[JPRT 108-30]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress S. Prt.
JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 108-30
_______________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2002
VOLUME II
__________
R E P O R T
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
88-454 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE E. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
------
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
Vice Chairman ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
AMO HOUGHTON, New York GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York BARBARA LEE, California
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
RON PAUL, Texas JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
NICK SMITH, Michigan EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin DIANE E. WATSON, California
JERRY WELLER, Illinois ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE PENCE, Indiana BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan CHRIS BELL, Texas
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Foreword......................................................... vii
Letter of Transmittal............................................ ix
Preface.......................................................... xi
Overview and Acknowledgments..................................... xiii
Introduction..................................................... xvii
Volume I
Africa:
Angola....................................................... 1
Benin........................................................ 20
Botswana..................................................... 30
Burkina Faso................................................. 40
Burundi...................................................... 50
Cameroon..................................................... 65
Cape Verde................................................... 85
Central African Republic..................................... 91
Chad......................................................... 105
Comoros...................................................... 119
Congo, Democratic Republic of the............................ 124
Congo, Republic of........................................... 150
Cote d'Ivoire................................................ 160
Djibouti..................................................... 188
Equatorial Guinea............................................ 197
Eritrea...................................................... 208
Ethiopia..................................................... 219
Gabon........................................................ 246
Gambia, The.................................................. 255
Ghana........................................................ 265
Guinea....................................................... 284
Guinea-Bissau................................................ 297
Kenya........................................................ 305
Lesotho...................................................... 333
Liberia...................................................... 341
Madagascar................................................... 356
Malawi....................................................... 367
Mali......................................................... 379
Mauritania................................................... 387
Mauritius.................................................... 400
Mozambique................................................... 406
Namibia...................................................... 423
Niger........................................................ 436
Nigeria...................................................... 447
Rwanda....................................................... 473
Sao Tome and Principe........................................ 486
Senegal...................................................... 490
Seychelles................................................... 502
Sierra Leone................................................. 508
Somalia...................................................... 521
South Africa................................................. 532
Sudan........................................................ 557
Swaziland.................................................... 575
Tanzania..................................................... 586
Togo......................................................... 603
Uganda....................................................... 615
Zambia....................................................... 640
Zimbabwe..................................................... 654
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia.................................................... 689
Brunei....................................................... 704
Burma........................................................ 712
Cambodia..................................................... 732
China (includes Hong Kong and Macau)......................... 749
China (Taiwan only).......................................... 820
East Timor................................................... 832
Fiji......................................................... 841
Indonesia.................................................... 852
Japan........................................................ 883
Kiribati..................................................... 899
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of....................... 903
Korea, Republic of........................................... 915
Laos......................................................... 929
Malaysia..................................................... 941
Marshall Islands............................................. 972
Micronesia, Federated States of.............................. 977
Mongolia..................................................... 981
Nauru........................................................ 990
New Zealand.................................................. 994
Palau........................................................ 1001
Papua New Guinea............................................. 1006
Philippines.................................................. 1012
Samoa........................................................ 1030
Singapore.................................................... 1035
Solomon Islands.............................................. 1052
Thailand..................................................... 1059
Tonga........................................................ 1079
Tuvalu....................................................... 1083
Vanuatu...................................................... 1087
Vietnam...................................................... 1091
Europe and Eurasia:
Albania...................................................... 1115
Andorra...................................................... 1127
Armenia...................................................... 1131
Austria...................................................... 1148
Azerbaijan................................................... 1159
Belarus...................................................... 1173
Belgium...................................................... 1196
Bosnia and Herzegovina....................................... 1204
Bulgaria..................................................... 1229
Croatia...................................................... 1249
Cyprus....................................................... 1266
Czech Republic............................................... 1278
Denmark...................................................... 1291
Estonia...................................................... 1296
Finland...................................................... 1304
France....................................................... 1308
Georgia...................................................... 1318
Germany...................................................... 1338
Greece....................................................... 1352
Hungary...................................................... 1365
Iceland...................................................... 1379
Ireland...................................................... 1387
Italy........................................................ 1395
Kazakhstan................................................... 1407
Kyrgyz Republic.............................................. 1432
Latvia....................................................... 1450
Liechtenstein................................................ 1459
Lithuania.................................................... 1464
Luxembourg................................................... 1476
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of....................... 1480
Malta........................................................ 1500
Moldova...................................................... 1504
Monaco....................................................... 1523
Netherlands, The............................................. 1526
Norway....................................................... 1534
Poland....................................................... 1539
Portugal..................................................... 1555
Romania...................................................... 1564
Russia....................................................... 1581
San Marino................................................... 1623
Slovak Republic.............................................. 1626
Slovenia..................................................... 1639
Spain........................................................ 1645
Sweden....................................................... 1654
Switzerland.................................................. 1661
Tajikistan................................................... 1676
Turkey....................................................... 1691
Turkmenistan................................................. 1721
Ukraine...................................................... 1735
United Kingdom............................................... 1764
Uzbekistan................................................... 1777
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of.............................. 1800
Volume II
Near East and North Africa:
Algeria...................................................... 1853
Bahrain...................................................... 1871
Egypt........................................................ 1884
Iran......................................................... 1904
Iraq......................................................... 1927
Israel and the occupied territories.......................... 1947
Jordan....................................................... 1994
Kuwait....................................................... 2012
Lebanon...................................................... 2030
Libya........................................................ 2045
Morocco...................................................... 2054
Western Sahara............................................. 2069
Oman......................................................... 2073
Qatar........................................................ 2082
Saudi Arabia................................................. 2090
Syria........................................................ 2108
Tunisia...................................................... 2122
United Arab Emirates......................................... 2141
Yemen........................................................ 2155
South Asia:
Afghanistan.................................................. 2175
Bangladesh................................................... 2187
Bhutan....................................................... 2217
India........................................................ 2227
Maldives..................................................... 2266
Nepal........................................................ 2274
Pakistan..................................................... 2295
Sri Lanka.................................................... 2331
Western Hemisphere:
Antigua and Barbuda.......................................... 2351
Argentina.................................................... 2357
Bahamas...................................................... 2372
Barbados..................................................... 2378
Belize....................................................... 2384
Bolivia...................................................... 2395
Brazil....................................................... 2409
Canada....................................................... 2436
Chile........................................................ 2444
Colombia..................................................... 2457
Costa Rica................................................... 2500
Cuba......................................................... 2510
Dominica..................................................... 2530
Dominican Republic........................................... 2535
Ecuador...................................................... 2554
El Salvador.................................................. 2567
Grenada...................................................... 2587
Guatemala.................................................... 2592
Guyana....................................................... 2623
Haiti........................................................ 2635
Honduras..................................................... 2652
Jamaica...................................................... 2671
Mexico....................................................... 2680
Nicaragua.................................................... 2714
Panama....................................................... 2732
Paraguay..................................................... 2747
Peru......................................................... 2759
St. Kitts and Nevis.......................................... 2781
Saint Lucia.................................................. 2786
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines............................. 2791
Suriname..................................................... 2797
Trinidad and Tobago.......................................... 2805
Uruguay...................................................... 2812
Venezuela.................................................... 2820
Appendixes:
A. Notes on Preparation of the Reports....................... 2841
B. Reporting on Worker Rights................................ 2845
C. Selected International Human Rights Conventions........... 2847
D. Description of Conventions in Appendix C.................. 2855
E. FYs 2002-2004 Selected U.S. Assistance Programs--Actual
Obligations................................................ 2856
F. 58th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Voting
Record..................................................... 2884
G. 58th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Voting
Table...................................................... 2890
H. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights...... 2905
FOREWORD
----------
The country reports on human rights practices contained
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance
with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not.
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance
legislation.
Richard G.Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.
(vii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, DC, March 31, 2003
Hon. Richard Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2002, prepared in compliance with sections
116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we
can provide any further information.
Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
(ix)
PREFACE
----------
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS
The year 2002 offered a stern test for the advancement of
human rights by the United States of America. This is not
necessarily because human rights violations grew in number or
severity--although there is no lack of challenge in that area--
but because we have been given greater opportunity to make good
on our commitment to uphold standards of human dignity and
liberty.
The year began with American forces in combat in
Afghanistan, and we continue to act there--with military,
political and economic resources--to reverse the ill effects of
the Taliban regime and the conditions that left unchecked its
cruel disregard for human rights. Elsewhere in the world, we
set our sights on further extending the blessings of liberty
and security, and demonstrating not only that they are
compatible, but also interdependent. We advanced these goals
not as exclusively American aspirations, but rather as the
birthright of all persons.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002 are
grounded in the conviction that we must recognize the problem
and describe it with full objectivity if we are to proceed to
solving it. We gain little by ignoring human rights abuses or
flinching from reporting them. This year's report covers 196
countries, ranging from defenders of human rights and democracy
to the worst violators of human dignity. But in truth, no
country is exempt from scrutiny, and all countries benefit from
constant striving to identify their weaknesses and improve
their performance in this less-than-perfect world. Furthermore,
the Reports serve as a gauge for our international human rights
efforts, pointing to areas of progress and drawing our
attention to new and continuing challenges.
In a world marching toward democracy and respect for human
rights; the United States is a leader, a partner and a
contributor. We have taken this responsibility with a deep and
abiding belief that human rights are universal. They are not
grounded exclusively in American or Western values. But their
protection worldwide serves a core U.S. national interest. It
is with this responsibility firmly in mind that we have
prepared, and now transmit, the Department of State's Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002 to the U.S.
Congress.
Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.
OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
----------
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS
Why the Reports Are Prepared
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department
of State in compliance with Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and Section
504 of the Trade Assistance Act of 1974, as amended. The law
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and
complete report regarding the status of internationally
recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A)
in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B)
in all other foreign countries which are members of the United
Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human
rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports
on several countries that do not fall into the categories
established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by
the congressional requirement.
The responsibility of the United States to speak out on
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized
in the early 1970s. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In
1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for
Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only the 82
countries receiving U.S. aid; this year 196 reports are
submitted.
How the Reports Are Prepared
In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of
human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, reflecting both a
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking
issues of human rights, worker rights and democracy. The 2002
human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by
hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service and other U.S.
Government employees.
Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including
government officials, jurists, armed forces sources,
journalists, human rights monitors, academics, and labor
activists. This information-gathering can be hazardous, and
U.S. Foreign Service Officers regularly go to great lengths,
under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate
reports of human rights abuse, monitor elections and come to
the aid of individuals at risk, such as political dissidents
and human rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their
governments.
After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, in cooperation with other
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate,
analyze and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on
their own sources of information. These included reports
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign
government officials, representatives from the United Nations
and other international and regional organizations and
institutions, experts from academia, and the media. Officers
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee
issues, military and police topics, women's issues and legal
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly and fairly
as possible.
The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy and making assistance,
training and other resource allocations. They also will serve
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover
internationally recognized individual, civil, political and
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. There rights include freedom from torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; from
prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or
clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of
the right to life, liberty and the security of the person.
Universal human rights seek to incorporate respect for
human dignity into the processes of government and law. All
persons have the inalienable right to change their government
by peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom
of expression, association, assembly, movement and religion,
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national
origin or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights,
including the right of association; the right to organize and
bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory
labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age
for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the
editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of: Editor
in Chief: Cynthia R. Bunton; Senior Advisors: E. Michael
Southwick, Michael E. Parmly, J. Scott Carpenter, Monica Vegas
Kladakis, Elizabeth Dugan; Senior Editors: Dan Dolan, Stan
Ifshin, Jennifer M. Pekkinen, Kimber Shearer; Editors: Amanda
K. Allen, Sandra Archer, Jonathan Bemis, Christopher R.
Bornhorst, Frank B. Crump, Kathleen Daly, Jeanette Davis, Julie
Eadeh, Sarah Finch, Joan Garner, Saba Ghori, Heather Glick,
Judith Greenspan, Jerome Hoganson, Gabrielle Hotung-Davidsen,
Ann Marie Jackson, Kari Johnstone, Jehan S. Jones, Sandra J.
Murphy, Peter Neisuler, Kathryn Northrop, Sarah Fox Ozkan,
Donald E. Parker, Gary V. Price, Ereni Roess, Lange
Schermerhorn, Rebecca A. Schwalbach, John Sheerin, James C.
Todd; Assistant Editors: Ken Audroue, David Abramson, Ralph D.
Anske, Kelly W. Bryant, Deborah J. Cahalen, Patricia A. Davis,
Douglas B. Dearborn, Thomas F. Farr, Carol G. Finerty, Amy E.
Gadsden, Jean M. Geran, Thomas J. Grubisha, Patrick Harvey,
Nancy M. Hewett, Sandra Hodgkinson, Victor Huser, Robert P.
Jackson, Jeffrey M. Jamison, Janet L. Mayland, Peter Mulrean,
Michael Orona, Susan O'Sullivan, Richard J. Patard, Gianni F.
Paz, Maria B. Pica, LeRoy G. Potts, Lynn M. Sicade, Wendy B.
Silverman, Mary T. Sullivan, Danika Walters, George M. White;
Editorial Assistants: Lena Auerbach, Judith R. Baroody, Jarrett
Basedow, Marianne Biron, Sally I. Buikema, Melanne Civic,
Tatiana C. Gfoeller-Volkoff, Sondra Govatski, Jessie M.
Harpole, Gabrielle Hoosein, Amy McKee, Ryan McMillan, Derek
Teeter; Technical Support: Daniel J. Bowens, Mitchell R. Brown,
Anthony Felder, Linda C. Hayes, Celine A. Neves, Tanika N.
Willis.
INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR THE
YEAR 2002
----------
Spreading democratic values and respect for human rights
around the world is one of the primary ways we have of
advancing the national security interests of the United States.
The defense of liberty is both an expression of our ideals and
a source of strength that we have drawn on throughout our
history. Democratic values have also been at the heart of
America's most enduring and effective alliances, partnerships
which continue to help us meet the challenges of tyranny and
deprivation.
The U.S. Constitution aims to ``secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity.'' We realize that
liberty is not a finished product, and that the course set out
for us by our Constitution requires vigilance. Our history is a
narrative of a nation confronting and overcoming obstacles to
freedom, and generations to come will also undoubtedly face the
question of how to fulfill the promise of our founding
documents.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices reflect
America's diligence in the struggle to expand freedom abroad.
Together with past reports, and reports to come, this
compendium is a snapshot of the global state of human rights
that depicts work in progress and points the way to future
tasks. It is a statement of our fundamental belief that human
rights are universal; they are indigenous to every corner of
the world, in every culture and in every religious tradition.
Human Rights and National Security
Governments that rule by force and use violence against
their own people often threaten and intimidate their neighbors.
Driven by shaky legitimacy, these regimes rule by iron fist,
putting their people and neighbors at the mercy of the cruel
logic of repression. In an age when the destructive capacities
of brutal regimes exceed national and even regional boundaries,
addressing human rights violations--whether episodic or
systemic--becomes imperative to the assurance of security
throughout the international community. On a smaller scale,
governments that breach their constitutional obligations and
the rule of law place their societies' well-being at risk in
their pursuit of stability.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices call
attention to patterns and instances of violations of basic
human rights as recognized in such fundamental documents as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United
Nations in 1948. They serve as the starting point--not the
end--of U.S. policy to advance human rights around the world.
The Reports are one of the most significant tools available to
the U.S. Government to help determine foreign policy strategies
that promote the development of democratic systems and
principles, and remedy abuse and disregard for human rights. As
President Bush declared in his January 2003 State of the Union
address, ``We will not permit the triumph of violence in the
affairs of men--free people will set the course of history.''
Governments can violate rights and punish people for
exercising freedoms, but they cannot extinguish the inherent
rights of all human beings. People who dare to dream of freedom
are setting the course of history not only in democratic
societies, but also in the repressive regimes under which many
live.
Cuba is a place where human rights are violated
every day, but the Varela Project, organized by Oswaldo
Paya, has proven a powerful tool for Cubans to express
their yearning for fundamental freedoms. Marta Beatriz
Roque's Assembly to Promote Civil Society is providing
another avenue for Cubans to express their desires for
change. These and other efforts by the opposition
movement are incrementally eroding the Cuban regime's
grip on power and oppression.
In Burma, even after years of on-and-off political
arrest, harassment and constant surveillance, Aung San
Suu Kyi is still wholly committed to bringing democracy
and a humane rule of law to the Burmese people. Her
tremendous strength of character stands boldly in the
face of the military regime's disregard for human
rights and democracy, a disregard that extends to
abuses such as extrajudicial killings, rapes,
disappearances, forced labor and forced relocations.
Their courage points the way to improving human rights--on
paths that are as diverse as the countries where they live.
U.S. policy is based on supporting individuals and groups
committed to following universally accepted paths to freedom,
equal protection, due process and the rule of law.
Promoting democratic governance is and will remain the best
way to ensure protection of human rights. The United States
recognizes that a world composed of democracies will better
protect our long-term national security than a world of
authoritarian or chaotic regimes. A democratic form of
government fosters the rule of law, open markets, more
prosperous economies and better-educated citizens and
ultimately a more humane, peaceful and predictable world.
The Year in Review: Human Rights, Democracy and Labor
Institutional changes: In Asia, democratic politics
continued to develop in East Timor, with the ratification of a
constitution, election of a president, and efforts to establish
governance based on the rule of law and human rights
protections. Taiwan's strides were also notable, with
consolidation and improvement of civil liberties catching up to
its free and open electoral system.
The push to meet European Union entry requirements resulted
in positive human rights developments in aspirant countries.
Turkey passed extensive human rights reform packages that
covered a broadening of laws on freedom of speech, political
activity and association, and fair trial. At the same time
torture, although illegal, was still a serious problem and
restrictions on freedom of the press remained.
Other positive developments in Europe included the first
general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be conducted by
local (not international) authorities since the Dayton Peace
Accords. Macedonia also reaffirmed the strength of its
democracy through peaceful elections while its parliament laid
the legal groundwork for improving civil and minority rights by
completing nearly all of the constitutional and legislative
actions related to the Framework Agreement.
In the Middle East, several positive steps were taken. In
May, the first open municipal council elections were held in
Bahrain, and in October women joined men in exercising their
right to vote for the first time in nearly 30 years to elect a
national parliament. Morocco saw its first open elections in
September, and in Qatar, a new constitution has been drafted
and municipal elections are scheduled for April 2003. Female
candidates will participate for the second time.
In Russia, a new Criminal Procedure Code that took effect
in July permitted for the first time the application of
existing Constitutional provisions that only upon a judicial
decision could individuals be arrested, taken into custody or
detained. The changes appeared to be having an effect on
police, prosecutorial behavior and the judicial system,
although there were reports of non-compliance in some regions.
The Chinese also continued to carry out some structural
reforms in the areas of the rule of law and democracy. Direct
elections at the village level took place in several provinces
and pressure to move them to higher levels grew. Economic
reform has led to legal reform, and legislatures continued
experimenting with public hearings to incorporate public
opinion into policy.
Political rights: In 2002 six nations in the western
hemisphere--The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica
and Jamaica--held elections for their chief of state or
government. The Organization of American States, which adopted
a democracy charter in 2001, put its collective commitment into
action in 2002 with vigorous efforts to resolve the political
crisis in Venezuela.
In Africa, Kenya's free election and peaceful transfer of
power in December signaled hope for the consolidation of
democratic politics there. A political crisis during the first
half of 2002 in Madagascar was eventually resolved, and
legislative elections were held. In Swaziland, respect for
rights and rule of law took steps backward with a government
declaration that it would not abide by court decisions.
In 2002 China continued to commit serious human rights
abuses in violation of international human rights instruments
and at year's end, a spate of arrests of political dissidents
and the imposition of the death sentence on two Tibetans, the
continued detentions of Rebiya Kadeer, Wang Youcai, Qin Yongmin
and others, and restrictions on religious freedom and
repression of some ethnic minorities were particularly
troubling.
Zimbabwe's government has used a systematic campaign of
violence and intimidation against stated and perceived
supporters of the opposition, even to the extent of routinely
and publicly denying food to these individuals. The Government
manipulated the composition of the courts and repeatedly
refused to abide by judicial decisions, which undermined the
judiciary.
In Eurasia, several republics of the former Soviet Union
resisted positive change. In Turkmenistan the human rights
situation deteriorated markedly after an attack on President
Niyazov's motorcade in November, leading to serious violations
of due process under the law including widespread arrests and
forced evictions of suspects' families, use of torture, threats
of rape and summary trials. In Kazakhstan the Government's poor
human rights record worsened, including selective prosecution
of opposition leaders and a pattern of media harassment
suggesting an attempt to silence media critics. While there
were positive steps in the first half of 2002, such as
registration of the first human rights NGO and abolition of
prior censorship of the media in Uzbekistan, there were also
setbacks that are a cause of concern, including at least four
deaths in detention due to torture. The Kyrgyz Republic held a
regional by-election in October, judged by independent
monitoring groups to be marred by irregularities such as
multiple voting and lax standards of voting eligibility.
Harassment of media and civil society continued and police
killed six unarmed protesters.
Pakistan's military regime began the process of restoring
elected civilian governance at the national and provincial
level in October. Observers deemed the elections to be flawed,
but the new government seems reasonably representative.
Internal and other conflicts: Throughout 2002, Sri Lanka
made progress in implementing a cease-fire agreement between
the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil-Eelam (LTTE).
Prisoners have been exchanged, roadblocks reduced, internally
displaced persons returned, and investigations into abuses by
security forces have increased. There were unconfirmed reports
that LTTE continued to commit extrajudicial killings, but
observers believe the number decreased in 2002. There were also
reports that LTTE continued to conscript children.
In Nepal, the Maoist campaign included killings, bombing,
torture, forced conscription of children and other violent
tactics. Government forces were accused of killing civilians
and abusing others suspected of Maoist sympathies.
The war in Sierra Leone was officially declared over in
January, and the Revolutionary United Front was disarmed.
Remarkably peaceful presidential elections were held in May
although there were reports of election irregularities.
Elsewhere in Africa, conflicts continued to fuel human
rights abuses. In Cote d'Ivoire, a coup attempt and ensuing
civil unrest sparked violations by government and rebel forces.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, major abuses
continued. Rwanda withdrew its troops by October, and Uganda
only had 1,000 troops left in the country at year's end.
After 27 years, peace came to Angola in February. The
former UNITA rebel movement has disarmed and is transitioning
into an unarmed political party, and the Government--working
with the opposition--is beginning to move the country toward
new elections. The massive human rights violations of the civil
war have come to an end, although an increase of abuses in
Cabinda Province is worrisome. The primary focus will now be on
the civil and political rights necessary for the conduct of
free and fair elections as well as the establishment of the
rule of law throughout the country.
Eritrea's record worsened through 2002. However, all
recorded Ethiopian prisoners of war (POWs) from the former
conflict were released. Ethiopia also released the last of the
Eritrean POWs during 2002.
In the Chechnya conflict, Russian forces and Chechen rebels
continued to commit serious human rights violations. Government
forces committed extrajudicial killings and at times used
indiscriminate force, which resulted in civilian casualties. A
number of government ``cleansing'' operations involved
extensive abuses of civilians. Chechen rebels increased their
killings of civilian officials and militia associated with the
Russian-appointed Chechen administration. On October 23,
approximately 41 members of Chechen terrorist groups took more
than 750 persons hostage in a Moscow theater. The terrorists
killed one hostage; another 128 hostages died in the rescue
effort.
Integrity of the person: Colombia showed signs of progress,
with generally good elections and a declaration by paramilitary
forces that they would negotiate peace in 2003. But problems
remain serious, particularly extrajudicial killings. The
Dominican Republic made strides in reducing the number of
extrajudicial killings. The police chief was replaced and
prosecutions--in civilian courts--of human rights offenders
increased.
Not surprisingly, many human rights abuses occurred in
nations that have non-democratic forms of government. Testimony
to the U.S. Congress in mid-2002 revealed systematic and
egregious violations of human rights in North Korea, including
torture, summary executions and the use of prison labor under
incredibly inhumane conditions.
Iraq's Republican Guard and other members of the security
apparatus committed widespread and systematic human rights
abuses including killings, torture, disappearances, rapes and
imprisonment of Iraqi political opposition and ethnic and
religious minorities.
In Cambodia, incidents of extrajudicial killings began to
increase as the country prepares for 2003 elections amidst a
culture of impunity and with serious shortcomings in the
Government's investigations.
Freedom of the press: Harassment and vandalism were common
tools used to threaten press freedom in 2002. Legal harassment
was also common: In the Kyrgyz Republic, opposition newspapers
were periodically refused printing services by the Government-
owned press and journalists faced libel suits filed by
government officials. Similar bureaucratic tactics were used to
pressure NGOs and opposition political organizations. On the
other hand, the Kyrgyz government registered the Media Support
Center, which is intended to provide an independent printing
facility and training for journalists. In Kazakhstan, violence
and harassment of journalists continued, and selective
prosecutions of opposition figures chilled the climate of free
speech. In Russia, direct and indirect government actions
further weakened the autonomy of the electronic media, which is
the public's primary source of information. Controls on
reporting of the conflict in Chechnya and terrorist incidents
elsewhere in Russia raised concerns about the ability of the
press and public to have adequate access to information about
government actions. In Ukraine, the killing of prominent
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze remained unsolved. Although an
investigation officially continued, there was a lack of
transparency and the authorities refused to cooperate with
foreign investigators whom they had invited to assist with the
investigation.
The closing down of pro-reform publications and jailing of
journalists, editors and publishers in Iran continued. A
dissident academic was sentenced to death for questioning the
Islamic system, a decision that sparked widespread student
demonstrations and finally resulted in the Government granting
a retrial. When a poll found that the overwhelming majority of
Iranians supported dialogue with the United States and almost
half agreed with U.S. policy vis-a-vis Iran, the regime closed
the polling institutes and arrested the pollsters.
Religious freedom: These issues are discussed in depth in
the annual Report on International Religious Freedom, published
in October 2002, but the Country Reports also highlight
important developments.
In Afghanistan there was dramatic improvement over the past
year, but respect for human rights varied widely in different
parts of the country. The reappearance of the Taliban's
Department of Vice and Virtue, in the form of the new
authority's Department of Accountability and Religious Affairs,
bears monitoring. Likewise, reprisals against ethnic Pashtuns--
albeit with a limited religious dimension--occurred in areas
controlled by some local Northern Alliance commanders.
Other internal conflicts have a more pronounced religious
dimension. Saudi Arabia continued to deny religious freedom to
non-Muslims by prohibiting them from engaging in public
worship. In some cases, non-Muslim individuals and private
gatherings of worshippers were subject to harassment, leading
to arrest, detainment, torture and deportation. Shi'a Muslims
faced widespread discrimination, including imprisonment and
torture.
Sectarian violence erupted in India's Gujarat Province in
February, where as many as 2,000 people--mostly Muslims--died.
Elections in Jammu and Kashmir, and in Gujarat, were held
successfully despite widespread terrorist violence and the new
state government has proposed steps to ease repression and
reduce alienation. Throughout India however, light punishment
for instigators of violence and perpetrators of abuse remained
a stumbling block to further improvement.
In Vietnam, religious (primarily Protestant) and ethnic
minorities in the Central Highlands and northwest provinces,
which have often been brought to heel by government authorities
in Hanoi, reportedly faced intensified repression, including
closing of churches and forced renunciations of faith.
Women/Children: In Afghanistan, human rights improvements
included women and ethnic minorities serving in the Government
and an estimated one million girls back in school. In Burma on
the other hand, the State Department documented stories of rape
of ethnic minority women by the Burmese military that were
similar to NGO reports on the issue suggesting that rape
continued to be a widespread practice. Also, the conscription
of child soldiers in Burma remained a serious problem.
Child labor in the informal sector, especially children
forced into the commercial sex industry, continued to be a
serious problem in Cambodia, along with trafficking in women
and children. In Cote d'Ivoire, child labor remained an issue
of concern, and the recruitment of child soldiers in the armed
civil conflict was cause for concern. Rebel groups in
particular used child soldiers.
Child soldiers were used in other conflicts, including in
Colombia, where both paramilitaries and guerrillas recruited
children, and there is evidence that guerrillas forcibly
pressed children into their forces. In Burundi, the Government
stated that it would not recruit child soldiers in its war
against rebel forces. However, there are unconfirmed reports
that children continue to serve in armed forces performing
occasional tasks such as carrying weapons and supplies.
Trafficking: In the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon acknowledged trafficking in
persons as problems in their countries and are taking steps to
address it by curbing abuses of foreign workers, regulating
camel jockeys as applicable, and combating commercial sexual
exploitation.
Awareness about trafficking in persons throughout Africa
grew. More African countries participated in time-bound
programs designed to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.
In addition, many of these cash-strapped governments are
increasingly working on creative programs to prevent
trafficking and protect trafficking victims. Public awareness
was raised at local government levels in many African
countries, particularly in West Africa, about traditional
practices that are being exploited by traffickers. In Tanzania,
children were mobilized to help identify traffickers and other
children particularly vulnerable to being trafficked. In
Southern Africa, some governments began devoting more attention
to the differences between trafficking, smuggling and seasonal
labor migration.
In East Asia and Pacific countries, governments in general
paid more attention to the problem of trafficking in persons.
Indonesia passed two national plans aimed at reducing
trafficking in women and children, and police action against
traffickers increased. Thailand increased its cooperation with
neighboring countries in addressing cross-border trafficking in
persons.
In South Asia, governments continued to demonstrate serious
collaboration with NGOs to provide protection, legal and
medical services, and skills training to trafficking victims.
This cooperative effort also extends to law enforcement, with
police jointly conducting raids with NGOs.
The push for stronger anti-Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
legislation was enhanced in the past year in many European
countries. For example, the Governments of Turkey, Greece and
Bulgaria all passed specific articles on trafficking in their
criminal codes. Russia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan
continued work on comprehensive drafts that should be finalized
and forwarded to their respective parliaments soon. Localized
referral systems between NGOs and police and other officials
were improved and strengthened in Ukraine and UN-administered
Kosovo. Serbia and Montenegro, in addition to their multi-
agency national anti-trafficking teams, provided a mobile
trafficking unit that brought assistance to victims throughout
the country. Croatia began implementation of their National
Action Plan, establishing shelters and a hotline, and drafting
a law making trafficking in persons a crime.
International cooperation on investigations occurred only
sporadically, with Italy and Albania showing concrete results
in their joint operations.
Ratification of the UN Protocol on Trafficking was also a
focus throughout the world, with several countries depositing
their ratification and preparing domestic implementation.
Corruption continued to be a major impediment to successful
anti-trafficking efforts. Open police corruption, harassment of
returning victims and inertia on reported cases showed the
public and civil society that many governments still are not
serious about combating trafficking.
Worker rights: In Venezuela, the conflict between the
Government and labor unions intensified throughout the year.
The International Labor Organization censured the Government's
refusal to recognize the election of Carlos Ortega as the
president of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, citing
government interference in independent trade union elections.
Progress was made in Bahrain, where legal protections for
the right to organize and collectively bargain were established
in new legislation. The Government resolved the problem of more
than 1,000 ``bidoon,'' long-term residents of the country who
were formerly stateless, by issuing them appropriate documents.
Corporate social responsibility: Partnerships among
governments, business, labor unions and civil society to
promote human rights and sustainable development flourished.
The UN Global Compact and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) worked to promote voluntary
principles and guidelines that advance corporate
responsibility. During the year, positive examples of
partnerships and dialogues between the public and private
sectors emerged.
Responding to conditions in the agricultural sector, an
innovative framework agreement was drafted between a
multinational corporation and regional labor unions to address
worker rights and corporate responsibility. A June 2002
Roundtable dialogue on the management of supply chains was
featured in a report on the annual meeting of National Contact
Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights gained
new participants. ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum and the
Government of Norway joined the multi-stakeholder dialogue.
Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the Secretary of
State's 2002 annual Award for Corporate Excellence at a
ceremony that recognized two U.S. firms for their outstanding
corporate citizenship and exemplary international business
practices by promoting healthcare in China and poverty
alleviation programs in Egypt.
NOTE: In many cases, the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices state that a country ``generally respects'' the
rights of its citizens. The phrase ``generally respects'' is
used because the protection and promotion of human rights is a
dynamic endeavor; it cannot accurately be stated that any
government fully respects these rights all the time without
qualification, in even the best of circumstances. Accordingly,
``generally respects'' is the standard phrase used to describe
all countries that attempt to protect human rights in the
fullest sense, and is thus the highest level of respect for
human rights assigned by this report.
In some instances, this year's Country Reports use the word
``Islamist,'' which should be interpreted by readers as a
Muslim who supports Islamic values and beliefs as the basis for
political and social life.
NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
----------
ALGERIA
As constitutional head of state, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister, and may dissolve the
legislature. According to the Constitution, the Prime Minister appoints
the cabinet ministers; however the President has taken a key role in
designating the members of the cabinet. The military establishment
strongly influences defense and foreign policy and is largely believed
to have influenced the outcome of the 1999 presidential election which
had numerous problems associated with it. President Bouteflika, who is
not affiliated formally with any party, ends his 5-year term in April
2004. The Government's cancellation of the 1992 elections, which the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) were poised to win, suspended the
country's democratic transition to a pluralist republic and resulted in
on-going fighting between the security forces and armed insurgent
groups seeking to impose an Islamic state. The ensuing violence
resulted in the deaths of approximately 100,000 or more in the last
decade. Although the Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary, executive branch decrees partially restricted the
judiciary's authority.
The Government's security apparatus comprises the army, consisting
of ground, naval and air defense forces; the national gendarmerie; the
national police; communal guards; and local self-defense forces. All of
these elements were involved in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism
operations and were under the control of the Government. Security
forces committed serious human rights abuses, although allegations of
such abuses continued to decline during the year.
The country confronts many of the challenges that states making the
transition from a state-administered to open market economy face. The
country had a total population of approximately 31.5 million. The
Government launched a large 4-year spending program in 2001 to
stimulate the economy and modernize key sectors; however, progress
continued to be slow. The Government's draft laws for liberalizing the
hydrocarbons sector have stalled due to opposition from labor unions.
The hydrocarbons sector was the backbone of the economy, accounting for
approximately 60 percent of budget revenues, 26 percent of GDP, and
over 95 percent of export earnings. Official estimates placed
unemployment at 30 percent; however, as much as 70 percent of the
population under the age of 30 were unable to find adequate employment.
Despite macroeconomic stability, the delay in the reforms and a non-
performing public sector privatization process stunted economic growth.
Despite the decline in security force abuses from prior years, the
human rights record remained generally poor, and there continued to be
problems with excessive use of force, increased restrictions on freedom
of expression, and failure to account for past disappearances. The
massacre of civilians by armed terrorist groups also continued. There
were significant limitations on citizens' right to change their
government.
While such abuses continued to decline, the security forces
committed extra-judicial killings, tortured, beat or otherwise abused
detainees, and arbitrarily arrested and detained, or held individuals
incommunicado. Most such cases were committed against suspected members
of armed groups in the context of the Government's continued battle
with terrorism. Security forces also committed serious abuses in
connection with riots and demonstrations by the Berbers in the Kabylie
region during the spring and summer of 2001. While armed confrontations
continued throughout the year, there was a decrease in flagrant abuses
committed by security forces. Further infringements occurred this year
during the May 30 parliamentary elections and the October 10 local
elections, when boycotts, protests, and other demonstrations led to
violent confrontations with police, which were often put down with
excessive force. Berber activists continued to face arrest, harassment,
and detainment at the hands of the Government in the months following
local and parliamentary elections.
Security-force involvement in disappearances from previous years
remained unresolved. The Government attempted to improve prison
conditions with the assistance of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP). During the year, prisoners died in fires which stemmed
from riots protesting prison conditions. Prolonged pretrial detention
and lengthy trial delays were problems. Despite reforms in the judicial
system, detention beyond the legal limit remained a problem.
Defendants' rights to due process, illegal searches, and infringements
on citizens' privacy rights also remained problems.
Although there was no overt censorship of information, the
Government continued to restrict freedom of speech, press, assembly,
association, and movement in varying degrees during the year. The print
media was relatively free and the independent press commented regularly
and openly and expressed a wide range of views on significant issues
such as terrorist violence and surrenders under the amnesty program.
However, some elements of the news media practiced self-censorship.
Unlike in the past, when electronic media expressed only government
policy, government-controlled radio and television stations presented a
variety of views, including those critical of the Government,
especially during the violence that took place in the Kabylie region of
the country from the spring and summer of 2001 through the end of this
year. The Government also placed some restrictions on freedom of
religion. Domestic violence against women, the Family Code's limits on
women's civil rights and societal discrimination against women remained
serious problems. Child abuse was a problem. Although the Government
recognized the Amazigh language as a national language, Kabylie ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic rights were the objects of demonstrations and
riots in the spring of 2001 and remained an undercurrent of the
political scene throughout the year, particularly during protests
surrounding the parliamentary and local elections. Child labor was a
problem.
Armed groups committed numerous serious abuses and killed hundreds
of civilians, including infants. While such violence continued to
decrease, it did not decrease at the same rate as in 2001. Armed
terrorists continued their widespread campaign of insurgency, targeting
government officials, families of security-force members, and
civilians. The killing of civilians often was the result of rivalry
between terrorist groups and to facilitate the theft of goods needed by
the armed groups. Violence was also used by terrorist groups to extort
money.
Armed groups left bombs in cars, cafes, and markets, which killed
and injured indiscriminately. Some killings, including massacres, also
were attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. Press reports
estimated that approximately 1,386 civilians, terrorists, and security
force members died during the year in the ongoing domestic turmoil. The
violence appears to have occurred primarily in the countryside, as the
security forces largely forced the insurgents out of the cities.
Algeria was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening
Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in
Seoul, Republic of Korea, as an observer.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The security forces
committed extra-judicial killings, mostly during clashes with armed
terrorist groups. The Government maintained that security forces
resorted to lethal force only in the context of armed clashes with
terrorists. However, security forces killed 71 civilians this year. The
Government also contends that, as a matter of policy, disciplinary
action is taken against soldiers or policemen who are guilty of
violating human rights, and that some disciplinary action was taken
during the year. However, the Government did not routinely release
specific information regarding punishments of military and security
force personnel and no such data was made public this year. The
majority of civilian deaths at the hands of security forces occurred
this year during protests in and around the Kabylie region.
During riots in late March, a gendarme shot and killed a young man
in Chemini, Bejaia. As a result of the rioting that ensued between
gendarmes and protestors, there were hundreds of casualties and four
persons were critically injured (see Section 1.g.).
In April mass protest marches took place in Kabylie towns to
commemorate the first anniversary of high school student Massinissa
Guermah's death in custody. Street battles between protesters and riot
police resulted in numerous injuries and deaths (see Sections 2.b.).
On August 2, security forces in the east of the country killed 40
terrorists after surrounding their mountain compound for 12 days. Over
the course of a 2-week period, security forces in the area of Tizi
Ouzou and Bejaia bombed different camps belonging to the terrorist
organization Salifast Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) camps using
military helicopters in an attempt to capture GSPC leader Hassan
Hattab.
In 2001 security forces surrounded for 11 days an abandoned mine
used as a stronghold by the terrorist group GSPC calling for the
terrorists to surrender. Security forces then used explosive to
collapse the mine, which killed 70 persons.
In 2001 Massinissa Guermah, a 19-year-old Amazigh high school
student, died in the custody of security forces of gunshot wounds.
During the April 2001 demonstrations and riots that ensued in the
Kabylie region following Guermah's death, security forces used
excessive force, killing at least 45 rioters and demonstrators and
injuring hundreds more (see Sections 1.c., 1.d, 2.b, and 5). Press
reports have estimated that as many as 80 rioters may have died at the
hands of security forces during the riots that continued into the
summer. Ten days after Guermah's death, the local gendarmerie issued a
statement claiming that the official responsible for the death of
Guermah had been court-martialed. The Government appointed two separate
commissions to investigate Guermah's death and the violence that
followed it. In 2001 the report of one commission, headed by Amazigh
jurist Mohand Issaad, found that the security forces version of the
death was ``not satisfactory,'' blamed gendarmerie units for using
excessive force in putting down the demonstrations, and found that the
units did so without orders. The report of the National Assembly
Commission, released this year, differed little from the original
account of the incident given by security forces. In reaction to the
National Assembly report's release, the Government issued financial
indemnities to the families of victims and detainees in addition to a
proclamation ordering the ``draw down'' of gendarmes during the year.
Both uniformed and civilian clothes police were deployed to minimize
tension in the region.
In November 1999, prominent FIS leader Abedlkader Hachani, who had
spoken out in favor of peace and reconciliation, was shot and killed in
Algiers. In December 1999, authorities arrested a suspect who had the
murder weapon in his possession. In March the suspect, Fouad Boulemia,
was found guilty and sentenced to death.
During the year, there continued to be no reports of pro-government
militia killing civilians as there had been in the past.
Armed groups targeted both security-force members and civilians.
Civilian deaths attributed to terrorists decreased by 30 percent from
2001 totals. In many cases, terrorists randomly targeted civilians in
an apparent attempt to create social disorder. In other cases, violent
reprisals were reportedly taken against those who failed to pay a
``tax'' to the terrorists. Armed groups killed numerous civilians,
including infants, in massacres and with small bombs. Bombs left in
cars, cafes, and markets killed and maimed persons indiscriminately
(see Section 1.g.). As well as the use of small bombs, terrorist
tactics included creating false roadblocks outside the cities, often by
using stolen police uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Some killings,
including massacres, also were attributed to revenge, banditry, and
land grabs.
Press reports estimated that approximately 1,386 civilians,
terrorists, and security force members died during the year as a result
of the ongoing violence, a decrease from the 1,980 who died during the
previous year. The violence appears to have occurred primarily in the
countryside, as the security forces largely forced the insurgents out
of the cities.
On April 24, terrorists associated with GIA targeted two families
as they slept in a nomad camp outside of Djelfa, killing 16 persons.
Among the victims were nine children and an infant. The sole survivors
of the attack reported that the group robbed the families of valuables,
food, and a single rifle after the attack. On May 1 six armed
terrorists associated with GIA entered the city of Tiaret and proceeded
to attack two families using axes and knives. Thirty-one persons were
killed and five persons injured during the attack.
At the start of summer, outside Jijel in the wilaya of Chlef,
terrorists slit the throats of 23 nomads. After setting fire to two of
the tents and a car, the attackers fled, taking with them a 26-year-old
woman. Press reports noted on July 3 that over the past 10-day period
80 persons were killed in acts of terrorism across the nation.
On August 15, a terrorist group killed 26 persons in the hamlet of
Khodr. The victims included women and 7 children between the ages of 3
and 12 years old.
On November 23, terrorists in the mountains outside Bejaia killed 9
members of the security forces during a nighttime counter-terrorist
operation.
Other similar incidents took place during the year and from 1991-
2001.
b. Disappearance.--There were no credible reports during the year
of disappearances in which the security forces were implicated.
However, local NGOs reported a new trend of prolonged detention ranging
from 8 to 18 months that was frequently reported as a disappearance
until the person in question was returned to his or her family. These
``new'' disappearances at the hands of security forces often differed
in duration and outcome from the disappearances which occurred in the
country during the first half of the 1990s that remained unresolved.
These incidents remained contrary to the legal procedures stipulated in
the country's penal code and its Constitution. There have been credible
reports of thousands of disappearances occurring over a period of
several years in the mid-90s, many of which involved the security
forces. A Ministry of Interior office in each district accepts cases
from resident families of those reported missing. Credible sources
state that the offices provided little useful information to the
families of those who disappeared. During the year, the Government
lobbied for internal and international support for a DNA lab and
forensics training to assist in the process of identifying human
remains in order to update relatives as to the status of the
disappeared.
In a press conference held in June, the Director of the National
Consultative Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights publicly admitted that ``the issue of the disappeared was the
country's greatest weakness and that more should and could be done.''
In August a body of a ``disappeared'' person was discovered buried
in a cemetery outside of Algiers. No records were available as to the
circumstances under which the body was interred, and the family was
unable to receive a certificate listing cause of death, despite
repeated requests.
In 2001 the Minister of Interior told the National Assembly that
the Ministry had agreed to investigate 4,880 cases of citizens reported
``disappeared.'' The Ministry reported that it provided information to
the families in 3,000 of those cases. In 1,600 of the cases, families
requested administrative action to obtain death certificates for their
missing relatives. There were no reported prosecutions of security-
force personnel stemming from these cases, but government officials
reported in 2000 that between 350 and 400 security officials had been
punished for ``human rights abuses.'' Families of the missing persons,
defense attorneys, and local human rights groups insisted that the
Government could do more to solve the outstanding cases. The Government
asserted that the majority of reported cases of disappearances either
were committed by terrorists disguised as security forces or involved
former armed Islamist supporters who went underground to avoid
terrorist reprisals.
The total number of disappeared in the country continues to be
debated. Official government estimates asserted publicly that
approximately 4,700 persons were missing, while privately some
government officials speculate that the total could be as high as
12,000. Local NGOs reported figures of the total number of disappeared
closer to 8,000. In September 2000, (AI) reported that since 1994 more
that 4,000 persons disappeared after being detained by security forces.
Local NGO sources noted that a few of the persons who disappeared
were released from captivity by the security forces, but that there was
no public information about these cases, due to the fear of reprisal
against those released. Family members and other human rights activists
maintained that a number of persons who disappeared were still alive in
the hands of security forces. Witness testimony made these assertions
credible. However, it remained unclear if the disappeared seen alive
during the 1995-1997 period still remain so. Terrorist groups continued
to kidnap scores of civilians. In many instances, the victims
disappeared, and the families were unable to obtain information about
their fate.
There were incidents of women and girls being kidnaped by terrorist
groups for the purposes of rape and servitude during the year (see
Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Both the Constitution and legislation prohibit torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, according to
local human rights groups and defense lawyers, the police at times
resorted to torture when interrogating persons including those
suspected of being involved with, or having sympathies for, armed
insurgency groups.
There continued to be reports of police torture and other abuse of
detainees during the year. AI stated that some persons die in custody
from torture or were executed. The International Red Cross noted a
decrease in incidents of torture and that the severity of such acts
diminished. Many victims of torture hesitate to make public such
allegations due to fear of government retaliation.
According to AI, in April, after plainclothes agents arrested Tahar
Facouli, a shopkeeper from the village of Surcouf, security forces
tortured him for his alleged contact with human rights lawyer Rachid
Mesli.
Rally for Democratic Culture (RCD) alleged during the course of the
year that four of its members and their families were detained and
tortured by ``persons with professional experience similar to those
given government training.'' Despite appeals to the Government for
clarification by year's end, no investigations into this matter had
occurred.
In the past, the Interior Ministry and the National Observatory of
Human Rights (ONDH) stated publicly that the Government would punish
those persons who violated the law and practiced torture. Government
officials reported in November 2000 that between 350 and 400 security
officials had been punished for human rights abuses, although the
Government provided no details regarding the abuses that such officials
committed or the punishment that they received. There was no
independent mechanism available to verify the Government's claim. The
National Observatory for Human Rights was replaced in 2001 by the
National Consultative Commission for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights (CNCPPDDH).
In response the backlash against security force tactics used to put
down riots during the 2001 Black Spring, the Government replaced
gendarme units patrolling the Kabylie region this year during the
summer and fall elections with members of the local police forces.
Armed altercations between security forces and rioting civilians
nonetheless continued this year, sometimes resulting in death. At the
writing of this report, gendarme units were deployed again to the
Kabylie region.
In 2001 the Government used excessive force in some instances to
put down demonstrations and riots throughout the year in the largely
Berber Kabylie region. Outdoor demonstrations in the Kabylie region
turned violent from April 22 to 28, following the death in security
forces' custody of a 19-year-old Berber high school student (see
Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.b., and 5.). Security forces used live
ammunition against demonstrators, including against youths throwing
stones and molotov cocktails. According to the ministry of the
interior, security forces killed 45 protesters and injured 491 within
six days in April of 2001. Some of those killed or injured were shot in
the back. AI reported in 2001 that press reports indicated that as many
as 80 persons were killed in the Kabylie through mid-year. In addition
the Government detained a large number of persons for short periods in
connection with the violence. AI reported that security forces
tortured, beat, and otherwise abused a number of them (see Section
1.d.). Although the Government allowed several subsequent
demonstrations to take place, it used force to disrupt several other
demonstrations that were held throughout the spring and summer of 2001
and through much of the period covered by this report (see Section
2.b.).
In 2000 the Government announced new laws and policies concerning
the Police Judiciaire (PJ), which interrogates suspects when they first
are arrested to determine whether there are grounds for prosecution.
Local judges now are required to grade the performance of PJ officers
operating in their jurisdiction in an effort to ensure that the
officers comply with the law in their treatment of suspects. In
addition, any suspect held in preventative detention is to undergo a
medical examination at the end of the detention, whether the suspect
requests it or not. These measures remained in effect and the
Government adopted them in practice.
In February 2001, following a bombing against a military unit in
the area, security forces arrested Said Zaoui and approximately 20
other men in Dellys. The detainees reportedly were tortured and Zaoui
reportedly remained in detention.
Police beat protestors while forcibly dispersing several
demonstrations during the year and in 2001 (see Section 2.b.).
Armed terrorist groups committed numerous abuses, such as
beheading, mutilating, and dismembering their victims, including
infants, children, and pregnant women. These groups also used bombs
that killed and injured persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). Deaths at
the hands of armed groups decreased by about 30 percent, from 1,124 in
2001 to 782 during the year (see Sections 1.a).
Prison conditions were spartan, but generally met international
standards. A local human rights activist noted that the condition of
prisons throughout the country were a result of overcrowding, more than
programmed or state-sponsored neglect. Poor medical standards for
prisoners received press coverage in October, 6 months after nationwide
prison protests. However, the provision of medical treatment remained
limited. The media reported there was one doctor for every 300
prisoners. An international NGO noted that the Government continued to
improve prison conditions over the past two years. Prisoners generally
were found to be in good health and benefited from adequate food and
expanded visitation rights. However, prison protests and riots occurred
throughout the summer, fall, and winter of this year, as a result of
conditions imposed by overcrowding and poor living conditions,
resulting in injuries and numerous deaths.
On April 30, a 19-year-old prisoner at Bab El Djedid Prison in
Algiers attempted to kill himself with a broken light bulb. As prison
guards attempted to stop the prisoner, a second prisoner in a nearby
cell lit a fire in his bed. Nineteen prisoners died and nine others
were injured in the ensuing fire. Three days later a revolt began in
the same prison, with approximately 60 prisoners climbing onto the roof
and threatening to jump.
On May 5, in the prison of Boussouf in Constantine, prisoners lit
fire to their sheets and beds. Forty-eight prisoners were injured and
four had serious injuries.
In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of
prisons or detention centers outside of programmed visits by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Government allowed
ICRC to visit prisons since 1999 and as of October, ICRC had an
official presence. Limited monitoring consisted of pre-selected
detainees, chosen by the Government, being granted access to and
meeting with various international human rights groups. The ICRC did
not visit FIS leaders or other political leaders in prison or under
house arrest.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces
continued arbitrarily to arrest and detain citizens, although such
practices have been reported less frequently than in past years.
The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspended the requirement that the
police obtain warrants in order to make an arrest. During the year, the
police made limited use of this law. However, according to defense
attorneys, police who executed searches without a warrant routinely
failed to identify themselves as police and abused those who asked for
identification (see Section 1.f.).
The Constitution provides that incommunicado detention in criminal
cases prior to arraignment may not exceed 48 hours, after which the
suspect must be charged or released. However, according to the 1992
Antiterrorist Law, the police may hold suspects in pre-arraignment
detention for up to 12 days, although police must inform suspects of
the charges against them. In practice the security forces generally
adhered to this 12-day limit in terrorist cases and to the 48-hour
limit in nonterrorist cases.
The President of CNCPPDDH stated in a press interview in September
that he considered ``the poor application of legal texts by judges,
notably the practice of 'preventive detention' to be the sole reason
that the country's entire judicial system continues to be of poor
quality.'' He further stated that the State of Emergency had no room to
accommodate human rights, and personally demanded that it be lifted.
In April according to AI, Tahar Facouli was tortured and kept in
detention because of his contacts with exiled human rights lawyer
Rachid Mesli.
Rally for Democratic Culture (RCD) members lodged a formal
complaint to the Ministry of Justice for the 3-day detainment without
formal charges of a party member from May 5 through May 8. In October a
human rights attorney who had frequently aligned himself with the RCD
was beaten by unknown assailants outside of the El Aurassi Hotel. RCD
officials alleged that ``aspects of the Government'' were involved in
the attack.
Arouch citizen's movement members Belaid Abrika, Mouloud Chebheb,
Mohamed Nekkah, Mahklouf Lyes, Allik Tahar, and Rachid Allouache were
arrested and detained while attempting to follow the court proceedings
of Kabylie residents arrested during the riots. On October 15, Abrika
was charged with inciting violence and held on a four month, renewable
basis until his trial. In December he and others began a hunger strike
which lasted 42 days to protest their detainment. In contravention of
the Penal Code, by year's end, a trial date had not been chosen by the
Government (see Section 3).
In April 2001, three students were arrested in two separate
incidents in the Kabylie region. One died in custody and the other two
subsequently were released. The death in custody precipitated
demonstrations and riots in the region throughout the spring and summer
and remained an aspect of protests carried out in the region this year
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.b.).
In 2001 the Government detained and released hundreds of persons in
connection with the demonstrations and riots that took place in the
Kabylie region in the spring and summer following the April death in
custody. AI reported that the police tortured or otherwise abused
persons in custody at that time (see Section 1.c.).
Abassi Madani, President of the banned FIS party, who was released
from prison in 1997, remained under house arrest and was allowed to
receive visits only from members of his family (see Section 2.d.).
During the year, Madani made numerous press statements and conducted
interviews while under house arrest. Jailed oppositionist and FIS vice
president Ali Belhadj, who had been held incommunicado from 1992 until
1998, was allowed contact with members of his family, who spoke to the
press on his behalf during the year. Media reports indicated that
government officials also held talks with the FIS in an attempt to
gauge public sentiment towards a release of the leaders on humanitarian
grounds due to poor health. In early December the Government abandoned
plans for his release, according to print media.
Police and communal guards frequently detained persons at
checkpoints. There were previously reports of police arresting close
relatives of suspected terrorists in order to force the suspects to
surrender. While no reports were received of similar acts this year,
73-year-old El-Hadj M'lik who was arrested in 2000 was questioned
concerning his sons, one of whom is believed to be a member of a
terrorist group. Security officials reassured the family on two
separate occasions that M'lik would be returned to them. However, the
Government has released no further information on the case during the
year.
Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Persons accused of
crimes sometimes did not receive expeditious trials; however, instances
of long-term detention appeared to decrease somewhat during the past
year (see Section 1.e.). Hundreds of state enterprise officials who
were arrested on charges of corruption in 1996 remained in detention.
Some local human rights activists and NGOs claimed that the Government
continued to keep some former prisoners under surveillance and required
them to report periodically to police.
Forced exile is not a legal form of punishment and was not known to
be practiced. However, numerous cases of self-imposed exile involved
former FIS members or persons who maintained that they have been
accused falsely of terrorism as punishment for openly criticizing
government policies.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, executive branch decrees restricted the
judiciary's authority. The Minister of Justice appoints the judges. A
judge's term is 10 years. The Government reportedly may remove judges
at will. In August 2000, the President announced a massive
reorganization of the judiciary. He changed approximately 80 percent of
the heads of the 187 lower courts and all but three of the presidents
of the 37 higher-level courts. Most of the court heads were reassigned
to new locations; however, a number were replaced. The Government
sought international technical assistance with the reform of its
judiciary over the course of the year, in many instances funded in full
by the Government.
The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which tried cases
involving civilians, and the military courts, which have tried
civilians on security and terrorism charges. There is also
Constitutional Council, which reviews the constitutionality of
treaties, laws, and regulations. Although the Council is not part of
the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found
unconstitutional. The Council has nine members: three of the members
(including the council president) are appointed by the President; two
are elected by the upper house of the Parliament; two are elected by
the lower house of the Parliament; one is elected by the Supreme Court;
and one is elected by the Council of State. Regular criminal courts try
those persons accused of security-related offenses. Long-term
detentions of suspects awaiting trial again appeared to decrease
somewhat during the year (see Section 1.d.).
According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent
until proven guilty. They have the right to confront their accusers and
may appeal the conviction. Trials are public, and defendants have the
right to legal counsel. However, the authorities did not always respect
all legal provisions regarding defendants' rights, and continue to deny
due process. Some lawyers did not accept cases of defendants accused of
security-related offenses, due to fear of retribution from the security
forces. Defense lawyers for members of the banned FIS suffered
harassment, death threats, and arrest.
An unknown number of persons who could be considered political
prisoners were serving prison sentences because of their sympathies
with Islamist groups and membership in the FIS. International human
rights groups did not request visits with political prisoners this
year; therefore it was unclear whether the Government would permit such
organizations to visit political prisoners.
In the days prior to the May legislative elections, President
Bouteflika granted amnesty to prisoners serving jail sentences for
criminal violations, including four students jailed for throwing rocks
at him during a visit to Algiers.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, but authorities frequently infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The state of emergency authorizes provincial governors to issue
exceptional warrants at any time. Security forces also entered
residences without warrants. According to defense attorneys, police who
executed searches without a warrant routinely failed to identify
themselves as police and abused persons who asked for identification.
Security forces deployed an extensive network of secret informers
against both terrorist targets and political opponents. Credible
sources and journalists believe that the Government actively monitored
telephone lines of political opponents, journalists, and human rights
groups (see Section 4). There were reports of police arresting close
relatives of suspected terrorists in order to force the suspects to
surrender (see Section 1.d.).
Armed terrorists entered private homes either to kill or kidnap
residents or to steal weapons, valuables, or food (see Section 1.a.).
After massacres that took place in their villages, numerous civilians
fled their homes. Armed terrorist groups consistently used threats of
violence to extort money from businesses and families across the
country.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law.--On
October 24, during a television interview with French channel LCI
broadcast nationally, General Touati, the President's Defense Advisor,
stated that the Kabylie region had been ``severely repressed.'' Kabylie
Security forces reportedly exhibited excessive force throughout the
year in the Kabylie region.
In March gendarme units stationed in Azazga (Tizi Ouzou), El Kseur,
and Seddouk abandoned their barracks in the face of widespread
protests. Rioters burned barracks buildings, and in retaliation,
gendarmes from El Kseur, upon orders from the Government, looted and
ransacked shops, threatened bystanders and protesters alike, and
attacked many. The death of a man in Seddouk at the hands of security
forces sparked off more violent clashes (see Section 1.a.).
Wide-spread protest throughout the Kabylie region during July and
August forced 21 gendarmerie brigades to withdraw after a young man was
killed when shot in the head by a plastic bullet during riots in
Chemini, Bejaia. Amidst the rioting that ensued, casualty figures were
in the hundreds and special units of security forces were called in to
replace the gendarmes as they withdrew from the region. Anticipating
the gendarmes' departure, youths marching on barracks in Mechtras were
fired at by gendarmes with rubber bullets and smoke grenades,
critically injuring four. Further rioting ensued, which resulted in
violent clashes between gendarmes and protesters (see Section 1.a.).
In April 2001, gendarme units used excessive force in response to
rioting in the Kabylie region. Gendarme units shot rioters with lethal
rounds, not rubber ones, often in the back. A report issued by the
Government-appointed Issad Commission to investigate the violence,
found that the gendarmes acted without orders. The Government claimed
that the gendarmes who fired the shots were disciplined. However, no
details were provided to the public during the year regarding the
specifics of this ``disciplinary'' action (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
Armed groups continued to be responsible for numerous,
indiscriminate killings. Terrorists left bombs at several markets and
other public places during the year, killing and injuring dozens of
persons. In rural areas, terrorists continued to plant bombs and mines,
which often targeted security force personnel.
On March 17, terrorists left a large home-made bomb which exploded
at a post office in Algiers, in which more 20 persons were injured.
On April 20, a nail bomb left at a school in Medea exploded
injuring 20. On May 15, a bomb a few meters from the headquarters of
the communal guard killed 4 and injured 14. Hidden in a manhole at the
entrance of an open-air market in Tazmalt, the blast was timed to kill
countless more had it not been for poor craftsmanship.
On July 5, a market bomb in Larbaa killed 38 and injured 82. As in
the past, such random lethal terrorist attacks occurred throughout the
year (see Section 1.a.).
On October 12, terrorists set up a false roadblock outside of
Boumia. Dressed as communal guards, a vehicle traveling from Algiers
was detained that contained six persons. Four civilians were robbed of
their valuables; the terrorists shot and killed the two police officers
traveling with the group.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech; however, the Government restricted this right in
practice. A 1990 law specifies that freedom of speech must respect
``individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the
national defense.'' The state of emergency decree gives the Government
broad authority to restrict these freedoms and to take legal action
against what it considers to be threats to the state or public order.
These regulations were enforced throughout the year, and in some
instances appeared to target specific media organizations and their
staff. The number of independent press publications prosecuted or fined
for reporting on security matters increased from the previous year.
While the law permits the Government to levy fines and jail time
against the press in a manner that restricts press freedom, in practice
the existence of such a did little to curb reporting by the independent
press. However, members of the press acknowledged the economic strains
placed on the print media as a result of the 2001 amendment.
In 2001 the Government enacted broad amendments to the Penal Code
that imposed high fines and prison terms of up to 24 months for
defamation or ``insult'' of government figures, including the
President, Members of Parliament, judges, members of the military and
``any other authority of public order.'' At least six prosecutions
occurred under the 2001 amendment to the Penal Code by year's end.
The Government's definition of security information often extended
beyond purely military matters to encompass broader political affairs.
In 1995 FIS officials who had been freed from detention in 1994
received direct orders from the Justice Ministry to make no further
public statements. This ban remained in force.
In general journalists exercised self-censorship by not publishing
criticism of specific senior military officials, although throughout
the year, the press widely criticized current and retired military
officers.
In February two journalists were brought before the court and
censured for reporting on security force tactics used against
terrorists in mountainous areas. A television journalist with National
Radio and Television (RTN) was refused accreditation without
explanation and barred from covering October's local elections. Despite
inquiries on his behalf by RTN and other interested parties, the
grounds of the refusal were not made public.
For example, in August media criticism of military spending forced
General Lamari to appear at a press conference, brandishing his pay
slip in defense of his salary. Media criticism of the military and its
leadership reached a groundswell during the Government sponsored
``Colloquium on Terrorism'' on October 26-28.
On October 22, the editors of three major newspapers El-
Watan, Liberte, and le Matin, were brought to court to respond to
charges brought against them by the Ministry of Defense under the 2001
Amendment. The El-Watan editor was charged with ``allowing'' a
journalist on his staff to write a libelous article about the son-in-
law of Colonel Boussis, a prominent retired colonel.
During the fall, the Ministry of Communication and Culture proposed
a pilot study to have fledgling newspapers screened by the Ministry of
the Interior and Ministry of Justice, as opposed to the Ministry of
Communication and Culture as provided for under the current law.
Journalists raised concerns that should the pilot study be promulgated
into law, journalists' freedom of expression will be constrained and
monitored by the Ministry of the Interior under the guise of national
security. By year's end, the pilot study was implemented.
In July 2001, Fawzia Ababsah, managing editor of the French-
language daily newspaper, L'Authentique, was tried in abstentia and
sentenced to 6 months in prison for defamation of Secretary General
Mahmoudi of the Finance Confederation (a union of financial workers).
Under the law, a person tried in abstentia has the right to ``oppose''
any such decision and have the case reheard at the same level. Ababsah
stated that she intended to oppose the finding in her case.
According to a 1994 inter-ministerial decree, independent
newspapers can print security information only from official government
bulletins carried by the Government-controlled Algerian Press Service
(APS). However, independent newspapers openly ignored the directive,
and the trend toward increased openness about security-force activities
continued during the year. The Government continued to provide the
press with more information than in the past about the security
situation. The Government-controlled press reported on terrorism in an
increasingly straightforward and accurate manner. Unlike in previous
years, when journalists deliberately did not report on current possible
abuses by security forces to avoid difficulties with the Government,
the independent press reported openly on abuses by the gendarmerie
during the recent violence in the Kabylie region in 2001 and the
violence surrounding this year's elections (see Sections 1.a., 1.c.,
1.d., 2.b., and 5). There also was significant coverage of NGO activity
aimed at publicizing government abuses committed in the past.
Other than El Moujahid, which is the official government newspaper
and reflects the FLN party's views, there were no newspapers owned by
political parties, although Liberte, L'Expression, L'Autentique, and
El-Borhane continued to report from an ideological perspective. Many
parties, including legal Islamist political parties, had access to the
independent press, in which they expressed their views without
government interference. Opposition parties also disseminated
information via the Internet and in comuniques.
In 2001 two independent newspapers (El Watan and Al-Khabbar) began
to print in a privately run printing plant with privately obtained
newsprint. This ended the Government's monopoly on printing companies
and newsprint imports. However, most independent newspapers continued
to rely on the Government for printing and paper imports. There was no
overt use of the Government's power to halt newspaper publications
during the year. However, an administrative notice was disseminated
throughout the ministries in March announcing that four newspapers that
were highly critical of the Government, Liberte, Le Matin, Le Soir, and
El-Youm, would no longer be distributed to ministry offices.
The Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent
press through the state-owned advertising company. All state-owned
companies that wished to place an advertisement in a newspaper had to
submit the item to the advertising company, which then decided in which
newspapers to place it. In an economy in which state companies' output
and government services still represented approximately two-thirds of
national income, government-provided advertising constituted a
significant source of advertising revenue for the country's newspapers.
Advertising companies tended to provide significant amounts of
advertising to publications with a strong anti-Islamist editorial line
and to withhold advertising from newspapers on political grounds, even
if such newspapers had large readerships or offered cheap advertising
rates.
Radio and television remained under government control, with
coverage favoring the Government's policies. Satellite-dish antennas
were widespread, and millions of citizens had access to European and
Middle Eastern broadcasting.
Many artists, intellectuals, and university educators fled the
country after widespread violence began in 1992; however, some
continued to return during the year. A growing number of academic
seminars and colloquiums occurred without governmental interference,
including a conference on Kabylie language and culture in October. In
May 2001, a forum on Judicial Reform was sponsored by Freedom House,
which enjoyed wide press coverage.
University students staged numerous small strikes early in the year
in support of the protests in Kabylie. In April a student strike in
Algiers shut down two universities. Launched to protest the arrest of
over 500 persons in the Kabylie region during riots staged throughout
the year, the universities remained closed for four days. The
Government did not interfere in any political or economic seminars, as
it had in the past.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly; however, the 1992 Emergency Law and
government practice sharply curtailed this right. Citizens and
organizations must obtain permits from the appointed local governor
before holding public meetings. The Government frequently granted
licenses to political parties, NGOs, and other groups to hold indoor
rallies, although licenses were frequently granted days before events
were to take place, often impeding event publicity and outreach.
On December 10, supporters of Arouch detainees attempted a protest
in Algiers. Security forces increased their presence and government
roadblocks along the road leading from Tizi Ouzou to Algiers, and
security was heightened throughout the capital. Approximately fifty
persons were arrested as police and security forces put down the 300-
person protest. In December a commune on the outskirts of Tizi Ouzou in
the Kabylie banned public demonstrations.
In response to the backlash against security force tactics used to
put down riots in Spring 2001, the Government replaced gendarme units
patrolling the Kabylie region this year during the summer and fall
elections with members of the local police forces. Armed altercations
between security forces and rioting civilians nonetheless continued
this year, frequently resulting in death.
In October gendarme units were deployed again to the Kabylie region
in the days surrounding the local elections to quell anticipated civil
unrest.
In spring 2001, the Government used excessive force in some
instances to put down demonstrations and riots in the largely Berber
Kabylie region. More than 50 persons were killed, hundreds were
injured, and a large number of persons were detained for short periods
in connection with the violence. AI reported that security forces
tortured, beat, and otherwise abused a number of them (see Sections
1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 5).
Although the Government allowed several subsequent demonstrations
to take place, it used force to disrupt several other demonstrations
that were held throughout the spring and summer of 2001 and during the
year (see Section 2.b.).
After the April 2001 violence, the Government permitted some
demonstrations (most of them unsanctioned) to take place. The largest
political demonstration to take place in Algiers since 1998 concluded
peacefully in early May 2001, in which more than 20,000 persons marched
in protest of government actions in quelling unrest in the Kabylie
region.
However, the Government at times used force to disperse
demonstrations that became violent. In late May 2001, as many as 20,000
demonstrators marched in Algiers with the tacit approval of the
Government. Security forces used tear gas and water cannons to break up
the demonstrations when 600 to 700 protestors became violent, throwing
stones at police. One month later, the Government dispersed a march of
more than 250,000 protesters after small groups of marchers became
violent, with tear gas and water cannons. Some protesters burned and
destroyed property, looting a police station, a bus depot, stores, and
businesses. In response, the Government announced a ban on
demonstrations in the capital which remained in effect.
Some other unlicensed groups continued to be active, including
groups dedicated to the cause of persons who have disappeared. Such
groups continued to hold regular demonstrations outside government
buildings during the year.
In November 2001, security forces in Constantine disrupted a
demonstration by family members of persons who had disappeared. When
the crowd of approximately 100 persons arrived at the town hall for the
weekly demonstration, they were met by security forces who demanded
that they disperse. When the demonstrators refused to leave, security
forces forcibly dispersed them, reportedly using truncheons. One person
was injured.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
the 1992 Emergency Law and government practice severely restricted it.
The Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before they
may be established (see Section 3). In October President Bouteflika
announced that the Government would consider dissolving parties that
received less that 5 percent of the vote during the local elections.
The Interior Minister confirmed the Government's intention to
promulgate such a decree, despite it being in violation of the
Constitution.
In 2000 the Government refused to approve the Wafa Party on the
grounds that many of its members had belonged to the outlawed FIS. The
Government closed the Party's offices in November 2000. The Front
Democratique, headed by former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali,
applied for registration in May 2000, but received no response within
the time period specified by law for governmental decision on such
cases (see Section 3). In March 2001, the Interior Minister stated that
the information in the party's application was too vague and that the
Ministry was in the process of gathering the information it needed to
make a decision. The Front Democratique remained unlicensed throughout
the year.
Domestic NGOs must be licensed by the Government and the Interior
Ministry regarded all associations as illegal unless they had licenses.
Domestic NGOs were prohibited from receiving funding from abroad. The
Ministry may deny a license to, or dissolve, any group regarded as a
threat to the Government's authority, or to the security or public
order of the State. After the Government suspended the parliamentary
election in 1992, it banned the FIS as a political party, and the
social and charitable groups associated with it (see Section 3).
Membership in the FIS remained illegal, although at least one former
FIS leader announced publicly that he intended to form a cultural youth
group. Some unlicensed groups operated openly.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination
based on religious belief and the Government generally respected this
right in practice; however, there were some restrictions. Although the
Constitution declares Islam to be the state religion and the law
limited the practice of other faiths; however, the Government followed
a de facto policy of tolerance by not inquiring into the religious
practices of individuals.
The law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a
faith other than Islam. However, Roman Catholic churches, including a
cathedral in Algiers (the seat of the Archbishop), conducted services
without government interference. There were only a few smaller churches
and other places of worship; non-Muslims usually congregated in private
homes for religious services.
Since Islam is the state religion, the country's education system
is structured to benefit Muslims. Education is free to all citizens
below the age of 16, and the study of Islam is a strict requirement in
the public schools, which are regulated by the Ministry of Education
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
The Government monitored activities in mosques for possible
security-related offenses and bars their use as public meeting places
outside of regular prayer hours. The Ministry of Religious Affairs
provided financial support to mosques and has limited control over the
training of imams. The Ministry of Religious Affairs frequently
appointed selected imams to mosques throughout the country, and by law
is allowed to pre-screen religious sermons before they are delivered
publicly. In practice, while the Government frequently reviewed
sermons, the press reported that mosques supplanted government-
appointed imams with those that hold views more closely aligned to the
sentiments of each mosques' adherents. The Ministry of Religious
Affairs publicly discussed its intention to create a government-run
school for the training of imams, charged with ensuring that all imams
are of the highest educational caliber and present messages in line
with government guidelines in place to stem religious fanaticism.
However, no school was established.
Amendments to the Penal Code in 2001 specify prison sentences and
fines for preaching in a mosque by persons who have not been recognized
by the Government as imams. ``Persons (including imams recognized by
the Government) were prohibited from speaking out during prayers at the
mosque in a manner that is ``contrary to the noble nature of the mosque
or likely to offend the cohesion of society or serve as an apology for
such actions.'' There were no reported cases in which the Government
invoked the new amendments by year's end.
Conversions from Islam to other religions were rare. Islam does not
recognize conversion to other faiths at any age. However, the
Constitution's provisions concerning freedom of religion prohibit any
government sanction against conversion. Because of safety concerns and
potential legal and social problems, Muslim converts practiced their
new faith clandestinely. Non-Islamic proselytizing is illegal, and the
Government restricted the importation of non-Islamic religious
literature for widespread distribution, although not for personal use.
Non-Islamic religious texts and music and video selections no longer
were difficult to locate for purchase. The Government prohibits the
dissemination of any literature portraying violence as a legitimate
precept of Islam.
The country's 11-year civil conflict has pitted self- proclaimed
radical Muslims against the general Islamic population. Self-proclaimed
``Islamists,'' or religious extremists issued public threats against
all ``infidels'' in the country, both foreigners and citizens, and
killed both Muslims and non-Muslims, including missionaries. The
majority of the country's terrorist groups did not, as a rule,
differentiate between religious and political killings.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of domestic
and foreign travel, and freedom to emigrate; however, the Government at
times restricted these rights. The Government did not allow foreign
travel by senior officials of the banned FIS. FIS President Abassi
Madani, who was released from prison in 1997, remained under house
arrest (see Section 1.d.). The Government also does not permit young
men who are eligible for the draft and who have not yet completed their
military service to leave the country if they do not have special
authorization; such authorization may be granted to students and to
those persons with special family circumstances.
The Family Code does not permit married females less than 19 years
of age to travel abroad without their husband's permission, although
this provision generally was not followed in practice (see Section 5).
Under the state of emergency, the Interior Minister and the
provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons
regarded as threats to public order. The Government also restricted
travel into four southern provinces, where much of the hydrocarbon
industry and many foreign workers were located, in order to enhance
security in those areas.
The police and the communal guards operated checkpoints throughout
the country. They routinely stopped vehicles to inspect identification
papers and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes
detained persons at these checkpoints.
Armed groups intercepted citizens at roadblocks, often using stolen
police uniforms and equipment in various regions to rob them of their
cash and vehicles. On occasion, armed groups killed groups of civilian
passengers at these roadblocks (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution and the law provide for the granting of asylum and
refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government grants
asylum and cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. In 2001 the Government provided first asylum to approximately
165,000 refugee Sahrawis, former residents of the Western Sahara who
left that territory after Morocco took control of it in the 1970s.
UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), the Algerian Red Crescent, and
other organizations assisted Sahrawi refugees.
The country also hosts an estimated 5,000 Palestinian refugees,
most of whom no longer require international assistance. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government; however, there are limitations to this right in practice
(see Section 2.b.). The military's continued influence in government
matters constrained citizens from exercising this right to the fullest
possible extent. However, the situation continued to improve, although
factors such as voter distrust and apathy, and boycotts in the Kabylie
region underscored continuing problems in the arena of transparent
governance. The strong prerogatives of the executive branch, supported
by the entrenched power of the military and the bureaucracy, inhibited
citizens from exercising this right.
President Bouteflika was elected in an April 1999 presidential
election that was seriously flawed by the withdrawal 1 day before the
election of all other candidates, who charged that the military already
had begun to implement plans to produce a fraudulent Bouteflika
victory. Until those allegations surfaced, the campaign was conducted
fairly, with all candidates widely covered in both state-owned and
private media. The conduct of the campaign--although regulated as to
the use of languages other than Arabic, and as to the timing, location,
and duration of meetings--was free, and all candidates traveled
extensively throughout the country. One potential candidate was denied
the ability to run because the electoral commission determined that he
could not prove that he had participated in the country's war of
independence against France, a legal requirement for candidates for
President born before July 1942. With the withdrawal of the other
candidates and the absence of foreign observers, it was difficult to
make an accurate determination of turnout for the election; although it
apparently was as low as 30 percent, the Government claimed a 60
percent turnout. The next presidential election is scheduled for April
2004.
The withdrawal of six presidential candidates in 1999 amidst
credible charges of fraud, and the election of President Bouteflika,
highlighted the continued dominance of the military elite in the
process of selecting the country's political leadership. This dominance
was reportedly not as prevalent in parliamentary and local elections.
During the year, a new electoral law was implemented, with the
oversight of the majority of the country's political parties, to remedy
problems in the existing election laws that permitted the Government to
remove candidates from party lists for ``security'' reasons. Elections
observers noted that those selected for removal were more frequently
from Islamic parties, questioning why a judge and a professor at the
national military academy could hold the positions they do, yet be
considered a national security threat when running for political
office.
On May 30, the country held its second round of multi-party
parliamentary elections since 1992. The elections were regarded as free
and fair, although not problem-free. Candidates representing 23
political parties participated, along with several independent
candidates.
FLN took control of the National Popular Assembly after an 11-year
absence from power. It more than tripled its number of seats in the
389-seat parliament, securing 199 seats in total. Two conservative
Islamic parties, Islah and Movement of the Society for Peace (MSP)
share control of 81 seats, the second largest bloc in the governing
body. The Kabylie-based Rally Democratic Culture (RCD) boycotted the
vote, and urged supporters to support its contention that the election
was an outright sham.
Voter turnout of 46 percent was the lowest since the country's
independence. Problems were reported by credible sources at some
polling stations, notably ballot envelopes filled with positive votes
for the FLN. The Kabylie region launched a sometimes violently enforced
boycott to protest the lack of transparency, increased corruption, and
overt discrimination against Amazigh parties and candidates,
successfully limiting the vote to 15 percent in some regions and 7
percent in Tizi Ouzou. In response to the protagonists of the boycott's
use of force to block voting from occurring in the region while the
boycott was in place, the Minister of the Interior publicly stated
prior to the elections that votes would be cast in all voting
locations.
Local elections on October 10 saw further boycotts by residents in
the Kabylie region, with many protests leading to violent
confrontations with the police. On October 5, the Arouch Citizen's
Movement organized a general strike in order to reject the upcoming
local elections. Riots and confrontations with security forces ensued,
of which many were violent. Police arrested and detained Arouch (Berber
political movement) leader Belaid Abrika, his attorneys, and other
leaders of the ``Movement of Citizens'' while attempting to follow the
court proceedings of Kabylie residents arrested during the riots. On
October 15, Abrika was charged with inciting violence and held on a 4
month renewable basis until his trial (see Section 1.d.). Strikes, sit-
ins, and demonstrations around the Court of Justice in Tizi Ouzou
protested the arrests and continued throughout the remainder of the
year.
Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to rule by
decree in special circumstances. The President subsequently must submit
to the Parliament for approval decrees issued while the Parliament is
not in session. The President did not exercise such authority during
the year. The Parliament has a popularly elected lower chamber, the
National Popular Assembly and an upper chamber, the National Council,
two-thirds of whose members are elected by municipal and provincial
councils. The President appoints the remaining one-third of the
National Council's members. Legislation must have the approval of
three-quarters of both the upper and lower chambers' members. Laws must
originate in the lower chamber.
Since 1997 the law requires that potential political parties
receive official approval from the Interior Ministry before they may be
established. To obtain approval, a party must have 25 founders from
across the country whose names must be registered with the Interior
Ministry. Two parties, Wafa and Front Democratique, have failed to
receive registration. In October President Bouteflika announced that
the Government would consider dissolving parties that received less
that 5 percent of the vote during the local elections. The Interior
Minister confirmed the Government's intention to promulgate such a
decree, despite it being in violation of the Constitution. No party may
use religion, Amazigh heritage, or Arab heritage as a basis of
organizing for political purposes. The law also bans political party
ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates party financing and
reporting requirements.
The more than 30 existing political parties represent a wide
spectrum of viewpoints and are engaged in activities that ranged from
holding rallies to issuing communiques. The Government continued to ban
the FIS as a political party (see Section 2.b.). In 2001 the Interior
Minister stated that the information in the Front Democratique's
application for recognition, which was filed in May 2000, was too
vague, and that the Ministry was in the process of gathering the
information it needed to make a decision. The party's application
remained pending at year's end. With the exception of the FLN and the
formerly governing National Democratic Rally (RND), political parties
sometimes encountered difficulties with local officials who hindered
their organizational efforts such as access to public venues and
permits for assembly. While opposition parties' access to state-
controlled electronic media remained limited, opposition party leaders
increasingly were permitted to represent their views on television and
on the radio, even those views directly critical of the Government.
This year, for the elections, there was an equal division of air time
for political parties. Televised parliamentary debates aired uncensored
and allowed all parties access to the electronic media. The independent
press also publicized their views.
The new Cabinet, named in June, had five female members. Twenty
four of the 389 members of the lower house of Parliament are women. The
upper house had seven female members. This was an increase of 45
percent and 14 percent respectively, from last year. The spokesperson
for the Benflis government was a woman. During both sets of the
elections that occurred this year, female candidates could be found on
the top tiers of lists; this remained true for both RND and the
Islamic-leaning party of Islah. In September 1999, President Bouteflika
appointed the first female provincial governor. A woman headed the
Workers' Party, and all the major political parties except one had
women's divisions headed by women.
The ethnic Berber minority of about 9 million centered in the
Kabylie region participated freely and actively in the political
process in the past. However, Berber protests and boycotts surrounding
the May and October elections underscored the economic and social
neglect felt by many in this community, which made up nearly one third
of the overall population. From April 2001 through the remainder of the
year, the Berber held a series of demonstrations, some violent;
security forces in some instances put down violent demonstrations with
excessive force (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
Two major opposition parties originated in the Berber-populated
region of the country: the Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for
Culture and Democracy. These two parties represented Amazigh political
and cultural concerns in the Parliament and the media. The two Berber-
based parties were required to conform with the 1997 changes to the
Electoral Law that stipulated that political parties must have at least
25 founders from across the country. Both parties dropped out of
parliament in protest of human rights violations in the Kabylie region
earlier in the year.
The Touaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, played an important role
in politics despite their small numbers, particularly in the South and
along the border regions where they remained the dominant ethnic group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The most active independent human rights group was the Algerian
League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), an independent
organization that had members throughout the country. The LADDH was not
permitted access to government officials for human rights and advocacy
or research purposes, or to prisons, except as under the normal
consultations allowed between a lawyer and a client. The less active
Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) was an independent organization
based in Constantine. The LADH had members throughout the country who
followed individual cases. Human rights groups reported occasional
harassment by government authorities in the form of obvious
surveillance and monitoring of telephone service (see Section 1.f.).
The Government allowed visits by international NGOs since loosening
its ban on such visits prior to 2000. Monitoring trips have occurred at
the invitation of the Government and the majority of groups were
allowed to move about freely. During the year, Human Rights Watch
(HRW), International Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC), and Reporters
without Borders have all been allowed to visit the country. Although an
Amnesty Algeria office was established in Algiers in 1999, AI was not
permitted access to the country since November of 2000. The
organization also claimed that the Government was staging
demonstrations opposing 2000 AI visit. Freedom House, after criticizing
the Government in late December for continued human rights abuses, also
incurred visa difficulties. In 2001 the Rights Consortium, a combined
effort of Freedom House, the International Center for Journalists, and
the American Bar Association, visited the country in January, February,
and May.
Doctors Without Borders requested visas to visit the Kabylie region
in June of 2001. Their requests were denied because the Government
maintained that the country's medical system was sufficient to handle
the demand for medical care. The Government had not responded
positively to requests for visits from the U.N. Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions.
However, the UN Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion was allowed to
visited the country in September.
The National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH) was established by
the Government in 1992 to report human rights violations to the
authorities; however, in February President Bouteflika announced the
creation of a new Human Rights Commission to replace the ONDH and the
national Human Rights Ombudsman. The new National Consultative
Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights was
formally established in October 2001. The Commission is made up of 45
members, 22 of whom belong to governmental bodies and 23 of whom come
from civil society and NGOs. The nongovernmental members include
representatives of Islamic religious organizations, the Red Crescent
Society, and women's rights advocacy groups. The President approves
nominees, and the Commission's budget and secretariat (which the
Government says will be ``independent'') come from his office. The
Commission reports on human rights issues, coordinates with police and
justice officials, advocates domestic and international human rights
causes, mediates between the Government and the population, and
providing expertise on human rights issues to the Government. Domestic
NGOs must be licensed by the Government and are prohibited from
receiving funding from abroad, although they may receive in-kind
donations. Some unlicensed NGOs operated openly.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race,
sex, belief, or any other personal or social condition; however, women
continued to face legal and social discrimination.
Women.--Women's rights advocates assert that spousal abuse was
common, but there were no reliable statistics regarding its extent.
Spousal abuse was more frequent in rural than urban areas and among
less-educated persons. There are no specific laws against spousal rape.
Rape is illegal, and in principle a spouse could be charged under the
law. However, there are strong societal pressures against a woman
seeking legal redress against her spouse for rape, and were no reports
of the law being applied in such cases. Battered women must obtain
medical certification of the physical effects of an assault before they
lodge a complaint with the police. However, because of societal
pressures, women frequently were reluctant to endure this process.
There were few facilities offering safe haven for abused women. Two
prominent associations for women that have received recognition by the
Government and international community in the country are SOS Femme en
Detresse and SOS Femme Batus. Women's rights groups experienced
difficulty in drawing attention to spousal abuse as an important social
problem, largely due to societal attitudes. There were several rape-
crisis centers run by women's groups, but they had few resources.
During the year, extremists sometimes specifically targeted women.
There were incidents of women and girls being kidnaped by terrorist
groups for the purposes of rape and servitude during the year. One rape
crisis center specializes in caring for women who are victims of rape
by terrorists (see Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.). In July 2001, a
group of young men raided a shantytown area near the oil town of Hassi-
Messaoud, raping and seriously wounding dozens of single women who
lived there. The violence was incited by an imam who accused the women
of prostitution and questioned why they were working while men in the
town were unemployed.
Also in July a similar attack took place in the area of Tebessa, a
trading center east of Algiers. Trials were held for both incidents
this year, with prison sentences meted out in each case.
Prostitution for economic reasons was a growing problem, despite
being prohibited by law.
A cabinet level position for the Female Condition and Family was
established during the year. However, no changes were made in the
family code. Some aspects of the law and many traditional social
practices discriminated against women. The 1984 Family Code, which was
based in large part on Shari'a, treated women as minors under the legal
guardianship of a husband or male relative. Under the family code
Muslim women are prevented from marrying non-Muslims, although this
regulation was not always enforced. The code does not restrict Muslim
men from marrying non-Muslim women. Under both Shari'a and civil law,
children born to a Muslim father are Muslim, regardless of the mother's
religion. Divorce was difficult for a wife to obtain except in cases of
abandonment or the husband's conviction for a serious crime. Husbands
generally obtained the right to the family's home in the case of
divorce. Custody of the children normally is awarded to the mother, but
she may not enroll them in a particular school or take them out of the
country without the father's authorization. Only males are able to
confer citizenship on their children. Muslim women are prohibited from
marrying non-Muslims; Muslim men may marry non-Muslim women.
The Family Code also affirmed the Islamic practice of allowing a
man to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs in practice.
A wife may sue for divorce if her husband does not inform her of his
intent to marry another woman prior to the marriage.
Women suffered from discrimination in inheritance claims; in
accordance with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an
estate than are male children or a deceased husband's brothers.
According to Shari'a, such a distinction is justified because other
provisions require that the husband's income and assets are to be used
to support the family, while the wife's remain, in principle, her own.
However, in practice women did not always have exclusive control over
assets that they bring to a marriage or income that they earn
themselves. Married females under 19 years of age may not travel abroad
without their husbands' permission (see Section 2.d.). Women may take
out business loans and use their own financial resources.
In its 2000 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) noted that the Government stated that,
despite equality between men and women in law and regulation, in
practice women still were confronted with discrimination in employment
resulting from societal stereotypes. Leaders of women's organizations
reported that discriminatory violations were common. Labor Ministry
inspectors did little to enforce the law.
Social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a career
was much stronger in rural areas than in major urban areas. Over the
past 2 years, women made up more than half of the university student
population. Women constituted only 10 percent of the work force.
Nonetheless, women may own businesses, enter into contracts, and pursue
careers similar to men's careers. About 25 percent of judges were
women, a percentage that has been growing in recent years. President
Bouteflika's changes to the judiciary in 2001 increased the number of
courts headed by women. Whereas women previously only headed a few
courts, women at year's end headed 26 (see Section 1.e.).
There were numerous women's rights groups, although the size of
individual groups was small. Their main goals were to foster women's
economic welfare and to amend aspects of the Family Code.
Children.--The Government provides free education for children
through the university system. More than 85 percent of children
completed the ninth grade. Boys and girls generally received the same
treatment in education, although girls were slightly more likely to
drop out for financial reasons in rural areas. The girls were then sent
to vocational training schools deemed more practical for their economic
situation.
The Government provided free medical care for all citizens-albeit
in often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports had
programs for children, but such programs faced serious funding problem.
Child abuse was a problem. However, a system for reporting actual
or suspected child abuse existed nationwide in the country's school
systems. Hospitals treat numerous child-abuse cases every year, but
many cases go unreported. Laws against child abuse have not led to
notable numbers of prosecutions. NGOs that specialized in care of
children cited an increase in domestic violence aimed at children,
which they attributed to the ``culture of violence'' developed during
the years since 1992 and the social dislocations caused by the movement
of rural families to the cities to escape terrorist violence. Children
often were the victims of terrorist attacks.
Economic necessity compelled many children to resort to informal
employment, such as street vending (see Section 6.d.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The Government did not mandate
accessibility to buildings or government services for persons with
disabilities. Public enterprises, in downsizing the work force,
generally ignored a law that requires that they reserve 1 percent of
their jobs for persons with disabilities. Social security provided for
payments for orthopedic equipment, and some NGOs received limited
government financial support.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Amazigh are an ethnic
minority centered in the Kabylie region. Amazigh nationalists sought to
maintain their own cultural and linguistic identity in the face of the
Government's continued Arabization program. Despite a declaration by
President Bouteflika in 1999 stating that Amazigh would never be a
recognized language, in April the Government recognized Amazigh as a
national language. The law requires that Arabic be the official
language for use in official documents. Two government television
stations had a regular news program in Amazigh, and one of the
Government radio stations broadcasted entirely in that language. As
part of the national charter signed in 1996, the Government and several
major political parties agreed that the Amazigh culture and language
were major political components of the country's identity. There were
professorships in Amazigh culture at the University of Tizi Ouzou.
Amazighs held influential positions in government, the army, business,
and journalism.
The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, played an important role
in politics despite their small numbers, particularly in the hydro-
carbon rich South and along the border regions where they remained the
dominant ethnic group.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers are required to obtain
government approval to establish a union, and the Government may
invalidate a union's legal status if its objectives are determined to
be contrary to the established institutional system, public order, good
morals or the laws or regulations in force. There were no legal
restrictions on a worker's right to join a union.
About two-thirds of the labor force belonged to unions. There is an
umbrella labor confederation, the General Union of Algerian Workers
(UGTA) and its affiliated entities, which dates from the era of a
single political party. The UGTA encompasses national unions that are
specialized by sector. There are also several autonomous unions.
The 1990 law on labor unions requires the Labor Ministry to approve
a union application within 30 days. The Autonomous Unions Confederation
(CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the autonomous unions,
but without success. The CSA continued to function without official
status.
Unions may form and join federations or confederations, affiliate
with international labor bodies, and develop relations with foreign
labor groups. For example, the UGTA is a member of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). However, the law prohibits
unions from associating with political parties and also prohibits
unions from receiving funds from foreign sources. The courts were
empowered to dissolve unions that engaged in illegal activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the Government
permitted this right in practice. The law prohibits discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers, and provides mechanisms
for resolving trade union complaints of antiunion practices by
employers. It also permits unions to recruit members at the workplace.
Under states of emergency, on-going since the Government was
empowered to require workers in both the public and private sectors to
stay at their jobs in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike.
According to the 1990 Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike
only after 14 days of mandatory conciliation or mediation. The
Government on occasion offered to mediate disputes. The law states that
decisions reached in mediation are binding on both parties. If no
agreement is reached in mediation, the workers may strike legally after
they vote by secret ballot to do so. A minimum level of public services
must be maintained during public sector service strikes.
Despite a law in effect requiring all public demonstrations,
protests, and strikes to receive government authorization prior to
commencement, ``unauthorized'' strikes and gatherings occurred
throughout the year with retaliation by the Government or security
forces. The 2001 ban on marches in the capital of Algiers remained in
effect.
During the year, the ILO Committee of Experts requested the
Government to take steps through legislation to ensure that no
provisions of Legislative Decree 92-03 were applied against workers
peacefully exercising the right to strike. The decree defines as
subversive acts, or acts of terrorism, offenses directed against the
stability and normal functioning of institutions through any action
taken with the intention of ``obstructing the operation of
establishments providing public service'' or of ``impeding traffic or
freedom of movement in public places.'' The Government claimed that the
Decree was not directed against the right to strike or the right to
organize and has never been used against workers exercising the right
to strike peacefully.
A 3-month nationwide strike for higher wages by university
professors was resolved in September, having been preceded by a 2-day
strike in February. A strike begun in May by the Federation of
Educational Workers (FNTE) was not resolved by year's end. On October
22, health sector workers protested poor working conditions and
insufficient wages. The media reported on plans for strikes within the
courts of the capital, strikes by labor unions, and further strikes
within municipality buildings organized by the Arouch.
In October members of the Arouch Citizen's Movement organized
strikes within municipal buildings to protest the arrest of Citizen
Movement Members and supporters as they tried to monitor the trials of
Kabylie detainees (see Section 1.a.). A ``Youth Strike'' ricocheted
across the country throughout August and September protesting economic
disenfranchisement and dwindling employment opportunities.
The Government established an export-processing zone in Jijel.
Workers in the Export Processing Zone have the same rights as other
workers in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--Forced or bonded labor
is incompatible with the Constitution's provisions on individual
rights, and the Penal Code prohibits compulsory labor, including forced
or bonded labor by children. While the Government generally enforced
the ban effectively, armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnaped young
women and girls, and held them captive for weeks at a time, during
which group members raped them and forced them into servitude (see
Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.f.).
The ILO's Committee of Experts noted in 2000 that the law that
requires persons who have completed a course of higher education or
training to perform a period of service of between 2 and 4 years in
order to obtain employment or work in an occupation, was not compatible
with relevant ILO conventions dealing with forced labor. The Committee
stated that it had been urging the Government for many years to cease
imposing prison labor to rehabilitate persons convicted for expressing
certain political views.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors
from the Ministry of Labor supposedly enforced the minimum employment
age by making periodic or unannounced inspection visits to public
sector enterprises. They did not enforce the law effectively in the
agricultural or private sectors. UNICEF reported in October 2001 that
approximately 5 percent of children worked in some capacity. There was
no child labor reported in the industrial sector; however, economic
necessity compelled many children to resort to informal employment (see
Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law defines the overall
framework for acceptable conditions of work but leaves specific
agreements on wages, hours, and conditions of employment to the
discretion of employers in consultation with employees. The Government
fixed by decree a monthly minimum wage for all sectors; however, this
was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. The minimum wage was approximately $105 (8,000 dinars) per
month. Ministry of Labor inspectors were responsible for ensuring
compliance with the minimum wage regulation; however, their enforcement
was inconsistent.
The standard workweek was 37.5 hours. Workers who worked beyond the
standard workweek received premium pay on a sliding scale from ``time
and a half'' to ``double time,'' depending on whether the overtime was
worked on a normal work day, a weekend, or a holiday.
There were well-developed occupation and health regulations
codified in the law, but government inspectors did not enforce these
regulations effectively. There were no reports of workers being
dismissed for removing themselves from hazardous working conditions.
Because employment generally was based on very detailed contracts,
workers rarely were subjected to conditions in the workplace about
which they were not previously informed. If workers were subjected to
such conditions, they first could attempt to renegotiate the employment
contract and, that failing, resort to the courts. The high demand for
employment in the country, however, gave the advantage to employers
seeking to exploit employees.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons. There were incidents of women and girls being
kidnaped by terrorist groups for the purposes of rape and servitude
during the year (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.c.).
__________
BAHRAIN
On February 14, the country became a monarchy with a Constitution
that reinstated a legislative body, one of whose chambers is elected.
The new Constitution also confirmed the King as hereditary ruler and
strengthened royal executive authority. According to the National
Action Charter, the King is the head of the three branches of
government: the executive, legislative, and judicial. The Constitution
gives the elected Council of Deputies a role in considering
legislation, but most legislative authority still resides with the King
and he appoints members of the Shura (Consultative) Council. The King
chairs the Higher Judicial Council.
The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled the country since the late
18th century and continued to dominate all facets of its society and
government. The King, Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, governs the
country with the assistance of his uncle, the Prime Minister; his son,
the Crown Prince; and an appointed cabinet of ministers. Members of the
Al-Khalifa family hold 9 out of 24 cabinet positions, including all
``strategic ministries.'' The partially elected National Assembly
consists of a Council of Deputies and an appointed Consultative
Council. The courts were subject to government pressure and occasional
accusations of corruption, and there have been very few instances of
people trying to bring cases against the Government. However, the
courts have ruled against the Government in the past.
Citizens belong to the Shi'a and Sunni sects of Islam, with the
Shi'a constituting approximately two-thirds of the indigenous
population. However, Sunnis predominate politically and economically
because the ruling family is Sunni and is supported by the armed
forces, the security services, and influential Sunni and Shi'a merchant
families who benefit from a relatively open economy under the Al-
Khalifas. Apart from violent demonstrations in April, there were few
incidents of political unrest and there has not been prolonged unrest
since 1996. In May slightly more than half of the country's eligible
voters, both men and women, participated in the first elections in more
than a quarter of a century, electing members of municipal councils
and, in October, electing 40 members of the Council of Deputies.
The Ministry of Interior was responsible for public security. It
controlled the public security force (police) and the extensive
security service, which were responsible for maintaining internal
order. The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) was responsible for defending
against external threats. It also monitored the internal security
situation. The security forces committed a few serious human rights
abuses during the year.
The country has a population of approximately 650,000, an estimated
one-third of whom are noncitizens, many of whom are Asian workers. It
has a mixed economy, is a regional financial and business center, and
depends on tourism from Saudi Arabia.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in a number of areas and improved significantly in other areas,
particularly concerning respect for political rights; however, its
record remained poor in other areas, particularly with respect to
impunity of government officials and the independence of the judiciary.
The Government denied citizens the right to change their government;
however, the election of the Council of Deputies should be a
significant step forward in improving citizens' ability to effect
change in their government.
All remaining political prisoners were freed and all exiles
officially allowed to return in 2001. Although more than 1000 persons
still faced problems obtaining proper documentation during the year,
the Government managed to resolve these problems and issued the
appropriate documents by the end of the year. The Government also
assisted in the return of approximately 300 persons that had been
forced into exile in the past decades.
Impunity remained a problem, and there were no known instances of
security forces personnel being punished for abuses of authority
committed during the year or in the past; however, according to the
Interior Ministry, its Disciplinary Court convicted a total of 25
police officers during the year and in 2001 for criminal activities.
Some were incarcerated. The Interior Ministry also referred 77
additional cases to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution. Under the
new Constitution, the judiciary is nominally independent, but it still
remained subject to government pressure. The press published credible
allegations that some judges were corrupt. The Government continued to
infringe to some extent on citizens' privacy rights.
The Government imposed some restrictions on the freedoms of speech
and the press, and restricted freedoms of assembly and association.
These restrictions increased during the first half of the year. The
founding of the country's first independent newspaper in September
marked an improvement for freedom of the press. The Government also
imposed some limits on freedom of religion and freedom of movement. In
July the Government registered the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, the
country's second human rights NGO. Violence against women and
discrimination based on sex, religion, and ethnicity remained problems.
The promulgation in September of a law on unions, which gave workers
for the first time the right to organize and bargain collectively, was
a significant improvement in the rights of workers. This and other
legislation also improved the legal status of foreign workers. Abuse of
foreign workers occurred, including numerous instances of forced labor
and some instances of trafficking. Bahrain was invited by the Community
of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second
CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings. However, authorities used rubber bullets
to disperse a demonstration resulting in the death of a demonstrator.
The Government established a committee to investigate the incident, but
the committee had not presented evidence or reached conclusions at
year's end (see Section 2.b.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were some reports of
police abuse of civilians during the year. On April 5, during
demonstrations near a diplomatic mission, in an effort to disperse a
violent demonstration, riot police struck a citizen with a rubber
projectile, resulting in his death (see Section 2.b.).
During demonstrations on April 10, police beat a human rights
activist who had asked them to stop beating a prostrate demonstrator.
The Undersecretary of the Interior promised to investigate the incident
and punish the officers responsible. In October the Ministry of
Interior reportedly concluded that the incident was the ``natural
result'' of interfering with police work. The process leading to this
conclusion was not disclosed. There were no indications that any
officers were punished.
In May Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) officers
reportedly kidnaped Jassim Ahmed Salman and beat him for 2 hours in
retaliation for Salman's participation in an assault on a DMI officer
during a small demonstration in May near a diplomatic mission. There
were no reports that the Government investigated this case or punished
those involved (see 1.d.).
On December 11, lawyers for eight citizens made allegations against
former Colonel Adil Jassim Flaifel for routinely engaging in torture
and ill-treatment of prisoners. According to Amnesty International
(AI), the general prosecutor in the Legal Affairs Bureau did not
acknowledge receipt of the complaint. He asserted that the general
amnesty issued by the King in February 2001 and reaffirmed in October
applied to government employees as well as regular citizens.
In 2001 two Shi'a men reported that the police detained and beat
them. Although one of the men admittedly sought the confrontation with
the police, the police illegally arrested them without a court-issued
warrant (see Section 1.d.).
In the past, there were credible reports that prisoners often were
tortured and subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Before the annulment of the State Security Act in February 2001, the
Government had difficulty in rebutting allegations of torture and of
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices because it permitted
incommunicado detention and detention without trial. There continued to
be credible reports of prisoners being beaten and mishandled.
Government officials and human rights activists stated that these
practices resulted more from poor police training and lax supervision
rather than from a systematic, extrajudicial effort to punish suspects.
There continued to be no known instances of officials being punished
for human rights abuses committed either during the year or in any
previous year.
There were no allegations that security forces threatened female
detainees with rape or inflicted other forms of sexual abuse and
harassment on them while they were in custody.
The prisons generally met international standards. Women prisoners
were housed separately from men, and juveniles were housed separately
until the age of 15. The last visit of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) to monitor prisons was in 2001, when the last of
the country's political prisoners were freed.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution states
that ``no person shall be arrested, detained, imprisoned, searched or
compelled to reside in a specified place except in accordance with the
provisions of the law and under the supervision of the judicial
authorities.'' The authorities generally observed these provisions in
practice, although there was a report of a case where security
officials detained a citizen without a legal warrant. In May DMI
officers allegedly detained and beat Jassim Ahmed Salman (see Section
1.c.).
In another incident in December 2001, which was reported to the
police in January, two Shi'a youths said they had been held by police
for 2 days without being charged. The victims were released within the
48-hour time period that the law allows police to hold suspects without
a court order. There were no reports of government investigations into
these incidents (see Section 1.c.).
Since the 2001 abolition of the State Security Act, courts refused
police requests to detain suspects longer than 48 hours, and the police
complied with court orders to release suspects. Judges may grant bail
to a suspect. However, attorneys still require a court order to visit
detainees in jail.
The Ministry of Justice is responsible for public prosecutors,
while the Ministry of Interior oversees the police and all aspects of
prison administration. Access to attorneys was restricted; in the early
stages of detention, prisoners and their attorneys must seek a court
order to be able to meet. Prisoners may receive visits from family
members, usually once a month.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports
of new cases of forced exile during the year. All remaining political
prisoners were freed, and all exiles officially allowed to return in
2001. Although more than 1000 persons in the country faced problems
obtaining proper citizenship documentation during the year, the
Government managed to resolve these problems and issued the appropriate
documents by the end of the year. The Government also assisted in the
return of some 300 persons that had been forced into exile in the past
decades (see Sections 4 and 5).
The Constitution prohibits stripping a person of nationality except
in cases of treason and other such cases as prescribed by the law. In
the past, the Government revoked the citizenship of persons whom it
considered to be security threats. There were no reports of such
actions during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was not independent, and
courts were subject to government pressure regarding verdicts,
sentencing, and appeals. In past cases, the King, the Prime Minister,
and other senior government officials lost civil cases brought against
them by private citizens; however, the court-ordered judgments were not
always implemented expeditiously. Members of the ruling Al-Khalifa
family were well represented in the judiciary and generally did not
recuse themselves from cases involving the interests of the Government.
According to the new Constitution, the King appoints all judges by
Royal Decree. Once appointed, judges are civil servants who may work
for the Government until the mandatory age of retirement (60 years).
The King also serves as chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, the
body responsible for supervising the work of the courts and the Public
Prosecution office. The Constitution does not provide a legislative
branch confirmation process for judicial appointees nor does it
establish an impeachment process. Article 106 provides for the
establishment of a Constitutional Court to rule on the
constitutionality of laws and statutes. The King appoints all judges of
this special court by Royal Decree. They serve 9-year terms and cannot
be removed before their terms expire. The King may present draft laws
to this court before their implementation to determine the extent of
their agreement with the Constitution, providing rudimentary judicial
review. The Court's determination is ``binding on all state authorities
and on everyone.''
The civil and criminal legal systems consisted of a complex mix of
courts, based on diverse legal sources, including Sunni and Shi'a
Shari'a (Islamic law), tribal law, and other civil codes and
regulations. The King's annulment of the 1974 State Security Act
abolished its separate, closed security court system, which had
jurisdiction in cases of alleged antigovernment activity.
The BDF maintained a separate court system for military personnel
accused of offenses under the Military Code of Justice. The Ministry of
Interior had a similar system for trying police officials. Neither
court reviewed cases involving civilian, criminal, or security
offenses.
Defendants may choose their own attorneys. If they are unable to
afford a private attorney, defendants may ask the Justice Ministry to
appoint an attorney to represent them in court. In the past, some
attorneys and family members involved in politically sensitive criminal
cases claimed that the Government interfered with court proceedings to
influence the outcome or to prevent judgments from being carried out;
however, there were no such reports during the year. There were
allegations of corruption in the judicial system.
Civil or criminal trial procedures provided for an open trial, the
right to counsel (with legal aid available when necessary), and the
right to appeal. Criminal court proceedings generally did not appear to
discriminate against women, children, or minority groups. Prior to the
annulment of the State Security Act in February 2001, there was
credible evidence that persons accused of anti-government crimes who
were tried in the criminal courts were denied fair trials. Such trials
were held in secret, and the defendants were not permitted to speak
with an attorney until their appearance before the judge at the
preliminary hearing. The annulment of the State Security Act also
abolished the State Security Court, which had tried security cases in
secret.
There were no reports of political prisoners during the year. In
mid-February 2001, the King pardoned and released all political
prisoners and detainees. Until that time, the Government held in
detention hundreds of Shi'a for offenses involving ``national
security.'' In accordance with tradition, the Government releases and
grants amnesty to some prisoners on major holidays.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary
interference with privacy, home, and correspondence except under the
provisions of law and under judicial supervision. Nonetheless, the
Government continued to infringe on citizens' right to privacy,
although such reports declined significantly during the year. The
Government continued to carry out some illegal searches. Telephone
calls and personal correspondence remained subject to monitoring.
Police informer networks were extensive and sophisticated.
There were no reports during the year of security forces setting up
checkpoints at the entrances to villages, conducting vehicle searches,
and requiring proof of identity from anyone seeking to enter or exit. A
government-controlled proxy prohibited user access to Internet sites
considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic, but these restrictions
were often circumvented (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The new Constitution provides for
the right to express and publish opinions ``under the rules and
conditions laid down by law, provided that the fundamental beliefs of
Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity of the people is not
prejudiced, and discord or sectarianism is not aroused.'' In practice,
the Government limited this right, particularly in the media. However,
the establishment of an independent newspaper in September helped
expand the freedom of the press.
Local press coverage and commentary on international issues was
open, and discussion of local economic and commercial issues also was
relatively unrestricted. Representatives from the Information Ministry
actively monitored and blocked local stories on sensitive matters,
especially those fostering sectarianism or criticizing the royal
family, and journalists practiced self-censorship. The new independent
Arabic daily Al-Wasat's coverage that criticized some government
policies and actions encouraged other papers to attempt to improve
their coverage on these matters. Al-Wasat's introduction, and the
competition it engendered with the established press, improved the
press climate noticeably.
Throughout the year, press censorship on sensitive issues was more
apparent than in 2001, but the press remained more open than before the
reforms of 2000. Since 2000, the press covered controversial issues
such as criticism of government policies, discussion of sectarian
issues, unemployment, and housing more freely than before. However,
criticism of the ruling family and the Saudi ruling family and
fostering sectarian divisions remained largely prohibited.
In January the ``Emergency Matters Court'' overturned the
Information Ministry's October 2001 decision to ban the publications of
Hafidh Al-Shaikh, a frequent columnist in local newspapers. The
Information Ministry accused Al-Shaikh of fostering sectarian divisions
in society, but Al-Shaikh and others claimed that an article he
published in a Lebanese newspaper criticizing the country's Crown
Prince was the reason for this banning. The Government chose not to
appeal the court's decision and Al-Shaikh continued to write and
publish.
The decision by four political societies to boycott the October 24
legislative election did not appear in any of the local papers while
London-based Al-Hayat, available at newsstands throughout the country,
gave the story front-page coverage. When the story did appear in the
local newspapers days later, coverage of the decision and its
announcement at a press conference was pale and conveyed a strong
progovernment slant. However, by October political discussion of the
boycott was extensive in Al-Wasat.
In November local media received instructions to avoid commenting
on the alleged human rights abuses of a former security official, Adel
Jassim Flaifel, who had fled the country because of alleged financial
misdeeds. However, some journalists published general statements about
these allegations. Many articles discussed the lawsuits connected with
Flaifel's alleged financial misdeeds in the country and in Australia.
By December there was detailed reporting on specific allegations of
human rights abuses by Flaifel (see Section 1.c.).
In November the Government issued Royal Decree number 47, a new law
governing the press. Article 1 of the new law states: ``Everyone has
the right to express his views and to publish them.'' The rest of the
law, which consists of 24 pages and 96 articles, devotes itself largely
to placing restrictions on these ``rights.'' Other articles allow
prison sentences for three general categories of offenses: criticizing
the State's official religion, criticizing the King, and inciting
actions that undermine state security. In addition, the law allows
fines up to $5,300 (BD 2,000) for 14 other offenses, including
publishing statements issued by a foreign state or organization before
obtaining the consent of the Minister of Information, any news reports
which may adversely affect the value of the national currency, any
offense against a head of state maintaining diplomatic relations with
the country, or offensive remarks towards an accredited representative
of a foreign country because of acts connected with his post.
The exact legal status of this law was unclear. All newspapers ran
articles and editorials criticizing the law, and 1 week after its
issuance, the Prime Minister declared the law ``frozen,'' and ordered
that the Cabinet review the law. This created some confusion, as the
term ``frozen'' is not defined under law, and it was not entirely clear
if this law was being applied. There were reports that two journalists
were suspended for 7 to 10 days in December, but it was not apparent if
these punishments were handed out under the authority of the new press
law.
Persons expressed critical opinions openly regarding some domestic
political and social issues in private settings and occasionally on
state-run television call-in shows and increasingly in organized public
forums. They did not criticize leading government officials. However,
public demonstrations increased over issues of family status law,
violations of zoning, and human rights abuses. These were covered in
the print media but not on government-owned television.
The Election Law promulgated in July regulated candidates'
political activities, prohibiting speeches at most public locations and
limiting the areas where campaign materials could be placed. However,
these regulations were only sporadically enforced (see 2.b.).
The Information Ministry controlled local broadcast media and
exercised considerable control over local print media, except Al-Wasat,
even though newspapers were privately owned. The Government generally
afforded foreign journalists access to the country and did not limit
their contacts. However, the Government continued to ban correspondents
from the Qatar-based television Al-Jazeera, accusing the station of
using sensationalized and one-sided coverage to project unfairly a
negative image of the Government.
The Bahrain Journalists' Association, formed in 2000, had a
preponderance of government employees from the Information Ministry and
was not an independent organization protecting journalists' rights and
interests.
The Government owned and operated all local radio and television
stations. Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi from
neighboring countries and Egypt were received without interference.
Government approval to access satellite dishes and to import or install
dishes no longer was required. The Qatar-based television station Al-
Jazeera was available in the country via satellite. Except for the
banning of Al-Jazeera's correspondents, there were no complaints by
international news services regarding press restrictions.
Access to the Internet was provided through the National Telephone
Company (BATELCO). E-mail use was unimpeded, although it was subject to
monitoring (see Section 1.f.). Approximately 235,000 residents of the
country, slightly more than one-third of the population, used the
Internet.
Although there were no formal regulations limiting academic
freedom, in practice academics avoided contentious political issues and
the university did not have a political science program. University
hiring and admissions policies favored Sunnis and others who were
presumed to support the Government, rather than focusing on
professional experience and academic qualifications. However, there
continued to be some improvement in the hiring of qualified individuals
in a nondiscriminatory manner during the year, and a few Shi'a
professors, including women, were hired. Larger numbers of Shi'a
students were accepted into the national university, but this was still
a smaller proportion than in the general population.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of free assembly; however, the Government
restricted its exercise by requiring that organizers of public events
acquire permits, which were not granted in a routine fashion. The law
prohibits unauthorized public gatherings of more than five persons. The
Government periodically limited and controlled gatherings that might
take on a political tone.
From the passage of the National Action Charter in February 2001
until July, gatherings at social and political clubs for political
discussions were held regularly and without any obvious obstruction by
the Government. However, the Political Rights Law promulgated in July
had a negative effect on the freedoms of speech and association (see
Section 2.a.). The law, intended to regulate election campaigns,
prohibits ``election meetings'' at worship centers, universities,
schools, government buildings, and public institutions. After this
law's promulgation, the occurrence of public meetings declined
precipitously, and they received little coverage in the local press.
One leader of a popular public forum reported that he had been told by
a high-level government official to reduce the attendance at meetings
and make them ``less political.''
Demonstrations occurred throughout the year, not all of which were
approved by the Government. Unless violent, the Government generally
did not intervene. On January 7, police dispersed an unauthorized
demonstration of 200 youths who were protesting unemployment in the
country. When demonstrators ignored police requests to avoid illegal
behavior and began blocking traffic, riot police used tear gas to
disperse the demonstration and arrested nine persons.
Initially peaceful demonstrations of 2,000 to 3,000 persons on
April 5 turned into an assault on the U.S. Embassy in which 1 citizen
was killed by local security forces (see Section 1.a. and 1.c.).
Emerging from a scheduled, peaceful protest, a well-organized group of
200-300 youths used firebombs, cinder blocks, and slings with metal
shot to attack the embassy, endangering embassy personnel and
destroying property. After an initially hesitant response, local riot
police used tear gas and fired 38mm flexible rubber batons, not rubber-
coated steel bullets, to disperse the attackers. One of the rubber
projectiles struck a citizen in the head, and he died of his injuries 2
days later. Following the incident, the Government announced the
establishment of a committee to investigate, but there has been no
public presentation of evidence or conclusions (see 1.a. and 1.c.).
A violent pro-Palestinian demonstration on April 10 directed
towards a diplomatic mission resulted in 60 casualties and 500 persons
being hospitalized when security forces used tear gas and rubber
bullets to disperse the crowd.
The Constitution provides for the right of free association;
however, the Government limited this right in practice, for example, by
prohibiting political parties. The Government allowed political
societies to run candidates and support them financially. On September
24, the Government took steps to improve significantly the right of
association for workers by granting them, for the first time, the right
to form trade unions.
During the last 2 years, the Government authorized several NGOs to
conduct political activities related to the organizations' purposes,
including two human rights organizations. Previously, only the Bahraini
Bar Association was exempt from the regulations that require that the
charters of all associations include a commitment to refrain from
political activity.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that Islam is the
official religion and also provides for freedom of religion; however,
there were some limits on this right. Thirteen Christian congregations
registered with the Ministry of Labor operated freely and allowed other
Christian congregations to use their facilities. Other unregistered
Christian congregations likely existed, and there was no attempt by the
Government to force them to register. There was also a Jewish synagogue
and a Hindu temple. The Government subjected both Sunni and Shi'a
Muslims to control and monitoring. Members of other religions who
practice their faith privately did so without interference from the
Government. Every religious group must obtain a permit from the
Ministry of Justice and Islamic affairs in order to operate. Depending
on circumstances, a religious group may also need approvals from the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Information, and/
or the Ministry of Education (if the religious group wants to run a
school).
The Government funded, monitored, and subjected all official
religious institutions to some controls. These include Shi'a and Sunni
mosques, Shi'a ma'tams (religious community centers), Shi'a and Sunni
waqfs (charitable foundations), and the religious courts, which
represent both the Ja'afari (Shi'a) and Maliki (one of the four Sunni)
schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Holding a religious meeting without a
permit is illegal. There were no reports of religious groups being
denied a permit. At least one religious event was held without a
permit, but the Government took no action against the event's sponsor.
In October the press reported that a school emphasizing a Shi'a
curriculum was established for the first time in the country.
The Government rarely interferes with what it considers legitimate
religious observations. The Political Rights Law promulgated in July
forbids election speeches in worship centers, but political sermons
continued, and there were no reports of the Government closing ma'tams
or mosques because of the content of religious services held there (see
Section 2.a. and 2.b.). In the past, the Government actively suppressed
activity deemed overtly political in nature, occasionally closing
mosques and ma'tams for allowing political demonstrations to take place
on or near their premises and detaining religious leaders for
delivering political sermons or for allowing such sermons to be
delivered in their mosques. There were no reported closures of ma'tams
or mosques during the year. The Government also may appropriate or
withhold funding in order to reward or punish particular individuals or
places of worship. There were no reports of the Government withholding
funding or closing religious facilities during the year.
Although there were notable exceptions, the Sunni Muslim minority
enjoyed a favored status. Members of the royal family are Sunnis, and
Sunnis received preference for employment in sensitive government
positions and in the managerial ranks of the civil service. Public
religious events, most notably the large annual Ashura marches by
Shi'a, were permitted but were monitored closely by the police. The
Shi'a celebration of Ashura is a 2-day national holiday in the country,
and the King ordered the Ministry of Information to provide full media
coverage of Ashura events. There were no restrictions on the number of
citizens permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi'a shrines and holy sites
in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Government monitored travel to Iran and
scrutinized carefully those who choose to pursue religious study there.
The Government discourages proselytizing by non-Muslims and
prohibits anti-Islamic writings. However, Bibles and other Christian
publications were displayed and sold openly in local bookstores. Some
small groups worshiped in their homes. Religious tracts of all branches
of Islam, cassettes of sermons delivered by Muslim preachers from other
countries, and publications of other religions readily were available.
One reported instance of societal violence against a minority
religion's property occurred during the year. On May 15, 70 graves at
the St. Christopher's Church cemetery were desecrated. The King
promised not only to restore the graveyard, but to transform it into a
monument to the country's history of Christian-Muslim relations. There
were no reports of the results of the investigation into this incident.
While the defense and internal security forces predominantly were
Sunni, Shi'a citizens were allowed to hold posts in these forces;
however, they did not hold positions of significance. In the private
sector, Shi'a citizens tended to be employed in lower paid, less
skilled jobs. In private conversations, Shi'a consistently complained
of discrimination, especially in receiving public sector jobs and slots
at the university. While Shi'a acknowledged that the situation was
improving slowly, they still made up a disproportionately high
percentage of the country's unemployed. Public discussion of this issue
remained taboo and any reference to Shi'a complaints in the press were
indirect.
Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shi'a
neighborhoods, particularly in villages, were inferior to those found
in Sunni urban communities, despite government initiatives beginning to
address the problem.
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2002 International
Religious Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution prohibits restrictions
on freedom of movement, except as provided by law and judicial
supervision. Banishment is prohibited, as is prevention of return.
Bahraini passports were valid for travel to all countries.
Citizens were free to move within the country and change their
place of residence or work. Although more than 1,000 persons in the
country faced problems obtaining proper citizenship documentation
during the year, the Government resolved these problems and issued the
appropriate documents by the end of the year. The Government also
assisted in the return of some 300 persons that had been forced into
exile in the past decades. The Government occasionally grants
citizenship to Sunni residents, most of whom are from Jordan, the
Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt. This practice was controversial, and
several of the candidates for the October legislative elections
campaigned publicly against this practice, calling it ``random
naturalization.'' The Government did not publish the numbers of Sunnis
and Shi'a it naturalized during the year, making it difficult to
evaluate these charges.
Under the 1963 Citizenship Law, the Government may reject
applications to obtain or renew passports for reasonable cause, but the
applicant has the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil
Court. The Government also issued temporary passports, valid for one
trip per year, to persons whose travel it wished to control or whose
claim to citizenship was questionable. A noncitizen resident may obtain
a travel document, usually valid for 2 years and renewable at the
country's embassies overseas. The holder of a travel document also
required a visa to reenter the country.
The Government cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), although it has not formulated a formal policy
regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum. The Government usually
does not accept refugees due to the country's small size and limited
resources. However, there were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government or their
political system; however, the Constitution provided for the first
democratically elected political institution since the dissolution of
the National Assembly in 1975. On February 14, the country became a
monarchy with a constitution. Elections for the newly established
Council of Deputies took place on October 24. The King appoints the
Prime Minister, who then proposes Cabinet Ministers that are appointed
by the King. Members of the ruling family hold all security-related
offices.
In February 2001, an overwhelming majority of eligible citizens
(98.4 percent), both male and female, endorsed a government plan called
the National Action Charter, to restore constitutional rule. The
Constitution was drafted in secret and delivered to the people as a
royal grant in February.
In May the country's voters elected municipal councils in the first
election among the Arab Gulf states that allowed men and women to
participate as both voters and candidates. These councils have
authority to allocate resources in their jurisdiction for local
services. Funding comes from taxes collected by the Ministry of
Municipalities and the Environment. These councils began meeting in
September, but their role is still being defined.
The 40 elected members of the Representative Council shared
legislative powers with the King and with the 40 members of the Shura
Council appointed by the King. Collectively, the two chambers are known
as the National Assembly. Either chamber may propose legislation, but
the Cabinet's Office of Legal Affairs must draft the actual text of
laws. The King may veto laws passed by the National Assembly, which may
override a veto by a two-thirds majority vote. If the legislature
overrides a veto, the King must promulgate the law within 1 month. The
King may dissolve the Representative Council at his discretion, and he
retains the power to amend the Constitution and propose, ratify, and
promulgate laws. Either council may question government ministers and
the Representative Council may pass by a two-thirds majority votes of
no confidence that require the minister's resignation. The
Representative Council may also introduce a resolution indicating it
cannot cooperate with the Prime Minister. The entire National Assembly
would then have to pass the resolution by a two-thirds majority that
would require the King to either dismiss the Prime Minister or dissolve
the Council of Deputies.
The Political Rights and Election Laws promulgated in July placed
restrictions on the freedoms of speech and association (see Sections
2.a. and 2.b.). There were no political parties. The Government drew
the electoral districts in both the municipal council and the
legislative elections to protect Sunni interests by creating several
districts with small populations likely to elect a Sunni candidate. In
contrast, districts where a Shi'a candidate was likely to win were
drawn to include large numbers of voters, a formula that diluted the
voting strength of the Shi'a community. International observers
commented that this gerrymandering generally violated the one-man one-
vote principle common to most democracies. They also observed that
candidates were not allowed to visually observe ballot counting and
that there was an incomplete reporting of election results during the
election process.
The country held its first elections in nearly 3 decades during the
year. In May voters elected municipal councils. In October slightly
more than half of eligible voters elected 40 members to the
Representative Council. The largest political society, joined by three
other smaller societies, chose not to participate in the October
elections, citing grievances over the Constitution, especially the
provisions that equalize the powers of the elected Council of Deputies
and the appointed Shura Council. There were no government candidates.
Informed observers reported that the election campaigning and voting
was substantially free and fair.
Although women candidates stood in both elections, none were
elected to office. However, in the October elections, two women forced
their competitors into runoffs in which each woman received more than
40 percent of the vote. The King appointed six women to the Shura
Council. There were no women at the ministerial levels of government.
The majority of women who chose to work in the Government did so in a
support capacity, and only a few attained senior positions within their
respective ministries or agencies. Women may vote and run for elected
office. Although no women were elected in either the municipal or
legislative elections, the Constitution provides for the right of women
to participate and was a consistent refrain in the public statements of
both the King and the Crown Prince. Turnout for municipal councils
elections in May was approximately 51 percent; just over 52 percent of
the voters who turned out for those elections were women. Turnout for
the October election was just over 53 percent, according to government
figures; the Government did not publish the number of women voters.
The King appointed one Christian and one Jewish member to the Shura
Council. Twenty-one Shura Council members were Shi'a Muslims and 17
were Sunni. Approximately one-third of the cabinet ministers were
Shi'a.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Restrictions on freedom of association and expression sometimes
hindered investigation or public criticism of the Government's human
rights policies. Over 300 NGOs have been registered, helping to
facilitate the growth of civil societies and public discourse. The
largest proportion were devoted to charitable activities. Some NGOs
dealt with concerns of expatriates and others focused on women's
issues. There was a human rights component in much of their efforts.
Members of these groups met with government officials and the
Government has responded on some issues, most notably on exilees and
the situation of the stateless bidoons (see Section 1.d.).
Most, if not all, of the members of the Damascus-based Committee
for the Defense of Human Rights in Bahrain and the Copenhagen-based
Bahrain Human Rights Organization have returned to the country since
the 2001 referendum on the National Action Charter. The London-based
Bahrain Freedom Movement and the Beirut-based Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain remained active outside the country, but Bahrain
Freedom Movement leader Dr. Mansur Al-Jamry returned to the country in
December 2001 and established an independent newspaper in September
(see Section 2.a.). Previously, Bahrain Freedom Movement leader Dr.
Majid Al-Alawi returned in January 2001 to become Assistant Secretary
General for the Bahrain Center for Studies and Research, the country's
only think tank. On November 11, Dr. Al-Alawi was named Minister of
Labor and Social Affairs.
In recent years, the Government allowed increasing access of
international human rights organizations. During the year, there were
no reports of government harassment of these groups or their members.
The U.N. High Commission for Human Rights visited the country in March
and praised its democratic reforms, especially those guaranteeing women
the right to vote and run for office. Officials from AI and Human
Rights Watch visited in February.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the
right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work
for all citizens. However, in practice these rights were protected
unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, ethnicity, or
sex.
Women.--Women's groups and health care professionals stated that
spousal abuse was common, particularly in poorer communities. In
general, there was little public attention to, or discussion of the
problem. Incidents usually were kept within the family. No government
policies or laws explicitly addressed violence against women. During
the year, a few articles appeared in the local press discussing
violence against women and the need for laws to defend women who are
abused. There were very few known instances of women seeking legal
redress for violence. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the courts were
not receptive to such cases. Rape is illegal; however, because marital
relations are governed by Shari'a law, spousal rape was not a legal
concept within the law.
It was not uncommon for foreign women working as domestic workers
to be beaten or sexually abused (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.). Numerous
cases were reported to local embassies and the police. However, most
victims were too intimidated to sue their employers. Courts reportedly
allowed victims who do appear to sue for damages, return home, or both.
Although prostitution is illegal, some foreign women, including
some who worked as hotel and restaurant staff, engaged in prostitution.
(see Section 6.f.).
Conditions for women in the country improved during the year, and
the Government played a leadership role in promoting the rights of
women. The Government publicly encouraged women to work and was a
leading employer of women, who constituted a significant percentage of
the Government workforce and included university professors, public
school teachers, and employees in the public health and social sectors.
However, in 2001, approximately 17 percent of the total work force was
female, and more than half of the female workers were noncitizens. NGOs
working on women's issues were very active in encouraging women to vote
and to run for office during the municipal council and parliamentary
elections. Several of these NGOs were also active on social issues such
as health and education, and provision of assistance to women and
children, particularly the poor.
Shari'a governs the legal rights of women. Specific rights vary
according to Shi'a or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law, as
determined by the individual's faith, or by the court in which various
contracts, including marriage, are made. Some women complained that
Shari'a courts were biased against women, especially in divorce cases.
In October a group of representatives of women's' societies filed
complaints with the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs against
several Shari'a judges, arguing that women were often treated unfairly
in these courts. They also called for the issuance of a long-promised
Personal Status Law that would more clearly define women's rights.
While both Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a
divorce, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local
religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases,
occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances
must travel abroad to seek a higher ranking opinion than that available
in the country. Women of either branch may own and inherit property and
may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the
absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property. By
contrast, in the absence of a direct male heir, Sunni women inherit
only a portion as governed by Shari'a; the balance is divided among the
brothers or male relatives of the deceased. In practice, better-
educated families used wills and other legal maneuvers to ameliorate
the negative impact of these rules.
In divorce cases, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni women
custody of daughters under the age of 9 and sons under the age of 7,
although custody usually reverts to the father once the children reach
those ages. Regardless of custody decisions, in all circumstances,
except for mental incapacitation, the father retains the right to make
certain legal decisions for his children, such as guardianship of any
property belonging to the child, until the child reaches legal age. A
noncitizen woman automatically loses custody of her children if she
divorces their citizen father. A Muslim woman legally may marry a non-
Muslim man if the man converts to Islam. In such marriages, the
children automatically are considered to be Muslim. Women may obtain
passports and leave the country without the permission of the male head
of the household. Women were free to work outside the home, to drive
cars without escorts, and to wear clothing of their choice.
Women increasingly took jobs previously reserved for men and
constituted approximately 17 percent of the workforce. Labor laws do
not discriminate against women; however, in practice there was
discrimination in the workplace, including inequality of wages and
denial of opportunity for advancement. Sexual harassment is prohibited;
however, it was a widespread problem for foreign women, especially
those working as domestics and other low-level service jobs. The
Government has encouraged the hiring of women, enacted special laws to
promote their entry into the work force, and was a leading employer of
women. Laws do not recognize the concept of equal pay for equal work,
and women frequently were paid less than men. Generally women worked
outside the home during the years between secondary school or
university and marriage.
Women made up the majority of students at the country's
universities, although some women complained that admissions policies
at the National University aimed to increase the number of male
students at the expense of qualified female applicants, especially
Shi'a women.
There were a large number of women's organizations that sought to
improve the status of women under both civil and Islamic law.
Constitutional provisions granting women the right to vote and run for
elected office were advances for women's rights. However, some women
expressed the view that, despite their participation in the work force
and their constitutional rights, in practice women's rights were not
advancing significantly because of the influence of religious
traditionalists. Other women desired a return to more traditional
values and supported calls for a return to traditional Islamic patterns
of social behavior.
Children.--The Government has stated often its commitment to the
protection of children's rights and welfare within the social and
religious framework of society. It generally honored this commitment
through enforcement of civil and criminal laws and an extensive social
welfare network. Public education for citizen children below the age of
15 was free. While the Constitution provides for compulsory education
at the primary levels (usually up to 12 or 13 years of age), the
authorities did not enforce attendance. Limited medical services for
infants and preadolescents were provided free of charge.
The social status of children is shaped by tradition and religion
to a greater extent than by civil law. Child abuse was rare, as was
public discussion of it; the preference of the authorities was to leave
such matters within the purview of the family or religious groups. One
case that drew public attention was that of a 13-year old girl who was
reportedly abused by members of her family and then disappeared.
According to local media, the case received attention at the highest
levels of the Government, but despite the Prime Minister's public
charge to the police to find her, she remained missing at year's end.
The authorities actively enforced the laws against prostitution,
including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping. Violators were
dealt with harshly and may be imprisoned, or, if a noncitizen,
deported. In the past, the authorities reportedly returned children
arrested for prostitution and other nonpolitical crimes to their
families rather than prosecute them, especially for first offenses.
There were no reports of child prostitution during the year.
Some legal experts called on the Government to establish a separate
juvenile court. However, other citizens insisted that the protection of
children was a religious, not a secular, function and opposed greater
government involvement. Independent and quasi-governmental
organizations, such as the Bahraini Society for the Protection of
Children and the Mother and Child Welfare Society, played an active
part in protecting children by providing counseling, legal assistance,
advice, and, in some cases, shelter and financial support to distressed
children and families. The Child Care Home, funded from both government
and private sources, provided shelter for children whose parents were
unable to care for them.
There were very few reports of arrests and detentions of juveniles
during the year, and those who were arrested reportedly were released
soon thereafter.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law protects the rights of persons
with disabilities and a variety of governmental, quasi-governmental,
and religious institutions were mandated to support and protect persons
with disabilities. The regional Center for the Treatment of the Blind
was headquartered in the country, and a similar Center for the
Education of Deaf Children was established in 1994. Society tended to
view persons with disabilities as special cases in need of protection
rather than as fully functioning members of society. Nonetheless, the
Government is required by law to provide vocational training for
persons with disabilities who wish to work, and maintains a list of
certified, trained persons with disabilities.
The Labor Law of 1976 also requires that any employer of more than
100 persons must hire at least 2 percent of its employees from the
Government's list of workers with disabilities; however, the Government
did not monitor compliance. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
worked actively to place persons with disabilities in public sector
jobs, such as in the public telephone exchanges. The Government's
housing regulations require that access be provided to persons with
disabilities. Greater emphasis has been given in recent years to public
building design that incorporates access for persons with disabilities;
however, the law does not mandate access to buildings for persons with
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most bidoon, a group of
approximately 9,000 to 15,000 formerly stateless persons, mostly Shi'a
of Persian-origin but including some Christians, were granted
citizenship during 2001. During the year, the Government granted
citizenship to the approximately 1,300 remaining bidoon (see Sections
1.d. and 2.d.). Approximately 1,000 of these were already living in the
country. The Government paid for the return of some 300 others from
Iran who were exiled forcibly in the 1980s. Without citizenship, bidoon
legally had been prohibited from buying land, starting a business, or
obtaining government loans. Bidoon and citizens who speak Farsi rather
than Arabic as their first language faced significant social and
economic discrimination, including difficulty in finding employment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--On September 24, the King promulgated
a new law on labor unions that grants workers for the first time the
right to form and join unions. Previously, the Constitution recognized
the right of workers to organize; however, the Government banned
independent trade unions. The new law also clearly grants noncitizens
the right to join unions. The first union formed under the new law was
formed on October 8 at the Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company.
Unions can be formed at establishments of any size. Employers and the
Government are required to treat unions as independent entities.
Labor leaders reported that unions were forming successfully and
had not reported any problems with excessively cumbersome rules and
regulations imposed by either the Government or corporate management.
The law established a union federation, the General Federation of
Workers Trade Unions in Bahrain (GFWTUB) that replaced the General
Federation of Bahraini Workers. All unions will be members of the
GFWTUB. The law does not restrict who may be a union official, other
than to stipulate that a member of a company's management may not be a
union member. The law also states that no more than one union per
establishment may be created and prohibits unions from engaging in
political activities.
The new law allows union membership for private sector workers,
workers in the civil service, and maritime workers. Labor leaders
reported that the law permits all categories of workers except soldiers
to join unions.
The law does not mention antiunion discrimination, and no reports
of such behavior were reported. Nothing in the law prohibits unions
from access to the legal system. The law encourages unions to
participate in international labor forums and events; however, none has
yet joined an internationally affiliated trade union organization. No
internationally affiliated trade union exists in the country.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The new law
grants workers for the first time the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Previously, the Government had denied this right,
allowing only Joint Labor-Management Committees (JLCs), which were not
independent mechanisms for representing workers' interests. Unions can
be formed at establishments of any size. Employers and the Government
are required to treat unions as independent entities.
The new law states that ``the right to strike is a legitimate means
for workers to defend their rights and interests''; however, the law
also places some restrictions on this right. The law requires
arbitration before a vote to strike and that three-quarters of a
union's members approve the strike in a secret ballot. It was not yet
clear if the arbitration was binding. Although government sources say
the arbitration provision will not preempt the right to strike, the
text of the law does not clearly specify that a union may proceed to a
strike vote if it disagrees with the arbitrator's decision. Officials
from the Government, labor, and business were reportedly comfortable
with this ambiguity.
Although there were reports of some workers' protests during the
year, there were no strikes.
There were two export processing zones (EPZs). Labor law and
practice were the same in the EPZs as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--Forced or bonded labor
is prohibited by law; however, in practice, the labor laws applied for
the most part only to citizens, and abuses occurred, particularly in
the cases of domestic servants and those working illegally. The law
also prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government
enforced this prohibition effectively.
Foreign workers, who make up approximately two-thirds of the
workforce, in many cases arrived in the country under the sponsorship
of an employer and then switched jobs while continuing to pay a fee to
their original sponsor. This practice made it difficult to monitor and
control the employment conditions of domestic and other workers. The
Government issued new regulations granting foreigners more freedom to
change jobs, but the process is legally cumbersome and many foreign
workers remained unaware of their rights and obligations under the law.
Unskilled foreign workers can become indentured servants, and often
lacked the knowledge to exercise their legal right to change
employment.
There were numerous credible reports that employers withhold
salaries from their foreign workers for months, even years, at a time,
and refused to grant them the necessary permission to leave the
country. The Government and the courts generally worked to rectify
abuses if they were brought to their attention, but they otherwise
focused little attention on the problem. The fear of deportation or
employer retaliation prevented many foreign workers from making
complaints to the authorities (see Section 6.e.).
Labor laws do not apply to domestic servants. There were numerous
credible reports that domestic servants, especially women, were forced
to work 12-or 16-hour days, given little time off, malnourished, and
subjected to verbal and physical abuse, including sexual molestation
and rape. Between 30 and 40 percent of the attempted suicide cases
handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals were foreign maids
(see Section 6.e.).
There were persistent reports that some foreign women working as
hotel and restaurant staff were locked in a communal house or apartment
when not working and driven to work in a van. Many reportedly traded
sexual favors with hotel managers in exchange for time off from work
(see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years of age.
Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 may not be employed in
hazardous conditions or at night, and may not work more than 6 hours
per day or on a piecework basis. Child labor laws were enforced
effectively by Ministry of Labor inspectors in the industrial sector;
child labor outside that sector was monitored less effectively, but it
was not believed to be significant outside family-operated businesses,
and even in such businesses it was not widespread.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The country does not have an
official minimum wage. However, the Government issued guidelines that
the public and private sectors should pay workers no less than $397.88
(150 dinars) per month, and the Government observed this standard in
paying its employees. Compliance with these guidelines was not actively
monitored, and few unskilled foreign laborers earned as much as the
guidelines suggest. For foreign workers, employers considered benefits
such as annual trips home, housing, and education bonuses as part of
the salary. However, these guidelines did not provide a decent standard
of living for a worker and family. The Labor Law, enforced by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of
work for all adult workers, including adequate standards regarding
hours of work (maximum 48 hours per week) and occupational safety and
health.
The Ministry enforced the law with periodic inspections and routine
fines for violators. The press often performed an ombudsman function on
labor problems, reporting job disputes and the results of labor cases
brought before the courts. Once a worker lodges a complaint, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs opens an investigation and often
takes remedial action. The Fourth High Court has jurisdiction over
cases involving alleged violations of the Labor Law. Complaints brought
before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs that cannot be settled
through arbitration by law must be referred to the Court within 15
days. In practice, most employers preferred to settle such disputes
through arbitration, particularly since the court and labor law
generally were considered to favor the employee.
Under the Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves
from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued
employment.
The Labor Law specifically favors citizens over foreign workers and
Arab foreigners over other foreign workers in hiring and firing.
Because employers included housing and other allowances in their salary
scales, foreign workers legally may be paid lower regular wages than
their citizen counterparts, although they sometimes received the same
or a greater total compensation package because of home leave and
holiday allowances. Western foreign workers and citizen workers were
paid comparable wages, with total compensation packages often
significantly greater for the former. Women in most jobs were entitled
to 60 days of paid maternity leave and nursing periods during the day.
However, women generally were paid less than men.
In 1993 the Government strengthened the Labor Law by decree of the
King, announcing that significant fines and jail sentences would be
imposed upon private sector employers who failed to pay wages required
by law. This law applied equally to employers of citizens and foreign
workers and was intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers, who
at times were denied the required salaries (see Section 6.c.). The law
provides equal protection to citizen and foreign workers; however, all
foreign workers require sponsorship by citizens or locally based
institutions and companies. According to representatives of several
embassies with large numbers of workers in the country, the Government
was generally responsive to embassy requests to investigate foreign
worker complaints regarding unpaid wages and mistreatment. However,
foreign workers, particularly those from developing countries, often
were unwilling to report abuses for fear of losing residence rights and
having to return to their countries of origin. Sponsors were able to
cancel the residence permit of any person under their sponsorship and
thereby blocked them for one year from obtaining entry or residence
visas from another sponsor; however, the sponsor may be subject to
sanctions for wrongful dismissal. Legislation introduced in July
allowed all workers except domestics to change jobs without obtaining a
``No Objection'' letter from their employers. However, the process for
utilizing these new rules was not well understood among expatriate
workers. They were also often unwilling to challenge their employers
for fear of being punished or deported. In addition, domestic workers
were exempted from this legislation, and many of them remained in
essence indentured workers, unable to change employment or leave the
country without their sponsors' consent (see Section 6.c.).
Foreign women who worked as domestic workers often were beaten or
sexually abused (see Section 5). Between 30 and 40 percent of attempted
suicide cases handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals were
foreign maids (see Section 6.c.). Unverified reports also suggested
that unskilled foreign laborers were also at risk of suicide.
A long-term goal of the Government is to replace foreign workers
with citizens throughout all sectors of the economy and to create new
jobs for citizens seeking employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons, and there were reports that some foreign
workers were recruited for employment on the basis of fraudulent
contracts and then forced to work under conditions different from what
was promised.
Workers from Southeast Asia, South Asia, Ethiopia, and the former
Soviet Union reported being forced into conditions that amounted to
trafficking. Some of these victims reported being sexually exploited or
being forced to work as prostitutes; however, the most common forms of
trafficking in persons involved unskilled construction laborers and
domestic workers. Victims of this form of trafficking experienced
withholding of passports by employers, alteration of contracts without
their consent, nonpayment of salaries, or being forced to work
extremely long hours.
Although prostitution is illegal, some foreign women, including
some who worked as hotel and restaurant staff, engaged voluntarily in
prostitution. There were also reports that some women were forced into
prostitution. When the Government discovered this kind of abuse, it
generally responded by prosecuting the offender, often the victim's
sponsor or employer. There were persistent reports that some women
working in hotels and restaurants were locked in a communal house or
apartment when not working and driven to work in a van (see Section
6.c.).
The Government began to take steps to combat trafficking. It
recognizes that trafficking is a problem and in February created an
interministerial National Task Force committee to formulate a
comprehensive plan to combat trafficking. The committee was considering
plans to deliver pamphlets on workers' rights to expatriate workers in
the country, provide manuals on these rights to local diplomatic
missions, create a dedicated entrance for workers arriving in the
country, and install a telephone hot line for victims. Victims of
trafficking may seek assistance from their embassies. The Government
did not provide assistance to victims.
__________
EGYPT
According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social democracy in which
Islam is the state religion. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which
has governed since its establishment in 1978, has used its entrenched
position to dominate national politics and has maintained an overriding
majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the partially
elected Shura (Consultative) Council. In 1999 President Hosni Mubarak
was reelected unopposed to a fourth 6-year term in a national
referendum. The President appoints the Cabinet and the country's 26
governors and may dismiss them at his discretion. The judiciary
generally was independent; however, this independence has been
compromised by the State of Emergency legislation in force, under which
the range of cases subject to its jurisdiction has been compromised due
to the improper use of State Emergency Security Courts and military
courts for inappropriate cases.
There are several security services in the Ministry of Interior,
two of which have been involved primarily in the Government's campaign
against terrorism: The State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS),
which conducted investigations and interrogated detainees, and the
Central Security Force (CSF), which enforced curfews and bans on public
demonstrations and conducted paramilitary operations against
terrorists. The President is the commander-in-chief of the military;
the military is a primary stabilizing factor within society but
generally has not involved itself in internal issues. The security
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses during the year;
however, there continued to be no reports of the use of deadly force in
the campaign against suspected terrorists.
Over the past decade, policy reforms encouraged a transition from a
government-controlled economy to a free market system, although state-
owned enterprises still dominated some key sectors of the economy. The
country had a population of approximately 68 million, which increases
by approximately 2 percent annually. The agricultural sector employed
the largest number of persons, and was almost entirely privately
controlled. Official statistics placed 34 percent of the employed labor
force in the agricultural sector, and knowledgeable observers estimated
that 3 to 5 percent of those were subsistence farmers. Income from
tourism, remittances from approximately 2 million citizens working
abroad, petroleum exports, and Suez Canal revenues were the other
principal sources of foreign currency and are vulnerable to external
shocks. Egypt is a middle income developing country, with poverty
(according to the Government's definition) at 23 percent of the
population.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in some areas; however, the Government's record remained poor with
respect to freedom of association, the improper use of State Security
Emergency Courts and military courts, and torture, among other areas.
The President and the entrenched NDP dominated the political scene to
such an extent that citizens did not have a meaningful ability to
change their government.
The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981 and was
renewed for another 3 years in June 2000, continued to restrict many
basic rights. The security forces continued to arrest and detain
suspected members of terrorist groups. In combating terrorism, the
security forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners,
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, held detainees in prolonged
pretrial detention, and occasionally engaged in mass arrests. In
actions unrelated to the antiterrorist campaign, local police killed,
tortured, and otherwise abused both criminal suspects and other
persons. Most cases were not pursued, although the Government took
disciplinary action against some police officers accused of abusing
detainees, including prosecution of a number of offenders.
Prison conditions remained poor. The Emergency Law allows
authorities to detain persons without charge, and the Government
continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. Thousands of
persons were detained without charge on suspicion of illegal terrorist
or political activity; others served sentences after being convicted on
similar charges. There was a past practice of improper use of State
Security Emergency Courts and military courts to try inappropriate
cases which infringed on a defendant's normal right under the
Constitution to a fair trial before an independent judiciary. During
the year, the Government did not refer any new cases to military
courts.
The Government used the Emergency Law to infringe on citizens'
civil liberties. Although citizens generally expressed themselves
freely, the Government partially restricted freedom of the press and
significantly restricted freedom of assembly and association. On July
29, a State Security Court concluded a retrial with the conviction of
Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his codefendants of defaming the state and
illegally accepting foreign funds. The verdict was overturned by the
Court of Cassation on December 4 and is scheduled to be retried in
February 2003 by the Court of Cassation, rather than another State
Security Court. Ibrahim's case had broad implications for freedom of
expression, and had a deterrent effect on the activities of human
rights organizations. The Government generally permitted human rights
groups to operate openly. The Government placed some restrictions on
freedom of religion.
Domestic violence against women was a problem. Although the
Government banned the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), it
persisted in the traditional milieu. Women and Christians faced
discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law.
The Government limited workers' rights. Child labor remained
widespread, despite government efforts to eradicate it. Exposure of
workers to hazardous working conditions and other abuses of the law by
employers continued, and the Government did not enforce labor laws
effectively. Egypt was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD)
Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as an observer.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings or of extrajudicial killings of suspected
terrorists by security forces during the year; however, police
committed other extrajudicial killings.
Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in
custody at police stations or prisons of 14 persons during the year:
Ahmed Youssef; Sayyed Eissa; Adel Mohamed; Mohamed Mahmoud Osman; Nader
Fathy Sayyed; Ahmed Mahmoud Mohamed; Mustafa Labib Hemdan; Mohamed Ali
Shahine. Hussein Hassan Khater died after a hunger strike at Kanater
prison. He maintained he was innocent. On October 26, it was reported
that authorities were investigating the death of five inmates at
Ghurbaniyat prison, all of whom died within a 2-week period in early
October. Reportedly, their deaths were listed as due to ``circulatory
failure.'' The results of the investigation had not been publicized by
year's end.
The retrial of 96 suspects accused of participating in the January
2000 violence in al-Kush, Sohag Governorate, that left 21 Christians
and 1 Muslim dead, concluded its sessions on October 9. The State
Security Court is scheduled to announce the verdicts in January 2003
(see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights
(EOHR) reported one disappearance during the year. On February 9, Adel
Mohammed Kamiha, a coffee shop owner, reportedly disappeared following
his transfer from police custody to the custody of State Security in
Alexandria.
In December an administrative court ordered the Ministry of the
Interior to pay $46,200 (100,000 Egyptian pounds) to a family in
compensation for the disappearance of their son, detained in 1989. The
Court also ruled that the reasons for his detention were illegitimate
and ordered his release by a court in April 1990. The victim was an
alleged member of the banned al-Jihad terrorist organization and a
student at Zaqaziq Faculty of Medicine. The Interior Ministry
reportedly failed to provide any information about his fate.
At year's end, 46 other cases of disappearance from previous years
documented by human rights organizations remained unsolved. Human
rights organizations provided names to the U.N. Working Group on
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances; the Government reportedly has
denied any involvement in the cases.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the infliction of ``physical or
moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or detained; however,
torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and
prison guards was common and persistent. The November session of U.N.
Committee Against Torture noted a systematic pattern of torture by the
security forces.
Under the Penal Code, torture of a defendant or giving orders to
torture are felonies punishable by hard labor or 3 to 10 years'
imprisonment. If the defendant dies under torture, the crime is one of
intentional murder punishable by a life sentence at hard labor. Arrest
without due cause, threatening death, or using physical torture is
punishable by temporary hard labor. Abuse of power to inflict cruelty
against persons is punishable by imprisonment of no more than 1 year or
a fine of no more than $61 (134 Egyptian pounds). In addition, victims
may bring a criminal or civil action for compensation against the
responsible government agency. There is no statute of limitations in
such cases.
Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous, credible
reports that security forces tortured and mistreated citizens. Reports
of torture and mistreatment at police stations remained frequent. While
the Government investigated torture complaints in criminal cases and
punished some offending officers, the punishments generally have not
conformed to the seriousness of the offense.
Incommunicado detention is authorized for prolonged periods and
frequently accompanied allegations of torture (see Section 1.d.).
While the law requires security authorities to keep written records
of detained citizens, human rights groups reported that such records
often were lacking, effectively blocking the investigation of
complaints.
Human rights groups believed that the SSIS continued to employ
torture. Victims usually were taken to an SSIS office, where they were
handcuffed, blindfolded, and questioned about their associations,
religious beliefs, and political views. Torture was used to extract
information, coerce the victims to end their oppositionist activities,
and to deter others from similar activities.
Principal methods of torture reportedly employed by the police
included: Being stripped and blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or
doorframe with feet just touching the floor; beaten with fists, whips,
metal rods, or other objects; subjected to electrical shocks; and
doused with cold water. Victims frequently reported being subjected to
threats and forced to sign blank papers to be used against the victim
or the victim's family in the future should the victim complain of
abuse. Some victims, including male and female detainees, reported that
they were sexually assaulted or threatened with the rape of themselves
or family members.
In March the EOHR reported 59 documented cases of torture in 2001
in police stations and other detention centers, in which 11 victims
died. The report included nine cases of citizens apparently
unaffiliated with any political group or trend. In one case, four
family members of a wanted defendant were tortured. Twenty-two of the
cases involved individuals on trial for conspiracy to commit terrorism
and membership in an extremist organization, known as the ``Wa'ad''
(``The Promise'') (see Section 1.e.). One individual arrested in a
police Internet ``sting'' claimed that he had been tortured (see
Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.a.).
In September 51 defendants in the Wa'ad case were convicted and 43
were acquitted. Of the 43 acquitted, 12 were rearrested. Twenty-eight
of the 94 Wa'ad defendants told the prosecution that they were tortured
during interrogations.
During the year, the Government expanded efforts to hold security
personnel accountable for torturing prisoners in their custody. Human
rights organizations and the press reported during the year 17
different instances in which personnel were held publicly accountable.
Some of the cases involved incidents that took place in previous years.
Some but not all of the cases prosecuted involved the deaths of
prisoners.
In June the EOHR welcomed moves by the Ministry of Interior to
combat torture. The EOHR called for reviewing of all legislation on the
subject, amending articles of the Penal Code, and establishing a
permanent mechanism for investigating torture complaints. In addition,
the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners (HRCAP), in an
October report entitled ``The Truth,'' commended judicial efforts to
try security officers for torture, but outlined current obstacles,
including a vague legal definition of torture, and the inability of
victims to sue perpetrators directly.
During the year, the Government took some steps to hold torturers
accountable. For example, in March the Menoufiya Criminal Court
sentenced the warden of Wadi Natroun Prison to 10 years' imprisonment,
a subordinate to 7 years' imprisonment, and four other policemen to 5-
year terms for torturing inmate Ahmed Mohamed Eissa to death and
falsifying documents to disguise the cause of death. The defendants had
contested the 2000 verdict and were tried before a different circuit,
which handed down the same sentences.
In June the Prosecutor's office began an investigation into the May
27 death, allegedly due to torture, of Mohamed Mahmoud Osman, who was
detained at Old Cairo Police Station for 2 days prior to his death.
Osman reportedly had refused a body search after being stopped by
police. Osman was released after 2 days and reportedly had extensive
bruising on his body. He died at home within days.
Also in July, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced two policemen and
a police informant to 5 years at hard labor for torture resulting in
the February 23 death of Ahmed Youssef, whose brother Yasser was wanted
by the police. Ahmed was taken instead to El Wayli police station where
he was severely tortured to obtain information on the whereabouts of
his brother.
In August the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced the head of the
investigations unit at the Nasr City Police Station and a captain in
the unit, to 3-years' imprisonment and a fine of $924 (2,001 Egyptian
pounds) each for the torture to death of Sayyed Eissa and the severe
torture of his friend, Mustafa Abdel Aziz. The two defendants were
detained without charge for 45 days on suspicion of car theft. The
Minister of Interior personally referred the case for prosecution. Two
other defendants in the case, the head of the auto theft unit and a
police officer, were acquitted.
In addition to prosecutions of police involved in cases of torture
and abuse of detainees, civil courts continued to review cases and
frequently awarded compensation to victims of police abuse. Human
rights observers recommended that rules and standards for victims be
established to obtain redress and parity in compensation.
In prominent criminal cases, defendants alleged that they were
tortured during questioning by police. Attorneys for 52 allegedly
homosexual men, arrested in May 2001 and charged with debauchery and
``insulting a heavenly religion,'' claimed that their clients were
abused physically during the initial days of their detention, and that
several had confessed under torture. Defendants in other cases
involving homosexuality also claimed that they were tortured in order
to extract confessions to the charge of ``debauchery'' (see Sections
1.e. and 2.c.).
In the Government's pending investigation of the alleged torture of
dozens of suspects detained during the investigation of a double murder
in the town of al-Kush, Sohag Governorate, in 1998, no interviews of
village residents took place and the investigation appeared to make no
progress during the year.
From November 11 to 22, three domestic human rights associations,
as well as two international organizations, presented their allegations
and findings to the Committee Against Torture (CAT), a subcommittee of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The final recommendations of the
U.N. Committee welcomed several recent actions taken by the Government
including: The abolition of flogging in prisons (undertaken in 2001);
unannounced inspections of places of detention; court decisions that
disregarded confessions obtained under duress; increased human rights
training for police officials; and the establishment of several human
rights committees and departments within government ministries.
However, the CAT report expressed concerns about: The continued
implementation of the state of emergency since 1981; consistent reports
of torture and ill treatment, especially at the hands of the SSIS;
abuse of juveniles; abuse of homosexuals; the continued use of
administrative detention; the lack of access by victims of torture to
the courts and the length of proceedings, in addition to disparities in
the awarding of compensation; and restrictions on NGOs.
The CAT recommended that the Government consider: Ending the state
of emergency; the adoption of a clear legal definition of torture; the
abolition of incommunicado detention; the prompt investigation of
complaints of torture; the more frequent inspection of places of
detention; the review of military court decisions by a higher tribunal;
the removal of ambiguities in the law that allow the prosecution of
individuals for their sexual orientation; cessation and punishment of
the abuse of minors and a halt to their detention with adults; the
acceptance of a visit by a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture; the
establishment of rules and standards for victims to obtain redress and
parity in compensation; and to allow human rights organizations to
pursue their activities unhindered.
The country's delegation told the CAT that ``incompatibility of
timetables'' had not made possible a visit to the country by the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Torture.
Prison conditions remained poor and tuberculosis was widespread.
Prisoners suffered from overcrowding of cells, the lack of proper
hygiene, food, clean water, proper ventilation, and recreational
activities, as well as inadequate medical care. Some prisons continued
to be closed to the public.
On June 9, the Public Prosecutor issued orders to all prosecutors'
offices to allow defense lawyers access to investigation reports prior
to the prosecution's questioning of defendants and ordered that lawyers
and defendants not be separated for any reason during questioning.
On July 10, HRCAP obtained an administrative court order that
allows prisoners and their lawyers to meet privately without any
barriers between them (such as standard mesh fencing).
Prisoners were sometimes released on religious holidays without
administrative delays, reflecting the Ministry of Interior's decision
for direct release from prisons, rather than an intermediate transfer
to security directorates for out-processing. However, human rights
organizations reported that implementation of the policy in criminal
cases was inconsistent, and that the direct-release policy was not
implemented in general in cases involving political prisoners,
especially in cases of detainees suspected of membership in the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Suspected Islamic group members were released during the year.
Some were identified as repentant members of the Islamic Group, a
banned terrorist organization. Observers said that the number of
suspected Islamic Group members released during the year was 750.
In March, April, and June, HRCAP successfully won court cases
against the Ministry of Interior to lift the ban on visits to four
prisons.
Failure to implement judicial rulings regarding the release of
administrative detainees or opening of prisons to visits continued to
be a problem during the year. Relatives and lawyers often were unable
to obtain access to prisons for visits. Restrictions were placed on
visits to prisoners who are incarcerated for political or terrorist
crimes, limiting the number of visits allowed for each prisoner and the
total number of visitors allowed in the prison at one time. In November
a Ministry of the Interior decree prohibited visits to inmates in three
maximum security prisons, Istiqbal Tora, Abu Za'abal, and Liman Abu
Za'abal, citing security concerns. The EOHR issued a statement
regretting the move and asserting that the decree contradicted previous
court rulings and existing regulations governing the treatment of
prisons.
As required by law, the public prosecutor continued to inspect
prisons during the year. Findings were not made public. However, the
premises of the SSIS, where torture was practiced, were excluded from
mandatory judicial inspection.
In December 2001, the People's Assembly approved an amendment
banning flogging as a disciplinary measure in prisons. Local human
rights groups welcomed the ban.
There were separate prison facilities for men, women, and
juveniles. However, the separation of adults from juveniles did not
always occur, and abuses of minors were common. There were separate
military prisons, and civilians were not detained in them. Political
prisoners generally were detained separately from prisoners convicted
of violent crimes.
In principle lawyers, acting as de facto human rights monitors,
were permitted to visit prisoners in their capacity as legal counsel;
however, in practice they often faced considerable bureaucratic
obstacles that prevented them from meeting with their clients who were
prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
other domestic and international human rights monitors did not have
access to prisons or to all places of detention.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--During the year,
security forces conducted large-scale arrests and detained hundreds of
individuals without charge. Police also at times arbitrarily arrested
and detained persons. Under the provisions of the Emergency Law, the
police may obtain an arrest warrant from the Ministry of Interior upon
showing that an individual poses a danger to security and public order.
This procedure nullified the constitutional requirement of showing that
an individual likely has committed a specific crime to obtain a warrant
from a judge or prosecutor.
The Emergency Law allows authorities to detain an individual
without charge. After 30 days, a detainee has the right to demand a
court hearing to challenge the legality of the detention order and may
resubmit his motion for a hearing at 1-month intervals thereafter.
There is no maximum limit to the length of detention if the judge
continues to uphold the legality of the detention order or if the
detainee fails to exercise his right to a hearing. Incommunicado
detention is authorized for prolonged periods by internal prison
regulations. Human rights groups and the CAT both expressed concern
over the application of measures of solitary confinement.
In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the
State broad detention powers. Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must
bring charges within 48 hours or release the suspect. However, they may
detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months pending investigation.
Arrests under the Penal Code occurred openly and with warrants issued
by a district prosecutor or judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal
Code contains several provisions to combat extremist violence, which
broadly define terrorism to include the acts of ``spreading panic'' and
``obstructing the work of authorities.''
Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of persons were detained
administratively in recent years under the Emergency Law on suspicion
of terrorist or political activity, in addition to several thousand
others convicted and serving sentences on similar charges (see Section
1.e.). In July Mohamed Zarei, head of HRCAP, put the total figure at
15,000. Other estimates ranged between 13,000 and 16,000. Zarei stated
that the number reflected the release of approximately 7,000 detainees
over the past 3 years.
In March HRCAP began the issuance of a series of lists of sick
prisoners that it alleged were detained illegally. As of October, the
group counted 505 such persons. The lists provided information on the
date of arrest (all from the 1990s), the number of court orders for
release, their present place of detention, and their ailment. The
reports did not include information on the reasons for detention
(political or criminal). HRCAP forwarded the lists to the President,
urging the release of the detainees.
Between February and June, newspapers and human rights groups
reported the arrest of several individual members of the Popular
Egyptian Committee to Support the Intifada and the Palestinian People.
Tawfik Wail was arrested at the Cairo Book Fair while gathering
signatures for a petition and released 3 days later. The Committee
claimed that Wail was tortured. The National Committee in Defense of
Prisoners of Conscience claimed in April that Haytham Mahmoud Mohamed
was arrested in Alexandria along with seven members of the Popular
Egyptian Committee to Support the Intifada and the Palestinian People,
for unspecified reasons. The Secretary General of the Committee also
was charged with possession of leaflets calling for demonstrations in
support of Palestine. On May 21, EOHR issued a statement congratulating
the prosecution for the release of the detainees.
Over the course of the year, security forces arrested approximately
300 persons allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has
been an illegal organization since 1954. Charges leveled against
members typically included: Belonging to and attempting to revive the
activities of a banned organization; obstructing the laws and
constitution of the country; inciting the masses against the Government
(usually organizing demonstrations critical of the Government's
position on the peace process and relationship with the United States;
and attempting to infiltrate student bodies to spread the ideology of a
banned organization.
Of the approximately 300 detained, none remained in detention at
year's end, according to a lawyer for the Muslim Brotherhood. Of those
detained, 101 were arrested on charges of rioting, vandalism, and
destruction of public property in Raml district during the June 27
parliamentary elections. Raml, near Alexandria, was the site of
skirmishes between security forces and supporters of two candidates
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Six lawyers affiliated with the
campaign of (female) Islamist candidate Gihan El Khalafawi also were
arrested and detained by prosecutors for 15 days on suspicion of
incitement to riot. In October the court acquitted 35 of the 101
defendants and sentenced the remaining 66 to 3 months (time served). In
an unusual statement, the judge in the case called on the Government to
repeal the Emergency Law and urged authorities to limit referrals to
the State Security Court to cases of an exceptional nature with a
direct impact upon national security (see Section 1.e.).
Arrests targeting high level Muslim Brotherhood members included
Ali Abdel Fattah, who was arrested in May in Alexandria and released in
August, for allegedly planning a ``million man march'' in support of
the Intifada, and the September arrest in Cairo of Rashad Bayoumi and
17 others. In June security forces impounded the offices of the
Alexandria Physicians' Syndicate, whose head and Secretary-General were
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Syndicate offices allegedly were
used as a base for Brotherhood activities. In July a military court
handed down rulings in the case of 22 Muslim Brotherhood members who
had been referred to the court by presidential decree in November 2001.
The court sentenced 5 of them to 5-years' imprisonment, 11 to 3-years'
imprisonment, and acquitted 6.
In compliance with court orders, 35 members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, including Muhammad El-Sayed Habib, were released in August
after 15 months in detention. After a court ordered the release of 12
Muslim Brotherhood members, having served three-quarters of their
sentence, the Government contested the ruling. In October prominent
Brotherhood member Mokhtar Nouh was released from prison.
During the year, there were several confirmed reports that converts
to Christianity were harassed by security authorities (see Section
2.c.). For example, in June convert Hisham Samir Abdel-Lateef Ibrahim
was detained in Alexandria by the SSIS, and held for 52 days at SSIS
facilities in Alexandria and Cairo before being transferred to Torah
Farms Prison, where he was interrogated at least three times. Ibrahim
is believed to have been charged with forging identity documents, and
``contempt of religion,'' although as of year's end, his case had not
been referred to court. In a letter smuggled out of the prison, Ibrahim
claimed that other converts to Christianity were detained in the same
prison. He admitted to having procured a falsified identity document
that showed his new religious affiliation. Ibrahim's case came to the
attention of Coptic activists during the summer, when they retained
legal counsel for him and began to sue for his release.
The Government did not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary was generally
independent; however, under the Emergency Law, cases involving
terrorism and national security may be tried in military, State
Security, or State Security Emergency Courts, in which the accused does
not receive all the normal constitutional protections of the civilian
judicial system. The authorities ignored judicial orders in some cases.
In a number of public statements during the year, Public Prosecutor
Maher Abdel Wahed stated his intention to support abolishment of State
Security Emergency Courts.
The Constitution provides for the independence and immunity of
judges and forbids interference by other authorities in the exercise of
their judicial functions, and this provision generally was observed in
practice. The President appoints all judges upon recommendation of the
Higher Judicial Council, a constitutional body composed of senior
judges. Judges are appointed for life, with mandatory retirement at age
64. Only the Higher Judicial Council may dismiss judges for cause, such
as corruption. The Higher Judicial Council is a set body headed by the
president of the Court of Cassation. The Council regulates judicial
promotions and transfers. The Government included lectures on human
rights and other social issues in its training courses for prosecutors
and judges.
In the civilian court system, there are criminal courts, civil
courts, administrative courts, and a Supreme Constitutional Court.
There are three levels of regular criminal courts: Primary courts,
appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, which represents the final
stage of criminal appeal. Criminal courts also have a state security
division to hear cases that the Government considers to bear on state
security; in these courts, the defendant may appeal only on procedural
grounds. Civil courts hear civil cases and administrative courts hear
cases contesting government actions or procedures; both systems have
upper-level courts to hear appeals. The Supreme Constitutional Court
hears challenges to the constitutionality of laws or verdicts in any of
the courts.
A lawyer is appointed at the court's expense if the defendant does
not have counsel. Appointed lawyers are drawn from a roster that is
chosen by the Bar Association; however, expenses are borne by the
State. Any denial of this right is grounds for appeal of the ruling.
However, detainees in certain high security prisons continued to allege
that they were denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed
until trial, thus denying counsel the time to prepare an adequate
defense. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's in court.
There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as a judge, but
no women served as judges (see Section 5).
In 1992 following a rise in extremist violence, the Government
began trying cases of defendants accused of terrorism and membership in
terrorist groups before military tribunals. In 1993 the Supreme
Constitutional Court ruled that the President may invoke the Emergency
Law to refer any crime to a military court. This use of military and
State Security Emergency Courts under the Emergency Law since 1993 was
broadly interpreted and deprived hundreds of civilian defendants of
their normal right under the Constitution to be tried by a civilian
judge. The Government defended the use of military courts as necessary
to try terrorism cases, maintaining that trials in the civilian courts
were protracted and that civilian judges and their families were
vulnerable to terrorist threats. No new cases involving civilian
defendants were referred to military courts during the year.
Military verdicts were subject to a review by other military judges
and confirmation by the President, who in practice usually delegated
the review function to a senior military officer. Defense attorneys
claimed that they were not given sufficient time to prepare defenses
and that judges tended to rush cases involving a large number of
defendants. Nonetheless, judges had guidelines for sentencing,
defendants had the right to counsel, and statements of the charges
against defendants were made public. Observers needed government
permission to attend. Diplomats attended some military trials during
the year. Human rights activists have attended, but only when acting in
their capacity as lawyers for one of the defendants.
On September 9, a military court handed down verdicts in the trial
of 94 defendants (5 of whom remained at large) on charges of conspiracy
to commit acts of terrorism and membership in an illegal Islamist
organization, the Wa'ad. The court sentenced defendants to varying
terms of up to 15 years at hard labor, including Egyptian-American
Muhammad Hisham Seif Iddin, or up to 3-years' imprisonment, and
acquitted 43 other defendants. The release of the acquitted reportedly
was delayed, and 12 were rearrested, including lead defendant Sheikh
Nash'at Ibrahim. No new developments were reported by year's end.
In the case of 170 defendants of the terrorist Islamic Group, there
were no developments during the year; available information indicated
that they remained in prison awaiting trial. In the case of the 22
Muslim Brothers, on July 30 the courts acquitted 6, sentenced 5 to 5
years in prison, and 11 to 3 years in prison.
The State Security Emergency Courts shared jurisdiction with
military courts over crimes affecting national security. The President
appointed judges to these courts from the civilian judiciary upon the
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and, if he chose to appoint
military judges, the Minister of Defense. Sentences were subject to
confirmation by the President. There was no right of appeal. The
President may alter or annul a decision of a State Security Emergency
Court, including a decision to release a defendant.
During the year, State Security Emergency Courts handed down
verdicts in 5 cases involving 12 defendants.
In March a court sentenced Sherif El-Filali to 15 years' hard labor
on espionage charges. On March 5, a court convicted eight persons from
the city of Matariya of ``insulting a heavenly religion.'' Sentences
ranged from 3 years in prison to a 1-year suspended sentence (see
Section 2.c.). In April courts sentenced to 10 years at hard labor
Mohammed El-Sayid Soliman, an alleged member of the banned terrorist
Islamic Jihad group, as well as an alleged associate of Al-Qai'da
leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri. In June a court sentenced Magdi Anwar Tawfiq
to 10 years at hard labor for spying for Israel. In a July retrial,
Mahmoud Abdel Ghani, an alleged member of the outlawed terrorist
Islamic Group, was sentenced to life in prison for having joined the
military wing of the group in Assiut and subsequently killing a police
officer. At his first trial, Abdel Ghani had been sentenced to 5 years,
but a military governor, on behalf of the President, refused to ratify
the ruling and ordered a retrial. There were no further judgments
issued by emergency courts after July.
In May President Mubarak ordered a civilian court to retry 50 men
in what was called the ``Queen Boat case,'' 23 of whom had been
convicted in a State Security Emergency Court of ``habitual
debauchery'' in November 2001. At the same time, the President ratified
the verdicts against two of the original defendants who had been
convicted of ``insulting a heavenly religion'' and ``unorthodox
religious beliefs and practices.'' The retrial of the 50 was ongoing at
year's end.
In July the Military Governor's office rejected the appeal of
Mamdouh Mehran, who had been sentenced in 2001 to prison for 3 years
for propagating false information and ``insulting a heavenly
religion,'' by publishing an article about the alleged sexual
misconduct of a defrocked Coptic monk (see Section 2.a.).
On February 6, the Court of Cassation overturned Saad Eddin
Ibrahim's May 2001 conviction and ordered a retrial. On July 29, a
State Security Court found Ibrahim guilty of seeking to harm the
reputation of the State, accepting foreign funding without government
approval, and defrauding a donor, and sentenced him to 7-years'
imprisonment. Three codefendants were convicted on fraud charges and
sentenced to 2- to 3-year terms, and three others received 1-year
suspended sentences. The verdict was issued moments after formal oral
arguments had been concluded.
In the Ibrahim case, the charge of defrauding a donor stemmed from
an E.U. Commission grant of $246,266 (261,000 euros) to Ibrahim's Ibn
Khaldoun Center for Development Studies. Judges disregarded an
affidavit from the chief of the E.U. mission in the country that
affirmed that the E.U. was fully satisfied with the way the Center
handled its grant. As in the first trial, the defense was denied access
to the files of the Ibn Khaldoun center, seized by investigators at the
time of Ibrahim's initial arrest in 2000. During the trial, judges did
not address numerous defense motions, and at year's end had not
provided the defense with a copy of the court transcript. Lawyers for
Ibrahim and his codefendants filed appeals in September. On December 4,
the Court of Cassation overturned the State Security Court's July 29
conviction and set a retrial date of January 7, 2003, later rescheduled
to February 4. Since this was the second time the court overturned a
lower court's verdict, the Court of Cassation itself, rather than
another State Security Court, will retry the case.
On October 20, a State Security Court began hearing the case of 26
persons, including three Britons, accused of membership in the
extremist ``Islamic Liberation Party,'' which allegedly aimed to
overthrow the Government. Some defendants have alleged they were
tortured. One British defendant, who told the press his confession had
been coerced, incorporated the word ``lies'' into his English signature
on his confession.
During the year, the Government continued to try and convict
journalists and authors for slander, as well as for expressing their
views on political and religious issues (see Sections 2.a. and 2.c.).
According to local human rights organizations, there were
approximately 13,000 to 16,000 persons detained without charge on
suspicion of illegal terrorist or political activity (see Section
1.d.), in addition to several thousand others convicted and serving
sentences on similar charges.
The Government did not permit access by international humanitarian
organizations to political prisoners (see Section 1.c.). In October, an
Amnesty International (AI) delegation was permitted to visit the
country, but authorities denied the group's request to pay visits to
detainees.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity and secrecy
of the home, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of
communication; however, the Emergency Law abridges the constitutional
provisions regarding the right to privacy, and the Government used the
Emergency Law to infringe on these rights. Under the Constitution,
police must obtain warrants before undertaking searches and wiretaps.
Courts have dismissed cases in which warrants were issued without
sufficient cause. Police officers who conducted searches without proper
warrants were subject to criminal penalties, although penalties seldom
were imposed. However, the Emergency Law empowers the Government to
place wiretaps, intercept mail, and search persons or places without
warrants. Security agencies frequently placed political activists,
suspected subversives, journalists, foreigners, and writers under
surveillance, screened their correspondence (especially international
mail), searched them and their homes, and confiscated personal
property.
In November the upper house of Parliament, the Shura Council,
approved a draft bill that permits security agencies and the Interior
Ministry to conduct telephone and Internet wiretaps in the interest of
national security. A draft article that permitted such tapping without
court approval faced resistance among members and was withdrawn from
the bill.
Although the law does not explicitly criminalize homosexual acts,
police have targeted homosexuals using Internet-based ``sting''
operations leading to arrests on charges of ``debauchery.'' According
to a press report, a senior Interior Ministry official counted 19
arrests of suspected homosexuals via the Internet. Local NGOs have
counted 31 instances of Internet-based arrests of homosexuals since
police began the practice in 2001. There were allegations of torture
and convictions in the absence of evidence (see Sections 1.c. and
2.a.).
The Ministry of Interior has the authority to stop specific issues
of foreign-published newspapers from entering the country on the
grounds of protecting public order; it exercised this authority
sporadically (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially
restricted these rights. Citizens openly expressed their views on a
wide range of political and social issues, including vigorous criticism
of government officials and policies, but generally avoided certain
topics, such as direct criticism of the President.
The case of Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun
Center for Development Studies, had broad implications for freedom of
expression and a deterrent effect on human rights groups. Local
observers believed that Ibrahim was prosecuted because of public
remarks that he made regarding high-ranking officials that exceeded
unwritten limits regarding freedom of expression (see Sections 1.e. and
4).
The Constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or
private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There
are numerous restrictions on legal entities that seek to establish
their own newspapers, including a limit of 10 percent ownership by any
individual.
The Government owned stock in the three largest daily newspapers,
and the President appointed their editors in chief, who generally
followed the Government line. The Government also held a monopoly on
the printing and distribution of newspapers, including those of the
opposition parties. The Government used its monopolistic control of
newsprint to limit the output of opposition publications.
Opposition political parties published their own newspapers but
received a subsidy from the Government and, in some cases, subsidies
from foreign interests as well. Most newspapers were weeklies, with the
exception of the dailies Al-Wafd and Al-Ahrar, both of which had small
circulations. Opposition newspapers frequently published criticism of
the Government. They also gave greater prominence to human rights
abuses than did state-run newspapers. All party newspapers were
required by law to reflect the platform of their parties.
On July 15, the Higher Council for the Press approved the
publication of 10 new periodicals and changes to the names of 2
existing publications. No publications lost the right to publish. All
10 new newspapers were independent.
In May the Higher Administrative Court overturned a previous
revocation of the permit of the weekly tabloid An-Naba', following
publication of an article alleging sexual misconduct by a defrocked
Coptic Orthodox monk (see Section 1.e.).
In April the Administrative Court ruled for the 14th time in favor
of the return of Al-Shaab newspaper, the official publication of the
Labor Party. The court decided that since the Labor Party was
suspended, but not disbanded, its newspaper could continue to publish.
Because of the difficulties in obtaining a license, several
publishers of newspapers and magazines aimed at a domestic audience
obtained foreign licenses. The Department of Censorship in the Ministry
of Information has the authority to censor or halt their distribution.
The Center for Human Rights and Legal Assistance in 1999 organized
a legal challenge to the constitutionality of the Information
Ministry's censorship of offshore publications. The Supreme
Constitutional Court began hearing the case in 2000 and held another
hearing in January, but still had not issued a decision by year's end.
There were no cases of censorship of foreign-licensed publications
during the year.
The Penal Code, Press Law, and Publications Law govern press
issues. The Penal Code stipulates fines or imprisonment for criticism
of the President, members of the Government, and foreign heads of
state. The Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in 1998 to review the
constitutionality of those articles of the Penal Code that specify
imprisonment as a penalty for journalists convicted of libel, but had
not begun hearing the case by year's end. The Press and Publication
Laws ostensibly provide protection against malicious and
unsubstantiated reporting. Financial penalties for violations were
increased substantially in 1996 when relevant provisions of the Penal
Code were revised, but the judicial process remained long and costly,
creating a bar to realistic legal recourse for those wrongly defamed.
In recent years, opposition party newspapers have published within
limits articles critical of the President and foreign heads of state
without being charged or harassed. The Government continued to charge
journalists with libel. If he were found to be negligent, an editor-in-
chief could be considered criminally responsible for libel contained in
any portion of the newspaper.
For example, one of the six libel cases referred to the
Constitutional Court during the year was the 1999 case of Mohamed
Abdellah, who was sentenced in 2001 to 3 months' suspended sentence and
fined a total of $4,620 (10,000 Egyptian pounds) for allegedly
slandering Press Syndicate president Ibrahim Nafei. The Constitutional
Court held its first session to review it and five other cases that
were combined and heard together on March 18. The date of the next
session was not set by year's end.
During the year, the courts tried a number of prominent cases of
libel filed both by government officials and private individuals. For
example, in February the Cairo Criminal Court acquitted Mustafa Bakry,
chief editor of Al-Osbou' newspaper but sentenced two journalists at
the newspaper to a fine of $6,930 (15,000 Egyptian pounds) each for
libel against a member of the People's Assembly. In April the Boulaq
Court of Misdemeanors sentenced Ahmed Haredi Mohamed, a member of the
Press Syndicate and the chief editor of Al Mithak Al Arabi, an
electronic newspaper, to 6 months' imprisonment, a fine of $462 (1,000
Egyptian pounds), and $924 (2,001 Egyptian pounds) as temporary
compensation. Haredi was charged with libel and slander against Ibrahim
Nafei, Press Syndicate President and chief editor of Al-Ahram, who
initiated the lawsuit.
In June the Fayyoum Court of Misdemeanors acquitted journalist
Maher Naguib of slander and dismissed a civil suit against his
newspaper, Akhbar El Youm, and its chief editor Ibrahim Se'da. Naguib
had published a feature story on the allegedly improper acquisition of
state owned land by private interests. The court stated that the intent
of the article was not to libel the plaintiff but to defend public
welfare. In November the Boulaq Court of Misdemeanor sentenced chief
editor of Al-Midan newspaper Said Abdel Khaleq and a journalist to 3
months in prison at labor (suspended) for publishing a photo of Anwar
Sadat's body after his assassination.
The Public Prosecutor may issue a temporary ban on the publication
of news pertaining to cases involving national security in order to
protect the confidentiality of the cases. The length of the ban is
based on the length of time required for the prosecution to prepare its
case.
The law provides penalties for individuals who disclose information
about the State during emergencies, including war and natural
disasters. The penalties include fines of up to $2,772 (6,000 Egyptian
pounds) and prison sentences of up to 3 years. There were no reports
that the law was applied during the year.
The law prohibits current or former members of the police from
publishing work-related information without prior permission from the
Interior Minister.
Various ministries legally are authorized to ban or confiscate
books and other works of art upon obtaining a court order; however,
books may not be confiscated from the market without a court order.
There were no court-ordered confiscations of books during the year.
During the year, criminal and other lawsuits were brought or
continued against several authors for expressing their views on
religious or political issues. Most notable among these was the case of
sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim whose charges in the State Security
Emergency Court included harming the reputation of the State through
his writings (see Sections 1.e. and 4).
The Ministry of Interior regularly confiscated leaflets and other
works by Islamists and other critics of the State. Members of the
illegal Muslim Brotherhood also were arrested in connection with
publications (see Sections 1.d. and 3). In many cases, the press
reported that police confiscated written materials such as leaflets
during the arrests.
The Ministry of Interior sporadically prevented specific issues of
foreign-published newspapers from entering the country on the grounds
of protecting public order (see Section 1.f.). The Ministry of Defense
may ban works about sensitive security issues. The Council of Ministers
may order the banning of works that it deems offensive to public
morals, detrimental to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the
peace.
The Government controlled and censored the state-owned broadcast
media. The Ministry of Information owned and operated all ground-based
domestic television and radio stations. Two private satellite stations,
al Mihwar and Dream TV, began broadcasting in 2001 and operated without
direct government interference. The Government had a 20 percent
financial stake in the first and a 10 percent stake in the second. The
Government did not block reception of foreign channels via satellite.
The percentage of residents who received satellite television
broadcasts was small, but many coffee shops and other public places
offered satellite television.
Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests as
scripts and as final productions. However, many plays and films that
were highly critical of the Government and its policies were not
censored. Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship
tests as scripts and as final productions. However, many plays and
films that were highly critical of the Government and its policies were
not censored.
The Ministry of Culture also censored foreign films to be shown in
theaters, but it was more lenient regarding the same films in
videocassette format. Government censors ensured that foreign films
made in the country portrayed the country in a favorable light. The
Censorship Department banned three films from public viewing during the
year: ``From Hell,'' banned for its violent and sexually explicit
scenes; an Arabic film, ``Hidden Shadows,'' which dealt with
relationships between spirits and humans; and ``The Guard,'' a science
fiction story that depicted an ``evil'' spirit Talal, found in southern
Iraq, fighting the ``good'' spirit David.
The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology estimated
that approximately 1 million citizens were Internet users. The
Government did not restrict Internet use and did not monitor citizens'
Internet use on a broad scale, although there may have been some
monitoring by law enforcement officials.
On July 7, the Sayyeda Zeinab Court of Misdemeanors issued the
first verdict of its kind. It ordered a 1-year (suspended) prison term
and a fine for Shuhdy Naguib Serrour for posting on the Internet a poem
written by his father containing phrases that ``violated public
ethics.'' The political poem, written in the early 1970s, was banned
from publication at the time. The prosecution considered posting the
piece on the Internet to be a violation of the ban. On August 26,
Shuhdy contested the ruling before the Court of Appeals. On October 14,
the South Cairo Court of Appeals upheld the previous decision.
In June the Dokki Court of Misdemeanors sentenced Mohamed Hisham
and his wife Hannan Sayyed to 6 months imprisonment with labor and a
fine of $3,210 (5,000 Egyptian pounds) each for posting nude pictures
on the Internet. Other cases of arrest related to the Internet also
have included homosexuals in police ``sting'' operations (see Section
1.f.).
The Government did not restrict directly academic freedom at
universities. However, deans were government-appointed rather than
elected by the faculty. The Government justified the measure as a means
to combat Islamist influence on campus. The Government also
occasionally banned books for use on campuses, although no such cases
occurred during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
significantly restricted freedom of assembly. Citizens must obtain
approval from the Ministry of Interior before holding public meetings,
rallies, and protest marches. Many demonstrations were not approved;
however, the Government tightly controlled public demonstrations that
did occur to prevent them from spreading into the streets or other
areas. The Interior Ministry selectively obstructed meetings scheduled
to be held on private property and university campuses (see Section 4).
The Government significantly restricted freedom of association.
During the year, Law 84 entered into force. The law regulates the
formation, function, and funding of NGOs and private foundations. The
law grants to the Minister of Insurance and Social Affairs the
authority to dissolve by decree NGOs, a power previously reserved to
the courts. The law also requires NGOs to obtain permission from the
Government before accepting foreign funds. According to government
officials, funds from foreign government donors with established
development programs in the country were excluded from this
requirement. Government officials said that the law, which went into
effect with the publication of executive regulations in October, would
be applied in a liberal spirit.
In 2000 the Supreme Constitutional Court overturned the previous
law, Law 153. Pending the passage of Law 84 and the issuance of
executive regulations, an earlier law (Law 32) was reinstated, leaving
many NGOs in an unsettled registration status. No human rights
organizations were registered as NGOs during the year. Several other
human rights organizations that applied for registration in the past,
including the EOHR, HRCAP, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights
Studies (CIHRS) were not registered by year's end.
Under legislation governing professional syndicates, at least 50
percent of the general membership of an association must elect the
governing board. Failing a quorum, a second election must be held in
which at least 30 percent of the membership votes for the board. If
such a quorum is unattainable, the judiciary may appoint a caretaker
board until new elections can be scheduled. The law was adopted to
prevent well-organized minorities, specifically Islamists, from
capturing or retaining the leadership of professional syndicates.
Members of the syndicates have reported that Islamists have used
irregular electoral techniques, such as physically blocking polling
places and limiting or changing the location of polling sites.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
belief and the practice of religious rites; however, the Government
placed restrictions on this right and discrimination against religious
minorities existed. Only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are
recognized by the Government as religions.
Most citizens are Sunni Muslims. There is a small number of Shi'a
Muslims. Approximately 8 to 10 percent of the population are
Christians, the majority of whom belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church.
There are other small Christian denominations, a small Baha'i
community, and a Jewish community that numbers approximately 200
persons.
Under the Constitution, Islam is the official state religion and
primary source of legislation. Accordingly, religious practices that
conflict with Shari'a (Islamic law) are prohibited. However, the
practice of Christianity or Judaism does not conflict with Shari'a and,
for the most part, members of the non-Muslim minority worshipped
without harassment and maintained links with coreligionists abroad.
All mosques must be licensed, and the Government was engaged in an
effort to control them legally. The Government appointed and paid the
salaries of the imams who lead prayers in mosques, proposed themes for
them, and monitored their sermons. In December 2001, the Minister of
Awqaf announced that the Government controlled 57,000 mosques and
13,000 mosques located in private buildings. There were more than
80,000 mosques in the country, of which as many as 10,000 may be
unlicensed. In an effort to combat extremists, the Government announced
its intention to bring all unauthorized mosques under its control.
Neither the Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes prohibits
proselytizing or conversion. However, during the past two decades,
several dozen Christians who were accused of proselytizing or who had
converted from Islam were harassed by police or arrested on charges of
violating Article 98(F) of the Penal Code, which prohibits citizens
from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian
strife.
There are no restrictions on the conversion of non-Muslims to
Islam. However, in cases involving conversion from Islam to
Christianity, authorities have charged several converts with violating
laws prohibiting the falsification of documents. In such instances,
converts, who fear government harassment if they officially register
the change from Islam to Christianity, have altered their
identification cards and other official documents themselves to reflect
their new religious affiliation.
In 1996 human rights activist Mamdouh Naklah filed a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the 10 conditions for building a
church, some dating from the Ottoman era. The court requested in
October 2001 that the State Commissioners render an opinion on the
constitutionality of the conditions. No opinion was issued during the
year.
In response to strong criticism of the restrictive requirements
dating back to the Ottoman era, President Mubarak took several steps to
facilitate church repairs. In 1999 he issued a decree making the repair
of all places of worship subject to a 1976 civil construction code. The
decree was significant symbolically because it made churches and
mosques equal under the law. The practical impact of the decree was to
facilitate significantly church repairs; however, Christians reported
that local permits still were subject to approval by security
authorities.
During the year, the Government issued 12 permits for church-
related construction. The approval process for church construction
suffered from delays and was insufficiently responsive to the Christian
community, although the President reportedly approved all requests for
permits that were presented to him. The incidence of blocked or delayed
orders varied, often depending on the church's relationship with local
security officials and the level of support of the local governor.
In July following a complaint by Muslim villagers, Sohag security
authorities closed a building used as a church since 1975 in Nag'a al
Kiman on the grounds that it had no permit, and briefly arrested some
of the congregation. Church officials maintained that most churches in
the area had no permit and the security authorities were aware of that
fact. There was no resolution of the problem by year's end.
The Constitution requires schools to offer religious instruction.
Public and private schools provided religious instruction according to
the faith of the student.
The Government occasionally prosecuted members of religious groups
whose practices deviated from mainstream Islamic beliefs and whose
activities were believed to jeopardize communal harmony. In May the
President upheld the convictions in a State Security Emergency Court of
two citizens, charged with insulting a heavenly religion. They
allegedly advocated a belief system combining Islam and tolerance for
homosexuality (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
On March 5, a State Security Emergency Court convicted eight
persons from the city of Matariya (near Cairo) of insulting a heavenly
religion. They were arrested in October 2001 for unorthodox Islamic
beliefs and practices. Sentences ranged from 3 years in prison to a 1-
year suspended sentence.
In September Sayed Tolba, who claimed to be a prophet, was
sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for insulting religion and promoting
extreme ideas. Twenty followers received lesser sentences.
During the year, several writers also were charged with expressing
unorthodox religious beliefs and practices (see Section 2.a.).
The Islamic Research Center of Al-Azhar University had legal
authority to censor all publications dealing with the Koran and Islamic
scriptural texts (see Section 2.a.).
In September 2001, the Alexandria administrative court issued a
decision canceling the annual Jewish celebration at the tomb of Rabbi
Abu Hasira in Beheira. Reportedly, villagers complained about the
behavior of pilgrims. The court suspended a Ministry of Culture decree
declaring the tomb a national antiquity site. Although the Ministry
reportedly contested the 2001 decision, the festival was not held
during the year and the matter remained unresolved at year's end.
The Constitution provides for equal public rights and duties
without discrimination due to religion or creed. For the most part, the
Government upheld these constitutional protections; however,
discrimination against minority religions, including Christians and
Baha'is, existed.
In a well-received step on December 17, the President declared that
January 7, Coptic Christmas, would henceforth be a national holiday.
The move was warmly welcomed by Christians and also by the country's
principal Islamic leader, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. Christian leaders
stated that the declaration gave Copts increased recognition and
respect and raised the consciousness of the country's Muslims toward
non-Muslim fellow citizens.
Although there has been improvement in the past 2 years in some
areas, such as the introduction of the Coptic era into history
curriculums in all government schools and increased coverage of
Christian subjects in the mass media, discriminatory government
practices persisted including suspected statistical underrepresentation
of the size of the Christian population for the 1986 census, the last
which indicated religion.
There were no Christians serving as governors, police
commissioners, city mayors, university presidents, or deans. There were
few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services and armed
forces. Discrimination against Christians also continued in public
sector employment, in staff appointments to public universities, in
failure (with the exception of one case during the year) to admit
Christians into public university training programs for Arabic language
teachers that involved study of the Koran, and payment of Muslim imams
through public funds (Christian clergy are paid with private church
funds).
The approximately 6 million Coptic Christians were the objects of
occasional violent assaults by the Islamic Group and other terrorists.
Some Christians alleged that the Government was lax in protecting
Christian lives and property, as several riots and conflicts with
injuries and property damage occurred during the year (see Section
2.c.). However, there were no reports of terrorist attacks against
Christians. In a number of cases, in particular regarding murder, it
was difficult to determine whether religion was a factor.
During the year, the trial continued of 96 persons (58 Muslims and
38 Christians) for crimes, including murder committed in al-Kush in
Sohag Governorate in 2000. A trade dispute between a Christian clothing
merchant and a Muslim customer in December 1999 escalated into violent
exchanges, resulting in the deaths of 21 Christians and 1 Muslim. The
Muslim victim was killed by other Muslims who mistook him for a
Christian. The violence also resulted in the injury of 39 persons in
al-Kush and 5 persons in the neighboring municipality of Dar al-Salaam.
Approximately 200 businesses and homes in the area were damaged.
The first trial of the 96 ended in February 2001, with the
acquittal of 92 of the 96 defendants. The lead judge cited inadequate
evidence in justifying the verdicts. After an outcry from the Christian
community, the Public Prosecutor successfully appealed the verdicts,
and a retrial opened in November 2001, and completed sessions in
October. The lead judge said the verdict is expected to be announced in
January 2003.
There were reports of forced conversions of Coptic girls to Islam.
Reports of such cases were disputed and often included inflammatory
allegations and categorical denials of kidnaping and rape. Observers,
including human rights groups, found it extremely difficult to
determine whether compulsion was used, as most cases involved a Coptic
girl who converted to Islam when she married a Muslim. According to the
Government, in such cases the girl must meet with her family, with her
priest, and with the head of her church before she is allowed to
convert. However, there were credible reports of government harassment
of Christian families that attempted to regain custody of their
daughters. The law states that a marriage of a girl under the age of 16
is prohibited, and between the ages of 16 and 21 is illegal without the
approval and presence of her guardian. The authorities also sometimes
failed to uphold the law in cases of marriage between underage
Christian girls and Muslim boys.
There is no legal requirement for a Christian girl or woman to
convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim. However, if a Christian
woman marries a Muslim man, the Coptic Orthodox Church excommunicates
her. Ignorance of the law and societal pressure, including the
centrality of marriage to a woman's identity, often affect her
decision. Family conflict and financial pressure also are cited as
factors. Conversion is regarded as a disgrace to the convert's family,
so most Christian families would object strongly to a daughter's wish
to marry a Muslim. If a Christian girl converts to Islam, her family
loses guardianship, which transfers to a Muslim custodian, who is
likely to grant approval. The law is silent on the matter of the
acceptable age of conversion.
In April a court ruled in the case of Iman 'Atiya Soliman, born a
Christian in 1982, who ``disappeared,'' or was ``kidnaped,'' (according
to her family) in 1999, reportedly converted to Islam in 1999, and
married in 2000. The girl's father sued for custody and abolition of
the marriage, alleging that authorities had issued her a falsified
identity card, which showed her to be 22 at the time of her marriage.
The court ruled that the father lost custody of his daughter when she
converted to Islam.
Anti-Semitism is found in both the progovernment press and in the
press of the opposition parties, and increased late in 2000 and again
during the year following the outbreak of violence in Israel and the
occupied territories. There were no violent anti-Semitic incidents in
recent years directed at the tiny Jewish community.
Dream TV, a station in which the Government had a 10 percent
interest, aired a historical drama series titled ``Horseman without a
Horse.'' The 41-episode series contained numerous anti-Semitic
depictions of Jewish characters and included some references to the
forged ``Protocols of the Elders of Zion.'' Following international
protests, state-owned Egypt TV, one of many stations in the Middle East
that broadcast the series, edited 77 minutes from the program and added
a disclaimer, which noted that the historical authenticity of the
protocols had never been established and that the series was the result
of the author's imagination. There was some direct criticism of the
series in the local press, especially for the poor scriptwriting and
low production value, but also some criticism of the anti-Semitic
material. Progovernment newspapers published a denunciation of the
protocols by local historian Abdel Waheb Al-Messiry. In addition, in
late December, Presidential advisor Ossama El-Baz published a three-
part series in the progovernment newspaper Al-Ahram in which he
explained the origins of and criticized the phenomenon of anti-
Semitism.
In 1960 President Gamal Abdel Nasser issued a decree banning Baha'i
institutions and community activities. All Baha'i community properties,
including Baha'i centers, libraries, and cemeteries, were confiscated
at that time. The ban has not been rescinded. ``Baha'i'' is not
allowable as a religious identity, which is a required category on
official documents. Its prohibition constitutes an infringement on
religious freedom.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and foreigners were free to
travel within the country, except in certain military areas. Males who
have not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or
emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or bypassed under
special circumstances. Unmarried women under the age of 21 must have
permission from their fathers to obtain passports and travel. Married
women no longer legally require the same permission from their
husbands; however, in practice police reportedly still required such
permission in most cases (see Section 5). Citizens who leave the
country had the right to return.
The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum and refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government maintained
several reservations to the convention that limited the ease with which
the refugee population could integrate locally. Because the country
lacked national legislation or a legal framework governing the granting
of asylum, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) assumed full responsibility for the determination of refugee
status on behalf of the Government. The Government generally cooperated
with the UNHCR and treated refugees in accordance with minimum
standards and agreed arrangements. The UNHCR provided recognized
refugees with a refugee identification card that was considered a
residence permit and bore the stamp of the national authorities.
Refugees generally may not obtain citizenship. During the year,
approximately 9,000 recognized refugees, the majority of whom were
Sudanese, resided in the country, in addition to the 70,000 Palestinian
refugees registered with government authorities. There were also
approximately 16,000 asylum seekers awaiting status determination.
Although there was no pattern of abuse of refugees, during random
security sweeps the Government temporarily detained some refugees who
were not carrying proper identification. Following intervention by the
UNHCR, the refugees were released.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The ruling National Democratic Party dominated the 454-seat
People's Assembly, the 264-seat Shura Council, local governments, the
mass media, labor, and the large public sector, and controlled the
licensing of new political parties, newspapers, and private
organizations to such an extent that, as a practical matter, citizens
did not have a meaningful ability to change their government.
In September 1999, President Hosni Mubarak was elected unopposed to
a fourth 6-year term in a national referendum. According to official
results, he received 94 percent of the vote. Mubarak had been
previously nominated by the People's Assembly. Under the Constitution,
the electorate is not presented with a choice among competing
presidential candidates.
Despite the overall improvement in the electoral process, there
still were problems affecting the fairness of the 2000 parliamentary
elections, particularly in the period leading up to elections and
outside some polling stations on election day. During the months
preceding the elections, the Government arrested thousands of members
of the Muslim Brotherhood on charges of belonging to an illegal
organization. Most observers believed that the Government was seeking
to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood's participation in the People's
Assembly and professional syndicate elections through intimidation. In
addition, previous convictions on such charges legally precluded many
potential candidates from running.
The People's Assembly debated government proposals, and members
exercised their authority to call cabinet ministers to explain policy.
The executive initiated almost all legislation. The Assembly exercised
limited influence in the areas of security and foreign policy, and
retained little oversight of the Interior Ministry's use of Emergency
Law powers. Many executive branch initiatives and policies were carried
out by regulation through ministerial decree without legislative
oversight. Votes generally were reported in aggregate terms of yeas and
nays, and thus constituents had no independent method of checking a
member's voting record.
The Shura Council, the upper house of Parliament, had 264 seats;
two-thirds of which were elected and one-third of which were appointed
by the President. In 2001 President Mubarak appointed 45 members to the
Shura Council, including 8 women and 4 Christians.
There were 16 recognized opposition parties. In 2001 the courts
accepted one party, El Geel (``the generation'') Democratic Party and
upheld the Political Parties Committee's rejection of the Republican
Party. Seven appeals were pending before the Administrative Court by
parties that had been rejected by the Political Parties Committee.
The Political Parties Committee also may withdraw recognition from
existing political parties. The Labor Party, which lost recognition in
2000 under similar circumstances, remained suspended (see Section
2.a.).
The Muslim Brotherhood remained an illegal organization and may not
be recognized as a political party under the law, which prohibits
political parties based on religion. Muslim Brotherhood members were
known as such publicly and openly spoke their views, although they did
not explicitly identify themselves as members of the organization. They
remained subject to government pressure (see Section 1.d.). Seventeen
candidates affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood were elected to the
People's Assembly (as independents) in 2000.
In November several opposition parties and human rights
organizations announced the formation of a coalition termed the
``Committee for the Defense of Democracy.'' The committee's stated
mandate was to advocate political and economic reforms. The committee's
first objectives were to block the extension of the Emergency Law (in
force since 1981 and due for renewal in May 2003) and to oppose
implementation of a law that regulates NGOs.
The total number of women in the People's Assembly was 11. The
total number of People's Assembly members from religious minorities
(all Christian) was seven. Two women and 2 Christians served among the
32 ministers in the Cabinet. There were no women and no non-Muslims on
the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
In June the Government passed a law governing the regulation and
operation of NGOs. The new law replaced one struck down by the Supreme
Constitutional Court in June 2000 on procedural grounds. The new law,
and its subsequent implementing regulations, were controversial and
drew criticism from local NGOs and international activists, some of
whom charged that the law and regulations placed unduly burdensome
restrictions on NGO operations. Of particular concern was a new
provision in the law that granted the Minister of Social Affairs the
authority to dissolve an NGO by decree, rather than requiring a court
order.
The status of many NGOs remained unclear during the year, as their
previous registrations were invalidated with the annulment of Law 153/
1999. Under the implementing regulations of the new law, issued on
October 23, NGOs were given 1 year in which to reregister. No human
rights organizations were registered as NGOs during the year. Several
human rights organizations that applied for registration in 1999 or
2000, including the EOHR, HRCAP, and CIHRS, were not registered by
year's end (see Section 2.b.).
Despite years of nonrecognition, the EOHR and other groups at times
obtained the cooperation of government officials. EOHR field workers
visit some prisons in their capacity as legal counsel, but not as human
rights observers. They call on some government officials and receive
funding from foreign human rights organizations. In an unusual and
positive development, in September 2001 the Ministry of Interior issued
a detailed written rebuttal to a March 2001 report by the HRCAP
regarding torture and lawsuits related to torture (see Section 1.c.).
Government restrictions on NGO activities, including limits on
organizations' ability to accept funding, continued to inhibit
significantly reporting on human rights abuses. The case of Saad Eddin
Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies,
had a significant deterrent effect on the work of human rights
organizations, which existed largely on foreign funding (see Sections
1.e. and 2.a.).
During the year the Government permitted the CIHR and other human
rights organizations, including HRCAP, EOHR, Arab Center for
Independence of Judiciary, and ``The Land Center,'' to hold conferences
and to participate in international conferences.
In July LCHR issued a statement signed by eight other human rights
organizations in which they complained of harassment by security
officials and the Azbakiya Public Prosecutor's office regarding its
irregular publication ``Al Ard.'' According to LCHR, a prosecutorial
investigation was continuing at year's end (see Section 2.b.).
The Government generally cooperated with international
organizations. However, it has not agreed to a requested visit by the
UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Torture, according to the delegate to the
November session of the CAT, because of an incompatibility of
timetables (see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal
treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many
traditional practices discriminated against women and religious
minorities.
Women.--Domestic violence against women was a significant problem
and was reflected in press accounts of specific incidents. The law does
not prohibit spousal abuse specifically; provisions of law relating to
assault in general are applied. According to a 1995 national study, one
of every three women who have ever been married had been beaten at
least once during marriage. Among those who had been beaten, less than
half had ever sought help. Due to the value attached to privacy in the
country's traditional society, abuse within the family rarely was
discussed publicly. Spousal abuse is grounds for a divorce; however,
the law requires the plaintiff to produce eyewitnesses, a difficult
condition to meet. Several NGOs offered counseling, legal aid, and
other services to women who were victims of domestic violence.
Activists believed that in general the police and the judiciary
considered the ``integrity of the family'' more important than the well
being of the woman. The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs
operated more than 150 family counseling bureaus nationwide, which
provided legal and medical services.
The Government prosecuted rapists, and punishment for rape ranges
from 3 years in prison to life imprisonment with hard labor. Although
reliable statistics regarding rape were not available, activists
believed that it was not uncommon, despite strong social disapproval.
If a rapist is convicted of abducting his victim, he is subject to
execution. Marital rape is not illegal.
``Honor killings'' (a man murdering a female for her perceived lack
of chastity) were not common. In practice the courts sentenced
perpetrators of honor killings to lesser punishments than those
convicted in other cases of murder. There were no reliable statistics
regarding the extent of honor killings.
FGM was common despite the Government's commitment to eradicating
the practice and NGO efforts to combat it. Traditional and family
pressures remained strong; a study conducted in 2000 estimated the
percentage of women who have ever been married and had undergone FGM at
97 percent. The survey showed that attitudes may be changing slowly;
over a 5-year period, the incidence of FGM among the daughters (from
ages 11 to 19) of women surveyed fell from 83 to 78 percent. FGM was
equally prevalent among Muslims and Christians.
In 1996 the Minister of Health and Population issued a decree
banning FGM. In addition to attempting to enforce the decree, the
Government supported a range of efforts via television and by religious
leaders to educate the public. However, illiteracy impedes some women
from distinguishing between the deep-rooted tradition of FGM and
religious practices. Moreover, many citizens believed that FGM was an
important part of maintaining female chastity, and the practice was
supported by some Muslim religious authorities and Islamist political
activists.
Prostitution and sex tourism are illegal but occurred, mostly in
Cairo and Alexandria.
Sexual harassment is not prohibited specifically by law; there were
no statistics available regarding its prevalence.
The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the
law and many traditional practices discriminated against women. By law
unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their
fathers to obtain passports and to travel. Married women do not, but
police sometimes did not apply the law consistently. Only males may
confer citizenship; children born to women with foreign husbands are
not conferred the benefits of citizenship. In rare cases, this meant
that children born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers were
themselves stateless. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's
in the courts. There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as
a judge, although in practice no women served as judges. At year's end,
the Court of Cassation still was examining the cases of two female
attorneys, Fatma Lashin and Amany Talaat, who challenged the
Government's refusal to appoint them as public prosecutors. (To become
a judge, one must first serve as a public prosecutor.)
Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally corresponded
to an individual's religion. In 2000 the Parliament passed a new
Personal Status Law that made it easier for a Muslim woman to obtain a
divorce without her husband's consent, provided that she was willing to
forego alimony and the return of her dowry. (The Coptic Orthodox Church
permits divorce only in specific circumstances, such as adultery or
conversion of one spouse to another religion.)
Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry
Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim
men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's
inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance
rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the
balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits
all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs face strong social
pressure to provide for all family members who require assistance;
however, this assistance is not always provided.
Labor laws provide for equal rates of pay for equal work for men
and women in the public sector. According to government figures, women
constituted 17 percent of private business owners and occupied 25
percent of the managerial positions in the four major national banks.
Educated women had employment opportunities, but social pressure
against women pursuing a career was strong, and women's rights
advocates claimed that Islamist influence inhibited further gains.
Women's rights advocates also pointed to other discriminatory
traditional or cultural attitudes and practices, such as FGM and the
traditional male relative's role in enforcing chastity.
A number of active women's rights groups worked in diverse areas,
including reforming family law, educating women on their legal rights,
promoting literacy, and combating FGM.
Children.--The Government remained committed to the protection of
children's welfare and attempted to do so within the limits of its
budgetary resources. The Child Law provides for privileges, protection,
and care for children in general. Six of the law's 144 articles set
rules protective of working children (see Section 6.d.). Other
provisions include a requirement that employers set up or contract with
a child care center if they employ more than 100 women; the right of
rehabilitation for children with disabilities; a prohibition on
sentencing defendants between the ages of 16 and 18 to capital
punishment, hard labor for life, or temporary hard labor; and a
prohibition on placing defendants under the age of 15 in preventive
custody, although the prosecution may order that they be lodged in an
``observation house'' and be summoned upon request. International
donors provided many of the resources for children's welfare,
especially in the field of child immunization.
The Government provided public education, which is compulsory for
the first 9 academic years (typically until the age of 15). The
Government treated boys and girls equally at all levels of education.
There were no statistics available regarding the prevalence of
child abuse.
Children with foreign fathers were not considered citizens and thus
could not attend public school or state universities, were barred from
certain professional schools, and could not work without meeting
foreign residency requirements and obtaining work permits. There were
an estimated 400,000 such children in the country.
FGM generally was performed on girls between the ages of 7 and 12
(see Section 5, Women).
Persons with Disabilities.--There are no laws specifically
prohibiting discrimination against persons with physical or mental
disabilities, but the Government made serious efforts to address their
rights. It worked closely with U.N. agencies and other international
aid donors to design job-training programs for persons with
disabilities. The Government also sought to increase the public's
awareness of the capabilities of persons with disabilities in
television programming, the print media, and in educational material in
public schools. There were approximately 5.7 million persons with
disabilities, of whom 1.5 million were disabled severely.
By law all businesses must designate 5 percent of their jobs for
persons with disabilities, who are exempt from normal literacy
requirements. Although there was no legislation mandating access to
public accommodations and transportation, persons with disabilities may
ride government-owned mass transit buses free of charge, were given
priority in obtaining telephones, and received reductions on customs
duties for private vehicles. A number of NGOs were active in efforts to
train and assist persons with disabilities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--There are no legal obstacles to
establishing private sector unions, although such unions were not
common. Workers may join trade unions but are not required to do so. A
union local, or workers' committee, may be formed if 50 employees
express a desire to organize. Most union members, about one-quarter of
the labor force, were employed by state-owned enterprises. Unionization
decreased in the past several years as a result of early retirement
plans in public sector enterprises, and the privatization of many of
these enterprises. The law stipulates that ``high administrative''
officials in government and in public sector enterprises may not join
unions.
There were 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian
Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized labor
federation. The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of
Experts repeatedly emphasized that a law that requires all trade unions
to belong to a single federation infringes on freedom of association.
The ILO also consistently criticized ETUF control over the nomination
and election procedures for trade union officers, as well as the lack
of protection of the right of workers' organizations to organize their
administration, including their financial activities, without
interference from public authorities. However, the Government showed no
sign that it intended to accept the establishment of more than one
federation. ETUF officials had close relations with the NDP, and some
were members of the People's Assembly or the Shura Council. They spoke
vigorously on behalf of worker concerns, but public confrontations
between the ETUF and the Government were rare.
Some unions within the ETUF were affiliated with international
trade union organizations. Others were in the process of becoming
affiliated.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining did not exist in any meaningful sense because by law the
Government sets wages, benefits, and job classifications. The ILO for
years claimed that the Labor Code undermined the principle of voluntary
bargaining by providing that any clause of a collective agreement that
might impair the economic interest of the country was null and void.
Under the law, unions may negotiate work contracts with public sector
enterprises if the latter agree to such negotiations, but unions
otherwise lacked collective bargaining power in the public sector.
The labor laws do not provide adequately for the right to strike.
The Government considered strikes a form of public disturbance and
therefore illegal. Workers who strike may face prosecution and prison
sentences of up to 2 years; however, there were no such prosecutions
during the year.
There were approximately a dozen strikes during the year. Strikes
mainly concerned delayed payment of salaries, wage cuts, terminations,
increased working hours, and suspension of job promotions. In one
incident, 170 subway assistant drivers staged a hunger strike for more
than 1 week because they were not promoted. The strike was significant
because it took place in one of the ``public utilities that provide
vital services.'' Under the new labor law that was approved in June,
workers in such utilities are denied the right to strike. Some members
of parliament have threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the
new law.
Firms, apart from large ones in the private sector, generally did
not adhere to government-mandated standards. Although they are required
to observe some government practices, such as the minimum wage, social
security insurance, and official holidays, firms often did not adhere
to government practice in nonbinding matters, including award of the
annual Labor Day bonus.
Labor law and practice are the same in the six existing export
processing zones (EPZs) as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, and domestic and foreign workers generally are
not subject to coerced or bonded labor; however, the Criminal Code
authorizes sentences of hard labor for some crimes. The law does not
prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children. In April the
Government signed and ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of
Child Labor (see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor was widespread and the Government took
seriously the problem of child labor; however, in general it did not
devote adequate resources to implement its child labor policies. The
minimum age for employment is 14 years of age in nonagricultural work.
UNICEF reported on the widespread practice of poor rural families
making arrangements for a daughter to be employed as a domestic servant
in the homes of wealthy citizens (see Section 6.c.).
The Labor Law of 1996 and associated ministerial decrees greatly
limit the type and conditions of work that children below the age of 18
may perform legally. Provincial governors, with the approval of the
Minister of Education, may authorize seasonal work for children between
the ages of 12 and 14, provided that duties are not hazardous and do
not interfere with schooling. During the summer, the President and the
Ministry of Education authorized governors to delay the start of the
school year in their governorates pending the end of the crop season.
According to media reports, one provincial governor delayed school for
1 week pending the end of a crop season.
Preemployment training for children under the age of 12 is
prohibited. Children are prohibited from working for more than 6 hours
a day and one or more breaks totaling at least 1 hour must be included.
Children may not work overtime, during their weekly day off, between 8
p.m. and 7 a.m., or for more than 4 hours continuously.
The Government continued to take steps during the year to address
the problem of child labor. The Government worked closely during the
year with international organizations--in particular UNICEF and the
ILO--as well as international and domestic NGOs and labor unions to
implement programs designed to address child labor and its root causes.
In 2000 the Ministry of Manpower child labor unit created a
database for tracking child labor in the country and inspectors began
raids to uncover violations in 2001. However, the Government did not
take any effective action against employers, as the fines assessed were
as low as $9 (20 Egyptian pounds), which did not deter violators.
Inspection raids increased during the year. In 2001 The Minister of
Justice also issued decree 2235, establishing the General Department
for Judicial Protection for Children.
Statistical information regarding the number of working children
was difficult to obtain and often out-of-date. NGOs estimated that up
to 1.5 million children worked. Government studies indicate that the
concentration of working children was higher in rural than in urban
areas. Nearly 78 percent of working children were in the agricultural
sector. However, children also worked in light industry. The Central
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) conducted at the
request of NCCM a household survey on child labor in 2001-02 that was
analyzed by the NCCM for policy formulation. Results of the survey are
expected to be made public in 2003.
While local trade unions reported that the Ministry of Labor
adequately enforced the labor laws in state-owned enterprises,
enforcement in the private sector, especially in the informal sector,
was lax. Many working children were abused, overworked, and exposed to
potentially hazardous conditions by their employers, and the
restrictions in the Child Law have not improved conditions due to lax
enforcement on the part of the Government.
The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
children.
The NCCM is taking the lead on formulating a national plan to
eliminate hazardous forms of child labor that exist in the country.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--During the year, the minimum
wage for government and public sector employees increased to $81 (176
Egyptian pounds) per month for a 6-day, 36-hour workweek. The Labor Law
stipulates that 48 hours is the maximum number of hours that may be
worked in 1 week. Overtime for hours worked beyond 36 per week is
payable at the rate of 25 percent extra for daylight hours and 50
percent extra for nighttime hours. The law also stipulates a maximum of
7 hours per day and 42 hours per week for work in ``hazardous
industries.'' Some government agencies instituted a 5-day, 36-hour
workweek. The nationwide minimum wage generally was enforced
effectively regarding larger private companies; however, smaller firms
did not always pay the minimum wage. The minimum wage did not provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family; however, base pay
commonly was supplemented by a complex system of fringe benefits and
bonuses that may double or triple a worker's take-home pay and provide
a decent standard of living.
The Ministry of Labor set worker health and safety standards, which
also apply in the EPZs; however, enforcement and inspections were
uneven.
The law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working
conditions, and workers had the right to remove themselves from
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
In August the Minister of Manpower said that the total number of
foreign workers holding work and residence permits was 18,177, not
including Sudanese, Palestinians, and foreigners married to citizens.
Unofficial estimates of undocumented workers were as high as 116,000.
Foreign workers with the required permits enjoyed legal protections.
There were occasional reports of employer abuse of undocumented
workers, especially domestic workers. A few employers were prosecuted
during the year for abuse of domestic workers, but many claims of abuse
were unsubstantiated because undocumented workers were reluctant to
make their identities public.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits prostitution and sex
tourism. There were anecdotal reports of trafficking of persons from
sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe through the country to Europe and
Israel.
----------
IRAN \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report
draws heavily on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a
populist revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The Constitution,
ratified after the revolution by popular referendum, established a
theocratic republic and declared as its purpose the establishment of
institutions and a society based on Islamic principles and norms. The
Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State,
Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, was the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Revolution and has direct control over the armed forces, the internal
security forces, and the judiciary. Mohammad Khatami was elected to a
second 4-year term as President in a popular vote in June 2001, with 77
percent of the vote. A popularly elected 290-seat unicameral Islamic
Consultative Assembly, or Majles, develops and passes legislation.
Reformers and moderates won a landslide victory in the February 2000
Majles election, and constituted a majority of that body; however, the
Council of Guardians and other elements within the Government blocked
much of the early reform legislation passed by the Majles. A Council of
Guardians reviewed all legislation passed by the Majles for adherence
to Islamic and constitutional principles. The Council consisted of six
clerical members, who are appointed by the Supreme Leader, and six lay
jurists (legal scholars), who are nominated by the head of the
judiciary and approved by the Majles. The Constitution provides the
Council of Guardians the power to screen and disqualify candidates for
elective offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements, including
candidates' ideological beliefs. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW),
the Council of Guardians rejected the candidacy of 145 out of the 356
candidates who filed to run for 17 seats in the special Majles election
held concurrently with the Presidential election in June 2001. This
constituted a far higher percentage than were rejected in the February
2000 Majles elections. The judiciary was subject to government and
religious influence.
Several agencies shared responsibility for internal security,
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of
Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was
established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known
as Basijis, and gangs of men known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of
the Party of God), acted as vigilantes, and intimidated and physically
threatened demonstrators, journalists, and persons suspected of
counterrevolutionary activities. The Ansar-e Hezbollah often were
aligned with particular members of the leadership. Both the regular and
the paramilitary security forces committed numerous serious human
rights abuses.
The country had a mixed economy that was heavily dependent on
export earnings from the country's extensive petroleum reserves. The
country had a population of approximately 66,000,000. The Constitution
mandates that all large-scale industry be publicly owned and
administered by the State. Large charitable foundations called bonyads,
most with strong connections to the Government, controlled the
extensive properties and business expropriated from the Pahlavi family
and from other figures associated with the monarchy. The bonyads
exercised considerable influence on the economy, but neither accounted
publicly for revenue nor paid taxes. Legislation was introduced in the
Majlis during the year, which would require the bonyads to pay taxes at
the rate of 25 percent. It was not yet clear if this legislation became
law. The Government heavily subsidized basic foodstuffs and energy
costs. Private property rights were largely respected. Economic
performance was generally tied to the price of oil, whose exports
accounted for nearly 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings.
Government mismanagement and corruption also negatively affected
economic performance. Unemployment was estimated to be between 20 and
25 percent, and inflation at approximately 18 to 20 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and
deteriorated substantially during the year, despite continuing efforts
within society to make the Government accountable for its human rights
policies. The Government denied citizens the right to change their
government. Systematic abuses included summary executions;
disappearances; widespread use of torture and other degrading
treatment, reportedly including rape; severe punishments such as
stoning and flogging; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and
detention; and prolonged and incommunicado detention.
On occasion there were judicial proceedings against government
officials for misconduct; however, perpetrators usually remained
unpunished. The influence of conservative government clerics, which
pervaded the judiciary, often prevented citizens from receiving due
process or fair trials. The Government used the judiciary to stifle
dissent and obstruct progress on human rights. The Government infringed
on citizens' privacy rights, and restricted freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and association.
The Government restricted freedom of religion, particularly for
Baha'is. The Government controlled the selection of candidates for
elections. An intense political struggle continued during the year
between a broad popular movement that favored greater liberalization in
government policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and
certain hard-line elements in the Government and society, which viewed
such reforms as a threat to the survival of the Islamic republic. In
many cases, this struggle was played out within the Government itself,
with reformists and hard-liners squaring off in divisive internal
debates. In August President Khatami introduced two bills in the Majles
designed to enhance his Presidential powers. One would remove the right
of the Guardian Council to veto candidates running for elections. The
bills were passed and awaited ratification by the Guardian Council at
year's end. As in the past, reformist members of Parliament were
harassed, and for the first time, were prosecuted and jailed for
statements made under cover of parliamentary immunity. Khatami's June
2001 reelection did not appear to have resulted in meaningful reform.
On the contrary, the repression of reformers, including
parliamentarians, continued and intensified.
The Government restricted the work of human rights groups and
denied entry to the U.N. Special Representative for Iran of the
Commission on Human Rights (UNSR) during the period of his mandate. The
UNSR's mandate ended during the year with the defeat of the resolution
at the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in April. Violence against
women occurred, and women faced legal and societal discrimination. The
Government discriminated against religious and ethnic minorities and
severely restricted workers' rights, including freedom of association
and the right to organize and bargain collectively. Child labor
persisted. Vigilante groups, with strong ties to certain members of the
Government, enforced their interpretation of appropriate social
behavior through intimidation and violence. There were reports of
trafficking in persons.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The Government has
been responsible for numerous killings, and during the year there were
reportedly executions that took place following trials in which there
was a lack of due process. As in the past, there were incidents of
security forces using excessive force while suppressing demonstrations.
In January two teachers were arrested during a demonstration
against low wages and poor working conditions. After they were
hospitalized due to injuries they received at the demonstration, their
families believed that they died while in custody (see Section 2.b.).
There were anecdotal reports of security forces killing persons
during the October 2001 ``soccer riots.'' The Government acknowledged
that it arrested hundreds of persons, but denied that anyone was killed
(see Sections 1.f., 2.a., and 2.b.).
The controversy around the killings of several prominent dissidents
and intellectuals in late 1998 continued. The case involved the
killings, over a 2-month period from October to December 1998, of
prominent political activists Darioush Forouhar and Parvaneh Forouhar
and writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouandeh. Political activist
Pirouz Davani disappeared in the same time period and has never been
found (see Section 1.b.). Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in
January 2001, a court convicted fifteen out of the eighteen defendants
for the killings. However, HRW also reported that the trial did not
clarify who actually ordered the murders. Several Ministry of
Intelligence officials were mentioned as possible suspects in the
press, but they were not charged, and the trial did not produce any
incriminating information regarding their involvement. In August 2001,
the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of the fifteen officials and
sent the case back to the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces
(JOAF) for further review. In May, the JOAF withdrew two of the three
death sentences after the families of the victims pardoned the
murderers. However, the court sentenced them to ten years in prison and
banned them from service in the Intelligence Ministry. The court
reduced the prison sentences of several other defendants believed to be
complicit in the case while leaving the rest intact. None of the
original fifteen were pardoned or set free by year's end. There was no
further information, but all of the defendants were likely appealing
the May verdicts.
The UNSR reported in August 2001 that these extrajudicial killings
continued to cause controversy about what is perceived to be the
Government's cover-up of involvement of high-level officials in the
affair. Several citizens, including prominent investigative journalist
Akbar Ganji, were arrested in connection with statements they made
about the case (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The UNSR also reported
rumors suggesting that there were more than 80 killings or
disappearances over a 10-year period as part of a wider campaign to
silence dissent.
Many members of religious minority groups, including the Baha'is,
evangelical Christians, and Sunni clerics were killed in recent years,
allegedly by government agents or directly at the hands of authorities.
The Government announced in September 1998 that it would take no
action to threaten the life of British author Salman Rushdie, or anyone
associated with his work, The Satanic Verses, despite the issuance of a
fatwa against Rushdie's life in 1989. The announcement came during
discussions with the United Kingdom regarding the restoration of full
diplomatic relations. Several revolutionary foundations and a number of
Majles deputies within the country repudiated the Government's pledge
and emphasized the ``irrevocability'' of the fatwa, or religious
ruling, by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for Rushdie's murder.
The 15 Khordad Foundation raised the bounty it earlier had established
for the murder of Rushdie.
A November 1995 law criminalized dissent and applied the death
penalty to offenses such as ``attempts against the security of the
State, outrage against high-ranking officials, and insults against the
memory of Imam Khomeini and against the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Republic.'' Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in
the absence of sufficient procedural safeguards. Although domestic
press stopped reporting most executions, according to international
reports they continued in substantial numbers. No figures were
available for the year. The UNSR, based on media reports, cited an
estimated 60 executions from January through July 2001, a decrease from
130 during the same period the year before. The Government did not
cooperate in providing the UNSR with a precise number of executions
carried out in 2001.
During the period on which he reported, the UNSR reported that
approximately two thirds of the executions took place in public,
contrary to regulations, and that state television broadcasted scenes
from hangings on at least two occasions during 2001. He also noted that
a woman was hanged publicly in March 2001. Exiles and human rights
monitors alleged that many of those executed for criminal offenses,
such as narcotics trafficking, actually were political dissidents.
Supporters of outlawed political organizations, such as the Mujahedin-
e-Khalq organization, were believed to make up a large number of those
executed each year.
Press reports indicated that three men were publicly hanged in
January for the crimes of murder and rape. Reportedly, five men
convicted of a series of attacks on women in Tehran were publicly
executed during the year, and their bodies driven through the city on
mobile cranes.
The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), an opposition
party, alleged that the Government arrested Habibullah Tanhaeyan from
the city of Sanandaj on December 11, and executed him on December 15
after four days of interrogation and torture. The PDKI also reported
the execution of one of its members, Karim Toujali, in January, and of
four Kurdish political prisoners in October. Other sources claimed the
number executed in October was three or five. The party said that the
prisoners were tortured before they were executed. The Society for the
Defense of Human Rights in Iran (SDHRI) claimed that the families of
the executed prisoners were not informed of either their trials or
their convictions, and that the prisoners were tortured before they
were executed. SDHRI confirmed the PDKI's report that the bodies were
turned over to them only on condition that they be buried at night and
without ceremony. The PDKI claimed that 12 of the 110 party members
remaining in jail at the end of the year were sentenced to death.
b. Disappearance.--No reliable information was available regarding
the number of disappearances during the year.
Siamak Pourzand, husband of human rights lawyer Mehrangiz Kar and
the manager of the Tehran Cultural Center, disappeared in Tehran in
November 2001. He was held incommunicado for several months before his
disappearance.
Pirouz Davani, a political activist who disappeared in late 1998
along with several other prominent intellectuals and dissidents who
were later found killed, remained unaccounted for, and was believed to
have been killed for his political beliefs and activism (see Section
1.a.).
According to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the
United States, since 1979 more than 200 Baha'is have been killed and 15
have disappeared and are presumed dead.
The group ``Families of Iranian Jewish Prisoners:'' (FIJP)
publicized the names of twelve Iranian Jews who disappeared while
attempting to escape from the country in the 1990s. They disappeared
while being smuggled out of the country during a period when Jews were
not being issued passports to be able to travel freely. Babak Shaoulian
Tehrani and Shaheen Nikkhoo disappeared in June 1994; Behzad (Kamran)
Sakaru and Farhad Ezzati in September 1994; Homayoun Balazadeh, Omid
Solouki, Reuben Cohan-Masliah, and Ibrahim Cohan-Masliah in December
1994; Syrus Gaharamany, Ibrahim Gaharamany, and Norallah Rbizadeh
(Felfeli) in February 1997, and Es-haagh Hassid (Hashid) in February
1997. Their families have had no contact with them since the dates of
their disappearance, but have heard anecdotal stories that some of them
were alive and being held in prison. The Government has not given out
any information on their whereabouts and has not charged any of them
with crimes. FIJP believes that the Government dealt with these cases
differently than with other cases of persons being captured while
trying to escape from the country because these twelve persons were
Jewish (see Section 2.c.).
A Christian group reported that between 15 and 23 Iranian
Christians disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 (see
Section 2.c.). Those who disappeared were reportedly Muslim converts to
Christianity whose baptisms had been discovered by the authorities. The
group that reported the figure believes that most or all of those who
disappeared were killed.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however,
there were numerous credible reports that security forces and prison
personnel continued to torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison
facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, were notorious for the
cruel and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon political opponents
of the Government. Common methods included suspension for long periods
in contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and
most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other
instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also
reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete
deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete
blindness. Stoning and flogging are prescribed expressly by the Islamic
Penal Code in the country as appropriate punishments for adultery.
In March the Majlis passed a bill to end torture and forced
confessions. However, the Council of Guardians reportedly vetoed the
bill in June, arguing that the bill would limit the authority of judges
to adjudicate on the admissibility of confessions and therefore was
against the principles of Islam.
In July in a new effort to combat ``un-Islamic behavior'' and
social corruption among the young, the Government announced the
formation of a new ``morality force.'' The force was meant to enforce
the Islamic Republic's strict rules of moral behavior. Press reports
indicated that members of this force chased and beat persons in the
streets for offenses such as listening to music, or in the case of
women, wearing makeup or clothing that was not modest enough (see
Section 1.f.).
In early December, all eleven female parliamentarians indicated
that they would present a bill that would outlaw stoning as punishment
for adultery. Stoning in the country was widespread after the
revolution, but has been rare in recent years. A few persons were
sentenced to death by stoning this year, while at least two persons
were stoned in 2001.
In December authorities informed European Union human rights
negotiators during their visit to begin a human rights dialog that
stoning was to be abolished as a form of capital punishment. According
to press reports, the judiciary chief issued an internal directive
instructing judges to use prison terms and other forms of punishment in
place of stoning for the crime of adultery. It was not clear at year's
end if this new directive will be implemented.
Harsh punishments were carried out, including stoning and flogging.
The UNSR reported the stoning deaths of two women and the sentencing to
death by stoning of at least one other during 2001. He cited press
reports of the May stoning death of an unnamed 35-year-old woman at
Evin Prison in Tehran, who was arrested 8 years earlier on charges of
appearing in pornographic films. The UNSR reported that a woman was
sentenced in June to death by stoning for the murder of her husband. He
also reported that the Supreme Court upheld the sentence of death by
public stoning of 38-year-old Maryam Ayoubi, who was convicted for the
murder of her husband. Her sentence was carried out in Evin Prison in
July. The law also allows for the relatives of murder victims to take
part in the execution of the killer.
Siamak Pourzand, the husband of human rights lawyer Mehrangiz Kar,
was tried in March behind closed doors, charged with ``undermining
state security through his links with monarchists and counter-
revolutionaries.'' In May he was sentenced to 11 years in prison. Press
reports said that he had confessed to his crimes at his trial, but his
wife claimed that the confession was extracted under duress. Pourzand
was provisionally released from prison in November, but it was still
unclear at year's end if was granted unconditional freedom. Pourzand
suffered severe health problems while held incommunicado, reportedly
including a heart attack, and was allegedly denied proper medical
treatment.
According to press reports, in July, a court in Khuzestan Province
sentenced a woman ``to be made blind in public'' after she blinded a
man she had alleged was harassing her by throwing acid at him. She
appealed the sentence. There was no information available as to the
outcome of the case at year's end.
In October two thieves convicted of more than thirty robberies each
reportedly had four fingers amputated in a public ceremony.
During 2001 HRW reported that public floggings were increasingly
used for a wide range of social offenses, including breaches of the
dress code. As an example, eight men convicted of drinking alcohol and
causing public disturbance were reportedly flogged publicly in Tehran,
with each man receiving seventy to eighty lashes. HRW also reported
that clashes between police and demonstrators broke out at public
floggings and executions in Tehran in July and August 2001 when
protesters demonstrated against these forms of punishment.
In November 2000, investigative journalist Akbar Ganji went on
trial for statements he allegedly made during an April 2000 conference
in Berlin regarding the country's politics (see Sections 1.a. and
1.e.). He was arrested upon his return to the country and held over the
next 6 months for long periods in solitary confinement. Ganji told the
court that he was beaten and tortured in prison. Ganji previously had
written articles implicating former President Rafsanjani in a series of
killings of dissidents and intellectuals, apparently carried out by
security forces.
In July 1999, the Government and individuals acting with the
consent of the authorities used excessive force in attacking a
dormitory during student protests in Tehran, including reportedly
throwing students from windows. Approximately 300 students were injured
in the incident. The UNSR noted numerous credible reports that students
arrested following the demonstration were tortured in prison (see
Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions were harsh. Some prisoners were held in solitary
confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force
confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise
tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly intimidated
family members of detainees and tortured detainees in the presence of
family members.
In his August 2001 report, the UNSR noted that the head of the
National Prisons Organization (NPO) had told him that the prison
population had risen 40 percent over the previous year. Previously, the
UNSR had received reports about prisoner overcrowding and unrest, along
with little space available for each prisoner.
The UNSR reported that much of the prisoner abuse occurred in
unofficial detention centers run by the secret service and military.
The UNSR further reported that according to the head of the NPO, the
unofficial detention centers officially were brought under the control
of the NPO during 2001. In the UNSR's 2001 report, the UNSR was unable
to determine whether the change actually had taken place, and whether
it had impacted the number of cases of prisoner abuse. HRW has reported
that Prison 59 in Tehran, which is located in a Revolutionary Guard
compound, was the only remaining prison not brought under the
jurisdiction of the NPO. Access to Prison 59 was denied, including to
Members of Parliament and the President's staff.
The Iranian Human Rights Working Group (IHRWG), an Internet-based
human rights NGO, reported that conditions for political prisoners
deteriorated during the year.
In August 2001, a parliamentary group investigating abuses
committed by state institutions reportedly cited a large increase in
the number of persons being imprisoned, more than two-thirds of them
for drug-related offenses. It also noted that HIV/AIDS and other
diseases were spreading rapidly throughout the prison population.
Other than the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the
Government did not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents by human
rights monitors (see Section 4).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices
remained common. There was reportedly no legal time limit for
incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine the
legality of detention. In the period immediately following arrest, many
detainees were held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and
family members. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or in
local Revolutionary Guard offices.
The security forces often did not inform family members of a
prisoner's welfare and location. Prisoners often were denied visits by
family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed
prisoners did not always receive notification of the prisoners' deaths.
Those who did receive such information reportedly were forced on
occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
In May as part of an effort to combat the supposed ``decline in
public morality,'' Iranian-American dancer Mohammad Khordadian was
arrested for ``corrupting the morals of Iranian youth'' when he
attempted to leave the country at the end of his first visit their. He
was imprisoned and then sentenced to a 10-year suspended sentence, a
10-year travel ban, a 3-year ban on attending weddings other than those
of close family members and any other public celebrations, and a
permanent ban on teaching dance classes. After the verdict was issued,
he was released from prison and acquitted of all charges on appeal.
In July the Government permanently dissolved the Freedom Movement,
the country's oldest opposition party, and sentenced over thirty of its
members to jail terms ranging from 4 months to 10 years on charges of
trying to overthrow the Islamic system. Other members were barred from
political activity for up to 10 years, and ordered to pay fines in
amounts up to more than $6,000.
In September a noted actress who publicly kissed a student of a
famous film director at a film festival was also arrested for
corrupting public morals.
In March 2001, the authorities provisionally closed the 50-year-old
Iran Freedom Movement for ``attempting to overthrow the Islamic
regime.'' HRW reported that the initial closure came after the arrest
of 21 independent political activists, including a former chancellor of
Tehran University. The activists were associated with religious-
nationalism, which advocates constitutional Islamic rule and a respect
for democratic principles (see Section 1.e.). Among those arrested for
association with the Freedom Movement was one of its founders, the
prominent legal scholar Dr. Seyed Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyed Javadi, and its
Secretary General and former government minister Ibrahim Yazdi.
Security forces also reportedly ransacked the offices of the Bazargan
Cultural Foundation and the Society of Islamic Engineers while
searching for suspects.
Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the cultural rights of Azeris,
was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups claimed that Chehrangi was
arrested to prevent his registration as a candidate in the February
2000 Majles elections (see Section 5).
Numerous publishers, editors, and journalists were either detained,
jailed, and fined, or were prohibited from publishing their writings
during the year (see Section 2.a.). The Government appeared to follow a
policy of intimidation toward members of the media whom it considered
to pose a threat to the current system of Islamic government.
Adherents of the Baha'i Faith continued to face arbitrary arrest
and detention. According to Baha'i sources, four Baha'is remained in
prison at the end of the year, including two who were convicted of
either apostasy or ``actions against God'' and sentenced to death, but
whose sentences were commuted to life in prison. The Government adhered
to a practice of keeping a small number of Baha'is in detention at any
given time. Sources claimed that such arrests were carried out to
``terrorize'' the community and to disrupt the lives of its members.
Most of those arrested were charged and then quickly released. However,
the charges against them were often not dropped, forcing them to live
in a continuing state of uncertainty and apprehension (see section
2.c.). In October 2001 authorities released two Baha'is from prison in
Mashad. One of those, whose original death sentence was reduced to 5
\1/2\ years, was released after serving 5 years. The other was released
after completing his 4-year sentence, which had been reduced from his
original sentence of ten years (see Section 2.c.).
The Government enforced house arrest and other measures to restrict
the movements and ability to communicate of several senior religious
leaders whose views regarding political and governance issues were at
variance with the ruling orthodoxy. Several of these figures disputed
the legitimacy and position of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei. These clerics included Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Tabataei-Qomi,
who has been under house arrest in Mashad for more than fifteen years,
Ayatollah Ya'asub al-Din Rastgari, who has been under house arrest in
Qom since late 1996, and Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who died in
December 2001 while under house arrest in Qom. Ayatollah Hossein Ali
Montazeri, the former designated successor of the late Spiritual
Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and an outspoken critic of the Supreme
Leader, remained under house arrest and heightened police surveillance
at year's end (see Sections 1.e.and 2.a.). The followers of these and
other dissident clerics, many of them junior clerics and students,
reportedly were detained in recent years and tortured by government
authorities.
Although reliable statistics were not available, international
observers believed that hundreds of citizens were detained for their
political beliefs.
The Government continued to exchange with Iraq prisoners of war
(POWs) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war. However, a final settlement of the issue between the two
governments was not achieved by year's end.
The Government did not use forced exile, and no information was
available regarding whether the law prohibits forced exile; however,
the Government used internal exile as a punishment. Many dissidents and
ethnic and religious minorities left and continue to leave the country
due to a perception of threat from the Government.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The court system was not
independent and was subject to government and religious influence. It
served as the principal vehicle of the Government to restrict freedom
and reform in the society. U.N. representatives, including the UNSR,
and independent human rights organizations continued to note the
absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials.
There are several different court systems. The two most active are
the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses,
and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter were established in
1979 to try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic
Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics
crimes, economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and
official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged
transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court
investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security
duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A
press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers
in the media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.
The judicial system was designed to conform, where possible, to an
Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources.
Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a cleric
chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned as the
head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced by Ayatollah
Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor
General also must be clerics.
Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survived in
the civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right
to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of
appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury
system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation was not
addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government
advised judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and
interpretation of Islamic law, rather than rely on statutes enacted
during the Pahlavi monarchy.
Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against
national security and other principal offenses are heard, were
notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness.
Revolutionary Court judges acted as both prosecutor and judge in the
same case, and judges were chosen in part based on their ideological
commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often was prolonged and
defendants lacked access to attorneys. Indictments often lacked clarity
and included undefined offenses such as ``antirevolutionary behavior,''
``moral corruption,'' and ``siding with global arrogance.'' Defendants
did not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary
trials of 5 minutes duration occurred. Others were shown trials that
were intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession.
The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system continued
to be a subject of debate. The clerical courts, which were established
in 1987 to investigate offenses and crimes committed by clerics, and
which are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, were not provided
for in the Constitution, and operated outside the domain of the
judiciary. In particular, critics alleged that the clerical courts were
used to prosecute certain clerics for expressing controversial ideas
and for participating in activities outside the sphere of religion,
such as journalism.
No estimates were available regarding the number of political
prisoners. However, the Government often arrested, convicted, and
sentenced persons on questionable criminal charges, including drug
trafficking, when their actual ``offenses'' were political.
The Government frequently charged members of religious minorities
with crimes such as ``confronting the regime'' and apostasy, and
conducted trials in these cases in the same manner as threats to
national security.
In March after a trial behind closed doors but with his lawyer
present, Nasser Zarafshan, the attorney representing the families of
the victims of the 1998 extrajudicial killings of dissidents by
intelligence ministry officials, was sentenced to five years in prison
and seventy lashes. He was charged with leaking confidential
information pertaining to the trial. HRW reported that he was also
charged with ``having weapons and alcohol at his law firm.'' Zarafshan
was originally arrested in October 2000 but released after a month
pending trial. HRW stated that Zarafshan never discussed the contents
of the investigation openly, but did criticize problems with the
investigation of the killings and noted that important information was
missing from the court files (see Section 1.a.).
In November reformist professor Hashem Aghajari was sentenced to
death at a closed trial for the crime of blaspheming against Islam in a
speech he gave in Hamedan in June. In addition to the death sentence,
he was sentenced to 74 lashes, exile to a remote desert location, eight
years in jail, and a ban on teaching for ten years. His attorney
appealed the verdict. The death sentence was widely denounced across
the political spectrum. President Khatami and hundreds of Majlis
members questioned the verdict, noting that the death sentence should
not be applied. As a result of protests caused by the case, Supreme
Leader Khamenei instructed the Hamedan court to reexamine the case. No
decision had been made by the court by the end of the year (see Section
2.b.).
There have been unconfirmed reports that Abbas Amir-Entezam, former
Deputy Prime Minister and longtime political dissident, was released by
year's end. In December 1999, authorities rearrested Amier-Entezam
after an interview with him was published in a local newspaper. Amir-
Entezam spent much of the past 20 years in and out of prison. Amir-
Entezam appealed for a fair and public trial, which has been denied to
him. He was a frequent victim of torture in prison and has had numerous
medical problems as a result of his torture. Amir-Entezam suffered a
ruptured eardrum due to repeated beatings, kidney failure resulting
from denial of access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate
condition. He reported having been taken on numerous occasions before a
firing squad and told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live.
Several other lawyers known for their defense of human rights were
also reportedly subjected to persecution, among them Mohammad Dadkhah,
who participated in the defense of members of the Iran Freedom
Movement. Dadkhah was sentenced to 5 months in jail and banned from
practicing law for 10 years (see Section 1.d.).
In January 2001, the Revolutionary Court sentenced 7 of 17 writers,
intellectuals, and political figures who took part in an April
conference in Berlin regarding the implications of the February 2000
Majles elections (see Section 3). The Court reportedly convicted seven
of them on the vague charge of ``having conspired to overthrow the
system of the Islamic Republic.''
The 17 defendants included 12 persons who attended the conference
and were arrested upon their return to the country. They were charged
with taking part in antigovernment and anti-Islamic activities, and
included investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.) newspaper editor Mohammed Reza Jalaipour, Member of Parliament
Jamileh Kadivar, women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla
Lahidji, opposition politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, student leader Ali
Afshari, and others, including two translators for the German Embassy
in Tehran. The Court convicted three other defendants on lesser
charges, imposing fines and suspended sentences, and acquitted seven
others. The trial reportedly was closed, and HRW claimed that it
violated recognized international free trial standards because several
of the defendants were held for months without access to legal counsel.
One of the defendants, Sahabi, was provisionally released, but
rearrested following public remarks he made in March 2001, and remained
in detention without new charges being filed against him at year's end.
During the latter part of 2000, SCC began the trial of Hojatoleslam
Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a cleric who participated in the Berlin
conference, on charges of apostasy and ``corruption on earth,'' which
potentially carry the death penalty. Eshkevari had called for more
liberal interpretations of Islamic law in certain areas. He was
sentenced to death, but the sentence was overturned on appeal in May
2001. He was permitted a 2 day furlough from prison in September 2000.
In October, the Special Court for the Clergy commuted his sentence to 7
years, of which he had already served 2 years.
In November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice President
Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-year prison
term for allegedly publishing ``anti-Islamic articles, insulting
government officials, promoting friendly relations with the United
States,'' and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric Ayatollah
Hossein Ali Montazeri in Khordad, a newspaper that Nouri established in
late 1998 and that closed at the time of his arrest. Nouri used the
public trial to attack the legitimacy of the SCC. He was released on
November 5 (see Section.).
Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi, who resigned as head of the judiciary in
August 2000, stated in 1996 that the Baha'i faith was an espionage
organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this view (see
Section 2.c.).
The trials in 2000 and 2001 of 13 Jewish citizens on charges
related to espionage for Israel were marked throughout by a lack of due
process. The defendants were held for more than 1 year without being
charged formally or given access to lawyers. The trial was closed, and
the defendants were not allowed to choose their own lawyers. Following
the trial, defense lawyers told news reporters that they were
threatened by judiciary officials and pressured to admit their clients'
guilt (see Section 2.c.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that ``reputation, life,
property, (and) dwelling(s)'' are protected from trespass except as
``provided by law''; however, the Government infringed on these rights.
Security forces monitored the social activities of citizens, entered
homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations, and opened mail
without court authorization.
Organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, an organization of
hard-line vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate
revolutionary comportment upon the society, harassed, beat, and
intimidated those who demonstrated publicly for reform or who did not
observe dress codes or other modes of correct ``revolutionary''
conduct. This included women whose clothing did not cover their hair
and all parts of their body except the hands and face, or those who
wore makeup or nail polish.
Ansar-e Hezbollah gangs were used to destroy newspaper offices and
printing presses, intimidate dissident clerics, and disrupt peaceful
gatherings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Ansar-e Hezbollah cells were
organized throughout the country and some were reportedly linked to
individual members of the country's leadership.
Vigilante violence included attacking young persons considered too
``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invading private homes,
abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of
popular entertainment. Authorities occasionally entered homes to remove
television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private gatherings in which
unmarried men and women socialized, or where alcohol, mixed dancing, or
other forbidden activities were offered or took place. For example,
more than 1,000 satellite dishes were confiscated after the October
2001 soccer riots, according to press reports (see Sections 1.a., 2.a.,
and 2.b.), and the Government continued its campaign against satellite
dishes this year. Enforcement appeared to be arbitrary, varying widely
with the political climate and the individuals involved. Authorities
reportedly were bribed to avoid enforcement in some of these
circumstances.
Prison guards intimidated family members of detainees (see Section
1.c.). Opposition figures living abroad reported harassment of their
relatives in the country.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, except when published ideas are ``contrary to
Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights''; however, the
Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press in practice.
After the election of President Khatami in 1997, the independent press,
especially newspapers and magazines, played an increasingly important
role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding reform in the
society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression did
not exist, and the independent press was subjected to arbitrary
enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably the
judiciary, which treated such debates as a threat.
The Government carefully monitored the statements and views of the
country's senior religious leaders to prevent dissent within the
clerical ranks. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, a cleric formerly
designated as the successor to the late Spiritual Leader Ayatollah
Khomeini, remained under house arrest at the end of the year. In
November 1997, he called into question the authority of the Supreme
Leader, Ali Khamenei, criticizing his increasing intervention in
government policy. The comments sparked attacks by Ansar-e Hezbollah
mobs on Montazeri's residence and on a Koranic school in Qom run by
Montazeri. The promotion of Montazeri's views were among the charges
brought against clerics Mohsen Kadivar and former Interior Minister
Abdollah Nouri at hearings of the Special Clerical Court in 1999 (see
Section 1.e.). HRW reported a number of protests against Montazeri's
detention in 2001, including a letter circulated by his children asking
that the Government lift restrictions on him, and a petition signed on
Montazeri's behalf by 126 out of the 290 members of Parliament. In 2000
the press reported that several persons were jailed for expressing
support for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.
In July the Friday prayer leader of Isfahan, Taheri, resigned,
stating that he could no longer tolerate the corruption and repression
of the country's clerical leadership. Friday prayer leaders are
appointed by the Senior Leader of the Islamic Republic, and are the
senior religious authorities in their districts. According to HRW, the
conservative establishment attempted to limit the damage by restricting
coverage of Taheri's statement since he was appointed by Ayatollah
Khomeini, and has impeccable religious credentials.
The Government reportedly continued to persecute senior Shi'a
religious leaders and their followers who dissented from the ruling
religious establishment. In Qom in 2001, the body of Grand Ayatollah
Mohammad Shirazi, a leading dissident cleric, was seized by security
forces during his funeral and buried in a mosque, rather than on the
grounds of his house as he had requested.
During the year, at least 17 Majles members were called before the
courts for criticizing the Government in one form or another; 1 was
sentenced to 40 lashes and another fined. At year's end, there was no
information available on whether either sentence was carried out.
During 2001 approximately 60 reformist Majles members were reportedly
brought to court for a variety of alleged offenses, and although no
precise figures were available, that trend continued during the year.
In January reformist members of Parliament staged a walkout to
protest pro-reform Parliamentarian Hossein Loqmanian's imprisonment,
which led the Supreme Leader to pardon him after he had spent several
weeks in prison. In December 2001, Loqmanian began serving a 13-month
sentence for insulting the judiciary. He became the first Majles member
to serve a jail sentence. Two other Majles members resigned their seats
to protest Loqmanian's imprisonment. These cases resulted from the
ongoing conflict between reformist Parliamentarians and the hard-line
judiciary over precisely what type of speech is protected by
parliamentary immunity. Furthermore, Parliamentarians convicted of
crimes could be barred from running for the Majles again, since the law
prohibits persons with criminal records from running for office.
In October the judicial authorities closed down the National
Institute for Research Studies and Opinion Polls, which found in a poll
commissioned by the Parliament that approximately three quarters of the
population supported dialogue with the U.S., and close to half approved
of U.S. policy towards their country. According to press reports,
Institute director Behrouz Geranpayeh was interrogated and held
incommunicado for more than a month. Managing Director Hussein Qazian
of the private Ayandeh polling institute that participated in the poll
was also arrested. Abbas Abdi, one of the organizers of the student
takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, and now a prominent
journalist and member of the board of Ayandeh, was arrested in
November. All were charged with a combination of spying for the U.S.,
illegal contacts with foreign embassies, working with anti-regime
groups, and carrying out research on the order of the foreign polling
organization; although government intelligence officials had publicly
stated that the accused were not spies. According to press reports,
President Khatami's executive branch also rejected the charges, stating
that the pollsters were doing legitimate work cleared by the
Intelligence and Foreign Ministries. Reformist Parliamentarians were
barred from the court, and press reports indicated that the defendants
were not allowed to see their families or their attorneys.
In spring 2001, authorities reportedly arrested Fatima Haghighatjoo
for inciting public opinion and insulting the judiciary when she
criticized the arrest of a female journalist, and claimed that the
Government tortured and mistreated prisoners. She was the first sitting
Majles member to face prosecution for statements made under cover of
immunity. Authorities released her on bail immediately after her
arrest, but eventually sentenced her to 22 months in prison. In
December 2001 her sentence was reduced to 17 months. Her sentence was
upheld by the courts, but at year's end, she had not served time in
prison. As with the case of Mohsen Mirdamadi, there was press
speculation that she would only go to prison when she leaves the
Majles. Another Majles Deputy, Mohammad Dadfar, whose jail sentence was
upheld by the courts, had not been sent to prison at year's end.
In 2001 approximately 60 parliamentarians were arrested and charged
with ``inciting public opinion.'' The cases were a result of the
ongoing conflict between reformist parliamentarians and the
conservative judiciary over precisely what type of speech is protected
by parliamentary immunity (see Section 1.d.). The harassment of Majles
members continued throughout the year.
Newspapers and magazines represented a wide variety of political
and social perspectives, some allied with members of the Government.
Many subjects of discussion were tolerated, including criticism of
certain government policies. However, the 1995 Press Law prohibits the
publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of subjects, including
material ``insulting Islam and its sanctities'' or ``promoting subjects
that might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic.'' Prohibited
topics include fault-finding comments regarding the personality and
achievements of the late Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini;
direct criticism of the Supreme Leader; assailing the principle of
velayat-e faqih, or rule by a supreme religious leader; questioning the
tenets of certain Islamic legal principles; publishing sensitive or
classified material affecting national security; promotion of the views
of certain dissident clerics, including Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri;
and advocating rights or autonomy for ethnic minorities.
The 1995 Press Law established the Press Supervisory Board, which
is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, a Supreme
Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a university professor
appointed by the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance. The Board is
responsible for issuing press licenses and for examining complaints
filed against publications or individual journalists, editors, or
publishers. In certain cases, the Press Supervisory Board may refer
complaints to the courts for further action, including closure. The
Press Court heard such complaints. Its hearings were conducted in
public with a jury composed of clerics, government officials, and
editors of government-controlled newspapers. The jury was empowered to
recommend to the presiding judge the guilt or innocence of defendants
and the severity of any penalty to be imposed, although these
recommendations were not legally binding.
In the past, recommendations made by Press Court juries for
relatively lenient penalties often were disregarded by the presiding
judge in favor of harsher measures, including closure. In the last two
years, some human rights groups asserted that the increasingly
conservative Press Court assumed responsibility for cases before they
were considered by the Press Supervisory Board, thus resulting in
harsher judgments in many cases.
In March 2000, after the success of reformers in capturing a
majority of seats in the February 2000 parliamentary elections, the
outgoing Parliament passed amendments to the Press Law that gave the
Press Court increased procedural and jurisdictional power. The
amendments allowed prosecution of individual journalists, in addition
to their editors and publishers, for a broad range of ill-defined
political offenses. The incoming Parliament, which was seated in May
2000, introduced a bill in August 2000 to reverse the restrictive
amendments. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei intervened with a letter
to the Speaker demanding that the bill be dropped from consideration,
and despite some strongly worded objections from members, the bill was
withdrawn. Semiofficial vigilante groups then appeared outside the
Parliament, creating an atmosphere of intimidation.
Public officials frequently lodged complaints against journalists,
editors, and publishers. The practice of complaining about the writings
of journalists crossed ideological lines. Offending writers were
subject to lawsuits and fines. Suspension from journalistic activities
and imprisonment were common punishments for guilty verdicts for
offenses ranging from ``fabrication'' to ``propaganda against the
State'' to ``insulting the leadership of the Islamic Republic.'' The
police raided newspaper offices, and Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs attacked
the offices of liberal publications and bookstores without interference
from the police or prosecution by the courts.
The Government's record regarding freedom of expression continued
to deteriorate. It remained a central issue in the struggle between
hardliners and political reformers. The Government continued its policy
of issuing licenses for new publications, some of which openly
criticized certain of its policies, until they were shut down. However,
these licenses were issued at a much slower rate than in past years. By
the end of the year, approximately 85 had been closed down. Several
dozen pro-reform newspapers continued to form and publish, most with
heavy self-censorship. When they were shut down, others opened to take
their place.
Dozens of individual editors and journalists have been charged and
tried by the Press Court, and several prominent journalists were jailed
for long periods without trial. Others have been sentenced to prison
terms or exorbitant fines. As of November 2001, more than 20
journalists, editors, and publishers reportedly remained in prison.
Freedom of the press continued to deteriorate during the year. Many
newspapers and magazines were closed and many of their managers were
sentenced to jail and lashings. The judiciary reportedly threatened to
prosecute the official Islamic Republic News Agency for printing a
statement by the recently banned Freedom Movement (see Sections 1.d.
and 2.b.). In July, Norouz, the leading reformist newspaper in the
country, was banned for six months. Its director, Mohsen Mirdamadi, who
headed the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the
Majlis, was sentenced to six months in jail, a fine, and a 4-year ban
on involvement in journalism. Press reports indicated that the charges
against him were ``publishing lies, disturbing public opinion, and
taking action against national security.'' At year's end, Mirdamadi had
not gone to jail, even though his sentence was upheld by the courts.
According to some press reports, it was unclear when the sentence would
be carried out, possibly when he leaves the Majles.
According to press reports, other newspapers banned during the year
included Golestan-e-Iran, which had been publishing for approximately
1-month, and was closed for ``making propaganda against the system and
spreading lies, and encouraging immorality through publishing
pictures.'' Another newspaper, Vaqt, was also closed for ``encouraging
immorality through the publication of pictures.''
In October 2000, Akbar Tajik-Saeeki, identified as the prayer
leader at a Tehran mosque, reportedly was jailed by the SCC for signing
a petition protesting the continued detention of Grand Ayatollah
Montazeri. In December 2000, one of Montazeri's sons was arrested for
distributing his father's writings.
The 134 signatories of the 1994 Declaration of Iranian Writers,
which declared a collective intent to work for the removal of barriers
to freedom of thought and expression, remained at risk. In the past,
the Association of International Writers (PEN) noted that the
authorities had not resolved the killings of some of its signatories or
the disappearance of Pirouz in 1998 (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
The Government directly controlled and maintained a monopoly over
all television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflected
the Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because
newspapers and other print media had a limited circulation outside
large cities, radio and television served as the principal news source
for many citizens. Satellite dishes that received foreign television
broadcasts were forbidden; however, many citizens, particularly the
wealthy, owned them. The Government confiscated many satellite dishes
in the wake of the October 2001 soccer riots and during periodic
crackdowns during the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.f., and 2.b.).
The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance was in charge of
screening books prior to publication to ensure that they did not
contain offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical
of the Government were published without reprisal. The Ministry
inspected foreign printed materials prior to their release on the
market.
The Government effectively censored domestic films, since they were
the main source of funding for film producers. Those producers must
submit scripts and film proposals to government officials in advance of
funding approval. However, such government restrictions appeared to
have eased since the 1997 election of President Khatami.
Academic censorship persisted. Government informers who monitored
classroom material and activities reportedly were common on university
campuses. Admission to universities was politicized; all applicants had
to pass ``character tests'' in which officials screened out applicants
critical of the Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors had
to cooperate with government authorities over a period of years.
Members of the Ansar-e Hezbollah disrupted lectures and appearances by
academics whose views did not conform with their own.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
permits assemblies and marches ``provided they do not violate the
principles of Islam''; however, in practice the Government restricted
freedom of assembly and closely monitored gatherings to ensure that
they did not constitute uncontrolled antigovernment protest. Such
gatherings included public entertainment and lectures, student
gatherings, labor protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer
gatherings. A significant factor for groups in deciding whether to hold
a public gathering is whether it would be opposed by the semiofficial
Ansar-e Hezbollah, which used violence and intimidation to disperse
such assemblies.
In January two teachers Mohammad-Ebrahim Ahmad-Nia and Akhtar
Ghassem -Zadeh-Moin were hospitalized for injuries received at a
demonstration. They were arrested during a demonstration against low
wages and poor working conditions. Their families were not allowed to
visit them. According to sources, the families were told to refrain
from public comment on the cases if they wanted their loved-ones to
live. By March, the families had heard nothing and believed that they
might have died in custody. There was no further information available
on these cases at the end of the year (see Section 1.a.).
In November the Aghajari (see Section 2.a.) verdict sparked large
and ongoing student protests at universities throughout the country.
Students boycotted classes for almost 2 weeks and in the largest pro-
reform demonstrations in 3 years, crowds of up to 5,000 students at
college campuses called for freedom of speech and major political
reforms, and denounced the Aghajari death sentence as ``medieval.''
Four student leaders who were arrested in the wake of the
demonstrations by ``plainclothes'' forces working for the Intelligence
Ministry were released after being held for one day. In late December,
two students were given jail terms for their protests against the
Aghajari sentence. Hojatollah Rahimi was sentenced to 2 years in prison
and 70 lashes for ``insulting religious sanctities and issuing an
insulting declaration.'' Co-defendant Parviz Torkashvand was sentenced
to 4 months in jail and forty lashes.
A government clampdown through the use of Basiji and other forces
led to a quiet period of two weeks that ended on December 7, when there
was a large demonstration at the University of Tehran. It was attended
by over 2,000 within the walls of the campus, with a larger crowd
outside. The demonstrators demanded freedom for all political
prisoners, a referendum, and the resignations of the President and the
head of the judiciary. Press reports indicated that law enforcement
officials and the ``plainclothes'' force broke up the demonstration
using batons, whips, and belts, and arrested over 200 persons, many of
whom were still being held at the end of the year. Demonstrations on
December 9 and 10 were also broken up violently by Basiji forces.
In October 2001, riots and demonstrations broke out throughout the
country after the national soccer team lost a match it had been heavily
favored to win. The Government arrested hundreds of persons. There were
anecdotal reports that some demonstrators were killed; however, the
Government denied this (see Sections 1.a., 1.f., and 2.a.).
The UNSR reported that in December 2000, police forcibly disrupted
a peaceful demonstration by Kurdish students at the University of
Tehran, injuring and arresting a number of the demonstrators.
In July 1999, students at the University of Tehran who were
protesting proposed legislation by the Majles that would limit press
freedoms and protested the Government's closure of a prominent reform-
oriented newspaper, were attacked by elements of the security forces
and the Ansar-e Hezbollah. Police forces reportedly looked on and
allowed repeated attacks against the students and their dormitory. HRW
reported that, according to witnesses, at least 4 students were killed
in the assault on the dormitory, 300 were injured, and 400 were
detained. The demonstrations continued to grow in subsequent days to
include many nonstudents. Looting, vandalism, and large-scale rioting
began and spread to cities outside Tehran.
In September 1999, the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Court,
Hojatoleslam Gholamhossein Rahbarpour, was quoted as saying that 1,500
students were arrested during the riots, 500 were released immediately
after questioning, 800 were released later, and formal investigations
were undertaken against the remaining 200. He also announced that four
student leaders were sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court for
their role in the demonstrations. The death sentences reportedly were
commuted to prison terms in 2000. The UNSR's 2000 report stated that
about two-thirds of the students who initially were arrested
subsequently were released, but noted that there has been no formal
accounting of all the persons arrested in connection with the July 1999
demonstrations.
The Government arrested the leaders of the Iran Nations Party in
the aftermath of the July 1999 demonstrations. The party was a secular
nationalist movement that predates the revolution and was viewed as a
threat by certain elements of the Government. The party was accused of
inciting rioters and of encouraging disparaging slogans against
``sacred values.'' Agents of the intelligence service in late 1998
killed the former head of the Iran Nations Party, Darioush Forouhar,
along with his wife (see Section 1.a.).
In the aftermath of these events, the Government took action
against members of the security forces for their assault on the student
dormitory, and against student leaders, demonstrators, and political
activists, whom it blamed for inciting illegal behavior. In August
1999, the commander of the security forces, General Hedayat Lotfian,
was summoned before the Parliament to explain the role of his officers
in the dormitory raid. He reportedly announced that 98 officers were
arrested for their actions.
In February 2000, 20 police officers and officials were tried on
charges of misconduct in connection with the demonstrations. The court
found that misconduct had occurred, and ordered compensation for 34
injured students. However, the court then released all but two of the
accused officers.
The Government limited freedom of association. The Constitution
provides for the establishment of political parties, professional
associations, Islamic religious groups, and organizations for
recognized religious minorities, provided that such groups do not
violate the principles of ``freedom, sovereignty, and national unity,''
or question Islam as the basis of the Islamic Republic. However,
President Khatami repeatedly has declared as a major goal the rule of
law and development of civil society.
The Government permanently banned the Iran Freedom Movement during
they year. In March 2001 the Government provisionally closed the 50-
year-old Iran Freedom Movement for ``attempting to overthrow the
Islamic regime.'' In response to the permanent dissolution of the
movement in July, President Khatami warned against the banning of
political groups, saying that suppression did not eliminate ideas; they
are simply forced underground and continue to grow (see Section 1.e.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricted freedom of
religion. The Constitution declares that the ``official religion of
Iran is Islam and the sect followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver)
Shi'ism,'' and that this principle is ``eternally immutable.'' Article
144 of the Constitution states that ``the Army of the Islamic Republic
of Iran must be an Islamic army,'' which is ``committed to an Islamic
ideology,'' and must ``recruit into its service individuals who have
faith in the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to
the cause of achieving its goals.'' However, members of religious
minority communities sometimes served in the military. It also states
that ``other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full respect,''
and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews, the country's pre-
Islamic religions, as the only ``protected religious minorities.''
Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution did not
enjoy freedom of religion. Members of the country's religious
minorities, including Baha'is, Jews, Christians, and Sufi Muslims
reported imprisonment, harassment, and intimidation based on their
religious beliefs. This situation most directly affected the nearly
350,000 followers of the Baha'i Faith, who effectively had no legal
rights either as individuals or as a community.
The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system was
rule by a ``religious jurisconsult.'' Its senior leadership, including
the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the head of the
Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
(Parliament) was composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
Religious activity was monitored closely by the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Adherents of recognized religious
minorities were not required to register individually with the
Government. However, their community, religious, and cultural
organizations, as well as schools and public events, were monitored
closely. Baha'is were not recognized by the Government as a legitimate
religious community; they were considered heretics belonging to an
outlawed political organization. Registration of Baha'is was a police
function. Evangelical Christian groups were pressured by government
authorities to compile and hand over membership lists for their
congregations; however, evangelicals resisted this demand. Non-Muslim
owners of grocery shops were required to indicate their religious
affiliation on the fronts of their shops.
The population was approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89
percent were Shi'a and 10 percent Sunni (mostly Turkomans, Arabs,
Baluchis, and Kurds living in the southwest, southeast, and northwest).
Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities constituted less
than 1 percent of the population. Sufi brotherhoods were popular, but
there were no reliable statistics on their number. All religious
minorities suffered varying degrees of officially sanctioned
discrimination, particularly in the areas of employment, education, and
housing.
The Government generally allowed recognized religious minorities to
conduct religious education of their adherents, although it restricted
this right considerably in some cases. Members of religious minorities
were allowed to vote, but they could not run for President.
Recognized religious minorities were allowed by the Government to
establish community centers and certain cultural, social, sports, or
charitable associations that they financed themselves. This did not
apply to the Baha'i community, which has been denied the right to
assemble officially or to maintain administrative institutions since
1983. Since the Baha'i faith has no clergy, the denial of the right to
form such institutions and elect officers threatened its very existence
in the country. Broad restrictions on Baha'is appeared to be geared to
destroying them as a community.
In September 2001, in conjunction with an appeal connected to the
1998 raids and property confiscations against the Baha'i community's
higher education institution, the Ministry of Justice issued a report
that reiterated that government policy continued to be implemented in
such a manner as to eliminate the Baha'is as a community. The report
stated in part that Baha'is could only be enrolled in schools provided
they did not identify themselves as Baha'is, and that they preferably
should be enrolled in schools with a strong Muslim religious ideology.
The report also stated that all those identified as Baha'is must be
expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during
the course of their studies whenever their identity as Baha'is becomes
known.
University applicants were required to pass an examination in
Islamic theology. Although public school students received instruction
in Islam, this requirement limited the access of most religious
minorities to higher education. Applicants for public sector employment
similarly were screened for their knowledge of Islam.
The legal system discriminated against religious minorities,
awarding lower monetary compensation in injury and death lawsuits for
non-Muslims than for Muslims and imposing heavier punishments on non-
Muslims than on Muslims. A bill was passed by the Majlis early in the
year which would equalize the ``blood money'' paid to the families of
crime victims. The Guardian Council had not ruled on whether to ratify
the bill, but there were reports that the Supreme Leader supported it.
Since Baha'is were not a recognized religious minority, a change in the
law would not apply to them.
The Government was highly suspicious of proselytizing of Muslims by
non-Muslims and was harsh in its response, in particular against
Baha'is and Evangelical Christians. The Government regarded Baha'is,
whose faith originally derives from a strand of Islam, as a heretical
sect, and has fueled anti-Baha'i and anti-Semitic sentiment in the
country for political purposes.
The Government did not ensure the right of citizens to change or
recant their religion. Apostasy, specifically conversion from Islam,
may be punishable by death.
Although Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of
the Constitution, some Sunni groups claimed to be discriminated against
by the Government. In particular, Sunnis cited the lack of a Sunni
mosque in Tehran and claimed that authorities refused to authorize
construction of a Sunni place of worship in the capital. Sunnis also
accused the state broadcasting company of airing programs insulting to
Sunnis. Numerous Sunni clerics were reported to have been killed in
recent years, some allegedly by government agents. Sufi organizations
outside the country remained concerned about repression by the
authorities of Sufi religious practices.
The largest religious minority was the Baha'i faith, estimated at
350,000 adherents throughout the country. Baha'is were considered
apostates because of their claim to a religious revelation subsequent
to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Baha'i Faith was defined by the
Government as a political ``sect'' linked to the Pahlavi monarchy and,
therefore, as counterrevolutionary. Historically at risk, Baha'is often
have suffered increased levels of mistreatment during times of
political unrest.
Baha'is may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links
with co-religionists abroad. The fact that the Baha'i world
headquarters (established by the founder of the Baha'i Faith in the
19th century in what was then Ottoman-controlled Palestine) is situated
in what is now the state of Israel exposed Baha'is to government
charges of ``espionage on behalf of Zionism.''
According to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the
U.S., since 1979, more than 200 Baha'is have been killed, and 15
disappeared and presumed dead. The Government continued to imprison and
detain Baha'is based on their religious beliefs.
The property rights of Baha'is generally were disregarded.
Properties belonging to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as places
of worship and graveyards, were confiscated by the Government in the
years after the 1979 revolution and, in some cases, defiled. The
Government's seizure of Baha'i personal property, as well as its denial
of access to education and employment, continued to erode the economic
base of the Baha'i community.
Baha'i group meetings and religious education, which often took
place in private homes and offices, were severely curtailed. Public and
private universities continued to deny admittance to Baha'i students.
The use of suspended sentences appears to be a government tactic to
discourage Baha'is from taking part in monthly religious gatherings.
In September 1998, authorities conducted a nationwide raid of more
than 500 homes and offices owned or occupied by Baha'is to disrupt the
activities of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning. The Institute
employed Baha'i faculty and professors, many of whom had been dismissed
from teaching positions by the Government as a result of their faith,
and conducted classes in homes or offices owned or rented by Baha'is.
During the operation, which took place in at least 14 different cities,
36 faculty members were arrested, and a variety of personal property,
including books, papers, and furniture, either were destroyed or
confiscated. Government interrogators sought to force the detained
faculty members to sign statements acknowledging that the Open
University was defunct and pledging not to collaborate with it in the
future. Baha'is outside the country reported that none of the 36
detainees would sign the document. All but 4 of the 36 persons detained
during the September 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute were released by
November 1998.
In March 1999, Dr. Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi,
Habibullah Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, the four
remaining detainees from the September 1998 raid, were convicted under
Article 498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging
from 3 to 10 years. In July 1999, Mirzapanah, who had been sentenced to
3 years in prison, became ill and was hospitalized. Prison authorities
allowed him to return home upon his recovery on the understanding that
they could find him whenever necessary. The other three were released
in December 1999.
The Government reportedly kept a small number of Baha'is in
arbitrary detention, some at risk of execution, on an ongoing basis.
With the release earlier this year of a prisoner originally sentenced
to death in 1997, there were four Baha'is reported to be in prison for
practicing their faith at year's end, two of them facing life
sentences. In addition, the Government harassed the Baha'i community by
arresting persons arbitrarily, charging and then releasing them, often
without dropping the charges against them. According to credible
foreign Baha'i sources, persecution of the community in general, and
these practices in particular, seem to have intensified since the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights ended formal monitoring of the human rights
situation in the country via the UNSR in the spring.
Baha'is regularly were denied compensation for injury or criminal
victimization. Government authorities claimed that only Muslim
plaintiffs were eligible for compensation in these circumstances.
Baha'is continued to be denied most forms of government employment.
Thousands of Baha'is dismissed from government jobs in the early 1980s
received no unemployment benefits and were required to repay the
Government salaries or pensions from their first day of employment.
Some of those unable to do so faced prison sentences.
The Government often prevented Baha'is from traveling outside the
country.
However, over the past several years, the Government has taken some
positive steps in recognizing the rights of Baha'is, as well as other
religious minorities. In November 1999, President Khatami publicly
stated that no one in the country should be persecuted because of his
or her religious beliefs. He added that he would defend the civil
rights of all citizens, regardless of their beliefs or religion.
Subsequently the Expediency Council approved the ``Right of
Citizenship'' bill, affirming the social and political rights of all
citizens and their equality before the law. In February 2000, following
approval of the bill, the head of the judiciary notified all registry
offices in the country that they should permit couples to be registered
as husband and wife without being required to state their religious
affiliation. This measure effectively permitted the registration of
Baha'i marriages in the country. Previously Baha'i marriages were not
recognized by the Government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges of
prostitution. Consequently, children of Baha'i marriages were not
recognized as legitimate and were denied inheritance rights. At the end
of the year, Baha'is could obtain ration booklets and send their
children to public elementary and secondary schools.
The UNSR estimated the Christian community at approximately
300,000. Of these the majority were ethnic Armenians and Assyro-
Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and evangelical churches also were
active, although nonethnically based groups report restrictions on
their activities. The UNSR reported that Christians were emigrating at
an estimated rate of 15,000 to 20,000 per year.
The authorities became particularly vigilant in recent years in
curbing proselytizing activities by evangelical Christians, whose
services were conducted in Persian. Government officials closed
evangelical churches and arrested converts. Members of evangelical
congregations were required to carry membership cards, photocopies of
which must be provided to the authorities. Worshipers were subject to
identity checks by authorities posted outside congregation centers.
Meetings for evangelical services were restricted by the authorities to
Sundays, and church officials were ordered to inform the Ministry of
Information and Islamic Guidance before admitting new members to their
congregations.
Mistreatment of evangelical Christians continued in recent years.
Christian groups have reported instances of government harassment of
churchgoers in Tehran, in particular of worshipers at the Assembly of
God congregation in the capital. Cited instances of harassment included
conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by Revolutionary
Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering church premises
and demands for presentation of identity papers of worshipers inside.
Estimates of the size of the Iranian Jewish community varied from
25,000 to 30,000; a substantial reduction from the estimated 75,000 to
80,000 Iranian Jews prior to the 1979 revolution.
While Jews were a recognized religious minority, allegations of
official discrimination were frequent. The Government's anti-Israel
stance, and the perception among many citizens that Jewish citizens
supported Zionism and the State of Israel, created a threatening
atmosphere for the small community. Jews limited their contact with and
did not openly express support for Israel out of fear of reprisal.
Recent anti-American and anti-Israeli demonstrations included the
denunciation of Jews, as opposed to the past practice of denouncing
only Israel and Zionism, adding to the threatening atmosphere for the
community. Jewish leaders reportedly were reluctant to draw attention
to official mistreatment of their community due to fear of government
reprisal.
Some Jewish groups outside the country reported an increase in
anti-Semitic propaganda in the official and semiofficial media. One
example was the periodic publication of the anti-Semitic and fictitious
``Protocols of the Elders of Zion,'' both by the Government and by
periodicals associated with hard line elements of the Government.
The Government allowed the practice of Judaism, but restricted and
interfered with it in practice. Education of Jewish children has become
more difficult in recent years. The Government allowed the teaching of
Hebrew, recognizing its necessity for the practice of Judaism. However,
it strongly discouraged teachers from distributing Hebrew texts to
students, making it difficult to teach the language in practice. The
Government also required that several Jewish schools remain open on
Saturdays, the Jewish Sabbath, to conform with the schedule of other
schools in the school system.
Jews were gradually dismissed from most government positions after
1979. Members of the community are permitted to obtain passports and to
travel outside the country; however, with the exception of certain
business travelers, they were required by the authorities to obtain
government clearance (and pay additional fees) before each trip abroad.
The Government appeared concerned about the emigration of Jews.
Permission generally was not granted for all members of Jewish families
to travel outside the country at the same time (see Section 2.d.).
In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested in the cities of
Shiraz and Isfahan. Among the group were several prominent rabbis,
teachers of Hebrew, and their students. The charges centered on alleged
acts of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense punishable by death.
The 13 were jailed for more than a year before trial, largely in
solitary confinement, without official charges or access to lawyers. In
April 2000, the defendants were appointed lawyers, and a closed trial
commenced in a revolutionary court in Shiraz. Human rights groups and
governments around the world criticized the lack of due process in the
proceedings. The UNSR characterized them as ``in no way fair.'' In July
2000, 10 of the 13, along with 2 Muslim defendants, were convicted on
charges of illegal contact with Israel, conspiracy to form an illegal
organization, and recruiting agents. They received prison sentences
ranging from 4 to 13 years. Three were acquitted. The lawyers of those
convicted filed an appeal and in September 2000, an appeals court
overturned the convictions for forming an illegal organization and
recruiting agents, but upheld the convictions for illegal contacts with
Israel. Their sentences were reduced to between 2 and 9 years
imprisonment. In January 2001, the Supreme Court rejected a final
appeal. One of the ten convicted was released in February 2001 upon
completion of his prison term, and another was released in January of
this year at the end of his term. Three additional prisoners were
released in October, leaving five remaining in prison at year's end.
Jewish groups outside the country noted that the March 1999 arrest
of the 13 Jewish individuals coincided with an increase in anti-Semitic
propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hardline elements
of the Government. Since the beginning of the trial, Jewish businesses
in Tehran and Shiraz have been targets of vandalism and boycotts, and
Jews have reportedly suffered personal harassment and intimidation.
The group ``Families of Iranian Jewish Prisoners'' (FIJP) has gone
public with the names of twelve Iranian Jews who disappeared while
attempting to leave the country in the 1990s. FIJP believes that the
Government has dealt with these cases differently than it dealt with
other cases of people being captured while trying to escape from the
country because these individuals were Jewish (see Section 1.b.).
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Mandaeans were regarded as Christians, and were included among the
country's three recognized religious minorities. However, Mandaeans
regarded themselves as adherents of a religion that practices
Christianity in both belief and practice. The small community faced
discrimination similar to that experienced by the country's other pre-
Islamic religious minorities.
The Government restricted the movement of several senior religious
leaders, some of whom had been under house arrest for years (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government placed some restrictions
on these rights. Citizens may travel within the country, although there
were restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during times of occasional
heavy fighting. Roadblocks and security checks were common on routes
between major cities. Citizens may change their place of residence
without obtaining official permission. The Government required exit
permits (a validation stamp in the passport) for draft-age men and
citizens who were politically suspect. Some citizens, particularly
those whose skills were in short supply and who were educated at
government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit permits. The
Government restricted the movement of certain religious minorities and
several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
Citizens returning from abroad sometimes were subjected to searches
and extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of
antigovernment activities abroad. Cassette tapes, printed material,
personal correspondence, and photographs were subject to confiscation.
The Government permitted Jews to travel abroad, but often denied
them multiple-exit permits issued to other citizens. Baha'is often
experienced difficulty in obtaining passports.
Women must obtain the permission of their husband, father, or other
male relative to obtain a passport. Married women must receive written
permission from their husbands before being allowed to leave the
country.
The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperated
with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. Although the Government generally provided first asylum, it
sometimes increased pressure on refugees to return to their home
countries, particularly when the economy worsened.
The country hosted a large refugee population, mostly Afghans. At
the end of the year, there were approximately one million refugees from
Afghanistan, a decrease from the 2 million estimated by the UNHCR in
2001. Hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan
during the year. The UNHCR expressed concern that the Government was
pressing them to leave, a contention the Government denied. Most
refugees subsisted on itinerant labor. The Government accused many
Afghans of involvement in drug trafficking; as a result, there were
reports that many of them were arrested and executed. With the conflict
in Afghanistan after the September 2001 terrorist attack in the U.S.,
many more Afghans attempted to enter the country across the Iranian
border. However, the Government had sealed its border in anticipation
of a war in Afghanistan. The Government set up several refugee camps
just inside Afghanistan to deal with the crisis.
The UNHCR estimated that there were approximately 450,000 to
510,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees in the country at the end of 2001, of
whom approximately 83 percent were Shi'a and 17 percent non-Shi'a. An
additional 70,000 refugees were Shi'a Arabs. Many of the Iraqi refugees
were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war because of
their suspected Iranian origin. In numerous instances, both the Iraqi
and Iranian governments disputed their citizenship, rendering many of
them stateless. Other Iraqi refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait in 1990.
Although the Government claimed to host more than 30,000 refugees
of other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans,
Somalis, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis, it did not provide information
about them or allow the UNHCR or other organizations access to them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The right of citizens to change their government is restricted
significantly. The Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is
selected for a life term by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of
Experts may also remove the Supreme Leader. The Assembly itself is
restricted to clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by
popular vote from a list approved by the Government. There is no
separation of state and religion, and clerics dominate the Government.
The Government repressed attempts to separate state and religion or to
alter the State's theocratic foundation. The Government effectively
controlled the selection of candidates for elections, although a bill
approved by the Parliament and now awaiting approval by the Guardian
Council would weaken its control. The Constitution provides for a
Council of Guardians, composed of six Islamic clergymen and six lay
members, who review all laws for consistency with Islamic law and the
Constitution. The Council also screens political candidates for
ideological, political, and religious suitability. It accepts only
candidates who support a theocratic state; clerics who disagree with
government policies also have been disqualified.
Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members
of the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a former
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in 1992 by
the Majles for ``liberalism'' and ``negligence,'' was reelected
President in 2001 with 77 percent of the vote. The UNSR reported that
the Guardian Council significantly limited the number of candidates
permitted to run and noted that the Interior Minister denounced the
``unprincipled disqualification'' of candidates.
Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly
of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates,
which led to criticism from many observers that the Government
improperly predetermined the election results.
Elections were held for the 290-seat Majles in February 2000. Of
more than 6,000 candidates, 576 were disqualified before the elections
by the Council of Guardians, which represented a substantial decrease
from the 44 percent who were disqualified before the 1996 elections.
Most of those disqualified were outspoken advocates of political
reform, including some of the most prominent supporters of President
Khatami. However, candidates with a wide range of views were permitted
to run. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for moderate and
reform candidates, who constituted a large majority in the Majles. In
June 2001, elections were held for Majles seats. The Council of
Guardians reportedly disqualified 100 potential candidates, more than
one-quarter of those wishing to run. Largely due to the
disqualification of reform candidates, conservative candidates or
conservatives running as independents won all six seats up for
election. Vigorous parliamentary debates took place regarding various
issues. However, the Supreme Leader and other conservatives within the
Government used constitutional provisions to block much of the early
reform legislation passed by the Majles.
In February 1999, elections for nationwide local councils were held
for the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures
indicated that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council
seats across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous
districts. The Councils did not appear to have been granted the
autonomy or authority to make them effective or meaningful local
institutions; doing so would have been viewed as a threat to the
control of the central government. The next local council elections
will be held in February 2003.
Women held 9 out of 290 Majles seats. There were no female cabinet
members, although several held high level positions and a woman served
as Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs.
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elected deputies to Majles seats
reserved for them. However, religious minorities, by law and practice,
were barred from being elected to a representative body--except to the
seats in the Majles reserved for them--and from holding senior
government or military positions. Religious minorities were allowed to
vote, but could not run for president.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights
groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and has
stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a
country's ``culture and beliefs.''
Various professional groups representing writers, journalists,
photographers, and others attempted to monitor government restrictions
in their fields, as well as harassment and intimidation against
individual members of their professions. However, their ability to
meet, organize, and effect change was curtailed severely by the
Government. Although there were a few domestic NGOs, there was no
information available on what type of groups they were or the services
they provided.
International human rights NGOs such as HRW and Amnesty
International (AI) were not permitted to establish offices in or
conduct regular investigative visits to the country. Representatives of
HRW and AI, who were asked by the European Union to attend EU-Iran
human rights talks in December as part of the EU delegation, were
barred by government authorities from attending the talks. HRW and
members of a European judicial monitoring NGO were permitted to send
representatives to Shiraz for the trial of 13 Jewish citizens on
espionage charges (see Section 2.c.). However, they were not permitted
to monitor the trial proceedings.
After the defeat of the resolution criticizing the country and
renewing the UNSR's mandate at the meeting of the Commission on Human
Rights in the spring, press reports indicated that the country declared
itself ready to welcome visits by thematic UN human rights rapporteurs
from different fields. No such visits took place during the year.
However, the country was engaged in discussions on human rights with
the EU in connection with the Trade and Cooperation Agreement embarked
upon by the two sides.
The ICRC and the UNHCR both operated in the country. However, the
Government did not allow the UNSR for Human Rights in Iran to visit the
country from 1997 to 2001, the last year his mandate to monitor human
rights in the country was in effect. When the UNSR was last allowed
entry into the country to gather information for his yearly report in
1996, he was able to correspond with government officials during the
period of his mandate and often received replies to his inquiries.
The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995
under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board
as an observer. In 1996 the Government established a human rights
committee in the Majles. However, most observers believed that these
committees lacked independence and power.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
In general the Government did not discriminate on the basis of
race, disability, language, or social status; however, it discriminated
on the basis of religion and sex. In some instances, it discriminated
on the basis of language, such as with the Kurds, Azeris, and Ahwazi
Arabs.
Women.--Although spousal abuse and violence against women occurred,
statistics on such abuse were not available. Abuse in the family was
considered a private matter and seldom was discussed publicly. Rape is
illegal; however, the law was rarely enforced and rape was a widespread
problem. The UNSR published statistics provided by the IHRC indicating
that at the end of 2001, of a total of approximately 3,000 currently
active files, an estimated 1,000 were related to women's issues.
However, the UNSR noted in his September 2000 report that media
reporting on the situation of women diminished, in part due to the
closure of the reform-oriented press (see Section 2.a.).
Prostitution was illegal. Accurate information regarding the extent
of the problem was not widely available, although the issue received
widespread attention during they year as a result of the public's
greater interest in social problems. However, press reports described
prostitution as a severe problem. There was a growing understanding of
the need to deal with the problem, especially because of its role in
the spread of AIDS.
Press reporting indicated that the Government acknowledged that
prostitution had become very widespread, and was conducting a
crackdown. In July two well-known soccer players were sentenced to 170
lashes after being arrested at a brothel. The Government closed many
brothels around the country during the year and the police reportedly
arrested 243 persons involved in prostitution networks. There was a
report that a man was executed in April in Mashad for killing sixteen
prostitutes. He claimed that he considered the killings to be a
religious obligation. In another instance, in the city of Karaj, a
judge of a revolutionary court was sentenced to 10 years in prison and
a lashing for forcing runaway girls into prostitution.
Reports indicated that due to the passage of persons across the
border with Afghanistan, there was a rise in trafficking. There were
also reports in 2001 that women were trafficked into the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) for forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Discrimination against women was reinforced by law through
provisions of the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those
sections dealing with family and property law. Shortly after the 1979
revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a
hallmark bill adopted in 1967, that gave women increased rights in the
home and workplace, and replaced it with a legal system based largely
on Shari'a practices. In 1998 the Majles passed legislation that
mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of medical care.
Even though the law permits it, marriage at the minimum age of nine
is rare. All women must have the permission of their father or a male
relative in order to marry. The law allowed for the practice of
temporary marriages based on a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a girl
may become the wife of a married or single Muslim male after a simple
and brief religious ceremony. The temporary marriage may last any
length of time. According to Shi'a Islamic law, men may have as many
temporary wives as they wish. Such wives are not granted rights
associated with traditional marriage.
The Penal Code includes provisions that mandate the stoning of
women and men convicted of adultery, although judges were instructed at
the end of the year cease sentencing adulterers to stoning (see Section
1.c.). Women have the right to divorce. However, a husband is not
required to cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In December a new law
made the adjudication of cases in which women demand divorces less
arbitrary and less costly.
Privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional
interpretations of Islamic law are limited by a model contract which
recognizes a divorced woman's right to a share in the property that
couples acquire during their marriage and to increased alimony rights.
Women who remarry are forced to give the child's father custody of
children from earlier marriages. However, the law granted custody of
minor children to the mother in certain divorce cases in which the
father is proven unfit to care for the child. Muslim women may not
marry non-Muslim men, and the testimony of a woman is worth half that
of a man in court. The ``blood money'' paid to the family of a female
crime victim is half the sum paid for a man, and will remain so even if
the new law passed by the Majlis equalizing ``blood money'' for Muslims
and non-Muslims is accepted by the Guardian Council (see section 2.c.).
Any change would only pertain to men. A married woman must obtain the
written consent of her husband before traveling outside the country
(see Section 2.d.).
Women had access to primary and advanced education; however, social
and legal constraints limited their professional opportunities. Women
were represented in many fields of the work force, and the Government
has not prevented women from entering many traditionally male-dominated
fields. However, many women choose not to work outside the home.
According to international organizations, there were 2 million women in
the work force in 2001, of whom approximately 1.8 million were employed
during the year. The law provides maternity, child care, and pension
benefits.
The Government enforced gender segregation in most public spaces,
and prohibited women from mixing openly with unmarried men or men not
related to them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses
and enter public buildings, universities, and airports through separate
entrances. Women were prohibited from attending male sporting events,
although this restriction did not appear to be enforced universally.
While the enforcement of conservative Islamic dress codes varied, what
women wore in public was not entirely a matter of personal choice. The
authorities sometimes harassed women if their dress or behavior was
considered inappropriate, and women may be sentenced to flogging or
imprisonment for such violations (see Section 1.c.). The law prohibits
the publication of pictures of uncovered women in the print media,
including pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to
observe Islamic dress codes at work.
Children.--Except in isolated areas of the country, children had
access to free education through the 12th grade (compulsory to age 11),
and to some form of health care.
There was not enough information available to reflect how the
Government dealt with child abuse.
A girls' center in Karaj reportedly was involved in the trafficking
of girls (see Section 6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--There is no available information
regarding whether the Government has legislated or otherwise mandated
accessibility for persons with disabilities, or whether discrimination
against persons with disabilities is prohibited. Film clips showed
children tied or chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and
without appropriate care. It is not known to what extent this
represents the typical treatment of persons with disabilities since
from 1996.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Kurds sought greater
autonomy from the central government and continued to suffer from
government discrimination. The Kurds' status as Sunni Muslims is an
aggravating factor in their relations with the Shi'a-dominated
government. Such tensions predated the revolution. Kurds often were
suspected by government authorities of harboring separatist or foreign
sympathies. These suspicions have led to sporadic outbreaks of fighting
between government forces and Kurdish groups. Sunni Kurds protested
against the appointment of a Shi'a governor in the Kurdistan province,
who was chosen over numerous Sunni Kurdish candidates.
The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) claimed that the
Government arrested and executed at least three of its members during
the year. Other sources claimed the number executed in October was
three or five.
According to the UNSR, President Khatami, who won an overwhelming
percentage of the Kurdish vote in the recent Presidential election, has
made several conciliatory gestures to the Kurdish population. He
appointed the first Kurd to hold the position of Governor of Kurdistan,
and the Governor appeared to be facilitating a ``process of
reconciliation.'' The UNSR reported that the Government appeared to be
encouraging Kurdish cultural expression, and subsidizing some Kurdish
language classes. The number of Kurdish publications increased, and
discussion of limited Kurdish TV broadcasting began. However, there was
still no public school education in the Kurdish language.
Azeris are well integrated into the Government and society, but
complained of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. The Government
traditionally viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, particularly
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of an
independent Azerbaijan. Mohammed Chehregani, an advocate for the
cultural rights of Azeris, has been arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and
released several times over the past five years. According to Azeri
groups, Chehregani's December 1999 arrest was made to prevent his
registration as a candidate for the February 2000 parliamentary
elections (see Section 1.d.). They also claimed that there were a
number of Azeri political prisoners jailed for advocating cultural and
language rights for Iranian Azerbaijanis. The Government has charged
several of them with ``revolting against the Islamic state.''
Foreign representatives of the Ahwazi Arabs of Khuzistan, whose
numbers could range as high as 4 million or more, claimed that their
community in the southwest of the country suffered from discrimination.
They claimed that the Ahwazis were denied the right to study, speak,
publish newspapers, and educate their children in Arabic, and that the
use of Arabic names for babies was prohibited except for ordinary Shi'a
religious names. They asserted that the Government has ignored their
appeals to de-mine the vast stretches of Khuzistan which were mined
during the Iran-Iraq War, and that consequently, many people,
especially children, continued to be maimed by mines. They further
stated that many Arabs, both Shi'a and Sunni, have been imprisoned and
tortured for voicing opinions critical of government policies.
According to these sources, five Arab-Iranian men have been hanged in
the past several years for opposing the Government's policy of
confiscating Arab lands in Khuzistan province.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code grants workers the
right to establish unions; however, the Government did not allow
independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the
Worker's House, founded in 1982, was the sole authorized national labor
organization. It served primarily as a conduit for the Government to
exert control over workers. The leadership of the Worker's House
coordinated activities with Islamic labor councils, which were made up
of representatives of the workers and one representative of management
in industrial, agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35
employees. These councils also functioned as instruments of government
control, although they frequently were able to block layoffs and
dismissals.
According to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights for the year,
the role of the Worker's House changed in recent years, and there was
more tolerance of workers' organizations, which included four nurses
organizations, a health workers' union, and a textile workers' union.
The report also notes that a February 2000 law exempted companies with
up to 5 employees from the need to comply with labor legislation for 6
years. This law affected approximately 3 million workers, making them
easier to hire and fire.
The Labor Code allows employers and employees to establish guilds.
The guilds issued vocational licenses and helped members find jobs.
Instances of late or partial pay for government workers reportedly
were common.
There were no known affiliations with international labor
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers did not
have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective
bargaining agreements. The ICFTU also noted that the presence of
security/intelligence forces in the workplace, as well as increasing
use of temporary contracts, acted as obstacles to organizing.
The Government did not tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds
with its economic and labor policies. The law prohibits strikes by
government workers. It also prohibits government workers from having
contacts with foreigners and stipulates penalties for failure to
observe Islamic dress codes and principles at work. Nevertheless,
strikes did occur. In addition to strikes, there were also work
stoppages and protests by oil, textile, electrical manufacturing, and
metal workers, as well as by the unemployed.
Many of these protests were due to non-payment of wage arrears,
according to the ICFTU. It cited a March 2001 demonstration by 4,500
workers of the Simin textile factory in Isfahan, which was forcibly
broken up by security forces, resulting in injuries and arrests.
Another demonstration in May 2001 by 1000 textile workers at the Baresh
factory for the same grievance was also attacked by police. Another
protest by textile workers outside the Parliament building in June
resulted in satisfaction of their demands, but subsequent
demonstrations by workers there in July and in Isfahan in October were
violently repressed.
It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in the
export processing zones differ from the law and practice in the rest of
the country. According to the ICFTU's Annual Survey of Violations of
Trade Union Rights for the year, labor legislation did not apply in the
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Penal Code provides
that the Government may require any person who does not have work to
take suitable employment; however, this did not appear to be enforced
regularly. This provision has been criticized frequently by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) as contravening ILO Convention
29 on forced labor. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children; however, this was not enforced adequately, and such labor by
children was a serious problem.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, it was a serious problem (see Section 6.c.). The Labor Law
prohibits employment of minors under 15 years of age and places
restrictions on the employment of minors under age 18; however, laws
pertaining to child labor were not enforced adequately. The law permits
children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some small
businesses. By law, women and minors may not be employed in hard labor
or night work. Information regarding the extent to which these
regulations were enforced was not available. In August the country
ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of Child Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code empowers the
Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels for each
industrial sector and region; however, no information was available
regarding mechanisms used to set wages. It was not known if the minimum
wages were adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates
that the minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses
of a family and should take inflation into account. Under poor economic
conditions, many middle-class citizens must work two or three jobs to
support their families. The daily minimum wage for an uneducated
laborer was $2.50 (2000 tomans), which was not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
The Labor Code establishes a maximum 6-day, 48-hour workweek, with
1 weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid
annual leave and several paid public holidays.
According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by
the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting
workplace safety and health. The Council reportedly issued 28 safety
directives, and oversaw the activities of 3,000 safety committees
established in enterprises employing more than 10 persons. Labor
organizations outside the country have alleged that hazardous work
environments have been common in the country and have resulted in
thousands of worker deaths per year. It was not known how well the
Ministry's inspectors enforced regulations. It was not known whether
workers could remove themselves from hazardous situations without
risking the loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons, and persons reportedly were trafficked to,
through, and from the country during the year. Anecdotal reports
indicated that during the year, there may have been a rise in
trafficking due to the unsettled situation and passage of people across
the border with Afghanistan. It was difficult to measure the extent of
the Government's efforts to curb human trafficking, but national and
international press reporting indicated that Tehran has taken action
against bandits involved in abducting women and children. The regime
has also reportedly arrested, convicted, and executed numerous human
trafficking offenders. During the year, police reportedly arrested
numerous members of prostitution rings and closed down brothels.
In May the police arrested 100 persons, including both citizens and
foreigners, who had allegedly trafficked young girls to France,
Britain, Turkey, and certain Gulf countries. There were three other
large networks discovered in the investigation which sent girls to the
UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Turkey.
In June senior judicial officials were implicated in a prostitution
network in Tehran and in August, the judge of a revolutionary court in
the Karaj was sentenced to 10 years in prison and a lashing for forcing
runaway girls to work as prostitutes.
Also in August, authorities broke up a prostitution ring in Mashad
that was responsible for trafficking many young women into Pakistan for
forced prostitution.
The UNSR noted in his August 2001 report that a girl's shelter in
Karaj, the Jasmine Center, was closed down after an investigation
reportedly revealed that it had become involved in the trafficking of
girls. The press focused on the high-level connections of the operators
of the Center. The authorities subsequently charged a judge of the
Revolutionary Court in the affair.
There were reports in 2001 that women were trafficked to the UAE
for the purpose of forced prostitution. There also were reports in 2001
that young boys were trafficked through the country to be camel jockeys
in the UAE.
There were reportedly three trials in 2001 related to the
trafficking of persons; however, there was no information regarding the
details of the trials or their outcomes.
__________
IRAQ \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The United States does not have diplomatic representation in
Iraq. This report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the provisional Constitution of 1968, Iraq claims to be a
democratic republic. However, political power has rested exclusively in
a harshly repressive one-party apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein
al-Tikriti and members of his extended family. According to the
Constitution, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which exercised both executive and
legislative authority. President Saddam Hussein, who was also Prime
Minister, Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional
Command of the Ba'th Party, therefore wielded absolute decisive power.
Hussein and his regime obtained 100 percent of the votes cast in a
nondemocratic ``referendum'' on his presidency held in October that did
not include secret ballots, and many credible reports indicated that
voters feared possible reprisal for a dissenting vote. The judiciary
was not independent, and the President had the ability to override any
ruling or refer any case to a secret system of special courts outside
the normal judiciary.
Under the RCC and Ba'ath party structure, the Tikriti family
maintained total effective control of the security forces and the
military. The regime's security apparatus included militias attached to
the President, the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. The military
and these paramilitary forces often played an internal security role
and were central to maintaining the environment of intimidation and
fear on which regime power depended. The regime historically made
little attempt to acknowledge, investigate, or punish officials or
members of the military or security forces accused of human rights
abuses; however, in February it admitted that state police were
commonly accused of human rights violations. Members of the military
and security forces committed widespread, serious, and systematic human
rights abuses. In the Kurdish North, party militias under civilian
control provided regional security and have committed human rights
abuses.
The country has an estimated population of 24 million people. The
regime owned all major industries and controlled most of the highly
centralized economy, which is based largely on oil production. The
Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars damaged the economy, and the country has been
subject to U.N. sanctions since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Sanctions
ban all exports, except oil sales, under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 986 and subsequent resolutions--the ``oil-for-food''
program. Under the program, the country also was permitted, under U.N.
control, to import food, medicine, supplies for water, sanitation,
electricity, agriculture, and education projects, and spare parts for
the oil sector. The regime routinely circumvented U.N. sanctions. Under
a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.N., the regime shares
administration of 13 percent of ``oil for food'' revenues with Kurdish
parties in areas under their control.
Ethnically and linguistically the Iraqi population includes Arabs,
Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenians. The religious mix
likewise is varied and consists of Shi'a and Sunni Muslims (both Arab
and Kurdish), Christians (including Chaldeans and Assyrians), Kurdish
Yazidis, and a small number of Jews and Sabean Mandaeans. Civil
uprisings occurred in previous years, especially in Kurdish areas in
the north and Shi'a areas in the south. The minority Arab Sunni regime
reacted with extreme repression against those who oppose or even
question it. The regime also systematically forced the removal of
ethnic minorities under its policy of ``Arabizing'' arable land.
The regime's human rights record remained extremely poor, and it
continued to commit numerous, serious human rights abuses. Citizens did
not have the right to change the regime. The regime continued summarily
to execute alleged political opponents and leaders of the Shi'a
religious community. Reports suggested that persons were executed
merely because of their association with an opposition group. The
regime continued to be responsible for disappearances and to kill and
torture persons suspected of or related to persons suspected of
oppositionist politics, economic crimes, military desertion, and a
variety of other activities.
Security forces routinely tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise
abused detainees. Prison conditions were extremely poor and frequently
life threatening. The regime reportedly conducted ``prison cleansing''
campaigns to kill inmates in order to relieve overcrowding in the
prisons. The authorities routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention,
prolonged detention, and incommunicado detention, and continued to deny
citizens the basic right to due process. The regime granted a much-
publicized amnesty in October to all prisoners except those accused of
spying for the United States or Israel, but by all accounts prisoner
release was not as universal as claimed. This public relations event
served mainly to corroborate previous reporting of summary executions,
disappearances, torture, and inhuman living conditions within the
regime's prison system. Many prisoners remained unaccounted for after
the amnesty.
Saddam Hussein and his inner circle of supporters continued to
impose arbitrary rule. The regime continued to infringe on citizens'
privacy rights. The regime severely restricted freedoms of speech, the
press, assembly, association, religion, and movement. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the country issued a
report in March detailing ongoing, grievous violations of human rights
by the regime. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the U.N. General
Assembly passed a resolution in November criticizing the regime's
suppression of these freedoms. In April the European Parliament
published a report condemning the regime's human rights abuses.
Nevertheless, human rights abuses remained difficult to document
because of the regime's concealment of facts, including its prohibition
on the establishment of independent human rights organizations, its
persistent refusal to allow visits of human rights monitors, and its
continued restrictions designed to prevent dissent. Although in
February, the Special Rapporteur was allowed a single, 4-day visit to
research abuses in the country for the first time since 1992, time and
access were severely limited and strongly controlled by the regime. It
has refused to allow a followup visit. Past U.N. reporting on the
regime's human rights abuses was based almost entirely on interviews
with recent emigrants, opposition groups and others that had contacts
inside the country, and on published reports from outside the country.
Violence and discrimination against women occurred.
The regime has enacted laws affording a variety of protections to
women; however, it has been difficult to determine the practical
effects of such protections. The regime neglected the health and
nutritional needs of children and discriminated against religious
minorities and ethnic groups. The regime restricted severely trade
union rights, and there were instances of forced labor.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) have controlled most areas in the three northern
provinces of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniah since the regime withdrew
its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from the area
after the 1991 Kurdish uprising. The KDP and the PUK fought one another
from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify their
separate administrations and to hold new elections in July 1999. The
cease-fire has held, although reunification measures were long delayed.
The unified Assembly was convened for the first time in October. The
PUK held municipal elections in February 2000 and the KDP held
municipal elections in May 2001, the first elections held in the
Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992. Foreign and local election
observers reported that the elections generally were fair.
The KDP, PUK, and other opposition groups committed human rights
abuses. However, the PUK and KDP have enacted laws establishing an
independent judiciary, providing for freedom of religion, freedom of
the press, freedom of assembly, the right to form political parties,
and women's and workers' rights. According to press reporting and
independent observers, both groups generally observed such laws in
practice. In addition, both the PUK and KDP have established human
rights ministries to monitor human rights conditions, to submit reports
to relevant international bodies, including the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), and to recommend ways to end abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--In keeping with its
long and established record of executing perceived or alleged political
opponents, the regime committed numerous political and other
extrajudicial killings throughout the reporting period. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur repeatedly criticized the regime for the ``sheer
number of executions'' taking place in the country, the number of
``extrajudicial executions on political grounds,'' and ``the absence of
a due process of the law.''
The list of offenses legally requiring a mandatory death penalty
has grown substantially in past years and includes anything that could
be characterized as ``sabotaging the national economy.'' This includes
offenses such as forgery, as well as smuggling cars, spare parts, heavy
equipment, and machinery. More significantly, the Special Rapporteur
noted that mere membership in certain political parties was punishable
by death, and that there was a pervasive fear of death for any act or
expression of dissent. There were recurrent reports of the use of the
death penalty for such offenses as ``insulting'' the President or the
Ba'th Party. The Special Rapporteur also noted that even the
``suggestion that someone is not a supporter of the President carries
the prospect of the death penalty.''
As in previous years, there were numerous credible reports that the
regime continued to execute persons thought to be involved in plotting
against Saddam Hussein or the Ba'th Party. These executions included
high-ranking civilian, military, and tribal leaders. In January Iraq
Press (IP) reported that three dissidents--Ali Hassan Abed, Jawad
Kadhem, and Abdujabaleel al-Uqaili--were executed for allegedly
attacking members of the Ba'th Party. In February IP also reported that
10 senior army Republican Guard officers, including Lieutenant General
Mohammed al-Dulaimi, were executed for allegedly plotting a coup. In
April the U.K.-based Guardian newspaper reported that Lieutenant
Colonel Mohamad Daham al-Tikriti, a recent defector from the General
Security Service, admitted that in February 150-200 civilians were
killed ``at random'' on suspicion of conspiracy and buried in a mass
grave near Baghdad as part of a larger effort in which 1,500 civilians
were summarily executed in the first 2 months of the year. According to
Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report for 2003, civilians detained in
Abu Ghurayb prison were apparently executed in March and others in
June. A number of military personnel were reportedly also executed in
March in Baghdad, Mosul, and other cities. HRW also documented that 11
military officers, including an Army Major General, were executed
between March and July 2001; and other executions of mid-level to
senior officers occurred in August and October 2001, all on the charge
of involvement in suspected coup attempts. In June the Iraqi Communist
Party (ICP) reported that eight citizens from Basra were executed in
November 2001 on suspicion of contacting the opposition.
The regime reportedly continued to pursue a policy of eliminating
prominent Shi'a clerics and their followers suspected of disloyalty to
the regime. For instance, the Sunday Times reported in May that regime
security forces attacked Shi'a worshippers in Karbala on a religious
pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam Hussein, killing at least 40 of them.
This continued an alleged pattern of repression against Shi'a. For
example, according to HRW, five Shi'a from al-Najaf province were among
those apparently executed in March in Abu Ghurayb prison. In 2001 the
regime reportedly executed two Shi'a clerics for claiming that the
regime was involved in the killing of a Shi'a cleric in 1999 and killed
another Shi'a cleric, Hussein Bahr al-Uloom, for refusing to appear on
television to congratulate Qusay Saddam Hussein on his election to a
Ba'th Party position. In 1998 and 1999, the regime killed a number of
leading Shi'a clerics, prompting the former Special Rapporteur in 1999
to express his concern to the regime that the killings might be part of
a systematic attack by regime officials on the independent leadership
of the Shi'a community (see Section 2.c.). The regime did not respond
to the Special Rapporteur's letter.
Regime agents publicly targeted family members of defectors and
dissidents for torture and killing (see Section 1.f.). This continued
an alleged pattern of torture of relatives of dissidents. For example,
in 2001 the regime reportedly tortured to death the mother of three
Iraqi defectors for her children's opposition activities. In 2000
regime agents reportedly killed Safiyah Hassan, who allegedly publicly
criticized the regime for killing her husband and two sons, Hussein and
Saddam Kamal. Her husband and sons had been senior regime officials;
however, the brothers defected to Jordan in 1996. The regime offered
the men immunity if they returned to the country; however, upon their
return, regime agents killed them and their father.
Regime security forces conducted numerous killings of political
prisoners, minority group members, criminal suspects, and others during
attempted apprehension or while in custody. Opposition groups and
defectors continued to provide detailed accounts, including the names
of hundreds of persons killed, of summary prison executions carried out
for the apparent purpose of reducing prison overcrowding. In September
2001, the regime executed 28 political prisoners in Abu Ghurayb prison
as a part of its prison cleansing campaign. During 2000 the Special
Rapporteur received reports referring to a prison cleansing execution
campaign taking place in Abu Ghurayb, Radwaniyah, and other prisons. A
former officer from the Mukhabarat (Intelligence Service) reported that
he participated in a 1998 mass murder at Abu Ghurayb prison following a
Revolutionary Command Council directive to ``clean out'' the country's
prisons. The regime's motive for such high numbers of summary
executions, estimated at more than 4,000 since 1997, may also be linked
to reported efforts to intimidate the population.
In a much-publicized move, the regime announced 48 hours in advance
a surprise amnesty, which included political prisoners and army
deserters in October. Those released were mainly held in Abu Ghurayb
prison. Press reports reflected evidence that some prisoners were
summarily executed in anticipation of the release. Also, many families
expecting the release of relatives in this amnesty reportedly
discovered that they had been executed in captivity without trial. The
regime made no effort to investigate current or past cases, answer
accusations about summary executions, or identify and punish
perpetrators during the year.
Among many other examples of killings in custody, HRW reported that
the regime hanged 'Abd al-Waheed al-Rifa'i in March 2001 after 2 years
in detention without trial. Relatives reported his body bore marks of
torture when they collected it from the General Security Directorate in
Baghdad. Reports of deaths in custody due to poor prison conditions and
official negligence continued (see Section 1.c.). In addition, many
people who were displaced forcibly still lived in tent camps under
harsh conditions, which also resulted in many deaths (see Sections 2.d.
and 5).
Reports of deaths of civilians caused by landmines continued.
Approximately 7 million landmines left over from the Iran-Iraq war
remain in place in northern Iraq. PUK representatives reported that the
population living in the region under its control suffered
approximately 250 casualties per month from exploded mines. Many of
these victims died. Despite repeated requests, the regime refused to
provide maps of known mine fields to facilitate their removal (see
Section 1.g.).
There were many notable cases of regime extrajudicial killings that
remained outstanding. As in previous years, the regime continued to
deny the widespread killings of Kurds in the north of the country
during the ``Anfal'' campaign of 1988 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.).
Both the Special Rapporteur and HRW concluded that the regime's
policies against the Kurds raised questions of crimes against humanity
and violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
In February the Minister of Justice specifically informed the
Special Rapporteur that prostitution is not punishable by death under
the law and claimed that no one had been sentenced to death for
prostitution in many years. However, security forces allegedly beheaded
a number of women suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of
facilitating or covering up such activities in October 2001. Security
agents reportedly decapitated numerous women and men in front of their
family members. According to Amnesty International (AI), the victim's
heads were displayed in front of their homes for several days. Thirty
of the victims' names reportedly were published, which included three
doctors and one medical assistant.
Politically motivated killings by opposition groups and rebel/
insurgent/terrorist groups continued. Political killings and terrorist
actions continued in the Kurd-controlled north of the country. For
example, numerous press reports in November and December outlined
several battles in the northeast between PUK forces and fighters of
Ansar al-Islam (AAI), an Islamic extremist group. Such fighting
continued a pattern of violence in that area. In 2001 assailants
assassinated the governor of Irbil, Fransu Hariri. PUK and KDP
investigators blamed Islamic groups such as AAI for the killing. In
2000 unknown persons killed the leader of the Democratic Nationalist
Union of Kurdistan, Sirbit Mahmud. In July 2000, unknown assailants
killed parliamentary deputy Osman Hassan. Also in July 2000, PUK forces
reportedly killed a number of members of the Iraqi Communist Workers
Party (ICWP), and KDP forces killed several members of the Iraqi
Turkmen Front (ITF). Neither the PUK nor the KDP released information
regarding investigations into the killings. Political killings and
terrorist actions continued in ethnically Shi'a southern provinces. In
January IP reported three assailants attacked Major Kadhem al-Zaidi, a
senior Mukhabarat officer notorious for his use of torture, near Basra.
This continued a pattern of retaliatory violence in the south of the
country. For example, in 2001 the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) reported that its members killed Raed
Khidir, a Ba'th Party official in the south.
Killings due to societal violence were also reported. For example,
Assyrian and Chaldean press reported in August that a Catholic nun was
slain in Baghdad by alleged Muslim extremists (see Section 2.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There continued to be widespread reports of
disappearances throughout the year. The regime did nothing to address
accusations regarding previously reported disappearances. A large
number of presumed disappeared citizens remained unaccounted for.
Hundreds were still missing in the aftermath of the brief military
occupation of Erbil in August 1996. Many of these persons may have been
killed surreptitiously late in 1997 and throughout 1998, in the
reported prison cleansing campaign (see Section 1.a.). The missing were
primarily from the Kurd minority but included members of the Assyrian,
Turkmen, and Yazidi communities.
The regime continued to ignore the more than 16,000 documented
disappearance cases conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by the U.N. Special
Rapporteur. Despite several well-publicized exchanges with Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the regime effectively ignored requests from
those governments to account for those who disappeared during Iraq's
1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and regarding prisoners of war captured
in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The regime failed to return, and did
little to account for, a large number of Kuwaiti citizens and citizens
of other countries who were detained during the Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait. Of 609 cases of missing Kuwaiti citizens under review by the
Tripartite Commission on Gulf War Missing, only 3 have been resolved.
The regime denied having any knowledge of the others and claimed that
any relevant records were lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War,
although it subsequently claimed to have provided such records to
Kuwait in October. Iran reported that the regime still had not
accounted for 5,000 Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) missing since the
Iran-Iraq War. The Governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran
repeated calls for more dialog on this subject.
The majority of the 16,496 cases known to the Special Rapporteur
were persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared during the 1988 Anfal
campaign. In February the International Alliance for Justice/Coalition
for Justice in Iraq (AIJ/CJI) and the British Broadcasting Company
(BBC) reported the discovery of a fourth mass grave holding the
executed bodies of six ethnic Kurds believed killed during the Anfal
campaign, providing further evidence of the fate of the disappeared
Kurds. The Special Rapporteur estimated that the total number of Kurds
who disappeared during that period could reach several tens of
thousands. Human Rights Watch estimated the total at between 70,000 and
150,000, and AI at more than 100,000. The second largest group of
disappearance cases known to the Special Rapporteur consisted of Shi'a
who were reported to have disappeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s
as their families were expelled to Iran due to their alleged Persian
ancestry.
In 2001 AI reported that the regime has the world's worst record
for numbers of persons who disappeared and remained unaccounted for.
Numerous credible reports alleged the existence of special prison wards
that held individuals whose whereabouts, status, and fate was not
disclosed (see Section 1.c.).
In 1997 and 1999, AI documented the repeated failure by the regime
to respond to requests for information about persons who disappeared.
The report detailed numerous unresolved cases dating from the early
1980s through the mid-1990s. The report concluded that few victims
became targets of the regime because of any crime they had committed;
rather, they were arrested and held as hostages in order to force a
relative, who may have escaped abroad, to surrender. Others were
arrested because of their family's link to a political opponent or
simply because of their ethnic origin (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.).
The Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups continued to
request that the regime provide information about the 1991 arrest of
the late Grand Ayatollah Abdullah Quasi Al-Koei and 108 of his
associates. The Ayatollah died while under house arrest in Al-Najaf.
Other individuals who were arrested with him have not been accounted
for, and the regime refused to respond to queries regarding their
status. Similarly, AI identified a number of Ayatollah Sadden al-Sadr's
aides who were arrested in the weeks prior to his killing in February
1999 (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Their whereabouts remained
unknown. In its November 1999 report, AI identified eight aides of al-
Sadr who disappeared.
In addition to the tens of thousands of reported disappearances,
human rights groups reported during the year that the regime continued
to hold thousands of other citizens in incommunicado detention (see
Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
In October press reports indicated that prisoners released in the
prisoner amnesty, and families of prisoners that failed to appear after
the release, alleged that numerous political prisoners remained
incarcerated or had been secretly executed in prison. This event
appeared to confirm the reported pattern of disappearances and secret
executions alleged by human rights groups. The regime did not
acknowledge conducting abductions, and has not iniated any
investigations into alleged disappearances, nor attempted to bring
perpetrators to justice.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture; however, the
security services routinely and systematically tortured detainees
throughout the year. According to former prisoners, torture techniques
included branding, electric shock administered to the genitals and
other areas, beating, removal of fingernails, amputation without
anesthesia, burning with hot irons and blowtorches, suspension from
rotating ceiling fans, dripping of acid on the skin, rape, breaking of
limbs, denial of food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark
and extremely small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm
family members and relatives. Evidence of such torture was often
apparent when security forces returned the mutilated bodies of torture
victims to their families. There were persistent reports that families
were made to pay for the cost of executions of loved ones. Refugees who
arrived in Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving
governments and displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their
claims. In August 2001, AI released a report entitled ``Iraq:
Systematic Torture of Political Prisoners,'' which detailed the
systematic and routine use of torture against suspected political
opponents and, occasionally, other prisoners.
The Special Rapporteur continued to receive reports that arrested
persons routinely were subjected to mistreatment, including prolonged
interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings, and various
deprivations. For some years, the Special Rapporteur expressed concern
about cruel and unusual punishments prescribed by the law, including
amputations and branding. In 2000 the authorities reportedly introduced
tongue amputation as a punishment for persons who criticized Saddam
Hussein or his family. In February regime authorities reportedly
amputated the tongue of a person who allegedly criticized Saddam
Hussein in the city of Diwaniya. As on previous occasions, authorities
reportedly performed the amputation in front of a large crowd. Similar
tongue amputations reportedly occurred in the city of Hilla during
2001. The regime never acknowledged such reports, conducted any
investigation, nor took action against those who amputated prisoners'
tongues. The Special Rapporteur received numerous reports of soldiers
having their ears cut off as punishment for desertion. The Minister of
the Interior admitted the existence of this practice, but claimed, in
February, that ``it had now definitively ceased.''
There were numerous allegations of politically motivated torture
and reports of torture against family members, including the children,
of suspected critics of the regime. For instance, a Health Coordinator
for the refugee health program in Yemen alleged in January that an
Iraqi child under her care, bearing the marks of needle scars on its
wrists and forearms, had reportedly been injected with an agent that
caused severe mental retardation in retaliation for the father's
suspected opposition to the regime. The U.K.-based Independent
newspaper reported in March that the regime had begun publicly to
threaten torture against family members of prominent exiled
oppositionists and dissidents in an effort to curtail their political
activities (see Section 1.f.). These reports continued a pattern of
alleged systematic use of torture by the regime for political or other
nationalist reasons. For example, the regime routinely tortured
national soccer team players for poor performance. In May 2001, Saad
Keis Naoman, a soccer player who defected to Europe, alleged that he
and his teammates were beaten and humiliated at the order of Uday
Saddam Hussein. In 2000 three soccer players, who played for a team
that lost an October game in the Asian Cup quarterfinals, reportedly
were whipped and detained for 3 days. Sharar Haydar Mohamad al-Hadithi,
a former soccer player, stated in August 1999 that he and his teammates
were tortured on Uday Hussein's orders for not winning matches. In 1997
members of the national soccer team reportedly were beaten and tortured
on Uday's orders because of poor play in a World Cup qualifying match.
Beyond the use of torture, the regime systematically employed
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of people for political
purposes. For example, the BBC reported in June that the regime forbids
parents from burying the bodies of deceased children for an extended
period of time (reportedly up to 3 or 4 months) so that they can be
amassed for burial after propaganda parades and nationalist ceremonies.
Human rights organizations and opposition groups continued to
receive reports of women who suffered from severe psychological trauma
after being raped while in custody. Security forces also reportedly
sexually assaulted and threatened sexual assault against officials,
opposition members, and their families, in order to blackmail them into
compliance (see Section 1.f.). This continued an alleged pattern of the
regime's systematic use of rape for political purposes. Former
Mukhabarat member Khalid Al-Janabi reported in 2001 that a Mukhabarat
unit, the Technical Operations Directorate, used rape and sexual
assault in a systematic and institutionalized manner for political
purposes. The unit reportedly also videotaped the rape of female
relatives of suspected oppositionists and used the videotapes for
blackmail purposes and to ensure future cooperation (see Section 1.f.).
The security forces allegedly also raped women who were captured during
the Anfal campaign in the 1980s and during the 1990 occupation of
Kuwait. The regime never acknowledged these reports, conducted any
investigation, nor took action against those who committed the rapes.
Prison conditions were extremely poor and life threatening. There
reportedly were numerous official, semi-official, and private prisons
throughout the country. Overcrowding was a serious problem. In May
1998, Labor and Social Affairs Minister Abdul Hamid Aziz Sabah stated
in an interview that ``the prisons are filled to five times their
capacity and the situation is serious.'' Sabah was dismissed from his
post at that time, and the regime-owned daily newspaper Babel
reiterated the regime's longstanding claim that it held virtually no
prisoners. However, in February the Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs admitted to the Special Rapporteur that the prison system was
overcrowded. It remained unclear to what extent the mass executions
committed pursuant to the prison cleansing campaign reduced
overcrowding prior to the October prisoner amnesty (see Section 1.a.).
It also remained unclear how many prisoners were actually released in
the amnesty. Press reports indicated that the chief focus of the prison
amnesty was Abu Ghurayb prison, and that other facilities held many
political prisoners. Many families of prisoners who did not appear in
the amnesty alleged that their relatives were either killed in custody
or remained secreted in other facilities.
Certain prisons were infamous for routine mistreatment of detainees
and prisoners. Abu Ghurayb, Baladiat, Makasib, Rashidiya, Radwaniyah,
and other prisons reportedly had torture chambers. Hundreds of Fayli
(Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian origin, who had disappeared
in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war, reportedly were being held
incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison. There were numerous mentally
ill prisoners at Al-Shamma'iya prison in Baghdad, which reportedly was
the site of torture and a number of disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah
detention center was a former POW facility near Baghdad and reportedly
the site of torture as well as mass executions (see Section 1.a.).
In March the regime released the body of a prominent executed
dissident. The family alleged that the body bore obvious marks of
torture from his incarceration (see Section 1.a.). This continued an
alleged pattern of systematic abuse of prisoners by the regime. For
example, in 2000 the Special Rapporteur reported receiving information
about two detention facilities in which prisoners were locked in metal
boxes the size of coffins that reportedly were opened for only 30
minutes each day. A multistory underground detention and torture center
reportedly was built under the general military hospital building close
to the Al-Rashid military camp on the outskirts of Baghdad. The Center
for Human Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party (CHR/ICP) stated that the
complex included torture and execution chambers. A section reportedly
was reserved for prisoners in a ``frozen'' state--whose status, fate,
or whereabouts were not disclosed (see Section 1.b.). In 2000 the Iraqi
Communist Party reported that 13 prisoners died at Makaseb detention
center in December 1999 and January 2000 as a result of torture and
poor prison conditions. ICP reported that three prisoners were killed
in a prison in Ashar in the southern province of Basra in March when a
guard who was in the process of beating a number of prisoners fired a
gun at prisoners who tried to defend themselves. Another prisoner
injured in the incident reportedly later died of his wounds (see
Section 1.g.).
In the past, the regime had not permitted visits by human rights
observers, but did allow the Special Rapporteur to inspect briefly
several prisons during his February visit. The Special Rapporteur
observed that sections of the Abu Ghurayb facility that he visited kept
prisoners in ``conditions that were almost appalling.'' The regime
claimed that prisons were open to inspections from the ICRC in
accordance with standard modalities, but the ICRC had stated that it
had only been given intermittent access to facilities such as Abu
Ghurayb prison, and that access was only to well-known, better-kept
facilities for foreign nationals.
Iraqi Kurdish regional officials reported in 2000 that prisons in
the three northern provinces were open to the ICRC and other
international observers. According to the ICRC, regular and consistent
improvement in conditions was observed on its weekly prison visits to
declared prisons. However, both the PUK and the KDP reportedly
maintained private, undeclared prisons, and both groups reportedly
denied access to ICRC officials to those facilities. There were reports
that authorities of both the PUK and KDP tortured detainees and
prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
legal code explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
the authorities routinely engaged in these practices. The Special
Rapporteur continued to receive reports of widespread arbitrary arrest
and detention, often for long periods of time, without access to a
lawyer or the courts. As indicated in the November 1999 AI report,
``Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression,'' many thousands of persons
have been arrested arbitrarily in the last few years because of
suspected opposition activities or because they were related to persons
sought by the authorities. Those arrested often were taken away by
plainclothes security agents, who offered no explanation and produced
no warrant to the person or family members (see Section 1.f.). The
authorities frequently denied detainees legal representation and visits
by family members. In most cases, family members did not know the
whereabouts of detainees and did not make inquiries for fear of
reprisal. Many persons were taken away in front of family members, who
heard nothing further until days, months, or years later, when they
were told to retrieve the often-mutilated corpse of their relative.
There also were reports of the widespread practice of holding family
members and close associates responsible for the alleged actions of
others (see Section 1.f.).
IP reported in March that the regime had arbitrarily arrested 50
Kurds in a new mass detention in Khanaqin as part of its ethnic
cleansing campaign in Kurdish areas under its control. The report
alleged that Ba'thist agents subsequently confiscated 40 private
residences as part of this effort. This continued an alleged pattern of
arbitrary arrest for political aims. For example, in 2001 the regime
initiated an arrest and detention campaign involving thousands of
individuals who initially had volunteered to serve in the newly formed
Al-Quds militia force, but who had not shown up for training.
Mass arbitrary arrests and detentions often occurred in areas in
which antiregime leaflets were distributed. In June 2001, the CJI
reported that the regime arrested dozens of lawyers and jurists for
distributing oppositionist leaflets that reportedly indicated the
authors' intent to expose the regime's violations of human rights.
Security forces arrested hundreds of persons in al-Najaf, Karbala, and
in the Shi'a section of Baghdad following an anonymous distribution of
antiregime leaflets in 2000. Many other arrests had no apparent basis.
In September 2001, the regime arrested and expelled six U.N.
humanitarian workers and refused to provide any evidence as a basis for
its actions (see Section 1.g.).
According to international human rights groups, numerous foreigners
arrested arbitrarily in previous years also remained in detention.
The regime reportedly targeted the Shi'a community for arbitrary
arrest and other abuses. In February IP reported that security
authorities detained and questioned Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sisstani in
the city of Najaf without a warrant on several occasions. This
continued an alleged pattern of the regime's use of arbitrary arrest
and detention to persecute the Shi'a population. For example, in May
2001, the regime reportedly executed two Shi'a clerics, Abdulsattar
Abed-Ibrahim al-Mausawi and Ahmad al-Hashemi, for claiming that the
regime was involved in the killing of a Shi'a cleric in 1999 and the
killings of four engineers from the Electricity Board. In the weeks
preceding the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah Sadeq al-Sadr and two
of his sons, many of al-Sadr's aides were arrested, and their
whereabouts still were unknown at year's end (see Sections 1.a., 1.b.,
and 1.g.). Hundreds more reportedly were arrested and the houses of
many demolished in the weeks following Sadr's killing (see Section
1.g.).
Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian
origin, who disappeared in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war,
reportedly were being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison (see
Section 1.c.). According to a report received by the Special Rapporteur
in 1998, such persons had been detained without charge for close to 2
decades in extremely harsh conditions. The report stated that many of
the detainees were used as subjects in the country's secret, outlawed
experimental chemical and biological weapons programs.
Although no statistics were available, observers estimated the
number of political detainees to be in the tens of thousands, some of
whom have been held for decades.
In recent years the regime made several efforts to improve its
standing with human rights groups and the U.N. Special Rapporteur by
declaring prisoner, deserter, and exilee amnesties, most recently in
October (see Section 1.c.). In June 1999, in another example, the
regime announced a general amnesty for citizens who had left the
country illegally or were exiled officially for a specified period of
time but failed to return after the period of exile expired (see
Section 2.d.). No citizens were known to have returned to the country
based upon this amnesty, and an estimated 2 to 3 million self-exiled
citizens reportedly remained fearful of returning to the country. For
the most part, these declared amnesties have been dismissed as public
relations gestures and merely corroborated allegations that the regime
arbitrarily arrested and detained many citizens. Past reporting also
indicated that it was very difficult or expensive for prisoners to
obtain release once incarcerated. In May 2001, the press reported that
the authorities released 3,000 prisoners who paid bribes to prison
officials to have their prison terms cut. One former prisoner said his
family paid approximately $3,125 (5 million Iraqi dinars) for him to be
released after serving 7 years of his original 15-year sentence.
The PUK and the KDP reportedly held some political prisoners and
detainees in the north of the country. The KDP and PUK reached
agreement for the mutual release of political prisoners in 1999. In
March 2000, the KDP released 10 PUK prisoners and the PUK released 5
KDP prisoners (see Section 1.g.). In 2001 PUK and KDP officials
reported that all remaining PUK and KDP political prisoners and
detainees had been exchanged per the agreement.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary was not independent,
and there was no check on the President's power to override any court
decision. In 1999 the Special Rapporteur and international human rights
groups observed that the repressive nature of the political and legal
systems precludes the rule of law. Numerous laws facilitate continued
repression, and the regime used extrajudicial methods to extract
confessions or coerce cooperation.
There are parallel judicial systems: The regular courts, which try
common criminal offenses; and the special security courts, which
generally try national security cases but also may try criminal cases.
In addition to the Court of Appeal, there is the Court of Cassation,
which is the highest court. Special security courts reportedly have
jurisdiction in all cases involving espionage and treason, peaceful
political dissent, smuggling, currency exchange violations, and drug
trafficking. According to the Special Rapporteur and other sources,
military officers or civil servants with no legal training head these
tribunals, which hear cases in secret. Authorities often held
defendants incommunicado and did not permit contact with lawyers (see
Section 1.d.). The courts admitted confessions extracted by torture,
which often served as the basis for conviction (see Section 1.c.). Many
cases appeared to end in summary execution, although defendants may
appeal to the President for clemency. Saddam Hussein may grant clemency
in any case that suits his political goals or predilections.
The Minister of Justice admitted the existence of the special
security courts in February but claimed that they were staffed with
judges from the regular judiciary, and that trials in such courts were
conducted with all the rights and procedures of the normal civil
courts. This prompted the Special Rapporteur to conclude that if this
were true, such courts were unnecessary. There were no Shari'a (Islamic
law) courts; however, regular courts were empowered to administer
Shari'a in cases involving personal status, such as divorce and
inheritance.
Procedures in the regular courts in theory provide for many
protections; however, the regime often assigned to the security courts
cases that, on their legal merits, would appear to fall under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are
public, and defendants are entitled to counsel, at regime expense in
the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the
charges and evidence brought against their clients. There is no jury
system; panels of three judges try cases. Defendants have the right to
appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation.
The regime shielded certain groups from prosecution for alleged
crimes. For example, a 1990 decree granted immunity to men who
committed ``honor crimes,'' a violent assault with intent to commit
murder against a woman by a relative for her perceived immodest
behavior or alleged sexual misconduct (see Section 5). A 1992 decree
granted immunity from prosecution to members of the Ba'th Party and
security forces who killed anyone while in pursuit of army deserters.
Unconfirmed but widespread reports indicated that this decree had been
applied to prevent trials or punishment of regime officials.
It was difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners,
because the regime rarely acknowledged arrests or imprisonments, and
families were afraid to talk about arrests. Many of the tens of
thousands of persons who disappeared or were killed in the past few
years originally were held as political prisoners.
Both the PUK- and the KDP-controlled local administrations
maintained separate judicial systems. They used the Iraqi legal code.
Both come under a separate Supreme Court of Cassation. During the year,
PUK and KDP officials reported that the PUK and KDP had exchanged all
political prisoners and detainees in accordance with a 1999 agreement.
However, the PUK and the KDP reportedly continued to hold some
political prisoners and detainees (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The regime frequently infringed on citizens'
constitutional right to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly
involving national security. The law defined security offenses so
broadly that authorities effectively were exempt from the legal
requirement to obtain search warrants, and searches without warrants
were commonplace. The regime routinely ignored constitutional
provisions designed to protect the confidentiality of mail, telegraphic
correspondence, and telephone conversations. The regime periodically
jammed news broadcasts from outside the country, including those of
opposition groups (see Section 2.a.). The security services and the
Ba'th Party maintained pervasive networks of informers to deter
dissident activity and instill fear in the public.
The authorities continued systematically to detain, abuse, and kill
family members and close associates of alleged regime opponents (see
Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.g.). In January for example, AIJ/CJI
reported that the regime publicly threatened on Iraqi satellite TV to
systematically rape the female relatives of Faiq Sheikh Ali, a
prominent dissident and journalist residing abroad, in retaliation for
his criticism of the regime on a political talk show. This continued an
alleged pattern of the regime's systematic interference with privacy
for political reasons. For example, in May 2001, the authorities
reportedly tortured to death the mother of three defectors because of
her children's opposition activities. In June 2000, a former general
reportedly received a videotape of security forces raping a female
family member. He subsequently received a telephone call from an
intelligence agent who stated that another female relative was being
held and warned him to stop speaking out against the regime. In
November 1999, the regime expelled more than 4,000 families that had
sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War.
The regime continued its Arabization campaign of ethnic cleansing
designed to harass and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkmen from regime-
controlled areas. According to press reports and opposition sources,
the regime forcibly displaced hundreds of families. In March the Los
Angeles Times reported that the regime extended its Arabization efforts
to include the placement of Arab names on headstones in cemeteries in
non-Arab communities. In April the regime issued a new decree to all
hospitals and bureaus registering births and deaths prohibiting the
registration of Christian names. As in previous years, the regime
periodically sealed off entire districts in Kirkuk and conducted day-
long, house-to-house searches (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Regime
officials also took hostage members of minority groups to intimidate
their families into leaving their home regions (see Sections 1.d.,
2.d., and 5). Authorities demolished the houses and detained and
executed family members of Shi'a who protested regime actions (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.g.).
The Special Rapporteur noted that guilt by association was
facilitated by administrative requirements imposed on relatives of
deserters or other perceived opponents of the regime. For example,
conscripts were required to secure a guarantor to sign a document
stating that the named conscript would not desert military service and
that the guarantor would accept personal responsibility if the
conscript deserted. Relatives who did not report deserters could lose
their ration cards for purchasing regime-controlled food supplies, be
evicted from their residences, or face the arrest of other family
members. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
reported in October and December 1999 that authorities denied food
ration cards to families that failed to send their young sons to the
``Lion Cubs of Saddam'' compulsory weapons training camps (see Section
5).
The Special Security Office reportedly continued efforts to
intimidate the relatives of opposition members. Relatives of citizens
outside the country who were suspected of sympathizing with the
opposition were forced to call the suspected opposition members to warn
them against participating in opposition conferences or activities.
Others were publicly threatened on satellite television with rape or
torture if their relatives failed to cease political activities (see
Section 2.a.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The authorities continued to detain, abuse, and
kill family members and close associates of alleged regime opponents
(see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.f.). The regime had continued a
campaign of intimidation directed at U.N. and nongovernmental
organization (NGO) relief workers. In February 2001, the Foreign
Minister threatened to cut official ties to U.N. workers supervising
oil-for-food program distribution in northern Iraq, and to revoke their
visas and deport them. In September 2001, the regime expelled six U.N.
humanitarian relief workers without providing any explanation.
The regime continued to Arabize certain Kurdish areas, such as the
urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement of local
residents from their homes and villages and their replacement by Arabs
from outside the area (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.d., and 5).
Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the regime before 1991,
continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid
during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars; however, the army failed to clear
them before it abandoned the area. Kurdish officials estimated that at
least 7 million landmines remained in place in Kurdish-controlled
areas. Landmines also were a problem along the Iraq-Iran border
throughout the central and southern areas in the country. There was no
information regarding civilian casualties or the regime's efforts, if
any, to clear old mine fields in areas under the central regime's
control. According to reports by the U.N. Office of Project Services,
the Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian Peoples' Aid, landmines killed
more than 3,000 persons in the three northern provinces since the 1991
uprising. PUK officials estimated that mine casualties in its area of
control occurred at a rate of approximately 250 per month. The Special
Rapporteur repeatedly reminded the regime of its obligation under the
Landmines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of mines.
Various NGOs continued efforts to remove landmines from the area and
increase awareness of mines among local residents. PUK officials stated
that the regime repeatedly rebuffed requests to provide maps of known
minefields. In December 1998, the regime declared that mine-clearing
activity was subversive and ordered NGO workers performing such
activity to leave the country. In April 2001, Kurdish sources accused
the regime of exploding a bomb near an NGO working on mine clearing in
the north. In April 1999, a New Zealander working for the U.N. mine-
clearing program in the north was shot and killed at close range by an
unknown assailant. The KDP arrested a person who claimed to have killed
the U.N. worker on behalf of Saddam Hussein's Fedayeen.
Regime attacks on Shi'a worshippers continued an alleged pattern of
the use of excessive force for internal political reasons. For example,
following the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr
and his sons (see Section 1.a.), hundreds of persons were reportedly
killed in military assaults on protesters in Shi'a areas of Baghdad,
and in cities with a Shi'a majority such as Karbala, Nasiriyah, Najaf,
and Basra. While a funeral for al-Sadr was prohibited, spontaneous
gatherings of mourners took place in the days after his death. Regime
security forces used excessive force in breaking up these illegal
gatherings, killing hundreds of persons. In 2000 authorities continued
to target alleged supporters of al-Sadr. Security officials reportedly
executed 36 religious students who had been arrested after al-Sadr's
killing. In 1999 and 2000, as a reprisal for the disturbances following
al-Sadr's killing, the regime expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a
families from Baghdad. Numerous Shi'a who fled the country in 1999 and
2000 told HRW that security forces interrogated, detained, and tortured
them.
After the 1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war
crimes perpetrated by the regime, including deliberate killing,
torture, rape, pillage, and hostage-taking. HRW and other organizations
worked with various agencies to bring a genocide case at the
International Court of Justice against the regime for its conduct of
the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1988.
During the year, no hostilities were reported between the two major
Iraqi Kurdish parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. The KDP and
the PUK agreed in September 1998 to unify their administrations;
however, little progress has been made toward implementing the
agreement. In October 1999, senior officials from the two parties
agreed on a series of measures, including prisoner exchanges, the
return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes, and
arrangements for freedom of movement between their respective areas.
Most of the measures were not implemented (see Section 1.d.). However,
in 2001 the two main Kurdish parties reported some progress toward full
implementation of the Washington Agreement, including the return of
3,000 IDPs displaced since the 1995-96 fighting, improved movement
between the Kurdish-controlled areas, and the exchange of all
prisoners. The unified Assembly was convened for the first time in
October.
Press reports indicated that the PUK and AAI fought several minor
battles resulting in a few deaths during the reporting period. Although
minor compared to past events, this continued a pattern of violence in
the Kurdish North. For example, in 2001 armed hostilities that resulted
in deaths were reported between the PUK and Islamic groups, the PUK and
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the KDP and the PKK. In July
2000, the PUK reportedly ordered all opposition groups to move their
offices out of Sulaymaniah's city center following a number of
bombings; the ICWP reportedly refused to move. PUK security forces
subsequently killed at least six ICWP members and arrested several
others at an ICWP office in Sulaymaniah. PUK forces also killed several
ICWP members who were inside a car. In connection with this dispute,
the PUK closed the ICWP-affiliated Independent Women's Organization and
the Women's Protection Center in July 2000 and detained temporarily 12
women who had been staying at an abused women's shelter within the
Center. The PUK announced that it would investigate the security
forces' actions; however, no information was available by year's end.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press ``in compliance with the
revolutionary, national, and progressive trend''; however, in practice
the regime did not permit freedom of speech or of the press and did not
tolerate political dissent in areas under its control. In November
2000, the U.N. General Assembly again criticized the regime's
``suppression of freedom of thought, expression, information,
association, and assembly.'' The Special Rapporteur stated in October
1999 that citizens lived ``in a climate of fear,'' in which whatever
they said or did, particularly in the area of politics, involved ``the
risk of arrest and interrogation by the police or military
intelligence.'' He noted that ``the mere suggestion that someone is not
a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death
penalty.''
There were numerous reports throughout the year of regime
interference in the freedom of speech. For example, in February the
World Association of Newspapers (WAN) condemned the regime's attempt to
muzzle prominent dissident journalist Faiq Sheikh Ali (see Section
1.f.) and expressed concern that another prominent journalist received
death threats during the year for his contact with members of the
opposition. This continued a pattern of alleged regime interference in
the freedom of speech. In June 2001, the Human Rights Alliance reported
that the regime had killed more than 500 journalists and intellectuals
over the previous decade.
The regime, the Ba'th Party, or persons close to Saddam Hussein
owned all print and broadcast media and operated them as propaganda
outlets. They generally did not report opposing points of view that
were expressed either domestically or abroad. A 2002 Freedom House
report rated press freedom in the country at 96 out of a possible 100
points, with 0 being the most free and 100 being the most controlled.
Several statutes and decrees suppress freedom of speech and of the
press, including: Revolutionary Command Council Decree Number 840 of
1986, which penalizes free expression and stipulates the death penalty
for anyone insulting the President or other high regime officials;
Section 214 of the Penal Code, which prohibits singing a song likely to
cause civil strife; and the 1968 Press Act, which prohibits the writing
of articles on 12 specific subjects, including those detrimental to the
President, the Revolutionary Command Council, and the Ba'th Party. In
February 2001, opposition press reported that the regime added the
penalty of cutting out the tongue of anyone who ridiculed the
President. There were several reports during the year that this penalty
was imposed (see Section 1.c.).
The Ministry of Culture and Information periodically held meetings
at which it issued general guidelines for the press. Foreign
journalists must work from offices located within the ministry building
and were accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who
reportedly restricted their movements and made it impossible for them
to interact freely with citizens.
According to the Special Rapporteur, journalists were under
continuous pressure to join the Ba'th Party and must follow the
mandates of the Iraqi Union of Journalists, headed by Uday Hussein.
According to local sources, in 1999 Uday Hussein dismissed hundreds of
union members who had not praised Saddam Hussein and the regime
sufficiently or often enough (see Section 6.a.). Each reporter must
inform a security officer regarding the nature of news intended for the
foreign media, and intelligence officers screen broadcasts before
airing. In October the regime attempted to expel foreign journalists
who reported on the spontaneous demonstrations of family members of
disappeared prisoners that erupted after they failed to appear in the
prison amnesty. This continued a pattern of interference in the freedom
of the press. For example, in September 1999, Hashem Hasan, a
journalist and Baghdad University professor, was arrested after
declining an appointment as editor of one of Uday Hussein's
publications. The Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (RSF) sent a
letter of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hassan's fate and
whereabouts still remained unknown at year's end (see Section 1.b.).
The regime regularly jammed foreign news broadcasts (see Section
1.f.). Satellite dishes, modems, and fax machines were banned, although
some restrictions reportedly were lifted in 1999. Regime-controlled
areas had only two land-based television channels, the official Iraq
Television, and Youth TV, owned by Uday Saddam Hussein. In 2001 Uday
Hussein reportedly assumed control of the satellite television service.
According to press reports, Internet service was available but highly
restricted by the regime. Reportedly only 500 computers had links to
the web within regime-controlled areas, and these access points were
subject to close oversight from regime censors. Books may be published
only with the authorization of the Ministry of Culture and Information.
The Ministry of Education often sent textbooks with proregime
propaganda to Kurdish regions; however, Kurds routinely removed
propaganda items from such textbooks.
The regime did not respect academic freedom and exercised strict
control over academic publications and foreign travel by academics.
University employees were hired and fired depending on their support
for the regime.
In the north, many independent newspapers appeared over the past 8
years, as did opposition radio and television broadcasts. The absence
of central authority permitted significant freedom of expression,
including criticism of the regional Kurdish authorities; however, most
journalists were influenced or controlled by various political
organizations. Satellite services and related equipment for telephone,
fax, Internet, and television services were available. Although the
rival Kurdish parties in the north, the PUK and KDP, stated that full
press freedom was allowed in areas under their respective control, in
practice neither effectively permitted distribution of the opposing
group's newspapers and other literature.
The Internet was available widely through Internet cafes in major
urban centers in Kurdish-controlled areas. In regime-operated Internet
cafes, users only were permitted to view Web sites provided by the
Ministry of Culture and Information. The regional authorities did not
try to limit access to preapproved web sites; however, they often
monitored web usage by individuals.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the regime restricted this
right in practice. Citizens may not assemble legally other than to
express support for the regime, which regularly orchestrated crowds to
demonstrate support for it and its policies through financial
incentives for those who participated and threats of violence against
those who did not. According to press reports, several spontaneous
demonstrations arising in the wake of the October prison amnesty were
forcibly dispersed (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
regime restricted this right in practice. The regime controlled the
establishment of political parties, regulated their internal affairs,
and monitored their activities. New political parties must be based in
Baghdad and were prohibited from having any ethnic or religious
character. The political magazine Alef-Be, which is published by the
Ministry of Culture and Information, reported in December 1999 that two
political groups would not be permitted to form parties because they
had an insufficient number of members. The magazine reprinted the
conditions necessary to establish political parties, which included the
requirement that a political group must have at least 150 members over
the age of 25. A 1999 law also stipulates that new parties must ``take
pride'' in the 1958 and 1968 revolutions, which created the republic
and brought the Ba'th Party to power. Several parties were outlawed
specifically, and membership in them was a capital offense (see Section
3). The law prescribes the death penalty for anyone ``infiltrating''
the Ba'th Party.
In the Kurdish-controlled north, numerous political parties and
social and cultural organizations existed. The KDP- and PUK-controlled
administrations imposed restrictions on some political parties and
groups they considered security risks, or that refused to register as
political parties or to participate in local elections. The PUK and KDP
have forced political parties that violate these rules to shut down.
Neither the KDP nor PUK allowed the other group to open party offices
in territory under its control; however, they did allow other political
parties to operate in those territories and included them in their
administrations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion provided that it does not violate ``morality and public
order''; however, the regime severely limited freedom of religion in
practice. Islam is the official state religion. The Ministry of
Endowments and Religious Affairs monitored places of worship, appointed
the clergy, approved the building and repair of all places of worship,
and approved the publication of all religious literature.
More than 95 percent of the population is Muslim. The
(predominantly Arab) Shi'a constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority,
while Sunni make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent
are Sunni Kurds, 13 to 16 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are
Sunni Turkmen). The remaining approximately 5 percent consist of
Christians--Chaldeans (Roman Catholic), Assyrians (Church of the East),
Syriac (Eastern Orthodox), and Yazidis (Armenian Orthodox), and a small
number of Jews and Sabean Mandaeans.
The regime does not recognize political organizations that have
been formed by Shi'a Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups
continued to attract support despite their illegal status. There are
religious qualifications for government office; candidates for the
National Assembly, for example, ``must believe in God'' (see Section
3).
Various segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself
constitutes a minority of the population, effectively have controlled
the regime since independence in 1932. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct
advantage in all areas of secular life, including civil, political,
military, and economic. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not distinct
ethnically. Shi'a Arabs have supported an independent country alongside
Sunni Arabs since the 1920 Revolt, many joined the Ba'th Party, and
Shi'a formed the core of the army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Shi'a
Arabs, the religious majority of the population, have long been
economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni
Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups in the north, the Shi'a
Arabs of the south have been targeted for particular discrimination and
abuse.
The regime has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of murder,
summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the
religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a population (see
Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Despite nominal legal protection of
religious equality, the regime severely repressed the Shi'a clergy and
those who follow the Shi'a faith. Forces from the Mukhabarat, General
Security (Amin Al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos
(Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'th Party killed senior Shi'a clerics,
desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites, and interfered with Shi'a
religious education. Security agents reportedly were stationed at all
major Shi'a mosques and shrines and searched, harassed, and arbitrarily
arrested worshipers.
The following regime restrictions on religious rights remained in
effect during the year: Restrictions and outright bans on communal
Friday prayer by Shi'a; restrictions on the loaning of books by Shi'a
mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on regime-
controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of Shi'a
books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral processions
other than those organized by the regime; a ban on other Shi'a funeral
observances such as gatherings for Koran reading; and the prohibition
of certain processions and public meetings that commemorate Shi'a holy
days. Shi'a groups report that they captured documents from the
security services during the 1991 uprising that listed thousands of
forbidden Shi'a religious writings.
In June 1999, several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the
regime instituted a program in the predominantly Shi'a districts of
Baghdad that used food ration cards to restrict where individuals could
pray. The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food program,
reportedly were checked on entry to a mosque and were printed with a
notice of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray at an
unauthorized location.
Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars
being subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment in the past several
years, particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic
center of Najaf. In 2000 AI reported that the regime deported
systematically tens of thousands of Shi'a (both Arabs and Kurds) to
Iran in the late 1970s and early 1980s, on the basis that they were of
Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources, religious scholars and
Shi'a merchants who supported the schools financially were the
principal targets for deportation. After the 1991 popular uprising, the
regime relaxed some restrictions on Shi'a attending the schools.
However, the revival of the schools appeared to have exceeded greatly
the regime's expectations and led to an intensified crackdown on the
Shi'a religious establishment, including the requirement that speeches
by imams in mosques be based upon regime-provided material that
attacked fundamentalist trends.
The regime consistently politicized and interfered with religious
pilgrimages, both of Muslims who wished to make the Hajj to Mecca and
Medina and of both Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who traveled to
holy sites within the country (see Section 2.d.). For example, in 1998
the U.N. Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel
and expenses to pilgrims making the Hajj; however, the regime rejected
this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds
to cover Hajj-related expenses via a neutral third party; the regime
again rejected the offer. Following the December 1999 passage of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1284, the Sanctions Committee again sought
to devise a protocol to facilitate payment to individuals making the
journey. The Sanctions Committee proposed to issue $250 in cash and
$1,750 in traveler's checks to each individual pilgrim to be
distributed at the U.N. office in Baghdad in the presence of both U.N.
and Iraqi officials. The regime again declined and, consequently, no
Iraqi pilgrims were able to take advantage of the available funds or,
in 2000, of the permitted flights. The regime continued to insist that
these funds would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to the
regime-controlled central bank, not to the Hajj pilgrims.
Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram
and 40 days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout
the country and around the world travel to the Iraqi city of Karbala to
commemorate the death there centuries ago of the Imam Hussein. The
regime for several decades interfered with these Ashura commemorations
by preventing processions on foot into the city. In 1998 and 1999,
violent incidents were reported between pilgrims on one side and Ba'th
Party members and security forces enforcing the ban on the other. In
2000 security forces opened fire on persons who attempted to walk from
Al-Najaf to Karbala (see Section 1.g.). During the year, there were no
reports of violence during the pilgrimage; however, the regime
reportedly imposed travel restrictions.
The regime also sought to undermine the identity of minority
Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the regime engaged
in various abuses against the country's estimated 350,000 Assyrian and
Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from
northern areas and repression of political rights (see Section 2.d.).
Most Assyrians lived in the northern provinces, and the regime often
accused them of collaborating with Iraqi Kurds. Military forces
destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal campaign and
reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians.
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by
Muslims against Christians in the north in the past few years. Kurdish
groups often referred to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Christians
reported several ritual killings of Christian clergy by unknown
assailants, which they claimed were perpetrated by Muslim extremists.
Press and Christian opposition groups reported that an Assyrian nun was
killed in an apparent emulation of Muslim ritual slaughter in July (see
Section 1.a.). These reports continued an alleged pattern of violence
and persecution directed against Christian and other religious
minorities throughout the country.
The regime imposed repressive measures on Yazidis (see Section 5).
Although few Jews remained in the country, regime officials
frequently made anti-Semitic statements.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The regime restricted movement within
the country of citizens and foreigners. Police checkpoints were common
on major roads and highways. Persons who entered sensitive border areas
and numerous designated security zones were subject to arrest.
The regime required citizens to obtain specific regime
authorization and expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may
not make more than two trips abroad annually. Before traveling abroad,
citizens were required to post collateral, which was refundable upon
their return. There were restrictions on the amount of currency that
may be taken out of the country. Women were not permitted to travel
outside the country alone; male relatives must escort them (see Section
5). Prior to December 1999, every student who wished to travel abroad
was required to provide a guarantor who would be liable if the student
failed to return. In December 1999, authorities banned all travel for
students (including those in grade school), canceled spring and summer
holidays, and enrolled students in compulsory military training and
weapons-use courses.
In an apparent effort to convince citizens living abroad to return
to the country, the regime radio announced in June 1999 an amnesty for
teachers who left the country illegally after the Gulf War. Shortly
thereafter the Revolutionary Command Council decreed a general amnesty
for all citizens who either had left the country illegally or who had
failed to return after the period of exile had expired (see Section
1.d.). In October 1999, Justice Minster Shabib al-Maliki announced that
authorities might seize assets belonging to citizens living outside the
country who did not return in response to the amnesty decree. A special
ministerial committee was formed to track and monitor citizens inside
the country who received money from relatives living abroad.
A November 1999 law provides for additional penalties for citizens
who attempt to leave the country illegally. Under the law, a prison
term of up to 10 years and ``confiscation of movable and immovable
property'' is to be imposed on anyone who attempts to leave illegally.
Similar penalties face anyone found to encourage or assist persons
banned from travel, including health care professionals, engineers, and
university professors. In 2000 the director of the Real Estate
Registration Department stated that pursuant to the decree, the regime
confiscated the property of a number of persons.
The regime restricted foreign travel by journalists, authors,
university professors, doctors, scientists, and all employees of the
Ministry of Information. Security authorities interrogated all media
employees, journalists, and writers upon their return from foreign
travel.
The regime consistently politicized and interfered with religious
pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wished to make the Hajj to
Mecca and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims to holy
sites in the country (see Section 2.c.).
Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in the country for 5
years (1 year for spouses of government employees) were required to
apply for naturalization as citizens. Many foreigners thus become
subject to travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance
included, but were not limited to, loss of the spouse's job, a
substantial financial penalty, and repayment of any governmental
educational expenses. The regime prevented many citizens who also held
citizenship in another country, especially the children of Iraqi
fathers and foreign-born mothers, from visiting the country of their
other nationality.
The U.N. Secretary General estimated that there were more than
500,000 IDPs remaining in the 3 northern provinces (Erbil, Dohuk, and
Sulaymaniah), most of whom fled regime-controlled areas in early 1991
during the uprising that followed the Gulf War. Yazidi Kurds reported
in November that they were subjected to forced concentration in the
vicinity of Dohuk over the last few years. The regime continued its
Arabization policy by discriminating against and forcibly relocating
the non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians living
in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, Tuz, Khoramatu, and other
districts. Most observers viewed the policy as an attempt to decrease
the proportion of non-Arab citizens in the oil-rich Kirkuk region, and
thereby secure Arab demographic control of the area.
Non-Arab citizens were forced either to change their ethnicity on
their identity documents and adopt Arabic names or be expelled to the
Kurd-controlled northern provinces. Persons may avoid expulsion if they
relinquish their Kurdish, Turkmen, Chaldean, or Assyrian identity and
register as Arabs. Persons who refused to relinquish their identity may
have their assets expropriated and their ration cards withdrawn prior
to being deported.
The Revolutionary Command Council mandated that new housing and
employment be created for Arab residents who had been resettled in
Kirkuk, while new construction or renovation of Kurd-owned property
reportedly was prohibited. Non-Arabs may not sell their homes, except
to Arabs, nor register or inherit property. Authorities estimated that
since 1991, more than 100,000 persons were displaced as part of the
Arabization program.
According to numerous deportees in the north, the regime generally
used a systematic procedure to evict and deport non-Arab citizens.
Frequently, a security force official demanded that a family change its
ethnicity from Kurdish or Turkmen to Arab. Subsequently, security
officials frequently arrested the head of household and informed the
other family members that the person would be imprisoned until they
agreed to settle elsewhere in the country. Such families frequently
chose to move to the north; family members must sign a form that states
that the departure was voluntary and they were not allowed to take any
property or their food ration cards issued under the U.N. oil-for-food
program. The regime frequently transferred the families' houses to Arab
Ba'th Party members.
Those expelled were not permitted to return. The Special Rapporteur
reported in 1999 that citizens who provided employment, food, or
shelter to returning or newly arriving Kurds were subject to arrest.
The regime denied that it expelled non-Arab families.
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees remained abroad. Apart from
those suspected of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the regime's
suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others were Kurds who fled
during the Anfal campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million refugees who fled
following the 1991 uprisings, the great majority, particularly Kurds,
repatriated themselves in northern areas outside regime control.
The regime did not cooperate with the UNHCR, did not provide first
asylum, and did not respect the rights of refugees.
Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds who fled civil strife in
southeastern Turkey remained in northern areas controlled by the regime
in Baghdad. The UNHCR was treating such displaced persons as refugees
until it reached an official determination of their status.
During the year, the KDP and PUK reiterated their September 1998
agreement to begin returning to their rightful homes the many thousands
of persons each side had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting
in the three northern provinces. In June the first 70 families were
returned. In April 2000, the UNHCR noted that displaced persons still
were living in tents or in open, unheated buildings (see Section 1.g.).
In August 1999, the KDP reportedly imposed a blockade on eight
Assyrian villages near Aqra. Some sources indicated that KDP forces
reportedly reentered one of the villages a couple of days later,
rounded up the villagers, and publicly beat two of them. The KDP denied
that the blockade or village raids occurred.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens did not have the right to change their government. The
President wielded power over all instruments of control. Most important
officials either were members of Saddam Hussein's family or were family
allies from his hometown of Tikrit. Although the regime took steps to
look more like a democracy, the political process still was controlled
firmly by the regime. The October so-called referendum on Saddam
Hussein's presidency was not free and was dismissed as a sham by most
international observers. It did not include voter privacy, and many
credible reports indicated that voters feared reprisal if they cast a
dissenting vote. The regime claimed a 100 percent yes vote out of 16
million votes cast. In a similar ``referendum'' in 1995, a total of 500
persons reportedly were arrested in Karbala, Baghdad, and Ramadi
provinces for casting negative ballots, and a member of the
intelligence services reportedly was executed for refusing to vote for
the President.
There are strict qualifications for parliamentary candidates; by
law the candidates for the National Assembly must be over 25 years old
and ``believe in God, the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and
socialism.'' Elections for the National Assembly were held in March
2000; 220 of the 250 parliamentary seats were contested and
presidential appointees filled the 30 remaining seats. Out of the 250
seats, members of the Ba'th Party reportedly won 165 seats,
independents won 55, and 30 were appointed by Saddam Hussein to
represent the northern provinces. According to the Special Rapporteur,
the Ba'th Party allegedly instructed a number of its members to run as
nominally independent candidates. Saddam Hussein's son Uday was elected
to the National Assembly with 99.9 percent of the vote.
Full political participation at the national level is restricted to
members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, who were estimated to
constitute approximately 8 percent of the population. The political
system is dominated by the Party, which governed through the
Revolutionary Command Council. President Saddam Hussein heads the
council. The RCC exercises both executive and legislative authority.
The RCC dominates the National Assembly, which is completely
subordinate to it and the executive branch.
Opposition political organizations were illegal and severely
suppressed. Membership in certain political parties was punishable by
death. In October 2000, security forces reportedly executed eight
persons on charges of forming an opposition organization (see Sections
1.a. and 2.b.). In 1991 the RCC adopted a law that theoretically
authorized the creation of political parties other than the Ba'th
Party. However, in practice the law was used to prohibit parties that
did not support the President and the regime. In 1999 various media
published articles claiming that Saddam Hussein instructed officials in
October 1999 to consider the formation of new political parties, a
state council, and a new Constitution. However, a Ministry of Culture
and Information magazine later reported that the only two groups that
attempted to form a party were refused for having an insufficient
number of members.
The regime did not recognize the various political groupings and
parties that have been formed by Shi'a, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen, or
other communities. These political groups continued to attract support
despite their illegal status.
The law provides for the election of women and minorities to the
National Assembly; however, they had only token representation.
In the north, all central regime functions have been performed by
local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the regime withdrew its
military forces and civilian administrative personnel from the area
after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament and local regime
administrators were elected in 1992. The parliament last met in May
1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de facto control of the north,
the KDP and the PUK, battled one another from 1994 through 1997. In
September 1998, they agreed to unify their separate administrations and
to hold new elections in July 1999. The cease-fire has held; however,
reunification measures have been greatly delayed. The PUK and KDP
convened the united Assembly in October for the first time. The PUK
held municipal elections in February 2000 and the KDP held municipal
elections in May, the first elections held in the Kurdish-controlled
areas since 1992. Foreign and local election observers reported that
the elections generally were fair.
The KDP reportedly required membership lists from ethnic minority
political parties. The regime also imposed additional restrictions on
some political parties (see Section 2.b.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The regime did not permit the establishment of independent human
rights organizations. Citizens established several human rights groups
abroad and in northern areas not under regime control. Monitors from
most foreign and international human rights groups were not allowed in
the country. However, the regime allowed several international
humanitarian and aid organizations to operate in the country.
During the year for the first time since 1992, the regime allowed
the U.N. Special Rapporteur to pay a 4-day, strictly controlled visit
to the country, but the regime responded only partially or not at all
to his requests for information.
In November the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the U.N.
General Assembly issued a report that noted ``with dismay'' the lack of
improvement in the situation of human rights in the country. The report
strongly condemned the ``systematic, widespread, and extremely grave
violations of human rights'' and of international humanitarian law by
the regime, which it stated resulted in ``all-pervasive repression and
oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread
terror.'' The report called on the Government to fulfill its
obligations under international human rights treaties.
The regime operated an official human rights group that routinely
denied allegations of abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution and the legal system provide for some rights for
women, children, and minorities; however, in practice the regime
systematically violated these rights.
Women.--Domestic violence against women occurred but little was
known about its extent. Such abuse customarily was addressed within the
tightly knit family structure. There was no public discussion of the
subject, and no statistics were published. Spousal violence constitutes
grounds for divorce and may be prosecuted; however, suits brought on
such charges reportedly were rare. Under a 1990 law, men who committed
honor crimes may receive immunity from prosecution (see Section 1.e.).
The law prohibits rape; however, security forces raped family
members of persons in the opposition as a punishment (see Section 1.c).
No information was available regarding the frequency or severity of
rape in society.
Prostitution is illegal. The regime denied claims that it has
beheaded women accused of prostitution (see Section 1.a.).
The regime stated that it was committed to equality for women, who
make up approximately 20 percent of the work force. It enacted laws to
protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual
harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and
police forces; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land
ownership, taxation, and suffrage. It was difficult to determine the
extent to which these protections were afforded in practice. Women were
not allowed to travel outside the country alone (see Section 2.d.).
In April 2000, the PUK declared that immunity would not be given
for honor crimes in the area under its control. Several active women's
organizations operated in the Kurd-controlled regions in the north. In
September 2001, the KDP began admitting women into the police academy
in preparation for their integration into the police force.
Children.--No information was available regarding whether the
regime has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare of
children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human rights
groups collected a substantial body of evidence indicating the regime's
continued disregard for the rights and welfare of children. Education
for boys is compulsory through the sixth grade. Children may continue
in public schools through grade 12, but children often left after grade
6 to help in family enterprises. The regime claimed that it also has
enacted laws to make education for girls compulsory.
The regime's failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security Council
resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions. There were
widespread reports that food and medicine that could have been made
available to the general public, including children, were stockpiled in
warehouses or diverted for the personal use of some regime officials.
The executive director of the U.N. office in charge of the oil-for-food
program confirmed the insufficient placement of orders in a January
2000 letter to the regime, in which he expressed concern about the low
rate of submission of applications in the health, education, water,
sanitation, and petroleum sectors. He also stated that of the $570
million worth of medicines and medical supplies that had arrived in the
country through the oil-for-food program in 1998 and 1999, only 48
percent had been distributed to clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies.
The regime's management of the oil-for-food program did not take
into account the special requirements of children between the ages of 1
and 5, despite the U.N. Secretary General's specific injunction that
the regime modify its implementation procedures to address the needs of
this vulnerable group. In 1999 UNICEF issued the results of the first
surveys of child and maternal mortality in the country that have been
conducted since 1991. The surveys were conducted between February and
May 1999, in cooperation with the regime in the southern and central
regions, and in cooperation with the local Kurdish authorities in the
north. The surveys revealed that in the south and central parts of the
country, home to 85 percent of the population, children under 5 years
old were dying at more than twice the rate that they were a decade
before. In contrast mortality rates for children less than 5 years old
in the Kurdish-controlled north dropped in the period between 1994 and
1999. The Special Rapporteur criticized the regime for ``letting
innocent people suffer while it maneuvered to get sanctions lifted.''
Had the regime not waited 5 years to adopt the oil-for-food program in
1996, he stated in October 1999, ``millions of innocent people would
have avoided serious and prolonged suffering.''
During the year, the regime held 3-week training courses in weapons
use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and infantry
tactics for children between 10 and 15 years of age. Camps for these
``Saddam Cubs'' operated throughout the country. Senior military
officers who supervised the course noted that the children held up
under the ``physical and psychological strain'' of training that lasted
for as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the opposition reported
that the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to fill all
of the vacancies in the program. Families reportedly were threatened
with the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to enroll
their children in the course. The Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq reported in October 1999 that authorities were
denying food ration cards to families that failed to send their young
sons to Saddam Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps (see Section
1.f.). Similarly, authorities reportedly withheld school examination
results to students unless they registered in the Fedayeen Saddam
organization (see Section 1.f.).
Regime officials allegedly took children from minority groups in
order to intimidate their families to leave cities and regions in which
the regime wishes to create a Sunni Arab majority (see Sections 1.d.,
1.f., and 2.d.).
Persons with Disabilities.--No information was available regarding
the regime's policy towards persons with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's cultural and
linguistic diversity was not reflected in its political and economic
structure. Non-Arabs were denied equal access to employment, education,
and physical security. Non-Arabs were not permitted to sell their homes
except to Arabs, nor to register or inherit property. As part of its
Arabization policy, the regime continued to relocate forcibly the non-
Arab population, including Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians living in
Kirkuk, Sinjar, and other districts (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
Similarly, the regime forced many Arabs to relocate to regions forcibly
vacated by other groups. Both major Kurdish political parties indicated
that the regime occasionally targeted Assyrians, as well as ethnic
Kurds and Turkmen, in expulsions from Kirkuk in order to attempt to
``Arabize'' the city (see Section 2.d.).
Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct
ethnic group, as well as the descendants of some of the earliest
Christian communities. These communities speak a different language
(Syriac), preserve traditions of Christianity, and have a rich cultural
and historical heritage that they trace back more than 2,000 years.
Although these groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the regime,
without any historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such,
evidently to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated
regime (see Section 2.c.).
The regime did not permit education in languages other than Arabic
and Kurdish. Thus, in areas under regime control, Assyrian and Chaldean
children were not permitted to attend classes in Syriac.
The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many
Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some
would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct
from Muslim Kurds. However, the regime, without any historical basis,
defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the regime
compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to join in
domestic military action against Muslim Kurds. Captured regime
documents included in a 1998 HRW report described special all-Yazidi
military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to
``pursue and attack'' Muslim Kurds. The regime imposed the same
repressive measures on Yazidis as on other groups (see Section 2.c.).
Citizens considered by the regime to be of Iranian origin must
carry special identification and often were precluded from desirable
employment. Over the years, the regime deported hundreds of thousands
of citizens of Iranian origin.
Ethnic minorities faced some discrimination and harassment by Kurds
in the north. In areas of the north under Kurdish control, classes in
Syriac and Turkish were permitted in primary schools run by Assyrian or
Turkmen parties, since the 1991 uprising against the regime. However,
teaching of Syriac reportedly remained restricted. The Kurdish
administrations also required that all school children begin learning
Arabic in primary school.
Assyrians continued to fear attacks by the PKK, a Turkish-based
terrorist organization that operated against indigenous Kurds in
northern areas. In 2000 Assyrians reported being caught in the middle
of intra-Kurdish fighting. Some Assyrian villagers reported in 2000
being pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a
campaign by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to
possible food supplies. There were no reports during the year of the
Kurdistan Regional government's investigation into a series of bombings
in 1998 and 1999 that many Assyrian groups believed were part of a
terror campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving the north.
Ethnic Turkmen also claimed discrimination by Kurdish groups,
including the required use of the Kurdistan flag in Turkmen schools and
the assignment of Kurdish teachers to Turkmen schools.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--There were no trade unions
independent of regime control, and workers rights were highly
restricted. The Trade Union Organization Law of 1987 established the
Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions (IGFTU), a regime-controlled
trade union structure, as the sole legal trade federation. The IGFTU is
linked to the Ba'th Party, which used it to promote party principles
and policies among union members.
Workers in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees
or workers in state enterprises, had the right to join local union
committees. The committees were affiliated with individual trade
unions, which in turn belonged to the IGFTU.
In 1999 Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members of
the Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and the
regime sufficiently (see Section 2.a.). Also in 1999, Uday Hussein
reportedly jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National Students
Union for failing to carry out his orders to take action against
students known for their criticism of the situation in the country. No
significant developments have occurred in these cases.
The IGFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of
Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation
of Trade Unions.
In the Kurd-controlled northern region, the law allows persons to
form and join trade unions and other organizations, and to use such
organizations for political action. Dozens of trade groups have been
formed since 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
bargain collectively is not recognized. The regime sets salaries for
public sector workers, the majority of employed persons. Wages in the
much smaller private sector were set by employers or negotiated
individually with workers. Public sector workers frequently were
shifted from one job and work location to another to prevent them from
forming close associations with other workers. The Labor Code does not
protect workers from antiunion discrimination, an omission that has
been criticized repeatedly by the Committee of Experts of the
International Labor Organization (ILO).
The Labor Law restricts the right to strike. According to the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, such restrictions on
the right to strike include penal sanctions, such as imprisonment or
detention in labor camps. No strike has been reported during the past 2
decades.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--Forced labor is
prohibited by law; however, the Penal Code mandates prison sentences,
including compulsory labor, for civil servants and employees of state
enterprises for breaches of labor ``discipline,'' including resigning
from a job. According to the ILO, foreign workers in the country have
been prevented from terminating their employment and returning to their
native countries because of regime-imposed penal sanctions on persons
who do so. There was no information available regarding forced and
bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The employment of children under the age of 14 is
prohibited, except in small-scale family enterprises. However, children
reportedly were encouraged increasingly to work in order to help
support their families because of the country's harsh economic
conditions. The law stipulates that employees between the ages of 14
and 18 work fewer hours per week than adults. Each year the regime
enrolls children as young as 10 years of age in a paramilitary training
program (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no information
available regarding minimum wages.
Most workers in urban areas worked a 6-day, 48-hour workweek. The
head of each ministry sets hours for regime employees. Working hours
for agricultural workers varied according to individual employer-
employee agreements.
Occupational safety programs were in effect in state-run
enterprises. Inspectors ostensibly inspected private establishments,
but enforcement varied widely. There was no information regarding
workers' ability to remove themselves from work situations that
endanger their health or safety.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no information available
regarding whether the law prohibits trafficking in persons. There were
reports of persons trafficked within the country.
__________
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system and
free elections. There is no constitution; a series of ``basic laws''
provide for fundamental rights. The legislature, or Knesset, has the
power to dissolve the Government and limit the authority of the
executive branch. In February 2001, Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon was
elected Prime Minister and in March 2001 took office as the head of a
broad ``unity'' government that included the Labor Party, the largest
bloc in the Knesset. On November 5, after Labor withdrew from the
Government, Prime Minister Sharon announced he was unable to form a
coalition and asked the President to dissolve the Knesset and call for
new elections. New elections for the Knesset are scheduled for January
28, 2003. The judiciary is independent.
Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been in a state of war with
most of its Arab neighbors. Throughout its existence, Israel also has
experienced numerous terrorist attacks by a number of terrorist
organizations that had as their stated objective the elimination of the
Israeli State. With the onset of the ``Al-Aqsa Intifada'' in September
2000, there was a dramatic escalation in the level of violence directed
against Israelis. Since 2000 the number of terrorist incidents, and
Israeli casualties due to such attacks, rose sharply.
Israel concluded peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan
in 1994, and a series of agreements with the Palestinians beginning in
1993. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel occupied the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights (the human rights
situation in the occupied territories is discussed in the annex
appended to this report). The international community does not
recognize Israel's sovereignty over any part of the occupied
territories.
Since 1991, the Israelis and the Palestinians made repeated
attempts at negotiating peace. The most recent Tenet Agreement and the
Mitchell Plan established a working framework for both parties to
reduce the violence and negotiate peace. During 2000 and early 2001,
the parties held intensive talks concerning final status issues,
including water rights, refugees, settlers, the status of Jerusalem,
and border and security issues. They did not reach an agreement.
Despite meetings between high-level Israel and Palestinian officials,
and repeated declarations of cease-fires on both sides, efforts to end
the violence yielded few results. However, during the year the United
States, the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United
Nations, (or the Quartet), conducted a series of ministerial-level
meetings to develop a roadmap to reach their vision of two democratic
states--Israel and Palestine--living side by side in peace and
security.
Internal security was the responsibility of the Israel Security
Agency (the ISA--formerly the General Security Service (GSS) and also
known as Shin Bet, or Shabak), which was under the authority of the
Prime Minister's office. The police were under the authority of the
Minister of Internal Security. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were
under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The IDF included
a significant portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve
status and played a role in maintaining security. The Foreign Affairs
and Defense Committee in the Knesset reviewed the activities of the IDF
and the ISA. Members of the security forces committed serious human
rights abuses in the occupied territories and regarding Palestinian
detainees.
The country's population was approximately 6.4 million (including
Israeli settlers who lived in the occupied territories). The country
had an advanced industrial economy with a relatively high standard of
living. During the year, unemployment was approximately 10 percent, but
was substantially higher in the country's peripheral regions and among
lower-skilled workers. These facts disproportionately affected the
country's non-Jewish citizens. The country's economic growth was
accompanied by an increase in income inequality. The longstanding gap
in levels of income within the Jewish population and between Jewish and
Arab citizens increased. Arab citizens populated most of the 17 towns
in Israel with the highest unemployment rates. During the year, the
country relied heavily on foreign workers, principally from Asia and
Eastern Europe, who were employed in agriculture and construction and
constituted approximately 10 percent of the labor force.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be problems with respect to its
treatment of Arab citizens. During the year, terrorist organizations
such as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Hizballah, Islamic
Jihad in Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PLFP), among others, committed acts of terrorism in Israel.
Nearly 226 terror attacks, including suicide bombings, drive-by
shootings, mortar and grenade attacks, and stabbings occurred in the
West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper. Also during the year, more than 469
Israelis were killed and over 2,498 injured, a sharp increase from the
previous year. In November 2000, a Legal Commission of Inquiry was
established to investigate the demonstrations and riots of October
2000, during which police used excessive force and killed 13 Arab
citizens. The Commission completed its investigation but had not
released a report of its findings at year's end.
Israeli and international human rights organizations continued to
report an increase in the number of allegations that security forces
tortured detainees, including using abusive methods prohibited in a
September 1999 High Court decision. There also were numerous
allegations that police officers beat detainees. Detention and prison
conditions for Palestinian security detainees held in Israel were poor
and did not meet international standards regarding the provision of
sufficient living space, food, and access to medical care. During the
year, the Government detained without charge thousands of persons in
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Some security prisoners were sentenced
on the basis of coerced confessions by both themselves and others.
According to human rights organizations, the legal system often imposed
more severe punishments on Arab citizens than on Jewish citizens,
although such discrepancies were not provided by law.
The Government interfered with individual privacy in some
instances. The Government imposed severe restrictions on the movement
of persons and some restrictions on the movement of goods between
Israel and the West Bank and Gaza as well as between cities in the West
Bank and Gaza. Also known as ``closure,'' this practice has been in
effect to varying extents since 1993 (see Section 2.d. of the annex).
The Government claimed that the closures were necessary to prevent
terrorism. Discrimination and societal violence against women
persisted, although the Government continued to take steps to address
these problems. Discrimination against persons with disabilities
persisted. The Government did little to reduce institutional, legal,
and societal discrimination against the country's Arab citizens, who
constituted approximately 20 percent of the population but did not
share fully the rights and benefits provided to, and obligations
imposed on, the country's Jewish citizens. Trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution was a continuing problem. Israel was
invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend
the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings during the year.
In October 2000, police used excessive force to disperse
demonstrations in the north of the country, killing 13 Arab citizens
and injuring 300. In response the Government of Ehud Barak established
a Legal Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Justice Theodore Or, to
investigate the cause of the riots and the police response. In 2001
numerous police officers testified that the police, including snipers,
fired live ammunition into crowds of demonstrators. Doctors testified
that rubber-coated steel bullets being fired from close range
apparently caused several of the 13 deaths. Some police described a few
of their colleagues as having engaged in overly aggressive actions.
Testimony during the year corroborated previous testimony and also
explored alleged inflammatory rhetoric by Israeli Arab politicians
during the demonstrations.
In February the Commission warned 14 individuals that it planned to
investigate responsibility for the violence and deaths. Among the 14
warned individuals were former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, former
Minister of Internal Security Shlomo Ben Ami, former Northern Police
Commander Alik Ron, several other police officials, Knesset members
Abdulmalik Dehamshe and Azmi Bisharah, and former Mayor of Um al-Fahm
Sheikh Ra'ed Salah. All 14 individuals had a right to legal counsel and
to call and cross-examine witnesses. In his testimony to the
Commission, Ben Ami denied ever having seen a document prepared by his
ministry's legal department in 2000 outlining ways he should cover
himself if he were investigated over the actions of that month. Ben Ami
did not deny that Arab leaders, including members of the Knesset, had
warned him prior to the 2000 event of increasing violence and racism in
the police force and of incidents of brutality against Arab citizens.
In September Barak testified that he had never ordered the police ``to
use every means necessary to keep roads open'' during demonstrations.
He said that statements he had made during a radio interview on October
2, 2000, that seemed to support claims that he had ordered the police
to take ``any action necessary to bring about the rule of law and
freedom of movement within the State'' were ``not relevant,'' since he
had made those statements to calm public concerns. The Commission had
not issued its findings by year's end.
During the year, there were no violent demonstrations on the scale
of those that occurred in 2000.
There was a sharp increase in the number of suicide bombings,
shootings, and other acts of terrorism by Palestinian groups or
individuals in the country and the occupied territories, which resulted
in the deaths of at least 469 Israelis (also see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.
of the annex).
On January 17, a terrorist with an assault rifle opened fire on a
Bat Mitzvah celebration in Hadera killing 6 persons and injuring 35. On
March 27, a suicide bombing killed 29 persons and injured 140 during a
Passover Seder at the Park Hotel in Netanya. On April 12,a suicide
bombing killed 6 persons, including 2 foreign workers from China, and
injured 104 near Jerusalem's Mehane Yehuda Market.
On May 15 and 31, suicide bombings killed 30 persons and injured 95
in attacks in Rishon Lezion and Haifa. On June 5, a car packed with
explosives struck a bus traveling from Tel Aviv to Tiberias, killing 17
persons and injuring 38. On July 31, a bomb exploded at Hebrew
University in Jerusalem and killed 9 persons, 4 citizens and 5
Americans. On August 4, a suicide bombing of a bus traveling from Haifa
to Safed killed 9 persons and injured 50.
On September 19, a bomb on a bus in Tel Aviv killed 6 persons and
injured 70. On October 21, a car packed with explosives crashed into a
bus traveling from Kiryat Shmonah to Tel Aviv and killed 14 persons and
injured 50.
Attacks by Hizballah in the Sheba Farms/Har Dov area in the
northern part of the country resulted in the death of one soldier. On
March 12, infiltrators from Lebanon killed five civilians, one soldier,
and wounded seven others. It was believed that the attackers acted with
the assistance of Hizballah.
b. Disappearance.--At year's end, Elhannan Tannenbaum, who was
kidnaped in either Europe or Lebanon in 2000, was believed to still be
in Hizballah custody. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) attempted to pass medication and messages to Tannenbaum but was
unable to ascertain whether he received the packages. Tannenbaum's
family believed he may be seriously ill.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Laws and administrative regulations prohibit the physical
abuse of detainees. During the year there were credible reports that
there was an increase in the number of allegations that security forces
tortured detainees, including using methods prohibited by a 1999 High
Court decision. The Attorney General has the authority to accept a
``necessity defense'' in deciding whether or not to prosecute. There
also were numerous allegations that police officers beat detainees.
Although it was not clear if any formal complaints of torture were
filed, human rights groups maintained that no GSS agent has been
criminally charged with torture or other ill treatment for the past
several years. Human rights groups further complained that the
investigators who did field work for the Attorney General's office on
such claims were GSS agents.
The 1997 Arrest and Detention Law provides for the right to live in
conditions that would not harm the health or dignity of the detainee,
access to adequate health care, the right to a bed for each detainee,
and access to exercise and fresh air daily. Conditions varied in
incarceration facilities in the country and the occupied territories,
which were administered by the Israeli Prison Service (IPS), the IDF,
or the national police. IPS prisons, which generally housed citizens
convicted of common crimes, generally met international standards.
Since the 1995 closure of the main IDF detention camps in the
occupied territories, all security detainees from the occupied
territories who were held for more than a few days were transferred to
facilities within Israel. During the year, security detainees usually
were held in the IDF's Megiddo prison, in IPS facilities, and in
special sections of police detention facilities. Prisoners incarcerated
for security reasons were subject to a different regimen, even in IPS
facilities, and conditions for them were poor. According to the
Government, security detainees may receive financial assistance from
the Palestinian Authority (PA); food, including food required for
observing religious holidays from their families and other persons or
organizations; and medical supplies from the ICRC and other aid
organizations. Security detainees include some minors. Detention
facilities administered by the IDF were limited to male Palestinian
detainees. The total number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel,
which was 1,854 at the beginning of the year, reached 4,672 by year's
end. The Government stated that it held 1,007 persons from Gaza and the
West Bank, and no Israeli Arabs in administrative detention (without
charge or trial) at year's end. The Government detained approximately
10,000 prisoners at some point during the year (see Section 1.d.).
Conditions at the Russian Compound remained extremely poor;
however, conditions in other IDF facilities improved in some respects.
For example, inmates were provided more time to exercise outside their
cells. Nevertheless, recreational facilities remained minimal, and
there were strict limitations on family visits to detainees.
Male family members of Palestinian prisoners who were between 16
and 40 years of age and any family members with security records
generally were barred from visiting relatives in facilities in Israel.
Following the outbreak of violence in 2000, the Government banned all
family visits for Palestinian prisoners in jails. However, during the
year, the Government intermittently allowed the ICRC to arrange for
family members to visit Palestinian prisoners in government facilities
(see Section 1.c. of the annex).
Since the Intifada began, only Israeli lawyers or Palestinian
lawyers with Jerusalem identification cards were permitted to visit
Palestinian prisoners in jails as advocates or monitors, which reduced
significantly the availability and timeliness of legal aid for such
prisoners.
Conditions at some national police detention facilities remained
poor. Such facilities were intended to hold criminal detainees prior to
trial but often became de facto prisons. Those held included some
security detainees and some persons who were convicted and sentenced.
Inmates in the national police detention facilities often were not
accorded the same rights as prisoners in the IPS system. Moreover,
conditions were worse in the separate facilities for security detainees
maintained both in police facilities and in IPS prisons. There were no
programs to improve prison conditions by year's end.
Children's rights groups expressed particular concern over the
separate sections of holding facilities for the detention of children.
Overcrowding, poor physical conditions, lack of social workers, and
denial of visits by parents remained problems. In addition to some
Israeli minors held in criminal cases, there were Palestinian juveniles
among the detainees. There were separate prison facilities for Arab and
Jewish children separate from the adult prison population. Men, women,
and children were held in separate facilities.
All incarceration facilities were monitored regularly by various
institutions including branches of the Government, members of the
Knesset, the ICRC, and human rights groups (see Section 1.d. of the
annex).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest; however, the Government did not always observe this
prohibition. Defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty and
have the right to writs of habeas corpus and other procedural
safeguards. However, a 1979 law permits, subject to judicial review,
administrative, or preventive detention (i.e., without charge or
trial), which was used in a small percentage of security cases. In such
cases, the Minister of Defense may issue a detention order for a
maximum of 1 year, which could be extended every 3 months. Within 24
hours of issuance, detainees must appear before a district judge who
could confirm, shorten, or overturn the order. If the order was
confirmed, an automatic review took place after 3 months. Detainees had
the right to be represented by counsel and to appeal detention orders
to the High Court of Justice; however, the security forces could delay
notification of counsel with the consent of a judge, which was usually
granted. According to human rights groups and legal experts, there were
some cases in which a judge denied the Government's request to delay
notification of counsel. At detention hearings, the security forces may
withhold evidence from defense lawyers on security grounds. The
Government also may seek to renew administrative detention orders.
However, the security services must ``show cause'' for continued
detention, and, in some instances, individuals were released because
the standard could not be met. No information was available concerning
an approximate percentage of those released because the standard for
continued detention could not be met.
On March 4, the Knesset passed the Imprisonment of Illegal
Combatants Law, which allows the IDF to detain anyone if there is a
basis to assume that he or she ``takes part in hostile activity against
Israel, directly or indirectly'' or ``belongs to a force engaged in
hostile activity against the State of Israel.''
In felony cases and in ordinary security arrests, a district court
judge could postpone notifying the detainee's attorney for 48 hours.
The Minister of Defense could extend the postponement to 7 days on
national security grounds. Moreover, a judge could postpone
notification for up to 15 days in national security cases.
The 1997 Arrest and Detention Law more narrowly defined the grounds
for pretrial detention in criminal and security cases and reduced to 24
hours the length of time a person may be held without charge; however,
this law does not extend to administrative detention cases. Human
rights groups alleged abuse of detention orders in cases in which the
accused did not pose a clear danger to society.
Since the beginning of the Intifada, children's rights activists
have recommended separate legislation to define when and how a child
may be arrested and how long children may be detained. However, no
action had been taken by year's end.
Some protections afforded to citizens were not extended to
Palestinian detainees, who fell under the jurisdiction of military law
even if they were detained in Israel. Following IDF redeployment in the
West Bank, detention centers there were closed in 1995. As a result,
all Palestinian detainees held for longer than 1 or 2 days were
incarcerated in Israel (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
At year's end, the Government held approximately 6,700 Palestinians
in custody, 3 times as many during the previous year. Those held were a
combination of common criminal prisoners (approximately 1,500),
administrative detainees (approximately 850), and ordinary security
detainees (approximately 4200, nearly 5 times more than the previous
year). In April 2000, a High Court ruling declared illegal the holding
of Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons as ``bargaining chips'' to
extract concessions or the release of Israeli prisoners held in
Lebanon. The Government has held, without explicit charges, both Sheikh
Obeid, a Lebanese Hizballah leader, since 1989 and Mustafa Dirani, a
head of security for the Amal militia, since 1994. The Government
claimed both were security threats. In 2001 the Government did not
comply with a High Court decision mandating that the ICRC have access
to Obeid. However, in June ICRC was able to make its first visit to
both Obeid and Durani. There was another visit in October. At year's
end, Obeid, Durani, and 27 other Lebanese prisoners (20 on security
grounds, 7 on criminal grounds) remained in custody.
The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government
generally respected this prohibition in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision. The judiciary generally provided citizens with a fair and
efficient judicial process. However, in practice, according to some
human rights organizations, Arab citizens often received stiffer
punishments than Jewish citizens. The judicial system is composed of
civil, military, religious, labor relations, and administrative courts,
with the High Court of Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The
High Court of Justice is both a court of first instance (in cases
involving government action) and an appellate court (when it sits as
the Supreme Court). All courts in the judicial system, including the
High Court of Justice, have appellate courts or jurisdictions.
The law provides for the right to a hearing with representation by
counsel, and authorities generally observed this right in practice. A
regional and national system of public defenders operated by the
Ministry of Justice employed approximately 700 attorneys through 5
regional offices. Under the system, economically disadvantaged persons
who faced sentences of 5 years or longer, and all persons who were
accused of crimes with sentences of 10 years or longer, received
mandatory legal representation. Judges also had discretionary power to
appoint an attorney in all cases. Approximately 70 percent of
defendants were represented by counsel. All nonsecurity trials were
public except those in which the interests of the parties were deemed
best served by privacy.
Cases involving national security may be tried in either military
or civil courts and may be partly or wholly closed to the public. The
prosecution must justify closing the proceedings to the public in such
cases, and the Attorney General determines the venue. Adult defendants
had the right to be represented by counsel even in closed proceedings
but may be denied access to some evidence on security grounds. Under
the law, convictions may not be based on any evidence denied to the
defense, although it may influence a judge's decision.
The 1970 regulations governing military trials were the same as
evidentiary rules in criminal cases. Convictions may not be based
solely on confessions, although in practice some security prisoners
have been sentenced on the basis of the coerced confessions by both
themselves and others. Counsel may assist the accused, and a judge may
assign counsel to those defendants when the judge deems it necessary.
Charges were made available to the defendant and the public in Hebrew,
and the court could order that the charges be translated into Arabic if
necessary. Sentencing in military courts was consistent with that in
criminal courts. Defendants in military trials had the right to appeal
through the Military High Court. Defendants in military trials also
could petition the civilian High Court of Justice (sitting as a court
of first instance) in cases in which they believed there were
procedural or evidentiary irregularities.
According to human rights organizations, the legal system in
practice often imposed stiffer punishments on Israeli Arab citizens
than on Israeli Jewish citizens. For example, human rights advocates
claimed that Arab citizens were more likely to be convicted of murder
(which carries a mandatory life sentence) than Jewish citizens. The
courts reportedly also were more likely to detain Arab citizens until
the conclusion of proceedings. For example, in the first month after
the October 2000 riots in Arab and Jewish locales, police arrested
approximately 1,000 persons, including 660 Arabs and 340 Jews. Of the
Arabs arrested, 79 percent reportedly were indicted, compared to 21
percent of the Jews; 72 percent of the Arabs were detained without
bond, compared to 11 percent of the Jews. A number of Arabs accused of
crimes such as stone-throwing during the year received sentences of
more than 3 years. In contrast in October 2001, a Jewish man who was
convicted of being part of a mob that severely beat a Palestinian man
in Netanya in March was sentenced to 18 months in prison (see Section
1.c.). The Government has stated that allegations of systematic
discrimination of non-Jews in the courts were unfounded.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law generally protected privacy of the individual
and the home; however, there also were laws that provide that
authorities may interfere with mail and monitor telephone conversations
in certain circumstances. In criminal cases, the law permits
wiretapping under court order; in security cases, the order must be
issued by the Ministry of Defense. Under emergency regulations,
authorities may open and destroy mail based on security considerations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
the press, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The law authorizes the Government to censor any material
reported from Israel or the occupied territories that it regarded as
sensitive on national security grounds; however, authorities rarely
applied the law in practice. However, during the year, the Ministry of
Interior closed an Arab newspaper, Sawt al-Haqq Wal-Hurriya. The
newspaper was affiliated with the northern branch of the Islamic
movement in the country, and had previously published articles the
Government believed supported terrorism in the country. A censorship
agreement between the Government and media representatives applied to
all media organizations in the country and provided that military
censorship was to be applied only in cases involving national security
issues that had a near certainty of harming the country's defense
interests. All media organizations may appeal the censor's decision to
the High Court of Justice. Moreover, a clause prohibits the military
censor from closing a newspaper for censorship violations and from
appealing a court judgement against it. News printed or broadcast
abroad may be reported without the censor's review, which permits the
media to run previously censored stories that have appeared in foreign
sources. Emergency regulations made it illegal for persons to express
support for illegal organizations. On occasion the Government
prosecuted persons for speaking or writing on behalf of terrorist
groups. In August 2001, the Attorney General announced that he would
file an indictment against Knesset Member Azmi Bisharah for making
statements perceived by some as supportive of Hizballah during
Bisharah's June visit to Syria (a country still in a state of war with
Israel). In November 2001, the Knesset voted to lift Bisharah's
immunity so that he could face prosecution. At year's end, the case was
still in discovery.
One Palestinian-owned newspaper, Al-Quds, was required to submit
its entire contents, including advertising, to the military censor by 4
p.m. each day. The editor claimed that this process caused his
journalists to practice self-censorship. During the year, journalists
and professional journalist groups claimed that the Government placed
limitations on their freedom of movement within the occupied
territories, between the West Bank and Gaza, and between the occupied
territories and Israel during violent unrest. The Government and
security forces have stated that they did not target journalists due to
their profession; however, three journalists were killed and at least
five were injured while covering events in the occupied territories
during the year (see Section 2.a. of the annex).
The Government Press Office, due to security concerns, required
foreign journalists to sign an agreement stating that they will submit
certain news stories and photographs for censorship; however, they
rarely were challenged for not doing so.
Individuals, groups, and the press freely addressed within the
limits of the law public issues and criticized government policies and
officials without reprisal. Laws prohibit hate speech and incitement to
violence. The Government investigated a significantly higher number of
Arab Members of the Knesset (MKs) than Jewish MKs for the use of hate
speech and incitement to violence.
All newspapers were privately owned and managed. Newspaper licenses
were valid only for Israel; separate licenses were required to
distribute publications in areas in the occupied territories still
under the Government's authority. There were 16 daily newspapers, 90
weekly local newspapers, and more than 250 periodical publications.
Directed by a government appointee, the quasi-independent Israel
Broadcast Authority controlled television Channel 1 and Kol Israel
(Voice of Israel) radio, both major sources of news and information.
The privately operated Channel 2, the country's first commercial
television station, was operated by 3 franchise companies and
supervised by the Second Television and Radio Authority, a public body
that also supervised 14 private radio stations. There were five cable
television companies that carried both domestic and international
networks and produced shows specifically for the Israeli audience.
The Government generally respected academic freedom; however, in
December 2001 the human rights organization Adalah claimed that the
Government interfered with the education of Israeli Arab students
because a member of the GSS monitored and approved the appointment of
teachers and administrators in Arab schools. Adalah claimed that the
GSS discriminates against candidates for education positions based on
political affiliations, although there have been no credible reports
since the mid-1980s of the Government denying a teachers certificate on
security grounds (see Section 5). However, a teaching certificate does
not ensure job placement. For example, during the year, Minister of
Education Limor Livnat supported an unsuccessful attempt to prosecute
university professors who supported conscientious objectors to Israeli
practices. In addition, there was an abortive attempt to dismiss a
historian, Ilan Pappe, at Haifa University who criticized the
prevailing interpretation of the 1948 conflict between Israelis and
Palestinians. However, at year's end, he continued to teach there.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of assembly, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice.
During the year, there were a number of peaceful demonstrations for
and against peace negotiations with the Palestinians.
The law provides for the right of association, and the Government
generally respected this provision in practice. However, during the
year, the Government continued to deny registration of a new
Palestinian NGO in Israel, Tawasul. The organization works to establish
connections between Arab citizens and other cultures around the world
(see Section 4). The Government stated that it merely wanted the
organization to change its name, due to its similarity to those of
other registered NGOs.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government generally respected this right; however, it imposed
some restrictions. Approximately 80 percent of citizens are Jewish,
although some persons in that group are not considered Jewish under
Orthodox Jewish law or are related by marriage to a Jewish citizen.
Muslims, Christians, and Druze make up the remaining 20 percent of the
population. The Government recognized 5 religions: Judaism, Islam,
Christianity, Druzism, and Samaritanism. The status of some Christian
organizations with representation in the country heretofore has been
defined by a collection of ad hoc arrangements with various government
agencies. Several of these organizations sought to negotiate with the
Government in an attempt to formalize their status. Each recognized
religious community has legal authority over its members in matters of
marriage and divorce. Secular courts have primacy over questions of
inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring cases to
religious courts. Jewish and Druze families may ask for some family
status matters, such as alimony and child custody in divorces, to be
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
Christians only may ask that child custody and child support be
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
Muslims have no recourse to civil courts in family-status matters.
Under the Law of Return, the Government grants automatic
citizenship and residence rights to Jewish immigrants and their
families; the Law of Return does not apply to non-Jews or to persons of
Jewish descent who have converted to another faith (see Section 2.d.).
Members of unrecognized religious groups (particularly evangelical
Christians, but also Russian immigrants and others who considered
themselves Jewish but were not recognized as such), at times faced
problems obtaining marriage certificates or burial services. However,
informal arrangements provided relief in some cases.
Many Israeli Jews who wish to marry in secular or non-Orthodox
religious ceremonies do so abroad, and the Ministry of Interior
recognizes such marriages. However, many Jewish citizens object to such
exclusive control, and it has been at times a source of serious
controversy in society, particularly in recent years, as thousands of
immigrants from the former Soviet Union have not been recognized as
Jewish by Orthodox authorities. For example, questions have been raised
about according Russian immigrants full Jewish burial rights if their
Jewish heritage was not certified by the Orthodox Rabbinate.
Under the Jewish religious courts' interpretation of personal
status law, a Jewish woman may not receive a final writ of divorce
without her husband's consent. Consequently, there were thousands of
so-called ``agunot'' in the country who were unable to remarry or have
legitimate children because their husbands either disappeared or
refused to grant a divorce.
Some Islamic law courts have held that Muslim women may not request
a divorce but that women may be forced to consent if a divorce is
granted to a man.
The Government provided proportionally greater financial support to
institutions in the Orthodox Jewish sector compared with those in the
non-Orthodox or non-Jewish sector, i.e., Muslim, Christian, and Druze.
For example, the budget for the Ministry of Religious Affairs for 2000
only allocated 2.9 percent of its resources to the non-Jewish sector,
although Muslims, Christians, and Druze constituted approximately 20
percent of the population. In 1998 the High Court of Justice ruled that
the Ministry of Religion budget allocation constituted ``prima facie
discrimination'' but that the plaintiff's petition did not provide
adequate information about the religious needs of the various
communities. The Court refused to intervene in the budgetary process on
the grounds that such action would invade the proper sphere of the
legislature. However, in 2000 the Court ordered the Government to
allocate resources equitably to cemeteries of the Jewish and Arab
communities. The Government began implementing to some degree the
decision during the year. For example, some non-Jewish cemeteries
reported enhanced financing and some money to complete long-standing
infrastructure and improvement projects.
For security reasons, the Government imposed restrictions on
citizens who perform the Hajj, including requiring that they be over
the age of 30 (see Section 2.d.). The Government justified these
restrictions on the grounds that Saudi Arabia remained officially at
war with Israel and that travel to Saudi Arabia therefore was
considered subject to security considerations.
Missionaries were allowed to proselytize, although the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints voluntarily refrained from doing so
under an agreement with the Government. The law prohibits anyone from
offering or receiving material benefits as an inducement to conversion;
however, there have been no reports of the enforcement of this law.
The Government has recognized only Jewish holy places under the
1967 Protection of Holy Sites Law. However, the Government stated that
it also protects the holy sites of other faiths. It also stated that is
has provided funds for some holy sites of other faiths. Muslim groups
claimed that the Government has been reluctant to renovate mosques in
areas where there no longer was a Muslim population. In May the High
Court sustained a demolition order for a mosque in the unrecognized
village of Husseinya, which was built without a permit in 1996.
During the year, the Government continued to refuse recognition to
the duly-elected Greek Orthodox Patriarch, Eirinaios I. Many local
Greek Orthodox Christians perceived the Government's actions as
interference with the internal workings of their church.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government generally respected them in practice for citizens,
except with regard to military or security zones or in instances in
which citizens may be confined by administrative order to their
neighborhoods or villages. Since the outbreak of violence in 2000, the
Government has imposed some restrictions on the movement of persons
between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza, and between cities inside
the West Bank and Gaza (see Section 2.d. of the annex).
Citizens generally were free to travel abroad and to emigrate,
provided they had no outstanding military obligations and were not
restricted by administrative order. During the year, the Government
issued an order restricting the right of Sheik Raed Salah, leader of
the oppositionist Northern Branch of Israel's Islamic Movement, to
travel abroad. The Government claimed to have confidential security
reasons for banning the foreign travel of Sheik Salah. For security
reasons, the Government imposed some restrictions on its Muslim
citizens who performed the Hajj (see Section 2.c.). The Government did
not allow persons to return from the Hajj if they left the country
without formal permission. The Government justified these restrictions
on the grounds that Saudi Arabia remained officially at war with Israel
and that travel to Saudi Arabia therefore was considered subject to
security considerations.
The Government stated that non-Jewish female citizens who marry
noncitizen men, including men from the occupied territories, could
retain their citizenship. The law includes provisions that allow a male
spouse of a non-Jewish citizen to acquire citizenship and enter the
country after the spouse passes a 4 \1/2\ year, multistage period of
adaptation, except in cases in which the man has a criminal record or
is suspected of posing a threat to security. A small number of
Christian, Muslim, and Druze women who have married men from Arab
states or the West Bank and Gaza have made unsubstantiated claims that
the Government revoked their citizenship and their right to reenter
Israel; particularly after marrying men who are citizens of countries
officially at war with Israel. A much larger number of Israeli Arabs,
both men and women, were waiting for the Ministry of Interior to admit
their spouses into Israel as residents. One NGO, Adalah, claimed to
have a list of dozens of couples who were denied the right to unite in
Israel, despite laws guaranteeing this right.
During the year, journalists claimed that the Government placed
limits on their freedom of movement within the occupied territories,
between the West Bank and Gaza, and between Israel and the occupied
territories, during violent unrest (see Section 2.a.).
Citizens are required to enter and leave the country on their
Israeli passports only. In addition, no citizen or passport-holder was
permitted to travel to countries officially at war with Israel without
special permission from the Government. During the year, there were
credible reports that the Government confiscated both the Israeli and
Vatican passports of Archimandrite Theodosios Hanna, an Israeli citizen
of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem. Hanna was held and
interrogated by police at the Russian Compound. He was questioned
regarding visits he made to Syria and Lebanon, relations with PA
President Yasser Arafat, and his position on the Intifada. When
summoned to collect his passports, Hanna was informed that he would
have to sign a statement promising not to incite violence against the
state, make statements in support of terrorist activity, and to visit
states hostile to the country without Ministry of Interior permission.
Hanna refused to sign and was denied his passports.
The Government welcomes Jewish immigrants and their Jewish or non-
Jewish family members, refugees and immigrants, on whom it confers
automatic citizenship and residence rights under the Law of Return.
Children of female converts to Judaism are eligible to immigrate only
if the children were born after the woman's conversion. The Law of
Return does not apply to non-Jews or to persons of Jewish descent who
have converted to another faith. During the year, several Israeli
citizens from the former Soviet Union told diplomats that the Ministry
of Interior was attempting to strip their citizenship and return them
to their home countries because they had divorced their Jewish spouses.
At least one of those potential deportees had served a full term in the
IDF.
Other than the Law of Return and the family reunification statutes,
there is no immigration law that provides for immigration to the
country or for political asylum or refugee status. The law does allow
individuals to live in the country as permanent residents. The
Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
Jewish refugees. The Government did not provide asylum to refugees from
states with which the country remains in a state of war. Individuals
present in the country on tourist or work visas, or those in the
country illegally, sometimes filed petitions with the local UNHCR
representative as the first step in seeking refugee status. During the
year, the Government removed the right to adjudicate status from UNHCR
headquarters in Geneva and granted it to an interministerial committee,
which reviewed pending cases to determine if the facts merited
designation of refugee status. The interministerial committee makes a
recommendation to the Minister of the Interior, who has the final
authority to determine status. If a person is granted such status, it
is government policy to grant renewable temporary visas, provided that
the person is not from a state with which the country is at war. In
those cases, the Government attempts to find a third country in which
the individuals can live. The Government provides refugees all the
protections under refugee conventions, although in some instances
individual ministries have not complied in an expeditious manner. Some
NGOs alleged that the process has been politicized and that decisions
of the committee have been disregarded.
The issue of first asylum did not arise during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage for adult citizens. National elections were held on February
6, 2001, when Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister and the governing
coalition changed party affiliation. The country is a parliamentary
democracy with an active multiparty system in which political views are
wide-ranging. Relatively small parties, including those whose primary
support is among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the Knesset.
Elections are by secret ballot.
There were no legal impediments to the participation of women and
minorities in government. Women held 17 of 120 Knesset seats. Of the
Knesset's 20 committees, 6 (including the Committee on the Status of
Women) were chaired by women. At year's end, there were 2 women in the
Cabinet; 4 women served on the 14-member High Court of Justice. There
were 11 Arabs and 2 Druze in the 120-member Knesset; most represented
parties that derived their support largely or entirely from the Arab
community. No Arab or Druze citizens served on the 14-member High Court
of Justice.
In May the Knesset amended the Basic Law, which prohibits the
candidacy of any party or individual who denies the Jewish and
democratic existence of the State of Israel or incites racism, to also
prohibit parties and individuals who ``support (in action or speech)
the armed struggle of enemy states or terror organizations.'' This
amendment opened a door to challenges which were made by the Attorney
General to one Israeli-Arab party and one Jewish candidate.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of local and international human rights groups
operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally
cooperated with investigations. However, Human Rights Watch reported
increased harassment by IDF soldiers and increased difficulty in
gaining permission for expatriate staff to enter the country.
In March the Ministry of Interior issued an order to border
officials to bar the entry to all foreign nationals who were affiliated
with Palestinian NGOs and solidarity organizations. For example, in
April the Ministry of Interior attempted to ban entry into the country
of three representatives of international human rights organizations
and threatened to deport them within hours. Sidiki Kaba and Driss El
Yazami, President and Secretary General of the International Federation
of Human Rights Leagues, and Henri LeClerck, former President of the
Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, were told they would not be allowed to
enter the country. The three had traveled to participate in a press
conference regarding human rights violations resulting from Israeli
incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas of the occupied
territories. All three had proper travel documentation, including
visas. The Government stated that it barred these individuals because
they were interested in making political statements.
On August 11, Adalah claimed that the Government would investigate
the group on the grounds of undertaking activities beyond the scope of
its mandate, association with a political party, and financial
mismanagement. The group raised concerns and stated that the
investigation appeared to be government efforts to hinder or prevent
its functioning.
During the year, the Government continued to deny registration to a
new Palestinian NGO in Israel, Tawasul. The Government said that it
merely wanted the organization to change its name, due to its
similarity to those of other registered NGOs (see Section 2.b.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or marital
status. The law also prohibits discrimination by both government and
nongovernmental entities on the basis of race, political beliefs, and
age. Local human rights groups were concerned that these laws often
were not enforced, either as a result of institutionalized
discrimination, or because resources for implementing those laws, or
mechanisms for their enforcement, were lacking. According to a report
submitted to the U.N. by the Government in February, allocation of
resources to different population groups was not consistent with the
law's prohibition on discrimination.
The Government owns and manages 77 percent of the country's land
area, and as a matter of policy it does not sell land. The Jewish
National Fund (JNF), an organization established in 1897 for the
purchase and management of land for the Jewish people, owned 8 percent
of the country's land area, including a considerable amount transferred
directly from the Government, and managed another 8 percent on behalf
of the Government. The JNF's statute prohibits the sale or lease of
land to non-Jews. Foreigners and citizens of all religions were allowed
freely to purchase or lease the 7 percent of land not controlled by the
Government or the JNF. In March 2000, the High Court of Justice ruled
that the Government's use of the JNF to develop public land was
discriminatory. At year's end, there were no new developments in this
case.
Women.--In March 2000, the Knesset passed the Equality of Women
Law, which provides for equal rights for women in the workplace, the
military, education, health, housing, and social welfare, and entitles
women to protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual
exploitation, and trafficking. The law prohibits domestic violence;
however, violence against women was a problem, despite the steps taken
by the Government and other organizations to reduce such violence.
During the year, approximately 20 women were killed by their
husbands or other male relatives. According to a prominent women's
group, between 150,000 and 200,000 (4 and 6 percent) of women and girls
were victims of domestic violence each year; an estimated 12,000 to
14,000 (7 percent) of them were abused on a regular basis. According to
women's organizations, approximately 3,000 women and girls were
assaulted sexually and approximately 1,000 were victims of incest
during the year; an estimated 45 percent of them were girls under the
age of 18. Only a small percentage of the victims complained to the
police. According to the Domestic Violence Law, a district or
magistrate court may prohibit access by violent family members to their
property.
Rape is illegal.
Arab human rights advocates formed a coalition to raise public
awareness of so-called honor crimes. There were an unknown number of
Arab women killed during the year by male relatives in family ``honor''
cases, a violent assault with intent to commit murder against a woman
or girl by a relative for her perceived immodest behavior or alleged
sexual misconduct. Families often attempted to cover up the cause of
such deaths. NGOs and press accounts reported that the Government
investigated and tried the perpetrators of so-called honor crimes.
Prostitution is not illegal; however, the operation of brothels and
organized sex enterprises is outlawed. Prostitution was a problem. NGOs
reported that an unknown number, possibly between 100 and 200, of the
nation's prostitutes were under the age of 18.
Trafficking in women became a significant problem in recent years.
According to recent studies, every year hundreds of women from the
former Soviet Union were trafficked to the country by well-organized
criminal networks to work as prostitutes (see Section 6.f.).
In 1998 the country adopted a comprehensive sexual harassment
prevention law; since that time, several prominent cases have increased
public awareness of the issue.
In 1996 legislation was adopted that provides for class action
suits and requires employers to provide equal pay for equal work,
including important side benefits and allowances; however, women's
rights advocates claimed that deep gaps remained. Women's advocacy
groups reported that women routinely received lower wages for
comparable work, were promoted less often, and had fewer career
opportunities than their male counterparts. For example, the wage gap
between men and women for year-round, full-time employment was
approximately 30 percent, and only 2 percent of women served in
positions of senior management in large companies.
The adjudication of personal status law in the areas of marriage
and divorce is left to religious courts, in which Jewish and Muslim
women are subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights. Under
personal status law, Jewish women are not allowed to initiate divorce
proceedings without their husbands' consent; consequently there were
estimated to be thousands of ``agunot'' who may not remarry or have
legitimate children because their husbands either disappeared or
refused to grant a divorce.
In accordance with Orthodox Jewish law, the 1995 Rabbinical Courts
Law allows rabbinical tribunals to impose sanctions on husbands who
refuse to divorce wives who have ample grounds for divorce, such as
abuse. Since 1999 a foreign citizen has been in prison for refusing to
grant his wife a divorce. However, in some cases, rabbinical courts
failed to invoke these sanctions. In addition, there were cases in
which a wife failed to agree to a divorce, but rabbinical authorities
allowed the man to ``take a second wife''; this remedy was not
available to wives. Such restrictive practices have been used by
husbands to extort concessions from their wives in return for agreeing
to a divorce. Rabbinical courts also may exercise jurisdiction over and
issue sanctions against non-citizen Jews present in the country.
Some Islamic law courts in the country have held that Muslim women
may not request a divorce, but that women may be forced to consent if a
divorce is granted to a man.
Children.--The Government has stated its commitment to the rights
and welfare of children; however, in practice resources at times were
insufficient, particularly with respect to low-income families.
Government spending was proportionally lower in predominantly Arab
areas than in Jewish areas, which adversely affected children in Arab
villages and cities. In June the Government passed an emergency
economic plan that reduced the child allowance. Children whose parents
have served in the army had a cut of 4 percent and children whose
parents have not served in the army had a cut of 24 percent. Most
Israeli Arabs are exempt from compulsory military service. In addition
to the 12 percent cut in February, the decision makes child allowances
37 percent lower for Arab children compared to Jewish children.
However, children of Druze or Circassians who are drafted or Christian/
Muslims who volunteer for the IDF receive the higher figure. Children
from religious Jewish families who do not serve in the IDF receive the
lower figure. Ultra orthodox Jews who did not serve in the military
faced the same child welfare cuts. However, they were eligible for
extra subsidies, including educational supplements not available to
others.
Education was compulsory up to the age of 15 or until the child
reaches the 10th grade, whichever comes first. Arab children made up
approximately one-quarter of the public school population, but
historically government resources allocated for them were
proportionately less than for Jewish children. Many schools in Arab
communities were dilapidated and overcrowded, lacked special education
services and counselors, had poor libraries, and had no sports
facilities. The Government allocated 26 percent of the school budget
for the year for the construction of new classrooms for schools in Arab
communities (not including Druze communities). According to the
Government's report to the U.N. in February, government investment per
Arab pupil was approximately 60 percent of investment per Jewish pupil.
High school graduation rates for Arabs were significantly lower
than for Jews. According to 1998 statistics, 58 percent of the teachers
in Jewish schools had university degrees compared with 39 percent of
the teachers in Arab schools. Preschool attendance for Bedouin children
was the lowest in the country, and the dropout rate for Bedouin high
school students was the highest.
Arab groups noted that the public school curriculum stressed
Israel's Jewish culture and heritage. Israeli Arab students were not
eligible to participate in a special education program to provide
academic assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. A
petition was filed with the High Court of Justice in 1997 charging that
the Ministry of Education's refusal to provide this program to Israeli
Arab students was discriminatory. The Attorney General's office agreed
that the policy constituted impermissible discrimination but asked for
5 years to expand the program to Israeli Arab students. The petitioners
rejected this proposal as being too slow. The court held hearings on
the case twice in 1999; during the hearings, the Government promised to
equalize special education resources by 2004. In July 2000, the
Commission to Examine the Implementation of the Special Education Law
(the Margalit Commission) published its detailed recommendations on how
to improve special education in the Arab sector. At year's end, the
Government still had not implemented those recommendations, and the
budget for the year did not contain provisions to equalize spending on
Arab and Jewish special education.
The Government operated a number of school systems: one for secular
Jews, at least two for religious Jews, and one for Israeli Arabs. Most
Jewish children attended schools where the language of instruction was
Hebrew and the curriculum included Jewish history. Although Israeli
Arab children were free to attend ``Jewish schools,'' most chose
schools where the language of instruction was Arabic and the curriculum
had less of a ``Jewish'' focus. Israeli Arab children overall received
an education inferior to that of Jewish children in the secular system.
The Education Ministry allocated money per class, and due to the larger
classes of Arab students, acknowledged that it allocated less money per
student in the Arab system than in the Jewish systems. In addition,
Jewish schools received additional state and state-sponsored funding
for school construction and special programs through other government
agencies. In its report to the U.N. in February, the Government stated
that the discrepancies between the two sectors were reflected in
various aspects in the Arab sector; including physical infrastructure,
the average number of students per class, the number of enrichment
hours, the extent of support services, and the level of education of
professional staff. In 1999 the Government decided to implement a plan
that would place the budgetary and educational standards of the Arab
sector on par with those of the Jewish sector from the period 1999 to
2003. The plan proposed a unified criteria for allocating resources to
the Arab sector, relative to the Jewish sector, and proposed
integrating the Arab and Druze sectors equally in all new Ministry
programs. However, the Follow-Up Committee on Arab Education claimed
that the Ministry's implementation was only partial and did not
encompass all of the recommendations presented in the original 5-year
plan.
In December 2001, Adalah requested that the Government discontinue
GSS monitoring and approval of teachers and administrators in Arab
schools and claimed that in its role at the Ministry of Education, the
GSS discriminated against persons on the basis of their political
affiliation (see Section 2.a.).
There has been concern regarding the thousands of children of the
country's growing population of foreign workers, many of whom resided
in the country illegally. Technically, foreign workers may not enter
the country with their spouses or bring their spouses into the country
on tourist or work status. Those who did were subject to deportation.
Foreign workers who married while in country lost their status and were
subject to deportation. These restrictions, however, did not preclude
the possibility of children being born to foreign workers while in the
country. Those children were entitled to remain with their parent and
to receive limited health and education benefits until the age of 18.
Children of parents who were in the country illegally live in social
limbo, occasionally without access to adequate education and medical
care.
The Government has legislated against sexual, physical, and
psychological abuse of children and has mandated comprehensive
reporting requirements regarding these problems. Although there was a
sharp increase in reported cases of child abuse in recent years,
activists believed that this largely was due to increased awareness of
the issue rather than a growing pattern of abuse. There were five
shelters for children at risk of abuse.
Activists estimated that there may be several hundred prostitutes
among the nation's children (see Section 6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The Government provided a range of
benefits, including income maintenance, housing subsidies, and
transportation support for persons with disabilities, who constituted
approximately 10 percent of the population. Existing anti-
discrimination laws do not prohibit discrimination based on disability,
and persons with disabilities continued to encounter difficulties in
areas such as employment and housing. A law requiring access for
persons with disabilities to public buildings was not widely enforced.
There was no law providing for access to public transportation for
persons with disabilities. Extended protests by organizations for
persons with disabilities during the year led to a small increase in
government spending in support of persons with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government did not allocate
sufficient resources or take adequate measures to provide Israeli
Arabs, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the population, with
the same quality of government services, as well as the same
opportunities for government employment, as Jews. In addition,
government spending was proportionally far lower in predominantly Arab
areas than in Jewish areas; on a per capita basis, the Government spent
two-thirds as much for Arabs as for Jews. In February the Government
noted in a report to the U.N. that ``the Arab population is typified by
larger families, lower levels of education, and lower income than the
total Israeli population.''
Municipalities, including Arab municipalities, were responsible for
issuing building permits within the municipal boundaries. Some Arab
NGOs claimed that outside of Arab-governed municipalities, the
Government was more restrictive in issuing building permits to Arabs
than to Jews.
The Bedouin sector was the weakest of all the population groups in
the country. Bedouin living in unrecognized villages had no way to
obtain building permits. In May the Government destroyed 52 Bedouin
homes, eliminating all the tents and temporary structures in the
unrecognized village of al-'Araqib in the Negev, in which two Bedouin
tribes were living. Many ministers publicly acknowledged the continuing
disparities in government funding for the country's non-Jewish
citizens. Following the demonstrations and disturbances in September
and October 2000, the Government approved a $975 million (4 billion
NIS) economic assistance plan for the country's Arab citizens to be
phased in over 4 years. Most of the money included in the plan was
allocated for education and new infrastructure development. Israeli
Arab leaders and human rights groups criticized the plan because it was
not based on a comprehensive survey of the economic and development
needs of the country's Arab population and was considered inadequate to
meet that population's needs. Critics also pointed out that only half
of the total sum represented newly allocated money. The Government had
still not implemented the plan by year's end.
By law, the Israel Land Authority has 18-24 members; half of which
represent organizations forbidden by statute to transfer land to non-
Jews. In 1999 the Government appointed the first Arab citizen to the
board, and in 2001 the High Court of Justice ruled that the Government
must appoint an additional Arab to the board. However, during the year,
this had not been done. In March 2000, the High Court ruled on a 1995
petition brought by an Arab citizen couple who were barred from buying
a home in Katzir, a Jewish municipality that was built on state-owned
land. The High Court ruled that the Government's use of the Jewish
National Fund to develop public land was discriminatory, since the
fund's bylaws prohibit the sale or lease of land to non-Jews. The High
Court determined that its ruling in the case would not affect previous
land allocations and that differentiating between Jews and non-Jews in
land allocation might be acceptable under unspecified ``special
circumstances.'' The municipality was instructed to develop and publish
criteria for its decisions and a plan for implementation. By year's
end, Israel Lands Authority had not fully implemented the ruling, and
the Arab couple still had not been able to purchase a home in Katzir.
Israeli Arab organizations have challenged publicly the 1996
``Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel,'' which listed as
priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking
the territorial contiguity of Arab villages and towns, on the grounds
that it discriminates against Arab citizens; the Government continued
to use this document for planning in the Galilee. At year's end, there
were no discernible changes.
Israeli Arabs were underrepresented in the student bodies and
faculties of most universities and in higher level professional and
business ranks. In 1999 Arabs constituted 8.7 percent of the students
at major universities in the country. Well-educated Arabs often were
unable to find jobs commensurate with their level of education. Arab
citizens held fewer than 60 of the country's 5,000 university faculty
positions. The Government stated that it was committed to granting
equal and fair conditions to Israeli Arabs, particularly in the areas
of education, housing, and employment. A small number of Israeli Arabs
have risen to responsible positions in the civil service, generally in
the Arab departments of government ministries. In 1994 a civil service
commission began a 3-year affirmative action program to expand that
number, but it has achieved only modest results. In 2000 only the
Ministry of Health and Ministry of Religious Affairs had representation
of more that 5 percent of Arabs in their workforce. The Ministries of
Housing, Transportation, and Trade and Industry, all had representation
of less than 1 percent of Arabs in their workforce. Arab composition in
the remaining 15 ministries was approximately 5 percent. In October
2000, the Knesset passed a bill requiring that minorities and
underrepresented populations be granted ``appropriate representation''
in the civil service and on the boards of government corporations. The
Government took steps toward implementing the law during the year,
including setting aside civil service positions for Arab candidates and
appointing more Israeli Arabs to corporate boards. For example, during
the year, an Arab citizen was appointed to the board of Ben Gurion
Airport.
In practice few Israeli Arabs served in the military or worked in
companies with defense contracts or in security-related fields. The
Israeli Druze and Circassian communities were subject to the military
draft and the overwhelming majority accepted service willingly. Some
Bedouin and other Arab citizens who were not subject to the draft
served voluntarily. Those who did not serve in the army had less access
than other citizens to those social and economic benefits for which
military service was a prerequisite or an advantage, such as housing,
new-household subsidies, and government or security-related industrial
employment. NGOs challenged in court a government plan to pay less
social security child allowance benefits to families in which at least
one parent did not serve in the IDF than to families in which at least
one parent did. Until the court decides the case, the child benefits
remain equal for all families, regardless of parents' IDF service.
Israeli Arab groups alleged that many employers used the
prerequisite of military service to avoid hiring non-Jews. For
instance, in August 2001 the municipality of Tel Aviv advertised for
parking lot attendants; ``military service'' was a prerequisite.
There were approximately 130,000 Bedouin in the Negev; of this
number approximately half lived in 7 state planned communities and the
other half lived in 45 settlements that were not recognized by the
Government. The recognized Bedouin villages receive basic services from
the Government; however, they are among the poorest communities in the
country. The unrecognized villages were declared illegal by the
National Planning and Building Law of 1965 when the lands on which they
sit were rezoned as nonresidential, and the Government claimed
ownership of the land. According to the Government, recognizing these
villages would conflict with its attempts to establish new villages in
``an orderly manner, and would leave disputes over the land
unresolved.'' Residents of the unrecognized villages paid taxes to the
Government; however, their villages were not eligible for government
services. Consequently, such villages were denied basic health,
education, water, electricity, employment opportunities, and other
services. In 34 villages, there was no school at all; under these
circumstances, there was little incentive to stay in school. New
building in the unrecognized villages was considered illegal and
subject to demolition. Private efforts have supplied some unrecognized
villages with water, and the courts have ordered the provision of
limited health and education services. The Government has yet to
fulfill its commitment to resolve the legal status of unrecognized Arab
villages. Since 1994, 8 villages have been recognized officially, but
nearly 100 more, of varying size and with a total population of nearly
70,000 persons, remained illegal. Following a 1999 High Court decision,
the Government agreed to begin a study to determine the infrastructure
needed in each village, and that the implementation of plans made by a
professional team of researchers would be discussed with villagers. A
planning committee was required to submit a report regarding the
progress of these plans to the Court in October. No projects related to
the planning committee had begun by year's end.
In February the Israel Lands Administration sprayed from the air
chemical defoliant over 12,000 dunams (12 sq. km) of Bedouin wheat
fields on the Negev that had been planted on unrecognized land. The
Minister for National Infrastructure explained that the crops had been
illegally planted on state-owned land and that he was acting to return
the power of the Land Authority. The Ministry's action was widely
criticized, both inside and outside the Government.
There continued to be claims by Arab groups that land expropriation
for public use affected the Arab community disproportionately; that
Arabs have been allowed too little input in planning decisions that
affect their schools and municipalities; that mosques and cemeteries
belonging to the Islamic Waqf (religious endowment) have been neglected
or expropriated unjustly for public use; and that successive
governments have blocked the return to their homes of citizens
displaced in the early years of the country's history. The Government
has yet to agree with the pre-1948 residents of the northern villages
of Bir Am and Ikrit, and their descendants, regarding their long-term
demand to be allowed to rebuild their houses. In 1997 a special
interministerial panel recommended that the Government allow the
villagers to return to Bir Am and Ikrit. The High Court granted the
Government several extensions for implementing the recommendation. In
October 2001, after the expiration of the most recent extension, under
instructions from the Sharon government, the State Prosecutor's Office
submitted an affidavit to the High Court asking it to reject the
villagers' appeal, stating that the Government had legally appropriated
the land and that the precedent of returning displaced persons to their
villages would be used for propaganda and political purposes by the
Palestinian Authority. The Court's decision was pending at year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Citizen workers may join and
establish labor organizations freely. Most unions belong to Histadrut
(the General Federation of Labor in Israel) or to a much smaller rival
federation, the Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National Federation of
Labor). These organizations were independent of the Government.
Histadrut members elected national and local officers and officials of
its affiliated women's organization, Na'amat, from political party
lists of those already in the union. Plant or enterprise committee
members were elected individually. Approximately 650,000 workers were
members of Histadrut, and much of the non-Histadrut work force was
covered by Histadrut's collective bargaining agreements.
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who worked in Israel
were not able to join Israeli trade unions or organize their own unions
in Israel. Palestinian trade unions in the occupied territories were
not permitted to conduct activities in Israel (see Section 6.a. of the
annex). However, nonresident workers in the organized sector were
entitled to the protection of Histadrut work contracts and grievance
procedures. They may join, vote for, and be elected to shop-level
workers' committees if their numbers in individual establishments
exceed a minimum threshold. Palestinian participation in such
committees was minimal.
Labor laws apply to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to the
Syrian Druze living on the Golan Heights.
Unions were free to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizen workers
exercised their legal rights to organize and bargain collectively.
While there was no law specifically prohibiting antiunion
discrimination, the law against discrimination could be cited to
contest discrimination based on union membership. No antiunion
discrimination was reported.
Nonresident workers could not organize their own unions or engage
in collective bargaining, but they were entitled to be represented by
the bargaining agent and protected by collective bargaining agreements.
It was estimated that there were approximately 300,000 foreign workers
in the country. They did not pay union dues, but were required to pay a
1 percent agency fee in lieu of dues, which entitled them to union
protection by Histadrut's collective bargaining agreements. The
Ministry of Labor could extend collective bargaining agreements to
nonunionized workplaces in the same industrial sector. The Ministry of
Labor also oversaw personal contracts in the unorganized sectors of the
economy.
The right to strike was exercised regularly. Unions must provide 15
days' notice prior to a strike unless otherwise specified in the
collective bargaining agreement. However, unauthorized strikes
occurred. Strike leaders--even those organizing illegal strikes--are
protected by law. If essential public services are affected, the
Government may appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while the
parties continue negotiations. There were a number of strikes in both
the public and private sectors during the year by employees protesting
the effects of privatization. Worker dismissals and the terms of
severance arrangements often were the central issues of dispute. During
the year, there were major strikes of municipal workers on several
occasions. The workers were protesting wage and benefit issues.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor, specifically including forced and bonded labor by
children, and neither citizens nor nonresident Palestinians working in
Israel generally were subject to this practice; however, civil rights
groups charged that unscrupulous employers often took advantage of
illegal workers' lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to
involuntary servitude (see Section 6.e.). The problem was notable
concerning non-Palestinian illegal workers.
Women were trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Section
6.f.)
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children who have attained the age of 15 years, and who
fall under the compulsory education law (which applies to all children
except those who have completed grade 10), may not be employed unless
they work as apprentices under the Apprenticeship Law. Children who are
14-years-old may be employed during official school holidays.
Employment of those 16 to 18 years of age is restricted to ensure time
for rest and education; and the Government enforced these restrictions
in practice.
There were no reliable data regarding illegal child workers. The
small number of child workers reportedly was concentrated among the
country's Arab population and its most recent Jewish immigrants.
Illegal employment was found primarily in urban, light industry.
Children's rights groups have called for more vigorous enforcement
of child labor laws, combined with a parallel effort to deal with the
causes of illegal child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 2001 the minimum wage was
raised to 47.5 percent of the average wage. The minimum wage was
calculated periodically and adjusted for cost of living increases. At
year's end, the minimum wage was approximately $760 (3,266 NIS) per
month. The minimum wage often was supplemented by special allowances
and generally was sufficient to provide a worker and family with a
decent standard of living. Union officials expressed concern over
enforcement of minimum wage regulations, particularly with respect to
employers of illegal nonresident workers, who sometimes paid less than
the minimum wage.
By law the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours a
week, 8 hours per day, and 7 hours on the day before the weekly rest,
which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and include the Sabbath.
Employers must receive a government permit to hire nonresident
workers from the occupied territories, certifying that no citizen is
available for the job. All Palestinians from the occupied territories
were employed on a daily basis and, unless they were employed on shift
work, were not authorized to spend the night in Israel. Palestinians
without valid work permits were subject to arrest. Due to security
concerns, the Government stopped issuing almost all permits for
Palestinian workers following the outbreak of violence in 2000.
Nonresident workers were paid through the employment service of the
Ministry of Labor, which disbursed wages and benefits collected from
employers. The Ministry deducted a 1 percent union fee and the workers'
required contributions to the National Insurance Institute (NII), the
agency that administered the Israeli social security system,
unemployment benefits, and other benefits. Despite these deductions,
Palestinian workers were not eligible for all NII benefits. They
continued to be insured for injuries suffered while working in the
country, maternity leave, as well as the bankruptcy of a worker's
employer. However, they did not have access to unemployment insurance,
general disability payments, or low-income supplements. Since 1993 the
Government has agreed to transfer the NII fees collected from
Palestinian workers to the Palestinian Authority, which is to assume
responsibility for all the pensions and social benefits of Palestinians
working in Israel. Mechanisms for providing these services in the PA
controlled territories, as well as mechanisms for transferring the
funds, have not been established. At year's end, the funds were not
transferred and were held in a trust.
Following the outbreak of violence in 2000, the Government
implemented a closure policy, which prevented nearly all Palestinians
from getting to their places of employment in Israel (see Section
2.d.).
Along with union representatives, the Labor Inspection Service
enforced labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace, although
resource constraints, such as adequate staffing, affected overall
enforcement. Legislation protects the employment rights of safety
delegates elected or appointed by the workers. In cooperation with
management, these delegates were responsible for safety and health in
the workplace.
Workers did not have the legal right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
However, collective bargaining agreements provided some workers with
recourse through the work site labor committee. Any worker may
challenge unsafe work practices through government oversight and legal
agencies.
Public debate continued regarding the role in the workplace and
society of non-Palestinian foreign workers, who were estimated to
number at least 300,000, about half of whom were undocumented and
employed illegally. The majority of such workers came from Eastern
Europe and Southeast Asia, and worked in the construction and
agricultural sectors. The law does not allow foreign workers the
ability to obtain citizenship or permanent residence status, unless
they are Jewish, in which case they would qualify under the laws which
allow for Jewish persons to immigrate. As a result, foreign workers and
their families, especially those who entered the country illegally,
experienced uncertainty in addressing legal and social problems,
including exploitation or abuse in the workplace.
There have been growing allegations that foreign workers were being
lured to Israel with the promise of jobs that in fact did not exist.
Many foreign workers paid up to $10,000 to work in Israel. Work visas
were tied to specific jobs, and quotas to bring in foreign workers were
assigned by the Government to employers. Technically, it is illegal for
manpower companies who provide the workers to the employers, to receive
payments from the worker, but NGOs and news articles alleged that the
companies made thousands of dollars from each worker brought into the
country, usually as a payment from the foreign partner. According to
NGOs, there have been a significant number of cases where workers have
been dismissed shortly after arriving in Israel. These NGOs alleged
that the manpower companies worked with deportation authorities to
deport the newly arrived workers, who were then replaced with new
workers, earning the manpower companies more fees. NGOs argued that
most workers expected to work for some time in Israel to recoup their
initial payments; often they sought illegal employment for fear of
returning home with large debts. According to NGOs, there have been
cases where workers have killed themselves rather than face this
prospect.
Illegal foreign workers facing deportation were brought before a
special court established to deal with issues related to deportation,
and workers may contest the deportations. Many workers lacked fluency
in Hebrew, which hindered the process. NGOs existed to aid workers
facing deportations, and there have been cases in which the worker's
status was reinstated. The court also provided a forum where deportable
workers can claim that they were not paid or given benefits according
to the law. In some cases, the court delayed deportation until all
claims, including severance, were paid. However, some NGOs suggested
that illegal workers often lived in situations amounting to involuntary
servitude, due primarily to their tenuous legal status. NGOs noted
several cases in which foreign workers were injured by the police
during arrest. In some cases, these NGOs claimed, the workers were so
seriously injured that they were not ultimately detained, due to the
potential cost of care for their injuries. At least one foreign worker
killed himself while in detention, and NGOs claimed that detention
facilities did not meet minimum standards.
During the year there were attempts to include foreign workers
within the national trade union Histadrut. News articles and some
advocates stated that the union was interested only in collecting dues
and had not acted to protect key union members who were singled out for
deportation. The editor of the foreign worker newspaper Manila-Tel Aviv
Times was deported shortly after giving interviews to other
publications on the subject of foreign worker rights under the law;
foreign worker advocates claimed the deportation was politically
motivated. Human rights groups claimed that since foreign worker
residency permits were tied to specific employment, even legal foreign
workers had little leverage to influence their work conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women
for the purpose of prostitution; however, it remained a serious
problem. The penal code stipulates that it is a criminal offense,
punishable to between 5 and 7 years imprisonment, to force or coerce a
person to engage in prostitution. The penal code also makes it a
criminal offense to induce a woman to leave the country with the intent
to ``practice prostitution abroad.'' In 2000 the Knesset passed the
Equality of Women Law (see Section 5), which stipulates that every
woman is entitled to protection from violence, sexual harassment,
sexual exploitation, and trafficking. In June 2000, the Government
enacted a law that prohibits the trafficking of persons for the purpose
of prostitution. The operation of brothels and ``organized sex
enterprises'' is outlawed, as are many of the abuses committed by
traffickers and pimps, such as assault, rape, abduction, and false
imprisonment. During the year, the Government reported that it
increasingly pursued legal action against traffickers.
Women were trafficked primarily from the former Soviet Union,
including Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. According to Amnesty
International (AI), every year hundreds of women from the former Soviet
Union were brought to the country by well-organized criminal networks
and forced, often through violence and threats, to work illegally as
prostitutes. According to some local NGOs, several hundred women were
trafficked into the country annually. NGOs reported that the number of
trafficked women entering the country fell from previous years because
of increased security at Ben Gurion airport, but women still were being
trafficked across the Egyptian border.
Activists estimated that there may be several hundred prostitutes
among the nation's children (see Section 5).
Traffickers reportedly often lured women into traveling to the
country by offering them jobs in the service industry. In many cases,
traffickers met women at the border and confiscated all their official
documents. Many trafficked women were forced to live and work under
extremely harsh conditions and to give most of the money they earned to
their traffickers. The women reportedly often were raped and beaten,
then auctioned to pimps who repeated the procedure. If the women
escaped from their traffickers, they were often afraid to report their
situations to the police because the traffickers threatened to hunt
them down and hurt them. According to press reports, it was common for
trafficked women to be told that they must repay the costs of their
travel to the country through servicing up to 25 clients a day. They
were paid little or no money for this work and once the debt had been
repaid, they were auctioned again.
In previous years, some victims accused individual police officers
of complicity with brothel owners and traffickers and the Government
worked to review these cases. However, during the year, the Government
stated that although there were no specific allegations of police
involvement in trafficking, there were several allegations that some
police officers were involved in ``trafficking-related activity,'' such
as warning brothel owners before police raids.
During the year, the Government opened 67 files for trafficking and
related crimes; most files dealt with multiple victims and suspects;
the files specifically included trafficking as a charge. A total of 138
persons were detained for trafficking related crimes during the year;
92 persons were arrested and 55 detained until the beginning of legal
proceedings. The Government convicted 33 persons and delivered
sentences. In 28 cases, the Government settled by plea bargaining with
the defendants.
Police often detained trafficked women following raids on brothels;
the number of such raids increased during the year. The Ministry of
Interior has broad powers to deport illegal aliens and to hold them in
detention pending deportation. According to the Ministry of Public
Security, through September, the Government deported 264 victims of
trafficking, not all of whom were prostitutes who had been living
illegally in the country.
Authorities generally kept trafficked women who were arrested in a
special section of a women's prison and then deported them. Trafficked
women often did not challenge a deportation order because they did not
speak the language or were unaware of the appeals procedure. The
Government transferred women who testified against their traffickers to
a hotel or hostel and provided them funds on which to live. Many women
were reluctant or afraid to testify in trials due to threats and
intimidation by their traffickers. The country has no witness
protection program or close and effective links with primary supply
countries, such as Moldova. Trafficked women could not apply for legal
status to remain as refugees or protected persons unless they were
Jewish and filed under the Law of Return. NGO reports and witness
testimony indicated that the Government did not attempt to determine
whether or not a trafficked woman or girl would be at risk of abuse if
she were deported to her country of origin, even in cases in which the
woman or girl had testified in criminal proceedings.
The Government provided limited funding to NGOs for assistance to
victims. In November the Government finalized a plan to make a shelter
available for trafficked women. The Government provided legal
representation to some trafficked women. The Government acknowledged
the need to educate trafficked women regarding where to go for help and
was developing such programs, but had not finalized any plans for or
begun such education programs by year's end.
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (INCLUDING AREAS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY)
Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East
Jerusalem during the 1967 War. Following the Madrid peace conference in
1992, Israel and the Palestinians entered into negotiations and in
1993, signed the Oslo Accords which established a framework for
negotiating transitional and final status arrangements. Pursuant to the
May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the September 1995 Interim
Agreement, Israel transferred most responsibilities for civil
government in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the newly
created Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel retained responsibility for
external security; foreign relations; the overall security of Israelis,
including public order in the Israeli settlements; and certain other
matters. (This annex on the occupied territories should be read in
conjunction with the report on Israel).
The 1995 Interim Agreement divided the territories into Areas A, B,
and C, denoting differing levels of Palestinian and Israeli control.
Israel was assigned control of certain civil functions and was
responsible for all security in portions of the occupied territories
categorized as Area C. Israel and the PA were assigned varying degrees
of control and jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Since then, Israel and the PA have administered the West Bank and Gaza
Strip to varying extents. However, the distinctions made under the
Interim Agreements were no longer in force following Israel's military
incursions into most PA-controlled areas, which Israel carried out
citing the Authority's failure to abide by its security
responsibilities.
The ``Intifada,'' or Palestinian uprising, began in September 2000.
Its causes are complex and remain highly controversial between the
parties. Since 2000 the security situation has deteriorated both within
Israel and within the Occupied Territories. Israeli and Palestinian
violence associated with the Intifada has claimed 1,782 Palestinian
lives, 649 Israeli lives, and the lives of 41 foreign nationals. During
the past year, the scale and nature of the violence changed and clashes
have continued daily. The conflict was marked by increased Israeli
military operations and armed attacks and terrorism by Palestinians
against Israeli targets--including civilians within Israel, settlers,
and soldiers in the occupied territories and Israel. The attacks also
included suicide bombings, roadside bombings, shooting at Israeli
vehicles and military installations, firing of antitank missiles and
mortars, and use of hand grenades. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) military
actions against Palestinians included violence and abuse at
checkpoints, incursions into Palestinian-controlled towns and villages,
targeted killings, firing toward civilian areas with tanks and fighter
aircraft, and intense gun battles with Palestinian shooters. Many
observers characterized such actions as punitive. By year's end, Israel
reasserted military control, which placed all major West Bank cities
except Jericho under IDF control, demolished the homes of suicide
bombers and wanted men, conducted mass arrests, and transferred some
suspects.
In the West Bank, Area C included the Israeli settlements,
constituted more than 61 percent of the land, and approximately 4
percent of the total West Bank Palestinian population. In Gaza more
than 12 percent of the land was designated as Area C equivalent, and
included the Israeli settlements. In areas designated as Area B, the PA
was assigned jurisdiction over civil affairs and shared security
responsibilities with Israel. Approximately 21 percent of West Bank
land was Area B, and approximately 41 percent of the West Bank
Palestinian population resided there. The Area B equivalent in Gaza
constituted almost 19 percent of the land. The PA had control over
civil affairs and security in Area A. The West Bank Area A constituted
nearly 18 percent of the land, and included roughly 55 percent of the
West Bank Palestinian population. The Gaza Area A equivalent
constituted approximately 69 percent of the land.
In parts of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel exercised civil
authority through the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Office of
Coordination and Liaison, known by the Hebrew acronym MATAK. The
approximately 208,000 Israeli settlers (an increase of 33,000 since
2001) living in Area C of the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip were
subject to Israeli law and, as citizens, received preferential
treatment from Israeli authorities compared to Palestinians in the
protection of their personal and property rights. The body of law
governing Palestinians in the occupied territories derived from
Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, and Egyptian law, and Israeli
military orders. Certain laws and regulations promulgated by the PA
also were in force. The international community considered Israel's
authority in the occupied territories to be subject to the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War. The Israeli government
considered the Hague Regulations applicable and maintained that it
largely observed the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions.
In January 1996, Palestinians chose their first popularly elected
government in democratic elections that generally were free and fair;
the 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the Chairman of
the Executive Authority were then elected. The PA has a cabinet of 19
ministers; however, Chairman Yasir Arafat controls the affairs of
government and makes all major decisions. Most senior government
positions in the PA are held by individuals who are members of, or
loyal to, Arafat's Fatah faction of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). Prior to the Intifada, the PLC met regularly to
discuss issues significant to the Palestinians; however, it did not
have significant influence on policy or the behavior of the executive.
In late 2001, Arafat invoked a state of emergency that granted him
broader powers to make arrests, prohibit demonstrations, and take
action against political opponents.
On May 14, Arafat signed the long-pending Independence of the
Judiciary Law and on May 29 the PA Basic Law, which defined the
authorities of the three governmental branches and prescribed direct
election of a president accountable to a cabinet and to the elected
PLC. Neither law was implemented fully, and at year's end the
respective roles of the Ministry of Justice and the High Judicial
Council in court operations were still unclear (see Section 1.e.). West
Bank courts applied laws passed by the Legislative Council and pre-1967
Jordanian law. In recent years, the PA made little progress in efforts
to unify the Gaza and West Bank legal codes. Gaza law for subjects not
covered by unified legislation included elements from Ottoman law,
British Mandate law, Egyptian law, and Israeli military orders. The PA
courts were perceived as inefficient, and the PA executive and security
services frequently ignored or failed to carry out court decisions.
Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consisted
of the IDF, the Israel Security Agency (the ISA-formerly the General
Security Service, or GSS, and also known as Shin Bet, or Shabak), the
Israeli National Police (INP), and the paramilitary border police.
Israeli military courts tried Palestinians accused of committing acts
of violence and terror in Israeli-controlled areas. Members of the
Israeli security forces committed numerous, serious human rights
abuses.
The Palestinian Police Force (PPF) was established in May 1994 and
included the Palestinian Public Security Force, the Palestinian Civil
Police, the Preventive Security Force (PSF), the General Intelligence
Service, or Mukhabarat, the Palestinian Presidential Security Force,
and the Palestinian Coastal Police. Other quasi-military security
organizations, such as the Military Intelligence organization, also
exercised de facto law enforcement powers. Palestinian police were
responsible for security and law enforcement for Palestinians and other
non-Israelis in PA-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Israeli settlers in the occupied territories were not subject to PA
security force jurisdiction. Members of the PA security forces
committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The occupied territories were composed of the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank, and East Jerusalem. The population of the Gaza Strip was
approximately 1,225,911, not including some 7,000 Israeli settlers. The
population of the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) was
approximately 2,163,667 not including some 182,000 Israeli settlers.
The population of East Jerusalem, within the municipal boundaries
established by Israel in 1967 was approximately 385,600, including
174,000 Israeli settlers.
The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is small, poorly
developed, highly dependent on Israel, and was impacted severely by
Israeli curfews and closures, as well as the continuing conflict. The
economy relied primarily on agriculture, services, and, to a lesser
extent, small manufacturing. Before the beginning of the Intifada,
approximately 125,000 workers from the West Bank and Gaza
(approximately 22 percent of the Palestinian work force) were employed
in Israel. During heightened terrorist activity in Israel or periods of
unrest in the West Bank or Gaza, Israeli-imposed closures on
Palestinian cities, curfews, and strict limitations on movement within
the West Bank and Gaza impeded Palestinians from reaching jobs or
markets and disrupted internal and external trade. In addition the IDF
and settlers destroyed sections of Palestinian-owned agricultural land
and economic infrastructure. The Government of Israel stated that some
of these actions, such as the destruction of groves alongside roadways
and security fences by the IDF, were necessary for security reasons.
Some human rights groups stated that these actions exceeded what was
required for security. Unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza was
estimated at 44 percent by year's end, up from 23 percent the previous
year. Approximately 66.5 percent of Palestinian households were living
below the poverty line (57.8 percent of families in the West Bank and
84.6 percent of families in Gaza), which was significantly higher than
in previous years.
Israel requires Palestinians to obtain Israeli permits for
themselves and their vehicles to cross from the West Bank or Gaza into
Israel and Jerusalem. Citing security concerns, Israel applied partial
``external closure,'' or enhanced restrictions, on the movement of
persons and products, often for lengthy periods. During times of
violent protest in the West Bank or Gaza, or when it believed that
there was an increased likelihood of such unrest or of terrorist
attacks in Israel, Israel imposes a tightened, comprehensive version of
external closure, generally referred to as total external closure.
Total external closures also are instituted regularly during major
Israeli holidays and during some Muslim holidays. During such closures,
Israel prevents Palestinians from entering Israel or Jerusalem. Israel
imposed total external closure on the West Bank for the entire year,
compared with 210 days of total external closure in 2001 and 88 days in
2000.
Israel also placed Palestinians in the West Bank under strict
``internal closure'' for the entire year, allowing only Palestinians
with special permits for work or health services to leave cities and
pass through checkpoints on main roads. Most Palestinians were unable
to leave their towns or forced to travel without authorization on
secondary roads.
Israeli forces further restricted freedom of movement of
Palestinians by imposing extended curfews on Palestinian towns or
neighborhoods. These curfews did not apply to Israeli settlers in the
same areas.
Israel's overall human rights record in the occupied territories
remained poor and worsened in several areas as it continued to commit
serious human rights abuses. Security forces killed at least 990
Palestinians and 2 foreign nationals and injured 4,382 Palestinians and
other persons during the year, some of whom were innocent bystanders.
Israeli security forces targeted and killed at least 37 Palestinian
terror suspects. Israeli forces undertook some of these targeted
killings in areas where civilian casualties were likely, killing 25
bystanders, including 13 children. The Israeli government said that it
made every effort to reduce civilian casualties during these
operations.
Israeli security units used excessive force during Palestinian
demonstrations, while on patrol, pursuing suspects, and enforcing
checkpoints and curfews, which resulted in many deaths. IDF forces also
shelled, bombed, and raided Palestinian civilian areas in response to
Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets. Israeli soldiers placed
Palestinian civilians in danger by ordering them to facilitate military
operations, which exposed them to live fire between armed Palestinians
and Israeli soldiers. The Israeli government said that it has
reiterated to its forces that this practice is absolutely prohibited
unless the civilian gives his voluntary consent. Israeli forces
sometimes arbitrarily destroyed or looted Palestinian property during
these operations. Israeli security forces often impeded the provision
of medical assistance to Palestinian civilians by strict enforcement of
internal closures, alleging in some cases that emergency vehicles have
been used to facilitate terrorist transit and operations. Israeli
security forces harassed and abused Palestinian pedestrians and drivers
who attempted to pass through the approximately 430 Israeli-controlled
checkpoints in the occupied territories. Israel conducted mass,
arbitrary arrests in the West Bank during military operations,
summoning and detaining males between the ages of 15 to 45. Israel
provided poor conditions for Palestinians in its prisons. Facilities
were overcrowded, sanitation was poor, and food and clothing at times
were insufficient. Israeli security forces tortured detainees,
including using methods prohibited in a 1999 High Court decision;
police officers also beat detainees. During the year, two Palestinian
prisoners died under ambiguous circumstances after Israeli forces took
them into custody. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and
infringements on privacy rights remained problems.
Israel carried out policies of demolitions, strict curfews, and
closures that directly punished innocent civilians. Israel
intentionally punished innocent Palestinians by demolishing the homes
of families and relatives of suspected terrorists. Israel's demolitions
left hundreds of Palestinians not involved in terror attacks homeless.
Some of the suspects had already been killed or arrested. The IDF
destroyed numerous orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation
systems on Palestinian-controlled agricultural land. Israel censored
Palestinian publications in East Jerusalem, attacked and closed media
outlets in the territories, blocked publications and broadcasts, and
periodically detained or harassed members of the media. Three
journalists covering clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security
forces, including some who clearly were identified as non-combatants,
were killed by IDF fire and at least five others were injured. The
Israeli authorities placed strict limits on freedom of assembly, and
severely restricted freedom of movement for Palestinians. Israeli
security forces failed to prevent Israelis from entering Palestinian-
controlled areas in the West Bank who injured or killed several
Palestinians. In some cases, Israeli soldiers escorted Israeli
civilians who beat Palestinians and damaged Palestinian property.
The PA's overall human rights record remained poor, and it
continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. Many members of
Palestinian security services and the Fatah faction of the PLO
participated with civilians and terrorist groups in violent attacks
against Israeli settlers, other civilians, and soldiers. The PLO and PA
have not complied with most of their commitments to Israel, notably
those relating to the renunciation of violence and terrorism, taking
responsibility for all PLO elements, and disciplining violators.
Although there was no conclusive evidence that the most senior PLO or
PA leadership gave prior approval for these acts, some leaders endorsed
such acts in principle in speeches and interviews. For example, PA
Minister of Interior Hani al-Hassan several months ago made comments
affirming the legitimacy of attacks on soldiers and settlers in the
territories. On a number of occasions, Arafat called on Palestinians
not to attack civilians and ordered a complete cease-fire, but he took
no action to that effect. PA and PLO officials often condemned attacks
against Israeli civilians, but failed consistently to condemn attacks
on settlers and soldiers in the occupied territories. PA security
forces arrested some of those implicated in the violence, but most were
quickly released or not kept under credible conditions of arrest.
Palestinian security forces used excessive force against
Palestinians during demonstrations. The PA was responsible for the
death of seven Palestinians who were in its custody. The PA had
arrested six of the victims on charges of collaboration with Israel,
and vigilantes subsequently killed them. The PA security services
either failed to protect the prisoners from attack or actively turned
them over to their killers. PA security officials tortured and abused
prisoners. Such torture and abuse reportedly was widespread. PA
security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and
prolonged detention remained a problem. The PA provided poor conditions
for prisoners. PA courts--particularly PA security courts--were
inefficient and failed to ensure fair and expeditious trials. The
imposition by Israel of internal closure in the occupied territories
during the year obstructed courts from holding sessions or issuing
rulings during most of the year. The PA executive and security services
frequently ignored or failed to enforce court decisions. PA security
forces infringed on citizens' rights to privacy and restricted freedom
of speech and the press. Palestinian groups harassed and abused
journalists. Such restrictions and harassment contributed to the
practice of self-censorship by many Palestinian commentators,
reporters, and critics. During the year, informal reports of domestic
abuse of women increased, and ``honor crimes'' persisted. Societal
discrimination against women and persons with disabilities and child
labor remained problems.
Israeli civilians, especially settlers, harassed, attacked, and
occasionally killed Palestinians in the occupied territories. During
the year, settlers attacked and killed at least five Palestinians.
Settlers also caused significant economic damage to Palestinians by
attacking and damaging greenhouses and agricultural equipment,
uprooting olive trees, and damaging other valuable crops. The settlers
did not act under government directive in the attacks, and Israeli
soldiers sometimes restrained them, but in several cases Israeli
soldiers accompanied them or stood by without acting. The Government of
Israel stated that 80 Israeli settlers were indicted for acts of
violence against Palestinians. However, in general, settlers rarely
served prison sentences if convicted of a crime against a Palestinian.
Palestinian civilians were responsible for the deaths of 154
Israelis killed in the occupied territories. Palestinians targeted
Israelis in drive-by shootings and ambushes, suicide and other
bombings, mortar attacks, and armed attacks on settlements and military
bases. Palestinian militant groups used minors to prepare attacks or
carry them out, exploitation that amounted to forced conscription.
During the year, Palestinians acting individually or in groups,
including off-duty members of the PA security services, killed 74
Israeli civilians, 82 Israeli security personnel, and 3 foreign
nationals in the occupied territories. Most of the attacks were
organized by a number of Palestinian terrorist groups, including the
militant Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the Palestine Islamic
Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. The Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and Fatah affiliated groups also
participated in the attacks. Palestinian civilians also killed at least
35 Palestinians in the occupied territories who allegedly had
collaborated with Israel. Most of the deaths were shootings perpetrated
by small groups of unidentified Palestinian gunmen. The PA conducted no
investigations and made no arrests in any of these killings.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--During the year, the
number of deaths due to political violence associated with the Intifada
remained extremely high in the occupied territories. Israeli security
forces killed at least 990 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, of
whom 132 were members of PA security forces and 2 were foreign
nationals. Israeli civilians, mostly settlers, as well as extremist
groups believed to be associated with settlers, killed at least five
Palestinians. Palestinian militants and civilians killed an estimated
189 Israeli civilians and security personnel in the occupied
territories. Palestinian civilians killed at least 35 Palestinians
suspected of spying for the Israeli government (see Sections 1.c. and
1.g.).
Most Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces were killed
during armed clashes, targeted killings, incursions into Palestinian-
controlled areas, at checkpoints, or as a result of sometimes excessive
or indiscriminate fire toward Palestinian civilian areas. During these
incidents, Palestinian protesters frequently threw stones and Molotov
cocktails, and in some cases, also fired weapons at IDF soldiers (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Israeli security forces used a variety of
means to disperse protesters, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal
bullets, and live ammunition. The IDF generally did not investigate the
actions of security force members who killed and injured Palestinians
under suspicious circumstances. Since the start of the Intifada, the
IDF has opened only 30 investigations into the improper use of deadly
force despite the fact that human rights organizations have raised
numerous allegations.
Israeli security forces used excessive force against protesters, in
response to perceived threats while on patrols, in pursuing fleeing
suspects, and in responding to trespassers in restricted areas, at
times resulting in death. For example, on September 30, IDF soldiers
shot and killed a 10-year old Palestinian boy in the Balata Refugee
Camp in Nablus. The boy was among a group of youths who were throwing
rocks at Israeli soldiers. The use of lethal force against a rock-
thrower, in this instance and in many others like it, was excessive.
IDF statistics state that no Israeli soldier has ever been killed by
rock throwing.
On May 5, the IDF killed a mother and her two young children in
Jenin, while they were picking grape leaves in the area. Soldiers in an
approaching tank heard a loud sound and opened fire, killing the woman
and her children. The IDF initially claimed the tank had run over a
mine, but later acknowledged that the tank's track had simply
disconnected. While the IDF expressed regret for the deaths, it
maintained that the soldiers acted according to regulations.
IDF soldiers shot and killed suspects who were avoiding arrest but
not threatening their lives. For example, on November 27, the IDF
undertook a military incursion into the Askar Refugee Camp in Nablus in
the early morning and shot and killed a fleeing man, who walked the
streets of the camp in the morning to awaken people for prayers. He was
discovered later to have been a frightened civilian not wanted by the
IDF.
IDF soldiers fired without warning on trespassers in restricted
areas, on several occasions killing Palestinians who posed no threat.
For example, on the night of December 12, Israeli soldiers in a tank
fired on and killed five men spotted near the fence dividing Israel and
the Gaza Strip. When an IDF patrol went to investigate the scene the
following day, it discovered that the five men were unarmed Palestinian
workers from a single family who apparently were seeking to enter
Israel to find jobs.
The IDF rules of engagement authorize soldiers to use deadly fire
in cases of self defense, in defense of others facing an imminent
threat to life, during procedures for apprehending suspected
terrorists, and in extreme cases when dispersing rioters. The IDF
stated that its rules of engagement on the use of live fire are fully
consistent with international laws of armed conflict.
During the year the IDF targeted for killing at least 37
Palestinians. In the process, IDF forces killed at least 25 bystanders,
relatives, or associates of those targeted and injured a number of
others, although the Israeli security forces state that in planning
operations, they make every effort to reduce civilian casualties.
According to the IDF, the targeted persons were individuals whom the
IDF believed were terrorists and had recently attacked or had been
planning future attacks against Israeli civilians, settlements, or
military targets. The IDF stated that it targeted persons only with the
authorization of senior political leaders. The Government of Israel
stated that such actions were exceptional self-defense measures taken
only against those engaged in hostilities against Israeli citizens and
were justified by its obligation to protect its citizens against
terrorism and consistent with its right to self defense.
Israeli security forces put large numbers of civilian lives in
jeopardy by undertaking targeted killings in crowded areas where
civilian casualties were likely. This occurred despite statements that
it had aborted operations against known terrorists when it became clear
that they might endanger innocent civilians. For example, on July 23,
Israel fired a missile at a civilian apartment building in a densely
populated area of Gaza City in order to kill HAMAS military wing leader
Salah Shahada. Israeli forces killed 14 other Palestinians in the
effort, including 9 children. The Government of Israel publicly
apologized for the incident.
Israeli security personnel used excessive force while manning
checkpoints, killing a number of Palestinians (see Section 1.g.). On
December 3, an IDF soldier shot and killed a 95-year-old Palestinian
woman riding in a taxi on a Ramallah road that the army claimed was
forbidden to Palestinian vehicles. An IDF inquiry into the case
established that the shots were fired without justification, because
the taxi did not pose a lethal threat to the soldiers. The soldier
faced possible criminal charges.
Israel put civilian lives in jeopardy by using imprecise, heavy
weaponry in operations against terrorist infrastructure conducted in
civilian areas, in contravention of their own rules of engagement.
Frequently, and often following shooting attacks, many of which were
nonlethal, in the direction of Israeli settlements and military
positions, the IDF retaliated against Palestinian towns and cities in
the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli forces fired tank shells, heavy
machine-gun rounds, and rockets from helicopters and F-16s at targets
in residential and business neighborhoods located near the sites from
which the Palestinian gunfire was believed to have originated. For
example, on October 17 an unidentified Palestinian located in the Rafah
refugee camp area fired an antitank shell at an IDF construction crew.
Israeli forces responded by firing tank shells into the refugee camp,
killing seven Palestinians including two women and two children. The
shells also injured 35 other Palestinians.
Numerous civilians were killed by Israeli security forces during
military incursions into Palestinian-controlled (Area A) cities and
towns. Such incursions usually were conducted in response to
Palestinian suicide bombings, shooting attacks that had killed Israeli
civilians, settlers, or soldiers, or to make arrests. Israeli security
forces also conducted military incursions on the basis of intelligence
information about possible future attacks. Palestinians often resisted
with gunfire and by booby-trapping civilian homes and apartment
buildings. The military incursions into these areas varied in length
from a few hours to several months. As part of such actions, the IDF
usually leveled and raided buildings, including homes. The Government
of Israel stated that such actions were intended to widen a security
strip area adjacent to Israeli-controlled territory to or clear access
for Israeli forces.
On April 3, Israeli security forces launched an incursion into the
Jenin refugee camp, home to approximately 14,000 Palestinian civilians.
The Government of Israel stated that the incursion was intended to
attack Palestinian terrorists who had taken refuge in the camp and were
responsible for suicide bombings and other attacks that had killed more
than 70 Israelis since March. Israeli forces destroyed approximately
140 homes and made 200 others structurally unsound during the
operation, leaving approximately 4,000 camp residents homeless. Israeli
forces killed 52 Palestinians in the operation, including 22 unarmed
civilians who were killed inadvertently during the operation. The
Israeli government stated that it made every effort to reduce civilian
casualties, including by not using heavy weaponry or airpower.
Palestinian gunmen killed 14 Israeli soldiers during the operation.
Israeli forces used excessive force to enforce curfews in
reoccupied Palestinian areas, resulting in the deaths of at least 15
civilians, 12 of them children under the age of 16. For example, on
October 11 Israeli border police enforcing a curfew in Nablus fired on
a family sitting on its balcony, killing the mother and injuring her
husband and son. Israel said it was investigating the killing, but no
results were forthcoming at year's end.
Israeli security forces manning checkpoints often impeded the
provision of medical assistance to sick and injured Palestinians,
contributing to the deaths of at least 14 Palestinians (see Section
1.g.).
During the year, Israeli forces were responsible for the death in
custody of at least one Palestinian. On March 31, IDF soldiers detained
Murad 'Awaisa, a 17-year-old Palestinian, and several other
Palestinians in an apartment building in Ramallah. IDF soldiers beat
'Awaisa and forcibly removed him from the room where he was imprisoned.
Other detainees reported intense gunfire inside and outside the
building and that the soldiers later told them that 'Awaisa had died.
Inspection by the Palestinian physician who took 'Awaisa's body to the
hospital and quick burial revealed two bullet wounds. The IDF said it
would investigate the death. No results were forthcoming by year's end.
Israel forces may have beaten and killed one other Palestinian
prisoner. On December 30, Israeli Border Police in Hebron arrested
'Imran Abu Hamdiyeh, a 17 year old Palestinian. Palestinians found
Hamdiyeh dead in Hebron's industrial area later that day. He had been
beaten to death. Israel said it was investigating the death but no
results of the investigation were forthcoming by year's end.
Palestinian security forces used excessive force against
Palestinians during demonstrations. For example, on January 22 PA
police in Nablus violently dispersed a crowd demonstrating against the
PA and demanding the release of HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
prisoners. The police shot and killed a Palestinian man while
dispersing the crowd.
Palestinian security officers and members of Arafat's Fatah faction
attacked and killed Israeli settlers, civilians, and soldiers. They
often fired at Israelis from within or close to the homes of
Palestinian civilians or in other locations in which civilians were
present, drawing Israeli return fire and increasing the potential for
the noncombatants to be injured. Arafat issued several ceasefire orders
and denounced attacks on civilians without lasting effect, but took no
action to arrest or try violators.
During the year, there were no reports that Palestinian security
forces impeded the provision of medical assistance to injured Israelis
in the occupied territories.
The PA was responsible for the deaths of seven Palestinians in
custody. The PA arrested six of the victims on charges of collaboration
with Israel, and vigilantes subsequently killed them. The PA security
services either failed to protect the prisoners from attack or actively
turned them over to their killers. For example, in 2001 PA security
services arrested Mahmoud Nimer Sabateen, a 27-year-old Palestinian
from the village of Housan, on suspicion that he collaborated with
Israel and provided information that led to the killing of Fatah
activists. In 2001, Sabateen was sentenced to death by firing squad. On
March 14, when the execution still had not been carried out, armed
Fatah members dragged Sabateen from his prison and killed him in
Bethlehem.
Palestinian police may have tortured and killed one prisoner. On
April 24, Ayman Ghayad Hilles, a 36-year-old Palestinian from al-
Shajaeya in Gaza, died while in the custody of PA police in Gaza City.
On April 23, PA police arrested Hilles allegedly on criminal charges
and informed his family 1-day later that he had died in custody after
being transferred to al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. PA police said
that an investigation would be conducted to determine the circumstances
of his death. At the request of the family, an autopsy was carried out
at al-Shifa hospital. A preliminary examination revealed large bruises
on his legs and hands, as well as signs of blunt trauma to the head,
suggesting that Hilles had been tortured. The autopsy concluded that it
was a suspicious death.
Palestinian civilians harassed, attacked, and killed Israelis,
especially settlers and soldiers. During the year, Palestinians, acting
as individuals or in unorganized or small groups, including some
members of PA security services, killed 88 Israeli civilians, 101
Israeli soldiers, and injured hundreds of others in acts of violence
and terrorism in the occupied territories (see Section 1.c.). The
Palestinian attacks consisted of shootings, bombings involving
improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and stone-throwing at
Israeli drivers.
For example, on June 5, 2001, a five-month-old Israeli boy was hit
in the head and critically injured when Palestinians threw stones at
the car he was riding in near Shilo Junction in the West Bank. He was
transported to the Hadassah intensive care unit, where he died on June
10.
On February 16, a Palestinian suicide bomber strapped with nail
studded explosives blew himself up in a pizzeria at the Israeli Karnei
Shomron settlement in the West Bank, killing three Israeli children.
On September 5, Palestinian militants detonated explosives that
they had concealed near the Kissufim Crossing in Gaza and blew up an
Israeli tank, killing an Israeli soldier.
Israeli settlers, acting individually or in small, at times
unstructured, groups harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Section 1.c.). During
the year, settlers killed at least five Palestinians by shooting them
or stoning their vehicles and causing accidents. For example, on
October 6 armed settlers fired on Palestinians harvesting olives. They
injured two Palestinian men and killed a Palestinian who rushed to the
scene. The Israeli government did not generally prosecute the settlers
for their acts of violence (see Section 1.g.). According to Israeli
government statistics, 80 settlers were indicted for violence against
Palestinians. However, in general settlers rarely were detained or even
investigated for crimes they committed against Palestinians.
HAMAS, PIJ, the PFLP, DLFP, and Fatah-affiliated groups such as the
al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the Brigades of Return continued to kill
and injure Israelis. By year's end, the PA made few arrests in these
killings and made no effective efforts to control the violence. Many of
those arrested were released a short time later or held under
conditions not commensurate with normal conditions of arrest.
Some PA officials made public statements justifying Palestinian
attacks on Israelis, stating that such attacks were in response to the
occupation. Additionally, Fatah leaders made public statements urging
Palestinians to continue all aspects of the Intifada, including violent
attacks.
Palestinian civilians also killed at least 35 Palestinians in the
occupied territories who allegedly collaborated with Israel. Most of
the deaths were shootings perpetrated by small groups of unidentified
Palestinian gunmen. In March alone, Palestinian extremists killed 10
alleged collaborators in the streets of the West Bank. The PA made no
arrests in any of these killings. An example of such a case was the
March 14 death of Mahmoud Nimer Sabateen, in which no one was held
accountable.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year.
In 2001 one man disappeared in the West Bank and remained missing.
Some have suggested that his disappearance was probably criminally
motivated and not carried out by Israel.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--In a landmark September 1999 decision, the Israeli High
Court of Justice prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices,
including violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions,
sleep deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure
to extreme temperatures; however, during the year, human rights
organizations, including B'tselem, Human Rights Watch, LAW, and the
Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners reported that there was an
increase in the number of allegations that Israeli security forces
tortured and abused detainees, and used methods prohibited in the 1999
High Court decision. Israeli security forces could obtain special
permission to use ``moderate physical pressure'' against detainees
considered to possess information about an imminent attack. The GSS has
used court-approved ``extraordinary interrogation methods''--some of
which included physical pressure--in 90 cases since the law was passed
in 1999. The Attorney General's office investigated allegations of
mistreatment, but few cases were opened and no GSS agent has been
criminally charged with torture or other abuse for the past several
years. Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups noted that jailers
made it difficult to visit prisoners during the interrogation period
and that some detainees were reluctant to report abuse out of fear of
retribution.
Several human rights groups stated that the case of Abdel Rahman
al-Ahmar was representative of the allegations of physical abuse they
received. In May 2001, Israeli authorities arrested al-Ahmar, a well-
known Palestinian human rights activist and field researcher, for
entering Jerusalem without a permit. The authorities first detained al-
Ahmar at Etzion prison, then transferred him 6 days later to the
Russian Compound in Jerusalem. According to testimony he gave his
lawyer, authorities beat al-Ahmar when they arrested him, subjected him
to shabeh (shackling in painful positions for prolonged periods), and
held him in a dirty, cold cell. According to a press release from the
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, authorities denied al-Ahmar
adequate medical care. In June 2001, an Israeli military judge denied
al-Ahmar's legal complaint of torture--despite bruises on his arms and
visible difficulty walking--and extended his detention without charging
him. In July 2001, al-Ahmar was remanded for 6 months of administrative
detention, and in November 2001 the order was renewed for an additional
6 months. International, Israeli, and Palestinian human rights groups
continued to petition for his release. Al-Ahmar was released early this
year.
Most convictions in security cases before Israeli courts were based
on confessions. The law prohibits the admission of forced confessions
as evidence. A detainee may not have contact with a lawyer until after
interrogation, a process that may last days or weeks. The Israel
government did not allow representatives of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to detainees until the 14th day of
detention. Detainees sometimes stated in court that their confessions
were coerced, but judges rarely excluded such confessions. During the
year, there were no known cases in which an Israeli court excluded a
Palestinian confession because of a finding of improper means of
investigation or interrogation.
During the year, Israeli security forces injured approximately
4,382 Palestinians during armed clashes, violent demonstrations,
retaliatory strikes, and other military actions (see Sections 1.a.,
1.g., and 2.b.).
The IDF injured a number of bystanders, including journalists, at
demonstrations, clashes, during retaliatory strikes, and during
targeted killings. During the year, Israeli gunfire killed three
journalists and injured at least one other during Israeli military
actions (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.).
Israeli authorities abused Palestinians at checkpoints, subjecting
them to verbal and physical harassment. Each day, tens of thousands of
Palestinians who traveled between Palestinian towns and villages had to
pass through 1 or more of the approximately 430 Israeli checkpoints
across the occupied territories; significantly more than the 130
checkpoints in 2001. Abuse was common, and as many as several thousand
Palestinians encountered some form of abuse from soldiers at
checkpoints. Palestinians were subjected to excessive delays in passing
through checkpoints. Israeli soldiers forced Palestinian civilians to
wait in the rain or inclement weather for excessive periods of time.
For example, in November Israeli soldiers made a group of Palestinian
schoolteachers in Asira ash-Shamaliya wait in a ditch in the rain for
several hours before allowing them to pass through a military
checkpoint.
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were subjected to beatings,
tire slashings, and gunfire directed against them or their vehicles
because they were traveling on, or trying to circumvent, roads on which
the IDF blocked passage to Palestinians as it attempted to enforce
internal closures between Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank
and Gaza (see Section 2.d.).
Israeli security personnel on patrol abused and in some cases
tortured Palestinian civilians. On several occasions during the year,
Israeli border policemen in Hebron detained Palestinian civilians and
beat them without provocation. For example, in early December, Israeli
Border Police in Hebron halted Badr Abu Sneineh, a Palestinian taxi
driver, handcuffed him, and beat him for 10 minutes. On December 3, IDF
soldiers in Hebron raided a barbershop in the city for no stated
security purpose, shaved the heads of two Palestinians sitting in the
shop, and beat them. The IDF had opened an investigation into the
latter incident, but no results were forthcoming at year's end.
Israeli fire killed 4 on-duty Palestinian medical personnel during
retaliatory attacks on civilian areas or PA institutions, compared to
67 attacks against Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) ambulances
and 121 injuries caused by IDF soldiers (see Sections 1.a and 1.g.).
Article 13 of the PA Basic Law signed this year prohibits the use
of torture or force against detainees; however, PA security forces
tortured and abused Palestinian detainees. Such abuse generally took
place after arrest and during interrogation, and reportedly was
widespread. Palestinian security officers were not issued formal
guidelines regarding the proper conduct of interrogations. The PA
lacked adequate equipment to collect and use evidence, and convictions
were based largely on confessions.
PA security officials tortured and abused prisoners by threatening,
hooding, beating, and tying detainees in painful positions, forcing
them to stand for long periods of time, depriving them of sleep and
food, and burning detainees with cigarettes and hot instruments.
Palestinians also alleged that PA authorities have shaken them
violently while in PA custody. International human rights groups have
documented widespread arbitrary and abusive conduct by the PA. The
organizations stated that the use of torture was widespread and not
restricted to those persons detained on security charges. Human rights
groups stated that Palestinians who were suspected of belonging to
radical Islamic groups were more likely to be treated poorly, as were
the 250 alleged collaborators with Israel who were arrested since the
start of the Intifada. Observers noted that documentation of abuses was
very limited, due partly to the hesitancy of alleged victims to file or
make public claims of torture and abuse against the PA authorities.
During the year, one Palestinian died under PA custody, allegedly
due to abuse (see Section 1.a.).
Palestinian security officers and Fatah Tanzim members with
firearms attacked and injured Israelis. In some cases, they fired at
Israeli civilians or soldiers from within or close to the homes of
Palestinian civilians, drawing Israeli return fire (see Section 1.a.).
Palestinian security forces often failed to prevent armed Palestinians
in areas under PA control from opening fire on Israeli settlers or
other civilians, soldiers, or military targets.
Extremist Israeli settlers harassed, attacked, and occasionally
killed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Section 1.a.).
Some settlers attacked Palestinian homes and damaged crops, olive
trees, greenhouses, and agricultural equipment, usually in areas
located near settlements, causing extensive economic damage to
Palestinian-owned agricultural land. In October settlers disrupted the
Palestinian olive harvest by firing on Palestinians picking olives,
beating harvesters returning home and stealing the harvest, and
invading Palestinian property and picking the olives themselves. The
settlers admitted to these activities but cited past Palestinian
attacks on their settlement and claimed that the Palestinians must be
deterred. Many settlers also claimed that Palestinians had no right to
live on the land of ``greater Israel'' and that Palestinian attempts to
cultivate their land was a form of theft. The settlers acted in an area
in which the IDF was responsible for security. Settlers acted
independent of government direction in such attacks. There have been
some instances in which IDF forces protected Palestinians from
settlers; however, the Government of Israel generally did not prosecute
settlers for their acts of violence against Palestinians, and settlers
rarely served prison sentences if convicted of a crime against a
Palestinian. However, during the year, the Government stated that it
indicted 80 Israelis for violence against Palestinians. In 20 of the
cases, the perpetrators were indicted during their detention. Israel
often enforced security by applying curfews and closures only to
Palestinians, which on occasion prevented Palestinians from defending
themselves and their property from attacks by settlers.
For example, from July 26 to 28, settlers in Hebron killed Nivin
Jamjum, age 14, stabbed Ahmad a-Natsheh, age 8, beat Ahmad's brother
Falah, age 9; injured more than 10 other Palestinians; took control of
a house and damaged property in 20 other houses. Settlers also verbally
and physically abused Israeli security forces in the city, but some
committed their violence while accompanied by Israeli soldiers.
Settlers claimed they were avenging a Palestinian shooting attack on
July 26 that killed Elazar Leibowitz, a 21-year-old Israeli soldier and
Hebron settler, and three residents of the P'sagot settlement, Hana and
Yosef Dickstein and their 9-year-old son, Shuva'el. The couple's two
other children were injured in the attack. A curfew on the city
remained in effect for Palestinians during the duration of the events
described.
During the year, Israeli settlers in Hebron continued their
longstanding harassment of members of the Temporary International
Presence in Hebron (TIPH), which monitored relations between Israeli
and Palestinian security forces, Palestinian civilians, and settlers in
the city, and damaged a number of their vehicles.
Palestinians harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed Israelis,
especially settlers (see Section 1.a.).
Conditions for Palestinians in Israeli prisons were poor.
Facilities were overcrowded, sanitation was poor, and at times food and
clothing were insufficient. Israel set up tents at the Ofer Camp and
crowded 60 Palestinian prisoners under each tent. Israel was unprepared
to accommodate properly the thousands of Palestinians that were
arrested in sweeps that accompanied Israeli operations this year.
During April and May, Israel shut down the Ketziot prison to reorganize
the facilities after discovering that it was not suited to handling the
large number of detainees. In August 40 female Palestinian prisoners at
the Ramlah prison conducted a 5 day hunger strike protesting conditions
at the facility.
The IDF prevented families from the West Bank from visiting
prisoners, citing the security situation as the reason. Visits for
families of prisoners from Gaza took place at a fairly normal level.
During the year, one Palestinian prisoner died in Israeli custody under
suspicious circumstances and another Palestinian who had been taken
into custody was later found dead (see Section 1.a.).
Israel permitted independent monitoring of prison conditions by the
ICRC and other groups, although human rights groups sometimes
encountered difficulties gaining access to specific detainees.
The PA provided poor conditions for its prisoners. In many cases,
facilities were old, dilapidated, and neglected. There are separate
facilities to hold juvenile prisoners. Most Palestinian prison
facilities and detention centers were destroyed during the current
conflict, and prisoners were kept informally in houses or other
buildings. One Palestinian died under suspicious circumstances after
having been taken into custody by the PA (see Section 1.a.).
The PA permitted independent monitoring of its prisons, although
human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, and lawyers reported
difficulties arranging visits or gaining access to specific detainees.
Human rights organizations stated that their ability to visit PA
prisons and detention centers varied depending on which security
organization controlled the facility. Human rights organizations stated
that the police, the Preventive Security Force, and Mukhabarat
generally allowed them to inspect facilities and visit prisoners and
detainees. However, they stated that the Military Intelligence
Organization usually did not grant them access to facilities that they
controlled. Human rights monitors stated that prison authorities did
not consistently permit them to have access to PA detention facilities,
and that they rarely were permitted to see inmates while they were
under interrogation.
The ICRC operated in the West Bank and Gaza under the terms of a
memorandum of understanding signed in September 1996 between the ICRC
and the PLO. The memorandum accorded the ICRC access to all detainees
held by the PA and allowed regular inspections of prison conditions. In
accordance with the agreement, the ICRC conducted visits of facilities
run by the PA. The PA may deny a group access to a detainee for 14 days
immediately following his or her arrest. When abuses occurred, they
frequently happened during that 2 week period.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Israeli security
personnel may arrest without warrant or hold for questioning a person
suspected of having committed a criminal or security offense. During
the year, Israel conducted mass, arbitrary arrests in the West Bank.
Most of those arrested were released several days or weeks thereafter.
On April 5, Israel issued Military Order 1500, allowing the Israeli
army to detain people for 18 days during which detainees were barred
from seeing a lawyer or appearing before court. In March and April,
during Operation Defensive Shield, Israel conducted mass arrests under
this order's authority. Israeli forces began the operation on March 28,
one day after a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up in the Park
Hotel in Netanya, killing 30 Israelis. Israel entered cities and
ordered all male civilians between the ages of 15 and 50 to assemble in
main squares, blindfolded and handcuffed them, and led them to
detention centers for processing. In such a way Israel arbitrarily
detained approximately 7,000 Palestinians and later released 5,600 of
them after a few days or weeks without taking legal action against
them. Several Palestinians and human rights groups challenged the
legality of these arbitrary arrests and delays of legal representation
in court, and Israel announced that it would allow access to an
attorney within 4 days and an appearance before a judge after 12 days.
Human rights group did not consider these changes sufficient and their
legal challenge had not been adjudicated by year's end.
Israel used administrative detention to hold hundreds of
Palestinians without trial or charge. Prisoners who were not charged
and tried in time were administratively detained after their arrest to
put off their trial. At year's end, Israel held 1,007 Palestinians in
administrative detention. Individual administrative detention orders
could be issued for up to 6-month periods and could be renewed
indefinitely. Israel conducted de facto detentions at checkpoints by
confiscating Palestinian identification cards and keys. Israel
conducted these detentions as a form of harassment at checkpoints and
Palestinians were unable to leave the scene until IDF soldiers returned
the items.
Israeli authorities intermittently issued special summonses for
those suspected of involvement in or knowledge of security offenses.
There were reports that some such summonses were issued immediately
before and during the Intifada. Israeli military order 1369 provided
for a 7-year prison term for anyone who did not respond to a special
summons delivered to a family member or posted in the MATAK office
nearest the suspect's home address. During the year, there were no
reports that any person was convicted of failing to respond to a
summons. Bail rarely was available to those arrested for security
offenses.
Israel applied a different age standard in prosecuting Palestinian
youth than when prosecuting Israeli youth. Israeli youth under the age
of 18 cannot be tried as adults; however, Palestinian youth who are 17
years of age can be tried as adults.
Authorities must inform detainees of their right to an attorney and
whether there are any orders prohibiting such contact. Higher-ranking
officials or judges may extend the period during which a detainee is
denied access to counsel. For example, access to counsel was denied
routinely while a suspect was being interrogated, which may last up to
several weeks.
Israel hampered or prevented contacts between Palestinians in
Israeli prisons and detention facilities and their lawyers, families,
and human rights organizations. Legislation regarding the occupied
territories requires the Israeli authorities to inform the family of a
person's arrest and place of detention ``without delay.'' Israeli
authorities stated that they attempted to post notification of arrest
within 48 hours, but that senior officers may delay notification for up
to 12 days. In fact a military commander may appeal to a judge to
extend this period in security cases for an unlimited period of time.
Such notification rarely was given, and Palestinian suspects often were
kept incommunicado for much longer than 48 hours. Even if family
members or others became aware of a person's arrest, it often was
difficult for them to obtain information regarding where a detainee was
being held or whether the detainee had access to an attorney.
Palestinians generally located detained family members through their
own efforts. Palestinians may check with a local ICRC office or the
Israeli human rights organization HaMoked to determine whether it has
information regarding the whereabouts of a family member.
The Israeli government routinely transferred Palestinians arrested
in the occupied territories to facilities in Israel, especially the
prison in Ashkelon and the military detention centers in Megiddo and
the Negev Desert. Israeli authorities in some instances scheduled
appointments between attorneys and their detained clients, only to move
the clients to another prison prior to the meetings. Authorities
reportedly used such tactics to delay lawyer-client meetings for as
long as 90 days. Palestinian prisoners had difficulty obtaining legal
representation because of restrictions in place on Palestinian lawyers.
Since the Intifada began, only Israeli citizens or Palestinian lawyers
with Jerusalem identification cards were permitted to visit Palestinian
prisoners in Israeli prisons as advocates or monitors. This
significantly reduced the availability and timeliness of legal aid for
such prisoners due to a reduction from 1,300 to approximately 100
available lawyers to handle such cases. Lawyers with Jerusalem
identification cards reported frequent, repeated, and lengthy delays in
meeting with prisoners. Israeli lawyers did not take steps to fill the
void, which had grown even more severe with the greatly increased
numbers of Palestinian detainees during the past year.
Human rights groups stated that Palestinian lawyers from the Gaza
Strip had a more difficult time obtaining permission to meet their
clients than their West Bank counterparts, and that they were denied
entry into Israel more frequently than West Bank lawyers.
Male family members between 16 and 40 years of age, and any family
members with security records, generally were barred from visiting
relatives in Israeli facilities. Relatives of Palestinian prisoners
also stated that in some instances they learned that visitation rights
were canceled only when they arrived at the prison after having
traveled for many hours from the occupied territories. Following the
outbreak of violence in September 2000, the Israeli government banned
all family visits for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons,
although some visitation rights were restored intermittently after ICRC
intervention (see Section 1.c.).
Evidence used at hearings for administrative detentions in security
cases was secret and unavailable to the detainee or his attorney during
the hearings; the detainee and defense lawyer were required to leave
the courtroom when secret evidence was presented. Israeli authorities
maintained that they were unable to present evidence in open court
because doing so would compromise the method of acquiring the evidence.
In 1998 the High Court of Justice ruled that only judges, rather than
military officials, may renew administrative detention orders beyond a
6-month period. Detainees may appeal detention orders, or the renewal
of a detention order, before a military judge, but their chances for
success were very limited. No information was available regarding
whether any detainees were successful in such appeals.
During the year, the total number of Palestinian prisoners and
administrative detainees in Israeli prisons more than doubled due to
arrests associated with terrorist acts and the violence of the ongoing
Intifada. According to the IDF, there were 4,672 Palestinian security
prisoners held in IDF and Israeli Prisons Service jails, compared to
1,854 at the end of 2001. The IDF also held an unspecified number of
Palestinian detainees in waiting facilities in the occupied
territories. Approximately 1,400 had been detained before the Intifada
began (most of them were pre-Oslo prisoners serving long terms), and
approximately 3,000 of those in custody had been arrested during the
year. During the year, approximately 10,000 Palestinians were detained,
of whom an estimated 7,000 were released or had completed their
sentences.
At year's end, Israel held 1,007 Palestinians in administrative
detention. Most had been detained for less than 1 year. A number of
Palestinians under administrative detention during the previous several
years have had their detention orders renewed repeatedly and few, if
any, appeals were successful.
Israel forcibly transferred persons suspected of terror from the
West Bank to Gaza. In July the Government of Israel announced its
intention to forcibly transfer from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip
relatives of persons known or suspected of having organized or
participated in attacks against Israelis. On August 1, the IDF West
Bank Commander signed an amendment to Military Order 378 allowing for
the forcible transfer of Palestinians from the West Bank to the Gaza
Strip. On September 3, the Israeli High Court of Justice issued a
ruling allowing the forcible transfer of two Palestinians from Nablus
to the Gaza Strip on the grounds that they were not being transferred
out of the occupied territories and had allegedly assisted their
brother to commit attacks against Israelis. The two Palestinians,
Intisar and Kifah 'Ajuri, were in detention since June 4 and July 18,
respectively, but never were charged nor brought to trial. The Israeli
government claimed that it could not try them because this would expose
the source of the evidence against them.
The 2001 PA Criminal Procedures Law contains unified procedures
that allow police to hold detainees without charges for 24 hours.
Prosecutors can authorize detention for another 15 days. Court approval
is necessary for detention without charges for a maximum of 30 more
days. The Attorney General can ask any court of first instance to
authorize up to another 45 days of detention. After the first 90 days
of incarceration, the detainee must be brought before the court having
jurisdiction in the case for any other extension of detention. A trial
must start within 6 months of arrest, or the detainee must be released.
On May 14, Chairman Arafat signed the Independence of the Judiciary
Law and on May 29 he signed the PA Basic Law, which defines the
authorities of the three governmental branches and prescribes direct
election of a president accountable to his cabinet and to the elected
PLC. Neither law has yet been fully implemented; hence the safeguards
they offer are not fully in place. The lack of safeguards has
contributed to the tendency of PA security forces to refuse to carry
out High Court of Justice orders to release detainees.
PA security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and
security officials often ignored laws that restrict their actions. The
PA ignored court decisions calling for the release of alleged security
criminals. On November 24, the PA High Court of Justice ordered Eid
Atya Abu Anseer released from detention for lack of evidence. The PA
Military Intelligence Service in Gaza had arrested Anseer on charges of
collaborating with Israel. Despite this ruling, Anseer remained
imprisoned at year's end. Lawyers and PA judicial officials
acknowledged that, in contravention of the law, PA security services
sometimes arrested and detained persons without informing judicial
officials.
At year's end, approximately 250 suspected collaborators and at
least 20 political prisoners were in custody in PA prisons (see Section
1.e.). These alleged collaborators often were held without sufficient
evidence, and denied access to lawyers, their families, or doctors.
PA authorities generally permitted prisoners--except those held for
security offenses--to receive visits from family members and human
rights monitors. PA security officials did not always permit lawyers to
see their clients. In principle detainees may notify their families of
their arrest, but this was not always permitted.
PA security services had overlapping or unclear mandates that often
complicated the protection of human rights. Leadership changes and
Israeli strikes against security posts have seriously crippled the PA
security apparatus. Under existing law in the West Bank, only the PA's
civil police force is authorized to make arrests. In practice all
security forces detained persons at various times. The operating
procedures and regulations for the conduct of PA security personnel in
the various services still were not well developed and have not been
made fully available to the public.
There were many detention facilities in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip administered by the overlapping PA security services, a situation
that complicated the ability of families, lawyers, and even the
Ministry of Justice to track detainees' whereabouts and to determine
their numbers. During the year, most PA prisons were destroyed during
Israeli operations, and the use of informal detention centers in homes
and apartment buildings spread. Security services, including Preventive
Security, General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the Coast
Guard have their own interrogation and detention facilities. In general
these services did not inform families of a relative's arrest, or did
so only sporadically. Most PA security officers remained unaware of
proper arrest, detention, and interrogation procedures, as well as
basic human rights standards.
PA security forces continued to harass journalists, political
activists, and human rights advocates who criticized the PA and its
policies (see Section 2.a.).
Neither the Israeli government nor the PA used forced exile, or
forcibly deported anyone from the occupied territories, during the
year. However, Israel and the PA sanctioned the voluntary agreement of
13 Palestinian gunmen to go into exile in Europe and another 35 to Gaza
in a negotiated resolution of the standoff at the Church of the
Nativity in Bethlehem in the spring.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Israeli law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision. Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses in the
occupied territories usually were tried in Israeli military courts.
Security offenses are defined broadly and may include charges as varied
as stone throwing or membership in outlawed organizations, such as
HAMAS or the PFLP. Military prosecutors brought charges. Serious
charges were tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses were
tried before one judge. The Israeli military courts rarely acquitted
Palestinians of security offenses, but sentences in some cases were
reduced on appeal.
The 1970 regulations governing Israeli military trials allowed for
evidentiary rules that were the same in criminal cases. Convictions may
not be based solely on confessions, although in practice some security
prisoners were sentenced on the basis of the alleged coerced
confessions of both themselves and others. The prosecution must justify
closing the proceedings to the public in such cases, and the Attorney
General determines the venue. Counsel may assist the accused, and a
judge may assign counsel to those defendants when it is deemed
necessary. Charges are made available to the defendant and the public
in Hebrew, and the court may order that the charges be translated into
Arabic if necessary. Sentencing in military courts was consistent with
that in civilian criminal courts. Defendants in military trials had the
right to appeal through the Military High Court. Defendants in military
trials also may petition to the civilian High Court of Justice (as a
court of first instance) in cases in which they believe there are
procedural or evidentiary irregularities. The court may hear secret
evidence in security cases that is not available to the defendant or
his attorney; however, while a conviction may not be based solely on
such evidence, it reportedly may influence the judge's decision.
Trials sometimes were delayed because witnesses, including Israeli
military or police officers, did not appear, the defendant was not
brought to court, files were lost, or attorneys failed to appear,
sometimes because they were not informed of the trial date or travel
restrictions prevented Palestinian lawyers from reaching the court (see
Section 2.d.). These delays pressured some defendants to plead guilty
to minor offenses so that an expedited trial could be held; in
expedited trials a charge sheet was drawn up within 48 hours and a
court hearing was scheduled within days. There frequently was no
testimony provided by Palestinian witnesses either for or against
Palestinians on trial. Israeli authorities maintained that this was due
to the refusal of Palestinians to cooperate with the authorities.
However, Palestinian authorities maintained that the absence of
Palestinian witnesses was due to strict travel restrictions. Tension
resulting from the security situation, and the closures imposed on the
West Bank and Gaza, posed additional barriers to cooperation. Physical
and psychological pressures and reduced sentences for those who
confessed induced security detainees to sign confessions. Confessions
usually were given in Arabic but translated into Hebrew for the record
because, authorities maintained, many Israeli court personnel could
speak Arabic but few could read it. As a result, many Palestinian
prisoners signed confessions written in Hebrew, which many could not
read or understand.
Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client
consultations in prisons hindered legal defense efforts. Appointments
to see clients were difficult to arrange, and prison authorities often
failed to produce clients for scheduled appointments.
Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of
security and ordinary criminal offenses were tried under Israeli law in
the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges presided, and the
standards of due process and admissibility of evidence were governed by
the laws of Israel, not military orders. Settlers rarely were
prosecuted in Israeli courts of crimes against Palestinians, and, in
the rare instances in which they were convicted, regularly received
lighter punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts of
similar crimes against either Israelis or other Palestinians (see
Section 1.a.). The Government of Israel stated that it established a
special department within the police force to investigate violence by
settlers; the establishment of such a unit has not noticeably
diminished the problem. During the year, 42 settlers were indicted for
violence in the occupied territories; however, most of these
indictments were for crimes against Israeli security forces rather than
against Palestinians.
The Israeli government maintained that it held no political
prisoners, but Palestinians claimed that many of the 1,007 Palestinian
administrative detainees being held without charge were political
prisoners.
The Government of Israel held thousands of persons for security
related offenses (see Section 1.d.).
The PA courts were inefficient, lacked staff and resources, and
often did not ensure fair and expeditious trials. The PA executive and
security services frequently failed to carry out court decisions and
otherwise inhibited judicial independence. The lack of judicial
independence and the lack of rule of law in the PA lead to continuing
problems of torture, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary detention
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.).
The PA inherited a court system largely based on structures and
legal codes that predate the 1967 Israeli occupation and Israeli
military orders. Legislation implemented in the past 2 years clarified
the court structure and changed the types or sizes of cases that some
of the civil courts can conduct. A High Judicial Council (HJC)
maintained authority over most court operations. In each governorate
there must be at least one conciliation court and a court of first
instance that hears appeals from that conciliation court, and that has
original jurisdiction of more serious cases. Legislation dictates that
three courts of appeal sit in Gaza, Ramallah, and Jerusalem to review
decisions of the first instance courts. In practice, there was no
Jerusalem appeals court and the Ramallah court handles its
responsibilities. There was also a High Court, officially designated as
sitting in Jerusalem, but it meets in Ramallah and Gaza City. The High
Court also served as the Constitutional Court until additional
legislation establishes it as a separate court. The High Court also
serves as the Court of Cassation and as an administrative court until
administrative courts are established by legislation. Most of the
changes required by the legislation started to take effect during the
last year, and very limited resources and restriction of movement have
hampered the transition.
The PA executive at times did not respect decisions of the courts,
and the Palestinian security agencies did not always enforce their
rulings (see Section 1.d.). In 1995 the PA established state security
courts in Gaza and the West Bank to try cases involving security
issues, but in recent years only the High State Security Court has
functioned. A civilian judge who also sits on the Court of Appeals
headed the High State Security Court. In most cases, three military
judges presided over each case. Most of the judges were military
officers but a civilian judge usually headed each panel of the High
State Security Court. There was no right of appeal, but the PA
president reviewed the court's findings, and he could confirm or reject
its decisions. The PA Ministry of Justice had no jurisdiction over the
state security courts, which were subordinate only to the Chairman.
There was a separate Attorney General appointed by the Chairman to work
with the state security courts. There were military courts to handle
charges against members of the security forces, but during the year,
they saw little if any activity.
The Gaza legal code is derived from Ottoman law, British Mandate
law, Egyptian law, and PA directives and laws. Pre-1967 Jordanian law,
together with PA directives and laws, applied in the West Bank. Both
sets of laws were modified substantially by Israeli military orders.
According to the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement,
Israeli military decrees issued during the occupation remained valid in
both areas and were subject to review by the parties pursuant to
specific procedure. The PA had passed many pieces of fundamental
legislation that unify the Gaza and West Bank legal codes, but there
was still a lack of unified legislation and regulations on many
subjects. Human rights advocates stated that the PA's judiciary did not
operate consistently. Judges stated they were hampered by their lack of
information about decisions issued by other courts.
The court system in general was struggling to recover from years of
neglect; most of the problems predated PA jurisdiction and were
aggravated by lack of resources and attention since the PA assumed
control of the courts. Judges and staff lacked sufficient resources and
suffered from a lack of skills and training. In addition, closures,
curfews, and the inability of PLC members to travel seriously impeded
administrative functions and implementation of reform. Court procedures
and record keeping were antiquated, although donor-funded activities
started to improve some of the systems. The delivery of justice often
was perceived as slow and uneven. The ability of the courts to obtain
enforcement of their decisions was extremely weak. A heavy caseload
even before the Intifada exacerbated these systemic problems. During
the past 2 years, the revolving caseload reportedly increased by 50 to
60 percent (see Section 2.d.).
The High Judicial Council (HJC) slowly was gaining authority over
judicial matters that formerly were administered by the PA Ministry of
Justice. The 1998 Independence of the Judiciary Law created the HJC to
enhance the judicial system and its independence. Arafat appointed an
HJC by a decree issued in 2000 and published in 2001, giving it the
powers it would have had if he had signed the judicial independence
law. Arafat signed that particular law as well as the PA Basic Law on
May 14, both of which pertained to the powers of the HJC. However,
instead of appointing an HJC with the 9 members required by the
judicial independence law, Arafat reappointed the same 11 members he
appointed in 2000. Three of the HJC members were older than 70 years,
the age limit contained in the law for HJC members, including its
president. During the year, discussions continued within the PA about
the membership of the HJC and the extent of control the laws give the
Ministry over court operations, even as the HJC planned the budget for
the judicial branch, supervised judicial operations in the West Bank
and Gaza, and nominated more than 30 new judges for the Chairman's
confirmation. Prior to this year, the Ministry of Justice appointed all
civil judges for 10-year terms and supervised judicial operations.
The PA's state security courts failed to afford defendants due
process. In theory these courts can apply procedures from the criminal
procedures law or those specified in the Revolutionary Code. The PA
usually ignored the legal limits on the length of prearraignment
detention of detainees suspected of security offenses. Defendants often
were brought to court without knowledge of the charges against them or
sufficient time to prepare a defense. They typically were represented
by court-appointed lawyers, who generally were members of the security
services with valid law degrees, but who had not practiced trial law,
or in some cases, any law, as part of their career. However, during the
year there were more cases in which defendants chose their own lawyers.
Court sessions often took place on short notice in the middle of the
night, and the advocates were not always present. In some instances,
security courts tried cases, issued verdicts, and imposed sentences in
a single session lasting a few hours.
During the year, the state security courts sentenced 12 persons to
death for collaboration with Israel in the killing of Palestinians.
Defendants often were unable to obtain competent legal counsel or bring
forward witnesses in their defense. All executions required approval
from PA Chairman Arafat before they could be carried out, and he has
not granted such permission since the execution of two Palestinians in
2001.
The state security courts adjudicated cases that fell far outside
the scope of the courts' original mandate. In addition to cases in
which violations of state security allegedly occurred, the courts have
on occasion dealt with tax cases and economic crimes, such as
smuggling. In 2000 Chairman Arafat decreed that ``serious'' crimes,
including homicide, rape, and drug trafficking, be referred to state
security courts. The decision prompted human rights organizations to
issue statements requesting the abolition of state security courts and
the referral of all cases to the regular civil courts.
There were no reports during the year that persons were convicted
for their political beliefs. However, at year's end, a credible
Palestinian prisoner rights organization estimated that the PA held at
least 20 political prisoners, as well as approximately 250 Palestinians
on charges of collaboration (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Israeli military authorities on many occasions entered
private Palestinian homes and institutions without a warrant, citing
security concerns. An officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or
above could authorize such action. In conducting searches, both in
areas under Israeli control and during incursions into areas ostensibly
under PA control, IDF personnel forcibly entered and in some cases,
beat occupants and destroyed property.
Israeli forces arbitrarily destroyed or looted Palestinian property
during military operations. During Operation Defensive Shield, which
lasted from March 29 through April 21, numerous Palestinian Authority,
NGO, and private offices were vandalized, damaged, and looted. Six
Israeli soldiers were indicted for looting, of whom five were convicted
and demoted and given prison sentences of up to five months. 20 other
Israeli military police investigations were underway for violence,
looting, and vandalism. Israeli authorities stated that forced entry
may occur lawfully only when incident to an arrest and when entry was
resisted. Authorities stated that beatings and arbitrary destruction of
property during searches were punishable violations of military
regulations and that compensation was due to victims in such cases. The
Israeli government stated that it did not keep consolidated information
regarding the claims against the Ministry of Defense for damages
resulting from IDF actions.
Israeli security forces demolished and sealed the homes (owned or
rented) of Palestinians suspected of terrorism or the relatives of such
suspects, without any judicial review (see Section 1.g.). During the
year, according to Israeli human rights organization B'tselem, Israeli
forces demolished 112 homes as punishment for terror activity.
The IDF destroyed numerous citrus orchards, olive and date groves,
and irrigation systems on Palestinian-owned agricultural land in both
the West Bank and Gaza. The IDF destroyed these groves or orchards for
security reasons, stating that Palestinians had been shooting from
those areas. Israel claimed that since the beginning of the Intifada it
destroyed 5,500 dunams (1,223 acres) of orchards in Gaza and 4,500
dunams (1,000 acres) of cultivated and uncultivated land. However, the
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights estimated that Israel razed 16,000
dunams (3,558 acres) of land in that period. The separation wall that
Israel began to build this year in the West Bank was expected to divide
6,000 dunams of land from its Palestinian owners. Israel claimed that
Regulation 119 of the Defence Emergency Regulations passed under the
British mandate allows military commanders to destroy homes and
property without judicial review if they suspect that they have been
used for violent purposes.
The PA required the Attorney General to issue warrants for entry
and searches of private property; however, Palestinian security
services frequently ignored these requirements. Police searched homes
without the consent of their owners. In some cases, police forcibly
entered premises and destroyed property.
PA security forces at times detained or placed under house arrest
the relatives of alleged security criminals. For example, in 2001 the
PA arrested and detained two brothers of the suspects in the killing of
the Israeli Tourism Minister. The PA released them during the year (see
Section 1.d.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Israeli security forces often used excessive force
against Palestinians and others, in contravention of their official
rules of engagement (see Section 1.a.). In 2001 the IDF stated that its
actions and its rules of engagement were based on a legal framework,
that it followed a policy of restraint and proportionality, and that to
the extent possible, it avoided harming civilians.
IDF regulations permitted the use of rubber-coated metal bullets
and live ammunition only when the life of the soldier or another person
imminently was threatened, and no other means of defense is available,
to apprehend a fleeing person suspected of having committed a dangerous
offense who did not respond to warning calls and shots, and to disperse
a violent demonstration or riot. A response to a violent demonstration
must be in clear escalatory stages--first tear gas--then warning shots
in the air, then rubber-coated steel bullets. IDF Open-Fire Regulations
stated that, in apprehending a fleeing suspect, soldiers were to direct
fire at the suspect's legs only. Soldiers were not permitted to fire at
persons suspected of having committed only minor offenses, such as
refusal to identify themselves or fleeing from security forces.
Regulations prohibited security force members from opening fire in the
direction of children or women, even in the case of severe public
disorder, unless there is an immediate and obvious danger to a
soldier's life. Firing on a suspicious vehicle at a checkpoint was
permitted only when the soldiers at the site are in a clearly life-
threatening situation.
The IDF killed or injured Palestinians or others in non life-
threatening situations. IDF forces used lethal force against
Palestinians throwing stones, even though IDF data indicated that there
were no known cases in which an Israeli soldier on duty had ever been
killed by stone-throwing during the Intifada (see Section 1.a.).
IDF fire killed or injured a number of innocent bystanders,
including journalists and Palestinian civilians, when they fired into
crowds at demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). Palestinian
medical groups estimated that approximately 10 percent of the injuries
will result in permanent disabilities, and another 10 percent will
require medical rehabilitation (see Section 5).
Israel obstructed the movement of and occasionally fired upon
medical personal and ambulances. During the year, the PRCS stated that
IDF soldiers and settlers committed 44 attacks against PRCS ambulances.
The PRCS also reported that IDF soldiers and Israeli settlers injured
63 PRCS emergency personnel in attacks. The Government of Israel stated
that it has ordered soldiers to refrain from interfering with the
provision of medical services, and to allow ambulances and medical
personnel to pass through checkpoints, and had provided this
information to soldiers. The Government of Israel further stated that
Palestinians had used ambulances to transport arms, and that soldiers
must balance these security considerations with humanitarian concerns.
On January 27, a female Palestinian paramedic employed by the PRCS
carried out a suicide bombing in central Jerusalem, killing herself and
1 Israeli while injuring more than 100 others. It was not known whether
she used her credentials as a paramedic to aid her access into Israel.
On March 4, an Israeli tank fired on a PCRS Ambulance in Jenin,
killing the local head of the Emergency Medical Service.
On March 27, IDF soldiers stopped a PRCS Ambulance south of
Ramallah and reported finding a wanted man and an explosive belt inside
the vehicle. PRCS officials claimed the belt was planted in the
ambulance.
During the Intifada, the IDF also used excessive force in
responding to a number of incidents at checkpoints (see Section 1.a.).
Israeli soldiers placed Palestinian civilians in danger by ordering
them to facilitate military operations, which exposed them to live fire
between armed Palestinians and Israeli soldiers. Since the beginning of
the Intifada, IDF soldiers have ordered Palestinian civilians to enter
buildings to check whether they were booby-trapped; to expel their
occupants; to remove suspicious objects from the road; and to walk in
front of soldiers to protect them from gunfire. For example, IDF
officials acknowledged that on August 14, IDF soldiers in the West Bank
village of Tubas forced 17-year-old Palestinian Nidal Abu M'khisan at
gunpoint to approach a house containing a suspected terrorist and
demand him to surrender. The Palestinian, Nasser Jarrar, subsequently
shot and killed M'khisan, apparently thinking he was an IDF soldier. In
August seven human rights organizations, including B'tselem, petitioned
the Israeli High Court of Justice and obtained an injunction against
the use of Palestinians as ``shields'' for Israeli forces. Israel
admitted the use of such practices, in violation of existing
procedures, and reiterated that IDF forces ``are absolutely forbidden
to use civilians of any kind as a means of 'living shield' against
gunfire or attack by the Palestinian side, or as 'hostages.''' However,
B'tselem reported that IDF soldiers instead could employ the ``neighbor
procedure,'' using consenting civilians to enter homes and buildings
ahead of soldiers. Israel claimed that Palestinians who agreed without
coercion to enter homes for the IDF were not being exploited. Human
rights groups asserted that Palestinians who agreed to assist such
operations often did so out of fear of the soldiers even if they are
not directly coerced. Palestinians who took part in such operations
without being harmed still faced the risk of being branded as
collaborators and risked being attacked by other Palestinians.
Israel also placed civilians in danger by occupying Palestinian
homes and using them as military bases, including at times, during
operations designed to eliminate terrorist infrastructure. The
occupation of the home turns it into a military target, and forcing
residents to remain inside puts them in unnecessary danger. For
example, on January 21 IDF forces raiding Tulkarm took over the house
of Ali Tawfiq al-Shurati, made it a military position, and locked Ali's
wife and five children in a ground floor apartment for 24 hours.
The IDF fired tank rounds, as well as rockets from helicopters and
military aircraft, on targets in cities and towns in the West Bank and
Gaza during operations undertaken in response to attacks on Israeli
soldiers, settlers and other civilians (see Section 1.a.).
Israeli forces demolished the homes of the families and relatives
of those convicted of or suspected of committing terror attacks,
effectively punishing innocent Palestinians not implicated in the
attacks. Israel's demolitions left hundreds of Palestinians not
directly implicated in the attacks homeless. During the year, Israel
demolished 114 Palestinian homes, compared to 8 in 2001. The numbers of
such demolitions increased as Israel re-occupied areas previously under
exclusive PA control and gained access to such homes.
Israel's extensive curfews on Palestinian towns punished entire
innocent populations. During the year, Israel demolished 114
Palestinian homes, compared to 8 in 2001. Israel's demolitions left
hundreds of Palestinians not involved in terror attacks homeless. The
curfews affected every aspect of life for Palestinians, damaging
livelihood and causing food shortages. During Operation Defensive
Shield in March and April, 800,000 Palestinians were prevented from
leaving their homes for 2 weeks. The village of al-Walaja remained
under constant curfew from April 2 to May 10. During the start of
Operation Determined Path, which was ongoing at the end of the year,
extensive curfews were still in place. For example, the city of Nablus
was under curfew for 96.5 percent of time from June 18 to September,
according to a report by the World Bank. All major Palestinian cities
were also under curfew at varying times during this period. Qalqilya,
which experienced the least curfew hours of major Palestinian cities
during this period, was under curfew for 40.2 percent of the time. The
Israeli government's sustained imposition of internal and external
closures and curfews in the West Bank and Gaza during the year severely
impacted Palestinian society and economy, contributing to shortages of
basic food, water, and the provision of medical care and supplies.
The external and internal closures contributed to increased
unemployment and poverty in the occupied territories. Approximately
125,000 West Bank and Gaza workers, representing roughly 20 percent of
the Palestinian work force, depended on day jobs in Israel, Israeli
settlements, and Jerusalem. The closures on Palestinian cities and
towns also impeded Palestinians from reaching jobs or markets in the
occupied territories and disrupted internal and external trade.
Closures and the destruction of large swathes of Palestinian-owned
agricultural land and economic infrastructure by the IDF and settlers,
contributed to an adjusted unemployment rate of approximately 44
percent. Closures particularly isolated and hurt the roughly 200,000
Palestinians who lived in rural villages. Rural villages rarely were
self-sustaining communities and did not have the full range of
services--such as medical care, education, or municipal provision of
water--that larger urban areas had, increasing their isolation when
community members were not able to travel outside the area to obtain
access to services and provisions. Other rural villages under full
Israeli control were further isolated from major Palestinian population
centers.
The ICRC and various medical organizations stated that the
prolonged closure of Palestinian cities significantly obstructed the
delivery of medical care and prevented patients from passing through
checkpoints, in some cases even when urgent treatment was critical to
life and death. Since the beginning of the Intifada at least 34 persons
died as a result of delays in, or prohibition from, crossing
checkpoints to reach medical care. During the year, 12 died because of
such delays. The closures made it impossible for most patients living
outside large cities who need repeated medical treatment, such as
dialysis or physical therapy, to reach medical centers on a regular
basis. The PRCS stated that more than one-third of Palestinians who
were injured in the Intifada required some type of physical
rehabilitation and at least ten percent have permanent disabilities.
Medical professionals noted that many Palestinians delayed all but
emergency medical care because of the restrictions and economic
conditions. Preventative treatment, such as vaccinations, antenatal and
postnatal care, and family planning in most cases were postponed; and
the number of births at home, in ambulances, and at checkpoints
increased significantly. Medical observers noted that as the Intifada
continued, the negative consequences would continue to have a
significant impact on public health.
On January 21, Ra'ed Sabri Ibrahim Sruji, a 46-year-old Palestinian
from the Tulkarm refugee camp and a diabetes patient suffering from
kidney failure, was on his way to the hospital in Nablus when the
ambulance he was in was detained at the Deir Sharaf checkpoint for 3
hours. He died due to lack of prompt treatment.
Closures and curfews also have affected the provision of emergency
medical care. Israeli security services stopped and searched all
ambulances at each checkpoint, which frequently added life-threatening
delays in reaching hospitals, due to the fact that some had to use
substandard local roads when denied access through any of the
checkpoints. Israeli security forces often impeded the provision of
medical assistance to Palestinian civilians by strict enforcement of
internal closures, which contributed to at least 14 deaths. The PCRS
reported that its average response time to emergency calls in ``outer
city'' areas is 40 to 50 minutes, compared to a past average of 10-15
minutes. The PRCS also reported that Israel denied it access to outer
city areas altogether 70 percent of the time.
Israeli soldiers frequently harassed and abused Palestinian
emergency services staff at the checkpoints (see Section 1.c.). The
closures also significantly impeded the ability of medical staff to
reach work.
Israel regularly transferred Palestinians arrested in the occupied
territories to prisons and detention facilities in Israel (see Section
1.d.).
Palestinian terrorist groups used minors to prepare attacks or
carry them out. These youths were recruited to throw pipe bombs, plant
explosives, and carry out suicide attacks.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Israeli government generally
respected freedom of speech in some areas in the occupied territories;
however, it imposed censorship and prohibited public expressions of
anti-Israeli sentiment and of support for Islamic extremist groups.
Three journalists covering clashes between Palestinians and Israeli
security forces, including some who were clearly identified as
noncombatants, were killed by IDF fire and at least five others were
injured. IDF soldiers routinely harassed and occasionally detained
Palestinian and other journalists covering stories in the West Bank and
Gaza. Israel frequently denied journalists travel permits and revoked
or delayed issuing press credentials, all of which amounted to de facto
censorship. The IDF moderately to extensively damaged radio and
television stations and newspaper offices in Ramallah during the
Israeli incursion in March and April. During the year, Israel raided a
newspaper's premises.
During the year, the Israeli government continued to enforce
selectively its standing prohibition on the display in Jerusalem of
Palestinian political symbols, such as flags, national colors, and
graffiti. Such displays were punishable by fines or imprisonment.
Israeli enforcement of existing censorship regulations remained
stringent regarding press coverage of the Intifada. Israeli authorities
monitored Arabic newspapers based in East Jerusalem for security-
related issues, and newspapers sometimes were ordered to halt
publication of stories about the security situation until the
information first appeared in the Israeli media. Military censors
reviewed Arabic publications for material related to the public order
and security of Israel. Reports by foreign journalists were subject to
review by Israeli military censors for security issues, and the
satellite feed used by many foreign journalists was monitored. In
periods of heightened security, the Israeli government often closed
areas to journalists when it imposed a curfew or closure. Israeli
authorities denied entry permits to Palestinian journalists traveling
to their place of employment in Jerusalem during closures of the
territories, and the journalists had difficulty renewing their Israeli
issued press credentials (see Section 2.d.).
The IDF required a permit for Palestinian publications sold in
areas of the occupied territories under its control. Publications may
be censored or banned for content considered anti-Semitic or anti-
Israeli. Possession of banned materials was punishable by a fine and
imprisonment. The Israeli government prohibited the delivery and
distribution of publications, including newspapers, in the Gaza Strip
on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (when import of any item is
prohibited) and on numerous other occasions when the closure of the
Gaza Strip was particularly tight. On several occasions during the
year, usually following terrorist incidents, the Israelis banned
Palestinian daily newspapers from entering Gaza. However, during such
periods, Israeli newspapers were allowed into Gaza. During internal
closures, the Israeli government also occasionally blocked the delivery
of Palestinian daily newspapers to Palestinian cities in the West Bank.
Israeli soldiers sought out and destroyed Palestinian media outlets
during operations in the West Bank. Most local Palestinian radio and
television stations went off the air or scaled back their broadcasts
because of damage done by the Israeli army. On January 19, the IDF
detonated explosives in the main building of the Palestinian
Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) in Ramallah, severely damaging the
building and destroying equipment. The Israeli government singled out
PBC for broadcasting material deemed to be anti-Semitic or that incited
violence. On April 2, Israeli soldiers took over the building housing
al-Quds Educational Television in Ramallah and occupied it for 20 days,
during which they destroyed a studio, cameras, computers, videos and
satellite receivers, and sprayed graffiti on the walls.
Israel also harassed Palestinian media organizations. In April IDF
soldiers occupied the broadcasting station of a Palestinian cable
outlet in Ramallah, interrupted its broadcasting, and transmitted
pornography to area residents. On October 6, Israeli forces raided the
facilities of al-Ayyam newspaper in Ramallah. The newspaper reported
that Israeli forces stormed the building after midnight, forced all
employees into one room and searched the premises for 2 hours.
During the year, three journalists were killed. On March 13,
Israeli gunfire killed Raffaele Ciriello, special correspondent in
Ramallah of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera. On July 12, in
Jenin, Israeli gunfire killed Palestinian photographer Imad Abu Zarha.
On August 23, the Israeli army denied all responsibility, stating that
there was no proof of any firing at the journalists. Journalist and
press groups rejected Israeli claims. On September 21, Voice of
Palestine journalist Issam Hamza Tillawi was shot in the back of the
head as he was reporting on a Palestinian demonstration in Ramallah.
On September 25, the Paris-based organization Reporters Sans
Frontieres (RSF) released a statement expressing concern over
journalists injured by Israeli forces. The organization noted 46 cases
of journalists who had been injured by gunfire, nearly all from Israeli
sources since the beginning of the Intifada. Several of those shot,
mostly Palestinians, were seriously injured, even though some were
clearly identifiable as journalists and standing apart from clashes
when hit (see Section 1.g.).
Israel confiscated journalists' press cards and equipment on
several occasions. On April 6, Israeli authorities deported Jasim
Azzawi of Abu Dhabi Television, who was on a special assignment.
Azzawi, who is an American citizen, filed an affidavit on April 4 at
the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem stating that he was summoned to the
Israeli government Press Office and was told that the Prime Minister's
office decided to revoke his press credentials and expel him for
alleged inflammatory reporting. On April 9, Israeli troops in Bethlehem
threatened TV Tokyo reporter Yuzuru Saito and confiscated a tape from
his cameraman and from French cameraman Vincent Benhamou.
On several occasions, Israel detained and questioned journalists.
On April 24, Israeli troops in the West Bank detained Reuters cameraman
Mazen Da'na and Hussam Abu Allan, a photographer for Agence-France
Presse.
The PA restricted freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
During the year, the PA limited free expression, particularly regarding
human rights and alleged security issues. Press freedom is subject to a
1995 press law that does not protect the press adequately. PA security
services closed media outlets, banned publications or broadcasts, and
periodically harassed or detained members of the media (see Section
1.d.). Palestinian commentators and human rights groups stated that, as
a result, journalists practiced self-censorship.
On August 27, the PA supported the Palestinian Journalists'
Syndicate in the Gaza Strip to bar journalists from photographing
Palestinian children wearing military uniforms and carrying weapons.
On April 1, Palestinians threatened journalists working for the
Associated Press, Reuters, and Palestine TV in Bethlehem and forced
them to hand over footage, shot the night before, of the body of an
alleged Palestinian collaborator who had been shot in a parking lot.
There were three Palestinian dailies and several Palestinian weekly
newspapers. There also were several monthly magazines and three
tabloids.
In addition to the official Palestinian Broadcast Corporation
television and radio, also known as Voice of Palestine, there were
approximately 20 independently owned televisions stations and 9 radio
stations in the West Bank.
The Internet was available widely.
Israeli-imposed closures, curfews, and military actions severely
restricted academic freedom by disrupting the operations of West Bank
and Gaza schools, colleges, and universities during the year. Students
and staff at all educational levels had difficulty traveling to and
from educational facilities because most areas were under some form of
internal closure for the entire year. In addition, Israeli forces
imposed curfews on many Palestinian areas, some for 24 hours a day, for
extended periods (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Students from Gaza were
unable to reach West Bank universities since early October 2000, when
Israel closed the safe passage route between Gaza and the West Bank.
Both Bir Zeit University in Ramallah and An-Najah University in Nablus
were unable to open for the fall semester: Bir Zeit due in large part
to a roadblock preventing access to the school, and An-Najah due to an
almost continuous curfew in Nablus since midsummer. Israeli shelling
and gunfire during military operations consequently damaged a number of
schools in the West Bank and Gaza.
In March, the IDF relocated a roadblock in al-Khader village
blocking access to the Hope Flowers School. Hope Flowers was the only
Palestinian school in the West Bank that employed a curriculum
emphasizing democracy and coexistence. After repeated requests by
foreign governments and other interested parties, Israel repositioned
the roadblock to facilitate access to the school. The sniper position
that overlooked the roadblock remained in place at year's end.
The PA generally had authority over all levels of education in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and it controlled the budgets of all public
colleges. During the year, the PA did not interfere with education in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Israeli
government placed severe limits on freedom of assembly for Palestinians
in the occupied territories, largely through the imposition of internal
closures and curfews (see Section 2.d.). Israeli military orders banned
public gatherings of 10 or more persons without a permit. After the
1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel relaxed
enforcement of this rule, except in cases of Palestinian demonstrations
against land seizures or settlement expansions. However, extensive
curfews during the year made assembly of any kind impossible in most
major Palestinian cities. Those Palestinians who chose to take part in
even peaceful demonstrations often did so only by breaking curfew
restrictions and IDF prohibitions against demonstrations.
Israeli security forces killed scores of Palestinians and injured
several thousand during demonstrations and other often violent clashes
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The Israeli and Palestinian authorities
regularly disputed whether Palestinians fired at security forces during
such demonstrations. The PA and individual Palestinians stated that
Israeli security forces often resorted to live fire even when
Palestinian did not shoot at them first. In 2001 the IDF changed its
definition of ``life-threatening'' situations to include stone-throwing
in some cases.
The PA imposed some formal limits on freedom of assembly; however,
while it required permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large
cultural events, these permits rarely were denied. In Gaza police
approval was required for political meetings at several specific large
meeting halls. Written permission also was required for buses to
transport passengers to attend political meetings. In West Bank cities,
the PA required permits for outdoor rallies and demonstrations and
prohibited calls for violence, displays of arms, and racist slogans,
although this rarely was enforced.
The Israeli government placed severe restrictions on freedom of
association in East Jerusalem. In 2001 Israeli forces closed Orient
House, the preeminent Palestinian political institution in Jerusalem,
and consequently other East Jerusalem institutions located in Orient
House, including: The Chamber of Commerce, the Land Research Center,
the Higher Council for Tourism, a women's center, a prisoner's rights
society, and a historical preservation group. The Israeli police
arrested a number of Palestinians and foreign nationals during protests
calling for the reopening of Orient House. The closings were part of
the Government's response to a suicide bombing in Jerusalem; the
Government stated that it closed Orient House because it was engaged in
political activity in violation of the Interim Agreement. At year's
end, Orient House remained closed.
On February 6, the Israeli police closed the Multi-Sectoral Review
Project, an EU-funded project dedicated to surveying development needs
in East Jerusalem. Israel claimed that the project was linked to the
PA, which was not permitted a presence in East Jerusalem under the
terms of the Oslo Agreement. The same day, police closed the Land
Research Center. On June 5, the police closed the East Jerusalem
offices of the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce. On July
9, police closed the office of Al-Quds University President Sari
Nusseibeh; Nusseibeh was able to reopen his office a few days later
after signing a pledge to not use his office for activities relating to
his separate role as PLO Political Commissioner for Jerusalem Affairs.
On September 20, the Israeli police closed the offices of the Jerusalem
Cultural Association and the Union of Sports Clubs.
The PA placed some limits on freedom of association; however, the
PA permitted Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-
help organizations to operate.
The armed wings of HAMAS, PIJ, and other Palestinian opposition
groups remained outlawed. While it was not illegal to belong to other
components of these groups, during times of heightened security, the PA
detained members of these other components (see Section 1.d.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--Israeli law provides for freedom of
worship, and the Government generally respected this right in practice
in the occupied territories. Israel did not ban any group on religious
grounds, and permitted all faiths to operate schools and institutions.
Religious publications in East Jerusalem were subject to the
Publications Laws, including prohibition against the publication of
sermons that incite violence against Israelis or against the State of
Israel. However, Israel's imposed closure of the West Bank and Gaza,
including the internal closure that severely restricted travel between
towns and cities within the occupied territories, significantly impeded
freedom of worship for Muslims and Christians. Israeli closure policies
prevented tens of thousands of Palestinians from reaching their places
of worship in Jerusalem and the West Bank, including during religious
holidays such as Ramadan, Christmas, and Easter. On numerous occasions,
the Israeli government prevented worshippers under the age of 45 from
attending Friday prayers inside the Haram al-Sharif. The Israeli
government stated that such actions were necessary for security
reasons.
During the year, the Government of Israel's continued closure
policy prevented a number of Palestinian religious leaders (both Muslim
and Christian) from reaching their congregations. In March 2001, the
Israeli government pledged to create a ``hot line'' to facilitate the
movement of clerics through checkpoints; however, at year's end, it had
not done so. In previous years, several clergymen reported that they
were subject to harassment at checkpoints.
The PA has no law that specifically protects religious freedom;
however, the PA generally respected religious freedom in practice.
The PA required individuals to be at least nominally affiliated
with some religion. Religion must be declared on identification papers,
and all personal status legal matters must be handled in either Shari'a
or Christian ecclesiastical courts. Islam is the de facto official
religion of the PA, and its Islamic institutions and places of worship
received preferential treatment. The PA had a Ministry of Waqf and
Religious Affairs that paid for the construction and maintenance of
mosques and the salaries of many Palestinian imams. The Ministry also
provided some Christian clergymen and Christian charitable
organizations with limited financial support. The PA did not provide
financial support to any Jewish institutions or holy sites in the
occupied territories.
The PA required that religion be taught in PA schools. There were
separate classes for Muslim and Christian students. In 2001 the PA
implemented a compulsory curriculum that required the study of
Christianity for Christian students in grades one through six.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.--During the year, the Israeli
government severely restricted freedom of movement for Palestinians, in
response to the continuing violence of the Intifada. During the year,
most Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza were prohibited from
entering Israel, and the IDF instituted a massive network of
checkpoints and roadblocks across the occupied territories, which
impeded the movement of people and goods between Palestinian cities,
villages, and towns. Numerous cities were placed under strict curfews
that ran for weeks and even months. During the year, the restrictions
on movement were the most severe that Israel had imposed since it
occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza in 1967.
Since March 1993, Israel has required that all West Bank and Gaza
residents obtain permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. However, Israel
often denied applicants permits with no explanation and did not allow
effective means of appeal. Palestinian officials with VIP passes,
including PA cabinet officials and members of the Palestinian Council,
regularly have been subjected to long delays and searches at Israeli
checkpoints in the West Bank, despite the fact that they were traveling
on special passes issued by the Israeli government. During the year,
this practice increased markedly, severely restricting PA officials
from conducting administrative functions and implementing reform.
Even in periods before the Intifada, Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip found it difficult to obtain permits to work, visit,
study, or obtain medical care in Israel. Israeli authorities permitted
only a small number of Gazans to bring vehicles into Israel and
sometimes did not permit West Bank vehicles to enter Jerusalem or
Israel. Except for senior PA officials, Palestinians of all ages
crossing between the Gaza Strip and Israel were not permitted to travel
by automobile across the main checkpoint. Instead they were forced to
travel along a narrow walkway almost a mile long. Israelis moving into
and out of the Gaza Strip were permitted to use their automobile.
Israeli regulations prohibited Palestinian residents of Jerusalem from
entering the West Bank, although this ban only intermittently was
enforced. Israeli authorities also required that these Palestinian
residents provide written notice to the Israeli government if they
intended to travel to the Gaza Strip; however, provision of such notice
did not ensure that the Government would permit the travel.
Since 1993 Israel applied varying levels of ``closure,'' or
enhanced restrictions, on the movement of Palestinians and their goods,
often for lengthy periods, in response to Palestinian terrorist attacks
and other changing security conditions. The Government of Israel
imposed a tightened version of closure, called ``comprehensive,
external closure'' during periods of violent protest in the West Bank
or Gaza, or when it believed that there was an increased likelihood of
such unrest. Comprehensive closures also were instituted regularly
during major Israeli holidays and during some Muslim holidays. During
such closures, the Israel government cancelled travel permits and
prevented Palestinians--even those with valid work permits--from
entering Israel or Jerusalem. During comprehensive closures, the
authorities severely restricted the movement of goods between Israel
and the occupied territories and between the West Bank and Gaza. Due to
the ongoing unrest, Israel imposed strict and consistent external
closure throughout the year, compared with 210 days in 2001 and 88 days
in 2000.
During periods of unrest in the West Bank and Gaza, in the
aftermath of terrorist attacks, or during military exercises, the
Israeli government prohibited travel between towns and villages within
the West Bank. These ``internal'' closures cut off the flow of goods,
including food and fuel, and restricted the movement of persons. During
the year, Israel expanded internal closures further, sometimes in
response to specific acts of violence and sometimes as a preventive
measure imposed on entire cities and towns. The internal closures were
even more severe when Palestinians were prohibited from using primary
roads and physical barricades close off many secondary roads.
The Israeli government further constrained the movement of
Palestinians and goods in the West Bank and Gaza by imposing total
closures on specific areas or villages, sometimes for weeks at a time,
and by intermittently closing the Gaza Airport and the Allenby and
Rafah crossing points to Jordan and Egypt. Israel also consistently
imposed curfews in some areas, often for extended periods. During the
curfews, Palestinians generally were confined to their homes for all
but a few hours per week during which they were allowed to buy food and
other provisions.
The prolonged closures and curfews imposed by the Government of
Israel on Palestinian cities and towns during the year had a severely
negative impact on every sector of the Palestinian economy. They
impeded Palestinians from reaching jobs or markets and disrupted
internal and external trade (see Section 1.g.).
The prolonged closure also seriously impacted students' ability to
attend school and university (see Sections 2.a. and 5.). The Government
of Israel stated that they were necessary security measures (see
Section 1.g.).
Israel carried out policies of strict curfews and closures that
directly punished innocent civilians. The IDF delayed or prohibited
ambulances from crossing checkpoints (see Section 1.g.). In 1998 the
Israeli government established a ``continuous employment program'' that
allowed selected Palestinian workers who were approved by the Ministry
of Defense, married, over 28-years-old, and worked in Israel for a long
period of time, to enter Israel to work even in the event of a
tightened closure. During the year, the program was not implemented.
The Israeli government required all Palestinian residents to obtain
permits for foreign travel and restricted the travel of some political
activists. Bridge-crossing permits to Jordan may be obtained at post
offices without a screening process.
Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem, which Israel occupied
during the 1967 War, generally have chosen not to accept Israeli
citizenship, choosing instead to seek a residence permit or Jerusalem
identification card. Israel applied the 1952 Law of Permanent Residency
and its 1974 amendments to Jerusalem identification card holders. The
law stipulates that a Jerusalem resident loses the right of residence
if he or she leaves Israeli territory for more than 7 years, acquires
the nationality of another country, or acquires permanent residence in
another country. Such persons are permitted to return only as tourists
and sometimes are denied entry. The Government of Israel government
does not apply these same restrictions to Israeli citizens.
In 2000 the Israeli Ministry of Interior published new instructions
regarding residency rights in Jerusalem. According to these
instructions, residents of Israel whose identity cards had been revoked
since 1995 and who returned to live in Israel since 1998 and had
maintained ``an appropriate connection'' were entitled to restoration
of their identity cards. Although the new guidelines still permitted
the revocation of residency in cases in which East Jerusalem
Palestinians obtained new citizenship or residency rights while living
abroad, human rights groups reported a significant reduction in such
revocations.
Israeli authorities also placed restrictions on family
reunification. Most Palestinians who were abroad before or during the
1967 War, or who lost their residence permits for other reasons since
then, were not permitted to reside permanently with their families in
Jerusalem or the occupied territories. Foreign-born spouses and
children of Palestinian residents also experienced difficulty in
obtaining permission to reside with their family members. For example,
a Palestinian with a West Bank identification card must apply to the
Government of Israel for permission to live with his or her Jerusalem-
resident spouse in Jerusalem. In May the Israeli Knesset declared a
freeze on providing residency permits. At year's end, the freeze
remained in effect. Palestinians reported delays of several years or
more before spouses were granted residency permits. The Government of
Israel occasionally issued limited-duration permits, which must be
renewed. Renewing the permits may take up to 8 months, a common delay
that resulted in many Palestinians falling out of status. Palestinians
also reported extensive delays in registering newborn children with
Israeli authorities. In practice women with Jerusalem residence rights
found it more difficult to obtain permission for their spouses to
reside in Jerusalem than did men, since Israeli security authorities
considered Palestinian males to be greater security risks.
The PA issued passports and identification cards for Palestinians
who resided in the West Bank and Gaza, and the Israeli government
required residents of the West Bank and Gaza to use their Palestinian
passports to exit and enter Israel. Bearers of Palestinian passports
did not need special exit permits from the PA; however, when leaving
the area via Ben Gurion Airport, the Israeli government required
Palestinians to obtain permits to transit Israel to reach the airport.
Since 2001 Israeli authorities rarely granted these requests except in
humanitarian or special interest cases. Without this permit, travelers
must depart via land crossings and may experience delays lasting days
or weeks. Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza were
prohibited from using the Sheikh Hussein or Arava crossings. As a
result, most Palestinians could exit and enter the West Bank and Gaza
only via the Allenby Bridge or Rafah crossing points, which were closed
completely several times during the year. Internal closures made it
difficult for Palestinians to reach even these crossing points and
begin the wait at the border.
Palestinians who held Jerusalem identification cards, issued by the
Israeli government, must obtain special travel documents from the
Israeli government to travel abroad. Human rights groups reported that
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem often did not apply for Israeli
travel documents because they feared that the application might prompt
a reexamination of their residency status and lead to the revocation of
their identity cards.
Upon request the Jordanian government also issued travel documents
to Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Palestinians who
wish to travel to Jordan must leave their Israeli identification
documents with Israeli authorities at the Allenby Bridge. The Israeli
authorities also required that Palestinians from East Jerusalem obtain
a special permit to cross the Allenby Bridge, which they must purchase
from the Ministry of Interior. Restrictions on residency, reentry, and
family reunification only applied to Palestinian residents of the
occupied territories.
The PA generally did not restrict freedom of movement.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
In 1996 Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
East Jerusalem chose their first popularly elected government in
elections that generally were free and fair; the 88-member Palestinian
Legislative Council and Chairman of the Executive Authority were
elected. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat won almost 89 percent of the vote in
a two-person race for Chairman. Approximately 700 candidates competed
for Council seats. Voters elected Council members to multimember
electoral districts. As many as 35 of the elected members were
independent candidates. International observers concluded that the
election could reasonably be regarded as generally free and fair,
despite some irregularities. During the year, the Council debated
numerous draft laws and resolutions. Some members of the Council stated
that it lacked power in relation to the executive branch. In September
Arafat issued a decree setting January 20, 2003 as the date for
elections for Ra'is and the Legislative Council.
The last municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza took place
in 1996, and in September PA officials announced that new elections
will be held in March 2003. Incumbent municipal officials serve until
the following elections. In the case of the death or resignation of an
incumbent, the Ministry of Local government appoints a replacement,
with the approval of the PA Chairman.
Most Palestinians in East Jerusalem do not recognize the
jurisdiction of the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem. While all
Palestinians with residency permits are eligible, only a very small
percentage of Jerusalem's Palestinian population voted in the municipal
council elections. There were no Palestinian residents of Jerusalem on
the city council. There were 5 women on the 88-member Council, and 1
woman served in a ministerial-level position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
During the year, Israel obstructed the movement and activity of
human rights monitors and NGO workers by imposing strict internal and
external closures. In many cases, such groups refused to apply for
special travel permits in order to protest Israel's regulation of their
activities. Israeli, Palestinian, and international humanitarian and
human rights NGOs monitored the Israeli government's human rights
practices in the occupied territories. Some of these organizations were
critical of the Israeli government's practices and cooperation. The
Israeli government permitted human rights groups to publish and hold
press conferences.
The U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) reported increased delays
for its personnel and vehicles at checkpoints. Other humanitarian
groups, such as PRCS, faced similar problems.
During their 2001 seizure of the Orient House, Israeli security
officials confiscated office equipment, as well as documents belonging
to the organization and other Palestinian groups in Jerusalem. At
year's end, the Government of Israel still had not provided
representatives of the Orient House a full accounting of the documents
and property seized and Orient House remained closed (see Section
2.b.).
Local human rights groups, most of which were Palestinian, and
several international organizations monitored the PA's human rights
practices. PA officials usually met with their representatives. Public
criticism from these groups has been somewhat less forthcoming since
the outbreak of the Intifada, with several NGOs voluntarily deciding to
focus their efforts on the Palestinian struggle for basic rights and
defer comprehensive critiques of the PA's human rights performance.
During the year, human rights organizations reported that they
sometimes were denied access to detainees in Palestinian prisons during
the year (see Section 1.d.). Observers noted that documentation of
abuses was very limited because victims were hesitant to file or make
public claims of abuse against PA authorities.
From April 27 to May 6, the Government of Israel permitted the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to visit the occupied
territories, in a period of heightened tension, to assess worker rights
and the economic situation. The ILO released a report documenting the
``socioeconomic meltdown'' in the occupied territories and the
humanitarian and economic crisis of the Palestinians as a result of
Israeli closures, curfews, and military actions. The report also
emphasized the sense of ``insecurity in Israel due to suicide
bombings'' and the impact on the Israeli economy.
Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence
Organization in the West Bank and the police, appointed officials to
act as liaisons with human rights groups. These officers met with human
rights organizations and members of the diplomatic community to discuss
human rights cases.
The ICRC operated in the West Bank and Gaza under the terms of 1996
memorandum of understanding between the ICRC and the PLO. Other human
rights groups, including the Palestinian Independent Commission for
Citizens' Rights and the Mandela Institute, regularly visited PA
prisons and detention centers. During the year, some human rights and
international humanitarian organizations reported that they
occasionally encountered delays in obtaining access to detainees in
Palestinian prisons. PA officials reportedly were less responsive to
queries regarding the PA's policies toward and treatment of
collaborators and members of Islamist opposition groups than to queries
on other detainees (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
In 2000 Chairman Arafat approved the NGO law, which had been passed
by the PLC in 1998, and which governs the activities of NGOs and their
relations with the PA. The PA issued registration certificates for 150
of the approximately 350 new and existing NGOs that submitted
applications. The remaining applications still were under review at
year's end. In a June government reshuffle, the PA Ministry of NGOs was
downgraded to an agency (see Section 2.d.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
Under the complex mixture of laws and regulations that apply to the
occupied territories, Palestinians were disadvantaged under Israeli law
and practices compared with the treatment received by Israeli settlers.
This included discrimination in residency and land use.
In the Palestinian territories, homosexuals were persecuted by both
the public and by PA security officers. Homosexuals were subject to
harassment and physical abuse, and some were arrested. Several
Palestinians alleged that PA security officers tortured them because of
their sexual orientation.
Women.--The law does not explicitly prohibit domestic violence, but
assault and battery are crimes. There were reports indicating that
domestic violence increased during the Intifada.
The problems of rape, domestic violence, and violence related to
``family honor'' gained greater attention in the Palestinian community
as a result of a significant effort by Palestinian women's groups;
however, public discussion generally remained muted. The crimes almost
exclusively were tied to alleged sexual interactions of female family
members with men who were not their husbands. This could include rape,
a sexual encounter with any man except a woman's husband, or being seen
alone with a male who was not her family member. Honor crimes resulted
when family members beat or killed women in response to such alleged
violations of their family's honor. Victims of violence often were
encouraged by relatives to remain quiet and were punished themselves or
blamed for the ``shame'' that had been brought upon them and their
families. Women's groups sought to educate women on these problems, but
women's rights advocates stated that few resources were available to
shelter the victims of violence because women's shelters are not
accepted culturally in Palestinian society. Activists also maintained
that society was not receptive to providing counseling or outreach
services to victims of violence, which these advocates saw as more
widespread than was acknowledged. According to women's groups, there
was no reliable data on the incidence of violence against women.
Spousal abuse, sexual abuse, and ``honor killings'' occurred, but
societal pressures prevented most incidents from being reported and
most cases were handled within the families concerned, usually by male
family members. However, there were increasing anecdotal reports from
women's and humanitarian groups that the incidence of domestic abuse
rose significantly during the year.
Rape is illegal and spousal rape is not explicitly prohibited.
During the year, there were no figures available regarding the extent
of the problem.
Palestinian women endured various forms of social prejudice and
repression within their own society. Due to early marriages, some
girls, especially in rural areas, did not finish the mandatory level of
schooling. Cultural restrictions occasionally prevented women from
attending colleges and universities. Women who married outside of their
faith, particularly Christian women who married Muslim men, often were
disowned by their families and sometimes were harassed and threatened
with death by members of their community. Local officials sometimes
attempted to convince such women to leave their communities in order to
protect themselves.
Before the Intifada began in 2000, a growing number of Palestinian
women worked outside the home, where they often encountered
discrimination and occasionally experienced sexual harassment. There
were no special laws that provide for women's rights in the workplace.
Women were underrepresented in most aspects of professional life.
Despite the fact that there is a small group of women who were
prominent in politics, medicine, law, teaching, and NGOs, women for the
most part were seriously underrepresented in the decision-making
positions in these fields.
Personal status law for Palestinians is based on religious law. For
Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is derived from Shari'a
(Islamic law). The varied ecclesiastical courts ruled on personal
status issues for Christians. In the West Bank and Gaza, Shari'a
pertaining to women is part of the Jordanian Status Law of 1976, which
includes inheritance and marriage laws. Under the law, women inherit
less than male members of the family. The marriage law allows men to
take more than one wife, although few did so. Women were permitted to
make ``stipulations'' in the marriage contract to protect them in the
event of divorce and questions of child custody; however, only an
estimated 1 percent of women took advantage of this provision, leaving
most women at a disadvantage in the areas of divorce or child custody.
Ecclesiastical courts also often favored men over women in divorce and
child custody cases.
While there was an active women's movement in the West Bank,
serious attention has shifted only recently from nationalist
aspirations to issues that greatly affected women, such as domestic
violence, equal access to education and employment, and laws concerning
marriage and inheritance.
Children.--The PA provides for compulsory education through the
ninth grade, when children usually reach 15 years of age. However,
early marriage in certain sectors of society at times prevented girls
from completing the mandatory level of schooling. Especially in rural
areas and refugee camps, boys often left school before they reached the
mandatory age in order to help support their families.
The internal closure across the occupied territories and extended
periods of curfew in most major cities significantly impeded the
ability of both students and teachers to reach educational facilities
(see Sections 2.a. and 2.d.). In areas under curfew, all classes were
cancelled.
Numerous education and health care professionals acknowledged that
students were badly affected by the violent security situation, which
interfered with learning and manifested itself in lack of focus,
nightmares, daytime and nighttime incontinence, and other behavioral
problems. Closures and curfews impeded school attendance and UNRWA
reported that 72,000 teacher workdays were lost in the 2001-02 academic
year. UNWRA reported that test scores in its West Bank and Gaza schools
dropped dramatically, and dropout rates rose for the first time in a
decade.
The PA Ministry of Health provided for children's immunizations.
The PA insurance program provided basic medical care for children, for
a small monthly fee.
Child abuse is not prohibited explicitly by law. Abuse existed but
was not a widespread problem. Parents or families that failed to
protect children from abuse may be penalized by law. PA courts may
provide protections for children in ``difficult situations,'' including
cases of neglect or abuse. The Ministry of Social Affairs may intervene
by bringing a case before a court, which would decide how to best
protect the child. The judge may decide to place a child in an official
protective institution, or with an alternate family. There was one
protective institution for children in Gaza and one in the West Bank.
British Mandate, Jordanian, and military laws, from which West Bank
and Gaza law is derived, offered protection to children under the Penal
Code and a new Labor Code passed and published during the year. The new
Labor Code set a higher minimum age for any employment of children. No
children 14 or under can work, and children aged 15-18 could be
employed only for certain types of work and under certain conditions
(see Section 6.d.). While there was no juvenile court system, judges
specializing in children's cases generally adjudicated on juvenile
cases. In cases in which the child was the victim, judges had the
discretion to remove the child from a situation considered harmful.
However, the system was not sophisticated in the protection it afforded
children.
Palestinians living in East Jerusalem continued to be discriminated
against in terms of their access to municipal services, compared to
other residents of Jerusalem. According to the Association for Civil
Rights in Israel, the Government of Israel and the municipality have
not kept their pledge to the High Court to build three new infant-care
clinics in East Jerusalem. In addition East Jerusalem schools remained
underfunded and overcrowded, and many students were denied an education
in public schools due to lack of space. In 2001 the Government agreed
to build 245 new classrooms within the next 4 years in order to
alleviate this problem; however, no funds were budgeted for that
purpose. This year's budget included enough funds for 60 new
classrooms.
International and domestic NGOs, including UNICEF, Save the
Children, and Defense for Children International, promoted the rights
and welfare of children in the occupied territories. There also were
numerous Palestinian social welfare organizations that focused on
developing and providing educational, medical, and cultural services to
children. A number of other groups specialized in addressing the needs
of children with disabilities.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no mandated accessibility to
public facilities in the occupied territories under either Israeli law
or Palestinian authority. Many Palestinians with disabilities were
segregated and isolated from Palestinian society; they were
discriminated against in most spheres, including education, employment,
transportation, and access to public buildings and facilities. There
were approximately 130,000 Palestinians with disabilities in the West
Bank and Gaza prior to the outbreak of the current Intifada. The
Health, Development, Information, and Policy Institute estimated that
one-tenth of the approximately 21,000 Palestinians injured in the
Intifada will have permanent disabilities.
Some Palestinian institutions cared for and trained persons with
disabilities; however, their efforts consistently were under-funded.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Labor affairs in the West Bank and
Gaza came under Palestinian responsibility with the signing of the
Interim Agreement in September 1995. During the year, labor affairs in
the West Bank were governed by Jordanian Law 21 of 1965, as amended by
Israeli military orders, and in Gaza by PA decisions. In 2001 Arafat
signed a labor law that took effect in January; however, it has faced
strong resistance from the Palestinian business community. The
Palestinian law permits workers to establish and join unions without
government authorization. The previous Israeli requirement that all
proposed West Bank unions apply for a permit no longer was enforced.
Following a process to consolidate trade unions in the West Bank, there
were 12 trade unions. Four trade unions were in Gaza. During the year,
no unions were dissolved by administrative or legislative action.
Israeli labor law governs Palestinian workers in Jerusalem. They
were free to establish their own unions. Although the Israeli
government restricted unions in Jerusalem from joining West Bank trade
union federations, this restriction was not enforced. Individual
Palestinian workers in Jerusalem may belong simultaneously to unions
affiliated with West Bank federations and the Israeli Histadrut Labor
Federation.
West Bank unions were not affiliated with the Israeli Histadrut
Federation. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who worked in
Israel or Jerusalem were not full members of Histadrut, but they were
required to contribute 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut. Their
partial membership entitled them to limited benefits, including
compensation in the case of on-the-job injuries, maternity leave, and
compensation in the case the employer declares bankruptcy. (Full
members of Histadrut also received health insurance, social security
benefits, pensions, and unemployment benefits.) Negotiations between
Histadrut and West Bank union officials to return half of this fee to
the Palestinian Union Federation were completed in 1996, but funds have
yet to be transferred. Palestinians from the occupied territories who
worked in Israel were not permitted to join Israeli trade unions or to
organize their own in Israel.
The great majority of West Bank and Gaza unions belonged to the
Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU), an estimated
95,000 to 100,000 workers in the West Bank were members of the PGFTU,
the largest union bloc, which consisted of 12 trade unions in the West
Bank and 8 in Gaza. The organization had approximately 46,500 members
in Gaza. The PGFTU estimated that actual organized membership of dues-
paying members, included approximately 75 percent of all Palestinian
workers. The PGFTU was involved in the completion of the negotiations
with Histadrut regarding workers' fees. The reorganization of unions
under the PGFTU was intended to enable the West Bank and Gaza unions to
better represent the union members' interests.
Palestinian unions that seek to strike must submit to arbitration
by the PA Ministry of Labor. If the union disagrees with the final
arbitration and strikes, a tribunal of senior judges appointed by the
PA decides what, if any, disciplinary action is to be taken, such as a
fine. There are no laws in the occupied territories that specifically
protect the rights of striking workers. In practice such workers had
little or no protection from an employer's retribution. During the
year, there were no reported labor strikes.
The PGFTU participated in some programs of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, but was not a member.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A majority of
workers in the occupied territories were self-employed or unpaid family
helpers in agriculture or commerce. Only 35 percent of employment in
the occupied territories historically has consisted of wage jobs. Most
of this employment has been through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA), the PA, or municipalities. Collective bargaining was
protected. Committees of 3 to 5 members adjudicated Labor disputes in
businesses employing more than 20 workers. The PGFTU reported one
strike during the year. Existing laws and regulations do not offer real
protection against antiunion discrimination.
There were no export processing zones in the occupied territories,
although the Gaza Industrial Estate did enjoy free trade access to
foreign markets. Israeli closures and curfews impeded the right to
organize and bargain collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--PA law does not prohibit
specifically forced or bonded labor, including forced and bonded labor
by children, and during the year there were no reports of such
practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal working age in the West Bank and Gaza is
15 years, and there are special limits governing the conditions of
employment for juveniles between 15 and 18 years, including
prohibitions against working at night, under conditions of hard labor,
or in jobs that require them to travel outside their area of domicile.
However, in practice many Palestinian children under the age of 15 were
engaged in some form of work. Most such employment was believed to
involve work on family farms and in family shops, or as urban street
vendors. Some employment of children also reportedly occurred in small
manufacturing enterprises, such as shoe and textile factories. The PA's
capacity to enforce existing labor laws was limited. It had only 40
labor inspectors to inspect an estimated 65,000 enterprises. The ILO
and UNICEF were working with the PA to study the nature and extent of
the problem and to develop the capacity to enforce and update child
labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no minimum wage in the
West Bank or Gaza Strip. Prior to the outbreak of the Intifada in 2000,
which severely disrupted employment patters for the majority of working
Palestinians, the average wage for full-time workers appeared to
provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living. The
majority of Palestinians currently were unemployed or underemployed and
the standard of living has dropped dramatically over the last 2 years.
The dependency ratio increased more than 50 percent since the start of
the Intifada. In 2000 one Palestinian supported 4.3 persons in the West
Bank and 5.9 persons in Gaza. During the year, those figures reached
6.9 persons and 9.4 persons, respectively. As wage earners were forced
to support 50 percent more persons, the standard of living seriously
deteriorated.
In the West Bank, the normal workweek was 48 hours in most areas;
in Gaza, the workweek was 45 hours for day laborers and 40 hours for
salaried employees. There was no effective enforcement of maximum
workweek laws.
The PA Ministry of Labor was responsible for inspecting workplaces
and enforcing safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza. The
Ministry's ability to enforce the standard was limited due to lack of
resources for inspections and other constraints; however, it carried
out inspections. The Ministry reported that closures, curfews, and
ongoing Israeli military operations further limited its ability to
carry out inspections. The Ministry of Labor stated that new factories
and workplaces met international health and safety standards, but that
older ones failed to meet such standards. There was no specific legal
protection afforded workers that allows them to remove themselves from
an unhealthy or unsafe work setting without risking loss of employment.
Like all Israeli workers, Palestinians who worked in Israel were
required to contribute to the National Insurance Institute (NII), which
provided unemployment insurance and other benefits. Palestinians from
the West Bank and Gaza were eligible for some, but not all, NII
benefits. According to the Interim Agreement, Palestinians who worked
in Israel and Jerusalem benefit from NII in cases of injuries that
occurred in Israel, the bankruptcy of a worker's employer, and
allowances for maternity leave.
There were outstanding cases of Palestinian workers who attempted
to sue their Israeli employers for non-payment of wages but were unable
to travel to the relevant courts because they were unable to receive
the proper permits.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Palestinian law does not prohibit
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
were trafficked to, from, or within the occupied territories.
----------
JORDAN
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy ruled
by King Abdullah II bin Hussein since the death of his father, King
Hussein bin Talal. The Constitution concentrates a high degree of
executive and legislative authority in the King, who determines
domestic and foreign policy. In the King's absence, a regent, whose
authority is outlined in the Constitution, assumes many of the King's
responsibilities. The Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet
are appointed by the King and manage the daily affairs of the
Government. The Parliament consists of the 40-member Senate, appointed
by the King, and a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies which is
elected every 4 years. The lower house exerts influence only
intermittently on domestic and foreign policy issues. The 1997
parliamentary elections were marred by reports of registration
irregularities, fraud, and restrictions on the press and on campaign
materials. The King dissolved Parliament in June 2001 and subsequently
postponed elections until spring 2003. A new election law enacted by
the Government in July 2001 increased the size of the lower house from
80 seats to 104. According to the Constitution, the judiciary is
independent, and the Government took steps in 2001 to strengthen the
judiciary's administrative independence. However, in practice, it
remained susceptible to political pressure and interference by the
executive.
General police functions were the responsibility of the Public
Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD, the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID), and the military shared responsibility for
maintaining internal security, and had authority to monitor the
activities of persons believed to be security threats. Elements of the
security forces continued to commit human rights abuses.
Foreign assistance, remittances from citizens working abroad,
exports of minerals, and, increasingly, revenues from export of
manufactured goods and tourism were the mainstays of the country's
economy. The Government made substantial progress in deregulation,
privatizing state owned companies and opening up to foreign trade and
investment. As the country makes a transition to a market driven
economic system, the main economic problems it faced were high
unemployment and persistent poverty, especially in rural areas. Other
drags on economic growth included the political uncertainty in the
region, limited water resources, and the lack of a viable market for
the country's products in its traditional trading partners in the
region, particularly Iraq. Economic growth, which has improved in
recent years after stagnating in the mid-1990s, is only partially
addressing these problems.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in some areas; however, there were significant problems in other areas.
There were significant restrictions on citizens' right to change their
government. Citizens may participate in the political system through
their elected representatives in Parliament; however, the King has
discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister,
Cabinet, and upper house of Parliament, to dissolve Parliament, and to
establish public policy. Other human rights problems included police
abuse and mistreatment of detainees, allegations of torture, arbitrary
arrest and detention, lack of transparent investigations and
accountability within the security services, prolonged detention
without charge, denial of due process of law stemming from the expanded
authority of the State Security Court and interference in the judicial
process, infringements on citizens' privacy rights, harassment of
members of opposition political parties, and significant restrictions
on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.
A law enacted by the Government in October 2001 gave the Government
broad powers to restrict and prosecute journalists and to close
publications. This royal decree, or temporary law, in the absence of
Parliament effectively superseded the 1999 amendments to the Press and
Publications Law, which had reduced somewhat the restrictions in
previous laws regarding the ability of journalists and publications to
function and report freely. Significant restrictions continued
throughout the year. The Government limited academic freedom. In July,
several professors were dismissed from local faculties, apparently for
political reasons. The Government imposes some limits on freedom of
religion, and there was official and societal discrimination against
adherents of unrecognized religions. The evangelical Christian
community reported incidents of governmental harassment during the
year. One foreign Protestant pastor and his family reportedly left the
country after being harassed by the Government. There were some
restrictions on freedom of movement. Violence against women,
restrictions on women's rights, and societal discrimination against
women were problems. Although there was some evidence that societal
attitudes toward ``honor'' crimes was improving, the law still allowed
for reduced punishments for violent honor crimes against women for
alleged immoral acts. Child abuse remained a problem, and
discrimination against Palestinians persisted. Abuse of foreign
domestics was a problem, and child labor occurred on a small scale.
Jordan was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening
Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in
Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents during the year.
The security services promoted a climate of impunity by continuing
to be reluctant to conduct transparent investigations into allegations
of wrongful deaths that occurred during police detention in previous
years. However, in some instances, the authorities were more
forthcoming.
In January, a youth from Ma'an died in a hospital while in police
custody. The Government reported that the boy was arrested for
violating the privacy of neighbors, and suffered from fatal injuries
after falling from a roof during flight from the police. Local
residents said the Government was not truthful about the circumstances
surrounding the boy's death. This death lead to rioting, the death of a
police officer, and the injury of six police officers and eight
rioters.
In April, a 10-year old boy was killed during an anti-Israeli
demonstration in the Baqaa refugee camp. Family members claimed he was
struck by a tear gas canister fired by anti-riot police. The Government
formed a special committee to investigate the incident and concluded
that there was no wrongdoing on the part of the Government because the
boy was struck in the head by an object not fired by police.
In November, a challenge to government authority by an armed group
in Ma'an led to the deaths of five persons, including two police
officers and three militants.
In August 2001, unknown assailants shot and killed an Israeli
businessman working in Amman. Two extremist organizations, the Islamic
Movement of Jordan (``The Group of Ahmed Al Daqamseh'') and the
previously unknown ``Nobles of Jordan'', claimed responsibility for the
killing. The Government stated that it had reason to believe the
killing was criminal and not political in nature. At the end of the
year, the Government had made no arrests in the case.
In September 2001 the police provided diplomatic representatives
with credible information that security forces were not responsible for
the death of one person and injury of six others during an October 2000
protest in the Baqaa refugee camp. Protesters continued to maintain
that police caused the death and injuries.
According to the Government, several members of the security
service were remanded for trial in the January 2000 beating death of
Mar'i Khalil Al-Jahran in a South Shuna police station. There were no
developments in this matter during the year.
On February 28, terrorists unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate
a senior government official and his family with a car bomb. Two
bystanders were killed by the blast. At the end of the year, the
Government's investigation of the incident continued.
In October, USAID official Lawrence Foley was shot and killed in
front of his home. In December, the Government arrested two suspects,
who confessed to the act as well as being members of the terrorist
organization Al Qa'ida. The trial date is set for 2003.
Women continued to be victims of ``honor killings'' (see Section
5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law provides prisoners with the right to humane
treatment and provides prisoners the right to an attorney. However, the
police and security forces sometimes abused detainees physically and
verbally during detention and interrogation, and allegedly also used
torture. Allegations of torture were difficult to verify because the
police and security officials frequently denied detainees timely access
to lawyers, despite legal provisions requiring such access. The most
frequently alleged methods of torture included sleep deprivation,
beatings on the soles of the feet, prolonged suspension with ropes in
contorted positions, and extended solitary confinement. Defendants in
high-profile cases before the State Security Court claimed to have been
subjected to physical and psychological abuse while in detention.
Government officials denied allegations of torture and abuse.
In October, the Court of Cassation considered convicted terrorist
Raed Hijazi's appeal and remanded the case to the Security Court with
an order to reconsider the death sentence. Hijazi's sentence stood. In
January, the State Security Court rejected accused Hijazi's defense
that his confession was coerced, found Hijazi guilty, and sentenced him
to death. He had been tried for crimes against the national security.
In 2000, Syria had apprehended Hijazi, accused of a terrorist plot
targeting American and Israeli tourists during the millennium
celebrations, and rendered him to stand trial. According to media
accounts of the trial, doctors for both the defense and the prosecution
testified that Hijazi's body showed signs of having been beaten, but
witnesses, including Hijazi, made contradictory and inconclusive claims
regarding whether the alleged abuse occurred while he was in Jordanian
or Syrian custody.
A number of cases of beatings and other abuse while in police
custody were reported to human rights activists during the year. Many
of these reported incidents occurred during April, when there were
hundreds of anti-Israeli demonstrations throughout the country. In
April, a local newspaper reporter covering anti-Israeli demonstrations
in Sweileh claimed that he was detained, threatened and 'manhandled' by
government security forces (see Section 2.c.). Human rights activists
believed that there were many incidents that were not documented.
Police on several occasions used force to disperse demonstrations
during the year (see Section 2.b.).
There were no developments in the investigation of the November and
December 2000 shooting attacks against Israeli diplomats.
Most prisons met international standards. That said, prisons and
local police detention facilities were spartan, and on the whole were
severely overcrowded and understaffed. Human rights groups and
prisoners complained of poor food and water quality, inadequate medical
facilities, and poor sanitation in certain facilities. In July 2001 the
Government passed a temporary law that restricted the types of physical
force that prison officials may use to subdue prisoners. In 2000 the
Government opened a new prison facility in an attempt to alleviate the
problem of overcrowding.
The Government held some persons who are detained on national
security grounds in separate detention facilities maintained by the
GID. The Government held other security detainees and prisoners in
regular prisons. Conditions in GID detention facilities were
significantly better than general police detention facilities. While
security prisoners often were separated from common criminals,
conditions for such prisoners did not differ significantly.
Local human rights monitors were allowed to visit prisons, but
complained that the authorities required them to undertake a lengthy
and difficult procedure to obtain permission for such visits. The U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had access to prisoners. With
some exceptions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
was permitted unrestricted access to prisoners and prison facilities,
including GID facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution states
that ``personal freedom shall be guaranteed'' and that no person may be
detained or imprisoned ``except in accordance with the provisions of
the law.'' Under the Constitution, citizens are subject to arrest,
trial, and punishment for the defamation of heads of state,
dissemination of ``false or exaggerated information outside the country
that attacks state dignity,'' or defamation of public officials.
Criminal laws generally required warrants; however, in most cases
suspects may be detained for up to 48 hours in the absence of a
warrant. Police obtained many warrants after making arrests.
The Criminal Code requires that police notify legal authorities
within 48 hours of an arrest and that legal authorities file formal
charges within 10 days of an arrest; however, the courts routinely
granted requests from prosecutors for 15-day extensions, also provided
by law. This practice generally extended pretrial detention for
protracted periods of time. The security forces arbitrarily arrested
and detained citizens. In cases involving state security, the
authorities frequently held defendants in lengthy pretrial detention,
did not provide defendants with the written charges against them, and
did not allow defendants to meet with their lawyers until shortly
before trial. Defendants before the State Security Court usually met
with their attorneys only 1 or 2 days before their trial. In April 2001
the Parliament passed amendments to the Criminal Code that eliminated
pretrial detentions for certain categories of misdemeanors.
The Government detained persons, including journalists (see Section
2. a.) and Islamists for varying amounts of time for what appeared to
be political reasons. Human rights sources reported that more than
1,000 persons were detained for security reasons and subsequently
released within a short period of time throughout the year. Human
rights groups reported that there were a smaller number of long-term
political detainees.
Local governors had the authority to invoke the Preventing Crimes
Law, which allowed them to place citizens under house arrest for up to
one year without formally charging them (see Section 2.d.). House
arrest may involve requiring persons to report daily to a local police
station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons who violate the terms
of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to 14 days.
The Government used the threat of detention to intimidate
journalists into practicing self-censorship. In October 2001, the
Government adopted a series of amendments to Penal Code provisions
dealing with the press. Subsequent to the adoption of these amendments,
there were incidents of detainment and intimidation of journalists (see
Section 2.a.).
The Constitution prohibits the expulsion of any citizen, and the
Government did not routinely use forced exile; however, in June the
Government attempted to prevent the return of Ibrahim Ghosheh, one of
four leaders of the terrorist organization HAMAS allegedly expelled in
1999. In June 2001, Ghosheh arrived unexpectedly from Qatar, and
immigration authorities at Queen Alia International Airport (QAIA)
attempted to block his admission to the country. Ghosheh was detained
at the airport until June 30, when the Government admitted him to the
country in return for his pledge to cease his HAMAS activities. The
three other expelled HAMAS leaders remained outside the country at
year's end (see Sections 1.e. and 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary, and the Government passed legislation in
2001 to strengthen such independence; however, the judiciary was not
independent in practice and remained subject to pressure and outside
interference. A judge's appointment to, advancement within, and
dismissal from the judiciary are determined by the Higher Judiciary
Council, a committee whose members were appointed by the King. In June
2001 Parliament passed a law intended to give the Council increased
independent jurisdiction over the judicial branch; previously, the
Council had been subject to frequent interference and pressure from the
Ministry of Justice stemming from the Ministry's oversight of the
council. The new law promoted the independence of the judicial system
by limiting the Ministry of Justice's administrative control over
judges. There had been numerous allegations in previous years that
judges were ``reassigned'' temporarily to another court or judicial
district to remove them from a particular proceeding. The Government
claimed that the Higher Judiciary Council's new independence made such
tampering much more difficult. Despite constitutional prohibitions
against such actions, judges complained of telephone surveillance by
the Government (see Section 1.f.).
The judicial system consists of several types of courts. Most
criminal cases are tried in civilian courts, which include the appeals
courts, the Court of Cassation, and the Supreme Court. Cases involving
sedition, armed insurrection, financial crimes, drug trafficking, and
offenses against the royal family are tried in the State Security
Court.
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts have jurisdiction over marriage and
divorce among Muslims. Christian courts have jurisdiction over marriage
and divorce cases among Christians, but apply Shari'a law in
inheritance cases (see Section 5).
Most civilian court trials were open. Defendants are entitled to
legal counsel, may challenge witnesses, and have the right to appeal.
Defendants facing the death penalty or life imprisonment must be
represented by legal counsel. Public defenders were provided if the
defendant is unable to hire legal counsel. According to government
legal officials, civil, criminal, and commercial courts accord equal
weight to the testimony of men and women. However, in Shar'ia court,
the testimony of two women is equal to that of a man's in most
circumstances (see Section 5).
The State Security Court consisted of a panel of three judges, two
military officers and one civilian. Sessions frequently were closed to
the public. Defendants tried in the State Security Court often were
held in pretrial detention without access to lawyers, although they
were permitted to be visited by representatives of the ICRC. In the
State Security Court, judges have inquired into allegations that
defendants were tortured and have allowed the testimony of physicians
regarding such allegations (see Section 1.c.). The Court of Cassation
ruled that the State Security Court may not issue a death sentence on
the basis of a confession obtained as a result of torture. Defendants
in the State Security Court have the right to appeal their sentences to
the Court of Cassation, which is authorized to review issues of both
fact and law. Appeals are automatic for cases involving the death
penalty.
In September 2001, the Government passed a temporary law that
removed the right of appeal for defendants convicted of misdemeanors in
the State Security Court. According to reports, several defendants were
convicted in the State Security Court without the right to appeal, the
most notable being Toujan Faisal (see Section 2.a.). King Abdullah
later pardoned Faisal.
In the past, defense attorneys have challenged the appointment of
military judges to the State Security Court to try civilian cases as
contrary to the concept of an independent judiciary. According to human
rights activists, military judges appeared to have received adequate
training in civil law and procedure.
In the past, the press routinely carried details of cases tried
before the State Security Court, despite 1998 provisions in the Press
and Publication Law that prohibited press coverage of any case that was
under investigation, unless expressly permitted by the authorities. The
1999 amendments to the Press and Publications Law permitted journalists
to cover court proceedings ``unless the court rules otherwise.'' There
was press coverage of trials in the State Security Court during the
year.
The Court of Cassation vacated the State Security Court's verdict
of July 2001, in which the State Security Court had retried and
sentenced nine men to life imprisonment for their alleged involvement
in politically motivated bombings in 1998. The July 2001 retrial came
as a result of credible reports that the initial trial in 1998 was
flawed, and that the defendant's confessions were made under duress and
torture. Following the ruling of the Court of Cassation vacating the
State Security Court verdict, there were no further developments in the
case.
In June 2001 the Government permitted one of the four HAMAS leaders
expelled in 1999 to reenter the country (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.);
there were credible reports of executive branch influence with respect
to the original verdict of expulsion.
There were no reports of political prisoners; however, the
Government detained persons for varying periods of time for political
reasons (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires that security forces obtain
a warrant from the Prosecutor General or a judge before conducting
searches or otherwise interfering with these rights, and the security
services generally respected these restrictions; however, in security
cases, at times in violation of the law, the authorities obtained
warrants retroactively or obtain pre-approved warrants. Security
officers monitored telephone conversations and Internet communication,
read private correspondence, and engaged in surveillance of persons
considered to pose a threat to the Government or national security. The
law permits these practices if the Government obtains a court order.
Judges complained of unlawful telephone surveillance (see Section
1.e.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government imposed a
number of restrictions on these rights, and such restrictions increased
during the year. In October 2001, the Government broadened its
authority to prosecute journalists and close publications. The
Government detained and restricted journalists based on the provisions
of the October 2001 laws.
The 1998 Press and Publications Law and the 1999 revisions to the
law, combined with the 1998 Press Association Law, imposed stringent
restrictions on the operation of newspapers. The Government also
intimidated journalists to encourage self-censorship. Private citizens
may be prosecuted for slandering the royal family, the Government, or
foreign leaders, and for ``sowing sedition.'' Citizens generally did
not hesitate to criticize the Government openly, but were more
circumspect in regard to the King and the royal family. The Press and
Publications Law and the law governing the Jordan Press Association
(JPA) require membership in the JPA for persons to be considered
``legal'' journalists or editors, thus potentially excluding dozens of
practicing journalists from the profession. The Government during the
year selectively enforced this provision. The JPA used its authority to
enforce bans on journalists receiving funding from foreign sources or
having Israeli contacts. In 1999 then-Prime Minister Abdul Raouf
Rawabdeh issued an order directing government offices to cooperate only
with JPA members.
The 1998 Press and Publications Law granted the Government wide
discretionary powers to issue fines, withdraw licenses, and order
shutdowns, which enabled it to control the editorial content of
newspapers. However, the 1999 amendments to the Press and Publications
Law limited to some extent the Government's discretion to issue fines,
transferred the power to withdraw licenses to the judiciary, limited
significantly the Government's power to order shutdowns, and allowed
journalists to cover court proceedings unless the court ruled
otherwise. The 1998 Press and Publications Law imposed strict limits on
publications, which gave the Government very broad leeway to sanction
publications. According to the 1999 amendments, all publications must
be licensed by the Government. The law also requires that the editor in
chief of a newspaper be a citizen who permanently resides in the
country and to have been a member of the JPA for at least 4 years. This
last provision reflected a reduction in the requirements of previous
legislation but placed the burden of regulation on the JPA.
The Penal Code authorizes the State to take action against any
person who incites violence, defames heads of state, disseminates
``false or exaggerated information outside the country that attacks
state dignity,'' or defames a public official.
In October 2001, the Government adopted a series of amendments to
Penal Code provisions dealing with the press. The amendments reinforced
existing Penal Code restrictions on free speech and allow for the
prosecution of any person found to have written, published, or aired
any statements ``harmful to national unity; instigating criminal
actions; sowing the seeds of hatred and malice; inciting divisions
among members of society; instigating acts of religious and racial
fanaticism; insulting the dignity of individuals, their reputation or
personal freedoms; committing acts of corruption or publishing false
information or rumors; inciting people to organize strikes or sit-ins,
or to hold meetings in a manner that violates the law; or committing
any act considered harmful to the state's reputation and dignity.'' The
amendments gave the State Security Court the authority to temporarily
or permanently close any publication or media outlet that published or
aired any such statements. The Government strengthened provisions
regarding defamation of the King or Royal Family, providing as
punishment imprisonment of three years. In addition all violators of
the new provisions automatically were subject to trial before the State
Security Court rather than the special press and copyright court.
Prior to the October 2001 amendments, persons accused of violating
the Press and Publications Law were tried in a special court for press
and copyright cases. Journalists also may be prosecuted for criminal
and security violations in connection with their work. Although a
substantial number of cases were dismissed before trial, many other
cases lingered in the courts for years. The Government routinely used
detention and prosecution or the threat of prosecution to intimidate
journalists and thereby successfully encouraged self-censorship (see
Section 1.d.).
In March former parliamentarian Toujan Faisal was arrested and
charged with acts of sedition via libel and incitement of violence
against the Government. On a foreign-based Internet site and on al-
Jazeera, Faisal criticized the Prime Minister and the judicial system
for corruption. In May the State Security Court and sentenced Faisal to
one and a half years in prison. Since Faisal was convicted of
misdemeanors, she had no right to appeal (see section 1.e.). Many
contended that Faisal's arrest and sentence were the result of a
political vendetta. In May the King pardoned Faisal and she was
released in late June.
On March 18, editor Hashem Khalidi and publisher Tajeddin Hroub of
the weekly Al-Bilad were detained on the charge of publishing ``false
news'' following publication of an article in their newspaper.
In March a foreign NGO reported that a publication of the
opposition weekly Al Majd was censored by the Government. In September
Al-Majd claimed that their publication was delayed for one day because
``security forces'' stopped the printing of the newspaper until
articles considered ``offensive'' were removed. In January the editor
of the newspaper, Fahd al-Rimawi had been detained for 2 days and
charged with publishing false news.
In April Al-Jazeera correspondent Mahmoud Al Housa was detained for
3 days, apparently under the provisions of the October amendments. In
the same month a local newspaper reporter covering demonstrations in
Sweileh claimed that he was detained, threatened and ``manhandled'' by
government security forces (see section 1.c.). In August he claimed
that government authorities seized his passport and threatened him with
prosecution.
In August the Government closed indefinitely the local office of Al
Jazeera and suspended the media credentials of Al Jazeera's local
correspondents in response to their airing of a talk show segment which
the Government considered inflammatory and anti-Government.
In August journalist Mamoun Al Roussan, editor-in-chief of the
weekly Al Jazeera was arrested and detained for publishing an article
criticizing Qatari officials. Both Al Roussan and his publisher, Sakher
Abu Anzeh were detained for a week.
In November Yasser Abu Hilalah, a columnist for the Al Rai
newspaper and former correspondent for Al Jazeera, and Samir Abu
Hilalah, a journalist with Al Arab Al Youm, were released after being
held for 24 hours. Both were detained after sending information to
their respective news sources on the unrest between security forces and
citizens in Ma'an.
In January 2001, the Government arrested seven members of the Anti-
Normalization Committee, a group that opposes the country's relations
with Israel, on charges of belonging to an illegal group (see Section
2.b.). The State Security Court also charged two of the seven with
possession of explosives and with terrorist activities. The arrests
followed the publication of the Committee's blacklist, which included
the names of companies and persons with ties to Israel or Israeli
businesses. All seven detainees were released on bail while awaiting
trial. The trials had not yet begun by year's end. The Government also
filed charges under the Press and Publications Law against two
journalists, Ma'moun Rousan and Abdel Naser Hourani, for printing the
blacklist in their publications. At the end of the year, both men were
still involved in judicial proceedings related to the charges.
In May 2001, police in Amman arrested journalists Jamal Alawi, and
Yasser Zaatreh. According to press reports, police forcibly detained
the journalists during anti-Israeli rallies marking the anniversary of
the creation of the State of Israel. That same month, police also
reportedly seized film and cameras from other television journalists.
Alawi and Zaatreh were released without charge after a brief detention.
Police reportedly beat Tareq Ayyoub as he attempted to cover political
demonstrations in Amman (see Section 2.b.).
In June 2001, police in Zarqa briefly detained five journalists who
worked for the Associated Press. The reporters were attempting to film
a memorial service for the suicide bomber involved in the Dolphinarium
Disco bombing in Tel Aviv. Police released all five after a few hours.
In July 2001, Senator Jawad Anani claimed that he was forced to
resign following his publication of an article that was critical of the
Government. The Government denied any involvement in Anani's decision
to resign.
In December 2001 the GID reportedly detained two television
journalists associated with al-Jazeera for covering a demonstration by
Islamists in Ma'an. According to the reporters, the GID forced them to
hand over their video footage and physically abused them while they
were in custody. Both journalists were released with 24 hours and no
charges were filed against them.
The Press and Publications Department continued to enforce bans on
the publication of a number of books within the country. Although some
books were banned based on religious objections, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the number banned for political reasons is higher.
There were no developments in the January 2000 arrest of Asim Ogla
Al-Maghayirah, whom authorities accused of affiliation with the banned
political party Al-Tahrir and of distribution of illegal pamphlets.
In February 2000, the High Court of Justice dismissed the appeal of
Nidal Mansour's expulsion from the JPA. In September 2000, the JPA had
voted to expel Mansour for allegedly receiving foreign funding on
behalf of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) that he headed (see
Section 4). As a result of the Court's decision, Mansour was removed as
editor of the newspaper that he owns.
The Press and Publications Department continued its April 2000 ban
on a book of poetry by Ziyad Al-Anani; the book contained a poem that
reportedly was offensive to Islam (see Section 2.c.).
Some journalists continued to complain about high taxes on the
media industry and tariffs on paper, which they claimed led them to
reduce the size of their publications. They also criticized the
Government for its policy of advertising predominantly in newspapers in
which the Government owned shares.
The Government did not block the entry of foreign publications
during the year. In January 2000, the Government passed a bill that
grants foreign media operations ``absolute freedom of expression'' in
the country. The bill reportedly was passed in order to encourage
foreign investment. At the time, some commentators criticized the
Government for passing a bill that offers full autonomy for foreign
journalists while maintaining laws that restrict freedom of expression
for local journalists.
Radio and television news broadcasts were more restricted than the
print media. The Government was the sole broadcaster of radio and
television programs. It had commercial agreements with the British
Broadcasting Corporation, the London-based Middle East Broadcasting
Center, and Radio Monte Carlo that allow it to simulcast regional
programs using local radio transmitters. Jordan Television (JTV)
reported only the Government's position on controversial matters.
International satellite television and Israeli and Syrian television
broadcasts were available and unrestricted.
The GID actively investigated Internet reports of ``crimes against
the King.'' In March, the Government restored access to two overseas
websites that it had blocked within the country. There were additional
reports of government interference with Internet access.
The Government limited academic freedom. In June, three
universities dismissed a total of eight professors, most of whom taught
Shari'a law, without explanation. Most suspected the Saudi-educated
professors were dismissed because of their political views and/or their
background. Four of the professors have since been reinstated. During
the year, sources in the academic community claimed that there was an
intelligence presence in academic institutions. In 2001 two university
presidents were pressured to resign because of their political views.
Some academics claimed that they received frequent threats of
dismissal.
During the year, Jordan University continued its policy established
in March 2000 that granted the president of the University the
authority to appoint half of it's 80-member student council, including
the chair. The amendment was viewed widely as an effort to curb the
influence of campus Islamists. Many students, including non-Islamists,
objected to the University's decision.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricts freedom of assembly. Citizens must obtain permits for public
gatherings. In August 2001 the Government adopted a law that requires
the organizers of rallies and demonstrations to request permission from
provincial governors at least 3 days prior to any event. Under the law,
no protest may be held without the governor's consent and violators
face imprisonment from 1 to 6 months and a fine not to exceed $4,230
(3,000 dinars). The Government adopted the law in the absence of a
sitting Parliament, which the King dissolved in June 2001 (see Section
3).
In mid-March, media reports indicated that tear gas was used in
protests at refugee camps and some protestors were detained; however
the demonstrations remained peaceful overall.
On March 22, there were media reports that the Government used tear
gas to disperse approximately 1,500 protestors in Irbid when they
attempted to march from a local university to the city's center. The
demonstrators had been denied a permit to demonstrate by the
Government. Unconfirmed press reports indicated that some of the
demonstrators were beaten.
Despite the restrictions, there were numerous anti-Israeli protests
and demonstrations throughout the country, especially in April. On some
occasions in April, police used tear gas, water cannons, and dogs to
disperse protestors in various areas of Amman and throughout the
country.
In May and June, professional associations cancelled demonstrations
in which they planned, among other things, to burn American goods. The
cancellations were reportedly prompted by government pressure.
In June 4 members of the outlawed Liberation Party were sentenced
to 1 year in prison. Reportedly, the four were arrested while obtaining
signatures on a memorandum to the Prime Minister that demanded, among
other things, military aid to the Palestinians.
In August Saudi religious extremist Sheikh Salman al Awdah was
detained and deported from the country prior to delivering a scheduled
speech.
In March 2001, riot police protecting the Prime Ministry used
physical force to disperse a sit-in by 25 academics protesting the
absence of employment opportunities at local universities. No one was
seriously injured; however, press reports claimed that at least 10
demonstrators briefly were detained. The Government denied that it
detained any of the demonstrators.
In April 2001, organizers canceled a planned march from the
Shmeisani area of Amman to U.N. offices in the city. According to press
reports, the governor of Amman refused permission for the event.
In May 2001, security forces dispersed hundreds of protestors who
were attempting to stage two rallies in Amman. The Government claimed
that the rallies were unauthorized and unlawful. Police used tear gas,
water cannons, batons, and dogs to disperse the demonstrators,
reportedly injuring between 10 and 30 persons (see Section 1.c. and
2.a.).
In July 2001, police and University of Jordan security personnel
refused to allow students holding an anti-Israeli protest to exit the
campus. No force was used in the incident.
The Government restricted freedom of association. The Government
required and routinely granted approval for conferences, workshops, and
seminars. Currently, professionals must join their respective
professional associations.
The Government routinely licensed political parties and other
associations. There were 30 licensed political parties. Membership in
an unlicensed political party was illegal. The Government may deny
licenses to parties that it decides do not meet a list of political and
other criteria contained in the Political Parties Law. The High Court
of Justice may dissolve a party if it violates the Constitution or the
Political Parties Law.
In January 2001, security officials arrested seven members of the
Anti-Normalization Committee, a group that opposes the country's
relations with Israel, on charges of belonging to an illegal group (see
Section 2. a.). The State Security Court also charged two of the seven
persons with possession of explosives and with terrorist activities.
The arrests followed the publication of the Committee's blacklist,
which included the names of companies and persons with ties to Israel
or Israeli businesses. All seven detainees were released on bail while
awaiting trial. The trials had not yet begun by year's end.
In October 2001, the Government arrested or detained more than 50
persons for violating the public gathering laws. Included in the
October detentions were at least 10 students from Jordan University, 15
members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic
Action Front (IAF), and members of extremist groups. The Government had
released all 50 persons by the end of 2001.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the
safeguarding of ``all forms of worship and religious rites in
accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless such is
inconsistent with public order or morality.'' Within that
constitutional framework, the Government imposes some restrictions on
freedom of religion. The Constitution also states that ``there shall be
no discrimination'' between Jordanians ``as regards their rights and
duties on grounds of race, language, or religion.'' However, some
members of unrecognized religious groups and religious converts from
Islam faced legal discrimination and bureaucratic difficulties in
personal status cases.
According to the Constitution, Islam is the state religion. The
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Trusts managed Islamic institutions
and the construction of mosques. It also appointed imams, provided
mosque staff salaries, managed Islamic clergy training centers, and
subsidized certain activities sponsored by mosques. The Government
loosely monitored sermons at mosques and required that speakers refrain
from criticizing the Royal Family or instigating social or political
unrest. The Political Parties Law prohibits the use of houses of
worship for political party activity. The law was designed primarily to
deny government opponents the ability to preach politically oriented
sermons in mosques.
Persons enjoy freedom of belief, and there were no reports that the
practice of any faith was prohibited. However, the Government does not
officially recognize all religious groups. Some religious groups, while
allowed to meet and practice their faith, complained of societal and/or
official discrimination. In addition, not all Christian denominations
have been accorded legal recognition as religions. The Prime Minister
unofficially conferred with an interfaith council of bishops
representing local churches on all matters relating to the Christian
community, including the registration of new churches in the country.
The Government used the following criteria when considering recognition
of Christian churches as separate official religions: the faith does
not contradict the nature of the Constitution, public ethics, customs,
or traditions; the faith is recognized by the Middle East Council of
Churches; the faith does not oppose the national religion; and the
group includes some citizen followers.
Religious institutions, such as churches that wish to receive
official government recognition, must apply to the Prime Ministry for
registration. Recognized non-Muslim religious institutions did not
receive subsidies; they were financially and administratively
independent from the Government and were tax-exempt. Some churches were
registered with the Ministry of Justice as ``societies,'' rather than
churches.
According to the Government, the role of the State in religious
affairs is limited to supervision. Groups that have practices that
violate the law and the nature of society were prohibited; however,
there were no reported cases of religious groups being banned in
practice.
The Government did not recognize the Druze or Baha'i faiths as
religions but did not prohibit the practice of the faiths. Druze faced
official discrimination but did not complain of social discrimination.
Baha'is faced both official and social discrimination. The Government
did not record the bearer's religion on national identity cards issued
to Druze or Baha'is. The small Druze and Baha'i communities did not
have their own courts to adjudicate personal status and family matters;
such matters are heard in Shari'a courts. The Government did not
officially recognize the Druze temple in Azraq, and four social halls
belonging to the Druze were registered as ``societies.'' The Government
did not permit Baha'is to register schools or places of worship.
The Government did not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of
Christ, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, but each
denomination was allowed to conduct religious services and activities
without interference.
The Government did not interfere with public worship by the
country's Christian minority. Although the majority of Christians were
allowed to practice freely, some activities, such as encouraging
Muslims to convert to the Christian faith were prohibited.
The Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary (JETS), a Christian
training school for pastors and missionaries, had still not been
accredited by the end of the year. As a result, students and faculty
from the U.S. and elsewhere wishing to attend JETS were still unable to
obtain student visas. JETS continued its operations with students
studying on tourist visas.
Shari'a prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims.
Conversion to the Muslim faith by Christians was allowed; however, a
Muslim may not covert to another religion. Muslims who convert to other
faiths complained of social and government discrimination. The
Government does not fully recognize the legality of such conversions.
Under Shari'a, converts are regarded as apostates and legally may be
denied their property and other rights. However, in practice, this
principle was not applied. According to the Government, it neither
encourages nor prohibits apostasy. Converts from Islam do not fall
under the jurisdiction of their new religion's laws in matters of
personal status and are still considered Muslims under Shari'a.
Conversely, converts to Islam fall under the jurisdiction of the
Shari'a courts. Shari'a prescribes the death penalty for Muslims who
convert to another religion; however, there is no corresponding statute
under national law, and such punishment has never been applied.
Government policy requires that foreign missionary groups (which
the Government believes are not familiar with the customs and
traditions of the country) refrain from public proselytizing ``for the
sake of their own personal safety from members of society that oppose
such practices.'' The Government has taken action against some
Christian proselytizers in response to the complaints of recognized
Christian groups who charge that the activities of these missionaries
``disrupt the cohesiveness and peace between religious groups in
society.'' In December, an American pastor asserted that the Government
harassed him and his wife, and threatened to cancel their residency
permits. The pastor claimed that the Government intimidation was in
response to his refusal to verify whether or not Muslims attended his
church's services.
In the past, there were some reports of local government officials
encouraging Christian females involved in relationships with Muslim
males to covert to Islam to diffuse family or tribal disputes caused by
the relationship (see Section 5). However, there were no known cases in
which local officials harassed or coerced persons to convert during the
year.
According to the Constitution, religious community trusts
(``Awqaf'') and matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce,
child custody, and inheritance fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Shari'a courts for Muslims, and separate non-Muslim tribunals
for each religious community recognized by the Government. There is no
civil marriage. The head of the department that manages Shari'a court
affairs (a cabinet-level position) appoints Shari'a judges, while each
recognized non-Muslim religious community selects the structure and
members of its own tribunal. All judicial nominations are approved by
the Prime Minister and commissioned officially by royal decree. The
Protestant denominations registered as ``societies'' come under the
jurisdiction of one of the recognized Protestant church tribunals.
There are no tribunals assigned for atheists or adherents of
unrecognized religions. These persons must request one of the
recognized courts to hear their personal status cases.
During the year, a child custody case was adjudicated through the
court system (both Shari'a and civil) and custody of two minors who
were raised as Christian was transferred from their Christian mother to
her Muslim brother-in-law.
Shari'a is applied in all matters relating to family law involving
Muslims or the children of a Muslim father, and all citizens, including
non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions regarding
inheritance. Men are able to divorce their spouses more easily than
women are, although a law passed in December 2001 allows women to
divorce their husbands in Shari'a Court. Since the law went into
effect, Shari'a courts have granted at least two divorces brought by
women (see Section 5).
All minor children of a male citizen who converts to Islam are
automatically considered to be Muslim. Adult children of a male
Christian who has converted to Islam become ineligible to inherit from
their father if they do not themselves convert to Islam. When a Muslim
converts to Christianity, the act is not recognized legally by the
authorities, and the subject continues to be treated as a Muslim in
matters of family and property law, and the minor children of a male
Muslim who converts to Christianity continue to be treated as Muslims
under the law.
Some Christians are unable to divorce under the legal system
because they are subject to their faith's religious court system, which
does not allow divorce. Many of these individuals convert to another
Christian denomination or the Muslim faith in order to divorce legally.
The Government notes individuals' religions (except for Druze and
Baha'is, and other unrecognized religions) on the national identity
card and ``family book'' (a national registration record that is issued
to the head of every family and that serves as proof of citizenship) of
all citizens. Atheists must associate themselves with a recognized
religion for official identification purposes.
The Government traditionally reserves some positions in the upper
levels of the military for Christians; however, all senior command
positions have been traditionally reserved for Muslims. Division-level
commanders and higher are required to lead Islamic prayer for certain
occasions. There were no Christian clergy in the military.
Despite efforts by religious extremists, in 2001 the criminal court
and Shari'a court acquitted poet Musa Hawamdeh of charges that he had
``insulted religious values and defamed prophets'' in his poetry.
The Press and Publications Department continued its April 2000 ban
on a book of poetry by Ziyad Al-Anani; the book contained a poem that
reportedly was offensive to Islam (see Section 2.a.).
In June 2000, due to a dispute stemming from an intrachurch rivalry
between the Jerusalem Patriarchate and the Antioch Orthodox
Patriarchate, the Government closed an Arab Orthodox church that was
aligned with the Antioch Patriarch in Damascus. The Government closed
the church following a request from the local Orthodox hierarchy to
enforce a 1958 law that grants the Jerusalem Patriarchate authority
over all Orthodox churches in the country. In December 2000 the church
reopened with permission from the Government, but was closed again a
week later based largely on pressure from the Orthodox hierarchy. The
Government stated that the church was free to open under a different
name that would not imply affiliation with the Orthodox Church. The
church remained closed at year's end.
Non-Jordanian Christian missionaries operated in the country but
were subject to restrictions. Christian missionaries may not
proselytize Muslims. During the year, U.S.-affiliated Christian mission
groups in the country continued to complain of bureaucratic
difficulties, including refusal by the Government to renew residence
permits.
In February 2000, the governor of the Amman municipality closed the
office of Life Agape--an organization associated with the Baptist
Church--after the director refused to sign a letter stating that he
would not ``deal with Muslims.'' The office remained closed at the end
of the year.
In April and September 1999, a foreign employee of a small language
school in Amman applied for a residence permit from the Ministry of
Interior. His application was denied, reportedly because government
officials believed that he had been attempting to convert Muslims to
Christianity. He reapplied in April 2000, and was awaiting a response
from the Government at the year's end.
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2002 International
Religious Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for the right of
citizens to travel freely abroad and within the country except in
designated military areas; however, there are some restrictions on
freedom of movement. The law requires that all women, including foreign
women married to citizens, obtain written permission from a male
guardian--usually their father or husband--to apply for a passport. The
current passport laws do not state that a woman must have permission
from her male guardian to renew her passport. In the past, there were
several cases in which mothers reportedly were prevented from departing
with their children because authorities enforced requests from fathers
to prevent their children from leaving the country (see Section 5).
The GID sometimes withheld passports from citizens on security
grounds. In August a reporter claimed that government security forces
confiscated his passport. Local governors have the authority to invoke
the Preventing Crimes Law, which allows them to place citizens under
house arrest for up to a year without formally charging them (see
Section 1.d.). House arrest may involve requiring persons to report
daily to a local police station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons
who violate the terms of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to
14 days.
Persons with full citizenship received passports that are valid for
5 years. Most Palestinians living in the country were citizens and
received passports that are valid for 5 years. However, the Government
estimated that there are 150,000 Palestinian residents who are refugees
or children of refugees who arrived from Gaza after 1967 and do not
qualify for citizenship. They receive 2-year passports valid only for
travel. In the period following the country's administrative and legal
disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, Palestinians residing in the
West Bank received 2-year passports valid for travel only, instead of
5-year Jordanian passports. In 1995, King Hussein announced that West
Bank residents without other travel documentation again would be
eligible to receive 5-year passports. However, the Government
emphasized that these passports are for travel only and do not connote
citizenship, which may be proven only by presenting one's ``national
number,'' a civil registration number accorded at birth or upon
naturalization to persons holding citizenship. The national number is
recorded on national identity cards and in family registration books,
which are issued only to citizens.
During the year, there were allegations that the Government did not
consistently apply citizenship laws. There were 32 cases reported in
which passports were taken by the Government in efforts to implement
1988 West Bank disengagement laws. In 2001, there were reports of 52
complaints from persons or families claiming that the Government denied
their right to citizenship. All 52 reported complainants disputed the
Government's claim that they were ineligible for citizenship under the
regulations, and many filed appeals with the Ministry of Interior.
In July 2001, there were reports that immigration officials at the
King Hussein/Allenby Bridge crossing with Israel confiscated the
Jordanian passports belonging to Jordanians of Palestinian origin who
were carrying both Jordanian and Palestinian Authority travel
documents. The Government stated that such confiscations were
consistent with laws that prohibit citizens of Arab League countries
from holding passports of any other Arab League member. Human rights
observers claimed that no such law exists, and that the policy against
dual nationality is based on an informal agreement of Arab League
countries.
Human rights activists reported that approximately 1000 Jordanians
of Palestinian origin remained outside the country at year's end, due
to the Government's refusal to renew their passports at embassies
overseas. The majority of such persons now live in Syria, Lebanon, and
Libya as stateless persons. Diplomatic representatives or human rights
observers who inquired about the situation received no government
response.
The Constitution specifically prohibits the deportation of
citizens. In June 2001 the Government permitted the return of Ibrahim
Ghosheh, one of four HAMAS leaders allegedly expelled in 1999. Although
initially refused entrance, Ghosheh was admitted in return for his
pledge to cease his activities with HAMAS. The three other expelled
HAMAS leaders remained outside the country at the year's end (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
There is no law or statute that provides for the granting of
refugee status or asylum. The Government generally cooperates with the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The UNHCR must resettle refugees in other countries. However, in April
2001 the Ministry of Interior signed a memorandum of understanding with
the UNHCR concerning the status and treatment of refugees. Under the
agreement, the Government admits asylum seekers, including those who
have entered the country clandestinely, and respects the UNHCR's
eligibility determinations under the refugee definitions set forth in
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The agreement provides protection against the forcible
return of refugees from the country, and recognizes the legal
definition of a refugee as set forth in the U.N. Convention. The UNHCR
regularly trains law enforcement officials in international refugee
law, including specialized courses for policewomen. The Government
provides first asylum. According to UNHCR figures, 55,626 persons
sought asylum through the UNHCR between October 1990 and 2000.
The Government estimates that over 300,000 Iraqis resided in the
country. Since 1991 thousands of Iraqis have applied for refugee status
and received legal and material assistance from the UNHCR. In addition
to applications from Iraqis during the year, the UNHCR also received
applications for refugee status from Sudanese, Russians from Chechnya,
Somalis, and Eritreans.
For the 2001-2002 school year, the Government continued its policy
of denying Iraqi children admittance to school unless they are legal
residents of the country or recognized as refugees by the UNHCR.
Almost 1.6 million Palestinian refugees were registered in the
country with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA). The UNRWA counts another 800,000 Palestinians as either
displaced persons from the 1967 war, arrivals following the 1967 war,
or returnees from the Gulf between 1990 and 1991.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
There are significant restrictions on citizens' right to change
their government. Citizens may participate in the political system
through their elected representatives in Parliament; however, the King
has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister,
Cabinet, and upper house of Parliament, to dissolve Parliament, and to
establish public policy. Appointments made by the King to high level
government posts do not require legislative approval. Executive power
is vested in the King (or, in his absence, in the Regent), who
exercises his power through his ministers in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
In June 2001, the King dissolved Parliament and directed the
Government to draft a new election law. In August the King again
announced postponement of elections and indicated that they would be
held by spring 2003. As of year's end, the King had not announced a
specific date for elections and the Parliament remained dissolved.
According to the provisions of a temporary election law approved by
the King in July 2001, the Parliament is composed of a 40-member Senate
appointed by the King, and a popularly elected 104-member Chamber of
Deputies. The Chamber of Deputies previously contained 80 members. The
Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to initiate legislation,
and it may approve, reject, and amend legislation proposed by the
Cabinet. A group of 10 senators or deputies may submit draft bills for
consideration; however, in practice legislation is initiated and
drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers and submitted by the Government to
Parliament for consideration.
Opposition Members of Parliament have claimed that attempts by
members of the lower house to initiate legislation receive no response
from the Government. The King proposes and dismisses extraordinary
sessions of Parliament and may postpone regular sessions for up to 60
days. If the Government amends or enacts a law when Parliament is not
in session, it must submit the law to Parliament for consideration
during the next session; however, such ``temporary'' laws do not expire
and, while technically subject to action by Parliament when it returns
to session, may in practice remain in force without legislative
approval.
Municipal elections in July 1999 featured the participation of the
parties that had boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections; however,
low voter turnout necessitated a second day of balloting. The municipal
elections were regarded generally as free and fair.
The July 2001 election law increased the number of electoral
districts by redrawing district boundaries and redistributing seats
among districts. The Government also included provisions, such as those
requiring verification of polling results by members of the Judiciary,
that are designed to increase transparency and accuracy. The voting age
was lowered from 19 to 18 years. The law did not include quotas for
women or opposition political parties. Observers believed that the new
law continues to favor electorates in the rural and southern part of
the country as well as in regions with populations known for their
traditional, pro-Hashemite views.
The law retains the so-called one-man, one vote provision, which
allows voters to choose only one candidate in multiple-seat districts.
In the largely tribal society, citizens tend to cast their first vote
for family members, and any additional votes in accordance with their
political leanings. The amendment also limits representation in the
largely Palestinian urban areas. As a result, the amendment in practice
tended to limit the chances of other nontribal candidates, including
women, Islamists, and other opposition candidates, to be elected.
From July to September 2001, the Government initiated a series of
consolidations designed to merge many of the country's 328
municipalities into approximately 100. The Ministry of Municipal,
Rural, and Environment Affairs stated that these mergers were taken to
reduce municipal operating costs and improve local services. Opponents
of the measure claimed that the consolidations were an attempt to
undermine the strength of Islamist parties in local government, and
that it will weaken the democratic process at the municipal level by
reducing the number of locally elected officials. The IAF sought to
enjoin the Government from making the consolidations, but the courts
held that the IAF had no standing to initiate such an action.
Women have the right to vote, and women's groups encouraged women
to vote and to be active in the political process. There was one female
minister. In the previous Parliament there were two female senators,
and one female member of the Chamber of Deputies.
Of the 104 seats in the lower house scheduled for election in 2003,
9 are reserved for Christians, 9 for Bedouins, and 3 for either the
Circassian or Chechen ethnic minorities.
The Palestinian community, estimated at more than half of the total
citizen population, contributed 6 of 28 ministers. In the most recent
Parliament, 6 of 40 senators and 11 of 80 lower house deputies were of
Palestinian origin. There were no Palestinians in any of the 12
governorships throughout the country. The electoral system gives
greater representation to areas that have a majority of inhabitants of
non-Palestinian origin.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups investigated
allegations of human rights abuses and published and disseminated
findings critical of government policy. The 1999 amendments to the
Press and Publications Law removed restrictions on the publication of
information about the military and security services, which had
prevented the publication by domestic groups of reports alleging
torture and other abuses committed by the security services; however,
similar restrictions still exist in the Penal Code and other laws (see
Section 2.a.).
The local chapters of the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR)
and the Jordanian Human Rights Organization (JHRO) were registered with
the Government. On October 29, the Ministry of Interior dissolved the
Jordanian Society for Citizens' Rights (JSCR), one of the few human
rights groups not affiliated with any political movements or the
Government. The Government reported that it closed the NGO because of
legal infractions and internal disputes related to finances. However,
the JCSR claimed the closure was for political reasons, including the
JCSR's reporting of Palestinian citizens losing their passports as a
result of 1988 disengagement laws.
The groups drew public attention to alleged human rights abuses and
a range of other political issues. They also pressed the Government
either to bring formal charges against political detainees or to
release them promptly. The AOHR and JSCR (before it was dissolved)
published human rights reports during the year. In 2001, the AOHR
asserted that the Government responds to only about 10 percent of the
complaints that the NGO submits on behalf of individuals who allegedly
were subjected to human rights abuses by the authorities; the JSCR
claimed the Government responds to 20 percent of its cases. Before it
was dissolved, the JSCR reported that the Government generally
supported its public workshops during which citizens discussed their
viewpoints on sensitive social and political topics. Local NGOs
reported that the Government did not generally interfere with their
actions. Local NGOs were not permitted to receive funds from foreign
sources, and some NGO workers reported that they feared they would be
accused of accepting illegal funds from abroad. In September 2000 the
Jordan Press Association expelled its vice president, Nidal Mansour for
allegedly receiving foreign funding for the NGO he headed, the Center
for Defending Freedom of Journalists. In February 2001, the Higher
Court of Justice denied Mansour's appeal of his expulsion (see Section
2.a.).
In March 2000 the Government formed the Royal Commission for Human
Rights, chaired by Queen Rania. The mandate of the Commission is to
present recommendations on reforming current laws and practices to King
Abdullah and to institutionalize human rights in the country. In
November 2000, the Commission sponsored two human rights awareness
seminars with police and judicial officials in Amman and Aqaba. In June
2001 the Commission presented a draft law designed to create an
independent National Center for Human Rights. The Government had not
released the draft nor taken any further action on the legislation at
the end of the year.
The Government established in 2000 the National Team for Family
Protection and the Child Protection Center (see Section 5). The
Government controlled the Parliamentary Public Freedoms Committee, the
Ombudsman, and the Human Rights Office at the Prime Ministry.
The Government generally cooperated with international NGOs. The
ICRC usually was permitted full and unrestricted access to detainees
and prisoners, including those held by the GID and the military
intelligence directorate (see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social status
The law does not distinguish between citizens on the basis of race.
However, women and some minorities were treated differently under the
law and faced discrimination in employment, housing, and other areas.
Women.--Violence against women was common. Reported incidents of
violence against women did not reflect the full extent of the problem.
Medical experts acknowledged that spousal abuse occurred frequently.
However, cultural norms discouraged victims from seeking medical or
legal help, thus making it difficult to assess the extent of such
abuse.
Abused women have the right to file a complaint in court against
their spouses for physical abuse but in practice, familial and societal
pressures discouraged them from seeking legal remedies. Marital rape is
not illegal. NGOs such as the Jordanian Women's Union, which had a
telephone hot-line for victims of domestic violence, provided
assistance in such matters. Wife-battering technically was grounds for
divorce, but a husband may seek to demonstrate that he has authority
from the Koran to correct an irreligious or disobedient wife by
striking her.
The Criminal Code provides for leniency for a person found guilty
of committing an ``honor crime,'' a violent assault with intent to
commit murder against a female by a relative for her perceived immodest
behavior or alleged sexual misconduct. Law enforcement treatment of men
accused of honor crimes reflected widespread unwillingness to recognize
the abuse involved or to take action against the problem. Although the
press was in the past reluctant to report on honor crimes, many honor
crimes committed during the year were reported, including the total
number of 21. The actual number of honor crimes was believed to be
significantly higher. Human rights observers believed that many more
such crimes were committed but not documented as honor crimes.
According to women's rights activists, there was some evidence of a
societal trend toward condemnation of honor crimes. However, in 2001
one forensic medical examiner estimated that 25 percent of all murders
committed in the country were honor crimes. The police regularly
imprisoned women who are potential victims of honor crimes for their
own protection. In 2001 there were up to 40 women involuntarily
detained in such ``protective'' custody during the year.
According to Article 340 of the Penal Code, a ``crime of honor''
defense may be invoked by a defendant accused of murder who ``surprises
his wife or any close female relative'' in an act of adultery or
fornication, and the perpetrator of the honor crime is judged not
guilty of murder. Although few defendants are able to meet the
stringent requirements for a crime of honor defense (the defendant
personally must have witnessed the female victim engaging in sexual
relations), most avoided trial for the crime of murder, and were tried
instead on the charge of manslaughter. Even those convicted of murder
rarely spent more than 2 years in prison. In contrast to honor crimes,
the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death, and the maximum
penalty for second-degree murder is 15 years. Such defenses also
commonly relied on the male relative having acted in the ``heat of
passion'' upon hearing of a female relative's alleged transgression,
usually without any investigation on the part of the assailant to
determine the veracity of the allegation before committing the assault.
Defenses in such cases fall under Article 98 of the Penal Code. In
December 2001 the Government passed a temporary law amending Article
340 to apply equally to men and women. However, this legal change did
not substantially affect the sentencing of perpetrators of honor crimes
as no defendant in an honor crime invoked Article 340 during the year.
In February, a 37-year-old man was sentenced to 1 year in prison
for killing his pregnant sister and her alleged lover. Her brother,
Mohammad Ahmad shot Farjeh Ahmad, after she confessed to him that she
was pregnant out of wedlock. Mohammad Ahmad subsequently shot and
killed Farjeh's lover. The Criminal Court found that ``Farjeh's
unlawful and dangerous actions caused the defendant to lose his temper
and to kill both of the victims without realizing the consequences of
his actions.''
In June, the Criminal Court reduced a felony charge of murder
against 31-year-old Faisal Hassan to a misdemeanor, exactly 1 year
after he shot and stabbed his pregnant sister. The Criminal Court
reduced his charge to misdemeanor in accordance with Article 98
``because the defendant committed his crime in a fit of fury and his
family dropped charges against him.'' Hassan was sentenced to time
served and released.
In September the Court of Cassation overturned a 3-month sentence
given to a 35-year old man for murdering his sister, Fadia Mohammad to
``cleanse his honor.'' The court remanded the case to the Criminal
Court with an instruction to return with a harsher sentence. On
November 9, the Criminal Court imposed a 10-year prison sentence. In
June 2001, Fadia Mohammad had been shot and stabbed by her brother, who
killed her after learning that she was pregnant.
During the year, a 39-year-old man was formally charged with the
premeditated murder of his wife. After shooting her, he subsequently
surrendered to local authorities. His wife had just finished serving a
2-year prison sentence for adultery and allegedly had returned to her
Egyptian lover after her release from prison. The husband found her in
a busy marketplace in Irbid and shot her four times in the head.
In July 2001, a 15-year-old boy from Irbid confessed to killing his
20-year-old sister. He claimed to have acted in defense of his family's
honor. The boy repeatedly struck his sister in the head with a club
before covering her body in kerosene and setting it on fire. A
coroner's report found that the girl had not been sexually active. Her
brother surrendered himself to police and was sentenced to 4 years in
juvenile detention for his crime.
There were no developments in the April 2000 death of Fathieh
Mohammad, who reportedly was shot and killed by her father to ``cleanse
his honor.'' The police subsequently arrested and charged both her
father and brother for the crime.
Most activists believe that even if Article 340 were repealed,
honor crimes likely would persist, with sentences continuing to be
reduced under Article 98.
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) was rarely practiced. However, one
southern tribe of Egyptian origin in the small village of Rahmah near
Aqaba reportedly practiced FGM. In 2001, one local Mufti issued a fatwa
stating that FGM ``safeguards women's chastity and protects them
against malignant diseases by preventing fat excretions.'' However, the
Mufti also stated that since FGM is not a requirement of Islam, women
who do not undergo this procedure should not be embarrassed.
According to the law, sexual harassment is strictly prohibited and
subject to criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment. Sexual
harassment, assault, and unwelcome advances of a sexual nature against
women did not appear to be widespread problems.
Women experienced legal discrimination in matters of pension and
social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, ability to travel,
child custody, citizenship, and the value of their Shari'a court
testimony in certain limited circumstances (see Section 1.e.). The
Government provided men with more generous social security benefits
than women. The Government continued pension payments of deceased male
civil servants but discontinued payments of deceased female civil
servants to their heirs. Current laws and regulations governing health
insurance for civil servants do not permit women to extend their health
insurance coverage to dependents or spouses. However, divorced and
widowed women may extend coverage to their children.
Under Shari'a as applied in the country, female heirs receive half
the amount of male heirs and the non-Muslim widows of Muslim spouses
have no inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives half of her
parents' estate; the balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole
male heir inherits both of his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs
have the duty to provide for all family members who need assistance.
Men are able to divorce their spouses more easily than women, although
the most recent personal status law does grant women the right to bring
a divorce action in certain limited circumstances (see section 2.c.).
Marriage and divorce matters for Christians are adjudicated by special
courts for each denomination (see Section 2.c.). There were 11 female
judges in the country, up from 6 in 2001.
The law requires a married woman to obtain her husband's permission
to obtain, but not renew, a passport (see Section 2.d.). Married women
do not have the legal right to transmit citizenship to their children.
Furthermore, women may not petition for citizenship for their non-
Jordanian husbands. The husbands themselves must apply for citizenship
after fulfilling a requirement of 15 years of continuous residence.
Once the husbands have obtained citizenship, they may apply to transmit
the citizenship to their children. However, in practice such an
application may take years and, in many cases, citizenship ultimately
still may be denied to the husband and children. Such children become
stateless and, if they do not hold legal residency, lacked the rights
of citizen children, such as the right to attend school or seek other
government services.
Civil law grants women equal pay for equal work, but in practice
this law often was ignored. Press and union leaders reported during the
year that a small number of employers in the private sector reportedly
paid their female employees well under the legal minimum wage, despite
the fact that the women were under contract.
Social pressures discouraged many women from pursuing professional
careers. Nonetheless, women had employment opportunities in many
professions, including government, engineering, medicine, education,
the military, and law. According to 2001 NGO reports, women constituted
approximately 16.5 percent of the work force and 50 percent of
university students. While female employees held approximately 52 and
39 percent of jobs in the education and health sectors respectively,
they held only 7.5 percent of managerial posts and 10 percent of all
jobs in the private sector. Women's groups stressed that the problem of
discrimination was not only one of law, but also of women's lack of
awareness of their rights or unwillingness to assert those rights. The
Business and Professional Women's Club held seminars on women's rights
and assists women in establishing small businesses. The chapter also
provided several programs for potential female voters and candidates
for the upcoming 2003 parliamentary elections. Members of the royal
family worked actively to improve the status of women.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare in the areas of education and health. However, government
efforts in these areas were constrained by limited financial resources.
Education is compulsory until the age of 16; however, no legislation
exists to enforce the law or punish guardians for violating it, and
absence of children from school is without penalty. The overall school
attendance rate was 92 percent and the total secondary school
attendance rate was 92 percent. Since the beginning of the 1999-2000
school year, the Government denied Iraqi children admittance to public
school unless they were legal residents of the country or recognized as
refugees by the UNHCR (see Section 2.d.).
The Government attempted to address the issues of educational
development and quality, and the relevance of education to job-market
demand, with few concrete results. The Government also grants fee
reductions and food and transportation supplements to families with
many children or to very poor families to make education more
affordable.
Students must obtain a good behavior certificate from the GID in
order to qualify for admission under the university quota system.
Activists reported that the GID sometimes withholds these certificates
from deserving students due to a family member's allegedly problematic
record.
The Government provided free inoculation programs typically
administered through the school system for children. In addition,
children had access to government-subsidized public clinics, which
offer reduced fees for most services.
In March 2000, Queen Rania established the National Team for Family
Protection (NTFP) to consolidate all issues concerning family safety.
In August 2000, the Government opened ``Dar al Amman,'' the nation's
first child protection center. The facility provides temporary shelter,
medical care, and rehabilitation for children ages 6 to 12 years who
have suffered abuse.
Although the problem was difficult to quantify, social and health
workers believe that there was a significant incidence of child abuse
in families, and that the incidence of child sexual abuse was
significantly higher than reported. The law specifies punishment for
abuses against children. Rape or sodomy of a child under 15 years of
age carries the death penalty.
The Family Protection Unit of the Public Security Department (PSD)
works with victims and perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence.
The Unit deals primarily with child and spousal abuse, providing
multiple in-house services, including medical treatment for patients.
The Unit cooperates with police to apprehend perpetrators of domestic
violence, facilitates participation in education and rehabilitation
programs, and refers patients to other facilities.
Illegitimate children are entitled to the same rights under the law
as legitimate children; however, in practice, they suffered severe
discrimination in a society that does not tolerate adultery or
premarital sex. Most illegitimate children become wards of the State or
live a meager existence on the fringes of society. In either case,
their prospects for marriage and gainful employment are limited.
Furthermore, illegitimate children who are not acknowledged legally by
their fathers are considered stateless and are not given passports or
identity numbers.
The Government attempts to safeguard some other children's rights,
especially regarding child labor (see Section 6.d.). Although the law
prohibits most children under the age of 16 from working, child vendors
worked on the streets of Amman. The Ministry of Social Development has
a committee to address the problem and in some cases removes the
children from the streets, returns them to their families or to
juvenile centers, and may provide the families with a monthly stipend.
However, the children often return to the streets. Stagnant economic
conditions and social disruption have caused the number of these
children to increase over the last 10 years. Selling newspapers,
tissues, small food items, or gum, the vendors, along with the other
children who pick through trash dumpsters to find recyclable cans to
sell, sometimes were the sole source of income for their families.
Persons with Disabilities.--High unemployment in the general
population restricts job opportunities for persons with disabilities,
estimated by the Ministry of Social Development to number 220,000.
Thirteen percent of citizens with disabilities received monetary
assistance from the Government. The Government passed legislation in
1993, reinforced in 2000, requiring future public buildings to
accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities and to retro-fit
existing public buildings; however, implementation has been slow.
The law requires that 2 percent of the available jobs be reserved
for persons with physical disabilities. Private organizations and
members of the royal family actively promoted programs to protect and
advance the interests of persons with disabilities.
Indigenous Persons.--The country's indigenous people, nomadic
Bedouin and East Bank town-dwellers, traditionally have been the
backbone of popular support for the Hashemite monarchy and are
represented disproportionately in senior military, security, and civil
service jobs. Nevertheless, many Bedouin in rural areas were severely
disadvantaged economically. Many persons of East Bank origin complained
that the dynamic private sector largely is in the hands of the
Palestinian majority.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Palestinians residing in the
country, who made up more than half of the population, suffered
discrimination in appointments to positions in the Government and the
military, in admittance to public universities, and in the granting of
university scholarships. The Government granted citizenship to all
Palestinians who fled to the country in the period after the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war, and to a large number of refugees and displaced persons
who arrived as a result of the 1967 war. However, most refugees who
fled Gaza after 1967 were not entitled to citizenship and were issued
2-year passports valid for travel only. In 1995 then-King Hussein
announced that West Bank residents without other travel documentation
would be eligible to receive 5-year Jordanian passports. However, the
Government emphasized that these passports are for travel only and do
not connote citizenship (see Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers in the private sector and in
some state-owned companies have the right to form and join unions.
Unions must be registered to be considered legal. Union by-laws limit
membership to citizens, effectively excluding the country's
approximately 150,000 foreign workers. However, some unions represented
the interests of foreign workers informally. Over 30 percent of the
work force were organized into 17 unions. Although union membership in
the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU), the sole
trade federation, was not mandatory, all unions belonged to it. The
Government subsidizes and audits the GFJTU's salaries and activities.
Union officials are elected by secret ballot to 4-year terms. The
Government cosponsors and approves the timing of these elections and
monitors them to ensure compliance with the law. Union leaders
complained about the requirement to have government oversight of their
elections.
The GFJTU belongs to the Arab Labor organization, the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have and
exercise the right to bargain collectively. The Constitution prohibits
antiunion discrimination, but the ICFTU claimed that the Government did
not protect adequately employees from antiunion discrimination and that
the Government has dismissed public sector employees for political
reasons. Workers may lodge complaints of antiunion discrimination with
the Ministry of Labor, which is authorized to order the reinstatement
of employees discharged for union activities. There were no complaints
of antiunion discrimination lodged with the Ministry of Labor during
the year.
Labor laws mandate that workers must obtain permission from the
Government in order to strike. Unions generally do not seek approval
for a strike, but workers use the threat of a strike as a negotiating
tactic. Strikes are prohibited if a labor dispute is under mediation or
arbitration. If a settlement is not reached through mediation, the
Ministry of Labor may refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal with
agreement of both parties.
The tribunal is an independent arbitration panel of judges
appointed by the Ministry of Labor. The decisions of the panel are
legally binding. If only one party agrees, the Ministry of Labor refers
the dispute to the Council of Ministers and then to Parliament. Labor
law prohibits employers from dismissing a worker during a labor
dispute.
During the year, there were three strikes reported in the textile
sector. These employees went on strike claiming that, among other
issues, the employers failed to pay wages in a timely manner. There
were other labor incidents during the year in the construction and
cement sectors. In most cases, labor and management reached agreements
quickly, and the Government assisted in mediating disputes.
The national labor laws apply in the free trade zones in Aqaba and
Zarqa. The QIZs (Qualified Industrial Zones), or export zones which
produced manufactured goods with at least 8 percent Israeli input,
applied national labor laws as well.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution forbids
bonded labor, except in a state of emergency such as war or natural
disaster, and it generally was not practiced. However, foreign domestic
servants, almost exclusively female, often were subject to coercion and
abuse and, in some cases, worked under conditions that amounted to
forced labor (see Section 6.e.). The law does not prohibit specifically
forced or compulsory labor by children; however, such practices were
not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Labor law forbids children under the age of 16 from being
employed, except as apprentices, and prohibits children under the age
of 17 from working in hazardous jobs. Children under the age of 18 may
not work for more than 6 hours continuously, between the hours of 8
p.m. and 6 a.m., and during weekends, religious celebrations, or
national holidays. Provisions in the labor laws do not extend to the
informal sector, which consists of agriculture, domestic labor, and
family businesses.
According to the law, employers who hire a child under the age of
16 must pay a fine ranging from $140 to $710 (100 to 500 dinars). The
fine is doubled if the offense is repeated. However, the Government did
not provide training for government officials who are responsible for
enforcing child labor laws and did not enforce laws regarding child
labor during the year. All child labor enforcement responsibilities
rest in the hands of 85 Ministry of Labor inspectors. Government
officials claimed that if children were barred from working in
practice, they will lose important income on which their families
depend, and may turn to more serious activities, such as drug
trafficking and prostitution, for income.
In late 1999, the Ministry of Labor established a new division to
deal with issues of child labor. The division was established to
receive, investigate, and address child labor complaints and related
issues. Assistance received from the International Labor Organization
(ILO) and increases in the Government's funding for the Ministry of
Labor this year and in 2001, allowed the Ministry to staff the
division.
Financial assistance received from ILO during the year and in 2001
supported government efforts to implement the provisions of ILO
Convention 182 on Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.
Government policy also facilitated the work of NGOs in this area. There
were no specific mechanisms for receiving, investigating, or addressing
child labor complaints relating to allegations of the worst forms of
child labor.
Anecdotal evidence suggested that child labor, especially of child
street vendors, was more prevalent now than it was 10 years ago due to
declining economic conditions (see Section 5).
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national minimum wage was
$121 (85 dinars) per month for all workers except domestic servants,
those working in small family businesses and those in the agricultural
sector. The national minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The Government estimated that the
poverty level was at a monthly wage of about $125 (89 dinars) per month
for a family with 7.5 members. A study completed by the Ministry of
Labor in July 1999 found that 18.7 percent of the population lived at
or below the poverty level and that 1.5 percent lived in ``abject''
poverty, defined by the Government as $58 (40.5 dinars) per month for a
family with 7.5 members. The Government provides minimal assistance to
at least 45,000 indigent families.
The law requires overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the
standard workweek, which generally is 48 hours. Hotel, restaurant, and
cinema employees may work up to 54 hours per week. Workers may not work
more than 10 hours in any continuous period or more than 60 hours of
overtime per month. Employees are entitled to 1 day off per week.
The law specifies a number of health and safety requirements for
workers, which the Ministry of Labor is authorized to enforce. The law
does not require employers to report industrial accidents or
occupational diseases to the Ministry of Labor. Workers do not have a
statutory right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without
risking the loss of their jobs.
Labor law does not apply to the agricultural sector, small family
businesses, or domestic servants. Domestic servants do not have a legal
forum to address their labor grievances and have no standing to sue in
court for nonpayment of wages. Abuse of domestic servants, most of whom
were foreign, was widespread. Imprisonment of maids and illegal
confiscation of travel documents by employers was common. Victims, who
fear losing their work permits and being returned to their home
country, generally did not report complaints of beatings, insufficient
food, and rape to officials. Domestic servants generally were not given
days off and frequently were called upon to work at any hour of the day
or night.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in women or men and the practice was not known to occur. A
1926 law specifically prohibits trafficking in children. There were no
reports that persons were trafficked, to, from, or within the country.
__________
KUWAIT
Kuwait is a constitutional, hereditary amirate ruled by princes
(Amirs) drawn from the Al-Sabah family. The Al-Sabahs have governed in
consultation with prominent commercial families and other community
leaders for over 200 years. The 1962 Constitution provides for an
elected National Assembly and details the powers of the Government and
the rights of citizens, although the Constitution also permits the Amir
to suspend any or all of its provisions by decree. Only 14.8 percent of
citizens (males over the age of 21) have the right to vote. The most
recent general election, held in July 1999, was conducted as provided
in the Constitution after the Amir dissolved a gridlocked National
Assembly. A by-election was held in December 2000 to fill the seat of a
deceased Member of Parliament (M.P.). In both cases, the election
campaigns were generally considered to be free and fair; however, there
were some problems. Executive and legislative leaders continued to
develop political institutions by resolving major disagreements within
the framework of the Constitution and without recourse to extrajudicial
measures.
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Under
the Constitution, the National Assembly has a limited role in approving
the Amir's choice of Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir). If the
National Assembly rejects his nominee, the Amir then submits three
names, from which the Assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. The
Amir traditionally has appointed the Crown Prince to be Prime Minister,
although this is not mandatory; the Crown Prince appoints the members
of the Government. However, the elected National Assembly has
demonstrated the ability at times to influence or overturn decisions of
the Government. Members regularly require ministers to appear before
the full Assembly for formal question sessions when they are
dissatisfied with the Government's performance. On occasion, pressure
exerted by the National Assembly, including through votes of no
confidence, has led to the resignation or removal of ministers. In July
the Minister of Finance survived a ``no-confidence'' vote.
The Government bans formal political parties, and women do not have
the right to vote or seek election to the National Assembly. A law
promulgated in 1998 bans primaries previously conducted by religious
sects and tribes. The Constitution and law provide for a degree of
judicial independence; however, the Amir appoints all judges, and
renewal of most judicial appointments was subject to government
approval.
The national police, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and
Kuwait State Security (KSS) were responsible for internal security
under the supervision of civilian authorities of the Ministry of
Interior. Members of the security forces committed a number of human
rights abuses.
With large oil reserves, the economy was highly dependent on its
energy sector. The Government owned the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
and, despite its stated emphasis on an open market, it dominated the
local economy through direct expenditures and government-owned
companies and equities. Oil revenue provided about 85 percent of total
government revenues. According to government statistics, 93 percent of
the indigenous workforce was employed in the public sector, while
foreigners constituted 94 percent of the private sector workforce.
Within a total population of 2.3 million there were 870,000 citizens
who enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the world.
Domestic servants and unskilled workers often lived and worked in poor
conditions.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in many areas, and there were some improvements during the year;
however, its record was poor in some significant areas. Some police and
members of the security forces abused detainees during interrogation.
Overcrowding in the prisons continued to be a problem; however, the
Government completed construction on two new prison buildings and began
constructing a third.
The judiciary was subject to government influence, and a pattern of
bias against foreign residents existed. The Government infringed on
citizens' privacy rights in some areas. Security forces occasionally
monitored the activities of persons and their communications. The
Government restricted freedom of speech and the press. The Government
restricted freedom of assembly and association. The Government placed
some limits on freedom of religion and freedom of movement. Violence
and discrimination against women, especially foreign domestic servants,
were problems and discrimination against noncitizens persisted.
A problem existed with regard to the legal status of approximately
74,000 ``bidoon,'' Arabs with residency ties but no documentation of
their nationality. The Government restricted worker rights. The Labor
Law did not protect domestic workers, whose situation remained poor.
Unskilled foreign workers suffered from the lack of a minimum wage in
the private sector, from the Government's failure to enforce the Labor
Law, and at times physical abuse; some worked under conditions that, in
effect, constituted indentured servitude. Young boys, usually from
South Asia, were used as jockeys in camel races. Kuwait was invited by
the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as an observer.
The country suffered under Iraqi occupation from August 1990 to
February 1991, when an international coalition expelled Iraqi forces.
Many human rights violations committed by the Iraqi army during this
period remained unresolved, particularly the fate of 605 citizens and
other residents taken by Iraq who were still unaccounted for at year's
end.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or it agents.
There were no developments in the investigations into the
extrajudicial killings that occurred during the period after the
country's liberation in February 1991.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Iraqi authorities have not accounted for 605 citizens and other
residents taken prisoner during Iraq's occupation of the country. There
has been no significant development since 1994 in these disappearance
cases. The Government of Iraq has refused to comply with U.N. Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, which stipulates the release of
detainees. In 1999 Iraq ceased its participation in ICRC-sponsored
talks regarding the fate of the detainees. UNSCR 1284 later that year
called on Iraq to resume its cooperation with the ICRC and the
Tripartite Commission on Gulf War POWs and Missing Persons (TPC). The
U.N. Secretary General's special representative, Yuli Vorontsov, has
repeatedly reported to the U.N. Security Council Iraq's continued
refusal to cooperate with the U.N. regarding these cases. However, in
December, the TPC held its first official meeting since 1998, with Iraq
participating by long distance.
In connection with the case of a government official who was
detained in Iraq on March 15th for inadvertently crossing the border,
there were reports that indicated that there were Iraqi citizens being
detained for entering the country by mistake as well.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there
continued to be credible reports that some police and members of the
security forces abused detainees during interrogation. Reported
mistreatment included blindfolding, verbal threats, and physical abuse.
Police and security forces were more likely to inflict such abuse on
noncitizens, particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, than on citizens.
In February a police officer was sentenced to death for the March
2001 murder of a news editor. The police officer believed that the
editor had insulted the officer's tribe in articles written and
published by the editor.
The Government stated that it investigates all allegations of abuse
and that it has punished at least some of the offenders. However, the
Government did not make public either the findings of its
investigations or what, if any, punishments were imposed. This practice
created a climate of impunity, which diminished deterrence against
abuse.
Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they
have been mistreated during interrogation. However, the courts
frequently dismissed abuse complaints because defendants were unable to
provide physical evidence of abuse. Members of the security forces
routinely did not reveal their identity during interrogation, a
practice that further complicated confirmation of abuse.
In February security personnel allegedly abused a youth, Yousef Al-
Anzi, while in police custody. Al-Anzi's family submitted a medical
report to document the boy's claims. A case file was assigned to the
courts and was pending judicial review at year's end. The security
counsel reportedly asserted pressure on the family to withdraw the
claim. Also in February, security personnel assaulted an attorney from
the Criminal Security Department when he was visiting a client. He
submitted a medical report detailing his injuries and filed a police
complaint against the officers involved. In March, a 32-year old
Egyptian man alleged that Jleeb al-Shuyoukh security personnel tortured
him. On March 12th, the Kuwait Lawyers Association issued a statement
condemning recent abuse of prisoners by Ministry of Interior officials.
Prison conditions, including conditions for those held for security
offenses, met or exceeded international standards in terms of food,
access to basic health care, scheduled family visits, cleanliness, and
opportunities for work and exercise. Overcrowding in the prisons
continued to be a problem; however, the Government neared completion of
two new prison buildings, and finalized plans for three additional
buildings. A team of three medical specialists attended the prisons
weekly, a psychiatrist was on call 24 hours, and specialized health
care was available from local hospitals. Approximately 1,815 men and
108 women were serving sentences or awaiting trial in prison; detainees
were counted separately.
Unlike in the past, there were no reports of mistreatment of
prisoners at the Talha or Central Prisons, at the Shuwaikh deportation
facility, or elsewhere. An estimated 250 deportees were being held at
the deportation facility in Shuwaikh; some of these deportees have been
kept there for up to 6 months waiting for their proper identity papers
or for their country of nationality to accept them (see Section 1.d.).
In July it was reported that hundreds of prisoners at the Central
Prison were infected by tuberculosis. A family of 15 tested positive
for tuberculosis after visiting the Central Prison.
Drug-related offenders made up 70 percent of the Central Prison
inmate population. In addition to nearing completion on the first two
of five new prison buildings, the Director of Prisons also increased
prison staffing, expanded the drug rehabilitation program for inmates,
and increased the number of education programs available within the
prisons, bringing in volunteers to teach academic and vocational
classes.
In September, the Central Prison Rehabilitation Center opened. The
Center offered psychological counseling and educational courses to
inmates suffering from drug and alcohol addiction.
The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee closely monitored
prison conditions throughout the year, and the Government allowed the
International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to all prisons
and detention facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the
Government generally observed these prohibitions. In general, police
officers must obtain an arrest warrant from state prosecutors or a
judge before making an arrest (see Section 1.f.), although in
misdemeanor cases the arresting officer may issue them. Security forces
occasionally detained persons at checkpoints in Kuwait City (see
Section 2.d.).
Under the Penal Code, those suspected of serious crimes may be held
for up to 4 days without charge, during which time security officers
may prevent lawyers and family members from visiting them. In such
cases, lawyers are permitted to attend legal proceedings, but are not
to have direct contact with their clients. If charges are filed,
prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21
days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention
pending trial.
Of the 2,386 persons serving sentences or being detained pending
trial, 63 were being held on security grounds. Of the members of a
suspected indigenous terrorist cell who were arrested on security
grounds in November 2000, there is no information available on how many
were acquitted of charges and released during the year. The leader of
the group received a 7-year sentence in December 2000; the other three
members were scheduled to face charges of conspiracy to commit murder
and illegal possession of weapons.
The Government may expel noncitizens, including bidoon, if it
considers them security risks. The Government also may expel foreigners
if they are unable to obtain or renew work or residency permits. There
were approximately 13 bidoon and 758 foreigners held in detention
facilities, some of them pending deportation. Some detainees have been
held for up to 6 months. Many deportation orders were issued
administratively, without the benefit of a trial. However, the
Government did not return deportees to their countries of origin
forcibly, allowing those who object to remain in detention (see Section
2.d.). This practice leads to prolonged detention of deportees,
particularly Iraqis, who do not wish to return to their own countries.
The practice also was a factor in the complex problem faced by
stateless bidoon deportees, who essentially remained in detention
because their stateless condition made the execution of the deportation
order impossible (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
The Talha Deportation Center, which had been criticized in previous
years by human rights groups, formally was reconstituted as a minimum-
security prison in March 2000. There were no allegations of the forced,
prolonged detention of deportees in the facility during the year (see
Section 1.c.).
The Constitution prohibits deportation or forced exile of citizens,
and there were no reports of these practices. The Penal Code provides
that noncitizens convicted of felonies must be deported after finishing
their jail terms. However, in certain circumstances, citizens may have
their citizenship revoked, including citizens sentenced for a felony
during the first 10 years of attaining citizenship, citizens discharged
from a public job for acts against integrity during the first 10 years
of attaining citizenship, and citizens who take up residence in a
foreign country and join an authority that is designed to undermine the
country.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
right to a fair trial and states that ``judges shall not be subject to
any authority''; however, the Amir appoints all judges, and the renewal
of judicial appointments is subject to government approval. Judges who
are citizens have lifetime appointments; however, the majority of
judges were noncitizens. Noncitizen judges hold 1- to 3-year renewable
contracts, which undermined their independence. The Ministry of Justice
may remove judges for cause, but rarely does so. Foreign residents
involved in legal disputes with citizens frequently claimed that the
courts show a bias in favor of citizens.
The secular court system tries both civil and criminal cases. The
Court of Cassation is the highest level of judicial appeal. Sunni and
Shi'a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective branches for
family law cases. The Government established in 2000 a Shi'a appellate
court that operated throughout the year. In the secular courts no
groups were barred from testifying. Most courts considered men and
women's testimonies equally; however, in the family courts the
testimony of one man is equal to the testimony of two women.
Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and appeal
verdicts. The Amir has the constitutional power to pardon or commute
all sentences. Defendants in felony cases are required by law to be
represented in court by legal counsel, which the courts provide in
criminal cases. In misdemeanor cases, defendants have the right to
waive the presence of legal counsel, and the court is not required to
provide counsel to indigent defendants. However, the Kuwaiti Bar
Association is obligated upon court request to appoint an attorney pro
bono for indigent defendants in civil, commercial, and criminal cases.
While virtually all indigent criminal defendants asked for and received
pro bono counsel, in practice very few indigent civil and commercial
plaintiffs requested this service.
Both defendants and prosecutors may appeal court verdicts to the
High Court of Appeal, which may rule on whether the law was applied
properly as well as on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Decisions of the High Court of Appeal may be presented to the Court of
Cassation, which conducts a limited, formal review of cases to
determine only whether the law was applied properly.
In March 2001 the Court of Cassation commuted a 1993 military
court's death sentence to a life sentence for Alaa Hussein, head of the
Iraqi-installed ``provisional'' government during the occupation. The
Chief Justice determined that Hussein expressed guilt and remorse for
his actions by returning voluntarily to the country, and in May 2000
the Court commuted his sentence from death to life. The trial appeared
to have been conducted in a fair and open manner.
The Government continued to incarcerate 31 citizens, bidoon,
Palestinians, and Syrians convicted of collaboration with Iraq during
the 1990-1991 occupation. Under the law, such collaboration is
considered a felony. Most of the persons convicted in the Martial Law
Court in 1991, and the Special State Security Court, which was
abolished in 1995, did not receive fair trials. Amnesty International
(AI) faulted the trials in general, and particularly noted the absence
of any right of appeal of the verdicts.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for individual privacy and
sanctity of the home. The Government generally respected these rights
in practice; however, the law, which generally requires police to
obtain a warrant to search both public and private property, provides
for a warrantless search if alcohol or narcotics are suspected on the
premises or if police are in hot pursuit of a suspect fleeing the scene
of a crime. A warrant may be obtained from the State Prosecutor or, in
the case of searches of private property, from a judge (see Section
1.d.). The security forces occasionally monitored the activities of
persons and their communications.
The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men
and requires male citizens to obtain government approval to marry
foreign female citizens. Although the Government may advise men against
marriage to a foreign national, there were no known cases of the
Government refusing permission for such marriages. The Government
advises women against marrying foreign nationals (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, printing, and publishing ``in accordance with the
conditions and manner specified by law,'' and, with some exceptions,
citizens are free to criticize the Government at public meetings and in
the media; however, several laws empower the Government to impose
restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, and journalists
practiced self-censorship. During the year no court cases were
initiated under the restrictive laws. The Government, through the
Ministry of Information, practiced informal censorship by pressuring
individual publishers and editors believed to have ``crossed the line''
in attacking government policies and discussing subjects deemed
offensive to Islam, tradition, or the interests of the State.
Newspapers were privately owned and free to report on many social,
economic, and political issues and frequently criticized government
policies and officials, including the Crown Prince/Prime Minister.
Press accounts at the beginning of the year, which questioned and
criticized the Government, led to National Assembly members calling for
formal question sessions of several cabinet members. Such actions may
lead to votes of no confidence against Ministers, as well as their
removal from office.
The Government ended prepublication censorship in 1992, but
journalists still censored themselves. The Press Law prohibits the
publication of any direct criticism of the Amir, official government
communications with other states, and material that served to ``attack
religions'' or ``incite people to commit crimes, create hatred, or
spreads dissension among the populace.'' Direct criticism by the press
of the Cabinet's foreign and security policy occurred during the year
as in other years.
In order to begin publication of a newspaper, the publisher must
obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information.
Publishers may lose their license if their publications do not appear
for 6 months. This 6-month rule prevents publishers from publishing
sporadically. It is not used to suspend or shut down existing
newspapers. Individuals also must obtain permission from the Ministry
of Information before publishing any printed material, including
brochures and wall posters. There were no reported cases of the
Ministry of Information denying permission to publish printed material
during the year.
In January police confiscated film belonging to a press
photographer who was covering a public disturbance. Police officials
did not provide any explanations regarding the action taken towards the
press photographer.
As of the end of 2001, two journalists Fawwaz Muhammad al-Awadi
Bessisso and Ibtisam Berto Sulaiman al-Dakhil, were jailed in the
country. Both had been imprisoned in June 1991 and later sentenced to
life in prison because of their work with a newspaper that was
published under Iraqi occupation. Both of these journalists remained in
prison despite the release by royal decree of other journalists who had
worked for the same newspaper. Since the Government agreed to release
the two journalists if a third country would accept them, the ICRC was
processing paperwork to have the two reporters deported to Ireland.
The Government did not censor foreign journalists and permitted
them open access to the country.
The Government did not threaten to shut down any newspapers during
the year. In 2000 the Government attempted to close two newspapers,
charging them with publishing false information. After significant
public criticism, particularly by the National Assembly, the Cabinet
decided not to shut down the papers. The criticism led to the offer of
resignation by the Cabinet in March 2000, which was not accepted at
that time, and to proposals by National Assembly members to amend the
constitutional article that permits government suspension of
publications without review by the Assembly or the courts; however, no
action was taken to amend the article.
The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion
(see Section 2.c.). For 3 consecutive years, there have been no
prosecutions of print or broadcast journalists for ridiculing religion.
There were no prosecutions of persons or publishers related to book
publications during the year. Under the law, any citizen may initiate a
court case against an author if the citizen deems that the author has
defamed Islam, the ruling family, or public morals. Often these court
cases are brought for political reasons. In September 2001, a private
citizen filed criminal charges against a university professor for
speaking and writing about lesbianism and homosexuality; the case
remained in adjournment at year's end.
The Government owned and controlled the local radio and television
companies. Satellite dishes were widely available, and operated without
restriction. The Ministry of Information censored all books, films,
videotapes, periodicals, and other imported publications deemed morally
offensive. The Ministry censored media for political content as well
and did not grant licenses to magazines with a political focus. The
General Organization of Printing and Publishing controlled the
publication and distribution of all informational materials.
The Internet was technically accessible; however, serious
consequences resulted from some forms of Internet use, and the ability
of many cafe owners to provide the service was reportedly under threat.
There reportedly are 165,000 regular Internet users, representing 8.5
percent of the total population. The Ministry of Communications issued
new directives to Internet service providers to block ``immoral'' sites
and some political sites. Internet providers responded by installing
filtering technology. Each Internet service provider determined what
sites to block, within the framework of censorship norms. Under
pressure from Islamic members of the National Assembly, the Ministry of
Communications in May conducted a raid on 19 Internet cafes on the
basis that the Internet cafes were not installing filtering software to
block ``immoral'' sites as ordered in earlier directives. As a result
of the raids, the Ministry of Communications issued new rules
regulating Internet usage. The new rules require cafe owners to obtain
the names and civil ID numbers of customers and to submit that
information to the Ministry as requested. The law also establishes a
$162,500 (50,000 dinars) bond. Press reports indicate that 90 percent
of the Internet cafes would not be able to comply with the new law and
would be forced to close their doors.
The Constitution provides for freedom of opinion and of research,
and states that every person shall have the right to express and
propagate his opinion verbally, in writing or otherwise. There is no
formal government censorship of university teaching, research, or
publication. However, academic freedom is limited by self-censorship
and academics were subject to the same restraints as the media with
regard to criticism of the Amir or Islam.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right in practice. Public gatherings must receive prior government
approval, as must private gatherings of more than five persons that
result in the issuance of a public statement. Informal weekly, social
and political gatherings of men, known as ``diwaniyas,'' are protected
by the Constitution. Most adult male citizens, including the Amir,
members of the Government, and members of the National Assembly hosted
or attended diwaniyas, where topics of current interest were discussed.
The diwaniya system contributed to the development of political
consensus and official decision making. Women were not precluded from
holding diwaniyas; however, such diwaniyas were uncommon. By tradition
women were barred from male diwanyas.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
the Government restricted this right in practice. The Government banned
political parties; however, several unofficial blocs, acting much like
parties, existed and were active in the National Assembly. Candidates
were allowed to run for elections only as individuals, not under the
banner of any entity (see Section 3).
All nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must obtain a license from
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in order to be recognized
officially. The Government uses its power to license as a means of
political control and has tightened control since October 2001. There
are 74 NGOs waiting licensing by the Ministry. The Ministry has
licensed 51 NGOs, including professional groups, a bar association, and
scientific bodies; however, since 1985, it has issued only 5 new
licenses. Licensed NGOs received government subsidies for their
operating expenses, including travel and per diem expenses for
participating in international conferences. The Ministry has
disapproved other license requests on the grounds that previously
established NGOs already provide services similar to those proposed by
the petitioners (see Sections 2.d. and 4). Members of licensed NGOs
must obtain permission from the Ministry before attending international
conferences (see Sections 2.d. and 4). There were no cases of the
Government denying or barring representatives of licensed NGOs from
attending international conferences.
There are hundreds of unlicensed civic groups, clubs, and
unofficial NGOs in the country. They did not receive government
subsidies. In 1999, in accordance with a 1993 decree that ordered
unregistered NGOs to cease activities, the Government announced a
crackdown on unlicensed branches of NGOs, whose activities it
previously had overlooked, including unlicensed branches of Islamic
charities, and required that they cease operations by mid-September
1999. No further action was taken pursuant to the announced crackdown
(see Sections 2.c. and 4). However, in August 2001, the Government
undertook efforts to prevent unlicensed charity collections by persons
fraudulently misrepresenting themselves as part of charity groups. The
Government subsequently intensified its supervision of all charity
groups as part of its effort to prevent any diversion of funds to
terrorists. In October 2001, the Government announced that all
unlicensed branches of charities would be closed by the end of the
year. In August, the Acting Minister of Social Affairs and Labor issued
a ministerial decree to create a charitable organizations department
within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The new department
will regulate domestic charities based in the country by reviewing
their applications for registration, monitoring their operations, and
establishing a new accounting system to comply with regulations
governing charitable operations (see Section 2.c.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government places some limits on this right. The
Constitution also provides that the State protect the freedom to
practice religion in accordance with established customs, ``provided
that it does not conflict with public policy or morals.'' Islam is the
state religion. The Constitution states that Shari'a (Islamic law) is
``a main source of legislation.
The procedure for registration and licensing of religious groups
was unclear. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has official
responsibility for overseeing religious groups. Officially recognized
churches must deal with a variety of government entities, including the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (for visas and residence permits
for pastors and other staff) and the Municipality (for building
permits). While there reportedly is no official government ``list'' of
recognized churches, seven Christian churches have at least some type
of official recognition that enables them to operate openly. These
seven churches have open ``files'' at the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labor, allowing them to bring in the pastors and staff necessary to
run their churches. Further, by tradition three of the country's
churches are recognized widely as enjoying full recognition by the
Government and are allowed to operate compounds officially designated
as churches: the Catholic Church (which includes two separate churches,
the Latin Catholic and the Maronite), the Anglican Church, and the
National Evangelical Protestant Church of Kuwait. The other four
churches reportedly were allowed to operate openly, hire employees,
invite religious speakers, and conduct other such activities, all
without interference from the Government; however, according to
government records, their compounds were registered only as private
homes.
The procedures for the registration and licensing of religious
groups also appeared to be connected with government restrictions on
NGOs, religious or otherwise. In 1993 all unlicensed organizations were
ordered by the Council of Ministers to cease their activities. This
order never has been enforced; however, since that time all but five
applications by NGOs have been frozen (see Section 4). There were
reports that in the last few years at least two groups have applied for
permission to build their own churches, but the Government has not yet
responded to their requests. In October 2001, the Government announced
that all unlicensed branches of charities would be closed by the end of
the year. In August, the Acting Minister of Social Affairs and Labor
issued a ministerial decree to create a charitable organizations
department within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The new
department will regulate religious charities based in the country by
reviewing their applications for registration, monitoring their
operations and establishing a new accounting system to comply with
regulations governing charitable operations (see Section 2.b.). At the
end of the year, the Government announced that it would close any
charities that had not obtained licenses.
The Government discriminated in some instances against the Shi'a
minority. They have been disadvantaged in provision of mosques and in
access to religious education. Shi'a were underrepresented in high
government positions.
Shi'a were free to conduct their traditional forms of worship
without government interference. However, there still were complaints
regarding the scarcity of sufficient Shi'a mosques and the Government's
slowness or failure to grant approval for the construction of new Shi'a
mosques as well as the repair of existing mosques. There were
approximately 36 Shi'a mosques serving the Shi'a population in the
country, compared to 550 Sunni mosques. In 2001 the Government began to
address such concerns by licensing the construction of three new
mosques; two of these approved mosques were under construction at
year's end.
In addition the Government took steps toward greater equality for
Shi'a by instituting a separate appellate court to try Shi'a family law
cases and by agreeing to establish an independent Shi'a charity
authority comparable to the Sunni Awqaf and nongovernmental entities.
Shi'a leaders also have complained that Shi'a who aspire to serve
as imams are forced to seek appropriate training and education abroad
due to the lack of Shi'a jurisprudence courses at Kuwait University's
College of Islamic Law, which only offers Sunni jurisprudence. Shi'a
reportedly no longer expressed concern that proposed legislation
concerning Zakat and the Islamic Penal Code failed to take into account
Shi'a specific beliefs; if the laws are passed without Shi'a input,
Shi'a may be excluded from enforcement measures.
Members of religions not sanctioned in the Koran, such as Sikhs,
Hindus and Buddhists, may not build places of worship, but are allowed
to worship privately in their homes without interference from the
Government.
While some discrimination based on religion reportedly occurred on
a personal level, most observers agreed that it was not widespread.
There was a perception among some domestic employees and other members
of the unskilled labor force, particularly nationals of Southeast Asian
countries, that they would receive better treatment from employers as
well as society as a whole if they converted to Islam. However, others
did not see conversion to Islam as a factor in this regard.
The Catholic, Anglican, National Evangelical, Greek Orthodox,
Armenian Orthodox, and Coptic Orthodox Churches were able to operate
freely on their compounds, holding worship services without government
interference. The leaders of these churches stated that the Government
generally was supportive of the churches' presence, even providing
police security and traffic direction as needed. Other Christian
denominations (including Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Marthoma, and
Indian Orthodox), while not recognized legally, were allowed to operate
in private homes or in the facilities of recognized churches without
government interference, provided that they did not disturb their
neighbors and did not violate laws regarding assembly and
proselytizing.
The Government prohibited proselytizing Muslims; however, Christian
churches may serve non-Muslim congregations. The law prohibited
organized religious education other than Islam; however, this law was
not enforced rigidly and such education took place. Although informal
religious instruction occurred inside private homes and on church
compounds without government interference, there were reports that
government ``inspectors'' periodically visited public and private
schools outside church compounds to ensure that no religious teaching
other than Islam was taking place.
The Government did not permit the establishment of non-Islamic
publishing companies or training institutions for clergy. Nevertheless,
several churches published religious materials for use solely by their
congregations. Further, some churches, in the privacy of their
compounds, provided informal instruction to persons interested in
joining the clergy.
A private company, the Book House Company Ltd., was permitted to
import significant amounts of Bibles and other Christian religious
material--including videotapes and compact discs--for use solely among
the congregations of the country's recognized churches. The Book House
Company was the only bookstore that had an import license to bring in
such materials, which also required approval by government censors.
There were reports of private citizens having non-Islamic religious
materials confiscated by customs officials upon arrival at the airport.
Although there is a small community of Christian citizens, a law
passed in 1980 prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims. However,
citizens who were Christians before 1980 (and children born to families
of such citizens since that date), were allowed to transmit their
citizenship to their children.
According to the law, a non-Muslim man must convert to Islam when
he marries a Muslim woman if the marriage is to be legal in the
country. The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim
men (see Section 1.f.). A non-Muslim woman does not have to convert to
Islam to marry a Muslim man, but it is to her advantage to do so.
Failure to convert may mean that, should the couple later divorce, the
Muslim father would be granted custody of children, even those who most
likely would have been left in the mother's custody if she were Muslim.
The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion
(see Section 2.a.). However, unlike in previous years, there were no
cases during the year of writers being threatened or charged with
publishing opinions unmindful of Islamic norms.
The Papal Nuncio resided in Kuwait City and also represented
Vatican interests in the other Gulf States and Yemen. The Church viewed
the Government's establishing relations with the Vatican as significant
in terms of government tolerance of Christianity.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution does not provide for
the rights of freedom of movement, freedom of travel, and freedom to
immigrate. The Government placed some limits on freedom of movement.
Citizens have the right to travel freely within the country and to
change their workplace as desired. Unmarried women 21 years of age and
older were free to obtain a passport and travel abroad at any time;
however, married women who apply for passports must obtain their
husbands' signatures on the application form. Once she has a passport,
a married woman does not need her husband's permission to travel, but
he may prevent her departure from the country by contacting the
immigration authorities and placing a 24-hour travel ban on her. After
this 24-hour period, a court order is required if the husband still
wishes to prevent his wife from leaving the country. All minor children
must have their father's permission to travel outside of the country.
Citizens were free to emigrate and to return. Security forces in Kuwait
City occasionally set up checkpoints at which they may detain
individuals (see Section 1.d.). The checkpoints were mainly for
immigration purposes and were used to apprehend undocumented aliens. In
July the Ministry of the Interior allowed expatriates a 45-day grace
period to legalize their residency status or to depart the country
without facing possible legal action.
The law permits the Government to place a travel ban on any citizen
or foreigner who has a legal case pending before the courts. Members of
licensed NGOs must obtain government approval to attend international
conferences as official representatives of the NGO (see Sections 2.b.
and 4). The Government severely restricted the ability of its bidoon
population to travel abroad (see Sections 2.d. and 5). In January a
bidoon was arrested at a border post and charged with attempting to
leave the country illegally.
The Government has abandoned its previous policy of limiting the
presence of workers from nations whose leaders had supported Iraq in
the Gulf War. In August 2001, the Interior Minister announced that
there were no longer any special restrictions or permits required for
Palestinian workers wishing to return to the country. At year's end,
there were approximately 30,000 to 40,000 Palestinians, 30,000 to
40,000 Jordanians, and 4,000 Yemenis resident in the country.
While the Government permitted the ICRC to verify if deportees
objected to returning to their countries of origin, it detained those
with objections until they either changed their minds or made
alternative arrangements to travel to another country (see Section
1.d.).
There was no legislation governing refugees, asylees, or first
asylum, and no clear standard procedure for processing a person's claim
to be a refugee. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of
political refugees. The Government stated that it did not deport anyone
who claimed a fear of persecution in their home country, but it often
kept such persons in detention rather than grant them permission to
live and work in the country (see Section 1.d.). There were no reports
of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintained
an office in the country and had access to refugees in detention.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Under
the Constitution, the National Assembly has a limited role in approving
the Amir's choice of Crown Prince (the future Amir). If the Assembly
rejects the Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits three names from
which the Assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. There is no
universal suffrage; only about 14.8 percent of citizens have the right
to vote. Women, and citizens naturalized for less than 20 years, may
not vote or seek election to the National Assembly. Members of the
armed forces, police, and other uniformed personnel of the Ministry of
Interior are prohibited from voting or seeking election to the National
Assembly.
Under the Constitution, the Amir holds executive power and shares
legislative power with the National Assembly. The Prime Minister is
appointed by the Amir and presides over a 16-member cabinet, which he
chooses in consultation with the Amir. In accordance with the practice
of the ruling family (but not specifically the Constitution), the Prime
Minister always has been the Crown Prince. The Constitution empowers
the Amir to suspend its provisions and to rule by decree. The Amir
suspended constitutional provisions and dissolved the National Assembly
from 1976-81, and in 1986 the Amir effectively dissolved the Assembly
by suspending the constitutional provisions on the Assembly's election.
The Assembly remained dissolved until 1992, when elections were held.
Since 1992 the constitutional provisions with respect to the Assembly
have been observed. The Constitution provides that cabinet members sit
in the National Assembly and may vote on legislation. At least one
member of the Cabinet must be an elected member of the National
Assembly.
There were 50 elected National Assembly members. Members served 4-
year terms, and National Assembly elections have been held on schedule
since 1992. The Government banned political parties; however, several
well-organized and unofficial blocs, acting much as political parties,
existed and were active in the National Assembly. The Government
acknowledged and, at times, worked with these blocs, which were
organized on the basis of common ideological goals. Most political
blocs joined to form coalitions during the year. The coalitions issued
platforms and expressed an intention to run together in the next
elections. Several called for formal recognition as political parties,
although the Government indicated that it was not prepared to
acknowledge them as such. Because of the ban on political parties,
Assembly candidates must nominate themselves.
The Constitution empowers the National Assembly to overturn any
amiri decrees made during its dissolution, and the Assembly has done so
in some cases. During its first session of 1999, the National Assembly
rejected 35 of 60 amiri decrees issued during the dissolution of the
Assembly, including the decree providing for women's political rights.
The National Assembly did not amend any amiri proposals during the
year.
In December 2000, a by-election was held to fill the seat of a
deceased assembly member. The election campaign was considered
generally free and fair. Press reports cited allegations of vote buying
leveled at the candidate who won the election; however no official
accusations were made.
In February 2001, the Cabinet resigned after a number of its
members were scheduled for intense formal questioning by the National
Assembly. At the request of the Amir, the Prime Minister formed a new
government that included changes in key ministerial positions.
In October 2001, various assembly members proposed formal
questioning of four ministers. In the most serious case, the Minister
of Oil was accused of being an agent for a foreign petroleum company
because his wife was allegedly on the company's payroll. Liberal
assembly members complained that Islamists were using the threat of
formal questioning to change government policy on specific issues, such
as regulation of Islamic charities and gender segregation.
Women did not have the right to vote and had little opportunity to
influence government. A May 1999 amiri decree gave women the right to
vote, to seek election to the National Assembly beginning with the
National Assembly election scheduled for 2003, and to hold cabinet
office. However, in November 1999, the Parliament vetoed the May
decree, based in part on the Amir having bypassed the Assembly by
introducing the change while the Assembly was not in session and in
part on traditionalist resistance to women's suffrage. Shortly
thereafter members of the Assembly introduced identical legislation,
but it also was defeated. No new legislation has been introduced by
either the Government or by assembly members. In June 2001, a poll of
university students showed that 84 percent of female students and 65
percent of male students favored women's suffrage. Women did hold some
relatively senior nonpolitical positions within some ministries.
There was one Shi'a member of the Cabinet, the Minister of
Commerce. Of 50 National Assembly members, 6 were Shi'a, as was the
armed forces Chief of Staff.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued its practice of preventing the
establishment of new local human rights groups by not approving their
requests for licenses (see Section 2.b.). Since 1985 the Government has
issued only five licenses. The only local human rights NGO in operation
was the Kuwait Human Rights Society. The Government refused other
license requests on the grounds that previously established NGOs
already provided services similar to those proposed by the petitioners.
Members of licensed NGOs must obtain permission from the Government to
attend international conferences as official representatives of the
NGO; however, there were no cases of NGOs being restricted from
attending any conference during the year (see Sections 2.b. and 2.d.).
NGOs cannot receive foreign funding without government authorization.
The Government has not shut down any unlicensed NGOs since early
2000. In August 2001, the Government began prohibiting public
collection boxes for unlicensed Islamic charities to prevent potential
misuse of funds (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
The Government permitted international human rights organizations
to visit the country and to establish offices. Several organizations
conducted fieldwork and reported excellent communication with and
reasonable cooperation from the Government. For example, AI and Human
Rights Watch regularly exchanged information with the Government either
directly or through the Arab Human Rights Organization.
The Government has cooperated fully in the work of the U.N. Special
Rapporteurs for Iran and Iraq and the high-level representative of the
Secretary General on the issue of its citizens missing in Iraq since
the end of the Gulf War. In 2000 the Government submitted its first
periodic report on the implementation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
The Government cooperated closely with the International Labor
Organization (ILO), which sent two senior officials in November 2001 to
advise them on how to improve the labor situation within the country.
At the ILO's urging, the Government agreed to ratify the remaining two
of eight conventions from the ILO's Declaration of Basic Rights at
Work. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor approved the provisions,
which were being reviewed by the Legal Advice and Legislation
Department at year's end.
The National Assembly has an active Human Rights Committee, which
took testimony from individuals regarding abuses, investigated
conditions in prisons and nursing homes, and made nonbinding
recommendations for redress. Despite its designation as an advisory
body, the Human Rights Committee has shown that, in practice, it is
able to mobilize government agencies to address significant human
rights problems. In July 2001, the committee announced that it would
publish an annual report on human rights in the country; however the
report had not been published at year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, national
origin, language, or religion. However, many laws and regulations
discriminated against women and noncitizens, who faced widespread
social, economic, and legal discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women was a problem. Each of the country's
50 police stations reportedly received on average 1 to 2 complaints of
spousal abuse each week, although this may be understated. Of the
complaints received, approximately 60 percent involved spousal abuse of
noncitizen women. The police and the courts generally sought to resolve
family disputes informally. The police referred serious cases to the
Ministry of Health. The courts have found husbands guilty of spousal
abuse.
Rape and sexual assault remained serious problems, particularly for
foreign domestic servants or unskilled workers. The police occasionally
arrested rapists who held their victims for a period of days, raping
them repeatedly. The law provides that citizens found guilty of crimes
that violate moral integrity, such as rape or incest, are forbidden
from holding public jobs. In January, the court upheld a 15-year prison
sentence handed down to a police officer who kidnaped and raped a
woman. In June, three Bangladeshi men convicted of the 1996 rape and
murder of a Sri Lankan housemaid were hanged. There were 10 reported
incidents of gang rape during the year.
Some employers physically abused foreign women working as domestic
servants, and, despite economic and social difficulties for a domestic
servant who lodged a complaint, there were continuing reports of the
rape of such women by male employers and male coworkers. The local
press devoted considerable attention to the problem, and both the
police and the courts have taken action against employers when
presented with evidence of serious abuse. Some rapes resulted in
unwanted pregnancies. There were reports of domestic servants killing
children that were fathered by employers. Occasionally, domestic
workers were charged with assaulting their employers; in such cases,
the workers claimed that they acted in response to physical abuse or
poor working conditions. There were also dozens of reports of domestic
workers committing or attempting to commit suicide because of
desperation over poor working conditions. In general these involved
hanging or jumping from windows.
Foreign-born domestic employees have the right to sue their
employers for abuse, but few do so, fearing judicial bias and
deportation. A specialized police facility investigated some complaints
and provided some shelter for runaway maids (see Sections 6.c. and
6.e.).
There were a number of pending cases in which foreign-born domestic
employees were tortured, severely beaten, or died at the hands of their
employers. In April, an Indian maid was beaten severely and tortured
over a period of several months by her sponsor's family members,
including the children of the sponsor. The maid suffered severe head
trauma that included nearly having her ear amputated at the hands of
the sponsor's family. The wife of the sponsor was arrested and was
awaiting trial at year's end. The maid has since returned to her home
in India. The case prompted considerable public concern.
In April, a citizen woman was sentenced to 7 years in jail for
beating her Indonesian maid to death with a vacuum cleaner. Three of
her children were acquitted. There were no new developments in the
kidnap, rape, torture, and beating of a group of four domestic workers
allegedly by state security employees in June 2000.
Runaway servants, including many women alleging physical or sexual
abuse, often seek shelter at their country's embassy for repatriation
or a change in employers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.). At any given
time, nearly 1,000 women were reported to be in embassy shelters.
Unemployed, runaway foreign domestic workers were susceptible to
recruitment into prostitution. The police actively enforced laws
against pandering and prostitution, with arrests reported almost every
week. Prostitutes generally were deported to their countries of origin.
In recent years, procurers received stiff jail terms. There were at
least three reports during the year of procurers kidnaping maids off
the street and forcing them into prostitution.
``Honor'' crimes are not considered acceptable and there is no
provision in the Criminal Code that allows for leniency in such cases.
In May, three men and one woman were arrested for taking part in an
'honor killing' that resulted in the death of a 6-year old female
citizen. The killing was allegedly planned to avenge the honor of the
arrested woman's family after it was discovered that the woman had a
sexual relationship with the victim's brother. The case was under
appeal at year's end.
There have also been reports of women, mainly from Asia who have
been trafficked and brought into the country to work as prostitutes.
Many had initially been brought to the country as domestic servants
(see Section 6.f.).
Women continued to experience legal and social discrimination.
Women are denied the right to vote (see Section 3). Their testimony is
worth half that of a man's in proceedings before the family courts (see
Section 1.e.). Married women require their husbands' permission to
obtain a passport (see Section 2.d.). By law only men are able to
confer citizenship; therefore, children born to citizen mothers and
stateless fathers are themselves stateless. The Government forbids
marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men (see Sections 1.f. and
2.c.). Inheritance is governed by Islamic law, which differs according
to the branch of Islam. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a
women may inherit all property, while Sunni women inherit only a
portion, with the balance divided among brothers, uncles, and male
cousins of the deceased.
In January, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Education stated
that the election law was the main hurdle to women's political rights.
In February the Court of First Instance postponed a decision on the
case of two women seeking the right to vote. On February 18, women
participated in a march to be included in the electoral rolls. In
March, the Interior and Defense Committee of the National Assembly
rejected the women's suffrage bill on the basis that the Legislative
and Legal Committee already had rejected it. In April the court
postponed the case of a woman suing to register her name on the
electoral roll.
Women traditionally are restrained from choosing certain roles in
society, and the law restricted women from working in ``dangerous
industries'' and trades ``harmful'' to health. However, almost all
citizens worked for the state in office jobs. Educated women maintained
that the conservative nature of society limited career opportunities.
An estimated 33 percent of citizen women of working age were employed.
The law provided for ``remuneration equal to that of a man provided she
does the same work.'' This provision was respected in practice. A few
women have been appointed to senior positions in the Ministry of
Education, the Ministry of Planning, and the state-owned Kuwaiti
Petroleum Corporation. There was one female ambassador and two female
undersecretaries; however, there were no female judges or prosecutors.
There is no specific law that addressed ``sexual harassment'';
however, it was not reported to be a problem other than for domestic
servants.
In cases of divorce, the Government makes family entitlement
payments to the divorced husband, who is expected by law and custom to
provide for his children even though custody of minor children usually
was given to the mother. The law discriminated against women married to
foreign men. Such women are not entitled to government housing
subsidies, which are available to male citizens. The law also requires
women to pay residence fees for their husbands and does not recognize
marriage as the basis for granting residency to foreign-born husbands.
Instead the law grants residency only if the husband is employed. By
contrast male citizens married to foreign-born women do not have to pay
residency fees for their spouses, and their spouses' right to residency
derives from marriage.
In response to pressure from the National Assembly to comply with a
law passed in 1996, the university increased the number of classes
segregated by gender. Although deans have the option to leave higher
level classes mixed if it can be justified because of lack of
professors or classroom space, the number of mixed classes dropped
during the year, and all freshman and sophomore classes are segregated
by gender.
Polygyny is legal; however, it was more common among tribal
elements of the population.
There were several women's organizations that followed women's
issues, among the most active of which were the Women's Cultural and
Social Society (WCSS) and the Women's Affairs Committee.
Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
Citizen boys and girls received a free education, which extended
through the university level, including advanced degrees. The
Government provided free health care and a variety of other services to
citizen children; noncitizen children must pay a small fee to be
admitted into a health facility and additional fees for specialized
care. Citizen parents also received a monthly government allowance for
each child.
The marriage of girls under the age of 17 was uncommon among the
urban population but remained a practice of the Bedouins in outlying
areas. There were credible reports of underage South Asian and
Southeast Asian girls working as domestic servants (see Sections 6.c.
and 6.d.).
Young boys from Bangladesh, Sudan, Eritrea are brought into the
country to be used as camel jockeys (see Sections 6.c., and 6.d.). Many
of the jockeys came to the country from racing during the season in
other Gulf nations.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children; however, there
were some cases of male youths, some as young as 6 years old, raped by
men or gangs of other male youths. There were incidents of arrests in
some cases, but no convictions were reported.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no institutionalized
discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment,
education, or in the provision of state services. Legislation passed by
the National Assembly in 1996 mandated accessibility for persons with
disabilities to all public facilities, and provided an affirmative
action employment program for persons with disabilities. However, this
law has not been implemented fully. The law prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities and imposes penalties against
employers who refrained from hiring persons with disabilities without
reasonable cause. The Government paid extensive stipends to citizens
with disabilities, which covered transportation, housing, job training,
and social welfare. There were no similar provisions for noncitizens.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The plight of the 74,000 bidoon
remained a significant problem, and the Government continued to address
the issue. The bidoon (a term meaning ``without'') are Arabs who have
residency ties to the country--some going back for generations, some
for briefer periods--but who have no documentation of their
nationality. The bidoon have been the objects of harsh government
policy since the mid-1980s. Since 1985 the Government has eliminated
the bidoon from the census rolls, discontinued their access to
government jobs and free education, and sought to deport many. In 1993
the Government decreed that bidoon males no longer would be allowed to
serve in the military; however, in July 2001, the Minister of Defense
suspended action to force bidoon to resign from the Army. The
Government has denied bidoon official documents such as birth
certificates, marriage certificates, civil identification, and drivers'
licenses, which made it difficult for many unregistered bidoon,
particularly young bidoon, to find employment. Bidoon paid more for
medical care than citizens do, although less than residents of other
countries. The Government did not issue travel documents to bidoon
routinely, and if bidoon traveled abroad without documentation, they
risked being barred from returning to the country unless they received
advance permission from the immigration authorities. Marriages posed
special hardships because the offspring of male bidoon inherited the
father's undetermined legal status.
A law passed in June 2000 required bidoon to register by June 27,
2000 to begin the process under which they could be documented as
citizens. The law provided that bidoon who were able to prove
sufficient ties to the country (that is, their presence, or the
presence of their forebears, in the country prior to 1965) were
eligible to apply for citizenship directly. The Government currently
has 122,216 bidoon cases on file. Of these, 30,824 officially have
registered as bidoon and may be naturalized directly from bidoon
status, if they are able to prove Kuwaiti nationality. However, the
Government maintained that at least 40 to 50 percent of the bidoon were
concealing their true identities. While the law allows up to 2,000
registered bidoon to be naturalized each year, the Government only
granted citizenship to 1,647 during the year. However, an additional
5,500 bidoon in 3 categories--wives of citizens, sons of female
citizens married to bidoon, and those whose male relatives are
citizens--have been permitted to apply for citizenship beyond the 2,000
per year limit.
The Government has not stated clearly what will happen to bidoon
unable to provide documentation proving sufficient ties. An Executive
Committee in Charge of the Bidoon under the Ministry of Interior has
been designated to resolve the issue. The Government had stated that
those who did not register by the June 27, 2000 cut-off date and who
did not rectify their status will be subject to deportation as illegal
residents; however, no such action was taken during the year. There
were no reports during the year that the Government decided the
nationality of any bidoon without a hearing. As a result of what
allegedly were fraudulent applications, the Government brought forgery
charges against 108 bidoon applicants for naturalization since July
2001. The only forgery conviction was in 2001.
Since July 2000, when the new law went into effect, 5,312 bidoon
have been documented as citizens of other countries. Most have admitted
to Saudi or Syrian origin. Once documented, bidoon are able to obtain
residency permits and other official papers. However, there also were
credible reports of government authorities encouraging bidoon to
purchase counterfeit passports in order to establish a claim to an
alternate nationality.
In June, the Council of Ministers and the Amir discussed a draft
law which would require bidoon to submit a passport with a valid permit
when applying for Kuwaiti citizenship. The Council of Ministers and the
Amir approved the draft law and referred it to the National Assembly
for ratification. A final vote on the law had not yet taken place by
year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers had the right to join unions.
Nonetheless, the Government restricted the right of freedom of
association by stipulating that there be only one union per
occupational trade, and that unions may establish only one federation.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long criticized such
restrictions.
Approximately 60,000 persons, less than 5 percent of a total work
force of 1.27 million, were organized into unions, of which 14 were
affiliated with the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF), the sole
legal trade union federation. The Bank Workers Union and the Kuwait
Airways Workers Union were independent of the KTUF. The law stipulates
that any new union must include at least 100 workers, 15 of whom must
be citizens. Both the ILO and the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) have criticized this requirement because it
discourages unions in sectors that employ few citizens, such as the
construction industry and the domestic servant sector. Only 5.6 percent
of employed citizens worked in the private sector. Despite KTUF
complaints about the need for an updated law, draft proposals for a new
labor law have remained under consideration for more than 10 years.
A new draft Labor Law was submitted in November 2001 to the Council
of Ministers. At year's end, the Council of Ministers Legal Affairs
Committee was examining it.
The Government's pervasive oversight powers further eroded union
independence. The Government subsidizes as much as 90 percent of most
union budgets and may inspect the financial records of any union. The
ILO has criticized the legal prohibition on any union from engaging in
political or religious activities, which are vaguely defined. The law
empowers the courts to dissolve any union for violating labor laws or
for threatening ``public order and morals,'' although such a court
decision may be appealed. The Amir also may dissolve a union by decree.
By law the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor is authorized to seize
the assets of any dissolved union. The ILO has criticized this aspect
of the law. Although no union has been dissolved, the law subordinates
the legal existence of the unions to the power of the State.
According to government statistics published during the year,
1,021,481 foreigners were employed in the country. They constituted
over 80 percent of the work force but less than 5 percent of the
unionized work force. The Labor Law discriminated against foreign
workers by denying them voting rights and by permitting them to join
unions only after 5 years of residence, although the KTUF stated that
this requirement was not enforced. The KTUF administered an Expatriate
Labor Office, which was authorized to investigate complaints of foreign
laborers and provide them with free legal advice. Any foreign worker
covered under the Labor Law, which excluded domestic servants, could
submit a grievance to the Labor Office regardless of union status.
However, such services were not utilized widely.
In November 2001, two senior members of the ILO Secretariat advised
the Government on how to improve its labor situation, including
ratification of the remaining two of eight conventions from the ILO's
Declaration of Basic Rights at Work. The Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor approved the provisions, which were under review by the Legal
Advice and Legislation Department at year's end. In addition to other
areas of ongoing concern, ILO officials also pointed to problem areas
where the Government could make improvements, including low wages and
widespread abuse of domestic servants, and the lack of a minimum wage
for workers, who must pay health, education, and other fees to the
Government. The ILO officials commended the Government for progress in
increased freedoms for existing trade unions and improved rights for
workers, such as sick leave and end-of-service benefits.
The Labor Law prohibits antiunion discrimination. Any worker who
alleges antiunion discrimination has the right to appeal to the
judiciary. There were no reports of discrimination against employees
based on their affiliation with a union. Employers found guilty of
antiunion discrimination must reinstate workers fired for union
activities.
Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The KTUF belonged
to the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the
formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the right to organize and bargain collectively, subject to certain
restrictions (see Section 6.a.). These rights have been incorporated in
the Labor Law and, according to all reports, have been respected in
practice.
The Labor Law provides for direct negotiations between employers
and ``laborers or their representatives'' in the private sector. Most
disagreements were resolved in such negotiations; if not, either party
may petition the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for mediation. If
mediation fails, the dispute is referred to a labor arbitration board,
which is composed of officials from the High Court of Appeals, the
Attorney General's office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor.
The Civil Service Law makes no provision for collective bargaining
between government workers and their employer. Technically, wages and
conditions of employment for civil service workers are established by
the Government, but in practice, the Government sets the benefit scales
after conducting informal meetings with officials from the civil
service unions. Union officials resolved most issues at the working
level and had regular access to senior officials.
The law limits the right to strike. It requires that all labor
disputes must be referred to compulsory arbitration if labor and
management are unable to reach a solution. The law does not contain any
provision ensuring strikers freedom from legal or administrative action
taken against them by the State. However, the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs has proved responsive to sit-ins or protests by workers
who faced obvious wrongdoing by their employers.
There were no strikes during the year.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor ``except in cases specified by law for national
emergency and with just remuneration''; however, many unskilled foreign
workers were treated like indentured servants (see Section 6.e.). The
Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children. However,
there were reports of young boys being used as camel jockeys, as well
as of underage girls working as domestic servants (see Sections 5 and
6.d.).
Foreign workers generally may not change their employment without
permission from their original sponsors unless they have been in the
country for more than 2 years. Domestic workers particularly were
vulnerable to abuses stemming from restrictions on transferring
sponsorship because the Labor Law does not protect them. In many cases
employers exercised control over their servants by withholding their
passports, although the Government prohibits this practice, and in some
instances acted to retrieve the passports of maids involved in
disputes.
Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled South
Asian workers, lived and worked much like indentured servants. They
frequently faced poor working conditions and at times encountered
physical abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.e.). Domestic servants who ran
away from their employers could be treated as criminals under the law.
However, the authorities usually did not enforce this provision. In
some reported cases, employers illegally withheld wages from domestic
servants to cover the costs involved in bringing them to the country.
There were credible reports of widespread visa trading, a system by
which sponsors agreed to extend their sponsorship to workers outside of
the country in exchange for a fee of $1,500 to $4,000 (451 to 1202
dinars). Middlemen, generally foreigners, used the promise of Kuwaiti
sponsorship to attract workers from economically depressed countries,
taking a commission and remitting the rest to the nominal sponsor. Once
in the country, such workers were passed on to employers in the
informal sector or found employment with parties that would otherwise
be unable to sponsor them. Foreign workers who were recruited with
these traded visas not only faced possible prosecution for being
engaged in illegal employment (that is, working for an employer other
than their sponsor), but also left themselves extremely vulnerable to
extortion by employers, sponsors, and middlemen. Visa trading has
resulted in growing numbers of unemployed foreign workers who buy visas
to enter the country and then are unable to find work. Government
efforts to crack down on visa trading, such as closing front companies
for visa traders, have not made significant progress. There were laws
aimed at curbing visa trading, with penalties against both employers
and visa traders, but the laws seldom were enforced. Unlike in previous
years, there were no cases of enforcement.
For over 10 years, the ILO has criticized a 1979 legislative decree
that requires prior authorization for public meetings and gatherings,
and provides for a penalty of imprisonment including an obligation to
work in a vocation of the prisoner's choosing within the prison system.
The ILO also was critical of a 1980 legislative decree respecting
security, order, and discipline aboard ships, breaches of which also
may be punished by imprisonment with an obligation to work.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age is 18 years for all forms of work,
both full- and part-time. Employers may obtain permits from the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to employ juveniles between the
ages of 14 and 18 in certain trades. Juveniles may work a maximum of 6
hours a day on the condition that they work no more than 4 consecutive
hours followed by a 1-hour rest period.
Article 42 of the Constitution prohibits forced labor, including
forced or bonded labor by children. In addition, the Labor Law
prohibits child labor, forced or compulsory labor, and exploitation of
workers. The Government has ratified 14 ILO conventions, including the
conventions prohibiting servitude and forced labor, and its Labor Law
enforced these conventions. Child labor was rare in the country;
however, some South Asian and Southeast Asian domestic servants were
under age 18 (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Such underage workers
reportedly falsified their ages in order to enter the country. There
were reports of young boys being used as camel jockeys (see Sections 5
and 6.c.). Some small businessmen employed their children on a part-
time basis.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labor is responsible for enforcing all labor laws. An informal two-
tiered labor market ensured high wages for citizen employees, most of
whom were in government white collar or executive positions, while
foreign workers, even those in skilled positions, received
substantially lower wages. In June 2001, the visiting Bangladeshi
Foreign Minister reported that Bangladeshi domestic workers earned as
little as $70 per month (21 dinars). There was no legal minimum wage in
the private sector. In the public sector, the monthly minimum wage was
approximately $753 (227 dinars) for citizens and approximately $300 (90
dinars) for noncitizens. However, noncitizens did not receive the same
social benefits as citizens and must pay fees for education and health
care, which were provided free for all citizens. Private sector wages
ranged from $10,000 (3,000 dinars) each month for top managers of large
companies to between $500 to $2500 (150 to 750 dinars) for other
skilled professionals and nonskilled workers. The public sector minimum
wage provided a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Wages of unskilled workers in the private sector did not always provide
a decent standard of living, with housemaids often making less than
$115 (35 dinars) per month. To be eligible to sponsor family members
for residency, government and private sector workers must receive a
minimum wage of $1,500 (450 dinars) per month; this figure represented
an 11 percent increase from 2001.
The Labor Law establishes general conditions of work for the
private sector, with the oil industry treated separately. The Civil
Service Law also prescribes additional conditions for the public
sector, which consisted almost entirely of citizen workers. The Labor
Law limits the standard work week to 48 hours with 1 full day of rest
per week, provides for a minimum of 14 workdays of leave each year, and
establishes a compensation schedule for industrial accidents. In July
2001, the Government initiated a new program of unemployment allowances
for citizen graduates who are unable to find jobs in the public sector
or with private companies, providing regular payments until such
positions are found. Domestic servants, who specifically were excluded
from the Labor Law, frequently worked long hours, greatly in excess of
48 hours.
The ILO has urged the Government to extend the weekly 24-
consecutive-hour rest period to temporary workers employed for a period
of less than 6 months and workers in enterprises employing fewer than
five persons. The law pertaining to the oil industry provides for a 40-
hour workweek, 30 days of annual leave, and sick leave. Laws
establishing work conditions were not applied uniformly to foreign
workers.
The Government has issued occupational health and safety standards;
however, compliance and enforcement appeared poor, especially with
respect to unskilled foreign laborers. To decrease accident rates, the
Government periodically inspected installations to raise awareness
among workers and employers, and to ensure that they abided by the
safety rules, controlled the pollution resulting from certain dangerous
industries, trained workers who use new machines in specialized
institutes, and reported violations. Workers had the right to remove
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their
continued employment, and legal protection existed for both citizen and
foreign workers who filed complaints about such conditions. However,
the Government never has devoted sufficient attention to worker safety
issues, which has resulted in poor training of inspectors, inadequate
injury reports, and no link between insurance payments and accident
reports.
While the law mandates that all outdoor work stop in the event that
the temperature rises above 122 degrees Fahrenheit, there were
allegations that the Government's meteorological division falsified
official readings to allow work to proceed; however, the Meteorological
Division consistently has denied these allegations. During the months
of July and August 2001, the official temperature was documented above
122 degrees Fahrenheit on several occasions, but work reportedly
continued at many outdoor locations. At the Ahmadi Port refinery, work
continued in intense heat despite the collapse of three workers.
Refinery shift supervisors reportedly asked for postponement of outdoor
activities until the evening, but management refused their request.
Employers often exploited workers' willingness to accept
substandard conditions. Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or
semiskilled South Asian workers, lived and worked much like indentured
servants, were unaware of their legal rights, and generally lacked the
means to pursue a legal remedy. They frequently faced contractual
disputes and poor working conditions, and may face physical and sexual
abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Most were in debt to their employers
before they arrived in the country and had little choice but to accept
the employer's conditions, even if they breached the contractual terms.
It was not uncommon for wages to be withheld for a period of months, or
to be decreased substantially. Many foreign workers were forced to live
in ``housing camps,'' which generally were overcrowded and lacked
adequate cooking and bathroom facilities. Workers were housed 10 or
more to a room in squalid conditions, many without access to adequate
running water. The workers were only allowed off the camp compound on
company transport or by permission of the employer. Foreign workers'
ability to change their employment was limited, and, in some cases,
employers' possession of foreign workers' passports allowed them to
exercise control over such employees (see Section 6.c). Many foreign
workers went heavily into debt and could not afford to return home.
The Labor Law discriminates against foreign workers by limiting
their ability to join unions (see Section 6.a.). The KTUF administered
an Expatriate Labor Office, which was authorized to investigate
complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free legal advice.
However, these services were not utilized widely. Any foreign worker
could submit a grievance to the labor office regardless of union
status.
The Labor Law provides for employer-provided medical care and
compensation to both citizen and foreign workers disabled by injury or
disease due to job-related causes. Once a worker files a claim, the
courts decide the amount of compensation, which is paid in one lump sum
rather than monthly payments. Workers, especially foreigners, have had
difficulty enforcing such decisions. The law also requires that
employers provide periodic medical examinations to workers exposed to
environmental hazards on the job, such as chemicals and asbestos.
Foreigners must pay high fees for medical care, both yearly and each
time medical care is provided. Many employers deducted the medical fees
from employees' salaries. Adequate and affordable health care remained
a problem for many foreign workers. No health insurance system existed.
Domestic servants were not covered under the Labor Law. Those who
flee their employers may be treated as criminals, although the
authorities usually did not prosecute them. In some reported cases,
employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the
costs involved in bringing them to the country. It is also a common
practice for employers illegally to withhold their passports. Maids
paid the same amount or more than other unskilled or semiskilled
workers for visas to work in the country.
Runaway servants often sought help at their country's embassy for
either repatriation or assistance in dealing with employers. The
numbers of servants in need of assistance remained high during the year
as conditions for domestic employees remained poor.
Although most such workers sought shelter due to contractual or
financial problems with their employers, some women also alleged
physical and sexual abuse. Some embassies continued to report the
steady occurrence of physical abuse and mistreatment involving domestic
servants, including withheld salaries, overwork, and not being fed
regularly or enough. Each government has attempted to register its
nationals who arrive to work in the country as domestic employees and
to regulate recruiting agents in their home countries, without much
success. Limited services provided by the police facility designated to
mediate among embassies, domestic workers, and employers made it very
difficult for domestic servants to file complaints, receive withheld
salary, or reach settlement in cases of mistreatment. Domestic servants
must deal with neighborhood police stations, whose personnel are
untrained and inexperienced in handling their cases and often side with
the employer (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Some countries either have warned their female citizens about such
work conditions or banned them altogether from working in the country
as domestic servants. The Government of India officially banned its
nationals from working in the country as domestic employees, but Indian
nationals still buy visas and enter the country as domestic workers. In
2000 the Egyptian Foreign Minister warned women seeking employment in
all Gulf countries to ``exercise caution'' and to avoid being forced
into illegal activities. In June 2001, the Bangladeshi government
lifted its ban on domestic servants coming to the country.
The courts find in favor of employees in an estimated 90 percent of
the labor disputes they hear, but this success did not result in
improved conditions for foreign workers. No legal mechanism exists for
foreign workers to enforce settlements. There is no compulsion for
employers to obey court rulings, and workers often did not receive
court-ordered compensation. Employers also reportedly used illegal
methods to pressure foreign employees to drop cases against them, such
as by withholding their passports, encouraging police intimidation and
brutality, and filing criminal charges against them for fabricated
crimes, such as theft.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons, although laws against slavery, prostitution,
forced labor, coercion, kidnaping, and other acts could be used to
prosecute traffickers. The Government has ratified some international
conventions that commit it to apply these laws.
In April a report on female foreign workers in the country showed
that the migrants had been promised domestic work, but often were
employed in other work. In addition, many were expected to provide
sexual services in addition to their domestic services and a modest
proportion were engaged in prostitution exclusively.
In three incidents during the year, procurers kidnaped domestic
servants off the street and temporarily forced them into prostitution.
In these cases, the kidnapers were arrested and the domestic servants
released.
In 2001 police broke up several organized rings involved in
prostitution and the trading of sex slaves. In one of the rings,
approximately 100 prostitutes, along with their pimps and clients, were
arrested. Fifty were young Asian women who had been traded as sex
slaves.
__________
LEBANON
Lebanon is a parliamentary republic, with a constitution dating
from 1926, in which, based on the unwritten ``National Pact of 1943,''
the President is a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni
Muslim, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim.
President Emile Lahoud took office in 1998 after an election by
Parliament that was heavily influenced by Syria. The Parliament
consists of 128 deputies, equally divided between Christian and Muslim
representatives. In parliamentary elections in 2000, incumbent Prime
Minister Salim al-Hoss lost his seat in a contested election, and
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was named Prime Minister by
President Lahoud in October 2000. According to international observers,
the elections were flawed; however, there reportedly were fewer voting
irregularities than in the 1996 parliamentary elections. Although the
judiciary was independent in principle, in practice, it was subject to
political pressure.
Non-Lebanese military and paramilitary forces retained significant
influence over much of the country. According to the 1989 Taif Accord,
a peace settlement to end the civil war, the Syrian and Lebanese
governments were to determine the redeployment of Syrian troops to
specified areas of the Biqa' Valley, with full withdrawal contingent
upon subsequent agreement by both governments. The Syrian government
did not carry out this partial redeployment and has prevented
implementation of other political reforms stipulated by the Taif
Accord. Strong Syrian influence over local politics and decision makers
made officials unwilling to press for further progress on fulfilling
Taif agreements, including Syrian withdrawal. Since the Taif Accord was
signed, no government has requested formally the withdrawal of Syrian
forces. The Government's relationship with Syria did not reflect the
will of most of the country's citizens.
In 1991 the Governments of Syria and Lebanon concluded a security
agreement that provided a framework for security cooperation between
their armed forces. Approximately 22,000 Syrian troops were stationed
in locations throughout the country, excluding the south. An
undetermined number of Syrian military intelligence personnel in the
country continued to conduct their activities independently.
Until May 2000, Israel exerted control in or near its self-
proclaimed ``security zone'' in the south through direct military
action and support for its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). In
2000, after 22 years of occupation, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops
withdrew from the south and the SLA disbanded. Following the
withdrawal, the Government deployed more than 1,000 police and soldiers
to the former security zone. The Government did not attempt to disarm
Hizballah, a terrorist organization operating in the region.
Palestinian groups operated autonomously in refugee camps
throughout the country. Several armed Palestinian factions were located
in the refugee camps, although their freedom of movement was restricted
significantly. The Government did not attempt to assert state control
over the Palestinian camps; however, during the year it successfully
took into custody fugitives who had sought refuge in the camps.
During the year, Hizballah, the influence of the Syrian government,
and Palestinian groups all undermined the authority of the Government
and interfered with the application of law in those areas not
completely under the Government's control.
The security forces consisted of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the
Internal Security Forces (ISF), which enforced laws, conducted searches
and arrests, and referred cases to the judiciary; and the State
Security Apparatus and the Surete Generale, both of which collected
information on groups deemed a possible threat to state security. The
Surete Generale was responsible for the issuance of passports and
residency permits, the screening and censoring of foreign periodicals,
plays, documentaries, television programs, and movies, and the
censoring of those parts that addressed national security issues and
``morals.'' The security forces committed numerous, serious human
rights abuses, sometimes acting independently, and other times on
instruction of senior government officials.
The country of approximately 4 million had a market-based economy,
in which the majority of the private sector was employed in the service
sector and in a small industrial sector. During the year, there was
slow implementation of economic reforms, unfavorable domestic political
developments, and continuing regional instability that led to nearly
stagnant economic activity. Unemployment was estimated to be
approximately 25 percent.
The Government's overall human rights record remained poor;
although there were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems
remained. The right of citizens to change their government remained
significantly restricted by the lack of complete government control
over parts of the country, shortcomings in the electoral system, the
flawed 2000 elections, and Syrian influence. Members of the security
forces used excessive force and tortured and abused some detainees.
Prison conditions remained poor. Government abuses also included the
arbitrary arrest and detention of persons who were critical of
government policies. Despite a new Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted
in 2001, lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials remained
problems. The courts were subject to political pressure. During the
year, the Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and
continued surveillance of political activities. The Government limited
press and media freedom.
The Government continued to restrict freedom of assembly and
imposed some limits on freedom of association. There were some
restrictions on freedom of religion. The Government imposed some limits
on freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against women,
abuse of children, discrimination against Palestinians, forced labor,
including by children, child labor, and the mistreatment of foreign
domestic servants remained problems.
Palestinian groups in refugee camps maintained a separate, often
arbitrary, system of justice for Palestinians living in the camps.
Palestinians sometimes appealed to the country's authorities for legal
recourse, often through both their Lebanese and Palestinian agents in
the camps. Lebanon was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD)
Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as an observer.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents. On November 21, American citizen
missionary Bonnie Witherall was killed at the Sidon health clinic where
she worked. It is believed that Sunni extremists, possibly operating
from the Ain Al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp, were responsible.
However, no group has claimed responsibility for the killing and the
case remained unsolved at year's end (see Section 2.c.).
On January 24, former Lebanese Forces Commander and former cabinet
member Elie Hobeiqa and three of his bodyguards were killed when a car
bomb exploded near Hobeiqa's residence. Five men were detained by the
authorities for questioning but were later released. On May 21, Jihad
Jibril, the son of the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command, was killed when an explosive
detonated inside his car. Two persons were in government custody in
connection with the killings at year's end. Unknown groups claimed
responsibility for the above killings. Also on May 21, the body of
Ramzi Irani, the officer-in-charge of the banned Lebanese Forces at the
Lebanese University was found 14 days after he was discovered missing.
No one has claimed responsibility for his death.
In March State Prosecutor General Adnan Addoum acknowledged that
four persons had died in custody during 2000; a Sudanese asylum seeker
and three SLA detainees died of natural causes. There were no reported
deaths in custody during the year.
The judicial system continued to suffer from a backlog of hearings
into cases of deaths in custody, some as old as 6 years. Such cases
sometimes involved individuals connected to political groups or accused
of criminal activity.
Following IDF withdrawal in 2000, violence in and around the former
Israeli controlled security zone decreased significantly. However,
there were a number of violent cross-border incidents since the
withdrawal, involving Hizballah, Palestinian, and other unidentified
armed elements. No incidents resulted in civilian deaths during the
year.
According to the LAF National Demining Office, there were
approximately 400,000 landmines in the former security zone that had
been occupied by Israel. The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) statistics on recorded landmines in the former security zone
indicated that 50,644 antipersonnel mines were located in 108
minefields along the Lebanon-Israel border. Since the Israeli
withdrawal, there have been 35 deaths and 192 injuries due to landmine
accidents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Since 1999 the Government has worked to investigate cases of
disappearance during the civil war, concluding in September 2000 that
all persons who disappeared at least 4 years before the end of the
civil war were dead. However, in December 2000, following the release
by the Syrian authorities of an estimated 149 Lebanese detainees from
Syrian jails, including some who had been declared dead, the Government
formed a new committee to reexamine the cases and received about 800
applications from family members.
In 2001 the Israeli government announced that the Israel soldiers
kidnaped by Hizballah in 2000 were believed to be dead. During the
year, Hizballah continued to maintain the position that it would
release Israeli soldiers in return for the release of Arab prisoners
held by Israel.
In October 2000, Hizballah kidnaped IDF reservist Elhann
Tannenbaum. At year's end, he was still presumed to be detained.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture is not banned specifically by the Constitution,
and there continued to be credible reports that security forces abused
detainees and, in some instances, used torture. Human rights groups
reported that torture was a common practice. Violent abuse usually
occurred during preliminary investigations conducted at police stations
or military installations, in which suspects were interrogated without
an attorney. Such abuse occurred despite laws that prevented judges
from accepting any confession extracted under duress.
Methods of torture reportedly included beatings and suspension by
arms tied behind the back. Unlike in the past, there were no reported
applications of electric shocks to the genitals.
In 2001, the Justice Minister publicly stated that ``torture in
Lebanese prisons is real, and mainly occurs during preliminary
investigations.'' The Minister also added that the Government would
adopt measures to eliminate the use of torture. By year's end, no
measures had been taken.
The Government initially held incommunicado most of the 3,000 SLA
personnel who surrendered to authorities following the IDF's May 2000
withdrawal; however, it subsequently allowed lawyers and family members
to have access (see Section 1.d.). Some former SLA detainees reported
that they were abused or tortured. Amnesty International (AI) and other
human rights organizations reported that some detainees were beaten,
handcuffed, blindfolded, and forced to lie face down on the ground.
In 2001 security forces arrested hundreds of supporters of exiled
General Michel 'Awn, and detained Tawfiq Hindi, political advisor to
former Lebanese Forces commander Samir Ja'ja. (see Section 1.d.). Some
of those arrested claimed that officers had abused them. They also
alleged that they were psychologically tortured when authorities
threatened their families.
Abuses occurred in areas outside of the State's authority,
including in Palestinian refugee camps. During the year, there were
reports that members of the various groups who controlled the camps
detained their Palestinian rivals (see Section 1.d.).
Prison conditions were poor and did not meet minimum international
standards. The Government did not allocate funds for prison reform.
In 2001 members of the Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights
visited all prisons in the country except those controlled by the
Ministry of Defense. The Interior Ministry denied the press permission
to accompany the delegation. The Chairman of the Commission
subsequently stated that ``the health conditions of the prisoners are
deplorable and require continuous care. We hope the women's prisons
will be emptied and the prisoners transferred.'' He also indicated that
of the 7,230 persons being held in prison, only 2,500 were convicted.
In 2000 AI issued a report on prison conditions for women which
highlighted numerous, serious human rights abuses, including torture,
as well as the breach of legal rights of citizens. In response to
public concern, the Prosecutor General appointed one of his senior
aides to investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment of women
in pretrial detention. In May, the Prosecutor's office issued a
communique denying all allegations of torture against women. The
Government has made a modest effort to rehabilitate some inmates.
The Surete Generale, which is in charge of border posts, operated a
detention facility. All detainees, mostly Egyptians and Sri Lankans,
were detained there pending deportation. In 2001, the Surete Generale
opened a new detention facility, which reportedly provided somewhat
better conditions than the old facility. Their detention was supposed
to be 1 to 2 months, pending the regularization of their status.
However, some, mainly asylum seekers, were detained for more than a
year.
Former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', who is serving four
life sentences for the murder or attempted murder of various political
figures during and after the civil war, was kept in solitary
confinement in a prison in the basement of the Ministry of Defense.
Government officials stated that his solitary confinement was necessary
for his own protection.
During the year, local journalists and human rights organizations
were given access to certain prisons except those controlled by the
Ministry of Defense. Following the Israeli withdrawal, the Government
did not grant independent monitors access to former SLA soldiers in
custody. In September the Cabinet ordered that International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives should be allowed to visit all
prisons, including the one under the control of the Ministry of
Defense. However, by year's end ICRC had not done so because the
Ministry of Defense had not granted permission.
Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, Hizballah detained
and reportedly mistreated SLA members and suspected agents at unknown
locations. The SLA operated its own detention facility, and there were
frequent allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees (see
Section 1.d.).
Hizballah did not permit visits by human rights monitors to those
persons in its custody. Men, women, and juveniles were held separately
in government prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires
security forces to obtain warrants before making arrests; however, the
Government used arbitrary arrest and detention. Military intelligence
personnel made arrests without warrants in cases involving military
personnel and those involving espionage, treason, weapons possession,
and draft evasion (see Section 1.e.). In 2001 the Parliamentary
Commission for Human Rights stated that of the 7,230 persons being held
in prison, only 2,500 were convicted.
In 2001 the Parliament enacted and put into effect a new Code of
Criminal Procedure. The new law provides greater legal protection to
suspects, including the right to a lawyer, to a medical examination,
and to inform next of kin. Under the Code, arresting officers are
required to refer a subject to a prosecutor within 48 hours of arrest,
unless there were witnesses to the crime, in which case the suspect may
not be held in custody more than 24 hours. The period may be extended
to 48 hours with the agreement of the public prosecutor's office. If a
suspect is held more than 48 hours without formal charges, the arrest
is considered arbitrary and the detainee must be released. In such
cases, officials responsible for the prolonged arrest may be prosecuted
on charges of depriving personal freedom. A suspect caught in hot
pursuit must be referred to an examining judge, who decides whether to
issue an indictment or order the release of the suspect. Under the
Code, bail is available in all cases regardless of the charges. Many
provisions of the new Code were not observed in practice. Some police
and members of the judiciary have claimed that they were not properly
informed of the new provisions.
Defendants had the right to legal counsel, but there was no state-
funded public defender's office. The Bar Association operated an office
for those who could not afford a lawyer, and the court panel on many
occasions asked the Bar Association to appoint lawyers for defendants.
Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary detention and
arrest. On several occasions during the year, security forces detained
and arrested hundreds of citizens on grounds of national security.
Protestors were also arbitrarily detained and arrested (see Section
2.b.). The Government also detained, interrogated, and beat journalists
(see Section 2.a.).
In 2001, security forces arrested, interrogated, and searched the
homes of more than 100 citizens, predominately Christian supporters of
exiled General Michel 'Awn, and jailed commander of the disbanded
Lebanese Forces, Samir Ja'Ja'. Most of the arrests and searches took
place without warrants, and those arrested claimed that they were not
given access to lawyers. The authorities allegedly forced most of them
to sign affidavits stating that they would abstain from politics and
released them within 2 weeks after their arrests. Some were blindfolded
and forced to sign the affidavits without reading them; some of those
who refused were beaten until they signed. Retired General Nadim Lteif,
Coordinator of the Awnist movement, and Tawfiq Hindi, former political
advisor of Samir Ja'Ja', were among those arrested. At least 77 of
those detained were referred to both military and civilian courts (see
Section 1.e.). All but five of those arrested were released within
weeks. Two persons were held until November 2001, when they were
released on bail. In March the court dropped all charges against them.
In February, six men were arrested and accused of spying for Israel
on Hizballah, as well as on Lebanese and Syrian military positions and
Lebanese political figures and financial institutions. In September,
military tribunals sentenced the men to terms ranging from 1 year in
prison to death. Hassan Hashem, a former official of the country's
Shi'a Amal militia, was sentenced to 3 years of hard labor. One
defendant tried in absentia received a death sentence.
On July 11, the military court of appeals sentenced Lebanese Forces
political advisor Tawfiq Hindi and journalist Habib Younis to 15 months
imprisonment for having established contacts with Israeli forces. The
tribunal also convicted journalist Antoine Bassil for providing
assistance to Israeli forces and sentenced him to 30 months. On
November 9 and 16, respectively, Hindi and Younis were released.
The Government initially held incommunicado most of the 3,000 SLA
members who surrendered to the authorities following the IDF's
withdrawal in 2000 (see Section 1.c.); however, lawyers and family
members have since been provided access. The authorities often detained
without charges for short periods of time political opponents and
opponents of the Syrian government. Legal action against them remained
pending; however, they were free to travel abroad.
Palestinian refugees were subject to arrest, detention, and
harassment by state security forces, Syrian forces, and rival
Palestinians.
Unlike in 2000, there were no allegations during the year of the
transfer of citizens by government authorities to Syria. By year's end,
9 of 54 persons turned over in 2000 to Syria remained in Syrian
custody, including Abu Haytham Karara, an official of the Progressive
Socialist Party. No formal charges were brought against them. Human
rights activists believed that there were numerous Lebanese,
Palestinians, and Jordanians in prolonged and often secret detention.
According to AI, Syrian forces operating in Lebanon carried out
searches, arrests, and detentions of Lebanese nationals outside any
legal framework. The Government formed a committee in 2000 to
investigate cases of those who disappeared during the civil strife (see
Section 1.b.). Although it was due to report on its findings by July,
the committee had not done so by year's end.
Abuses occurred in areas outside of the State's authority,
including the Palestinian refugee camps. During the year, there were
reports that members of the various groups who controlled the camps
detained their Palestinian rivals.
During the year, there were no reports that Hizballah conducted
arbitrary arrests in areas outside central government control.
Israel continued to hold 20 Lebanese citizens, including Sheikh
Abed al-Karim Obaid and Mustafa Dirani, who had been held without
charge since 1989 and 1994, respectively.
The law does not provide for forced exile, and it was not practiced
regularly.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary was independent in
principle; however, it was subject to political pressure. The
Constitution provides for a constitutional council to determine the
constitutionality of newly adopted laws upon the request of 10 members
of Parliament, and stipulates that judges shall be independent in the
exercise of their duties; however, influential politicians as well as
Syrian and Lebanese intelligence officers at times intervened and
protected their supporters from prosecution.
The judicial system consisted of the regular civilian courts; the
Military Court, which tries cases involving military personnel and
civilians in security-related issues; the Judicial Council, which tries
national security cases; and the tribunals of the various religious
affiliations, which adjudicate matters of personal status, including
marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody (see Section 5).
The Judicial Council is a permanent tribunal of five senior judges
that adjudicates threats to national security. Upon the recommendation
of the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet decides whether to try a case
before this tribunal. Verdicts from this tribunal are irrevocable and
may not be appealed.
The Ministry of Justice appointed all other judges based on the
religious affiliation of the prospective judge. A shortage of judges
has impeded efforts to adjudicate cases backlogged during years of
internal conflict. Trial delays were aggravated by the Government's
inability to conduct investigations in areas outside of its control.
In general trials were public, but judges had the discretion to
make a court session secret. Defendants had the right to be present at
trial and the right of timely consultation with an attorney. Defendants
had the right to confront or question witnesses against them but must
do so through the court panel, which decided whether or not to permit
the defendant's question. Defendants and their attorneys had access to
government-held evidence relevant to their cases and had the right of
appeal. These rights generally were observed in practice.
Defendants on trial for security cases, which were heard before the
Judicial Council, had the same procedural rights as other defendants;
however, there was no right to appeal in such cases. The testimony of a
woman was equal to that of a man (see Section 5).
The Military Court had jurisdiction over cases involving the
military as well as those involving civilians in espionage, treason,
weapons possession, and draft evasion cases. Civilians could be tried
for security issues, and military personnel could be tried for civil
issues. The military court had two tribunals-the permanent tribunal and
the cassation tribunal-the latter of which heard appeals from the
former. A civilian judge chaired the higher court. Defendants on trial
under the military tribunal had the same procedural rights as
defendants in ordinary courts.
In 2000, the Military Court began trying the cases of the
approximately 3,000 SLA militiamen who surrendered to the Government
following the Israeli withdrawal from the south. Some of the former SLA
militiamen were charged under Article 273 of the Penal Code for taking
up arms against the State, an offense punishable by death; others were
charged under Article 285 of the Penal Code for trading with the enemy,
an offense punishable by a minimum of 1 year in prison. Domestic human
rights groups and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
reported that the trials were open to journalists and members of the
public but were not fair. AI reported that such summary trials neither
allowed the innocent to be acquitted nor ensured the discovery of those
who may be guilty of war crimes. According to AI, the court tried
between 23 and 43 persons each day. SLA lawyers who requested an
adjournment to study the files of detainees were granted additional
time. However, in most cases, defense lawyers received the files
shortly before trial and consequently were unable to argue the cases
individually. The standard defense presented by lawyers for the
militiamen was that the Government had been unable to defend citizens
living under Israeli occupation for the last 22 years. Therefore the
residents had no choice but to work with the occupiers.
By year's end, more than 2,919 former SLA members had been tried
and convicted. Approximately one-third of the former SLA members
received 1-year prison sentences and approximately one-third received
sentences of 3 to 4 weeks under Article 273. Two persons who were
implicated in the abuse and torture of prisoners at al-Khiam prison
were sentenced to life in prison. The military prosecutor recommended
the death sentence for 37 former SLA militiamen for allegedly killing
members of ``the resistance'' (i.e., Hizballah). 21 of these militiamen
were tried while in government custody; 16 were tried in absentia. The
Military Court denied every recommendation for the death sentence and
handed down lighter sentences in each case. During the year, following
attacks by angry crowds on two former SLA members in their villages,
the court amended the sentences of some persons, barring them from
returning to their villages for several years. According to the
Government, these bans were issued to protect the former SLA members
and were difficult to enforce. During the year, no similar sentences
were issued. There were no new reports that the Government or Hizballah
subjected former SLA members who returned to their villages to regular
harassment. On July 19, Mahmoud Salim Mahbouba filed a claim that armed
individuals broke into his house and kidnaped his son, Mohammed, a
former SLA member who was released from Roumeih prison after serving a
2-year sentence. By year's end, the Government had released all of the
220 SLA militiamen who were tried following the June 1999 SLA
withdrawal from Jezzine.
In 2001 the State Prosecutor's Office requested that the Bar
Association lift the immunity of lawyer Muhammad Mugraby to permit
Mugraby's prosecution for criticizing the country's judicial system at
a press conference. The Bar Association complied with the request; at
year's end, Mugraby's challenge of the decision remained pending (see
Section 2.a.).
In August 2001, the Government arrested without warrant Antoine
Bassil, a correspondent for a Saudi Arabian television station, for his
alleged association with Israeli officials. In July Bassil was
sentenced to 30 months in prison by a military tribunal(see Section
2.a.).
In 2001, the Government arrested without warrant Habib Younis, the
managing editor in al-Hayat's Beirut office, for his alleged
association with Israel. Authorities referred his case to a military
court, which indicted him for conspiring with Israel. Younis was
sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment and was released on November 16
(see Section 1.d.).
In 2001 authorities referred at least 77 'Awn and Ja'Ja supporters
to both military and civilian courts. Charges brought by the Military
Prosecutor's Office included opposing the policy of the Government;
disseminating the principles of an unauthorized political party;
jeopardizing the country's relations with a friendly state; using oral
and written statements not authorized by the Government; defaming the
Syrian army's reputation; organizing meetings and activities of a
unauthorized political party; and transmitting false and exaggerated
information. Tawfiq Hindi, Ja'Ja's former political advisor was charged
with collaborating with the Israeli enemy, forming an association to
harm the State's authority, and damaging the country's relation with a
sisterly nation(see Section 1.d.). In 2001 the Court of Cassation ruled
that the military court did not have jurisdiction in 63 of the cases,
which were transferred to a criminal court. At year's end, these cases
were still pending in court. The cases of Nadim Lteif and Hikmat Deeb,
who were charged with defaming the Lebanese and Syrian armies, were
referred to both military and civilian courts (see Section 1.d.). At
year's end, both cases remained pending.
Palestinian groups in refugee camps operated an autonomous and
arbitrary system of justice.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
domicile; however, authorities frequently interfered with the privacy
of persons regarded as enemies of the Government. Laws require that
prosecutors obtain warrants before entering homes, except when the
security forces are in close pursuit of armed attackers; however, in
practice the law was not respected.
The Government and Syrian intelligence services used informer
networks and monitored telephones to gather information on their
perceived adversaries. The Army Intelligence Service monitored the
movements and activities of members of opposition groups (see Section
2.b.). The Government conceded that telephone calls were monitored by
security services but claimed that monitoring occurred only with prior
authorization from competent judicial authorities.
Politicians and human rights advocates reported increasing and more
overt government intelligence services' surveillance of political
meetings and political activities across the religious and political
spectrum. In 1999 the Parliament passed a law that authorized
surveillance in national security and law enforcement cases but banned
its use against government ministers and parliamentary deputies;
however, the Government had not adopted the necessary implementing
decrees by year's end.
Militias and non-Lebanese forces operating outside the area of
central government authority frequently have violated citizens' privacy
rights. Various factions also used informer networks and the monitoring
of telephones to obtain information regarding their perceived
adversaries.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government limited
this right in practice, particularly by intimidating journalists and
broadcasters into practicing self-censorship. The Government censored
television broadcasts on a case-by-case basis.
Although there were repeated attempts to restrict freedom of
opinion and speech during the year, daily criticism of government
policies and leaders continued. Dozens of newspapers and hundreds of
periodicals were published throughout the country and were financed by
various local and foreign groups. The press was privately owned and
press content often reflected the opinions of financial backers.
The Government had several legal mechanisms at its disposal to
control freedom of expression. The Surete Generale was authorized to
censor all foreign magazines and nonperiodical works, including plays,
books, and films, before they were distributed in the market. The law
prohibits attacks on the dignity of the Head of State or foreign
leaders. The Government may prosecute offending journalists and
publications in the Publications Court, a special tribunal empowered to
try such matters. Moreover, the 1991 security agreement between Lebanon
and Syria contained a provision that effectively prohibits the
publication of any information deemed harmful to the security of either
state. In view of the risk of prosecution, journalists censored
themselves on matters related to Syria.
In 1999 President Lahoud announced that under his tenure no charges
would be brought against any journalist because of his writings or
opinions; however, during the year the Government continued to harass,
abuse, and detain journalists.
In January Surete Generale officers and plainclothes agents
confiscated 650 DVDs at the Virgin Megastore. The titles confiscated
included Rabbi Jacob, The Ten Commandments, Superman, and Jesus of
Nazareth. The Surete General claimed that the confiscated merchandise
was smuggled illegally through customs and contained material that
slandered religion and public decency and contravened the boycott
against Israel.
In January the Surete Generale imposed ``prior censorship'' on the
Saudi-owned daily Asharq al-Awsat. In December 2001, the newspaper
reported that President Lahoud escaped an assassination attempt while
on vacation in Monte Carlo. The Beirut Public Prosecutor filed a
lawsuit against the newspaper. The Minister of Information criticized
the decision taken by the Surete and stated that ``no prior censorship
should be practiced on local newspapers.'' The case was still pending
at year's end.
On March 25, the ISF beat several photographers who were taking
pictures of a collapsed building in Beirut. The Minister of the
Interior ordered an investigation to reprimand those responsible for
the misconduct. No information was available about any punitive action
at year's end.
On April 12, the Beirut Public Prosecutor pressed charges against
the publisher of the International Herald Tribune (ITH) in Beirut,
after the newspaper ran a pro-Israeli advertisement of the Anti-
Defamation League. The charges were leveled at the publisher and
editor-in-chief of the local English newspaper the Daily Star who is
the IHT legal representative. At year's end, the case remained pending
in court.
In August, the Beirut Public Prosecutor filed a lawsuit against the
chairman and news editor of Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation
International (LBCI) for having ``instigated sectarian discord and
threatened civil peace'' during its coverage of a shooting incident in
which eight employees of the Ministry of Education were killed. The
station's news coverage of the event focused on the fact that the
shooter was a Shi'a Muslim, whereas seven of the eight who were killed
were Christians. In August the Beirut Public Prosecutor charged the
Murr Television Station (MTV), its political news director, and the
host of ``Referendum'' political talk show with ``broadcasting material
whose nature is to damage ties to a sisterly nation'' (Syria) and
``assailing the dignity of the President, slandering the security
services and undermining social order.'' At year's end, the case
remained pending in court.
On September 4, the Publications Court ordered the closure of MTV
and RML radio, citing Article 68 of the Parliamentary Election Law,
which stipulates ``complete closure'' for broadcasting election
propaganda during the campaign period. ISF and army troops closed the
station's headquarters shortly after the decision. The court ruled
against an appeal to reopen the stations on October 21. On December 27,
the court denied a second appeal.
In September State Prosecutor Addoum announced that he would
examine declarations made by opposition members in Lebanon and abroad
after the Christian Maronite World Congress held in Los Angeles in
June, including TV interviews and press statements, in search of
elements which could incriminate them. This included statements about
Syria and the Syria Accountability Act. Addoum ordered security
agencies to gather information about opposition activities outside
Lebanon.
In August 2001, the Government brought charges against Joseph Nasr,
the editor in chief of the daily newspaper An-Nahar, and Rafi Madayan,
the author of an article published in that newspaper that the
Government deemed insulting to the military. The Government also
brought charges against the weekly newspaper Al-Watan Al-Arabi for
having published news that it deemed insulting to the Lebanese and
Syrian armies. The cases had not been tried by year's end.
In August 2001, the army's intelligence services arrested without a
warrant Antoine Bassil, a correspondent for the Saudi Arabian
television station Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). In
December 2001, a court indicted Bassil on charges of contact with the
enemy, entering Israel, forming an association to harm the State's
authority, and damaging relations with a sisterly country. In July the
military court found him guilty and sentenced him to 30 months
imprisonment (see Section 1.e.).
In August 2001, the Government arrested without a warrant Habib
Younis, an editor with al-Hayat's Beirut office on charges of ``contact
with the Israeli enemy.'' The Government interrogated Younis without
the presence of a lawyer (see Section 1.e.) and the military court
indicted him on charges of conspiring with Israel. In July the military
court found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 months imprisonment (see
section 1.d.).
The Government continued to restrict radio and television
broadcasts in a discriminatory manner. There were 7
television stations and 37 radio stations. The Government owned one
television and one radio station; the remaining stations were owned
privately. Satellite television was available widely and was
inexpensive.
Although the Government did not censor broadcasts directly,
government officials exerted pressure on journalists to practice self-
censorship. For example, in November the Government pressured LBCI not
to air a talk show that was to include an outspoken opposition figure.
The Government also pressured the media not to report on the arrest in
Syria of an al-Hayat correspondent.
In general the Government did not restrict Internet access, and it
was used widely.
The Government generally respected academic freedom, and the
country had a strong private educational system.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricted
this right in practice. Any group that wished to organize a rally had
to obtain the prior approval of the Ministry of Interior, which did not
render decisions consistently. Groups opposing government positions
sometimes did not receive permits.
On several occasions during the year, military personnel used
excessive force to disperse protesters of government political and
economic policies and the Syrian presence in Lebanon, sometimes
detaining or arresting them (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
In August 2001, approximately 200 persons, mostly university
students, gathered near the Justice Ministry to protest the arrests of
more than 100 'Awnists and Lebanese Forces supporters. Plainclothes
intelligence agents arrested at least 10 persons, reportedly including
1 journalist (see Section 2.a.), and used heavy force to suppress the
demonstration. Demonstrators were beaten with rifle butts, kicked, and
trampled by security forces. At least two journalists reportedly also
were beaten (see Section 2.a.). All of those arrested were released
within 2 days. A few days after the protest, the Minister of Interior
stated that those responsible for using excessive force would be
punished. Subsequently the Justice Minister instructed the Prosecutor
General's Office to investigate the incident; however, there were no
reports that any measures were taken by year's end.
On March 14, approximately 2,000 demonstrators, mostly student
supporters of the now-exiled former Army Commander Michel 'Awn,
participated in an anti-Syrian march. Security forces and LAF troops
dealt responsibly with the protestors and the demonstration was
peaceful.
During March and April, at least 20 nonviolent demonstrations and
sit-ins took place in support of the Palestinian Intifada. The
Government took an aggressive stance by providing protection and
security for foreign interests during that period. However, on April 3,
a demonstration of 3,500-4,000 took place at a diplomatic mission. When
the crowd attacked security forces with stones, the security forces
deployed tear gas and water cannons to disperse it. At least seven
police members and some demonstrators were slightly injured.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right and did not interfere with
most organizations; however, it imposed limits on this right. The law
requires every new organization to submit a notification of formation
to the Ministry of Interior, which issues a receipt. In addition to
what is provided by law, the Ministry of Interior imposed on
organizations further restrictions and requirements that were not
enforced consistently. The Ministry at times withheld the receipt,
essentially transforming a notification procedure into an approval
process. The Ministry in some cases sent notification of formation
papers to the security forces, which then conducted inquiries regarding
an organization's founding members. The results of such inquiries may
be used by the Ministry in deciding whether or not to approve the
formation of the group.
Organizations must invite Ministry representatives to a general
assembly in which votes are held for by-law amendments or in which
elections are held for positions on the board of directors. The
Ministry also required every association to obtain the Ministry's
approval of any change in by-laws; failure to do so could result in the
dissolution of the association.
Although the law did not distinguish between political parties and
other associations, the Cabinet had to license political parties.
The Government scrutinized requests to establish political
movements or parties and to some extent monitored their activities. The
Army Intelligence Service monitored the movements and activities of
members of opposition groups (see Section 1.f.).
The Government closely monitored groups critical of Syrian
policies, and their members were subject to harassment and arrest by
the Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice; however, there were some restrictions. Discrimination based
on religion is built into the system of government. The Government
subsidized all religions and all Muslim clerics received monthly
salaries from the Government.
The State is required to ensure the free exercise of all religious
rites, provided that public order is not disturbed. The Constitution
also provides that the personal status and religious interests of the
population be respected. The Government permitted recognized religions
to exercise authority over matters pertaining to personal status, such
as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. There is no state religion;
however, politics are based on the principle of religious
representation, which was applied to every aspect of public life.
A group that seeks official recognition must submit its dogma and
moral principles for government review to ensure that such principles
did not contradict popular values and the Constitution. The group must
ensure that the number of its adherents is sufficient to maintain its
continuity. Alternatively, religious groups may apply to obtain
recognition through existing religious groups. Official recognition
conveys certain benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to
apply the recognized religion's codes to personal status matters. Each
recognized religious group has its own courts for family law matters,
such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. State
recognition was not a legal requirement for religious worship or
practice. For example, although Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus were not
recognized officially, they were allowed to practice their faith
without government interference; however, their marriages, divorces,
and inheritances in the country were not recognized under the law.
The unwritten ``National Pact'' of 1943 stipulates that the
President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament be a
Maronite Christian, a Sunni Muslim, and a Shi'a Muslim, respectively.
The 1989 Taif Accord, which ended the country's 15-year civil war,
reaffirmed this arrangement but resulted in increased Muslim
representation in Parliament and reduced the power of the Maronite
President. The Accord called for the ultimate abolition of political
sectarianism in favor of ``expertise and competence''; however, little
substantive progress was made in this regard. A ``Committee for
Abolishing Confessionalism,'' which was called for in the Taif Accord,
had not yet been formed by year's end. One notable exception was the
LAF which, through universal conscription and an emphasis on
professionalism, has significantly reduced the role of confessionalism
(or religious sectarianism) in the armed forces. Christians and Muslims
were represented equally in the Parliament. Seats in the Parliament and
Cabinet, and posts in the civil service, were distributed
proportionally among the 18 recognized groups (see Section 3).
The Government required that religious affiliation be encoded on
national identity cards, but not on passports.
Religious groups administered their own family and personal status
laws. There were 18 recognized religious groups, each of which differed
in its treatment of marriage, family, property rights, and inheritance.
Many of these laws discriminated against women. For example, Sunni
inheritance law provided a son twice the inheritance of a daughter.
Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do so only
with the concurrence of their husbands. There is no law that permits
civil marriages, although such ceremonies performed outside the country
were recognized by the State. Only religious authorities may perform
marriages.
There were no legal barriers to proselytizing; however, traditional
attitudes and edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discouraged
such activity. During the year, there were reports that members of the
Christian community in Kesirwan, with the knowledge of local clergy,
occasionally verbally harassed church leaders and persons who attended
an unrecognized Protestant evangelical church.
In October a Greek Orthodox church in Tripoli and the Saint Elias
Maronite Church in Sidon were bombed. Later that month, arsonists set
fire to a northern mosque. President Lahoud blamed ``Israeli
sympathizers'' for the second incident. No one had been arrested in
connection with either crime by year's end.
On November 21, an American citizen missionary affiliated with the
Christian and Missionary Evangelical Alliance was killed in Sidon. No
group has claimed responsibility for the killing (see Section 1.a.).
For a detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice;
however, there were some limitations. The law prohibits travel to
Israel. The LAF and Syrian troops maintained checkpoints throughout
much of the country. All men between 18 and 21 years of age were
subject to compulsory military service and were required to register at
a recruitment office and obtain a travel authorization document before
leaving the country. Married women must obtain their husband's
signatures to apply for a passport. Although a man may obtain passports
for his children without his wife's approval, a women may not obtain
passports for her children without the approval of her husband (see
Section 5).
There were no legal restrictions on the right of citizens to return
to the country. However, many emigres were reluctant to return for a
variety of political, economic, and social reasons. The Government
encouraged the return to their homes of over 600,000 persons displaced
internally during the civil war. Although some persons have begun to
reclaim homes abandoned or damaged during the war, the vast majority of
displaced persons have not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their
property. The resettlement process was slowed by tight budgetary
constraints, destroyed infrastructure, political feuds, a lack of
schools and economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security
still was inadequate in some parts of the country.
In 2000, approximately 6,000 SLA militiamen and their families fled
to Israel. At year's end, approximately 2,200 had returned to the
country. Several hundred relocated elsewhere outside of Israel, and
between 3,000 and 4,000 remained in Israel at year's end. Of the former
SLA personnel who returned to the country, most received prison
sentences of varying lengths (see Section 1.e.). The Government
publicly stated that the former SLA militiamen were welcome to return
to the country, but that they would face trial upon their return. There
were few incidents of harassment of returned SLA deportees.
Most non-Lebanese refugees were Palestinians. In 2001 the U.N.
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) reported that the number of Palestinian
refugees in the country registered with the UNRWA was approximately
383,000. This figure, which included only the families of refugees who
arrived in 1948, was presumed to include many thousands who reside
outside of the country. Most experts estimated the actual number in the
country to be between 150,000 and 200,000. Most Palestinian refugees
were unable to obtain citizenship and were subject to governmental and
societal discrimination; however, Palestinian women who married
Lebanese men could obtain citizenship (see Section 5).
The Government issued travel documents to Palestinian refugees to
enable them to travel and work abroad. The Government did not issue
visitors' visas to Jordanian nationals who were born in the country and
were of Palestinian origin.
On several occasions, Hizballah operatives interfered with the
freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel. For example on April 4, about
15 Hizballah operatives forced an observer group to stop at checkpoints
and assaulted them, injuring 3. According to the U.N. Secretary
General's report, no action was taken despite government assurances
that the perpetrators would be arrested and brought to trial.
There were no legal provisions for granting asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government granted
admission and temporary (6 months) refuge to asylum seekers, but not
permanent asylum. The Government generally cooperated with the offices
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNRWA.
According to the UNHCR, there were nearly 3,000 non-Palestinian
refugees, primarily Iraqis and Sudanese, detained for illegal entry
into the country. During the year, the Surete General granted UNHCR
officials access to the detainees. There were credible reports that the
Surete Generale deported Iraqi Kurds seeking asylum back to Iraq
through Syria.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution states that citizens have the right to change
their government in periodic free and fair elections; however, lack of
control over parts of the country, defects in the electoral process,
and strong Syrian influence over politics and decision makers
significantly restrict this right.
According to the Constitution, elections for the Parliament must be
held every 4 years. In turn, the Parliament elects the President every
6 years. The President and Parliament nominate the Prime Minister, who,
with the President, chooses the Cabinet. According to the unwritten
``National Pact of 1943,'' the President must be a Maronite Christian,
the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker a Shi'a Muslim (see
Section 2.c.). Since the National Reconciliation Agreement reached in
Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1989, which revised the 6 to 5 ratio of Christian
to Muslim seats in Parliament, there has been a 50-50 balance between
Christian and Muslim Members of Parliament. The Taif Accord also
increased the number of seats in Parliament and transferred some powers
from the Maronite President to the Sunni Prime Minister and the
religiously mixed Cabinet.
The parliamentary elections in 2000 showed fewer incidents of voter
fraud and tampering with ballots than previous elections; however, the
process was flawed with serious shortcomings, including Syrian
government influence on the electoral law and candidate selection,
progovernmental media manipulation, and improper activities of security
services.
On June 2, a by-election held in the Metn district for the Greek-
Orthodox seat was reportedly marred by numerous irregularities, in
addition to the Minister of Interior's claim that the secret ballot is
``optional.'' In November the Constitutional Council names the third
placed candidate as the winner.
In September 2001, municipal elections were held for the first time
since 1963 in 64 villages and towns in areas formerly occupied by
Israel. Local observers reported that the elections were generally free
and fair; however, there were some irregularities, including attempts
by government agencies to pressure candidates and voters, the presence
of unauthorized persons inside polling stations, and the absence of
registration committees on voting day to correct errors in voters
lists.
Women had the right to vote, and there were no legal barriers to
their participation in politics; however, there were significant
cultural barriers. No woman has ever held a cabinet position. In 2000,
three women were elected to the 128-seat Parliament.
Palestinian refugees had no political rights (see Section 5). An
estimated 17 Palestinian factions operated in the country and were
generally organized around prominent individuals. Most Palestinians
lived in refugee camps controlled by one or more factions. Refugee
leaders were not elected, but there were ``popular committees'' that
met regularly with UNRWA and visitors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several local human rights groups operated freely without overt
government restriction, including the Lebanese Association for Human
Rights, the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights-Lebanon, and
the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled. Some of these
groups have sought to publicize the detention in Syria of hundreds of
Lebanese citizens and took credit in part for the release of a number
of Lebanese from Syrian jails during 1999 (see Section 1.d.). The Bar
Association and other private organizations regularly held public
events that included discussions of human rights issues. Some human
rights groups reported harassment and intimidation by government,
Syrian, or Hizballah forces.
The Government generally cooperated with international NGOs and met
with them during the year. In March the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights met with senior government officials. The
ICRC and AI maintained offices in the country. During the year,
government officials discussed human rights problems with
representatives of foreign governments and NGOs. For example, the
Lebanese Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights discussed issues
related to Iraqi asylum seekers with the Government and secured the
non-deportation of Iraqi Kurds back to Iraq.
The Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights did not take action
in response to the arrests in 2001 by security forces of antigovernment
and anti-Syrian protestors. However, the Commission played an important
role in ratifying the U.N. Convention against Torture in 2001 and
passing the new Code of Criminal Procedure. Following visits to the
prisons, the Commission's chairman stated that the Commission would
work on improving prison conditions by passing the Code of Criminal
Procedure and by increasing funding to build new correctional
facilities; however, by year's end, no funds had been allocated.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution calls for ``social justice and equality of duties
and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism'';
however, in practice aspects of the law and traditional beliefs
discriminated against women. Although the law reserves a percentage of
private sector and government jobs to persons with disabilities, there
were few accommodations made for them. Discrimination based on race,
language, or social status is illegal and was not widespread among
citizens; however, foreign domestic servants often were mistreated.
Women.--The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence;
however, violence against women was a common problem. Cases reported
were believed to be only a fraction of the actual number. There were no
authoritative statistics on the extent of spousal abuse. Most experts
agreed that the problem affected a significant portion of the female
population. Despite a law prohibiting battery with a maximum sentence
of 3 years in prison for those convicted, some religious courts legally
may require a battered wife to return to the house in spite of physical
abuse. Many women were compelled to remain in abusive marriages because
of social and family pressures. Possible loss of custody of children
and the absence of an independent source of income also prevented women
from leaving their husbands.
The Government had no separate program to provide medical
assistance to battered women; however, it provided legal assistance to
victims who could not afford it regardless of the gender of the victim.
In most of the cases, the police ignored complaints submitted by
battered or abused women. The NGO The Lebanese Council to Resist
Violence Against Women has worked actively to reduce violence against
women by offering counseling and legal aid and raising awareness about
domestic violence.
Foreign domestic servants often were mistreated, abused, and in
some cases, raped. Asian and African female workers had no practical
legal recourse available to them because of their low status, isolation
from society, and because the labor laws did not protect them (see
Section 6.e.). Because of such abuse, the Government prohibited foreign
women from working if they were from countries that did not have
diplomatic representation in the country.
The law prohibits rape, and the minimum sentence for a person
convicted of rape is 5 years in prison. The minimum sentence for a
person convicted of raping a minor is 7 years.
The legal system was discriminatory in its handling of so-called
``honor crimes.'' According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife
or other female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he
demonstrates that he committed the crime in response to a socially
unacceptable sexual relationship conducted by the victim. However, in
1999 the law was amended to increase the severity of the sentence for
perpetrators of ``honor crimes.'' Several instances of honor crimes are
reported in the media every year, and reportedly there were an average
of two to three cases of honor crimes each month during the year. No
person has been convicted in a case legally considered as an honor
crime.
Prostitution is legal but regulated; in practice most prostitution
is unlicensed and thus illegal. Thousands of foreign women, primarily
from Russia and Eastern Europe, engaged in prostitution. The country
was a destination for trafficked persons, primarily women (see Section
6.f.).
Women had varying employment opportunities in government, medicine,
law, academia, the arts, and to a lesser degree, business. However,
social pressure against women pursuing careers was strong in some parts
of society. Men sometimes exercised considerable control over female
relatives, restricting their activities outside of the home or their
contact with friends and relatives. The law prohibits sexual
harassment; however, it was a widespread problem.
Women may own property but often ceded control of it to male
relatives for cultural reasons and because of family pressure. Husbands
may block foreign travel by their wives (see Section 2.d.). The
testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man in court (see Section
1.e.).
In 2001, Parliament adopted a law providing equal pay for equal
work for men and women. During the year, the Parliament passed
legislation giving women serving in government the same rights as men
in terms of medical coverage and hospitalization.
Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children.
Accordingly, children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers are
not eligible for citizenship. Citizen widows may confer citizenship on
their minor children.
Children.--Education was free in public schools and compulsory
until the age of 13. However, public schools generally were inadequate,
and the cost of private education was a significant problem for the
middle and lower classes. Many children, particularly in rural areas,
took jobs at a young age to help support their families. UNICEF
reported that in the 2000 school year, approximately 85 percent of
children between the ages of 3 and 5, and approximately 98 percent of
children between the ages of 7 to 11 were enrolled in school. In some
families with limited incomes, boys received more education than girls.
Illiteracy rates were approximately 38 percent. The minimum for child
employment is 14 years of age (see Section 6.d.).
An undetermined number of children were neglected, abused, and
exploited. The normal procedure for adoption was through religious
homes or institutions authorized to arrange adoption; however, the
demand to provide infants for adoption abroad resulted in illegal
international adoptions. There were no statistics available concerning
the prevalence of the illegal adoption of infants. Poor children often
were compelled by their parents to seek employment and often took jobs
that jeopardized their safety (see Section 6.d.). Because of their
ages, wages earned by such children were not in conformity with labor
regulations. The Government did not have specific child protection laws
to remove children from abusive situations and did not grant NGOs
adequate legal standing to litigate on behalf of abused minor children.
During the year, the police discovered and broke up several child
prostitution rings.
Persons with Disabilities.--More than 100,000 persons became
disabled during the civil war. Families generally performed care of
persons with disabilities. Most efforts to assist persons with
disabilities were made by approximately 100 private organizations.
These organizations were relatively active, although poorly funded.
There were few accommodations for persons with disabilities in the
cities.
The law on persons with disabilities stipulates that at least three
percent of all government and private sector positions should be filled
by persons with disabilities, provided that such persons fulfill the
qualifications of the position.
During the year, joint committees composed of the National
Committee for the Disabled and the Ministries of Health, Labor, and
Education were formed to implement the disabled law. During the year,
the Ministry of Finance informed all firms and companies that it would
not settle obligations with them unless they proved that three percent
of their work force was composed of disabled personnel.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the UNHCR, an
estimated 380,000 Palestinian refugees were registered in the country
(see Section 2.d.); however, it was believed that perhaps between
150,000 to 200,000 Palestinians actually resided in the country. Most
Palestinian refugees lived in overpopulated camps that suffered
repeated heavy damage as a result of fighting. The Government generally
prohibited the construction of permanent structures in the camps on the
grounds that such construction encouraged the notion of permanent
refugee settlement in the country. Refugees feared that the Government
may reduce the size of the camps or eliminate them completely. Very few
Palestinians received work permits, and those who found work usually
were directed into unskilled occupations. In recent years, Palestinian
incomes have continued to decline. The law prohibited Palestinian
refugees from working in 72 professions.
In 2001 the Parliament passed legislation depriving Palestinian
refugees of the right to own property in the country. Under the new
law, Palestinians no longer may purchase property and those who own
property will be prohibited from passing it on to their children. The
Parliament justified the law on the grounds that it was protecting the
right of Palestinian refugees to return to the homes they fled after
the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Other foreigners may own a
limited size plot of land but only after obtaining the approval of five
different district offices. The law applies to all foreigners, but it
is applied in a manner disadvantageous to the 25,000 Kurds in the
country. The Government did not provide health services to Palestinian
refugees, who relied on UNRWA and UNRWA-contracted hospitals.
In recent years, Palestinian incomes have declined. Palestinian
children reportedly have been forced to leave school at an early age
because U.N. relief workers do not have sufficient funds for education
programs. The U.N. estimates that 18 percent of street children in the
country are Palestinian. Drug addiction, prostitution, and crime
reportedly were increasing in the camps, although reliable statistics
were not available. In 1999, the Fatah faction of the PLO expanded its
operations in the Ain al-Hilwah refugee camp by opening security
offices and hiring personnel to maintain order in the camps.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all workers
except government employees may establish and join unions. Worker
representatives must be chosen from those employed within the
bargaining unit. About 900,000 persons formed the active labor force,
14 percent of who were members of 210 labor unions and associations.
Most of these unions gathered to form Federations. To date, 37
federations, with about 200,000 workers, were represented in the
General Confederation of Labor (GCL).
Palestinian refugees may organize their own unions; however,
because of restrictions on their right to work, few Palestinians
participated actively in trade unions.
Unions were free to affiliate with international federations and
confederations, and they maintained a variety of such affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
workers to organize and to bargain collectively exists in law and
practice. Most worker groups engaged in some form of collective
bargaining with their employers. Stronger federations obtained
significant gains for their members and on occasion have assisted
nonunionized workers. There were no government mechanisms to promote
voluntary labor-management negotiations, and workers had no protection
against antiunion discrimination. Union leaders alleged credibly that,
in the past, the Government has tried to interfere in elections for
union officials.
The law provides for the right to strike. In December the teachers'
union went on a strike and then staged a demonstration to protest
budget proposals including taxes on pensions and working hour
increases.
In June and July, taxi and bus drivers held separate strikes to
protest a new government anti-pollution measure calling for a switch
from diesel to gasoline for all passenger vehicles carrying less than
15 passengers.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--Forced labor is not
prohibited by law. Children, foreign domestic servants, and other
foreign workers sometimes were forced to remain in situations amounting
to coerced or bonded labor (see Sections 5 and 6.e.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits employment of workers under the
age of 18 for more than 6 hours per day, and requires 1 hour of rest if
work is more than 4 hours. The law defines workers under the age of 14
as child laborers. The amendments also entitle children to 21 days of
paid annual leave. Children are prohibited from working between the
hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. The Code also prohibits certain types of
mechanical work for children between the ages of 8 and 13 and other
types for those between the ages of 13 and 16. The law prohibits
children under the age of 18 from working in jobs that jeopardize their
health, safety, or morals. The Ministry of Labor was responsible for
enforcing these requirements; however, it did not apply the law
rigorously. During the year, a law was passed regarding the protection
of juveniles exposed to danger.
In June Parliament ratified ILO Convention No. 138, concerning
minimum age for admission to employment. According to the Central
Statistics Administration, 7.6 percent of working children were between
the ages of 6 and 14. The report also indicated that of this 7.6
percent, 45.3 percent were performing all kinds of jobs, such as
working in the fields concurrently helping their parents in the home.
Most of these child laborers were citizens, but some were Syrian; they
worked predominantly in the industrial, craft, and metallurgical
sectors.
Approximately 40 percent of working children worked 10 to 14 hours
per day, and few received social welfare benefits. In addition, the
active labor force included approximately 52,000 workers between the
ages of 15 and 19, who were not eligible for the minimum wage until
they reached the age of 21.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government set a legal
minimum wage, currently approximately $200 (300,000 Lebanese pounds)
per month. The law was not enforced effectively in the private sector.
In theory the courts were called upon to enforce it, but in practice
they did not. The minimum wage was insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Trade unions attempted to
ensure the payment of minimum wages in both the public sector and the
large-scale private sector.
The Labor Law prescribes a standard 6-day workweek of 48 hours,
with a 24-hour rest period per week. In practice workers in the
industrial sector worked an average of 35 hours per week, and workers
in other sectors worked an average of 30 hours per week. The law
includes specific occupational health and safety regulations. Labor
regulations require employers to take adequate precautions for employee
safety. The Ministry of Labor was responsible for enforcing these
regulations, and it did so unevenly. Labor organizers reported that
workers did not have the right to remove themselves from hazardous
conditions without jeopardizing their continued employment. Foreign
domestic servants, mostly of Asian and African origin, often were
mistreated, abused, and raped (see Section 5). A recruitment agency and
the employer signed the employment contract for a foreign worker;
workers rarely were a party to the contract or, if they were a party,
might not know what the contract stipulates because it is written in
Arabic. The recruitment agency or employers confiscated the passports
of foreign domestic workers when the workers arrived at the airport.
Labor laws do not protect foreign domestic servants. Domestic servants
often worked 18 hours per day, and in most cases did not receive
vacations or holidays. There was no minimum wage for domestic servants;
their average wage was approximately $100 (150,000 Lebanese pounds) per
month. They had no entitlement to government financial assistance.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code stipulates that ``any
person who deprives another of freedom either by abduction or any other
means shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor.'' During the year,
the country was a destination for African and Asian women contracted as
household workers, and Eastern European and Russian women contracted as
dancers in adult clubs. These women may have come voluntarily; however,
there was evidence that many found themselves in coercive work
situations from which they had little practical legal recourse. If
forced prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurred as
a result of the abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor
be sentenced to at least 1 year in prison.
Many women became illegal workers because their employers did not
renew their work and residency permits. Unscrupulous employers sometime
falsely accused the employee of theft in order to relinquish
responsibility for the employee as well as the taxes and airline ticket
home (see section 6.e). Restrictions of movement and withholding of
passports were common practices. A very small number of exploited
foreign workers have won cases against their employers. The judiciary
did not usually acknowledge the violation of maids' rights, but in a
few cases, courts decided in favor of foreign workers against whom
charges had been brought. In October, the criminal court of the Metn
district acquitted two Filipino maids from charges brought against them
by their employers for theft. In another case, a Sri Lankan maid was
repatriated after her employer dropped charges brought against her for
leaving her house.
There is no law specifically prohibiting trafficking and during the
year the Government did not prosecute such cases. However, during the
year the Government took multiple new measures to counter trafficking,
including signing on December 9 the U.N. Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. Other anti-
trafficking measures included the closure of approximately 15 illegal
employment agencies for violating trafficking related regulations by
the Ministry of Labor, and participation in awareness programs. The
Government did not provide foreign workers with relief from
deportation, shelter, or access to legal, medical or psychological
services. However, social workers from the Caritas Migrant Center have
full-time access to the Government retention Center for Foreign
Persons. A number of NGOs provided pro bono legal assistance and
counseling to victims of trafficking. The Ministry of Labor has
established a complaint procedure through which it says it will take an
active role in complaint cases. To date, few victims of trafficking
have used this procedure. During the year, the Ministry of Labor also
began implementing procedures for lodging complaints against employers
or employment agencies.
----------
LIBYA \1\
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\1\ The United States has no official presence in Libya.
Information on the human rights situation therefore is limited; this
report draws heavily on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship
that has been ruled by Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi (the ``Brother
Leader and Guide of the Revolution'') since 1969, when he led a
military coup that overthrew King Idris I. Borrowing from Islamic and
pan-Arab ideas, Qadhafi created a political system that rejects
democracy and political parties and purports to establish a ``third
way'' superior to capitalism and communism. Libya's governing
principles are derived predominantly from Qadhafi's ``Green Book.'' In
theory the citizenry rules the country through a series of popular
congresses, as laid out in the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969 and
the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People of
1977, but in practice Qadhafi and his inner circle monopolize political
power. Qadhafi is aided by extragovernmental organizations--the
Revolutionary Committees--that exercise control over most aspects of
citizens' lives. The judiciary was not independent of the Government,
and security forces had the power to pass sentences without trial.
The country maintained an extensive security apparatus, consisting
of several elite military units, including Qadhafi's personal
bodyguards, local Revolutionary Committees, People's Committees, and
``Purification'' Committees. The result was a multilayered, pervasive
surveillance system that monitored and controlled the activities of
individuals. The various security forces committed numerous serious
human rights abuses.
The Government dominated the economy through complete control of
the country's oil resources, which accounted for approximately 95
percent of export earnings and an estimated 23 percent of the gross
domestic product. Oil revenues were the principal source of foreign
exchange. Much of the country's income has been lost to waste,
corruption, conventional armament purchases, and attempts to develop
weapons of mass destruction, as well as to large donations made to
``liberation'' movements and to developing countries in attempts to
increase Qadhafi's influence in Africa and elsewhere. The Government's
mismanagement of the economy has led to high inflation and increased
import prices, resulting in a decline in the standard of living for
most of its 5.4 million citizens in recent years. U.N. sanctions
against the country were suspended--but not permanently lifted--in 1999
following the Government's surrender of two of its citizens suspected
in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103. On March 14, a Scottish
appellate court in the Netherlands upheld the conviction of Abdelbasset
al-Megrahi in connection with the bombing. Megrahi subsequently
appealed his sentence to the European Commission for Human Rights.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens did not have the
right to change their government. Qadhafi used summary judicial
proceedings to suppress domestic opposition. Security forces tortured
prisoners during interrogations and as punishment. Prison conditions
were poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons,
and many prisoners were held incommunicado. Many political detainees
were held for years without charge or trial. The Government controlled
the judiciary, and citizens did not have the right to a fair public
trial or to be represented by legal counsel. The Government infringed
on citizens' privacy rights, and citizens did not have the right to be
secure in their homes or persons, or to own private property. The
Government restricted freedom of speech, press, assembly, association,
and religion. The Government imposed some limits on freedom of
movement. The Government prohibited the establishment of independent
human rights organizations.
Violence against women was a problem. Traditional attitudes and
practices continued to discriminate against women, and female genital
mutilation (FGM) was practiced in remote areas of the country. The
Government discriminated against and repressed tribal groups. The
Government continued to repress banned Islamic groups and exercised
tight control over ethnic and tribal minorities, such as Amazighs
(Berbers), Tuaregs, and the Warfalla tribe. The Government restricted
basic worker rights, used forced labor, and discriminated against
foreign workers. There have been reports of slavery and trafficking in
persons. The country's human rights record came under intense
international scrutiny after the African Union in June endorsed the
country's nomination to chair the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) in 2003. The Government appointed for the first time in
September a Secretary for Human Rights; at year's end, this fledgling
ministry had yet to demonstrate any influence over the country's human
rights policies.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There was one report
that a person died as a result of torture while in custody. On
September 6, the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) reported
that when Mohammad Massaud Izbeda inquired at the Revolutionary
Committee Headquarters as to why his son had not been among 62
prisoners released by the Government on September 1, the authorities
detained and tortured Mr. Izbeda. According to reports, he was released
later that day and died the same night (see Section 1.c.).
An unknown number of deaths in custody occurred as a result of poor
prison conditions (see Section 1.c.).
In 2001 the Government continued to take proactive measures to
prevent the development of any serious opposition within the country,
focusing its efforts primarily on Islamist groups. It reinforced the
tightened security measures put in place following a 1996 prison mutiny
in Benghazi by arresting possible dissidents, conducting military
operations in the areas of insurrection, and killing a number of
persons.
In October 2001, mobs killed an estimated 150 Africans, including a
Chadian diplomat, in the worst outbreak of antiforeigner violence since
Qadafi took power in 1969. Government security forces reportedly
intervened to stop the violence, but then deported hundreds of
thousands of African migrant workers by driving them in convoys to the
southern border and leaving them stranded in the desert (see Section
6.e.).
In November 2001, a German court found four persons, including a
former government diplomat, guilty of murder and attempted murder in
connection with the 1986 bombing of the La Belle disco in then-West
Berlin. In rendering his oral verdict, the judge declared that there
was clear government responsibility. The German government immediately
called upon the Government to admit responsibility and provide
compensation for the victims.
U.N. sanctions against the country were suspended in 1999 after the
Government surrendered two suspects wanted in connection with the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which killed 259
persons on board and 11 persons on the ground. On March 14, a Scottish
appellate court in the Netherlands upheld the conviction of government
agent Abdelbasset al-Megrahi in connection with the bombing. In
September Megrahi appealed the case to the European Court of Human
Rights, alleging that his rights were breached during his 2000-2001
trial and the subsequent appeal. U.N. Security Council resolutions
required the country to fulfill certain obligations regarding the Pan
Am 103 bombing before sanctions may be permanently lifted, including
accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials and paying
appropriate compensation.
In March 1999, a French court convicted in absentia six defendants
in the bombing of UTA flight 772 over Chad in 1989, which killed 171
persons, and sentenced them to life in prison. In July 2000, the
Government paid the French government $31 million (17 million dinars)
to compensate the victims' families. During Foreign Minister Shalgam's
official visit to Paris in October, the country agreed to pay further
compensation to the families of UTA victims who did not receive
compensation from the 2000 settlement.
b. Disappearance.--In the past year, there were no reports of
abductions; however, the Government in the past has abducted and killed
dissidents in the country and abroad.
In January accusations of government responsibility for the 1978
disappearance of Lebanese Shi'a leader Imam Mousa al-Sadr and two of
his companions in the country resurfaced when Qadhafi announced his
intention to attend the Arab League Summit meeting in Beirut in March.
A Lebanese Shi'a Muslim group called the Sadr Brigades responded by
threatening unspecified action against Qadhafi if he came to Beirut,
causing him to cancel his visit. The Government denied any involvement
in Musa Sadr's disappearance, and in August the Government issued a
public appeal for any information related to the disappearance. In
October the Sadr Brigades publicly vowed vengeance against Qadhafi
based on information it said Iran had provided which proved the
country's culpability.
The Government did not take any action in the 1993 disappearance in
Cairo of its citizen Mansur Kikhiya, a human rights and political
activist.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law provides for fines against any official using
excessive force; nonetheless, there were no known cases of prosecution
for torture or abuse. Security personnel routinely torture prisoners
during interrogations or for punishment. Government agents reportedly
detained and tortured foreign workers, particularly those from sub-
Saharan Africa. Reports of torture were difficult to corroborate
because many prisoners were held incommunicado. In July Qadhafi's son,
Saif al-Islam, announced that the Government would make public the
names of any government personnel involved in torture, even if they
were senior officials, and would bring them trial. The Government had
not made public any names by year's end. Methods of torture reportedly
included: chaining to a wall for hours; clubbing; applying electric
shock; applying corkscrews to the back; pouring lemon juice in open
wounds; breaking fingers and allowing the joints to heal without
medical care; suffocating with plastic bags; depriving of food and
water; hanging by the wrists; suspending from a pole inserted between
the knees and elbows; burning with cigarettes; attacking with dogs; and
beating on the soles of the feet.
In May a court sentenced Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif, Sayyid
Muhammad Ahmad, Dahmu Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Sharif, and Barkah Sidi Jira
Barkah to have their right hands and left legs amputated in punishment
for theft. The sentences were carried out in July and were the first in
the country since Qadhafi came to power 1969.
On September 6, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)
reported that Mohammad Massaud Izbeda inquired at the Revolutionary
Committee Headquarters as to why his son, Abdallah Mohammad Massaud
Izbeda, had not been among the 62 prisoners released by the Government
on September 1. Authorities at the headquarters detained and tortured
Mr. Izbeda. According to reports, he was released later that day and
died the same night. Security forces reportedly attempted to remove
Izbeda's body from its gravesite on September 13 when a group of young
persons intervened. Authorities arrested several, subjecting at least
one, Seif Salem Aljadik, to torture, and reportedly killing others.
Authorities also demolished both Mr. Izbeda and Mr. Aljadik's homes
(see Section 1.a.).
In May 1999, in a much publicized case involving the HIV infection
of nearly 400 children, 16 defendants, including 6 Bulgarians and 1
Palestinian, all health professionals, claimed that their confessions
had been obtained under duress. In February a court in Benghazi
conducted an official inquiry into the defendants' claims of torture.
Defense lawyers for the professionals told the press that the inquiry
was completed but the results were not communicated to the defense. In
November the seven suspects told the Sunday Times that they had signed
confessions after months of torture. The torture methods they described
included electric shocks, beatings, sleep deprivation, intimidation by
police dogs, and forcing one female suspect to undress and threatening
to insert a lighted lamp into her vagina. These signed confessions are
now the prosecution's best evidence against the suspects. The case
remained pending at year's end. According to Amnesty International
(AI), although the verdict was supposed to be announced in September
2001, no such action has occurred.
In 1998 152 professionals and students were arrested in Benghazi
for alleged involvement with an Islamic organizations not known to have
used or advocated violence. An international human rights organization
noted that the defendants were subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture,
and ill-treatment while being held in incommunicado detention (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
Prison conditions reportedly were poor. According to AI, political
detainees reportedly were held in cruel, inhuman, or degrading
conditions, and denied adequate medical care, which led to several
deaths in custody. The Government did not permit prison visits by human
rights monitors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--By law the Government
may hold detainees incommunicado for unlimited periods. Security forces
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The Government held many
political detainees incommunicado in unofficial detention centers
controlled by members of the Revolutionary Committees.
Scores of businessmen, traders, and shop owners have been arrested
arbitrarily on charges of corruption, dealing in foreign goods, and
funding Islamic fundamentalist groups in violation of the 1994 Purge
Law. The Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption, black
marketeering, drug trafficking, and atheism. ``Purification committees
enforced the law.
Hundreds of political detainees, many associated with banned
Islamic groups, reportedly were held in prisons throughout the country
(but mainly in the Abu Salim prison in Tripoli); many have been held
for years without charge. Some human rights organizations estimated
this number to be as high as 2,000. Hundreds of other detainees may
have been held for periods too brief (3 to 4 months) to permit
confirmation by outside observers.
On February 16, a People's Court in Tripoli sentenced to death
Salem Abu Hanak and Abdullah Ahmed Izzedin, 2 out of at least 152
professionals who were arbitrarily arrested in 1998 in Benghazi for
involvement with Islamic organizations. Eighty-six of the 152 men were
sentenced while 66 were acquitted. Those who were convicted received
sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. The appeal trial
opened on December 14. AI reported that lawyers for the accused were
neither allowed to study their case files nor to meet with their
clients. The lawyers were denied access to the court, and the judge
appointed government clerks to replace them. Family members were
allowed to meet the accused briefly for the first time since their
arrest in April 2001, but then not again until at least December 2001
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
In May 1999, the 16 defendants of the case involving the HIV
infection of nearly 400 children were kept in incommunicado detention
for approximately 10 months, without access to their families or legal
representation (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
On September 1, the Government freed 62 political prisoners,
including Muhammad Ali al-Akrami, al-Ajili Muhammad Abd al-Raham al-
Azhari, Muhammad Ali al-Qajiji, Salih Omar al-Qasbi, and Muhammad al-
Sadiq al-Tarhuni, who had been imprisoned since 1973 for their peaceful
involvement with the prohibited Islamic Liberation Party.
On September 1, the Government pardoned 50 Egyptian prisoners and
deported them to Egypt. In October the Government returned 238 Nigerian
prisoners arrested in anti-African riots in July 2001 to Nigeria to
serve out jail terms imposed by courts, following an appeal by the
Nigerian government.
There was no information available on Abdullah Ali al-Sanussi al-
Darrat, who was detained without charge and has not had a trial since
1973 (see Section 2.a.).
The Government did not impose forced exile as a form of punishment,
and it continued to encourage citizen dissidents abroad to return,
promising to ensure their safety. It is unclear whether such promises
were honored. The Government repatriated dozens of family members of
suspected citizen al-Qa'ida members from Afghanistan and Pakistan in
waves throughout the year. Although the Government publicly guaranteed
their safety, the likelihood of such safety remained unclear. Students
studying abroad have been interrogated upon their return.
In connection with the September 2000 mob violence against sub-
Saharan workers, many sub-Saharan Africans, including Chadians,
Ghanaians, and Nigerians were repatriated after seeking assistance from
their embassies.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary was not independent
of the Government, and security forces had the power to pass sentences
without trial. The Government used summary judicial proceedings to
suppress domestic dissent.
There were four levels of courts: summary courts, which tried petty
offenses; the courts of first instance, which tried more serious
crimes; the courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court, which was the
final appellate level.
Special revolutionary courts tried political offenses. Such trials
often were held in secret or even in the absence of the accused. In
other cases, the security forces had the power to pass sentences
without trial, especially in cases involving political opposition. In
the past, Qadhafi has incited local cadres to take extrajudicial action
against suspected opponents.
The private practice of law is illegal; all lawyers must be members
of the Secretariat of Justice.
On February 16, in the trial of the 152 professionals and students
who were arrested in Benghazi for alleged involvement with an Islamic
organization, an international human rights organization noted that the
trial was held in secret and that the judges hearing the case were not
legally qualified. At the time of their arrest, the defendants were not
informed of the charges against them nor were they allowed to meet
their lawyers for consultation (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d).
On February 17, the special People's Court, charged with trying 16
health professionals (9 Libyans, 1 Palestinian, and 6 Bulgarians) in
1999 for allegedly infecting 400 children with HIV, dropped the
conspiracy charge and transferred the proceedings to the criminal
court. The attorney defending the persons claimed he was allowed to
meet with his clients twice in the 3 years since their jailing. The
case was still pending at year's end (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
The Government held a large number of political prisoners. AI
estimated that there were hundreds of persons imprisoned for political
reasons; other groups put that number as high as 2,000. According to
AI, in September 62 prisoners were released on the 33rd anniversary of
Qadhafi coming to power.
The Government did not permit access to political prisoners by
international human rights monitors.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government does not respect the right to privacy.
Security agencies often disregarded the legal requirement to obtain
warrants before entering a private home. They also routinely monitored
telephone calls.
The security agencies and the Revolutionary Committees oversaw an
extensive network of informants; one credible foreign observer
estimated that 10 to 20 percent of the population was engaged in
surveillance for the Government. Exiles reported that family ties to
suspected government opponents may result in harassment and detention.
The Government may seize and destroy property belonging to ``enemies of
the people'' or those who ``cooperate'' with foreign powers. In the
past, citizens reported that the Government warned members of the
extended family of government opponents that they too risked the death
penalty.
The law provides for the punishment of families or communities that
aid, abet, or do not inform the Government of criminals and
oppositionists in their midst. The crimes include ``obstructing the
people's power, instigating and practicing tribal fanaticism,
possessing, trading in or smuggling unlicensed weapons, and damaging
public and private institutions and property.'' The law also provides
that ``any group, whether large or small,'' including towns, villages,
local assemblies, tribes, or families, be punished in their entirety if
they are accused by the General People's Congress of sympathizing,
financing, aiding in any way, harboring, protecting, or refraining from
identifying perpetrators of such crimes. Punishment under the
Collective Punishment Law ranges from the denial of access to utilities
(water, electricity, telephone), fuels, food supplies, official
documents, and participation in local assemblies, to the termination of
new economic projects and state subsidies. The ``Code of Honor'',
passed by the People's General Congress in 1997, provides for
collective punishment to be inflicted on the relatives of persons
having committed certain crimes, normally opponents of the regime.
The 1994 Purge Law provides for the confiscation of private assets
above a nominal amount, describing wealth in excess of such
undetermined amounts as ``the fruits of exploitation or corruption.''
In 1996 the Government ordered the formation of hundreds of ``Purge''
or Purification Committees composed of young military officers and
students. The Purification Committees reportedly seized some
``excessive'' amounts of private wealth from members of the middle and
affluent classes; the confiscated property was taken from the rich to
be given to the poor in an effort to appease the populace and to
strengthen the Government's power and control over the country. The
activities of the Purification Committees continued during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government severely limited
the freedoms of speech and of the press. This was especially true with
regard to criticism of Qadhafi or his government. The occasional
instances of criticism of political leaders and policies in the state-
controlled media usually were government attempts to test public
opinion or weaken a government figure who may be a potential challenger
to Qadhafi. The authorities tolerated some difference of opinion in
People's Committee meetings and at the General People's Congress.
The Government did not respond to requests on the whereabouts of
the journalist Abdullah Ali al-Sanussi al-Darat, who has been detained
without trial or charges brought against him since 1973 (see Section
1.d.).
In April the press announced that the Government had revoked writer
Farag Sayyid Bul-Isha's citizenship as a punishment for his
participation in a program on Al-Jazeera.
The Government restricted freedom of speech in several ways: by
prohibiting all political activities not officially approved; by
enacting laws so vague that many forms of speech or expression may be
interpreted as illegal; and by operating a pervasive system of
informants that created an atmosphere of mistrust at all levels of
society (see Section 1.f.).
The State owns and controlled the media. There was a state-run
daily newspaper, Al-Shams, with a circulation of 40,000. Local
Revolutionary Committees published several smaller newspapers. The
official news agency, JANA, was the designated conduit for official
views. The Government did not permit the publication of opinions
contrary to its policy. Such foreign publications as Newsweek, Time,
the International Herald Tribune, L'Express, and Jeune Afrique were
available, but authorities routinely censored them and had the power to
prohibit their entry into the market.
Technology has made the Internet and satellite television widely
available in the country. According to numerous anecdotal reports, both
were accessed easily in Tripoli.
The Government restricted academic freedom. Professors and teachers
who discussed politically sensitive topics face the risk of government
reprisal.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
does not provide for the right of assembly, and the Government severely
restricted this right. Public assembly was permitted only with
government approval and in support of the Government's positions.
The Government restricted the right of association; it grants such
a right only to institutions affiliated with the Government. Under the
law, political activity found by the authorities to be treasonous is
punishable by death. An offense may include any activity that is
``opposed to the principles of the Revolution.''
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricted freedom of
religion. The country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, and the
leadership states publicly its preference for Islam.
In an apparent effort to eliminate all alternative power bases, the
Government banned the once powerful Sanusiyya Sufi order of Islam. In
its place, Qadhafi established the Islamic Call Society (ICS), which
was the outlet for state-approved religion, as well as a tool for
exporting the revolution abroad. The ICS also was responsible for
relations with other religions, including Christian churches in the
country. In 1992 the Government announced that the ICS would be
disbanded; however, its director still conducted activities, suggesting
that the organization remains operational. The Government heavily
censored its clerics. Islamic groups whose beliefs and practices were
at variance with the state-approved teaching of Islam were banned.
Although most Islamic institutions were under state control, some
mosques were endowed by prominent families; however, they generally
followed the Government-approved interpretation of Islam. Government
officials repeatedly denounced militant Islam throughout the year.
Members of some minority religions were allowed to conduct
services. Christian churches operated openly and were tolerated by the
authorities. However, Christians were restricted by the lack of
churches; there was a government limit of one church per denomination
per city.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict
the internal movement of citizens, but it has imposed blockades on
those cities and regions (primarily in the east) in which
antigovernment attacks or movements originated.
The Government required citizens to obtain exit permits for travel
abroad and limited their access to hard currency. A woman must have her
husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 5). Authorities
routinely seized the passports of foreigners married to citizens upon
their entry into the country.
The right of return exists. The Government has called on students,
many of whom receive a government subsidy, and others working abroad,
to return to the country on little or no notice.
The Government expelled noncitizens arbitrarily. The Government
repatriated dozens of family members of suspected al-Qa'ida members
from Afghanistan and Pakistan in waves throughout the year.
Following reports in October 2001 of mob violence in which 150
African workers were killed, the Government expelled hundreds of
thousands of African migrants by driving them in convoys to the border
with Niger and Chad and abandoning them there in the desert (see
Sections 1.a., 5 and 6.e.). In February 2000, eight nationals were
forcibly returned from Jordan and in July 2000 four nationals were
forcibly returned from Pakistan. All were suspected of having
sympathies with certain religious groups.
While the country has acceded to the 1969 Organization of African
Unity Convention on refugees, it is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The law does not include provisions for granting asylum, first asylum,
or refugee status. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
reported that there were approximately 33,000 refugees in the country,
including 30,000 Palestinians and 3,000 Somalis. During 2001 the UNHCR
assisted approximately 1,300 of the most vulnerable refugees in the
country and supported income-generating programs for refugee women. The
Government cooperated with UNHCR and provided free housing to
approximately 850 refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Government denied citizens the right to change their
government. Major government decisions were controlled by Qadhafi, his
close associates, and committees acting in his name. Political parties
were banned. Qadhafi appointed military officers and official
functionaries down to junior levels. Corruption and favoritism, partly
based on tribal origin, were major problems that adversely affected
government efficiency.
In theory, popular political participation is provided by the
grassroots People's Committees, which are open to both men and women,
and which send representatives annually to the national General
People's Congress (GPC). The GPC is chosen by Qadhafi and merely
approves all recommendations made by him.
Qadhafi established the Revolutionary Committees in 1977. These
bodies consisted primarily of youths who guard against political
dissent. Some committees have engaged in show trials of government
opponents; the committees also have been implicated in the killing of
opponents abroad. The committees approve all candidates in elections
for the GPC.
There was no reliable information on the representation of women
and minorities in the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government prohibits the establishment of independent human
rights organizations.
The Government created the Libyan Arab Human Rights Committee in
1989. The committee was not known to have published any reports.
The Government has not responded substantively to appeals from AI
on behalf of detainees.
In June the African Union (AU) nominated the country to chair the
57th UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The nomination renewed
international scrutiny of the country's human rights record and caused
international organizations to criticize the AU for backing the
country. The Government publicly dismissed criticism of its human
rights record in August, issuing a statement that ``respect of human
rights is enshrined.'' In September Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam
defended the country's nomination on the grounds that chairing the CHR
would influence the Government into better behavior.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors;
however, the Government did not enforce the prohibitions, particularly
those against discrimination against women and tribal minorities.
Women.--Although there was little detailed information regarding
the extent of violence against women, it remained a problem. In
general, the intervention of neighbors and extended family members
tended to limit the reporting of domestic violence. Abuse within the
family rarely was discussed publicly, due to the value attached to
privacy in society.
Some nomadic tribes located in remote areas still practiced FGM on
young girls.
Citizens have been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves,
mainly southern Sudanese women and children (see Section 6.f.).
The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation granted women total equality.
Despite this legal provision, traditional attitudes and practices
prevailed, and discrimination against women persisted, keeping them
from attaining the family or civil rights formally provided them. Women
were reportedly prevented in practice from owning property. A woman
must have the permission of her husband or another close male relative
to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
Although their status is still not equal to that of men, the
opportunity for women to make notable social progress increased in
recent years. Oil wealth, urbanization, development plans, education
programs, and even the impetus behind Qadhafi's revolutionary
government have contributed to the creation of new employment
opportunities for women. In recent years, foreign diplomats have noted
a growing sense of individualism in some segments of society,
especially among educated youth. For example, many educated young
couples preferred to set up their own households, rather than move in
with their parents, and viewed polygyny with scorn. Educational
differences between men and women have narrowed.
In general, the emancipation of women is a generational phenomenon:
urban women under the age of 35 tended to have more ``modern''
attitudes toward life; however, older urban women tended to have more
traditional attitudes toward family and employment. Moreover, a
significant proportion of rural women did not attend school and were
inclined to instill in their children such traditional beliefs as
women's subservient role in society.
Female participation in the workforce, particularly in services,
has increased in the last decade. However, employment gains by women
were often inhibited by lingering traditional restrictions that
discourage women from playing an active role in the workplace and by
the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist values. Some observers have
noted that even educated women often lacked self-confidence and social
awareness and sought only a limited degree of occupational and social
equality with men.
Children.--The Government subsidized education (which is compulsory
until age 15) and medical care, and it has improved the welfare of
children; however, declining revenues and general economic
mismanagement have led to cutbacks, particularly in medical services.
Sudanese girls reportedly have been trafficked and sold as slaves
in the country (see Section 6.f.).
FGM was practiced on young girls.
Persons with Disabilities.--No information was available on the
Government's efforts, if any, to assist persons with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Arabic-speaking Muslims of
mixed Arab and Amazigh ancestry constituted 97 percent of the
population. The principal minorities are Amazighs and sub-Saharan
Africans. There were frequent allegations of discrimination based on
tribal status, particularly against Amazighs in the interior and
Tuaregs in the south. The Government manipulated the tribes to maintain
a grip on power by rewarding some tribes with money and government
positions and repressing and jailing members of various other tribes.
The Government also has attempted to keep the tribes fractured by
pitting one against another.
Foreigners constituted a significant part of the workforce.
According to some estimates, there were 2.5 million foreign workers.
Africans in particular have become targets of resentment in the past.
In October 2001, mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly
killed 150 African workers, including a Chadian diplomat. The
Government dispersed the rioters, but then reportedly expelled hundreds
of thousands of African workers (see Sections 1.a., 2.d., and 6.e.). In
September 2000, mobs beat and killed numerous African workers and, in
some cases, burned their places of residence and employment. The mobs
blamed the foreign population for increased crime and the presence of
HIV/AIDS in the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Independent trade unions and
professional associations are prohibited, and workers do not have the
right to form their own unions. The Government regards such structures
as unacceptable ``intermediaries between the revolution and the working
forces.'' However, workers may join the National Trade Unions'
Federation, which was created in 1972 and is administered by the
People's Committee system. The Government prohibited foreign workers
from joining this organization.
The official trade union organization played an active role in the
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization
of African Trade Union Unity. The Arab Maghreb Trade Union Federation
suspended the membership of the country's trade union organization in
1993. The suspension followed reports that Qadhafi had replaced all
union leaders, and in some cases, with loyal followers without union
experience.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense, because labor law
requires that the Government must approve all agreements.
The law does not provide workers with the right to strike. In a
1992 speech, Qadhafi claimed that workers were permitted to strike but
added that strikes do not occur because the workers control their
enterprises. There were no reports of strikes during the year.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--Forced or bonded labor
is not prohibited by law, and there was no information regarding
whether the law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children or whether
such practices occured. In its 2000 report, the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts stated that in the country
``persons expressing certain political views or views ideologically
opposed to the established political, social, or economic system may be
punished with penalties of imprisonment,'' including ``an obligation to
perform labor.'' The ILO report also noted that public employees may be
sentenced to compulsory labor ``as a punishment for breaches of labor
discipline or for participation in strikes, even in services whose
interruption would not endanger the life, personal safety, or health of
the whole or part of the population.''
There have been credible reports that the Government arbitrarily
forced some foreign workers into involuntary military service or has
coerced them into performing subversive activities against their own
countries.
Despite the Penal Code's prohibition on slavery, citizens have been
implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, mainly southern Sudanese
women and children, who were captured by Sudanese government troops in
the ongoing civil war in Sudan (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 18. There
was no information available on the prevalence of child labor, or
whether forced or bonded labor by children is prohibited or practiced
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The labor law defines the rights
and duties of workers, including matters of compensation, pension
rights, minimum rest periods, and working hours.
Wages, which are forbidden by the Green Book and are actually paid
in the form of ``entitlements'' to workers, frequently were in arrears.
A public sector wage freeze was imposed over a decade ago particularly
in the face of consistently high inflation. According to some reports,
the average family lived on $170 (86.7 dinars) a month. Although there
was no information available regarding whether the average wage was
sufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of
living, the Government heavily subsidized rent, utilities, oil, and
every day food staples such as flour and sugar. The legal maximum
workweek is 48 hours.
Labor inspectors are assigned to inspect places of work for
compliance with occupational health and safety standards. Certain
industries, such as the petroleum sector, attempted to maintain
standards set by foreign companies. There was no information regarding
whether a worker may remove himself from an unhealthy or unsafe work
situation without risking continued employment.
Although foreign workers constitute a significant percentage of the
work force, the Labor Law does not accord them equality of treatment.
Foreign workers were permitted to reside in the country only for the
duration of their work contracts and could not send more than half of
their earnings to their families in their home countries. They were
subject to arbitrary pressures, such as changes in work rules and
contracts, and had little option but to accept such changes or to
depart the country. Foreign workers who were not under contract enjoyed
no protection.
In 1997 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
cited inadequate housing, threats of imprisonment to those accused of
disobeying disciplinary rules, and accusations of causing a variety of
societal problems as some of the problems in the Government's treatment
of foreign laborers.
The Government used the threat of expulsion of foreign workers as
leverage against countries whose foreign policies ran counter to the
Government's.
In October 2001, mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly
killed 150 African workers, leading to the deportation of hundreds of
thousands of African workers by the Government (see Sections 1.a.,
2.d., and 5). The violence followed similar attacks on African workers
in September 2000.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no information available
regarding whether the law specifically prohibits trafficking in
persons. However, the offenses of prostitution and related offenses,
including sexual trafficking are illegal in the Penal Code.
There have been reports of trafficking in persons. The country was
a place of transit for women trafficked from Africa to central Europe,
and there were reports that Sri Lankan women were transported through
the country as well. In August 2001, Senegalese authorities detained
100 young Senegalese women from boarding a charter flight to the
country. According to a media report, in September 2001 two French
nationals of Senegalese origin were arrested and charged with
organizing international prostitution. There were reports that these
women were being sent to the country to work as prostitutes.
Citizens have been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves,
mainly southern Sudanese women and children, who were captured by
Sudanese government troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan (see
Section 6.c.).
__________
MOROCCO
The Constitution provides for a monarchy with a Parliament and an
independent judiciary; however, ultimate authority rests with the King,
Mohammed VI, who presides over the Council of Ministers, appoints or
approves members of the Government, and may, at his discretion,
terminate the tenure of any minister, dissolve the Parliament, call for
new elections, and rule by decree. Since the constitutional reform of
1996, the bicameral legislature consists of a lower house, the Chamber
of Representatives, which is elected through universal suffrage, and an
upper house, the Chamber of Counselors, whose members are elected by
various regional, local, and professional councils (members of whom are
elected directly). The Lower House of Parliament also may dissolve the
Government through a vote of no confidence. In September the country
held parliamentary elections for the lower chamber that were widely
regarded as the first free, fair, and transparent elections in its
history. There were instances of administrative mistakes that hampered
the voting process in some areas. There were some charges of party
members engaging in vote-buying and other irregularities, which the
Government was continuing to investigate at year's end. The entire
voting process was changed, and was confusing to some voters, which may
have reduced turnout (52 percent). Unlike in the past, the Ministry of
the Interior oversaw the elections in a manner widely regarded as fair,
and actively pursued those who violated electoral laws. The King
consulted with the heads of the major political parties concerning the
formation of a new government and appointed nonparty member and former
Interior Minister Driss Jettou as the new Prime Minister. The judiciary
remained subject to government influence and corruption, although
government reforms aimed at improvement.
The security apparatus included several overlapping police and
paramilitary organizations. The Border Police and the National Security
Police were departments of the Ministry of Interior; the Judicial
Police lay within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice; and the
Royal Gendarmerie reported to the Palace. Civilian authorities
maintained effective control of the security forces. Some members of
the security forces continued to commit serious human rights abuses,
although such abuses decreased somewhat during the year.
The country had a population of approximately 30,645,000. The
economy was based on large phosphate reserves, a diverse agricultural
sector, fisheries, a sizable tourist industry, and a growing
manufacturing sector. Citizens working abroad were a source of
substantial remittances. The Government expected a real GDP increase of
4.2 percent for the year. One in five citizens lived in poverty.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
most areas; however, the Government's record was generally poor in a
few areas. Citizens lacked the full ability to change their government.
There were two reported deaths in police custody and several prisoners
have died while incarcerated. While there were some well-publicized
prosecutions for abuses by security forces, the failure to prosecute
most other cases raised concerns regarding the Government's commitment
to resolving the problem.
Authorities, at times, arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.
Human rights groups did not believe that the Government disclosed all
the information about citizens who were abducted from the 1960s through
the 1980s. At times, the authorities infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. Prison conditions remained harsh. The Judiciary lacked
independence.
A new Press Code did not change the situation substantially and
freedom of the press remained restricted. The police violently
dispersed peaceful demonstrations several times during the year. The
Government limited freedom of religion. Human rights awareness training
continued. Domestic violence and discrimination against women were
common. The Government violated worker rights, subjecting unions to
government interference, restricting the right to strike and the right
to form unions, and using security forces to break up strikes. Child
labor was a problem, and the Government did not act forcefully to end
the practice of the illegal employment of young girls who were
subjected to exploitative domestic servitude. Trafficking in persons
was a problem. Morocco was invited by the Community of Democracies'
(CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings.
In January the local branch of the Moroccan Association for Human
Rights (AMDH) alleged that Omar Aouad died as a result of torture in
the Kenitra prison. The authorities questioned some prison officials.
There was no further action taken during the year.
On November 28, Mohamed Boucetta, imprisoned for petty crime,
reportedly died in custody in Laayoune prison in the Western Sahara.
According to Saharan activist groups, he told family members two days
before his death that he was being tortured and an autopsy indicated
that ``blows and wounds'' caused his death. A prison warden was
reportedly in custody concerning the death, and the prison director was
reportedly suspended. Media reports suggested that fellow inmates beat
him to death. An investigation was ongoing at year's end (see Section
1.c.).
In 2001 a policeman was tried and convicted of torture resulting in
the death of a person in custody in Sale. In February he was found not
guilty on appeal; however, another policeman was convicted in the same
case and was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment (see Section 1.c.).
In July 2000, a Royal Armed Forces patrol took Mustapha Najaiji and
another person into custody. According to the other person, the patrol
beat Najiaji at a Ministry of Interior holding cell. The security
forces reported Najiaji committed suicide by hanging himself. The
second person later claimed Najiaji died from the beatings. The AMDH
reported that the autopsy indicated that Najiaji had been the victim of
violence before his death. No charges were filed in the case during the
year (see Section 1.c.).
After a lengthy investigation, the trial of three policemen accused
of manslaughter in the 1996 death in custody of Hassan Mernissi resumed
in September 2000 and was still pending at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no new cases of confirmed
disappearance. However, the AMDH claimed that the continued practice of
incommunicado detention without informing family members of those
detained was evidence of the continued practice of forced disappearance
(see Section 1.d.).
The forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the Government
and its policies occurred during several decades. In 1997 the
Government pledged that such activities would not recur, and that it
would disclose as much information as possible about past cases. The
Government provided information and death certificates for many of
those who had disappeared over the years. However, hundreds of families
did not have any information about their missing relatives, many of
whom disappeared over 20 years ago. Authorities stated that they
released information on all confirmed disappearance cases.
After years of denying that Sahrawis (inhabitants of the former
Spanish Protectorate of Western Sahara) were imprisoned in Morocco for
military or political activity related to the Polisario Front (Popular
Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro), an
organization seeking independence for the region, the Government
released more than 300 such prisoners in 1991. Entire families, and
Sahrawis who had disappeared in the mid-1970s, were among those
released. The Government failed to conduct a public inquiry or to
explain how and why those released spent up to 16 years of
incommunicado detention without charge or trial. The former Sahrawi
detainees formed an informal association whose principal objective is
to seek redress and compensation from the Government for their
detention. They reported little progress during the year in gaining
government recognition of their grievances.
Since October 1998, the Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights
(CCDH) has released information regarding cases of disappearance.
However, human rights groups and families continue to claim hundreds
more cases of disappearances than the Government, which listed only
112. Many disputed disappearances are from the Western Sahara.
In June the AMDH, the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH)
and the Forum for Truth and Justice (FVJ) organized a ``Caravan of
Truth'' to Kelaat, M'gouna, a notorious prison for political detainees
in the 1970s. More than 500 people went to plead with the authorities
to release all information on all the disappeared.
The CCDH also was responsible for assisting the Royal Arbitration
Commission in providing compensation to victims of past human rights
abuses, or their surviving family members, including Sahrawis.
According to the CCDH, the Commission had resolved 422 cases, involving
1027 persons during the first 6 months of the year. However, numerous
cases remained pending at year's end.
Nevertheless, human rights organizations continued to maintain that
the compensation process was inadequate. Some groups also criticized
the small number of cases settled, citing that thousands remained. The
CCDH maintained that it completed the disappearance and Sahrawi cases
and currently was investigating individual claims, which took longer to
resolve.
Associations that sought information regarding those who have
disappeared called upon the Government for full disclosure of events
surrounding cases that date back to the 1960s. Associations in the
Western Sahara that sought information on disappearances were not free
from government interference; there were reports that some members of
these associations were harassed and intimidated while seeking
information regarding missing Sahrawis. Some also continued to be
denied passports (see Section 2.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and the Government claimed that
the use of torture has been discontinued; however, some members of the
security forces tortured or otherwise abused detainees. The Penal Code
stipulates sentences up to life imprisonment for public servants who
``use or oblige the use of violence'' against others in the exercise of
their official duties. By law, pretrial-investigating judges must, if
asked to do so or if they themselves notice physical marks that so
warrant, refer the detained person to an expert in forensic medicine.
However, according to human rights groups, judges often ignored this
requirement in practice. While there were some well-publicized
prosecutions for abuses by security forces, the failure to prosecute
most other cases raised concerns regarding the Government's commitment
to resolving the problem.
In March approximately 50 off-duty soldiers assaulted civilians in
El Hajeb, resulting in more than 20 persons injured (see Section 6.f.).
The Gendarmerie arrested six of the soldiers, who were tried by a
military court and sentenced to 2 months in prison.
The family of Mohamed Boucetta, who died in custody in Laayoune on
November 28, claimed that he said that he was being tortured (see
Section 1.a.).
In February 2001, as a result of police torture a person died in
custody in Sale (see Section 1.a.).
No charges were filed, nor are likely to be, in the following cases
of alleged torture in 2000: Mustapha Najiaji (see Section 1.a);
Abderrahmane Jamali by police in Casablanca at the request of another
person; two cases to extort money by a Royal Gendarmerie officer in
Zaio; a Sahawari student in Marrakech after demonstrations; and a
university student in Rabat also after a demonstration.
The Government continued to admit past torture and abuses. While it
was not willing to prosecute those responsible, the Royal Arbitration
Commission continued to hear and rule on claims and offer restitution
to victims and has permitted human rights groups to organize
conferences on the subject. In June Supreme Court President Driss
Dahak, also President of the Royal Advisory Council on Human Rights,
met with Inge Genefke, founder of the International Council for the
Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture (a Danish NGO), to discuss
financial compensation to victims and the importance of the
rehabilitation process. Genefke also urged the Government to permit the
U.N. Committee Against Torture to make confidential investigations in
the country and to consider individual complaints.
During the year, police violently dispersed demonstrator s (see
Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions remained harsh, and did not generally meet
international standards, despite some improvements in medical care and
efforts to expand capacity. Separate facilities were nonetheless
maintained for men and for women and for minors. Pretrial detainees
were not held separately from convicts.
Extreme overcrowding, malnutrition, and lack of hygiene continued
to aggravate the poor health conditions inside prisons. Several fires
at prisons, including one in November at El Jadida that claimed 50
lives, raised anxiety about poor incarceration conditions.
In June the Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (OMP) alleged that 12
percent of prisoners were minors that the prison administration failed
to protect. The OMP continued to call attention to problems of
corruption, maltreatment, malnutrition, sexual abuse, lack of training
and education, drug abuse and violence within the prisons, as well as
the issue of incarcerating first-time offenders with hardened
criminals.
The Government permitted monitors from international humanitarian
organizations to visit prisons, including those holding alleged
``political prisoners''; however, no organizations visited such
prisoners during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution does
not prohibit arbitrary arrest or detention, and police continued to use
these practices. Although legal provisions for due process have been
revised extensively in recent years, reports indicated that authorities
sometimes ignored them. Although police usually made arrests in public
and during the day, they did not always identify themselves and did not
always obtain warrants. Preventive detention is limited to 48 hours,
with one 24-hour extension allowed at the prosecutor's discretion. In
state security cases, the preventive detention period is 96 hours; the
prosecutor may also extend this time. Defendants are denied access to
counsel during this initial period, which is when the accused is
interrogated and abuse or torture is most likely to occur. There is no
access to family members during the initial period. Some members of the
security forces, long accustomed to indefinite precharge access to
detainees, continued to resist the time limits.
The police were required to notify a person's next of kin of an
arrest ``as soon as possible.'' However, lawyers were not always
informed promptly of the date of arrest, and thus were not able to
monitor compliance with the preventive detention limits. While the law
provides for a limited system of bail, it rarely was granted. However,
defendants in some instances were released on their own recognizance.
The law does not provide for habeas corpus or its equivalent. Under a
separate military code, military authorities may detain members of the
military without warrants or public trial.
Although accused persons generally are brought to trial within an
initial period of 2 months, prosecutors may request up to five
additional 2-month extensions of pretrial detention. Thus, an accused
person may be kept in detention for up to 1 year prior to trial.
In July Human Rights Watch claimed that about 80 persons had been
arbitrarily arrested for al-Qa'ida involvement. Tangier Islamist
Abdelouahed Bekhout, accused of al-Qa'ida ties, was released after 40
days confinement on July 12, due to lack of evidence. Most of the
remaining detainees were also released.
The law provides for forced exile; however, there were no known
instances of its use during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the courts were subject to
extrajudicial pressures, including government influence. Some members
of the judiciary were corrupt and delays were lengthy in some cases.
The Government continued to implement reforms intended to increase
judicial independence impartiality, and efficiency.
There are four levels in the common law court system: Communal and
district courts; courts of first instance; the Appeals Court; and the
Supreme Court. While in theory there is a single court system under the
Ministry of Justice, other courts also operate, including: The Special
Court of Justice, which handles cases of civil service corruption;
administrative courts; commercial courts; and the military tribunal,
which also tries state security cases on certain occasions (although
the Government may also direct state security cases to the regular
court system).
Although there is a single court system for most nonmilitary
matters, family issues are adjudicated by a Family Court system formed
in July whose judges are trained in Shari'a (Islamic law) as applied in
the country. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to become a judge, and
the majority of judges are not lawyers. All new judges are graduates of
a 3-year training program.
In general detainees are arraigned before a court of first
instance. If the judge determines that a confession was obtained under
duress, the law requires him to exclude it from evidence. However,
according to reliable sources, cases often were adjudicated on the
basis of forced confessions.
While appeal courts may in some cases be used as a second reference
for courts of first instance, they primarily handle cases involving
crimes punishable by 5 years or more in prison. In practice defendants
before appeals courts who are implicated in such crimes consequently
have no method of appeal. The Supreme Court does not review and rule on
cases sent to it by courts of appeal; the Supreme Court may overturn an
appellate court's ruling on procedural grounds only. The absence of
appeals for defendants in such crimes therefore becomes more
problematic given the fact that an investigation into the case by an
examining magistrate is mandatory only in those crimes punishable by
sentences of life imprisonment or death.
There was some progress in judicial reform, especially in public
corruption and judicial disciplinary cases. Efforts continued with
modest success to increase efficiency and to end petty corruption,
which, according to most observers, remained a routine cost of court
business. Additionally, the court system remained subject to
extrajudicial pressures.
In June in a well publicized public corruption case, 10 people
accused of embezzling tens of millions of dollars from the Caisse
Nationale du Credit Agricole (CNCA) were sentenced to 2 to 12 years in
prison. Former Minister and ex-head of CNCA Rachid Haddaoui was
sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Nine others received sentences
totaling 49 years in prison. In addition, the court ordered the
reimbursement of approximately $7.4 million (74 million dirhams).
The law does not distinguish political and security cases from
common criminal cases. At the Government's discretion, serious state
security cases such as those relating to the Monarchy, Islam or
territorial integrity may be brought before a specially constituted
military tribunal, responsible to the military and the Ministry of
Interior.
Aside from external pressures, resource constraints also affected
the court system. Although the Ministry of Justice provides an attorney
at public expense for serious crimes (when the offense carries a
maximum sentence of more than 5 years), appointed attorneys who were
not paid enough often provided inadequate representation.
During the year, sensitive human rights issues arose in some cases,
most of which were covered openly and extensively by national and
international media. Defense attorneys continued to claim that judicial
processes in these cases were marked by significant irregularities, and
that such irregularities infringed on the right to a fair trial for the
accused.
In July 2001, Ahmed Boukhari, a former intelligence agent, made
public allegations regarding the Government's role in the 1965 Paris
disappearance of socialist leader Mehdi Ben Barka. Authorities
subsequently brought charges against him for writing bad checks, and
former colleagues successfully sued him for defamation. He served 3
months in prison on the check charge and 3 months on the defamation
charge, and he paid fines in both instances.
The Ben Barka case continued to embarrass the Government. Most
observers saw the cases against Boukhari as heavy-handed attempts to
prevent him from talking about the Ben Barka disappearance.
Nevertheless, it was freely covered in the Moroccan press. At year's
end, the Government had not responded to Boukhari's request for a
passport in order to travel to provide testimony in a French court.
In 1999 and 2000, Mustapha Adib, an Air Force captain, was
convicted and reconvicted after the initial conviction was reversed in
two military trials for violating the Military Code and libeling the
military. The authorities detained Adib after he spoke out against
military corruption and harassment to a journalist from the French
newspaper Le Monde. The sentence was 2 \1/2\ years in prison, and
expulsion from the military. The incident remained a focus of public
interest. The truth regarding Adib's accusations of corruption was not
a defense and, in fact, never was contested. After his release, Captain
Adib gave a number of press interviews. He ran for Parliament but was
not elected.
The Government did not consider any of its prisoners to be
political prisoners; however, Amnesty International (AI) identified 60
persons whom it considered to be political prisoners.
Various international human rights groups' estimates of the number
of persons in prison for advocating independence for the Western Sahara
varied from zero to 700. No consensus on a definitive number was
reached. Conditions in the Western Sahara complicate attempts to
confirm whether Sahrawis were imprisoned solely for their political
affiliation or open advocacy of independence, or for other actions in
violation of the law. The AMDH claimed that it knew of no persons
imprisoned for having solely overtly advocated independence.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the home is inviolable
and that no search or investigation may take place without a search
warrant, and the law stipulates that a search warrant may be issued by
a prosecutor on good cause; however, authorities sometimes ignored
these provisions.
Government security services monitored certain persons and
organizations, both foreign and domestic, and government informers
monitored activities on university campuses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression; however, the law permits prison sentences and
financial penalties for journalists and publishers who violate its
restrictions on defamation, libel and discussion regarding three
topics: The Monarchy; territorial integrity; and Islam. The Press Code
lists threats to ``public order'' as one of the criteria for the censor
to consider. Within these limits, newspapers and weeklies were
published across the political spectrum and were sometimes critical of
government policies.
Government control of the media generally was exercised through
directives and ``guidance'' from the Ministry of Interior. Publications
that were judged offensive could be confiscated or indefinitely
suspended. The Government may censor newspapers directly by ordering
them not to report on specific items or events. The Government
registered and licensed domestic newspapers and journals and could use
the licensing process to prevent the publication of materials that
exceeded its threshold of tolerable dissent. The Ministry of Interior
could control foreign publications by removing ``banned'' publications
from circulation.
In February the Government passed a new Press Code; however, its
substantive changes from the 1958 Code were minimal. The Code reflected
compromises over differences between party-oriented officials of the
previous government, who wanted increased press freedom, and more
conservative officials in the national security, justice, and religious
ministries directly appointed by the King. The Government claimed that
the bill guaranteed the citizen's right to information, journalists'
right to access information, and respect for the practice of journalism
while respecting the Constitution, the law and ethics. The new Press
Code was not well received by the Moroccan National Union of
Journalists (SNPM), various political parties, human rights groups, and
international NGOs.
The new law requires the Ministry of the Interior to justify to the
courts any seizure or banning of domestic or foreign publications,
suspension of the publisher's license, or destruction of equipment. The
law continues to provide for jail sentences (3 to 5 years, rather than
the 5 to 20 of the 1958 law), fines, and payment of damages for
newspaper officials found guilty of libeling public officials.
There were approximately 2,000 domestic and foreign newspapers,
magazines, and journals in circulation during the year. The Government
owned the official press agency, Maghreb Arab Press (MAP), and the
Arabic daily newspaper, Al-Anbaa. The Government also supported two
semiofficial dailies, the French-language Le Matin and the Arabic-
language Assahra Al Maghribia. In addition the Government subsidized
the rest of the press through price controls for newsprint and office
space. The Government generally tolerated satirical and often stinging
editorials in the opposition parties' dailies. The media continued to
engage regularly in self-censorship to avoid possible sanctions.
The Government owned Moroccan Radio-Television (RTM). Another major
broadcaster was the French-backed Medi-1, which operated from Tangier.
While nominally private and independent, Medi-1 practiced self-
censorship, as do other media outlets. A government-appointed committee
monitored broadcasts. The Government owned the only television stations
whose broadcasts could be received in most parts of the nation without
decoders or satellite dish antennas. Dish antennas were in wide use
throughout the country. The Government did not impede the reception of
foreign broadcasts during the year.
In January the director of the print shop ``Safagraphic'' accused
the secret services of causing $15,000 (150,000 dirhams) damage to his
shop, which printed the books and publications of the Islamist Justice
and Charity Organization (JCO).
In February the Casablanca Court of Appeals commuted to suspended
terms the prison sentences and reduced the fines of the directors of
the weekly Le Journal, whom the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed
Benaissa, had sued for libel.
In April an independent weekly, Le Reporter, claimed that an issue
of the Al Ayyam newspaper had been banned for publishing an interview
in April with attorney Aderrahim Berrada, in which he said that
officials should ask public forgiveness for human rights violations in
the country.
In May authorities seized 8,000 copies of Issue No. 15 of the
periodical Wajhat Nadhar. This issue contained an article and a
transcript of an interview about the monarchy with Prince Moulay
Hicham, a member of the royal family known for his liberal opinions,
who is now in self-imposed exile. However, Demain Magazine later
published a full transcript of the interview without incident.
In June the authorities apprehended Jam Roues, a member of the FVJ,
while he was making photocopies of a pamphlet compiled during the
Caravan of Truth movement, which he refused to turn over to the police.
Another FVJ member contacted Interior Minister Driss Jettou, who
ordered Roes' immediate release.
During the year, the Government banned French publications (Le
Monde, Liberation, and VSD) for articles critical of the Monarchy.
The Government continued to block the publication of the JCO's
newspapers Al Addle Awl Insane and Result Al Futaba throughout the
year. The authorities blocked two of the JCO's web sites at the same
time, with domestic access to them cut off.
In general the press published unflattering articles that would
have been censored in past years. The press openly reported on topics
such as government corruption and financial scandals, sensitive human
rights cases, harsh prison conditions, torture, poverty, prostitution,
violence against women, exploitation of child maids, and sexual abuse
of children.
Many books that openly criticized Morocco's past were published and
sold freely. Five books remained banned, all relating to disappearances
and the regime of King Hassan II.
The Government did not block Internet access generally, apart from
JCO's Web sites.
Academic freedom was restricted. There was no open debate on the
Monarchy, the Western Sahara, and Islam. Government informers monitored
campus activities, mostly Islamist, and the Ministry of Interior
approved the appointments of rectors (see Section 1.f.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law also permits the
Government to suppress peaceful demonstrations and mass gatherings, and
at times during the year police forcibly prevented and disrupted
gatherings. Most conferences and demonstrations required the prior
authorization of the Ministry of Interior, ostensibly for security
reasons. Local observers generally agreed that the authorities required
a declaration of a public meeting and their own authorization in order
for public-venue meetings to proceed, and the authorities only allowed
meetings to proceed that they considered non-threatening.
In January police violently dispersed 60 unemployed blind people
demonstrating in front of the Parliament in Rabat. Many were injured
and 17 were hospitalized.
In February security forces violently dispersed unemployed
graduates and journalists in front of Parliament. The unemployed
graduates were protesting, and the journalists were planning to attend
a press conference on the new Press Code, called by the National Union
of the Moroccan Press (SNPM) Secretary General Younes Moujahid. More
than 60 demonstrators were injured, 11 seriously. More were injured
when the security forces refused to allow additional ambulances to
respond.
During the year, most meetings and marches took place peacefully
without government interference. In April Rabat experienced the largest
demonstration in the country's history, in support of the Palestinians.
Conservative estimates placed the crowd at 250,000. The demonstration
was peaceful, and the authorities acted with restraint.
Other peaceful demonstrations during the year included: An FVJ sit-
in and hunger strike to raise awareness about former political
prisoners; an Islamist union sit-in in front of the Education Ministry
to protest the nonapplication of the new statute for teachers; and a
sit-in to protest the provision of water and electricity as
insufficient, irregular, and expensive.
However, there were instances of improper official intervention
(and one case of non-action) during the year. In January, for example,
unemployed doctors marched in Rabat. Police intervention resulted in
several injuries, and spectators condemned the violent reaction by the
authorities. In February four journalists, covering a demonstration of
unemployed university graduates, were beaten by police with clubs. Also
in February, an Islamist student faction occupied the University of
Mohammedia and assaulted numerous other students, while also unlawfully
seizing campus facilities. The authorities did not intervene to stop
these activities. In April the authorities prevented, for the second
time, a demonstration in support of the Berber rights movement in
Kabylie, Algeria.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government limited this right in practice. Under a 1958 decree, which
was amended substantially in 1973 to introduce restrictions on civil
society organizations, persons who wished to create an organization
were required to obtain the approval of the Ministry of Interior before
holding meetings. In practice the Ministry used this requirement to
prevent persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the
Government from forming legal organizations. Historically, extreme
Islamist and leftist groups encountered the greatest difficulty in
obtaining official approval. Although there were over 20 active
Islamist groups, the Government prohibited membership in two, the JCO
and Jama'a Islamia, due to their anti-Monarchist orientation. The
Ministry of Interior, which has used this power to control
participation in the political process, also must approve political
parties. However, individual Islamists are not barred from
participating in recognized political parties.
Prior to the September Parliamentary elections, the Government
decreed that any existing political party that had not participated in
at least two elections would be dissolved and that public aid would not
be granted to any party that did not hold a congress every four years.
To create a new party, a declaration must be submitted to the Interior
Ministry, signed by at least 1,000 co-founding members from all regions
of the country. Before the election 37 parties were in existence (many
created during the year) and 26 of them ran candidates in the
elections.
The Party for Justice and Development (PJD) was the only Islamist
party that participated in the elections.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and Jewish and Christian communities openly practiced their
faiths; however, the Government placed certain restrictions on
Christian religious materials and proselytizing, and several small
religious minorities were tolerated with varying degrees of official
restrictions.
The Government monitored the activities of mosques and placed other
restrictions on Muslims and Islamic organizations whose activities were
deemed to have exceeded the bounds of religious practice and become
political in nature. The Constitution provides that Islam is the
official religion, and designates the King as ``Commander of the
Faithful'' with the responsibility of ensuring ``respect for Islam.''
The Government did not license or approve religions or religious
organizations. The Government provided tax benefits, land, and building
grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the
observance of the major religions.
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs monitored Friday mosque sermons and
the Koranic schools to ensure the teaching of approved doctrine. At
times the authorities suppressed the activities of Islamists, but
generally tolerated activities limited to the propagation of Islam,
education, and charity. Security forces sometimes closed mosques to the
public shortly after Friday services to prevent the use of the premises
for unauthorized political activity. The Government strictly controlled
the construction of new mosques. Most mosques were constructed using
private funds.
The Government barred the Islamic JCO as a political party and
subjected prominent members to constant surveillance and at times
refused to issue passports to them. The Government continued to block
JCO web sites and publication of newspapers (see Sections 1.f., 2.a.,
2.b., and 3).
The teaching of Islam in public schools benefited from
discretionary funding in the Government's annual education budget, as
did other curriculum subjects. The annual budget also provided funds
for religious instruction to the small parallel system of Jewish public
schools.
A small foreign Christian community operated churches, orphanages,
hospitals, and schools without any restriction or licensing
requirement. Missionaries who conducted themselves in accordance with
societal expectations largely were left unhindered. However, those who
proselytized publicly faced expulsion. Islamic law and tradition called
for strict punishment for any Muslim who converted to another faith.
Any attempt to induce a Muslim to convert was illegal.
The Government permitted the display and sale of Bibles in French,
English, and Spanish, but confiscated Arabic-language Bibles and
refused licenses for their importation and sale, despite the absence of
any law banning such books. Nevertheless, Arabic Bibles have been sold
in local bookstores. This year, there were no known cases in which
foreigners were denied entry into the country because they were
carrying Christian materials, as has occurred in the past.
There are two sets of laws and courts--one for Jews and one for
Muslims--pertaining to marriage, inheritance, and family matters. The
family law courts are administered, depending on the law that applies,
by rabbinical or Islamic authorities who are court officials.
Parliament must authorize any changes to those laws.
The Government continued to encourage tolerance and respect among
religions. In March the Government invited Israel to attend the
International Parliamentary Union in Marrakech, despite protests. In
May the organization ``Al Ghadir'' asked for official status. This is
the first time an association of Shiite citizens asked for official
recognition. No response was received from the authorities by year's
end.
Beginning in June, several preachers and religious counselors were
accused of exploiting mosques for political purposes, such as promoting
Islamist parties. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowments
called for permanent control and monitoring of mosques to avoid their
exploitation for political propaganda, such as disturbing pamphlets and
raising funds.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement; however, the Government restricted this right in certain
areas. The Gendarmerie maintained checkpoints throughout the country,
at which drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations were examined for
validity. In the Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, authorities
restricted movement in areas regarded as militarily sensitive.
The Ministry of Interior restricted freedom to travel outside the
country in certain circumstances. In addition, all civil servants and
military personnel must obtain written permission from their ministries
to leave the country. The OMDH and AMDH compiled lists of individuals
who reportedly were denied passports or who had passports but were
denied permission to travel. The OMDH contended that the Government, in
resorting to arbitrary administrative delays, continued to harass
former political prisoners who sought to resume normal lives.
In February the FVJ demanded an explanation of the Government's
refusal to allow Ahmed Boukhari a passport to travel to Paris to
testify in court concerning the Ben Barka case (see Section 1.e).
The Government welcomed voluntary repatriation of Jews who had
emigrated. Jewish emigres, including those with Israeli citizenship,
freely visited the country. The Government also encouraged the return
of Sahrawis who departed Morocco due to the conflict in the Western
Sahara, provided that they recognized the Government's claim to the
region. The Government did not permit Western Saharan nationalists who
have been released from prison to live in the disputed territory.
The Government cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. While the country has from time to time provided political
asylum to individuals, the issue of first asylum never has arisen. The
law does not contain provisions implementing the 1951 U.N. Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no
reports of forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Constitutional provisions establishing periodic free elections
notwithstanding, citizens did not have the full right to change their
government. The King, as head of state, appoints the Prime Minister,
who is the titular head of government. Constitutional changes in 1992,
retained in the Constitution of 1996, authorize the Prime Minister to
nominate all government ministers, but the King may nominate ministers
himself and has the power to replace any minister at will. The
Parliament has the theoretical ability to change the system of
government. However, the Constitution may not be changed without the
King's approval. The Ministry of Interior appoints the provincial
governors (walis) and district administrative officials (local caids).
However, the King may nominate walis. Municipal and regional councils
are elected. The Government consists of 39 cabinet-level posts,
including 6 ``sovereign'' ministerial posts traditionally appointed by
the King himself (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Islamic Affairs,
Defense Administration, and Secretary General of the Government).
On September 27, parliamentary elections were held. Despite some
administrative problems and some allegations of misconduct by party
officials and local politicians, most observers, both domestic and
foreign, concluded that the elections were generally free, fair, and
transparent, the first such elections in the country's history.
According to observers, the absence of fraud and manipulation enhanced
the credibility of reform efforts generally.
In preparing for the elections, Parliament re-wrote the Electoral
Code in its entirety. The new Code included a proportional list system,
plus a novel ``national list'' of 30 seats reserved for women, as a
means to increase dramatically the number of women in Parliament. By
the time of elections, approximately 37 parties representing mainstream
views were in existence, and 26 of them ran candidates. The Government
conducted a massive voter education campaign. However, 61 percent of
the electorate was illiterate, requiring the ballots to use symbols for
all 26 parties. Fifty-two percent of those eligible voted, according to
government statistics. The Interior Ministry publicized election
violations and moved swiftly to investigate them and prosecute those
responsible.
The new Parliament consisted of the 30 women who gained seats
reserved for women on the National List, plus five who won seats in
their local districts. The previous Parliament had two women in the
lower chamber. Women occupied 85 out of 22,600 seats of local communal
councils throughout the country. Several proposed parties were not
allowed to form during the year. The JCO never has been granted legal
status as a political party (see Section 2.b.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government cooperated with local human rights monitors, who
acted within the generally accepted boundaries of political discourse
in the country. There were three nationally organized and government-
recognized nongovernmental human rights groups: The Moroccan
Organization for Human Rights (OMDH), the Moroccan League for the
Defense of Human Rights (LMDDH), and the Moroccan Association for Human
Rights (AMDH). Former AMDH members formed a fourth group, the Committee
for the Defense of Human Rights (CDDH), in 1992. There were also
numerous regional human rights organizations. The Government maintained
close relations with all of these groups and generally was responsive
to them. The AMDH did not cooperate officially with the Government, but
usually shared information.
Founded in 1979 and 1988, respectively, the AMDH and OMDH have
spent years addressing human rights abuses, and at times were harassed
and restricted by the Government. However, some of their former leaders
during the year occupied high level posts in the Government, and AMDH
and OMDH since 2000 have had ``public utility'' status, which conferred
financial benefits such as government subsidies in recognition of their
serving the public interest.
Two prominent national human rights NGOs, the Forum for Truth and
Justice (FVJ) and the Moroccan Prison Observatory (OPM), were formed in
1999. Created by victims of forced disappearance and surviving family
members, the FVJ's principal goal was to encourage the Government to
address openly the issue of past forced disappearances and arbitrary
detention. The OPM's main purpose was improving the treatment and
living conditions of prisoners. These groups maintained fairly regular
contact with government authorities throughout the year.
The Government's attitude toward international human rights
organizations depended on the sensitivity of the areas of the NGOs'
concern. The Government took a generally cooperative stance, even when
some sensitive issues were touched upon, such as disappearances and
abuses by security forces. In 2001 AI Secretary General Pierre Sane
visited the country. Sane praised ``the progress recorded by Morocco in
the field of human rights and the methods by which the issue of
detainees and exiles was dealt with.'' However, Sane urged the
Government to improve its record regarding cases of political prisoners
and the disappeared; he claimed that the Government held 60 political
prisoners and had not accounted for 450 disappearances. Sane also urged
the Government to investigate and prosecute those responsible for past
crimes and abuses. An agreement between AI and the Government for a 10-
year human rights education program was negotiated with the Ministry of
Human Rights, and training began in September. The Ministry of Human
Rights and the Ministry of Education provided human rights education
for teachers, although by year's end the subject was not being taught
in the classrooms.
In March the country's chapter of AI urged the Government to sign
all international human rights conventions and to adapt laws to
international standards concerning human rights.
The Government authorized the formation over the summer of a new
independent NGO, the National Elections Observatory, to monitor the
September 27 elections. Over 3,500 observers were trained and monitored
the Parliamentary elections.
The Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH), a 12 year-
old advisory body, counseled the Palace on human rights issues, and was
the organization charged by the King to resolve cases related to
persons who had disappeared. Despite recent changes in the composition
and conduct of the Council, some human rights organizations urged
further changes to increase the voice of civil society in the CCDH. In
December the King appointed former Minister of Justice Omar Azziman as
President and former political prisoner Driss Benzekri as the Secretary
General of the CCDH. Benzekri was jailed for 17 years, and, since his
release, had worked helping former political prisoners file claims for
compensation. He was vice president of OMDH and a leader in FVJ.
The Government continued its efforts to institutionalize human
rights training within the national school curriculum. In May a
delegation from AMDH, OMDH, and FVJ met with the Interior Minister to
urge speeding up the slow process of examining the files of victims of
human rights abuses. The Government and NGOs hosted several human
rights conferences throughout the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens;
however, women faced discrimination in the law and in traditional
practice.
Women.--Spousal violence was common. Although a battered wife had
the right to file a complaint with the police, as a practical matter
she would do so only if prepared to bring criminal charges. While
physical abuse legally was grounds for divorce, a court would grant a
divorce only if the woman were able to provide two witnesses to the
abuse. Medical certificates were not sufficient. If the court found
against the woman, she was returned to her husband's home. Thus, few
women reported abuses to the authorities. However, there was
substantial progress in making the public aware of problems concerning
women, children, the handicapped and minorities.
The Criminal Code provides for severe punishment for men convicted
of rape or sexual assault. The defendants in such cases bear the burden
of proving their innocence. However, sexual assaults often go
unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss of virginity.
While not provided for by law, victims' families may offer rapists the
opportunity to marry their victims in order to preserve the honor of
the family. Spousal rape was not a crime.
The law is more lenient toward men with respect to crimes committed
against their wives. ``Honor crimes,'' a euphemism that refers to
violent assaults with intent to commit murder against a female for her
perceived immodest or defiant behavior remained extremely rare.
However, two cases of killings did occur in March. In Skhirat the
father of 17-year old Hanna Bousalhi slit her throat and stabbed her
for allegedly having a relationship with a male classmate. He was
sentenced to 20 years in prison. In Sale the husband of Fatna Kriaa was
convicted of killing her for allegedly having an affair with his
cousin.
Prostitution was prevalent, especially in urban centers. There were
thousands of teenagers involved in prostitution. Although prostitution
itself is against the law, the Government did not prosecute women who
were coerced into providing sexual services. Trafficking in persons,
particularly in child maids, was a problem (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
Women were subjected to various forms of legal and cultural
discrimination. The civil law status of women is governed by the Code
of Personal Status (known as the ``Moudawana''), based on the Malikite
school of Islamic law, and revised in 1993. Women's groups called
attention to unequal treatment under the Code, particularly under the
laws governing marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Women do not
automatically lose child custody in divorce cases. However, the courts
generally rule in favor of the parent who did not file for the divorce.
Citizenship passes through the father.
Under the Criminal Code, women generally are accorded the same
treatment as men, but this is not the case for family and estate law,
which is based on the Code of Personal Status. Under the Code of
Personal Status, women inherit only half as much as male heirs.
Moreover, even in cases in which the law provides for equal status,
cultural norms often prevented a woman from exercising those rights.
For example, when a woman inherits property, male relatives may
pressure her to relinquish her interest.
While many well-educated women pursue careers, few rise to the top
echelons of their professions. Women constitute approximately 35
percent of the work force, with the majority in the industrial,
service, and teaching sectors. In 1998 (the last official statistics
available) the Government reported that the illiteracy rate for women
was 67 percent (83 percent in rural areas), compared with 41 percent
for men (50 percent in rural areas). Women in rural areas were most
affected by inequality. Women who earned secondary school diplomas had
equal access to university education.
The King and the Government continued to promote their proposal to
reform the Personal Status Code in order to advance women's rights.
Islamists and some other traditional segments of society firmly opposed
the proposal, especially with respect to its more controversial
elements, such as reform of women's legal status in marriage and family
law issues.
In March 2001, the King and Prime Minister met with 40
representatives of women's organizations at the Royal Palace. The King
subsequently established a Consultative Commission for the Moudawana.
Several months later, a number of organizations formed a collective,
the ``Spring of Equality,'' to protest the lack of movement on the Code
of Personal Status reform. The Spring of Equality continued to protest
during the year over the lack of progress in reform.
Women made dramatic progress in the parliamentary elections (see
Section 4). Many NGOs (76 by one count) worked to advance women's
rights and to promote women's issues. Among these were the Democratic
Association of Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action, and the
Moroccan Association for Women's Rights, all of which advocated
enhanced political and civil rights, as well as numerous NGOs that
provided shelters for battered women, taught women basic hygiene,
family planning, and child care, and promoted literacy. In March on
International Women's Day, 40 women's groups staged a sit-in in front
of Parliament, demanding ``Citizenship, Equality and Dignity for
Women.''
In February an NGO released the results of a study in Casablanca.
According to the study of 300 single mothers, 31 percent were child
maids under the age of 15; 28 percent were factory workers; 18 percent
were unemployed; and 13 percent were adult housekeepers.
Children.--The Government remained committed to the protection of
children's welfare and attempted to do so within the limits of its
budgetary resources. The law provides for compulsory education for
children between the ages of 7 and 13; however, not all children
between these ages attended school due to family decisions and
shortfalls in government resources, and the Government did not enforce
the law. School attendance between the ages of 7 and 13 was 98 percent.
The Government had difficulty addressing the problem of child labor
(see Section 6.c. and 6.d.). Young girls were exploited as domestic
servants on a very large scale (see Section 6.f.). Teenage prostitution
in urban centers has been estimated in the thousands by NGO activists.
The clientele consisted of both foreign tourists and citizens. More
young girls than boys were involved.
The practice of adoptive servitude, in which urban families employ
young rural girls and use them as domestic servants in their homes, was
prevalent (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). Credible reports of physical
and psychological abuse in such circumstances were widespread. Some
orphanages have been charged as complicit in the practice. More often
parents of rural girls ``contracted'' their daughters to wealthy urban
families and collected the salaries for their work as maids. Adoptive
servitude was accepted socially, was unregulated by the Government, and
has only in recent years begun to attract public criticism. Since 2000
the National Observatory of Children's Rights (ONDE) has conducted a
human rights awareness campaign regarding the plight of child maids.
The number of children working illegally as domestic servants was
high: 45 percent of household employees under the age of 18 were
between the ages of 10 and 12, and 26 percent were under the age of 10,
according to a 2001 joint study by the Moroccan League for the
Protection of Children and UNICEF. The legal minimum age of employment
is 15 years. The report denounced the poor treatment a number of the
children received, such as being forced to work all day with no breaks.
The League demanded that the Government increase the minimum age for
employment and strengthen the protection of child workers. The
Government continued to have difficulty addressing the related problem
of child labor in general (see Section 6.d). However, many children
worked either as domestic servants, artisan ``apprentices,'' or in some
other capacity that kept them from attending school.
Another problem facing abandoned children of both sexes was their
lack of civil status. Civil status is necessary to obtain a birth
certificate, passport, or marriage license. If a father did not
register his child, the child was without civil status and the benefits
of citizenship. It is possible for an individual to self-register, but
the process is long and cumbersome. While any child, regardless of
parentage, may be registered within a month of birth, a court order is
required if registration does not take place in that time.
In January the issue of sexual abuse of children received increased
public attention, when a 9-year old girl, Loubna Mahjoubi, died
following sexual abuse. Pavillion 28, a Casablanca center that
performed forensic medical examinations on child victims, reported
seeing 200 abused children during the year. Half of those cases were
sexual abuse cases. Child sexual abuse may be increasing, and NGOs
advocated stiffer sentences.
In April a new law provided that children born out of wedlock can
now carry the father's name. Islamists criticized the new law. Single
mothers were heavily stigmatized.
Persons with Disabilities.--There are no laws to assist persons
with disabilities. A high incidence of disabling disease, especially
polio, has resulted in a correspondingly high number of persons with
disabilities. The latest statistics from the Government estimated the
number of persons with disabilities at 2.2 million, or 7 percent of the
population. However, other estimates were as high as 3 million. While
the Ministry of Social Affairs attempted to integrate persons with
disabilities into society, in practice integration largely was left to
private charities. The annual budget for the ministerial department in
charge of affairs concerning persons with disabilities was only.01
percent of the overall annual budget. The Royal Family, through the use
of the Mohammed V Solidarity Fund, continued to aid the country's
disabled population. Nonprofit special-education programs were priced
beyond the reach of most families. Typically, their families supported
persons with disabilities; some survived by begging.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The official language is
Arabic. Both French and Arabic were used in the news media and
educational institutions. Science and technical courses were taught in
French, thereby preventing the large, monolingual-Arabic-speaking
population from participation in such programs. Educational reforms in
the past decade have emphasized the use of Arabic in secondary schools.
However, failure to transform the university system similarly has led
to the disqualification of many students from higher education in
lucrative fields. The poor lacked the means to provide additional
instruction in French to supplement the few hours per week taught in
public schools.
Approximately 60 percent of the population claim Berber heritage,
including the Royal Family. Berber cultural groups contended that
Berber traditions and the Berber language were being lost rapidly. A
number of Berber associations claimed that the Government refused to
register births for children with traditional Berber names, discouraged
the public display of the Berber language, limited the activities of
Berber associations, and continued to Arabize the names of towns,
villages, and geographic landmarks. Nevertheless, a full page of a
major national newspaper was devoted on a monthly basis to articles and
poems on Berber culture, which were printed in the Berber language.
Official media broadcast in the Berber language for limited periods
each day.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to establish and
join trade unions, although the laws reportedly have not been
implemented in some areas, and the unions were not completely free from
government interference. About 600,000 of the country's 10 million
workers were unionized in 17 trade union federations. Four federations
dominated the labor scene: The Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT), the
Confederation Democratique du Travail (CDT); the Union Generale des
Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM); and the Islamist-oriented Union
Nationale du Travail au Maroc (UNTM). Most were linked to political
parties.
Union officers were sometimes subject to government pressure. Union
leadership did not always uphold the rights of members to select their
own leaders. There was no case of the rank and file voting out its
current leadership and replacing it with another.
There is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination.
Under the ostensible justification of ``separation for cause,''
employers have dismissed workers for union activities that were
regarded as threatening to employer interests.
According to the IFCTU, in November 2000, the management of a
multinational textile factory in Sale responded to their employees'
election of eight members of a trade union committee by firing all
eight elected workers and posting a large banner at the factory
entrance that read ``NO UNION.'' The eight trade union leaders
subsequently were harassed and assaulted by company security personnel.
They were detained briefly at a police station. The Governor of Sale
reportedly rejected publicly the existence of trade unions in his
district. The eight workers ultimately returned to their jobs, and were
able to establish a union.
The courts have the authority to reinstate such workers and were
able to enforce rulings that compelled employers to pay damages and
back pay. Unions may sue to have labor laws enforced, and employers may
sue unions when they believe that unions have overstepped their
authority.
Unions belonged to regional labor organizations and maintained ties
with international trade union secretariats. The UMT was a member of
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is implied in the constitutional
provisions on the right to strike and the right to join organizations;
however, the laws governing collective bargaining were inadequate and
often ignored in several companies and even within the public sector.
Trade union federations competed among themselves to organize workers.
Any group of eight workers may organize a union and a worker may change
union affiliation easily. A work site may contain several independent
locals or locals affiliated with more than one labor federation.
Collective bargaining has been a longstanding tradition in some
parts of the economy, such as the industrial sector, and is becoming
more prevalent in the service sector, including banking, health and the
civil service. The wages and conditions of employment of unionized
workers generally were set in discussions between employer and worker
representatives. However, wages for the vast majority of workers were
set unilaterally by employers. Labor disputes have arisen in some cases
as the result of employers failing to implement collective bargaining
agreements. The most serious recent example was the Government's
failure to implement an agreement negotiated with the three major
teachers' unions in December 2000. Following the Government's failure
to include any needed adjustments in its 2002 budget, the major
teachers' unions struck for 3 days in November 2001. The strike was met
with police repression, leaving several teachers injured.
While workers have a right to strike, the law requires compulsory
arbitration of disputes. Work stoppages normally were intended to
advertise grievances and lasted 24 to 72 hours or less. Butchers in the
Greater Casablanca region conducted the most effective strike. They
carried out a work stoppage of more than a week to protest increased
fees at a new abattoir.
Compared to the previous year, there was a significant drop in
labor unrest, which CDT leaders claimed was due less to a ``detente in
social tensions'' than to economic stagnation. Unions organized 166
work stoppages during the first 9 months of the year resulting in
101,897 lost workdays, according to Labor Ministry statistics. During
the corresponding first 9 months of 2001, there were 193 strikes
resulting in 204,871 lost workdays.
During the year, the police were called out on several occasions to
remove protesters who were members of the Moroccan Association of
Unemployed College Graduates. In December police beat an estimated 30
unemployed graduates when they refused to disperse from the Moroccan
Parliament building. Also in December the UMT complained that 24 union
members at a plant in Kenitra were arrested for demanding the minimum
wage of $180 (1800 dirhams) per month. At various times, dockworkers at
Casablanca Port were summarily dismissed for, as the UMT described it,
``demanding their rights.'' Article 288 of the Penal Code, which the
UMT wants repealed, permits employers to initiate criminal prosecutions
of workers for stopping work if they strike. The Government has the
authority to break up demonstrations in public areas that do not have
government authorization, or to prevent the unauthorized occupancy of
private space such as a factory.
In the past, the Government in a number of instances used security
forces to break up demonstrating strikers, at times using excessive
force in doing so. For example, in May 2001, 11 protesters were
hospitalized after police forcibly removed them from a sit-in at the
Ministry of Agriculture, and in October 2001 police violently broke up
a sit-in at a strike by the port workers union USTPM.
There were no charges filed, nor are there likely to be, after
investigations in the August 2000 incident in which the nephew of a
private transportation company owner drove a bus into a crowd killing 3
strikers and injuring 12, nor in the February 2000 operation in
Tarmilet where security forces arrested and injured dozens of striking
workers using rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons.
Employers wishing to dismiss workers are required by law to notify
the provincial governor through the labor inspector's office. In cases
in which the employer plans to replace dismissed workers, a government
labor inspector provides replacements and mediates the cases of workers
who protest their dismissal. Any worker who is dismissed for committing
a serious infraction of work rules is entitled by law to a court
hearing that is a fundamental right and is strictly enforced.
In general the Government ensured the observance of labor laws in
larger companies and in the public sector. In the informal economy,
such as in the family workshops that dominated the handicrafts sector,
employers routinely ignored labor laws and regulations, and government
inspectors lacked the resources to monitor violations effectively.
Unions resorted increasingly to litigation to resolve labor
disputes. The Ministry of Labor's 496 inspectors served as
investigators and conciliators in labor disputes. According to the
Ministry of Labor, its inspectors were able to help resolve some 713
potential strikes affecting 573 businesses during the first nine months
of the year. It claimed that its staff, over the same period, helped to
reinstate 3039 employees.
Labor law reform remained controversial. According to employer
groups, the law makes it extremely difficult to fire or lay off
permanent employees. The standard for legally firing a permanent
employee is ``serious error'' committed by the employee, and the courts
set the burden of proof very high. Reductions in force due to economic
hardship also became mired in politics and were extremely hard to
implement.
Labor law applied equally to the small Tangier export zone. The
proportion of unionized workers in the export zone was comparable to
the rest of the economy, approximately 6 percent.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor, including by children; however there were reports that
such practices occurred (see Section 6.f.). However, in practice the
Government lacked the resources to inspect places of employment to
ensure that forced labor was not being used. Forced labor persisted in
the practice of adoptive servitude in households (see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In January the minimum employment age rose from 12 to 15.
The minimum age applies to all sectors and includes apprenticed
children and those in family businesses. Various laws provide
protective measures for children under 16 at work. The law prohibits
children under 16 from being employed more than 10 hours per day,
including a minimum of a 1-hour break. All employees are limited to a
maximum 48-hour regularly scheduled workweek.
Abuse of child labor laws was common, particularly in the informal
sector. In practice children often were apprenticed before age 12,
particularly in small family-run workshops in the handicraft industry.
Children, particularly rural girls, also were employed informally as
domestic servants and usually received little or no payment. Safety and
health conditions, as well as wages in businesses that employ children
often were substandard.
Ministry of Labor inspectors were responsible for enforcing child
labor regulations, which generally were observed in the industrialized,
unionized sector of the economy. However, the inspectors were not
authorized to monitor the conditions of domestic servants. The
Government maintained that the informal handicrafts sector was
difficult to monitor.
The Government lacked the resources to enforce laws against child
labor. There was also a general acceptance of the desirability of
contributing to family income, as well as the presumption that it was
necessary to start working at a young age to properly learn traditional
handicraft skills.
A study of child maids in Casablanca in 2000 concluded that
approximately 13,000 girls under age 15 were employed there as child
maids. Another study concluded there were 20,000 child maids in the
country's other major cities. The study also concluded that over 80
percent of the child maids were illiterate and that over 80 percent
came from rural areas. In about half of the cases, the child maid
received no pay, or her pay went directly to her family. Many child
maids reported long working hours, no rest breaks, and abusive
conditions. Four percent reported being sexually abused in the
employer's household.
As a result, the Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the
Ministry of Health and UNICEF, as well as domestic NGOs such as the
Moroccan League for the Protection of Children (LMPE) and National
Observatory of the Rights of Children (ONDE), attempted to address the
problem. They have sought to increase possibilities for child maids to
receive education, health care and job training, and the opportunity to
return to their families or leave their employers. Three child welfare
NGOs operated centers for these purposes that received private
contributions and governmental and foreign funding.
Along with UNICEF and several domestic NGOs, the ILO had several
ongoing programs to attempted to provide child maids and other working
children, particularly young ostensibly apprentice artisans,
rudimentary education, health care, and leisure activities.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In July 2000, the Government
increased the minimum wage by 10 percent to approximately $180 (1,800
dirhams) per month in the industrialized sector and to approximately $9
(90 dirhams) per day for agricultural workers; however, businesses in
the extensive informal sector often ignored the minimum wage
requirements. Neither the minimum wage for the industrialized sector
nor the wage for agricultural workers provided a decent standard of
living for a worker and family, even with government subsidies for
food, diesel fuel, and public transportation. Unions continued to
appeal unsuccessfully for a minimum wage of approximately $180 (1,800
dirhams) per month. In many cases, several family members combined
their income to support the family. Most workers in the industrial
sector earned more than the minimum wage. They generally were paid
between 13 and 16 months' salary, including bonuses, each year.
The minimum wage was not enforced effectively in the informal and
handicraft sectors. However, the Government pay scale exceeded the
minimum wage for workers at the lowest civil service grades. To
increase employment opportunities, the Government allowed firms to hire
recent graduates for a limited period through a subsidized internship
program at less than the minimum wage. However, due to economic
conditions, most were not offered full-time employment at the
conclusion of their internships. According to the Government, the
unemployment rate was 12 percent, but some union leaders contend that a
more accurate figure, including underemployment, would be approximately
35 percent.
The law provides for a 48-hour maximum workweek, with no more than
10 hours worked in any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid
public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and
safety, including a prohibition on night work for women and minors. As
with other labor regulations and laws, these were not observed
universally and were not enforced effectively by the Government in all
sectors.
Occupational health and safety standards were rudimentary, except
for a prohibition on the employment of women in certain dangerous
occupations. The labor inspectors attempted to monitor working
conditions and investigate accidents, but lacked sufficient resources.
While workers in principle had the right to remove themselves from work
situations that endangered health and safety without jeopardizing their
continued employment, there were no reports of workers attempting to
exercise this right.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons; under the Penal Code perpetrators were
prosecuted either for fraud, corruption of minors, or as persons who
forced others into prostitution. Trafficking in persons was a problem.
Prostitution was prevalent, particularly in cities with large
numbers of tourists, as well as near towns with large military
installations (see Section 5). Prostitution of minors took place in the
village of El Hajeb near Meknes that attracted sex tourists from Europe
and the Gulf. NGO activists estimated that there were thousands of
teenage prostitutes in urban centers. Women and girls were sometimes
forced into prostitution.
Women also were trafficked abroad. For example, in June police
broke up a trafficking ring in Meknes, based on the testimony of
victims who had escaped from Syria and the UAE and returned to Morocco.
The victims testified that they were hired as domestics, but once in
Syria and the United Arab Emirates, they were forced to work as
nightclub ``dancers'' and prostitutes. They further testified that
other young women remained in Syria, waiting to be rescued.
Internal trafficking was also a problem, particularly for women for
sexual exploitation or of young girls for domestic service.
Due to fiscal constraints, the Government did not provide direct
funding to NGOs offering services to victims of trafficking. However,
the Government did provide in-kind support. In terms of prevention, the
Government supported modest programs aimed at keeping children in
school, improving education opportunities for rural girls, and
expanding economic opportunities in high-risk areas.
The country was also a transit point for trafficking and alien
smuggling to Europe. Hundreds of citizens and foreigners, most from
sub-Saharan Africa, drown annually attempting to cross the Strait of
Gibraltar.
WESTERN SAHARA
The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remained the subject of
dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front
(Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de
Oro), an organization seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan
government sent troops and settlers into the northern two-thirds of the
Western Sahara after Spain withdrew from the area in 1975, and extended
its administration over the southern province of Oued Ed-Dahab after
Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. Since 1973 the Polisario has
challenged the claims of Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco to the
territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently from
1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment to the area of a United
Nations peacekeeping contingent, known by its French initials, MINURSO.
In 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory
opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that while
some of the region's tribes had historical ties to Morocco, the ties
were insufficient to establish ``any tie of territorial sovereignty''
between the Western Sahara and Morocco. The Court added that it had not
found ``legal ties'' that might affect the applicable U.N. General
Assembly resolution regarding the decolonization of the territory, and,
in particular, the principle of self-determination for its people.
Sahrawis (as the persons native to the territory are called) lived in
the area controlled by Morocco, as refugees in Algeria near the border
with Morocco, and to a lesser extent, in Mauritania. A Moroccan-
constructed berm or sand wall encloses most of the territory.
In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario accepted the U.N. plan for a
referendum allowing the Sahrawis to decide between integration with
Morocco or independence for the territory. However, disagreements over
voter eligibility were not resolved and, a referendum has not yet taken
place. In March 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed
former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as his personal envoy to
examine approaches for a peaceful settlement. During the intervening 5
years, Baker has visited the region, consulted with the parties, and
offered various proposals to resolve the problem.
The Moroccan government has undertaken a sizable economic program
subsidizing migration and development in the Western Sahara as part of
its efforts to strengthen Moroccan claims to the territory, although
incomes and standards of living were substantially below Moroccan
levels. The population of the territory was an estimated 400,000.
In February since the parties had made no further progress, the
Special Envoy asked the U.N. Security Council to select one of four
options: A referendum; a U.N. pullout; the ``third way'' of autonomy
within Morocco; or partition of the Western Sahara. The Security
Council was unable to agree on one of these options, so it extended
MINURSO's mandate until January 2003, and authorized the Special Envoy
to formulate a new proposal. In November King Mohammed VI publicly
rejected plans sponsored by the U.N. for a referendum to determine the
future of the territory, dismissing the plan as ``out of date'' and
``null.''
Since 1977 the Saharan provinces of Laayoune, Smara, and Boujdour
(and Oued Ed-Dahab since 1983) have participated in elections organized
and controlled by the Moroccan government. Sahrawis whose political
views were aligned with the Moroccan government filled all the seats
allotted to the Western Sahara in the Moroccan Parliament.
On September 27, Moroccan parliamentary elections took place that
were generally free, fair and transparent, albeit with isolated
instances of irregularities. No Sahrawis opposed to Moroccan
sovereignty were candidates in the election. The national turnout was
52 percent; however, the Government stated that 70 percent of eligible
voters participated in the Western Sahara. There was no progress during
the year on local elections to choose members to the proposed new Royal
Advisory Council on the Western Sahara that the King had announced in
October 1999.
On November 28, Mohamed Boucetta, imprisoned for petty crime, died
in custody in Laayoune prison in the Western Sahara. According to
Saharan activist groups, he told family members two days before his
death that he was being tortured and an autopsy indicated that ``blows
and wounds'' caused his death. A prison warden was reportedly in
custody concerning the death, and the prison director was reportedly
suspended. Media reports suggested that fellow inmates beat him to
death. An investigation was ongoing at year's end.
As in past years, there were no new cases of disappearance in that
part of the Western Sahara under Moroccan administration. The forced
disappearance of individuals who opposed the Government of Morocco and
its policies occurred over several decades; however, the Government in
1998 pledged to ensure that such activities would not recur, and to
disclose as much information as possible on past cases. Those who
disappeared were Sahrawis or Moroccans who challenged the Moroccan
government's claim to the Western Sahara or other government policies.
Many of those who disappeared were held in secret detention camps.
Although in 1991 the Moroccan government released more than 300 such
detainees, hundreds of Sahrawi and Moroccan families did not have any
information regarding their missing relatives, many of whom disappeared
over 20 years ago, at year's end.
International human rights organizations claimed that
disappearances of Sahrawis in the Western Sahara could number between
1,000 and 1,500, although conditions in the territory prevented
confirmation of this figure.
The Government of Morocco failed to conduct a public inquiry or to
explain how and why those released spent up to 16 years of
incommunicado detention without charge or trial. The former Sahrawi
detainees formed an informal association whose principal objective was
to seek redress and compensation from the Government for their
detention. A delegation of this association continued to meet with
various government officials, human rights organizations, members of
the press, and diplomatic representatives in both Rabat and Laayoune
during the year. They claimed that the Government made little progress
during the year in recognizing their grievances. In 2000 through the
Arbitration Commission of the Royal Advisory Council on Human Rights
(CCDH), the Government began distributing preliminary compensation
payments to affected Sahrawis, and announced that more compensation
could be distributed pending the results of a review of petitions by
Sahrawi claimants. However, numerous cases remained pending at year's
end. Despite reforms to the CCDH structure, many still viewed the
process as biased and flawed administratively.
The U.N. settlement plan called for the release of all POWs after
the voter identification process was completed. MINURSO completed the
voter identification process in 1999. In January the Polisario released
115 Moroccan POWs and in June released 101 additional POWs. By year's
end, the Polisario held 1,260 POWs, of whom 817 had been prisoners for
over 20 years. In June an International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) delegation visited the Moroccan POWs, and reported that their
physical and psychological health remained extremely poor. There also
were credible reports from Moroccan NGOs that the Polisario authority
used the POWs for forced labor.
The Polisario claimed that the Moroccan government continued to
hold several hundred Sahrawis as political prisoners and approximately
300 former combatants as POWs. The Government of Morocco formally
denied that any Sahrawi former combatants remained in detention.
Representatives of the ICRC have stated that Morocco has released all
Polisario former combatants.
The Government of Morocco claimed that the Polisario detained
30,000 Sahrawi refugees against their will in camps near Tindouf in
southwestern Algeria. The Polisario denied this charge. According to
credible reports, the number of persons in the camps in Tindouf far
exceeded 30,000, but the assertion that they wished to leave remained
unsubstantiated. The Polisario reportedly have not allowed the UNHCR
and WFP to conduct a census of the camps in the Tindouf area.
Police arrested and detained Sahrawis who supported Saharan
independence. In June police arrested Ahmed Nassiri, Sahrawi activist
and a member of the Morocan human rights NGO, Forum for Truth and
Justice (FVJ), who had been sought since the violent conflicts with
police in Smara in November 2001. His trial was postponed twice due to
the absence of witnesses (who were themselves imprisoned) and had not
taken place at year's end. Four foreign observers followed the process.
In August police arrested Ali Salem Tamek, an official of the Moroccan
Democratic Confederation of Workers and an FVJ member. One week later
he was accused of membership in a political group working for a foreign
power and convicted of threats to the security of the state. Sentenced
to 2 years in prison and a fine of $1,000 (10,000 dirhams), Tamek began
a hunger strike in November to protest against his conditions of
detention. Moroccan human rights NGOs considered these cases to be
ordinary criminal cases involving assault and property damage.
The Polisario reportedly restricted freedom of expression, peaceful
assembly, and association. According to Amnesty International (AI),
Moroccan authorities continued to refuse to register the independent
newspaper Sawt Al-Janoub. In November 2001 in Smara, according to the
NGO Reporters without Borders (RSF), police arrested and physically
abused Nouredinne Darif, a correspondent for the weekly Al Amal
Addimocrati, when he went to the hospital to inquire about the
condition of demonstrators beaten by the police at the demonstration on
the same day. While Darif was acquited in April, a court in Laayoune
convicted 14 of the Sahrawi demonstrators of arson and armed violence
and other charges related to violence. According to a report of the
trial by Spanish observers from the law schools of Barcelona and
Badajoz, the defendants claimed that they had been tortured.
Freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and
association remain very restricted in the Western Sahara.
Demonstrations were disrupted during the year. In March there was a
minor civil disturbance in Laayoune. A number of Sahwari unemployed
college graduates attempted a sit-in to demand jobs. The authorities
forcibly disbursed the demonstrators. In September the court of appeal
in Layounne confirmed the prison sentences of five of six unemployed
Sahrawi university graduates who were arrested in the course of a
peaceful demonstration at Smara in April 2000.
In May two other activists claimed that Moroccan authorities had
tortured them for going to a mosque in memory of the death in London of
Polisario official Fadel Ismail.
A number of other Sahrawis remained imprisoned for peaceful
protests supporting Saharan independence. Youths released in previous
years reported that the Moroccan police continued to monitor them
closely.
Political rights for the residents of Western Sahara were
circumscribed. Freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly
and association remained very restricted. In June a Sahrawi activist
claimed that the Sahwaris were unable to form political associations or
politically oriented NGOs.
Freedom of movement within the Western Sahara was limited in
militarily sensitive areas, both within the area controlled by the
Government of Morocco and the area controlled by the Polisario. Both
Moroccan and Polisario security forces at times subjected travelers to
arbitrary questioning. The Polisario reportedly restricted freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly, association, and movement in its camps
near Tindouf. In June members of two NGOs representing Sahrawis who had
left the Polisario camps met in Laayoune with foreign diplomats and
provided photographs of victims of torture and booklets alleging that
abuses took place near Tindouf.
The civilian population living in the Western Sahara under Moroccan
administration was subject to Moroccan law. U.N. observers and foreign
human rights groups maintained that Sahrawis had difficulty obtaining
Moroccan passports, that the Moroccan government monitored the
political views of Sahrawis more closely than those of Moroccan
citizens, and that the police and paramilitary authorities reacted
especially harshly against those suspected of supporting independence
and the Polisario. The Moroccan government limited access to the
territory. International human rights organizations and impartial
journalists sometimes experienced difficulty in securing admission,
although an AI delegation conducted a research mission in June and
July, which included the Western Sahara, focussed primarily on the
issue of the ``disappeared.''
Moroccan laws apply in the part of the Western Sahara controlled by
Morocco. As in Morocco itself, women were subjected to various forms of
legal and cultural discrimination. Female illiteracy was very high,
especially in rural areas.
There was little organized labor activity in the Western Sahara.
The same labor laws that apply in Morocco were applied in the Moroccan-
controlled areas of the Western Sahara. Moroccan unions were present in
the areas of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco, but were not active.
The 15 percent of the territory outside Moroccan control did not have
any major population centers or economic activity apart from nomadic
herding. The Polisario-sponsored labor union, the Sario Federation of
Labor, was not active in the Western Sahara.
There were no strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining
agreements during the year. Most union members were employees of the
Moroccan government or state-owned organizations. They were paid 85
percent more than their counterparts in Morocco as an inducement to
Moroccan citizens to relocate to the Western Sahara. Workers in the
Western Sahara were exempt from income and value-added taxes and
received subsidies on commodities such as flour, oil, sugar, fuel, and
utilities.
Moroccan law prohibited forced labor, and it did not appear to
occur in the Western Sahara.
Regulations on the minimum age of employment were the same as in
Morocco. Child labor appeared to be less common than in Morocco,
primarily because of the absence of industries most likely to employ
children, such as rug-knotting and other traditional handicrafts. A
government work program for adults, the Promotion Nationale, provided
families with sufficient income so that the hired child maids were not
common. Children in the few remaining nomadic groups presumably worked
as shepherds with other group members.
The minimum wage and maximum hours of work were identical to those
in Morocco. However, in practice workers in some fish processing plants
worked as many as 12 hours per day, 6 days per week, well beyond the
10-hour day, 48-hour week maximum stipulated in Moroccan law during
peak periods. Occupational health and safety standards were the same as
those enforced in Morocco. They were rudimentary, except for a
prohibition on the employment of women in dangerous occupations.
__________
OMAN
The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy that has been ruled by the Al
Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no
political parties, but does have one representative institution, whose
members were elected directly by voters selected by the Government. The
Sultan, Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id, acceded to the throne in 1970.
Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important policy
issues, he has brought tribal leaders and other notable persons into
the Government. In accordance with tradition and cultural norms, much
decision-making is by consensus among these leaders. In 1991 the Sultan
established a Consultative Council, or Majlis Al-Shura, which replaced
an older advisory body. The Consultative Council was expanded to 83
seats for the 2000 elections, and members were chosen directly by the
vote of 175,000 government-selected electors, of whom approximately
100,000 actually voted. In 1996 the Sultan promulgated by decree the
country's ``Basic Charter'' (also known as the Basic Law), which
provides for many basic human rights. Implementing legislation has only
been enacted in some family, judicial administration, and financial
cases; however, the Government has made it clear that the Basic Charter
has the immediate force of law. While appropriate laws pertaining to
various articles of the Charter will be enacted, the responsibilities
delineated in the Charter came into full force when it was enacted in
1996. In cases where there is no implementing legislation, judges must
render judgement in accord with the principles of the Basic Charter.
The Consultative Council has no formal legislative powers but may
question government ministers and recommend changes to new laws
regarding economic and social policy, which on occasion leads to
amendments to proposed decrees. In 2001 the Sultan appointed 53
members, including 5 women, as members of the State Council (Majlis Al-
Dawla), which, with the Consultative Council, forms the bicameral body
known as the Majlis Oman (Council of Oman). In November the Sultan
announced his intention to permit native born citizens 21 or older to
vote in the Consultative Council elections in 2003. The judiciary was
not independent in practice and courts were subject to the Sultan's
influence. The Sultan had the right to overturn judicial decisions on
appeal.
The internal and external security apparatus fell under the
authority of the Royal Office, which coordinated all intelligence and
security policies. The Internal Security Service investigated all
matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman Police (ROP),
whose head also had cabinet status, performed regular police duties,
provided security at airports, served as the country's immigration
agency, and maintained a small coast guard. Unlike in previous years,
there were no reports that security forces committed human rights
abuses during the year. The country had a population of approximately
2.4 million, including approximately 624,000 foreigners. The country
has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive economic progress
and improve public access to health care, education, and social
services for its citizens. The economy was mixed, with significant
government participation in industry, transportation, and
communications.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens' in some areas; however, its record was poor in other areas.
Citizens did not have the right to change their government. Police did
not always follow procedures regarding arrest and detention, and in
some instances police handling of arrest and detention constituted
incommunicado detention. In 2000, royal decree 97/99 came into effect
that detailed the rules, regulations, and procedures governing criminal
and civil trials. In the past, there were instances in which due
process was denied to persons tried in state security courts. Citizens
must obtain permission from the Government to marry foreigners. The
Government restricted freedom of expression and association. The
Government must approve the establishment of all associations, and
human rights organizations were prohibited. The Government did not
ensure full rights for women. The Government severely restricted worker
rights. Foreign workers in private firms at times were placed in
situations amounting to forced labor, and abuse of foreign domestic
servants was a problem.
The 1996 Basic Charter, issued as a decree by the Sultan, defines
and protects many basic human rights, such as an independent judiciary,
and the freedoms of association, speech, and the press. The Basic
Charter states that the Government was to strive to issue all enabling
laws within 2 years of November 1996. Only certain laws pertaining to
the legal code for family and interpersonal relationships, to judicial
reform, and to aspects of the Finance Ministry have been enacted. Local
legal experts consider the rights and responsibilities delineated by
the Basic Charter to have the full and immediate force of law, without
the need for separate implementing legislation. Oman was invited by the
Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November
2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as an
observer.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Basic Charter specifically prohibits torture, and
there were no reports of torture during the year.
Judges had the right to order investigations of allegations of
mistreatment. The Basic Charter specifically prohibits ``physical or
mental torture'' and stipulates that all confessions obtained by such
methods are to be considered null and void.
In 2000, the police used tear gas and physical force to control
demonstrations, and made some arrests (see Section 2.b.). In April the
police broke up demonstrations but there were no reports of excessive
use of force or tear gas.
Prison conditions were spartan, but appeared to meet international
standards. Access to some prisoners was restricted severely. There were
separate facilities for men and women, as well as separate facilities
for juveniles and adults. Security prisoners were held separately and
in different conditions from regular prisoners. Pretrial detainees also
were held separately.
The Government did not permit independent monitoring of prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Basic Charter
provides for certain legal and procedural rights for detainees. The
police may obtain warrants prior to making arrests but were not
required by law to do so. However, within 24 hours of arrest, the
authorities must obtain court orders to hold suspects in pretrial
detention, and the police were required to file charges or request a
magistrate judge to order continued detention. However, in practice the
police did not always follow these procedures. Judges may order
detentions for 14 days to allow investigation and may grant extensions
if necessary. There was a functioning system of bail.
Police handling of arrests and detentions constituted incommunicado
detention in some instances. The police did not always notify a
detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker, the worker's
sponsor of the detention. At times notification was only made just
prior to the detainee's release. The authorities posted the previous
week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the
accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court
building. The police did not always permit attorneys and family members
to visit detainees. Judges occasionally interceded to ensure that
security officials allowed such visits.
The Basic Charter prohibits exile, and the Government did not use
forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Basic Charter affirms the
independence of the judiciary; however, the various courts were
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence in practice. All
judges are appointed by the Sultan and serve at his pleasure. The
Sultan acted as a court of final appeal and interceded in cases of
particular interest, such as those concerning national security.
However, there were no reported instances in which the Sultan
overturned a decision of the magistrate courts.
In 1999 the Sultan issued several royal decrees to establish a law
on judicial authority and to affirm the independence of the judiciary
as called for in the Basic Charter. The decrees formally established
the judiciary as an independent, hierarchical system composed of a
Supreme Court, an appeals court, primary courts (one located in each
region), and, within the primary courts, divisional courts. Within each
of the courts there are divisions to consider commercial, civil, penal,
labor, taxation, general, and personal status cases (the latter under
Shari'a). The former Authority for the Settlement of Commercial
Disputes was abolished in 2001, and commercial cases were heard in
primary courts. The General Prosecutor's Office, which before the 2001
reform was under the jurisdiction of the Royal Omani Police Chief
Inspector, became an independent legal entity within the Ministry of
Justice. In 1999 an Administrative Court was established to review
complaints against the misuse of governmental authority; it operated
under the authority of the Diwan of Royal Court.
The Ministry of Justice administered all courts. The judiciary
comprised the magistrate courts, which adjudicated misdemeanors and
criminal matters, and the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts, which
adjudicated personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance. The
Labor Welfare Board attempted to mediate disputes between employers and
employees. If a settlement cannot be reached, the parties may seek
recourse in the appropriate courts. The courts of general jurisdiction
may hear cases involving rent disputes.
In 1984 a royal decree established the magistrate court system of
primary courts, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court to take over all
criminal cases from the Shari'a courts. Regional courts of first
instance handled misdemeanor cases, which were heard by individual
judges. All felonies were adjudicated at the Central Magistrate Court
by a panel made up of the President of the Magistrate Court and two
judges. All rulings of the felony panel were final except for those in
which the defendant was sentenced to death. The death penalty rarely
was used, except in serious felonies such as murder, and the Sultan
must approve death sentences. There was no provision for amputation.
The Criminal Appeals Panel also was presided over by the President
of the Magistrate Court and included the court's vice president and two
judges. This panel heard appeals of rulings made by all courts of first
instance. In the past, specially trained prosecutors from the Royal
Oman Police (ROP), all of whom were trained as police officers as well
as prosecutors, carried out the role of public prosecutor in criminal
cases; however, as a step toward implementing a 1999 Royal decree
designed to increase the independence of the judiciary, prosecutors
were made independent of the ROP.
The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There
are no written rules of evidence, codified procedures for entering
cases into the criminal system, or any detailed legal provisions for a
public trial. Criminal procedures have developed by tradition and
precedents in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police
provided defendants with the written charges against them; defendants
were presumed innocent and have the right to present evidence and
confront witnesses. The prosecution and the defense direct questions to
witnesses through the judge, who was usually the only person to
question witnesses in court. Article 22 of the Basic Charter provides
for the presumption of innocence, and Article 23 provides for the right
to counsel, ensuring for those financially unable the means to legal
defense. Judges often pronounced the verdict and sentence within 1 day
of the completion of a trial. Those convicted may appeal jail sentences
longer than 3 months and fines over the equivalent of $1,250 (480
rials) to a three-judge panel. Defendants accused of national security
offenses and serious felonies did not have the right of appeal.
The State Security Court tried cases involving national security
and criminal cases that the Government decided required expeditious or
especially sensitive handling. Magistrate court judges have presided
over trials in the State Security Court. Defendants tried by the
Security Court were not permitted to have legal representation present.
The timing and the location of the Court's proceedings were not
disclosed publicly. The Court did not follow legal procedures as
strictly as the magistrate courts, although prominent civilian jurists
formed the judicial panel. The Sultan has exercised his powers of
extending leniency, including in political cases.
The Shari'a courts were administered by the Ministry of Justice and
applied Shari'a law as interpreted under the Ibadhi school of Islamic
jurisprudence. Courts of first instance were located in each of the 59
wilayats, or governorates, and were presided over by a single judge, or
qadi. Appeals of the rulings of the courts of first instance involving
prison sentences of 2 weeks or more or fines greater than $260 (100
rials) must be brought within 1 month before the Shari'a Court of
Appeals. Panels of three judges heard appeals cases. Court of Appeals
rulings themselves may be appealed, within a 1-month period, to the
Supreme Committee for Complaints, which was composed of four members,
including the Minister of Justice and the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate.
In 1997 the Government promulgated into law the provisions of the
1996 Basic Charter pertaining to family law which falls under the
purview of the Shari'a courts. The law has regularized the nature of
the cases and the range of corresponding judgments within the Shari'a
court system that only deals with family law.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The police were not required by law to obtain search
warrants. There was a widely held view that the Government eavesdropped
on both oral and written communications. Citizens were required to
obtain permission from the Ministry of Interior to marry foreigners,
except nationals of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Such
permission was not granted automatically. Delays or denial of
permission resulted in secret marriages within the country. Marriages
in foreign countries may lead to denial of entry of the foreign spouse
into the country and prevent a legitimate child from claiming
citizenship rights.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Basic Charter
provides for freedom of speech and of the press, the Government
restricted these rights in practice. The law prohibits criticism of the
Sultan in any form or medium. The authorities tolerated criticism of
government officials and agencies, but such criticism rarely received
media coverage.
The Press and Publication Law authorizes the Government to censor
all domestic and imported publications. Ministry of Information censors
may act against any material regarded as politically, culturally, or
sexually offensive. Journalists and writers generally exercised self-
censorship to avoid government harassment. Editorials generally were
consistent with the Government's views, although the authorities
tolerated some criticism regarding foreign affairs issues. The
Government discouraged in-depth reporting on controversial domestic
issues and sought to influence privately owned dailies and periodicals
by subsidizing their operating costs. There were five daily newspapers,
three in Arabic and two in English. Arabic language dailies ``Al-
Watan'' and ``Shabiba'' as well as English daily ``Times of Oman'' were
privately owned.
Customs officials confiscated videocassette tapes and erased
offensive material, despite the lack of published guidelines regarding
what was considered offensive. Such tapes may or may not be returned to
their owners. Government censorship decisions were changed periodically
without stated reason. There was a general perception that the
confiscation of books and tapes at the border from private individuals
and restrictions on popular novels eased somewhat; however, it
reportedly has become more difficult to obtain permission to distribute
books in the local market that censors decide have factual errors
regarding the country (including outdated maps).
The Government owned three local radio stations and two local
television stations. In general they did not air any politically
controversial material, although the state television company was
allowed to broadcast public question and answer sessions between
ministers and the Majlis Al-Shura; however, this only happened twice
during the year. The Government did not allow the establishment of
privately owned radio and television companies. The availability of
satellite dishes has made foreign broadcast information accessible to
those with the financial resources to obtain access to the dishes.
The appropriate government authority, such as Sultan Qaboos
University, the police, or the relevant ministry must approve public
cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars.
Most organizations avoided controversial issues because of fears that
the authorities may cancel their events.
The Government, through its national telecommunications company,
made Internet access available for a charge to citizens and foreign
residents. However, it blocked certain web sites that it considered
pornographic or politically sensitive. As use of the Internet to
express views normally not permitted in other media grew, the
Government took additional measures to monitor and censor it. The
Government placed warnings on web sites that criticism of the Sultan or
personal criticism of government officials was likely to be censored,
which ultimately caused some to practice self-censorship.
The Government restricted academic freedom, particularly regarding
publishing or discussing controversial matters, such as politics.
Professors may be dismissed for going beyond acceptable boundaries.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Basic Charter
provides for freedom of assembly, although all public gatherings
require government approval. The authorities with rare exceptions
enforced this requirement. Over the course of 8 days in 2000, rare,
unauthorized public demonstrations in support of the Palestinians and
against Israeli and U.S. policies took place at Sultan Qaboos
University and other venues. Most demonstrators were young men, and
most demonstrations were peaceful. Rock throwing and vandalism of
private property occurred at some locations. On one or two occasions,
police used tear gas and physical force to control demonstrations and
arrested some persons. After the demonstrations, the Government acted
to prevent further demonstrations, through arrests and limiting
demonstrations to areas that could be controlled. However, in April
public demonstrations occurred in support of the Palestinian Intifada.
The Government restricted freedom of association. The law states
that the Ministry of Social Development must approve the establishment
of all organizations and their by-laws; however, some groups, such as
certain social groups, were allowed to function without formal
registration. The Government used the power to license organizations to
control the political environment. It did not license groups regarded
as a threat to the predominant social and political views or the
interests of the Sultanate. Formal registration of foreign associations
was limited to a maximum of one association for any nationality. The
Basic Charter's provisions in this area regulated the formation of
associations.
A 2000 royal decree allowed for the formation of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) providing services to women, children, and the
elderly. Seven NGOs were registered, four relating to persons with
disabilities and three professional societies. Some government-
sponsored women's associations perform some associative functions and
were completely dependent on government funding, while others were
self-funded through membership fees, corporate donations, and product
sales.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law does not provide for freedom of
religion. However, the Basic Charter protects the freedom to practice
religious rites, in accordance with tradition, provided that such
freedom does not breach public order. The Basic Charter also provides
that Islam is the state religion and that Shari'a is the basis for
legislation. Non-Muslim religious organizations must be registered with
the Government.
Discrimination against individuals on the basis of religion was
prohibited. There were no laws prohibiting discrimination against
religious minorities. Some members of the Shi'a Muslim minority claimed
that they faced discrimination in employment and educational
opportunities. However, some Shi'a occupied prominent positions in both
the private and public sectors, although much less so in the public
sector. For example, the Ministers of National Economy (also de facto
Minister of Finance), Commerce and Industry, and Health were all Shi'a.
Many other government officials also were Shi'a, such as the Director
General of Maritime Affairs at the Ministry of Transport and
Telecommunications.
Most citizens are Ibadhi or Sunni Muslims, but there is also a
minority of Shi'a Muslims. Non-Muslims were free to worship at churches
and temples built on land donated by the Sultan. There were many
Christian denominations, which utilized two plots of donated land, on
which two Catholic and two Protestant churches were built. Hindu
temples also existed on government-provided land. Land was made
available to Catholic and Protestant missions to provide places of
worship and ministry to resident Christians in Sohar and Salalah.
The Government prohibited non-Muslims from proselytizing. It also
prohibited non-Muslim groups from publishing religious material,
although religious material printed abroad could be brought into the
country. Certain medical and educational activity by missionaries was
permitted as long as missionaries did not proselytize. Members of all
religions and religious groups were free to maintain links with
coreligionists abroad and undertake foreign travel for religious
purposes.
The Government expected all imams to preach sermons within the
parameters of standardized texts distributed monthly by the Ministry of
Awqaf and Religious Affairs. The Government monitored mosque sermons to
ensure that imams did not discuss political topics and stayed within
the state-approved orthodoxy of Islam.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law does not provide for these
rights, and the Government partially restricted these rights in
practice. The Government did not restrict travel by citizens within the
country except to military areas. Foreigners other than diplomats must
obtain a government pass to cross border points. To obtain a passport
and depart the country, a woman must have authorization from her
husband, father, or nearest male relative. However, a woman having a
national identity card (which also must be authorized by a male
relative) may travel to certain Gulf Cooperation Council countries
without a passport.
The Basic Charter prohibits the extradition of political refugees,
and there were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution. The issue of the provision of first
asylum did not arise during the year. Tight control over the entry of
foreigners into the country effectively limited refugees and
prospective asylum seekers from entering. There was no government
policy of cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens did not have the right to peacefully change their
government. The Government is an autocracy in which the Sultan retains
ultimate authority on all foreign and domestic issues.
In November 1996, the Sultan promulgated by decree the first
defacto written constitution, known as the Basic Charter. Although it
is considered to have immediate force of law, laws and regulations to
implement some provisions have not been enacted. While family,
judicial, administrative, and financial implementing legislation were
enacted, others have yet to be promulgated.
The law does not provide for political parties or direct elections.
Citizens had indirect access to senior officials through the
traditional practice of petitioning their patrons, usually the local
governor, for redress of grievances. The Sultan appointed the
governors. Successful redress depended on the effectiveness of a
patron's access to appropriate decisionmakers. The Sultan made an
annual 3-week tour of the country, accompanied by his ministers. The
tour allowed the Sultan to listen directly to his subjects' concerns.
In 1991 Sultan Qaboos established a Consultative Council, or Majlis
Al-Shura. In November the Sultan issued a royal decree expanding the
electorate to include all native born citizens. This was a departure
from the 2000 election format in which the Government established a
system under which Consultative Council members, male and female, were
elected directly by receiving the most votes from eligible voters in
their districts. In the 2000 elections, the Government selected more
than 175,000 men and women, approximately 25 percent of adult citizens,
to register to vote, of whom 114,000 registered and 100,000 voted. The
Government's selection criteria reportedly was based on tribal and
social status; educational background; personal and professional
connections; and loyalty to the Government. In 2000 the number of
eligible female voters increased from 5,000 to 52,000. In August 2000 a
royal decree abolished the prior procedure under which voters (or
electors) had volunteered as candidates for Consultative Council seats,
had their police records checked by the Government, and relied on
government approval of their decision to run. The nominees with the
most votes did not win appointment to the Consultative Council if the
Sultan decided not to appoint them. Under the new procedures,
candidates were not subject to government scrutiny, and the Sultan no
longer ratified winning candidates. However, the Sultan controlled the
process, and at least two sitting members of the Consultative Council
were excluded from the outset from standing for reelection in 2000
possibly because of their criticism of ministers during previous
Consultative Council sessions.
The Consultative Council has no formal legislative powers, which
remain concentrated in the Sultan's hands; however, it served as a
conduit of information between the citizens and the Government
ministries. No serving government official was eligible to be a
Consultative Council member. The Consultative Council may question
government ministers in public or in private, review all draft laws on
social and economic policy, and recommend legislative changes to the
Sultan, who makes the final decision. In 2001 the membership of the
Majlis Al-Dawla, or State Council, increased from 48 to 53 members,
including 5 female members. The precise responsibilities of the State
Council and its relationship to the existing Consultative Council have
yet to be clarified. The State Council and the Consultative Council
together form the Majlis Oman, or Council of Oman. In 2000 a royal
directive was issued prohibiting members of the Council of Oman from
serving more than two 3-year terms.
The Sultan publicly has advocated a greater role for women in both
the public and private sectors. Women held senior government positions,
including four at the undersecretary level and there was one woman
ambassador. Women constituted 30 percent of eligible voters in the 2000
elections, and, according to the Sultan's November statement of
intention, all women 21 years or older will be eligible to vote in the
2003 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government prohibited the establishment of human rights NGOs,
and there were no government-controlled or autonomous human rights
entities in the country. The existing restrictions on the freedom of
speech and association did not permit any activity or speech critical
of the Government.
There were no visits to the country by U.N. or international human
rights organizations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Basic Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,
ethnic origin, race, language, sect, place of residence, and social
class. Effective government enforcement was insufficient in some areas,
and societal and cultural discrimination based on gender, race, social
class, and disability existed.
Women.--The law does not specifically address domestic violence
against women; however, according to Shari'a, all forms of physical
abuse are illegal. There was no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse,
although observers claimed that allegations of such abuse in the
Shari'a courts were not uncommon and conversations with local observers
indicated that domestic violence was a real concern. Doctors did not
have a legal responsibility to report either spousal or child abuse to
the courts. Battered women may file a complaint with the police but
more often sought family intervention to protect them from violent
domestic situations. Likewise, families sought to intervene to keep
such problems from public view. There were reports of employers and co-
workers physically and sexually abusing domestic servants and harassing
hospital nurses without being held accountable for such actions (see
Section 6.d.). There were no government programs for abused women.
The law prohibits rape. Shari'a provides no punishment for spousal
rape.
Prostitution was illegal, and due to strict cultural norms and
immigration controls, was rare.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) was still practiced by very few
communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region. Experts believed
that the number of such cases was small and declining annually.
Many women lived within the confines of their homes. While progress
has been made in changing laws and attitudes, women continued to face
many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women hampered
their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector of the
economy, or inform themselves of their rights. Government officials
frequently denied women land grants or housing loans and preferred to
conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative. Women
may own property. Women required permission from a male relative to
leave the country (see Section 2.b.).
Some aspects of Islamic law and tradition as interpreted in the
country also discriminated against women. Shari'a favors male heirs in
adjudicating inheritance claims. Many women were reluctant to take an
inheritance dispute to court for fear of alienating the family.
Since 1970 conditions for women have improved markedly in several
areas. Whereas in 1970 no schools existed for girls, the most recent
figures available from the Ministry of Education in 1999 reported an
enrollment rate of nearly 95 percent for all girls eligible for
elementary school, and government statistics showed that girls make up
49 percent of all citizen students. The Government spent approximately
9 percent of its total budget on education. In the 2000-2001 school
year, 48.7 percent of the total number of students attending public
schools were girls, slightly lower than in previous years. Women
constituted approximately half of the 5,000 students at Sultan Qaboos
University. In 2001, 731 women and 566 men received bachelor's degrees
as members of the 11th graduating class, while 2 women and 40 men
received master's degrees. The university had a quota system with the
apparent goal of increasing the number of men studying certain
specialties. For example, women reportedly were being limited to 50
percent of the seats in the medical department. The quota system was
expected to allow women to constitute a majority in some other
departments.
Women also have made gains in the work force. Some educated women
have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the
media. Approximately 30 percent of all civil servants were women; of
these, 59 percent were citizens. In both the public and private
sectors, women were entitled to maternity leave and equal pay for equal
work. The Government, the country's largest employer of women, observed
such regulations, as did many private sector employers. However, many
educated women still faced job discrimination because prospective
employers feared that they might resign to marry or raise families.
Female employees in the Government have sought administrative redress
for alleged denial of promotion in favor of less capable men.
Government grants for study abroad generally were divided evenly
between men and women. According to recently published statistics
approximately 23 percent of students who study abroad under the
sponsorship of the Ministry of Higher Education were women.
Within the Government, women's affairs were the responsibility of
the Ministry of Social Development (formerly the Ministry of Social
Affairs, Labor, and Vocational Training). The Ministry provided support
for women's affairs through funding of the Oman Women's Association
(OWA) and local community development centers (LCDCs). The OWA
consisted of 25 chapters, with an active membership of more than 3,000
women. Typical OWA activities included sponsoring health or
sociological lectures, kindergarten services, and handicraft-training
programs. The OWA also provided an informal counseling and support role
for women with divorce-related difficulties, girls forced to marry
against their will, and women and girls suffering from domestic abuse.
The main purpose of the 50 LCDCs located throughout the country was to
encourage women to improve the quality of life for their families and
to improve their contributions to the community. LCDC activities
focused on health and sociology lectures, childcare issues, and
agricultural and traditional handicraft training programs.
Children.--The Government has made the education, health, and
general welfare of children a budgetary priority. Primary school
education for children, including noncitizen children, was free and
universal, but not compulsory. Most children attended school through
secondary school, until age 18. The infant mortality rate continued to
decline, and comprehensive immunization rates rose. The Government
provided free health care for children to age six. There was no pattern
of familial or other child abuse, but government officials have
publicly called for greater awareness and prevention of child abuse.
Child prostitution was not known to occur.
FGM was rare; it was performed mainly on young girls (see Section
5, women).
Persons with Disabilities.--There were no laws prohibiting
discrimination against persons with disabilities. The Government has
mandated parking spaces and some ramps for wheelchair access in private
and government office buildings and shopping centers. Compliance was
voluntary, yet widely observed. Students in wheelchairs had easy access
to Sultan Qaboos University. There was 1 government-sponsored
rehabilitation center in the capital area and seventeen private
rehabilitation centers throughout the country. The Government has
established numerous rehabilitation centers for children with
disabilities. Persons with disabilities, including blind persons,
worked in government offices. While the Government could charge a small
fee to citizens seeking government health care, persons with
disabilities generally were not charged for physical therapy and
prosthetics support.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Basic Charter prohibits
discrimination based on racial or ethnic characteristics. While in the
past, citizens of African origin claimed that they frequently faced job
discrimination in both the public and private sectors, these
allegations have diminished in recent years.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers did not have the right to
form or to join unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
stipulates that ``it is absolutely forbidden to provoke a strike for
any reason.'' Labor unrest was rare. The law does not provide for the
right to collective bargaining; however, it required that employers of
more than 50 workers form a joint labor-management committee as a
communication forum between the two groups. The implementation of this
provision was uneven, and the effectiveness of the committees was
questionable. In general the committees discussed such matters as the
living conditions at company-provided housing. They were not authorized
to discuss wages, hours, or conditions of employment. Such issues were
specified in the work contracts signed individually by workers and
employers and had to be consistent with the guidelines of the Ministry
of Manpower (formerly a part of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor,
and Vocational Training).
The law defines conditions of employment for some citizens and
foreign workers. It covers domestic servants and construction workers
but not temporary workers or those with work contracts that expire
within 3 months.
Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Development
and posted conspicuously in the workplace by employers of 10 or more
workers. Similarly any employer with 50 or more workers must establish
a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company, any
employee, including foreign workers, may file a grievance with the
Labor Welfare Board. In some cases, worker representatives filed
collective grievances, but most grievances were filed by individual
workers. Lower-paid workers used the procedure regularly. Legal counsel
may represent plaintiffs and defendants in such cases.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Basic Charter
prohibits forced or bonded labor for any person, including children;
however, the Government did not investigate or enforce the law
effectively. Foreign workers at times were placed in situations
amounting to forced labor. Employers have withheld letters of release
(documents that release workers from employment contracts), which allow
workers to change employers. Without such a letter, a foreign worker
must continue to work for his current employer or become technically
unemployed, which was sufficient grounds for deportation. Many foreign
workers were not aware of their right to take such disputes before the
Labor Welfare Board. Others were reluctant to file complaints for fear
of retribution from unscrupulous employers. In most cases brought
before it, the Board released the worker from service without
deportation and awarded compensation for time worked under compulsion;
however, employers faced no penalty other than to reimburse the
worker's back wages.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits children under the age of 13 from
working. Children between 13 and 16 years of age may be employed, but
must obtain the Ministry's permission to work overtime, at night, on
weekends or holidays, or to perform strenuous labor. The Ministry of
Social Development generally enforced the law; however, in practice
enforcement often did not extend to some small family businesses that
employ underage children, particularly in the agricultural and
fisheries sectors. Child labor did not exist in any industry.
The law specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor by children,
and it was not known to occur.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social
Development issues minimum wage guidelines for various categories of
workers. In 1998 the Government raised the minimum wage for most
citizens to about $260 (100 rials) per month, plus $52 (20 rials) for
transportation and housing. Minimum wage guidelines did not apply to a
variety of occupational categories, including small businesses that
employed fewer than five persons, the self-employed, domestic servants,
dependent family members working for a family firm, and some categories
of manual labor. Many foreigners worked in occupations that were exempt
from the minimum wage law, and the Government was lax in enforcing
minimum wage guidelines, where applicable, for foreign workers employed
in menial jobs. However, highly skilled foreign workers were well paid.
The minimum wage was sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The compensation for foreign manual
laborers and clerks was sufficient to cover living expenses and to
permit savings to be sent home.
The private sector workweek was 40 to 45 hours and included a rest
period from Thursday afternoon through Friday. Government workers have
a 35-hour workweek. While the law does not designate the number of days
in a workweek, it requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week
and mandates overtime pay for hours in excess of 48 per week.
Government regulations regarding hours of employment were not always
enforced. Employees who worked extra hours without compensation could
file a complaint before the Labor Welfare Board, but the Board's
rulings were not binding.
Every worker has the right to 15 days of annual leave during the
first 3 years of employment and 30 days per year thereafter. Employers
provide many foreign nationals, including domestic servants, with
annual or biannual round-trip tickets to their countries of origin.
The law states that employers must not place their employees in
situations involving dangerous work; however, the law does not
specifically grant a worker the right to remove himself from dangerous
work without jeopardy to his continued employment. All employers were
required by law to provide first aid facilities. Work sites with more
than 100 employees were required to have a nurse. Employees covered
under the Labor Law could recover compensation for injury or illness
sustained on the job through employer-provided medical insurance. The
health and safety standard codes were enforced by inspectors from the
Department of Health and Safety of the Directorate of Labor. As
required by law, they made regular onsite inspections.
Foreign workers constituted at least 50 percent of the work force
and as much as 80 percent of the private sector work force. In the
past, there were reports that employers or male coworkers sexually
harassed and abused foreign females employed in such positions as
domestic servants and hospital nurses. Foreign women employed as
domestic servants and garment workers have claimed that their employers
withheld their salaries and that government officials were unresponsive
to their grievances, due to investigative procedures that disadvantaged
the victim. There were reports of employers physically and sexually
abusing foreign domestic servants, and employers were not always held
accountable for such actions. Foreign women at times have had to ask
their governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse (see Section
5).
Foreign workers at times found themselves in situations amounting
to forced labor (see Section 6.c.).
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
to, from, or within the country.
----------
QATAR
Qatar is a monarchy with no constitution or political parties. It
is governed by the ruling Al-Thani family through its head, the Amir.
The current Amir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, took power from
his father in 1995 with the support of leading branches of the Al-Thani
family, and in consultation with other leading families. This
transition of authority did not represent a change in the basic
governing order. The Amir holds absolute power, the exercise of which
is influenced by religious law, consultation with leading citizens,
rule by consensus, and the right of any citizen to gain access to the
Amir to appeal government decisions. The Amir generally legislates
after consultation with leading citizens, an arrangement
institutionalized in an appointed advisory council that assists the
Amir in formulating policy. In 1999 the Amir convened a constitutional
committee to draft a permanent constitution that would provide for
parliamentary elections and in July the committee completed its work
and submitted a draft constitution to the Amir. In 1999 citizens
participated in the first ever free and fair election of a national
body, the Central Municipal Council. The second elections for the
Municipal Council are scheduled for April 2003. The judiciary is
nominally independent. Approximately 50 percent of the judges are
foreign nationals. All judges hold their positions at the Government's
discretion.
The country has efficient police and security services. The
civilian security force, controlled by the Interior Ministry, consists
of two sections: The police and the General Administration of Public
Security. A state security investigative unit (Mubahith), which reports
directly to the Amiri Diwan (the office of the Amir), performs internal
security investigations, gathers intelligence, and is responsible for
sedition and espionage cases. There also is a civilian intelligence
service (Mukhabarat), which also reports directly to the Amiri Diwan.
There were no reports that security forces committed human rights
abuses.
The population is approximately 600,000, of whom 150,000 are
believed to be citizens. The State owns most basic industries and
services, but the retail and construction industries are privately
owned. Oil is the principal natural resource now exploited, but the
country's extensive natural gas resources play an increasingly
important role. Rapid development in the 1970s and 1980s created an
economy in which foreign workers, mostly South Asian and Arab,
represent approximately 85 percent of the workforce. The Government has
aimed for a modest increase in the participation of local nationals in
the workforce. Many government jobs are offered generally only to
citizens and private sector businesses are encouraged to recruit
citizens as well.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, its record remained poor in some areas. Citizens did
not have the right to change their government peacefully. The
Government severely limited the rights of assembly and association. The
Government restricted freedom of religion, although it continued to
take some steps to ease restrictions on the practice of non-Muslim
religions. Women's rights were restricted by law and social customs.
Women have the right to vote. The Government severely restricted
workers' rights. At times some domestic servants were mistreated and
abused. Noncitizens, who make up more than 75 percent of local
residents, faced discrimination in the workplace. The country also was
a destination for trafficked persons. Qatar was invited by the
Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November
2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as an
observer.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and there were no allegations
of torture by security forces during the year. There were unconfirmed
allegations in previous years that some of the defendants in the trial
of the 1996 coup plotters (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.) had been
tortured while in police custody; however, government officials have
denied the allegations. The Government administered most corporal
punishment prescribed by Islamic law but did not allow amputation.
Punishments were not administered publicly.
Prison conditions generally met international standards. Women were
held separately from men, and juveniles were held separately from
adults. Pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted
prisoners. In 2000 the International Committee of the Red Cross visited
prisons; no other organization has requested prison visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the police had the discretion
to arrest persons based on minimal suspicion. Unlike in pervious years,
there were no reports of arbitrary detention in security cases. The
authorities generally charged suspects within 48 hours. Suspects
usually are presented to the Attorney General within 24 hours of
arrest. The Attorney General decided whether to hold the suspect up to
a maximum of 4 days, after which time the suspect was presented before
a judge, who may order the suspect released or remanded to custody to
await trial. Judges may extend pretrial detention for 1 week at a time
to allow the authorities to conduct investigations or order the release
of the suspect through bail. Lengthy pretrial detention was not known
to occur. The accused is entitled to legal representation throughout
the process. There were no provisions for making legal counsel
available to indigents at state expense. Suspects who were detained in
security cases generally were afforded access to counsel; however, they
may be detained indefinitely while under investigation. During the
year, there were no cases of incommunicado detention.
In 2001 the Appeals Court upheld the guilty verdicts and sentenced
to death 19 of those convicted of involvement in a 1996 coup attempt,
including the prime suspect Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Hamad Al-Thani.
The final decision to carry out or commute the executions rested with
the Amir. By year's end, the Amir had not made a decision, and the 19
remained in prison. The remaining 14 suspects' sentences of life
imprisonment were upheld (see Section 1.e.).
The law does not address forced exile and in the past the
Government has used forced exile; however, there were no reported cases
of forced exile during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the judiciary nominally
is independent, most judges were foreign nationals holding residence
permits granted by the civil authorities. All judges held their
positions at the Government's discretion. Approximately 50 percent of
the judges are citizens. The Amir appoints all judges for renewable 3-
year terms.
Responsibility for the judiciary was shared among the bureaucracies
of three ministries. Adlea (Civil Law) courts were subordinate to the
Ministry of Justice, Shari'a (Islamic law) courts worked for the
Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, and Prosecutors fell under
the Ministry of Interior.
The Adlea courts had jurisdiction in commercial, national security,
all forms of trafficking (including drugs, contraband, and persons),
and criminal matters. The Shari'a courts had jurisdiction in family,
inheritance, deportation, wrongful injury, and most other civil cases.
The law provides for the establishment of ad hoc state security courts.
Although there have been no cases before these courts since the current
Amir assumed power, they were not abolished formally by law and remain
an option. Defendants tried by all courts had the right to appeal. The
Appeals Court is the highest in the country.
The Shari'a courts applied most principles contained in the draft
Family Status Law, which covered marriage, inheritance, and juvenile
matters, to cases under adjudication. Some provisions of the
legislation continue to be debated. Shari'a trials usually were brief.
Shari'a family law trials often were held without counsel; however, an
increasing number of litigants, especially women, used lawyers to
present their cases. After both parties stated their cases and examined
witnesses, judges usually delivered a verdict after a short
deliberation.
Criminal cases normally were tried within 2 to 3 months after
suspects were detained. Suspects were entitled to bail, except in cases
of violent crime. Citizens or noncitizens were allowed to provide bail.
Foreigners who were charged with minor crimes were permitted to be
released to a citizen sponsor, although they were prohibited from
departing the country until the case was resolved. Defendants in the
civil courts had the right to be represented by defense attorneys.
Both Muslim and non-Muslim litigants may request the Shari'a courts
to assume jurisdiction in family, commercial, and civil cases. Trials
in both the Adlea and the Shari'a courts were public, but the presiding
judge can close the courtroom to the public if the case is deemed
sensitive. Lawyers in the past did not play a formal role except to
prepare litigants for their cases; however, an increasing number of
litigants availed themselves of a lawyer to present their cases,
particularly in divorce cases. In such cases, lawyers prepared the
litigants and spoke for them during the hearing. Non-Arabic speakers
were provided with interpreters. Defendants were entitled to legal
representation throughout the trial and pretrial process.
Foreign residents were disadvantaged in cases involving the
performance of labor contracts.
Defendants appeared before a judge for a preliminary hearing within
4 days of their arrest. Judges may extend pretrial detention for 1 week
at a time to allow the authorities to conduct investigations. Lengthy
pretrial detention was not known to occur.
After a public trial of persons arrested for involvement in the
1996 coup attempt, in 2000 trial judges sentenced 33 defendants to life
imprisonment. Nine of them were tried in absentia. Another 85
defendants were acquitted on all charges. In 2001 the Appeals Court
upheld the guilty verdicts and sentenced to death 19 of the 33
convicted; the Amir had not made a decision by year's end whether to
carry out or commute the death sentences (see Section 1.d.).
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such actions, and the Government
generally respected these prohibitions in practice. Traditional
attitudes of respect for the sanctity of the home and the privacy of
women provided a great deal of protection against arbitrary intrusion
for citizens and residents; there was no distinction between citizens
and noncitizens. A warrant must be obtained before police may search a
residence or business, except in cases involving national security or
emergencies. Judicial authorities issued search warrants. There were no
reports of unauthorized searches of homes during the year. The police
and security forces were believed to monitor the telephone calls of
suspected criminals, of those considered to be security risks, and of
selected foreigners.
Citizens must obtain government permission to marry foreigners and
to apply for residence permits or citizenship for their spouses; such
permission generally was granted.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law does not provide for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government imposed some
restrictions on these rights in practice. There was no formal
censorship of the media.
Citizens expressed many of their views freely and in public.
Although sensitive political and religious questions were off-limits,
for many citizens there was little fear of government monitoring of
their speech; however, the larger noncitizen population did not enjoy
the same latitude and did not express itself freely and publicly.
Unlike in previous years, there were no prosecutions for the expression
of views considered offensive to the Government.
While none of the five daily newspapers, three in Arabic and two in
English, are state-owned, the owners or board members generally are
either high-level government officials or have ties to government
officials. Copies of foreign newspapers and magazines were censored for
explicit sexual content. The law provides for criminal penalties and
jail sentences for libel. All cases involving the media fall under the
jurisdiction of the criminal courts. Journalists continued to practice
self-censorship due to social and political pressures when reporting on
government policies, the ruling family, and relations with neighboring
states.
Although personal criticism of government officials was rare, the
performance of ministries was the subject of extensive reporting.
During the year, the Minister of Health in particular faced substantial
criticism in the press and from the Advisory Council for the poor
performance of the public health and hospital systems. In 2001 the
Ministry of Education sued one Arabic language newspaper for a critical
report on public schools, but the case was dismissed when it came to
trial.
The Censorship Office in the Qatar Radio and Television Corporation
reviewed materials for pornography and material deemed hostile to
Islam. There were no reports of political censorship of foreign print
or broadcast news media or foreign programs, but the Internet was
censored for these reasons. Customs officials screened imported print
media, videocassettes, and similar items for pornography, but no longer
blocked the personal importation of non-Islamic religious items (see
Section 2.c.).
State-owned television and radio reflected government views, but
the private satellite television network, Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel
(JSC), provided an internationally oriented perspective that JSC and
the Government both claimed to be free of government influence.
Although it is privately owned, since its inception, the Government has
paid some of Al-Jazeera's operating costs. Al-Jazeera's programs
generally did not cover local news. Callers to a popular morning show
on the state-owned radio frequently discussed topics such as government
inefficiency and the lack of responsiveness by various ministries to
citizens' needs, such as poor schools, failure to deliver adequate
water and sewage services, and problems with the health care system.
Approximately 80,000 residents now access the Internet, which was
provided through the privatized telecommunications monopoly. During the
year, Internet rates for Internet Service Providers (ISP) subscribers
were reduced, and prepaid and dial-up access for non-subscribers was
introduced, encouraging greater access to the Internet. Internet
service was censored for political, religious, and pornographic content
through a proxy server, which blocked Web sites containing certain key
words and phrases. A user who believed that a site was censored
mistakenly could submit the Web address to have the site reviewed for
suitability.
There was no legal provision or tradition of academic freedom, and
instructors at the University exercised self-censorship.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law does not
provide for the freedom of assembly, and the Government severely
limited it in practice. The Government generally did not allow
political demonstrations; however, in April it permitted a peaceful
demonstration during which approximately 3,000 persons protested the
Israeli government's actions against Palestinians.
The law does not provide for freedom of association, and the
Government severely limited it in practice. The Government did not
allow political parties or membership in international professional
organizations critical of the Government or of any other Arab
government. Private social, sport, trade, professional, and cultural
societies must be registered with the Government; registration of such
groups routinely was granted. Security forces monitored the activities
of such groups.
c. Freedom of Religion.--There is no legal protection for freedom
of religion, and the Government officially prohibited public worship by
non-Muslims; however, it permitted and protected private services.
The state religion is Islam, as interpreted by the conservative
Wahhabi order of the Sunni branch. While Shi'a Muslims practiced most
aspects of Islam freely, they did not organize traditional Shi'a
ceremonies or perform rites such as self-flagellation.
The Government and ruling family are linked inextricably to Islam.
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs controls the construction of mosques,
the administration of clerical affairs, and Islamic education. The Amir
participated in public prayers during both Eid holiday periods, and
personally financed the Hajj journeys of poor pilgrims.
Shi'a Muslims were well represented in the bureaucracy and business
community, but there were no Shi'as employed in senior national
security positions. Non-Muslims were not known to face governmental or
societal discrimination or violence.
Christian church officials continued to press the Government for
authorization to construct churches. The Government designated plots
for the Catholic, Anglican, Coptic, and other Christian communities on
land set aside for the construction of churches, but had not issued
building permits by year's end. In the past, the Government has raised
concerns that rapid progress may provoke criticism among more
conservative critics. In November the Government established diplomatic
relations with the Vatican.
Non-Muslims may not proselytize, and the Government officially
prohibits public worship by non-Muslims. However, it did permit and
protect private services. Converting from Islam is considered apostasy,
and is technically a capital offense; however, since 1971 there have
been no records of execution for such a crime.
The Government did not permit Hindus, Buddhists, or other
polytheistic religions to operate as freely as Christian congregations.
However, there was no official effort to harass or hamper adherents of
these faiths in the private practice of their religion. There were no
reliable estimates of the number of non-Muslims in the country.
The Government formally prohibited the publication, importation,
and distribution of non-Islamic religious literature; however, in
practice individuals generally were not prevented from importing Bibles
and other religious items for personal use. Religious materials for use
at Christmas and Easter were available readily in local shops. However,
Bibles were not available in Arabic.
Islamic instruction was compulsory in public schools. While there
were no restrictions on non-Muslims providing private religious
instruction for children, most foreign children attended secular
private schools.
Both Muslim and non-Muslim litigants may request Shari'a courts to
assume jurisdiction in commercial or civil cases.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government generally respected them in practice, with some notable
exceptions. There were no restrictions on internal travel, except
around sensitive military and oil installations. In general, women did
not require permission from male guardians to travel; however, men may
prevent female relatives and children from leaving the country by
providing their names to immigration officers at ports of departure.
Technically women employed by the Government must obtain official
permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but the extent to
which this regulation was enforced was not known. Citizens critical of
the Government sometimes faced restrictions on their right to travel
abroad.
All citizens have the right to return. Foreigners were subject to
immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the local
labor force. Foreign workers must have the permission of their sponsor
employer to enter and depart the country (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.),
but their dependents may leave the country without restriction. Foreign
women who are married to citizens were granted residence permits and
may apply for citizenship; however, they were expected to relinquish
their foreign citizenship.
The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. Those attempting to enter the
country illegally, including persons seeking asylum from nearby
countries, were refused entry. Asylum seekers who were able to obtain
local sponsorship or employment were allowed to enter and may remain as
long as they are employed.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government or the
political system peacefully. The political institutions combine the
characteristics of a traditional Bedouin tribal state and a modern
bureaucracy. Under the amended Provisional Constitution, the Amir must
be chosen from and by the adult males of the Al-Thani family. The
Government did not permit political parties or organized opposition
groups.
The Amir exercises most executive and legislative powers, including
appointment of cabinet members. In 1999 citizens elected a 29-member
Central Municipal Council. For the first time, men and women aged 18
and older were permitted both to vote and to run as candidates in free
and fair elections. The Council is a nonpartisan body that addressed
local issues such as street repair, green space, trash collection, and
public works projects. Its role is to advise the Minister of Municipal
Affairs and Agriculture. The Council does not have the authority to
change policy.
In 1998 the Amir announced the formation of a committee to draft a
permanent constitution that would provide for parliamentary elections.
The constitutional committee was inaugurated in 1999 and included 36
government officials, academics, and prominent business leaders. In
addition to subcommittees on the legislature, executive, and judiciary,
it included a subcommittee on human rights. In July the committee
completed its work and submitted a draft constitution to the Amir.
Impediments that prevented or hindered women from participating in
politics included lack of experience and role models, and the
traditional society, in which women are expected to be mothers and
caretakers. The highest-ranking women in official positions were the
Undersecretary of Education and the Vice-President of the University.
There were no women on the elected Municipal Council. The Amir's
sister, Sheikha Hessa al Thani, Vice President of the Supreme Council
of Family Affairs, was given the title of Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not permit independent local human rights
organizations to exist. However, on November 11, the Amir announced the
establishment of a National Committee for Human Rights, to be composed
of representatives drawn from both government ministries and civil
society. The Committee was charged with investigating human rights
violations and improving local human rights conditions. By year's end,
members had not been named and the Committee had not yet met.
No international human rights organizations were known to have
requested to investigate conditions in the country during the year.
However, Amnesty International and foreign embassies were invited to
send observers to sessions of the public trial of those accused in the
1996 coup attempt. Foreign observers attended the trial sessions held
in 2001.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination in the workplace; however,
institutional, cultural, and legal discrimination based on gender,
race, and social status existed.
Women.--According to Shari'a, all forms of physical abuse are
illegal. The maximum penalty for rape is death. Shari'a provides for no
punishment for spousal rape. According to a local nongovernmental
organization (NGO) on family issues, domestic violence against women
occurred, but was not widespread. The police investigated reports of
violence against women. In the past few years, the Government has
demonstrated an increased willingness to make arrests in cases of
domestic violence, whether against citizens or foreigners. However,
offenders who are citizens usually received lighter punishments than
did foreigners. During the year, there were no publicized arrests or
convictions for domestic violence.
Some employers mistreated some foreign domestic servants,
especially those from South Asia and the Philippines. In most cases,
the mistreatment involved nonpayment or late payment of wages, but also
included rape and physical abuse (see Section 6.e.). Foreign embassies
provided shelter for maids who left their employers as a result of
abuse or disputes. Abused domestic servants usually did not press
charges for fear of losing their jobs.
The legal system allows leniency for a man found guilty of
committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent
assault against a woman for perceived immodesty or defiant behavior;
however, such honor killings are rare and none received public
attention during the year.
The activities of women were restricted closely both by law and
tradition. For example, women were prohibited from applying for
driver's licenses unless they had permission from a male guardian. This
restriction did not apply to noncitizen women. The Government adhered
to Shari'a as practiced in the country in matters of inheritance and
child custody. Muslim wives have the right to inherit from their
husbands. However, they inherit only one-half as much as male
relatives. Non-Muslim wives inherit nothing, unless a special exception
is arranged. In cases of divorce, Shari'a is followed; younger children
remain with the mother and older children with the father. Both parents
retain permanent rights of visitation. However, local authorities did
not allow a noncitizen parent to take his or her child out of the
country without permission of the citizen parent. Women may attend
court proceedings but generally are represented by a male relative;
however, women may represent themselves. According to Shari'a, the
testimony of two women equals that of one man, but the courts routinely
interpret this on a case-by-case basis. A non-Muslim woman is not
required to convert to Islam upon marriage to a Muslim; however, many
make a personal decision to do so. A noncitizen woman is not required
to become a citizen upon marriage to a citizen. Children born to a
Muslim father are considered to be Muslim.
The legal system follows Shari'a law in matters of inheritance and
child custody. Muslims have the automatic right to inherit from their
spouses; however non-Muslim spouses (invariably wives, since Muslim
women cannot legally marry non-Muslims) do not inherit unless their
spouse formally wills them a portion (up to one third of the total) of
their estates. Muslim wives have the right to inherit from their
husbands. However, they inherit only one-half as much as male
relatives. In cases of divorce, young children usually remain with the
mother, whatever her religion. However, the Government did not allow
noncitizen parents, even if they have custody of their children, to
take them out of the country without the permission of the citizen
parent, which effectively discriminated against non-Muslim parents.
Professional opportunities for women increased. Many serve as
senior professionals in government service, education, health, and
private business. Women made up 14 percent of the overall workforce,
and 26 percent of the local national workforce, including as university
professors, public school teachers, and police. Women appeared to
receive equal pay for equal work; however, they often did not receive
equal allowances. These allowances generally covered transportation and
housing costs.
Although women legally were able to travel abroad alone (see
Section 2.d.), tradition and social pressures caused most to travel
with male escorts. There also have been complaints that citizen
husbands took their foreign spouses' passports and, without prior
approval, turned them in for local citizenship documents. The husbands
then informed their wives that the wives had lost their former
citizenship. In other cases, foreign wives have reported being
forbidden by their husbands or in-laws to visit or to contact foreign
embassies.
The Government actively supported women's education. Females
constituted approximately two-thirds of the student body at the
University. Increasingly women received government scholarships to
pursue degrees at foreign universities.
There were no independent women's rights organizations, nor has the
Government permitted the establishment of such organizations. The
Supreme Council for Family Affairs sought to improve the status of
women and the family under both civil and Islamic law. During the year,
the Council sponsored a symposium designed to increase women's
participation in political affairs, including the upcoming elections.
Children.--The Government demonstrated its commitment to citizens'
children's rights through a well-funded, free public education system
(elementary through university) and a complete medical protection
program. Education was compulsory for citizens (both boys and girls)
through the age of 18. Education through primary school (the equivalent
of 9th grade) was compulsory and free for all noncitizen resident
children. Medical coverage for noncitizen children was limited.
There was no societal pattern of abuse of children, apart from the
trafficked, juvenile camel jockeys, which was a problem (see Sections
6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
The Supreme Council for Family Affairs, in collaboration with the
Ministry of Interior, set up a hotline called the Friendly Line for use
by children. The system allowed both citizen and noncitizen children to
call in with questions and concerns ranging from school, health, and
psychological problems to concerns about sexual harassment.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law does not address the question
of discrimination against persons with disabilities. The Government did
not enact legislation or otherwise mandate provision of accessibility
for persons with disabilities, who also face societal discrimination.
The Government maintained a hospital and schools that provide high-
quality, free services to persons, including noncitizens, with mental
and physical disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government discriminated
based on nationality in the areas of employment, education, housing,
and health services. Noncitizens did not receive the same benefits as
citizens. They were required to pay for health care, electricity,
water, and education (services that were provided free of charge to
citizens) and were not permitted to own property. The largest
nationality groups among noncitizens were Indian, Pakistani, and
Iranian nationals, and Arab nationals of other countries. In the
private sector, many citizens of Iranian origin occupied some of the
highest positions.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law prohibits all workers,
including foreigners, from forming labor unions. The law provides for
the establishment of joint consultative committees composed of
representatives of the employer and workers. The right of association
was limited strictly. The committees did not discuss wages but
considered issues such as organization, productivity, conditions of
employment, training of workers, and safety measures and their
implementation.
Since 1995 the country has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers were
prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining. Wages were set
unilaterally by employers without government involvement. Local courts
handled disputes between workers and employers; however, foreign
workers tended to avoid drawing attention to their problems with their
employers for fear of being repatriated at the request of their
employer.
The law provides most workers with the right to strike, but only
after their particular grievance has been ruled on by the Labor
Department of the Ministry of Civil Service. Employers may close a
place of work or dismiss employees once the Department has heard a
complaint. The Department widely was perceived to be objective, within
a narrow mandate dealing with the nonpayment of wages and poor living
conditions. It did not consider wage levels that were set by employers
unilaterally in the absence of labor unions.
Although it was government policy to assist laborers seeking
payment of late salaries due (usually through the Labor Department),
small groups of laborers (10 to 20) resorted to illegal work stoppages
to force payment of arrears. In 2001 1,500 employees of a local
construction company went on strike to force payment of their wages.
After management did not honor an initial settlement brokered by the
Labor Department, employees struck again during the year, forcing
immediate payment of 1 month's back wages and a new commitment to
settle outstanding arrears. Also during the year, another case involved
850 employees of a construction firm in which management did not
implement a settlement to pay back wages, leading to Labor Department
intervention and a new commitment from management to pay wages owed.
The right to strike did not exist for government employees,
domestic servants, or members of the employer's family. No worker in a
public utility, health, or security service may strike if it would harm
the public or lead to property damage.
Strikes remained frequent during the year. The Labor Department
claimed that it resolved the vast majority of worker complaints
amicably, with a very small percentage referred to the courts for
judgment.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor, including by children; however, foreign workers in
some cases were employed under circumstances that constituted forced
labor. Three-quarters of the workforce were foreign workers who,
dependent on a single employer for residency rights, were vulnerable to
abuse. For example, employers must give consent before exit permits are
issued to any foreign employee seeking to leave the country. Some
employers temporarily withheld this consent to force foreign employees
to work for longer periods than they wished. In extreme cases,
employers deported employees at the end of their contract in order to
avoid paying them the lawfully mandated end-of-service bonus. Unskilled
workers and domestic servants were particularly vulnerable to
nonpayment or late payment of wages.
Very young boys were used as jockeys in camel races (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law provides that minors between the ages of 15 and 18
may be employed with the approval of their parents or guardians, and
some children work in small, family-owned businesses. Minors may not
work more than 6 hours a day or more than 36 hours a week. Employers
must provide the Labor Department with the names and occupations of
their minor employees. Employers also must obtain permission from the
Ministry of Education to hire a minor. The Department may prohibit the
employment of minors in jobs that are judged dangerous to the health,
safety, or morals of minors. Child labor occurred. Very young children,
usually of African or South Asian background, were employed as jockeys
in camel races (see Section 6.f.).
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and generally
enforced this prohibition effectively with respect to citizen but not
noncitizen children (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Although the law provides the
Amir with authority to set one, there was no minimum wage,. The average
wage provided a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
According to Planning Council statistics, the average monthly wage in
2001 was $795 (2,902 riyals). The law prescribes a 48-hour workweek
with a 24-hour rest period, although most government offices followed a
36-hours-per-week work schedule. Employees who worked more than 48
hours per week, or 36 hours per week during the Muslim month of
Ramadan, were entitled to overtime pay. This law was adhered to in
government offices and major private sector companies. It was not
observed with respect to unskilled laborers and domestic and personal
employees, all of whom, with scant exception, were foreigners. Many
such workers frequently worked 7 days per week, and more than 12 hours
per day with few or no holidays, no overtime pay, and no effective way
to redress grievances.
The Government has enacted regulations regarding worker safety, but
enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy and
Industry, was lax. The Department of Public Safety oversaw safety
training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company had its
own safety standards and procedures. The law listed partial and
permanent disabilities for which compensation may be awarded, some
connected with handling chemicals and petroleum products or
construction injuries. The law does not specifically set rates of
payment and compensation. Workers who suffered work-related sickness or
injuries received free medical treatment provided by the Government.
The law does not provide workers specifically the right to remove
themselves from hazardous work conditions, and workers often hesitated
to remove themselves from hazardous work conditions because of fear of
dismissal.
Foreign workers may enter the country on a visitor's visa, but a
sponsor then is needed to convert the visitor's visa to a work visa and
the worker must have his sponsor's permission to depart the country.
The Government has also penalized citizen employers who severely
violated residence and sponsorship laws by prohibiting them from
importing labor until they rectified the situation. The law provides
any worker with the right to seek legal relief from onerous work
conditions; however, domestic servants generally did not pursue such
relief in order to avoid repatriation. Employers mistreated some
foreign domestic servants. Such mistreatment generally involved the
nonpayment or late payment of wages; in some cases it involved rape and
physical abuse (see Section 5).
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits prostitution and
trafficking in persons; however, there have been reports that both
children and women were trafficked to the country.
Children aged 4 to 15, mostly of African, Pakistani, and
Bangladeshi origin, were used as jockeys in camel races. Guardians and
handlers, who often posed as parents, brought the children into the
country and supervised their training. They lived in difficult
conditions and trained on a daily basis to become riders.
The country also was a destination for trafficked women and girls.
Women from East Asia, South Asia, and Africa traveled to the country to
work as domestic servants, and some have reported being forced into
domestic servitude and sexual exploitation. The Government provided
assistance to domestics who have suffered from abuse in the form of
payment of back wages and repatriation.
The Government did not investigate or prosecute traffickers
actively. The Government repatriated victims of trafficking upon
discovering their presence and did not provide assistance to victims.
It did not support public awareness campaigns regarding the problem of
trafficking of women and girls.
In 2000 a national campaign was undertaken to set the minimum age
of 15 and minimum weight of 100 pounds for camel jockeys. In 2001 the
Government introduced new safety measures including the use of helmets
and safety belts, and opened a school and health center for the riders.
During the year, however, the minimum weight only was raised from 48.4
to 50.6 pounds.
__________
SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected representative
institutions or political parties. It is ruled by King Fahd bin Abd Al-
Aziz Al Saud, a son of King Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, who unified the
country in the early 20th century. A 1992 royal decree reserved for the
King exclusive power to name the Crown Prince. Since the death of King
Abd Al-Aziz, the King and Crown Prince have been chosen from among his
sons. Crown Prince Abdullah has played an increasing role in governance
since King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995. The Government has declared
the Islamic holy book the Koran and the Sunna (tradition) of the
Prophet Muhammad to be the country's Constitution. The Government bases
its legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of a rigorously
conservative form of Islam. Neither the Government nor the society in
general accepted the concept of separation of religion and state. The
Government prohibited the establishment of political parties and
suppressed opposition views. In 1992 King Fahd appointed a Consultative
Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, and similar provincial assemblies. The
Majlis, an increasingly influential appointed consultative body, began
holding sessions in 1993 and was expanded first in 1997 and again in
2001. The judiciary, though subject to influence by government
officials, was reportedly becoming slightly more independent.
The Government maintained control of the various security forces.
Police and border forces under the Ministry of Interior were
responsible for internal security. Also subordinate to the Ministry of
Interior were the Mubahith, or internal security force, and the elite
special forces. The Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, whose
agents commonly were known as Mutawwa'in, or religious police, was a
semiautonomous agency that enforced adherence to Islamic norms by
monitoring public behavior. The Crown Prince controlled the National
Guard. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Aviation,
Prince Sultan, was responsible for all the military forces. Members of
the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
The population was approximately 22.1 million. The oil industry was
the basis of the transformation of the country from a pastoral,
agricultural, and trading society to a rapidly urbanizing one,
characterized by large-scale infrastructure projects, an extensive
social welfare system, and a labor market comprised largely of foreign
workers. Oil and gas revenues accounted for approximately 35 to 40
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 75 percent of
government income. Agriculture accounted for approximately 6 percent of
GDP. Government spending accounted for 37 percent of GDP. Approximately
40 percent of the economy was nominally private, and the Government was
promoting further privatization of the economy. Since 1995 the
Government has aggressively campaigned to increase the number of
citizens in the public and private work forces.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained.
Citizens did not have the right or the legal means to change their
government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and prisoners,
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and hold them in incommunicado
detention. Security forces committed torture. In 2001 the Council of
Ministers approved a new law regarding punitive measures that would
forbid harming detainees and to allow those accused of crimes to hire a
lawyer or legal agent. On May 1, the new Saudi Criminal Procedural Law
went into effect. Prolonged detention without charge was a problem.
Security forces committed such abuses, in contradiction to the law, but
with the acquiescence of the Government. The Mutawwa'in continued to
intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and foreigners. Most trials were
closed, and defendants usually appeared before judges without legal
counsel. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The
Government prohibited or restricted freedom of speech, the press,
assembly, association, religion, and movement. However, during the
year, the Government continued to tolerate a wider range of debate and
criticism in the press concerning domestic issues. Discrimination and
violence against women, discrimination against ethnic and religious
minorities, and strict limitations on worker rights continued.
The Government viewed its interpretation of Islamic law as its sole
source of guidance on human rights and disagreed with internationally
accepted definitions of human rights. However, in the past and during
the year, the Government initiated limited measures to participate in
international human rights activities, such as its welcome in October
of the visit of the U.N. Human Rights envoy following the Government's
implementation in May of its new bill of rights Criminal Procedure
Code, which the Government claimed would address some of its
obligations under the Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents.
The Government executed persons for criminal offenses after closed
trials in which forced confessions were common. A few procedural
safeguards were provided through the new Criminal Procedural Law,
though there was little evidence of its actual implementation (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Shar'ia (Islamic law) prohibits any judge from accepting a
confession obtained under duress; however, there were credible reports
that the authorities abused detainees, both citizens and foreigners.
Ministry of Interior officials were responsible for most incidents of
abuse of prisoners, including beatings, whippings, sleep deprivation,
and at least three cases of drugging of foreign prisoners. In addition,
there were allegations of torture, including allegations of beatings
with sticks, suspension from bars by handcuffs, and threats against
family members. Torture and abuse were used to obtain required
confessions from prisoners (see Section 1.e.). There were reports that
in detention centers some boys and young men were flogged, forced
constantly to lie on hard floors, deprived of sleep, and threatened
with whipping and other abuse.
The Government has refused to recognize the mandate of the U.N.
Committee Against Torture to investigate alleged abuses, although it
has invited the committee to visit the country. However, the Government
has pledged to cooperate with U.N. human rights mechanisms and
announced in 2000 the establishment of a committee to investigate
allegations of torture pursuant to its obligations under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (see Section 4). At year's end, there was no indication that
the committee had begun functioning.
In October the Government welcomed the visit of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the first ever
from the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, and allowed the U.N. Human
Rights lawyer and his team to examine its criminal and civil laws,
courts, and prisons. The Government's past failure to criticize human
rights abuses has contributed to the public perception that security
forces may commit abuses with impunity.
The Mutawwa'in continued to intimidate, harass, abuse, and detain
citizens and foreigners of both sexes. They also brought citizens to
police for detention. Throughout the year, both citizens and foreigners
reported incidents of intimidation, harassment, and detention by the
Mutawwa'in (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.).
The Government punished criminals according to its interpretation
of Shari'a. Punishments included flogging, amputation, and execution by
beheading, stoning, or firing squad. At year's end, authorities
acknowledged 43 executions, significantly lower than the 81 in the
previous year. Executions were for killing, narcotics-related offenses,
rape, and armed robbery. In accordance with Shari'a, the authorities
may punish repeated thievery and other repeated offenses by amputation
of the right hand and left foot. Persons convicted of political or
religious crimes reportedly were flogged with a leather strap. Persons
convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol-related offenses or
being alone in the company of an unrelated person of the opposite sex,
sometimes were punished by caning.
Prison and jail conditions varied. Prisons reportedly generally met
internationally accepted standards and allegedly provided air-
conditioned cells, good nutrition, regular exercise, and careful
patrolling by prison guards. In October the Government received the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and
allowed him access to prisons. During his visit, the Government again
publicized its intention to form a human rights committee, though no
details were forthcoming at year's end. Some police stations,
deportation centers, and jails, nonetheless, were overcrowded,
unsanitary, and not air-conditioned. Authorities generally allowed
family members access to detainees, but in some cases only after
holding detainees for a significant period of time.
In 1992 King Fahd established regional Boards of Investigation and
Public Prosecution. The members of these boards had the right to
inspect prisons, review prisoners' files, and hear their complaints.
However, the Government did not yet permit NGO human rights monitors to
visit prisons or jails.
Representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
were present at the Rafha refugee camp, which houses former Iraqi
prisoners of war and civilians who fled Iraq following the Gulf War.
According to UNHCR officials, there was no systematic abuse of refugees
by camp guards. When isolated instances of abuse surfaced in the past,
the authorities were responsive and willing to investigate allegations
and reprimand or remove offending guards. The camp received a high
level of material assistance and was generally comfortable and well
run. The Government previously confined refugees to the camp, except in
the event of approved emigration (see Section 2.d.); however, during
the year, refugees were permitted to visit the town of Rafha to shop.
During the year, the Government began working with the UNHCR to make
arrangements for Rafha refugees to gain employment in the Rafha area.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the authorities at times
arrested and detained persons without following explicit legal
guidelines. The Mutawwa'in generally were free to intimidate and bring
to police stations persons whom they accused of committing ``crimes of
vice'' based on their own religious interpretations. There were few
existing formal procedures to safeguard against abuse, although the
Government claimed that it punished individual officers who violate
regulations. There have been few publicized cases of citizens
successfully obtaining judicial redress for abuse of the Government's
power of arrest and detention. In February the press reported that at
least one Court of Grievances ordered the police department in Jeddah
to pay compensation to one Arab expatriate for detaining him illegally
for 2 months.
According to regulation, authorities may not detain suspects for
longer than 3 days before charging them. However, serious exceptions
have been reported. In practice persons were held weeks or months and
sometimes longer. The regulations also provided for bail for less
serious crimes, although authorities at times released detainees on the
recognizance of a patron or sponsoring employer without the payment of
bail. If they were not released, authorities typically detained accused
persons for an average of 2 months before sending the case to trial or,
in the case of some foreigners, summarily deporting them. There were no
established procedures providing detainees the right to inform their
family of their arrest.
The Mutawwa'in have the authority to detain persons for no more
than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress
and behavior. In the past, they sometimes exceeded this limit before
delivering detainees to the police (see Section 1.f.). Mutawwa'in
reportedly in practice handed over detainees to police within the 24-
hour period; however, in some cases police held prisoners for longer
periods, depending on the offense. Procedures required a police officer
to accompany the Mutawwa'in at the time of an arrest. Mutawwa'in
generally complied with this requirement. During the year, in the more
conservative Riyadh district, reports continued of Mutawwa'in
accosting, abusing, arresting, and detaining persons alleged to have
violated dress and behavior standards.
The Mutawwa'in reportedly detained young men for offenses that
included eating in restaurants with young women, making lewd remarks to
women in the shopping malls, or walking in groups through family-only
sections of shopping centers. Women of many nationalities were detained
for actions such as riding in a taxi with a man who was not their
relative, appearing with their heads uncovered in shopping malls, and
eating in restaurants with males who were not their relatives. Many
such prisoners were held for days, sometimes weeks, without officials
notifying their families or, in the case of foreigners, their
embassies.
The Government continued to detain Christians, at times for holding
services and at times apparently arbitrarily (see Section 2.c.).
During the year, the Government reportedly detained a number of
Shi'a sheikhs (religious leaders)(see Section 2.c.).
Early in the year, the Government arrested six leaders of the
Ismaili Shi'ite sect in Najran. They continued to be detained along
with a reported 93 others held since the protests there. On December 3,
King Fahd commuted the death penalty for 17 citizens arrested during
the Najran riots to 10 years in prison and lowered the sentence from 10
to 5 years for many of the others arrested. On December 24, the
Government released an elderly Ismaili religious leader, Hajj Mohammed
Al-Saadi, held in a maximum security prison since the riots in 2000. He
was among those whose sentences were reduced in the King's Ramadan
pardon in early December.
Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of
Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior's security service
(Mubahith), commonly were held incommunicado in special prisons during
the initial phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months.
The GDI allowed the detainees only limited contact with their families
or lawyers.
The authorities may detain without charge persons who publicly
criticize the Government, or may charge them with attempting to
destabilize the Government (see Sections 2.a. and 3). In late January,
in celebration of King Fahd's 20 years of rule and the holy month of
Ramadan, the Minister of Interior announced the release of 13,768
prisoners serving time for minor offenses, including 8,905 citizens and
4,863 foreigners.
The Government continued to commit abuses against members of the
Shi'a minority. The Government reportedly continued to detain an
unknown number of Shi'a who were arrested in the aftermath of the 1996
Al-Khobar bombing. Government security forces reportedly arrested Shi'a
based on the smallest suspicion, held them in custody for lengthy
periods, and then released them without explanation. In February the
Government released Sheikh Al-Ghanim after detention for nearly 2
years; however, 16 Shi'a remained in prison at year's end.
During the year, the Public Security Department in Jeddah announced
its commitment to discourage abuse by security forces through the
establishment of hotlines (including telephone and fax numbers and an
e-mail address) for use by the general public. These new hotlines will
allow the public the opportunity to complain about any breach of law by
security personnel and to report abuse by police officers. The director
of Public Security in Jeddah said a special task force had been set up
in the department to act on complaints and proposals from the public.
The Jeddah Public Security Department also promised to compensate all
proven violations made by security personnel against any citizen or
expatriate.
There was no reliable information about the total number of
political detainees.
The Government did not use forced exile; however, it previously has
revoked the citizenship of opponents of the Government who reside
outside the country (see Section 3).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The independence of the judiciary
is prescribed by law and was generally respected in practice; however,
judges occasionally acceded to the influence of the executive branch,
high-ranking members of the royal family and their associates, who were
not required to appear before the courts. Judges are appointed by the
Justice Ministry and confirmed by the Royal Diwan (Royal Court). The
Ministry exercised judicial, financial, and administrative control of
the courts. The Supreme Judicial Council, whose members appointed by
the King, may discipline or remove judges.
The legal system is based on Shari'a. Shari'a courts exercise
jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Such jurisdiction
extends to non-Muslims for crimes committed in the country. Shari'a
courts base judgments largely on their interpretation of the Koran and
the Sunna. Cases involving relatively small penalties were tried in
Shari'a summary courts. More serious crimes were adjudicated in Shari'a
courts of common pleas. Appeals from Shari'a courts were made to the
courts of appeal.
Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against
the Government and enforcement of foreign judgments, were held before
specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the
Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.
The Government permitted Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal
tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community. There
was no comparable right for non-Muslims or foreigners, whose cases were
handled in regular Shari'a courts.
The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed
personnel and civil servants that are charged with violations of
military regulations. The Minister of Defense and Aviation and the King
review the decisions of courts-martial.
The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse
decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review
lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for
reconsideration.
The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of
20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It
establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in
deciding cases.
On May 1, the November 2001 Saudi Criminal Procedural Law, went
into effect. Reported by the press as a bill of rights, the 225-article
law reportedly was part of a plan to restructure court procedures. The
approval of the bill followed the Government's decision to allow
persons under investigation the right to a lawyer and to permit lawyers
to present arguments in criminal courts. In May, following the
announcement of the new law's implementation, the Justice Minister
issued a public statement announcing his instructions to courts and
judges to inform convicts of their right to appeal rulings. According
to knowledgeable attorneys there is no evidence yet of the law's
implementation.
There were reports during the year that the authorities tortured
detainees and pressured them to confess by isolation, blindfolding, and
drugging over a period of weeks.
A woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a
man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two
women.
Female parties to court proceedings such as divorce and family law
cases generally must deputize male relatives to speak on their behalf.
In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case of
adultery, confessions before a judge almost always were required for
criminal conviction--a situation that repeatedly has led prosecuting
authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse
(see Section 1.c.).
Sentencing was not uniform. Laws and regulations state that
defendants should be treated equally; however, under Shari'a as
interpreted and applied in the country, crimes against Muslims received
harsher penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of
wrongful death, the amount of indemnity or ``blood money'' awarded to
relatives varied with the nationality, religion, age, and sex of the
victim. A sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for
punishments stipulated by the Koran.
Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and
reduce a judge's sentence. In general members of the royal family and
other powerful families were not subject to the same rule of law as
ordinary citizens. For example, judges did not have the power to issue
a warrant summoning any member of the royal family.
The King and his advisors reviewed cases involving capital
punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and
grant pardons, except for capital crimes committed against individuals.
In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the
killer--usually in return for compensation from the family or the King.
There was insufficient information to determine the number of
political prisoners. The Government did not provide information
regarding such persons or respond to inquiries about them. It did not
allow access to political prisoners by international humanitarian
organizations. Moreover, the Government conducted closed trials for
persons who may have been political prisoners and in other cases has
detained persons incommunicado for long periods while under
investigation. Amnesty International previously estimated the number of
political prisoners to be between 100 and 200; however, there were no
current or reliable figures available.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The sanctity of family life and the inviolability of
the home are among the most fundamental of Islamic precepts. The
Government infringed on these rights. Royal decrees include provisions
calling for the Government to defend the home from unlawful intrusions,
while laws and regulations prohibit officials from intercepting mail
and electronic communication except when necessary during criminal
investigations. Nonetheless, there were few procedural safeguards
against government interference with privacy, family, home, or
correspondence.
The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain
permission from the provincial governor before searching a private
home; however, warrants are not required by law.
Customs officials routinely opened mail and shipments to search for
contraband, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim
religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored materials
considered offensive, including Christian Bibles and religious
videotapes (see Section 2.c.). The authorities also opened mail and
used informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters.
Security forces used wiretaps against foreigners suspected of alcohol-
related offenses. Informants and an informal system of ward bosses in
some districts reported ``seditious ideas,'' antigovernment activity,
or behavior contrary to Islam in their neighborhoods to the Ministry of
the Interior.
The Government enforced most social and Islamic religious norms,
the Government's interpretation of which are matters of law (see
Section 5). Women may not marry noncitizens without government
permission; men must obtain government permission to marry noncitizen
women outside the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In
accordance with Shari'a, women are prohibited from marrying non-
Muslims; men may marry Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims.
Marriages between Sunni and Shi'a citizens were discouraged, and any
such marriages generally were made formal officiated in ceremonies in
the neighboring country of Bahrain.
In March the Government announced new restrictions against citizens
marrying foreigners. The Council of Ministers passed a law barring top
civil servants and security officials from marrying foreigners without
permission from the King. The list included ministers, judges,
employees in the Royal Court and Cabinet, Majlis Ash-Shura members,
diplomats and administrative staff in the Foreign Ministry, civil
servants posted overseas, chairmen of boards of private companies,
staff of the Defense Ministry, National Guard, internal security,
intelligence service, public prosecution and customs. According to
press reports, citizens who married foreigners without prior
authorization no longer would qualify for any of those jobs. The
marital restrictions also applied to citizens studying overseas.
Violators risked disciplinary action, including being fired from their
jobs and even trial.
Mutawwa'in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in
different regions of the country, but they were most numerous in the
central Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawwa'in and
religious vigilantes acting on their own harassed, abused, arrested,
and detained citizens and foreigners (see Section 1.d.). The Government
requires the Mutawwa'in to follow established procedures and to offer
instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawwa'in did not always
comply with the requirements. During the year, the Government neither
criticized publicly abuses by Mutawwa'in and religious vigilantes nor
sought to curtail such abuses.
Mutawwa'in enforcement of strict standards of social behavior
included the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily
prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of
public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places
designated for men, as well as preventing men from entering public
places designated for families. Mutawwa'in frequently reproached
citizen and foreign women for failure to observe strict dress codes and
arrested men and women found together who were not married or closely
related.
Local media emphasized remarks made by the Interior Minister during
a November visit to the Riyadh headquarters of the Commission for the
Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. The Minister called on the
Mutawwa'in to respect the sanctity of private homes and refrain from
activity that could be construed as prying or harassing citizens.
According to credible sources, incidents with Mutawwa'in usually
increased during Ramadan because many feel they have added license to
assert their authority during the holy month.
Some professors believed that informers monitor comments made in
university classrooms and reported them to government authorities.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government severely limited
freedom of speech and the press; however, the Government continued to
relax restrictions somewhat during the year. The authorities did not
permit criticism of Islam or the ruling family, and criticism of the
Government was rare. However, in November the press reported debate
over religious matters. The press published critical commentary about
religious authorities segregating women in the Grand Mosque in Mecca
and temporarily restricting access for women from certain areas of the
Prophet's Mosque in Medina. On November 15, one female citizen
journalist described discrimination against female pilgrims in an
article in the Arab News stating ``I will continue writing about this
until the authorities listen to what I have to say.''
The authorities allowed the press some freedom to criticize
governmental bodies and social policies through editorial comments and
cartoons. For example, editors allowed publication of sensational
stories of citizen experiences abroad. Also during the year, both
Arabic and English newspapers reported on domestic problems, such as
abuse of women, servants, and children, previously not addressed by the
media. Persons whose criticisms aligned them with an organized
political opposition were subject to arrest and detention until they
confessed to a crime or signed a statement promising not to resume such
criticisms, which was tantamount to a confession.
On occasion the Government provided direction to mosque orators and
imams regarding the content of their messages; in some instances the
Government has banned imams from speaking for political comments that
they made (see Section 2.c.).
The print media were privately owned but publicly subsidized. A
media policy statement and a national security law prohibit the
dissemination of criticism of the Government. The media policy
statement urged journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote
Arab interests, and preserve cultural heritage. The Ministry of
Information appointed, and may remove, all editors in chief. It also
provided guidelines to newspapers regarding controversial issues. The
Government owned the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which expressed official
government views.
In 2001 the Council of Ministers approved a new press law
establishing a journalists' association for citizens to address wages,
benefits, and relations with management. In February the Government
announced that journalists could now begin to form their own press
association as approved by the Council of Ministers.
Newspapers typically published news on sensitive subjects, such as
crime or terrorism, only after the information was released by the SPA
or when a senior government official had authorized it. Two Saudi-
owned, London-based dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, were
distributed widely and read in the country. Both newspapers tended to
practice self-censorship in order to comply with government
restrictions on sensitive issues.
The authorities dictated to domestic newspapers when they are
allowed to release stories about the country that are based on stories
in the foreign press. The authorities also continued on occasion to
censor stories about the country in foreign publications. Censors
removed or blackened offending articles, glued pages together, or
prevented certain issues of foreign publications from entering the
market. However, while this occurred, it was not consistent and
frequently controversial articles appeared in foreign publications that
were distributed. During the year, the Ministry of Information
continued to relax its blackout policy regarding politically sensitive
news concerning the country reported in the international media,
although press restrictions regarding domestic reporting remained
stringent. Access by citizens to outside sources of information, such
as Arabic and Western satellite television channels and the Internet,
was increasingly widespread.
In the past, the Government has restricted the entry of foreign
journalists. However, during the year, it granted visas to a large
number of international media professionals. The Government allowed
foreign journalists and photographers, both male and female, to travel
widely and to interview. However, in one instance, authorities
confiscated videotapes and a laptop computer from one reporter.
Authorities gave no reason for confiscating the material.
In March local newspapers publicized public outrage at the fire in
the Mecca girls' school. The Government issued a report to the press
and the media reported eyewitness accounts from the scene. The
resultant public outcry resulted in the dissolution of the separate and
religiously controlled Presidency for Girls' Education and the
incorporation of female education into the Ministry of Education.
Government interference with the press continued. In March an
editor was fired for criticizing judges. In May the Government forced
the firing of the editor of Al-Watan for criticizing religious judges.
The Government owned and operated the television and radio
companies. Government censors removed any reference to politics,
religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from foreign
programs and songs. There were several million satellite-receiving
dishes in the country, which provided citizens with foreign broadcasts.
The Government banned all books, magazines, and other materials
that it considered sexual or pornographic in nature. The Ministry of
Information compiled and updated a list of publications that were
prohibited from being sold in the country.
The Government censored all forms of public artistic expression and
prohibited cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances,
except those that are considered folkloric.
Access to the Internet was available legally only through local
servers, which the Government monitored closely. There were as many as
one million Internet subscribers. Some citizens attempted to circumvent
this control by accessing the Internet through servers in other
countries. The Government attempted to block all Web sites that it
deemed sexual, pornographic, politically offensive, or ``un-Islamic.''
However, such Web sites were accessible from within the country. In
2001 the Government closed a number of Internet cafes, especially those
established for women, after complaints that the cafes were being used
for ``immoral purposes.''
Academic freedom was restricted. For example, the authorities
prohibited the study of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and
Western philosophy. Informers monitored their classroom comments and
reported to government and religious authorities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Shari'a does not
address freedom of assembly, but the Government strictly limited
freedom of assembly in practice. It prohibited public demonstrations as
a means of political expression. Public meetings were segregated by
sex. Unless sponsored by diplomatic missions or approved by the
appropriate governor, foreign residents who seek to hold unsegregated
meetings risked arrest and deportation. The authorities monitored any
large gatherings of persons, especially of women. The Mutawwa'in
dispersed groups of women found in public places, such as restaurants.
Government policy permits women to attend cultural and social events at
diplomatic chanceries and residences only if they are accompanied by a
father, brother, or husband. However, in practice police often
implemented the policy arbitrarily. On some occasions during the year,
authorities actively prohibited women from entering diplomatic
chanceries or residences to attend cultural events and lectures.
Shari'a does not address freedom of association, and the Government
strictly limited freedom of association in practice. The Government
prohibited the establishment of political parties or any type of
opposition group (see Section 3). By its power to license associations,
the Government ensured that groups conform to public policy. The
Government licensed a large number of humanitarian organizations and
tribal and professional societies, such as the Saudi Chemists Society
and the Saudi Pharmacists Society. The Government claimed that such
groups operate without government interference because they were not
detrimental to public security.
The Government maintained its position that public demonstrations
were not allowed; however, a small number of public demonstrations
occurred. On April 5, protesters demonstrated outside a foreign
Consulate in Dhahran. On April 8, university students protested outside
Jeddah's King Abd al-Aziz University in support of the Palestinians.
The Government peacefully dispersed the crowds. Authorities prevented
the holding of other public demonstrations and, according to several
reports, used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators in
the Eastern Province town of Qatif.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion did not exist. Islam
is the official religion, and all citizens must be Muslims.
The Government prohibited non-Islamic public worship. The
Government recognized the right of non-Muslims to worship in private;
however, it did not always respect this right in practice. Conversion
by a Muslim to another religion was considered apostasy. Public
apostasy is a crime under Shari'a and punishable by death. There were
no executions for apostasy during the year, and no reports of any such
executions for the past several years.
Islamic practice generally was limited to that of the Wahhabi
order, which adhered to the Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam
as interpreted by Muhammad Ibn Al-Wahab, a puritanical 18th century
religious reformer. The spreading of Muslim teachings not in conformity
with the officially accepted interpretation of Islam was prohibited.
However, there were significant numbers of Sufis in the western
province who engaged in technically illegal practices, such as
celebrating the Mawlid, or Prophet's birthday, more or less openly
without government interference. The practice of other schools of Sunni
Islam was discouraged, and there was institutionalized discrimination
against adherents of the Shi'a branch of Islam.
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs directly supervised, and was a
major source of funds for the construction and maintenance of most
mosques in the country. The Ministry paid the salaries of imams (prayer
leaders) and others who worked in the mosques. On occasion the
Government provided direction to mosque orators and imams regarding the
content of their messages; in some instances, imams were banned from
speaking. A governmental committee was responsible for defining the
qualifications of imams. The Mutawwa'in received their funding from the
Government and were government employees. The General President of the
Mutawwa'in held the rank of cabinet minister. Mutawwa'in and imams were
trained at the Imam Mohammed University outside of Riyadh and also at
the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca.
Foreign imams were barred from leading worship during the most
heavily attended prayer times and prohibited from delivering sermons
during Friday congregational prayers. The Government stated that its
actions were part of its ``Saudiization'' plan to replace foreign
workers with citizens. The spreading of Muslim teachings not in
conformance with the officially accepted interpretation of Islam was
prohibited. Writers and other individuals who publicly criticized this
interpretation, including both those who advocated a stricter
interpretation and those who favored a more moderate interpretation
than the Government's, were imprisoned and faced other reprisals.
The Shi'a Muslim minority (approximately 900,000 of approximately
14 million citizens) lived mostly in the Eastern Province, although a
significant number also resided in Medina in the western province. Its
members were the objects of officially sanctioned political, social,
and economic discrimination (see Section 5).
The authorities permitted the celebration of the Shi'a holiday of
Ashura in the eastern province city of Qatif, provided that the
celebrants did not undertake large, public marches or engage in self-
flagellation (a traditional Shi'a practice). The celebrations were
monitored by the police. No other Ashura celebrations were permitted in
the country, and many Shi'a traveled to Qatif or to Bahrain to
participate in Ashura celebrations. The Government continued to enforce
other restrictions on the Shi'a community, such as banning Shi'a books.
According to various reports, the Government arrested and detained
a number of Shi'a sheikhs (religious leaders) in 2000 and during the
year. Early in 2000, a Shi'a sheikh was taken into custody, and three
other sheikhs were arrested for unknown reasons near the border with
Jordan. Credible human rights organizations reported that at least
seven additional Shi'a religious leaders reportedly remained in
detention for violating restrictions on Shi'a religious practices. In
March 2000, Mubahith officers reportedly arrested and detained Sheikh
Mohammed Al Amri in Medina. In April 2000, Hashim Al-Sayyid Al-Sada, a
Shi'a cleric suspected of political or religious dissent, was arrested
in his home and reportedly remained in incommunicado detention at
year's end (see Section 1.d.). In February Sheikh Aliban Ali al-Ghanim
who was arrested in August 2000 was released.
The Government seldom permitted private construction of Shi'a
mosques. The Shi'a have declined government offers to build state-
supported mosques because the Government would prohibit the
incorporation and display of Shi'a motifs in any such mosques.
In 2000 rioting by Makarama Ismaili Shi'as in Najran led to an
attack by an armed group of Shi'a on a hotel that contained an office
of the regional governor. Security forces responded, leading to
extended gun battles between the two sides. In December the Government
stated that 1 member of the security forces was killed in Najran and
that King Fahd commuted the death sentence for 17 of the anti-
government insurrectionists.
Early this year in Najran, 6 leaders of the Ismaili Shiite sect
were arrested and continued to be detained along with a reported 93
others held since the protests in 2000. In 2001 all six persons were
known to have met with a foreign journalist visiting Najran. By year's
end, there were 102 minority Ismailis reportedly still in prison in
Najran.
Magic is widely believed in and sometimes practiced, often in the
form of fortune telling and swindles. However, under Shari'a the
practice of magic is regarded as the worst form of polytheism, an
offense for which no repentance is accepted, and which is punishable by
death. There were an unknown number of detainees held in prison on the
charge of ``sorcery,'' or the practice of ``black magic'' or
``witchcraft.'' In a few cases, self-proclaimed ``miracle workers''
were executed for sorcery involving physical harm or apostasy. The
press reported that police arrested persons accused of sorcery. Based
on vague accounts and lack of definition of sorcery included in the
crime reports, the charges appeared to be based on hearsay and
neighbors' reports of alleged misdeeds. There was no information
available on prison time or punishment.
The Government prohibited public non-Muslim religious activities.
Non-Muslim worshippers risked arrest, lashing, and deportation for
engaging in overt religious activity that attracts official attention.
The Government has stated publicly, including before the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, that its policy is to protect the right of
non-Muslims to worship privately. During the year, senior officials in
the Government reaffirmed to a visiting religious delegation the right
of non-Muslims to engage in private religious worship. However, it did
not provide explicit guidelines-such as the number of persons permitted
to attend and acceptable locations-for determining what constitutes
private worship, which made distinctions between public and private
worship unclear. Such lack of clarity, as well as instances of
arbitrary enforcement by the authorities, forced most non-Muslims to
worship in such a manner as to avoid discovery by the Government or
others. Those detained for non-Muslim worship almost always were
deported by authorities after sometimes lengthy periods of arrest
during investigation.
At year's end, there were no reports that Christians detained for
practicing their religion remained in prisons. During the year, there
were a few raids, arrests, and detentions of Christians throughout the
country. In early January, three Ethiopian Christians, detained in 2001
in Jeddah in connection with an investigation into a Christian worship
group, alleged in a well-circulated e-mail that they were tortured,
submitted to severe punishment and physical abuse. Later in the year
the three were released and deported. In March 2 Filipino Christians,
imprisoned in Dammam for conducting a Roman Catholic prayer group in
their home, were sentenced to 150 lashes and deportation following a
30-day jail sentence. In April Mutawwa'in arrested 26 Christians in
successive raids on 2 private houses and handed them over to the
Mubahith or investigative arm of the Ministry of Interior. After 2
days, 23 of the Christians were released, but 3 of them (1 Sudanese and
2 Sri Lankans) remained in prison until September 5, and then were
released without charge. They subsequently were informed by their Saudi
sponsors that they had to leave the country and not return to their
work. In late May, police in Jeddah imprisoned 11 Ethiopian and
Eritrean Christians accused of practicing their religion in their
homes. By early September all of them had been released and deported.
The Government did not permit non-Muslim clergy to enter the
country for the purpose of conducting religious services, although some
came under other auspices. Such restrictions made it very difficult for
most non-Muslims to maintain contact with clergymen and attend
services. Catholics and Orthodox Christians, who require a priest on a
regular basis to receive the sacraments required by their faith,
particularly were affected.
Proselytizing by non-Muslims, including the distribution of non-
Muslim religious materials such as Bibles, was illegal. There were no
reports during the year of arrests for proselytizing. Muslims or non-
Muslims wearing religious symbols of any kind in public risked
confrontation with the Mutawwa'in. Under the auspices of the Ministry
of Islamic Affairs, approximately 50 so-called ``Call and Guidance''
centers employing approximately 500 citizens to convert foreigners to
Islam. Some non-Muslim foreigners converted to Islam during their stay
in the country, including more than 200 persons in Jeddah each year.
The press often carried articles about such conversions, including
testimonials.
Under the Hanbali interpretation of Shari'a law, judges may
discount the testimony of persons who are not practicing Muslims or who
do not adhere to the correct doctrine. Legal sources reported that
testimony by Shi'a is often ignored in courts of law or is deemed to
have less weight than testimony by Sunnis. For example, in 2001 a judge
in the eastern province asked two witnesses to an automobile accident
if they were Shi'a. When they so confirmed, the judge announced to the
court that their testimony was inadmissible. Sentencing under the legal
system was not uniform. Laws and regulations state that defendants
should be treated equally; however, under Shari'a as interpreted and
applied in the country, crimes against Muslims may result in harsher
penalties than those against non-Muslims.
Islamic religious education was mandatory in public schools at all
levels. All children received religious instruction, which generally
was limited to that of the Hanbali school of Islam.
In accordance with Shari'a, Saudi women were prohibited from
marrying non-Muslims, but Saudi men may marry Christians and Jews, as
well as Muslims.
The Government required noncitizens to carry Iqamas, or legal
resident identity cards, which contained a religious designation for
``Muslim'' or ``non-Muslim.''
Shi'a citizens are discriminated against in government and
employment, especially in national security jobs. Shi'a are subjected
to employment restrictions in the oil and petrochemical industries and
some Shi'a who are suspected of subversion have been subjected
periodically to surveillance and limitations on travel abroad. Since
beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of a U.S. military
installation, authorities have detained, interrogated, and confiscated
the passports of a number of Shi'a, including Shi'a returning to the
country following travel to Iran (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
Additionally, the courts will not accept a member of the Shi'a faith as
a witness in a trial.
In 2000 rioting by members of the Makarama Ismaili Shi'a eventually
led to an attack by an armed group of Shi'a led to extended gun battles
with security forces between the two sides.
Children of Saudi fathers are considered Muslim, and reportedly are
coerced to conform to their father's interpretation of Islam. However,
no cases were reported during the year.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricted these rights.
The Government restricted the travel of citizen women. All women in the
country were prohibited from driving and were dependent upon males for
any transportation. Likewise, they must obtain written permission from
their closest male relative before the authorities allowed them to
travel abroad (see Section 5). The requirement to obtain permission
from a male relative or guardian applied also to foreign women married
to citizens or to the minor and single adult daughters of Saudi
fathers. In 2001, the Government announced that women could obtain
their own identity cards; however, it required that they obtain
permission to receive a card from their nearest male relatives.
Moreover, the identity cards have not been made mandatory for women
(see Section 5). The restrictions on travel also applied to American
citizen children of Saudi fathers. In cases where there were custody
disputes between American women and their Saudi husbands, the husband
was able to prevent the travel of the children to the United States
even when there was a valid U.S. custody order. These restrictions on
travel can continue even after the children reach adulthood, although
the Government has worked with U.S. consular officials to overcome a
father or husband's refusal to permit the travel of adult American
citizen female relatives. During the year, senior officials indicated a
willingness to allow adult American citizen women to travel despite
objections by their husband or other male relative. However, by year's
end, the policy had not been implemented.
Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, some Shi'a suspected of
subversion have been subjected periodically to surveillance and
limitations on travel abroad. In 2001 the Government lifted the
requirement that citizens intending to travel to Iran seek permission
in advance from authorities.
There was a high increase in tourism, especially religious tourism
by Shi'ites from Saudi Arabia to Iran. The change corresponded with
improving relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Advance permission
for travel to Iraq, whether for business or religious pilgrimage, has
been necessary for some time due to security concerns, but such travel
remained possible. Travel to Iraq still required specific permission.
Foreigners typically were allowed to reside or work in the country
only under the sponsorship of a citizen or business. By law the
sponsors or employers of foreign residents must hold their passports
until they are prepared to depart the country. The Government required
foreign residents to carry identification cards. It did not permit
foreigners to change their workplace without their sponsor's
permission.
Stateless ``bidoons'' continued moving and living nomadically
around the northern border. Bidoons are Arabs who have residency ties
to the country--some going back generations, some for briefer periods--
but who have no conclusive documentation of their nationality. Bidoons
were given Iqamas by the Government but not passports and had
difficulty in obtaining visas for foreign travel.
Sponsors generally retained possession of foreign workers'
passports, although some classes of foreign workers were allowed to
keep their passports. Foreign workers must obtain permission from their
sponsors to travel abroad. If sponsors were involved in a commercial or
labor dispute with foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to
prohibit the employees from departing the country until the dispute is
resolved. Some sponsors used this as a pressure tactic to resolve
disputes in their favor or to have foreign employees deported. There
were numerous reports of the Government prohibiting foreign employees
involved in labor disputes from departing the country until the dispute
was resolved (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
The Government seized the passports of all potential suspects and
witnesses in criminal cases and suspended the issuance of exit visas to
them until the case was concluded. As a result, some foreign nationals
were forced to remain in the country for lengthy periods against their
will. The authorities sometimes confiscated the passports of suspected
oppositionists and their families.
Citizens may emigrate. The Government prohibited dual citizenship;
however, children who hold other citizenship by virtue of birth abroad
increasingly were permitted to leave the country using non-Saudi
passports. Apart from marriage to a citizen, there were no provisions
for foreign residents to acquire citizenship. Children born to a
citizen father acquired Saudi citizenship. However, a citizen mother
may not convey citizenship to her children. Foreigners were granted
citizenship in rare cases, generally through the advocacy of an
influential patron.
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum and refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The Basic Law provides that ``the state will grant political asylum
if the public interest militates in favor of it.'' The law does not
specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases, and does not provide
for first asylum. In general the authorities regarded refugees and
displaced persons similarly as they did foreign workers. They must have
sponsors for employment or risk expulsion. Of the 33,000 Iraqi
civilians and former prisoners of war allowed refuge in the country at
the end of the Gulf War, none have been granted permanent asylum.
Nevertheless, the Government cooperated with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It has underwritten the entire cost
of providing safe haven to the Iraqi refugees and continued to provide
logistical and administrative support to the UNHCR and other
resettlement agencies. At year's end, approximately 27,000 of the
original 33,000 Iraqi refugees had been resettled in other countries or
voluntarily repatriated to Iraq. Most of the approximately 5,200
remaining refugees were restricted to the Rafha Refugee Camp. At year's
end, following the visit to the Rafha Refugee Camp by the UNCHR,
efforts were still being made to find asylum for approximately 3,000
refugees who wished to leave the camp but not return to Iraq. According
to the UNHCR, the Government has agreed that the remaining 2,200 be
given continuing refuge and possible employment in the area until they
could be repatriated safely to Iraq. In October the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees visited the Rafha camp and later reported
that during his visit, the refugees staged a peaceful protest and
complained about the lack of freedom, movement, and prospects for the
future. The UNHCR has monitored more than 3,000 persons voluntarily
returning to Iraq from Rafha since December 1991 and found no evidence
of forcible repatriation (see Section 1.c.).
The Government has allowed some foreigners to remain temporarily in
the country in cases in which their safety would be jeopardized if they
were deported to their home countries.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens did not have the right to change their government. There
were no formal democratic institutions, and only a few members of the
ruling family had a voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the
political system. The King ruled on civil and religious matters within
certain limitations established by religious law, tradition, and the
need to maintain consensus among the ruling family and religious
leaders.
The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince served as
Deputy Prime Minister. The King appointed all other ministers, who in
turn appointed subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. In 1992
the King appointed 60 members to a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-
Shura. This strictly advisory body began to hold sessions in 1993. In
1997 and again in May the King expanded the membership of the Council;
it has 120 members plus its chairman. There were two Shi'as on the
Council. The Council engaged in debates that, while closed to the
general public, provided advice and views occasionally contrary to the
Government's proposed policy or recommended course of action. The
Government usually incorporated the Majlis' advice into its final
policy announcements or tried to convince it why the Government's
policy was correct. In November the Majlis Ash-Shura publicly announced
that it wanted to play more than its limited advisory role. The Majlis
sought to have more power to cope with modern developments and to make
it more effective. However, also in November, local press reported a
meeting in which the governors and the Minister of Interior of the
country's regions signaled a reaffirmation of royal power. All but 1 of
the country's 13 governors are either sons or grandsons of King
Abdulaziz, the founder of the country.
The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars (ulema) is another advisory
body to the King and the Cabinet. It reviews the Government's public
policies for compliance with Shari'a. The Government viewed the Council
as an important source of religious legitimacy and takes the Council's
opinions into account when promulgating legislation.
Communication between citizens and the Government usually was
expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups
such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. In theory any
male citizen or foreign national may express an opinion or a grievance
at a majlis, an open-door meeting held by the King, a prince, or an
important national or local official. However, as governmental
functions have become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized,
public access to senior officials became more restricted. Since the
assassination of King Faisal in 1975, kings have reduced the frequency
of their personal contacts with the public. However, in 2001 and during
the year, Crown Prince Abdullah held a variety of meetings with
citizens throughout the country. Ministers and district governors can
be approached for discussion at a majlis.
Typical topics raised in a majlis include complaints about
bureaucratic delay or insensitivity, requests for personal redress or
assistance, and criticism of particular acts of government affecting
family welfare. Broader ``political'' concerns--social, economic, or
foreign policy--rarely were raised. Complaints about royal abuses of
power were not entertained. In general journalists, academics, and
businessmen believed that institutionalized avenues of domestic
criticism of the regime were closed. Feedback was filtered through
private personal channels and has affected various policy issues,
including the Middle East peace process, youth unemployment, and the
construction of new infrastructure.
The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR),
established in 1993, and its rival faction, the Islamic Reform
Movement, established in 1996, continued to criticize the Government,
using computers and fax transmissions to send newsletters from London
to the country. Both were repressed by the Government and have no
officially recognized existence.
Women played no formal role in government and politics and were
actively discouraged from doing so. Participation by women in a majlis
was restricted, although some women sought redress through female
members of the royal family. On rare occasions, women have been called
to advise members of the Majlis Ash-Shura in private, closed-door
sessions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There were no publicly active human rights groups, and the
Government has made it clear that none critical of government policies
would be permitted.
In October a U.N. Human Rights envoy visited the country at the
invitation of the Government. The local press covered the visit of the
U.N. Special Rapporteur as he reviewed the judicial system. The visit
by the U.N. Human Rights envoy followed the Government-implementation
of the new Saudi Criminal Procedural Bill of Rights. In the past, the
Government also has announced publicly through the press, that it would
welcome visits from other human rights groups, including Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch.
During the year, a citizen formerly imprisoned for his political
views moved freely in the country trying to establish an NGO called
Human Rights First-the Society For Protecting and Defending Human
Rights in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Representing a group of 12
citizens, the organizer petitioned senior government officials to allow
the establishment of this first NGO.
The Government disagreed with internationally accepted definitions
of human rights and viewed its interpretation of Islamic law as the
only necessary guide to protect human rights. The Government generally
ignored citations of government human rights abuses by international
monitors or foreign governments and in the past has criticized such
citations as attacks on Islam.
The Government maintained that the new Criminal Procedural law
regarding rights of prisoners and punitive measures will address its
obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In February the
Government announced in the national press that it would establish two
human rights commissions, one governmental and the other
nongovernmental. In April, at the meeting of the Human Rights
Commission in Geneva, the Government announced that it was in the final
stages of establishing these commissions. The press also publicized
that the Government had signed four out of six international human
rights covenants and was planning to sign the remaining two soon. Since
May there were no indications of the law's implementation for
prisoners, especially victims of human rights abuses, held in
government prisons.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
There was legal and systemic discrimination based on sex. The law
forbids discrimination based on race, but not nationality, although
such discrimination occurs. The Government and private organizations
cooperated in providing services for persons with disabilities;
however, there is no legislation mandating public access. The Shi'a
minority suffered social, legal, economic, and political discrimination
(see section 2.c.). While rare, there were occasional reports that
religious police have arrested and punished men for engaging in
homosexual activity. Punishments included lashes, prison sentences, and
deportation of expatriates.
Women.--Shari'a prohibits abuse and violence against all innocent
persons, including women. The Government did not keep statistics on
spousal abuse or other forms of violence against women. However, based
on the information available regarding physical spousal abuse and
violence against women, such violence and abuse appeared to be common
problems. Hospital workers reported that many women were admitted for
treatment of injuries that apparently resulted from spousal violence;
hospitals now are required to report any suspicious injuries to
authorities. A citizen may prevent his wife and any child or unmarried
adult daughter from obtaining an exit visa to depart the country (see
Section 2.d.).
Foreign embassies continued to receive many reports that employers
abused foreign women working as domestic servants. Some embassies of
countries with large domestic servant populations maintained safehouses
to which their citizens may flee to escape work situations that
included forced confinement, withholding of food, beating and other
physical abuse, and rape. Often the reported abuse is at the hands of
female citizens. During the year, the media reported more frequently on
cases involving domestic abuse of women, servants, and children.
However, in general the Government considered such cases to be family
matters and did not intervene unless charges of abuse were brought to
its attention. It was almost impossible for foreign women to obtain
redress in the courts due to the courts' strict evidentiary rules and
the women and servants' own fears of reprisals. During the year, there
were increasing reports of employers being punished for abuse of
domestic servants. There were no private support groups or religious
associations to assist such women.
By religious law and social custom, women have the right to own
property and are entitled to financial support from their husbands or
male relatives. However, women have few political or social rights and
are not treated as equal members of society. There were no active
women's rights groups. Women legally may not drive motor vehicles and
are restricted in their use of public facilities when men are present.
Women must enter city buses by separate rear entrances and sit in
specially designated sections. Women risked arrest by the Mutawwa'in
for riding in a vehicle driven by a male who was not an employee or a
close male relative. Women were not admitted to a hospital for medical
treatment without the consent of a male relative. By law and custom,
women may not undertake domestic or foreign travel alone (see Section
2.d.). During the year, the Government began again to issue national
identity cards to females, despite a national campaign by some
religious conservatives against it. In November the press reported the
Interior Minister as suggesting that it was not absolutely necessary
that a male guardian accompany a woman applying for an ID as long as
she could produce documentary evidence of her identity.
In public a woman was expected to wear an abaya (a black garment
that covers the entire body) and also to cover her head and hair. The
Mutawwa'in generally expected women from Arab countries, and other
countries in Asia and Africa to comply more fully with local customs of
dress than they do Western women; nonetheless, in recent years they
have instructed Western women to wear the abaya and cover their hair
and face. During the year, Mutawwa'in continued to admonish and harass
women to wear their abayas and cover their hair.
Unlike in previous years, there were no reports during the year of
government officials and ministries barring accredited female diplomats
in the country from official meetings or placing other restrictions on
them.
There is no law specifically prohibiting female genital mutilation
(FGM), and it was practiced among some foreign workers from East Africa
and the Nile Valley. It was not always clear whether the procedure
occurred in the country or the workers' home countries.
Prostitution is illegal and did not appear to be a widespread
problem.
Women also are subject to discrimination under Shari'a as
interpreted in the country, which stipulates that daughters receive
half the inheritance awarded to their brothers. While Shari'a provides
women with a basis to own and dispose of property independently, women
often are constrained from asserting such rights because of various
legal and societal barriers, especially regarding employment and
freedom of movement. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man
equals that of two women (see Section 1.e.). Although Islamic law
permits polygyny, with up to four wives, it is becoming less common due
to demographic and economic changes. Islamic law enjoins a man to treat
each wife equally. In practice such equality is left to the discretion
of the husband. Some women participated in Al-Mesyar (or ``short
daytime visit'') marriages, or what are described as ``weekend
marriages,'' in which the women relinquished their legal rights to
financial support and nighttime cohabitation. Additionally, the husband
was not required to inform his other wives of the marriage, and any
children resulting from such a marriage have no inheritance rights. The
Government placed greater restrictions on women than on men regarding
marriage to noncitizens and non-Muslims (see Section 1.f.).
Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but
men may divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men were required to
pay immediately an amount of money agreed upon at the time of the
marriage, which serves as a one-time alimony payment. Women who
demonstrate legal grounds for divorce still were entitled to this
alimony. If divorced or widowed, a Muslim woman normally may keep her
children until they attain a specified age: 7 years for boys; 9 years
for girls. Children over these ages are awarded to the divorced husband
or the deceased husband's family. Numerous divorced foreign women
continued to be prevented by their former husbands from visiting their
children after divorce.
Women had access to free but segregated education through the
university level. They constituted more than 58 percent of all
university students, but were excluded from studying such subjects as
engineering, journalism, and architecture. Men may study overseas;
women may do so only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male
relative.
Women made up approximately 14.6 percent of the formal citizen work
force. Unemployment among women was approximately 15.8 percent. Saudi
women reportedly owned approximately 20 percent of the businesses,
although they must deputize a male relative to represent them in
financial transactions. Most employment opportunities for women were in
education and health care. Despite limited educational opportunities in
many professional fields, some female citizens were able to study
abroad and return to work in professions such as architecture and
journalism. Many foreign women worked as domestic servants and nurses.
Women who wished to enter nontraditional fields were subject to
discrimination. Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if there are
no adult male kin present with whom they may reside and who agree to
take responsibility for them. Most workplaces in which women were
present are segregated by gender. Frequently, contact with male
supervisors or clients was allowed only by telephone or fax machine.
According to the Ministry of Commerce, women were not eligible to be
issued business licenses for work in fields that might require them to
supervise foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal on a
regular basis with government officials. However, in hospital settings
and in the energy industry, women and men worked together, and, in some
instances, women supervised male employees. Some women and men
continued to seek opportunities for women and to break down gender
segregation. In May according to the press, the Justice Minister
announced that the Government was considering opening the legal
profession to women, but not allowing females to appear in court before
judges.
During the year, the Government began to deal with discrimination
based on gender when it responded to public outrage over the girls'
school fire in Mecca by dissolving the separate Presidency for Girls'
Education and incorporating women's education into the Ministry of
Education, eliminating women's education from control of religious
authorities. Increasingly, the press covered issues concerning women's
rights and gender discrimination.
Children.--The Government provided all children with free education
and medical care. Children were not subject to the strict social
segregation faced by women although they were segregated by sex in
schools, beginning at the age of 7; however, schools were integrated
through the fourth grade in some areas. By age 9, most children were
segregated by sex in school. In more general social situations, boys
were segregated at the age of 12 and girls at the onset of puberty.
It was difficult to gauge the prevalence of child abuse, since the
Government keeps no national statistics on such cases. Although in
general the culture greatly prizes children, new studies by Saudi
female doctors indicated that severe abuse and neglect of children
appeared to be more widespread than previously reported. In February
doctors, dentists, academics, and socially concerned citizens held a
conference on the topic of Child Abuse, including physical abuse of
women, and launched a nationwide campaign to raise public awareness.
The press has also played an important role in beginning to raise
national consciousness about the widespread problem. In February the
Government announced that it is planning to establish a special unit
within the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to address child abuse.
This new governmental department will handle abuse at home and
``protect women and children in particular from being subjected to
mental and physical abuse by other family members.''
Trafficking in children for forced begging persisted (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The law provides hiring quotas for
persons with disabilities. There is no legislation that mandates public
accessibility; however, newer commercial buildings often include such
access, as do some newer government buildings. The provision of
government social services increasingly has brought persons with
disabilities into the public mainstream. The Government and private
charitable organizations cooperated in education, employment, and other
services for persons with disabilities.
During the year the Government took a variety of steps promoting
more rights and elimination of discrimination against persons with
disabilities. In January the press publicized a study conducted by the
National Project on Disability and Rehabilitation Research that found a
total of 493,605 disabled persons in the country. Of that number,
representing 4 percent of the population, 34 percent have some form of
body disabilities and 30 percent have sight disabilities. In May the
Government announced the formation of an endowment committee for
handicapped children. In July the Government established a new supreme
council to deal with the affairs of the disabled and the Crown Prince
was named as chairman. In September the press announced a plan to open
a chapter of Best Buddies International, an NGO to help persons with
mental disabilities, which would be the first such operation in the
country.
Foreign criminal rings reportedly bought and imported children with
disabilities for the purpose of forced begging (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
Police generally transported mentally ill persons found wandering
alone in public to their families or a hospital. Police claimed that
according to Islam, family members should be taking care of such
individuals.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination
is illegal, there was substantial societal prejudice based on ethnic or
national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia were subject to
various forms of formal and informal discrimination and have the most
difficulty in obtaining justice for their grievances. For example, pay
scales for identical or similar labor or professional services were set
by nationality such that two similarly qualified and experienced
foreign nationals performing the same employment duties receive varied
compensation based on their nationalities.
In November Crown Prince Abdullah issued a call for a national
strategy to eliminate poverty. In a widely publicized visit to the
homes of poor citizens living in dilapidated districts, the Crown
Prince was quoted as saying, ``we have to admit this problem and
implement the strategy immediately.'' One week later, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs established an Anti-Poverty Fund and announced
the formation of a strategy to tackle the problem.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Government prohibited the
establishment of labor unions; however, in April the Minister of Labor
endorsed the plans announced in 2001 for the establishment of labor
committees for citizens in local companies, including factories, having
more than 100 employees. The aim will be the establishment of
communication between employees and employers and the improvement of
work standards in the workplace. In May the Ministry of Labor announced
that it was continuing with its plans to establish labor committees in
private establishments. The press reported that the Riyadh Chamber of
Commerce and Industry held the first introductory meeting of labor
committees. Ministry legal experts issued public statements denying
foreign pressure to establish such labor committees. The labor
committees are to consist of three to nine members, who would serve 3-
year terms. The Government has no role in selecting the committee
members; both management and workers will be represented. The committee
may make recommendations to company management to improve work
conditions, increase productivity, improve health and safety, and
recommend training programs. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
may send a representative to attend committee meetings. A committee
must provide a written report of its meetings to company management,
which also will be transmitted to the Ministry. The Ministry may
dissolve a labor committee if it violates regulations or threatens
public security. Foreign workers may not form or become members of
labor committees. No committees existed by year's end.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining was forbidden. Foreign workers comprised approximately two-
thirds of the work force. There was no minimum wage; wages were set by
employers and varied according to the type of work performed and the
nationality of the worker (see Section 5).
Strikes were prohibited; however, in March more than 450 hospital
cleaners at the Military Hospital in Riyadh staged a strike to protest
a 2-month delay in payment of their salaries by the contracting
company. They returned to work when the company officials agreed to pay
1 month's salary immediately and the other in the near future. In 2000
in Jeddah, foreign hospital, food processing, and construction workers
who had not been paid staged strikes. In 1995 the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation suspended coverage because of the Government's
lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker rights
standards.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Government
prohibited forced or bonded labor pursuant to a royal decree that
abolished slavery. Ratification of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, which prohibit forced labor, gives them
the force of law. However, employers had significant control over the
movements of foreign employees, which gave rise to situations that
sometimes involved forced labor, especially in remote areas where
workers were unable to leave their place of work.
In September the Ministry of Interior reported that the Government
system of sponsorship of expatriate workers has come under national
scrutiny. However, the Minister, however, said the Government is not
yet ready to abrogate the current system of sponsorship until it has
been fully studied and a better system for controlling the expatriate
labor force has been presented and accepted.
Some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas
to pressure them to sign a new work contract or to drop claims against
their employers for unpaid salary (see Section 2.d.). Additionally,
some sponsors refused to provide foreign workers with a ``letter of no
objection'' that would allow them to be employed by another sponsor.
The authorities in some cases forced maids fleeing abusive employment
circumstances to return to their employers.
There were many reports of workers whose employers refused to pay
several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other promised
benefits. Foreign workers with such grievances, except foreign domestic
servants, had the right to complain before the labor courts, but few
did so because of fear of deportation. The labor system was conducive
to the exploitation of foreign workers because enforcement of work
contracts was difficult and generally favors employers. Labor courts,
while generally fair, may take many months to reach a final appellate
ruling, during which time the employer may prevent the foreign laborer
from leaving the country. An employer also may delay a case until a
worker's funds are exhausted, and the worker is forced to return to his
home country.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children. Nonetheless, with the rare exception of criminal begging
rings, and the possible exceptions of family businesses, forced or
bonded child labor did not occur (see Section 6.d.). In 1997 the
Government attempted to eradicate forced child begging. Nevertheless,
criminal rings consisting almost exclusively of foreigners have
continued to buy and import South Asian and African children for the
purpose of forced begging (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 13 years, which may be
waived by the Ministry of Labor with the consent of the juvenile's
guardian. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-
oriented businesses or in other areas that are construed as extensions
of the household, such as farming, herding, and domestic service.
Children under the age of 18 may not be employed in hazardous or
harmful industries, such as mining or industries employing power-
operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity
responsible for enforcing the minimum age for employment of children,
the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in
the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. However, in
general children played a minimal role in the work force.
In April the press publicized stories about the Mecca
Municipality's efforts to end a child-labor racket in Mecca. The
majority of child beggars are citizens, many of them girls with
disabilities, according to an ILO study reported in the press in
September. The new figures contrasted sharply with previous claims by
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs that only 25 percent of the
children begging were citizens. The Ministry has established special
offices in both Mecca and Medina to combat the growing problem of child
beggars.
The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by
children, but it was not a problem, with the rare exception of forced
child begging rings, and possibly family businesses (see Section 6.c.).
Reportedly, young boys of Saudi, Sudanese, South Asian, and Yemeni
origin were used as jockeys in camel races.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legal minimum wage.
Labor regulations establish a 48-hour workweek at regular pay and allow
employers to require up to 12 additional hours of overtime at time-and-
a-half pay. Labor law provides for a 24-hour rest period, normally on
Fridays, although the employer may grant it on another day. The average
wage generally provides a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
The ILO has stated that the Government did not formulated
legislation implementing the ILO Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration
and that regulations that segregated work places by sex or limit
vocational programs for women violated ILO Convention 111 on
Discrimination in Employment and Occupation.
Workers risked losing employment if they remove themselves from
hazardous work conditions.
Labor regulations require employers to protect most workers from
job-related hazards and disease. However, foreign nationals reported
frequent failures to enforce health and safety standards. Farmers,
herdsmen, domestic servants, and workers in family-operated businesses
were not covered by these regulations.
Some foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have claimed
that after their arrival in the country, they were presented with work
contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than originally
promised. Other foreign workers reportedly have signed contracts in
their home countries and later were pressured to sign less favorable
contracts upon arrival. Some employees reported that at the end of
their contract service, their employers refused to grant permission to
allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes with
their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted (see
Section 2.d.). The labor laws, including those designed to limit
working hours and regulate working conditions, do not apply to foreign
domestic servants, and such domestic servants may not seek the
protection of the labor courts. There were credible reports that female
domestic servants sometimes were forced to work 16 to 20 hours per day
7 days per week. There were numerous confirmed reports of maids fleeing
employers and seeking refuge in their embassies (see Section 5).
Foreign embassies continued to receive reports of employers abusing
domestic servants. Such abuse included withholding of food, beatings
and other physical abuse, and rape (see Section 5). The Government's
figures for 1999 stated that 7,000 maids fled their place of
employment, and the actual number presumably was higher. In 2001 the
media reported additional stories of such incidents. The authorities in
some cases forced such maids to return to their places of employment.
The ongoing campaign to remove illegal immigrants from the country
has done little to Saudiize the economy because illegal immigrants
largely worked in low-income positions, which most citizens considered
unsuitable. The Government carried out the campaign by widely
publicizing its enforcement of existing laws against illegal immigrants
and citizens employing or sponsoring illegal immigrants. Since 1999 as
many as 1.1 million persons departed or were deported for violating
residence and labor laws, under the terms of a 1997 amnesty, which
allows illegal immigrants and their employers or sponsors to avoid the
possibility of prosecution by voluntarily seeking expeditious
repatriation.
The effect of the expeditious repatriation of some illegal
immigrants and the legalization of others has been to improve overall
working conditions for legally employed foreigners. Illegal immigrants
generally were willing to accept lower salaries and fewer benefits than
legally employed immigrants. The departure or legalization of illegal
workers reduced the competition for certain jobs and thereby reduced
the incentive for legal immigrants to accept lower wages and fewer
benefits as a means of competing with illegal immigrants. Furthermore,
their departure or legalization removed a large portion of the class of
workers most vulnerable to abuse and exploitation because of their
illegal status.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits slavery and the
smuggling of persons into the country. In August the press reported
that the Council of Ministers approved two international protocols on
trafficking in persons, one that combats the smuggling of immigrants by
land, sea, or air and the other that seeks to prevent trade in persons,
especially women and children.
Criminal rings consisting almost exclusively of foreigners have
bought and imported South Asian children, including children with
disabilities, and women for the purpose of organized begging,
particularly in the vicinity of the Grand Mosque in Mecca during
Islamic holidays.
There were unconfirmed reports that women were trafficked into the
country to work as prostitutes.
Among the millions of foreign workers in the country, some persons,
particularly domestic workers, are defrauded by employment agencies or
exploited by employers; some workers overstay their contracts and are
exploited as they have few legal protections. Many foreign domestic
servants fled work situations that included forced confinement, beating
and other physical abuse, withholding of food, and rape. The
authorities often forced domestic servants to return to their places of
employment (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
During the year, the Government acknowledged trafficking problems
in terms of abuse of domestic servants, especially female expatriate
workers. The press carried a number of stories on problems and issues
related to abuse of maids and other domestic workers. The media
campaign appeared to be an effort to begin raising national awareness
about the problem. Government officials indicated that they wished to
begin taking actions to counter the problems of trafficking, which
involved abuse of expatriate domestic workers. The Ministry of Labor
has formed an internal committee that is preparing an educational
program to advise foreign domestic workers of their rights for recourse
to authorities if they experience abuse or nonpayment of wages.
In October the Council of Ministers issued a mandate delegating the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs as they overseer for all work
visas, including seasonal labor. In November the Government granted a
transition period of 6 months to the Labor Ministry to assume full
responsibility for the granting of work visas to expatriates.
Also in November, the Government ordered that all private
recruitment offices must adopt a standard commitment contract in their
dealings with foreign recruiters sending labor to the country. The
press reported that the new labor contract would become mandatory
December 19.
__________
SYRIA
Syria is a republic under a military regime with virtually absolute
authority in the hands of the President. Despite the existence of some
institutions of democratic government, the President, with counsel from
his ministers, high-ranking members of the ruling Ba'th Party, and a
relatively small circle of security advisers, makes key decisions
regarding foreign policy, national security, internal politics, and the
economy. All three branches of government are influenced to varying
degrees by leaders of the Ba'th Party, whose primacy in state
institutions and the Parliament is mandated by the Constitution. The
Parliament may not initiate laws but only assesses and at times
modifies those proposed by the executive branch. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary, but security courts are subject
to political influence. The regular courts generally display
independence, although political connections and bribery may influence
verdicts.
The powerful role of the security services in government, which
extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part from the state
of emergency that has been in place almost continuously since 1963. The
Government justifies martial law because of the state of war with
Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Syrian Military
Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies, while
General Security, State Security, and Political Security come under the
purview of the Ministry of Interior. The branches of the security
services operated independently of each other and outside the legal
system. The security forces were under effective government control.
Their members committed serious human rights abuses.
The population of the country was approximately 17 million. The
economy was based on commerce, agriculture, oil production, and
government services. Economic growth was hampered by the still dominant
state role in the economy, a complex bureaucracy, overarching security
concerns, endemic corruption, currency restrictions, a lack of modern
financial services and communications, and a weak legal system.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
continued to commit serious abuses. Citizens did not have the right to
change their government. The Government used its vast powers to prevent
any organized political opposition, and there have been very few
antigovernment manifestations. Continuing serious abuses included the
use of torture in detention; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest
and detention; prolonged detention without trial; fundamentally unfair
trials in the security courts; an inefficient judiciary that suffered
from corruption and, at times, political influence; and infringement on
privacy rights. The Government significantly restricted freedom of
speech and of the press. Freedom of assembly does not exist under the
law and the Government restricted freedom of association. The
Government did not officially allow independent domestic human rights
groups to exist; however, it permitted periodic meetings of unlicensed
civil society forums throughout the year. The Government placed some
limits on freedom of religion and freedom of movement. Proselytizing by
groups it considered Zionist was not tolerated, and proselytizing in
general was not encouraged. Violence and societal discrimination
against women were problems. The Government discriminated against the
stateless Kurdish minority, suppressed worker rights, and tolerated
child labor in some instances.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings or other killings committed by government
forces during the year.
In November 2000, a number of armed clashes occurred between
Bedouin shepherds and Druze residents of Suwayda Province that required
government military intervention to stop. Local press reported that
between 15 and 20 Druze, Bedouin, and security forces personnel were
killed (see Section 5). Some members of the security forces committed a
number of serious human rights abuses. In its Annual Report, the Syrian
Human Rights Commission stated that in 2001 and during the year three
individuals died in detention (see Section 1.c.). The Government has
not investigated previous deaths in detention.
b. Disappearance.--There were no new confirmed reports of
politically motivated disappearances during the year. Because security
forces often did not provide detainees' families with information
regarding their welfare or location, many persons who disappeared in
past years are believed to be in long-term detention or to have died in
detention. The number of new disappearances has declined in recent
years, although this may be due to the Government's success in
deterring opposition political activity rather than a loosening of the
criteria for detention (see Section 1.d.).
Despite inquiries by international human rights organizations and
foreign governments, the Government offered little new information on
the welfare and whereabouts of persons who have been held incommunicado
for years or about whom little is known other than the approximate date
of their detention. The Government claimed that it has released all
Palestinians and Jordanian and Lebanese citizens who reportedly were
abducted from Lebanon during and after Lebanon's civil war. However,
the Government's claim was disputed by Lebanese nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), Amnesty International (AI), and other
international NGOs, as well as some family members of those who
allegedly remain in the country's prisons (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Despite the existence of constitutional provisions and
several Penal Code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence
that security forces continued to use torture, although to a lesser
extent than in previous years. Former prisoners, detainees, and the
London-based Syrian Human Rights Organization reported that torture
methods included administering electrical shocks; pulling out
fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while
the victim is suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine;
bending the detainees into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed
body parts; and using a chair that bends backwards to asphyxiate the
victim or fracture the victim's spine. In 2001 AI published a report
claiming that authorities at Tadmur Prison regularly tortured
prisoners, or forced prisoners to torture each other. Although it
occurs in prisons, torture was most likely to occur while detainees
were being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various
security services throughout the country, especially while the
authorities were attempting to extract a confession or information.
The Government has denied that it uses torture and claims that it
would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or
physical abuse. Past victims of torture have identified the officials
who tortured them, up to the level of brigadier general. If allegations
of excessive force or physical abuse are to be made in court, the
plaintiff is required to initiate his own civil suit against the
alleged abuser. Courts did not order medical examinations for
defendants who claimed that they were tortured (see Section 1.e.).
There were no substantiated allegations of torture during the year.
In 2000 the Government apprehended Raed Hijazi, accused of a
terrorist plot targeting American and Israeli tourists in Jordan during
the millennium celebrations, and sent him to Jordan to stand trial.
According to media accounts of the trial, doctors for both the defense
and the prosecution testified that Hijazi's body showed signs of having
been beaten, but witnesses, including Hijazi, made contradictory and
inconclusive claims regarding whether the alleged abuse occurred while
he was in Jordanian or Syrian custody. The Jordanian court has rejected
the allegations that Hijazi's confession was coerced. In February the
Jordanian authorities sentenced Hijazi to death. He has appealed the
decision but remained in custody at year's end pending a decision.
Prison conditions generally were poor and did not meet
international standards for health and sanitation. However, there were
separate facilities for men, women, and children. Pre-trial detainees,
particularly those held for political or security reasons, were usually
held separately from convicted prisoners. Facilities for political or
national security prisoners generally were worse than those for common
criminals.
At some prisons, authorities allowed visitation, but in other
prisons, security officials demanded bribes from family members who
wished to visit incarcerated relatives. Overcrowding and the denial of
food occurred at several prisons. According to Human Rights Watch,
prisoners and detainees were held without adequate medical care, and
some prisoners with significant health problems reportedly were denied
medical treatment. Some former detainees have reported that the
Government prohibited reading materials, even the Koran, for political
prisoners.
In 2001 the London-based Syrian Human Rights Commission reported
that three detainees died in prison and that their remains bore
evidence of torture and extreme medical neglect.
The Government did not permit independent monitoring of prison or
detention center conditions, although diplomatic or consular officials
were granted access in high profile cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention were significant problems. The Emergency Law, which
authorizes the Government to conduct preventive arrests, overrides
Penal Code provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, including
the need to obtain warrants. Officials contend that the Emergency Law
is applied only in narrowly defined cases, and in January 2001, the
regional press reported that the Information Minister claimed that the
authorities had frozen ``martial law.'' Nonetheless, in cases involving
political or national security offenses, arrests often were carried out
in secret. Suspects may be detained incommunicado for prolonged periods
without charge or trial and are denied the right to a judicial
determination regarding the pretrial detention. Some of these practices
were prohibited by the state of emergency, but the authorities were not
held to these strictures. Additionally, those suspected of political or
national security offenses may be arrested and prosecuted under
ambiguous and broad articles of the Penal Code, and subsequently tried
in either the criminal or security courts, as occurred with the 10
civil society activists arrested in August and September 2001. During
the year, two were tried and sentenced in criminal court and eight were
tried and sentenced in secrecy in the Supreme State Security Court
under the Emergency Law's authority. All were initially held
incommunicado and in solitary confinement, though the criminal court
trials and initial sessions of one of the other trials were open to the
press and diplomats.
The Government detained relatives of detainees or of fugitives in
order to obtain confessions or the fugitive's surrender (see Section
1.f.). The Government also threatened families or friends of detainees,
at times with the threat of expulsion, to ensure their silence, to
force them to disavow publicly their relatives, or to force detainees
into compliance.
Defendants in civil and criminal trials had the right to bail
hearings and the possible release from detention on their own
recognizance. Bail was not allowed for those accused of state security
offenses. Unlike defendants in regular criminal and civil cases,
security detainees did not have access to lawyers prior to or during
questioning.
Detainees had no legal redress for false arrest. Security forces
often did not provide detainees' families with information regarding
their welfare or location while in detention. Consequently many persons
who have disappeared in past years are believed to be in long-term
detention without charge or possibly to have died in detention (see
Section 1.b.). Many detainees brought to trial have been held
incommunicado for years, and their trials often have been unfair (see
Section 1.e.). In the past, there were reliable reports that the
Government did not notify foreign governments when their citizens were
arrested or detained.
Pretrial detention may be lengthy, even in cases not involving
political or national security offenses. The criminal justice system is
backlogged. Many criminal suspects were held in pretrial detention for
months and may have their trials extended for additional months.
Lengthy pretrial detention and drawn-out court proceedings are caused
by a shortage of available courts and the absence of legal provisions
for a speedy trial or plea bargaining (see Section 1.e.).
In May 2001, the Government released prominent political prisoner
Nizar Nayyuf, who had been imprisoned since 1992 for founding an
unlawful organization, disseminating false information, and undermining
the Government; he immediately was placed under house arrest. In June
2001, the Government allowed Nayyuf to leave the country for medical
treatment. In September 2001, Nayyuf was summoned to appear before an
investigating court to respond to a complaint against him filed by
Ba'th party lawyers for ``inciting confessionalism, attempting to
illegally change the Constitution, and publishing false reports
abroad.'' Nayyuf had not returned by year's end. The NGO Reporters
Without Borders (RSF) claimed that the Government harassed and
intimidated members of Nayyuf's family following the issuance of the
summons. The Government reportedly fired two members of his immediate
family from their jobs. The municipality threatened to expel members of
Nayyuf's family if they did not disavow publicly his statements (see
Section 4).
In August 2001, the Government arrested independent Member of
Parliament Ma'mun Humsi during his hunger strike protesting official
corruption, the excessive powers of the security forces, and the
continuation of the Emergency Law. In a departure from previous
practice, the Interior Ministry issued a statement justifying Humsi's
arrest under Penal Code articles dealing with crimes against state
security (see Section 3). In September 2001, the Government detained
independent Member of Parliament Riad Seif shortly after Seif
reactivated his unlicensed political discussion forum. The principal
charge against both individuals was attempting to illegally change the
Constitution (see Section 3). In March and April, Humsi and Seif were
convicted in criminal court of attempting to change the Constitution
illegally and each sentenced to 5 years in prison (see Section 1.e.).
In September 2001, the Government detained prominent political
activist and longtime detainee Riad al-Turk for violations of Penal
Code articles dealing with crimes against state security, after al-Turk
made derogatory public comments about late President Hafiz al-Asad. In
June Al-Turk was convicted in closed Supreme State Security Court of
attempting to change the Constitution illegally and sentenced to 30
months in prison (see Section 1.e.). On November 16, President Asad
ordered Al-Turk released on humanitarian grounds.
In September 2001, the Government detained seven additional
prominent human rights activists who had issued statements in support
of Humsi, Seif, and al-Turk. The Government reportedly charged the
seven activists under Penal Code articles dealing with crimes against
state security (see Section 2.a.). Although all of the 10 civil society
activists were arrested for Penal Code violations, only Humsi and Seif
were tried in criminal court while all the others were tried in the
Supreme State Security Court under the authority of the Emergency Law
(see Section 1.e.).
At year's end, the leaders of the Turkomen who reportedly were
detained without charge in 1996, remained in detention.
In 1999 and 2000, there were reports of arrests of hundreds of
Syrian and Palestinian Islamists. Most of those arrested reportedly
were released after signing an agreement not to participate in
political activities; however, some may remain in detention. At year's
end, there were no new reports on those detained. There were no
credible reports that the Government arrested Islamists on political
charges during the year.
There were no reports of the arrests of minors on political charges
during the year.
In January 2001, the Jordanian press reported the release from
Syrian jails of six Jordanian prisoners of Palestinian origin, who had
been imprisoned for membership in Palestinian organizations. Between
May and July 2000, there were unconfirmed reports that a large number
of Jordanian prisoners were released. However, according to AI, only
three of the Jordanians released in 2000 had been held for political
reasons.
In March 2001, Syrian intelligence officials in Lebanon arrested
three Syrian Druze men who had converted to Christianity, possibly on
suspicion of membership in Jehovah's Witnesses. The men were released
after 2 months.
In July and August 2001, there were unconfirmed regional press
reports that approximately 500 political detainees were moved from
Tadmur Prison to Saydnaya Prison in preparation for the eventual
closing of Tadmur. In 2000 the Government also closed the Mazzah
prison, which reportedly held numerous prisoners and detainees. In
August, AI reported the release of Communist Action Party member
Haytham Na'al after 27 years in prison.
In 2000 the Government declared an amnesty for 600 political
prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some nonpolitical
prisoners. The highly publicized amnesty was the first time the
Government acknowledged detention of persons for political reasons.
There were no credible reports of transfers of political prisoners
during the year.
Most of those arrested during crackdowns in the 1980s, in response
to violent attacks by the Muslim Brotherhood, have been released;
however, some may remain in prolonged detention without charge. Some
union and professional association officials detained in 1980 may
remain in detention (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
The number of remaining political detainees is unknown. In June
2000, prior to the November 2000 prison amnesty, Amnesty International
estimated that there were approximately 1,500 political detainees; many
of the detainees reportedly were suspected supporters of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th party. There also were
Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian political detainees. Estimates of
detainees are difficult to confirm because the Government does not
verify publicly the number of detentions without charge, the release of
detainees or amnestied prisoners, or whether detainees subsequently are
sentenced to prison (see Section 1.e.).
Former prisoners were subject to a so-called ``rights ban,'' which
begins from the day of sentencing and lasts until 7 years after the
expiration of the sentence, in the case of felony convictions. Persons
subject to this ban are not allowed to vote, run for office, or work in
the public sector; they often also are denied passports.
The Constitution prohibits exile; however, the Government has
exiled citizens in the past. The Government refused to reissue the
passports of citizens who fled the country in the 1980s; such citizens
consequently are unable to return to the country.
There were no known instances of forced exile during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, but the two exceptional courts dealing with
cases of alleged national security violations were not independent of
executive branch control. The regular court system generally displayed
considerable independence in civil cases, although political
connections and bribery at times influenced verdicts.
The judicial system is composed of the civil and criminal courts,
military courts, security courts, and religious courts, which
adjudicate matters of personal status such as divorce and inheritance
(see Section 5). The Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal.
The Supreme Constitutional Court is empowered to rule on the
constitutionality of laws and decrees; it does not hear appeals.
Civil and criminal courts are organized under the Ministry of
Justice. Defendants before these courts were entitled to the legal
representation of their choice; the courts appoint lawyers for
indigents. Defendants were presumed innocent; they are allowed to
present evidence and to confront their accusers. Trials are public,
except for those involving juveniles or sex offenses. Defendants may
appeal their verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to
the Court of Cassation. Such appeals are difficult to win because the
courts do not provide verbatim transcripts of cases--only summaries
prepared by the presiding judges. There are no juries.
Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as
military personnel. A military prosecutor decides the venue for a
civilian defendant. There have been reports that the Government
operates military field courts in locations outside established
courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observed fewer of the formal
procedures of regular military courts.
In September a military court charged lawyer and Chairman of the
Syrian Human Rights Committee, Haytham al-Maleh, and three of his
associates in abstentia for spreading false news outside of the
country, belonging to a political association of an international
nature without government approval, and publishing material that causes
sectarian friction.
The two security courts are the Supreme State Security Court
(SSSC), which tries political and national security cases, and the
Economic Security Court (ESC), which tried cases involving financial
crimes. Both courts operated under the state of emergency, not ordinary
law, and did not observe constitutional provisions safeguarding
defendants' rights.
Charges against defendants in the SSSC often were vague. Many
defendants appeared to be tried for exercising normal political rights,
such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the
prosecution of anyone ``opposing the goals of the revolution,''
``shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution,''
or attempting to ``change the economic or social structure of the
State.'' Nonetheless, the Government contends that the SSSC tries only
persons who have sought to use violence against the State.
Under SSSC procedures, defendants are not present during the
preliminary or investigative phase of the trial, during which the
prosecutor presents evidence. Trials usually were closed to the public.
Lawyers were not ensured access to their clients before the trial and
were excluded from the court during their client's initial
interrogation by the prosecutor. Lawyers submitted written defense
pleas rather than oral presentations. The State's case often was based
on confessions, and defendants have not been allowed to argue in court
that their confessions were coerced. There was no known instance in
which the court ordered a medical examination for a defendant who
claimed that he was tortured. The SSSC reportedly has acquitted some
defendants, but the Government did not provide any statistics regarding
the conviction rate. Defendants do not have the right to appeal
verdicts, but sentences are reviewed by the Minister of Interior, who
may ratify, nullify, or alter them. The President also may intervene in
the review process.
Accurate information regarding the number of cases heard by the
SSSC was difficult to obtain, although hundreds of cases were believed
to pass through the court annually. Many reportedly involved charges
relating to membership in various banned political groups, including
the Party of Communist Action and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th
Party. Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in the past.
Since 1997 there have been no visits by human rights NGOs to attend
sessions of the SSSC (see Section 4).
The 10 civil society activists arrested in August and September
2001 were tried in criminal and state security courts. In February
independent Parliamentarians Mamun Humsi and Riyad Seif were tried in
criminal court proceedings that were open, for the first time, to
foreign observers and the press. AI noted that their parliamentary
immunity was lifted without due attention to the procedures established
by law. Humsi and Seif were denied confidential access to their lawyers
throughout their detention and observers noted a number of procedural
irregularities during the trials. In March and April, respectively, the
Government sentenced Humsi and Seif to 5 years' imprisonment each for
attempting to change the constitution illegally and inciting racial and
sectarian strife.
During the year, the eight other civil society activists arrested
in August and September 2001 were tried in secrecy by the Supreme State
Security Court under authority of the Emergency Law. Only the first
session of former political prisoner Riad al-Turk's trial was open to
the media and international observers. Al-Turk was sentenced to 30
months for attempting to change the Constitution illegally but was
released by presidential decree in November (see Section 1.d.). Lawyer
and member of Seif and Humsi's defense team, Habib Issa, and physician
and cofounder of the Syrian Human Rights Society, Walid al-Buni, were
each sentenced to 5 years in prison for attempting to change the
Constitution illegally. Economist and regime critic Arif Dalila was
sentenced to up to 10 years for the same offense. Civil society
activist Habib Saleh received a 3-year sentence for opposing the
objectives of the revolution and inciting ethnic and sectarian strife.
Hassan Sa'dun, physician and member of the Committee for the Defense of
Human Rights, Kamal al-Labwani, and engineer Fawaz Tillu were sentenced
respectively to 2, 3, and 5 years in prison for instigating armed
mutiny against the Government (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 3).
The ESC tried persons for alleged violations of foreign exchange
laws and other economic crimes. The prosecution of economic crimes was
not applied uniformly. Like the SSSC, the ESC did not ensure due
process for defendants. Defendants were not provided adequate access to
lawyers to prepare their defenses, and the State's case usually was
based on confessions. High-ranking government officials may influence
verdicts. Those convicted of the most serious economic crimes do not
have the right of appeal, but those convicted of lesser crimes may
appeal to the Court of Cassation. The Economic Penal Code allowed
defendants in economic courts to be released on bail. The bail
provision does not extend to those accused of forgery, counterfeiting,
or auto theft; however, the amendment is intended to provide relief for
those accused of other economic crimes, many of whom have been in
pretrial detention for long periods of time. These amendments to the
Economic Penal Code also limit the categories of cases that can be
tried in the ESC. In November 2001, the Government approved a general
pardon for nonpolitical prisoners and a reduction of sentences by one-
third for persons convicted of economic crimes, with a provision to
commute sentences entirely for persons who return embezzled funds to
investors within 1 year of the law's effective date.
At least two persons arrested when late President Asad took power
in 1970 may remain in prison, despite the expiration of one of the
prisoners' sentences.
The Government in the past denied that it held political prisoners,
arguing that although the aims of some prisoners may be political,
their activities, including subversion, were criminal. The official
media reported that the 600 beneficiaries of the November 2000 amnesty
were political prisoners and detainees; this reportedly was the first
time that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for
political reasons. Nonetheless, the Emergency Law and the Penal Code
are so broad and vague, and the Government's power so sweeping, that
many persons were convicted and are in prison for the mere expression
of political opposition to the Government. The Government's sentencing
of 10 prominent civil society and human rights activists for ``crimes
of state security'' represented a retreat from recent modest attempts
at political liberalization (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
The exact number of political prisoners was unknown. Unconfirmed
regional press reports estimated the total number of political
prisoners at between 400 and 600. In April 2001, a domestic human
rights organization estimated the number to be nearly 800, including
approximately 130 belonging to the Islamic Liberation Party, 250
members and activists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, 150
members of the pro-Iraq wing of the Ba'th Party, and 14 Communists. In
its report for the year, the Syrian Human Rights Committee estimated
that there were approximately 4,000 political prisoners still in
detention.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although laws prohibit such actions, the Emergency Law
authorizes the security services to enter homes and conduct searches
without warrants if security matters, very broadly defined, are
involved. The security services selectively monitored telephone
conversations and fax transmissions. The Government opened mail
destined for both citizens and foreign residents. It also prevented the
delivery of human rights materials (see Section 2.a.).
The Government continued its practice of threatening or detaining
the relatives of detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain
confessions, minimize outside interference, or prompt the fugitive's
surrender (see Section 1.d.). There have been reports that security
personnel force prisoners to watch relatives being tortured in order to
extract confessions. According to AI, security forces also detained
family members of suspected oppositionists (see Section 1.d.).
In the past, the Government and the Ba'th Party monitored and
attempted to restrict some citizens' visits to foreign embassies and
cultural centers.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right to express opinions freely in speech and in writing, but the
Government restricted these rights significantly in practice. The
Government strictly controlled the dissemination of information and
permitted little written or oral criticism of President Asad, his
family, the Ba'th Party, the military, or the legitimacy of the
Government. The Government also did not permit sectarian issues to be
raised. Detention and beatings for individual expressions of opinion
that violate these unwritten rules at times occurred. The Government
also threatened activists to attempt to control their behavior. In
January 2001, novelist Nabil Sulayman was attacked outside his
apartment in Latakia. Some observers believed the attack was a message
from the Government to civil society advocates to moderate their
pressure for reform. The attack came just after Information Minister
Adnan 'Umran publicly criticized civil society advocates.
In a speech in February 2001, President Asad explicitly criticized
civil society advocates as elites ``from outside'' who wrongly claim to
speak for the majority and said that openness would only be tolerated
as long as it ``does not threaten the stability of the homeland or the
course of development.'' The Government required all social, political,
and cultural forums and clubs to obtain advance official approval for
meetings, to obtain approval for lecturers and lecture topics, and to
submit lists of all attendees (see Section 2.b.). During the year,
several unapproved forums met, which while technically unhindered, were
under government observation.
In January 2001, the regional press reported on a ``Group of
1,000'' intellectuals that issued a statement calling for more
comprehensive reforms than those demanded by a group of 99
intellectuals in September 2000. The group's statement called for
lifting martial law, ending the state of emergency that has been in
effect since 1963, releasing political prisoners, and expanding civil
liberties in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Although the Government did not take action immediately against any of
the signatories, in September 2001 it detained seven prominent human
rights figures, reportedly charging them under articles in the Penal
Code dealing with crimes against state security. A number of those
detained were signatories of the ``Group of 1,000'' petition. The
Government tried the 10 civil society and human rights activists in
criminal and state security courts and sentenced them to 2 to 10 years
in prison for crimes against state security (see Section 1.e.). In
December 2000, a local human rights organization published an open
letter in a Lebanese newspaper calling for the closure of the notorious
Tadmur Prison.
The Emergency Law and Penal Code articles dealing with crimes
against state security allow the Government broad discretion in
determining what constitutes illegal expression. The Emergency Law
prohibits the publication of ``false information'', which opposes ``the
goals of the revolution'' (see Section 1.e.). Penal Code articles
prohibit ``attempting to illegally change the Constitution,''
``preventing authorities from executing their responsibilities,'' and
``acts or speech inciting confessionalism.'' In August 2001, the
Government amended the Press Law to permit the reestablishment of
publications that were circulated prior to 1963 and established a
framework in which the National Front Parties, as well as other
approved private individuals and organizations, would be permitted to
publish their own newspapers. However, the same amendments also
stipulated imprisonment and stiff financial penalties as part of broad,
vague provisions prohibiting the publication of ``inaccurate''
information, particularly if it ``causes public unrest, disturbs
international relations, violates the dignity of the state or national
unity, affects the morale of the armed forces, or inflicts harm on the
national economy and the safety of the monetary system.'' Persons found
guilty of publishing such information were subject to prison terms
ranging from 1 to 3 years and fines ranging from $10,000 to $20,000
(500,000 to 1 million Syrian pounds). The amendments also imposed
strict punishments on reporters who do not reveal their government
sources in response to government requests. Critics claimed that the
amendment would increase self-censorship by journalists, and that it
strengthened, rather than relaxed, restrictions on the press.
The Government imprisoned journalists for failing to observe press
restrictions. Official media reported that journalist Ibrahim Hamidi
was arrested on December 23 on charges of ``publishing unfounded
news,'' a violation of Article 51 of the 2001 Publication Law. Although
the announcement did not specify the violation, it was believed to be a
December 20 article in the London-based al-Hayat discussing the
Government's contingency planning for possible hostilities in Iraq. At
year's end, Hamidi still was detained by authorities and denied contact
with his family. State security services were known to threaten local
journalists, including with the removal of credentials, for articles
printed outside the country. In April and May the Government refused to
renew the press credentials and/or residency permits of several
journalists for reasons including ``ill-intentioned reporting'' and
``violating the rules for accrediting correspondents and the tradition
of the profession of journalism.''
The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and
National Guidance censored domestic and imported foreign press. They
usually prevent the publication or distribution of any material deemed
threatening or embarrassing by the security services to high levels of
the Government. Censorship usually was stricter for materials in
Arabic. Commonly censored subjects included: The Government's human
rights record; Islamic fundamentalism; allegations of official
involvement in drug trafficking; aspects of the Government's role in
Lebanon; graphic descriptions of sexual activity; material unfavorable
to the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict; and material that was
offensive to any of the country's religious groups. In addition most
journalists and writers practiced self-censorship to avoid provoking a
negative government reaction.
There were several new private publications in 2000 and 2001, but
only one appeared during this year. In January 2001, the Government
permitted publication of the National Progressive Front's (NPF)
Communist Party newspaper, The People's Voice. It became the first
private paper distributed openly since 1963. In February 2001, the
Government permitted publication of the NPF's Union Socialist Party's
private newspaper, The Unionist. Also in February 2001, the Government
permitted the publication of a private satirical weekly newspaper, The
Lamplighter, which criticized politically nonsensitive instances of
government waste and corruption. In June 2001, the Government permitted
the publication of the private weekly newspaper The Economist, which
was critical of the performance of the Government.
In his July 2000 inaugural speech, President Bashar Al-Asad
emphasized the principle of media transparency. Since July 2000, both
the print and electronic media at times have been critical of Ba'th
Party and government performance and have reported openly on a range of
social and economic issues. While this relaxation of censorship did not
extend to domestic politics or foreign policy issues, it was a notable
departure from past practice. Some Damascus-based correspondents for
regional Arab media also were able to file reports on internal
political issues, such as rumored governmental changes, new political
discussion groups, and the possible introduction of new parties to the
Ba'th Party-dominated National Progressive Front.
The media continued to broaden somewhat their reporting on regional
developments, including the Middle East peace process. The media
covered some peace process events factually, but other events were
reported selectively to support official views. The Government-
controlled press increased its coverage of official corruption and
governmental inefficiency. A few privately owned newspapers published
during the year; foreign-owned, foreign-published newspapers continued
to circulate relatively freely.
The Government or the Ba'th Party owned and operated the radio and
television companies and most of the newspaper publishing houses. The
Ministry of Information closely monitored radio and television news
programs to ensure adherence to the Government line. The Government did
not interfere with broadcasts from abroad. Satellite dishes have
proliferated throughout all regions and in neighborhoods of all social
and economic categories, and in 2001 the Minister of Economy and
Foreign Trade authorized private sector importers to import satellite
receivers and visual intercommunication systems.
The Ministry of Culture and National Guidance censored fiction and
nonfiction works, including films. It also approved which films may or
may not be shown at the cultural centers operated by foreign embassies.
The Government prohibited the publication of books and other materials
in Kurdish; however, there were credible reports that Kurdish language
materials were available in the country (see Section 5).
In 2000 cellular telephone service was introduced although its high
cost severely limited the number of subscribers. Internet access and
access to e-mail was limited but growing. The Government blocked access
to selected Internet sites that contained information deemed
politically sensitive or pornographic in nature. The Government also
consistently blocked citizens' access to servers that provide free e-
mail services. The Government has disrupted telephone services to the
offices and residences of several foreign diplomats, allegedly because
the lines were used to access Internet providers outside the country.
The Government restricted academic freedom. Public school teachers
were not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy,
although authorities allowed somewhat greater freedom of expression at
the university level.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
assembly does not exist under the law. Citizens may not hold
demonstrations unless they obtain permission from the Ministry of
Interior. Most public demonstrations were organized by the Government
or the Ba'th Party. The Government selectively permitted some
demonstrations, usually for political reasons. The Government applied
the restrictions on public assembly in Palestinian refugee camps, where
controlled demonstrations have been allowed.
During the year there continued to be numerous demonstrations, most
of which were permitted or organized by the Government, and some of
which were directed against diplomatic missions and international
agencies in reaction to the Israeli government's use of force against
Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
In 2000 there were large demonstrations in Suwayda province
following violent clashes between Bedouin shepherds and Druze residents
of the province (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
The Government restricted freedom of association. During the year,
it required private associations to register with authorities and
denied several such requests, presumably on political grounds. The
Government usually granted registration to groups not engaged in
political or other activities deemed sensitive. The Government required
political forums and discussion groups to obtain prior approval to hold
lectures and seminars and to submit lists of all attendees. Despite
these restrictions, during the year several domestic human rights and
civil society groups held meetings without registering with the
Government or obtaining prior approval for the meetings.
The authorities did not allow the establishment of independent
political parties (see Section 3).
The Government sentenced 10 human rights activists who had called
for the expansion of civil liberties and organized public dialogue to
lengthy prison stays for committing crimes against state security (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
In 1980 the Government dissolved, and then reconstituted under its
control, the executive boards of professional associations after some
members staged a national strike and advocated an end to the state of
emergency. The associations have not been independent since that time
and generally are led by members of the Ba'th Party, although nonparty
members may serve on their executive boards. At year's end, there was
no new information on whether any persons detained in 1980 crackdowns
on union and professional association officials remained in detention
(see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice; however, it imposed restrictions in some areas. The
Constitution requires that the President be a Muslim. There is no
official state religion; Sunni Muslims constitute the majority of the
population.
All religions and orders must register with the Government, which
monitors fund raising and requires permits for all meetings by
religious groups, except for worship. There is a strict separation of
religious institutions and the state. Religious groups tended to avoid
any involvement in internal political affairs. The Government in turn
generally refrained from becoming involved in strictly religious
issues.
The Government considers militant Islam a threat and follows
closely the practice of its adherents. The Government has allowed many
new mosques to be built; however, sermons are monitored and controlled,
and mosques are closed between prayers.
In 1999 and 2000, there were large-scale arrests, and torture in
some cases, of Syrian and Palestinian Islamists affiliated with the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Salvation Party (see Sections 1.c.
and 1.d.).
Officially all schools are government run and nonsectarian,
although some schools are run in practice by Christian, Druze, and
Jewish minorities. There is mandatory religious instruction in schools,
with government-approved teachers and curriculums. Religion courses are
divided into separate classes for Muslim, Druze, and Christian
students. Although Arabic is the official language in public schools,
the Government permits the teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac
(Aramaic), and Chaldean in some schools on the basis that these are
``liturgical languages.''
Religious groups are subject to their respective religious laws on
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance (see Section 5).
Government policy officially disavows sectarianism of any kind.
However, in the case of Alawis, religious affiliation can facilitate
access to influential and sensitive posts. For example, members of the
President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the security
services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage of
the population, estimated at 12 percent (see Section 3).
For primarily political rather than religious reasons, the less
than 100 Jews remaining in the country generally are barred from
government employment and do not have military service obligations.
Jews are the only religious minority group whose passports and identity
cards note their religion.
There generally was little societal discrimination or violence
against religious minorities, including Jews.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government limited freedom of
movement. The Government restricted travel near the Golan Heights.
Travel to Israel was illegal. Exit visas generally no longer were
required for women, men over 50 years old, and citizens living abroad.
Individuals have been denied permission to travel abroad on political
grounds, although government officials deny that this practice occurs.
The authorities may prosecute any person found attempting to emigrate
or to travel abroad illegally, or who has been deported from another
country, or who is suspected of having visited Israel. Women over the
age of 18 have the legal right to travel without the permission of male
relatives. However, a husband or a father may file a request with the
Ministry of Interior to prohibit his wife or daughter's departure from
the country (see Section 5). Security checkpoints continued, although
primarily in military and other restricted areas. There were few police
checkpoints on main roads and in populated areas. Generally the
security services set up checkpoints to search for smuggled goods,
weapons, narcotics, and subversive literature. The searches took place
without warrants.
The Government has refused to recognize the citizenship of or to
grant identity documents to some persons of Kurdish descent. Their lack
of citizenship or identity documents restricts them from traveling to
and from the country (see Section 5). Emigres who did not complete
mandatory military service may pay a fee to avoid being conscripted
while visiting the country.
As of June, 401,185 Palestinian refugees were registered with the
U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the country. In general
Palestinian refugees no longer report unusual difficulties travelling
in and out of the country, as has been the case in the past. The
Government restricted entry by Palestinians who were not resident in
the country.
Citizens of Arab League countries may enter the country without a
visa for a stay of up to 3 months, a period that is renewable on
application to government authorities. Residency permits require proof
of employment and a fixed address in the country.
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates on a
case-by-case basis with the office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum but is
selective about extending protection to refugees; 2,260 persons sought
asylum during the year. Although the Government denied that it forcibly
repatriated persons with a valid claim to refugee status, it apparently
did so in the past. In September there were 3,018 non-Palestinian
refugees in the country, all of whom were receiving assistance from the
UNHCR, including 1,812 refugees of Iraqi origin.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Although citizens vote for the President and Members of Parliament,
they did not have the right to change their government. The late
President Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five times
after taking power in 1970. His son, Bashar Al-Asad, also was confirmed
by an unopposed referendum in July 2000. The Government is headed by a
Cabinet, which the President has the discretion to change. Political
opposition to the President is vigorously suppressed. The President and
his senior aides, particularly those in the military and security
services, ultimately make most basic decisions in political and
economic life, with a very limited degree of public accountability.
Moreover the Constitution mandates that the Ba'th Party is the ruling
party and is ensured a majority in all government and popular
associations, such as workers' and women's groups. Six smaller
political parties are permitted to exist and, along with the Ba'th
Party, make up the National Progressive Front (NPF), a grouping of
parties that represents the sole framework of legal political party
participation for citizens. While created to give the appearance of a
multiparty system, the NPF is dominated by the Ba'th Party and does not
change the essentially one-party character of the political system.
Non-Ba'th Party members of the NPF exist as political parties largely
in name only and conform strictly to Ba'th Party and government
policies. In 2000 there were reports that the Government was
considering legislation to expand the NPF to include new parties and
several parties previously banned; however, at year's end, there were
no new developments.
The Ba'th Party dominates the Parliament, which is known as the
People's Council. Although parliamentarians may criticize policies and
modify draft laws, the executive branch retains ultimate control over
the legislative process. The Government has allowed independent non-NPF
candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats in the 250-member
People's Council. The allotment of non-NPF deputies was 83, ensuring a
permanent absolute majority for the Ba'th Party-dominated NPF.
Elections for the 250 seats in the People's Council last took place in
1998.
In March and April, the Government sentenced independent Members of
Parliament Ma'mun Humsi and Riad Seif to 5 year prison terms for
attempting to illegally change the Constitution (see Section 1.d.).
Persons convicted by the State Security Court may be deprived of
their political rights after they are released from prison. Such
restrictions include a prohibition against engaging in political
activity, the denial of passports, and a bar on accepting government
jobs and some other forms of employment. The duration of such
restrictions is 7 years after expiration of the sentence in the case of
felony convictions; however, in practice the restrictions may continue
beyond that period. The Government contends that this practice is
mandated by the Penal Code; it has been in effect since 1949.
Women and minorities, with the exception of the Jewish population
and stateless Kurds (see Section 5), participated in the political
system without restriction. There were 2 female cabinet ministers, and
26 of the 250 members of Parliament were women. No figures of the
percentage of women and minorities who vote were available; however,
citizens are required by law to vote.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government did not allow domestic human rights groups to exist
legally. Human rights groups have operated legally but ultimately were
banned by the Government. The Government's sentencing of 10 civil
society leaders this year to lengthy prison sentences stifled the
activities of human rights activists and organizations (see Sections
1.d., 1.e., and 2.a.).
In February 2001, Human Rights Watch criticized the Government for
restricting civil society groups from meeting. Human Rights Watch
claimed that such groups had grown in popularity in the preceding
months, but that on February 18, 2001 the Government informed many
leaders of such groups that their meetings could not be held without
government permission.
The Government has met only twice with international human rights
organizations: Human Rights Watch in 1995 and Amnesty International in
1997.
As a matter of policy, the Government in its dealings with
international groups denied that it commits human rights abuses. It has
not permitted representatives of international organizations to visit
prisons. The Government stated that it responds in writing to all
inquiries from NGOs regarding human rights issues, including the cases
of individual detainees and prisoners, through an interagency
governmental committee established expressly for that purpose. The
Government usually responds to queries from human rights organizations
and foreign embassies regarding specific cases by claiming that the
prisoner in question has violated national security laws.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights and equal opportunity
for all citizens. However, in practice membership in the Ba'th Party or
close familial relations with a prominent party member or powerful
government official can be important for economic, social, or
educational advancement. Party or government connections paved the way
for entrance into better elementary and secondary schools, access to
lucrative employment, and greater power within the Government, the
military, and the security services. Certain prominent positions, such
as that of provincial governor, were reserved solely for Ba'th Party
members. Apart from some discrimination against Jews and stateless
Kurds, there were no apparent patterns of systematic government
discrimination based on race, sex, disability, language, or social
status. However, there were varying degrees of societal discrimination
in each of these areas.
Women.--Violence against women occurred, but there were no reliable
statistics regarding the prevalence of domestic violence or sexual
assault. The vast majority of cases likely were unreported, and victims
generally were reluctant to seek assistance outside the family.
Battered women have the legal right to seek redress in court, but few
do so because of the social stigma attached to such action. The Syrian
Women's Federation offers services to battered wives to remedy
individual family problems. The Syrian Family Planning Association also
attempts to deal with this problem. Some private groups, including the
Family Planning Association, have organized seminars on violence
against women, which were reported by the Government press. There are a
few private, nonofficial, specifically designated shelters or safe
havens for battered women who seek to flee their husbands.
Rape is a felony; however, there are no laws against spousal rape.
Prostitution is prohibited by law, and it was not a widespread
problem.
The law specifically provides for reduced sentences in ``honor''
crimes (violent assaults with intent to kill against a female by a male
for alleged sexual misconduct). Instances of honor crimes were rare and
occurred primarily in rural areas in which Bedouin customs prevail.
The law prohibits sexual harassment and specifies different
punishments depending on whether the victim is a minor or an adult.
Sexual harassment was rarely reported.
The Constitution provides for equality between men and women and
equal pay for equal work. Moreover the Government has sought to
overcome traditional discriminatory attitudes toward women and
encourages women's education. However, the Government has not yet
changed personal status, retirement, and social security laws that
discriminate against women. In addition, some secular laws discriminate
against women. For example, under criminal law, the punishment for
adultery for a woman is twice that as for the same crime committed by a
man.
Christians, Muslims, and other religious groups are subject to
their respective religious laws on marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
For Muslims, personal status law on divorce is based on Shari'a
(Islamic law), and some of its provisions discriminate against women.
For example, husbands may claim adultery as grounds for divorce, but
wives face more difficulty in presenting the same argument. If a woman
requests a divorce from her husband, she may not be entitled to child
support in some instances. In addition, under the law a woman loses the
right to custody of boys when they reach age 9 and girls at age 12.
Inheritance for Muslims also is based on Shari'a. Accordingly
Muslim women usually are granted half of the inheritance share of male
heirs. However, Shari'a mandates that male heirs provide financial
support to the female relatives who inherit less. If they do not,
females have the right to sue.
Polygyny is legal but is practiced only by a small minority of
Muslim men.
A husband may request that his wife's travel abroad be prohibited
(see Section 2.d.). Women generally are barred from travelling abroad
with their children unless they are able to prove that the father has
granted permission for the children to travel.
Women participated actively in public life and were represented in
most professions, including the military. Women were not impeded from
owning or managing land or other real property. Women constituted
approximately 7 percent of judges, 10 percent of lawyers, 57 percent of
teachers below university level, and 20 percent of university
professors.
Children.--There was no legal discrimination between boys and girls
in education or in health care. The Government provides free, public
education from primary school through university. Education is
compulsory for all children, male or female, between the ages of 6 and
12. According to the Syrian Women's Union, approximately 46 percent of
the total number of students through the secondary level are female.
Nevertheless, societal pressure for early marriage and childbearing
interferes with girls' educational progress, particularly in rural
areas, in which the dropout rates for female students remained high.
The Government provides medical care for children until the age of
18.
Although there are cases of child abuse, there is no societal
pattern of abuse against children. The law provides for severe
penalties for those found guilty of the most serious abuses against
children.
Child prostitution and trafficking in children are rare; incidents
that arise mainly involve destitute orphans.
The law emphasizes the need to protect children, and the Government
has organized seminars regarding the subject of child welfare.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities and seeks to integrate them into the
public sector work force. However, implementation is inconsistent.
Regulations reserving four percent of government and public sector jobs
for persons with disabilities are not implemented rigorously. Persons
with disabilities may not legally challenge alleged instances of
discrimination. There are no laws that mandate access to public
buildings for persons with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally
permitted national and ethnic minorities to conduct traditional,
religious, and cultural activities; however, the Government's attitude
toward the Kurdish minority was a significant exception. Although the
Government contends that there was no discrimination against the
Kurdish population, it placed limits on the use and teaching of the
Kurdish language. It also restricted the publication of books and other
materials written in Kurdish (see Section 2.a.), Kurdish cultural
expression, and, at times, the celebration of Kurdish festivals. The
Government tacitly accepted the importation and distribution of Kurdish
language materials, particularly in the northeast region where most of
the Kurds in the country reside. Some members of the Kurdish community
have been tried by the Supreme State Security Court for expressing
support for greater Kurdish autonomy or independence. Although the
Government stopped the practice of stripping Kurds of their Syrian
nationality (some 120,000 had lost Syrian nationality under this
program in the 1960s), it never restored the nationality to those who
lost it earlier. As a result, those who had lost their nationality, and
their children, have been unable to obtain passports, or even
identification cards and birth certificates. Without Syrian
nationality, these stateless Kurds, who according to UNHCR estimates
number approximately 200,000, are unable to own land, are not permitted
to practice as doctors or engineers or be employed by the Government,
are ineligible for admission to public hospitals, have no right to
vote, and cannot travel to and from the country. They also encounter
difficulties in enrolling their children in school, and in some cases,
in registering their marriages.
In November 2000, a number of armed clashes occurred between
Bedouin shepherds and Druze residents of Suwayda Province that required
government military intervention to stop. Local press reported that
between 15 and 20 Druze, Bedouin, and security forces personnel were
killed. There were large demonstrations following the deaths (see
Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
In August President Asad became the first president in 40 years to
visit Hasakeh province in the northeast, where most Kurds reside. In
meetings with regional and Kurdish leaders, he reportedly acknowledged
the importance of Kurds to the local cultural heritage and stated his
willingness to discuss citizenship problems.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides
for this right, workers were not free to establish unions independent
of the Government. All unions must belong to the General Federation of
Trade Unions (GFTU), which is dominated by the Ba'th Party and is in
fact a part of the State's bureaucratic structure. The GFTU is an
information channel between political decision-makers and workers. The
GFTU transmits instructions downward to the unions and workers but also
conveys information to decision-makers about worker conditions and
needs. The GFTU advises the Government on legislation, organizes
workers, and formulates rules for various member unions. The GFTU
president is a senior member of the Ba'th Party. He and his deputy may
attend cabinet meetings on economic affairs. The GFTU controls nearly
all aspects of union activity.
There were no reports of antiunion discrimination. Since the unions
are part of the Government's bureaucratic structure, they are protected
by law from antiunion discrimination.
The GFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions.
In 1992 the country's eligibility for tariff preferences under the
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences was suspended because the
Government failed to afford internationally recognized worker rights to
workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively does not exist in any meaningful
sense. Government representatives were part of the bargaining process
in the public sector. In the public sector, unions did not normally
bargain collectively on wage issues, but there was some evidence that
union representatives participated with representatives of employers
and the supervising ministry in establishing minimum wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. Workers serve on the boards of directors of
public enterprises, and union representatives always are included on
the boards.
The law provides for collective bargaining in the private sector,
although past repression by the Government dissuaded most workers from
exercising this right.
Unions have the right to litigate disputes over work contracts and
other workers' interests with employers and may ask for binding
arbitration. In practice labor and management representatives settle
most disputes without resort to legal remedies or arbitration.
Management has the right to request arbitration, but that right seldom
is exercised. Arbitration usually occurs when a worker initiates a
dispute over wages or severance pay.
The law does not prohibit strikes; however, previous government
crackdowns deterred workers from striking. In 1980 the security forces
arrested many union and professional association officials who planned
a national strike. Some of them are believed to remain in detention,
either without trial or after being tried by the State Security Court
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). During the year, there were no strikes.
There are no unions in the seven free trade zones. Firms in the
zones are exempt from the laws and regulations governing hiring and
firing, although they must observe some provisions on health, safety,
hours, and sick and annual leave.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--There is no law
prohibiting forced or bonded labor, including that performed by
children. There were no reports of forced or bonded labor by children,
or forced labor involving foreign workers or domestic servants. Forced
labor has been imposed as a punishment for some convicted prisoners.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Law provides for the protection of children from
exploitation in the workplace; however, the Government tolerated child
labor in some instances. Independent information and audits regarding
government enforcement were not available. The compulsory age for
schooling is 6 to 12 years of age; however, in 2000 the Parliament
approved legislation that raised the private sector minimum age for
employment from 12 to 15 years for most types of nonagricultural labor,
and from 16 to 18 years for heavy work. Working hours for youths of
legal age do not differ from those established for adults. In all
cases, parental permission is required for children under the age of
16. The law prohibits children from working at night. However, the law
applies only to children who work for a salary. Those who work in
family businesses and who technically are not paid a salary--a common
phenomenon--do not fall under the law. Children under the age of 16 are
prohibited by law from working in mines, at petroleum sites, or in
other dangerous fields. Children are not allowed to lift, carry, or
drag heavy objects. The exploitation of children for begging purposes
also is prohibited. The Government claims that the expansion of the
private sector has led to more young children working.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitored employment
conditions for persons under the age of 18, but it does not have enough
inspectors to ensure compliance with the laws. The Ministry has the
authority to specify the industries in which children 15 and 16 years
of age may work.
The Labor Inspection Department performed unannounced spot checks
of employers on a daily basis to enforce the law; however, the scope of
these checks was unknown. The majority of children under age 16 who
work did so for their parents in the agricultural sector without
remuneration. The ILO reported in 1998 that 10.5 percent of children
under the age of 18 participate in the labor force, which amounts to
4.7 percent of the total work force.
The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children;
however, such practices were not known to occur.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs is responsible for enforcing minimum wage levels in the public
and private sectors. In May the Government increased public sector
minimum wages by 20 percent to $69 (3,175 Syrian pounds) per month,
plus other compensation (for example, meals, uniforms, and
transportation). In August the Government announced a 20 percent
increase in private sector minimum wages. The gain in minimum wage
levels was largely cancelled out by the increase in prices. These wages
did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. As
a result, many workers in both the public and private sectors take
additional jobs or are supported by their extended families.
The statutory workweek for administrative staff is 6 days of 6
hours each, and laborers work 6 days a week of 8 hours each. In some
cases a 9-hour workday is permitted. The laws mandate one 24-hour rest
day per week. Rules and regulations severely limit the ability of an
employer to dismiss employees without cause. Even if a person is absent
from work without notice for a long period, the employer must follow a
lengthy procedure of trying to find the person and notify him,
including through newspaper notices, before he is able to take any
action against the employee. Dismissed employees have the right of
appeal to a committee of representatives from the union, management,
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the appropriate
municipality. Such committees usually find in favor of the employee.
Dismissed employees are entitled to 80 percent of salary benefits while
the dispute is under consideration. No additional back wages are
awarded should the employer be found at fault, nor are wage penalties
imposed in cases in which the employer is not found at fault. The law
does not protect temporary workers who are not subject to regulations
on minimum wages. Small private firms and businesses employ such
workers to avoid the costs associated with hiring permanent employees.
The law mandates safety in all sectors, and managers are expected
to implement them fully. In practice there is little enforcement
without worker complaints, which occur infrequently despite government
efforts to post notices regarding safety rights and regulations. Large
companies, such as oil field contractors, employ safety engineers.
The ILO noted in 1998 that a provision in the Labor Code allowing
employers to keep workers at the workplace for as many as 11 hours a
day might lead to abuse. However, there have been no reports of such
abuses. Officials from the Ministries of Health and Labor are
designated to inspect work sites for compliance with health and safety
standards; however, such inspections appear to be sporadic, apart from
those conducted in hotels and other facilities that cater to
foreigners. The enforcement of labor laws in rural areas also is more
lax than in urban areas, where inspectors are concentrated. Workers may
lodge complaints about health and safety conditions, with special
committees established to adjudicate such cases. Workers have the right
to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of
employment.
The law provides protection for foreign workers who reside legally
in the country; but not for illegal workers. There were no credible
estimates available on the number of illegal workers in the country.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
persons were systematically being trafficked to, from, or within the
country. Standard labor laws could be applied in the event of
allegations of trafficking. The Penal Code penalizes prostitution and
trafficking of citizen women abroad.
----------
TUNISIA
Tunisia is a constitutional republic dominated by a single
political party. President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali and his
Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party have controlled the
Government, including the legislature, since 1987. This dominance was
reaffirmed in an overwhelming RCD victory in the October 1999
legislative and presidential elections. Although 1999 revisions to the
Constitution allowed 2 opposition candidates to run against Ben Ali in
the elections, the official results stated that Ben Ali won 99.44
percent of the vote. The ruling RCD party's domination of state
institutions and political activity precludes credible and competitive
electoral challenges from unsanctioned actors. Approximately 20 percent
of representation in the Chamber of Deputies is reserved for opposition
parties (34 of 182 seats). On June 1, nearly half the Constitution was
amended after the Government initiated changes that, among other
things, removed term limits for the presidency, raised the age limit of
presidential candidates, granted immunity to the president for acts
committed while in office, and created a second legislative chamber. In
May the Government had put the amendment reforms to a national
referendum and stated that it passed with 99.52 percent of the vote,
though credible reports indicated that the vote was characterized by
intimidation and that there was no secret ballot. The next presidential
election is scheduled for 2004. The President appoints the Prime
Minister, the Cabinet, and the 24 governors. There were reports of
government pressure and interference during voting for the May 26
constitutional referendum and some NGOs condemned the Government's
amendment plan as a reinstatement of a ``presidency-for-life.''
Although the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the
executive branch and the President strongly influenced judicial
decisions, particularly in political cases.
The police share responsibility for internal security with a
paramilitary National Guard. The police operated in the capital and a
few other cities. In outlying areas, their policing duties were shared
with, or ceded to, the National Guard. Both forces were under the
control of the Minister of Interior and the President. Security forces
continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
The country had a population of 9.7 million with an export-oriented
market economy based on manufactured exports, tourism, agriculture, and
petroleum. According to government statistics, more than 60 percent of
citizens are in the middle class and only 4.2 percent of citizens fell
below the poverty line.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
some areas; however, its record remained poor in other areas, and
significant problems remained. There were significant limitations on
citizens' right to change their government. Members of the security
forces tortured and physically abused prisoners and detainees. Security
forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. International
observers were not allowed to inspect prisons, and lengthy pretrial
detention and incommunicado detention remained problems. The Government
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Security forces physically
abused, intimidated, and harassed citizens who voiced public criticism
of the Government. The Government continued to impose significant
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press. Editors and
journalists continued to practice self-censorship. The Government
remained intolerant of public criticism, using physical abuse, criminal
investigations, the court system, arbitrary arrests, and travel
controls (including denial of passports), to discourage criticism and
limit the activities of human rights activists. The Government
restricted freedom of assembly and association. The Government did not
permit proselytizing. The Government continued to support the rights of
women and children; however, legal discrimination against women
continued to exist. Child labor existed but continued to decline, due
principally to government efforts to address the problem. Tunisia was
invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend
the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as an observer.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, during the year there were
allegations of three deaths in custody in which members of the security
forces were involved directly or in which they were accused of
complicity. In March the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia
(CNLT) released its second report on the state of liberties in the
country that described incidents in 2000 and 2001 of five suspicious
deaths in custody that the police classified as suicides and roadside
deaths the police classified as vehicle accidents.
In March the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) branch in Medenine
investigated the death in police custody of Imed Ben Ali Bourguiba. The
police claimed that Bourguiba committed suicide on March 14. No
information on his death was made public.
On March 23, Abdelwahab Boussaa, a 32-year-old an-Nahdha member who
had been imprisoned since 1991 for membership in an illegal
organization, died in prison of acute renal failure caused by a hunger
strike protesting prison conditions and torture by prison authorities.
On March 30, Lakhdar Ben Hacine Zbiri, a 36-year-old an-Nahdha
member, died in prison allegedly as a result of neglect. Prison
officials were accused of denying Zbiri, who was diagnosed earlier with
leukemia, adequate medical care.
The Government did not release any information on the following
deaths in custody reported in 2001: Abderrahman Jehinaoui; Ryadh
Bouslama Sayadi; Zine Ben Brik; and Hassene Azouzi.
In 2001 the Government sentenced to prison terms some security
officials found responsible for deaths in custody (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the use of torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, security
forces reportedly routinely used various methods of torture to coerce
confessions from detainees and to punish political prisoners. The forms
of torture included electric shock; confinement to tiny, unlit cells;
submersion of the head in water; beatings with hands, sticks, and
police batons; suspension from cell doors resulting in lost
consciousness; cigarette burns, and food and sleep deprivation. Police
also reportedly beat naked, manacled prisoners while they were
suspended from a rod. Some credible reports indicated the use of sexual
assault and threats of sexual assault by police and prison officials
against the wives of Islamist prisoners to extract information or to
intimidate or punish prisoners.
In June Ali Mansouri, a prisoner who alleged he was severely beaten
by prison guards, received the final payment in compensation for
amputation of both legs as a result of mistreatment received in prison.
In the first case of its kind, Mansouri filed criminal charges against
the mistreatment by prison guards in 2000. In 2001 the court found four
guards guilty of torture and sentenced them each to 4 years in prison.
It also ordered the Government to pay $210,000 (315,000 dinars) in
compensation to Mansouri. On January 25, the Mansouri decision was
reviewed by the Criminal Court of Appeal. The court upheld convictions
of three of the guards, sentencing two of them to 4 years imprisonment
and reducing the sentence of a third guard to 2 years. The court
overturned the conviction of the fourth guard.
According to Amnesty International (AI) and defense attorneys, the
courts routinely failed to investigate allegations of torture and
mistreatment and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under
torture. In 1999 the Government enacted amendments to the Penal Code
that adopted the U.N. definition of torture, instructed police to
inform detainees of their rights, including, notably, the right of a
defendant to demand a medical examination while in detention, and
increased the maximum penalty for those convicted of committing acts of
torture from 5 to 8 years. The Government also shortened the maximum
allowable period of prearraignment incommunicado detention from 10 to 6
days and added a requirement that the police notify suspects' families
on the day of their arrest (see Section 1.d.). However, credible
sources claimed that the Government rarely enforced these provisions
and that appeals to the court for enforcement routinely were denied.
Credible reports indicated that police tortured Lofti Ferhat, a 39-
year-old former courier who had been living in France before his 2000
arrest. During his incommunicado detention at the Ministry of Interior,
he signed an admission of membership in a group linked to an-Nahdha. In
2001 a military court convened to hear the case against Ferhat and,
based on the signed admission extracted under torture by authorities,
sentenced him to 7 years in prison plus 5 years of administrative
control. In May the Court of Cassation upheld his sentence and ruled
that the defendant's claims of torture were inadmissible in the appeal
hearing (see Section 1.e.).
In June the LTDH released a report citing that the human rights
situation in the country had ``seriously deteriorated.'' The report,
the first publicly released since 1994, cited several instances of
torture and deaths in prison. In July the League announced that it
would prepare a report specifically aimed at documenting the situation
in the prisons and estimated the prison population to be more than
30,000.
Human rights advocates maintained that charges of torture and
mistreatment were difficult to document because government authorities
often denied medical examinations until evidence of abuse has
disappeared. The Government maintained that it investigates all
complaints of torture and mistreatment filed with the prosecutor's
office and claimed that alleged victims sometimes publicly accused
authorities of acts of abuse without taking the steps required to
initiate an investigation. However, according to human rights groups,
police often refused to register complaints and judges dismissed
complaints lodged by alleged victims of torture with little or no
investigation. Absent a formal complaint, the Government may open an
administrative investigation but is unlikely to release the results to
the lawyers of affected prisoners. The Government appeared to
distinguish Islamists from other political opposition prisoners;
Islamists tended to receive harsher treatment during their arrests and
confinement. The 2001 conviction of the prison guards in the Mansouri
case represented the first documented instance in which prison security
officials were disciplined for such abuse.
Security forces attacked and beat citizens, particularly human
rights activists, for holding demonstrations or meetings, or for
criticizing the Government (see Sections 2.b. and 4). On January 13,
the CNLT reported that police prevented a plenary meeting they tried to
hold at the Aloes Publishing House to discuss the organization's annual
report.
On January 30, plainclothes police beat Loumamba Mohseni, director
of communications for the Web magazine Kaws El Karama, unconscious as
he waited for a taxi.
In April during otherwise peaceful pro-Palestinian demonstrations,
police armed with truncheons dispersed demonstrators, mostly human
rights and opposition leaders, beating some and chasing others into
side streets.
On August 28, five plainclothes policemen attacked Lasaad Jouhri,
former prisoner of conscience upon leaving a lawyer's office. Police
beat Jouhri, who has a partially paralyzed right leg sustained from
torture in prison between 1991 and 1994, with his crutch, concentrating
the blows on his right knee (see Section 2.b.).
On December 11, former judge Mokhtar Yahiaoui was attacked and
severely beaten by three plainclothes policemen while trying to enter
the law offices of his colleague Noureddine Bhiri. Yahiaoui indicated
that one policeman blocked the entry to the office and dragged him to a
narrow side street where two other officers beat him. Yahiaoui's
screams drew a crowd of onlookers and the police relented long enough
for Yahiaoui to run back to Bhiri's office. He was treated in a local
hospital for contusions to his head, face and legs. Yahiaoui said he
believed the beating was because of a call he made on December 10 for
the Government to release 23 political prisoners who have been in
detention for more than 10 years.
In 2001 legal responsibility for the prison and parole system
transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice,
which stated publicly its intent to improve prison conditions; however,
there were no discernable changes by year's end.
Prison conditions ranged from Spartan to poor and, in nearly all
cases, did not meet international standards. Credible sources reported
that overcrowding remained a serious problem, with 40 to 50 prisoners
typically confined to a single 194-square foot cell, and up to 140
prisoners held in a 323-square foot cell. Defense attorneys reported
that prisoners were forced to share a single water and toilet facility
with more than 100 cellmates, creating serious sanitation problems.
On December 12, the magazine Realities published an article
documenting substantial overcrowding and substandard prison conditions.
The article quoted a study by the International Center for Prison
Studies, King's College London, which indicated a prison population
rate of 253 prisoners per 100,000 persons. Realities claimed that
prisoners were made to sleep on floors and under beds and that some
waited up to 7 months before moving from the floor to a bed shared with
other prisoners. In response to the article, President Ben Ali
announced the formation of a commission of inquiry into prison
conditions. On December 16, the public prosecutor called the author of
the article, Hedi Yahmed, to answer charges of defamation and
``spreading false information aimed at undermining the public order.''
On December 19, he was forced to resign after substantial government
pressure and left the country (see Section 2.a.).
There were credible reports that conditions and prison rules were
harsher for political prisoners than for the general prison population.
One credible report alleged the existence of special cell blocks and
prisons for political prisoners, in which they might be held in
solitary confinement for months at a time. Another credible source
reported that high-ranking leaders of the illegal an-Nahdha Islamist
movement remained in solitary confinement since 1991. Other sources
alleged that political prisoners regularly were moved among jails
throughout the country, thereby making it more difficult for their
families to deliver food to them and to discourage their supporters or
the press from inquiring about them. The CNLT reported in the past that
inmates were instructed to isolate new political prisoners and were
punished severely for contact with them.
During the year, prisoners undertook several hunger strikes to
protest substandard prison conditions, mistreatment, and the denial of
family visits. In January Mohamed Moaada began a hunger strike to
protest poor prison conditions and his lack of proper medical
treatment. On January 31, Moaada received a presidential pardon and was
conditionally released from prison.
On March 16, Ammar Amroussia, a Tunisian Communist Worker's Party
(PCOT) member detained on February 2, began a hunger strike protesting
prison conditions and his transfer. On November 7, he was released from
prison as part of an amnesty marking the 15th anniversary of President
Ben Ali's accession to power.
In June Radhia Nasraoui undertook a 6-week hunger strike protesting
her husband Hamma Hammami's imprisonment. The Government responded by
characterizing her actions as ``immoral.'' During her hunger strike,
she traveled to Paris with her daughter, claiming she wanted her
children in France ``far away from police provocation'' (see Section
2.b.).
On July 29, prisoners at Borj El Amri near Tunis started a general
hunger strike protesting their conditions. Credible reports indicated
that the prison director beat one of the prisoners, Hatem Ben Romdhane,
for his participation.
Zakaria Ben Mustapha, National Commissioner for Human Rights,
continued the practice of reviewing prison conditions. The organization
is government-funded and in January Ben Mustapha reported his findings
to President Ben Ali, who declined to make them public.
The Government did not permit international organizations or the
media to inspect or monitor prison conditions. In March the CNLT called
for reform of the prison system, citing the systematic torture and
abuse of prisoners and continued lack of basic hygienic conditions and
medical care. Men, women, and children were held separately in prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law authorizes the
police to make arrests without warrants only in the cases of suspected
felons or crimes in progress; however, the authorities did not observe
this restriction and arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems.
The Penal Code provides for a maximum 3-day detention period, renewable
once (for a maximum of 6 days) by the prosecutor, thus reducing from 10
days to 6 the period that the Government may hold a suspect
incommunicado following arrest and prior to arraignment. The Code also
requires arresting officers to inform detainees of their rights and
detainees' families of the arrest at the time of arrest, and to make a
complete record of the times and dates of such notifications. Credible
sources stated that the law rarely was enforced with respect to either
common criminals or political detainees. Detainees have the right to be
informed of the grounds for arrest before questioning and may request a
medical examination. However, they do not have a right to legal
representation during the 6-day incommunicado detention period.
Attorneys, human rights monitors, and former detainees maintained that
the authorities illegally extend the maximum limit of pre-arraignment
detention by falsifying the date of arrest. Police reportedly extorted
money from families of innocent detainees for dropping charges against
them.
The law permits the release of accused persons on bail, which may
be paid by a third party. In cases involving crimes for which the
sentence exceeds 5 years or that involve national security, preventive
detention may last an initial period of 6 months and be extended by
court order for two additional 4-month periods. For crimes in which the
sentence may not exceed 5 years, the court may extend the initial 6-
month pretrial detention by an additional 3 months only. During this
period, the court conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and
accepts evidence and motions of both parties. The law provides persons
indicted for criminal acts the right to appeal their indictment before
the case comes to trial. Detainees have the right to be represented by
counsel during arraignment. The Government provides legal
representation for indigents. At arraignment the examining magistrate
may decide to release the accused or remand him to pretrial detention.
A case proceeds from investigation to a criminal court, which sets
a trial date. There is no legal limit to the length of time the court
may hold a case over for trial, nor is there a legal basis for a speedy
hearing. Complaints of prolonged detention of persons awaiting trial
were common, and President Ben Ali publicly had encouraged judges to
make better use of release on bail and suspended sentences. Some
defendants have claimed that they have been held in pretrial detention
for years.
On May 31, Moncef Chaker reportedly was arrested and taken to his
home where police seized his personal computer. He was held in
incommunicado detention at the Ministry of Interior for several days.
No explanation was given for his arrest and he indicated police
threatened him not to reveal details of his detention.
On September 4, Zouhayer Makhlouf and Chadli Turki were arrested
for reasons that were not made clear to them. Makhlouf, an AI member,
indicated he was asked to give up his membership in the human rights
organization. Turki, a medical doctor, indicated he believed he was
being harassed possibly because of links to some political opponents.
On September 8, they were released.
Sihem Bensedrine, who in 2001 was arrested, charged with defamation
of a judge and spreading false information aimed at undermining the
public order on Al-Mustaquella satellite broadcast in London, and
released as part of a broader amnesty, may still be subject to judicial
proceedings. However, at year's end, she had not been subject to
additional proceedings.
On January 31, Mohammed Moaada was conditionally released on a
presidential pardon and his civil and political rights were restored.
In 2001 police arrested Moaada, former secretary general of the
Democratic Socialist Movement (MDS) opposition party, for violating the
conditions of his parole. Precise charges were not publicly specified;
however, prior to his arrest he had appeared on Al Mustaquella
criticizing the Government.
The Penal Code contains provisions for the imposition of
administrative controls following completion of a prison sentence;
however, only judges have the right to order a former prisoner to
register at a police station, and the law limits registration
requirements to 5 years. Security forces reportedly arbitrarily imposed
administrative controls on former prisoners following their release
from prison, which often prevented them from being able to hold a job.
Defense attorneys reported that some clients must sign in four or five
times daily, at times that are determined only the previous evening.
When the clients arrive at the police station, they may be forced to
wait hours before signing in, making employment impossible and
childcare difficult. Numerous Islamists released from prison in recent
years have been subjected to these types of requirements.
The law allows judges to substitute community service for jail
sentences in minor cases in which the sentence would be 6 months or
less. There is no evidence that this alternative was applied in
political cases.
There were reports of hundreds of political detainees, although
there was no reliable estimate due to arbitrary government detention
practices and the lack of public arrest records. The Government denied
arresting persons for political crimes. Rather, it relied on a variety
of broad or vague provisions in the Penal Code, including against
``spreading false information aimed at undermining the public order,''
and ``belonging to an illegal organization,'' to arrest and charge
political opponents, human rights activists, and Islamists, among
others.
Judges and the Government exercised the authority to release
prisoners or suspend their sentences, often on conditional parole. For
example, in 2001 human rights lawyer Nejib Hosni received a
presidential pardon after serving 4 \1/2\ months for violating his
conditional parole by practicing law. Hosni appeared at the Court of
Appeal on behalf of Hamma Hammami and addressed the court as a lawyer
despite the official ban on his practicing. The Tunisian Bar
Association came to his defense, claiming that only it has the
authority to disbar lawyers. Hosni continued to practice law, despite
the Government's ban, and represented several human rights defendants.
On September 4, Hamma Hammami and Samir Taamallah were released on
conditional parole for health reasons.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government
observed this prohibition. Some political opponents in self-imposed
exile were prevented from obtaining or renewing their passports in
order to return. However, since 2000 the Government had returned 200
passports (see Section 2.d.). One report indicated that in July
journalist Abdallah Zouari received an administrative order from the
Ministry of Interior ordering him to comply with an internal exile
provision of his administrative control, banishing him to Zarzis in the
south of the country (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary, the executive branch and the President
strongly influenced judicial decisions, particularly in political
cases. The judicial branch is part of the Ministry of Justice; the
executive branch appoints, assigns, grants tenure to, and transfers
judges. In addition, the President is head of the Supreme Council of
Judges. This renders judges susceptible to pressure in sensitive cases.
In January the Chamber of Deputies passed a law granting citizens legal
recourse to the Administrative Tribunal to address grievances against
government ministries, as a type of ombudsman. However, government
officials rarely respected decisions by the tribunal in practice.
The court system consists of the regular civil and criminal courts,
including the courts of first instance; the courts of appeal; and the
Court of Cassation, the nation's highest appeals court; as well as the
military tribunals within the Defense Ministry.
Military tribunals try cases involving military personnel and
civilians accused of national security crimes. A military tribunal
consists of a civilian judge from the Supreme Court and four military
judges. Defendants may appeal the tribunal's verdict to the final
arbiter, the Court of Cassation, which considers arguments on points of
law as opposed to the facts of a case. AI has claimed that citizens
charged under the tribunals have been denied basic rights during the
judicial process. During the year, in one instance, civilians were
tried before a military tribunal. The defendants were convicted of
association with terrorist groups and sentenced to prison terms. In
January 34 persons were convicted of belonging to a terrorist group
linked to al-Qa'ida, 30 of whom remained outside the country.
In May, in another civilian case dating to 2000, Lofti Ferhat's
conviction of belonging to a group linked to an-Nahdha was upheld.
By law the accused has the right to be present at trial, be
represented by counsel, question witnesses, and appeal verdicts.
However, in practice judges do not always observe these rights. The law
permits trial in absentia of fugitives from the law. Both the accused
and the prosecutor may appeal decisions of the lower courts. Defendants
may request a different judge if they believe that a judge is not
impartial; however, in practice judges do not always permit this. In
2001 a sitting judge, Jedidi Ghenya, was quoted as declaring in court
that everyone who appears before him is guilty until they prove their
innocence, despite the fact that the Constitution provides for the
presumption of innocence until the legal establishment of guilt.
Trials in the regular courts of first instance and in the courts of
appeals are open to the public. The presiding judge or panel of judges
dominates a trial, and defense attorneys have little opportunity to
participate substantively. Defense lawyers contended that the courts
often failed to grant them adequate notice of trial dates or allow them
time to prepare their cases. Some also reported that judges restricted
access to evidence and court records, requiring in some cases, for
example, that all attorneys of record examine the court record on one
specified date in judges' chambers, without allowing attorneys to copy
material documents. Defense lawyers also claimed that judges sometimes
refuse to allow them to call witnesses on their clients' behalf or to
question key government witnesses. Lengthy trial delays also were a
problem (see Section 1.d.).
Although civil law, including family and inheritance law, is
codified, judges were known to override codified law with Islamic law
if codified law conflicts with Shari'a, especially in cases involving
child custody. Generally Shari'a-based civil law was applied only in
some family cases. Some families avoided the application of Shari'a in
inheritance questions by executing sales contracts between parents and
children in order to ensure that daughters received shares of property
equal to that of the sons.
For example, codified laws provide women with the legal right to
custody over minor children; however, judges have refused to grant
women permission to leave the country with minor children, holding that
Shari'a appoints the father as the head of the family who must grant
children permission to travel. On July 22, police prevented Radhia
Nasraoui's 3-year-old daughter from traveling. Though she had her
mother's permission, police indicated her father, Hamma Hammami, who
was in prison at the time, must also give his permission. The child was
allowed to travel with her mother several days later.
In court a woman's testimony is worth the same as a man's.
Human rights activists contended that the judicial system is
neither independent nor fair and that it applies the law unevenly to
defendants facing politically motivated charges. On February 7, the
National Council of the Order of Lawyers observed a strike protesting
the conditions of Hamma Hammami's 1999 trial, during which Hammami and
two co-defendants were tried in absentia. When they returned to the
country to respond to charges, they were removed from court and re-
sentenced in closed court. The Government described the strike as
illegal.
On November 20, a Canadian national of Tunisian origin, Bechir
Saad, was sentenced on appeal to 4 years in prison for membership in
an-Nahdha. Saad, resident in Canada since 1989, was arrested during a
holiday in the country. A Canadian consular official and a Canadian
magistrate were allowed to attend his trial.
Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from
diplomatic missions, members of the European Parliament, and foreign
journalists to monitor trials, while selectively barring other
observers from human rights organizations from entering the country
(see Section 4).
AI and defense attorneys reported that courts routinely failed to
investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment, and have accepted
as evidence confessions extracted under torture (see Section 1.c.).
Defense lawyers and human rights activists claimed that the summary
nature of court sessions sometimes prevented reasoned deliberation.
They also claimed that erratic court schedules and procedures were
designed to deter and discourage observers of political trials.
There is no definitive information regarding the number of
political prisoners. Human Rights Watch has reported that there might
be hundreds of political prisoners convicted and imprisoned for
membership in the Islamist group an-Nahdha and the PCOT, for
disseminating information produced by these banned organizations, and
for aiding relatives of convicted members. In September 2001, AI
estimated that there were up to 1,000 political prisoners. Nearly all
those prisoners that have been identified by international human rights
groups as political prisoners or prisoners of conscience have been
arrested or detained under articles of the Penal or Press Codes
prohibiting membership in illegal organizations or spreading false
information aimed at undermining the public order.
The Government traditionally releases prisoners on national
holidays. On November 7, the Government released six political
prisoners to mark the anniversary of President Ben Ali's accession to
power: Ammar Amroussia (PCOT), Abdejabbar Madouri (PCOT), Abdallah
Zouari (an-Nahdha), Fethi Karoud (an-Nahdha), Khaled Khaldi (an-
Nahdha), and Ahmed Amari (an-Nahdha).
The Government denied that it holds any prisoners considered
``political,'' and normally did not provide details on the numbers or
types of prisoners released.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
person, the home, and for the privacy of correspondence, ``except in
exceptional cases defined by law.'' However, the Government infringed
on these rights. The law requires that the police obtain warrants to
conduct searches; however, police sometimes ignored the requirement if
authorities considered that state security is at stake or that a crime
is in progress.
The Government broke into and ransacked the homes and offices of
human rights activists and opposition figures.
In December 2001, Rally for an International Alternative for
Development (RAID) reported that the houses of two of its members,
Fathi Chamkhi and Sadri Khiari, were broken into and vandalized. On
July 6, Chamkhi reported his house again was broken into as a
punishment, he believed, for his participation in a meeting in Lyon on
the state of human rights in the country.
Authorities may invoke state security interests to justify
telephone surveillance. There were numerous reports of government
interception of fax and computer-transmitted communications. The law
does not authorize explicitly these activities, although the Government
has stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure implicitly gives
investigating magistrates such authority. Many political activists
experienced frequent and sometimes extended interruptions of
residential and business telephone and fax services. Human rights
activists accused the Government of using the 1998 Postal Code, with
its broad but undefined prohibition against mail that threatens the
public order, to interfere with their mail and interrupt the delivery
of foreign publications. Local phone, fax, and copy shops require users
to turn over their identification cards when requesting to send faxes.
During the year, Radhia Nasraoui, a human rights lawyer, reported
that the Government routinely cut her telephone service. In 2001 there
were reports of the temporary disruption of cellular and landline
service to prominent human rights and opposition leaders during the
call-in portion of the Al-Mustaquella television program (see Section
2.a.).
The security forces routinely monitored the activities of political
critics, and sometimes harassed, followed, questioned, assaulted or
otherwise intimidated them, their relatives, and associates. Security
forces continued to harass, assault, and intimidate members of the CNLT
(see Sections 1.c, 2.b, and 4). For example, police place journalists
who wrote articles critical of the Government, or who were active in
human rights organizations, under surveillance (see Section 2.a.).
Credible reports indicated that the children of activists were also
harassed and beaten by police. For example, on June 14 a man attacked
Amira Yahiaoui, daughter of Mokhtar Yahiaoui, with a club as she was
leaving school. Witnesses believed the attacker to be a member of the
police.
Human rights activists, lawyers, and other political activists also
reported that they were under police surveillance. For example, police
continued their heavy surveillance of the CNLT offices in Tunis (see
Sections 2.b. and 4). In January LTDH president Mokhtar Trifi and
committee member Neji Marzouk reported being subjected to body searches
by border police when flying to Paris to attend a human rights
conference. On February 7, Trifi also reported that his office was
broken into and vandalized. Police refused to register his complaint,
prompting Trifi's suspicion that the break-in was the work of
``political police.'' During the year, both the home and offices of
human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui continued to be under heavy
surveillance.
Human rights activists claimed that the Government subjected the
family members of Islamist activists, as well as other human rights
activists, to arbitrary arrest, reportedly utilizing charges of
``association with criminal elements'' to punish family members for
alleged crimes committed by the activists. Human rights activists
reported that their family members were denied jobs, business licenses,
and the right to travel due to their relatives' activism. Human rights
activists also alleged that the relatives of Islamist activists who are
in jail or living abroad were subjected to police surveillance and
mandatory visits to police stations to report their contact with
relatives. The Government maintained that the Islamists' relatives were
members or associates of the outlawed an-Nahdha movement and that they
correctly were subjected to legitimate laws prohibiting membership in
or association with that organization.
There were no reports during the year that the Government refused
to issue passports to family members of human rights activists.
However, police seized the passport of Hamma Hammami's daughter during
a trip to the country's north coast. Nejib Hosni and his family members
no longer were denied their passports.
Human rights activists alleged that security forces arbitrarily
imposed administrative controls on prisoners following their release
from prison (see Section 1.d.) and confiscated national identity cards
from numerous former prisoners. Confiscation of an identity card makes
nearly every aspect of civil and administrative life difficult. An
individual must have an identity card to receive access to healthcare,
to sign a lease, to buy or drive a car, to have access to bank
accounts, and pensions, and even to join a sports club. Police may stop
anyone at anytime and ask for their identity card. If individuals are
unable to produce cards, police may detain them until their identity
can be established by a central fingerprint database. In 2000 a
credible source claimed that the Government confiscated the national
identity cards of as many as 10,000 persons who were either former
prisoners convicted of membership in an-Nahdha or relatives of an-
Nahdha members and their supporters.
The Government regularly prohibited the distribution of some
foreign publications (see Section 2.a.). The security forces often
questioned citizens seen talking with foreign visitors or residents,
particularly visiting international human rights monitors and
journalists (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and of the press; however, the Government
restricted these rights in practice. The Government used a central
censorship office as well as indirect methods to restrict press freedom
and encourage a high degree of self-censorship. The Government also
uses the Press Code, which contains broad provisions prohibiting
subversion and defamation, to prosecute individuals who express
dissenting opinions. In a 2001 speech before the RCD, President Ben Ali
stated that although the Government must protect the right of citizens
to hold dissenting opinions, those citizens who criticize the country
in the international media were ``traitors'' who would be prosecuted to
the full extent of the law. Direct criticism of government policies or
officials was restricted, either directly or through self-censorship,
but press discussions of sensitive democracy and human rights problems
in general were permitted.
In 2001 the Chamber of Deputies approved several changes to the
Press Code, which included the designation of the Ministry of Human
Rights, Communications, and Relations with the Chamber of Deputies as
the central censorship office. However, with the abolishment of this
ministry in September, the role of censor reverted to the Ministry of
Interior. Opposition members and international observers viewed the
changes to the Press Code as largely superficial--designed to give the
appearance of liberalization while only making minor cosmetic changes,
transferring a number of offenses from the Press Code to the Penal
Code, making them subject to judicial review and streamlining the
censorship process. The revisions provided that copies of newspapers
published outside of Tunis could be deposited with local governors
rather than at central Tunis offices. Newspapers were required to raise
the percentage of journalists drawn from the Institute of Journalism
(IPSI) on their editorial staff from 30 percent to 50 percent. In May
the Tunisian Association of Journalists (AJT) released a widely
disseminated report strongly criticizing the Government's control of
the press and information sector.
In September, after the May replacement of Minister of Human Rights
Slaheddine Maaoui by Fethis Houidi, the Ministry of Human Rights,
Communications, and Relations with the Chamber of Deputies was
abolished. The portfolio was folded into a new Ministry of Justice and
Human Rights under Minister of Justice Bechir Tekkari. Also in
September, former university professor Harm Ben Salem was appointed
General Coordinator for Human Rights in the newly designated ministry
(see Section 4).
The Government detained, interrogated, and harassed local and
international human rights activists (see Sections 1.c. and 4). On
August 19, Islamist dissident and journalist Abdallah Zouari was
arrested for violating the provisions of his administrative control.
Zouari, a journalist for the an-Nahdha newspaper Al Fajr, originally
was sentenced in 1991 to 11 years in prison for membership in an
illegal organization. In June he was released under the condition he
would serve out his 5 years of administrative control in the town of
Zarzis (300 miles south of Tunis). Credible sources claimed his August
arrest stemmed from his ignoring a July 15 letter from the Ministry of
Interior ordering him to Zarzis. The Government denied Zouari ever held
a press card or worked as a journalist and claimed his conviction was
for possessing, making, and carrying ammunitions, weapons, and
explosives as well as undermining state security. The court handed down
an 8-month sentence (see Sections 1.e. and 4).
On May 16, border police at Tunis-Carthage airport refused entry
into Tunis to French journalist Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, who had written
items critical of the Ben Ali regime (see Section 4).
On June 4, Zouhair Yahiaoui was arrested and charged with spreading
false information in relation to his opposition web magazine TUNeZINE.
The magazine had published an online conference on the May 26
Constitutional referendum and asked respondents to vote whether they
felt living in the country was like a prison. He also was alleged to
have posted a rumor of an armed attack against the President. On June
20, Yahiaoui was sentenced to 2 years and 4 months in prison. During
his July 10 appeal, the sentence was reduced to 2 years. Defense
lawyers indicated they were given no opportunity to make arguments. In
September Yahiaoui indicated he shared a cell that was 40 square meters
with 80 persons and that they only had access to water for 30 minutes a
day.
Although several independent newspapers and magazines--including
several opposition party journals--existed, the Government relied upon
direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a
high degree of self-censorship. Primary among these methods was ``depot
legal,'' the requirement that printers and publishers provide copies of
all publications to the Ministry of Human Rights, Communications, and
Relations with the Chamber of Deputies prior to distribution. However,
with the abolishment of this ministry in September, use of ``depot
legal'' reverted to the Ministry of Interior. The opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (PDP) claimed that in January and August 2001 copies
of its Al-Mawqif newspaper were removed from newsstands because they
contained an article critical of the Government. Publication of the Al-
Mawkif newspaper was delayed on several occasions. Since 1999 the
Government has not permitted the Tunisian Bar Association to publish
its internal bulletin. In March the Government seized opposition paper
At-Tariq Al Jadid when editors tried to print a story critical of the
constitutional reform plan.
Since 1994 the Government has refused to allow AI's local chapter
to distribute textbooks on human rights written for high school
students. Similarly, distributors must deposit copies of publications
printed abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and the Ministry of Interior
prior to their public release. While publishers need not wait for an
authorization, they must obtain a receipt of deposit before
distribution. On occasion such receipts reportedly were withheld,
sometimes indefinitely. Without a receipt, publications may not be
distributed legally.
The Press Code contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion and
defamation, neither of which is defined clearly. The code stipulates
fines and confiscation for failure to comply with these provisions. The
Government routinely utilized this method to prevent distribution of
editions of foreign newspapers and magazines that contained articles
critical of the country.
The Government also reportedly withheld depot legal to remove from
circulation books that it deemed critical of the Government. Unlike in
previous year, there were no reports that the Government provided
official texts on major domestic and international events and
reprimanded publishers and editors who failed to publish these
statements.
The Government also used indirect methods, such as newsprint
subsidies and control of public advertising revenues, to encourage
self-censorship in the media. The Tunisian Agency for External
Communications effectively censored by selectively withholding
advertising funds. There were credible reports that the Government
withheld advertising orders, a vital source of revenues, from
publications that published articles deemed offensive by the
Government. For example, after Yahmed's Realities article, the
Government pulled its ads from the magazine for a brief time (see
Section 1.c.).
The Government exerted further control over the media by
threatening to impose restrictions on journalists, such as refusing
permission to travel abroad, withholding press credentials, and
imposing police surveillance on those who wrote articles critical of
the Government. In December journalist Hedi Yahmed was forced to resign
from Realities after writing an article on prison conditions (see
Section 1.c.).
Members of the security forces also reportedly questioned
journalists regarding the nature of press conferences and other public
functions hosted by foreigners that the journalists attended.
Several journalists from Al-Fajr, the publication associated with
the outlawed an-Nahdha movement, remained in jail, serving sentences
that were imposed in the early 1990s. The Government maintained that
the arrests, indictments, and convictions were carried out in full
accordance with the law. Visiting foreign journalists sometimes
complained of being followed by security officials. In 2001 Reporters
Without Borders (RSF) journalist Robert Menard was deported for
disturbing the public order by distributing illegal information.
In November RSF released a study ranking countries by their level
of press freedom. The country was ranked 128th out of 139 countries. At
year's end, the Tunisian Newspaper Association remained expelled from
the World Association of Newspapers (WAN).
The Government owned and operated the Tunisian Radio and Television
Establishment (ERTT). The ERTT's coverage of government news was taken
directly from the official news agency, TAP. There were several
government-owned regional radio stations and two national television
channels. A bilateral agreement with Italy permits citizens to receive
the Italian television station RAI-UNO; since 1999 the broadcast of
French television station France 2 remained suspended because of its
critical coverage of the elections. Recent estimates placed the number
of satellite dishes in the country at well over 200,000. The Government
regulated their sale and installation. Many citizens received two
satellite programs broadcast from London by members of the opposition:
Al-Mustaquella and Zeitouna. The programs served as alternative sources
for news and political opinion both through their satellite
transmissions and Zeitouna's web site.
During the year, the Government encouraged greater use of the
Internet and lowered Internet user and telephone connection fees.
Journalists and students were entitled to a 25 percent reduction in
Internet usage fees. In September the Government reported that there
were 460,000 Internet users and 71,000 subscribers. During the year,
the Government closed several public Internet stations citing
complaints that minors were accessing ``immoral'' Web sites. Credible
sources indicated some people who would otherwise subscribe have
avoided doing so because of fears of government monitoring and
censoring e-mail and Web site content. The Government also arrested
some Web journalists. The Government used the Internet widely, with
most government ministries and agencies posting information on readily
accessible Web sites. However, the Government frequently blocked Web
sites and on-line publications containing information critical of the
Government posted by international NGOs, opposition parties, and
foreign governments, including a report on Internet use in the country
by Human Rights Watch. The five Internet service providers in the
country remained under the control of the Tunisian Internet Agency,
which regularly provided lists of subscribers to the Government. Human
rights activists alleged that the agency regularly interfered with and
intercepted their Internet communications. The Press Code, including
the requirement that advance copies of publications be provided to the
Government, applies to information shared on the Internet (see Section
4).
The Government limited academic freedom. Like journalists,
university professors sometimes practiced self-censorship by avoiding
classroom criticism of the Government or statements supportive of the
an-Nahdha movement. Professors alleged that the Government utilized the
threat of tax audits, control over university positions, and strict
publishing rules to encourage self-censorship. The presence of police
on campuses also discouraged dissent. Professors must inform the
Ministry of Higher Education in advance of any seminars, including the
list of participants and subjects to be addressed. Copies of papers to
be presented in university settings or seminars must be provided to the
Ministry in advance.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricted
this right. Groups that wish to hold a public meeting, rally, or march
must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior by applying no later
than 3 days in advance of the proposed event and submitting a list of
participants. The authorities routinely approved such permits for
groups that support government positions, but often refused permission
for groups that express dissenting views. In addition to permits,
registration also was used to control status and operations of NGOs.
During the year, LTDH activists continued to report government
harassment, interrogation, property loss or damage, unauthorized home
entry, and denial of passports. In October the LTDH reported
disruptions to its regional elections in the southern town of Gabes and
the northern town of Jendouba. Accounts of events differed but the LTDH
maintained that ruling RCD party delegates objected to the voting
procedures in Gabes and moved that the congress should be adjourned
without completing the election. Members of the RCD threatened LTDH
members with physical violence and police intervened, ultimately
prohibiting the conclusion of the voting. Additionally, smaller LTDH
offices reported difficulty in renting space to hold elections. Leaders
maintained that hotel and hall managers have been threatened by police
not to rent meeting space to them. Despite LTDH president Mokhtar
Trifi's pledge to continue elections despite threats and violence, no
new board was elected by year's end.
The CNLT reported that several dozen political police disrupted its
plenary meeting on January 13 by surrounding the neighborhood in which
they had planned to meet and preventing members from entering. Reports
from a support committee for PCOT spokesman Hamma Hammami indicated
that on January 20, police violently disrupted a meeting it attempted
to hold at the LTDH branch in Sfax.
In February the Ministry of Interior refused to legally register
the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (FDTL). Since its founding
in 1994, the FDTL, a center-left NGO of intellectuals, professionals,
and political opposition members, has been trying to obtain legal
status. In October it was recognized legally.
In February police searched the house of and arrested Salah
Hamzaoui, head of a support committee for Hamma Hammami. Police warned
him that opening his home to political meetings could expose him to
legal/judicial proceedings. On May 22 police surrounded Hamzaoui's
house when a Hammami support committee tried to meet there. Police
prevented individuals from entering the house.
In August 2001, less than a week after Sihem Bensedrine's release
from prison, police assaulted her and other activists outside the
publishing house which Bensedrine directs.
Credible reports indicated that Lasaad Jouhri, a former Islamist
prisoner, remained under close police surveillance and harassment
throughout the year for his political involvement. Police questioned
and warned those individuals speaking to him in public. In August five
plainclothes police severely beat Jouhri in Tunis (see Section 1.c.).
In April government-sanctioned pro-Palestinian demonstrations
erupted into spontaneous demonstrations mostly on university and high
school campuses. Some reportedly resulted in violent confrontations
between demonstrators and police, and several demonstrators were
injured. For example, on April 5 police violently dispersed a
nongovernment sanctioned, pro-Palestinian demonstration of
approximately 300 civil society activists, lawyers, and human rights
activists. Also in April, the LTDH reported that 15 students arrested
during the demonstrations were mistreated in jail and forced to sign
statements promising not to take part in demonstrations again.
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the
Government restricted this right by barring some political groups or
parties based on religion, race, region of origin, or political
orientation. On December 13, the Government banned 11 opposition and
civil society groups from demonstrating against war with Iraq. Hundreds
of riot police enforced the ban, though organizers indicated they had
tried to coordinate the protest with authorities beforehand.
Presiding judges in trials of Islamists routinely refused to
investigate claims that their confessions were extracted under torture.
Human rights activists alleged that the Government extended its
prosecution of Islamist activists to include family members who were
not politically active (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). Also, in
some cases, several years lapsed after detention and before defendants
were brought to trial.
The Government banned organizations that it claims threaten
disruption of the public order and used this proscription to prosecute
and harass members of the PCOT, CNLT, RAID and ban political parties.
On February 2, Hamma Hammami along with two co-defendants,
Abdeljabar Madouri and Samir Taamallah, came out of over 3 years in
hiding to file opposing briefs to their 1999 in absentia convictions
for membership in an illegal organization and spreading false
information aimed at undermining the public order. The charges stemmed
from their membership in PCOT. Hammami's return drew some 400
supporters, international observers, journalists, human rights
activists, lawyers, and diplomats to the court. Before presenting their
appeal before the judge, Hammami, Madouri and Taamallah were seized by
plainclothes police, handcuffed and dragged out of court. Upon
realizing that Hammami had been removed forcibly, crowds that had
gathered in the courtroom stood on benches and began chanting calls for
'political freedom' before singing the national anthem. Human rights
lawyers agreed that the public display of support for Hammami in court
was the first open and vocal demonstration of political dissent in
several years. At one point, lawyers and supporters believed Hammami
was being held upstairs in the courthouse and moved up the stairs
intending to free him. Amidst the confusion, court officials locked an
internal hall gate, preventing much of the crowd from leaving the
courthouse and others from entering. There were reports that
journalists and supporters were harassed, assaulted and arrested by
police. Police reportedly confiscated some journalists' camera
equipment.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the free
exercise of other religions that do not disturb the public order, and
the Government generally observed and enforced this right; however, it
did not permit political parties based on religion, prohibited
proselytizing, and partially limited the religious freedom of Baha'is.
Islam is the state religion. The Constitution stipulates that the
President must be a Muslim.
The Government recognized all Christian and Jewish religious
organizations that were established before independence in 1956.
Although the Government permitted Christian churches to operate freely,
only the Catholic Church had formal recognition from the post-
independence government. Since 1999 the Government has not permitted
registration of a Jewish religious organization in Jerba; however, the
group has been permitted to operate and it performs religious
activities and charitable work unhindered.
The Government controlled and subsidized mosques and paid the
salaries of prayer leaders. The President appointed the Grand Mufti of
the Republic. The 1988 Law on Mosques provided that only personnel
appointed by the Government may lead activities in mosques and
stipulated that mosques must remain closed except during prayer times
and other authorized religious ceremonies, such as marriages or
funerals.
The Government did not permit the establishment of political
parties based on religion, prohibited recognition of the an-Nahdha
party, and prosecuted suspected party members on the grounds of
membership in an illegal organization (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e.,
and 2.b.). The Government maintained tight surveillance over Islamists
and members of the Islamic fundamentalist community. The Government
revoked the identity cards of an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 Islamists
and fundamentalists, which seriously disadvantaged them (see Section
1.f.).
According to reliable sources, the Government has refused to issue
passports to Islamists and fundamentalists. The Government forbade the
wearing of the hijab (headscarves worn by traditional Muslim women) in
government offices. According to human rights lawyers, the Government
regularly questioned Muslims who were observed praying frequently in
mosques. Reliable sources report that the authorities instructed imams
to espouse government social and economic programs during prayer times
in mosques.
The Government allowed the Jewish community freedom of worship and
paid the salary of the Grand Rabbi. It also partially subsidized
restoration and maintenance costs for some synagogues. In 1999 the
Jewish community elected a new board of directors, its first since
independence in 1956, but continued to await approval from the governor
of Tunis. Once approval is obtained from the governor, the organization
is expected to receive permanent status. At year's end, the board is
still waiting for formal approval. However, the board reported no
obstacles to conducting normal activities. The acting board has changed
its name to the Jewish Committee of Tunisia. The Government permitted
the Jewish community to operate private religious schools and allowed
Jewish children on the island of Jerba to divide their academic day
between secular public schools and private religious schools. The
Government also encouraged Jewish expatriates to return for the annual
Jewish pilgrimage to the historic El-Ghriba Synagogue on the island of
Jerba. During the year, an international Jewish relief organization
made trips to the country and reported no interference with its
activities. In March a synagogue in the Tunis suburb of La Marsa was
broken into and vandalized and in April a synagogue in Sfax also was
vandalized. No injuries were reported and damage was minor. Both
incidents were isolated, and the Government responded by increasing
security at both sites.
On April 11, a terrorist attack outside the El-Ghriba synagogue
killed 21 persons and severely damaged the interior of the synagogue.
Approximately 2 weeks before the annual pilgrimage, the driver of a
truck transporting liquid gas, Nizar Nawar, a 24-year-old citizen,
detonated an explosive device while the truck stood at the synagogue
compound wall, killing himself, 14 German nationals, 1 French national,
and 5 other citizens. The Government initially claimed the explosion
was an accident and immediately began repairing the wall and removing
evidence. On April 22, after German authorities became involved in the
investigation, the Government admitted that the incident was an attack.
The Government provided increased security for the synagogue and
encouraged pilgrims and tourists to visit El-Ghriba despite the attack.
The Government regarded the Baha'i faith as a heretical sect of
Islam and permitted its adherents to practice their faith only in
private.
In general the Government did not permit Christian groups to
establish new churches, and proselytizing was viewed as an act against
the public order. Foreign missionary organizations and groups operate
but were not permitted to proselytize in the country. Authorities
deported foreigners suspected of proselytizing and did not permit them
to return. There were no reported cases of official action against
persons suspected of proselytizing during the year; however, in 2001
there were reports materials distributed by Christian missionaries were
confiscated from local secondary students.
Islamic religious education was mandatory in public schools;
however, the religious curriculum for secondary school students also
included the histories of Judaism and Christianity.
Religious groups were subjected to the same restrictions on freedom
of speech and the press as secular NGOs. Although Christian groups
reported that they were able to distribute previously approved
religious publications in European languages without difficulty, they
claimed that the Government generally did not approve either
publication or distribution of Arabic-language Christian material.
Moreover, authorized distribution of religious publications was limited
to existing religious communities, because the Government viewed public
distribution of both religious and secular documents as a threat to the
public order and hence an illegal act.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and persons were free to change their place of residence or
work at will; however, in practice the Government restricted the
freedom of movement and foreign travel of those critical of it.
The 1998 amendments to the passport law transferred power for
canceling passports from the Ministry of Interior to the courts;
however, the amended law contained broad provisions that permit
passport seizure on undefined national security grounds and deny
citizens the right either to present their case against seizure or to
appeal the judges' decision. By law the Ministry of Interior must
submit requests to seize or withhold a citizen's passport through the
Public Prosecutor to the courts; however, the Ministry of Interior
routinely bypassed the Public Prosecutor to withhold passports from
citizens. Credible reports indicated that the Public Prosecutor always
deferred to the Ministry of Interior on such requests.
The Government arbitrarily withheld passports from citizens.
According to reliable sources, the Government withheld many passports
of members of the human rights community, including human rights lawyer
Nejib Hosni, and PCOT student Nourredine Ben N'tiche, as well as many
members of the Islamist community. According to credible sources, some
political opponents in self-imposed exile were prevented from obtaining
or renewing their passports in order to return (see Section 1.d.).
According to reliable sources, the Government reportedly confiscated
the passports of a small number of Christian converts. Abdallah Zouari,
a journalist, who in June was released after serving an 11-year
sentence for his association with an-Nahdha, in August was rearrested
and sentenced to 8 months in prison for failing to abide by the
Ministry of Interior's exile provision in his order of administrative
control. Zouari, who is from Tunis, was ordered to live in Zarzis (300
miles south of the capital) (see Section 1.d.).
In January the Government prevented Mokhtar Yahiaoui, removed from
the judicial bench in 2001 for speaking out against government
interference in the judiciary, from traveling to Paris, to Geneva in
April, and to Athens in June. Border police initially indicated that
the reason for preventing his departure was due to the incorrect
listing of judge as Yahiaoui's profession in his passport.
Hedi Bejaoui, another member of an-Nahdha, under administrative
control since 1990, has been unable to travel for medical treatment due
to the Government's seizure of his passport (see Section 1.d.).
On November 23, the Government again denied Sadri Khiari the right
to travel to France to defend his dissertation. A support committee
called Article 13, after the ``freedom of movement'' section of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was established in support of
Khiari and others who were denied their right to travel.
The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum and refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It also expressly prohibits
the extradition of political refugees. The Government cooperated with
the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
assisting refugees. The Government acknowledged the UNHCR's
determination of refugee status, which was accorded to 102 individuals
during the year. During the year, the UNHCR processed 38 applications
for asylum. The Government provided first asylum for refugees based on
UNHCR recommendations. There was no pattern of abuse of refugees.
Although a few refugees were deported during the year, none were forced
to return to countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides that the citizenry shall elect the
President and members of the legislature for 5-year terms; however,
there were significant limitations on citizens' right to change their
government. In 1999 President Ben Ali was reelected for a third 5-year
term in the country's first multi-party presidential elections.
Official government results stated that Ben Ali won with 99.44 percent
of the vote. The ruling RCD party's domination of state institutions
and political activity precludes credible and competitive electoral
challenges from unsanctioned actors. In February government proposed
constitutional amendments were put forward in a program titled 'The
Republic of Tomorrow,' which called for amending 38 of the
Constitution's 76 articles. In a February 27 speech to the Chamber of
Deputies, President Ben Ali said his aim was to ``entrench the spirit
of democracy and the multiparty system.'' As prescribed by the
Constitution, President Ben Ali sought the input of the Constitutional
Council and the Chamber of Deputies, and organized the national
campaign for the first-ever referendum on May 26. While the process of
proposing and passing the amendments technically followed the law, many
observers viewed the amendments as an attempt to enable President Ben
Ali to remain in office past his third 5-year term, conceivably until
he reached the age of 75 in 2014.
On May 26, a national referendum, despite serious procedural
questions, including the secrecy of the vote, passed with an officially
reported 99.52 percent of the vote. A presidentially appointed election
monitoring group presented a confidential report to the President
regarding the election process, which reportedly substantiated numerous
irregularities alleged by opposition parties.
The most substantive changes involved the six following articles of
the Constitution: Article 15 originally tasked citizens with the
responsibility for national defense. The amended version broadened this
responsibility to include protection of the country's ``independence,
sovereignty, and integrity.'' Human rights activists believed that the
new wording may be used to prosecute activists who criticize the regime
abroad. Article 19 established a Chamber of Councilors as a second
legislative chamber. The chamber would comprise 1-2 members elected
from each governorate (based on population), a second group of members
chosen by the president from professional organizations and a third
group appointed by the President from among national public figures.
Article 39, originally limiting the president to three terms, was
abolished. Changes to Article 40 raised the upper age limit of
presidential candidates to 75. Article 41 granted the president
judicial immunity upon leaving office for acts he undertook in the
exercise of his duties. Lastly, Article 57 granted the Constitutional
Council responsibility for determining if the president is unfit to
govern and mandates that the President of the Chamber of Deputies is
next in the line of succession to hold the presidency for between 45
and 60 days until new elections can be held.
The RCD party and its direct predecessor parties have controlled
the political arena since independence in 1956. The RCD dominates the
Cabinet, the Chamber of Deputies, and regional and local governments.
The President appointed the Cabinet and the 24 governors. The
Government and the party are integrated closely; the President of the
Republic also is the president of the party, and the party's secretary
general holds the rank of minister.
Narrowly written criteria in the Electoral Code greatly restrict
the eligibility of persons to run for president. A candidate must
receive the endorsement of 30 sitting deputies or municipal council
presidents to be eligible to run.
The 182-seat Chamber of Deputies does not function as a
counterweight to the executive branch; rather, it served as an arena in
which the executive's legislative proposals are debated prior to
virtually automatic approval. Debate within the Chamber is often lively
and government ministers are summoned to respond to deputies'
questions, although heated exchanges critical of government policy were
not reported fully in the press. Regardless of the debate, the Chamber
has a history of approving all government proposals; the Chamber does
occasionally modify the proposed legislation. The new chamber will
serve as an upper house and will function largely with similar duties
of the Chamber of Deputies. It will have law-making authority.
The Electoral Code reserves 20 percent of the seats for the
officially recognized, or legal, opposition parties distributed on a
proportional basis to those parties that did not win directly elected
district seats. For the 1999 elections, each party represented in the
Chamber of Deputies received an annual public subsidy of approximately
$42,000 (60,000 dinars), plus an additional payment of $3,500 (5,000
dinars) per deputy. The Government also provided campaign financing
that corresponded to the number of district lists that each party
presented. Moreover, with funding based on the number of seats in
Parliament, the opposition parties had no interest in forming
coalitions against the RCD, but concentrated instead on competing with
each other for the largest possible share of the 20 percent of seats
reserved for the opposition. During the elections, opposition parties
found independent fundraising impossible, and those that published
newspapers or magazines faced difficulties in obtaining paid
advertisers. However, in 2001 the President announced a 50 percent
increase in allowances given by the Government to opposition
newspapers. Each opposition newspaper received $105,000 (150,000
dinars) annually. The Government did not permit the establishment of
political parties on the basis of religion and uses the prohibition to
refuse recognition of the an-Nahdha party and to prosecute suspected
members on the grounds of membership in an illegal organization (see
Sections 2.b. and 2.c.). On October 25, the Democratic Forum for Labor
and Liberties (FTDL) was legalized, 8 years after first applying for
recognition.
During the 4 month long campaign for the constitutional referendum,
the Government gave opposition parties rare television time to present
their positions.
Twenty-one of the 182 Deputies elected were women, up from 13 of
163 deputies in the previous Chamber. There were six women in the
Cabinet. Fourteen women held the position of deputy governor within the
24 governorates. Three women served as president of chambers on the 22-
member Court of Cassation, which is the highest court of appeal.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The LTDH is the most active independent advocacy organization, with
41 branches throughout the country. The organization receives and
researches complaints and protests individual and systemic abuses.
During the year, LTDH members and other human rights activists reported
government beatings, harassment, interrogations, property loss or
damage, unauthorized home entry, and denial of passports.
In September a delegation of Dutch lawyers were denied entry into
the country to protest the lack of an independent judiciary and support
for the Tunisian Bar Association. On October 26, the Government refused
entry to a delegation from the International Commission of Jurists
(ICJ).
In February Khemais Ksila was sentenced in absentia to 10 years in
prison and fined $3,600 (TD 5,000) for attempted rape. Observers
believed that the case received a disproportionate amount of press
coverage throughout the latter half of 2001, aimed at discrediting
Ksila before he had the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.
In 2001 LTDH vice president Souhayr Belhassen was criticized heavily in
the press for her work on a human rights commission investigating
abuses in Iraq. The report had not been released by year's end.
There were numerous additional reports during the year of police
attacking human rights activists, journalists, and others critical of
the Government (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.). During the year,
LTDH activists continued to report government harassment,
interrogation, and property loss or damage. In previous years, the LTDH
had reported unauthorized home entries and denial of passports. During
the year, the LTDH reported that some of its regional elections were
disrupted by RCD activists. By year's end, incomplete regional results
precluded national elections from taking place (see Section 2.b.).
Since 1998 the Government has refused to authorize CNLT
registration as an NGO. The court has not yet acted on the 1999
administrative appeal filed by the CNLT's founders. CNLT issued
statements criticizing government human rights practices. Government
officials stated that, by publishing communiques in the name of an
unregistered NGO, CNLT members violated the Publications Code (which
requires that advance copies be provided to the Government), belonged
to an illegal organization, and threatened public order. Some CNLT
members still are unable to obtain passports (see Sections 1.f. and
2.d.).
In March the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning
human rights violations in Tunisia and calling for the release of Hamma
Hammami and his co-defendants (see Section 2.b.).
Citing no guarantees of a fair trial and the threat of
mistreatment, members of the European Parliament and international
human rights NGOs objected to the Government's December request for
extradition from France of dissident Khemais Toumi. Toumi had been
convicted in absentia in 1997 and sentenced to 5 years in prison. On
December 6, he was arrested in France and his extradition remained
pending at year's end.
International observers were permitted to monitor trials, and they
reported that the Government generally permitted them to conduct such
monitoring (see Section 1.e.).
The Government reportedly blocked access to the Internet Web sites
of most human rights organizations (see Section 2.a.). Human rights
activists and lawyers complained of frequent interruptions of postal
and telephone services (see Section 1.f.).
AI continued to maintain a local chapter though members complained
that the office suffered repeated loss of telephone and fax service.
Persons who were considering joining the chapter reported that security
officials discouraged them from doing so. AI officials reported that
they were under periodic police surveillance and that there was
interference with their mail. In 2001 police assaulted and detained two
foreign delegates from AI (see Section 1.d.).
Human rights offices in certain ministries and a governmental body,
the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, addressed and
sometimes resolved human rights complaints. The Higher Commission
submits confidential reports directly to President Ben Ali. In
September the Ministry of Human Rights, Communications, and Relations
with the Chamber of Deputies was replaced by a new Ministry of Justice
and Human Rights under Minister of Justice Bechir Tekkari and former
university professor Hatem Ben Salem was appointed General Coordinator
for Human Rights in the new ministry (see Section 2.a.). In 2001 the
Government announced the establishment of a documentation center for
human rights; however, at year's end, there was no indication that it
was operating.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides that all citizens shall have equal rights
and responsibilities and be equal under the law, and the Government
generally respected these rights in practice. Legal discrimination was
not pervasive, apart from that experienced by women in certain areas,
such as inheritance, which is governed by Shari'a.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no
comprehensive statistics to measure its extent. In 2000, according to a
family court judge, women file approximately 4,000 complaints of
domestic violence each year, but later drop approximately half of those
complaints. There have been no recent estimates as to the number of
these complaints. The Tunisian Democratic Women's Association operates
a counseling center for women who are victims of domestic violence. The
center assists approximately 20 women per month. The National Union of
Tunisian Women (UNFT) is a government-sponsored organization that runs
centers to assist women and children in difficulty. Instances of rape
or assault by someone unknown to the victim are rare. Police officers
and the courts tend to regard domestic violence as a problem to be
handled by the family. Nonetheless, there are stiff penalties for
spousal abuse. Both the fine and imprisonment for battery or violence
committed by a spouse or family member are double those for the same
crimes committed by an individual not related to the victim.
Rape is specifically prohibited by the Penal Code. There is no
legal exception to this law for spousal rape, but in part due to social
stigma there were no reports of spousal rape being prosecuted.
Prostitution is prohibited by the Penal Code specifically, but
charges against individuals are rare. There have been no reported cases
of trafficking, forced prostitution, or sex tourism.
Women enjoyed substantial rights and the Government has made
serious efforts to advance those rights, especially in the areas of
property-ownership practices and support to divorced women. Either the
mother or father may convey citizenship to a child.
Muslim women were not permitted to marry outside their religion.
Marriages of Muslim women to non-Muslim men abroad were considered
common-law, which are prohibited and thus void when the couple returns
to the country. Non-Muslim women who marry Muslim men were not
permitted to inherit from their husbands, nor may the husbands and any
children (who are considered to be Muslim) from the marriage inherit
from the non-Muslim wife. Some Christian converts reported difficulty
in having their civil marriages recognized.
Most property acquired during marriage, including property acquired
solely by the wife, still is held in the name of the husband.
Inheritance law, based on Shari'a and tradition, discriminates against
women, and women still face societal and economic discrimination in
certain areas, such as private sector employment.
Sexual harassment is prohibited specifically by the Penal Code.
Women comprised approximately 29 percent of the work force. There
are an estimated 5,000 businesses headed by women, which is an increase
from 3,900 in 2000. Women served in high levels of the Government as
cabinet ministers or secretaries of state; there currently are six
women who hold these positions. Women constituted 37 percent of the
civil service and 24 percent of the nation's total jurists. Women held
14 deputy governorships in the country's 24 governorates (or
administrative regions). Approximately 51 percent of university
students enrolled in the 2000-2001 academic year were women.
The law explicitly requires equal pay for equal work. Although
there are no statistics comparing the average earnings of men and
women, generally women and men performing the same work are believed to
be paid the same wages.
While the rate of illiteracy has dropped markedly in both rural and
urban areas, the rate of female illiteracy in all categories is at
least double that of men. Among 10- to 14-year-old children, 5.5
percent of urban girls are illiterate, compared with 2.2 percent of
urban boys, and 27 percent of rural girls compared with less than 7
percent of rural boys.
Several NGOs focused, in whole or in part, on women's advocacy, or
research women's issues, and a number of attorneys represent women in
domestic cases.
There is a separate Ministry for Women's Affairs, Family and
Childhood, with a relatively large budget nearly 3 percent of the total
budget of $2 million (3 million dinars) supporting its mission to
ensure the legal rights and improve the socioeconomic status of women.
The Government supported and funded the (UNFT), women's professional
associations, and the Government's Women's Research Center.
Children.--The Government demonstrated a strong commitment to free
and universal public education, which is compulsory until age 16.
Approximately 80 percent of boys attend until that age in urban areas
and 60 percent of boys and girls in rural areas. Primary school
enrollment for the scholastic year was slightly less than the preceding
year's, reflecting a decline in the birth rate; secondary school
enrollment showed an increase of 8 percent, which appeared equally
divided between boys and girls. The Government reported that 99.1
percent of children attend primary school full-time. The Government
sponsored an immunization program targeting preschool-age children, and
reported that more than 95 percent of children are vaccinated.
Penalties for convictions for abandonment and assault on minors are
severe. There was no societal pattern of abuse of children. Following
the September cabinet reshuffle, there were two ministries responsible
for rights of children. The Ministry of Women's Affairs, Family and
Childhood and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Leisure. Each have
secretaries of state responsible for guaranteeing the rights of
children. In April the Chamber of Deputies adopted a law to complete
the Code for the Protection of Children creating a 'Parliament of the
Child' to teach children civic responsibility.
There were no reports of child prostitution.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
on disability and mandates that at least 1 percent of the public and
private sector jobs be reserved for persons with disabilities. All
public buildings constructed since 1991 must be accessible to persons
with physical disabilities. Many cities, including the capital, began
installing wheelchair access ramps on city sidewalks. The Government
issued special cards to persons with disabilities for benefits such as
unrestricted parking, priority medical services, preferential seating
on public transportation, and consumer discounts. The Government
provided tax incentives to companies to encourage the hiring of persons
with physical disabilities.
The law includes provisions prohibiting discrimination against
persons with mental disabilities. Several active NGOs provide
educational, vocational, and recreational assistance to children and
young adults with mental disabilities. Some were funded by the
Government and international organizations.
Indigenous Persons.--The Government estimated that the small
Amazigh (Berber) minority constitutes less than 3 percent of the
population. Some older Amazighs have retained their native language,
but the younger generation has been assimilated into local culture
through schooling and marriage. Amazighs were free to participate in
politics and to express themselves culturally.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide the right of workers to organize and form unions. The
Government generally respected this right. The Tunisian General
Federation of Labor (UGTT) is the country's only labor federation.
Approximately 15 percent of the 3.3 million person work force,
including civil servants and employees of state-owned enterprises, are
members, and a considerably larger proportion of the work force is
covered by union contracts. A union may be dissolved only by court
order.
The UGTT and its member unions legally are independent of the
Government and the ruling party, but operate under regulations that
restrict their freedom of action. The UGTT's membership included
persons associated with all political tendencies, although Islamists
have been removed from union offices. There were credible reports that
the UGTT receives substantial government subsidies to supplement modest
union dues and funding from the National Social Security Account. While
regional and sector-specific unions operate with some independence on
local issues, the central UGTT leadership generally cooperated with the
Government regarding its economic reform program. Throughout the year
the UGTT board showed some independence regarding economic and social
issues and to support greater democracy.
The law prohibited antiunion discrimination by employers. However,
the UGTT claims that there is antiunion activity among private sector
employers, especially firing of union activists and using temporary
workers to avoid unionization. In certain industries, such as textiles,
hotels, and construction, temporary workers account for a large
majority of the work force. The Labor Code protects temporary workers,
but enforcement is more difficult than in the case of permanent
workers. A committee chaired by an officer from the Labor Inspectorate
of the Office of the Inspector General of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Solidarity, and including a labor representative and an
employers' association representative, approves all worker dismissals.
Unions were free to associate with international bodies. The UGTT
is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and Confederation of
African Trade Unions; many individual unions are affiliated with
relevant international sectoral confederations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is protected by law and observed in
practice. Wages and working conditions are set in triennial
negotiations between the UGTT member unions and employers. Forty-seven
collective bargaining agreements set standards for industries in the
private sector and cover 80 percent of the total private sector
workforce. Each agreement was negotiated by representatives of unions
and employers in the area the agreement encompasses. The Government's
role in the private sector negotiations was minimal, consisting mainly
of lending its good offices if talks appear to be stalled. However, the
Government must approve (but may not modify) the agreements. Once
approved the agreements set standards for all employees, both union and
nonunion, in the areas that they cover. The UGTT also negotiated wages
and work conditions of civil servants and employees of state-owned
enterprises. The Government is the partner in such negotiations. In
October the Government completed a series of triennial labor
negotiations with the UGTT and UTICA (the private sector's employer's
association). Negotiations were protracted and complex but resulted in
a compromise of a 5 percent wage hike across most sectors. The
agreements signed in 2000 provided for annual wage increases ranging
from four to six percent.
Unions, including those representing civil servants, have the right
to strike, provided that they give 10 days advance notice to the UGTT
and it approves of the strike. The ICFTU has characterized the
requirement for prior UGTT approval of strikes as a violation of worker
rights. However, such advance approval rarely was sought in practice.
There were numerous short-lived strikes over failure by employers to
fulfill contract provisions regarding pay and conditions and over
efforts by employers to impede union activities. While the majority of
the strikes technically were illegal, the Government did not prosecute
workers for illegal strike activity, and the strikes were reported
objectively in the press. The law prohibited retribution against
strikers.
Labor disputes were settled through conciliation panels in which
labor and management are represented equally. Tripartite regional
arbitration commissions settle industrial disputes when conciliation
fails.
There were export-processing zones (EPZs) in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children, and the Government generally enforced
this prohibition effectively; however, some families of teenage girls
placed them as household domestics to collect their wages (see Section
6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. The minimum
age for light work in the nonindustrial and agricultural sectors is 13
years. Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 must have 12 hours of rest
per day, which must include the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
Children between the ages of 14 and 16 in nonagricultural sectors may
work no more than 2 hours per day. The total time that children spend
in school and work may not exceed 7 hours per day. The minimum age for
hazardous or manual labor is 18. Inspectors of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Solidarity examined the records of employees to verify that
employers comply with the minimum age law. There were no reports of
sanctions against employers. Nonetheless, young children often
performed agricultural work in rural areas and worked as vendors in
urban areas, primarily during the summer vacation from school.
Observers have expressed concern that child labor continued to
exist, disguised as apprenticeship, particularly in the handicraft
industry, and in the cases of teenage girls whose families place them
as household domestics in order to collect their wages. There were no
reliable statistics on the extent of this phenomenon; however, an
independent lawyer who conducted a study of the practice in 2000
concluded that hiring of underage girls as household domestics has
declined with increased government enforcement of school attendance and
minimum work age laws. The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor,
and the Government generally enforces this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a
range of administratively determined minimum wages, which are set by a
commission of representatives from the Ministries of Social Affairs and
Solidarity, Development and International Cooperation, and Finance, in
consultation with the UGTT and the Employers' Association. The
President approved the commission's recommendations. In June the
industrial minimum wage was raised to $147.43 (200.5 dinars) per month
for a 48-hour workweek and to $129.34 (175.9 dinars) per month for a
40-hour workweek. The agricultural minimum wage is $4.45 (6.059 dinars)
per day. When supplemented by transportation and family allowances, the
minimum wage provides for a decent standard of living for a worker and
family, but covering only essential costs. The Labor Code sets a
standard 48-hour workweek for most sectors and requires one 24-hour
rest period per week.
Regional labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing wage and
hour standards. They inspect most firms about once every 2 years.
However, the Government often encountered difficulty in enforcing the
minimum wage law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy.
Moreover, more than 240,000 workers were employed in the informal
sector, which falls outside the purview of labor legislation.
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity has responsibility
for enforcing health and safety standards in the workplace. There were
special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions and
standards tend to be better in firms that are export oriented than in
those producing exclusively for the domestic market. Workers were free
to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing
their employment, and they may take legal action against employers who
retaliate against them for exercising this right.
The few foreign workers have the same protections as citizen
workers.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, it does prohibit slavery and bonded labor.
Trafficking in persons generally was not a problem; however, in June
eleven people drowned off the north coast near Kelibia (55 miles
northeast of Tunis) trying to swim to a boat smuggling people to Italy.
Police arrested 70 persons who had boarded the ship, the captain, and
several of the organizers of the smuggling ring. Defendants claimed
they had paid up to $710 (970 dinars) each to a smuggling network to
cross the Mediterranean to Italy. In July five defendants accused of
organizing the smuggling ring were convicted and sentenced to 6 years
in prison each. The 70 who attempted to immigrate illegally were fined
$150 (205 dinars) each.
In September the bodies of 10 illegal immigrants washed ashore in
Sicily. Fifty more immigrants were rescued from the sea after being
thrown overboard by their smugglers. The Italian Navy arrested the 27-
year-old citizen captain of the boat. All on board were local
nationals.
In October the Government hosted a ministerial conference on
migration throughout the western Mediterranean. The conference included
ministers from Algeria, Spain, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco,
Mauritania, and Portugal and resulted in the ``Tunis Declaration,''
aimed at combating illegal migration.
__________
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates
established in 1971. None has any democratically elected institutions
or political parties. Traditional rule in the emirates generally has
been patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty
to the tribal leaders. There are no general elections, but citizens may
express their concerns directly to their leaders through traditional
mechanisms, such as the open majlis, or council. In accordance with the
1971 Constitution, the seven emirate rulers constitute a Federal
Supreme Council, the highest legislative and executive body. The
Council selects a President and Vice President from its membership; the
President in turn appoints the Prime Minister and Cabinet. In December
2001, the Council reelected Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan as head
of the state for 5 years. The Constitution requires the Council to meet
annually, although individual leaders met frequently in more
traditional settings. The Cabinet manages the Federation on a day-to-
day basis. A consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC),
consisting of 40 advisors appointed for 2-year terms by the emirate
rulers, reviews proposed legislation, discusses the annual budget, and
may question federal government ministers in open sessions. Each
emirate retains control over its own oil and mineral wealth, some
aspects of internal security, and some regulation of internal and
external commerce. The federal government asserts primacy in matters of
foreign and defense policy, some aspects of internal security, and
increasingly in matters of law and the supply of some government
services. The judiciary generally was independent, but its decisions
were subject to review by the political leadership.
Each emirate maintained its own independent police force. While all
emirate internal security organs theoretically were branches of one
federal organization, in practice they operate with considerable
independence. There were no reports that security forces committed
human rights abuses.
The country has a free market economy based on oil and gas
production, trade, and light manufacturing. The local government in
each emirate owns the petroleum production enterprise in that emirate.
Most of the country's petroleum resources were located in Abu Dhabi,
the largest emirate by area. The Emirate of Dubai was likewise an oil
producer, as well as a growing financial, commercial, and tourism
center in the region. The remaining five emirates had negligible
resources and therefore depended in varying degrees on federal
government subsidies. The economy provided citizens with a high per
capita income, but it was heavily dependent on foreign skilled and
unskilled workers. The expatriate population amounted to more than 80
percent of the estimated 3.9 million population in the country.
The Government generally respected its citizens' rights in some
areas; however, its record was poor in other areas. Citizens did not
have the right to change their government. The Government restricted
the freedoms of speech and of the press. The press continued to avoid
direct criticism of the Government and exercised self-censorship. The
Government restricted the freedoms of assembly and association, and
imposed some restrictions on freedom of religion. The Government
restricted the rights of workers, some of whom were not protected by
labor laws. There were no labor unions. There were reports of poor
working conditions, failure to pay wages, and abuse of foreign domestic
servants in an economy in which 98 percent of the private sector
workforce was foreign. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
intensified the inspection of establishments to ensure compliance with
the labor laws and ferret out violators. Trafficking in women and
children continued to be a problem. Beginning September 1, the
Government implemented and enforced a ban against the use of juvenile
camel jockeys, a number of whom were trafficked to the country from
South Asia.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents during the year. There were no developments in
the case of Libyan national Abdullah Abu al Ghazali, who died while in
security force custody in September 2001. According to Amnesty
International (AI), al-Ghazali's wife was informed that her husband had
committed suicide while in detention. At year's end, there was no new
information on the investigation of this case.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and there were no
reports that government officials employed it.
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts (except in Dubai) frequently imposed
flogging on Muslims found guilty of adultery, prostitution, and drug or
alcohol abuse. In practice flogging was administered in accordance with
Shari'a to prevent major or permanent injuries. Convictions in the
Shari'a courts did not necessarily require the imposition of Shari'a
penalties on non-Muslims, but such sentences were carried out in a few
cases. According to AI, in 2001, at least 18 flogging sentences were
passed in cases of adultery.
Prison conditions reportedly were mixed, depending on the location.
Dubai and Abu Dhabi prison conditions generally met international
standards; however, rural prison conditions at times were inadequate.
Men and women were housed separately. Pretrial detainees were kept
separately from convicted criminals until the trial begins. Juveniles
were housed separately from adults.
There was no independent monitoring of prison conditions. There was
no information that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
requested or was denied access to prisons for independent monitoring.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, search, detention, or imprisonment. The law
permits incommunicado detention; in the past, the Government generally
used it in allegedly sensitive criminal cases in which the police
claimed that communication between the accused and a third party could
jeopardize their investigation. In such cases, no one was notified that
the person had been arrested and was being held, which could amount to
forced disappearance.
The law prohibits arrest or search without probable cause.
Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police must report arrests
within 48 hours to the Public Prosecutor, who must determine within the
next 24 hours whether to charge, release, or order further detention
pending an investigation. The Public Prosecutor may order that
detainees be held for 7 days with the discretion to extend detention
for another 14 days. For additional detention without charge in cases
of felonies or misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment, the authorities
must obtain a court order. A court-ordered extension may not exceed an
additional 30 days of detention without charge and is granted only upon
a showing by the authorities of sufficient evidence that the defendant
committed the offense.
The country was a signatory to the Vienna Convention. However, at
times some foreign diplomats complained that the authorities did not
notify them when their citizens were detained or arrested, and that
they only discovered the detention or arrest by word of mouth, by
periodic prison visits, or because of an inquiry from the citizen's
family as to the citizen's whereabouts.
In concert with other governments, there were arrests and detention
in 2001 of numerous individuals suspected of ties to extremist groups.
Most of them were released.
The Federal Constitution provides accused persons the right to a
speedy trial. This right most often is invoked in civil cases, with
civil defendants at times demanding same-day disposition of the cases
filed against them. Authorities generally brought criminal defendants
to trial in a reasonable time, with the exception of drug-related
cases. In drug-related cases, the authorities were required to inform
the office of the ruler for the emirate in which the offense was
committed of the charges.
Trials could last a substantial period of time, depending on the
seriousness of the charges, number of witnesses, and availability of
judges. Rape cases sometimes took more than 1 year to get to trial.
There was no formal system of bail, but the authorities temporarily
could release detainees who deposited money, an important document such
as a passport, or an unsecured personal guarantee statement signed by a
third party. Those arrested on regular charges were generally allowed
to telephone third parties while in detention.
Defendants in cases involving loss of life, including involuntary
manslaughter, could be denied release in accordance with the law.
However, bail usually was permitted after a payment of compensation,
which was a form of financial penalty imposed on defendants in criminal
cases involving a killing.
Review of criminal cases by the local ruler's diwan and
bureaucratic delays in processing prisoners or releasing them at times
could result in detainees serving additional, unnecessary time in the
central prisons.
The rulers of the various emirates regularly pardoned prisoners on
religious and national holidays. Those pardoned generally were serving
sentences from 3 to 5 years for financial crimes, immigration
violations, and other minor offenses; pardons reportedly were not
extended to prisoners convicted of murder, rape, and kidnaping. Most of
the pardoned foreign nationals were to be deported, while those jailed
for financial crimes were to be given a grace period to settle amounts
still owed.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it was not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary; however, its decisions were subject to
review by the political leadership.
Most judges were noncitizen Arabs, whose mandate was subject to
periodic renewal by the Government. The percentage of citizens serving
as public prosecutors and judges, particularly at the federal level,
continued to grow.
There is a dual system of Shari'a (Islamic) courts for criminal and
family law matters and secular courts for civil law matters. The civil
courts generally were part of the federal system, except in the Dubai
and Ras Al-Khaimah Emirates, and were answerable to the Federal Supreme
Court located in Abu Dhabi, which had the power of judicial review as
well as original jurisdiction in disputes between emirates or between
the federal government and individual emirates. The Emirates of Dubai
and Ras Al-Khaimah had their own local and appellate courts, which had
jurisdiction over matters within their territory that the Constitution
or federal legislation did not specifically reserve to the federal
system. The Emirates of Dubai and Ras Al-Khaimah did not refer cases in
their courts to the Federal Supreme Court located in Abu Dhabi for
judicial review, although they maintained a liaison with the federal
Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Awqaf.
Each emirate administered Shari'a courts. In some emirates, in
addition to family matters, these courts considered all types of civil
and commercial cases as well as serious criminal cases. They acted in
accordance with traditional Islamic law and practice, but also were
required to answer to the Federal Supreme Court. Dubai had a special
Shi'a council to act on matters pertaining to Shi'a family law (see
Section 5).
Legal counsel may represent defendants in both court systems. Under
the Criminal Procedures Code, the accused has a right to government-
provided counsel in all cases involving a capital crime or possible
life imprisonment regardless of whether the defendant is financially
able to hire counsel. The Government provides counsel to indigent
defendants charged with felonies punishable by ``provisional
imprisonment'' or imprisonment of 3-15 years.
The right to legal counsel was interpreted to provide that the
accused was entitled to an attorney only after the police had completed
their investigation. Thus, police could question accused persons
sometimes for days or weeks, as in narcotics cases, without benefit of
legal counsel.
Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. There were no
jury trials. The number of judges sitting for a case depended on the
type of crime alleged. Generally three judges sat for felony criminal
cases and one judge sat in all other cases. All trials were public,
except for national security cases and those deemed by the judge likely
to harm public morality.
Each court system has an appeals process. Death sentences may be
appealed to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense was committed
or to the President of the Federation. Non-Muslims who are tried for
criminal offenses in Shari'a courts could receive civil penalties at
the discretion of the judge. Shari'a penalties imposed on non-Muslims
could be overturned or modified by a higher court.
In cases in which a defendant is acquitted of a crime, the
prosecutor may appeal the acquittal to a higher court. If the case is
appealed, the higher court reviews the case and may receive more and
new evidence. If convinced of the defendant's guilt, the appellate
court may set aside the lower court's verdict of not guilty and enter a
verdict of guilty with an order that the defendant pay compensation.
The appellate standard for overturning an acquittal is reportedly
``without the slightest doubt of guilt.''
In cases in which a defendant is sentenced to death, the sentence
may be reduced to a term of imprisonment if the victim or victim's
family provides a statement to the court forgiving the defendant. This
waiver by the victim or victim's family was sometimes made in exchange
for ``diya,'' a financial payment from the defendant. The term of
imprisonment in criminal cases was not related to the defendant's
payment of compensation to the victim or victim's family.
The local rulers' diwans, following traditional prerogatives,
maintained the practice of reviewing many types of criminal and civil
offenses before cases were referred to the prosecutor's office.
However, this practice was not as prevalent during the year, and such
cases usually were referred directly to the prosecutor's office. The
diwans may review sentences passed by judges and reserve the right to
return cases to the courts on appeal. The diwans' involvement, which
typically occurred when the case involved parties from two different
emirates or a citizen and a noncitizen, could lead to long delays prior
to and following the judicial process, causing some prisoners to remain
in prison after they had completed their sentences. Unlike in the past,
there were no reports of intervention by other emirates' rulers in
specific cases of personal interest.
The military has its own court system based on western military
judicial practice. Military tribunals try only military personnel.
There was no separate national security court system. Convicted
criminals may request a pardon at any time, except if convicted of
serious offenses such as murder.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits entry into homes without
the owner's permission, except in accordance with the law. Only police
officers and public prosecutors carrying a warrant were permitted entry
into homes. If the authorities entered a home without a warrant, their
actions were considered illegal, and the evidence obtained thereby was
suppressible. Officers' actions in searching premises were subject to
review, and officers were subject to disciplinary action if they acted
irresponsibly. Local custom and practice place a high value on privacy,
and entry into private homes without the owner's permission was rare. A
female police officer was required to be present during the search of a
private home when male family members were absent. There was no known
surveillance of private correspondence, although there have been cases
of incoming international mail being censored.
Family matters for Muslims are governed by Shari'a law and the
local Shari'a courts. As such, Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-
Muslims. However, in addition to marrying Muslim women, Muslim men are
free to marry women ``of the book,'' that is Christian or Jewish women.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech; however, the Government restricted this right in
practice. Freedom of the press was restricted.
The law specifically prohibits criticism of the Government, ruling
families, and friendly governments that threaten social stability under
penalty of imprisonment. However, the law was rarely enforced because
journalists practiced self-censorship, and there were no such cases
reported during the year.
The country's three English-language newspapers were privately
owned, as were three of its six Arabic-language newspapers; however,
all privately owned newspapers received government subsidies.
Newspapers often relied on news agencies for reporting and news. The
Government-owned Emirates News Agency regularly provided all newspapers
with themes for editorials and with articles regarding domestic and
international issues, which then usually were printed verbatim.
By law the Ministry of Information must license all publications.
The Ministry also approves the appointment of editors. The law governs
content and contains a list of proscribed subjects. Government
officials reportedly warned journalists when they published material
deemed politically or culturally sensitive.
Journalists engaged in critical investigative reporting on
government policy, the ruling families, national security, religion,
and relations with neighboring states only if given at least implied
permission to report on such matters. During the year, there were no
such articles that received widespread attention.
In September 2000, the Government banned 10 prominent citizens,
including 4 university professors, from publishing opinion pieces in
the country's Arabic and English language press and from giving local
television interviews. In April 2001, in response to inquiries by the
FNC, the Minister of Information stated that no written ban existed.
Reports indicated, however, that a ``de facto'' ban promoted by the
Government continued to exist, prohibiting those banned from writing
articles or granting interviews, despite remarks by government
officials to the contrary.
Emirates Media, which published Al-Ittihad newspaper and owned Abu
Dhabi's radio and television stations, forbade all its employees,
including journalists, from speaking with representatives of foreign
diplomatic missions without prior approval, although the rule was not
enforced in practice.
A press club in Dubai provided facilities for the international
press, including access to information, and served as a site for
discussions between political figures and journalists. While self-
censorship conditions what was reported, foreign journalists and news
organizations, including Reuters and CNN operating out of Dubai Media
City, part of the Dubai Technology, Electronic Commerce and Media Zone
(TECOM), reported that they experienced little to few or no
restrictions on the content of print and broadcast material produced
for use outside the country.
In January the Dubai Press Club invited 18 international press
clubs to form the International Association of Press Clubs, of which
Dubai would be the permanent secretariat.
All television and radio stations were government-owned and
conformed to government reporting guidelines; however, these
unpublished guidelines were not always applied consistently. Satellite
receiving dishes were widespread and provided access to international
broadcasts without apparent censorship. The main pan-Arab dailies were
not censored and were distributed on the same day of publication.
Censors at the Ministry of Information and Culture reviewed imported
newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, films, and videos; they
banned or censored before distribution any material considered
pornographic, violent, derogatory to Islam, supportive of certain
Israeli government positions, unduly critical of friendly countries, or
critical of the Government or the ruling families.
According to a press report, local access to the Internet, which
was open to public use with an estimated 1 million users, was through a
state-owned monopoly. However, the public was reportedly increasingly
in favor of ending this monopoly and opening the market to more
companies. A proxy server blocked material regarded as pornographic or
as promoting radical Islamic ideologies and antigovernment sites. In
most cases, the proxy server did not appear to block news services,
political expression unrelated to radical Islam, or material
originating from specific countries. The Internet monopoly solicited
suggestions from users regarding ``objectionable'' sites, and at times
the Government responded by briefly blocking some politically oriented
sites, which were, after an apparent review, later unblocked. The
monopoly also blocked commercial ``voice-chat'' sites on the Internet.
The ban on criticism of the Government also restricts academic
freedom. Academic materials destined for schools in the country were
subject to censorship. For example, male and female students were
banned from reading texts in which the human body was pictured or
sexuality was featured (see Section 5). In February the Ministry of
Education and Youth listed 26 books prohibited in schools (although
such books were widely available in bookstores), and obligated private
schools to comply with the Ministry of Education and Youth's censorship
rules regarding curricula and textbooks.
There were no specific cases reported regarding restrictions on
academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricted freedom of peaceful assembly. Organized public gatherings
required a government permit, which rarely was granted. In practice,
however, the Government rarely interfered with informal gatherings held
without a government permit in public places unless complaints were
made.
There were a number of organized gatherings of workers before the
Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs complaining of unpaid wages. There
also were a number of peaceful marches and rallies conducted in support
of the Palestinian cause.
Each emirate determined its own practice on public gatherings.
Citizens normally confined their political discussions to the
numerous gatherings or majlises, which were held in private homes.
There were a multitude of associations organized for economic,
religious, labor, social, cultural, sports, and other purposes.
The Government does not permit freedom of association without prior
permission; however most types of associations were allowed without
prior permission.
Unauthorized political organizations are prohibited. There were no
political parties, independent human rights groups, or trade unions
(see Sections 3, 4, and 6.a.).
All nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must be registered with
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs; however, a number of
unregistered local NGOs operated in the country. NGOs in the country
focused on a multitude of issues, including women's issues, the
environment, natural history and archaeology. The Jurists Association's
Human Rights Committee focused on local and regional human rights
issues. The percentage of citizen membership in NGOs varied widely.
Also, all private associations, including children's clubs, charitable
groups, and hobby associations, must be approved and licensed by local
authorities, although this requirement was enforced loosely in some
emirates. NGOs registered or licensed with the Government reportedly
received funds or subsidies from the Government according to the size
of their membership.
Private associations must follow the Government's censorship
guidelines if they publish any material.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Federal Constitution designates Islam
as the official religion, and Islam is also the official religion of
all seven of the individual emirates of the federal union. The Federal
Constitution provides for the freedom to exercise religious worship in
accordance with established customs, provided that it does not conflict
with public policy or violate public morals. The Government generally
respected this right in practice; however, the Government controlled
virtually all Sunni mosques and prohibited proselytizing by non-
Muslims.
Virtually all Sunni mosques were government funded or subsidized;
about 5 percent of Sunni mosques were entirely private, and several
large mosques had large private endowments. The federal Ministries of
Justice and Islamic Affairs and Awqaf distributed weekly guidance to
both Sunni imams and Shi'a shaikhs regarding subject matter, themes,
and content of religious sermons, and ensured that clergy did not
deviate frequently or significantly from approved topics in their
sermons. All Sunni imams were employees of either the Federal Ministry
of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Awqaf, or individual emirate
departments. The Emirate of Dubai's Department of Islamic Affairs and
Endowments controlled the appointment of preachers in that Emirate's
private mosques, as well as the conduct of their work.
The Shi'a minority, which was concentrated in the northern
emirates, was free to worship and maintain its own mosques. All Shi'a
mosques were considered private and receive no funds from the
Government. The Government did not appoint shaikhs for Shi'a mosques.
Shi'a Muslims in Dubai could pursue Shi'a family law cases through a
special Shi'a council rather than the Shari'a courts.
Considerable local autonomy in religious matters resided in the
individual emirates. There did not appear to be a formalized method of
granting official status to religious groups. Rather, the ruling
families could grant access to land and permission to build a church
thereon. Since not all religious groups had land use grants with
churches built there, several unrelated Christian congregations were
required to share common facilities. Even so, because Islam considers
Christianity one of the three monotheistic religions, facilities for
Christian congregations were far greater in number and size than those
for non-Christian and non-Muslim groups, despite the fact that
Christians represented less than a quarter of non-Muslim foreigners.
Some non-Muslims were permitted to practice their religion freely
in religious compounds built on land grants from the local rulers. In
such cases, a religious group leader requested from the local ruler a
grant of land (title to which remained with the ruler) with permission
to build a house of worship there. Religious groups without land grants
and churches built on it were limited in their ability to assemble for
worship and to conduct business, but were allowed to worship on the
compounds of other religious groups if permitted by such religious
groups to do so. Discreet, off-compound private and public gatherings
were not targeted or disrupted by the police or other security forces.
The Government followed a policy of tolerance towards non-Muslim
religions and in practice, interfered very little in the religious
activities of non-Muslims. Apparent differences in the treatment of
Muslim and non-Muslim groups often had their origin in the dichotomy
between citizens and noncitizens rather than religious difference.
The conversion of Muslims to other religions was regarded with
extreme antipathy. Therefore, although non-Muslims in the country were
free to practice their religion, they were not allowed to proselytize
publicly or distribute religious literature under penalty of criminal
prosecution and imprisonment. While there was no law against missionary
activities, in the past, authorities threatened to revoke the residence
permits of persons suspected of such activities; however, no such
permits were revoked during the year. Although the Government did not
permit foreign missionaries to proselytize, they have performed
nontraditional humanitarian missionary work since before the country's
independence in 1971. An International Bible Society representative in
Al-Ain distributed bibles and other religious material to Christian
religious groups countrywide. Authorities did not deny permission to
Christians who attempted to distribute religious material to remain in
the country.
On November 12, two members of the CID arrested a Filipino pastor
for distributing religious materials at a public shopping mall in
violation of the prohibition against proselytizing. He was detained
until December 17 before being released on informal bail and provided
his passport to the authorities as security for his release. He was not
charged formally by year's end; however, his movements in the country
have not been restricted, and he reportedly has preached to various
evangelical congregations throughout the country since his release.
In March 2001, Dubai police arrested four visiting noncitizens for
violating laws barring non-Muslims from proselytizing because they
distributed Christian religious materials, including videos and CD-
ROMS, on a public street. One of those arrested was detained for less
than a week. The accused persons deposited their passports as security
to guarantee their appearance in court. They were able to move freely
about Dubai but not permitted to leave the city. The charges against
the noncitizens were dropped in April 2001 and they left the country
the following day.
Although immigration authorities routinely asked foreigners to
declare their religious affiliation, the Government did not collect or
analyze this information, and religious affiliation was not a factor in
the issuance or renewal of visas or residence permits. In 2001 Abu
Dhabi inquired about religious affiliation in its fist municipality-
wide census as part of a demographic analysis.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement
or relocation within the country. Except for security areas such as
defense and oil installations, the Government generally respected these
rights in practice.
Unrestricted foreign travel and emigration are permitted to male
citizens, except those involved in legal disputes under adjudication.
Custom dictated that a husband could bar his wife, minor male and
female children, and adult unmarried daughters from leaving the
country, which he usually accomplished by taking custody of their
passports (see Section 5). However, there was no enforcement of this
custom at exit points unless there was a court order that barred an
individual from traveling. All citizens have the right to return.
There was a small population of ``stateless'' residents who either
were without citizenship or had no proof of citizenship to any country.
Many such families have lived in the country for more than one
generation. Many stateless residents originally were from Iran and
South Asia; other stateless residents included Bedouins or the
descendants of Bedouins who were unable to prove that they originated
in the country. There was no formal procedure for naturalization,
although foreign women received citizenship by marriage to a citizen,
and anyone could receive a passport by presidential fiat. Because they
were not of the original tribal groups, naturalized citizens could have
their passports and citizenship status revoked for criminal or
politically provocative actions; however, such revocations were rare,
and there were no reports of such occurrences during the year.
A child born to a citizen man and noncitizen woman acquired
citizenship at birth. In November the Government announced that
children born to citizen women and noncitizen men also acquired
citizenship at birth.
Although not sanctioned by law, employers generally required
foreign national employees to surrender their passports as a condition
of employment. In practice this prevented international travel or
repatriation by foreign national employees without their employers'
consent and especially affected such employees in the resolution of
employment disputes. Employers sometimes petitioned immigration
authorities to blacklist employees with whom they were engaged in
contract disputes. Citizens were not restricted in seeking or changing
employment. However, foreign nationals in specific occupations could
not change employers without first leaving the country for 6 months
(see Section 6.e.).
The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. In the past, the Government
detained persons seeking refugee status, particularly non-Arabs, while
they awaited resettlement in a third country.
There were no reports during the year of persons seeking refugee
status or first asylum and the issue of first asylum did not arise
during the year. The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees.
During the year, there were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. There
are no popular elections or democratic institutions, and citizens do
not have the right to form political parties. Federal executive and
legislative power is in the hands of the Federal Supreme Council, a
body composed of the hereditary rulers of the seven emirates that
elects from its members the country's President and Vice-President.
Decisions at the federal level generally were made by consensus among
the rulers, their families, and other leading families. The seven
emirate rulers, their extended families, and those persons and families
to whom they were allied by historical ties, marriage, or common
interest held political and economic power in their respective
emirates.
A federal consultative body, called the Federal National Council
(FNC), consists of 40 advisors appointed by the rulers. Advisors are
drawn from each emirate, with proportion based on emirate population.
The FNC has no legislative authority but it may question ministers and
make policy recommendations to the Cabinet. Its sessions usually were
open to the public.
The choice of appointing a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling
family in consultation with other prominent tribal figures. By
tradition, rulers and ruling families were presumed to have the right
to rule, but their incumbency ultimately depended on the quality of
their leadership and their responsiveness to their subjects' needs.
Emirate rulers were accessible, in varying degrees, to citizens who had
a problem or a request.
Tradition rather than the law limited the political role of women,
and there were very few women in senior positions. There were no female
members of the FNC. In Sharjah five women served on the emirate-wide,
40-member Consultative Council. The new female Council members were
appointed to the Council's Family Development Committee; however, they
reportedly were not limited to working on social issues and could also
join the Council's other committees. Other women in senior government
positions included an undersecretary in the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs and an assistant undersecretary for planning and
evaluation in the Ministry of Education.
Although the small Shi'a minority has enjoyed commercial success,
few Shi'as held top positions in the Federal government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Jurists' Association Human Rights Committee, which focused on
human rights education, operated as an independent domestic human
rights NGO. The Committee conducted a number of seminars and symposia
throughout the year on various human rights issues.
The Government cooperated with international human rights NGOs,
other foreign human rights NGOs, and international governmental
organizations. There were no reports that the Government refused to
cooperate with or refused access to international NGO human rights
monitors.
In the summer, AI visited the country and discussed various human
rights issues with government officials. During the year, the
Government also cooperated with foreign NGOs and worked with foreign
governments on issues involving the practice of trafficking in boys for
use as child camel jockeys.
In July representatives from the Armenian office of the
International Organization for Migration met with government officials
and community members to discuss trafficking in women issues. The
Government continued to work with the International Labor Organization
on labor issues.
In May the Ministry of the Interior conducted a seminar entitled
``Police Profession and Human Rights'' and created a Human Rights
Department to monitor human rights abuses centrally and to increase
awareness on human rights issues.
In July the Government-sponsored Zayed Center for Coordination and
Follow-Up, an affiliate of the Arab League, hosted a 2-day
international conference on human rights and war victims. In December
the Dubai Police Human Rights Section hosted a conference on the
protection of prisoners' rights and other human rights issues. The
Dubai Police Academy continued to include a course on human rights in
its curriculum for fourth-year students.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law without
regard to race, nationality, or social status. However, there was
institutional and cultural discrimination based on sex and nationality.
Women.--Abuse and rape are criminal offenses, and offenders were
prosecuted and penalized. There were some reported cases of spousal
abuse. The laws protect women from verbal abuse or harassment from men,
and violators were subject to criminal action. Police units were
stationed at major public hospitals so that victims of abuse could file
complaints, which would fall under the jurisdiction of the Shari'a
courts; in addition, attending physicians could call upon police to
interview suspected victims of abuse. Social workers and counselors
also maintained offices at public hospitals. However, women sometimes
were reluctant to file formal charges for social, cultural, and
economic reasons. When abuse was reported to local police, authorities
could take action to protect the complainant. There continue to be
credible reports of physical and sexual abuse of female domestic
servants by some local and foreign employers (see Section 6.e.). In
July the Women's Da'waa Administration, part of the Dubai Awqaf and
Islamic Affairs Department, established a telephone hotline for women
and children. The hotline had direct access to the Dubai Police if
police assistance was necessary, and was open to requests for
assistance from women in all emirates.
Although ``honor killings'' were uncommon, in June, in an apparent
``honor killing'' case, the Shari'a Appeal Court in Ras Al-Khaimah
Emirate commuted a foreign national's sentence of death to 5 years
served upon the defendant's parents' request that the death penalty be
waived. The defendant was convicted of the death of his younger sister
by stabbing because she married without her family's approval. The
defendant also seriously injured a second sister who tried to
intervene.
Prostitution is illegal; however, it has become an increasing
problem in recent years, particularly in Dubai. No accurate statistics
were available. However, substantial numbers of women arrived from the
states of the former Soviet Union, Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe,
and other states of the Middle East for temporary stays during which
they engaged in prostitution and possibly other activities connected
with organized crime. There was credible evidence that many of these
women sought to enter the country to make substantially more money than
they could earn in their home countries by engaging in prostitution;
however, other reports suggested that some of them engaged in
involuntary prostitution because their salaries were not paid or they
were reduced (see Section 6.f.).
While prostitution was acknowledged widely to exist, the Government
did not address the issue publicly because of societal sensitivities.
In an effort to combat prostitution, the Dubai police conducted special
patrols in areas frequented by prostitutes, and the immigration and
police forces have formed special units that conducted raids and sting
operations in areas frequented by prostitutes. To address the problem,
authorities restricted the number of visas issued to single women
between the ages of 30 and 40. However, press reports indicated that
airlines and tourism companies continued to obtain visitor visas for
single women between the ages of 30 and 40.
Trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual exploitation was a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
There were no legal prohibitions against women owning property or
businesses. The Shari'a law of inheritance applies equally to men and
women although laws of distribution may differ. When a woman marries,
her separate property (including her dowry, which is set by law at a
maximum of approximately $13,700 or 50,000 dirhams) and the income of
her separate property remain under her control and are not commingled
with the separate property of her husband. During the marriage, the
husband is obliged to provide a marital home and necessities for his
wife and children. In the event of divorce, a woman takes her separate
property, any amounts she receives in a property settlement with her
husband, plus any allowances granted to her for maintenance for her and
the children.
Custom dictated that a husband could bar his wife, minor male and
female children, and adult unmarried daughters from leaving the
country, if only by taking custody of their passports (see Section
2.d.).
Neither the labor law nor the civil service law, which covers labor
matters in the public sector, prohibits the employment of women. A man
has no right under Shari'a law to ban his wife from working if she was
employed at the time of their marriage. By custom and tradition, some
government bodies would not employ a married woman without her
husband's written consent, although such permission usually was
granted.
Shari'a law is applied in personal status cases. The law permits
men to have more than one wife, but not more than four, at a time. A
husband is required to ask his wife's permission and approval before he
may take a second wife.
Divorce is permissible. A woman may be granted a divorce if she can
prove that her husband has inflicted physical or moral harm upon her;
for example, that he has deliberately stayed away from her for 3
months, or has not paid for her upkeep or for the maintenance of her
children. Divorced women are granted custody of female children until
they reach the age of maturity or marry; they are granted temporary
custody of male children until they reach the age of 13. If the mother
is deemed unfit, custody reverts to the next able female relative on
the mother's side. A woman who remarries may forfeit her right to the
custody of children from a previous marriage.
The law prohibits cohabitation by unmarried couples. The Government
may imprison and deport noncitizen women if they bear children out of
wedlock. In the event that a court sentences a woman to prison for such
an offense, local authorities, at the request of the prisoner, may hold
the newborn children in a special area within the confines of the
prison or place them with a relative. In rare cases, children were held
in other facilities until the mother's release. In Dubai Emirate,
unmarried pregnant women generally must marry the father of the child
or repatriate to their home country. Otherwise, both parties would be
subject to arrest for fornication.
There were no legal prohibitions against a woman owning her own
business. Traditionally, professional women, including doctors,
architects, and lawyers, did not face restrictions on licensing
businesses in their names. The Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce conducted
programs to encourage small business entrepreneurship by women. The
Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Abu Dhabi and Dubai Emirates had
Businesswomen's Councils.
In October the first Arab and International Businesswomen's
Conference was held in Dubai. Attended by about 500 delegates, the
conference featured international women entrepreneurs and workshops
conducted by professional trainers.
Women who worked outside the home sometimes did not receive equal
benefits, such as housing, and faced discrimination in promotion. If a
woman and her husband were both employed by the Government, both
housing allowances will be paid to the husband because he is obliged
under Shari'a law to provide for housing. The Government provided
employee housing allowances to single women and to married women whose
husbands were employed in the private sector.
Maternity leave for public sector employees is a minimum of 45 days
to a maximum of 6 months--2 months with full pay, 2 additional months
of nursing leave with half salary, and the possibility of 2 more months
without salary.
Opportunities for women have grown in government service,
education, private business, and health services. Citizen and
noncitizen women constituted 15 percent of the national workforce. The
federal government publicly has encouraged citizen women to join the
workforce, ensuring public sector employment for all that apply. Women
represent most primary and secondary school teachers and health care
workers, and make up almost half of all government workers.
The law prohibits sexual harassment. As a form of deterrence,
Dubai-based newspapers regularly published pictures of men arrested in
Dubai for harassing women in public places. In August a citizen was
convicted and fined in Dubai for breach of privacy because he secretly
photographed six girls in a restaurant.
Women continued to make progress in education. They constituted
over 75 percent of the student body at UAE University in Al-Ain. Most
universities have separate campuses for men and women; however, the
American Universities in Dubai and Sharjah, private institutions, were
coeducational. Academic materials were subject to censorship, and
students were banned from reading texts in which the human body was
pictured or sexuality was featured (see Section 2.a.).
Women officially were encouraged to continue their education, and
government-sponsored women's centers provided adult education and
technical training courses. The federal armed forces accepted female
volunteers, who enrolled in a special training course that started
after the Gulf War. The Dubai Police College also recruited women; many
were deployed at airports, immigration offices, and women's prisons.
In August the first class of policewomen for Sharjah Emirate,
consisting of 53 women, completed a police skills training course at
the Sharjah Academy for Police Sciences.
Children.--The Government expended resources on the welfare of
child citizens; however, noncitizen children received fewer benefits.
Children who were citizens received free public education through
the university level, free health care, and were assured housing.
Citizens employed by the Government also were eligible to receive aid
from the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare for sons and daughters
who were under the age of 18, unmarried, or had disabilities.
Noncitizen resident children were not permitted to enroll in public
school unless they lived in rural areas that lacked private schools.
Many foreign workers in private sector employment received education
allowances as part of their salary packages; otherwise, expatriates
residing in the country paid for the expense of their children's
education. In an effort to help offset this expense for public
employees, the Government provided an annual subsidy of approximately
$1,600 (6,000 dirhams) to its noncitizen employees for private school
tuition per family.
Citizen children were required to attend school--segregated by
gender--through the sixth grade, the last grade of primary education,
when children could be as young as 10 or 11 years old. However,
compulsory education was not enforced, and some children, both girls
and boys, did not attend school.
Child abuse was not prevalent, apart from the trafficking of young
boys employed as camel jockeys (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
Effective September 1, the Government banned the use of young boys as
jockeys in camel races, with violators subject to penalties up to and
including imprisonment. The Government enforced the ban by inspections
at races. There were no reports of ban violations by year's end.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no discrimination against
persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision
of other state services. There was no federal legislation requiring
accessibility for persons with disabilities; however, most public
buildings provided access to disabled persons. The Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs sponsored six government physical and mental
rehabilitation centers open only to citizens.
Other rehabilitation centers were semi-government or established by
charity associations. Initiatives ranged from monthly social aid funds,
special education, and transportation assistance, to sending a team to
the Special Olympics. The Government and quasi-government entities also
provided a significant amount of nongovernmental financial assistance,
services, and emotional support to persons with disabilities.
In September the Ministry of the Interior established in Abu Dhabi
Emirate, the Rehabilitation, Training and Recruitment Center for People
with Special Needs. The center provided comprehensive education,
training and guidance and job placement assistance to disabled persons
between 14 and 40 years of age.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Societal discrimination against
noncitizens, while not legally sanctioned, was prevalent and occurred
in most areas of daily life, including employment, housing, and social
interaction. Employment, immigration, and security policy, as well as
cultural attitudes towards the very substantial number of foreign
workers, were conditioned by national origin.
It was estimated that more than 50 percent of foreign workers were
from the Indian subcontinent. Noncitizens were denied access to some
free services provided by the Government, including education, health
care, and social and recreational club memberships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law does not authorize workers to
form or join unions, and in practice, there were none. However, the
Government allowed workers to associate freely for the advancement of
common goals and interests. In practice workers addressed grievances
and negotiated disputes or matters of interest with employers through
formal and informal mechanisms.
Since 1995, the country has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards. However, the ILO reported in April that the country,
along with other Gulf States, had agreed to start projects to improve
respect for freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Although the
law does not grant workers the right to engage in collective
bargaining, it expressly authorizes collective work dispute resolution.
There were a number of organized gatherings of workers that
complained of unpaid wages before the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs. Some professional associations were granted greater freedom to
raise work-related concerns, to lobby the Government for redress, or to
file a grievance with the Government. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs reviewed employment contracts for workers in the industrial and
service sectors to ensure compliance with the labor laws. The labor
laws do not cover domestic and agricultural workers. The Ministry of
Interior's Naturalization and Residency Administration reviewed the
contracts of foreign domestic employees as part of residency permit
processing to ensure that the negotiated salaries and terms were
adequate. For the resolution of work-related disputes, workers had to
rely on conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs or on special labor courts.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs distributed information to
foreign workers outlining their rights under the labor law and how to
pursue labor disputes, whether individual or collective. Employees
could file individual employment dispute complaints with the Ministry
of Labor. With the Ministry acting as mediator, if the complaint was
unresolved by agreement of the parties, the employee could file a
complaint with the labor courts. In a collective work dispute between
employees and employer or employers concerning a subject of joint
interest to all or a group of them in an establishment, trade, vocation
or in a certain vocational sector, employees or employers could file
complaints with the Labor Ministry if they were unable to settle such
disputes amicably. If the Labor Ministry was unable to mediate a
settlement within 10 days, the complaint was submitted to a
Conciliation Committee for settlement. Either the employee or employer
could appeal the Conciliation Committee's decision to a Supreme
Committee of Conciliation, whose decision is final. While these
regulations existed, there was little information available about their
implementation in practice.
The Government prohibits strikes by those employed in the public
sector on the grounds of national security considerations. However,
there were a number of strikes by private sector employees during the
year. There were no reports that workers who went on strike were
deported.
Labor laws do not cover, and therefore do not protect, government
employees, domestic servants, and agricultural workers. The latter two
groups faced considerable difficulty in negotiating employment
contracts because the mandatory requirements contained in the labor law
did not apply. They also faced considerable difficulty in obtaining
assistance to resolve disputes with their employers. The employer
generally tied an employee's residency or visa to his employment and
sponsorship. If the employee terminated his employment and was unable
to secure new employment and a new sponsor, the employee lost residency
and could be required to leave the country.
Businesses in free trade zones must comply with federal labor laws;
however the Ministry of Labor did not regulate them. Instead, each free
trade zone maintained its own labor department to address workers
concerns.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--Forced or bonded labor
was illegal. However, some employment agents brought foreign workers to
the country under conditions approaching indenture. Some women
reportedly were brought to the country for service sector employment
and later were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Some low-
paid unskilled and semi-skilled workers were victims of contract-
switching.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
generally enforces this prohibition effectively. In particular, it has
taken concrete steps to resolve the problems of child camel jockeys
(see Section 4, 6.d., and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The labor law prohibits employment of persons under the
age of 15 and has special provisions for employing those 15 to 18 years
of age. The Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible
for enforcing the regulations. Other regulations permitted employers to
employ only adult foreign workers. The Government did not issue work
permits for foreign workers under the age of 18 years. Child labor was
not tolerated, with the exception in the past of child camel jockeys
(see Section 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
In September the Government implemented and began enforcing a child
camel jockey ban with criminal penalties for violators up to and
including imprisonment. The ban prohibits the use of camel jockeys less
than 15 years of age and less than 45 kilograms (99 pounds). The
Government enforced the ban through inspections at races. There were no
cases of ban violations reported by year's end.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Approximately 98 percent of the
private sector workforce consisted of foreigners. There were a
considerable number of skilled foreign nationals in the country who
were employed under favorable working conditions. However, the country
also was a destination for a large number of unskilled workers,
including up to 250,000 domestic servants, most of them women from
South and East Asia, and an even larger number of unskilled male
workers, mostly from South Asia. These unskilled laborers actively
competed for jobs in the country and other Gulf countries, and in the
past were subject to poor working conditions.
The standard workday is 8 hours per day; the standard workweek is 6
days per week; however, these standards were not enforced strictly.
Certain types of workers, notably domestic servants, could be obliged
to work longer than the mandated standard. The law also provides for a
minimum of 24 days per year of annual leave (2 days per month if
service is more than 6 months but less than 1 year; 30 days per year if
service exceeds 1 year) plus 10 national and religious holidays. There
was no legislated or administrative minimum wage; rather, supply and
demand determined compensation. Compensation depended on occupation and
employer and ranged from $109 (400 dirhams) per month for domestic or
agricultural workers working for local individual employers to $164
(600 dirhams) per month for construction workers working for companies
to much higher salaries for highly skilled employees. Compensation
packages generally provided housing or housing allowances. In addition,
other benefits, such as homeward passage or health cards for minimal to
no-cost health care, were often provided to employees by their
employers.
The Labor and Social Affairs Ministry reviewed labor contracts and
did not approve any contract that stipulated a clearly unacceptable
wage.
Most foreign workers did not earn the salary required to obtain
residency permits for their families. The required monthly minimum
salary to permit accompanying families was $1,090 (3,924 dirhams) or
$817 (2,941 dirhams), when a housing allowance is provided.
In two recent cases affecting the long held assumption of almost
total job security for citizens, a number of citizens were
involuntarily transferred, retired, or terminated from government
employment reportedly due to their affiliations or opinions. The
federal civil service laws, rather than the labor laws, covered public
sector employees. According to press reports, 10 national employees of
the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Awqaf filed complaints in
June alleging that adverse employment actions taken against them--
involuntary retirement prior to the legal age of retirement--were in
alleged violation of the civil service laws and the Social Security
Law.
In August some employees of the Ministry of Education and Youth
also were affected by adverse employment decisions. Press reports
indicated that these national employees were retired involuntarily,
whereas others were transferred involuntarily to other federal
ministries. The affected employees claimed they had good service
records and alleged that the adverse employment actions were taken
without stated reasons, cause, notice or process.
There continued to be local newspaper reports regarding the non-
payment of wages to foreign workers.
In May 73 laborers gathered to file a complaint against their
contracting company employer for 6 months unpaid wages and for failure
to renew their residence permits and labor cards. The police station
provided a bus to transport the workers to file their complaint. Also
in May, more than 20 medical students protested the suspension of their
classes by their lecturers because the lecturers had not been paid for
3 months. In August approximately 1,500 workers gathered at their
employer's head office to complain of unpaid wages. In September over
100 hotel employees filed a joint complaint against their employers for
unpaid wages of 3 to 5 months, annual leave salary, and end-of-leave
service benefits. The hotel had recently been sold without prior notice
to the employees and without making any legal arrangement to settle the
unpaid salaries and benefits. At year's end, there was no new
information available on two cases involving the non-payment of wages
from 2001: 61 Indian and Bangladeshi laborers and 500 South Asian
construction workers.
In May 2001, the Government introduced a new law requiring some
employers to deposit monetary guarantees with third-party banks. The
purpose of the guarantee was to decrease the growing number of cases in
which employees worked, sometimes for months, without wages. The amount
of the guarantee increased according to the number of workers employed
by the depositor. In theory, the greater the number of workers employed
by a company, the more money would be deposited and the greater the
likelihood that workers would be paid in a timely manner. However, the
law does not protect all workers. The law exempts from this requirement
those companies in which the Government owns a share, banks, insurance
firms, petroleum firms, and certain hotels.
In May the Labor Ministry announced that the institution of bank
guarantees to protect rights of workers had been mostly successful as
the number of labor disputes, especially in companies that were
required to deposit large bank guarantees, had decreased. After reports
that some employers were making their employees pay the amount of the
bank guarantee, in September the Labor Ministry warned employers that
such actions were in violation of the labor laws since the employers
were responsible for providing the bank guarantees and that the
Ministry would take strict action against companies that deducted the
value of the bank guarantee from their workers' salaries.
In May the Labor Ministry announced it would not tolerate the
violation of the rights of workers, especially those of low-income
laborers, and increased and intensified inspections. In August the
Labor Ministry announced that 215 companies had been blacklisted
(suspended from submitting applications for new work permits or
sponsorship transfers) and fined for labor law violations. In September
the Labor Ministry blacklisted a company for failure to comply with an
agreement with the Ministry to pay outstanding backpay of five months
to 300 workers.
Labor law violations by private industry reportedly were high due
to a shortage of labor inspectors and resources. In June the Labor
Ministry created a special task force to inspect all industrial
establishments in the private sector. In November 54 additional labor
inspectors began work.
Some foreign nationals involved in disputes with employers,
particularly in cases in which the employee signed a contract
containing a clause not to complete, could be blacklisted by the
employer with immigration authorities, effectively preventing their
return for a specified period of time. Employers also had the option to
petition to ban from the work force for 6 months any foreign employee
who left his job without fulfilling the terms of his contract (see
Section 2.d.).
Employers did not always follow the laws regarding the sponsorship
of foreign employees. Under the regulations, a company that has one or
more employee whose work permit has expired and not been renewed will
be barred from employing new staff. However, the rule was enforced
unevenly.
The Ministries of Health and of Labor and Social Affairs,
municipalities, and civil defense enforced health and safety standards,
and the Government required every large industrial concern to employ a
certified occupational safety officer. However, health and safety
standards were not observed uniformly. Press reports in June 2001 noted
a Ministry of Labor study that stated that many industrial
establishments failed to observe health and safety regulations, and
more than half provided substandard housing and unclean environments,
with sometimes as many as 15 workers living in a single room.
In August in Dubai, the steel roof of a four-story power plant
building under construction collapsed, killing 9 laborers and injuring
19, 5 of them seriously. In response, Dubai Municipality ordered a team
of its Building and Housing Department's specialized construction
engineers to visit the site and report on the collapsed structure. The
Labor Ministry also investigated the accident with regard to the legal
responsibilities of the involved companies to their workers. In May
2001, Dubai increased inspections of construction worksites and
factories. This measure followed a series of deaths and injuries caused
by accidents at construction sites throughout the country.
Contrary to popular belief, there is no law in the country that
prohibits labor outdoors when the temperature exceeds 50 degrees
Celsius. The law does require, however, that employers provide
employees with a safe work environment. Medical experts in the country
reported that it was inadvisable for laborers to work outdoors when the
temperature exceeded 40 degrees Celsius.
After five Dubai workers died of sunstroke in July, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs urged companies to provide safety measures to
avoid casualties from sunstroke and heat exposure, including reducing
work hours or splitting the workday to include a break between 11 a.m.
or noon and 3:00 p.m. The Labor Ministry also warned employers that it
would strictly enforce regulations requiring employers to ensure safe
working conditions for their employees. At year's end, there was no
further information.
In July 2 Sharjah hospitals reported receiving 10 cases of
sunstroke each day. Abu Dhabi public hospital emergency units reported
340 cases of severe and mild sunstroke, mostly involving outdoor
laborers, in the first 3 weeks of August. In the first week of August,
60 workers who suffered from sunstroke were admitted to a Dubai
hospital. At year's end, there was no further information.
Workers' jobs were not protected if they removed themselves from
what they considered to be unsafe working conditions. However, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs could require employers to
reinstate workers who were dismissed for not performing unsafe work.
Injured workers were entitled to fair compensation, and all workers had
the right to lodge grievances with Ministry officials, who made an
effort to investigate all complaints.
Rulings on complaints may be appealed within the Ministry and
ultimately to the courts; however, many workers chose not to protest
for fear of reprisals or deportation.
There were reports of abuse of domestic workers by their employers.
Allegations included excessive work hours, nonpayment of wages, and
verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. There was no further information
available on cases in 2001 of attempted suicide and rape (see Section
5).
Sponsorship and residency laws do not permit most foreign national
employees to change employers, and employers normally held their
employees' passports. Because of this practice, servants were unable to
leave their employment and return to their home country or find another
job.
In the past, employers typically transported workers from their
living quarters to their work site in trucks, trailers, or pick-ups. In
an effort to improve the safety of workers during the transport, in
April 2001, the Dubai Emirate banned transport in or through the
emirate of laborers in pick-up trucks and truck trailers that were not
designed to transport persons and lacked safety features, and required
employers to transport employees in buses, with offenders subject to
fines and/or vehicle seizure. In December Abu Dhabi Emirate also banned
this practice.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons, although child smuggling, prostitution, and
pornography are crimes. Trafficking in women and young boys used as
camel jockeys was a problem. The Government investigated allegations of
trafficking in persons when such allegations were made and provided
assistance in repatriation, medical care and locating shelter for
trafficking victims.
In September the Government banned the use of children as camel
jockeys in an effort to end this use of child labor and eliminate the
trafficking of young boys to the country for this purpose. The
Government also tightened controls at points of entry into the country
for boys under the age of 15 years and ordered the repatriation of
children in the country used as camel jockeys.
The law prohibits the use of camel jockeys that are less than 15
years of age and weigh less than 45 kilograms (99 pounds). All camel
jockeys are required to have a government-issued identification card,
which were issued after physical examination by a medical committee
through the use of x-rays and other tests to confirm that the child was
at least 15 years of age.
The Government established the following penalties for violators of
the child camel jockey ban: first offense, fine of approximately $5,500
(20,000 dirhams); second offense, banned from participation in camel
races for one year; third and subsequent offenses, imprisonment. The
Government enforced the ban by inspections at camel races.
There reportedly were as many as hundreds of underage camel jockeys
working in the country who were subjected to harsh conditions.
In the past, credible sources reported that almost all camel
jockeys were boys between the ages of 4 and 10 brought to the country
by small, organized gangs. The gangs obtained the youths, usually from
poor families in Pakistan and Bangladesh, by kidnaping, or in some
instances by buying them from their parents or taking them under false
pretenses, and then smuggling them into the country. Some children have
reported being beaten while working as jockeys, and others have been
injured seriously during races.
There was no further action taken in the 2001 death of a 7-year old
Bangladeshi boy in Dubai or the kidnaping in 2000 of a 10-year old
Pakistani boy camel jockey.
There were credible reports of trafficking in women to the country.
Some foreign diplomats and NGOs reported that some women were brought
to the country under the false pretense of working in the service
sector or as domestic servants, but then were forced into prostitution.
When these women and girls arrived in the country, the traffickers did
not provide the promised employment, reportedly took their passports,
and forced them to work as prostitutes to repay their travel expenses.
The women received little payment from the traffickers, however, which
made it difficult to repay their debts.
The women also were warned that they could be arrested if they
turned to the police or others for help because they were in the
country illegally. It was unclear whether this trafficking activity was
conducted with the full complicity of the women's citizen sponsors, or
whether the women's generally noncitizen agents were exploiting the
sponsorship system to engage in illicit activity (see Section 5).
The Kazakhstan government reported in June 2001 that it broke up a
trafficking ring that specialized in sending women to the country for
prostitution. Five members of the ring were arrested while attempting
to board a woman and a 15-year-old girl on a flight to Dubai.
__________
YEMEN
The Republic of Yemen is a republic with an active bicameral
legislature. Constitutional power is shared among the popularly elected
President, the appointed 111-member Shura Council, and a popularly
elected 301-seat House of Representatives. President Saleh is the
leader of the General People's Congress (GPC), which dominates the
Government. In September 1999, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was
directly elected in a popular vote to another 5-year term. The
Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote
from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election
was generally free and fair; however, there were problems, including
the lack of a credible voter registration list and election-related
violence. In addition, the President was not opposed by a competitive
candidate because his sole opponent was a member of the GPC. In 1997
parliamentary elections were held and the GPC won an absolute majority.
The elections were reasonably free and fair, although there were some
problems with voting procedures. The Parliament was not yet an
effective counterweight to executive authority, although it
increasingly demonstrated independence from the Government. The elected
House of Representatives was led by the head of the Islaah, the leading
opposition party, who effectively blocked some legislation favored by
the Executive. Real political power rested with the executive branch,
particularly the President. In February 2001, local elections were held
with all major opposition parties participating. The nominally
independent judiciary was weak and severely hampered by corruption,
executive branch interference, and the frequent failure of the
authorities to enforce judgments.
The primary state security apparatus is the Political Security
Organization (PSO), which reports directly to the President. The
Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the police reports to the
Ministry of Interior and conducts most criminal investigations and
makes most arrests. The Central Security Organization (CSO), also a
part of the Ministry of Interior, maintains a paramilitary force.
Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the
security forces, although there were some instances during the year in
which elements of the security forces acted independently of the
Government. Members of the security forces committed serious human
rights abuses.
Yemen is a very poor country with a population of approximately 19
million; more than 40 percent of the population live in poverty and the
unemployment rate is 36 percent. Its embryonic market-based economy,
despite a reform effort, remained impeded by government interference
and corruption. The economy is mixed; oil and remittances from workers
in other Arabian Peninsula states are the primary sources of foreign
exchange. The economy suffered due to other Arab governments' reaction
to the Government's lack of support for the U.N. coalition during the
Gulf War. However, international foreign aid and worker's remittances
have reemerged as important sources of income.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
some areas; however, its record was poor in several other areas, and
serious problems remained. There were limitations on citizens' ability
to change their government. There were no reports of arbitrary or
unlawful deprivation of life by the Government or its agents. Members
of the security forces tortured and otherwise abused persons, and
continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. During the year,
there were efforts to implement directives intended to align arrest,
interrogation, and detention procedures more closely with
internationally accepted standards. Prison conditions were poor. PSO
officers have broad discretion over perceived national security issues.
Despite constitutional constraints, security officers routinely
monitored citizens' activities, searched their homes, detained citizens
for questioning, and mistreated detainees. The Government usually
failed to hold members of the security forces accountable for abuses;
however, at year's end, there were two ongoing trials against security
officials. Prolonged pretrial detention was a serious problem, and
inefficiency, judicial corruption, and executive interference undermine
due process. The Government continued a comprehensive, long-term
program for judicial reform. The law limited freedom of speech and of
the press, and the Government continued to harass, intimidate, and
detain journalists. Journalists practiced self-censorship. The
Government at times limited freedom of assembly. The Government imposed
some restrictions on freedom of religion, and placed some limits on
freedom of movement. The Government displayed official support for
donor-funded democracy and human rights programs. Violence and
discrimination against women were problems. Female genital mutilation
(FGM) was practiced on a limited scale. The Government publicly
discouraged FGM, and sponsored initiatives through its National Women's
Committee to combat the practice. There was some discrimination against
persons with disabilities and against religious, racial, and ethnic
minorities. The Government influenced labor unions. Child labor was a
problem. Yemen was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD)
Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as an observer.
Bombings and targeted shooting increased during the year, with
several bombings in Sana'a and one in Marib, a grenade attack on the
U.S. Embassy, an attack on the oil tanker Limburg, a political killing
and the killing of three American hospital workers. The Government and
international observers attributed these bombings and shootings to
terrorism, religious extremism, and antigovernment political groups
based in the country and abroad.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life by the Government
or its agents. There were some reports during the year that security
forces killed or injured persons whom they believed were engaging in
criminal activity and resisting arrest.
For example, in January two persons reportedly were killed during a
clash between security forces and the bodyguards of Sheikh Mansur al-
Hanik, a Member of Parliament. In October several persons were killed
during a fight between security forces protecting a foreign embassy and
the bodyguards of family members of the Speaker of Parliament. Both
incidents illustrate the clashes that occasionally escalate between
private bodyguards of prominent figures and government forces. No
arrests were made in either incident.
There reportedly was no action taken against the members of the
security forces responsible for the following killings in 2001: The
January death in custody of Mohammed al-Yafia; the April killing of a
demonstrator in al-Dalah; the December death of four tribal members in
Marib and Shebwa governates; and the 2000 death in custody of Sabah
Seif Salem.
Four security officials were tried for abuses committed in previous
years. During the year, in Hadramaut, three security officers were on
trial for torturing two young boys. In Damar a former Security Director
was on trial for torture and bribery. These cases still were pending at
year's end.
Approximately seven persons were killed in election-related
violence in October (see Section 3).
Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and other abuses,
and the Government's ability to control tribal elements remained
limited. In addition, tensions between the Government and various
tribes periodically escalated into violent confrontations (see Section
5). In May 2001, the President gave the Shura Council the task of
developing a strategy to address the phenomenon of violent tribal
revenge; however, the Council had not done so by year's end. During the
year, the Shura Council issued a report stating that more than 2,000
persons died in 2001 as a result of tribal revenge.
Persons continued to be killed and injured in unexplained bombings
and shootings during the year. In most cases, it was impossible to
determine the perpetrator or the motive, and there were no claims of
responsibility. Some cases appeared to have criminal, religious, or
political motives; others appeared to be cases of tribal revenge or
land disputes. On November 29, a bomb detonated outside a state complex
in Marib.
There were threats, attacks, and killing of high-profile persons
during the year. For example, in December a high ranking official at
the Yemeni Socialist Party, Jarallah Omar, was killed in Sana'a. On
December 31, an individual smuggled a semiautomatic rifle into the
hospital in Jibla and killed three American medical workers and injured
one (see Section 2.c.). Both suspects were in custody by year's end.
During the year, the Government announced its intention to bring
suspects to trial in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. The explosion
killed 17 sailors and injured 39 others (see Section 1.e.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances in the last 8 years. Disappearances that occurred during
the 1994 war of secession have gone unresolved. The Government states
that the scarcity of records, resulting from the country's lack of an
effective national registry, hindered its attempts to create database
files for those persons who have disappeared. Both Amnesty
International (AI) and the U.N. Working Group on Enforced and
Involuntary Disappearances continued to note that there were hundreds
of unresolved disappearances dating from the preunity period in the
former PDRY. AI has received no credible reports of new disappearances
in the last 8 years.
There were no tribal kidnapings during the year. In the past, some
tribes sought to bring their political and economic concerns to the
attention of the Government by kidnaping and holding hostages. Foreign
businessmen, diplomats, and tourists were the principal targets. A
total of 166 foreigners have been kidnaped since 1992. Kidnaping
victims rarely were injured, and the authorities generally were
successful in obtaining the negotiated release of foreign hostages.
There has been a marked decline in tribal kidnapings of foreigners,
from six cases involving eight persons in 2000 to seven cases involving
seven persons in 2001 to no cases during the year. This decrease was at
least in part the result of the Government's establishment of a special
court and special prosecutor to try kidnapers and other violent
offenders. The Government issued by presidential decree a law that
stipulated severe punishments up to and including capital punishment
for persons involved in kidnaping, carjacking, attacking oil pipelines,
and other acts of banditry and sabotage.
In December 2001, a court convicted four men who had kidnaped a
German citizen in November 2001. The perpetrator received a 25-year
sentence and the others received 20-year sentences; however, in April
an appeals court increased the sentence for Ahmed Nasser al-Zayidi, to
a death sentence. The arrests, trials, and convictions continue. The
Government's prosecution appears to have deterred kidnapings. There
were no reports of tribal opposition or interference in these cases.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution is ambiguous regarding the prohibition of
cruel or inhuman punishment, and members of the security forces
tortured and otherwise abused persons in detention. Arresting
authorities were known to use force during interrogations, especially
against those arrested for violent crimes. Detainees in some instances
were confined in leg-irons and shackles, despite a law outlawing this
practice.
The Government has acknowledged publicly that torture takes place,
but it has claimed that the use of torture was not government policy.
The Government has taken some effective steps to end the practice or to
punish those who commit such abuses. However, a government prosecutor
has cited illiteracy and lack of training among police and security
officials as reasons for the persistence of the use of undue force in
prisons; corruption and pressure from superiors to produce convictions
also play a role. The immunity of all public employees from prosecution
for crimes allegedly committed while on duty also hinders
accountability; prosecutors must obtain permission from the Attorney
General to investigate members of the security forces, and the head of
the Appeals Court formally must lift their immunity before they are
tried. Low salaries for police officers also contribute to corruption
and police abuse.
There reportedly was no action taken against the members of the
security forces responsible for the following killings: The January
2001 torture and death in custody of Mohammed al-Yafia and the 2000
torture and killing of Sabah Seif Salem (see Section 1.a.).
There were two reported prosecutions of security officers during
the year for abuses committed in 2001. In Hadramaut three security
officers were on trial for torturing two young boys. In Damar a former
Security Director continued to be on trial for torture of persons. Both
cases were ongoing at year's end (see Section 1.a.).
There have been numerous allegations and credible evidence that the
authorities tortured and abused suspects and detainees to attempt to
coerce confessions before or during trial. During the year, several
families of persons detained in relation to terrorist activities have
alleged that torture has been used during interrogation.
The Constitution may be interpreted as permitting amputations in
accordance with Shari'a (Islamic law). However, the use of amputations
as punishment is extremely rare. Prior to the 2001 Sharaf case, there
had been no reports of amputations since 1991, although a small number
of persons who have been found guilty of theft remain in jail awaiting
the implementation of their amputation. The Shari'a-based law permits
physical punishment for some crimes. For example, in Ibb governorate in
2000, Mohamed Tahbit al-Su'mi, after being tried and convicted, was
stoned to death for the 1992 rape and murder of his 12-year-old
daughter. Capital punishment usually was carried out by firing squad;
stoning was almost unheard of, but was approved in this case due to the
unusual brutality of the crime.
In previous years, the Government at times used excessive force to
put down demonstrations and riots (see Section 2.b.).
Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, causing
numerous deaths and injuries (see Section 5).
Prison conditions were poor and did not meet internationally
recognized standards. Prisons were overcrowded, sanitary conditions
were poor, and food and health care were inadequate. Prison authorities
often exact bribes from prisoners or refuse to release prisoners who
have completed their sentences until family members pay a bribe. Tribal
leaders misused the prison system by placing ``problem'' tribesmen in
jail, either to punish them for noncriminal indiscretions or to protect
them from retaliation or violence motivated by revenge. Authorities in
some cases arrested without charge and imprisoned refugees, persons
with mental disabilities, and illegal immigrants and placed them in
prisons with common criminals.
Women were held in prison separately from men and conditions were
equally poor in women's prisons, where children likely were
incarcerated along with their mothers. At times male police and prison
officials subjected female prisoners to sexual harassment and violent
interrogation. The law requires male members of the families of female
prisoners to arrange their release; however, female prisoners regularly
were held in jail past the expiration of their sentences because their
male relatives refused to authorize their release due to the shame
associated with their alleged behavior.
There was continued attention focused during the year on the
circumstances of women prisoners. Several Nongovernmental Organizations
(NGOs), often with government support, undertook activities to address
the legal and other problems of female prisoners (see Section 4). For
example, the Women's National Committee published a report outlining
the problems and suggesting solutions to the plight of women in prison
during the year.
Unauthorized ``private'' prisons were a problem. Most such prisons
were in rural areas controlled by tribes, and many were simply a room
in a tribal sheikh's house. Persons detained in such prisons often were
held for strictly personal or tribal reasons and without trial or
sentencing. There were credible reports of the existence of private
prisons in government installations, although senior officials did not
sanction these prisons.
During the year, efforts continued to implement directives intended
to align arrest, interrogation, and detention procedures more closely
with internationally accepted standards. For example, the Ministry of
Interior created detention and interrogation centers in each
governorate (including four in Sana'a), to prevent suspects from being
detained with convicted criminals.
In November the President celebrated the Islamic holy month of
Ramadan by arranging for the release of dozens of prisoners. During the
year, the Government's Supreme National Committee for Human Rights
continued the 2000 government initiative, which permits the release of
prisoners who, in keeping with tribal or Islamic law, were being held
in prison pending payment of restitution to their victims, despite
having completed their sentences.
The Government tightly controlled access to detention facilities by
NGOs, although in some cases it permitted local and international human
rights monitors access to persons accused of crimes. In 2000 the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the Government's
full cooperation, conducted a comprehensive inspection of the country's
major prisons. While serious problems remain, the ICRC acknowledged the
Government's commitment to penal reform and noted that the Government
had made significant improvements since the 1995 ICRC inspection,
especially with regard to the incarceration of persons with mental
disabilities.
Patients with mental illness, particularly those who commit crimes,
were imprisoned and even shackled when there was no one to care for
them. In some instances, authorities arrested persons with mental
illness without charge and placed them in prisons alongside criminals.
The ICRC, in cooperation with the Yemeni Red Crescent Society, built
and staffed separate detention facilities for prisoners with mental
illness.
The PSO did not permit access to its detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides due
process safeguards; however, security forces arbitrarily arrest and
detain persons. Enforcement of the law was irregular and in some cases
nonexistent, particularly in cases involving security offenses.
According to the law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of
arrest or be released. The judge or prosecuting attorney must inform
the accused of the basis for the arrest and decide whether detention is
required. In no case may a detainee legally be held longer than 7 days
without a court order. Despite these constitutional and other legal
provisions, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge
were common practices.
During the year, in concert with partners in the war on terrorism,
the Government continued to detain suspects accused of links to
terrorism. According to the Yemen Times, in July, the Government
released 104 detainees. A parliamentary report issued in September
contained an acknowledgement by the Minister of Interior that such
detentions violated the Constitution; however, it asserted that they
were necessary for national security. In November the President
celebrated the Islamic holy month of Ramadan by arranging for the
release of approximately 30 detainees; at year's end, approximately 80
persons remained in detention.
Amar Mahmoud Ali Abdo al-Madhagi reportedly was in prison and
awaiting trial at year's end.
During the year, the Government continued to detain journalists for
questioning concerning articles critical of the Government or that the
Government considered sensitive. For example, in May the PSO detained
journalist Abdul-Rahim Muhsen and held him incommunicado for 6 days and
did not release him from prison for 19 days (see Section 2.a.). An
increase in the number of such incidents occurred for the first time
since 1999.
The law prohibits incommunicado detentions. The law provides
detainees with the right to inform their families of their arrests and
to decline to answer questions without an attorney present. There were
provisions for bail. In practice many authorities abide by these
provisions only if bribed.
Citizens regularly claim that security officials did not observe
due process procedures when arresting and detaining suspects,
particularly those accused of involvement in political violence. There
also were claims that private individuals hired lower-level security
officials to intervene on their behalf and harass their business
rivals. Security forces at times detained demonstrators (see Section
2.b.).
In cases in which a criminal suspect was at large, security forces
in some instances detain a relative while the suspect was being sought.
The detention may continue while the concerned families negotiate
compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. Arbitration, rather than the
court system, commonly was used to settle cases.
The Government failed to ensure that detainees and prisoners were
incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities. Unlike in
previous years, the Ministry of Interior and the PSO operated
extrajudicial detention facilities.
A large percentage of the total prison population consists of
pretrial detainees. There have been allegations that a large number of
persons have been imprisoned for years without documentation concerning
charges against them, their trials, or their sentences.
While some cases of those being held without charge have been
redressed through the efforts of local human rights groups and
government inspection missions (and some illegally detained prisoners
released), the authorities have not investigated nor resolved these
cases adequately.
Unauthorized private prisons also exist (see Sections 1.c. and
1.e.).
The law does not permit forced exile. The Government does not use
forced exile. However, at the end of the 1994 war of secession, the
Government denied amnesty to the 16 most senior leaders of the armed,
secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) who fled abroad.
Although they were not forced into exile, some were subject to arrest
if they return. The trial of the so-called ``16'' concluded in March
1998. During the year, with the encouragement of the Government,
prominent southern journalists, military officers, and their families
who fled the country during the 1994 war of secession returned to the
country, including Salim Saleh (see Section 1.e.).
During the year, the Government deported more than 100 foreigners,
many of whom were studying at Muslim religious schools, who allegedly
were in the country illegally. The Government claimed that these
persons were suspected of inciting violence or engaging in criminal
acts by promoting religious extremism. The Government deported them
using existing laws that require all foreigners to register with the
police or immigration authorities within a month of arrival in the
country.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
``autonomous'' judiciary and independent judges; however, the judiciary
was not fully independent, and it was weak and severely hampered by
corruption, and executive branch interference. The executive branch
appointed judges, and some have been harassed, reassigned, or removed
from office following rulings against the Government. Many litigants
maintain, and the Government acknowledges, that a judge's social ties
and bribery at times influence the verdict more than the law or the
facts. Many judges were poorly trained; some closely associated with
the Government often render decisions favorable to it. The judiciary
was hampered further by the Government's frequent reluctance to enforce
judgments. Tribal members at times threatened and harassed members of
the judiciary.
There were five types of courts: Criminal; civil and personal
status; kidnaping/terrorism; commercial; and court-martial.
All laws are codified from Shari'a, under which there are no jury
trials. Criminal cases were adjudicated by a judge, who plays an active
role in questioning witnesses and the accused. Under the Constitution
and by law, the Government must provide attorneys for indigent
defendants; however, in practice this never occurs. Judges at times
``appoint'' attorneys present in their courtrooms to represent indigent
defendants; however, most accept to avoid displeasing judges before
whom they must appear later.
By law prosecutors were a part of the judiciary and independent of
the Government; however, in practice prosecutors considered themselves
as an extension of the police.
Defense attorneys were allowed to counsel their clients, address
the court, and examine witnesses. Defendants, including those in
commercial courts, have the right to appeal their sentences. Trials
generally were public; however, all courts may conduct closed sessions
``for reasons of public security or morals.'' Foreign litigants in
commercial disputes have complained of biased rulings. However, some
foreign companies have won cases against local defendants, and some
such decisions have been enforced.
In addition, to regular courts, the law permits a system of tribal
adjudication for noncriminal issues, although in practice tribal
``judges'' often adjudicate criminal cases as well. The results of such
mediation carry the same if not greater weight as court judgments.
Persons jailed under the tribal system usually were not charged
formally with a crime but stood publicly accused of their
transgression.
A special court tried persons charged with kidnaping, carjacking,
attacking oil pipelines, and other acts of banditry and sabotage (see
Section 1.b.). In May this court handed down a sentence to an offender
who had thrown two grenades over the U.S. Embassy wall on March 15;
however, the sentence subsequently was reduced to 10-years on grounds
that the perpetrator suffered from psychological problems.
The Government continued its program begun in 1997 to reform the
judiciary. While the program has not yet been completed, some attorneys
cite improvements, including a reduction in the number of Supreme Court
justices from 90 to 40 in 1998, an increase in judges' salaries to
deter corruption, an increase in the Ministry of Justice's budget in
2000, and participation by judges in workshops and study tours
conducted by foreign judicial officials. However, there have not yet
been any tangible impacts on the administration of justice.
During the year, the country's Higher Judicial Council, chaired by
the President, dismissed 35 judges and prosecutors for violating the
law. In 2001 the Higher Judicial Council dismissed 20 judges and
prosecutors and forced 108 others to retire. The council also
strengthened the Ministry of Justice's authority to investigate and
prosecute allegations of judicial abuse, and instructed the
Accountability Council to accelerate its investigation of pending
cases.
The security services continued to arrest and prosecutors to charge
and try persons alleged to be linked to various shootings, explosions,
bombings, and other acts of violence. Citizens and human rights groups
alleged that the judiciary did not observe due process in these cases.
In September the Parliament issued a report on detainees held in
connection with terrorist activities. In the report, detainees' family
members alleged that detainees were held without family notification,
without counsel, without charges, and without basic privileges such as
health care. Family members alleged that some were held in isolation
and tortured. The Minister of Interior acknowledged that the detainees
were held, but asserted that it was necessary for national security. He
denied the torture charges and said that the detainees related to the
USS Cole attacks would be charged and prosecuted after investigation in
cooperation with international law enforcement partners. By year's end,
the investigation into the attack was transferred to the General
Prosecutor to prepare for trial, and several suspects were in custody
(see Section 1.a.). In 2001 the lawyer claimed that authorities denied
him access to his clients. There also were expressions of concern that
the prosecution had postponed proceeding to trial to give security
officials more time to investigate. However, there have been no reports
of allegations of torture from persons detained in connection with the
USS Cole investigation.
In January 2001, explosive devices were detonated in Aden outside
the Anglican Christ Church, which is used as a transient hotel by
seamen, and the official SABA News Agency office. Authorities
attributed the bombings to religious extremists, possibly affiliated
with the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA). Five persons were arrested and
their trial began in April 2001. In August three of five persons were
convicted of planning and carrying out the bombings and received
sentences of 6, 2 \1/2\, and 2 years, respectively. One defendant was
acquitted for lack of evidence and the fifth defendant's fate was
unknown.
The Government claims that it does not hold political prisoners.
Local opposition politicians and human rights activists generally
accept this claim; however, some international human rights groups and
members of the opposition-in-exile dispute it.
At the end of the 1994 war of secession, the President pardoned
nearly all who had fought against the central government, including
military personnel and most leaders of the unrecognized DRY. In
previous years, the Government tried in absentia the DRY leaders of the
so-called ``16.'' In January, Yemeni Socialist Party figure Salim
Saleh, accompanied by President Saleh, returned from his self-imposed
exile. At year's end, the President issued an amnesty to all but 4 of
the ``16.''
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Despite constitutional provisions against government
interference with privacy, security forces routinely searched homes and
private offices, monitored telephones, read personal mail, and
otherwise intruded into personal matters for alleged security reasons.
Such activities were conducted without legally issued warrants or
judicial supervision. Security forces regularly monitored telephone
conversations and interfered with the telephone service of government
critics and opponents. Security forces sometimes detained relatives of
suspects while the suspect was being sought (see Section 1.d.).
Government informers monitored meetings and assemblies (see Section
2.b.).
The Government reportedly blocked sexually explicit Web sites, but
did not block politically oriented sites (see Section 2.a.). The
Government claimed that it did not monitor Internet usage, but some
persons suspected security authorities read their e-mail messages.
There have been no reports that the Government has taken action against
Internet users.
The law prohibited arrests or the serving of a subpoena between the
hours of sundown and dawn. However, persons suspected of crimes in some
instances were taken from their homes in the middle of the night,
without search warrants.
No citizen may marry a foreigner without Interior Ministry
permission (see Section 5). This regulation does not carry the force of
law and appears to be enforced irregularly. However, some human rights
groups have raised concerns about the regulation.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press ``within the limits of the law'';
however, the Government influenced the media and restricted press
freedom. Some security officials attempted to influence press coverage
by threatening, harassing, and detaining journalists. Although most
citizens were uninhibited in their private discussions of domestic and
foreign policies, some were cautious in public, fearing harassment for
criticism of the Government. The Penal Code criminalizes, with fines
and sentences up to 5 years in jail, ``the humiliation of the State,
the Cabinet, or parliamentary institutions,'' the publication of
``false information'' that ``threatens public order or the public
interest,'' and ``false stories intended to damage Arab and friendly
countries or their relations with Yemen.''
An atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political
party newspapers continued at a higher level than before the war of
secession, despite a presidential amnesty to all journalists in July.
The Government used criminal prosecution, censorship, arrests, and
intimidation directed at journalists. For example, three journalists
were convicted on June 4, of ``religious sedition'' and ``harming
national unity'' and given 5-month suspended sentences. However, in
June 2001, with the Government's permission and encouragement, eight
prominent southern journalists who fled the country after the 1994 war
of secession returned to the country and resumed their careers.
The Ministry of Information influenced the media through its
control of most printing presses, subsidies to certain newspapers, and
its ownership of the country's sole television and radio outlets. Only
one newspaper, the thrice-weekly Aden independent Al-Ayyam, owned its
own press. The Government selected the items to be covered in news
broadcasts, and it often did not permit broadcast reporting critical of
the Government. However, during the most recent presidential election
campaign, the media extensively reported in full the many critical
comments made by the President's opponent. The Government televised
parliamentary debates, but it may edit them selectively to remove
criticism.
Press Law regulations specify that newspapers must apply annually
to the Government for licensing renewal, and that they must show
continuing evidence of about $4,375 (700,000 riyals) in operating
capital. Some journalists claimed that the regulations were designed to
drive some opposition newspapers out of business.
Although newspapers ostensibly were permitted to criticize the
Government, journalists at times censored themselves, especially when
writing on such sensitive issues as government policies toward the
southern governorates, relations with Saudi Arabia and other foreign
governments, official corruption, and combating terrorism. Journalists
were subject to arrest for libel, dismissal from employment, or
extrajudicial harassment. However, during the year the press
extensively covered the parliamentary report on detainees who
criticized the Government for their treatment (see Section 1.d.).
Editors-in-chief legally were responsible for everything printed in
their newspapers, regardless of authorship. Some journalists have
reported being threatened by security officials to change the tone and
substance of their reporting. Journalists must have a permit to travel
abroad, although there were no reports that this restriction was
enforced during the year (see Section 2.d.). During the year, the
Government enforced a 2001 circular prohibiting publication of
information or news pertaining to the armed forces before
``consulting'' with the Ministry of Defense when journalists who
reported on an alleged shooting of a military helicopter were harassed
and detained by security officials.
Most individual journalists and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate
agreed that the number of such incidents increased during the year for
the first time since 1999. In July the President issued amnesty for all
journalists in detention or awaiting trial. The amnesty directed the
General Prosecutor to stop all cases filed against journalists awaiting
prosecution. The orders also required journalists to pledge to
discontinue reporting that goes against the law, national norms, or
national unity. Because of these orders, no journalist signed the
pledge and while detainees have been released, no cases have been
resolved. Some journalists claimed that most harassment comes from the
police, in particular the CID, and no longer the PSO. Cases and ongoing
trials involving journalists often were not resolved formally, but
rather were settled through unofficial agreements between the
Government and the journalists, or languished indefinitely.
During the year, approximately 30 journalists from 23 media
institutions were investigated, charged, or imprisoned. By year's end,
the Ministry of Interior also shut down three opposition newspapers. In
May Abdul-Rahim Muhsen, a journalist for the Yemeni Socialist Party's
newspaper Al-Thawri, was arrested by the PSO. He was interrogated and
detained until July, despite a court sentence of 5 months imprisonment.
He had written articles that were critical of the Government. On June
5, Ibrahim Hussein, an Al-Thawri journalist, also was sentenced to 5
months in jail. Two weeks later, Hussein was rearrested and imprisoned
by the PSO and held incommunicado. On July 9, he was released pending
trial. The case was pending at year's end.
In June the Supreme Court upheld a lower court's 2001 decision to
suspend publication of Al-Shumu for approximately 1 year for alleging
corruption in the Ministry of Education. The Supreme Court also fined
Seif al-Hadhri, Al-Shumu's editor-in-chief $59 (10,000 riyals). The
Court also sentenced al-Hadhri to 6 months in prison and banned him
from practicing journalism for 10 months. Human rights groups
criticized the verdict and the sentence had not been carried out by
year's end. Al-Hadhri continues to practice journalism and in late
summer resumed publication of Al-Shumu'. During the year, al-Hadhri
reported negatively about the Ministry of Interior, and subsequently
the entire editorial board was arrested and held for 21 days in jail.
The editorial board was released, and the case was pending at year's
end.
There were no developments in two cases involving articles that
criticized the Government of Saudi Arabia: The 2000 court cases of
Jamal Ahmed Amer, a journalist for al-Usbu' newspaper and a member of
the opposition Nasserist Party and Dr. Qasim Sallam, the general
secretary of the opposition Arab Socialist Baath Party. Amer was
detained and held incommunicado for 6 days for writing an article
critical of Yemeni-Saudi relations. Sallam wrote an article that
alleged that there were supporters of Israel in the Saudi leadership.
There were no developments in the 2000 case of Hisham Ba Sharahil,
the editor of al-Ayyam who was charged with ``instigating the use of
force and terrorism'' and ``publishing false information'' for
publishing an interview with Islamic militant Abu Hamza al-Masri in
1999. He also was charged with ``insulting public institutions'' for
publishing an article critical of the Director of Aden Security from
the secessionist Movement of Self-Determination for South Arabia
(HATAM). Ba Sharahil's case was ongoing at year's end.
The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate defends freedom of the press and
publicizes human rights concerns. Critics claim that the syndicate was
ineffective because it has too many nonjournalist members who support
government policy. In previous years, several independent and
opposition party journalists formed a rival union, the Committee for
the Defense of Journalists, under the leadership of Hisham Ba Sharahil,
the publisher of al-Ayyam newspaper, to defend more vigorously
journalists harassed by the Government.
Customs officials confiscate foreign publications regarded as
pornographic or objectionable because of religious or political
content. In April 2001, PSO officials in Taiz detained Faysal Said
Fara'a, the director of a private cultural center, for 1 day of
questioning following his alleged receipt of banned books dealing with
the opposition. There were no reports during the year that the Ministry
of Information delayed the distribution of international Arabic-
language dailies in an effort to decrease their sales in the country,
as had occurred in previous years. However, authorities monitor foreign
publications, banning those that they deem harmful to national
interests.
An author must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Culture to
publish a book. Most books were approved, but the process was time-
consuming. The author must submit copies of the book to the Ministry.
Officials at the National Library must read and endorse the text, and
then it is submitted to a special committee for final approval. If a
book is not deemed appropriate for publication, the Ministry simply
does not issue a decision. Publishers usually do not deal with an
author who has not yet obtained a permit.
In June the Western Court of Sana'a asked the public prosecutor to
arrest Wajdi al-Ahdal, a novelist, for allegedly ``abusing Islam and
undermining the country's conventions.'' The Ministry of Culture
ordered copies of his book removed from shelves and ordered the closing
of the publisher. In May al-Ahdal left the country.
Internet use increased significantly. An estimated 46,400 persons
used the Internet, and 11,600 persons subscribed to it. There were more
than 80 Internet cafes in Sana'a and approximately 30 in other cities.
The Government did not impose restrictions on Internet use, but most
persons claimed that equipment and subscriptions costs were
prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the Ministry
of Telecommunications, and YemenNet were the country's Internet service
providers. The Government did not block politically oriented Web sites.
The Government restricted academic freedom to some extent because
of the extreme politicization of university campuses. A majority of
professors and students aligned themselves with either the ruling GPC
party or the opposition Islaah party. Each group closely monitored the
activities of the other. Top administrative positions usually were
awarded to political allies of these two major parties. There were
several clashes between GPC- and Islaah-affiliated students during the
year, but no serious violence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government limited this
right in practice. The Government claimed that it banned and disrupted
some demonstrations to prevent them from degenerating into riots and
violence. The Government required a permit for demonstrations, which it
issued routinely. Government informers monitored meetings and
assemblies. The opposition claimed that the Government sometimes
detained activists for questioning to prevent them from organizing
demonstrations.
Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of members of the
security forces using excessive force to disperse demonstrations. There
were a number of small, peaceful demonstrations during the year.
Authorities reportedly arrested the soldier responsible for the
April 2001 killing of a demonstrator in al-Dalah governorate, but there
was no information regarding whether he was disciplined. Residents of
al-Dalah long have resisted central government authority, and the
governorate for many years has been the scene of frequent (and at times
violent) clashes between often-armed residents and security forces.
The Constitution provides for the freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Associations
must obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Social Affairs or
the Ministry of Culture, usually a routine matter. Government
informants monitor meetings and assemblies.
The Government cooperates to some extent with NGOs, although NGOs
complain that there is a lack of response to their requests from
government officials. Some part of the Government's limited
responsiveness was due to a lack of material and human resources. In
January 2001, the Parliament passed the controversial Law for
Associations and Foundations, which regulates the formation and
activities of NGOs (see Section 4).
All political parties must be registered in accordance with the
Political Parties Law, which stipulates that each party must have at
least 75 founders and 2,500 members (see Section 3).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares that Islam is
the official religion and also provides for freedom of religion, and
the Government generally respected this right in practice; however,
there were some restrictions.
Followers of other religions were free to worship according to
their beliefs and to wear religiously distinctive ornaments or dress;
however, the Government forbids conversions, requires permission for
the construction of new places of worship, and prohibits non-Muslims
from proselytizing and holding elected office. The Government does not
designate religion on passports or identity cards. The Constitution
states that Shari'a is the source of all legislation.
Under Islam the conversion of a Muslim to another religion is
considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. There were no reports
of cases in which the crime was charged or prosecuted by government
authorities.
Official government policy does not prohibit or prescribe
punishment for the possession of non-Islamic religious literature.
However, there were unconfirmed reports that foreigners, on occasion,
have been harassed by police for its possession. In addition,
ostensibly to prevent proselytizing, some members of the security
forces occasionally censored the mail of Christian clergy who minister
to the foreign community.
The Government did not allow the building of new non-Muslim public
places of worship without permission. Weekly services for Catholic,
Protestant, and Ethiopian Christians were held in various locations in
Sana'a without government interference. Christian church services were
held regularly in other cities without harassment in private homes or
facilities such as schools, and these facilities appear to accommodate
the small numbers involved.
There were unconfirmed reports that some police, without the
authorization or knowledge of their superiors, on occasion have
harassed and detained persons suspected of apostasy to compel them to
renounce their conversions.
Public schools provided instruction in Islam but not in other
religions. However, almost all non-Muslims were foreigners who attended
private schools.
The Government has taken steps to prevent the politicization of
mosques in an attempt to curb extremism. This included the monitoring
of mosques for sermons that incite violence or other political
statements that it considered harmful to public security. Private
Islamic organizations may maintain ties to pan-Islamic organizations
and, in the past, have operated private schools, but the Government
monitored their activities.
The Government has taken steps to criticize publicly efforts by
some clerics to foment hatred and announced a plan to deny the use of
madrassahs (Islamic religious schools) for extremist purposes. The
Government threatened religious academies with closure, and deported
hundreds of foreign students. In May 2001, the Government mandated the
implementation of a 1992 law to unify educational curriculums and
administration of all publicly funded schools. Publicly funded Islamic
schools would be absorbed into the national system. This process began
in 2001, but the full implementation of the law remained ongoing.
In 2000 the Government suspended its policy (enacted earlier that
same year) of allowing Yemeni-origin Israeli passport holders to travel
to Yemen on laissez-passer documents. However, Yemeni, Israeli, and
other Jews may travel freely to and within the country on non-Israeli
passports (see Section 2.d.).
Following unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, owners of
property previously expropriated by the Communist government of the
former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRK), including
religious organizations, were invited to seek restitution of their
property. However, implementation of the process, including for
religious institutions, has been extremely limited, and very few
properties have been returned to previous owners.
Shari'a-based law and social custom discriminate against women (see
Section 5). Men were permitted to take as many as four wives, although
very few do so. By law the minimum age of marriage is 15. However, the
law largely is not enforced, and some girls marry as early as age 12.
On December 30, an individual killed 3 foreign medical staff and
injured 1 in a hospital in Jibla. The person was arrested immediately
after the shooting.
There reportedly were no developments in the case of the five
individuals who were arrested in connection with the 2001 bombing of
Christ Church in Aden. Their trial began in April 2001 and concluded in
August. No details of the trial were released to the public. There
reportedly were no developments in the case of a Muslim individual who
opened fire on worshipers during evening prayers at the local mosque in
Dhabyan. The shootings appeared to be criminally rather than
religiously motivated.
Nearly all of the country's once sizable Jewish population has
emigrated. There were no legal restrictions on the few hundred Jews who
remain, although there were traditional restrictions on places of
residence and choice of employment (see Section 5).
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on
freedom of movement. In general the Government did not obstruct
domestic travel, although the army and security forces maintained
checkpoints on major roads. There were a few reports during the year
that security forces at checkpoints killed or injured persons whom they
believed were engaging in criminal activity and resisting arrest.
In certain areas, armed tribesmen occasionally manned checkpoints
alongside military or security officials, and subjected travelers to
physical harassment, bribe demands, or theft.
The Government did not routinely obstruct foreign travel or the
right to emigrate and return. However, journalists must have a permit
to travel abroad. There were no reports that the restriction on
journalists was enforced during the year (see Section 2.a.). Women must
obtain permission from a male relative before applying for a passport
or departing the country.
Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country often were
required by security officials at government checkpoints to show that
they possessed resident status or refugee identification cards.
During the year, in an intensified effort to address terrorism and
perceived religious extremism, the Government enforced existing laws
that previously had been applied only erratically, and deported
foreigners who were in the country illegally or whom it suspected of
inciting violence or engaging in criminal acts. The initiative was not
applied to refugees, and there were no reports of due process
violations.
The law does not include provisions for granting asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the
Government continues to grant refugee status on a group basis to
Somalis who arrived in the country after 1991.
In 2000 the Government offered asylum to 56,524 Somalis. The
Government also cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in assisting refugees from Eritrea (2,560 persons), Ethiopia
(1,203 persons), and various other countries (252 persons). The
Government permitted the UNHCR to monitor the situation of an estimated
2,000 Iraqis in Yemen.
Approximately 43,000 Somali refugees have been integrated into
society and received medical treatment assistance from UNHCR. In
January 2001, the Government established the National Committee for
Refugee Affairs, which is composed of the Ministries of Interior and
Foreign Affairs, the Immigration Authority, and the Political Security
Organization, to handle refugee questions.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government; however, there were limitations in practice. The Government
by law is accountable to the Parliament; however, the Parliament was
not an effective counterweight to executive authority. Decisionmaking
and real political power still rested in the hands of the executive
branch, particularly the President. In addition, the Constitution
prohibits the establishment of parties that are contrary to Islam,
oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution, or violate the country's
international commitments.
The President appoints the Prime Minister, who forms the
Government. The cabinet consists of 35 ministers. Parliament is elected
by universal adult suffrage; the first such election was held in 1993.
International observers judged the 1997 parliamentary elections and
2001 local council elections as ``reasonably free and fair,'' despite
some problems associated with the voting.
Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President and leader of the GPC, was
elected to a 5-year term in the country's first nation-wide direct
presidential election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the
vote. The Constitution provides that the President is elected by
popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and
the election was generally free and fair; however, there were some
problems, including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In
addition, the President was not opposed by a truly competitive
candidate because the candidate selected by the leftist opposition
coalition did not receive from the GPC-dominated Parliament the minimum
number of votes required to run (the other opposition party chose not
to run its own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The
President's sole opponent was a member of the GPC. There was no
significant violence associated with the election.
Although the Constitution permits Parliament to initiate
legislation, to date it has not done so. Parliament generally was
relegated to debating policies that the Government already had
submitted, although it increasingly and successfully revised or blocked
draft legislation submitted by the Government. In addition, the
Government routinely consulted senior parliamentary leaders when it
drafted important national legislation. Despite the fact that the
President's party enjoyed an absolute majority, Parliament has rejected
or delayed action on major legislation introduced by the Government and
has forced significant modification. The Parliament also has criticized
strongly the Government for some actions, including the issue of
detainees and aspects of the Government's counterterrorism campaign.
Ministers frequently were called to Parliament to defend actions,
policies, or proposed legislation, although they may and sometimes do
refuse to appear. Parliamentarians at times were sharply critical
during these sessions. Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff attend
foreign NGO-sponsored training workshops designed to increase their
independence and effectiveness.
In a national referendum held in February 2001, citizens approved
several amendments to the Constitution, including amendments that would
extend the terms of Members of Parliament from 4 to 6 years and the
President from 5 to 7 years, allow the President to dissolve Parliament
without a referendum in rare instances, and abolish the President's
ability to issue decrees while Parliament was in recess. Another
approved amendment transformed the 59-member Consultative Council, an
advisory board to the President, into an appointed 111-member Shura
Council. The new Council, like the old, advises the President on a
range of issues and consists of appointed members chaired by a former
prime minister. However, unlike its predecessor, which had no
constitutional role, the Shura Council has limited legislative and
candidate approval powers.
Formal government authority is centralized in Sana'a; many
citizens, especially in urban areas, complain about the inability of
local and governorate entities to make policy or resource decisions.
The Local Authority Law, considered by the Government as an important
part of its ongoing democratization program, decentralizes authority by
establishing locally elected district and governorate councils.
Government-appointed governors headed the councils. The first elections
for the councils were held concurrently with the constitutional
referendum in February 2001. A few local councils still were not
constituted at year's end and many continued to lack sufficient
resources.
In some governorates, tribal leaders exercised considerable
discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Central
government authority in these areas often was weak.
In October voter registration was held for parliamentary elections
scheduled to take place in April 2003. Total registration increased to
more than 8 million voters, and women's registration increased 40
percent. Approximately seven persons were killed in registration-
related violence. Forty-two persons were wounded in more than 400
incidents of violence.
In general the elections and referendum in 2001 appeared to be free
and fair; however, there were problems. Approximately 28 persons were
killed and 47 injured in election-related violence. There were some
reports of fraud, as well as logistical problems in voting procedures.
The multiparty system remained weak. The GPC dominated the
Parliament, and Islaah was the only other party of significance in
Parliament. However, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) declared its
intention to participate in the April 2003 elections. All parties must
be registered in accordance with the Political Parties Law of 1991,
which stipulates that each party must have at least 75 founders and
2,500 members. Some oppositionists contended that they were unable to
organize new parties because of the prohibitively high legal
requirements regarding the minimum number of members and leaders. The
YSP and several smaller parties boycotted the country's first
nationwide direct presidential election in September 1999, but they
returned to active political life by participating in the February 2001
local elections and constitutional referendum.
The Government provided financial support to political parties,
including a small stipend to publish their own newspapers. However, the
YSP claims that the Government has yet to return the assets that it
seized from the party during the 1994 war of secession.
An extensive cabinet change in April 2001 expanded the Cabinet from
24 to 35 ministers, restructured existing ministries, and created
several new ministries to place greater emphasis on important national
issues, such as population, the environment, and human rights. The new
government program focuses on domestic reform, with particular
attention to human development, including education, economic
development, electoral reform, political decentralization, judicial
reform, and human rights.
There were 2 women in the 301-seat legislature. There were no women
in the Supreme Court. There was 1 woman in the Cabinet. Two women were
elected to the Parliament in 1997 (the same number as in 1993), and an
increasing number hold senior leadership positions in the Government or
in the GPC. The country's first female minister was appointed in April
2001, and 35 women were elected to the local councils. Voter
registration of women is less than half that of men although the
October voter registration showed a 40 per cent increase in the levels
of women's registration. Approximately 30 percent of women in the
country voted in the last election.
Many Akhdam, a small ethnic minority who may be descendants of
African slaves, did not participate in the political process. There
were no credible reports that citizen members of religious minorities
were not permitted to participate in the political process (see Section
2.c.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The concept of local nongovernmental human rights organizations is
relatively new, with the first groups forming only in the 1990s. During
the year, several groups held workshops and other activities without
government interference and often with government support.
A number of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials
sometimes were cooperative and responsive to their views; however, NGOs
complained that at times there was a lack of response to their
requests. Some part of the Government's limitation in responsiveness
was due to a lack of material and human resources. During the year,
several government-sponsored initiatives were aimed at furthering
cooperation with NGOs. For example, in October the Shura Council
sponsored a workshop that brought together more than 20 NGOs with
government officials and journalists.
The Taiz-based HRITC, domestic human rights NGO, placed particular
emphasis on education and NGO training. During 2001 the HRITC sponsored
numerous public lectures, training workshops, and conferences, and
participated in several meetings of the international human rights
community. During the year, the HRITC continued its work and developed
a directory of NGOs operating in the country. Several donors have
supported the HRITC. The HRITC did not conduct any investigations into
alleged human rights abuses during the year.
The Sana'a-based NGO Forum for a Civil Society focuses on human
rights within the context of establishing a legal framework for
prosecuting violators and helping to reconcile draft legislation that
is inconsistent with the Government's human rights policy or stated
responsibilities. The forum was instrumental in raising public opinion
and opposition to problems within the draft NGO and police laws (see
Section 2.b.). The forum also is reviewing the Personal Status and
Civil Procedure Laws to investigate how the laws affect women's rights
(see Section 5) and is involved in anticorruption endeavors and prison
reform. The group publishes the monthly Al-Qistas.
The Yemen Institute for Developing Democracy objective in creating
the group, Yemeni Democratic Forum, was to create a mechanism that
would promote democratic participation and government-civil society
engagement. During the year, it monitored the voter registration
process to ensure it was generally free and fair.
The National Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development
(NCHRDD) participated with other organizations in prison inspection
tours.
AI, Human Rights Watch, the Parliament of the European Union, and
the Committee to Protect Journalists observed the country closely. The
ICRC maintained a resident representative. The Government has given
these groups broad access to government officials, records, refugee
camps, and prisons (see Section 1.c.).
The Supreme National Committee for Human Rights (SNCHR), which
reported to the Deputy Prime Minister, who also was Minister of Foreign
Affairs, was dissolved in June 2001, reconstituted, and then placed
under the authority of the new Minister of State for Human Rights. The
SNCHR had been responsible for ensuring that the country met its
obligations with respect to implementing international human rights
conventions and investigating specific instances of abuse. The
committee viewed, as its highest priority, education as a means to
effect cultural change. It undertook several human rights educational
projects, including incorporating human rights education into secondary
school curriculums and providing human rights workshops for police
officers and other security officials. The committee was less active in
investigating specific cases of abuse.
The Government created a new Human Rights Ministry in April 2001,
headed by the country's first female minister. The country's Minister
of State for Human Rights, Dr. Wahibah Fare'e, was a prominent women's
rights activist and the founder of Queen Arwa University. Dr. Fare'e
has identified women's rights, the rights of children and persons with
disabilities, and prison reform as her priorities. Since her
appointment, she has attended a number of human rights conferences and
workshops.
The Human Rights Committee of the President's Shura Council
conducted numerous prison inspections, and suggested that those
prisoners who had finished their sentences but did not pay their fines
be released (see Section 1.c.).
The Parliament's human rights committee participated in prison
inspections during the year. The committee has no authority except to
issue reports.
The Committee to Combat Torture is composed of 100 senior
parliamentarians and party leaders, including some opposition members,
but apparently was inactive during the year.
The Center for Future Studies, a think tank affiliated with the
Islaah Party, issues an annual report on human rights practices,
providing a wide-ranging overview of human rights. There is little
follow-up to the report.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal in general
rights and duties,'' and that society ``is based on social solidarity,
which is based on justice, freedom, and equality according to the
law''; however, discrimination based on race, sex, and disability,
existed. Entrenched cultural attitudes often affected women's ability
to enjoy equal rights.
Women.--The law provides for protection against violence against
women; however, such provisions rarely were enforced. Although spousal
abuse reportedly was common, it generally was undocumented. Violence
against women and children was considered a family affair and usually
was not reported to the police. In the country's traditional society,
an abused woman was expected to take her complaint to a male relative
(rather than the authorities), who should intercede on her behalf or
provide her sanctuary if required. The only institutionalized aid
program for victims was a small shelter for battered women in Aden.
The law prohibits rape; however, it was a widespread problem.
The press and women's rights activists only recently have begun to
investigate or report on violations of women's rights. During the year
and in 2001, NGO-sponsored conferences attempted to raise the media's
awareness of violence against women.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) was practiced. The prevalence of
the practice varied substantially by region. Citizens of African origin
or those living in communities with strong African influence were more
likely to practice FGM. In January 2001, the Cabinet issued a decree
making it illegal for public or private health service practitioners to
practice FGM, and some government health workers and officials
continued to discourage the practice actively and publicly. During the
year, the January 2001 Cabinet decree was reissued as a presidential
decree, making it illegal for heath service practitioners to practice
FGM. On December 28, some NGOs in Hodeidah and Aden held a conference
on combating FGM to discuss specific ways to combat the practice.
Prostitution is illegal; however, it occurred in practice.
The Penal Code allows for leniency for persons guilty of committing
a ``crime against honor,'' a euphemism for violent assaults or killings
committed against a female for her perceived immodest or defiant
behavior. Legal provisions regarding violence against women state that
an accused man should be put to death for murdering a woman. However, a
husband who murdered his wife and her lover may be fined or imprisoned
for a term not to exceed a year. Despite the apparent sanctioning of
honor killings, most citizens, including women's activists, believed
the phenomenon was not widespread. Some international NGOs claimed that
the practice was more prevalent, but admitted to a lack of evidence to
support such claims.
Women faced significant restrictions on their role in society. The
law, social custom, and Shari'a, as interpreted in the country,
discriminated against women. Men were permitted to take as many as four
wives, although very few do so. By law the minimum age of marriage is
15. However, the law largely is not enforced, and some girls marry as
early as age 12.
The law stipulates that the wife's ``consent'' to the marriage is
required; consent is defined as ``silence'' for previously unwed women
and ``pronouncement of consent'' for divorced women. The husband and
the wife's ``guardian'' (usually her father) sign the marriage
contract; in Aden and some outlying governorates, the wife also signs.
The practice of bride-price payments is widespread, despite efforts to
limit the size of such payments.
The law provides that the wife must obey the husband. She must live
with him at the place stipulated in the contract, consummate the
marriage, and not leave the home without his consent. Husbands may
divorce wives without justifying their action in court. A woman has the
legal right to divorce; however, she must provide a justification, such
as her husband's nonsupport, impotence, or taking of a second wife
without her consent. However, the expense of hiring a lawyer is a
significant deterrent, as is the necessity for rural women to travel to
a city to present their case. A woman seeking a divorce also must repay
the mahr (a portion of her bride price), which creates an additional
hardship. As a woman's family usually retains the mahr, the refusal by
a family to pay the mahr effectively can prevent a divorce. The
family's refusal to accept the woman back into the home also may deter
divorce, as few other options are available to women. When a divorce
occurs, the family home and older children often were awarded to the
husband. The divorced woman usually returns to her father's home or to
the home of another male relative. Her former husband must continue to
support her for another 3 months, since she may not remarry until she
proves that she is not pregnant.
The Cabinet issued the ``House of Obedience'' law, which contained
provisions that forced women who left their husbands to return. During
the year, the law was passed by Parliament. A grassroots effort to
lobby against the provisions was conducted by NGOs, lawyers,
journalists, and the National Women's Committee (NWC). Subsequently,
government removed the provisions that forced women to return to their
husbands after they had left them.
Women who seek to travel abroad must obtain permission from their
husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel (see Section
2.d.). They also were expected to be accompanied by male relatives.
However, enforcement of this requirement is not consistent.
Shari'a-based law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian or
Jewish woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Women do
not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born spouses;
however, they may confer citizenship on children born in the country of
foreign-born fathers.
According to an Interior Ministry regulation, any citizen who
wishes to marry a foreigner must obtain the permission of the Ministry.
A woman wishing to marry a foreigner must present proof of her parents'
approval to the Interior Ministry. A foreign woman who wishes to marry
a citizen man must prove to the Ministry that she is ``of good conduct
and behavior,'' and ``is free from contagious disease.'' There were no
corresponding requirements for men to demonstrate parental approval,
good conduct, or freedom from contagious diseases. Although the
regulation does not have the force of law and is applied irregularly,
some human rights groups have raised concerns about it.
The Government consistently supported women's rights as exemplified
by local law and the expansion of the public role of women. The
President frequently speaks publicly about the importance of women in
politics and economic development. Several ministries have a number of
female directors general. In 2000 the Prime Minister established the
Supreme Council for Women, an independent governmental body charged
with promoting women's issues in the Government.
According to 2000 government statistics, approximately 68 percent
of women were illiterate, compared with approximately 28 percent of
men. The fertility rate is 6.5 children per woman. Most women have
little access to basic health care.
In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, were better
educated and have had somewhat greater employment opportunities than
their northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 war of secession,
the number of working women in the south appears to have declined, due
not only to the stagnant economy but also to increasing cultural
pressure from the north. According to the UNDP, female workers account
for 19 percent of the paid labor force. There were no laws prohibiting
sexual harassment, and it occurs in practice.
Prior to unification, approximately half of the judges working in
the PDRY were women. However, after the 1994 war of secession,
conservative leaders of the judiciary reassigned many southern female
judges to administrative or clerical duties. Although several female
judges continue to practice in Aden, there were no female judges in
northern courts.
The National Women's Committee (NWC), a government-sponsored semi-
independent women's association, promotes women's education and civic
responsibility through seminars and workshops and by coordinating
donors' programs. The committee's chairwoman sits on the Prime
Ministerial Supreme Council for Women. In July 2001, the NWC, in a
legal reform project financed by the World Bank, completed a 6 month
review of 58 significant national laws to find and rectify provisions
that discriminated against women or violated equal status requirements
agreed to by the Government in international conventions. The NWC's
seven-member legal committee identified problems and recommended legal
changes. The Cabinet approved the recommended changes in principle,
with some revisions; however, Parliament passed no legislation
regarding this matter by year's end. During the year, the NWC also
pushed for a quota system to reserve at least 10 percent of the
parliament seats for women. The Government passed no legislation
regarding the guarantee by year's end.
There were a number of recently formed NGOs working for women's
advancement, including the Social Association for Productive Families,
promoting vocational development for women; the Women and Children's
Department of the Center for Future Studies, organizing seminars and
publishing studies on women and children; the Woman and Child
Development Association, focusing on health education and illiteracy;
and the Yemeni Council for Motherhood and Childhood, providing
microcredit and vocational training to women.
Children.--While the Government asserts its commitment to protect
children's rights, it lacked the resources necessary to ensure adequate
health care, education, and welfare services for children. Malnutrition
was common. The infant mortality rate in 1999 was 75 deaths per 1,000
births, down from 105 per 1,000 in 1998. Male children received
preferential treatment and had better health and survival rates.
The law provides for universal, compulsory, and free education from
ages 6 to 15; however, the provision regarding compulsory attendance is
not enforced. Many children, especially girls, do not attend primary
school. According to a UNDP report released during 2001, average
student attendance in primary schools is 76 percent for boys and 40
percent for girls. In rural areas, 52 percent of children attend
school; the rate in urban areas is 81 percent. In 1998 to encourage
girls' attendance at school, the Government passed a law that
eliminated school fees and the requirement of uniforms for girls.
According to an UNICEF report, enrollment of girls in school increased
by 4 percent in 1998.
Child marriage is common in rural areas. Although the law requires
that a girl be 15 years of age to marry, the law is not enforced, and
marriages of girls as young as age 12 occur.
The law does not prohibit Child abuse, and it was a problem.
FGM was practiced on a limited scale (see Section 5).
Persons with Disabilities.--Persons with mental and physical
disabilities faced distinct social prejudices, as well as
discrimination in education and employment. The Government mandated the
acceptance of persons with disabilities in universities, exempted them
from paying tuition, and required that schools be made more accessible
to persons with disabilities; however, it was unclear to what extent
these laws have been implemented. There is no national law mandating
the accessibility of buildings for persons with disabilities.
Public awareness regarding the need to address the concerns of
persons with disabilities appeared to be increasing. For example,
during 2001 a privately funded center for persons with hearing and
speaking impairments was established in Taiz. In 2000 donors financed
the establishment of three new schools for persons with disabilities in
Taiz governorate.
The Handicapped Society and the Challenge Society were involved in
assisting persons with disabilities. These two NGOs provided
rehabilitation assistance and vocational training, and sponsored
cultural and sports activities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens with a noncitizen
parent at times face discrimination in employment and in other areas.
Persons who sought employment at Sana'a University or admission to the
military academy by law must demonstrate that they have two citizen
parents. Nonetheless, many senior government officials, including
Members of Parliament and ministers, have only one citizen parent. In
some cases, naturalization of the noncitizen parent is sufficient to
overcome the ``two-Yemeni-parent'' requirement.
A small group of persons claiming to be the descendants of ancient
Ethiopian occupiers of the country who later were enslaved, were
considered the lowest social class. Known as the ``Akhdam'' (servants),
they live in poverty and endure persistent social discrimination. The
Government's Social Fund for Development (SFD) for ``special needs
groups,'' focused particularly on the Akhdam. In July 2001, several
Akhdam-origin citizens in Taiz governorate established the Free Black
People's Charitable Organization to fight discrimination and improve
conditions for their community.
Human rights groups have reported that some immigrants of African
origin have difficulty in securing Interior Ministry permission to
marry citizens. An Interior Ministry regulation required that marriages
of citizens and foreigners be approved in advance by the Ministry (see
Section 1.f.).
Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, and the
Government's ability to control tribal elements responsible for acts of
violence remained limited. For example, during January two persons were
reported killed in tribal disputes between the al-Fukara and al-Saiad
tribes in Mareb governorate. In March two persons were reported killed
and four injured in Saada in a tribal leadership dispute between Bani
Ghalfan and al-Bau Slamah tribes. In May five persons were killed and
seven injured in a tribal dispute between al-Wahbi and al-Ubaysi tribes
in al-Bayda governorate. Tensions, which periodically escalate into
violent confrontations, continue between the Government and some
tribes.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and Labor Law
provide that citizens have the right to form and join unions; however,
this right was restricted in practice. The Government sought to place
its own personnel in positions of influence inside unions and trade
union federations.
The General Federation of Trade Unions of Yemen (GFWTUY) remained
the sole national umbrella organization. The GFWTUY claimed
approximately 350,000 members in 14 unions and denied any association
with the Government, although it worked closely with the Government to
resolve labor disputes through negotiation. Observers suggest that the
Government likely would not tolerate the establishment of an
alternative labor federation unless it believed such an establishment
to be in its best interest.
Only the General Assembly of the GFWTUY may dissolve unions. The
law provides equal labor rights for women, and it confirms the freedom
of workers to associate. The Labor Law does not stipulate a minimum
membership for unions, nor does it limit them to a specific enterprise
or firm. Thus, citizens may associate by profession or trade.
The law generally protects employees from antiunion discrimination;
however, during the year the International Confederation of Labor
Unions identified weaknesses within this law. Employers do not have the
right to dismiss an employee for union activities. Employees may appeal
any disputes, including cases of antiunion discrimination, to the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. Employees also may take a case to
the Labor Arbitration Committee, which is chaired by the Ministry of
Labor and also consists of an employer representative and a GFWTUY
representative. Such cases often were disposed favorably toward
workers, especially if the employer was a foreign company.
The GFWTUY is affiliated with the Confederation of Arab Trade
Unions and since November 2001 with the Brussels-based International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The GFWTUY withdrew from the
formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions in January
2001.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law
provides workers with the right to organize and bargain collectively.
The Government permitted these activities; however, it sought to
influence them by placing its own personnel inside groups and
organizations. The Ministry of Labor has veto power over collective
bargaining agreements, a practice criticized by the International Labor
Organization (ILO). Several such agreements exist. Agreements may be
invalidated if they were ``likely to cause a breach of security or to
damage the economic interests of the country.'' Unions may negotiate
wage settlements for their members and may resort to strikes or other
actions to achieve their demands. Public sector employees must take
their grievances to court.
The Labor Law provides for the right to strike; however, strikes
were not permitted unless a dispute between workers and employers is
``final'' and ``incontestable'' (a prior attempt must have been made to
settle through negotiation or arbitration). The proposal to strike must
be submitted to at least 60 percent of all concerned workers, of whom
25 percent must vote in favor of the proposal. Permission to strike
also must be obtained from the GFWTUY. Strikes for explicit ``political
purposes'' were prohibited.
There were very few strikes during the year, and there were no
reports of violence in connection with these strikes.
There are no export processing zones (EPZs) in operation; an EPZ is
planned for Aden.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, and there were no reports that such
practices occurred.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The established minimum age for employment is 15 years in
the private sector and 18 years in the public sector. By special
permit, children between the ages of 12 and 15 may work. The Government
rarely enforced these provisions, especially in rural and remote areas.
The Government also did not enforce laws requiring 9 years of
compulsory education for children.
Child labor was common, especially in rural areas. Many children
were required to work in subsistence farming because of the poverty of
their families. Even in urban areas, children worked in stores and
workshops, sold goods on the streets, and begged. Many school-aged
children work instead of attending school, particularly in areas in
which schools were not easily accessible.
In 2000 the President's Consultative Council (now the Shura
Council) adopted the ILO's Child Labor Strategy to address persistent
child labor problems. A special council, under the leadership of the
Minister of Social Affairs and Labor, used the strategy as a
government-wide guideline for enforcing existing child labor laws and
formulating and implementing new laws.
The Child Labor Unit at the Ministry of Labor implemented and
enforced child labor laws and regulations. The unit is responsible for
investigating and addressing cases and issuing guidelines to prevent
child labor. They have offices in 11 provinces, and have established
specific guidelines to prevent child labor under the age of 12. The
Government was an active partner with the International Program to
Eliminate Child Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no established minimum
wage for any type of employment. The Labor Law states that ``it shall
not be permissible that the minimal level of the wage of a worker
should be less than the minimal wages of government civil servants.''
During the year, the Government again increased civil servants' wages.
Private sector workers, especially skilled technicians, earn a far
higher wage. The average wage does not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family.
The law specifies a maximum 48-hour workweek with a maximum 8-hour
workday, but many workshops and stores operate 10- to 12-hour shifts
without penalty. The 35-hour workweek for government employees was 7
hours per day from Saturday through Wednesday.
The Ministry of Labor was responsible for regulating workplace
health and safety conditions. The requisite legislation for regulating
occupational health is contained in the Labor Law, but enforcement was
weak to nonexistent. Many workers regularly were exposed to toxic
industrial products and develop respiratory illnesses. Some foreign-
owned companies as well as major manufacturers implement higher health,
safety, and environmental standards than the Government required.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations and may challenge dismissals in court. These laws were
generally respected in practice.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
from, or within the country.
SOUTH ASIA
----------
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan has experienced civil war and political instability for
23 years. The arrival of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces and
the collapse of the Taliban in 2001 helped to begin to bring an end the
decades-long pattern of serious human rights abuses. There was no
functioning central government from 1996 until December 22, 2001, when
the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) took office. On December 5,
2001, a U.N.-sponsored Afghan peace conference in Bonn, Germany,
approved a broad agreement for the establishment of transitional
mechanisms, including a 6-month AIA to govern the country. There was a
peaceful transfer of power from the AIA to the Transitional Islamic
State of Afghanistan (TISA). As mandated by the Bonn Agreement, the
AIA/TISA formed the Judicial Commission, the Human Rights Commission,
and a Drafting Committee of the Constitutional Commission to begin the
process of reform in these areas. A Civil Service Commission has yet to
be named. In June the Emergency Loya Jirga, a gathering of Afghan
representatives from throughout the country, elected Hamid Karzai as
President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. Karzai
subsequently formed a cabinet including two female members and broad
ethnic representation. The Loya Jirga was unable to reach a decision on
formation of a legislative body and deferred its creation until
elections scheduled for June 2004. Major provincial centers were under
the control of regional commanders. With one significant exception in
the southeast, these commanders acknowledged the Karzai administration
as the legitimate central authority. Karzai appointed governors to all
32 provinces. The 1964 Constitution served as the interim Constitution.
The legal framework of the country and judicial system of the country
were also set forth in the Bonn Agreement. Existing laws, not
inconsistent with the Bonn Agreement, the country's international
obligations, or applicable provisions of the Constitution, remained in
effect. Judicial power rested with the Supreme Court. Under the Karzai
government, the rule of law applied throughout the country; however, in
practice recognition of the rule of law, particularly outside of Kabul,
was limited. Years of Soviet occupation and civil war resulted in the
country's laws becoming a mix of codes. During these years, much of the
formal judicial structure deteriorated. The judiciary continued to
operate on an ad hoc basis.
During most of 2001, the Taliban, an ultra-conservative Islamic
movement, controlled approximately 90 percent of the country. On
October 7, 2001, OEF, a U.S.-led coalition, began military action aimed
at toppling the Taliban regime and eliminating the al-Qa'ida network in
the country. U.S. forces worked in concert with anti-Taliban forces of
the Northern Alliance as well as others in the southern part of the
country. By mid-November 2001, the Taliban had been removed from power.
U.S. military operations continued during the year, especially in
southern and eastern regions, to capture and detain remaining Taliban
and al-Qa'ida fighters.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), established on
December 20, 2001, was responsible for the security of Kabul under the
command of the United Kingdom and later Turkey. Outside the capital,
regional commanders and warlords maintained local militias. Sporadic
fighting continued across the north among rival commanders loyal to
Jumbesh leader General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Jamiat-i Islami
commander Mohammad Atta. There was also skirmishing in the west near
Shindand between Herat leader Ismail Khan and Pashtun commander
Amanullah Khan. In October Pacha Khan Zadran, a warlord in Khost/
Paktia, fled from Khost after months of instigating attacks on forces
loyal to the Karzai government and refusing to yield the governor's
residence to a Karzai appointee.
The dislocations associated with more than 20 years of fighting,
together with years of severe drought, reduced the country's economy to
below subsistence level for a majority of the population. A U.N.-
sponsored health survey in the north in January 2001 found alarming
levels of malnutrition, especially among women and children. Most of
the population of approximately 25.8 million remained engaged in
agriculture and animal husbandry. In previous years, opium poppy was
the mainstay of the economy and largely financed the military
operations of various provincial authorities. While production dropped
dramatically in 2001 after a Taliban ban on poppy growth, cultivation
resumed and produced one of the world's largest poppy harvests during
the year. The severe drought affected more than half of the population
and continued to affect severely approximately 5 to 6 million persons.
The drought increased internal displacement and caused massive loss of
livestock and loss of livelihood. Livestock losses were reported at
approximately 50 percent. Crop loss in many areas averaged 75 percent.
Additionally, a lack of resources and the prolonged civil war impeded
reconstruction of irrigation systems, repair of market roads, and
replanting of orchards. Since the AIA/TISA took office, rehabilitation
efforts in these areas accelerated with international assistance. While
the removal of the Taliban permitted increased mine clearance activity,
millions of landmines and unexploded ordnance remained throughout the
country, restricting areas available for cultivation. In October TISA
successfully began introduction of a new currency. Formal economic
activity consisted primarily of small to medium shops buying and
selling a range of materials and goods transiting the country. There
was little manufacturing or industrial activity. The country was
dependent on international assistance, and large portions of the
population required food aid to survive. Reconstruction, primarily in
the areas of water and sanitation, hospitals, schools, and secondary
roads, proceeded in differing degrees throughout the country.
The Government made significant progress in establishing democracy
and good governance during its first full year of democratic government
after prolonged civil war and political instability; however,
reconstruction and recovery was the central focus of activity, and
numerous problems remained. The Government allowed citizens the right
to change their government through Loya Jirga elections that were
deemed free and fair; however, there were some reports of intimidation
and interference in the Loya Jirga process. Members of the security
forces committed arbitrary, unlawful, and some extrajudicial killings,
and officials used torture in jails and prisons. Prison conditions
remained poor. Overcrowding and limited food and medical supplies
contributed to deteriorating health and even death among prisoners.
There were approximately 500,000 displaced persons. Sporadic fighting
and related security concerns, as well as the drought, discouraged some
refugees from returning to their country. The Karzai government
generally provided for the freedom of speech, the press, assembly,
association, religion, and movement; however, serious problems
remained. Violence and societal discrimination against women and
minorities were problems. Women and girls were subjected to rape and
kidnaping, particularly in areas outside Kabul where security problems
persisted. Local commanders in northern provinces targeted Pashtuns for
murder, looting, rape, and destruction of property. Approximately
60,000 Pashtuns became displaced because of the violence. Worker rights
were not defined, although the 1964 Constitution generally prohibited
forced labor. Local reports indicated there was widespread disregard
for and abuse of internationally recognized worker rights. Child labor
persisted. Afghanistan was invited by the Community of Democracies'
(CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as an observer.
The remnants of the Taliban and rogue warlords sometimes
threatened, robbed, attacked, and occasionally killed local villagers,
political opponents, and prisoners. During the year, some efforts were
made to bring to justice those persons responsible for serious abuses.
On October 9, Abdul Shah, a Taliban commander, was convicted of mass
murder and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
In addition, significant efforts were made to improve the situation
for women. After the fall of the Taliban, some women, primarily in
Kabul, were able to discard the burqa, a head-to-toe veil that the
Taliban enforced rigidly. In December President Karzai decreed that
women had the right to choose whether to wear the burqa. Female civil
servants and teachers also were able to return to work. International
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were able to
employ women. For example, on March 8, the country celebrated
International Women's Day for the first time in many years. Hundreds of
schools nationwide were opened or reopened for 3 million boys and girls
beginning in March. In May a new primary school for 600 boys and 430
girls opened in the village of Nawabad. In Herat Province, nearly
100,000 girls enrolled in schools in grades 1-12 during the year. With
the assistance of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, more than 2
million Afghan refugees returned to their home communities around the
country.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The arrival of the
OEF forces and the collapse of the Taliban in 2001 helped begin to
bring an end to the decades-long pattern of serious human rights
abuses, including extrajudicial killings. However, in the aftermath
there continued to be reports of unlawful killings. In November police
used excessive force and killed two persons to disperse demonstrations
in Kabul when hundreds of students protested living conditions in
dormitories (see Section 2.b.). The Government launched an
investigation into the incident; however, no findings had been issued
at year's end. According to Amnesty International (AI), there were
reports of intimidation, attacks, and killings during the Loya Jirga
process. One report stated that at least eight persons were killed
during the delegate selection process, and in Herat, several candidates
were arbitrarily detained, harassed, and threatened. At year's end, no
investigation or arrests had been made in connection with the killings.
There were reports of deaths in custody. In November the U.N.
reported that at least one potential witness to the events that
surrounded the November 2001 transport of Taliban prisoners who died in
September after being taken into custody by Jumbesh leader General
Dostum's forces. Taliban fighters died in fighting, during the
suppression of a riot and while in custody in Mazar-i Sharif (see
Section 1.g.).
In 1998 the U.N. found several mass graves connected with the
massacre of Taliban fighters near Mazar-i Sharif in 1997, which
contained evidence consistent with mass executions. Independent
investigations of these and other killings, including killings by the
Taliban, were hindered by the continuing warfare and the unwillingness
of local commanders to allow investigators to visit the areas in
question. At year's end, mass killings from 1997 and 1998 had not been
fully investigated.
During the year, there were instances of government forces killing
civilians during the fight against Taliban supporters. In August 70
persons reportedly were killed in fighting between ethnic Tajik forces
and ethnic Pashtuns forces in Herat.
An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by
landmines. Casualties caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance were
estimated at 10 to 12 per day (see Section 1.g.).
There were numerous bombings during the year. For example, on April
8, 4 persons were killed and 12 injured when a bomb exploded near a car
carrying the Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim in Jalalabad. On June 19,
unknown assailants launched a rocket near the U.S. Embassy. There were
no injuries. On September 5, approximately 35 persons were killed by a
car bomb in Kabul. No one claimed responsibility for any of these acts.
The lack of an effective police force, poor infrastructure and
communications, instability, and insecurity made it difficult to
investigate unlawful killings, bombings, or civilian deaths, and there
were no reliable estimates of the numbers involved.
Unknown assailants attacked and killed several senior officials.
For example, in February Civil Aviation Minister Abdul Rahman was
killed at Kabul airport. No suspect had been arrested and by year's
end, no prosecution had taken place. In July Vice President and Public
Works Minister Haji Abdul Qadir was killed in an ambush while leaving
his office. At year's end, there had been no claim of responsibility.
President Karzai appointed a five-member team of officials to
investigate the killing. By year's end the case still was under
investigation. On September 5, a 19-year-old assailant killed one
person in an attempt to assassinate President Karzai.
In November 2001, Taliban prisoners staged a revolt at Qala-i Jangi
near Mazar-i Sharif. Approximately 120 prisoners died during the
uprising. There were reports that Northern Alliance fighters killed
some of the prisoners after the uprising had been brought under
control. No action was taken against those reportedly responsible for
post-battle executions of prisoners.
There were no developments in the 2001 mass killings by the Taliban
of mainly Shi'a Hazaras in Yawkowlang.
b. Disappearance.--There were reports of politically motivated
disappearances. In September the U.N. reported the disappearance of
several potential witnesses to the deaths of Taliban prisoners
transported to Shiberghan prison in November 2001. There were
allegations that forces loyal to northern leader General Dostum were
responsible for these disappearances.
There were credible allegations of Taliban responsibility for
disappearances, abductions, kidnapings, and hostage-takings between
1998 and 2001. Taliban forces reportedly abducted women and girls from
Taloqan, the Shomali plain, and Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i Sharif.
A number of accounts indicated that the Taliban forced women and girls
into marriages or trafficked them to Pakistan and the Arab Gulf states.
The whereabouts of most of these women and girls remained unknown. By
year's end, the whereabouts of thousands of persons detained by the
Taliban, including those detained after the capture of Mazar-i Sharif
in 1998, fighting in Taloqan in 2000, and occupation of Yakawlang in
2001, remained unknown.
There were no developments in the disappearances of General Abdul
Rahman, General Farooq, Moulvi Shabuddin, Waliullah Dagarwal, General
Syed Agha Rayees, engineer Nabi Shah, and Wolaswal Ismail.
Groups in Russia listed nearly 300 Soviet soldiers formerly serving
in Afghanistan as missing in action or prisoners of war (POWs) from the
Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989). Most were thought to be dead or to have
assimilated voluntarily into Afghan society, although some allegedly
were held against their will. A number of persons from the former
Soviet Union, missing since the period of the Soviet occupation, were
presumed dead.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1964 Constitution, in effect under the Bonn Agreement,
prohibits such practices, and torture did not appear to be systematic
throughout the country, but there were reports of abuses. Some
provincial authorities were believed to have used torture against
opponents and POWs, although specific information generally was
lacking. Some prison officials reportedly beat prisoners in Kabul. In
November Human Rights Watch (HRW) alleged that some police authorities
in Herat routinely employed electric shock on detainees. HRW also
reported that some Herat security officials beat prisoners who were
hung upside down. In late May, Herat Governor Ismail Khan's security
forces arrested Mohammad Rafiq Shahir, and police reportedly beat
Shahir so severely that cuts and bruises were still visible during the
Loya Jirga in mid-June (see Section 3). According to a 2001 report,
prison authorities in Badakhshan Province routinely used rubber and
plastic-bound cables in beatings.
Prison conditions remained poor. According to AI, prisoners lived
in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions in collective cells and were not
sheltered from severe winter conditions. In January the Physicians for
Human Rights (PHR) reported on the ``deplorable conditions'' at
Shiberghan Prison. The PHR found severe overcrowding, non existent
sanitation, exposure to winter cold, inadequate food, and no medical
supplies for the 3,500 prisoners. Dysentery, pneumonia, and yellow
jaundice were epidemic. According to the PHR report, the cells in
Shiberghan were constructed to house 10 to 15 prisoners, but they held
80 to 110 men during the year.
A number of regional leaders, particularly Ismail Khan in Herat and
General Dostum in Shiberghan, maintained prisons that most likely held
political detainees. Herat prison held 600 to 700 prisoners. Shiberghan
prison held approximately 1,000 inmates, including Taliban fighters and
a number of Pakistanis.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to
visit detainees during the year; however, fighting and poor security
for foreign personnel limited the ability of the ICRC to monitor prison
conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Legal and law
enforcement institutions existed but operated unevenly throughout the
country due to lack of personnel and training. During the year, justice
was administered on an ad hoc basis according to a mixture of codified
law from earlier periods, Shari'a law, and local custom. Persons were
subject to arbitrary detention. There were credible reports that local
police authorities extorted bribes from civilians in return for their
release from prison or to avoid arrest. Judicial and police procedures
varied from locality to locality. Procedures for taking persons into
custody and bringing them to justice followed no established code.
Practices varied depending on the area and local authorities. Some
areas had a more formal judicial structure than others.
There were unconfirmed reports of private detention facilities
around Kabul and in northern regions of the country.
In the months proceeding the Loya Jirga in June, Ismail Khan's
officials reportedly arrested Loya Jirga candidates who were not his
supporters.
In November 2001, supporters of former king Zahir Shah reportedly
were arrested and severely beaten by Herat authorities. The arrests
took place when the former king's supporters attempted to hold a
political rally near Herat's main mosque.
A number of persons arrested by the Taliban for political reasons
were believed still to be in detention until the fall of the Taliban
late in 2001. The whereabouts of such detainees was uncertain at year's
end.
There was no information available regarding forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--With no functioning nationwide
judicial system, many municipal and provincial authorities relied on
some interpretation of Islamic law and traditional tribal codes of
justice. The Bonn Agreement called for the establishment of a Judicial
Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with
Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law, and local
legal traditions. In November the Government inaugurated the Judicial
Commission, and President Karzai appointed two women and various ethnic
minorities to it. The judiciary operated with minimal training.
The administration and implementation of justice varied from area
to area and depended on the inclinations of local authorities. In the
cities, courts decided criminal and civil cases. There reportedly was a
lower court and a higher court in every province. The Supreme Court was
located in Kabul. In cases involving murder and rape, convicted
prisoners generally were sentenced to execution, although relatives of
the victim could instead choose to accept other restitution or could
enforce the verdict themselves. Decisions of the courts reportedly were
final. The courts reportedly heard cases in sessions that lasted only a
few minutes. According to AI, some judges in these courts were
untrained in law and at times based their judgments on a combination of
their personal understanding of Islamic law and a tribal code of honor
prevalent in Pashtun areas. In rural areas, local elders and shuras
were the primary means of settling criminal matters and civil disputes.
In September a closed court convicted Abdullah Shah, a former
commander, of mass murder, including the killing of 50 Hazaras during a
bus hijacking. Before Shah's appeal was formally heard by the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Fazl Shinwari publicly stated that Shah should
receive the death sentence. Shah subsequently received a death sentence
at the conclusion of his appeal. Shah did not have legal representation
during the appeal. In general defendants did not have the right to an
attorney, although they were permitted attorneys in some instances.
Most provincial authorities likely held political prisoners, but
there were no reliable estimates of the numbers involved.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The 1964 Constitution, in effect under the Bonn
Agreement, states that, ``No one, including the State can enter or
search a residence without the permission of the resident or the orders
of a competent court.'' However, armed groups forcibly invaded and
looted the homes and businesses of civilians. These gunmen reportedly
acted with impunity, due to the absence of a responsive police force or
legal protection for victims. In addition, it was unclear what
authority controlled the actions of the local commanders, who patrolled
the streets of cities and towns outside of the areas controlled by the
ISAF. In the north, local commanders, particularly Jumbesh commander
Lal, targeted Pashtuns, abusing female members of families,
confiscating property, and destroying homes.
In the southeastern town of Gardez, unknown extremists began an
intimidation campaign, leaving leaflets warning video shop owners to
stop selling cassettes. In September a bomb exploded, destroying four
shops and damaging eight others. On April 27, shells and rockets
exploded destroying shops and killing 18 persons.
Kabul police authorities placed women under detention in prison, at
the request of family members, for defying the family's wishes on the
choice of a spouse.
There were reports of forcible conscription in the north by forces
loyal to Jumbesh leader General Dostum (see Section 1.g.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The international community worked closely during
the year with local officials in the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. The Taliban's rapid fall from power averted a much-feared
large-scale humanitarian disaster. After the fall of the Taliban,
looting by armed groups and individuals, general insecurity, and harsh
weather conditions at times hampered humanitarian assistance efforts.
Primary limitations for the delivery of assistance remained logistical
and centered on the difficulties in moving relief goods overland to
geographically remote areas. Continued lawlessness and sporadic
fighting in northern areas also impeded assistance efforts. Instability
in the southeast, where Taliban and al-Qa'ida remnants remained at
large and where local warlord Pacha Khan Zadran openly attacked forces
loyal to the central government, limited delivery of assistance to this
sector. In November President Karzai fired approximately 20 senior and
80 minor officials for corruption and facilitating insecurity on the
roads.
A U.N. report released in late June catalogued the intimidation and
violence directed at NGO workers including threats, accusations,
kidnapings, attacks, murder, rape of family members of local NGO staff,
and armed robbery. Some provincial governors extorted a ``tax'' from
local NGOs. NGOs sometimes were forced to pay twice if district leaders
were from different provincial authorities. Despite issuing a number of
resolutions agreeing to cooperate and improve security conditions,
senior factional leadership managed to take action only in a minority
of cases and often with little commitment.
For example, on June 8, armed men in Mazar-i Sharif raped an NGO
humanitarian assistance worker and beat the local staff who was
accompanying her. Northern authorities detained three men and at year's
end, charges against them were still pending. In June armed men in
Takhar Province fired upon the vehicle of an international NGO when the
occupants refused to provide a ride to the group. In June near Mazar-i
Sharif, armed men shot at a convoy of international NGO vehicles. On
June 10, armed men broke into an international NGO's office in Mazar-i
Sharif and assaulted the guards on staff. Fighting between commanders
loyal to General Dostum's Jumbesh party and Jamiat-i Islami's Mohammad
Atta in Balkh Province forced an international NGO to cease its
operations in an area to which 3,000 internally displaced persons (IDP)
families had returned. The NGO's departure closed the only local health
clinic. In Samangan and Jowzjan Provinces, local NGOs reported constant
threats and intimidation from local authorities. In Aybak district,
commander Almas told NGO staff managing distribution of IDP return
assistance cards that unless a substantial number of cards were given
to his men, he would halt all IDP returns going through his area. In
Kaldar district, 400 workers from an international NGO project were
taken hostage as part of a forced recruitment drive conducted by a
local commander.
In April armed men killed a senior professional staff member of the
U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in his home. At year's
end, the alleged killer remained at large. In May fighters affiliated
with General Dostum's Jumbesh party attacked IDPs, including the rape
of females at a camp in Balkh after young men in the IDP families
resisted conscription (see Section 1.f.). Armed men in police uniforms
in Mazar-i Sharif forced their way into the home of a senior U.N.
national staff member and took $5,000, after claiming that they were
searching for women in the house. Sporadic fighting and lawlessness
remained a hindrance to assistance efforts in the north through the
second half of the year.
During most of the year, continued internal conflict resulted in
instances of the use of excessive force that caused the deaths of
civilians, property damage, and the displacement of residents. For
example, in November Ismail Khan reportedly ordered an attack on a
village near Shindand that precipitated an exchange of rocket fire with
rival Pashtun commander Amanullah Khan, killing at least seven persons
including four children. During November and December, Ismail Khan and
Amanullah Khan continued to fight, resulting in civilian casualties.
In general independent investigations of alleged killings were
hindered by the unwillingness of local authorities to allow
investigators to visit the areas in question. The Council of the North
(General Dostum, Mohammad Atta, and Mohammad Saidi) issued a statement
on August 28 denying the allegation and declaring that it was ready to
cooperate with an investigation of the mass gravesite at Dasht-i Leili
by professional and technical specialists drawn from the U.N. and
coalition countries. However, local authorities suggested that there
was no guarantee of security for investigators. By year's end, no
investigation had taken place.
On November 25, Northern Alliance forces reportedly killed at least
120 prisoners at the Qala-i Jangi Fort, allegedly during the
suppression of a riot. In November 2001, Northern Alliance forces
reportedly killed 100 to 300 Taliban fighters in Mazar-i Sharif; there
were conflicting reports as to whether some of the Taliban forces
attempted to surrender before they were shelled.
In November 2001, following a prison revolt, different sources
estimated that 200 to 1000 Taliban prisoners died while in the custody
of General Abdul Rashid Dostum's forces while being transported in
sealed containers from Mazar-i Sharif to Shiberghan prison. According
to some accounts, Dostum's troops prevented drivers from making air
holes in the containers or from offering water to the prisoners. In
February and April, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and U.N. experts
examined Dasht-i Leili, an area west of Shiberghan, allegedly
containing the bodies of Taliban prisoners. U.N. experts found evidence
of summary executions and death by suffocation.
The U.N. estimated that there were 5 to 7 million landmines and
more than 750,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance throughout the country,
planted mainly during the Soviet occupation. However, some NGOs
estimated that there may be fewer than 1 million mines. There have been
claims that 162 of 356 districts were mine-affected. The most heavily
mined areas were the provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan. The
landmines and unexploded ordnance caused deaths and injuries,
restricted areas available for cultivation, and impeded the return of
refugees to mine-affected regions. From 1995 to 1997, new mines were
believed to have been laid over 90 square miles of land, reportedly
mostly by the Northern Alliance in the western provinces of Badghis and
Faryab. Additional newly-mined areas were reported but not confirmed in
2000 and, during the year in the conflict areas north of Kabul. The
Northern Alliance reportedly laid these mines in response to the
Taliban's summer 2000 offensive.
An estimated 400,000 persons have been killed or wounded by
landmines. Casualties caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance were
estimated at 10 to 12 per day. In some parts of the country, including
in Herat and Kandahar, almost 90 percent of households were affected by
the presence of landmines. An estimated 96 percent of civilian mine and
unexploded ordnance casualties were male. Approximately 53 percent of
mine and unexploded ordnance casualties occurred in the 18 to 40 age
group, while 34 percent of the casualties involved children, according
to the U.N. Mine Action Center. Landmines and unexploded ordnance
resulted in death in approximately 30 percent of cases and in serious
injuries and disability, including amputation and blindness, in
approximately 20 percent of cases.
With funding from international donors, the U.N. organized and
trained mine detection and clearance teams, which operated throughout
the country. Nearly all areas that have been cleared were in productive
use, and more than 1.5 million refugees and IDPs returned to areas
cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance. Nonetheless, the mines and
unexploded ordnance were expected to pose a threat for many years.
Clearance rates and safety increased for clearance teams assisted by
dogs. U.N. agencies and NGOs had instituted a number of educational
programs and mine awareness campaigns for women and children in various
parts of the country. Many were curtailed as a result of Taliban
restrictions on women and girls but have been reinvigorated since the
fall of the Taliban. Continued warfare, as well as prolonged and severe
drought, also resulted in massive, forced displacement of civilians.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1964 Constitution somewhat
provided for freedom of speech and of the press; however, some senior
officials attempted to intimidate journalists and influence their
reporting. The draft press law contained articles that curtail press
freedom, specifically information that ``offends Islam'' or ``weakens
Afghanistan's army.'' All information must follow Shari'a law, and a
publication could be suspended when the article on forbidden content
was violated, although there were no reports of that during the year.
There were approximately 150 regular publications. The State owned at
least 35 of these publications and almost all of the electronic news
media. All other newspapers were published only sporadically and for
the most part were affiliated with different provincial authorities.
Some government officials through political party ties maintained their
own communications facilities. Kabul and other major provincial cities
had limited television broadcasts.
During the year, the Government maintained departments that were
pre-disposed to crack down on journalists. For example, the security
service (Amniat-i Milli) did not disband a section that was tasked with
surveillance of the news media.
Government and factional control of television, radio, and most
publications throughout the country effectively limited freedom of the
press. During the year, the central government maintained a predominant
role in the news media, and criticism of the authorities was rare.
While some independent journalists and writers published magazines and
newsletters, according to Reporters Without Borders (RWB), circulation
largely was confined to Kabul and many were self-censored. In practice
many persons listened to the dozen international stations that
broadcast in Dari or Pashto. The BBC, Voice of America, Radio Liberty,
and Radio Free Afghanistan were available throughout the country. In
the countryside, local radio and television stations were under the
control of the local authorities.
Journalists were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and
violence during the year. For example, HRW reported that security
officials in Herat detained and mistreated a local journalist, Rafiq
Shaheer, to prevent him from covering the local Loya Jirga selection
process. Herat authorities, according to HRW, also pressured
journalists to avoid filing stories critical of Ismail Khan and his
government. In August Herat officials reportedly prevented journalists
from covering Ismail Khan's military operations against Pashtun forces
in the Ghorian and Shindand districts. However, at year's end, there
were reports that outside newspapers, including the Kabul Weekly,
``Ebtekar,'' and ``Takhassos,'' were circulating with greater frequency
and in greater quantities than in earlier times.
According to RWB, reporters were the target of threats and
intimidation from militants during the year. For example, one of Radio
Solh station's directors, Zakia Zaki, was threatened with death at the
time of the station's installation in Jebel-i Sharat. In March
unidentified assailants in Gardez injured Toronto Star reporter
Kathleen Kenna when a bomb was thrown into her car. Also in March,
anonymous leaflets were circulating in the eastern part of the country
calling for the abduction of foreign reporters. In October unidentified
persons kidnaped and beat a cameraman after he helped a British
journalist make a documentary that reported the death of thousands of
Taliban fighters at the hands of General Dostom (see Section 4).
A number of journalists were killed during the intensified fighting
late in 2001. In November 2001, in Nangarhar Province, armed men forced
four journalists, Harry Burton, Maria Grazia Cutuli, Julio Fuentes, and
Azizullah Haidari, out of their convoy of vehicles and executed them.
On February 9, an Interior Ministry official announced the arrest of
two suspects in the killing; however, by year's end, no confirmation of
those arrests had taken place.
There were a few reports that government forces prohibited music,
movies, and television on religious grounds. For example, in August the
head of Kabul Radio and TV Engineer Eshaq, who was affiliated with
Jamiat-i Islami, briefly banned the appearance of women singers on
television (see Section 5). However, unlike in previous years,
televisions, radios, and other electronic goods were sold freely, and
music was played widely.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1964
Constitution states that citizens have the right to assemble without
prior permission and to form political parties; however, tenuous
security and likely opposition from local authorities seriously
inhibited freedom of assembly and association outside of Kabul during
most of the year. In Kabul a spectrum of organizations and political
parties operated. Citizens staged two civil society forums in Kabul
with the assistance of the NGO Swisspeace. Progressive political
parties and movements were able to meet without interference in Kabul.
In September an International Conference on Media and Law took
place in Kabul. Approximately 300 citizens attended along with a number
of international observers. The conference included Afghan officials
who made themselves available during panel discussions for a wide-
ranging set of questions from the conference participants. In November
a group of journalists in Balkh Province reportedly formed an
``independent writer's club.''
The Government used harassment and excessive force against
demonstrators during the year. For example, in November, Interior
Ministry forces fired on Kabul University students protesting poor
living conditions at the school and killed two demonstrators.
The Government allows for freedom of association; however, there
were reports of harassment by officials during the year. In Herat HRW
reported that Ismail Khan's officials harassed and interfered with the
Professionals' Shura, the Herat Literary Society, and the Women's
Shura. In September forces loyal to Ismail Khan prevented the
Professionals' Shura from holding a seminar on the new currency.
Authorities pressured the literary society to avoid the subject of
women's rights. Ismail Khan's handpicked leadership for the Women's
Shura reportedly criticized Shura members who openly disagreed with
Khan's views on women's rights.
At year's end, NGOs and international organizations continued to
report that local commanders were charging them for the relief supplies
they were bringing into the country (see Sections 1.g. and 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The 1964 Constitution, in effect under the
Bonn Agreement, states that Islam is the ``sacred religion of
Afghanistan'' and states that religious rites of the state shall be
performed according to the Hanafi doctrine. The Constitution also
states that ``non-Muslim citizens shall be free to perform their
rituals within the limits determined by laws for public decency and
public peace.'' The central government began to pursue a policy of
religious tolerance during the year; however, custom and law required
affiliation with some religion, and atheism was considered apostasy and
was punishable by death.
Reliable sources estimated that 85 percent of the population were
Sunni Muslim, and most of the remaining 15 percent were Shi'a. Shi'a,
including the predominately Shi'a Hazara ethnic group, were among the
most economically disadvantaged persons in the country. Relations
between the different branches of Islam in the country were difficult.
Historically, the minority Shi'a faced discrimination from the majority
Sunni population. The Shi'a minority advocated a national government
that would give them equal rights as citizens. There also were small
numbers of Ismailis living in the central and northern parts of the
country. Ismailis were Shi'a but consider the Aga Khan their spiritual
leader.
Licensing and registration of religious groups do not appear to be
required by the authorities in any part of the country. The small
number of non-Muslim residents remaining in the country may practice
their faith but may not proselytize.
Following the Emergency Loya Jirga in June, Dr. Sima Samar, the
former Minister for Women's Affairs was charged with blasphemy for
allegedly insulting Islam (see Section 5).
The parts of the country's educational system that survived more
than 20 years of war placed considerable emphasis on religion. However,
since the fall of the Taliban, public school curriculums have included
religious subjects, but detailed religious study was conducted under
the guidance of religious leaders. There is no restriction on parental
religious teaching.
Before the October 2001 collapse of the Taliban, repression by the
Taliban of the Hazara ethnic group, which is predominantly Shi'a
Muslim, was particularly severe. Although the conflict between the
Hazaras and the Taliban was political and military as well as
religious, and it was not possible to state with certainty that the
Taliban engaged in its campaign against the Hazaras solely because of
their religious beliefs, the religious affiliation of the Hazaras
apparently was a significant factor leading to their repression.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights for men; however in practice their ability to travel within the
country was hampered by sporadic fighting, brigandage, landmines, a
road network in a state of disrepair, and limited domestic air service.
Despite these obstacles, many men continued to travel relatively
freely, with buses using routes in most parts of the country. The law
also provides that women are required to obtain permission from a male
family member before having an application for a passport processed
(see Section. Women were forbidden to leave the home except in the
company of a male relative. U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed
because of the Taliban's links to international terrorism were lifted,
and the Afghan airline Ariana's landing rights at non-foreign airports
were reinstated. Ariana commenced international flights in September.
Commercial trade was impeded as local commanders and criminals
continued to demand road tolls and at times close roads.
Afghan refugees returned home in record numbers during the year.
Most of the 2 million returnees availed themselves of UNHCR's
assistance, while a smaller number returned spontaneously. UNHCR
estimates that more than 3 million Afghan refugees remained in
Pakistan, Iran, and other neighboring countries at year's end. Iran and
Pakistan forcibly repatriated approximately 38,500 refugees during the
year. There were approximately 700,000 displaced persons. Women and
children constituted 75 percent of the refugee population. The majority
of refugee returnees have settled in urban areas, which placed
additional strain on the cities' already overburdened infrastructures.
There were further population movements from rural to urban areas due
to drought, insecurity, and inadequate assistance in rural areas.
Sporadic fighting and related security concerns, as well as the
drought, discouraged some refugees from returning.
According to HRW, since the collapse of the Taliban regime in the
northern part of the country, ethnic Pashtuns throughout the country
have faced widespread abuses including killings, sexual violence,
beatings, and extortion. Pashtuns reportedly were targeted because
their ethnic group was closely associated with the Taliban regime.
According to U.N. estimates, approximately 60,000 Pashtuns became
displaced because of the violence. In late February, the UNHCR issued
public reports that contained allegations by ethnic Pashtuns entering
Pakistan that they were fleeing human rights abuses in the northern
section of the country. The AIA's interlocutor on assistance issues
established a commission to look into human rights problems faced by
the Pashtuns in the north.
In October 2001, the Government of Iran set up two camps for Afghan
IDPs who were attempting to flee to Iran from territory that was then
controlled by the Taliban. The camps sheltered more than 10,000
refugees at year's end.
There was no available information on policies regarding refugees,
asylum, provision of first asylum, or the forced return of refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
On December 5, 2001, a U.N.-sponsored Afghan peace conference in
Bonn, Germany, approved a broad agreement for the establishment of
transitional mechanisms, including a 6-month AIA to govern the country.
There was a peaceful transfer of power from the AIA to the TISA during
the June Emergency Loya Jirga. The Government allowed citizens the
right to change their government through Loya Jirga elections that were
deemed free and fair; however, there were some reports of intimidation
and interference in the Loya Jirga process. President Karzai selected a
cabinet of 5 vice presidents and 29 ministers. The Loya Jirga deferred
a decision on the creation of a national legislature. Under the Bonn
Agreement, elections will be held in June 2004.
Some violence marred the selection of Loya Jirga delegates in the
provinces. In the Herat area, according to HRW, local authorities used
arrests and violence to intimidate candidates in the Loya Jirga
selection process who were not supporters of Ismail Khan, including
Pashtuns, some women, and those associated with former king Zahir Shah.
In late May, Ismail Khan's security forces arrested Mohammad Rafiq
Shahir, head of Herat's Professionals' Shura, a civic group of
intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, and teachers. Herat authorities
reportedly warned Shahir not to participate in the Loya Jirga process.
There also were widespread reports of bribery throughout the
country during the Loya Jirga selection process. A number of Loya Jirga
delegates reported receiving threats after speaking out against the
participation of warlords in the gathering. Other delegates, according
to HRW, expressed alarm at the intrusive presence of agents from the
Government's intelligence service.
Citizens had the opportunity to question senior leaders during the
Loya Jirga. Inside and outside the Loya Jirga, political workers handed
out posters and literature. Men and women were able to engage in
discussions freely. U.N. observers estimated that 1,200 out of the
1,500 elected delegates turned out to witness the proceedings. Unlike
in previous years, the Government encouraged the leaders of all ethnic
minorities to engage in meaningful political dialog with opponents.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Some of these were
based in neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan, with branches inside
the country; others were based in the country. The focus of their
activities was primarily humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation,
health, education, and agriculture. However, the lack of security and
instability in the north and southeast severely reduced NGO activities
in these areas. During the year, there were continued attacks on aid
groups, including the gang rape of an international staff member, the
robberies of two NGO offices, and the firing on NGO vehicles (see
Section 1.g.). For example, on March 1, the World Food Program reported
that it had been forced to temporarily suspend its food distribution in
the north after fighting between unnamed parties made the area too
dangerous for operations to continue.
Several international NGOs, including the International Human
Rights Law Group (IHRLG) and HRW, were run by local employees who
monitored the situation inside the country. IHRLG ran a series of legal
education seminars for local attorneys.
In August, as mandated by the Bonn Agreement, an independent Afghan
Human Rights Commission was formed. During the year, the Commission
showed signs of independence from government control. By year's end,
the Commission collected over 500 complaints or requests for assistance
on human rights abuses. However, lack of financial resources and
personnel confined the Commission's activities largely to Kabul.
In October the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Extra-Judicial,
Arbitrary, or Summary Executions and the U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights visited cities throughout the country.
In January and February, PHR conducted a survey of possible mass
gravesites in the north, including Dasht-i Leili, where Taliban
fighters who died in the custody of General Dostum's Jumbesh forces
were allegedly buried. In April a U.N. team conducted a follow up visit
to the Dasht-i Leili site and exhumed approximately 15 bodies. While
General Dostum and other northern leaders issued public statements
offering to cooperate with an investigation, northern authorities also
indicated in the late summer and early fall that they could not provide
security to investigators (see Section 1.g.).
Security conditions and instability in the north and southeast
impeded NGO assistance activities. During the year, there were reports
that commanders in the north were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance,
harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and otherwise hindering
the movement of humanitarian aid (see Sections 1.g. and 2.b.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The 1964 Constitution, in effect under the Bonn Agreement, states
that ``The people of Afghanistan, without any discrimination or
preference, have equal rights and obligations under the law.'' However,
statutory law has not been modified to be consistent with anti-
discrimination principles. At year's end, local custom and practices
generally prevailed in much of the country. Discrimination against
women was widespread. However, its severity, varied from area to area,
depending on the local leadership's attitude toward education for girls
and employment for women and on local attitudes. Historically the
minority Shi'a faced discrimination from the majority Sunni population.
There was greater acceptance of persons with disabilities as the number
of persons maimed by landmines and warfare increased and as the
presence of persons with disabilities became more widespread.
Women.--Following the Taliban's fall from power, the arrival of the
AIA, and easing of restrictions on women, the international community
noted some improvements in the status of women; however, serious
problems remained. HRW reported that advances in women's and girls'
rights were tempered by growing government repression of social and
political life. In December President Karzai decreed that women have
the right to choose whether to wear the burqa. The central government
named several women to cabinet positions and other areas of
responsibility. Women in a number of places regained some measure of
access to public life, health care, and employment; however, lack of
education and limited employment possibilities continued to impede the
ability of many women to improve their situation.
As lawlessness and sporadic fighting continued in areas outside
Kabul, violence against women persisted, including beatings, rapes,
forced marriages, and kidnapings. Such incidents generally went
unreported, and most information was anecdotal. It was difficult to
document rapes, in particular, in view of the social stigma that
surrounds rape. Information on domestic violence and marital rape was
limited. In a climate of secrecy and impunity, it was likely that
domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
Women actively participated in the Loya Jirga (see Section 3).
Women were able to question leaders openly and discussed inter-gender
issues during the Loya Jirga. Dr. Masouda Jalal, a woman, stood as a
candidate for the presidency. However, some security officials
attempted to intimidate female participants. For example, Defense
Minister Fahim directly ordered a security official to desist when one
guard tried to silence a woman questioner. During the Loya Jirga, AIA
Minister for Women's Affairs Sima Samar received death threats for
allegedly insulting Islam. Samar charged that fundamentalists who
objected to her outspoken manner trumped up the allegation. The
controversy did not end publicly until Supreme Court Chief Justice Fazl
Shinwari exonerated her of the charge (see Section 2.c.).
Throughout the country, approximately 100 women were held in
detention facilities. Many were imprisoned at the request of a family
member. Some of those incarcerated opposed the wishes of the family in
the choice of a marriage partner. Others had committed adultery. Some
faced bigamy charges from husbands who granted a divorce only to change
their minds when the divorced wife remarried. Other women faced similar
charges from husbands who had deserted them and reappeared after the
wife had remarried. In early November, President Karzai released 20
women in Kabul in an amnesty associated with Ramadan. However, Kabul's
Police Chief Basir Salangi stated that the police would continue to
arrest women if their husband or family brought a complaint to the
authorities.
The law also provides that women are required to obtain permission
from a male family member before having an application for a passport
processed.
Women in the north, particularly from Pashtun families, were the
targets of sexual violence throughout the year. According to HRW,
Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara commanders perpetrated many of the attacks.
Local commanders, particularly in the north, used rape as a tool of
intimidation against the international and local NGO community (see
Section 2.c.).
There also were reports that minority women sometimes were
subjected to forced marriage, which sometimes resulted in self-
immolations. Although statistics were not available, hospital doctors
reported that these self-immolations were increasingly common among
young women in the western part of the country. For example, a 14-year-
old arrived at the hospital in Herat in critical condition with burns
over most of her body. She had been given in marriage to a 60-year-old
man with grown children.
Discrimination against women in some areas was particularly harsh.
Some local authorities excluded women from all employment outside the
home, apart from the traditional work of women in agriculture; women
were forbidden to leave the home except in the company of a male
relative (see Section 2.d.). In November the Government revived the
activities of the Department of Vice and Virtue, particularly in Kabul
and Herat. During the year, that department changed its name to the
Department of Accountability and Religious Affairs and planned to
advocate only that women wear a headscarf in public. However, in
December HRW alleged that women who were caught talking with men on the
streets of Herat risked being seized by special moral police, taken to
a hospital, and forced to undergo an exam to determine if they had sex.
By year's end, these allegations had not been further substantiated.
According to NGOs, in Herat, the authorities in the spring and
summer called in female NGO workers to instruct them to dress and
behave ``properly.'' There were no further reports of such meetings
during the year; however, local authorities reportedly continued to
exert strong pressure on women to conduct and dress themselves in
accordance with a conservative interpretation of Islam and local
customs. In November Judge Marzeya Basil was reportedly dismissed from
her position in Kabul after local television broadcast pictures of her
shaking hands with male foreign heads of state and not wearing a
headscarf. The local broadcast of the visit also generated complaints
from the public about women in the group appearing without headscarves.
Court authorities in Kabul claimed that Basil was dismissed because she
had been absent for more than 20 days from her position without
permission.
In previous years, Taliban actions significantly reduced women's
access to health care by excluding women from treatment by male
physicians in most hospitals. During the year, some women continued to
be denied access to adequate medical facilities. According to
Management Sciences for Health, nearly 40 percent of the 756 basic
primary-health facilities had no female workers, a major deterrent for
women because societal barriers discouraged them from seeking care from
male heath workers. Life expectancy rates were estimated at 45 years
for women and 46 years for men. Researchers found an average of 1,600
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. In the same health survey, it
was determined that only 10 percent of the country's hospitals had
equipment to perform cesarean sections. In most regions, there was less
than 1 physician per 10,000 persons. Health services reached only 29
percent of the population and only 17 percent of the rural population.
Since the fall of the Taliban, there were some improvements in the
status of women, especially in the area of education. Unlike in
previous years, girls were allowed to return to school and university;
however, the lack of teachers, materials, and security concerns
remained deterrents to girls' education. At year's end, education
official in Herat Province reported that 97,906 girls enrolled in
school during the year. According to the U.N., 500 of the 3,000 persons
who took university entrance examinations were women.
Approximately 85 percent of women were illiterate and in rural
areas, illiteracy rates among women often were nearly 100 percent.
Unlike in previous years, women in most areas were permitted to
drive. In September an NGO that trains and counsels women in war-torn
countries offered a driving school for women.
Children.--Local administrative bodies and international assistance
organizations took action to ensure children's welfare to the extent
possible; however, the situation of children was very poor.
Approximately 45 percent of the population was made up of children age
14 or under. The infant mortality rate was 250 out of 1,000 births;
Medecins Sans Frontieres reported in 2000 that 250,000 children per
year die of malnutrition. One-quarter of children die before the age of
5. These figures most likely have increased due to another year of
drought, intensified fighting, and massive displacement. A Management
Sciences for Health study also found that only about one-fourth of all
health facilities offer basic services for children, including
immunization, antenatal care, postpartum care, and treatment of
childhood diseases. An UNICEF study also reported that the majority of
children were highly traumatized and expected to die before reaching
adulthood. According to the study, some 90 percent have nightmares and
suffer from acute anxiety, while 70 percent have seen acts of violence,
including the killing of parents or relatives.
While girls throughout the country were able to attend school, the
U.N. reported that in some areas a climate of insecurity persisted. In
the spring, anonymous leaflets distributed at schools in the Kandahar
area urged citizens not to cooperate with foreigners. On September 25,
a girls' school near the northern town of Sar-i Pul was set on fire. In
mid-September a small device reportedly detonated under a chair in a
changing room in a coeducational primary school in Kandahar, causing
minor injuries to a teacher. On October 25, in Wardak Province, unknown
assailants fired rockets at the De Afghanan School. The school was
badly damaged; however, no one was injured in the attack. A leaflet was
left near the school denouncing the influence of foreigners on women
and girls.
There were credible reports that both the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance used child soldiers. Northern Alliance officials publicly
stated that their soldiers must be at least 18 years of age, but press
sources reported that preteen soldiers were used in Northern Alliance
forces.
Persons with Disabilities.--The Government took no measures to
protect the rights of persons with mental and physical disabilities or
to mandate accessibility for them. In December hundreds of persons with
disabilities protested against the State, claiming that the State was
not doing enough to care for them. In addition, they demanded the
resignation of the Minister of the Disabled, Abdullah Wardak, and
accused him of not disbursing foreign aid meant for them. There
reportedly has been increased public acceptance of persons with
disabilities because of their increasing prevalence due to landmines or
other war-related injuries. An estimated 800,000 persons suffered from
disabilities requiring at least some form of assistance. Although
community-based health and rehabilitation committees provided services
to approximately 100,000 persons, their activities were restricted to
60 out of 330 districts, and they were able to assist only a small
number of those in need.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Bonn Agreement revived the 1964
Constitution's broad provisions for protection of workers and a mixture
of labor laws from earlier periods; however, little is known about
labor laws, their enforcement, or practices. Labor rights were not
defined beyond the Ministry of Labor, and in the context of the
breakdown of governmental authority there was no effective central
authority to enforce them. The only large employers in Kabul were the
Governmental structure of minimally functioning ministries and local
and international NGOs.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Current law is
not fully in compliance with internationally recognized workers rights
to form free trade unions. The country lacks a tradition of genuine
labor-management bargaining. There were no known labor courts or other
mechanisms for resolving labor disputes. Wages were determined by
market forces, or, in the case of government workers, dictated by the
Government.
There were no reports of labor rallies or strikes.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The 1964 Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children; however,
little information was available regarding forced or compulsory labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to labor laws, children under the age of 15 were
not allowed to work more than 30 hours per week. However, there was no
evidence that authorities in any part of the country enforced labor
laws relating to the employment of children. Children from the age of 6
often worked to help support their families by herding animals in rural
areas and by collecting paper and firewood, shining shoes, begging, or
collecting scrap metal among street debris in the cities. Some of these
practices exposed children to the danger of landmines.
The Government was not a party to the ILO Convention 182 on Child
Labor. However, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
the country followed ILO standards regarding child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--According to labor laws, the
average workweek for laborers was 40 hours. However, there was no
available information regarding a statutory minimum wage or maximum
workweek, or the enforcement of safe labor practices. Many workers
apparently were allotted time off regularly for prayers and observance
of religious holidays. Most persons worked in the informal sector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no legislation prohibiting
trafficking in persons. A July U.N. report on Women and Human Rights
reported increasing anecdotal evidence of trafficking in Afghan girls
to Pakistan, Iran, and the Gulf States. Some girls reportedly were kept
in brothels used by Afghans. The whereabouts of many of the girls, some
as young as 10, reportedly kidnaped and trafficked by the Taliban
remained unknown.
The U.N. July report also noted that many poor families were
promising young girls in marriage to satisfy family debts.
There were a number of reports that children, particularly from the
south and southeast, were trafficked to Pakistan to work in factories.
__________
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy, with broad powers
exercised by the Prime Minister (PM). PM Khaleda Zia, leader of the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), came to power in elections on
October 1, 2001, deemed to be free and fair by international and
domestic observers. The BNP formed a four-party alliance government
with Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh Jatiya Party (BJP), and Islami Oikko
Jote (IOJ). Political competition is vigorous, and violence is a
pervasive feature of politics, including political campaigns. The
October 2001 elections, supervised by a non-party Caretaker government
(CG), took place in a climate of sporadic violence and isolated
irregularities. All of the major parties boycotted Parliament while in
the opposition, claiming that they had little opportunity to engage in
real debate on legislative and national issues. The higher levels of
the judiciary displayed a significant degree of independence and often
ruled against the Government; however, lower judicial officers were
reluctant to challenge government decisions and suffered from
corruption. The Official Secrets Act of 1923 can protect corrupt
government officials from public scrutiny, hindering the transparency
and accountability of the Government at all levels.
The Home Affairs Ministry controlled the police and paramilitary
forces, which had primary responsibility for internal security. Police
were often reluctant to pursue investigations against persons
affiliated with the ruling party, and the Government frequently used
the police for political purposes. There was widespread police
corruption and lack of discipline. Security forces committed numerous
serious human rights abuses and were rarely disciplined, even for the
most egregious actions.
Annual per capita income among the population of approximately
131.2 million was approximately $375. The economy is market-based, but
the Government owned most utilities, many transport companies, and
large manufacturing and distribution firms. A small elite controlled
much of the private economy, but there was an emerging middle class.
Foreign investment was concentrated in the gas sector and in electrical
power generation facilities. Earnings from exports fell by 8 percent,
but remittances from workers overseas increased. Foreign aid remained
an important source of national income. Efforts to improve governance
through reform have been unsuccessful, often blocked by bureaucratic
intransigence, vested economic interests, endemic corruption, and
political polarization.
The Government's commitment to economic reform was piecemeal,
although it has taken some difficult decisions, including closing
money-losing state-owned enterprises.
The Government's human rights record remained poor and it continued
to commit numerous serious human rights abuses. Security forces
committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and deaths in custody
more than doubled from 2001. Both major political parties often
employed violence, causing deaths and numerous injuries. According to
press reports, vigilante justice resulted in numerous killings. Police
routinely used torture, beatings, and other forms of abuse while
interrogating suspects and frequently beat demonstrators. The
Government rarely punished persons responsible for torture or unlawful
deaths. Prison conditions were extremely poor.
The Government continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily,
and to use the Special Powers Act (SPA) and Section 54 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which allowed for warrantless arrest and preventive
detention. The Government replaced the Public Safety Act (PSA), which
lacked bail provisions, with the Speedy Trial Act (STA), which provided
for quicker disposal of cases and bail. The lower judiciary was subject
to executive influence and suffered from corruption. A large judicial
case backlog existed and lengthy pretrial detention was a problem.
Police searched homes without warrants, and the Government forcibly
relocated illegal squatter settlements. Virtually all journalists
practiced some self-censorship. Attacks on journalists and efforts to
intimidate them by government officials, political party activists, and
others increased. The Government limited freedom of assembly,
particularly for political opponents, and on occasion, limited freedom
of movement. The Government generally permitted a wide variety of human
rights groups to conduct their activities, but it brought a number of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) under intense scrutiny. Violence
and discrimination against women remained serious problems. Abuse of
children and child prostitution were problems. Societal discrimination
against persons with disabilities, indigenous people, and religious
minorities was a problem. The Government limited worker rights,
especially in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs), and was ineffective
in enforcing those workers' rights in place. Some domestic servants,
including many children, worked in conditions that resembled servitude
and many suffered abuse. Child labor and abuse of child workers
remained widespread and were serious problems. Trafficking in women and
children for the purpose of prostitution and at times for forced labor
remained serious problems. Bangladesh was invited by the Community of
Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD
Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Security forces
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. The police; the
paramilitary organization, Bangladesh Rifles (BDR); the auxiliary
organization, Ansar; and the army used unwarranted lethal force.
According to one human rights organization, 83 persons died as a
result of the use of lethal force by the police and other security
forces during the year. Fifteen of those deaths occurred during the
army-led anti-crime drive ``Operation Clean Heart'' that began on
October 16. An additional 148 deaths occurred in custody, 31 of those
following arrest and interrogation by the army during Operation Clean
Heart. Government statements regarding these deaths at first asserted
that the deceased had died of heart attacks or of drowning while trying
to escape. However, on November 18 the Government's Principal
Information Officer stated that there had been no deaths in army
custody (as of that date the death toll was 36) and on November 24 he
alleged that some newspaper reports on deaths related to Operation
Clean Heart were baseless.
Jamaluddin Fakir, an Awami League (AL) student activist, died on
April 19 as a result of police torture at the Kapsasia police station
in the Gazipur district. Human rights organizations concluded that
Fakir's death was a result of torture while in police custody. The
Government suspended two police officers and investigated the incident.
Fakir's mother filed murder charges with a local court after the police
station refused to register the case.
On May 9, the Detective Branch (DB) police in Narayanganj arrested
four persons, including Badal, suspected in a rape and murder incident.
According to Badal's mother, police tortured her son. On May 17, Badal
became critically ill and died. A fellow detainee reported that the
police blindfolded detainees and tortured them. He said Badal faced the
most severe torture, including possibly electric shocks. Police denied
having tortured Badal. Badal's mother filed a murder case against the
police but withdrew it under threats and pressure.
In early June, BDR personnel killed Mohammed Sohel during an
anticrime drive in Dhaka. The BDR claimed that Sohel had died from
falling off a roof; others disputed that claim. Human rights
organizations asserted that Sohel died from torture.
On October 28, according to a newspaper report, army personnel
assaulted Abul Hossain Litu at his poultry farm. According to Litu's
wife, army personnel claimed that Litu was a member of the criminal
group ``Seven Star.'' When he did not produce firearms as they
demanded, they tortured him until he died. After Litu's wife filed
murder charges against Major Kabir and his troops, a lower court
ordered the police to investigate the charges.
On November 8, army personnel arrested Abu Sufain, a BNP activist,
during Operation Clean Heart. According to newspaper reports, Sufain
became ill during interrogation on November 9 and died. An inquest
report was prepared and an autopsy was performed. Newspapers reported
that the inquest report made mention of signs of injury on Sufain's
legs and hands. Investigation by a human rights NGO revealed that Abu
Sufain died due to torture by army personnel.
In February 2001, after the High Court ruled that all ``fatwas''
(expert opinions on Islamic law) were illegal (see Section 2.c.), NGOs
organized a rally in Dhaka to applaud the ruling. Some Islamic groups
blocked roads into the city and tried to disrupt the rally. In the
ensuing violence, a policeman was killed. Police arrested leaders of
the IOJ a member of the four-party opposition alliance in connection
with the killing. In Brahmanbaria some Muslim leaders called a
``hartal'' (general strikes which were often used by opposition parties
and other groups) to demand the reversal of the High Court verdict and
the release of the arrested IOJ leaders. Several thousand persons
marched in a demonstration that became violent. When police and
paramilitary forces opened fire, they killed 6 persons and injured 25
others. During the clash, 15 policemen were also injured. After a mob
attacked the police station in retaliation, the police shot and killed
three more persons.
According to one human rights organization, 117 persons died in
prison and police custody during the year (see Section 1.c.). Moreover,
an additional 31 deaths occurred after security forces detained
suspects during the army-led anticrime drive ``Operation Clean Heart.''
Most abuses go unpunished, and the resulting climate of impunity
remained a serious obstacle to ending abuse and killings. However, in
some instances where there was evidence of police culpability for
killings, the authorities took action.
On March 14, a district and sessions court in Natore convicted a
police subinspector and nine others for the 1994 killing of a youth in
custody. The court sentenced the police officer to a 10-year prison
term and the others to life in prison.
Violence, often resulting in deaths, was a pervasive element in the
country's politics (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Supporters of different
political parties, and often supporters of different factions within
one party, frequently clashed with each other and with police during
rallies and demonstrations. According to human rights organizations,
more than 420 persons were killed and nearly 8,741 others were injured
in politically motivated violence throughout the year. BNP supporters,
often with the connivance and support of the police, violently
disrupted opposition party rallies and demonstrations (see Sections
2.b. and 3). However, there were no reports of deaths from violence
related to hartals.
On May 2, the police filed charges against Alhaj Maqbul Hossain,
former AL M.P. for the Dhanmondi area of Dhaka, Mohammed Sadeq Khan,
former Dhaka City Commission ward commissioner, and 11 others for the
1999 murder of Sajal Chowdhury, a BNP activist. On November 23, Khan
was denied bail and sent to the Dhaka Central Jail. Hossain and another
accused were out on bail. The remaining 10 accused were still at large
at year's end.
Between May and October, four newly elected BNP-backed ward
commissioners of Dhaka City Corporation were shot and killed by unknown
assailants. On October 4, police arrested eight persons for their
alleged involvement in the murders.
On June 9, Sadequnnahar Sony, a student of Bangladesh University of
Engineering and Technology (BUET), was killed in the crossfire between
two factions of the JCD. Sony's death sparked protests from students
and teachers, ultimately leading to the closure of BUET and the banning
of student politics on campus. After the university reopened in August,
student groups protested the ban.
In June 2001, an explosion during a meeting at an AL office in
Narayanganj killed 20 and injured over 100 persons. The AL government
accused 27 persons from the BNP and the Freedom Parties in connection
with the bombing. Six persons were arrested and subsequently released
on bail. In May the son of a woman who was killed in the bombing filed
charges against 58 leaders and activists of the AL and Jatiya Party.
The accused included local AL leader Khokon Shaha and former AL M.P.
Shamim Osman. Most of the others accused have secured bail from the
High Court. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was
investigating the case. In mid-September a commission investigating
bombings that took place during the previous administration submitted
its report to the Government. In its report, the commission blamed
Sheikh Hasina and some of her AL party colleagues for six of the seven
bomb attacks in the second half of the AL administration (see Section
2.c.).
The trial of the July 2000 killing of eight persons, including six
members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) was ongoing.
In April 2001, the High Court upheld the 1998 convictions of 12 of
the 15 persons sentenced to death for the 1975 murder of then-President
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of AL President and former Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina) and 21 of his family members. Of the 12 persons
convicted, 4 were in custody. The 11 others, living outside of the
country, were convicted in absentia. The appeals process has been
stalled because three of the seven-member appellate panel of the
Supreme Court have refused to hear the case and two other judges have
been recused due to their participation in the hearing at the High
Court level. The case could progress if the Government would appoint an
ad hoc judge to the appellate division for the purpose of completing
this case; however, by the end of the year, this has not happened.
Four of the eight persons accused of perpetrating the November 1975
killings in jail of four senior AL leaders remained in prison. Their
trial began in April 2001. Thirteen others living outside of the
country were being tried in absentia (see Section 1.e.). Four of the
eight persons originally imprisoned were released on bail in December
2001. The case was still being actively pursued through the courts.
Press reports of vigilante killings by mobs were common. Newspapers
on numerous occasions reported that mobs had beaten alleged muggers,
sometimes to death. Press editorials and commentaries commented that
the increasing mob violence reflected a breakdown of law and order and
a popular perception that the criminal justice system did not function.
Violence along the border with India remained a problem. According
to press accounts and human rights groups, border violence has claimed
several hundred citizen lives during the last 5 years. Domestic human
rights NGOs reported that Indian border forces killed as many as 105
citizens during the year.
b. Disappearance.--On November 11, police and army personnel
arrested Mintoo Ghosh and, according to his mother, took him to an
unknown location. Ghosh's mother had not seen him since then. On
November 17, she filed a case requesting the officer-in-charge of the
Sutrapur police station inform her of Ghosh's whereabouts.
In August 2001, Abu Taher, General Secretary of the AL in Laxmipur,
and one other suspect were jailed for the alleged abduction in
September 2000 of Nurul Islam, a BNP official. In August charges were
filed against 31 persons including Taher, his wife, and two of his sons
following the jail cell confession of one of the other suspects. The
suspect who confessed said that he and the others accused disposed of
Nurul Islam's body in the Meghna River. On October 23, the trial began.
Taher's wife, her eldest son, and 17 others accused were still at
large. On December 25, it was announced that the court proceedings were
likely to be switched to the Divisional Special Trial Tribunal in
Chittagong.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment; however, police routinely employed physical and
psychological torture and other abuse during arrests and
interrogations. Torture may consist of threats and beatings, and the
use of electric shock. The Government rarely convicted or punished
those responsible for torture, and a climate of impunity allowed such
police abuses to continue.
On February 28, A.F.M. Bahauddin Nasim, aide to Sheikh Hasina, was
arrested. Nasim's lawyers claimed Nasim suffered severe torture while
in police and army custody, including having his hands and feet tied,
his head covered, and being hung upside down and spun. The police also
allegedly beat Nasim on various parts of his body with glass bottles
filled with hot water and administered electric shocks. After meeting
her husband in prison, Nasim's wife, Dr. Sultana Shamim Chowdhury, told
reporters that she saw visible signs of torture on his body. Originally
arrested under Section 54, the Government filed numerous charges
against Nasim in an effort to keep him jailed as long as possible. On
December 30, the High Court declared his detention illegal and ordered
his release (see Section 1.d.).
On April 4, two policemen allegedly detained A.T. Shamsuzzaman,
owner of a restaurant in the Mohakhali section of Dhaka and assaulted
him for his failure to pay extortion. At the Gulshan police station,
police kicked and beat him with a baton. Shamsuzzaman told human rights
investigators that the policemen took money from him at his restaurant.
On July 24, male and female police officers entered a female
student dormitory at Dhaka University (DU), dragged female students out
of the dormitories, and beat them. Some of the victims alleged sexual
harassment by male police officers. The police detained 18 students
overnight. Thirty students were injured in the raid. A one-member
judicial commission investigated the incident and found DU
administrators and police officers responsible for the incident. The
commission report recommended banning teacher participation in politics
on campus. On October 13, the inquiry committee formed by DU
authorities submitted its report October 13 to the university Vice
Chancellor with nine recommendations, including transfer of all
officers and employees of the hall and taking action against Zannatul
Kanon, the individual who filed the charges, for filing cases against
students. Police and BDR personnel conducted raids at DU dormitories
several times throughout the year and recovered some weapons. They also
arrested some students and outsiders on campus.
On August 21, BNP workers dragged AL leader Chhabi Rani Mondol into
the BNP office at Rampal in Bagerhat. They beat her with hammers and
clubs on the face, chest, and forehead. Her attackers allegedly took
photographs of her nude before throwing her out onto the road. A local
BNP chapter expelled four of the persons involved in the incident and
dissolved the Rampal unit of the party. Officials were pursuing a case
filed by Mondol against 15 persons in the incident. Police arrested 3
of the 15 accused. The Government suspended and then reassigned a
police officer for negligence in the case.
During Operation Clean Heart in October, an individual was arrested
by the police and taken into custody. Relatives and friends were not
permitted to see him. While in custody he was blindfolded and taken to
an unknown location. There he was hung upside down and beaten on his
hips, buttocks and thighs for an extended amount of time. His
interrogators accused him of being an agent of the Indian government
and state enemy and instructed him to leave the country. Interrogators
also ordered him to urinate into an electrified bucket. He remained
confined in a very small cell for at least 2 more weeks.
Rape of female detainees in police or other official custody has
been a problem in the past. While there were no reports of such rapes
during the year, it was unclear whether the situation has improved or
whether rapes continued and were not being reported.
Police have been known to rape women not in custody, as well. One
human rights organization documented seven cases of rape and, during
the first 6 months of the year, six cases of attempted rape by law
enforcement officials against women not in custody.
In addition, after women reported that they were raped or involved
in family disputes, they frequently were detained in ``safe custody''
(in reality, confined in jail cells) where they endured poor conditions
and were sometimes abused and raped (see Section 5). Although the law
prohibits women in safe custody from being housed with criminals, in
practice, no separate facilities existed. This year the Government
began transferring women in safe custody to vagrant homes or NGO-run
shelters, where available.
The police often employed excessive, sometimes lethal, force in
dealing with opposition demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
Police corruption remained a problem, and there were credible
reports that police facilitated or were involved in trafficking in
women and children (see Section 6.f.). In July the Law Commission, an
independent body, recommended amendments to Section 54 to curb police
abuse. None of the recommendations had been adopted by the end of the
year. Extortion from businesses and individuals by law enforcement
personnel and persons with political backing was common, and
businessmen on several occasions went on strikes to protest the
extortion.
Human rights groups and press reports indicated that vigilantism
against women for perceived moral transgressions occurred in rural
areas, often under a fatwa (a proclamation from an Islamic leader) (see
Section 2.c.), and included punishments such as whipping. One human
rights organization recorded 32 such fatwa cases during the year. In
these cases, 19 persons were lashed and others faced punishments
ranging from physical assault to shunning of families by their
communities.
Rejected suitors, angry husbands, or those seeking revenge
sometimes threw acid on a woman's face (see Section 5).
Prison conditions were extremely poor and were a contributing
factor in some custodial deaths. One human rights organization reported
that 148 persons died in custody during the year (see Section 1.a.).
Most prisons were overcrowded and lacked adequate facilities.
Government figures indicated that the existing prison population of
roughly 75,000 was 300 percent of the official prison capacity of
approximately 25,000. Prison population figures included 2,000 women
and approximately 1,200 children under the age of 16. Of the entire
prison population, approximately 25 percent of those detained had been
convicted and 71 percent were being tried or awaiting trial. In some
cases, cells were so crowded that prisoners slept in shifts. At the end
of the year the Dhaka Central Jail (DCJ) reportedly housed
approximately 11,500 prisoners in a facility with a capacity of just
over 2,600. A new prison facility in Kashimpur, north of Dhaka, opened
in September 2001 although the first phase of construction for it had
yet to be completed. Law Minister Moudud Ahmed told the official news
agency that the first phase of the construction work for the Kashimpur
jail would be completed soon, but did not provide a date for its
completion.
There were reports of rampant corruption and irregularities in the
prisons. In August the new Inspector General of Prisons found gross
irregularities inside DCJ and transferred 17 officials from DCJ to
other prisons. According to a newspaper report, a deputy inspector
general (DIG) of prisons fled from Chittagong after receiving death
threats because of his investigation of irregularities in the jail
there. The DIG had confiscated two truckloads of unauthorized
materials, including knives and liquor, intended for notorious
criminals incarcerated there.
The treatment of prisoners in the jails was not equal. There were
three classes of cells: A, B, and C. Common criminals and low-level
political workers generally were held in C cells, which often have dirt
floors, no furnishings, and poor quality food. The use of restraining
devices on prisoners in these cells was common. Conditions in A and B
cells were markedly better; A cells were reserved for prominent
prisoners. B cells were considered 'second class' and were reserved for
convicted individuals. Those confined to B cells received items like
clothing that other detainees and prisoners being tried did not
receive.
Juveniles were required by law to be detained separately from
adults; however, due to a lack of facilities, in practice many were
with adult prisoners.
In general the Government did not permit prison visits by
independent human rights monitors, including the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Government-appointed committees of
prominent private citizens in each prison locality monitored prisons
monthly, but did not release their findings. District judges
occasionally also visited prisons, but rarely disclosed their findings.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
to arrest and to detain persons arbitrarily, as well as to use national
security legislation such as the SPA of 1974 to detain citizens without
formal charges or specific complaints being filed against them. The
Constitution states that each person arrested shall be informed of the
grounds for detention, provided access to a lawyer of his choice,
brought before a magistrate within 24 hours, and freed unless the
magistrate authorizes continued detention. However, the Constitution
specifically allows preventive detention, with specified safeguards,
outside these requirements. In practice authorities frequently violated
these constitutional provisions, even in nonpreventive detention cases.
In an April 1999 ruling, a two-judge High Court panel criticized the
police force for rampant abuse of detention laws and powers. There has
been no change in police methods since that ruling.
Under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals may
be detained for suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a
magistrate or a warrant. Some persons initially detained under Section
54 subsequently were charged with a crime, while others were released
without any charge. According to one human rights organization, a total
of 755 persons were detained under the SPA during the first 6 months of
2001. Another human rights organization, quoting prison authorities,
cited the number of SPA detainees at 655. No data is available for
detentions this year; however, on December 23 two benches of the High
Court Division of the Supreme Court declared 138 detentions illegal and
ordered the release of the detainees. All the detained persons were
arrested under Section 54 and were being held under the SPA. The
Government frequently used Section 54 to harass and intimidate members
of the political opposition and their families. Police sometimes
detained opposition activists prior to and during demonstrations
without citing any legal authority, holding them until the event was
over. Newspapers reported instances of police detaining persons to
extract money or for personal vengeance.
Under the SPA, the Government or a district magistrate may order a
person detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act likely
``to prejudice the security of the country.'' Other offenses subject to
the SPA include smuggling, black market activity, or hoarding. The
magistrate must inform the detainee of the grounds for detention within
15 days, and the Ministry of Home Affairs must agree with the grounds
presented for detention within 30 days or release the detainee. The
Government does not have to charge the detainee with a statutory crime.
In practice detainees sometimes were held for longer periods. Detainees
may appeal their detention, and the Government may grant early release.
An advisory board composed of two persons who have been, or are
qualified to be, high court judges and one civil servant are supposed
to examine the cases of SPA detainees after 4 months. On June 19, the
High Court stated that the Government does not have any right to extend
detention and, as such, SPA detainees must be released after 30 days
unless the advisory board recommends an extension. The High Court
judgment also made mandatory the requirement that authorities inform
the court of the grounds for the detention order against the accused
within 15 days and, if possible, earlier. On June 24, the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court concurred with the High Court judgment.
If the Government adequately defends its detention order, the detainee
remains imprisoned; if not, the detainee is released. If the defendant
in an SPA case is able to present his case before the High Court in
Dhaka, the High Court generally rules in favor of the defendant.
However, many defendants either were too poor or, because of strict
detention, were unable to obtain legal counsel and thereby moved the
case beyond the magistrate level. Magistrates subject to the
administrative controls of the Establishment Ministry were less likely
to dismiss a case (see Section 1.e.). Detainees were allowed to consult
with lawyers, although usually not until a charge was filed; however,
they were not entitled to be represented by a lawyer before an advisory
board. Detainees may receive visitors. The Government has held
incommunicado prominent prisoners for extended amounts of time.
According to a September 2000 study by a parliamentary
subcommittee, 98.8 percent of the 69,010 SPA detainees over a period of
26 years were released on orders from the High Court. The study
asserted that SPA cases generally were so weak and vague that the court
had no alternative but to grant bail. This situation continued at
year's end.
On February 25, police arrested 10 leaders of BCL near the
residence of the AL president without warrant or charges. The police
filed a case against them under Section 54 and sought a 7-day custody
period from the court. The magistrate rejected the custody request and
granted bail. The individuals, however, could not be released because
the police had requested their continued detention under the SPA. After
successfully challenging the detention order, seven of these arrested
were released from DCJ on March 27. The remaining were released later,
but were rearrested several times.
On March 4, the AL presidium expressed concern over the whereabouts
of A.F.M. Bahauddin Nasim, personal assistant to Sheikh Hasina. The
presidium stated that Nasim was arrested and accused in a number of
criminal cases, was kept incommunicado and was tortured. In an April 3
ruling, the High Court ordered the Government to disclose where and
under what authority they were holding Nasim. The Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court stayed the order. Nasim faced criminal charges,
including sedition and remained in prison. Originally arrested under
Section 54, he was charged with smuggling foreign currency. On April
12, he was charged with taking part in the June 2001 armed attack of
Khaleda Zia's motorcade. The hearing on the sedition charges began on
October 16. On September 17, the High Court ruled against the
Government regarding Nasim's petition to have he smuggling charges
dismissed. In November the High Court granted him bail on all charges
and on December 30 declared his detention illegal and ordered his
release (see Section 2.d.).
On March 15, police arrested former State Minister Dr. Mohiuddin
Khan Alamgir under Section 54 and later detained him under the SPA.
Alamgir was charged in a total of eight cases as of the end of the year
ranging from misappropriating grant funding, corruption, and to
sedition. On August 3, the High Court declared the SPA detention of
Alamgir illegal. In total he had been detained for six months. Alamgir
was granted bail on all eight of the alleged offenses while he awaited
trial (see Section 2.d.).
On October 20, the army, during Operation Clean Heart, arrested
Saber Hossain Chowdhury, political secretary to Sheikh Hasina. He was
given 2 days remand and charged under Section 54. On October 24, he was
charged in two cases, one in connection with the attack on Khaldea
Zia's motorcade in June 2001 and the other for attempted embezzlement.
The High Court declared his detention illegal in November and ordered
him released from prison. On December 14, the High Court again issued a
ruling questioning the legality of Chowdhury's detention.
The Government used Section 54 and the SPA to arrest and detain
many other opposition activists, including former M.P.s Haji Selim and
Kamal Ahmed Mujumder, as well as AL leader and activist Sayeed Kokon,
and former General Secretary of BCL, Ashim Kumar Ukil.
On April 2, Parliament scrapped the Public Safety Act enacted by
the AL government in January 2000. The BNP alleged widespread AL
government misuse of the PSA to harass and detain political opponents.
Like the SPA, the PSA allowed police to circumvent normal
procedures, which led to arrests based on little or no concrete
evidence. A week after the repeal of PSA, Parliament passed the Law and
Order Disruption Crimes Speedy Trial Act (STA) to remain in force for 2
years if not extended. It contains a provision for the trial of those
accused of certain crimes in special courts from 30 to 60 days after
arrest. Unlike the PSA, the STA has a bail provision, but made it
mandatory for the court to record the grounds for granting bail. As a
safeguard against misuse of the law, it provided punishment for
bringing false charges with jail terms from 2 to 5 years. On June 23,
in response to a writ filed by Lalmonirhat Bar Association President
Matiur Rahman, who was charged under the STA on June 13, the High Court
requested the Government to explain why the STA should not be declared
unconstitutional. In general there have not been allegations of
widespread misuse of the STA.
In November 2001, the police Special Branch detained Shariar Kabir
and held him for 2 days before charging him with carrying out seditious
acts abroad. On January 20, Kabir was released on bail and a sedition
case against him remained pending. On December 8, police arrested
Kabir, along with several other AL leaders, under Section 54 following
a series of deadly bomb explosions in Mymensingh cinema halls. He was
charged with involvement in acts of sabotage and subversion. Kabir was
given 30 days' detention on December 12 and charged with antistate
activities in another case, involving two foreign journalists
associated with British TV and their local facilitators. On December
15, a High Court ruling questioned the legality of Kabir's SPA
detention and directed the Government to pay compensation to Kabir as
well as provide him with medical care. Kabir was granted ad interim
bail on December 18 in connection with the British TV case, however the
Government failed to produce him as ordered by the court and he
remained in jail at year's end.
There was a system of bail for criminal offenses that was employed
for both violent and nonviolent crimes. However, some provisions of the
law precluded the granting of bail. The Women and Children Repression
Prevention Act provides special procedures for persons accused of
violence against women and children. The law calls for harsher
penalties, provides compensation to victims, and requires action
against investigating officers for negligence or willful failure in
duty.
Some human rights groups expressed concern that the non-bailable
period of detention was an effective tool for exacting personal
vengeance.
In February, the Government released one Indian and four Burmese
nationals from DCJ following a January High Court order to end their
illegal detention (see Section 2.d.). The Burmese nationals were
arrested in September 1994 under the Foreigners Act for entering the
country without valid travel documents and were given jail sentences of
a maximum of 5 months. The Indian national arrested under the same law
in 1999 was sentenced to a 16-month prison term. The High Court ordered
the Government to grant the five's request for political asylum or to
transport them to a third country. In April officials of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs decided to repatriate 731 foreigners who had served
their jail terms.
In July 2 months after his death, Falu Miah won a compensation suit
for his unlawful detention of more than 21 years. Police arrested Falu
Miah in connection with a robbery in August 1972. He was never brought
before a court during his imprisonment and was not informed of the
reason for his detention. The court acquitted him 10 days after his
release on bail.
On August 28, Faruk Miah, a victim of mistaken identity, was
released from prison in Kishoreganj after 30 months of imprisonment.
The police had arrested him in February 2000 in connection with a case
in which he was not involved.
In June police arrested an 11-year-old boy and sent him to prison
after a detained smuggler named the boy and other members of the boy's
family as accomplices. The local chapter of a human rights organization
filed a petition with the court to secure the boy's release.
On July 21, a High Court bench issued a ruling against a police
officer in Manikganj after newspapers reported that the officer had
filed charges against an 18-month-old boy in a case for allegedly
taking part in a clash. The High Court ordered the child's acquittal on
the charges.
The Government sometimes used serial detentions to prevent the
release of political activists.
On March 27, the High Court declared the February 25 SPA detention
of three top leaders of Bangladesh Chhatra League-Liaqat Shikder,
Nazrul Islam Babu and Rafiqul Islam Kotowal-illegal and ordered their
release. They were rearrested at the entrance of the jail and accused
in a previously filed murder case. On April 1, the metropolitan
sessions judge granted them interim bail but two more cases were filed
against them and the police again arrested them. On September 9, in a
written statement made by Shikder's mother, she claimed Shikder had
become seriously ill due to continuous torture. In September all three
were released from jail.
In March 2001, JP Chairman Ershad was detained under the SPA after
the court ordered his release upon payment of a fine in a corruption
case. He faced numerous other charges at year's end.
On July 15, AL President Sheikh Hasina told reporters that 450,000
of her supporters were implicated in false cases throughout the country
since the Government took office in October 2001. Law Minister Moudud
Ahmed stated that the AL government had filed 17,000 political cases
and harassed about 425,000 opposition activists during its rule between
1996 and 2001, giving as examples the 154 cases the AL government filed
against M.P. Sadeq Hossain Khola and 114 cases filed against M.P.
Amanullah Aman. On March 3, Home Minister Altaf Hossain Chowdhury said
that since coming to power in October 2001, the Government had released
11,706 persons detained in 960 politically motivated cases filed under
the previous government.
It is difficult to estimate the total number of detentions for
political reasons. Many activists were charged for crimes, and many
criminals claim to be political activists. Because of crowded court
dockets and magistrates who were reluctant to challenge the Government,
the judicial system did not deal effectively with criminal cases that
may be political in origin. There was no independent body with the
authority and ability to monitor detentions or to prevent, detect, or
publicize cases of political harassment. Most such detentions appeared
to last for several days or weeks. Defendants in most cases receive
bail, but dismissal of wrongful charges or acquittal may take years.
The Constitution does not address exile, but does provide for the
right of free movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration,
and repatriation. The Government did not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, under a longstanding ``temporary''
provision of the Constitution, the lower courts remained part of the
executive and were subject to its influence. The higher levels of the
judiciary displayed a significant degree of independence and often
ruled against the Government in criminal, civil, and even politically
controversial cases. However, there was corruption within the legal
process, especially at lower levels. Corruption within the police force
and lack of transparency of police investigations delayed or thwarted
justice in many cases.
Victims of police abuse were generally reluctant to file cases
against the police, as there was no independent body charged with
investigation of criminal allegations against members of the police
force. However, a December 2001 ruling of the High Court bench found
that police presence during a judicial inquiry of alleged victims of
police abuse was illegal.
The court system has two levels: the lower courts and the Supreme
Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. The lower courts consisted
of magistrates, who were part of the executive branch of the
Government, and session and district judges, who belonged to the
judicial branch.
In June 2001, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a 1997 High Court order
to separate the judiciary from the executive. The ruling declared which
elements of the 1997 order could be implemented without constitutional
amendment and ordered the Government to implement those elements within
8 weeks. The AL government did not implement the directive. In August
2001, Ishtiaq Ahmed, law advisor to the caretaker government, announced
that the judiciary would be separated from the executive by
promulgating an ordinance and left the job of implementing the
ordinance to the next elected government. The newly elected government
formed a cabinet committee to develop implementation plans. However,
the committee has made slow progress, drawing criticism from the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The appellate panel has
extended the period for implementation of its directives on several
occasions at the request of the Government and the latest deadline for
implementation is scheduled for January 26, 2003.
The Supreme Court is divided into two sections: the High Court and
the Appellate Court. The High Court hears original cases and reviews
cases from the lower courts. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to
hear appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the High
Court. Rulings of the Appellate Court are binding on all other courts.
Due to the judicial system's million-case backlog, the Ministry of
Law initiated a pilot program in the city of Comilla offering
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in some civil cases. Citizens have
the opportunity to have their cases mediated by persons with a
background in law before filing their cases. According to government
sources, the pilot program, initiated in family courts in 15 districts
in 2001, was very successful and popular among citizens. According to
the Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Moudud Ahmed, the
program was to be extended to all the remaining 49 district family
courts by the end of the year.
Early in the year, the number of judges on the appellate panel of
the Supreme Court was raised from five to seven so the appellate panel
could split into two benches and more quickly dispose of cases. The
Home Ministry formed a special committee to monitor progress of
proceedings for more than 100 high-profile cases and provide directives
to government agencies to speed up the trials. In one case, the Dhaka
Metropolitan Sessions court completed a kidnaping/murder trial in 27
working days.
On October 24, President Iajuddin Ahmed signed an ordinance
instituting a ``Special Tribunal for Speedy Trial'' system that would
cover six major criminal offences. The new law deals with crimes
including murder, rape, possession of illegal arms, narcotics and
explosives, and hoarding. It was signed into law while Parliament was
not in session, but was ratified in Parliament November 14 during an
opposition walkout. Thirty cases were initially sent to the 'tribunals'
for trial. The High Court issued a show cause notice concerning the
constitutionality of the law on December 15.
Trials were public. The law provided the accused with the right to
be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call
witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. State funded defense attorneys
rarely were provided, and there were few legal aid programs to offer
financial assistance. There is no mandated provision of counsel for
accused indigents, but the Government does appoint lawyers to represent
individuals tried in absentia. In rural areas, individuals often did
not receive legal representation. In urban areas, legal counsel
generally was available if individuals can afford the expense. However,
sometimes detainees and suspects in police detention were denied access
to legal counsel. Trials conducted under the SPA, the PSA, and the
Women and Children Repression Prevention Act were similar to normal
trials, but were tried without the lengthy adjournments typical in
other cases. Under the provisions of the PSA, STA, and the Women and
Children Repression Prevention Act, special tribunals heard cases and
issued verdicts. Cases under these laws must be investigated and tried
within specific time limits, although the law was unclear as to the
disposition of the case if it is not finished before the time limit
elapses (see Section 1.d.).
Persons may be tried in absentia, although this rarely occurred.
Thirteen of the 21 persons accused in the 1975 ``jail killing'' case
were being tried in absentia and eight of those convicted of killing
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 21 members of his family were convicted in
absentia in 1998 (see Section 1.a.). There is no automatic right to a
retrial if a person convicted in absentia later returns. Absent
defendants may be represented by state-appointed counsel but may not
choose their own attorneys and, if convicted, may not file appeals
until they return to the country.
A major problem of the court system was the overwhelming backlog of
cases, and trials underway typically are marked by extended
continuances while many accused persons remained in prison. These
conditions, and the corruption encountered in the judicial process,
effectively prevented many persons from obtaining a fair trial.
Transparency International estimated that more than 60 percent of
the persons involved in court cases paid bribes to court officials.
In August 2001, Idris Ali was released after serving 5 years in
prison in a case of mistaken identity. The High Court ordered his
release on three separate occasions, but the orders did not reach the
jail authorities. Idris's lawyer stated publicly that only bribery
ensured proper processing of documents in court. Because of the
difficulty in accessing the courts and because litigation is time
consuming, alternative dispute resolution by traditional village
leaders, which is regarded by some persons to be more transparent and
swift, was popular in rural communities. However, these mechanisms were
also subject to abuse.
The Government stated that it holds no political prisoners, but
opposition parties and human rights monitors claimed that many
opposition activists were arrested and convicted with criminal charges
as a pretext for their political activities. Soon after assuming power
in mid-July 2001, the CG formed a judicial commission to review cases
of political prisoners and detentions under the SPA. The commission
recommended that some cases be brought to trial and others dismissed.
In December 2001, the new government formed its own judicial commission
to look into political cases. On March 4, Home Minister Altaf Hossain
Chowdhury said the Government had released 11,706 persons in
politically motivated cases. In April the PSA Repeal Law became law and
gave the Government authority to determine which cases filed under the
SPA law would be withdrawn and which ones would be pursued (see Section
1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires authorities to obtain a judicial
warrant before entering a home; however, according to human rights
monitors, police rarely obtained warrants, and officers violating the
procedure were not punished. In addition, the SPA permits searches
without a warrant.
Security forces raided the residence of a top AL leader, Amir
Hossain Amu, three times between May and December. According to AL
sources, security forces ransacked Amu's house and verbally abused his
wife under the pretext of searching for illegal firearms.
On June 21, police in the Pakundia section of Kishoreganj district
raided the home of an AL supporter, Abdul Malek, without warrant. The
police harassed the occupants of the house, including Abdul Malek's
wife, and reportedly tried to remove her clothes. The police allegedly
told Malek's family that they would go if the family paid them money. A
human rights organization reported that the authorities took no action
against the police officers involved.
During the year, the police and the BDR conducted raids on the
houses of political activists and alleged criminals without warrants
during frequent anticrime drives. On May 29, BDR personnel broke into
the house of a BNP leader and gas line contractor Nurul Haq and started
beating him. Haq was rescued by the intervention of local police.
The Government periodically forcibly resettled persons. In March a
High Court bench stayed, for 3 months, a Ministry of Housing and Public
Works order to dismantle slums in the Amtali section of Dhaka and
ordered the Government to explain why it should not be directed to
resettle the slum residents.
In September 2001, 70 prostitutes tried to re-enter the vacant
Tanbazar brothel and police resisted. Some women were injured, three of
whom were hospitalized.
The Government sometimes punished family members for the alleged
crimes of others. In May in Dhaka, having failed to arrest two alleged
criminals, police arrested 12 of their relatives and detained them
under the SPA, including the 60-year-old father and 53-year-old mother
of one of the alleged criminals.
The police Special Branch, National Security Intelligence, and the
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) employed informers to
report on citizens perceived to be political opponents of the
Government and to conduct surveillance of them. Political leaders,
human rights activists, foreign NGOs, and journalists reported
occasional harassment by these security organizations. In addition,
foreign missionaries reported that internal security forces and others
closely monitored their activities; however, no missionaries reported
other harassment during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, expression, and the press, subject to ``reasonable
restrictions'' in the interest of security, friendly relations with
foreign states, public order, decency and morality, or to prohibit
defamation or incitement to an offense; however, there were numerous
examples of the Government limiting these rights in practice. Some
government leaders encouraged violence against journalists by ruling
party members.
As in past years, journalists pressed for repeal of the Official
Secrets Act of 1923. According to the act, a citizen must prove why he
or she needs information before the Government will provide it. The act
protected corrupt government officials from public scrutiny and
hindered transparency and accountability of the Government at all
levels.
The hundreds of daily and weekly publications provided a forum for
a wide range of views. While some publications supported the overall
policies of the Government, most newspapers reported critically on
government policies and activities. In addition to an official
government-owned wire service, there was one private wire service
affiliated with overseas ownership.
Despite this proliferation of news articles, Reporters Without
Borders (RSF), in their first publication of a worldwide index of
countries according to their respect for press freedom, ranked the
country 118 out of 139, stating that, ``armed rebel movements, militias
or political parties constantly endanger the lives of journalists. The
state fails to do all it could to protect them and fight the immunity
very often enjoyed by those responsible for such violence.''
Newspaper ownership and content were not subject to direct
government restriction. However, the Government influenced journalists
through financial means such as government advertising and allocations
of newsprint imported at favorable tariff rates. The Government stated
that it considered circulation of the newspapers, compliance with wage
board standards, objectivity in reporting, coverage of development
activities, and ``attitude towards the spirit of Bangladesh's War of
Liberation'' as factors in allocating advertising. In the past,
commercial firms often were reluctant to advertise in newspapers
critical of the Government; however, this appeared to no longer be the
case.
The Government owned and controlled virtually all radio and
television stations with the exception of a few privately owned cable
stations, such as Ekushey Television (ETV), ATN Bangla, and private
broadcaster Radio Metrowave.
On August 29, the Supreme Court, responding to a petition by two
pro-BNP educators and a journalist, ordered ETV, the only full-fledged
broadcast television station in the private sector, to be closed down.
This was based on alleged irregularities in its license. No appeals are
possible from this court. Petitions were filed, however, concerning the
shutting down of ETV's transmission and seizure of its equipment. These
petitions were rejected by the High Court on September 16.
The activities of the Prime Minister occupied the bulk of prime
time news bulletins on both television and radio, followed by the
activities of members of the Cabinet. Opposition party news received
little coverage. As a condition of operation, both private stations
were required to broadcast for free government news programs and
national addresses by both the Prime Minister and the President. In
July 2001, Parliament approved two bills granting autonomy to state-run
Bangladesh Television (BTV) and Bangladesh Betar (Bangladesh Radio).
Passage of these laws has not ensured real autonomy for them and the
Government has not implemented the laws. Government intrusion into the
selection of news remained a pervasive problem. Many journalists at
private stations exercised self-censorship as well.
Journalists and others were subject to incarceration when private
parties filed criminal libel proceedings against them. Ruling party
M.P.s filed separate criminal libel suits against several newspapers
after articles were published that the politicians viewed as false and
defamatory. The journalists in all cases received anticipatory bail
from the courts, and none of the cases moved to trial. Sedition charges
remained pending, and those persons accused remained on bail.
While some journalists were critical, most practiced some degree of
self-censorship. Many journalists cited fear of possible harassment,
retaliation, or physical harm as a reason to avoid sensitive stories.
Government leaders, political party activists, and others frequently
launched violent attacks on journalists and newspapers, and violent
physical attacks against journalists occurred during the year.
Political parties and persons acting on their behalf conducted attacks
both on media offices and on individual journalists targeted as a
consequence of their news reporting. These crimes largely remained
unsolved and the perpetrators, often identified by name or party
affiliation in press reports, were not held accountable in many cases.
Attacks by political activists on journalists also were common during
times of political street violence, and some journalists were injured
in police actions.
In March the management of the Government-run wire service
Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS) fired 20 journalists. Observers
believe the journalists were fired because of their alleged allegiance
to the AL. Colleagues of the journalists protested management's action
and were in turn threatened with disciplinary action. BSS management
hired 22 journalists who reportedly were sympathetic to the BNP.
On May 20, Matiur Rahman Chowdhury, editor of Manavzamin and
stringer for the Voice of America (VOA) Bangla Service, was sentenced
to 6 months in jail for publishing a recorded conversation between
former president Hussain Muhammad Ershad and a judge of the High Court
Division of the Supreme Court. Chowdhury appealed the verdict and the
sentence has been stayed.
According to RSF during the year, 244 journalists faced repression,
compared to 162 in 2001, and 126 in 2000. They also reported that
during the year, 3 journalists were killed, 102 injured, 39 attacked,
30 arrested, and 147 threatened. On June 18, RSF stated that in the 8
months since the Government's assumption of power, ``as many as 145
journalists were assaulted or threatened with death, 1 was murdered, 4
detained by the authorities, and 16 press clubs or newsrooms
attacked.'' The figures reported by RSF were not independently verified
and the Government protested the characterization portrayed in the
statement.
On June 21, police and security personnel used sticks to assault
journalists who converged at the residence of the President to gather
news after President Professor A.Q.M. Badruddoza Chowdhury resigned.
The officials dragged women journalists by their hair and kicked
several photojournalists. They did not allow the journalists to speak
with Chowdhury. When Chowdhury's son, a BNP M.P., told the police that
his father would like to speak with the press, the security men
declared that they had been instructed by higher authorities not to
allow the journalists to speak with the outgoing President.
On July 2, armed BNP activists assaulted Monirul Haidar Iqbal, the
Mongla correspondent of Dhaka's largest circulation Bangla- language
daily, Jugantor. According to a complaint filed by Iqbal, the BNP
activists assaulted him because of his stories on the illegal
occupation of shrimp fields by supporters of the ruling coalition.
Iqbal lodged a formal complaint with the police.
On July 5, members of a faction of the outlawed BCP allegedly
kidnaped Shukur Ali, a reporter with Anirban, a Khulna daily newspaper.
He remained missing and five BCP members have been charged in the case.
On July 5, the Government cancelled the publishing license of a
Bangla language daily Dainik Uttarbanga Barta, published in Natore. The
Government action followed the publication of a March 26 article that
referred to the current Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia as leader of
the opposition and to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as the prime
minister. The managing editor of the newspaper, who was also a local AL
leader, apologized for what he claimed was an error due to incorrect
data processing and a correction was published the following day. The
newspaper management said that they would appeal against the
Government's decision.
On July 13, a caller identifying himself as the son of Parliament's
Chief Whip Khondokar Delwar Hossain made death threats against Arifu
Rahman, a staff correspondent of Dhaka's Bangla-language daily Prothom
Alo. Rahman lodged a formal complaint with the police.
On July 22, the Bangla-language daily Janakantha accused the
Government of trying to suppress its reporting. The statement noted
that soon after coming to office, the Government stopped placing
advertisements in Janakantha. It then threatened to file a treason case
against the daily for publishing a report about transfers in the
police.
On September 7, JCD activists reportedly attacked a public pro-ETV
meeting. The activists reportedly ransacked the podium and assaulted
the organizers of the meeting. Ten persons were injured in the attack,
two critically, including a correspondent of a Dhaka-based Bangla-
language daily and a cultural activist belonging to the Sheikh Mujib
Cultural Alliance. Seven pro-BNP student activists were suspended from
the party for their role in the attack. Ten individuals accused of
participating in the incident were granted anticipatory bail on
September 11.
On November 25 police arrested two foreign journalists associated
with British Television, Zeba Naz Malik and Leopold Bruno Sorentino,
while crossing to India at the Benapole border. Two citizens, Moniza
Pricila Raj and Meser Ali were taken into custody that same day in
connection with the case. Ali was released after providing a witness
statement in the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Police
confiscated videocassettes and U.S. currency from Raj when she was
taken into custody. The three, plus Selim Samad, a freelance
journalist, were charged with sedition and the three in custody were
placed on 5-day remand on November 26. Sumi Khan, a journalist of the
weekly Shaptahik 2000, was also arrested in Chittagong in connection
with the incident. Khan was released on November 29 after 10 hours
detention. In a press briefing on December 1, the Government's
Principal Information Officer, Khondker Mairul Alam stated that the two
foreigners were held as NGO activists for their suspected involvement
in ``subversive'' and ``anti-state acts.'' The two foreign journalists
were deported on December 11 after issuing statements expressing their
regret for the incident.
Raj was granted ad interim bail on December 18, but remained in
prison until December 22. Samad was granted bail on December 23 and the
order sent via special messenger to ensure the delay in release that
occurred with Raj was not repeated. Samad, however, was placed on 1-
month detention under the SPA before the bail order was received at the
jail. On December 31, the High Court issued a ruling questioning the
legality of Samad's detention.
On December 7, Reuters released an article with a quote attributed
to the Home Minister that stated the Mymensingh bombing attacks could
be the work of Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida network and that he had
ordered a national security alert. The Home Minister denied making the
statement and Reuters retracted the story. On December 13, police
arrested Enamul Haque Chowdhury, a stringer for Reuters, as the author
of the article and searched the Reuters office in Dhaka. He remained in
jail at year's end.
Political activists frequently attacked journalists. In January
2001, political activists, reportedly with the support and backing of
AL M.P. Joynal Hazari, beat and stabbed the United News of Bangladesh's
(UNB) correspondent in Feni, Tipu Sultan. Opponents of the AL blamed a
pro-AL student front and AL activists for the attack. The AL government
donated $2,000 (Taka 100,000) for the injured journalist's treatment.
The journalist initiated legal proceedings without any result to date.
The case was under reinvestigation. The Committee to Protect
Journalists (CPJ) cited Sultan for his exposure of official corruption,
which resulted in his being assaulted.
In November 2001, the Government stopped buying advertising space
in the popular Bangla language daily Janakantha following reports by
the newspaper of alleged atrocities committed against minority
community and activists of the AL.
Feminist author Taslima Nasreen remained abroad after being freed
on bond while criminal charges were still pending against her for
insulting religious beliefs of the country's Muslims. On May 26, the
Government banned her latest book, Utal Hawa (Wild Wind). Utal Hawa is
a sequel to her earlier novel, Amar Meyebela (My Girlhood), published
in 1999, which was also banned in the country for being anti-Islamic.
On October 13 a court sentenced Nasreen, in absentia, to one year in
jail for her ``derogatory remarks about Islam'' in a case filed by a
local Jamaat-e-Islami leader November 1999.
A government Film Censor Board reviewed local and foreign films and
may censor or ban them on the grounds of state security, law and order,
religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or
plagiarism. The Board did not ban any locally produced films during the
year; however, in April the Film Censor Board obliged a filmmaker to
modify a film's dialogue before issuing a certificate for public
screening. On December 14, the High Court stayed the screening of the
film ``Hason Raja'' (a mystic philosopher who composed hundreds of
songs) in response to a petition filed by Sadia Chowdhury Porag, a
descendent of Hason Raja. In her petition, Porag asserted that the film
bears no relationship to the truth, distorting the image of and placing
a stigma on the memory of Hason Raja. The court also issued a show
cause notice to the Film Censor Board to provide reason why screening
of the film should be allowed. The Board banned the screenings of
several imported English-language movies for their pornographic
content. Video rental libraries provided a wide variety of films to
their borrowers, and government efforts to enforce censorship on these
rental films were sporadic and ineffectual. The Government did not
limit citizens' access to the Internet.
Foreign publications were subject to review and censorship.
Censorship most often was used in cases of immodest or obscene
photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, and
objectionable comments about national leaders.
The Government banned the April 4 issue of the Far Eastern Economic
Review for an article it contained on the rise of pro-Islamic movements
in the country. Security services were instructed to closely monitor
foreign journalists entering the country on tourist visas.
The Government generally respected academic freedom. Although
teachers and students at all levels largely were free to pursue
academic assignments, research on extremely sensitive religious and
political topics was forbidden.
The situation on public university campuses seriously inhibited the
ability of students to receive a university education and of teachers
to teach. Armed clashes between student groups of different parties or
of different factions within a particular party resulted in prolonged
closures of colleges and universities in Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet, and
Noakhali.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, subject to restrictions in the
interest of public order and public health; however, the Government
frequently limited this right. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure
Code (CrPC) allows the Government to ban assemblies of more than four
persons. According to one human rights organization, the Government
imposed 24 such bans during the first 6 months of the year. The
Government sometimes used bans to prohibit rallies for security
reasons, but many independent observers believed that such explanations
usually were a pretext. Supporters of the ruling party frequently will
schedule their own rallies at the same venue and time, thus providing
the Government a basis for imposing a ban.
On January 9, armed police fired teargas to disperse a peaceful AL
sit-in demonstration near the AL central office in Dhaka in protest of
a rise in the price of petroleum. Police charged the demonstrators with
batons. The AL opted to stage the sit-in after the police refused to
allow them to conduct a procession. In the same afternoon, police took
similar action to break up another AL rally at Muktangon and picked up
10 AL student activists. Questioned by AL leaders, police replied they
were acting on instructions from higher authorities.
On March 25, the Dhaka Metropolitan Police imposed Section 144 at
the Osmany Udyan area to foil an AL scheduled hunger strike. The hunger
strike was held to protest the passage of a law aimed at removing the
portrait of late president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, revered by AL
supporters as the Father of the Nation, from government offices. When
leaders and supporters started to gather at Osmany Udyan, defying the
ban, police charged with clubs and teargas, assaulting key leaders.
They included former Agriculture Minister Motia Chowdhury, the AL
President's political secretary Saber Hossain Chowdhury, and noted
television actor and politician Asaduzzaman Noor These persons were
detained for about 3 hours.
Violence also was endemic between the student political wings of
the major national parties, and between rival factions within the
parties.
On January 15, students of Bangladesh Agricultural University in
Mymenshingh rioted in protest of a reported government intention to
change the name of the university. Approximately 100 students, as well
as several teachers, were injured in clashes with the police.
During an August 27 nationwide student strike called by the
Progressive Students' Unity (PSU), 12 students were injured in police
action on the BUET campus. Escalating demonstrations led to an
indefinite closure of the university.
In late 2001, PM Zia, who had suspended the central committee of
the BNP student wing, Jatiyabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD) appealed to other
political parties to reach a consensus on banning student politics. The
AL and some students and teachers opposed the move. On September 9, PM
Zia lifted her suspension order on the JCD central committee and
announced the formation of a new convening committee.
Various political parties called numerous hartals during the year.
Party activists enforced these strikes through threatened or actual
violence against strikebreakers. Those persons who did not join the
strike were coerced into observing prohibitions against vehicular
transport and normal operation of businesses. Party activists mounted
processions during the hartals. Although surveys indicated a majority
of citizens were opposed to the use of hartals as a political weapon,
all of the major parties continue to use them. In August 2001, leaders
of all parties agreed to refrain from calling for hartals, but the
agreement did not last, and there was no attempt this year to refrain
from hartals. Police rarely interfered with ruling party processions on
such occasions and often worked in tandem with ruling party activists
to disrupt and to discourage opposition processions.
The Constitution provides for the right of every citizen to form
associations, subject to ``reasonable restrictions'' in the interest of
morality or public order, and in general the Government respected this
right. Individuals were free to join private groups.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the
state religion and also stipulates the right--subject to law, public
order, and morality--to practice the religion of one's choice; however,
the Government generally respected this provision in practice. Although
the Government is secular, religion exerts a powerful influence on
politics. The Government is sensitive to the Muslim consciousness of
the majority of its citizens. It can fail to protect minority groups,
contributing to an atmosphere of impunity. Approximately 88 percent of
the population is Muslim. Some members of the Hindu, Christian, and
Buddhist minorities experienced discrimination by those who regard
minorities in general as politically vulnerable.
Religious minorities were disadvantaged in practice in such areas
as access to government jobs and political office. Selection boards in
the Government services often lacked minority group representation.
Religious organizations were not required to register with the
Government; however, all NGOs, including religious organizations, were
required to register with the NGO Affairs Bureau if they received
foreign money for social development projects. The Government has the
legal ability to cancel the registration of an NGO or to take other
actions such as dissolve the executive committee of the NGO, freeze its
bank accounts, or cancel projects. However, such powers rarely were
used and did not affect NGOs with religious affiliations.
The Government allowed various religions to establish places of
worship, to train clergy, to travel for religious purposes, and to
maintain links with co-religionists abroad. The law permitted citizens
to proselytize. However, strong social resistance to conversion from
Islam means that most missionary efforts by Christian groups were aimed
at serving communities that have been Christian for several generations
or longer. Foreign missionaries were allowed to work in the country,
but their right to proselytize is not protected by the Constitution.
Some missionaries faced problems in obtaining visas or renewing visas,
which must be renewed annually. Some foreign missionaries reported that
internal security forces and others closely monitored their activities;
however, no missionaries reported other harassment during the year.
In January 2001, the High Court ruled illegal all fatwas, or expert
opinions on Islamic law. Only those Muftis (religious scholars) who
have expertise in Islamic law are authorized to declare a fatwa;
however, in practice village religious leaders sometimes made
declarations on individual cases, calling the declaration a fatwa.
Fatwas commonly deal with marriage and divorce, or mete out punishments
for perceived moral transgressions. Victims were sometimes lashed or
shunned by their communities (see Section 1.c.). While the Court's
intention was to end the extrajudicial enforcement of penalties by
religious leaders, the 2001 ruling, which generated violent protests,
declared all fatwas illegal (see Section 1.a.). Several weeks later,
the Appellate Court stayed the High Court's ruling. No date has been
set for rehearing the issue.
Many Hindus have been unable to recover landholdings lost because
of discrimination in the application of the law, especially the Vested
Property Act. Property ownership, particularly among Hindus, has been a
contentious issue since partition in 1947. In April 2001 Parliament
passed the Vested Property Return Act. This law required the Government
to return land that was seized under the now-defunct Vested Property
Act; a law that allowed ``enemy'' (in practice Hindu) lands to be
expropriated by the State. The Government was tasked to prepare a list
of vested property holdings by October 2001, and claims were to have
been filed within 90 days of the publication date. No further claims
were to be accepted after that period expired. The Government has yet
to publish the list of vested properties.
On November 26, the Parliament passed an amendment to the Vested
Property Act allowing the Government unlimited time to return the
vested properties. The properties were to remain under the control of
Deputy Commissioners until a tribunal settles ownership. The amendment
also gives the Deputy Commissioners the right to lease such properties
until they are returned to their owners. The Government claimed that
this provision would prevent the properties from being stolen.
Since the October 2001 elections, some newspapers and NGOs, the
Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, and the AL have
alleged that religious minorities have been targeted for attacks. The
Government sometimes has failed to criticize, investigate, and
prosecute the perpetrators of attacks by local gang leaders. However,
targeted attacks, motivated solely by religious differences, could not
be independently verified.
Violence, including killings and injuries, occurred both before and
after the October 2001 election. There were reports of harassment of
Hindus, including killings, rape, looting, and torture, also was
related to post-election violence.
In late November 2001, the High Court ordered the Government to
look into and report on attacks on religious minorities, and to
demonstrate that it is taking adequate steps to protect minorities. The
Government submitted its report later in the year.
According to one human rights organization, during the transition
of power from the CG to the newly elected government in October 2001,
BNP supporters raped at least 10 Hindu women in the island district of
Bhola and looted several Hindu houses. Incidents of rape and looting
were also reported in the southwestern district of Bagerhat. The
situation improved after the new government members visited the areas
and deployed additional police to troubled locations. In February an
AL-backed Crime Against Humanity convention alleged ``systematic
persecution'' of religious minorities and called for the perpetrators
of the persecutions to be brought to trial under local and
international laws.
In some cases, field investigations by independent human rights
organizations into incidents of alleged religious persecution of
minority communities found that newspapers exaggerated the stories and
inflated common criminal incidents into stories of religious
persecution. A BNWLA investigation team found that the June 4
Janakantha report of Jamaat-e-Islami supporters stripping and taking a
nude photograph of a 60-year-old Hindu woman could not be
substantiated.
In the past, the Ahmadiyas, whom many mainstream Muslims consider
heretical, were the target of attacks and harassment. An Ahmadiya
mosque in Kushtia which mainstream Muslims captured in 1999 remained
under police control for approximately 3 years, preventing Ahmadiyas
from worshipping.
In August, the Ahmadiyas regained control and starting using the
mosque for prayers.
On April 22, unidentified assailants killed Ganojyoti Mohasthobir,
a monk at a Buddhist temple and orphanage at Rauzan in Chittagong
District. Media reports suggested that the killing might have been
related to a land dispute. Home Minister Altaf Hossain Chowdhury and
Foreign Minister Morshed Khan visited the temple and assured the public
that the incident would be properly investigated and those involved in
the killing would be brought to trial. On December 22, police arrested
Alich Mohammad alias Mahmud in connection with the case. The case
remained under investigation at the end of the reporting period.
On April 28, a criminal gang at Radha Madam Asram in Khagrachhari
killed Modon Gopal, a Hindu priest. The criminals also looted gold
statues from the temple.
On May 12, 12 unidentified persons broke into Dabua Benubon Bhiar
Buddhist Monastery at Beltoli before the monastery occupants and local
residents chased them away. Ain-O-Shalish Kendra, a human rights NGO,
filed a petition with the High Court asking that the Government be
ordered to investigate the incidents and submit its findings to the
court. The Government submitted its report to the court in August
stating that it had taken action against perpetrators of violence
against members of the minority communities wherever such incidents
took place. The Government report said investigations revealed that
many of the reports were false or exaggerated.
In June 2001, in Baniachar, Gopalganj district, a bomb exploded
inside a Catholic church during Sunday mass, killing 10 persons and
injuring 20. The army investigated and concluded that the bomb was
produced outside of the country. Police detained various persons for
questioning, but as of year's end; no progress had been made on the
case. A judicial commission, formed by the Government in December 2001
to probe politically motivated bombing incidents during the AL
government period, investigated the Baniarchar bombing incident. In
mid-September the commission submitted its report to the Government.
The commission blamed Sheikh Hasina and some of her AL party colleagues
for six of the seven bomb attacks in the second half of the AL
administration. Two of the three commission members stated they could
not identify the culprit of the bombings investigated and dissented,
saying that the head of the commission, Judge Abdul Bari Sarkar
inserted his personal views in the final report.
In November 2001, unidentified assailants killed Principal Gopal
Krishna Muhuri of Nazirhat College in Chittagong. Following the murder,
Hindus staged a violent demonstration, protesting that Muhuri was
killed because he was a Hindu. Muhuri's family stated that he was
unpopular with the Jammat-I-Islami party, as he had refused it and
other political parties access to the college's campus. It is unclear
whether the murder was religiously motivated. Three teachers at the
college were arrested in connection with the murder and have since been
granted bail. In July the police also arrested three known criminals on
suspicion of their involvement in the killings, all of whom were in
jail. On November 14, police filed a case against 12 persons in
connection with the killing, including the three teachers, the three
persons currently in jail, and an accountant at the college where
Muhuir was Principal.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution does not address exile,
but does provide for the right of free movement within the country,
foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. In practice, citizens
generally were able to move freely within the country and to travel
abroad, to emigrate, and to repatriate. There were, however, instances
in which the Government restricted these rights.
On December 2, the High Court ordered the return of former State
Minister for Planning, Alamgir's passport to allow him to travel abroad
for 3 months seeking medical treatment. His passport was confiscated at
Zia International Airport as he was departing for Singapore (see
Section 1.d.).
On occasion, the movement of major opposition political leaders was
restricted, and the Government did little to assist them.
On August 30, BNP activists barricaded a road in southwestern
Satkhira district to obstruct a motorcade of AL Leader Sheikh Hasina.
BNP activists allegedly threw bricks at the vehicle. Hasina's
bodyguards overpowered the demonstrators and her motorcade passed
unharmed. AL leaders alleged police inaction during the melee and
called a countrywide hartal on September 1 to protest the incident (see
Section 1.d.).
The country's passports were invalid for travel to Israel.
Approximately 300,000 Bihari Muslims live in various camps
throughout the country; they have been in the camps since 1971 awaiting
settlement in Pakistan. Biharis are non-Bengali Muslims who emigrated
to what formerly was East Pakistan during the 1947 partition of British
India. Most supported Pakistan during the country's 1971 War of
Independence. They later declined to accept citizenship and asked to be
repatriated to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan historically has
been reluctant to accept the Biharis.
Since 1992 approximately 232,000 Rohingya (Muslims from the
northern Burmese state of Arakan) have been repatriated voluntarily to
Burma. An additional 22,700 have left the camps and are living among
the local citizens. More than 20,800 refugees remained in two camps
administered by the Government in cooperation with the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In April 1999, the UNHCR urged the
Government to allow any refugees who could not return to Burma to be
allowed to work in the country, benefit from local medical programs,
and send their children to local schools. The Government refused these
requests, insisting that all Rohingya refugees must remain in the camps
until their return to Burma. According to Human Rights Watch, there
were reports of violence by refugee camp officials against Rohingya.
There were also claims of discrimination from the local population
towards the Rohingya.
On April 24, in a clash involving refugees, police, and student
activists, about 70 persons including 10 Rohingya were injured when
student activists of the BNP converged on Kutupalong refugee camp
demanding fees from a contractor who was building new sheds.
Despite senior level discussions with the Burmese government, the
two governments remained unable to accelerate the rate of repatriation.
According to the UNHCR, the Government, and human rights groups,
more than 100,000 Rohingya who entered the country since 1991 live in
precarious circumstances outside the camps with no formal
documentation. The Government effectively denied asylum to the new
arrivals by categorizing them as illegal economic migrants and turned
back as many persons as possible at the border. According to UNHCR,
which has interviewed some of these migrants, at least some of them
were fleeing persecution and were entitled to refugee status. Visits to
refugee camps by foreign diplomats revealed that some unregistered
persons, many of them having returned illegally after their official
repatriation to Burma, live in the camps and share food with relatives
who receive rations based on the number of registered members of the
camps. On a number of occasions, camp officials have handed some of the
unregistered persons over to the police who sent them to prison under
the Foreigners' Act.
The law does not include provisions for granting refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
Government generally cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The law does not provide for first
asylum or resettlement of asylum seekers. However, in practice the
Government granted temporary asylum to individual asylum seekers whom
the UNHCR interviewed and recognized as refugees on a case-by-case
basis. At the request of UNHCR, the Government allowed approximately
125 refugees and asylum seekers, including non-Rohingya Burmese,
Somalis, Iranians, and Sri Lankans, to remain in the country pending
durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation or resettlement to
other countries. The Government rejected asylum petitions from one
Indian and four Burmese nationals who were released from prison in
February (see Section 1.d.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The country is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which
elections by secret ballot are held on the basis of universal suffrage.
M.P.s are elected at least every 5 years. The Parliament has 300
elected members. Party leaders appoint candidates for elections; many
allege that some candidates effectively ``purchase'' nomination from
party leaders with generous campaign contributions or personal
``gifts.''
Under a 1996 constitutional amendment, general parliamentary
elections are presided over by a caretaker government, led by the most
recently retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. If he cannot or is
unwilling, another senior retired justice or other neutral figure
presides over the caretaker government. Sheikh Hasina, leader of the
AL, was Prime Minister until Parliament's term of office expired in
July 2001. At that time, in accordance with the Constitution, a CG was
installed to oversee the holding of the elections and to manage the
day-to-day operations of the Government until the next Prime Minister
took office on October 10, 2001. Domestic and international observers
deemed the eighth general election held on October 1, 2001 to be
generally free and fair, in spite of sporadic violence and isolated
irregularities. The AL president alleged ``crude rigging'' in the
election. However, she eventually was sworn in as an M.P. and was
subsequently elected the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament.
The AL, which has 58 members in the 300-seat parliament boycotted
parliament from October 2001 until June 24, alleging harassment of
party activists and attacks on minority community members by ruling
party supporters in different areas of the country.
Violence, including killings and injuries, occurred both before and
after the October 2001 election. In September an activist from the AL
was killed as he was campaigning. Also in September, two bomb blasts
killed at least 8 AL members and injured more than 100 others in the
district of Bagerhat during an election rally. In response to the
increased violence, the caretaker government deployed 50,000 troops. In
the first 25 days of October, 266 murders and 213 rape cases related to
post election violence were recorded around the country. Harassment of
Hindus, including killings, rape, looting, and torture, also allegedly
was related to post-election violence (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
In July 2000, Parliament passed the ``zilla'' (district) council
law, which provided for indirect election of the district council
chairman by an electoral college of elected lower level
representatives. The law empowered the Government to appoint these
chairmen until the indirect elections can be held to date; the
Government has not made such appointments.
In 1991 the Constitution was amended to change the country from a
presidential system to a parliamentary system. The changes stipulated
that an M.P. who resigned from his party or voted against it in
Parliament automatically lost his seat. In practice this provision
solidified the control of Parliament by the Government and the Prime
Minister. The Prime Minister usually decides on major governmental
policies, with little or no involvement by Parliament. Parliament's
effectiveness as a deliberative body was undermined further by the
country's relatively narrow partisan politics. Political activities
were motivated by short-term benefits, often limited to the individual
politician. All of the major parties have boycotted Parliament while in
the opposition, claiming that they had little opportunity to engage in
real debate on legislation and national issues. In August 2001, all of
the major parties agreed that they would not boycott Parliament;
however, the AL boycotted the first three sessions and part of the
fourth session of the current Parliament.
M.P.s rather than the ministers concerned head parliamentary
committees, which potentially allowed them to effectively oversee
government work. However, most of the parliamentary committees,
including standing committees for 37 ministries/divisions, were yet to
be formed. The AL has demanded that the ruling party appoint opposition
members as chairs of at least 10 of the 48 committees. Of the seventh
Parliament's 46 committees, an opposition M.P. chaired only one.
On August 8, 2001 the CG passed the Representation of the People
Amendment Ordinance that addressed much-needed election reform issues.
The ordinance gave more independence to the Election Commission and law
enforcement powers to specify military branches on election day. The
Ordinance required political parties to maintain accounts and keep
records of campaign contributions and expenses. It also codified rules
for election observers, both international and domestic, in polling
places. While a limited number of observers had been present in the
polling booths during previous elections, there was no legal provision
guaranteeing them access. Local NGOs and civil society organizations
deployed a large number of observers for the October 2001 elections.
The ordinance also contained a provision to expedite the process for
adjudicating election fraud cases. At the time of the October 2001
elections, 21 of 22 election fraud cases from the 1996 elections were
still pending. Under the new provisions, election fraud cases are tried
in the High Court instead of a lower level court. The Election
Commission was working on a draft to propose more reforms giving the
Commission additional powers to ensure transparency of the election
process, but has not made any notable progress.
Parliamentary by-elections in four constituencies were held in
January, in a peaceful and generally orderly manner. Voter turnout was
lower than normal. The AL also boycotted the April 25 elections to city
offices in Dhaka, Khulna, and Rajshahi.
Until April 2001, when the constitutional provision that provided
parliamentary participation for women expired, 30 legislative seats
were reserved for women appointed by majority vote in Parliament;
critics charged that these seats acted far less to empower women than
to enhance the ruling party's majority. Women were free to contest any
seat in Parliament, and in August 2001, the AL and the BNP agreed in
principle to add at least 60 seats, exclusively for women M.P.s to the
existing 300 in Parliament. However, neither the BNP nor the AL had
taken any steps to introduce this election provision during the period
covered by this report.
Seats were not specifically reserved for minority groups, such as
tribal people. Members of minority groups held legislative seats.
However, minorities were not represented proportionately. Minorities
represented approximately 12 percent of the population and they held
less than three percent of the Parliamentary seats.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally permitted human rights groups to conduct
their activities. A wide variety of groups published reports, held
press conferences, and issued appeals to the Government with regard to
specific cases. While human rights groups were often sharply critical
of the Government, they frequently practiced self-censorship,
particularly on some politically sensitive cases and subjects. During
the year, the Government requested that UNICEF finalize the Birth
Registration Act in consultation with women and children's rights
groups. In January 2000, Parliament passed the Women and Children
Repression Prevention Act.
In June the Government granted registration to the Bangladesh
Section of Amnesty International, under the Societies Registration Act.
The application was originally filed in October 1990. Registration
allows an NGO to receive funding from abroad.
The Government was defensive about international criticism
regarding human rights problems. However, the Government was open to
dialog with international organizations and foreign diplomatic missions
regarding such issues. Despite their election pledge and repeated
public announcements, the Government did not take action to enact
legislation establishing an independent National Human Rights
Commission. The previous government also failed to establish this
commission despite repeated promises. The Government also has not taken
any visible steps to make good its election pledge of forming an
independent anticorruption commission.
The Government has not taken action on its promise to replace the
Official Secrets Act with the Right to Information Act. In April, Law
Minister Moudud Ahmed said that a Right to Information Bill would be
brought to Parliament in 2 months, but no bill was introduced by years
end. Early in the year, the Government took action to bring into effect
the decades-old Ombudsman Law, and the Law Minister announced that an
ombudsman would be appointed soon; however, by year's end this had not
occurred.
The Government pressured some individual human rights advocates,
including by filing false allegations against them or by delaying
reentry visas for international human rights activists. Missionaries
who advocated for human rights faced similar problems. A few human
rights activists reported harassment by the intelligence agencies.
From September through the end of the year the Government drafted a
policy report regarding NGO operations inside the country, primarily
aimed at restricting political activities by NGOs. Despite several
statements of its impending release, the draft policy report had not
been completed by year-end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution states ``all citizens are equal before the law and
are entitled to equal protection by the law''; however, in practice the
Government did not strongly enforce laws aimed at eliminating
discrimination. Women, children, minority groups, and persons with
disabilities often confronted social and economic disadvantages.
Women.--Recent reports indicated that domestic violence was
widespread. However, violence against women was difficult to quantify
because of unreliable statistics. A report released by the U.N. Fund
for Population Activities (UNFPA) in September 2000 asserted that 47
percent of adult women reported physical abuse by their male partner.
The Government, the media, and women's rights organizations fostered a
growing awareness of the problem of violence against women. Much of the
violence against women was related to disputes over dowries. According
to the report of a human rights group, there were 190 dowry-related
killings during the year. In addition to the killings, 28 women
committed suicide, 1 attempted suicide, 90 underwent physical torture,
14 others were victims of acid attacks, at least 1 was divorced by her
husband, and 2 were driven out of their husbands' houses following
disputes over dowries during the same period.
On May 14, a special tribunal judge in Jessore sentenced a man to
death for beating his wife, Kohinoor, to death in January 1997 over a
dowry dispute.
On July 1, K.M. Rashid ``Jewel'' allegedly beat his wife Noorjahan
Akhter Bakul following Bakul's family's failure to meet Jewel's demand
for dowry. Seriously injured, Bakul was rushed to Dhaka Medical College
Hospital where she died.
On July 2, a district court in Kishoreganj sentenced Motiur Rahman
to death for beating his wife, Hasne Ara, to death in June 1994 for her
family's failure to meet his dowry demand.
In May 2001, the High Court confirmed the death sentence of three
policemen convicted of the 1995 rape and killing of a 14-year-old girl.
The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse, but it makes no
specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. According to one human
rights organization, 1,350 women and girls were raped during the year.
Prosecution of rapists was uneven. While some rapists received
sentences of ``life imprisonment'' (in practice generally 22 \1/2\
years), other cases were settled by village arbitration councils, which
did not have the authority to prosecute criminals and therefore only
levied fines. Many rapes go unreported. In some cases, rape victims
committed suicide to escape the psychological aftermath including
social stigma. According to an NGO report, 15 rape victims committed
suicide in the first 6 months of the year.
According to one women's rights organization, courts sentenced 18
rapists to death and 61 rapists to life terms in prison through mid-
August.
In some cases, rural arbitrators punished the rape victim along
with or instead of punishing the rapist. On February 26, a union
council member raped an indigenous woman at Miahpara near Rajshahi.
Village leaders later whipped the rape victim and forced her to pay a
fine of approximately $25 (Taka 1,500).
The Government enacted laws specifically prohibiting certain forms
of discrimination against women, including the Dowry Prohibition Act,
the Cruelty to Women Law, and the Women and Children Repression
Prevention Act (see Section 1.d.). However, enforcement of these laws
was weak, especially in rural areas, and the Government seldom
prosecuted those cases that were filed. According to government
sources, the Social Welfare Department runs six vagrant homes and one
training center for destitute persons, with a total capacity of 2,300.
In July there were 1,986 persons, including 1,075 women, in those
facilities. In addition, the Women Affairs Department runs six
shelters, one each in the six divisional headquarters, for abused women
and children.
On May 20, the Department opened a Safe Custody center in Dhaka.
The Bangladesh National Women Lawyers' Association (BNWLA) also has two
shelters in Dhaka, and a few other NGOs also run smaller facilities to
provide shelter to destitute persons and distressed women and children.
However, this was insufficient to meet victims' shelter needs; as a
result, the Government often held women who filed rape complaints in
``safe custody,'' usually in prison. Safe custody frequently resulted
in further abuses against victims, discouraged the filing of complaints
by other women, and often continued for extended periods during which
women often were unable to gain release (see Section 1.c.).
Human rights groups and press reports indicated that incidents of
vigilantism against women--sometimes led by religious leaders--at times
occurred, particularly in rural areas. These included punishments such
as the whipping of women accused of moral offenses (see Section 2.c.).
Acid attacks were a growing concern. Assailants throw acid in the
faces of women and a growing number of men, leaving victims horribly
disfigured and often blind. According to the Acid Survivors'
Foundation, a local organization that offers assistance to acid attack
victims, approximately 300 acid attacks occur each year. Over half of
acid attack victims are female. The percentage of male acid attack
victims has increased for the past three years.
Even after extensive treatment, victims remained severely scarred,
making social reintegration very difficult. The most common motivation
for acid throwing attacks against women was revenge by a rejected
suitor; land disputes are another leading cause of the acid attacks.
Few perpetrators of the acid attacks are prosecuted. Often the
perpetrator flings the acid in through an open window during the night,
making cases difficult to prove.
According to one human rights organization, 483 persons fell victim
to acid attacks during the year, 247 women and 136 men. In the first
eight months of the year the BNWLA pursued 26 cases involving acid
crimes and three of them were resolved. In one case, the perpetrator
was sentenced to death; three other perpetrators were sentenced to life
in prison. Of approximately 750 reported assaults with acid between
1998 and 2001, 25 perpetrators were found guilty. Of the 25 guilty
verdicts, nine perpetrators were sentenced to death. Sentences are
commensurate with the extent of the victim's burns.
In March the Government enacted two laws to control the
availability of acid and address acid violence directed towards women.
The acid crime control law has failed to have an impact primarily
because of lack of awareness of the law among the public and law
enforcement personnel and because of its poor application. In 2001 351
persons, mostly women, came under acid attacks and 153 cases were
filed. However, the new acid crime control law provides for speedier
prosecutions in special tribunals and generally does not allow bail for
crimes charged under this law.
There was extensive trafficking in women for the purpose of
prostitution within the country and to other countries in Asia, and
there were credible reports that police facilitated or were involved in
trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
For the most part, women remained in a subordinate position in
society, and the Government had not acted effectively to protect their
basic freedoms. Literacy rates were approximately 29 percent for women,
compared with 52 percent for men. In recent years, female school
enrollment had improved. Approximately 50 percent of primary and
secondary school students were female. Women often were ignorant of
their rights because of continued high illiteracy rates and unequal
educational opportunities. Strong social stigmas and lack of means to
obtain legal assistance frequently keep women from seeking redress in
the courts. Many NGOs operated programs to raise women's awareness of
their rights, and to encourage and assist them in exercising those
rights. The Government also has expanded its program of incentives for
female education by making education free for girls up to grade 12
(approximately age 18) using a stipend system from grades six to 12. By
comparison, boys received free education up to grade five. Prime
Minister Khaleda Zia inaugurated a stipend program for female students
in grades 11 and 12 on August 1 and hinted that the program might be
expanded up to a higher level.
Under the Muslim Family Ordinance, female heirs inherit less than
male relatives do, and wives have fewer divorce rights than husbands.
Men are permitted to have up to four wives, although this right was
rarely exercised. Laws provide some protection for women against
arbitrary divorce and the taking of additional wives by husbands
without the first wife's consent, but the protections generally applied
only to registered marriages. Marriages in rural areas sometimes are
not registered because of ignorance of the law. Under the law, a Muslim
husband is required to pay his ex-wife alimony for only 3 months, but
this was not always paid for the required amount of time and not paid
at all in some instances.
Employment opportunities have been greater for women than for men
in the last decade, largely due to the growth of the export garment
industry in Dhaka and Chittagong. Approximately 80 percent of the 1.4
million garment sector workers were women. Programs extending micro-
credit to rural women also have contributed to greater economic power
for them. However, women still filled only a small fraction of other
wage-earning jobs. According to a Public Administration Reforms
Commission report of October 2000, women held only 12 percent of
government jobs, and only 2 percent of senior positions. The Government
policy to include more women in government jobs has had only limited
effect. In recent years, approximately 15 percent of all recruits into
government service were women. According to a government survey
released in May 2001, women made up only 2.1 percent of the workforce
in the Home Ministry, which is responsible for police and internal
security and 1.77 percent of the workforce in the Ministry of Local
government and Rural Development.
The garment and shrimp processing industries employed the largest
proportions of female laborers. Forty-three percent of women worked in
the agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors, but 70 percent of
them were unpaid family laborers. Many women work as manual laborers on
construction projects as well; women constitute nearly 25 percent of
all manufacturing workers. Women also were found in the electronics,
food processing, beverage, and handicraft industries. Pay was generally
comparable for men and women performing similar work.
Children.--The Government undertook programs in the areas of
primary education, health, and nutrition. Many of these efforts were
supplemented by local and foreign NGOs. These joint efforts have
allowed the country to begin making significant progress in improving
health, nutrition, and education; however, slightly more than half of
all children were still chronically malnourished.
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the country's
largest NGO, provided primary education to more than 1.2 million
children. In cooperation with the Nonformal Education Directorate of
the Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF implemented a program to
provide education to 350,000 (primarily working) children in urban slum
areas around the country.
In addition, the ILO has undertaken education and social welfare
programs for more than 50,000 children. The Government made universal
primary education between the ages of 6 and 10 years mandatory in 1991,
but has not implemented the law fully.
According to Education Ministry statistics, more than 80 percent of
children between the ages of 6 and 10 years were enrolled in school.
Enrollment of boys and girls was roughly equal. Approximately 70
percent of all children completed grade five. Most schools have two
shifts. Most children in grades one and two spend 2 \1/2\ hours a day
in school; children in grades three to five are in school for 4 hours.
The Government provided incentives for rural female children between
the ages of 12 and 16 years to remain in school. These incentives were
effective in increasing the number of girls in school.
Because of widespread poverty, many children were compelled to work
at a very young age. This frequently results in abuse of children,
mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service and
may include servitude and prostitution; this labor-related child abuse
occurred commonly at all levels of society and throughout the country
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). Sometimes children were seriously injured
or killed in workplaces (see Section 6.d.). Reports from human rights
monitors indicate that child abandonment, kidnaping, and trafficking
continued to be serious and widespread problems. There was extensive
trafficking of children, primarily to India, Pakistan, and destinations
within the country, largely for the purpose of prostitution and forced
labor (see Section 6.f.).
According to a report published by the Government news agency BSS
on September 5 there were about 400,000 homeless children in the
country; as many as 150,000 of whom have no knowledge of their parents.
UNICEF estimated that there are approximately 10,000 child
prostitutes in the country; other estimates have been as high as
29,000. Prostitution is legal, but only for those over 18 years of age
and with government certification. However, this minimum age
requirement commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented
easily by false statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely were
prosecuted, and large numbers of child prostitutes worked in brothels.
Few facilities existed for children whose parents are incarcerated.
According to one NGO, about 1,200 children under 16 years of age were
in prisons throughout the country as of September.
According to a children's rights organization, 538 children were
abducted during the year. Abductors killed at least two of the children
when their guardians' failed to meet demands for ransom. In one case, a
district court in Dhaka sentenced an abductor to death. According to
this organization, nearly 1,500 children suffered unnatural deaths
during the year.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal treatment
and freedom from discrimination for persons with disabilities; however,
in practice, persons with disabilities faced social and economic
discrimination. The Bangladesh Persons with Disability Welfare Act of
2001 provides for equal rights for disabled persons. The act focuses on
prevention of disability, treatment, education, rehabilitation and
employment, transport accessibility and advocacy. Government facilities
for treating persons with mental handicaps were inadequate.
According to the National Forum of Organizations Working With the
Disabled, an umbrella organization consisting of more than 80 NGOs
working in various fields of disability, approximately 14 percent of
the country's population had some form of disability. The economic
condition of most families limited their ability to assist with the
special needs of a person with disabilities, and superstition and fear
of persons with disabilities in society sometimes resulted in their
isolation.
However, there have been a number of private initiatives in the
areas of medical and vocational rehabilitation, as well as employment
of persons with disabilities. The Center for Rehabilitation of the
Paralyzed, a privately-funded facility, provided both in-patient and
out-patient medical services for both children and adults with various
physical disabilities, and an educational facility for training
professionals specializing in treating persons with disabilities. It
ran a model village to enable the disabled to adjust to village life
before reintegration, helped to integrate residents back into society
and provided vocational training, micro-credits, and employment
generation opportunities. The Center also offered advocacy, networking,
and accident prevention programs. In addition, The Center was also
involved with a 3-year research project to develop policies to ensure a
safe and healthy workplace environment in the country. It focused on
identification of high-risk work sites, developing a database for work-
related injuries, and developing a network of spinal cord lesion
management service providers. Some employers, both in the private for-
profit and nonprofit sectors, have hired individuals with hearing
impairments and physical disabilities for professional and
nonprofessional positions, including as clerical workers, therapists,
trainers, and computer-aided design operators.
Indigenous Persons.--Tribal people have had a marginal ability to
influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. The 1997
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord ended 25 years of insurgency
in the CHT, although law and order problems continued. The Land
Commission that is to deal with land disputes between tribal
individuals and Bengali settlers did not function effectively in
addressing critical land disputes. Tribal leaders also expressed
disappointment at the lack of progress in providing assistance to
tribals who left the area during the insurgency.
Until 1985 the Government regularly allotted land in the CHT to
non-tribal Bangladeshi settlers, including land that was claimed by
indigenous people under traditional concepts of land ownership. This
led to the displacement of many tribal groups, such as the Chakmas and
Marmas. Bangladeshi inhabitants in the CHT increased from 3 percent of
the region's population in 1947 to approximately 50 percent of the
area's 1 million persons in 1997. The Shanti-Bahini, a tribal group,
waged a low-level conflict in the CHT from the early 1970s until the
signing of the CHT Peace Accord with the Government in December 1997.
During the periods of violence, all of those involved, including
indigenous tribes, settlers, and security forces, accused each other of
human rights violations. Such accusations continue to this day.
The terms of the 1997 pact provided for a strong local government,
consisting of mostly tribal representatives; reduction of the military
presence in the CHT region; and a substantial compensation package for
displaced tribal families. Under the pact, the Government established a
Land Commission to deal with land disputes between Bangladeshis and
tribals. According to the Peace Accord, the Commission's verdict was to
be final and appeal would not be possible; however, until July 2001
there was no legal basis for the Commission. Moreover, tribal leaders
continued to express disappointment in the lack of progress in
providing assistance to tribals who left the area during the
insurgency. Shantu Larma, the former insurgent leader, held talks with
the Prime Minister in April and with the Law Minister in July to
discuss implementation of the Peace Accord, setting up of district
courts in the three hill districts, and ways to improve law and order.
Extortion and kidnaping for ransom were rampant in the CHT. On
January 19, alleged members of United People's Democratic Front (UPDF)
abducted three persons in Matiranga in the sub-district of
Khagrachhari. On February 13 armed youths kidnaped 10 businessmen. A
committee formed by the local administration negotiated the release of
eight victims on February 21. On February 13, the kidnapers of two
businessmen who were abducted from Naniarchar received a ransom payment
and released their victims. On July 19, alleged UPDF members kidnaped
two jeep drivers from near Tarabunia Bridge in Rangamati and demanded
ransom. On August 3, masked men said to be from a rival tribal group
kidnaped six tribal persons, shooting and killing them on the bank of
the Shongu River in Bandarban district.
In February 2001, three foreign engineers were abducted at gunpoint
from a road in Rangamati District in the CHT. After their release in
March of 2001 one of the hostages told a newspaper reporter that one of
his abductors had confided that the motive was not political but
rather, they wanted money for the benefit of Chakma people. Donor-
assisted development activities in the CHT came to a halt following
this incident.
Beginning June 1, a mission comprising government representatives
and donor agencies under the coordination of the United National
Development Program (UNDP) carried out an 11-day assessment of the CHT
security situation and the possibility of renewed development
assistance. In its report, the mission said kidnapings and extortion of
development workers had continued, mostly due to regional party
conflicts and extortion rackets. The mission report further stated that
the security situation throughout most of the region was good enough to
resume development assistance. However, tribal and non-tribal
differences, unresolved issues relating to land, elections, and the law
and order situation all continued to create tension and the potential
for conflicts.
In June 2001, an alleged tribal member killed a Bangladeshi truck
driver in Khagrachhari District in the CHT. Bangladeshis formed a
procession to protest the killing and to demand action against those
responsible. A bomb exploded during the procession. Clashes between
Bangladeshis and tribals ensued, injuring 18 persons, including 1
policeman. Bangladeshis later set fire to more than 100 houses
belonging to tribals. The Government imposed provisions of Section 144
of the Penal Code, which permitted arrest for unlawful assemblies that
threatened public safety. Police arrested 6 tribals in connection with
the murder of the truck driver, and 15 others for arson.
According to one human rights organization, in August 2000, some
Bangladeshis allegedly killed Alfred Soren, a leader of the Santal
tribe over a land dispute. Although ninety-one persons were accused of
involvement in the attack, four were arrested. In February 2001, the
Government paid approximately $926 (Taka 50,000) in compensation to
Soren's family and approximately $185 (Taka 10,000) to each of the
families of nine injured persons.
Tribal people in other areas have also reported problems of loss of
land to Bengali Muslims. The Garos of the Modhupur forest region
continued to face problems in maintaining their cultural traditions and
livelihoods in the face of deforestation and encroachment. The pressure
on the Garo community had resulted in greater migration to urban areas
and to the Indian state of Meghalaya, threatening the existence of
16,000 persons.
On Easter Sunday 2001, the Forestry Department inaugurated an eco-
park on the lands inhabited by the predominantly Christian Khasi
tribals in Mouluvibazar. Although indigenous Khasis had lived on these
lands for generations, the Government did not recognize their
ownership. The Government claimed ownership and stated that the Khasis
were occupying the land illegally. The Government did not undertake any
activities to implement the eco-park project this year, but the project
has not been officially cancelled.
On July 21, Forest Department officials evicted the Khasi members
living in a village in Moulvibazar. On July 26, Forest Department
guards shot and killed a Khasi member, Abinash, and injured 10 others
in an attempt to evict the Khasis after they had returned to the
village. Two Forest Department guards sustained arrow wounds. At year's
end, police did not arrest anyone in connection with the killing.
In April 2001, in a clash over land between Khasi and Bengalis in
Moulavibazar, 1 person died and 10 were injured. Later in 2001 a group
of 50 to 60 Bengalis led by a former union council member attacked a
Khasi village. Fifty persons, mostly Khasi, were injured in the attack.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to join unions and--with government approval--the right to form a
union; however the Government did not always respect this right in
practice. The total work force was approximately 58 million persons, of
whom 1.8 million belonged to unions, most of which were affiliated with
political parties. There were no reliable labor statistics for the
large informal sector, in which the vast majority (75 to 80 percent) of
citizens worked.
A workplace requires 30 percent union participation for union
registration. Moreover, would-be unionists technically were forbidden
to engage in many activities prior to registration, and legally are not
protected from employer retaliation during this period. Labor activists
have protested that this requirement severely restricted workers'
freedom to organize, particularly in small enterprises and the private
sector, and the International Labor Organization (ILO) has requested
the Government to amend the 30 percent provision. The ILO also had
requested that the Government amend provisions that bar registration of
a union composed of workers from different workplaces owned by
different employers. An estimated 15 percent of the approximately 5,450
labor unions were affiliated with 25 officially registered National
Trade Union (NTU) centers. There were also several unregistered NTUs.
Railway, postal, telegraph, and telephone department workers may
join unions; other civil servants, police, and military personnel were
forbidden to join unions in large part because of the highly political
nature of those unions. Many civil servants who were forbidden to join
unions, such as teachers and nurses, formed associations that performed
functions similar to labor unions, such as providing for members'
welfare, offering legal services, and airing grievances. Some workers
formed unregistered unions, particularly university employees and
workers in the construction and transport (both public and private)
industries.
In 1999 the ILO Committee of Experts stated that the Government's
rejections of several applications for registration by trade unions in
the textile, metal, and garment sectors was unjustified. The Ministry
of Labor contended that these cases lacked the necessary documentation.
There were no legal restrictions on political activities by labor
unions, although the calling of nationwide hartals or transportation
blockades by unions was considered a criminal rather than a political
act and was forbidden.
Unions were highly politicized, and were strongest in state-owned
enterprises and in such institutions as the Government-run port in
Chittagong. Virtually all the NTU centers were affiliated with
political parties. Some unions engaged in intimidation and vandalism.
Fighting often was over the control of rackets or extortion payoffs and
typically involved knives, guns, and homemade bombs. According to the
ICFTU, Iqbal Majumder, the General Secretary of the Workers Trade Union
Federation was shot dead on August 2, 2001.
Workers were eligible for membership on their union's executive
staff, the size of which is set by law in proportion to the number of
union members. The Registrar of Trade Unions may cancel registration of
a union with the concurrence of the Labor Court, but no such actions
were known to have taken place during the year.
There were provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the
immunity of registered unions or union officers from civil liability.
Enforcement of these provisions was uneven. In past illegal work
actions, such as transportation blockades, police officers had arrested
union members under the SPA or regular criminal codes.
There were no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
organizations, and unions and federations maintained a variety of such
links. Trade unionists are required to obtain government clearance to
travel to ILO meetings, but there were no reports that clearances were
denied during the year.
In a November report, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
reviewed complaints that the president and other members of the
Bangladesh Diploma Nurses Association had been harassed and persecuted
on trade union activities. According to the ILO, Taposhi Bhattacharee
was suspended from her hospital post because of alleged participation
in an illegal October 2001 meeting.
The ILO Committee of Experts Report on ILO Freedom of Association
noted certain exclusions from the Industrial Relations Ordinance,
restrictions regarding membership in unions and election of union
officials, restrictions on activities of public servants' associations,
right to organize and bargain collectively in export processing zones,
and restrictions on the right to strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the
Industrial Relations Ordinance, there is considerable leeway for
discrimination against union members and organizers by employers. For
example, the ordinance allows the arbitrary transfer of workers
suspected of union activities or termination with payment of mandatory
severance benefits (2 weeks salary). In practice private sector
employers usually discouraged any union activity, sometimes working in
collaboration with local police.
The Registrar of Trade Unions rules on discrimination complaints.
In a number of cases, the Labor Court ordered the reinstatement of
workers fired for union activities. However, the Labor Court's overall
effectiveness was hampered by a serious case backlog, and in the past
there had been allegations that employers had corrupted some of its
deliberations.
Collective bargaining by workers is legal on the condition that
unions legally registered as collective bargaining agents by the
Registrar of Trade Unions represent them. Labor unions were affiliated
with the various political parties; therefore, each industry generally
had more than one labor union (one or more for each political party).
To engage in collective bargaining, each union must nominate
representatives to a Collective Bargaining Authority (CBA) committee,
which the Registrar of Trade Unions must approve after reviewing the
selection process. Collective bargaining occurred on occasion in large
private enterprises such as pharmaceuticals, jute, or textiles but
because of high unemployment, workers may forgo collective bargaining
due to concerns over job security. Collective bargaining in small
private enterprises generally did not occur. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) had criticized the country
for what it viewed as legal impediments that hampered such bargaining.
Public sector workers' pay levels and the National Pay and Wages
Commission, whose recommendations were binding and may not be disputed
except on the issue of implementation, set other benefits.
The right to strike is not recognized specifically in the law, but
strikes were a common form of workers' protest. In addition, political
opposition parties used general strikes to pressure the Government to
meet political demands. Workers at Chittagong port, the country's major
harbor, conducted several work stoppages to protest a proposed new
private container port. The process of conducting work stoppages was
habitual until the Government designated this sector as essential
during the year. Some employees organized in professional associations
or unregistered unions also went on strike during the year. Wildcat
strikes are illegal but did occur, with varying government responses.
Wildcat strikes in the transportation sector were particularly common.
The Essential Services Ordinance of 1958 permitted the Government
to bar strikes for 3 months in any sector that it declared essential.
During the year, the Government applied this to the Power Development
Board, the Dhaka Electric Supply Authority, Chittagong Port, and nine
companies in the gas and energy sectors. In the past, the Government
had applied this ban to national airline pilots, water supply workers,
and shipping employees. The ban may be renewed for 3-month periods. The
Government is empowered to prohibit a strike or lockout at any time
before or after the strike or lockout begins and to refer the dispute
to the Labor Court.
Mechanisms for conciliation, arbitration, and labor court dispute
resolution were established under the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
Workers have the right to strike in the event of a failure to settle.
If the strike lasts 30 days or longer, the Government may prohibit it
and refer the dispute to the Labor Court for adjudication, although
this has not happened in recent years. The ILO has criticized the
provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance that require three-
quarters of a worker's organization to consent to a strike and that
grant the Government authority to prohibit a strike at any time.
The country's five Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were exempt from
the application of the Employment of Labor (Standing Orders) Act, the
Industrial Relations Ordinance, and the Factories Act. These laws
established the freedom of association and the right to bargain
collectively, and set forth wage, hour, and occupational safety and
health standards. While substitutes for some of the provisions of these
laws were implemented through EPZ regulations, which the Bangladesh EPZ
Authority is charged with enforcing, professional and industry-based
unions are prohibited in the zones. A small number of workers in the
EPZs skirted prohibitions on forming unions by setting up associations.
The Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA) reported that
workers selected representatives for workers' welfare committees and
dispute resolution tribunals, each intended to provide workers and
managers more experience in resolving workplace disputes. In 2000 the
Government pledged to apply all sections of the labor law to the EPZs
by January 1, 2004.
According to BEPZA there were approximately 44,000 persons employed
in EPZs in Dhaka, 76,000 in Chittagong, and 1,400 in other areas. The
ILO, in its 2001 report on the application of International Labor
Conventions, deplored the lack of progress and discrepancies between
legislation and certain ILO Conventions, including freedom of
association and collective bargaining. During the year, the ILO
Committee of Experts Report noted that there were particular problems
with voluntary bargaining in the private sector, a lack of legal
protection against acts of interference, and a denial of protection
against anti-union discrimination and the right to bargain
collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that performed by children;
however, the Government did not enforce this prohibition effectively.
The Factories Act and Shops and Establishments Act established
inspection mechanisms to enforce laws against forced labor; however,
these laws were not enforced rigorously, partly because resources for
enforcement were scarce. There was no bonded or forced labor in large-
scale enterprises; however, numerous domestic servants, including many
children worked in conditions that resembled servitude and many
suffered physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. A local NGO
released a study of various forms of violence against domestic workers
in 2001. The study found that 7 children were tortured, 3 died from
physical torture, 2 were raped, and 19 were otherwise victimized. In
the past, the Government has brought criminal charges against employers
who abuse domestic servants; however, many impoverished families
settled for financial compensation.
In 2000 the ILO noted that certain provisions of the Penal Code,
the Special Powers Act, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, and the
Control of Employment Ordinance, allowed for the imposition of forced
labor as punishment for expressing political views or views opposed to
the established political system, as a punishment for various breaches
of labor discipline, and as punishment for participating in strikes in
a wide range of circumstances. For example, sentences of up to 14 years
of forced labor can be imposed for offenses such as ``obstruction of
transport,'' a commonly used tactic in strikes. In addition, under the
Merchant Shipping Ordinance, seafarers may be forced on board ship to
perform their duties. There were no reports of the use of these
provisions during the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no law that uniformly prohibits the employment of
children, and child labor was a serious problem. Some laws prohibit
labor by children in certain sectors. The Factories Act bars children
under the age of 14 from working in factories. This law also stipulates
that children and adolescents are allowed to work only a maximum 5-hour
day and only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The Shops and
Establishments Act prohibits the employment of children younger than
the age of 12 in commercial workplaces. The Employment of Children Act
prohibited the employment of children under the age of 15 in the
railways or in goods' handling within ports.
Because of widespread poverty, many children began to work at a
very young age. The Government estimated that approximately 6.6 million
children between the ages of 5 and 14 years worked. Working children
were found in 200 different types of activities, of which 49 were
regarded as harmful to children's physical and mental well being.
Sometimes children were seriously injured or killed in workplaces.
For example, in October a 12-year old domestic servant was severely
beaten and locked in the toilet for taking a spoon of milk without
permission. Also in October, a 14-year old girl was taken to the
hospital for burns and other injuries following severe beatings by her
employer. There were no reports of deaths of children domestic workers
although there were some of adult domestic workers. A November 2000
garment factory fire resulted in the death of 10 child workers.
Children often worked alongside other family members in small-scale
and subsistence agriculture. Hours usually were long, the pay usually
was low, and the conditions were sometimes hazardous. Children drove
rickshaws; broke bricks at construction sites; carried fruit,
vegetables, and dry goods for shoppers at markets; worked at tea
stalls; and worked in the shrimp processing industry as ``fry
catchers'', depot workers, and de-headers. Many children worked in the
beedi (hand-rolled cigarette) industry, and children under 18 years old
sometimes worked in hazardous circumstances in the leather industry.
Children routinely performed domestic work. In the past, the Government
brought criminal charges against employers who abused domestic
servants. Under the law, every child must attend school through the
fifth grade, or the age of 10 years. However, there was no effective
mechanism to enforce this provision.
There was virtually no enforcement of child labor law enforcement
outside the export garment sector. Penalties for child labor violations
were nominal fines ranging from about $4 to $10 (Taka 228 to 570). The
Ministry of Labor had fewer than 110 inspectors to monitor 180,000
registered factories and establishments. These inspectors were charged
with enforcing labor laws pertaining to more than 1.5 million workers.
Most child workers were employed in agriculture and other informal
sectors, where no government oversight occurred.
The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers' and Exporters Association
(BGMEA) inspects member factories to eliminate child labor in the
garment sector. Among the 3,340 garment factories they inspected during
the year, the team found 71 member factories employing a total of 155
children. According to the ICFTU, there was a significant reduction of
child labor in the garment industry; while 43 percent of exporting
factories used child labor in 1995, by 2001, the figure had fallen 5
percent. The BGMEA fined each factory about $100 (Taka 5,700). Former
child employees were also offered a small monthly stipend to help
replace their lost income while attending UNICEF-sponsored schools.
In cooperation with the Non-Formal Education Directorate of the
Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF implemented a ``hard-to-
reach'' program to provide education to 350,000 (primarily working)
children in urban slum areas around the country. Working with the
Government, NGOs, and some trade unions, International Program for the
Elimination of Child Labor (ILO/IPEC) had 20 action programs, targeting
approximately 6,000 children working in hazardous conditions, designed
to ensure that children received an education, rather than removing
children from work. The largest ILO project focused on children working
in hazardous occupations, ranging from exposure to chemicals and other
harmful substances to long tedious working hours. The first phase of
the project began in August 2001. Aimed at removing 30,000 children
from hazardous occupations and preventing another 15,000 younger
siblings from taking their place, the project focused on the beedi
industry, the construction sector, leather tanneries, match factories,
and the domestic work sector. The ILO has contracted with 24 NGO
partners to create child labor monitoring community resource centers.
So far, over 18,000 working children are attending non-formal education
classes and 2,000 have been mainstreamed to formal schools. 1,681 have
been withdrawn from hazardous work while 6 beedi factories have signed
memoranda of understanding with the local communities declaring
themselves ``child labor free.''
The Constitution prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that
performed by children; however, the Government did not enforce this
prohibition effectively.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no national minimum
wage. Instead, the Wage Commission, which convenes every several years,
sets wages and benefits industry by industry, using a range based on
skill level. In most cases, private sector employers ignored this wage
structure. For example, in the garment industry, many factories did not
pay legal minimum wages, and it was common for workers of smaller
factories to experience delays in receiving their pay or to receive
``trainee'' wages well past the maximum 3 months. According to the
ICFTU, an international trade union study from February 2001 indicated
that 21.7 percent of textile workers in the country earned the minimum
wage. Wages in the EPZs were generally higher than outside the zones.
The declared minimum monthly wage for a skilled industrial worker was
approximately $63 (Taka 3,400) for a worker in an EPZ and approximately
$49 (Taka 2,650) for a worker outside an EPZ. This was sufficient to
provide an individual with a minimal standard of living, but was not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
The law sets a standard 48-hour workweek with 1 day off mandated. A
60-hour workweek, inclusive of a maximum 12 hours of overtime, was
allowed. The law was enforced poorly in industries such as hosiery and
ready-made garments.
The Factories Act nominally sets occupational health and safety
standards. The law is comprehensive but largely was ignored by
employers. For example, there are many fire safety violations in the
garment industry. Many factories were located in structures that were
not designed adequately for industrial use, nor for the easy evacuation
of large work forces. In November 2000, 48 garment workers, including
10 children, were killed and more than 100 persons were injured when
they were unable to escape from a factory fire due to locked exits.
In August 2001, 18 garment workers were trampled to death because
an exit gate jammed as they were fleeing a factory after a fire alarm.
Workers may resort to legal action for enforcement of the law's
provisions, but few cases actually were prosecuted. Enforcement by the
Labor Ministry's industrial inspectors was weak, due both to the low
number of labor inspectors, and to endemic corruption and inefficiency
among inspectors. Due to a high unemployment rate and inadequate
enforcement of the laws, workers demanding correction of dangerous
working conditions or refusing to participate in perceived dangerous
activities risked losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, trafficking was a serious problem. There was
extensive trafficking in both women and children, primarily to India,
Pakistan, and destinations within the country, mainly for the purpose
of prostitution and in some instances for labor servitude. Some
children also were trafficked to the Middle East to be used as camel
jockeys.
Trafficking in children for immoral or illegal purposes carries the
death penalty or life imprisonment. However, few perpetrators were
punished. Besides law enforcement agencies, a number of NGOs, including
BNWLA, Odhikar, ACD, Ahasania Mission and INCIDIN, recovered and
assisted victims of trafficking. In the first six months of the year,
law enforcement agencies rescued 103 victims while the BNMLA rescued 25
victims from inside the country and 14 others from outside the country.
During this period, 163 alleged traffickers were arrested and detained
in prisons. The BNMLA conducted 129 cases related to trafficking in
women and children and 23 traffickers were convicted in nine cases
resolved in the first half of the year.
The number of persons arrested for trafficking was difficult to
obtain as charges against traffickers usually are for lesser crimes,
such as crossing borders without proper documents. A September 6
newspaper report quoting statistics from the Center for Women and
Children Studies (CWCS) said only 1 percent of trafficked children and
55 percent of kidnaped children were rescued between January 2000 and
June. According to CWCS most trafficked boys were under 10 years of age
while most trafficked girls were between 11-16 years old.
The Government developed a set of policies and plans regarding the
trafficking issue, and initiated a program across a number of
ministries to address the problem. Arrests and prosecutions increased
significantly and a major national anti-trafficking prevention campaign
was launched to increase awareness of the problem among vulnerable
groups. However, government capacity to address this issue remained
limited. Government projects included conducting awareness campaigns,
research, lobbying, and rescue and rehabilitation programs. While the
Government provided support for returning trafficking victims,
government-run shelters were generally inadequate and poorly run.
In June 2000, the Government signed a 3-year, approximately $2
million (Taka 108 million) project with the Norwegian government aid
organization, NORAD, to develop an interministerial infrastructure for
addressing the trafficking problem. This project, based in the
Department of Women and Children's Affairs, was intended to be the
focal point for addressing the prosecution, protection, and prevention
activities carried out by the Government. A goal of the project was for
the Government to become more involved in arresting and prosecuting
traffickers. However, because the Government did not keep records of
births and marriages at the village level, it was very difficult for
authorities to detect false claims of marriage or family ties. Despite
this, there was some prosecution of these cases. Increasing shelter
capacity and rehabilitation programs was another feature of the NORAD
project.
The exact number of women and children trafficked was unknown;
however, human rights monitors estimated that more than 20,000 women
and children were trafficked annually from the country for the purpose
of prostitution. Most trafficked persons were lured by promises of good
jobs or marriage, and some were forced into involuntary servitude
outside of the country. Parents sometimes willingly sent their children
away to escape poverty. Unwed mothers, orphans, and others outside of
the normal family support system were also susceptible. Traffickers
living abroad often arrived in a village to ``marry'' a woman, only to
dispose of her upon arrival in the destination country, where women
were sold by their new ``friends'' or ``husbands'' into bonded labor,
menial jobs, or prostitution. Criminal gangs conducted some of the
trafficking. The border with India was loosely controlled, especially
around Jessore and Benapole, making illegal border crossings easy.
The number of child prostitutes was difficult to determine.
Prostitution is legal, but only for persons over 18 years of age with
government certification; however, this minimum age requirement
commonly was ignored by authorities, and was circumvented easily by
false statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely were prosecuted,
and large numbers of child prostitutes worked in brothels. Trafficking
in women for purposes of prostitution carries a sentence varying from
10 years in prison to the death penalty. Human rights monitors also
credibly reported that police and local government officials often
ignored trafficking in women and children for prostitution, and were
easily bribed to look the other way (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
Children, usually young boys, also were trafficked into the Middle
East to work as camel jockeys. It was estimated that there were
anywhere from 100 to more than 1,000 underage South Asian camel jockeys
working in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) alone; while many come from
India and Pakistan, a growing number came from the country. Criminal
gangs procured most of the youths. The majority of such children worked
with the knowledge of their parents, who received as much as
approximately $200 (Taka 10,000) for their child's labor, although a
significant minority simply were kidnaped. The gangs bringing the
jockeys earned approximately $150 (Taka 7,500) per month from the labor
of each child. The usual procedure used was to add the children's names
to the passport of a Bangladeshi or Indian woman who already has a visa
for the Middle East. During the year, police made arrests in several
incidents for trafficking in young boys to the Middle East and at
year's end these cases were pending before the courts.
There were credible reports that police facilitated trafficking of
women and children. When perpetrators were caught trafficking persons
across the border, police involvement was low level, consisting
primarily of falsifying documents with statements like ``passport
fraud'' rather than ``trafficking.'' The law stipulates a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment for persons found guilty of trafficking a
child into prostitution.
Many NGOs and community-based organizations are working on the
trafficking problem through prevention efforts, research, data
collection, documentation, advocacy, awareness creation and networking,
crossborder collaboration, legal enforcement, rescue, rehabilitation,
reintegration, income generation and low-interest loan programs,
vocational training, and legislative reform.
Action Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children
(ATSEC), a national antitrafficking network, recently began to
implement several antitrafficking activities. These activities included
linking NGOs and government entities into a strong partnership,
establishing a focal point for moving the national antitrafficking
agenda forward, establishing a resource center to disseminate data on
the subject, and providing technical support to grassroots
organizations. In addition, ATSEC developed culturally sensitive
prevention and awareness messages that will reach persons at the
community level. The program has developed and tested materials used
for a national campaign using all media. This included conducting
awareness-raising workshops and meetings at all levels, launching
school programs, establishing a mobile campaign throughout the country,
and launching an advertising campaign in border areas.
The Association for Community Development conducted a study on
trafficking issues and conducted workshops and outreach programs aimed
at reaching potential victims of trafficking before they are
trafficked. The BNWLA conducted awareness programs aimed at alerting
poor persons to the dangers of trafficking through leaflets, stickers,
and posters. The BNWLA also provided legal assistance to trafficking
victims, and initiated legal action against traffickers. The BNWLA ran
a shelter home for trafficked women and children that provided health
care, counseling, and training. CWCS monitored trafficking across the
country, conducted awareness meetings, and had a pilot project to make
police aware of the rights of women and children. Awareness of
trafficking is increasing, and the topic received frequent press
coverage. Two umbrella organizations of antitrafficking NGOs existed
and sought to improve coordination and planning of efforts against the
problem.
Over the past year a number of important breakthroughs have been
made in the trafficking sector. All of the major actors, including the
Government, have come together to develop a common, unified umbrella
program. In addition, agencies have developed a proposed plan of action
to address the trafficking issue regionally.
__________
BHUTAN
Bhutan is ruled by a hereditary monarch, King Jigme Singye
Wangchuk, who governs with the support of a National Assembly, a
Cabinet, a Council of Ministers (the Royal Advisory Council), and the
Monastic Body, a 5,000-member body that is headed by four
representatives with the consent of the King. There is no written
constitution to protect fundamental political and human rights;
however, during the year a constitution was being drafted and debated
by the National Assembly. In recent years, the Government has adopted
some measures to increase the power of the National Assembly. Since
ascending to the throne in 1972, the King has continued the efforts
toward social and political modernization begun by his father. In the
last few years, the Government has improved rapidly services in
education, health care, sanitation, and communications, with parallel
but slower development of representative governance and decisionmaking.
The judiciary is not independent of the King.
The Royal Bhutan Police (RBP), assisted by the Royal Bhutan Army
(including those assigned to the Royal Body Guard), and a national
militia maintain internal security. Some members of these forces
committed human rights abuses.
The economy is predominately a government-controlled economy. It is
based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the main livelihood
for 90 percent of the population and account for approximately half of
the gross domestic product (GDP); the population is 698,950.
Agriculture largely consists of subsistence farming and animal
husbandry. Citrus fruit, cardamom, and other spices are the leading
agricultural exports. Cement and electricity are the other important
exports. Strong trade and monetary ties link the economy closely to
that of India. Income distribution remained very unequal, with the
approximately 10 percent of the population receiving about 70 percent
of the national income. Hydroelectric power production potential and
tourism are key resources, although the Government limits tourism
because of inadequate infrastructure and environmental and cultural
concerns. Tourist arrivals also are limited by a requirement that
tourists purchase a high priced minimum daily rate holiday package
before visiting the country. Visas are required of all persons other
than Indian nationals. Unemployment for the population under the age of
20 increased during the year.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and problems
remained in several areas. Citizens do not have the right to change
their government, although citizens voted for 105 out of the 150
representatives in the National Assembly during the year. The King
exercised strong, active, and direct power over the Government. The
Government prohibits political parties, and none operate legally.
Arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems, and reports continued
of torture and abuse of detainees. Impunity for those who commit abuses
also was a problem. Judges serve at the King's pleasure, and the
Government limited significantly the right to a fair trial. In April
2000, the Government established the Department of Legal Affairs.
Programs to build a body of written law and to train lawyers were
progressing. The Government limited significantly citizens' right to
privacy. The Government restricted freedom of speech, press, assembly,
and association. Citizens faced limitations on freedom of religion.
Approximately three-fourths of population is composed of Buddhists with
cultural traditions akin to those of Tibet. The Buddhist majority
consisted of two principal ethnic and linguistic groups: The Ngalongs
of the western part of the country and the Sharchops of the eastern
part of the country. The remaining one fourth of the population, ethnic
Nepalese, most of whom are Hindus, primarily live in the country's
southern districts. Government efforts to institute policies designed
to preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic group, to
change citizenship requirements, and to control illegal immigration
resulted in political protests, ethnic conflict, and repression of
ethnic Nepalese in southern districts during the late 1980s and early
1990s. Since 1998 the Government began resettling Buddhist Bhutanese
from other regions of the country on land in southern districts vacated
by the ethnic Nepalese living in refugee camps in Nepal, which is
likely to complicate any future return of the ethnic Nepalese.
Tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese left the country in 1991-92,
many of whom were expelled forcibly. According to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of March, 101,160 ethnic Nepalese
remained in 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal; upwards of 15,000 reside
outside of the camps in the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal. The
Government maintained that some of those in the camps never were
citizens, and therefore have no right to return. The Government
continued its negotiation with the Government of Nepal on repatriation
of ethnic Nepalese in the refugee camps. A bilateral meeting of Foreign
Secretaries in November 2001 failed to resolve disputes concerning the
categorization of refugees in terms of eligibility for their eventual
repatriation. The Government restricted worker rights.
The Government claimed that it has prosecuted government personnel
for unspecified abuses committed in the early 1990s; however, there is
little indication that the Government has investigated adequately or
punished any security force officials involved in torture, rape, and
other abuses committed against ethnic Nepalese residents.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivations of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
Domestic human rights groups alleged that the Government has taken
no action to punish a government official for the 1998 killing of
Buddhist monk Gomchen Karma. The Government stated that the shooting
was accidental and that the official responsible has been suspended
from duty and charged in connection with the incident. The opposition
Druk National Congress claimed that the official responsible reportedly
was forced to resign from his government job; however, he was never
tried.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The laws proscribe torture and abuse in general; however,
human rights advocates stated that in practice the security forces
ignored these provisions. No one was prosecuted in connection with
violating prohibitions against torture during the year. In 2000 there
were reports that security forces stopped ethnic Nepalese refugees
attempting to return to the country, beat them or tortured them, and
sent them back across the border. Refugee groups state that this has
discouraged others from trying to return to the country.
Refugee groups credibly claimed that persons detained as suspected
dissidents in the early 1990s were tortured and/or raped by security
forces. During those years, the Government's ethnic policies and the
crackdown on ethnic Nepalese political agitation created a climate of
impunity in which the Government tacitly condoned the physical abuse of
ethnic Nepalese. The Government indicated that members of the RBP
engaged in ``overzealous'' behavior in dealing with the ethnic Nepalese
political agitation, and the Government prosecuted three government
officials for unspecified abuses of authority during that period;
however, the Government failed to provide further details of these
cases to the public.
Prison conditions reportedly were adequate, if austere. Visits by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the opening of
a prison in Thimphu contributed to improving conditions of detention.
However, human rights groups active outside the country maintained that
prison conditions outside of the capitol city of Thimphu remained
oppressive.
The Government and the ICRC signed a new Memorandum of
Understanding in 1998, extending the ICRC prison visits program for
another 5 years. The ICRC conducted one prison visit during the year,
as it has done for each of the past 8 years, and was allowed unhindered
access.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remained problems. Under the law, police may not arrest a
person without a warrant and must bring an arrested person before a
court within 24 hours, exclusive of travel time from place of arrest.
However, legal protections were incomplete, due to the lack of a fully
developed criminal procedure code and to deficiencies in police
training and practice. Incommunicado detention, particularly of
Nepalese refugees returning without authorization, was still known to
occur. Incommunicado detention of suspected militants was a serious
problem in the early 1990s, but the initiation of ICRC prison visits
and the establishment of an ICRC mail service between detainees and
family members has helped to allay this problem. Of those detained in
connection with political dissidence and violence in southern areas in
1991-92, 70 continued to serve sentences after conviction by the High
Court, according to the ICRC.
In May 2001, Damber Singh Pulami, a refugee who had lived in a camp
in Nepal, was arrested in the country. Pulami reportedly was a member
of the Youth Organization of Bhutan (the youth wing of the banned
Bhutan People's Party) and had gone to the country to check on the
internal resettlement of non-Nepalese to the south. Amnesty
International (AI) still has not received a response to queries about
the charges against him, his whereabouts, and his physical condition,
although according to one human rights group Pulami is in Chemgang Jail
in Thimphu. The Government admitted that it had arrested Pulami in May
2001; however, it alleged that Pulami was a criminal and was arrested
in connected with extortion, kidnaping, killing, and subversive
activities. According to AI, Tul Man Tamang, a 30-year-old construction
worker was arrested in June 2001 on suspicion of organizing political
activities. He reportedly was taken to a police station at Chimakothi
in Chhukha district where he allegedly was tortured, held incommunicado
in a dark cell, and forced to sign a statement saying he was leaving
the country voluntarily before being forcibly exiled to India. During
the year, the Government continued to deny that it had arrested Tul Man
Tamang.
There were no developments in the June 2001 arrest of Ugyen
Tenzing, a member of the Druk-Yul Peoples' Democratic Party, in Samtse
district. N.L. Katwal, a central committee member of the Bhutan Gorkha
National Liberation Front, was 1 of more than 55 persons arrested
during a demonstration in Phuntsholing in 2000. In December 2000, he
was sentenced to 13 years and 6 months in prison. He was serving his
sentence in Chamgang Jail at year's end.
Rongthong Kunley Dorji, leader of the Druk National Congress (DNC)
and United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD), was arrested in India
in 1997, following the issuance of an extradition request by Bhutanese
authorities. Human rights groups contend that the charges brought
against Dorji by the Government are motivated politically and
constitute an attempt to suppress his prodemocracy activities. In 1998
an Indian court released Dorji on bail but placed restrictions on his
movements. Dorji's extradition case still was pending in the Indian
courts and is proceeding slowly. According to a refugee-based human
rights group, only one prosecution witness, a Joint Secretary in
India's Ministry of External Affairs, has been cross-examined in the
last 40 months. The next witness, another Indian government official,
was scheduled to testify in January 2003.
In the past, according to AI, many persons have been detained on
suspicion of being members or supporters of the DNC. Human rights
groups alleged that arrest and abuse of refugees returning to the
country without authorization continued to occur but went unreported by
the Government. The Government acknowledged that 58 persons whom it
described as terrorists were serving sentences at the end of 1998 for
crimes including rape, murder, and robbery. There were no peaceful
protest marches from India to Bhutan during the year, perhaps due to
fear of arrests and deportation, as occurred in previous years after
such marches. Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan
charged that in 1999 the Bhutanese police assaulted them, injuring
several demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all of the
marchers to Nepal (see Section 5).
Although the Government does not use exile formally as punishment,
many accused political dissidents freed under government amnesties
state that they were released on the condition that they depart the
country. Many of them subsequently registered at refugee camps in
Nepal. The Government denied this.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no written constitution
and the judiciary is not independent of the King; however, during 2001
the King commanded a 39-member committee to draft a constitution, which
is intended to pave the way for a constitutional monarchy in upcoming
years (see Section 3). The judicial system consisted of three branches,
the Sub-Divisional Court, the District Court, and a High Court. Only
the King can pardon or commute a sentence. Judges were appointed by the
King on the recommendation of the Chief Justice and may be removed by
the King. There was no uniform system of qualifications for judge
appointments. For example, a nongovernmental organization (NGO)
reported that the Chief Justice had not completed formal high school
studies before his judicial appointment. Village headmen adjudicate
minor offenses and administrative matters.
The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) conducted state prosecutions,
drafted and reviewed legislation, and rendered legal counsel. The OLA
was composed of a Legal Services Division (which eventually was to
become the Ministry of Law and Justice) with domestic, international,
and human rights sections; and a Prosecution Division, with a criminal
section and a civil section.
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters were adjudicated
under a legal code established in the 17th century and revised in 1958
and 1965. State-appointed prosecutors filed charges and prosecuted
cases for offenses against the State. In other cases, the relevant
organizations and departments of government filed charges and conducted
the prosecution. Defendants were supposed to be presented with written
charges in languages that they understood and given time to prepare
their own defense. However, according to some political dissidents,
this practice was not always followed. There were reports that
defendants received legal representation at trial, and that they could
choose from a list of 150 government-licensed and employed advocates to
assist with their defense; however, it was not known how many
defendants actually received such assistance. A legal education program
gradually was building a body of persons who have received formal
training abroad in the law. For example, the Government sends many
lawyers to India and other countries for legal training; 54 persons
have completed legal studies abroad, and 43 more were enrolled. Village
headmen, who had the power to arbitrate disputes, constitute the bottom
rung of the judicial system. Magistrates, each with responsibility for
a block of villages, could review their decisions. Magistrates'
decisions could be appealed to district judges, of which there was one
for each of the country's 20 districts. The High Court in Thimphu is
the country's Supreme Court.
Defendants have the right to appeal to the High Court and may make
a final appeal to the King, who traditionally delegated the decision to
the Royal Advisory Council. Trials were supposed to be conducted in
open hearings, but NGOs alleged that this was not always the case in
practice. Courts decisions were not published and public access to the
country's laws was limited. The National Library houses the legal codes
in the national language, but other copies or volumes were not
available to the public. There was a legal requirement that citizens
pay for their own legal counsel; however, many citizens were unable to
afford representation and thus in practice did not receive legal
assistance in court.
Questions of family law, such as marriage, divorce, and adoption,
traditionally are resolved according to a citizen's religion: Buddhist
tradition for the majority of the population and Hindu tradition for
the ethnic Nepalese. Nonetheless the Government states that there is
one formal law that governs these matters.
Some or all of the approximately 106 prisoners serving sentences
for offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by
ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners (see Section
1.e.).
In 1999 the King pardoned prisoner Tek Nath Rizal, a prominent
ethnic Nepalese dissident and internationally recognized political
prisoner. In 2000 Rizal was granted permission to leave the country to
receive medial treatment in India; however, at year's end, NGOs
reported that the Government has failed to restore his house and land,
which in effect, forced him to lead a migratory life and move from one
place to the next.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--There are no laws providing for these rights.
According to human rights groups, police regularly conducted house-to-
house searches for suspected dissidents without explanation or legal
justification. The Government requires all citizens, including
minorities, to wear the traditional dress of the Buddhist majority in
all public places, and strictly enforced this law for visits to
Buddhist religious buildings, monasteries, or government offices; in
schools, and when attending official functions and public ceremonies;
however, some citizens commented that enforcement of this law was
arbitrary and sporadic.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government restricts freedom
of speech, and to a lesser extent freedom of the press. The country's
only regular publication is Kuensel, a weekly newspaper with a
circulation of 15,000. It also reports stories on a daily basis through
its on-line edition. Kuensel was formerly government-run and human
rights groups have stated that government ministries reviewed editorial
material and suppressed or changed content. According to the
Government, Kuensel was independent and was funded entirely through
advertising and subscription revenue. Its board consists of senior
civil servants and private individuals. Kuensel, was published in
English, Dzongkha, and Nepali languages, and it supported the
Government but did occasionally report criticism of the King and of
government policies in the National Assembly. For example, the Kuensel
published a series of articles that exposed corrupt practices of some
Ministers during the year. Some journalists who worked for Kuensel were
reportedly subjected to threats and harassment by the Ministers and
their activists. The Government maintained that there were no
restrictions on individuals starting new publications, but that the
market was too small to support any. Nepalese, Indian, and other
foreign newspapers and magazines were available, but readership was in
the hundreds and primarily limited to government officials.
After a 10-year ban on private television reception, in 2000 the
Government began to allow broadcasts of locally produced and foreign
programs. There were more than 33 cable providers in the country with
more than 10,000 subscribers. A large variety of programming was
available, including CNN and BBC. The Government did not censor cable
content. The Government radio station broadcasts each day for two hours
in the four major languages (Dzongkha, Nepali, English, and Sharchop).
The Government inaugurated the country's first Internet service
provider, Druknet, in 1999; it had 1,820 subscribers as of late 2000.
There were Internet cafes in Thimphu, Phuentsholing and Bumthang. The
Government did not censor any content on Druknet except for
pornography, which was blocked.
There were no reported restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricted freedom of assembly and association. Citizens may engage in
peaceful assembly and association only for purposes approved by the
Government. NGOs and political parties were illegal under the law.
Although the Government allowed civic and business organizations, there
were no legally recognized political parties. The Government regarded
parties organized by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the Bhutan People's Party
(BPP), the Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP), and the Druk
National Congress--as ``terrorist and antinational'' organizations and
declared them illegal. These parties, which seek the repatriation of
refugees and democratic reform, did not conduct activities inside the
country.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion;
however, the Government restricted this right in practice. The Drukpa
branch of the Kagyupa School of Mahayana Buddhism was the state
religion. Approximately two-thirds of the population practiced either
Drukpa Kagyupa or Ningmapa Buddhism.
The Drukpa discipline was practiced predominantly in the western
and central parts of the country, which was inhabited mainly by ethnic
Ngalongs (descendants of Tibetan immigrants who predominate in
government and the civil service, and whose cultural norms have been
declared to be the standard for all citizens). The Ningmapa school was
practiced predominantly in the eastern part of the country, although
there were adherents, including the royal family, in other areas. Most
of those living in the east are ethnic Sharchops--the descendants of
those thought to be the country's original inhabitants. The Government
subsidized monasteries and shrines of the Drukpa sect and provided aid
to approximately one-third of the Kingdom's 12,000 monks. The
Government also provided financial assistance for the construction of
Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist temples and shrines. NGOs reported
that permission from the Government to build a Hindu temple was
required but rarely granted. There were no Hindu temples in Thumphu,
despite the migration of many ethnic Nepalese to Thumphu. The Drukpa
branch of Buddhism enjoyed statutory representation in the National
Assembly (Drukpa monks occupy 10 seats in the 150-member National
Assembly) and in the Royal Advisory Council (Drukpa monks hold 2 of the
11 seats on the Council); the Drukpa branch was an influential voice on
public policy. Citizens of other faiths, mostly Hindus, enjoy freedom
of worship but may not proselytize. Followers of religions other than
Buddhism and Hinduism generally were free to worship in private homes
but may not erect religious buildings or congregate in public. Under
the law, conversions were illegal. Some of the country's few
Christians, mostly ethnic Nepalese living in the south, state that they
were subject to harassment and discrimination by the Government, local
authorities, and non-Christian citizens.
The King declared major Hindu festivals to be national holidays,
and the royal family participates in them. Foreign missionaries are not
permitted to proselytize, but international Christian relief
organizations and Jesuit priests were active in education and
humanitarian activities. The Government restricted the import into the
country of printed religious matter; only Buddhist religious texts can
be imported. According to dissidents living outside of the country,
Buddhist religious teaching, of both the Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa
sects was permitted in the schools, but the teaching of other religious
faiths was not. Applicants for government services sometimes were asked
their religion before services are rendered. All government civil
servants, regardless of religion, were required to take an oath of
allegiance to the King, the country, and the people. The oath does not
have religious content, but was administered by a Buddhist lama.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens traveling in border regions
were required to show their citizenship identity cards at immigration
check points, which in some cases were located at a considerable
distance from what is in effect an open border with India. By treaty
citizens may reside and work in India.
The country was not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (see Section
5). The Government states that it recognizes the right to asylum in
accordance with international refugee law; however, the Government has
not formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, first asylum, or
the return of refugees to countries in which they fear persecution.
According to one credible human rights source, until recently the
Government systematically arrested and imprisoned Tibetan refugees
crossing the border with Tibet. This policy was followed under a tacit
agreement with China. So invariable was this policy that Tibetan
leaders advised refugees not to use routes of escape through the
country, and refugees have not done so for several years. Since
Tibetans effectively were the only refugee population seeking first
asylum in the country, the issue of first asylum did not arise during
the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
country is a monarchy with sovereign power vested in the King. However,
during 2001 a draft constitution was written. A newspaper quoted the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as saying that the committee
discussed the merits of multiparty politics. The drafting committee was
chaired by the Chief Justice of the High Court and was, according to
the Government, composed of representatives of the Monastic body, the
people, the judiciary, and the Royal government. The Government
indicated that the Constitution would be a codification of existing
Buddhist-influenced societal standards. In 1998 the King devolved his
day-to-day executive powers to the Council of Ministers, who were
elected by the National Assembly from among themselves, but reserved
control of ``matters of national sovereignty and national security''
for himself. He also introduced term limits for his Council of
Ministers and proposed measures to increase the role of the National
Assembly in the formation of his government. The National Assembly
elected a new Council of Ministers and government in July 1998 to a 5-
year term. In July 2001, the National Assembly elected six Royal
Advisory Councilors. There were elected or partially elected assemblies
at the local, district, and national levels, and the Government claimed
to encourage decentralization and citizen participation. These
elections were conducted in much the same way as National Assembly
elections. Since 1969 the National Assembly has had the power to remove
ministers whom the King appoints, but it never has done so. Political
authority ultimately resided in the King, and decisionmaking involves
only a small number of officials. Officials subject to questioning by
the National Assembly routinely make major decisions, but the National
Assembly is not known to have overturned any decisions reached by the
King and government officials.
Political parties do not exist legally. The Government has banned
parties established abroad by ethnic Nepalese, Sarchops, or Eastern
Bhutanese (see Section 2.b.).
The National Assembly had 150 members. Of these, 105 were elected
by citizens, 10 were selected by a part of the Buddhist clergy, and the
remaining 35 were appointed by the King to represent the Government.
The National Assembly, which meets irregularly, had little independent
authority. However, there were efforts underway to have the National
Assembly meet on a more regular basis, and in recent years the King and
the Council of Ministers have been more responsive to the National
Assembly's concerns. The procedures for the nomination and election of
National Assembly members state that in order to be eligible for
nomination as a candidate, a person must be a citizen; be at least 25
years of age; not be married to a foreign national; not have been
terminated or compulsorily retired for misconduct from government
service; not have committed any act of treason against the King, the
populace, and country; have no criminal record or any criminal case
pending against him; have respect for the nation's laws; and be able to
read and write in Dzongkha (the language, in several dialects, spoken
by Bhutanese Buddhists).
Each National Assembly constituency consists of a number of
villages. Each village was permitted to nominate one candidate but must
do so by consensus. There was no provision for self-nomination, and the
law states that no person may campaign for the candidacy or canvass
through other means. If more than one village within a constituency
puts forward a candidate, an election was conducted by the district
development committee, and the candidate obtaining a simple majority of
votes cast was declared the winner. During the year, the law allowed
individuals over the age of 18 the right to vote. The law did not make
clear how a candidate was selected if none achieves a simple majority.
However, it did state that in case of a tie among the candidates in the
election, selection shall be made through the drawing of lots. The
candidate whose name was drawn shall be deemed to be elected.
Human rights activists claim that the only time individual citizens
have any involvement in choosing a National Assembly representative was
when they are asked for consensus approval of a village candidate by
the village headman. The name put to villagers for consensus approval
by the headman is suggested to him by district officials, who in turn
take their direction from the central government. Consensus approval
took place at a public gathering. Human rights activists stated that
there was no secret ballot.
The National Assembly enacted laws, approved senior government
appointments, and advised the King on matters of national importance.
Voting was by secret ballot, with a simple majority needed to pass a
measure. The King may not formally veto legislation, but may return
bills for further consideration. The Assembly occasionally rejected the
King's recommendations or delayed implementing them, but in general,
the King had enough influence to persuade the Assembly to approve
legislation that he considered essential or to withdraw proposals he
opposed. The Assembly may question government officials and force them
to resign by a two-thirds vote of no confidence; however, the National
Assembly never has compelled any government official to resign. The
Royal Civil Service Commission was responsible for disciplining
subministerial level government officials and has removed several
following their convictions for crimes, including embezzlement.
The 1998 decree provided that all cabinet ministers were to be
elected by the National Assembly and that the roles and
responsibilities of the cabinet ministries were to be spelled out. Each
cabinet minister was to be elected by simple majority in a secret
ballot in the National Assembly from among candidates nominated by the
King. The King was to select nominees for cabinet office from among
senior government officials holding the rank of secretary or above. The
King was to determine the portfolios of his ministers, whose terms were
limited to 5 years, after which they must pass a vote of confidence in
the National Assembly in order to remain in office. Finally the decree
provided that the National Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of no
confidence, can require the King to abdicate and to be replaced by the
next person in the line of succession. After adopting the decree, the
National Assembly elected a new council of ministers consistent with
it. Human rights groups maintained that since only the King may
nominate candidates for cabinet office, their election by the National
Assembly was not a significant democratic reform. The King removed
himself as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1998. Based on an
election held in the National Assembly in 1998, Cabinet Ministers who
received the most votes rotate the position on a yearly basis. The
Chairman of the Council of Ministers serves as Prime Minster and Head
of government. At year's end, Trade and Industry Minister Khundu
Wangchuk served as Chairman.
The Monastic Body comprised of 5,000 monks was financed by an
annual government grant and was the sole arbiter on religious matters
in the country. The body also played an advisory role in the National
Assembly, the Royal Advisory Council, and with the King. The King
almost consistently deferred to the body's pronouncements on religious
matters and many decisions affecting the state.
There are 15 women in the National Assembly. There are 2 women in
the Supreme Court, 23 percent of civil service employees are women, and
women hold more than 30 percent of positions at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The persistence of traditional gender roles apparently
accounted for a low proportion of women in government, although women
have made visible gains.
There are 105 elected people's representatives in the National
Assembly. All major ethnic groups are represented in the National
Assembly, including 14 ethnic Nepalese.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There were no legal human rights NGOs in the country. The
Government regarded human rights groups established by ethnic Nepalese
exiles--the Human Rights Organization of Bhutan, the People's Forum for
Human Rights in Bhutan, and the Association of Human Rights Activists-
Bhutan--as political organizations and did not permit them to operate
in the country. AI was permitted to visit in 1998, and later released a
report.
ICRC representatives conducted a yearly prison visit, and the
Government allowed them unhindered access to detention facilities,
including those in southern districts inhabited by ethnic Nepalese. The
chairman and members of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention have made two visits to the country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
Ongoing government efforts to cultivate a national identity rooted
in the language, religion, and culture of the Ngalong ethnic group
restricted cultural expression by other ethnic groups. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, the Government instituted policies designed to
preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic group. It also
committed many abuses against the ethnic Nepalese, which led to the
departure of tens of thousands of them. Many ethnic Nepalese were
expelled forcibly, and almost 100,000 of them remain in refugee camps
in Nepal. At the time, the Government claimed that it was concerned
about the rapid population growth of and political agitation by the
ethnic Nepalese. The Government claimed ethnic and gender
discrimination in employment was not a problem. It claims that ethnic
Nepalese fill 16 percent the civic service or government employment,
which was less than their proportion of the total population. Bhutanese
human rights groups active outside the country claim that ethnic
Nepalese actually make up approximately one third of the country's
population and that the Government underreports their number. Women
were accorded respect in the traditions of most ethnic groups, although
some exile groups claim that gender discrimination was a problem.
Women.--There was no evidence that rape or spousal abuse were
extensive problems. However, NGOs reported that many women did not
report rape either because of the cultural issues or because they were
unaware of the legal options.
The Rape Act contained a clear definition of criminal sexual
assault and specified penalties. In cases of rape involving minors,
sentences range from 5 to 17 years. In extreme cases, a rapist may be
imprisoned for life. There were few known instances of sexual
harassment.
Women constitute 48 percent of the population and participate
freely in the social and economic life of the country. Approximately 43
percent of enrollment in school was female. Inheritance law provides
for equal inheritance among all sons and daughters, but traditional
inheritance practices, which vary among ethnic groups, may be observed
if the heirs choose to forego legal challenges. Dowries were not
customary, even among ethnic Nepalese Hindus. Among some groups,
inheritance practices favoring daughters reportedly account for the
large numbers of women who own shops and businesses and for an
accompanying tendency of women to drop out of higher education to go
into business. However, female school enrollment has been growing in
response to government policies. Women increasingly were found among
senior officials and private sector entrepreneurs, especially in the
tourism industry. Women in unskilled jobs generally are paid slightly
less than men. Women constitute approximately 30 percent of the formal
work force.
In questions related to family law, including divorce, child
custody, and inheritance, were adjudicated by the customary law of each
ethnic or religious group. The minimum age of marriage for women was 16
years, except in the case of Muslims, who continue to follow their
customary marriage practices. The application of different legal
practices based on membership in a religious or ethnic group often
results in discrimination against women. Polygyny was allowed, provided
the first wife gives her permission. Polyandry was permitted but did
not often occur. Marriages may be arranged by the marriage partners
themselves as well as by their parents. Divorce was common. Existing
legislation requires that all marriages must be registered; it also
favors women in matters of alimony.
Children.--The Government demonstrated its commitment to child
welfare by rapid expansion of primary schools, healthcare facilities,
and immunization programs. Mortality rates for both infants and
children under 5 years dropped significantly since 1989. The Government
provided free and compulsory primary school education, and primary
school enrollment increased 9 percent per year since 1991, with
enrollment of girls increasing at an even higher rate. Government
policies aimed at increasing enrollment of girls increased the
proportion of girls in primary schools from 39 percent in 1990 to 45
percent during 2001. In 2001 the participation rate for children in
primary schools was estimated at 72 percent, with the rate of
completion of 7 years of schooling at 60 percent for girls and at 59
percent for boys. The number of children enrolled in school has grown
to 126,718 in 2001. There was no law barring ethnic Nepalese children
from attending school. However, most of the 75 primary schools in
southern areas heavily populated by ethnic Nepalese that were closed in
1990 remain closed. The closure of the schools acts as an effective
barrier to the ability of the ethnic Nepalese in southern areas to
obtain a primary education. In addition, ethnic Nepalese also claimed
that the Security Clearance Form, which is a prerequisite for taking
one's passport out of the Foreign Ministry, was biased against ethnic
Nepalese. The ethnic Nepalese said that since the forms are based on
the security clearance of their parents, it frequently excludes
children of ethnic Nepalese. Exile groups claim that Nepalese students
scoring highly on national exams were not always given the same
advantages as other students (such as the chance to study abroad at
government expense), particularly if they are related to prominent
dissidents or refugees.
There was no societal pattern of abuse against children. Children
enjoy a privileged position in society and benefit from international
development programs focused on maternal and child welfare. A study by
the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) found that boys and girls received
equal treatment regarding nutrition and health care and that there is
little difference in child mortality rates between the sexes.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no evidence of official
discrimination toward persons with disabilities, but the Government has
not passed legislation mandating accessibility for persons with
disabilities. Societal discrimination against persons with disabilities
remained a problem.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Nepalese have lived in
the southern part of the country for centuries, and the early phases of
economic development at the turn of the century brought a large influx
of additional ethnic Nepalese. Early efforts at national integration
focused on assimilation, including financial incentives for
intermarriage, education for some students in regions other than their
own, and an increase in development funds for the south. However, in
the late 1980s, concern over the increase in the population of and
political agitation among ethnic Nepalese prompted aggressive
government efforts to assert a national culture, to tighten control
over southern regions, to control illegal immigration, to expel ethnic
Nepalese, and to promote national integration.
Discriminatory measures, introduced in 1989, continued during the
year. Measures included a requirement that national dress be worn for
official occasions and as a school uniform, the teaching of Dzongkha as
a second language in all schools, and an end to instruction in Nepali
as a second language.
During the mid- and late 1980s, citizenship became a highly
contentious matter. Requirements for citizenship first were formalized
in the Citizenship Law of 1958, which granted citizenship to all adults
who owned land and had lived in the country for at least 10 years.
However, the law significantly tightened requirements and resulted in
the denaturalization of many ethnic Nepalese. The 1985 law required
that both parents be citizens in order to confer citizenship on a
child, and that persons seeking to prove citizenship through their own
or their parents' residency in 1958 be able to prove residency in the
country at that time. In many cases, persons were unable to produce the
documentation necessary, such as land tax receipts from 1958, to show
residency. The law permits residents who lost citizenship under the
1985 law to apply for naturalization if they can prove residence during
the 15 years prior to that time. The Government declared all residents
who could not meet the new citizenship requirements to be illegal
immigrants. Beginning in 1988, the Government expelled large numbers of
ethnic Nepalese through enforcement of the new citizenship laws.
The Citizenship Act also provided for the revocation of the
citizenship of any naturalized citizen who ``has shown by act or speech
to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, country, and
people of Bhutan.'' The Home Ministry later declared in a circular that
any nationals leaving the country to assist ``antinationals,'' and the
families of such persons, would forfeit their citizenship. Human rights
groups alleged that these provisions were used widely to revoke the
citizenship of ethnic Nepalese who subsequently were expelled or
otherwise departed from the country. In response to the perceived
repression, ethnic Nepalese protested, sometimes violently. The
protests were led by the BPP, which advocated full citizenship rights
for ethnic Nepalese and for democratic reforms. Characterizing the BPP
as a ``terrorist'' movement backed by Indian sympathizers, the
authorities cracked down on its activities and ordered the closure of
local Nepalese schools, clinics, and development programs after several
were raided or bombed by dissidents. There were credible reports that
many ethnic Nepalese activists were beaten and tortured while in
custody, and that security forces committed acts of rape. There also
were credible reports that militants, including BPP members, attacked
and killed census officers and other officials, and engaged in
bombings.
Local officials took advantage of the climate of repression to
coerce ethnic Nepalese to sell their land below its fair value and to
emigrate. Beginning in 1991, ethnic Nepalese began to leave southern
areas of the country in large numbers and take refuge in Nepal. Many
ethnic Nepalese claimed they also were forced to sign ``voluntary
migration forms'' and leave the country, after local officials
threatened to fine or imprison them for failing to comply. According to
UNHCR, there were 102,800 ethnic Nepalese refugees in seven refugee
camps in eastern Nepal as of December. An additional 15,000 refugees,
according to UNHCR estimates, were living outside the camps in Nepal
and India.
Ethnic Nepalese political groups in exile complain that the
revision of the country's citizenship laws in 1985 denaturalized tens
of thousands of former residents of the country. They also complained
that the new laws have been applied selectively and made unfair demands
for documentation on a largely illiterate group when the country only
recently adopted basic administrative procedures. They claimed that
many ethnic Nepalese whose families have been in the country for
generations were expelled because they were unable to document their
claims to residence. The Government denies this and asserts that a
three-member village committee, typically ethnic Nepalese in southern
districts, certifies in writing that a resident is a citizen in cases
where documents cannot be produced.
Since 1994 there have been a series of negotiations between Nepal
and Bhutan to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem. In December 2000,
the two countries agreed upon a system to verify the Bhutanese refugees
in Nepal in preparation for their return to the country. Refugee
verifications began in March 2001. By December 2001, all the residents
of the first camp had been interviewed, and the Bhutanese verification
team went back to Thimphu pending the start of verification at the next
camp. Refugee groups are concerned that at the present rate,
verification will take several years. Bilateral negotiations on
repatriation issues in November 2001 failed to arrive at an agreement,
and the matter was deferred to a proposed future session of
ministerial-level talks. The talks' earlier lack of progress frustrated
refugees, and some held ``peace marches'' to protest their plight.
The UNHCR monitored the conditions of the Bhutanese refugees in
camps in eastern Nepal and provided for their basic needs. U.N.
officials, diplomats and NGO representative visitors to the camps had
described conditions as generally very good, largely as a result of
efficient UNHCR administration, conscientious government oversight and
the refugees taking responsibility for their surroundings. However,
there were reports by refugee women and children that some of the
Bhutanese refugee workers at the camps had committed sexual assault.
The UNHCR responded by conducting an investigation and the Government
of Nepal provided more police protection to the camps.
The Government contended that many of the documents presented by
refugees in the camps were fraudulent. NGOs claimed that these
assertions by the Government represented an attempt to eliminate the
majority of the refugees from qualifying as citizens.
In 1998 the Government expanded its program of resettling Buddhist
Bhutanese from other regions of the country on land in the southern
part of the country vacated by the ethnic Nepalese living in refugee
camps in Nepal. Human rights groups maintained that this action
prejudices any eventual outcome of negotiations over the return of the
refugees to the country. The Government maintained that citizens who
are ethnic Nepalese from the south sometimes were resettled on more
fertile land in other parts of the country. The failure of the
Government to permit the return of ethnic Nepalese refugees has tended
to reinforce societal prejudices against this group, as has the
Government's policy on the forced retirement of refugee family members
in government service and the resettlement of Buddhists on land vacated
by expelled ethnic Nepalese in the south.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions were not permitted, and
there were no labor unions. The Government maintained that, with very
little industrialization, there was little labor to be organized.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There was no
collective bargaining in industry. Workers did not have the right to
strike, and the Government was not a member of the International Labor
Organization (ILO). Industry accounted for approximately 25 percent of
the GDP, but employed only a minute fraction of the total work force.
The Government affected wages in the manufacturing sector through its
control over wages in state-owned industries.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Government prohibits
forced or bonded labor, and there were no reports that such practices
occurred. However, mandatory national service was practiced.
Agricultural workers were required to work in state service for 15 days
per year. NGOs stated that this practice was administered selectively.
For instance, NGOs believe the practice often selected poor
agricultural workers at the height of their harvesting season. There
was no evidence to suggest that domestic workers were subjected to
coerced or bonded labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years
for citizens and 20 years for noncitizens. A UNICEF study suggested
that children as young as 11 years sometimes are employed with
roadbuilding teams, which usually were made up of non-citizen guest
workers. Children often do agricultural work and chores on family
farms. The law specifically does not prohibit forced and bonded labor
by children, but there were no reports that such practices occurred.
The country has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on preventing the Worst
Forms of Child Labor; however, as a state party to the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the Government supports the provisions
contained therein. The country lacks a large pool of ready labor; for
major projects, such as road works, the Government brings in hired
laborers from India.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A circular that went into effect
in 1994 established wage rates, rules and regulations for labor
recruiting agencies, and the regulations for payment of worker's
compensation. Wage rates were revised periodically, and range upward
from a minimum of roughly $2.50 (100 ngultrums) per day plus various
allowances paid in cash or kind. This minimum wage provided a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The workday was defined as
8 hours with a 1-hour lunch break. Work in excess of this must be paid
at one and one-half times normal rates. Workers paid on a monthly basis
are entitled to 1 day's paid leave for 6 days of work and 15 days of
leave annually. The largest salaried work force was the Government
service, which has an administered wage structure last revised in 1988
but supplemented by special allowances and increases. The last such
increase was in 1999. According to the latest Census of Manufacturing
Industries, only 38 industrial establishments employed more than 50
workers. Smaller industrial units included 39 plants of medium size,
345 small units, 832 cottage industry units, and 2,154 ``mini'' units.
The Government favored family-owned farms. Land laws prohibited a
farmer from selling his or her last 5 acres and required the sale of
holdings in excess of 25 acres. This, along with the country's rugged
geography, results in a predominantly self-employed agricultural
workforce. Workers were entitled to free medical care within the
country. Cases that cannot be dealt with in the country were flown to
other countries (usually India) for treatment. Workers were eligible
for compensation for partial or total disability, and in the event of
death their families were entitled to compensation. Existing labor
regulations did not grant workers the right to remove themselves from
work situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardizing
their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
were trafficked to, from, or within the country.
__________
INDIA
India is a longstanding parliamentary democracy with a bicameral
parliament. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) leads a multi party coalition, heads the Government.
President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who was elected in July by an electoral
college consisting of Members of Parliament and members of state
assemblies, is Head of State and also has special emergency powers.
State Assembly elections held earlier in the year in Uttar Pradesh,
Punjab, Uttaranchal, Manipur, and Goa were conducted generally in a
free and transparent manner with little violence. In December elections
were held in Gujarat where the BJP won a closely watched election
following accusations of government failure to control riots in
February to March that killed over 2,000 persons, mostly Muslims. The
judiciary is independent.
Although the 28 state governments have primary responsibility for
maintaining law and order, the central government provides guidance and
support through the use of paramilitary forces throughout the country.
The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls most of the paramilitary
forces, the internal intelligence bureaus, and the nationwide police
service; it provides training for senior police officers of the state-
organized police forces. The armed forces are under civilian control.
Members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights
abuses.
The country is in transition from a government-controlled to a
largely market-oriented economy. The private sector is predominant in
agriculture, most nonfinancial services, consumer goods manufacturing,
and some heavy industrial sectors. Economic liberalization and
structural reforms begun in 1991 continued, although momentum slowed.
The country's economic problems were compounded by a population growth
rate of 1.7 percent annually and a population of more than 1.2 billion.
Income distribution remained very unequal, with the top 20 percent of
the population receiving 34.4 percent of national income and the bottom
20 percent receiving 10 percent. According to a government survey, 23.6
percent of the urban population and 27.1 percent of the rural
population lived below the poverty level.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, numerous serious problems remained. Significant
human rights abuses included: Extrajudicial killings, including faked
encounter killings, deaths of suspects in police custody throughout the
country, and excessive use of force by security forces combating active
insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and several northeastern states;
torture and rape by police and other agents of the Government; poor
prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention in
Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast; continued detention throughout the
country of thousands arrested under special security legislation;
lengthy pretrial detention without charge; prolonged detention while
undergoing trial; occasional limits on freedom of the press and freedom
of movement; harassment and arrest of human rights monitors; extensive
societal violence against women; legal and societal discrimination
against women; forced prostitution; child prostitution and female
infanticide; discrimination against persons with disabilities; serious
discrimination and violence against indigenous people and scheduled
castes and tribes; widespread intercaste and communal violence;
religiously motivated violence against Muslims and Christians;
widespread exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor; and
trafficking in women and children. India was invited by the Community
of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second
CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
Many of these abuses are generated by a traditionally hierarchical
social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country's many
ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and
the authorities' attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods
and training. These problems are acute in Jammu and Kashmir, where
judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed counterinsurgency
tactics, the refusal of security forces to obey court orders, and
terrorist threats have disrupted the judicial system. In the northeast,
there was no clear decrease in the number of killings, despite
negotiated ceasefires between the Government and some insurgent forces
and between some tribal groups.
In November State Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir
transferred power to a coalition composed of the People's Democratic
Party and the Congress Party. International observers stated that the
election took place in a somewhat fair and transparent manner; however,
some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alleged that there were some
flaws in the election, including that all major separatist groups
boycotted the elections and there was an widespread fear of attacks by
militants. These two parties defeated the National Conference, a
political party that has dominated state-level politics since Indian
independence in 1947. Violence remained a pervasive feature of politics
in Jammu and Kashmir. The fall elections took place in a climate of
sporadic violence and isolated irregularities. Election-related
violence killed more than 800 persons.
Terrorist attacks remained problems. The concerted campaign of
execution-style killings of civilians by Kashmiri and foreign-based
militant groups continued and included several killings of political
leaders and party workers. Separatist militants were responsible for
numerous, serious abuses, including killing of armed forces personnel,
police, government officials, and civilians; torture; rape; and other
forms of brutality. Separatist militants also were responsible for
kidnaping and extortion in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern
states. The Government accused the terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
(LET) and Jaish-e-Muhammad of responsibility for carrying out many of
the attacks on civilians and military personnel.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Arbitrary and
unlawful deprivations of life by government forces (including deaths in
custody and faked encounter killings) continued to occur frequently in
the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in several northeastern states,
where separatist insurgencies continued. Security forces offered
bounties for wanted militants. Extrajudicial killings of criminals and
suspected criminals by police or prison officers also occurred in a
number of states. Militant groups active in Jammu and Kashmir, several
northeast states, and parts of Andhra Pradesh, killed members of rival
factions, government security forces, government officials, and
civilians.
Official government figures indicated that militant activity
increased notably during the year in Jammu and Kashmir. (Kashmir has
been at the center of a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan
since the two nations gained their independence in 1947; both claim
Kashmir.) According to the Kashmir Times, security forces killed 1,606
militants in encounters as of September, compared with 1,520 militants
killed during the same period in 2000. In addition, human rights groups
alleged that during the year security forces killed a number of
captured non-Kashmiri militants in Jammu and Kashmir. During conflicts
with armed militants, security forces allegedly responded
indiscriminately to gunfire. Kashmiri separatist groups claimed that in
many instances ``encounters'' were faked and that security forces
summarily executed suspected militants and civilians offering no
resistance. Statements by senior police and army officials confirmed
that the security forces were under instructions to kill foreign
militants, rather than attempt to capture them alive. Human rights
groups alleged that this particularly was true in the case of security
force encounters with non-Kashmiri militants who crossed into Jammu and
Kashmir illegally. According to one prominent human rights activist,
the armed forces were under orders to shoot any person who was within
12 miles of the Line of Control (the ceasefire line delineating parts
of India from Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir) or to shoot any person who
was unable to quickly justify their presence in the area.
According to press reports and anecdotal accounts, persons killed
in disputed encounters typically were detained by security forces, and
their bodies, often bearing multiple bullet wounds and often marks of
torture, were returned to relatives or otherwise were discovered
shortly afterwards. For example, in January Ali Muhammad Bhat was
beaten, shot, and killed allegedly in retribution for filing a
complaint against the security forces. In March Mubarak Shah and his
wife were killed in Dushar Gool. Security forces allegedly detained the
pair a few days before they were killed.
In December in Srinigar Mohammad Ahsan Untoo, chairman of the
Kashmir Human Rights forum, protested human rights violations by
security forces in Kashmir, by dousing himself in kerosene and lighting
himself on fire.
There reportedly was no action taken against members of the
security forces responsible for the following killings in Jammu and
Kashmir: The February 2001 ``encounter'' killing of Azam Ali in
Nalgonda; the May 2001 alleged custody killing of Aijaz Ahmad Kitab;
the January 2000 alleged custody killing of Mohammad Tahir Shah; the
March 2000 alleged custody killing of Gulab Muhammad Chechi.
According to local press reports, the number of persons killed in
encounter deaths varied widely throughout the country. In Delhi there
were eight reported encounter deaths; in Chennai there were six; in
Gujarat there were three. However, in Uttar Pradesh, there were 260; in
Bihar there were 68, and in Mumbai there were 47.
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), called for all alleged
encounter deaths to be investigated immediately by an independent
agency; however, such an agency was not established during the year. In
addition, members of the security forces rarely were held accountable
for these killings. The NHRC may inquire into alleged security force
abuses in Jammu and Kashmir but does not have the statutory power to
investigate such allegations. Human rights activists maintained that
the Government increasingly substituted financial compensation to
victims' families for punishment of those found guilty of illegal
conduct. In an overwhelming majority of cases where compensation was
recommended, it never was delivered. In some cases, victims or victims'
families distrusted the military judicial system and petitioned to
transfer a particular case from a military to a civil court. The
authorities generally did not report encounter deaths that occurred in
Jammu and Kashmir to the NHRC; however, private citizens informed the
Commission of various abuses.
The security forces killed many civilians during military
counterinsurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir. For example, in
October security forces killed nine persons following a gun battle
between militants and security officials in Kashmir.
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Disturbed Areas Act
remained in effect in several states in which active secessionist
movements exist, namely, in Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur,
Assam, and parts of Tripura. The Disturbed Areas Act gives police
extraordinary powers of arrest and detention, which, according to human
rights groups, allowed security forces to operate with virtual impunity
in areas under the act. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act provides
search and arrest powers without warrants (see Section 1.d.).
Accountability remained a serious problem in Jammu and Kashmir.
Security forces committed thousands of serious human rights violations
over the course of the conflict, including extrajudicial killings,
disappearances, and torture (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). Despite this
record of abuse, only a few hundred members of the security forces have
been prosecuted and punished since 1990 for human rights violations or
other crimes. Punishments ranged from reduction in rank to imprisonment
for up to 10 years.
In order to get greater accountability for abuses committed by
security forces members in Jammu and Kashmir, the NHRC recommended that
the Government allow the NHRC to investigate complaints of the army and
paramilitary forces excesses; however, the Government decided that the
paramilitary forces were part of the armed forces. As such,
paramilitary forces were protected from investigation by the NHRC and
from criminal prosecution for certain acts under various emergency
statutes. Under the Human Rights Protection Act, the NHRC cannot
directly investigate allegations of human rights abuses by the armed
and paramilitary forces.
Violence, often resulting in deaths, was a pervasive element in
Jammu and Kashmir politics (see Section 3). According to the Jammu and
Kashmir Director General of Police, shootings, explosions, and suicide
attacks during the election killed more than 800 persons. More than 260
civilians, 250 security personnel, and 370 militants were killed in
politically motivated violence during the year. For example, between
August and October militants killed 44 persons from the National
Conference Party, Congress Party, People's Democratic Party and
independent activists and two candidates, Jammu and Kashmir Law
Minister Mushtaq Ahmed Lone and Abdul Rehman. Supporters of different
political parties, and supporters of different factions within one
party, frequently clashed with each other and with police during the
election.
There were many allegations that military and paramilitary forces
engaged in abduction, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, and the
extrajudicial killing of militants and noncombatant civilians,
particularly in areas of insurgencies (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., 1.d.,
and 1.g.). The majority of complaints during the year involved
individual cases; while there had been complaints of individual houses
being destroyed, there were no reports of entire villages being burned
by armed forces or of mass killings, as in past years. Human rights
groups alleged that police often faked encounters to cover up the
torture and subsequent killing of both militants and noncombatants. For
example, in May police arrested Bhujangrao Bhandari in Nerul. Police
asserted that Bhandari had hung himself; however, since Bhandari only
had one arm, human rights observers said the police version lacked
credibility. By year's end, no inquiry had been ordered in Bhandari's
case. The number of persons killed and injured in militant violence in
the northeastern states was significant but was much lower than the
numbers killed in similar violence in Kashmir. The Home Ministry
reported that during 2001, 107 members of the security forces, 429
civilians, and 517 militants were killed in the northeast. According to
India Today, deaths in Mumbai in police encounters from January to July
were 39, compared with 92 in 2001. Numerous incidents of encounters
involving security forces and militant organizations such as the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of
Bodoland (NDFB), and the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
continued. For example, on October 30 in Guwahati two militants
allegedly involved in a mortar attack on Dispur on October 27 were
killed by state police. An investigation by the Assam Human Rights
Commission resulted in the transfer of two senior police officials. In
November police shot and killed two men they claimed were Pakistani
terrorists. A witness challenged the police account of the shooting,
alleged the encounter was fake, and later filed a petition in the Delhi
High Court seeking an independent inquiry into the incident. At year's
end, the witness claimed that the Government put pressure on him to
change his statement.
No action reportedly was taken by the Chief Minister of Andhra
Pradesh in the 2001 killing of Azam Ali or Purushotham. The Andhra
Pradesh Civil Liberties Commission (APCLC) believed that the police,
not the PWG, were involved in the killings. In 2001 Amnesty
International (AI) had asked the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh to
order an impartial investigation into the killing of Purushotham and
Azam Ali. There were no reports of any action taken against the
responsible members of the police who killed six PWG activists and one
civilian in June 2001.
The NHRC investigated 285 reported cases of encounter deaths
allegedly committed by the Andhra Pradesh police in connection with
anti-People's War Group (PWG) operations. According to the Andhra
Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, the NHRC had evidence of police
culpability in several cases. However, such cases had not been
adjudicated in the courts or otherwise acted on by the state
government. The Government's failure to act expeditiously on NHRC
findings discouraged local human rights groups from filing additional
encounter death cases with the NHRC. As evidence that encounters often
were faked by police, human rights groups cited the refusal of police
officials to turn over the bodies of suspects killed. The bodies often
were cremated before families could view them. The trial continued in
the 2001 NHRC investigation of 285 reported cases of encounter deaths
allegedly committed by the Andhra Pradesh police in connection with
anti-PWG operations.
In Andhra Pradesh, the Disturbed Areas Act had been in force in a
number of districts for more than 4 years. Human rights groups alleged
that security forces were able to operate with virtual impunity under
the act. They further alleged that Andhra Pradesh police officers
trained and provided weapons to an armed vigilante group known as the
``Green Tigers,'' whose mission was to combat the Naxalite group in the
state. In November, two alleged LTTE terrorists were killed by the
police in Tamil Nadu. Little was known about the size, composition, or
activities of this group.
Court action in cases of extrajudicial killings was slow and
uncertain. In one case, Army Major Avtar Singh was arrested in 1998 for
the 1996 killing of human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi in Kashmir.
Singh and 11 countermilitants were charged with Andrabi's killing and
10 other unlawful killings. Criminal charges and a court martial still
were pending against Singh at year's end. Human rights workers alleged
that the central government and the Jammu and Kashmir state government
both attempted to subvert the judicial process by withholding evidence
in the case. There were no developments in the 1996 killing of human
rights monitor Parag Kumar Das, who allegedly was killed by a militant
who previously had surrendered and was supported by the Government.
Police frequently used excessive force indiscriminately against
demonstrators, killing citizens (see Section 2.b.).
In July the Supreme Court ordered regular checks on police stations
to ascertain the incidence of custodial violence against persons. The
Court directed state human rights commissions and other civic rights
protection committees to conduct surprise checks. These checks were
conducted in a small number of police stations in the States of Madhya
Pradesh and West Bengal.
Deaths in custody were common both for suspected militants and
other criminals. According to the NHRC, there were 1,305 reported
deaths in custody nationwide during 2001, the latest year for which
data were available. Many died from natural causes aggravated by poor
prison conditions (see Section 1.c.).
For example, in April Karna Chetri was found dead in the Sardar
Police Station in Assam following a reported scuffle and a bullet
injury. In May several police officers reportedly beat to death a
retired police officer at the Gauripur police station in Guwahati,
Assam. The retired police office had entered the station to seek the
release of his son who had been arrested for reckless driving. The son
was also tortured by the police, but no one was held accountable. In
May police detained and beat to death Amit Arora at the police station
in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Arora reportedly had planned to expose a corrupt
police unit in Jaipur. Citizens protested local police after police
denied the death. The police ordered an inquiry into the death, filed
charges against some of police responsible, and transferred 37 police
officers to another station by year's end. In August the police
detained a member of the CPI (ML) in Janashakti under suspicion of
Naxalite activities. When he was taken to the hospital one day later,
doctors declared that he had died in custody. After an investigation by
the police, the Andhra Pradesh Home Minister Goud ordered the
installation of video cameras in jails; however, by year's end the
order had not been implemented.
The NHRC focused on torture and deaths in custody by directing
district magistrates to report all deaths in police and judicial
custody to the commission and stating that failure to do so would be
interpreted as an attempted coverup. Magistrates appeared to be
complying with this directive, although states varied in their
adherence to NHRC directives on custodial deaths. However, security
forces were not required to report custodial deaths in Jammu and
Kashmir or the northeastern states to the NHRC and did not do so. The
final Criminal Investigation Department report of Uttar Pradesh
concluded that the cause of Ram Kishore's 1993 death was natural, due
to heart problems. There reportedly was no action taken or formal
investigation into the July 2001 death of the Masood in Jammu and
Kashmir. In addition, there was no report from the Home Ministry and
Defense Ministry regarding media reports of custodial deaths, which the
NHRC requested in 2001.
During the year, some state governments took some measures
regarding custodial deaths. Following NHRC guidelines, in 2001 the
state government of Maharashtra mandated automatic post-mortem
examinations and inquiries by a magistrate following all cases of
custodial deaths. The district jail in Pune, the state's second largest
city, became the first in the country to adopt video-conferencing to
help magistrates determine the health and well-being of persons in
judicial custody (see Section 1.c.).
In Bihar the NHRC recorded 144 custodial deaths in its 2001-2002
reporting period. According to the NHRC, the Bihar government had not
been responsive to NHRC directives and reports addressing police
training and accountability. However, the Bihar Inspector General of
Prisons reportedly stated that of the 144 cases, only 15 were
``unnatural deaths.'' Human rights sources claimed that the number was
higher. The NHRC Chairperson stated that Bihar had the second highest
number of human rights violations in the country, and it had not yet
formed a State Human Rights Commission.
Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by
progovernment countermilitants continued to be a significant problem in
Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants were members of police auxiliary
units consisting of former separatists who surrendered to government
forces, but who retained their weapons and paramilitary organization.
Government agencies funded, exchanged intelligence with, and directed
the operations of countermilitants as part of the counterinsurgency
effort. The Government also recruited countermilitants into the Special
Operations Group of the Jammu and Kashmir police and into the Border
Security Force. Countermilitants were known to search persons at
roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) and guard large areas of the Kashmir
Valley from attacks by militants. The Government, through its
sponsoring and condoning of extrajudicial countermilitant activities,
was responsible for killings, abductions, and other abuses committed by
these militant groups. According to a 2000 estimate, as many as 3,000
countermilitants continued to operate in Jammu and Kashmir,
particularly in the countryside, outside major towns.
Insurgency and ethnic violence was a problem in the seven
northeastern states. The main insurgent groups in the northeast
included two factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN) in Nagaland; Meitei extremists in Manipur; the ULFA and the Bodo
security forces in Assam; and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and
the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in Tripura. The
proclaimed objective of many of these groups was to secede from the
country. Their stated grievances against the Government ranged from
charges of neglect and indifference to the widespread poverty of the
region to allegations of active discrimination against the tribal and
nontribal people of the region by the central government (see Section
5). The oldest of these conflicts, involving the Nagas, dates back to
the country's independence in 1947. During the year, talks continued
between various insurgent groups and central and state government
officials. In July the Government and the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland-Isaac and Muivah (NSCN-IM) announced the extension of the
unilateral August 2001 cease-fire, which was extended until August
2003. The talks between the Government and the NSCN-IM continued when
representatives of the two met in Malaysia. Subsequently, the talks
also led to the withdrawal of arrest warrants against NSCN-IM leaders
by the Nagaland Chief Minister. Unlike in previous years, the
Government's extended cease-fire was not resisted in Manipur, Assam,
and Arunachal Pradesh, and there were no reports of protests as a
result of the continued cease-fire.
Surrenders by militants in the northeast, often under government
incentive programs, were common in recent years. Surrendered militants
usually were given a resettlement and retraining allowance and other
assistance. In Andhra Pradesh, the state government offered a financial
package to surrendered PWG militants, a program that prompted hundreds
of Naxalites to leave the movement in recent years. According to human
rights activists and journalists, a few surrendered militants were
allowed to retain their weapons and were working for the police as
anti-PWG officers, residing in police camps and barracks. Human rights
groups alleged that police used former militants to kill Naxalites and
human rights activists with close links to the PWG, although police
attributed such killings to internal feuds within the PWG. Several
hundred PWG militants surrendered during the year.
In Tripura a systematic surrender of arms by a faction of NLFT
insurgents and NLFT fringe groups was due to the increased security
pressure and to infighting within NLFT insurgent ranks. Since 2000 a
few hundred militants surrendered in small groups to the security
forces, handing in their weapons.
The killings of ULFA leaders' family members during the year
renewed concerns about the situation in Assam. On January 4,
unidentified assailants shot and killed three relatives of two ULFA
militants, including two relatives of ULFA deputy commander in chief
Raju Baruah. In addition, ULFA militants killed Avinash Bordoloi and
two other surrendered ULFAs in Nalbari district. On June 25, five
tribal militants were killed and several were injured during a series
of encounters between NLFT and ATTF at Takarjala in Tripura. More than
87,000 persons lived under poor conditions in relief camps in Assam's
Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts as a result of the
ongoing violence between Bodos and Santhals (see Section 2.d.).
Militant groups in Manipur, Tripura, and Assam continued to attack
civilians. For example, in April four tribals were killed after they
had been abducted by NLFT militants in West Bengal's Takajala area. In
June two Gorkha Rifles personnel were killed, and five others were
injured by NSCN (IM) militants. In August NLFT killed four CPM
activists in Kanchanpur, Tripura. On October 27, NDFB militants killed
22 villagers in Datgiri in Assam's Kokerahjar district.
In Assam 97 civilians, 206 militants, and 25 security force
personnel were killed in clashes with militants during 2001.
In Manipur 25 civilians, 72 militants, and 34 security force
personnel were killed in clashes with militants during the year. The
Manipur government declared a month-long ceasefire with militants in
March 2001, but numerous persons were killed in counterinsurgency
incidents after the ceasefire went into effect. In Manipur 18 militant
groups reportedly were active, including outlawed Meitei organizations.
In Tripura separatist-related violence continued and resulted in
the deaths of 73 civilians, 28 militants, and 30 security force
personnel.
In Nagaland 2 civilians, 13 militants, and 2 security force
personnel were killed in clashes with militants during the year.
Throughout the year, talks continued between various Naga separatists
and central and state government officials. In November the Government
decided now to renew a ban on the Naga group, NSCN-IM, in anticipation
of talks with the NSCN-IM. The Government's continued negotiations with
Naga separatists over a cease-fire caused significant unrest in
Nagaland and in neighboring states.
In the north-central states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, and West
Bengal, clashes between police officers and PWG continued. For
instance, in January PWG members detonated a bomb in Gumla district,
which killed 11 persons, including 9 policemen. On November 19, PWG
members detonated a bomb on a bus in Andhra Pradesh, which killed 14
persons. On December 26, PWG members attacked a village and killed
seven persons, including women and children. The police sometimes
responded with violence; for example, in January 2001, an activist of
the Communist Party of India Liberation Front was killed and five
others injured police fired on a procession of the Naxalite party in
Gaya district of Bihar (see Section 2.b.). According to police, 82
Naxalites were killed in armed encounters during the year. Twenty years
of guerrilla-style conflict between state authorities and Naxalites led
to serious human rights abuses committed by both sides.
Killings of security force members by militants in Jammu and
Kashmir increased for the fourth year in a row. According to official
statistics, 181 security force personnel were killed in the state
during the year.
During the year, militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir targeted
civilians, members of the security forces, and politicians. According
to the Minister of State for Home, militants had killed 907 civilians
as of November 15, compared with 996 in 2001. For example, in two
separate attacks in May and November, terrorists entered Hindu
Raghunath Temple and killed 25 persons. On May 15, 30 persons were
killed and 48 injured by militants in Kaluchak when gunmen opened fire
on a bus and stormed an army camp. In May militants killed moderate
Kashmiri separatist leader Abdul Gani Lone at a political meeting in
Srinagar. The militant group Al-Badr claimed responsibility for the
Abdul Gani killing. In June three policemen were killed and several
injured by militants in Srinagar. On July 14, militants killed 28
persons in Rajiv Nagar slum area in Jammu. In August 9 Hindu pilgrims
were killed and 30 injured by militants in Pahalgam during the annual
Amarnath Yatra (see Section 2.c.). In November six members of the
India's Central Reserve Police Force were killed and nine injured by
two militants in a suicide attack on a police camp in Kashmir. On
December 20, Abdul Aziz Mir, a People's Democratic Party member of the
state assembly, was killed by militants while returning home from
Friday prayers. The militant group Save Kashmir Movement claimed
responsibility for the Abdul Aziz Mir killing.
There reportedly was no action taken against the responsible
militants in the following cases: The January 2001 killing of two
civilians on the Kashmir airport; the January 2001 grenade attack on
Farooq Abdullah in Srinagar; the November 2001 killing of four soldiers
by LET terrorists in Anantnag District; the August 2000 killing of six
Hindu villagers in Jammu. However, in the December 2000 killing of a
soldier and two civilians at Delhi's Red Fort, a trial was ongoing and
has resulted in one conviction to date.
Nearly 800 persons were killed and 500 civilians were injured in
violence related to the October Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly
polls (see Sections 1.g. and 4).
Religious and ethnically motivated violence caused numerous deaths,
and there were reports that government agents encouraged this behavior
(see Section 5).
Mob lynchings of tribal people occurred in many states (see Section
5).
b. Disappearance.--According to human rights groups,
unacknowledged, incommunicado detention of suspected militants
continued in Jammu and Kashmir. In October 2001, the Government of
Jammu and Kashmir stated that during the last 6 years, 2,250 persons
were reported missing. The state government claimed that most of those
who disappeared were young men who crossed into Pakistan-controlled
Kashmir for training in terrorist camps.
According to the Kashmir Times, 152 militants were arrested between
January and November. In comparison, according to the Ministry of Home
Affairs, 645 suspected militants were arrested in 2000. Human rights
organizations alleged that the decline in the number of militants
arrested was consistent with reports that security forces were killing
many militants captured in encounters (see Section 1.a.); that pattern
continued during the year. According to an AI report released in 2000,
there have been between 700 and 800 unsolved disappearances in Kashmir
since 1990. In the northeastern states, the Government was unable to
provide complete statistics for the number of persons held under
special security laws, but acknowledged that 43 persons were in
detention under the National Security Act as of 1998. Although the
Government allowed the Terrorist and Disruptive Practices (Prevention)
Act (TADA) to lapse in 1995, one human right organization credibly
reported that more than 1,000 persons remained in detention awaiting
prosecution under the law. Several thousand others are held in short-
term (1-day to 6 months' duration) confinement in transit and
interrogation centers.
In June in Rawalapora numerous persons gathered to protest the
alleged custodial disappearance of Manzoor Ahmad Dar. Dar allegedly was
detained by Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Jammu and Kashmir
police. Later in the year, the police admitted involvement; however,
they denied any claim that the disappearance was the work of the
security forces.
There were no developments in the case of Chundrakpam Ongabi
Sumila's husband, who was abducted in May 2001 by suspected Assam
Rifles. In addition, there were no developments in the February 2000
disappearance of M. Akbar Tantray.
Human rights groups maintained that in Jammu and Kashmir and in the
northeastern states several hundred persons were held by the military
and paramilitary forces in long term unacknowledged detention in
interrogation centers and transit camps that nominally were intended
only for short term confinement. Human rights groups feared that many
of these unacknowledged prisoners were subjected to torture and
extrajudicial killing (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In August 2000, AI
reported that the disappearances of up to 1,000 persons reported
missing in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990 remained unexplained by
authorities.
The Government maintained that screening committees administered by
the state governments provided information about detainees to their
families. However, other sources indicated that families were able to
confirm the detention of their relatives only by bribing prison guards.
In November the state government of Jammu and Kashmir responded to this
problem by installing a screening system to review old detention cases
and released numerous detainees (see Section 1.d.).
In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early
1990s appeared to have ended. Hundreds of police and security officials
were not held accountable for serious human rights abuses committed
there during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. The Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) claimed to be pursuing actively charges against
dozens of police officials implicated in the ``mass cremations'' in
which police in Amritsar, Patti, and Tarn Taran district secretly
disposed of approximately 2,000 bodies of suspected militants. The
militants were believed to have been abducted, extrajudicially
executed, and cremated without the knowledge or consent of their
families. During the year, the NHRC examined the cases of 585 fully
identified bodies to ascertain whether police officers had been
responsible for the deaths or for any human rights violation; however,
the Government continued to challenge the NHRC's jurisdiction in the
cases. By year's end, no significant progress was made in identifying
the cremated bodies or bringing to justice those responsible for the
killings. These numbers demonstrated the extent of the violence during
those years and, given the pattern of police abuses prevalent during
the period, credibly included many persons killed in extrajudicial
executions. In 1998 former Justice Singh announced that the Committee
for the Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab (CCDP) would form a
three-member commission to investigate the mass cremations. The
Commission met with inaction on the part of the authorities and made
little progress during the year (see Section 4).
AI expressed concern that Punjab police officials continued to
obstruct the judicial inquiry into the death of human rights monitor
Jaswant Singh Khalra. During the year, the case was scheduled for
recording evidence in a Session court; however, by the time evidence
started to be recorded in November, a key witness denied having been
witness to Khalra's disappearance into police custody. Before his
death, Khalra was investigating the cremation of unidentified bodies by
Tarn Taran police. These and other events prompted extended public
debate over the accountability of Punjab police for abuses committed
while suppressing a violent insurgency. According to human rights
monitors in Punjab, approximately 100 police officials either faced
charges, were prosecuted, or were under investigation for human rights
abuses at year's end.
There were credible reports that police throughout the country
often did not file required arrest reports. As a result, there were
hundreds of unsolved disappearances in which relatives claimed that an
individual was taken into police custody and never heard from again.
Police usually denied these claims, countering that there were no
records of arrest. There were no developments in the 2001 cases of the
four persons arrested without an arrest memo and held by Border
Security Force (BSF) officers in Churachandpur district.
In Manipur 14-year-old Yumlembam Sanamacha has been missing ever
since soldiers arrested him in 1998. During the year, there was a
judicial review into the Sanamacha case, and the family was awarded
compensation from the state government of $6,250 (RS 300,000); however,
by year's end, the award had not been given to the family.
Militants in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states
continued to use kidnapings to terrorize the population, seek the
release of detained comrades, and extort funds. Sometimes kidnaped
persons later were killed (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). There were 211
reported kidnapings in the northeastern states during the year. For
example, on September 1, suspected NLFT militants abducted an 8-year-
old boy from a village in Dhalai district, Tripura. On December 19,
NLFT militants abducted three sons of a local level leader in the same
district.
During the year, there were no developments in the following 2001
cases of kidnapings by militants: The January kidnaping of a CPM worker
from Dhalai district; the July kidnaping of Parthapratim Roy Burman;
the August kidnaping of Sambhu Nath and Ram Avtar Chakravarty in south
Assam; the August kidnaping of six persons from Rangrung tea estate in
North Tripura; the August kidnaping of seven Hindu youths in the
Rajouri district of the Kashmir valley in Jammu and Kashmir; and the
August kidnaping of a group of Hindu shepherds in Doda district.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and confessions extracted by
force generally are inadmissible in court; however, authorities often
used torture during interrogations. In other instances, authorities
tortured detainees to extort money and sometimes as summary punishment.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that the security
forces systematically tortured persons in Jammu and Kashmir to coerce
confessions to militant activity, to reveal information about suspected
militants, or to inflict punishment for suspected support or sympathy
with militants. Information was not made public regarding any instances
of action taken against security force personnel in Jammu and Kashmir
for acts of torture.
In June members of the security forces tortured and killed the
brother of an alleged terrorist from Kupwara. Police alleged the victim
died in a skirmish while he was leading them to a terrorist hideout.
There were no reports of an investigations by year's end. There were no
developments in the following 2001 cases: The February torture of a man
from Surankot; the torture of Gulzar Ahmad Ganie; or the death of
students Shiraz Ahmad Khan and Syed Malik.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture noted that methods of
torture included beating, rape, crushing the leg muscles with a wooden
roller, burning with heated objects, and electric shocks. Because many
alleged torture victims died in custody, and others were afraid to
speak out, there were few firsthand accounts, although marks of torture
often were found on the bodies of deceased detainees. Unlike in the
previous year, the Home Ministry did not extend an invitation to the
U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings or
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial killings.
The prevalence of torture by police in detention facilities
throughout the country was reflected in the number of cases of deaths
in police custody (see Section 1.a.). New Delhi's Tihar jail was
notorious for the mistreatment of prisoners, with approximately 10
percent of custodial deaths occurring there. Police and jailers
typically assaulted new prisoners for money and personal articles. In
addition, police commonly tortured detainees during custodial
interrogation. Although police officers were subject to prosecution for
such offenses under the Penal Code, the Government often failed to hold
them accountable. According to AI, torture usually takes place under
two contexts: In the course of regular criminal investigations and
following unlawful and arbitrary arrests. For example, during criminal
investigation police frequently resorted to torture to extract
information from suspects while in custody, and legislation was
reported to be misused during which torture frequently took place.
There were no developments in the 2001 case of the torture of prisoner
Yunus Fakir Mohammad Shaikh.
Police also tortured other citizens. In November a 37-year-old man
was arrested by the police in Chennai on charges of belonging to an
extremist political organization. According to a local NGO, he was kept
in custody for 4 days and tortured. At year's end, charges had not been
filed. In April 2001 a 14-year-old girl allegedly was abducted,
tortured with electric shocks, and raped for 6 days by the Patiala
police (see Sections 1.g. and 5). At year's end, no police officer had
been charged.
There also were incidents in which police beat journalists (see
Section 2.a.), demonstrators (see Section 2.b.), and Muslim students
(see Section 2.c.). Police also committed abuses against tribal people
(see Section 5).
The rape of persons in custody was part of the broader pattern of
custodial abuse. NGOs asserted that rape by police, including custodial
rape, was more common than NHRC figures indicated. Although evidence
was lacking, a higher incidence of abuse appeared credible, given other
evidence of abusive behavior by police and the likelihood that many
rapes were unreported due to a sense of shame and a fear of retribution
among victims. However, limits placed on the arrest, search, and police
custody of women appeared effectively to limit the frequency of rape in
custody. In January a tribal woman alleged that she was raped by the
head constable in Vaniyyambadi Police Station in Tamil Nadu after being
arrested on theft charges.
There reportedly was no action taken against members of the
security forces responsible for the following 2001 cases of rape of
persons in custody: The October rape of a tribal woman and the rape of
Mary Lushai in Dhalai, Tripura. At year's end, the Government had not
disciplined or charged the police officers involved in the September
2000 rape of a 16-year-old girl arrested on suspicion of petty theft,
despite repeated requests from the court. There were no developments in
the July 2000 case of the rape of a tribal housewife in Lamdam village,
Manipur by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. The CRPF
alleged that the rape was committed in retaliation for an attack
carried out on a CRPF patrol by People's Liberation Army militants the
previous day (see Section 1.g.).
In April a 17-year-old girl alleged three BSF force personnel in
Pahalgam raped her. She stated that the BSF forces forced their way
into her home and raped her at gunpoint. In April the state ordered an
inquiry into the rape.
There was a pattern of rape by paramilitary personnel in Jammu and
Kashmir and the northeast as a means of instilling fear among
noncombatants in insurgency-affected areas (see Section 1.g.), but it
was not included in NHRC statistics because it involved the military
forces. According to an NGO in Kashmir, there were 200 rapes by
paramilitary personnel in 2000. Another NGO reported 10 cases of rape
during the year.
The NHRC had not released the statistics of its actions against
police during the year.
Some militant groups in the northeast used rape as a tactic to
terrorize the populace; however, no cases were known to be reported
during the year.
According to press reports, prison officials used prisoners as
domestic servants and sold female prisoners to brothels (see Sections
5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
In Jammu and Kashmir, torture victims or their relatives reportedly
had difficulty in filing complaints because local police were issued
instructions not to open a case without permission from higher
authorities. In addition, the (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act
provides that unless approval is obtained from the central government,
no ``prosecution, suit, or other legal proceeding shall be instituted .
. . against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be
done in exercise of the powers of the act.'' This provision allowed the
security forces to act with virtual impunity.
The Government occasionally used excessive force in putting down
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). For example, AI reported that on
July 20 police officers beat villagers who resisted police efforts to
forcibly evict the villagers from their homes in Madhya Pradesh. AI
recounted that approximately 400 police officers reportedly entered
Khedi Balwadi and started pulling and dragging persons into vans. If
persons tried to resist this police action, they were beaten severely.
The villagers were taken to a resettlement site.
The Government also occasionally used excessive force against
tribal people. For example, in October police shot at three tribal
persons in Orissa. In response to this incident, the Chief Minister
suspended the District Superintendent of Police and the Additional
District Magistrate. In addition, a three-member ministerial committee
was ordered to inquire into the incident. There reportedly were no
developments in the investigation of the April 2001 killing of 5 tribal
persons in Madhya Pradesh or the March 2001 shooting of a Naxalite in
Maraknar.
Police corruption undermined efforts to combat trafficking in women
and children (see Section 6.f.).
Religiously motivated violence led to a number of deaths and
injuries as well as damage to property (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and
5).
Prison conditions were very poor. Prisons were severely
overcrowded, and the provision of food and medical care frequently was
inadequate.
After a March 30 revolt by inmates in Bihar, the NHRC visited the
Chhapra jail to study the circumstances that led to the revolt and
subsequently to the Government entering the prison. During and after
the Government intervention, six inmates were killed. The result of the
study was a NHRC report critical of the jail authorities for continued
poor prison conditions.
In April hundreds of prisoners at the Divisional Jail in Bihar went
on hunger strike to protest the assault on two of their colleagues by
prison staff. The Government held talks with the prisoners. The
prisoners demanded action against the officials involved in the
assault.
Overcrowding in prisons was common. For example, the Divisional
Jail in Bihar had a planned capacity of 212 prisoners but held 750
inmates. Prisons operated above capacity because more than 60 percent
of the prison population were persons awaiting hearings (see Section
1.d.). In Kashmir persons awaiting hearings made up 90 percent of
prison population and in Bihar 80 percent. For example, New Delhi's
Tihar jail, with a designed capacity of 3,300 persons, housed 9,000
prisoners. The Chennai Central Prison in Tamil Nadu, designed to hold
1,419 persons, housed more than 3,121 inmates. According to the SAHRDC,
in the poorest states, such as Bihar, where 265 police stations had no
lockup facilities, the lack of prisons led police to shackle prisoners
to trees. The Prison Act remained unamended at year's end.
The 1,140 deaths in judicial custody reported to the NHRC during
the year included a large proportion of deaths from natural causes that
in some cases were aggravated by poor prison conditions (see Section
1.a.). A study conducted by the NHRC found that tuberculosis was the
cause of death in most deaths in judicial custody. Deaths in police
custody, which typically occurred within hours or days of initial
detention, more clearly implied violent abuse and torture. However, in
January 2001, the NHRC requested that the Commission be informed of any
custodial death within 2 months and that a post-mortem report,
magisterial inquest, and a video of the post-mortem be provided to the
NHRC.
NGOs were allowed to work in prisons, within specific governmental
guidelines. In Kerala and Karnataka, the state governments selectively
cleared NGOs to visit prisons. Although custodial abuse is deeply
rooted in police practices, increased press reporting and parliamentary
questioning provided evidence of growing public awareness of the
problem. The NHRC identified torture and deaths in detention as one of
its priority concerns.
In September two transgender persons alleged that the Bandra
railway police stripped them, locked them with alleged criminals, and
encouraged the criminals to molest them. They reportedly were arrested
for traveling without a train ticket, which normally merits a cash
fine.
In prison, women were housed separately from men in similar
conditions. By law juveniles must be detained in rehabilitative
facilities; however, at times they were detained in prison, especially
in rural areas. Pretrial detainees were not separated from the general
prison population.
With the exception of an agreement with the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) for visits to detention facilities in Jammu and
Kashmir, the Government did not allow NGOs to monitor prison conditions
in those regions (see Section 4). However, 15 states and union
territories have authorized the NHRC to conduct surprise check-ups on
jails. The NHRC's ``Special Rapporteur and Chief Coordinator of
Custodial Justice'' helped implement its directive to state prison
authorities to ensure that medical check-ups were performed on all
inmates.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government
implemented a variety of special security laws intended to help law
enforcement authorities fight separatist insurgencies, and there were
credible reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and detention under
these laws during the year.
According to AI, the authorities continued to use the TADA,
although it lapsed in 1995, to detain persons in Jammu and Kashmir.
Human rights sources estimated that approximately 1,000 persons
remained in custody under TADA or related charges at year's end. A
small number of arrests under the TADA continued for crimes allegedly
committed before the law lapsed. In November the Jammu and Kashmir
governments established a committee to review detainees' cases;
however, the committee had not met at year's end. TADA courts used
abridged procedures. For example, defense counsel was not permitted to
see witnesses for the prosecution, who were kept behind screens while
testifying in court. Also, confessions extracted under duress were
admissible as evidence. The special task force established by the state
police forces of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to capture a bandit hiding in
forests in the border area between the 2 states had arrested some 121
persons under the TADA prior to the law's lapse; 51 of these persons
still were in custody at year's end.
In March the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) was enacted
into law and changed to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). The
POTA allows detention without charge for 3 months, deems not disclosing
information to the authorities about terrorist activities an offense,
and provides extensive new powers to ban organizations and seize their
assets. This ordinance is similar to the TADA in that it permits
detention for 30 days without trial, summary trials, and the use of
testimony exacted under duress. In addition, the bill provides for
special courts to try offenses, place the burden of proof at the bail
stage on the accused, make confessions to a police officer of the rank
of superintendent of police admissible as evidence, extend the period
of remand from 15 to 60 days, and set mandatory sentences for
terrorism-related offenses. Since the POTO and POTA were enacted, the
Jammu and Kashmir police have arrested approximately 426 people, 50
percent of whom were charged with sheltering terrorists. In March Yasin
Malik, Hurriyat leader and the Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front, was arrested under POTA. He was released on bail in
June; however, he was re-arrested the same day under the Jammu and
Kashmir Public Safely Act (PSA), which does not require a charge. In
November he was released again; however, he still faced charges under
the POTA. In July in Madhya Pradesh, police invoked POTA against the
Naxalites PWG.
In addition, the POTA was used to arrest members of various
organizations and opposition political parties on charges of publicly
expressing support of the banned LTTE terrorist group. For example, on
July 11, police arrested Marumalachi Dravida Munnetra Kazahagam leader
Vaiko for speaking in support of the LTTE at a public meeting. On
August 1, Tamil Nationalist Movement leader Pazha Nedumaran was
arrested for convening a conference in support of the LTTE in Chennai.
In August police arrested P. Nedumaran under POTA for being a supporter
of the Tamil terrorist group. At year's end, 15 persons had been
arrested under the POTA.
In December a special court in New Delhi issued the first
conviction under the POTA and ruled that four accomplices of the
militants who attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001 were
guilty (see Section 1.g.). Three of the defendants were sentenced to
death and the fourth was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined
$200 (RS 10,000).
Preventive detention laws in the event of threats to public order
and national security exist. An individual may be detained--without
charge or trial--for up to 3 months, and detainees were denied their
rights or compensation for unlawful arrest or detention. In addition to
providing for limits on the length of detention, the preventive
detention laws provide for judicial review. Several laws of this type
remain in effect.
The National Security Act (NSA) permits the detention of persons
considered to be security risks; police anywhere in the country (except
for Jammu and Kashmir) may detain suspects under NSA provisions. Under
these provisions, the authorities may detain a suspect without charge
or trial for as long as 1 year on loosely defined security grounds. The
NSA does not define ``security risk.'' The state government must
confirm the detention order, which is reviewed by an advisory board of
three High Court judges within 7 weeks of the arrest. NSA detainees are
permitted visits by family members and lawyers, and must be informed of
the grounds for their detention within 5 days (10 to 15 days in
exceptional circumstances). The Government was not able to provide
figures on how many persons were detained nationwide under the NSA, but
in 1997 there were 1,163 such persons. According to press accounts
during the year, there were no cases of persons detained under NSA in
the northeast. Human rights groups alleged that preventive detention
may be ordered and extended under the act purely on the opinion of the
detaining authority and after advisory board review. No court may
overturn such a decision.
The PSA covers corresponding procedures for that state. More than
half of the detainees in Jammu and Kashmir were held under the PSA.
Under these provisions, the authorities may detain a suspect for
detention without charge and without judicial review for up to 2 years;
suspects do not have access to family members or legal council. For
example, in June Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a senior Hurriyat leader, and
his two sons-in-law were detained under the PSA and the Officials
Secrets Act (see Section 2.a.). The Government charged Geelani with
money laundering and possession of armed forces documents and charged
his sons-in-law with possession of classified materials. At year's end,
Geelani and one son-in-law remained in jail in Ranchi, Jharkand. The
second son-in-law was released in November.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act (AFSPA). In a representation made to the NHRC, the
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center (SAHRDC) asserted that the
act's powers were ``too vast and sweeping and posed a grave threat to
the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizenry of the
(disturbed) areas covered by the act.'' The SAHRDC also asserted that
the powers granted to authorities to declare any area to be a
``disturbed area,'' and thus subject to the other provisions of the
act, were too broad. Moreover, the SAHRDC noted that the act empowered
any commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or
any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces to fire upon
and otherwise use force, even to the point of death, if he believed
that it was necessary for the maintenance of law and order. Further,
the act states that ``no prosecution, suit, or other legal proceedings
shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the central
government against any person in respect of anything done or purported
to be done in exercise of powers'' conferred by the act. The SAHRDC
believed that many custodial deaths and extrajudicial killings had been
committed as a result of the power granted to the armed forces under
AFSPA.
In June 2001, the police placed 23,000 opposition party leaders and
workers, mostly from the DMK party, into preventive detention for 4
days in Tamil Nadu. Police organized the arrests to forestall civil
disorder after the arrest of former DMK Chief Minister Karunanidhi on
criminal conspiracy charges. Opposition leaders and human rights
activists alleged that the roundup was unprecedented in scale and was
intended to intimidate the opposition. The arrests led to the
overcrowding of already congested jails. In July 2001, the NHRC asked
the Tamil Nadu state government to justify the arrests and explain
apparent human rights violations. According to the NGO People's Watch,
the state government responded to the inquiry by questioning the
validity of the NHRC, and by year's end, the matter had been referred
to the Supreme Court.
In 2001 in Madurai Central prison, 3,008 opposition figures joined
1,900 inmates in a facility designed for only 1,200 persons. Some of
the opposition leaders taken into preventive detention were released
after 4 to 5 days with no charges filed against them.
Human rights groups alleged that between June and August, police
detained 30 members of teachers' unions and other activist groups in
Warangel and Mahboobnagar on suspicion of PWG membership. Police
allegedly tortured some of the detainees and the teachers reportedly
were ordered to resign from their jobs.
The Constitution provides that detainees have the right to be
informed of the grounds for their arrest, to be represented by counsel,
and, unless held under a preventive detention law, to appear before a
magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. At this initial appearance, the
accused either must be remanded for further investigation or released.
The Supreme Court has upheld these provisions. The accused must be
informed of the right to bail at the time of arrest and may, unless
held on a nonbailable offense, apply for bail at any time. The police
must file charges within 60 to 90 days of arrest; if they fail to do
so, court approval of a bail application becomes mandatory.
A program of prison visits by the ICRC was designed in part to help
assure communications between detainees and their families. During the
year, the ICRC visited hundreds of detainees in approximately 20 places
of detention, including all acknowledged detention centers in Jammu and
Kashmir, and also visited Kashmiri detainees elsewhere in the country.
However, the ICRC was not authorized to visit interrogation centers or
transit centers, nor did it have access to regular detention centers in
the northeastern states (see Sections 1.c. and 4). During the year, the
ICRC stated that it encountered increasing difficulties in maintaining
systematic access to people detained in connection with the situation
in Jammu and Kashmir.
The court system was extremely overloaded, resulting in the
detention of thousands of persons awaiting trial for periods longer
than they would receive if convicted. Prisoners were held for months or
even years before obtaining a trial date. According to a report by the
Home Affairs, there were 24 million cases pending during the year, and
some cases had been pending since 1950. In July the Law Minister told
Parliament that more than 500,000 cases were pending for more than one
decade. In 1999 the chairman of the NHRC stated that 60 percent of all
police arrests were ``unnecessary and unjustifiable'' and that the
incarceration of those wrongly arrested accounted for 43 percent of the
total annual expenditure on prisons. The commission found that 90
percent of the 780 inmates that it studied were unconvicted prisoners
awaiting completion of trial.
In March 2001, the NHRC reported that it had directed the West
Bengal government to pay $1,044 (RS 50,000) in compensation to the
court guardian of a 12-year-old girl who was in the custody of the West
Bengal police for nearly a decade because she was the sole witness to
her parents' murder. The case against then-Bihar Minister of State for
Cooperatives Lalit Yadav, his cousin, and four others still was pending
at year's end for the alleged illegal detention and torture of a truck
driver and cleaner at the minister's residence.
In 2000 the Government announced that it was allocating $108.15
million (RS 5.03 billion) to state governments for the creation of
1,734 additional courts during 2000-2005 to hear more cases and reduce
the number of remand prisoners. At year's end, 706 of these courts had
been set up.
There were political detainees reported during the year.
The Government did not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice; however, serious problems remained. The
judiciary was backlogged and understaffed in most parts of the country,
and in Jammu and Kashmir, the judiciary barely functioned due to
threats by militants and to frequent refusal by security forces to obey
court orders.
Courts of first resort exist at the subdistrict and district
levels. More serious cases and appeals are heard in state-level high
courts and by the national-level Supreme Court, which also rules on
constitutional questions. State governments appoint subdistrict and
district judicial magistrates. High court judges are appointed on the
recommendation of the federal Law Ministry, with the advice of the
Supreme Court, the High Court Chief Justice, and the chief minister of
the State, usually from among district judges or lawyers practicing
before the same courts. Supreme Court judges are appointed similarly
from among High Court judges. The Chief Justice is selected on the
basis of seniority. Under a Supreme Court ruling, the Chief Justice, in
consultation with his colleagues, has a decisive voice in selecting
judicial candidates. The President appoints judges, and they may serve
up to the age of 62 on the state high courts and up to the age of 65 on
the Supreme Court.
When legal procedures functioned normally, they generally assured a
fair trial, but the process often was drawn out and inaccessible to
poor persons. The Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial in
most cases, but it allows exceptions in proceedings involving official
secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the safety of the
State might be made, or under provisions of special security
legislation. Sentences must be announced in public. Defendants have the
right to choose counsel from attorneys who are fully independent of the
Government. There were effective channels for appeal at most levels of
the judicial system, and the State provides free legal counsel to the
indigent. Defendants are allowed to question witnesses against them,
present their own witnesses and evidence, and have access to government
evidence held against them.
Muslim personal status law governs many noncriminal matters
involving Muslims, including family law, inheritance, and divorce. The
Government does not interfere in the personal status laws of the
minority communities, and as a result personal status laws that
discriminate against women are upheld.
In Jammu and Kashmir, the judicial system barely functioned due to
threats by militants against judges, witnesses, and their family
members; because of judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed
antimilitant actions; and because of the frequent refusal by security
forces to obey court orders. Courts in Jammu and Kashmir were reluctant
to hear cases involving terrorist crimes and failed to act
expeditiously on habeas corpus cases, if they acted at all. There were
a few convictions of alleged terrorists in the Jammu High Court during
the year; many more accused militants had been in pretrial detention
for years.
Criminal gangs in all four southern states were known to attack
rivals and scare off complainants and witnesses from court premises,
denying free access to justice. In some cases, accused persons were
attacked while being escorted by police to the courts.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary
was not invited to visit the country during the year.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The police must obtain warrants for searches and
seizures. In a criminal investigation, the police may conduct searches
without warrants to avoid undue delay, but they must justify the
searches in writing to the nearest magistrate with jurisdiction over
the offense. The authorities in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam
have special powers to search and arrest without a warrant.
The Government Enforcement Directorate (ED), which was mandated to
investigate foreign exchange and currency violations, searched,
interrogated, and arrested thousands of business and management
professionals annually, often without search warrants. However, the ED
ultimately convicted very few persons. According to official figures,
in 1999, the latest year for which figures are available, there were
387 searches or raids by the ED, resulting in 107 prosecutions and 29
convictions.
The Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of communications,
including monitoring telephone conversations and intercepting personal
mail, in case of public emergency or ``in the interest of the public
safety or tranquillity.'' Every state government has used these powers,
as has the central government.
The Information Technology Act includes provisions that grant the
police powers to search premises and arrest individuals without a
warrant. Under the Act, the maximum sentences for failing to provide
information to the Government on request and transmitting
``lascivious'' material were 1 year and 5 years respectively. The Act
also requires Internet cafes to monitor Internet use and inform the
authorities (see Section 2.a.). At year's end, one person had been
arrested under the Act, but he was released after some confusion about
the nature of the alleged offense. NGOs criticized the Act, stating
that its provisions were Draconian.
The Government did not restrict citizens' personal appearance;
however, in Kashmir and Manipur dress codes were announced. The Kanglei
Yawon Kanna Lup in Manipur announced a dress code for the state's women
that bans the wearing of saris, salwar kameez, and trousers. The group
threatened to punish with death women who violated the code, and it
urged women to wear the traditional Phanek and Chador on all occasions
but allowed girls to wear salwars as school uniforms. In Kashmir the
militant group Lashkar-e-Jabbar ordered Muslim women to dress in
burqas, Hindu women to wear bindis, and Sikh women to wear identifying
saffron headscarves (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Government forces committed numerous serious
violations of humanitarian law in the disputed State of Jammu and
Kashmir. Between 350,000 and 450,000 army and paramilitary forces were
deployed in Jammu and Kashmir, although the Government did not release
official figures. The Muslim majority population in the Kashmir Valley
suffered from the repressive tactics of the security forces. Under the
Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed Forces (Jammu and
Kashmir) Special Powers Act, security force personnel had extraordinary
powers, including authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those
persons disturbing the peace, and to destroy structures suspected of
harboring militants or arms.
The Union Home Ministry was unable to estimate how many civilians
were killed in crossfire by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir during
the year. The security forces continued to abduct and kill suspected
terrorists, but they did not accept accountability for these abuses.
Many commanders' inclination not to participate in such practices led
to a reduced number of cases, and as a result government-supported
countermilitants often committed these abuses.
According to credible reports, in addition to harassment during
searches and arbitrary arrests (see Section 1.d.), security forces
abducted and sometimes used civilians as human shields in night
patrolling and searching for landmines; the abuses occurred mostly in
the Kupwara and Doda districts. Because of Doda's inaccessibility, the
abuses there allegedly were underreported.
The continued incursion of Pakistani-backed armed insurgents into
territory on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC) in the State
of Jammu and Kashmir resulted in an increased counterinsurgency
campaign, accompanied by repressive offensive measures. Mortar and
small arms fire across the LOC killed an unknown number of civilians
during the year. For example, on May 30, 14 persons, including 3 army
soldiers and 11 civilians, were killed in overnight artillery shelling
and mortar fire. According to a government official, security forces
killed 1,471 militants during the year. On January 19, three militants
and a soldier were killed in gunfights in Jammu and Kashmir.
Kashmiri militant groups also committed serious abuses, including
numerous execution-style mass killings of Hindu (Pandit), Sikh, and
Buddhist villagers in Jammu and Kashmir (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
Militant groups also killed police officers and members of the security
forces. In February militants killed eight Hindus, including six
children in the Rajouri district. On May 21, militants shot and killed
prominent Hurriyat leader Abdul Ghani Lone during a memorial rally in
Srinagar. Between August and October, 44 political workers were killed
in Udhanipus, Pulwamma, Srinigar, Kupwara, and Baramulla by militants
during the fall election campaign.
In addition to political killings, kidnapings, and rapes of
politicians and civilians (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.),
insurgents engaged in extortion and carried out acts of random terror
that killed hundreds of Kashmiris. Many of the militants were Afghani,
Pakistani, and other nationals. The militants used time-delayed
explosives, landmines, hand grenades, and snipers. There was a
significant upsurge in militant violence against security forces and a
tendency to use heavy weapons such as hand grenades and rockets.
Militants killed and injured numerous security personnel and destroyed
a great deal of security force property; many civilians also were
killed. For example, in January militants killed a Muslim family of 11,
including 8 children, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In December a
Delhi court found three Kashmiris guilty under the anti-terrorism law
of helping militants plan and carry out the 2001 Parliament attack and
sentenced them to death (see Section 1.d.).
Extremist and terrorist activities in the northeast also claimed
many lives. In addition to ambushes, terrorists increasingly resorted
to destroying bridges and laying time bombs on roads, on railway
tracks, and in trains. For example, in May the Kuki Revolutionary Army
killed 11 Assam Rifles personnel at Lepan area in Manipur. In June the
insurgent group United Liberation Front of Asom killed one person in an
attack on a police battalion in Bongaigaon in Assam. In April 2001,
week-long fighting between 2 Naga insurgent groups left more than 45
persons dead; 4,500 persons were forced to flee 15 villages in Mon
district.
During the year, police arrested numerous persons suspected of
involvement in previous terrorist attacks and brought charges against
some suspects. Charges also were brought against persons accused of
involvement with human suicide bomb attacks to advance Sikh separatism,
as well as against dozens of captured separatist insurgents in Jammu
and Kashmir for bombings, killings, and acts of sabotage.
Landmines were a problem in Jammu and Kashmir and to some extent in
Punjab. Landmines, booby traps, and unexploded ordnance posed a problem
to resettlement of displaced persons and rebuilding. For example, in
January 11 persons were killed in a landmine blast in Gumla district.
In June two persons were killed and five injured in a landmine blast in
Palamu district, Jharkhand. Militants previously restricted landmine
use to army convoys traveling outside of major cities, but during the
year they used command-detonated landmines in Srinagar city.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice; however, there were some
limitations. A vigorous and growing press reflected a wide variety of
political, social, and economic beliefs. Newspapers and magazines
regularly published investigative reports and allegations of government
wrongdoing, and the press generally promoted human rights and
criticized perceived government lapses.
Under the Official Secrets Act, the Government may restrict
publication of sensitive stories or suppress criticism of its politics.
For example, on June 9, Syed Iftikhar Gilani, the New Delhi bureau
chief of the Kashmir Times, was imprisoned for allegedly possessing
classified documents in violation of this act. Gilani alleged that the
only evidence the Government presented to substantiate this charge was
a 1995 public document that referred to human rights abuses committed
by Indian security forces in Kashmir. At year's end, Gilani remained in
detention.
In December Parliament passed a Right to Information law; at year's
end, this bill was pending the President's approval. This act allows
citizens to request and receive documents from the Government that are
considered to be in the public domain.
In the print media, all publications were privately owned. In the
electronic media, 80 percent of the channels were privately owned, and
20 percent were operated by Doordarshan, a semi-autonomous body
controlled by the Government. Both wire services were semi-autonomous.
The Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act remained in effect in
Jammu and Kashmir. Under the Act, a district magistrate may prohibit
the press from publishing material likely to incite murder or any act
of violence. As punishment the Act stipulates that the authorities may
seize newspaper premises and printing presses. Despite these
restrictions, newspapers in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir,
reported in detail on alleged human rights abuses by the Government and
regularly published press releases of Islamic separatist Kashmiri
groups. The authorities generally allowed foreign journalists to travel
freely in Jammu and Kashmir, where they regularly spoke with separatist
leaders and filed reports on government abuses.
In Assam the state government attempted to impede criticism by
filing a number of criminal defamation charges against journalists.
The Press Council is a statutory body of journalists, publishers,
academics, and politicians, with a chairman appointed by the
Government. Designed to be a self-regulating mechanism for the press,
it investigates complaints of irresponsible journalism and sets a code
of conduct for publishers. This code includes a commitment not to
publish articles or details that might incite caste or communal
violence. The Council publicly criticized newspapers or journalists it
believed had broken the code of conduct, but its findings, while noted
by the press community, carried no legal weight.
At the state level, regional political parties have the ability to
influence regional media. The Indian Express, an independent newspaper,
was unable to get advertising from the state government after its
reporting on the Gujarat violence. In addition, a number of journalists
who worked for English newspapers and the electronic media, who had
criticized the Modi government and its political supporters, reportedly
were subjected to ``strong-arm'' tactics by VHP and Bajrang Dal
activists. These alleged ``strong-arm'' tactics included anonymous
threatening phone calls and a ``whispering campaign.''
Authorities occasionally beat, detained, and harassed journalists,
particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, which resulted in significant self-
censorship. For example, on April 7, the police used excessive force
against more than 20 reporters and photographers in Ahmedabad at the
Gandhi Ashram. The journalists were covering two peace demonstrations
that were disrupted by members of the youth section of the BJP. On
April 8, an official communique stated that a commission of inquiry was
being set up and would be chaired by a retired judge of the High Court
and the Commission was to issue a report 3 weeks after the incident;
however, at year's end, no report had been filed or made public. In May
members of the BSF assaulted 17 journalists. In August, an editor and
three employees of the weekly Chattan were beaten in their offices by
members of the security forces. In June Alex Perry, the bureau chief
for a magazine, was detained and questioned for several hours
concerning alleged irregularities with his passport. His detention
followed the publication of a June 19 article critical of the Prime
Minister. On November 19, Farooq Javed Khan, photographer for the
Hindustan Times and Kashmir Images was beaten by police officers as he
walked home from his office in Srinigar. At year's end, the police had
not investigated these incidents.
In September government employees beat several journalists in
Assam, three of whom required hospitalization. At year's end, a
departmental inquiry was conducted and the Government suspended several
state employees.
In some instances, allegations of violence against journalists were
made against state governments. No action reportedly was taken against
the town magistrate who used excessive force against journalist Parag
Saikia in July 2000.
In Calcutta the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) often
threatened journalists; however, as the power of the party diminished,
journalists criticized the Government more frequently.
Nonviolent pressure on journalists comes from official sources as
well: Kumar Badal, journalist of the vernacular daily newspaper
Naharolgi Thoudang was arrested in 2000 on charges of indulging in
antinational activities. He was released after a court ruled that the
allegation was baseless. Some newspapers received more than $1.29
million (RS 60 million) annually in advertising revenue from the state
government. The threat of losing this revenue contributed to self-
censorship by smaller media outlets, which heavily relied on government
advertising.
There were no developments in the investigation of the attack by
BSF in 2001 that left 11 persons dead, 8 of them civilians, and 3
journalists hospitalized. There were no developments in the 2001 case
of Aajir Asam.
During the year, the Government of Tamil Nadu and the Press Council
of India completed an investigation into the 2001 case of police
charging 12 members of the press and injuring them during a DMK rally;
however, the commission's report was not released to the public. On
February 5, Suresh, a Sun Television reporter was granted bail. He was
arrested on in June 2001.
The Government maintains a list of banned books that may not be
imported or sold in the country; some--such as Salman Rushdie's
``Satanic Verses''--because they contain material government censors
have deemed inflammatory.
Intimidation by militant groups caused significant self-censorship
by journalists. The local press continued to face pressure from
militant groups attempting to influence coverage. For example,
militants fired rockets at the All India Radio Station and the
Doordashan complex in Srinigar in November. No one was injured in these
incidents.
On April 14, unknown assailants killed Paritosh Pandey, a crime
reporter of the Jansatta Express in Lucknow. Many observers believed
that Pandey's death was in response to his reporting of criminal gangs.
On April 15, dozens of journalists staged a demonstration to complain
that police were slow to respond to news of Pandey's murder. During
this demonstration, a security official hit a reporter with a rifle
butt and caused serious injuries (see Section 2.b.). The police had not
arrested anyone in connection with the killing by year's end.
On May 29, unknown assailants shot Zafar Iqbal, a reporter for the
Kashmir Images in Srinagar. Local journalists believed Igbal may have
been targeted because the publication is known for supporting the
Government. The police had not arrested anyone in connection with the
killing by year's end.
During the year, as in 2001, 2000, and 1999, Kashmiri militant
groups threatened journalists and editors and even imposed temporary
bans on some publications that were critical of their activities.
The trial continued in the 2000 killing of V. Selvaraj, a
journalist with the biweekly Nakkeeran.
Television no longer was a government monopoly, but this was due
more to technological changes than to government policy. Private
satellite television was distributed widely by cable or satellite dish
in throughout the country. These channels provided substantial
competition for DDTV, the national broadcaster, in both presentation
and credibility. DDTV frequently was accused of manipulating the news
for the benefit of the Government; however, cable operators were not
free from criticism. In some parts of the country, to varying degrees,
satellite channel owners used their medium to promote the platforms of
the political parties that they supported.
In March police sealed the offices of a local news television
channel, and four media persons were arrested in Vadodara. The police
claimed that the television channels were ``fueling divisive feelings
among the populace, and causing communal disharmony under the
provisions of the Penal Code.'' The four media persons were released on
bail, and the police reopened the offices later that evening. The owner
of the television channel said that the authorities seized his offices
in retaliation for his expose of police inaction during the riots in
Gujarat.
Government measures to control objectionable content on satellite
channel--specifically, tobacco and alcohol advertisements--still were
in effect, which held cable distributors liable under civil law. The
(often foreign) satellite broadcasters, rather than the domestic cable
operators, fall within the scope of the regulation.
AM radio broadcasting remained a government monopoly. Private FM
radio station ownership was legalized during 2000, but licenses only
authorized entertainment and educational content. Licenses did not
permit independent news broadcasting.
A government censorship board reviewed films before licensing them
for distribution. The board censored material it deemed offensive to
public morals or communal sentiment. This led to self-censorship among
producers, who often avoided subjects perceived as critical of the
Government. Producers of video newsmagazines that appeared on national
television were required to submit their programs to DDTV, which
occasionally censored stories that portrayed the Government in an
unfavorable light.
The Government limited access to the Internet. The Informational
Technology Act provides for censoring information on the Internet on
public morality grounds, and it considers ``unauthorized access to
electronic information'' a crime. According to Reporters Without
Borders, this law allows police officers to search the homes or offices
of Internet users, at any time and without a warrant. On July 4, Kumar
Badal, a reporter with the on line newspaper Tehelka.com, was arrested
and charged with asking poachers to kill wild animals in a national
park. In June the CBI searched the head office of Tehelka.com and the
home of a Tehelka.com employee hours before the site's editor in chief
was to give testimony about a corruption scandal that led to the
resignations of Defense Minister and the president of the Hindu
nationalist party. Anyone running an ``anti-Indian'' site risked up to
5 years in prison.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom, and students and
faculty espoused a wide range of views. In addition to approximately 16
national universities and 259 state universities, states were empowered
to accredit locally run private institutions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities sometimes
required permits and notification prior to holding parades or
demonstrations, but local governments ordinarily respected the right to
protest peacefully, except in Jammu and Kashmir, where separatist
parties routinely were denied permits for public gatherings. During
periods of civil tension, the authorities may ban public assemblies or
impose a curfew under the Criminal Procedure Code.
Parts of Srinagar and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir occasionally
came under curfew, but more often were affected by strikes called by
separatists. From November until year's end, the country's independent
election authorities banned all religious processions in Gujarat. The
ruling came in response to a demonstration planned by the hardline
Hindu group, VHP. The commission said that the VHP march should not be
allowed to go ahead because there was a likelihood that ``provocative
and intemperate'' speeches being made during the procession. In
response, the Gujarat VHP attempted to organize a procession from
Ahmedabad to Godhra in contravention of the Election Commission
guidelines. The Gujarat police prevented the procession and arrested
the leaders; however, later that day they were released.
In January police fired upon a demonstration in Bihar, and 2
students were killed and 10 were injured. The students were protesting
a hike in university fees; however, the Government alleged that police
fired only after stones were hurled at them. For example, in May
members of the BSF fired on demonstrators in Safakadal to protest the
BSF beating of a Muslim clergyman who used a loudspeaker in a mosque.
The shooting killed one person and injured numerous others. In June one
laborer was killed, and five were injured when police opened fire on
protesters at a tea plantation in West Bengal. Police claimed that the
laborers attacked representatives from a property company who tried to
take back the land. On August 29, several persons, including the CPI
state council members were injured when police charged CPI activists
who were demonstrating against the Government's increase in power
rates. On September 20, several persons were injured when police fired
on a group of persons distributing pamphlets outside Srinagar's largest
mosque.
There were no reports of any action taken against the responsible
members of the police who fired into a crowd of villagers in 2001. The
army apologized for the incident and promised an official inquiry;
however, no security force members have been charged in the incident.
No action reportedly was taken against members of the police who used
excessive force to disperse demonstrations on the following dates of
2001: August 6; June 18; August 12; and the November riot in Guwahati,
Assam. Reportedly no action was taken against the members of the SOG
who used excessive force to disperse demonstrations in the April 2000
killing of eight persons in Jammu and Kashmir.
The Constitution provides for the right to form associations, and
the Government generally respected this right in practice.
A requirement exists that NGOs secure the prior approval of the
Ministry of Home Affairs before organizing international conferences.
Human rights groups contended that the requirement provides the
Government with substantial political control over the work of NGOs and
their freedom of assembly and association. Some NGOs alleged that some
of their members were denied visas to enter the country.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for secular
government and the protection of religious freedom, and the central
government generally respected these provisions in practice; however,
it sometimes did not act effectively to counter societal attacks
against religious minorities and attempts by state and local
governments to limit religious freedom. This failure resulted in part
from the legal constraints inherent in the country's federal structure
and in part from the law enforcement and justice systems, which at
times were ineffective. The ineffective investigation and prosecution
of attacks on religious minorities was interpreted by some extremist
elements as a signal that such violence likely would go unpunished.
Tension between Muslims and Hindus, and to an increasing extent between
Hindus and Christians, continued to pose a challenge to the secular
foundation of the State.
Although the law provides for religious freedom, enforcement of the
law was poor, particularly at the state and local levels, where the
failure to deal adequately with intragroup and intergroup conflict and
with local disturbances abridged the right to religious freedom. There
was significant Hindu-Muslim violence during the year. In many cases,
the Government response was inadequate, consisting largely of
statements criticizing the violence against Muslims, with few efforts
to hold accountable those persons responsible or to prevent such
incidents from occurring (see Section 5). For example, in September
Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi allegedly made disrespectful
remarks about Muslims in an election rally speech. In the speech, Modi
allegedly blamed Muslims living in refugee camps for the state's
population boom, although he denied insulting Muslims. Throughout the
year, the Government generally described the violence and attacks as a
series of isolated local events.
The leading party in the Government coalition is the BJP, a Hindu
nationalist political party with links to Hindu extremist groups that
were implicated in violent acts against Christians and Muslims. The BJP
also leads state governments in Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Goa.
Many BJP leaders and party workers were members of the Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and share some of its ideology. The RSS
espouses a return to Hindu values and cultural norms. However, the BJP
is an independent political party, and the degree of RSS influence over
its policy making was not clear. Members of the BJP, the RSS, and other
affiliated organizations were implicated in incidents of violence and
discrimination against Christians and Muslims. The BJP and RSS
officially express respect and tolerance for other religions; however,
the RSS in particular opposes conversions from Hinduism and believes
that all citizens should adhere to Hindu cultural values. The BJP
officially agrees that the caste system should be eliminated, but many
of its members are ambivalent about this. The BJP's traditional
cultural agenda includes calls for construction of a new Hindu temple
to replace an ancient Hindu temple that was believed to have stood on
the site of a mosque in Ayodhya that a Hindu mob destroyed in 1992; for
the repeal of Article 370 of the Constitution, which grants special
rights to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the country's only Muslim
majority state; and for the enactment of a uniform civil code that
would apply to members of all religions.
No registration is required for religions. Legally mandated
benefits are assigned to certain groups, including some groups defined
by their religion. For example, some states reserve jobs and
educational enrollment slots for Muslims, who do not benefit from
reservations designed to help lower-caste Hindus.
In May 2001, the Government banned Deendar Anjuman, a Muslim group
whose members were arrested in connection with a series of church
bombings in Karnataka in 2000. The Government banned the group for
``fomenting communal tension'' and actions ``prejudicial to India's
security.'' During the year, the Government arrested, and tried 20
members of Deendar Anjuman implicated in the Karnataka church bombing.
The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act makes it a
criminal offense to use any religious site for political purposes or to
use temples for harboring persons accused or convicted of crimes. While
specifically designed to deal with Sikh places of worship in Punjab,
the law applies to all religious sites. The Religious Buildings and
Places Act requires a state government-endorsed permit before
construction of any religious building may commence in the state. The
Act's supporters claimed that its aim was to curb the use of Muslim
institutions by Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, but the
measure became a controversial political issue among religious groups
in the northern part of the country. In West Bengal, legislation in
force requires any person desiring to construct a place of worship to
obtain permission from the district magistrate.
On March 13, the Supreme Court ruled that Hindu activists could not
perform a March 15 religious ceremony on the land surrounding the site
of the demolished mosque in Ayodhya. Thousands of police and
paramilitary troops were deployed in and around Ayodhya, and most Hindu
militants were stopped from entering the town.
On October 31, the controversial Prohibition of Forcible Conversion
of Religion Bill that bans ``forced'' religious conversions, passed in
the State of Tamil Nadu. Human rights advocates believed that the law
made it more difficult for poor persons, mistreated minorities, and
others ostracized under the caste system, to convert from Hinduism to
another religion.
There is no national law that bars proselytizing by Christian
citizens. Foreign missionaries generally may renew their visas, but the
Government refused to admit new resident foreign missionaries. New
arrivals entered as tourists on short-term visas. During the year,
state officials continued to refuse to issue permits for foreign
Christian missionaries, as well as other persons, to enter some
northeastern states, on the grounds of political instability in the
region. Missionaries and religious organizations must comply with the
Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), which restricts funding
from abroad and, therefore, the ability of certain groups to finance
their activities. The Government was empowered to ban a religious
organization if it has violated the FCRA, has provoked intercommunity
friction, or has been involved in terrorism or sedition.
The legal system accommodated minority religions' personal status
laws; there were different personal laws for different religious
communities. Religion-specific laws pertain in matters of marriage,
divorce, adoption, and inheritance. For example, Muslim personal status
law governed many noncriminal matters involving Muslims, including
family law, inheritance, and divorce. The personal status laws of the
religious communities sometimes discriminated against women (see
Section 5).
Tensions between Muslims and Hindus, and between Hindus and
Christians, continued during the year. Attacks on religious minorities
occurred in several states, which brought into question the
Government's ability to prevent sectarian and religious violence. The
worst religious violence during the year was directed against Muslims
by Hindus in Gujarat. It was alleged widely that the police and state
government in Gujarat did little to stop the violence promptly and at
times even encouraged or assisted the Hindu fundamentalists in
perpetrating violent acts (see Section 5).
In February after an attack by Muslims on a train in Godhra that
resulted in the deaths of 58 Hindus, an estimated 2,000 Muslims were
killed in rioting in Gujarat. Beginning on February 28, Hindus attacked
and looted Muslim homes, business, and places of worship. The rioting
continued from March to mid-May. NGOs reported that police were
implicated directly in many of the attacks against Muslims in Gujarat,
and in some cases, NGOs contended, police officials encouraged the mob.
The Gujarat state government and the police were criticized for failing
to stop the violence and in some cases for participating in or
encouraging it. Muslim women and girls were raped, and an estimated 850
to 2,000 Muslims were killed. Human rights activists reported that the
Gujarat police received specific instructions not to take action to
prevent a possible violent reaction to the February 27 attack by
Muslims on a train in Godhra carrying Hindus. These observers asserted
that Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi personally told Ahmedabad
police officials on February 27 to allow Hindus 2 days to react
``peacefully'' to the Godhra incident. The police reportedly told
Muslim victims, ``we don't have orders to help you.'' It was reported
that assailants frequently chanted ``the police are with us,''
according to eyewitness accounts. HRW reported that much of the
violence was planned well in advance of the Godhra attack and was
carried out with state approval and orchestration.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the worst violence occurred
in the city of Ahmedabad. HRW reported that, ``Between February 28 and
March 2 the attackers descended with militia-like precision on
Ahmedabad by the thousands, arriving in trucks, clad in saffron
scarves, and khaki shorts, the signature uniform of Hindu nationalist
groups. Chanting slogans of incitement to kill, they came armed with
swords, trishuls, sophisticated explosives and gas cylinders. They were
guided by computer printouts listing the addresses of Muslim families
and their properties--and embarked on a murderous rampage confident
that the police was with them. In many cases, the police led the
charge, using gunfire to kill Muslims who got in the mob's way.'' In
addition, there were reports that ``most bodies that had arrived--were
burned and butchered beyond recognition. Many were missing body parts--
arms, legs, and even heads. The elderly and the handicapped were not
spared. In some cases, pregnant women had their bellies cut open and
their fetuses pulled out and hacked or burned before the women were
killed.''
On March 24, a report that the Government of Gujarat transferred
police officials who allegedly had taken action against Hindu rioters
drew further media and NHRC criticism of perceived government
partisanship. In its final report on Gujarat, released on June 1, the
NHRC held the Gujarat government responsible for the riots and accused
it of ``a complicity that was tacit if not explicit.'' The report
concluded that ``there is no doubt, in the opinion of this Commission,
that there was a comprehensive failure on the part of the state
government to control the persistent violation of rights of life,
liberty, equality, and dignity of the people of the state.'' The report
recommended a CBI inquiry into the communal riots, which the state
government subsequently refused to allow.
The destruction caused the forcible displacement of more than
100,000 Muslims into makeshift camps throughout Gujarat. The Government
disbanded the camps by mid-June.
Some Christian groups also claimed that BJP officials at state and
local levels became increasingly uncooperative. The Government also has
been criticized for not attempting to restrain the country's radical
Hindu groups.
Christian leaders noted a slight decrease in the incidents of
violence against their community and also a change in the type of
incidents; however, attacks against Christians continued. On February
17, a church in Karnataka was attacked during morning mass. According
to HRW, 70 men, draped in the Hindu nationalist signature saffron
flags, descended on the church and hurled bricks and stones at the
congregation.
On April 29, a church in Orissa was attacked and set on fire with
20 worshippers inside. No injuries were reported. A spokesman for the
Catholic Bishops' Conference of India said that fewer physical attacks
occurred against Christians; however, Hindu nationalists began an
ideological campaign to limit access to Christian institutions and
discourage or, in some cases, prohibit conversions to Christianity. For
example, on July 18, Sister Brishi Ekka was sentenced to 6 months in
jail by a court in Chhattisgarh for not reporting the 1996 conversion
of 95 families to Christianity. This was the first conviction under the
state's anti-conversion law, which has been in force since the 1970s.
Sister Ekka appealed the decision in the Chhattisgarh High Court and
later was released on bail. The Government found that 80 percent of
attacks on minorities were motivated by local incidents, economic
arguments, or intradenominational feuds. In August a new cable
television station, promoting Catholic values, was launched in Kerala;
however, several cable television station operators in Kerala and the
neighboring states reportedly refused to make the stations' programing
available to viewers. In November 2001, newspapers reported that Muslim
terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, targeted the Missionaries of
Charity in Calcutta. Press reports stated that extremist groups
targeted the nuns because they received economic aid from the United
States to convert Muslims to Christianity. The fear of conversion of
Hindus and Muslims by Christians was highlighted in an August 15
statement by Prime Minister Vajpayee. He stated ``There is a conversion
motive behind the welfare activities being carried out by some
Christian missionaries in the country's backward areas, and it is not
proper, although conversion is permissible under the law.''
In May 2001, a Christian priest, Father Jaideep, was attacked in
Jatni town, Orissa. Local citizens, who were enraged by the priest's
distribution of pamphlets to propagate Christianity in a Hindu-
dominated area, allegedly participated in the attack.
Citizens often referred to schools, hospitals, and other
institutions as ``missionary'' even when they were owned and run
entirely by indigenous Christian citizens. By using the adjective
``missionary,'' the RSS tapped into a longstanding fear of foreign
religious domination.
By year's end, the trial continued in Orissa of Dara Singh, a
member of the Hindu extremist Bajrang Dal, who was arrested in 2000 for
the Staines' murders.
In Christian majority areas, Christians sometimes were the
oppressors. In Tripura there were several cases of harassment of non-
Christians by Christian members of the National Liberation Front of
Tripura (NLFT), a militant tribal group with an evangelical bent. For
example, NLFT tribal insurgents have prohibited Hindu and Muslim
festivals in areas that they control, cautioned women not to wear
traditional Hindu tribal attire, and prohibited indigenous forms of
worship. In Assam, the issue of Bangladeshi migrants (who generally
were Muslim) has become very sensitive among the Assamese
(predominantly Hindu) population, which considers itself increasingly
to be outnumbered.
Hindus have been victims of violence. For example, on September 24,
an attack on the Swaminarayan Hindu Temple in Gujarat left 40 persons
dead before security forces stormed the temple. The Government
responded swiftly by deploying approximately 3,000 army personnel to
dispel a strike and protest march called by the VHP to protest the
attack. Critics of the Government noted that had the Government acted
quickly following the Gujarat violence, many deaths could have been
prevented.
Throughout the year, pan-Islamic militants continued to try to
drive all non-Muslims out of Kashmir. In August militants unlawfully
entered a house in Jammu and killed four members of a Hindu family.
There was no reported progress regarding any investigation of the 2001
killing of six Sikhs in Srinagar. These mass killings in Kashmir,
targeted against the Sikh community, increased fears that the remainder
of Kashmir's minorities may try or be forced to leave. There was an
exodus of many from the Sikh community, particularly the young, during
2001.
There was no reported progress regarding any investigation of the
March 2000 killings of 35 Sikh men in the village of Chatti Singhpora,
near Anantnag in south Kashmir.
The degree to which the BJP's nationalist Hindu agenda was felt
throughout the country with respect to religious minorities varied
depending on the region. In some states, governments made efforts to
reaffirm their commitment to secularism. In others, mainly in the
south, religious groups alleged that since the BJP's rise to power in
the national government, some government bureaucrats began to enforce
laws selectively to the detriment of religious minorities. For example,
this revivalist campaign included the ``Hinduization'' of education,
including the revision of history books to include hate propaganda
against Islamic and Christian communities. The situation in the east
varied. For example, the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act contains a
provision requiring a monthly government report on the number of
conversions and requiring a police inquiry into conversions, but this
provision was not enforced.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants citizens the
freedom of movement, and the Government generally respected this in
practice; citizens enjoyed freedom of movement within the country
except in certain border areas where, for security reasons, special
permits were required.
Vehicle checkpoints, at which BSF routinely searched and questioned
occupants, were a common feature throughout most of Jammu and Kashmir.
It also was common for police to block entry and exit points in
preparation for gathering young males for police lineups. These
searches tended to focus on troubled areas, as opposed to the mass
searches that were common in the past. According to a credible source,
such search operations seldom yielded any results. There were frequent
curfews in areas of conflict, including in New Delhi in recent years.
Under the Passports Act, the Government may deny a passport to any
applicant who ``may or is likely to engage outside India in activities
prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India.'' The Government
used this provision to prohibit the foreign travel of some government
critics, especially those advocating Sikh independence and members of
the violent separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. For example, in
November the Government denied Yasin Malik, a Kashmiri separatist, a
passport to travel outside the county.
During the year, there were reports that Bodo-Santhal ethnic
clashes continued. In April NDFB militants killed five Adivasis in
Hatiphuli Relief Camp in Kokrajhar. In July suspected NDFB militants
killed nine Adivasis in a village relief camp in the same district. In
December four Santhal woodcutters were killed by Bodo militants. More
than 87,000 persons lived under poor conditions in relief camps in
Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts as a result of
the ongoing violence between Bodos and Santhals.
The incursions of Pakistani-backed armed forces into territory on
the Indian side of the LOC in Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military
campaign to repel the intrusion continued during the year and allegedly
forced many residents of Jammu and Kashmir from their homes, a number
of whom took refuge on the Pakistani side of the LOC. Many homes were
destroyed. In 2000 Jammu and Kashmir home minister Mustaq Ahmad Lone
told the state assembly that 43,510 persons remained displaced since
1999 (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.).
Since 1990 more than 235,000 Bangladeshis have been deported, many
from Maharashtra and West Bengal. The occasional deportation of
Bangladeshis judged to have entered the country illegally continued
during the year, but there was no repetition of the systematic roundup
of Bangladeshis for mass deportation that had been conducted by the
Maharashtra government in the past. The Government estimated that there
were 10 million Bangladeshis living illegally in the country. By year's
end, the Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal law (IMDT), which
largely was aimed at illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, had not been
implemented. The central government acknowledged that the law was aimed
at Bangladeshis, but claimed that it was unable to repeal the act due
to a lack of consensus in Parliament.
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government has not
formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum. The
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had no formal
status, but the Government permitted the UNHCR to assist certain groups
of refugees (notably Afghans, Iranians, Somalis, Burmese, and
Sudanese). The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees visited the country
in May.
The Government provided first asylum to some refugees, most notably
in recent years to Tibetan and Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. However, this
policy was applied inconsistently. For example, the insistence of some
border authorities on the presentation of passport and visas by those
claiming refugee status occasionally resulted in individuals or groups
being refused admittance. This occurred in recent years in cases
involving Chin and Rakhine refugees from Burma and Afghans who entered
the country through Pakistan. The UNHCR reported that the country
continued to host a large urban refugee population, roughly 90 percent
of whom were from Afghanistan. Refugees were not required to make
claims in other countries. In April the UNHCR announced that it would
help Burmese refugees be self-sufficient and end their monthly
subsistence allowances. However, the UNHCR continued to assist
extremely needy refugees including women and children.
The Government recognized certain groups, including Chakmas from
Bangladesh, Tamils from Sri Lanka, and Tibetans as refugees and
provided them with assistance in refugee camps or in resettlement
areas. According to UNHCR and government statistics, there were
approximately 110,000 Tibetans, approximately 64,990 Sri Lankan Tamils
in 131 camps, and perhaps as many as 80,000 Sri Lankan Tamils outside
of the camps living in the country at year's end. According to the
Tamil Nadu government, there were 60,000 refugees residing in 108
refugee camps and as many as 80,000 residing outside the camps. The
refugees in the camps were permitted to work, and the state and central
governments paid to educate refugee children and provided limited
welfare benefits. Some 80,000 Chakma permanent residents remained in
Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram; the Supreme Court has upheld their right
to citizenship. However, the Supreme Court's order to extend
citizenship to this group still was not enforced by year's end. The
UNHCR reported that 11,642 Afghans, 857 Burmese, and approximately 350
others were receiving assistance from the UNHCR in the country as of
August 2001. The Government also assisted an unknown number of persons
from Tibet and Sri Lanka. Although the Government formally did not
recognize these persons as refugees, it did not deport them. Instead,
they received renewable residence permits, or their status was ignored.
Increasingly during the year, some of these groups--Afghans, Iraqis,
and Iranians in particular--were not granted renewal of their residence
permits by the authorities on the grounds that they were not in
possession of valid national passports. Due to financial and other
reasons, many refugees were unable or unwilling to obtain or renew
their national passports and therefore were unable to regularize their
status in the country.
The Tamil Nadu government provided educational facilities to Sri
Lankan Tamil refugee children, and the central government provided some
assistance and channeled assistance from NGO and church groups. The
central government generally denied NGOs and the UNHCR direct access to
the camps. NGOs reported refugee complaints about deteriorated housing,
poor sanitation, delayed assistance payments, and inadequate medical
care in the Tamil refugee camps. The Government used some of these
``special camps'' to hold suspected members of the LTTE terrorist
organization. Human rights groups alleged that inmates of the special
camps sometimes were subjected to physical abuse and that their
confinement to the camps amounted to imprisonment without trial. They
alleged that several of those acquitted by the Supreme Court in 1999 of
involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
remained confined in these special camps. During the year, the Tamil
Nadu government initiated a review of the inmates of the special camps
to determine whether any could be released. Some of the inmates were
allowed to return to Sri Lanka voluntarily; however, approximately 170
persons remained in the special camps.
Santhals were non-recognized refugees in Assam, and human rights
groups estimated that 200,000 lived in relief camps. The Santhals were
being sheltered in 100 camps in Assam; conditions in such camps were
extremely poor and the Assam government claimed it did not have the
resources to improve the conditions of the relief camps.
Ethnic Chins were among the nonrecognized refugees in the
northeastern states, particularly Mizoram. Student-led demonstrations
protested Chins and Chakma's presence in Mizoram. During the year,
tensions between security forces and Chin National Force (CNF)
insurgents operating in Burma allegedly resulted in the detention,
interrogation, and expulsion of some persons associated with the CNF to
Burma, where they credibly feared persecution. In September 2001, there
were news reports that thousands of ethnic Chins were asked to leave
Mizoram. The Mizoram Chief Minister stated that he wanted the border
with Burma to be ``fenced to check further infiltration of immigrants
into the state.'' Human rights monitors alleged that approximately
1,000 Chin refugees were arrested in Mizoram, and some 200 had been
repatriated forcibly to Burma between July and September 2000. NGOs
estimated that 10,000 persons were expelled to Burma, where ``the
deportees were jailed pending hearings to be scheduled before military
tribunals.'' An estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Chins lived and worked
illegally in Mizoram.
Mizoram human rights groups estimated that some 31,000 Reangs, a
tribal group from Mizoram that were displaced due to a sectarian
conflict, were being sheltered in 6 camps in North Tripura. Conditions
in such camps were poor, and the Tripura government asked the central
government to allot funds for their care. Reang leaders in the camps
pressed for reserved jobs, education benefits, and a comprehensive
rehabilitation package for refugees in the relief camps. The Mizoram
government rejected these demands and maintained that only 16,000 of
the refugees had a valid claim to reside in the state.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The country has a democratic, parliamentary system
of government with representatives elected in multiparty elections. A
Parliament sits for 5 years unless dissolved earlier for new elections,
except under constitutionally defined emergency situations. State
governments were elected at regular intervals except in states under
President's Rule.
On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President may proclaim a
state of emergency in any part of the national territory in the event
of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Similarly, President's
Rule may be declared in the event of a collapse of a state's
constitutional machinery. The Supreme Court has upheld the Government's
authority to suspend fundamental rights during an emergency.
During the year, State Assembly elections were conducted in Uttar
Pradesh, Punjab, Uttaranchal, Manipur, Goa, and Gujarat. In Gujarat
international observers stated that the elections took place in a
somewhat free and transparent manner; however, there were reports that
persons had been left off the electoral register.
The elections in Jammu and Kashmir, held between September 16 and
October 8, were to elect members to a new state assembly to form a new
government. International observers stated that the elections were
conducted in a reasonibly free and transparent manner; however, some
NGOs alleged that there were some flaws in the election, including that
all major separatist groups boycotted the elections and there was an
all-pervading fear of attacks by militants. Some 800 persons were
killed in election-related violence in state assembly polling in Jammu
and Kashmir (see Section 1.a.), and there were some allegations of
voter fraud. Between August 2, when elections were announced, and
September 24, when the second phase of elections came to an end, over
500 persons were killed. On October 1, as polls opened, three gunmen
hurled grenade and rocket attacks at polling stations throughout the
district of Anantnag. On September 24, militants abducted and beheaded
National Conference leader Abdul Rahim Sofi in North Kashmir. Despite
these fears and election-related violence, according to the Election
Commission more than 44 percent of the citizens voted.
There were 70 women in the 783 seat legislature. There were 6 women
in the Cabinet. A large proportion of women participated in voting
throughout the country (with turnout rates slightly lower than those of
men), and numerous women were represented in all major parties in the
national and state legislatures. The passage of the ``Panchayati Raj''
constitutional amendments reserved 30 percent of seats in elected
village councils (Panchayats) for women, which brought more than 1
million women into political life at the grassroots level.
The Constitution reserves seats in Parliament and state
legislatures for ``scheduled tribes'' and ``scheduled castes'' in
proportion to their population (see Section 5). Indigenous people
actively participated in national and local politics, but their impact
depended on their numerical strength. In the northeastern states,
indigenous people were a large proportion of the population and
consequently exercised a dominant influence in the political process.
In contrast, in Maharashtra and Gujarat, tribal people were a small
minority and were unsuccessful in blocking projects that they opposed.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Independent human rights organizations operated throughout most of
the country, investigating abuses and publishing their findings;
however, in some states and in a few circumstances, human rights groups
faced restrictions. Human rights monitors in Jammu and Kashmir were
unable to move around the state to document human rights violations due
to fear of retribution by security forces and countermilitants. Several
individuals closely involved in the documentation of violations in
Jammu and Kashmir, including lawyers and journalists, were attacked and
in some cases killed. International human rights monitors had
difficulty in obtaining visas to visit the country for investigation
purposes.
Unlike in previous years, the Home Minister did not enforce a
dormant executive order requiring visitors for some conferences from
certain countries to register beforehand.
The Government appointed a National Human Rights Commission in 1993
with powers to investigate and recommend policy changes, punishment,
and compensation in cases of police abuse. In addition, the NHRC was
directed to contribute to the establishment, growth, and functioning of
human rights NGOs. The Government appointed the members and financed
the operations of the NHRC. The NHRC was seriously understaffed, and it
is prohibited by statute from directly investigating allegations of
abuse involving army and paramilitary forces. The Commission acted
independently of the Government, often voicing strong criticism of
government institutions and actions. However, the NHRC faced numerous
institutional and legal weaknesses, which human rights groups said
hampered its effectiveness.
From April 2000 to March 2001, the last year for which figures were
available, the NHRC received 71,685 new complaints of human rights
violations, an increase of more than 41 percent compared with 2000.
More than 50 percent of the complaints were from Uttar Pradesh. The
increased number of complaints was believed to be the result of the
Commission's increased visibility. Of the 53,711 cases considered
during 2000, 32,172 were dismissed; 10,718 were transmitted to other
governmental authorities for disposition; 3,395 were concluded, and
7,426 remained pending.
The NHRC also has influenced the legislative process, particularly
by issuing recommendations on women's issues, persons with
disabilities, and children's rights. The NHRC encouraged the
establishment of human rights cells in police headquarters in some
states; however, this policy was not implemented in any meaningful way.
In January the NHRC opened a separate Women's Human Rights Cell in its
New Delhi office. This office was able to notify state governments of
human rights violations and investigate some complaints, but it cannot
impose punitive measures or implement corrective action. In addition,
in October the NHRC created a computerized complaint database on its
website, where information about each case was available. The NHRC also
was involved in programs to eliminate child labor (see Section 6.c.).
HRW reported the June killing of human rights defender Navleen
Kumar outside of Mumbai. On June 30, four persons were arrested in
connection with the killing. On July 8, P.B. D'Sa, vice president of
the Karnataka state branch of the People's Union for Civil Liberties,
was stabbed and sustained serious injuries. According to HRW, police
personnel reportedly were involved in the attack. AI reported the
November 2000 killing of human rights defender T. Purushotham in
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh; however, by year's end, there were no
investigations into Purushotham's death. There was no definitive
resolution in the case of abducted and killed Kashmir human rights
monitor Jalil Andrabi in 1996. Human rights workers alleged that the
state attempted to subvert the judicial process by withholding evidence
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
Several Christian-affiliated (in many cases, nonevangelical)
international relief agencies stated that during the year their work in
delivering services to the poor became considerably more difficult due
to threats, increased bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases,
physical attacks on their field workers by Hindu extremists (see
Sections 2.c. and 5). The prison visits program in Jammu and Kashmir by
the ICRC continued during the year (see Section 1.c.). ICRC
representatives also continued training police and BSF personnel in
international humanitarian law. In 2001 the authorities continued to
deny HRW and AI permission to visit Jammu and Kashmir. In 2001 the
Government denied HRW any access to the country and only allowed AI
limited access. The West Bengal government, which was governed by the
communist party, and its Chief Minister, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, called
AI ``anticommunist'' and refused to acknowledge that its report on West
Bengal was authentic. The Government also continued to deny the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings permission to visit the
country. Unlike in previous years, the Home Ministry did not invite the
U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings or
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial killings. Police and security
forces arrested and harassed human rights monitors. The Government
continued to refuse repeated UNHCR requests for access to the Sri
Lankan Tamil refugee camps in Tamil Nadu (see Section 2.d.).
The Human Rights Act requests each state to establish a state human
rights commission, but not all states have done so. Commissions exist
in 12 states: Assam, Chhattisgarh, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Jammu and
Kashmir, Kerala, and Rajasthan. Bihar, Goa, and Andhra Pradesh have yet
to appoint state human rights commissions. Gujarat has not established
officially a state commission, but in 2000 a commission of inquiry was
created to report on the custodial death of Colonel Pratap Save, a
retired military officer. This commission had yet to report its
conclusions by year's end. Uttar Pradesh, the state with the largest
number of human rights complaints to the NHRC, stated its intention to
set up a state human rights commission but had not yet done so. The
state human rights commission established in Jammu and Kashmir by an
act of the state legislature had no power to investigate independently
alleged human rights violations committed by security force members.
The NHRC and the National Minorities Commission took unilateral
action not prompted by a specific complaint or legal demand and warned
the state and central government in Gujarat to take corrective action
in regard to the February and March violence. Subsequently, the central
government created a special compensation package for the victims of
the violence in Gujarat as a direct result of this warning.
The Madhya Pradesh state human rights commission was active in
pursuing complaints. From April 2001 to March, the commission received
13,308 complaints, more than the number from the previous year. The
commission lamented that at the district level, the Government was
extremely slow in responding to complaints forwarded to it. Partly as a
result, 5,191 complaints were pending as of March 31.
The Maharashtra state human rights commission came into existence
in March 2001, and it received 1,440 complaints in 2001, of which 740
were pending at year's end.
The Chhattisgarh state has not created a human rights commission.
Tamil Nadu's Human Rights Commission had five members and was
presided over by a retired High Court Chief Justice. It worked on caste
clashes and deaths resulting from illicit liquor sales, but its lack of
authority to investigate effectively barred it from considering major
incidents. The three-member Kerala Human Rights Commission was
understaffed and relatively inactive, although it probed prison
conditions. In addition to these state human rights commissions,
special courts to hear human rights cases were established in Tamil
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. However, the courts in Uttar
Pradesh did not function despite a 1999 court order that they be
reactivated.
Punjab's Human Rights Commission (PHRC) had four members and was
presided over by a Chairperson. The selection for a 5-year term was
made by the State Governor acting on the advice of a committee chaired
by the Chief Minister. Several local human rights organizations
expressed concern that the PHRC members did not appear to have the
record of involvement in the protection and promotion of human rights
that was required under the Protection of Human Rights Act (PHRA). In
2001 the Commission received 6,300 complaints of human rights
violations. According to AI, the Commission was understaffed and
seriously limited by the PHRA, which limited its powers to investigate
individual cases of human rights violations. The People's Commission, a
separate body to investigate disappearances, was established by retired
Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh to highlight the fate of more than
2,000 persons who ``disappeared'' during the period of political unrest
in Punjab (see Section 1.b.); it continued to receive little
cooperation from state government authorities.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social status
The traditional caste system as well as differences of ethnicity,
religion, and language deeply divide society. Despite laws designed to
prevent discrimination, other legislation as well as social and
cultural practices had a profound discriminatory impact, and
discrimination against women, persons with disabilities, indigenous
people, and national, racial, and ethnic minorities was a problem.
According to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, caste clashes were frequent in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil
Nadu.
Women.--Domestic violence was common and a serious problem. In a
survey by the National Family Health Survey released during the year,
56 percent of the women said that domestic violence was justified.
These sentiments, combined with ineffective prosecution, made progress
against domestic violence difficult.
The issue of rape received increased political and social attention
during the year. The press consistently reported that violence against
women was increasing, although local women's organizations claimed that
there simply had been increased reporting. Only 10 percent of rape
cases were adjudicated fully by the courts, and police typically failed
to arrest rapists, thus fostering a climate of impunity. Mass rapes
often formed part of the tactics of intimidation used by upper caste
gangs against lower castes, and gang rapes often were committed as a
punishment for alleged adultery or as a means of coercion or revenge in
rural property disputes. Numbers of reports of rape and the extent of
prosecution varied from state to state. Madhya Pradesh had the highest
rates of rape reported. In Assam 30 percent of rape cases involved
girls below 18 years of age. Most of the victims were maidservants,
some as young as 6 years old. On November 24, a medical student
allegedly was gang raped in broad daylight in New Delhi. Police
arrested a man and three suspected accomplices and charged them with
rape, robbery, and criminal conspiracy.
Dowry disputes also were a serious problem. Although providing or
taking dowry was illegal under the Dowry Prohibition Act, dowry was
practiced widely. In the typical dowry dispute, a groom's family
members harassed a new wife whom they believed had not provided a
sufficient dowry. This harassment sometimes ended in the woman's death,
which family members often tried to portray as a suicide or accident.
Although most dowry deaths involved lower and middle-class families,
the phenomenon crossed both caste and religious lines.
Under the Penal Code, courts must presume that the husband or the
wife's in-laws were responsible for every unnatural death of a woman in
the first 7 years of marriage--provided that harassment was proven. In
such cases, police procedures required that an officer of deputy
superintendent rank or above conduct the investigation and that a team
of two or more doctors perform the postmortem procedures. According to
human rights monitors, in practice police did not follow these
procedures consistently. In August the Supreme Court stressed the need
to enforce effectively the Dowry Prohibition Act and to increase social
awareness; however, there was no indication of improved enforcement or
increased awareness.
Sati, the practice of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their
husbands, was banned, but continued in a few cases despite the ban. On
August 6, a 65-year-old woman died after performing sati on the funeral
pyre of her husband in Madhya Pradesh. The state government ordered a
magisterial inquiry into the incident, and subsequently 15 persons were
arrested in connection with the incident. At year's end, the suspects
faced charges of murder and conspiracy.
Several traditional practices that were harmful to women continued
during the year. In April a tribal woman in Madhya Pradesh was forced
to immerse herself in urine in a ritual intended to cleanse her of
social ostracism; the police arrested four upper caste youths at year's
end. In July a married woman in Indore was forced to engage in the
practice of ``agnipariksha,'' where her hands were placed in a fire to
test her fidelity to her husband, at the request of her in-laws. At
year's end, the National Commission had begun an investigation into the
incident.
In remote villages, witchcraft accusations and punishments still
occurred. In February a woman accused of being a witch was tortured and
paraded naked in Rajasthan. Police arrested persons involved in the
torture, and the District Collector ordered that the woman be paid $105
(RS 5,040).
Societal violence against women was a serious problem. In February
communal violence in Gujarat resulted in the deaths of many women. The
violence began on February 27 after a Muslim mob in the town of Godhra
attacked and set fire to two train cars carrying Hindu activists.
Fifty-eight persons were killed, most of them women and children. In
the subsequent riots, Muslim women and girls were raped, and an
estimated 2,000 Muslim persons were killed (see Section 2.c.). In April
a fact-finding team visited Gujarat to document the impact of communal
riots on women. A subsequent report stated that Muslim women had been
subjected to ``unimaginable, inhuman, barbaric'' sexual violence during
the violence.
Dalit (``untouchable'' caste) women have been stripped naked by
mobs and paraded around in public to humiliate Dalits who offended
other castes. For example, in July two Dalit women allegedly were gang
raped and paraded nude in a Sudan village following a land dispute with
local businessmen. Police arrested one person in the case. According to
HRW, another Dalit woman was paraded naked in Kishanganj in November
due to a land dispute.
In Kashmir the Lashkar-e-Jabbar militant group required all Muslim
women to wear a burqa (a garment that totally covered the face and
body) when in public or risk retribution. A significant number of women
in the Kashmir Valley appeared to be complying with the order,
frightened by the threat of being attacked with acid, beheaded, or
killed. Lashkar-e-Jabbar also further ordered Hindus and Sikhs in the
valley to wear identifying marks and told transport companies to
reserve 50 percent of their seats for women in an effort to separate
men and women in public spaces. At year's end, Al-Badr militants
ordered all women police officers in Rajouri District to quit their
jobs by January 15, 2003.
In February 2001, the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of the UNCHR continued to
recommend an extensive range of legal reform, additional resources, and
affirmative government action to eliminate gender inequality.
Numerous laws exist to protect women's rights, including the Equal
Remuneration Act, the Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act, the Sati
(Widow Burning) Prevention Act, and the Dowry Prohibition Act. However,
the Government often was unable to enforce these laws, especially in
rural areas in which traditions were deeply rooted. According to press
reports, the rate of acquittal in dowry death cases was high, and
because of court backlogs it took 6 to 7 years on average to rule on
such cases.
Prostitution was common, with an estimated 2.3 million prostitutes
in the country, some 575,000 of whom were children. Many indigenous
tribal women were forced into sexual exploitation (see Section 6.c.).
In recent years, prostitutes began to demand legal rights, licenses,
and reemployment training, especially in Mumbai, New Delhi, and
Calcutta. In January the Government signed the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Prevention and Combating
Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution. The country is a
significant source, transit point, and destination for many thousands
of trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
In 1999 according to NCRB statistics, there were 8,858 cases of
sexual harassment. Sexual harassment of women in the workplace became a
subject of NHRC consideration during the year. The NHRC instituted a
committee to investigate harassment of women in the legal profession
and asked universities to establish complaint committees immediately.
The commission suggested the creation of a telephone hot line for
complaints, initially starting in New Delhi, and gave advice to the
media on reporting incidents of harassment against women. The National
Commission for Women conducted 18 meetings with 568 representatives of
public sector units, including public and private banks, educational
institutions, corporations, universities, and hotels, to examine
further issues of compliance to address harassment against women.
The law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but enforcement
was inadequate. In both rural and urban areas, women were paid less
than men for doing the same job. Women experienced economic
discrimination in access to employment and credit, which acted as an
impediment to women owning a business. The promotion of women to
managerial positions within businesses often was slower than that of
males. State governments supported micro credit programs for women that
began to have an impact in many rural districts.
The Government continued to review legislation on marriage; it
passed the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act during 2001; the act widely
had been criticized as biased against women. The Act placed limitations
on interfaith marriages and specified penalties, such as 10 years'
imprisonment, for clergymen who contravened its provisions. Under the
Act, no marriage in which one party is a non-Christian may be
celebrated in a church (see Section 2.c.).
Under many tribal land systems, notably in Bihar, tribal women do
not have the right to own land. Other laws relating to the ownership of
assets and land accorded women little control over land use, retention,
or sale. However, several exceptions existed, such as in Ladakh and
Meghalaya, where women had several husbands and controlled the family
inheritance.
Children.--The Government has not demonstrated a commitment to
children's rights and welfare. The Government does not provide
compulsory, free, and universal primary education, and only
approximately 59 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 14
attend school. However, during the year, the lower house of Parliament
passed a constitutional amendment giving all children ages 6 to 14 the
right to free and compulsory education provided by the State. The
amendment also placed an obligation on parents and guardians to provide
educational opportunities to these children. The amendment awaited the
President's endorsement at year's end. Of a primary school-age
population of approximately 203 million, approximately 120 million
children attended school. However, according to UNICEF, 76.2 percent of
all children aged 11 to 13 years were attending school. No significant
sectors or groups actively were excluded from education, but children
of wealthier families were more likely to attend school than those of
poor families. A significant gender gap existed in school attendance,
particularly at the secondary level.
Child welfare organizations estimated that there were 500,000
street children nationwide living in abject poverty. A coalition of
approximately 50 NGOs conducted a detailed survey in the Calcutta
municipal area and identified 145,000 children who were not attending
school, although not all of them were street children. The NGOs
received UNICEF assistance in training teachers to conduct transitional
education for a target group of 45,000 5- to 9-year-old children. The
course work was intended to allow these children to enter mainstream
schooling. The program aimed to set up an additional 600 schools for
the remaining 29,000 children by year's end. Approximately 500 teachers
had been trained by year's end.
Medical care is free to all citizens; however, availability and
quality were problems, particularly in rural areas.
Child abuse is prohibited specifically by law. The Government
stated that child abuse was not a significant problem; however, the
Government has not released comprehensive statistics regarding child
abuse.
Abuse of children in both public and private educational
institutions was a problem. Schoolteachers often beat children. On
December 27, police arrested and charged a teacher trainee who
allegedly abused a four-year-old student in Mirambika School in New
Delhi. In August 2001, schoolchildren in Barpeta district were asked to
participate in a statewide peace march organized by the Assam
government. Young children were taken in a long procession during the
midday heat and were provided insecticide-ridden food as refreshments.
Three children died and nearly 1,000 others became ill. The NHRC
requested that the Assam Chief Secretary issue a detailed report on the
incident and provide prompt medical treatment for the victims. At
year's end, the investigation into the incident continued.
The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act prohibits child
marriage, a traditional practice in the northern part of the country.
The Act raised the age requirement for marriage for girls to 15 from 18
years, but the Government did not enforce the Act. According to one
report, 50 percent of girls in Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and
Madhya Pradesh were married by age 16. NCRB statistics showed that only
56 cases were registered under the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment)
Act during 1999. Each year in April, during the Hindu festival of
Askhay Tritiya, thousands of child marriages were performed in Madhya
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan. Although state governments
conducted awareness campaigns during the year, enforcement was weak and
the practice was accepted in certain communities.
Runaway children, especially in larger cities, were at high risk
for sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. They often worked 18- to 20-
hour days, frequently in hazardous conditions (see Section 6.c.), and
suffered sexual and mental abuse.
Trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution was
a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
The buying and selling of children for adoption occurred. In April
2001, police raided a child adoption racket in Andhra Pradesh. Nearly
200 children were rescued from several orphanages that were involved in
the buying and selling of children for adoption. At year's end, police
made some arrests and had charged some persons in connection with this
incident.
The Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment set up a 24-
hour ``child help line'' phone-in service for children in distress in
nine cities. Run by NGOs with government funding, the child help line
assisted street children, orphans, destitute children, runaway
children, and children suffering abuse and exploitation.
The traditional preference for male children continued. Although
the law prohibits the use of amniocentesis and sonogram tests for sex
determination, the Government did not enforce the law. The tests were
misused widely for sex determination, and termination of a
disproportionate number of pregnancies with female fetuses occurred. In
the 12 years since the State of Maharashtra passed a law banning the
use of such tests for sex determination, the state government filed
charges against only one doctor, who was acquitted. Human rights groups
estimated that at least 10,000 cases of female infanticide occurred
yearly, primarily in poor rural areas. Parts of Tamil Nadu (Dharmapuri,
Salem, and Madurai districts) still had high rates of female
infanticide. In addition, parents often gave priority in health care
and nutrition to male infants. Women's rights groups pointed out that
the burden of providing girls with an adequate dowry was one factor
that made daughters less desirable.
Persons with Disabilities.--Although the Persons with Disabilities
Act provides equal rights to all persons with disabilities, advocacy
organizations admitted that its practical effects so far have been
minimal in part due to a clause that makes the implementation of
programs dependent on the ``economic capacity'' of the Government.
According to regional NGOs, there were more than 50 million persons
with disabilities in the country. According to Javed Abidi of the
National Center for Promotion of Employment for Disabled People
(NCPEDP), the census taken during the year failed to include categories
of disability, thus making an accurate estimate of the needs of persons
with disabilities impossible. Neither law nor regulations required
accessibility for persons with disabilities. With the adoption of the
Persons with Disability Act, a nascent disabled rights movement slowly
was raising public awareness of the rights of persons with
disabilities. Government buildings, educational establishments, and
public spaces in New Delhi have almost no provisions for wheelchair
access.
The Disabled Division of the Ministry of Welfare had a budget of
more than $47 million (RS 2.3 billion) for the 2001-2002 fiscal year
for a number of organizations and committees at the national, regional,
and local levels. The Ministry delivered rehabilitation services to the
rural population through 16 district centers. A national rehabilitation
plan committed the Government to put a rehabilitation center in each of
more than 400 districts, but services still were concentrated in urban
areas. Moreover, the impact of government programs was limited.
Significant funding was provided to a few government organizations such
as the Artificial Limbs Manufacturing Corporation of India, the
National Handicapped Finance and Development Corporation, and the
Rehabilitation Council of India.
As a result of the passage of the Persons with Disability Act,
there was a Disabilities Commissioner who over saw implementation of
the act and its provisions protecting persons with disabilities. In
addition, the NHRC formed a group of seven experts in August 2001 to
identify issues affecting persons with disabilities, to review
government policies, and to protect the rights of persons with
disabilities.
According to the Persons with Disability Act, 3 percent of
positions in government offices and state-owned enterprises must be
reserved for persons with visual, hearing, or orthopedic disabilities;
however, a survey conducted in 1999 by the NCPEDP indicated that in the
public sector the figure was 0.54 percent and in the private sector
0.28 percent.
The Government provided special railway fares, education
allowances, scholarships, customs exemptions, budgetary funds from the
Ministry of Rural Development, and rehabilitation training to assist
the disabled; however,implementation of these entitlements was not
comprehensive.
Mental health care was a problem. Hospitals were overcrowded and
served primarily as a ``dumping ground'' for the mentally handicapped.
Patients generally were ill-fed, denied adequate medical attention, and
kept in poorly ventilated halls with poor sanitary conditions. In
August 2001, 26 inmates at a private Muslim mental hospital in Erwadi,
Tamil Nadu, died in a fire, because they were chained to their beds,
which apparently was a common practice in many such private
institutions. In January 2001, the NHRC wrote to the chief ministers of
all states to ask them to abide by recommendations to remove all
persons with mental illness from jails; however, by year's end, no
action had been taken.
Indigenous Persons.--The Innerline Regulations enacted by the
British in 1873 still provide the basis for safeguarding tribal rights
in most of the northeastern border states. These regulations prohibit
any person, including citizens from other states, from going beyond an
inner boundary without a valid permit. No rubber, wax, ivory, or other
forest products may be removed from the protected areas without prior
authorization. No outsiders were allowed to own land in the tribal
areas without approval from tribal authorities.
The last census conducted indicated that 8 percent of citizens
belonged to scheduled tribes. According to the Indian Confederation of
Indigenous and Tribal People (ICITP), 80 percent of the tribal
population live below the poverty level. At year's end, no action had
been taken to repeal the Habitual Offenders Act that aimed at the
nomadic tribes. According to the ICITP, more than 40,000 tribal women,
mainly from Orissa and Bihar, were forced into situations of economic
and sexual exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Special courts to
hear complaints of atrocities committed against tribal people were to
have been established under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, but
this never was accomplished.
Despite constitutional safeguards, the rights of indigenous groups
in the eastern parts of the country often were ignored. Indigenous
peoples suffered discrimination and harassment, were deprived wrongly
of their land, and were subjected to torture and to arbitrary arrest.
There was encroachment on tribal land in almost every eastern state,
including by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, and by businesses that
illegally removed forest and mineral products. Moreover, persons from
other backgrounds often usurped places reserved for members of tribes
and lower castes in national educational institutions. Mob lynching,
arson, and police atrocities against tribal people occurred in many
states (see Section 1.c.). According to a local NGO, in February 2001
police in Koel-Karo fired on a crowd of 4,000 tribals who had assembled
to protest the state government's management of the Koel-Karo dam
project and killed 8 persons (see Section 1.a.).
Numerous tribal movements demanding the protection of land and
property rights. The Jharkhand Movement in Bihar and Orissa and the
Bodo Movement in Assam reflected deep economic and social grievances
among indigenous peoples. In the Jharkhand area, tribal people
complained that they were relegated to unskilled mining jobs, lost
their forests to industrial construction, and were displaced by
development projects. Largely tribal-populated states from the Jharkand
area of Bihar and the Chhatisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh were
created. The Jharkhand Adivasi Chhatra Sangh called for ``ulgulan''
(mass awakening) to fight for the cause of the tribals and to demand a
60 percent reservation for tribals in jobs and education, despite the
fact that Jharkhand's tribal population made up only 27 percent of the
population.
There was some local autonomy for tribal people in the northeast.
In Meghalaya tribal chiefs still wielded influence in certain villages.
The Nagaland government controlled the rights to certain mineral
resources, and autonomous district councils in Tripura, Assam, and
Meghalaya control matters such as education, rural development, and
forestry in cooperation with the state governors.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's caste system has
strong historic ties to Hinduism. It delineates clear social strata,
assigning highly structured religious, cultural, and social roles to
each caste and subcaste. Members of each caste--and frequently each
subcaste-are expected to fulfill a specific set of duties (known as
dharma) in order to secure elevation to a higher caste through rebirth.
Dalits (formerly called untouchables) were viewed by many Hindus as
separate from or ``below'' the caste system; nonetheless, they too were
expected to follow their dharma if they hope to achieve caste in a
future life. Despite longstanding efforts to eliminate the
discriminatory aspects of caste, the practice remained widespread.
The practice of untouchability, which affected those who, along
with tribal people, occupied the lowest strata of the caste system was
outlawed in theory by the Constitution and the 1955 Civil Rights Act,
but it remained an important aspect of life. Untouchability refers to
the social restrictions imposed on persons because of their birth into
certain Hindu castes. Dalits were considered unclean by higher caste
Hindus and thus traditionally were relegated to separate villages or
neighborhoods and to low paying and often undesirable occupations (such
as scavenging, street sweeping, and removing human waste and dead
animals). Many rural Dalits worked as agricultural laborers for higher
caste landowners. By custom Dalits may be required to perform tasks for
upper caste Hindus without remuneration. The majority of bonded
laborers were Dalits (see Section 6.c.). Dalits are among the poorest
of citizens, generally do not own land, and often are illiterate. They
face significant discrimination despite the laws that exist to protect
them, and often are prohibited from using the same wells and from
attending the same temples as higher caste Hindus, and from marrying
persons from higher castes. In addition they face segregation in
housing, in land ownership, on roads, and on buses. Dalits tend to be
malnourished, lack access to health care, work in poor conditions (see
Section 6.e.), and face continuing and severe social ostracism. In
contrast the highest caste, the Brahmin, with 3.5 percent of the
population, holds 78 percent of the judicial positions and
approximately 50 percent of parliamentary seats. NGOs reported that
crimes committed by higher caste Hindus against Dalits often were
unpunished, either because the authorities did not prosecute vigorously
such cases or because the crimes were unreported by the victims, who
feared retaliation. For example, in October five Dalits youths were
killed by a mob, reportedly led by members of the VHP, in Haryana after
reports of cow slaughtering in the town. According to HRW, the local
leader of the VHP said he had no regrets over the incident and that the
life of a cow was worth more than that of five Dalits. A police
investigation resulted in 30 arrests; however, there was no further
action by year's end. In recent years, groups--including some that use
violence--organized to protect Dalit rights.
A survey conducted during 2001 by the Protection of Civil Rights
wing of the Tamil Nadu Adidravidar (indigenous peoples) Department
identified 191 villages in Tamil Nadu where caste-based oppression and
violence, and the practice of untouchability, were prevalent. Several
human rights groups believed that this number was too low and human
rights groups alleged that in many Tamil Nadu villages, scheduled
castes were not allowed to participate in local festivals, own houses
or property in upper caste areas, share upper caste burial grounds, or
draw water from public wells in upper-caste neighborhoods. The erection
of statues of Dalit heroes or of the flags of Dalit parties in public
places often became the cause of inter-caste tension. In several
village teashops, Dalits were served beverages in separate cups (the
so-called two-tumbler system).
According to press reports, some members of the higher caste
disagreed with the State Election Commission's decision to reserve the
Melavalavu Panchayat presidency for Dalits and forcibly closed the
Panchayat office for several days. When the president and his
associates filed a complaint with the district authorities about the
incident, they were hacked to death.
The Constitution gives the President the authority to identify
historically disadvantaged castes, Dalits, and tribal people (members
of indigenous groups historically outside the caste system). These
``scheduled'' castes, Dalits, and tribes were entitled to affirmative
action and hiring quotas in employment, benefits from special
development funds, and special training programs. The impact of
reservations and quotas on society and on the groups they were designed
to benefit was a subject of active debate. According to the 1991
census, scheduled castes, including Dalits, made up 16 percent, and
scheduled tribes were 8 percent of the country's 1991 population of 846
million. Christians historically rejected the concept of caste;
however, because many Christians descended from low caste Hindu
families, many continued to suffer the same social and economic
limitations that low caste Hindus do, particularly in rural areas. Low
caste Hindus who convert to Christianity lose their eligibility for
affirmative action programs. Those who become Buddhists or Sikhs do
not. In some states, government jobs were reserved for Muslims of low
caste descent.
In October the Supreme Court decided that minority-run educational
institutions that receive government funding may not determine
unilaterally the number of reservations for various groups in their
admission policies.
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act lists offenses against disadvantaged persons and
provides for stiff penalties for offenders. However, this act had only
a modest effect in curbing abuse. Human rights NGOs alleged that caste
violence was on the increase.
Intercaste violence claimed hundreds of lives annually; it was
especially pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh.
Social pressures to enforce rigid caste lines in all social
settings led to episodes of vigilante retribution. In Uttar Pradesh in
August 2001, a young couple, a Brahmin boy and a Jat (lower caste)
girl, were hanged publicly by their own families in front of most of
the village as punishment for refusing to break off a cross-caste
relationship. While much more rare in urban settings, such extreme
examples of intolerance occured regularly in rural parts of the
country.
Complicated social and ethnic divisions in society created severe
localized discrimination. For example, the Pardhis, a small former
itinerant community in Maharashtra, faced discrimination at the hands
of the police and the rest of rural society in the area in which they
live. In the town of Kalamb in northern Maharashtra, the police
arrested nine members of the Pardhi community as suspects in a robbery
case on August 2001. When the Pardhi community held a protest march in
August 2001, a mob burned 50 Pardhi homes. Due to sustained pressure
from state human rights activists and the local media, the police filed
charges against the several persons. The local media, however,
frequently was biased against minorities in Maharashtra and continued
to report that the Pardhi community burned its own dwellings to qualify
for government compensation.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association, and the Government generally respected this right
in practice. Workers may establish and join unions of their own
choosing without prior authorization. More than 400 million persons
made up the country's active work force, and some 30 million of these
workers were employed in the formal sector. The rest overwhelmingly
were agricultural workers and, to a lesser extent, urban nonindustrial
laborers. While some trade unions represented agricultural workers and
informal sector workers, most of the country's estimated 13 to 15
million union members were part of the 30-million-member formal sector.
Of these 13 to 15 million unionized workers, some 80 percent were
members of unions affiliated with one of the 5 major trade union
centrals. All major trade union centrals were affiliated to a greater
or lesser extent with particular political parties. Central unions
stressed their independence and in some cases were attempting to sever
previously tight party control. In practice legal protections of worker
rights were effective only for the organized industrial sector. Outside
the modern industrial sector, laws were difficult to enforce. Union
membership was rare in the informal sector.
When abuses, such as intimidation or suppression of legitimate
trade union activities, were perpetrated against nationally organized
or other large-scale unions or unionized workers, the authorities
generally responded by prosecuting and punishing those persons
responsible. Unaffiliated unions were not able, in all instances, to
secure for themselves the protections and rights provided by law.
The Trade Union Act prohibits discrimination against union members
and organizers, and employers are penalized if they discriminate
against employees engaged in union activities.
Unions are free to affiliate with international trade union
organizations. The Indian National Trade Union Congress and the Hind
Mazdoor Sabha were affiliated with the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the All India Trade Union Congress was
affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is the normal means of setting wages and settling disputes
in unionized plants in the organized industrial sector. Trade unions
vigorously defended worker interests in this process. Although a system
of specialized labor courts adjudicates labor disputes, there were long
delays and a backlog of unresolved cases. When the parties are unable
to agree on equitable wages, the Government may establish boards of
union, management, and government representatives to determine them.
The legislation makes a clear distinction between civil servants and
other workers. Public service employees have very limited organizing
and collective bargaining rights.
Trade unions often exercised the right to strike, but public sector
unions were required to give at least 14 days' notice prior to
striking. Some states have laws requiring workers in certain nonpublic
sector industries to give notice of a planned strike.
The Essential Services Maintenance Act allows the Government to ban
strikes and requires conciliation or arbitration in specified
``essential'' industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging the
assertion that a given dispute falls within the scope of this act;
however, essential services never have been defined in law. The act
thus is subject to varying interpretations from state to state. The
Maharashtra government passed a law in 1999 banning strikes in
essential services, that included transport services, milk supply
services the electricity department, and hospitals. The Industrial
Disputes Act prohibits retribution by employers against employees
involved in legal strike actions, and this prohibition was observed in
practice.
The Kerala High Court declared that all general strikes (bandhs)
were illegal and that all organizers of protests would be liable for
losses caused by shutdowns. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict,
drawing attention to the difference between a complete closedown of all
activities (bandh) and a general strike (hartal). While it is likely
that the ruling was introduced in relation to political strikes, unions
stated that it remained a potential threat to their activities. Other
court rulings also declared strikes illegal and made striking workers
pay damages because consumers and the public suffered during strikes.
According to Ministry of Labor statistics, between January and
December 2001 there were 672 strikes and lockouts throughout the
country, involving 587,778 workers. In all, 241,187 person-days were
lost due to strikes, and 50,154 person-days were lost due to lockouts
during this period. In April approximately 10 million workers of
government-owned enterprises went on a 1 day strike to protest
government plans to amend the labor law. The proposed changes would
have made it easier to fire workers. The Industrial Disputes Act
prohibits retaliation against strikers, provided that the strike is
legal.
There were seven Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Entry into the
EPZs ordinarily was limited to employees, and such entry restrictions
applied to union organizers. All companies bused their workers directly
to and from the factory. While workers in the EPZs have the right to
organize and to bargain collectively, union activity was rare. In
addition, unions did not pursue vigorously efforts to organize private-
sector employees in the years since EPZs were established. Women
constituted the majority of the work force in the EPZs. The ICFTU
reported that overtime was compulsory in the EPZs, that workers often
were employed on temporary contracts with fictitious contractors rather
than directly by the company, and that workers feared that complaints
about substandard working conditions would result in their being fired.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, such
practices were widespread. The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act
prohibits all bonded labor, by adults and children. Offenders may be
sentenced to up to 3 years in prison, but prosecutions were rare.
Enforcement of this statute, which was the responsibility of state and
local governments, varied from state to state and generally was not
effective, due to inadequate resources and to societal acceptance of
bonded or forced labor. Labor inspectors at the state and local level
had overwhelming case loads, and in many cases, did not receive
adequate support or protection to challenge employers, who often had
direct access to government officials. On the occasions when inspectors
referred violations for prosecution, long court backlogs and inadequate
funding for legal counsel frequently resulted in acquittals. NGOs
estimated that there were 20 to 65 million bonded laborers in the
country, including a large number of children (see Section 6.d.).
According to HRW, the majority of bonded laborers were Dalits (see
Section 5), and bondage was passed from generation to generation.
A 1983 Supreme Court decision defined forced labor as work at less
than the minimum wage, which usually was set by the state governments.
Under this definition, which differed from that of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), forced labor was widespread, especially in
rural areas.
Bonded labor, the result of a private contractual relationship
whereby a worker incurs or inherits debts to a contractor and then must
work off the debt plus interest, was illegal but widespread. The
Government estimated that between enactment of the Bonded (Abolition)
Act in 1976 and March 2001, 280,411 bonded workers were released from
their obligations. Other sources maintained that those released
constituted only 5 percent of the total number of bonded laborers.
State governments provided a sum of money to workers freed from bondage
for their rehabilitation. The NHRC formed a high-level Central Action
Group, which routinely reviewed compliance with the Bonded Labor System
Act. The NHRC also appointed a special Rapporteur to work in Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu and report on compliance. In
addition, the NHRC instituted a system for receiving regular reports on
bonded labor from the states. The NHRC also assessed the bonded labor
problem, identifying state districts in which it especially was acute.
It identified and evaluated NGOs working in these areas and conducted
training in bonded labor law enforcement for district officials in the
acutely affected areas. Some press reports indicated that Tamil Nadu
alone had 25,800 bonded laborers, in response to which the state
government began implementing and continued to work on rehabilitation
plans. In 1999 alone, it allocated $1.25 million (RS 54.4 million) for
these plans. Government officials worked to release other bonded
laborers in many states. In West Bengal, organized traffic in illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants was a source of bonded labor (see Section 6.f.).
NGOs such as the Bonded Labor Liberation Front worked to release
bonded laborers throughout the year.
Female bondage, forced prostitution, and trafficking in women and
children for the purpose of prostitution were widespread problems (see
Section 6.f.). According to press reports, prison officials used
prisoners as domestic servants and sold female prisoners to brothels
(see Section 1.c.). Devadasis, prepubescent girls given to a Hindu
deity or temple as ``servants of God,'' were taken from their families
and required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste
Hindus. Reportedly many eventually were sold to urban brothels (see
Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor but
did not enforce this prohibition effectively and forced child labor was
a problem. The law prohibits the exploitation of children in the
workplace.
The Government continued its plan to eliminate child labor from
hazardous industries and eventually from all industries. This program,
for which approximately $55 million (RS 2.64 billion) was budgeted
since 1992, included the enhanced enforcement of child labor laws,
income supplements for families, subsidized school lunches in areas
which child labor was concentrated, and a public awareness campaign.
The Government continued efforts to enhance enforcement of the Child
Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act and other laws prohibiting and
regulating child labor.
There is no overall minimum age for child labor. However, work by
children under 14 years of age was barred completely in ``hazardous
industries,'' which includes among other things, passenger, goods, and
mail transport by railway. There were 13 occupations and 51 processes
in which children were prohibited from working under the act. Child
labor was prohibited in certain hazardous industries where there are
specific age limits for specific jobs. In occupations and processes in
which child labor is permitted, work by children is permissible only
for 6 hours between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m., with 1 day's rest weekly.
In addition to industries that utilize forced or indentured child
labor (see Section 6.c.), there was evidence that child labor was used
in the following industries: Hand-knotted carpets; gemstone polishing;
leather goods; and sporting goods.
The enforcement of child labor laws was the responsibility of the
state governments; however, enforcement was inadequate, especially in
the informal sector in which most children who work were employed. In
2001 the state government of Karnataka promulgated an ambitious plan to
eliminate all child labor; however, there was no evidence the plan was
in operation during the year. The continuing prevalence of child labor
was attributed to social acceptance of the practice, to the failure of
the state and federal governments to make primary school education
compulsory, and to ineffective state and federal government enforcement
of existing laws.
The Government established the National Child Labor Project (NCLP)
to release children from hazardous work places and provide them with
transitional schooling leading to mainstreaming in regular schools and
other forms of assistance. In addition, government programs assisted
working children in rural development, women and children's
development, health, and adult job creation programs. As of December
2001, the NCLP had 100 projects in 13 states. From April 2000 to
December 31, 205,800 children participated in the NCLP. During their
participation in the NCLP, the children's families were given a small
stipend--usually $2.15 to $4.30 (RS 100 to 200) per month.
Government efforts to eliminate child labor affected only a small
fraction of children in the workplace. A Supreme Court decision
increased penalties for employers of children in hazardous industries
to $430 (RS 20,000) per child employed and established a welfare fund
for formerly employed children. The Government is required to find
employment for an adult member of the child's family or pay $108 (RS
5,000) to the family. According to the South Asian Coalition on Child
Servitude the authorities were pursuing some 6,000 cases against
employers. The Supreme Court ruling also helped make local government
officials more aware of the prohibitions against child labor in
hazardous industries. This in some cases helped improve cooperation
between local officials and NGOs like SACCS that removed children from
hazardous workplaces. In the hand-knotted carpet producing area of
Uttar Pradesh, the NHRC and NGOs worked with the state government to
establish a task force for the elimination of child labor.
Estimates of the number of child laborers varied widely. The
Government census of 1991 put the number of child workers at 11
million. The ILO estimated the number at 44 million, while NGOs stated
that the figure is 55 million. Most, if not all, of the 87 million
children not in school did housework, worked on family farms, worked
alongside their parents as paid agricultural laborers, worked as
domestic servants, or otherwise were employed.
The working conditions of domestic servants and children in the
workplace often amounted to bonded labor. Children sent from their
homes to work because their parents cannot afford to feed them, or in
order to pay off a debt incurred by a parent or relative, had no
choice. There were no universally accepted figures for the number of
bonded child laborers. However, in the carpet industry alone, human
rights organizations estimated that there may be as many as 300,000
children working, many of them under conditions that amount to bonded
labor. Officials claimed that they were unable to stop this practice
because the children were working with their parents' consent. In
addition, there was a reasonable basis to believe that products were
produced using forced or indentured child labor in the following
industries: Brassware; hand-knotted wool carpets; explosive fireworks;
footwear; hand-blown glass bangles; hand-made locks; hand-dipped
matches; hand-broken quarried stones; hand-spun silk thread and hand-
loomed silk cloth; hand-made bricks; and beedis (hand-rolled
cigarettes). A number of these industries exposed children to
particularly hazardous work conditions (see Section 6.d.). In its first
attempt to address the issue of domestic child labor, during 2000 the
Government issued a notification prohibiting government employees from
hiring children as domestic help. Those employers who failed to abide
by the law were subject to penalties provided by the Bonded Labor
System (Abolition) Act (such as fines and imprisonment) and also to
disciplinary action at the workplace.
Bonded child labor in silk twining factories was a problem. The
labor commissioner estimated that there were 3,000 bonded child
laborers in the Magadi silk twining factories. According to HRW, bonded
children as young as 5 years old worked 12 or more hours a day, 6 1/2
or 7 days a week. Children making silk thread dip their hands in
boiling water that burns and blisters them. They breathe smoke and
fumes from machinery, handle dead worms that cause infections, and
guide twisting threats that cut their fingers. As they assist weavers,
children sit at cramped looms in damp, dim rooms. They do not go to
school and often were often beaten by their employers. By the time they
reached adulthood, they were impoverished, illiterate, and often
crippled by the work. In response UNICEF started a nonformal education
program for the estimated 3,000 bonded child laborers working in the
industry. By late 2000, approximately 260 children were enrolled. In
addition, UNICEF began a microcredit program for the parents of these
children to create income-generating opportunities as an alternative to
child labor.
Employers in some industries also took steps to combat child labor.
The Carpet Export Promotion Council (CEPC), a quasi- governmental
organization that received funding from the Ministry of Textiles, has a
membership of 2,500 exporters who subscribed to a code of conduct
barring them from purchasing hand-knotted carpets known to have been
produced with child labor. The CEPC conducted inspections to insure
compliance and allowed members to use voluntarily a government-
originated label to signify adherence to the code of conduct. Rugmark,
which was a private initiative, operated a similar voluntary label
scheme. Rugmark had 250 exporter members who buy carpets from the
28,710 looms registered with Rugmark. However, the CEPC stated that
even with the program it was impossible to ensure that a carpet had
been produced without child labor, given the difficulties of monitoring
a decentralized and geographically dispersed industry. A private-sector
research and consulting firm conducted the inspections, which covered
only 10 percent of registered looms. The inspectors had difficulty
locating unregistered looms. The Government also cooperated with
UNICEF, UNESCO, the UNDP, and the ILO in its efforts to eliminate child
labor.
The Government participated in the ILO's International Program on
the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). Approximately 90,000 children
were removed from work and received education and stipends through IPEC
programs since they began in the country in 1992.
The NHRC, continuing its own child labor agenda, organized NGO
programs to provide special schooling, rehabilitation, and family
income supplements for children in the glass industry in Firozabad. The
NHRC also intervened in individual cases.
The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
forms of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The directive principles of the
Constitution declare that ``the State shall endeavor to secure . . . to
all workers . . . a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural
opportunities.'' Laws set minimum wages, hours of work, and safety and
health standards. Laws governing minimum wages and hours of work
generally were observed in industries subject to the Factories Act but
largely were not enforced elsewhere and did not ensure acceptable
conditions of work for the 90 percent of the work force not subject to
the Factories Act.
Minimum wages varied according to the state and to the sector of
industry. Such wages provided only a minimal standard of living for a
worker and were inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Most workers employed in units subject to the
Factories Act received more than the minimum wage, including mandated
bonuses and other benefits. The state governments set a separate
minimum wage for agricultural workers but did not enforce it
effectively. Some industries, such as the apparel and footwear
industries, did not have a prescribed minimum wage in any of the states
in which such industries operated.
The Factories Act established an 8-hour workday, a 48-hour
workweek, and various standards for working conditions. These standards
generally were enforced and accepted in the modern industrial sector,
but tended not to be observed in older and less economically robust
industries. State governments were responsible for enforcement of the
Factories Act. However, the large number of industries covered by a
small number of factory inspectors and the inspectors' limited training
and susceptibility to bribery resulted in lax enforcement.
The enforcement of safety and health standards also was poor.
Although occupational safety and health measures varied widely, in
general state and central government resources for inspection and
enforcement of standards were adequate. However, as awareness grew, the
courts began to take work-related illnesses more seriously.
Industrial accidents continued to occur frequently due to improper
enforcement of existing laws. Chemical industries were the most prone
to accidents. According to the Director General of Mines' safety rules,
mining companies must seal the entrances to abandoned underground mines
and opencast mines were to be bulldozed and reforested. These rules
seldom were obeyed. According to the Government, during the period from
January to September 2001, 192 persons were killed in mining accidents.
In February 2001, the collapse of a mine wall led to the death of more
than 30 miners. An investigation into the cause of the disaster began
during the year. Illegal mining was rampant. In October a fire in the
firecracker manufacturing company in Andhra Pradesh killed 13.
Safety conditions tended to be better in the EPZs.
The law does not provide workers with the right to remove
themselves from work situations that endanger health and safety without
jeopardizing their continued employment.
Legal foreign workers were protected under the law; however,
illegal foreign workers had no protection.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, trafficking in persons was a significant problem.
NGOs alleged that corruption at the enforcement level helps to
perpetuate the problem. The country was a significant source, transit
point, and destination for numerous trafficked persons, primarily for
the purposes of prostitution and forced labor.
The country was a destination country for Nepali and Bangladeshi
women and girls trafficked for the purpose of labor and prostitution.
Internal trafficking of women and children was widespread. To a lesser
extent, the country is a origin for women and children trafficked to
other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and the West. The country
serves as a transit point for Bangladeshi girls and women trafficked
for sexual exploitation to Pakistan, and for boys trafficked to the
Gulf States to work as camel jockeys. NGOs reported that sexual
exploitation of children for sex tourism increased sharply in the
states of Goa and Kerala.
Child prostitution occurred in the cities, and there were an
estimated 575,00 child prostitutes nationwide. According to an ILO
estimate, 15 percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes
were children. More than 2.3 million girls and women were believed to
be working in the sex industry against their will within the country at
any given time, and more than 200,000 persons were believed to be
trafficked into, within, or through the country annually. Women's
rights organizations and NGOs estimated that more than 12,000 and
perhaps as many as 50,000 women and children were trafficked into the
country annually from neighboring states for the sex trade. According
to an ILO estimate, 15 percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million
prostitutes were children, while the U.N. reported that an estimated 40
percent were below 18 years of age. Many tribal women were forced into
sexual exploitation.
Trafficking in, to, and through the country largely was controlled
by organized crime.
There was a growing pattern of trafficking in child prostitutes
from Nepal. Girls as young as 7 years of age were trafficked from
economically depressed neighborhoods in Nepal, Bangladesh, and rural
areas to the major prostitution centers of Mumbai, Calcutta, and New
Delhi. There were approximately 100,000 to 200,000 women and girls
working in brothels in Mumbai and 40,000 to 100,000 in Calcutta. In
Mumbai an estimated 90 percent of sex workers began when they were
under 18 years of age; half were from Nepal. A similar profile was
believed to exist among female sex workers in Calcutta, although the
vast majority of women who were trafficked there came from Bangladesh.
NGOs in the region estimated that approximately 6,000 to 10,000 girls
were trafficked annually from Nepal to Indian brothels, and that a
similar number were trafficked from Bangladesh.
The northeastern states of Meghalaya, Manipur, and Tripura were
source areas for internally trafficked women and girls. West Bengal was
a source for women and girls trafficked to Mumbai, Delhi, Uttar
Pradesh, and Punjab for the commercial sex trade. The women involved in
Mumbai's sex trade were mainly from Karnataka, rural Maharashtra, Tamil
Nadu, Orissa, Bangladesh, and Nepal.
In West Bengal, the organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi
immigrants was a source of bonded labor. Calcutta was a convenient
transit point for traffickers who send Bangladeshis to New Delhi,
Mumbai, Uttar Pradesh, and West Asia. Persons sometimes were sold into
virtual slavery.
Within the country, women from economically depressed areas often
moved into the cities seeking greater economic opportunities, and once
there were victimized by traffickers who forced or coerced them into
the sex trade. In some cases, family members sold young girls into the
sex trade. For example, according to a local NGO researcher, in one
village in Uttar Pradesh, girls 1 to 2 years of age were purchased from
their parents and adopted by persons who trained them for the sex trade
through the use of pornographic materials and then sold them into the
sex trade when they were 7 to 12 years old.
Many indigenous tribal women were forced into sexual exploitation.
According to the Indian Center for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
(ICITP), more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar,
were forced into economic and sexual exploitation; many came from
tribes that were driven off their land by national park schemes. In
Punjab persons of both sexes were sold in weekend bazaars, ostensibly
as farm labor; many instead were purchased for the purposes of forced
sexual services. The Department of Social Welfare suggested that more
efficient implementation of ongoing development programs for tribal
people in the district offered the best remedy for the child labor
problem.
The number of women being trafficked to other countries was
comparatively low. In July 2000, authorities cooperated with
investigators seeking evidence in the prosecution of Lakreddy Bali
Reddy, a U.S. citizen of Indian birth, who was indicted for trafficking
minor girls for sexual exploitation from a rural area of Andhra Pradesh
to the U.S. Reddy allegedly paid the airfares and expenses of 350 to
400 young men and women aged approximately 13 to 18 years, mostly from
low castes, and obtained their passports and visas--ostensibly to work
as specialty cooks or laborers in his restaurants or apartment
business. However, upon arrival in the U.S., the girls reportedly were
put to work in a prostitution ring. Some of the girls claimed that
Reddy had sex with them in India after their parents sold them; at
least one victim was 12 years old. At year's end, Reddy pled guilty to
trafficking and was imprisoned for this crime.
Many boys, some of whom were as young as age 4, were trafficked to
West Asia or the Persian Gulf States (especially the United Arab
Emirates) and became camel jockeys in camel races. Some such boys end
up as beggars in Saudi Arabia during the hajj. The majority of such
children worked with the knowledge of their parents, who received as
much as $200 (RS 9,300) for their child's labor, although a significant
minority simply were kidnaped. The gangs bringing the jockeys earned
approximately $150 (RS 6,975) per month from the labor of each child.
The usual procedure used for bringing the children to the Gulf States
was to have their names added to the passport of a Bangladeshi or
Indian woman who already had a visa for the Gulf; the children
fraudulently were claimed to be her children. Girls and women were
trafficked to the Persian Gulf States to work as domestic workers or
sex workers.
The National Commission for Women reported that organized crime
played a significant role in the country's sex trafficking trade and
that women and children who were trafficked frequently were subjected
to extortion, beatings, and rape. How women were trafficked varies
widely: Some were abducted forcibly or drugged, while others were made
false offers of marriage, employment, or shelter. Poverty, illiteracy,
and lack of employment opportunities contributed to the trafficking
problem, although organized crime was a common element in all
trafficking incidents, as was police corruption and collusion. Although
corruption was endemic in the country, there was no known anti-
corruption initiative that was linked specifically to corruption as it
related to trafficking during the year. NGOs alleged that ignorance, a
lack of political resolve to tackle it, and corruption at the
enforcement level perpetuated the problem.
Although the police were charged with enforcing the country's laws
on prostitution and trafficking in women and children, NGOs, observers,
and sex workers uniformly viewed police actions as part of the problem.
Sex workers in Mumbai and Calcutta claimed that harassment, extortion,
and occasional arrests on soliciting charges usually characterized
police intervention. The police seldom were seen as a positive force
that addressed the violence of pimps and traffickers while protecting
underage girls from bonded sex labor. In May in a raid on a brothel in
Pune, the police reportedly discovered that one major brothel owner's
cell-phone had the numbers of many senior police officers in its
memory. A commonly held view among sex workers and NGOs was that local
police and politicians responsible for the redlight areas received
bribes from organized crime networks to protect the lucrative sex
trade. NGOs, victims, and the media continued to identify corruption at
the enforcement level as an impediment to swifter and fairer justice
for trafficked women and children.
Victims of trafficking were subject to threats, including emotional
blackmail, violence, and confinement, as well as the threat of
apprehension by authorities, detention, prosecution and deportation.
Most victims of trafficking did not possess identity documents. Once
removed from their communities to an area dominated by a different
culture and a different language or dialect, it was difficult for
victims of trafficking to find their way back home, where they may face
social ostracism.
The penalty for traffickers was prescribed by the Immoral
Trafficking Prevention Act (ITPA). If the offense had been committed
against a child (under 16 years), the punishment was imprisonment for 7
years to life. If the victim was a minor (16 to 18 years), the
punishment was from 7 to 14 years. Other penalties under the act range
from minimum terms of imprisonment of 1 year for brothel-keeping, to
minimum terms of 7 years to life imprisonment for detaining a person,
with or without consent, for prostitution.
Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act (ITPA), supplemented by the
Penal Code, prohibits trafficking in human beings and contains severe
penalties for violations. The Constitution also prohibits trafficking
in persons. The ITPA toughened penalties for trafficking in children,
particularly by focusing on traffickers, pimps, landlords, and brothel
operators, while protecting underage girls as victims. The ITPA
required police to use only female police officers to interrogate girls
rescued from brothels. The ITPA also required the Government to provide
protection and rehabilitation for these rescued girls. In addition,
under the ITPA, prostitution is not a crime; the ITPA criminalizes only
solicitation or engaging in sex acts in or near a public place. Some
NGOs noted that this ambiguity, which was intended to protect
trafficking victims, instead was exploited to protect the sex industry.
However, the country's prostitution and trafficking laws were
imposed selectively by police; clients and organizers of the sex trade
tended not to be penalized, while prostitutes found soliciting or
practicing their trade in or near (200 yards) public places were
penalized. Due to the selective implementation, the ``rescue'' of sex
workers from brothels often led to their revictimization. Using the
ITPA's provisions against soliciting or engaging in sexual acts, police
regularly may arrest sex workers, extort money from them, evict them,
and take their children from them. Clients of prostitutes, by
comparison, largely were immune from any law enforcement threat, as
clients committed a crime only if they had engaged in a sex act with a
sex worker in a public place or had had sex with a girl under the age
of 16 years (statutory rape). Therefore, although the intention of the
ITPA was to increase enforcement efforts against the traffickers,
pimps, and border operators, the opposite occured; a Calcutta NGO
reported that on average, approximately 80 to 90 percent of the arrests
made under the ITPA in West Bengal state in the 1990s were of female
sex workers. Only a small fraction of arrests made under the ITPA
involved traffickers. Implementation of the ITPA's provisions for
protection and rehabilitation of women and children who were rescued
from the sex trade was extremely poor. NGOs familiar with the legal
history of prostitution and trafficking laws regarded the failure of
the judiciary to recognize this inequity in the law's implementation as
a continuing ``blind spot.'' Over the last several years, arrests and
prosecutions under the ITPA remained relatively static, while all
indications suggested a growing level of trafficking into and within
the country.
NGOs and others alleged that when police took action against
brothels suspected of enslaving minors, the resulting police raids
often were planned poorly and seldom coordinated with NGOs or
government social agencies. NGOs claimed that without advance notice of
police raids on brothels, they were not able to lend valuable
assistance in identifying and interviewing underage victims. Moreover,
police did not seek advice or assistance from NGOs in planning law
enforcement action to protect the victims during raids. Therefore, the
police action often worsened the situation of the girls and women
indebted to traffickers and brothel owners. Girls rescued from brothels
were treated as criminals and often abused sexually by their police
rescuers or by the staff of government remand centers, where they were
housed temporarily before being brought back to the brothels as a
result of the bribes paid by brothel operators, or legally released
into the custody of traffickers and madams posing as relatives. In
these cases, the debt owned by the girls to the brothel operators and
traffickers further increases as the costs of bribing or legally
obtaining release of the girls is added to their labor debt.
NGOs also have demanded that special ITPA courts for speedy
resolution of cases allow videotaped testimony so that underage victims
need not be summoned back for trial. Social welfare agencies of the
central and state governments were underfunded and were unable to
implement antitrafficking plans effectively. The NGO community took the
lead on prevention, protection, and prosecution of trafficking and has
a mixed record in securing the cooperation of the state and local
police. During the year, police and NGOs rescued 12 minor girls from
brothels in New Delhi. The Andhra Pradesh NGO Sthree, registered nine
cases and arrested ten traffickers in two Andhra Pradesh districts
between May and November. At year's end, six trials were ongoing in
connection with these arrests. In separate incidents, Railway Police
helped to rescue 41 children from Chennai to Gujarat on September 19
and ten girls in Coimbatore on September 17. There were roughly 80 NGOs
in 10 states around the country working for the emancipation and
rehabilitation of women and children trafficked into the sex trade. A
group on child prostitution established by the NHRC includes
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department
of Women and Child Development, NGOs, and UNICEF. It continued to meet
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal
prohibitions.
Some NGOs were very knowledgeable about the trafficking situation
in the brothel areas such as Kamathipura, and could identify
traffickers and the locations of girls being held captive by brothel
owners. However, most of these NGOs were reluctant to trust the police
with this information due to the past conduct of police in brothel
raids and the likelihood that many trafficking victims would be
arrested and revictimized rather than assisted by such raids.
Cooperation among NGOs in sharing information and assessing the
magnitude and scope of the trafficking problem in Mumbai has not been
significant, although it continued to improve. Some NGOs, particularly
in Mumbai, Calcutta, New Delhi, and Pondicherry, worked aggressively to
sensitize, train, and create awareness of trafficking among local
authorities. The NGO Prerana, which worked closely with government
officials, was an example.
Efforts to improve NGO coordination were being made in Calcutta,
where 10 NGOs met monthly as part of the Action Against Trafficking and
Sexual Exploitation of Children (AATSEC) forum. Every 3 months, the
group attempted to meet with its Bangladeshi and Nepalese counterparts.
Calcutta NGOs such as Sanlaap also were seeking to build stronger
working relationships with local police. As a result of this
coordination, Sanlaap built stronger working relationships with police
and other law enforcement officials in Calcutta. It organized and
sponsored meetings between representatives of the sex workers and
police to discuss such issues as violence against women and
trafficking. The seminars helped sensitize police to the fact that many
of the sex workers were the victims of organized traffickers. Sanlaap
has been allowed to place a counselor at the West Bengal Remand Home
for Women, where rescued trafficking victims were housed. It also has
been permitted to place counselors in police stations within Calcutta's
red light district and convinced the courts to release young
trafficking victims into its custody, instead of sending them to the
remand home.
Training and informational meetings took place under the AATSEC
forum, which worked with groups in Nepal and Bangladesh. The NHRC asked
the committee that oversees the Hajj (pilgrimage) to require individual
passports for children instead of allowing them to be included on that
of their escort, in order to reduce trafficking of children. NHRC also
advised the Government of West Bengal to make efforts to educate
Muslims about child trafficking.
----------
MALDIVES
The Republic of Maldives has a parliamentary style of government
with a strong executive. The President appoints the Cabinet, members of
the judiciary, and one-sixth of the Parliament. The President derives
additional influence from his constitutional roles as the ``Supreme
authority to propagate the tenets of Islam.'' Political parties
officially were discouraged, and candidates for the unicameral
legislature, the People's Majlis, ran as individuals. The Majlis
selected a single presidential nominee who was approved or rejected in
a national referendum. President Gayoom was approved for a fifth 5-year
term in 1998. The Majlis must approve all legislation and is empowered
to enact legislation without presidential approval. Civil law is
subordinate to Shari'a (Islamic law), but civil law generally is
applied in criminal and civil cases. The judiciary was subject to
executive influence.
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the National
Security Service (NSS). The NSS includes the armed forces and police,
and its members serve in both police and military capacities during
their careers. The Director of the NSS reports to the Minister of
Defense. The police division investigates crimes, collects
intelligence, makes arrests, and enforces house arrest. There were no
reports that security forces committed human rights abuses.
Tourism and fishing provide employment for more than one-half of
the work force. Tourism accounts for 30 percent of government revenues
and roughly 70 percent of foreign exchange receipts. The population is
approximately 270,000. Agriculture and manufacturing continue to play a
minor role in the economy, which is constrained by a severe shortage of
labor and lack of arable land. The per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2001 was $2,100 (25,892 Rufiyaa), and the GDP growth rate was
approximately 2 percent.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The President's
power to appoint a significant portion of the Parliament constrains
citizens' ability to change their government. A continued easing of
government restrictions and the Press Council's balanced handling of
issues related to journalistic standards allowed a greater diversity of
views in the media. The Government limits freedom of assembly and
association, and does not permit the formation of political parties.
There were significant restrictions on the freedom of religion. In the
past, the Government has detained arbitrarily and expelled foreigners
for proselytizing and detained citizens who converted. Although the
Government has undertaken a number of programs addressing women's
issues, women faced a variety of legal and social disadvantages. The
Government also restricted certain worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that government officials employed them. There was an
unconfirmed report of beatings or other mistreatment of persons in
police custody during the year; however, by year's end this could not
be independently verified (see Section 1.d.). There were no reports of
public floggings (which are allowed under Shari'a as interpreted in the
country), as in past years. Punishments usually were confined to fines,
compensatory payment, house arrest, imprisonment, or banishment to a
remote atoll. The Government generally permitted those who are banished
to receive visits by family members.
The country's prison was destroyed by fire in 1999. Following the
fire, the Government transferred prisoners to a temporary facility,
which housed a fluctuating population of approximately 300 inmates.
Prison conditions at the existing facility, including food and
housing, generally were adequate. Prisoners were allowed to work and
were given the opportunity for regular exercise and recreation. Spouses
were allowed privacy during visits with incarcerated partners. The
Government was surveying prison facilities in other countries to
incorporate international standards and improvements in the
reconstruction of the prison, and it has requested training for prison
guards. Women were held separately from men. Children were held
separately from adults. Persons arrested for drug use are sent to a
``drug rehabilitation center'' (on a space available basis) where
sleeping quarters and most activities are segregated; although common
areas were shared by all.
The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats.
The issue of visits by human rights groups was not known to have arisen
during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution states
that no person shall be arrested or detained for more than 24 hours
without being informed of the grounds for arrest or detention.
Police initiate investigations based on suspicion of criminal
activity or in response to written complaints from citizens, police
officers, or government officials. They were not required to obtain
warrants for arrests. Based on the results of police investigations,
the Attorney General referred cases to the appropriate court. The
authorities generally kept the details of a case confidential until
they were confident that the charges were likely to be upheld. In the
past, persons have been held for long periods without charge, but there
were no reports of such occurrences during the year.
Depending upon the charges, a suspect may remain free, be detained
in prison, or placed under house arrest for 15 days during
investigations. The President may extend pretrial detention for an
additional 30 days, but in most cases the suspect is released if not
brought to trial within 15 days. Those who are released pending trial
may not leave a specific atoll. Within 24 hours of an arrest, an
individual must be told of the grounds for the arrest. An individual
then can be held for 7 days. If no legal proceedings have been
initiated within 7 days, the case is referred to an anonymous 3-member
civilian commission appointed by the President that can authorize an
additional 15 days of detention. After that time, if legal proceedings
still have not been initiated, a judge must sanction the continued
detention on a monthly basis. Although there was no right to legal
counsel during police interrogation, detainees were granted access to
family members. There was no provision for bail.
The Government may prohibit access to a telephone and nonfamily
visits to those under house arrest. While there have been no reported
cases of incommunicado detention in the past few years, the law does
not provide safeguards against this abuse.
There were no reports of religious prisoners during the year;
however, there were several reports of religious detainees during the
year. The law limits a citizen's right to freedom of expression in
order to protect the ``basic tenets of Islam.'' According to Amnesty
International and other sources, four individuals were arrested for
distributing Islamist and antigovernment literature during the year. By
year's end, three of the men were convicted to lengthy prison sentences
for extremism and subversion, and the fourth man was released. In
addition, a Muslim clergyman reportedly was questioned and temporarily
detained during an investigation into accusations that he had made
Islamist-tinged sermons in June.
Member of Parliament (M.P.) Abdullah Shakir was arrested in July
2001 and released the following month. There was some dispute as to why
he was arrested; the Government states he was arrested on a purely
civil matter, which since has been resolved, but international human
rights groups claimed that he was arrested for his support of a
petition to form political parties in the country (see Section 2.b.).
In March Shakir's appeal against the 2001 sentence was rejected by the
high court.
There were no reports of the external exile of citizens during the
year. In the past, the Government sometimes has banished convicted
criminals to inhabited atolls away from their home communities, but
there were no reports that this occurred during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution does not provide
for an independent judiciary, and the judiciary is subject to executive
influence. In addition to his authority to review High Court decisions,
the President influences the judiciary through his power to appoint and
dismiss judges, all of whom serve at his pleasure and are not subject
to confirmation by the Majlis. The President also may grant pardons and
amnesties.
There were three courts: One for civil matters; one for criminal
cases; and one for family and juvenile cases. On the recommendation of
the Ministry of Justice, the President appoints a principal judge for
each court. There was also a High Court in Male, which was independent
of the Justice Ministry and which handled a wide range of cases,
including politically sensitive ones. The High Court also acts as court
of appeals. High Court rulings can be reviewed by a five-member
advisory council appointed by the President. The President also has
authority to affirm judgments of the High Court, to order a second
hearing, or to overturn the Court's decision. In addition to the Male
court, there were 204 general courts on the islands.
There were no jury trials. Most trials were public and conducted by
judges and magistrates trained in Islamic, civil, and criminal law.
Magistrates usually adjudicate cases on outer islands, but when more
complex legal questions were involved, the Justice Ministry would send
more experienced judges to handle the case.
The Constitution provides that an accused person be presumed
innocent until proven guilty, and that an accused person has the right
to defend himself ``in accordance with Shari'a.'' During a trial, the
accused also may call witnesses, and be assisted by a lawyer. Courts do
not provide lawyers to indigent defendants. Judges question the
concerned parties and attempt to establish the facts of a case.
Civil law is subordinate to Shari'a, which is applied in situations
not covered by civil law as well as in certain acts such as divorce and
adultery. Courts adjudicating matrimonial and criminal cases generally
do not allow legal counsel in court because, according to a local
interpretation of Shari'a, all answers and submissions should come
directly from the parties involved. However, the High Court allowed
legal counsel in all cases, including those in which the rights to
counsel was denied in lower court. Under the country's Islamic
practice, the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one
man in matters involving Shari'a, such as adultery, finance, and
inheritance. In other cases, the testimony of men and women were equal
(see Section 5).
There were no confirmed reports of political prisoners. Human
rights agencies alleged that there are political prisoners; however,
the Government maintained that these prisoners were convicted of crimes
not related to politics.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits security officials from
opening or reading letters, telegrams, and wireless messages or
monitoring telephone conversations, ``except as expressly provided by
law.'' The NSS may open the mail of private citizens and monitor
telephone conversations if authorized in the course of a criminal
investigation.
Although the Constitution provides that residential premises and
dwellings should be inviolable, there is no legal requirement for
search or arrest warrants. The Attorney General or a commanding officer
of the police must approve the search of private residences.
The Government policy to encourage a concentration of the
population on the larger islands continued, and the policy generally
was successful in moving a significant number of citizens to the larger
islands.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits public
statements that are contrary to Islam, threaten the public order, or
are libelous. The Penal Code prohibits inciting citizens against the
Government. However, an amendment to the Penal Code decriminalized
``true account(s)'' by journalists of governmental actions.
Regulations that make publishers responsible for the content of the
material they published remain in effect, but no legal actions against
publishers were initiated during the year.
The Press Council is composed of lawyers, private and government
media representatives, and other government officials. The Council
reviews charges of journalistic misconduct (advising the Ministry of
Information, Arts, and Culture on measures to be taken against
reporters, when appropriate) and promotes professional standards within
the media by recommending reforms and making suggestions for
improvement. Private journalists have said that they are satisfied with
the Council's objectivity and performance. The Government agreed that
private journalists, rather than the Government, should take
responsibility for preparation of a journalistic code of ethics.
Individual newspapers and journals established their own ethical
guidelines in many cases.
Most major media outlets were owned either by the Government or its
sympathizers. Nonetheless, these sympathetic outlets on occasion
strongly criticize the Government.
Almost 200 newspapers and periodicals were registered with the
Government, only some of which publish on a regular basis. Aafathis, a
morning daily, often was critical of government policy, as was the
Monday Times, a weekly English language magazine. Two dailies, Miadhu
and Haveeru, were progovernment.
The Government owned and operated the only television and radio
stations. It did not interfere with foreign broadcasts or with the sale
of satellite receivers. Reports drawn from foreign newscasts were aired
on the Government television station. Cable News Network (CNN) was
shown daily, uncensored, on local television.
There were no reports of government censorship of the electronic
media; nor were there closures of any publications or reports of
intimidation of journalists.
Television news and public affairs programming routinely discussed
topics of concern and freely criticized government performance. Regular
press conferences with government ministers continued. Journalists were
more self-confident than in the past; self-censorship appeared to have
diminished, although it remained a problem. Since it is not clear when
criticism violates the law prohibiting public statements that were
contrary to Islam, threaten the public, or were libelous, journalists
and publishers continued to watch what they say, particularly on
political topics, to avoid censure by the Government.
There were no legal prohibitions on the import of foreign
publications except for those containing pornography or material
otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic values. No seizures of
foreign publications were reported during the year.
The Internet is available. There were no government attempts, other
than blocking pornographic material, to interfere with its use.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom. Some teachers
reportedly are vocal in their criticism of the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly ``peaceably and in a manner that does
not contravene the law''; however, the Government imposed limits on
this right in practice. The Home Ministry permitted public political
meetings during electoral campaigns, but limited them to small
gatherings on private premises.
The Government imposes some limits on freedom of association. The
Government registered clubs and other private associations if they do
not contravene Islamic or civil law. While not forbidden by law, the
President officially discouraged political parties on the grounds that
they were inappropriate to the homogeneous nature of society. The
President reaffirmed this position when he decided against a petition
to form a political party in June 2001. One signatory to the petition
was M.P. Abdullah Shakir, who subsequently was arrested, but was
released soon thereafter. Some observers believed his arrest was
connected to his support for the creation of political parties in the
country, but the Government maintained that he was arrested in
connection with a civil matter (see Section 1.e.). There were
unconfirmed reports that the Government harassed politicians who signed
the petition to form political parties. During the year, Mohammed
Nasheed lost his seat in the Majlis after he was convicted of petty
theft. He reportedly was released from internal exile in late August.
Some observers claim that the theft charge was fabricated to punish
Nasheed for supporting a movement to form a political party and for his
criticism of President Gayoom (see Section 3).
During the year, many Majlis members were active and outspoken
critics of the Government and called for closer parliamentary
examination of government policy.
Although not prohibited, there were no active local human rights
groups in the country. The Government has been responsive to requests
from foreign governments and international organizations to examine
human rights problems (see Section 4). While the Government also does
not prohibit labor unions, it recognizes neither the right to form them
nor the right to strike. There were no reports of efforts to form
unions or to strike during the year (see Section 6).
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted
significantly. The Constitution designates the Sunni branch of Islam as
the official state religion, and the Government interprets this
provision to impose a requirement that citizens be Muslims. The
practice of any religion other than Islam is prohibited by law. Foreign
residents are allowed to practice their religion if they do so
privately and do not encourage citizens to participate. President
Gayoom repeatedly has stated that no other religion should be allowed
in the country, and the Home Affairs Ministry has announced special
programs to safeguard and strengthen religious unity. The President,
the members of the People's Majlis, and cabinet members must be
Muslims.
There were no places of worship for adherents of other religions.
The Government prohibits the importation of icons and religious
statues, but it generally permitted the importation of individual
religious literature, such as Bibles, for personal use. It also
prohibited non-Muslim clergy and missionaries from proselytizing and
conducting public worship services. Conversion of a Muslim to another
faith was a violation of Shari'a and may result in punishment. In the
past, would-be converts have been detained and counseled regarding
their conversion from Islam. Foreigners have been detained and expelled
for proselytizing. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of
foreigners detained for proselytizing.
Islamic instruction was a mandatory part of the school curriculum,
and the Government funds the salaries of religious instructors. The
Government has established a Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs to
provide guidance on religious matters. The Government also has set
standards for individuals who conduct Friday services at mosques to
ensure adequate theological qualifications, and to ensure that services
were not dominated by radicals.
Under the country's Islamic practice, certain legal provisions
discriminate against women (see Sections 1.e., 3, and 5).
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel at home and
abroad, to emigrate, and to return. Because of overcrowding, the
Government discouraged migration to the capital island of Male or its
surrounding atoll. Foreign workers often were housed at their
worksites. Their ability to travel freely was restricted, and they were
not allowed to mingle with the local population on the islands.
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government has not
formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum. The
issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the year.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens' ability to change their government is constrained, and
the strong executive exerts significant influence over both the
legislature and the judiciary. Under the Constitution, the Majlis
chooses a single presidential nominee, who must be a Sunni Muslim male,
from a list of self-announced candidates for the nomination. Would-be
nominees for president were not permitted to campaign for the
nomination. The nominee is then confirmed or rejected by secret ballot
in a nationwide referendum. From a field of five candidates, President
Gayoom was nominated by the Majlis and was confirmed by referendum for
a fifth 5-year term in 1998. Observers from the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) found the referendum to be free and
fair.
The Office of the President was the most powerful political
institution. The Constitution gives Shari'a preeminence over civil law
and designates the President as the ``supreme authority to propagate
the tenets'' of Islam. The President's authority to appoint one-sixth
of the Majlis members, which was one-third of the total needed for
nominating the president, provided the president with a power base and
strong political leverage. The President also was Commander in Chief of
the armed forces, the Minister of Defense and National Security, the
Minister of Finance and Treasury, and the Governor of the Maldivian
Monetary Authority.
The elected members of the Majlis, who must be Muslims, serve 5-
year terms. All citizens over 21 years of age may vote. Of the body's
50 members, 42 are elected and the President appoints 8 members.
Individuals or groups were free to approach members of the Majlis with
grievances or opinions on proposed legislation, and any member may
introduce legislation. There were no political parties, which were
officially discouraged (see Section 2.b.).
Relations between the Government and the Majlis have been
constructive. The Government may introduce legislation but may not
enact a bill into law without the Majlis' approval. The Majlis may
enact legislation into law without presidential assent if the President
fails to act on the proposal within 30 days or if a bill is repassed
with a two-thirds majority. In the past few years, the Majlis
increasingly have become independent, challenging government policies
and rejecting government-proposed legislation.
For the past several years, the Majlis have held a question period
during which members may question government ministers about public
policy. Debate on the floor since the question period was instituted
has become increasingly sharp and open.
Elections to the People's Majlis last were held in 1999. According
to observers from the SAARC, the elections were generally free and
fair. A by-election was held in April following the controversial
expulsion of M.P. Mohammed Nasheed from the Majlis, upon his conviction
for theft (see Section 2.b.). According to observers, the election was
generally free and fair.
There were 5 women in the 48-member Majlis. There was one woman in
the Cabinet. Women were not eligible to become president but may hold
other government posts. However, for reasons of tradition and culture,
relatively few women sought or were selected for public office. In
December 2001, the position of Atoll Chief of Felidhe was awarded to a
women, Haseena Moosa. In order to increase participation by women in
the political process, the Government continued a political awareness
campaign in the atolls. In the November 1999 elections, six women ran
for seats and two were elected. During the 1999 elections, observers
from the SAARC noted that women participated equally in the electoral
process. Following the elections, President Gayoom appointed an
additional three women to the Majlis.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Although not prohibited, there were no active local human rights
groups. The Government has been very responsive to the interest of
foreign governments in examining human rights problems. A number of
international human rights organizations, such as UNICEF, are present
in the country. The Government cooperated with these international
organizations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens before
the law, but there is no specific provision to prohibit discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, disability, or social status. Women
traditionally have been disadvantaged, particularly in terms of the
application of Shari'a, in matters such as divorce, education,
inheritance, and testimony in legal proceedings.
Women.--Women's rights advocates agreed that domestic violence and
other forms of violence against women were not widespread. There were
no firm data on the extent of violence against women because of the
value attached to privacy. Police officials reported that they received
few complaints of assaults against women. Rape and other violent crimes
against women were extremely rare. Under Shari'a the penalty would be
flogging, banishment, or imprisonment for up to 5 years.
Although women traditionally have played a subordinate role in
society, they participate in public life in growing numbers and
gradually are participating at higher levels. During the year, there
was one woman minister, the Minister of Women's Affairs and Social
Welfare, and one women nominated to the position of Atoll Chief (see
Section 3). Women constitute 38 percent of government employees, and
approximately 10 percent of uniformed NSS personnel. Well-educated
women maintained that cultural norms, not the law, inhibit women's
education and career choices. However, during the year, the Government
continued law literacy programs and workshops on gender and political
awareness in the outer atolls to make women aware of their legal
rights. The Government also has built 15 women's centers in the atolls,
which are facilities where family health workers can provide medical
services. The centers also provide libraries and space for meetings and
other activities with a focus on the development of women. In addition,
in July 2001 the Government passed a family law that makes 18 years of
age the minimum age of marriage for women.
Under Islamic practice, husbands may divorce their wives more
easily than vice versa, absent any mutual agreement to divorce. Shari'a
also governs intestate inheritance, granting male heirs twice the share
of female heirs. A woman's testimony was equal only to one-half of that
of a man in matters involving adultery, finance, and inheritance (see
Section 1.e.). Women who work for wages receive pay equal to that of
men in the same positions.
In 2000 the Cabinet created a Gender Equality Council to serve as
an advisory body to the Government to help strengthen the role of women
in society and to help ensure equal participation by women in the
country's development; however, there were no reports of specific
council actions during the year.
Children.--The Government does not have a program of compulsory
education, but it provided universal access to free primary education.
The percentage of school-age children in school in 2001 was: (grades 1
to 5) 99 percent; (grades 6 to 7) 96 percent; and grades (8 to 10) 51
percent. Of the students enrolled, 49 percent were female and 51
percent are male. In many instances, education for girls was curtailed
after the seventh grade, largely because parents do not allow girls to
leave their home island for an island having a secondary school.
Nevertheless, women enjoyed a higher literacy rate (98 percent) than
men (96 percent).
Children's rights were incorporated into law, which specifically
protects them from both physical and psychological abuse, including
abuse at the hands of teachers or parents. The Ministry of Women's
Affairs and Social Welfare has the authority to enforce this law, takes
its responsibility seriously, and has received strong popular support
for its efforts. Although unable to provide an exact number, the
Ministry noted that there continued to be reports of child abuse during
the year, including sexual abuse. Penalties for the sexual abuse of
children range from banishment to imprisonment for up to 3 years. It is
not known if there were any prosecutions for child abuse or child
sexual abuse during the year. At year's end, the Government was
reviewing the law to see if improvements and additional protections are
necessary.
The Government was committed to the protection of children's rights
and welfare. The Government was working with UNICEF to implement the
rights provided for in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The Government has established a National Council for the Protection of
the Rights of the Child. Government policy provided for equal access to
educational and health programs for both male and female children. In
May the Government ratified two Optional Protocols, on the Children in
Armed Conflict and Sale of Children, of the U.N. Convention on
Children.
Persons with Disabilities.--There is no law that specifically
addresses the rights of persons with physical or mental disabilities.
In 1999 the Government initiated a survey that identified 30,000
persons with disabilities in the country (primarily hearing and
visually impaired). The Government has established programs and
provided services for persons with disabilities.
Persons with disabilities usually were cared for by their families.
When family care was unavailable, persons with disabilities were kept
in the Institute for Needy People, which also assisted elderly persons.
The Government provided free medication for all persons with mental
disabilities in the islands, and mobile teams regularly visited
patients with mental disabilities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--While the Government does not
expressly prohibit unions, it recognizes neither the right to form them
nor the right to strike. However, small groups of similarly employed
workers with mutual interests have formed associations, which include
employers as well as employees. These associations may address a
variety of issues, including workers' rights.
The work force consisted of between 70,000 and 75,000 persons,
including expatriate labor and seasonal and part-time workers. The
approximately 27,000 foreigners who work in the country make up almost
half of the workers in the formal sector; most are employed in hotels,
the retail and wholesale trade, factories, or on construction projects.
The Government employed approximately 22,000 persons, both permanent
and temporary. It estimated that the manufacturing sector employs
approximately 15 percent of the labor force and tourism another 10
percent.
There are no laws specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination
by employers against union members or organizers.
Although workers can affiliate with international labor
federations, this generally has not been the case. However, it is
believed some seamen have joined such federations.
In 1995 the U.S. Government suspended the country's eligibility for
tariff preferences under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
because the Government failed to take steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights to workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law neither
prohibits nor protects workers' rights to organize and bargain
collectively. Wages in the private sector are set by contract between
employers and employees and are usually based on the rates for similar
work in the public sector.
There were no reports of efforts to form unions or of strikes
during the year.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law does not
prohibit forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, there
were no reports that such practices occurred.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no compulsory education law, but almost 98
percent of school-age children to grade 7 were enrolled in school (see
Section 5). The law bars children under 14 years of age from ``places
of waged work and from work that is not suitable for that child's age,
health, or physical ability or that might obstruct the education or
adversely affect the mentality or behavior of the child.'' The law also
prohibits government employment of children under the age of 16. There
were no reports of children being employed in the small industrial
sector, although children work in family fishing, agricultural, and
commercial activities. The hours of work of young workers were not
limited specifically by statute. A Unit for Children's Rights in the
Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare is responsible only for
monitoring compliance with the child labor regulations, not
enforcement.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The regulations for employee
relations specify the terms that must be incorporated into employment
contracts and address such issues as training, work hours, safety,
remuneration, leave, fines, and termination. There was no national
minimum wage for the private sector, although the Government has
established wage floors for certain kinds of work such as government
employment, which provided a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Given the severe shortage of labor, employers must offer
competitive pay and conditions to attract skilled workers.
There were no statutory provisions for hours of work, but the
regulations required that a work contract specify the normal work and
overtime hours on a weekly or monthly basis. In the public sector, a 7
hour day and a 5 day workweek have been established through
administrative circulars from the President's office. Overtime pay in
the public sector was instituted in 1990. There are no laws governing
health and safety conditions. There were regulatory requirements that
employers provide a safe working environment and ensure the observance
of safety measures. It was unclear whether workers can remove
themselves from unsafe working conditions without risking the loss of
their jobs. The Ministry of Trade, Industries, and Labor has a Labor
Dispute Settlement Unit to resolve wage and labor disputes and to visit
worksites and enforce labor regulations.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
to, from, or within the country. The Attorney General's Office believes
that should a case arise, it could be addressed under Shari'a.
__________
NEPAL
Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of
government. In 1990 the late King Birendra, formerly an absolute
monarch, legalized political parties, after which an interim government
promulgated a new Constitution. King Birendra's brother, King
Gyanendra, assumed the throne on June 4, 2001, after the late Crown
Prince Dipendra apparently killed King Birendra and nine members of the
royal family. The democratically elected Parliament consists of the
House of Representatives (lower house) and the National Assembly (upper
house). In 1999 the country's third national parliamentary elections
were held, which international observers considered to be generally
free and fair. At the request of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba,
King Gyanendra dissolved Parliament in May and set mid-term elections
for November 13. In October the King dissolved the caretaker
government, postponed elections indefinitely, and asked all major
political parties to nominate members to an interim Cabinet. On October
11, the King appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand as Prime Minister of an
interim government. After Maoist insurgents broke a 4-month ceasefire
with a series of violent attacks in November 2001, King Gyanendra,
acting on the advice of the Cabinet of Ministers, declared a nationwide
state of emergency which remained in effect until it expired on August
28. Under the Constitution's emergency provisions, the King suspended
several constitutional rights, including the right to assembly, the
right to public information, and the rights to opinion and expression.
These rights were restored after the expiration of the emergency on
August 28. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;
however, the courts often were inefficient and susceptible to political
pressure and corruption.
In 1996 the leaders of the Maoist United People's Front
(``Maoists'') launched a ``People's War'' that has led to continued
violence in 74 of the country's 75 districts. The insurrection has been
waged through torture, killings, bombings, extortion, and intimidation
against civilians and public officials.
The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) assumed responsibility for internal
security from the National Police Force at the beginning of the state
of emergency in November 2001 and continued this responsibility during
the year. The Army maintained internal security and was subject to
effective control of the King, who was its Supreme Commander. The
National Police Force continued to be subject to effective civilian
control. Local Chief District Officers (CDO's), who were civil servants
in the Home Ministry, have wide discretion in maintaining law and
order. An Act passed by Parliament in August 2001 provided for the
establishment of the paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF). There were
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the by the security forces. Some members of the security forces
committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
The country is extremely poor, with an annual per capita gross
domestic product of approximately $242; the population is 23.2 million.
More than 80 percent of the country's population support themselves
through subsistence agriculture. Principal crops include rice, wheat,
maize, jute, and potatoes. Tourism and the export of carpets and
garments were the major sources of foreign exchange. Foreign aid
accounted for more than half of the development budget. The economy was
mixed, with 39 public sector firms. Seventeen former government firms
have been privatized or liquidated since 1992, although the rate of
privatization was slow.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
continued to commit numerous abuses. The security forces used
unwarranted lethal force and continued to abuse detainees, using
torture as punishment or to extract confessions. Impunity remained a
problem. In the beginning of the state of emergency in November 2001
the Government stated that restrictions were targeted only at Maoist
insurgents; however, the security forces were given broad latitude to
arrest and detain individuals suspected of Maoist sympathies. The
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) investigated allegations of
human rights violations and recommended compensation for victims and
penalties for police officers who commit abuses. While the Government
had begun to pay compensation to some victims, the police officers
involved seldom were punished. The disappearance of persons in custody
was a problem. Prison conditions remained poor. The authorities used
arbitrary arrest and detention. Following the state of emergency
declaration, the King promulgated the Terrorist Ordinance that defined
a number of crimes, including taking up arms against the sovereignty
and security of the country, as acts of terrorism. The Ordinance also
allowed the Government to declare individuals as terrorists and detain
them for up to 90 days without charge; to hold persons under house
arrest; and to set up special courts for terrorists. The King also
promulgated a second order designating members of the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoists) and individuals involved with or assisting the
Maoists as terrorists. After the expiration of the state of emergency
on August 28, Maoist suspects were detained under the Terrorist and
Destructive Activities Act, which was passed by Parliament on April 4.
The Act allowed suspects to be detained without charge for up to 60
days and to be held in preventive detention for up to 90 days. The Act
provides for immunity for members of the security forces or others who
undertake ``bona fide'' actions to control terrorism. During the year,
none of the cases filed against Maoist suspects under the special anti-
terrorism legislation were tried. Lengthy pretrial detention, judicial
susceptibility to political pressure and corruption, and long delays in
trial procedures remained problems. The Government at times imposed
some restrictions on freedom of expression, and the media practiced
self-censorship. After the November 2001 declaration of the state of
emergency, several journalists and other individuals working for
Maoist-affiliated newspapers were arrested and the newspapers closed
down. Freedom of assembly was one of the constitutional rights
suspended after the declaration of emergency; however, the Government
subsequently clarified that only rallies and demonstrations by Maoist-
affiliated organizations were banned during the emergency. In practice,
only a few mass meeting or rallies took place during the emergency. The
Government restricted certain public celebrations by the Tibetan
community. The Constitution imposes restrictions on proselytizing to
spread religion. Women, persons with disabilities, and lower castes
suffered from widespread discrimination. Violence against women,
trafficking in women and girls for prostitution, and child labor also
remained serious problems. There have been instances of forced child
labor and forced labor in the past, but there were no cases reported
during the year. Nepal was invited by the Community of Democracies'
(CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
During the year, the Maoists increased the scope of their campaign,
frequently committing torture, killings, bombings, forcibly
conscripting children, and other abuses.
On February 21, the Government passed a law that prohibited the
practice of bonded ``Kamaiya'' laborers, established district-level
committees to supervise the rehabilitation of former Kamaiya laborers,
and provided for fines and other judicial measures for employers who
use Kamaiya labor. In March the Parliament passed a law allowing
unmarried adult women equal rights to inherit property from their
parents. In July the RNA created a human rights cell under its Adjutant
General Department to investigate reports of human rights violations.
During the year, the human rights cell conducted 8 investigations and
in two cases, the soldiers involved were disciplined; however, no
person faced a court martial.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The security forces
continued to commit extrajudicial killings. The Terrorism and
Destructive Activities Act passed by Parliament in April provides for
immunity for members of the security forces or other who undertake
``bona fide'' actions to control terrorism. Unlike the previous year,
there were no reports that police killed persons while trying to
control violent demonstrations. According to Amnesty International
(AI), some observers found the number of prisoners taken under
battlefield conditions to be low and concluded that many Maoist
fighters apparently were killed rather than taken prisoner.
Police also were responsible for deaths in custody. For example, on
March 15 soldiers arrested Kancha Dongol in Kathmandu on suspicion of
Maoist activities. An autopsy revealed he had been shot twice and was
severely beaten. After an initial investigation, two soldiers were
disciplined for dereliction of duty; further investigation into the
incident by the RNA was pending at year's end. On March 27, police in
Rayapur, Saptari shot and killed Ajabwal Yadav while in police custody,
according to local NGO the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC). On
May 2, INSEC reported the custodial death of Sakur Manihar in Krishna
Nagar, Kapilabastu. According to INSEC, some of his relatives believed
he was beaten to death during his detention at the police station in
Kapilabastu. On June 26, the local media reported that police in
Kathmandu killed Krishna Sen, a Maoist Central Committee member and
editor of the Maoist newspaper Jana Disha, while in police custody.
According to a local human rights organization, Krishna Sen's body
reportedly had been brought to a Kathmandu hospital by the police and
then quickly taken for cremation. The Government officially denied the
report and claimed that it had no information on Sen's arrest (see
Section2.a.). On August 4, police brought the body of Ram Hari Khadga,
who had been arrested earlier that day, to a hospital for an autopsy.
According to the police report, Khadga died while he attempted to jump
from a police vehicle while in motion. However, the autopsy found
injuries to his back, upper and lower limbs, and head consistent with
multiple blunt blows to the head. The autopsy determined Khadga likely
had been beaten to death.
There were no developments in the following 2001 cases: The death
of Bhadur Ale Magaar and Rita Banjara; the police killing of suspected
Maoist Madan Shestha; the death in custody of Kul Bahadur Malla,
Chandra Jumari B.K., and Tika Kumari Khatri in Tatopani; the police
killing of Prakash Ojha in Morang District; the police killing of
Chandradip Yadav, Uttimlal Yadav, and Devkumar Yadav; the investigation
of the police killing Bishnu Rai; the killing of Jit Bahadur Ghatri
(see Section 1.c.); or the January 2001 killing of five robbery
suspects in a jungle in Bara District.
On February 26, a member of the APF shot and killed a 14-year-old
girl in Chaumala, Kailali. According to press reports, the APF member
may have had a personal dispute with the girl's family. The APF
arrested the member and turned him over to the police for
investigation. At year's end, the policeman remained in jail awaiting
trial.
Civilians continued to be killed by security forces. In most cases
of unlawful or extrajudicial killings, the security forces claimed that
the victims were members of the Maoists. For example, according to AI,
on January 6, security forces killed 14-year-old Dalle Nepali in
Pipaltari, Myagdi district, while he was trying to run away without
making an attempt to arrest him. Security forces claimed the boy was a
member of the Maoists who had been killed while trying to escape from a
search operation. On February 26, soldiers shot and killed 32 laborers
in Kalikot District. According to press and human rights reports,
Maoists hid at the laborers' camp; however, they had reportedly fled by
the time the Army arrived. A Ministry of Defense press released noted
only that security forces killed 67 ``Maoists'' in Kalikot from
February 22-25. A Royal Nepal Army (RNA) investigation concluded that
the laborers killed were Maoist activists. On March 12, 10 members of
the National People's Front, a left-wing political party, were summoned
to an army camp in Bhingithe, Baglung District. Seven of the 10 persons
were released, and the bodies of the remaining three were found by
villagers the following day. The RNA said the three persons were
Maoists who were killed while trying to escape. On July 22, RNA troops
conducting a joint operation with police in Sarahawa, Bardiya, shot and
killed 12-year-old Rupa Tharu. After conducting an investigation, the
RNA recommended that her family be paid compensation for her death. On
October 29, a joint police and RNA patrol in Pandusen, Bajura
reportedly shot and killed Maoist suspect Padum Bahadur Shahi near a
field where he was working with other family members. On November 27,
RNA soldiers fired upon 5 boys returning after midnight from funeral
rites for a relative in Nuwakot District. The five boys, ranging in age
from 14 to 19, were killed. The local commander said the boys were
approaching a security perimeter and failed to heed an order to halt.
After an investigation was conducted into the incident, the RNA
recommended that the boys' families be paid compensation for their
deaths. In November five citizens attending a religious ceremony in
Rolpa District were killed by gunshots fired from an RNA-manned
helicopter. The RNA investigated the incident and found that the
aircraft had been fired upon first, therefore no persons have been
charged in connection with the killings. On December 4, RNA troops shot
and killed nine persons, ranging in age from 14 to 23 who were
celebrating a festival in Laximpur, Dang District. The RNA contended
that the nine persons were Maoists. At year's end, there reportedly was
no action taken against the responsible members of the RNA for the
deaths.
During the year, the RNA investigated the 2001 incident of 16-year-
old Jitendra Tharu and claimed that Tharu was killed in the crossfire
between the police and Maoists. Another local human rights organization
reported that RNA troops shot and killed 11 villagers holding a meeting
in Dang District in November 2001. During the year, the RNA
investigated the incident and determined that the army units were fired
upon first.
There were no developments in the November 2001 killing of eight
Maoists, four NGO employees, and a local civilian, or in the December
2001 death of Dil Bahadur Ram.
Unlike in previous years, there were no reports that police fired
into crowds during the year. In May 2001, police fired into a crowd in
Lamjung protesting government corruption, killing Shuk Man Gurung, the
Khudi Village Development Chairman.
In September 2001, police in Parsa District in the south-central
part of the country shot and killed one civilian while attempting to
quell a riot between long-time residents of the lowland area and
alleged Maoist migrants from the hills. The incident was under
investigation by the Home Ministry at year's end.
In October 2001, police in Tulsipur, Dang District, shot into a
crowd of violent rioters, killing a 25-year-old man and injuring nine
others. The rioters were vandalizing and setting fire to buses in
protest after a bus hit and killed two students.
The Appellate Court in Lalitpur was investigating the cases of five
persons killed by police attempting to control violent riots at the end
of December 2000 in Kathmandu. According to the Home Ministry, the
Government has paid the families of the deceased slightly more than
$650 each (NRs 50,000) and fined the officers involved.
Police, armed personnel, insurgents, and noncombatants continue to
be killed in the increasingly violent ``People's War.'' Launched in
1996 by leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal (``Prachanda'') and Baburam
Bhattarai, the ``People's War'' is a self-declared Maoist insurgency.
The Government continued to commit human rights abuses in its efforts
to combat the insurgency. Approximately 3,040 Maoists were killed by
security forces during the year. Some of the deaths were believed to
have been extrajudicial killings. In August 2001, the NHRC recommended
disciplinary action against police officials responsible for ordering
police to fire into a meeting of the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal
Women's Association in Bharatpur in late 2000, killing one woman and
injuring several others. The Commission also has recommended that the
Government pay compensation of more than $1,300 (NRs 100,000) to the
family of the woman who was killed and lesser amounts to four of the
injured.
Maoists were responsible for numerous abuses. Maoist rebels clashed
with security forces repeatedly during the year. Police fatalities
totaled 446; RNA fatalities totaled 204; and APF fatalities totaled 96
for the year. For example, on January 28, three policemen, including
the Officer in Charge of the District, were killed when their vehicle
hit a landmine in Kailali. On September 7, 49 policemen were killed by
Maoists in a police post in Bhiman, Sindhuli. On September 8, 32
policemen were killed in a Maoist attack on district headquarters in
Sandhikharkha, Arghakhanchi. On November 15, 33 policemen were killed
in a Maoist attack on the district headquarter in Jumla.
On April 12, Maoists attacked an APF post in Satbariya, Dang,
killing 37 members of the paramilitary force. On May 7, 17 APF members
were killed in an attack in Gam, Rolpa.
On February 17, 55 RNA members were killed when Maoists attacked
district headquarters in Mangelsen, Achham. On May 7, Maoists attacked
a combined police/army post in Gam, Rolpa, killing 35 soldiers. On
September 8, Maoists attacked a district headquarters in Sandhikharkha,
Arghakhanchi, and killed 17 soldiers. On November 15, 4 soldiers were
killed in a Maoist attack on district headquarters in Jumla.
Although their activities were focused on the security forces, the
Maoists continued to kill and injure civilians and politicians. The
insurgents killed 518 civilians during the year. For example, on
January 16, Maoists abducted, shot, and killed schoolteacher and local
AI Coordinator Mukti Nath Adhikari in Chandeshwor, Lamjung (see Section
4). On February 22, Maoists torched a bus and killed five persons in
Bandhara, Chitwan, including an 8-year-old girl. On March 12, Village
Development Chairman Ram Mani Gyawali was tortured and killed in
Kerung, Arghakhanchi. On March 21, Maoists abducted and killed Lekhnath
Gautam, a teacher and a local AI member. On May 31, the program
director for the NGO Plan International, Ishwor Lal Joshi, was shot and
killed in Baitadi District. On June 4, local Nepal Red Cross Vice
President Dhruva Dev Acharya was shot and killed by Maoists in Devghat,
Tanahun. According to AI, on July 9, 300 Maoists dragged all male
villagers above age 15 from their homes in Banke district. The Maoists
proceeded to beat 25 persons with clubs, rifle butts, and spears, after
accusing them of handing over two Maoists to the police earlier in the
day. Two men died after the beatings and several others were wounded
severely. On August 16, Manohar Pratap Malla, the son of a former
minister, was killed by Maoists in Dhanusha District. On November 9, a
Nepali contract guard supervisor was shot and killed by Maoists in his
home in Kathmandu. On November 14, Maoists killed Chakra Bahadur
Dagaura, a UML member of parliament, in the western district of
Kailali. The motive behind the killing remained unclear; however,
family members claimed that Dagaura had refused to donate money to the
militants.
Although their activities were focused on the Government, Maoists
also used bombs on civilians. On March 2, a 16-year-old student was
killed in a Maoist bomb blast at a school in Siddhikali, Sankhuwasabha.
On September 16, Shiva Pariyar was killed by a bomb during a Maoist
general strike in Hamja, Kaski. On November 8, a 14-year-old boy was
killed in a Maoist bomb blast in Banepa, Kavre.
In December 2001, Maoists stabbed Nepali Congress activist Megh
Bahadur Baniya to death in Chinnebas, Syangja District. In December
2001, two assailants claiming to be Maoists shot and killed Ramesh
Manandhar, a plainclothes foreign Embassy guard, on duty in Kathmandu.
In December 2001, a group of 15-20 Maoists in Dailekh District beat to
death Janak Thapa. In December 2001, Maoists killed a primary school
headmaster and a former President of the Village Development Committee
in Gorkha District. In December 2001, Maoists shot and killed a 23-
year-old man in Tara Khola, Baglung District.
The Government and the Maoists declared a ceasefire in July 2001
and held three rounds of talks in August, September, and November 2001.
Following the third round of talks, the Maoists unilaterally broke the
ceasefire in November 2001 with attacks on police, army, and APF
personnel in several districts. The insurgency has resulted in the
deaths of an estimated 6,600 persons, including 954 policemen; 238
soldiers; 102 members of the APF; 858 civilians; and 4,444 insurgents.
In September 2001, several villagers beat to death 60-year-old
Malechhiya Devi in Bela Ekdara, Mahottari District, on suspicion of
witchcraft. One person has been jailed in connection with the case;
four others absconded (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--The disappearance of persons while in the
custody of the security forces is a problem. On April 4, Parliament
passed the Terrorist and Destructive Activities Act, which contains
many of the same anti-terrorism features as the Ordinance, but without
the accompanying restrictions on civil rights. According to the INSEC,
269 civilians have disappeared in government custody since 1996 and 32
have disappeared during the year. According to AI 66 persons have
disappeared in government custody during the year. According to AI, on
July 2, Som Bahadur Ghale Tamang, General Secretary of the Tamang
Indigenous People's Organization, disappeared after he reportedly was
arrested by members of the APF in his home in Kathmandu. The previous
day he had participated in a peaceful march for indigenous rights in
Kathmandu.
On June 11, Khim Lal Devkota, a member of the Nepal Bar
Association, was arrested at his law firm in Kathmandu. After the
police and the Army denied having detained Devkota, a habeas corpus
petition was filed with the Supreme Court by his wife on June 18.
Devkota was released from detention after the Supreme Court ordered his
release September 24.
According to AI, on July 15, Bishnu Prasad Gyawali was arrested by
soldiers from his shop in Fulbari, Kailali District. Authorities claim
that Gyawali was arrested on suspicion of having supplied food to the
Maoists. Authorities have acknowledged his detainment; however, they
have given no information about his whereabouts or allowed his family
to visit him.
On July 29, Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, a teacher and a member of the
Maoists' Joint Revolutionary Council, reportedly was arrested from his
Kathmandu home by plainclothes security personnel. He subsequently was
released on December 16 (see Section 4). According to local press
reports, on August 19, security forces arrested Tendi Sherpa, advisor
to the Nepal Sherpa Students' Forum and president of a local unit of
the All Nepal National Free Students' Union. The police and the Army
maintain that they have no knowledge of the whereabouts of Tendi
Sherpa.
There were no developments in the disappearances of Shiva Prasad
Sharma in February 2001, and Dinesh Sharma in November 2000.
Police statistics indicate that the Maoists have abducted 227
policemen since 1996. During the year, 6 of the 227 remained missing.
On July 13, 2001 Maoists surrounded a police post in Rolpa in the west,
taking dozens of policemen hostage. The Army subsequently confronted
the insurgents, and a standoff ensued. Representatives of human rights
groups who arrived in Rolpa within days to mediate state that the
Maoists released 22 of the police hostages at that time, and may have
released more thereafter. Since no hostages were handed over directly
to the Government, the Government cannot confirm those releases. In
September 2001, the Maoists released 5 policemen previously captured in
Banke, and in 2001 released 17 of those captured in Rolpa to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In October 2001,
Maoists released an additional eight policemen to the ICRC. According
to the Home Ministry, all of the police originally missing from Rolpa
have been accounted for.
According to the Government, the Maoists have abducted 968
civilians since 1996. INSEC reported that Maoists abducted 132 persons
during the year and that at year's end 470 civilians remained missing
since the beginning of the insurgency in 1996. On May 7, Maoists
kidnaped Om Kumar Amoli, a high school principal, and Bhakti Devkota, a
teacher, in Putu, Surkhet. On May 15, Maoists kidnaped Narayan Prasad
Subedi, General Secretary of the Nepal Red Cross in Rolpa District. On
September 19, Maoists abducted approximately 200 persons, including
students and teachers from a village in Ramechhap District. The
students ranged in age from 12 to 16. According to the Ramechhap CDO,
the hostages were taken to a nearby town and released later in the day.
In July 2001, Maoists kidnaped former Nepali Congress MP and Bajura
District Development Chairman Dev Raj Joshi. He was released September
2001. In September 2001, Maoists abducted two members of the Chaughada
Village Development Committee in Nuwakot. One escaped the following day
and the other was released within 48 hours, but claimed he had been
beaten during his detention.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Civil Code
prohibits acts such as beating and mutilation; however, security forces
at times used torture and beatings to punish suspects or to extract
confessions. According to AI, torture methods included rape, boxing of
the ears, beating of the feet, and the rolling of weights over the
thighs. AI noted that torture apparently was used to intimidate or
punish detainees and to extract information and/or confessions, and
that torture often occurred while detainees were held incommunicado and
unable to contact family members, doctors, or lawyers (see Section
1.d.). The Government sometimes failed to conduct thorough and
independent investigations of reports of security force brutality and
generally did not take significant disciplinary action against officers
involved.
Members of the security forces often were unwilling to investigate
and to discipline fellow officers, and persons were afraid to bring
cases against the police or Army for fear of reprisals. The Government
provides human rights education for the police force, and soldiers
receive human rights education as part of their regular training.
The Constitution and the Torture Compensation Act provide for
compensation for victims of torture. According to the Center for
Victims of Torture (CVICT), 7 persons filed for compensation under the
act during the year, compared to 7 claims during 2001. CVICT said that
one new case was awarded compensation during the year.
On May 7, security forces arrested Bharat Khadga on suspicion of
being a Maoist in Chitwan. Khadga, who worked for a local NGO, was
administered electric shocks while in custody. He was released on May
9. A complaint was filed with the Royal Nepal Army, which conducted an
investigation. The Government said that one of the officers involved in
the incident was forced into early retirement and the other officer was
barred from taking a staff college entrance examination.
On May 30, security forces arrested Indra Kumar Acharya and his 19-
year-old daughter Yuvati on suspicion of being a Maoist in Liwang,
Rolpa. According to INSEC, Yuvati was beaten during interrogation and
her father stripped, stepped on, hanged upside down, and tortured. Both
were released on June 2.
According to INSEC, on June 12, police arrested 16-year-old
Chetkana Adhikary in Banke District on theft charges. After his
release, the boy's father filed a complaint with the Alliance for Human
Rights and Social Justice. The father alleged that the boy was beaten
while in custody with batons and tire tubes, and tortured with bamboo
rollers. At year's end, no action has been taken on the complaint.
According to AI, in April two RNA officers raped two teenaged girls
at an Army barracks in Nepalganj, Bank District. After the December 19
publication of the AI report recounting the incident, the girls and
their families recanted, and denied that the rapes occurred. Human
rights groups suspected the girls recanted under pressure and further
investigation of the incident by the RNA was pending at year's end.
On July 16, a woman was abducted from her teashop by five members
of the paramilitary APF in Mahottari District. According to CVICT, the
woman was gangraped and beaten. When the woman brought the case to the
District Police Office, the office refused to accept her rape complaint
because the 35-day deadline between the incident and her filing date
had expired. By year's end, the case was refiled in the district court.
According to CVICT, on July 22, Krishna Lohani B.K. was arrested in
Dharan, Sunsari District, and reportedly tortured by police. Upon her
release, CVICT filed a torture compensation case; however, by year's
end no action was taken. On October 24, Krishna Lohani's husband, Ram
Bahadur B.K., was arrested and reportedly tortured by police. He was
released in December. At year's end, no action was taken against the
members of the police involved in the case of Ram Bahadur B.K.
The law prohibits trafficking in persons and prescribes
imprisonment of up to 20 years for infractions; however, trafficking in
women and girls remained a serious problem in several of the country's
poorest areas, and border guards commonly accepted bribes from
traffickers (see Section 6.f.).
In May 2001, four persons filed a torture compensation case,
claiming they were beaten during their detention on criminal charges in
Jhapa District. In June 2001, five members of a family who had come to
the Chief District Office in Nepalgunj to obtain citizenship
certificates were detained for 2 days as suspected Maoists. At least
two of the five claimed they were beaten while in police custody.
AI conducted an official visit to the country from September 9 to
23. As a result of that visit, AI recorded many persons testimony of
torture by all arms of the security forces. In November 2000, AI
recommended amendments to the Torture Compensation Act, including
changes to the Penal Code that would make torture a specific offense
under criminal law. The Government has taken no action on suggested
changes to the law. Human rights groups have reported instances of
torture in areas affected by the ``People's War.''
Local and international human rights groups also have documented
Maoist violence in areas affected by the ``People's War,'' including
the severing of limbs. The Maoists most often have targeted political
leaders, local elites, teachers, local-level civil servants, and
suspected informers. These targets included not only members of the
majority Nepali Congress Party (NCP), but also members of the
opposition Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist/Leninist (CPN-UML).
According to the Government, human rights groups, and the media,
Maoists conscripted civilians, including children, into service and
have used abducted civilians as human shields during attacks on army
and police posts (see Section 5).
Throughout the year, Maoists looted banks and bombed or set fire to
government offices and homes of local political leaders. International
nongovernmental organization (NGO) offices also were attacked on
several occasions, as were schools, businesses, infrastructure, and
factories. At year's end, Maoists destroyed approximately one-third of
the Village Development Committee buildings throughout the country. On
March 30, Maoists attacked a hydroelectric plant in Jhimruk, Pyuthan
and left three districts without electricity. On April 23, Maoists
hijacked three Nepal Red Cross ambulances on the Dhading/Chitwan
border. On May 17, Maoists detonated a bomb at an INGO-funded orphanage
and boarding school in Surkhet District (see Section 1.a.). On August
8, Maoists detonated a bomb at a private business college in Kathmandu.
There also were cases of intimidation, torture, or other degrading
treatment. On February 18, five Maoists armed with guns and knives
attacked a 55-year-old gas station owner in Chitwan District. The armed
Maoists stabbed him in the back, head, and hands, chopping off one of
his fingers. His son was shot and killed in the attack. On April 5,
Maoists abducted journalist Demling Lama from his home in
Sindhupalchowk district. Lama, who managed to escape after a few days,
said he was severely tortured while in Maoist custody (see Section
2.a.). According to INSEC, on June 23, Maoists abducted Ramesh Prasad
Neupane of Kumari, Nuwakot District and tortured him for 3 days before
he was allowed to return home.
According to the press, in September 2001, a Maoist cadre in the
local ``people's government'' in Nuwakot district raped a 12-year-old
girl. Government and opposition members of parliament demanded that the
Maoist leadership take action against the suspect. According to press
reports, a Maoist ``people's court'' convicted the suspect and decided
he should be beaten. This sentence reportedly was carried out at the
end of September 2001.
Prison conditions were poor. Overcrowding was common in prisons,
and authorities sometimes handcuff or fetter detainees. According to
the Department of Prisons, there were 6,877 persons in jail, of which
approximately 50 percent were awaiting trial. Women normally were
incarcerated separately from men, but in similar conditions.
Due to a lack of adequate juvenile detention facilities, children
sometimes were incarcerated with adults, either with an incarcerated
parent, or as criminal offenders. In November 2001, the Government
began transferring children detained in jail to two residential
facilities that provide education in accord with a provision in the
1992 Children's Act. By year's end, 28 dependent children of inmates
and 8 juvenile offenders had moved into the residential facilities and
begun school. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of
children in jail or custody as suspected or convicted criminals;
however, there were reports of children held under the anti-terrorist
laws as suspected Maoists (see Section 5). On December 17 the Supreme
Court ordered the release of 16-year-old Diwakar Adhikari, who had been
held in prison since December 2001, as a suspected Maoist. He
subsequently was released by the police.
According to INSEC, in November 2001, Jit Bahadur Ghatri was
arrested by the RNA in Dang District. He subsequently died in the
hospital on November 30, 2001. The cause of his death was unknown.
In 2000 the Government established separate juvenile benches in
district courts where youth are tried. As a result, trials of persons
under the age of 18 now occur in a separate room in the courthouse,
though there are no separate juvenile courts as such.
The authorities are more likely to transfer sick prisoners to
hospitals than they were in the past. However, due to the inadequacy of
appropriate facilities, the authorities sometimes place mentally ill
prisoners in jails under inhumane conditions.
The Government permits local human rights groups and the ICRC to
visit prisons. During the year, the ICRC conducted 97 visits to 38
police stations and 59 jails nationwide. The ICRC registered 1,674 new
detainees in 42 out of the country's 75 districts. According to the
ICRC, it ``will continue to seek access'' to detainees in army custody.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that the authorities must arraign or release a suspect
within 24 hours of arrest, but the police at times violated this
provision. Under the law, the police must obtain warrants for an arrest
unless a person is caught in the act of committing a crime. For many
offenses, the case must be filed in court within 7 days of arrest. If
the court upholds the detention, the law authorizes the police to hold
the suspect for 25 days to complete their investigation, with a
possible extension of 7 days. However, the police occasionally held
prisoners longer. The Supreme Court has, in some cases, ordered the
release of detainees held longer than 24 hours without a court
appearance. Some foreigners, including refugees, have reported
difficulty in obtaining bail.
Detainees have the legal right to receive visits by family members,
and they are permitted access to lawyers once authorities file charges.
In practice the police grant access to prisoners on a basis that varies
from prison to prison; however, Maoist suspects often were denied
visits from family members and lawyers. There was a system of bail, but
bonds were too expensive for most citizens. Due to court backlogs, a
slow appeals process, and poor access to legal representation, pretrial
detention often exceeded the period to which persons subsequently were
sentenced after a trial and conviction.
Under the Public Security Act, the authorities may detain persons
who allegedly threaten domestic security and tranquility, amicable
relations with other countries, or relations between citizens of
different classes or religions. Persons whom the Government detained
under the Act were considered to be in preventive detention and could
be held for up to 6 months without being charged with a crime. The
authorities may extend periods of detention after submitting written
notices to the Home Ministry. The police must notify the district court
of the detention within 24 hours, and it may order an additional 6
months of detention before authorities file official charges. Human
rights groups allege that the police have used arbitrary arrest and
detention during the ``People's War'' to intimidate communities
considered sympathetic to the Maoists.
Under the state of emergency, which remained in effect from
November 26, 2001 to August 28, the security forces were allowed to
detain persons without charge for 90 days, with the possibility of
another 90-day extension from the Home Ministry. Detainees arrested on
suspicion of terrorism under the state of emergency are not guaranteed
the right to counsel or family visits. Under the Terrorism and
Destructive Activities Act passed by Parliament on April 4, suspects
must appear before a court within 60 days after their arrest. The
suspects may be held in preventive detention for up to 90 days;
however, in practice many suspects were held much longer. According to
government sources, 6,075 suspected Maoists have been arrested during
the year. Of that number, authorities plan to file cases against 5,465
and 610 remain under investigation. At year's end, none of the cases
have been tried. Figures for the number of persons being detained by
the Army who are suspected of being Maoist were unavailable by year's
end. For example, on March 3, Gopal Budhatoki, editor of Sanghu, was
detained by the RNA because he had published a ``seditious'' article on
the RNA; Budhatoki was released on March 26.
Other laws, including the Public Offenses Act, permit arbitrary
detention. This act and its many amendments cover crimes such as
disturbing the peace, vandalism, rioting, and fighting. Human rights
monitors expressed concern that the act vests too much discretionary
power in the CDO, the highest-ranking civil servant in each of the
country's 75 districts. The act authorized the CDO to order detentions,
to issue search warrants, and to specify fines and other punishments
for misdemeanors without judicial review. Few recent instances of the
use of the Public Offenses Act have been reported, since it has become
more common to arrest persons under the Terrorism and Destructive
Activities Act, particularly Maoists. In 2000 local authorities in
Biratnagar arrested Laxmi Mudbari, the central member of the Maoist-
affiliated All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary), under the
act; Mudbari remained incarcerated at year's end. Human rights
commission officials reported several other cases of arrests or
detentions under the Public Offenses Act, but were unable to provide
details of the cases.
Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of police re-
arresting persons on court premises immediately following their release
by the courts.
Authorities detained journalists and their advocates on occasion,
on suspicion of having ties to or sympathy for the Maoists (see Section
2.a.). According to INSEC, 123 Nepali journalists have been arrested or
detained under the Terrorist and Destructive Activities Ordinance. At
year's end, 24 journalists were in government detention and 2 remained
in Maoist detention.
There were no reports of political detainees.
The Constitution prohibits exile and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, lower level courts remain vulnerable to
political pressure, and bribery of judges and court staff is endemic.
The Supreme Court has the right to review the constitutionality of
legislation passed by Parliament. In the past it has ruled that
provisions in the Labor Act and in the Nepal Citizenship Act are
unconstitutional. The Court also decided that the dissolution of the
Parliament at the request of a former Prime Minister was
unconstitutional, and ordered the legislature restored. In September
2001, the Court found Prime Minister Deuba's decision to freeze land
sales unconstitutional.
Appellate and district courts have become increasingly independent,
although sometimes they remained susceptible to political pressures. In
Rolpa, one of the districts most affected by the ``People's War,''
human rights groups have accused the district courts of acting in
complicity with CDOs in violating detainees' rights. Human rights
groups alleged that arrest without a warrant, prolonged detention
without trial, and police torture occurred in Maoist-affected areas.
The judicial system consists of three levels: District Courts,
Appellate Courts, and the Supreme Court. The King appoints judges on
the recommendation of the Judicial Council, a constitutional body
chaired by the Chief Justice. The Council also was responsible for the
assignment of judges, disciplinary action, and other administrative
matters. Judges decide cases; there was no jury system. In December
2000, the Government established a Special Court with jurisdiction to
hear cases related to narcotics trafficking; trafficking in women and
girls; crimes against the state; and crimes related to foreign
currency, such as counterfeiting and money laundering.
Delays in the administration of justice were a severe problem.
According to the latest statistics, the Supreme Court had a backlog of
16,654 cases; the appellate courts 11,235; and district courts 31,005.
Under the state of emergency, the right to constitutional remedy
(except habeas corpus) was suspended, and the Supreme Court temporarily
suspended accepting new civil rights cases. By year's end, seventeen
cases have been filed in Appellate Courts against suspected Maoists
arrested under special anti-terrorism laws; however, none of these
cases have been brought to trial.
The Constitution provides for the right to counsel, equal
protection under the law, protection from double jeopardy, protection
from retroactive application of the law, and public trials, except in
some security and customs cases. All lower court decisions, including
acquittals, were subject to appeal. The Supreme Court was the court of
last appeal, but the King may grant pardons. The King also can suspend,
commute, or remit any sentence. On the recommendation of the
Government, the King often pardons up to 12 prisoners on national
holidays, if they have served 75 percent of their sentence and shown
good behavior.
Although prisoners have a constitutional right to legal
representation and a court appointed lawyer, a government lawyer or
access to private attorneys was provided only on request. Consequently,
those persons unaware of their rights may be deprived of legal
representation. Suspects detained under the Terrorism and Destructive
Activities Act often are denied access to both attorneys and family
members.
There have been reports of cases in which authorities allegedly
penalized attorneys involved in the defense of human rights. According
to INSEC, seven attorneys were arrested for suspected Maoism since the
beginning of the state of emergency on November 26, 2001. On March 12,
Saligram Sapkota, a member of the Nepal Bar Association, was arrested
in Nepalgunj, Banke District by the security forces. His wife reported
bruises on Sapkota's face and marks on his leg and thigh. He was
released on June 14. According to AI, on March 14, Ramnath Mainali, a
member of the Nepal Bar Association, was arrested in Kathmandu. Mainali
was the legal advisor for the Maoist affiliated publication Janadesh
Weekly and had filed a habeas corpus petition for one of the
publication's editors. Mainali was released on July 10.
Military courts adjudicate cases concerning military personnel, who
are immune from prosecution in civilian courts. Military courts do not
try civilians for crimes involving the military services.
The authorities may prosecute terrorism or treason cases under the
Treason Act. Specially constituted tribunals hear these trials in
closed sessions. No such trials have occurred during the past 6 years.
In districts where Maoists have gained effective control, the
insurgents have set up ``people's courts.'' Although these courts
generally decide civil cases, in 2001 eight policemen who surrendered
in Dailekh were reportedly found guilty of crimes against the people by
a hastily constituted ``people's court'' and summarily were executed.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with
privacy, family, home or correspondence; however, under the state of
emergency, security forces were allowed the right to search homes,
vehicles, and places of business without a search warrant. Search
warrants were required before searches and seizures may be carried out,
except in cases involving suspected security and narcotics violations.
The law empowers the police to issue warrants for searches and seizures
in criminal cases upon receipt of information about criminal
activities. Within 24 hours of their issuance, warrants in misdemeanor
cases must be approved by the CDO. Court judges must approve them in
felony cases. Following renewed violence in November 2001 the King
declared a state of emergency nationwide, in which many constitutional
rights, including the right to privacy, were suspended. Under the
Terrorism and Destructive Activities Act, the security forces may
conduct searches as long as they inform the subject of the search ``in
advance.'' Since that time travelers have been stopped and subjected to
vehicle and body searches by security personnel at roadblocks in many
areas of the country.
Government provisions permitted discrimination in employment on the
basis of political opinion; however, such discrimination was not known
to occur.
The Government continued to provide food relief through the Nepal
Food Corporation to needy citizens, including those in areas controlled
by the Maoists. The Government delivered food rations to District
Development Offices for distribution.
Military commanders in some conflict areas prohibited some medical
items and blockaded food shipments. The Government maintained that such
incidents occurred at the direction of individual commanders and was
not a governmental policy.
Maoist commanders in certain areas also reportedly blockaded food
and medical supplies and impeded the delivery of health care services
by interdicting travel by health workers and by confiscating supplies.
Section 2. Respect For Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution specifies that
all citizens shall have freedom of thought and expression and that the
Government may not censor any news item or other reading material;
however, the Government imposed restrictions on these rights. The
Constitution prohibits speech and writing that would threaten the
sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom; disturb the harmonious
relations among persons of different castes or communities; promote
sedition, defamation, contempt of court, or crime; or contradict decent
public behavior or morality.
In November 2001, King Gyanendra declared a state of national
emergency which lasted until August 28. According to the Constitution,
several civil rights, including freedom of expression, may be curtailed
for the duration of the state of emergency. The Government announced
that restrictions under the emergency were intended to target the
Maoists and not the general population; however, journalists and
editors of several mainstream publications were detained during the
emergency. Several journalists and editors of Maoist-affiliated
newspapers also were detained and their newspaper offices closed after
the emergency was announced. Government authorities also requested the
press in general not to run stories favorably portraying the Maoists.
Approximately 100 journalists had been detained for varying amounts of
time since the beginning of the state of emergency. By year's end, 24
journalists and 9 other employees of newspapers continued to be
detained. On March 3, Gopal Budathoki, editor and publisher of the
Sanghu Weekly was abducted from his home by plainclothes security
forces. On March 6, former-Prime Minister Deuba defended Budathoki's
arrest, stating that Budathoki's paper had published articles
detrimental to the morale of the army. He was released from custody on
March 26. On March 16, Shyam Shrestha, editor of the monthly
publication Mulyankan was detained, along with two human rights
activists, by security forces at Tribhuvan International Airport. He
was released from detention on March 26. According to the Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) on November 12, police detained Tikaram Rai,
editor of the Nepali-language daily Aparanha. He was released on
November 14. On November 29, Journalists and human rights activists
filed a petition in court claiming compensation for illegal detention
and severe torture during the state of emergency. By year's end, there
had been no further developments in this petition.
The Press and Publications Act provides for the licensing of
publications and the granting of credentials to journalists. The act
also includes penalties for violating these requirements. In addition,
the act prohibits publication of material that, among other things,
promotes disrespect toward the King or the royal family; that
undermines security, peace, order, the dignity of the King, or the
integrity or sovereignty of the Kingdom; that creates animosity among
persons of different castes and religions; or that adversely affects
the good conduct or morality of the public. The act also provides a
basis for banning foreign publications; however, foreign publications
were widely available.
There were hundreds of independent vernacular and English-language
newspapers available, representing various political points of view.
The Government ownes ``Gorkhapatra,'' a Nepali-language daily, and
``The Rising Nepal,'' the largest English-language daily. Editors and
writers at government newspapers practiced self-censorship and
generally reflected government policy. Editors and writers at some
private newspapers practice self-censorship as well. Ruling political
parties have influenced the editorial policy of the Government
newspapers to their advantage. Views of human rights groups, the
statements of the police, and the press releases of Maoist leaders were
reported in the press prior to the imposition of the state of emergency
and after its expiration.
Some journalists and their advocates have suffered human rights
abuses. In March 2001, the Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus
releasing Krishna Sen from jail (see Section 1.a.). He was arrested in
1999 in connection with the publication of an interview with a Maoist
leader. Sen immediately was rearrested and moved to another jail in
Mahottari District. Sen told the press that police forced him to sign
an acknowledgement of his release even though he still was in police
custody. Following protests from journalists across the country, Sen
was released March 14, 2001. In May, local newspaper Jana Astha
reported that Krishna Sen, editor of the daily Janadisha, was re-
arrested and killed in custody. The Government denied the claim. No
investigation into Krishna's death was initiated by year's end. There
were no developments in the case of the January 2000 killing of Shambhu
Prasad Patel.
The Broadcast Act allows private television and FM radio
broadcasts, but implementation of the Act has been slow. The Government
owned one television station, and controlled one radio station that
broadcasts both AM and FM signals. Radio, primarily short and medium
waves, reaches the greatest number of persons and has the largest
influence. Government-owned Radio Nepal broadcasts throughout the
country through a series of repeater stations. With privatization of a
number of radio bands, there has been a marked increase in the range of
programming options available. In January 2001, the Government issued a
circular to private radio stations in the country reiterating a
previous but little-enforced ban on the collection and broadcast by
independent radio stations of news other than that provided by Radio
Nepal. In July 2001, the Supreme Court annulled the Government's order.
As a result, privately owned FM stations can broadcast their own
independently collected news but also must broadcast Radio Nepal news
at least once daily. The Government does not restrict access to foreign
radio broadcasts, private cable networks, or to the purchase of
television satellite dishes. Indian, Chinese, and Pakistani broadcast
television also was readily available in many parts of the country.
Two private cable television networks operated in the Kathmandu
Valley. They mainly provided entertainment programming, but commentary
critical of government policies occasionally occurred during publicly
broadcast discussion programs. An additional two private operators were
granted licenses; however, the two operators have not begun
broadcasting. Throughout the country, local entrepreneurs also received
international stations via satellite for viewing in local bars, and
resold the signal to local residents. Television time on the
Government-owned television station also was leased to private
producers. In addition to the state-owned television station, two
private television stations were licensed to produce and broadcast
programs. One of those stations broadcasted through leased time slots
on Television Nepal; the other through a Thai company's satellite.
During the year the Government expanded to 25 the number of private
FM broadcasting licenses; 20 were operating. Private stations must
broadcast the Government station's news program but also were permitted
to rebroadcast news from abroad. Private radio stations, like print
media, practiced self-censorship.
There have been many debates about liberalizing the media and
privatizing government-owned media. This debate has put pressure, which
successive governments so far have resisted, to open the airwaves and
divest government-controlled printing operations. However, private FM
radio and cable and satellite television have overtaken the
Government's ability to regulate them.
The Government licensed 15 companies for Internet and e-mail
services.
There were no government efforts to curtail academic freedom during
the year; however, security forces killed 4 teachers as suspected
Maoists during the year.
The Maoists did not tolerate freedom of expression. They tightly
restricted the print and broadcast media under its control. The Maoists
killed some of those reporting and publishing on human rights. On April
5, Maoists abducted Demling Lama, a correspondent for Radio Nepal and
the Himalaya Times, from his home in Sindhupalchowk District. He
reportedly was tortured while in custody. He escaped and reported the
incident to the police and the press (see Section 1.c.). On August 20,
Maoists killed Nawaraj Sharma, editor of the Karnali Sandesh, in
Kalikot District. On December 11, Maoists abducted and killed Ambika
Timilsena, a former reporter for the Maoist-affiliated newspaper
Janadesh. On April 29, Maoists destroyed the transmitting station of
the state-owned Radio Nepal in Guaridana, Mahottari District.
Maoist groups exorted money from private schools and teachers and
sometimes inflicted punishment on school officials. Threats and
intimidation from Maoist-affiliated All Nepal National Independent
Student Union (Revolutionary) (ANNISU-R) succeeded in closing down more
than 200 private schools, primarily in areas most heavily affected by
Maoist activities. Two private schools in Kathmandu remain closed, one
permanently. The ANNISU-R demanded, often violently, the halving of
tuition, curriculum changes, and the banning of the singing of the
national anthem. The Maoists have killed 40 teachers since the
beginning of the insurgency in 1996 and have destroyed 25 school
buildings. Teachers in Maoist-affected areas reported regular threats
and extortion demands from the Maoists. The Department of Education
estimated that 3,000 teachers have been displaced, beaten, or killed by
Maoists since 1996. On February 23; March 4-5; April 23-27; September
16; and on October 1-2, Maoists enforced strikes that effectively
closed down nearly all public and private schools across the nation. On
December 9-22 the Maoists enforced a strike that closed private schools
in the Kathmandu Valley. On May 11, Maoists set on fire the Mahendra
Sanskrit University in Dang District and destroyed the facility. On May
17, Maoists set off a bomb at an NGO-funded orphanage and private
school in Surkhet District.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association; however, the
Government restricted these rights on vague grounds, such as
undermining the sovereignty and integrity of the State or disturbing
law and order. Freedom of assembly was one of the civil rights
suspended under the state of emergency. The Government required that
organizers apply for permits for public rallies and demonstrations.
Except for the duration of the state of emergency, large public
demonstrations were common, and police intervention was rare except in
cases where crowds became violent or violated the terms of their parade
permit. Local authorities in Kathmandu halted a number of public
celebrations by the Tibetan community throughout the year. Police in
Kathmandu prevented a Tibetan cultural program in honor of the
thirteenth birthday of the eleventh Panchen Lama on April 28. In 2001
local authorities in Boudhanath, Kathmandu, halted the performance of a
traditional dance scheduled to be performed during the 6-day
celebration of the Tibetan New Year.
In September 2001, the Kathmandu Chief District Officer imposed a
1-month ban on all public meetings in anticipation of a massive Maoist
rally to be held in September 2001. The Government rescinded the ban in
September 2001, after the Maoists agreed to cancel the march.
In December 2000, police stopped a procession of Tibetan school
children, monks, and others on their way to Swyambounath Temple in
Kathmandu to celebrate the Dalai Lama's fiftieth anniversary of his
assumption of state responsibility. No injuries were reported.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and permits the practice of all religions; however,
proselytizing was prohibited and punishable with fines or imprisonment,
and members of minority religions occasionally complained of police
harassment. Some Christian groups were concerned that the ban on
proselytizing limited the expression of non-Hindu religious belief. The
Constitution describes the country as a ``Hindu Kingdom,'' although it
does not establish Hinduism as the state religion.
The Press and Publications Act prohibits the publication of
materials that create animosity among persons of different castes or
religions. On January 31, the Government ordered Muslim religious
schools to register with the local District Administration Officers.
The schools had to supply information about their funding sources in
order to continue operation. Some Muslim leaders criticized the move as
discriminatory.
A conviction for conversion or proselytizing can result in fines or
imprisonment or, in the case of foreigners, expulsion from the country.
Arrests or detentions for proselytizing were rare, and there have been
few incidents of punishment or investigation in connection with
conversion or proselytizing during the last few years. However, the
Government on occasion investigated reports of proselytizing.
Nongovernmental groups or individuals were free to file charges of
proselytizing against individuals or organizations. A 1999 case was
filed with the Supreme Court against the Adventist Development and
Relief Agency and the United Missions to Nepal, an umbrella Protestant
NGO; however, it was dismissed by the Court on August 16.
Some Christian groups reported that Hindu fundamentalism has
increased in the past few years. In 1999 the India-based Hindu
political party Shiv Sena, locally known as Pashupati Sena, opened an
office in Kathmandu; a few Shiv Sena candidates unsuccessfully ran for
office in the 1999 general elections.
Government policy does not support religious extremism, although
some political figures have made public statements critical of
Christian missionary activities.
Some citizens were wary of proselytizing and conversion by
Christians and, therefore, viewed the presence of Christianity with
alarm. Two representatives of different Christian organizations also
have alleged oppression of Christians and destruction of at least two
churches by Maoist sympathizers.
The caste system strongly influences society, even though it was
prohibited by the Constitution. Caste discrimination was widely
practiced at Hindu temples where, for example, members of the lowest
castes were not permitted to enter. Otherwise, the Government made an
effort to protect the rights of the disadvantaged castes.
In August 2001, the Prime Minister made a speech emphasizing that
caste-based discrimination, including barring access to temples, is
illegal. Since then, members of the lower castes have successfully and
publicly entered many temples, including Pashupatinath, the national
site most sacred to Hindus.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement and residence, and the Government generally does not restrict
travel abroad. However, for security reasons, the Government restricted
travel by foreigners, including Tibetan residents, to some areas near
the Chinese border. The Government also has imposed restrictions on
women's travel to the Gulf states to work as domestic servants, in
response to cases of abuse of such women in the past. These
restrictions do not apply to women who were traveling to the Gulf
states for other reasons, nor do they apply to travel to other areas.
Women's rights groups have protested the ban; however, in September
2001, the Supreme Court dismissed a case challenging the restriction as
discriminatory. The Government allowed citizens abroad to return, and
was not known to revoke citizenship for political reasons.
The Government has no official refugee policy. However, it does
provide asylum for refugees and has cooperated with the office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees from Bhutan and Tibet. The UNHCR
maintains an office in Kathmandu. Since 1959 the Government has
accepted as residents approximately 20,000 Tibetan refugees, many of
whom still reside in the country. Since 1991 it also has provided
asylum to approximately 101,000 persons who claim Bhutanese
citizenship. The great majority of these refugees live in UNHCR
administered camps in the eastern part of the country. An additional
15,000 refugees reside outside the camps in either the country or
India. The total represents approximately one-sixth of Bhutan's
estimated pre-1991 population. Since the flight of the Karmapa Lama
from Tibet in January 2000, the Government has disallowed UNHCR access
to the Nepal-China border to monitor the treatment of Tibetan refugees.
In September 2001, the Government authorized UNHCR to travel to the
headquarters of a border district, but not the border itself, to
consult with local officials.
The People's Republic of China and the Government tightened control
of movement across their border in 1986, but neither side has
consistently enforced those restrictions. Police and customs officials
occasionally harass Tibetan asylum seekers who cross the border from
China. According to the UNHCR, police conduct in this regard has
improved since 1999, although border police sometimes extort money from
Tibetans in exchange for passage. There were reports of the forced
repatriation of Tibetan asylum seekers during the year; however, poor
communication with the border has made it difficult to confirm. There
are credible reports that Tibetan asylum seekers are sometimes handed
back to Chinese authorities even after crossing the border.
In March 2001, 18 Tibetans arrested for entering the country from
India without proper travel documents were released after serving 4
months in prison. The individuals were turned over to UNHCR, which
labeled them ``persons of concern'' and returned them to India. In
August 2001, 10 Tibetans previously resident in India were arrested in
Kathmandu for failure to possess required travel documents, and were
convicted of immigration violations. An 11th Tibetan, arrested in June
2000, also is currently serving a prison term for failure to pay
immigration fines. On February 19, one of the detainees gave birth in
jail. The infant remained incarcerated with its mother until she was
released following payment of her fines by a foreign philanthropist in
August. By year's end, three of the original Tibetans arrested were
released; however, on December 13, three more Tibetans who had entered
Nepal without documents were detained in Kathmandu.
The UNHCR monitored the condition of Bhutanese refugees and
provided for their basic needs. The Government accepted the refugee
presence as temporary on humanitarian grounds. The camps were
administered by UNHCR; the World Food Program (WFP) provides sustenance
and the Government made a contribution to the WFP earmarked for the
refugees. U.N. officials, diplomats and NGO representative visitors to
the camps had described conditions as generally very good, largely as a
result of efficient UNHCR administration, conscientious government
oversight and the refugees taking responsibility for their
surroundings. However, there were reports by refugee women and children
that some of the Bhutanese refugee workers at the camps had committed
sexual assault. The Government responded by providing more police
protection to the camp and UNHCR began an investigation. The Government
officially restricted refugee freedom of movement and work, but did not
strictly enforce its policies. Local authorities have attempted to
restrict some of the limited economic activity in the camps permitted
by the central government. Violence sometimes has broken out between
camp residents and the surrounding local population. The UNHCR and
other donors and relief organizations have defused tensions through an
assistance plan for refugee-affected areas aimed at improving
conditions in communities adjacent to the camps.
In 1994 the Government and the Government of Bhutan formed a joint
committee and began bilateral talks to resolve the refugee problem.
During the tenth round of bilateral talks in December 2000, they agreed
on preparations for verification at the camps. Verification interviews
at the first refugee camp commenced in March 2001 and concluded in
December 2001. No further verification has taken place since then.
Bilateral negotiations on repatriation issues in November 2001 failed
to arrive at an agreement, and the matter was deferred to a proposed
future session of ministerial-level talks. The talks' earlier lack of
progress frustrated refugees, and some held ``peace marches'' to
protest their plight.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully.
Citizens, through their elected representatives, also have the right to
amend the Constitution with the exception of certain basic principles
that they may not change--sovereignty vested in the people, the
multiparty system, fundamental rights, and the constitutional monarchy.
The country is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form
of government. Parliamentary elections are scheduled at least every 5
years. Midterm elections may be called if the ruling party loses its
majority, loses a vote of no confidence, or calls for elections. On May
22, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba asked King Gyanendra to dissolve
Parliament and schedule mid-term elections for November 13. On October
3, the Prime Minister asked the King to delay polls until November 2003
because of Maoist threats to disrupt the elections with violence. On
October 4, the King dismissed Deuba's caretaker government for its
failure to hold elections within the constitutionally mandated period;
temporarily assumed executive powers; postponed elections indefinitely;
and invited all mainstream political parties to nominate members of a
new caretaker government. On October 11, the King appointed Lokendra
Bahadur Chand as Prime Minister of a caretaker government. By year's
end, no date had been set for national or local elections.
Under the Constitution all citizens aged 18 and over may vote. The
House of Representatives, or lower house, may send legislation directly
to the King by majority vote. The National Assembly, or upper house,
may amend or reject lower house legislation, but the lower house can
overrule its objections. The upper house also may introduce legislation
and send it to the lower house for consideration.
The King exercised certain powers with the advice and consent of
the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. The King has exclusive
authority to enact, amend, and repeal laws relating to succession to
the throne. The King's income and property are tax-exempt and
inviolable, and no question may be raised in any court about any act
performed by the King. The Constitution permits the King, acting on
advice of the Council of Ministers, to exercise emergency powers in the
event of war, external aggression, armed revolt, or extreme economic
depression. In such an emergency, the King, as advised by the civilian
government, may suspend without judicial review many basic freedoms,
including the freedoms of expression and assembly, freedom from
censorship, and freedom from preventive detention. However, he may not
suspend habeas corpus or the right to form associations. The King's
declaration of a state of emergency must be approved after 3 months by
a two-thirds majority of the lower house of the Parliament. If the
lower house is not in session, the upper house exercises this power. A
state of emergency may be maintained for up to 3 months without
legislative approval and for up to 6 months, renewable only once for an
additional 6 months, if the legislature grants approval.
The Constitution bars the registration and participation in
elections of any political party that is based on ``religion,
community, caste, tribe, or region,'' or that does not operate openly
and democratically. In the 1999 election, there were sporadic incidents
of violence that mainly occurred between supporters of rival political
parties. Maoist efforts to disrupt the 1999 elections by intimidating
voters and candidates had some effect. The elections generally were
held throughout the country according to schedule. International
observers considered the elections to be generally free and fair.
There were 12 women in the 205 seat legislature, before its
dissolution, and there were 9 women in the 60-member National Assembly.
There was one woman in the interim Cabinet appointed by the King in
October. There were no specific laws that restrict women, indigenous
people, or minorities from participating in the Government or in
political parties. Tradition limits the roles of women and some castes
in the political process. However, the Constitution requires that women
constitute at least 5 percent of each party's candidates for the House
of Representatives. The law also requires that at least 20 percent of
all village and municipal level seats be reserved for female
candidates. The 1999 elections resulted in an increase from 7 to 12 in
the number of women in the 205-seat lower house and from 5 to 9 in the
60-seat upper house.
No specific laws prevent minorities from voting or restrict them
from participating in the Government and political parties on the same
basis as other citizens. Hindus and members of certain castes
traditionally have held more power than others, but members of other
religious and social groups have in the past few years gained
increasing influence in government, including senior leadership
positions. There were no special provisions to allocate a set number or
percentage of political party positions or parliamentary seats for any
minority group. In August 2001, Ramprit Paswan, an opposition Member of
Parliament and a ``dalit'' (member of the lowest caste), was elected
Vice Chairman of the National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic (and international) human rights groups
operated, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights
cases; however, the Government detained human rights activists
suspected of Maoist affiliation during the state of emergency. There
were approximately 10 domestic human rights NGOs. These included the
Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), INSEC, the International
Institute for Human Rights, Environment, and Development (INHURED), and
the Human Rights and Peace Society (HURPES). The Nepal Law Society also
monitored human rights abuses and a number of NGOs focused on specific
areas such as torture, child labor, women's rights, or ethnic
minorities.
According to INSEC, security forces arrested 16 human rights
activists during the state of emergency. The Government continued to
hold 8 at year's end. On March 16, security forces arrested Pramod
Kafle, a human rights activist involved in Bhutanese refugee affairs;
Mahesh Maskey, a doctor active in human rights; and Shyam Shrestha, a
journalist, at Tribhuvan International Airport as they were leaving on
a flight to India. They were released on March 26. At year's end, Prem
Bahadur Saud and Tim Kumari Khanal continued to be detained. Bishnu
Prasad Khanal was released in 2001; however, he was re-arrested in
January. On June 23, Khanal was released. There were reports that the
Government and the Maoists limited the activities of human rights
activists. Maoists also prevented journalists and human rights
activists who traveled to Rolpa to inspect the area freely on their
own.
On July 29, Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, who is a secondary school
teacher, lawyer, member of a human rights organization, and suspected
Maoist, reportedly was arrested from his home in Kathmandu. Army and
police officials maintained that he was not in custody (see Section
1.b.). On December 16, Shrestha was released. Shrestha previously had
been arrested by police in July 2000; however, Shrestha never was
charged with any crime.
The insurgency has caused a number of NGOs in the midwestern
districts to reduce their activities substantially. In addition,
Maoists have killed and abducted NGO workers. On January 16, Maoists
killed Mukti Nath Adhikari, head of a local chapter of Amnesty
International in Lamjung District. Hari Narayan Shrestha of Human
Rights and Peace Society's Ramechhap district office was abducted by
Maoists on August 18, 2001 and released 3 days later. During the year
insurgents stole hundreds of metric tons of emergency food supplies
from INGO programs targeting vulnerable populations. Maoists also have
targeted aircraft attempting to make humanitarian deliveries of
foodstuffs to midwestern districts.
In 2000 the Government formed the NHRC, a government-appointed
commission with a mandate to investigate human rights violations. The
Commission included members from all major political parties and
operated independently; however, resource constraints and insufficient
manpower restricted the number of cases the commission can bring to
court. Once the NHRC completes an investigation and makes a
recommendation, the Government has 3 months to respond. Since its
establishment, the Commission has received 861 complaints of human
rights violations, investigated 51, and issued final recommendations in
5 cases. Some cases involve the disappearance of detainees, illegal
detention, and arrest of acquitted persons, but many other cases are
relatively trivial.
The Government does not refuse visas to international NGO human
rights monitors, or otherwise restrict their access when they are in
the country. However, some areas along the country's border with China
are restricted. An organization monitoring Tibetan refugee flows has
been denied access to these border areas.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution specifies that the Government shall not
discriminate against citizens on grounds of race, sex, caste, or
ideology; however, there still is a de facto caste system.
Discrimination against lower castes, women, and the disabled remains
common, especially in rural areas.
Women.--Violence against women is a serious problem that receives
limited public attention. On April 11, Parliament passed the Domestic
Violence Control Bill, which is awaiting royal approval. The bill would
stipulate penalties for domestic violence, including ordering the
aggressor to pay hospital costs for the victim, and fining the
aggressor a minimum of $64 (NRs 5,000). There was a general
unwillingness among citizens, and particularly among government
authorities, to recognize violence against women as a problem. In a
survey conducted by local NGO SAATHI, 42 percent of the respondents
said that in their experience medical practitioners were uncooperative
or negligent in cases of violence against women and girls. This
unwillingness to recognize violence against women and girls as
unacceptable in daily life was seen not just in the medical profession,
but among the police and politicians as well.
Rape and incest also are problems, particularly in rural areas.
Laws against rape provided for prison sentences of 6 to 10 years for
the rape of a woman under 14 years of age and 3 to 5 years for the rape
of a woman over the age of 14. The law prescribes imprisonment for 1
year or a fine for the rape of a prostitute. As of May 2, the law does
forbid spousal rape. A survey conducted by SAATHI found that 39 percent
of rape victims who reported the crime to police were under the age of
19. Of those victims who reported the crime to the authorities, 25
percent said the perpetrator was convicted and jailed.
The dowry tradition is strong, with greater prevalence in the Terai
region. The killing of brides because of defaults on or inadequacy of
dowry payments was rare, but did occur. More common was the physical
abuse of wives by the husband and the husband's family to obtain
additional dowry or to force the woman to leave to enable the son to
remarry.
Folk beliefs about witchcraft, which are especially strong in the
lowland Terai area on the Indian border, generally target women,
particularly elderly and/or widowed women. Shamans or other local
authority figures sometimes publicly beat and physically abuse
suspected witches as part of an exorcism ceremony. In September 2001,
two men, including a local village official, were jailed in Simardahi,
Mahottari District, after failing to post bond for charges relating to
the August 14 beating of an elderly woman after publicly denouncing her
as a witch. The two men had been charged under the Public Offense Act.
In September 2001, police arrested five men in Sirsiya Khalbatol,
Parsa, for beating and forcefeeding feces to a 60-year-old widow
suspected of witchcraft. In September 2001, the Supreme Court issued a
show cause notice to the Government for its failure to enact a law
specifically to punish perpetrators of violence in witchcraft cases. In
September 2001, four villagers beat 60-year-old Malechhiya Devi to
death in Bel Ekdara, Mahottari, on suspicion of witchcraft. The
victim's widower filed charges against the five suspects, who fled
after the incident (see Section 1.a.).
The police department has 18 ``women's cells.'' These cells include
female officers who received special training in handling victims of
domestic violence. The police also have sent out directives instructing
all officers to treat domestic violence as a criminal offense that
should be prosecuted. However, according to a police official, this
type of directive was difficult to enforce because of entrenched
discriminatory attitudes. Even though the police may make an arrest,
further prosecution often was not pursued by the victim or by the
Government.
At least ten NGOs in Kathmandu work on the problem of violence
against women and on women's issues in general. SAATHI's assistance
program includes a women's shelter and a suicide intervention center.
The shelter provided housing, medical attention, counseling, and legal
advocacy for the victims of violence.
Trafficking in women remained a serious problem in several of the
country's poorest areas, and large numbers of women still are forced to
work against their will as prostitutes in other countries (see Section
6.f.).
Although the Constitution provides protections for women, including
equal pay for equal work, the Government often has not taken
significant action to implement those provisions, even in many state
industries. Women face systematic discrimination, particularly in rural
areas, where religious and cultural tradition, lack of education, and
ignorance of the law remain severe impediments to their exercise of
basic rights such as the right to vote or to hold property in their own
names. Women have benefited from some changes in marriage and
inheritance laws. On March 14, Parliament passed a bill which allowed
unmarried, widowed, or divorced women to inherit parental property. The
Citizenship Law discriminates against foreign spouses of female
citizens, and denies citizenship to the children of female citizens
married to foreign spouses, even if those children are born in the
country. Many other discriminatory laws still remain. According to
legal experts, there are over 50 laws that discriminate against women.
For example, the law grants women the right to divorce, but on narrower
grounds than those applicable to men. The law on property rights also
favors men in its provisions for inheritance, land tenancy, and the
division of family property.
According to the 2001 census, the most recent statistics available,
the female literacy rate was 43 percent, compared with 65 percent for
men. Human rights groups reported that girls attend secondary schools
at a rate half that of boys. There were many NGOs focused on
integrating women into society and the economy. These NGOs worked in
the areas of literacy, small business, skills transfer, and prevention
of trafficking in women and girls. There also were a growing number of
women's advocacy groups. Most political parties have women's groups.
Children.--Education is not compulsory. Government policy was to
provide free primary education for all children between the ages of 6
and 12 years, but the quality of education was sorely inadequate, many
families cannot afford school supplies and clothing, and schools do not
exist in all areas. Schools charge fees for higher education.
Approximately 60 percent of the children who work also attended school.
However, approximately 70 to 75 percent of boys who work go to school,
compared to only 50 to 60 percent of the girls who work. Basic health
care was provided free to children and adults at government clinics,
but they were poorly equipped and too few in number to meet the demand.
Community-based health programs assisted in the prevention of childhood
diseases and provide primary health care services. Poor or nonexistent
sanitation in rural areas puts many children at risk from severe and
fatal illnesses. The Government has made significant progress in
improving basic community health care services over the past 5 years,
bringing down the mortality rate of children under age 5 by 23 percent
since 1996. A Vitamin A supplementation program operated nationwide,
and immunization outreach has increased from 45 percent in 1996 to 60
percent this year. The lack of adequate antenatal care and widespread
malnutrition remained problems.
Forced prostitution and trafficking in young girls remained serious
problems (see Section 6.f.).
Societal attitudes view a female child as a commodity, to be
bartered off in marriage, or as a burden. Some persons, in fact,
consider marrying a girl before menarche an honorable, sacred act that
increases one's chances of a better afterlife. As a result, although
the law prohibits marriage for girls before the age of 18, child brides
were common. According to the Ministry of Health, girls' average age of
marriage was 16 years of age. The age difference in marriage often was
cited as one cause of domestic violence.
The Government incarcerated some dependent children with adult
parent offenders if there were no other adult relatives to care for
them. In November 2001, the Government began transferring children
detained in jail to two residential facilities that provide education
in accord with a provision in the 1992 Children's Act. At year's end,
28 dependent children of inmates and 8 juvenile offenders had moved
into the residential facilities and begun school. Unlike in previous
years, there were no reports of children in jail or custody as
suspected or convicted criminals, although there were reports of
children held under anti-terrorism laws as suspected Maoists.
There have been numerous reports that Maoists recruit teenagers to
serve as porters, runners, cooks, and armed cadre.
Persons with Disabilities.--Persons with disabilities face
widespread societal discrimination. There was discrimination against
persons with disabilities in employment, education and in the provision
of other state services. Families often were stigmatized by and ashamed
of family members with disabilities, who may be hidden away or
neglected. Economic integration was further hampered by the general
view that persons with disabilities were unproductive. The mentally
retarded were associated with the mentally ill. Sometimes mentally ill
and retarded persons were placed in prisons due to the lack of
facilities or support. A report authored jointly by UNICEF and the
National Planning Commission estimated that there are approximately
400,000 persons with disabilities in country.
The Government long has been involved in providing for persons with
disabilities, but limited resources have kept the level of government
assistance insufficient to meet their needs. The Disabled Persons
Protection and Welfare Act and additional 1994 rules mandate
accessibility to buildings, transportation, employment, education, and
other state services. The Government has begun developing a policy on
equal access for persons with disabilities to public buildings and
transportation. However, despite government funding for special
education programs, the Government does not implement effectively or
enforce laws regarding persons with disabilities. A number of NGOs
working with persons with disabilities received significant funding
from the Government, but persons with physical or mental disabilities
relied almost exclusively on family members to assist them.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country has over 75 ethnic
groups that speak 50 different languages. The Constitution provides
that each community ``shall have the right to preserve and promote its
language, script, and culture.'' The Constitution further specifies
that each community has the right to operate schools up to the primary
level in its mother tongue.
In remote areas, school lessons and national radio broadcasts often
were conducted in the local language. However, in areas with nearby
municipalities, education at the primary, secondary, and university
levels was conducted almost exclusively in Nepali, which was
constitutionally mandated as the official language of the State. On
November 29, UNESCO reported that 13 indigenous languages were
endangered and the language of the Kusunda community is nearly extinct.
Discrimination against lower castes was especially common in the
rural areas in the western part of the country, even though the
Government has outlawed the public shunning of ``untouchables,'' and
makes an effort to protect the rights of the disadvantaged castes.
Economic, social and educational advancement tended to be a function of
historical patterns, geographic location, and caste. Better education
and higher levels of prosperity, especially in the Kathmandu Valley,
slowly were reducing caste distinctions and increasing opportunities
for lower socioeconomic groups. Better educated, urban-oriented castes
(Brahmin, Chhetri, and certain elements of the Newar community
traditionally dominant in the Kathmandu Valley) continued to dominate
politics and senior administrative and military positions, and to
control a disproportionate share of natural resources in their
territories. Two members of the Cabinet were from ethnic minority
communities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
freedom to establish and to join unions and associations. It permitted
the restriction of unions only in cases of subversion, sedition, or
similar conditions. Trade unions developed administrative structures to
organize workers, to bargain collectively, and to conduct worker
education programs. The three largest trade unions were affiliated with
political parties.
Union participation in the formal sector accounted for
approximately 10 to 12 percent of the formal work force. The Labor Act
and the Trade Union Act formulated enabling regulations; however, the
Government has not yet fully implemented these acts. The Trade Union
Act defines procedures for establishing trade unions, associations, and
federations. It also protect unions and officials from lawsuits arising
from actions taken in the discharge of union duties, including
collective bargaining, and prohibits employers from discriminating
against trade union members or organizers. There were few reports of
discrimination against union members.
The Government does not restrict unions from joining international
labor bodies. Several trade federations and union organizations
maintain a variety of international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Act
provides for collective bargaining, although the organizational
structures to implement the act's provisions have not been established.
Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated 20 percent of wage
earners in the organized sector, and hotel workers have bargained
aggressively for additional compensation. However, in general, labor
remained widely unable to use collective bargaining effectively due to
inexperience, employer reluctance to bargain, and court injunctions.
The law permits strikes, except by employees in essential services
such as water supply, electricity, and telecommunications. The law
empowers the Government to halt a strike or to suspend a union's
activities if the union disturbs the peace or if it adversely affected
the nation's economic interests. Under the Labor Act, 60 percent of a
union's membership must vote in favor of a strike in a secret ballot
for the strike to be legal. In March 2001 the Government averted a
strike threatened by hotel employees by determining that hotel
employees fall under the Essential Services Act that proscribes
strikes. Contract employees at a foreign-owned factory in Hetauda
district struck from August 26 to 28, 2001 after management refused to
hire them as permanent employees. Strike organizers suspended the
strike after 3 days. In 2001 there were frequent reports of Maoist-
affiliated agitators disrupting work at garment and carpet factories in
the Kathmandu Valley. Some factory owners reported receiving demands
from the Maoists that included tripling wages for unskilled laborers;
hiring all seasonal or contract employees as permanent labor; and
firing any foreign workers. In August 2001, Maoist labor organizers
stopped work at four Kathmandu Valley garment factories for several
hours, shut off the electricity, and forced employees outside to listen
to speeches.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, there
were reports that such practices occurred. The Department of Labor
enforces laws against forced labor in the small formal sector, but
remains unable to enforce the law outside that sector.
Historically, a system of bonded agricultural laborers, known as
the Kamaiyas, existed in areas of the western Terai region. In July
2000, the Government made bonded labor illegal and released the
``Kamaiya'' bonded agricultural workers from their debts. Resettlement
of the Kamaiyas began in January 2001, and distribution of land began
in March 2001. On February 21, the Kamiya Prohibition Act became law,
which codified the emancipation of bonded laborers and established
fines of $194 to $325 (NRs 15,000 to 25,000) for employers engaged in
Kamaiya labor practices. The Act emancipated those persons who worked
as Kamaiya laborers; forgave outstanding Kamaiya loans and canceled
bonds or related contracts; and provided for the return of the
Kamaiyas' mortgaged or secured property within three months. The Act
also established ``Freed Kamaiya Rehabilitation and Monitoring
Committees'' in specific affected districts, and created a new position
of ``Welfare Officer'' to oversee the administration of the
Government's Kamaiya relief funds.
Enforcement of the Act by the Government was haphazard. To date,
approximately 12,092 (out of a total 52,000 eligible) have been
provided with up to one-third of an acre of land and 75 cubic feet of
timber to build houses. The Government has set up temporary camps for
Kamaiyas still awaiting settlement and has begun arrangements for
distribution of food under a food-for-work program. A 2001 Rapid
Assessment conducted by the ILO estimates that 17,000 child laborers
are working as bonded laborers in the remnants of the Kamaiya system
(see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution stipulates that children shall not be
employed in factories, mines, or similar hazardous work and limits
children between the ages of 14 and 16 years to a 36-hour workweek. The
law established a minimum age for employment of minors at 16 years in
industry and 14 years in agriculture and mandated acceptable working
conditions for children.
During the year, the ILO estimated that 33,000 children work as
bonded laborers. In July 2000, the Government passed the Child Labor
Act, the country's first comprehensive child labor law. The law,
drafted with the assistance of the ILO, was the first national
legislation to establish specific penalties for those who unlawfully
employ children. It repeated the existing prohibition of the employment
of children under the age of 14 years and renewed the constitutional
provision that children between the ages of 14 and 16 years may work,
but no more than 6 hours a day and 6 days a week. The law prohibited
child labor in tourism, cigarette or carpet factories, mines, or
laboratories. Employers must maintain records of all 14-to 16-year-old
laborers. However, because the necessary implementing regulations to
accompany the law have not yet been passed, implementation was
difficult. In September 2001, the Supreme Court, acting on a petition
filed by an NGO, ordered several government ministries to explain the
lack of progress on implementing regulations for the Child Labor Act.
The ministries responded to this court order by stating that the
continued delay is a result of the necessity to rework the Act to have
it comply with the ILO Convention 182.
These legal protections notwithstanding, resources devoted to their
enforcement are limited, and children work in many sectors of the
economy. NGOs estimated that 2.6 million children--most of them girls--
were economically active. Of that number, 1.7 million children worked
full time. The agricultural sector accounted for most child laborers--
an estimated 95 percent. Roughly 60 percent of children who work also
attend school. Approximately 70 to 75 percent of boys who work go to
school, compared with 50 to 60 percent of girls who work. ILO Rapid
Assessments published in 2001 estimate that 55,000 child laborers
worked as domestics in urban areas, 42,000 as porters, 4,000 as rag
pickers, and 17,000 as bonded laborers. The bonded laborers continued
to work in the remnants of the Kamaiya system, usually as a condition
on the employment contract of their parents. Others are economically
active in a few small-scale and cottage industries, such as brick and
tile works, quarries, coal mines, match factories and auto repair
shops. In previous years there were reports that children also were
economically active in the carpet weaving, pottery, basket weaving,
sewing, and ironsmithing industries.
There were reports that the Maoists use children, including girls,
as soldiers, shields, runners, and messengers.
The Ministry of Labor's enforcement record was mixed. According to
the Ministry, during 2001 it conducted several hundred inspections of
carpet factories in the Kathmandu Valley to ensure that no child labor
was present; however, this statement later was retracted. Government
monitoring of other industries and of industries outside the Kathmandu
Valley was sporadic. The Government also conducted public awareness
programs to raise public sensitivity to the problem of child labor.
On May 3, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Dhiraj K.C., a child
laborer who was shackled by his employer, Madhusan Munakarmi, to
prevent him from escape from work. The court ordered Munakarmi to pay a
fine of $38 (NRs 3,000) and to pay K.C. $961 (NRs 75,000) in
compensation.
The private sector has made its own efforts to eradicate child
labor, especially in the carpet industry. In August 1999 the carpet
manufacturers association pledged publicly to end child labor in the
industry by 2005. The Rugmark Foundation certifies carpets made without
child labor; over half of all carpet factories participate in this or a
similar certification system. As a result of this initiative, and of
consumer pressure, Rugmark estimates that children constitute only 2
percent of the work force in the export-oriented carpet industry.
However, children's rights activists stated that children remain a part
of the work force, in the smaller factories and family weaving units.
During the year, Rugmark investigated 71 complaints and conducted 4,037
inspections at 458 factories. Rugmark removed 23 children from
employment, and issued warnings to 33 factories.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In April 2000 the Government
passed legislation that raised the minimum monthly wage for unskilled
labor to $20 (NRs 1,450). The law also defined monthly minimum wages
for semi-skilled labor at approximately $21 (NRs 1,500), skilled labor
at $22 (NRs 1,610), and highly skilled labor at $25 (NRs 1,800). The
minimum wage for children ages 14 to 16 was set at $16 (NRs 1,144).
Additional allowances for food and other benefits as provided by the
act total $7 (NRs 500) per month for adult labor, and $5 (NRs 360) per
month for children aged 14-16. Wages in the unorganized service sector
and in agriculture often are as much as 50 percent lower. The Labor Act
calls for a 48-hour workweek, with 1 day off per week, and limits
overtime to 20 hours per week.
Health and safety standards and other benefits such as a provident
fund and maternity benefits also were established in the act.
Implementation of the new Labor Act has been slow, as the Government
has not created the necessary regulatory or administrative structures
to enforce its provisions. Workers do not have the right to remove
themselves from dangerous work situations without fear of losing their
jobs. Although the law authorizes labor officers to order employers to
rectify unsafe conditions, enforcement of safety standards remains
minimal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons and prescribes imprisonment of up to 20 years for infractions;
however, trafficking in women and girls remained a serious problem in
several of the country's poorest areas, and borderguards and
immigration officials commonly accepted bribes from traffickers. The
Government protects the rights of victims and does not detain, jail, or
prosecute them for violations of other laws. Young women were by far
the most common targets; trafficking of boys was reported in rare
instances. While the vast majority of trafficking was of women and
girls for sexual exploitation, women and girls sometimes were
trafficked for domestic service, manual or semi-skilled bonded labor,
or other purposes. The country was a primary source country for the
South Asia region; most women and girls trafficked from the country go
to India.
Local NGOs combating trafficking estimated that from 5,000 to
12,000 Nepali women and girls were lured or abducted annually into
India and subsequently forced into prostitution; however, these numbers
were not consistent and NGOs were seeking better estimates. Citizens
reportedly also have been trafficked to Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and
other countries in the Middle East. In some cases, parents or relatives
sell women and young girls into sexual slavery. Hundreds of girls and
women return voluntarily, were rescued, or were repatriated to the
country annually after having worked as prostitutes in India. Most were
destitute and, according to some estimates, 50 percent were HIV-
positive when they returned.
There is legislation to protect women from coercive trafficking,
including a ban on female domestic labor leaving the country to work in
Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf; however, enforcement was
not strict and penalties were modest. Women's rights groups have
protested the ban as discriminatory. Government officials suspected
that organized crime groups and ``marriage brokers'' were the primary
perpetrators of trafficking in the country. The traffickers usually
were from the country, but have links to brothels in India. NGOs
reported that approximately 50 percent of the victims were lured to
India with the promise of good jobs and marriage, 40 percent were sold
by a family member and 10 percent were kidnaped. These estimates have
not been verified. NGOs have found that once prevention programs were
initiated in a district, the traffickers move to other areas.
A 2001 study by ILO-IPEC found that 30 percent of sex workers in
Kathmandu are below 18 years of age. Another study by a foreign labor
department states that 5,000 to 7,000 sex workers were between the ages
of 10 and 18 years old. Since 1996 active special police units have
dealt with crimes against women and children.
Enforcement of antitrafficking statutes remains sporadic, but the
Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare (MOWCSW) has introduced
legislation to toughen penalties against traffickers. During the year,
a Documentation and Information Center was established within the
Ministry to coordinate trafficking initiatives. The Human Trafficking
Control Act of 1986 prohibited selling persons in the country or abroad
and provided for penalties of up to 20 years' imprisonment for
traffickers. However, this legislation does not criminalize the
separation of minors from their legal guardians with the intent of
trafficking them. As a result, no crime occurs until the victim and
perpetrators are outside the jurisdiction. There were many social and
legal obstacles to successful prosecution, and convictions are rare.
Border guards commonly accept bribes to allow contraband and trafficked
girls in or out of the country.
According to the 2000-2001 annual report of the Attorney General's
Office, 463 antitrafficking cases have been filed, of which 132
resulted in convictions and 95 in acquittals, while 236 remain
undecided. A 2001 survey conducted of 3 jails in the capital by the
Human Rights and Environment Forum found 180 convicted or alleged
traffickers in jail. Those convicted were serving sentences of up to 20
years.
While the Government lacks both the resources and institutional
capability to address effectively its trafficking problem, the
Government has established a National Task Force at MOWCSW with
personnel assigned to coordinate the response. There were programs in
place to train the police and the MOWCSW worked closely with local NGOs
to rehabilitate and otherwise assist victims. However, the Government
lacked the fiscal means to provide adequate training and resources to
police, and the courts were overburdened and susceptible to corruption.
Government welfare agencies generally were incapable of delivering
effective public outreach programs or assistance to trafficking
victims. As a result, antitrafficking efforts primarily have been the
domain of NGOs and bilateral donors. While the Government has
promulgated a ``National Plan of Action'' to combat trafficking, its
implementation has been haphazard.
The Government provided limited funding to NGOs to provide
assistance to victims with rehabilitation, medical care, and legal
services. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare sponsored job and
skill training programs in several poor districts known for sending
prostitutes to India. In May 1999, the Ministry of Women and Social
Welfare opened the Women's Skill Development and Training Center, a
rehabilitation and skills training center for women returned from being
trafficked and for women and girls at risk of being trafficked. The
Government protected the rights of victims and did not detain, jail, or
prosecute them for violations of other laws.
The Government, together with NGOs and international organizations,
has implemented local, regional and national public awareness campaigns
about trafficking in persons. Cultural attitudes toward returned
victims of trafficking were often negative and the Government response
sometimes reflected that bias. There were more than 40 NGOs combating
trafficking, several of which have rehabilitation and skills training
programs for trafficking victims. Two representative NGOs were members
of the MOWCSW's National Task Force Against Trafficking. With the
Government's endorsement, many NGOs have public information and
outreach campaigns in rural areas. These groups commonly use leaflets,
comic books, films, speaker programs, and skits to convey
antitrafficking messages and education. Some organizations involved in
the rehabilitation of trafficking victims state that their members have
been threatened and that their offices have been vandalized because of
their activities.
During the year, the U.N. Development Fund for Women and the Joint
Initiative against Trafficking (a joint project of the U.N. Task Force
against Trafficking and the MOWCSW) hosted several workshops to enhance
cross-border anti-trafficking collaboration. The International Agency
Coordinating Group, comprised of NGOs, bilateral donor agencies, and
government agencies, met regularly to share information, plan common
approaches, and avoid duplication of work.
__________
PAKISTAN
Pakistan is a federal republic. From a bloodless coup in October
1999 to elections in October, Pakistan was governed by a Provisional
Constitutional Order (PCO), which suspended the constitution and
parliamentary government. On April 30, President Musharraf held a
nationwide referendum to extend his presidency for 5 years, although
critics and legal scholars argued that a president cannot be elected by
referendum. President Musharraf claimed a 97.5 percent vote in favor of
the extension; however, many independent observers cited evidence of
systematic fraud and inflated voting figures. Shortly after the
referendum, President Musharraf announced a controversial package of
constitutional amendments, the Legislative Framework Order (LFO), which
amended the suspended Constitution to allow: the President to dismiss
the Prime Minister and dissolve the Parliament; the creation of a
National Security Council (NSC) as a constitutional body; and the
insertion of a number of qualification requirements for candidates for
Parliament. One effect of the amendments was to concentrate executive
power in the presidency at the expense of the legislature and prime
minister. Opposition politicians, lawyers, civil society groups, and
many in the international community expressed concern about the
amendment package and its constitutional legitimacy. Under the auspices
of the LFO-amended constitution, Pakistan held its first national and
provincial assembly elections since the October 1999 coup.
International observers, NGOs, and human rights activists, including
the European Union election observation mission (EUEOM), alleged
serious flaws in the national and provincial election framework;
however, these observers stated that the election day itself was free
of serious irregularities. There were reports of election day violence
that killed 7 persons. As a result of the elections, limited power was
to be transferred to Parliament and the Prime Minister; however, by
year's end, the assembly had met only twice and had not been permitted
to debate any issues other than the Prime Minister's vote of
confidence. On November 20, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali was re-elected
as Prime Minister by the newly elected National Assembly, and in
December Jamali won a parliamentary vote of confidence, which was
required under the Constitution. President Musharraf and the military
continued to dominate the Government led by the Pakistan Muslim League
(Quaid-e-Azam). Electoral reforms implemented during the year included
the elimination of separate electorates for religious minorities, the
restoration of National Assembly seats reserved for women candidates,
and an increase in the overall number of national assembly seats from
237 to 342. Corruption and inefficiency remained acute, despite reforms
initiated by the Musharraf government to reduce corruption; however,
these reforms have had some effect on officials at higher levels of
government. The Supreme Court demonstrated a limited degree of
independence and the overall credibility of the judiciary remained low.
The police have primary internal security responsibilities,
although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and the Frontier
Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are
acute, such as Karachi and the frontier areas. Provincial governments
control the police and the paramilitary forces when they are assisting
in law and order operations. In August despite criticism from human
rights groups, the Government promulgated the Police Ordinance 2002
that included an increase in political control of the police. During
some religious holidays, the regular army was deployed in sensitive
areas to help maintain public order. Some members of the police
committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Pakistan is a poor country with great extremes in the distribution
of wealth; its population was approximately 142 million. Cotton,
textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products are the principal
exports. The economy included both state-run and private industries and
financial institutions. The Constitution provides for the right of
private businesses to operate freely in most sectors of the economy,
and there continued to be a strong private sector. The per capita
annual income was approximately $475. During the year, the Government
pursued several economic reforms designed to alleviate poverty.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained.
Citizens participated in national government elections during the year;
however, many observers alleged serious flaws in the legal framework
for the election. Unlike in previous years, police committed an
increased number of extrajudicial killings. There were fewer killings
between rival political factions and sectarian groups during the year;
however, there was an increase in violence against Christians. Police
abused and raped citizens. While the officers responsible for such
abuses sometimes were transferred or suspended for their actions, no
officer has been convicted and very few have been arrested. In Karachi
there were signs of progress in redressing police excesses; however, in
general police continued to commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison
conditions remained extremely poor and life threatening, and police
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. During the year, the
Government undertook a major effort to curb religious extremism. Five
organizations responsible for sectarian killings were banned by year's
end, and the Government accelerated a crackdown on members of several
extremist religious groups. Several major political leaders remained in
exile abroad at year's end. Case backlogs led to long delays in trials,
and lengthy pretrial detention was common. The judiciary was subject to
executive and other outside influences, corruption, inefficiency, and
lack of resources remained problems. The Government has taken steps to
control the judiciary and to remove itself from judicial oversight.
Some aspects of the Government's implementation of its anticorruption
campaign violated due process. By year's end, two senior Muslim League
politicians, Javed Hashmi and Mehtab Abassi were released on bail. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The press was able to publish relatively freely; however, several
journalists practiced self-censorship, especially on sensitive issues
related to the military. Provincial and local governments occasionally
arrested journalists and closed newspapers critical of the Government
or allegedly accused of printing offensive material. The broadcast
media remained a closely controlled government monopoly. Journalists
were targets of harassment and violence by individuals and groups. On
January 23, Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl was abducted by
terrorists and later killed. During the year, the Government
sporadically permitted several large antigovernment demonstrations;
however, it prevented other protests and arrested organizers, including
for security reasons. The Government imposed some limits on freedom of
association, religion, and movement. President Musharraf has spoken out
against some of the human rights abuses of the previous government;
however, the Government only made minimal progress toward achieving the
goals set at conferences devoted to human rights themes that were held
during the year.
Significant numbers of women were subjected to violence, rape, and
other forms of abuse by spouses and members of society. The Government
publicly criticized the practice of ``honor killings'' but such
killings continued throughout the country; however, the Government
intervened in two cases of tribal justice and prosecuted the alleged
perpetrators. Discrimination against women was widespread, and
traditional social and legal constraints generally kept women in a
subordinate position in society. Violence against children, as well as
child abuse and prostitution, remained serious problems. Female
children still lag far behind males in education, health care, and
other social indices. Governmental and societal discrimination against
religious minorities, particularly Christians and Ahmadis, remained a
problem, and the Government failed to take effective measures to
counter prevalent public prejudices against religious minorities.
Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and
civil disturbances, although the number of sectarian attacks against
Shi'a professionals declined significantly. Terrorist attacks,
particularly against Western and Christian targets, increased
significantly. President Musharraf and several cabinet ministers
publicly criticized efforts by some clerics to foment hatred and
announced a plan to deny the use of madrassahs (Islamic religious
schools) for extremist purposes. The Government and employers continued
to restrict worker rights significantly. Debt slavery persisted, and
bonded labor by both adults and children remained a problem. The use of
child labor remained widespread. On August 28, the Government passed
the Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance; however,
trafficking in women and children for the purposes of prostitution and
bonded labor was a serious problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Police committed
extrajudicial killings. There were reports that there was an increase
in extrajudicial killings during the year; exact figures were unknown
by year's end. The police and security forces were responsible for the
deaths of a number of individuals associated with political or
terrorist groups during the year.
The extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects, often while in
police custody or in staged encounters was common. Police officials
generally insisted that these deaths occurred during attempts to escape
or to resist arrest; however, family members and the press insisted
that many of these deaths were staged. Police personnel have been known
to kill suspected criminals to prevent them from implicating police in
crimes during court proceedings. In May militant Riaz Basra was shot
and killed while being transferred in police custody in Punjab. In
August four suspects associated with banned militant group Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi were killed in a police encounter while being transferred in
Vehari in Southern Punjab. In October Falak Sher died in police custody
in Lahore (see Section 1.c.). Police also reportedly killed suspected
criminals to circumvent or overcome insufficient evidence, to
intimidate witnesses, judicial corruption, and, at times, political
pressure. Police personnel continued to torture persons in custody
throughout the country.
Amnesty International (AI) estimates that at least 100 persons died
from police torture each year (see Section 1.c.).
On August 20, one protester was killed and 15 were injured when
Army Rangers fired into a crowd of farmers in Okara. The farmers were
protesting the army's demand that they sign leases for their farmland.
The army blockaded several villages for two weeks and cut off power and
water to the village in Okara. Several villagers remained hospitalized
at year's end. The army investigated the incident; however, no one was
charged in connection with the killing. There were no developments in
the October 2001 killing of three protesters in Kuchlak or in the
November 2001 killing of four demonstrators in Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab.
During the year, the HRCP reported disturbances at prisons by
prisoners over their mistreatment by prison staff. In 2001, eleven
prisoners at Adiala jail in Rawalpindi beat a police officer for not
allowing their visitors to meet with them. Similar incidents were
reported in Sahiwal and Faisalabad districts in 2001. There were
reports that four prisoners died in a riot in a Peshawar jail in
October 2000; however, prison authorities denied these reports. No
disciplinary actions were taken or charges filed in connection with the
incident, and the Government is unlikely to take further action.
The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an urban Sindh-based political
party that in the past used violence to further its aims claimed that
the police specifically targeted its adherents for extrajudicial
killings. On April 29, one member of MQM was killed in Karachi when an
unknown person fired on President Musharraf's motorcade and police
returned fire.
Police officers occasionally were transferred or briefly suspended
for involvement in extrajudicial killings. However, rare court-ordered
inquiries into these killings resulted in few trials and no
convictions. In general police continued to commit such killings with
impunity. In September, two policemen were charged with killing a fruit
vendor in Lahore. The two policemen allegedly pushed him into oil when
he would not meet their payment demands.
Police professionalism was low. New officers received 6 months of
training, and many hires were the result of political patronage rather
than merit. Salaries and benefits were inadequate. In August 2001, the
Government introduced a comprehensive package of police reforms. Key
changes included transferring oversight of district superintendents of
police (DSP) (a rank roughly equivalent to a lieutenant colonel) from
federally appointed district commissioners to elected district mayors;
granting DSPs permission to order the use of live fire on their own
authority; and the establishment of public safety commissions at the
district level. Under this system, a police officer who believes that
the district mayor is abusing his authority over local law enforcement
will have a place to seek redress. By year's end, the new system had
not fully been implemented, and many local officials complained that
the new system had no real control over the police.
There were high-profile killings during the year. On April 27,
unknown gunmen killed two MQM leaders, Mustapha Kamal Rizvi and Nishat
Malik in Karachi. Widespread unsubstantiated speculation surrounded the
June 24 death of former Federal Minister of Labor and party leader Omar
Asghar Khan, despite official reports that the death was a suicide.
Khan resigned from his position in December 2001 to create his own
political party, the Qaumi Jamhoori Party. Khan planned to contest
elections in October. At year's end, the investigation into his death
continued.
There reportedly was no action taken against the responsible
militants in the following 2001 cases: The October killing of a police
officer and 16 worshippers at St. Dominic's Church in Bahawalpur or the
December killing of Ehtehshamuddin Haider, brother of Interior Minister
Moinuddin Haider.
There were numerous bombings during the year. For example, on March
17, 5 persons were killed, including 2 dependents of a U.S. diplomat,
and 41 persons were injured, in Islamabad when an unknown individual
threw 6 grenades into a Protestant church during services (see Section
2.c.). On May 8, 11 persons were killed when a suspected suicide bomber
rammed a shuttle bus at the Sheraton hotel in Karachi. On June 14, 12
persons were killed when a bomb exploded outside the U.S. Consulate in
Karachi. On November 15, two persons were killed and nine persons were
injured when a bomb exploded at a bus station in Hyderabad,
approximately 100 miles from Karachi. No one claimed responsibility for
any of these acts.
Sectarian violence and tensions continued to be a serious problem
throughout the country. Despite the Government's ban on groups involved
in sectarian killings, violence between rival Sunni and Shi'a Muslim
groups continued, although the number of Shi'a professionals killed in
Karachi and elsewhere decreased significantly. In addition, Ahmadis,
Christians, and other religious minorities often were the targets of
such violence. During the year, at least 53 cases of sectarian violence
occurred in the country, most carried out by unidentified gunmen.
For example, on January 1, the Sunni prayer leader of a suburban
Usman Ghani Mosque was shot and killed by unknown assailants when he
returned home in Karachi. On February 4, Jhang Police Inspector
Mohammad Jamil was killed after conducting several successful
operations against the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The same day, Dr. Fayyaz
Karim was shot and killed outside a mosque in Karachi. On April 26, 12
persons were killed and 25 injured when a bomb exploded at a Shi'a
place of worship in Bhakkar.
Numerous such killings remain unresolved. On August 14, 2001,
unidentified motorcycle riders shot and killed Rizwan Shah, an
activist, in the Harkatuk Ansar. During the year, police made no
arrests in connection with past sectarian killings.
Honor killings were a problem. HCRP estimated that more than 200
women were killed by family members in so-called honor killings;
however many more women are believed to be affected by this crime. For
example, HCRP reported that in Pubjab, approximately 280 incidents of
honor killings were recorded during the year. Of these 280 incidents,
150 of the women were married and 103 women were single; 17 women were
harmed by their fathers, 100 women were harmed by their brothers, 86
women were harmed by their husbands, 11 by their in-laws, 29 by other
relatives, 12 by sons, and 23 were harmed by unknowns. Mehvish
Miankhel, a member of an influential political family in Dera Ghazi
Khan, allegedly was killed by her uncle in April 2001 after her uncle
accused her of having an affair. A criminal complaint was filed against
Miankhel's uncle, father, grandfather, two cousins, and two maternal
uncles on July 7. All were granted pre-arrest bail and were not
detained. During the year, police made no arrests in connection with
the 2000 killing of Mumlikat Bibi (see Section 1.f.).
Tension along the line of control between Pakistan and Indian-held
Kashmir was high during the year, and there was shelling in several
sectors. In May at the height of the Indo-Pakistani tensions, villages
along the border were evacuated. Approximately 194 civilians were
killed on the Pakistani side of the line of control at year's end,
according to a government official.
b. Disappearance.--Unlike in previous years, there were no credible
reports of disappearances at the hands of the security forces.
In the intra-Mohajir violence in Karachi, victims sometimes first
were held and tortured by opposing groups (or, as the Muttahida Quami
Movement (MQM) - Altaf alleges, by security forces). Bodies of these
victims, often mutilated, generally were dumped in the street soon
after the victims were abducted; however, the incidence of such crimes
decreased greatly during the year.
In July 2000, retired Major General Anwar Sher and an Afghan aide,
Abdul Qaher Shariati, disappeared; they were active in organizing
Afghans to pursue a peace process. There were no new developments in
the case during the year.
On January 28, militants kidnaped and killed foreign correspondent
for the Wall Street Journal Daniel Pearl in Karachi. The militants
reportedly were part of a group called the National Movement for the
Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty; however, police later arrested
Salman Saquib, Fahad Naseem, Sheik Adil, and prominent Islamic militant
Sheik Omar Saeed. All four defendants were affiliated with the
terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). In Hyderabad on July 15
all four defendants were found guilty; Sheik Omar Saeed was sentenced
to death; the other three defendants were sentenced to life in prison.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Penal Code prohibit torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, police regularly
tortured, and otherwise abused persons. Police routinely used force to
elicit confessions; however, there were fewer reports of torture by
police during the year. Some human rights groups stated that this
decrease reflects the influence of army monitoring teams, who
discourage the use of torture; other observers suggested that the
frequency of torture remained unchanged, but the media devoted less
attention to the issue during the year. Human rights observers
suggested that, because of widespread torture by the police, suspects
usually confessed to crimes regardless of their actual culpability; the
courts subsequently threw out many such confessions. According to the
Society for Human Rights and Prisoners Aid (SHARP), 38 deaths due to
police torture were reported during the year.
Police personnel continued to torture persons in custody throughout
the country. A newspaper reported that there were 80 cases of torture
in police custody in Lahore.
Common torture methods included: Beating; burning with cigarettes;
whipping the soles of the feet; sexual assault; prolonged isolation;
electric shock; denial of food or sleep; hanging upside down; forced
spreading of the legs with bar fetters; and public humiliation.
Human rights organizations and the press have criticized the
provision of the Anti-Terrorist Act that allows confessions obtained in
police custody to be used in ``special courts,'' because police torture
of suspects is common. Police generally did not attempt to use
confessions to secure convictions under this law.
There was greater scrutiny by NGOs and the media of police
behavior, including prison inspections in the Punjab and Sindh.
However, the Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) reported that no
new cases had been filed against police officers during the year. CPLC
officials believed that police reforms introduced during 2001
(including increased oversight by elected officials) were responsible
for fewer abuses. During the year, 60 Punjab police officers reportedly
were punished for various offenses. Cooperation between the CPLC and
the police human rights complaint unit resulted in the dismissal of 216
policemen and the demotion of or fines for 1,226 others between
November 1998 and July 1999.
The Hudood Ordinances, which aimed to make the Penal Code more
Islamic, provide for harsh punishments for violations of Shari'a
(Islamic law), including death by stoning for unlawful sexual relations
and amputation for other crimes. These so-called Hadd punishments
require a high standard of evidence. For example, four adult Muslim men
of good character must witness an act for a Hadd punishment to apply.
In over 20 years since the Hudood Ordinances were adopted, not a single
Hadd punishment has been carried out. However, on the basis of lesser
evidence, ordinary punishments such as jail terms or fines were
imposed. In April a court convicted Zaafran Bibi of adultery and
sentenced her to death by stoning. Bibi initially accused her brother-
in-law of rape in March 2001, claiming the incident took place 2 weeks
prior to her filing the charge. A medical exam at the time determined
that she was pregnant, and her husband claimed paternity for the child.
On June 6, the Federal Shariat Court acquitted Zafran Bibi of adultery
and ordered her release. The Hudood Ordinances were applied to Muslims
and non-Muslims alike.
Special women's police stations have been established in response
to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse of women, including
rape. These stations were staffed by female personnel, but receive even
fewer material and human resources than regular police stations.
Efforts to raise funds for the stations during the year achieved
minimal results. According to the Government's Commission of Inquiry
for Women, the stations did not function independently or fulfill their
purpose. Despite court orders and regulations that only female officers
may interrogate female suspects, women continued to be detained
overnight at regular police stations and abused by male officers. A
Lahore newspaper alleged that of 80 confirmed cases in Lahore of police
abuse, 3 were against women. Instances of abuse of women in prisons are
less frequent than in police stations. Sexual abuse of child detainees
by police or guards reportedly also is a problem.
Police used excessive force against demonstrators during the year
(see Section 2.b.).
Police at times also beat journalists. In April journalists were
beaten as they staged a walk-out on a pro-referendum rally in the
Punjab. Six journalists were injured (see Section 2.a.).
Impunity remained a problem. Despite some cases during the year in
which police officers were investigated or charged in connection with
abuse of detainees, the failure of the Government to prosecute and to
punish abusers effectively was widely considered a great obstacle to
ending or reducing police abuse. The authorities sometimes transferred,
suspended, or arrested offending officers, but seldom prosecuted or
punished them; investigating officers generally shield their
colleagues. However, in May 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the Lahore
High Court's January 2001 conviction of two government doctors for
submitting false statements regarding police torture of prisoner Nadeem
Iqbal.
Police corruption was widespread. Police and prison officials
frequently used the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and
their families. Police accepted money for registering cases on false
charges and tortured innocent citizens. Persons paid the police to
humiliate their opponents and to avenge their personal grievances.
District police authorities in Gujranwala in Northern Punjab dismissed
60 policemen for corruption. At least eight police officials in Punjab
were convicted for corruption and fined or imprisoned. Police
corruption was most serious at the level of the Station House Officer
(SHO), the official who runs each precinct. Some SHOs widely were
believed to operate arrest-for-ransom operations and to have
established unsanctioned police stations to collect illicit revenue. An
August 2000 news report listed seven such stations in Karachi. SHOs
were powerful; although no such incidents were reported during the
year, some were believed to have killed superior officers who tried to
stop corrupt practices in the past. Senior government officials have
confirmed that police stations, and assignments therein, were sold to
interested parties who then proceed to recoup their investment though
illicit activities.
During the year, the Government took some steps to reduce police
corruption and transferred several senior police officers to other
provinces to circumvent their local ties. In Gujranwala, in northern
Punjab, district police authorities dismissed 60 policemen and 15
others were retired compulsorily on the charges of corruption and
inefficiency in the first six months of the year. In Lahore, six police
officials were convicted of taking bribes and sentenced to two years of
imprisonment and fined. In August 2001, the Government implemented
reforms at the local level that included taking responsibility for the
police away from the nonelected District Commissioners while granting
oversight authority over the police to the newly elected district
nazims (mayors) and newly organized Public Safety Commissions (that are
composed of elected and nonelected members). The impact of this reform
remained unclear at year's end, although some critics claimed that the
reforms will make it easier for politicians to order the police to
intimidate and harass their political opponents. Senior government
officials predicted that it will take several years of sustained
political and financial commitment before positive gains are achieved.
At year's end, the Public Safety Commission had not been established
due to financial constraints. Actions taken to redress police abuses
often have mixed results. In urban Sindh, the CPLC committees helped to
curb some excesses, but complaints of large-scale police abuses
persisted.
Police failed in some instances to protect members of religious
minorities--particularly Christians and Ahmadis--from societal attacks
(see Section 5).
Prison conditions were extremely poor and life threatening.
Overcrowding was widespread. According to the HRCP, SHARP, and
International Human Rights Monitor (IHRM), there were 80,000 prisoners
in jails that were built to hold a maximum of 35,833 persons. In Adiala
Jail in Rawalpindi had prison population of 5,521 in a space designed
for 1,800. The HCRP claimed that in a Punjab jail, built to house
17,637 prisoners, contained 56,599. An IHRM report claimed 24 prisoners
died in Adiala Jail during the year due to improper health care, poor
hygienic conditions and rotten food. IHRM estimated 1,700-2,500 deaths
per year due to poor conditions nationwide. Some 80 percent of
prisoners were awaiting trial, mostly for petty offenses.
There are three classes (A, B, and C) of prison facilities. Class
``C'' cells generally hold common criminals and those in pretrial
detention. Such cells often have dirt floors and no furnishings.
Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffered the most abuse, including
beatings and forced kneeling for long periods of time. Unsanitary
conditions were common in small, poorly ventilated, and decrepit
colonial-era prisons, which mainly were considered class ``C.''
Inadequate food led to chronic malnutrition for those unable to
supplement their diet with help from family or friends. Access to
medical care was a problem. Mentally ill prisoners normally lacked
adequate care and were not segregated from the general prison
population (see Section 5). Foreign prisoners, mostly citizens of
African countries often remained in prison long after their sentences
were completed because there was no one to pay for their deportation to
their home country. Government officials claimed that years of
inadequate budgets were the reason for poor prison conditions. ``B''
cells often were used for prisoners with a university education or who
benefit from political connections. Conditions in ``A'' and ``B'' cells
were markedly better; prisoners in these cells are permitted to have
servants, special food, and satellite television. Authorities reserved
``A'' cells for prominent persons, including political leaders.
Especially prominent individuals--including some political figures--
sometimes were held under house arrest and permitted to receive
visitors.
Shackling of prisoners was routine. The shackles used were tight,
heavy, and painful, and reportedly have led to gangrene and amputation
in several cases. No cases concerning the fettering of minors were
reported in the press during the year.
There were reports of prison riots. On November 14, a riot broke
out in Sahiwal district jail and one policeman and 20 prisoners were
injured. One prisoner later died. The prisoners were allegedly sent to
District Jail Kasur where two of them were killed because of severe
police torture. No action was taken and no details were provided after
the incident.
Female detainees and prisoners were held separately from male
detainees and prisoners. According to the Progressive Women's
Association, there were approximately 2,765 women in jail nationwide at
year's end. Pretrial detainees often are not segregated from convicted
criminals.
There are few facilities for convicted prisoners under 21 years of
age, and children frequently were incarcerated along with the general
prison population. Punjab has two jails for juvenile offenders, and
Karachi has an industrial school for juvenile offenders. Children
offenders often were kept in separate barracks in adult prisons;
however, to keep the children separated, most of the time they were
confined to their barracks. There were few educational and recreational
facilities available for youth offenders. Many children in prison were
born to female inmates who were sexually abused by prison guards.
Punjab and Sindh provinces have laws mandating special judicial
procedures for child offenders; however, in practice children and
adults essentially are treated equally. According to a local NGO, an
estimated 4,992 children were held in the nation's prisons at the end
of 2001, compared with 4,200 in 2000. Imprisoned children often spent
long periods of time in prison awaiting trial or a hearing before a
magistrate, often in violation of the law. Children were subject to the
same delays and inefficiencies in the justice system as were adults
(see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that
children frequently were beaten and even tortured while in detention;
usually this was done to extract confessions, but it was done also to
punish or intimidate child detainees or to extort payment from their
families for their release. Sexual abuse of child detainees by police
or guards reportedly was a problem.
Courts also may order that children be sent to reform schools or
various types of residential facilities, many designed to provide
vocational or other training. There were two facilities--one in Karachi
and one in Bahawalpur--that serve as reform schools for juvenile
offenders. Juvenile offenders and, in some cases, homeless and
destitute children, may be sent to these residential facilities, for
terms not to exceed the amount of time until they reach majority.
Conditions in these institutions reportedly were poor, similar to those
found in jails. Abuse and torture of the children in such institutions
was a problem; one study found that 17.4 percent of the inmates of the
Youthful Offenders Industrial School in Karachi had been tortured or
otherwise mistreated. Educational facilities in these institutions
often were inadequate. Extortion on the part of the staff at such
institutions reportedly was widespread; parents of inmates often were
required to pay lower level staff members to visit their children or
bring them food. Drug trafficking by guards and other staff also was a
problem; some children reportedly developed drug habits while in these
institutions and were supplied drugs by their guards.
Landlords in Sindh and political factions in Karachi operated
private jails (see Section 1.d.).
The Government permits visits to prisoners and detainees by human
rights monitors, family members, and lawyers with some restrictions
(see Section 1.d.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the authorities did not always
comply with the law, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained
citizens. The law permits the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) of a
local district to order detention without charge for 30 days of persons
suspected of threatening public order and safety. The DCO may renew
detention in 30-day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights
monitors report instances in which prisoners jailed under the
Maintenance of Public Order Act have been imprisoned for up to 6 months
without charge. For other criminal offenses, police may hold a suspect
for 24 hours without charge. After a prisoner appears before a
magistrate, the court may grant permission for continued detention for
a maximum period of 14 days if the police provide material proof that
this is necessary for an investigation. The Musharraf government
created the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and special
accountability courts to try corruption cases; the National
Accountability Ordinance (NAO) initially permitted those suspected of
corrupt practices to be detained for 90 days without charge (see
Section 1.e.). In April 2001, the Supreme Court modified several
provisions of the NAB ordinance. It reduced the NAB's freedom to hold
suspects without charge from 90 days to 15 days, renewable with
judicial concurrence. The maximum period of disqualification from
political office pursuant to a corruption conviction was reduced from
21 years to 10 years, and the court required that future appointments
of key NAB officials receive the Chief Justice's concurrence. In
January the Government detained more than 2,000 members of banned
extremist and jihad groups. At year's end, all were released on bail
after the charges were filed. In addition to the arrests, police closed
and sealed offices of the five newly banned groups.
Police may arrest individuals on the basis of a First Incident
Report (FIR) filed by a complainant and have been known to file FIR's
without supporting evidence. FIR's frequently were used to harass or
intimidate individuals. Charges against an individual also may be based
on a ``blind'' FIR, which lists the perpetrators as ``person or persons
unknown.'' If the case is not solved, the FIR is placed in the inactive
file. When needed, a FIR is reactivated and taken to a magistrate by
the police; the police then name a suspect and ask that the suspect be
remanded for 14 days while they investigate further. After 14 days, if
the case is dropped for lack of evidence, another FIR is activated and
brought against the accused. In this manner, rolling charges can be
used to hold a suspect in custody continuously.
If the police can provide material proof that detention (physical
remand or police custody for the purpose of interrogation) is necessary
for an investigation, a court may extend detention for a total of 14
days. However, such proof may be little more than unsubstantiated
assertions by the police. In practice the authorities do not observe
fully the limits on detention. Police are not required to notify anyone
when an arrest is made and often hold detainees without charge until a
court challenges them. The police sometimes detained individuals
arbitrarily without charge or on false charges to extort payment for
their release. Human rights monitors reported that a number of police
stations have secret detention cells in which individuals are kept
while police bargain for their release. There also were reports that
the police move prisoners from one police station to another if they
suspect a surprise visit by higher authorities. Some women continued to
be detained arbitrarily and sexually abused (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
Police also detained relatives of wanted criminals in order to compel
suspects to surrender (see Section 1.f.).
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have a separate
legal system, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which recognizes
the doctrine of collective responsibility. Authorities are empowered to
detain fellow members of a fugitive's tribe, or to blockade a
fugitive's village, pending his surrender or punishment by his own
tribe in accordance with local tradition. On June 22, a woman in
Meerwala, Punjab, was gang-raped on the orders of a council of tribal
elders as punishment for her brother's alleged affair with a woman of a
higher tribe. Authorities alleged that the tribal jury threatened to
have all women in the family raped unless the girl submitted to the
punishment. Government authorities were notified a few days after the
incident and the Punjab police arrested eight suspects, including the
alleged rapists and some individuals who pressed the tribal council to
issue the verdict. On August 31, an Anti-terrorist Court ruled that
four rapists and two jurors should receive the death penalty. The court
awarded life imprisonment and a fine to each of the other four
defendants. At year's end, the cases were appealed with the Appellate
Tribunal. At year's end, President Musharraf sent the girl $8,300 (PKR
500,000) as compensation (see Section 5).
The police also have been known to detain persons as a result of
personal vendettas.
The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within
30 days of their arrest. However, in many cases, trials do not start
until 6 months after the filing of charges. During the year the HRCP
estimated that there were almost as many individuals awaiting trial in
jail as there were prisoners serving sentences. The HRCP reported that
in Punjab 35,260 males were awaiting trial, while only 11,068 males had
been convicted. In 1999 in 62 city courts, 7,000 prisoners were
awaiting trial in 6,000 cases; in 3,500 of these cases, the police had
not even brought a ``challan,'' or indictment, to the court.
Persons in jail awaiting trial sometimes were held for periods
longer than the sentence that they would have received if convicted.
Court officials reported that each judge reviews between 70 and 80
cases per day, but that action was taken on only 3 or 4 each week.
According to the Pakistan Law Commission, there were 10,515 cases
pending in the Supreme Court as of September 30, 2001. Clogged lower
courts exacerbate the situation; the majority of cases in the High
Courts consist of appeals of lower court rulings. Once an appeal
reaches the High Court, there are further opportunities for delay
because decisions of individual judges frequently are referred to
panels composed of two or three judges. There continued to be charges
that magistrates and police, under pressure from provincial and federal
officials to achieve high conviction rates, persuaded detainees to
plead guilty without informing them of the consequences. Senior
government officials acknowledged during the year that this was a
problem. Politically powerful persons also attempted to influence
magistrates in their decisionmaking, sometimes threatening to transfer
magistrates to other assignments.
Asif Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, has
waited for more than 5 years for the start of his trial on charges of
killing his brother-in-law, Murtaza Bhutto in 1997. In April 1999,
Zardari was tried and convicted separately on corruption charges. In
December 2001 Zardari received bail but was not released; the NAB
ordered his continued detention on suspicion of corruption.
The Government permitted visits to prisoners and detainees by human
rights monitors, family members, and lawyers (see Section 1.c.), with
some restrictions. In some cases, authorities refuse family visits and,
in some police stations, persons must to pay bribes to see a prisoner.
Foreign diplomats may meet with prisoners when they appear in court but
generally are refused permission for prison visits. Local human rights
activists reported few restrictions to their access to prisons, even
though the Government continued to deny prison visits by the ICRC.
The Government justified the creation of antiterrorist courts by
citing the large number of murder and other cases that are clogging the
regular court system (see Section 1.e.). The antiterrorist courts
reportedly sentenced 39 persons to death during the year.
The Government sometimes used preventive detention, mass arrests,
and excessive force to quell protests or civil unrest and to prevent
political meetings. On a number of occasions, police arrested persons
prior to demonstrations under the Criminal Procedures Code ban (see
Section 2.b.). These arrests were carried out under Section 16 of the
Maintenance of Public Order Act, which prohibits speech that ``causes
or is likely to cause alarm to the public.''
Despite governmental claims that NAB cases would be pursued
independent of an individual's political affiliation, NAB had
selectively targeted certain persons in the anti-corruption campaign
(see Section 1.e.). As of the end of October, the NAB filed 507 cases,
with 287 convictions, 39 acquittals, 6 case withdrawal and 220 cases in
progress. Senior opposition figures charged that NAB threats were used
to pressure politicians to join the PML-Q, run as independents, or vote
for Prime Minister Jamali in the vote of confidence during the year.
For example, according to HRW, Aftab Sherpao, an influential PPP leader
and former chief minister from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
returned this year from London to face corruption charges. He
subsequently was acquitted after his faction of the PPP pledged its
support for Musharraf in the referendum on his presidency. At year's
end, Sherpao was elected to the National Assembly and became Minister
for Water and Power.
During the year, few journalists reportedly were arrested,
according to the NGO Journalists for Democracy and Human Rights. The
police charged journalists at a referendum rally in April. In September
several journalists attempting to travel into Afghanistan reportedly
were detained.
Following the 1999 coup, the Musharraf government detained without
warrants and without charges several dozen political figures, military
officers, and government administrators. At year's end, most of them
had been released. By year's end, two senior Muslim League politicians,
Javed Hashmi and Mehtab Abassi were released on bail.
In December 2000, the Government commuted former Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif's prison sentence, confiscated assets belonging to the
Sharif family, and exiled him and 18 of his family members to Saudi
Arabia for 10 years. During the year, Saifur Rehman and Saeed Mehdi
Sharif were acquitted of maintenance of public order charges. Sharif
also had to agree to withdraw from politics while in exile. Some
observers claimed that the Government exiled Sharif both to remove him
from politics and to reduce the power and influence of the opposition.
Many persons apprehended by the NAB (see Section 1.e.) remained in
detention past the ordinance's stipulated 90 days detention without
charge. During the year, Mian Manzoor Watoo, Sattar, and Dr. Farooq
Sattar were released from custody; however, Sattar's 2000 conviction on
widely disputed corruption charges continued at year's end.
Hundreds of MQM activists have been arrested since November and
remained in custody at year's end; some of these activists were being
held without charge. According to MQM officials, police have arrested
more than 700 MQM officials during the past 3 years. In April a
Hyderabad MQM organizer was charged with inciting people to violence
during a strike and on April 19, the Government arrested MQM Senator
Aftab Shaikh.
Women were charged under the Hudood Ordinances for sexual
misconduct, such as adultery. A Hudood law meant to deter false
accusations is enforced weakly, and one human rights monitor claimed
that 80 percent of adultery-related Hudood cases were filed without
supporting evidence. In 1998 approximately one-third of the women in
jails in Lahore, Peshawar, and Mardan were awaiting trial for adultery;
that percentage likely remains accurate. Most women tried under the
ordinance were acquitted, but the stigma of an adultery charge alone is
severe. Men accused of rape sometimes were acquitted and released,
while their victims were held for adultery or fornication. The
Commission of Inquiry for Women recommended that the Hudood laws be
repealed, saying they are based on an erroneous interpretation of
Shari'a (see Section 5).
Private jails exist in tribal and feudal areas. Human rights groups
alleged that as many as 50 private jails, housing some 4,500 bonded
laborers, were being maintained by landlords in lower Sindh (see
Section 6.c.). Some prisoners reportedly have been held for many years.
In the five districts of upper Sindh, landlords defied the courts and
police by holding tribal jirgas, which settle feuds, award fines, and
even sentenced persons to the death penalty in defiance of provincial
laws.
AI reported that both citizens and non citizens were arbitrarily
arrested on suspicion of being al-Qa'ida or Taliban fighters, and some
of these persons were deported to their home countries. However, the
exact number of those detained, arrested or deported was unknown by
year's end.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary remained
subject to executive branch and other outside influences, and despite
the Musharraf government's pledge to respect the independence of the
judicial system, the Government took steps to control the judiciary and
to remove the Government from judicial oversight. On August 22, the
Legal Framework Order (LFO) amended the Constitution and the PCO to
allow: The empowerment of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister
and dissolve the Parliament; formalized the role of the army in
governance by the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) as a
constitutional body; and the insertion of a number of qualification
requirements for candidates for Parliament. The PCO issued in October
1999, provided that all courts functioning at the time of the coup
would continue to operate, but that no court would have the power to
issue orders against President Musharraf or any person exercising
powers or jurisdiction under his authority. President Musharraf further
undermined the independence of the judiciary when he ordered all
Supreme Court, Shari'at court, and provincial High Court justices to
take an oath to uphold the PCO that brought the military into power.
Low salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads, corruption, and
intimidation by political and religious pressure groups contributed to
judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts. Six Supreme
Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and nine provincial High
Court justices resigned in protest; however, 85 percent of the affected
justices agreed to swear allegiance to the PCO. As a result of this
decree, government directives and ordinances under the PCO no longer
were subject to judicial review, including the LFO which brought about
fundamental changes to the Constitution. Some government officials
claimed that President Musharraf issued this decree due to concerns
that judges were being bribed to rule against the Government in the
court challenges to the military takeover. Many persons criticized this
requirement, stating that it effectively ended the role of the
judiciary as an independent body. In June the Supreme Court ruled that
the October referendum was constitutional and further cast doubt on the
independence of the judiciary from the military government (see Section
3).
The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic
infighting, inactivity, and the overlapping jurisdictions of the
different court systems. Heavy backlogs that severely delayed the
application of justice remained, due to scores of unfilled judgeships
and to archaic and inefficient court procedures. The politicized
appointment process held up the promotion of many lower court judges to
the High Courts. Although the higher level judiciary was considered
competent and generally honest, there were widespread reports of
corruption among lower level magistrates and minor court functionaries.
In 2000 the Supreme Court ruled that it was legal for the Musharraf
government to amend the Constitution as long as the amendments did not
change the basic character of the Constitution, and reserved the right
to review the military's performance, the continued necessity of the
Emergency Proclamation, and the PCO. Many observers criticized the
Supreme Court decision as vague and contradictory. The Government
respected this ruling during the year. In April 2001, the Supreme Court
also modified several provisions of the NAB ordinance, and the
Government respected the amended provisions during the year. Despite
these decisions, the overall credibility of the judiciary remained low.
The judicial system involves several court systems with overlapping
and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There were civil and criminal
systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics, and
antiterrorist cases, as well as the federal Shariat court for certain
Hudood offenses. The appeals process in the civil system was: Civil
court, district court, High Court, and the Supreme Court. In the
criminal system, the progression was magistrate, sessions court, High
Court, and the Supreme Court.
The civil judicial system provided for an open trial, the
presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal
of sentences. Attorneys were appointed for indigents only in capital
cases. There were no jury trials. Due to the limited number of judges,
the heavy backlog of cases, lengthy court procedures, and political
pressures, cases routinely take years, and defendants must make
frequent court appearances. Cases start over when an attorney changes.
Under both the Hudood and standard criminal codes, there were bailable
and nonbailable offenses. According to the Criminal Procedures Code,
the accused in bailable offenses must be granted bail, and those
charged with nonbailable offenses should be granted bail if the alleged
crime carries a sentence of less than 10 years. Many accused,
especially well-connected persons who are made aware of impending
warrants against them, were able to obtain prearrest bail, and thus
were spared arrest and incarceration.
Double jeopardy applies to those convicted of possessing narcotics
because of a federal Shariat court ruling that customs and narcotics
cases be initiated separately. During 2001 the Lahore High Court
ordered the release of eight prisoners, including five foreign
nationals, who had served their sentences under the Customs Act and
were awaiting trial for a narcotics charge arising out of the same
incident. The court noted that the law did not allow punishment twice
for the same offense.
The judiciary argued that it failed to try and convict terrorist
suspects in a timely manner because of poor police casework,
prosecutorial negligence, and the resulting lack of evidence. In
response to this problem, the Anti-Terrorist Act was passed; special
antiterrorist courts began operations in 1997. The antiterrorist
courts, designed for the speedy punishment of terrorist suspects, have
special streamlined procedures; however, due to the continued
intimidation of witnesses, police, and judges, the courts initially
produced only a handful of convictions. Under the act, terrorist
killings were punishable by death and any act, including speech,
intended to stir up religious hatred, is punishable by up to 7 years'
rigorous imprisonment. Additional offenses that can be tried under the
Anti-Terrorist Act include acts to stir-up religious feelings; efforts
to ``wage war against the State''; conspiracy; acts committed in
abetting an offense; and kidnaping of or abduction to confine a person.
The Government has used the anti-terrorist courts for high-profile
cases, including the Daniel Pearl kidnaping and killing, the Meerwala
gang rape incident, and the Okara farmer protest. Cases were to be
decided within 7 working days, but judges were free to extend the
period of time as required. Trials in absentia initially were permitted
but later were prohibited. Appeals to an appellate tribunal also were
required to take no more than 7 days, but appellate authority since has
been restored to the High and Supreme Courts, under which these time
limits do not apply. Under the Anti-Terrorist Act, bail was not to be
granted if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
is guilty.
In June 2001, the Musharraf government approved an amendment to the
Anti-Terrorist Act. The new ordinance defines terrorism as ``the use or
threat of action where the use, or threatened use, is designed to
coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a
section of the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or
insecurity in society; and the use or threat is made for the purpose of
advancing a political, religious, ideological, or ethnic cause.'' In
November the Government approved an amendment to the anti-terrorism
law; however, it has yet to be ratified by the Parliament. The new
amendment gives the Government the authority to restrict the activities
of suspected terrorists, probe their assets, and hold them for up to a
year, without charges filed against them.
Leading members of the judiciary, human rights groups, the press,
and politicians from a number of parties expressed strong reservations
about the antiterrorist courts, charging that they constitute a
parallel judicial system and could be used as tools of political
repression. Government officials and police believed that the deterrent
effect of the act's death penalty provisions contributed to the
reduction in sectarian violence after its passage. The antiterrorist
courts also are empowered to try persons accused of particularly
``heinous'' crimes, such as gang rape and child killings, and several
persons have been tried, convicted, and executed under these
provisions.
The Musharraf government created by ordinance a special
antiterrorist court in Sindh presided over by a High Court justice
rather than a lower level judge, as was usually the case. The amended
provision permitted the High Court justice to ``transfer . . . any case
pending before any other special court . . . and try the case'' in his
court. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif maintained that these changes were
designed to help the Musharraf government prosecute Sharif. The 2000
trial of Nawaz Sharif and six codefendants on charges of hijacking was
the most widely publicized case tried by an antiterrorist court.
Diplomatic observers who attended the Sharif trial concluded that the
trial generally was fair, open, and transparent. In October 2000, the
appeals court upheld Nawaz Sharif's convictions for hijacking and
terrorism but combined them into one offense. The court also denied the
prosecution appeal to upgrade Sharif's sentence to the death penalty,
reduced the amount of property forfeiture, and affirmed the
antiterrorism court's acquittals of the six codefendants.
The Musharraf government in 1999 created by ordinance the NAB and
special accountability courts to try corruption cases (see Section
1.d.). The NAB was created in part to deal with as much as $4 billion
(PKR 208 billion) that was estimated to be owed to the country's banks
(all of which were state-owned at the time; several have since been
privatized) by debtors, primarily from among the wealthy elite. The
Musharraf government stated that it would not target genuine business
failures or small defaulters and does not appear to have done so. The
NAB was given broad powers to prosecute corruption cases, and the
accountability courts were expected to try such cases within 30 days.
As originally promulgated, the ordinance prohibited courts from
granting bail and gave the NAB chairman sole power to decide if and
when to release detainees.
The ordinance also allowed those suspected by the State Bank of
Pakistan of defaulting on government loans or of corrupt practices to
be detained for 15 days without charge (renewable with judicial
concurrence) and, prior to being charged, did not allow access to
counsel. In accountability cases, there was a presumption of guilt, and
conviction under the ordinance can result in 14 years' imprisonment,
fines, and confiscation of property. Those convicted also originally
were disqualified from running for office or holding office for 10
years. In August 2000, the Government announced that persons with a
court conviction would be barred from holding party office. This
provision was used during the general election to prevent certain
candidates from entering the contest.
Despite government claims that NAB cases would be pursued
independent of an individual's political affiliation, NAB has taken a
selective approach to anti-corruption efforts (see Section 1.d.).
The Government denied press reports that it had decided not to
pursue accountability cases against active members of the military or
the judiciary; however, no serving members of the military or the
judiciary have been charged by the NAB. However, in May former Chief of
the Naval Staff Mansoor ul-Haq was charged with corruption under the
NAB ordinance. Ul-Hag pled guilty, agreed to repay the money, and was
released in January. The Government also withdrew the privilege of
retention of the rank of admiral. During 2001, Jehangir Badr, Mehtab
Abbasi, and Javed Hashmi were arrested by the NAB; all but Badr were
released by year's end.
The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape (see Section 5),
extramarital sex (including adultery and fornication), and various
gambling, alcohol, and property offenses. Offenses were distinguished
according to punishment, with some offenses liable to Hadd, or Koranic,
punishment (see Section 1.c.), and others to Tazir, or secular
punishment. Although both types of cases were tried in ordinary
criminal courts, special, more stringent rules of evidence apply in
Hadd cases; Hadd punishments were mandatory if there was enough
evidence to support them. Hadd punishments regarding sexual offences
were most severe for married Muslims; for example, if a married Muslim
man confesses to rape or there are four adult male Muslim witnesses to
the act, the accused must be stoned to death; if the accused rapist is
not Muslim or married, if he confesses, or if the act is witnessed by
four adult males (not all Muslim), the accused must be sentenced to 100
lashes with a whip, and such other punishment, including death, as the
court may deem fit. The testimony of four female witnesses, or that of
a rape victim alone, is insufficient to impose Hadd punishments. If the
evidence falls short of Hadd criteria, then the accused may be
sentenced to a lesser class of penalties (Tazir). Since it is difficult
to obtain sufficient evidence to support the Hadd punishments, most
rape cases are tried at the Tazir level, under which sentences may be
imposed of up to 25 years in prison and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment
has been applied in the more than 20 years that the Hudood ordinances
have been in force. For Tazir punishments, there was no distinction
between Muslim and non-Muslim offenders. Under Tazir the evidentiary
requirement for financial or future obligations is for two male
witnesses or one male and two female witnesses; in all other matters,
the court may accept the testimony of one man or one woman (see Section
5).
The federal Shariat court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme
Court serve as appellate courts for certain convictions in criminal
court under the Hudood ordinances. The federal Shariat court also may
overturn any legislation judged to be inconsistent with the tenets of
Islam. However, these cases may be appealed to the Shari'a bench of the
Supreme Court. In two areas of the NWFP--Malakand and Kohistan--the
Government in 1999 announced plans to implement Shari'a law by
regulation and by ordinance, respectively. In September 1999, the NWFP
assembly passed a bill that incorporated the Kohistan ordinance into
law (see Section 2.c.). In November, the new MMA-led government of NWFP
reportedly affirmed to the media its plan to implement Shair'a law in
the province. However, no information was given as to when the plan
would enter into force.
Appeals of certain Hudood convictions involving penalties in excess
of 2 years imprisonment were referred exclusively to the Shariat courts
and were heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges using
ordinary criminal procedures. Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and
must be familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in a
Shariat court were entitled to the lawyer of their choice. There was a
system of bail.
The Penal Code incorporates the doctrines of Qisas (roughly, an eye
for an eye) and Diyat (blood money). Qisas was not known to have been
invoked; however, Diyat occasionally was applied, particularly in the
NWFP, in place of judicial punishment of the wrongdoer. Only the family
of the victim, not the State, may pardon the defendant. The Hudood,
Qisas, and Diyat ordinances applied to ordinary criminal courts and
Shariat courts. According to Christian activists, if a Muslim kills a
non-Muslim, he can redress the crime by paying Diyat to the victim's
family; however, a non-Muslim who kills a Muslim does not have the
option of paying and must serve a jail sentence or face the death
penalty for his crime. Failure to pay Diyat in noncapital cases can
result in indefinitely extended incarceration, under Section 331 of the
Diyat ordinance. Some persons remained in prison after completion of
their terms for failure to pay Diyat.
Administration of justice in the FATA normally is the
responsibility of tribal elders and maliks, or leaders. They may
conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. In such
proceedings, the accused have no right to legal representation, bail,
or appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for murder.
However, the Government's political agents, who were federal civil
servants assigned to tribal agencies, oversaw such proceedings and
could have imposed prison terms of up to 14 years. Paramilitary forces
under the direction of the political agents frequently conducted
punitive actions during enforcement operations. For example, in raids
on criminal activities, the authorities have damaged surrounding homes
as extrajudicial punishment of residents for having tolerated nearby
criminal activity (see Section 1.f.).
In previous years, in remote areas outside the jurisdiction of
federal political agents, tribal councils levy harsher, unsanctioned
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or stoning.
Another related form of justice operating in the NWFP, particularly
in the tribal areas, is the concept of Pakhtunwali, or the Pakhtun
Tribal Code, in which revenge is an important element. Under this code,
a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take revenge for
wrongs--either real or perceived--to redeem their honor. More often
than not, these disputes arise over women and land, and frequently
result in violence (see Section 5). In Meerwala, Punjab a woman was
gang-raped on the orders of a council of tribal elders (see Sections
1.d. & 5). In a village outside Mianwali, a tribal council permitted a
family to give eight girls, ages 5 to 16, in marriage to another
family, in exchange for the commutation of the death sentence for four
family members.
There were reports of approximately 10 political prisoners in
custody at year's end. Some political groups also argue that they were
marked for arrest based on their political affiliation (see Section
1.d.). The MQM in particular has argued that the Government used
antiterrorist court convictions in Sindh to silence its activists;
however, there were no political arrests during the general election
campaign.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The Anti-Terrorist Act allowed police or military personnel acting as
police to enter and to search homes and offices without search
warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be used in an
alleged terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision
never was tested in the courts. The Government promulgated new
antiterrorist ordinances in October 1998, April 1999, and in August
2001. The purpose of the 2001 ordinance was to strengthen the power of
the judiciary to prosecute terrorism cases. Under the ordinances, many
blasphemy cases were tried by antiterrorist courts. By law the police
need a warrant to search a home, but not to search a person. Despite
this law, police entered homes without a warrant and sometimes stole
valuables during searches. Specifically, human rights activists
criticized the new Police Ordinance 2002 for broadening police power to
search and enter homes. In the absence of a warrant, a policeman is
subject to charges of criminal trespass. However, police seldom were
punished for illegal entry.
The Government maintained several domestic intelligence services
that monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists,
and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Credible reports indicated
that the authorities routinely use wiretaps and intercepted and opened
mail. The Supreme Court directed the Government to seek its permission
before carrying out wiretapping or eavesdropping operations; however,
the judiciary's directive has been ignored widely. No action was taken
during the year in the 1996 case of 12 government agencies accused of
tapping and monitoring citizens' phone calls and no additional action
was expected.
Unlike in previous years, provincial governments did not forcibly
move landless laborers from their temporary camps.
Civil marriages do not exist; marriages are performed and
registered according to one's religion. Upon conversion to Islam, the
marriages of Jewish or Christian men remain legal; however, upon
conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian women, or of
other non-Muslims, that were performed under the rites of the previous
religion are considered dissolved (see Section 2.c.).
While the Government generally does not interfere with the right to
marry, the Government on occasion assisted influential families to
prevent marriages they oppose. The Government also failed to prosecute
vigorously cases in which families punished members (generally women)
for marrying or seeking a divorce against the wishes of other family
members. In June 2000, Mumlikat Bibi was killed in her parents' home in
the village of Yar Hussain in the NWFP. Her father, who reportedly
opposed Bibi's efforts to choose a spouse without parental consent, was
accused of being the culprit (see Section 1.a); his trial was ongoing
at year's end.
In some cases, the authorities have detained relatives in order to
force a family member who was the recipient of an arrest warrant to
surrender (see Section 1.d.).
The Frontier Crimes Regulation, the separate legal system in the
FATA, permits collective responsibility, and empowers the authorities
to detain innocent members of the suspect's tribe, or to blockade an
entire village (see Section 1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens generally were free to
discuss public issues; however, some journalists practiced a degree of
self-censorship. The Government did not attempt to exercise direct
control over views expressed in the print media. Newspaper editorials
and commentators increasingly were critical of the Government; however,
direct criticism of the military and judiciary was rare. In September
2001 the Ministry of Information directed the media to avoid direct
criticism of the United States or of the Government's cooperation in
combating terrorism. However, unlike in the past and despite
restrictions imposed on the electronic media, foreign journalists
operating in the country were permitted to broadcast stories without
obtaining prior clearance from the Ministry of Information.
Investigative journalism was rare; instead, the press acts freely to
publish charges and countercharges by named and unnamed parties and
individuals representing competing political and social interests. Both
governmental and nongovernmental entities sometimes pay for favorable
media coverage.
During the year, the Government established a 21-member Press
Council, to oversee the quality of journalism in the country. The
Council is made up of senior press editors, journalists, and the
Secretary of Information. In September the Government promulgated the
Defamation Ordinance, which required accused journalists to produce
proof of their stories in court. If the proof was not produced, the
journalists could be fined approximately $900 (PKR 50,000) or sent to
prison for 3 months. The editors of the national press widely
criticized this promulgation.
The Constitution also prohibited the ridicule of Islam, the armed
forces, or the judiciary. The Penal Code mandates the death sentence
for anyone defiling the name of the Prophet Mohammad, life imprisonment
for desecrating the Koran, and up to 10 years in prison for insulting
another's religious beliefs with the intent to outrage religious
feelings (see Section 2.c.). The Anti-Terrorist Act stipulates
imprisonment with rigorous labor for up to 7 years for using abusive or
insulting words, or possessing or distributing written or recorded
material, with the intent to stir up sectarian hatred. No warrant was
required to seize such material.
In January the Government further amended the Anti-Terrorist Act to
ban five of the extremist Tehrik-e-Ja'fria Pakistan, Sipah-e-Sihaba-
Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-
Sharait-e-Muhammadi groups (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.); the amendments
also made any person who printed, published, or disseminated any
material from these organizations subject to 6 months' imprisonment.
Provincial and local governments occasionally arrested journalists
and closed newspapers accused of printing offensive material, but this
was not a widespread practice. In March Shaheen Sehbai, the influential
editor of the English-language newspaper The News, resigned. He alleged
that he was leaving under pressure from the Government. In January
2001, the Government closed the Frontier Post, an English-language
daily based in Peshawar, and arrested five members of its staff after
the Frontier Post published a letter to the editor that allegedly
contained derogatory characterizations of the Prophet Mohammad. Most of
the staff later was released on bail, and the paper was permitted to
reopen after a period of several months. However, the paper's presses
were burned by a mob in January 2001, reportedly while the police stood
by and did little to stop it.
The State no longer publishes daily newspapers; however, the
Ministry of Information controls and manages the country's primary wire
service, the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP). The APP is both the
Government's own news agency and the official carrier of international
news to the local media. The few small privately owned wire services
usually were circumspect in their coverage of sensitive domestic news
and tended to follow a government line; however, there were some
controversial news stories published during the year. For example
Online news agency discussed the Intelligence Agency's (ISI) alleged
manipulation of the October elections.
Privately owned newspapers freely discussed public policy and
criticized the Government. They reported remarks made by opposition
politicians, and their editorials reflected a wide spectrum of views.
Local police, political parties, ethnic, sectarian, and religious
groups, militant student organizations, and occasionally commercial
interests exerted heavy pressure on newspapers to carry their
statements or press releases. Such pressure was a common feature of
journalism; among extreme groups it can include physical violence, the
sacking of offices, the intimidation or beating of journalists, and
interference with the distribution of newspapers. The police
investigation of the 2001 attack of the bureau chief of the Hyderabad
newspaper Ummat, was ongoing at year's end. At times landlords and
their agents, who have become accustomed to terrorizing with impunity
the citizens living on their lands, retaliate against journalists who
report on their actions. Journalists working in remote areas could
expect more difficulties from local authorities and influential
individuals than their urban counterparts. However, violence against
and intimidation of journalists was a nationwide problem.
The Government occasionally denied visas to journalists who were
from India or were of Indian descent.
The broadcast media were mainly government monopolies directed by
the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and Pakistan Television (PTV),
although private cable channels broadcasting from abroad had a growing
audience. Domestic news coverage and public affairs programming on
these media were controlled closely by the Government and traditionally
reflected its views. One private radio station, one television
broadcaster, and a semi private cable television station were licensed
under special contractual arrangements with the Government. The semi
private television station, Shalimar Television Network (STN),
occasionally rebroadcast PTV news. While the STN routinely censors
those segments considered to be socially or sexually offensive, rarely,
if ever, were foreign news stories censored for content. The Ministry
of Information exercised some influence over broadcasting by
restricting government advertising. It also monitored advertising on
all broadcast media, editing or removing advertisements deemed morally
objectionable.
During the year, 22 licenses were issued to private sector
entrepreneurs and 3 were operative by year's end. Three television
broadcasters, and a semi--private cable television station were
licensed under special contractual arrangements with the Government.
Two satellite channels, Geo and Indus News, were also issued licenses.
These two private sector news broadcasters were given liberty to report
freely.
Satellite dishes readily were available on the local market and
were priced within reach of almost everyone with a television set--well
into the lower-middle classes. South Asian satellite channels (usually
India-based) have become important sources of news and popular
entertainment. The MMA government in NWFP pledged to ban satellite and
cable television in the province because of its ``immoral and un-
Islamic content.''
The competitive nature of politics helps to ensure press freedom
since the media often serve as a forum for political parties,
commercial, religious, and various other interests to vie with and
criticize each other publicly. Although the press rarely criticizes
Islam as such, leaders of religious parties and movements were not
exempt from public scrutiny and criticism. In September 2001 several
newspapers published letters to the editor that were critical of
religious parties that continued to express support for the Taliban.
Sufi Mohammad, the leader of a prominent political Islamic group, was
criticized for his role in encouraging teenage boys to fight for the
Taliban.
The press traditionally avoided negative coverage of the armed
forces, and the Office of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) held
press coverage of military matters under close restraint. However,
after the 1999 coup, journalists reported no attempts by the ISPR to
influence editorial content. Discussion of the defense budget continued
during the year, especially in the English-language press. Personnel
changes among senior army officers also were discussed widely in the
press, and newspapers published calls for extending the accountability
process to include former military officers. Although many journalists
chose to exercise self-censorship regarding the military during the
year, the Government permitted significant criticism of retired
military officials. President Musharraf was the subject of intense and
public criticism during the year.
Reports of intimidation, heavy-handed surveillance, and legal
action to quiet unduly curious or nondeferential journalists were
common in the past, but these reports have declined significantly since
the coup. During the year only a few journalists were arrested,
according to the HCRP. The Government has considerable leverage over
the press through its substantial budget for advertising and public
interest campaigns and its ability to enforce regulations. Human rights
groups, journalists, and opposition figures accused the Government of
attempting to silence journalists and public figures; however, there
had been fewer such complaints since the coup. According to HRW, on
July 25 editor of the daily Jasarat, Muzaffar Ejaz reportedly was
abducted by members of the ISI and interrogated about the publication
of a controversial article on faction politics in the Muslim League. He
was released the next morning.
In September 2001, the Government enacted the Freedom of
Information Ordinance, which required every government office to
designate a freedom of information officer who would be responsible for
providing replies to written applications within 21 days. However, the
law excluded all classified documents and did not define what
constitutes classified information.
On April 14, police assaulted journalists in Faisalbad, Punjab
province, during a rally staged to promote the October referendum (see
Section 1.c.). According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ),
15 journalists were injured and a large number of civilians were hurt.
On April 15, Information Minister Nisar Memon expressed regret over the
attack and ordered an inquiry into the incident. There were no reports
of any action taken against the responsible members of the police who
used excessive force to disperse demonstrations during the year.
On May 4, unknown persons shot and killed the editor of Urdu daily
``Kohistan'' while he was in his office in Lahore. On October 22,
unknown assailants attacked and killed a prominent journalist, Shahid
Soomro, while he was in his home in Kandhkot. No one claimed
responsibility and police officials have yet to identify any suspects.
There were no further developments in the following 2001 cases:
Shakil Shaikh, Abu Bakar Siddique, Hayat Ullah, and the two British
journalists expelled, allegedly for being involved in activities that
defamed the country.
Foreign books must pass government censors before being reprinted.
Books and magazines may be imported freely, but likewise are subject to
censorship for objectionable sexual or religious content. In September
2001, the Government censored an article in Newsweek magazine
concerning the case of Dr. Younis Shaikh, who was arrested on blasphemy
charges in October 2000 and sentenced to death in August (see Section
2.c.). However, the Government permitted the publication of the same
article in a Pakistani magazine.
Obscene literature, a category broadly defined by the Government,
was subject to seizure. Dramas and documentaries on previously taboo
subjects, including corruption, social privilege, narcotics, violence
against women, and female inequality, were broadcast on television;
however, some sensitive series have been canceled before being
broadcast. In December police detained two dozen movie theater and
video shop owners in a crackdown on pornographic and unlicensed cinemas
by the new Islamist government of the North-West Frontier. The
provincial police chief, Muhammad Saeed Khan, also issued a statement
that set a 48-hour deadline for the police to remove ``vulgar and
obscene'' billboards.
The Government generally respected academic freedom. However, the
atmosphere of violence and intolerance fostered by student
organizations, typically tied to religious political parties, continued
to threaten academic freedom, despite a Supreme Court ruling that
prohibited student political organizations on campuses. On some
university campuses, well-armed groups of students, primarily from
radical religious organizations, had armed clashes with and intimidated
other students, instructors, and administrators over issues such as
language, syllabus contents, examination policies, grades, doctrines,
and dress. These groups frequently facilitated cheating on
examinations, interfered with the hiring of staff, controlled who was
admitted to the universities, and sometimes also controlled the funds
of the institutions. Such control generally has been achieved through a
combination of protest rallies, control of the campus media, and
threats of mass violence. At Punjab University, the student wing of the
political party Jaamat-i-Islami (the largest Islamic political party)
attempted to continue to impose its self-defined code of conduct on
teachers and students by threatening to foment unrest on campus if its
demands were not met.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom ``to assemble peacefully and without arms subject
to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public
order''; however, the Government imposed significant restrictions on
this right during the year. Rallies and processions on streets, roads,
and railway stations remained prohibited, and provincial and district
administrations were given authority to determine the time and place of
meeting. Ahmadis have been prohibited from holding any conferences or
gatherings since 1984(see Section 2.c.). Throughout the year, the
Government occasionally interfered with large opposition rallies, which
were held by an alliance of political parties. In March 2000, the
Musharraf government enacted an ordinance banning all public political
gatherings, processions, and strikes held outdoors. During the election
campaign, the Government approved some public political gatherings,
including pro-government and opposition candidates rallies and outdoor
meetings. During the year, the ban was enforced unevenly.
District magistrates occasionally exercised their power under the
Criminal Procedures Code to ban meetings of more than four persons
where demonstrations seemed likely to result in violence. During the
year, police made preventive arrests of political party organizers
prior to announced demonstrations. For example, on April 21, the
Government prevented a protest and arrested several party leaders by
the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) party in Lahore, even through the JI officials
claimed they received prior permission for the protest. On July 12,
police blocked roads leading to the city square and arrested nine local
Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) leaders after the party
attempted to hold a rally against the draft constitutional amendments.
The Government generally allowed all Islamist parties to hold rallies
and campaign; however, the Government denied rally permits to secular
parties.
In previous years, the MQM had been harassed in its regular
political activities, especially by the Sindh police. Police frequently
arrested PML leaders and supporters in order to prevent planned
demonstrations during the year; the HRCP noted that all public PML
demonstrations in Karachi were prevented, except for meetings at the
party's headquarters (see Section 1.d.).
Police sometimes used excessive force against demonstrators. On
July 29, police shot and killed four protesters in Islamabad. The
demonstrators were protesting their eviction from a sector in
Islamabad.
The authorities sometimes prevented leaders of religious political
parties from traveling to certain areas if they believed their presence
would increase sectarian tensions or cause public violence (see Section
2.d.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association subject to
restriction by government ordinance and law; however, the Government
limited this right in practice. NGOs were required to register with the
Government under the ``Cooperative Societies and Companies'' Ordinance
of 1960. NGOs usually register through the Ministry of Social Welfare
and must submit to a 6-month probationary period during which the
Government tracks their activities. NGOs also are required to submit a
progress report after the completion of this period, and then they are
registered formally. No prominent NGO reported problems with the
Government over registrations during the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and stated that adequate provisions shall be made for
minorities to profess and practice their religions freely; however, the
Government limited freedom of religion. The country is an Islamic
republic in which approximately 95 percent of the population is Muslim.
The majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, but an estimated 15
percent of the population is Shi'a. The Constitution required that laws
be consistent with Islam and imposed some elements of Koranic law on
both Muslims and religious minorities. In July 2000, President
Musharraf amended the PCO in order to incorporate the Islamic
provisions of the Constitution, which include the definition of
``Muslim'' and ``non-Muslim'' and procedures regarding Shariat courts.
While there was no law establishing the Koranic death penalty for
apostates (those who convert from Islam), social pressure against
apostasy is so powerful that most such conversions take place in
secret. Reprisals and threats of reprisals against suspected converts
were common. Members of religious minorities were subject to violence
and harassment, and police at times refused to prevent such actions or
to charge persons who commit them, which contributed the impunity for
acts of violence and intimidation against religious minorities.
All citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation, were
subject to certain provisions of Shari'a. In the Malakand division and
the Kohistan district of the NWFP, ordinances required that ``all
cases, suits, inquiries, matters, and proceedings in the courts shall
be decided in accordance with Shari'a.'' These ordinances define
Shari'a as the injunctions found in both the Koran and the Sunna
(tradition) of the Prophet Mohammed. Islamic law judges, with the
assistance of the Ulema (Islamic scholars), under the general
supervision of the Peshawar High Court, tried all court cases in the
Malakand Division and the Kohistan District. Elsewhere in the country,
partial provisions of Shari'a apply.
The Constitution protected religious minorities from being taxed to
support the majority religion; no one may be forced to pay taxes for
the support of any religion other than his own. For example, Sunni
Muslims are subject to the ``zakat,'' a religious tax of 2.5 percent of
their income; however, Shi'a Muslims and other religious minorities do
not pay the ``zakat.''
In January the Government eliminated the separate electorates
system which had long been a point of contention between religious
minorities and human rights groups on the one side and the Government
on the other. With the elimination of the separate electorate system,
political representation is to be based on geographic constituencies
that represent all residents regardless of religious affiliation.
Minority group leaders believed this change may help to make public
officials take notice of the concerns and rights of minority groups.
Because of their concentrated populations, religious minorities could
have significant influence as swing voting blocks in some
constituencies. Few non-Muslims were active in the country's mainstream
political parties due to limitations on their ability to run for
elective office under the previous separate electorates system.
During the year, the number of cases filed under the blasphemy laws
continued to be significant. A Christian NGO reported that 58 cases
were registered during 2000 and 2001, compared to 53 cases during 1999-
2000. In October 2000, police arrested Nasir Ahmad of Rajanpur district
under Section 295(b) for allegedly defiling a copy of the Koran. Ahmad
remained in custody and his trial had not been concluded at year's end.
The blasphemy laws also have been used to ``settle scores'' unrelated
to religious activity, such as intrafamily or property disputes. On
July 5, a mob of approximately 300 persons killed a 48-year-old Muslim
on the fatwa of a cleric in the central Punjab province. The man
previously had been charged with blasphemy; however, he was acquitted
on the grounds he was mentally ill.
In July HRW reported that Wajihul Hassan was sentenced to death for
allegedly having made phone calls to the complainant that contained
derogatory remarks about the Prophet. In April 2001, police registered
a blasphemy case against Pervez Masih, a Christian in Sialkot District,
Punjab. Masih, who owns a private school, was arrested under section
295(c) of the Penal Code and placed in Sialkot District jail where he
remained at year's end. Christian leaders alleged that the case was
filed at the behest of Mohammad Ibrahim, a Sunni Muslim educator who
owned a rival school in the same village. In May 2000, a lower court in
Sialkot district, Punjab, sentenced two Christian brothers to 35 years'
imprisonment each and fined them each $1,500 (PKR 75,000) for allegedly
desecrating the Koran and blaspheming the Prophet Mohammed. Lawyers for
the brothers filed an appeal in the Lahore High Court that was to be
heard in January 2001; however, the hearing was rescheduled for
February after the judge in the case retired. The two brothers remained
in detention at year's end. By year's end, the Supreme Court dismissed
the blasphemy case against Ayub Masih who was released after 6 years in
solitary confinement.
Police also arrest Muslims under the blasphemy laws; government
officials maintain that approximately two-thirds of the total blasphemy
cases that have been brought to trial have affected Muslims. Dr. Younis
Shaikh sentenced in 2000 on blasphemy charges was denied bail,
sentenced to death, and fined $1,580 (PKR 100,000) by a sessions court
on August 18. His case was under appeal at year's end. Yusuf Ali, who
had been convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to death, was shot and
killed in the Lahore Central Jail by another inmate on July 11. Some
jail officials were arrested in connection with the incident, including
an Assistant Superintendent (who reportedly took responsibility for the
shooting and stepped down). At year's end, the shooting was still under
investigation by the authorities. The 1998 death sentence of Shi'a
Muslim Ghulam Akbar was under appeal at year's end.
When blasphemy and other religious cases are brought to court,
extremists often pack the courtroom and make public threats about the
consequences of an acquittal. As a result, the accused often are denied
requests for bail on the grounds that their lives would be at risk from
vigilantes if released. Many judges also try to pass such cases to
other jurists; some judges reportedly have handed down guilty verdicts
to protect themselves and their families from religious extremists.
The Constitution specifically prohibited discriminatory admission
to any governmental educational institution solely on the basis of
religion. Government officials state that the only factors affecting
admission to governmental educational institutions are students' grades
and home provinces. However, students must declare their religion on
application forms. Ahmadis and Christians reported discrimination in
applying to government educational institutions due to their religious
affiliation.
``Islamiyyat'' (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim
students in state-run schools. Although students of other faiths
legally are not required to study Islam, they are not provided with
parallel studies in their own religions. In practice teachers compel
many non-Muslim students to complete Islamic studies.
On June 19, the Government announced the Madrassah Registration
Ordinance of 2002, which went into effect immediately. Under the
ordinance, all madrassahs (religious schools) were required to register
with the Pakistan Madrassah Education Board and provincial boards.
Madrassahs failing to do so may be fined or closed. The madrassahs no
longer are allowed to accept grants or aid from foreign sources,
although madrassahs offering courses in science, math, Urdu, and
English are eligible for government funds. Madrassahs were given 6
months to comply. The ordinance was designed to regulate the
madrassahs, where many poor children are educated, and to combat
religious extremism.
The Government designates religion on passports, and to get a
passport citizens must declare whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim.
Muslims also must affirm that they accept the unqualified finality of
the prophethood of Mohammed and declare that Ahmadis are non-Muslims.
Permission to buy land comes from one municipal bureaucracy, and
permission to build a house of worship from another. For all religious
groups, the process appeared to be subject to bureaucratic delays and
requests for bribes.
The Government distinguished between Muslims and non-Muslims with
regard to politics and political rights. Furthermore, according to the
Constitution, the President and the Prime Minister must be Muslim. The
Prime Minister, federal ministers, and ministers of state, as well as
elected members of the Senate and National Assembly (including non-
Muslims) must take an oath to ``strive to preserve the Islamic
ideology, which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan'' (see
Section 3).
The Ahmadis are subject to specific restrictions under law. A
constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority
because, according to the Government, they do not accept Mohammed as
the last prophet of Islam. However, Ahmadis regard themselves as
Muslims and observe Islamic practices. In May the Government announced
the restoration of a voter registration form designed to single out
Ahmadis. The section, which required Muslims to swear they believe in
the ``finality of Mohammed's prophethood,'' singled out members of the
Ahmadis sect who are less categorical about this tenet of Islam. The
Government and anti-Ahmadi religious groups have used this provision
extensively to harass Ahmadis. Ahmadis suffer from various restrictions
of religious freedom and widespread societal discrimination, including
violation of their places of worship, being barred from burial in
Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of religion, speech, and assembly,
and restrictions on their press. Several Ahmadi mosques remained
closed. Ahmadis have been prohibited from holding conferences or
gatherings. Ahmadis are prohibited from taking part in the Hajj (the
annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca). Some popular newspapers publish
anti-Ahmadi ``conspiracy'' stories, which contribute to anti-Ahmadi
sentiments in society.
Acts of sectarian and religious violence continued during the year
(see Section 5). A number of massacres in churches and mosques brought
into question the Government's ability to prevent sectarian and
religious violence. The worst religious violence was directed against
the country's Shi'a minority, who continued disproportionately to be
victims of individual and mass killings. Despite the Government's ban
on groups involved in sectarian killings, violence between rival Sunni
and Shi'a Muslim groups continued during the year. Many of the victims
were Shi'a professionals--doctors and lawyers--who were not politically
active or involved with sectarian groups. During the year, at least 53
cases of sectarian violence occurred in the country, most carried out
by unidentified gunmen. For example, on February 4, Dr. Fayyaz Karim
was shot and killed outside a mosque in Karachi. On June 17, three
Shi'a men were shot and killed by unknown gunmen outside of a Shi'a
mosque, who was opposed by the Sunni extremist groups Lash-Kar-e
Jhangyi and Singh Sahaba Pakistan.
Sectarian violence between members of different religious groups
received national attention during the year and continued to be a
serious problem. Christians, Ahmadis, and other religious minorities
often were the targets of such violence.
Christians have been victims of violence. For example, in March an
attack on a church in Islamabad left five persons dead, including two
foreign nationals. In August gunmen attacked the Murree Christian
School and killed four persons. Three days later, militants threw
grenades at worshippers at a Christian hospital in Taxila and left
three persons dead. On December 25, 3 children were killed and 14 were
injured in a grenade attack on a Christian Church in Chianwala village
in Sialkot. On December 27, police detained four men, including a
radical Muslim cleric, on suspicion of carrying out the Christmas day
attack. During the year, police made no arrests in connection with past
sectarian killings. Numerous such killings remain unresolved.
Several incidents of sectarian violence between rival Sunni and
Shi'a groups typically occur during Muharram, the time when Shi'a
Muslims mourn the death of the Prophet Mohammed's nephew Ali and Ali's
son Hussain. Government efforts to stem a wave of violence, including
mass arrests of those suspected of participating in sectarian violence,
resulted in no deaths during the year.
Beginning in 2001 and throughout the year, the Government undertook
a major effort to curb religious extremism and address the intimidation
of religious minorities. On January 12, the Government banned another
five groups suspected of inciting religious violence and jihad: Tehrik-
e-Ja'fria Pakistan, Sipah-e-Sihaba-Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-
Muhammad, and Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Sharait-e-Muhammadi. Hundreds of local
and national offices were closed, and almost 2,000 members of these
groups were arrested in the weeks following the announcement. Most
detainees were low-level organization members who were released after
90 days without being charged. Rumors persisted that higher level party
leaders enjoyed the protection and patronage of government agencies,
and avoided arrest by going underground. In late June, the authorities
in Lahore arrested at least 30 members of 2 of the banned groups. By
year's end, the Government accelerated its detention of members of
several extremist groups. In addition, violence in country has prompted
the Government on several occasions to round up hundreds of members of
religious extremist groups and students at madrassahs believed to be
terrorist recruiting centers and training grounds.
Government authorities afford religious minorities fewer legal
protections than are afforded to Sunni Muslim citizens. Members of
religious minorities are subject to violence and harassment, and police
at times refuse to prevent such actions or to charge persons who commit
them.
Ahmadi individuals and institutions often are targets of religious
intolerance, much of which is instigated by organized religious
extremists. Ahmadi leaders charge that militant Sunni mullahs and their
followers sometimes stage marches through the streets of Rabwah, a
predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center in central Punjab.
Backed by crowds of 100 to 200 persons, the mullahs purportedly
denounce Ahmadis and their founder, a situation that sometimes leads to
violence. The Ahmadis claim that police generally are present during
these marches but do not intervene to prevent trouble. For example, in
January Ghulam Mustafa Mohsin was killed in his home in District Toba
Tek Sing, after receiving a series of death threats.
Ahmadis suffer from harassment and discrimination and have limited
chances for advancement into management levels in government service.
In the past few years Ahmadis claim that even the rumor that someone
may be an Ahmadi or have Ahmadi relatives can stifle opportunities for
employment or promotion. Ahmadi students in public schools are subject
to abuse by their non-Ahmadi classmates, and the quality of teachers
assigned to predominantly Ahmadi schools by the Government generally is
poor. However, most Ahmadis are home-schooled or go to private Ahmadi-
run schools. Young Ahmadis complain of difficulty in gaining admittance
to good colleges and consequently having to go abroad for higher
education. Certain sections of the Penal Code discriminate against
Ahmadis, particularly the provision that forbids Ahmadis from
``directly or indirectly'' posing as Muslims. Armed with this vague
wording, mullahs have brought charges against Ahmadis for using
standard Muslim salutations and for naming their children Mohammed.
The predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center of Chenab Nagar
(formerly known as Rabwah) in Punjab often has been a site of violence
against Ahmadis (see Section 5).
Other religious minority groups also experienced considerable
discrimination in employment and education. In the country's early
years, minorities were able to rise to the senior ranks of the military
and civil service; now many were unable to rise above mid-level ranks.
The Government claimed that officers in the military were promoted
strictly on merit, and there were two active duty generals who were
members of religious minorities. The lack of religious minorities at
higher levels of the military partially may be due to the limited
number of minorities who opt for a career in the armed forces.
Discrimination in employment reportedly was common. Christians in
particular have difficulty finding jobs other than menial labor,
although Christian activists say the employment situation has improved
somewhat in the private sector. Christians were overrepresented in the
country's most oppressed social group--that of bonded laborers. Many
Christians complained about the difficulty that their children face in
gaining admission to government schools and colleges, a problem they
attribute to discrimination. Many Christians continued to express fear
of forced marriages between Muslim men and Christian women, although
the practice was relatively rare. Reprisals against suspected converts
to Christianity occur, and a general atmosphere of religious
intolerance has led to acts of violence against religious minorities.
Although there were few Jewish citizens in the country, anti-
Semitic sentiments appeared to be widespread, and anti-Semitic and
anti-Zionist press articles were common.
However, the return of joint electorates eliminated parliamentary
and assembly seats reserved for minorities. Some minority leaders
complained that these seats should have been retained after the joint
electorate system was eliminated.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights;
however, the Government limited them in practice. The Government at
times prevented political party leaders and religious leaders from
traveling to certain parts of the country (see Section 2.b.). Travel to
Israel is prohibited by law, but some citizens may visit Israel without
penalty by not getting their passports stamped by the Government of
Israel. Government employees and students must obtain ``no objection''
certificates before travelling abroad, although this requirement rarely
was enforced against students.
Citizens regularly exercised the right to emigrate. However, an
Exit Control List (ECL), which was made public but was revised
constantly, was used to prevent the departure of wanted criminals and
individuals under investigation for defaulting on loans, corruption, or
other offenses. Soon after coming to power, the Musharraf government
increased the use of the ECL, reportedly to prevent those suspected of
loan defaults or corruption from leaving the country. The focus
apparently was on potential loan defaulters as part of the Musharraf
government's emphasis on accountability. However, according to the
Government, there were approximately 2,450 names on the ECL for the
period of January to September. No judicial action was required to add
a name to the ECL; those named have the right to appeal to the
Secretary of Interior and, if refused, to the Advocate General of the
senior judiciary. In practice courts have directed the Government to
lift restrictions on some politicians on the ECL.
The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylum
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, nor has the Government adopted
domestic legislation concerning the treatment of refugees or the
granting of asylum status. In December 1999, the office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted a change from the practice
of granting ``prima facie'' status to all Afghans in the country; under
the current policy, the Government treats all undocumented Afghans as
aliens under the Foreigners Act, making them potentially subject to
deportation. However, in practice the Government has allowed the vast
majority of the Afghans who have entered the country to remain. On
October 22, the Government, Afghanistan and UNHCR agreed on an Afghan/
Pakistan refugee accord, which institutionalized the voluntary
repatriation of 1.8 million Afghan refugees from Pakistan for three
years. The Government will continue its negotiation with UNHCR and the
Government of Afghanistan on procedures for the screening and
repatriation of Afghans in the refugee camps. In the past, the fear of
large numbers of new refugees trying to enter the country coupled with
the absence of a legalized asylum framework and the sharp economic
competition with host communities led to a more restrictive admissions
policy and a deterioration in protection for many refugees.
The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
registered refugees. The Government provided first asylum to
approximately 200,000 persons during the year. First asylum has been
provided to refugees from Afghanistan since 1979. In November 2001,
President Musharraf announced that limited numbers of ``vulnerable''
Afghan refugees would be allowed to enter the country, including
injured persons, unaccompanied minors, the elderly, and those from
drought-affected areas of Afghanistan; adherence to this policy
fluctuated through year's end. Refugees that did not fit into this
category still were denied entry to the country. The Government refers
to refugees who entered the country after September 2001 as
``externally displaced persons'' and works with UNHCR to provide
services to them. There remain an estimated 1.5 million Afghan refugees
in the country who have been granted first asylum, and live in refugee
camps (mainly in the NWFP and Baluchistan). There also were an
estimated 1.4 million unregistered Afghans in urban areas throughout
the country, including in Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and
Lahore. In January UNHCR set up two new camps (Dara I and Dara II) on
the Pakistan side of Chaman border to accommodate the approximately
20,000 refugees in one week. On February 27, the Ministry of Interior
announced that the country would not allow UNHCR to process new
arrivals. At one point, there were up to 40,000 persons waiting to be
registered and relocated. The Government officially never reversed its
position on vulnerable persons, but said that none of the new arrivals
met the vulnerable criteria. In response, UNHCR improved the
humanitarian conditions in the waiting areas and redoubled its efforts
to establish Zhare Dasht settlement on the Afghan side of the Chaman
border. UNHRC reported the situation for refugees improved during the
year.
Many Afghan refugees continued to live and work in the country, and
were self-supporting and lived outside of refugee camps, usually in
urban or semi-urban areas. This resulted in some hostility among local
communities whose residents resent the economic competition and believe
that the refugees contribute to high crime rates. Conditions for
refugees outside of the camps often were worse than for those in the
camps. Refugees outside the camps also faced harassment by the police,
especially in Peshawar, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi. Single women,
female-headed households, and children who work on the streets faced
particular security problems.
Most refugee camps were well established, and living conditions
resembled those in neighboring villages, even though most direct
assistance to the camps ended in the early 1990's. Most recent arrivals
have gone to urban areas like Peshawar or Quetta, but some have settled
in the new Akora Khattak camp, the Shamshatoo camp, and the New
Shamshatoo camp. Conditions for newly arrived Afghans generally were
worse than conditions in the well-established camps. For example,
sanitation, health care, shelter, and fresh water were continuing
problems in the new camps. Some of the most recent arrivals still
reside in makeshift tents. Severe overcrowding was a problem (at one
point the camp housed approximately 60,000 persons). The Government and
UNHCR opened several camps to house the most recent arrivals from
Afghanistan, and to accommodate undocumented refugees from Quetta. By
year's end, more than 100,000 refugees were housed in the new refugee
camps. Refugees in the Nasir Bagh camp were evicted on June 8 because
the owners of the land the camp was located on proceeded with the
construction of a housing development. Some residents returned to
Afghanistan voluntarily; others were relocated to other camps.
The Government occasionally harassed refugees and threatened them
with deportation; harassment and threats of deportation of Afghan
refugees increased during the year. On May 8, officials in Islamabad
and Rawalpindi rounded up and arrested 580 Afghans, after a killing of
two policemen in Rawalpindi. On June 11, 68 of the 580 were deported
and the remainder were released on June 21 without being deported.
There were reports of instances in which police demanded bribes from
Afghans and threatened them with deportation if they did not pay. It is
unknown how many Afghans may have been deported in this manner during
the year. Complaints were made with the State and Frontier Regions
Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the NWFP provincial government
that such summary deportations did not comply with the law. The refugee
community expressed increasing fear of deportation, and cited this fear
as the reason why more male family members remained at home, thus
reducing family income.
The Government cooperated with UNHCR to support voluntary
repatriations to rural areas of Afghanistan considered to be safe. On
March 1, UNHCR started a voluntary repatriation program and opened
centers throughout both the country and Afghanistan and offered
financial and other assistance to repatriating refugees. UNHCR
estimated that approximately 400,000 Pakistan-based Afghan refugees
would participate; however, by the end of September, over 1.5 million
had repatriated. Afghan refugees have limited access to legal
protection and depend on UNHCR and group leaders to resolve disputes
among themselves and with the Government.
Most able-bodied male refugees have found at least intermittent
employment; however, they are not covered by local labor laws. NGOs and
private entities provided women and girls with better education and
health care than was available in Afghanistan. However, Afghan women
working for NGOs were targets for occasional harassment and violence by
conservatives and Taliban sympathizers.
The resettlement of Biharis continued to be a contentious issue,
and at year's end no further resettlement has occurred.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provided citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens participated in government
elections during the year. However, in practice, President Musharraf
and the military continued to dominate the federal coalition government
led by the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam). In June 2001,
President Musharraf issued an amendment to the existing PCO that
allowed him to become President and formally dissolved the National
Assembly, the Senate, and the provincial assemblies. The Musharraf
government pledged to return the country to a democracy; however,
President Musharraf stressed his priority first to build a strong
economic and political foundation in order to avert another bout of
``sham'' democracy. President Musharraf abided by the May 2000 Supreme
Court ruling that mandated that national elections were to be held in
October. The October national elections were deemed somewhat free and
fair by many international observers. However, some NGOs and election
observers accused the Government of pre-poll rigging, poll
irregularities, and tampering with results on selected seats to help
pro-government candidates.
The Government announced a series of ordinances that regulated the
elections. These ordinances limited political parties' ability to
organize and campaign before the October elections. One measure
required all political parties to elect their leadership and refused
registration to any party whose leaders had a court conviction.
Individuals with convictions were barred from running for office.
Effectively this measure sidelined the PPP's Benazir Bhutto, convicted
in absentia of absconding from NAB charges, and PML-N's Nawaz Sharif,
convicted of hijacking in 2000. Other changes included limiting the
size of gatherings, processions, the use of loudspeakers, the size of
posters and hung banners, and educational requirements for candidates.
The late announcement of the election schedule also curtailed the
campaign season to less than 5 weeks, in contrast to the usual 90 days.
Prior to the elections, political parties and civilian groups
alleged the Government wielded its influence unduly in ``pre-poll
rigging.'' These NGOs claimed the top provincial leadership as well as
members of the federal government and military agencies pressured
members of other parties to join the progovernment PML-Q, or run
independently. Local government officials, elected in August 2001 as
part of a devolution of power program, were accused of helping
progovernment candidates by delivering needed services and development
funds to key electoral constituencies. Others accused police and army
personnel of intimidation of voters and party workers.
On April 30, President Musharraf held a nationwide referendum on a
five-year extension of his presidency and claimed to have received a
97.5 percent vote in favor of the referendum. However, some independent
observers found evidence of widespread fraud and coerced voting.
Politicians, lawyers, and civil society groups criticized the
referendum and argued that a president could only be elected as
prescribed in the Constitution, and that the referendum could not be
used to elect a president. In June the Supreme Court ruled that the
referendum was constitutional; however, the court allowed the results
to be revisited by an elected parliament. By year's end, the elected
Parliament had not debated the April referendum. In August the
Government announced the Legislative Framework Order (LFO), which
amended the Constitution and the PCO to allow: the empowerment of the
President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the Parliament;
the creation of a National Security Council as a constitutional body;
and the insertion of a number of qualification requirements for
candidates for Parliament. Under the auspices of the LFO-amended
constitution, Pakistan held the first national and provincial assembly
elections since the October 1999 coup. International observers, NGOs,
and human rights activists, including the European Union election
observation mission (EUEOM), alleged serious flaws in the national and
provincial election framework; however, these observers stated that the
election day itself was free of serious irregularities. There were
reports of election day violence that killed 7 persons. The Government
had established the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) to develop
political reforms and a framework for elections in previous years.
During the year, the NRB reformed electoral laws that included the
elimination of the separate electorates system for religious minorities
(see Section 2.c.) and the tripling of National Assembly seats reserved
for women. Although many persons welcomed these changes, the major
political parties continued to call for the return of exiled political
leaders.
Citizens' right to change their government also was restricted by
the executive's strong influence on the judiciary. The Supreme Court
demonstrated little independence during the year. Its unanimous
decision in favor of the presidential referendum and its consistent
support of government changes to electoral procedures resulted in
approval of all of the Government's proposed electoral and
constitutional changes. In January 2000, President Musharraf ordered
all of the justices in the country to swear to uphold his PCO, and not
to make any decision against the Chief Executive or any person
exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority; as a result,
government directives and ordinances under the PCO no longer are
subject to judicial review (see Section 1.e.).
Citizens participated in national government elections during the
year; however, many NGOs alleged there were serious flaws in the
election. The PML-Q won a majority of seats and formed a government.
Despite the measures the Government designed to make the electoral
commission independent of government control, the election commission
came under severe criticism when it failed to protect an area clearly
within its mandate from interference by state authorities. According to
the EU, the electoral commission's failure to curb the authorities'
misuse of state resources in favor of political parties for the PML-Q
raised serious doubts about its independence. Furthermore, in January
the Government appointed Irshad Hassan Khan, the retired Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, to be Chief Election Commissioner. Irshad was
known for his role in presiding over the April 2000 Supreme Court
ruling that upheld the legality of the October 1999 coup. His
appointment raised further doubts about the commission's independence.
During 2001, President Musharraf focused on the need to reduce the
power of the central government by devolving power to the local level.
Between December 31, 2000, and August 2001, elections for local
government assemblies were held in the country's 97 districts. Directly
elected union councilors formed an electoral college to elect a
district mayor (nazim) and members of district council. According to
local and international election observers, the elections generally
were free and fair. However, the Government was accused by some
political parties of intervening in several mayoral races to ensure
that the pro-Musharraf candidates were elected. Such government
pressure was most evident in Lahore and Rawalpindi. In February 2001,
the Government modified laws governing local elections to permit
minorities to vote for district and township mayoral positions on a
joint-electorates basis.
The Musharraf government did not ban political parties, and the
parties active prior to the 1999 coup, including the Pakistan Muslim
League (which was led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) continued
some activities. During the year, the Government forced the PPP and
PML-N to elect leaders other than Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif by
refusing to register any parties whose leaders had a court conviction.
The Government also amended the Political Parties Act to bar any person
from becoming Prime Minister for a third time. This amendment
effectively barred Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from power.
The Government permitted progovernment and religious parties to
assemble and hold processions; however, other political parties often
were denied permission to stage political events (see Section 2.b.).
The Government arrested 3,000 persons in opposition political parties
during the year. On March 23, police detained 400 leaders and workers
of the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) to prevent them
from attending an opposition rally in Lahore. In March 2000, President
Musharraf issued an ordinance banning all political gatherings held
outdoors (see Section 2.b.). The ban remained in effect at year's end.
The National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) prohibits those convicted
of corruption under the NAO from holding political office for 10 years
(see Section 1.d.). In August 2000, the Government amended the
Political Parties Act to disqualify automatically anyone with a court
conviction from holding party office. Legal observers expressed concern
over the concentration of power in the NAO, the fact that NAO chairmen
have all been members of the military, and the presumption of guilt in
accountability cases.
Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the
political status of the northern areas--Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan--
was not resolved. As a result, more than 1 million inhabitants of the
northern areas were not covered under the Constitution and have had no
representation in the federal legislature. An appointed civil servant
administers these areas; an elected Northern Areas Council serves only
in an advisory capacity and has no authority to change laws or to raise
and spend revenue.
There are 60 of women in the 342-seat National Assembly; there is
one woman in the Cabinet; and none in the Supreme Court. During 2001
the Musharraf government set aside one-third of the seats in the local
council elections for female candidates. During the year, the NRB
enacted electoral reforms that include the tripling of National
Assembly seats reserved for women. According to the Election
Commission, 2,621 women competed for 1,867 reserved seats at the
district level in 2001. In some districts, social and religious
conservatives prevented women from becoming candidates; however, in
several districts, female candidates were elected unopposed. Women
participate in large numbers in elections, although some are dissuaded
from voting by family, religious, and social customs. In districts of
the NWFP and southern Punjab's tribal areas, conservative religious
leaders lobbied successfully to prevent women from contesting elections
or casting ballots. According to press reports, female voters were
threatened and their families intimidated from voting and running for
office. In October the MMA coalition of religious parties declared that
the families of women who voted in NWFP would be fined. Prime Minister
Jamali has one female minister and one female special advisor.
Provincial governors appointed by President Musharraf also have named
women to serve in provincial cabinets.
There are 10 minorities in the 342-seat legislature; there are none
in the Cabinet; and there are none in the Supreme Court. The Government
distinguished between Muslims and non-Muslims with regard to politics
and political rights (see Section 2.c.). Furthermore, according to the
Constitution, the President and the Prime Minister must be Muslim. The
Prime Minister, federal ministers, and ministers of state, as well as
elected members of the Senate and National Assembly (including non-
Muslims) must take an oath to ``strive to preserve the Islamic
ideology, which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan.'' Electoral
reforms prepared during the year eliminated the separate electorate
system for religious minorities. In addition to joint electorates,
minorities could vote for reserved at-large candidates who would
represent their groups. The Musharraf government restored the
conditions for voting as outlined in the Constitution; however,
pressure from religious groups led the Government to declare that
Muslim voters had to sign an oath to declare the finality of the
prophet Mohammed. Voters who did not sign the oath would be put on a
separate electoral roll in the same constituency. This requirement
singled out Ahmadis. Under the previous electoral system, minorities
voted for reserved at-large seats, not for nonminority candidates who
represent actual constituencies. Under Article 106 of the Constitution,
minorities also had reserved seats in the provincial assemblies (see
Section 2.c.).
Prior to 1997, in keeping with local traditions, tribal leaders, or
maliks, appointed in the governor's name by the central government's
political agents in each agency, elected the FATA National Assembly
members. In accordance with the Government's general ban on political
party activities in the FATA, candidates were not allowed to register
by political party, and political party rallies were not allowed.
However, several political parties did campaign covertly. Tribal
members, including large numbers of women in some areas, registered to
vote despite campaigns by some tribes against their participation.
However, on election day far fewer registered women than registered men
actually voted.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases; however, they are
required to be licensed. Government officials often were cooperative
and responsive to their views. Human rights groups reported that they
generally had good access to police stations and prisons. The
Government cooperated with international and local NGOs in a number of
high profile cases, including the Merrwala gang rape incident. These
NGOs provided access to international organizations and helped to
spearhead investigations into the incident. The Government provided
protection to human rights lawyers defending accused blasphemers
following threats and attacks on the lawyers by religious extremists.
In early June 2001, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan called on
the Government to end the harassment of HRCP employees by lower level
functionaries. The HRCP also accused government officials of launching
tax investigations against HCRP employees who had been critical of
government policies.
The Musharraf government made some attempts to ease some of the
previous government's restrictions on NGOs. President Musharraf
appointed several persons with prominent NGO backgrounds to his
Cabinet, and many NGO workers reported a smooth working relationship
with the Government during the year. The new government in Punjab under
President Musharraf also lifted the previous ban on NGO registration.
International observers were permitted to visit the country and
travel freely. Several international organizations, focused on refugee
relief, maintained permanent offices in the country, although some
reported difficulty in securing visas for their foreign staff. Also,
during the October elections, international observers were present at
various numbers of polling stations; however, some reported obstruction
of their mission by the Government.
The Ministry of Human Rights, a department within the Ministry of
Law, Justice, Human Rights, and Parliamentary Affairs, finalized and
began limited implementation of a reform program for jails. During the
year, it increased its capacity to collect and catalog reports of human
rights abuses. However, the department is not viewed as effective by
human rights observers. The Government has failed to take follow-up
action on the 1997 report of the Commission of Inquiry for Women.
The Government made some limited progress towards achieving the
other human rights goals, after an April 2000 conference on human
rights. In late April 2001 former President Tarar issued an amendment
ordinance to the citizenship law to enable women married to foreigners
to claim citizenship for their children (see Section 5). The Government
inaugurated a National Commission on the Status of Women in September
2000.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provided for equality before the law for all
citizens and broadly prohibited discrimination based on race, religion,
caste, residence, or place of birth; however, in practice there was
significant discrimination based on these factors.
Women.--Domestic violence was a widespread and serious problem.
Human rights groups estimated that a large number of women were victims
of domestic violence at the hands of their husbands, in-laws, or other
relatives. According to the HRCP one out of every two women was the
victim of mental or physical violence. The Parliamentary Commission of
Inquiry for Women reported in 2001 that violence against women ``has
been described as the most pervasive violation of human rights'' in the
country, and it called for legislation clearly stating that domestic
violence against women is a criminal offense. Husbands were known to
kill their wives even for trivial offenses, and often newly married
women were abused and harassed by their in-laws. While abusers may be
charged with assault, cases rarely were filed. Police usually returned
battered women to their abusive family members. Women were reluctant to
file charges because of societal mores that stigmatize divorce and make
women economically and psychologically dependent on their relatives.
Relatives also were reluctant to report abuse to protect the reputation
of the family. There are no specific laws pertaining to domestic
violence, except for the Qisas and Diyat ordinances, which rarely were
invoked and may privatize the crime. However, Qisas and Diyat cannot be
invoked where the victim was a direct lineal descendant of the
perpetrator. Police and judges tended to see domestic violence as a
family problem, and were reluctant to take action in such cases. Thus
it was difficult for women to obtain relief from the justice system in
cases of domestic violence.
During the year, the press reported on hundreds of incidents of
violence against women and drew attention to the killings of married
women by relatives over dowry or other family-related disputes. Most of
the victims were burned to death, allegedly in kitchen stove accidents;
some women reportedly were burned with acid. During 2001, 471 dowry
deaths were reported, but according to one NGO, only 60 to 70 percent
of such cases are reported. During the year, 317 burn cases were
reported to the Progressive Women's Association (PWA). Human rights
monitors asserted that many cases were not reported by hospitals and
that, even when they were, the police were reluctant to investigate or
file charges. Furthermore, human rights monitors agree that most
``stove deaths'' in fact are killings based upon a suspicion of illicit
sexual relationship or upon dowry demands. Increased media coverage of
cases of wife burnings, spousal abuse, spousal killing, and rape has
helped to raise awareness about violence against women.
By year's end, The Crisis Center for Women in Distress helped 89
women through legal and medical referrals, counseling from trained
psychologists, and a hotline for women in distress. A second crisis
center in Vehari, in southern Punjab, opened in 1998.
Rape was a pervasive problem. In 2001 the HRCP estimated that at
least eight women, five of them minors, were raped every day, and more
than two-thirds of those were gang-raped. The law provides for the
death penalty for persons convicted of gang rape. No executions have
been carried out under this law and conviction rates remain low. It is
estimated that less than one-third of all rapes are reported to the
police. Police rarely respond to and sometimes are implicated in these
attacks (see Section 1.c.). On June 22, a woman in Meerwala, Punjab was
gang-raped on the orders of a council of tribal elders (see Section
1.d.).
According to HRCP, in most rape cases the victims are pressured to
drop charges because of the threat of Hudood adultery or fornication
charges against them if they cannot prove the absence of consent. All
consensual extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of
the Hudood Ordinances, and carry Hadd (Koranic) or Tazir (secular)
punishments (see Section 1.e.). Accordingly, if a woman cannot prove
the absence of consent, there was a risk that she may be charged with a
violation of the Hudood ordinances for fornication or adultery. The
Hadd--or maximum punishment for this offense--was public flogging or
stoning; however, for Hadd punishments to apply, especially stringent
rules of evidence were followed. Hadd punishments were mandatory if
evidentiary requirements were met; for sexual offenses, four adult male
Muslims must witness the act or the alleged perpetrator must confess.
For non-Muslims or in cases where all of the 4 male witnesses were not
Muslim, the punishment was less severe. The testimony of four female
witnesses, or that of the victim alone, was insufficient to impose Hadd
punishments; therefore, even if a man rapes a woman in the presence of
several women, he cannot be subjected to the Hadd punishment. If Hadd
punishment requirements were not met, the accused may be sentenced to a
lesser class of penalties (Tazir); in practice most rape cases were
tried at this level. Under Tazir a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25
years in prison and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment has been applied in
the more than 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force.
For Tazir punishments, there was no distinction between Muslim and non-
Muslim offenders.
According to an HRCP lawyer, the Musharraf government has brought
fewer charges against women under the Hudood Ordinance than were
brought in the past, and the courts have shown greater leniency toward
women in their sentences and in the granting of bail. According to AI,
men accused of rape sometimes were acquitted and released, while their
victims were held on adultery charges.
According to a 2001 HRW report, women face difficulty at every
level of the judicial system in bringing rape cases to trial. Police
are reluctant to take the complaint and sometimes are abusive toward
the victim; the courts do not have consistent standards of proof as to
what constitutes rape and what corroboration is required; and judges,
police, and prosecutors are biased against female rape victims, tending
towards a presumption of female consent and the belief that women lie
about such things. Judges on the whole reportedly were reluctant to
convict; however, if there was some evidence, judges have been known to
convict the accused of the lesser offense of adultery or fornication
(consensual sex). In 2001 HRW also reported that women face problems in
the collection of evidence; that the doctors tasked to examine rape
victims often believe that the victims are lying; that the doctors were
trained insufficiently and have inadequate facilities for the
collection of forensic evidence pertaining to rape; that they do not
testify very effectively in court; and that they tend to focus on the
virginity status of the victim, and, due either to an inadequate
understanding of the need for prompt medical evaluations or to
inadequate resources, often delay the medical examinations for many
days or even weeks, making any evidence that they collect of dubious
utility. Medical examiners and police personnel sometimes are abusive
physically or verbally during these exams, especially in cases where a
woman is charged with adultery or fornication (for which an exam may be
requested) and does not wish to be examined (such women, despite the
fact that by law they should not be examined without their consent,
have been examined, and even have been beaten for their refusal to be
examined). Police and doctors often do not know that a woman must
consent to this type of exam before it can be performed, and judges may
not inform women of their right to decline. If they report rape to the
police, women's cases often are delayed or mishandled, and women
frequently were harassed by police or the alleged perpetrators to drop
the case. Police sometimes accept bribes from the accused rapist to get
the victim to drop a case; however, in other cases, police will request
bribes from the victim to pursue the case against the accused rapist.
Police tend to investigate the cases poorly, and may not inform women
of the need for a medical exam or may stall or block women's attempts
to obtain one.
The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women in 2001
criticized Hudood Ordinances relating to extramarital sex and
recommended that they be repealed, asserting that they are based on an
erroneous interpretation of Shari'a. The Commission charged that the
laws on adultery and rape have been subject to widespread misuse, with
95 percent of the women accused of adultery being found innocent either
in the court of first instance or on appeal. However, the Commission
pointed out that, by that time, the woman may have spent months in
jail, suffered sexual abuse at the hands of the police, and seen her
reputation destroyed. According to one human rights monitor, 80 percent
of adultery-related Hudood cases were filed without supporting
evidence. The Commission found that the main victims of the Hudood
Ordinances are poor women who were unable to defend themselves against
slanderous charges. These ordinances also have been used by husbands
and other male family members to punish their wives and female
relatives for reasons having nothing to do with sexual propriety,
according to the Commission. One NGO run by a prominent human rights
activist reported that 262 women were on trial for adultery in Lahore
as of May 2001. An additional 33 were awaiting trial and 26 had been
convicted under the Hudood Ordinances in 2001, the most recent
statistics available.
Marital rape is not a crime. The Hudood Ordinances abolished
punishment for raping one's wife. However, the Commission of Inquiry
for women has recommended reinstating penalties for marital rape.
Marriage registration (nikah) sometimes occurs years before a marriage
is consummated (rukh sati). The nikah (unconsummated) marriage is
regarded as a formal marital relationship, and thus a woman or girl
cannot be raped by a man to whom her marriage is registered, even if
the marriage has not yet been entered into formally.
There were numerous reports of women killed or mutilated by male
relatives who suspected them of adultery. Few such cases were
investigated seriously and those who are arrested often were acquitted
on the grounds that they were ``provoked,'' or for a lack of witnesses.
While the tradition of killing those suspected of illicit sexual
relations, in order to restore tribal or family honor women are far
more likely to be killed than men. The HRCP estimated in 2001 that as
many as 204 women were killed by their husbands or family, mostly as a
result of honor killings, known as ``karo/kari'' (or adulterer/
adulteress) in Sindh. Around 278 honor killings took place in Punjab
according to the HCRP. More than 800 women were killed by family
members in honor killings during 2001. The problem was believed to be
even more extensive in rural Sindh and Baluchistan, where ``karo/kari''
killings were common. Tribal custom among the Baluch and the Pathans
sanctions such killings. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has
rejected the concept of ``honor'' as a mitigating circumstance in a
murder case and recommended that such killings be treated as simple
murder. Women who were the victims of rape may become the victims of
their families' vengeance against the victims' ``defilement.'' The
Government failed to take action in honor killing cases, particularly
when influential families were involved. In April 2001 Mehvish Miankhel
was killed by her uncle and the Government did not arrest her attacker.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced by the Bohra Muslims.
There are an estimated 100,000 Bohra Muslims in the country; the Bohra
observe a form of Shi'a Islam that was practiced in medieval Cairo.
There were no available statistics on the extent to which the Bohra
practice FGM; however, the practice of FGM in the Bohra community
reportedly has declined in the last few years.
Sexual harassment is a widespread problem in the country but there
is no separate law to prosecute offenders. There is one article in the
Pakistan Penal Code that deals with harassment.
Significant barriers to the advancement of women begin at birth. In
general female children are less valued and cared for than are male
children. According to a U.N. study, girls receive less nourishment,
health care, and education than do boys. In June, the New York Times
reported that the country has only 94 females for every 100 males, when
the international average is 104 females for every 100 males.
Human rights monitors and women's groups believe that a narrow
interpretation of Shari'a has had a harmful effect on the rights of
women and minorities, as it reinforces popular attitudes and
perceptions and contributes to an atmosphere in which discriminatory
treatment of women and non-Muslims is accepted more readily.
The value of women's testimony is not equal to that of a man's in
certain court cases tried under the Hudood Ordinances or before a
federal Shariat Court (see Section 1.e.).
In inheritance cases women generally do not receive--or are pressed
to surrender--the share of the inheritance they legally are due.
Civil marriages do not exist; marriages were performed and
registered according to one's religion. Upon conversion to Islam, the
marriages of Jewish or Christian men remain legal; however, upon
conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian women, or of
other non-Muslims, that were performed under the rites of the previous
religion are considered dissolved (see Section 2.c.). Children born to
Jewish or Christian women who convert to Islam after marriage were
considered illegitimate only if their husbands do not also convert, and
if women in such cases do not separate from their husbands.
Both civil and religious laws theoretically protect women's rights
in cases of divorce, but many women are unaware of their rights, and
often the laws were not observed. One NGO reported that legal literacy
is constrained by the lack of laws printed in local languages. Judicial
reforms begun in April with foreign funding included plans to publish
laws in Urdu, which is understood by the majority of citizens; some
laws had been published in Urdu as of year's end. The Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry for Women recommended that marriage registration
(nikahnama) be obligatory and that women, as well as men, have the
right to initiate divorce proceedings. It also called for the
punishment of those who coerce women or girls into forced marriages. A
husband legally is bound to maintain his wife until 3 months after the
divorce. A father is bound to maintain his children until they reach
the age of 14 for males, or 16 for females. However, the legal process
is so complicated and lengthy that it can take years for the children
to get maintenance.
Discrimination against women particularly is acute in rural areas.
In some areas of rural Sindh and Baluchistan, female literacy rates
were 2 percent or less. A survey of rural females by the National
Institute of Psychology found that 42 percent of parents cited ``no
financial benefit'' as the reason they kept their daughters from
attending school and sent their sons instead. Similarly a study by the
NWFP directorate of primary education concluded that most girls in
rural areas do not go to school because they have to look after the
household while their mothers help in the fields. In Karachi only 28
percent of girls completing matriculation (10th grade) exams in science
during the year would be able to find places in government-run
colleges, as opposed to 83 percent of boys passing the same tests. In
Baluchistan conditions were much worse, with only 2 percent of the
province's women having received any formal education. Education
activists noted that many parents would like to educate their
daughters; however, many parents reportedly chose not to send their
daughters to school due to the poor quality of instruction and the lack
of facilities.
In rural areas, the practice of a woman ``marrying the Koran''
still was accepted widely if the family cannot arrange a suitable
marriage or wants to keep the family wealth intact. A woman ``married
to the Koran'' is forbidden to have any contact with males more than 14
years of age, including her immediate family members. Press reports
indicate that the practice of buying and selling brides still occurs in
parts of the NWFP and the Punjab.
A special three-member bench of the Lahore High Court upheld in
1997 the federal Shariat Court's ruling that a Muslim woman can marry
without the consent of her wali (guardian--usually her father).
However, in practice social custom dictates that couples are to marry
at the direction of family elders. When this custom was violated,
especially across ethnic lines, violence against the couple may result,
and the authorities generally failed to prosecute such cases
vigorously.
Although a small number of women study and teach in universities,
postgraduate employment opportunities for women largely remain limited
to teaching, medical services, and the law. Nevertheless an increasing
number of women are entering the commercial and public sectors.
Women's organizations operate primarily in urban centers. Many
concentrate on educating women about existing legal rights. Other
groups concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women in prison who
may not be able to afford an attorney.
In 2001 an amendment ordinance to the citizenship law was issued
which enabled women married to foreigners to claim citizenship for
their children.
Children.--The Government, through its laws and programs, does not
demonstrate a strong commitment to children's rights and welfare. There
is no federal law on compulsory education, and neither the federal nor
provincial governments provide sufficient resources to assure universal
education. The education system is in disarray, with studies showing
that only 65 to 70 percent of children under the age of 12 are enrolled
in school, less than half of whom actually complete primary school. A
reported 10,000 schools have closed in recent years due to a lack of
teachers. Even those children who go to school are not assured of being
able to read and write. According to UNICEF figures in 2001, a
nationwide sample of children in grade five revealed that only 33
percent could read with comprehension, while a mere 17 percent were
able to write a simple letter. Development experts point to a number of
factors for the poor state of public education, including the low
percentage of gross national product devoted to education and
inefficient and corrupt federal and provincial bureaucracies. Those
fortunate enough to pursue higher education often face inordinate
delays in receiving the results of final exams.
Information about progress in educating girls was contradictory. A
survey in 2001 found that the enrollment rate for girls under age 12
was 65 percent, which was less than that of boys (75 percent), but
considerably higher than the 1990 figure of 50 percent. Since official
government figures count at most 1.5 million school-age children in
public and private schools and madrassahs in Karachi (of an estimated 4
million or more between the ages of 5 and 14), enrollment figures of 65
and 75 percent are difficult to substantiate. The female literacy rate
has doubled during the past two decades, although, at roughly 27
percent, it was just more than half that of males.
Education was a provincial responsibility. In previous years,
comprehensive surveys were performed to identify school buildings that
were being misused as well as the large numbers of teachers and
administrators who were not performing their duties or even showing up
for work. Administrative action against these ``ghost schools'' began,
and the Government was better placed to ensure that its education
budget was not misused. The Punjab government also worked closely with
both international and local NGOs to improve primary and secondary
education. However, no legal action was taken against those found
responsible for the misuse of government property. In August 2001, a
former provincial official reported that a survey revealed that half of
the third grade teachers at one school in Punjab did not know their
multiplication tables. Nevertheless, the official claimed the Punjab
government refused to dismiss unqualified teachers.
In June the Government announced a new ordinance regulating
madrassahs under a voluntary registration program that included the
setting up of model schools, the setting of teacher training standards,
and the standardization of the curricula in participating schools to
include general education subjects. A board was to be set up to enforce
the regulations, oversee participating schools, and control all
internal and external funding for participating schools. Religious
clerics objected to any government regulation of the madrassahs and as
a result, the Government withdrew most of the requirements and ceased
to pursue madrassah reform.
According to press reports, there are several madrassahs where
children were confined illegally and kept in unhealthy conditions, and
there were reports of the abuse of children studying at madrassahs
during the year. Sexual abuse of boys was believed widely to occur at
some madrassahs.
Health care services, like education, remained seriously inadequate
for the nation's children. Children suffered a high rate of preventable
childhood diseases. According to the National Institute of Child Health
Care, more than 70 percent of deaths between birth and the age of 5
years were caused by easily preventable ailments such as diarrhea and
malnutrition. Public health administration suffers from poor
management, lack of accountability, unreliable or falsified statistics,
and lack of cooperation among agencies. In 2001 30 million children
under the age of 5 were targeted for polio vaccinations. According to
the Extended Program for Immunizations, 27 million children were
successfully vaccinated. Only 116 cases of polio were reported in 2001.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) reported that 8 percent of
children suffer from iron deficiency and 30 to 40 percent of children
in the country suffer from stunted growth. According to a family-
planning NGO, up to 50 percent of children were born iodine-deficient,
resulting in high rates of mental retardation.
Children sometimes were kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for
ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Section 6.d.). In July
in Punjab eight girls were forced to marry significantly older men in a
rival family, in exchange for commuted death sentences on members of
their families. In rural areas, it is a traditional practice for poor
parents to give children to rich landlords in exchange for money or
land, according to human rights advocates. These children frequently
were abused by these landlords and held as bonded laborers for life.
Landlords also have been known to pay impoverished parents for the
``virginity'' of their daughters, whom the landlords then rape.
Incidents of rape were common. A UNICEF-sponsored study of Punjab found
that 15 percent of girls reported having been abused sexually. Sexual
abuse of boys was more common in segments of society where women and
girls traditionally remain within the home. According to a local NGO,
459 boys and 615 girls were reported to have been sexually abused
during 2001.
The HRCP reported that in the majority of child abuse cases,
children were abused by acquaintances. There were credible reports of
boys being sexually abused in a jail located in Punjab province in
2000. Child prostitution involving boys and girls widely is known to
exist but rarely is discussed (see Section 6.f.). All forms of
prostitution were illegal, and a person who abducted a child under the
age of 10 and committed sexual assault may be sentenced to death. The
Shabab-i-Milli, the youth wing of the Jaamat-i-Islami party, launched a
campaign in May 2000 to combat child prostitution by raising public
awareness of the problem. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has
observed that child sexual abuse is a subject that ``has been virtually
ignored'' and called for a public education campaign on the subject,
including introducing it into school curriculums and training nurses
and doctors in how to handle such cases.
Children's rights theoretically were protected by numerous laws
that incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child. In September 2001, the Government signed the Optional Protocols
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children
in armed conflict and the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography. However, the Government
frequently failed to enforce these laws.
In July 2000, the Government passed the Juvenile Justice System
Ordinance. The ordinance abolished the death penalty for minors under
18 years of age, mandates that the Government provide children with
legal assistance, prohibited children from being tried for crimes with
adults, and prohibited the proceedings of juvenile courts from being
published.
Trafficking in children is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
Child labor is a significant problem (see Section 6.d.).
There are several NGOs that promote children's labor rights and
child protections, operating in Islamabad, and in the provinces.
Persons with Disabilities.--There are no laws requiring equal
accessibility to public buildings for persons with disabilities. The
vast majority of persons with physical and mental disabilities are
cared for by their families. However, in some cases these individuals
are forced into begging; organized criminal ``beggarmasters'' skim off
much of the proceeds. Parents reportedly have given children as
offerings to Baba Shah Dola, a shrine in Punjab where the children
reportedly are deformed intentionally by clamping a metal form on the
head that induces microcephalitis. Some human rights organizations
asked local authorities to investigate this practice; however, there
have been no investigations. There is a legal provision requiring
public and private organizations to reserve at least 2 percent of their
jobs for qualified persons with disabilities. Organizations that do not
wish to hire persons with disabilities instead can give a certain
amount of money to the Government treasury, which goes into a fund for
persons with disabilities. This obligation rarely was enforced. The
National Council for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled provides some
job placement and loan facilities.
Mentally ill prisoners normally lack adequate care and were not
segregated from the general prison population (see Section 1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Industrial Relations Ordinance
(IRO) permits industrial workers to form trade unions subject to major
restrictions in some employment areas. However, the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reported the IRO only covers
companies that employ 50 or more persons, and that companies sometimes
subdivided their workforces into artificial subsidiaries (while keeping
them all on the same premises) to evade the IRO. The Essential Services
Maintenance Act (ESMA) covers the state administration, government
services, and state enterprises such as oil and gas production,
electricity generation and transmission, the state-owned airline, the
national railroad, and ports. Workers in these sectors are allowed to
form unions. However, the ESMA sharply restricts normal union
activities, usually prohibiting, for example, the right to strike in
affected organizations. A worker's right to quit also may be curtailed
under the ESMA. For each industry subject to the ESMA, the Government
must make a finding, renewable every 6 months, on the limits of union
activity.
An amendment to the IRO states that: 1) Only employees of the
represented industry can hold office in a trade union; and 2)
federations formed by trade unions cannot bargain with individual
employers; each union has to bargain for itself. The first provision
disadvantages smaller unions, which may not have enough officers
capable of bargaining. The second provision is an attempt to weaken the
power of the federations. This amendment has been challenged by the
trade unions and, as a result, has not yet come into force. An
amendment to the IRO states that unions which received less than 15
percent of worker's votes were to be dissolved automatically and their
registrations canceled. No action has been taken to implement these
elements.
The ILO has stated repeatedly that the country's law and practice
violate the Government's commitments under ILO Convention 87. The ILO
has urged the Government to lift prohibitions against union activity by
teachers, radio, television, railway, forestry, hospital, banking, and
other government employees, as well as to rescind the existing ban on
strikes. The ILO also expressed concern about the practice of
artificial promotions that exclude workers from the purview of
Convention 111. In response to a government request, the ILO has
provided technical assistance to help bring the country's labor laws
into conformity with the ILO's conventions. However, no legislative
action has been taken.
Unions may belong to federations, and there are eight major
federations. The Government permits trade unions across the political
spectrum. While many unions remain aloof from politics, some are
associated with political parties. Unions associated with opposition
parties are allowed to carry on their activities freely. During the
local government elections, unions fielded candidates for labor
councilor positions.
The IRO prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Under the
law, private employers are required to reinstate workers fired for
union activities. However, in practice, such redress has not been
available to workers, because workers usually do not pursue redress
through the courts due to the fact that the legal system was slow,
prohibitively expensive, and often corrupt.
Federations were free to affiliate with international federations
and confederations. Pakistani trade unions belong to the ICFTU and to
secretariats affiliated with the ICFTU.
The United States revoked the Generalized System of Preferences
trade benefits in 1996 for certain goods, such as leather sporting
goods, surgical instruments, and hand-loomed carpets, due to failure to
make progress on various worker rights issues including child labor
(see Section 6.d.).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
industrial workers to organize and freely elect representatives to act
as collective bargaining agents is established in law. In general legal
unions have the right to bargain collectively. However, the many
restrictions on forming unions (see Section 6.a.) preclude collective
bargaining by large sections of the labor force.
There is no provision allowing agricultural workers to unionize as
they are not defined as ``an industry.'' Water and power workers may
engage in ``responsible trade unionism.''
According to government estimates, union members make up
approximately 10 percent of the industrial labor force and 3 percent of
the total estimated work force. Unions claimed that the number of union
members was underestimated.
Legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off periods
constrain the right to strike, as does the Government's authority to
ban any strike that may cause ``serious hardship to the community'' or
prejudice the national interest. The Government also may ban a strike
that has continued for 30 days. The rare strikes that did occur were
generally short and illegal. Police do not hesitate to crack down on
worker demonstrations. The law prohibits employers from seeking
retribution against leaders of a legal strike and stipulates criminal
penalties for offenders. Under the Industrial Relations Ordinance of
2002, courts only may impose fines for violations of this provision;
imprisonment no longer is permitted. The level of fines has been
increased. The law does not protect leaders of illegal strikes. There
were no strikes during the year, and some labor leaders attribute this
to the ban on strikes by large unions, such as Pakistan Railways and
Pakistan International Airways (PIA). The ICFTU reported in 2001 that
the Government also suspended union activities, including canceling
collective bargaining agreements and closing union offices, at PIA.
The ESMA also restricts collective bargaining. For each industry
subject to the ESMA, the Government must make a finding, renewable
every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. In cases in which the
Government prohibits collective bargaining, special wage boards decide
wage levels.
The special wage boards were established at the provincial level
and were composed of representatives from industry, labor, and the
provincial labor ministry, which provided the chairman. Despite the
presence of labor representatives, unions generally were dissatisfied
with the boards' findings. Disputes were adjudicated before the
National Industrial Relations Commission. A worker's right to quit also
may be curtailed. Dismissed workers have no recourse to the labor
courts.
The ESMA exempts export promotion zones (EPZs) from the IRO's
granting of workers the right to form trade unions. The workers in EPZs
have no protection against employer interference or anti-union
discrimination. There was only 1 EPZ, in Karachi, with nearly 6,000
employees, according to government sources.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Government prohibits
forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, the Government
did not enforce these prohibitions effectively. Critics argue that the
ESMA's limitation on worker rights, especially the right to quit,
constitutes a form of compulsory labor. The ILO objected to this as a
violation of Convention 29. The Government responded that the
maintenance of essential services is required for the defense and
security of the country, and that continued reviews have limited these
services to a few core areas such as electricity generation and
distribution, and air and sea ports.
The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act (BLAA) outlawed bonded
labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and forbade lawsuits for the
recovery of existing debts. The act makes bonded labor by children
punishable by up to 5 years in prison and up to $900 (PKR 50,000) in
fines. However, provincial governments, which are responsible for
enforcing the law, have failed to establish enforcement mechanisms.
Strong social ties between employers and public officials at the local
level further undercut the law's effectiveness. In addition the law is
written in English and frequently is incomprehensible to persons it is
intended to protect. Some provincial laws appeared to violate the BLAA.
It is likely that handmade bricks and hand-woven wool carpets were
produced with forced or indentured child labor. Illegal bonded labor is
widespread. It was common in the brick, glass, and fishing industries
and was found among agricultural and construction workers in rural
areas. The Government undertook a survey of bonded labor during the
year that was to be completed in 2002. Bonded laborers often were drawn
from the ranks of the unskilled, low-caste, and often non-Muslim. The
Bonded Labor Liberation Front (BLLF), an NGO that advocated for the
rights of bonded laborers and provided a safe haven and educational and
vocational training for those who have escaped their bondage, reported
that it had freed about 1,000 bonded brick kiln workers. Bonded labor,
including bonded child labor, reportedly is used in the production of
carpets for export under the peshgi system, by which a worker was
advanced money and raw materials for a carpet he promises to complete
(see Section 6.d.). The lack of education among bonded laborers
deprived them of the ability to perform the necessary calculations to
know when they have paid their debts to bondholders. Bonded laborers
who escape often face retaliation from former employers. In March 2000,
the Lahore High Court ordered the release of 24 brick kiln workers,
including 10 women and children. According to press accounts, the
laborers were kept in chains, were not compensated for their work, and
were beaten frequently. Press reports indicate that there were similar
numbers of bonded labors freed during the year. Others returned to
their former status after being freed because they lack the education,
money, and mobility to seek a different livelihood. Although the police
arrested violators of the law against bonded labor, many such
individuals bribed the police to release them. Conservative estimates
put the number of bonded workers at several million. The Government
disputed that peshgi workers were ``bonded'' or ``forced'' laborers and
argued that they were ``contract laborers'' who negotiate a salary
advance in a free and open market.
Human rights groups report that as many as 50 private jails housing
some 4,500 bonded laborers were maintained by landlords in rural Sindh.
The Constitution and the law prohibited slavery. However, in remote
areas of rural Sindh, bonded agricultural labor and debt slavery have a
long history. Landlords have kept entire families in private prisons
and sold families to other landlords.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government has adopted laws and promulgated policies
to protect children from exploitation in the workplace; however,
enforcement of child labor laws was lax and child labor was a serious
problem. The Constitution prohibits the employment of children under
age 14 years in factories, mines, and other hazardous occupations. The
Employment of Children Act prohibits the employment of children under
age 14 in certain occupations and regulates their conditions of work.
Under this law, no child is allowed to work overtime or at night.
Penalties for the violation of the act include fines of up to $300 (PKR
20,000) or 1 year in prison. As of year's end, no one had ever received
the maximum penalty. Child labor was common and resulted from a
combination of severe poverty, employer greed, and inadequate
enforcement of laws intended to control it. The Government issued a
national policy to combat child labor and by year's end, the Ministry
of Labor and Ministry of Social Welfare received $172,400 (PKR 100
million) to fund the national child labor action plan. A board was been
formed to launch projects to combat child labor, and provincial
governments were asked to submit proposals during the year. In
addition, every province has been asked to appoint an official
responsible for child labor programs and initiatives, and a proposal
has been submitted to Ministry of Labor to begin informal education
centers for child workers.
Only the Government and exporters regard the ILO 1996 survey as an
accurate measurement of the incidence of child labor. Many observers
believed that it understated the problem, and gave higher estimates of
as many as 20 million child laborers. A recent ILO survey indicated
that agriculture was the largest child labor industry; followed by the
informal sector, which included domestic work, street vending, illegal
work, and family businesses; hazardous work, such as the leather,
surgical instruments, and brick kiln industries ranked third. The
report also noted that when programs were developed to eliminate child
labor in one industry, parents often shift their children to work in
other industries.
During a press conference in February 2000, the president of the
Punjab Laborers Front stated that 100,000 children between the ages of
5 and 12 years were working in more than 4,500 brick kilns in Punjab.
The ILO, the Ministry of Labor, and the Federal Bureau of Statistics
were scheduled to conduct a new survey during the year in more than
30,000 households; this survey is to include the agricultural sector
and rural areas where the worst forms of child labor often occur. The
survey was expected to be completed in 2002; however, at year's end,
the survey had not been completed.
Child labor, mostly female, was common in the carpet industry, much
it family-run. Carpet manufacturers, along with the ILO-IPEC, have
established a program to eliminate child labor from the industry
through monitoring and rehabilitation, which continued throughout the
year. In 2001, 285 informal education centers had been set up. Of the
9,519 children enrolled in the centers in 2001, 8,114 were active in
the carpet industry and 1,405 were working siblings. In 2001, 30 new
rehabilitation centers, capable of serving 950 children, were added to
the existing 153 rehabilitation centers. The ILO runs a program that
aimed to decrease child labor in the carpet industry by promoting
educational opportunities for children. Its efforts have been extremely
successful, and as a result, the demand for enrollment in public
schools far exceeds the capacity of existing schools.
Although surgical instrument manufacturers have acted to remove
child laborers from their factories, child labor still occurs at
rudimentary offsite filing and polishing centers run by subcontractors
for low-end items. Almost all children working in the surgical
instrument industry are male. According to the ILO and the Punjab
Welfare Department in 2001, children constitute about 15 percent of the
work force in the surgical instrument industry in Sialkot; 3,200 of
these children are estimated to be under age 14. According to a June
1999 report issued by Public Services International, the average age of
children in the surgical instrument industry was 12. Children in the
surgical instrument industry were prone to injuries from machinery and
burns from hot metal, as well as respiratory illnesses from inhaling
poisonous metal dust. The successful efforts to eliminate child labor
in other industries have not been matched in the surgical instrument
industry.
Child labor was not regarded as a particular problem in the textile
and apparel industries, but no specific studies of this sector have
been performed.
In response to international criticism, the Government began to
push provincial authorities to enforce child labor laws. However,
enforcement of these laws remained a problem. There were few child
labor inspectors in most districts, and the inspectors often had little
training and insufficient resources. They reportedly also were corrupt.
By law inspectors also may not inspect facilities that employ less than
10 persons; most child labor occurs in such facilities. Hundreds of
convictions were obtained each year for violations of child labor laws,
but low fines levied by the courts--ranging from an average of $6 (PKR
364) in the NWFP to an average of $110 (PKR 7,280) in Baluchistan--were
not a significant deterrent. The Employment of Children Act allows for
fines of up to $275 (PKR 18,200). Penalties often were not imposed on
those found to be violating child labor laws.
Soccer ball manufacturers, importers, the ILO, and UNICEF have
implemented a plan to eliminate child labor from the soccer ball
industry. This project, based in Sialkot, monitors the production of
soccer balls at established stitching centers, and set up as many as
185 rehabilitation centers to educate former child laborers and their
younger siblings. At the end of 2000, there were 153 rehabilitation
centers, and an additional 70 centers were planned for the next 2
years. The ILO child labor program has entered the phase out and
assessment stage with a total 74 centers. This year they will begin
closing them and assessing their impact on child labor. In addition,
the project sought to identify unemployed adults, especially women,
from the families of former child stitchers to take up stitching work
and replace lost income. Women initially were reluctant to move from
their homes to stitching centers.
Under a memorandum of understanding with the Government, the ILO/
IPEC program in the country is involved with other child labor
projects, beginning in 2001 and continuing at year's end. Projects in
Sialkot include one in the surgical instruments industry and one in the
nonformal (nonexporting) sectors. The ILO works with the Government,
employers, workers, and NGOs to pursue the Government's policy and plan
of action for child labor. The Government established 30 rehabilitation
centers (50 are planned) for former child laborers through the Pakistan
Bait-ul-Mal, the Government's social welfare fund. Each center educates
120 children. The ILO created a similar program in conjunction with the
European Union, specifically targeting child bonded laborers, and
during the year the Government took charge of 18 centers begun by the
European Union. In 1998 the ILO and the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation (SDC) launched a large project to combat child labor
and child abuse in the NWFP. This program, which targets children in
the automobile repair sector, aims to provide children with vocational
training and informal education. During the year, this project was
extended through 2005. It has targeted assistance to 720 children; so
far, it has provided informal education to 160 children and pre
vocational training to 393 others.
The Child Care Foundation of Pakistan, a national NGO, was
established in 1996 with support from the Ministry of Commerce. Other
NGOs, such as the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, conduct programs to end child
labor. Bait-ul-Mal, with funding from the Government and international
organizations, operates 33 education centers for children known
collectively as the National Center for the Rehabilitation of Child
Labor. Parents of working children are offered compensation of $5 (PKR
300) per month, plus a small daily stipend of approximately $0.08 (PKR
5) in exchange for sending their children to school. Children in the
centers receive free schooling, uniforms, books, and meals. However,
many children apparently did not remain there for more than a year; the
schools often were in areas far from their clients. The Bunyad Literacy
Community Council and Sudhaar also run schools focusing on children who
work in the soccer ball and carpet industries; their programs aim to
transition children out of working and into mainstream schooling. Other
local NGOs, such as the Society for the Protection of the Rights of the
Child, are working to eliminate child labor.
In August 2001, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the
worst forms of child labor.
The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, forced
child labor was a problem. There were reports that children in juvenile
detention facilities were required to work. Children at the Karachi
Central Jail, who were imprisoned for crimes they committed, were
detained with their parents, or were born in jail, reportedly were
involved in woodcrafts and television repairs. Verifying these reports
was difficult because of limited outside access to the jail.
Children sometimes were kidnaped to be used for forced labor (see
Section 5). Seventy percent of working children have the status of
``unpaid family helpers.'' Observers also believed that the incidence
of bonded labor among such children was significant, but there were no
reliable figures available on this.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Federal statutes applicable
throughout the country govern labor regulations. The minimum wage for
unskilled workers is $42 (PKR 2,500) per month, with only slightly
higher minimum rates for skilled workers. It applies only to industrial
and commercial establishments employing 50 or more workers and not to
agricultural or other workers in the informal sectors. The national
minimum wage usually does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family.
Federal law provides for a maximum workweek of 48 hours (54 hours
for seasonal factories) with rest periods during the workday and paid
annual holidays. These regulations did not apply to agricultural
workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and
contractors. Large numbers of workers do not enjoy these benefits. Many
workers were unaware of their rights.
Additional benefits required by the Federal Labor Code include
official government holidays, overtime pay, annual and sick leave,
health and safety standards in the workplace, health care, education
for workers' children, social security, old age benefits, and a
worker's welfare fund. Employees earning more than $47 (PKR 3,120) per
month do not receive all of these benefits.
The provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor regulations
because of limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory
structures. In general health and safety standards are poor. Although
organized labor presses for improvements, the Government has done
little and its efforts to enforce existing legal protection are weak.
There is a serious lack of adherence to mine safety and health
protocols. For example, mines often only have one opening for entry,
egress, and ventilation. Workers cannot remove themselves from
dangerous working conditions without risking loss of employment.
In April 2001, the Government announced a labor reforms package.
The package includes the introduction of voluntary group insurance,
expansion of existing low-cost housing projects, an increase in
monetary compensation for death or disability, and an increase in old
age pensions. Government officials stated that progress in implementing
the reform package was made by year's end. Labor leaders continued to
criticize the reform package as too limited in scope.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, trafficking in persons, especially in women, is a
serious problem. The law prohibits the trafficking of women under age
21 into the country for sexual purposes or kidnaping. The Constitution
prohibits slavery and forced labor. The Government has done little to
stem the flow of women trafficked into the country or to help victims
of trafficking. For example, despite the estimated thousands of women
involved, only 88 cases were registered in Sindh between 1990 and 1999.
Of the 260 men and 110 women arrested, 87 were charged and only 7 were
sentenced. The Government does not provide direct assistance to victims
but does provide legal assistance and funding for NGOs that assist
victims.
Pakistan is a source, transit, and destination country for
trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation, but more
significantly, for use as bonded labor. Thousands of women are
trafficked into the country every year, mainly from Bangladesh. Smaller
numbers of Burmese, Sri Lankan, Indian, Afghan, and Central Asian women
also are trafficked into the country and some Pakistani women are
trafficked overseas, mainly to Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia to work as
prostitutes or domestic workers. East Asian and Bangladeshi women are
trafficked through the country en route to other destinations. Internal
trafficking of Pakistani women and Afghani refugees from rural areas to
urban centers is a problem. Trafficking in women has occurred for
decades; there likely are several hundred thousand trafficked women in
the country. Press reports indicate that the buying and selling of
brides persists in parts of the NWFP and Punjab.
Foreign trafficking victims usually were deceived with false
prospects of marriage or offers of legitimate jobs in the country.
Traffickers also used force, abduction, threats, and coercion to entice
and control trafficking victims. Traffickers generally were affiliated
with powerful criminal interests. There have been some reports of lower
level official complicity and corruption with regard to trafficking.
The border police, immigration officers, customs officials, police, and
other officials (including members of the judiciary), reportedly
sometimes facilitated trafficking in return for bribes.
Trafficking victims do not have legal residency and, if found by
the authorities, are detained, arrested, and prosecuted for violation
of immigration laws or of the Hudood ordinances. The Hudood ordinances
criminalize extramarital sexual relations and place a burden on female
rape victims because testimony of female victims and witnesses carry no
legal weight. If a woman brings charges of rape to court and the case
cannot be proved, the court automatically takes the rape victim's
allegations as a confession of her own complicity and acknowledgment of
consensual adultery (see Section 5). These laws discourage trafficking
victims from bringing forward charges. Without money to pay for bail,
trafficking victims often were bailed out by their pimps, who require
them to return to prostitution. Small numbers of escaped victims of
trafficking end up in shelters run by NGOs that assist trafficking
victims, but most did not because there were few such shelters
available. Many women who were not bailed out were not repatriated.
Since most Bangladeshi women arrive without documentation, the
Bangladesh High Commission will not take responsibility for them, and
they remain confined to women's shelters. Some have been repatriated at
the expense of individuals who discover them and pay for their return
home. The Commission of Inquiry for Women drew attention to the problem
of ``enforced prostitution and trafficking in women,'' noting that
women are the victims of exploitation by police and pimps, and should
be treated with compassion. One NGO, Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal
Aid (LHRLA), has reported extensively on trafficking and has provided
documentation of the problem; several other NGOs occasionally work on
the issue. Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid and the Society for
Human Rights and Prisoner's Aid run specific programs to assist
trafficking victims, and a few other local NGOs also assist trafficking
victims on a smaller scale.
Physical beauty and educational level were major factors in
determining prices. Some women reportedly were sold into slavery and
sent to Persian Gulf countries; women sent to rural Pakistan reportedly
were de facto slaves. Buyers in such shops reportedly purchased women
for purposes of labor or sex; some married their buyers.
Young boys were trafficked to the Persian Gulf to work as camel
jockeys; reports estimated that there were between several hundred and
a few thousand boys between the ages of 3 and 10 working as camel
jockeys, mostly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Most are from Punjab
or Sindh. There are approximately 1,000 such children in Qatar, and
there are reports of such children in Saudi Arabia. Dera Ghazi Khan in
Punjab is a center for trafficking in children, and is a major source
of children trafficked as camel jockeys. The majority of these boys
were sent to the Gulf countries by their parents, landless agricultural
workers who receive either a monthly sum of money or a lump sum for
their child's labor. Parents occasionally also accompany their children
to the Persian Gulf. However, some of these children were abducted by
traffickers in the country and were sent abroad without the knowledge
of their parents. The boys generally were sent to the Gulf countries
under the passports of women posing as their mothers. The conditions
such children live under often were poor, and many children reportedly
are injured or maimed while racing camels. The children reportedly do
not receive proper medical care or schooling, and deliberately are
underfed to keep them as light as possible. When they become too old to
race, they are sent back to the country and left to fend for
themselves. In February 2000, the district administration in Multan
approached the Pakistan Ambassador to the UAE for the return of two
children reportedly sold to a UAE citizen for approximately $400 (PKR
20,000) each, and the federal investigation agency filed charges
against four residents of Multan who were involved in the deal. As of
year's end, there was no report on the return of the boys. The
Government recently broke two trafficking rings of children smuggled
into Iran, and was attempting to extradite eight adults wanted for
trafficking. Within the country, children sometimes are kidnaped to be
used as forced labor, for ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy
(see Section 6.d.).
The Government assists underage children and has rescued some
kidnaped victims. On March 15, police in Karachi announced they had
rescued 11 infants and arrested 8 persons on suspicion of trafficking.
The Government sponsors shelters and training programs for actual
and potential trafficking victims. There were 276 detention centers
where women were sheltered and given access to medical treatment,
limited legal representation, and some vocational training. The
Government provided temporary residence status to foreign trafficking
victims; however, police often treated victims of trafficking as
criminals. The Government does not provide specialized training to
assist trafficking victims. Very few NGOs deal specifically with
trafficking; however, many local and provincial NGOs provide shelter to
victims of trafficking and women and children at risk for trafficking.
__________
SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka is a democratic republic with an active multiparty
system. Constitutional power is shared between the popularly elected
President and the 225-member Parliament. Since 1983, the Government had
fought the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist
organization fighting for a separate ethnic Tamil state in the north
and east of the country; however, in December 2001, the Government and
the LTTE each announced unilateral cease fires. This historic process
of reconciliation between the Government and the LTTE continued during
the year in Norwegian-facilitated talks in Thailand and Norway. By all
accounts, the talks were successful and both sides agreed to hold
further meetings in 2003. As a result of the peace process, there has
been a sharp reduction in roadblocks and checkpoints around the
country, the return of approximately 220,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) to their points of origin in the north and east, and to
the opening of numerous investigations into questionable actions by
security force personnel.
Violence, including at least 50 deaths, and irregularities marred
the December 2001 parliamentary elections in which the United National
Front (UNF), a coalition of parties led by the United National Party
(UNP), won a majority in Parliament for a 6-year term. Fearing possible
infiltration by the LTTE, the Government prohibited more than 40,000
Tamil voters from crossing army checkpoints from LTTE controlled
territories to vote. Chandrika Kumaratunga, head of the People's
Alliance (PA) coalition, won reelection in 1999 for a second 5-year
presidential term. The Government generally respected constitutional
provisions for an independent judiciary.
The Ministry of Interior controls the 60,000-member police force,
which is responsible for internal security in most areas of the
country, and has been used in military operations against the LTTE. The
Ministry of Defense controls the 120,000-member Army (which includes
the Army Volunteer Force), the 17,000-member Navy, and the 18,500
member Air Force. In the past, the police paramilitary Special Task
Force (STF) battled the LTTE. The more than 20,000 member Home Guards,
an armed force drawn from local communities and responsible to the
police, provide security for Muslim and Sinhalese village communities
near LTTE-controlled areas. In previous years, the Government also
armed and appeared to direct various anti-LTTE Tamil militias; however,
during the year, the Government implemented programs to disarm the
militias that previously had been linked with the security forces. Some
members of the security forces committed serious human right abuses.
Sri Lanka is a low-income country with a market economy based
mainly on the export of textiles, tea, rubber, coconuts, and gems. It
also earns substantial foreign exchange from the repatriated earnings
of citizens employed abroad, and from tourism. The population is
approximately 18.5 million. Real GDP growth was -1.4 percent in 2001.
Growth during the year was forecast at 2-3 percent. The decline in 2001
was attributed mainly to the worldwide economic downturn, the July 2001
LTTE attack on Colombo's international airport, and prolonged power
outages throughout the country. The economy recovered slowly during the
year, aided by economic reform and increased donor assistance.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Unlike
previous years, there were disputed reports of security forces
committing extrajudicial killings and no reports of disappearances.
However, the military and police reportedly tortured detainees. There
was at least one report of a death in custody. Security forces have
raped a woman while they were in custody. Torture remained a problem
and prison conditions remained poor. There were no reports of arbitrary
arrest during the year. During the year, the Government released more
than 750 Tamils held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and no
new arrests under the PTA occurred during the year. Observers claim
that the PTA, like the Emergency Regulations (ER) repealed in 2001,
permitted arbitrary arrests of Tamils. Unlike in previous years, there
were no reports of the security forces failing to comply with legal
protections, including impunity for those responsible for human rights
violations.
The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights; however,
restrictions on the freedom of the press were eased somewhat. Unlike in
previous years, there were no reports that security forces harassed
journalists. The LTTE permitted controlled access to uncleared areas of
the country to journalists, in effect lifting some censorship in the
areas it controls. Some LTTE-imposed restrictions remained on freedom
of movement, such as from Vavuniya to Jaffna. Violence and
discrimination against women, child prostitution, child labor, and
discrimination against persons with disabilities continued to be
problems. There is some discrimination and occasional violence against
religious minorities, and institutionalized ethnic discrimination
against Tamils remains a problem. Trafficking in women and children for
the purpose of forced labor occurs, and there is some trafficking of
women and children for the commercial sex industry. There is evidence
of a continued but declining international interest in the country's
children for sex trade. Sri Lanka was invited by the Community of
Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD
Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
In the past few years, the Government has taken steps to address
human rights concerns. During the year, the Government named a new
chairman for the National Human Rights Commission (HRC). In 2000 the
Government established an Interministerial Permanent Standing Committee
and an Interministerial Working Group on Human Rights Issues, chaired
by senior officials, to investigate human rights abuses. At the same
time, the Government established the Prosecution of Torture
Perpetrators Unit, under the direct supervision of the Attorney
General.
Unlike in previous years, former Tamil terrorist organizations
aligned with the former PA government, who were suspected still to be
armed, were not implicated in cases involving extrajudicial killing and
torture, although incidents of detention and extortion still were
reported during the year.
The LTTE continued to commit serious human rights abuses. The LTTE
reportedly committed several unlawful killings, and was responsible for
disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, detentions, and extortion.
Through a campaign of intimidation, the LTTE continued to undermine the
work of elected local government bodies in Jaffna. On occasion the LTTE
prevented political and governmental activities from occurring in the
north and east. The LTTE continued to control large sections of the
north and east of the country. The LTTE denied those under its control
the right to change their government, did not provide for fair trials,
infringed on privacy rights, somewhat restricted freedom of movement,
used child soldiers, and discriminated against ethnic and religious
minorities. The LTTE released all of the military personnel it
reportedly held in its custody during the year.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Unlike in previous
years, there were no credible reports that security forces committed
extrajudicial killings. There were no developments in the following
2001 cases: The death in custody of Kanapathypillai Udayakumar in
January; the security forces killing of two persons during a rally in
July; the air force personnel killing of Sivagnanam Manohari in
September.
Impunity remained a problem. Between April 1995 and December 2001,
several hundred persons were killed or disappeared after being taken
into security force custody. With the exception of the six security
force personnel convicted in the 1996 killing of university student
Krishanthi Kumaraswamy; there have been no other convictions for
extrajudicial killings. At year's end, the Government was investigating
29 cases of rape, 109 cases of torture, and 500 cases of disappearance
by security force personnel. Although there were numerous cases in
which military personnel may have committed human rights violations for
which they have not been identified and brought to justice, the
Government passed indictments against security force personnel in a
number of high profile cases; including the Bindunuwewa massacre and
the Ranjani rape and murder case.
In 2000 nine Tamil civilians were reported missing in Mirusuvil
after being arrested by the army (SLA). One person escaped, and
reported the incident to police and the local magistrate. The escapee
identified two SLA soldiers as the perpetrators, and the soldiers
admitted to torturing nine civilians and murdering eight of them. Nine
soldiers later were arrested for the torture and killings. The army
commander administratively punished the soldiers by having their
salaries withheld (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). The case was
transferred to the Anuradhapura Magistrate's Court for adjudication in
November 2001. On November 27, five members of the army were charged
with the murders and were standing trial at year's end.
In November 2000, four mutilated bodies were found in Nilaveli. The
following day Tamil civilians protested against the deaths claiming
that the naval personnel involved attempted to coerce statements from
relatives of the deceased that the dead were members of the LTTE. The
bodies of the two primary organizers of the demonstration later were
found. Following a military investigation, the commander of the local
navy base and other key military personnel were transferred in June
2001, but no one has been charged in connection with the killings and
no further action was expected in this case.
In October 2000 local villagers killed 27 Tamil men held at the
Bindunuwewa rehabilitation camp for former child soldiers and 15 others
were injured. Police allegedly took part in the killings and did
nothing to prevent the villagers from entering the detention camp.
Violence after the killings continued for almost 1 week before police
were able to restore order. The HRC stated that the police were guilty
of ``grave dereliction of duty.'' Three of the survivors were able to
testify at a Presidential Hearing, which met regularly throughout 2001.
Many witnesses at the hearing criticized police actions at the scene
and during the initial investigations. In 2001 all suspects in the case
were released on bail. Due to the failure to show at the scheduled
hearing in November, the court has remanded all suspects until
completion of the trial. At year's end, 10 police officers and 41
villagers were indicted and were standing trial.
There were no developments in the April 2000 killing of the chief
suspect in the 1993 killing of prominent politician Lalith
Athulathmudali.
In previous years, some cases of extrajudicial killings were
reprisals against civilians for LTTE attacks in which members of the
security forces or civilians were killed or injured. In most cases, the
security forces claimed that the victims were members of the LTTE, but
human rights monitors believed otherwise. In Thampalakamam, near
Trincomalee, in 1998, police and home guards allegedly killed eight
Tamil civilians, possibly in reprisal for the LTTE bombing of the
Temple of the Tooth a week earlier. The Government arrested police
officers and home guards, charging 4 with murder and 17 with unlawful
assembly. At year's end, eight police officers had been indicted and
hearings continued.
Although the courts in 2000 ordered five soldiers arrested for the
1999 gang rape and murder of Ida Carmelita, a young Tamil girl, the
case remained pending at year's end. Court hearings continued during
the year.
At his sentencing for the 1998 rape and murder of Krishanthi
Kumaraswamy, a Tamil university student, former Lance Corporal
Somaratne Rajapakse claimed knowledge of mass graves at Chemmani in
Jaffna containing the bodies of up to 400 persons killed by security
forces in 1996. The other five defendants corroborated his claim of
mass graves in the Chemmani area, where they allegedly had buried
between 120 and 140 bodies on the orders of their superiors.
Exhumations in 1999 yielded 15 skeletons. Two of the victims were
identified as young men who had disappeared in 1996. In 2001, 13 of the
bodies had not been identified. Rajapakse and others named a total of
20 security force personnel, including former policemen, as responsible
for the killings. The remaining unidentified bodies underwent DNA
testing for identification purposes. The Attorney General's office has
indicated that it was not satisfied with the inconclusive initial
results and reportedly was searching for funds to provide for a more
detailed test. At year's end, the case still was pending. All suspects
in the case have been released on bail.
There were no developments in the case against eight soldiers and
one reserve police constable arrested on suspicion of the massacre of
24 Tamil villagers in Kamarapuram in February 1996. In addition, there
were no developments in the trial of 22 Special Task Force (STF)
members arrested on suspicion of killing 23 Tamil youths at Bolgoda
Lake in 1995.
In 1994 the PA government began prosecutions in several
extrajudicial killings allegedly committed by members of the security
forces. The trial of 21 soldiers accused of massacring 35 Tamil
civilians in 1992 in the village of Mailanthani in Batticaloa district
was transferred to the Colombo High Court in 1996. Many witnesses for
the case live in displaced persons camps, and could not come to court
to give evidence. A jury trial, which began in January, ended on
November 25 when the security forces were acquitted. At year's end,
representatives of the victims were requesting that the Attorney
General appeal the jury's decision.
There were no developments in the January 2000 killing of Tamil
politician Kumar Ponnambalam.
Although former terrorist Tamil militant groups armed by and
aligned with the former PA government committed extrajudicial killings
in the past, there were no credible reports of such killings during the
year.
In the past, the military wing of the People's Liberation
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Razeek group were
responsible for killing a number of persons; however, there were no
reports of such killings during the year. The security forces had armed
and used these militias and a number of other Tamil militant
organizations to provide information, to help identify LTTE terrorists,
and, in some cases, to fight in military operations against the
terrorists. The exact size of these militias was impossible to
ascertain, but they probably totaled fewer than 2,000 persons. These
groups were asked to disarm following the formal February ceasefire
agreement between the Government and LTTE. The militia did hand over
some weapons to the Government; however, most observers believe that
the groups kept some arms. Persons killed by these militants in the
past probably included LTTE operatives and civilians who failed to
comply with extortion demands.
There were no developments in the 2000 death of Jaffna media
correspondent Mayilvaganam Nimalarajan.
There were unconfirmed reports that the LTTE continued to commit
unlawful killings. Due to the inaccessibility of LTTE-controlled areas
and the LTTE's prevention of investigations by outside agencies, the
exact number and type of killings in LTTE-controlled areas is unknown.
Some observers believe that the amount of killings was reduced
drastically last year. Attacks by the LTTE killed civilians outside of
LTTE-controlled areas in the past; however, there were no such
confirmed reports during the year.
In 2001 attacks and counter-attacks between government forces and
the LTTE occurred almost daily; however, there were no such attacks
during the year. There were two suicide bombing attacks attributed to
the LTTE during 2001, on September 15 and October 29, in addition to
the July attack on the airport north of Colombo (see Section 1.g.).
There were no reports of suicide bombings during the year. There were
reports that the LTTE committed unlawful killings, including lamppost
killings in 2001 (see Section 1.g.).
b. Disappearance.--Unlike in previous years, there were no credible
reports of disappearances at the hands of the security forces.
In 2001 the army, navy, police, and paramilitary groups were
involved in as many as 10 disappearances, primarily in Vavuniya.
Between January and September 2001, the Human Rights Commission
received 44 reports of disappearances in Vavuniya alone. These cases
were not confirmed. In December 2000, eight Tamil civilians were
reported missing in Mirusuvil. Two SLA soldiers were identified as
perpetrators and admitted to killing eight of the civilians. The
soldiers were punished administratively by the army (see Sections 1.a.
and 1.c.).
In February 2000, a fisherman seen arrested by naval personnel near
Trincomalee disappeared. During the year, the Trincomalee High Court
ordered a police line up; however, the witness did not identify any of
the suspects. At year's end, the High Court was conducting a habeas
corpus hearing in conjunction with the case.
Those who disappeared in 2001 and previous years usually are
presumed dead. The 2000 U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances lists the country as having an extremely large number of
``nonclarified'' disappearances. The Commander of the Army and the
Inspector General of Police both criticized the disappearances and
stated that the perpetrators would be called to account. Although there
have been few prosecutions of security force personnel to date, during
the year there were numerous indictments and investigations, including
the case against the security forces involved in the Bindunuwewa
massacre and the killings in Mirusuvil.
The Attorney General's office successfully prosecuted 4 cases by
year's end involving members of the security forces on abduction and
murder charges. In November the Government formed a new commission to
investigate disappearances in Jaffna area during 1996 and 1997. The
commission was expected to begin work in 2003.
In 1999 the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances made its third visit to the country. Its report,
released in December 1999 cited the PTA and ER as important factors
contributing to disappearances and recommended the abolition or
modification of these laws to bring them into conformity with
internationally accepted human rights standards. The ER was repealed in
2001 and there were no arrests under the PTA during the year; however,
some arrests were being made without proper procedures and the
Government had not all persons detained under the PTA in previous years
at year's end (see Section 1.d.). The reviewing process for some cases
still was ongoing at year's end.
Tamil militias aligned with the former PA government also were
responsible for disappearances in past years; however, there were no
reports during the year. These militias detained persons at various
locations that in effect served as undeclared detention centers. The
HRC had no mandate or authority to enforce respect for human rights
among these militia groups. It was impossible to determine the exact
number of victims because of the secrecy with which these groups
operated. During the year, the Government took steps to disarm these
militias as part of the peace process.
The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined number of civilian
disappearances in the north and east during the year. Although the LTTE
previously has denied taking any prisoners from its battles in January,
they released 10 citizens, including some soldiers, to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On September 28, the
LTTE exchanged 7 soldiers in exchange for 13 LTTE cadre. At year's end,
the LTTE was not known to be holding any prisoners (see section 1.g.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Despite legal prohibitions, the security forces and police
continued to torture and mistreat persons in police custody and
prisons. The Convention Against Torture Act (CATA) made torture a
punishable offense. Under the CATA, torture is defined as a specific
crime, the High Court has jurisdiction over violations, and criminal
conviction carries a 7-year minimum sentence. However, according to a
recent Amnesty International (AI) report and press release, the CATA
does not implement several provisions of the U.N. Convention; this
results in torture being prohibited under specific circumstances but
allowed under others. Consequently, torture continued with relative
impunity. In addition, the PTA makes confessions obtained under any
circumstance, including by torture, sufficient to hold a person until
they are brought to court. In some cases, the detention can extend for
years.
Since 2000 the Government has been working on developing
regulations to prosecute and punish military and police personnel
responsible for torture. The Attorney General's Office and the Criminal
Investigation Unit have established units to focus on torture
complaints; the units forwarded 14 cases for indictments during the
year. The Interparliamentary Permanent Standing Committee and its
Interministerial Working Group on Human Rights Issues have begun
tracking criminal investigations of torture. In addition, the
Government also ceased paying fines incurred by security force
personnel found guilty of torture. Security force personnel have been
fined under civil statutes for engaging in torture. According to the
Attorney General's Office, members of the security forces and police
have been prosecuted under criminal statutes, but none of the cases had
come to conclusion.
Members of the security forces continued to torture and mistreat
detainees and other prisoners, particularly during interrogation.
Methods of torture included electric shock, beatings, suspension by the
wrists or feet in contorted positions, burning, slamming testicles in
desk drawers, and near drowning. In other cases, victims must remain in
unnatural positions for extended periods or have bags laced with
insecticide, chili powder, or gasoline placed over their heads.
Detainees have reported broken bones and other serious injuries as a
result of their mistreatment. There were reports of rape in detention
during the year. Medical examination of persons arrested since 2000
continued to reveal multiple cases of torture.
In December 2000, the bodies of eight Tamils tortured and killed by
the army in Mirusuvil were exhumed after one person escaped and
notified authorities. Nine soldiers were arrested, and by year's end, a
trial had begun (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). The military also
conducted its own inquiry; the personnel involved were discharged.
On March 15, Thivyan Krishnasamy, a student leader and an outspoken
critic of the actions of security forces in Jaffna, was released from
custody. Human rights observers claim that he was arrested because of
his political activism, but the police stated that he was connected to
the LTTE. He was arrested in July 2001 and when he was brought before a
court in August he complained of being tortured. In response to his
allegations of torture, the Jaffna Student Union held protests during
the fall of 2001. In response university administrators temporarily
closed the university to avoid violence.
During 2001 there were a number of reports of women being raped by
security forces while in detention. One such case involved two women
arrested in March 2001 in Mannar who claimed that they were tortured
and repeatedly raped by naval and police personnel. The women were
released on bail in April 2001 and filed charges against their
assailants. At year's end, the 14 accused were standing trial for rape,
torture, or both. A fundamental rights case also was opened against the
accused. Four other cases in which the security forces are accused of
raping women in detention still were pending at year's end.
Under fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution, torture
victims may file civil suit for compensation in the high courts or
Supreme Court. Courts have granted awards ranging from approximately
$175 (14,200 rupees) to $2,280 (182,500 rupees). However, most cases
take 2 years or more to move through the courts.
Impunity remained a problem. In the majority of cases in which
military personnel may have committed human rights abuses, the
Government has not identified those responsible or brought them to
justice.
At the invitation of the Government, the U.N. Committee on Torture
sent a five-person mission to Colombo in 2000 to determine whether a
systematic pattern of torture exists in the country and, if so, to make
recommendations for eliminating the practice. In 2001 the mission had
submitted its confidential report to President Kumaratunga; however, by
year's end, the report had not been released to the public.
In the past, Tamil militants aligned with the former PA government
engaged in torture; however, there were no such reports during the
year.
The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis.
Prison conditions generally were poor and did not meet
international standards because of overcrowding and lack of sanitary
facilities; however, the Government permitted visits by independent
human rights observers. The Government permitted representatives from
the ICRC to visit places of detention. The ICRC conducted 185 visits to
35 government locations. The HRC also visited 681 police stations and
more than 326 detention facilities by year's end (see Section 1.d.).
Conditions also reportedly were poor in LTTE-run detention
facilities. The IRCR conducted 8 visits in LTTE-controlled detention
facilities.
The LTTE permitted the ICRC to visit soldiers detained in the
Vavuniya region approximately once every 6 weeks until their release
(see Section 1.g.). Due to the release of detainees in 2000 and the
apparent release of the remaining soldiers held by the LTTE, ICRC
visited fewer LTTE detention centers than in previous years (see
Section 1.d.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the past, arbitrary
arrest and detention were problems; however, there were no reports of
arbitrary arrests or detentions during the year. Under the law,
authorities must inform an arrested person of the reason for arrest and
bring that person before a magistrate within 24 hours. In practice,
persons detained generally appear before a magistrate within a few days
of arrest. The magistrate may authorize bail or order continued
pretrial detention for up to three months or longer. Security forces
must issue an arrest receipt at the time of arrest, and despite some
efforts by the Government to enforce this standard, arrest receipts
rarely were issued. Observers believed that the lack of arrest receipts
prevents adequate tracking of cases, which permits extended detentions
and torture without making any persons directly responsible for those
detainees.
Under the ER and the PTA, security forces could detain suspects for
extended periods of time without court approval. The ER, in force
periodically since 1979 and in force island-wide from August 1998 until
July 2001, gave security forces broad powers to arrest and detain
without charge or the right to judicial review. ER provisions permitted
police to hold individuals for up to 90 days to investigate suspected
offenses, although the police had to present detainees to a court
within 30 days to record the detention. The court was able to order a
further 6 months' detention.
In past years, the army generally turned over those that it
arrested under the ER to the police within 24 hours, although the
police and the army did not always issue arrest receipts or notify the
HRC within 48 hours. The HRC has a legal mandate to visit those
arrested, and police generally respected this. Due to censorship and
infrequent access, observers could not determine the state of affairs
in LTTE-controlled areas.
In the past, there were credible reports that the military held
persons for short amounts of time in smaller camps for interrogation
before transferring them to declared places of detention; however,
there were no such reports during the year. This procedure, which
allegedly occurred on the Jaffna peninsula, in Vavuniya, and in the
east (see Section 1.c.), did not comply with requirements to notify the
HRC of arrests and to issue arrest receipts. The military maintained
the detainees were ``in transit,'' and claimed they did not violate the
detainees' rights.
Unlike in previous years, there were no large-scale arrests of
Tamils during the year. In the past, many detentions occurred during
operations against the LTTE. Most detentions lasted a maximum of
several days although some extended to several months. As of September
1, 222 Tamils charged under the PTA remained in detention without bail
awaiting trial. As part of the peace process' confidence building
measures, the Government released more than 750 Tamils arrested under
the PTA during the first 8 months of the year.
Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of arbitrary
arrests or searches of residents. In previous years, Tamils complained
that they were abused verbally and held for extended periods at
security checkpoints throughout Colombo. During the week following the
July 2001, attack on Colombo's main airbase and international airport,
security forces detained hundreds of Tamils in the Colombo region for
questioning. In addition, those arrested sometimes were held in prisons
with convicted criminals. The vast majority of checkpoints were removed
in January and the reports of regular mistreatment by security forces
largely ceased.
The Committee to Inquire into Undue Arrest and Harassment (CIUAH),
which includes senior opposition party and Tamil representatives,
examines complaints of arrest and harassment by security forces and
takes remedial action as needed. The Committee received more than 1,200
complaints in 2001. Opinions on the effectiveness of the CIUAH were
mixed. Some human rights observers believe that the work of the
committee deterred random arrests and alleviated problems encountered
by detainees and their families. The role of the CIUAH diminished
drastically during the year due to peace-process related improvements.
The HRC investigated the legality of detention in cases referred to
it by the Supreme Court and private citizens. Although the HRC is
legally mandated to exercise oversight over arrests and detentions by
the security forces and to undertake visits to prisons, members of the
security forces sometimes violated the regulations and failed to
cooperate with the HRC.
The Government continued to give the ICRC unhindered access to
approximately 160 detention centers, police stations, and army camps
recognized officially as places of detention. Due to the lapsing of the
ER in July 2001, the total number of persons detained in military bases
at any one time has been reduced dramatically, with the military making
fewer arrests and transferring detainees to police facilities more
quickly than in previous years. With the ceasefire agreement, the
number of arrests by the military has dramatically declined.
The EPDP reportedly detained its own members for short periods in
Jaffna as punishment for breaking party discipline. Unlike in previous
years, there were no reports of the PLOTE continuing to run places of
illegal detention in Vavuniya.
The LTTE in the past has detained civilians, often holding them for
ransom. There were reports of this practice during the year, such as
the multiple reports of kidnaping of Muslim businessmen in Batticaloa
area, particularly during the first 4 months of the year. Reports
indicate that the LTTE demanded anywhere from a few hundred dollars to
upwards of $10,415 (1,000,000 Rupees) for their release. At year's end,
all the Muslim businessmen reportedly had been released.
The Government does not practice forced exile, and there are no
legal provisions allowing its use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice.
The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeal, and the high courts. A judicial service commission, composed of
the Chief Justice and two Supreme Court judges, appoints, transfers,
and dismisses lower court judges. Judges serve until the mandatory
retirement age of 65 for the Supreme Court and 62 for other courts.
Judges can be removed for reasons of misbehavior or physical or mental
incapacity, but only after a legal investigation followed by joint
action of the President and the Parliament.
In criminal cases, juries try defendants in public. Defendants are
informed of the charges and evidence against them, and may be
represented by the counsel of their choice, have the right to appeal.
The Government provides counsel for indigent persons tried on criminal
charges in the high courts and the courts of appeal, but it does not
provide counsel in other cases. Private legal aid organizations assist
some defendants. In addition, the Ministry of Justice operates 11
community legal aid centers to assist those who cannot afford
representation and to serve as educational resources for local
communities. However, these legal aid centers had tried no cases by the
end of September. There are no jury trials in cases brought under the
PTA. Confessions, obtained by various coercive means, including
torture, are inadmissible in criminal proceedings, but are allowed in
PTA cases. Defendants bear the burden of proof to show that their
confessions were obtained by coercion. Defendants in PTA cases have the
right to appeal. Subject to judicial review in certain cases,
defendants can spend up to 18 months in prison on administrative order
waiting for their cases to be heard. Once their cases come to trial,
decisions are made relatively quickly. During the year, more than 750
PTA cases were dropped and the prisoners released.
Most court proceedings in Colombo and the south are conducted in
English or Sinhala, which, due to a shortage of court-appointed
interpreters, has restricted the ability of Tamil-speaking defendants
to get a fair hearing. Trials and hearings in the north and east are in
Tamil and English, but many serious cases, including those having to do
with terrorism, are tried in Colombo. While Tamil-speaking judges exist
at the magistrate level, only four high court judges, an appeals court
judge, and a Supreme Court justice speak fluent Tamil. Few legal
textbooks and only one law report exist in Tamil, and the Government
has complied only slowly with legislation requiring publishing all laws
in English, Sinhala, and Tamil.
In the past in Jaffna, LTTE threats against court officials
sometimes disrupted normal court operations. Although the Jaffna high
court suspended activities due to security concerns in 2000, it
reopened in 2001 and still was functioning at year's end. During the
year, the LTTE expanded the operations of its court system into areas
previously under the Government's judicial system in the north and
east. With the expansion, the LTTE demanded all Tamil civilians stop
using the Governments judicial system and only rely on the LTTE's legal
system. Credible reports indicated that the LTTE has implemented the
change through the threat of force.
The LTTE has its own self-described court system, composed of
judges with little or no legal training. The courts operate without
codified or defined legal authority and essentially operate as agents
of the LTTE rather than as an independent judiciary. The courts
reportedly impose severe punishments, including execution.
The Government claims that all persons held under the PTA are
suspected members of the LTTE and therefore are legitimate security
threats. Insufficient information exists to verify this claim and to
determine whether these detainees are political prisoners. In many
cases, human rights monitors question the legitimacy of the criminal
charges brought against these persons. More than 750 PTA cases were
dismissed by the Attorney General by September 1. The Attorney
General's office expected a few more of the 222 remaining cases to be
dismissed at year's end. The Government claimed that the cases that
remained only will be of those individuals directly linked to suicide
bombings or other terrorist and criminal acts.
The LTTE also reportedly holds a number of political prisoners. The
number is impossible to determine because of the secretive nature of
the organization. The LTTE refuses to allow the ICRC access to these
prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy,
and the Government generally respected this provision in practice;
however, it infringed on citizen's privacy rights in some areas. The
police obtained proper warrants for arrests and searches conducted
under ordinary law; however, the security forces were not required to
obtain warrants for searches conducted either under the now lapsed ER
or the PTA. The Secretary of the Ministry of Defense was responsible
for providing oversight for such searches. Some Tamils complained that
their homes were searched as a means of general harassment by the
security forces. The Government was believed to monitor telephone
conversations and correspondence on a selective basis. However, there
were no reports of such activity by security forces during the year.
On September 4, taking into account the fast progress of the peace
process, the Government legalized the LTTE.
The LTTE routinely invaded the privacy of citizens, by maintaining
an effective network of informants. The LTTE also forcibly recruited
children during the year (see Section 6.d.). During August and
September, the LTTE handed over 85 children to UNICEF, stating that the
children had volunteered to serve, but that the LTTE does not accept
children (see Section 6.d.). Unlike in the previous year, there were no
reports that the LTTE expelled Muslims from their homes.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Hostilities between the Government and the LTTE
abated with the announcement of unilateral ceasefires in December 2001,
followed by a formal ceasefire accord agreed to in February.
Subsequently, a number of prisoners have been exchanged and the key
road connecting Jaffna has been opened. The reconciliation also has led
to a sharp reduction in roadblocks and checkpoints around the country,
the return of approximately 150,000 IDPs to their points of origin in
the north and east, and to the opening of numerous investigations into
actions by security force personnel.
On April 29, in Nilaveli, on the east coast, naval personnel opened
fire and injured two Tamil women. The circumstances surrounding the
incident remained unclear at year's end. The investigation into the
incident remained open. On October 10, seven civilians were killed when
security force personnel fired into a crowd storming their compound in
the east. Some observers claimed the security forces used excessive
force in repelling a peaceful crowd that was demonstrating against the
alleged harassment of LTTE cadre earlier in the day. Others claim the
security forces were justified in repelling what appeared to be a LTTE-
instigated attack.
In 2001 an estimated 2,000 combatants and 100 civilians were killed
in conflict-related incidents. Unlike in previous years, there were no
reports that the airforce carried out a bombing campaign.
In the past, the Government often publicized aspects of its planned
operations to allow civilians time to vacate the probable areas to be
affected. However, in 2001, the armed forces did not give public
warnings before the commencement of operations.
Investigations into the May 2000 incident in which a bomb exploded
at a Buddhist temple in Batticaloa concluded in 2001. After the bomb
exploded, security forces reportedly opened fire, killing four children
and injuring eight more. The Government maintained that the evidence
and interviews of witnesses do not support those claims. No arrests
have been made to date, and the incident no longer was under
investigation.
In November 2001, the SLA created the Directorate of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law in the army. The directorate is charged with
coordinating all human rights activities for the army from ICRC
training classes (see Section 4) to overseeing the human rights cells
that are assigned throughout the military. The SLA also states that all
of its personnel have completed the appropriate training and pledged to
adhere to the ``rules of international Humanitarian Law.'' Early in the
year, the air force and navy instituted similar programs. The armed
forces operated under written rules of engagement that severely
restricted the shelling, bombardment, or other use of firepower against
civilian-occupied areas.
The Government continued to provide food relief, through the
Commissioner General for Essential Services (CGES) and the Multi-
Purpose Cooperative Societies (MCPS), to displaced and other needy
citizens, including those in areas controlled by the LTTE. The
Government delivered food rations to the Vanni area through a
checkpoint that is controlled on one side by the security forces and on
the other by the LTTE. The border into the territory controlled by the
LTTE was not closed during the year.
In previous years, NGOs and other groups that sought to take
controlled items to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region needed
permission from local officials as well as from the Ministry of
Defense. Delays were common and approval sometimes was denied. As a
result, many medical items in the Vanni region and Jaffna were in short
supply, which contributed to a deterioration in the quality and
quantity of medical care furnished to the civilian population. Previous
restrictions on the transport of items such as cement, batteries, and
currency into the LTTE-controlled areas no longer were no in effect
during the year.
The Ministry of Defense reported capturing several LTTE terrorists
with weapons in government-controlled areas in direct contradiction of
the terms of the ceasefire agreement. The Government reportedly
returned most LTTE personnel directly to the closest LTTE checkpoint;
however, some were detained for longer periods. Previously the military
sent the cadre they captured or who surrendered to rehabilitation
centers. The ICRC continued to visit former LTTE members in government
rehabilitation camps, although the October 2000 massacre of more than
20 such detainees at a government-run detention facility at
Bindunuwewa, near Bandarawella, led observers to question the continued
security of residents of these facilities (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
In view of the scale of hostilities in previous years and the large
number of LTTE casualties, some observers have found the number of
prisoners taken under battlefield conditions to be low and have
concluded that many LTTE fighters apparently were killed rather than
taken prisoner. Some observers believed that, on the Government side,
an unwritten ``take-no-prisoners'' policy had been in effect. The
military denied this claim, stating that other factors limited the
number of prisoners taken, such as the LTTE's efforts to remove injured
fighters from the battlefield, the proclivity of its fighters to choose
suicide over capture, and the LTTE's occasional practice of killing its
own badly injured fighters. There were no reports of security forces
personnel executing LTTE cadres during the year.
In previous years, the Government refused to permit relief
organizations to provide medical attention to injured LTTE fighters,
although it has offered to treat any LTTE injured entrusted to
government care. According to credible reports, injured LTTE cadres
surrendering to the Government received appropriate medical care.
The LTTE admitted that in the past it killed security forces
personnel rather than take them prisoner. Past eyewitness accounts
confirm that the LTTE has executed injured soldiers on the battlefield.
At year's end, the LTTE reportedly had released all security force
personnel they were holding. The LTTE is believed to have killed most
of the police officers and security force personnel captured in the
past few years. In January the LTTE unilaterally released 10 citizens
including some soldiers. On September 28, the LTTE released 7 prisoners
in exchange for the release of 13 of their cadres.
The LTTE used excessive force in the war. During the year, the LTTE
engaged in hostage taking, hijackings, and forcible recruitment,
including of children.
In July 2001, the LTTE attacked Colombo's main airbase and
international airport. During the attack, the LTTE destroyed six
military and four civilian aircraft. The LTTE also damaged the civilian
airport.
In the past, the LTTE regularly was accused of killing civilians.
For example, the LTTE was accused of killing four Sinhalese villagers
at Wahalkada village in March 2001, and killing a Tamil civilian and
injuring 15 others in Trincomalee in June 2001.
The LTTE uses child soldiers. In October four children ranging in
age from 15 to 17 years surrendered to a local church near Trincomalee
after escaping from the LTTE. According to Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission, the international monitors received approximately 600
complaints about child abductions since early March, and credible
sources say those children are recruited to be child soldiers. Credible
sources reported increased LTTE recruitment, including recruitment of
children during the year.
The LTTE expropriates food, fuel, and other items meant for IDPs,
thus exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE-controlled areas.
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE-controlled areas as well as in
other parts of the Vanni region, with nutrition levels falling below
the national average. Experts have reported a high rate of anemia and a
low birth rate, both of which indicate lower levels of nutrition.
Confirmed cases of malnutrition included hundreds of children. However,
a survey completed by Medecins Sans Frontieres in 1999 found
malnutrition levels in the war-affected areas at about the same level
as in the war-free south of the country.
Landmines were a problem in Jaffna and the Vanni and to some extent
in the east (see Section 5). Landmines, booby traps, and unexploded
ordnance pose a problem to resettlement of displaced persons and
rebuilding. A U.N. landmine team tasked with locating and mapping LTTE
and army mines in the Jaffna peninsula suspended its mission in 2000
stating that it was impossible to continue as long as hostilities
continued. At year's end, a U.N. team had begun coordinating the
process of mapping the mined areas in the country and established
oversite for a mine removal program. During the year, the Sri Lankan
Military and the LTTE removed mines in areas they controlled. During
the year, the Government reported four mine-related casualties among
civilians per month. In August 2001, a civilian bus travelling to
Trincomalee hit a land mine injuring 30 of its passengers. In September
2001, a vehicle carrying a family hit a mine approximately 5 kilometers
north of Jaffna, killing all six passengers and the driver.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. In the past, the Government
restricted these rights in practice, often using national security
grounds permitted by law; however, there were no reports of such
practices during the year. During the year, criminal defamation laws,
which had often been used by the Government to intimidate independent
media outlets, were eliminated. In 2001 the Government officially
lifted the censorship on war reporting. However, even when no specific
government censorship is exercised, private television stations impose
their own, informal censorship on international television news
rebroadcast in the country.
The Government controls the country's largest newspaper chain, two
major television stations, and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation
(SLBC). There are a variety of independent, privately owned newspapers,
journals, and radio and television stations, most of which freely
criticize the Government and its policies. The Government imposes no
political restrictions on the establishment of new media enterprises.
The President officially eased censorship restrictions on foreign
journalists in a circular published in June 2000; however, material for
publication or broadcast within the country, regardless of author,
remained subject to government approval until the repeal of censorship
laws in June 2001. Claims of harassment and intimidation of private
media by the Government continue. In November Paul Harris, a foreign
national and a journalist loosely affiliated with the ``Daily
Telegraph'' was denied a visa extension, allegedly for violation of the
terms of his visa. Speculation in the press is that the denial was
based on political pressure because of Mr. Harris' criticism of the
Government and the LTTE. Multiple organizations, including the Editor's
Guild of Sri Lanka, the Free Media Movement, the Foreign Correspondents
Association of Sri Lanka, and the President's office have criticized
the decision as an infringement on freedom of the press.
Human rights observers commented that in the past Tamils from the
north or east who criticized the Sri Lankan military and government
often were harassed and sometimes arrested. They cite the case of
Thiviyan Krishnasamy, a student leader in Jaffna and critic of the
military in the Jaffna area. He was arrested in July 2001 and released
in March (see Section 1.c.).
In September 2000, police arrested a young man for criticizing the
president on a radio call-in show. Police traced the call to discover
the caller's address. The young man's parents alleged that he had a
mental illness and could not be held responsible for his comments. At
year's end, the young man was released and the case was dismissed.
In 2000 police detained two persons for questioning in connection
with the 1999 murder of Rohana Kumara, editor of a Sinhala-language
newspaper that had been critical of leading figures in the ruling
coalition. By year's end, no one had been charged in connection with
the case.
No action was taken, nor is any likely, into the following: The
1999 killing of editor Ramesh Nadarajah, and the 1999 abduction of a
journalist by an army brigadier. On February 9, two airforce personnel
were given lengthy jail sentences for the February 1998 killing of a
journalist who regularly reported on defense matters, including
corruption in military procurements. At year's end, the airforce
personnel were released on bail pending conclusion of the appeals
process.
During the year, the defamation laws were repealed and all cases
pertaining to the defamation laws were dropped.
The Sri Lanka Tamil Media Alliance (SLTMA) was formed in 1999 to
protect the interests of Tamil journalists, who allege that they are
subject to harassment and intimidation by Tamil paramilitary groups and
Sri Lankan security forces. Regional Tamil correspondents working in
the war zones have complained of arbitrary arrest and detention in the
past and difficulty in obtaining press accreditation. The SLTMA has
filed cases on behalf of Tamil journalists, but its cases have not yet
succeeded in the courts.
Unlike in the previous year, travel by local and foreign
journalists to conflict areas was not restricted. The LTTE does not
tolerate freedom of expression. It tightly restricts the print and
broadcast media in areas under its control. The LTTE has killed those
reporting and publishing on human rights.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
The LTTE restricted academic freedom, and it has repressed and
killed intellectuals who criticize it, most notably the moderate and
widely respected Tamil politician and academic, Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam,
who was killed by a suicide bomber in July 1999. The LTTE also has
severely repressed members of human rights organizations, such as the
University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR), and other groups. Many
former members of the UTHR have been killed.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly and association, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. Although the PTA may be used to
restrict this freedom, the Government did not use the act for that
purpose during the year. Numerous peaceful political and nonpolitical
rallies were held throughout the country during the year.
In July 2001, the opposition held a rally that the Government
claimed was illegal under the 1981 Referendum Act, which essentially
states that rallies and demonstrations of a political nature cannot be
held when a referendum is scheduled. Security forces killed two persons
when the Government confronted the rally with force, prompting further
demonstrations. However, the Government generally grants permits for
demonstrations, including those by opposition parties and minority
groups.
On October 9, eight Tamil civilians were killed by Special Task
Force police during a protest in Akkaraipattu. Police and the
commission tasked with investigating the incident claim that the crowd
was trying to forcefully enter the police compound and the police were
defending themselves. Tamils have disputed this finding, asserting that
the protest was peaceful. In April 2001, a violent clash between the
Sinhalese and Muslim communities occurred in Mawanella. The Muslim
community protested alleged police inaction concerning the assault on a
Muslim store clerk. In response, a group of Sinhalese attacked the
Muslim protesters. As the conflict escalated, two Muslims were killed
and scores of buildings and a few vehicles were destroyed. Police
reportedly did nothing to stop the destruction of Muslim property. The
investigation into the Mawanella incident remained open at year's end.
The LTTE does not allow freedom of association in the areas that it
controls. The LTTE reportedly has used coercion to make persons attend
rallies that it sponsors. On the Jaffna Peninsula, the LTTE
occasionally has posted in public places the names of Tamil civilians
accused of associating with security forces and other government
entities. The LTTE has killed Tamil civilians who have cooperated with
the security forces in establishing a civil administration in Jaffna
under a political leadership elected freely and fairly in January 1998.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution accords Buddhism a
foremost position, but it also provides for the right of members of
other faiths to practice their religions freely, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. Despite the special status
afforded by the Constitution to Buddhism, major religious festivals of
all faiths are celebrated as public holidays.
Foreign clergy may work in the country, but the Government has
sought to limit the number of foreign religious workers given temporary
work permits. Permission usually is restricted to denominations
registered with the Government. The Government has prohibited the entry
of new foreign clergy on a permanent basis. It permitted those already
in the country to remain.
Some evangelical Christians have expressed concern that their
efforts at proselytizing often meet with hostility and harassment from
the local Buddhist clergy and others opposed to their work. In April
two Christians were physically assaulted by a Buddhist monk.
Evangelicals sometimes complain that the Government tacitly condones
such harassment, but there is no evidence to support this claim.
In April 2001, a Muslim cashier was attacked by 4 Sinhalese. When
the Muslim community protested police inaction, the Muslim persons were
confronted by rioting Sinhalese, and 2 Muslims were killed. The police
investigation into this incident remains open and no arrests have been
reported.
The LTTE expelled virtually the entire Muslim population from their
homes in the northern part of the island in 1990. Most of these persons
remain displaced. During the year, the LTTE leadership has met with the
leaders of the Muslim community on their incorporation into the peace
process. In the past, the LTTE has expropriated Muslim homes, land, and
businesses and threatened Muslim families with death if they attempt to
return. The LTTE has made some conciliatory statements to the Muslim
community, but the statements are viewed with skepticism by some
Muslims.
In September a group of Christians vandalized a Jehovah's witness
hall, breaking windows, ripping through electrical systems, and burning
equipment used to establish a new hall in Negombo. Witnesses claimed
that the police did not react to the disturbance until after the crowd
dispersed.
The LTTE attacked Buddhist sites, most notably the historic Dalada
Maligawa or ``Temple of the Tooth,'' the holiest Buddhist shrine in the
country, in Kandy in January 1998. In May 2000, an LTTE bombing near a
temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival in Batticaloa killed 23 persons
and injured dozens of others.
The LTTE has been accused in the past of using church and temple
compounds, where civilians were instructed by the Government to
congregate in the event of hostilities, as shields for the storage of
munitions.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants every citizen
``freedom of movement and of choosing his residence'' and ``freedom to
return to [the country],'' and the Government generally respected the
right to domestic and foreign travel. However, in the past, the war
with the LTTE prompted the Government to impose more stringent checks
on travelers from the north and the east and on movement in Colombo,
particularly after dark. Tamils had to obtain police passes to move
freely in the north and east, and frequently they were harassed at
checkpoints throughout the country. These security measures had the
effect of restricting the movement of Tamils.
However, during the year, the Government lifted a majority of the
travel restrictions within the country. Areas near military bases and
high security zones still have limited access. Some observers claim the
high security zones are excessive and unfairly claim Tamil lands,
particularly in Jaffna. The LTTE limited travel on the road connecting
Jaffna in the north to the rest of the country; however, in April the
Government lifted all of its restrictions on travel to Jaffna.
Fighting between government and the LTTE has displaced hundreds of
thousands of persons, with many displaced multiple times as front lines
shifted. The UNHCR reports that there are less than 600,000 IDPs in
country. Since September 2000, 172,000 IDPs have been living in welfare
centers ranging from camps, where conditions vary considerably, to
settlements with a full range of government social services and food
aid. By the end of 2001, an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 IDPs,
including those in the Vanni, had registered for government food aid,
and were receiving medicine and other essential supplies from the
Government. However, by year's end, more than 220,000 IDPs returned to
points of origin in country, with more than half of the returnees
transited to points in Jaffna District.
The Government has sought to resettle the displaced when possible
and has arranged for a number of those from Jaffna to return to their
homes. Over the years, the Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR,
built permanent housing for 18,000 Muslims in the Puttalam area. An
additional one-time resettlement program relocated 1,000 families by
the end of 2001.
The LTTE has discriminated against Muslims, and in 1990 expelled
some 46,000 Muslim inhabitants--virtually the entire Muslim
population--from their homes in areas under LTTE control in the
northern part of the island. Most of these persons remain displaced and
live in or near welfare centers. There were credible reports that the
LTTE has warned thousands of Muslims displaced from the Mannar area not
to return to their homes until the conflict is over. However, it
appeared that these attacks by the LTTE were not targeted against
persons due to their religious beliefs, rather, it appeared that they
were part of an overall strategy to clear the north and east of persons
not sympathetic to the cause of an independent Tamil state. During the
year, the LTTE has invited the Muslim IDPs to return home, asserting
they will not be harmed. Although some Muslim IDPs have begun returning
home, the vast majority have not and were instead waiting for a
guarantee from the Government for their safety in LTTE-controlled
areas.
Between October 1996 and the end of 1999, more than 150,000 persons
moved out of LTTE-controlled regions through Vavuniya and other transit
points into government controlled regions. Of these, more than 100,000
reached Jaffna and other Tamil-majority areas. Many had left the Vanni
region with the intention of proceeding south; they opted for other
destinations only after learning that they would have to remain in
transit camps until security clearances for southward travel were
obtained. Obtaining a clearance could take up to 4 months in some
cases, and some human rights groups alleged that the procedures were
arbitrary and unreasonably strict. The Government restricted the
movement of displaced Tamils due to possible security, economic, and
social concerns. These restrictions have been lifted with the onset of
the peace process.
The LTTE occasionally disrupts the flow of persons exiting the
Vanni region through the two established and legal checkpoints. In
particular the LTTE taxes civilians travelling through areas it
controls. In the past, the LTTE disrupted the movement of IDPs from
Trincomalee to Jaffna by hijacking or attacking civilian shipping,
although there were no such reports this year. Humanitarian groups
estimate that more than 200,000 IDPs live in LTTE-controlled areas (see
Section 1.g.).
An estimated 65,000 Tamil refugees live in camps in Tamil Nadu in
Southern India. Approximately 100,000 refugees may have integrated into
Tamil society in India over the years. UNHCR reports that a small
number may have returned from India during the year.
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of the
provision of first asylum did not arise during the year. The Government
does not permit the entry of refugees into the country or grant first
asylum, nor does it aid those who manage to enter to seek permanent
residence elsewhere. There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, fair, and multiparty elections held on the
basis of universal suffrage; however, recent elections have been marred
by violence and some irregularities. The country is a longstanding
democratic republic with an active multiparty system. Power is shared
between the popularly elected President and the 225-member Parliament.
The right to change the Government was exercised in the December 2001
parliamentary elections in which the United National Front, a coalition
of parties led by the UNP, won a majority in Parliament for the next 6-
year period. Fearing possible infiltration by the LTTE, the Government
prohibited more than 40,000 Tamil voters from LTTE controlled
territories from crossing army checkpoints to vote.
Following the December 2001 elections, the UNP and its allies
formed the new government. The president's party, the PA, is now the
opposition in Parliament. The UNP, led by Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe, has formed the new government and filled the positions
in the cabinet. Cohabitation ties between the President and Prime
Minister have been difficult.
The President suspended Parliament from July to September 2001 out
of concern that her coalition had lost its majority in Parliament
because of defections. The suspension of Parliament angered opposition
parties, which sponsored numerous demonstrations. One of these
demonstrations, ended with the deaths of two marchers killed by
security forces (see Section 2.b.). After further defections from her
coalition, the President dissolved Parliament in October 2001, and
called for elections to take place in December 2001.
In December 2001, 12 supporters of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress
were killed, apparently by hired thugs of a PA candidate. Former PA MP
Anuruddha Ratwatte and his two sons have been indicted for conspiracy.
In addition, 15 others, including security force personnel, were
indicted for their alleged involvement in the murders. The trial
continued at year's end. Despite an extremely violent campaign,
including credible reports on the use of intimidation by both of the
major parties, voter turnout exceeded 70 percent. The People's Alliance
for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL) reported 755 incidents of
violence and 49 deaths; the Center for Monitoring Election Violence
(CMEV) reported 4,208 incidents, and 73 deaths; and the police reported
2,247 incidents, and 45 deaths during the year.
In September 2001, the Parliament passed the 17th Amendment, which
established an independent Commission on Elections (among other
commissions), which is to be tasked with ensuring free and fair
elections; however, implementing legislation has yet to be passed.
A delegation from the European Union monitoring the election
expressed concern about violence and irregularities in the voting, but
concluded that the election ``did to a reasonable degree reflect the
will of the electorate.''
The Commissioner of Elections recognized 46 parties at the time of
general elections in October 2000; only 13 parties actually held seats
in the 225-member Parliament elected during 2001. The two most
influential parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (the principal
component party of the governing PA coalition) and the UNP, generally
draw their support from the majority Sinhalese community. These two
parties have alternated in power since independence.
There are 9 women in the 225 Parliament. There was one in the 73
member Cabinet and the Supreme Court. In December 1999, a woman was
elected President for a second term. One woman (Minister of Women's
Affairs) was appointed to the new cabinet formed after the December 5
elections.
There are 28 Tamil and 21 Muslim persons in the 225 member
Parliament elected in December 2001. The Parliament elected in October
2000 had 23 Tamil and 22 Muslim members.
The LTTE refuses to allow elections in areas under its control,
although it did not oppose campaigning by certain Tamil parties in the
east during the December 2001 parliamentary elections. In previous
years, the LTTE effectively had undermined the functioning of local
government bodies in Jaffna through a campaign of killing and
intimidation. This campaign included the killing of 2 of Jaffna's
mayors and death threats against members of the 17 local councils.
During the period of the conflict, the LTTE killed popularly elected
politicians, including those elected by Tamils in areas the LTTE
claimed as part of a Tamil homeland.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several domestic human rights NGOs, including the Consortium of
Humanitarian Agencies (CHA), the University Teachers for Human Rights,
Jaffna (UTHR-J), the Civil Rights Movement (CRM), and the Law and
Society Trust (LST), monitor civil and political liberties. There are
no adverse regulations governing the activities of local and foreign
NGOs, although the Government officially requires NGOs to include
action plans and detailed descriptions of funding sources as part of
its registration process. Some NGO workers have seen this as an attempt
by the Government to exert greater control over the NGO sector after
previous human rights groups criticisms. Few NGOs complied with these
new reporting requirements. A number of domestic and international
human rights groups generally operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views.
The Government allowed the ICRC unrestricted access to detention
facilities (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The ICRC provides
international humanitarian law training materials and training to the
security forces. The UNHCR, the ICRC, and a variety of international
NGOs assisted in the delivery of medical and other essential supplies
to the Vanni area (see Section 1.g.).
In the first 6 months of the year, the HRC conducted more than 600
visits to police stations and more than 300 visits to detention
facilities. The HRC has more than 4,500 cases of alleged human rights
abuse pending. The Commission's investigation into the allegations by
former Lance Corporal Rajapakse about mass graves at Chemmani in Jaffna
resulted in exhumations in 1999 that provided the basis for the ongoing
case (see Section 1.a.). Nonetheless, some human rights observers
believed that the work of the HRC was hampered by a lack of strong
leadership; however, over the past year, many human rights observers
recognized that the new leader of the HRC was willing to confront other
branches of the Government on human rights problems and new standard
procedures. Activists have expressed some satisfaction with the new
leadership's prompt investigation into the November 2000 Bindunuwewu
massacre.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights under the law for all
citizens, and the Government generally respected these rights. The
Supreme Court regularly upholds court rulings in cases in which
individuals file suit over the abridgment of their fundamental civil
rights. The HRC and the CIUAH are other mechanisms that the Government
has established to ensure enforcement of constitutional provisions in
addition to access to the courts (see Section 1.d.).
Women.--Sexual assault, rape, and spousal abuse (often associated
with alcohol abuse) continued to be serious and pervasive problems.
Amendments to the Penal Code introduced in 1995 specifically addressed
sexual abuse and exploitation and modified rape laws to create a more
equitable burden of proof and to make punishments more stringent.
Marital rape is considered an offense in cases of spouses living under
judicial separation, and laws govern sexual molestation and sexual
harassment in the workplace. While the Penal Code may ease some of the
problems faced by victims of sexual assault, many women's organizations
believe that greater sensitization of police and judicial officials is
required. The Government set up the Bureau for the Protection of
Children and Women within the police in 1994 to respond to calls for
greater awareness and attention; however, there was no information on
any actions taken by the Bureau nor on the number of crimes against
women.
In the previous year, police reported 500 rape case investigations.
From January 1 to October 1, the police have reported a total of 865
rape investigations in country, and 29 involve security force
personnel. In 2001 there were a number of reports of security forces
raping women in custody (see Section 1.c.). During the year, there was
one such report. There have been no convictions in the cases involving
security force personnel.
Although laws against procuring and trafficking were strengthened
in 1995, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced labor occurs
(see Sections 6.f.).
The Constitution provides for equal employment opportunities in the
public sector. However, women have no legal protection against
discrimination in the private sector where they sometimes are paid less
than men for equal work, often experience difficulty in rising to
supervisory positions, and face sexual harassment. Women constitute
approximately one-half of the formal work force.
Women have equal rights under national, civil, and criminal law.
However, questions related to family law, including divorce, child
custody, and inheritance, are adjudicated by the customary law of each
ethnic or religious group. The minimum age of marriage for women was 18
years, except in the case of Muslims, who continue to follow their
customary marriage practices. The application of different legal
practices based on membership in a religious or ethnic group often
results in discrimination against women.
Children.--The Government is committed to protecting the welfare
and rights of children, but is constrained by a lack of resources. The
Government demonstrated this commitment through its extensive systems
of public education and medical care. The law requires children between
the ages of 5 and 14 to attend school. Approximately 85 percent of
children under the age of 16 attend school. Education was free through
the university level. Health care, including immunization, also was
free.
In the period from January 1 to October, the police recorded 613
cases of pedophilia, compared with 767 cases of crimes against children
for January 2001 to August 2001. Many NGOs attribute the problem of
exploitation of children to the lack of law enforcement rather than
adequate legislation. Many law enforcement resources were diverted to
the conflict with the LTTE, although the police's Bureau for the
Protection of Children and Women conducts investigations into crimes
against these two groups. In September the police opened an office to
work directly with the National Child Protection Authority (NCPA) on
children's issues to support NCPA investigations into crimes against
children and to arrest suspects based on those investigations.
Under the law, the definition of child abuse includes all acts of
sexual violence against, trafficking in, and cruelty to children. The
law also prohibits the use of children in exploitative labor or illegal
activities or in any act contrary to compulsory education regulations.
The legislation further widened the definition of child abuse to
include the involvement of children in war. The NCPA is comprised of
representatives from the education, medical, retired police, and legal
professions; it reports directly to the President.
The Government has pushed for greater international cooperation to
bring those guilty of pedophilia to justice. The penalty for pedophilia
is not less than 5 years and up to 20 years as well as an unspecified
fine. Four cases of pedophilia were brought to court in 2000, one
involving a foreigner. Two cases were brought to court during the year;
however, in both cases the accused fled the country. There were few
reported arrests for pedophilia during the year, but there were no
convictions.
Child prostitution is a problem in certain coastal resort areas.
The Government estimates that there are more than 2,000 active child
prostitutes in the country, but private groups claim that the number is
much higher (see Section 6.f.). The bulk of child sexual abuse in the
form of child prostitution is committed by citizens; however, some
child prostitutes are boys who cater to foreign tourists. Some of these
children are forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
The LTTE uses child soldiers and recruits children, sometimes
forcibly, for use in battlefield support functions and in combat. LTTE
recruits, some as young as 13, have surrendered to the military, and
credible reports indicate the LTTE has stepped up recruiting efforts
(see Section 1.g.). In May 1998, the LTTE gave assurances to the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Children in
Armed Combat that it would not recruit children under the age of 17.
The LTTE has not honored this pledge, and even after the ceasefire
agreement there were multiple credible reports of the LTTE forcibly
recruiting children (see Section 6.d.).
Persons with Disabilities.--There was some discrimination against
persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision
of other state services. The law does not mandate access to buildings
for persons with disabilities. The World Health Organization estimates
that 7 percent of the population was persons with disabilities. Most
persons with disabilities, who are unable to work, were cared for by
their families. The Department of Social Services operated eight
vocational training schools for persons with physical and mental
disabilities and sponsored a program of job training and placement for
graduates. The Government also provided some financial support to NGOs
that assist persons with disabilities; subsidized prosthetic devices
and other medical aids for persons with disabilities; make some
purchases from suppliers with disabilities; and has registered 74
schools and training institutions for persons with disabilities run by
NGOs. The Department of Social Services has selected job placement
officers to help the estimated 200,000 work-eligible persons with
disabilities find jobs. In spite of these efforts, persons with
disabilities still face difficulties because of negative attitudes and
societal discrimination. The law forbidding discrimination against any
person on the grounds of disability. No cases were known to have been
filed under this law.
Indigenous Persons.--The country's indigenous people, known as
Veddas, number fewer than l,000. Some prefer to maintain their isolated
traditional way of life, and they are protected by the Constitution.
There are no legal restrictions on their participation in the political
or economic life of the nation. In 1998 the Government fulfilled a
long-standing Vedda demand when the President issued an order granting
Veddas the right to hunt and gather in specific protected forest areas.
The executive order granted the Veddas the freedom to protect their
culture and to carry on their traditional way of life without
hindrance. Under a pilot program, Veddas received special identity
cards to enable their use of these forest areas. Some Veddas still
complain that they are being pushed off of their land.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There were approximately one
million Tamils of comparatively recent Indian origin, the so-called
``tea estate'' Tamils or ``Indian'' Tamils, whose ancestors originally
were brought to the country in the 19th century to work on plantations.
Approximately 75,000 of these persons do not qualify for either Indian
or Sri Lankan citizenship and face discrimination, especially in the
allocation of government funds for education. Without national identity
cards, they also were vulnerable to arrest by the security forces.
However, the Government has stated that none of these persons would be
forced to depart the country. During 1999 the Government introduced a
program to begin registering these individuals; 15,300 tea estate
Tamils received identity cards between January and September 2001. Some
critics charged that the program did not progress fast enough.
Both Sri Lankan and ``tea estate'' Tamils maintained that they long
have suffered systematic discrimination in university education,
government employment, and in other matters controlled by the
Government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Government respects the
constitutional right of workers to establish unions, and the country
has a strong trade union tradition. Any seven workers may form a union,
adopt a charter, elect leaders, and publicize their views; however, in
practice such rights can be subject to administrative delays, and
unofficially are discouraged. Nonetheless, approximately 25 percent of
the 6.7 million person work force nationwide and more than 70 percent
of the plantation work force, which is overwhelmingly Hill Tamil, is
unionized. In total there were more than 1,000,000 union members,
650,000 of whom were women. Approximately 20 percent of the
nonagricultural work force in the private sector was unionized. Unions
represent most workers in large private firms, but those in small-scale
agriculture and small businesses usually do not belong to unions.
Public sector employees are unionized at very high rates and are highly
politicized.
Most large unions are affiliated with political parties and play a
prominent role in the political process, though major unions in the
public sector are politically independent. More than 30 labor unions
have political affiliations, but there are also a small number of
unaffiliated unions, some of which have active leaders and a relatively
large membership. The Ministry of Labor registered 147 new unions and
canceled the registration of 155 others, bringing the total number of
functioning unions to 1,580. The Ministry of Labor is authorized by law
to cancel the registration of any union that does not submit an annual
report. This requirement was the only legal grounds for cancellation of
registration.
This law is being implemented. Employers found guilty of such
discrimination must reinstate workers fired for union activities but
may transfer them to different locations.
During the year, the Government was cited by the ICFTU for failure
to observe an ILO convention. Unions may affiliate with international
bodies, and some have done so. The Ceylon Workers Congress, composed
exclusively of Hill Tamil plantation workers, is the only trade union
organization affiliated with the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), although a new trade union in the Biyagama export
processing zone (EPZ) is affiliated with the Youth Forum of the ICFTU.
No national trade union center exists to centralize or facilitate
contact with international groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to collective bargaining; however, very few
companies practice it. Large firms may have employees in as many as 60
different unions. In enterprises without unions, including those in the
EPZs, worker councils--composed of employees, employers and often a
public sector representative--generally provide the forums for labor
and management negotiation. The councils do not have the power to
negotiate binding contracts, and labor advocates have criticized them
as ineffective.
In 1999 Parliament passed an amendment to the Industrial Disputes
Act to require employers to recognize trade unions and the right to
collective bargaining. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination.
All workers, other than civil servants and workers in ``essential''
services, have the right to strike. By law workers may lodge complaints
with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal, or the Supreme Court
to protect their rights. These mechanisms were effective and new
reforms placed limits on the amount of time allowed to resolve
arbitration cases; however, there continued to be substantial backlog
delays in the resolution of cases. The Government periodically has
controlled strikes by declaring some industries essential under the ER
(which lapsed in 2000). The President retains the power to designate
any industry as an essential service. The ILO has pointed out to the
Government that essential services should be limited to services where
an interruption would endanger the life, personal safety, or health of
the population.
Civil servants collectively may submit labor grievances to the
Public Service Commission, but they have no legal grounds to strike.
Nonetheless, government workers in the transportation, medical,
educational, power generation, financial, and port sectors have staged
brief strikes and other work actions in the past few years. There were
numerous public sector strikes during the year.
The law prohibits retribution against strikers in nonessential
sectors. Employers may dismiss workers only for disciplinary reasons,
mainly misconduct. Incompetence or low productivity were not grounds
for dismissal. Dismissed employees have a right to appeal their
termination before a labor tribunal.
There are approximately 110,000 workers employed in three EPZs, a
large percentage of them women. Under the law, workers in the EPZs have
the same rights to join unions as other workers. Few unions have formed
in the EPZs, partially because of severe restrictions on access by
union organizers to the zones. While the unionization rate in the rest
of the country is approximately 25 percent, the rate within the EPZs
was only 10 percent. Labor representatives alleged that the
Government's Board of Investment, which manages the EPZs, including
setting wages and working conditions in the EPZs, has discouraged union
activity. The short-term nature of employment and relatively young
workforce in the zones makes it difficult to organize. Work councils in
the EPZs are chaired by the Government's Board of Investment (BOI) and
only have the power to make recommendations. Labor representatives also
allege that the Labor Commissioner, under BOI pressure, has failed to
prosecute employers who refuse to recognize or enter into collective
bargaining with trade unions. While employers in the EPZs generally
offer higher wages and better working conditions than employers
elsewhere, workers face other concerns, such as security, expensive but
low quality boarding houses, and sexual harassment. In most instances,
wage boards establish minimum wages and conditions of employment,
except in the EPZs, where wages and work conditions are set by the BOI.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor; however, there were reports that such practices
occurred. ILO Convention 105 was not ratified yet by the end of
September. The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children
specifically, but government officials interpret it as applying to
persons of all ages (see Section 6.d.). There were credible reports
that some rural children were employed in debt bondage as domestic
servants in urban households, and there were numerous reports that some
of these children had been abused.
There were credible reports that some soldiers attached to an army
camp north of Batticaloa forced local villagers to build a wall around
the camp during 2000, and that they beat individuals who refused to
comply. The military apparently transferred the officer responsible for
the forced labor when the abuse was publicized.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits labor by children under 14 years of age,
but child labor is a problem and still exists in the informal sectors.
The NCPA combats the problem of child abuse, including unlawful child
labor. The act consolidated existing legislation that established what
types of employment are restricted for children, which age groups are
affected. The Ministry of Labor is the competent authority to set
regulations and carry out implementation, and monitoring. The minimum
age for employment is 14, although the law permits the employment of
younger children by their parents or guardians in limited work. The law
permits the employment of persons from the age of 14 for not more than
one hour on any day before school. However, the Trade Union Ordinance
of 1935 allows membership only from the age of 16. The law also permits
employment in any school or institution for training purposes. The
Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act, which requires children between
the ages of 5 and 14 to attend school, has been in effect since January
1998, although it still is being implemented. Despite legislation,
child labor still exists in the informal sector. A child activity
survey carried out in 1998 and 1999 by the Department of Census and
Statistics found almost 11,000 children between the ages of 5 and 14
working full time and another 15,000 engaged in both economic activity
and housekeeping. The survey found 450,000 children employed by their
families in seasonal agricultural work.
Persons under age 16 may not be employed in any public enterprise
in which life or limb is endangered. There are no reports that children
are employed in the EPZs, the garment industry, or any other export
industry, although children sometimes are employed during harvest
periods in the plantation sectors and in nonplantation agriculture.
Many thousands of children were believed to be employed in domestic
service, although this situation is not regulated or documented. A 1997
study reported that child domestic servants are employed in 8.6 percent
of homes in the Southern Province. The same study reported that child
laborers in the domestic service sector often are deprived of an
education. Many child domestics reportedly are subjected to physical,
sexual, and emotional abuse.
Regular employment of children also occurs in the informal sector
and in family enterprises such as family farms, crafts, small trade
establishments, restaurants, and repair shops. Government inspections
have been unable to eliminate these forms of child labor (see Section
5), although an awareness campaign coupled with the establishment of
hot lines for reporting child labor has led to an increase in the
prosecutions regarding child labor violations by the Labor Department.
The Labor Department reported 194 complaints regarding child labor in
2000, with 79 of these cases withdrawn due to lack of evidence or
faulty complaints. The Department prosecuted 7 cases in 2000. In the
first 8 months of the year, the Labor Department reported 199
complaints, with 48 cases withdrawn and 40 prosecuted. According to the
Ministry of Labor, there were 10 prosecutions for child labor (below
the age of 14) during 2000. Under legislation dating from 1956, the
maximum penalty for employing minors is about $12 (1,000 rupees), with
a maximum jail term of 6 months.
Although forced or bonded labor by persons of any age is prohibited
by law, some rural children reportedly have served in debt bondage (see
Sections 5 and 6.c.).
The LTTE continued to use high school-age children for work as
cooks, messengers, and clerks. In some cases, the children reportedly
help build fortifications. In the past, children as young as age 10
were said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special
schools that provided them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal
education. The LTTE uses children as young as 13 years of age in
battle, and children sometimes are recruited forcibly into the LTTE
(see Section 5). A program of compulsory physical training, including
mock military drills, for most of the population of the areas that it
controls, including for schoolchildren and the aged reportedly still
functions. According to LTTE spokesmen, this work is meant to keep the
population fit; however, it is believed widely that the training was
established to gain tighter control over the population and to provide
a base for recruiting fighters. Despite repeated claims to the contrary
by the LTTE, there were credible reports that the LTTE continued to
recruit forcibly children throughout the year. Individuals or small
groups of children intermittently turned themselves over to security
forces or religious leaders saying they had escaped LTTE training camps
throughout the year. During August and September, the LTTE handed over
85 children to UNICEF, stating that the children had volunteered to
serve, but that the LTTE does not accept children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national minimum wage does
not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but
the vast majority of families have more than one breadwinner. The
Ministry of Labor effectively enforces the minimum wage law for large
companies through routine inspections; however, staffing shortages
prevent the department from effectively monitoring the informal sector.
While there is no universal national minimum wage, approximately 40
wage boards set minimum wages and working conditions by sector and
industry. In 2001 minimum wage rates averaged approximately $29.38
(2,625 rupees) per month in industry, commerce, and the service sector.
The rate was approximately $1.38 (104.53 rupees) per day in
agriculture. The minimum wage in the garment industry was $25.73 (2,300
rupees) per month.
Most permanent full-time workers are covered by laws that prohibit
them from regularly working more than 45 hours per week (a 5 \1/2\-day
workweek). Overtime is limited to 60 hours per month under a recent
ruling. Labor organizers are concerned that the new legislation does
not include a provision for overtime to be done with the consent of the
worker. Such workers also receive 14 days of annual leave, 14 to 21
days of medical leave, and approximately 20 local holidays each year.
Maternity leave is available for permanent and seasonal or part-time
female workers. Several laws protect the safety and health of
industrial workers, but the Ministry of Labor's small staff of
inspectors is inadequate to enforce compliance with the laws. Health
and safety regulations do not meet international standards. Workers
have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that
endanger their health, but many workers are unaware of, or indifferent
to, health risks, and fear that they would lose their jobs if they
removed themselves.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, Sri Lanka is a country of origin and destination for
trafficked persons, primarily women and children for the purposes of
forced labor, and for sexual exploitation. Sri Lankan women travel to
Middle Eastern countries to work as domestics and some have reported
being forced into domestic servitude and sexual exploitation. A small
number of Thai, Russian, and Chinese women have been trafficked to Sri
Lanka for purposes of sexual exploitation. Some Sri Lankan children are
trafficked internally to work as domestics and for sexual exploitation.
There were unconfirmed reports that boys were trafficked to the Middle
East as camel jockeys.
The law provide for penalties for trafficking in women including
imprisonment for 2 to 20 years, and a fine. For trafficking in
children, the law allows imprisonment of 5 to 20 years, and a fine.
Internal trafficking in male children was also a problem,
especially from areas bordering the northern and eastern provinces.
Protecting Environment and Children Everywhere (PEACE), a domestic NGO,
estimated that in 2001 there were at least 5,000 male children between
the ages of 8 and 15 years who were engaged as sex workers both at
beach and mountain resorts. Some of these children were forced into
prostitution by their parents or by organized crime (see Section 5).
PEACE also reports that an additional 7,000 young men aged 15 to 18
years are self-employed prostitutes; however, some organizations
believe the PEACE numbers to be inflated.
The Government took action during 2001 to prepare a national plan
to combat the trafficking of children. The project was part of a
regional project funded by the ILO. On a local level, on October 1, the
police opened an office to work as part of the NCPA in children's
issues, including trafficking in children.
The country has a reputation as a destination for foreign
pedophiles. Officials believe that approximately 30 percent of the
clients were tourists and 70 percent are locals. The Government
occasionally prosecuted foreign pedophiles, and there have been some
convictions; however there were no such convictions during the year.
Many NGOs attribute the problem of child exploitation to a lack of law
enforcement. There was evidence of continuing, but reduced,
international interest in Sri Lankan children for the sex trade as
evidenced in tourism by foreign pedophiles, and in Internet sites
featuring child pornography involving the country's children.
The Government has undertaken several initiatives to provide
protection and services to victims of internal trafficking, including
supporting rehabilitation camps for victims. In addition, the
Government has initiated some awareness campaigns to educate women
about the dangers of trafficking; however, most of the campaigns are
through local and international NGOs and somewhat through the Bureau of
Foreign employment.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
----------
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Antigua and Barbuda is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a
member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and
a bicameral legislative assembly composed the Government. A Governor
General, appointed by the British monarch, was the titular head of
state, with largely ceremonial powers. Prime Minister Lester B. Bird's
Antigua Labour Party (ALP) has controlled the Government and Parliament
since 1976. In the 1999 elections, which observers described as free
but not fair, the ALP retained power by winning 12 of 17 parliamentary
seats. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary.
Security forces consisted of a police force and the small Antigua
and Barbuda Defense Force. The police were organized, trained, and
supervised according to British law enforcement practices. The civilian
authorities generally maintained effective control of the security
forces. There were reports of occasional instances of excessive use of
force by the police and prison guards.
The country had a mixed economy with a strong private sector. The
population was approximately 76,000. Tourism was the most important
source of foreign exchange earnings. Economic activity in the first
quarter expanded relative to the same period in 2001 due to increased
activity in the construction, communication, and government services
sectors. The country was burdened by a large and growing external debt,
which remained a serious economic problem. Economic growth slowed to
1.5 percent in 2001 from 2.5 percent in 2000. The unemployment rate was
11 percent at the end of 2001.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remained in several areas. There were
reports of a killing in custody and of police brutality. Prison
conditions were poor, and there were allegations of abuse of prison
inmates and sexual harassment of female prison guards. Opposition
parties had greater opportunities to express their views through a
radio station that started operations in 2001; however, the radio
station owners continued to report efforts by the Government to limit
their access to the public. Societal discrimination and violence
against women continued to be problems. Antigua and Barbuda was invited
by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--In May police shot
and killed Andy ``Natty Rough'' Francis, who had been held more than 48
hours without being charged, when he attempted to escape the police
station. His brother, Richard Williams, who was a prisoner, was denied
permission to attend the funeral or view the body. The assistant police
commissioner and three other police officers investigated the shooting;
in addition, the Ministry of Public Security appointed a two-man
commission to investigate. The Commission recommended a formal
coroner's inquest, which could compel witness testimony, and also noted
discrepancies in the police account of events.
In September Glen Harper died at his home in the Gambles area while
police were attempting to subdue him after he beat his father
unconscious. According to newspaper reports, Harper attacked the
officers and almost bit off the finger of one of the officers. A post
mortem revealed that Harper died as a result of a fractured spine after
reportedly throwing himself against the wall and veranda of the house.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) requested a formal coroner's
inquest, which had not taken place by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respected these prohibitions in practice;
however, there were occasional reports of police brutality and
threatening behavior and allegations of abuse by prison guards.
In October a court found police Corporal Clarence Francis guilty on
charges of shooting and wounding Gerald Collymore Horsford in December
2000 and sentenced him to 9 months in jail.
Prison conditions were poor. Conditions at the lone, 18th century
prison worsened considerably after a fire destroyed most of the
facility in 1999. The prison remained overcrowded, with 146 prisoners.
Prison conditions were unsanitary and inadequate, particularly in
regard to recreation and rehabilitation, but the Government asserted
that an inspection in June 2001 by the United Kingdom's Inspectorate of
Prisons had not found the prison or the food unsanitary. A followup
inspection was conducted in November. The Rehabilitation Center for
prisoners found guilty of committing minor crimes held seven male
prisoners at year's end.
Pretrial detainees were not held together with convicted prisoners.
In July the Government established a task force to investigate and
report any inappropriate behavior by management and staff at the prison
during the previous 6 months and to investigate allegations of sexual
harassment among prison staff and prisoners. Task force members
included the Medical Superintendent at the Mental Hospital, a retired
High Court Judge, a Senior Foreign Affairs Officer, and a retired
Senior Probation Officer. While the Government did not make the report
public, in September the Outlet newspaper reported that it called for
the Prison Superintendent to step down, citing claims by female prison
officers that the Prison Superintendent had harassed them sexually,
which the superintendent denied. According to the newspaper, the task
force also criticized prison management for causing resentment and
morale problems among staff by favoring younger officers over more
experienced officers and for not adequately investigating allegations
that a prison guard was involved sexually with an inmate. The Labor
Ministry's Permanent Secretary declined to take action on the task
force report, based on an analysis by the Labor Commissioner that it
lacked sufficient evidence to support its recommendation that the
Prison Superintendent be discharged.
The women's prison facility was separate and did not experience the
problems encountered in the men's prison. There was no separate
facility for juveniles, who were housed with adult inmates.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
respected these prohibitions in practice.
Criminal defendants had the right to a judicial determination of
the legality of their detention. The police must bring detainees before
a court within 48 hours of arrest or detention. However, members of the
opposition United Progressive Party (UPP) asserted that there were
instances where this was violated, particularly on Thursdays or
Fridays, and that increasingly, arresting and detention officers were
unavailable to arrange bail or to expedite the process of releasing
detainees. The press reported that Andy Francis was held more than 48
hours without charges (see Section 1.a.).
The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not use it
in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice.
The judicial system is part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system
and reflects historical ties to the United Kingdom. The Constitution
designates the Privy Council in London as the final court of appeal,
which always is employed in the case of death sentences. There were no
military or political courts.
The Constitution provides that criminal defendants should receive a
fair, open, and public trial. In capital cases only, the Government
provided legal assistance at public expense to persons without the
means to retain a private attorney. Courts can reach verdicts quickly,
with some cases coming to conclusion in a matter of days.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
government authorities generally respected these prohibitions in
practice. Violations were subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, of the press, and other forms of communication, and
the authorities generally respected these provisions in practice.
Privately owned print media, including daily and weekly newspapers,
were active and offered a range of opinion, often publishing vigorous
criticism of the Government. However, the Government restricted
opposition parties' access to electronic media, effectively denying
them equal coverage.
The Government owned one of the three general interest radio
stations and the single television station. A religious station
broadcast without impediment. One of the Prime Minister's brothers
owned the second radio station, and another brother was the principal
owner of the sole cable television company. The Government-controlled
media reported regularly on the activities of the Government and the
ruling party but limited their coverage of and access by opposition
parties.
In April 2001, the country's first independent broadcast media, the
Observer radio station, became operational. Permission to operate the
station was granted only after the United Kingdom Privy Council upheld
the owners' suit against the Government for denying an operating
license. This radio station, operated by the owners of the Observer
newspaper, was accessible to political and religious groups of all
persuasions, and was utilized occasionally by the Government. The
opposition accused the Government of trying to marginalize the Observer
radio station by refusing to grant it duty free concessions; ZDK Radio,
which is owned by members of the Prime Minister's family, received such
concessions. The opposition UPP, which publishes the Crusader
newspaper, also applied for and received a radio license in 2001;
however, the station had not begun operations at year's end.
The Government continued to restrict the opposition's access to the
media, and there continued to be allegations of censorship as the
result of subtle coercive pressure by influential persons. For example,
owners of the Observer radio station claimed that several large
corporations declined to advertise on the station for fear of losing
lucrative government contracts. In addition, the Government, citing
violations of the Telecommunications Act, revoked the owners' license
to operate satellite transmission equipment and seized the equipment.
At year's end, the Government withdrew individual charges against the
owner but continued to press charges against the company.
Journalists and media houses continued to report efforts by the
Government to restrict coverage of alleged government scandals. In
February the Government asked Julius Gittens, a Barbadian journalist
hired to help in the start-up phase of the Observer radio station, to
leave the country on the basis that he had failed to follow the proper
procedures to secure a work permit. Radio station personnel alleged
that Gittens was asked to leave because the station had called for
public inquiries into alleged government scandals. According to
Gittens, government authorities told him he was not eligible to reapply
for a new work permit on the basis of a nonpublished government ruling
that limits work permits to no more than two nonnationals in any media
house; he would be the third nonnational at Observer radio.
In August two separate fires interrupted the operations of ZDK
Radio and the cable television station, both owned by members of the
Prime Minister's family.
In May a lone masked assailant shot and killed the 1-year-old son
of fire fighter Eldred Jacobs in a brutal attack at his home that
wounded Jacobs and other family members. The newspapers reported that
Jacobs, recently transferred from police headquarters, had made a call
to an Observer radio program that was intercepted. According to the
press reports, Jacobs was accused of saying that he believed in the
veracity of allegations of criminal wrongdoing made against the Prime
Minister, and that the police would not arrest the Prime Minister
because they too were implicated. The radio station owners reported
that, to their knowledge, no such call came into the station. The DPP
questioned the accuracy of the press report but said he would ask for
an inquest into the matter.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly. The police generally
issued the required permits for public meetings but sometimes denied
them to avert violent confrontations. The opposition held several
demonstrations during the year to protest government policies and
alleged government scandals. There were no reports of police
interference with these demonstrations.
A court dismissed the Government's case against 10 of the residents
of Bendals arrested in a protest demonstration in 2001 over threats to
public health caused by the operation of nearby quarries; however, the
case against the group's chairman and one other protester remained in
the courts at year's end.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
Members of the Rastafarian community complained that law
enforcement officials unfairly targeted them. However, it was not clear
whether such complaints reflected discrimination on the basis of
religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of the laws
against marijuana, which was used as part of Rastafarian religious
practice.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government generally respected them in practice.
The Government assessed all claims by refugees under the provisions
of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of persons
to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for a multiparty political system
accommodating a wide spectrum of political viewpoints. All citizens 18
years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. The
Constitution requires general elections at least every 5 years; the
last general elections were held in 1999. The Commonwealth observer
group that monitored those elections reported irregularities in the
electoral process and assessed the elections as free but not fair. The
Governor General appoints the senators in proportion to the parties'
representation in Parliament and with the advice of the Prime Minister
and the leader of the opposition.
In the 1999 elections, the Antigua Labour Party retained power by
winning 12 of 17 parliamentary seats, 2 more than it had won in the
previous elections in 1994. Except for a period in opposition from
1971-76, the ALP has held power continuously since 1951. The opposition
charged that the ALP's longstanding monopoly on patronage and its
influence over access to economic opportunities made it extremely
difficult for opposition parties to attract membership and financial
support. In 1992 public concern over corruption in government led to
the merger of three opposition political parties into the UPP.
The Commonwealth report indicated that for the 1999 elections, the
voters' register stood at 52,348 voters, of a total population of
approximately 69,000 persons. Since 40 percent of the population were
estimated to be below voting age, the voting rolls appeared to be
inflated. According to the observer group, the weeklong voter
registration appeared too restrictive and potentially disfranchised
citizens, such as persons who would reach the voting age of 18 after
July but before the elections. The observer group also recommended the
establishment of an independent electoral commission to improve the
voter registration process. In December 2001, Parliament amended the
Representation of the People Act to provide for year-round registration
to be effective after a new list of voters was compiled. In December
the deadline to compile the new voters' list was extended to March
2003.
On April 4, the Government appointed the new Electoral Commission,
which includes five members; three of the commission members (including
the Chairman) were nominated by the Prime Minister and two were
nominated by the opposition party. In November the opposition members
walked out to protest the appointment of the Elections Supervisor,
depriving the commission of a quorum and shutting down its operations.
At year's end, a compromise was reached with the assistance of the
Ombudsman, and it was agreed that the commission would start up again
in early 2003. The Supervisor of Elections, as distinguished from the
Chairman of the Electoral Commission, manages the office staff; the
Electoral Commission sets policy.
There were no impediments to participation by women in government
and politics. The Directorate of Gender Affairs participated in
workshops to encourage women to become active in politics. There were
no women elected to the 17-seat House of Representatives; there was 1
woman in the 17-seat Senate. In addition, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate, both appointed
positions, were women. The Attorney General, a Guyanese national
resident in Antigua, was the only woman in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There were no governmental restrictions on the formation of local
human rights organizations. The Antigua and Barbuda Human Rights
Association, chaired by a lecturer at the University of the West
Indies, met sporadically. It represented individuals and groups who
claimed that their rights had been violated.
The Government's Ombudsman has reviewed an increasing number of
cases annually. The Ombudsman is chosen by both houses of Parliament; a
resolution sets the length of his term. The current Ombudsman's term is
10 years or until age 70, whichever comes first. The office of the
Ombudsman operates independently of the judiciary and the Director of
Public Prosecutions; however, recommendations for trial must be
approved by the DPP. The Ombudsman's office has the authority to pursue
a recommendation through the ministry involved, directly with the Prime
Minister, and ultimately may take the matter to Parliament. The
Ombudsman, Hayden Thomas, reported that 90 percent of the cases he
pursued were resolved successfully by contact with the concerned
ministries. The Ombudsman makes recommendations to the Government based
on investigations into citizens' complaints; however, the ministries
were often slow to implement his recommendations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, creed,
language, or social status, and the Government generally respected
these provisions in practice.
Women.--Violence against women was treated as a matter of public
concern, and nongovernmental social welfare groups focused on the
problem. Women in many cases were reluctant to testify against their
abusers. A 1999 Domestic Violence Act prohibits and provides penalties
for domestic violence, as well as rape and other sexual offenses.
Organizations such as the Government's Directorate of Gender Affairs
sought to increase women's awareness of their rights under the law in
cases of domestic violence. The Directorate of Gender Affairs
instituted a domestic violence program that included training for
police officers, magistrates, and judges. The Directorate also ran a
domestic abuse hot line and worked with a nongovernmental organization
to provide safe havens for abused women and children. There were a
number of active nongovernmental organizations that addressed issues
affecting women.
Prostitution is prohibited, but it was a problem.
Sexual harassment is illegal, but it was rarely prosecuted.
According to the Labor Department, there was a high incidence of sexual
harassment reported by employees in both the private and public
sectors.
While the role of women in society is not restricted legally,
economic conditions in rural areas tended to limit women to home and
family, although some women worked as domestics, in agriculture, or in
the large tourism sector. Women were well represented in the public
sector; 54 percent of the public service and over half the Permanent
Secretaries were female. In addition, 41 percent of the bar association
members were female.
The Professional Organization for Women of Antigua was a networking
and resource group for female executives. It held seminars for women
entering the workforce during the year.
Children.--While the Government repeatedly expressed its commitment
to children's rights, its efforts to protect those rights in practice
were limited. The Government provided education for children through
the age of 16; it was free, universal, and compulsory. Children had
access to health care and other public services.
Child abuse remained a problem. The age of consent is 16 years old.
In August 2001, the police uncovered a child pornography and
prostitution ring, and high-ranking members of society reportedly were
implicated. A task force with representatives from both the Government
and nongovernmental sectors was created to investigate the matter, but
no cases had been successfully prosecuted by the end of the year.
Several were dismissed because the complainant failed to appear.
In 2000 the Government established a committee to implement the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. In addition, the Government
joined the Global Movement for Children. UNICEF helped support a study
of the needs of children and families, and its recommendations were
being used to develop a National Plan of Action on Child Survival,
Development, and Protection.
Persons with Disabilities.--No specific laws mandate accessibility
for persons with disabilities, but constitutional provisions prohibit
discrimination against the physically disabled in employment and
education. There was no evidence of widespread discrimination against
persons with disabilities, although the Government did not enforce the
constitutional antidiscrimination provisions. There was one complaint
that a person was not hired due to a disability; the Labor Commission
had the matter under review at year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers had the right to associate
freely and to form labor unions. Approximately 75 percent of workers
belonged to a union, and the hotel industry was heavily unionized.
There were two major trade unions: The Antigua and Barbuda Trades and
Labour Union (ATLU) and the Antigua and Barbuda Workers' Union (AWU).
The ATLU was associated with the ruling ALP, while the larger and more
active AWU was allied rather loosely with the opposition.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination. During the year, there
were two reports of antiunion discrimination but, after investigating,
the Labor Commission determined that the charges had not been proved.
The Labor Commission can require that employers and employees submit to
mediation if antiunion discrimination is alleged. However, the
mediator's recommendations are not binding, and either party may seek
recourse to the courts. Employers found guilty of antiunion
discrimination were not required to rehire employees fired for union
activities.
Unions were free to affiliate with international labor
organizations, and they did so in practice.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor
organizations were free to organize and bargain collectively.
The Labor Code recognizes the right to strike, but the Industrial
Relations Court may limit this right in a given dispute. Workers who
provide essential services (including bus, telephone, port, and
petroleum workers, in addition to health and safety workers) must give
21 days' notice of intent to strike. Once either party to a dispute
requests that the court mediate, strikes are then prohibited under
penalty of imprisonment. Because of the delays associated with this
process, unions often resolved labor disputes before a strike was
called. In addition, an injunction may be issued against a legal strike
when the national interest is threatened or affected. The International
Labor Organization's Committee of Experts repeatedly requested the
Government to amend certain paragraphs of the 1976 Industrial Courts
Act and the extensive list of essential services in the Labor Code,
asserting that these provisions could be applied to prohibit the right
to strike. During the year, there were seven strikes or work-related
protests, including a strike against a government-owned utility company
and one involving the seaport. The Education Ministry intervened in the
teachers' disputes; the Labor Ministry intervened in the other cases,
and the workers returned to work.
There were no export processing zones, but there were free trade
zones that facilitated services such as international banking and
gambling. The Labor Code applied equally to workers in these zones as
elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution forbids
slavery and forced labor, including that by children, and they did not
exist in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law stipulates a minimum working age of 16 years,
which corresponds with the provisions of the Education Act. In
addition, persons under 18 years of age must have a medical clearance
to work. The Ministry of Labor, which is required by law to conduct
periodic inspections of workplaces, effectively enforced this law. The
Labor Commissioner's Office also had an Inspectorate that investigated
exploitative child labor matters. There was one report of a minimum age
employment violation; the Labor Commission discussed the matter with
both the employer and the employee, and the under-age employee stopped
working.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides that the
Minister of Labor can issue orders, which have the force of law, to
establish a minimum wage. During the year a tripartite committee of
representatives from employers, employees, and government met and
recommended changes to the minimum wage. In December the Minister of
Labor increased the minimum wage and set it at $2.22 (EC$6.00) an hour
for all categories of labor. The minimum wage provided a barely
adequate standard of living for a worker and family, and in practice
the great majority of workers earned substantially more than the
minimum wage.
The law provides that workers are not required to work more than a
48-hour, 6-day workweek, but in practice the standard workweek was 40
hours in 5 days. The law stipulates that workers receive a minimum of
12 days of annual leave. The law requires employers to provide
maternity leave with 40 percent of wages for 6 weeks of leave, while
social service programs provide the remaining 60 percent of wages. The
employer's obligation ends after the first 6 weeks, but social services
continue to pay 60 percent of wages for an additional 7 weeks, for a
total of 13 weeks.
The Government has not yet developed occupational health and safety
laws or regulations, but a section of the Labor Code includes some
provisions regarding occupational safety and health. Plans to
incorporate comprehensive legislation on safety, health, and the
welfare of workers into the existing Labor Code have not been
implemented. The Government was exploring alternative sources of
funding to purchase health and safety equipment. Although not
specifically provided for by law, workers may leave a dangerous
workplace situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. At year's end, official investigations
were in progress to determine whether illegal aliens had been
trafficked from the country to the United States in 2000 and 2001.
__________
ARGENTINA
Argentina is a federal constitutional democracy with an executive
branch headed by an elected president, a bicameral legislature, and a
separate judiciary. In 1999 voters elected President Fernando de la Rua
in generally free and fair elections. After protests in December 2001,
de la Rua resigned and was succeeded briefly by three interim
presidents before the Legislative Assembly elected Eduardo Duhalde to
serve out the remainder of the de la Rua term. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary, but judges and judicial staff
were inefficient and at times subject to political influence.
The President is the constitutional commander-in-chief, and a
civilian Defense Minister oversees the armed forces. Several agencies
share responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Federal Police
(PFA) report to the Ministry of Justice, Security, and Human Rights, as
do the Border Police (``Gendarmeria'') and Coast Guard. The PFA has
jurisdiction in the Federal Capital and over federal crimes in the
provinces. Provincial police are subordinate to the provincial
governors. Some members of the security forces committed human rights
abuses.
The country has a market-based mixed agricultural, industrial, and
service economy and a population of approximately 36.2 million. A
recession that began in 1998 deepened, and production and consumption
dropped sharply after the banking system was paralyzed, the Government
defaulted on loan obligations, and the local currency--uncoupled from
the dollar--lost 70 percent of its value. Per capita gross domestic
product dropped from $7,418 in 2001 to approximately $2,700, and
unemployment rose to 21.5 percent. Income disparities increased, and
over 50 percent of the population lived below the poverty line.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. There were
instances of killings, torture, and brutality by police and prison
officials. Authorities prosecuted some police for such actions,
although impunity continued, particularly in jails and prisons. Police
corruption was a problem. Police used excessive force against
demonstrators on several occasions. Overcrowding in jails and prisons
was a problem. Provincial police sometimes arbitrarily arrested and
detained citizens. The judiciary showed clear signs of politicization.
The judiciary continued to work through the legacy of human rights
abuses of the ``dirty war'' of the 1976-83 military regime. Anti-
Semitism remained a problem; however, the Government took steps to
combat it. Domestic violence against women was a problem.
Discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities persisted. Child
labor was a problem. Argentina was invited by the Community of
Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD
Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings; however, police and prison
officers were responsible for a number of killings involving the use of
unwarranted or excessive force. The authorities investigated and in
some cases detained, tried, and convicted the officers involved;
however, impunity for those who committed abuses was sometimes a
problem.
There were a number of killings, including prison killings with
suspected official involvement, killings at the time of apprehension,
killings of demonstrators, and killings by stray bullets.
On June 18, Daniel Chocobar died after being attacked by another
prisoner the previous day. Chocobar had been transferred to Prison Unit
9 of La Plata, Buenos Aires, after having denounced mistreatment in
2001 in General Alvear prison, where other prisoners subsequently
reported that officials offered them incentives to kill Chocobar (see
Section 1.c). Chocobar's death followed that of at least four other
prisoners who had filed complaints or served as witnesses against
prison mistreatment.
On June 26, Dario Santillan and Maximiliano Kosteki were shot and
killed following a confrontation between police and roadblock
demonstrators in the Buenos Aires suburb of Avellaneda (see Sections
1.c. and 2.b.).
On September 14, Roque Sebastian Villagra was killed by Federal
Police in Buenos Aires. The police initially reported that Villagra was
killed while resisting arrest; however, an autopsy later determined
that Villagra, who had a police record, was shot in the back of the
neck at close range. Three police were under preventive detention at
the end of the year.
Also on September 14, Federal Police agents forced three youths to
jump into the Riachuelo river. One of the youths, 19-year-old Ezequiel
Demonty, drowned. An autopsy showed Demonty, who had a hearing
disability, received blows in the face and head prior to his drowning.
Nine police were detained and charged with ``illegal deprivation of
liberty followed by death,'' although the case initially was filed as
``torture followed by death.'' At year's end, the case had not come to
trial.
Of the estimated 27 deaths that occurred in relation to the
December 2001 store lootings and demonstrations, at least 5 in the city
of Buenos Aires, 3 in Rosario and 1 in Santa Fe appeared attributable
to police, according to information compiled by the Center for Legal
and Social Studies (CELS). In the case of the five demonstrators killed
in downtown Buenos Aires, an investigation began shortly after the
events. A federal judge ordered the arrest of the former Minister of
Interior, the Secretary of Interior, and various other officials. The
two political level officials were released, although not exonerated,
approximately 5 months later at the order of a higher court, which also
ordered that the former Minister and the former President be questioned
in the continuing investigation. Judge Oswaldo Barbero's investigation
into the deaths that occurred in Rosario remained pending at year's
end.
The policeman whose personal weapon fired the bullet that killed
bystander Edith Acevedo in El Talar, Buenos Aires Province, in March
2001, was convicted of homicide on November 7. The judge suspended his
sentence of 3 years and released him after he had spent over 18 months
under detention pending trial.
Two police officers were charged in the case of the April 2001
killings of minors Gaston Galvan and Miguel Burgos whose bodies with
hands and feet tied had been found with multiple gunshot wounds on a
roadside in Tigre, Buenos Aires Province: One of the officers was in
jail and the other was a fugitive. Two other officers from the same
suspected group--which some human rights groups considered a death
squad--were under detention for the killings of other minors. The
deaths of 64 minors who were killed in supposed confrontations with
police in Buenos Aires Province during 1999 and 2000 remained under
investigation by the Attorney General. In March the Attorney General
made public the first report on his investigation into the suspicious
deaths of minors, including a list of 15 police officers suspected of
involvement.
There was no new information on the investigations in: The March
2001 shooting death of 16-year-old Martin Gonzalez in Tigre, Buenos
Aires Province (with suspected involvement of a policeman) or the June
2001 deaths of Carlos Santillan and Oscar Barrios (apparently related
to confrontations between police and roadblock protesters).
On March 14, Cordoba's general prosecutor closed the investigations
into the 2000 death of Vanesa Lorena Ledesma, a transvestite who died
after 5 days under detention for a bar fight, concluding that Ledesma
died of natural causes related to a congenital heart anomaly.
In June a court convicted policeman Francisco David Bravo of
homicide in the line of duty in the 2000 death of Juan Marcelo
Carunchio in Cordoba. The court sentenced him to 2 years and 6 months,
which was suspended and prohibited him from working as a police officer
for 5 years. The court ordered police and provincial government to pay
an indemnity to Carunchio's family.
In October a former Caseros prison guard was convicted of homicide
and sentenced to 20 years for the 2000 restaurant killing in which
Maximiliano Noguera allegedly participated with the connivance of
penitentiary staff. Another Caseros prison inmate was sentenced to 8
years for the associated robbery.
A policeman, Felipe Gil, was under detention and awaiting trial for
homicide in the deaths of Jose Zambrano and Pablo Rodriguez in Mendoza
Province in 2000. Several police who were detained in a related
corruption case were later exonerated.
There was no new information on the killings in 2000 of Manuel
Fernandez in Jujuy, Jorge Marcelo Gonzalez in Corrientes, or Anibal
Veron in Salta.
A trial of police officers suspected of killing two hostages as
well as a robber in the 1999 Villa Ramallo bank robbery--which some
believe was done to hide possible police involvement in the robbery--
remained pending at year's end. A trial for the robbery itself ended in
September with several convictions, including that of one policeman.
The investigation continued into the 1994 terrorist bombing of the
Buenos Aires Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in which 85 persons were
killed. The trial of 20 suspects (15 of whom are former police
officers) accused of providing material support for the attack began in
September 2001 and continued at year's end (see Section 5).
Courts continued to challenge the ``Due Obedience'' and ``Full
Stop'' amnesty laws and pardons that benefited those suspected of
having committed human rights violations during the 1976-83 military
regime. In one such case, Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral investigated
cooperation among military and security officials of the six
participating nations of ``Operation Condor.'' In another case, in July
Federal Judge Bonadio ordered the detention of over 40 individuals,
mainly former military, intelligence, and police officials, including
Leopoldo Galtieri (now deceased) and former generals Cristino
Nicolaides and Carlos Suarez Mason. Bonadio was investigating the
kidnaping and killing of 18 exiled Montonero guerrillas who had
returned to the country for a 1979-80 ``counteroffensive.'' Other
prosecutions of ``dirty war'' era offenses included cases stemming from
crimes committed prior to the 1976 military coup, crimes involving
theft of detainees' goods, and crimes related to the appropriation of
minor children of detainees (see Section 1.b.). ``Truth Trials''
continued and in some cases brought testimony resulting in new court
cases challenging the amnesty laws.
The final decision as to the validity of the amnesty laws reached
the Supreme Court, after federal judge Gabriel Cavallo declared amnesty
laws invalid in March 2001 and an appeals court upheld that decision
the following November. Cavallo and the appeals court based their
decisions in part on the argument that the crimes at issue were
proscribed by international law, which under Argentina's constitution
would take precedence over local law (see Section 1.b.). In August
Attorney General Nicolas Becerra issued an opinion arguing that the
Supreme Court should declare the amnesty laws unconstitutional.
Judicial authorities in Spain, Italy, France, Sweden, and Germany
sought to prosecute those believed responsible for disappearances and
killings during the military regime. In a December 2001 decree, the
Government stated that the Foreign Ministry would refuse extradition
for acts that occurred in its national territory or under its
jurisdiction, confirming a long-held policy. In January the Government
rejected Sweden's request for extradition of formal naval officer
Alfredo Astiz.
Retired Navy Commander Ricardo Cavallo, arrested in Mexico in 2000,
continued legal challenges in Mexico to his extradition to Spain to
face charges of genocide, torture and terrorism.
In July Chile rejected Judge Maria Servini de Cubria's request for
extradition of six former military and intelligence officials for the
1974 assassination of Chilean general Carlos Prats and his wife in
Buenos Aires on the grounds that the extradition request had not
included sufficient information to prove the participation of the
officials in the crime. In March Chilean courts also rejected the
extradition of the former director of the Chilean intelligence agency
Manuel Contreras, requested by Judge Canicoba Corral in the Operation
Condor investigation for similar reasons.
During the year, 45 Federal Police were killed in the Buenos Aires
area: Six were on regular duty, and the others were performing official
guard services.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year.
Judicial proceedings and extradition attempts related to killings,
disappearances, and torture committed by the 1976-83 military regimes
continued (see Section 1.a.).
The Under Secretariat for Human Rights, which maintains the files
of the National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP), received
9,005 claims for financial compensation from families of those who died
or disappeared during the military dictatorship. While some human
rights groups claimed that as many as 30,000 persons disappeared, the
number of compensation applications suggested that a figure between
10,000 and 15,000 may be more accurate.
At the urging of the human rights organization Grandmothers of the
Plaza de Mayo, judicial authorities continued to investigate the
kidnaping and illegal adoption by members of the former military regime
of children born to detained dissidents. There were an estimated 250 to
300 such cases. The Grandmothers also assisted families in presenting
about 200 cases of kidnaped children nationwide and by mid-year had
identified 73 children of disappeared persons.
In March Uruguayan Sara Mendez, whose baby was kidnaped while she
was detained in a clandestine detention center in Argentina in 1976,
was reunited with her 26-year-old son Simon Riquelo.
Francisco Gomez was imprisoned and his wife, Teodora Jofre, placed
under house arrest, accused of falsifying documents and appropriating
the child of Patricia Roisinblit and Jose Manuel Perez, born while the
parents were held in a clandestine detention center. Navy doctor Jorge
Luis Magnacco also remained under house arrest for having attended the
clandestine births.
A Supreme Court decision was pending in the case of a suspected
daughter of a couple who disappeared; the daughter refused a 2000 court
order to provide a blood sample for DNA analysis to prove her true
identity. The woman said that she will submit the sample voluntarily
only if her adoptive parents, who have been detained since 1999 on
charges of illegal adoption and substitution of identity, are given
immunity.
Many of the military junta leaders sentenced in 1985 to life
imprisonment for crimes committed during the military dictatorship, who
were pardoned in 1990 and then rearrested in 2000, remained under house
arrest.
Despite amnesty laws benefiting those suspected of human rights
abuses during the dirty war, since 1995 human rights activists have
pursued truth trials, intended to correct official records, especially
with regard to the fate of those who disappeared and those born in
captivity (see Section 1.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Criminal Code
provides penalties for torture similar to those for homicide; however,
torture and brutality by police and prison guards remained serious
problems. Human rights organizations described widespread police
brutality, the use of torture on suspects, and corruption within the
prison and police forces. The Government investigated some reports of
police or prison brutality, but few cases were tried and even fewer
resulted in convictions. In some jurisdictions, such as Mendoza
Province and greater Buenos Aires, threats to witnesses and advocates
made prosecution of abuses and reform more difficult. A January 2001
report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture recalled concerns
raised in the U.N. Human Rights Commission's October 2000 review under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In
particular, the Rapporteur noted concerns about allegations that
torture and excessive use of force by police officials were ``a
widespread problem and that government mechanisms established to
address it are inadequate.'' The Rapporteur's report also expressed
concern about prison conditions and cited specifically ``the severe
overcrowding and the poor quality of basic necessities and services,
including food, clothing and medical care.'' The report also stated
that it had been established that there had been ``abuses of authority
by prison officials, such as torture and ill-treatment and
corruption.'' A Secretariat for Human Rights for Buenos Aires Province
was created in January, with one of its first tasks being development
of a Program for the Prevention of Torture.
In 2001 three federal judges strongly criticized ``the generalized
practice of torture in all its forms in a systematic way, in the area
of investigations and the treatment of detainees, especially in the
Province of Buenos Aires, where there is a history of authoritarian
style state violence.'' The judges based their report in part on a
2000-01 investigation by public defender Mario Coriolano and noted that
few instances of complaints were sustained in courts because of the
difficulty of obtaining proof due to witnesses' fear of reprisals.
According to press reports, a study by the National Attorney
General's office indicated that of 676 complaints filed in the Federal
Capital of Buenos Aires in 2000 for illegal harassment or torture, only
4 public trials were held, and there were no convictions. In the first
half of 2001, 271 complaints were filed; 2 trials were held that
resulted in 1 conviction. A July 26 report by CELS to the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Torture indicated that the number of complaints for
torture of minors under state supervision in Buenos Aires Province more
than doubled in the first 6 months of the year over the same period in
2001. In general there was little improvement in the treatment of
prisoners, including minors, and impunity for abuses prevailed. Steps
were taken that could weaken detection and prosecution, such as placing
the Buenos Aires provincial prosecutor rather than the public defender
in charge of registering abuses.
On May 10, police in the Buenos Aires suburb of Florencia Varela
detained a young couple to ``check their records.'' The two were then
beaten. Upon her release, the woman, Andrea Viera, already in poor
health, had to be taken to a hospital where she died several days
later. An investigation was begun and seven police were detained and
are awaiting trial.
According to witnesses and consistent with an autopsy report,
Ezequiel Desmonty was beaten by police prior to being forced into a
river where he drowned on September 14 (see Section 1.a.).
Two police officers were charged in the April 2001 killings in
Tigre, Buenos Aires, of two boys whose families had filed torture
complaints: One of the officers was in jail, and the other was a
fugitive (see Section 1.a.).
There was no new information in the two 2001 cases of beating and
intimidation of police witnesses who alleged police corruption,
involving Adrian Lopez in Mendoza Province and Roberto Lucero and Maria
de los Angeles de Romero in Buenos Aires Province.
Five police agents, including a chief, were jailed and face charges
for torture in the case of Javier Villanueva, detained in Lomas de
Zamora, Buenos Aires Province in October 2001, and later determined by
a medical examination to have been subject to torture by electrical
shock.
In May a court convicted a policewoman, three other former
provincial police, and a member of the national intelligence agency
(SIDE) and sentenced them to 3 to 15 years in prison for the 2000
beating of Ariel Simonini in Tres de Febrero, Buenos Aires Province.
There was no further information in Judge Mario Castillo Sola's
investigation of the 2000 kidnaping and torture of Aldo Bravo by
provincial police of Santiago del Estero or in Judge Hugo Perotti's
investigation into the 2000 police beating of Cristian Omar Lopez in
Diamante district.
There were numerous charges of police corruption. Police activities
were often not well financed and police were not well paid, with a
starting monthly salary of $110 (400 pesos) compared with an average
worker's earnings of approximately $150 (550 pesos) monthly. A police
captain earns approximately $560 (2,000 pesos) monthly. Police often
performed official contract guard duty to earn extra money. Police
corruption was systemic; some of the most common practices included
extortion of and protection for those involved in illegal gambling,
prostitution, and auto theft rings, as well as detention and extortion
of citizens under the threat of planting evidence to charge them for
crimes. Addressing police corruption was difficult in part because the
suspects intimidated whistleblowing colleagues, judicial officials, and
civilian witnesses. Threats and beatings allegedly aimed to intimidate
witnesses were common and, in some cases, occurred in connection with
murders believed committed by members of security forces (see Section
1.a.).
Provincial police and Federal Border Police clashed with
demonstrators on numerous occasions during the year (see Section 2.b.).
On a number of occasions police used tear gas, water cannons, and
rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators, and injuries and deaths were
reported. In a confrontation in Buenos Aires Province on June 26, two
persons were killed and others were injured (see Sections 1.a. and
2.b.).
The investigation into the killing of at least five persons in
protests in Buenos Aires in December 2001 continued, and there were a
number of detentions made in the case (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and
3.).
In the March 2001 beating of Maria Dolores Gomez, public defender
in San Isidro, Buenos Aires Province, investigations failed either to
substantiate that the assault on Gomez were related to her work or to
corroborate evidence of threats to Gomez. However, the Border Police
provided protection to Gomez in response to a request by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (see Section 1.e.).
There was no known progress in the investigations into the January
2001 explosion that damaged a Shi'a Muslim mosque in Buenos Aires (see
Section 5) or into the May 2001 attack on the daughter of political
activist Hebe de Bonafini in Buenos Aires Province (see Section 4).
Prison conditions were poor. Some facilities are old and
dilapidated, and many prisons and jails were overcrowded. A notable
increase in crime and stricter provisions for early release combined
with a slow judicial system to fill prisons and police stations to well
above capacity. According to CELS, in Buenos Aires Province (which
accounts for over 37 percent of all prisoners nationwide) 24,200
prisoners were held in facilities designed for 15,900, and over 80
percent of those incarcerated were held in pretrial detention. The
overcrowding contributed both to security problems--such as jailbreaks
and riots--and to mistreatment of prisoners.
Torture and brutality by prison guards and officials remained
serious problems. A number of prisoners who had previously filed
complaints about torture and mistreatment were killed in prison in 2001
and 2002. After filing a torture complaint at General Alvear Prison in
2001, Daniel Chocobar produced witnesses who testified that prison
officials had offered other prisoners benefits in exchange for killing
him. Chocobar was transferred but was stabbed by another prisoner at
Prison Unit 9 in La Plata on June 17 and died the next day. Several
other prisoners, such as Juan Ramon Gonzalez Sosa, who had testified
about mistreatment at General Alvear prison, were also killed under
suspicious circumstances in 2001 (see Section 1.a). There was no
reported serious investigation of these cases by the penitentiary
service.
Hernan Larranaga, a prisoner burned in his isolation cell after
prison officials were seen carrying a suspicious liquid there in July
2001, survived after months of intensive burn therapy. He remained
incarcerated, and there were reports that his life would be under
threat in any of the Buenos Aires Penitentiary units. There was no new
information on the investigation into the burning.
Corruption among prison guards was a problem. Incidents in various
prisons in Buenos Aires Province suggested the existence of a network
of prison corruption aimed at retaliating against and silencing
prisoners who filed complaints about torture. In a public trial that
began in September for the killing of a police officer guarding a
restaurant in 1998, a prisoner claimed he was released to commit crimes
and shared a portion of the proceeds with prison guards, one of whom
was also a participant in the restaurant incident. This case was linked
to the 2001 prison guard taping of testimony by prisoner Carlos Sandez
Tejada and the suspicious deaths of prisoners Maximiliano Noguera and
his former cellmate and witness to prison irregularities, Miguel Angel
Arribas (see Section 1.a.). The January 2001 report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Torture noted concerns about ``abuses of authority by
prison officials, such as torture and ill treatment, and corruption.''
Under national regulations, pretrial prisoners may not be held
together with convicted prisoners; however, reliable reports indicate
that this segregation of prisoners often was not respected in practice.
The law provides for separate facilities for women and for minors,
and these were available.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code limits
the arrest and investigatory power of the police and the judiciary;
however, provincial police sometimes ignored these restrictions and
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Human rights groups found
it difficult to document such incidents and said that victims were
reluctant to file complaints because they feared police retaliation or
did not believe that their complaints would result in any action.
Police may detain suspects for up to 10 hours without an arrest
warrant if the authorities have a well-founded belief that suspects
have committed, or are about to commit, a crime, or if they are unable
to determine the identity of a suspect. However, human rights groups
argued that this provision of law was disregarded in order to extort
money from persons by threatening to charge them with illegal weapons
or drug possession.
A 2001 law permits the Federal Police to question suspects at the
scene of the crime and to hold suspects incommunicado for up to 10
hours. It also gives police additional search powers (see Section
1.f.).
The law allows pretrial detention for up to 2 years, and the slow
pace of the justice system often resulted in lengthy pretrial
detentions (see Section 1.e.). If convicted, a prisoner usually
receives credit for time already served. According to local
authorities, approximately 70 percent of the inmates in the federal
prisons of the greater Buenos Aires area were in pretrial detention.
The law provides for the right to bail, and it was utilized in
practice.
The law does not permit forced exile, and it was not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is nominally
independent and impartial, its judges and judicial personnel were
inefficient and at times subject to and apt to exercise political
influence. The system was hampered by inordinate delays, procedural
logjams, changes of judges, inadequate administrative support, and
incompetence. Judges have broad discretion as to whether and how to
pursue investigations, contributing to a sense that many decisions are
arbitrary. Allegations of corruption were reported widely, but only a
small number of investigations, judicial impeachment trials, and
dismissals of judges actually took place. Allegations of corruption in
provincial courts were even more frequent than at the federal level,
reflecting strong connections between some governors and judicial
powers in their provinces.
Throughout much of the year, the National Congress pursued an
effort to impeach all the members of the Supreme Court. Charges against
the members ranged from failure to investigate the 1992 bombing of the
Israeli Embassy to a broad variety of ethics issues. There was a
widespread perception that the impeachment effort was highly
politicized. Although the Impeachment Committee of the Chamber of
Deputies recommended the impeachment of all nine Justices, the
impeachments were shelved in October when none gained a two-thirds
majority in the full Chamber.
There were credible allegations of efforts by members of security
forces and others to intimidate the judiciary and witnesses (see
Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.).
On June 4, in Villa Carlos Paz, Cordoba Province, teenage Ian Duran
was shot to death shortly before he was expected to testify in the
investigation into the May murder of Pablo Jossens. In June a detective
investigating the Jossens case was also shot to death, and, according
to press accounts, the initial prosecutor for the case received threats
and turned the case over to another prosecutor. In September Duran's
family began receiving death threats, and in November Duran's mother,
also a potential witness in the Jossens case, was attacked and told to
keep silent. In December the former police chief was taken into custody
and charged with secondary participation in the murder of Jossens.
The Government provided a Border Police protection detail for
public defender Maria Dolores Gomez, who was beaten and reportedly
received threats attributed to prison authorities in March 2001. An
investigation into the threats failed to substantiate them (see Section
1.c.).
There was no new information in the investigation into the 2000
death threats received by Judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria and her
judicial secretary Ricardo Parodi, apparently in relation to
investigations of kidnaping of children during the dirty war (see
Section 1.b.). Additional security was provided to them.
The judicial system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
each headed by a Supreme Court with chambers of appeal and section
courts below it. The federal courts are divided between the criminal
courts and economic courts.
The Council of Magistrates submits a slate of candidates for each
federal judicial vacancy to the President, whose selection is subject
to Senate approval. The Council also conducts impeachment hearings and
administers the federal court system. In October there were 93 vacant
positions and 67 slates awaiting Executive decisions. Two judges were
removed by the Council.
Trials are public, and defendants have the right to legal counsel
and to call defense witnesses. A panel of judges decides guilt or
innocence. Federal and provincial courts continued the transition to
oral trials in criminal cases, instead of the old system of written
submissions. However, substantial elements of the old system remain.
For example, before the oral part of a trial begins, judges receive
pretrial written documentation regarding the case, which, according to
prominent legal experts, could bias a judge before oral testimony is
heard. Lengthy delays in trials were a problem. The 1994 Constitution
provides for trial by jury; however, required implementing legislation
has not been passed. There is a provision for counsel for indigents;
however, in practice counsel may not always be provided due to a lack
of resources.
Several groups expressed concern regarding laws for judicial
proceedings regarding minors (see Section 5).
Nine of the 11 prisoners convicted in the 1989 assault on the army
barracks at La Tablada received conditional liberty in May.
There were no other reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
Government generally respected these prohibitions in practice.
Violations were subject to legal sanction. In practice local police
stopped and searched individuals without probable cause--a practice
that increased as crime rates rose.
A 2001 law gave Federal Police new powers, including the power to
enter the scene of a search without civilian witnesses in case of
danger; to take evidence of a crime found while searching for items
related to a different crime; and to search anyone, their belongings
and cars, without a court order in order to find items ``stemming from
or constituting a crime or which could be used to commit one'' as long
as prior circumstances justify it and they are done in a place that is
public or with unrestricted access. The law also provides for expanded
powers of detention (see Section 1.d.).
A 2001 intelligence law provides for legislative oversight over
government intelligence activities and prohibits unauthorized
interception of telephone, postal, facsimile, or other voice or image
transmissions as well as other kinds of information, files, and private
documents. On June 6, the Government issued implementing regulations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
A number of independent newspapers and magazines published freely,
and all print media were owned privately. Privately owned radio and
television stations broadcast freely. The Federal government owns the
Telam wire service, a radio network, and a television station. A few
provincial governments also own broadcast media.
There was no information on the status of investigations into the
March 2001 delivery of a hand grenade and note to Carlos Abrehu, editor
of La Gaceta of Tucuman, or of the shots fired into the homes of radio
journalists Edgardo Soto in Santa Rosa and Martin Oeschger in Santa
Fe's Capitan Bermudez in February and June 2001, respectively.
In June 2001, the Special Rapporteur for the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights visited the Province of Santiago del Estero where daily El
Liberal's reproduction of an insulting headline brought an onerous
legal challenge by the Women's Branch of the Peronist Party. In his
report released on February 25, the Special Rapporteur stated that the
right of freedom of opinion and expression was widely respected and
realized in the country; however, in the case of Santiago del Estero
Province, he expressed deep concern. He urged provincial authorities to
find a peaceful settlement to the crisis in which the Government
withheld advertising to cripple El Liberal, which had become the target
of abuse of executive power.
There was no additional information with respect to reports in 2000
of wiretaps and threats against El Liberal and threats against
Cordoba's La Voz del Interior, which had published information about
wiretapping and other abuses attributed to the provincial government of
Santiago del Estero.
Suspects on trial for the 1999 killing of Ricardo Gangeme in Chubut
Province, which some observers believed was related to his writing,
were acquitted in a trial that began in August.
The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government did not
restrict this right in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
and the law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. There were numerous
peaceful protests and demonstrations throughout the country during the
year (see Section 6.a.). However, on a number of occasions, the
security forces used rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons to
disperse unruly demonstrators, resulting in several deaths and a number
of injuries (see Section 1.a).
Protest marches, roadblocks, and other demonstrations occurred
frequently during the year. Often the protests were related to
restrictions on withdrawals from banks and conversion of dollar
deposits to pesos, cuts in or late payment of public employees' wages,
loss of employment, distribution of public benefit programs, and
deterioration of public services. Roadblocks usually carried out by
organized groups of the unemployed were common. The vast majority of
these protests were carried out peacefully; however, in some cases,
there was violence, and clashes occurred between demonstrators and
public security forces, which generally used tear gas and rubber
bullets to disperse protesters. Demonstrators sometimes were detained,
often leading to charges that the Government, whether national or
provincial, was ``criminalizing'' protests.
On June 26, in the Buenos Aires suburb of Avellaneda, a group of
several hundred club-wielding demonstrators clashed with provincial
police and Naval Prefecture forces. While initially using tear gas and
rubber bullets, police forces pursuing demonstrators subsequently used
force that resulted in two deaths and numerous injuries. Autopsies on
demonstrators Maximiliano Kosteki and Dario Santillan found they were
killed by metal shot. Press photos showed police pointing shotguns
toward Santillan. In the same clash, it was reported that more than 100
persons were injured by such means as rubber and lead shot and that
there were dozens of brief detentions and a search without a warrant of
the nearby United Left/Communist Party headquarters (where protesters
had taken refuge). An investigation began immediately, and the
provincial governor replaced the Security Minister and police
officials. A number of police were detained, including the police chief
in charge of the operation (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution and the law provide for freedom of association,
and the Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The Constitution states that the Federal government
``sustains the apostolic Roman Catholic faith,'' and the Government
provides the Catholic Church with a variety of subsidies. Other
religious faiths were practiced freely.
The Secretariat of Worship in the Ministry of Foreign Relations,
International Trade, and Worship is responsible for conducting the
Government's relations with the Catholic Church, non-Catholic Christian
churches, and other religious organizations in the country. Religious
organizations that wish to hold public worship services and to obtain
tax exempt status must register with the Secretariat, and must report
periodically to the Secretariat in order to maintain their status.
Acts of discrimination and violence against religious minorities,
particularly the Jewish and Muslim communities continued to be
reported. Combating this and other forms of intolerance was a priority
for the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and
Racism (INADI). The Government continued to support a public dialog to
highlight past discrimination and to encourage improved religious
tolerance. There were a number of reports of anti-Semitic acts and of
threats against Jewish organizations and individuals during the year.
The most frequent incidents included the appearance of anti-Semitic and
pro-Nazi graffiti and posters in cities throughout the country.
On July 14, some 150 tombs in an Islamic cemetery in the La Matanza
district of Buenos Aires Province were attacked. Tombstones were broken
and graves disturbed, but no offensive messages or graffiti were found.
INADI and predominantly Jewish groups, acting in solidarity with the
Islamic community, immediately issued statements repudiating the
attacks as discriminatory. The La Matanza prosecutor was charged with
the investigation.
On November 8, an anti-tank grenade was found outside a Jewish club
in La Plata, Buenos Aires Province. The grenade, which was not equipped
to explode, was found in a box along with a note bearing anti-Semitic
slogans and a drawing of a swastika.
There was no progress in the investigations into the January 2001
attack on the Shi'a Muslim mosque in Buenos Aires, the bomb threat
reportedly received 2 days later by the San Justo Islamic Cultural
Center in Buenos Aires, or the April 2001 letter bomb which injured
musician Alberto Merenson.
The Government began a Holocaust Education Project, under the
auspices of the International Holocaust Education Task Force, which the
country joined in June. The Ministry of Education worked to include
Holocaust education in primary and secondary schools, and schools now
commemorate a national day of tolerance on April 19. The Government
renewed the charter of the National Commission for Clarification of
Nazi Activities (CEANA), enabling CEANA to continue its investigations
and to cooperate in Holocaust education.
The investigation into the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires came to a virtual standstill. However, the investigation
to find those directly responsible for the 1994 bombing of the AMIA
Jewish community center (in which 85 persons died) continued during the
year.
The public trial of 20 individuals (including 15 former Buenos
Aires Province police officers) accused of providing the vehicle used
in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center continued.
Since the trial began in September 2001, testimony of over 800
witnesses focussed largely on carefully establishing the facts of the
case, particularly the use of a van filled with explosives to carry out
the attack (see Section 1.a.).
In May the third suspect accused in the 1995 beating of a youth
believed to be Jewish surrendered to authorities after failing to
appear in the December 2001 trial in which the other two defendants
were convicted. In August he was released from detention, and a trial
date had not been set by year's end.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for
these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
Protesters frequently blocked roads and streets (see Sections 2.b. and
6.a.).
A committee composed of representatives of the Ministries of
Justice, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior determines grants of refugee
status, using the criteria of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A representative of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees may participate in committee hearings,
but may not vote. The Government granted refugee status to numerous
persons and accepted refugees for resettlement. As of September, 1,500
persons were awaiting decisions on their refugee status requests.
During the year, the country received 360 new requests for refugee
status from persons from 23 countries, compared with 861 requests
received in 2001, 1,320 in 2000, and 1,456 in 1999. The country also
implemented a cooperation program with the UNHCR, enabling them to more
efficiently examine the large influx of cases in 1999 and 2000. The
issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the year.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. In 1999 voters elected Fernando de la Rua, leader of the
``Alianza'' coalition of opposition parties, as president. In national
midterm legislative elections in October 2001, the opposition
Justicialist party maintained its absolute majority in the Senate and
replaced the Alianza as the largest party in the Lower House. This was
the first time that the voters directly elected the Senate; previously
provincial legislatures elected senators.
On December 20, 2001, after protests, street violence, looting, and
deadly confrontations between security forces and demonstrators,
President De la Rua resigned. After several short-term interim
presidencies, including one lasting 1 week headed by fomer San Luis
Governor Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, the legislature selected former Buenos
Aires provincial governor Eduardo Duhalde to serve out the remainder of
the De la Rua term. In June Duhalde called for presidential elections
to be moved forward to allow a new President to take office by May 25,
2003.
The Constitution calls for political parties to implement measures
to increase women's representation in elective office. Decrees were
issued in 1993 and 2000 effectively resulting in an increase in the
representation of women in the national legislature. In the lower
chamber, 77 of 257 members were women. In the Senate, there were 24
women among the 72 members. Three cabinet members were women, the
Minister of Labor, Employment and Social Security, the Minister of
Education, and the Minister of Social Development. There were no female
Supreme Court justices, but women were prominent in other levels of the
judiciary.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. The Government was
usually cooperative, although not always responsive to their views.
Among the most active human rights organizations were the
Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo, the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo Founding
Line, the Center for Legal and Social Studies, the Permanent Assembly
for Human Rights, Service for Peace and Justice, and New Rights of Man.
There were credible allegations of efforts by members of security
forces and others to intimidate the judiciary, witnesses, and local
human rights organizations (see Section 1.e.). For example, in June
Daniel Chocobar, a witness to alleged prison guard abuses was killed in
prison apparently by another prisoner, but prison official involvement
was plausible (see Section 1.a.). On September 20, unknown assailants
shot into the home of Estela de Carlotto, a well-known leader of the
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. She was not injured in the attack,
and the provincial government immediately began an investigation into
the attack.
Within the Federal government, the Ministry of Justice, Security
and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human Rights addresses human
rights concerns at a domestic level. Human rights issues at the
international level are handled by the Directorate General of Human
Rights of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade, and
Worship. The Foreign Ministry passes information on human rights issues
raised internationally to the Ministry of Justice, which in turn,
coordinates with a network of human rights representatives in the
provinces. The Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Justice, Security and
Human Rights cooperated with international human rights entities and
provided helpful follow up information and assistance on key cases.
Representatives of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) visited the country from July 29 to August 6. The IACHR
representatives noted government efforts to solve amicably pending
human rights cases, the deep impact of the social and economic crisis
on human rights, the serious lack of confidence in the judiciary, and
the need for a well functioning judiciary as a base for the protection
of human rights. They also took note of public concern about
deterioration in public security and of numerous complaints related to
abuses by public security forces. The IAHCR representatives highlighted
overcrowding and consequent problems in jails and prisons and
encouraged measures adopted by the Buenos Aires provincial government
to improve protection of fundamental rights in the province.
A 2000 law calls for the human rights commissions of both chambers
to write an annual report on human rights in the country beginning in
2001; the two committees had begun work but had not issued a report by
year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution and law provide for equal treatment for all
citizens, and the law provides for prison terms of up to 3 years for
discrimination based on race, nationality, ideology, political opinion,
sex, economic position, social class, or physical characteristics.
INADI is mandated to identify and combat all forms of intolerance
in the country. INADI investigates violations of the antidiscrimination
law and carries out research and educational programs to promote social
and cultural pluralism and combat discriminatory attitudes. After
several years of institutional difficulties, the law establishing INADI
was amended to provide INADI with greater independence and a budget of
its own.
A 2000 Amnesty International (AI) report expressed concern over
reports that police targeted, tortured, and harassed gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals (see Section 1.c.). The report included information
regarding the 2000 death in police custody of a transvestite whose body
showed signs of torture (see Section 1.a.). AI noted that police bylaws
and provincial codes of misdemeanors allow police to detain or sanction
members of sexual minorities for actions that do not constitute a
criminal offense.
Women.--Domestic violence and sexual harassment against women were
recognized as serious social problems; however, the lack of official
statistics on these crimes made accurate measure of the problems
difficult. The Government, through the National Council of Women,
implemented a new database system to standardize statistics on domestic
violence, permit a more accurate evaluation of the scope of the
problem, and promote better public policy. Although no national
statistics on domestic violence were available, there were 658
complaints of sexual abuse filed in Buenos Aires in 2001, and experts
estimated that only 10 to 20 percent of such incidents were reported.
Any person suffering physical or psychological domestic violence by
a family member may file a formal complaint with a judge or police
station; the level of injury inflicted determines the punishment under
the civil and criminal codes. In addition, the Law on Protection
Against Family Violence gives a judge the right to prevent the
perpetrator of a violent act from entering the home or place of work of
the victim and temporarily to decide issues of family support, child
custody, and arrangements for communication with children.
Reliable statistics as to the extent of rape were not available.
The crime of rape falls under the Law of Crimes Against Sexual
Integrity. Marital rape and acquaintance rape are offenses under the
law, if force is involved, but the need for proof, either in the form
of clear physical injury or the testimony of a witness, often presented
problems. The penalties for rape vary from 6 months to 20 years and
depend on the nature of the relationship between the rapist and victim
and the physical and mental harm inflicted.
Public and private institutions offered prevention programs and
provide support and treatment for women who had been abused, but
transitory housing was almost nonexistent. The Buenos Aires municipal
government operated a small shelter for battered women and a 24-hour
hot line offering support and guidance to victims of violence, but few
other shelters exist. NGOs working in the area of women's rights
stressed that women often did not have a full understanding of their
rights or of what actions could be considered punishable offenses.
Sexual harassment was a serious problem. In 2001 Buenos Aires
Province adopted the first law outlawing sexual harassment in
provincial agencies. However, women lacked information about what
constitutes sexual harassment.
Prostitution is illegal but did occur. Some women have been
trafficked to the country for purposes of prostitution in the past (see
Section 6.f.).
Despite legal prohibitions, women encountered economic
discrimination and occupied a disproportionate number of lower paying
jobs. Often women were paid less than men for equivalent work, although
this is prohibited explicitly by law. Working women also were
represented disproportionately in the informal sector, where they did
not have the work-related economic and social benefits enjoyed by
registered workers.
The National Council of Women, an interagency organization under
the authority of the President's Cabinet Chief, carried out programs to
promote equal opportunity for women in the social, political, and
economic arenas. The Special Agency for Women's Issues, a unit in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, participated in studying domestic law
standards so as to adapt them to the rules of international law. This
Agency and the National Council of Women, together with the Labor
Ministry and union and business organizations, formed the Tripartite
Committee on Equal Opportunity for Men and Women in the Workplace,
which sought to foster equal treatment and opportunities for men and
women in the job market.
Children.--The Government voiced strong commitment to issues of
children's rights and welfare, including education and health; however,
austere federal and provincial budgets meant that programs in these
areas received insufficient funding. The Ministry of Justice, Security,
and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human and Social Rights worked
with UNICEF and other international agencies to promote children's
rights.
The law requires that all children receive a minimum of 9 years of
schooling, beginning at 6 years of age. Education is compulsory, free,
and universal for children up to the age of 15; however, adequate
schooling is unavailable in some rural areas. A 1999 study by the
National Council for Childhood, Adolescence and the Family--an
independent government organization reporting to the Ministry of Social
Development and Environment--stated that approximately 99 percent of
all children of primary school age attended schools, with roughly the
same percentages for both genders. There were numerous federal and
provincial health care programs for children, although not all children
had access to them.
NGOs and church sources indicated that child abuse and prostitution
increased, although no corroborating statistics were available. A 2000
UNICEF report stated that sexual exploitation of children was
widespread due to police inefficiency and lack of judicial
intervention. The children involved usually worked in the same
institutions as adults. The National Council for Childhood,
Adolescence, and the Family has developed an Action Plan, together with
the Attorney General, the Ministry of Justice, Security and Human
Rights, the National Council of Women, and UNICEF, on the elimination
of child prostitution.
The country's economic crisis disproportionately affected children.
Almost 3 out of 4 children under age 12 lived under the official
poverty line. Nearly 40 percent of children were considered indigent,
as their families did not earn enough to meet their basic food
necessities. According to the Center for Studies on Infant Nutrition,
malnutrition increased from 11 percent to 20 percent between 2001 and
2002. The public health system did not keep pace with the increased
risks. The press reported over 60 deaths of children attributed to
malnutrition, and the health minister estimated that some 11,000
children in Argentina die each year from such preventable causes.
Schools often had meal programs, and elementary school attendance
reportedly remained high even in poor communities. The Government's
subsidy program for unemployed heads of households assisted more than 2
million people by year's end. An emergency feeding program was also
implemented nationwide. Many school meal programs were kept open over
the summer break in order to help ameliorate the situation.
There was a report of an isolated case of two Bolivian children
trafficked to the country for labor (see Section 6.f.).
UNICEF and the National Council for Childhood, Adolescence and the
Family were concerned about existing laws for judicial proceedings
regarding minors. Children under the age of 16 have immunity. However,
under the Law of Guardianship, those accused of a crime who are between
the ages of 16 and 18 are taken before a judge and assumed guilty of
the crime, without the benefit of either an oral or written trial.
Punishment is then determined based not on the severity of the crime
under the law but on the financial ability of the guardians to provide
treatment and rehabilitation. Thus, minors who commit serious crimes
but come from wealthier families may be released to the guardians,
while minors from impoverished backgrounds may be sent to juvenile
detention centers for lesser crimes.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities in employment, education, and the
provision of other state services, and mandates access to buildings for
persons with disabilities. There was some progress in these areas. The
National Advisory Commission on the Integration of People with
Disabilities (a governmental office), the national ombudsman, and
numerous NGOs defended the rights of persons with disabilities and
helped them to find employment.
A 1994 law mandates standards regarding access to public buildings,
parks, plazas, stairs, and pedestrian areas. Street curbs, commuter
train stations, and some buildings in Buenos Aires have been modified
to accommodate wheelchairs, but many public buildings and lavatories
remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities. The Buenos Aires
subway system installed a small number of escalators and four elevators
for one of the city's five subway lines; however, the other four subway
lines remained inaccessible to many persons with disabilities.
A 2000 law mandated greater accessibility to buses and trains for
persons with disabilities such that 1 of 50 buses must be equipped with
a lowered floor or wheelchair lift. However, NGO groups claimed that
these buses were not maintained, that these bus services were not
regular, and that bus drivers were not given special training to deal
with the needs of persons with disabilities.
NGOs and special interest groups claimed accessibility laws often
were not respected in practice. The law does not define the term
``accessible'' nor does it provide deadlines or penalties for
noncompliance. The national law is not mandatory for the provinces, and
there are no penalties for provincial noncompliance. Accessibility laws
have not been implemented in local building codes, and many new
buildings were not accessible to persons with disabilities. Grievances
filed about the failure to comply with these laws may result in a fine,
but usually no action was taken to make the building accessible to
persons with disabilities.
The National Ombudsman's 2001 report criticized the Government for
insufficient funding and failure to enforce laws regarding
discrimination and accessibility for persons with disabilities, such as
ensuring that government buildings provide space for persons with
disabilities to operate small businesses and that at least 4 percent of
the work force in government offices be comprised of persons with
disabilities. A newly enacted law put into effect at the end of the
year provides for the Ministry of Labor and National Advisory
Commission for the Integration of People with Disabilities jointly to
oversee fulfillment of the 4-percent national government employment
quota.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution recognizes the ethnic and
cultural identities of indigenous people and states that Congress shall
protect their right to bilingual education, recognize their communities
and the communal ownership of their ancestral lands, and allow for
their participation in the management of their natural resources.
However, in practice, indigenous people did not participate in the
management of their lands or natural resources. The National Institute
of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) is the Government agency responsible for
implementing these provisions. The Indigenous Advisory Council has not
yet been established as provided in the law creating INAI.
The principal indigenous groups--the Kollas in Salta and Jujuy, the
Mapuches in the Patagonian provinces, and the Wichis and Tobas in the
northern provinces--were believed to represent less than 5 percent of
the national population. The INAI estimated that there were
approximately 700,000 indigenous persons, most of whom resided in rural
areas. However, the nongovernmental Indigenous Association of the
Argentine Republic estimated the indigenous population at 1.5 million
persons. Other demographers in recent years estimated there were at
most 450,000 indigenous persons. The 2001 national census collected
information about indigenous identity for the first time; however,
results of the information about indigenous identity had not been
released at year's end.
Poverty rates were higher than average in areas with large
indigenous populations. Indigenous persons have higher rates of
illiteracy, chronic disease, and unemployment. Government efforts to
offer bilingual education opportunities to indigenous people continued
to be hampered by a lack of trained teachers.
Since 1994 the Government has restored approximately 2.5 million
acres of land to indigenous communities. Nonetheless, some communities
were involved in land disputes with provincial governments and private
companies, particularly over questions of natural resource extraction
and road construction.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Racist incidents were
underreported, and racism often was denied as a problem; however,
members of racial minorities, such as those of African descent,
reported frequent cases of verbal insults and, in some cases, physical
assaults on the streets of Buenos Aires.
Individuals of indigenous descent from the northern part of the
country, as well as from Bolivia, Peru, and other Latin American
countries, reportedly were subjected frequently to verbal insults
because of their dark skin. Accounts by those who have been subject to
incidents of racial prejudice indicated that this was a more common
problem than was reported widely. There were several incidents of
apparent racial discrimination against Afro-Americans, including two
serious cases involving unprovoked beatings in public establishments by
private security personnel. Members of minority groups reported
avoiding buses and other crowded public facilities out of fear of being
subjected to racial harassment.
In March 2001, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination expressed concern regarding reports throughout the
country of police brutality committed on a variety of pretexts on
grounds of race, color, or ethnic origin.
In January 2001, a Bolivian woman, Marcelina Meneses, and her 10-
month-old Argentine son were insulted, then were pushed or fell from a
suburban train. Both were killed. There was no reported progress in the
investigation despite efforts by the Bolivian immigrant community to
locate witnesses.
There was no further information on the investigation into the 2000
racial discrimination case of a woman of African descent, Elisa Souza
de Melgarejo, and her grandson, who were assaulted verbally in a
supermarket.
In 2001 the Argentine Soccer Association established rules to stop
or cancel games when any ethnic incidents or taunting erupts, such as
anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant incidents that occurred at soccer
matches in the past several years. Such incidents diminished after the
rules were implemented.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form ``free and democratic labor unions, recognized by simple
inscription in a special register,'' and unions exercise this right.
With the exception of military personnel, all workers are free to form
unions. An estimated 35 percent of the work force was organized. Trade
unions are independent of the Government and political parties,
although many union leaders traditionally have supported the
Justicialist Party. Most unions are affiliated with one of the two
factions of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT). A smaller
federation, the Argentine Workers' Central, also is recognized legally.
Labor groups not affiliated with the CGT continued to argue that
the Professional Associations Law provision for legal recognition of
only one union per sector conflict with International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 87. The ILO's Committee of Experts, in a
document released during the year, noted with satisfaction various
measures the Government had taken in 2001 to provide trade union
associations merely registered with rights and benefits similar to
those of unions legally recognized. However, it indicated that it would
address all the matters raised earlier in its next session.
The law prohibits antiunion practices, and the Government generally
enforced this prohibition in practice.
Unions are free to join international confederations without
government restrictions; many unions also were active in international
trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides unions with the right to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements and to have recourse to conciliation and
arbitration. The Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security
ratifies collective bargaining agreements, which cover roughly three-
fourths of the formally employed work force. According to the ILO, the
ratification process impedes free collective bargaining because the
Ministry not only considers whether a collective labor agreement
contains clauses violating public order standards, but also considers
whether the agreement complies with productivity, investment,
technology, and vocational training criteria. However, there were no
known cases during the year when the Government refused to approve any
collective agreements under the above criteria.
The 2000 Labor Reform Law allows collective bargaining on a
regional, provincial, or company basis. A conciliation service, which
began operation in 1997, has helped reduce the number of labor disputes
in courts. In April and September, foreign experts conducted training
sessions in mediation for labor professionals, particularly government
officials.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and this right
was observed in practice. There were no national general strikes by the
largest union confederations, but there were numerous smaller scale
strikes. These strikes generally were brief protests related to sector
specific problems or were carried out by public sector employees,
including teachers, against the economic model or specific government
austerity measures.
Groups of unemployed and underemployed workers, retirees, and
unions around the country frequently demonstrated and used roadblocks
as acts of protest. Hundreds of incidents took place during the year.
Many of the roadblocks were carried out by groups of impoverished
persons demanding retention or restoration of jobs, more federal and
provincial unemployment payments or job subsidies. The roadblocks
usually were organized by political or labor leaders. While most
roadblocks were resolved by negotiated settlements, sometimes including
promises of extended or expanded unemployment programs, some ended in
confrontations between the police and demonstrators. Two persons were
killed in Buenos Aires Province in association with such a
confrontation (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
There are three functioning export processing zones with many
others legally registered but not active. The primary commercial
advantages of these zones are related to customs and duty exemptions.
The same labor laws apply within these zones as in all other parts of
the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor, including by children. During the year, there was only
one report of workers found in conditions of forced labor with poor pay
and working conditions. In December the press reported that police
arrested two Bolivians who owned a garment factory in the city of
Buenos Aires where 15 young Bolivians, including two minors, were found
working in conditions constituting ``servitude.''
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The education law requires that children attend school
until the age of 15, effectively prohibiting formal employment of
children under 15; however, other laws are inconsistent and child labor
was a problem. The labor laws still allow children to work at the age
of 14, and in rare cases the Ministry of Education may authorize a
younger child to work as part of a family unit. Children between the
ages of 15 and 16 may work in a limited number of job categories, but
not more than 6 hours a day or 35 hours a week. The penalty for
employing underage workers ranges from $278 to $1,388 (1,000 to 5,000
pesos) for each child employed.
In May the Ministry of Labor published, with IPEC support, a
Diagnostic Synthesis on Child Labor that estimated the number of
children working in 2000 at 483,000--a 91.6 percent increase in 5
years. Relying on a broader definition, which includes children working
in their homes, the Diagnostic estimates that there were 1.5 million
child laborers.
In June a UNICEF education consultant reportedly stated that in the
large urban areas 6 of every 10 adolescents (ages 13-17) worked rather
than studied. Such considerable and continuing growth in child labor
was considered credible given the country's economic distress.
In 2000 the President formally established a National Commission
for the Eradication of Child Labor to work with the Government,
organized labor, the business community, religious groups, UNICEF, and
NGOs. The Commission, whose activities are financed largely by IPEC,
signed several agreements with provinces to cooperate in addressing
child labor problems and conducted training activities.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum
wage was $54 (200 pesos), which was not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. It is determined by a
tripartite committee and has not changed since 1993. However, few
workers in the formal sector made the minimum wage; according to a
prominent labor expert, the estimated average income of a laborer was
approximately $150 (550 pesos) per month. Those employed full time in
the informal sector were estimated to make closer to $100 (370 pesos)
per month.
Federal labor law sets standards in the areas of health, safety,
and hours. The maximum workday is 8 hours, and the maximum workweek is
48 hours. Overtime payment is required for hours worked in excess of
these limits. The law also sets minimums for periods of rest and paid
vacation. However, laws governing acceptable conditions of work are not
enforced universally, particularly for workers in the informal sector
who constituted an estimated 40 percent of the work force prior to the
current economic crisis and likely an even larger share of the work
force during the year.
Employers are required by law to insure their employees against
accidents at the workplace, and when traveling to and from work.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous or
unhealthful work situations, after having gone through a claim
procedure, without jeopardy to continued employment. Nonetheless,
workers who leave the workplace before it has been proven unsafe risk
being fired; in such cases, the worker has the right to judicial
appeal, but the process can be very lengthy.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws specifically address
trafficking in persons; however, other laws may be used to prosecute
crimes associated with trafficking, such as kidnaping, forced labor,
use of false documents, and prostitution. Laws against child abuse
provide penalties for trafficking children for purposes of
prostitution, and other laws prohibit alien smuggling, indentured
servitude, and similar abuses. There were credible reports that women
brought from the Dominican Republic to work in Argentina in the mid to
late 1990s were coerced into prostitution. An investigation
encompassing nearly a dozen such women was underway at year's end, and
the International Organization of Migration approved the return of 51
Dominicans during the year. There also was a report of 15 Bolivians,
including 2 children, who may have been trafficked to the country.
While there were no government programs specifically to assist
trafficking victims, the Office for Assistance to Migrants can provide
help, and the Office for Assistance to the Victims of Crime provided
practical, legal, and psychological support to several Dominican
victims of trafficking who are pursuing cases in the legal system. The
Government seldom detained immigrants on immigration-related charges.
__________
BAHAMAS
The Commonwealth of the Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth
II, the nominal head of state, is represented by an appointed Governor
General. Prime Minister Perry Christie's Progressive Liberal Party
(PLP) regained control of the Government after May elections that
observers found to be generally free and fair. The judiciary was
generally independent.
The national police force maintains internal security, and the
small Royal Bahamas Defence Force is responsible for external security
and some minor domestic security functions such as guarding foreign
embassies and ambassadors; both answer to civilian authority. There
continued to be reports that the police occasionally committed human
rights abuses.
The country has a developing market-based economy that depends
primarily on tourism, which accounts for 60 percent of the gross
domestic product. The country's population is approximately 305,000.
Financial services, particularly offshore banking and trust management,
are also major sources of revenue. While many citizens enjoyed
relatively high income levels, there was considerable underemployment
and poverty. The unemployment rate was estimated at 9.1 percent during
the year.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remained in several areas. There were
reports that police occasionally beat and abused detainees, and prison
conditions remained harsh. The police occasionally used arbitrary
arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention and delays in trials
were problems. Violence and discrimination against women and violence
against children also were problems. Discrimination against persons
with disabilities and persons of Haitian descent persisted. Bahamas was
invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend
the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel and
degrading treatment or punishment; however, the police occasionally
beat or otherwise abused suspects. Many of the charges of abuse
involved beatings to extract confessions. There were no formal
complaints involving beatings to extract confessions filed during the
year; however, in April a Nassau man alleged that two police officers
pulled him from his home and beat him without provocation. The victim
displayed visible bruises to the media. At year's end, the matter was
under active investigation by the police complaints unit. Human rights
monitors and members of the public continued to express concern over
such instances of police abuse of criminal suspects. Police officials,
while denying systematic or chronic abuses, acknowledged that police on
occasion abused their authority, and pledged to address any wrongdoing
by police officers. According to officials, defendants' rights were
protected by trial judges (see Section 1.e.).
The Police Complaints and Corruption Branch, which reports directly
to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, was responsible for investigating
allegations of police brutality. This unit determines if enough
evidence of abuse or misconduct exists in a particular case to warrant
disciplinary action within the police system or, in some cases,
criminal prosecution by the Attorney General. Local human rights
observers doubted the police force's ability to investigate itself
impartially in cases of alleged abuse and misconduct and believed that
many incidents of improper police behavior were unreported. An
independent civilian was supposed to be appointed to oversee the
complaints and corruption branch; however, at year's end the Government
had not selected anyone for this position. This civilian would report
directly to the Minister of National Security and consult with the
Police Commissioner. Police officials insisted that their
investigations were fair and thorough. There were 398 complaints
against the police during the year, compared with 428 in 2001. Of these
398 cases, 170 remained under investigation at year's end, and 88
resulted in disciplinary action. Examples of disciplinary action
included suspension without pay, fines, and dismissal. No officers were
dismissed during the year because of alleged human rights abuses.
Police officials believed that continuing turnover in personnel was a
contributing factor in disciplinary cases. There were approximately
2,200 officers.
Corporal punishment is permitted by law with some restrictions;
however, it has not been used for several years. For example, caning
was permitted at police stations but only if performed by a sergeant or
higher ranking official. Cat-o'-nine-tails were allowed at prisons but
have not been used for several years.
Conditions at Fox Hill, the only prison, continued to improve but
remained harsh. Overcrowding was a major problem. The men's maximum-
security block, originally built in 1953 to house 400 to 600 inmates,
held more than 700 of the prison's total of more than 1,400 inmates.
The remaining prisoners were housed in medium- and minimum-security
units that were at, or above, intended capacity. Male prisoners were
crowded into poorly ventilated cells that generally lacked regular
running water. Most prisoners lacked beds. Many of them slept on
concrete floors and were locked in their cells 23 hours per day. With
the opening of a new maximum-security wing in August, prison officials
hoped to alleviate overcrowding and separate prisoners being held ``on
remand'' (detention pending trial or further court action) from
convicted prisoners. All inmates were screened for infectious diseases,
and prison officials estimated that approximately 7 percent of the
incoming prison population was infected with the HIV virus. There were
occasional escapes from Fox Hill prison (see Section 1.d.).
Organizations providing aid, counseling services, and religious
instruction had regular access to inmates. The Government provided
limited funds for improvements in prison facilities and prisoner
rehabilitation programs. Prison officials instituted some technical and
vocational programs, and correctional officers were undergoing
instruction to become certified trainers, although the process was
hindered by resource constraints. Modern training facilities are
equipped with new computers, and the prison also offered some
educational and literacy programs for prisoners.
Women were held separately from male prisoners. The prison's female
population was around 40 inmates, considerably less than the female
unit's full capacity of 200. Conditions for women were less severe, and
the facilities had running water.
The new maximum-security building has a separate section for
juvenile offenders between the ages of 16 and 18. Offenders younger
than that, along with children made wards of the court by their parents
because of ``uncontrollable behavior,'' were housed at the Simpson Penn
Center for Boys and the Williamae Pratt Center for Girls.
Domestic and international human rights groups were able to visit
the prison during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, police occasionally
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. In general the authorities
conducted arrests openly and, when required, obtained judicially issued
warrants. The law provides that a suspect must be charged within 72
hours of arrest. The Government generally respected the right to a
judicial determination of the legality of arrests.
Serious cases, including those of suspected narcotics or firearms
offenses, do not require warrants where probable cause exists. Arrested
persons appear before a magistrate within 72 hours (or by the next
business day for cases arising on weekends and holidays) to hear the
charges against them. Arrested persons may hire an attorney of their
choice, and the Government does not provide legal representation except
to destitute suspects charged with capital crimes. Some local legal
professionals and human rights observers believed that this lack of
representation risked hasty convictions on the basis of unchallenged
evidence, particularly in the case of poor or illiterate defendants.
However, there was no statistical evidence to indicate that this was
more than an occasional problem.
The Bail Act prohibits bail for repeat offenders and those accused
of certain violent crimes. Judges tended not to grant bail to foreign
suspects, particularly on more serious offenses, since the authorities
considered foreign offenders more likely to flee if released on bail.
Judges sometimes authorized cash bail for foreigners arrested on minor
charges; however, in practice foreign suspects generally prefer to
plead guilty and pay a fine rather than pursue their right to defend
themselves, given possible delays in court cases and harsh conditions
in the prison. Attorneys and other prisoner advocates continued to
complain of excessive pretrial detention (see Section 1.e.). The
Constitution mandates that suspects can be held for a ``reasonable
period of time'' before trial, giving considerable flexibility. It was
not unusual for a murder suspect to be held 2 years before trial and on
occasion up to 4 years.
The authorities detained illegal immigrants, primarily Haitians and
Cubans, at the detention center located off Carmichael Road until
arrangements could be made for them to leave the country, or they
obtain legal status. In the detention center, which can hold up to 600
detainees, women and men were housed separately. The highest occupancy
at any one time was approximately 350. Haitians usually were
repatriated within 48 hours, due to increased cooperation between
Bahamian and Haitian authorities and improved efficiency in processing.
In addition to Haitians and Cubans, immigration authorities also housed
illegal migrants from China, Equador, Venezuela, India, and Nigeria.
Average length of detention varied dramatically by nationality and
availability of funds to pay for repatriation. Cuban immigrants tended
to have longer stays that reached 7 months and averaged 3.5 months.
Many detainees were provided with food and other items by relatives and
friends on a regular basis, and those who can arrange and finance their
repatriation generally were deported much more quickly. Illegal
immigrants convicted of crimes other than immigration violations were
held at Fox Hill prison where they may remain for weeks or months after
serving their sentences, pending deportation.
Exile is illegal and was not practiced during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice.
Magistrate's courts are the lowest level courts and only handle
crimes with a maximum sentence of 5 years. Trial by jury is available
only in the Supreme Court, which is the trial court that handles most
major cases. Its decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal; the
Privy Council in London is the final court of appeal. The Governor
General appoints judges on the advice, in most cases, of the
independent Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
The justice system derives from English common law. The
Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
judiciary generally enforced this right. However, the judicial system
had a large backlog of cases, and delays reportedly lasted as long as 2
years. To reduce the backlog, the Government continued the process of
streamlining appeals, computerizing court records, and hiring new
judges, magistrates, and court reporters. The Supreme Court established
a task force to recommend further reforms in the court system and
published a report in 1999 proposing modifications in the system to
facilitate case flow management, including the disposition of cases
within 6 months of initial filing.
Despite these measures to improve efficiency, complaints persisted
of excessive pretrial detention, outdated record keeping, delayed
justice for victims, and a failure to update new laws in the books.
Some judges have been brought in from abroad; while familiar with
English common law, they lacked experience regarding local law and
procedures. There were isolated complaints of deviations from normal,
fair court proceedings--particularly in civil matters--but there were
no indications that this was a widespread problem.
In 1999 the final appeals court, the Privy Council, ruled that
death-row inmates appealing their sentences must be given the chance to
be heard by bodies such as the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Death-row
inmates have petitioned the UNHRC or IACHR, but the Government, while
it accepts the Privy Council's ruling, has not agreed that it will be
bound by UNHRC or IACHR recommendations.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such actions, and the
Government generally respected these prohibitions in practice. The law
usually requires a court order for entry into or search of a private
residence, but a police inspector or more senior police official may
authorize a search without a court order where probable cause to
suspect a weapons violation exists. Such an official also may authorize
the search of a person (which extends to the vehicle in which the
person is traveling) without a court order, should probable cause exist
to suspect drug possession.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and press, and the Government generally respected
this right in practice.
Three daily and several weekly newspapers, all privately owned,
expressed a variety of views on issues of public interest, including
varying degrees of criticism of the Government and its policies.
Foreign newspapers and magazines were readily available.
There is a government-run radio station and five privately owned
radio broadcasters. The country's sole television station, the state-
owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas, presented a variety of
views, although opposition politicians claimed, with some
justification, that their views did not receive as extensive coverage
as those of the Government.
The Government did not restrict Internet access.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedoms of assembly and association, and the Government
generally respected these rights in practice. Groups must obtain
permits to hold public demonstrations, and the authorities generally
grant such permits.
The law permits private associations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. There was no separation of church and State in the country,
and the Constitution explicitly calls for respect for Christian values;
however, there were no allegations of violations of religious freedom
during the year.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees.
There was no legislation governing the processing of asylum
seekers, and applications for political asylum were supposed to be
adjudicated on a case-by-case basis at the cabinet level. Trained
immigration officials screened asylum applicants, and the UNHCR
reviewed the interview records and offered advice on certain cases.
Local and international human rights observers criticized the
Government for failing to screen potential asylum applicants
adequately. These organizations claimed that some Haitians with a
legitimate fear of persecution were repatriated without having the
opportunity to make a claim for asylum. Although the repatriation
agreement between the Bahamas and Haiti expired at the end of 1995, the
Government continued to repatriate illegal Haitian immigrants based on
the terms of that agreement, and on December 20, the Bahamian and
Haitian governments signed an agreement to share repatriation costs of
illegal Haitian immigrants. They are all interviewed by immigration
officials and given the opportunity to claim asylum. The Government
signed a repatriation agreement with Cuba in 1998. The Royal Bahamian
Defence Force brings all migrants intercepted at sea back to port.
The Department of Immigration reported that 5,462 Haitian, 68
Cuban, and 74 Dominican Republic citizens had been repatriated, out of
a total of 6,368 repatriations. A total of 54 persons requested asylum
during the year, and of these, 2 were recommended for refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
The country is a constitutional, parliamentary democracy with
general elections at least every 5 years. An elected Prime Minister and
Parliament govern. The political process is open to all elements of
society, and citizens 18 years of age and older are eligible to
register and vote. Voting is by secret ballot. The two principal
political parties are the ruling Progressive Liberal Party and the
opposition Free National Movement (FNM). In May the PLP won 30 of 40
seats in the House of Assembly and formed the new government under
Perry Christie. The FNM won only six seats and independents won four.
Both the ruling party and the opposition name members to the upper
house, the Senate, in compliance with constitutional guidelines.
Although it does pass legislation, the Senate is primarily a
deliberative body that serves as a public forum to discuss national
problems and policies.
There were no legal impediments to participation by women in
government and politics. The 40-seat House of Assembly has 8 elected
women members and 7 appointed women Senators, including the President
of the Senate. Cynthia Pratt was the country's first woman Deputy Prime
Minister and first woman Minister of National Security. Women also
headed the Ministry of Transportation and Aviation, the Ministry of
Financial Services and Investment, and the Ministry of Social Services
and Development.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials
were very cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Government generally respected in practice the constitutional
provisions for individual rights and freedoms regardless of race, place
of origin, political opinion, creed, or sex. However, the Constitution
and the law contained certain provisions that discriminated against
women.
Women.--Violence against women continued to be a serious,
widespread problem. Government crime statistics did not separate
domestic violence from other incidents of violence. The Government
operated a nationwide toll-free hot line, with two trained volunteers
on each of the inhabited islands who were on call to respond in the
event of a crisis. Government and private women's organizations
conducted public awareness campaigns highlighting the problems of abuse
and domestic violence. In November 2000, the Department of Social
Services in partnership with a private company established, for the
first time, two safe houses to assist battered women. The Domestic
Court, which exclusively addresses family issues such as spousal abuse,
maintenance payments, and legal separation, continued to receive a high
volume of cases. The court can and does impose various legal
constraints to protect women from abusive spouses or companions. Rape,
including spousal rape, was a crime. Prosecutions and convictions on
rape charges were common and the maximum penalty frequently was
applied. However, advocates for women's rights saw a need to improve
the effectiveness of enforcement of the court's orders. They cited a
general reluctance on the part of law enforcement authorities to
intervene in domestic disputes and a lack of police training and
sensitivity in dealing with domestic violence. The police recognized
domestic violence as a high priority and provided specialized training
to several hundred officers in mandatory classes for all incoming
officers as well as in ongoing training. Women's rights activists noted
the new training the police had received and believed that it was a
positive development.
The Constitution discriminates against women by not providing them
with the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their foreign-
born spouses. The law also makes it easier for men with foreign spouses
to confer citizenship on their children than for women with foreign
spouses. Some inheritance laws also favored men over women. For
example, when a person dies without a will, the estate passes to the
oldest legitimate son, or in cases where there is no son, the closest
legitimate male relative. Prominent women of all political persuasions
continued to push for an amendment to the Constitution and related laws
to redress this situation. In 2001 Parliament passed legislation to
amend the Constitution and eliminate this discrimination; however, the
amendment (along with four other proposed constitutional changes) was
defeated soundly in a referendum after the PLP and much of the local
religious community opposed it. The Government promised to consult with
the citizens before again moving forward with this legislation, but no
firm timetable had been established to do so.
Women participated fully in society and were well represented in
the business and professional sectors.
Children.--The Government claimed child welfare and education are a
priority but they lacked sufficient funding. The public schools, in
particular, lacked basic educational materials, and facilities were
overcrowded and substandard. Public education was compulsory for
children through the age of 16, and most children attended school until
this age.
Both the Government and civic organizations conducted intensive
public education programs aimed at the problem of child abuse and
appropriate parenting behavior; however, child abuse and neglect
remained serious problems. In 2001 there were 101 reports of sexual
abuse of minors, 13 reports of incest, 18 reports of physical abuse, 83
reports of child neglect, and 9 cases of child abandonment. More recent
statistics were unavailable.
The law requires that all persons who have contact with a child
they believe to be abused sexually report their suspicions to the
police. However, the same reporting requirement does not apply to cases
of physical abuse, which health care professionals believe occurred
quite frequently. The police referred reported cases of sexual and
physical abuse to the Department of Social Services, which investigates
them and can bring criminal charges against perpetrators. The
Department may remove children from abusive situations if the court
deems it necessary. The highly publicized death of a 4-year-old boy,
and subsequent arrest of his father, focused renewed attention on this
issue.
Persons with Disabilities.--Although the 1973 National Building
Code mandates certain accommodations for persons with physical
disabilities in new public buildings, the authorities rarely enforced
this requirement. There was no overarching disability act. There were
housing units in Nassau designed specifically for persons with
disabilities, but very few buildings and public facilities were
accessible to persons with disabilities. The code also failed to
mandate accommodations in new private buildings, which often lacked
accessibility as well. Advocates for persons with disabilities
complained of widespread job discrimination and general apathy on the
part of private employers and political leaders toward their need for
training and equal opportunity. They noted that there was no general
legislation to implement and enforce equal opportunity policies in the
workplace, educational institutions, or elsewhere.
The Disability Affairs Unit of the Ministry of Social Development
and National Insurance worked with the Bahamas Council for Disability,
an umbrella organization of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that
offered services for persons with disabilities, to provide a
coordinated public and private sector approach to the needs of persons
with disabilities. A mix of government and private residential and
nonresidential institutions provided a range of education, training,
counseling, and job placement services for adults and children with
both physical and mental disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Unofficial estimates suggest
that between 20 and 25 percent of the population are Haitians or
citizens of Haitian descent, making them the largest and most visible
ethnic minority in the islands. While 30,000 to 40,000 Haitian citizens
resided in the country legally, some observers believed that similarly
large numbers were in the country illegally. Haitian children were
granted access to education and social services. Children born of non-
Bahamian parents or to a Bahamian mother with a non-Bahamian father in
the Bahamas do not automatically acquire citizenship.
Although Haitians and Bahamians of Haitian descent generally were
well integrated into society, interethnic tensions and inequities
persisted. Some members of the Haitian community complained of
discrimination in the job market, and resentment of continued Haitian
immigration was widespread. However, reports of ethnic violence or
blatant discrimination against legally resident Haitians were scarce.
Some leaders of the Haitian community approved of the Government's
approach to the repatriation of illegal migrants and pointed to the
high number of ethnic Haitians in the public service.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides labor
unions with the right of free assembly and association, and the
Government generally respected these rights in practice. Private sector
and most public sector workers may form or join unions without prior
approval. Members of the police force, defense force, fire brigade, and
prison guards may not organize or join unions. Workers exercised the
right of association extensively, with almost one-quarter of the work
force (and 80 percent of the workers in the important hotel industry)
belonging to unions.
Three major umbrella labor organizations--the National Workers
Council of Trade Unions and Associations, the Trade Union Congress, and
the National Congress of Trade Unions--along with individual labor
unions, all functioned independently of government or political party
control.
The Constitution and the Industrial Relations Act prohibit
antiunion discrimination by employers. The act requires employers to
recognize trade unions, and it requires the reinstatement of workers
fired for union activities. Employers may dismiss workers in accordance
with applicable contracts, which generally require some severance pay.
The Government enforced labor laws and regulations uniformly throughout
the country.
In order to resolve trade disputes more quickly, in 1996 Parliament
amended the Industrial Relations Act to establish an industrial
tribunal. According to the act, labor disputes first are filed with the
Ministry of Labor and then, if not resolved, are turned over to the
tribunal. The tribunal follows normal court procedures for the
admission of evidence, direct examination, and cross-examination. The
tribunal's decision is final and can only be appealed in court on a
strict question of law. Some employers complained that the industrial
tribunal was biased unfairly in favor of employees.
All labor unions have the right to maintain affiliations with
international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers freely
exercised their right to organize and participate in collective
bargaining, which the law protects. Unions and employers negotiated
wage rates without government interference.
The Industrial Relations Act requires that, before a strike begins,
a simple majority of a union's membership must vote in favor of a
motion to strike. The Department of Labor must supervise the vote.
Workers have the right to strike, and it was generally respected in
practice; however, the Government has the right to intervene in the
national interest to assure delivery of essential services. Unions
threatened several work stoppages against both public and private
employers during the year.
Freeport was a specially designated free trade zone. Labor law and
practice in this zone do not differ from those in the rest of the
country. However, human rights advocates asserted that the Port
Authority has allowed the Hong Kong-based company Hutchinson-Whampoa,
which owned the harbor, airport, and many major hotels in Freeport, to
discourage unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor by all persons, including children,
and such labor did not exist in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 14 for industrial work or work during school hours. Children under
the age of 16 may not work at night. There was no legal minimum age for
employment in other sectors, and some children worked part time in
light industry and service jobs. On June 14, the Government ratified
the International Labor Organization's Convention 182 on elimination of
the worst forms of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Minimum Wage Act, passed in
December 2001, established a minimum wage for the private sector of
$3.50 (B$3.50) an hour or $150 (B$150) a week for the first time. In
2000 the Government established a minimum wage of $4.66 (B$4.66) per
hour for all hourly and temporary workers throughout the public sector.
In view of the high cost of living, these minimum wages did not provide
more than a subsistence living for a worker and family. The act reduces
the regular workweek from 48 hours to 40 hours, provides for one 24-
hour rest period, and requires overtime payment (time and a half) for
hours beyond the standard.
The Ministry of Labor was responsible for enforcing labor laws and
has a team of inspectors who conduct on-site visits to enforce
occupational health and safety standards and investigate employee
concerns and complaints; however, inspections occurred infrequently.
The Ministry normally announced inspection visits in advance, and
employers generally cooperated with inspectors to implement safety
standards.
The national insurance program compensates workers for work-related
injuries. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to find
suitable alternative employment for employees injured on the job but
still able to work. The law does not provide a right for workers to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code bans
prostitution and prohibits the detention of persons against their will
and for immoral purposes. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country, and the Government
did not prosecute any cases against traffickers.
__________
BARBADOS
Barbados is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty,
parliamentary form of government and is a member of the Commonwealth of
Nations. The Queen was head of state and was represented by an
appointed Governor General. Prime Minister Owen Arthur of the Barbados
Labour Party (BLP) was the head of government and governed with an
appointed cabinet. The judiciary was generally independent.
The Royal Barbados Police Force was charged with maintaining public
order. The small Barbados Defense Force (BDF) was responsible for
national security and can be employed to maintain public order in times
of crisis, emergency, or other specific need; the BDF supported the
police during the year. Police occasionally committed some human rights
abuses.
The free market economy was based on tourism, services, light
manufacturing, and agriculture. The country's population was
approximately 275,000. The Government was the single largest employer,
employing about 21 percent of the work force. The economy contracted as
real growth declined by 0.6 percent, compared to a drop of 2.8 percent
in 2001. Tourism declined by 2.8 percent, compared to a drop of 5.9
percent in 2001. Crop damage resulting from tropical storm Lili, which
hit the island in September, contributed to losses in the agricultural
sector. The unemployment rate at the end of September was 10.3 percent.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. There were
occasional allegations of excessive use of force by police. Societal
violence against women and children were problems. Barbados was invited
by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and
inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment. The majority of
complaints against the police alleged unprofessional conduct and
beating or assault.
In March newspapers reported that four policemen allegedly beat
Colin Gaul, a Guyana-born Swedish citizen, and forcibly removed him
from a flight bound for Guyana after the captain of the flight refused
to take off with him on board. The press reported that Gaul, who was
traveling with his 3-year-old son, had complained loudly at having to
walk from the back of the aircraft to his seat near the front of the
aircraft, while other passengers with children seated near the front
had been allowed to board from the front of the plane. The airline told
the press that Gaul had been abusive on an earlier flight and cited
security concerns as a reason to remove him. After Gaul refused
requests by security guards and police to leave the plane, the
policemen allegedly grabbed him and punched him in the head with bare
fists and forced him off the plane. According to press reports, one of
the passengers who witnessed the incident gave a statement to the
Guyana Human Rights Association. The police conducted an investigation,
but no results were made public.
At year's end, assault charges filed by students at the University
of the West Indies against a police officer were still pending before
the High Court. These charges arose out of an incident in 2001 when
students barricaded the main campus road and clashed with police (see
Section 2.b.).
The police force has an Office of Professional Responsibility
headed by a superintendent to deal with matters of inappropriate police
conduct. Although Parliament passed a law in 2001 creating an
independent Police Complaints Authority to review complaints against
the police, this entity was not yet functioning at year's end.
Police procedures provide that the police may question suspects,
and other persons they hold, only at a police station, except when
expressly permitted by a senior divisional officer. An officer must
visit detainees at least once every 3 hours to inquire about the
detainees' condition. After 24 hours, the detaining authority must
submit a written report to the Deputy Commissioner. The authorities
must approve and record all movements of detainees between stations.
The authorities generally adhered to these basic principles, although
there were occasional allegations that officials used excessive force.
For a decade, the authorities have issued firearms to special foot
patrols in high crime areas in response to public concern. In 2000 the
Government created an armed special rapid response unit, which
continued to operate during the year. Aside from this exception, the
police force was mostly unarmed, in keeping with its British
traditions. In addition, the law provides that the police can request
the BDF to assist them when needed for specific periods of time. During
these times, such as the annual ``Crop Over'' carnival period, the
police and BDF may run joint patrols. In addition, the police operated
a mobile unit that could be dispatched as needed, including to the
tourism areas.
Prison conditions were inadequate. The sole prison (Glendairy) was
antiquated and overcrowded, with more than 700 male and 92 female
inmates in a 150-year-old structure built for 350 inmates.
There were separate areas for pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners at the prison; however, there was occasional mixing due to
space constraints.
There was a separate wing for female prisoners at the prison, and
there were separate detention facilities for boys and girls.
In March the Government discharged 8 of the 14 prison officers who
were suspended in November 2001 for the alleged beatings of 36 inmates.
The other six officers, including three senior officers, were suspended
with half-pay. A total of 9 officers faced over 100 charges, mainly for
assault, as a result of the alleged beatings. At year's end, the
officers were free on bail pending further court hearings.
The Government allowed private groups to visit prisons to ascertain
conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and requires detainees to
be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and the
Government generally respected these provisions in practice. Criminal
defendants had the right to counsel, and attorneys had ready access to
their clients.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it was not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it was generally free of intervention by
other branches of government.
The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, which consists of the
high court and court of appeal. The Governor General, on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the
leader of the opposition, appoints the Chief Justice and other judges.
Judges serve until the age of 65.
The Constitution provides that persons charged with criminal
offenses be given a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial court, and the Government generally respected
this right in practice. The judicial system provides for the right of
due process at each level. The law presumes defendants innocent until
proven guilty.
The Government provided free legal aid to the indigent, with the
exception of a limit of approximately $2,100 (--1,300) on expenses
incurred for appeals by death row prisoners to the Privy Council in
London. Two inmates challenged this limit and sued the Government on
the grounds that it effectively deprived them of their right to due
process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or
seizure, and the law requires warrants to be issued before privately
owned property may be entered and searched. The Government did not
interfere routinely in the private lives of its citizens.
The Government did not censor mail. However, the Government
restricted the receipt of foreign publications deemed to be
pornographic. Other foreign publications of a nonprurient nature were
allowed without restriction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. There were two independent daily
newspapers, both of which presented opposition political views. The
Government regularly came under criticism in the newspapers and on
daily call-in radio programs. There were six radio stations, two of
which were owned by the Government. The Caribbean Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) television service (the only television source,
excluding direct satellite reception) was government-owned. Although
CBC was a state enterprise, it regularly reported views opposing
government policies. The press remained vigorously critical of the
Government on a broad range of issues. The Government prohibited the
production of pornographic materials.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. Political parties, trade
unions, and private organizations functioned and held meetings and
rallies generally without hindrance.
The Public Order Act of 1970 requires police approval for public
assemblies, which was granted routinely.
Gatherings related to school activities do not require written
police permission. In March 2001, students at a demonstration at the
University of the West Indies barricaded the main campus access road
and clashed with police, who arrested several students, a clerk, and a
law lecturer. The authorities charged the students and lecturer with
impeding the public road access in violation of the Road Traffic Act;
lawyers for the students filed assault charges against a police officer
and also filed a constitutional motion asserting that statements made
by the Prime Minister prejudiced their chances of a free trial. At
year's end, the motion had not yet been heard, and all parties remained
free on bail.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
For more detailed information see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
Citizens and legal residents move freely within the country and leave
and enter it without restriction.
The Government had not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
did not arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have this right in law and exercised it in practice.
Political parties compete in free and fair elections by secret ballot
at least every 5 years. There were no impediments to participation in
the political process, and all citizens over the age of 18 may vote.
The Prime Minister exercised executive power along with the Cabinet of
Ministers that he appoints, balanced by the bicameral Parliament and
the judicial system. In the 1999 elections, the BLP won a decisive
victory, gaining a 26-to-2 majority over the Democratic Labour Party.
There were no legal impediments to the participation of women and
minorities in government or politics. There were four female Senators
and four female members of the Cabinet, including the Deputy Prime
Minister, who served concurrently as Foreign Minister, and the Attorney
General.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local groups involved with human rights operated freely and without
government hindrance. The Caribbean Human Rights Network, a Caribbean-
wide human rights organization that had its headquarters and a small
staff in Barbados, disbanded in March 2001 due to a lack of funding.
The Government Ombudsman's office hears complaints against
government offices for alleged injuries or injustices resulting from
administrative conduct. The Governor General appoints the Ombudsman on
the recommendation of the Prime Minister in consultation with the
Leader of the Opposition; Parliament must approve the appointment. The
Ombudsman serves until age 65 but may be extended for an additional 5
years. The office was prohibited from involvement in policy issues
involving foreign affairs, immigration questions, and certain other
matters. The office did investigate complaints of inappropriate
behavior by police. The Ombudsman's reports were submitted to
Parliament.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law,
regardless of race, religion, or sex. The Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
Women.--Violence and abuse against women continued to be
significant social problems. In 2001 there were 71 cases of rape
reported to the police; more recent figures were not available. Spousal
abuse remained a significant criminal activity during the year. Spousal
rape, as distinguished from spousal abuse and domestic violence, is not
specifically mentioned in the criminal statutes but was addressed as
part of British common law, which generally was followed in the
country.
The Domestic Violence Law specifies the appropriate police response
to domestic violence; it is intended to protect all members of the
family, including men and children. It applies equally to marriages and
to common law relationships. Criminal penalties for violent crimes were
the same regardless of the sex of the offender or the victim; however,
in practice female offenders usually received lighter sentences than
their male counterparts for similar offenses. The courts heard a number
of cases of domestic violence against women involving assault or
wounding. Victims may request restraining orders, which the courts
often issue. The courts can sentence an offender to jail for breaching
such an order. The police had a Victim Support Unit, made up of
civilians and volunteers, who offered support to victims, particularly
female victims, of violent crimes.
There were public and private counseling services for victims of
domestic violence, rape, and child abuse. The Business and Professional
Women's Club ran a crisis center staffed by 30 trained counselors and
provided legal and medical referral services. The center also had a hot
line for clients who wished to maintain their anonymity. The Government
funded a shelter for battered women, which accommodates 20 women and
children; nongovernmental organizations operated it. The shelter
offered psychological and physiological counseling by trained
counselors to victims of domestic violence. The counselors accompanied
victims to the hospital and other agencies if necessary. In the first 8
months of the year, the shelter assisted 36 women and 34 children; the
maximum stay was 3 months.
Prostitution is illegal, but it was a problem, fueled by poverty
and tourism.
Government statistics showed that women bore a greater share of the
unemployment burden than men; the unemployment rate for women was 12.6
percent at the end of 2001, compared to a rate of 9.8 percent for men.
Sexual harassment in the workplace was a problem, but no statistics
were available. Draft legislation aimed at preventing sexual harassment
in the workplace was under discussion in connection with other
proposals to harmonize labor legislation among the Caribbean nations.
In addition, the Barbados Workers Union continued to seek guidelines on
sexual harassment in contracts and agreements it concluded with
employers.
Women actively participated in all aspects of national life and
were well represented at all levels of both the public and private
sectors. They headed 44 percent of all households and were not
discriminated against in public housing or other social welfare
programs. A Poverty Eradication Fund focused on encouraging
entrepreneurial activities to increase employment for women and youth.
Women owned approximately 30 percent of all businesses in the Small
Business Association and carried in excess of 70 percent of the recent
mortgages in the country. The Government reported that the number of
female applicants for the police force as well as for other jobs
traditionally held by men increased dramatically during the year.
The National Organization of Women was an affiliate of the
Caribbean Women's Association, a regional women's organization.
Children born overseas and out of wedlock to Barbadian men are
considered citizens. Previously, Barbadian women married to non-
Barbadian men were unable to confer citizenship on their children. A
2000 law, retroactive to the date of independence in 1966, provides
that a child born to a male or female citizen has immediate
citizenship.
Children.--The Government was committed to children's human rights
and welfare, although violence and abuse against children remained
serious problems. The Government provided for compulsory education
until the age of 16. The national health insurance program provided
children with free medical and dental services for most medical
conditions. The Child Care Board had a mandate for the care and
protection of children. This involved investigating day care centers,
cases of child abuse or child labor, the provision of counseling
services, residential placement, and foster care. The Welfare
Department offered counseling on a broad range of family-related
issues, and the Child Care Board conducted counseling for child abuse
victims.
The press reported that there was an increase in the number of
complaints of rape of girls under 16 years old. According to the media,
police officials were concerned that children had become targets
because rapists saw them as less likely to be infected with the HIV/
AIDS virus.
Persons with Disabilities.--Other than constitutional provisions of
equality for all, there are no laws that specifically prohibit
discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment,
education, or the provision of other state services. However, the
Ministry of Social Transformation established the Disabilities Unit to
address the concerns of persons with disabilities and created an
advisory committee on disabilities. The Labor Department, a unit within
the Ministry that finds jobs for the disabled, has long advocated the
introduction of legislation prohibiting discrimination. In September
the Government issued a White Paper on Persons with Disabilities
outlining policies to facilitate the full integration and participation
in society of persons with disabilities.
In 2001 the Disabilities Unit found employment for 26 persons, of
whom 11 were hired on a permanent basis. In addition to the work
experience program, the unit announced plans to acquire two buildings
to be used for income generating activities and career counseling. In
2001 the unit began loaning wheelchairs to persons who otherwise would
have not had access to wheelchairs. Despite these efforts, in September
newspapers reported that a wheelchair-bound child with cerebral palsy
was unable to attend classes at her new school in the north of the
island because specially equipped buses did not run that far. After her
transportation problems were highlighted in the press, a local
charitable organization agreed to provide the necessary transportation.
In addition, the Government announced that the Transport Board had
purchased two adaptive buses and the disability unit purchased a 14-
seat bus capable of accommodating 8 wheelchairs.
The Government launched a well-financed fight against the high
incidence of HIV/AIDS. In addition to actions designed to limit the
spread of the disease, the Government initiated programs designed to
assist persons living with HIV/AIDS and to discourage discrimination
against infected persons. The Elroy Phillips Center, a residence
facility for persons with HIV/AIDS, was in its 7th year of operation.
While there is no legislation mandating provision of accessibility
to public thoroughfares or public or private buildings, the Town and
Country Planning Department set provisions for all public buildings to
include accessibility to persons with disabilities. As a result, the
majority of new buildings had ramps, reserved parking, and special
sanitary facilities for such persons.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers freely exercised their right
to form and belong to trade unions and to strike. Approximately 30
percent of the labor force belonged to trade unions. Overall union
membership declined slightly during the year due to job losses in some
industries. There were two major unions and several smaller ones,
representing various sectors. The public service union, the National
Union of Public Workers, was independent of any political party or the
Government. Some officers of the largest union, the Barbados Workers'
Union, were associated personally with the Democratic Labour Party.
Most unions belonged to the Congress of Trade Unions and Staff
Associations.
Employers have no legal obligation to recognize unions under the
Trade Union Act of 1964, but most did so when a significant percentage
of their employees expressed a desire to be represented by a registered
union. While there is no specific law that prohibits discrimination
against union activity, the courts provided a method of redress for
employees who allege wrongful dismissal. The courts commonly awarded
monetary compensation but rarely ordered reemployment. Legislation to
address the union recognition process was still pending at year's end.
Trade unions were free to form federations and were affiliated with
a variety of regional and international labor organizations. The
Caribbean Congress of Labor has its headquarters in the country.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Normally,
wages and working conditions were negotiated through the collective
bargaining process, but in 1993 the Tripartite Prices and Incomes
Policy Accord established a 2-year wage freeze. Since then, negotiated
protocols contain provisions for increases in basic wages and increases
based on productivity. Protocol Four, which covers 2001-04, was
intended to encompass the needs of an increasingly global workforce as
the Caribbean nations move towards the development of a single market
economy and the free movement of skilled labor. It included an appendix
covering the treatment of HIV/AIDS in the workplace. These protocols
did not have the force of law.
The law accords full protection to trade unionists' personal and
property rights. All private and public sector employees were permitted
to strike, but essential workers may strike only under certain
circumstances and after following prescribed procedures. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the Better
Security Act of 1920, which provides that persons who willfully and
maliciously break a contract knowing that it would cause injury to
persons are liable for a fine or 3 months' imprisonment. The ILO asked
that the law be amended on the grounds that it could be invoked in the
case of a strike; the Government had not taken any action to do so.
In 2000 the nonunion Barbados Police Association supported the
police over unfulfilled promises of increased wages and increased
allowances. At year's end, the Government was still reappraising civil
service salary scales. The Government insisted that the police should
be included in this exercise and that they should not receive special
treatment. In the interim, in keeping with promises made by the then-
Attorney General, Parliament approved an allowance package for certain
ranks of the police force.
There were no manufacturing or special areas where collective
bargaining rights were legally or administratively impaired. There were
no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced, compulsory, or bonded labor, including by children,
and there were no reports that such practices occurred.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum working age of 16 was broadly observed.
Compulsory primary and secondary education policies reinforced minimum
age requirements (see Section 5). The Labor Department had a small
cadre of labor inspectors who conducted spot investigations of
enterprises and checked records to verify compliance with the law.
These inspectors may take legal action against an employer who is found
to have underage workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for and the
authorities establish minimum wages for specified categories of
workers. Only two categories of workers have a formally regulated
minimum wage--household domestics and shop assistants (entry level
commercial workers). Household domestics were entitled to a minimum
wage of $0.75 (BDS$1.50) per hour, although in actual labor market
conditions, the prevailing wage was triple that amount. There were two
age-related minimum wage categories for shop assistants. The adult
minimum wage for shop assistants was $2.13 (BDS$4.25) per hour and the
minimum wage for 16- and 17-year-old shop assistants was $1.97
(BDS$3.95) per hour. The minimum wage for shop assistants was
marginally sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family; most employees earned more. Some persons also
received remittances from relatives abroad or operated cottage
industries to supplement their income.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days, and the law
requires overtime payment for hours worked in excess. The Government
accepts ILO conventions, standards, and other sectoral conventions
regarding maximum hours of work. However, there was no general
legislation that covered all occupations. Employers must provide a
minimum of 3 weeks' annual leave. Unemployment benefits and national
insurance (social security) covered all workers. A comprehensive,
government-sponsored health program offered subsidized treatment and
medication.
The Factories Act of 1983 sets the officially recognized
occupational safety and health standards. The Labor Department enforced
health and safety standards and followed up to ensure that management
corrected problems cited. The Factories Act also requires that in
certain sectors firms employing more than 50 workers create a safety
committee. This committee could challenge the decisions of management
concerning the occupational safety and health environment. Trade union
monitors identified safety problems for government factory inspectors
to ensure the enforcement of safety and health regulations and
effective correction by management. The Barbados Workers Union accused
government-operated corporations in particular of doing a ``poor job''
in health and safety. The Government pledged to undertake inspections
of government-operated corporations and manufacturing plants, and the
Labor Department's Inspections Unit conducted several routine annual
inspections of such corporations. During the year, several workers died
as a result of cave-ins or falls while digging deep trenches. These
well-publicized incidents led to increased calls for more stringent
safety standards. Workers had a limited right to remove themselves from
dangerous or hazardous job situations without jeopardizing their
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons, although laws against slavery and
forced labor could be applied. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked to, from, or within the country.
__________
BELIZE
Belize is a parliamentary democracy with a constitution enacted in
1981 upon independence from the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister, a
cabinet of ministers, and a legislative assembly govern the country.
The Governor General represented Queen Elizabeth II in the largely
ceremonial role of head of state. Prime Minister Said Musa's People's
United Party (PUP) held 26 of the 29 seats in the House of
Representatives following generally free and fair elections in 1998.
The judiciary was generally independent.
The Police Department had primary responsibility for law
enforcement and maintenance of order. The Belize Defence Force (BDF)
was responsible for external security but, when deemed appropriate by
civilian authorities, could be tasked to assist the police department.
Throughout the year, armed BDF soldiers routinely accompanied police
patrols in Belize City in an attempt to reduce the worsening violent
crime rate. The police reported to the Minister of Budget Management,
Investment, and Home Affairs, while the BDF reported to the Minister of
Defence and National Emergency Management. The civilian authorities
maintained effective control of the security forces. Some members of
the police committed human rights abuses.
The market-based economy was primarily agricultural, although
tourism has become the principal source of foreign exchange earnings;
the country's population was approximately 250,000. There was a very
small industrial sector, comprised of limited agribusiness, clothing,
and boat manufacturing. The agricultural sector was heavily dependent
upon preferential access to export markets for sugar and for bananas.
In 2001 gross domestic product grew at an annual rate of 4.6 percent,
and inflation was minimal. The gap between rich and poor was not a
major societal concern.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Principal human
rights abuses included alleged unlawful police killings, brutality and
excessive use of force by some members of the police and prison guards,
poor prison conditions, allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention,
and lengthy pretrial detention, but the number of complaints of human
rights abuse decreased from 2001. Violence and discrimination against
women, abuse of children, and employer mistreatment of undocumented
foreign workers also were problems. There were reports of trafficking
in persons. Belize was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD)
Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
political killings by the security forces; however, there were some
alleged unlawful or unwarranted killings by the police.
On January 9, police found the bodies of Kirk Thompson and Edmund
Velasquez floating in the Old Northern River. Thompson and Velasquez
were suspected of murdering a police officer, a security guard, and a
businessman, and injuring another police officer. Several members of
the police told the press the two men would never be taken alive. An
autopsy found no signs of gunshot or puncture wounds and determined
that the two drowned with no sign of foul play. Despite the autopsy,
the victims' families and others remain convinced the police killed
Thompson and Velasquez.
On September 27, two forestry officials and two police officers
attempted to confiscate a quantity of illegally harvested mahogany at a
remote site near the Ke'kchi Maya village of Otoxha but were prevented
from doing so by the arrival of 30 Maya, armed with machetes. The Maya,
who had been hired to cut the timber, said that the police could not
take it because they had not been paid for their work; the police said
the Maya advanced on them in a threatening manner. Although the police
said they fired warning shots in the air, the police shot and killed
two Maya and injured three others. The Government paid compensation to
the families of the Maya who were killed and convened a Commission of
Inquiry to investigate. The Commission's preliminary finding was that
the police acted in self-defense.
On December 30, Albert Pennil was shot to death outside a
restaurant in Belize City. The next day police arrested three suspects,
one of whom was police constable Kevin Alvarez. In November 2001, the
authorities fired Alvarez from the police force after a number of
complaints about his behavior, including his alleged involvement in a
lethal shooting and a beheading, but rehired him early in the year.
Alvarez was expected to appear in court in January 2003.
In the September 2001 killing of Frederick Reynolds by police
constable Mervin Vernon, in August the Director of Public Prosecutions
(DPP) charged Vernon with manslaughter by negligence, and a trial was
expected early in 2003.
In the October 2001 death of George Michael Hyde, the Human Rights
Commission of Belize (HRCB) investigated and found the police action to
be justified. At year's end, the coroner's inquests into the February
2000 death of Kelvin Barrow and the March 2000 death of prisoner Cecil
Ramirez had been delayed because files were destroyed in a September
fire at the Magistrate's Court.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
On September 8, while on patrol, police constable Martin Castillo
and two BDF soldiers (on assignment with the police) kidnaped two men
in Belize City and turned them over to a suspected drug gang. Castillo
and the soldiers were arrested as they were on their way to abduct a
third person. The authorities charged the police constable with
kidnaping but dropped all charges against the soldiers after they
explained that they thought they were conducting legitimate police
business.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or other inhuman
punishment; however, there were several reports that the police and
prison staff used excessive force. Some of the most common complaints
received by the office of the Ombudsman involved alleged misconduct and
abuse by police and Department of Corrections personnel. The Ombudsman
reported that the number of such reports decreased; however, a number
of cases of alleged abused featured in the press were never reported to
the Ombudsman's office. The Ombudsman stated that police use of force
was appropriate in the majority of cases he investigated, usually due
to the complainant having resisted arrest, even if the level of force
used was sometimes excessive.
The Police Department's internal affairs and discipline (IAD)
section, the DPP, and the Ombudsman's office investigated allegations
of abuse by officials. According to IAD, there were 322 sanctions
against police officers for infractions during the year. The vast
majority of these were for petty offenses, with 190 for being absent
without leave. A small number of the offenses were more serious,
including two convictions for using unwarranted personal violence, two
for discharge of a weapon without cause, one conviction for negligent
use of a firearm, and three for permitting a prisoner to escape.
An Amnesty International study found that human rights violations
by police, the military, and prison guards were sporadic, but also
found a general lack of systematic investigation and judicial followup
when abuses were reported. In many cases, the Government ignored
reports of abuses or withheld action until the case had faded from the
public's attention, at which point no action was. Despite this
generally poor approach, the Government did take action in a small
number of cases.
On March 5, a four-person police patrol entered a store in Belize
City, assaulted the owner and a customer, and stole some money, an
event recorded on the store's surveillance system. The authorities
arrested the four police officers and charged them with theft,
conspiracy to commit theft, and two counts of common assault each.
On May 27, four inmates attempted to escape from Hattieville
Prison. They were caught and brought to a room in the maximum-security
section where prison officers beat them with batons and rifles, and
officer Ean Daley shot each prisoner in the upper thigh. Over the next
2 days, human rights groups reported that a dozen other prisoners were
severely beaten by guards. The authorities brought no criminal charges
against any guard but dismissed Daley, who had been suspended in 2000
for beating and shooting a prisoner. At year's end, the Ombudsman was
trying to convince the Government to bring charges against Daley.
In early December, a prisoner escaped from Hattieville Prison. He
was recaptured but was injured in the process. Prison guards George
Myvett and Joshua Trapp escorted the prisoner to a hospital for
treatment. While at the hospital, the two guards began to beat the
prisoner in front of witnesses. On December 17, the authorities fired
both Myvett and Trapp from their jobs.
In April police used force to break up a peaceful protest march.
Two civilians were shot, a number were beaten, and several hundred
affected by teargas; several police officers were injured by thrown
stones (see Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions were poor. Conditions at the country's only
prison, in Hattieville, deteriorated since it opened in 1993. Although
designed to house 500 inmates, it housed 917 male and 34 female
prisoners, resulting in significant overcrowding. In the remand
section, 151 detainees shared 13 15- by 20-foot cells, equipped with
beds for only a quarter of that number. The remand section flooded in
the rain, and the detainees shared one shower in an unlit room. Health,
hygiene, and nutrition were problems at the prison. The prison had a
medical clinic and nurse, but its budget for medical care was 26 cents
(Bz$0.52) per prisoner per month. Prisoners often had to pay for their
own treatment and medicine. The lack of a duty nurse on weekends
contributed to the diabetes-related death of a prisoner on July 6.
Meals were delivered to the prisoners in 5-gallon buckets on a
wheelbarrow, and prisoners ate in their cells--often next to uncovered
buckets used as toilets. These buckets were dumped into a ditch
directly behind one cellblock, contaminating ground water and creating
a breeding ground for insects.
Pretrial detainees were housed in overcrowded cells separate from
convicted criminals. The prison psychiatrist provided mental health
services; there was no separate facility for inmates with mental
illnesses. First-time offenders were housed in the same building as
those who committed capital crimes. Although the Assembly passed
legislation that would reduce the number of first-time offenders sent
to prison, the Government had only limited funding to support the
proposed changes, such as developing community service projects to
employ first-time offenders.
There were reports of physical brutality by prison wardens. Inmates
claimed that guards sometimes beat troublesome prisoners and placed
them in an isolation cell until their wounds healed. A common
punishment was placing inmates in an unlit and unventilated punishment
cell, and restricting their diet to bread and water. This cell was 8-
by 10-feet, and held up to nine prisoners for as long as 1 month each.
In addition, prisoners enforced their own code of conduct and attacked
prisoners convicted of particularly serious crimes, such as child
molestation. Incidents of gang- and drug-related violence in the prison
continued. Frequent prison breaks, confiscation of weapons, and reports
of beatings occurred throughout the prison's history. During the year,
prison authorities confiscated a large number of deadly weapons,
including machetes and makeshift guns.
The prison included a separate facility for women, located about
200 yards outside the main compound. Conditions in the women's facility
were significantly better than those in the men's compound. The 34
women held there occupied 17 cells; each inmate had her own bed. The
facility was clean, and inmates had access to limited educational
classes and vocational classes in computers.
The Government's efforts to rehabilitate prisoners decreased during
the year. Its Youth Enhancement Agency closed, and minor prisoners were
then housed in a separate boot-camp style section of the main prison.
Opportunities for work or skills training at the prison were extremely
limited. The prison's fish farm closed shortly after it opened due to
lack of funds, and inmates no longer worked at a nearby citrus farm.
Approximately 10 inmates took a welding class, a handful created mosaic
tiles, and a limited number of others were allowed to work outside the
prison, often in construction. There was a time-off program for good
behavior.
In August the Government privatized the management of Hattieville
Prison. The Government's Ministry of Home Affairs retained oversight
responsibility, but management was taken over by the nonprofit Kolbe
Foundation, created by members of the Prison Advisory Board and the
local Rotary Club. Kolbe's first acts were to streamline finances and
increase professionalism among the staff; by year's end it had acquired
beds for most prisoners, and had almost completed building a mess hall
and improving the kitchen. Kolbe believed it could improve the prison
by reducing endemic waste and corruption, and by using unpaid prison
labor on infrastructure projects.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government generally
observed these provisions; however, there were occasional accusations
of arbitrary arrest and detention.
Police were required to obtain a search or arrest warrant issued by
a magistrate in most cases. The only exceptions were in cases of hot
pursuit, when there was probable cause, or if there was suspicion a
firearm was present. Customs officers could search a premise with a
Writ of Assistance issued by the Comptroller of Customs. The law
requires the police to inform a detainee of the cause of detention
within 48 hours of arrest and to bring the person before a court to be
charged formally within 48 hours. In practice the authorities normally
informed detainees immediately of the charges against them.
Police were required to follow ``The Judges' Rules,'' a code of
conduct governing police interaction with arrested persons. In rare
instances, entire cases were thrown out when the Judges' Rules were
violated. More commonly, a confession obtained through violation of
these rules was deemed invalid. Detainees were usually granted timely
access to family members and lawyers, although there were occasional
complaints that inmates were denied access or denied a phone call after
arrest. Bail was available for all cases except murder and was granted
in all but the most serious cases. In cases involving narcotics, the
police cannot grant bail, but a magistrate's court may do so after a
full hearing. Detainees sometimes could not afford bail, and backlogs
in the docket often caused considerable delays and postponement of
hearings, resulting in an overcrowded prison, and at times prolonged
pretrial detention (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
Immigration violators ordered deported often spent months in prison
while the Government decided what to do with them. In April two Cubans
illegally entered Belize, falsely claiming to be U.S. citizens. They
were sentenced to 3 months in prison for immigration fraud; they
applied for political asylum, which was denied. Despite their prison
sentences having ended in July, the pair remained in prison until
December (see Section 2.d.).
The Constitution forbids exile, and it was not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice. In the past, judicial independence had possibly
been compromised because some foreign judges had to negotiate renewal
of their contracts with the Government, but judges now hold lifetime
appointments (until the mandatory retirement age of 65). Only one of
the four justices sitting on the Supreme Court was a citizen. There
were 17 magistrates with 2 vacant positions; only 3 of the magistrates
had a legal background. Every magistrate was a citizen. Most judges
were members of the civil service and were routinely transferred
between court and administrative postings. The few judges who were
trained in law spend most of their career as a magistrate, but the
majority were transferred on and off the bench. In May the Government
appointed a new Director of Public Prosecutions, and for the first
time, appointed him to the job for life. The DPP reported no attempt at
political interference in his job. The judiciary was seen as relatively
honest; one corrupt Supreme Court justice was impeached and disbarred
in January.
The judiciary consists of the alcalde courts (with jurisdiction
over small civil claims and minor criminal infractions), the
magistrate's courts, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and a
family court that handles cases of child abuse, domestic violence, and
child support. Those convicted by either a magistrate's court or the
Supreme Court may appeal to the Court of Appeals. In exceptional cases,
including those resulting in a capital sentence, the convicted party
may make a final appeal to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
Trial by jury was mandatory in capital cases.
Persons accused of civil or criminal offenses had constitutional
rights to presumption of innocence, protection against self-
incrimination, defense by counsel, a public trial, and appeal.
Defendants had the right to be present at their trial unless the
opposing party fears for his or her safety. In such a case, the court
granted interim provisions under which both parties were addressed
individually during a 5-day period.
Legal counsel for indigent defendants was provided by the State
only for capital crimes. In 1999 the Government appointed an attorney
to the Legal Aid Center to improve and strengthen legal aid services to
the public. Most defendants could not afford an attorney, and these
were convicted at a much higher rate than those with legal
representation. The Legal Aid Center's staff attorney handled up to 150
cases a year, leaving the majority of defendants unrepresented. The
judicial system was constrained by a severe lack of trained personnel,
and police officers often acted as prosecutors in the magistrate's
courts. At year's end, the DPP started hiring professional, full-time
prosecutors to replace the largely untrained and inexperienced police
prosecutors.
The family court is at the same level as the magistrate's courts;
however, trials in cases that come before the family court generally
were private. The convicted party in family court may appeal to the
Supreme Court.
There were lengthy trial backlogs in the judicial system. Routine
cases without a defense attorney were disposed of within 1 month, but
cases involving a serious crime or where there was a defense attorney
took up to 1 year. The Government briefly implemented a ``fast track''
trial court to cut the backlog, but the new Director of Public
Prosecutions discontinued this process as unconstitutional. Despite an
increase in serious crimes, poor case management, lack of attorney
discipline, unreliable witnesses, and several cases that had been
ongoing for years, the backlog of cases was shrinking.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respected these prohibitions, and violators were
subject to legal action. However, disputes regarding the Government's
exercise of eminent domain rights arose in the past and took some time
to resolve.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these provisions in practice. The Constitution also permits
the authorities to make ``reasonable provisions'' in the interests of
defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public
health. These provisions include forbidding any citizen to question the
validity of the financial disclosure statements submitted by public
officials. Anyone who questioned these statements orally or in writing
outside a rigidly prescribed procedure was subject to a fine of up to
$2,500 (Bz$5,000), or imprisonment of up to 3 years, or both.
A wide range of viewpoints was presented publicly, usually without
government interference, in 10 privately owned weekly newspapers, 3 of
which were owned by major political parties. There were no daily
newspapers. All newspapers were subject to the constraints of libel
laws, but these laws had not been invoked in several years. Newspapers,
especially the one owned by the opposition party, were routinely
critical of the Government without fear of reprisal.
There were 11 privately owned commercial radio stations, including
1 British military station that broadcast news directly from London and
other Caribbean nations. Popular radio call-in programs were lively and
featured open criticism of, and comments on, government and political
matters.
There were two privately owned television stations that produced
local news and feature programming. There were also several cable
television providers throughout the country that rebroadcast foreign
stations. The Belize Broadcasting Authority regulated broadcasting and
asserted its right to preview certain broadcasts, such as those with
political content, and to delete any defamatory or personally libelous
material from political broadcasts. While this right exists, it has not
been exercised in several years.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and for freedom of association, and
the Government generally respected these rights in practice. Political
parties and other groups with political objectives freely held rallies
and mass meetings. The organizers of public meetings must obtain a
permit 36 hours in advance of the meetings; such permits were not
denied for political reasons and were granted routinely in practice.
On April 24, over 200 people demonstrated against an increase of
bus fares in the town of Benque Viejo del Carmen. Police attempted to
disperse the crowd, with some police pushing the demonstrators, some of
whom responded by throwing sticks and stones. In the ensuing violence,
Corporal Thomas Flores shot and severely wounded two people at close
range with an M-16 rifle, and police beat a number of people and
indiscriminately fired tear gas. The tear gas affected as many as 300
persons, including 60 elementary school students in a classroom. A
police investigation found several officers used excessive force, but
no criminal charges were filed against the police. Several protesters
were charged, but their cases were postponed indefinitely.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
The law provides for granting of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Until closing its Refugee Department in
1999, the Government cooperated directly with the office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Since then, the UNHCR relied
upon a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) to monitor the status
of asylees and to represent its interests. It was unclear how many
outstanding refugee or asylum claims there were as of year's end. Of
the 39 cases pending from 2001, several became Belizean residents,
mostly through marriage, and others left the country. There were 18 new
cases during the year. The Government has not recognized any individual
as a refugee since 1997 and had no procedure in place to accept or
resettle refugees.
The Government last honored the principle of first asylum in the
case of four persons in 1995.
Since 1999 the Government has not accepted asylum applications, and
there was no mechanism to adjudicate asylum requests, nor any
legislation that formalized the asylum process. An eligibility
committee was reestablished early in the year and met once to discuss
procedures, but no subsequent meetings were held. In April two Cubans
applied for asylum. Lacking a formal mechanism to review their claim,
the case went before the Supreme Court, which denied asylum. The
Government could not afford to deport the two, so they remained
incarcerated at Hattieville Prison, even though they were no longer
serving any sentence (see Section 1.d.). In December the Government
released them and ordered them to leave the country with another group
of Cubans who had been denied asylum by the Magistrate's Court. The
refugees requested they not be returned to Cuba, so instead the
Government allowed them to depart the country by sea, possibly in boats
donated by a local businessman. None of the Cubans had valid travel
documents, and their destination was unknown.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The country is a democracy governed by a national
assembly with executive direction from a cabinet of ministers headed by
Prime Minister Said Musa. The law requires national elections every 5
years. The Government changed hands in August 1998 when the PUP won 26
of 29 seats in the House of Representatives in generally free and fair
elections.
All elections were held by secret ballot, and suffrage was
universal for citizens 18 years of age and older. National political
parties included the People's United Party, the United Democratic Party
(UDP), and the National Alliance for Belizean Rights. Another political
party, calling itself ``We the People,'' was formed in 2001 and planned
to field a full slate of candidates in the next election. The country's
ethnic diversity was reflected in each party's membership.
No laws impeded participation of women in politics, and 82 percent
of both men and women were registered to vote. There were three women
in the House of Representatives; two were elected Representatives and
the other was appointed to serve as Speaker of the House. There were 5
women in the 12-member appointed Senate, and another woman served as
president of the Senate. There was one woman in the Cabinet, and five
women were chief executive officers of ministries. The Chief Elections
Officer was also a woman.
There were no laws impeding participation by indigenous persons or
minority groups in politics. There were Mestizo, Creole, Maya, and
Garifuna representatives in the National Assembly. Voter registration
and participation were not tracked by ethnicity; however, there were no
complaints or reports of electoral discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups generally operated
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials were usually
cooperative and responsive to their views. The main limitation on human
rights monitoring was the limited number of NGOs in the country and
their problems attracting funding.
The Human Rights Commission of Belize (HRCB), an NGO affiliated
with regional human rights organizations and partly funded by the
UNHCR, operated without government restriction on a wide range of
issues, including migrant and agricultural workers' rights and cases of
alleged police abuse. The HRCB published human rights complaints and
urged police and other governmental bodies to act upon them. The HRCB
gained prominence through media reports about its workshops and
seminars that educate citizens about human rights.
In 1999 the Government created the position of Ombudsman to act as
a check against governmental abuses. The Ombudsman stated in his third
annual report that he received 334 formal complaints between April 2001
and March. While most complaints were against the Government, a number
were against private entities. There were 109 complaints against the
Police Department; 65 regarding the Lands Department; followed by the
Department of Corrections with 25 complaints; and the Family Courts
with 15 complaints. The Ombudsman received an average of five
complaints of human rights violations each month, a number that
decreased over the last 2 years. The Ombudsman investigated the
majority of these cases and published his findings on many of them in
the annual reports.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, place of
origin, political opinion, color, creed, or sex. The country is
multiracial and multiethnic, and discrimination was rare, although
ethnic tension, particularly resentment of recently arrived Central
American and Asian immigrants, continued to be a problem. The
Government continued to reserve certain professions for citizens,
granting permits and licenses to noncitizens only in specific cases.
These occupations included fishing, souvenir manufacturing, sightseeing
tours, accounting, insurance, real estate, and legal services.
Women.--Domestic violence against women was a worsening problem.
The Family Violence Unit of the police recorded approximately 1,000
instances of domestic violence against women during the year. Two-
thirds of the reported cases were from Belize City, the country's only
urban center, although the amount of violence may have been
underreported in other parts of the country where persons were
reluctant to discuss or report it. A shelter for battered women offered
short-term housing. The Belize Organization for Women and Development,
an NGO, advised women on their rights and provided counseling.
Laws prohibit rape and sexual harassment. The police and courts
began to treat rape more seriously than in previous years, but it was
still not a priority. The Magistrate's Court reported five convictions
for rape and one for attempted rape, with sentences ranging from 5 to
28 years. Arrests and convictions for rape were widely covered in the
press. The police and courts more strongly enforced statutory rape
laws, with 27 convictions. The Criminal Code prohibits marital rape.
Adult prostitution is not illegal, although the law prohibits
loitering for prostitution, operating a brothel, or for a man to
solicit for prostitution. The laws, which carry penalties of fines up
to $500 (Bz$1,000) or 1 year of imprisonment, were weakly enforced.
Several prominent brothels openly operated, and sex tourism increased.
Despite constitutional provisions for equality, women faced social
and economic prejudice. It was harder for women to find employment, and
in 1999 the female unemployment rate was 20.3 percent compared with 9
percent for men. Most employed women were concentrated in female-
dominated occupations with traditionally low status and wages. Although
there was no statistical support for the claim, it was believed widely
that women found it more difficult than men to obtain business and
agricultural financing and other resources. In recent years the
proportion of women in higher education increased, and 64 percent of
students at the University of Belize were women.
The Women's Department in the Ministry of Human Development, Women
and Children, and Civil Society is charged with developing programs to
improve the status of women. A number of officially registered women's
groups worked closely with various government ministries to promote
social awareness programs. There were no legal impediments to women
owning or managing land or other real property. Women were active in
all spheres of national life, but relatively few held top managerial
positions. However, women headed the Belize Business Bureau, the Belize
Citrus Growers Association, several prominent environmental NGOs, and
the Belize Rotary Club. The law mandates equal pay for equal work;
however, women tended to earn less than men; in 1999 the median monthly
income for a working woman was $290 (Bz$580) compared to $317 (Bz$634)
for a man.
Children.--Education is compulsory for children between the ages of
5 and 15. After children finish their primary education, they may enter
a secondary school, the Government-run apprenticeship program, or a
vocational institution. However, these programs had room for only about
one-half of the children finishing primary school; competition for
spaces in secondary school was intense. Education was nominally free,
but various school, book, and uniform fees placed education out of
reach for many poor children. There were also many truants and
dropouts. Religious organizations administered a number of educational
institutions, including a majority of primary schools and the most
prestigious girls' and boys' secondary schools.
The Family Services Division in the Ministry of Human Development,
Women and Children, and Civil Society was devoted primarily to
children's issues. The division coordinated programs for children who
were victims of domestic violence, advocated remedies in specific cases
before the family court, conducted public education campaigns,
investigated cases of trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.), and
worked with NGOs and UNICEF to promote children's welfare. The National
Committee for Families and Children included a representative from the
Ministry of Human Development, Women and Children, and Civil Society.
Child abuse was not considered to be widespread or a societal
problem; the Family Violence Unit recorded around 100 cases of domestic
violence against children a year, nationwide. The 1998 Families and
Children Act allows authorities to remove a child legally from an
abusive home environment, removes the limit placed on child support
that a parent must pay, and allows men to file for support, as well as
women. It requires parents to maintain and support children until they
reach the age of 18, compared with the previous law's mandate of
support until the age of 16. The law also accepts DNA testing as legal
proof of paternity and maternity. It requires that all adoptions be
reported to the Human Development Department of the Ministry of Human
Development, Women and Children, and Civil Society, and that
prospective parents be screened before they may adopt a child. In
January the Minister enacted a statutory instrument to strengthen the
Families and Children Act to help prevent child abuse and aid
prosecution. The National Organization for the Prevention of Child
Abuse and Neglect (NOPCAN) instituted a nationwide telephone help line
to encourage discourse and reduce abuse.
A practice that occurred throughout the country was that of parents
selling their female children to an older man, often a friend of the
family (see Section 6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The law does not provide specifically
for accessibility for persons with disabilities or prohibit job
discrimination against them. The Government's Disability Services Unit,
as well as a number of NGOs, such as the Belize Association of and for
Persons with Disabilities and the Belize Center for the Visually
Impaired, provided assistance to such persons. Children with
disabilities had access to government special education facilities,
although the requirements to enter such programs were strict.
Indigenous Persons.--Among the country's indigenous people, the
Mopan and Ke'kchi were grouped under the general term Maya, although
their leaders stated that they should be identified as the Masenal,
meaning ``common people.'' The Maya sought official recognition of
their communal claims to land, but the Government was reluctant to
single out one ethnic group for special consideration. The Government
designated 77,000 acres as 9 separate Mayan reserves; however, Mayan
leaders claimed that the Maya have an ancestral claim to a total of
500,000 acres. The Maya formed cultural councils and other groups to
advance their interests, sometimes with the collaboration of NGOs
concerned with environmental and indigenous issues. Several Mayan
organizations filed suit to force the Government to recognize the
Maya's ancestral land claims and to prevent further granting of logging
concessions on the disputed land. At year's end, the suit was still
pending in civil court.
In 2000 the Government and the Mayan People of Southern Belize (a
loose association of Mayan and nongovernmental groups) signed a
collective agreement to address the grievances set forth in a petition
by Mayan community leaders in 1998. The Mayan people live in the south,
the poorest region of the country and the area that received the least
government funding. On December 19, the Government signed an agreement
with the Maya Leader's Alliance to begin implementing phase one of the
2000 agreement.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--By law and in practice, workers
generally were free to establish and join trade unions. Seven
independent unions, whose members constituted approximately 11 percent
of the labor force, represented a cross-section of workers, including
most civil service employees. The Ministry of Labor recognizes unions
after they file with the Registrar's Office. Unions may organize
freely, and the law requires employers to recognize unions when a
critical level of membership is reached. The law empowers members to
draft the bylaws and the constitutions of their unions, and they were
free to elect officers from among the membership at large. Unions that
chose not to hold elections may act as representatives for their
membership, but the National Trade Union Congress of Belize permitted
only unions that held free and annual elections of officers to join its
ranks. Both law and precedent effectively protect unions against
dissolution or suspension by administrative authority.
Although no unions were affiliated officially with political
parties, several were sympathetic to one or the other of the two main
parties (the PUP and the UDP).
The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination both before and
after a union is registered. However, since 1989 the ILO has been
drawing the Government's attention to the need to ensure that workers
benefit from adequate protection against antiunion discrimination,
stating that the fine of $125 (Bz$250) does not exert a sufficiently
dissuasive effect against actions of antiunion discrimination.
According to the Trade Unions and Employers Organizations Act, any
worker who is a victim of antiunion discrimination can seek redress in
the Supreme Court with allowable judgments of up to $2,500 (Bz$5,000).
Some employers have been known to block union organization by
terminating the employment of key union sympathizers, usually on
grounds purportedly unrelated to union activities. Effective redress
was extremely difficult to obtain in such situations. Technically, a
worker could file a complaint with the Labor Department, but in
practice it was difficult to prove that a termination was due to union
activity.
Unions freely exercised the right to form federations and
confederations and affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining and unions practice it freely
throughout the country. Employers and unions set wages in free
negotiations, or, more commonly, employers simply established them. The
Labor Commissioner or his representative acted as a mediator in
deadlocked collective bargaining negotiations between labor and
management, offering nonbinding counsel to both sides. Historically the
Commissioner's guidance has been accepted voluntarily. However, should
either union or management choose not to accept the Commissioner's
decision, both were entitled to a legal hearing of the case, provided
that it was linked to some provision of civil or criminal law.
The law permits unions to strike and does not require them to give
notice before going on strike. However, this right was limited for
public sector workers in areas designated as ``essential services.''
Both the ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
have found the Government's definition of essential services to be
overly broad and an infringement on some workers' right to strike. The
Essential Services Act also empowers the Government to refer a dispute
to compulsory arbitration to prohibit or terminate a strike.
There was one strike during the year. On March 12, an estimated
2,500 members of the National Teachers Union held a 1-day strike in
Belmopan to protest low wages. The Government began negotiations with
the union and agreed to a pay raise in late December. In the year's
only other labor action, the Belize Agricultural Health Authority
(BAHA) held a ``work to rule'' protest the last week of November.
BAHA's workers were protesting management's refusal to recognize the
Public Service Union as the workers' representative, the unilateral
imposition of new employment conditions, and the termination of three
employees. The protest ended when management agreed to enter a dialog
with the union.
The Labor Code applies in the country's export processing zones
(EPZs). There were no unions in the EPZs.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution and
laws forbid forced, compulsory, or bonded labor, including that
performed by children, and it generally was not known to occur.
However, there were instances of Chinese migrants being forced to work
in local (Chinese-owned) sweatshops. Members of the East Indian
community also imported employees from India in effect as bonded labor,
holding their passports and paying less than minimum wage. In at least
one case, the employer arranged for an Indian employee to be deported
when the employee asked for his salary after 2 years' work.
The ILO Committee of Experts criticized a section of the Trade
Union Act that calls for the penalty of imprisonment (involving,
according to prison rules, an obligation to work) for an employee of
the Government, municipal authority, or any employer in charge of
supplying electricity, water, railway, health, sanitary or medical
services or communications who breaks a contract of service, knowing
that the probable consequence will be injury, danger, or grave
inconvenience to the community.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Act prohibits all employment of children under
age 12 and prohibits employment of children between the ages of 12 and
14 before the end of school hours on official school days. However,
there was a long tradition of children's employment on family farms and
in family-run businesses, which the law allows. The minimum age for
employment was 17 years for work near hazardous machinery. Inspectors
from the Departments of Labor and Education enforced this regulation.
A January 2001 NOPCAN report stated that child labor existed in
many forms in the Corozal district, with children working as shop
assistants, gasoline attendants, and cane farmers. In 1999 the ILO
estimated that 2 percent of children between the ages of 10 and 14 were
working. In the rural regions, children worked on family plots and
businesses after school, on weekends, and during vacations and were
involved in the citrus, banana, and sugar industries as field workers.
In urban areas, children shined shoes, sold newspapers and other small
items, and worked in markets. Teenage girls, many of whom were migrants
from neighboring Central American countries, worked as domestic
servants, and some were rumored to work as bar maids and prostitutes.
Other reported instances of violation of child labor laws were rare;
one report that received wide exposure involved the employment of 16-
to 18-year-olds in the Commercial Free Zone, an EPZ near the Mexican
border, where the teenagers reportedly worked during school hours and
for longer hours than allowed by law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was $1.12
(Bz$2.25), except in export industries, where it was $1.00 (Bz$2.00)
per hour. For domestic workers in private households and shop
assistants in stores where liquor was not consumed, the rate was raised
to $1.00 (Bz$2.00) per hour during the year. The minimum wage law did
not cover workers paid on a piecework basis. The Ministry of Labor was
charged with enforcing the legal minimum wage, which generally was
respected in practice. The minimum wage as sole source of income did
not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
salaried workers received more than the minimum wage.
The law sets the normal workweek at no more than 6 days or 45
hours. It requires payment for overtime work, 13 public holidays, an
annual vacation of 2 weeks, and sick leave for up to 16 days. An
employee is eligible for severance pay provided that he was employed
continuously for at least 5 years.
The exploitation of undocumented Guatemalan, Honduran, and
Salvadoran workers, particularly young service workers and some
agricultural workers, continued to be a problem. Health clinics in the
region reported that the most frequently treated ailments were
pesticide-related skin conditions. During the year, 200 families of
banana farm workers were given housing off the farms. The company that
buys all the country's banana exports built and donated the village of
San Juan to its workers. The Government provided land for the village
of Bella Vista, and the European Union provided water and electricity.
Local NGOs reported that banana workers no longer lived near where
pesticides are sprayed.
A patchwork of health and safety regulations covered numerous
industries, and the Ministry of Labor enforced these regulations to
varying degrees. Enforcement was not universal, and the ministries
committed their limited inspection and investigative resources
principally to urban and more accessible rural areas where labor,
health, and safety complaints had been registered. Workers had the
legal right to remove themselves from a dangerous workplace situation
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits certain types of
trafficking in persons, and there were reports that persons were
trafficked to the country. The Criminal Code does not specifically
mention trafficking in persons, but outlaws procuring for sexual
purposes. The Summary Jurisdiction (Offenses) Act outlaws maintenance
of a brothel, living off of the earnings of prostitution, and
solicitation. The maximum sentence for operating a brothel was a $250
(Bz$500) fine or up to 6 months in prison. The maximum fine for living
off of the earnings of prostitution was $50 (Bz$100) or up to 6 months
in prison. Enforcement of these laws was rare. Two brothel owners were
arrested during the year for employing foreign prostitutes, but they
were only charged for immigration violations.
The Ministry of Human Development, Women and Children, and Civil
Society, the police, and Immigration all have the authority to
investigate cases of trafficking in women or children. In practice,
Immigration handled most suspected cases of trafficking. On December 6,
Immigration raided a number of brothels in Orange Walk and apprehended
26 female immigrants working as prostitutes--23 from Guatemala and 3
from El Salvador. Most were legal residents; only three were found to
be illegally in the country and were deported. All were over 18 years
of age, and none complained of coercion.
In 2001 the National Committee for Families and Children (NCFC) and
UNICEF commissioned a study of sex trafficking, which concluded that
many minors were involved in the sex industry and that some women and
children were trafficked to Belize from other Central American
countries. NCFC's report found that approximately 35 percent of those
working in the sex industry were under age 18 (the Corozal region
ranked the highest, with 45 percent of sex workers reportedly being
minors), with the youngest girls being only 13 years old. The majority
of women working in brothels were from Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala; many had worked in the sex industry in their home countries,
but came to earn more money as a prostitute in Belize. According to
this report, very few claimed to have been coerced or tricked into
coming to the country.
In February International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), an
NGO, investigated sex trafficking in Belize and found reports of women
who were lured to the country under false pretences. The IHRLI study
cited two public health workers who believed that up to one-half of all
prostitutes had been tricked into coming to Belize. IHRLI also found
that the brothel owners kept the personal documents and passports of
many of the prostitutes to keep them at the brothels. The report
acknowledged that much of its information was anecdotal, from secondary
sources.
An NGO representative who distributed condoms and taught HIV
awareness in organized brothels reported that he had not met a single
prostitute who was coerced or tricked into coming to the country. He
believed most prostitutes were adults, with only an estimated 5 percent
being under 18, and reported that bar owners traded the women around
the country, but only with the women's consent.
The NCFC and IHRLI reports also found many instances of minors
engaged in prostitution with an older man, in some case of their own
volition, in others arranged by their family. These girls were
typically of high-school age, but some as young as 13 were reported,
and came from economically disadvantaged families. They provided sexual
favors to an older man in return for clothing, jewelry, or school fees
and books. In a limited number of cases where the Government attempted
to prosecute the men for unlawful carnal knowledge, these efforts were
usually stymied by the unwillingness of the girls' families to press
charges. In some cases, at least one of which involved a 13-year-old,
the family coerced the man to marry their daughter to avoid criminal
charges.
There were few confirmed cases of trafficking in children for the
purpose of prostitution. On May 3, police arrested Norma Patricia Moz
and John Majarrez. Moz, a recent immigrant from El Salvador, had
allegedly sold her 10- and 13-year-old daughters to elderly businessman
Majarrez for sexual purposes. A police medical exam confirmed that both
of the girls had been raped. Majarrez was charged with one count each
of carnal knowledge and indecent assault and two charges of common
assault. Moz was initially indicted for procuring, but those charges
were dropped in December.
----------
BOLIVIA
A constitutional, multiparty democracy with an elected president
and bicameral legislature, Bolivia has separate executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government, with an attorney general
independent of all three. President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of the
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) took office on August 6 after
he was elected by a joint session of the Bolivian Congress following
the June 30 national election, in which the MNR won a plurality of the
vote. The governing coalition controlled both houses of the
legislature. Coalition members held the top leadership positions in
both chambers. The executive and legislative branches suffered from
corruption and inefficiency. The judiciary, while generally
independent, also suffered from corruption and inefficiency.
The National Police have primary responsibility for internal
security, but military forces can be called upon for help in critical
situations, and this occurred during the year. The Judicial Technical
Police (PTJ) conducts investigations for common crimes (cases that do
not involve narcotics). The police provided security for coca
eradication work crews in the Chapare region, a tropical area where
illegal coca is grown. The Special Counternarcotics Force (FELCN),
including the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), is dedicated to
antinarcotics enforcement. The Expeditionary Task Force (FEC), a
military force composed of conscripts who had completed their
obligatory service and commanded by active duty military officers, was
disbanded in July. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective
control over the security forces; however, at least one member of these
forces was convicted of human rights abuses.
The country has a market-oriented economy. There is extensive
poverty, and 58.6 percent of the population of 8.3 million lived below
the poverty line. Many citizens lacked access to such basic services as
potable water, sewage, electricity, and primary health care. The
country is rich in minerals and hydrocarbons; however, most workers
were engaged in traditional agriculture, and many citizens were barely
linked to the cash economy. The Government remained heavily dependent
on foreign assistance to finance development projects.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Legal and
institutional deficiencies prevented the full protection of citizens'
rights. Security forces killed five protesters and injured dozens of
others in violent demonstrations during the year. Five members of the
security forces were killed and dozens of others injured, allegedly by
militant cocaleros (illegal coca growers). There were unconfirmed
allegations of torture by the police and security forces. There were
credible reports of abuses by police, including use of excessive force,
petty theft, extortion, and improper arrests. Investigations of alleged
official abuses moved slowly. Prison conditions were harsh, and
violence in prisons was a problem. At times police arbitrarily arrested
and detained persons. Prolonged detention due to antiquated procedures,
inefficiency, and corruption in the judicial system remained a serious
problem, although this began to change in 2001 with the implementation
of the new Code of Criminal Procedures (CCP). The Government enacted a
new Public Ministry Law to adapt the prosecutorial function of the
judicial system to the requirements of the CCP. There were reports that
the Government infringed on citizens' property rights. Other problems
included domestic violence and discrimination against women, abuse of
children, discrimination against and abuse of indigenous people,
discrimination against Afro-Bolivians, child labor, inhuman working
conditions in the mining industry, and trafficking in persons. Bolivia
was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to
attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul,
Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings committed by government
agents; however, security forces allegedly killed five protesters
during violent demonstrations. Most deaths and injuries occurred in or
near the Chapare where cocaleros often violently opposed the security
forces' attempts to enforce the law and reduce the illegal coca crop
that is used mainly to manufacture cocaine. Some human rights groups
blamed the forced eradication for the violence, and cocaleros demanded
its suspension, often by blocking a strategic highway used to transport
legal crops to market.
On January 15, violent protests erupted in the town of Sacaba,
Cochabamba, as police responded to cocalero protests against a decree
banning the transport and sale of illegal coca leaf from the Chapare.
Sacaba has a legal market for coca from the Yungas, and the market's
closure was not the intended object of police actions. However,
thousands of demonstrators entered the offices of the General Coca
Directorate (DIGECO) and the main market, setting fire to 25 vehicles
and damaging other property. Police responded with tear gas, rubber
bullets, and live ammunition. On January 16, violence escalated, and a
number of injuries were reported on both sides. Demonstrators Fidel
Montano Espinoza and Fortunato Markani Limachi were killed by gunfire,
but it was not clear who fired the shots. On January 17, cocaleros
again entered the coca market, and violent clashes ensued. The next
day, four members of the security forces were found dead. Police
arrested over 70 cocalero leaders in an attempt to quell the
disturbances; all were released shortly afterwards, but some complained
of mistreatment by police under the command of Colonel Eduardo Wayar.
At year's end, several investigations were underway to determine
responsibility in the various incidents.
On January 22, in Cochabamba, 67-year-old Filomena Soliz Terceros
was allegedly struck on the head by a tear gas canister fired by police
during a violent demonstration. Soliz apparently fled into the market
during the confusion, where she was struck by a projectile and rendered
unconscious. She was evacuated to Viedma hospital where she died on
January 27. Authorities investigated the case and concluded that her
death was accidental.
On January 29, in Sinahota, Chapare, FEC soldiers led by army
Colonel Aurelio Burgos Blacutt confronted a group of cocalero
demonstrators attempting to block the strategic Cochabamba-Santa Cruz
highway. According to reports, the FEC soldiers tried to disperse the
crowd by firing shots into the air. Other accounts state that the group
had just completed an uneventful march and were resting and chewing
coca leaves when the soldiers fired into the crowd and attacked them
without warning. According to some witnesses, Burgos aimed and fired
his sidearm directly at Marcos Ortiz Llanos, who died shortly after
being evacuated to Villa Tunari hospital. The witnesses also claimed
that Burgos beat them as they tried to render assistance to the
stricken Ortiz. The military investigated the shooting and exonerated
Burgos, concluding that the officer found Ortiz already wounded and
only gestured at him with his pistol while giving orders. The military
reported testing Burgos' weapon and determined that it had not been
recently fired, although it was not clear whether ballistics tests were
conducted. The Attorney General's office opened a parallel
investigation into the case but concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to bring charges against Colonel Burgos.
On February 5, in Sinahota, Roberto Vargas Villareal died of
cardiac arrest following his participation in a peaceful demonstration.
According to his family, Vargas was exposed to large quantities of tear
gas the previous day in Cochabamba during violent demonstrations. Some
individuals charged that the exposure to tear gas caused Vargas' death;
however, no medical examination corroborated their contention.
On February 7, Segindina Ichuta Mamani was struck on the head by a
rock as she traveled in an open truck along the Cochabamba to Oruro
highway. She died shortly afterwards from the injury in Oruro's General
Hospital. Although it was not established who threw the rock, some
individuals blamed Ichuta's death on the violence surrounding the
earlier police crackdown in Sacaba.
On October 6, near Ichoa Alto in the Chapare, a group of
approximately 300 cocaleros armed with stones and dynamite sticks
surrounded and harassed a Joint Eradication Task Force (FTC) group
engaged in coca plant eradication. The FTC security unit fired shots,
and cocalero Gabino Toledo was killed, and two others, Erasmo Aguirre
Aguirre and Diogenes Melgarejo Candia, were wounded. Cocaleros
reportedly did not allow officials access to Toledo's body for
examination. The cocaleros later pulled a nearby UMOPAR police officer
from his car, beat and then released him, and burned the vehicle. An
investigation determined that the police acted in self-defense; no one
was charged in the beating of the UMOPAR police officer.
There were several deaths due to violence in the prisons during the
year (see Section 1.c.).
In September approximately 1 year after the shooting death of Ramon
Perez, policeman Macarlo Wilfredo Beltran was tried, convicted of
``negligent and imprudent'' homicide, and sentenced. Perez was killed
when security forces fired shots at a group of protesters attempting to
occupy a camp for coca eradication workers near Loma Alta in the
Chapare. The judge who convicted Beltran suspended his 3-year jail
sentence under light conditions and restrictions.
In December 2001, FEC soldier Juan Eladio Bora shot and killed
Casimiro Huanca Coloque, a leader in the Chimore Coca Growers
Federation, during a confrontation between the FEC and cocalero
protesters seeking to block the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway. A second
protester, Fructuoso Herbas, was shot in the shin, resulting in the
amputation of his leg. A military court determined that security forces
acted in self-defense, and it did not charge Eladio Bora. However, the
court sanctioned his commanding officer, Lieutenant Heriberto Ramos
Salazar, with a 72-hour house arrest for failure to maintain
discipline. A separate civilian investigation by the Public Ministry
similarly concluded that there was insufficient evidence to charge
Eladio Bora.
In the case of Richard Cordoba, who died in February 2001 as a
result of asphyxiation through hanging while in police custody in
Cochabamba, the PTJ investigated, and the authorities charged at least
five police officers in the death. The trial was in its final phase at
year's end, and a verdict was imminent.
There was no progress in the November 2001 killing of 3 protesters
(Maximo Rojas, Abel Orozco, and Claudio Quiroga Herrera) and injury of
more than 13 others in violent clashes with security forces near Senda
Seis in the Chapare. According to the Government, a crowd of
demonstrators formed around security forces; the security forces first
fired warning shots and then, following training doctrine, fired at the
feet of the protesters. The Government theorized that several bullets
may have ricocheted and struck the demonstrators, causing the deaths
and injuries. Human rights organizations disputed the Government's
version of events, but public prosecutors concluded there was
insufficient evidence to charge any members of the security forces, and
no further action appeared likely.
In October 2001, Nilda Escobar Aguilar was killed near Los Amigos,
Central Isarzama in the Chapare, when she was struck in the head by a
tear gas canister during a clash between demonstrators and security
forces. The Attorney General's office continued to investigate his case
after receiving new information.
In connection with the November 2001 deaths of 7 persons and
injuries to 20 others in clashes between landless peasants and small
landowners in Pananti near Yacuiba, the authorities arrested nine
campesinos and eight landowners. In November a court in Tarija
convicted the landowner defendants of ``brawls and fighting,'' and the
judge suspended their 3-year sentences. A separate trial was scheduled
for the campesino defendants under the new oral arguments trial system.
Dissatisfied with the trial results and the Attorney General's
investigation, the NGO Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Bolivia
(APDHB) referred the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.
In December 2001, security forces and squatters clashed near
Yapacani, a town near the Chapare, reportedly resulting in injuries to
a number of police and squatters, and the gunshot death of one
civilian, Jose Luis Velazquez. Local police reportedly said that they
were attacked while attempting to lift a blockade, but a relative said
Velazquez was not involved in the protests. There were no further
developments in the case, and none appears likely.
The military justice system closed the April 2000 case against
Captain Robinson Iriarte Lafuente, who was videotaped in civilian
clothes kneeling alongside troops and firing a rifle during the April
2000 disturbances in Cochabamba.
There was no progress in the case of Miguel Angel Rivero Siles, who
died in 1999 from severe burns suffered in a solitary confinement cell
at San Sebastian prison in Cochabamba. Charges against police at the
prison remained pending at year's end.
The 1999 case of Carlos Freddy Cano Lopez, who died of burns after
his arrest, continued to work through the court under the old trial
system. Cano's widow continued to press charges against policeman
Carlos Balderrama and others implicated in the case. At year's end, the
Attorney General's office reported that the trial was in its final
stage.
There was no progress in the 1998 case of five civilian deaths in
the Chapare and further progress appeared unlikely.
There was no progress in the 1996 cases against officers accused of
responsibility for violence in countering a protest that resulted in
civilian deaths in Amayapampa areas of Potosi Department, and none
appeared likely. In December the Attorney General closed cases against
then-President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and other senior officials for
their alleged involvement in the cases.
The Government's delay in completing effective investigations and
identifying and punishing those responsible for either civilian or
security force deaths resulted in a perception of impunity. However,
the Congressional Human Rights Committee, the Ombudsman's office, the
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, and NGOs continued to press the
Government to expedite action in the cases.
There were reports of killings of government security forces by
nongovernmental actors. On January 17, during violent confrontations in
Sacaba, 4 members of the security forces were killed and approximately
60 more were injured in the days after the demonstrations. Army
conscripts Waldo Cartagena and Humberto Pinaya died from gunshot wounds
fired by snipers, and policeman Antonio Gutierrez and Army Second
Lieutenant Marcelo Trujillo Aranda died of strangulation and trauma to
the head. Their bodies showed signs of torture and appeared to have
been severely beaten by rocks and dragged approximately 2 miles to
where they were killed. The Government believed that illegal coca
growers were responsible for the four deaths, and investigations
continued at year's end.
On October 4, in Majo, south of Chimore, Marine conscript and FTC
member Robin Huanacoma was critically wounded when he triggered a
buried explosive booby trap while eradicating illegal coca plants.
Huanacoma was evacuated to a hospital in Santa Cruz where he died a few
hours later. Authorities suspected militant cocaleros of planting the
device and confirmed that some cocaleros received special training on
the handling of firearms and the fabrication of homemade mines from
individuals opposed to eradication. The case was under investigation at
year's end, but it appeared unlikely that those responsible would be
identified.
There was no progress in the investigation of the 2000 killings of
four security officials and the spouse of one security official who
disappeared in the Chapare during violent disturbances and were later
found tortured and killed. Another security official was still missing
and presumed dead. The Government believes that illegal coca growers
were responsible for the deaths of the security officials, but it
appeared unlikely that evidence would be found to prosecute a case.
On November 17, at Sindicato Los Yukis, near Yapacani,
approximately 30 armed and hooded men invaded a building of the
Federation of Colonizers and shot and killed campesino Luciano Jaldin
Fermin. A week later, the bodies of three other men (Ricardo Rojas
Caravallo, Martin Condori, and Wilber Nunez Flores) were found nearby
in the jungle; autopsies revealed signs of torture and strangulation. A
local landowner was suspected of hiring the gunmen who killed Jaldin;
however, responsibility for the killings of the other individuals
remained unclear, and the Attorney General's office was investigating
the cases at year's end.
There were several reported cases of alleged criminals lynched or
burned by civilians, sometimes resulting in death, for their alleged
crimes.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
On December 10, the President submitted a bill to Congress that
would make disappearance a crime punishable by up to 30 years in
prison.
The case of Juan Carlos Trujillo Oroza, who disappeared during the
1971-78 de facto regime of President Hugo Banzer, was reopened pursuant
to a November 2001 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, but further
developments appeared unlikely.
The death in mid-year of Hugo Banzer ended any further action on
the December 2001 international arrest warrant that an Argentine judge
had filed for the former president to face legal proceedings in
Argentina for his alleged role in ``Plan Condor'' in the mid-1970s.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
Government generally respected these provisions; however, there were a
number of allegations of torture, beatings, and abuse by members of the
security forces.
Security forces clashed with demonstrators on several occasions
during the year, resulting in the deaths of five demonstrators and
dozens of injuries (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). In January dozens of
protesters were injured during clashes between violent demonstrators
and government security forces in Sacaba. At least some of the injuries
were attributed to rubber bullets used by the security forces.
Investigations into these incidents were pending at year's end.
There were allegations that security officials beat cocalero
leaders whom they detained in Sacaba during the January disturbances
and that they beat other civilians to try to learn the names of those
responsible for security officers' deaths. At year's end, the Public
Ministry continued investigating the allegations to determine the
security units and commanders involved.
There also were credible allegations that military commissioned and
noncommissioned officers beat and otherwise mistreated military
conscripts. For example, Colonel Rory Barrientos, the Commander of the
2nd Ecological Battalion, allegedly beat conscripts in four separate
incidents but reportedly was only lightly sanctioned by the military.
In October the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH) sought
charges against Barrientos in a civil court, and the Human Rights
Ombudsman's office began an investigation into his actions. Barrientos
was suspended from duty and received unspecified sanctions from a
military court.
On November 10, in Cochabamba, army Major Luis Fernando Garcia, in
an apparently inebriated state, shot and wounded Jose Luis Alvarez,
whom Garcia may have misidentified for an assailant who had accosted
him earlier. Police arrested Garcia, who remained in jail at year's end
awaiting trial.
Pursuant to agreements with the Human Rights Ombudsman's office and
the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Armed Forces between
1999-2002 provided human rights training for 1,110 instructors and
approximately 30,000 recruits.
Several police officers were fired and charged for off-duty crimes,
and a number were dismissed for corruption. However, the police
generally did not investigate their own colleagues, and prosecutors
were reluctant to prosecute security officials for alleged offenses
committed while on duty. The FELCN internal affairs unit investigates
allegations against FELCN officers of malfeasance, wrongdoing, and
human rights abuses.
Approximately 6,000 FELCN members, PTJ members, lawyers, law
students, prosecutors, judges, and NGO representatives received
training on the new Code of Criminal Procedures over the last 3 years.
During the year, policemen and military officers received crowd control
training that emphasized respect for human rights and internationally
accepted principles of crowd control. FELCN officers also received
training over the last 3 years on human rights issues incorporated in
general counternarcotics training. Basic FELCN and UMOPAR training
includes a human rights module.
Indigenous communities in areas with little or no central
government presence imposed punishment that reportedly included the
death penalty for members who violated traditional laws or rules,
although the Constitution prohibits the death penalty.
In attacks on government security forces and coca eradication
crews, militant cocaleros killed five members of the security forces
and injured more than 70 others.
On September 3, near Guadalupe in the Chapare, approximately 70
cocaleros armed with weapons and dynamite confronted a FTC group
preparing to eradicate coca plants. Police fired tear gas to disperse
the crowd. In the ensuing skirmish, Fructuoso Apaza struck armed
policeman Silverio Chinchi Plata with a machete on the head and
shoulder, severely wounding him. The policeman was evacuated to a
hospital in Santa Cruz. Apaza, who suffered broken ribs during his
arrest, was charged with attempted murder; at year's end, he was free
on bail while the case remained under investigation.
On October 19, near Alto San Pablo in the Chapare, Army conscript
Jose Luis Aramayo suffered leg and abdomen injuries when his pick
struck a booby trap while he and his JTF companions were eradicating
coca. The JTF commander said that 12 such homemade mines were found and
deactivated in the area in previous weeks. Officials suspected
cocaleros of planting the devices, but it appeared unlikely that those
responsible would be found.
On November 16, during routine eradication activities, four Navy
members of the Joint Eradication Task Force were injured when a booby
trap exploded at an eradication site near San Pablo, south of Chimore.
Injuries to three of the eradicators (Armando Arteaga, 19, Aurleio
Sejas Soliz, 18, and Edilberto Gonzales Teran, 22) were relatively
minor, and they were treated at the eradication camp. The fourth, Juan
Marcelo Chicoba, 22, was injured more seriously and was evacuated to
Santa Cruz where he was treated and later discharged. Following the
incident, UMOPAR commander Hernan Capriolo said that 25 booby traps had
been deactivated in the area during the preceding 15 days. The Ministry
of government also said that some peasants in the Chapare had received
training by individuals opposed to anti-drug efforts, in the handling
of firearms and the fabrication of booby-traps.
Prison conditions were harsh. Prisons were overcrowded and in poor
condition. With the exception of the maximum-security prison of
Chonchocoro in El Alto, government authorities effectively controlled
only the outer security perimeter of each prison. Inside prison walls,
prisoners usually were in control. Violence between prisoners and, in
some cases, the involvement of prison officials in violence against
prisoners were problems. Corruption was a problem among low-ranking and
poorly paid guards and prison wardens. Detention centers, which are
supposed to house the accused prior to the completion of their trials
and sentencing (if convicted), also were overcrowded. Convicted
criminals often were housed in detention centers on a judge's orders
because of overcrowding in the larger prisons.
According to the Director General of the Penal System in the
Ministry of government, as of December, there were 5,535 prisoners in
facilities designed to hold 4,700 prisoners. Nearly 90 percent of
prisoners (almost 90 percent of them men) were held in prisons in the
major cities. The majority of all prisoners were held for narcotics
crimes. The Pardon and Extraordinary Freedom Jubilee 2000 Law, as
amended, reduced the overcrowding. The law pardoned prisoners under the
age of 21 or over the age of 60; reduced felony sentences by one-third
for all prisoners sentenced prior to August 2000; and pardoned
prisoners who are parents of minor children and have completed at least
50 percent of their sentences. Reductions in felony sentences were not
extended to prisoners convicted of murder, parricide, or treason, nor
to most prisoners convicted of terrorism, rape, or narcotics
trafficking. In addition, prisoners who were convicted of murder, rape,
kidnaping, terrorism, or narcotics crimes and sentenced to more than 10
years in jail were not eligible for the benefits given to prisoners
under age 21 or over age 60, or to parents of minor children.
A prisoner's wealth can determine cell size, visiting privileges,
day-pass eligibility, and place or length of confinement. Cell prices
ranged from $17 to $4,340 (130 to 32,500 bolivianos), paid to prior
occupants or to prisoners who control cell blocks. For example, in the
poorest parts of San Pedro prison in La Paz, inmates occupy tiny cells
(3 by 4 by 6 feet) with no ventilation, lighting, or beds. Crowding in
some ``low-rent'' sections obliges inmates to sleep sitting up.
Although only children up to 6 years old are supposed to live with an
incarcerated parent, children as old as age 12 live with their fathers
in San Pedro prison. According to the Director General, in December
there were 803 children living with a parent in prison. If such
children have nowhere else to go, the Government considers it more
humane to support them in prison than to leave them homeless. The
standard prison diet can cause anemia. The Government budgets only
$0.30 (2 bolivianos) per prisoner per day for food, and prisoners who
can afford to supplement the standard prison diet by buying food do so.
There was no adequate health care within the prisons, and it was
difficult for prisoners to get permission for outside medical
treatment. However, affluent prisoners can obtain transfers to
preferred prisons or even to outside private institutional care for
``medical'' reasons. Drugs and alcohol were readily available for those
inmates who can pay.
There was no progress, and none appeared likely in the following
prison death cases: The March 2001 hanging of Jose Valentin Mujica at
the maximum security San Pedro de Chonchocoro prison near La Paz; the
June 2001 killing of three prisoners at Palmasola prison in Santa Cruz
resulting from violence among inmates; the 2000 hanging of Brazilian
prisoner Mustafa Samir and shooting of Peruvians Omar Casis and Renaldo
Montesinos at San Pedro de Chonchocoro prison.
There are separate prisons for women; conditions for female inmates
were similar to those for men. However, overcrowding at the San
Sebastian women's prison in Cochabamba was worse than in most prisons
for men.
Convicted juvenile prisoners were not segregated from adult
prisoners in jails. Rehabilitation programs for juveniles or other
prisoners were scarce to nonexistent. The Government acknowledged these
problems but did not budget sufficient resources to correct them.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
observers and news media representatives.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were some
instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests were carried out
openly. The new CCP requires an arrest warrant, and the police must
inform the prosecutor of the arrest within 8 hours. The prosecutor
within 16 hours then must have the detainee released under bail or ask
a court to continue to hold the detainee in jail until trial. A
detainee may not be held for more than 24 hours without court approval.
However, there were credible reports that these legal safeguards were
violated in some cases.
Denial of justice through prolonged detention remained a serious
ongoing problem, although this began to change with the full
implementation in 2001 of the new CCP that provides that a detainee
cannot be held for longer than 18 months awaiting trial and sentencing
(see Section 1.e.). If the process is not completed in 18 months, the
detainee may request his release by a judge. However, judicial
corruption, a shortage of public defenders, inadequate case-tracking
mechanisms, and complex criminal justice procedures keep persons
incarcerated for months, or even years, before trial. The Constitution
provides for judicial determination of the legality of detention.
Prisoners are released if a judge rules detention illegal, but the
process can take months. Prisoners may see a lawyer, but approximately
70 percent cannot afford legal counsel, and public defenders were
overburdened (see Section 1.e.).
A 2001 report of the U.N. Committee Against Torture estimated that
two-thirds of the prison population were waiting for the processing of
their cases to be finished.
The Government continued to address the problem of delay of justice
by implementing the 1994 constitutional reforms to streamline the
judicial system and by taking measures to correct other deficiencies as
they come to light. Most prisoners still awaited either trial or
sentencing, but under the CCP the courts had begun to provide release
on bail for some prisoners. Judges still have the authority to order
preventive detention for suspects under arrest deemed to be a flight
risk or for obstruction of justice. If a suspect is not detained, a
judge may order significant restrictions on a suspect's travel.
Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in
children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their
protection, simply on the orders of a social worker. There is no
judicial review of such orders.
The 1997 detention case of Waldo Albarracin, President of the APDH,
continued to move slowly through the judicial system. The authorities
had yet to take any action regarding the four police officials accused
of abducting Albarracin; although legal cases against two policemen
remained pending at year's end, further action was unlikely.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the
Government did not employ it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary was generally
independent; however, corruption and inefficiency in the judicial
system remained major problems. Poor pay and working conditions made
judges and prosecutors susceptible to bribes.
The judicial system has three levels of courts: Trial Court,
Superior Court, and the Supreme Court or Constitutional Tribunal
appellate review. The Supreme Court hears appeals in general, while the
Constitutional Tribunal only hears appeals on constitutional issues.
With the full implementation in 2001 of the CCP, the criminal
justice system changed from essentially a closed, written system to a
system of transparent oral trials. The earlier system made it difficult
for poor, illiterate persons to have effective access to courts and
legal redress and gave rise to lengthy judicial processes and prolonged
pretrial incarcerations (see Section 1.d.). The CCP specifically
addresses this problem by requiring that no pretrial detention exceed
18 months. In cases in which a sentence has been issued, but the case
is being appealed, the maximum period of detention is 24 months.
The 2001 Public Ministry Law provides that the prosecutor, instead
of the judge, is in charge of the investigative stage of a case. The
prosecutor instructs the police, from the perspective of a legal
practitioner, as to what witness statements and evidence are needed to
prosecute the case. Counternarcotics prosecutors lead the investigation
of narcotics cases. During its first stage, the prosecutor tries the
case before a judge of instruction if it is a misdemeanor case (which
carries a possible sentence of less than 4 years), or before sentencing
courts that include three citizen judges (jurors) and two professional
judges for felony cases (possible sentence of 4 years or more).
The superior court review is restricted to a review of the
application of the law. Supreme Court review, the third stage, is
restricted to cases involving exceptional circumstances. During the
superior court and Supreme Court reviews, the courts may confirm,
reduce, increase, or annul sentences, or provide alternatives not
contemplated in lower courts.
Defendants have constitutional rights to a presumption of
innocence, to remain silent, to have an attorney, to confront
witnesses, to present evidence on their own behalf, to due process, and
to appeal judicial decisions. In practice almost none of these rights
have been protected systematically, although the implementation of the
CCP facilitated more efficient investigations, transparent oral trials,
and credible verdicts.
The law provides for a defense attorney at public expense if
needed; however, one was not always promptly available. There were
approximately 167 public defenders, legal assistants, and social
workers nationwide. The public defender program also provides
information about human rights to citizens and seeks to involve public
defenders in arrest cases at the earliest possible juncture to ensure
that human rights and due process are honored. Mobile public defenders
who travel to the more remote parts of the country had some positive
effect; however, public defenders remained overburdened.
The CCP also recognizes the conflict resolution traditions of
indigenous communities, but not the imposition of the death penalty
(see Section 1.c.).
The Judicial Council oversees the disciplinary aspects of the
judicial process and provides an impartial body to review the actions
of judges. Its powers include the authority to conduct administrative
investigations and to censure for malpractice judges at all levels
found culpable of malfeasance; however, the dismissal of a superior
court or higher level judge requires a final judgment and sentence of
conviction in a criminal case tried before the Supreme Court. The
Council may suspend without pay, for up to 13 months, judges against
whom a criminal charge has been filed or against whom a disciplinary
process has been initiated. At year's end, legislation remained pending
to give the Council the power to effect suspension of up to 3 years or
specifically to establish the Council's power to dismiss judges found
guilty of malpractice by the Council.
The military justice system generally was susceptible to senior-
level influence and corruption and avoided rulings that would embarrass
the military. When a military member is accused of a crime related to
his military service, the commander of the affected unit assigns an
officer to conduct an inquiry and prepare a report of the findings. The
results of the findings are forwarded to a judicial advisor--usually at
the division level--who then recommends a finding of either innocence
or guilt. For minor infractions, the advisor may recommend sanctions
such as house arrest or loss of time-in-grade (which delays promotions
and affects future assignments). For major infractions, the case is
forwarded to a military court (the permanent tribunal for cases
involving enlisted members and officers below the rank of general/
admiral and the supreme tribunal for generals/admirals and appeals of
cases from the permanent tribunal). General officers head both
tribunals. For the permanent tribunal, a judge advocate of war (usually
a civilian lawyer) reviews the findings of the advisor and may change
the recommendations of the advisor. The permanent tribunal usually
accepts the recommendations of the judge advocate of war. Authorities
recognize conflicts over military and civilian jurisdiction in certain
cases involving human rights. An inter-ministerial commission, headed
by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, was charged to prepare
legislation to address these conflicts as well as to incorporate
various international human rights agreements into domestic law.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of the home
and the privacy of citizens; however, while the authorities generally
respected these provisions, there were credible allegations of security
forces involved in thefts of property. Residents in the coca-growing
areas generally were reluctant to file and pursue formal complaints.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right to express ideas and opinions freely by any means of
dissemination; however, there were some limitations on freedom of
speech. Newspapers were privately owned and frequently adopted
antigovernment positions. State-owned and private radio and television
stations generally operated freely. In January the Government briefly
closed the Chapare's ``Radio Soberania,'' a forum for cocalero leader
and then-presidential candidate Evo Morales. Although it lacked proper
permits, engaged in tendentious speech, and broadcast instructions to
cocaleros on where to gather for rallies and roadblocks, the station
continued to operate freely.
The Penal Code provides that persons found guilty of insulting,
defaming, or slandering public officials for carrying out their duties
may be jailed from 1 month to 2 years. If the insults are directed
against the President, Vice President, or a minister, the sentence may
be increased by one-half.
Press associations criticized the Government for the death in
September 2001 of a civilian who was accompanying journalists as they
approached an eradication camp near Loma Alta in the Chapare (see
Section 1.a.). They also called for the Government to provide for
protection and freedom of movement in the Chapare, where illegal coca
growers often block roads (see Section 2.d.).
The 40-person La Paz Press Tribunal, an independent body, is
authorized to evaluate journalists' practices that are alleged to
violate either the Constitution or citizens' rights. The Government
prohibited the importation of pornographic books, magazines, and
artwork, but it did not block Internet sources.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom, and the law
grants public universities autonomous status.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities generally
respected this right in practice; however, security forces killed five
persons and injured others during violent protests during the year (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The Government routinely granted permits for
marches and rallies. There were numerous demonstrations throughout the
year; in some cases protesters blocked roads, and on several occasions
protesters became violent. The authorities generally tried to avoid
confronting demonstrators, and frequent marches in downtown La Paz
caused chronic traffic congestion and inconvenience for citizens.
However, security forces clashed with union and other demonstrators on
several occasions during the year. The authorities intervened only when
rallies became violent or interfered substantially with normal civic
activity. The police regularly used tear gas and other forms of crowd
control.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the authorities
generally respected this right in practice. The Government requires
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to register with the appropriate
departmental government, and authorities granted such registration
routinely and objectively.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. Roman Catholicism predominates, and the Constitution
recognizes it as the official religion. The Roman Catholic Church
received support from the State (about 300 priests receive small
stipends) and exercised a limited degree of political influence.
Non-Catholic religious organizations, including missionary groups,
must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship and
receive authorization for legal religious representation. The Ministry
is not allowed to deny registration based on an organization's articles
of faith, but the legal process can be time-consuming and expensive,
leading some groups to forgo registration and operate informally
without certain tax and customs benefits. Most registered religious
groups were identified as Protestant or ``evangelical.''
In 2000 then-President Banzer signed a Supreme Decree governing the
relationships between religious organizations and the Government. The
decree, reflecting input from religious groups, was designed to
increase transparency and dialog in church-state relations.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. The
law permits emigration and provides for the right to return. The
Government does not revoke citizenship for political or other reasons.
The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees.
The Government accepted eight refugees during the year. The total
number of registered refugees, according to UNHCR, was 351. The issue
of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the year.
There were no reports of persons forced to return to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Political parties ranging from far left to moderate
right functioned openly. Implementing regulations for the 1994
constitutional revisions specify that half of the congressional
deputies be elected individually and directly, rather than from party
lists. On August 6, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of the centrist
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement assumed the presidency (succeeding
Jorge Quiroga of the Nationalist Democratic Action Party) after he was
elected in a joint session of the Bolivian Congress following the June
30 national election. The MNR won a plurality but not a majority of the
popular vote. A coalition of parties supported the MNR in the Joint
Session vote, which is required when no candidate wins a majority of
the popular vote. Although there were some allegations of vote-counting
irregularities in the June elections, most observers, including a
mission from the Organization of American States, concluded that the
elections were free and fair. The governing coalition controlled both
houses of the legislature, holding 17 of 27 seats in the Senate and 71
of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Coalition members held the top
leadership positions in both chambers. Elections for national offices
and municipal governments are held every 5 years; the next national
election is scheduled for June 2007.
The National Electoral Court (CNE) and its lower departmental
courts oversee the electoral process, including voter registration,
tabulation, and certification of ballots. Pursuant to a July 2001
mandate from Congress, the CNE selected new departmental electoral
court judges and modified the Electoral Code so that head departmental
electoral judges are selected by congressional vote.
There are no legal impediments to women or indigenous people
voting, holding political office, or rising to political leadership.
The law requires that every third candidate on party candidate lists be
female. In addition, every other candidate on municipal election
ballots, beginning with the second candidate, must be a woman--a
requirement that has increased female representation to approximately
30 percent of municipal council positions. However, in 2000 there were
reports that in some municipalities party leaders pressured
councilwomen to resign in favor of their male substitutes, and women in
three separate municipalities allegedly were threatened with death if
they did not resign their positions. There were 28 women among the 157
deputies and senators, 3 women among the 50 vice ministers, and 2 women
in the 18-member Cabinet. There were no indigenous members of the
Cabinet, and the number of indigenous members of the Chamber of
Deputies was estimated at 35 percent--a figure difficult to confirm
since designation as indigenous is self-declared.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials
were generally cooperative and responsive to their views; however, NGOs
and the Ombudsman complained that occasionally government security
forces and government ministries refused to cooperate when NGOs or the
Ombudsman were conducting investigations.
The Human Rights Ombudsman is a position with a 5-year term
established in the Constitution. The Ombudsman is chosen by Congress
and is charged with providing oversight for the defense, promotion, and
spread of human rights, specifically to defend citizens against abuses
by the Government. The Human Rights Ombudsman, Ana Maria Romero de
Campero, conducted numerous investigations and in September presented a
comprehensive report to Congress that was critical of the Government.
The report stated that for the fourth consecutive year the police force
was the Government organization most often accused of human rights
abuses. Indigenous people filed approximately 60 percent of all
complaints received by the Ombudsman. The Congressional Human Rights
Committee also investigated alleged human rights abuses in the Chapare.
The Chimore Center for Justice and Human Rights (CCJHR) continued
to be active in the Chapare region. It reported its findings to the
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, disseminated human rights
information, accepted complaints of abuses committed, kept records and
referred complaints to the Public Ministry. The CCJHR also houses a
medical forensic expert and an investigative staff to review
complaints.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
language, political or other opinion, origin, or economic or social
condition; however, there was significant discrimination against women,
indigenous people, and the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
Women.--Violence against women was a pervasive problem, but no
system existed to record the incidence of cases. The Family Violence
Units of the police handle crimes of domestic violence and physical or
sexual abuse against women and children. The La Paz unit alone received
1,212 complaints for the period January-July: 519 for physical
violence, 178 for psychological violence and 56 for sexual violence.
There was only one reported conviction under the Family Violence Law--a
case in which a husband was sentenced to 8 years and 2 months for
slashing his spouse. On November 25, Vice Minister for the Woman Martha
Noya stated that 7 out of 10 women suffered psychological or physical
violence in the home 3 to 5 times a year and that 3 of 10 women
suffered a higher rate of abuse. The Family Violence Unit estimated
that more than 53 percent of the victims do not take any action when
exposed to domestic violence.
Rape was also a serious but underreported problem. The Law on
Domestic and Family Violence makes the rape of an adult victim a public
crime; however, the victim must press charges, and only 3 percent of
complaints received by the Public Ministry were for rape. The Law
Against Sexual Violation criminalizes statutory rape, with penalties of
10 to 20 years for the rape of a child under the age of 14, 2 to 6
years for statutory rape of a person from 14 to 18 years of age, and 5
to 20 years for forcible rape of a child or an adult. The CCP provides
that crimes against adults included in previous laws on sex crimes can
be made public crimes; however, the victim must press charges. Sexual
crimes against minors automatically are considered public crimes.
Public agencies stated that reports of abuse increased markedly as a
result of these laws, as citizens became more aware of the problem and
of the availability of help.
Prostitution is legal for adults age 18 and older, and there were
reports of trafficking in women for the purposes of prostitution and
forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
The CCP (see Section 1.e.) considers sexual harassment a civil
crime. There were no statistics on the incidence of sexual harassment,
but the problem generally was acknowledged to exist widely in the male-
oriented society.
Legal services offices devoted to family and women's rights
operated throughout the country. The Maternal and Infant Health
Insurance Program provided health services, focused on maternal and
infant health, to women of reproductive age and to children under the
age of 5.
Women generally do not enjoy a social status equal to that of men.
Many women do not know their legal rights. Traditional prejudices and
social conditions remained obstacles to advancement. In rural areas,
for instance, traditional practices restricting land inheritance for
women remained a problem. The Labor Code restricts the proportion of
female staff in business to 45 percent of the workforce unless large
groups of women are required in a particular enterprise; however, this
restriction was not enforced actively. The minimum wage law treats men
and women equally; however, women generally earned less than men did
for equal work. Most women in urban areas worked in the informal
economy and the services and trade sectors, including domestic service
and micro-business, whereas in rural areas the vast majority of
economically active women worked in agriculture. Young girls often left
school early to work at home or in the economy. A 2000 UNDP study found
that the literacy rate for women over the age of 15 was 79 percent
compared with 92 percent for men. Although not effectively enforced,
the national labor law limits women to a workday 1 hour shorter than
that of men and prohibits them from working at night (see Section
6.e.).
Children.--The Government is aware of the need to provide legal and
institutional infrastructure for the protection of children. There are
seven Defender of Children and Adolescents offices to protect
children's rights and interests. However, the Government did not give
the situation of children sufficient political priority to improve
conditions quickly and effectively.
Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years
of primary school, this requirement was enforced poorly, particularly
in rural areas. The Ministry of Education and the World Bank estimated
in 1997 that 26 percent of children graduated from high school. Girls
had lower rates of school participation and higher dropout rates than
boys.
The National Institute of Statistics calculated in 1998 that
approximately 24 percent of children less than 3 years old were
chronically undernourished. A 1999 UNICEF report on infant mortality
indicated that 85 of every 1,000 children died before the age of 5.
Many children, particularly from rural areas, lack birth certificates
and the identity documents they need to secure social benefits and
protection. The Government developed but had not funded a plan to
provide these documents free of charge.
Physical and psychological abuse in the home was a serious problem.
Corporal punishment and verbal abuse were common in schools.
Child prostitution was a problem, particularly in urban areas and
in the Chapare region. At least two NGOs, Fundacion La Paz and
Q'Haruru, had active programs to combat child prostitution. The
Government's plan to combat child labor included a campaign against
child prostitution (see Section 6.d.).
There were reports of children trafficked for forced labor to
neighboring countries (see Section 6.f.).
The Code for Boys, Girls, and Adolescents establishes the rights of
children and adolescents; it also regulates adoptions and tightens
protection against exploitative child labor and violence against
children. However, resource constraints continued to impede full
implementation of this law.
Children from 11 to 16 years of age may be detained indefinitely in
children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their own
protection, simply on the orders of a social worker (see Section).
Child labor was a serious problem (see Section 6.d.). In September
the Government received $1.5 million (11.2 million bolivianos) for a
project to combat child labor in the Department of Potosi.
Persons with Disabilities.--The Law on Disabilities requires
wheelchair access to all public and private buildings, duty free import
of orthopedic devices, a 50 percent reduction in public transportation
fares, and expanded teaching of sign language and Braille. A National
Committee for Incapacitated Persons was mandated to oversee the law's
enforcement, conduct studies, and to channel and supervise programs and
donations for persons with disabilities; however, there was little
information on its effectiveness. The electoral law requires
accommodation for blind voters; however, in general there were no
special services or infrastructure to accommodate persons with
disabilities. A lack of adequate resources impeded full implementation
of the law. Societal discrimination kept many persons with disabilities
at home from an early age, limiting their integration into society.
Indigenous Persons.--In the 2001 census, approximately 62 percent
of the population over 15 years of age identified themselves as
indigenous, primarily from the Quechua or Aymara groups. The Agrarian
Reform Law provides for indigenous communities to have legal title to
their communal lands and for individual farmers to have title to the
land they work. The Government and indigenous leaders jointly developed
provisions of this law. However, the issue of land, specifically the
Agrarian Reform Law, was a continuing source of complaints and protests
by indigenous people. Indigenous people complained that their
territories were not defined legally or protected, and that outsiders
exploited their resources.
Indigenous groups have taken advantage of the Popular Participation
Law to form municipalities that offer them greater opportunities for
self-determination. The CCP recognizes the conflict resolution
traditions of indigenous communities (see Section 1.e.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is societal
discrimination against the small Afro-Bolivian minority. Afro-Bolivians
generally remained at the low end of the socioeconomic scale, and faced
severe disadvantages in health, life expectancy, education, income,
literacy, and employment. The majority of the estimated 25,000 Afro-
Bolivians live in the Yungas region of the department of La Paz.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide that workers have the right to form trade unions; however,
inefficient labor courts and inadequate government regulation at times
limited the exercise of this right by workers. Workers may form a union
in any private company of 20 or more employees; however, an estimated
70 percent of workers were employed in micro or small enterprises with
fewer than 20 employees. Moreover, labor leaders said that a section of
the 1985 Economic Liberalization Decree, which eliminated the
Government's role in authorizing worker dismissals had been exploited
by the private sector to fire workers for organizing or to avoid paying
severance benefits, although both actions remain illegal. Public sector
workers also have the right to form a union. The Labor Code requires
prior government authorization to establish a union and confirm its
elected leadership, permits only one union per enterprise, and allows
the Government to dissolve unions by administrative fiat. Following the
1997 visit of an International Labor Organization (ILO) direct contacts
mission, the Government agreed to amend its labor laws with respect to
the powers of authorities to dissolve trade unions by administrative
order and its power to supervise union affairs; however, it has not
done so. The Government was not known to abuse this authority for
political or other reasons and generally did not penalize workers for
union activities.
Because of the legal costs and time required to register new
nongovernmental entities, almost all unions are affiliates of the
Bolivian Labor Federation (COB). Less than one-half of the workers in
the formal economy belong to unions, and employment in the formal
economy itself has fallen markedly in recent decades to approximately
30 percent of those employed. Several large groups of informal workers,
including up to 50,000 ``cooperative'' miners, thousands of street
vendors, and hundreds of thousands of poor indigenous farmers
(campesinos) were loosely affiliated with the COB.
In many respects, the country's labor laws and regulations are
favorable to workers; however, many of the standards were ignored in
practice.
Unions were not free from influence by political parties, but many
in organized labor increasingly rejected traditional political parties
and supported movements seeking fundamental change in the economic and
political system. Most parties have labor committees that attempted to
influence union activity and also had party activists inside the
unions.
The law prohibits discrimination against union members and
organizers. However, labor laws intended to protect workers' rights to
freedom of association and to form and join trade unions are inadequate
and fail to deter employers from retaliating against workers, nor does
the law protect workers against acts of interference by employers. The
Government agreed to amend these laws following an ILO direct contacts
mission in 1997; however, the Government has failed to do so.
Complaints of antiunion discrimination go to the National Labor Court,
which can take a year or more to rule due to a significant backlog of
cases. The court ruled in favor of discharged workers in some cases and
successfully required their reinstatement. However, union leaders said
that problems were often moot by the time the court ruled.
The law allows unions to join international labor organizations.
The COB worked with mainstream international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the Labor Code provide workers with the right to
organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining, or voluntary
direct negotiations between employers and workers without the
participation of the Government, was limited. Most collective
bargaining agreements are restricted to wages and exclude other
conditions. The Labor Code requires unions to revert to government
mediation before beginning a strike and employers to do likewise before
initiating a lockout. The practice of direct employee-management
negotiations in individual enterprises expanded, as the private
sector's economic role expanded.
There was limited major strike activity during the year, in part
because attention was focused on national elections.
The Labor Code bans strikes in public services, including banks and
public markets; however, workers in the public sector frequently did
strike, with strikes by teachers and health care workers the most
common. Public sector employees have not been penalized for strike
activities in recent years. Solidarity strikes are illegal, but the
Government neither prosecuted nor imposed penalties in such cases.
Labor law and practice in the seven special duty-free zones are the
same as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor, including by children; however, the practices of child
apprenticeship and agricultural servitude by indigenous workers
continued, as did some alleged individual cases of household workers
effectively held captive by their employers (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
The ILO Committee of Experts reported that the abuses and lack of
payment of wages constitute forced labor in the agriculture sector.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits all work for payment by children under
the age of 14; however, in practice the Ministry of Labor generally did
not enforce child labor laws, including those pertaining to the minimum
age and maximum hours for child workers, school completion
requirements, and health and safety conditions for children in the
workplace. Child labor was a serious problem. The law prohibits a range
of dangerous, immoral, and unhealthy work for minors under the age of
18. Labor law permits apprenticeship for those 12 to 14 years old under
various formal but poorly enforced restrictions, which have been
criticized by the ILO and were considered by some to be tantamount to
bondage (see Section 6.c.).
Approximately one in every four children between the ages of 7 and
14 was employed in some way. A 1999 ILO study estimated that
approximately 70,000 children between the ages of 7 and 14 were working
in cities and that approximately 300,000 children in the same age group
were working in rural areas--usually to help provide for family
subsistence--in uncontrolled and sometimes unhealthy conditions. The
extreme poverty of many families dictated the involuntary employment of
their children to survive.
In April 2001, the Inter-Institutional Commission for the
Progressive Elimination of Child Labor released a 10-year ``Plan for
the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor'' to address financial,
health, education, and other needs of children and to provide
incentives for poor families to keep children in school, improve
governmental enforcement of labor laws, and prevent the worst forms of
child labor. However, the plan had little funding. The new
administration endorsed the plan, and at year's end was completing
plans to eliminate child labor in its worst forms, including in mining,
sugar cane harvesting, and prostitution.
In December the country completed ratification of ILO Convention
182 on the worst forms of child labor.
The Labor Ministry is responsible for enforcing child labor
provisions but did not enforce them throughout the country. Urban
children sold goods, shined shoes, and assisted transport operators.
Rural children often worked with parents from an early age, generally
in subsistence agriculture. Children generally were not employed in
factories or formal businesses but, when employed, often worked the
same hours as adults. Children also worked in mines and other dangerous
occupations in the informal sector. Child prostitution was a growing
problem (see Section 5).
The NGO Defense of Children International criticized traffickers
for using children under the age of 14 to transport drugs.
The traditional practice of ``criadito'' service persisted in some
parts of the country. Criaditos are indigenous children of both sexes,
usually 10 to 12 years old, whom their parents indenture to middle- and
upper-class families to perform household work in exchange for
education, clothing, room, and board. Such work is illegal, and there
are no controls over the benefits to, or treatment of, such children,
who may become virtual slaves for the years of their indenture.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government establishes the
minimum wage for the public and private sectors by supreme decree
following traditional negotiation with the COB, and the wage increased
in January by almost 9 percent to approximately $57 (430 bolivianos)
per month, plus bonuses and fringe benefits. The minimum wage did not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family, and most
formal sector workers earned more, although many informal sector
workers earned less. Although the minimum wage fell below prevailing
wages in most jobs, certain benefit calculations were pegged to it. The
minimum wage did not cover members of the informal sector, who
constituted the majority of the urban work force, nor did it cover
farmers, who accounted for 30 percent of the working population.
Although not effectively enforced, the law establishes an 8-hour
workday and a maximum workweek of 48 hours, limits women to a workday 1
hour shorter than that of men, and prohibits women from working at
night (see Section 5). The Labor Ministry's Bureau of Occupational
Safety has responsibility for protection of workers' health and safety,
but relevant standards were enforced poorly. Many workers died due to
unsafe conditions. With support from an international donor, the
Government reestablished a national tripartite committee charged with
monitoring and improving occupational safety and health standards. The
Labor Ministry maintained a hot line for worker inquiries, complaints,
and reports of unfair labor practices and unsafe working conditions.
Working conditions in the mining sector were particularly poor.
Although the State Mining Corporation has an office responsible for
safety, many mines, often old and using antiquated equipment, were
dangerous and unhealthy. In some mines operated as cooperatives, miners
earned less than $3 (22 bolivianos) per 12-hour day. Miners in such
cooperatives worked without respirators in mines where toxic gases and
cancer-causing dusts abound; bought their own supplies, including
dynamite; had no scheduled rest periods; and many worked underground
for up to 24 hours continuously. There are no special provisions in the
law defining when workers may remove themselves from dangerous
situations. Unless the work contract covers this area, any worker who
refuses to work based on the individual's judgment of excessively
dangerous conditions may face dismissal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons for the purpose of prostitution. There are no other laws that
specifically address trafficking in persons, although many aspects of
the problem are covered in other laws and in the Constitution.
Trafficking in women and children was a problem.
There were reports of domestic trafficking in women for the purpose
of prostitution. NGOs expressed continued concern that women were
trafficked for prostitution.
There were credible reports that the country was a source of
persons trafficked for forced labor in neighboring countries,
especially Argentina, and to a lesser extent Chile and Brazil, although
there were no reliable estimates available as to the extent of the
problem. A small percentage of economic migrants received fraudulent
information about prospective jobs in neighboring countries, which
turned out to be forced labor under harsh conditions. Some of the fraud
leading to involuntary servitude originated within the country.
Women and adolescents, especially from indigenous ethnic groups in
the altiplano (high plains) region, were more at risk of being
trafficked. Victims generally were trafficked to Argentina to work in
agriculture, factories, trades, and as domestic employees; to Chile to
work as domestic employees; and to Brazil to work in factories and as
domestic employees.
The Government, including top immigration officials, did not
facilitate, condone, or otherwise act complicitly in trafficking;
however, individual low-ranking employees of various government
agencies took bribes to allow various types of smuggling, including
contraband and persons.
The Immigration Service is primarily responsible for combating
trafficking, with the assistance of the National Police when active law
enforcement investigations are necessary. The Immigration Service has
responsibility for all ports of entry/exit and border crossings. There
is an interagency Minor's Committee to combat trafficking in
adolescents for forced labor to neighboring countries. However, the
Government did not commit the resources necessary to address this
problem.
The 1999 Law for the Protection of the Victims of Crimes Against
Sexual Freedom specifically outlaws trafficking in persons for the
purpose of prostitution and provides for sentences of up to 12 year's
imprisonment. Heavier sentences are imposed if the victim is a minor.
There are also laws prohibiting the falsification of government
documents, such as passports, visas, and civil registry documents. In
addition, the Penal Code prohibits slavery or an ``analogous state,''
and it is punishable with 2 to 8 years of imprisonment. The Government
also cooperated with other governments to investigate and prosecute
trafficking cases. There were no known prosecutions during the year.
Several NGOs worked with vulnerable groups, providing assistance,
incentives to education, and information about legal rights.
__________
BRAZIL
Brazil is a constitutional federal republic composed of 26 states
and the Federal District. The federal legislative branch exercises
authority independent of the executive branch. In October voters
elected President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party (PT)
to a 4-year term. The elections marked the fourth time since the end of
military rule in 1985 that citizens freely chose their president and
elected the legislative bodies in accordance with the 1988
Constitution. All parties were able to compete on the basis of fair and
equal procedures. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, it was often inefficient and, especially at the
state level, subject to political and economic influences.
The military was responsible for national defense and remained
subject to effective civilian control, both in law and in practice. The
federal police force was very small and primarily investigative. It
played little role in routine law enforcement. Police forces fell
primarily under the control of the states and were divided into two
groups: The ``civil police'' were plain-clothes officers and had an
investigative role, and the ``military police'' were uniformed police
and were responsible for maintaining public order. Although the
individual state governments controlled the military police, the
Constitution provides that they can be called into active military
service in the event of an emergency, and they maintained some military
characteristics and privileges, including a separate judicial system.
The state police forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
The country had a market-based and diversified economy and a
population of approximately 175 million. The Government, which
traditionally played a dominant role in shaping economic development,
encouraged greater private sector participation in the economy through
privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, and removal of some
impediments to competition, trade, and investment. Industrial
production, including mining operations and a large and diversified
capital goods sector, accounted for 34 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP), agriculture contributed 8 percent, and services
accounted for 58 percent. Exports consisted of both manufactured and
primary goods. Per capita GDP was approximately $2,900 in 2001, and the
economy grew by 1.5 percent. Income distribution remained highly
skewed. The real average wage fell 10 percent from 1997 to 2001.
The Federal government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be numerous serious abuses, and
the record of some state governments was poor. State police forces
(both civil and military) committed many extrajudicial killings,
tortured and beat suspects under interrogation, and arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons. Police also were implicated in a variety
of criminal activities, including killings for hire, death squad
executions, extortion, kidnapings for ransom, and narcotics
trafficking. Despite new powers to intervene in certain types of human
rights cases granted in January, the federal police failed to act in
the numerous human rights violations by state authorities. The
Government established a national torture hot line for victims of
torture, but it did not result in more convictions or a diminution of
the problem.
Government authorities often failed to prevent violence inside
prisons. The state governments did not punish most perpetrators of
these abuses effectively. The separate system of military police
tribunals remained overloaded, rarely investigated cases thoroughly,
seldom convicted abusers, and contributed to a climate of impunity for
police officers involved in extrajudicial killings or abuse of
prisoners. Prison conditions ranged from poor to extremely harsh.
Prison officials often tortured and beat inmates. The judiciary had a
large case backlog and often was unable to ensure the right to a fair
and speedy trial. Justice remained slow and often unreliable,
especially in regions where powerful economic interests influenced the
local judiciary. Victims, particularly those who were suspected
criminals, had difficulty in being heard by oversight bodies.
Investigations of human rights abuses by police officials were often
limited to internal police reviews and were not referred to the Office
of the Public Prosecutor or other independent bodies for review.
Police used excessive force to disperse demonstrators on several
occasions, causing serious injuries. Human rights monitors on occasion
faced threats and harassment. Violence and discrimination against
women, and child prostitution and abuse, remained chronic problems.
Government authorities often failed adequately to protect indigenous
people from outsiders who encroached on their lands or to provide them
with adequate health care and other basic services in many areas.
Discrimination against Afro-Brazilians and violence against homosexuals
were serious problems. Rural violence, including the killings of land
reform and rural labor activists, persisted. Forced labor for adults
and children continued. Trafficking in persons, particularly women and
children for the purpose of prostitution, persisted. Brazil was invited
by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
A new National Human Rights Program focused on social, as well as
cultural and economic, rights. Congress ratified into law a
presidential decree giving the federal police authority to intervene at
the state level in certain human rights cases and in kidnapings that
were politically motivated, but the federal police did not use this
authority.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Extrajudicial
killings committed by state police (military and civil) remained a
serious problem throughout the country. Uniformed police summarily
executed suspected criminals and then filed false reports that the
deceased were resisting arrest. There were numerous killings by police.
Statistics released by the Sao Paulo State Secretary for Security
indicated that 610 people were killed during the year by Sao Paulo
police (civil and military); statistics released by the Sao Paulo
police ombudsman indicated that 825 people were killed by Sao Paulo
police during the year. The ombudsman's figures included killings by
off-duty police. In April 2001, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
noted that torture by jail and prison officials often resulted in death
(see Section 1.c.). Harsh prison conditions and prison riots continued
to lead to the death of inmates (see Section 1.c.). Police also killed
street children, indigenous persons, and labor activists (see Sections
5 and 6.a.). Death squads and other criminal groups, many of which
included police as members, committed other killings. Numerous credible
reports indicated the involvement of state police officials in crime,
including revenge killings and the intimidation and killing of
witnesses involved in testifying against police officials (see Section
1.e.). The authorities' failure to investigate, prosecute, and punish
police who committed such acts perpetuated a climate of impunity that
encouraged human rights abuses. Many persons continued to be killed in
disputes over land ownership and usage.
An April 2001 report by human rights organizations stated that law
enforcement authorities summarily executed approximately 2,000 persons
each year.
According to the police ombudswoman in Rio de Janeiro, in the first
9 months of the year, citizens registered complaints for 23 police
homicides in the state, believed to be only a small fraction of the
actual total of police homicides. A human rights nongovernmental
organization (NGO) estimated that the number of police homicides during
the first 9 months of the year exceeded the number officially reported
for the same period of 2000 (312). The Rio de Janeiro State government
halted release of data on police homicides after September 2000.
Research conducted by the Institute for Religious Studies (ISER) in the
mid-1990s suggested that during that period the level of police
homicides was double the official number reported. The ISER report
cited 40 cases in Rio de Janeiro that clearly demonstrated execution-
style deaths, in which police first immobilized the victims and then
shot them at point-blank range. In 64 percent of the cases examined by
ISER, the victims were shot in the back.
In the first 4 months of the year, the Sao Paulo ombudsman received
128 complaints of police homicide, 62 complaints of disciplinary
infractions, and 44 complaints of poor service. According to the
Ombudsman, in the first 6 months of the year, 73 cases of police abuse
were presented to the Public Prosecutor, and action was taken on only
12 of the cases. The Sao Paulo State Secretary for Security reported
that Sao Paulo police on average killed 59 civilians monthly, a rate 33
percent higher than in 2001, and the highest figure since statistics on
police killings began to be kept in 1995; statistics released by the
Sao Paulo police ombudsman indicated that the monthly average was 69.
State Secretary of Security figures indicated that during the year 59
Sao Paulo policemen were killed and 537 injured in the line of duty.
According to a domestic NGO, international human rights observers, and
diplomats, killing by police was a national problem, not limited to the
largest cities or states.
According to press reports, in February in Campo Grande, military
police officer Guaracy Arede shot and killed Alessandra Luisa de
Carvalho Marques who was riding with a friend in a passenger van.
Arede, described as drunk, entered the vehicle and molested Carvalho
Marques who then sought to exit the van. In front of numerous
witnesses, Arede shot Carvalho Marques once in the head and once in the
neck as she fled from the vehicle. Police arrested Arede, and the trial
was pending at year's end.
In February in Campos, Sao Paulo, highway patrolman Jose Vargas de
Oliveira was accused of shooting to death a truck driver who wouldn't
pay a ``tip.'' Oliveira was later arrested when he surrendered to the
Federal Highway Police; there was no further information regarding
action in the case.
In February Rio de Janeiro taxi driver Sergio Luiz Couto was shot
several times and killed the day before he was to give a deposition
denouncing military police officials. Seven months prior to his death,
Couto had been kidnaped by a team of public security officers who
demanded a ransom of approximately $57,140 (200,000 reais). For his
involvement in the kidnaping, police Major Dilo Pereira Soares Junior
was imprisoned for 31 days. Couto's wife stated that her husband had
received multiple threats from an officer with the military police
prior to his murder. There was no indication of new developments in the
case at year's end.
On March 5, Sao Paulo police killed 12 members of the criminal
faction and prison gang First Command of the Capital (known as the PCC)
in a highway shootout. The police reportedly suspected that the group
planned a prison break or robbery. Over 100 military police mounted a
roadblock near the town of Sorocaba. The 17 suspects, traveling in 6
different vehicles including a bus, opened fire and attempted to flee.
Five suspects escaped but were later captured. The Sao Paulo police
ombudsman's advisor stated that marks on the bodies indicated that
excessive force had also been employed.
Sao Paulo State Secretary of Public Security Saulo de Castro Abreu
Filho expressed regret over the deaths but stated that this ``war
operation'' was ``well carried out.'' However, Sao Paulo Vice Mayor
Helio Bicudo--relying on the findings of an independent medical
examiner--contended that the operation was ``an execution.'' Bicudo
testified about the case before the Organization of American States'
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in October. In its
response, the Government indicated that the facts of the case were
still under investigation. The IACHR accepted the case for inquiry. The
civil and military police each opened investigations into the case; by
year's end, no determination had been made on whether to charge any
police officials in connection with the incident.
In April in Baixada Santista, Sao Paulo, military police killed
five boys and a bar owner while searching for a youth who stole a
sergeant's weapon. Witnesses asserted that the police entered a bar
looking for the ``thief,'' then stole wallets and forced the patrons to
lie on the floor. The bar owner refused and was shot twice and killed
along with five youths who were also present.
In May police antikidnaping investigators killed 56-year-old Jorge
Jose Martins in his home in Campinas, Sao Paulo. Police claimed that
Martins fired first, but Martins' family asserted that he was executed.
The Sao Paulo police ombudsman endorsed the family's version and
demanded an investigation. At year's end, a police officer had been
charged but was free while the trial was pending. In the interim, the
officer continued his duties and received a promotion.
Lack of accountability and an inefficient criminal justice system
allowed police impunity to continue. All crimes less serious than
intentional homicide committed by uniformed police officers against
civilians remained in the military justice system. Long delays allowed
many cases to expire due to statutes of limitations (see Section 1.e.).
In 2000 the military justice system processed 527 cases.
The 1996 ``Bicudo'' Law provides civil courts with jurisdiction
over serious crimes committed by uniformed police officers, allowing
civil prosecutors to review the most egregious criminal cases while the
police themselves review less prominent cases. According to human
rights activists, the law had marginal success since it applies only to
an intentional killing by police. Almost without exception, police
investigators concluded that suspects were killed while resisting
arrest, and thus the deaths were justified.
The Sao Paulo police ombudsman convinced some judges to review more
carefully the circumstances surrounding the deaths of civilians by
police. During the year, the ombudsman appealed to judges to consider
three factors: 1) the crime alleged, 2) the alleged resistance of the
suspect to arrest, and 3) the possible crime committed by police in
killing the suspect.
In October the Sao Paulo police ombudsman protested the conclusion
of an internal police investigation regarding the 2001 killing by five
civil police of four individuals suspected of involvement in the murder
of the mayor of Caraguatatuba, Sao Paulo. According to press reports,
the policemen claimed they shot the suspects in self-defense while
trying to arrest them. However, the ombudsman alleged that the
investigation suggested the case should have been sent to a civilian
prosecutor to review evidence of intentional homicide by the police.
The ombudsman indicated he would review the case to ascertain whether
the police actually executed the suspects. The case has been referred
to the public prosecutor, and an investigation was opened; by year's
end no determination had been made on whether to file charges against
the policemen involved.
In October the case of retired police Colonel Ubiratan Guimaraes--
the highest ranking policeman to face a civilian jury under the Bicudo
law--was complicated when Guimaraes was elected to a 4-year term in the
Sao Paulo State Legislative Assembly. Guimaraes had been convicted of
murder in 2001 for his involvement in the 1992 Carandiru prison
rebellion in which 111 prisoners were killed (see Section 1.c.). He was
sentenced to a 632-year prison term, although under the Constitution
his prison term would be limited to 30 years. Guimaraes appealed his
conviction and was subsequently released pending resolution of the
appeal. The other 85 officers accused of involvement in the Carandiru
massacre were still awaiting trial. While the statute of limitations
has expired for the charges of torture and beatings, the officers can
still be tried for murder. All of the officers were free awaiting
trial.
In July the Sao Paulo press reported that the 40-member Group for
Repression of Crimes of Intolerance (GRADI), a military police
intelligence network directly subordinate to the Secretary of Public
Security, had illegally recruited prisoners to infiltrate PCC cells on
three separate occasions. In the 9 months between July 2001 and March
2002, the 3 GRADI infiltration operations reportedly resulted in 7
arrests and 22 deaths, including 1 informant. The dead informant, 22-
year-old Fernando Henrique Rodrigues Batista, was allegedly killed in
July 2001 by the same police who recruited him.
Human rights activists and some within the judiciary compared GRADI
to the police ``death squads'' that operated in the 1970s. The police
ombudsman reported that he had evidence linking 21 homicides to GRADI;
so far no charges have been brought against GRADI officers. The Sao
Paulo Public Prosecutor ordered an inquiry into these allegations, as
did the Congress' Human Rights Commission; however, in an official
statement, the Sao Paulo Secretary of Public Security defended GRADI's
actions.
In October in the coastal town of Garuja, two members of the Sao
Paulo uniformed police were arrested for the October murders of two
motorcyclists detained after a pursuit, 17-year-old Anderson do Carmo
and 20-year-old Celso Giolelli Malgahaes Junior. An eyewitness reported
that the policemen placed the youths in the back of their vehicle and
drove away. The following morning, their bullet-ridden bodies were
found in a garbage dump. Corporal Mauricio Miranda and Private Silvio
Ricardo Monteiro Batista were arrested and were being tried for
homicide; they remained in custody pending the conclusion of the case.
As of November, no police officers were charged in the 2000 killing
of a member of the Landless Movement (MST) during a confrontation
between protesters and uniformed police in Curitiba, Parana. An
internal police investigation concluded that the police had not
committed a crime and that the police were justified in using their
weapons in self-defense after the marchers failed to comply with an
order to disperse.
In 2000 the Sao Paulo Secretary of Security created a Special
Commission to curb excessive use of police force and required police in
Sao Paulo who kill a suspect to complete within 24 hours a detailed
report explaining why lethal force was used. According to the Sao Paulo
ombudsman, the police did not fully comply with this regulation: Many
filed no report while others filed incomplete or inaccurate reports.
Two military police were convicted in the August 2001 murder of
Roberto Angelo de Souza in Canoas, Rio Grande do Sul. Each received the
minimum penalty of 6 years' incarceration, and they were expelled from
the police force.
In the case of Thomas Feltes Engel, killed in Sao Leopoldo, Rio
Grande do Sul, in September 2001, prosecutors were seeking the
conviction of a military policeman for homicide.
In the September 2001 case of two Sao Paulo military police accused
of murdering Sidney de Lima Advento, the accused officers provided
depositions, but the case had not come to trial by year's end.
No further information was available concerning reports that in
2000, a local police officer was arrested near Boa Vista, Roraima, on
the charge that he had participated in the killing of seven
adolescents. The case was believed to be inactive.
In 2001 a court convicted 5 and acquitted 19 police officers (of 31
charged with participation) in the 1993 massacre of 21 residents of the
Vigario Geral neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro. At year's end, four
officers still awaited trial. None of the victims' families received
compensation from the Government.
The use of torture by police sometimes led to the death of the
victims (see Section 1.c.).
Harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, official negligence,
poor sanitary conditions, abuse by guards, and a lack of medical care
led to a number of deaths in prisons. Prison homicides, due to both
prisoner violence and action by authorities during rebellions,
continued during the year, but official statistics were unavailable.
No further information was available in the case of the director of
security and discipline of Andradina Penitentiary in Sao Paulo State
charged with triple homicide in the February 2001 asphyxiation deaths
of three prison gang members reportedly involved in prison rebellions.
Police killings of street children continued (see Section 5).
By year's end, no arrests had been made in the case of two Truka
indigenous persons allegedly murdered by state police in January 2001
in Pernambuco.
No progress was reported in the case of Xucuru leader Francisco de
Assis Santana, murdered in August 2001 in Pernambuco while en route to
a meeting with the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) to complain about
encroachment on indigenous lands.
No information was available as to the date of a possible new trial
in the case of a landowner accused of ordering the 1983 killing of
Guarani land activist Marcal Tupa-I. In April 2001, the Supreme Court
overturned a verdict of innocence in the case.
Several labor activists were killed during the year (see Section
6.a.).
By year's end, two mayors and two other persons had been indicted
in the September 2001 killing of labor leader and city councilman
Carlos ``Gato'' Alberto Santos de Oliveira in Sergipe State. Three
witnesses interviewed by prosecutors received police protection.
According to public security officials, death squads in which the
police are involved continued to operate. Human rights groups reported
the existence of organized death squads linked to the police forces
that target suspected criminals and persons considered
``undesirable''--such as street children--in almost every state. In
2000 Amnesty International (AI) reported that police death squads
remained active in Mato Grosso do Sul. A 1999 report on death squads by
the Human Rights Committee of the Federal Chamber of Deputies found
that death squad activity with police involvement also existed in
several other states, including Bahia, Rio Grande do Norte, Mato
Grosso, Amazonas, Para, Paraiba, Ceara, Espirito Santo, and Acre. The
report did indicate that, with the exception of Bahia, death squad
activity was declining. However, human rights groups and the local
press reported that murders by death squads continued, although no
examples were cited.
According to investigations by human rights committees in the Bahia
legislature and the lower house of the Congress, in Bahia State alone
death squads murdered 123 persons from January to August, compared with
321 persons in all of 2001. These numbers represented about 10 percent
of all adolescent and young adult murder victims in the state. Most
victims were poor and black, and in many cases they were tortured
before being killed. However, Bahia's public security secretary,
testifying in a Justice Ministry investigation, denied the existence of
death squads in the state.
In April and May 2001, the authorities arrested eight uniformed
policemen, an investigative policeman, and two firemen suspected of
participating in death squad killings in Rio de Janeiro State. Three of
the suspects were accused of the April 2001 murder of 21-year-old
Leonardo Marinho, son of another fireman. There was no further
information on the case.
In Espirito Santo State, a 1999 state police investigation and a
state parliamentary committee of inquiry initially reported that an
informal organization called the ``Squad le Cocq'' involving police,
judicial, and elected authorities--including president of the State
Assembly Jose Carlos Gratz--was responsible for the vast majority of
organized crime in the state. However, a yearlong investigation by the
parliamentary committee failed to prove any of the accusations against
Gratz. The legislator was reelected in October, but an election court
judge annulled the result on grounds that Gratz had committed illegal
acts during his campaign. Press reports indicated continuing activity
by organized crime in Espirito Santo. Human rights activists, NGOs, and
politicians urged the Federal government to intervene, and late in the
year a federal-state task force began investigations to root out
organized crime in the state.
Many persons have been killed in recent years in conflicts
involving disputes over land ownership and usage. The MST continued its
campaign of legal occupation of lands identified as unproductive and
illegal occupation of land not so designated. The MST also continued
its occupation of public buildings. MST activists often used
confrontational and violent tactics and destroyed private property
during some occupations. The Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission
(CPT), the country's foremost entity monitoring human rights in rural
areas, reported that at least 16 rural laborers were murdered in land
conflicts. Moreover, according to CPT, at least 73 persons received
death threats as a result of land disputes.
A 2000 CPT report concluded that the impunity enjoyed by landed
interests as a result of the ``fragile'' justice system and the
collusion of local political interests continued to encourage serious
human rights abuses of landless activists, including murder and
torture. However, the report also noted that the tactics of the land
reform movement led to a self-perpetuating cycle in the past several
years, in which increased confrontation and tension led to increased
government attention, encouraging in turn more land occupations.
No arrests or prosecutions were reported in the 2001 killings of
two leaders of landless movements in the State of Mato Grosso do Sul:
In April 2001, Jose Rafael do Nascimento, founder and leader of the
Movement of Rural Workers (MTR), was killed by civil police, who
alleged he was shot while resisting arrest in connection with homicides
in Sao Paulo, and in June 2001, Valdecir Padilha, a local leader of the
MST, was killed by an unidentified gunman. There was no further
information available on either case.
There were no known developments in the killings in 2000 of Jose
Dutra da Costa, a rural activist in Para State and Manuel Souza Neto, a
leader of the MST. Landowners were suspected of involvement in both
cases.
Military police involved in the 1996 massacre of 19 MST protesters
at Eldorado dos Carajas, Para State, went on trial in April. Of the 146
police tried, 144 were absolved, and 2 were convicted. Major Jose
Oliveira was sentenced to 158 years in prison, and Lieutenant Colonel
Mario Pantoja to 228 years. Both appealed the verdict and remained
free. AI criticized the decision, citing numerous errors in the trial.
Violence committed against children remained a serious problem. A
UNESCO study reported that 75 percent of deaths of adolescents between
the ages of 15 to 19 resulted from violence.
b. Disappearance.--Police were implicated in kidnapings for ransom.
Most observers believed that uniformed and civil police involvement in
criminal activity, including kidnaping and extortion, was widespread.
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
On January 24, then-President Cardoso issued a temporary executive
decree authorizing the federal police to intervene at the state level
in certain human rights cases, including kidnapings. The decree became
law on May 8; however, the federal police were not known to have used
this new authority during the year.
A 1995 law assigned government responsibility for the deaths of
political activists who ``disappeared'' during the military regime
while in custody and obligated the Government to pay indemnities of
between $74,000 and $110,000 (200,000 to 300,000 reais) to each of the
families. In 1997 President Cardoso signed a decree awarding
reparations to the families of 43 such persons. As of August, 280 out
of 366 requesters had received indemnities. A commission created by the
law continued to evaluate requests for, and authorize payment of,
indemnities. In October Rio de Janeiro State created a legislative
commission to review requests for state indemnities for persons who
disappeared or were tortured under the military regime. The
indemnities, which were based on life expectancy, could range from
about $28,570 to $42,860 (100,000 to 150,000 reais).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and a 1997 law prohibit torture and
provide severe legal penalties for its use; however, torture by police
and prison guards remained a serious and widespread problem.
In a 2001 report on torture in jails and prisons, U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Torture Sir Nigel Rodley concluded that torture was still
widespread, systematic, and often deadly (see Section 1.a.). Rodley
based his report primarily on visits to prisons in five different
states during 2000. Torture was reportedly practiced during every phase
of detention: Initial questioning, temporary detention, and long-term
detention. Rodley noted that the most common forms of torture were
electric shocks, beatings, and threats. Usually the torture victims
were poor and uneducated. According to Rodley, police and prison
officials usually were inadequately trained and unfamiliar with proper
investigative procedures. In response the Government undertook to
implement the report's recommendations but also noted that the
Constitution restrains the Federal government from controlling the
actions of state governments and police authorities.
Several human rights groups, including AI and Justica Global,
issued reports during the year on torture. The AI report noted that
systematic torture and maltreatment continued throughout the justice
system in 2001, often commencing at the initial moment of detention.
The press also claimed that GRADI police tortured prisoners.
In March two prisoners--one convicted of homicide, the other of
theft--were allegedly tortured. With a judge's consent, GRADI police
officers had removed the two prisoners from Sao Paulo's Carandiru
prison to infiltrate a PCC gang that was planning a robbery near
Guaruja, on the Sao Paulo coast. During the operation, the two
prisoners attempted to escape. Police recaptured the prisoners and
allegedly beat them, returning the two to prison the following day with
multiple cuts and other injuries.
In July Osmarilton Meneses dos Santos was tortured and badly beaten
for 3 days by civil police in Bahia State. Allegedly, the police were
seeking a false confession for the robbery of a motorcycle. The victim
later reported the incident to the legislature's Commission on Human
Rights. Despite promises by the governor for quick action, the officers
were only moved to new stations.
The police appeared to benefit from a high level of impunity in
cases of torture. Often the police themselves were responsible for
investigating cases of torture carried out by fellow policemen. The
problem remained most pervasive at the state level. The Government
began a ``National Campaign to Combat Torture'' to sensitize all
segments of civil society--judges, attorneys, and legislators, as well
as the general public--to the rights of prisoners. Judges, public
prosecutors, and attorneys were expected to receive training in
investigating complaints of torture. The campaign also included media
advertisements that torture is a crime and a nationwide toll-free
number to receive complaints.
The NGO National Movement for Human Rights, which administers the
Ministry of Justice's torture hot line reported it received 873 calls
alleging torture or inhuman or degrading treatment during the year.
Among metropolitan capitals, Sao Paulo had the highest percentage of
complaints. In 51 percent of the calls alleging torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment, the alleged perpetrators were public agents--198
were civil police and 240 were uniformed police. States with the
highest number of allegations of mistreatment at the hands of civil and
uniformed police were Sao Paulo (175), Minas Gerais (129), Bahia (87),
Para (88) and Rio (65). Sixty-nine percent of alleged victims were men,
21 percent were women, and 10 percent were juveniles. Actual incidents
of torture may be significantly higher than use of the hot line
indicated. A 2002 Justica Global report, citing data from two other
human rights groups working in Sao Paulo State prisons, reported 1,631
cases of torture in the state's prisons.
While agreeing that the hot line was a positive step, human rights
activists cautioned that it did not attack the heart of the
mistreatment problem. The activists urged that attorneys, prosecutors,
and judges receive training on how to investigate allegations of
torture and bring offenders to justice.
Long delays in the special police courts allowed many cases of
torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of limitations
(see Section 1.e.).
The police investigation in the February 2001 torture case of
Wander Cosme Carvalheiro (whom Sao Paulo civil police were accused of
torturing while trying to obtain a murder confession) was still
underway. The report on the police investigation in the case of Marcos
Puga--allegedly beaten by Sao Paulo police in 2000--was referred to the
court in August for a determination of whether to bring criminal
charges against the police officials involved in the incident; a
separate disciplinary inquiry remained underway. No new information was
available on the case of two alleged cigarette smugglers in Foz de
Iguacu reportedly beaten by two police officers.
At year's end, a local court was still conducting pretrial hearings
of witnesses regarding the allegations that in January 2001 police in
Minas Gerais beat and tortured Alexandre de Oliveira into falsely
confessing that he had raped his infant daughter.
There was no further progress by year's end in the case of two
alleged shoplifters reportedly tortured in January 2001 by Carrefour
department store security guards and local drug traffickers.
Police violence against homosexuals continued (see Section 5). Gay
rights activists in the city of Recife compiled substantial evidence of
extortion and the unlawful use of violence against transvestite
prostitutes. Police routinely extorted money from transvestites and
often beat or killed those who failed to cooperate. Several NGOs
documented the existence of skinhead, neo-Nazi, and ``machista''
(homophobic) gangs that attacked suspected homosexuals in cities
including Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, and
Brasilia (see Section 5). In some cases, these gangs allegedly included
police officers.
Human rights groups criticized the alleged sexual abuse of members
of indigenous groups by army units stationed in Roraima State (see
Section 5).
The National Secretariat for Human Rights sponsored human rights
training programs throughout the country in cooperation with federal
and state entities and national and international organizations. The
Secretariat administered human rights training for policemen in
cooperation with AI in 10 states. Human rights groups maintained that
the effect of these programs was limited. However, human rights
activists in many states reported willingness of police authorities to
address their concerns and to deal with problems brought to their
attention.
Respect for human rights and sensitivity to the problems of
minorities and the poor were included in police training in Rio de
Janeiro. An Institute for Public Security, created in 2000 to reform
police organization, recruitment, and training in Rio de Janeiro, made
only limited progress in improving human rights performance of the
police. A number of states have established ombudsmen (see Section 4).
In December the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
concluded its human rights training courses for high-ranking state
military police officers at the Federal Police Academy in Brasilia.
Military police from several states were trained in basic techniques,
including the apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects
without recourse to excessive or unnecessary force.
Sao Paulo's community policing initiative provided training to
about one-fifth of the city's uniformed police force under the state
initiative. Pursuant to the initiative, high-ranking police officials
met with citizens' consultative groups weekly. The uniformed police
also instituted a policy of ``recycling'' policemen involved in
shootings, removing them from patrols for 6 months and offering them
counseling.
Prison conditions throughout the country ranged from poor to
extremely harsh and life threatening. Penal authorities in those states
with the highest prison populations often did not separate young
offenders from adults and petty offenders from violent criminals.
Prison riots were frequent. Discipline was difficult to maintain under
such conditions, and prison officials often resorted to brutal
treatment, including torture. Harsh or dangerous working conditions,
official negligence, poor sanitary conditions, abuse and mistreatment
by guards, and a lack of medical care led to a number of deaths in
prisons (see Section 1.a.). The poor working conditions for prison
guards also encouraged corruption. According to an official in Sao
Paulo State's School of Penitentiary Administration, however, guards
were investigated more aggressively and disciplined more effectively.
This official also noted the 2- to 5-year period required to fire
corrupt police and prison guards had been cut to 8 months.
Sao Paulo State prison officials took steps to improve the quality
of the guard force, including training over 7,000 guards during the
year, with instruction in human rights, infectious diseases, drug
addiction, and ethics. The Sao Paulo State also attempted to improve
conditions by building more prisons and creating committees of
community leaders to monitor prison conditions. Sao Paulo State--like
the states of Parana and Rio Grande do Sul--had a prison ombudsman
program.
Severe overcrowding in prisons and police detention centers was
prevalent and was most critical in the states with the largest prison
populations, including Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do
Sul, Maranhao, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Parana, and
Pernambuco. A national prison census completed in November 2001
indicated that there were approximately 233,000 prisoners in a prison
system designed to accommodate 167,000 prisoners. Construction of
penitentiaries continued but was inadequate to alleviate overcrowding.
Sao Paulo State completed 10 model prisons, or ``resocialization
centers,'' and 5 more were under construction, each designed to hold
210 prisoners. In addition to the resocialization centers, 39
penitentiaries were under construction in Sao Paulo State during the
year. Seven were operational at year's end.
Overcrowding was an even greater problem in police jails than in
penitentiaries. The jails were intended to be temporary holding
facilities; however, due to pretrial delays and overcrowding in state
penitentiaries, almost 53,000 of the 229,000 prisoners resided in local
lockups, awaiting either trial or transfer to state penitentiaries.
According to Sao Paulo State's School of Penitentiary Administration,
approximately 14,000 persons awaiting trial were incarcerated in the
state's local police stations. Another 12,500 who had been tried and
convicted were awaiting transfer to permanent facilities.
Overcrowding, poor conditions, prisoner riots, and accusations of
sexual abuse and torture pervaded Sao Paulo's juvenile detention
centers, known as FEBEM. Early in the year, Maria Luiza Granado was
appointed to oversee Sao Paulo's 57 FEBEM facilities--the sixth FEBEM
president in just over 2 years.
The number of inmate rebellions decreased--a trend that the Public
Prosecutor for Children and Youth attributed to greater efforts by the
authorities to maintain peace during an election year. According to the
Public Prosecutor, the number of complaints of torture against juvenile
inmates in Sao Paulo increased to 93 in the first half of the year.
Construction of new FEBEM facilities continued at a slow pace.
After prison riots in 1999, Sao Paulo State undertook to build 20 new
FEBEM facilities; 10 new facilities were completed and 8 were renovated
by year's end.
On January 2, Fernando Dutra Pinto, the convicted kidnaper of the
daughter of a television personality, died in the Belem Provisionary
Detention Center, in Sao Paulo. An investigation by a University of Sao
Paulo pathologist found that Pinto--who had been attacked by prison
guards on December 10, 2001--had suffered a cut that developed into a
generalized infection. Left untreated, the wound contributed to Pinto's
death. The four guards suspected of having carried out the attack were
not relieved of duty but were transferred to other prisons. The Civil
Police initiated an administrative inquiry into the case. By year's
end, no one had been tried for criminal misconduct.
In the first half of the year, there were four new accusations of
torture at FEBEM's Franco da Rocha site. One youth alleged the
existence of a torture room. The Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) cited
100 percent overcrowding in the facility, leading to ``an extraordinary
state of tension.'' In March two of the directors of the Franco da
Rocha complex were relieved of duty, leading to a 1-day strike by over
90 percent of the guard force.
A July rebellion at the Tatuape FEBEM facility resulted in a number
of injuries but no deaths.
The Public Prosecutor for Children and Youth acknowledged that
FEBEM's Unit 27 of the Raposo Tavares complex had been the subject of
numerous complaints of torture. In November 2001, a judge ordered that
16 guards and 4 directors of the facility be criminally prosecuted for
torture. Despite the court order, the accused remained on duty at the
complex. A subsequent accusation of torture was substantiated and led
to the removal of one of the directors in July.
FEBEM's Parelheiros facility was closed in July at the orders of
both a judge and the governor of Sao Paulo. NGOs and public prosecutors
had protested that juveniles should not be housed in the converted
adult maximum-security prison.
There was no new information on the case of the May 2001 rebellion
at the Tatuape FEBEM facility. Following the rebellion, guards
allegedly beat 78 inmates.
In December a UNICEF Project Coordinator criticized the FEBEM
incarceration system in a press interview. In response to an AI
criticism of the Sao Paulo government, the FEBEM president stated that
600 guards were relieved in 2001 based on abuse allegations, and that
all juveniles were treated in accordance with the law. In May the State
of Sao Paulo reduced the number of public defenders assigned to FEBEM
from 13 to 7. AI expressed its concern over this further reduction in
resources.
In November the IACHR announced plans to investigate systematic
human rights abuses in FEBEM institutions in response to eight specific
cases in which the Sao Paulo State Justice Tribunal had halted
investigations into mistreatment of inmates on the grounds that they
prejudiced ``public security.'' FEBEM responded that such an
investigation would be irrelevant since the facilities already had been
closed.
Prisons generally did not provide adequate protection against
violence inflicted by inmates on one another. In April three inmates,
two of whom were 18 years old, were decapitated by fellow inmates in
the Praia Grande Jail in Santos, Sao Paulo. One was also dismembered.
In the confusion that followed, 10 prisoners escaped. At the time, the
prison, with a capacity of 512, held 788 prisoners.
In September Sao Paulo State closed the Carandiru prison complex,
the scene of a 1992 riot in which state police killed 111 prisoners and
where 16 inmates were killed in a 2001 riot. Carandiru's approximately
7,000 inmates were moved to smaller prisons throughout the state and
other parts of the country.
Although there was no official count, there were numerous prison
riots and rebellions during the year.
In January a prison rebellion provoked by warring factions left 45
dead in the White Bear Penitentiary in Rondonia State. Most of the
deaths appeared to have resulted from prisoner-on-prisoner violence,
although NGOs attributed some of the deaths to use of excessive force
by penal authorities.
Prisoners also were subjected to extremely unhealthy conditions.
Scabies and tuberculosis--diseases uncommon in the general population--
were widespread in Sao Paulo prisons, as were HIV/AIDS and even
leprosy. In December 2001, the Ministry of Justice estimated that 10 to
20 percent of the national prison population was HIV positive. Denial
of first aid and other medical care sometimes was used as a form of
punishment. According to the U.N. Committee on Torture's report,
homosexuals and patients with AIDS were discriminated against in
prisons and often confined in separate cells.
The judiciary's ineffective use of alternative sentencing
contributed to the problem of overcrowding. Only 10 states used
alternative punishments, and only 3 percent of convicted prisoners
received such a sentence.
Authorities attempted to hold pretrial detainees separately from
convicted prisoners; however, due to prison overcrowding, pretrial
detention facilities often were also used to house convicted criminals.
The States of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo provided separate prison
facilities for women; however, in those states, there were no
facilities for women that had only women guards and wardens. Elsewhere
women were held with men in some facilities. Male officers served in
women's prisons, and abuse and extortion of sexual favors were common.
In Rio de Janeiro State, there were only two police districts in which
women were held in gender-segregated short-term jail facilities.
Women's facilities in Sao Paulo's penitentiary system were even more
overcrowded than those for men. There were 1,971 women in facilities
built to accommodate 1,700 female inmates.
It is government policy to permit prison visits by independent
human rights observers, and state prison authorities generally followed
this policy in practice. Federal officials in the Ministry of Justice
responsible for penal matters offered full cooperation to AI, which
reported no significant problems in gaining access to state-run prison
facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention and the Government generally observed
these prohibitions; however, police continued at times to arrest and
detain persons arbitrarily. The Constitution limits arrests to those
caught in the act of committing a crime or those arrested by order of a
judicial authority.
Human rights observers alleged that civil and uniformed police
regularly detained persons illegally to extort money or other favors.
The authorities generally respected the constitutional provision
for a judicial determination of the legality of detention, although
many convicted inmates were detained beyond their sentences due to poor
record keeping. The law permits provisional detention for up to 5 days
under specified conditions during a police investigation, but a judge
may extend this period. In general detainees were allowed prompt access
to family members or a lawyer, but there were cases when detainees--
typically poor and uneducated--were held longer than the provisional
period. Groups that assisted street children claimed that the police
sometimes detained youths without judicial orders or held them
incommunicado.
In criminal cases, defendants arrested in the act of committing a
crime must be charged within 30 days of their arrest. Other defendants
must be charged within 45 days, although this period may be extended.
In practice the backlog in the courts almost always resulted in
extending the period for charging defendants.
Bail was available for most crimes, and defendants for all but the
most serious crimes had the right to a bail hearing.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it was not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is an independent
branch of government; however, it was inefficient, often subject to
political and economic influences--especially at the state level--and
lacked adequate resources. Judicial officials were often poorly
trained. In many instances, poorer, less educated citizens made limited
use of the appeals process that might ensure their rights to a fair
trial.
The judicial system with the federal Supreme Court at its apex
included courts of first instance and appeals courts. States organized
their own judicial systems but must adhere to the basic principles in
the Constitution. Specialized courts dealt with police, labor,
elections, juveniles, and family matters.
Based on the police investigation that led to the formal charges,
prosecutors prepared an indictment for the review of a judge who
determined if the indictment met the legal requirements to bring the
accused to trial. A jury process tried those accused of capital crimes,
including attempted homicide. A judge tried lesser crimes. Defendants
had the right to appeal all convictions to state superior courts. They
had the further right to appeal state court decisions to both the
federal Supreme Court on constitutional grounds and to the federal
Superior Court to contest whether a decision was consistent with the
decision of a court in another state or infringed on federal law. All
defendants sentenced to 20 years in prison or more had the automatic
right to a retrial.
Special police courts composed of four ranking state uniformed
police officials and one civilian judge had jurisdiction over state
uniformed police (except those charged with homicide). Most police
accused of crimes appeared before these courts (which are separate from
the courts-martial of the armed forces, except for the final appeals
court). Within these courts, conviction was often the exception rather
than the rule. With too few judges for the caseload, there were severe
backlogs, and human rights groups noted a lack of willingness by police
to investigate fellow officers. Long delays allowed many cases of
torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of limitations.
The law provides civilian courts with jurisdiction over cases in
which uniformed police officers were accused of homicide (see Section
1.a.). However, except for the most egregious cases, the internal
police investigation determined whether the homicide was intentional,
while the police tribunal decided whether to forward the case to a
civilian court for trial. As a result, few cases were referred to the
civilian courts. The average case took 8 years to reach a definitive
decision. At the appellate court level, a large backlog of cases
hindered the court's ability to ensure fair and expeditious trials.
There continued to be numerous credible reports of state police
officials' involvement in intimidation and killing of witnesses
involved in testifying against police officials (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.).
Defendants were entitled to counsel and must be made fully aware of
the charges against them. There was no presumption of innocence.
According to the Ministry of Justice, approximately 85 percent of
prisoners could not afford an attorney. In such cases, the court must
provide one at public expense; the law requires courts to appoint
private attorneys to represent poor defendants when public defenders
are unavailable; however, often no effective defense was provided.
The right to a fair public trial as provided by law generally was
respected in practice, although in some regions--particularly in rural
areas--the judiciary generally was less professionally capable and more
subject to external influences. Similarly, when cases involved gunmen
hired by landowners to kill squatters or rural union activists, local
police often were less diligent in investigating, prosecutors were
reluctant to initiate proceedings, and judges found reasons to delay
(see Section 1.a.).
Low pay and exacting competitive examinations that could eliminate
as many as 90 percent of the applicants made it difficult to fill
vacancies on the bench. The law requires that trials be held within a
set period of time from the date of the crime; however, due to the
backlog, old cases frequently were dismissed unheard. This practice
reportedly encouraged corrupt judges to delay certain cases purposely
so that they could eventually be dismissed. Defense counsel often
delayed cases in the hope that an appeals court might render a
favorable opinion, and because they were paid according to the amount
of time that they spend on a case.
According to one observer, courts convicted a much higher
percentage of Afro-Brazilian defendants than they did whites (see
Section 5).
There were no reports of political prisoners, although the MST
claimed that its members jailed in connection with land disputes were
in effect political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however,
there were reports that the police conducted searches without a warrant
(see Section 1.c.). Wiretaps authorized by judicial authority were
permitted.
The inviolability of private correspondence generally was
respected.
In midyear a human rights NGO and the press reported that armed
drug traffickers in several slums in Rio de Janeiro forced families out
of their homes if they refused to comply with traffickers' demands or
tolerate illegal drug sales in the neighborhood. In one case,
traffickers allegedly murdered a 15-year-old girl in her home and
caused the rest of her family to flee. In November the NGO reported
that an average of 33 families per week were displaced in this manner.
According to the NGO and press reports, police often assisted the
families in moving, but failed to provide protection that would enable
them to remain in their homes.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution prohibits all
forms of censorship and provides for freedom of speech and a free
press, and the authorities generally respected these rights in
practice; however, there were several attacks against journalists
during the year.
Privately owned newspapers, magazines, and a growing number of on-
line electronic publications vigorously reported and commented on
government performance. Both the print and broadcast media routinely
discussed controversial social and political issues and engaged in
investigative reporting. Most radio and television stations were owned
privately; however, the Government had licensing authority, and
politicians frequently obtained licenses. The Liberal Party controlled
a national network of radio and television stations. Current or former
congressional representatives, some of whom were members of the
committee that oversees communications, owned many television and radio
stations, as well as local newspapers. It was unknown how many media
outlets were controlled indirectly by politicians, since concessions
often were registered in the names of family members or friends.
Penalties for libel under the 1967 Press Law include imprisonment,
which rarely was imposed. The National Newspaper Association (ANJ)
pressed for an updated press law, noting that the existing law does not
establish criteria for calculating maximum fines for libel. The ANJ and
newspaper owners throughout the country complained about huge fines and
jail terms imposed against newspapers for ``moral damage'' that
appeared aimed at crippling news organizations.
Complex electoral campaign laws regulate the broadcast media and
apportion the free use of commercial radio and television broadcast
time granted to political parties during an election campaign. The
short periods for rulings and nonappeal provisions of the regulations
are designed to enforce discipline and ensure that remedies are applied
in a timely manner. Media and free speech advocates generally accepted
the manner in which the campaign laws were enforced.
Foreign publications were distributed widely; prior review of
films, plays, and radio and television programming was used only to
determine a suitable viewing age.
The National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ) and the ANJ
documented a number of violent attacks, including killings and threats,
against journalists. The August 2001 ANJ report--covering the period
August 2000 through July 2001--listed seven cases of physical
aggression against journalists (including one case that involved
Brazilian journalists in Paraguay). The ANJ report noted that seven
journalists were murdered since 1995 and that none of the crimes had
been solved. The ANJ further stated that impunity for crimes committed
against journalists in conjunction with the inappropriate and
inconsistent application of the Press Law impeded the functioning of a
free press.
In October the NGO Reporters without Borders denounced the 1998
murder of journalist Manoel Leal in Itabuna, Bahia, as an attack on
press freedom and called on the authorities to revive the stalled
investigation of the case.
In September Savio Brandao, owner of the Folha do Estado newspaper
in Mato Grosso State, was killed at close range, allegedly by hit men.
The newspaper had been carrying stories on organized crime in the
state. A police chief characterized the murder as ``a carefully
executed crime.'' In October former uniformed police officers Hercules
Araujo Agostinho and Celio de Souza were arrested for the crime and at
year's end were awaiting trial. The Minister of Justice promised
federal assistance in the form of a federal police antiorganized crime
taskforce to assist the State of Mato Grosso's investigation.
In October journalist Felipe Santolia--who had published articles
about corruption in Piaui State and alleged that congressmen in the
state had bought votes--was tied and nailed to a tree in a mock
crucifixion but survived.
On October 23, a regional election tribunal judge in Brasilia
ordered the seizure of all copies of the next day's edition of the
newspaper Correiro Braziliense if it printed the transcript of the
governor's phone conversations that reportedly implicated the governor
in an illegal land deal. The judge acted at the request of the governor
and the Frente Brasilia Solidaria, which backed him in the election.
The judge's order was overturned by the Supreme Election Tribunal.
In June prominent television journalist Tim Lopes was murdered in
Rio de Janeiro; seven persons accused of the crime were arrested in
September, and their trial was pending at year's end. A human rights
NGO reported in November that, as a result of this case, newspaper
editors had instructed their reporters to be more cautious in pursuing
their investigations and to stay out of high risk areas. According to
the Inter-American Press Association, Lopes was the fourth journalist
murdered in Rio de Janeiro State since 1994.
There were no further developments in the case of the August 2001
murder of journalist Mario Coelho de Almeida Filho in Rio de Janeiro.
Coelho was killed the evening before he was to testify in a criminal
defamation lawsuit involving a local politician.
A domestic television journalist, who in August 2001 received
repeated implied death threats after her series of investigative
reports on drug trafficking in Rio de Janeiro's shantytowns, remained
in hiding after failing to receive the police protection she had
requested.
The Government did not impose restrictions on the use of the
Internet; however, federal and state police began to monitor the
Internet to detect on-line recruitment by sex traffickers (see Section
6.f.).
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. Permits were not required for outdoor
political or labor meetings, and such meetings occurred frequently.
On March 25, approximately 150 members of the MST invaded Fazenda
Santa Maria, the farm of a personal friend and business partner of
then-President Cardoso. The invasion came in retaliation for the arrest
of 16 MST leaders during the March 23-24 occupation of President
Cardoso's farm.
In 2000 police injured more than 30 persons while using bullets and
tear gas to disrupt a march protesting ceremonies marking the
quincentennial of the arrival of the Portuguese. Indigenous leaders
filed suit against the police for damages and at year's end continued
to press the Minister of Justice to accelerate a decision in the case.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. In the 2000 census approximately 74 percent of the population
identified themselves as Roman Catholic; however, there was no favored
or state religion. There were no registration requirements for
religions or religious groups, and all faiths were free to establish
places of worship, train clergy, and proselytize. The Government
controlled entry into indigenous lands and required missionary groups
to seek permission from the FUNAI.
Leaders in the Jewish community expressed concern over the
continued appearance of anti-Semitic material on Internet websites
compiled by neo-Nazi and ``skinhead'' groups.
In September a Rio de Janeiro state court upheld a sentence of
community service imposed on a writer for publishing anti-Semitic slurs
in a small-city newspaper. In October a court in Minas Gerais State
imposed a fine of $500 (1,800 reais) on a retired lawyer for using a
racial slur in talking with a 29-year-old stonemason (see Section 5).
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice,
although there were restrictions on entry into protected indigenous
areas, and a parent is not allowed to leave the country with children
under the age of 18 without the permission of the other parent.
A 1997 law provides for asylum and refugee status in accordance
with the principles of the 1951 U. N. Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government provided first asylum
and cooperated with the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were an
estimated 2,894 refugees in the country, mostly from Angola and other
African countries, but also including persons from Iran, Bosnia, and
Kosovo. The Government expanded its resettlement program to accept
UNHCR referral of 100 refugees from Iran, Namibia, and Afghanistan.
During the year, a total of 68 persons were granted refugee status, out
of a total of approximately 531 requests. According to the Ministry of
Justice, the number of refugees granted asylum was significantly lower
than in 2001 due to the end of the Angolan civil war.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Voting is secret and mandatory for all literate
citizens aged 18 to 70, except for military conscripts who may not
vote. It is voluntary for minors from 16 to 18 years of age, for the
illiterate, and for those aged 70 and over.
In the October national elections, Worker's Party candidate Inacio
Luiz Lula da Silva won a 4-year term with over 61 percent of the vote
in the second-round runoff.
The Chamber of Deputies has 513 seats; the Senate has 81 seats. In
the October elections, the PT won 91 Chamber seats and 14 Senate seats,
becoming the largest single party in the Chamber. At year's end, the PT
was negotiating with other parties to build majority coalitions in both
houses.
A September 2001 constitutional amendment limits the President's
power to legislate by ``provisional measure'' (MP). The amendment
limits the validity of presidential MPs to 60 days (renewable once).
The President no longer may issue MPs that address nationality,
citizenship, political rights, legal due process, or the judicial
branch, or that could change the Constitution or the budget (except
under extraordinary circumstances).
Women had full political rights under the Constitution and were
increasingly active in politics and government. Cultural,
institutional, and financial barriers continued to limit women's
participation in political life. In the October elections, there were
2,647 female candidates (14 percent of the total), compared with 1,778
female candidates in 1998 (12 percent of the total). Representation of
women in the national Congress increased from 6.1 percent to 8.4
percent after the October elections: 42 women were elected to the
Chamber of Deputies and 8 to the Senate. Incoming President Lula da
Silva nominated four women to hold cabinet-level positions, including
that of Secretary of State for Women's Affairs, which previously was
supervised by the Ministry of Justice and now reports directly to the
President.
Diverse ethnic and racial groups, including indigenous people, were
free to participate politically.
In September the regional electoral tribunal in Acre State ruled
that incumbent Governor Jorge Viana could not stand for reelection
because of alleged campaign law abuses. The TSE overturned the
decision.
In September several voters in poor regions of the Federal District
alleged that they had received threats from representatives of the
governor and other incumbent candidates campaigning for reelection.
Voters alleged that they were warned that if they did not vote for the
specified candidates, health and other social benefits would be cut
off.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local and national human rights groups generally operated without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Federal officials usually were cooperative and
responsive to their views. Federal and state officials in many cases
actively solicited the aid and cooperation of NGOs in addressing human
rights problems; however, human rights monitors occasionally were
threatened and harassed for their efforts to identify and take action
against human rights abusers, especially members of the state police
forces.
AI denounced death threats made during the year against more than
50 human rights activists working in Espirito Santo State and called on
the state government to do more to investigate human rights abuses and
organized crime. AI also challenged President Cardoso to do more to
assist the Ministry of Justice's investigation into the abuses in
Espirito Santo.
Denise Frossard, a retired judge working for Transparency
International, received death threats. Former military policeman Jadir
Simeone Duarte--who allegedly received an offer of $270,000 (1 million
reais) to kill Frossard--was arrested before he could commit the
murder.
The Justice Ministry's National Secretariat of Human Rights
administered and sponsored programs to reduce violence among the poor,
to train police officials in human rights practices, and to combat
discrimination against blacks, women, children, indigenous peoples, the
elderly, and persons with disabilities.
During the year, the Government appointed Paulo Sergio Pinheiro,
former U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burundi and the U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar, as the new Secretary
for Human Rights. In October 2001, the Government established a Federal
Commission Against Torture (see Section 1.c.).
A number of states have ombudsmen (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
However, some NGOs and human rights observers questioned the
independence of some of the ombudsmen. All ombudsmen offices suffered
from insufficient resources.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race,
religion, or nationality; however, discrimination against women,
blacks, and indigenous people continued unabated, and there was
widespread violence against homosexuals. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) noted that significant differences in wages affected
women and blacks, particularly in rural areas. A 1997 law provides
prison penalties and fines for racist acts, including promulgation of
pejorative terms for ethnic or racial groups, use of the swastika, or
acts of discrimination based on sex, religion, age, or ethnic origin.
There were no known convictions under this law.
There continued to be reports of violence against homosexuals,
although it was not always clear that the victim's sexual orientation
was the reason for the attack. The Gay Group of Bahia (GGB), the
country's best known homosexual rights organization, and AI documented
the existence of skinhead, neo-Nazi, and ``machista'' gangs that
attacked suspected homosexuals in cities including Rio de Janeiro, Sao
Paulo, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, and Brasilia. In some cases, these
gangs included police officers (see Section 1.c.).
The GGB claimed that 132 homosexuals--male and female--were killed
in 2001. Transvestite prostitutes--the most visible homosexual group--
were at greatest greater risk of violence; there were reports of police
abuse of transvestites (see Section 1.c.). The police reportedly
investigated 46 murders related to homosexuality.
In September Igor Xavier was reportedly killed in Minas Gerais
State by an antigay farmer. The farmer, who admitted the shooting,
claimed that the victim abused his 19-year-old son; however, evidence
pointed to an elaborately planned murder. According to witnesses, the
farmer met Xavier at a bar, took him home, shot him twice at close
range, and dumped the body on the side of a rural highway. The farmer's
family members later helped him clean up the murder scene.
In April Jose Marcio Santos Almeida, a known homosexual, was stoned
and beaten in a small town in Alagoas State. Before dying the following
day, Almeida named his attackers, who were arrested and remained in
police custody at year's end. His death was labeled a hate crime. A
2000 survey conducted on the killing of homosexuals registered 28
deaths in Sao Paulo, 18 in Pernambuco, and 10 in Alagoas. Bahia State
allegedly recorded 1,960 homosexual-related killings between 1980 and
2000.
In the case of the 2000 beating death in Sao Paulo of Edson Neris
da Silva--seen holding hands with another man--a court sentenced two
alleged gang members to 21 years in prison, while a third suspect
received a lighter sentence. The status of the court cases against 15
other defendants in the case was unknown.
The Secretariat of State Security of Rio de Janeiro, in partnership
with NGOs, continued to operate a hot line for complaints of violence
or other crimes against homosexuals, as well as for complaints of
prejudice, discrimination, or other crimes based on race, ethnicity,
color, religion, or national origin. The offices in police headquarters
where both hot lines were located also offered professional counseling
to victims of such offenses.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic violence, which were both widespread and
underreported. Most major cities and towns had special police offices
to deal with such crimes against women; however, reporting crimes and
receiving help continued to be a problem for women living in remote
areas sometimes great distances from the nearest special office. For
example, the large but sparsely populated states of Acre and Roraima
each had only one such office.
In Rio de Janeiro an integrated center for support to women victims
of violence or discrimination, which opened in March 2001, provided
psychological and legal assistance to 130 women per month and had a hot
line to encourage women to register complaints. Women who consulted the
center about domestic violence could stay at women's shelters run by
the city of Rio de Janeiro and a smaller town. Demand by women and
their children to stay in the shelters exceeded their capacity.
Each state secretariat for public security operated ``women's
stations'' (delegacias da mulher). However, the quality of services
provided varied widely, and the availability was especially limited in
isolated areas. The stations were intended to provide the following
services for victims of domestic violence: Psychological counseling; a
``shelter home'' for victims of extremely serious abuses who had no
place to go; hospital treatment for rape victims, including treatment
for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases; and initiation of
criminal cases by investigating and forwarding evidence to the courts.
However, a November 2001 Ministry of Justice report revealed that many
of the women's stations fell far short of standards. For example, 20
percent lacked a conventional telephone line, 53 percent lacked police
officers trained in dealing with violence against women, and 77 percent
did not have an officer on duty 24 hours a day. In Rio de Janeiro
State, the women's police stations registered 1,364 cases of sexual
violence against women during the year, a 2.4 percent increase over the
1,332 cases in 2001.
The sentences for rape varied from 8 to 10 years. An offender
accused of domestic violence in a case that did not involve a serious
offense and carried penalties of less than 1 year's imprisonment could
receive alternative sentencing with no jail term. A national study of
rape cases carried out by a group of Sao Paulo academics indicated that
family members committed roughly 70 percent of rapes.
Spousal rape is illegal; however, men who committed crimes against
women, including sexual assault and murder, were unlikely to be brought
to trial. A 1999 study indicated that 70 percent of criminal complaints
regarding domestic violence against women were suspended without a
conclusion. Only 2 percent of criminal complaints of violence against
women led to convictions. In 1998 the National Movement for Human
Rights (NMHR) reported that female murder victims were 30 times more
likely to have been killed by current or former husbands or lovers than
by others, a rate that the NMHR believed still continued.
Adult prostitution is not illegal; however, various associated
activities, such as running an establishment of prostitution, are
illegal.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution was a serious
problem (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment is a criminal offense, punishable by 1 to 2 years
in jail. In addition to its application in the workplace, the law
encompasses sexual advances between family members, individuals in
educational institutions, and service providers or clients. In the
workplace, it applies only in hierarchical situations, where the
harasser is of higher rank or position than the victim.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on gender in
employment or wages and provides for 120 days of paid maternity leave.
However, the provision against wage discrimination rarely was enforced.
According to a study conducted by the Getulio Vargas Foundation, women
had to study 25 percent more in order to receive the same salary as
men. On average, each additional year of studies yielded a 10 percent
salary increase for men, and only an 8 percent increase for women.
A 2000 study by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
(IBGE) indicated that in the country's six largest metropolitan areas,
the median income for women was 67 percent that for men; 1998
government statistics indicated that women with a high-school education
or less earned, on average, 63 percent of the salaries earned by men
with comparable education. Afro-Brazilian women earned on average 26
percent of a white male's salary. A 2001 Ministry of Labor survey
reported that the average starting salary for high school educated
women in Sao Paulo was one-third less than the average starting salary
for high school educated men. According to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MLE), Centers for the Prevention of Workplace
Discrimination existed in 16 states. These centers, which were housed
in regional bureaus of the Ministry, promoted programs to end
discrimination in the workplace and cultivated partnerships with other
organizations that combat discrimination. The centers also served as
clearinghouses for allegations of discrimination.
The Maternity Leave Law prohibits employers from requiring
applicants or employees to take pregnancy tests or present
sterilization certificates; however, some employers sought
sterilization certificates from female job applicants or tried to avoid
hiring women of childbearing age. Employers found violating the law are
subject to a jail term ranging from 1 to 2 years, while the company
must pay a fine equal to 10 times the salary of its highest-paid
employee. At year's end, there was no information on enforcement of
this law.
In December in one of his first appointments, incoming President
Lula da Silva named a woman to the newly created cabinet-level position
of Secretary of State for Women's Affairs.
Children.--Millions of children continued to suffer from the
poverty afflicting their families, worked to survive, and failed to get
an education. Schooling is free and compulsory between the ages of 7
and 14 and was available in all parts of the country; however, not all
children attended school regularly. The rate of school enrollment of
children aged 7 to 14 increased from 89 percent in 1994 to 95 percent
in 1999, but there were still 1.1 million children in this age group
who did not attend school. Repetition rates and the poor quality of
public schools continued to be a problem. Fully 40 percent of first-
graders repeated the year, and in a number of states first-graders were
more likely to fail than to pass. Girls and boys attended school in
roughly comparable numbers.
In 2000 UNICEF reported that each year nearly 100,000 children died
before their first birthday, almost half during the perinatal period.
Between 1989 and 1999, the national infant mortality rate declined from
51 to 34 per 1,000 live births; however, in some states, such as
Alagoas, it was as high as 72 per 1,000, and some municipalities had
rates of 110 per 1,000.
A 2001 UNICEF report based on 1999 data estimated that over 20
million children and adolescents--almost 39 percent of the total--lived
in poverty. The Inter-American Development Bank estimated in 2001 that
30 million children lived below the poverty line.
Child abuse was widespread, but the 2001 UNICEF report noted that
there were no useful nationwide statistics on its extent.
Sexual exploitation of children and child prostitution remained a
significant problem throughout the country. In association with the
Ministry of Justice, the NGO ABRAPIA since 1997 has operated a
telephone hot line to register complaints of sexual abuse against
children and adolescents. In the 5-year period ending December 2001,
the hot line received a monthly average of 40 complaints nationwide, of
which one-third came from the States of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
In the first 6 months of the year, the hot line received 797
complaints, compared with 303 in the first 6 months of 2001. ABRAPIA
also administered the ``SOS-child'' program in Rio de Janeiro State
that registered complaints of domestic abuse against children and
provided medical and social assistance.
A 1999 study by the Reference Center on Children and Adolescents
(CECRIA), an entity within the National Human Rights Secretariat,
indicated that patterns of sexual exploitation of children corresponded
to the distinct economic and social profile of the country's region. In
the northern Amazonian region, sexual exploitation of children centered
around brothels that catered to mining settlements. In the large urban
centers, children, principally girls, who left home to escape abuse or
sexual exploitation often prostituted themselves on the streets in
order to survive. In the cities along the northeast coast, sexual
tourism exploiting children was prevalent and involved networks of
travel agents, hotel workers, taxi drivers, and others who actively
recruited children and even trafficked them outside the country (see
Section 6.f.). Child prostitution also developed in the areas served by
the country's navigable rivers, particularly in ports and at
international borders. The report noted that although trafficking
developed in part to meet the demands of foreigners, the local
population sustained it. In 2000 the ILO reported that observers had
cited over 3,000 girls who were subjected to debt servitude and forced
into prostitution in Rondonia State.
A June law lengthened the maximum sentence to 10 years in prison
for persons who manage brothels that exploit child prostitutes. In
December the Ministry of Justice announced a program in cooperation
with the U.N. Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to combat trafficking in
persons for sexual exploitation--the National Plan to Combat Sexual
Exploitation of Children (see Section 6.f.).
In 2000 the Government instituted the Sentinel Program to combat
the sexual exploitation of minors. The program envisioned construction
of 200 centers in capital cities and areas where sexual exploitation
was prevalent, with multiprofessional staffs to assist victims of
sexual abuse and exploitation. When necessary, staff also placed
victims in foster homes. As of September, Sentinel included 40 centers
throughout the country.
Trafficking in children for the purpose of prostitution was a
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
Child labor was a serious problem (see Section 6.d.).
There were no reliable figures on the number of street children.
Some were homeless, but the majority returned to a home at night. In
2000 a study in the city of Sao Paulo found 609 children living
permanently on the street; a much greater number of children spent
their days on the streets but had families with whom they spent the
night.
The city of Rio de Janeiro, in cooperation with NGOs, provided 41
shelters and group homes, but the shelters reportedly were overcrowded
and the staff was inadequately trained; two of the shelters closed
during the year. Drug use, particularly glue sniffing and crack, was
increasingly prevalent among street children. NGOs reported that
extreme poverty at home or sexual abuse by fathers and stepfathers were
the principal reasons that many children chose to live in the streets.
An IGBE study reported that 47 percent of Sao Paulo street children
came from families that earned less than $150 (540 reais) per month.
Police killings of street children continued. In December 2001,
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson stated that
police violence against street children was a major concern. She
specifically expressed concern about the kidnaping of street children
for adoption and sexual abuse.
From 1990 to 2000, there were 21 murders of boys between the ages
of 9 and 13 in Maranhao State, many of whom bore signs of sexual
assault. In 2000 Justica Global and the Macros Passerini Defense Fund
filed a complaint with the IACHR accusing the state government and the
federal authorities of failing to investigate the crimes; in November
2001 the IACHR gave the Government 2 months to investigate and halt the
killings. There were no known developments in the cases by year's end.
Youth were both victims and perpetrators of violence. Of all deaths
of 15- to 19-year-olds, 72 percent were due to causes such as homicide,
suicide, and traffic accidents; approximately 85 percent of the victims
had been sexually exploited. These violent deaths reduced by at least 3
years the average life expectancy of men. Homicide was the leading
cause of death for children aged 10 to 14, and only 1.9 percent of
their murderers served prison sentences.
The News Agency for Children's Rights closely tracked stories in
the media, published studies, and recognized media outlets that
effectively covered child welfare issues. UNICEF worked in cooperation
with the media organization Rede Globo to coordinate the Child Hope
campaign.
Persons with Disabilities.--The Constitution contains several
provisions for persons with disabilities, stipulating a minimum wage,
educational opportunities, and access to public buildings and public
transportation. However, groups that worked with persons with
disabilities reported that state governments failed to meet the legally
mandated targets for educational opportunities and work placement. A
1991 law stipulates percentages of vacancies that businesses must
reserve for persons with disabilities: 2 percent in firms over 100
employees; 3 percent in firms over 300 employees, and 5 percent in
firms over 500 employees. In 2001 in Rio de Janeiro State, the Ministry
of Labor began on-site inspections of firms to encourage compliance
with the law; similarly, a Federal District information campaign to
encourage compliance continued. The Rio de Janeiro State government's
employment bank for persons with physical, auditory, or visual
disabilities continued to place job applicants. At least two NGOs in
Rio de Janeiro State offered job placement services for persons with
disabilities, and demand for their services expanded during the year as
businesses sought to comply with the employment law.
There was little progress nationwide on eliminating architectural
barriers. A December 2001 city of Rio de Janeiro law requires
multifamily condominiums to make alterations ensuring access to
handicapped residents. In the city of Rio de Janeiro, the disabled had
little or no access to buses (the main public transportation), subway,
phone booths, and many other public facilities. In 1999 Rio de Janeiro
mandated bus companies to make a specific number of buses on certain
routes accessible to wheelchair users within 3 months; however, there
were reportedly no buses in the city adapted for wheelchairs. In the
city of Rio de Janeiro, bus companies were required to provide free
passes to persons with disabilities. The Rio de Janeiro State
government also created interagency committees to consult with NGOs on
how to provide more access for persons with disabilities to buildings,
employment opportunities, and competitive sports. During the year, a
state housing program delivered 86 new houses equipped for handicapped
residents, implementing a policy that 10 percent of publicly provided
homes shall be so equipped. To assist visually impaired persons, some
private firms have implemented Braille instructions for shopping and
placing orders.
The country made significant advances in expanding the availability
of special instruction for children with disabilities. In 1997 only 43
percent of school districts offered special education programs,
compared with 59 percent in 1999. The availability of such programs
varied greatly by region: In the northeast, only 37 percent of school
districts had such programs, while they were available in 81 percent of
school districts in the southernmost three states.
There were over 7,300 instances of persons being committed to
mental institutions during the year. There were no statistics available
on the total number of patients in mental institutions. Some nonviolent
patients spent their entire lives in institutions. The Government paid
hospitals about $12 (28 reais) per day for each patient. A 2000 Chamber
of Deputies' Human Rights Commission report of conditions of mental
hospitals and asylums cited many examples of understaffed and poorly
administered hospitals, substandard living conditions for many
patients, and severely overcrowded and dirty facilities. A 2001
patients' bill of rights law establishes clear criteria for commitment
into mental institutions and gives the Public Minister (an independent
watchdog agency) an opportunity to review each case of involuntary or
compulsory commitment.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution grants the indigenous
population broad rights, including the protection of their cultural
patrimony and the exclusive use of their traditional lands; however,
the Government did not secure these rights for indigenous people in
practice. The Government estimated that over half lived in poverty in
communities whose traditional ways of life were threatened on a variety
of fronts.
A March 2001 study by the Social Economic Institute found that the
indigenous population grew by 3.5 percent in 2000, to a total of
approximately 350,000 persons, spread among 216 ``nations.'' The report
noted many problems faced by indigenous people, including disease and
poor health care, loss of native culture, and recurring trespasses and
illegal mining and extraction activities on indigenous lands. Road
construction and deforestation were also threats.
Indigenous leaders and activists complained that indigenous people
had only limited participation in decisions taken by the Government
affecting their land, cultures, traditions, and allocation of national
resources. They also criticized the Government for devoting
insufficient resources to health care, other basic services, and
protection of indigenous reserves from outsiders. Illegal mining,
logging, and ranching were endemic on indigenous land.
The National Indian Foundation was responsible for the coordination
and implementation of indigenous policies. The President appoints the
head of FUNAI; it was organized into 52 regions with directors
appointed directly by the FUNAI president.
The 1988 Constitution charged the Federal government with
demarcating indigenous areas within 5 years. Reportedly, the Government
had completed demarcation of almost all of the total area of recognized
indigenous territory. At least 400 of the 600 recognized indigenous
areas had reached the final registration stage, 136 remained to be
demarcated legally, and 64 had yet to be processed. Identified
indigenous territory constituted 12 percent of the national territory.
The Constitution provides indigenous peoples with the exclusive
beneficial use of the soil, waters, and minerals on indigenous lands;
the Government administers the lands but was obliged to consider the
views of the affected communities regarding development or use of the
land, and the communities had the right to ``participate'' in the
benefits gained from such use. However, legislation regulating mining
on indigenous lands pending before the Congress since 1995 has never
been passed.
Many indigenous lands were exploited illegally by nonindigenous
persons for mining, logging, and agriculture. Nonindigenous persons
destroyed the environment and wildlife, spread disease and provoked
violent confrontations. FUNAI acknowledged that it did not have the
resources to protect indigenous lands from encroachment and depended on
the federal police--an understaffed and poorly equipped agency--for law
enforcement on indigenous lands.
The Ministry of Public Health was responsible for delivery of
mandated health care to indigenous people. According to health workers'
unions, poor working conditions and lack of resources from the
Government made it difficult for health workers to travel into
indigenous areas to provide sufficient medical care. Due partly to the
Government's failure to provide legally mandated medical care,
indigenous people periodically suffered epidemics of malaria, measles,
and tuberculosis; however, there were significant advances in
indigenous health since 1999. For example, the incidence of registered
cases of malaria among the Yanomami fell from 8.3 percent in January
2000 to 0.3 percent in September 2001, while infant mortality dropped
significantly, although it was still higher than in the general
population.
Human rights groups and the Human Rights Commission of the Chamber
of Deputies criticized the alleged sexual abuse of members of
indigenous groups by soldiers in army units stationed in Roraima State.
The Minister of Defense denied the allegations, stating that any sexual
relations that took place were consensual in nature and usually
involved soldiers of indigenous origin.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the law prohibits
racial discrimination, darker-skinned citizens frequently encountered
discrimination.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture noted that the majority of
the victims of torture were of Afro-Brazilian descent (see Section
1.c.). Research by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)
noted a disproportionately high rate of police killings of Afro-
Brazilians. Persons of color were five times more likely to be shot or
killed in the course of a law enforcement action than were persons
perceived to be white. The Sao Paulo police ombudsman claimed that the
majority of victims in police killings were young black men from
impoverished areas on the periphery of major cities.
The law specifically prohibits, among other practices, denial of
public or private facilities, employment, or housing to anyone based on
race. The law also prohibits, and provides jail terms for the
incitement of racial discrimination or prejudice and the dissemination
of racially offensive symbols and epithets. The media reported arrests
of several persons charged with using racial slurs during the year.
A federal government quota system that went into effect in June
required that at least 20 percent of new hires be Afro-Brazilian, 20
percent women, and 5 percent persons with disabilities. There were
exceptions; for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not
automatically hire 20 percent Afro-Brazilians, but instead will offer
scholarships to 20 Afro-Brazilians to help them prepare for the
diplomatic exam.
In its first 22 months of operation (through October), a hot line
created by Rio de Janeiro State received slightly more than 800
accusations of racist offenses, of which 104 were referred to the
criminal justice system and 48 were being actively investigated or
prosecuted.
A study of 22 states, done at Sao Paulo's Pontifical Catholic
University, showed that between 1995 and 2000, the authorities received
1,050 discrimination complaints, of which 651 were investigated and 394
were brought to trial; however, there were no convictions. The study
noted that this record reflected the difficulty of proving acts of
racism and demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the existing antiracism
statutes on the part of lawmakers, public attorneys, judges, and
lawyers.
IPEA reported that citizens of African descent--constituting
approximately 45 percent of the population--represented 60 percent of
the poorest segment of society and received 7 percent of the national
income. Studies also showed that rates of police torture, court
convictions, child labor, illiteracy, and infant mortality were higher
among citizens of African descent than among whites (see Section 1.c.).
Education played a role in perpetuating racial disparities. The
difference in average number of years of education between a black
person and white person had not changed in 40 years. Approximately 60
percent of Afro-Brazilians in the lowest social class had less than 3
years of education, compared with 37 percent of whites. A 1999 IPEA
study found that the illiteracy rate among Afro-Brazilians was 20
percent, compared with 8 percent for whites and the national average of
13 percent. Afro-Brazilians were not admitted to universities in large
numbers, in part due to economic pressures and the low quality of
public education. Only 5 percent of university students and 2.2 percent
of university graduates were Afro-Brazilian.
Some educational institutions and official entities instituted
programs to narrow the educational gap between blacks and whites. The
Steve Biko Institute in the city of Salvador provided extra classes to
help 200 Afro-Brazilian students gain admission to universities in
Bahia State; about 180 students were enrolled in the classes paying
tuition of approximately $35 dollars (80 reais) per month. At least
three nongovernmental projects helped Afro-Brazilians pass university
entrance exams in Rio de Janeiro.
In February the Governor of the Federal District, Joaquim Roriz,
was accused of being a racist after comments made during a speech in
the city of Brazlandia. Angered by Worker's Party protesters, Roriz
asked the audience to boo Marinaldo Nascimento, whom he slurred with a
racial epithet.
Concern continued over the appearance of racist material on the
Internet. In June the Sao Paulo State legislature and various NGOs
requested that the Attorney General investigate who was responsible for
disseminating neo-Nazi, racist, and discriminatory content on five
Internet sites and submitted a 100-page document, providing examples of
language inciting attacks on people of color and Jews in Sao Paulo, Rio
de Janeiro, and Belem (Para), as well as a threat to set fire to the
City Hall in Caxias do Sul (Rio Grande do Sul). The document cited
texts exhorting the ``preservation of the pure race'' by means of
violent attacks. The Attorney General's investigation continued at
year's end.
There was no further information regarding investigations into the
threats two members of the Sao Paulo State assembly's Human Rights
Committee reportedly received in 2000 from a group identifying itself
as ``raca pura'' (pure race).
Afro-Brazilian women were particularly disadvantaged by
discrimination. An IPEA researcher found that women of African descent
suffered discrimination in the work place: Nationwide, white men had an
average monthly salary of about $269 (726 reais), white women $212 (573
reais), Afro-Brazilian men $125 (337 reais), and Afro-Brazilian women
$107 (289 reais). The study also found that white men had an
unemployment rate of 7.3 percent, black men 11 percent, white women
12.5 percent, and black women 16.5 percent.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide for union representation of all workers (except members of the
military, the uniformed police, and firemen) but imposes a
hierarchical, unitary system funded by a mandatory union tax on workers
and employers. New unions must register with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, which accepts the registration if no objections are filed
by other unions. Registration may be contested by other unions that
represent workers in the same geographical area and professional
category. In the case of such an objection, the MLE's Secretariat for
Labor Relations has 15 days to consider the validity of the objection.
If the objection is found to be valid, the MLE does not register the
union and union organizers may challenge this decision in the labor
courts.
The 1988 Constitution stipulates certain restrictions, such as
``unicidade'' (``one-per-city''), which limits freedom of association
by prohibiting multiple, competing unions of the same professional
category in a given geographical area. Most elements of the labor
movement, as well as the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU), criticized the retention of unicidade.
In practice a number of competing unions were allowed to exist
among the thousands of local unions; however, the MLE and the courts
actively enforced the principle of unicidade in decisions regarding the
registration of new unions.
Approximately 16 percent of the work force was unionized, but
nearly twice this percentage was charged a mandatory union tax and also
was covered by collective bargaining agreements (see Section 6.b.).
Most informal sector workers, including self-employed workers and those
not formally registered with the Labor Ministry, fell outside the
official union structure. As a result, they did not enjoy union
representation and were usually unable to exercise fully their labor
rights. The informal sector grew rapidly over the previous decade and
accounted for approximately half of the labor force. In the
agricultural sector, 70 percent of workers were unregistered.
The Ministry of Labor estimated that there were approximately
11,000 unions across the country. Local unions legally may affiliate
with state federations and national confederations in their
professional category. Although the law makes no provision for central
labor organizations that include multiple categories of workers, there
were four major centrals: The Workers' Unitary Central (CUT), the Forca
Sindical (Union Force or FS), the Workers' General Confederation (CGT),
and the Social Democratic Union (SDS). Labor centrals channeled much of
the political activity of the labor movement, organized strikes
involving multiple categories, and represented workers in governmental
and tripartite councils. Centrals did not have legal standing to
represent professional categories of workers in collective bargaining.
The Constitution prohibits government interference in labor unions.
Unions and their leadership generally were independent of the
Government and of the political parties; however, there were some
exceptions. A number of labor leaders also held prominent positions in
political parties. Labor organizations often formed alliances with
political parties and social movements to advocate for specific issues.
For example, the CUT joined with the National Conference of Bishops,
the Landless Movement, and a variety of NGOs to conduct a national
plebiscite on debt repayment in 2000 and to organize the World Social
Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2001. The same forces organized a
national ``plebiscite'' on participation in the Free Trade Agreement of
the Americas during the year. The major union centrals had close
relationships with left-of-center political parties and often
coordinated actions with party leaders. The October elections
demonstrated the closeness of these ties: FS leader Paulo Pereira da
Silva (Paulinho) served as vice presidential candidate for Ciro Gomes,
and CUT Metalworkers' president Roberto Marinho ran for Deputy Governor
of Sao Paulo alongside Workers Party candidate Jose Genoino.
There were no further developments in the police investigation into
the November 2001 murder of Aldamir Carlos dos Santos, the president of
Sintergia, the electrical workers' union in Rio de Janeiro.
Intimidation and killings of rural labor union organizers and their
agents continued to be a problem. The CPT reported that labor leaders
were victimized by a campaign of violence in rural areas, with the
perpetrators enjoying relative impunity (see Section 1.a.). Only 85 of
the 1,222 killings of rural labor leaders and land reform activists
registered by the CPT since 1985 came to trial, and only 8 persons were
convicted. The CPT reported that 18 rural labor leaders were murdered
through the first 8 months of the year.
In July labor activist Jose Pinheiro Lima and his wife and son were
killed near Maraba, Para. The authorities charged a landowner with
ordering the deaths but released him from custody.
Para continued to be the state with the most violence directed
toward labor leaders. According to leaders of the National
Confederation of Agricultural Workers, there was an organized campaign
in Para State to kill rural labor leaders. Catholic Church sources
reported that eight activists were killed in Para State in 2001, and
through August there were six more killings, including those of MST
leader Ivo Lindo do Carmo and union official Bartolomeu Morais de
Silva. CPT leaders in Para State claimed that gunmen hired by estate
owners committed most of these murders. They noted that those who hire
gunmen had become more adept at hiding their participation and
increasingly targeted labor leaders with significant experience in
organizing and leading land appropriations.
In May a local judge in Rio Maria, Para, ordered that a trial of
two men (including the former mayor) charged with the 1985 murder of
Joao Canuto, the first president of the local rural workers' union,
should proceed; the trial had not started by year's end. Canuto's
daughter, Luzia Canuto, received death threats as a result of the case.
Human rights groups and land reform activists criticized a jury
verdict in June in Paraiba absolving a landowner of guilt in the 1983
slaying of rural labor leader Margarida Maria Alves. The case was also
the subject of an action in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The Constitution prohibits the dismissal of employees who are
candidates for or holders of union leadership positions. However, the
authorities did not effectively enforce laws that protect union members
from discrimination. Those who were dismissed often must resort to a
lengthy court process for relief. Labor courts charged with resolving
these and other disputes involving unfair dismissal, working
conditions, salary disputes, and other grievances were slow and
cumbersome. It was estimated that more than 3 million complaints
languished in the labor court system at year's end. Although most
complaints were resolved in the first hearing, the appeals process
introduced many delays, and some cases remained unresolved for 5 to 10
years. According to the Supreme Labor Court, over 2 million complaints
were registered annually in labor courts.
The Government sought to reduce this backlog and increase the
efficiency of the courts. A 2000 law permits cases with relatively low
monetary claims to be adjudicated in one meeting with a judge within 30
days of the filing; another law promotes the formation of employee/
employer conciliation commissions designed to resolve grievances before
they reach the labor courts. Approximately 1,400 such commissions
operated, and approximately half of the complaints reaching labor
courts could be handled with the expedited procedure. Nonetheless,
lengthy delays remained frequent.
Unions and centrals freely affiliated with international trade
union organizations; the CUT, FS, and CGT were affiliated with the
ICFTU.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right of workers to organize and to
engage in collective bargaining. Businesses and unions worked to
improve collective bargaining by training negotiators, but many local
representatives had not received this training and remained unprepared
to represent members effectively in negotiations. The labor justice
system, which may set wages and working conditions when negotiations
break down and either party appeals to labor courts, continued to
weaken collective bargaining. Although such appeals occurred less
frequently than a decade ago, the possibility of a better result in
labor courts still led to a lack of bargaining in good faith by parties
in numerous negotiations.
Collective bargaining was widespread in the formal sector. In the
first 10 months of the year, 17,741 agreements were registered with the
Ministry of Labor, compared with 21,963 agreements in all of 2001. The
law obliges unions to negotiate on behalf of all registered workers in
the professional category and geographical area they represent,
regardless of whether an employee pays voluntary membership dues to the
union. Unions typically negotiated with employer associations (also
called unions) that represent companies with employees in the same area
and occupational category.
A 1995 regulation that ended inflation indexing of wages also
allowed for mediation of wage settlements with consent of the parties
involved and provided greater latitude for collective bargaining. Free
mediation services were provided by the Ministry of Labor and the
federal Labor Prosecutor's Office (MPT), and unions and employers also
may choose a private mediator from a registry kept by the Labor
Ministry. According to the MLE, in the first 10 months of the year,
more than 8,000 collective bargaining agreements used mediation
services, compared with over 10,000 in all of 2001.
The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike, except
for the military, police, and firemen. The law stipulates that a strike
may be ruled ``abusive'' by labor courts and be punishable by law if a
number of conditions are not met, such as maintaining essential
services during a strike and notifying employers at least 48 hours
before the beginning of a walkout. Failure to end a strike after a
labor court decision is punishable by law. The Government generally did
not interfere with the right to strike, provided that all laws were
obeyed. Employers are prohibited from hiring substitute workers during
a legal strike and from firing workers for strike-related activity
provided that the strike is not ruled abusive. However, in practice,
employers did fire strike organizers for reasons ostensibly unrelated
to strikes, and legal recourse related to retaliatory discharge was
often a protracted process.
The number of strikes diminished in the past several years. During
the year, teachers, health workers, port officials, transport workers,
stevedores, health-care providers, and metalworkers all engaged in
strikes.
The Congress has not passed enabling legislation for labor code
provisions permitting strikes in the public sector; however, in
practice the Government seldom interfered with the right of government
workers to strike. Numerous public sector unions at the federal, state,
and local levels held strikes during the year to demand salary
increases. According to the Interunion Department of Socioeconomic
Studies and Statistics (DIEESE), the Federal government had not given a
general salary increase to federal employees in 7 years, resulting in a
significant erosion of real earnings. Public sector unions who struck
during the year included social security workers, professors, judicial
workers, and customs agents.
In 2001 civil and uniformed police walked out in many states to
demand salary increases and safer working conditions. While civil
police are allowed to form unions and conduct strikes, uniformed police
are prohibited from organizing.
Labor law applies equally in the country's four free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children; however,
forced labor and trafficking of workers were reported in the majority
of states (see Section 6.f.). The practice occurred most commonly in
the rural north and central west of the country, in activities such as
forest clearing, logging, charcoal production, raising of livestock,
and agriculture. Forced labor typically involved young men drawn from
the impoverished northeast, but women and children also were engaged in
activities such as charcoal production. Children involved in forced
labor typically worked alongside their parents. Although indigenous
people constituted a small percentage of the overall population, they
were especially vulnerable to forced labor schemes when separated from
their communities (see Section 5). Labor inspectors also found
immigrants working in conditions of forced labor in Sao Paulo.
According to government officials, Bolivian, Korean, and Chinese
laborers were exploited in urban sweatshops under conditions that may
involve fraud or coercion.
The CPT estimated that approximately 15,000 workers were trapped in
forced labor schemes throughout the country, although it acknowledged
that the hidden nature of the practice made estimates inexact. Labor
intermediaries (``gatos'') trafficked most forced laborers to the
remote estates where they worked (see Section 6.f.). At the worksite,
laborers were forced to work in brutal conditions until they repaid
inflated debts related to the costs of travel, tools, clothing, or
food. Armed guards sometimes were used to retain laborers, but the
remoteness of the location, confiscation of documents, and threats of
legal action or physical harm usually were sufficient to prevent
laborers from fleeing. The CPT reported that fleeing workers were
killed or beaten to set an example to others at the worksite. Dire
poverty, low levels of education, and workers' lack of awareness about
their rights contributed to their vulnerability to forced labor
schemes. The MLE reported that nearly 80 percent of forced laborers had
no official documentation and that most were illiterate.
The Penal Code provides that violators of forced or compulsory
labor laws may be sentenced up to 8 years in prison. The law also
provides penalties for various crimes related to forced labor, such as
recruiting, transporting, or obliging workers to incur debt as part of
a forced labor scheme (see Section 6.f.). However, the ILO expressed
concern that the effective abolition of forced labor was hindered by
failure to impose effective penalties, the impunity of those
responsible, delays in judicial procedure, and the absence of
coordination between the various government bodies. The law allows the
Government to expropriate lands on which forced labor has been found
and to distribute the property in the Government's land reform program;
however, these provisions rarely were applied, in part because the
Government must compensate landowners for seized lands, sometimes at
values that were criticized for being overly generous. Enabling
legislation for the constitutional provision allowing confiscation of
land on which forced labor is discovered remained under consideration.
Violators of forced labor laws enjoyed virtual impunity. There were
only 26 arrests and 3 convictions in the nearly 5,000 instances of
forced labor uncovered by inspection teams since 1995. Those convicted
were freed on appeal or sentenced to do community service. Factors
contributing to this record included: Disputes over legal jurisdiction;
a lack of a clear definition of forced labor in the Penal Code; local
political pressure; weak coordination among the police, the judiciary,
and prosecutors; the remoteness of areas in which forced labor is
practiced; witnesses' fear of retaliation; and police failure to
conduct criminal investigations when accompanying labor inspectors on
raids. The ILO, ICFTU, Anti-Slavery International, and the Pastoral
Land Commission found that the current system did not effectively
penalize those who exact forced labor. A complaint has been lodged with
the OAS against the Government for negligence in investigating forced
labor in the Brazil Verde estate. A number of ranchowners and
employers, although cited repeatedly for using forced labor schemes,
received only token sentences.
However, there were exceptions to the impunity: In November a labor
court judge in Para fined a plantation owner approximately $18,000
(60,000 reais) for using forced labor. It was the first time that a
farmer had been fined on the basis of the damage he caused to the
workers. The president of the Supreme Labor Court, Francisco Fausto,
praised the decision of the Regional Labor Court, noting that forced
labor would be ended only by the application of such sanctions.
The Executive Group to Combat Forced Labor (GERTRAF) coordinated
the Government's efforts to eliminate forced labor since 1995. GERTRAF
is chaired by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, and it includes
representatives from seven ministries, unions, employers, and NGOs. In
December 2001, the President appointed a special advisor on forced
labor issues, and the Secretariat for Human Rights of the Justice
Ministry created a parallel commission to develop recommendations to
improve the enforcement of laws on forced labor and child labor. During
the year, the MPT and the Brazilian Bar Association established forced
labor commissions. Prosecution of forced labor cases is the
responsibility of the Federal Prosecutor's Office, but the MPT also may
become involved in investigating such cases (see Section 6.f.).
GERTRAF's enforcement arm--the Special Group for Mobile
Inspection--had responsibility for locating and liberating workers
trapped in forced labor. The mobile unit worked in conjunction with
federal police officers, who accompanied labor inspectors on raids to
provide protection. When mobile teams found workers in conditions of
forced labor, they levied fines on estate owners and required employers
to provide back pay and benefits to workers before returning the
workers to their municipalities of origin. In October labor inspectors
in the mobile unit received death threats while conducting raids in
Para State.
Through August the mobile group had located approximately 1,600
forced laborers, exceeding the number of liberated workers for any
previous full year of operation. Forced laborers were found during the
year in activities including deforestation, logging, mining, raising
livestock, and harvesting sugarcane, coffee, cotton, papayas, pepper,
and soybeans. In March the mobile unit found 53 workers toiling in
conditions of forced labor on a ranch owned by a leading member of the
federal Chamber of Deputies. Although the Labor Minister issued a
statement exonerating the politician, subsequent testimony revealed the
use of debt servitude on the ranch. The MPT forwarded the case to the
Attorney General and also filed a civil suit against the politician for
damages equaling about $5,800 (20,000 reais) per worker. In another
major raid in October, the mobile unit liberated 180 workers, including
30 children, working on a black pepper ranch in Para State.
Despite its efforts, the mobile unit had only a limited impact on
the incidence of forced labor. The CPT, whose network of local churches
was responsible for the vast majority of forced labor complaints
reaching the mobile unit, reported that forced labor may actually be
growing. The CPT noted that the number of raids by the mobile unit
remained relatively constant in the past 3 years, while the number of
liberated workers had grown significantly, revealing an increase in the
number of forced laborers per ranch. In Para State, where most forced
labor was found, the CPT received complaints of approximately 3,200
cases of forced labor on 80 ranches through September, nearly three
times the total for all of 2001. The mobile unit reportedly was unable
to keep up with the increase in forced labor complaints due to
insufficient resources and the cost and time required to mount an
operation. The mobile unit encountered resistance from local
authorities, including from the local bureaus of the Labor Ministry, in
a number of states.
Poverty and a lack of viable alternatives led many workers
repeatedly to fall prey to trafficking and forced labor schemes. In
October the Government moved to end this cycle by instituting a measure
that allows workers freed from forced labor schemes to receive three
installments of unemployment insurance equal to the minimum wage--
approximately $57 (200 reais) per month--and to be eligible for job
training. To educate rural workers about the dangers of forced labor,
the CPT ran an informational campaign in which it distributed pamphlets
to rural workers in areas targeted by traffickers (see Section 6.f). In
some states, local unions registered and tracked workers who left the
municipality to work on remote ranches. The National Confederation of
Agricultural Workers' radio programs also educated rural workers about
forced labor.
In March the ILO officially established a program to support
governmental efforts to fight forced labor through improved interagency
cooperation, strengthened enforcement, heightened public awareness,
training for relevant government agencies, and the provision of
additional resources to the Government. The ILO program had already
contributed to increased discussion of forced labor through a number of
seminars and workshops.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law restricts work that may be performed by children;
however, child labor was a widespread problem despite government
efforts to combat it. The minimum working age is 16 years of age, and
apprenticeships may begin at 14. The law bars all minors under age 18
from work that constitutes a physical strain or from employment in
nocturnal, unhealthy, dangerous, or morally harmful conditions.
However, the authorities rarely enforced additional legal restrictions
intended to protect working minors under age 18.
The law requires permission of the parents for minors to work as
apprentices, and apprentices must attend school through the primary
grades. Because the legal working age is 16, the Government sought to
increase the number of apprenticeships to provide more opportunities to
14- and 15-year-olds. A 2000 law expands apprenticeship programs by
allowing a wider range of enterprises to participate.
According to government figures, the number of working children age
14 and under decreased from 2.97 million in 1999 to 2.23 million in
2001. The largest decline was in the 10- to 14-year-old age group. The
percentage of children who worked in the 5 to 14 age group dropped from
9 percent in 1999 to 6.8 percent 2 years later. Approximately half of
child laborers received no income, and 90 percent worked in the
unregistered informal sector. The highest incidence of child labor was
found in the northeast, where half of all child workers were employed.
Slightly over half of child laborers worked in rural areas, and two-
thirds were boys.
The Labor Ministry reported that children worked in approximately
100 rural and urban activities. Common rural activities included
fishing, mining, raising livestock, producing charcoal, and harvesting
sugarcane, sisal, tobacco, cotton, citrus fruits, and a variety of
other crops. In urban areas, children worked in shoe shining,
transportation, construction, restaurants, street peddling, begging,
drug trafficking and prostitution (see Section 5). The ILO estimated
that approximately 500,000 children and adolescents worked as domestic
servants and that 20 percent of 10- to 14-year-old girls worked as
domestics. Most of these workers received less than half the minimum
wage and worked in excess of 40 hours a week.
The hidden and informal nature of child labor made children
especially vulnerable to workplace accidents. For instance, children
who produced charcoal, sisal, sugarcane, and footwear suffered from
dismemberment, gastrointestinal disease, lacerations, blindness, and
burns caused by applying pesticides with inadequate protection.
The Ministry of Labor and Employment was responsible for inspecting
worksites to enforce child labor laws. These efforts were guided
regionally by Special Groups for the Eradication of Child Labor, which
gathered data and developed plans for child labor inspection. Still,
most inspections of children in the workplace were driven by complaints
brought by workers, teachers, unions, NGOs, and the media. Through the
first 8 months of the year, approximately 3,250 inspectors conducted
over 19,500 inspections that reached workers under 18 years of age.
Labor inspectors continued to prioritize inspections in the informal
sector to reduce the number of unregistered workers, but they remained
unable to enter private homes and farms, where much of the nation's
child labor was found. In most cases, inspectors attempted to reach
agreements and to have employers desist from labor law violations
before levying fines of $115 (400 reais) per violation. As a result,
few employers were actually fined for employing children.
Labor Ministry inspectors often worked closely with labor
prosecutors from the MPT, who had broader powers and were able to
impose larger fines. The MPT--an independent government agency
responsible for prosecuting labor infractions--had a national
commission to fight child labor. The commission included 50 prosecutors
and focused on strategic areas including sexual exploitation, trash-
picking, apprenticeships, and work in a family setting. The commission
allowed the Ministry of Labor to be more responsive to complaints
regarding child labor and to encourage public commitments from
officials to address child labor.
The Ministry of Social Security and Assistance coordinated the
Government's Program for the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI), which
provided cash stipends to low-income families who kept their children
in school and out of work. This program was the Government's primary
effort to end the worst forms of child labor. Because the public school
day lasts only 4 hours, PETI emphasized complementary educational
activities for children during nonschool hours as an alternative to
working. PETI assisted approximately 800,000 children in all 26 states
and the federal capital during the year, focussing on removing children
from work activities considered to be among the most hazardous by the
Government. Although the program concentrated on rural areas, it had
also grown rapidly in urban areas.
To prevent child labor and promote education, the Federal
government also continued to expand its Bolsa Escola (School Stipend)
program. The program provided mothers of low-income families with
stipends of $4 (15 reais) per child between the ages of 6 and 15, up to
a total of 3 children per family. To receive the stipend, the child's
monthly school attendance rate must be 85 percent. The Ministry of
Education coordinated the Bolsa program, but responsibility for day-to-
day management fell largely on municipal governments. At year's end,
the program provided stipends to the mothers of approximately 9 million
children in over 5,000 municipalities. In addition to the federal
program, an estimated 100 municipal governments operated stipend
programs, including Belem, Campinas, Belo Horizonte, Manaus, Olinda,
and Recife.
In order fully to comply with ILO conventions on the minimum age
for work and on the eradication of the worst forms of child labor, in
September the Minister of Labor created the National Commission to
Eradicate Child Labor, which was developing a comprehensive national
child labor plan to strengthen child labor eradication efforts.
Civil society supported the Government's child labor elimination
programs. For example, the National Forum for the Prevention and
Eradication of Child Labor--with chapters in every state and over 40
institutional members from government and the private sector--promoted
debate and broad analysis of national child labor prevention efforts.
The Centers for the Defense of Children and Adolescents also were
active in many parts of the country and reported violations of
children's rights and implemented eradication programs (see Section 5).
The private sector and unions also played a major role in fighting
child labor. The Toy Industry's ABRINQ Foundation for Children's Rights
operated a labeling program that identified companies with child-
friendly policies and a commitment to eliminate child labor. The
Foundation also fostered prochild initiatives through its awards
programs for organizations, journalists, and mayors. The Pro-Child
Institute in Sao Paulo State coordinated a labeling program in the
footwear industry. The Institute helped to reduce instances of child
labor in footwear production in the state. All major labor centrals
implemented programs to educate union members about the hazards of
child labor and encouraged members to report instances of child labor
to authorities.
The ILO's Program on the Elimination of Child Labor focused on
capacity building, awareness raising, research promotion, and the
incorporation of income generating schemes and monitoring systems in
child labor prevention programs. The ILO also coordinated a program to
reduce sexual exploitation of children and child labor in domestic
service (see Section 5). UNICEF supported over 200 programs to improve
the lives of children and since 1999 has helped to remove over 13,000
children from work in garbage dumps and place them in schools, in part
by providing scholarships to families and helping adults in those
families find other forms of income generation.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government adjusts the
minimum wage annually; in April it was raised from $51 to $57 (from 180
to 200 reais), which was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. A 2000 study by the DIEESE concluded
that the minimum wage was about one-fifth of the salary necessary to
support a family of four in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area. The IBGE
estimated that approximately one in three workers earned the minimum
wage or less.
The Constitution limits the workweek to 44 hours and specifies a
weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on Sundays. The
law also includes a prohibition on excessive overtime and stipulates
that hours worked above the weekly limit must be compensated at a rate
equal to time and a half; these provisions generally were enforced in
the formal sector. The law allows employers to compensate workers with
time off rather than with overtime pay, provided that the local union
agrees to the arrangement.
Unsafe working conditions were prevalent throughout the country.
While workplace accidents dropped by 6 percent in 2001, there were
still nearly 340,000 such accidents. The number of workplace deaths due
to accidents dropped by more than one-third, to slightly over 2,500.
The Ministry of Labor sets occupational, health, and safety standards,
which are consistent with internationally recognized norms. However,
the Ministry devoted insufficient resources for adequate inspection and
enforcement of these standards. Employees or their unions may file
claims related to worker safety with regional labor courts, although in
practice this was frequently a protracted process. According to the
Ministry of Labor, the most dangerous industries in the country were
logging, mining (including oil drilling), construction, and oil
refining.
The law requires employers to establish internal committees for
accident prevention in workplaces. It also protects employee members of
these committees from being fired for their committee activities.
However, such firings did occur, and legal recourse usually requires
years before resolution. The MPT reported during the year that numerous
firms used computerized records to compile ``black lists'' identifying
workers who had filed claims in labor courts. Individual workers did
not have the legal right to remove themselves from the workplace when
faced with hazardous working conditions; however, workers could express
such concerns to an internal committee for an immediate investigation.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the transport of
persons for illicit reasons within and outside the country; however,
trafficking in persons primarily from and within the country was a
problem. Internal trafficking of rural workers into forced labor
schemes was a serious problem, while trafficking from rural to urban
areas occurred to lesser extent (see Section 6.c.). Although
comprehensive government statistics on the problem were unavailable,
authorities estimated that thousands of women and adolescents were
trafficked, both domestically and internationally, for commercial
sexual exploitation. Labor inspectors also found a small number of
persons from other countries trafficked to work in urban sweatshops.
The NGO CECRIA's June report on trafficking in persons for
commercial sexual exploitation--drawing on police, media, and other
sources--identified over 130 sex trafficking routes, including 109
domestic routes (see Section 5). Domestic routes included: From Goias
State to Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro; from rural areas in the north
and northeast to coastal cities for sexual tourism; and from small
towns in the north to outposts in the Amazon region where itinerant
workers often transit. CECRIA's report also identified trafficking
routes of children for sexual exploitation from the southern region of
the country into Argentina and Paraguay. The survey also called
attention to sex trafficking to areas with major development projects.
Internationally, Spain was the destination of most identified routes
(32), followed by the Netherlands (11), Venezuela (10), Italy (9),
Portugal (8), and Paraguay (7). The report indicated that many sex
trafficking routes were closely related to arms and drug trafficking
routes.
CECRIA found that the typical sex trafficking victims were darker-
skinned women between 15 and 27 years of age, but researchers also
noted the presence of adolescent boys as victims, some of whom worked
as transvestites. Persons who fell prey to trafficking schemes
typically came from low-income families and usually had not finished
high school. Traffickers often lured victims with promises of lucrative
work as dancers or models in Europe; beauty contest winners were cited
as common targets. Girls were recruited at clubs and modeling agencies,
or through the Internet, want ads, mail-order bride schemes, and maid
and au pair services. Most women who were trafficked internationally
were older than 18, but younger victims were also trafficked with
falsified documents.
Police officials believed that most women who were recruited by
trafficking organizations understood that they were to work as
prostitutes, but they did not know about working conditions and their
prospective earnings. In other cases, women were told that they would
work as nannies or domestic workers. Upon arrival, the victims'
passports were often confiscated and they were forced to prostitute
themselves and live in virtual confinement. In addition to threatening
physical violence, traffickers often used debt and isolation to control
the victims.
In addition to sex trafficking, the other major type of trafficking
was the internal trafficking of workers into forced labor schemes. This
typically occurred when employers recruited laborers from poor, rural
towns and transported them to remote areas where escape was difficult.
Workers were then obliged to toil in brutal conditions until they were
able to repay inflated debts (see Section 6.c.). Union leaders claimed
that nearly all of the 15,000 people estimated to be working as forced
laborers had been trafficked by labor recruiters. The ILO cooperated
with the Government, unions, and the CPT to construct a data base for
use in recording and combating trafficking.
The Penal Code establishes a prison sentence of 3 to 8 years for
transporting women in or out of the country for the purposes of
prostitution, but it does not directly address the substantial internal
trafficking of women. The Statute on Children and Adolescents provides
some regulations on the matter by requiring the permission or presence
of both parents for children to leave the country; it also prohibits
children from leaving the country with a foreigner unless previous
approval is given by the authorities. Still, local activists claimed
that laws on trafficking for exploitation were open to interpretation
and difficult to enforce, especially in relation to domestic
trafficking. They called for comprehensive legislation to aid in
prosecution of traffickers.
Laws regarding trafficking for forced labor present similar
shortcomings, and activists advocated legislation to define more
clearly modern forms of slave labor, such as the use of fraud and debt
servitude. A 1998 Penal Code Amendment provides that traffickers may
receive a fine and prison sentences of 1 to 3 years, which may be
increased if the victim is under 18, a senior citizen, pregnant, a
person with disabilities, or a member of an indigenous group.
Nevertheless, disputes regarding legal jurisdiction contributed to the
Government's failure to prosecute labor traffickers effectively.
Laws on forced labor and domestic trafficking were not enforced
effectively. Although labor inspectors had identified 5,000 instances
of forced labor since 1995--nearly all of which involved traffickers--
only 3 people had been convicted for related crimes (see Section 6.c.).
Factors impeding such arrests included: The mobility of labor
contractors, lack of training for police officers, and the potential
witnesses' fear of reprisal and inability to remain in the area to
testify. In most cases, police officers accompanying mobile inspection
teams did not conduct investigations, thus hampering prosecutors'
efforts to build strong cases. Federal prosecutors and NGOs also
reported that corruption among state police often impeded the
apprehension of traffickers. However, in November federal police in
Tocantins State arrested 5 men for trafficking 190 rural workers to
ranches in Para State.
The Federal Highway Police were responsible for checking documents
and monitoring movement along highways and roads. In a limited number
of cases, they were involved in apprehending suspected traffickers.
Federal and state police monitored the Internet to detect on-line
recruitment by sex traffickers, and at least one prosecution for such
an offense occurred due to a complaint from an NGO (see Section 2.a.).
Police officers reported difficulty in capturing and incarcerating
traffickers because of the need to apprehend them in the act of
traveling with the victims. In addition, most women who left the
country with traffickers did so willingly. Fear of reprisals also kept
victims from seeking police intervention or from testifying against
traffickers. As a result, few trials involving traffickers resulted in
convictions. CECRIA reported that only 10 of the 36 trafficking cases
dealt with by federal courts in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in recent
years went to trial, with only 2 convictions.
In June 2001, federal police in Rio de Janeiro uncovered a
trafficking scheme responsible for taking men and women to Japan to
work as prostitutes. During the investigation, the police found
evidence implicating Japanese organized crime in trafficking other men
and women to Japan from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Interpol
cooperated with investigations in the case, but there were no major
developments by year's end.
The Government coordinated several antitrafficking programs,
including public information campaigns, a Ministry of Justice
initiative against sexual exploitation, and the inclusion of
trafficking as a priority area in the National Plan to Combat Sexual
Exploitation of Children (see Section 5). A Ministry of Justice
antitrafficking program undertaken in December 2001 in collaboration
with UNDCP focused on constructing networks and opening six reference
centers to receive trafficking complaints and provide assistance to
victims. This program and other government efforts to combat
trafficking in persons suffered from a lack of interagency cooperation
and a severe shortage of funding (see Section 5).
Rio de Janeiro State had centers to provide assistance to female
victims of violence, and NGOs helped women who were victims of abuse
(see Section 5). In October the Government announced an agreement with
a foreign donor to strengthen the country's network to combat the
sexual exploitation of children.
NGOs played a vital role in efforts to halt trafficking. The
Humanitarian Center to Support Women in Salvador, Bahia, sponsored
research and coordinated a campaign to educate girls and women about
the risks of being trafficked abroad. The Brazilian Multiprofessional
Association for the Protection of Children and Adolescents managed a
number of programs in Rio de Janeiro aimed at protecting youth from
trafficking and domestic and sexual abuse and operated a national hot
line on sexual exploitation.
__________
CANADA
Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal parliamentary
form of government. Citizens periodically choose their representatives
in free and fair multiparty elections. Jean Chretien began his third
consecutive term as Prime Minister in November 2000; his Liberal Party
had a majority of 172 of 301 seats in Parliament. The judiciary is
independent.
Elected civilian officials control the federal, provincial, and
municipal police forces. The armed forces have no role in domestic law
enforcement except in national emergencies. Laws requiring the security
forces to respect human rights are observed strictly, and the courts
punish violators.
The country has a highly developed, market-based economy and a
population of approximately 31.4 million. Laws extensively protect the
well-being of workers and provide for workers' freedom of association.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means for dealing
with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in
some areas. Problems include discrimination against women, persons with
disabilities, and aboriginal people. There was an increase in the
number of reported incidents of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim
harassment. The Government continued to take serious steps to address
private acts of violence against women. Trafficking of persons into the
country, including trafficking for purposes of prostitution, was a
growing problem. Canada was invited by the Community of Democracies'
(CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In June 2001, an off-duty Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
officer shot and killed his former girlfriend and injured three other
persons riding in a car with her. The authorities immediately arrested
him and charged him with murder and attempted murder. His case was
pending at year's end.
The trial of four Toronto policemen charged with manslaughter for
the death of a suspect whom they beat while taking him into custody in
2000 is scheduled to begin in September 2003.
The RCMP completed an inquiry into the deaths of four aboriginal
men in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, in 2000. Two of the men were found
frozen to death in an isolated area on the outskirts of Saskatoon, and
the other two died at or near their homes shortly after being released
from police custody. The RCMP found no basis for any criminal charges;
local authorities conducted coroner's inquests in October 2001 and in
January, which found no evidence of criminal conduct in the freezing
deaths. The coroner's jury, however, made a series of recommendations
to the RCMP for handling future cases (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the Government
generally observed these prohibitions in practice; however, there were
isolated incidents of police mistreating suspects.
In June 2001, two Saskatoon city police officers were found guilty
of the charge of illegal confinement after they left an aboriginal man
on the outskirts of the city in subzero temperatures without adequate
clothing. The officers were fired and sentenced to 8 months in jail.
They were free on bail while they appealed their conviction. Two
aboriginal men were found dead in the same area around the same time,
but a coroner's inquest did not find evidence of criminal conduct in
those deaths. In response to these deaths and the arrest of the
Saskatoon city police officers, the province of Saskatchewan formed a
3-year commission to study justice issues of aboriginal people.
The military continued to receive complaints from women serving in
the armed forces who charged that they were subject to sexual abuse,
harassment, and discrimination. An armed forces grievance board that is
independent of the military chain of command began operations in June
2000. In addition, other mechanisms established by the Government to
address such complaints, including the Advisory Board on Canadian
Forces Gender Integration and Employment Equity and an Ombudsman in the
Department of National Defense, continued to operate. As of November 1,
the Ombudsman had received seven sexual assault complaints, three
sexual harassment complaints, and three gender discrimination
complaints.
Prison conditions generally met international standards, and the
Government permitted visits by independent human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government generally
observed these prohibitions in practice. Bail was generally available.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and
efficient judicial process and enforced the right to a fair trial.
The court system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
which handle both civil and criminal matters. The highest federal court
is the Supreme Court, which exercises general appellate jurisdiction
and advises on constitutional matters.
The judicial system is based on English common law at the federal
level as well as in most provinces; in the province of Quebec, it is
derived from the Napoleonic Code. Throughout the country, judges are
appointed. In criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of
innocence and the right to a public trial, to counsel (which is free
for indigents), and to appeal. The prosecution also may appeal in
certain limited circumstances.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law generally prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respected these prohibitions in practice, and
violations were subject to effective legal sanction.
In December 2001, Parliament passed an antiterrorism bill that
expanded police investigative and wiretapping powers. Federal and
provincial authorities did not use the provisions of the bill that
allow the Government to make preventative arrests of suspected
terrorists and to conduct investigative hearings. There were no court
challenges to the bill or complaints made to human rights commissions
concerning its application.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government generally respected these
rights in practice; however, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
Government may limit free speech in the name of goals such as ending
discrimination, ensuring social harmony, or promoting gender equality.
The Court ruled that the benefits of limiting hate speech and promoting
equality are sufficient to outweigh the freedom of speech clause in the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Journalists occasionally were banned from reporting some specific
details of court cases until the trials were concluded, and these
restrictions, adopted to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial,
enjoyed wide popular support. Some restrictions on the media are
imposed by provincial-level film censorship, broadcasters' voluntary
codes curbing graphic violence, and laws against hate literature and
pornography. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for free
speech and free press, but both the Criminal Code and human rights
legislation have established limits. Inciting hatred (in certain cases)
or genocide is a criminal offense. The Supreme Court has set a high
threshold for such cases by specifying that these acts must be proven
to be willful and public. The Broadcasting Act, which prohibits
programming containing any abusive comment that would expose
individuals or groups to hatred or contempt, has not yet been
challenged in the courts.
The Human Rights Act also prohibits repeated telephone
communications that expose a person or group to hatred or contempt. The
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal found that the Internet falls under this
act. In January the Tribunal ruled that the law prohibited the
operation of an anti-Semitic hate-site. In August the Tribunal made a
similar finding, ordering an Internet hate-site targeting homosexuals
to cease operating.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Charter of
Rights and Freedoms provides for these rights, and the Government
generally respected them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Charter of Rights and Freedoms
provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice.
Religious groups are not required to register with the Government.
Public funding for Roman Catholic schools--or separate schools--is
constitutionally protected in the country's original four provinces,
but the policy has been challenged in recent years. In 1999 the U.N.
Human Rights Committee found that the province of Ontario had failed to
provide equal and effective protection against discrimination. In June
2001, the Ontario provincial legislature passed a graduated tax credit
plan for parents of children attending all private schools, removing
the historical limitation that provided such credits only in regard to
Roman Catholic schools. The plan's 5-year phase-in began during the
year.
There were a number of reports of harassment of religious
minorities.
The League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith in Canada reported 197
incidents of anti-Semitism in the first 6 months of the year, compared
with 286 incidents in all of 2001. Twelve of the reported incidents
were violent; 121 were cases of harassment, and 64 were reports of
vandalism. In April a synagogue in Saskatchewan and another in Ontario
were set on fire. On May 19, a pipe bomb damaged the only Jewish
synagogue in Quebec City. Approximately 75 percent of the incidents
occurred in Toronto and Montreal, with other cases scattered across the
country.
Some fundamentalist Christian groups' child disciplinary practices
came under close scrutiny by the Government. In October a former nun
and founding member of a religious commune on Prince Edward Island was
convicted of assaulting five children by beating them with a wooden
rod. In July 2001, Ontario authorities removed seven children from
their parents' custody after provincial authorities reported the
children showed signs of heavy corporal punishment. The parents belong
to the Christian fundamentalist Church of God (affiliated with the
Mennonites), which advocates use of belts and sticks in disciplining
children. The children were returned to their parents' custody subject
to provincial supervision.
In May 2001, a Muslim chaplain filed suit in federal court against
an Ontario provincial judge who ejected him from the courtroom in 1993
for wearing a Muslim cap. The chaplain's initial complaints filed with
Canadian Judicial Council, provincial and federal human rights
commissions were dismissed because the law gives judges immunity from
human rights laws. In November 2001, the federal district court
dismissed the case. The federal appeals court heard the chaplain's
appeal on October 31 and declined to order the Judicial Council to
reopen the chaplain's complaint.
The number of reported incidents of Muslim harassment increased. In
a survey on Muslim life post-September 11, 60 percent of the
respondents said that they had experienced some form of discrimination
because of their religion. The Government strongly and publicly urged
the population to refrain from prejudice against Muslims or other
persons on the basis of their religious beliefs, ethnic heritage, or
cultural differences. Police forces investigated and discouraged anti-
Muslim actions.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government generally respected them in practice.
The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in
accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees and extended first asylum. Canada
is a resettlement country, and the Government projected that it would
approve approximately 29,000 claims for refugee status during the year;
as of August, 18,380 such claims had been approved.
In January the Supreme Court ruled that refugees facing torture in
their home countries generally cannot be deported there, unless
evidence shows that their continued presence poses a serious threat to
national security. In June an Iranian suspected of being a trained
government assassin was deported to Iran after claiming, but failing to
show, that he faced a serious risk of torture upon return. The case of
a Sri Lankan suspected of being a fundraiser for the Tamil Tigers who
claimed that he would be tortured upon return to Sri Lanka remained
pending after being remanded by the Supreme Court back to the Minister
of Immigration. During the year, the country signed a ``safe third
country'' agreement on refugees to return aliens previously resident in
the United Sates to that country for adjudication of asylum. Human
rights and immigrant groups criticized the agreement, which enters into
force in 2003.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
In November 2000, the last general election, the Liberal Party won
a majority with 172 of 301 seats in the national parliamentary
elections. The Canadian Alliance (conservative) won 66 seats, the Bloc
Quebecois (separatist) won 38 seats, the New Democratic Party (liberal)
won 13 seats, and the Progressive Conservative Party (conservative) won
12 seats. In August Jean Chretien of the Liberal Party announced his
intention to step down as Prime Minister in February 2004. New
elections will be held sometime between then and November 2005.
The governing party in the province of Quebec continued to maintain
that Quebec has the right to withdraw from the Confederation if that
decision proves to be the democratically expressed will of the
residents of Quebec. The Supreme Court ruled in 1998 that a unilateral
declaration of independence would be illegal, but that the Federal
government and other provinces would be obligated to negotiate Quebec's
separation if a clear majority of Quebecois voted to change their
relationship with Canada on the basis of a clearly phrased referendum
question. However, after the second defeat of a referendum in 1995,
public support for holding another referendum has declined.
There are no laws limiting the participation of women or minorities
in political life. In the Parliament, 63 of 301 members in the House of
Commons were women, and 4 members were of aboriginal (Inuit, North
American Indian, or Metis) origin. Of 105 senators, 31 were women and 6
were of aboriginal origin. Women held 10 seats in the 36-person
Cabinet. In 1999 a woman was appointed for the first time as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. The Governor General is a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operated without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials were very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for equal benefits and
protection of the law regardless of race, national or ethnic origin,
color, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. These rights
generally were respected in practice.
Women.--The law prohibits violence against women, including spousal
abuse; however, it remained a problem. The Government's last general
social survey, done in 1999, indicated that an estimated 8 percent of
women (and 7 percent of men) who were married or living in a common-law
relationship during the previous 5-year period experienced some type of
violence committed by their partner on at least one occasion. The
economic costs of violence against women are estimated to be $2.7
billion (Cdn $4.2 billion). Services available to abused women have
increased significantly over the past 2 decades, and there were 508
shelters for abused women across the country in 2000.
A total of 24,419 cases of sexual assault were reported in 2001, an
increase of 370 cases from 2000. The courts consider such cases
seriously and those convicted of sexual assault face up to 10 years in
prison. Cases involving weapons, threats, wounding, or endangerment of
life carry longer sentences, up to life imprisonment.
Prostitution is legal, but pimping (benefiting from the earnings of
prostitution of another) and operating, being found in, or working in a
brothel are not. Communicating in public for the purpose of
prostitution (solicitation or ``streetwalking'') is also illegal, but
is considered a lesser offense than the other offenses related to
prostitution.
Women were trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation (see
Section 6.f.).
The Criminal Code prohibits criminal harassment (stalking) and
makes it punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. The law
prohibits sexual harassment, and the Government generally enforced this
provision. Women continued to complain of harassment in the armed
forces, and the Government established mechanisms to try to resolve
complaints (see Section 1.c.).
Women are well represented in the labor force, including business
and the professions. Employment equity laws and regulations cover
federal employees in all but the security and defense services. Women
have marriage and property rights equal to those of men. Women head
over 85 percent of single-parent households.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. Education is free through grade 13 and is
compulsory nationwide through age 15 or 16, depending on the province.
Federal and provincial regulations protect children from abuse,
overwork, and discrimination and penalize perpetrators of such
offenses.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Past
institutional abuses of children (mostly orphans and aboriginal
children) in residential homes continued to come to light, and the
Government and churches which operated the homes sought to close,
through class action settlements, more than 12,000 abuse cases filed by
former residents. The Government announced a $1.1 billion (Cdn $1.7
billion) plan for the settlement of physical and sexual abuse claims,
and the Anglican and Presbyterian churches agreed to contribute
substantial amounts to the settlement fund.
Children were trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation (see
Section 6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination
against persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the
provision of other state services. Nevertheless, the Government
continued to receive numerous complaints regarding societal
discrimination against persons with disabilities and instituted
programs to discourage such discrimination. Persons with disabilities
were underrepresented in the work force; they constituted 2.7 percent
of the federally regulated private sector work force, while those
capable of working total 6.5 percent of the population. The Government
instituted programs to help persons with disabilities to join the work
force.
The law provides a variety of protections and rights for persons
with disabilities and specifically prohibits discrimination against
persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision
of public services. Sexual exploitation of persons with disabilities in
situations of dependency is a criminal offense. The law requires
employers and service providers to accommodate special needs of persons
with disabilities, unless it constitutes an undue hardship, and
mandates access to buildings for persons with disabilities.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution recognizes three different
groups of aboriginals: Indians (generally called First Nations), Inuit
(formerly called Eskimos), and Metis (persons of mixed Indian-European
ancestry). Aboriginals make up approximately 2.8 percent of the
population. In the country's three territories, aboriginals constitute
20 percent of Yukon, 62 percent of Northwest Territories, and 84
percent of Nunavut. Disputes over land claims, self-government, treaty
rights, taxation, duty-free imports, fishing and hunting rights, and
alleged harassment by police continued to be sources of tension on some
reserves. Aboriginal persons remained underrepresented in the work
force, overrepresented on welfare rolls and in prison populations, and
more susceptible to suicide and poverty than other population groups.
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically protects aboriginal
rights, including those established by historical land claims
settlements; aboriginal rights also are recognized in the Constitution
and by the courts. Historical treaties with aboriginal groups in
eastern Canada form the basis for the Federal government's policies
there, but some language with uncertain intent resulted in extensive
legal challenges to the Government's interpretation of treaty rights.
Aboriginal groups in the west that never signed historical treaties
continued to claim land and resources, and many continued to seek legal
resolution of outstanding issues. As a result, the evolution of the
Federal government's policy toward aboriginal rights, particularly land
claims, has been linked closely to legal challenges, including 45
Supreme Court decisions.
On February 7, the Government of Quebec settled a long-running
dispute with the Cree Nation by signing an agreement that ensured the
withdrawal by the Cree of all legal action related to Quebec's past
application of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. The Cree
consented to the development of hydro-projects in return for $2.3
billion (Cdn $3.6 billion) over 50 years, autonomy over economic and
community development, and more control over how their land is managed.
On April 9, Quebec signed an agreement with the 14 Inuit communities in
the political entity of Nunavik, Northern Quebec, that provided them
with full control of profits generated from resource development
including hydropower exploration. On April 24, the Quebec government
also announced an agreement-in-principle involving land transfers and
resource-sharing, with the West North Shore Innu (Nitassinan). At
year's end, the draft agreement had not achieved community consensus.
In 1998 the Government established the Aboriginal Action Plan, a
``long-term, broad-based'' policy approach to promote the quality of
life of aboriginal people and promote self-sufficiency. According to
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, the Government budgeted $4.5
billion (Cdn $7 billion) for aboriginal programs in 2001-02. This money
is intended to ensure that aboriginal persons have access to basic
services (education, housing, water, sewage, health, and social)
comparable to those provided to other citizens through provincial,
municipal, and territorial governments.
During fiscal year 2000-01, the Government settled seven specific
claims involving five First Nations, for a total expenditure of $75
million (Cdn $116 million). Since the inception of the program in 1992
through March 31, 2001, authorities had settled 227 specific and treaty
land entitlement claims amounting to $760 million (Cdn $1.18 billion).
However, First Nation leaders claimed that at the current rate of claim
settlement, it will take the Government 150 years to settle all
outstanding aboriginal claims. The Federal government continued to be
involved in self-government negotiations with over 350 First Nations,
and several self-government agreements-in-principle (agreed upon by
negotiators) and a few final agreements were in advanced stages of
negotiations at year's end. Professional development and fiscal
accountability projects further supported indigenous self-governance.
In response to court decisions over the past few years, the
Government continued working to resolve a variety of issues, including
fishing rights in Atlantic Canada. Disputes over aboriginal fishing
rights in Atlantic Canada continued after a 1999 Supreme Court ruling
on the Marshall case that interpreted centuries-old treaties to allow
First Nations to earn a moderate livelihood from natural resources, in
compliance with government regulations that promote conservation and
protect others who depend on the same resource. The Federal government
negotiated interim fishing agreements with all 34 aboriginal
communities in Atlantic Canada, and longer term agreements were being
negotiated at year's end. Other test cases that involve members of
aboriginal groups being tried on charges of illegally harvesting timber
on Crown land continued in the court systems in New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia.
In 2000 the Federal and British Columbia governments concluded a
treaty with the Nisga'a people who live in northwestern British
Columbia. The treaty gave the Nisga'a control over 765 square miles of
tribal lands, a cash settlement, fishing and timber-cutting rights, and
certain rights of self-government. The treaty ended a range of special
tax breaks and other benefits available under previous arrangements.
The treaty was ratified by the Nisga'a people in 1998 and by the
provincial legislature in 1999. It was debated and passed by Parliament
in 1999. Although the British Columbia legislature ratified the treaty,
two groups challenged the treaty in court. The court of appeals ruled
against a challenge from the Liberal Party that contended that the
treaty should have been submitted to a referendum. A case brought by
the Gitanyow, an indigenous group located near the Nisga'a, who contend
that the treaty awarded more than 85 percent of their traditional
tribal lands to the Nisga'a, remained pending in the courts at year's
end.
In 1999 representatives of the Governments of Newfoundland and
Labrador, the Federal government, and the Labrador Inuit Association
initialed a land claims agreement for the Inuit. The plan provides for
land, water rights, self-government, and an economic development plan
that includes sharing revenues from subsurface developments. The plan
has not yet been put into effect, as the parties were still negotiating
a final, comprehensive land claims agreement.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Support of a referendum on
Quebec sovereignty has declined since the narrow defeat of the 1995
referendum.
The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the linguistic and
cultural rights of minorities and established English and French as the
country's two official languages. Despite the federal policy of
bilingualism, English speakers in Quebec and French speakers in other
parts of the country generally live and work in the language of the
majority. The provinces are free to grant French or English the status
of an official language, or not to do so. Only New Brunswick has
granted the two languages equal status. The Charter of the French
Language in Quebec makes French the official language of the province
and requires the use of French in commerce, the workplace, education,
and government. Minority language rights are secured by law in Quebec's
Charter of the French Language.
The English-speaking minority of Quebec, representing 9 percent of
the population of the province and 16 percent of the population of the
city of Montreal, continued to protest restrictions placed on English-
language use. English speakers also expressed concern over health
services and public schooling in their language.
The Charter of the French Language restricts access to publicly
funded English education only to those students who did most of their
elementary or secondary studies in English in Canada. The law also
limits English language education to those students with a brother or a
sister who did most of their elementary or secondary studies in English
in Canada or in cases in which the father or the mother did most of his
or her studies in English in Canada. During the year, the Quebec
National Assembly passed an amendment to the Charter of the French
Language. This new law further limits access to English language
schooling by no longer recognizing 1 year of private English language
schooling in Quebec as fulfilling the eligibility criteria for an
otherwise ineligible student to attend a publicly funded English school
in Quebec.
Provinces other than Quebec often lack adequate French-language
schooling and health services, which is of concern to local
francophones, although French-language schools and French immersion
programs were reported to be thriving in all three prairie provinces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Except for members of the armed
forces and some police, workers in both the public and private sectors
have the right to associate freely. The Labor Code protects these
rights for all employees under federal jurisdiction, while provincial
legislation protects all other organized workers.
Workers in both the public (except for some police) and the private
sectors have the right to organize and bargain collectively. While the
law protects collective bargaining, there are limitations, which vary
from province to province, for some public sector workers providing
essential services.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and requires employers
to reinstate workers fired for union activities. There are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints and obtaining redress.
Trade unions are independent of the Government. Of the civilian
labor force, approximately 29.5 percent was unionized.
All labor unions have full access to mediation, arbitration, and
the judicial system.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All workers
have the right to strike, except for those in the public sector who
provide essential services. The law prohibits employer retribution
against strikers and union leaders, and the Government generally
enforced this provision in practice.
Labor action, including strikes, occurred throughout the country
during the year. Significant strikes during the year included: A 54-day
strike by over 45,000 Ontario Public Service employees, which affected
prisons, psychiatric hospitals, highway transport enforcement,
government laboratories, probation and parole services, parks and
tourist attractions, along with hundreds of government offices across
Ontario; and a mid-summer 2-week strike by 25,000 municipal workers
(including sanitation workers) that became known as the ``garbage
strike.'' The Pope's impending visit to Toronto pushed the provincial
government to pass back-to-work legislation which forced workers back
on the job and put an end to the strike.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor, including by children, and it generally did not occur;
however, women and children were trafficked for the purpose of sexual
exploitation (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor legislation varies from province to province.
The Federal government does not employ youths under 17 years of age
while school is in session. Most provinces prohibit children under age
15 or 16 from working without parental consent, at night, or in any
hazardous employment. These prohibitions were enforced effectively
through inspections conducted by the federal and provincial labor
ministries.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Standard work hours vary from
province to province, but in all provinces the limit is 40 or 48 per
week, with at least 24 hours of rest.
Minimum wage rates are set in each province and territory, and
ranged from $3.54 to $5.16 (Cdn $5.50 to Cdn $7.20) per hour. Ontario
and Alberta have a minimum wage rate for youths lower than their
respective minimums for adult workers. The minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. A family
whose only employed member earns the minimum wage would be considered
below the poverty line.
Federal law provides safety and health standards for employees
under federal jurisdiction, while provincial and territorial
legislation provides for all other employees. Federal and provincial
labor departments monitor and enforce these standards. Federal,
provincial, and territorial laws protect the right of workers with
``reasonable cause'' to refuse dangerous work and to remove themselves
from hazardous work conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The 2001 Immigration Act outlaws
trafficking in persons; however, trafficking remained a problem. The
Immigration Act establishes criminal penalties of up to life in prison
and fines of up to $645,000 (Cdn $1,000,000) for convicted traffickers.
The country is a destination and a transit point to the United States
for women, children, and men trafficked for purposes of sexual
exploitation, labor, and the drug trade. There were no overall
estimates as to the extent of the problem. There have been several
widely reported cases of smuggling and trafficking, including hundreds
of Chinese who arrived illegally by ship in British Columbia in 1999.
There were reports that Honduran boys were trafficked to Canada for the
purpose of drug trafficking. There were also reports that Mexican, Sri
Lankan, and Haitian men and women were trafficked to Canada.
Vancouver and Toronto serve as hubs for organized crime groups that
traffic in persons, including trafficking for prostitution. East Asian
crime groups targeted Canada, and Vancouver in particular, because of
lax immigration laws, benefits available to immigrants, and the
proximity to the U.S. border.
Thousands of persons, including at least 15,000 Chinese, entered
Canada illegally over the last decade. These persons come primarily
from East Asia (especially China and Korea, also Malaysia), Central and
South Asia, Eastern Europe, Russia, Latin America (including Mexico,
Honduras, and Haiti), and South Africa. Many of these illegal
immigrants paid large sums to be smuggled to the country and were
indentured to their traffickers upon arrival. Almost all trafficked
persons worked at lower than minimum wage and used most of their
salaries to pay down their debt at usurious interest rates. The
traffickers used violence to ensure that their clients pay and that
they do not inform the police. Asian women and girls who were smuggled
into Canada often were forced into prostitution. Traffickers used
intimidation and violence, as well as the illegal immigrants' inability
to speak English, to keep these victims from running away or informing
the police.
In March 2001, police arrested 9 persons involved in an
international trafficking ring suspected of illegally transporting
about 1,200 Korean and Chinese citizens through the country into the
United States. Many of those who entered the United States illegally
were women under the age of 20 and were destined to work in a position
of debt bondage to restaurants, factories, and brothels.
In November 2001, Vancouver police cracked a prostitution ring, and
the authorities deported 11 Malaysian women, at least half of whom said
that they had been coerced into prostitution by a man who seized their
passports upon arrival in the country.
The Government reconvened an Interdepartmental Working Group on
Trafficking in Women. There were no government-sponsored programs to
help victims of trafficking; however, the Government funded NGO
assistance programs. Victims may apply for permanent residence under
the ``humanitarian and compassionate'' provisions of the Immigration
Act. Some victims of trafficking were arrested and deported. In
prostitution cases, often the prostitute instead of the customer was
arrested. If in the country illegally, the prostitute may face
deportation, especially after committing a crime. Local authorities to
some degree lacked awareness about the victims of trafficking, which is
compounded by the fear many victims have of telling the authorities
about the crime committed against them.
__________
CHILE
Chile is a multiparty democracy with a constitution that provides
for a strong executive, a bicameral legislature, and a separate
judiciary. Approved by referendum in 1980 and amended in 1989, the
Constitution was written under the former military government and
retains certain institutional limits on popular rule. In January 2000,
voters elected Ricardo Lagos of the Socialist Party as president in a
free and fair runoff election. He defeated center-right candidate
Joaquin Lavin of the Alliance for Chile coalition. All three presidents
elected since the country returned to democracy in 1990 have been
members of the four-party ``Concertacion'' coalition. The National
Congress consists of 120 deputies and 48 senators; this includes 9
designated senators and 1 former president who is senator-for-life. On
July 4, former President Augusto Pinochet resigned his position as
senator-for-life. The Concertacion coalition held a 63-57 majority in
the lower house. The Senate was divided 24-24 between pro-Lagos
legislators and the opposition. The Constitution provides for a
judicial system independent of the other branches of government.
The armed forces are constitutionally subordinate to the President
through an appointed civilian Minister of Defense but enjoy a large
degree of legal autonomy. Most notably the President must have the
concurrence of the National Security Council, which consists of
military and civilian officials, to remove service chiefs. The
Carabineros (the uniformed national police) have primary responsibility
for public order, safety, and border security. The civilian
Investigations Police are responsible for criminal investigations and
immigration control. Both organizations are under operational control
of the Ministry of Interior. Some members of the police committed human
rights abuses.
In 1999 the export-led free-market economy experienced its first
recession after 15 consecutive years of expansion, and the economy has
yet to regain its pre-1999 dynamism. The population is estimated at
approximately 15.4 million. Economic growth for the year was 1.9
percent with inflation of 2.8 percent. Copper remained the most
important export; salmon, forest products, fresh fruit, fishmeal, other
minerals, and manufactured goods also were significant sources of
foreign exchange. Unemployment averaged 9 percent during the year. The
percentage of the population living below the poverty line decreased
from 45 percent in 1987 to 20.6 percent in 2001.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights;
however, problems remained in some areas. The most serious problems
continued to be excessive use of force and mistreatment by police
forces, and physical abuse in jails and prisons. Prisons often were
overcrowded and antiquated. Detainees sometimes were not advised
promptly of charges against them nor granted a timely hearing before a
judge. Antidefamation laws adversely affected journalists and authors.
The authorities occasionally used force against protesters.
Discrimination and violence against women and children continued to be
problems. Indigenous people remained marginalized. In December 2001, a
new labor code was introduced that increased protections for such
fundamental worker rights as the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Child labor was a problem in the informal economy. Chile
was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to
attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul,
Republic of Korea, as a participant.
During the year, the Government, primarily the judiciary, took
significant steps to allow for the investigation of human rights abuses
committed during the former military government and to bring those
accountable in certain cases to justice. In January the armed services,
religious groups, and human rights leaders provided some information on
the manner of death and fate of 200 persons who disappeared while in
official custody during the Pinochet regime; however, military
authorities were unwilling or unable to provide a full accounting for
the fate of many of the 3,000 persons who disappeared or were killed.
On July 2, the Supreme Court ruled that former President Pinochet was
mentally unfit to stand trial, and ended all legal proceedings against
him in the Caravan of Death case. There was no appeal of this decision.
Subsequent rulings in other cases indicated that the same criteria
would be used to block legal proceedings in all criminal cases brought
against the former president.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Other Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
A number of cases from previous years in which the police were
accused of extrajudicial killings due to excessive use of force or
mistreatment of prisoners while in custody remained under investigation
or pending resolution of appeals.
The family of Carlos Antionio Millaman Munos was successful in
reopening the investigation into his January 2000 death. The case had
been on hold due to failure to prove that a crime had taken place.
Millaman had been detained on charges of aggravated robbery. According
to the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights of the
People (CODEPU), persons who visited him at the headquarters of the
Investigative Police in the Santiago suburb of La Florida reported that
he was in bad physical condition and feared for his life; he was
transferred to the El Salvador hospital where he died later in the day.
In 1999 a court sentenced four police officers to 10 years in
prison for the death of Raul Palma Salgado, who died in police custody
in 1998 after police allegedly tortured him. After an appeal process,
their sentence was reduced by a court martial. In August the Supreme
Court restored the original sentence.
In December the investigation into the case of the 1989 murder of
leftist leader Jecar Nehgme was delegated to Judge Hugo Dolmestch, who
also was responsible for investigating the case known as Operation
Albania--the June 1987 killings of 12 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
(FPMR) members--because those responsible for the two crimes are
thought to be the same. The investigation continued at year's end.
In 2000 former President Pinochet returned to Chile where he faced
charges in numerous human rights cases. The investigation of the most
prominent of these cases, known as the Caravan of Death, led to a
Supreme Court decision in August 2000 that lifted Pinochet's
parliamentary immunity. In January 2001, Judge Juan Guzman indicted him
as the intellectual author of 57 homicides and 18 instances of
kidnaping; an appeals court later reduced the charges to engaging in a
coverup of the crimes. Pinochet was placed under house arrest and
subsequently freed on bail. On July 2, the Criminal Chamber of the
Supreme Court ruled that Pinochet was mentally unfit to defend himself
against charges stemming from the Caravan of Death case; the ruling was
based on psychiatric and neurological exams. There was no appeal.
Subsequent rulings in other cases indicate that, for the same reasons,
no criminal action against Pinochet is likely to occur. Following the
court decision, Pinochet resigned his seat in the Senate taking
advantage of a law that offers certain privileges to former presidents,
including legal immunity.
The August 2000 ruling by the Supreme Court lifting Pinochet's
immunity in the Caravan of Death case included an opinion by the
majority indicating that the Amnesty Law (covering human rights
violations from 1973 to 1978) and the statute of limitations should be
applied only after the circumstances of the crime and the guilty party
have been identified. Nevertheless, several judges (particularly in
courts-martial) continued to close cases under the Amnesty Law without
completing an investigation into the circumstances of the crime. On
December 3, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier opinion by
ordering that a previously closed investigation into the disappearance
of Hector Contreras be reopened, and transferred the case from military
jurisdiction to a civilian court. The Foundation for Social Help of
Christian Churches (FASIC), the CODEPU, and other human rights
organizations have several denial-of-justice cases pending before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding previously
closed disappearance and execution cases. Denial-of-justice cases based
on application of the Amnesty Law also have been filed with the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).
In April in the case of Operation Albania, Judge Hugo Dolmestch
indicted 16 former military and police officers, including retired army
General Hugo Salas Wenzel, as well as 2 civilians. At year's end, the
judge had not issued indictments in the related case involving the 1986
deaths of journalist Jose Carrasco and three other persons.
On August 5, the judge investigating the 1982 killing of labor
leader Tucapel Jimenez sentenced six persons (including two retired
generals) as authors of the crime, two as accomplices and four as
involved in the coverup. Only those charged as authors received jail
sentences. The others were given parole for varying periods of time.
Four of the accused were absolved. The labor union that Jimenez led
before his death appealed the verdict and sought harsher sentences.
In June 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of a lower court
not to reopen the case of Carmelo Soria, a Spanish citizen working for
the U.N. and killed in Santiago in 1976. Nevertheless, in December the
Government reached a settlement with the family, including monetary
compensation of $1.5 million (1.1 billion pesos), recognition of
Soria's diplomatic status, and an agreement to ask the Supreme Court to
reopen the case. The high court's decision was still pending at year's
end.
On September 10, in response to an extradition request from
Argentina, the Santiago Appeals Court ruled not to lift Augusto
Pinochet's immunity (as a former president), arguing that his poor
mental and physical health prevented him from standing trial for his
role in the 1974 car bombing in Buenos Aires that claimed the lives of
former Chilean army chief Carlos Prats and his wife Sofia Cuthbert. In
October 2001, a judge ordered the preventive arrest of four retired
generals and a civilian as a first step in processing their extradition
for the same crime. On December 3, the Supreme Court decided that,
rather than extraditing the accused, they would be tried in the
country.
The investigation continued into the death of Charles Horman, a
U.S. citizen killed after being detained by security forces following
the 1973 coup d'etat. On October 11, the case was transferred from
investigating Judge Juan Guzman to Judge Jorge Zepeda.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In January 2001, through the Defense Ministry-sponsored Human
Rights Roundtable Dialog, the armed forces provided information on the
whereabouts of 200 persons who disappeared while in official custody
during the Pinochet regime. All of the information was made public, but
some of the information provided was found to be inaccurate. In
addition, subsequent investigations have shown that the Air Force did
not hand over all the information that it had collected. In October
obstruction of justice charges were brought against Patricio Campos,
the recently-resigned fifth-ranking general of the Air Force. The
Communist Party and the Group of Families of the Disappeared
subsequently initiated two lawsuits for obstruction of justice against
former general Patricio Rios, the recently-resigned head of the Air
Force. Investigations continued at year's end.
While noting the value in having the armed forces officially
acknowledge the commission of human rights abuses during the Pinochet
regime, President Lagos stated that there remained more than 600 cases
of missing persons about whose whereabouts no information had been
provided. The Ministry of Justice authorized 20 judges to dedicate
their time exclusively to cases of disappearances and another 51 judges
to give preference to the investigation of such cases. As a result of
their work, the remains of a few dozen victims were found and
identified, and some of the perpetrators of the crimes were charged.
Investigations of military-era detentions and disappearances of
persons at Colonia Dignidad (now called ``Villa Baviera''), a secretive
German-speaking settlement 240 miles south of Santiago, made no further
progress during the year. Paul Schaefer, who immigrated from Germany in
1961 with 300 followers, founded the 34,000-acre enclave. In April
1999, Judge Guzman issued a detention order against the 79-year-old
Schaefer for the kidnaping and disappearance in 1974 of Alvaro Vallejos
in the vicinity of Colonia Dignidad. Schaefer, also wanted by the
authorities on other charges, remained a fugitive at year's end. In
October 2000, the authorities arrested Schaefer's deputy Gerhard Muecke
in connection with Vallejos' disappearance. The Government issued an
order to expel Muecke but he must stand trial first in connection with
Vallejos's disappearance and two other charges that remained under
investigation at year's end. Muecke remained in custody at year's end.
In 1985 Boris Weisfeiler disappeared near Colonia Dignidad under
circumstances that have yet to be fully clarified. The case was
reopened, and it remained under investigation at year's end.
Of the 1,156 persons who disappeared under the military regime, the
remains of more than 900 have yet to be found. The Government agency in
charge of the compensation program for the families of those executed
or who disappeared under the military regime recognizes 3,197 victims
of the Pinochet era. These include 2,095 victims in which circumstances
of death have been established and 1,102 cases in which the persons
disappeared. Survivors of the victims receive pensions, educational
benefits, and other assistance. During the year, monthly pension
benefits, distributed to an average 3,441 eligible survivors (spouse,
mother or father, and children), were approximately $9.5 million (6.3
billion pesos). From 1992 through 2001, the program distributed well
over $87 million (57.8 billion pesos).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of excessive pressure on
detainees and the law provides that if a member of the police force
uses ``torture or unlawful coercion,'' either physical or mental,
orders them to be applied, or commits them against a person under
arrest or detention, the officer would be sentenced to imprisonment.
Officers who know about the abuse and have the ``necessary power and
authority'' to prevent or stop it also would be considered accessories
to the crime if they fail to do so. The CODEPU found that this law had
an important impact on the conduct of the Investigative Police, but
less so in the case of the Carabineros. Still, reports of abuse and
mistreatment by the Carabineros, the Investigations Police, and prison
guards were on the rise. Few of these reports lead to hearings in court
and even fewer led to convictions.
In 2001 the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO)
published a report on court complaints filed about police violence,
which indicated that such reports more than doubled over the last
decade. The author speculated that some but not all of the increase may
be attributable to an increased willingness on the part of citizens to
report police mistreatment and the rise in arrests for certain types of
crimes.
According to the FLACSO study, in 1995-96 the Government
Corporation for Judicial Assistance in Santiago received 195
accusations of mistreatment by the police at the moment of arrest in
1995-96, 400 in 1997, 815 in 1998, 1,107 in 1999, and 1,074 in 2000. Of
a total of 3,591 cases, only 200 were brought before a judge. Usually
countercharges of violence against police officers were filed and these
cases were sent to a military court. The CODEPU was aware of only 12
cases in which the civil judge retained jurisdiction and notes that of
173 cases brought before military tribunals, only 6 resulted in
convictions. The CODEPU was unaware of any case in which a member of
the Investigative Police has been convicted.
No new information has become available regarding the mistreatment
of military conscripts during the year.
During the year, there were instances of violent confrontations
between radical Mapuche groups and local landowners, logging companies,
and government authorities in the southern part of the country (see
Section 5). The actions took the form of protests and, occasionally,
instances of rock throwing, land occupations, and burning of crops or
buildings. On November 11, an activist was shot and killed in a
confrontation with the police. Several Mapuches were arrested in
connection with acts of violence.
Police occasionally used force against protesters (see Section
2.b.).
In 2001 courses in human rights became part of the core curriculum
in police academies for both rank and file police and officers. During
the year, similar courses were introduced at the academy for prison
guards and officials.
Prison conditions were generally poor. Prisons often were
overcrowded and antiquated, with sub-standard sanitary conditions. In
March overcrowding led to a prison riot in Valdivia in which part of
the prison was destroyed by fire. Several guards and prisoners were
injured although there were no fatalities. The prison, built for 200
inmates, housed more than 600. In 2001 a fire broke out in the prison
in Iquique that led to the death of 26 prisoners. A police
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the fire and the
subsequent response by prison officials continued at year's end. The
Ministry of Justice announced a $5 million (3 billion pesos) program in
all prisons to develop contingency planning for emergencies and prevent
such incidents from occurring in the future.
The Government recognized that overcrowding in prisons continued to
be a problem. The Ministry of Justice stated that in October 2001 there
were 34,335 prisoners in prisons designed to lodge 23,025 inmates, a
situation that remained unchanged during the year. In 2001 the Ministry
of Justice opened bids on 3 new prisons, to be completed in December
2003 and designed initially to house 4,800 prisoners. These prisons are
part of a plan to construct 10 new prisons in the next several years,
to house an initial population of 16,000 prisoners. Even with this
ambitious construction program, the growing prison population is
projected to continue to exceed the space available. Food met minimal
nutritional needs, and prisoners may supplement the diet by buying
food. Those with sufficient funds often can ``rent'' space in a better
wing of the prison.
Although most analysts state that the guards generally behave
responsibly and do not mistreat prisoners, prisoners have complained to
CODEPU about beatings, and the courts have received numerous complaints
of mistreatment of prisoners. Prison guards have been accused of using
excessive force to stop attempted prison breaks. The Supreme Court
expressed particular concern over the sanitary conditions and treatment
of prisoners in the Colina II prison's Alfa high security unit. In
January 26 prisoners were treated for self-inflicted wounds in protest
of their conditions. An investigation ordered by the Supreme Court
found evidence of physical mistreatment of the prisoners. The Santiago
Appeals Court ordered the unit closed until improvements were made. No
one was charged by year's end.
The Minister of Interior asked the courts to conduct independent
investigations of credible complaints of police abuse, but such
investigations often did not result in arrests due in part to the
reluctance of judges to pursue the issue vigorously. Statistics on
complaints of mistreatment and reliable reporting of such instances
during the year were not available.
When requested by other human rights organizations or family
members, CODEPU lawyers visited detainees during the interrogation and
represented some suspected terrorists in court. The CODEPU continued to
investigate alleged use of excessive force against detainees and
particularly was concerned about the treatment of prisoners in maximum-
security prisons and prisoners with HIV/AIDS and mental deficiencies
who often did not receive adequate medical attention.
Pretrial detainees generally were not held with convicted
prisoners. Women generally were housed in separate facilities, which
tend to be less crowded and with somewhat better conditions than men's
prisons.
By law juvenile offenders (those under the age of 18) were
segregated from adult prisoners. According to the latest available
figures, there were 422 minors in adult prisons at the end of 1998.
However, in September the Supreme Court admonished police officials for
failing to keep minors sufficiently separated from adult offenders and
ordered prison officials to correct this deficiency. Separation of
minors was a concern especially when a minor initially was detained
before being brought to court. A study by Diego Portales University
determined that in 2001, of the 10,748 minors detained, 37.3 percent
were initially held in adult facilities. The National Minors Service
began construction of two juvenile detention centers during 2001 and
two more during the year.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution states
that no one can be arrested or detained except by a public official
expressly authorized by law. The courts must be advised within 48 hours
of the arrest and the detainee placed at a judge's disposition. No one
can be arrested or detained except in their house or a public facility
designed for that purpose. Provisional liberty must be granted unless a
judge decides that detention is necessary to pursue the investigation
or for the protection of the prisoner or the public. The accused cannot
be obliged to testify against himself. The authorities generally
respected constitutional provisions for arrest and detention; however,
detainees often were not advised promptly of charges against them nor
granted a timely hearing before a judge. The Constitution allows
civilian and military courts to order detention for up to 5 days
without arraignment and to extend the detention of alleged terrorists
for up to 10 days. The law affords detainees 30 minutes of immediate
and subsequent daily access to a lawyer (in the presence of a prison
guard) and to a doctor to verify their physical condition. The law does
not permit a judge to deny such access; however, a 1994 study by Diego
Portales University indicated that, at that time, 23 percent of the
detainees interviewed said they had had no contact with a lawyer.
The most recent statistics available showed that at the end of
1999, 8 percent of the general prison population of 24,791 were under
investigation but not charged with a crime; 45 percent were charged
with an offense and were awaiting trial or had been convicted and were
awaiting sentencing; and 48 percent were serving sentences.
The law requires police to inform those detained of their rights,
to expedite notification of the detention to family members, and
eliminates the ability of police to demand identification from or stop
persons based solely on suspicion. The law also prohibits physical
abuse by police against detained persons (see Section 1.c.). The
Constitution allows judges to set bail.
There were no cases of forced exile; however, a number of people
convicted of terrorism have had the remainder of their sentences
commuted to exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
judicial system independent of the other branches of government. Most
sitting judges come from the career judiciary. All judges are appointed
for life. A 1997 Constitutional reform set 75 as the age limit for
Supreme Court justices, gave the Senate the right to veto presidential
nominations to the Court, and increased court membership from 16 to 21.
It also mandated that five members of the Supreme Court must be
civilians from outside the career judiciary. The Supreme Court prepares
lists of nominees for all members of the Supreme Court and appeals
courts, from which the President makes nominations. Cases decided in
the lower courts can be referred to appeals courts and ultimately to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court continued to work with the other
branches of government on broad judicial reform.
If formal charges are filed in civilian courts against a member of
the military, including the Carabineros, the military prosecutor asks
for jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court sometimes has granted. This
is of particular consequence in human rights cases from the period
covered by the Amnesty Law. Military courts are much more inclined to
grant amnesty without a full investigation. Military courts have the
authority to charge and try civilians for terrorist acts, defamation of
military personnel, and sedition. Rulings by military tribunals may be
appealed to the Supreme Court. Persons accused of terrorist acts and
persons arrested during demonstrations for assaulting a police officer
are brought before military tribunals.
Civilians prosecuted in military courts have the same legal
protections as those prosecuted in civilian courts (see Section 2.a.).
They are entitled to counsel, the charges are public, the sentencing
guidelines are the same (with the exception that the death penalty can
be imposed in a military court but not in a civilian court), and
appeals ultimately may be heard by the Supreme Court. The primary
difference in the military court system is that the initial
investigation and charges are brought by a military prosecutor and the
first instance of appeal is in a Court Martial, composed of two
civilian and three military judges.
A 1997 judicial reform law created the post of Attorney General,
with a 10-year term, and an office of support staff that was in full
operation during the year. An office of Public Defender also was
established to provide professional legal counsel to anyone who should
seek such assistance (see Section 1.d.). The judicial reform law, which
applies to criminal cases, provides that national and regional
prosecutors investigate crimes and formulate charges, leaving judges
and magistrates the narrower function of judging the merits of evidence
presented to them. Training and administrative setup began in 1999, and
implementation began in December 2000, with oral trials in 2 of the 13
political regions. At year's end, eight regions had begun to implement
the reform. Initial reports indicated that the reform resulted in a
more transparent process, greater respect for defendants' rights, and
speedier trials.
The preexisting criminal justice system did not provide for oral
trials. In those regions where the judicial reform law has yet to be
implemented, criminal proceedings were inquisitorial rather than
adversarial. The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel,
but indigent defendants, who account for the majority of the cases,
have not always received effective legal representation. They usually
were represented by someone from the Government's legal assistance
corporation, often a law student finishing his or her studies and doing
a mandatory internship. On occasion the court may appoint a lawyer.
There were no reports of political prisoners, although 57 inmates
in Santiago's maximum-security prison all charged with terrorist acts
following the return to democracy routinely claimed to be political
prisoners. Their cases have been pending for 10 to 12 years before a
military court. They have yet to be convicted or sentenced.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such actions, and the
Government generally respected these prohibitions in practice. A
privacy law bars obtaining information by undisclosed taping, telephone
intercepts, and other surreptitious means, as well as the dissemination
of such information, except by judicial order in narcotics-related
cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. Human rights groups criticized the
existence and application of laws that allow government officials to
prosecute journalists who insult or criticize them; the Government
revoked one such law and sought to revoke others, but cases were still
brought during the year.
The press maintained its independence, criticized the Government,
and covered issues sensitive to the military, including human rights
cases.
In 2001 President Lagos signed a law on freedom of the press that
eliminated a provision under the 1958 State Security Law that made it a
criminal offense to besmirch the honor of state institutions and their
members and symbols, such as the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
military services, the flag, and the President. Before its revocation,
individual government officials occasionally had invoked the provision.
Military courts have the authority to charge and try civilians for
defamation of military personnel and for sedition, but their rulings
may be appealed to the Supreme Court (see Section 1.e.).
Despite the new press law, the Penal Code still prohibits insulting
state institutions such as the presidency, as well as legislative and
judicial bodies. In December the president of the Supreme Court brought
charges against a talk show participant who, commenting on the case of
a woman who spent 3 years in prison for a crime for which she
ultimately was absolved, accused the justice system of being immoral,
cowardly, and corrupt. He was imprisoned briefly and released on bail.
The case was still pending at year's end. The Government sought
priority action in Congress on a bill that would remove these
provisions protecting government officials.
In December 2001, the president of the State Defense Council
brought private libel charges against El Mercurio newspaper for
criticism of her performance of official duties and the suggestion that
she resign. She had to bring charges on a private basis because the
State Defense Council is not one of the institutions covered against
libel in the Penal Code. The case was still pending at year's end.
A 1996 privacy law set penalties for those who infringe on the
private and public life of individuals and their families; however, the
privacy law has never been applied to the media.
Two major media groups controlled most of the print media, which
largely were independent of the Government. The Government is the
majority owner of La Nacion newspaper, but its editorial content is not
under direct government control. Investigative journalism made
significant strides forward when La Nacion reported on the alleged
withholding of information on human rights violations under the
military regime by the Air Force and in addition, when several leading
private newspapers broke stories on alleged bribery within congress and
the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works.
The broadcast media also largely were independent of direct
government influence. The Television Nacional network is state-owned
but not under direct government control. It receives no government
subsidy and was self-financing through commercial advertising. It is
editorially independent and is governed by a board of directors
appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. Members reflect
various political viewpoints, and the board encouraged the expression
of varied opinions over the network.
The National Television Council (CNT), supported with government
funding, is charged with assuring that television programming
``respects the moral and cultural values of the nation.'' The CNT's
principal role is to regulate violence and sexual explicitness in both
broadcast and cable television programming content. Films and other
programs judged by the CNT to be excessively violent or to have obscene
language or sexually explicit scenes may be shown only after 10 p.m.
when ``family viewing hours'' end. In practice the ever-increasing
volume of programming made the CNT's job all but impossible. The CNT
issued occasional warnings to networks and cable providers and
sometimes obliged them to postpone the showing of certain films until
after 10 p.m. It also occasionally levied fines. Debate continued over
the CNT's role during the year.
On July 11, the Congress approved a constitutional reform designed
to put an end to film censorship and established a film classification
system to take its place. The new classification system was scheduled
to begin operating in January 2003. Following a 2001 ruling criticizing
the Supreme Court's 1997 decision to uphold the 1989 ban on the
exhibition of the film ``The Last Temptation of Christ,'' the IACHR
gave the Government 60 days to explain what steps had been taken to end
censorship and allow exhibition of the film. At year's end, the film
had still not been exhibited commercially in the country.
On December 4, a Santiago court ordered police to seize immediately
all existing copies of journalist Cristobal Pena's book ``Cecilia, La
Vida en Llamas''. The book is an unauthorized biography of pop diva
Cecilia Pantoja and the removal order came after the singer filed a
libel suit against the author. The book no longer was on sale in
bookstores pending an appeal by the author.
The courts may prohibit media coverage of legal cases in progress
but did so rarely. The press began using foreign Internet web sites to
publish articles when gag orders were issued. The Government did not
restrict use of the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice; however, police
occasionally used force against demonstrators.
In April police arrested more than 100 students protesting the cost
of student bus passes in Santiago. In June police used tear gas and
water cannons to break up a student protest in Valparaiso over the
financing of university studies. In August police arrested more than 60
students and several persons were hurt during a student protest over
the cost of bus transportation in Santiago. In early September, police
arrested 12 persons and again used water cannons and tear gas in
Valparaiso when students commemorating victims of the military
dictatorship began erecting barricades and throwing Molotov cocktails.
On the anniversary of the September 1973 coup 505 protesters (445 from
around the city of Santiago and 60 elsewhere in the country) were
arrested. There were 14 policemen injured (4 seriously). One person
attempting to erect a barricade was injured.
On October 16, one person was injured and 22 arrested when police
broke up a hip hop concert. An amateur video showed what appeared to be
unnecessary force by the Carabineros, leading the Corporation to Defend
the Rights of Juveniles (CODEJU) to bring a lawsuit against the
Carabineros.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. Church and State officially are separate; however, the Roman
Catholic Church continued to receive some preferential treatment. All
denominations practiced their faiths without restriction.
A 1999 law on religion, designed to bring other religious entities
in line with the legal status enjoyed by the Catholic Church, went into
effect in March 2000. The law bestows the same legal status that the
Catholic Church previously enjoyed upon all other faiths and removed
the ability of the State to dissolve religious entities by decree.
Instead, this only can occur after a judicial review begun by a
complaint filed by the autonomous State Defense Council.
Many of the approximately 2 million Protestants, who represent
about 12 percent of the population according to the latest census
(1992), asserted that the Government has discriminated against them.
They cited the absence of Protestant armed forces chaplains,
difficulties for pastors to visit military hospitals, and the
predominantly Catholic religious education in public schools. Military
recruits, whatever their religion, were required at times to attend
Catholic events involving their unit. The new law grants other
religions the right to have chaplains in public hospitals, prisons, and
military units, and the presence of Protestant ministers in these
institutions was on the rise. In August Minister of Defense Bachelet
promised that all branches of the military would have Protestant
chaplains. In December 2001, President Lagos designated Methodist
Bishop Neftali Aravena as copastor for the chapel located in the
Presidential Palace. Aravena is the first non-Catholic pastor assigned
to the chapel in the Presidential Palace. A Protestant representative
also was given equal protocol status with the Roman Catholic Cardinal
at official events.
In July 2001, the President promulgated new regulations reinforcing
a prisoner's right freely to profess the religion of his or her choice.
The regulations require prisons to develop areas for worship and to
enlist Protestant and Catholic chaplains to hold services. As much as
70 percent of the prison population is estimated to engage in religious
activities, primarily evangelical or Catholic.
Schools were required to offer religious education twice a week
through middle school; enrollment in religious classes is optional for
students. It was mandatory to teach the creed requested by parents,
although enforcement was sometimes lax. Instruction was predominantly
in the Roman Catholic faith; however, more schools offered non-Catholic
alternatives for religious education. The mayor of Santiago pledged in
September that all schools in the municipality would offer an
evangelical alternative.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. In
order for minor children to leave the country, either alone or with
only one of their parents, they must have notarized permission from the
nonaccompanying parent(s).
The law includes provisions for granting asylum and refugee status
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue
of the provision of first asylum has not arisen.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage for citizens 18 years of age and over. In January
2000, voters elected Ricardo Lagos, of the Socialist Party, as
president in a free and fair runoff election. He defeated center-right
candidate Joaquin Lavin of the Alliance for Chile coalition. Lagos is a
member of the center-left Concertacion coalition, which includes his
Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Party for
Democracy (of which Lagos is also a member), and the Radical Social
Democrat Party.
The legislative branch, with the exception of 10 nonelected
senators among the 48 members of the upper house, is elected freely and
is independent from the executive branch. In December 2001, free and
fair congressional elections were held for all 120 seats in the lower
house and 18 of the 38 elected seats in the Senate. The elections
resulted in a 24-24 split between pro-Lagos senators and those of the
opposition and narrowed the Concertacion coalition's lead in the lower
house from 70-50 to 63-57.
The Government still operates under some political restraints that
the military regime imposed. Under the 1980 Constitution, various
national institutions--including the President, the Supreme Court, and
the National Security Council (the latter acting on nominations by the
armed forces)--appoint an additional nine Senators (beyond those
elected) to 8-year terms. In addition, former President Frei exercised
his option to become a senator-for-life. Former President Pinochet
resigned his senator-for-life position in July (see Section 1.a.).
The former military government wrote the 1980 Constitution, and
amended it slightly in 1989 after losing a referendum on whether
General Pinochet should stay in office as president. The Constitution
provides for a strong presidency and a legislative branch with limited
powers. It includes provisions designed to protect the interests of the
military and places limits on majority rule. These provisions include
limitations on the President's right to remove the commanders in chief
of the three armed services and the Carabineros, certain types of
legislation that require super-majorities, and the provision for
nonelected senators. In January the IACHR issued a resolution
criticizing the existence of designated senators and senators-for-life
and urged the Government to end the practice. In October 2000, a Senate
Commission (including two designated Senators) unanimously approved a
proposal that would abolish these positions starting in 2006; however,
at year's end, Congress had not passed legislation codifying this and
other proposals for constitutional reform.
Women have the right to vote and were active in all levels of
political life, including grassroots movements. There were no legal
impediments to women's participation in government and politics. There
were 15 women among the 120 deputies, 2 women in the 48-seat Senate,
and 5 women among the 16 cabinet ministers. In October 2001, President
Lagos appointed the first woman ever to serve as 1 of the 21 justices
of the Supreme Court.
The approximately 1.2 million indigenous people have the legal
right to participate freely in the political process, although
relatively few were active politically. There were no members of
Congress who acknowledge indigenous descent.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several human rights Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) were
active; however, many faced difficulties, due to limited sources of
funding. The Chilean Human Rights Commission, an NGO, is affiliated
with the International League of Human Rights. The Foundation for
Social Help of the Christian Churches continued to be active on the
full range of human rights issues and tracked the status of many human
rights cases, especially those involving the military. The CODEPU and
the Corporation to Defend the Rights of Juveniles greatly reduced their
scope of activity during the year. The Government cooperated with
domestic NGOs efforts to investigate accusations of human rights
violations. Many international NGOs also followed human rights issues
closely.
In May 2001, the Minister of Interior created an advisory council
to oversee a new autonomous state agency created to protect and promote
human rights. The agency helped the Legal Medical Service identify the
remains of those who disappeared during the Pinochet regime; cooperated
with the judiciary in designating special judges to investigate
disappearances; and, through the Ministry of Defense, has worked with
the armed forces to obtain more information (see Section 1.b.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law and the
Government generally respected these provisions. In 1999 Congress
amended the Constitution to emphasize the principle of equality between
men and women and stated that ``persons are born free and equal in
their dignity and rights.'' The new Labor Code prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, sex, age, marriage status, union membership,
religion, political opinion, nationality, national origin, or social
status (see Section 6.a.); however, such discrimination occurred in
practice.
Women.--Serious problems affecting women included sexual and
domestic violence. During the year, the National Women's Service
(SERNAM), which combats discrimination against women, conducted courses
on the legal, medical, and psychological aspects of domestic violence
for police officers and judicial and municipal authorities. A 1994 law
specifically addresses violence within the family. A study done in July
2001 by the University of Chile indicated that more than half the women
in the country have experienced violence in their relationship with
their partner. The study calculates that 34 percent of women have been
subject to physical violence (of which 14.9 percent was sexual
violence) and another 16.3 percent have suffered psychological
violence. Since the law on intrafamily violence went into effect, the
number of cases presented in the courts has increased from 1,419 in
1994 to 73,559 in 1999. In July 2001, SERNAM and more than 70 NGOs
initiated a campaign that included prominently displayed posters and
other activities designed to increase public awareness of the problem
of violence against women and reduce its occurrence.
The courts may order counseling for those involved in intrafamily
violence. At year's end, there were 17 government and 8 private centers
to attend to victims of intrafamily violence. The Investigative Police
had a special office that provided counseling for rape victims. The
Ministry of Justice also had several offices located throughout the
country specifically for assistance in rape cases. There were a number
of NGOs such as La Morada that provided counseling.
The law took effect increasing the penalties for sexual abuse. The
legislation includes clauses to facilitate proof of the crime and to
protect the privacy and safety of the person making the charge. The
Citizens' Peace Foundation indicated that there were 1,373 cases of
rape reported to the police in 2001, 1,250 in 2000, 1,297 in 1999, and
1,052 in 1998. Experts believe that a majority of rape cases go
unreported.
Adult prostitution is not expressly illegal. Police habitually
detained prostitutes (usually as a result of complaints by residents of
the neighborhood) and accuse them of ``offenses against morality,''
which can lead to a $70 (50,000 pesos) fine or 5 days in prison.
There were no laws against sexual harassment, although it was
generally recognized as a problem.
Legal distinctions between the sexes still exist. The law permits
legal separation but not divorce, so those who wish to remarry must
seek annulments. Since annulment implies that a marriage never existed
under the law, former spouses are left with little recourse for
financial support. A 1994 law created conjugal property as an option in
a marriage, but some women saw this as a disadvantage, since the law on
separate property (which still exists) gives women the right to one-
half their husbands' assets but gives husbands no rights to assets of
the wife. In the face of heavy opposition from the Catholic Church, the
Chamber of Deputies approved a divorce bill in 1997; the bill faces
Senate opposition but was still on the legislative agenda at year's
end.
A July 2001 SERNAM study found that the average earnings of women
were 68.2 percent of those of male heads of household. Women with no
schooling averaged a salary that was 81.3 percent that of their male
counterparts. The minimum wage for domestic helpers (who are thought to
number 300,000 in what is probably the largest single category of
working women) was only 75 percent of the standard minimum wage (see
Section 6.e.). Women with university training averaged 53.4 percent as
much earnings as their male counterparts. The Labor Code provides
specific benefits for pregnant workers and recent mothers; these also
apply to domestic workers. Employers do not have the right to ask women
to take pregnancy tests prior to hiring them, although the La Morada
Corporation for Women has received reports that the practice continued
in some companies.
Children.--The Government provides free education through high
school; education is compulsory from first through eighth grade.
Violence against children was a serious problem, although it
appeared to be declining. A survey of 8th grade students by UNICEF
comparing the incidence of mistreatment from 1994 to 2000 showed that
in 1994, 63 percent of children had been subject to some sort of
physical violence compared with 54 percent at the end of the period.
During the same period, those having suffered some sort of serious
physical violence from their parents had fallen from 34 percent to 25
percent.
A 1999 report by the National Minors Service (SENAME) noted that it
had handled the cases of 5,453 mistreated children for the first 6
months of that year; 583 of these cases were judged severe enough to be
presented to legal authorities. The SENAME reported that 9,723 cases of
abuse were brought to its attention in 1998. From mid-1998 to December
1999, the SENAME brought to the courts 713 cases for child abuse, 314
for rape, 292 for sexual abuse, 79 for grave harm done to children, and
28 cases of homicide. Of the cases, 70 percent came to trial, of which
80 percent resulted in convictions. SENAME lawyers received specialized
training in child abuse cases, leading to a higher conviction rate of
offenders according to the Director of the organization. A report from
the La Morada Corporation for Women released in 1999 estimated that
there were 20,000 cases of sexual abuse of children every year.
A 1996 UNICEF report stated that 34 percent of children under 12
years of age experienced serious physical violence, although only 3.2
percent of the victims of intrafamily violence reported to the
Carabineros family affairs unit were below the age of 18. A 1994 law on
intrafamily violence was designed in part to address this problem.
According to UNICEF, some form of corporal punishment was used by one
or both parents in 62 percent of households.
Child prostitution was a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Police and social workers make an effort to identify and place
child prostitutes found on the streets in juvenile homes.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law promotes the integration of
persons with disabilities into society; the Government's National Fund
for the Handicapped has a small budget to encourage such integration.
The 1992 census found that 288,000 citizens said that they had some
form of disability. Persons with disabilities still suffer some forms
of legal discrimination; for example, blind persons cannot become
teachers or tutors. Although the law requires that new public buildings
provide access for persons with disabilities, the public transportation
system did not make provision for wheelchair access, and subway lines
in the Santiago metropolitan area provided facilitated access for
persons with disabilities only in some areas.
Indigenous Persons.--Approximately 1.2 million persons identify
themselves as indigenous. The Mapuches, from the south, account for
approximately 930,000 of this total. There are also small Aymara,
Atacameno, Rapa Nui, and Kawaskhar populations in other parts of the
country. A committee composed of representatives of indigenous groups
participated in drafting the 1993 law that recognizes the ethnic
diversity of the indigenous population and gives indigenous people a
voice in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and traditions. It
provides for eventual bilingual education in schools with indigenous
populations, replacing a statute that emphasized assimilation of
indigenous people. Of the population that identifies itself as
indigenous, approximately one-half remained separated from the rest of
society, largely due to historical, cultural, educational, and
geographical factors. In practice the ability of indigenous people to
participate in governmental decisions affecting their lands, cultures,
traditions, and the allocation of natural resources was marginal.
Indigenous people also experienced some societal discrimination.
The National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI) was
created in 1994, and indigenous people were elected directly as
representatives to this body in 1995 and 1999. It advises and directs
government programs that assist the economic development of indigenous
people. In May 2000, the Commission for Truth and New Treatment
appointed by the Lagos administration proposed a 16-point program aimed
at addressing indigenous concerns. As part of the program, the
Commission for Truth and New Treatment became permanent, with a mandate
to find ways to facilitate the participation of Mapuche and other
indigenous populations in the formulation of national policies
affecting them. The commission met during the year and is charged with
issuing a report by June 2003.
Land occupations and other violence by isolated Mapuche Indian
groups against private forestry companies occurred through much of the
year (see Section 1.c.). Police arrested nine Mapuches following a land
seizure in March. In April, in two separate instances, trucks carrying
lumber were set on fire; no persons were injured. The police charged
two Mapuches in one of the incidents. Approximately a dozen Mapuches
briefly occupied the offices of the European Union protesting the
Government's handling of Mapuche land issues and its treatment of
indigenous people.
On November 7, a Mapuche activist was shot and killed in a
confrontation with police. This incident led to a rise in protests and
confrontations. In December seven leaders of the activist group
Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco were arrested and jailed as suspects in an
attack on a forestry plantation in December 2001. They face charges for
terrorist acts and for being part of an illicit association under the
State Security Law.
Several Mapuche families continued to object to exchanging
traditional lands for other property as part of the Ralco hydroelectric
project. Sixty-seven families accepted economic inducements to move to
other land but six families involved continued to object to Ente
Nacional de Electicidad's (ENDESA) effort to have them resettled. In
March police used tear gas and bullets to turn back protesters armed
with Molotov cocktails, sticks, and stones in an attempt to block
construction of the dam. More than 50 protesters were arrested and 15
injured. In June a small bomb blew out windows at the Chilectra
headquarters (owned by ENDESA) in Santiago. In December one of the six
families reached a financial settlement with the company. The others
subsequently entered into negotiations with ENDESA.
The Ninth region, which is mainly Mapuche, is one of the regions
using the new criminal justice system (see Section 1.e.). Because of a
rise in cases stemming from violent actions, some indigenous leaders
saw the new system as a way to target and repress the Mapuche; these
feelings of distrust may represent a lack of understanding of the new
system, which in fact provided them with enhanced rights.
The Government was preparing a response to a 1999 suggestion from
the U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that
the Government apologize to and compensate indigenous people for their
historical treatment, and explicitly outlaw racial and ethnic
discrimination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country assimilated a major
European migration in the 19th century and major Middle Eastern and
Croatian migrations in the early part of the 20th century. There are
also smaller racial and ethnic minority groups such as those of Asian
descent and African-Chileans, who experienced some societal
intolerance.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions
without prior authorization and to join existing unions. The work force
was estimated at 5.87 million persons, of whom 3.7 million were
salaried. Union membership was approximately 580,000, or roughly 10
percent of the work force. Police and military personnel may not
organize collectively. Members of unions were free to withdraw from
union membership. The law prohibits closed union shops.
The Labor Code permits nationwide labor centrals; the Unified
Workers Central (CUT) was the largest and most representative of these.
Labor unions were effectively independent of the Government, but union
leaders usually were elected from lists based on party affiliation and
sometimes receive direction from party headquarters. Political
activities or affiliations of unions or union officials were not
restricted, although currently serving union officials are not allowed
to hold public office. Registering a union was a simple process. In
December 2001, a major reform of the Labor Code went into effect. Among
various other provisions aimed at facilitating the formation of unions
and promoting collective bargaining, the reform freed unions from
government regulation of their internal organization and permitted
unions to be structured along geographic as well as functional lines.
Amendments to the Labor Code resulting from the 1981 reform placed
additional limits on the causes for dismissal (for example, misconduct
outside the workplace no longer was grounds for dismissal) and
significantly increased the penalties for unjustified dismissals.
Employees who believe they have been dismissed unfairly or dismissed
owing to their trade union activities file complaints with the Ministry
of Labor and ultimately, the labor tribunals. According to the revised
Labor Code, if the dismissal is found to be related to trade union
activity on the part of the employee, he or she may choose between
reinstatement with back wages or an additional compensatory payment.
The burden of proof rests with the employer in cases in which alleged
illegal antiunion activity is supported in a report by a labor
inspector.
During the year, there continued to be allegations that employers
dismissed workers for union activity and attempted to avoid a complaint
by immediately paying them some multiple of the normal severance pay.
During the year, labor leaders complained that companies invoked the
law's needs-of-the-company clause to fire workers after a union had
signed a new contract even though penalties for doing so without
justification have been increased. Workers often were reluctant to
contest these actions because of the huge backlog in the Labor
Tribunals. This is expected to change since the Labor Directorate may
become a party to these cases.
The CUT and many other labor confederations and federations
maintained ties to international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Employees in
the private sector have the right to strike; however, the Government
regulates this right, and there were some restrictions. The law permits
replacement of striking workers, subject to the payment of a fine that
is distributed among the strikers. Public employees in theory do not
enjoy the right to strike, although government teachers, municipal, and
health workers have gone on strike in the past. The law proscribes
employees of some 30 companies--largely providers of essential services
(e.g., water and electricity)--from striking; it stipulates compulsory
arbitration to resolve disputes in these companies. There was no
provision for compulsory arbitration in the public sector. Strikes by
agricultural workers during the harvest season were prohibited.
Employers must pay severance benefits to striking workers and must
show cause to dismiss workers.
There were a number of strikes during the year. In May 2001, a
strike against the bicycle manufacturer Bianchi received considerable
attention when one of the striking workers was struck and killed by a
bus carrying nonstriking workers attempting to enter the facility. The
case remained under investigation for possible criminal charges at
year's end. Eight workers were fired after the strike ended.
Despite legal provisions for collective bargaining, before the
modifications that went into force in December 2001, the Labor Code
included provisions that made it difficult for trade unions to organize
in many sectors.
Union officials and the Ministry of Labor have indicated that the
modifications of the Labor Code have made union organizing easier and
preliminary data on new union formation after December 2001 appear to
confirm those expectations. The head of the labor inspectors stated
that her office noted among workers a sense of greater security in
forming new unions and initiating collective bargaining negotiations,
while at the same time, less resistance to these activities on the part
of employers.
Workers engaged in the formation of a union may not be discharged
during the period from 10 days before to 30 days after the vote to
unionize. Likewise, the workers engaged in collective bargaining are
immune for 10 days before the presentation of a contract proposal until
30 days after it is signed. They are also entitled to all pertinent
financial information from the company for the last 2 years. The
modifications also greatly increase fines for violating immunities
enjoyed by union leaders or artificially dividing up a company for the
purpose of avoiding provisions in the code or resisting unionization.
To enforce the new provisions, the Labor Directorate under the Ministry
of Labor had begun to hire some of the 443 new employees mandated under
the new legislation, including 300 labor inspectors, almost doubling
the number of field inspectors.
Temporary workers--defined in the Labor Code as those in
agriculture and construction, as well as port workers and
entertainers--may form unions, but their right to collective bargaining
is limited. The recent modification of the Labor Code contains reforms
aimed at facilitating collective bargaining in the agricultural sector
but it is still dependent on employers agreeing to negotiate. Inter-
company unions were permitted to bargain collectively only if the
individual employers agree to negotiate under such terms.
Labor laws apply in the duty free zones; there were no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution and the
Labor Code prohibit forced or bonded labor, and it was not known to
occur. While the Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced and
bonded labor by children, there were no reports of such practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law restricts child labor; however, it was a problem
in the informal economy. The law allows children between the ages of 16
and 18 to work with the express permission of their parents or
guardians. The law allows 15-year-olds to work under certain
conditions; their parents must consent, they must have finished
compulsory schooling, and they may only perform light work not
requiring hard physical labor or constituting a threat to health and
childhood development. Additional provisions in the law protect workers
under 18 years of age by restricting the types of work open to them
(for example, they may not work in nightclubs) and by establishing
special conditions of work (they may not work more than 8 hours in 1
day). The minimum age to work in an underground mine is 21 years;
special regulations govern the ability of 18- to 21-year-olds to work
at other types of mining sites.
Labor inspectors enforced these regulations, and compliance was
good in the formal economy; however, many children were employed in the
informal economy. UNICEF estimated that approximately 107,000 children
between the ages of 12 and 19 work. A government study in 1996
estimated that 15,000 children between the ages of 6 and 11 and 35,000
children between the ages of 12 and 14 were in the work force. A 1998
Catholic Church study estimated that 50,000 children under the age of
15 worked. The majority of these were males from single-parent
households headed by women; among these were children who worked more
than 40 hours per week and did not attend school. During the year, an
ILO study put the number of working children age 12-14 in 2000 at
14,914, or 2 percent of the children of that age. Children sold chewing
gum on the street, washed windshields, worked as street performers,
begged, or helped their parents to harvest crops. The Ministry of Labor
convenes regular meetings of a tripartite group (business-labor-
government) to monitor progress in eradicating child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages, and
the minimum wage is adjusted annually. A tripartite committee
comprising government, employer, and labor representatives normally
suggests a minimum wage based on projected inflation and increases in
productivity. The minimum wage at year's end was approximately $150
(111,500 pesos) net of deductions per month. This wage was designed to
serve as the starting wage for an unskilled single worker entering the
labor force and did not provide a worker and family with a decent
standard of living. The minimum wage for domestic servants was 75
percent of that for other occupations (see Section 5). The Government
estimated that the proportion of the workforce at or below minimum wage
rose from 9.1 percent in 1998 to 14.4 percent in 1999. According to the
Government, of the workers who earn the minimum wage, approximately 43
percent are between the ages of 15 and 19.
The law sets hours of work and occupational safety and health
standards. The legal workweek is 48 hours and is scheduled to be
reduced to 45 hours on January 1, 2005. The maximum workday length is
10 hours, but positions such as caretakers and domestic servants are
exempted. All workers enjoy at least one 24-hour rest period during the
workweek, except for workers at high altitudes who voluntarily exchange
a work-free day each week for several consecutive work-free days every
2 weeks.
Occupational health and safety were protected under the law and
administered by both the Ministries of Health and of Labor. The
Government increased resources for inspections by more than 60 percent
since 1990 and plans almost to double the current number over the next
3 years, while targeting industries guilty of the worst abuses. As a
result, enforcement was improving, and voluntary compliance was fairly
good. Insurance mutual funds provide workers' compensation and
occupational safety training for the private and public sectors.
Workers who remove themselves from situations that endanger their
health and safety have their employment protected if a real danger to
their health or safety exists.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws that specifically
prohibit all forms of trafficking in persons; however, the law makes it
a crime for anyone to promote or facilitate the entry to or exit from
the country of persons for the purpose of facilitating prostitution.
Sanctions are increased in cases in which the victim is a minor; in
which violence or intimidation is used; if deception or abuse of
authority is involved; if the victim is related or under the tutelage
of the perpetrator; if advantage is taken of a victim's circumstances
or handicap; or if the action is of a recurring nature. Child
prostitution was a problem; there were a few other reports that persons
were trafficked to or from the country.
There are legal sanctions for adults who are found to have induced
children under the age of 18 to engage in commercial sex or engage them
for the purposes of pornography. UNICEF estimated in 1999 that there
were roughly 10,000 child prostitutes between the ages of 6 and 18. The
age of consent is 12 years; the law is vague regarding child
prostitution above this age unless force, fraud, or abuse of authority
can be proven.
The Government employs various measures to help educate the general
population on trafficking. For example, the Carabinero Public Relations
Department carried out lectures on prevention intended for children,
adolescents, and adults with the purpose of preventing the
disappearance of minors and adolescents as well as avoiding deception.
Other organizations such as Mother's Centers, and the National Service
for Minors also offered support programs to prevent trafficking.
----------
COLOMBIA
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy in which the
Liberal and Conservative parties have long dominated politics. On March
10, voters elected a bicameral legislature with a mix of Liberal,
Conservative, and independent members. On May 26, voters elected
independent Alvaro Uribe President. Both elections were generally free
and fair, in spite of a concerted campaign by terrorist organizations
such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to disrupt
them. A major internal armed conflict between the Government and
leftist guerrillas, particularly the FARC and the terrorist
organization National Liberation Army (ELN)--as well as right-wing
paramilitaries, particularly the terrorist organization United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), caused the deaths of between 5,000
and 6,000 civilians during the year, including combat casualties,
political killings, and forced disappearances. Serious violations of
human rights were commonplace. The civilian judiciary was largely
independent of government influence; however, the suborning or
intimidation of judges, witnesses, and prosecutors was common.
The civilian-led Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for
internal and external security and oversees both the National Police
and the Armed Forces, including the army, air force, and navy, which
includes the coast guard and the marines. In addition to the armed
forces and the National Police, the public security forces include
armed state law enforcement and investigative authorities such as the
Administrative Department of Security (DAS), which has broad
intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and immigration control
functions, and the Prosecutor General's Corps of Technical
Investigators (CTI). The National Police are responsible for
maintaining internal order and security in urban areas, although
persistent guerrilla assaults on isolated detachments have compelled
the thinly-staffed Police to leave 157 municipalities without a Police
presence. The Armed Forces are responsible for order and security in
rural areas and support the National Police in urban areas when called
upon. Over the years, the public security forces have taken important
steps to improve their human rights record; however, some members of
the armed forces and the police continued to commit serious of human
rights abuses.
Despite decades of drug and politically related violence, the
market-based economy is diverse and relatively advanced. The country's
population is estimated at 44 million. Crude oil, coal, coffee, and cut
flowers are the principal legal exports, although illegal drug
trafficking has created a large illicit economy. Economic growth for
the year was estimated at 1.6 percent, while inflation measured over 7
percent. Income distribution was highly skewed, with 67 percent of the
population living in poverty.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; there were
continued efforts to improve the legal framework and institutional
mechanisms, but implementation lagged, and serious problems remained in
many areas. A small percentage of total human rights abuses reported
were attributed to state security forces; however, some members of the
Government security forces continued to commit serious abuses,
including unlawful and extrajudicial killings. Some members of the
security forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed
serious abuses. Impunity remained at the core of the country's human
rights problems. The civilian judiciary was inefficient, severely
overburdened by a large case backlog, and undermined by corruption and
intimidation. Despite some prosecutions and convictions, the
authorities rarely brought high-ranking officers of the security forces
charged with human rights offenses to trial.
Police, prison guards, and military forces mistreated detainees.
Conditions in the overcrowded and underfunded prisons were harsh;
however, renovation and new construction ameliorated some problems.
There were allegations of arbitrary arrests and detentions,
particularly in ``Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones,'' and
prolonged pretrial detention remained a fundamental problem. The
authorities sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and the
security forces sometimes interfered with public demonstrations and
marches. A number of journalists were killed, and journalists continued
to work in an atmosphere of threats and intimidation, in some instances
from local officials, but primarily from paramilitary groups and
guerrillas. Journalists practiced self-censorship to avoid reprisals.
There were some restrictions on freedom of movement, generally because
of security concerns and confined to narrowly defined geographic areas,
particularly ``Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones.'' Violence and
instability in rural areas displaced over 400,000 civilians from their
homes. The total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) may have
exceeded 2.5 million. There were reports that security force members
harassed members of human rights groups. Violence and extensive
societal discrimination against women, child abuse, and child
prostitution were serious problems. Extensive societal discrimination
against indigenous people and minorities continued. Labor leaders and
activists continued to be victims of high levels of violence. Child
labor was a widespread problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the
purpose of sexual exploitation was a problem. Colombia was invited by
the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
Paramilitaries continued to commit numerous unlawful and political
killings, particularly of labor leaders, often kidnaping and torturing
suspected guerrilla sympathizers prior to executing them.
Paramilitaries also conducted kidnapings for ransom. Paramilitaries
committed ``social cleansing'' killings of homosexuals and other
``undesirable'' elements. However, paramilitaries appeared to commit
far fewer large-scale massacres than in 2001. Paramilitaries often
interfered with personal privacy in areas where they exercised de facto
control, and regularly engaged in military operations in which they
endangered civilian lives by fighting in urban areas and using civilian
dwellings as combat shelter. Paramilitaries displaced thousands through
both terror-induced forced displacements of suspect populations and
military operations that drove peasants from their homes.
Paramilitaries regularly threatened and attacked human rights workers
and journalists who criticized their illegal activities. Paramilitaries
also recruited child soldiers.
Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, were responsible for a large
percentage of civilian deaths attributable to the internal armed
conflict. The rate of guerrilla abuses increased during the year,
particularly as the FARC attempted to undermine the national elections
and complicate the peaceful transfer of power between administrations.
They engaged in a concerted campaign to destabilize municipal
governments by killing 9 mayors and threatening to execute others,
forcing nearly 400 mayors to submit their resignations. In addition to
politicians, guerrillas killed journalists, labor union members, and
numerous religious leaders. The FARC also continued to kidnap, torture,
and kill off-duty members of the public security forces. Guerrillas,
particularly the FARC and the ELN, kidnaped thousands of civilians to
help finance subversion and put political pressure on the Government.
Victims were held in deplorable conditions and often tortured both
physically and psychologically. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC,
caused mass displacements both intentionally and as byproducts of
military offensives, and caused thousands of civilian deaths and
injuries through indiscriminate attacks on small towns and random
terrorist bombings throughout the country. Guerrillas, particularly the
FARC, engaged in widespread recruitment of minors and used female
conscripts as sex slaves.
In April the Executive Director of the Americas Division of Human
Rights Watch (HRW) testified that both the FARC and the AUC committed
similar abuses and crimes, although their motives and goals were
different.
The Government operated a protection program for threatened human
rights workers, union leaders, journalists, mayors, and several other
groups. The program provided a range of protection options, ranging
from vehicles and armoring of offices to relocation and economic
assistance.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Political,
unlawful, and some extrajudicial killings remained an extremely serious
problem. The Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
(CPDDH), a prominent local human rights NGO (see Section 4), estimated
that of the 28,230 homicides reported by the National Police, 4,416
were politically motivated. The DAS estimated that there were
approximately 4,025 politically motivated homicides, the vast majority
committed by nonstate actors. However, some members of the security
forces continued to commit unlawful killings. The CPDDH reported that
the security forces committed 59 political killings during the year, or
1.34 percent of the total. The Jesuit founded Center for Investigation
and Popular Research (CINEP) reported that security forces were
responsible for 92 intentional homicides of protected persons in the
first 6 months of 2001. Most of the incidents cited by the CPDDH and
CINEP were under investigation by military and/or civilian authorities
at year's end. Civilian courts tried an increasing number of cases of
military personnel accused of human rights violations (see Section
1.e.). Members of the security forces sometimes collaborated illegally
with paramilitary forces, and the authorities continued to investigate
past cases of alleged collaboration with or failure to prevent
massacres by paramilitaries. Investigations of past killings and
massacres proceeded slowly. There were no published reports that police
or members of the armed forces committed social cleansing killings.
On September 25, near the village of Brisas de Yanacue, in the
municipality of Cantagallo, Bolivar department, army troops broke into
a private residence before sunrise and killed Florentino Castellanos
and his 9-year-old son. Castellanos's wife, Mongui Jerez, was seriously
wounded, losing an arm and a leg. Army troops mistakenly suspected that
FARC guerrillas were sheltered in the family's dwelling. At year's end,
the Procuraduria General (the Procuraduria) and the military were
investigating the incident to establish basic facts and determine if
the military should transfer its investigation to the Prosecutor
General's Office (Fiscalia).
On December 8, the Fiscalia indicted 8 members of the army's Ninth
Brigade, including a colonel and a captain, for the August 24 killing
of FARC deserter Robinson Castro. The suspects allegedly killed Castro
to steal $250,000 (728.1 million pesos) in cash he had intended to turn
over to government authorities.
Authorities continued to investigate the April 2001 killing of
policeman Carlos Ceballos, who had testified in the investigation of
illegal wiretapping by the Medellin GAULA anti-kidnaping force (see
Section 1.f.).
The CPDDH reported that 2,452 persons were killed in massacres
during the year. The CPDDH defines a ``massacre'' as the killing of 3
or more persons outside of combat in the same general location within a
24 period. The MOD reported a much smaller figure, with 361 persons
killed in massacres during the year. The National Police registered 680
victims of massacres. Both the MOD and the National Police define a
``massacre'' as the killing outside of combat of 4 or more persons in a
single incident. The CPDDH reported that state security forces killed
86 persons in massacres during the year, although it released no
information on specific incidents. There continued to be reports of
acts of negligence or deliberate omission by state security forces that
facilitated massacres.
The Inspector General's Office (Procuraduria) received 217
complaints against members of the state security forces related to
massacres and unlawful killings. The Procuraduria sanctioned three
members of the army and eight members of the police on murder charges,
and exonerated five members of the army, 2 members of the police, and
one member of the air force. The office continued to refer all cases
involving human rights violations to the Prosecutor General for
criminal investigation.
The Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia was investigating 173 members
of the state security forces for human rights crimes at year's end. The
unit arrested 57 members of the state security forces during the year
and filed charges against 25 for a variety of crimes including murder,
torture, kidnaping, and collaboration with paramilitary groups.
However, for various reasons, including lack of resources for
investigations, lack of protection for witnesses and investigators,
lack of coordination between government organs, and, in some cases,
obstruction of justice by individuals, impunity continued to be
widespread.
In 2001 a military trial court exonerated the soldiers involved in
the August 2000 killing of six children by an army unit in the town of
Pueblo Rico, Antioquia department; however, the Superior Military
Tribunal returned the case for reconsideration. No decision had been
reached at year's end (see Section 1.g.).
There was no significant progress in investigations by the Fiscalia
and the Procuraduria of a March 2001 paramilitary massacre in San
Carlos, Antioquia department, which resulted in the deaths of 13
persons. CINEP and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) charged
that police and military troops withdrew from the area of the attack 3
days prior to the massacre, and permitted a truck carrying 15
paramilitary hostages to pass unchallenged through a military
roadblock.
On November 28, prosecutors permanently closed their investigation
of army Colonel Miguel Angel Sierra, army Captain Carlos Alirio
Buitrago, and four enlisted men for their alleged participation in the
January 2000 killings of Uberney Giraldo and Jose Evelio Gallo near the
village of San Antonio, Montebello municipality, Antioquia department.
Both Giraldo and Gallo were long-demobilized ELN guerrillas associated
with the Socialist Renewal Current (CRS) political movement. The
Fiscalia continued to investigate the suspected participation in the
crimes of army noncommissioned officers Humberto de Jesus Blandon and
Sandro Fernando Barrera. The Procuraduria continued its own
investigation of the case at year's end.
On June 6, the Procuraduria ordered the dismissal of army
Lieutenant Emilio Suarez and 28 enlisted personnel for participating in
the 1997 kidnaping and killing of two suspected guerrillas near Santa
Ana, Antioquia department, and for subsequently staging a mock combat
intended to cover up the crimes.
On November 5, retired army Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Plazas, former
director of intelligence for the army's 13th Brigade, was sentenced to
40 years in prison for his role in the 1998 kidnaping and killing of
Jewish businessman Benjamin Khoudari. The Bogota Supreme Court had
still not ruled on appeals by two other persons of their convictions
for aggravated kidnaping and murder in the case.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the possible involvement of
public security forces in the May 1998 Barrancabermeja massacre, as
well as the July 2000 killing of Elizabeth Canas, a key eyewitness. The
Procuraduria also was conducting an inquiry into Canas's death. No
progress seemed likely in either investigation.
There was no ruling in the trial of retired army Colonel Bernardo
Ruiz, former commander of a military intelligence brigade, for
allegedly ordering the 1995 killing of Conservative Party leader Alvaro
Gomez. Two civilians were convicted of the killing and sentenced to
lengthy prison terms, while four other persons were acquitted.
The Supreme Court had not yet ruled on an appeal by five army
officers and four suspected paramilitaries of their 1998 convictions
for the 1988 Nuevo Segovia paramilitary massacre in which 43 persons
were killed.
On May 23, the Council of State overturned on a technicality the
Inspector General's 1994 order dismissing Brigadier General Alvaro
Velandia from the armed forces for involvement in the 1987 kidnaping,
torture, and killing of Nydia Erika Bautista, an M-19 guerrilla. The
Procuraduria was appealing the decision at year's end. The Association
of Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons (ASFADDES) and the
Bogota office of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR)
condemned the decision. ASFADDES and Bautista's relatives had already
presented the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR). No progress seemed likely in an investigation of the case by
the Fiscalia.
Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups,
including instances of both passive support and direct collaboration by
members of the public security forces, particularly the army,
continued. Evidence suggested that there were tacit arrangements
between local military commanders and paramilitary groups in some
regions, since paramilitary forces operated freely in some areas
despite a significant military presence. Some members of the security
forces actively collaborated with members of paramilitary groups--
passing them through roadblocks, sharing intelligence, providing them
with ammunition, and allegedly even joining their ranks while off duty.
The military high command stated repeatedly that it would not
tolerate collaboration between military personnel and paramilitaries,
and that the armed forces would combat paramilitary groups. Although
state security forces doubled operations against paramilitaries during
the year and quadrupled the number of paramilitaries captured since
2000 (see Section 1.g.), security force actions in the field were not
always consistent with the leadership's positions. In addition to
active collaboration, the military often was accused of failing to
respond in a timely manner to warnings of impending paramilitary
massacres or selective killings. The military generally cited lack of
credible information, available manpower, and adequate mobility to
explain these failures. Impunity for military personnel who
collaborated with members of paramilitary groups remained common.
An investigation continued into the January 2001 paramilitary
massacre of 27 civilians at the village of Chengue, near the town of
Chalan in Sucre department. On November 12, a specialized criminal
court in Sincelejo found army Sergeant Ruben Dario Rojas ``not guilty''
of facilitating the massacre. The Fiscalia appealed the decision. The
same specialized court had yet to rule of the culpability of army
Sergeant Euclides Rafael Bossa, although the evidence against the two
suspects was similar. The Fiscalia formally linked paramilitary leader
Nidia Esther Veilla to the crime. The Procuraduria filed formal
disciplinary charges against nine members of the public security
forces, including former Navy Admiral Rodrigo Quinones, for possible
culpable omission in failing to prevent the massacre. Quinones resigned
from the armed forces effective December 31.
In December the authorities released two gunmen arrested for the
August 2001 killing of Yolanda Paternina, local lead prosecutor in the
Chengue case, for lack of evidence. Two CTI investigators working
undercover on the case already had disappeared in April 2001 near the
town of Berrugas and were presumed dead.
On May 3, the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia formally charged 72
paramilitaries for killing 20 persons in the April 2001 massacre in the
Alto Naya region, bordering the departments of Cauca and Valle del
Cauca. Fifteen paramilitaries pled guilty to conspiracy to commit the
crimes. Three others were convicted of killing and sentenced to 26
years in prison. The Procuraduria was conducting a disciplinary
investigation into allegations that the army may have been negligent in
preventing the massacre. According to prosecutors, no active duty
service members were implicated in the commission of this crime.
The Procuraduria was investigating army Brigadier General Eduardo
Herrera and Police Colonel Guillermo Aranda for possible misconduct
related to the July 2001 kidnaping by paramilitaries of 43 men near
Peque, Antioquia department. Seven of these men, who the AUC forced to
herd cattle, were later found dead. At year's end, it was still unclear
whether their paramilitary kidnapers killed them or the FARC did on the
assumption that they were paramilitary collaborators.
The Procuraduria found no evidence of misconduct by any member of
the public security forces related to the October 2001 paramilitary
massacre of 24 persons near the city of Buga, Valle del Cauca
department. The Fiscalia continued its criminal investigation; however,
the investigation's closure seemed likely.
Civilian authorities continued to investigate the February 2000
paramilitary massacre of 42 persons in the El Salado neighborhood of
the town of Las Ovejas, Bolivar department. An earlier military
investigation found complaints of complicity to be unsubstantiated.
Authorities detained 16 suspected paramilitaries, who were standing
trial at year's end. The Procuraduria continued its disciplinary
investigation of nine members of the public security forces, including
navy admiral Humberto Cubos and former admiral Rodrigo Quinones, for
potential misconduct related to the incident.
The Fiscalia also was investigating allegations of army complicity
in a series of paramilitary crimes in and around the ``peace
community'' of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia
department in 2000 and 2001. In two separate incidents in 2000,
paramilitaries massacred five residents of San Jose and six residents
of the nearby community of La Union. In March 2001 paramilitaries again
entered San Jose and threatened members of the community. In July 2001,
paramilitaries entered La Union, killed one resident, and drove out
hundreds of others. On March 30, presumed paramilitaries killed a
member of the San Jose peace community on the road between San Jose and
the regional capital of Apartado. On October 20, paramilitaries entered
La Union, ``disappeared'' one resident, and drove out hundreds of
others, who were displaced to San Jose. To prevent further terrorist
attacks on the community, the military established a permanent presence
in the mountains surrounding La Union. La Union's residents had not
returned by year's end. Although peace community leaders accused the
army's 17th Brigade of involvement or acquiescence in many of these
incidents, prosecutors uncovered no evidence of military complicity.
An investigation continued of army Colonel Victor Matamorros and
army Captain Juan Carlos Fernandez regarding allegations that the two
actively collaborated with paramilitaries between 1997 and 1999 in the
department of Norte de Santander. Matamorros and Fernandez were the
commander and intelligence chief, respectively, of an army battalion
based in the departmental capital of Cucuta. Over a period of 5 months
in 1999, 15 major paramilitary massacres occurred near the Norte de
Santander towns of La Gabarra and Tibu. On April 8, a court in Cucuta
convicted Giovanni Velasquez, a paramilitary, of aggravated murder for
his role in the massacre.
In March 2001, the Fiscalia charged former Tibu military base
commander Major Mauricio Llorente, former Tibu police commander Major
Harbey Fernando Ortega, and 13 policemen with murder and complicity
with paramilitaries in one of the 1999 Tibu massacres. An investigation
continued into a related massacre of six persons near the town of Los
Cuervos. The Procuraduria continued its disciplinary investigation of a
police official for possible involvement in the Los Cuervos massacre;
however, it closed its investigation of the Tibu massacre after finding
no evidence of negligence or complicity by any member of the public
security forces.
The Fiscalia closed its investigation into allegations that Colonel
Rafael Alfonso Hani collaborated with paramilitaries while commander of
the army's Palace Battalion, based in Buga, Valle del Cauca department,
from 1999 to 2000. Despite the fact that there was a significant
increase in paramilitary activity in the region during Hani's tenure,
prosecutors found insufficient evidence to charge him with a crime. The
Procuraduria continued its own investigation of Hani.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate the 1998 paramilitary
massacre of 19 persons in Puerto Alvira, near the town of Mapiripan,
Meta department. In March 2001, the Superior Military Tribunal
confirmed a lower military court's decision to close the military's
investigation of the case. The Procuraduria formally exonerated Major
General Agustin Ardila, Major General Jaime Humberto Cortes, Brigadier
General Freddy Padilla, Brigadier General Jaime Uscategui, and
Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Sanchez of any wrongdoing related to the
massacre at Puerto Alvira. The Fiscalia continued its investigation of
21 members of the public security forces for alleged collusion with
paramilitaries responsible for approximately 160 social cleansing
killings in northeastern Antioquia between 1995 and 1998. The
Procuraduria was investigating 26 officials on disciplinary charges
related to the same events. The Fiscalia continued its investigation of
General Jaime Humberto Uscategui for alleged collusion with
paramilitaries related to the 1997 Mapiripan massacre. In November
2001, the Constitutional Court overturned on jurisdictional grounds
Uscategui's April 2001 military court conviction for dereliction of
duty in failing to prevent the massacre (see Section 1.e.). The
Fiscalia also was prosecuting 11 other defendants, including 3 members
of the armed forces, for offenses related to events at Mapiripan.
There was no reported progress in an investigation by the Fiscalia
into allegations that retired Brigadier General Fernando Millan armed
and equipped a paramilitary group in Santander department that was
responsible for the killings of at least 11 persons in 1997. On March
8, the Procuraduria, which was conducting a disciplinary investigation
of the allegations, exonerated Millan but found army Colonel Hernando
Sanchez and police Lieutenant Oscar Esteban Hernandez guilty, ordering
their immediate dismissal. The ruling was confirmed on appeal on July
9.
The Fiscalia continued its investigation into allegations that
former General Rito Alejo del Rio collaborated with paramilitaries in
the Uraba region of Antioquia department while he was commander of the
army's 17th Brigade from 1995-97. Del Rio was arrested on these charges
in July 2001, but subsequently was released based on a controversial
ruling that there were jurisdictional flaws in the arrest warrant. On
December 5, the Procuraduria closed its disciplinary investigation into
similar allegations after finding insufficient evidence of the alleged
crimes.
The trial continued of retired army Colonel Jose Ancizar Hincapie
for alleged collaboration with paramilitaries who killed 11 persons
between 1993 and 1994.
Former navy intelligence informant Jimmy Alberto Arenas was
convicted of murdering 63 persons in Barrancabermeja between 1991 and
1993 and was sentenced to a lengthy prison term.
The majority of the approximately 80 cases from the country before
the IACHR involved violations of the right to life. The IACHR continued
its attempt to broker an amicable settlement of the former Patriotic
Union (UP) Party's 1996 complaint charging the Government with ``action
or omission'' in what the UP termed ``political genocide'' of UP and
Communist Party members. Negotiations to amicably resolve the dispute,
which began in 1999, continued. Despite ongoing implementation of a
Ministry of Interior protection program for members of the UP and the
Communist Party, little progress was achieved. The Government cited the
large numbers of complainants as a complicating factor in resolving the
dispute. Members of the UP continued to be targets of violence. On
November 26, 10 armed men abducted Omar de Jesus Correa near a mass
transit station in Medellin. His welfare and whereabouts remained
unknown at year's end. In 2001 the IACHR presented a case to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights involving alleged military-paramilitary
collaboration in the 1996 killings of 19 merchants near the town of
Simacota, Santander department.
On July 29, the Government concluded an amicable settlement of
claims related to the 1992 police killings of eight children and one
adult in the Villatina neighborhood of Medellin. As part of the
settlement, the Government agreed to construct and equip the community
with a modern health center, fund the establishment of an employment-
generating local small business, and indemnify the victims' families.
Shortly after his inauguration, President Uribe instructed foreign
ministry officials to reach friendly settlements in all pending cases
in which state responsibility seemed clear. On October 17, the
Government began serious negotiations on five cases.
Paramilitaries committed numerous political and unlawful killings,
primarily in areas they disputed with guerrillas and generally in the
absence of a strong government presence. The MOD reported that
paramilitary forces were responsible for the deaths of 397 civilians as
of November 30. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported that it
had received reports of 329 unlawful killings by paramilitaries as of
October 31. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), a
well-known local NGO (see Section 4), paramilitaries were responsible
for the deaths of at least 930 civilians in the first 6 months of the
year. Paramilitaries targeted journalists (see Section 2.a.), human
rights activists (see Section 4), labor leaders (see Section 6.a.),
community activists, indigenous leaders (see Section 5), local
politicians, and others they suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas.
The Fiscalia continued investigations into numerous killings
committed by paramilitaries in the Magdalena River port city of
Barrancabermeja, Santander department. During the year, army personnel
concentrated on combating paramilitary influence in the region. Of the
54 confirmed members of illegal armed groups captured by the army
battalion in Barrancabermeja, 48 were paramilitaries. The battalion
also captured 66 persons involved in gasoline theft, a multi-million
dollar criminal enterprise dominated by paramilitaries.
Four paramilitaries were on trial for the February 2001 killing of
former Cucuta regional ombudsman Ivan Villamizar (see Section 4).
The Fiscalia was investigating the September 2001 killing by
presumed paramilitaries of Congressman and House of Representatives
Acting Peace Committee Chairman Jairo Hernando Rojas.
Paramilitaries also killed members of the armed forces and national
police who attempted to hamper their illegal activities. For example,
on June 14, paramilitary gunmen interrupted an English class at a night
school in the town of Pamplona, Norte de Santander department, and
killed local police chief Major Sergio Gutierrez. Gutierrez had
received death threats warning him to cease efforts to dismantle a
local paramilitary organization. On November 19, 12 armed men killed 2
police investigators working on an operation to combat paramilitary
extortionists in the town of La Ceja, Antioquia department. On December
3, 15 paramilitaries from the Central Bolivar Block stopped a bus 12
miles outside the town of Concepcion, Santander department, removed 3
unarmed police officers dressed in civilian clothes, and killed them.
The three officers were traveling to the town of Malaga to testify in a
criminal case against paramilitaries.
In November 2001, AUC leader Carlos Castano issued a public
statement promising the cessation of large-scale paramilitary
massacres. Based on the observations of diplomatic observers and the
national press, many AUC-affiliated paramilitary groups appeared to
change their operations accordingly, significantly reducing the number
of massacres perpetrated by paramilitaries. For example, according to
the MOD, paramilitaries had killed 54 persons in 11 massacres as of
November 30, compared with 281 victims in 42 massacres in 2001. The
National Police released a similar figure, reporting that 59 persons
were killed by paramilitaries in massacres during the year. However,
the CPDDH released a much larger figure, reporting that paramilitaries
killed 1,549 persons in massacres.
For example, on August 22, members of the AUC's Calima Front, which
is deeply involved in drug trafficking, kidnaped and killed eight men
near the village of Barragan, in Valle del Cauca department. Two days
later, army troops killed two paramilitaries believed to have been
involved in the killings.
Prosecutors continued to investigate massacres committed by
paramilitaries in 2001 in the municipalities of Penol, Antioquia
department, Frias, Magdalena department, Sabaletas, Valle del Cauca
department, and a remote region of Boyaca department. There was no
significant progress in any of these investigations.
Prosecutors continued to investigate an April 2000 paramilitary
massacre of 21 men at Tibu, Norte de Santander department.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate a series of attacks in
November 2000 in which paramilitaries killed 27 fishermen in the La
Cienaga de Santa Marta area, Magdalena department.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate two different massacres near
Trujillo, Valle del Cauca department, in 1989-90 and 1994. The
authorities held one accused paramilitary in custody and had
outstanding arrest warrants for three others. One paramilitary suspect
was killed while in custody.
The Fiscalia reopened an investigation into the 1990 killing of
presidential candidate and former M-19 guerrilla Carlos Pizarro after
AUC leader Carlos Castano confessed to the killing in memoirs published
in 2001. In June prosecutors requested that Castano be tried in
absentia and sentenced to 60 years in prison.
Paramilitary ``social cleansing'' killings of homosexuals,
prostitutes, drug users, vagrants, and persons with mental disabilities
were reported in Barrancabermeja, Cucuta, and other cities. The CCJ
reported that paramilitaries committed at least 212 ``social
cleansing'' killings in the first 6 months of the year. For example, on
June 14, paramilitaries executed two men on the outskirts of the town
of Giron, Santander department; a note attached to one of the bodies
attempted to justify the killings on the grounds that the men were
common criminals. On September 14, paramilitaries in the town of
Soledad, Atlantico department, killed 19-year-old Mario Paut as a
presumed vagrant because he had broken a 9 p.m. curfew. Paut had left
his home at 10 p.m. to buy diapers for his 1-month-old infant.
During the year, guerrillas, particularly the FARC, appeared to
have committed a higher percentage of the nation's unlawful killings
than they did the previous year, often targeting noncombatants. The MOD
attributed 70 percent of civilian deaths, or 916 killings, to
guerrillas between January and November. The MOD had attributed 51
percent of civilian deaths in 2001 to guerrillas. The Human Rights
Ombudsman's Office reported that as of October 31, it had received
complaints of 324 intentional killings by guerrillas, 193 by the FARC,
20 by the ELN, and 111 by unidentified guerrillas. However, the CPDDH
reported that guerrillas were responsible for only 452 civilian deaths
during the year, or 10 percent of the total. The CPDDH attributed 382
killings to the FARC and 53 to the ELN. The CPDDH attributed the deaths
of 3,882 civilians to unidentified illegal armed groups.
Guerrilla targets included local elected officials and candidates
for public office (see Section 3), civic leaders, business owners,
peasants opposed to guerrilla activities, religious leaders (see
Section 2.c.), indigenous people (see Section 5), labor leaders (see
Section 6.a.), and teachers (see Section 2.a.). Some communities
controlled by guerrillas also experienced social cleansing killings.
Guerrilla offensives often caused significant civilian casualties (see
Section 1.g.) and prompted significant displacements (see Section
2.d.).
Many unlawful killings committed by guerrillas were politically-
motivated. The security chief for ex-president Andres Pastrana claimed
to have thwarted 92 attempts on Pastrana's life, the vast majority by
guerrillas, during Pastrana's 4-year-term that ended on August 7. The
FARC also attempted to assassinate candidate and current President
Alvaro Uribe at least 12 times (see Section 3).
Smaller guerrilla groups also committed politically motivated
unlawful killings. For example, on April 27, seven members of the
Popular Liberation Army (EPL) killed a 16-year-old girl in the town of
San Calixto, Norte de Santander department, for consorting with local
military personnel.
The FARC committed more large-scale massacres than it did in 2001.
The Ministry of Defense attributed 85 percent of civilian deaths in
massacres during the year, or 307 total killings, to guerrillas. In
2001 the MOD attributed 36 percent of such deaths to guerrillas. The
CPDDH reported that guerrillas killed 280 persons in massacres during
the year, only 11 percent of its much larger estimate of massacre
victims. According to the CPDDH, the FARC killed 241 persons in
massacres and the ELN killed 31. The CPDDH blamed the deaths of an
additional 691 persons on unidentified illegal armed groups.
On September 15, the FARC abducted 22 coca-leaf pickers near the
town of Vista Hermosa, Meta department. After 4 days of torture, the
guerrillas killed 11 coca-leaf pickers and buried them in a mass grave,
apparently because the FARC suspected they were paramilitary
collaborators. On August 10, near the town of La Gabarra, Norte de
Santander department, the FARC shot and killed seven peasants who
refused to be forcibly recruited. On August 31, near the town of
Corralito in the Montes de Maria region of Bolivar department, the FARC
killed eight farm workers whom it accused of being paramilitary
collaborators.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the February 2001 killings by
the FARC of seven ecotourists in Purace national park, bordering the
departments of Huila and Cauca. Eight senior FARC leaders were
identified as suspects in the case.
An investigation continued into the FARC's May 2001 killing of
seven peasants near the village of Alto Sinu, Tierra Alta municipality,
Cordoba department. Prosecutors ordered the arrest of Jhoverman
Sanchez, leader of the FARC's 58th Front.
There was no progress in the investigation of the ELN's killing of
nine peasants in the village of La Cristalina, located near the town of
Puerto Wilches, Santander department, in retaliation for their vocal
opposition to a government proposal to create an ELN safe haven in the
region in anticipation of potential peace negotiations.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate deaths, disappearances, and
kidnapings of off-duty military and police personnel, often killed as
part of the FARC's publicly announced ``Pistol Plan.'' On May 12, the
FARC kidnaped, tortured, and executed nine enlisted soldiers on a
Mothers Day furlough in Caqueta department (see Section 1.b.). On
September 14, in Cucuta, Norte de Santander department, a reported
member of the FARC shot and killed an 18-year-old soldier at his
mother's home.
Little progress was made or seemed likely on investigations into
killings committed by the FARC in its former safe haven (``despeje'').
For example, no arrests were anticipated for the FARC's killing of
seven residents of the former despeje town of La Macarena, Meta
department, in the week following the abolishment of the FARC safe
haven. Five of the victims were killed reportedly for failing to fully
cooperate with the FARC, and two others were killed for attempting to
steal FARC commander Mono Jojoy's custom bed and prize pig following
his departure.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate the killings of 20 persons,
including 8 police officers and the mayor of Vigia del Fuerte,
Antioquia department, during a March 2000 FARC attack on Vigia del
Fuerte and Bellavista, Choco department, located on opposite sides of
the Atrato River. On April 8, the authorities charged three members of
the FARC with killing and terrorism. They were in custody and awaiting
trial at year's end.
The Fiscalia continued to investigate the FARC's December 2000
killing of Congressional peace commission chairman Diego Turbay, his
mother, and five other persons in Caqueta department. No progress was
expected in arresting the senior FARC leaders accused of ordering the
crime. However, on June 5, a court sentenced--in absentia--Manuel
Marulanda, alias ``Tirofijo''; Jorge Briceno, alias ``Mono Jojoy''; and
3 other members of the FARC Secretariat to 396 years in prison for the
1997 kidnaping and killing of Turbay's older brother, then-Senator
Rodrigo Turbay.
On November 5, the Fiscalia ordered the arrest of eight members of
the FARC's 57th Front for the January 2001 killing of Henry Perea,
mayor of the town of Jurardo, Choco department. Perea had been pulled
from his office and shot in broad daylight. No arrests appeared
imminent.
On July 30, prosecutors indicted nine senior FARC leaders for the
September 2001 kidnaping and killing of former Minister of Culture
Consuelo Araujo near Valledupar, Cesar department. The FARC apparently
killed Araujo when it became clear she could not maintain the pace
required for the FARC to outrun military efforts to rescue her. On
November 18, the Fiscalia ordered the arrest of two other FARC leaders
for their involvement in the crime.
Authorities failed to capture FARC Eastern Bloc commander German
Briceno, known as ``Grannobles''; who was indicted for the 1999
killings of U.S. citizen indigenous rights activists Terence Freitas,
Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok near Saravena, Arauca
department. On November 28, police arrested three FARC guerrillas
suspected of involvement in the kidnaping. Confessed FARC member Nelson
Vargas, who was suspected of participating directly in the killings,
was serving a prison sentence for the separate crime of rebellion.
The FARC executed guerrilla soldiers who attempted to desert. For
example, on June 3, near the town of Yondo, eastern Antioquia
department, the FARC killed two female soldiers who planned to desert.
Guerrillas killed citizens using bombs, artillery, and
antipersonnel landmines, and continued their practice of using gas
canisters to attack small towns, killing civilians indiscriminately
(see Section 1.g.).
b. Disappearance.--The law specifically defines forced
disappearance as a crime. More than 3,800 cases of forced disappearance
have been formally reported since 1977. Very few have been resolved.
The great majority of victims of forced disappearance have never been
seen or heard from again.
The CPDDH reported that state security forces were responsible for
10 forced disappearances during the year. The CCJ reported four such
cases in the first 6 months of the year. The Procuraduria investigated
105 members of the state security forces on disciplinary charges
related to forced disappearances (see Section 1.a.). In 35 cases, the
allegations were credible enough for the Procuraduria to open a formal
investigation. One army captain was formally charged, two police agents
were found guilty and sanctioned, and one police agent was exonerated.
The law prohibits kidnaping; however, it remained an extremely
serious problem. According to the Free Country Foundation, an anti-
kidnaping NGO (see Section 4), during the year there were a total of
2,986 kidnapings; 936 were attributed to the FARC, 776 to the ELN, 180
to paramilitaries, including the AUC, and the remaining to smaller
groups such as the EPL (People's Liberation Army) and common criminals.
Elite government anti-kidnaping units known as GAULAs and other
elements of the security forces freed 693 hostages and forced the
release of 190 others. However, despite government efforts, the Free
Country Foundation reported that at least 62 persons died in captivity
during the year, including 3 children. Thirty-eight of these persons
were killed by their captors. On January 29, then-President Andres
Pastrana signed a new anti-kidnaping law that provides for 40-year jail
sentences. At the same time, Pastrana announced disbursements of
approximately $2 million (5 billion pesos) to strengthen the GAULAs.
Some members of the state security forces were involved in
kidnaping for ransom. For example, on May 14, police arrested two
members of the National Police and an official from the Fiscalia for
participating in the kidnaping of shoe magnate Esteban Rangel. On
September 20, the BBC reported that some kidnap victims alleged they
were abducted by members of the police either at roadblocks or after
having been flagged down by police cars. The report noted that victims
were uncertain whether they had been kidnaped by corrupt police
officers or guerrillas using stolen police uniforms.
Paramilitaries were responsible for the majority of forced
disappearances. The CPDDH attributed 439 forced disappearances during
the year to paramilitaries, or 60 percent of such violations. The CPDDH
also reported that 277 persons were forcibly ``disappeared'' by
unidentified armed groups. According to the Free Country Foundation,
paramilitaries were responsible for 180 kidnapings, or 7 percent of all
kidnapings during the year in which a perpetrator was identified.
Paramilitaries generally abducted persons suspected of collaboration
with guerrillas, whom they almost always killed (see Section 1.a.). In
April and October, presumed paramilitaries abducted persons near the
town of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia
department (see Section 1.a.).
An investigation continued into the June 2001 paramilitary
abduction of Embera-Katio indigenous leader Kimi Domico in Tierralta,
Cordoba department. Domico apparently was kidnaped in retaliation for
cooperation with the FARC. In December 2001, AUC military commander
Salvatore Mancuso implied that Domico had been killed.
Authorities continued to investigate the October 2001 paramilitary
kidnaping of 13 fishermen near the Cienaga de Santa Marta, Magdalena
department. Three of the victims escaped, and at least six were
confirmed dead. The four victims still missing were presumed dead.
Paramilitaries sometimes abducted government employees
investigating paramilitary crimes (see Section 1.a.). No further
progress seemed likely in the April 2001 disappearances of two CTI
investigators near Berrugas, Sucre department, who were working
undercover on the January 2001 Chengue paramilitary massacre (see
Section 1.a.). An investigation continued into the 2000 abduction of
seven members of the CTI near Minguillo, Cesar department. The
whereabouts of the CTI employees were unknown, and they were presumed
dead.
Paramilitaries generally did not hold hostages for long periods of
time to gain political concessions. However, they did commit kidnapings
for ransom. For example, in 2000 paramilitaries kidnaped Venezuelan
businessman Richard Bolton, who was only released on July 15 after his
family paid a large ransom.
Kidnaping continued to be an unambiguous, standing policy and major
source of revenue for both the FARC and ELN. The FARC continued to
kidnap persons in accordance with its so-called ``Law 002,'' announced
in March 2000, which requires persons with more than $1 million (2.95
billion pesos) in assets to volunteer payments to the FARC or risk
detention. The Free Country Foundation reported that guerrillas
committed 75 percent of the 2,986 kidnapings reported during the year
in which a perpetrator was identified. The Foundation reported that the
FARC kidnaped 936 persons and the ELN 776. In addition, the FARC often
purchased victims kidnaped by common criminals and then negotiated
ransom payments with the families. There were many reports that
guerrillas tortured kidnap victims (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).
Several released kidnap victims claimed that the FARC had been holding
more than 200 persons in the former despeje before the zone's
abolishment in February.
According to the Free Country Foundation, merchants, government
employees, and cattle ranchers were among the guerrillas' preferred
victims. However, the largest category of kidnaping victims was
children, over 384 of whom were kidnaped during the year. In 2001, for
example, the FARC kidnaped 11-year-old Laura Ulloa from her school bus
in Cali, and did not release her until April 5. It was suspected that a
ransom was paid for her return. In October 2001, the FARC kidnaped 18-
month-old Mariana Ossa in a middle class neighborhood of Medellin.
Although Ossa's parents paid a ransom for her release in July, she was
not released until December 22. The FARC kidnaped several mayors'
children to pressure the mayors into resigning (see Section 3).
According to the Free Country Foundation, 1,714 kidnapings during
the year, or over 57 percent of the total, were economically motivated.
During an April 2 newspaper interview, ELN Supreme Commander Nicolas
Rodriguez, alias ``Gabino,'' stated that the ELN expected to receive
payment for the release of kidnap victims. Gabino added that kidnap
victims ``have a specific economic value'' and that ``the Government
must understand that, if there are funds for a peace agreement, these
funds must be applied to resolving the situation of these kidnap
victims.'' The Government immediately rejected Gabino's demand.
On August 19, the ELN kidnaped 27 tourists from a resort near the
town of Bahia Solano, Choco department. At year's end, all but three
had been released, most in return for ransom payments or IOUs
accompanied by death threats for noncompliance. Victims reported that
the group, which included retired persons and children, was forced to
hike 12 hours a day through jungle swamps on meager rations of bananas
and rice. Many of the victims contracted malaria or other serious
illnesses and one elderly victim died of a heart attack and was buried
in an unmarked grave.
Guerrillas sometimes demanded ransom payments before returning the
bodies of kidnap victims who died in captivity. For example, in April
relatives of a merchant kidnaped near the town of Pensilvania, Caldas
department, paid the FARC nearly $2,000 (5.9 million pesos) to recover
his body.
Guerrillas also kidnaped foreigners for ransom. According to the
Free Country Foundation, 31 foreigners were kidnaped during the year.
For example, on April 19, the FARC abducted two Canadian citizens and
one French citizen whose helicopter made an emergency landing in a
remote region of Narino department. They were released on July 30.
Government authorities believe a ransom was paid. In October 2001, the
FARC kidnaped Dutch student Roelant Jonker near the village of Santa
Cecilia, Choco department. Jonker was released on June 12 in return for
a ransom of approximately $8,000 (23.6 million pesos). On May 22, a
combined team of army, police, and DAS personnel rescued 64-year-old
Maria Luisa Trevissan de Bachetti, an Italian citizen and owner of a
Venezuelan steel plant, from a joint FARC/ELN team holding her hostage
in the town of Maico, La Guajira department. Trevissan de Bachetti had
been kidnaped on April 19 in Venezuela. The guerrillas were demanding
$10 million (29.5 billion pesos) for her release.
The FARC committed numerous politically motivated kidnapings in an
attempt to destabilize the Government and pressure it into a prisoner
exchange. According to the Free Country Foundation, there were 208
politically motivated kidnapings during the year. On April 15, HRW
published a letter to FARC leader Manuel Marulanda that called for an
immediate end to targeting political leaders.
On February 20, FARC operatives hijacked an airliner on route from
Neiva, capital of Huila department, to Bogota, forced it to land on the
Bogota-Neiva highway, and kidnaped Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem,
Chairman of the Senate Peace Commission. The hijacking was apparently
planned for the express purpose of kidnaping Senator Gechem. Gechem's
cousin, Diego Turbay, former chairman of the House of Representatives
Peace Commission, was killed by the FARC in 2000. Gechem's kidnaping
led then-President Pastrana to declare a definitive end to stalled
peace negotiations with the FARC and abolish the FARC's despeje in the
south.
On February 23, 3 days after the despeje was abolished, the FARC
kidnaped presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and her campaign
manager, Clara Rojas, on the highway between Florencia and San Vicente
del Caguan, Caqueta department. On July 23, the FARC released a
videotape of a thin, tired Betancourt, apparently recorded on May 15.
In early October, a Bogota television news station received a message
from the FARC stating that Betancourt was in good condition.
On April 11, the FARC committed a daring daylight kidnaping of 16
members of the Valle del Cauca departmental assembly from the
assembly's headquarters in downtown Cali. FARC operatives dressed in
army uniforms announced that the building was being evacuated because
of a bomb threat and hurried victims into a waiting bus painted in army
colors. Although four victims were rescued by the military in the
following week, 12 victims remained in captivity at year's end. On
August 28 and December 27, the FARC released videos of the 12 remaining
captives, who appeared to be in good health.
On April 21, the FARC kidnaped Guillermo Gaviria, governor of
Antioquia, and Gilberto Echeverri, departmental peace commissioner and
former national Minister of Defense, while the governor was leading a
peace march through the eastern Antioquia town of El Vaho.
The FARC continued to hold captive former members of Congress
Orlando Bernal, Luis Eladio Perez, and Consuelo Gonzalez, kidnaped in
2001, and Congressman Oscar Lizcano, kidnaped in 2000. All four former
members' terms expired while they were in captivity. The FARC also held
former Meta governor Alan Jara, who was kidnaped in July 2001 while
riding in a U.N. vehicle with the U.N. Development Program (UNDP)
director and other government officials.
The FARC continued to hold nine victims of a mass kidnaping carried
out in July 2001 from a luxury apartment building in Neiva, Huila
department. The captives included the wife and two children of a
congressman.
Members of the public security forces were also among the preferred
victims of politically-motivated kidnapings. According to the Free
Country Foundation, 68 members of the public security forces were
kidnaped during the year, all by guerrillas, particularly the FARC. The
Ministry of Defense reported that the FARC and ELN continued to hold or
had ``disappeared'' at least 102 members of the public security forces.
On April 5, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
recovered the bodies of two police officers, both killed by the FARC.
One of the bodies was that of Corporal Jose Norberto Perez, the father
of Andres Felipe Perez, a 13-year-old boy who died of cancer in
December 2001 after having pleaded with the FARC to release his father
so that the family could be reunited before the boy's death.
Guerrillas kidnaped journalists (see Section 2.a.).
The whereabouts of three American missionaries kidnaped from
eastern Panama in 1993 remained unknown, and they were presumed dead.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law explicitly prohibit
torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
however, there were reports that the police, military, and prison
guards mistreated and tortured detainees. The Military Penal Code
directs that trials of members of the military and police accused of
torture be held in civilian, rather than military, courts (see Section
1.e.). The Procuraduria received 103 complaints of torture by state
agents during the year. CINEP reported that state security forces
tortured 16 persons during the first 6 months of the year; 14 of these
cases were attributed to the army and 2 to the police.
The Fiscalia was investigating accusations publicized during the
year by the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP)
that members of the Cali GAULA collaborated with paramilitaries in
abducting and torturing individuals suspected of involvement in
kidnapings.
Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano, Captains Alvaro Hernando Moreno and
Rafael Garcia, Lieutenant Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo, and four
noncommissioned officers remained on trial at year's end for torturing
12 marines with asphyxiation and electric shock in 1995.
CINEP reported 42 cases of torture by paramilitaries during the
first 6 months of the year. Victims of paramilitary killings often
showed signs of torture.
Guerrilla groups also tortured and abused persons. CINEP reported
only three cases of torture by guerrillas during the first 6 months of
the year; however, the bodies of many persons kidnaped and subsequently
killed by guerrillas showed signs of torture and disfigurement.
Numerous former kidnap victims and hostages taken by the guerrillas
during combat reported severe deprivation, denial of medical attention,
and physical and psychological torture during captivity (see Section
1.b.). The MOD reported that guerrillas tortured or mutilated and
killed soldiers and policemen after they surrendered (see Section
1.g.).
Prison conditions were harsh, particularly for prisoners without
significant outside support. Severe overcrowding and dangerous sanitary
and health conditions remained serious problems. The National Prison
and Penitentiary Institute (INPEC) reported that the nation's daily
food allowance per prisoner was only $1.25 (3,500 pesos). Private
sources continued to provide the majority of most prisoners' food. In
June 2001, based on a lawsuit filed by prisoners incarcerated in
Valledupar, Cesar department, the Valledupar Supreme Court ordered
INPEC to improve prison conditions in the department. Many of INPEC's
10,000 prison guards were poorly trained or corrupt. On March 6, prison
guards at the Valledupar penitentiary beat an unruly prisoner in his
cell so severely that he died 36 hours later. The Fiscalia placed the
six guards under arrest on suspicion of murder. The Office reportedly
was investigating allegations of prison guard brutality in other
installations as well.
Only four prisons--Valledupar, Acacias, Popayan, and Combita--met
international standards for acceptable conditions for prison
facilities. Two more prisons designed to meet these standards were
under construction in La Porada, Caldas department, and Palo Gordo,
near Bucaramanga, Santander department. In other prisons, inmates paid
to eat, drink, sleep on a mattress, wash clothes, or make telephone
calls. Many inmates in such facilities also were forced to pay
protection money to fellow inmates or corrupt prison guards.
According to INPEC, overcrowding remained a serious problem. In
October the country's prisons and jails held approximately 52,900
inmates, 16 percent over their intended capacity of 45,500. The
country's largest prisons had some of the highest occupancy levels. For
example, Medellin's Bellavista prison, the country's largest, held over
three times as many prisoners as it was designed to hold.
An estimated 17.8 percent of the country's prisons were between 40
and 80 years old, 3.5 percent between 80 and 201 years old, and 2.4
percent more than 201 years old. The Ministry of Justice made some
progress in implementing a plan announced in 2000 to expand prison
capacity by 18,000 beds by 2003. Since the announcement, the Government
renovated 17 of the country's 151 penitentiaries, including some of its
largest, expanding prison capacity by 6,400 beds.
The Government sometimes failed to prevent deadly violence among
inmates. For example, on July 12, a routine cell search in
Bucaramanga's La Modelo jail revealed plans for a mass escape led by
ELN inmates and sparked a large riot that resulted in the death of one
inmate and serious injuries to four others. INPEC reported 8 major
prison riots, compared with 19 in 2001. However, unlike the previous
year when 61 inmates died in such uprisings, only 3 lives were lost in
these disturbances.
There were no large-scale prison escapes; however, a total of 223
prisoners did escape from the country's prisons during the year. These
escapes were divided roughly evenly between classic escapes and abuses
of administrative privileges such as 72-hour passes. Nevertheless,
these numbers represented an improvement over 781 escapes registered in
2000. Enhanced external security, which prevented paramilitaries and
guerrillas from breaking out imprisoned comrades, and the revocation
during the year of the policy permitting the issuance of 72-hour passes
to favored prisoners, accounted for the improvement. Several failed
escapes were elaborately planned, such as an effort by paramilitaries,
discovered in October, to tunnel out of Bogota's La Picota prison.
During the year, the authorities moved high-level narcotics
traffickers to the new high security prison at Combita, where they
endured the same spartan conditions as other prisoners. The renovation
of the high security wing of Bogota's La Picota prison also was
completed, ending many inmates' relatively comfortable prison
lifestyles.
There were separate prison facilities for women, and in some parts
of the country there were separate women's prisons. Conditions at
women's prisons were similar to those at men's prisons, but were far
less violent. According to the Criminal Procedure Code, no one under
the age of 18 may be held in a prison. Juveniles were held in separate
facilities operated by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).
There were no separate facilities for pretrial detainees, who made
up an estimated 43 percent of all prison inmates. According to INPEC,
981 pretrial detainees were held in overcrowded police jails, despite
court orders that they be transferred to long-term detention
facilities. Failure on the part of many local military commanders and
jail supervisors to keep mandatory detention records or follow
notification procedures made accounting precisely for all detainees
impossible.
The ICRC continued to have routine access to most prisons and
police and military detention centers. The ICRC continued to have ad
hoc access to civilians held by paramilitaries and guerrillas. However,
the FARC and ELN continued to deny the ICRC access to police and
military hostages (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
includes several provisions designed to prevent illegal detention;
however, there continued to be allegations that authorities arrested or
detained citizens arbitrarily. Many such allegations originated in
``Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones'' established by presidential
decree, where security forces were granted expanded powers to establish
public order.
President Uribe issued Decree 2002 on September 10 by authority of
his August declaration of a ``State of Internal Disturbance'' (see
Section 1.f.). In addition to authorizing the creation of
``Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones'', the decree granted the
police and armed forces the power to make arrests, intercept
communications, and search private residences without written warrants,
and to do so without judicial authorization in exigent circumstances.
However, on November 26, the Constitutional Court struck down
provisions of the decree that granted police powers to the military,
emphasizing that prosecutorial officials must determine when personal
liberty interests can be infringed upon in the interests of public
safety.
The Constitutional Court's decision was consistent with its April
11 ruling striking down the National Defense and Security Act of 2001,
which had threatened to infringe on the due process rights of persons
detained or investigated by the military (see Section 1.e.). Among
other things, the Act had not specified the maximum period detainees
might be held by the military before being turned over to civilian
authorities.
The law prohibits incommunicado detention. Even in Rehabilitation
Zones, anyone detained by law enforcement authorities must be brought
before a senior prosecutor within 36 hours of his or her detention. A
senior prosecutor must then rule on the legality of the detention
within an additional 36 hours. Despite these legal protections, there
continued to be allegations of arbitrary detention.
Conditional pretrial release is available for minor offenses or
after unduly long periods of investigative detention. In the case of
most felonies, detention prior to the filing of formal charges cannot
exceed 180 days, after which a suspect must be conditionally released.
In the cases of crimes deemed particularly serious, such as murder or
terrorism, authorities are allowed up to 360 days to file formal
charges before a suspect must be conditionally released.
Paramilitaries in the city of Barrancabermeja, Santander
department, exercised illegal ``social controls,'' such as curfews for
children, ad hoc punishments for domestic violence and petty crimes,
and the issuance of paramilitary-produced identification cards to bona
fide local residents.
The FARC pressed the Government to adopt a permanent prisoner
exchange law; however, both the Pastrana and Uribe administrations
rejected the idea. Families of kidnap victims, particularly relatives
of 12 Valle del Cauca Assembly members kidnaped in April and still held
by the FARC (see Section 1.b.), pressed the Government to participate
in a one-time humanitarian prisoner exchange. During the year,
guerrillas continued to hold at least 47, and as many as 102, soldiers
and police who either were captured in combat or kidnaped while off-
duty. The ICRC was not permitted access to them (see Section 1.b.).
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not
practice it. However, there were numerous instances of individuals
pressured into self-exile for their personal safety. Such cases
included persons from all walks of life, including politicians,
journalists, human rights workers, slum-dwellers, business executives,
farmers, and others (see Sections 2.a. and 4). The threats came from
various quarters: some individual members of the security forces,
paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups, narcotics traffickers, and other
criminal elements.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the civilian justice system was independent
of the executive and legislative branches in both theory and practice;
however, the suborning or intimidation of judges, witnesses, and
prosecutors was common. Impunity remained the single greatest problem
threatening the credibility of the Government's commitment to human
rights. The university-affiliated Corporation for Judicial Excellence,
which was preparing a study on impunity, reported that the overall
level of impunity cited by a variety of governmental and
nongovernmental sources was between 80 and 95 percent.
Judges have long been subject to threats and intimidation,
particularly when handling cases involving members of the public
security forces or of paramilitary, guerrilla, and narcotics
trafficking organizations. Violent attacks and threats against
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges continued. Prosecutors
reported that potential witnesses in major cases often lacked faith in
the Government's ability to protect them and thus were unwilling to
testify, hindering chances for successful prosecutions. For example, in
December two prosecution witnesses failed to appear at the trial of
three members of the Irish Republican Army who were accused of training
members of the FARC. One of the witnesses could not be found, and the
other said that he feared for his life.
According to a statement issued by the Supreme Court, as of July
16, terrorist organizations such as the FARC and the AUC had threatened
judicial officials working in at least 368 courts in 231
municipalities. As of August 30, 408 judges and 396 prosecutors from
248 municipalities felt obligated to work out of offices in
departmental capitals for reasons of security.
In March 2001, Bogota judge Lesther Gonzalez received threats that
appeared related to important cases on her docket, including the 1995
assassination of Alvaro Gomez, the 1997 Mapiripan massacre, and the
1997 killings of three CINEP volunteers. Also in March 2001, Medellin
judge Adalgisa Lopera fled the city with her family following a death
threat. Judge Lopera heard paramilitarism, terrorism, and narcotics
cases.
In April 2001, two undercover CTI employees investigating the
January 2001 Chengue massacre disappeared in Sucre department. In
December two gunmen arrested for the August 2001 killing of Yolanda
Paternina, local lead prosecutor in the case, were released for lack of
evidence (see Section 1.a.).
An investigation continued into the April 2000 killing of
prosecutor Margarita Maria Pulgarin in Medellin. Paramilitaries were
suspected of killing her. One suspect had been charged in absentia;
however, no one had been detained by year's end.
The civilian justice system is a separate and independent branch of
government that uses a Napoleonic legal system incorporating some
accusatorial elements. The military justice system, which is part of
the executive branch, also relies on a mixed system, although
accusatorial aspects predominate.
On December 16, Congress approved constitutional changes designed
to convert the current mixed judicial system into a purely accusatorial
system. The reforms will go into effect in January 2005, prior to which
major changes will have to be made to the penal, criminal procedure,
and evidence codes. After that date, judges, rather than prosecutors,
will issue arrest warrants and decide pretrial motions. Cases will be
tried in open court and decided on the basis of oral trial proceedings,
rather than an exhaustive written dossier. Prosecutor General Luis
Camilo Osorio has predicted that the reforms will reduce the average
investigatory phase of a case from 3 years to 6 months.
The judicial system was extremely overburdened. Based on
information collected from 77 percent of the nation's courts, as of
September the administrative chamber of the Supreme Council of the
Judiciary (CSJ) reported that the civilian judiciary suffered from a
backlog of at least 1,14 million cases, approximately 140,000 of them
criminal. These backlogs had created large numbers of pretrial
detainees (see Section 1.c.) In October, the President of the Council
of State complained that the Council was facing a 6 to 8 year backlog.
The Fiscalia reported that approximately 220,000 arrest warrants were
still outstanding.
The civilian justice system is composed of four functional
jurisdictions: civil, administrative, constitutional, and special. The
civil jurisdiction is the largest jurisdiction within the civilian
justice system, and handles all criminal, civil, labor, agrarian, and
domestic cases involving non-military personnel. The civil jurisdiction
is divided into 31 judicial districts, each containing at least one
judicial circuit encompassing one or more municipalities. A superior
tribunal serves as each district's court of appeals. The civil
jurisdiction's 436 magistrates are distributed according to the
population of each district. The lower circuit and municipal courts,
each staffed by a judge, a court clerk, and perhaps a few
administrative personnel, are the basic cells of the civil
jurisdiction. In the smallest towns, a single ``all-purpose'' judge
rules on all cases.
Specialized circuit courts within the civil jurisdiction try cases
involving crimes designated as grave threats to the administration of
justice, such as narcotics trafficking, terrorism, paramilitarism,
torture, and money laundering.
The Supreme Court is the highest court within the civil
jurisdiction and serves as its final court of appeals. In addition to
hearing appeals from lower courts, the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction in trials of the President, cabinet ministers, heads of
independent government agencies, admirals and generals, and magistrates
of the Supreme Court, Council of State, Constitutional Court, and CSJ.
The administrative jurisdiction of the civilian justice system is
divided into 27 judicial districts with an equal number of tribunals.
Each tribunal has from 1 to 23 magistrates, depending on the population
of the district. Administrative actions such as decrees and resolutions
may be challenged in the administrative jurisdiction on constitutional
or other grounds. The Council of State is the highest court in the
administrative jurisdiction and serves as the final court of appeals
for complaints arising from administrative acts.
The Constitutional Court, which is charged with ``safeguarding the
integrity and supremacy'' of the Constitution, is the sole judicial
body comprising the constitutional jurisdiction of the civilian justice
system. It rules on the constitutionality of laws, presidential
decrees, and constitutional reforms. The Constitutional Court may also
issue advisory opinions on the constitutionality of bills not yet
signed into law, and randomly reviews the decisions of lower courts on
``tutelas,'' or writs of protection of fundamental rights, which can be
filed before any judge of any court at any stage of a judicial
procedure as a legal defense of last resort. Courts must rule on the
validity of a tutela within 10 days. Approximately 15,500 tutelas were
before the Constitutional Court for possible review.
The final functional jurisdiction of the civilian justice system is
the special jurisdiction. The special jurisdiction consists of the
justice of the peace program, designed to encourage alternative dispute
resolution at the municipal level, which has been implemented in less
than 1 percent of the country's municipalities, and the indigenous
jurisdiction, which grants indigenous leaders the right to exercise
judicial functions on indigenous reservations in accordance with
traditional laws (see Section 5.).
The CSJ is responsible for the administration and discipline of the
civilian justice system. The CSJ is divided into two chambers:
administrative and disciplinary. The administrative chamber supervises
the civilian justice system's budget and determines its organization.
The disciplinary chamber disciplines judicial officials and resolves
jurisdictional clashes, such as those between the civilian and military
justice systems.
The Supreme Court, the Council of State, the Constitutional Court,
and the CSJ are four roughly coequal supreme judicial organs that often
issue conflicting rulings and frequently disagree regarding
jurisdictional responsibilities.
The Fiscalia is tasked with investigating criminal offenses and
presenting evidence against the accused. The Supreme Court elects the
Prosecutor General from a list of three candidates selected by the
President. The Prosecutor General serves a 4-year term that overlaps
two presidential administrations. The Office is independent of both the
executive and judicial branches and is divided into national, regional,
and local offices. The Office has its own corps of armed investigators
known as the Corps of Technical Investigators (CTI). The Office has
significant judicial functions; however, consistent with constitutional
reforms passed in December, it will be converted by 2005 into a purely
investigatory and prosecutorial agency.
The Prosecutor General created the Human Rights Unit in 1995. As of
October, the Unit's 41 prosecutors had 1,369 open cases involving 1,618
suspects, including 173 members of the state security forces. The Human
Rights Unit arrested 57 members of the state security forces during the
year and filed charges against 25 for a variety of crimes including
murder, torture, kidnaping, and collaboration with paramilitary groups.
However, impunity continued to be very widespread.
In November HRW published ``A Wrong Turn; the Record of the
Colombian Attorney General's Office,'' a report that alleged that under
the leadership of Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio, the ability of
the Fiscalia to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses had
deteriorated. The report accused the Prosecutor General of failing to
support prosecutors who worked on human rights cases by not providing
adequate protection for justice officials whose lives were threatened
and by the dismissal and forced resignation of veteran prosecutors and
judicial investigators.
In its December response, the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia
reported that for the first time in its history, Osorio had obtained a
specific allotment in the national budget for the Unit. While it was
true that 4 of the Unit's 41 prosecutors had been dismissed during the
year, their replacements had equal or greater experience. Finally, the
Unit was working hard to increase the protection available to
prosecutors.
The Procuraduria investigates allegations of misconduct by public
employees, including members of the state security forces. The
Inspector General, whose term overlaps those of two presidents, is
elected by the Senate to a 4-year term from a list of three candidates
nominated by the President, Supreme Court, and Council of State. During
the year, the Procuraduria received 395 complaints of alleged serious
violations of human rights by state agents, compared with 502
complaints in 2001. A total of 235 of these complaints were lodged
against the army, 3 against the navy, 8 against the air force, and 149
against the National Police. Of these complaints, 380 were still under
preliminary investigation, 14 had reached the stage of a formal
disciplinary investigation, and 1 had resulted in the filing of formal
charges. The Procuraduria imposes administrative sanctions that range
from letters of reprimand to dismissal and permanent bans from public
office. It has no authority to impose criminal sanctions, but can refer
cases to the Prosecutor General. The Procuraduria referred all cases of
human rights violations received during the year to the Prosecutor
General for investigation and reported that that the majority of these
cases were investigated by the Fiscalia.
The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, or Public Defender,
employs 923 public defenders nationwide to provide the indigent with
legal representation in criminal cases. However, as of December, these
public defenders were required to manage over 70,000 cases. In
addition, the Ombudsman's 34 departmental and regional offices
throughout the country provide a legal channel for thousands of
complaints and allegations of human rights violations (see Section 4).
The Ombudsman, who reports to the Inspector General, is elected by the
House of Representatives from a list of three candidates submitted by
the President to serve a 4-year term that overlaps those of two
presidents.
A criminal case begins with a preliminary investigation that can
last up to 180 working days. If evidence is found linking a particular
individual to a crime, the case moves into a formal investigative stage
in which prosecutors have a maximum of 360 working days to file formal
charges. Once formal charges are filed, the Government has 35 working
days to bring a case to trial. Trials are open to the public. Judges
question witnesses directly and determine the outcome of all trials.
There are no juries.
The Constitution specifically provides for the right to due
process. Nevertheless, as of November 30, the Human Rights Ombudsman's
office had received 1,270 complaints of denial of due process. An
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and has the right to
timely consultation with counsel. Attorneys from the Ombudsman's Office
are required to represent indigent defendants; however, representation
for the indigent has historically been inadequate. During the year, an
estimated 90 percent of indigent defendants received no assistance from
a public defender. Defendants have the right to be present at
proceedings against them, present witnesses and evidence on their own
behalf, and confront and question prosecution witnesses. Defendants
also have the right to review government evidence relevant to the case.
Defendants have the right to appeal a conviction to a higher court. The
Constitution extends these rights to all citizens.
The military justice system, as part of the Ministry of Defense,
falls under the executive branch. To improve the accountability and
independence of the military justice system, the military judicial code
was amended in 2000 so that military prosecutors report directly to the
director of the military justice system, rather than to their local
unit commanders. The director of the military justice system reports
directly to the civilian Minister of Defense. Nevertheless, impunity
for members of the public security forces--particularly high-ranking
officers--accused of human rights abuses or collaboration with
paramilitaries remained a problem. Some military justice personnel
investigating sensitive cases reported they were pressured to make
particular rulings and threatened or harassed for not doing so.
The military justice system is composed of the Superior Military
Tribunal, which serves as the court of appeals for all cases tried in
the military justice system, and 40 military trial courts. The civilian
Supreme Court serves as a second court of appeals for cases in which
sentences of 6 years or more in prison are imposed. The military
judiciary may investigate, prosecute, and try active duty military and
police personnel for alleged crimes ``related to acts of military
service.'' Civil courts must try retired personnel, even for service-
related acts committed before their retirement. The military penal code
specifically defines forced disappearance, torture, and genocide as
crimes not related to military service. Moreover, a presidential
directive issued in 2000 raised ``to the category of law'' a 1997
Constitutional Court ruling that defined all serious violations of
human rights as being unrelated to military service. The military penal
code also provides protections to members of the public security
services who may feel pressure from commanders to violate human rights.
For example, the code denies unit commanders the power to judge
subordinates and extends legal protection to service members who refuse
to obey illegal orders to commit human rights abuses.
Criminal investigations by the military justice system are designed
to be completed rapidly. By law an investigation may last a maximum of
180 working days, after which a suspect must be brought to trial within
2 months. However, this rigorous timetable is suspended if a defendant
appeals the court's jurisdiction or procedural rulings. This exception
causes many cases in the military justice system to drag on for years.
For example, jurisdictional appeals accounted for some of the delay in
the military's investigation of the apparent air force bombing of the
village of Santo Domingo, Arauca department in December 1998 (see
Section 1.g.). The military justice system's formal investigation began
in 2000, and was still in its investigatory phase when it was
transferred to the civilian justice system in December.
Criminal procedure within the military justice system is similar to
that within the civilian justice system, with the exception that the
military justice system has already incorporated many accusatorial
elements. Defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty and
have the right to timely consultation with counsel. However, there is
no military equivalent to the civilian public defender system;
defendants generally must retain counsel at their own expense.
Representatives of the civilian justice system--generally from the
Procuraduria--have a right to be present at military trials.
The military judiciary demonstrated a willingness during the year
to turn cases of military personnel accused of human rights violations
or other criminal activities over to the civilian justice system. The
Superior Military Tribunal reported that between August 1997 and
December it voluntarily transferred 1,377 cases, 627 military and 750
police, to the civilian justice system. An independent review of the
627 cases involving military personnel revealed that 168 cases involved
allegations of gross violations of human rights or collaboration with
paramilitaries.
In September 2000, the President signed 12 decrees to reform and
strengthen the military. The decrees sharpened the definitions,
classifications, and punishments for crimes, required military
officials to cooperate with civilian investigators who investigate such
crimes, and mandated, with limited exceptions, the dismissal of service
members convicted and imprisoned by either the civilian or military
justice systems.
Presidential Decree 1790 of 2000 allows senior military commanders,
at their discretion, to separate from service any uniformed members of
the security services regardless of time of service. From October 2000
through the end of 2001, the military dismissed approximately 600
members; no figures were available on how many were discharged during
the year under the authority of Decree 1790. No information was
available from the MOD regarding the specific reasons for any of the
dismissals, nor were the names of those dismissed made public. The MOD
confirmed the claims of many human rights NGOs that a large number of
those dismissed subsequently entered the ranks of illegal paramilitary
groups.
When military officers were tried, convicted, and sentenced for
human rights violations, they generally were not incarcerated in
civilian prisons but were confined instead to their bases or military
police detention centers, as permitted by law. Some performed
administrative functions while incarcerated. The MOD reported, and the
Fiscalia confirmed, that military and police prisoners charged by
civilian prosecutors routinely were suspended from their duties and
placed on half-pay. Officers and noncommissioned officers were removed
from any command duties. Forty-one members of the military and 25
police officers reportedly were suspended at year's end.
To address concerns about escapes from improvised military
detention facilities, in June a new high security military prison was
inaugurated near Melgar, Tolima department. The civilian INPEC provided
oversight of the military's management of the prison. Although the
facility was designed to house up to 200 inmates, it was still not
large enough to house all military prisoners, leaving some in
facilities of questionable security.
The case of former General Jaime Humberto Uscategui, accused of
failing to prevent a 1997 massacre in Mapiripan, Meta department,
remained under investigation by the Fiscalia (see Section 1.a.).
Although the Constitution dictates that generals accused of crimes
related to acts of service must be tried by the Supreme Court,
Uscategui would be tried by an ordinary criminal court because the
crimes of which he was accused were unrelated to acts of service.
According to statistics provided by the CSJ, in cases of
jurisdictional conflict between the military and civilian justice
systems, the total number of cases assigned to military courts dropped
from 50 percent in 1992 to 15 percent in 2000. Over the same period,
cases assigned to civilian jurisdiction rose from 40 percent in 1992 to
60 percent. Between January and September, the CSJ ruled on 39
jurisdictional disputes between the civilian and military justice
systems, assigning 16 cases to the civilian justice system, 5 cases to
the military justice systems, and abstaining from ruling on 18 cases.
The Government stated that it did not hold political prisoners.
The ICRC had access to the approximately 3,000 prisoners accused of
terrorism, rebellion, or aiding and abetting insurgency.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for the protection of these rights,
and the Government generally respected them in practice; however, at
times the authorities infringed upon them.
On August 8, President Uribe declared a ``State of Internal
Disturbance''--upheld by the Constitutional Court on October 2--that
granted him expanded emergency powers with the potential to abridge
individual rights. On September 10, President Uribe issued Decree 2002,
which allowed members of the public security forces to perform arrests,
searches, and wiretaps without a written warrant. Oral authorization
from a judicial authority was still required, except in exigent
circumstances. Arrests, searches, and wiretaps made without prior
judicial authorization had to be fully justified within 24 hours. On
November 26, the Constitutional Court struck down's Decree 2002's grant
of police powers to the armed forces, ruling that only prosecutorial
authorities may determine when privacy rights can be infringed in the
interests of public safety. Decree 2002 also authorized the creation of
special ``Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones'' in which military
authorities can exercise exceptional powers, including limiting
civilian movements and temporarily commandeering private property and
individual services. Two such zones were created during the year, one
in the department of Arauca and another encompassing portions of
Bolivar and Sucre departments. In its November 26 decision, the
Constitutional Court overturned a provision granting the military
authority to conduct censuses in these zones.
With the exception of exigent circumstances, the law generally
requires a judicial order signed by a senior prosecutor for authorities
to enter a private home without the owner's consent, even in
Rehabilitation Zones. The MOD continued training public security forces
in legal search procedures that comply with constitutional requirements
and human rights standards.
Government authorities generally need a judicial order to intercept
mail or monitor telephone conversations. This protection extends to
prisoners. However, government authorities sometimes monitored
telephone conversations without authorization.
An investigation by the Fiscalia continued into extensive illegal
wiretapping of human rights NGOs by the Medellin GAULA (see Section
1.b.). Prosecutors also continued investigating the April 2001 killing
of police officer Carlos Ceballos, who testified in the case (see
Section 1.a.). The Procuraduria was conducting its own disciplinary
investigation into Ceballos's killing.
The Government generally did not punish family members for alleged
violations committed by their relatives. However, there were complaints
that some family members of guerrilla leaders were falsely accused of
crimes. For example, on July 16, DAS officials in Bogota arrested
Javier Carvajalino, brother of FARC leader Jesus Emilio Carvajalino,
alias Andres Paris. Javier Carvajalino, a respected attorney with the
Bogota district office of the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, was
accused of conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks in the nation's
capital. The arrest was criticized not only by human rights NGOs, but
by government officials as well, and on November 20, Carvajalino was
released from custody following a decision by a senior prosecutor to
close the case for lack of evidence.
Paramilitaries illegally monitored private communications in
attempts to identify guerrilla collaborators. They also forcibly
entered private homes when searching for suspected guerrillas.
Paramilitaries caused forced displacement. Paramilitaries harassed,
threatened, and killed individuals because of their membership in
leftist political organizations, and also threatened and killed family
members of known guerrillas.
Guerrillas also arbitrarily interfered with privacy, home, and
family rights. For example, guerrillas used wiretaps and accessed
private bank accounts to select victims to extort and kidnap.
Guerrillas also broke into private homes in search of kidnap victims.
The FARC caused mass displacements of peasants and engaged in forced
conscription, particularly of minors (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
Children were also among the preferred kidnaping targets of
guerrillas (see Section 1.b.).
Guerrillas continued a policy of killing, attacking, and
threatening off-duty police and military personnel, their relatives,
and citizens who cooperated with them.
Former female guerrillas reported forced abortions and forced
implantation of intrauterine devices (see Section 1.g.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The country's 40-year-old internal conflict--among
government forces, several leftist insurgent groups, and a right-wing
paramilitary movement nominally supportive of the State--intensified
during the year. The internal armed conflict, and the narcotics
trafficking that both fueled it and prospered from it, were the central
causes of violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law. In her 2001 report, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary
Robinson noted that all sides in the conflict failed to respect the
principles of humanitarian law. She said that ``the conflict has
deteriorated to such an extent that combatants are disregarding the
most basic humanitarian precept--the defenseless civilian population
and children continue to be the principal victims of these actions.''
For example, in November 2001, the World Food Program reported that
armed groups had been hijacking trucks carrying deliveries intended for
displaced children.
The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office stated in its 2001 report that
women, who by and large remain socially and economically disadvantaged,
continued to be affected disproportionately by violence, particularly
in war zones (see Section 5). The Ombudsman's Office also noted a lack
of government programs to address their problems. Female leaders of
political and peasant organizations in various regions were the targets
of abuse, threats, torture, and executions. Intrafamilial violence,
sexual assault, and killing of women remained serious problems
throughout the country (see Section 5). More than 30 percent of FARC
combatants were female. Several observers criticized the use of female
combatants in guerrilla organizations as sex slaves (see Sections 1.f.
and 5).
Government security forces generally abided by international
humanitarian law and respected human rights; however, some members of
the security forces violated these standards and committed serious
violations of human rights. Data gathered by CINEP indicated that
during the first 6 months of the year, state security forces were
responsible for the deaths of 30 civilians during combat operations.
Paramilitary groups and guerrillas committed the great majority of
abuses.
In December Amnesty International (AI) published ``Colombia:
Security at What Cost?'', a report that alleged that the Government
contributed to impunity by weakening the role of civilian human rights
institutions, restricting the rights of civilians through security
measures authorized by the declaration of a ``State of Internal
Disturbance'' and Presidential Decree 2002, and drawing the civilian
population into the internal conflict through policies such as its
civilian informant program. The Government insisted it was not
undermining civilian institutions and that enhanced security measures
were necessary to establish a secure environment in which illegal armed
groups could not infringe on human rights.
There were no reports during the year that the Government
militarized public hospitals in conflict areas, which had increased the
risk that the hospitals would become targets of guerrilla attack. There
were no reports that the Government refused medical treatment to
guerrillas. In 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled that state security
forces could not maintain installations such as police stations next to
schools, to avoid endangering the lives of students in case of
guerrilla attacks; however, this practice continued in some
communities.
Forced displacement is a crime; however, military counterinsurgency
operations sometimes forced peasants to flee their homes and farms, and
there was a very large population of IDPs (see Section 2.d.). NGOs and
international governmental organizations sometimes blamed government
negligence for large-scale displacements, as occurred in May in the
department of Choco, where combat between the FARC and AUC along the
Atrato River displaced at least 3,000 persons from the town of Bojaya
and surrounding communities. The UNHCHR held the Government partly
responsible for events at Bojaya, where 119 civilians died, since the
Government appeared to have ignored warnings from the Catholic Church
about large groups of paramilitaries traveling past military
installations along the Atrato. On June 18, the Procuraduria opened a
formal investigation into the conduct of the security forces before,
during, and immediately after the Bojaya tragedy.
The ICRC reported that the Government, including military
authorities, followed an open-door policy toward the ICRC. For example,
in the weeks following the abolition of the former FARC ``despeje,''
the ICRC was the only international organization granted access to the
region. The military readily incorporated Red Cross curriculums on
international humanitarian law in standard military training. However,
impunity remained a problem. According to military sources, local
commanders often transferred or discharged soldiers accused of serious
human rights violations, rather than initiate legal proceedings. It
remained unclear how many suspected human rights violators were
investigated or prosecuted after being dismissed (see Section 1.e.).
There was still no decision by an army judge regarding the
responsibility of members of an army unit for the 2000 shooting deaths
of six children in the town of Pueblo Rico, Antioquia department. The
Superior Military Tribunal returned the case for reconsideration in
April 2001 following an initial ruling of innocence based on findings
that the children were caught in a crossfire between the army and ELN
guerrillas. A decision by the Procuraduria was pending regarding a
parallel disciplinary investigation of the case.
In October the Procuraduria ordered the dismissal of two air force
pilots involved in the 1998 bombing of the town of Santo Domingo,
Arauca department. The pilots, who at the time of the bombing were
supporting army units engaged in combat with the FARC, were ruled to
have acted negligently. On October 31, the Constitutional Court ruled
that a parallel criminal case being handled by the military justice
system should be transferred to civilian court. The air force refused
to accept responsibility for the incident. On January 25, presumed
paramilitaries shot and killed Angel Riveros, a witness in the Santo
Domingo investigation and community leader in Arauca department.
Some members of the public security forces--principally enlisted
personnel and noncommissioned officers--collaborated with or tolerated
the activities of illegal paramilitaries. Reasons for collaboration or
tolerance varied from ideological sympathy and perceived operational
exigencies to corruption and participation in illegal paramilitary
activities such as drug trafficking. On May 27, civilian law
enforcement authorities arrested army Major Orlando Alberto Martinez
for his alleged role in trafficking thousands of AK-47 assault rifles
from Bulgaria to the AUC. On May 30, Martinez was dismissed from the
armed forces based on the discretionary powers of Presidential Decree
1790 of 2000 (see Section 1.e.).
Civilian defense authorities and the military high command
repeatedly emphasized official opposition to paramilitarism and the
Government's commitment to combat paramilitaries and guerrillas with
equal vigor. In the first 11 months of the year, public security forces
killed 183 paramilitaries in combat and captured 1,214.
Paramilitaries were responsible for numerous violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights. There were
approximately 12,000 paramilitaries in the country, organized into
several associations, the largest and most influential of which was the
terrorist organization AUC. The AUC experienced a series of leadership
crises during the year that led to its temporary breakup and a
reduction in its membership. The largest of the paramilitary
organizations that formally remained a part of the AUC was the United
Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), which operated in the
northern part of the country and was led by the principal organizers of
the AUC, Carlos Castano and Salvatore Mancuso.
Following a November 2001 statement by Castano promising an end to
paramilitary massacres, the number of massacres committed by
paramilitaries appeared to drop dramatically. However, paramilitaries
still committed massacres and were responsible for many selective
political killings (see Section 1.a.), which frequently involved
kidnaping and torture (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). Paramilitary groups
used terror as a tactic to take support away from guerrillas.
Paramilitaries forcibly displaced civilians residing along key drug
and weapons transit corridors or suspected of harboring sympathies for
guerrillas. For example, on August 18, approximately 400 armed
paramilitaries arrived in the villages of San Francisco and Puerto
Matilde, located in a FARC-dominated region along the Cimitarra river
in the municipality of Yondo, Antioquia department. Approximately 600
persons were displaced. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported
receiving 1,528 complaints of forced displacement by paramilitaries as
of October 31. Paramilitaries also prevented or limited the delivery of
foodstuffs and medicines to towns and regions considered sympathetic to
guerrillas, straining local economies and increasing forced
displacement, particularly in the departments of Choco, Antioquia,
Santander, Bolivar, Cesar, and La Guajira (see Section 2.d.). For
example, in March, paramilitary violence and intimidation against
persons transporting food and supplies to the town of San Jose de
Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia department, created a de
facto blockade of the town.
Hundreds of civilians died during the year as a result of combat
between paramilitaries and guerrillas. For example, the UNHCHR held the
AUC partly responsible for the deaths of 119 civilians killed by a FARC
cylinder bomb in Bojaya, Choco department, based on the fact that AUC
fighters exposed the civilian population to danger by taking shelter in
the town. Throughout the year, civilians in poor urban areas and rural
districts were killed and wounded during exchanges of gunfire between
illegal armed groups. For example, on May 30, four civilians in the
``Veinte de Julio'' neighborhood of Medellin, Antioquia department,
were killed by stray bullets during a firefight between paramilitaries
and leftist urban militias.
Paramilitaries failed to respect the injured and medical personnel.
Doctors and hospitals suspected of treating guerrillas were frequently
declared military targets. For example, on August 16, paramilitaries
posing as patients killed nurse Amparo Figueroa at the local hospital
in the town of Miranda, Cauca department. Figueroa's name figured on a
paramilitary hit list of health care personnel accused of providing
medical care to guerrillas. The March 2001 paramilitary kidnaping and
killing of a wounded ELN guerrilla being transported in a Red Cross
ambulance led the ICRC to suspend the evacuation of wounded combatants.
ICRC evacuations remained suspended throughout the year. On December
31, the AUC issued a written pledge that it would not attack
ambulances, medical infrastructure, medical workers, and members of
medical missions.
In anticipation of potential peace negotiations with the
Government, the AUC declared a unilateral cease-fire beginning December
1. Several unaffiliated paramilitary groups agreed to abide by similar
cease-fires. On December 16, Congress amended Public Order Law 418 of
1997, which authorizes the President to negotiate with ``illegal armed
groups'', to allow negotiations with groups, such as paramilitaries,
that had not been granted ``political status'' by the Government. On
December 26, the Government named six individuals to a special
``exploratory commission'' that, in cooperation with Peace Commissioner
Luis Carlos Restrepo, was to make contact with paramilitary groups that
had expressed an interest in seeking peace with the Government.
However, not all paramilitaries abided by the cease-fire, and some
continued to commit serious violations of human rights.
Although paramilitaries continued to recruit minors throughout the
year (see Section 5), in December the Central Bolivar Block released a
total of 19 child soldiers into the custody of a humanitarian
commission headed by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) (see
Section 5).
The country's two largest left-wing guerrilla organizations are the
16,500 member terrorist organization Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the 4,500 member terrorist organization National
Liberation Army (ELN). While the FARC has grown larger and more
prosperous in recent years, due to drug trafficking and the temporary
security of the despeje, the ELN has been in steady decline. In many
areas previously dominated by the ELN, the two guerrilla groups worked
together to combat government forces and paramilitaries.
Both the FARC and the ELN systematically attacked noncombatants and
violated citizens' rights through unlawful killings, kidnapings, and
torture (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.). Guerrillas were
responsible for a large percentage of civilian deaths related to the
internal conflict. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported that as
of October 31, 63 percent of complaints it had received regarding
violations of international humanitarian law related to abuses by
guerrillas. The FARC alone accounted for at least 45 percent of these
complaints. According to CINEP, guerrillas killed 1,243 civilians
during the first 6 months of the year. CINEP attributed 1,115 of these
deaths to the FARC, and 58 to the ELN. The Ministry of Defense
attributed 916 civilian deaths, or 70 percent of total unlawful
killings, to guerrillas (see Section 1.a.). The FARC continued to
kidnap, torture, and killing off-duty soldiers and policemen as part of
its openly acknowledged ``Pistol Plan'' (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and
1.c.). Guerrillas also were responsible for attacks on religious and
indigenous leaders and forcibly recruited minors (see Sections 1.g.,
2.c., and 5).
Guerrillas failed to respect the injured and medical personnel.
Both the FARC and ELN frequently executed wounded prisoners and
threatened and killed doctors and nurses. On August 30, for example, a
joint FARC/ELN unit attacked an ambulance outside the town of Morales,
Bolivar department, seriously injuring three health care workers. On
July 28, the ELN stopped an ambulance outside the town of Cravo Norte,
Arauca department, killed the driver, and stole the medicine he was
transporting. On December 31, the ELN issued a written communique in
which it pledged not to attack ambulances, medical infrastructure,
medical workers, and members of medical missions. According to the Free
Country Foundation, guerrillas were responsible for the kidnapings of
29 doctors during the year, most for economic reasons (see Section
1.b.).
Guerrillas forcibly displaced peasants to clear key drug and
weapons transit routes and remove potential government or paramilitary
collaborators from strategic zones. For example, in early August the
FARC forced the departure of at least 1,600 peasants from the village
of Puerto Alvira, Meta department, which is located along the Guaviare
river, a key transit route. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office
reported receiving 2,202 complaints of forced displacement by
guerrillas, including at least 1,500 instances of forced displacement
by the FARC. Guerrillas also blockaded communities in areas in which
they exerted control. For example, following a major landslide in the
San Lucas mountain range of Bolivar department that destroyed several
small communities, the ELN prevented government officials and rescue
teams from reaching the area for nearly a week. On December 30, near
the town of San Lucas, eastern Antioquia department, the ELN declared
that no vehicle would be allowed to enter or leave the town. The
following day, less than a mile outside of town and despite the
presence in San Lucas of significant numbers of police and army
personnel, the ELN enforced its order by executing five truck drivers
who ignored its edict. Later on December 31, the ELN destroyed a major
bridge linking San Lucas with the Medellin-Bogota highway.
Guerrillas used landmines to defend static positions such as base
camps and drug labs and as indiscriminate weapons of terror. According
to the Vice President's Office, landmines killed an average of two
persons each day. There were approximately 100,000 landmines in use in
the country, spread throughout 40 percent of the national territory.
There were 155 land mine incidents through September 15, involving 459
victims, 107 of whom died. Fifty-five percent of these casualties were
members of the Armed Forces. Guerrillas were responsible for over 90
percent of landmine incidents. In September the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines singled out the FARC for criticism as one of the
world's foremost users of landmines. The FARC disguised landmines as
everyday items such as soccer balls and paint cans, and increasingly
used plastic mines that could not be detected by standard minesweeping
technology. Thousands of IDPs were unable to return to their homes
because of fear of landmines (see Section 2.d.).
Combat between guerrillas and state security forces or
paramilitaries resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. For
example, on May 2, FARC forces launched an inaccurate gas cylinder bomb
at AUC forces taking cover in the small town of Bojaya, located along
the Atrato river in central Choco department. The bomb struck the town
church, where approximately 300 civilians had sought refuge from the
fighting, leaving 119 civilians dead, including 45 children, and at
least 105 wounded. On May 20, the UNHCHR's country office held the FARC
responsible for having fired the gas cylinder. On June 8, FARC
commander Alfonso Cano was reported to have described the Bojaya attack
as a mistake caused by the nature of warfare. On November 8, AI
published a letter to FARC Commander Manuel Marulanda rejecting Cano's
excuse and calling on the FARC to issue a statement promising to
respect the right of the civilian population not to be drawn into the
armed conflict.
According to the Ministry of Defense, as of November 30,
guerrillas, particularly the FARC, and, to a lesser extent, the ELN,
committed nearly 1,000 terrorist bombings. In the early morning hours
of April 7, for example, a large car bomb exploded in a congested
nightclub area of Villavicencio, Meta Department. The car bomb, which
killed 11 and wounded at least 70, was detonated as a secondary device
that targeted onlookers who arrived to see the results of a smaller
explosion 5 minutes earlier. On October 22, a FARC car bomb exploded
outside Bogota's metropolitan police headquarters, killing 3 persons
and injuring at least 39. A similar bomb exploded outside another
Bogota police station on December 9, injuring 35. On December 10,
Bogota police seized four additional FARC car bombs capable of even
greater destruction. On December 13, a powerful FARC bomb disguised as
a briefcase exploded in a crowded restaurant on the 30th floor of an
upscale residential and commercial complex in Bogota, wounding at least
30 persons. On December 21, the ELN detonated a large car bomb next to
police headquarters in Cucuta, Norte de Santander department, killing
four civilians.
The FARC also targeted particular individuals for bombings. On
December 13, for example, a FARC book bomb exploded in the hands of
Senator German Vargas, a strong supporter of President Uribe. Vargas
lost a finger in the explosion. On August 20, a similar book bomb
addressed to Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio was intercepted by
CTI agents before it reached him. The FARC also used other, more
creative methods of bomb delivery, such as attaching explosives to
mules and dogs, rigging lost wallets, and booby-trapping dead bodies.
For example, on April 22, members of the FARC's 61st Front forced two
children to lead a horse loaded with explosives toward a military
checkpoint near the town of Acevedo, Huila department. The charge
exploded prematurely, killing one of the children. On May 3, FARC
guerrillas killed a 14-year-old boy, attached explosives to his body,
and forced a civilian to drive it to an army barracks in Vista Hermosa,
Meta department, where it was deactivated by military anti-explosives
experts. On December 30, near Cerro Azul, southern Bolivar department,
an army soldier lost a leg when he accidentally activated a FARC-rigged
bomb attached to the body of a dead paramilitary fighter killed in
FARC-AUC combat 5 days earlier.
Following the abolition of the despeje in February, the FARC
intensified its systematic campaign to attack and cripple the nation's
infrastructure. According to government figures, the FARC destroyed 483
electrical towers, costing the nation approximately $335 million
(760.45 billion pesos) in repair costs and overall damage to the
national economy. Large regions of the country were plunged into
darkness for weeks at a time. The town of San Vicente del Caguan,
former capital of the despeje, which depended on electrical pumps to
draw water from underground wells, suffered particularly serious
deprivation as threats of FARC violence discouraged private trucking
companies from shipping in water, food, and other basic supplies. As of
September 30, the National Transportation Association reported that at
least 75 buses had been hijacked and destroyed by guerrillas, resulting
in a loss of at least $4 million (9.08 billion pesos).
The FARC, in conjunction with the ELN, also blew 74 holes in the
nation's oil pipelines, resulting in a loss of approximately $225
million (510.75 billion pesos) in government revenue. Attacks on the
oil infrastructure also caused significant environmental damage. On
August 12, prosecutors formally charged 9 members of the ELN, including
senior leader Nicholas Rodriguez, alias ``Gabino'', with murder for a
1998 oil pipeline bombing in Antioquia department that killed 84
persons. The FARC also destroyed 62 telecommunications towers and 100
bridges. In addition, the FARC committed 12 attacks against dams and
aqueducts, the most notorious of which was its attempt to blow a hole
in Chingaza Dam, Bogota's principal source of drinking water. Had the
attack on Chingaza succeeded, it would not only have risked the water
supply of the country's largest city, but also flooded and destroyed
Villavicencio, a city with an estimated population of 300,000 and
capital of the department of Meta.
In its November 8 letter to FARC commander Manuel Marulanda, AI
expressed concern over the FARC's July 23 killing of Embera indigenous
leader Bertuflo Domico in Dabeiba, Antioquia department (see Section
5). The letter also described the killing of several evangelical
pastors, including Abel Ruiz on July 31, by presumed FARC members in
San Vicente del Caguan, Caqueta department (see Section 2.c.). Amnesty,
as it has in the past, criticized the recruitment of minors and the
violence committed against women in the FARC (see Section 5). The
letter called on the FARC and all armed groups in the country to
respect the rights of noncombatants.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press and the Government generally respected
these rights in practice; however, journalists regularly practiced
self-censorship to avoid retaliation and harassment by various groups.
Individuals criticized the Government both publicly and in private
without fear of reprisal. The privately owned print media published a
wide spectrum of political viewpoints and often sharply criticized the
Government without fear of reprisals. Media ownership remained highly
concentrated. Wealthy families or groups associated with one of the two
dominant political parties consolidated their holdings of news media,
and regional firms continued to purchase local news media outlets. As a
result of the general economic downturn, large press conglomerates
closed radio stations and newspaper offices in certain provinces and
reduced staff. In September financial problems forced El Espectador,
the nation's oldest newspaper, to change from a daily to a weekly
publication. Economic problems and concentration of media ownership
limited the media's resources, causing it to rely heavily on a smaller
pool of advertisers, including the Government. The National Television
Commission continued to oversee television programming throughout the
year.
The Government did not use libel laws to suppress criticism or
engage in direct or indirect censorship of the media. However, the
media's reliance on government advertising revenues may have reduced
its criticism of government actions and policies.
The Government did not assert ``national security'' to suppress
views that were merely politically embarrassing or objectionable on
other grounds. However, Reporters Without Borders criticized the
presidential decree that created Special Rehabilitation and
Consolidation Zones in highly conflictive areas that foreigners,
including journalists, could enter only with special permission from
government authorities. The organization stated that ``the possibility
of journalists being refused entry into the special zones is a flagrant
violation of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention, whose article
13 guarantees freedom of movement for journalists.'' In accordance with
a November 26 decision by the Constitutional Court, the Government
announced that it would grant foreign press correspondents registered
with the Government's international press office expedited
authorization to visit Rehabilitation Zones. A ban on the publication
of evidence pertaining to criminal investigations, based on secrecy
provisions of the penal code and an anticorruption statute, also
remained in effect.
Police or other public security forces generally did not subject
journalists to harassment, intimidation, or violence. However, there
were exceptions, as well as reports of threats against journalists from
local officials accused of corruption. On January 30, unknown persons
shot Orlando Sierra, deputy editor and columnist for La Patria
newspaper in Manizales, Caldas department. He died on February 1. On
May 9, Luis Fernando Soto was sentenced to 19 years in prison for the
crime, but accepted a plea bargain that reduced his sentence by 10
years. Two other persons were under arrest and awaiting trial. A joint
investigation by seven prominent newspapers and magazines revealed that
local politicians, whom Sierra had frequently accused of corruption,
may have ordered his killing.
During the year, both paramilitaries and guerrillas intimidated,
threatened, kidnaped, and killed journalists. According to information
gathered by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the
Colombian Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP), at least 10 media
representatives were killed, 75 threatened, and 12 kidnaped. At least
four of the media representatives killed during the year were killed as
a direct consequence of their work. The number of reported threats was
believed to be low, since many targeted individuals did not report
threats to government authorities or NGOs. Domestic and international
NGOs and other international organizations reported self-censorship by
the media due to threats from illegal armed groups. In May the
Committee to Protect Journalists included the country on a list of the
10 worst places to be a journalist, noting that 29 journalists had been
killed in the country in the last 10 years.
Paramilitaries regularly threatened journalists. For example, in an
interview published in the July 8 edition of Santander department's
Vanguardia Liberal daily, a paramilitary commander from the Middle
Magdalena region threatened to execute journalists who published
sensationalistic stories about paramilitary atrocities. In a July 29
communique, paramilitaries in the department of Arauca stated that
``journalists, anchormen, correspondents, and media owners and
managers'' would be declared ``military targets'' if they failed to
``live up to the responsibilities of their profession.''
On March 21, El Espectador columnist Fernando Garavito went into
exile abroad because of death threats, allegedly from paramilitaries.
In his columns, Garavito had harshly criticized paramilitary groups, as
well as then-presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe.
Paramilitaries were suspected of killing journalists. For example,
on June 28, outside the city of Arauca in the department of the same
name, presumed paramilitaries intercepted a vehicle driven by Efrain
Alberto Varela, director of local radio station Meridiano 70. Despite
the pleas of Varela's sister and brother-in-law, he was removed from
the vehicle and killed. Six days before his death, he had denounced on
the air the arrival of over 100 paramilitaries in the city of Arauca.
No progress appeared likely in an investigation by the Fiscalia
into the September 2000 paramilitary killing of Carlos Jose Restrepo,
publisher of a small newspaper in the department of Tolima and a former
member of the now demobilized M-19 guerrillas.
In November a specialized criminal court in Bogota began receiving
evidence in the trial of two hired killers suspected of killing
journalist, comedian, and human rights activist Jaime Garzon in 1999.
AUC leader Carlos Castano was being tried in absentia for his role in
organizing Garzon's death.
On July 26, a specialized criminal court in Bucaramanga, Santander
department, sentenced two paramilitaries to 19 years in prison for the
1999 murders of cameraman Luis Alberto Rincon and photographer Alberto
Sanchez in the town of Playon.
The offices of the Prosecutor General and Inspector General were
awaiting a ruling on their appeals of ``not guilty'' verdicts issued in
favor of two paramilitaries accused of murdering newspaper editor
Guzman Quintero in Valledupar, Cesar department, in 1999.
There were no developments in the investigation of the 2000
kidnaping and rape of journalist Jinet Bedoya by men identifying
themselves as paramilitaries. No progress in the case appeared likely.
Guerrillas frequently threatened journalists. For example, in July
the FARC's urban front operating in Cali, capital of Valle del Cauca
department, sent a statement to the local office of the RCN media group
accusing eight journalists of being ``enemies of the people and
defending the interests of the ruling oligarchy.'' The eight were
warned to leave the city within 3 days or be killed.
Guerrillas also kidnaped journalists or held them against their
will. For example, on February 19 and 20 near the village of El
Currillo on the border between the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta,
members of the FARC's 49th Front held foreign correspondent T.
Christian Miller captive while they verified his press credentials.
They released Miller after 24 hours in captivity. On August 6, near the
town of Mistrato in the department of Risaralda, members of the FARC's
Aurelio Rodriquez Front kidnaped three media representatives from the
local El Tiempo Cafe newspaper and released them the next day. Most
guerrilla kidnapings of journalists were brief.
Guerrillas also killed media representatives. For example, on July
11, members of the FARC abducted and shot Elizabeth Obando at a
roadblock near the town of Playa Rica, Tolima department. Obando died
from her wounds on July 13. Obando, who was responsible for the
distribution of regional newspaper El Nuevo Dia in the municipality of
Roncevalles, had been involved in a public confrontation with a
regional FARC leader who objected to a story in the paper criticizing
FARC extortion, child soldier recruitment, and forced ``agrarian
reform'' in the area.
Threats of violence drove at least 13 journalists into exile,
joining five who had left the country in 2001. Former RCN journalist
Claudia Gurisatti remained in exile because of FARC threats. Three
suspects arrested for conspiring to kill her were released because of
lack of evidence. Vice President Francisco Santos, former editor of the
country's largest circulation newspaper, Bogota's El Tiempo, and
founder of the Free Country Foundation, a prominent anti-kidnaping NGO,
returned from exile to assume the responsibilities of the vice-
presidency.
The authors of most threats and acts of violence against
journalists remained undetermined. For example, no progress was made
and little further progress seemed likely in investigations by the
Fiscalia into the 2000 deaths of radio journalists Guillermo Leon and
Alfredo Abad in Florencia, capital of Caqueta department.
In October the International Federation of Journalists opened an
office in Bogota to monitor violence against the media and help provide
assistance to local journalists. In 2000 the Inter-American Press
Society had opened its own rapid action unit in Bogota to help the
Fiscalia investigate crimes against journalists. The Ministry of
Interior operated a program for the protection of journalists,
established by an August 2000 presidential decree. During the year, the
program provided protection to 41 journalists. The Ministry of the
Interior also supported an alerts network organized for journalists by
providing a small number of radios and an emergency telephone hot line.
In October the Attorney General's office, in response to rising crimes
against journalists, added 12 new prosecutors to its unit dedicated to
investigating attacks against the press.
Domestic organizations that promoted freedom of the press included
the Colombian Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP) and Media for Peace.
The Government did not limit or block access to the Internet or
censor websites.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom. However,
paramilitary groups and guerrillas maintained a presence on many
university campuses, aimed at generating political support for their
respective campaigns and undermining support for their adversaries
through both violent and nonviolent means. Paramilitaries threatened
and killed university professors and students they suspected of leftist
sympathies. For example, in 1999 the AUC took credit for killing a
University of Antioquia student. Following the killing, the AUC
released a list of other ``subversive'' students it demanded cease
their ``delinquent activities'' or leave the university on pain of
death. Several of these students withdrew. Paramilitaries have had
their greatest influence in the north of the country, where in the last
7 years they are suspected of killing as many as 12 students and
professors at the University of Atlantico, in Barranquilla, Atlantico
department, and as many as 10 at the University of Cordoba, in
Monteria, Cordoba department.
Leftist guerrillas used university campuses to plan, prepare for,
and carry out terrorist attacks. On October 26, the Medellin
metropolitan police discovered 332 explosive devices hidden on the
campus of the University of Antioquia. The explosives were linked to an
illegal student organization with ties to FARC urban militias. On
November 20, a protest at the Industrial University of Santander (UIS),
in Bucaramanga, turned violent, apparently after six members of the ELN
infiltrated the demonstration against the university's new private
security firm, which leftist students accused of participating in the
Government's civilian informants program. One student was killed, and
10 students and 12 policemen were injured. On November 22, four mortar
rounds launched from the campus of the National University landed on a
grass field in front of the headquarters of the Fiscalia, wounding one
passerby. At year's end, a government investigation had uncovered no
evidence of student involvement in the attack.
Both paramilitary groups and guerrillas regularly threatened and
killed public school teachers, particularly at the high school level.
In November Minister of Education Cecilia Maria Velez reported that
approximately 800 teachers, mostly in rural areas, were working under
the shadow of death threats from illegal armed groups, particularly the
FARC. According to the National Teacher's Union (FECODE), 83 teachers
were killed during the year, most by paramilitaries. For example, on
October 28, in the village of Media Luna, Pivijay municipality,
Magdalena department, four alleged members of the AUC shot and killed
Oscar David Polo at the entrance of the school where he taught. Four
teachers were killed in this small municipality during the year, and 9
total in the department of Magdalena. A total of 14 teachers were
killed in the department of Antioquia, more than in any other
department.
Investigations continued into 1999 attacks against three prominent
academics: Jesus Antonio Bejarano, a former government peace
commissioner; Dario Betancur, head of the social sciences faculty of
Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica; and Hernando Henao, an anthropologist
who published on the subject of displaced persons. Prosecutors
suspected the FARC of responsibility for Bejarano's death and the AUC
of responsibility for killing Henao.
As a result of these and other incidents, many professors and
students assumed a lower profile. Some universities banned
extracurricular social activities that addressed controversial topics
related to the internal armed conflict. Some academics went into
voluntary exile.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. The authorities normally did not
interfere with public meetings and demonstrations and granted the
required permission except when they determined that there was imminent
danger to public order.
There were large demonstrations on many occasions by citizens
throughout the country, some to repudiate terrorist activities, and
others to protest government budget cuts and social policies. The
authorities generally did not interfere. For example, on September 16,
approximately 800,000 public employees throughout the country went on
strike and held large marches in major cities to protest government-
sponsored pension, labor, and tax reform bills. The protest was
generally peaceful. However, the following day, government officials
announced that employees whose positions were considered essential,
such a firefighters and judges, would be sanctioned for having
participated in the strike. Also, throughout the week of September 16
there were clashes between members of the public security forces and
peasants conducting parallel mobilizations in rural areas to protest
government agricultural programs and related policies. The security
forces temporarily detained hundreds of peasants to enforce a
government decree that prohibited impeding transportation on public
highways. The Government claimed, and some peasants confirmed, that the
FARC pressured some peasants into participating in the protests. On
September 17, the Government expelled three Spanish citizens it claimed
were inciting peasant protests (see Section 4).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Legal
organizations are free to associate with international groups in their
field. However, membership in proscribed organizations such as the
FARC, ELN, EPL, and AUC is a crime. Freedom of association was limited
in practice by threats and acts of violence committed by illegal armed
groups against labor unions and NGOs (see Sections 4 and 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
Although there is no official state religion, most citizens were
Roman Catholic and the Roman Catholic Church retained a de facto
privileged status. Accession to a 1997 public law agreement with the
State is required for non-Roman Catholic religions to minister to their
adherents in public institutions, such as schools and hospitals.
Although 12 Christian churches acceded to the agreement, the Government
has not given a similar opportunity to hundreds of other mostly small,
evangelical churches that received legal recognition after 1997.
Protestant churches also complained that new zoning laws showed de
facto favoritism toward Roman Catholicism, since most Roman Catholic
cathedrals were constructed before zoning laws were instituted and were
therefore exempt from the laws' requirements.
The Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia reported that it was
investigating 42 crimes believed to have been religiously motivated.
Paramilitaries sometimes harassed religious leaders and members,
usually for political reasons.
On March 6, a court sentenced the convicted murderer of Roman
Catholic priest Jorge Luis Maza and Spanish aid worker Inigo Egiluz to
31 years in prison. Nine alleged members of a paramilitary group
arrested in connection with this crime were released for lack of
evidence. The case was closed at year's end.
The FARC and ELN threatened and committed acts of violence against
religious leaders and members, usually for political reasons, and
inhibited the right to free religious expression in areas they
controlled.
The Bishop's Conference of the Roman Catholic Church reported that
illegal armed groups killed 11 Catholic priests during the year. The
FARC is suspected of most of these killings. On January 12, Guillermo
Leon Corrales, a Roman Catholic priest resident overseas who was
visiting family, was killed in the town of La Estrella, near Medellin,
Antioquia department. Several years earlier, Corrales had been
threatened by members of a radical leftist student organization at the
Medellin high school where he taught. Another priest was confirmed
killed by the FARC in the same region the following day. The Government
was investigating the possibility that the killings were related.
On March 16, Isaias Duarte, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cali, was
killed as he left a church in a poor Cali neighborhood. On November 29,
the Fiscalia indicted FARC 30th Front commander John Fredy Jimenez and
a hired gunman for carrying out the crime. A second gunman had been
killed in prison in May. Prosecutors also opened a formal investigation
of seven members of the FARC Secretariat, including Pedro Antonio
Marin, alias ``Tirofijo,'' and Jorge Briceno, alias ``Mono Jojoy,'' who
they suspected ordered Duarte's killing to silence his blunt criticism
of their criminal activities and insincerity in peace negotiations.
On July 13, two unknown assailants killed Sister Marta Ines Velez,
director of the Marcelino Mothers Shelter in the town of Mogotes,
Santander department. Sister Velez was the religious community delegate
to the Mogotes community assembly, an organization whose efforts to
promote peace won the town the country's 1998 National Peace Prize.
On October 20, the army foiled a plot by the FARC to kidnap
Francisco Javier Munera, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Florencia,
Caqueta department. After the army learned of the plot, Bishop Munera
was moved to a different location.
On November 11, FARC guerrillas kidnaped Jorge Enrique Jimenez,
president of the Latin American Bishops Conference and Bishop of
Zipaquira, Cundinamarca department, along with parish priest Desiderio
Orjuela. On November 15, members of the armed forces rescued the two
churchmen.
According to the Christian Union Movement (MUC), an association of
evangelical Christian churches, 32 Protestant pastors had been killed
as of November 30. According to the MUC, 93 pastors had been killed
since 1994. The FARC was believed responsible for 90 percent of the
killings of Protestant pastors. FARC threats and violence forced the
closure of hundreds of evangelical churches, particularly in the
southwestern part of the country. According to the MUC, the FARC
targeted Protestant pastors and church members for political, rather
than religious, reasons.
In August FARC guerrillas shot and killed Pentecostal clergyman
Abel Ruiz in San Vicente del Caguan, Caqueta department, capital of the
FARC's former despeje. On July 14, FARC guerrillas shot and killed Jose
Vicente Flores, another United Pentecostal Church minister, in the same
church.
On October 17, near the town of Anserma, Caldas department, ELN
guerrillas executed Bishop Gabriel Arias, Vicar of Armenia, Quindio
department, while Arias was on a humanitarian mission to plead for the
release of former Quindio governor Ancizar Lopez, the victim of an ELN
kidnaping.
Authorities failed to capture the FARC's Arley Leal and Milton de
Jesus Tonal, who were suspected of the 1998 killing of Roman Catholic
priest Alcides Jimenez in Putumayo. The Procuraduria continued to
investigate possible government negligence in failing to prevent the
killing.
Investigations continued into the March 2000 killing of Roman
Catholic priest Hugo Duque in Supia, Caldas department, and the March
2001 killing of Protestant pastor Onofre Hernandez in Arauca City,
Arauca department. There appeared to be little likelihood of progress
in either case.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
the right to travel domestically and abroad, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice; however, there were
exceptions. For example, in areas where counterinsurgency operations
were underway, police and military officials often required civilians
to obtain safe-conduct passes. In special Rehabilitation and
Consolidation Zones established by presidential decree, travel was
restricted and persons were sometimes detained for up to 24 hours so
that officials could conduct identification checks as provided by law.
Paramilitaries and guerrillas used similar means to restrict travel in
areas they controlled. The Government implemented curfews in conflict
zones. Outsiders who wished to enter indigenous reservations had to be
invited.
Throughout the year, roadblocks erected by paramilitaries
guerrillas, and peasant farmers inhibited transportation,
communication, and commerce (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.). Social
organizations also resorted to blocking roads to protest government
actions or policies (see Section 2.b.). Almost every major artery was
closed at some point during the year. There were numerous reports of
members of indigenous communities, particularly in Putumayo, being
forbidden to leave their communities without either paramilitary or
FARC permission, and in which paramilitaries and guerrillas blockaded
communities.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 5,086
Colombians registered as refugees in Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. An
additional 3,995 Colombians requested asylum in Ecuador, the
neighboring country with the most liberal asylum policy. Hundreds of
Colombians also fled to Costa Rica. There were few reports of the
forced return of refugees from Panama, Ecuador, or Costa Rica, although
most refugees received little assistance. There continued to be reports
that refugees were forcibly repatriated from Venezuela.
In April the Constitutional Court upheld a May 2000 law that
criminalized forced displacement; however, there was a large population
of IDPs caused by forced conscription and incursions by paramilitaries
and guerrillas, battles between illegal armed groups, and military
counterinsurgency operations that displaced peasants from their homes
and farms.
Both paramilitaries and guerrillas used forced displacement to gain
control over disputed territories and to weaken their opponents' base
of support. Authorities sometimes encouraged civilian populations to
move back to their homes before security situations had normalized, or
civilians returned before it was advisable.
In August 2001, the U.N. Special Coordinator on Internal
Displacement characterized the country's internal displacement problem
as ``acute.'' According to the UNHCR, the country ranks second among
countries with the largest IDP populations. The Government estimated
that there were 350,000 new displaced persons during the year, a
significant increase from 2001. According to the Consultancy for Human
Rights and Displacement (CODHES), a human rights NGO specializing in
displacement issues (see Section 4), 353,000 civilians were displaced
during the first 9 months of the year. If CODHES's statistics were
accurate, and displacements continued at the same rate during the last
3 months of the year, over 400,000 persons were displaced during the
year, an increase of at least 50,000 over 2001. Precise numbers of IDPs
were difficult to obtain, since some were displaced more than once and
many did not register with the Government or NGOs. The FARC and the ELN
discouraged IDPs from registering with the Government through force,
intimidation, and disinformation. Guerrilla agents masqueraded as IDPs
to sow doubt and discontent among the displaced population. The
Government's IDP service agency, the Social Solidarity Network (RSS),
reported a significant increase in the number of municipalities
affected by displaced populations. According to government figures,
since 1996 over 927,000 citizens had registered as IDPs. CODHES
estimated that over 2 million persons were displaced over the same
period. The RSS worked with the UNHCR, CODHES, and the Bishop's
Conference of the Roman Catholic Church to develop a system for
providing more accurate estimates of IDPs; however, they had yet to
reach agreement on such a mechanism.
CODHES stated that some persons have been displaced for as long as
10 years, but it could not define a typical timeframe. CODHES estimated
that 65 percent of displacements became permanent, while the ICRC
placed the figure at 50 percent. The U.N. Thematic Group, an
intersectoral working group composed of U.N. agencies, government
agencies, and NGOs, reported that state agents were responsible for
less than five percent of displacements during the year.
Paramilitaries, on the other hand, were responsible for 55 percent, and
guerrillas for 40 percent.
The vast majority of IDPs were rural peasants displaced to cities,
where many had difficulty integrating into society. Many displaced
persons settled on the outskirts of large cities such as Bogota,
Bucaramanga, Medellin, and Cartagena, where conditions were overcrowded
and unsanitary. Poor neighborhoods were overwhelmed by a need for basic
public services. According to CODHES, 57 percent of IDPs were women, 22
percent were female heads of household, and 70 percent were under the
age of 19. In July UNHCR reported that 72 percent of all IDPs were
women and children. Some families fled or remained displaced to avoid
the forced recruitment of their children by guerrillas (see Sections
1.f. and 5). Thousands of IDPs were unable to return to their homes
because of the presence of antipersonnel mines (see Section 1.g.).
Displaced women and girls were particularly vulnerable to domestic
violence and sexual abuse and exploitation (see Section 5). PAHO
reported that only 65 percent of displaced households had access to
health services through the general social security system, and that
many could not afford the required co-payment, despite the fact that it
was as low as 15 percent of a person's total medical expenses. UNICEF
estimated that only 68 percent of displaced children attended school.
Malnutrition among displaced children was common. According to the
UNHCR, more than one-third of IDPs were indigenous or Afro-Colombian.
The Government was unable to provide sufficient humanitarian
assistance to the displaced, despite statutes and court rulings
requiring it to do so. Although conditions for IDP communities varied
in different regions, conditions for displaced persons in many
locations were poor and unhygienic, with little access to health care,
and few educational or employment opportunities. Government assistance
for the displaced was provided principally through the RSS, the
Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), and the Ministry of Health.
However, the Government itself acknowledged that the ICRC and various
NGOs provided 70 to 80 percent of humanitarian assistance received by
the displaced. Most displaced persons received emergency humanitarian
assistance from the ICRC, the RSS, or NGOs for only 90 days, although
some IDPs received it for longer, and others never received any aid.
The ICRC provided emergency assistance to 200,000 displaced persons
during the year. The local office of the UNHCR, which is headquartered
in Bogota and has four field offices throughout the country, worked to
strengthen the Government's ability to address the IDP crisis. In June
the UNHCR expanded to Antioquia department a project begun in 1999 to
provide identification documents to IDPs. More than 52,000 persons had
received documents under the project since its inception.
On December 21, the police removed an organized group of 106 IDPs
from the former headquarters of the ICRC in Bogota. It appeared that
the squatters departed voluntarily after having been warned that if
they did otherwise, they would be forcibly evicted. Many of the IDPs
already owned homes through a government-sponsored subsidy program.
Those who did not own homes were lodged in a local hotel at government
expense until other accommodations were found. Prior to the IDPs'
expulsion, at least 200 others had either moved to their subsidized
homes or found other long-term solutions that allowed them to leave the
ICRC's former headquarters.
The Constitution provides for the right to asylum under terms
established by law in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The country has a
tradition of providing asylum dating from 1920s. The Government
reserves the right to determine eligibility for asylum, based upon its
own assessment of the nature of an applicant's claim. The issue of the
provision of first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, 207
recognized refugees resided in the country. During the year, 9 persons
applied for asylum. Three applications were rejected, and six were
pending at year's end.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Presidential elections are held every 4 years, with
the incumbent barred from reelection. Members of Congress are also
elected to 4-year terms. Governors, mayors, and other local officials
are elected to 3-year terms. Congressional and presidential elections
were held in March and May, respectively. The last elections for local
officials took place in October 2000.
On March 10, voters elected a bicameral legislature with a mix of
Liberal, Conservative, and independent members. On May 26, voters
elected independent Alvaro Uribe President. Both elections were
generally free and fair, in spite of a concerted campaign by terrorist
organizations such as the FARC to disrupt them. The Liberal and
Conservative parties often negotiated with members of smaller,
independent parties to form working coalitions. In the House, the
Liberal Party held on to 58 seats, while the Conservative Party held
21. The remaining 87 seats were filled by candidates from some 40
different ``independent'' political movements, some loosely affiliated
with the Liberal and Conservative parties. In the Senate, Liberals took
31 seats, Conservatives took 13, indigenous candidates took 2
constitutionally mandated seats, and independents filled the remaining
56 seats.
Political parties generally operated freely without government
interference. Parties that fail to garner 50,000 votes in a general
election lose the right to present candidates and receive government
funds. However, they may reincorporate at any time by presenting 50,000
signatures to the National Electoral Board. Suffrage is universal and
voluntary for citizens age 18 and over, except for active duty members
of the police and armed forces, who are prohibited from voting.
Civilian public employees, although eligible to vote, are not allowed
to participate in partisan politics.
The congressional and presidential elections, conducted under
unprecedented levels of state security, were generally free and fair,
despite attempts by paramilitaries and guerrillas to interfere in the
political process. However, the National Electoral Commission
invalidated 17,000 votes based on evidence of fraud, annulling the
victories of five Senators-elect. In areas dominated by paramilitaries,
such as the department of Cordoba and urban areas of the Middle
Magdalena region, paramilitaries gathered community leaders--sometimes
by force--to instruct them on acceptable candidates. However, despite
paramilitary boasting that they elected 35 percent of the legislature,
election results revealed that candidates reportedly endorsed by
paramilitaries consistently lost in regions dominated by these groups.
For example, in the city of Barracabermeja, where paramilitary
influence was widely acknowledged, all candidates reportedly endorsed
by paramilitaries lost the elections by wide margins.
Guerrillas conducted a systematic campaign of violence designed to
disrupt and discredit the national elections. The FARC attempted to
assassinate Alvaro Uribe when he was a candidate more than 12 times,
including a major bomb attack on April 14 in the coastal city of
Barranquilla that left 3 dead and 13 injured, including 10 civilians.
The FARC threatened to kill civic leaders and residents of towns in
which most voters cast their ballots for Uribe, and successfully
prevented thousands of peasants in rural areas from going to the polls.
Nevertheless, in FARC influenced regions, such as the department of
Caqueta, Uribe won by a large margin. In retaliation for Uribe's first
round election victory, on June 5 the FARC killed Luis Carlos Caro, the
mayor of Solita, a town in Caqueta department that voted overwhelmingly
for Uribe. In an attempt to destabilize the country prior to Uribe's
inauguration, the FARC extended its threats to all local elected
officials throughout the country, resulting in the submission of
resignations by 399 mayors nationwide. Another 300 mayors were
obligated to carry out their responsibilities by telephone and
messenger from relatively secure department capitals. Many city council
members and municipal workers also resigned, halting the provision of
public services in many municipalities. In total, the FARC killed 9
mayors and 70 city councilmen during the year. On inauguration day, the
FARC launched a rocket attack on the presidential palace; however, most
of the 15 rockets missed their target and fell in a slum near the
palace, killing 23 persons, including 3 children.
The FARC also committed aggressions against threatened mayors'
families. In July the FARC killed Omar Castano, the son of Jose Leonel
Castano, mayor of the town of Vista Hermosa, Meta department, formerly
part of the FARC despeje. Omar Castano had been kidnaped June 28. His
body was not returned. The FARC kidnaped several mayors' children to
pressure the mayors into resigning. For example, on July 17, members of
the FARC kidnaped the 3-year-old daughter of Libardo Herazo, mayor of
Colon, Putumayo department. The girl and her nanny were released on
July 31, after Herazo publicly announced his resignation.
The AUC initially threatened to retaliate against mayors who
resigned in the face of FARC intimidation, but stepped back from this
policy in June as announced in a letter to the Colombian Federation of
Municipalities.
The FARC kidnaped politicians in an attempt to force the Government
into a prisoner exchange. For example, on February 23, the FARC
kidnaped independent presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt (see
Section 1.b.). Three days earlier, the FARC had kidnaped Senator Jorge
Eduardo Gechem (see Section 1.b.), Chairman of the Senate Peace
Commission, during an airplane hijacking. The FARC continued to hold
captive an additional four members of Congress (see Section 1.b.).
Both the AUC and the FARC claimed to operate clandestine political
movements: the AUC's National and Democratic Movement, launched in
September 2001, and the FARC's Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia,
announced in April 2000. The status of these movements was uncertain,
although their influence appeared minimal.
In municipalities that lacked a state security presence and in poor
urban neighborhoods both guerrillas and paramilitaries sought to impose
control and garner political support using measures along a spectrum
from social cleansing killings (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 5) to
donations of labor and materiel for community projects.
There are no legal and few practical restrictions on the
participation of women and minorities in the political process. In
March 2000, a quota law went into effect requiring that a minimum goal
of 30 percent of nominated positions be allocated to women. The quota
law does not apply to publicly elected positions or managers of
parastatal corporations. The Government must report to Congress each
year on the percentage of women in high-level governmental positions.
The new Uribe administration increased the number of women in
significant executive branch posts. There were 8 women in the 18-member
cabinet, including the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Relations and
the High Commissioner for Plan Colombia. There were also 7 female vice
ministers. Women occupied 11 seats in the 102-member Senate and 20
seats in the 161-member House of Representatives. There was 1 woman on
the 23-member Supreme Court and another on the 9-member Constitutional
Court. Two of the 13 magistrates on the CSJ were women. According to
the Government's 2001 end-of-year report, 75 women served as city
mayors and 1 as a departmental governor.
Indigenous persons made up less than two percent of the population.
There were three indigenous Senators, two of whom occupied seats
reserved for indigenous persons, and one indigenous member of the House
of Representatives. In 2000 citizens of the department of Cauca elected
the nation's first indigenous governor. There were no indigenous
ministers or vice-ministers and no indigenous person served on any of
the nation's high courts.
Approximately 21 percent of the population was of Afro-Colombian
descent. There were two Afro-Colombian Senators and five Afro-Colombian
members of the House of Representatives. However, there was no Afro-
Colombian minister or vice minister and no Afro-Colombian on any of the
nation's high courts. There were 70 Afro-Colombian mayors. A
disproportionate percentage of the country's displaced persons were
Afro-Colombians who had difficulty participating in the political
process.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases; however, many
prominent human rights monitors worked under constant fear for their
physical safety. Government officials were generally cooperative and
responsive to their views; however, lingering suspicions on both sides
sometimes made cooperation difficult. Over 60,000 human rights and
civil society NGOs were registered in the country. Most existed only on
paper. Approximately 1,000 small to medium-sized NGOs were members of
the Colombian Federation of NGOs. The Truth for Colombia (``Verdad
Colombia'') group was a relatively new association of small, right wing
human rights NGOs. The most significant domestic human rights NGOs
included: the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) and Lawyers'
Collective Jose Alvear Restrepo, both of which focused on defending
human rights through legal analysis and case work; the Jesuit-founded
Center for Popular Research and Education (CINEP), which managed the
country's largest and most influential database of human rights
violations; the Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
(CPDDH), which provided support and assistance to victims of human
rights violations and worked to organize civil society to defend human
rights and promote a peaceful resolution to the country's armed
conflict; the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP),
which focused on the rights and treatment of persons detained for
politically motivated crimes, particularly left-wing subversion; the
Association of Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons (ASFADDES),
the country's leading voice in demanding justice for the disappeared,
many of whom were active in the legitimate left-wing Patriotic Union
(UP) political party; the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement
(CODHES) which advocated policies designed to prevent displacement and
defended the rights of the displaced; the Association for Alternative
Social Promotion (MINGA), which sought to promote respect for human
rights through education, research, lobbying, and legal assistance
(MINGA received the French Republic's Liberty, Equality, Fraternity
Prize for Human Rights during the year); the Peace Network (Redepaz), a
civil society organization dedicated to the promotion of peace at the
national, regional, and local level; and the Free Country Foundation,
which provided psychological, legal, and public relations assistance to
kidnap victims and their families and lobbied the Government for better
anti-kidnaping efforts.
On October 23, President Uribe sent various foreign ambassadors a
letter in which he promised to guarantee the rights of NGOs to work in
the country and argued that his policy to retake the national territory
would ensure freedom of speech and human rights in the long term. He
stressed that the active participation of civilians was necessary to
reestablish public order. Uribe said the judicial powers decreed in the
State of Internal Disturbance were needed to tackle impunity and were
legitimate, having been upheld by the Constitutional Court. He said he
had stressed to the armed forces that they must respect human rights
and operate within the norms of international treaties.
Although the Government generally did not interfere with the work
of domestic human rights NGOs, there were unconfirmed reports that
government security forces harassed or threatened human rights workers,
particularly in highly conflictive areas. Vice President Francisco
Santos, whose office directs the Presidential Program for the
Protection of Human Rights, told the press that NGOs would not be
harassed. Prominent local NGOs made an effort to be fair and objective
in their analysis of a serious and complex human rights situation.
However, their coverage of human rights abuses tended to focus on the
Government and right-wing paramilitaries, rather than leftist
guerrillas. For example, the Colombian embassy in Canada, noted that
only 3 of 5,000 letters generated in 2001 by alerts disseminated by
Colombian human rights groups specifically condemned the FARC.
Local human rights NGOs had an influence that far exceeded their
membership or resources. By sharing information among themselves and
disseminating it to international human rights organizations and the
media they raised the country's human rights profile and contributed to
significant levels of international attention. They were also effective
at changing laws and policies through lawsuits, such as the CCJ's
participation in a successful challenge to the National Defense and
Security Act of 2001, or the Free Country Foundation's effective
lobbying for stronger, more cohesive government anti-kidnaping efforts.
Representatives of a wide variety of government agencies found it
useful or politically necessary to meet with local human rights groups
and study their proposals.
The Government has occasionally filed criminal charges against
human rights advocates, generally for subversive activities. For
example, on December 6, CTI agents in Bucaramanga, Santander
department, arrested Julio Avella and Alvaro Tapias, President and
Treasurer, respectively, of the National Association of Solidarity
Assistance (ANDAS), an NGO arm of the Colombian Communist Party, for
allegedly providing financial assistance to the FARC. Arrest warrants
were still outstanding for Carlos Mejia and Gladys Rojas, former
directors of a small NGO in Barrancabermeja that in August 2001
organized a major international human rights event. Mejia and Rojas,
who remained in hiding, were charged with rebellion for acts prior to
their NGO organizing activities. Government officials sometimes have
accused human rights NGOs of being guerrilla front organizations
without providing evidence to back up their charges.
Under the authority granted by the President's declaration of a
State of Internal Disturbance, law enforcement authorities searched the
offices of a number of NGOs. Most searches focused on the headquarters
of small, local NGOs; however, on October 25, police raided and
searched the Bogota office of the Permanent Assembly for Peace, a
large, well-regarded NGO umbrella organization. Justifying the search
by reference to emergency powers granted under the State of Internal
Disturbance, police officials failed to secure a prosecutor's written
approval before entering the building. The raid, which was widely
condemned in the country and abroad, uncovered no evidence of illegal
activity.
In December the Fiscalia, finding that there was insufficient
evidence to bring formal charges, closed its investigation into
accusations that retired army Generals Fernando Millan and Rito Alejo
Del Rio bribed a witness to testify falsely against two leading NGO
organizers and a labor leader (see Section 1.a.).
The Fiscalia continued to investigate the illegal wiretapping of
NGO and labor unions offices by the Medellin GAULA (see Section 1.f.).
Paramilitaries subjected human rights groups to intense pressure in
the form of obvious surveillance, harassing telephone calls, graffiti
campaigns, and death threats.
For example, in August the ``Cacique Calarca'' bloc of the AUC,
which operated in the country's coffee belt, circulated a statement in
the departments of Quindio and Risaralda that accused 13 human rights
and labor leaders by name of being guerrilla agents. In addition, the
statement declared the 13 persons military targets and gave them 15
days to leave the region. On September 15, Augustin Jimenez of the CSPP
received an anonymous call that told him that a coworker had been
killed and that he would be next. The AUC repeatedly and explicitly
threatened the CSPP.
Paramilitaries were implicated in the deaths of human rights and
development workers. For example, on November 8, Jose Rusbell, a member
of the Joel Sierra Human Rights Committee, was killed by presumed
paramilitaries in the city of Tame, Arauca department. The IACHR
specifically condemned Rusbell's killing and asked the Government to
undertake an exhaustive investigation. According to the CCJ, 17 human
rights advocates were killed during the year, although only two such
deaths could be definitively attributed to paramilitaries.
An investigation continued into the August 2000 killing of peace
activist and former mayor Luis Fernando Rincon in Aguachica, Cesar
department. Human rights groups publicly accused alleged paramilitary
leader Libardo Humberto Prada of the crime. On January 16, the criminal
chamber of the Valledupar Supreme Court overturned a 2001 trial court
ruling exonerating Prada for the 1998 killing of local Redepaz
coordinator Amparo Leonor Jimenez, and sentenced him to 37 years in
prison.
There was no information on the whereabouts of Angel Quintero and
Claudia Patricia Monsalve, members of ASFADDES who were kidnaped in
2000 by presumed paramilitaries. Authorities continued to investigate
the kidnaping, although the victims were presumed dead.
Prosecutors issued arrest warrants for AUC leader Carlos Castano
and suspected paramilitary Yesid Fernando Lemus for the 1999 kidnapings
and murders of southern Bolivar department peasant leaders Edgar
Quiroga and Gildardo Fuentes.
Arrest warrants remained outstanding for Carlos Castano and four
other paramilitaries for the 1997 murders of two CINEP workers (see
Section 1.a.). Imminent arrests appeared unlikely.
The Government, through the Ministry of the Interior and the DAS,
allocated approximately $11.4 million (28.5 billion pesos) to its
program for the protection of human rights and labor activists
associated with 88 different human rights NGOs and unions. As of August
30, the Ministry, bolstered by a budget increase of 690 percent over
2000, had provided protection measures to 890 human rights activists
and bulletproofed 54 NGO offices and residences. Nevertheless,
legitimate requests for protection far outpaced the increase in the
protection program's budget. Human rights groups continued to state
that the protection programs were inadequate to address the crisis, and
called for increased efforts to combat impunity.
The Government generally did not interfere with the work of
international human rights and humanitarian NGOs. Representatives of
international human rights groups visited the country and held meetings
with local human rights groups and individuals in various regions of
the country without government interference. The larger international
NGOs, such as AI, HRW, and the Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA), devoted equal attention to government forces, guerrillas, and
paramilitaries; however, they held the Government to a higher standard
and criticized it not only for direct violations of human rights, but
also for its failure to completely sever links between the military and
paramilitaries and prevent high levels of political violence.
The Government deported several representatives of smaller
international human rights groups for violations of immigration law.
For example, in August and October, the DAS ordered five members of
Christian Peacemaker Teams, a small group that provided humanitarian
accompaniment in the highly conflicted Middle Magdalena region, to
depart the country for carrying out activities inconsistent with their
tourist visa status. On September 17, the DAS ordered one Spanish
citizen to depart the country and formally deported two others for
allegedly inciting peasants to participate in a national labor strike
(see Section 2.b.).
The Government cooperated with international governmental
organizations. The UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations
High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR), and the ICRC had an active
presence in the country and were allowed to carry out their work
without government interference.
UNHCHR's Bogota office opened at government invitation in 1997; it
has since added field offices in Cali and Medellin. The office
monitored and analyzed the national human rights situation and provided
advice and assistance on human rights protection. President Uribe
extended UNHCHR's mandate in the country through the end of his
administration in 2006.
The Government has an extensive human rights apparatus coordinated
by the Office of the President's Advisor for Human Rights. The Office
conducted regular dialog with local human rights groups and established
a Special ``Momentum'' Committee to advance judicial resolutions of 100
key human rights cases. Executive branch offices specializing in
promoting and protecting human rights include the human rights office
of the Ministry of Interior and the human rights offices of the
Ministry of Defense and its constituent services, including the
National Police.
The MOD reported that over 290,000 members of the security forces
had received human rights training since 1996, conducted by the ICRC,
the Colombian Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, foreign
governments, and other government offices and agencies. In September
2001, the MOD signed an agreement with two national universities and
the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights to conduct research and
training on human rights issues and to organize seminars designed to
foster dialog with NGOs and academics.
Offices of independent government agencies that protect and promote
human rights include the Procuraduria's Disciplinary Delegate for the
Defense of Human Rights, the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia, and the
Office of the National Human Rights Ombudsman. The House of
Representatives elects the National Human Rights Ombudsman for a 4-year
term, which does not coincide with that of the President. The office
has the constitutional duty to ensure the promotion and exercise of
human rights. The Ombudsman's 34 regional offices provided public
defenders to the indigent and a channel for complaints of human rights
violations (see Section 1.e.). The Ombudsman's Bogota office served as
the headquarters of a national Early Warning System designed to alert
public security forces to impending human rights violations,
particularly large-scale massacres. The Ombudsman's office was an
important party to the lawsuit that successfully challenged the
National Defense and Security Act of 2001 that was ruled
unconstitutional in April. In August 2000, the House of Representatives
confirmed former Constitutional Court Justice Eduardo Cifuentes as
Human Rights Ombudsman. Cifuentes was active in his role, publicly
criticizing a wide variety of human rights violations, visiting
massacre sites, and pressing for increased security and humanitarian
assistance for affected communities. His office, with international
assistance, provided training for its regional ombudsmen and conducted
public education on human rights. Despite the Ombudsman's successes,
resource constraints meant the office was generally underfunded and
understaffed, limiting its ability to effectively monitor human rights
violations or prevent their occurrence.
As of October 31, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office had processed
6,781 complaints of violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law, of which 3,747 involved forced displacements, 1,743
involved threats, 411 involved unlawful killings, and 191 involved
kidnapings.
Illegal armed groups sometimes targeted regional human rights
ombudsmen. Four paramilitaries were on trial for the January 2001
murder of regional human rights ombudsman Ivan Villamizar in Cucuta,
Norte de Santander department (see Section 1.a). The Fiscalia was
investigating the FARC's July 2000 kidnaping and killing of Jose Manuel
Bello, municipal human rights ombudsman in Vigia del Fuerte, in the
Atrato region of western Antioquia department. The office also was
investigating the July 2000 killing of Yemil Fernando Hurtado, human
rights ombudsman in Narino municipality in southeastern Antioquia.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination based on
race, sex, disability, language, or social status; however, in
practice, many of these provisions were not enforced. The killing of
homosexuals as part of so-called social cleansing campaigns,
particularly by paramilitaries, was a problem (see Section 1.a.).
Women.--Rape and other acts of violence against women were
pervasive in society, and like other crimes, seldom were prosecuted
successfully. According to the Ombudsman's 2001 report, intrafamilial
violence, sexual assault, and the killing of women were increasing
problems. The ICBF and the Presidential Adviser's Office for Youth,
Women, and Family Affairs continued to report high levels of spousal
and partner abuse throughout the country. The Institute for Forensic
Medicine reported 28,738 cases of spousal abuse for the year. There
were 6,519 cases of domestic violence against women by other family
members. The Institute reported 10,062 cases of suspected sex crimes,
including rape. The Institute commented that the crimes of domestic
violence and rape were greatly underreported, citing its 1995 survey
that indicated that as few as 5 percent of these crimes were reported,
and that only 2 percent of victims received a medical evaluation. The
ICBF conducted programs and provided refuge and counseling for victims
of spousal abuse; however, the level and amount of these services were
dwarfed by the magnitude of the problem. For example, each of the
ICBF's 527 family ombudsmen handled approximately 1,230 cases per year.
The 1996 Law on Family Violence criminalized violent acts committed
within families, including spousal rape. The law also provides legal
recourse for victims of family violence, immediate protection from
physical or psychological abuse, and judicial authority to remove the
abuser from the household. It allows a judge to oblige an abuser to
seek therapy or reeducation. For acts of spousal sexual violence, the
law mandates sentences of 6 months to 2 years and denies probation or
bail to offenders who disobey restraining orders issued by the courts.
A 1997 law also made additional, substantial modifications to the
Penal Code and introduced sentences of between 4 and 40 years for
crimes against sexual freedom or human dignity, including rape, sex
with a minor, sexual abuse, induction into prostitution, and child
pornography. The June 2000 reforms to the Penal Code reduced the
maximum sentence for violent sexual assault from 20 to 15 years; the
minimum sentence is 8 years. The ICBF's ``Make Peace'' program provided
support to women and children who were victims of domestic violence.
Under the auspices of the same program, the Human Rights Ombudsman's
office conducted regional training workshops in various cities to
promote application of domestic violence statutes.
Women faced an increased threat of sexual assault in the context of
the internal conflict (see Section 1.g.). The UNHCHR, CODHES, and the
Human Rights Ombudsman all noted that internally displaced women and
girls were particularly vulnerable to domestic violence, sexual abuse,
and sexual exploitation (see Section 2.d.). In August 2001, the
Colombian Pro-Family Institute published a study of sexual health and
reproduction in displaced women and adolescents that found that 20
percent of displaced women had been raped and that 30 percent of
displaced teenage girls had children or were pregnant. International
organizations and NGOs noted that sexual violence was largely
unreported and that no long-term assistance was available to female
IDPs. In addition, they criticized the use of female combatants in
guerrilla organizations as sex slaves. Former female guerrillas also
reported forced abortions and forced implantation of intrauterine
devices (see Section 1.g.).
Prostitution, which is legal in designated ``tolerance zones,'' was
widespread and remained a serious problem exacerbated by a poor economy
and internal displacement. Sex tourism existed to a limited extent,
particularly in coastal cities such as Cartagena and Barranquilla. It
was likely that some marriage and dating services were covers for
sexual tourism.
Trafficking in women for sexual exploitation continued to be a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
The law prohibits sexual harassment; however, it was a pervasive
problem.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women, and
specifically requires that authorities ensure ``adequate and effective
participation by women at decision making levels of public
administration.'' However, discrimination against women persisted. A
2000 study by the University of Rosario concluded that women faced
hiring discrimination, were disproportionately affected by
unemployment, and had salaries that were generally incompatible with
their education and experience. Government unemployment statistics
indicated that the unemployment rate for women was 20.5 percent, 6
points higher than the rate for men. According to the U.N., women
earned an average of 28 percent less than men during 2001. Female
workers in rural areas were most affected by wage discrimination and
unemployment.
Despite an explicit constitutional provision promising additional
resources for single mothers and government efforts to provide them
with training in parenting skills, women's groups reported that the
social and economic problems of single mothers remained great.
According to a 1997 Constitutional Court decision, pregnant women and
mothers of newborn children less than 3 months of age may not be fired
from their jobs without ``just cause.'' The court ruled that bearing
children was not just cause. There were no published reports of such
firings during the year.
Children.--Constitutional and legislative commitments to the
protection of children's rights were implemented only to a minimal
degree. The Constitution imposes an obligation on the family, society,
and the state to protect children, foster their development, and ensure
the full exercise of their rights. The Children's Code describes these
rights and establishes services and programs designed to enforce the
protection of minors. Children's advocates reported the need to educate
citizens regarding the code as well as the 1996 and 1997 laws on family
violence, which increased legal protection for women and children. The
ICBF oversees all government child protection and welfare programs and
also funds nongovernmental programs that benefit children. Despite
these legal protections and programs, government commitments to the
protection of children's rights were not fully implemented.
The Constitution provides for free public education, which is
compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15; however, a study by the
National Department of Statistics (DANE) estimated 14 percent of
children ages 5 to 17 did not attend school because of lax enforcement
of truancy laws, inadequate classroom space, and economic pressures for
children to provide additional family income. Although the Government
covered the basic costs of primary education, many families faced
additional expenses such as matriculation fees, books, school supplies,
and transportation costs, which were significant in rural areas where
many children lived far from school. These costs were often
prohibitive, particularly for the rural poor.
The law requires the Government to provide medical care for
children. However, medical facilities were not universally available,
particularly in rural areas.
Child abuse was a serious problem. The National Institute for
Forensic Medicine reported 8,125 cases of child abuse during the year.
According to the Association Against Child Abuse, only 5 percent of
child sex abuse cases were reported. Based on figures from the
Government's Institute for Legal Medicine, which reported 11,000 cases
of child sexual abuse during the year, the Association estimated that
at least 220,000 children were sexually abused during the year.
According to UNICEF, an estimated 35,000 adolescents worked as
prostitutes, in spite of legislation prohibiting sex with minors or the
employment of minors for prostitution.
Children were trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Section
6.f.).
In conflict zones, children often were caught in the crossfire
between public security forces, paramilitaries, and guerrillas. For
example, on June 16, a crossfire between paramilitaries and a mixed
contingent of FARC and ELN fighters killed a 9-year-old boy outside his
home near the rural village of Aguas Lindas, southern Bolivar
department. Landmines and abandoned munitions killed and maimed scores
of children. According to the Presidential Program for Human Rights,
landmines injured at least 20 children during the year. For example, on
June 9, a 15-year-old boy was killed after stepping on a landmine
outside the town of Cajibio, Cauca department. On September 19, three
children in a lower class section of Bogota were killed when the
fragmentation grenade with which they were playing exploded. The
grenade apparently had been discarded by members of a FARC urban
militia that operated in the neighborhood.
Children suffered disproportionately from the internal conflict,
often forfeiting opportunities to study as they were displaced by
conflict and suffered psychological traumas. According to UNICEF, over
1 million children have been displaced from their homes over the past
decade (see Section 2.d.). The Human Rights Ombudsman's office
estimated that only 15 percent of displaced children attended school.
Displaced children were particularly vulnerable to mistreatment, sexual
exploitation, and recruitment by criminals.
Since 1999, persons under the age of 18 are not allowed to serve in
the public security forces. However, both paramilitaries and guerrillas
employed child soldiers. The ICBF estimated that 12,000 to 15,000
children were members of illegal armed groups. Sixty percent of these
children were members of the FARC. The Roman Catholic Church stated
that the FARC used its freedom of action in its former despeje, or safe
haven, to lure or force hundreds of children into its ranks. Thousands
of families from FARC-prevalent zones throughout the country chose to
be displaced rather than risk the forcible recruitment of their
children. For example, many former-displaced residents of Bojaya, Choco
department chose to leave their teenage children in Quibdo, the
departmental capital, to avoid their forced recruitment by the FARC.
The FARC was believed responsible for the January 11 killing in Caldas
department of a Roman Catholic priest who had complained to authorities
in the departmental capital of Manizales about FARC recruitment at a
local high school. On August 2, the Fiscalia filed charges against
senior FARC leaders for the recruitment of minors. As a good will
gesture in anticipation of possible peace negotiations with the
Government (see section 1.g.), in December paramilitaries from the
Central Bolivar Bloc, formerly members of the AUC, handed over 19 child
soldiers to representatives of the ICBF and the Colombian Red Cross.
Although many minors were forcibly recruited, a UNICEF study found
that 83 percent of child soldiers volunteered. Limited educational and
economic opportunities and a desire for acceptance and camaraderie
increased the appeal of service in armed groups. Nevertheless, many
children found membership in guerrilla and paramilitary organizations
difficult, and the MOD reported an increase in the number of minors
deserting illegal armed groups. As of July, at least 230 children had
surrendered to state security forces during the year. FARC child
deserters reported that local guerrilla commanders threatened to kill
their families should they desert or attempt to do so. A reinsertion
program for former child soldiers administered by the ICBF provided
assistance to 332 children during the year.
Children were among the preferred kidnaping targets of guerrillas
(see Section 1.b.). The Free Country Foundation reported 384 kidnapings
of children during the year (see Section 1.b.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The Constitution enumerates the
fundamental social, economic, and cultural rights of persons with
physical disabilities. However, serious practical impediments prevented
the full participation of these persons in society. No legislation
mandates that buildings provide special access for persons with
disabilities. Consequently, the disabled could not access most public
buildings and transportation systems; however, the Constitutional Court
ruled that persons with physical disabilities must have access to
voting stations and receive assistance if they so request. The Court
also ruled that the social security fund for public employees cannot
refuse to provide services for children with disabilities, regardless
of the cost involved.
Indigenous Persons.--There are 82 distinct ethnic groups among the
country's 716,400 indigenous inhabitants, who constitute approximately
2 percent of the population. Indigenous communities are concentrated in
the Colombian Massif of the Andes Mountains, in southern Cauca
department, along the lowlands of the Pacific Coast, on the Guajira
peninsula, and in the Amazon region. According to the National
Organization of Colombia's Indigenous (ONIC), 93 percent of indigenous
persons live in rural areas, and approximately 115,000 indigenous
persons are without land.
The Constitution gives special recognition to the fundamental
rights of indigenous persons. The Ministry of Interior, through the
Office of Indigenous Affairs, is responsible for protecting the
territorial, cultural, and traditional rights of indigenous persons.
Ministry representatives were located in all regions of the country
with indigenous populations and worked with other governmental human
rights organizations and NGOs to promote indigenous interests and
investigate violations of indigenous rights. Despite legal protections,
indigenous persons continued to suffer discrimination and were often
relegated to the margins of society. UNHCHR's March 2001 report noted
that an estimated 80 percent of the indigenous population lived in
conditions of extreme poverty. In addition, indigenous communities
suffered disproportionately from the internal armed conflict (see
Section 1.g.). Members of indigenous communities often fled together in
mass displacements to relocate to other indigenous communities (see
Section 2.d.).
By law, indigenous groups have perpetual rights to their ancestral
lands. According to the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA), 28
percent of the national territory has been legally recognized as
indigenous land, and approximately 80 percent of these lands have been
demarcated. The Institute was involved in a program to buy back lands
declared to belong to indigenous communities. Approximately 200
indigenous communities had no legal title to lands that they claimed.
Armed groups often violently contested indigenous land ownership.
Traditional Indian authority boards operated approximately 545
reservations as municipal entities, with officials selected according
to indigenous traditions. The boards controlled reservation finances
and were subject to fiscal oversight by the national Comptroller
General. Sixty percent of the indigenous population lived on these
designated reservations.
In July Occidental Petroleum turned over oil exploration rights to
areas near the U'wa reservation in Arauca department to national
parastatal corporation Ecopetrol. Although the U'wa tribe had
strenuously opposed exploration near its reservation, the courts
consistently overruled U'wa legal efforts to prevent it. Occidental's
decision was economic, but Ecopetrol stated that it planned to continue
exploration in the area. In December the U'wa stated that they would
not oppose exploration by Ecopetrol.
The Constitution provides for special criminal and civil
jurisdictions within indigenous territories based on traditional
community laws (see Section 1.e.). However, these jurisdictions were
subject to manipulation and often rendered punishments that were much
more lenient than those imposed by regular civilian courts.
The law permits indigenous communities to educate their children in
traditional dialects and in the observance of cultural and religious
customs. Indigenous men are not subject to the national military draft.
Members of indigenous communities continued to be victims of all
sides in the internal conflict. According to the MOD, 73 indigenous
persons were killed during the year as a result of the internal armed
conflict, 29 in massacres. The UNHCHR strongly criticized both
paramilitary and FARC threats against indigenous communities and
characterized government investigations of human rights violations
against indigenous groups as insufficient. ONIC reported widespread
cases in which members of indigenous communities, particularly in
Putumayo, were forbidden to leave their communities without either
paramilitary or guerrilla permission, in which paramilitaries or
guerrillas blockaded communities, or in which indigenous persons
returning from urban areas were accused by guerrillas of being
paramilitary collaborators.
Paramilitaries and guerrillas forced indigenous persons, including
children, into their ranks (see Section 1.f.).
Paramilitaries killed indigenous persons (see Section 1.a.). For
example, in June, the Cauca Regional Indigenous Council condemned the
paramilitary killings of 10 indigenous persons near the towns of
Corinto and Pradera, northern Cauca department, and Florida, southern
Valle del Cauca department. In August paramilitaries ordered the
killing of three indigenous leaders near La Hormiga, Putumayo
department.
Guerrillas also killed indigenous persons. For example, on July 27,
the FARC killed Embera leader Bertulfo Domico in the town of Dabeiba,
western Antioquia department. Domico was apparently killed for leaving
the city without the local FARC commander's permission. On October 4,
FARC guerrillas killed Embera Katio tribe member Adolfo Cundama in
front of his family on a designated indigenous reservation near
Tierralta municipality, Cordoba department. The FARC accused Cundama of
collaborating with paramilitaries.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the National
Planning Department, the country had approximately 10.6 million
citizens of African heritage. The departments with the largest number
of Afro-Colombians were Valle, Antioquia, Bolivar, Atlantico,
Magdalena, and Cordoba. However, the department of Choco had the
highest percentage of Afro-Colombian residents, at 85 percent. Although
estimates vary, government figures indicated that Afro-Colombians
represented approximately 21 percent of total population.
Afro-Colombians are entitled to all constitutional rights and
protections; however, they faced significant societal discrimination.
Afro-Colombian organizations reported that Afro-Colombians had almost
no representation in the executive branch, judicial branch, civil
service positions, or in military hierarchies (see Section 3). The
March 2001 report of the UNHCHR noted that an estimated 80 percent of
Afro-Colombians lived in conditions of extreme poverty, that 74 percent
received wages below the legal minimum, and that their municipalities
had the highest rates of poverty. Choco had the lowest per capita level
of social investment and ranked last in terms of education, health, and
infrastructure. Although a special law designed to benefit Afro-
Colombians was passed in 1993, little concrete progress had been made
on the law's commitments to expand public services and private
investment in Choco and other predominantly Afro-Colombian regions
along the country's coastline.
Choco was also the scene of some of the country's worst political
violence, as paramilitaries and guerrillas struggled for control of the
department's key drug and weapons smuggling corridors. All 119
civilians killed in a FARC cylinder bomb attack on the town of Bojaya,
in Choco, were Afro-Colombians (see Section 1.g.).
A 1993 law authorizes Afro-Colombian communities to receive
collective titles to some Pacific coastal regions. Afro-Colombian
leaders complained that the Government was slow to issue land titles,
and that access to such lands was often inhibited by the presence of
paramilitaries or guerrillas. Afro-Colombians were disproportionately
represented among the nation's IDPs.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to organize unions, except for members of the armed forces,
police, and persons executing ``essential public services'' as defined
by law. In practice, violence against union members and antiunion
discrimination were obstacles to joining unions and engaging in trade
union activities. Labor leaders around the country continued to be
targets of attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics
traffickers. Union leaders contended that perpetrators of violence
against workers operated with virtual impunity.
The heavily amended 1948 Labor Code provides for automatic
recognition of unions that obtain 25 signatures from potential members
and comply with a simple registration process. However, the ILO has
received reports that this process is slow and sometimes takes years.
The law penalizes interference with freedom of association and allows
unions to determine freely their internal rules, elect officials, and
manage activities. The law also forbids the dissolution of trade unions
by administrative fiat. Law 584 limits government interference in a
union's right to free association. However, the law includes a
provision authorizing Ministry of Labor officials to compel trade
unions to provide interested third parties with relevant information on
their work, including books, registers, plans, and other documents. The
ILO Committee of Experts considers this amendment to be inconsistent
with freedom of association, since it believes an administrative
authority only should conduct investigations when there are reasonable
grounds to believe that an offense has been committed.
Labor leaders nationwide continued to be attacked by
paramilitaries, guerrillas, and narcotics traffickers. According to the
National Labor College (ENS), a Medellin-based NGO that collects,
studies, and consolidates information on organized labor, 178 labor
activists were killed during the year and 1,875 since 1991. The ENS
attributed a majority of these crimes to paramilitaries. Paramilitaries
were particularly aggressive in targeting members of the United Workers
Central (CUT), the country's largest and most left-leaning labor
federation. For example, authorities suspected paramilitaries of
killing Hernan de Jesus Ortiz and Jose Pineda in the municipality of
Aranzazu, Caldas department on April 12. Ortiz, a local teacher's union
(FECODE) leader, was also a member of the CUT's national board and an
active participant in its human rights office, which regularly
condemned paramilitary abuses. Pineda was a member of the CUT-
affiliated Colombian Electricity Workers Union (SINTRAELECOL).
Paramilitaries also continued their attacks on members of the Oil
Workers Trade Union (USO), which they accused of ties to the ELN. For
example, paramilitaries were suspected of the June 17 killing of USO
national board member Cesar Blanco in Bucaramanga. In June AI testified
to the ILO that paramilitaries also targeted public sector unions,
particularly health workers.
The Fiscalia continued investigating crimes perpetrated against
union leaders in previous years for which paramilitaries were believed
responsible. For example, investigations continued into the killings of
labor activists Valmore Locarno, Victor Hugo Orcasita, Gustavo Soler,
Ricardo Orozco, and Oscar Dario Soto. On the whole, government
identification of perpetrators of crimes against trade union members
was slow, a situation which the ILO Special Representative's June
report noted was aggravated by the difficulties faced by the
Procuraduria and the Fiscalia in carrying out their inquiries and
offering adequate assurances of protection so that witnesses would be
willing to come forward. Of the 116 killings of labor union members
documented as of September, there were no arrests, prosecutions, or
convictions at year's end. The Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia
reported that from August 1986 to April, there were 376 criminal
investigations into violations of the right to life of unionists. Of
these, 321 were in the preliminary stage, 24 were at the investigative
stage, 3 were at the trial state, 7 had been sent to military criminal
courts, and 13 were awaiting assignment. Guilty verdicts were issued in
only five cases.
Progress was made in several high profile investigations. For
example, on December 17, a specialized criminal court in Bogota
sentenced former army Captain Jorge Rojas and former army Sergeant
Evangelista Basto to 18 years in prison for the attempted killing of
public employee union (FENALTRASE) president Wilson Borja in December
2000. Rojas and Basto had been in active service when the crime
occurred, but were dismissed from the military during the course of the
criminal investigation. The court also convicted army Corporal Jhon
Fredy Pena of conspiracy and sentenced him to 42 months in prison. On
November 19, the Fiscalia reconfirmed its August 16 decision to
permanently close its investigation into the alleged involvement in the
crime of Police Lieutenant Carlos Fredy Gomez. A separate trial
continued of army Major Cesar Alonso Maldonado and civilian Regulo
Rueda for their alleged involvement in the plot to murder Borja. On
July 31, the DAS arrested AUC leader Sergio Manuel Cordoba, a suspect
in the 2001 killing of USO leader Aury Sara. On September 21, the army
arrested AUC leader Didimo Rodriguez, wanted for the October 2001
killing of labor leader Luis Manuel Anaya. On October 19, prosecutors
indicted Edgar Armando Daza for alleged involvement in the 1998 murder
of CUT Vice President Jorge Luis Ortega. On May 4, a Bogota judge
sentenced Rafael Cespedes to 27 years in prison for Ortega's murder.
Prosecutors also indicted a paramilitary suspect for the 2001 murder of
labor leader Jose Luis Guete.
In its evaluation of antiunion violence, the ENS also noted a
significant increase in crimes against union activists committed by
guerrillas. For example, on April 26, the FARC massacred nine members
of the Agricultural Workers Union (SINTRIANAGRO) near Apartado, in the
Uraba region of Antioquia department. Uraba was hotly contested between
guerrillas and paramilitaries. The ENS attributed the deaths of at
least 19 union activists to the FARC.
In addition to the many union activists who were killed, the ENS
also reported that 17 union members survived attempts on their lives,
189 were threatened with death, 26 were kidnaped, and 8 disappeared.
The most prominent release of a kidnaped union leader occurred on
April 7, when the AUC freed USO leader Gilberto Torres after 40 days in
captivity.
In an attempt to ameliorate the security risks confronting union
leaders, the Government significantly increased the resources it
devoted to the Program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and
Trade Union Leaders. Between 2000 and the year the Program's budget
increased nearly 700 percent, to nearly $11.5 million (28.5 billion
pesos). However, the UNHCHR has expressed concern over delays in
transferring and making available funds allocated to the program,
affecting the timely and effective implementation of security measures.
As of August, the program had assisted 1,195 union leaders and
activists, who, depending on a threat evaluation, received bulletproof
vests, bodyguards, and, in some cases, vehicles. Trade unionists and
human rights groups criticized the protection program because these
increased measures were insufficient to protect adequately the large
number of trade unionists who were threatened. For example, in March
2001 Valmore Locarno and Victor Orcasita, employees of Drummond Coal
Company and local president and vice-president of mine workers union
SINTRAMIENERGETICA, were killed by presumed paramilitaries after having
been assessed as ``medium to low'' risk. Six months later the new
president of the same union, Gustavo Soler, also was killed.
At the November ILO Governing Body meeting, the ILO's Committee on
Freedom of Association reported that measures adopted by the Government
had been insufficient to reduce the violence directed against trade
union officials. The Government had not reported any convictions of
individuals for the killing of trade unionists. The ILO Governing Body
decided by consensus to postpone to its March 2003 meeting any
consideration of appointing a ``Fact-Finding and Conciliation
Commission.'' The workers proposed a Commission of Inquiry in 1998, and
that proposal was pending.
The law forbids antiunion discrimination and the obstruction of
free association. However, according to union leaders, both
discrimination and obstruction of free association occurred frequently.
There were only 271 government labor inspectors to cover 1,098
municipalities and more than 300,000 companies. The inspection
apparatus was therefore weak. Furthermore, labor inspectors often
lacked basic equipment, including vehicles. Guerrillas sometimes
deterred labor inspectors from performing their duties by declaring
them military targets. In some cases, paramilitaries threatened and
killed union members who failed to renounce collective bargaining
agreements.
The Labor Code calls for fines to be levied for restricting freedom
of association.
Unions are free to join international confederations without
government restrictions and did so in practice.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution protects the rights of workers to organize and engage in
collective bargaining. Workers in large firms and public services have
been most successful in organizing, but these employees represented
only a small percentage of the workforce. High unemployment, a large
informal economic sector, traditional antiunion attitudes, and weak
union organization and leadership limited workers' bargaining power in
all sectors. A requirement that trade unions must represent a majority
of workers in each company as a condition for representing them in
sectoral agreements also weakened workers' bargaining power.
According to the ENS, there were 2,482 registered unions, with a
total of 860,281 members. The number of unions and union members
continued to decline during the year, as it had in previous years.
Approximately 5 percent of the labor force was unionized. The CUT
encouraged unions to merge along industry lines to increase their
efficiency and bargaining power.
The number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements
has been gradually declining. According to the ENS, 223,670 workers
were employed under collective bargaining agreements during the period
2000-2001, compared with 409,918 during the period 1994-95.
Collective pacts between individual workers and their employers are
not subject to collective bargaining and typically were used by
employers to obstruct labor organization. Although employers must
register collective pacts with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry does
not exercise any oversight or control over them.
The Labor Code eliminated mandatory mediation in private labor-
management disputes and extended the grace period before the Government
can intervene in a conflict. Federations may assist affiliate unions in
collective bargaining.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
members of the Armed Forces, Police, and persons executing essential
public services as defined by law.
Before staging a legal strike, unions must first negotiate directly
with management and, if no agreement results, accept mediation. The
Labor Code prohibits the use of strikebreakers. Legislation that
prohibits public employees from striking is still in effect, although
it often is overlooked. By law public employees must accept binding
arbitration if mediation fails; however, in practice public service
unions decide by membership vote whether or not to seek arbitration.
The ILO had a number of long-standing criticisms of the Labor Code:
the requirement that government officials be present at assemblies
convened to vote on a strike call; the legality of firing union
organizers from jobs in their trades once 6 months have passed
following a strike or dispute; the requirement that candidates for
trade union offices must belong to the occupation that their union
represents; the prohibition of strikes in a wide range of public
services that are not necessarily essential; various restrictions on
the right to strike; the power of the Ministry of Labor and the
President to intervene in disputes through compulsory arbitration when
a strike is declared illegal; and the power to dismiss trade union
officers involved in an unlawful strike.
On September 16, the three main labor federations called a national
work stoppage to protest the Government's proposed labor and pension
reforms. In March USO conducted a strike to protest the killing of one
USO member and the kidnaping of Gilberto Torres. In May and June, 7,000
employees at Telecom, the leading telecommunications company, went on
strike over wage levels and work rules.
Labor law applies in the country's 15 free trade zones (FTZs), and
its standards are enforced.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution forbids
slavery and any form of forced or bonded labor, and there were no
reports of such practices in the formal sector.
Paramilitaries and guerrillas practiced forced conscription (see
Section 5). There were some reports that guerrillas used forced labor.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children; however, the
Government does not have the resources to enforce this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.d.). Although there were no known instances
of forced child labor in the formal economy, several thousand children
were forced to serve as paramilitary or guerrilla combatants (see
Sections 1.f. and 5), to work as prostitutes (see Section 5), or as
coca pickers.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 14 in most jobs, and the Labor Code prohibits the
granting of work permits to children under 18; however, child labor
remained a significant problem, particularly in the informal sector.
According to the National Department of Statistics (DANE), nearly 15
percent of children were employed, over half of whom received no
remuneration. DANE reported that only 1 percent of child workers
received the minimum wage.
A 1989 decree established the Minors Code and prohibited the
employment of children under age 12. It also required exceptional
conditions and the express authorization of the Labor Ministry to
employ children between the ages of 12 and 17. Children under age 14
are prohibited from working, with the exception that those ages 12 and
13 may perform light work with the permission of their parents and
appropriate labor authorities. Children ages 12 and 13 may work a
maximum of 4 hours a day, children ages 14 and 15 may work a maximum of
6 hours a day, and children ages 16 and 17 may work a maximum of 8
hours a day. All child workers are prohibited from working at night, or
performing work where there is a risk of bodily harm or exposure to
excessive heat, cold, or noise. Children are prohibited from working in
a number of specific occupations, including mining and construction;
however, these requirements largely were ignored in practice, and only
5 percent of working children possessed the required work permits. By
allowing children ages 12 and 13 to work, even under restricted
conditions, the law contravenes international standards on child labor,
which set the minimum legal age for employment in developing countries
at 14 years. In addition, the legal minimum employment age of 14 was
inconsistent with completing a basic education.
In the formal sector, the Ministry of Labor enforced child labor
laws through periodic inspections. However, in the informal labor
sector and rural areas, child labor continued to be a problem,
particularly in agriculture and mining. Children as young as 11 worked
full time in almost every aspect of the cut flower industry. Even
children enrolled in school or, in some cases, those too young for
school, accompanied their parents to work at flower plantations at
night and on weekends. In 2001 the ILO reported that children were
employed in gold and emerald mining. However, in the mining sector,
coal mining presented the most difficult child labor problem. Many
marginal, usually family-run, mining operations employed young children
as a way to boost production and income. It is estimated that between
1,200 and 2,000 children were involved. The work was dangerous and the
hours were long. Younger children carried water and packaged coal,
while those ages 14 and up engaged in more physically demanding labor
such as carrying bags of coal. These informal mining operations were
illegal. The Ministry of Labor reported that by the end of 1999 an
interagency governmental committee had removed approximately 80 percent
of child laborers from the informal mines and returned them to school.
A Catholic Church study conducted in 1999 reported that
approximately 2.7 million children worked, including approximately
700,000 children who worked as coca pickers. Observers noted that the
economic downturn might increase the number of children working,
particularly in rural areas. Child participation in agricultural work
soared at harvest time. All child workers must receive the national
minimum wage for the hours that they work. However, according to the
Ministry of Labor, working children between the ages of 7 and 15 earned
between 13 and 47 percent of the minimum wage. An estimated 26 percent
of working children had regular access to health care; the health
services of the social security system cover only 10 percent of child
laborers. Approximately 25 percent were employed in potentially
dangerous activities. School attendance by working children was
significantly lower than for nonworking children, particularly in rural
areas.
The Labor Ministry had an inspector in each of the country's 32
departments and the national capital district, responsible for
certifying and conducting repeat inspections of workplaces that
employed children; however, the system lacked resources and covered
only 20 percent of the child labor force employed in the formal sector
of the economy. The Labor Ministry was designing an oversight and
inspection model to be implemented in early 2003. Under its Action Plan
to Eradicate Child Labor, the Government allocated $2 million (5.9
billion pesos) to the National Committee for the Eradication of Child
Labor, which includes representatives from the Ministries of Labor,
Health, Education, and Communications, as well as officials from
various other government offices, unions, employer associations, and
NGOs.
The Minors Code provides for fines ranging from 1 to 40 minimum
monthly salaries for violations. If a violation is deemed to have
endangered a child's life or threatened a child's moral values,
sanctions can also include the temporary or permanent closure of the
establishment in question.
The National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor has
conducted training on legislation and enforcement for approximately 600
public officials in the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, Cauca,
Cordoba, Cundinamarca, Santander, and Valle del Cauca. The Committee
also created an information system on child labor to measure and
understand the problem better. The Government, the main labor
federations, and media representatives published articles, broadcasted
documentaries, and launched various programs to delegitimize child
labor.
The Ministry of Education expanded the school day in 134
municipalities to prevent children from dropping out and entering the
labor force. In 2001 UNICEF launched a program to withdraw children
from the labor force and return them to school. Over 200 children in
Santander de Quilichao, Cauca department, 140 children in Medellin,
capital of Antioquia department, and 350 children in Armenia, capital
of Quindio department, benefited from this program.
The legal definitions of ``worst forms of child labor'' and
``hazardous work'' are consistent with ILO convention 182 and do not
exempt specific sectors.
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the
Government was unable to enforce this prohibition effectively.
Paramilitaries and guerrillas abducted children for use as combatants
(see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a uniform
minimum wage for workers every January to serve as a benchmark for wage
bargaining. The monthly minimum wage, set by tripartite negotiations
among representatives of business, organized labor, and the Government,
was about $114 (309,000 pesos). The national minimum wage did not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Because the minimum wage is based on the Government's target
inflation rate, the minimum wage has not kept up with real inflation in
the past several years. An estimated 70 percent of all workers earned
wages that were insufficient to cover the costs of the Government's
estimated low-income family shopping basket. An estimated 76 percent of
all workers earned no more than twice the minimum wage.
On December 20, Congress approved President Uribe's proposed labor
reform bill. The bill lengthened the regular working day by 4 hours and
reduced the amount of overtime pay. It also gave employers more
flexibility in devising work schedules. The ``indemnity'' paid to
workers who are unjustly fired will be reduced. However, for the first
time unemployed workers can receive an unemployment benefit for 6
months. Under the new system, apprentices no longer will be considered
employees, but they will be able to contribute to the social security
fund. The bill also establishes several subsidies for employers who
create new jobs.
Legislation provides comprehensive protection for workers'
occupational safety and health; however, these standards were poorly
enforced, in part because of the small number of Labor Ministry
inspectors. In general a lack of public safety awareness, inadequate
attention by unions, and lax enforcement by the Labor Ministry resulted
in a high level of industrial accidents and unhealthy working
conditions. Over 80 percent of industrial companies lacked safety
plans. The Social Security Institute reported over 56,000 work-related
accidents during the year, resulting in 356 deaths. The industries most
prone to worker accidents were mining, construction, and
transportation. According to insurance company association FASECOLDA,
approximately 12 million persons--many of them children--had no
insurance against work-related injuries.
According to the Labor Code, workers have the right to withdraw
from a hazardous work situation without jeopardizing continued
employment. However, unorganized workers, particularly those in the
agricultural sector, feared losing their jobs if they exercised their
right to criticize abuses.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Criminal Code defines trafficking
in persons as a crime; however, trafficking in persons, primarily women
and girls, remained a problem.
Law 747, passed in a special session of Congress in June, broadened
the definition of trafficking in persons and provided for prison
sentences of between 10 and 15 years and fines of up to 1,000 times the
monthly minimum wage. These penalties, which are even more severe than
those for rape (see Section 5), can be increased by up to one-third if
there are aggravating circumstances, such as trafficking of children
under the age of 14. Additional charges of illegal detention, violation
of the right to work in dignified conditions, and violation of personal
freedom also may be brought against traffickers. Police actively
investigated trafficking offenses and some traffickers were prosecuted.
However, inadequate resources for witness protection hindered
prosecutions.
A government advisory committee composed of representatives of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpol, the DAS, the Ministry of
Justice, the Procuraduria, the Fiscalia, and the Presidency met every 2
months to discuss trafficking in persons. The committee prepared
information campaigns, promoted information exchange between government
entities, created trafficking hot lines for victims, and encouraged
closer cooperation between the Government and Interpol.
The Government cooperated with foreign counterparts on
investigations and successfully freed victims in solo and joint
operations. To protect citizens who were trafficked to other countries,
government foreign missions provided legal aid and social welfare
assistance.
Colombia was a source country for trafficking in women and girls to
Europe, the United States, Asia, and other Latin American countries.
The DAS reported in 2000 that the country was one of the three most
common countries of origin of trafficking victims in the Western
Hemisphere; in 2000 an estimated 35,000 to 50,000 Colombian trafficking
victims were overseas. The majority of women trafficked for
prostitution reportedly went to the Netherlands, Spain, Japan, and Hong
Kong. A study carried out in Spain in 1999 by the Roman Catholic
religious order the ``Adoratrices'' found that Colombian women
constituted nearly half of all trafficking victims in that country.
According to press reports, more than 50 percent of women from Colombia
who entered Japan were trafficking victims forced to work as
prostitutes. Law enforcement authorities reported that most trafficking
victims were from the departments of Valle de Cauca, Antioquia,
Santander, Cundinamarca, and the coffee-growing regions of Risaralda,
Caldas, Quindio, and Tolima.
Police reported that most traffickers were linked to narcotics or
other criminal organizations. Traffickers disguised their intent by
running media ads offering jobs, portraying themselves as modeling
agents, offering marriage brokerage services, or operating lottery or
bingo scams with free trips as prizes. Recruiters reportedly loitered
outside high schools, shopping malls, and parks to lure adolescents
into accepting phantom jobs abroad.
The country's overall situation of economic downturn, high
unemployment, internal conflict between three major illegal armed
groups, and social exclusion contributed to the availability of
victims. While young women were the primary targets of traffickers,
children and men also were affected. According to officials at the
Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), a high rate of unwanted
pregnancy in unwed teenage girls contributed to trafficking in
children.
Additional efforts addressed the problem of trafficking within the
country's own borders. The Association Against Child Abuse estimated
that 220,000 children were victims of sexual exploitation. The ICBF
estimated that in Bogota alone there were over 10,000 girls and nearly
1,000 boys exploited as child prostitutes. During the year, the ICBF
provided assistance, either directly or through other specialized
agencies, to over 14,000 sexually exploited children.
The Hope Foundation, which assisted 26 trafficking victims through
October, provided educational information, social support, and
counseling to victims of trafficking who returned to the country.
Services provided by the Hope Foundation in coordination with
government social service agencies included psychological counseling,
social assistance, placement, and follow-up care.
__________
COSTA RICA
Costa Rica is a longstanding, stable, constitutional democracy with
a unicameral Legislative Assembly directly elected in free multiparty
elections every 4 years. The presidential term of Miguel Angel
Rodriguez of the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), who was elected
in February 1998, ended on May 8 with the inauguration of Abel Pacheco
de la Espriella, also of the PUSC. Pacheco was elected president during
a second-round vote in April that was necessitated by the failure of
any one candidate to obtain the constitutionally required 40 percent of
the popular vote during the first-round election in February. The
judiciary was generally independent.
The 1949 Constitution abolished the military forces. The Ministry
of Public Security--which included specialized units such as the
antidrug police--and the Ministry of the Presidency shared
responsibility for law enforcement and national security. Several
police units were combined within the Ministry of Public Security into
a single ``public force'' that included the Border Guard, the Rural
Guard, and the Civil Guard. Public security forces generally observed
procedural safeguards established by law and the Constitution; however,
there were a few reports of police abuse of authority.
The market economy was based primarily on light industry, tourism,
and agriculture; the country's population was approximately 3.85
million. The Constitution protects the right to private property;
however, domestic and foreign property owners encountered considerable
difficulty obtaining adequate, timely compensation for lands
expropriated for national parks and other purposes. The law grants
substantial rights to squatters who invade uncultivated land,
regardless of who may hold title to the property. Real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth was estimated at 0.9 percent in 2001, compared
with 1.7 percent in 2000. In October the official unemployment rate was
6.8 percent, the highest in 17 years. An estimated 21 percent of the
population lived in poverty.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provided effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in a
few areas. There were some instances of physical abuse by police and
prison guards, and the judicial system processed some criminal cases
very slowly, resulting in lengthy pretrial detention for some persons
charged with crimes. Domestic violence was a serious problem, and
traditional patterns of unequal opportunity for women remained, despite
continuing government and media efforts to advocate change. Abuse of
children also remained a problem, and child prostitution was a serious
problem. Child labor persisted. Costa Rica was invited by the Community
of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second
CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel or degrading treatment
and holds invalid any statement obtained through violence, and the
authorities generally abided by these prohibitions; however, members of
the public forces were responsible for some physical abuse. An
effective mechanism for lodging and recording complaints of police
misconduct existed. The Ombudsman's office served as a recourse to
citizens who had complaints about violations of their civil and human
rights and about deficiencies in public and private infrastructure. It
investigated complaints and, when appropriate, initiated suits against
officials.
The Ombudsman's office received 44 reports of police abuse of
authority or misconduct. At year's end, 24 reports were still being
investigated, 12 were determined to be legitimate, and 8 were
determined to be without merit. This compared with 21 legitimate
complaints received in 2001 and 52 in 2000.
A large percentage of Public Security Force police owed their
appointments to political patronage. The Rodriguez and Pacheco
administrations continued implementation of the 1994 Police Code and
the 2001 Law for Strengthening the Civilian Police in an effort to
depoliticize and professionalize the police force. That law amended the
Police Code to replace military ranks with civilian titles, required
the police academy to develop a course and diploma in police
administration that includes material on the fundamental and universal
principles of human rights, and attempted to ensure that police
officials were not dismissed due to a change in administrations. The
Government's long-term plan was to establish permanent, professional
cadres, eventually resulting in a nonpolitically appointed career
force.
Prison conditions were considered generally fair, and they
generally met international standards. Prisoners were usually separated
by sex and by level of security (minimum, medium, and maximum);
however, overcrowding sometimes prevented proper separation. Most but
not all pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted
prisoners. During the year, the Ombudsman's office received eight
complaints of physical abuse of prisoners by guards, of which four were
still being investigated, two were determined to be legitimate, and two
were determined to be without merit. The office also received 62 other
complaints from prisoners alleging inadequate medical care, arbitrary
administrative procedures, violation of due process of disciplinary
procedures, unfair denial of prison transfer requests, and poor living
conditions. Of these 62 complaints, 28 were still being investigated at
year's end, 12 were determined to be legitimate, and 22 were determined
to be without merit. The Ombudsman's office investigated all complaints
and referred serious cases of abuse to the public prosecutor. Illegal
narcotics were readily available in the prisons, and drug use was
common.
Penitentiary overcrowding remained a problem. In December the
Social Adaptation Division of the Ministry of Justice reported a total
of 12,635 persons under its supervision, including 6,637 jailed
prisoners, 1,044 persons required to spend nights and weekends in jail,
and 4,452 persons in supervised work programs requiring no jail time.
The overall prison overpopulation rate was 8 percent; however, crowding
was more severe in several small jails. The San Sebastian facility in
central San Jose, where many pretrial detainees were held, reported an
overpopulation rate of 36 percent. After viewing conditions there in
December, a judge ordered that no new prisoners be sent there until the
overcrowding was relieved. His order was later applied to prisons in
Liberia, Puntarenas, and San Ramon.
Problems during the year at La Reforma prison complex, the
country's largest, drew attention to conditions in that prison. As of
September, 3 homicides, 2 escapes, and a hunger strike involving 120
prisoners protesting poor conditions had taken place. The Ombudsman
attributed the problems to overcrowding, crumbling infrastructure, lack
of adequately trained prison personnel, lack of prisoner employment
programs, and insufficient medical care. Local judicial officials also
cited the practice of grouping hardened criminals together with first-
time offenders because of a shortage of maximum-security units and an
under-functioning drug-rehabilitation program.
Female prisoners were held separately in conditions that generally
were considered fair, although overcrowding existed in the women's
prison as well. Juveniles were held in separate detention facilities in
campus-like conditions that generally were considered good. The
juvenile penal system held 44 youths in detention and another 358 in
supervised alternative sanction programs.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and law
prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
respected these prohibitions in practice.
The law requires issuance of judicial warrants before making
arrests. The Constitution entitles a detainee to a judicial
determination of the legality of the detention during arraignment
before a court officer within 24 hours of arrest. The authorities
generally respected these rights.
The law provides for the right to bail, and the authorities
observed it in practice. The authorities generally did not hold
detainees incommunicado. With judicial authorization, the authorities
could hold suspects incommunicado for 48 hours after arrest or, under
special circumstances, for up to 10 days. A criminal court could hold
suspects in pretrial detention for periods of up to 1 year, and the
court of appeals could extend this period to 2 years in especially
complex cases. The law requires that suspects in pretrial detention
have their cases reviewed every 3 months by the court to determine the
appropriateness of continued detention. According to the Ministry of
Justice, in June there were 1,956 persons in pretrial detention,
representing 23 percent of the prison population.
The Constitution bars exile as punishment, and it was not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide
for an independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected
this provision in practice. The Constitution provides for the right to
a fair trial, and an independent judiciary enforced this right.
The Supreme Court supervised the work of the lower courts, known as
tribunals. The Legislative Assembly elected the 22 Supreme Court
magistrates to 8-year terms, subject to automatic renewal unless the
Assembly decided otherwise by a two-thirds majority. Accused persons
could select attorneys to represent them, and the law provides for
access to counsel at state expense for the indigent.
Persons accused of serious offenses and held without bail sometimes
remained in pretrial custody for long periods (see Section 1.d.).
Lengthy legal procedures, numerous appeals, and large numbers of
detainees caused delays and case backlogs.
There were no new reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government
authorities generally respected these prohibitions, and violations were
subject to effective legal sanction. The law requires judicial warrants
to search private homes. Judges could approve the use of wiretaps in
investigations of genocide, homicide, procurement of minors, production
of pornography, smuggling of minors, corruption of minors, trafficking
in the organs of minors, and international crimes (which include
terrorism and trafficking in slaves, women, children, or narcotics).
Legal guidelines on the use of wiretaps, however, were so restrictive
that the use of wiretaps was rare.
The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade
uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property.
Irregular enforcement of property rights and duplicate registrations of
title damaged the real property interests of many who believed they
held legitimate title to land. Landowners throughout the country have
suffered frequent squatter invasions for years. According to the
Ministry of Public Security, there were no large-scale removals of
squatters during the year, and no violence occurred during 14 small-
scale evictions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. An independent press, a generally
effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system
together ensured freedom of speech and of the press.
There were 6 major privately owned newspapers, several periodicals,
1 government and 4 privately owned television stations, and 1
government and over 90 privately owned radio stations, all of which
pursued independent editorial policies.
In an April survey by La Nacion newspaper of 81 journalists on
their perception of freedom of the press, 56 percent of the journalists
claimed that they had received some type of threat during the previous
12 months relating to the performance of their job. Of the threats
received, 37 percent were threats of judicial prosecution, 19 percent
were threats of economic reprisals against the employer, 19 percent
were threats against the job security of the reporter, and 10 percent
were threats of physical harm. Of the surveyed journalists, 85 percent
indicated that they felt constrained in their practice by existing
legislation, while 76 percent were unsatisfied with the slow progress
the Assembly had made in reforming existing laws.
A 1996 ``right of response'' law provides persons criticized in the
media with an opportunity to reply with equal attention and at equal
length. Print and electronic media continued to criticize public
figures; however, media managers found it difficult to comply with
provisions of this law. The Penal Code outlines a series of ``insult
laws'' that establish criminal penalties of up to 3 years in prison for
those convicted of ``insulting the honor or decorum of a public
official.'' The law also identifies defamation, libel, slander, and
calumny as offenses against a person's honor that can carry criminal
penalties. The Inter-American Press Association and the World Press
Freedom Committee asserted that such laws had the effect of restricting
reporting by the media, and that they wrongly provided public officials
with a shield from public scrutiny by citizens and the press.
The unsolved July 2001 murder of popular radio host Parmenio Medina
led to considerable public debate on press freedoms and renewed
attention to legislative proposals aimed at easing media restrictions.
The Legislative Assembly created a committee to study the different
proposals, but at year's end, debate continued, and the bill had not
been approved. On December 23, the police arrested a suspect in the
Medina murder, but no charges had been brought by year's end.
The Office of Control of Public Performances rated films and had
the authority to restrict or prohibit their showing; it had similar
powers over television programs and stage plays. Nonetheless, a wide
range of foreign films was available to the public. A tribunal reviewed
appeals of the office's actions.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them
in practice.
In April hundreds of rice farmers convened in the port of Caldera
to protest the unloading of imported rice and blocked the road for 2
days. Police forces dispersed the crowd with tear gas after rocks were
thrown at a police vehicle, injuring 34 persons, mostly from exposure
to teargas. The police briefly detained 15 persons for a few hours
following the disturbance, but all were released without being charged.
In July protesters opposed to the introduction of a new automobile
inspection requirement blocked several major highways in 2 days of
protests. Taxi drivers, automobile mechanics, and union leaders alleged
that the new requirement was too rigid, too expensive, and would force
too many cars off the road. The protesters blocked roadways by burning
tires and trees and set fire to one roadside restaurant and several
vehicles. Police again used tear gas to clear the demonstrations. The
police detained 175 participants and brought charges against 63 of
them. Most were charged with hindering public services, instigating
disorder, and aggravated resistance to police orders. Trial dates had
not yet been set by year's end.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state
religion; however, it also prohibits the State from impeding the free
exercise of other religions ``that do not impugn universal morality or
proper behavior.'' Members of all faiths freely practiced their
religion without government interference. The law grants all churches
tax-free status but allows the Government to provide land only to the
Catholic Church. Religious education teachers in public schools must be
certified by the Roman Catholic Church Conference, which does not
certify teachers from other denominations or faiths. Denominational and
nondenominational private schools were free to offer any religious
instruction they saw fit. Foreign missionaries and clergy of all faiths
worked and proselytized freely.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respected them in practice. There were no
restrictions on travel within the country, emigration, or the right of
return.
There was a long tradition of providing refuge to persons from
other countries. The law provides for granting asylum or refugee status
in accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government
admitted 4,634 persons as refugees under terms of the convention as of
December. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
reported the total refugee population to be 11,987 as of September 30.
The Government cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government made a distinction
between political asylum and refugee status. The issue of the provision
of first asylum did not arise. The UNHCR reported that the Government
had received 3,517 requests for asylum as of October 31. The
Constitution specifically prohibits repatriation of anyone subject to
potential persecution, and there were no reports of the forced return
of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
The authorities regularly repatriated undocumented Nicaraguans,
most of whom entered the country primarily for economic reasons.
However, following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the Government announced a
program of general amnesty for all Nicaraguans, Hondurans, and
Salvadorans who were in the country prior to November 9, 1998. By the
end of 2001, 213,037 Nicaraguans had qualified for and received legal
resident status, most of them under this government amnesty program.
According to the General Directorate of Migration, as of December, the
Government had deported 3,992 and denied entry to 31,345 Nicaraguans.
The UNHCR reported that 7,225 Colombian refugees were resident as
of September 30. The majority entered in legal visitor status and
applied for residence. According to the UNHCR, 3,386 Colombians
requested refugee status as of October 31, compared with 5,018 during
2001. These figures did not include other kinds of recognition, namely
for family reunification. Those who sought temporary refugee status
were expected to return to their country of origin once the period of
conflict ended there.
Allegations of abuse by the Border Guard periodically arose.
Although instances of physical abuse appeared to have declined, there
continued to be credible reports of extortion of migrants by border
officials.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage
and by secret ballot every 4 years. The independent Supreme Electoral
Tribunal ensured the integrity of elections, and the authorities and
citizens respected election results. The Constitution bars the
President from seeking reelection, and Assembly members may seek
reelection only after at least one term out of office.
In the February elections, the failure of any one presidential
candidate to win 40 percent of the popular vote necessitated a runoff
election in April, which was won by Abel Pacheco of the Social
Christian Union Party. PUSC candidates won 19 of the Legislative
Assembly's 57 seats. The National Liberation Party won 17 seats; the
newly formed Citizen's Action Party won 14 seats; the Libertarian
Movement Party won 6 seats; and the Costa Rican Renovation party won 1
seat.
Women encountered no legal impediments to their participation in
politics and were represented increasingly in leadership positions in
the Government and political parties. To increase women's
representation in government, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal required
that a minimum of 40 percent of candidates for elective office be
female and that women's names be placed accordingly on the ballots by
party slate. The First Vice President (who is also a cabinet member),
the Minister of Education, the Minister of Children's Welfare, the
Minister of Economy and Industry, the Minister of Health, the Minister
of the Presidency, and the Minister of Women's Affairs were women.
There were 20 women among the Legislative Assembly's 57 deputies, and
women held several prominent offices in the 3 largest political
parties. The Foundation of Women Parliamentarians of Costa Rica
promoted women's involvement in politics through informational meetings
and public awareness campaigns and also worked for a number of social
objectives, including the decentralization of government.
Indigenous people may participate freely in politics and
government; however, in practice, they have not played significant
roles in these areas, except on issues directly affecting their
welfare, largely because of their relatively small numbers and physical
isolation. They accounted for about 1 percent of the population, and
their approximately 20,000 votes constituted an important swing vote in
national elections. No member of the Legislative Assembly identified
himself as indigenous.
There were three Afro-Caribbean members in the Assembly; one
represented San Jose province and two represented the Caribbean
province of Limon. The country's 100,000 Afro-Caribbeans, who mostly
resided in Limon province, enjoyed full rights of citizenship,
including the protection of laws against racial discrimination.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Various human rights groups operated without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials were cooperative and responsive to
their views. The Costa Rican Commission for Human Rights and the
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America monitored
and reported on human rights, as did the Ombudsman's office.
The Legislative Assembly elects the Ombudsman for a 4-year,
renewable term. The Ombudsman's office was part of the legislative
branch, ensuring a high degree of independence from the executive
branch. The law provides for the functional, administrative, and
judicial independence of the Ombudsman's office. The office was divided
into nine different directorates, including one for women's issues, one
for children and adolescents, as well as a ``special protection''
directorate for populations such as indigenous people, senior citizens,
prisoners, persons with disabilities, immigrants, etc. The Ombudsman
opened regional offices in Ciudad Quesada and Liberia.
Several international organizations concerned with human rights,
including the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, were located in San Jose.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides that all persons are equal before the
law, and the Government generally respected this provision.
Women.--The Government identified domestic violence against women
and children as a serious societal problem. The National Institute for
Women (INAMU), an autonomous institution created in 1998 that is
dedicated to gender equality, received 63,990 calls on its domestic
abuse hot line from January through October. During this same period,
INAMU counseled 4,097 female victims of abuse in its San Jose office
and accepted 194 women in INAMU-run shelters. INAMU maintained 41
offices in municipalities around the country and had trained personnel
working in 32 of the country's 81 cantons.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor for Domestic Violence and
Sexual Crimes prosecuted 448 cases related to domestic violence during
the year, compared with 456 cases in 2001. INAMU reported that 24 women
were killed in incidents of domestic violence during the year, compared
with 11 in 2001.
The 1996 Law Against Domestic Violence establishes precautionary
measures to help victims. At year's end, the Legislative Assembly was
still debating a Bill to Qualify Violence Against Women as a Crime,
which would classify certain acts of domestic violence as crimes and
mandate their prosecution whether or not the victim pursued charges
against the perpetrator. The authorities incorporated training on
handling domestic violence cases into the basic training course for new
police personnel. The domestic violence law requires public hospitals
to report cases of domestic violence against women. It also denies the
perpetrator possession of the family home in favor of the victim.
Television coverage of this issue increased in news reporting, public
service announcements, and feature programs. Reports of violence
against women increased, possibly reflecting a greater willingness of
victims to report abuses rather than an actual increase in instances of
violence against women. The public prosecutor, police, and the
Ombudsman all had offices dedicated to this problem. The law against
sexual harassment in the workplace and educational institutions sought
to prevent and punish sexual harassment in those environments.
Prostitution is legal for persons over the age of 18. The Penal
Code prohibits individuals from promoting or facilitating the
prostitution of individuals of either sex, independent of the
individual's age, and the penalty is increased if the victim is under
the age of 18.
The prohibition against trafficking in women for the purpose of
prostitution was strengthened by a statute that went into effect in
1999, although trafficking was a problem (see Section 6.f.).
In the 2000 census, women constituted 49.6 percent of the
population. In 1998 President Rodriguez created the office of Minister
of Women's Affairs, who also heads INAMU. The 1990 Law for the
Promotion of the Social Equality of Women prohibits discrimination
against women and obligates the Government to promote political,
economic, social, and cultural equality. As part of its 3-year National
Plan for Equality of Opportunity between Women and Men, the Government
established an office for gender issues in almost all ministries and
most parastatal organizations.
According to the U.N. Development Program, women over age 15
represented 36.6 percent of the labor force. Most women (76 percent)
worked in the service sector, with the remainder working in industry
(17 percent) and agriculture (6 percent). Women occupied 45 percent of
professional and technical positions, and 30 percent of legislative,
senior official, and managerial positions. The Constitution and Labor
Code require that women and men receive equal pay for equal work;
however, the estimated earned income for women was approximately 78
percent of the earned income for men, despite the fact that 20.5
percent of women in the workforce had some university instruction,
compared to 11.4 percent of men.
Children.--The Government was committed to children's rights and
welfare through well-funded systems of public education and medical
care. The law requires 6 years of primary and 3 years of secondary
education for all children. There was no difference in the treatment of
girls and boys in education or in health care services. In 1998 the
Legislative Assembly passed a constitutional amendment increasing
spending on education from 4 percent to 6 percent of GDP. The country
had a high rate of literacy (95 percent) and a low rate of infant
mortality (10 persons per 1,000). The Government spent over 5 percent
of GDP on medical care. The autonomous National Institute for Children
(PANI) oversaw implementation of the Government's programs for
children. In May President Pacheco made PANI's Executive Director a
minister, with the title of Minister of Child Welfare.
In recent years, the PANI increased public awareness of abuse of
children, which remained a problem. From January to June, the Institute
intervened in 4,480 cases of abandonment (compared with 3,640 cases in
the first 6 months of 2001), 403 cases of physical abuse (compared with
1,246), 3,475 cases of sexual abuse (compared with 573), and 1,601
cases of psychological abuse (compared with 941) of children. The PANI
attributed the increase in cases to better reporting capabilities, an
expansion of the definition of child abuse, and simply more abuse. In
addition, the 1997 Code of Childhood and Adolescence redefined
psychological abuse and increased awareness of it. Traditional
attitudes and the inclination to treat such crimes as misdemeanors
sometimes hampered legal proceedings against those who committed crimes
against children.
The Government, police sources, and UNICEF representatives
acknowledged that child prostitution was a serious problem (see Section
6.f.).
The NGO Casa Alianza operated a 24-hour telephone help line that
received 71 accusations of exploitation of minors from January through
August. In 2000 the organization made a presentation to the IACHR about
what it termed the growing commercial sexual exploitation of children
in the country. Casa Alianza criticized the Government for not
providing the PANI with 7 percent of the national tax revenue since
1998, as stipulated by the law creating the PANI, and also criticized
the Government for the relatively low number of persons actually
charged, found guilty, and sentenced for child exploitation.
The fiscal austerity measures of the Pacheco administration
resulted in a 26 percent cut in PANI's budget during the year, and the
same reduction was set to be applied to PANI's 2003 budget. The cuts
resulted from the Government's reduction of the amount of money
transferred to the Social Development and Family Allocation Fund, which
is the primary source of PANI's funds. The Ombudsman decried the
reductions and pledged to restore PANI's budget by seeking donations
from international organizations.
Persons with Disabilities.--The 1996 Equal Opportunity for Persons
with Disabilities Law prohibits discrimination, provides for health
care services, and mandates provision of access to buildings for
persons with disabilities. This law was not enforced widely, and many
buildings remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities. A 2000
government study concluded that only 35 percent of the law's stated
goals had been implemented. Nonetheless, a number of public and private
institutions made efforts to improve access. In 1999 the PANI and the
Ministry of Education published specific classroom guidelines for
assisting children with hearing loss, motor difficulties, attention
deficit disorder, and mental retardation. The Ministry of Education
operated a Program for Persons with Disabilities, including a national
resource center that provided parents, students, and teachers with
advanced counseling, training, and information services. The Ministry
reported that 17,201 students with disabilities were registered in the
school system during the year, and that 46 special education centers
had been created.
Indigenous Persons.--The population of about 3.85 million includes
nearly 40,000 indigenous persons among 8 ethnic groups. Most lived in
traditional communities on 22 reserves which, because of their remote
location, often lacked access to schools, health care, electricity, and
potable water. The Government, through the National Indigenous
Commission, distributed identification cards to facilitate access to
public medical facilities in 1999. The Government also built a medical
clinic and several community health centers in indigenous areas. The
Ombudsman had an office to investigate violations of the rights of
indigenous people.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law specifies the right of
workers to join unions of their choosing without prior authorization,
and workers exercised this right in practice. About 15 percent of the
work force was unionized, and approximately 80 percent of all union
members were public sector employees. Unions operated independently of
government control.
Some trade union leaders contended that the existence of worker
``solidarity associations'' in some enterprises displaced unions and
discouraged collective bargaining. However, since 1993, these non-dues-
paying organizations were prohibited by law from representing workers
in collective bargaining negotiations or in any other way assuming the
functions of or inhibiting the formation of trade unions. Instead,
their function was to offer membership services, including credit union
programs, matching-fund savings accounts, and low-interest loans. In
some instances, employees had access to both trade union membership and
solidarity association services at the same time.
In December the AFL-CIO filed a petition with the U.S. Trade
Representative to remove the country from the list of beneficiary
countries under the U.S. General System of Preferences and the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. The AFL-CIO alleged that some
employers used solidarity associations, together with legal provisions
that permitted the negotiation of ``direct agreements'' between
employers and unrepresented workers, to establish employer-controlled
organizations. The petition also alleged that the Government did not
accord workers internationally recognized worker rights, specifically
the freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
A November 2001 ILO report summarized the results of its technical
assistance mission, which found that unions were independent, active,
and enjoyed the right to organize and express their views freely.
According to the ILO, unions represented all types of workers and
actively participated in bipartite and tripartite negotiating
structures. The law prohibits discrimination against union members and
imposes sanctions against offending employers. The ILO report, however,
noted continued problems related to the slowness and inefficiency of
redress procedures for unjustified firings and discriminatory antiunion
measures, especially in the private sector.
There were no new developments during the year in the ILO complaint
filed by a union alleging antiunion discrimination in the banana
industry, or on a complaint filed by the teachers union.
The ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) identified several
deficiencies in the labor law. Each year since 1998, the ILO encouraged
the Government to adopt new measures to bring its law and practice in
full compliance with internationally recognized worker rights. The
Constitutional Chamber ruled that the National Inspection Directorate
must comply with the 2-month time limit for investigations. The ILO
criticized this procedure for giving no guarantee or reparations for
damages caused, even if the legal deadlines were respected, since the
labor inspectors simply certify the wrongdoing but file no charges.
Most cases took up to 2 months to resolve, but some may take longer if
the judge decided that an unusual situation merited further
investigation and required witnesses. Delays in processing court
rulings were common throughout the judicial branch, with little
improvement in the slow and ineffective recourse procedures in response
to antiunion discrimination. The Ministry of Labor continued its
efforts to modernize the National Inspection Directorate, to enable it
to support worker rights by increasing the authority of regional
officers to investigate and process cases of alleged abuse by
employers. These regional offices also established local forums where
government officials, employers, and employees could discuss labor
issues. Inspectors were provided increased opportunities for training
and participation in Ministry of Labor administration.
Unions could form federations and confederations and affiliate
internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution protects the right to organize. Foreign nationals are
expressly prohibited from exercising direction or authority in unions.
Since 1998 the COE specifically addressed this problem and repeatedly
expressed its hope that the Government would adopt reforms to bring
this law and practice into full conformity with internationally
recognized norms. Specific provisions of the 1993 Labor Code reforms
provide protection from dismissal for union organizers and members
during union formation; however, the employer is not obligated to
follow any specific procedures to prove grounds for dismissal. The
revised provisions require employers who are found guilty of unfair
labor practices to reinstate workers fired for union activities;
however, enforcement of the measure was lax.
The November 2001 ILO report commented on several rulings issued by
the Constitutional Court that ``emphasized the confusion, uncertainty,
and even legal insecurity'' with regard to the scope of public sector
employees to bargain collectively. The COE ``expressed its deep concern
over this situation which constitutes a serious violation . . . of the
right to collective bargaining in the public sector.'' The COE urged
the Legislative Assembly to ratify ILO Conventions 151 and 154, which
would make it possible to find solutions to the problems that exist. A
group of legislators also began working on a bill to amend the
Constitution specifically to provide for the right to collective
bargaining.
Private sector unions had the legal right to engage in collective
bargaining; however, collective bargaining diminished as a result of
several factors, including lengthy delays in court processing of unfair
dismissal suits and solidarity associations in effect displacing trade
unions. The ILO report drew attention to the ``enormous imbalance'' in
the private sector between the number of collective agreements
concluded by trade union organizations (12, with very low coverage -
7,200 workers) and direct pacts concluded by nonunionized workers
(130). The COE noted that trade union confederations linked this
imbalance with employers or solidarity associations, an allegation that
employers denied. The ILO requested that the Government take the
necessary measures to promote collective bargaining within the meaning
of ILO Convention 87 and to hold an investigation by independent
persons concerning the reasons for the increase in direct pacts with
nonunionized workers.
The Constitution and Labor Code restrict the right of public sector
workers to strike. However, in 1998 the Supreme Court formally ruled
that public sector workers, except those in essential positions, had
the right to strike. Even before this ruling, the Government had
removed penalties for union leaders participating in such strikes.
Nonetheless, the COE reported that workers in the rail, maritime, and
air transport sectors were prohibited from exercising their right to
strike.
In 2000 the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber clarified the
law forbidding public sector strikes. It ruled that public sector
strikes could be allowed only if a judge approved them beforehand and
found that ``services necessary to the well-being of the public'' were
not jeopardized. Public sector workers who decided to strike could no
longer be penalized by a prison sentence but could face charges of
breach of contract.
There were no legal restrictions on the right of private sector
workers to strike, but few private sector workers belonged to unions.
Private sector strikes rarely occurred, and there were no major strikes
during the year.
All labor regulations applied fully to the country's nine export
processing zones (EPZs). The Labor Ministry oversaw labor regulations
within the EPZs.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, and there were no reports that it
occurred. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, and the
Government generally enforced this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code provide special
occupational protection for minors and pregnant and nursing women, and
establish a minimum working age of 15 years. Adolescents between the
ages of 15 and 18 may work for a maximum of 6 hours daily and 36 hours
weekly with special permission from the PANI, while children under the
age of 15 may not work legally. The PANI, in cooperation with the Labor
Ministry, generally enforced these regulations in the formal sector.
Due to limited government resources for enforcement, some children
worked on the fringes of the formal economy in violation of these
limits. Youths under the age of 18 may not work in the banana industry.
According to PANI estimates for 2000, 19 percent of children between
the ages of 5 and 17 were employed in domestic tasks, while 15 percent
worked outside the home. In October the Labor Ministry reported that
72,000 children between the ages of 5 and 16 worked illegally instead
of attending school. Another 16,000 children between the ages of 16 and
18 quit school to work. According to a 1998 survey, children between
the ages of 5 and 11 were paid only 11.6 percent of the minimum wage,
those between the ages of 12 and 14 were paid 21 percent of the minimum
wage, and the group between the ages of 15 and 17 was paid 56 percent
of the minimum wage.
With help from the ILO, the Labor Ministry was working to phase out
child labor in the formal sector and asked employers of children to
notify the Ministry of such employment. The National Directive
Committee for the Progressive Eradication of Child Labor and Protection
of Adolescent Laborers includes representatives from the PANI, the
Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public
Security, the Ombudsman's Office, UNICEF, the ILO, and area
universities. The Ministry of Labor maintained an Office for the
Eradication of Child Labor, which cooperated with projects sponsored by
the ILO, U.N. Development Program, and other entities. Nonetheless,
child labor remained an integral part of the informal economy,
particularly in small-scale agriculture and family-run microenterprises
selling various items, which employed a significant proportion of the
labor force. Child prostitution was a serious problem (see Section
6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for a
minimum wage. A National Wage Council, composed of three members each
from government, business, and labor, set minimum wage and salary
levels for all sectors. Monthly minimum wages for the private sector
were adjusted on July 4 and ranged from approximately $144 (51,732
colones) for domestic employees to approximately $560 (203,571 colones)
for some professionals. Public sector negotiations, based on private
sector minimum wages, normally followed the settlement of private
sector negotiations. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforced minimum
wages in the San Jose area but did so less effectively in rural areas.
Especially at the lower end of the wage scale, the minimum wage was not
sufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of
living.
The Constitution sets workday hours, overtime remuneration, days of
rest, and annual vacation rights. Although often circumvented in
practice, it also requires compensation for discharge without due
cause. Generally, workers may work a maximum of 8 hours during the day
and 6 at night, up to weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours, respectively.
Nonagricultural workers receive an overtime premium of 50 percent of
regular wages for work in excess of the daily work shift. However,
agricultural workers did not receive overtime pay if they voluntarily
worked beyond their normal hours. Little evidence existed that
employers coerced employees to perform such overtime.
A 1967 law on health and safety in the workplace requires
industrial, agricultural, and commercial firms with 10 or more workers
to establish a joint management-labor committee on workplace conditions
and allows the Government to inspect workplaces and to fine employers
for violations. Most firms subject to the law established such
committees but either did not use the committees or did not turn them
into effective instruments for improving workplace conditions. The
Government did not provide sufficient resources to the Labor Ministry
to ensure consistent maintenance of minimum conditions of safety and
sanitation, especially outside San Jose, or to verify effectively
compliance with labor laws by the country's approximately 42,000
companies. In June and August, two industrial accidents brought
attention to the lack of labor occupational safety inspectors operating
in the country. Workers had the right to leave work if conditions
become dangerous; however, workers who did so may jeopardize their jobs
unless they filed written complaints with the Ministry of Labor.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women
for the purpose of prostitution, and a 1999 statute strengthens this
prohibition; however, Costa Rica was a transit and destination country
for trafficked persons. Isolated cases of trafficking have involved
persons from Africa, Asia, Bolivia, China, Colombia, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, and the Middle East. There also were reports of
girls from the Philippines being trafficked to the country for the
purpose of sexual exploitation.
The Criminal Code prohibits trafficking in women and minors for the
purpose of prostitution, but it does not address all severe forms of
trafficking. In November 2001, the General Directorate of Migration
implemented an executive decree to prohibit persons linked to
trafficking from entering Costa Rica. In December 2001, a law entered
into force that permits the use of wiretaps in investigations of
trafficking, although legal guidelines governing the use of wiretaps
were so strict that investigators rarely used them.
Child prostitution was a serious problem. Although no official
statistics existed, the PANI identified street children in the urban
areas of San Jose, Limon, and Puntarenas as being at the greatest risk.
Estimates of the number of children involved in prostitution varied
widely, and the only scientific studies focused on limited areas. The
1999 Law Against the Sexual Exploitation of Minors specifically
penalizes persons who use children and adolescents under age 18 for
erotic purposes and makes it a crime to engage in prostitution with
minors. An adult who pays for sex with a minor can be sentenced to 2 to
10 years in prison. The Government took steps to enforce this law and
raided brothels and arrested clients. The law provides for prison
sentences from 4 to 10 years for those managing or promoting child
prostitution. On December 5, a court convicted five persons arrested in
2001 for sexual exploitation of children; two were sentenced to 30
years' imprisonment and three to 16 years.
A government Inter-Ministerial Group on Trafficking addressed the
problem in the country. Each participating ministry reportedly
incorporated preventive trafficking measures into its ministerial
agenda. The Government supported prevention programs to combat sexual
exploitation of minors and trafficking. There were limited formal
mechanisms specifically designed to aid trafficked victims; however,
the Government offered indirect assistance, such as stay-in-school
programs, to child victims of trafficking. Victims were not granted
temporary or permanent residence status and often were deported
immediately to their country of origin.
__________
CUBA
Cuba is a totalitarian state controlled by Fidel Castro, who is
Chief of State with the titles of President, Head of government, First
Secretary of the Communist Party, and commander in chief of the armed
forces. Castro exercises control over all aspects of life through the
Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the Government
bureaucracy headed by the Council of State, and the state security
apparatus. The Communist Party is the only legal political entity, and
Castro personally chooses the membership of the Politburo, the select
group that heads the party. There are no contested elections for the
601-member National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP), which meets
twice a year for a few days to rubber stamp decisions and policies
previously decided by the governing Council of State. The Communist
Party controls all government positions, including judicial offices.
The judiciary is completely subordinate to the Government and to the
Communist Party.
The Ministry of Interior is the principal entity of state security
and totalitarian control. Officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces,
which are led by Fidel Castro's brother General Raul Castro, were
assigned to the majority of key positions in the Ministry of Interior
in the past several years. In addition to the routine law enforcement
functions of regulating migration and controlling the Border Guard and
the regular police forces, the Interior Ministry's Department of State
Security investigated and actively suppressed political opposition and
dissent. It maintained a pervasive system of surveillance through
undercover agents, informers, rapid response brigades (RRBs), and
neighborhood-based Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs).
The Government traditionally has used the CDRs to mobilize citizens
against dissenters, impose ideological conformity, and root out
``counterrevolutionary'' behavior. RRBs consisted of workers from a
particular brigade (construction workers, a factory, etc.) that were
organized by the Communist Party to react forcefully to any situation
of social unrest. The Government on occasion used RRBs instead of the
police or military during such situations. Members of the security
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The economy was centrally planned, with some elements of state-
managed capitalism in sectors such as tourism and mining. The country's
population was approximately 11 million. The economy depended heavily
on primary products such as sugar and minerals, but also on its
recently developed tourism industry. The economy performed poorly
during the year, mainly due to inefficient policies. The 2001-02 sugar
harvest was poor, remittances from abroad decreased, and tourist
arrivals declined 5 percent below 2001 levels. In November 2001,
Hurricane Michelle severely affected agricultural production, which did
not begin to recover until midyear. Government officials announced that
the economy had grown by 1.1 percent during the year. Government policy
was officially aimed at preventing economic disparity, but persons with
access to dollars enjoyed a significantly higher standard of living
than those with access only to pesos. During the year, the Government
issued a moratorium on new licenses for small private businesses in the
service sector, many of which have been fined on unclear grounds or
taxed out of existence. A system of ``tourist apartheid'' continued,
whereby citizens were denied access to hotels, beaches, and resorts
reserved for foreign tourists.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens did not have the
right to change their government peacefully. Although the Constitution
allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be
submitted directly to the ANPP, the Government rejected a petition
known as the Varela Project, with over 11,000 signatures calling for a
national referendum on political and economic reforms. The Government
mobilized the population to sign a counter-petition reinforcing the
socialist basis of the State; the ANPP unanimously approved this
amendment. Communist Party-affiliated mass organizations tightly
controlled elections to provincial and national legislative bodies,
resulting in the selection of single, government-approved candidates.
Prisoners died in jail due to lack of medical care. Members of the
security forces and prison officials continued to beat and abuse
detainees and prisoners, including human rights activists. The
Government failed to prosecute or sanction adequately members of the
security forces and prison guards who committed abuses. Prison
conditions remained harsh and life threatening. The authorities
routinely continued to harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain,
imprison, and defame human rights advocates and members of independent
professional associations, including journalists, economists, doctors,
and lawyers, often with the goal of coercing them into leaving the
country. The Government used internal and external exile against such
persons. The Government denied political dissidents and human rights
advocates due process and subjected them to unfair trials. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government denied
citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It
limited the distribution of foreign publications and news, restricted
access to the Internet, and maintained strict censorship of news and
information to the public. The Government restricted some religious
activities but permitted others. The Government limited the entry of
religious workers to the country. The Government maintained tight
restrictions on freedom of movement, including foreign travel and did
not allow some citizens to leave the country. The Government was
sharply and publicly antagonistic to all criticism of its human rights
practices and discouraged foreign contacts with human rights activists.
Violence against women, especially domestic violence, and child
prostitution were problems. Racial discrimination was a problem. The
Government severely restricted worker rights, including the right to
form independent unions. The Government prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children; however, it required children to do farm work
without compensation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings.
On August 16, Juan Sanchez Picoto died in a psychiatric hospital in
San Luis de Jagua, allegedly by suicide. According to family members,
Sanchez Picoto had tried to emigrate nine times since 1998, and after
the last attempt the authorities forcibly removed him from his home and
placed him in a psychiatric unit for alcoholics at a Guantanamo
psychiatric hospital. He was held in a ward for violent and mentally
ill offenders, despite a doctor's diagnosis that he did not meet
criteria for involuntary commitment. He was allegedly given shock
therapy and assaulted by another detainee, resulting in a head injury.
On August 15, he was transferred from the Guantanamo hospital to the
San Luis de Jagua unit and died the next day; family members were not
allowed to see the body.
During the year, there were reports that prisoners died in jail due
to lack of medical care (see Section 1.c.).
There was no new information about the results of any investigation
into the deaths of Leovigildo Oliva and Leonardo Horta Camacho, and no
government action was likely; police reportedly shot and killed both
men in 2000.
The Government still has not indemnified the survivors and the
relatives of the 41 victims for the damages caused in the Border
Guard's July 1994 sinking of the ``13th of March'' tugboat, despite a
1996 recommendation by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) to do so.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detainees
and prisoners; however, members of the security forces sometimes beat
and otherwise abused human rights advocates, detainees, and prisoners.
The Government took no steps to curb these abuses. There continued to
be numerous reports of disproportionate police harassment of black
youths (see Section 5).
On March 4, state security agents, police, and civilian members of
an RRB beat blind activist Juan Carlos Gonzalez Leyva, independent
journalist Carlos Brizuela Yera, and eight other activists, who were at
a public hospital in Ciego de Avila protesting the earlier beating of
independent journalist Jesus Alvarez Castillo. Police forcibly removed
the protesters from the hospital and arrested them. On August 21, a
municipal court charged them with ``contempt for authority, public
disorder, disobedience, and resistance.'' Prosecutors requested a 6-
year sentence for Gonzalez Leyva. Gonzalez Leyva protested his
imprisonment through a liquids-only fast, and at year's end weighed
less than 100 pounds.
On September 17, plainclothes police beat 59-year-old Rafael Madlum
Payas of the Christian Liberation Movement as he approached a police
station to inquire about the cases of seven activists being held at the
station.
The Government continued to subject persons who disagreed with it
to what it called acts of repudiation. At government instigation,
members of state-controlled mass organizations, fellow workers, or
neighbors of intended victims were obliged to stage public protests
against those who dissented from the Government's policies, shouting
obscenities and often causing damage to the homes and property of those
targeted; physical attacks on the victims sometimes occurred. Police
and state security agents often were present but took no action to
prevent or end the attacks. Those who refused to participate in these
actions faced disciplinary action, including loss of employment.
On July 1, the first secretary of the Communist Party in Cruces,
Cienfuegos province, directed 150 persons to engage in an act of
repudiation against Gladys Aquit Manrique of the Cuban Pro Human Rights
Party. The persons shouted epithets at Aquit Manrique and kicked her
door.
There were also smaller-scale acts of repudiation, known as
``reuniones relampagos,'' or rapid repudiations. These acts were
conducted by a small number of persons, usually not from the target's
neighborhood, and lasted up to 30 minutes. These individuals shouted
epithets and threw stones or other objects at the victim's house.
On April 21, members of an RRB beat Grisel Almaguer Rodriguez of
the Political Prisoners Association as she departed the home of human
rights activist Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz.
On September 21, persons directed by state security officials threw
stones and mud at the home of Jose Daniel Ferrer of the Christian
Liberation Movement and beat Victor Rodriguez Vazquez and Yordanis
Almenares Crespo, who were visiting Ferrer at the time of the attack.
On September 24, police in Santiago province directed persons to
beat six members of the Christian Liberation Movement during an act of
rapid repudiation.
Prison conditions continued to be harsh and life threatening, and
conditions in detention facilities also were harsh. The Government
claimed that prisoners had rights such as family visitation, adequate
nutrition, pay for work, the right to request parole, and the right to
petition the prison director; however, police and prison officials
often denied these rights in practice, and beat, neglected, isolated,
and denied medical treatment to detainees and prisoners, including
those convicted of political crimes or those who persisted in
expressing their views. The Penal Code prohibits the use of corporal
punishment on prisoners and the use of any means to humiliate prisoners
or to lessen their dignity; however, the code fails to establish
penalties for committing such acts, and they continued to occur in
practice. Detainees and prisoners, both common and political, often
were subjected to repeated, vigorous interrogations designed to coerce
them into signing incriminating statements, to force collaboration with
authorities, or to intimidate victims. Some endured physical and sexual
abuse, typically by other inmates with the acquiescence of guards, or
long periods in punitive isolation cells. Pretrial detainees were held
separately from convicted prisoners. In Havana there were two detention
centers; once sentenced, persons were transferred to a prison.
Prisoners sometimes were held in ``punishment cells,'' which
usually were located in the basement of a prison, were semi-dark all
the time, had no water available in the cell, and had a hole for a
toilet. No reading materials were allowed, and family visits were
reduced to 10 minutes from 1 or 2 hours. There was no access to lawyers
while in the punishment cell.
On May 10, political prisoner Carlos Luis Diaz Fernandez informed
friends that he had been held in solitary confinement since January
2000 in a cell with no electric light and infested by rats and
mosquitoes.
In August six guards at Guamajal prison, Villa Clara province, beat
common prisoner Pedro Rafael Perez Fuentes until he was unconscious.
Perez Fuentes told his mother that the guards had beaten him because he
had asked them why he had been denied exercise privileges. The prison
warden verbally abused Perez Fuentes' mother when she informed him of
her plans to report the assault.
On August 6, prison officials, including the chief of political
reeducation, beat political prisoner Yosvani Aguilar Camejo. Aguilar
Camejo is the national coordinator for the Fraternal Brothers for
Dignity Movement. He was arrested at the time of the Mexican Embassy
break-in by asylum seekers in late February (see Section 1.d.).
Prison guards and state security officials subjected human rights
and prodemocracy activists to threats of physical violence, to
systematic psychological intimidation, and to detention or imprisonment
in cells with common and violent criminals, sexually aggressive
inmates, or state security agents posing as prisoners.
On February 21, political prisoner Ariel Fleitas Gonzalez advised
relatives that prison authorities had placed a dangerous common
criminal in his cell in Canaleta prison to monitor his activities. That
prisoner threatened Fleitas Gonzalez when the latter called upon
officials to respect prisoners' rights.
On June 20, a guard at Las Ladrilleras prison in Holguin province
instructed a common prisoner to beat political prisoner Daniel Mesa.
Mesa reportedly suffered brain damage as a result of the attack.
In late October, imprisoned dissident Leonardo Bruzon Avila was
hospitalized from the effects of a 43-day hunger strike. In February
the authorities had arrested Bruzon on charges of civil disobedience.
In December the authorities returned Bruzon to prison, where he resumed
a liquids-only diet. Family members and colleagues believed he was
returned to prison before he had fully recovered from the effects of
his hunger strike.
In November Ana Aquililla, wife of Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez,
reported that her husband remained confined with common prisoners, that
for more than 1 year he was not allowed outside the prison for
recreation, and that he could not receive family visits. Chaviano is
the former president of the National Council for Civil Rights in Cuba
and received a 15-year prison sentence in 1994 on charges of espionage
and disrespect.
Political prisoners were required to comply with the rules for
common criminals and often were punished severely if they refused. They
often were placed in punishment cells and held in isolation.
The Government regularly failed to provide adequate nutrition and
medical attention, and a number of prisoners died during the year due
to lack of medical attention. In 1997 the IACHR described the
nutritional and hygienic situation in the prisons, together with the
deficiencies in medical care, as ``alarming.'' Both the IACHR and the
former U.N. Special Rapporteur on Cuba, as well as other human rights
monitoring organizations, have reported the widespread incidence in
prisons of tuberculosis, scabies, hepatitis, parasitic infections, and
malnutrition.
In early June, common prisoner Hector Labrada Ruedas died of
internal bleeding after prison authorities refused his requests for
medical attention.
Alberto Martinez Martinez contracted hepatitis and leptospirosis
while being held for attempting to leave the country without government
authorization. He was placed in intensive care following his release.
Martinez Martinez is the son of Alberto Martinez Fernandez, president
of the Political Prisoners and Ex-Political Prisoners Club.
On June 19, the illegal (see Section 2.b.) nongovernmental
organization (NGO) National Office for the Receipt of Information on
Human Rights Violations reported that political prisoner Nestor Garcia
Valdes had contracted tuberculosis while being held in Guantanamo
Provincial Prison with nine infected common prisoners, none of whom had
received treatment for the disease.
The wife of political prisoner Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina reported
that Rodriguez feared for his health because he had been held for an
extended period in a cell with two prisoners suffering from
tuberculosis. Rodriguez was especially concerned because his wife and
young daughter visited him in his cell, exposing them to possible
infection as well. Rodriguez' wife claimed that the prison doctor had
refused to transfer Lobaina after learning that he was a political
prisoner, saying that his fate was of no concern to her. Rodriguez is
in the third year of a 6-year sentence for ``contempt of authority''
and ``public disorder.''
Political prisoner Osvaldo Dussu Medina reported that inmates in
Boniato prison were forced to wash their clothes in water contaminated
with feces and urine from a broken sewer pipe. Prison authorities had
been aware of the contamination for 2 years but did nothing to remedy
the situation.
Prison officials regularly denied prisoners other rights, such as
the right to correspondence, and continued to confiscate medications
and food brought by family members for political prisoners. Some prison
directors routinely denied religious workers access to detainees and
prisoners. Reading materials, including Bibles, were not allowed in
punishment cells. Prison authorities refused to grant blind dissident
Juan Carlos Gonzalez Leyva access to his Braille Bible.
In July prison officials in Ceramica Roja prison denied religious
visits to political prisoner Enrique Garcia Morejon of the Christian
Liberation Movement. Garcia Morejon twice requested visits by a
Catholic priest while the priest was visiting other prisoners.
There were separate prison facilities for women and for minors.
Conditions of these prisons, especially for women, did not take into
account the special needs of women. Human rights activists believed
that conditions were poor.
The Government did not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions by international or national human rights monitoring groups.
The Government has refused to allow prison visits by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since 1989. In 2001 the Cuban
Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCHRNC), an
illegal NGO, appealed to the Government to create a national commission
with representatives from the Cuban Red Cross, the Ministry of Public
Health, and different churches, to inspect the prisons and recommend
changes to the existing situation. The CCHRNC did not receive a
response from the Government.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention continued to be problems, and they remained the Government's
most effective tactics for harassing opponents. The Law of Penal
Procedures requires police to file formal charges and either release a
detainee or bring the case before a prosecutor within 96 hours of
arrest. It also requires the authorities to provide suspects with
access to a lawyer within 7 days of arrest. However, the Constitution
states that all legally recognized civil liberties can be denied to
anyone who actively opposes the decision of the Cuban people to build
socialism. The authorities routinely invoked this sweeping authority to
deny due process to those detained on purported state security grounds.
The authorities routinely engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention
of human rights advocates, subjecting them to interrogations, threats,
and degrading treatment and unsanitary conditions for hours or days at
a time. Police frequently lacked warrants when carrying out arrests or
issued warrants themselves at the time of arrest. Authorities sometime
employed false charges of common crimes to arrest political opponents.
Detainees often were not informed of the charges against them. The
CCHRNC reported a significant increase in the number of detentions in
February and March. In May Amnesty International recognized the
increase of arrests and harassment of dissidents, including organizers
for the opposition Varela Project (see Section 3), and expressed
concern about the increased use of violence by security forces. The
authorities continued to detain human rights activists and independent
journalists for short periods, often to prevent them from attending or
participating in events related to human rights issues (see Sections
2.a. and 2.b.). The authorities also placed such activists under house
arrest for short periods for similar reasons.
On January 28, police arrested Martha Beatriz Roque, director of
the Cuban Institute of Independent Economists, for refusing to allow
government employees to fumigate her residence against mosquitoes.
Roque refused because she had suffered allergic reactions as a result
of previous fumigations. State security officials took Roque to a
Ministry of Health office, where she was strip searched, held for 4
hours, and released. Government officials broke into Roque's house and
fumigated it while she was in detention.
On February 24, state security officials arrested independent
journalist Carlos Alberto Dominguez for participating in an event
commemorating the four pilots killed in February 1996 by military
aircraft. He was released the same day but was arrested again on
February 28 and remained jailed on charges of ``contempt for authority
and public disorder'' (see Section 2.a.). At year's end, his relatives
reported that Dominguez was in poor health and receiving inadequate
treatment for hypertension and severe migraine headaches.
In late February, police arrested at least 300 persons near the
Mexican Embassy after 21 asylum seekers used a bus to break through the
gates of the embassy. Many of those arrested were reportedly bystanders
not involved in the embassy intrusion. RRBs summoned by the Government
to the Mexican Embassy beat some bystanders. Most bystanders were
interrogated and released, but on March 6, Fidel Castro indicated that
130 of them would be tried on charges related to the embassy break-in.
According to relatives, approximately 60 remained jailed at year's end;
none had been tried.
On March 13, police arrested seven human rights activists in Nueva
Gerona, Isle of Youth, as they conducted a public demonstration calling
for democratic reforms and the release of political prisoners (see
Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
On March 18, state security officials arrested four leaders of the
Brotherhood of Blind Cubans to prevent a demonstration against police
mistreatment of handicapped street vendors and calling for the release
of blind dissident Juan Carlos Gonzalez Leyva (see Sections 1.c., 2.b.,
and 5). Police released the four after citing them with ``official
warnings.''
On April 17, police arrested Barbaro Vela Coego and Armando
Dominguez Gonzalez, president and vice president, respectively, of the
January 6 Civic Movement, to prevent their attendance at a fast in
honor of political prisoners. They were held for 2 hours and released
(see Section 2.b.).
On April 22, police arrested Milka Pena Martinez of the Cuban Pro
Human Rights Party for protesting a police search of her home (see
Section 1.f.). Police also arrested Luis Ferrer Garcia of the Christian
Liberation Movement, who was present at the time, and Ramon Collazo
Almaguer, who led a group of dissidents to Pena Martinez' home to
protest her arrest. Pena Martinez was fined and all three were
released.
On May 19, police arrested Nereida Cala Escalona and Evelio
Manteira Barban as they departed a meeting in Santiago de Cuba
organized by the Christian Liberation Movement. They were interrogated,
threatened with imprisonment, and released on May 20.
On June 1, police arrested nine activists as they departed a human
rights course at the illegal NGO Culture and Democracy Institute in
Santiago de Cuba. They were interrogated and released on June 2.
On June 7, police arrested three members of the 30th of November
Party in Santiago de Cuba. They were interrogated and released on June
10.
On June 14, state security officials beat and arrested independent
journalist Carlos Serpa Maceira while he was covering a march by human
rights activists in the Isle of Youth (see Section 2.a.). He was
briefly detained, fined $48 (1,200 pesos), and then released.
On July 24, police arrested human rights activist Adolfo Lazaro
Bosq at a vigil for political prisoners on charges of ``resistance and
contempt for the revolutionary process.'' On August 2, a municipal
court sentenced him to 1 year and 9 months' imprisonment (see Section
1.e.).
In July state security officials arrested independent journalist
Yoel Blanco Garcia and took him to a local firehouse where he was
interrogated. The state security officials warned Blanco Garcia not to
visit the home of Martha Beatriz Roque, director of the Cuban Institute
of Independent Economists.
On July 29, state security officials arrested Rogelio Menendez
Diaz, president of the Cuban Municipalities for Human Rights. He was
held for 35 days in Villa Marista prison, where guards transferred him
between chilled and heated cells. During interrogations, Menendez Diaz
was accused of organizing clandestine cells on behalf of exile groups
along with activists Angel Pablo Polanco and Marcel Valenzuela Salt,
who had also been detained. Menendez Diaz was charged with ``contempt
against the Commander in Chief'' and warned to cease opposition
activities. He was released on September 2 but rearrested on December
10, apparently to prevent his participation in events commemorating
International Human Rights Day. At year's end, he had not been tried
and remained jailed.
On July 30, state security officials arrested independent
journalist Angel Pablo Polanco and held him for 4 days in an
unregistered house of detention. Polanco was 60 years old and moved
with the aid of a walker. During a search of his home, state security
agents removed a fax machine and a telephone which Polanco had
purchased from a state company, $1,200 in cash, a tape recorder, books
on Cuban history, and files related to his work as a journalist. The
officials did not provide a receipt for the money or the items (see
Section 2.a.). Polanco was charged with inciting others to commit
``contempt of authority'' and ``insulting the symbols of the State,''
apparently in connection with plans by opposition groups to mark the
August 5 anniversary of 1994 riots in Havana. He was accused of
organizing clandestine cells along with activists Manuel Menendez Diaz
and Marcel Valenzuela Salt, who had been arrested on July 29. Polanco
was granted conditional release on August 3. At year's end, Polanco had
not been tried.
On September 11, police arrested Luis Milan of the Christian
Liberation Movement for writing a letter to municipal officials in
Santiago de Cuba calling for improved prison conditions.
On December 6, police arrested Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, a political
prisoner who had been released on October 31 after serving 3 years for
disrespect, creating a public disturbance, and encouraging others to
violate the law. The authorities arrested Biscet and 16 others to
prevent them from holding a seminar on nonviolent civil disobedience.
The authorities later released 12 of the detainees, but charged Biscet,
his associate Raul Arencibia Fajardo, and 2 others with public
disorder, which carries a sentence of up to 1 year.
The Government often held persons without charges for months and
then released them, which avoided the spectacle of a trial. Of the 36
political prisoners arrested during the year, 6 were released without
charges, including several who had been informally advised of charges
but were never processed.
State security police used detentions and warnings to prevent
organizations around the island from performing any actions in
remembrance of the four pilots killed in February 1996 by military
aircraft. As in previous years, on July 13, police prevented activists
from commemorating the 1994 sinking of the ``13th of March'' tugboat
(see Sections 1.d and 2.b.).
The authorities sometimes detained journalists in order to question
them about contacts with foreigners or to prevent them from covering
sensitive issues or criticizing the Government (see Section 2.a.).
Time in detention before trial counted toward time served if
convicted. Bail was available and usually was low and more equivalent
to a fine.
The Penal Code includes the concept of ``dangerousness,'' defined
as the ``special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated
by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms.'' If the
police decide that a person exhibits signs of dangerousness, they may
bring the offender before a court or subject him to therapy or
political reeducation. Government authorities regularly threatened
prosecution under this provision. Both the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR) and the IACHR criticized this tactic for its
subjectivity, the summary nature of the judicial proceedings employed,
the lack of legal safeguards, and the political considerations behind
its application. According to the IACHR, the so-called special
inclination to commit crimes referred to in the Penal Code amounted to
a subjective criterion used by the Government to justify violations of
individual freedoms and due process for persons whose sole crime was to
hold a view different from the official view.
The Government also used exile as a tool for controlling and
eliminating internal opposition. In May Amnesty International noted
that the Government detained human rights activists repeatedly for
short periods and threatened them with imprisonment unless they gave up
their activities or left the country. The Government used these
incremental, aggressive tactics to compel independent librarian Ramon
Humberto Colas and Maritza Lugo Fernandez, vice president of the
Democratic November 30 Party, to leave the country in December 2001 and
January, respectively.
The Government pressured imprisoned human rights activists and
political prisoners to apply for emigration and regularly conditioned
their release on acceptance of exile. Human Rights Watch observed that
the Government routinely invoked forced exile as a condition for
prisoner releases and also pressured activists to leave the country to
escape future prosecution. Amnesty International expressed particular
concern about the Government's practice of threatening to charge, try,
and imprison human rights advocates and independent journalists prior
to arrest or sentencing if they did not leave the country. According to
Amnesty International, this practice ``effectively prevents those
concerned from being able to act in public life in their own country.''
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
independent courts; however, it explicitly subordinates the courts to
the ANPP and the Council of State, which is headed by President Castro.
The ANPP and its lower level counterparts choose all judges. The
subordination of the courts to the Communist Party, which the
Constitution designates as the superior directive force of society and
the State, further compromises the judiciary's independence. The courts
undermined the right to a fair trial by restricting the right to a
defense and often failed to observe the few due process rights
available to defendants.
Civilian courts existed at the municipal, provincial, and supreme
court levels. Panels composed of a mix of professionally certified and
lay judges presided over them. There was a right to appeal, access to
counsel, and charges were known to the defendant. Defendants enjoyed a
presumption of innocence, but the authorities often ignored this right
in practice.
Military tribunals assumed jurisdiction for certain
counterrevolutionary cases and were governed by a special law. The
military tribunals processed civilians if a member of the military was
involved with civilians in a crime. There was a right to appeal, access
to counsel, and the charges were known to the defendant.
The law and trial practices did not meet international standards
for fair public trials. Almost all cases were tried in less than 1 day;
there were no jury trials. While most trials were public, trials were
closed when there were alleged violations of state security.
Prosecutors may introduce testimony from a CDR member about the
revolutionary background of a defendant, which may contribute to either
a longer or shorter sentence. The law recognizes the right of appeal in
municipal courts but limits it in provincial courts to cases such as
those involving maximum prison terms or the death penalty. Appeals in
capital cases are automatic. The Council of State ultimately must
affirm capital punishment.
Criteria for presenting evidence, especially in cases involving
human rights advocates, were arbitrary and discriminatory. Often the
sole evidence provided, particularly in political cases, was the
defendant's confession, usually obtained under duress and without the
legal advice or knowledge of a defense lawyer (see Section 1.c.). The
authorities regularly denied defendants access to their lawyers until
the day of the trial. Several dissidents who served prison terms
reported that they were tried and sentenced without counsel and were
not allowed to speak on their own behalf.
The law provides the accused with the right to an attorney, but the
control that the Government exerted over the livelihood of members of
the state-controlled lawyers' collectives compromised their ability to
represent clients, especially when they defended persons accused of
state security crimes. Attorneys reported reluctance to defend those
charged in political cases due to fear of jeopardizing their own
careers.
On January 30, the Havana Provincial Court sentenced activist
Carlos Oquendo Rodriguez to 2 years' imprisonment for ``contempt for
authority'' and ``public disorder.'' The provincial court confirmed the
sentence levied against Oquendo Rodriguez by a municipal court in 2001
and appealed by him to the provincial court. Prior to sentencing,
police officials offered to suspend Oquendo Rodriguez' sentence if he
recanted his political beliefs, but Oquendo Rodriguez refused.
On August 2, a municipal court sentenced human rights activist
Adolfo Lazaro Bosq to 1 year and 9 months' imprisonment for
``resistance and contempt against the revolutionary process.'' Bosq was
arrested on July 24 at a candlelight vigil for political prisoners (see
Section 1.d.).
Vladimiro Roca Antunez of the Internal Dissident Working Group was
released on May 5, after serving most of his 5-year sentence for a 1997
conviction for acts against the security of the State in relation to
the crime of sedition after the group peacefully expressed their
disagreement with the Government. Three other members received
conditional releases in 2000.
Human rights monitoring groups inside the country estimated the
number of political prisoners to be between 230 and 300 persons. At
year's end, the CCHRNC reported that 36 political prisoners had been
arrested and that there were 248 political prisoners in the country; at
the end of 2001, the CCHRNC had reported 240 political prisoners. The
CCHRNC noted that since the Government refused to publish the number of
prisoners in the country, its figures were based on information
obtained from family members of prisoners. A spokesperson for the
CCHRNC noted an end to a recent downward trend in the numbers of
political prisoners, with an increase in detentions in February and
March (see Section 1.d.). The authorities imprisoned persons on charges
such as disseminating enemy propaganda, illicit association, contempt
for the authorities (usually for criticizing President Castro),
clandestine printing, or the broad charge of rebellion, which often was
brought against advocates of peaceful democratic change. The Government
did not permit access to political prisoners by human rights
organizations. It continued to deny access to prisoners by the ICRC.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although the Constitution provides for the
inviolability of a citizen's home and correspondence, official
surveillance of private and family affairs by government-controlled
mass organizations, such as the CDRs, remained one of the most
pervasive and repressive features of daily life. The State assumed the
right to interfere in the lives of citizens, even those who did not
oppose the Government and its practices actively. The authorities
utilized a wide range of social controls. The mass organizations'
ostensible purpose was to improve the citizenry, but in fact their goal
was to discover and discourage nonconformity. Citizen participation in
these mass organizations declined; the economic crisis both reduced the
Government's ability to provide material incentives for their
participation and forced many persons to engage in black market
activities, which the mass organizations were supposed to report to the
authorities.
The Interior Ministry employed an intricate system of informants
and block committees (the CDRs) to monitor and control public opinion.
While less capable than in the past, CDRs continued to report on
suspicious activity, including conspicuous consumption; unauthorized
meetings, including those with foreigners; and defiant attitudes toward
the Government and the revolution.
The Government controlled all access to the Internet, and all
electronic mail messages were subject to censorship. Dial-up Internet
service was prohibitively expensive for most citizens. The Interior
Ministry's Department of State Security often read international
correspondence and monitored overseas telephone calls and conversations
with foreigners. The Government also monitored domestic phone calls and
correspondence. The Government sometimes denied telephone service to
political dissidents. Cell phones were generally not available to
average citizens.
Dolia Leal Francisco of the Cuban Institute of Independent
Economists reported that state security officials pressured her local
CDR to deny her home telephone service because of her
``counterrevolutionary activities.'' State security officials
threatened to terminate telephone service of Leal Francisco's neighbors
if they allowed her to use their phones. A CDR member and a state
security agent warned one neighbor that she would lose her job and that
her daughter's education would be affected if she allowed Leal
Francisco access to a telephone.
On February 8, state security officials threatened to evict
activist Adonis Castro Martinez from his home, which he had rented for
4 years from his employer, the Ministry of Health, because he had used
the home for meetings of the Cuban Pro Human Rights Party Affiliated
with the Andrei Sakharov Foundation (see Section 2.b.).
In late March, police instructed a neighbor of independent labor
organizers Luis Sergio Nunez and Gabriel Sanchez of the Independent
National Labor Organization to report on any calls made by them from
her telephone (see Section 6.b.).
On April 22, police arrested Milka Pena Martinez of the Cuban Pro
Human Rights Party for protesting a police search of her home (see
Section 1.d.). Police claimed to be searching for an individual who did
not live at that residence. Asked by Pena Martinez to produce a
warrant, a police lieutenant wrote out a warrant on a blank sheet of
paper. Police also arrested Luis Ferrer Garcia of the Christian
Liberation Movement, who was present at the time of the search of Pena
Martinez' home, and Ramon Collazo Almaguer, who led a group of
dissidents to Pena Martinez' home to protest her arrest. All three were
released after Pena Martinez was fined $80 (2,000 pesos) for being
unable to explain the presence of a large quantity of flour in her
home.
On May 8, telephone service was cut to the home of Luis Octavio
Garcia Gonzalez, spokesman for the Cuban Pro Human Rights Party
Affiliated with the Andrei Sakharov Foundation. When service was
restored, unknown persons made repeated calls to Garcia Gonzalez
shouting revolutionary slogans.
On May 17, police went to the home of Pedro Veliz, president of the
Independent Medical School of Cuba, and instructed him to leave Havana
for the day to prevent his attendance in ceremonies marking the
founding of a prerevolutionary political party (see Section 2.b.).
Veliz, along with his wife and children, were forced to leave their
home and were followed by state security officials until they left the
city.
On June 2, the National Office for the Receipt of Information on
Human Rights Violations in Cuba reported that workers at a popular
cyber cafe had been instructed to review all outgoing e-mails and to
track websites viewed by individual patrons.
On June 19, state security officials threatened to block the
university admission of the son of human rights activists Carmen Luz
Figueredo and Sergio Gomez Fernandez because of their failure to sign a
government petition making socialism an ``untouchable'' element of the
Constitution. That same day, CDR officials warned independent
journalist Carlos Serpa Maceira that his public refusal to sign that
government petition threatened his 9-year-old daughter's future. In
late June, directors of an agricultural cooperative in Camaguey
province suspended food subsidies to cooperative member Jorge de Armas
for failing to sign the Government petition (see Section 3).
There were numerous credible reports of forced evictions of
squatters and residents who lacked official permission to reside in
Havana. For example, on June 1, police in Havana province arrived in
the neighborhood of Buena Esperanza to remove persons from eastern Cuba
living in the area without authorization. An unknown number of men were
removed in trucks on that date, while women and children were given 72
hours to depart (see Section 2.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
citizens' freedoms of speech and press insofar as they ``conform to the
aims of socialist society.'' This clause effectively bars free speech.
In law and in practice, the Government did not allow criticism of the
revolution or its leaders. Laws against antigovernment propaganda,
graffiti, and disrespect of officials impose penalties between 3 months
and 1 year in prison. If President Castro or members of the ANPP or
Council of State were the objects of criticism, the sentence could be
extended to 3 years. Charges of disseminating enemy propaganda, which
included merely expressing opinions at odds with those of the
Government, could bring sentences of up to 14 years. In the
Government's view, such materials as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, international reports of human rights violations, and
mainstream foreign newspapers and magazines constituted enemy
propaganda. Local CDRs inhibited freedom of speech by monitoring and
reporting dissent or criticism. Police and state security officials
regularly harassed, threatened, and otherwise abused human rights
advocates in public and private as a means of intimidation and control.
The Constitution states that print and electronic media are state
property and can never become private property. The Communist Party
controlled all media except for a few small church-run publications.
Even the church-run publications, denied access to mass printing
equipment, were subject to governmental pressure. Vitral magazine, a
publication of the diocese of Pinar del Rio, continued to publish
during the year.
Citizens did not have the right to receive publications from
abroad, although news stands in hotels for foreigners and certain hard
currency stores sold foreign newspapers and magazines. The Government
continued to jam the transmission of Radio Marti and Television Marti.
Radio Marti broadcasts at times overcame the jamming attempts on short-
wave bands, but its medium-wave transmissions were blocked completely
in Havana. Security agents subjected dissidents, foreign diplomats, and
journalists to harassment and surveillance, including electronic
surveillance.
All legal media must operate under party guidelines and reflect
government views. The Government attempted to shape media coverage to
such a degree that it not only exerted pressure on domestic journalists
but also pressured groups normally outside the official realm of
control, such as visiting international correspondents.
The 1999 Law to Protect National Independence and the Economy
outlaws a broad range of activities that undermine state security and
toughens penalties for criminal activity. Under the law, anyone
possessing or disseminating literature deemed subversive, or supplying
information that could be used by U.S. authorities in the application
of U.S. legislation, may be subject to fines and prison terms of 7 to
20 years. While many activities between citizens and foreigners
possibly could fall within the purview of this law, it appeared to be
aimed primarily at independent journalists; however, no one has been
tried under this law.
The Government continued to threaten independent journalists,
either anonymously or openly, with arrests and convictions based on the
1999 law. Some journalists were threatened repeatedly since the law
took effect. Independent journalists noted that the law's very
existence affected their activities and increased self-censorship, and
some said that it was the Government's most effective tool to harass
members of the independent press.
The Government continued to subject independent journalists to
internal travel bans; arbitrary and periodic detentions (overnight or
longer); harassment of family and friends; seizures of computers,
office, and photographic equipment; and repeated threats of prolonged
imprisonment (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Independent
journalists in Havana reported that threatening phone calls and
harassment of family members continued during the year. Dozens of
reporters were detained repeatedly. The authorities also placed
journalists under house arrest to prevent them from reporting on
conferences sponsored by human rights activists, human rights events,
and court cases against activists. Independent journalists reported
that detentions, threats, and harassment were more severe in the
provinces than in the capital. Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, the Inter-American Press Association, Reporters Without Borders
(RSF), and the Committee to Protect Journalists repeatedly called
international attention to the Government's continued practice of
detaining independent journalists and others simply for exercising
their right to free speech. In addition, police increasingly tried to
prevent independent journalists from covering so-called sensitive
events (see Section 1.d.).
On February 24, state security officials arrested independent
journalist Carlos Alberto Dominguez for participating in a
commemoration of the four civilian pilots killed in February 1996 by
military aircraft (see Section 1.d.).
On February 28, police beat a British and an Italian journalist as
they were filming asylum seekers breaking into the Mexican Embassy (see
Section 1.d.). Castro ordered an investigation into the beating of the
pair, and the Foreign Minister apologized to both journalists for their
mistreatment.
On March 4, state security officials arrested independent
journalist Carlos Brizuela Yera while he and nine other activists were
protesting the earlier beating of an independent journalist during
which police beat and arrested blind dissident Juan Carlos Gonzalez
Leyva (see Section 1.d.). In August prosecutors charged Brizuela with
``public disorder, contempt for authority, resistance, and
disobedience.'' He had not been tried by year's end and remained in
jail.
On March 5, RSF protested the detention of independent journalists
Jesus Alvarez Castillo, Lexter Tellez Castro, Carlos Brizuela Yara,
Normando Hernandez, and Juan Basulto Morell in various incidents. RSF
requested that Interior Minister General Abelardo Colome punish the
authorities responsible for the arrests. At year's end, the Government
had not responded to that request.
On June 7, a state security official threatened to arrest the
president of the Independent Human Rights Center in Santiago de Cuba if
he did not cease providing information to foreign radio stations.
On June 14, state security officials beat and arrested independent
journalist Carlos Serpa Maceira while he was covering a march by human
rights activists on the Isle of Youth (see Section 1.d.).
In October the authorities seized material from a French journalist
departing the country, according to RSF.
In December RSF released a report ``Cuba, where news is the
exclusive reserve of the State,'' which criticized the complete absence
of freedom of the press. RSF also described the constant harassment of
independent journalists and the prison conditions faced by independent
journalists jailed for trying to practice their profession (see Section
1.c.).
In February 2001, Edel Garcia, director of the Central Norte del
Pais press agency, was detained for 12 hours to prevent him from
participating in the commemoration of two planes that were shot down by
military aircraft in international airspace in 1996. At year's end,
Garcia was not in detention, and his trial on charges of collaborating
with the enemy, providing information to Radio Marti, and conspiracy to
commit crimes and espionage remained pending.
Jesus and Jadir Hernandez of Havana-Press were charged with
trafficking in illegal migrants and collaboration with a foreign
mission in 2000; their trial was pending at year's end.
During the year, at least five independent journalists were denied
the right to emigrate, including Manuel Vazquez Portal, Edel Morales,
Jorge Olivera, Dorka Cespedes, and Normando Hernandez.
The authorities often confiscated equipment when arresting
journalists, particularly photographic and recording equipment. It was
possible to buy a fax machine or computer, payable in dollars; if a
receipt could be produced, the equipment usually was not confiscated.
However, police seized a telephone and fax machine from independent
journalist Angel Pablo Polanco despite the fact that he demonstrated
proof of purchase in the country for both items (see Section 1.d.).
Photocopiers and printers either were impossible to find on the local
market or were not sold to individuals, which made them a particularly
valuable commodity for journalists.
Resident foreign correspondents reported that the very high level
of government pressure experienced since 2000, including official and
informal complaints about articles, continued throughout the year. The
Government exercised its ability to control members of the resident
foreign press by requiring them to obtain a government exit permit each
time they wished to leave the country.
Distribution of information continued to be controlled tightly.
Importation of foreign literature was controlled, and the public had no
access to foreign magazines or newspapers. Leading members of the
Government asserted that citizens did not read foreign newspapers and
magazines to obtain news because they did not speak English and had
access to the daily televised round tables on issues with which they
needed to concern themselves. The Government sometimes barred
independent libraries from receiving materials from abroad and seized
materials donated by foreign diplomats.
The Government controlled all access to the Internet, and all
electronic mail messages were subject to censorship. Access to
computers and peripheral equipment was limited, and the Internet only
could be accessed through government-approved institutions. Dial-up
access to government-approved servers was prohibitively expensive for
most citizens. E-mail use grew slowly as the Government allowed access
to more users; however, the Government generally controlled its use,
and only very few persons or groups had access. The Government opened a
national Internet gateway to some journalists, artists, and municipal-
level youth community centers, but the authorities continued to
restrict the types and numbers of international sites that could be
accessed.
The Government officially prohibits all diplomatic missions in
Havana from printing or distributing publications, particularly
newspapers and newspaper clippings, unless these publications
exclusively address conditions in a mission's home country and prior
government approval is received. Many missions did not accept this
requirement and distributed materials; however, the Government's
threats to expel embassy officers who provided published materials had
a chilling effect on some missions.
The Government restricted literary and academic freedoms and
continued to emphasize the importance of reinforcing revolutionary
ideology and discipline over any freedom of expression. The educational
system taught that the State's interests took precedence over all other
commitments. Academics and other government officials were prohibited
from meeting with some diplomats without prior approval from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Education required
teachers to evaluate students' and their parents' ideological character
and to place such evaluations in school records. These reports directly
affected students' educational and career prospects. As a matter of
policy, the Government demanded that teaching materials for courses
such as mathematics or literature have an ideological content.
Government efforts to undermine dissidents included denying them
advanced education and professional opportunities. President Castro
stated publicly that the universities were available only to those who
shared his revolutionary beliefs.
Artistic expression was less restricted. The Government encouraged
the cultural community to attain the highest international standards in
order to sell its work overseas for hard currency. However, in 2000 the
Government began implementing a program called ``Broadening of
Culture'' that tied art, socialism, and modern ``revolutionary''
ideology and legends into its own vision of culture. The Government
used the Government media and the schools to impose this vision on the
public, particularly the youth.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
Constitution grants limited rights of assembly and association, these
rights are subject to the requirement that they may not be ``exercised
against the existence and objectives of the Socialist State.'' The law
punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons,
including those for private religious services in private homes, by up
to 3 months in prison and a fine. The authorities selectively enforced
this prohibition and often used it as a legal pretext to harass and
imprison human rights advocates.
The Government's policy of selectively authorizing the Catholic
Church to hold outdoor processions at specific locations on important
feast days continued during the year. On September 8, the Government
permitted for the fifth consecutive year a procession in connection
with Masses in celebration of the feast day of Our Lady of Charity in
Havana. A number of activists participated in the procession. Police in
Santiago de Cuba warned several dissidents in that city not to attend a
procession for Our Lady of Charity (see Section 2.c.). There were no
reports that processions were denied permits during the year.
The authorities never have approved a public meeting by a human
rights group and often detained activists to prevent them from
attending meetings, demonstrations, or ceremonies (see Section 1.d.).
Asked by a foreign correspondent in October whether his government
obstructed demonstrations, President Castro responded that he had ``no
need to control what does not occur.'' There were unapproved meetings
and demonstrations, which the Government frequently disrupted or
attempted to prevent. The authorities sometimes used or incited
violence against peaceful demonstrators.
On December 10, the authorities monitored, but did not block, a
commemoration of International Human Rights Day by more than 50 persons
at the home of dissident Martha Beatriz Roque. Police did not impede
similar activities at the home of dissident Odilia Collazos and other
sites throughout the country. Roque reported that 1,300 people across
the country participated in commemorations, most of which the
Government monitored but did not obstruct. However, police arrested
Rogelio Menendez and two others in Havana to prevent their
participation in December 10 ceremonies (see Section 1.d.).
In February state security officials threatened to evict an
activist from his home because he had used the home for meetings of the
Cuban Pro Human Rights Party Affiliated with the Andrei Sakharov
Foundation (see Section 2.b.). Also in February, state security
officers detained prodemocracy activists in different parts of the
country to prevent them from staging activities commemorating the 1996
shooting down of two civilian aircraft in international airspace (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
On March 13, police arrested seven human rights activists in Nueva
Gerona, Isle of Youth, as they conducted a public demonstration calling
for democratic reforms and the release of political prisoners (see
Section 1.d.). Police beat the activists as they were conducting a
silent march and took them to a local police station. They were fined
and released.
On March 18, state security officials arrested four leaders of the
Brotherhood of Blind Cubans to prevent a demonstration against police
mistreatment of handicapped street vendors and to call for the release
of blind dissident Juan Carlos Gonzalez Leyva (see Sections 1.c. and
5). Police released the four after issuing them ``official warnings.''
Earlier, on March 4, police arrested protesters at the public hospital
in Ciego de Avila.
On April 1, police called Alberto Fernandez Silva and Humberto
Echevarria Herrera of the Cuban Pro Human Rights Party Affiliated with
the Andrei Sakharov Foundation to a local police station to warn them
that they would be imprisoned if their organization did not cease all
meetings, masses, and vigils.
On April 17, police arrested Barbaro Vela Coego and Armando
Dominguez Gonzalez, president and vice president, respectively, of the
January 6 Civic Movement, to prevent their attendance at a fast in
honor of political prisoners. They were held for 2 hours and released
(see Section 1.d.).
On May 17, police went to the home of Pedro Veliz, president of the
Independent Medical School of Cuba, and instructed him to leave Havana
to prevent his attendance at ceremonies marking the anniversary of a
prerevolutionary political party (see Section 1.f.).
On May 25, police beat and arrested four members of the Cuban Pro
Human Rights Party Affiliated with the Andrei Sakharov Foundation who
were on their way to a Mass in honor of a dissident figure (see Section
2.c.). The four were searched, threatened with imprisonment, fined, and
released.
On June 1, police arrested nine activists as they departed a human
rights course at the Culture and Democracy Institute in Santiago de
Cuba (see Section 1.d.). They were interrogated and released on June 2.
On June 7, police forcefully removed 17 persons from the home of
activist Migdalia Rosado Hernandez, where the group was commemorating
the second anniversary of the Tamarindo 34 hunger strike. The police
took 14 persons far from their homes and abandoned them by the
roadside. Three others were fined and released.
On June 24, police blocked access to the home of activist Francisco
Moure Saladriga to prevent a meeting of members of the Cuban Human
Rights Party scheduled for that day.
In July state security officials in Santiago de Cuba warned
activists Evelio Manteira Barban, Orestes Alberto Alvarez, Manuel de
Jesus Nario, Joaquin Jimenez Hernandez, and Carlos Jimenez Cespedes
that they would be beaten and arrested if they held events
commemorating the sinking of the ``13th of March'' tugboat.
In early August, state security officials warned opposition
activists who were planning protests to coincide with the eighth
anniversary of the antigovernment riot that took place in Havana on
August 5, 1994 that they would be jailed if they participated in such
events. Independent journalist Angel Pablo Polanco and activists
Rogelio Menendez Diaz and Marcel Valenzuela Salt were arrested on
suspicion that they were organizing protests for August 5 (see Section
1.d.).
On September 7, state security officials in Santiago de Cuba warned
Orestes Alberto Alvarez Vega not to attend a Mass in honor of Our Lady
of Charity (see Section 2.c.).
The Government organized marches on May Day and held a rally,
``Tribuna Abierta,'' every Saturday in a different municipality in the
country. There was both radio and television coverage of the weekly
rally.
The Government generally denied citizens the freedom of
association. The Penal Code specifically outlaws illegal or
unrecognized groups. The Minister of Justice, in consultation with the
Interior Ministry, decides whether to give organizations legal
recognition. The authorities never have approved the existence of a
human rights group. However, there were a number of professional
associations that operated as NGOs without legal recognition, including
the Association of Independent Teachers, the Association of Independent
Lawyers (Agramonte), the Association of Independent Architects and
Engineers, and several independent journalist organizations.
Recognized churches (see Section 2.c.), the Roman Catholic
humanitarian organization Caritas, the Masonic Lodge, small human
rights groups, and a number of nascent fraternal or professional
organizations were the only associations outside the control or
influence of the State, the Communist Party, and their mass
organizations. With the exception of the Masons, who had been
established in the country for more than a century, the authorities
continued to ignore those groups' applications for legal recognition,
thereby subjecting members to potential charges of illegal association.
All other legally recognized NGOs were affiliated at least nominally
with or controlled by the Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution recognizes the right of
citizens to profess and practice any religious belief within the
framework of respect for the law; however, in law and in practice, the
Government continued to restrict freedom of religion. In general,
unregistered religious groups continued to experience various degrees
of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Government's
main interaction with religious denominations was through the Office of
Religious Affairs of the Communist Party. The Ministry of Interior
engaged in active efforts to control and monitor the country's
religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration,
and harassment of religious professionals and practitioners. The
Government's policy of permitting apolitical religious activity to take
place in government-approved sites remained unchanged; however,
citizens worshiping in officially sanctioned churches often were
subjected to surveillance by state security forces, and the
Government's efforts to maintain a strong degree of control over
religion continued.
The Constitution provides for the separation of church and State.
In 1991 the Government allowed religious adherents to join the
Communist Party. A 1992 constitutional amendment prohibits religious
discrimination and removed references to ``scientific materialism,''
(i.e., atheism) as the basis for the State. Members of the armed forces
did not attend religious services in uniform, probably to avoid
possible reprimand by superiors.
The Government requires churches and other religious groups to
register with the provincial registry of associations within the
Ministry of the Interior to obtain official recognition. In practice
the Government refused to recognize new denominations; however, the
Government tolerated some religions on the island, such as the Baha'i
Faith. Unregistered religious groups were subject to official
interference, harassment, and repression. The Government, with
occasional exceptions, prohibited the construction of new churches,
forcing many growing congregations to violate the law and meet in
private homes. In October the Government authorized the Greek Orthodox
Church to build a church in Havana.
Government harassment of private houses of worship continued, with
evangelical denominations reporting evictions from houses used for
these purposes. According to the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC)
officials, most of the private houses of worship that the Government
closed were unregistered, making them technically illegal. In addition,
CCC Pentecostal members complained about the preaching activities of
foreign missionaries that led some of their members to establish new
denominations without obtaining the required permits. Because of these
complaints by the Pentecostals, the CCC formally requested overseas
member church organizations to assist them in dissuading foreign
missionaries from establishing Pentecostal churches.
In 1998 following Pope John Paul II's visit, the country's Roman
Catholic bishops called on the Government to recognize the Catholic
Church's role in civil society and the family, as well as in the
temporal areas of work, the economy, the arts, and the scientific and
technical worlds. The Government continued to limit the Catholic
Church's access to the media and to the Internet and refused to allow
the Catholic Church to have a legal independent printing capability. It
maintained a prohibition against the establishment of religious-
affiliated schools.
In September local government authorities, for the fifth
consecutive year, allowed the Catholic Church to hold an outdoor
procession to mark the feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana (see
Section 2.b.). Although visibly present, state security personnel did
not harass any participants or observers as they did in 1998. However,
in Santiago, prior to the procession, security police ordered a number
of human rights activists not to attend the procession.
In 1998 the Government announced that henceforth citizens would be
allowed to celebrate Christmas as an official holiday. (The holiday had
been cancelled, ostensibly to spur the sugar harvest, in 1969 and
restored in 1997 as part of the preparations for the Pope's 1998
visit.) However, the Government maintained a 1995 decree prohibiting
nativity scenes in public buildings.
The Government allowed 9 priests and 12 nuns to enter the country
to replace other priests and nuns whose visas had expired. The
applications of 60 priests and other religious workers remained pending
at year's end.
In the past several years, the Government relaxed restrictions on
some religious denominations, including Seventh-day Adventists and
Jehovah's Witnesses. Jehovah's Witnesses, once considered ``active
religious enemies of the revolution,'' were allowed to proselytize
door-to-door and generally were not subjected to overt government
harassment, although there were sporadic reports of harassment by local
Communist Party and government officials.
Education is secular, and no religious educational institutions are
allowed. There were no reports that parents were restricted from
teaching religion to their children.
The Government continued to prevent any national or joint
enterprise (except those with specific authorization) from selling
computers, fax machines, photocopiers, or other equipment to any church
at other than official--and exorbitant--retail prices. There was no
restriction on the importation of religious literature and symbols if
imported by a registered religious group in accordance with the proper
procedures. In punishment cells, prisoners were denied access to
reading materials, including Bibles (see Section 1.c.).
The CCC continued to broadcast a monthly 15-minute program on a
national classical music radio station on the condition that the
program could not include material of a political character.
State security officials visited some priests and pastors prior to
significant religious events, ostensibly to warn them that dissidents
were trying to ``use the Church''; however, some critics claimed that
these visits were done in an effort to foster mistrust between the
churches and human rights or prodemocracy activists. State security
officers also regularly harassed human rights advocates who sought to
attend religious services commemorating special feast days or before
significant national days, sometimes entering churches and disrupting
religious ceremonies.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government severely restricted
freedom of movement. The Government generally did not impose legal
restrictions on domestic travel; however, it limited migration to
Havana, and initially restricted persons found to be HIV-positive to
sanatoriums for treatment and therapy before conditionally releasing
them into the community. For the past several years, state security
officials prohibited human rights advocates and independent journalists
from traveling outside their home provinces, and the Government also
sentenced others to internal exile.
On April 24, a local official in Puerto Padre, Las Tunas province,
encouraged the expulsion of Alfredo Dominguez Batista, Rigoberto Pena
Hernandez, and Hector Sanchez Garcia from that city for their
activities in support of the Varela Project. The two men were harassed
but were able to continue their work.
In July state security officials prevented human rights activist
Jose Manuel Rivas Medina of the Isle of Pines Human Rights Foundation
from departing the Isle of Youth for meetings in Havana. On July 1, two
state security agents prevented Rivas Medina from boarding a flight to
Havana. The next day, the same officials prevented Rivas Medina from
boarding a ferry and threatened to arrest him if he persisted in his
efforts to visit Havana.
Decree 217 prohibits persons in other provinces from moving into
Havana on the grounds that if internal migration was left unchecked,
the city's problems regarding housing, public transport, water, and
electrical supplies would become worse; visits to the city were
permissible. Police frequently checked the identification of persons on
the streets, and if someone from another province was found living in
Havana illegally, that person was fined $12 (300 pesos) and sent back
home. Fines were $40 (1,000 pesos) for those who resided illegally in
the neighborhoods of Old Havana and Cerro. Human rights observers noted
that while the decree affected migration countrywide, it targeted
individuals and families predominantly of African descent from the more
impoverished eastern provinces.
On June 1, police in Havana province entered the neighborhood of
Buena Esperanza to remove persons from the eastern provinces living in
the area without authorization. An unknown number of men were removed
in trucks on that date, while women and children were given 72 hours to
depart (see Section 1.d.).
The Government imposed some restrictions on both emigration and
temporary foreign travel. The Government allowed the majority of
persons who qualified for immigrant or refugee status in other
countries to depart; however, in certain cases the authorities delayed
or denied exit permits, usually without explanation. Some denials
involved professionals who tried to emigrate and whom the Government
subsequently banned from working in their occupational fields. The
Government refused permission to others because it considered their
cases sensitive for political or state security reasons. Resolution 54
denies exit permits to medical professionals until they have performed
3 to 5 years of service in their profession after requesting permission
to travel abroad. This regulation, normally applied to recent
graduates, was not published officially and may have applied to other
professionals as well.
The Independent Human Rights Center in Santiago reported that the
Government had denied exit permits to medical professionals Milagro
Beaton Betancourt, Nayibe Sarda Sabatel, Angel Edmundo Fernandez
Petell, Hector Arias, Raul Rizo, and Ariel Valverde Cuevas. The
Government usually denied exit permits to the family members of doctors
performing regional medical missions, a practice intended to discourage
such personnel from seeking asylum or emigrating.
In July immigration officials denied an exit permit to Elizardo
Sanchez Santa Cruz to attend a human rights conference in Guatemala.
Sanchez subsequently received an exit permit for a family visit.
In July immigration officials withdrew authorization they had
previously granted to independent librarian Gisela Delgado Sablon to
receive a human rights award abroad.
In September immigration officials informed Christian Liberation
Movement leader Oswaldo Jose Paya Sardinas that he needed authorization
from the Minister of Health before they would process his request for
an exit permit. Paya is an X-ray equipment technician employed by a
state company that falls under the authority of the Ministry of Health.
After several months' delay and after pressure from foreign
governments, the Government granted Paya an exit permit the day after
unknown persons left threatening placards in front of his home. Paya
had requested an exit permit to receive a human rights award abroad for
his leadership of the Varela Project (see Section 3). On December 18,
the European Parliament awarded Paya the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of
Thought.
In September immigration authorities informed dissident Vladimiro
Roca that they had up to 30 days to determine whether they would issue
an exit permit to ``people like him,'' apparently referring to his
status as a released political prisoner, rather than the 15 days
required for most applications. Roca requested an exit permit to
receive a human rights award abroad. In December the Government
formally denied Roca's request and refused to explain why his
application had been rejected.
On October 4, immigration officials denied independent economist
Martha Beatriz Roque's request for an exit permit to travel to receive
a human rights award abroad. Before denying her application,
immigration officials forced Roque to return numerous times to produce
documents--such as her ration card--not normally required for
applications for temporary travel.
In March 2001, immigration officials prevented independent
journalist Oswaldo de Cespedes and his family from boarding their
flight as political refugees. De Cespedes was informed that his exit
permit had been canceled. A migration official later told him that the
exit permit was canceled ``for interests of the State.'' His family was
allowed to leave at a later date and de Cespedes was allowed to depart
early in the year.
The Government routinely denied exit permits to young men
approaching the age of military service, and until they reached the age
of 27, even when it authorized other family members to leave. However,
in most of those cases approved for migration to the United States
under the September 1, 1994, U.S.-Cuban migration agreement, the
applicants eventually received exemption from obligatory service and
were granted exit permits.
The Government has a policy of denying exit permission for several
years to relatives of individuals who successfully migrated illegally
(e.g., merchant seamen who defected while overseas and sports figures
who defected while on tours abroad).
Migrants who travel to the United States must pay the Government a
total of $600 per adult and $400 per child, plus airfare. These
government fees for medical exam, passport, and exit visa--which must
be paid in dollars--were equivalent to about 5 years of a professional
person's accumulated peso salary and represented a significant
hardship, particularly for political refugees who usually were
marginalized and had no income. In 1996 the Government agreed to allow
1,000 needy refugees to leave each year with reduced exit fees.
However, after the first group of 1,000 in 1996, no further refugees
were accorded reduced fees. At year's end, of the 1,259 persons pending
travel, 23 approved refugees remained in the country because they were
unable to pay government exit fees for themselves and their families.
The Penal Code provides for imprisonment of up to 3 years or a fine
of $12 to $40 (300 to 1,000 pesos) for unauthorized departures by boat
or raft. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
stated that it regarded any sentence of more than 1 year for simple
illegal exit as harsh and excessive. Under the terms of the May 2,
1995, U.S.-Cuba Migration Accord, the Government agreed not to
prosecute or retaliate against migrants returned from international or
U.S. waters, or from the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, after
attempting to emigrate illegally if they had not committed a separate
criminal offense.
In 1994 the Government eased restrictions on visits by and
repatriations of Cuban emigrants. Citizens who established residency
abroad and who were in possession of government-issued permits to
reside abroad may travel to the country without visas. Persons at least
18 years of age are eligible to travel abroad and may stay abroad up to
11 months. In 1995 the Government announced that emigrants who were
considered not to have engaged in so-called hostile actions against the
Government and who were not subject to criminal proceedings in their
countries of residence could apply at Cuban consulates for renewable,
2-year multiple-entry travel authorizations. However, in 1999 the
Government announced that it would deny entry permits for emigrants who
had left the country illegally after September 1994. It remained
unclear whether the Government actually was implementing such a policy.
The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to individuals
persecuted ``for their ideals or struggles for democratic rights
against imperialism, fascism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; against
discrimination and racism; for national liberation; for the rights of
workers, peasants, and students; for their progressive political,
scientific, artistic, and literary activities; and for socialism and
peace.'' However, the Government has no formal mechanism to process
asylum for foreign nationals. Nonetheless, the Government honors the
principle of first asylum and provided it to a small number of persons.
There was no information available on its use during the year.
A total of 45 persons applied for refugee status during the year,
of which 9 were approved; according to the UNHCR, there were 1,005
refugees in the country.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the legal right to change their government or
to advocate change, and the Government retaliated systematically
against those who sought peaceful political change. The Constitution
proscribes any political organization other than the Communist Party.
During the year, the Government amended the Constitution to restrict
further citizens' rights to change the Government, making socialism the
``irrevocable'' basis of the Constitution. While the Constitution
provides for direct election of provincial, municipal, and ANPP
members, the candidates for provincial and national office must be
approved in advance by mass organizations controlled by the Government.
In practice a small group of leaders, under the direction of President
Castro, selected the members of the highest policy-making bodies of the
Communist Party: The Politburo and the Central Committee.
The authorities tightly controlled the selection of candidates and
all elections for government and party positions. The candidacy
committees were composed of members of government-controlled mass
organizations such as the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) and the
CDRs and were responsible for selecting candidates, whose names then
were sent to municipal assemblies that selected a single candidate for
each regional seat in the ANPP. An opposition or independent candidate
never has been allowed to run for national office.
In January 1998, the Government held national elections in which
601 candidates were approved to compete for the 601 seats in the
National Assembly. According to the official state media, the
candidates were voted in by more than 93 percent of the electorate. No
candidates with views independent from or in opposition to the
Government were allowed to run, and no views contrary to the Government
or the Communist Party were expressed in the Government-controlled
national media. The Government saturated the media and used government
ministries, Communist Party entities, and mass organizations to urge
voters to cast a ``unified vote'' where marking one box automatically
selected all candidates on the ballot form. In practice the Communist
Party approved candidates for all offices. A small minority of
candidates did not belong formally to the Communist Party. The
Communist Party was the only political party allowed to participate in
the elections.
Deputies in the National Assembly, delegates in the provincial
assemblies, and members of the Council of State are elected during
general elections every 5 years. Municipal elections are held every 2
\1/2\ years to elect 14,686 local representatives to the municipal
assemblies, the lowest level of the Government's structure. In October
the Government held elections for local representatives to the
municipal assemblies. Government newspapers reported that 95 percent of
voters participated in the election, compared with 98 percent in 2000.
Slightly less than 50 percent of those elected were incumbents, 22
percent were women, and 6 percent of all candidates were between the
ages of 16 and 30. The reports also claimed that nationwide the number
of blank ballots remained steady at 2.8 percent and the number of
annulled ballots decreased from 3 percent to 2.4 percent.
Although not a formal requirement, in practice Communist Party
membership was a prerequisite for high-level official positions and
professional advancement.
The Government rejected any change to the political system judged
incompatible with the revolution and ignored and actively suppressed
calls for democratic reform. On May 10, opposition organization All
United (Todos Unidos) delivered a petition to the National Assembly
proposing a five-point national referendum on political and economic
reforms. This effort, known as the Varela Project and led by Christian
Liberation Movement leader Oswaldo Paya, was based on Article 88 of the
1976 Constitution, which permits citizens to propose legislation if
such proposals are backed by at least 10,000 citizens; the Varela
petition had 11,020 signatures. The Varela Project called for an end to
limits on freedom of association, an amnesty for nonviolent political
prisoners, reduced barriers to private enterprise, electoral reforms,
and free elections within a year of the referendum. In an apparent
effort to reject the Varela Project without publicly addressing it, the
Government mobilized citizens to sign a petition making the socialist
character of the Constitution ``untouchable.'' The Government claimed
that 99.37 percent of eligible voters signed the Government petition
requesting such a modification to the Constitution. The National
Assembly unanimously passed the amendment making socialism the
``irrevocable'' basis of the Constitution. The changes did not rescind
the right of citizens to propose legislation, and Varela organizers
continued to collect signatures in support of their proposal.
Government officials harassed persons working in support of Project
Varela, retaliated against some persons who signed that petition, and
retaliated against some persons who did not sign the Government
petition (see Section 1.f.).
Government leadership positions continued to be dominated by men.
There were no legal impediments to women voting, holding political
office, or rising to political leadership; however, there were very few
women or minorities in policymaking positions in the Government or the
Party. There were 2 women in the 24-member Politburo and 18 in the 150-
member Central Committee. Women held 28 percent of the seats in the
601-seat National Assembly. Although blacks and persons of African
descent made up more than half the population, they held only six seats
in the Politburo. The National Assembly was approximately 42 percent
mulatto or mestizo, 40 percent white, 17 percent black, and 1 percent
other.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government did not recognize any domestic human rights groups
or permit them to function legally. The Government subjected domestic
human rights advocates to intense intimidation, harassment, and
repression. In violation of its own statutes, the Government refused to
consider applications for legal recognition submitted by human rights
monitoring groups (see Section 2.b.).
Dissidents generally believed that most human rights organizations
were infiltrated and subjected to constant surveillance. Activists
believed that some of the dissidents were either state security
officials or were persons attempting to qualify for refugee status to
leave the country. It was a crime punishable by 8 to 15 years'
imprisonment publicly to identify suspected state infiltrators.
In its 1997 report, the IACHR examined measures taken by the
Government and found that they did not ``comprise the bedrock of a
substantive reform in the present political system that would permit
the ideological and partisan pluralism implicit in the wellspring from
which a democratic system of government develops.'' The IACHR
recommended that the Government provide reasonable safeguards to
prevent violations of human rights, unconditionally release political
prisoners and those jailed for trying to leave the country, abolish the
concept of dangerousness in the Penal Code, eliminate other legal
restriction on basic freedoms, cease harassing human rights groups, and
establish a separation of powers so that the judiciary no longer would
be subordinate to political power (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
The Government steadfastly rejected international human rights
monitoring. In 1992 the country's U.N. representative stated that the
Government would not recognize the mandate of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights on Cuba and would not cooperate with the Special
Rapporteur on Cuba, despite being a UNCHR member. This policy remained
unchanged, and the Government refused even to acknowledge requests by
the Special Rapporteur to visit the country. On April 19, the UNCHR
passed a resolution that expressed concern about the human rights
situation in the country and renewed the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur on Cuba. At year's end, the Government had not allowed the
Rapporteur to visit Cuba as required by the UNCHR resolution.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The country is a multiracial society with a black and mixed-race
majority. The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex,
or national origin; however, evidence suggested that racial
discrimination occurred frequently.
Women.--Violent crime rarely was reported in the press, and there
was no publicly available data regarding the incidence of domestic
violence and rape; however, human rights advocates reported that
violence against women was a problem. The law establishes strict
penalties for rape, and the Government enforced the law; however,
according to human rights advocates, the police did not act on cases of
domestic violence.
The 2000 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women stated that most government officials did not view violence
against women as prevalent; however, activists at the grassroots level
were attuned to problems of violence affecting women. The Rapporteur
urged the Government to take comprehensive steps to enhance the legal
protection against violence against women and urged the adoption of
legislation to address domestic violence and sexual harassment.
Prostitution is legal for persons over 17 years of age; however,
pandering or otherwise benefiting from prostitution is a felony.
Prostitution increased greatly in recent years. Press reports indicated
that tourists from various countries visited specifically to patronize
inexpensive prostitutes. A government crackdown on prostitution that
began in late 1998 initially had some effect, but prostitutes (known as
``jineteras'') still were visible in Havana and other major cities
during the year. Police obtained early success in their efforts by
stationing officers on nearly every major street corner where tourists
were present. Some street police officers were suspected of providing
protection to the jineteras. Most observers believed that the
Government clamped down on prostitution to combat the perception that
the Government promoted sex tourism. The Government set up centers to
take prostitutes off the streets and reeducate them. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur's report recommended that the Government dismantle the
centers and find ``other mechanisms that do not violate the rights of
the prostitutes.'' There was no information available regarding whether
or not the Government dismantled these centers.
The Family Code states that women and men have equal rights and
responsibilities regarding marriage, divorce, raising children,
maintaining the home, and pursuing a career. Women were subject to the
same restrictions on property ownership as men. The law provides up to
1 year of maternity leave and grants working mothers preferential
access to goods and services. Approximately 40 percent of all women
worked, and they were well represented in many professions. According
to the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC), in 2000 women held 33 percent of
managerial positions. The FMC also asserted that 11,200 women had
received land parcels to cultivate, that more than 561,000 women had
begun working as agricultural workers, and that women devoted 34 hours
a week to domestic work, approximately the same number of hours they
spent working outside the home.
Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government protect
family, maternity, and matrimony. It also states that children,
legitimate or not, have the same rights under the law and notes the
duties of parents to protect them. The law requires school attendance
until the ninth grade, and this law generally was respected in
practice. Education was free, but it was grounded in Marxist ideology.
State organizations and schools were charged with the integral
formation of children and youth. The national health care system
covered all citizens.
There was no societal pattern of abuse of children. Police officers
who found children loitering in the streets or begging from tourists
frequently intervened and tried to find the parents. If the child was
found bothering tourists a second time, police frequently fined the
child's parents. Child prostitution was a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
on disability, and there were few complaints of such discrimination.
On March 18, state security officials arrested four leaders of the
Brotherhood of Blind Cubans to prevent a demonstration that opposed
police mistreatment of handicapped street vendors and that called for
the release of blind dissident Juan Carlos Gonzalez Leyva (see Sections
1.d. and 2.b.).
In April the Government-affiliated National Association of the
Blind expelled Tomas Arquimedes Quintana for violating the norms of the
organization by ``acting in contradiction to the goals of a socialist
state.'' Quintana is a member of the Cuban Human Rights Foundation and
of the Independent Brotherhood of the Blind.
There are no laws that mandate accessibility to buildings for
persons with disabilities. In practice buildings and transportation
rarely were accessible to persons with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Many persons of African descent
have benefited from access to basic education and medical care since
the 1959 revolution, and much of the police force and army enlisted
personnel is black. Nevertheless, racial discrimination often occurred
and was acknowledged publicly by high governmental officials, including
President Castro during remarks at the World Conference on Racism in
South Africa. President Castro acknowledged that the revolution had not
eradicated racism. There were numerous reports of disproportionate
police harassment of black youths. Evictions, exacerbated by Decree
217, primarily targeted individuals and families who migrated to Havana
from the eastern provinces, which were traditionally areas of black or
mixed-race populations (see Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution gives priority to
state or collective needs over individual choices regarding free
association or provision of employment. The demands of the economy and
society took precedence over individual workers' preferences.
Established official labor organizations had a mobilization function
and did not act as trade unions, promote worker rights, or protect the
right to strike. Such organizations were under the control of the State
and the Communist Party, which also managed the enterprises for which
the laborers worked. Because all legal unions were government entities,
antiunion discrimination by definition did not exist.
The Communist Party selects the leaders of the sole legal labor
confederation, the Confederation of Cuban Workers, whose principal
responsibility is to ensure that government production goals are met.
Despite disclaimers in international forums, the Government explicitly
prohibited independent unions, and none were recognized. There has been
no change in conditions since the 1992 International Labor Organization
(ILO) finding that the Government violated ILO norms on the freedom of
association and the right to organize. Those who attempted to engage in
unofficial union activities faced government harassment.
Workers may lose--and many have lost--their jobs for their
political beliefs, including their refusal to join the official union.
Several small independent labor organizations were created but
functioned without legal recognition and were unable to represent
workers effectively or work on their behalf.
On January 3, police arrested Milagros Zeneida Morales of the
Independent Workers Labor Union on charges of recruiting members for a
counterrevolutionary organization (see Section 1.d.).
In late March, police instructed Lidia Rodriguez to report on any
telephone calls made by independent labor organizers Luis Sergio Nunez
and Gabriel Sanchez of the Independent National Labor Organization (see
Section 1.f.).
On June 27, a state security official informed labor activist
Reinaldo Rodriguez Camejo that he would soon lose his job as a teacher
at a technical institute. In late July, the institute cancelled his 2-
year contract and informed him that he would not be rehired.
On July 1, state security officials ordered independent labor
organizer Leodegario Jimenez Ojeda, president of the Independent
Medical School in Santiago and a member of the Independent National
Labor Confederation, to their office, where they interrogated him and
accused him of participating in counterrevolutionary activities and
having links to ``terrorists'' in Miami.
In July the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association cited several
instances of government persecution of members of the Single Council of
Cuban Workers and called on the Government to allow formation of
independent trade unions.
The CTC is a member of the Communist World Federation of Trade
Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining does not exist. The State Committee for Work and Social
Security (CETSS) sets wages and salaries for the state sector, which is
almost the only employer in the country. The law prohibits strikes;
none were known to have occurred. The 1995 Foreign Investment Law
denies workers the right to contract directly with foreign companies
investing in the country without special government permission.
Although a few firms managed to negotiate exceptions, the Government
required foreign investors to contract workers through state employment
agencies, which were paid in foreign currency and, in turn, paid
workers very low wages in pesos. Typically workers received 5 percent
of the salary paid by the companies to the State. Workers subcontracted
by state employment agencies must meet certain political
qualifications. According to Minister of Basic Industry Marcos Portal,
the state employment agencies consulted with the Party, the CTC, and
the Union of Communist Youth to ensure that the workers chosen
``deserved'' to work in a joint enterprise.
There were no functioning export processing zones, although the law
authorizes the establishment of free trade zones and industrial parks.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--Neither the Constitution
nor the Labor Code prohibits forced or bonded labor. The Government
maintained correctional centers where it sent persons for crimes such
as dangerousness. Prisoners held there were forced to work on farms or
building sites; for example, doing construction, agricultural work, or
metal working. The authorities often imprisoned internees who did not
cooperate.
The Government employed special groups of workers, known as
``microbrigades,'' who were reassigned temporarily from their usual
jobs to work on special building projects. These microbrigades were
increasingly important in the Government's efforts to complete tourist
and other priority projects. Workers who refused to volunteer for these
jobs often risked discrimination or job loss. Microbrigade workers
reportedly received priority consideration for housing assignments. The
military assigned some conscripts to the Youth Labor Army, where they
served a 2-year military service requirement working on farms that
supplied both the armed forces and the civilian population.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, the Government required children to work without compensation.
All students over age 11 were expected to devote 30 to 45 days of their
summer vacation to farm work, laboring up to 8 hours per day. The
Ministry of Agriculture used ``voluntary labor'' by student work
brigades extensively in the farming sector. According to school rules,
refusal to do agricultural work could affect the student's ability to
continue studying at the institution.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum working age is 17 years. However, the
Labor Code permits the employment of 15- and 16-year-old children to
obtain training or to fill labor shortages.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The CETSS sets the minimum wage,
which varies by occupation. For example, the minimum monthly wage for a
maid was $6.60 (165 pesos); for a bilingual office clerk, $7.60 (190
pesos); and for a gardener $8.65 (216 pesos). The Government
supplemented the minimum wage with free education, subsidized medical
care (daily pay is reduced by 40 percent after the third day of being
admitted to a hospital), housing, and some food (this subsidized food
is enough for about 1 week per month). However, even with these
subsidies, the minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. Corruption and black market activities were
pervasive. The Government rationed most basic necessities such as food,
medicine, clothing, and cooking gas, which were in very short supply.
The Government required foreign companies in joint ventures with
state entities to hire and pay workers through the State (see Section
6.b.). Human Rights Watch noted that the required reliance on state-
controlled employment agencies effectively left workers without any
capacity directly to negotiate wages, benefits, the basis of
promotions, or the length of the workers' trial period at the job with
the employer. Foreign companies paid the Government as much as $500 to
$600 per worker per month while the workers received only a small
fraction of that in pesos from the Government.
The standard workweek was 44 hours, with shorter workweeks in
hazardous occupations, such as mining. The Government reduced the
workday in some government offices and state enterprises to save
energy.
Workplace environmental and safety controls usually were
inadequate, and the Government lacked effective enforcement mechanisms.
Industrial accidents apparently were frequent, but the Government
suppressed such reports. The Labor Code establishes that a worker who
considers his life in danger because of hazardous conditions has the
right not to work in his position or not to engage in specific
activities until such risks are eliminated. According to the Labor
Code, the worker remains obligated to work temporarily in whatever
other position may be assigned him at a salary provided for under the
law.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prohibits trafficking in
persons through or from the country and provides for penalties for
violations, including a term of 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for
organizing or cooperating in alien smuggling through the country; 10 to
20 years' imprisonment for entering the country to smuggle persons out
of the country; and 20 years to life in prison for using violence,
causing harm or death, or putting lives in danger in engaging in such
smuggling. These provisions were directed primarily at persons engaging
in organized smuggling of would-be emigrants. In addition, the revised
code made it illegal to promote or organize the entrance of persons
into or the exit of persons from the country for the purpose of
prostitution; violators were subject to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment.
Child prostitution was a problem, with young girls engaging in
prostitution to help support themselves and their families. It is
illegal for a person under 17 years of age to engage in prostitution.
The police enforced this law during the year as part of a general
crackdown on prostitution; however, the phenomenon continued as more
cabarets and discos opened for the growing tourist industry, which made
it easier for tourists to come into contact with child prostitutes.
----------
DOMINICA
Dominica is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member of
the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and a
unicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A president,
nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of the
opposition party, and elected for a 5-year term by the Parliament, was
head of state. The Prime Minister was Pierre Charles of the Dominica
Labour Party (DLP), which prevailed in generally free and fair
elections in January 2000, and which had a majority coalition in the
Parliament. The judiciary was generally independent.
The Dominica Police--the only security force--was controlled by and
responsive to the democratically elected government. There were
occasional allegations of abuse by the police.
The country's primarily agrarian, market-based economy depended on
earnings from banana exports, historically sold in the European market.
The country has a population of approximately 72,000. Revenues from the
banana industry were declining with the phase-out of its protected
trade status with the European Union, and the Government's efforts to
market the island as an ecotourism destination had mixed results. Faced
with falling revenue, instead of making public sector cuts, the
Government imposed new taxes and levies.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in several areas. Prison
conditions were poor; violence against women and children was a
problem; and there were instances of discrimination against indigenous
Carib Indians and societal discrimination against female Caribs in
mixed marriages. Dominica was invited by the Community of Democracies'
(CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, but there were
some complaints of use of excessive force by the police.
The police had an Internal Affairs Department to investigate public
complaints against the police and to provide counseling to police
officers. The unit received 55 complaints during the year, of which 22
alleged use of excessive force. Of these, the unit sent 4 to
Magistrate's Court, issued 2 warnings, and dismissed 3 for lack of
evidence; 13 cases were pending investigation or trial. During the
year, several officers attended human rights training courses in
Trinidad and other locations.
Prison conditions were poor. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions
continued to be problems in the prison facility, which held 223
prisoners at year's end. The prison provided work therapy, music and
sports programs, educational opportunities, and counseling for inmates.
Prisoners continued to complain about the poor quality of prison food;
however, prison officials noted that prisoners have access to fresh
pork from pigs raised at the prison. Pretrial detainees were housed
with convicted prisoners, due to overcrowding and a lack of sufficient
holding cells. Female prisoners were segregated from male prisoners,
and juveniles were segregated from adult inmates.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires that the authorities inform persons of the reasons for arrest
within 24 hours after arrest and bring the detainee to court within 72
hours. This requirement generally was honored in practice; however, if
the authorities were unable to bring a detainee to court within the
requisite period, the detainee could be released and rearrested later.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government did not use
it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it was generally independent in practice.
The judicial system is composed of a high court judge, 5
magistrates, and 10 magistrate courts located in police stations around
the country. Appeals can be made to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
and to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
The law provides for public trial before an independent, impartial
court. Criminal defendants were presumed innocent until proven guilty,
were allowed legal counsel, and had the right to appeal. Courts
provided free legal counsel to the indigent only in capital cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government
authorities generally respected these prohibitions, and violations were
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right of free expression, and the Government generally respected this
right in practice. The political opposition openly criticized the
Government.
The print media consisted of four private newspapers and political
party journals; all published without censorship or government
interference. The principal radio station was state-owned and had a
government-appointed board. There was also an independent radio station
owned by a private company. Citizens had access to independent news
sources through cable television and radio reception from neighboring
islands.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the
Government generally respected these rights in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
Members of the Rastafarian community complained that law
enforcement officials unfairly targeted them. However, it was not clear
whether such complaints reflected discrimination on the basis of
religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of laws
against marijuana, which was used as part of Rastafarian religious
practice.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. The
Government may revoke passports if subversion is suspected but had not
done so in the past several years.
The Government had not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The unicameral legislative assembly, called the
House of Assembly, was composed of 21 parliamentary representatives and
nine senators. The representatives were elected by popular vote. The
President appoints the senators; five senators are chosen with the
advice of the Prime Minister and four with the advice of the opposition
leader. Elections must be held at least every 5 years, although the
Prime Minister can call elections at any time.
In January 2000, the Dominica Labour Party won 10 seats in
generally free and fair elections, defeating the United Workers' Party
(UWP) which had held power since 1995. DLP leader Roosevelt P.
``Rosie'' Douglas forged a majority coalition of 13 seats out of the 21
elected seats in Parliament, with the Dominican Freedom Party, holder
of 2 seats, and 1 former UWP parliamentarian who changed party
affiliation to join the DLP government. Douglas died in office in
October 2000, and the former Minister of Communication and Works,
Pierre Charles, became Prime Minister.
There were no impediments in law or in practice to the
participation of women in leadership roles in government or political
parties. There were 6 women in the 30-seat legislature; 2 elected
parliamentary representatives and 4 senators appointed by the
President. There were no women in the Cabinet.
There were no impediments in law or in practice to the
participation of Carib Indians in national political life. The
Parliamentary Representative for Indigenous People was a Carib Indian;
he served concurrently as the Prime Minister's Parliamentary Secretary
with responsibility for Carib affairs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There were no government restrictions on the formation of local
human rights organizations, although no such groups existed. Several
advocacy groups, such as the Association of Disabled People, the
Dominican National Council of Women, and a women's and children's self-
help organization, operated freely and without government interference.
There were no requests for investigations of human rights abuses from
international or regional human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution includes provisions against racial, sexual, and
religious discrimination, which the authorities generally respected in
practice.
Women.--Domestic violence cases were common. Government and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including religious
organizations, tried to address this problem. There was no family court
to deal specifically with domestic violence issues. Women could bring
charges against husbands for battery, and both the police and the
courts prosecuted cases of rape and sexual assault, but there were no
specific spousal abuse laws. All rape cases were handled solely by
female police officers. The Department of Labor established a crisis
response mechanism to assist women who were victims of domestic
violence. The Welfare Department of the Ministry of Community
Development assisted victims of abuse by finding temporary shelter,
providing counseling to both parties, or recommending police action.
The Welfare Department reported all cases of abuse to the police.
In December 2001, a Protection Against Domestic Violence Act was
enacted that allows abused persons to appear before a magistrate
without an attorney and request a protective order. The court may also
order that the alleged perpetrator be removed from the home in order to
allow the victims, usually women and children, to remain in the home
while the matter was being investigated. Police enforcement of
protective orders increased after enactment of this act and after
officers received training in dealing with domestic abuse cases. The
Dominica National Council of Women, an NGO, taught preventive education
about domestic violence and maintained a shelter where counseling and
mediation services were available daily. Due to a shortage of funding,
the organization could only permit persons to stay at the shelter for
several days at a time; however, if needed, further housing was
provided in private homes for up to 3 weeks. During the year, the
Catholic Church held a domestic violence symposium attended by
approximately 400 persons.
Sexual harassment was a problem.
While there was little open discrimination against women, property
ownership continued to be deeded to ``heads of households,'' who were
usually males. When the male head of household died without a will, the
wife could not inherit the property or sell it, although she could live
in it and pass it to her children. In the civil service, the law
establishes fixed pay rates for specific jobs, whatever the gender of
the incumbent. According to the Labor Department, many women in rural
areas found it difficult to meet basic needs, at least in part owing to
the decline in the banana export industry.
Children.--The law stipulates that the Government should protect
the rights of children to education and health care. Education was
compulsory through the age of 16, and primary health care was available
throughout the island.
Various laws enumerate children's rights, but their enforcement was
hampered by lack of staffing in government agencies. There were nine
staff members in the social welfare office that handled all welfare
problems, including complaints of child abuse. According to the Welfare
Department, there were 189 cases of child abuse, compared with 155 in
2001. There was an increase in the number of child abuse cases in the
Carib reservation.
Although the maximum sentence for sexual molestation (rape, incest)
was 25 years' imprisonment, the normal sentence given was 5 to 7 years
except in the case of murder. The age of consent for sexual relations
is 16 years.
Persons with Disabilities.--Beyond the general protection of the
Constitution, there was no specific legislation to address problems
facing persons with disabilities. However, the labor laws permit
authorization of employment of a person with disabilities for less than
the minimum wage, in order to increase opportunities for employment of
such persons (see Section 6.e.). There was no requirement mandating
access for those with disabilities.
Indigenous Persons.--There was a significant Carib Indian
population, estimated at 3,400 persons, most of whom lived on a 3,782-
acre reservation created in 1903 and expanded in 1997. About 65 percent
of the Carib population were between the ages of 18 and 35. There was a
three-person police station on the reservation; generally several of
the police assigned there were Carib Indians. School, water, and health
facilities available on the Carib reservation were rudimentary but
similar to those available to other rural citizens; however, there was
no secondary school on the reservation. Most Carib Indians engaged in
farming, fishing, and handicrafts. Unemployment was believed to be
higher than in rest of the country, while the average income was below
the national average. The Government built a Heritage Village to
showcase Carib culture; at year's end the buildings were complete, but
it was not yet open to the public.
The reservation is governed by the 1978 Carib Act. Carib Indians
over the age of 18 who reside there were eligible to vote for the Chief
and six members of the Council of Advisors (they also were eligible to
vote in national elections). Separate elections for council members and
the Chief were held every 5 years. According to the Carib Act, the
Council must meet once a month, determine the Chief's itinerary, and
publish council meeting agendas in the Government Gazette.
Building permits for homes within the reservation were obtained
from the Carib Council and were available only to Carib Indians. As a
result, Carib women who were married to, or who lived with, non-Carib
men were often advised to put the home in their names. Until 1979 the
Carib Act allowed Carib men married to non-Carib women to continue
living on the Carib reserve but dictated that Carib women married to
non-Carib men had to move off the reservation. Although the law
changed, practice was not yet in keeping with the law. An estimated 25
percent of the Carib Indian population was believed to be in mixed
marriages or relationships.
One of the major issues facing the Carib Indians was the increasing
encroachment on their territory by farmers, particularly on the
southern side of the reservation. The 1903 land grant, on which the
Carib Indians based their claim to the land, did not clearly delineate
the reservation boundaries. Another issue for the Carib Indians was
their difficulty in obtaining bank financing. As all land on the
reservation was held communally, individuals were not able to pledge
the land as collateral for loans.
In June the Government ratified International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention No. 169, concerning indigenous and tribal people.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers had the legal right to
organize, to choose their representatives, and to strike. Unions
represented less than 10 percent of the total work force, but
approximately 55 percent of government workers were unionized. However,
the banana, coconut, and citrus fruit industries as well as port
services were deemed ``essential services,'' which effectively
prohibited workers in these sectors from going on strike. The ILO
considered this definition overly broad. The ILO repeatedly urged the
Government to amend legislation so that restrictions on the right to
strike would only be imposed in the case of services limited to those
the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety, or
health of the whole or part of the population, or in the case of an
acute national crisis. The ILO noted that existing legislation made it
possible to stop a strike by compulsory arbitration and empowered the
Minister to refer disputes to compulsory arbitration if in his or her
opinion it concerns serious issues. The Government did not take any
action to amend this legislation.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and
judicial authorities enforced union rights. In addition, employers must
reinstate workers fired for union activities. The law requires that
employers recognize unions as bargaining agents once both parties have
followed appropriate procedures. Department of Labor inspectors under
the supervision of the Labor Commissioner enforce labor legislation,
but the Labor Inspection Office lacked sufficient personnel to carry
out its duties.
All unions were independent of the Government. While there were no
direct ties, members of certain political parties dominated some
unions. In June 2001, the Public Service Workers Union circulated a
proposal to create a ``congress of unions'' as an umbrella
organization, but it drew no response from other unions or employee
associations.
Unions may affiliate with various international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have
legally defined rights to organize workers and to bargain with
employers. Collective bargaining was widespread in the nonagricultural
sectors of the economy, including in government service, and there was
also recourse to mediation and arbitration by the Government.
In June police officers staged a sickout that briefly crippled
operations around the island. The action was taken to draw attention to
a decade-long dispute between the Government and the Police Welfare
Association over pension benefits. On July 3, hundreds of private
sector and unemployed workers demonstrated to protest the new budget.
Government workers followed suit on July 9, effectively shutting down
most government operations for the day. On both occasions, members of
the police force staged additional sickouts in ``sympathy'' with other
protesters. Further demonstrations and sickouts were held in September,
causing the temporary (but unanticipated) closure of the airports.
Unions reported that the demonstrations were peaceful, and there was no
difficulty in obtaining permits for the demonstrations in advance.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children, and there were
no reports that such practices occurred. The ILO has asked the
Government to repeal the National Service Act, on the grounds that it
is conducive to forced labor for economic development; the Government
took no action to do so.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Two acts prohibit employment of children, but define
``child'' differently, one as under age 12 and the other under age 14.
During the year, the Government prepared legislation to harmonize these
two laws and to set the minimum legal age for employment at 16 years.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages for
various categories of workers, but these were last revised in 1989. The
minimum wage rate for some categories of workers (e.g., household
employees) was as low as $0.37 (EC$1.00) per hour if meals were
included. However, minimum wages for most workers fell in a range
between $0.74 (EC$2.00) per hour for tourist industry workers to $1.11
(EC$3.00) per hour for occupations such as shop clerks. Minimum wages
were not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. However, most workers (including domestic employees) earned
more than the legislated minimum wage for their category. The Minimum
Wage Advisory Board met in 1998 and recommended increases in these wage
levels, but the Government had not yet acted upon these recommendations
at year's end.
The labor standards laws state that no employer shall establish or
maintain differences in wages between men and women performing the same
or similar work with parallel responsibilities under similar
conditions. The law further states that no employer may reduce the
wages of an employee to comply with equal wage standards. The labor
laws also provide that the Labor Commissioner may authorize the
employment of a person with disabilities at a wage lower than the
minimum rate in order to enable that person to be employed gainfully.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. The law provides
for a minimum of 2 weeks' paid vacation per year. The Employment Safety
Act provides occupational health and safety regulations that are
consistent with international standards. Inspectors from the
Environmental Health Department of the Ministry of Health conduct
health and safety inspections. The rarely used enforcement mechanism
consists of inspections by the Department of Labor, which can and does
prescribe specific compliance measures, impose fines, and prosecute
offenders. Workers had the right to remove themselves from unsafe work
environments without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
The country had an economic citizenship program that allows foreign
investors to purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures
requiring cash inflows ranging from $75,000 (EC$200,000) to $100,000
(EC$270,000) for a family of up to four persons. This process
reportedly facilitated the illegal immigration of persons from China
and other countries to North America where, in some cases, they may be
forced by the criminal organizations that provided the funds to work
under conditions similar to bonded labor to repay their debt. The
Government refused to end the economic citizenship program, despite
complaints from the Governments of Canada and Australia. Since the
beginning of the economic citizenship program in 1996, 662 applicants
received citizenship. Approximately 167 persons, primarily from Russia
or China, purchased economic citizenship in 2001; of these, only about
46 persons actually resided in the country.
__________
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Constitution provides for a popularly elected president and a
bicameral congress. President Hipolito Mejia of the Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD) took office in August 2000 after a generally
free and fair election, replacing President Leonel Fernandez of the
Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). The PRD also controlled the Senate
and held the most seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary; however, interference from
outside forces, including the executive branch, remained a problem.
The National Police, the National Department of Investigations
(DNI), the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD), and the armed
forces (army, air force, and navy) formed the security forces. The
military's domestic responsibilities included maintaining public order
and protecting traffic, industry, commerce, persons, and property. The
police were under the Secretary of the Interior and Police; the
military was under the Secretary of the Armed Forces; and the DNI and
the DNCD, which had personnel from both the police and the military,
reported directly to the President. While civilian authorities
generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there
were some instances in which elements of the security forces acted
independently of government authority or control. Members of the
National Police and the military committed a number of human rights
abuses.
The market-based economy, once heavily dependent on sugar and other
agricultural exports, continued to diversify. The country has a
population of approximately 8.5 million, excluding an estimated 1
million undocumented Haitians. Tourism, telecommunications, and Free
Trade Zone (FTZ) exports were major sources of foreign currency and
employment, notwithstanding recent decreases in the growth of tourism
and FTZs. Remittances from abroad surpassed $1.9 billion per year.
Economic growth, which exceeded 7 percent per year from 1996 through
2000, was 4.5 percent for the year. Unemployment was estimated at 16
percent. Income distribution in the country was highly skewed.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were significant improvements in some areas, serious problems remained.
The number of extrajudicial killings dropped due in large part to the
replacement of Police Chief Candelier with General Jaime Marte
Martinez. Nonetheless, members of the security forces continued to
commit some unlawful killings. The police and--to a lesser degree--the
military tortured, beat, or otherwise abused detainees and prisoners.
Police on several occasions used excessive force to disperse
demonstrators. In a change from previous years, the Government began
regularly to refer cases of police and military abuse to the civilian
courts, instead of holding nontransparent proceedings in police or
military tribunals. Prison conditions ranged from poor to harsh. Some
prisoners died in custody due to negligence. Police arbitrarily
arrested and detained suspects and suspects' relatives. While the
judiciary continued to consolidate its independence and improve the
efficiency of the courts, lengthy pretrial detention and long trial
delays continued to be problems. The authorities sometimes infringed on
citizens' privacy rights, and police entered private homes without
judicial orders. Journalists at times practiced self-censorship. The
Government restricted the movement of, and forcibly expelled, some
Haitian and Dominican-Haitian migrants. Violence and discrimination
against women; prostitution, including child prostitution; abuse of
children; discrimination against persons with disabilities;
discrimination against and abuse of Haitian migrants and their
descendants; and child labor were serious problems. There continued to
be reports of forced labor. Many workers continued to face unsafe labor
conditions. Trafficking in persons was a serious problem. The Dominican
Republic was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening
Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in
Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials; however, members
of the security forces committed 126 killings that were unlawful,
unwarranted, or involved deadly use of force--a significant drop from
2001, during which more than 250 extrajudicial killings occurred.
This number includes some civilians who were killed in legitimate
exchanges of gunfire with police, as well as ``encounter'' killings
staged by the police. Despite significantly enhanced cooperation with
civilian authorities under the guidance of the new National Police
Chief, it remained difficult to quantify the exact number of police
killings, because police infrequently documented citizen killings in
accordance with minimum investigation or crime scene standards, and
mid-level officers sometimes failed to cooperate in investigations
ordered by civilian authorities (see Section 1.e.).
Human rights organizations stated that the police employed far less
unwarranted deadly force against criminal suspects than in previous
years, although uniformed vigilantism persisted on a less-than-deadly
level. Criminals who refused to pay police ``commissions'' or bribes to
ignore criminal activity were sometimes beaten or shot in an appendage
rather than killed. Lack of basic education, poor training, and weak
discipline were still endemic among members of the police force, and
directly contributed to the killings that occurred. These problems were
aggravated by low pay and the fact that there was no coherent policy on
the use of deadly force or rules of engagement by the police.
Additionally, the lack of professional and transparent investigation of
the circumstances in which police killed citizens in ``exchanges of
gunfire'' still led to occasional impunity for such killings. Finally,
there was a lack of meaningful training in human rights as applied to
police work; however, under the leadership of the new police chief, the
National Police took steps to address this problem. For example, in
August a 4-day program trained 15 members of the National Police and 15
prominent members of civil society, who were to conduct human rights
and dignity workshops for members of the National Police.
In the majority of police killings, the police claimed that the
deaths resulted from an exchange of gunfire in the course of an arrest.
Police asserted that the deaths of so-called delinquents resulted from
shoot-outs requiring the police to act in self-defense. A number of
eyewitness accounts matched police assertions; others did not. Staged
``encounter'' killings still occurred.
In March armed forces Private Eduardo Ortiz Delgadillo (then
assigned to the Metropolitan Transit Authority, headed by former
National Police Chief Candelier) shot and killed bus driver Flabio
Minaya Padilla, whose death sparked violent protests and condemnation
by a transport union. The authorities charged Ortiz, and his trial was
pending at year's end in a civilian court.
In April police officer Carlos Manuel Ramirez Herrera shot and
killed 19-year-old Juan Rafael De los Santos during a protest that took
place in the Moscu neighborhood of San Cristobal. Following the
shooting, residents attempted to burn the residence of and lynch a
municipal official, Jose Mercedes Corporan, whom they blamed for
instigating the death of De los Santos. Police Chief Marte designated a
commission to investigate the death of De los Santos and events
surrounding the demonstrations. The commission determined that Ramirez
should be removed from the police force; he was fired and was awaiting
trial at year's end.
On May 16, members of the armed forces election-day police in
Jarabacoa shot and killed two Partido Reformista Social Cristiano
(PRSC) activists in a shoot-out in front of approximately 50 witnesses.
On August 6, Attorney General Bello Rosa concluded an investigation
into the killings and recommended that those responsible be submitted
to civilian justice. Several days later, President Mejia ordered that
11 members of the military implicated in the crime be prosecuted in
civilian criminal court, based on a recent Supreme Court precedent
limiting military tribunals' authority to decide such cases to wartime.
The authorities accused Army Sergeant Edruy Reyes Ramirez of committing
the murders and charged Second Lieutenant Roger Antonio Acevedo
Martinez with being an accomplice. The Attorney General further
recommended that two colonels, Santo Augusto Nunez Francisco and Pedro
Antonio Caceres Chestaro, be charged with trying to cover up the crime
and mislead investigators. At year's end, the case was still in the
investigative phase.
Also in May, police Lieutenant Juan Bautista Berroa and two police
officers in Bonao killed 22-year-old Alejandro Pena Diaz, whom they had
taken prisoner, in the back of a truck. The police officers then threw
his body from the vehicle in a staged escape attempt. The authorities
dishonorably discharged the two police officers responsible for the
killing, arrested them, and held them to face civilian trial, set for
January 2003.
In several neighborhoods in Santo Domingo, civil society held
protests against police violence. The police at times forcibly
dispersed demonstrators using tear gas and weapons; on August 22,
during a protest in the Capotillo section of Santo Domingo, Alberto
Santos Veloz was killed by a stray bullet and 14 persons were injured
(see Sections 2.b. and 6.b.).
In September a police captain, police Lieutenant Charlie Rodriquez,
a sergeant, and a corporal all confessed to being part of a gang that
kidnaped and killed Victor Augusto (Franklin) Feliz Mendez. The police
also held 19-year-old Priscilla Diaz Infante in custody; she was the
last surviving civilian member of the group of seven that police
accused of murdering Feliz Mendez. The other civilians involved in the
case, Luciano Antonio Matos Diaz and Deiva Giner Castillo, died under
questionable circumstances shortly after Feliz Mendez's murder; one in
an exchange of gunfire with police, the other by suicide. At year's
end, a commission ruled that the civilian killed by police died in a
legitimate exchange of gunfire while attempting to evade arrest.
A significant number of deaths occurred in custody due to
negligence by prison authorities (see Section 1.c.).
According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active along the
border, two Haitian migrants were killed by military personnel while
attempting to enter the country (see Section 2.d.).
In the May 2001 killing of 26-year-old Ruben Dario Paniagua in the
Capotillo neighborhood, the civilian trial of four persons alleged to
have been involved in the killing was scheduled for February 2003.
Bienvenido Cross, a civilian with police ties, police officer Franklin
Tejada, police officer Carlos Feliz Mateo, and armed forces member
Warren Antonio Matos, were in jail awaiting trial; the authorities
released the other persons detained in connection with this case.
In the June 2001 killing of 37-year-old Carmelo del Rosario, the
authorities removed police Lieutenant Pedro Encarnacion Baez from duty
and sent the case to the civilian courts. Although jailed in Higuey,
Encarnacion Baez failed to appear at several hearings, the most recent
of which was on September 26.
In the July 2001 police killing of Wendy Altagracia Gaton Tejada in
the Herrera district, the authorities jailed police officer Demetrio
Marte Leonardo and scheduled him to be tried in civilian criminal court
in February 2003. The authorities sent three other officers charged in
this killing to a military court in 2001; there was no public
information regarding the status of their cases.
In the case of police Private Francisco Reyes Santana, known as
``Tyson,'' who was accused of killing 18-year-old Pedro Manuel
Contreras in September 2001, the Supreme Court ruled in December 2001
that Tyson and codefendant police Sergeant Medina Medina would be tried
in civilian criminal court. At year's end, both were in custody
awaiting trial, but no trial date had been set.
There were no developments in the cases of the police officers
involved in the killing of Johnny Perdomo Santo in November 2000,
Emilio Jose Matias and Lauri Mendez Sena in September 2000, the 30-
year-old Haitian killed in August 2000, the six Haitians and one
Dominican shot in July 2000, the killing of Juan Expedito Garcia in
July 2000, the killing of Juan Jose Urena in July 2000, or the killing
of Antonio Lora Fernandez in April 2000.
According to human rights groups, in the 2000 case involving three
individuals shot in Najayo Prison in San Cristobal, the officers
involved never were tried in either a police tribunal or a civilian
court.
There were no developments in the appeal of the 30-year sentences
of retired General Joaquin Pou Castro, former air force officer Mariano
Cabrera Duran, and Luis Emilio de la Rosa Beras, convicted in 2000 for
the 1975 murder of journalist Orlando Martinez Howley, a critic of the
Balaguer administration. A fourth defendant, General Salvador Lluberes
Montas, was to stand trial in 2001, but the trial did not take place.
Lluberes Montas failed to appear at 11 hearings in 2001 and at 3
additional hearings during the year. Although Lluberes Montas was
allegedly near death due to illness, various human rights groups
charged that he was living comfortably in his villa in Casa de Campo.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances; however, the Dominican Solidarity Center reported that
since the 1999 privatization of the sugarcane industry, more than 150
union organizers or members had disappeared (see Section 6.e.).
An instruction judge ordered that former Secretary of the Armed
Forces Constantino Matos Villanueva be tried in a criminal court in the
case of Narciso Gonzalez, a university professor and critic of the
Balaguer government who disappeared in May 1994. The judge excluded two
others, General Leonardo A. de Jesus Reyes Bencosme and Air Force
Colonel Manuel Concepcion Perez Volquez, from the case, although in
October 2001 the victim's family appealed this decision; that appeal
and Matos Villanueva's contest of the decision to try him in criminal
court remained pending in Santo Domingo's Court of Appeal at year's
end. There was no action during the year on the family's complaint to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and other
forms of physical abuse, and for the first time in years senior police
officials took this prohibition seriously and regularly investigated
reports of torture and abuse; however, some security forces personnel,
primarily mid-level and lower ranking police officers, continued to
torture, beat, and otherwise physically abuse detainees and prisoners.
Lack of supervision, training, and accountability throughout the law
enforcement and corrections systems exacerbated the problem of physical
abuse. Human rights groups and the local press reported repeated
instances of physical abuse of detainees while in custody, including
various forms of torture, beatings, and sexual abuse.
According to human rights organizations, the National Police, the
DNCD, and prison officials all used forms of torture. The method most
often used was beating. Other forms included asphyxiation with plastic
bags to elicit confessions, and a method called ``roasting the
chicken'' in which the victim was placed over hot coals and turned.
Human rights advocates described another form of abuse that guards
reportedly used against prisoners called ``the toaster,'' where
prisoners were laid, shackled hand and foot, on a bed of hot asphalt
for the entire day and beaten with a club if they screamed. Police also
were described as using a practice called ``golpe de pollo'' in which
they beat a person's ears until they bled. The Dominican Committee for
Human Rights stated that in the Fortaleza San Felipe prison in Puerto
Plata, some prisoners were tortured by pulling off their finger nails,
and another prisoner at San Felipe was hung from the cell wall for days
by chains that bound his wrists and left scars. Another ``new'' torture
method was reported in June, in which prison officials enclosed
detainees in water cisterns for lengthy periods. In Azua, according to
the Dominican Human Rights Commission, a youth named Robelin Lopez was
branded in the buttocks with a hot iron in an attempt to elicit a
confession.
Homosexual and transvestite detainees reported to gay rights
advocates that during detention the police held them in a darkened room
and gave them the alternative of performing fellatio on guards or being
placed in a locked cell with the most dangerous prisoners, where the
detainees presumed that they would be raped, beaten, or both. Other
informants confirmed that the police used the prospect of being locked
in with the most dangerous prisoners as a threat.
In June two of three youths detained for allegedly carving up
victims in satanic rites, Jairo Luis Matos and Gustavo Tejada de la
Rosa, accused police authorities of torturing them in an attempt to
elicit confessions. Police in the Fugitive Search and Capture Unit,
located in the Parque Mirador Norte area of Santo Domingo, asphyxiated
the young men with black plastic bags and beat them in an attempt to
obtain confessions. This unit previously had been implicated in acts of
torture aimed at eliciting confessions. In April the president of the
Dominican Human Rights Commission reported that the Commission received
multiple complaints of torture regarding this police unit.
Also in June, the authorities suspended from duty two National
Police captains from the Robbery and Monetary Crimes unit after they
were accused of torturing 21-year-old Carlos Javier Mendez to draw out
a confession for his alleged participation in a robbery. A special
investigative commission composed of members of the police and justice
sector determined that captains Ramon Antonio Marte Reyes and Luis F.
Sanchez Mejia should be tried in civilian court for violating law 309
by committing acts of torture. The two captains were fired and at
year's end were released on bail awaiting trial. In addition, the
authorities suspended Assistant District Attorney Diomaris Cepeda Diaz
for 2 weeks without pay for negligence.
In October judicial authorities decided that the case against
suspended police Colonel Francisco Beras Santos, who was charged with
the torture and sexual violation of a woman, should be heard in
criminal court. The colonel was accused of having forced 34-year-old
Elizabeth Martinez Perez to have oral sex with him before he would
allow her to go free. Police Chief Marte sent the evidence against the
colonel to be presented in a civilian court, rather than a military
tribunal. Beras appealed his case in three courts, but each court
rendered the decision that there was sufficient evidence to incriminate
him. At year's end, he was in prison awaiting the conclusion of his
criminal trial.
The National District Prosecutor's office program of placing
lawyers in high-volume police stations and in several DNCD offices to
monitor the investigative process and to ensure that detainees' rights
were respected (see Section 1.d.) remained largely limited to the Santo
Domingo metropolitan area, with a lesser presence in Santiago. There
was some evidence that assistant prosecutors at times acquiesced in
traditional police practices--as in the torture case of Carlos Javier
Mendez--rather than attempt to raise these practices to constitutional
standards. Less qualified prosecutors assigned to the rest of the
country did not assume strong roles in managing criminal investigations
and ensuring the rights of suspects.
Civilian prosecutors sometimes filed charges against police and
military officials alleging torture, physical abuse, and related
crimes. A 1997 law provides penalties for torture and physical abuse,
including sentences from 10 to 15 years in prison. However, until
recently, these provisions were not known fully or applied by
prosecutors and judges. There were repeated calls by human rights
groups for civilian trials of officials charged with abuse and torture,
and senior executive branch officials responded favorably during the
year. New abuse and torture cases were remanded to civilian criminal
courts as they arose. However, submission to civilian judicial
authority was sometimes still contested by mid-level officers (see
Section 1.e.).
During the year, the authorities dismissed numerous government
employees for links with smuggling groups (see Section 6.f.). In one
instance, Dominican Consul in Cap Haitien, Guillermo Radhames Garcia,
was removed from his post after the Directorate of Migration accused
him of personally transporting 16 Chinese nationals over the Dajabon
border into the country. Even though the Supreme Court recognized that
there was sufficient evidence to incriminate Garcia, it later dropped
the case against him at the request of the Attorney General, because
Garcia had been sworn in as the La Vega representative to the Chamber
of Deputies while confined in Dajabon. The Court said it was the
Chamber of Deputies' responsibility to censure Garcia.
Police officers also were fired for violent attacks, extortion, and
drug use. Significant problems remained because the authorities had not
undertaken serious efforts to vet police recruits. Many persons with
prior criminal records reportedly were incorporated into police ranks,
either using false names or identification or with recommendations from
other state institutions, such as the army.
Human rights courses were offered in the training curriculums for
military and DNCD enlisted personnel and officers. The Military
Institute of Human Rights offered diploma courses in human rights and
regularly sent representatives to border units to conduct mandatory
human rights training. However, monitoring and sanctioning systems for
abuses of human rights remained ineffective.
The three officers accused of being involved in 2000 of torture and
abuse of at least nine minors in the National District were not tried
by police tribunals or the civilian courts. An investigative judge in
the Eighth Penal Court, who was assigned to investigate the case in the
civilian courts, ruled that these courts did not have jurisdiction over
a police matter. The police tribunal took no action.
In August 2000, judges of the Appeals Court for Children and
Adolescents in San Pedro de Macoris made public a set of allegations of
similar abuses committed against 19 minors in police stations in Juan
Dolio and Boca Chica, as well as in the General Pedro Santana public
jail, which is controlled by the army. During the year, there was no
investigation into these alleged abuses by the police or the military.
Prison conditions ranged from poor to harsh. Reports of torture and
mistreatment in prisons were common. The prisons were seriously
overcrowded, health and sanitary conditions were poor, and some prisons
were out of control of the authorities. The General Directorate of
Prisons was under the authority of the Public Ministry and was
seriously underfunded. Budget allocations for necessities such as food,
medicine, and transportation were insufficient. Prisoners and human
rights groups alleged that prisoners were not taken to their trials if
they failed to pay bribes to the guards (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
Medical care in all prisons suffered from a lack of supplies and
available physicians. Prisoners immobilized by and dying of AIDS were
not transferred to a hospital, but some terminal-stage inmates were
released to spend their last days at home. Pretrial detainees were held
together with convicted prisoners. Inmates were not separated by crime
within the prison population; however, they could be put into solitary
confinement for disturbances while incarcerated.
According to the Attorney General's office, the police and the
military held almost 17,000 prisoners and detainees in 34 prisons with
a total capacity of approximately 9,000 persons. As of December, the
military controlled 21 prisons with a total of 5,618 prisoners, and the
National Police controlled 13 prisons, with a total of 10,922 inmates.
A warden was responsible for running each prison and reported to the
Attorney General through the Directorate of Prisons. A police or
military colonel (or lieutenant colonel), who only was appointed for 3
to 6 months, reported to the warden and was responsible for providing
security. However, in practice the colonel was in charge of the prison,
and neither the Directorate of Prisons nor the individual wardens had
much power. Some prisons were totally out of the authorities' control
and were in effect operated by armed inmates, who decided whether an
individual got food, space to sleep, or medical care. Individual
inmates only could secure a tolerable level of existence by paying for
it.
The overwhelming majority of prisons experienced extreme
overcrowding. San Cristobal Najayo jail was originally built to house
700 inmates and contained close to 3,000. The overcrowding and
deteriorating conditions at such prisons as Publica de Azua
(administered by the military) posed a serious threat to the health and
safety of the inmates. The prison, which was initially built in the
1940s to hold 40 inmates, held 171 prisoners. Inmates suffered from
various illnesses including tuberculosis, bronchitis, and skin
infections. Inmates who could not afford to pay for beds were forced to
sleep on the floor. During September more than 25 prisoners died at the
military-run prison of La Inmaculada Concepcion in La Vega in a fire
allegedly set to prevent an inspection by guards. Newspapers and human
rights groups reported extensive drug and arms trafficking within the
prisons, as well as prostitution and sexual abuse, including abuse of
minors.
A government food program for the general public was used to
provide lunches at some prisons. The former Director of Prisons
reported that his office had a budget of $0.50 (8 pesos) per inmate to
provide three meals per day. Inmates said that the food provided was
unacceptable, and most sought to beg or purchase food from persons in
the vicinity of the prison or from family members. Due to inefficiency
and corruption within the prison system, visitors often had to bribe
prison guards in order to visit prisoners. Female visitors often were
forced to strip naked prior to entering the prison and were harassed
sexually by prison guards.
Female inmates were separated from male inmates. In general,
conditions in the female prison wings were better than those found in
male prison wings. There were some reports of guards physically and
sexually abusing female inmates. There were also reports that in the
Najayo prison, guards forced women to act as prostitutes in exchange
for food and protection. Female inmates, unlike their male
counterparts, were prohibited from receiving conjugal visits. Those who
delivered while incarcerated were permitted to keep their babies with
them for 1 year.
The law requires that juveniles be detained separately from adults;
however, in practice juveniles often were mixed with the general
population. The authorities sometimes treated minors as adults--most
often when physical examinations indicated that the persons claiming to
be minors were probably adults--and incarcerated them in prison rather
than juvenile detention centers. The press reported a high incidence of
juveniles detained with adult prisoners being forced into sexual
servitude in return for protection. Human rights groups charged that
nearly all of the 280 juveniles in Najayo prison who were housed with
adults were abused sexually. In July 2001, a new prison for minors
opened in Najayo, with a capacity of 200 persons; however, human rights
groups charged that guards and prison staff continued to abuse minors
in the new wing.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers and by the press.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention were problems. The Constitution provides for the security of
the individual against imprisonment without legal process, bars
detention beyond 48 hours without the detainee being presented before
judicial authorities, and prohibits custodial authorities from not
presenting detainees when requested. It also provides for recourse to
habeas corpus proceedings to request the release of those unlawfully
held. However, the security forces continued to violate constitutional
provisions by detaining suspects for investigation or interrogation
beyond the prescribed 48-hour limit. The police typically detained all
suspects and witnesses in a crime and used the investigative process to
determine who were innocent and merit release, and whom they should
continue to hold. When the prosecutor's office began placing its
lawyers in police stations in 1997, the police began to curtail the
practice of arbitrary detentions; however, during the year, few new
prosecutors were sent and the effectiveness of those working in police
stations was negligible (see Section 1.c.).
Detainees at police headquarters in Santo Domingo, known as ``the
palace,'' reported that they were held for 15 to 21 days. Juveniles
held at the Department for Minors at the Villa Juana police station
commonly were held for 8 to 14 days, well beyond the 24-hour limit for
minors. The official in charge of the Department for Minors attributed
this to delays by the Juvenile Defender--the Public Ministry official
in charge of interrogating minors--in sending them before a Juvenile
Court judge. The law prohibits interrogation of juveniles by the police
or in the presence of police.
The police continued the practice of making frequent sweeps or
roundups in low-income, high-crime communities in which they arrested
and detained individuals arbitrarily, allegedly to fight delinquency.
During these sweeps, police arrested large numbers of residents and
seized property including motorcycles, other vehicles, and weapons. The
armed forces carried out similar sweeps, in which they closed down
major routes into Santo Domingo, searched cars for weapons and drugs,
and detained individuals thought to be criminals. In June security
forces arrested more than 700 residents of the Santiago area during
operations ``Centella'' and ``Guaraguao.'' Numerous firearms were
confiscated; 44 motorcycles and 18 cars were impounded.
Following the indiscriminate arrests, the police regularly detained
individuals for 20 days or more while they looked for a reason to
charge them. Human rights organizations reported that individuals
detained in these roundups frequently were beaten. The police stated
that they relied upon unlawful detention without presentation to a
court because some cases involved more complicated investigations.
However, there was a clear pattern of police arrests of individuals
before undertaking adequate investigation, and reliance on confessions
obtained under questionable circumstances to make their case (see
Section 1.c.).
A related problem was the police practice of arresting and
detaining individuals solely because of a familial or marital
relationship to a suspect. A suspect's parents, siblings, or spouse
were all vulnerable to this practice, the goal of which was to compel
an at-large suspect to surrender or to coerce a confession from one
already arrested.
In December the military briefly jailed a Dajabon area radio
broadcaster, reportedly arresting him without written authorization
from the correct judicial authorities (see Section 2.a.).
Local human rights observers reported roundups of Haitian and
Dominican-Haitian construction workers. Officials allegedly took groups
of darker-skinned or ``Haitian-looking'' individuals to empty buildings
soon after they were paid, in order to extort money from them (see
Section 5).
Many suspects endured long pretrial detention. About 82 percent of
the national prison population was awaiting trial; of these, about
three-quarters were ``prisoners without sentences,'' and the remainder
had convictions under appeal. The average pretrial detention throughout
the country was well over 6 months. Time already served counted toward
a sentence.
The failure of prison authorities to produce the accused for court
hearings was slightly less pronounced during the year but still caused
a significant percentage of trial postponements (see Section 1.e.).
Prisoners often had their court dates postponed because they were not
taken from the prison to court, or because their lawyer or witness did
not appear. The authorities held some prisoners even though there were
no formal charges against them.
Due to the historical inefficiency of the courts (see Section
1.e.), the granting of bail served as a de facto criminal justice
system, and defendants awarded bail rarely faced an actual trial. As a
rule, few defendants were granted bail. Large numbers of prisoners, who
had served at least half their sentences, were pardoned each August 16
and at year's end.
Most detainees and prisoners could not afford adequate defense
services. The program of the Commissioner for the Reform and
Modernization of Justice, which had lawyers to defend people for free,
ceased operation due to lack of funds. On May 31, the Supreme Court
created a National Office of Judicial Defense to provide legal advice
and representation to poor people being processed in courts. This
program was supported by foreign donors, and as of August 26, eight
lawyers were chosen for the National Judicial Defense Program.
The judicial system sometimes failed to protect the status of
minors in criminal cases (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its
use. However, persons who asserted that they were citizens sometimes
were expelled to Haiti (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, attempts by public and private
entities, including the executive branch, to undermine judicial
independence persisted. Civil society groups encouraged judicial
independence. The judiciary received training funded by foreign donors
in order to improve its ability to resist outside interference, but
such influence remained a problem. Court officials also began to
implement new selection criteria for judges.
The judiciary includes a 16-member Supreme Court, appeals courts,
courts of first instance, and justices of the peace. There are also
specialized courts that handle administrative, labor, land, and
juvenile matters. Under the 1994 constitutional amendments, the Supreme
Court is responsible for naming all lower court judges in accordance
with a judicial career law. The Supreme Court has been complete since
2001, when the National Council of Magistrates (CNM) met to fill three
vacancies. The Government has established 17 of the 25 courts provided
for by law, including 5 courts for children and adolescents.
Until recently, military and police tribunals enjoyed exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving members of the security forces. These
tribunals, while functioning similarly to criminal courts, had judges
and prosecutors who were military or police officers, and the results
generally were not made public. Decisions could be appealed, including
to the Supreme Court. Although police tribunals could remand accused
officers to civilian court jurisdiction, this almost never occurred
under the leadership of police chiefs prior to Chief Marte. Military
courts tried military personnel charged with killings, but depending
upon the severity of the offense, a panel of senior officers could send
the case to the civilian courts. When a police officer was involved in
a questionable incident, the case went to a police commission of
superior officers for investigation. If it was determined that the
police officer exceeded his authority, the case was sent to the police
tribunals or possibly to the civilian courts, depending on the severity
of the offense. In the security force killings committed during the
year, numerous officers were remanded to civilian criminal courts (see
Section 1.a.).
In 2000 six civil society groups made a submission to the Supreme
Court on the issue of the legality of Law 285, which encompasses the
Code of Police Justice. Civil society groups argued that police
tribunals violated the Constitution, and that they weakened the
separation and independence of governmental functions, as well as the
exclusivity of the judicial function in the administration of justice.
The lawsuit asked the court to rule on the constitutionality of these
tribunals; a judgment still was pending as the court awaited passage of
police reform legislation at year's end. However, in one case, in
December 2001, the Supreme Court set what the Attorney General termed a
precedent by ruling that in peacetime, certain criminal offenses
involving security forces should be tried in civilian courts (see
Section 1.a.).
Public pressure existed for military or police boards to remand
cases involving serious crimes to civilian court jurisdiction, and
multiple such cases were remanded during the year. In other cases,
civil authorities requested that the police turn over their files so
that cases of suspected extrajudicial killings might be evaluated
independently for possible prosecution. Although mid-ranking officers
were sometimes uncooperative, there was significant high-level
cooperation from the National Police and military in requested
investigations during the year (see Section 1.c.).
The judicial system is based primarily on the Napoleonic Code.
Judges, rather than juries, render all verdicts. Following the
commission of a crime, the criminal process begins with the arrest of
possible suspects. During the investigative phase, suspects are
questioned repeatedly and urged to confess. The Constitution provides
for the right not to be arrested without judicial warrant except in
cases where the suspect is caught in the act; the right not to be
deprived of liberty without trial or legal formalities, or for reasons
other than those provided by law; the right not to be a witness against
oneself; and the right to a defense in an impartial and public trial.
The authorities commonly violated these rights.
The most serious and common violation of these rights occurred when
police detained suspects, sometimes for many days, without allowing
them to call family members, while subjecting them to frequent
questioning (see Section 1.d.). Although accused persons were entitled
to have an attorney present, they often were not permitted to call one
or, if one arrived, the attorney was not permitted to be present during
the questioning. Torture frequently was used to coerce a confession
during questioning (see Section 1.c.). Under these circumstances,
suspects may confess to acts that they did not commit merely to get
relief from the intense questioning and the detention. The results of
these interrogations frequently formed the only evidence presented at
the trial.
The law provides for the remedy of ``amparo,'' an action any
citizen may bring for violation of a constitutional right, including
violations by judicial officials, in accordance with the terms of the
American Convention on Human Rights. The process of dispute resolution,
including reconciliation, mediation, and arbitration, continued to be
used as an alternative to trial and incarceration.
A large backlog of criminal cases remained in the National District
and throughout the country. The Supreme Court's plans to unclog the
court dockets were frustrated by the Government's failure to allocate
sufficient funds. Dockets were crowded with traffic infractions that
should have been heard in the traffic courts provided for by statute;
these courts had not been established, due to a lack of funds. Other
complications in clearing the backlog arose from the lack of funds for
transporting prisoners to court. Many cases were rescheduled when the
accused or key witnesses did not appear.
During the year, the Government adopted a new criminal code
intended to simplify court procedures, accelerate the justice system,
and discontinue the practice of holding a person in jail while trial
procedures were underway. The new code supports the presumption of
innocence until proven guilty. President Mejia established a commission
to handle the preparations necessary to implement the new criminal code
by 2004.
During the year, the Supreme Court also began a pilot program to
bring the courts to the jails to expedite the processing of inmates,
since transporting inmates to the courts was one of the biggest
obstacles to the administration of justice. Of the more than 16,500
inmates in custody, only 15 to 30 percent had been sentenced. The
program, which should help relieve prison congestion, began at San
Cristobal Najayo jail in August and was to expand to La Victoria
prison, the largest jail in the country, followed by Monte Plata.
While in 2000 the congestion in the criminal system was reduced by
more than 50 percent through use of community conciliation centers,
those gains largely were lost during the last 2 years. It was clear
that the change of 90 percent of Public Ministry officials by the Mejia
administration in August 2000 resulted in a marked deterioration of the
technical competence and ethical standards of prosecutors around the
country. The practical effect has been a decrease in the ability to
combat impunity and a deterioration in the quality of justice available
to the poor.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions against arbitrary
entrance into one's home; however, police sometimes broke into private
quarters without cause to search for suspects, and the authorities
infringed on citizens' privacy rights in other ways as well. Although
the Government denied arbitrary use of wiretapping or other
surreptitious methods to interfere with the private lives of persons or
families, it had not taken steps to dismantle an active private
wiretapping industry. In September the Dominican Human Rights
Commission reported that police captured Priscilla Diaz Infante,
allegedly involved in the Feliz Mendez murder, by tapping the
Commission's telephones (see Section 1.c.).
The law permits the arrest of a suspect caught in the act of
committing a crime, and police may enter a residence or business while
in hot pursuit of such suspects. Otherwise, judges must authorize
arrests and issue search warrants. However, the police continued to
violate these requirements. The Dominican Human Rights Committee
reported that police carried out raids on private homes in many poor
Santo Domingo neighborhoods, including Capotillo, Gualey, Guandules,
Guachupita, Los Alcarrizos, and La Zurza; police allegedly went into
homes without search warrants to look for delinquents.
According to the Dominican Human Rights Committee, the police on
several occasions used force to remove squatters from state-owned lands
in and near Santo Domingo.
The police continued to detain relatives and friends of suspects in
order to pressure suspects to surrender or to confess (see Section
1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government generally respected these
rights in practice.
Newspapers and magazines freely presented a diversity of opinion
and criticism; there were eight daily and seven weekly newspapers and
three weekly magazines. However, journalists and editors at times
practiced self-censorship, particularly when coverage could adversely
affect the economic or political interests of media owners.
Numerous privately owned radio and television stations broadcast
all political points of view. The Government controlled one television
station.
In December the military briefly jailed a Dajabon area radio
broadcaster, who implicated the President's son in the illicit sale of
agricultural products on a program discussing the cross-border
contraband trade. The Listin Diario newspaper reported that the
executive branch replaced the local District Attorney, Maria de los
Santos Tejada, after she demanded that the military free the
journalist, who had been arrested in the evening, without written
authorization from the correct judicial authorities. The Government
planned to proceed with a libel and defamation suit. The arrest and
firing created waves of protest in various sectors, and local religious
and civil society groups staged peaceful protest marches in Dajabon.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice; however, there were some exceptions,
and the Government at times restricted this right. Outdoor public
marches and meetings require permits, which the Government usually
granted; however, the police used force to break up demonstrations on
several occasions throughout the year, which sometimes resulted in
deaths and injuries. The Government used deadly force to disperse
demonstrators calling for completion of public works projects, the
provision of potable water, and the cessation of blackouts (see Section
1.a.).
In March the police killing of a bus driver caused violent protests
(see Section 1.a.). Metropolitan transit police intercepted a 40-
minibus protest parade in the Villa Juana area, leading to 35 arrests
and various injuries. The authorities eventually released those
arrested.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Political
parties frequently affiliated with their foreign counterpart
organizations. Professional organizations of lawyers, doctors,
teachers, and others functioned freely and maintained relationships
with counterpart organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The Constitution prohibits discrimination on religious
grounds, and many religions and denominations were active.
The Catholic Church, which signed a concordat with the Government
in 1954, enjoyed special privileges not extended to other religions.
These included the use of public funds to underwrite some church
expenses, such as rehabilitation of church facilities, and a complete
waiver of customs duties when importing goods into the country.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
travel, except for limitations imposed under judicial sentence, or
police regulations for immigration and health reasons, and the
Government generally respected these provisions in practice; however,
there were some exceptions. Citizens faced no unusual legal
restrictions on travel within or outside the country. The police
occasionally blocked roads to search cars for weapons and drugs (see
Section 1.d.). Local and international human rights groups cited
discrimination against Haitian migrants, whom they said were subject to
arbitrary and unilateral action by the authorities, and the military
reportedly killed some migrants attempting to enter the country (see
Section 1.a.).
Haitians continued to migrate in great numbers to the Dominican
Republic, some legally but the vast majority without legal documents,
in search of economic opportunity. Some illegal migration was assisted
by the authorities, who profited from it. Throughout the year, the
security forces, particularly the army, repatriated undocumented
Haitian nationals believed to be in the country illegally. The
Directorate of Migration reported that it repatriated over 12,000
Haitians during the year. In some cases, the Government denied those
deported the opportunity to demonstrate that they were legal residents
in the country or to make arrangements for their families or property.
The Haitian Embassy began a pilot program to issue identity
documents to Haitian adults residing in the country, and it issued over
30,000 such documents during the year. Most Haitians, including those
making clandestine crossings of the border, did not have identification
papers of any kind. The lack of identification made it difficult for
the authorities to provide social services, such as education, to
Haitian children.
NGOs and Catholic priests familiar with the process have protested
that children born of Haitian parents in the Dominican Republic,
generally denied registration as citizens, frequently were among those
deported as illegal Haitians (see Section 5).
In December a judge ordered the Central Electoral Board
(responsible for registering births and providing national
identification cards) to grant Dominican nationality to two sons of
illegal Haitian immigrants on the grounds that the children were born
on Dominican soil. This ruling generated controversy, and some members
of Congress asked the Supreme Court to overturn the lower court
decision, based on the fact that the parents were ``in transit,'' and
therefore the children could not acquire Dominican nationality. For
years, the term ``in transit'' had been interpreted to include anyone
not legally residing in the country, which included the vast majority
of Haitians, regardless of the years they had spent in the country. The
Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal, and many prominent figures
publicly spoke out in favor of the lower court ruling.
In 2000 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights heard a case
presented by human rights organizations, alleging that massive
expulsions, repatriations, and deportations of Haitians and Dominican-
Haitians by the Government violated international human rights law. The
Court's decision requested that the Government provide more detailed
information about the condition of individuals in the border
shantytowns who potentially were subject to forced expulsions and asked
for a report every 2 months on provisional measures adopted to comply
with the Court's decision. The Government provided the Court with the
bimonthly reports and expected the Court to send the issue again to the
IACHR.
NGO representatives working in rural areas reported that decisions
to deport often were made by lower-ranking members of the security
forces, sometimes based upon the racial characteristics of the
deportees. Such officials approached persons who looked like Haitians,
including persons who had very dark complexions and fairly poor
clothing, and engaged them in conversation, mainly to check their use
of Spanish and any accent they might have. If such persons spoke
Spanish poorly or with a noticeable accent, they were sometimes
detained and deported.
While the Government had a policy of strictly enforcing documentary
requirements and repatriation for those found lacking documents, it
appeared to have a more tolerant unofficial policy fueled by the
reality of dependence on Haitian labor for certain agricultural and
construction work. Thus, after being stopped as a suspected illegal
Haitian migrant, an individual could be allowed to remain in the
country despite lack of documentation if the story about work satisfied
the official. NGOs reported corruption among the military, migration
authorities, and other border officials and noted that these government
representatives sometimes allowed the transit of Haitian workers into
the country.
In September a Belgian priest, Pedro Ruquoy, stated that members of
the army, migration officers, and privatized sugar mills were all
complicit in smuggling field hands from Haiti. The priest said that in
a visit to Puerto Escondido, near the frontier, he visited
installations used to lodge Haitians temporarily prior to their
transfer to the sugar mills. The priest estimated that 30,000
undocumented Haitians had been smuggled through this center and said
that those recruiting the Haitians received about $8 (150 pesos) a
person (see Section 6.f.). Haitians recruited for the sugar mills
usually worked for only one harvest but remained in the country,
securing better-paying jobs in construction.
The Government did not actively cooperate with the office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government asserted that it
provided first asylum and resettlement. According to a 1984
presidential decree, an applicant for refugee status must be referred
to the Technical Subcommittee of the National Commission for Refugees
by the National Office of Refugee Affairs in the Migration Directorate.
The subcommittee, which makes a recommendation to the commission (both
chaired by the Foreign Ministry), is made up of members from the
Foreign Ministry, the DNI, and the Migration Directorate. The
commission, which makes a final decision on the application, consists
of the three members of the subcommittee; the legal advisor to the
President; and members from the National Police, the Ministry of Labor,
and the Attorney General's office.
As of December, more than 100 applications for refugee status had
been filed with the Office of Refugees in the Migration Directorate,
nearly all by Haitians. In 2001 the National Commission for Refugees
met for the first time since 1993. The National Commission reviewed
over 65 cases but did not make any decisions on pending refugee cases
at that time and has not met since. However, the Technical Subcommittee
met several times during the year, referring dozens of cases back to
the Migration Directorate for technicalities such as lack of properly
documented claimant signatures or identities.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through periodic elections. Citizens exercised
this right in generally free and fair congressional elections in May.
The President and all members of the Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies are elected freely every 4 years by secret ballot. There is
universal adult suffrage; however, active duty police and military
personnel may not vote. Voting is restricted to those who can document
nationality. The Central Electoral Board conducts all elections. During
the year, the legislature adopted constitutional reforms affecting the
electoral system, including a provision that the President may be
reelected one time. The reforms abolished a system whereby voters were
locked into the polling site until all voting had concluded, and women
and men no longer have to vote at separate times.
Congress provided an open forum for the free exchange of views and
debate. The main opposition party was the PLD, which held 1 of 32 seats
in the upper house and 42 of 150 seats in the lower house. A third
major party, the PRSC of former President Balaguer, held 2 seats in the
upper house and 36 seats in the lower house; various smaller parties
were certified to contest provincial and national elections.
The nation had a functioning multiparty system. Opposition groups
of the left, right, and center operated openly. The President often
dominated public policy formulation and implementation. He could
exercise his authority through the use of the veto, discretion to act
by decree, and influence as the leader of his party. Traditionally, the
President has predominant power in the Government, effectively making
many important decisions by decree. The President appoints the
governors of the 32 provinces.
Women and minorities confronted no serious legal impediments to
political participation. By law parties must reserve 33 percent of
positions for women on their lists of candidates for city councils;
however, the parties often placed women so low on the lists as to make
their election difficult or impossible. A woman, Milagros Ortiz-Bosch,
was Vice President. Two women served in the 32-member Senate; women
held 24 seats in the 150-member Chamber of Deputies. Women continued to
be represented in appointed positions, albeit to a limited degree. The
President of the Chamber of Deputies was a woman, as were three cabinet
secretaries. Women filled 5 of the 16 seats on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Nongovernmental human rights organizations generally operated
freely without government interference, and government officials were
somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views. In addition to the
Dominican Human Rights Committee, the National Human Rights Commission,
and the nongovernmental Truth Commission (addressing the Narciso
Gonzalez case), several Haitian, church, women's, and labor groups
existed.
In February 2001, Congress passed a law creating a human rights
ombudsman's office, although selection of the individual to fill the
position still remained pending at year's end. The law provides that
the Ombudsman is appointed for 6 years, with authority over public
sector issues involving human rights, the environment, women's issues,
youth issues, and consumer protection.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race and sex; however,
such discrimination existed, and the Government seldom acknowledged its
existence or made efforts to combat it.
Women.--Domestic violence was widespread. NGOs estimated that 40
percent of women and children were victims of domestic violence. Under
the 1997 Law Against Domestic Violence, the State can prosecute for
rape, incest, sexual aggression, and other forms of domestic violence.
Penalties for these crimes range from 1 year to 30 years in prison and
carry fines ranging from $30 to $6,000 (500 to 100,000 pesos). The
Secretariat of Women, as well as various NGOs, had outreach programs on
domestic violence and legal rights. The Government's center in Villa
Juana (Santo Domingo) for the legal support and forensic examination of
abused women handled over 100 cases per day. Due to the success of this
first center, the Government opened a second center and planned four
more. There were no functioning shelters for battered women.
The Department of Children, Teenagers, and Family of the Attorney
General's Office issued 2,600 protection orders in favor of women
during the first 6 months of the year, of which 25 percent were for
spouses of military personnel or policemen involved in domestic
violence. According to government statistics, 107 women were killed in
``crimes of passion'' during the year.
Rape was a serious problem and was believed to be widely
underreported. The Santo Domingo District Attorney's office received
1,706 rape or sexual violation complaints during the year. The
penalties for committing rape are 10 to 15 years in prison and a fine
of $6,000 to $12,000 (100,000 to 200,000 pesos). The State can
prosecute a suspect for rape even if the victim does not file charges,
and rape victims may press charges against a spouse. Victims often did
not report cases of rape because of fear of social stigma, as well as
the perception that the police and the judiciary would fail to provide
redress. The police were reluctant to handle rape cases and often
encouraged victims to seek assistance from NGOs.
The law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace; however, the
law was not enforced, and sexual harassment was widespread.
Prostitution is illegal; however, the Government usually did not
enforce prostitution laws. Sex tourism was a growing industry
throughout the country as the number of international visitors
increased. NGOs conducted HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted disease
prevention programs for male and female prostitutes, hotel and
industrial zone workers, and other high-risk groups. The Domestic
Violence Law prohibits acting as an intermediary in a transaction of
prostitution, and the Government used the law to prosecute third
parties that derived profit from prostitution.
Divorce was easily obtainable by either spouse, and women could
hold property in their own names apart from their husbands.
Traditionally, women did not share equal social and economic status or
opportunity with men, and men held the majority of leadership positions
in all sectors. In many instances, women were paid less than men in
jobs of equal content and equal skill level. Some employers reportedly
gave pregnancy tests to women before hiring them, as part of a required
medical examination. Union leaders and human rights advocates reported
that pregnant women often were not hired.
Children.--Despite the existence of government institutions
dedicated to child welfare, private social and religious organizations
carried the principal burden for such services. The Oversight
Organization for the Protection of Children, created by the executive
branch, was the primary government institution responsible for child
welfare. It carried out community information campaigns on children's
rights, including the prevention of child abuse, child labor, and
family violence. It also provided training to persons and groups
providing social services to children, judicial officials, and other
children's advocates. Private institutions received 35 to 40 percent of
the budget of the Oversight Organization. The Ministry of Youth
operated programs on drug prevention and HIV/AIDS awareness.
The 1994 Minor's Code requires 8 years of formal education.
Children of Haitian descent experienced difficulties attending school
due to their lack of official status. The code contains provisions
against child abuse, including physical and emotional mistreatment,
sexual exploitation, and child labor. It also provides for removal of a
mistreated child to a protective environment. According to local
monitors, instances of child abuse were underreported because of
traditional beliefs that family problems should be dealt with inside
the family. However, child abuse received increasing public attention.
In the National District, the Department of Family and Children, in
the Office of the Prosecutor, administered the Minor's Code and
arranged conciliation of family conflicts, the execution of court
decisions with respect to child protection, and interviews with
children whose rights had been violated.
Abuse, including physical, sexual, and psychological, was the most
serious human rights violation affecting children. The Department of
Family and Children estimated that 50 percent of the children in the
country were victims of some sort of abuse, although few such cases
reached the courts. In the majority of the cases, the accused was a
person close to the child: A father, grandfather, uncle, brother,
cousin, or close family friend. The criminal law provision on sexual
abuse and intrafamily violence provides for a penalty of 10 to 20
years' incarceration and a fine of $6,600 to $13,200 (108,000 to
216,000 pesos) for persons found guilty of sexual abuse of a minor, and
up to 30 years if the victim is a family member of the abuser.
The Ministry of Health estimated that between January and June,
there were 894 births by adolescents under age 15 and 15,560 births by
adolescents between the ages of 15 and 19, some of which reportedly
resulted from rape or incest.
Trafficking and sexual exploitation of children was a serious
problem (see Section 6.f.). Poor adolescent girls and boys sometimes
were enticed into performing sexual acts by the promise of food or
clothing; sometimes they were forced into unsafe relationships with
strangers by the need for money. Once involved, they could be held
against their will by individuals who sold their sexual favors to
others. Some of these minors were lured from their parental homes;
others were already on the street.
The judicial system sometimes failed to protect the status of
minors in criminal cases (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). In accord with
the Minor's Code, the Government established 17 courts of first
instance for minors and 5 appeals courts for minors, the latter in
Santo Domingo, Santiago, San Pedro, San Cristobal, and La Vega.
Although these juvenile courts were organized with a focus on
rehabilitating offenders, very few social services were available for
minors. In practice, juveniles were detained in excess of the time
permitted by law and often sent to jail rather than referred for
rehabilitative services. There were legal advocates especially for
juveniles in Santo Domingo and La Vega to provide them with
representation in delinquency cases. Human rights monitors reported
numerous cases of sexual abuse of minors in Najayo prison (see Section
1.c.).
Child labor was a serious problem in the informal sector of the
economy (see Section 6.d.). It was common for minors to be put on the
street to fend for themselves as younger siblings claimed the parent's
meager resources. Homeless children called ``palomas'' (doves) were
frequently at the mercy of adults who collected them and put them to
work begging and selling fruit, flowers, and other goods on the street.
In return for their work they were given basic housing. The ages at
which these children worked, the hours they worked, and their failure
to comply with compulsory school attendance all violated the law, but
the Government has not been able to combat this practice.
Persons with Disabilities.--Persons with disabilities encountered
discrimination in employment and in the provision of other services.
The law provides for physical access for persons with disabilities to
all new public and private buildings; however, the authorities did not
enforce this law uniformly. There was a Subsecretariat for
Rehabilitation under the Ministry of Public Health, a recreation center
for persons with disabilities in Las Caobas, and a department in the
Sports Ministry to facilitate athletic competition for such persons.
However, there was little consciousness of the need to make the daily
lives of persons with disabilities safer and more convenient. For
example, new street construction made few provisions for such persons
to cross the streets safely.
The Dominican Rehabilitation Association (ADR), which receives
about 30 percent of its budget from the Government, had 17 affiliates
throughout the country and provided services for 2,500 persons daily.
Discrimination against persons with mental illness was common, and
there were few resources dedicated to the mentally ill.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A strong prejudice against
Haitians exists and disadvantaged many Haitians and Dominicans of
Haitian ancestry, as well as other foreigners of African descent (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). The Government rarely acknowledged the
existence of this discrimination.
Efforts to stem the influx of illegal Haitian immigrants made it
more difficult for those Haitians already in the country to live
peacefully or legally. Although infrequently enforced, police
regulations threatened those offering transportation to illegal
immigrants with confiscation of their vehicles and discouraged taxi and
bus drivers from picking up darker-skinned persons. In roundups of
illegal immigrants, the authorities picked up and expelled darker
Dominicans as well as legal Haitian residents (see Section 1.d.).
Perhaps 500,000 Haitian immigrants--or 6 percent of the country's
population--lived in shantytowns or sugar cane work camps, in harsh
conditions with limited or no electricity, running water, or schooling.
There were estimates that as many as 1 million Haitians lived in the
country. Human rights groups regularly charged the Government with
unlawful deportations of, and police brutality toward, these
immigrants--most of whom resided in the country illegally and therefore
received little or no protection under the law (see Sections l.c.,
1.d., and 2.d.).
The Government refused to recognize and document as citizens many
individuals of Haitian ancestry born in the country (see Section 2.d.).
Since many Haitian parents never possessed documentation for their own
births, they were unable to demonstrate their own citizenship or that
of their children. Lack of birth registration sometimes deprived
children of Haitian descent of the opportunity to attend school where
there was one available. Even when permitted to attend primary school,
the children of Haitian parents rarely progressed beyond sixth grade.
In 2001 the Secretary of Education announced that all children would be
allowed to enroll in school through the eighth grade, whether or not
they had a birth certificate. The Central Electoral Board agreed to
facilitate acquisition of birth certificates by parents who could
produce identity cards in order that all children would have birth
certificates to enroll in school. NGOs reported that higher numbers of
Haitian children enrolled in school during the year, and according to a
census conducted by the Secretariat of Education, at least 63,000
children without birth certificates--of both Dominican and Haitian
parents--attended school.
Sometimes poor Haitian families arranged for Dominican families to
``adopt'' and employ their children to ensure a more promising future
for them. The adopting parents registered the child as their own. In
exchange, the parents received monetary payment or a supply of clothes
and food. In many cases, adoptive parents did not treat the adoptees as
full family members and expected them to work in the households or
family businesses rather than attend school, resulting in a kind of
indentured servitude, at least until the young person reached majority
(see Section 6.c.). There were reports that Haitian girls between the
ages of 10 and 14 were the most sought after, especially in border
areas.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
freedom to organize labor unions, and all workers, except the military
and the police, were free to organize. Organized labor represented an
estimated 10 percent of the work force and was divided among four major
confederations and a number of independent unions. There were 3,524
registered unions in the country, but an estimated 61 percent were
inactive. The 1992 Labor Code provides extensive protection for worker
rights and specifies the steps legally required to establish a union,
federation, or confederation. The code calls for automatic recognition
of a union if the Government has not acted on its application within 30
days. In practice, the Government readily facilitated recognition of
labor organizations.
The Government generally respected association rights and placed no
obstacles to union registration, affiliation, or the ability to engage
in legal strikes. However, enforcement of labor laws was sometimes
unreliable, inhibiting employees from freely exercising their rights.
Unions were independent of the Government and generally independent
of political parties. The law forbidding companies to fire union
organizers or members was enforced selectively, and penalties were
insufficient to deter employers from violating worker rights. The
Dominican Solidarity Center asserted that since the 1999 privatization
of the sugarcane industry, employers had been responsible for the
disappearances of over 150 union organizers or members (see Section
1.b.). There were additional reports of widespread discreet as well as
overt intimidation by employers in an effort to prevent union activity,
especially in the Free Trade Zones (see Section 6.b.).
The Dominican Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers (FEDOTRAZONAS)
reported significant antiunion activity at the FM company in Santiago
between July and September. According to FEDOTRAZONAS, when manager
Jose Miguel Torres could not dissuade the organizing committee from
forming a labor union within FM, management attempted to plant three
new ``workers'' in the burgeoning union. These three new workers,
wielding machetes, beat members of the organizing committee, one of
whom eventually shot and wounded one man holding a machete. A day
later, the two remaining members of the antiunion group showed up in
front of the company with a truckload of heavily armed ruffians to look
for the rest of the organizing committee, the remainder of whom had
fled. On October 25, the organizing committee once more informed
management of employees' intent to unionize. Management again brought
in additional ``workers'' who physically assaulted members of the
organizing committee, and on November 29, violently expelled those
members of the organizing committee who refused to stop prounion
activity. As a result of these incidents, the Labor Secretariat cited
the FM company for violating the Labor Code.
According to the Dominican Solidarity Center, in September
approximately 140 employees of the FTZ company Ramsa in Santiago were
fired without cause when they were forming a collective bargaining
agreement; 98 percent of those fired were union members or pregnant
women. Management allegedly bribed eight union organizers about $55,000
(1 million pesos) each in order to dissuade them from further prounion
activity or agitation. The Secretariat of Labor cited Ramsa for several
infractions of the Labor Code, including maternity rights violations,
and charged the company with violating the Penal Code. This was the
first time the Government brought a case of this sort against a FTZ
company; the initial hearing on the matter was scheduled for January
2003.
In 2000 the Caribbean Sugar Producer's Consortium laid off 150
workers at its sugar mill in Consuelo in retaliation for having formed
a trade union. A court order succeeded in getting the majority of the
workers reinstated, and those persons received some compensation for
the period during which the workers were unemployed. Those who were not
reinstated still had not received compensation at year's end, and the
original owners left the country, making it difficult to enforce the
court's judgment.
Labor unions can and do affiliate freely regionally and
internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is legal and may take place in firms in which a union has
gained the support of an absolute majority of the workers. Only a
minority of companies have collective bargaining pacts, and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) considered the requirements for
collective bargaining rights to be excessive and found that in many
cases they could impede collective bargaining. The Labor Code
stipulates that workers cannot be dismissed because of their trade
union membership or activities; however, in practice, workers sometimes
were fired because of their union activities.
The Labor Code establishes a system of labor courts for dealing
with disputes. While cases did make their way through the labor courts,
enforcement of judgments was sometimes unreliable.
The Constitution provides for the right of workers to strike (and
for private sector employers to lock out workers). Requirements for
officially calling a strike include the support of an absolute majority
of all company workers whether unionized or not, a prior attempt to
resolve the conflict through mediation, written notification to the
Ministry of Labor, and a 10-day waiting period following notification
before proceeding with the strike. Brief work stoppages, or unofficial
strikes, were more common. During the year, members of several major
transportation unions briefly walked off the job to protest countrywide
toll hikes. The Government sometimes responded with force to disperse
demonstrations in support of strikes (see Section 2.b.).
In June the Secretariat of Labor charged a Korean-owned FTZ company
with violating the Hygiene Code in an incident in which toxic fumes
sickened approximately 100 employees. (The company had been repainting
work areas during business hours.) This led the local union to initiate
a collective bargaining agreement, but the company refused to negotiate
several clauses, and negotiations broke down completely on December 4.
In October the company began laying off workers, including a large
number of union members and activists. By year's end, the factory had
begun moving equipment and primary materials to an affiliate located in
the Moca FTZ.
The Labor Code applies in the 40 established FTZs, which employed
approximately 160,000 workers, mostly women. Workplace regulations and
their enforcement in the FTZs did not differ from those in the country
at large, although working conditions were sometimes better, and the
pay was occasionally higher. Mandatory overtime was a common practice,
and it was sometimes enforced through locked doors or loss of pay or
jobs for those who refused (see Section 6.c.).
There were reports of widespread discreet intimidation by employers
in the FTZs in an effort to prevent union activity (see Section 6.a.).
Unions in the FTZs reported that their members hesitated to discuss
union activity at work, even during break time, for fear of losing
their jobs. Some FTZ companies were accused of discharging workers who
attempted to organize unions. In the FTZs, while there may be as many
as 10 collective bargaining agreements on paper, only 3 actually
functioned. The majority of the unions in the FTZs are affiliated with
the National Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers (FENATRAZONAS) or
the FEDOTRAZONAS. FENATRAZONAS estimated that only 3 percent of the
workers in the FTZs were unionized.
Many of the major manufacturers in the FTZs had voluntary ``codes
of conduct'' that included worker rights protection clauses; however,
it was not known if they incorporated the ILO's Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work. In general, workers rarely had heard of such codes
or the principles they set out. It also was not known how many workers
received training about the codes, if workers had any effective means
of asserting their rights under them, or whether any of the codes were
subject to credible independent monitoring.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits all
forms of forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, such
practices still existed in the adult worker population and among
children in the informal sector. Young children ``adopted'' by families
worked under a kind of indentured servitude, and homeless children were
made to beg by adults (see Section 5). Trafficking in women and
children, particularly for purposes of prostitution, was also a problem
(see Section 6.f.).
The FENATRAZONAS noted that mandatory overtime in the FTZ factories
was a common practice. Workers also reported that their employers
locked factory doors with chains so they could not leave, and took
incentive pay away from or fired those who refused to work overtime.
For example, many companies used an incentive system in which a team of
12 to 15 persons was given a quota to fill by the end of the week, in
order to receive extra benefits. Most teams were unable to fill the
quota to receive the benefits and were not paid overtime pay for the
extra time they put in to attempt to fill the quota. Union officials
stated that newly hired workers were not informed that overtime was
optional.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits employment of children less than
14 years of age and places restrictions on the employment of children
under the age of 16; however, child labor was a serious problem.
Restrictions for children between the ages of 14 and 16 include
limiting the daily number of working hours to 6, prohibiting employment
in dangerous occupations or in establishments serving alcohol, and
limiting nighttime work. A company could face legal sanctions and fines
if caught employing underage children. Children between the ages of 14
and 16 may work in apprenticeship and artistic programs. A national
child labor survey conducted by the Labor Ministry found that 428,720
children between the ages of 5 and 17 worked. (The total estimated
population for this age group was 2.4 million.) Of these children that
worked, 56 percent were less than age 14; 21 percent were between 14
and 15, and the remaining 23 percent were adolescents 16 or older; 90
percent of those that worked also attended school.
The high level of unemployment and lack of a social safety net
created pressures on families to allow or encourage children to earn
supplemental income (see Section 5). Tens of thousands of children
began working before the age of 14. Child labor took place primarily in
the informal economy, small businesses, clandestine factories, and
prostitution. Conditions in clandestine factories were generally poor,
unsanitary, and often dangerous. The Government attempted to eliminate
the use of children for cutting sugar cane; however, there were still
some reports that poor Haitian and Dominican adolescents accompanied
their parents to work in the cane fields, with the tacit acceptance of
sugar companies. Also, human rights groups reported a slight increase
in the number of undocumented Haitian 14- and 15-year-olds working in
the cane fields.
The Ministry of Labor, in collaboration with the ILO's Program on
the Eradication of Child Labor and other international labor rights
organizations, implemented programs to combat child labor. These
included the national child labor survey and a program to remove
children from dangerous agricultural work in San Jose de Ocoa,
Constanza, and Azua. The Constanza program removed over 550 children,
twice as many as the targeted number, from work in hazardous
agriculture, and placed them in schools.
The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however,
such practices persisted in the informal sector, and trafficking in
girls was a serious problem (see Section 6.f.). There were no confirmed
reports of forced child labor in the formal sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution empowers the
executive branch to set minimum wage levels, and the Labor Code assigns
this task to a national salary committee. Congress also may enact
minimum wage legislation. The minimum monthly salary was $135 (2,490
pesos) in the FTZs, and $200 (3,690 pesos) outside the FTZs. The
minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family; it only provided approximately one-third of the income
necessary to sustain an average family. The national poverty level,
which was based on a basket of goods and services consumed by a typical
family, was $357 (6,607 pesos) per month for a family of five.
The Labor Code establishes a standard work period of 8 hours per
day and 44 hours per week. The code also stipulates that all workers
are entitled to 36 hours of uninterrupted rest each week. In practice,
a typical workweek was Monday through Friday plus a half day on
Saturday, but longer hours were common. The code grants workers a 35
percent differential for work totaling between 44 hours to 68 hours per
week and double time for any hours above 68 hours per week. Overtime
was mandatory at some firms in the FTZs (see Section 6.c.).
Conditions for agricultural workers were poor, especially in the
sugar industry. Most sugar cane worker villages lacked schools, medical
facilities, running water, and sewage systems, and had high rates of
disease. On sugar plantations, cane cutters usually were paid by the
weight of cane cut rather than the hours worked. Employers often did
not provide trucks to transport the newly cut cane at the conclusion of
the workday, causing workers to receive lower compensation because the
cane dried and weighed less. Many cane cutters earned less than $4.00
(80 pesos) per day and were paid in tickets that were redeemable for
cash every 2 weeks. Because workers earned so little and sometimes
could not wait until payday to redeem their tickets, an informal barter
system evolved in which the tickets also were used to purchase items at
private stores located on the plantations. These private stores made
change by giving back a combination of tickets and cash, but the stores
often retained 10 percent of the cash due a customer.
The Dominican Human Rights Committee and shantytown residents
reported that conditions of work for cane workers had deteriorated
since the industry was privatized in 1999. In various sugarcane
industry shantytowns, field guards reportedly kept workers' clothes and
documents to prevent them from leaving. Employers also withheld wages
to keep workers in the fields.
Workers reportedly were paid less, worked longer hours, and had
fewer benefits, according to the committee. The Dominican Solidarity
Center reported that since 1999, over 150 union organizers or members
within the sugarcane industry disappeared (see Section 1.b.). The
center alleged that employers were responsible for these
disappearances.
The Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) sets workplace
safety and health conditions. During the year, Congress passed a new
Social Security law that expanded coverage of the social security
programs. Both the IDSS and the Ministry of Labor had a small corps of
inspectors charged with enforcing standards. The Secretariat of Labor
had 250 inspectors who seek to improve sanitation, health care, and
safety for workers. Included in this number was a smaller, specialized
corps (eight in Santo Domingo) of inspectors for the FTZs. Inspector
positions customarily were filled through political patronage, and
bribes from businesses were common. In practice workers could not
remove themselves from hazardous working situations without
jeopardizing employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no comprehensive law to
prohibit trafficking in persons or to provide victim services, although
several laws could be used against it. Trafficking in women and
children from, to, and within the country remained a serious problem.
Women 18 to 25 years of age were at the highest risk for being
trafficked. Principal destination countries were in Europe and Latin
America, and included Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Germany, Greece, Belgium, Curacao, San Martin, Aruba, Panama,
Venezuela, and Argentina. Women were trafficked to the United States,
although in smaller numbers. Within the country there was a serious
problem of prostitution of minors, primarily in the tourist areas. The
ILO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported a
growing problem of Haitian women and children being trafficked to beg
in the streets; according to the Director General of Migration, the
trafficking ring linked to these beggars was under investigation.
Government agencies that had a role in combating trafficking often
kept statistics only on illegal immigration, since they seldom
differentiated between trafficking and illegal immigration. NGOs such
as the Center for Integral Orientation and Investigation (COIN), and
international organizations such as UNICEF and IOM that worked with
trafficking victims, were able to provide general numbers through
interviews with individuals and extrapolation. The Directorate of
Migration estimated that there were approximately 400 rings of alien-
smugglers, traffickers, and purveyors of false documents operating
within the country. These individuals profited by facilitating the
trafficking of women to Europe and the Eastern Caribbean under false
pretenses and for purposes of prostitution. According to COIN and IOM,
traffickers were usually small groups involving just a few people.
Usually there was a contact in the destination country and a few
persons in the Dominican Republic who handled obtaining identification
and travel documents and recruited the persons to be trafficked.
According to the Directorate of Migration, individual members of
that directorate, the armed forces, or National Police who facilitate,
condone, or were complicit in trafficking activities or migrant
smuggling were investigated, and fired or prosecuted when appropriate.
NGOs reported corruption among the military and migration border
officials and noted that these officials sometimes cooperated with the
transit of Haitian workers into the country to work on sugar
plantations and construction sites (see Sections 2.d. and 6.d.).
Accion SIDA, an HIV/AIDS NGO, estimated that children constituted
10 to 15 percent of the total number of persons engaged in the
country's sex industry. Some elements within the tourist industry
facilitated the sexual exploitation of children; particular problem
areas were Boca Chica and Puerto Plata. Tours were marketed by
foreigners overseas with the understanding that boys and girls could be
found as sex partners. In July the National Prosecutor's Office and the
Association of Hotels signed an agreement to combat the exploitation of
children in the tourist industry. Journalists reported that a large
number of prostitutes in brothels around the National District appeared
to be between 16 and 18 years of age. Newspaper reports indicated that
as many as 30,000 children and adolescents may be involved in the sex
industry. There were several church-run shelters that provided refuge
to children who escaped prostitution. Prostitution was the principal
means of exploitation of underage girls in the informal economy.
The Interinstitutional Committee for the Protection of Migrant
Women, composed of seven governmental institutions, one professional
association, two nongovernmental organizations and a religious order,
became the lead organization dealing with this problem through its
regular monthly meetings and its cosponsorship of an August seminar on
the role of the State and civil society with respect to fighting
trafficking. It also assumed a coordination function since it was
comprised of the key agencies and organizations interested in and
responsible for combating trafficking.
The Secretariat of Labor also became much more involved with
trafficked minors through its program to fight the worst forms of child
labor. The ILO began a pilot program in Boca Chica to identify and work
with children involved in the sex trade and to coordinate with the
Secretariats of Health and Education to provide psychological support
and medical assistance, and to return the children to the classroom.
COIN counseled women planning to accept job offers in Europe and
the eastern Caribbean about immigration, health, and other issues
including the dangers of trafficking, forced prostitution, and domestic
servitude. The program also provided services to returning women. COIN
administered the Center for Health and Migration Information for
Migrant Women that carried out community education campaigns in high
risk areas on various issues, including citizenship, legal work
requirements, dangers of trafficking, forced prostitution, and domestic
servitude.
Several laws may be applied to prosecute those who traffic in
persons, one of which establishes sanctions against alien smugglers
involved in illegally transporting people into and out of the country.
That law provides that persons involved in planning, financing,
facilitating, or organizing the illegal transportation of persons shall
be imprisoned for a period of 3 to 10 years and fined $600 to $3,000
(10,000 to 50,000 pesos). However, in practice if these smugglers were
foreigners, they did not spend time in prison; they were simply
deported. The law also provides that if military personnel, police
officers, or agents of the public authority participate in the
commission of the acts mentioned, the tribunal shall impose the maximum
penalties. In addition, a law specifically targeting procurers of
prostitutes may be used to combat trafficking in persons; it imposes
jail terms of 2 to 10 years and fines of up to $6,000 (100,000 pesos)
for traffickers involved in the promotion of prostitution. This law
makes procurement of minors and adolescents, as well as threats of
violence, aggravating factors. The 1997 Law Against Domestic Violence,
as well as the Minor's Code, create protection under both civil and
criminal law against particular situations that may be conducive to, or
acts that may be a part of, the traffic in persons, whether female or
male, minors or adults. There is no law that provides substantial
protection and rehabilitation services to victims of trafficking.
According to the Directorate of Migration, cases of trafficking
were investigated actively. In October members of the Armed Forces and
migration authorities were investigating a ring of traffickers in La
Vega, a point of origin for many trafficked women who ended up in
Switzerland and Austria, but no arrests had been made.
The Oversight Organization for the Protection of Children sought to
prevent abuse of the child adoption process by those intending to sell
or exploit children through prostitution or child pornography. The
Department of Family and Children was concerned about kidnapings,
especially of infants, for sale to foreigners who deliberately
sidestepped legal formalities--including those of their own country.
The Government sought to protect children from being victimized by
those who would adopt them. Many children left the country as adoptees,
but government officials made such adoptions more difficult to deter
would-be traffickers from abusing the system.
The Government did not have services for assisting trafficking
victims such as temporary or permanent residency status, relief from
deportation, shelter, or access to legal, medical and psychological
services. When trafficked individuals were repatriated from abroad,
they were given a ``control record'' that went into their official
police record, and they were interviewed by a Migration Inspector.
According to COIN, most victims were too embarrassed or afraid to seek
legal action against traffickers. The Government initiated specialized
training for Dominican Consuls posted in Europe on how to provide
assistance to trafficked persons. COIN worked to develop relationships
with embassies and consulates that serve trafficked victims and with
other NGOs in destination countries that serve similar populations.
__________
ECUADOR
Ecuador is a constitutional republic with a 100-member unicameral
legislature that was chosen in free and fair elections in October 2002.
The National Congress is composed of four major parties, six minor
parties, and three independents spanning the spectrum from center-right
to extreme left. In November Lucio Gutierrez was elected President and
will assume office on January 15, 2003, succeeding Gustavo Noboa. The
judiciary is constitutionally independent but in practice was
inefficient and susceptible to outside pressure.
While the civilian authorities generally maintained effective
control of the security forces, the military enjoyed substantial
autonomy, which was reinforced by revenues generated from civil
aviation, shipping, and other commercial sectors. The civilian Ministry
of government is in charge of the National Police, which is responsible
for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of internal order. In
February President Noboa declared a state of emergency in Sucumbios and
Orellana Provinces due to local anti-government protests; this gave him
the authority to use troops to monitor and react to public protests.
Throughout the year, the military continued to supplement the police on
an ad hoc basis. Some police and members of the military continued to
commit human rights abuses.
The economy, which is in the third year of recovery from a severe
economic recession, is based on private enterprise, although there
continues to be significant government involvement in key sectors such
as petroleum, utilities, and aviation. The country's population is
estimated at 12.2 million. The principal exports are oil, bananas,
shrimp, and cut flowers, which, together with emigrant remittances and
tourism, are the country's leading sources of foreign income. Most
citizens were employed in the urban informal sector or as rural
agricultural workers; rural poverty was extensive, underemployment was
high, and there was severe maldistribution of income. A U.N.
Development Program report estimated that 71 percent of the citizens
lived in poverty in 2001 of whom 30 percent were indigent, with an
almost total lack of resources. Annual inflation was approximately 9.4
percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. There
were credible reports that police, security forces, and semiofficial
entities committed killings using unwarranted lethal force. Security
forces killed three persons during demonstrations; however, the number
of killings during demonstrations declined from 2001 levels, and
members of the security forces also faced prosecution and prison
sentences for some violations. Police tortured and otherwise mistreated
prisoners and detainees. Prison conditions remained poor. Persons often
were subject to arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention was a
problem. Once incarcerated, persons without lawyers may wait up to 1
year before being tried or released. Nearly one-half of the detainees
in jail have not been sentenced formally. The Government prosecuted a
few human rights abusers; however, in most cases there was no
prosecution or punishment. The judiciary was politicized, inefficient,
and sometimes corrupt, which undermined the rule of law. There was some
self-censorship in the media. Between June and August, unknown
assailants broke into the offices of three human rights organizations
and searched their files and computers. The police used tear gas and
other methods to quell protesters. Violence and pervasive
discrimination against women, indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians
remained problems. Child labor remained a problem. Mob violence and
vigilante killings persisted. Ecuador was invited by the Community of
Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD
Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings; however, there
continued to be credible reports that police, security forces, and
semiofficial entities such as neighborhood brigades used excessive
force and committed killings. (Neighborhood brigades or ``juntas'' are
civic defense groups organized by the National Police to provide an
anticrime presence in neighborhoods. Their members were not authorized
to carry firearms but often did.) Through November the Ecumenical
Committee for Human Rights (CEDHU) reported 23 killings by security
forces, compared with 62 killings during all of 2001. In some
instances, there was insufficient evidence to reach a conclusion as to
what occurred; however, the killings sometimes exhibited a suspicious
pattern.
Three bodies were discovered along the highway around Guayaquil
during the first 9 months of the year, compared with 26 bodies
discovered along the highway in 2001. Some human rights groups allege
that the Intervention and Rescue Group (GIR) police or the semi-
autonomous Guayas Transit Commission police (CTG) (operating under the
Mayor's anticrime plan Mas Seguridad) were involved in these killings;
others asserted that criminals were responsible. In almost all of these
cases over the past 2 years, government agencies did not investigate.
However, there was a police investigation in the case of David Delgado
and Carlos Lara, whose bodies were found along the highway around
Guayaquil on January 1. The bodies showed evidence of torture and
bullet wounds. A neighbor claimed to have seen six men dressed in GIR
uniforms take the two victims away in a car on December 29, 2001. Five
police officers were indicted in the case; as of December, the case
remained pending in the police court system.
Security forces killed three persons during demonstrations (see
Sections l.c. and 2.b.). On January 11, during national protests
against the Government's increase in the price of fuel, police in the
city of Cuenca shot and killed 16-year-old student Damian Pena. As of
December, the case remained under investigation by the prosecutor's
office. At the time of the killing, students had been throwing stones
at the police, and the police had fired tear gas at the protesters. On
February 24, during protests in Sucumbios and Orellana Provinces, a
house in Lago Agria was destroyed when gas tanks inside the house
exploded. When police arrived at the scene, they shot and killed 26-
year-old Marcelo Zambrano, who was unarmed. Bystanders said the police
shot Zambrano because he was slow to comply with an order to lie down
on the ground. As of December, one policeman was under investigation
for the killing, and no final decision had been made by the police
court system. There were reports that a second person, Luis Guerra
Pachacama, was shot and killed by security forces during the protests
in Orellana. One witness said that members of the military, who had
fired tear gas and bullets at demonstrators, shot Pachacama. As of
December, the investigation into the death of Pachacama appeared to be
stalled, and no further details in the case were known.
On March 24, in the town of Puyo, a policeman shot and killed
Congressman Eduardo Vasconez. According to bystanders, at 3:30 a.m.
Vasconez and policeman Fausto Bosques Cajas came to blows in an
argument, and Bosques fired one shot at Vasconez. The cause of the
argument was unclear, but apparently it started after Bosques had
stopped some youths. Bosques was charged in the case, but as of
December, no verdict had been reached.
In June Rodrigo Ron died in prison under suspicious circumstances
(see Section 1.c.).
On July 1, police in Sucumbios detained taxi driver Klever Abad for
transporting a type of fuel that is used in processing cocaine.
According to police, Abad threw himself into a river to avoid arrest.
His body was found several days later,
24 miles from the bridge, with apparent gunshot wounds. After an
investigation, a policeman was charged in the case; however, as of
December, the case remained in the police court system.
In the case of the February 2001 killing of Joffre Aroca, policeman
Carlos Rivera spent more than a year in prison without being sentenced.
Rivera escaped from prison in April but was captured and--after
returning to prison--was sentenced to 8 years in prison for the murder
of Aroca. Rivera appealed his sentence and was released from prison at
the end of April, since he had already served more than a year in
prison.
In August 2001, 22-year-old lieutenant Julio Robles died during a
military hazing event known as a ``baptism,'' which took place at the
B1-21 Infantry Battalion in Macara. As of December, the case against
three members of the army remained in the military courts without a
final resolution. In December President Noboa decreed that the three
defendants be discharged from the military.
In March a court sentenced five policemen to 12 years in prison for
the murder of Pedro and Carlos Jaramillo, and the attempted murder of
Pedro Baque, in 1999. Baque survived eight gunshots and testified
against the policemen. The court released three other policemen Baque
implicated in the attack.
Six policemen were sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in September
for the December 2000 murders of Pedro and German Akintiua. The
policemen killed the father and son, members of the Shuar indigenous
community, during an altercation. The policemen's appeal of the
decision remained pending at year's end.
Three individuals (not members of government security forces) were
arrested for the 1999 killings of Jaime Hurtado Gonzalez, a member of
Congress from the far-left Popular Democratic Movement party, and two
associates. The three were released after spending 1 year in jail. In
November the prosecutor for the case completed an investigation of the
case, but at year's end the judge had not decided whether to try the
three suspects.
There were cases of mob violence that resulted in lynching and
burning of suspected criminals (see Section l.e.). Mobs or vigilante
groups killed 11 crime suspects in the first 9 months of the year;
individual lynching continued to occur in all parts of the country,
especially in indigenous communities in remote areas of the highlands.
For example, on January 27, in the Cuendina neighborhood south of
Quito, 3 men were accused of robbing a bakery. Hundreds of residents
assembled, seized the men, beat them, and burned them alive. On July
13, police in Santa Rosa arrested Franklin Pauta for murder. Police
attempted to move him to a different town; however, residents blocked
the highway. The police returned to the police station, where an
estimated 3,500 residents surrounded them, threw Puata off the second
floor, and shot him. As of December, there were no reports of arrests
in either case.
In 2001 an indigenous group, known as ``Los Justicieros,'' was
accused of implementing vigilante justice. In July 8 members of this
group were sentenced to 8 years in prison for kidnaping a judge.
There was no update in the case against vigilantes for the March
2001 murder of Patterson Manzano. The case remained stalled in the
court system.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances and no disappearances attributed to the police.
Nine policemen and one civilian were convicted for the November
2001 murders of Elias Elint Lopez Pita and Luis Alberto Shinin Lazo:
Five for premeditated homicide, two as accomplices, and three as
accessories after the fact.
Criminal kidnaping for profit continued to be a problem in the
northern regions that border on Colombia. There were reports of
extortions and threats of kidnaping of ranchers, farmers, and
businessmen. There were no reliable estimates of the number of such
extortions or kidnapings--often attributed to Colombian armed gangs--
since many victims did not report the crimes for fear of retribution.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and similar forms of
intimidation and punishment; however, the police continued to torture
and abuse suspects and prisoners, usually with impunity.
The CEDHU published detailed reports on suspects who reported being
tortured by specific police officers. Through November it had
registered 23 cases of torture involving 64 victims and had noted
complaints of ``physical aggression'' by police or security forces
against a total of 312 persons. The Permanent Committee for the Defense
of Human Rights (CDH) reported 10 cases of torture by police and 70
cases of torture by prison guards between January and September in
Guayas Province alone. In most cases, the police appeared to have
abused such persons during investigations of ordinary street crime. The
victims reported that the police beat them, burned them with
cigarettes, applied electric shocks, or threatened them. In May five
persons testified that police in the city of Cuenca submerged them in
freezing water until they confessed to committing crimes. A special
commission was formed to investigate the accusations, and as of
December, four policemen were under investigation.
In June Rodrigo Ron, former police superintendent for the province
of Pichincha, died in prison under suspicious circumstances. According
to the authorities, he died after he fell in his cell. However, an
autopsy detailed bruises on many parts of his body, broken ribs, and a
2-inch cut in the back of his head. Ron had been accused of being the
leader of a band of car thieves. After the press revealed
inconsistencies between the initial story and the autopsy, prison
authorities began an investigation. By year's end, the case was under
investigation by a prosecutor, but no charges had been filed.
No action was taken in the February 2001 case of the alleged
torture of warehouse clerk Jose Ramires by members of the National
Police and the Air Force Combat Command in Guayaquil, and none appeared
likely.
There were complaints that security forces used excessive force
during demonstrations and that protesters were beaten while in
detention. (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
Police corruption was also a problem. Charges were dropped in April
against former Guayas Police Chief and Intelligence Director General
Abraham Correa for drug trafficking in the case against drug trafficker
Carlos Hong. Correa frequently had visited Hong's residence and
business and had intervened to free Hong's wife when she was arrested.
One of Correa's subordinates still faced charges in the case. A total
of 150 police officers were fired in 2001 for infractions related to
human rights violations or corruption.
There was no activity in the cases of police officer Freddy Veloz
and off-duty corporal Miguel Noriega who in 2000 had been accused,
respectively, of rape and of shooting and wounding another person.
Unknown parties set off 14 small bombs during the year. On
September 25, pamphlet bombs exploded in Guayaquil at the headquarters
of the Social Christian Party and at a branch office of Ecuador's
largest bank. One individual was injured. Pamphlets left at both sites
said that the ``Revolutionary Militia of the People'' was responsible.
Conditions in prisons and detention centers generally were poor and
tended to be worse in the tropical coastal areas than in the temperate
highlands. Overcrowding was a chronic problem elsewhere. According to
the National Judiciary Board, in September there were 9,641 inmates
incarcerated in facilities originally designed to hold 6,571 prisoners.
In Manabi Province, where 3 prisons were built to hold 390 prisoners,
there were 620 inmates in September. Prison authorities routinely
investigated deaths in custody. During the year, a number of prisons
experienced serious outbreaks of disease, including meningitis. In 2001
Congress increased the penalties for serious offenses in an attempt to
curb rising crime. Prison officials feared the measures would
exacerbate overcrowding, but overcrowding did not increase
significantly. Pretrial detainees are not held separately from
convicted prisoners. There are no separate facilities for repeat
offenders or dangerous criminals, nor are there effective
rehabilitation programs. Construction of new prisons was underway.
During the year, the daily amount allocated for prison rations
increased from 70 cents to 75 cents per inmate.
The Constitution requires that prisoners charged with lesser
offenses (those carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years or less) and who
have been detained for more than 1 year without a trial obtain their
freedom immediately. By August approximately 2,420 inmates had been
released under this law since it went into force in 1999.
Inmates in a number of prisons protested against a proposed change
to sentencing guidelines. Inmates sentenced for a number of less
serious crimes routinely serve only half their sentence. The proposed
change would have mandated increased jail time for these prisoners. In
February prisoners began protests, including hunger strikes, and in May
inmates in a Quito prison held approximately 300 visitors hostage. The
proposal was dropped by the Attorney General on May 30, and the
prisoners' protests ended.
At year's end, women constituted 9 percent of the total prison
population. Women were held separately from men, and conditions were
notably better in the women's prison in Quito than in other facilities.
There also were separate facilities for juveniles. Children in these
facilities often faced abuse.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers. The National Police Directorate Specializing in Children
(DINAPEN) served as a monitoring group for preventing abuse in prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
Penal Code provide that no person may be deprived of liberty without a
written order from a governmental authority; however, the authorities
often violated these legal protections in practice, and arbitrary
arrest and detention remained problems. The law requires the
authorities to issue specific written arrest orders within 24 hours of
detention--even in cases in which a suspect is caught committing a
crime--and the authorities must charge the suspect with a specific
criminal offense within 48 hours of arrest. All detained persons may
challenge the legality of their detention by petition within 48 hours
of their arrest, but in practice few such petitions were brought
forward. The senior elected official (usually the mayor) of the
locality in which the suspect is held reviews any such petitions.
Regardless of the legality of a detention, a prisoner may be released
only by court order. In some cases, detainees who are unaware of this,
or who do not have the funds to hire a lawyer, may remain in prison for
an extended period of time before being released. Bail generally is not
available, and the law prohibits it in cases of narcotics and major
offenses (i.e., offenses that ``affect or put at risk'' the public,
punishable by 3 to 35 years imprisonment).
Although the law prohibits incommunicado detention, human rights
organizations continued to report occasional cases of this practice.
Even when the police obtain a written arrest order, those charged with
determining the validity of detention often allowed frivolous charges
to be brought, either because they were overworked or because the
accuser bribed them. The system frequently was used as a means of
harassment in civil cases in which one party sought to have the other
arrested on criminal charges. Investigative detention up to and
including trial is legal if a judge determines that it is necessary and
if evidence that a crime has been committed is presented. The new
Criminal Procedures Code limits immediate detention to 48 hours for
suspicion of committing a crime and establishes preventive detention of
6 months for minor offenses and 12 months for major offenses once trial
has begun.
There were mass arrests during protests in January and February
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). During the January protests, according to
Amnesty International, police detained over 200 protesters some of whom
reported being beaten during their detention. The authorities arrested
approximately 100 persons during the state of emergency in Sucumbios
and Orellana Provinces in February and early March. Most were released
in early March.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary was
susceptible to outside pressure and corruption. Despite continuing
efforts to depoliticize and modernize the court system, the judiciary
continued to operate slowly and inconsistently. Judges reportedly
rendered decisions more quickly or more slowly as a result of political
pressure, or in some cases, the payment of bribes. A 2001 survey by the
Latin American Corporation for Development revealed that 54 percent of
judges believed that other judges were corrupt. There were lengthy
delays before most cases came to trial.
The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, superior circuit
courts, other courts and tribunals that hear cases in accordance with
the Constitution and other laws, and the Judicature Council, which is
charged with administering the court system and disciplining judges.
There also are military and police tribunals that have the same status
as circuit courts, while criminal, provincial, and cantonal (county)
courts serve as courts of first instance.
The regular court system tries most nonmilitary defendants,
although some indigenous groups try members independently for
violations of tribal rules. The law permits police or military courts
to try police officers and military defendants in closed sessions, in
accordance with the respective military and police court martial
manuals. Only the Supreme Court may try cases involving flag-rank
officers. The police court does not announce verdicts or punishments,
reinforcing the strong impression that the police are immune from
prosecution. The 1998 Constitution places both police and military
justice under the control of the Supreme Court. However, the three
systems have not yet been integrated, although weak efforts to do so
continued.
The Supreme Court that took office in 1997 publicly recognized the
shortcomings of the judicial system and pledged to improve the quality
and training of judges. In 1998 the Supreme Court supervised the
selection by open competition of all appellate judges. Between January
and September, the Judicature Council that took office in 1998 received
891 complaints against various judges. Thirty judges were dismissed
from their posts during the year. There are over 55,000 laws and
regulations in force. Many of these are conflicting, and judges have
been known to pick and choose from archaic legislation in an arbitrary
or capricious manner. The resulting lack of clear rules contributes to
what widely is referred to as ``juridical uncertainty.''
The failures of the justice system contributed to a growing number
of cases in which communities took the law into their own hands.
Lynching and burnings of suspected criminals by citizens and quasi-
official groups continued (see Section 1.a.). These occurred
particularly in indigenous communities and poor neighborhoods of major
cities, where there is little police presence.
The law provides for due process rights for criminal defendants,
but the authorities, including the Chief Prosecutor's office, often did
not observe these rights in practice. By law the accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty, and defendants have the right to a public
trial, defense attorneys, and appeal. They may present evidence, refuse
to testify against themselves, and confront and cross-examine
witnesses. Although a public defender system exists, in practice there
are almost no attorneys available to defend the large number of
impoverished suspects.
Trial is supposed to begin within 15 to 60 days of the initial
arrest; however, in practice initiation of the trial phase can take
years. Nearly half of all incarcerated persons had not been tried and
sentenced. Accused narcotics traffickers and suspects in major crimes
cannot obtain bail or be released on their own recognizance.
In July 2001, a new Criminal Procedures Code went into effect and
fundamentally changed the criminal justice system from an inquisitorial
system to an accusatorial system. Under the new system, the Chief
Prosecutor's office is to investigate and prosecute crimes, while the
role of judges is to become neutral arbiters presiding over oral
trials. Previously, judges and their staffs investigated crimes with
the help of the police while the public prosecutors (``fiscales'')
monitored the judges' progress. Under the new system, prosecutors have
wide discretion in deciding which cases can proceed. The judiciary now
hears criminal cases in oral trials, compared with the previous slow,
predominantly written inquisitorial system. The National Police
continued to work as investigators, but now are under the direction of
the prosecutors. There are no juries in the justice system. The new
code is intended to strengthen the justice system by improving due
process and enhancing the rights of the accused through measures such
as habeas corpus and limits on preventive detention (see Section 1.d.).
In December the Government authorized the formation of an organizing
committee to coordinate implementation of the abrupt change in roles,
functioning, and procedures for the criminal justice system. The
supplies and training available remained inadequate to meet the newly
expanded role of the prosecutor's office.
The 1998 Constitution also explicitly recognizes the indigenous
communities' right to exercise their own system of justice, based on
their traditions and customs. However, the law does not yet specify how
this is to work in practice. This parallel system has raised questions
of both jurisdiction and conformity to the right to a fair trial.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respected these prohibitions, and violations were
subject to effective legal sanctions. Wiretapping by the national
police to investigate crimes is legal with a court order. However,
members of the police did conduct wiretapping that is not officially
sanctioned, in part due to a lack of specific procedural guidance.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these provisions in practice; however, there were some
significant exceptions.
Individuals criticized the Government publicly and privately
without fear of reprisal. There is a free and vigorous press. Ownership
of the media is broadly based, and editorials represented a wide range
of political views and often criticized the Government. However, some
degree of self-censorship in the print media occurred, particularly
with respect to politically sensitive issues or stories about the
military and its related industries. Self-censorship appeared to have
operated in the media coverage of the labor dispute on a banana
plantation owned by wealthy businessman and presidential candidate
Alvaro Noboa (see Section 6.b.). This dispute received little coverage
in the national media, despite Noboa's economic and political
prominence. In addition, most elements of the media were influenced by
economic considerations and tended to reflect the narrow, regional
interests of their owners.
All of the major media organs--newspapers, radio, and television--
are locally and privately owned, except for one government-owned
national radio station. The law limits foreign investment in broadcast
media. Using a law promulgated by the last military regime that
requires the media to give the Government free space or broadcast time,
the Government may and did require television and radio to broadcast
programs produced by the Government featuring the President and other
top administration officials.
According to the Inter-American Press Association, during the state
of emergency that occurred in Sucumbios and Orellana Provinces in
February (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.), the Government ordered four
radio stations to stop broadcasting anything other than music for 3
days, in the interest of public security.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of free assembly for peaceful purposes, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice; however, there
were some limits, and security forces used force to quell some
demonstrations, resulting in deaths and injuries (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.). Public rallies require prior government permits, which generally
were granted, although exceptions occurred.
In January there were significant protests around the country
against an increase in fuel prices (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). Police
used tear gas, detained approximately 200 protesters, killed one
person; at least 9 others suffered mostly minor injuries. In February
and March, demonstrators blocked roads, and disrupted business in the
Amazonian provinces of Sucumbios and Orellana (see Sections 1.a. and
1.d.). Police and military forces again used tear gas, killed 2
persons, injured several others, and arrested approximately 100
demonstrators. There was no official review of the level of force used
to restore order. In the cases of the killings, there was no indication
that the demonstrators posed a serious threat to the police.
Numerous other labor and student demonstrations took place without
major incident in the capital and the outlying regions during the year.
Protesters often blocked roads (see Section 2.d.). In general the
security forces intervened in demonstrations only when there was
violence against bystanders or destruction of property.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The Government does not require religious groups to be
licensed or registered unless they form non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that engage in commercial activity.
The overwhelming majority of the population consider themselves to
be Roman Catholic, although many citizens either did not regularly
practice the religion or followed a syncretistic version that combines
indigenous beliefs with orthodox Catholic doctrine. The Government
allowed missionary activity and religious demonstrations by all
religions. The Government did not permit religious instruction in
public schools; private schools are permitted to teach religion, as are
parents in the home. There are no restrictions on publishing religious
materials in any language.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice;
however, frequent military and police roadblocks often presented
problems for travelers using public transportation, especially at
night. Protesters often blocked roads (see Section 2.b.). The
Government requires all citizens to obtain exit visas when traveling
abroad, which are granted routinely. Military and minor applicants must
comply with special requirements.
The law provides for granting refugee and asylee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of provision of first
asylum did not arise during the year. There were no reports of the
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
The Foreign Ministry reported that for the year there were 6,270
applications for refugee status. Since January 2000, a total of 10,958
individuals had applied, and at year's end, 5,595 applicants awaited
determination of their status. During the year, the authorities denied
1,365 applications and granted 1,713. Approximately 99 percent of these
refugees and applicants were Colombians; according to the UNHCR, the
majority of displaced Colombians were impoverished peasants fleeing
fighting, but some were adolescents escaping forced recruitment by
illegal armed groups in Narino and Caqueta. Most displaced persons
still came from Putumayo and transited Sucumbios, Quito, and Tulcan to
return home. The Government and the UNHCR developed a plan to cope with
a potential refugee influx into Sucumbios Province of up to 10,000
persons.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. In October a new Congress was elected, and in
November voters selected Lucio Gutierrez in the second round
presidential election. Election observers from the Organization of
American States, the European Union, and the Ecuadorian NGO Citizen
Participation termed the elections peaceful, free, and fair. President-
elect Gutierrez will assume office on January 15, 2003, succeeding
Gustavo Noboa. The President's term is 4 years, and the President may
not serve consecutive terms.
Deputies are elected to Congress for 4-year terms. Several parties
were represented in the 100-member Congress, and no one party
dominated. The Social Christian Party had the most seats (26). There
were also three other major parties and six smaller parties represented
in Congress. Eighteen members of Congress ran on an alliance of two or
more parties.
Voting is mandatory for literate citizens over 18 years of age and
voluntary for illiterate citizens. The law does not permit active duty
members of the military to vote. The Constitution bars members of the
clergy and active duty military personnel from election to Congress,
the presidency, or the vice presidency. The Constitution provides that
if a political party fails to garner a minimum of 5 percent of the
votes in two open elections, the party must be eliminated from the
electoral registry. Twelve parties were registered.
No specific laws prevent women or minorities from attaining
leadership positions in government. President-elect Gutierrez won the
election in alliance with Pachakutik, the largest indigenous political
party. However, few women, indigenous people, or Afro-Ecuadorians
occupied senior positions in government. A 1998 law requires that in
2000 at least 30 percent of the candidates for Congress and some local
positions be women, and that in each subsequent election an additional
5 percent of the candidates be women (for example, 35 percent in 2002),
until 2008 when 50 percent of the candidates are to be women. Women
held 17 of 100 seats in Congress, the largest proportion in the
country's history. President-elect Gutierrez named four female cabinet
ministers, including the first female Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The indigenous movement, which previously shunned politics, formed
the electoral movement ``Pachakutik'' and has run candidates for
national, provincial, and local office in all elections since 1996. In
November's elections, Pachakutik formed an alliance with President-
elect Gutierrez. Pachakutik has five members in Congress, and an
additional nine members of Congress ran on an alliance ticket that
included Pachakutik. Pachakutik is associated closely with the
politically active Confederation of Ecuadorian Indian Nationalities
(CONAIE). Indigenous members of the National Constituent Assembly and
their supporters won important constitutional protections for
indigenous rights in the 1998 Constitution. President-elect Gutierrez
named two indigenous cabinet members.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated
without restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Domestic human rights groups, such as the CEDHU and
the regional Latin American Human Rights Association (ALDHU), were
outspoken in their criticism of the Government's record on specific
cases. The Government has contracted with the ALDHU to provide
mandatory human rights training to the military and the police.
The offices of three human rights groups were broken into between
June and August. The nature of the break-ins indicated that these were
not simple robberies. Files were opened, laptop computers were turned
on but not stolen, and in one case a computer hard drive was stolen.
The police investigations appeared to be superficial and no arrests
were made.
In September during a press conference in Quito, a visiting senior
U.N. official publicly questioned President Noboa's grasp of human
rights following Noboa's August criticisms of ``some'' human rights
groups for ``protecting criminals'' and ``threatening national
security.''
The office of the Ombudsman (``Defensor del Pueblo'') was created
in 1998 to ensure ongoing attention to human rights problems; however,
some observers criticized its lack of independence in practice. In 2000
Congress removed the Ombudsman from office on charges of fraud for acts
that he committed while he was acting Attorney General, and Congress
has not named a permanent replacement. Claudio Mueckay continued as
acting Ombudsman at year's end. In November the office of the Ombudsman
completed a new procedures manual that will be used to ensure that the
procedures of all local ombudsman offices throughout the country are
uniform.
In 1998 the Government decreed an ambitious National Human Rights
Plan with the goal of preventing, penalizing, and eradicating human
rights violations in the country. The three branches of government, as
well as the independent Ombudsmen's office and a number of NGOs
contributed to development of this plan, and the U.N. contributed funds
to support it. The Government continued to implement various aspects of
the plan, including training of the Congress on human rights matters,
seminars, publication of documents, and a contingency plan for
refugees. In October several prominent human rights NGOs publicly
criticized the Government's lack of progress in implementing the plan.
In December the Government released its ``Human Rights Operative Plan''
which described possible mechanisms for implementing the National Human
Rights Plan.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, or
social status. In addition, the 1998 constitutional reforms explicitly
increased the rights of women, children, and minorities, and required
Congress to pass legislation implementing these rights promptly.
Congress has been only partially successful in carrying out this
mandate. Women, indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians continued to
face significant discrimination.
Women.--Although the law prohibits violence against women,
including within marriage, abuses were widespread. The Law Against
Violence Affecting Women and Children criminalized spousal abuse,
including physical, sexual, and psychological abuse; created family
courts; and reformed the Penal Code to give courts the power to remove
an abusive spouse from the home. The law also gives legal support to
the Government's Women's Bureau in cases of sexual harassment in the
workplace.
The Office of Gender, in the Ministry of government, reported
50,794 cases of sexual, psychological, or physical mistreatment of
women in 2000. Women may file complaints against a rapist or an abusive
spouse or companion only if they produce a witness. Some communities
have established their own centers for counseling and legal support of
abused women. The Government addressed such problems through its
Women's Bureau; however, although the Bureau can accept complaints
about abuse of women, it has no authority to act on the complaints but
refers cases to the prosecutor's office. The Women's Bureau has
projects in all provinces.
Many rapes were not reported due to the victims' reluctance to
confront the perpetrators. The penalty for rape is up to 25 years in
prison. In cases of statutory rape involving ``amorous'' sex with a
minor, if the rapist marries the victim the charges against him, or
anyone else who took part in the rape, cannot be pursued unless the
marriage subsequently is annulled. In 2001 Congress increased the
penalty for rape where death occurred to 35 years in prison.
Sexual harassment in the workplace was common. Typical cases of
sexual harassment reported in the press involved instances where a
supervisor solicited sexual favors from an employee.
Regulated adult prostitution is legal so long as the businesses are
registered with the Government and follow health regulations.
Discrimination against women is pervasive in society, particularly
with respect to educational and economic opportunities for those in the
lower economic strata. The increasingly active women's movement alleged
that culture and tradition inhibited achievement of full equality for
women. There were fewer women than men employed in professional work
and skilled trades, and pay discrimination against women was common.
The Ecuadorian Women's Permanent National Forum included more than
320 women's organizations and promoted social, economic, and cultural
change through various methods, including increasing political
participation by women. In addition, the National Women's Council
provides support for approximately 500 women's organizations, many of
which promoted social consciousness and greater participation by women
in the political process. The Women's Political Coordinator, an NGO
that operated in 22 provinces, promoted similar themes relating to
women's rights, with emphases on political participation and human
rights. It also focused on young women and Afro-Ecuadorian women.
Children.--The Government did not take effective steps to provide
for the welfare of children. The Constitution requires that children
achieve ``a basic level of education,'' estimated at 9 years of school;
however, due to the lack of schools in many rural communities, the
Government's failure to provide adequate resources, and the economic
needs of families, the Government rarely enforced this requirement in
practice. The National Statistics Institute reported in 2001 that 1 out
of 6 citizens between the ages of 13 and 20 had not completed the sixth
grade. Education is free. The Constitution provides that 30 percent of
the public budget must be devoted to education; however, in practice
only half of that amount was spent. The Government has programs in 18
urban areas that provide families with educational subsidies as an
incentive to keep children in school. In rural areas, many children
attend school only sporadically after 10 years of age to able to
contribute to household income as farm laborers (see Section 6.d.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
Child prostitution was a problem (see Section 6.f.)
Government resources to assist children traditionally have been
limited. Approximately 61 percent of children under the age of 5 years
are malnourished. After declining in previous years, it appeared that
government spending on education slightly increased during the year.
More than 20 NGOs promoted child welfare. Several private
organizations were very active in programs to assist street children,
and UNICEF also ran a program in conjunction with the Central Bank. The
children of the poor often experienced severe hardships, especially in
urban areas.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no official discrimination
against persons with disabilities in employment, education, or the
provision of other state services. The Constitution recognizes the
rights of persons with disabilities. In April 2001, Congress passed
legislation to promote the rights of persons with disabilities,
including access to education, employment, transportation, and
communication. However, the Government has few resources to ensure
access to these services in practice. In September the U.N. awarded the
country the Franklin Delano Roosevelt International Disability Award in
recognition of its creation of a national council and a national plan
for persons with disabilities.
Indigenous Persons.--While at least 85 percent of all citizens
claim some indigenous heritage, those who maintain their indigenous
cultural identity and live in indigenous communities comprise between
15 and 20 percent of the total population. The vast majority of
indigenous citizens reside in rural areas, including the highlands and
the Amazonian provinces, and most live in varying degrees of poverty. A
2000 government study found that 79 percent of indigenous children
lived under the poverty line. Land is scarce in the more heavily
populated highland areas, where high infant mortality, malnutrition,
and epidemic disease were common. Electricity and potable water often
were unavailable. Although the rural education system was seriously
deficient, many indigenous groups participated actively with the
Ministry of Education in the development of the bilingual education
program used in rural public schools.
The Constitution recognizes the rights of indigenous communities to
hold property communally, to administer traditional community justice
in certain cases, and to be consulted before natural resources are
exploited in community territories. Indigenous people also have the
same civil and political rights as other citizens. In the Amazon area,
indigenous groups have lobbied the Government, enlisted the help of
foreign and domestic NGOS, and mounted protests (including kidnaping
oil workers in December) in their attempts to win a share of oil
revenues and a voice in exploitation and development decisions. The
Constitution expressly recognizes the indigenous communities' right to
be consulted on, but not the right to approve, oil exploration and
development. The communities tended to be consulted on such matters,
although their wishes were not always met. Oil companies increased
their efforts to minimize the environmental and social impact of their
oil projects in the Amazon but continued to face criticism from
indigenous groups that environmental damage continued.
Despite their growing political influence and the efforts of
grassroots community groups, which were increasingly successful in
pressuring the Government to assist them, indigenous people continued
to suffer discrimination at many levels of society. With few
exceptions, indigenous people were at the lowest end of the
socioeconomic scale.
Following protests in January and February 2001, the three main
indigenous groups--CONAIE, the Federation of Indigenous and Black
Peasants of Ecuador (FENOCIN), and the Federation of Evangelical
Indigenous of Ecuador (FEINE)--tabled 23 topics for discussion with the
Government, including the claims by indigenous groups for indemnities
over lives lost during the protests. After President-elect Gutierrez
won in alliance with the mostly indigenous political party Pachakutik,
the talks were discontinued.
CONAIE was at the forefront of protests in 2000 that toppled
President Mahuad. CONAIE also attempted to arrange a popular referendum
and engaged in public demonstrations to protest government economic
austerity measures and to urge the repeal of economic modernization
laws involving privatization of state-owned enterprises.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of the rural,
northern coastal area includes large numbers of Afro-Ecuadorian
citizens. They suffered widespread poverty and pervasive
discrimination, particularly with regard to educational and economic
opportunity. There were no special government efforts to address these
problems.
Five major Afro-Ecuadorian organizations were active in the
country; the largest was the National Afro-Ecuadorian Confederation,
with headquarters in Quito. It estimated that Afro-Ecuadorians
accounted for more than one million persons, or approximately 9 percent
of the total population. While the presence of Afro-Ecuadorians has
grown in the fields of sports and culture, their educational
opportunities continued to be limited.
The press has focused on lingering racism among all strata of
society. Afro-Ecuadorian organizations noted that despite the absence
of official discrimination, societal discrimination, including
stereotyping, continued to affect them. For example, they asserted that
the police stop Afro-Ecuadorians for document checks more frequently
than they stop other citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and Labor Code
provide most workers with the right to form trade unions. The labor
code does not explicitly prohibit employers from interfering in the
establishment or functioning of worker organizations; however the labor
code explicitly prohibits employers from dismissing workers while they
are forming a union or negotiating a collective contract, although the
penalties for violations are relatively minor. Members of the police
and the military and public sector employees in nonrevenue producing
entities are not free to form trade unions. The 1991 Labor Code reforms
sets the number of workers required for an establishment to be
unionized at 30, which the International Labor Organization's Committee
on Freedom of Association considers too stringent a limitation at the
plant workers' council level. In June the ILO again criticized the 30-
worker minimum and called for the Government to take the necessary
measures to amend its labor code. In its 2002 Annual Survey of
Violations of Trade Union Rights, the ICFTU reported that 60 percent of
the enterprises in the country employed fewer than 30 workers, with
approximately 1 million workers excluded from organizing a union.
Although the Congress debated additional labor reforms, labor law
remained in flux because the Constitutional Court ruled in 2001 that
some recent labor legislation was unconstitutional (see Section 6.e.).
The court's ruling nullified several articles that the Government
stated provided flexibility to employers but that some observers
claimed undercut constitutional protections of worker rights.
Some companies have taken advantage of the law that prohibits
unions from organizing at companies that have less than 30 employees by
sub-contracting with several shell companies, each of which has less
than 30 workers. Under the Labor Code, these subcontracted workers have
no legal right to freedom of association or right to bargain
collectively with the companies that ultimately benefit from their
labor, nor do they have legal protection against anti-union
discrimination.
Labor laws intended to protect workers' rights to freedom of
association and to form and join trade unions are inadequate and failed
to deter employers from retaliating against workers for organizing.
Neither the Constitution nor the Labor Code requires reinstatement of
workers fired for union activity. The Government's failure to enforce
its labor laws and its lack of sufficient legal protection for workers'
rights allowed employers to violate workers' rights with impunity.
While employees of state-owned organizations enjoy rights similar
to those in the private sector, the law technically prevents the
majority of public sector employees from joining unions or exercising
collective bargaining rights. However, most public employees maintained
membership in some labor organization.
Under the law, unions may form freely (if the company has the
requisite 30 employees) and join federations or confederations, and
three of the large labor centrals maintained international
affiliations.
The Labor Code provides for resolution of labor conflicts through
an arbitration and conciliation board that consists of one
representative of the Ministry of Labor, two from the union, and two
from management.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor
market is highly segmented, with a minority of workers in skilled,
usually unionized, positions in state-run enterprises or in medium-to-
large industries. Approximately 12 percent of the work force was
organized. Most of the economically active population was employed in
the agricultural sector or the urban informal sector; the vast majority
of these workers were not organized.
Although the labor confederations were politically independent, the
two largest single labor unions, the National Union of Educators (UNE)
and the Union of Social Security Workers, were allied with the
Democratic Political Movement, a communist party. There are five large
labor confederations or centrals; no central was connected firmly to
any one political party, and there were no ties between the Government
and any labor union.
The Labor Code requires that all private employers with 30 or more
workers belonging to a union must negotiate collectively when the union
so requests. Collective bargaining agreements covered only one-quarter
of the approximately 12 percent of the work force that is organized. A
2000 labor law allowed businesses to hire workers on ``individual
contracts,'' but the practice has not become prevalent because Congress
began a review of the law and has not clarified its status.
The Labor Code streamlined the bargaining process in state
enterprises by requiring workers to be represented by only one labor
union. It prohibits discrimination against unions and requires that
employers provide space for union activities upon the union's request.
If the Ministry of Labor rules that a dismissal of an employee is
unjustified, it can require the employer to pay indemnities or
separation payments to the worker of 125 percent of a month's salary
for each year worked, although the reforms set a cap on such payments.
These payments were relatively low for workers earning the minimum wage
(i.e., payments of $400 or less), and the law does not require
reinstatement of workers fired for anti-union activity. Workers
generally were protected against antiunion discrimination only by
pressure from the union. The ILO Committee of Experts found that the
imposition of a fine ``provided for by law in all cases of unjustified
dismissal, when the real motive is . . . trade union membership or
activity'' is an inadequate protection against anti-union
discrimination.
Employees also worked on temporary contracts, especially in the
agricultural sector. While the Labor Code establishes a cap of 180
consecutive days for each contract, it does not prohibit the use of
consecutive 180-day contracts. Some ``temporary'' workers may work for
the same company (often for different sub-contractors of the same
company) for an extended period of time under a series of short-term
contracts. In practice it was difficult to organize temporary employees
on short-term contracts. Since the Labor Code does not recognize
temporary workers, they do not enjoy the same level of protection
offered to other workers.
There are few restrictions on the right of workers to strike,
although a 10-day cooling-off period is required before a strike can be
declared. The Labor Code limits solidarity strikes or boycotts to 3
days, provided that the Labor Ministry approves them. In some
industries, during a legal strike, workers may take possession of the
factory or workplace (thus ending production at the site) and receive
police protection during the takeover. However, in other industries,
such as agriculture, the law requires a 20-day waiting period from the
day the strike is called. During this time, workers and employers must
agree on how many workers are needed to ensure a minimum service, and
at least 20 percent of the workforce must continue to work in order to
provide essential services. The Labor Code provides that ``the employer
may contract substitute personnel'' only when striking workers refuse
to send the number of workers to provide the minimum necessary
services. The law does not explicitly prohibit the hiring of
strikebreakers by subcontractors or other third parties that are not
legally the striking workers' employer; however, the Labor Code
prohibits an employer from contracting substitute workers during a
strike, although in practice this law was not enforced. The employer
must pay all salaries and benefits during a legal strike; the Labor
Code protects strikers and their leaders from retaliation. The law does
not provide public workers with the right to strike and includes a
provision that striking public sector workers are liable to between 2
and 5 years in prison; however, there were frequent ``illegal''
strikes. The Government occasionally took action against striking
public workers and, during the year, ordered striking public health
workers back to work.
There were several significant strikes during the year. On May 6,
workers at the Los Alamos banana plantation, owned by presidential
candidate Alvaro Noboa, went on strike to protest poor working
conditions. On May 16, between 200 and 400 men attacked the striking
workers. Several workers were injured and one worker had his leg
amputated as the result of a gunshot wound. The police arrested 16 of
the attackers, but they were released on habeas corpus. However, the
prosecutor's investigation did not address the primary claims made by
the workers that they were threatened at gunpoint and that several were
wounded by the attackers. In October the prosecutor charged the 16
individuals (who claimed to be plantation guards) with misuse of
firearms and wounding of a police officer. Labor arbitration panels
ruled against the strikers on the grounds that they had not met legal
requirements for a strike, and in October the Superior Arbitration
Panels rejected the workers' appeal.
Public health workers, including doctors and nurses, went on strike
in February and July to demand higher wages and better working
conditions.
The 1990 Maquila Law permits the hiring of temporary workers for
the maquila (in-bond processing for export) industries. The maquila
system allows a company and its property to become an export-processing
zone wherever it is located. There were no unions or labor associations
in the maquilas. Most workers were hired on temporary contracts by the
employer to complete a specific order. Many such ``zones'' have been
established; most were relatively small and were dedicated to textiles
and fish processing.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution and the
Labor Code prohibit forced or bonded labor, including by children, and
there were no reports of it in general; however, there were reports of
children forced into prostitution (see Section 5)
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In December President Noboa signed a new law on minors
that includes a section on child labor. The new law raises the minimum
working age for minors from 14 to 15, for all types of labor. It also
reduces the maximum hours a minor may work to 6 hours per day, and 5
days a week. The law prohibits minors from working in hazardous
conditions, including in mines, with toxic or dangerous substances, or
with dangerous machinery. Employers are required to pay minors at least
80 percent of the wages received by adults for the same type of
employment. The law also increases the penalties for illegal child
labor. The parents or guardians can be fined $50 to $300 and the
employers $200 to $1,000 for participating in child labor. In cases of
repeated infractions the employer's business can be closed.
The Government formed the National Committee for the Progressive
Eradication of Child Labor in 1997--with a membership including
government agencies, and business and labor organizations--charged with
formulating a national plan for the eradication of child labor. During
the year, the Committee worked with the ILO's International Program on
the Elimination of Child Labor to conduct several industry specific
studies on child labor.
In practice the Ministry of Labor and the Minors' Tribunals fail to
enforce child labor laws, and child labor is prevalent. Despite the
economic recovery over the past 3 years, the situation has not improved
substantially, in part due to the emigration abroad of many parents who
have left their children behind. Urban child labor has increased with
the migration of the rural poor to the cities. A 2000 UNICEF report
estimated that almost half of the children between the ages of 10 and
17 worked. The National Statistics Institute (INEC) reported that in
2001 over 130,000 children 14 years old or younger worked. A separate
INEC study in 2001 reported that 455,000 children under the age of 15
worked.
In rural areas, young children often must leave school at an early
age to help out on the family's plot of land. More than 60 percent of
all children live in rural areas and did unpaid agricultural work for
their families. In April Human Rights Watch published a report of the
labor conditions on banana plantations. The 45 children interviewed for
the report described working long hours on the plantations in dangerous
conditions and without the proper safety equipment for the pesticides
that are used on the plantations. The Ministry of Labor did not devote
adequate resources to investigate exploitative child labor practices.
The Ministry of Labor has designated a ``Social Service
Directorate'' to monitor and control child labor in formal sector
businesses such as factories. In some instances the Directorate applied
sanctions, but in other cases, it merely helped to provide documents to
child workers. In urban areas, many children under 12 years of age
worked in family-owned ``businesses'' in the informal sector, shining
shoes, collecting and recycling garbage, or as street peddlers. Other
children were employed in commerce, messenger services, domestic
service, and begging. Children as young as 5 or 6 years often sold
newspapers or candy on the street to support themselves or to augment
family income.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor
periodically sets the minimum wage in consultation with the Commission
on Salaries, but Congress also may adjust it. As of September, the
minimum wage plus mandated bonuses provided a gross monthly
compensation of approximately $138 or 85 cents per hour in the case of
contract workers. The statutory minimum wage is not adequate to provide
a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most organized
workers in state industries and formal sector private enterprises
earned substantially more than the minimum wage and also received other
significant benefits through collective bargaining agreements. However,
the majority of workers worked in the large informal and rural sector
without recourse to the minimum wage or to legally mandated benefits.
The Ministry of Labor did not deploy sufficient resources to
enforce labor laws. The Labor Code provides for a 40-hour workweek, a
15-day annual vacation, a minimum wage, and other employer-provided
benefits, such as uniforms and training opportunities. In 2000, reforms
to the labor law gave nominally greater flexibility to employers for
hiring part-time workers; however, this legislation was affected by a
Constitutional Court decision related to workers' retirement benefits.
The impact of the Court's decision remained to be clarified at year's
end (see Section 6.a.).
The Labor Code also provides general protection for workers' health
and safety on the job. However, a worker may not leave the workplace
for health reasons, even if there is a hazardous situation. The worker
is allowed to request that an inspector from the Ministry of Labor come
to the workplace and confirm the hazard; that inspector then may close
down the workplace. Response time for inspectors ranged from a few days
in major cities to much longer in the countryside.
The Social Security Institute enforces health and safety standards
and regulations. In the formal sector, occupational health and safety
was not a significant problem. However, there were no specific
regulations governing health and safety standards in the agricultural
sector and in practice there was no enforcement of safety rules in the
small mines that make up the vast majority of the mining sector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--A misdemeanor law specifically
addresses trafficking in persons, and other laws could be used to
prosecute traffickers; however, no one has yet been convicted under the
trafficking laws, and there were reports that Ecuadorians were
trafficked out of the country.
A misdemeanor law specifically prohibits trafficking and provides
for penalties from 6 months to 3 years in prison, as well as fines. The
Migration Law and the Penal Code provide for the imposition of
sanctions on suppliers of false documents for purposes of travel or
work. Other laws dealing with kidnaping, labor, occupational safety,
and slavery apply to and provide sanctions for trafficking in persons.
In 2000 Congress amended the Criminal Code to strengthen sentences for
furnishing or utilizing false documents and for alien smuggling. Alien
smugglers or traffickers can receive sentences from 3 to 6 years'
imprisonment; the penalties range from 6 to 9 years if victims are
injured, and a penalty of up to 12 years may be imposed if a death
occurs. The law specifically exempts smuggling victims from
prosecution. At year's end, no case had yet reached a verdict under the
trafficking laws.
There were reports of prostitution by girls and boys under 18 years
of age in urban areas, and there were reports of cases in which
children were forced into prostitution (see Section 5).
No specific cases of trafficking were publicized during the year;
however, human rights organizations suspected that trafficking
occurred. In past years, Ecuadorian trafficking victims had been
identified in Spain, Guatemala, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the United
Kingdom. Although there were credible allegations that some government
officials were involved in alien smuggling, there was no evidence that
such officials facilitated or condoned trafficking in persons.
Since the beginning of its economic crisis in 1999, the country has
had a high rate of emigration: Up to 800,000 persons (or 7 percent of
the population) were estimated to have emigrated since 1998, primarily
to the United States and Spain, most of them illegally. Illegal
emigrants paid between $8,000 and $12,000 per person to criminal
organizations to be taken to the United States, usually through Central
America. Due to the extreme poverty of most of the emigrants, and the
high cost of such trips, some emigrants were vulnerable to traffickers.
__________
EL SALVADOR
El Salvador is a constitutional, multiparty democracy with an
executive branch headed by a president and a unicameral legislature. In
1999 voters elected President Francisco Flores of the Nationalist
Republican Alliance (ARENA) to a 5-year term. In generally free and
fair elections in March 2000, the former guerrilla organization
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) won a plurality of the
seats in the Legislative Assembly. ARENA maintains a working majority
in coalition with the conservative National Conciliation Party. Four
other parties and three independents hold seats in the Assembly. The
judiciary is constitutionally independent; however, it suffers from
inefficiency and corruption. The Supreme Court and the Attorney
General's office took initial steps during the year to address
inefficiency and corruption in the judiciary.
The National Civilian Police (PNC) maintains internal security. The
military is responsible for external security. The military provides
support for some PNC patrols in rural areas, a measure begun in 1995 by
presidential executive order in an effort to contain violence by well-
armed, organized criminal bands, and also provides support to the law
enforcement agencies for specific activities, including antinarcotics
efforts and reform school training for juvenile convicts. Civilian
authorities generally maintain effective control of the military and
security forces. Members of the police committed human rights abuses.
The free-market, mixed economy largely is based on services,
agriculture, and manufacturing. The country's population is over 6.5
million. Although agriculture accounts for only 9 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP), it is the largest source of employment,
engaging 20 percent of the work force, estimated at over 2.6 million
persons. Coffee and sugar are the principal export crops and used to be
the main sources of foreign exchange. The sustained decline in coffee
prices has depressed activity in this sector, and the largest sources
of foreign exchange are now family remittances and maquila exports.
According to the Salvadoran Coffee Council, the decline in coffee
prices reduced employment in the end of year harvest by approximately
40,000 jobs as of the end of December. The manufacturing sector, which
contributes 23 percent of GDP, employs 16.5 percent of the work force.
The textile sector, especially the maquila (in-bond assembly or
processing) plants in free trade zones, represents about 50 percent of
manufacturing sector employment and is the main source of new jobs. The
economy is open, and private property is respected. The rate of real
economic growth was estimated to reach 2 percent during the year.
Inflation was expected to reach 2.5 percent. The official unemployment
rate averaged 6.5 percent in the first 10 months of the year; however,
the rate of underemployment (less than full-time work or total income
below the minimum wage) during the year was estimated at about 29
percent as of late November. In January and February of 2001, two
earthquakes killed over 1,100 persons, made over 1.2 million homeless,
and caused over $1.9 billion in damage. According to the Ministry of
Economy's statistics and census office, during the first 10 months of
the year approximately 37 percent of the population lived below the
poverty level, compared to 38.8 percent in 2001.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. There
were no politically motivated killings or disappearances; however, some
police officers committed killings. Some police officers used excessive
force and mistreated detainees. Prison conditions remained poor, and
overcrowding was a continuing problem. At times police arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons. The PNC dismissed 372 employees and
sanctioned 520 others. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem.
The judiciary remained inefficient and hampered by widespread
corruption. The Supreme Court and the Attorney General's office took
initial steps during the year to address inefficiency and corruption in
the judiciary. The Court dismissed 38 judges based upon formal
notification by the Ministry of Education that they had not fulfilled
the requirements for their degrees. The Attorney General asked the
Court to lift the immunity of four judges whom he intended to
prosecute. Impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem.
Violence and discrimination against women remained a serious problem.
Discrimination against disabled persons also remained a problem. Abuse
of children, child labor, and forced child prostitution were also
problems. The Government did not protect adequately workers' rights to
organize and bargain collectively. Trafficking in women and children
was a problem. El Salvador was invited by the Community of Democracies'
(CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings by agents of the Government; however,
members of the police committed some killings. The Office of the
Inspector General of the PNC received allegations of police involvement
in 10 homicide cases in the first 9 months of the year. At year's end,
authorities were adjudicating whether police officers had acted
criminally or in the line of duty.
In September a prosecutor charged PNC officers Douglas Ernesto
Ventura Ramirez, Nehemias Castro Martinez and four civilians with the
March shooting death of Darwin Alexis Lopez Hernandez in Canton Entre
Rios, Colon. The prosecutor alleged that PNC officer Ventura paid to
have the victim killed, because the victim had filed a complaint after
Ventura had confiscated his bicycle 2 months before his death. In the
initial hearing, the court provisionally dismissed charges against the
police officers and a third defendant but ordered the trial to continue
against the three other defendants. The PNC Inspector General's office
conducted a review and provisionally closed the case based on the court
ruling and evidence that the PNC officers had been in different
locations at the time of the murder.
In May Victor Hugo Pena Hidalgo died 15 minutes after entering a
cell in the detention center of a court in San Salvador, the Isidro
Menendez Judicial Center. According to the prosecutor, Pena's physical
examination upon arrival at the center showed he was in good health.
His autopsy showed trauma to the abdomen with broken ribs and
hemorrhaging. The prosecutor reported that neither jail officials nor
his cellmates, who were members of a gang to which Pena had once
belonged, heard any disturbances; therefore, the prosecutor theorized
that Pena must have been beaten before his capture. The PNC Inspector
General's office conducted an investigation. According to its report,
the victim's mother said someone who was not a police officer had
beaten Pena prior to his capture, causing him serious abdominal pain.
Similarly, Pena's son said the police had not mistreated him. Based on
this information, the Inspector General's office provisionally closed
the investigation.
In July an unidentified assailant shot and killed Nelson Alfonso
Argueta Amaya, president of the national federation of demobilized
former civil war militia members. The prosecutor initially identified
several possible motives for the crime, including a personal dispute
over the victim's leadership of the organization. However, the PNC
later ruled out a political motive. The investigation continued at
year's end.
The PDDH received 30 complaints of attempted and/or completed
unlawful killings by police during the year. The PDDH was investigating
the cases at year's end.
In January a judge dismissed homicide charges against three police
officers (Jose Antonio Moran, William Alexander Castillo Gonzalez, and
Maria Rosibel Garcia) and one former police officer (Juan Carlos Ramos
Benitez) for the March 2001 killing of Fernando Naves Mendoza in El
Rosario, La Paz. The PNC fired Moran, Castillo, and Garcia in January
following an internal disciplinary hearing regarding their involvement
in the crime. A disciplinary tribunal had dismissed Ramos from the PNC
in June 2001 for another offense.
In March a civilian jury found Air Force flight school cadet Carlos
Mauricio Melara guilty of negligent homicide and acquitted Cesar
Humberto Dorat for the May 2001 beating and killing of Erick Mauricio
Pena Carmona. The judge sentenced Melara to 10 years and 8 months in
prison. In his ruling, the judge attributed partial responsibility to
the armed forces, saying the institution had not done what was
necessary to prevent this type of incident. Both the prosecution and
the defense appealed the verdict, and the appeals were pending at
year's end.
A total of 19 inmates died in prison due to violence and illness
during the year. During the year, the Attorney General's office
prosecuted two prisoners for carrying out the 2001 murder of Eduardo
Henriquez (aka Gigio); it charged one other prisoner with complicity
and 15 with covering up a crime. The trial was underway at year's end.
In 2000 a public prosecutor charged police captain Mariano
Rodriguez Zepeda with aggravated homicide for the 1998 shooting of Jose
Antonio Navidad Villalta. Following a preliminary hearing in November
2000, the trial was postponed on several occasions because either
witnesses or the defendant failed to appear. At year's end, the trial
had been rescheduled for March 2003.
On October 2, the Supreme Court agreed to consider a November 2001
complaint that the Attorney General, the Criminal Chamber of the
Supreme Court, a criminal appeals court, and a justice of the peace had
violated the constitutional rights of family members of the six Jesuit
priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter murdered in 1989.
Specifically, the complainants alleged that their rights to due
process, access to justice, and a speedy trial had been violated by the
defendants when they responded to the complainants' petition to
prosecute the persons who instigated the killings. In the same ruling,
the Supreme Court found inadmissible the complaint against the
President. In January and March 2001, an appeals court had upheld a
lower court's decision that the statute of limitations had expired in
the Jesuits' case.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances or of police involvement in kidnapings during the year.
Most disappearances were kidnapings for ransom. According to police
statistics, 19 persons were kidnaped through mid December, a
significant reduction from 49 kidnapings in 2001 and 114 in 2000. The
PNC reported that 134 people were convicted of kidnaping during the
year and sent to prison.
In November 2001, a court sentenced eight persons, including three
former police officers, to 15 years in prison for the January 2001
kidnaping of prominent businesswoman Elizabeth Bahaia in Ahuachapan. In
August a court convicted and gave the same sentence to two more
individuals for the same crime; one was former police officer Mauricio
Enrique Murgas Barrientos, who had been dismissed from the force by a
PNC disciplinary tribunal in 2000. At year's end, Murgas Barrientos and
four other individuals were standing trial for a second kidnaping of
Bahaia in September 2001. Murgas Barrientos and another individual also
faced charges of homicide for the murder of Bahaia's bodyguard, Jesus
Antonio Garcia Sintigo. At the time of his arrest in 2001, Murgas
Barrientos alleged that other police officers had been involved in the
crime, but he did not give their names. In October 2001, the PNC moved
its entire contingent based in Ahuachapan (approximately 100 persons)
to San Salvador and replaced them with soldiers and police from San
Salvador.
In March a court convicted nine persons, including two police
officers (Jorge Alberto Rodriguez and Rigoberto Antonio Reyes) and a
former police officer (Juan Antonio Lainez Quijano), for the 2000
kidnaping of businessman Rodrigo Zablah. They received sentences
ranging from 10 to 26 years and 8 months in prison. The court acquitted
a tenth defendant. In 2001 charges had been dropped against another
police officer (Carlos Alfredo Lopez Rosales), a cooperating witness,
and another individual. The PNC fired Lopez Rosales, Rodriguez, and
Reyes in 2000 following a disciplinary hearing.
By year's end, the Supreme Court had not issued a ruling regarding
the acquittal of PNC sergeant Tomasa Reyes Alvarado, former PNC
sergeant Jose Azcunaga Segura, and a civilian charged in the 2000
kidnaping of a couple in Sonsonate. In August 2002, a PNC disciplinary
tribunal cleared Reyes Alvarado.
In May a court exonerated former guerilla commander Raul Granillo,
also known as Commander Marcelo, of charges in the kidnapings of Nelson
Oswaldo Machuca Perez, Guillermo Alfredo Sol Bang, Kerim Eduardo Salume
Babum, Alberto Antonio Hill Dutriz, and Andres Abraham Suster
Castillejos between 1991 and 1995. The court convicted Diego Flores, a
lower ranking former guerilla, of kidnaping, extortion, and possession
of military weapons (charges stemming from all five cases) and
sentenced him to 102 years in prison. It found Angela del Carmen
Carrillo Palacios and Angela Carrillo Flores guilty of complicity. In
November, an appeals court revoked the ruling of the lower court. The
appeals court convicted Granillo in absentia of kidnaping and extortion
and sentenced him to 63 years in prison. It convicted Carrillo Palacios
and Carrillo Flores of kidnaping and extortion and sentenced them to 42
years in prison. The appeals court confirmed the lower court's
exoneration of Oscar Armando Bernal Martinez and Mauricio Ernesto
Martinez Bernal.
The Association for the Search for Children who Disappeared as a
Result of the Armed Conflict (Pro-Busqueda) acknowledged that neither
the Government nor the Legislative Assembly would create a national
commission to clarify what happened to children who disappeared during
the war and whose whereabouts remain unknown. In December 2000, they
accepted the Government's commitment to work with them to resolve these
questions by forming a working group consisting of the Public
Defender's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Salvadoran
Institute for the Protection of Children, the National Secretariat of
the Family, and the PDDH. In October 2001 the working group dissolved
after Pro-Busqueda claimed that it was unable to receive cooperation
from any of the organizations apart from the Public Defender's office,
which was unable to procure any cooperation from the armed forces. Pro-
Busqueda planned to push the Legislative Assembly again for the
creation of a national commission.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices. During the
year, the PDDH and the PNC Inspector General's office each received one
complaint alleging torture by a police officer. Some members of the PNC
continued to use excessive force or otherwise mistreated detainees.
On October 16, the police detained Deputy Inspector Abel Hernandez
Cortez based on an order from the Attorney General's regional office in
La Libertad charging him with committing torture and serious injury to
Jose Antonio Dominguez. At year's end, the Inspector General's office
had begun disciplinary proceedings against him.
In response to a report from the PDDH, the PNC Inspector General's
office initiated an investigation into allegations that on November 28,
riot police beat and then detained seven members of the Salvadoran
Association of Municipal Workers who were blocking a lane of traffic in
support of a health care strike. The riot police told the PDDH that
they used the force necessary to control the incident. The
investigation was ongoing at year's end.
In March police officers shot at a group who were drinking alcohol
in a home in Concepcion de Oriente and wounded Domingo Yanez Villatoro,
injuring him seriously. In their report, the police claimed the
civilians had threatened them with firearms. The PNC Inspector
General's office initiated an investigation and remanded four police
officers to a disciplinary tribunal. A prosecutor charged four officers
with negligent injury. The defendants failed to appear for their trial
in December, and the court ordered the trial to continue in their
absence.
During the year, the PDDH received a total of 1,095 complaints
against the PNC for all categories of human rights violations, compared
with 1,142 in 2001. Of the 3,303 total complaints received, 766 were
for violation of the right of personal integrity committed by
government authorities during the year and in prior years, compared
with 736 in 2001. This category covers torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force, and inhuman
treatment of detainees. The vast majority of these complaints involved
the PNC and were categorized as mistreatment.
At year's end, 140 police officers were in prison. Of those, 90
were serving their sentences, and 50 awaited the conclusion of their
trials.
During the year, the PNC dismissed 372 employees through ordinary
disciplinary procedures and sanctioned 520 others for lesser
infractions. PNC disciplinary authorities exonerated 503 PNC employees
investigated for a variety of offenses.
The Internal Affairs Unit of the PNC, which reports to the
Inspector General, investigates administrative complaints against
police; transfers information on criminal activity by police to the
Attorney General's office; and monitors criminal investigations of
police. The Unit reports findings of administrative violations to the
Inspector General and the PNC Director for disciplinary action.
Individuals may appeal through disciplinary hearings in special police
courts that are an internal, administrative mechanism of the PNC. These
courts can punish guilty parties with disciplinary measures or remove
them from the police force.
During the year, a special appeals board continued to review
appeals by former PNC employees who were dismissed under expedited
procedures authorized by the Legislative Assembly in 2000 (Decree 101).
The police chief dismissed 1,000 officers during the 5 1/2 months that
the special disciplinary authority was in force. A total of 295
officers appealed, and the special appeals board exonerated 42, who
were reinstated. In addition, some of the fired officers filed legal
complaints with the Supreme Court alleging that their dismissal under
Decree 101 had violated their constitutional rights, a charge supported
by the Human Rights Ombudsman's office (PDDH) and some NGOs.
Independent observers of the expedited procedures alleged that some
supervisors used the opportunity to remove innocent persons, such as
pregnant women and personnel with whom the supervisors had personal
differences.
In August 2001, a prominent women's rights organization asserted
that sexual harassment was widespread within the PNC and that female
officers were subject to violence within the police (see Section 5).
Human rights awareness is a standard component of the police
officers' basic training program.
Prison conditions remained poor. The prison system has the capacity
to hold 7,137 prisoners in 20 penal facilities. Overcrowding in
individual facilities continued as the prison population increased for
the third consecutive year. At year's end, 10,345 men were held in 17
prison facilities with a combined capacity of 6,812, and there were 31
men and 6 women in 3 secure hospital wards with a combined capacity of
75 persons. Because of a lack of holding cells, pretrial detainees
often are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together
with violent criminals.
Gangs continued to exercise influence within the prison system. In
December, a police official told the media that prisoners continued to
run criminal activities from their cells. In December, prisoners rioted
and killed two police officers during a routine search for contraband
in a major metropolitan prison. One prisoner died after being shot,
allegedly by a warden, during the riot. Prison authorities reported
that there were 19 deaths in the prison system during the year: one
prisoner was shot, allegedly by a warden, during a riot; one died of
burns; four died from wounds caused by violence between prisoners;
seven died from illness, including four HIV/AIDS related cases; one
died of injuries to his spine and internal organs. In five cases, the
prisons transferred the cadavers to the office of forensic medicine to
determine the cause of death.
There are separate facilities for female detainees and prisoners.
At the end of the year, there were 562 women in 3 women's prisons,
which have a capacity of 262, and 87 women in prisons where most
inmates are males. Conditions in the women's facilities are adequate
but overcrowded.
The law requires that all juveniles be housed separately from
adults both prior to trial and while serving a prison sentence, and the
Government generally observes this requirement in practice. However,
from June 2001 through April 2002 the PDDH found 9 juveniles in
pretrial detention facilities that also housed adults. Also, 21 minors
were housed in an adult prison under the supervision of the Salvadoran
Institute for the Full Development of Children and Adolescents (ISNA).
Gang violence in juvenile holding facilities is a problem. In April
2001, the authorities separated the different gangs in the country's
juvenile correction centers into different facilities to mitigate
violence between rival groups. ISNA (formerly the Salvadoran Institute
for the Protection of Children - ISPM) reported a sharp reduction of
gang-related violence in youth correction centers and an increased
ability to implement education and reintegration programs following
this change. Members of the Armed Forces provided reform school
training for juvenile convicts. Most criminal cases involving juveniles
are brought to trial or conciliation proceedings within 3 months.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
observers, NGOs, and the media.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest; however, there were complaints that at
times the PNC arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.
On April 15, the PNC arrested Esteban Ortiz Vasquez using an arrest
warrant for Esteban Benito Ortiz. The detainee showed his
identification documents to the police; however, they discounted the
documents as false. The police brought him before a judge, who
determined there was sufficient evidence to warrant detention during
the investigation. Ortiz Vasquez spent 30 days in jail before a public
defender convinced the judge of his identity and obtained his release.
The judge found that the police had used flawed procedures and asked
the PNC to conduct a disciplinary investigation.
During the year, the PDDH received 205 complaints alleging
violations of personal liberty, compared with 178 complaints in 2001.
The courts generally enforced a ruling that interrogation without the
presence of counsel is coerced, and that any evidence obtained in such
a manner is inadmissible. As a result, police authorities generally
delayed questioning until a public defender arrived.
The law permits the police to hold a person for 72 hours before
delivering the suspect to court, after which the judge may order
detention for an additional 72 hours to determine if an investigation
is warranted. Because of a lack of holding cells, such detainees often
are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together with
violent criminals (see Section 1.c.). The law allows 6 months to
investigate serious crimes before a judge is required to bring the
accused to trial or dismiss the case. In exceptionally complicated
cases, the judge or either party may ask the appeals court to extend
the deadline for 3 months. However, many cases were not completed
within the legally prescribed time frame. The Supreme Court reported
that 5,568 inmates (more than half the prison population) were in
pretrial detention at the end of the year (see Section 1.c.). According
to the Supreme Court, the judicial system received an average of 111
criminal cases per day during the year, compared to an average of 134
per day in 2001.
The Penitentiary Code permits release on bail for detainees who are
unlikely to flee or whose release would not impede the investigation of
the case. Because it may take several years for a case to come to
trial, some prisoners have been incarcerated longer than the maximum
legal sentence for their crimes. In such circumstances, a detainee may
request a review by the Supreme Court of his or her continued
detention.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government
observes this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice. However, the judiciary suffers from inefficiency
and corruption. During the year, the Supreme Court took initial steps
to address these problems.
The court structure has four levels: justices of the peace, trial
courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
oversees the budget and administration of the entire court system. The
Supreme Court selects justices of the peace, trial judges, and
appellate judges from a list of nominees proposed by the National
Judicial Council (CNJ). The CNJ is an independent body provided for in
the Constitution to nominate, train, and evaluate justices. The
Legislative Assembly elects, by a two-thirds majority, Supreme Court
magistrates from lists provided by the CNJ and the National Association
of Lawyers. Magistrates serve for periods of 9 years and may be
reelected. There are separate court systems for family matters and
juvenile offenders; they stress conciliation as an alternative to
adjudication. The system also has criminal sentencing courts and
penitentiary oversight courts. The former consider the evidence and
testimony that have been gathered throughout the trial proceedings,
judge innocence or guilt, and determine sentences. The latter monitor
the implementation of sentences. (For cases that entered the judicial
system before the penal code reforms of 1998, the trial court remains
responsible for establishing sentences.) Through its Department of
Judicial Investigation, the Supreme Court regularly receives and
investigates public complaints about judicial performance. This
department also reviews the findings and recommendations of the CNJ,
which evaluates justices on an ongoing basis. The Supreme Court imposes
penalties when warranted.
Judges, not juries, decide most cases. Juries are used in a
particular phase of the prosecution. Most cases start with a
preliminary hearing by a justice of the peace court, then proceed to
the trial court, which determines if there is enough evidence to
continue the prosecution and decides whether a jury or a sentencing
court should hear the case. Justice of the peace courts provide an
opportunity for conciliation as an alternative to trial proceedings for
some types of cases. Almost all cases such as homicide, kidnaping,
fraud, environment, drugs, or issues involving private property go to
sentencing courts. Juries hear only those cases that the law does not
assign to sentencing courts. After the jury's determination of
innocence or guilt, a judge decides the sentence. A jury verdict cannot
be appealed. However, the defendant may appeal the sentence to the
Supreme Court for reduction. A jury verdict may be overturned by a
mistrial determination that there were serious problems with jury panel
selection or errors in the trial procedure. A judge's verdict may be
appealed.
The Juvenile Legal Code requires that minors from 12 to 17 years of
age be tried only in juvenile courts, limits sentences for minors to a
maximum of 7 years, and includes alternatives to incarceration for
minors.
The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence,
protection from self-incrimination, legal counsel, freedom from
coercion, and compensation for damages due to judicial error.
Defendants also have the right to be present in court. These rights
were not always respected fully in practice. The Constitution and law
require the Government to provide legal counsel for the indigent;
however, this requirement was not always implemented in practice.
Impunity from the country's civil and criminal laws continued,
especially for persons who were politically, economically, or
institutionally well connected. According to the U.N. Secretary
General's December 20 addendum to his report on Central America, ``the
justice system is often slow and many judges are still susceptible to
political influence . . . many crimes go unpunished and effective
access to due process is seriously limited, in fact, if not legally,
for a large number of Salvadorans.'' Corruption in the judicial system
contributed to impunity; however, the Supreme Court took some steps to
address these problems. There were few, if any, reports of corruption
in the Attorney General's office during the year. The improvement
resulted apparently from the removal of unqualified staff in 2000 and
2001 through expedited disciplinary procedures.
In October the Attorney General asked the Supreme Court to lift the
immunity of four judges whom he intended to prosecute. The Attorney
General charged that judge Raul Edgardo Garcia Zuniga had used for his
own benefit a vehicle that had been seized and was being held as
evidence in his court. The Attorney General alleged that judge Alicia
Gonzalez de Ortiz of Lourdes Colon allowed a defendant in a rape case
to go free after he admitted guilt and paid a fine; the law does not
allow the use of this ``abbreviated procedure'' in rape cases. He
accused judge Jorge Anibal Arias Martinez of San Ignacio, Chalatenango
of accepting payments to mediate cases rather than continue with a
criminal trial. In December, the Supreme Court notified the Attorney
General that it had dismissed Garcia and, therefore, he no longer
enjoyed immunity. At year's end, the High Court had not ruled on the
requests to lift the immunity of Judges Martinez and Ortiz.
The Attorney General accused Judge Ricardo Canales Herrera of
misappropriation, through negligence, of approximately $20,000 (185,000
colones). Canales had reported the loss of the money from his court's
evidence storage room to the Attorney General and the Supreme Court and
had requested the Court's help in strengthening security. The Court
asserted that the judge had adequate infrastructure for storing the
money securely. Canales renounced his immunity in October to expedite
the investigation, and the Supreme Court dismissed him in November.
Canales filed a complaint against the Supreme Court asserting that, in
dismissing him, it had violated guarantees of due process and of equal
protection under the laws. Presenting newspaper reports as evidence, he
noted that there had been a multitude of losses from storerooms of
other courts--including the Supreme Court itself--during the year, but
no other judge had been investigated or disciplined. He maintained that
the Court was using this incident as an excuse to remove a judge who
had criticized problems in the judicial system. A number of NGOs and
other judges publicly defended Canales' record and supported his
hypothesis.
In February a justice of the peace released from custody Narciso
Ramirez, who was accused of running one of the largest alien smuggling
operations in the region. Journalists reported that the judge and the
defendant dined together in a local restaurant that night. Both
individuals denied that they had been together. In searching Ramirez's
property, prosecutors found a letter from the judge testifying to the
good moral character of the defendant; however, the letter disappeared
subsequently. The Supreme Court investigated the allegations and
exonerated the judge, finding that he had applied the law correctly in
releasing Ramirez on bail. The Court also found there was no evidence
showing a personal relationship with the defendant. A judge hearing a
case against Ramirez on separate charges in San Miguel ordered him
detained without bail. He remained in prison at the end of the year.
In August the Legislative Assembly urged the Attorney General's
office and police to continue the investigation of the 1999 rape and
murder of 9-year-old Katya Miranda. Human rights groups charged that
the investigation was flawed criminally, and that the prosecution was
inadequate to ensure due process.
In November an appeals court definitively dismissed charges of
fraudulent administration and use of false documents lodged against the
former director of the Salvadoran Soccer Federation, Juan Sigfrido
Torres Polanco, and it upheld the provisional dismissal of charges
against him for embezzling public funds from that institution. A trial
court previously had dismissed all charges against members of the
Federation's board of directors, who were also defendants in the case
stemming from the disappearance of $3.5 million (30,520,000 colones)
from the organization's coffers.
During the year, the Attorney General's office reported that, as a
result of the expedited dismissal process for unqualified staff
authorized by a 2000 law, it had dismissed 44 prosecutors, of whom an
appeals board exonerated and reinstated 24. In addition to these
dismissals, in December 2000 the Attorney General chose not to renew
the contracts of 18 prosecutors and 24 administrative personnel
suspected of involvement in anomalies within the institution. By the
end of the year, the Attorney General had implemented more than half of
the recommendations a review board had made in conducting an
institutional review of his office in 2001, such as using new personnel
selection and contracting procedures.
In September and October, the Supreme Court dismissed 38 judges
based upon formal notification by the Ministry of Education that they
had not fulfilled the requirements for their degrees. The action
responded in part to a 2001 report from the Attorney General's office
on its investigation of possible ``irregularities'' in the law degrees
of 916 lawyers, including prosecutors, judges, and politicians. That
report exonerated 12 of those investigated, charged 91 with criminal
wrongdoing (forging signatures, falsifying records, etc.) and cited
administrative irregularities in the remainder of the cases, mostly due
to problems with course equivalencies after transferring from one
university to another. During the year, the Attorney General's office
brought charges against 13 persons for criminal wrongdoing in obtaining
their law degrees. Two justices of the peace were convicted; one was
given a 3-year suspended sentence. In six cases, the court dismissed
the charges. At year's end, trial dates had been scheduled for five
others.
The 38 judges dismissed by the Court fell into the category of
administrative irregularities. All but one appealed the dismissals,
insisting that they had fulfilled all of the requirements in place at
the time and that it was wrong for the Ministry of Education to impose
new standards retroactively. The Court upheld the dismissals in all of
the cases. At year's end, it continued investigating 125 lawyers and 51
additional judges for irregularities in their titles. The dismissed
judges appealed to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.
NGOs and observers knowledgeable of the judicial system claimed
that the Court was doing the minimum necessary to respond to public
criticism, but it was not making a comprehensive effort to remove
unqualified and corrupt judges. The Supreme Court emphasized that its
Department of Judicial Investigation and the CNJ performed that
function by scrutinizing judicial performance on an ongoing basis.
Regarding the questionable degrees, the Court maintained it could only
act on information provided by the Ministry of Education, which was the
institution authorized to determine the validity of academic
credentials.
In practice, the Court imposed few sanctions upon judges based upon
the recommendations from the CNJ and the Department of Judicial
Investigation. Of the 227 complaints filed with the latter during the
year, the court found 29 inadmissible, suspended proceedings in 1 case,
reprimanded 4 judges, and dismissed 40 judges--Ricardo Canales, Raul
Garcia, and the 38 determined to have invalid legal titles.
Police, prosecutors, public defenders, and the courts continued to
have problems adjusting to the 1998 legal reforms. Inadequate police
coverage (due to limited resources) and intimidation of victims and
witnesses (especially by gangs) made it difficult to identify, arrest,
and prosecute criminals, thus diminishing public confidence in the
justice system. In July witnesses in the trial of accused alien
smugglers Edgar Campos and Blanca Rivas reported that defense lawyers
had harassed them in an effort to deter their testimony. Prosecutors
informed the judge hearing the case, and the information served as an
important justification for keeping the defendants incarcerated during
the trial. At year's end, the prosecutors planned to present criminal
charges against the defense attorneys.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for a right to privacy, and
government authorities generally respected this right in practice. The
law requires the police to have a resident's consent, a warrant, or a
reasonable belief that a crime is under way or is about to be
committed, before entering a private dwelling.
Since 2001 the police can use undercover agents with the permission
of the Attorney General and enter legally private property without a
warrant when criminal activity is suspected. In addition, samples of
blood and other bodily fluids can now be taken without the consent of
the accused if a judge mandates it.
Neither the Attorney General nor a special legislative commission
has identified who was responsible for illegal wiretapping activities
conducted by the telecommunications company, TELECOM, in 2000.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. Print and broadcast journalists
from all major media outlets regularly and freely criticized the
Government and reported opposition views. Opposition figures were
interviewed routinely in the press and on television and radio.
According to major media associations, the Government did not use
direct or indirect means to control the media. However, some television
stations continued to complain that advertising agencies responsible
for placement of government-funded public service announcements were
biased in favor of media companies that generally supported government
policy.
Some newspaper editors and radio news directors practiced self-
censorship, according to practitioners and observers, by discouraging
journalists from reporting on topics or presenting views that the
owners or publishers might not view favorably. Journalists alleged that
in July the new owners of RCS radio station closed the news department
because the reporters' presentation of the news did not adequately
reflect the owners' more conservative views. The owners maintained that
they took the action for budgetary reasons. In October worker
organizations and NGOs expressed concern to the Salvadoran Journalists
Association that a major newspaper, La Prensa Grafica, had required
them to change language in a paid advertisement about a controversial
strike before it would publish the ad. Similarly, another major
newspaper, El Diario de Hoy, had told the groups they would have to pay
for the Government's anticipated response to their paid advertisement
about the same subject. The newspaper explained that, as a result of a
lawsuit, it had instituted a requirement that anyone placing an
advertisement on a controversial topic had to leave a deposit to pay
for a reply by an opponent, should a court order it. If no one claimed
the right to reply within 30 days, the newspapers returned the deposit
to the individual or group who placed the original ad.
During a demonstration on May 1, protesters assaulted several
journalists after an opposition party leader made antagonistic public
comments to and about journalists. The victims and other media
maintained the opposition party leader had instigated the violence. The
Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), the International Radio
Broadcasters Association and leaders of the media condemned the verbal
and physical attacks as a threat to freedom of the press. The Attorney
General's office initiated an investigation.
In August the Legislative Assembly passed a National Defense Law
that included an article requiring citizens to provide to government
officials information considered necessary for national defense. The
Salvadoran Journalists' Association and other critics objected strongly
to that provision, asserting that it violated journalists' right to
keep sources confidential. When the law went to President Flores for
signature, he sent it back to the legislature with a recommendation to
address that concern. The legislature removed the controversial article
from the law. The modified law retains a requirement that public
officials provide information necessary for national defense.
In September the legislature approved reforms to the Organic Law of
the Court of Accounts, the national auditing agency. Leaders of the
media industry, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and other critics charged
that the provision on public access to the agency's audits infringed on
freedom of expression and citizens' right to access public information.
The provision required that the institution make the audits public
after all appeals had been exhausted. Critics maintained that, because
appeals often dragged on for years, the measure would deny the public
access to information for far too long. Even before the Assembly passed
the reforms, the Court of Accounts refused to allow members of
political parties and journalists to see audit reports that, by law,
were public information. In November the President sent the law back to
the legislature with suggested changes that removed the controversial
language. However, NGOs expressed concern that the proposed replacement
language reduced the universe of audits required to be made public and
had the same effect of delaying public access until all appeals were
exhausted. The legislature approved the president's proposed changes.
The IAPA identified problems in several areas, including the
absence of a law providing for journalists' right to maintain the
confidentiality of sources.
There are 5 daily newspapers with a combined daily circulation of
more than 250,000 copies, and 16 television stations. Five independent
and one government-owned and operated VHF television stations reach
most areas of the country. Eight independent UHF stations serve San
Salvador, and several can be received as far as 30 miles from the
capital. Two cable television systems cover much of the capital and the
major cities of San Miguel, Santa Ana, and Sonsonate. All carry major
national stations and a wide range of international programming.
Approximately 150 licensed radio stations broadcast on the FM and AM
bands.
A provision in the Criminal Code allows judges to close court
proceedings if public exposure could prejudice the case. The media and
the IAPA have claimed that the provision abridges press freedom.
There were no instances of censorship of books, other publications,
films, or plays.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for peaceful assembly for any lawful purpose, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Public
demonstrations were common and generally peaceful.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
In March 2001, the Supreme Court found constitutional all but four
articles of a 1996 law governing the registration, regulation, and
financial oversight of NGOs and non-Catholic religious groups that a
group of affected organizations had challenged in court in 1998. The
law remains in effect. However, the decision prohibits any official or
judge from denying legal status to an NGO for behavior that violates
social norms, morality, or public order as long as there are no
violations of the criminal code. Some NGOs asserted that the Ministry
of Governance delayed approval of legal status for controversial NGOs
with human rights or political agendas. In August the Ministry of
Governance refused to grant legal status to the Independent Monitoring
Group of El Salvador, an NGO that monitors respect for labor rights in
assembly factories (maquilas) (see Section 4.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The Constitution specifically recognizes the Roman Catholic
Church and grants it legal status. In addition, the Constitution
provides that other churches may register for such status in accordance
with the law.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
In July the Legislative Assembly passed a Special Law on Refugee
Status, which implements the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The law established a Refugee
Status Determination Committee composed of representatives of the
Social Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Migration Unit
of the Ministry of Governance to adjudicate refugee status.
The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The President and Vice President are elected every
5 years. The Constitution bars the President from election to
consecutive terms. Voting is by secret ballot.
In May the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional an article of the
electoral code that assigned a specific number of legislators to each
department of the country, saying it violated the constitutional
requirement for representation proportional to the population. One day
before the Court announced its decision, the Legislative Assembly
modified the law by allocating the number of legislators based on
ranges of population (e.g. a department with 300,000 to 400,000
citizens is entitled to 4 legislators). A political party and an NGO
protested that the change did not satisfy the constitutional
requirement, and they noted that the timing of the vote showed that
someone in the Court had leaked the information before the decision was
made public.
Ten political parties, representing the full political spectrum,
fielded seven candidates in the March 1999 presidential elections. The
Government did not restrict opposition participation, and there were no
violent incidents during the campaign. Observers found that the vote
was without major flaws and proceeded peacefully with fair access to
the polls for all. Francisco Flores, the candidate of the ARENA party,
won a clear majority in the first round of voting.
In March 2000, the country held legislative elections that
observers generally reported to be free and fair. The FMLN won a
plurality of legislative seats.
There are no laws or overt practices that prevent women from voting
or participating in the political and governmental systems. Women
account for 51 percent of the population; however, they represented 49
percent of the registered voters in the March 2000 election. Of the 11
executive branch ministries and 3 constitutionally independent
agencies, women headed 2, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Human
Rights Ombudsman's office. Women held a substantial number of vice- and
sub-ministerial jobs. An estimated 40 percent of the country's judges
were female. In March 2000, voters elected 8 women to the 84-seat
legislature, a decrease from the previous Assembly's 14 women. One
woman sat on the Assembly's 11-member governing board; there were 2
women on the board in the previous legislature.
Minorities, including indigenous people, are not barred from voting
or participating in government and politics. In practice, only a few
hundred Salvadorans identify as ethnic minorities, and no one who
identifies as a minority holds a leadership position in the Government
or the Legislative Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally demonstrated a willingness to discuss
human rights issues and problems with international and domestic NGOs.
However, it was sometimes reluctant to discuss worker rights issues
with NGOs, and it refused to discuss the topic with the PDDH. Numerous
domestic and various international NGOs operated freely. Domestic and
international NGOs are required to register with the Government under
the terms of the 1996 NGO registration law, and some reported
difficulties (see Section 2.b.).
In August the Ministry of Governance refused to grant legal status
to the Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador (GMIES), an NGO that
monitors respect for labor rights in maquilas. The Ministry of
Governance based its refusal on the objections of the Labor Ministry,
which asserted that government authorization of the GMIES' activities
would constitute a tacit delegation of the Labor Ministry's
responsibilities, something prohibited by law. The GMIES appealed the
decision with both ministries, without success.
The principal human rights investigative and monitoring body is the
Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, who is elected by the Assembly
for a 3-year term. The Peace Accords specifically created the PDDH,
which was established formally by an amendment to the Constitution that
defined its role.
In July 2001, the Legislative Assembly elected attorney Beatrice de
Carrillo to serve as Human Rights Ombudsman. The position had been
vacant officially for 17 months and in practice for 5 months. The
institution's reputation and the quality and quantity of its work had
declined since 1998, due to staffing gaps in the top position and the
election in 1998 of an Ombudsman accused of corruption. A vehement,
public dispute that began in 2000 between the acting Ombudsman and some
employees exacerbated these negative trends. Indicating their lack of
confidence in the institution, citizens filed fewer complaints with the
PDDH in 1999 and 2000 than in previous years and relied more heavily on
human rights NGOs. Public confidence in the PDDH initially appeared to
recover following de Carrillo's election--there was an immediate 10-
fold increase in complaints submitted. Many of these complaints (such
as the right to water, or compensation claims of former combatants) did
not fall into traditional human rights categories. During the year, the
Ombudsman expressed frustration with the Government's unwillingness to
respond to her agency's requests for information, as required by law,
and to implement its recommendations. Government officials responded
that the institution undermined its credibility by pronouncing on a
wide range of issues that exceeded its mandate and by issuing
resolutions on politically charged cases that had occurred many years
ago. The Ombudsman insisted that all of the work performed by her
institution fit within the 14 duties assigned to it by the
Constitution. She explained that, because the PDDH had not issued
resolutions on the old cases at the time they were submitted, the
institution had to issue them now to close out the cases.
In January the PDDH submitted to the Attorney General's office a
formal complaint stating that the Ombudsman had received death threats.
According to the PDDH, the Attorney General's office took no action on
the complaint during the year. The threats diminished during the year
but increased again in December following the Ombudsman's controversial
efforts to negotiate the release of four police officers held hostage
in a prison following a riot.
During the year, the PDDH accepted 3,303 complaints of human rights
violations, compared with 2,898 in 2001 (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The rights most frequently alleged to have been violated included
personal integrity and due process of law--766 and 520 complaints,
respectively. During the year the PDDH issued 164 resolutions involving
235 complaints filed during the year and in previous years. Some of the
resolutions addressed multiple complaints with similar characteristics
(e.g. mistreatment by police). It upheld the charges in 107
resolutions; found the accused not to have been responsible in 45
resolutions; and resolved 12 cases using its good offices. In the
remaining cases received during the year the PDDH had not determined
whether the facts substantiated the allegations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
and prohibits discrimination based on nationality, race, or sex. In
practice, discrimination against women, disabled persons, and
indigenous people occurred in salaries and hiring. There were some
instances of violence against homosexuals.
The NGO Entre Amigos reported that members of the municipal and
National Civilian police regularly detained and harassed homosexuals
and transvestites when they were out at night, although they were not
engaged in criminal activity. The police countered that they monitored
transvestites out at night because they had repeatedly been involved in
crimes including prostitution, public nudity, and robbery. A homosexual
employee of Entre Amigos reported that in August four PNC officers
detained him in a vacant lot, told him homosexuals should not exist,
beat him, and threatened they would do him more severe harm if he
reported the crime. He reported the crime. However, in November, the
Attorney General's office told him the case did not fall in its
jurisdiction for investigation because it was a petty offense. The law
requires the Attorney General's office to prosecute petty offenses as
well.
In October the Legislative Assembly removed from the 2001 Law on
Prevention and Control of Infection caused by the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus a provision requiring job applicants to take HIV
tests. During the year, NGOs, UNAIDS, and the Ministry of Health had
expressed concern that this provision facilitated discrimination
against infected persons and, in so doing, made it difficult for them
to obtain employment. Removal of this provision makes pre-employment
HIV tests optional, rather than mandatory. According to media reports,
through late November the Atlacatl Foundation, an NGO, had registered
six cases of people being fired after being diagnosed with HIV. In
addition, the Foundation maintained that three institutions of higher
education required HIV tests for students who wished to study health-
related careers.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, was a
widespread and serious problem. The law prohibits domestic violence and
provides for sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year in prison upon
conviction. Convicted offenders are prohibited from using alcohol or
drugs and from carrying guns. The law also allows the imposition of
restraining orders against offenders. Once a taboo social subject,
domestic violence increasingly is being recognized publicly and has
become a topic for national debate. Government institutions such as the
PDDH, the Attorney General's office, the Supreme Court, the Public
Defender's office, and the PNC coordinated efforts with NGOs and other
organizations to combat violence against women through education,
government efforts to increase enforcement of the law, and NGO support
programs for victims. The National Secretariat for the Family, through
the Salvadoran Institute for the Development of Women (ISDEMU),
maintains a hot line as well as a shelter for victims of domestic
abuse. The ISDEMU received 3,725 cases of domestic violence during the
year, compared to 3,423 cases in 2001. Incidents of domestic violence
and rape continued to be underreported for several reasons: societal
and cultural pressures against the victim; a fear of reprisal; poor
response to victims by the authorities; fear of publicity; and the
belief that cases are unlikely to be resolved. However, the Criminal
Code permits the Attorney General to prosecute in the case of a rape
with or without a complaint from the victim. The 2001 Criminal Code
reforms eliminated a provision allowing a victim's pardon to nullify
the criminal charge. The penalties for rape are 6 to 10 years in
prison. The law does not address specifically spousal rape; however, it
can be considered a crime if the actions meet the Criminal Code's
definition of rape. The ISDEMU received 451 cases of sexual aggression
compared to 386 in 2001.
The law does not prohibit a person from working as a prostitute.
However, it prohibits any person from inducing, facilitating,
promoting, or giving incentives to anyone else to work as a prostitute.
Prostitution is common, and there were credible reports that some women
and girls were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
Trafficking in women and girls for purposes of sexual exploitation
was a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The law prohibits sexual harassment; however, workers in export
processing zones (EPZs) have reported sexual harassment (see Section
6.b.).
In August 2001, a prominent women's rights organization, CEMUJER,
asserted that sexual harassment was widespread within the PNC. Citing a
2000 survey that it had conducted, the same NGO maintained that almost
60 percent of female sergeants had been victims of violence within the
police. During the year, the NGO assisted three female employees of the
PNC in bringing sexual harassment charges against superiors; the courts
dismissed the charges against the defendants in all three cases. During
the year the PNC Inspector General's office received two complaints of
sexual harassment by police officers. In one case, it found the police
officer and the PNC employee who had brought the charges shared
responsibility for the infraction; as a penalty, both were suspended
without pay for 12 days. In the other case, a PNC disciplinary court
suspended officer Rafael Antonio Nunez without pay for 60 days as
punishment for sexual harassment of a minor. There were reports that
PNC supervisors used legislation intended to facilitate the removal of
officers charged with crimes or incompetence to remove pregnant women
from the force (see Section 1.c.). Some factories in the EPZs required
female job applicants to present pregnancy test results, and they did
not hire pregnant women (see Section 6.b.).
The Constitution grants women and men the same legal rights, and
the Penal Code establishes sentences of 1 to 3 years in jail for public
officials who deny a person's civil rights based on gender. The law
prohibits pregnant women from performing strenuous activities in the
workplace after the fourth month of pregnancy (see Section 6.e.). All
women are entitled to 3 months of maternity leave--usually taken after
the baby is born.
Women suffer from cultural and societal discrimination and have
significantly reduced economic opportunities. Priority generally is
given to men for available jobs and promotions and to sons for
inheritances. Women are not accorded equal respect or stature in
traditional male-dominated areas such as agriculture and business. A
2000 UN Development Program (UNDP) study reported a rural illiteracy
rate of 38 percent for women and 34 percent for men. One of the factors
that contributes to girls' leaving school is teenage pregnancy. In
2001, a former personnel officer of an autonomous government
institution asserted that her supervisor had instructed her to give
preference to men over women in hiring. The Penal Code establishes a
sentence of 6 months to 2 years for employers who discriminate in labor
relations. In practice it is difficult for employees to report such
violations by their employers because they fear reprisals. In June
2000, the legislature ratified International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 100, on equal remuneration; however, a UNDP study showed
that men on average earned 14 percent more than women--$250 versus $219
(2,189 colones versus 1,913). The one sector in which there was an
exception to this practice was in the EPZs and in-bond assembly plants,
the largest source of new jobs, where women made up 85 to 90 percent of
the work force (see Section 6.b.). However, even in this sector, men
held the majority of positions in management and in departments where
employees receive higher wages (cutting, ironing, etc.). Training for
women generally was confined to low-wage occupational areas where women
already held most positions, such as teaching, nursing, home
industries, and small businesses.
Several NGOs were engaged in promoting women's rights and conducted
several rights awareness campaigns.
Children.--In July the Ministry of Education, the PNC, and ISNA
instituted a program to address the problem of student violence in San
Salvador. The police picked up students who were out of school
unsupervised (often in bars, pool halls, or video game shops) during
school hours and delivered them to ISNA. ISNA gave them psychological
counseling about violence and supervised them until their parents or
guardians took custody. Government officials reported that the measures
reduced street violence and fights among students. Through the end of
the school year in November, the police brought 195 youths to ISNA
under this program.
The Government concentrated more on reducing poverty and promoting
family stability through economic growth than in direct expenditure on
children's programs. With the encouragement of UNICEF, in September the
National Secretariat of the Family submitted to the Legislative
Assembly a new national policy of comprehensive attention for children
and adolescents.
Education is compulsory through the ninth grade. Public education
is nominally free through high school. The law prohibits persons from
impeding children's access to school for failure to pay fees or wear
uniforms. In practice, some schools continued to charge students fees
to cover budget shortfalls, and the inability to pay these fees or pay
for required books, uniforms, and activities prevented some poor
children from attending school. The Ministry of Education continued to
operate a hotline for the public to report school administrators who
violated these laws. During the year, the Ministry required at least
one school administrator to repay fees charged in violation of these
regulations. Rural areas fell short of providing a ninth grade
education to all potential students, in part because of a lack of
resources and in part because many rural parents withdraw their
children from school by the 6th grade to work. According to the
Ministry of Education, during the year 14 percent of primary school
aged children (ages 7-11) and approximately 32 percent of sixth to
eighth grade aged children (ages 12-14) in urban areas did not attend
classes. Meanwhile, primary school attendance in rural areas was
oversubscribed by almost 14 percent, because older children attended
classes below grade level. Only 7 percent of children in rural areas
attended school in grades 6 to 8.
Infant malnutrition continued to be a problem. A 2000 census showed
that 19 percent of children suffered from chronic malnutrition. The
Ministry of Health listed malnutrition as 1 of the 10 principal causes
of infant mortality in the country. The Government has a national plan
for infants designed to increase access to potable water, iodized salt,
and micronutrients, and to encourage breast feeding, but all of these
remained problem areas, especially among the rural poor.
The Government worked through state institutions and with UNICEF to
promote protection and general awareness of children's rights. However,
children continued to be victimized by physical and sexual abuse,
abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The ISNA, an autonomous entity,
has responsibility for protecting and promoting children's rights. The
ISNA reported that 1,493 children, some abandoned and others victims of
mistreatment, were staying in its shelters at the end of the year. It
reported 842 cases of physical mistreatment, 454 cases of negligence,
and 446 cases of abandonment, compared to 913 cases of physical
mistreatment, 366 cases of negligence, and 573 cases of abandonment
reported in 2001. Using different criteria, the ISDEMU recorded 1,694
cases of abuse during the year, compared to 1,196 in 2001.
The ISNA reported 173 cases of sexual abuse during the year,
compared to 115 in 2001. A majority of the victims were female.
Substance abuse (glue, paint thinner, and crack cocaine) was a
problem among urban street children. FUNDASALVA, an NGO, provided drug
counseling and treatment to minors. Another NGO, the Olaf Palme
Foundation, reported that it registered 40 cases of police abuse and
mistreatment of street children through the beginning of December. Of
those cases, 23 were reported to the PDDH and 5 to the Attorney
General's office. In the other cases, the NGO reported that the
children feared reprisals if they reported the abuse. As an example of
the mistreatment, the NGO reported that on October 30, a group of
police accused three youths between the ages of 13 and 16 of being
thieves when they came out of a church in downtown San Salvador. The
police handcuffed one youngster, hit another, and put glue in the hair
of a third. Later they made one of the youths clean their patrol car.
The PNC incorporated PDDH human rights training into programs for
police units that deal with juveniles.
Child prostitution is a problem. Between 10 and 25 percent of
visible prostitutes are minors, and an estimated 40 percent of the
hidden prostitutes who cater to upper-class clients are believed to be
minors, according to a UNICEF study released in 2000. ISNA assisted 15
children who were involved in prostitution, compared with 24 in 2001.
Children, especially those living on the streets, wee trafficked to
other countries and then forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The National Secretariat of the Family
estimated in 2000 that at least 8 percent of the population had some
form of disability. A 2000/2001 study by the World Health Organization
in conjunction with local and international partners found that the
majority of persons with disabilities were young, lived in rural areas,
and had little access to rehabilitation services. It found that many of
the causes of disability were preventable.
A significant number of the country's population of persons with
disabilities consists of former combatants and civilians wounded during
the conflict. Government and international funding provide
rehabilitation programs for these persons. During the year, the
Government accepted new registrations of persons wounded and disabled
as a result of the armed conflict (1980-92). Legislation passed in
December 2001 mandated this response to long-standing complaints that
thousands of war wounded had been unable to register during the initial
registration period. The re-registration opened the way for thousands
of additional persons with disabilities to receive government benefits.
Efforts to combat discrimination and increase opportunities for
those whose disabilities are unrelated to the war are growing but
remain inadequate. During the year, the Ministry of Labor promoted
voluntary compliance with a 2000 law that requires businesses to employ
1 person with a disability for every 25 employees, an increase from the
pre-existing requirement of 1 to 50. The Ministry's resources are
limited, and its records are kept on paper files in its regional
branches. There are no reliable data on the number of persons with
disabilities who are employed; however, the unemployment rate is
significantly higher than that in the general population.
Access by persons with disabilities to basic education was limited
due to lack of facilities and appropriate transportation. Only a few of
the Government's community-based health promoters have been trained to
treat persons with disabilities, and they rarely provided such service.
There were several organizations dedicated to protecting and
promoting the rights of persons with disabilities, but funding was
insufficient. Foreign funds for badly needed rehabilitation services
channeled through the Telethon Foundation Pro-Rehabilitation, a local
private voluntary organization, helped address numerous rehabilitation
issues and provided alternatives for the education and rehabilitation
of persons with disabilities. A semiautonomous institute, the
Salvadoran Rehabilitation Institute for the Disabled, has 10 centers
throughout the country and offers medical treatment, counseling,
special education programs, and professional training courses. The
Government and national and international private and nongovernmental
organizations provide its funding.
Indigenous Persons.--The country is ethnically homogeneous, and
only a few hundred citizens identify as indigenous people.
The Constitution states that native languages are part of the
national heritage and should be preserved and respected. In reality,
very few persons speak the indigenous language of Nahuatl. There are no
national laws regarding indigenous rights.
Early in the 20th century, facing active repression, most
indigenous people adopted local customs and successfully assimilated
into the general population, from which they now are generally
indistinguishable. There are a few very small communities whose members
still wear traditional dress and maintain traditional customs to a
recognizable degree; they do so without repression or interference.
There are no special rights for indigenous people; however, they are
allowed to make decisions regarding their communal lands just as any
other landowners under Article 105 of the Constitution. These small
indigenous groups exist in the poorest parts of the rural countryside
where employment opportunities are few and domestic violence is a
problem.
Indigenous people reportedly earn less than other agricultural
laborers. Indigenous women in particular have little access to
educational and work opportunities due to cultural practices, lack of
resources, and rural underdevelopment. As with the poor rural sector in
general, access to land is a problem confronting indigenous people. Few
possessed titles to land, and bank loans and other forms of credit were
extremely limited.
There are some small, active indigenous associations. The largest
and best known is the National Association of Indigenous Salvadorans.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
rights of workers and employers to form unions or associations, and
workers and employers exercised these rights in practice; however,
there were some problems. There were repeated complaints by workers, in
some cases supported by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
(CFA), that the Government impeded workers from exercising their right
of association. In June 2001, the CFA reiterated its 1999 finding that
the existing labor code restricts freedom of association.
There is a small organized labor sector with approximately 133
unions, 16 federations, and three confederations representing 142,500
workers in the private sector. In addition, there are 24 public
employee associations and 26 peasant organizations that, together, have
an estimated membership of 150,000 persons. Unions generally are
independent of the Government, political parties, and other political
forces. The Labor Code prohibits foreigners from holding leadership
positions in unions.
In August the Ministry of Governance refused to grant legal status
to the Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador, an NGO that
monitors respect for labor rights in assembly factories (see Section
2.b.).
Union leaders asserted that the Government and judges continued to
use excessive formalities as a justification to deny applications for
legal standing to unions and federations. Among the requirements to
obtain legal standing, unions must have a minimum of 35 members in the
workplace, hold a convention, and elect officers.
In July the Ministry of Labor (MOL) granted legal status to the
Federation of Unions of Salvadoran Workers of the Food, Beverage,
Restaurant, Hotel, and Agro-industrial Sectors. This federation
included five food industry unions whose application to form a
federation had been denied in 2000 because they allegedly had made
procedural errors in their application. The ILO had called on the
Government to reverse the 2000 decision.
By law only private sector workers have the right to form unions
and strike; some employees of autonomous public agencies may form
unions if the agencies do not provide essential services. Military
personnel, police, and government workers may not form unions but are
allowed to form professional and employee organizations. Some of the
most powerful labor groups are public employee associations. They have
the same responsibilities as unions, including collective bargaining.
The Government negotiated with public employee associations, although
the Labor Code provides for mandatory arbitration of public sector
disputes. The Government did not amend national legislation to
recognize the right of association of workers employed in the service
of the State, as recommended by the CFA in 2000.
The law prohibits antiunion actions before a union is registered
legally and prohibits the dismissal of workers whose names appear on a
union application.
Unions only may strike after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement. Unions first must seek to resolve differences
through direct negotiation, mediation, and arbitration before striking.
To be considered legal, the strike must aim to obtain or modify a
collective bargaining agreement and to defend the professional
interests of workers. Union members must approve a decision to strike
through secret ballot. The union must name a strike committee to serve
as a negotiator and send the list of names to the MOL, which notifies
the employer. The union must wait 4 days from the time the Ministry
notifies the employer before beginning the strike.
Public workers may not strike legally; however, the Government
generally treated strikes called by public employee associations as
legitimate.
On September 5, workers of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute
(ISSS) conducted a slow-down at several hospitals and clinics. They
then initiated a strike on September 18, which continued through the
end of the year, to pressure the Government to stop purchasing health
care-related services from private companies. An autonomous government
institution funded by payroll taxes and mandatory employer
contributions, ISSS provides health care to people employed in the
formal sector. In October a judge declared the strike illegal. In
November the Legislative Assembly passed and then, in December,
repealed a law that prohibited any contracting of social security-
related services. At year's end, negotiations continued over the
reinstatement of workers dismissed during and prior to the strike and
the payment of wages withheld from workers while they were on strike.
ISSS management maintained it had fired the workers for threatening
other employees or committing theft and fraud, while union leaders
insisted ISSS had dismissed them for ``opposing privatization.'' The
Government said it could not pay people for time they had not worked,
and it offered to give them overtime hours to make up their lost wages
and catch up on the institution's backlog of work.
From September through the end of the year, dozens of strike
leaders and their family members received phone calls threatening that
harm would come to them if they did not cease their activities. When an
NGO reported the threats to the Director of the PNC, he passed the
information to the Attorney General's office, which began interviewing
victims and attempting to trace the calls. Separately, doctors who
wanted to work during the strike reported that they received phone
calls threatening their own and their families' security if they
worked.
The Secretary General of the social security workers' union
(STISSS) Ricardo Monge reported that five people broke into his home on
November 15 at 1 a.m. and threatened him and his wife during the half-
hour they stayed. Allegedly they said they would kill him if he
continued with the strike. Monge said they took union and personal
papers but nothing else of value. He said he reported this to the
police, the Attorney General's office, and the Human Rights Ombudsman.
In 2001 ISSS workers engaged in several work stoppages ranging from
2 to 24 hours. In October 2001, the ISSS dismissed 6 employees and
suspended 22 others over an illegal work stoppage in May 2001. The
Labor Ministry had authorized the suspension of the 22 workers for up
to 30 days because, according to the Ministry, they had committed
serious acts that interfered with the functioning of their workplaces.
The union charged that the punitive measures were illegal because the
law prohibits the dismissal or suspension of union leaders and filed a
complaint with a labor court. The court had not issued a decision by
year's end.
The Labor Code prohibits partisan political activity by unions. The
unions routinely ignored this prohibition, but the Government took no
punitive action against them.
Unions and other labor organizations freely affiliated with
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the Labor Code provide for collective bargaining
rights for employees in the private sector and for certain categories
of workers in autonomous government agencies, such as utilities and the
port authority. However, both private sector unions (by law) and public
sector employee associations (in practice) used collective bargaining.
The MOL oversees implementation of collective bargaining agreements
and acts as a conciliator in labor disputes in the private sector and
in autonomous government institutions. In practice, ministers and the
heads of autonomous government institutions often negotiate with labor
organizations directly, relying on the MOL only for such functions as
officially certifying unions. The Ministry often seeks to conciliate
labor disputes through informal channels rather than attempt to enforce
regulations strictly, which has led to charges that the Ministry is
biased against labor. Labor leaders assert that the Government had an
unfair advantage in arbitration of public sector labor disputes,
because the Government holds two of three seats on arbitration panels.
(The employer, the workers, and the Labor Ministry each name one
representative to a panel.)
Corruption among labor inspectors and in the labor courts continued
to be a problem. In June 2001, the Labor Ministry removed from their
positions five inspectors, including a senior inspector, who had been
accepting bribes from companies.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination against unions. It
provides that union officials at the time of their election, throughout
their term, and for 1 year following their term may not be fired,
suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted except for
legal cause. However, the Labor Code does not require the employers to
reinstate them, but requires the employers to provide a severance
payment. In practice, some employers dismissed workers who sought to
form unions. The Government generally ensured that employers paid
severance to these workers. However, in most cases the Government did
not prevent their dismissal or require their reinstatement. Workers and
the ILO reported instances of employers using illegal pressure to
discourage organizing, including the dismissal of labor activists and
the maintenance of lists of workers who would not be hired because they
had belonged to unions.
On May 6, SELSA, the labor union at the bakery products company,
LIDO, conducted an on-the-job work stoppage to protest the lack of
progress during 3 months of salary negotiations. In the following week,
management prohibited the entry to the workplace of 41 union members,
including 11 union leaders, but continued to pay their salaries. Both
sides appealed to the labor courts. Management charged the 41 union
members were conducting an illegal strike by failing to perform their
duties. The employees accused management of applying a lockout. The
courts rejected both assertions. The employees requested an inspection
by the MOL to define the status of the affected workers. SELSA charged
that the company continued to pressure other union members by
reprimanding them regularly for disturbing order in the company. The
Labor Ministry reported that it conducted the requested inspections,
but the inspectors took no further action because another office of the
Ministry was mediating between the parties. According to the Labor
Ministry, in July the parties agreed that the company would pay the
workers the salaries owed to them since May 7 as well as other wages
and benefits due to them. The Ministry said that, on July 5, the union
leaders received their first payments, and the 30 other workers
submitted resignations and received payment in full. A labor NGO
reported that a Labor Ministry official refused to release the
settlement payments to the workers unless they signed letters of
resignation and told them their alternative was to engage in a lengthy
effort in the courts to obtain compensation. Six of the workers who
signed the resignation and received payment filed a suit maintaining
that the company had fired them illegally and their resignations had
been coerced. The legal proceedings were underway at year's end.
Tainan, a major foreign-owned textile assembly factory, closed
permanently in April, after initially announcing that it would suspend
operations temporarily. The closure took place just as the union was
reaching the affiliation level required for collective bargaining.
While the company attributed the closure first to a lack of orders and
then to business losses, labor advocates charged the multinational took
this action to avoid having to deal with a union in its workplace.
Following the initial suspension of operations, the union submitted a
formal complaint to the MOL alleging the company had orders but chose
to direct them to plants in other countries. The MOL responded that the
Labor Code authorized enterprises to suspend labor contracts for lack
of raw materials, and the law gave the MOL no discretionary authority
in these cases. The union and its supporters in other countries
conducted an international publicity campaign to bring pressure on
Tainan and its buyers. In November Tainan and the union signed an
agreement in which the company committed to open a unionized plant and
to establish a compensation fund for workers affected by the closure.
Between September 2001 and November, the electricity generation
company CEL dismissed 31 members of the Union of Electrical Sector
Workers (STSEL), 6 of whom were union leaders legally protected from
firing. The unionists charged the action aimed to destroy their
organization. They alleged CEL reinstated two dismissed workers after
they joined a rival union supported by CEL. To protest the firings,
three members held a hunger strike for 23 days in October and November,
and union members went on strike in a transmission plant for 2 weeks in
November. STSEL filed complaints with the MOL, the PDDH, and the labor
courts. CEL maintained it had fired some unionists--along with non-
union members--for cause, and other union members had resigned. It
offered severance pay to all of the employees in question, and 16 had
accepted at year's end. The rival union denied it received preferential
treatment from CEL. The Ministry of Labor held a mediation session in
November, which achieved no further results. In December CEL dismissed
18 more union members. According to the union, 10 of those fired were
union leaders, and one had a disability that entitled him to protection
from dismissal. At year's end, none had received severance pay.
On December 21, 2001, the National Institute for Public Employees'
Pensions (INPEP) dismissed 92 workers, of whom 56 were members of the
Union of Workers of the National Institute for Public Employees'
Pensions (SITINPEP), which complained to the ILO. The Government
informed the ILO that the reduction in staff was necessary after 80
percent of pension contributors transferred their savings to a new
pension system. The CFA expressed regret that the Government did not
try to reach an agreement with the union before dismissing the
employees, as required by the collective bargaining agreement. It asked
the Government to ensure that there was an investigation to determine
the reasons for the high proportion of unionists in the group of
persons dismissed, and that, if the investigation found any of the
dismissals were due to union membership or union activities, the
Government take the necessary measures to ensure the affected workers'
reinstatement. In preparing its response, the Ministry of Labor
asserted that INPEP had repeatedly informed the union and all INPEP
employees that its financial situation would require a reduction in
staff. The Ministry of Labor underscored that INPEP had eliminated
positions based on their function, regardless of who filled them, and
that it had paid severance to the affected employees. During the year,
the union charged that management pressured union members to renounce
their affiliation. These resignations, the dismissals, and voluntary
retirements from the institution reduced SITINPEP's membership below
the threshold required to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement.
In February the semiautonomous port authority (CEPA) and the
airport union, SITEAIES, signed an agreement resolving their dispute
over the September 2001 suspension without pay of approximately 150
security and cargo personnel at the San Salvador international airport.
The Government replaced these workers with police and soldiers as part
of its efforts to strengthen border security following terrorist
attacks in the United States. The airport union charged that CEPA
targeted union members for suspension to break the union and privatize
some of CEPA's functions. Prior to the February agreement, all but 64
of the airport workers had accepted a voluntary retirement package
offered by CEPA. In accordance with the settlement, the company paid
severance to the 64 remaining suspended workers; the affected workers
formed a cooperative; and, in April, the cooperative began providing
cargo services at the airport. In June the ILO called for the
Government to carry out an investigation and determine the reasons for
the ``militarization'' of the airport and the extent to which it
interfered with union activities. During the year, the airport union
repeatedly expressed concern to the MOL that CEPA management was
pressuring other airport employees to renounce their union affiliation
and was firing workers without notifying the union in advance, as
required by the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, it
criticized the Government for not having completed the formal
registration of the June 2001 collective bargaining agreement between
CEPA and SITEAIES.
There are approximately 220 maquila (in-bond assembly or
processing) plants, the majority of which are located in the country's
15 EPZs. The Labor Code applies in the EPZs; there are no special EPZ
labor regulations.
Most businesses in the EPZs are subject to a growing number of
private codes of conduct, which also include some worker rights
protections. In addition, two EPZs have their own codes of conduct for
all tenants. Some companies in the EPZs provided salaries and on-site
benefits (for example, clinics, cafeterias) competitive with the best
private sector enterprises (see Section 6.e.). However, there were
credible reports that some factories dismissed union organizers, and
there are no collective bargaining agreements with the 18 unions active
in the maquila sector. The International Confederation of Trade Unions
(ICFTU) contended in its 2000 report that some EPZ workers also
received low pay, endured health and safety risks, 12- to 14-hour
workdays, and had minimal toilet and rest breaks. The Government
contends that the workers often prefer not to use safety equipment, and
they have time for toilet and rest breaks.
The Ministry of Labor reported that it received nine complaints of
minimum-wage violations during the year, of which seven had been
resolved in favor of the workers. In the two remaining cases, the
Ministry had initiated the process of imposing a fine (see Section
6.e.).
In May 2001, a foreign NGO, the National Labor Committee (NLC),
made public the text of an August 2000 report on the maquila sector by
the Labor Ministry that described what it called the systematic
violation of workers' efforts to form unions as well as safety problems
and mandatory overtime policies (see Section 6.e.). The report also
identified weaknesses in the Ministry of Labor that undermined
employers' and workers' confidence in the institution. After the
initial publication of the report, the maquila association criticized
it as unsubstantiated and inaccurate. Labor NGOs, unions, and workers
affirmed that it described accurately conditions in the sector. In
August 2000, the Minister of Labor retracted the report, saying that it
had been published without his approval and did not adequately document
its assertions. President Flores stated publicly that the report showed
the Ministry of Labor was working to monitor conditions in the
maquilas.
During the year, there was no progress in the 2001 labor court case
of a pregnant woman fired by the apparel factory Amitex, allegedly for
participating in the formation of a union.
Since 2000 the MOL has had branch offices in EPZs to make its
services more accessible to its users. The Ministry provides the staff,
and the EPZs covered other costs.
Workers in a number of plants reported verbal abuse, sexual
harassment and, in several cases, being hit by a supervisor. The MOL
has insufficient resources to cover all the EPZs, much less the much
larger national private sector. In addition, corruption among labor
inspectors continued to be a problem (see Section 6.a.).
Although a 1996 law gives the Ministry of Economy the power to
withdraw free zone privileges from companies that violate labor
regulations, there have been no instances in which this has been used
or even threatened publicly. The ICFTU has reported persistent problems
facing female employees in EPZs, including mandatory pregnancy tests
and firing of workers who are pregnant (see Section 5).
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except in the case of natural
catastrophe and other instances specified by law, and the Government
generally enforces this provision; however, trafficking in persons,
primarily women and children, is a problem (see Section 5).
Although not specifically prohibited by law, forced and bonded
labor by children is covered by the general prohibition. There were no
reports that such practices occurred in the formal sector; however,
there were reports that minors were forced into prostitution, and
trafficking in children is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 14; however, child labor is a problem. According to
the annual household census conducted by the Directorate General of
Statistics and Censuses in 2001, more than 75,000 children between the
ages of 5 and 13 worked, as did almost 147,000 minors between the ages
of 14 and 17. Minors, age 14 or older, may receive special Labor
Ministry permission to work, but only where such employment is
indispensable to the sustenance of the minor and his or her family.
This is most often the case with children of peasant families who
traditionally work during planting and harvesting seasons. The law
prohibits those under the age of 18 from working in occupations
considered hazardous (see Section 6.e.). The law limits the workday to
6 hours (plus a maximum of 2 hours of overtime) for youths between 14
and 16 years of age and sets a maximum normal workweek for youths at 34
hours. The constitutional provisions apply to all sectors of the
economy. However, there is a large informal sector where it is
difficult to monitor practices or enforce labor laws. Orphans and
children from poor families frequently work for their own or family
survival as street vendors and general laborers in small businesses,
mostly in the informal sector. Children in these circumstances often do
not complete schooling. There were no reports of child labor in the
industrial sector. It does not exist in the EPZs.
The MOL is responsible for enforcing child labor laws; in practice,
labor inspectors focused almost exclusively on the formal sector, where
child labor is rare, and few labor inspectors have dealt with child
labor cases. The MOL has a mandate to monitor employers' observance of
labor laws; however, there are no employers as such in most of the
sectors identified as worst forms of child labor by a national
committee. In 2001 the committee, composed of seven government agencies
and representatives of labor, employers, and NGOs, identified
commercial sexual exploitation, work in garbage dumps, fishing/
shellfish harvesting, sugarcane farming, and fireworks as the worst
forms of child labor. The MOL receives few complaints of violations of
child labor laws, because many citizens perceive child labor as an
essential component of family income rather than a human rights
violation.
The Labor Code does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
labor by children, but they are covered by its general prohibition;
however, there were reports that minors were forced into prostitution
(see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set by
executive decree based on recommendations from a tripartite
(government, labor, and business) committee. The minimum daily wage is
$4.80 (42 colones) for commercial, industrial, construction, and
service employees; $2.47 (22 colones) for agricultural workers; and
$3.57 (31 colones) for seasonal agriculture industry workers. The
minimum wage with benefits does not provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family.
The MOL is responsible for enforcing minimum wage laws and
generally does so effectively in the formal sector. However, some
maquila plants underpaid workers and failed to compensate them in
accordance with the law for mandatory overtime, and did not pay legally
mandated contributions to health and pension programs. On January 1,
Laitex, a foreign-owned maquila, ceased operations without paying its
workers their salaries for the last 2 weeks of December, mandatory
annual bonus payments, or severance. In addition, although it had
consistently deducted mandatory employee contributions for health and
pension programs, it had not transferred either the employees' funds or
the mandatory employer contributions to the respective institutions.
Two hundred and seventy of Laitex's 459 employees filed a complaint
with the MOL. The Government prohibited the transfer or sale of
Laitex's physical assets until the debts were resolved. To recuperate
its fabric, Dorby Frocks, a foreign partner of Laitex, paid the overdue
salaries; however, at year's end, neither company had paid the other
debts.
The law sets a maximum normal workweek of 44 hours. It limits the
workweek to no more than 6 days for all workers. It requires bonus pay
for overtime. By law a full-time minimum wage employee is paid for an
8-hour day of rest in addition to the 44-hour normal workweek and
receives an average of 1 month's wage a year in required bonuses plus 2
weeks of paid vacation. Many workers worked more hours than the legal
maximum; some were paid overtime but others were not.
The Constitution and the Labor Code require employers, including
the Government, to take steps to ensure that employees are not placed
at risk in their workplaces. These laws prohibit the employment of
persons under 18 years of age in occupations considered hazardous or
morally dangerous, such as bars and billiard halls; the prohibition
also applies to hazardous occupations such as agricultural work with
poisonous chemicals or factory work with dangerous equipment. The Labor
Code prohibits pregnant women from engaging in strenuous physical
exertion at the workplace after the 4th month of pregnancy. Health and
safety regulations are outdated, and enforcement is inadequate. The MOL
attempts to enforce the applicable regulations but has restricted
powers and limited resources to enforce compliance. Workers in some
maquilas expressed concerns about unhealthy drinking water, unsanitary
bathrooms, and eating facilities, and inadequate ventilation (problems
with dust and heat). Some of the largest plants have dust control, air
conditioning, on-site medical facilities, and enforced safety regimes.
In July hundreds of workers showing classic signs of airborne
contamination by a toxic substance were evacuated from several maquilas
in a free trade zone. The workers were transported to hospitals, and
almost all of those admitted were discharged within 24 hours. The
company where the contamination appeared to originate closed its plant
and did not allow anyone - including Ministry of Labor and Environment
inspectors - to enter for more than 48 hours. Initial medical
examinations and tests within the plants revealed no evidence of
contamination. The Institute of Forensic Medicine identified a chemical
used in the production of tear gas. Following further investigation, an
interagency government report stated that none of the products
authorized for use in the maquilas' activities produced the
contaminant. It determined that a chemical agent unrelated to the
industrial process must have caused the contamination and, therefore,
the companies' monitoring systems could not have prevented the
incident. At year's end, the Attorney General's office had not
determined how the chemical had entered the facilities.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In October 2001, the Legislative
Assembly approved criminal code reforms that prohibited trafficking in
persons. Prior to the reforms the Criminal Code stipulated that any
crime involving commerce in women or children automatically carried a
30 percent increase in the prison sentence or fine that otherwise would
be imposed for that crime; however, trafficking in persons is a
problem.
Women and children are trafficked for prostitution to Mexico,
Guatemala, and other Central American countries. In the past, there
were credible reports that women and children were lured to Mexico by
procurers only to be sold to owners of establishments there who then
force the trafficked persons to work off the debt as prostitutes. On at
least two occasions during the year, the Prensa Grafica newspaper
reported the rescue of about a dozen Salvadoran women and girls from
brothels in Mexico, where traffickers had obligated them to work. In
2001 Guatemalan authorities reported that street children from El
Salvador were lured to border areas with Guatemala where they are then
forced into prostitution by organized rings. In July police in
Guatemala City raided a brothel and rescued nine children who had been
lured from El Salvador by offers of legitimate employment, but then
were forced into prostitution by the brothel's owner. Trafficking of
female teenagers, from 14 to 19 years-of-age, for sexual exploitation
also occurs within the country to the ports of Acajutla and La
Libertad. The majority of trafficked victims transiting El Salvador are
from Nicaragua, Honduras, and South America. According to police
reports, Nicaraguan minors are trafficked to bars in the cities of San
Miguel and El Sauce where they work as prostitutes. The most common
methods used to approach the victims are kidnaping, lucrative job
offers, and inducement into prostitution by friends.
The Unit for the Protection of Women and Children in the Attorney
General's office investigates cases of abuse against women and
children, including trafficking. The PNC, ISNA, and the Directorate of
Immigration also are involved in combating trafficking in persons.
However, the investigative units are new and poorly funded, and the
Government has not prosecuted traffickers.
The Government deports non-Salvadoran victims of trafficking;
however, victims can obtain temporary residency or refugee status if
they are likely to face political persecution in the country of origin.
Access to legal, medical, and psychological services is provided to the
victims. Victims of trafficking are not treated as criminals. The
Government does not provide assistance to its repatriated citizens who
are victims of trafficking, nor does it support the NGOs that assist
them.
----------
GRENADA
Grenada is a parliamentary democracy, with a Governor General as
titular Head of State. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Prime
Minister Keith Mitchell's New National Party (NNP) won all 15 seats and
formed a new government. Subsequently, one Member of Parliament left
the NNP and became the sole opposition member. The elections were
conducted openly and fairly and were free of violence. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary.
The 800-member Royal Grenada Police Force was responsible for
maintaining law and order. It was controlled by and responsive to
civilian authorities. There were occasional allegations of abuse by the
police.
The free-market economy was based on agriculture and tourism.
Grenada and 2 smaller islands, Carriacou and Petit Martinique, had a
population of approximately 103,000. The projected annual real economic
growth rate was 0.6 percent, compared with an estimated -3.4 percent in
2001.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. There were
allegations of police brutality. Violence against women was common, and
more women reported incidents of abuse and sought help from various
support systems. Child abuse remained a significant problem, and in
October 2001 the Social Services Ministry established a special hot
line to handle complaints of abuse. Grenada was invited by the
Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November
2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a
participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reported incidents of torture. Flogging, a legal form of punishment,
was rare but has been used as punishment for sex crimes and theft
cases.
There were several reports of alleged police brutality. In mid-
August the Nutmeg Association farmers led a march in the streets of St.
George's to protest the Government's decision to support a private
company, which offered farmers a higher price for their nutmeg than
that which traditionally was offered by the Nutmeg Association. A
police officer allegedly manhandled a woman during the demonstration.
The Police Commissioner publicly requested anyone who had been treated
brutally to report the incident to the Criminal Investigation
Department, but no one came forward. As a result, the matter was
dropped.
The media reported a second case in which three college students
threatened legal action against members of the Royal Grenada Police
Force for alleged police brutality. The police allegedly accused the
boys of being members of the ``Ginger Crew Gang,'' a group of teenage
boys who were involved in the forced entry and disturbance of social
functions, where they fought with the patrons. The three students
asserted that they became victims of severe police brutality and
retained a lawyer to press their case.
Allegations of police brutality were investigated internally by the
police. The Police Commissioner could discipline officers in valid
cases of brutality with penalties that may include dismissal from the
force. The Police Commissioner continued to speak out strongly against
police use of unlawful force.
Prison conditions generally met international standards, and the
Government permitted visits by independent human rights observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides the
police with the right to detain persons on suspicion without a warrant,
but they must bring formal charges within 48 hours. The police
generally adhered to this time limit in practice. If the police do not
charge a detainee within 48 hours, they must release the person.
The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality of
detention within 15 days after arrest on a criminal charge. The police
must formally arraign or release a detained person within 60 days, and
the authorities generally followed these procedures. There was a
functioning system of bail, although persons charged with capital
offenses were not eligible. Persons charged with treason may be
accorded bail only upon the recommendation of the Governor General.
The Constitution does not address exile, but the Government did not
use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, a part of the
Eastern Caribbean legal system, was generally independent. Final appeal
may be made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. Those arrested
on criminal charges are brought before a judge to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges; if there is,
the judge remands the defendant for trial.
The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the
authorities generally observed this right in practice. There is a
presumption of innocence, and the law protects persons against self-
incrimination and requires the police to explain a person's rights upon
arrest. The accused has the right to remain silent and to seek the
advice of legal counsel. A defense lawyer has the right to be present
during interrogation and may advise the accused how to respond or not
to respond to questions. The accused has the right to confront his
accuser.
The court appointed attorneys for indigents only in cases of murder
or other capital crimes. In other criminal cases that reached the
appellate stage, the court appointed a lawyer to represent the accused
if the defendant was not represented previously or reappointed earlier
counsel if the appellant no longer could afford that lawyer's services.
Due to the backlog of cases caused by a shortage of judges and
facilities, those charged with serious offenses must wait from 6 months
to 1 year before coming to trial in the High Court. With the exception
of persons charged with murder and foreign-born drug suspects, the
courts granted most defendants bail while awaiting trial.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respected these prohibitions. The law generally
requires judicially issued warrants for searching homes, except in
cases of hot pursuit. The law contains other exceptions that give the
police and security units legal authority to search persons and
property without warrants in certain circumstances. In practice police
obtained warrants in the majority of cases before conducting any
search.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. There were three weekly newspapers,
and several other newspapers published irregularly. One of the weeklies
was affiliated with an opposition political party, but the three most
widely circulated newspapers were independent and often critical of the
Government. The newspapers routinely carried press releases by the
opposition parties, including regular weekly columns expressing the
opposition parties' views.
There were 10 radio stations. The main station was part of the
Grenadian Broadcasting Network (GBN), a privately owned organization in
which the Government held a minority share. The principal television
station was also part of the GBN, and there was a privately owned
television station. A cable television company operated in most areas
of the country. All newspapers, radio, and television stations enjoyed
independence from the State and regularly reported opposition views.
The television news often carried reports on opposition activities,
including coverage of political rallies held by various political
parties and candidates, public forums featuring political leaders of
each of the major parties, and other public service broadcasts.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble for any peaceful purpose and for the
right of association, and the Government generally respected these
rights in practice. Supporters of political parties met frequently and
held public rallies; the authorities require permits for the use of a
public address system but not for public meetings themselves.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, and all citizens had the right to enter
and leave the country, except in special circumstances as outlined in
and limited by the 1986 Act to Restrict the Freedom of Movement of
Certain Persons. This law allows the Minister for National Security to
restrict travel out of the country by any person whose aims,
tendencies, or objectives include the overthrow of the democratic and
parliamentary system of government; it has not been invoked in the past
few years. Anyone so restricted may appeal after 3 months to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The Chief Justice appoints an
accredited lawyer to preside over such a tribunal.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
existed. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during
the year. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. General elections must be held every 5 years; in
January 1999, Prime Minister Keith C. Mitchell's NNP was returned to
office, securing all 15 seats in Parliament. In 2000 a Member of
Parliament changed party affiliation to become the single elected
opposition member, leaving the NNP with a majority of 14 seats.
There were no legal or other impediments to the participation by
women in government or politics. Four of the 15 elected Members of
Parliament were women; there was 1 woman among the 13 appointed
Senators. Women filled 10 of the 15 permanent secretary posts, the
highest civil service position in each ministry.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local human rights groups generally operated without government
restriction, and the Government cooperated with visits from
international human rights organizations.
In September 2001, the Government inaugurated a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission to investigate the period between the mid-
1970s and the late 1980s. The commission's terms of reference specify
the objective of recommending ``general amnesty to certain persons who
in the opinion of the commission have given truthful information during
the hearing of evidence.'' The commission was expected to review the
convictions of former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and other
leaders of the former People's Revolutionary government for their roles
in the 1983 assassination of former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and
his cabinet colleagues. In 1986 a court convicted Coard and 18 other
revolutionary leaders of murder and sentenced them to death;
subsequently, 2 were pardoned, and the sentences of the remaining 17
were commuted to life in prison. Of these, one person was granted
parole to undergo medical treatment overseas.
The 16 prisoners retained a lawyer from Trinidad who filed a
constitutional motion on their behalf. In February a high court judge
ruled that three should be released; the Government appealed, and in
November the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal overturned the High
Court's decision. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission held many
meetings but had not presented its final report to the Government by
year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, place of
origin, political opinion, color, creed, or sex, and the Government
generally adhered to these provisions.
Women.--Women's rights monitors believed that violence against
women remained a serious problem, and there was a notable increase in
reports of incidents of violence during the year. Some observers
believed that there was a new willingness by women to report abuse and
seek assistance after Parliament enacted a bill aimed at combating
domestic violence in May 2001. It provides for penalties including jail
sentences, fines, and community service and also includes provisions
for issuance of restraining orders. The police stated that most cases
of abuse were not reported, and others were settled out of court. The
law stipulates a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for a conviction of
any nonconsensual form of sex. Sentences for assault against a spouse
varied according to the severity of the incident. There was a shelter
for battered and abused women and their children in the northern part
of the island, with medical and psychological counseling personnel on
its staff. The home accommodates 20 persons.
Prostitution is illegal.
Sexual harassment in the workplace was a problem.
There was no evidence of official discrimination in health care,
employment, or education. Women frequently earned less than men
performing the same work; such wage differences were less marked for
the more highly paid jobs.
Children.--The Social Welfare Division within the Ministry of
Housing, Social Services, and Cooperatives provided probationary and
rehabilitative services to youths, day care services and social work
programs to families, assistance to families wishing to adopt or
provide foster care to children, and financial assistance to the six
children's homes run by private organizations.
Education is compulsory until the age of 16.
Government social service agencies reported a further increase in
the number of child abuse cases, including sexual abuse. Abused
children were placed either in a government-run home or in private
foster homes. The law provides for harsh penalties against those
convicted of child abuse and disallows the victim's alleged ``consent''
as a defense in cases of incest. There were three convictions for such
offenses during the year, with abusers sentenced to a maximum of 15
years in prison. In January Parliament passed a Child Protection Act.
In October the Social Services Ministry established a child abuse hot
line; it received an average of six calls per day. Women's
organizations and other nongovernmental groups increased their public
awareness efforts to recognize and combat sexual abuse of women and
children.
Persons with Disabilities.--The law does not protect job seekers
with disabilities from discrimination in employment, nor does it
mandate provision of accessibility to public buildings or services. The
National Council for the Disabled and the National Children's Home
assisted the Government in placing students with disabilities into
community schools. The Council also sought assistance from architects
and builders in the construction of ramps at hotels and public
buildings, and ramps were installed at some hotels and government
buildings.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers were free to organize
independent labor unions. Although employers were not legally obliged
to recognize a union formed by their employees, they generally did so
in practice. Labor Ministry officials estimated that 25 percent of the
work force was unionized, a decline reflecting loss of jobs during the
year. Union leaders played a significant role in the political process,
and one labor leader served in the Senate on behalf of the Grenada
Trades Union Council (GTUC).
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against union members
and organizers. Mechanisms exist to resolve complaints of
discrimination. After all avenues for resolving a complaint have been
exhausted between union representatives and employers, both sides may
agree to ask for the assistance of the Labor Commissioner. If the Labor
Commissioner is unable to find a resolution to the impasse, the
Minister of Labor intervenes and, if unable to reach an agreement, may
appoint an arbitration tribunal if both parties agree to abide by its
ruling. The law requires employers who are found guilty of antiunion
discrimination to rehire dismissed employees, but in most cases the
employee accepts the option of compensation. There were no cases of
antiunion discrimination reported to the Ministry during the year.
All unions were technically free of government control, and none
received government financial support. However, all of the major unions
belong to one umbrella labor federation, the GTUC, which was subsidized
by the Government. The GTUC held annual conventions and determined some
policies for member unions.
The GTUC and its unions freely affiliated with regional and
international trade union groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers were
free to organize and to participate in collective bargaining. The law
requires employers to recognize a union that represents the majority of
workers in a particular business.
Workers in the private and public sectors were free to strike, once
legal and procedural requirements were met. There were several strikes
or other types of industrial action during the year, including those by
workers at the Nutmeg Association, the Grenada Sugar Factory, and the
airport. All were short-lived and were settled with the intervention of
the Labor Commissioner, the Minister of Labor, and the respective
unions.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children,
and it was not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is illegal; however, children sometimes worked
in the agricultural sector. The statutory minimum age for employment of
children is 18 years. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor enforced
this provision in the formal sector by periodic checks; however,
enforcement efforts in the informal sector were lax. The Government has
endorsed but not yet ratified the International Labor Organization's
Convention 182 on elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--For the first time, the
Government established a tripartite Wages Advisory Committee, composed
of union, business, and government representatives. The Labor Ministry
prescribed minimum wages, which took effect in September. Minimum wages
were set for various categories of workers; for example, agricultural
workers were classified into male and female workers. Rates for men
were $1.85 (EC$5.00) per hour, and for women $1.75 (EC$4.75) per hour;
however, if a female worker performed the same task as a man, her rate
of pay was the same. All agricultural workers must be paid for a
minimum of 5 hours per day. The minimum wage for domestic workers was
set at $148.14 (EC$400) monthly. The minimum wage was not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
workers, including nonunionized workers, received packages of benefits
from employers set by collective bargaining agreements between
employers and labor unions. Many families received remittances from
relatives abroad and also helped support themselves through garden-plot
agriculture.
The Constitution stipulates that the maximum number of hours per
week workers may work is 40. The law does not prescribe a standard
workweek, except for the public sector, which is expected to work a 40-
hour week Monday through Friday. The normal workweek in the commercial
sector included Saturday morning work but did not exceed 40 hours.
The Government sets health and safety standards, but the
authorities enforced them unevenly. Workers can remove themselves from
dangerous workplace situations without jeopardy to continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked to, from, or within the country during the year.
__________
GUATEMALA
Guatemala is a democratic republic with separation of powers and a
centralized national administration. The 1985 Constitution provides for
universal suffrage to elect a one-term president and a unicameral
congress. President Alfonso Portillo of the Guatemalan Republican Front
(FRG) took office in January 2000 following a generally free and fair
December 1999 runoff election. The FRG maintains a majority (63 seats)
in the 113-member Congress. Despite significant pledges, the Portillo
administration and Congress took only limited steps to implement the
Peace Accords concluded with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Unity (URNG) guerrillas in 1996. The judiciary is independent; however,
it suffers from inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation.
The Minister of Interior oversees the National Civilian Police
(PNC), created in 1997 under the terms of the Peace Accords. The PNC
has sole responsibility for internal security. There are no active
members of the military in the police command structure. In February
the President ordered the dismissal of several military officers from
positions in the Ministry of Interior. However, the Government
frequently ordered the army to support the police, who are ill-equipped
and lack resources. The United Nations Verification Mission in
Guatemala (MINUGUA) reported that this practice constituted a grave
setback for the demilitarization of public security, as called for by
the Accords, and that there were no indications that joint operations
reduced crime levels. Under existing law, military personnel were
subordinated to police control during joint patrols or operations. The
Constitution requires the Minister of Defense to be an active duty
military officer. On December 29, the President announced a reduction
of 162 persons from the Presidential Military Staff (EMP) and committed
to further reductions and eventual dissolution of the EMP in 2003, in
long-overdue compliance with the Peace Accords. Nevertheless, the
Government has steadily increased the EMP's budget, while devoting a
lesser amount of resources to its successor organization, the
Secretariat for Strategic and Administrative Affairs (SAAS). Although
troop readiness levels are low, the overall military budget again
surpassed what the Peace Accords call for, leading civil society groups
to allege corruption and call for transparency in budget and spending.
Some members of the security forces committed human rights abuses. A
number of retired military officers with widely acknowledged ties to
violent, organized crime continued to have significant influence within
the army, police, judiciary, and executive branch.
The private sector-dominated economy grew by approximately 2
percent during the year. The country has a population of approximately
13 million. Coffee, sugar, and bananas are the leading traditional
exports, but tourism, apparel assembly, and other nontraditional
industries all contribute more than coffee. Significant declines in
world prices for coffee adversely affected the economy. Almost 40
percent of the work force and 60 percent of the poor are engaged in
some form of agriculture, according to census data. Inflation was 6.3
percent during the year, but the national currency held its value
against the dollar. Land distribution is highly skewed. One percent of
farms contain more than one-third of all land being cultivated. There
is a marked disparity in income distribution and poverty is pervasive,
particularly in the large indigenous community. Approximately 83
percent of the population lives in poverty; this figure rises to 90
percent among indigenous people. According to the U.N. Development
Program (UNDP), 59 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty.
Combined unemployment and underemployment were estimated at 46 percent.
Foreign aid is an important part of national income. Remittances from
citizens living abroad were the leading source of foreign currency and
are growing.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remain, and the human rights
situation deteriorated in some areas. There were several reports of
extrajudicial killings by security forces. There were increased reports
of violent deaths, killings, and ``social cleansing'' in which persons
deemed socially undesirable (e.g., gang members, local delinquents,
street children, prostitutes, and homosexuals) were murdered. Lynchings
and mob violence occurred at a higher rate than in 2001, although the
numbers of deaths decreased due to improved police intervention. In
some cases, security forces tortured, abused, and mistreated suspects
and detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh. In many cases, the
prosecutorial and judicial systems were unable to ensure full and
timely investigations, fair trials, or due process. Arbitrary arrest
and lengthy pretrial detentions continued to be problems. Judges and
other law enforcement officials were subject to intimidation and
corruption. In May the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights
Defenders noted a significant deterioration in the security of human
rights workers. Increased threats against judicial personnel,
journalists, witnesses, labor organizers, church activists, and labor
unionists heightened public insecurity. The obstruction of justice,
threats, and intimidation also were traced to ``parallel forces'' or
``clandestine groups'' related to the Government. MINUGUA found that
the majority of human rights violations were the result of the failure
of the state to investigate and punish those who broke the law. MINUGUA
estimated that 15 percent of the violations derived from the
obstruction of justice, particularly by police officers whose only
punishment was to be rotated out from assignments where there were
problems. Efforts to reform the judiciary continued; however, impunity
was systemic.
Most human rights cases remained pending for lengthy periods
without being investigated or languished in the courts as defense
attorneys took advantage of the inefficient judicial system and filed
numerous motions and appeals to delay trials. On October 8, appeals
judges annulled the 2001 conviction in the Bishop Gerardi murder case
and ordered a retrial. The prosecution has appealed the judges'
decision. On September 3, the trial of the alleged intellectual authors
of the 1990 murder of anthropologist Myrna Mack began after a 12-year
delay. On October 3, the court found former colonel Juan Valencia
Osorio guilty of ordering her murder and sentenced him to 30 years
imprisonment. The Government made some progress in fulfilling
settlements negotiated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), such as in the case of murdered journalist Irma Flaquer, but
negotiated no new settlements during the year.
Violence and discrimination against women persisted, as did
societal abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled and
indigenous people. Workers' efforts to form unions and participate in
union activities were hindered by ineffective government protection.
Child labor and trafficking in women and children were continuing
problems. Guatemala was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD)
Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
Attacks on human rights workers increased during the year. While
some of these attacks may have been instances of common crime, the
numbers and patterns of the attacks point to a deliberate, systematic
effort to intimidate human rights workers. In March, members of a
coalition of human rights groups demanded that the Government take
measures to ensure the security of human rights workers, investigate
and prosecute the material and intellectual authors of the attacks,
investigate the existence of clandestine groups and parallel forces
linked to state institutions believed to be behind the attacks, and
dismantle them. The Secretariat of Strategic Analysis produced a report
on the existence of such groups, although other public officials
refuted its findings. Human rights groups broke off dialogue, asserting
that the Government failed to respond adequately to their concerns and
did not accept the President's offer to meet with them. Some government
officials made public comments disparaging human rights workers and
international observers, and asserted that some of them had fabricated
alleged abuses.
In July members of the former Civil Defense Patrols (PAC) demanded
payment for services rendered to the army during the armed conflict.
The Government's initial agreement to provide indemnification prompted
protest from civil society groups and international human rights
observers. Opponents argued that compensating groups, many of which had
committed documented human rights abuses during the conflict, was an
insult to the victims for whom a National Reparations Plan has not been
developed.
MINUGUA continued to monitor peace accord implementation and human
rights issues. The Government asked the U.N. to extend MINUGUA's
mandate. MINUGUA reported that the overall human rights situation
deteriorated, and there were increased signs of the participation of
clandestine groups in illegal activities linked to employees of the
police, military intelligence, justice system, and Public Ministry.
These groups appeared to act with relative autonomy, and there was no
evidence that they were a part of government policy; however, they
operated with impunity. MINUGUA found evidence of civilian and military
officers linked to these groups operating both officially and
unofficially within the executive and judicial branches.
In March Amnesty International (AI) reported that successive
governments had failed to implement the human rights elements of the
1996 Peace Accords. The report alleged that this failure had
contributed to new death threats, attacks, and other acts of
intimidation against the country's human rights community and others
trying to combat impunity. The report claimed that the failure of the
legal system to deliver justice has been a major contributory factor to
this situation. In August Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that
similar threats and attacks against human rights defenders were carried
out by a clandestine group with possible links to both public security
forces and organized crime. In September AI reported the continued
operation of Civil Defense Patrols despite the provision for their
dissolution in the Peace Accords.
A new Human Rights Ombudsman, backed by civil society
organizations, was elected in June. A new Attorney General was selected
on May 9 and promised to combat impunity and promote respect for human
rights. He appointed a special prosecutor for crimes against human
rights workers and agreed to appoint a special prosecutor for crimes
against the indigenous.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1.Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were
allegations of politically motivated killings by government agents, and
security forces allegedly committed some extrajudicial killings. The
Government demonstrated some willingness to arrest and prosecute those
responsible; however, in many cases the scarcity of law enforcement
resources and a weak prosecutorial system prevented the Government from
adequately investigating killings and other crimes or arresting and
successfully prosecuting perpetrators (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
MINUGUA reported that it had received 89 allegations of
extrajudicial killings between July 2001 and June and had confirmed the
validity of the claims in 13 cases and 25 attempted killings. In the
previous reporting cycle, July 2000 to June 2001, MINUGUA corroborated
26 killings out of 43 allegations. The report noted a number of
extrajudicial killings by members of the police. Many of these cases
involved accidental discharges of weapons, drunken misbehavior by on-
or off-duty officers, questionable crowd control techniques, or poor
judgment by officers who lost control of unstable situations involving
angry crowds or persons resisting arrest. In some of these cases, there
was effective investigation by both the police Office of Professional
Responsibility (ORP) and the prosecutors. In others there was credible
evidence of a cover-up by police officers, the ORP, or both, and
frequently, inadequate investigations by the prosecutor's office.
MINUGUA again noted an increase in the participation of municipal
officials, particularly auxiliary mayors, in extrajudicial killings--
primarily lynchings.
On January 29, some 20 agents of the now defunct Department of
Anti-Narcotic Operations (DOAN) of the PNC entered the community of
Chocon, Izabal, allegedly to conduct a drug raid. DOAN agents shot and
killed Leonel Diaz Valenzuela and Abinail Cerna Castaneda as they ran
from a storefront toward their homes. Other individuals were illegally
detained, beaten, and tortured (see Section 1.c.). One individual, who
was detained, disappeared (see Section 1.b.). DOAN officials remained
in the community, occupying private homes and terrorizing the
residents, for well over a day. The officers subsequently gave multiple
versions of the events. On February 8,the ORP initiated an
investigation and charged 17 agents with a cover-up, altering the scene
of a crime, illegal detention, use of unnecessary force, and abuse of
authority. Arrest warrants were issued for the 17; one suspect fled
before he could be detained. On June 27, the Public Ministry asked the
High Impact Court of Chiquimula to open oral proceedings against the 16
captured agents for extrajudicial killing, illegal entry, forced
disappearance, altering a crime scene, and abuse of authority. On July
26, a judge ordered the trial to proceed.
In April the IACHR requested that the Government provide police
protection to the members of the community after suspicious vehicles
were seen in and around Chocon and a witness, Marvin Estuardo de Leon,
was murdered. In response, on April 12, the police established a
substation in Chocon.
On February 28, a shootout between members of the Criminal
Investigative Service (SIC) of the PNC and military intelligence
personnel killed two members of the military, and wounded three police
officers. Both the then-Minister of Interior and the Director of the
PNC maintained that the incident resulted from a lack of communication
during a rescue operation in a kidnapping case; however, there were
credible reports that the participants in the incident were, in fact,
members of a clandestine criminal group attempting to steal the ransom
money. According to MINUGUA and press reports, there were indications
that the criminals were members of the military. There was also
credible information that the police killed one of the military
personnel after he had been wounded and surrendered. The crime scene
was altered, and evidence was removed. In May a SIC investigator's
testimony that he was ordered to modify the official reports implicated
the Director of the PNC, the Minister of Interior, and others in the
command structure. Further obstruction of the investigation occurred
when two military officers linked to the clandestine group were sent
abroad.
There have been at least six murders of landless peasants occupying
private land in Morales, Izabal municipality since April 2001. Agents
associated with landowners are implicated in several of the murders,
and three local police at the scene of one of the murders when the
crime was committed were charged with ``neglecting their duties.''
There have been few arrests and no convictions in any of these cases.
On April 4, police officers illegally detained Rudy Castillo and
Erick Garcia in Sumpango, Sacatepequez. On April 8, the bodies of the
two men were found with evidence of torture (see Section 1.c.). The ORP
opened an investigation and on April 11, arrested officer Ronald Roca
and charged him. Two other PNC suspects remained at large. The victims'
families received multiple threats from unknown persons.
On April 27, William Ruano Mayen, the son of Pascual Ruano, a
witness in the Bethel Route case in which some 18 individuals were the
victims of extrajudicial killings by a group of former military and PAC
members during the 1997-99 period, was killed. Evidence suggested links
between the perpetrators of Mayen's death and the Bethel Route
killings; however, police made no arrests in this case.
There was no progress in the investigation of the 2000 deaths of
Oscar Guzman Garcia and Jose Castaneda Alvarez, who had been detained
by men wearing military uniforms in a jeep marked ``ZM12'' (for
Military Zone 12).
There were no known reports of deaths of detainees or prisoners
while in police custody during the year, although most cases from
previous years went unresolved, such as the 2000 death of Luis Armando
Colindres while in police custody or those of the prisoners killed
during jailbreaks and prison riots in 2001.
Most cases from past years remained unresolved, such as the
killings of Constitutional Court president Epaminondas Gonzalez in
1994, former presidential candidate Jorge Carpio in 1993, and Gerardi
witness Luis Garcia in 2001. There was some progress during the year in
cases of past extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces.
In many other cases, there was little or no progress, often due to the
tactics of defense attorneys who frequently took advantage of a legal
system that tolerates the filing of dilatory motions to derail
impending trials against their military clients.
On September 3, the trial of Edgar Godoy Gaitan, Juan Valencia
Osorio, and Juan Oliva Carrera, alleged intellectual authors of the
1990 murder of anthropologist Myrna Mack Chang, began. However, various
appeals by the defense, including one questioning the legality of
documents submitted as evidence, remained pending. On the first day of
the trial, the president of the court ordered the defendants'
imprisonment during the trial proceedings. During and leading up to the
trial, witnesses, prosecutors, and at least one judge reported
receiving threats (see Section 1.e.). In August unknown persons fired
shots outside the home of Roberto Romero, attorney of private plaintiff
Helen Mack, and Romero received threatening phone calls. Also in
August, the IACHR ordered the Government to take necessary steps to
protect Helen Mack and members of the Myrna Mack Foundation. On October
3, the court found former colonel Juan Valencia Osorio guilty and
sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment.
In November the trial of the Mack case began in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. The Court had agreed in 2000 to hear the case
due to excessive delays of the application of justice in the Guatemalan
courts.
On October 8, the Fourth Appeals Court annulled the 2001 conviction
and sentencing of three military officers to 30-year, noncommutable
sentences for the 1998 murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi, the Coordinator
of the Archbishop's Office on Human Rights (ODHAG), and ordered a
retrial. At year's end, the defendants remained in custody awaiting a
new trial. The prosecution appealed the judges' decision.
MINUGUA continued to confirm multiple complaints of threats, acts
of intimidation, and surveillance by those involved with the case (see
Sections 1.e. and 4).
In February the Public Ministry prosecutor, Mario Leal, announced
that his office had discovered that some of the 183 individuals listed
in the ``Military Diary'' were still alive. Leal indicated his intent
to call 6 witnesses to give testimony in connection with 75 criminal
cases filed by the victims' families against the military.
In June former PAC members staged a mass protest in the province of
Peten, occupying roads, an airport, and an oil refinery and detaining
tourists, while demanding cash payments for services rendered to the
army during the armed conflict. The Government's conciliatory response
and promises to consider compensation provoked outrage among civil
society groups, who pointed out that the Government had not yet
committed to a National Reparations Plan for victims of the armed
conflict, a central recommendation of the Historical Clarification
Commission (CEH). As groups of former PAC members across the country
joined in the demands, international human rights observers spoke out
against rewarding the victimizers. The CEH held the PACs responsible
for 18 percent of the massacres of unarmed civilians during the
conflict.
Progress in some notorious massacre cases stalled at year's end. In
August, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights agreed to hear the
case of the 1982 massacre in Plan de Sanchez, Baja Verapaz, in which
the army and PAC members killed 268 people. The Government has not
complied with the August 2000 settlement, including economic
reparations, with the survivors and the victim families.
Despite a September 2001 Supreme Court order to proceed with the
trial of five guerrillas for the 1998 massacre in El Aguacate,
Chimaltenango, there was no progress in the case.
Judicial proceedings in the 1995 Xaman massacre case remained
suspended due to multiple appeals pending before the Constitutional
Court.
The case of the 1982 military massacre at Dos Erres, Peten,
remained stalled in a Guatemalan court by 26 motions of appeal.
Although the Government made a reparation payment to the victims'
survivors in December 2001, further obligations under the 2000 amicable
settlement remained unfulfilled.
Prosecutor Mario Leal continued to interview witnesses and conduct
investigations in connection with the lawsuits filed in 2000-2001 on
behalf of communities whose citizens were massacred by government
security forces. Leal has interviewed more than 100 witnesses and
visited 4 massacre sites. The suits allege crimes, including genocide,
committed by the high command of former President Fernando Romeo Lucas
Garcia and that of former ``de facto'' president and current President
of Congress, retired General Efrain Rios Montt.
Exhumations of clandestine cemeteries continued throughout the
year, although work was set back by death threats, and exhumation teams
reported that some communities lost their will to participate (see
Section 4). Forensic scientists have exhumed more than 2,000 remains
from more than 280 sites since exhumations began in 1992. Most of the
bodies recovered have been those of victims of military or paramilitary
killings in the early 1980s. Forensics groups use the information
obtained from the exhumations to verify eyewitness reports of
massacres--of which the CEH recorded 669--and to determine, at least in
general terms, who might have been responsible. Forensic research and
DNA testing have identified some of the remains and have been used in
some criminal cases.
In July Families of the Disappeared in Guatemala (FAMDEGUA) began
to exhume remains of 16 guerrilla fighters killed by the army in 1990-
92 and interred in common graves in Antigua, Sacatepequez. The
exhumations were carried out in connection with a program that assists
families seeking children lost during the conflict (see Section 1.b.).
In August the Forensic Anthropological Foundation of Guatemala (FAFG)
began to exhume several clandestine cemeteries around Rabinal, Baja
Verapaz. Community records show more than 800 persons were killed in a
massacre in 1981. Although the team only found 51 skeletons, including
women and infant children, the majority incomplete, there was evidence
that the site had been disturbed. During the year, FAFG teams also
worked in Xiquin Sinai and Hacienda Vieja, Chimaltenango; Finca El
Zapote, Alta Verapaz; and Inebe and Pacux, Baja Verapaz. By year's end,
they had excavated 58 different sites and exhumed 417 remains.
In December 2000, a Spanish court decided not to hear a criminal
complaint filed in 1999 by Rigoberta Menchu against Rios Montt, former
President Fernando Lucas Garcia, and former de facto President Oscar
Humberto Mejia Victores for human rights abuses including genocide,
torture, and terrorism committed during the 36-year internal conflict.
Menchu petitioned the Spanish Supreme Court in March 2001 to overturn
the ruling, and in February the court agreed to consider her petition.
A decision was pending at year's end.
There were plausible allegations of politically motivated killings
by nonstate actors during the year, with only limited willingness on
the part of prosecutors to investigate such murders. In some of these
cases, evidence was not sufficient to conclude whether the killing was
politically motivated.
On February 15, Cesar Rodas, a witness in the Government Printing
Office case (see Section 2.b.), was shot and killed while walking
toward his parked car. Although Rodas carried cash and other items of
value, they were not taken. The police interviewed some 20 witnesses to
the crime, but were not able to establish a motive. On March 7, the
IACHR ordered the Government to provide police protection to five of
the witnesses, who reported being followed and threatened by unknown
individuals.
On March 14, four armed men shot and killed Jorge Rosal, a regional
leader of the Patriot Party, as he left the party's Guatemala City
headquarters. The Ministry of government quickly discounted a political
motive, even though nothing was stolen from Rosal's person. A month
before, the party's founder, retired General Otto Perez Molina, had
registered the new opposition party. Four days before the shooting,
Rosal had participated in a march with other members of the Patriot
Party involved in the Civic Movement, a political association founded
to protest government corruption (see Section 2.b.). The ensuing
investigation produced no suspects or motive.
On April 29, Guillermo Ovalle, an accountant at the Rigoberta
Menchu Foundation, was shot and killed while having lunch in a
cafeteria frequented by the staff of various human rights NGOs. Police
immediately captured two suspects identified by witnesses at the scene
of the crime. Nearly 4 months after the incident, the prosecutor had
not completed various pretrial proceedings, such as the identification
of the suspects in a line-up, due to dilatory tactics employed by the
defense (see Section 4).
During the year there were several killings characterized as acts
of ``social cleansing'' in which persons deemed as socially undesirable
were murdered. Unknown individuals killed at least five male homosexual
sex workers (see Section 5). Police did not identify any suspects.
Street children continued to be the victims of violence by unknown
persons (see Section 5).
There was no progress in the investigation of the 2000 and 2001
attacks on the son and daughter of retired General Otto Perez Molina
and the killings of Patricia Castellanos Fuentes de Aguilar and
Francisco Aguilar Alonzom.
There was no progress in the investigation of the May 2001 killing
of Sister Barbara Ann Ford. The prosecutor assigned to the case was
slow to investigate leads and was reluctant to cooperate with MINUGUA.
A motive has yet to be established.
MINUGUA reported 48 lynching cases involving 104 victims during the
year. In 14 cases, 20 victims died. While the number of reported
lynchings increased in comparison to 2001, the numbers of deaths
decreased, in large part due to the improved efforts of the police. In
2001 police intervention saved lives in 40 out of 75 cases recorded.
MINUGUA continued to verify cases that were planned or premeditated
events, some of which had the participation of municipal officials,
local leaders, or former members of Civil Defense Patrols. The large
majority of the attacks took place in heavily indigenous, rural areas
that suffer from the lowest rates of human development and poverty, and
where the justice system is least accessible. MINUGUA concluded that
the Government's weak response to crime fueled partial public
acceptance for lynchings.
Since MINUGUA began tracking individual lynching cases in 1997 and
up until January, it recorded a total of 421 cases, resulting in 215
deaths. Less than 10 percent of the perpetrators of these lynchings
have been tried and sentenced, and convictions were handed down in only
24 cases. In March 2001, a judge issued 41 arrest warrants for the
alleged ringleaders of the 2000 lynching of 8 men at a roadblock near
Xalbaquiej, Chichicastenango. The orders did not arrive at police
headquarters until October 4, 2001, were subsequently sent to the
Quiche station on October 22, 2001, and were finally delivered to the
substation in Chichicastenango in February, almost a year later. By
year's end, the police had not arrested anyone.
Although in most cases the justice system has been slow to
investigate, convict, and imprison perpetrators of lynchings, the
Government has demonstrated increased willingness to prosecute lynching
offenders. In February a prosecutor formally charged 22 individuals
with illegal detention, kidnaping, murder, illegal inhumation, and
resisting arrest in connection with the October 2001 lynching of Juan
Cuc, Jose Ical Xip, and Rene Alfredo Cho. On December 11, a court in
Coban, Alta Verapaz, found Alfredo Caal, Esteban Quej, and Celio Ortiz
guilty of the March 2001 lynching of Alvaro Hugo Martinez Perez, a
justice of the peace in Senahu, Alta Verapaz, and sentenced them to 52
years in prison.
There were several unsuccessful attempts to lynch local judicial
officials. On July 9, inhabitants of Nebaj, Quiche, took Judge Griselda
Yoc hostage. Yoc was taken to the town plaza, where the crowd demanded
that she explain the status of a case against a member of the
community. On July 19, a mob stormed the justice center demanding the
release of a second man whom Judge Yoc had ordered arrested for
invasion of private property. The Supreme Court closed the center on
July 23. Yoc and Juan Tul, a Justice of the Peace who had also been
threatened, were transferred. The center remained closed for 10 days.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year; however, there was at least one
reported disappearance during detention by security forces.
On January 29, DOAN agents, conducting a drug raid in Chochon,
Izabal, illegally detained Humberto Orellana Sis. Orellana Sis
subsequently disappeared and his whereabouts remain unknown (see
Section 1.a.).
On May 3, a human rights worker was abducted and tortured by
unknown men, who made cuts on his abdomen with a knife while
questioning him about his work (see Section 4).
Disappearances in high-profile cases from past years remained
unresolved at year's end. There was no progress in the investigation
into the 2000 disappearance of University of San Carlos professor and
social activist Mayra Gutierrez, and the case remained pending before
the IACHR. There was also no progress in the disappearance case of
Mynor Pineda Augustin following his 2000 arrest for kidnapping.
In June the National Commission for the Search for Disappeared
Children, created by civil society organizations in June 2001 after the
Government failed to follow the recommendation of the Historical
Clarification Commission to create such a body to search for children
who had disappeared during and since the armed conflict, released a
report on its first year of work. The Commission documented 425 cases
of disappeared children and facilitated 17 family reunifications. The
Commission reported that the primary obstacle to its work was the
military's refusal to provide access to its records on captured
children. In February the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Children in Armed
Conflicts recommended that the Commission be officially recognized and
enjoy formal participation by the Government (see Section 4).
In June 2001, groups associated with the National Human Rights
Coordinator filed 5,000 habeas corpus briefs on behalf of individuals
who disappeared between March 6, 1965, and October 19, 1993. The briefs
were processed immediately by the Supreme Court and sent to the
sentencing court to be investigated; however, little progress was made.
In February the Inter-American Court for Human Rights ordered the
Government to locate, exhume, and relinquish the remains of guerrilla
leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who disappeared in 1992, publicly
acknowledge responsibility for his death, and pay $498,000 (3,859,500
quetzals) in damages to his survivors.
The appeal of the September 2001 decision of the trial court to
dismiss, for lack of sufficient evidence, the case against retired
General and former de facto president Oscar Mejia Victores for his
alleged role in the 1984 disappearance of Fernando Garcia continued at
year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the integrity and security
of the person and prohibits physical or psychological torture of
prisoners; however, there were credible reports of torture, abuse, and
other mistreatment by members of the PNC during the year. These
complaints typically involved the use of excessive force during
arrests, interrogations, or other police operations. SIC detectives
continued to torture and beat detainees during interrogation to obtain
forced confessions, as did DOAN agents in one case. The Government and
the PNC showed little willingness to investigate, prosecute, or
otherwise punish officers who committed abuses. The PNC transferred
some cases of alleged torture to the Prosecutor's Office. There were a
significant number of murder victims whose bodies demonstrated signs of
torture or cruel treatment (see Section 1.a.).
In its 13th Report on Human Rights, MINUGUA reported receiving 551
complaints of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and
confirmed 270. The police, especially the Criminal Investigative
Service (SIC), committed the majority of violations. While complaints
of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by police increased by 128
percent, complaints of torture by police declined by 57 percent. The
police sometimes punished the use of excessive or illegal force by
officers; however, they more often merely transferred offenders to a
different location. In several cases, there was credible evidence that
police officers and their superiors altered documentation, falsified
evidence, bribed and intimidated victims and witnesses, or otherwise
obstructed the investigation and prosecution of police misconduct.
On January 29, DOAN agents unlawfully detained Porfirio Sanchez
Grijalba, Carlos Humberto Padilla, and Elio Hernandez Sanchez during an
alleged drug raid in Chocon, Izabal. All three were beaten. A hood
containing insecticide was placed over Sanchez's head while he was
interrogated and Hernandez's testicles were crushed (see Section 1.a.).
On February 8, a PNC officer raped two women who were detained in a
police station in Villa Nueva. On February 13, two other women reported
that they had been asked for sexual favors by officers in the same
station in exchange for the alteration of the report detailing their
crime. They reported that when they refused, they too were raped. The
ORP did not open an investigation, and the offending officers were
transferred to another station.
On April 4, the corpses of two men who were illegally detained by
PNC officers were found, showing signs of torture (see Section 1.a.).
On May 3, a human rights worker was abducted and tortured by
unknown men, who made cuts on his abdomen with a knife while
questioning him about his work (see Section
On September 6, the decapitated body of Manuel Garcia de la Cruz,
member of National Coordinator of Widows (CONAVIGUA), a human rights
group, was found in Joyabaj, Quiche. The police have not identified any
suspects.
Casa Alianza, an NGO, reported that the number of incidents of
killing and abuse of street children increased (see Sections 1.a. and
5).
During the year, groups of peasants forcibly occupied more than 60
farms in attempts to gain land. In most cases eviction orders were not
enforced. In some cases, evictions were carried out peacefully. There
were also isolated reports of excessive force by the police. On March
8, a police officer was accused of killing Jose Benjamin Perez in
Morales, Izabal (see Section 1.a.).
Corruption continued to be a major problem, and there were credible
allegations of involvement by individual police officers in criminal
activity, including kidnapings. Rather than discipline its officers,
the police often just transferred them to a different part of the
country. Transfers are a common practice and are used to avoid
personnel problems, corruption, and questions of mistreatment of
detainees. Impunity for police who commit abuses remained a serious
problem.
All PNC members were required to meet minimum education
requirements and pass an entrance examination. There were also
screening procedures to detect suspected human rights violators and
officers involved in criminal activities. Beginning in January, new
recruits were required to complete an 11-month training course,
including 60 hours of human rights training and 20 hours of ethics,
before entering on duty. Previously training lasted 6 months and
incorporated 35 course hours on human rights. The military also made
efforts to incorporate human rights training into its curriculum. In
March the army sponsored a Regional Human Rights Seminar with other
militaries in Latin America to discuss performance measures for human
rights standards.
In November 2001, the Government reached the Peace Accords goal of
putting 20,000 police on active duty. At year's end, PNC officers
numbered 21,180, representing 1 police officer for every 2,200 people.
Representation outside of the capital is improving; however,
approximately two-thirds of those police districts remained 60 to 75
percent staffed.
During the year several human rights NGOs and the Institute of
Comparative Studies in Penal Science formed the Council of Monitoring
and Support to Public Security to oversee the progress of reforms to
the PNC. In July it released its first report, which stated that the
principal problems facing the police were a lack of
professionalization, military influence, a lack of resources, and a
lack of internal controls. The Council reported that the constant
turnover in leadership, including both the director of the PNC and the
Minister of Interior, hampered continuity in policy and generated
insecurity within the institution. A lack of basic supplies such as
fuel and parts for vehicles, radios, and uniforms, further inhibited
its effectiveness. During the year, the Government transferred funds
from the PNC to both the Ministry of Defense and the EMP, while the
Police Academy suffered from a severe lack of financial resources.
In 1998 the PNC accepted some 60 police candidates from indigenous
communities in the Ixil region--approximately 30 of whom graduated on
their first attempt--to ensure that PNC personnel in those communities
would be proficient in the local language and able to operate
effectively in those communities. According to MINUGUA, approximately 7
percent of PNC officers speak an indigenous language. More officers who
speak an indigenous language have been assigned to a town where this
skill can be put to use. Approximately 75 percent now work in the
geographic area of their particular linguistic competency.
According to the Interior Ministry, there were more than 60,000
private security agents working in the country. Many firms have not
completed legal requirements and are owned by ex-soldiers and
policemen. Their forces outnumbered the police. The Ministry has done
little to investigate this issue, despite its jurisdiction over the
regulation of private security firms. In February, a court sentenced a
private guard to 30 years' imprisonment for the 2000 killing of a
father and son.
The ORP performs internal investigations of misconduct by police
officers. Despite greater numbers of police officers on duty throughout
the country and less public apprehension about filing complaints
against the police, the total number of such complaints remained
roughly the same as the previous year. The ORP has a strong corps of
investigators and has shown a considerable degree of improvement in
professionalism. However, their independence and effectiveness has been
hampered to some degree by the lack of support from the PNC leadership.
There were isolated cases in which ORP investigators appeared to
participate in cover-ups of police misconduct. The ORP reported that in
2001, it received 1,693 complaints, including 29 cases of homicide, 131
cases of abuse of authority, 136 cases of threats, 201 cases of
robbery, 7 cases of kidnaping, 63 cases of unlawful detention, and 150
cases of corruption. The ORP received 1,581 complaints in 2000,
including 43 of homicide, 222 of abuse of authority, 104 of robbery,
141 of corruption, 108 of improper conduct, 107 of threats, and 72 of
illegal detention. Cases in which sufficient evidence suggested that
criminal acts were committed were forwarded to the Public Ministry for
further investigation and prosecution. In 2001 the PNC fired 467
officers. In 2001 the ORP closed 878 cases, compared to 870 cases in
2000. The investigators found 35 percent of officers culpable and
exonerated 65 percent.
No active members of the military serve in the police command
structure. However, a 2000 law allows the Government to employ the army
to support temporarily the police in response to the rising rates of
violent crime. Under the law, military personnel are not clearly
subordinated to police control during joint patrols or operations. In a
May publication on the military's compliance with the Peace Accords,
MINUGUA noted that in some cases the army conducted patrols
independently and ordered district police chiefs to submit written
reports of their activities to local base commanders. The practice put
the institutional development of the PNC and judicial due process at
risk and was a serious setback for the demilitarization of public
security as stipulated by the Accords. MINUGUA reported that there was
no evidence that crime levels decreased as a result of the initiative.
On February 28, a shootout between members of the SIC and military
intelligence personnel during an alleged joint operation left two dead.
The subsequent investigation revealed alteration of official reports,
disturbance of the crime scene, and links between participants and
clandestine criminal networks (see Section 1.a.).
In May MINUGUA noted that excessive physical punishment continued
to play a role in the training methods of both the Kaibil army special
forces unit and the Adolfo V. Hall military academy.
Prison conditions remained harsh but generally not life
threatening. The prison system continued to suffer from a severe lack
of resources, particularly in the areas of prison security and medical
facilities. In September the prison system reported that its capacity
nationwide was 6,870; however, the prison population at the time was
7,103. Fifty-five percent of the prison population was not serving
prison terms but was being held in pretrial detention. Pretrial
detainees often were not separated from convicted criminals. However,
in June the Director of the Penitentiary System announced renewed
efforts to ensure their separation. Many were released either on good
behavior or because they never were sentenced. Some institutions were
overcrowded, but the Government made efforts to build new facilities
and in August opened a maximum security prison in Culiapa. The new
facility featured a recreation area, a private visiting area, and
medical and mental health clinics. The guards assigned to the facility
were recent graduates of the School for Prison Studies, created in 2001
to professionalize the prison system's staff. By year's end, 955 guards
had graduated from the program. The average guard-to-prisoner ratio is
1 to 12.
On December 23 and 24, inmates at Pavoncito prison staged violent
protests over the quality of food, the lack of visitation rights, and
poor living conditions. The prisoners eventually took control of the
prison. During the tumult, 14 prisoners were killed and 50 were
wounded. Practically all of the killings were committed by rival groups
of prisoners. NGOs allege that a pre-holiday roundup of youths for pre-
trial detention contributed to the rioting by disrupting the balance of
power between youth and more established gangs in prison.
Prisoners continued to complain of inadequate food and medical
care. Corruption, especially drug-related, was widespread. Prison
officials reported frequent escape attempts and other manifestations of
prisoner unrest. The military continued to provide perimeter security
for various prisons, as it has done since 1998.
In June 2001, 78 prisoners escaped from the maximum-security prison
facility in Escuintla. More than a year later, the authorities had
recaptured 53; 11 were killed, often under questionable circumstances;
and 14 others remained at large. Although the deaths of four of the
escapees were attributed to rival gangs, numerous activists questioned
whether the killings were instead an act of social cleansing by
authorities or parastatal elements.
According to press reports, the organizers of the June 2001 prison
break had bribed prison officials. On March 4, the trial of 20 guards,
2 wardens, the director, and the vice-director of the prison for
allegedly collaborating with the breakout began. It lasted more than 2
months as judges heard the testimony of more than 80 witnesses. The
director of the prison implicated high-level authorities in the prison
system as well as the ex-Minister of Interior, Byron Barrientos, who
was called for questioning but not charged with any crime. On May 23,
the Criminal Court of Escuintla sentenced the director and vice
director, the wardens, and a commander of the guard forces to five-
year, commutable sentences. The remainder were absolved. In June the
prosecutor asked for a retrial after various witnesses retracted their
statements.
In the wake of the prison break, a Consultative Commission on the
National Penitentiary System was established to analyze the existing
system and develop recommendations for improvements. The Commission's
final report found conditions to be very poor, especially for special
needs groups such as the sick, elderly, or disabled. It found that
prisoners often take control inside prisons and run criminal rings
while incarcerated, and that guards are often corrupt and poorly
trained. It submitted reform proposals to Congress that would allow
every prisoner to work and receive remuneration, provide educational
opportunities, form libraries, improve hygiene, strengthen security,
and improve infrastructure. During the year the Government made some
progress in improving access to education and skills training for
inmates.
The 401 female prisoners in the penal system generally are held in
facilities separate from men. However, the conditions are equally poor.
The Government permitted access to prisons by family members.
Immigration detention facilities do not always keep female detainees
separate from the male population.
Children are held in separate detention facilities. According to a
2000 MINUGUA report, there are only five juvenile delinquent facilities
in the country, and approximately 39 percent of the children housed in
these facilities have sought protection from the state and have
committed no offense.
In May the Constitutional Court ordered that a date be set for the
implementation of the version of the Minors' Code proposed by the FRG-
led Congress to supplant the outdated 1979 Code presently in force (see
Section 4).
The vast majority of juveniles detained by authorities are between
16 and 18 years old; 84 percent are boys. The Secretariat for Social
Welfare runs four Centers for the Treatment and Orientation of Minors:
one for girls and three for boys. Officials do not separate adequately
those who have been convicted and are serving a sentence from pre-trial
detainees. Those who are serving time for minor infractions are often
held with those who have committed serious offenses. Adequate
sanitation, hygiene, and nutrition are persistent problems within the
under-funded system.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors, public defenders, and religious groups.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention. However, there were frequent credible
reports of arrests without judicial warrants, illegal detentions, and
failure to adhere to prescribed time limits in legal proceedings. In
practice, arresting officers frequently fail to satisfy legal
requisites, especially with minors. The Constitution requires that a
court-issued arrest warrant be presented to a suspect prior to arrest
unless he is caught in the act of committing a crime. Police may not
detain a suspect for more than 6 hours without bringing the case before
a judge. Once a suspect has been arraigned, the prosecutor generally
has 3 months to complete his investigation and file the case in court
or seek a formal extension of the detention period. The law also
provides for access to lawyers and bail for most crimes.
There are no comprehensive, reliable data on the number of
arbitrary detentions, although most accounts agree that security forces
routinely ignored writs of habeas corpus in cases of illegal detention.
In its 12th report, MINUGUA investigated 110 cases of illegal or
arbitrary detention, and confirmed 88 of them. These figures reflected
an increase over the previous reporting cycle, in which MINUGUA
investigated some 31 cases of illegal or arbitrary detention, and
confirmed 23.
A study of the due process of minors in detention found that 95
percent of arrests of minors are without a warrant. Of these cases, 87
percent never go to trial. When the court system analyzed arrest
warrants for juveniles, it found such reasons as having tattoos or
scandalous behavior in public.
According to the registry maintained by the prison system, there
were a total of 8,077 prisoners throughout the country. Of those, 3,092
had been sentenced and the rest awaited trial. The law sets a limit of
3 months for pre-trial detention; however, longer detentions still
occurred routinely. Prisoners often were detained past their legal
trial or release dates, sometimes for years. Prisoners were not
released in a timely fashion after completing their full sentences due
to the failure of judges to issue the necessary court order or other
bureaucratic problems.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced as a
matter of policy. However, self-exile is a very common response by
citizens who feel threatened or intimidated.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judicial system often fails to
provide fair trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient
personnel and funds, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and
witnesses. The system's response to human rights violations, as well as
to general criminal activity, has been inadequate. Many high-profile
human rights cases remained pending in the courts for long periods as
defense attorneys employed numerous dilatory appeals and motions.
Courts sometimes took months to resolve even patently frivolous
appeals. There were numerous credible allegations of corruption,
manipulation, and intimidation in the judiciary. Intimidation and
killing of witnesses continued to be a problem; there were credible
reports of the killing and threatening of witnesses (see Section 1.a.
and 1.c.).
Judges and prosecutors continued to receive threats designed to
influence pending decisions or to seek reprisal for past decisions.
Death threats and intimidation of the judiciary were common in cases
involving human rights violations, particularly when the defendants
were active or former members of the military, military commissioners,
or former members of Civil Defense Patrols. Witnesses are often too
intimidated to testify. With relatively few exceptions, plaintiffs,
witnesses, prosecutors, and jurists involved in high-profile cases
against members of the military reported threats, intimidation, and
surveillance. Prosecutors, judges, and witnesses associated with the
Gerardi case reported continued threats, as did witnesses, prosecutors,
and at least one judge in the Mack case (see Section 1.a.). In July,
unknown individuals fired shots into the office of Flor de Maria
Garcia, who served as a judge in the Gerardi case. Those involved in
government corruption cases were also targeted, as in January when the
SIC uncovered a plot to assassinate the prosecutor handling a case
implicating former Minister of Interior Byron Barrientos and several
vice-ministers.
Many judges are denied health and life insurance because the
threats and intimidation that they receive make their jobs too
dangerous. The Government allocated more resources to the judiciary's
physical security, including providing protective details for a judge
and members of the prosecution team in the Mack case (see Section
1.a.). In July the Supreme Court announced the creation of a permanent
unit of 160 bodyguards to provide security for threatened judges and
magistrates. By September the Public Ministry had spent approximately
$195,000 (1.5 million quetzals) on its witness protection program. In
June the Association of Judges and Magistrates announced that 51 judges
had been threatened during the first 6 months of the year. By July 31,
the Special Prosecutor for crimes against judicial personnel had been
assigned 150 cases; however, the unit lacks the personnel and resources
necessary to carry out its mission.
In March the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers, Param Cumaraswamy, submitted the report of his May 2001
fact-finding mission to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. While the
report applauded efforts to professionalize the judiciary, it noted
that harassment and threats to justice workers had increased and that
adequate steps to ensure their security had not been taken, thereby
undermining their independence.
On April 15, an office in the headquarters of the Institute for
Public Penal Defense was broken into and ransacked. The incident
occurred while the Advisory Board was in session on a different floor
of the building. The perpetrators stole case processing computers,
other electronic equipment, and paper files, and urinated on desks and
furniture before leaving the office.
There were several unsuccessful attempts to lynch local judicial
officials (see Section 1.a.).
The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, appellate courts,
trial courts, and Probable Cause Judges (who function like grand
juries). There also are courts of special jurisdiction, such as labor
courts and family courts, which also are under the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court is independent of the rest of
the judiciary. There are several community courts in indigenous rural
areas.
The Constitution requires that Congress elect all Supreme Court and
appellate court magistrates every 5 years from lists prepared by panels
composed of active magistrates, representatives of the bar association,
law school deans, and university rectors.
The Criminal Procedures Code provides for the presumption of
innocence, the right to be present at trial, the right to counsel, plea
bargaining, and the possibility of release on bail. Trials are public,
allowing victims, family members, and human rights groups to observe
the process. Three-judge panels render verdicts. The Criminal
Procedures Code introduced oral trials; however, only those attorneys
who have graduated since 1994 have had any real training in oral
trials. In 2001 an innovative pilot project was initiated in the
municipalities of Zacapa and Quetzaltenango to present pretrial motions
orally, rather than in writing, and the Supreme Court approved the
extension of the project throughout the country. The code also provides
for language interpretation for those who require it. However, in
practice this provision is rarely honored due to budgetary and other
constraints (see Section 5). During the year, there were six
interpreters, six bilingual public defenders assistants, and four
public defenders who spoke indigenous languages throughout the country
working with the Institute for Public Defense. The Prosecutor's Office,
which is independent of the executive branch, may initiate criminal
proceedings on its own or in response to a complaint. Private parties
may participate in the prosecution of criminal cases as co-plaintiffs.
Lengthy investigations and frequent procedural motions by both defense
and prosecution often lead to excessively long pre-trial detention (see
Section 1.d.). Courts showed little willingness to exercise discretion
in dismissing frivolous or patently invalid motions. As a consequence,
parties continued to use such motions as delaying tactics, frequently
holding up trials for several months or even years.
Inefficiency, lack of resources, and corruption in the courts,
Public Ministry, and police continued to impede the proper functioning
of the judicial system and to undermine the right to due process. In
March magistrates from the Supreme Court threatened to take legal
action if Congress did not approve an increase of approximately $23
million (180 million quetzals) in the budget for the year. The Court
argued that by not authorizing sufficient funds for the functioning of
the judicial system, Congress violated the Constitution. The authorized
budget was almost $13 million (100 million quetzals) less than in 2001.
Several judges alleged that the cuts were retribution for Court
decisions that permitted legal action against several FRG deputies. In
May an agreement was reached with the Ministry of Finance to transfer
the needed funds.
The Supreme Court continued to seek the suspension of judges and to
conduct criminal investigations for improprieties or irregularities in
cases under its jurisdiction. In 2001 the Discipline Unit investigated
503 cases of wrongdoing. As a result of those investigations, 14 judges
were sanctioned, 32 were suspended, and 4 were sanctioned with the
recommendation that they be removed. Of the sanctions, 1,159 were
findings of impropriety, 66 were warnings, 9 judges were fired, and 1
was suspended. Magistrates received 13 findings of impropriety.
The Public Ministry has been hampered in its efforts to investigate
crimes and prosecute offenders by inadequate training and equipment,
excessive caseloads, and insufficient numbers of qualified
investigators. Prosecutors remained susceptible to intimidation and
corruption. In addition, the law's failure to delineate the
responsibility for investigating crimes to either the PNC or the Public
Ministry led to continued infighting and competition between these
organizations, as well as the duplication of investigative efforts. On
May 9, Carlos de Leon was appointed as new Attorney General and head of
the Public Ministry. De Leon argued that a lack of funding was the
source of most of the Ministry's deficiencies. In August he announced
that he would ask Congress to increase the Ministry's budget by 60
percent in 2003.
The 1999 Law on Judicial Careers established a system to regulate
the income, terms of office, promotion, training, disciplining, and
other activities of judges and magistrates. It provided for a mandatory
6-month training course for all newly appointed judges. The panel
reviewed numerous cases and issued sanctions ranging from letters of
reprimand to firing. The Council is responsible for selecting judges as
well as disciplining them in accordance with the law's criteria for
sanctions.
In March the Disciplinary Unit suspended two judges from the 14th
Appellate Court of Coban for releasing two captured drug traffickers on
bail. The Unit found the judges guilty of ineptitude, not corruption,
despite allegations that the suspects had paid approximately $195,000
(1,511,250 quetzals) for their liberty. The judges were suspended for 3
months without pay.
In April the Judicial Career Council reviewed the performance of 66
judges who were hired in 1996 and were required under the 1999 law to
be evaluated to enter the Judicial Career system at the termination of
their contract. Seventeen contracts were not renewed.
In cooperation with foreign donors, the Government continued its
efforts to reform the judicial system. Twelve justice centers, which
bring together judges, public defenders, prosecutors, private law
practitioners, police, municipal representatives, and civil society in
a team approach to dispute resolution and problem solving, continued to
provide efficient public service. Clerk of Court offices, established
in 1999, streamlined case processing, increased transparency, improved
customer service, and virtually eliminated the phenomenon whereby one
could bribe a court official to ``lose'' a case file. An analogous
system was inaugurated in Guatemala City in the Prosecutor's Office
Case Intake Unit. A modernized intake system reduced the average
waiting time for filing a complaint from several hours to approximately
10 minutes. In 2001 a new Prosecutor's Office Victim's Unit also was
inaugurated in the capital, with doctors and nurses on call 24 hours a
day to assist rape and other crime victims and to gather evidence for
their cases (see Section 5). These units have been extended to every
department of the country.
Despite some progress, much remains to be done to reform the
judiciary and establish effective rule of law, as mandated by the Peace
Accords. The National Commission for the Strengthening of Justice,
created following the Peace Accords, announced a strategic plan in 2001
to refine the roles of justices of the peace, institute reforms to the
penal code, and reduce duplication of work in the criminal labs run by
the police, the Public Ministry, and the judiciary. Much of the plan
has yet to be implemented.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of
home, correspondence, and private documents. However, allegations
persist that the authorities sometimes disregard these provisions.
Elements of the military, specifically the EMP and the Directorate of
Military Intelligence, reportedly continued to monitor private
communications. During the year, most human rights organizations
reported surveillance or telephone anomalies that suggested wiretapping
(see Section 4). In August the recently elected Human Rights Ombudsman
also discovered that his office was being monitored. Although
authorities announced their intent to investigate, no culprit was
named. There was no progress in the Public Ministry's 2001 case against
Colonel Juan Valencia Osorio, former director of security of the EMP,
for spying. On October 3, a court found Valencia guilty of ordering the
murder of Myrna Mack in 1990 and sentenced him to 30 years'
imprisonment (see Section 1.a.).
The military continued to honor the 1994 presidential order to
suspend all conscription, including forced recruitment, as the armed
forces found it relatively easy to recruit young male volunteers from
impoverished areas using pay and education incentives.
During the year, there were several reported cases of government
employees being forced to make contributions to the ruling party, the
FRG, as well as become party members, to obtain or keep their jobs. For
example, on February 1, 14 road workers were notified that their work
contracts were cancelled for refusing to make a monthly payment of
approximately $13 (100 quetzales), or two and one-half days' wages, to
support the FRG.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression, and the Government generally respected this
right in practice; however, there were numerous credible reports that
members of the press were targets of anonymous threats and
intimidation. Self-censorship was common and took the form of
individual decisions not to speak out or testify or media decisions not
to report certain issues.
On August 16, the scheduled trial of Bruce Harris, director of Casa
Alianza, was suspended after the 12th Criminal Court excused itself
from hearing the case. Attorney Susana de Umana filed a defamation case
against Harris in 1997 after the results of an investigation conducted
by the Attorney General into anomalies in 18 adoption cases, one of
which de Umana had processed, were made public. Harris filed several
appeals, but in 1999 the Constitutional Court ruled that Harris did not
enjoy the right to free speech, as he was not a journalist. The U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, expressed concern
over the progress in the case and the apparent restriction on freedom
of expression.
In addition to regular and open criticism of government policies,
the print media publicized communiques from human rights organizations,
unions, and groups opposed to the Government or its policies. The press
criticized the military and other powerful sectors. The press also
regularly published stories on reputed drug traffickers, official
corruption, and clandestine intelligence networks. There are seven
major dailies published in the capital and approximately six local
papers published outside the city.
The Government prepared public information programs that the radio
and television stations were required to broadcast. The Government
holds the rights to two national (VHF) television channels; however,
neither broadcast any programs during the year. In March President
Portillo announced a plan to turn over Channel 5--nominally assigned to
the army--to an institution representing civil society. In June the
Government selected the Catholic Church to take over the channel;
however, in July the Church declined the offer, saying its leaders
lacked time and expertise to manage a television operation.
Despite its Peace Accords pledge to enact reforms to the Radio
Communications Law to make radio frequencies available for indigenous
communities, the Government instead created a public auction system for
radio frequencies. Commercial operators generally outbid community
groups, thwarting community access. Responding to complaints by
commercial operators that some community stations were unlicensed
``pirates'' interfering with licensed frequencies, in February the
Superintendency of Telecommunications announced a plan to fine and/or
shut down unauthorized frequencies. In response, members of the
Guatemala Council of Community Media appeared before Congress to ask
for a guarantee that 25 percent of available frequencies would be
assigned to community radio stations. Negotiations continued at year's
end.
All four of the country's national television stations are owned by
a Mexican citizen, Angel Gonzalez, who plays a significant role in
politics. These channels were criticized strongly as being
monopolistic, pro-government, and interested in broadcasting only
uncontroversial news.
In March the President's Commission for Human Rights (COPREDEH)
published the book ``She Who Never Kept Silent,'' a collection of the
writings of journalist Irma Flaquer who, before she was kidnaped in
1980, published a column titled ``What Others Conceal'' that was
critical of atrocities committed during the conflict. In April the
Government paid a settlement of approximately $231,000 (1.8 million
quetzals) to Flaquer's family. Publication of the book and the payment
were stipulated as part of a 2001 settlement negotiated between the
Government, the Inter-American Press Society, and Flaquer's survivors.
There was no progress, however, in the investigation of the case, which
was reopened by a special prosecutor in December 2001.
Death threats against journalists and other citizens critical of
corruption were reported widely throughout the country. In December
2001, an editorial columnist for national daily ``Siglo Veintiuno''
left the country after receiving numerous e-mail and telephone death
threats for his criticism of the Government.
On June 7, four journalists received a written anonymous death
threat. The letter was addressed to a total of 11 individuals who are
active in the promotion of respect for human rights (see Section 4).
Investigations continued in the September 2001 shooting death of
Mynor Alegria Almendaris, host of Direct Line, a call-in program on
Radio Amatique, in Puerto Barrios, Izabal. Alegria had accused
officials and port authorities at Puerto Santo Tomas and the town of
Puerto Barrios of embezzlement, bribery, and other abuses. On January
16, witness Erik Duarte accused the Mayor of Puerto Barrios, Mario
Chigua Gonzalez, of having contracted Alegria's murder. On January 24,
police detained Alegria's ex-girlfriend Olga Linares and her sister,
Rosa, as possible accomplices. On April 19, a court revoked Chigua's
immunity so he could be subjected to trial. In May Duarte retracted his
statements, reported being threatened, and claimed that he was
pressured into blaming Chigua. On July 2, authorities apprehended Jairo
Gomez Sandoval for the murder. In July both Gomez and Duarte then
testified that two other individuals, acting Mayor of Puerto Barrios
Carlos Cantoral and local businessmen Erik Castaneda, had paid for
Alegria's killing. On July 25, police captured a second suspect,
Estuardo Orozco. On September 12, the High Impact Court of Chiquimula
released Olga and Rosa Linares for lack of evidence.
In August 2001, Congressional deputies Anabella de Leon and Magda
Arceo, along with the previous director of the National Printing
Office, Sylvia Mendez, accused the director of the office and then and
current Vice President Francisco Reyes Lopez of abuse of authority for
allegedly ordering government printers to produce flyers criticizing
Jorge Briz, the President of the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce and a
vocal critic of the Government. As a result of the ensuing
investigation, the women received numerous death threats and Arceo,
Mendez, and numerous other witnesses went into exile. Another witness
was murdered on February 15 (see Section 1.a.).
In January the Supreme Court suspended a new Law of Obligatory
Professional Association that was interpreted as requiring every
working journalist to hold a journalism degree, belong to a
professional association, and receive a government license. The Supreme
Court determined that the law represented a violation of Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and association.
The Government does not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. Peaceful demonstrations
were common. There were a variety of protests around the country to
demonstrate opposition to a variety of issues, for example: corruption
by high-level government officials, new taxes, the Government's
inability to resolve land conflicts, community water access, and
persecution of human rights activists. Among others, the disabled,
those suffering from HIV infection, former PAC members, street vendors,
and war widows conducted demonstrations.
On January 15, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity Party
(URNG) prepared a counter-presentation to the President's report to
Congress on the achievements of his first 2 years in office. FRG
supporters, who were bussed to the site of the National Congress,
arrived and allegedly beat URNG activists, burned their flags, and
destroyed their platform. Members of the National Advisory for Youth,
led by Juan Pablo Rios, grandson of Congress President and retired
General Efrain Rios Montt, reportedly organized the attack and paid a
musical group to drown out the URNG's protests. Police did not respond
to calls for help. URNG Congressional deputies demanded that the FRG
clarify its involvement in the event.
In March former guerrilla leader Alvaro Colom and retired General
Otto Perez Molina formed the Civic Movement and organized several
marches to protest government corruption. During the first and largest
on March 13, the Secretariat of Communication ran a series of paid
radio and television announcements discrediting the Movement.
Protests became violent on several occasions. Police generally
acted with restraint; however, there were some allegations of
unnecessary use of force. On May 23, transit police violently dislodged
several food vendors from a street in Guatemala City, destroying tables
and personal belongings and clubbing several people. On other
occasions, security forces were unable to keep the peace. On June 10,
between 5,000 and 20,000 residents of Tecpan, Chimaltenango, protested
against the collection of a property tax. Demonstrators damaged several
buildings, looted stores, and broke into the police station where they
removed weapons and equipment, wounded 13 police officers, and took
several hostages before reinforcements dispersed the crowd. On June 11,
police arrested five indigenous protest leaders.
On August 22, groups of landless peasants seized highways for 10
hours to pressure the Government into meeting outstanding demands
associated with land claims. Commerce was widely disrupted for several
hours. The peasants ended the blockage shortly after a government
spokesman announced initiatives to convoke dialogue with landowners and
seek additional funds for the Government land bank.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected it in practice. However, there were
credible allegations that the Government interfered with political
associations.
On March 16, not long after completion of the registration
requirements for Perez Molina's political party, the Patriot Party,
several armed men shot and killed Jorge Rosal, a regional party leader
(see Section 1.a.).
In April in the space of 24 hours, unknown persons broke into the
offices of two opposition parties, the Unified Democratic Left and the
Authentic Development parties. Computer equipment, paper files, and a
map were stolen, although cash in an office drawer was not.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice; however, the Government has not implemented the 1995
Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous People, which
provides for respect of spiritual rights of indigenous people. There is
no state religion; however, the Constitution recognizes explicitly the
separate legal status of the Catholic Church. The Government does not
subsidize religious groups directly. However, during the year
commercial radio operators charged that the ruling FRG was giving
financial support to evangelical Christian radio stations in different
areas of the country, presumably in exchange for future political
support. Members of a religion need not register to worship together.
However, the Government requires religious congregations (other than
the Catholic Church), as well as other nonreligious associations and
NGOs, to register as legal entities to transact business.
While there is no government policy of discrimination, a lack of
resources and political will to enforce existing laws and to implement
the Peace Accords limits the free expression of indigenous religious
practice. Indigenous leaders state that Maya culture does not receive
the official recognition it is due. The Government has not provided
mechanisms for free access to ceremonial sites considered sacred within
indigenous culture, nor has the Government provided for the
preservation or protection of such ceremonial sites as archaeological
preserves. Some indigenous groups consider the Government's use of
sacred sites as revenue-generating tourist destinations to be an
affront to their spiritual rights.
There was little progress in the ongoing appeals to the June 2001
sentencing of three military officers to 30-year, noncommutable
sentences for the 1998 murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi, the Coordinator
of the Archbishop's Office on Human Rights (ODHAG) (see Section 1.a.).
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
Persons attempting to enter the country illegally were often
subject to extortion and mistreatment by government officials. Many
observers believe this mistreatment is underreported because illegal
immigrants almost never have the capacity to lodge formal complaints,
either with the authorities or against them, and there is little legal
assistance available to such immigrants. The Migrant's House, an NGO,
reported that from 1997 to 2001, approximately 40 percent of the
migrants they assisted reported some form of abuse.
The Government grants refugee status and asylum in accordance with
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees from other countries.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage for those 18 years of age and older. Ballots are
secret. Members of the armed forces and police may not vote. Since the
return to democracy and civilian rule in 1985, there have been nine
free elections. International observers concluded that both the
November 1999 general election and the December 1999 runoff
presidential election were generally free and fair. Lack of transport,
onerous voter registration requirements, and the scheduling of
elections during the harvest season prevented many poor, indigenous,
and rural persons from voting. A significant percentage of the rural
poor population lacks the documentation needed to register to vote.
Several campaigns exist to document citizens, particularly among the
illiterate.
Voters elect the 113-member, unicameral Congress every 4 years
using a system of proportional representation based on population, with
deputies elected both from districts and from a nationwide list. Voter
participation in the 1999 elections was at a 13-year high. Four parties
and 2 coalitions won seats in the legislature, led by the FRG with a
63-seat majority, followed by the PAN with 21 seats, the Bancada
Unionista with 16 seats, and the New Nation Alliance coalition, which
includes the URNG, with 9 seats. Other small parties hold a total of
four seats. Congress can and does act independently of the Executive;
however, fragmentation along party lines and a weak staff and support
structure result in a legislature that is relatively ineffective.
Congress increased its relative power and independence under the
leadership of FRG President of Congress and retired General Efrain Rios
Montt, a former de facto president.
In December 1999, voters elected FRG presidential candidate Alfonso
Portillo in a runoff election that international observers
characterized as free and fair. He took office in January 2000.
During the year, there were allegations that government officials
made FRG membership a prerequisite for government employment and
demanded that monthly contributions be made to the party coffers (see
Section 1.f.).
There are no legal restrictions, and few practical ones, on the
participation of women in the political process. In 2001 MINUGUA
reported that only 69 percent of women of voting age were registered to
vote, and that of this group only 33 percent voted. The major parties
nominated and elected fewer female candidates for Congress in the 1999
elections. However, women's participation as voters was the highest
ever, despite social traditions that inhibit voting by women. Voters
elected 8 women to the 113-member Congress in 1999, and that number
increased to 12 as substitutes took the seats of members of Congress
recruited to serve in the executive branch. One woman, Zury Rios de
Lopez, daughter of Rios Montt, is the Second Vice President of
Congress. Women hold two seats on the Supreme Court and one on the
Constitutional Court. There were three female ministers in the
Cabinet--the Minister for Culture and Sports, the Minister of
Communication and Public Works, and the Minister of Economy. Less than
1 percent of the 330 mayors and less than 5 percent of the municipal
officials in the country were women.
The Constitution provides for equal rights for indigenous people.
Some attained high positions as judges and government officials, but
indigenous people still are underrepresented significantly in politics
due to limited educational opportunities and pervasive discrimination
(see Section 5). There are two indigenous members in the Cabinet. While
indigenous people make up 60 percent of the population, they represent
only 1 of 12 ministers and 1 of 12 presidential secretaries. Of 113
members of Congress, 14 are indigenous. There are 113 indigenous mayors
in the country, out of 331 municipalities, including Quezaltenango, the
second-largest city. There were two indigenous ambassadors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government permits local human rights groups to operate without
restriction, and numerous domestic and international groups investigate
and report freely on human rights issues; however, during the year,
many NGOs and human rights workers received threats or were intimidated
by unidentified persons. Senior government officials met with numerous
foreign government officials and international human rights monitors.
Some government officials, however, questioned the credibility of both
domestic human rights workers and international monitors. Many human
rights workers believed this public disregard emboldened those who
threatened them. While many international human rights organizations
and their workers do not enjoy formal legal status, they continue to
operate openly.
During the year, there was a marked increase in the number of
threats against human rights workers, as well as against journalists
and judicial personnel (see Sections 1.a., 1.e., and 2.a.). During the
year, there were 154 acts of intimidation perpetrated against human
rights workers. Most of these acts of intimidation involved anonymous
telephonic or written threats, surveillance, and unknown individuals
and cars following human rights workers or watching their workplaces or
residences. Prosecutors, judges, and witnesses in various human rights
cases, notably in the Myrna Mack case, also reported being the targets
of various acts of intimidation (see Section 1.e.). Some of the attacks
showed high degrees of sophistication and technical expertise.
Throughout the year, personnel in the Archbishop's Human Rights
Office reported multiple death threats, surveillance, and other acts of
intimidation. Some of the victims were those involved in the Gerardi
case (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.); others appear to have been targeted
for their work putting the Historical Memory Report project in digital
format for wider distribution.
On February 21, 11 individuals associated with forensic
anthropology teams investigating mass graves from the armed conflict
received a very specific and credible death threat. In the months that
followed, several of those named in the death threat received
intimidating phone calls, were accosted and threatened by armed men,
and reported that their homes were under surveillance. At least four
individuals fled the country. Also on February 21, a Catholic parish
house in Nebaj that forensic teams had used to store equipment was
burned to the ground. Experts concluded that it was arson. The parish
priest, Rigoberto Perez, actively supported the work of the
anthropologists and reported receiving death threats in the months that
followed the fire.
On March 3, the Archbishop of San Marcos, Alvaro Ramazzini,
received a death threat, presumably from individuals attempting to
discourage his work in ministering to squatters who occupied local
farms. Two weeks later, unknown persons raided his offices, scattered
files, and damaged computer equipment.
On March 7, unknown persons broke into the offices of Casa Alianza
and stole the files of 19 street children. A similar break-in had
occurred in April 2001, when the files of 12 street children were
stolen. Casa Alianza personnel also reported being accosted and
threatened on several occasions during the year.
Prosecutors ended an investigation into the July 2001 incident in
which an Amnesty International (AI) worker was found tied and gagged in
her hotel in Guatemala City. Guatemalan authorities dropped the case
after an investigation into a similar allegation in another country
involving the same AI worker proved inconclusive.
On March 20, the offices of the Association for the Advancement of
Social Sciences (AVANSCO) were broken into, although only a checkbook
was stolen. The incident occurred a few days after the presentation of
a report on post-conflict power structures linked to the military and
former members of the Civil Defense Patrols in Huehuetenango and
Quiche. In October 2001, the laptop computer of the report's
researcher, Matilde Gonzalez Izas, was stolen from her home. In
addition, Gonzalez received telephone threats and reported being
followed.
On April 29, Guillermo Ovalle, an accountant for the Rigoberta
Menchu Foundation (and nephew of its director), was shot and killed in
a cafeteria near the Foundation's offices. While the incident contained
some elements consistent with common crime, international human rights
monitors did not rule out the possibility of a political motive, as
threatening phone calls were made to the Foundation at the time of the
killing and unknown individuals were reportedly seen watching the
offices (see Section 1.a.).
On May 3, Domingo Yaxon, member of the Movement of Young Mayans and
CONAVIGUA, was abducted and assaulted after leaving a human rights
demonstration in front of the Presidential Palace. Yaxon was questioned
about his work, threatened, tortured, and left unconscious in front of
a funeral home (see Section 1.c.).
On June 7, 11 prominent human rights leaders and journalists
received a death threat. The letter was addressed to the ``enemies of
the fatherland'' and accused those listed of tarnishing the country's
image with their ``nonsensical talk.'' Human rights groups felt the
attack was in retaliation for the focus the June visit of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Defenders had put on the existence
of clandestine groups tied to the Government and their responsibility
for the assaults against human rights workers.
On July 21, unknown persons broke into the offices of the National
Coordinator for Human Rights (CONADEHGUA) and stole computers and
communication equipment, as well as paper files relating to
CONADEHGUA's research into the military's budget. The perpetrators left
behind surveillance photos taken of CONADEHGUA's director (see Section
1.f.).
On September 6, the body of another member of CONAVIGUA was found
in Joyabaj, Quiche. The body showed signs of torture (see Section
1.c.).
In March the Movement for Human Rights, an organization that unites
some 25 human rights NGOs in common initiatives, petitioned President
Portillo to bring an end to threats against human rights workers,
assure their security, and investigate and dismantle the clandestine
groups believed to be behind the intimidation. The Movement met with
members of the Cabinet three times. While the Secretary for Strategic
Analysis recognized the existence of such groups, the Minister of
Interior and the presidential spokesperson publicly dismissed his
findings. The Government failed to respond adequately to any of the
demands, and the Movement announced it would not meet further until
results were produced.
On May 29, the newly appointed Attorney General named Tatiana
Morales Special Prosecutor for crimes against human rights workers.
However, the office suffers from the same lack of resources the rest of
the Ministry faces (see Section 1.e.).
The IACHR ordered the Government to provide police protection to
the victims in the AVANSCO case and the forensic anthropologists.
Although the Government complied, there was no significant progress
made in any of the investigations, despite the fact that in some cases
the police were given the telephone numbers or license plates of the
perpetrators of the threats. In other cases, the Public Ministry
claimed that effective investigations could not be carried out because
the victims could not provide this information or speculate on the
identity of the attackers.
MINUGUA reduced its presence significantly in preparation for a
2004 departure, but continued to monitor implementation of the human
rights provisions of the Peace Accords and strengthen democratic
institutions. MINUGUA stated that the Government generally cooperated
with its investigations but cited occasional isolated incidents in
which government officials or institutions had obstructed its efforts.
In May Hila Jilani, U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights
Defenders, arrived on a fact-finding mission. She noted a climate of
fear that terrorized human rights workers. She stated that clandestine
groups had become the principal threat to their safety and urged the
Government to put an end to impunity and guarantee the protection of
human rights workers. She commented on a lack of respect for their work
on the part of public officials. President Portillo publicly dismissed
Jilani's findings as representing a subjective, personal opinion.
During a July visit, Santiago Canton, Executive Secretary of the IACHR
and Susana Villagran, IACHR Rapporteur for Guatemala, echoed many of
Jilani's concerns, and noted that the IACHR had been presented with
more than 130 instances of threats against human rights defenders this
year.
In June Congress elected a new Human Rights Ombudsman, Dr. Sergio
Morales, from among three candidates chosen by the Congressional
Committee on Human Rights. A coalition of more than 70 human rights
organizations proposed and endorsed his election, which was considered
a victory for civil society. The Ombudsman reports to Congress and
monitors the rights provided for by the Constitution. The PDH's rulings
do not have the force of law. The budget assigned to the PDH by
Congress has historically been inadequate and is less than the amount
reserved for the National Soccer Team. Relations between the Human
Rights Ombudsman's office and MINUGUA, strained in the past, improved
significantly after the start of the Morales' 5-year term in August.
Upon the expiration of the MINUGUA's mandate, which is scheduled for
2004, the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office is to assume MINUGUA's human
rights verification function.
COPREDEH is charged with formulating and promoting the Government's
human rights policy, accepting government responsibility for past human
rights abuse cases, and negotiating amicable settlements in those cases
before the IACHR. Although some progress was made in completing
obligations under prior agreements, such as in the Irma Flaquer case
(see Section 2.a.), COPREDEH failed, under the conservative leadership
of its director, Juan Fuentes Soria, to negotiate any new settlements
during the year. In April COPREDEH presented a new executive policy on
human rights. Civil society groups criticized the policy for its lack
of operational vision and COPREDEH's failure to solicit and incorporate
feedback from human rights organizations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are free and equal in
dignity and rights, and that the State must protect the life, liberty,
justice, security, peace, and development of all citizens. However, in
practice the Government frequently is unable to enforce these
provisions, due to inadequate resources, corruption, and a
dysfunctional judicial system (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
Societal prejudice against homosexuals was widespread. During the
year there were at least five killings of homosexual male sex workers.
There were no arrests made in any of the killings, and the police who
arrived on the scene abused the victims' companions. Oasis, a support
organization for homosexuals, characterized the killings as ``social
cleansing'' and claimed that during the year homosexuals were
frequently harassed by the police and often subjected to arbitrary
detention (see Section 1.a.).
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence,
remained common among all social classes. The 1996 Law on Domestic
Violence provides that the Prosecutor's Office, the national police,
family courts, legal clinics, and the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office
can receive complaints of domestic violence. Domestic violence is
defined as ``whatever action or omission by direct or indirect means
causes damage, or physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial
suffering'' to a person within the family group. The law provides for
the issuance of restraining orders against alleged aggressors and
obligates the PNC to intervene in situations of domestic violence.
Statistics vary significantly. The Prosecutor's Office reported
receiving 8,060 complaints of domestic violence against women and
children during 2001, 44 percent more than those received in 2000. Only
56 cases were brought to trial with convictions in 38 cases. A study
completed in December 2001 by the Andar Foundation found that 77 of
every 100 women suffer some form of domestic violence, and that the
majority of women are not familiar with the laws that protect them and
the institutions that can provide them with assistance. The PDH
estimates that for every reported case, there are 10 more that are not
reported.
Complaints of spousal abuse continued to rise due, at least in
part, to increased nationwide educational programs, which have
encouraged women to seek assistance. In 2001 the National Coordinator
for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women
(CONAPREVI) released its National Plan for the Prevention of Domestic
Violence. In May CONAPREVI reported that the Government had provided no
political or financial support for the implementation of the plan. In
June the Network Against Violence Against Women announced that the PDH
is the only institution that has adopted a form developed to simplify
the process of filing a domestic violence complaint with law
enforcement authorities, despite a nationwide promotion effort.
The Law to Prevent and Sanction Intrafamily Violence requires the
PNC to intervene in violent situations in the home. In July the press
reported that in many cases the police do not respond to calls for
help. The Political-Civic Convergence of Women reported that officers
who do arrive often chastise female victims for behavior that provokes
their husbands' ire. The Program for Prevention and Eradication of
Intrafamily Violence, a government program under the Secretariat of
Social Work of the First Lady, reported that it receives between 40 and
50 calls a day from battered women and children via its emergency
hotline.
The office of the Ombudsman for Indigenous Women, led by Juana
Catinac, provides social services for victims of domestic or social
violence, as well as mediation, conflict resolution, and legal services
for indigenous women. It also coordinates and promotes action by both
government institutions and NGOs to prevent violence and discrimination
against indigenous women; however, it lacks the human resources and
logistical capacity to perform its functions on a national level. Since
its creation in 1999, the office has been assigned the same budget each
year: approximately $256,000 (1,984,000 quetzals).
Sexual offenses and prostitution continued to increase. The
Prosecutor's Office reported receiving 1,550 cases of rape and sexual
assault during 2001. A total of 37 cases went to trial, with
convictions in 25 cases. In April the Office of Attention to the
Victim, a unit within the Public Ministry that offers psychological
treatment to individuals who have been sexually abused, reported
receiving an average of 67 new cases each month. The penal code does
not include a description of sexual assault as a crime.
Victims rarely reported criminal sexual violence, although the
number of complaints of such offenses continued to increase
significantly. Many observers believed that increases did not reflect
an increase in the number of rapes committed, but rather an increased
willingness on the part of victims to come forward, greater public
confidence in the police, and improved record-keeping of crime
statistics. Despite these advances, relatively few rape cases went to
court, in large part because police have little training or
investigative capacity for such crimes, and because many rape victims
were reluctant to report and prosecute such crimes. The law allows a
rapist to be exonerated when the victim is at least 12 years old and
agrees to marry him, but the Public Ministry must approve the marriage
when the victim is below the age of 18.
The law does not prohibit sexual harassment, which is common in the
workplace. Female domestic and maquila workers are particularly
vulnerable (see Section 6.e.). In April four female court employees
accused Judge Horacio Castillo Ceremeno, president of the Seventh
Sentencing Court, of having repeatedly requested sexual favors. On
April 13, the Judicial Disciplinary Board recommended that Ceremeno be
fired. On July 25, the Judicial Career Council ordered his suspension
for 15 days without pay.
Prostitution is not illegal. There are certain health code
requirements for persons engaging in prostitution. The number of
prostitutes increased during the year. Although no exact figures were
available, the Life of Hope Foundation, which works with female
prostitutes, estimated that there are 2,000 prostitutes working in the
capital alone. Pimping and inducing a person into prostitution are
crimes that can result in either fines or imprisonment, with heavier
penalties if minors are involved. Trafficking in women, primarily for
the purpose of prostitution, is illegal and a growing problem (see
Section 6.f.).
The Constitution asserts the principle of equality between the
sexes. Nonetheless, in practice women face job discrimination and are
less likely to win management positions. The PDH estimates that women
generally receive significantly lower pay than men; in many cases one
quarter of the salary for the same work. Some women were subjected to
preemployment pregnancy tests. Women are employed primarily in low-wage
jobs in the textile industry, agriculture, retail businesses, and the
public sector. More women than men are employed in the informal sector
of the economy, where pay and benefits generally are lower. Women may
own, manage, and inherit property on an equal basis with men.
More than half of indigenous women are illiterate. More than 50
percent of urban girls and 81 percent of rural girls drop out of
school. According to the 2000-01 National Survey on Living Conditions,
70 out of every 100 adult women have never received formal education.
In a 2001 study of human development, the UNDP reported that overall
government spending on women's programs over the previous 3-year period
was 0.5 percent of the national budget.
The Secretariat for Women's Affairs operates under the direction of
the President, advising him on the coordination of policies affecting
women and their development. The Secretariat's National Policy for the
Promotion and Development of Guatemalan Women and Plan for Equal
Opportunity 2001-06 identified and prioritized areas of critical need
for women, such as access to health care and education to protection
from domestic violence, but suffered from a lack of resources. During
the year, it primarily focused on developing inter-institutional
cooperation with existing programs.
In August the first 4 female SAAS civilian security agents
graduated among a class of 64. During the year, there were 38 women out
of a total of 404 students enrolled in the country's military academy.
Ten percent of police officers are female.
Children.--The Constitution charges the Government with protecting
the physical and mental health, as well as the moral well-being, of
minors. However, despite these provisions, the Government does not
devote sufficient resources to ensure adequate educational and health
services for children. Government spending on health remained stable,
at approximately 1.6 percent of the country's GDP, while marginally
increased resources were devoted to education, at approximately 2.6
percent.
A 2000 MINUGUA report found that 51 percent of the population is
under 18 years of age. Of this group, 83 percent live in poverty.
The Constitution provides for compulsory education for all children
up to the sixth grade. However, less than half the population actually
receives a primary education, and only 3 of 10 students who begin
primary school complete it. According to MINUGUA, one-fourth of all
children do not attend school and 63 percent of those are indigenous
girls. The average child receives 2.2 years of education. However,
among indigenous children, the average drops to 1.3 years. Children in
rural and indigenous areas are less likely to complete primary school.
The Ministry of Education attempted to improve these statistics during
the year by granting special scholarships to girls and working or
orphaned children.
In December 2001, the Ministry reported that the overall level of
school attendance had increased from 30 percent to 44 percent. On
August 7, the Center for National Economic Investigation (CIEN)
released a report on the progress of educational reform. The report
recognized the Ministry's attempt to increase the number of children
enrolled in primary school and promoted to middle school, but noted
that dropout rates had increased; the high rate of illiteracy among
women remained unchanged; and a very low percentage of resources was
assigned to post-primary levels.
Since August 2001, a country-wide hunger crisis brought on by
drought, the fall in coffee prices, and an overall lack of economic
development claimed the lives of more than 100 children. An emergency
census completed by UNICEF in 2001 reported that 14 percent of children
suffered from acute and 71 percent from chronic malnutrition. Public
health analyses showed that 60 percent of the cases of infant mortality
and 76 percent of the cases of maternal mortality were preventable
through attention to basic health and environmental measures that have
been neglected. The Peace Accords, recognizing the systematic violation
of children's right to health, called for a 50 percent reduction in
infant and maternal mortality and a 50 percent increase in public
health spending. Health coverage has increased since the signing of the
Accords, but government commitments have begun to taper off.
Approximately 1,340,000 women and children did not have access to basic
health services during the year. Government resources devoted to public
health decreased during the year. During the year, 7 percent of the
National Budget was devoted to the health sector, compared with 10
percent in 2001.
Most estimates indicated that reports of child abuse continue to
increase, although there are few statistics available to measure the
problem. The Public Ministry reported 1,267 cases of child abuse in
2001, as compared to 1,126 cases in 2000. The majority of victims were
between the ages of 2 and 10. A Permanent Commission for Children and
Youth investigates cases of child abuse. The Social Secretariat for the
Welfare of Children has oversight for the children's welfare programs,
treatment and training for children, and special education assistance
for children. The Secretariat provides shelter and assistance to
children who are victims of abuse. However, due to lack of resources,
these children sometimes are placed with other youths who have
committed crimes (see Section 1.c.). In July the Minor's Court
inaugurated the first educational program for parents whose children
have been placed under protective status by the court in cases of
parental abuse. The free, 4-month program offers training in human
rights, self-esteem, drug abuse prevention, and domestic and sexual
abuse. Thirty parents registered for the first session, and the court
plans to offer the program on a year-round basis beginning in January
2003.
On February 8, the courts convicted prominent businessman Alfonso
Ibarguen of multiple counts of rape of two girls in 1999, then aged 6
and 9, and sentenced him to 40 years' imprisonment. Marco Veliz, the
children's stepfather, who delivered the children to Ibarguen in
exchange for cash payments, was sentenced to 109 years. The two men
were ordered to pay the victims a total of approximately $320,000 (2.5
million quetzals). During the investigation and trial, Veliz and
Ibarguen threatened the children's mother on several occasions, and she
fled the country upon conclusion of the case.
On August 20, the outgoing Human Rights Ombudsman censured three
priests who were accused of sexually abusing four children. The
Catholic Church announced its intention to form a commission to
investigate the incidents.
On April 5, authorities intercepted 7 public transport buses with
53 Salvadoran children who were being illegally smuggled to the United
States. The authorities eventually assisted with an international
operation that successfully broke up a smuggling ring originating in El
Salvador.
Child labor is a problem. UNICEF estimates that 34 percent of all
children work. The Government defines the ``economically active
population'' as beginning at age six. In 2001 the Government initiated
a program to eliminate the worst forms of child labor; however, the
problem persists (see Section 6.d.).
The internal conflict left approximately 200,000 orphans throughout
the country. Approximately 10,000 children are members of street gangs.
Credible estimates put the number of street children at 6,500
nationwide, with about 4,000 of these youths concentrated in Guatemala
City. More than 450 children have disappeared since 1996.
Abuse of street children remained a serious problem (see Section
1.c.). Casa Alianza estimated that the average age of a street child
has dropped over the last 10 years from 13 years of age to 7. The
average life expectancy of a street child is 30 years. The majority of
street children ran away from home after being abused. Criminals--
reported to include private security guards and corrupt police or
military personnel--often recruited these children into thievery or
prostitution and drug rings. In February Casa Alianza reported that
between 1990 and 2001, an average of five street children were murdered
each year. There has been little or no investigation in 80 percent of
the cases. Individuals, private security guards, and other street
children--not police or other government forces--committed most
violence against street children. On June 20, unknown individuals shot
and killed three children and wounded three others who were sleeping on
a corner. On August 15, two men threw rocks at a street child who was
sleeping on the roof of a market stall, crushing her skull. Social
cleansing was a possible motive (see Section 1.a.). No arrests were
made. On May 16, the Protection of Children and Youth Forum launched a
public awareness campaign aimed at educating the populace about the
societal ills that contribute to the problem of street children.
The Government and a number of NGOs operate youth centers; however,
the funds devoted to them are not sufficient to alleviate the problem.
The Government maintains one shelter each for girls and boys in
Guatemala City. These shelters provide housing for the homeless and
incarceration for juvenile offenders.
In February the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Children in Armed
Conflicts, Olara Otunnu, expressed concern over the low level of state
resources devoted to education, health, and nutrition for children.
Otunnu also urged stronger government participation in the National
Commission for the Search for Disappeared Children (see Section 1.b.).
On May 16, the Constitutional Court ordered Congress to set a date
for the new Minor's Code to take effect. Casa Alianza and members of
the Movement for Children had filed an injunction questioning the
constitutionality of the February 2000 Congressional suspension of the
implementation of the code. Congress, arguing that time was needed to
develop the infrastructure for implementation, set an implementation
date of December 1, 2003.
Persons with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that the
State should protect persons with disabilities; however, persons with
physical disabilities suffer discrimination in education and employment
practices, and few resources are devoted to combat this problem. The
PDH estimated that the disabled population is 1.7 million. These
individuals have limited access to health care, recreational
facilities, and work opportunities. Educational resources for those
with special needs are scarce and the majority of the universities are
not handicapped accessible. The National Hospital for Mental Health,
the dominant health care provider for persons with mental illness,
lacks basic supplies and equipment. Patients suffer from unhygienic
living conditions and a shortage of medical professionals. Reports of
sexual abuse by the staff are common. In June the press reported that
only 30 percent of disabled children receive support from the Ministry
of Education, which employs 150 teachers trained to work with the 4,500
children with disabilities who are registered in public schools. During
the year, the Education Ministry began a public awareness program in
public schools to overcome teachers' resistance to attendance by
disabled students.
In 1996 Congress passed the Law for Protection of the Elderly and
the Law on Attention to Disabled Persons, which mandates equal access
to public facilities, prohibits discrimination based on disability, and
provides other legal protections. The law defines a person with
disabilities as one whose physical, mental, or emotional deficiencies
limit performance of normal activities. It stipulates equal opportunity
for persons with disabilities in health, education, work, recreation,
sports, and cultural activities. It also provides that all persons with
disabilities receive the benefits of labor laws and social security and
have the right to work. In addition, the law establishes equal
educational opportunities, the requirement that buildings meet access
codes, and the right to equal pay. Government efforts to implement the
legislation have been weak. While the National Council for the Disabled
(CONADI), composed of representatives of concerned government
ministries and agencies, met regularly to discuss initiatives, no
resources have been devoted to the implementation of their
recommendations. CONADI's petition for a permanent budgetary allocation
from the Government was rejected. CONADI organized protests to demand
that the Government follow through on its commitments to provide access
to public institutions, spaces, and transit.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution states that the country is
composed of diverse ethnic groups and obliges the Government to
recognize, respect, and promote the lifestyles, customs, traditions,
social organization, and manner of dress of indigenous people.
Indigenous people constitute more than half the population;
however, they remain largely outside the country's political, economic,
social, and cultural mainstream. A 2000 U.N. report stated that 73
percent of indigenous persons, and 72 percent of those living in rural
areas, faced an institutional lack of economic possibilities and
limited access to basic services. According to UNDP, 90 percent of the
indigenous are poor. The 1994 census, the most recent, found that 43
percent of the population is indigenous. However, most observers
believe that this figure is low, and that indigenous people constitute
a majority of the population. There is no single indicator of
indigenous status, and there are at least 22 separate Mayan ethnic
groups, each with its own language. In addition to the indigenous Mayan
groups, there is an indigenous Xinca community of some 6,000 persons.
The Garifuna, descendents of Africans brought to the Caribbean region
as slaves who later migrated to South and Central America, are a
separate minority group.
In 2000 when the Government designed a new 2000-04 timetable for
the implementation of the Peace Accords, it was clear that the majority
of the provisions regarding indigenous rights were incomplete. Among
the initiatives still pending are educational reforms that include
bilingual and intercultural components, promotion of the use of
indigenous languages, and the conservation and protection of ceremonial
sites. On April 3, MINUGUA released a public statement lamenting the
minimal advancement in the implementation of the Accord on Indigenous
Rights 7 years after its signing.
Indigenous people were the most frequent victims of extrajudicial
killings and other serious human rights abuses during the internal
conflict. The commissions established to discuss the implementation of
constitutional provisions relating to indigenous rights met during the
year to formulate recommendations to the Government regarding
protection of indigenous culture, languages, traditions, lands, and
sacred sites. Indigenous people continued to organize themselves into
interest groups to promote bilingual education, women's rights, and
community development. Politically, the indigenous groups remained
disunited, and there was little agreement among the groups on common
goals or strategies to increase their political representation and
power.
Rural indigenous people have limited educational opportunities and
fewer employment opportunities. For this reason, indigenous men
constitute a very high percentage of the military's ranks. Many
indigenous people are illiterate or do not speak Spanish. A
disproportionate number of indigenous girls do not attend school. The
Government has devoted few resources to bilingual education, and the
Ministry of Education has yet to implement the recommendations made by
the Commission on Educational Reform. CIEN noted in its annual report
on educational reform that some 900,000 children between the ages of 6
and 12 speak an indigenous language. Nevertheless, only 22 percent of
this population received bilingual instruction. Only 12 percent of all
teachers are bilingual. Since 1999 there have been no reports of
schools denying children the right to wear traditional indigenous
dress, a common complaint under the previous administration. However,
on June 5, an indigenous leader was denied entrance to a restaurant in
Guatemala City because she was wearing traditional dress. The owner of
the establishment made a public apology and fired the offending
employee, but indigenous groups cited the case as an example of the
discrimination the indigenous face daily. The victim announced her
intent to submit the case for consideration to the IACHR as an example
of the historical, institutional, and structured racism that exists in
the country. The Human Rights Ombudsman issued a moral condemnation to
the restaurant's owner and recommended that Congress promote laws
prohibiting and punishing all forms of discrimination.
Indigenous people arrested for crimes often are at a disadvantage
due to their limited comprehension of Spanish. The Criminal Procedures
Code states that the courts must provide interpretation for anyone
requiring such services during criminal proceedings. Despite this,
reports continued that indigenous people did not have equal access to
the justice system. The Public Ministry concentrated 18 interpreters in
former conflict areas of the country, and the Public Defender's Office
employed 6 bilingual public defenders and assigned them to areas where
they could serve as translators in addition to defending their clients.
The Government made efforts to recruit justices of the peace who are
bilingual in Spanish and an indigenous language. However, in 561
tribunals around the country there are only 62 judges who speak Mayan
languages, and 22 court interpreters. Only 14 percent of police
officers are indigenous. Better efforts were made to assign these
officers to towns where their language skills can be put to use.
Approximately 75 percent work in the geographic area of their
particular linguistic competency.
In his December 2001 report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers noted that access to justice for the
indigenous community is ``seriously defective'' (see Section 1.d.). He
specifically recommended that the Government take steps to incorporate
indigenous custom and practice into national laws. On August 8, the
Attorney General signed an accord promising to improve access to the
justice system for the indigenous. Among the initiatives was the
establishment of a Special Prosecutor for Indigenous Peoples to focus
on cases of discrimination.
In July more than 25 representatives from civil society formed the
National Roundtable Against Racism with the purpose of fostering an
open, public debate on the problem and to seek solutions. Also in July,
Mayan Defense, an NGO, began a 3-year education campaign to combat
racism and discrimination. Again in July, various indigenous women
leaders demanded the cancellation of the Rabin Ajau, an annual beauty
contest among indigenous women that has taken place for 33 years and
that receives government support. Previous participants and winners of
the contest took part in the protest, explaining that the event had no
roots in Mayan culture and that contestants were humiliated and
prevented from speaking freely during the pageant.
In May the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders
visited and expressed her concern over the increasing vulnerability of
indigenous leaders to attacks (see Section 4). In September the U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Rights visited and commented that
racism in country is ``latent''. On July 29 and 30, Pope John Paul II
visited the country. In his public remarks, he lamented the situation
of the indigenous and affirmed their right to respect, justice, and
peace.
On October 3, the Government settled the century-old Los Cimientos
land dispute. The Quiche community was relocated to a farm in Escuintla
with $3 million (23,250,000 quetzals) from the Presidential Secretariat
for Agrarian Affairs. This resolution took place over a year after the
Quiches had been forced out of Los Cimientos and into refugee camps in
June 2001 by ex-civilian patrollers from their rival indigenous group.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide workers with freedom of association and the right to form and
join trade unions. However, in practice the Government does not enforce
effectively labor laws to protect workers who exercise their rights.
All workers have the right to form or join unions, including public
sector employees, with the exception of members of the security forces.
Approximately 3 percent of the work force is unionized. The Government
does not control unions. There is no state interference in union
activities; however, some believe internal intelligence services may
monitor the activities of some politically active union leaders. In
2001 the Congress passed two sets of reforms to the national Labor Code
that an International Labor Organization (ILO) direct contact mission
noted ``constitute a significant step forward in the application of
Conventions Nos. 87 (freedom of association) and 98 (right to organize
and bargain collectively), in that they repeal or amend many of the
provisions criticized by the Committee of Experts.'' The reforms
redefined the mission of the Labor Ministry from exercising ``strict
oversight to ensure unions operate legally'' to guaranteeing ``the free
exercise of union rights.'' The reforms also permitted industrial or
sectoral unions. Legal recognition of a new industrial union now
requires that the membership constitute one-half plus one of the
workers in an industry. Labor activists consider this requirement a
virtually insurmountable barrier to the formation of new industrial
unions.
The 2001 reforms accord initial jurisdiction over labor law
violations to the Labor Ministry and set forth procedures for
processing complaints, making initial determinations, and fining
violators--new enforcement powers previously reserved to the labor
courts. The Ministry of Labor may levy substantial fines for violations
of labor rights; the Ministry claims to have levied more fines since
May 2001 than the labor courts have collected in the 50 years of their
existence. However, individual fines are generally low because
companies can challenge Ministry fines in the labor courts. The labor
inspection system remains ineffective and corrupt, despite continuing
efforts at improvement. Low pay, the lack of a strong ethic of public
service, and ineffective management prevent the Ministry from providing
effective service.
Retaliation, including firing, intimidation, and sometimes
violence, by employers and others against workers who try to exercise
internationally recognized labor rights is common and usually goes
unsanctioned. The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association continues
to monitor about a dozen allegations of serious violence between 1995
and 2000 against individuals for unionizing activities that lack
credible investigations, prosecutions, or trials. In April 2001, an ILO
Direct Contact Mission visited to investigate lack of progress in those
investigations. In June 2001, the Public Ministry assigned a Special
Prosecutor for Crimes Against Unionists and Journalists to review these
and all new cases involving union members. Since its inception, the
Special Prosecutor's Office accepted 80 cases involving union members,
31 of which remained under investigation at year's end. Only two
suspects have been brought before a judge and one person has been
detained. The remainder of the cases were found to be without merit by
judges or by the Prosecutor's Office. Arrest warrants have been issued
in only two cases. In October MINUGUA reported that labor leaders and
unions had received 288 threats against them from January 1, 2000-
September 15, including 158 death threats; 4 killings of unionists were
registered during that period. Another such killing occurred in
November.
The most common violation of freedom of association is the
dismissal of workers for unionizing activity. Some workers who suffer
illegal dismissal take their case to the labor courts and win
injunctions of reinstatement. Appeals and re-appeals by the employers,
along with legal ploys such as re-incorporation as a different entity,
often prolong proceedings for years. The labor courts generally do not
dismiss frivolous appeals, nor are their decisions enforced. According
to Labor Ministry officials, the labor courts vindicate the majority of
workers' claims against employers. However, employers comply with the
court decisions in only a small number of cases, creating a climate of
impunity. Often employers are not disciplined for not complying with
legally binding court orders.
For example, in 1998 foreign firms contracted with DYMEL, S.A. to
build a coal-fired power plant near San Jose, Escuintla. During
construction of the plant, DYMEL's workers, most contracted for the
duration of the construction phase of the project, formed a union.
DYMEL then fired 72 union organizers without required court permission.
The workers went to court and won a judgment reinstating them with back
pay. After appeals by DYMEL, the verdict was upheld by the
Constitutional Court in May 2001. Meanwhile, DYMEL had completed the
project, reorganized to shelter itself from claims, and moved assets
and operations to El Salvador. The workers began a sit-in on the
doorstep of the presidential offices in late November 2001. In October
the workers and DYMEL negotiated a financial settlement of worker
claims. On October 7, 71 workers received a monetary reward to cover
back wages and lawyers' fees.
Throughout the economy, employees were reluctant to exercise their
right of association for fear of reprisal by employers. Workers had
little confidence that the responsible executive and judicial
institutions would effectively protect or defend their rights if
violated. In addition, the weakness of labor inspectors, the failures
of the judicial system, poverty, the legacy of violent repression of
labor activists during the internal conflict, the climate of impunity,
and the deep-seated hostility of the business establishment toward
independent and self-governing labor associations constrained the
exercise of worker rights. In 1999 MINUGUA's Fourth report on the Peace
Process noted that ``genuine trade union freedom does not exist'' due
to anti-union violence. It also reported a significant gap between the
problems regarding workers' rights and the resources applied by the
Government to solving these problems.
Nobody has been charged for the December 2001 murder of Baudilio
Cermeno Ramirez, the Organization Secretary of the Light and Energy
Union.
Investigation of the 2000 killing of Oswaldo Monzon Lima, the
secretary general of a fuel drivers' union, continues without results.
Labor leaders reported receiving death threats and other acts of
intimidation. In its September report on human rights, MINUGUA reported
threats to the head of the immigration workers' union and the
UNSITRAGUA labor federation, as well as the attempted shooting of the
leader of the municipal workers union of Nueva Concepcion, Escuintla.
On November 27, the bodies of Carlos Francisco Guzman Lanuza, the
Secretary General of the Municipal Employees Union of Nueva Concepcion
and leader of a union of South Coast workers, and his brother were
discovered on a highway near Nueva Concepcion, Escuintla province. They
died from multiple bullet wounds. According to MINUGUA, since 2001
Nueva Concepcion had been plagued by violence from armed groups
associated with the mayor, Augusto Linares Arana. The investigation of
the case by the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Unionists had
produced no arrests at year's end. The General Central Union of
Guatemalan Workers (CGTG) described death threats and other forms of
intimidation received by a member of the municipal union of
Chichicastenango, another member of commercial workers' union of
Chichicastenango (both from municipal officials), by two leaders of the
Professional Heavy Truckers Union, and by the leader of the municipal
union of Puerto Barrios. On May 13, the adult son of the leader of the
National Federation of Public Servants (FENASEP) was killed in the
capital. The CGTG claims that none of these acts has been investigated
adequately.
An active ``solidarismo'' movement claims to have approximately
170,000 members in about 400 companies. Unions may operate legally in
workplaces that have solidarity associations, and workers have the
right to choose between the two or to belong to both. The Government
views these associations as civic organizations that need not interfere
with the functioning of trade unions. The Labor Code stipulates that
trade unions have an exclusive right to negotiate work conditions on
behalf of workers. However, unions charge that management promotes
solidarity associations to avoid the formation of trade unions or to
compete with existing labor unions. Representatives of most organized
labor groups criticize these associations for not permitting strikes,
having inadequate grievance procedures, and for displacing genuine,
independent trade unions with an employer-dominated structure. There
were credible reports that some associations did not adhere to
democratic principles.
The administrative process for unions to obtain legal status has
been simplified over the past decade. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor
reduced the number of steps needed to adjudicate union applications and
mandated a deadline of 20 workdays for reaching a decision. Labor Code
reforms adopted in 2001 authorized the Labor Ministry to establish a
free legal assistance service for workers who desire to unionize,
contained provisions designed to simplify further the Ministry's
application and recognition process, and strengthened union members'
ability to demand transparency in union activities. In 2001, the last
year for which complete official data is available, the Labor Ministry
granted legal status to 48 unions. At the end of 2001, there were 1,481
registered unions (742 considered ``active''), with 119,471 members.
Unofficial sources claim that by mid-year, that number had increased to
1,506 registered unions with 120,953 members.
The registered unions were generally independent of government and
political party domination.
The two unions at the Choi Shin/Cimatextiles maquila plants where
anti-union violence occurred in July 2001 have not been able to achieve
membership of 25 percent of workers to compel collective bargaining.
During the year, management claimed to have instituted voluntarily a
process of regular dialogue with the unions to prevent further
conflicts.
Many violations of the right of association and other labor rights
occurred in the public sector. In September 2001, MINUGUA highlighted
cases of intimidation, threats, and illegal firings of municipal
workers by public officials in Cuilapa, Santa Rosa; Guastatoya, El
Progresso; Tecpan, Chimaltenango; and La Gomera, Escuintla. In
addition, the management of Ministry of Health hospitals in the capital
and in Cuilapa, Santa Rosa refused to recognize union leaders or tried
to replace them with others, and the Ministry had not complied with
terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the previous
administration. In its September human rights report, MINUGUA verified
anti-union practices within the Office of the Comptroller General, who
spoke openly of his intention to dismantle two unions. In August
doctors in the major public hospital in the capital stopped work and
forced the Social Security Institute to agree to pay back wages with
increases.
The Labor Code provides for the right of employers to fire union
workers for cause, permits workers to appeal their dismissal to the
labor courts, and requires the reinstatement within 24 hours of any
unionized worker fired without cause. The Labor Code also prohibits
employers from firing any member of the executive committee of a union
and also protects them for 12 months after their terms end. An employer
may fire a member of the union's executive committee for cause only
after a trial in a labor court and issuance of a court resolution. Even
in clear-cut cases of illegal firings, labor laws have not been
enforced adequately.
Despite governmental, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to
restructure and modernize the labor court system, the system remained
ineffective. There are 20 labor courts; 7 in the capital and 13 located
elsewhere around the country. An additional nine courts address labor
issues, primarily appeals, as part of their jurisdiction. The weakness
of the judicial system as a whole, the severe shortage of competent
judges and staff, a heavy backlog of undecided cases, and failure to
enforce effectively court rulings all contribute to the labor courts'
lack of credibility and effectiveness. The small number of competent
and motivated labor inspectors and the lack of training and resources
devoted to detecting and investigating Labor Code violations compound
the weakness of the labor courts. UNICEF, the ILO, and MINUGUA continue
to urge the Government to speed up the administration of justice to
ensure the strict enforcement of labor laws. In 2001 MINUGUA singled
out the Third Judge for Labor for egregious delays in legal procedures
stemming from a dispute involving a bank workers union dating to 1997.
The judge took more than 3 years to convoke the parties before a
conciliation tribunal, which should have taken place within 36 hours.
Government efforts to improve the labor inspection system, begun in
2000, continued with international support. After substantially
expanding the size of the inspector corps in 2000, the Ministry of
Labor increased its rate of inspections and fired some incompetent or
corrupt inspectors. The Ministry also launched with MINUGUA assistance
a permanent training program for inspectors, created new individual
performance indicators for inspectors, began to computerize inspection
reports, cooperated with an ILO study on inspection norms, and enlisted
union and employer support for the creation of national and
departmental consultative councils to discuss Labor Inspectorate
operations.
Under the revised Labor Code, complaints can be heard at the
Ministry of Labor rather than requiring that inspectors travel to each
work site. The Ministry also instituted a set of complaint assistance,
small claims mediation, and information-providing initiatives designed
to provide better services to workers. The Ministry continued its
educational campaign on worker rights (especially the rights of minors
and women), which included a campaign of radio spots and the provision
of some educational materials in indigenous languages. In an effort to
improve enforcement of the Labor Code outside the capital, the Ministry
of Labor continued to decentralize its operations. Seven of the
Ministry's offices have been accorded regional authority. These
regional offices, in addition to labor inspectors, also include
specialists in women and workplace issues, management-worker relations/
conflict resolution, and minor workers/child labor issues. The Labor
Ministry plans to give these regional offices supervisory authority
over branch offices in the departmental capitals of each region.
MINUGUA and the Human Rights Ombudsman's office of the Defender of
Worker Rights take complaints related to violation of internationally
recognized worker rights. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office can
investigate union complaints and issue a statement; however, the office
has no enforcement powers beyond attempting to resolve the situation
through publicity and persuasion. The Ombudsman made public statements
about labor conditions in various sectors of the economy.
Unions may and do form federations and confederations and affiliate
with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the right to organize and bargain collectively. However, the small
number of unionized workers limits the practice of collective
bargaining. The prevailing business culture ignores labor contracts
because, in practice, they are largely unenforceable due to the weak,
cumbersome, and corrupt legal system. Labor Code reforms adopted in
2001 reduced from two-thirds to one-half plus one the number of union
members required to approve a collective bargaining agreement. The ILO
Committee of Experts had called for this change. The ILO also noted
other reforms necessary to provide for full exercise of the right to
organize and bargain collectively.
Other factors limiting the practice of collective bargaining
include the requirement that 25 percent of the workers in a factory or
business must be union members for collective bargaining to take place,
lack of experience, and management's aversion to sharing power with
workers. Management and labor honored collective contracts at some
firms. In others, management, and sometimes labor, chose to ignore
selected provisions of binding collective bargaining agreements.
According to the Ministry of Labor, 22 collective bargaining agreements
were registered in 2001. A total of 144 agreements were reached between
1997-2001, according to the most recent official data. The greatest
number of agreements were reached in the social services (44) and
industrial manufacturing (43) sectors. Most workers, even those
organized in trade unions, do not have collective contracts documenting
their wages and working conditions, nor do they have individual
contracts as required by law. According to a 2000 study by the
Association for Research and Social Studies, only 10 percent of workers
have a contract duly registered with the Labor Ministry as required by
law.
A February government decree prohibits the executive branch from
allowing any salary or other monetary benefits to increase under any
collective bargaining agreement. Labor groups have criticized this
policy and vowed to challenge its constitutionality under ILO
Convention 98.
The Labor Ministry has worked to promote the restructuring of labor
relations in enterprises by encouraging labor-management cooperation
and to bring about a ``culture of negotiation'' as called for by the
Peace Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation.
Despite these efforts, productive, good faith negotiations between
employer and worker representatives have been the exception rather than
the rule. The majority of unions that engaged in collective bargaining
during the year reported that some employers continued to reject the
underlying premise of collective bargaining--that power in the
workplace can be shared according to a contract between the employees
and company management for the benefit of both.
The law protects workers from retribution for forming unions and
for participating in trade union activities, but enforcement of these
provisions is weak. Many employers routinely seek to circumvent Labor
Code provisions to resist unionization. An ineffective legal system and
inadequate penalties for violations have hindered enforcement of the
right to form unions and participate in trade union activities in the
past and perpetuates the violence that workers face if they attempt to
exercise their rights.
The Labor Code prohibits employers from firing workers for union
organizing and protects them from being fired for 60 days following
notification to the Labor Ministry that a union is being formed.
Thereafter, they can be fired for cause, unless they are members of the
union's executive committee. During labor conflicts, unions frequently
seek a labor court injunction, which prohibits firing without approval
of a judge until the conflict is resolved (277 such injunctions were
filed in 2000, according to the most recent official data). Although
the Labor Code provides that workers fired illegally for union activity
should be reinstated within 24 hours, in practice employers have filed
a series of appeals or simply defied judicial orders for reinstatement.
The Labor Code reforms adopted in 2001 significantly increased by 10 to
50 times the minimum monthly wage-penalties for defying such orders.
However, effective utilization of these enhanced enforcement powers of
the Ministry of Labor has proved difficult. The Labor Ministry, and its
corps of labor inspectors in particular, continues to suffer from a
lack of respect from employers, inadequate resources, and corruption
(see Section 6.a.). The Labor Ministry reported issuing 4000 fines to
202 employers, totaling $70,279 (544,665 quetzals). According to the
Ministry, this total of fines on employers amounts to ten times what
the labor courts had issued in the past 50 years of their existence. An
additional 3,798 additional cases were being processed at year's end.
During the year, routine labor inspections increased to 24,632,
from 20,613 in 2001. Inspections based on a specific complaint reached
4,820.
Workers have the right to strike. However, the very low level of
unionization and procedural hurdles make legal strikes rare. The
reforms adopted in 2001 rescinded the provision--long noted by the ILO
as an unwarranted constraint on the right of association-that
prohibited seasonal agricultural workers from striking during harvest
time. The 2001 Labor Code reforms also reduced from two-thirds to one-
half plus one the number of a firm's workers required to call a legal
strike. The Labor Code requires that a labor court consider whether
workers are conducting themselves peacefully and have exhausted
available mediation before ruling on the legality of a strike. The 2001
Labor Code reforms created new procedures that workers in essential
services (health, utility, and communications) must follow to exercise
legally the right to strike; however, other changes in the Labor Code
gave the President and his cabinet the power to suspend any strike
deemed ``gravely prejudicial to the country's essential activities and
public services.'' Employers may suspend or fire workers for absence
without leave if authorities have not recognized their strike as legal.
The strike regulation law calls for binding arbitration if no agreement
is reached after 30 days of negotiation. For a strike to be declared, a
workplace election must be held, and 50 percent plus 1 person present,
including workers and management, must vote in favor of the strike. The
union then must petition a labor court for permission to strike. The
judge calls the petitioners and employer representatives before the
court and forms a Conciliation Tribunal to seek resolution of the
conflict. If no agreement is reached, the parties can go to binding
arbitration, or the judge may rule on the legality of the strike. In
practice, this can be a lengthy process, and few requests for strikes
are upheld.
There was one legal strike during the year. On July 5, the union of
municipal workers of Jalapa went on strike for 15 days. They returned
to work after the mayor pledged to honor union demands. Other
unofficial work stoppages were held by labor groups in the banana
sector, health sector, and others throughout the year. Landless peasant
groups blocked national roads to press the national government for more
attention to their demands for land.
Labor laws and regulations apply throughout the country, including
the few export processing zones (EPZs). (Maquilas that make garments
for export operate under an EPZ-like regime, although they are not
located in distinctly established areas.) The laws governing the EPZs
do not infringe on fundamental rights to organize trade unions or
bargain collectively. However, there are no collective bargaining
agreements between employers and any of the more 100,000 workers in the
for-export zones and maquila sector. Union leaders' inability to
organize workers in these zones is caused by employer intimidation and
pressure as well as unofficial restrictions on their access to the
EPZs.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution bars
forced or bonded labor; however, women are trafficked for the purpose
of sexual exploitation (see Section 6.f.). Trade union leaders and
human rights groups charge that employers sometimes forced workers to
work overtime, often without premium pay (see Section 6.e.). The law
does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by children;
however, they are covered by the general constitutional provision.
Forced or bonded labor by children generally did not occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution bars employment of minors under the age
of 14 without written permission from the Ministry of Labor. However,
the informal and agricultural sectors regularly employ younger
children, usually in small family enterprises. Economic necessity
forces most families to have their children seek some type of
employment to supplement family income, especially in rural and
indigenous communities. In 2000 MINUGUA found that 34 percent of
children 7 to 14 years of age work. Most minors work at household
chores, in subsistence agriculture, in family-run enterprises, and
elsewhere in the informal economy.
According to a special survey by the National Statistics Institute
completed in 1999, from 1998 to 1999 there were 326,095 children doing
paid work, and 495,780 doing chores in the home. An estimated 80
percent of work accidents involve 15-to-18-year-old workers who lack
proper safety training. The law prohibits minors from night work and
extra hours (the legal workday for minors younger than 14 is 6 hours;
for minors 14 to 17 years of age, it is 7 hours); from work in
establishments where alcoholic beverages are served; and from work in
unhealthy or dangerous conditions.
The ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor
is active in the fireworks industry and opened a pilot facility for
safe production of fireworks without child labor in July. The Labor
Ministry estimated that approximately 10 percent of the children in
this industry work illegally in factories, while younger children,
under the age of 14, typically work at home on piecework taken in by
their families. Accidents occur regularly in the informal cottage
fireworks industry. According to press reports an average of 25 persons
per year, the majority minors, suffer burns and amputations from
accidents in the fabrication of fireworks. Between 3,000 and 5,000
children were employed in the illegal cottage-based fireworks industry.
The ILO also sponsors programs to eliminate child labor in the
production of gravel and certain agricultural sectors.
Laws governing the employment of minors are not enforced
effectively, due to the weakness of the labor inspection and labor
court systems. The Association for Girls and Boys in Central America
estimates that approximately 2 million children work in the region. The
majority of child laborers work in agriculture (family farms, coffee,
and sugar cane harvesting), while others work in domestic service,
construction, family businesses, stone quarrying, rock-breaking,
fireworks manufacturing, shining shoes, begging, performing in the
streets, or other jobs. In 2001 the Ministry approved 1,014 permits for
minors under 14-years-old. Many children under the age of 14 work
without legal permission and are vulnerable to exploitation. Their
illegal status makes them ineligible to receive social benefits, social
insurance, vacations, or severance pay, and they often earn salaries
below the minimum wage.
In October the ILO reported that the number of child workers has
increased to 937,530, and that 38,878 of those are under 18 years of
age and working as domestics in private homes in conditions of modern
slavery. The ILO report studied 150 child domestic workers in Guatemala
City and 100 in the southeastern city of Jutiapa. Forty-five percent of
those interviewed were between 6 and 13 years old. The report asserts
that the total number of child and adolescent domestic workers in the
provinces of Guatemala and Jutiapa totals 10,433, the overwhelming
majority of whom (10,144) are female. In the capital, the majority of
children (74 of 100) worked 13 to 16 hours a day, and their average
monthly salary is approximately $51 (395 quetzals). Monthly wages were
even lower in Jutiapa, where 60 percent of those interviewed worked
less than 6 hours per day; however, they work for more than 1
household. Many suffered psychological mistreatment, including sexual
abuse.
In May the ILO released a report entitled ``Child Labor in Garbage
Dumps: A Rapid Evaluation.'' The report is the result of 167 interviews
with garbage pickers in the capital. Seventy percent of those
interviewed were between 7-18 years old. More than half of those
interviewed under 13 years old do not attend school. The figure was
higher (74 percent) for those between 14-18 years old. Eight percent of
those interviewed lived on the dump, and 32 percent lived nearby. The
child workers suffer a variety of physical maladies associated with
their work.
The Child Worker Protection Unit within the Ministry of Labor
enforces restrictions on child labor and educates minors, their
parents, and employers on the rights of minors in the labor market. In
2000 the Ministry of Labor, with the support of a group of NGOs,
finalized a National Plan for the Prevention and Eradication of Child
Labor and Protection of Adolescent Workers, which was approved by the
Cabinet in 2001. In 2001 the Ministry launched a national campaign to
eliminate the worst forms of child labor, and in November President
Portillo announced the creation of a new National Commission for the
Elimination of Child Labor which will coordinate ministerial
collaboration on implementation of the National Plan to Eradicate Child
Labor.
The labor law does not specifically prohibit bonded labor by
children; however, the Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory
labor. Bonded labor by children generally did not occur; however,
children were trafficked into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Although the law sets minimum
wages, noncompliance with minimum wage provisions in the rural and
informal sectors is widespread. A May 2001 government survey of
employment and income revealed that only 60 percent of the working
population received the minimum wage or more. As minimum wage
provisions have become more complex through inclusion of a monthly
``incentive bonus'', and as the minimum wage has risen during the year
and with a deepening economic crisis affecting the coffee-growing
sector, noncompliance with the law, which was already high, has risen.
Advocacy groups that focus on rural sector issues estimate that more
than half of workers engaged in day-long employment in the rural sector
do not receive the wages, benefits, and social security allocations
required by law. Minimum wage laws do not extend to domestic workers.
The Ministry of Labor oversees a tripartite committee that makes
recommendations for increases in the minimum wage. In the event that
agreement is not reached in the tripartite commission, the Government
may decree such increases based on recommendations of the Labor
Minister. The 2000 Labor Code reforms placed responsibility for
drafting the decrees setting new minimum wage levels, should there be
no consensual proposal submitted by the tripartite commission, on the
Labor Ministry. On January 1, a minimum wage increase, promulgated by
executive branch decree after the tripartite commission was unable to
reach a consensus, took effect. This decree raised the minimum daily
wage for agricultural work by $0.31 (2.42 quetzals) to $3.52 (27.50
quetzals). It raised the minimum daily wage for service, industrial,
and government sector work by $0.29 (2.33 quetzals) to $3.85 (30.00
quetzals). In August 2001, the Government decreed a mandatory monthly
bonus for all workers of $31.25 (250 quetzals) from a previous level of
$20.20 (162 quetzals) for agricultural workers and $19.30 (154
quetzals) for nonagricultural workers.
The minimum wage was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. According to the UNDP, at least 80
percent of the population, including approximately 60 percent of
working population, lives below the poverty line. The Ministry of Labor
conducts inspections to monitor compliance with minimum wage
provisions; however, the Ministry of Labor lacks the resources to
enforce adequately the minimum wage law.
An estimated 70 percent of workers are in the informal sector, and
are therefore completely without labor protections. Only 21 percent of
workers were covered by the National Social Security System (IGSS) in
2000, according to the Labor Ministry.
The legal workday is 8 hours and the workweek is 44 hours; a
tradition of longer hours remains in place in certain sectors. These
limits do not apply to domestic workers. The Labor Code requires a
weekly paid rest period of at least 24 hours. Trade union leaders and
human rights groups charge that employers sometimes forced workers to
work overtime, often without premium pay. Labor inspectors report
uncovering numerous instances of such abuses, but the lack of stiff
fines or strong regulatory sanctions, as well as inefficiencies in the
labor court system and enforcement of court orders, have inhibited
adequate enforcement of the law.
Occupational health and safety standards are inadequate. During the
year, as part of its effort to address this situation, the Ministry of
Labor participated in a number of regional international initiatives
intended to sensitize employers and workers to health and safety risks
in the workplace. The Labor Ministry provides training courses for
labor inspectors in health and safety standards, and has given such
training priority despite scarce resources. In August the Minister
unveiled a National Plan for Occupational Health and Safety developed
through tripartite participation.
Nevertheless, enforcement of occupational health and safety
standards remains weak. When serious or fatal industrial accidents
occur, the authorities often fail to investigate fully or assign
responsibility for negligence. Employers rarely are sanctioned for
having failed to provide a safe workplace. However, in the past, the
authorities suspended one maquila operation for safety shortcomings and
threatened about a dozen others with a suspension of operations if they
failed to improve safety conditions. Legislation requiring companies
with more than 50 employees to provide on-site medical facilities for
their workers has not been well enforced. However, most large employers
did provide such facilities for their employees. The fireworks industry
is particularly hazardous (see Section 6.b.). Workers have the legal
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
reprisal. However, few workers are willing to jeopardize their jobs by
complaining about unsafe working conditions.
A January report by the Women's Rights Division of HRW alleged that
women workers, especially in the domestic and maquila for-export
manufacturing sector, suffer from high rates of discrimination and
sexual harassment. One-third of a sample of 29 domestic workers
reported sexual harassment at work, according to the report. Labor law
exempts domestic workers from the right to an 8-hour workday and the
44-hour workweek, provides domestics only limited rights to national
holidays and weekly rest, and denies domestics the right to employee
health care under the national social security system. While the labor
code stipulates that all workers have the right to the minimum wage,
domestic workers are denied this right by executive decree.
The report alleged that maquilas often force women to reveal
whether they are pregnant as a condition of employment, either through
questions on job applications, in interviews, or through physical
examinations. Approximately 80 percent of the 100,000 maquila workers
are women.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits
trafficking and smuggling of persons; however, trafficking in women and
children is a problem. The country is a source and transit country of
women and children trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation.
There is also internal trafficking and in some cases, the country is a
destination country for trafficked victims. Trafficked persons come
mainly from other Central American countries and Ecuador. Victims
trafficked to Guatemala are usually young women or children who are
trafficked for sexual exploitation. Most of the minors brought to the
country are trafficked for sexual exploitation and placed in poor
surroundings and paid low salaries. A 1999 study by the NGO Pro-ninos,
Ninos Centro Americanos (PRONICE) suggests that fraud and threats are a
common form of recruitment. Usually traffickers choose pretty girls who
come from poor families. The most common ``contracting places'' are
along the borders. Those trafficked from Guatemala for sexual
exploitation are usually minors, both boys and girls, from poor
families. The traffickers often approach these individuals and offer
them lucrative jobs, which would allow them to make regular remittances
back to their families. The methods of approach include promises of
economic rewards, jobs in cafeterias or beauty parlors, or jobs in
other countries. The means of promotion include flyers, newspaper
advertisements, and verbal or personal recommendations.
NGOs and the press credibly alleged that some Immigration Service
officers accept bribes in return for allowing traffickers to bring
children into the country for purposes of sexual exploitation.
The Government is making efforts to combat trafficking despite
resource constraints and endemic corruption. The law specifically
prohibits trafficking and smuggling of persons. The Government
investigates trafficking cases; however, there have been no
prosecutions of trafficking cases since victims often fail to press
charges due to a cumbersome judicial system and fear of reprisal.
Prison sentences for traffickers are commutable to fines. The
Government does not assist or protect victims of trafficking, although
victims are not treated as criminals. However, Casa Alianza reported in
May that nine trafficked minors found in a brothel were temporarily
jailed by authorities ``for their own protection.'' The Government has
conducted antitrafficking and antismuggling public awareness campaigns,
and it provides limited funding to NGOs dedicated to preventing
trafficking.
The Defense of Children's Rights unit in the Human Rights
Ombudsman's Office and the Minors' Section of the Prosecutor's Office
investigate cases of trafficking. Officials in the Labor Ministry also
raise the issue with the police and social welfare agencies as part of
their efforts to combat child labor and child exploitation. NGOs that
focus on women and children's rights often help victims of trafficking
and work to educate the population about the dangers of trafficking.
The country is a significant transit and source country for alien
smuggling, both from neighboring Central American countries as well as
Ecuador, China, Taiwan, and South Asia. Some aliens are trafficked to
the United States. Traffickers use force, coercion, fraud, and
deception. In one instance, Chinese male victims apparently agreed to
debt bondage to pay off their transportation costs, while female
victims, some of whom were under age 18, apparently were being taken to
the United States to work as prostitutes. The victims were told that
their families in China would suffer if they broke the debt bondage
agreement.
Sexual exploitation of children is a growing problem, including
child prostitution and the trafficking of children for purposes of
prostitution. In June Casa Alianza estimated that there were more than
15,000 sexually exploited boys and girls in the country, many working
in the more than 600 bars and night spots in Guatemala City. The report
also noted an increase in visitors to the country for the purposes of
child sex tourism. Child prostitution is especially a problem in the
capital and in the towns of Escuintla, Tecun Uman, and Coban. There
continues to be a rise in child prostitution in towns along the borders
with Mexico and El Salvador. Child migrants who fail to cross the
border into Mexico often remain in the country and resort to
prostitution to survive. Many children are also brought into the
country from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras by organized rings
that force the children into prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Laws
protecting children from sexual exploitation are weak. Victim
protection programs are nonexistent, and children who are taken into
custody are often treated poorly by authorities and deported. In July
police jailed nine children, some as young as 14, who were trafficked
from El Salvador to work in brothels. The police released them after
Casa Alianza offered to provide the victims with counseling, housing,
and repatriation.
In 2001 the Social Secretariat for the Welfare of Children, in
conjunction with a commission of NGOs and other government ministries,
presented the National Plan of Action against Sexual Exploitation of
Children in Guatemala. The plan is an initiative to fight child
prostitution and pornography, trafficking of children, and sex tourism.
The Government, however, has not yet committed the financial resources
to implement it. In April the authorities apprehended a Canadian
citizen who, while living in a rural indigenous community, took
pornographic photographs of minors for export to Canada.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and Child Pornography visited the country in 1999, and
noted a marked increase in child prostitution in the towns along the
borders with Mexico and El Salvador. Along the border with El Salvador,
many child prostitutes were brought into the country from El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Honduras by organized rings. In its 1999 annual report
on the state of children, the Archbishop's Human Rights Office
identified the growing problem of child prostitution as inextricably
linked to that of trafficking in persons, noting that no child
prostitute got there alone.
__________
GUYANA
The Co-operative Republic of Guyana has a multiparty political
system based on proportional representation. Citizens elect an
executive president and a 65-member unicameral parliament. The
President appoints a prime minister and a cabinet. In March 2001,
citizens voted in a generally free and fair national election to
reelect the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and its Civic (C) partner.
Incumbent Bharrat Jagdeo received his own mandate for a 5-year term as
President. Social unrest and occasional violence marred the
postelection period, with the main opposition party alleging that
election procedures violated the Constitution. Despite some technical
problems, international observers considered the elections free and
fair. The judiciary, although constitutionally independent, was
inefficient and often appeared subject to government influence.
The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) and the Guyana Police Force (GPF)
were under effective civilian control. The GDF was a professional
military responsible for national defense, internal security, and
emergency response. The GPF, which included a Target Special Squad
(TSS) that has some paramilitary training, has the authority to make
arrests and was responsible for maintaining law and order throughout
the country. Some members of the police force committed human rights
abuses.
The economy, which for years was controlled under a system of
central planning, was based on a mix of private and state enterprises.
The country has a population of approximately 735,000. Rice, sugar,
bauxite, gold, fish, and timber were the major exports. There were
severe shortages of skilled labor, and the economy was constrained by
an inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure for transportation,
power distribution, flood control, and communications. Government
estimates placed real economic growth at 1 percent during the year,
compared with 1.9 percent in 2001. A 1999 U.N. Development Program
living conditions survey showed that 35 percent of the population lived
in poverty; 21 percent were extremely poor.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The police
continued to commit unlawful killings, and police abuse of suspects
continued to be a problem. The authorities took some steps to
investigate abuses, but in general, the police continued to commit
abuses with impunity. Prison conditions remained poor, and lengthy
pretrial detention continued to be a problem. The inefficient judicial
system resulted in long delays in trials. Police infringed on citizens'
privacy rights. The Government charged a television talk show host and
a political activist with treason. Violence against women and children,
societal discrimination against women and indigenous Amerindians,
incidents of discrimination stemming from the racial tensions between
Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese, child labor in the informal sector,
and trafficking in persons were all problems. Guyana was invited by the
Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November
2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a
participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The police continued
to commit unlawful killings. The Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA)
reported that the police killed 24 civilians during the year, compared
with 16 in 2001. In most cases, the police shot the victims while
attempting to arrest them or while a crime was being committed. Public
investigations rarely were conducted into such killings; in general
police abuses were committed with impunity.
In February five prisoners escaped from the Georgetown Camp Street
Prison, setting off a crime wave that overwhelmed the security forces.
The GPF had little success apprehending the criminals, who began
targeting police officers. From February to October, 12 law enforcement
officers were killed in separate incidents.
On April 6, members of the TSS killed Shaka Blair during a night
raid on his house in Buxton. Police alleged that Blair was harboring
the February prison escapees and fired on police as they approached the
house. Police claimed that they found a hand grenade in his possession.
Blair's wife and neighborhood residents disputed the police version of
events, claiming that Blair was murdered as direct retribution for the
killing of TSS member police Superintendent Leon Fraser on April 2. On
April 16, Working People's Alliance executive committee member Eusi
Kwayana filed private criminal murder charges against GPF Senior
Superintendent Steve Merai of the TSS for Blair's murder. The Director
of Public Prosecutions (DPP) dismissed those charges; however, the case
was appealed to the High Court where it was awaiting a ruling by the
Chief Justice.
On May 10, police killed Wesley Hendricks during a raid on his
house in Georgetown. Police stated that they stormed the residence
after receiving a tip that one of the February prison escapees was seen
in Hendrick's house. The raid netted a sizable quantity of weapons and
ammunition.
On July 3, members of the Presidential Guard shot and killed Mark
Crawford and Albetha Fufe after approximately 100 protesters, led by
local political activist Phillip Bynoe, stormed the Presidential Office
Compound in Georgetown during a large opposition political protest
march. The Government charged television talk show host Mark Benschop
and Bynoe with treason for inciting the crowd to invade the complex
(see Section 2.b.).
On July 25, Kwame Pindleton and Leroy Lowe were killed during a
shootout with police after they attempted to run a police roadblock
outside Georgetown. Two other men with Pindleton and Lowe managed to
escape. News reports identified Lowe as a former police officer. The
GPF stated that Pindleton was wanted in connection with several
murders.
On September 21, police shot and killed Dexter Dubissette in
Georgetown. Police stated that Dubissette was killed during an
encounter with members of the TSS, but eyewitnesses disputed the police
statements. They claimed that Dubissette was killed after being
summoned to approach the vehicle in which TSS officers were riding.
On October 11, police shot and killed Shawn Welcome while he was in
custody. Police arrested Welcome for possession of a weapon, a hand
grenade, and a quantity of cocaine and cannabis. Police stated that
Welcome was shot after he attempted to wrestle a gun away from an
officer escorting him to a police station. Police sources stated that
Welcome, along with three accomplices, was wanted in connection with
four murders and a series of robberies.
In February the High Court nullified the November 2001 coroner's
jury verdict that the police were responsible for the 2000 death of
Mohammed Shafeek, who died in Brickdam police lockup.
In most of the killings by police in previous years, including the
police shootings of Azad Bacchus, Shaazad Bacchus, and Fadil Ally in
2000, and of Fazal Narine and Colin McGregor in 1999, there were no new
developments.
During their weekly press conferences, representatives of the
opposition party, the People's National Congress/Reform (PNC/R), called
repeatedly for public inquiry into the operations of the TSS and urged
the Government to dismiss the Minister of Home Affairs. On April 9, at
a rally following street violence that broke out after the April 6
police killing of Shaka Blair, opposition leader Desmond Hoyte called
for the Government to disband the TSS and claimed that the Blair
shooting ``must be laid at the feet of the PPP government.'' The
Government continued to refuse to recognize police killings as a
problem and did not conduct any special investigations into the
operations of the TSS.
In June 2001, the GHRA issued a press statement strongly
criticizing the increase in extrajudicial killings and calling for a
National Oversight Committee to implement a national security policy.
It stated that the GPF was overwhelmed by criminal and politically
induced lawlessness. According to the GHRA, eight police killings took
place during the 2 months after the national elections in 2001, and the
GHRA recommended investigations into the coincidence of periods of high
levels of political lawlessness and such killings.
In March 2000, the U.N. Human Rights Committee made 22
recommendations to the Government, including a call for prompt
investigation by an impartial body of police killings and excessive use
of force. It also called for measures to ensure the prosecution of
offenders and to provide effective remedies to victims. The Committee
recommended that all law enforcement officials receive thorough
training in international human rights standards. During the year, the
GHRA conducted two general human rights training programs for the GPF,
two programs for the Prison Service, and one session for the GPF and
the GDF.
Many justice authorities and human rights activists stated that due
to rising crime and pressure from urban businesses, which were often
the targets of criminals, the Government did not actively pursue
investigations of alleged police abuses.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police
continued to abuse suspects. The GHRA continued to consider
mistreatment of prisoners by prison officers a problem. Moreover,
inmates, attorneys, and judicial authorities provided credible evidence
that police and correctional officers frequently ignored the actions of
other inmates who beat, robbed, or otherwise mistreated ``problem''
prisoners.
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) was composed of five members
who investigated complaints against police officers. The law provides
for the independence of the PCA; however, most members were from the
criminal justice system, and the PCA was not truly independent. The PCA
received 98 complaints through September (compared with 44 in all of
2001); it completed investigations of 43 cases and sent them to the
Police Commissioner for action. However, there was no information
publicly available on the status of the investigations. Even when
police officers faced charges, most of the cases were heard by lower
magistrate courts, where other specially trained police officers served
as the prosecutors (see Section 1.e.). Human rights monitors questioned
officers' commitment to prosecute their own colleagues.
The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) also investigated
complaints against police. As of 2000, at least 99 cases resulted in
some type of disciplinary action being taken against police officers.
The OPR did not release any information on how many cases it received
during the year, how many it completed action on, and how many were
awaiting instructions from the Department of Public Prosecutions.
Prison and jail conditions were poor, particularly in police
holding cells. Georgetown's Camp Street Prison, the country's largest,
was overcrowded. The Prison Authority reported that there were
approximately 600 inmates in the facility, a decrease from 850 held
there in 2001. According to prison officials, the facility was intended
to hold 500 inmates; however, the GHRA stated that the Camp Street
Prison initially was designed to hold 350 inmates. Conditions in the
country's four smaller prisons generally were adequate; they held
between 650 and 700 inmates. The GHRA continued to advocate improved
health care in the prison system. In addition to overcrowding and a
lack of medical personnel, poor staff morale was a serious problem.
Prison staffers were poorly paid, and their salaries and benefits were
insufficient to compensate for the on-the-job risks; however, they made
efforts to improve conditions for prisoners. Prison officials lobbied
the Government for increased funding to improve prison conditions; they
also encouraged efforts by local and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) to improve physical and sanitary conditions.
In July 2001, members of a United Kingdom Prison Reform Team
recommended that a high-level Commission on Criminal Justice be
established to address the problems within the prison system. The team
spent 18 months reviewing the Prison Service and found the major
problems to be overcrowding, poor conditions for prisoners and staff,
perceived infringement of basic human rights, minimal rehabilitation,
and high cost to taxpayers. The most immediate concern of the team was
overcrowding, which was attributed in large part to the lack of
alternatives to imprisonment. The team found that more than 80 percent
of prisoners were serving time for minor offenses with sentences of
from 1 to 3 months.
The GHRA reported no deaths in prison during the year attributed to
overcrowding; 12 prisoners died from disease. In October 2000, the GHRA
criticized prison authorities for the death of Michael Ramcharran at
the hands of another inmate, which the GHRA said was the direct result
of overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison. To reduce overcrowding, the
GHRA called on the judiciary to consider alternate sentencing for minor
offenses, rejuvenation of the Parole Board, and the release of ill
prisoners who have completed almost all of their sentences. However,
the Government did not adopt any of these recommendations. The Parole
Board continued to play a more active role, but was reluctant to
release prisoners due to insufficient postrelease resources, including
a lack of staff to monitor parolees.
Although sanitary and medical conditions in police station
temporary holding facilities varied, in almost all cases these
conditions were worse than those in the prisons. Some such jails were
bare, overcrowded, and damp. Few had beds, washbasins, furniture, or
utensils. Meals normally were not provided; friends and relatives had
to bring detainees food and water. Cells rarely had sanitary
facilities, and inmates sometimes were escorted by staff members
outside the cells to use holes in the floor for toilets. Inmates
generally slept on a thin pallet on the concrete floor. The Brickdam
lockup in Georgetown had poor sanitation and dangerous conditions. One
cell without plumbing or other facilities typically held up to 30
detainees and often was the site of violence between inmates. Although
precinct jails were intended to serve only as pretrial holding areas,
some suspects were detained there as long as 4 years, waiting for the
overburdened judicial system to act on their cases.
Pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted prisoners.
Conditions were generally adequate in the only women's prison,
which is at New Amsterdam, in a facility that held men and women in
separate dormitory-type buildings. There were a number of vocational
and educational courses. In 2001 the GHRA urged that female inmates'
responsibility for children be recognized in terms of length of
sentence and facilities for family contact. The East La Penitence
police jail, where female prisoners were held until sentencing, was
upgraded in 2000; sanitation improved, and piped water was provided for
the inmates.
Following widespread criticism caused by the detention in 1999 of
two boys (ages 8 and 11) with adult prisoners who mistreated them,
police were careful to place juvenile offenders in a fairly adequate
separate facility. The Ruimveldt police station was the only facility
holding juveniles between ages 14 and 17 years.
Prison officials were receptive to local and international NGO
requests to enter and inspect prison facilities. The GHRA participated
as a member of the prisons' visiting committee, which investigated
prisoner complaints, inspected diets, reviewed primary medical care
services, and provided recommendations to prison authorities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that no person may be deprived of personal liberty except as
authorized by law and requires judicial determination of the legality
of detention, a mandate that the authorities generally respected in
practice.
Arrest does not require a warrant issued by a court official.
Police may arrest without a warrant when an officer witnesses a crime
or at the officer's discretion in instances where there is good cause
to suspect that a crime or a breach of the peace has been or will be
committed. The law requires that a person arrested and held for more
than 24 hours be brought before a court to be charged. Bail was
generally available, except in capital offense cases. In narcotics
cases, magistrates had limited discretion in granting bail before trial
and were required to remand persons convicted of such crimes into
custody, even if an appeal were pending.
Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem; however, the
Government, according to the GHRA, made an effort to reduce the backlog
of cases. It raised the salaries of magistrates and demanded that
judges spend more time hearing cases and handling matters more
expeditiously. The GHRA estimated average pretrial detention at between
18 months and 2 years; a decline from 3 or 4 years common in past
years.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it was not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, but law enforcement officials and prominent
lawyers questioned that independence and accused the Government of
intervening in certain cases. In most human rights cases, the
Government generally respected the independence of the judiciary.
The court system is composed of a high court (the Supreme Court of
Judicature), an appeals court, and a system of magistrate courts.
Magistrates were members of the civil service and were trained lawyers.
The magistrate courts dealt with both criminal and civil matters, and
specially trained police officers served as prosecutors in lower
magistrate courts. The Ministry of Legal Affairs, headed by the
Attorney General, was the principal legal advisor to the State. The
Director of Public Prosecution was statutorily independent and could
file legal charges against offenders. The Constitution provides that
anyone charged with a criminal offense has the right to a hearing by a
court of law. This right generally was respected in practice.
Delays in judicial proceedings were caused by shortages of trained
court personnel and magistrates, inadequate resources, postponements at
the request of the defense or prosecution, occasional alleged acts of
bribery, poor tracking of cases, and the slowness of police in
preparing cases for trial. There were reports that police who served as
prosecutors in lower magistrate courts were reluctant to prosecute
police accused of abuses (see Section 1.c.). The inefficiency of the
judicial system undermined due process.
Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem (see Section 1.d.).
In June 2001, Members of Parliament voted to amend the
Constitution, incorporating a number of recommendations from the
Constitution Reform Commission. Intended to strengthen the judiciary,
the changes removed from executive control the appointment of judges
and members of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), as well as the
ability to extend the tenure of judges beyond the age of retirement. In
addition, the bill granted the JSC power to appoint the Director and
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, the Registrar and Deputy
Registrar of the High Court, and the Registrar and Deputy Registrar of
Deeds. The amendments also allowed the President, on the advice of the
JSC, to make temporary appointments of judges to sit in magistrate
courts and the High Court. The number of appointments was to depend on
the outcome of an audit of pending cases.
Due to the absence of the Constitutional Service Commissions
(Public Service Commission, the Police Service Commission, the Teaching
Service Commission, and the Judicial Service Commission) there were no
appointments or promotions to Public Service, the Police Force, the
Teaching Service, or the judiciary and magistracy for over a year. The
service commissions were casualties of the political impasse between
the PPP/C and the PNC/R over the composition in Parliament of the four
sectoral standing committees and the representation of each party on
the parliamentary management committee.
Defendants were granted public trials, and appeals could be made to
higher courts. Defendants were presumed innocent until found guilty.
Cases in magistrate's courts were tried without jury; more serious
cases were tried by jury in the High Court. Appeals of some murder
cases may go on for several years. Trial postponements were granted
routinely to both the defense and the prosecution. Programs designed to
improve legal structures, reform judicial procedures, upgrade technical
capabilities, and improve efficiency of the courts had only a limited
effect. Judicial staff still needed further training in all areas.
Although the law recognizes the right to legal counsel, in practice,
with the exception of cases involving capital crimes, it was limited to
those who could afford to pay. There was no public defender system, but
defendants in murder cases who needed a lawyer were assigned an
attorney by the court.
The Georgetown Legal Aid Clinic, with public and private support,
provided advice to persons who could not afford a lawyer, with a
special interest in cases of violence against women and criminal cases
related to civil cases (for example, assault as part of a divorce
case). The Guyana Association of Women Lawyers provided free legal
services for civil cases only.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of privacy;
however, the authorities often infringed on citizens' privacy. Law
enforcement officials must obtain warrants before searching private
homes or properties. Although the authorities generally respected these
requirements, there were numerous reports of police officers searching
homes without warrants, particularly in neighborhoods where narcotics
trafficking was a problem.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. Citizens openly criticized the
Government and its policies.
The independent Stabroek News published daily, and a wide range of
religious groups, political parties, and journalists published a
variety of privately owned weekly newspapers. The Government's daily
newspaper, the Guyana Chronicle, covered a broad spectrum of political
and nongovernmental groups. However, throughout the year, the Chronicle
typically displayed a clear antiopposition bias.
On July 11, police arrested Mark Benschop, talk show host of the
television program ``Straight Up,'' and charged him and political
activist Phillip Bynoe, who remained at large, with sedition and
inciting persons ``by words and conduct'' during the July 3 storming of
the Presidential Office Complex. The Government alleged that Benschop
and Bynoe delivered speeches at several public meetings between June 1
and July 3 urging their audiences to overthrow the Government (see
Section 2.b.). In August the Government began a preliminary inquiry
into charges of treason against Benshop; the case was still pending at
year's end.
On May 24, President Jagdeo signed the Inter-American Press
Association's 1994 Declaration of Chapultepec and stated that the local
media corps had nothing to fear from the Government.
In contrast to the Government's tolerance of the print media, a
growing number of journalists charged the Government with failure to
respect freedom of the electronic media. The Government owned and
operated the country's sole radio station, which broadcast on three
frequencies. There were no private radio stations, and private
interests continued to allege that the Government either denied or
failed to respond to more than 20 requests for radio frequency
authorizations. The Government maintained that it was unable to grant
frequencies to private stations because there was no legislation
governing their allocation. However, despite a similar lack of
legislation to govern television frequencies, there were 12 independent
television stations in addition to the Government station.
On May 9, VCT Channel 28 aired a taped statement by the late prison
escapee Andrew Douglas proclaiming his innocence and protesting lengthy
trial delays. In the absence of a broadcast authority, the Government
asked the Advisory Committee on Broadcasting to sanction the television
station for breach of broadcast standards relating to content. The
three-member committee refused to rule on the issue, stating that it
was not in its mandate to do so.
In May 2001, Prime Minister Samuel Hinds announced that the
Government no longer would tolerate unregulated broadcasting, and that
all television stations would be required to adhere to existing
legislation and obtain an official license. The existing laws--the Post
and Telegraph Act and Wireless Telegraphy Regulations--were to remain
in effect until a Commission on Broadcasting developed new broadcasting
legislation. Conditions for obtaining a license included assurances
that stations would not broadcast any program likely to offend the
public, incite racial hatred or crime, or lead to public disorder. The
opposition strongly criticized the announcement, stating that
enforcement of the deficient existing legislation was an attempt to
censure broadcasting that is critical of the Government. Despite the
controversy, 22 stations applied for broadcasting licenses, and the
Government granted 15 licenses in December 2001.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice; however, the police occasionally used
force against demonstrators.
The Public Order Act requires police permits for mass political
meetings. The Police Commissioner has the authority to refuse
permission for a public meeting if he believes that it may provoke a
breach of the peace. In cases of refusal, applicants may appeal to the
Minister of Home Affairs, whose decision on the matter is final. After
obtaining authorization, which generally was granted, political parties
and other groups held public meetings and rallies throughout the
country without hindrance.
On July 3, members of the Presidential Guard shot and killed Mark
Crawford and Albetha Fufe after approximately 100 protesters, led by
political activist Phillip Bynoe, stormed the Presidential Office
Compound in Georgetown during a large opposition political protest
march (see Section 1.a.). Organizers staged the march to coincide with
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Heads of government Meeting hosted by
the Government. The Government charged television talk show host Mark
Benschop and Bynoe with treason for inciting the crowd to invade the
complex.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, and the Government generally respected
this right in practice. Travel to Amerindian areas requires government
permission, the result of a law dating from colonial times designed to
protect indigenous people from exploitation. However, in practice most
persons traveled throughout these areas without regard to the formality
of a permit. Citizens were free to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to
return.
The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. The Government did not have a formal policy on
refugees or asylum and did not enact model legislation prepared by the
UNHCR. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens enjoyed this right and exercised it in free and fair
elections held in March 2001. There was a multiparty political system
based on proportional representation. Voters indirectly elect the
President to a 5-year term of office. Any citizen 18 years or older may
register to vote.
The party that wins the most votes for parliament wins the
presidency. A party's presidential candidate must be announced in
advance of the election. The President appoints a cabinet and a prime
minister who, with the President, exercise executive power. Citizens
were free to join or support political parties of their choice. Since
the party in power controls Parliament, the legislature typically
provided only a limited check on the executive's power. In November
2000, the National Assembly amended the Representation of the People
Act and the Constitution to permit the election of 25 of the 65
deputies from regional constituencies. Voters elected the other 40 from
a national slate of nominees chosen by the parties from different
sectors of society.
In 1999 Finance Minister Bharrat Jagdeo succeeded to the presidency
following the resignation of Janet Jagan for health reasons. In
December 2000, Parliament passed a Constitutional Amendment Act that
imposed a 7-year residence requirement on candidates for the presidency
and set a limit of two terms. In addition, the act removed a clause
that made the President immune from prosecution, and it limited to four
the number of ministers who need not be elected Members of Parliament.
In March 2001, citizens voted in a generally free and fair election
to sustain the PPP/C in office, defeating the PNC. Incumbent Bharrat
Jagdeo received his own mandate for a 5-year term as President.
However, the opposition called for the courts to declare the election
unconstitutional and illegal, which delayed Jagdeo's swearing in until
later that month.
In response to allegations of an unconstitutional electoral
process, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) ordered a review and
audit of the March 2001 election, conducted by an eight-member team
headed by a representative of the Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA). The team investigated voter registration, the
production of identification cards, staffing of polling stations,
operational and contingency planning, the counting of votes, and the
declaration of election results. As part of the review, the team
conducted detailed consultations with political parties,
representatives of civil society, and members of GECOM in June 2001.
The results, published in mid-August 2001, stated that IDEA was unable
to find any evidence of deliberate manipulation or electoral fraud
despite several procedural errors and system failures that the audit
examined in some detail. The report found no evidence of a conspiracy
or corruption to manipulate election systems or the election results,
as the opposition alleged.
Guyana is a racially divided society in which the political party
structure reflected the polarization of the main ethnic groups. The two
major parties (the PPP and the PNC) were formed largely by Indo-
Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese, respectively.
There were no legal impediments to the participation of women or
minorities in the political process. The December 2000 constitutional
amendments required that one-third of the parliamentary candidates be
female. The 65-member Parliament included 20 women and 4 Amerindians,
representing both major parties. The 20-person Cabinet included 4 women
and 1 Amerindian, and the Chancellor of the Judiciary was a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The authorities did not interfere with the activities of human
rights groups. The GHRA, the most active local human rights group,
functioned without government interference. Trade unions, professional
organizations, various ethnic groups, and churches participated in the
GHRA. It issued periodic press releases and published an annual report
on human rights. Members of the Government openly discussed human
rights issues and made public statements in response to foreign and
local human rights reports.
In June 2001, Parliament approved an act that provided for the
establishment of a Human Rights Commission (HRC). The HRC was charged
with promoting the observance and respect for rights outlined in the
Constitution, and protecting and investigating violations of these
rights and any other law relating to equality of opportunity and
treatment. The HRC comprised a Chairperson and the four chairpersons of
the Women's, Children's, Indigenous, and Ethnic Relations Commissions
in the Parliament; however, these commissions did not have a staff or a
budget for operations.
In 2001 the GHRA issued a press release in response to the
announcement of the newly established HRC, calling the Commissions Act
a ``lost opportunity,'' and criticizing the haste with which the act
was developed and implemented. It further complained about the lack of
members specifically charged with observing, protecting and
investigating fundamental human rights and freedoms, and the lack of
authority given the commission.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides fundamental rights for all persons
regardless of race, sex, religion, or national origin; however, the
Government did not always enforce these provisions effectively.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, was
widespread, and NGOs reported that domestic violence crossed racial and
socioeconomic lines. Despite efforts by NGOs and the DPP to sensitize
police officers to domestic violence, the police often were hesitant to
interfere in cases of domestic disputes. According to Help and Shelter
(H&S), the first local NGO dedicated to fighting domestic violence, it
handled 375 cases of abuse, including child, spousal, nonspousal, and
other domestic abuse between January and September.
The Domestic Violence Act defines domestic violence, establishes it
as a crime, and gives women the right to seek prompt protection.
Magistrates may issue interim protection orders when a victim of abuse,
a police officer, or a social worker fills out an application for
protection. A magistrate then evaluates the case and decides whether to
replace interim orders with permanent orders. The act allows victims to
seek protection, occupation, or tenancy orders. Protection orders
prohibited abusers from being anywhere that the applicant lives, works,
visits, or attends school. If protective orders were violated, the
abuser could be fined up to $54 (G$10,000) and imprisoned for up to 12
months; however, this legislation frequently was not enforced.
Occupation orders allowed the victim and any children to remain in a
home previously shared with an abuser, while the abuser must leave.
Similarly, tenancy orders required an abuser to leave a rented dwelling
and to continue to pay some or all of the rent. The GHRA criticized the
structure of the Domestic Violence Act, stating that the law could not
be implemented until appointments have been made to the Women's Affairs
Bureau. In addition, the GHRA reported that the forms needed to request
court orders were printed infrequently and were rarely available to the
public.
In March 2000, the U.N. Human Rights Committee criticized the lack
of information about the effect of the Domestic Violence Act in
reducing the level of violence against women. The committee called for
training police and other law enforcement personnel in the importance
of ensuring that women who were victims of violence were accorded equal
protection and that preventive and punitive measures were enforced. In
2001 the Government held 2-week training seminars for police officers
to sensitize them to the issues and advise them about procedures. The
authorities required officers who received training to conduct outreach
to other officers.
In its efforts to combat domestic violence, H&S focused on societal
reeducation in order to sensitize the public to domestic violence. By
February 2001, H&S had counseled 3,872 persons since it began offering
counseling services in November 1995. H&S reported that 79.2 percent of
its cases from January to October involved spousal abuse.
Rape, particularly of girls and young women, was a serious problem
but infrequently reported or prosecuted. Health professionals and NGOs
also reported a high incidence of incest. Lawyers said that while more
victims reported these crimes to the authorities, there still was a
social stigma applied to the victim for doing so. An estimated 3
percent of cases reported to H&S were rape cases; the vast majority of
these--70 percent--were reported by victims age 17 and under.
Prostitution is illegal, but it did occur, and it received
increased public attention due to the high incidence of HIV/AIDS among
prostitutes.
There was no legal protection against sexual harassment in the
workplace. The law prohibits dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy, and
dismissal on such grounds did not occur in practice. The Women's
Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Labor monitored the legal rights of
women, but its role was limited to employment-related services. The
Women's Leadership Institute, a collaborative effort between the
Government and the U.N. Development Program, sought through education
and training to facilitate greater participation by women in government
and the private sector. The center planned to train an average of 350
women annually on issues such as women's rights, status of women,
violence against women, and leadership development. In September 2001,
100 women began the first phase of the program, which involved 15 hours
per week of training for 4 months.
The 1997 Antidiscrimination Act built upon the provisions of the
1990 Equal Rights Act. The two laws provide a strengthened framework
under which women and minorities may seek redress for discriminatory
acts or practices. However, no case ever has been tried under the Equal
Rights Act, and critics of the Antidiscrimination Act claimed that it
was unlikely to be effective since it places enforcement
responsibilities on the overburdened Chief Labor Officer.
The law protects women's property rights in common-law marriages
and entitles a woman who separates or divorces to one-half the couple's
property if she had been working and one-third of the property if she
had been a housewife. Divorce by consent remained illegal. The courts
may overturn a husband's will in the event that it does not provide for
his wife, as long as she was dependent on him for financial support.
Children.--Children were affected more severely by the country's
poverty than any other group. One-third of the population was under 18
years of age and, although the Government provided free education
through secondary school (it is compulsory until age 14), the severe
deterioration of the public education and health care systems limited
children's future prospects. The public health system was inadequate,
and private health care was unaffordable for many children. Children
often did not attend school because their families needed them to
contribute to the household by working or providing childcare for
siblings or younger relatives (see Section 6.d.).
Concern continued to rise over the effects of domestic violence on
children. It was unclear how many deaths from child abuse took place,
since law enforcement officials believed that the vast majority of
criminal child abuse cases were unreported. H&S reported that it
received 31 cases of child abuse between January and September, the
equivalent of 8 percent of its cases for that time period. In June
2001, the Welfare Section of the Georgetown Education Department stated
that reports of physical and sexual abuse of children were on the rise,
with an average of two to three cases per month in the capital city
alone. There were no law enforcement investigative procedures in place
to determine if abuse or parental incapacity were the true causes of
death in some cases of the 400 children under the age of 5 who died
each year, deaths that usually were attributed to malnutrition or
disease.
Media reports of rape and incest further indicated that violence
against children was a significant problem. The Domestic Violence Act
allows police officers or social workers to file an application on
behalf of an abused child, but there was a lack of social services or
trained experts to assist children fleeing sexual, physical, or
emotional abuse. Many children suffered from neglect or abandonment,
particularly when from 1 to 2 percent of the adult population emigrate
each year, often leaving children behind.
There were reports of child prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
UNICEF criticized the practice in which girls traded sexual favors
for money, gifts, or help in employment or higher education, a practice
sometimes condoned by their parents yet obscured by cultural norms.
Media reports indicated that violence against children in public
schools continued to occur, but Education Ministry data on the number
of corporal punishment cases were unavailable. In June 2001, one
student suffered a broken collarbone and another a broken elbow as a
result of flogging by their teachers. Both teachers involved in the
incidents returned to work pending investigations. The Ministry of
Education responded to these incidents with a 30-point program intended
to phase out corporal punishment in schools.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no law mandating provision of
access for persons with disabilities, and the lack of appropriate
infrastructure to provide access to both public and private facilities
made it very difficult to employ persons with disabilities outside
their homes. In 1997 Parliament passed a law establishing a council for
persons with disabilities, which functioned throughout the year. There
were several special schools and training centers for persons with
disabilities, but the facilities lack trained staff and were in
disrepair.
Indigenous Persons.--The Amerindian population, which consists of
nine tribal groups, constituted an estimated 8 percent of the
population. Most lived in reservations and villages in remote parts of
the interior. Their standard of living was much lower than that of most
citizens and their ability to participate in decisions affecting their
lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources
was limited. Access to education and health care in Amerindian
communities was limited severely.
Amerindian life is regulated by the Amerindian Act, legislation
dating from colonial times designed to protect indigenous people from
exploitation. Under the act, the Government may determine who is an
Amerindian and what is an Amerindian community, appoint Amerindian
leaders, and annul decisions made by Amerindian councils. It also
prohibits the sale of alcohol to Amerindians and requires government
permission before any Amerindian may accept formal employment; however,
these provisions were not enforced. Both Amerindian individuals and
groups remained free to criticize the Government. In 1998 the Ministry
of Amerindian Affairs admitted that the Amerindian Act was antiquated
and expressed a commitment to update it, although it took no action to
do so.
The Government has long maintained that it was committed to
demarcating lands that traditionally have been the home of Amerindians,
but the Government held title to almost all the country's land and was
free to act as it wished without consultation. According to the
Amerindian Peoples Association, the Government demarcated over 30
Amerindian communities since 1998; however, most communities rejected
the demarcations because they did not conform to community-defined
boundaries, often reducing land size or transferring land to other
communities. In October six Amerindian villages filed a formal land
claim seeking legal recognition of land titles, but the Government
failed to respond to the petition.
Amerindian NGOs regarded government consultations as mere public
relations exercises and demarcation as a means of confining Amerindian
communities so that the remaining areas that Amerindians considered to
be their land could be offered as concessions to miners and loggers.
(Most of the titles to demarcated land were granted decades ago under
the Amerindian Act and did not allow for the growth of Amerindian
communities.) The Amerindian NGOs claimed that Amerindian leaders were
not consulted properly and were pressured into uninformed decisions.
The Government maintained that it would consider granting additional
land rights to those communities that agreed to have their lands
demarcated in 1999, but it did not take action to do so.
In March 2000, the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed regret
that the Government had not yet amended the Amerindian Act and
expressed concern that Amerindians did not enjoy fully the right to
equality before the law. The Committee particularly was concerned that
the right of Amerindians to enjoy their own culture was threatened by
logging, mining, and delays in the demarcation of their traditional
lands, and that in some cases insufficient land was demarcated to
enable them to pursue their traditional economic activities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Longstanding ethnic tensions,
primarily between citizens of African descent and those of South Asian
origin, continued to influence society and political life. Racial
grouping of social and political organizations polarized society along
ethnic lines, and discrimination and exclusion continued to occur.
Members of both the largely Indo-Guyanese PPP and the largely Afro-
Guyanese PNC engaged in rhetorical and propaganda attacks that fueled
racial tensions.
The civil service and defense and police forces overwhelmingly were
staffed by Afro-Guyanese. Recruitment efforts targeted at Indo-Guyanese
candidates for the uniformed services generally met with an
unenthusiastic response, with most qualified Indo-Guyanese candidates
opting for a business or professional career over military, police, or
public service. In the aftermath of the 1997 and 2001 national
elections, the Government continued efforts to recruit Indo-Guyanese
for the security forces. The Government also sponsored various forums
for discussion of racial problems and to promote inclusion, and it
supported the work of NGOs that dealt with these concerns.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association and specifically enumerates workers' rights to
form or belong to trade unions. The Trade Unions Recognition Law, which
requires employers to recognize the union chosen by a majority of the
workers, came into effect in 1999, but implementation has been slow.
The Trade Unions Recognition Board, created by this act, did not grant
recognition to any new unions; it issued recommendations to recertify
existing unions that previously had represented workers, but the
process was delayed.
Approximately 32 percent of the work force was unionized. Most
union members worked in the public sector and in state-owned
enterprises. There was no law prohibiting antiunion discrimination by
employers.
Organized labor freely associated in the major national federation,
the Guyana Trades Union Congress (GTUC), which was composed of 22
unions. There was a tradition of close ties between the trade union
movement and political parties. Historically, the two major political
parties have wielded significant influence over the leadership of
several unions, and trade union officials often served in dual roles as
party officials. This arrangement occasionally led to overt
politicization of labor issues. Efforts to negotiate a new contract
between the Government and the Guyana Public Service Union (GPSU) were
deadlocked amid allegations of bad faith that had distinct political
and racial overtones. The GPSU was largely Afro-Guyanese and the
governing PPP was largely Indo-Guyanese.
Unions and their federations freely maintained relations with
recognized international trade union and professional groups. All three
of the major international trade union federations had affiliates in
the country.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Public and
private sector employees possessed and utilized the right to organize
and to bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor certifies all
collective bargaining agreements and has never refused to do so.
Individual unions directly negotiated collective bargaining status,
pursuant to the 1993 repeal of a regulation that required that all
collective bargaining be negotiated through the GTUC. Unions were
dissatisfied with a provision that granted the Ministry of Finance veto
power over wage contracts negotiated by other ministries. The Chief
Labor Officer and the staff of the Ministry of Labor provided
consultation, enforcement, and conciliation services.
The law provides workers with the right to strike. Strikes may be
declared illegal if the union leadership did not approve them, or they
did not meet the requirements specified in collective bargaining
agreements. Public employees providing essential services may strike if
they provide the proper notice to the Ministry of Labor and leave a
skeleton staff in place, but they were required to engage in compulsory
arbitration to bring an end to a strike. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) urged the Government to amend this legislation to
limit the use of compulsory arbitration to only those strikes in
services the interruption of which would endanger life, personal
safety, or health. There was no law prohibiting retaliation against
strikers or antiunion discrimination by employers; however, this
principle always was included in the terms of resumption after a
strike. The Trade Unions Recognition Law defines and places limits on
the retaliatory actions employers may take against strikers.
Arbitration rulings, when agreed to by the contending parties, were
legally enforceable.
During negotiations in October for a new contract with the
Government, the GPSU demanded a 64 percent increase in the monthly
minimum wage. It argued that a substantial increase would end
underperformance and an exodus of trained and skilled public servants.
The negotiations deadlocked, and in November the Government announced
it would grant a 5 percent increase to most public service workers,
retroactive to January. The GPSU rejected the increase, stating that it
was intended to create the false impression that the Government was
responding to public calls for economic assistance. The GPSU continued
to insist that the matter be resolved through arbitration, to which
both sides had previously agreed. The Government stated that it had
consistently increased wages for public servants since taking office in
1992.
In 1999 following a civil service strike, an arbitration panel
awarded government workers an across-the-board 31 percent pay increase
for 1999, an additional 26 percent increase in 2000, and step
increases. While the Government paid the annual increases, it did not
agree to implement step increases; pay increases must be negotiated
annually.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, and there was no indication that it
occurred. The Government prohibited forced or bonded labor by children
and generally enforced this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Factories Act and the Employment of Young Persons and
Children Act set out minimum age requirements for employment of
children. According to UNICEF, however, child labor in the informal
sector was a problem, and it was common to see very young children
engaged in street trading in the capital. Legally, no person under age
14 may be employed in any industrial undertaking and no person under
age 16 may be employed at night, except under regulated circumstances.
The law permits children under age 14 to be employed only in
enterprises in which members of the same family were employed.
While the Ministry of Labor recognized that child labor existed in
the informal sector, it did not employ sufficient inspectors to enforce
existing laws effectively. The practice of teenage prostitution was a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Act and the Wages
Councils Act allow the Labor Minister to set minimum wages for various
categories of private employers, but there was no legislated private
sector minimum wage. As a result of the civil service arbitration
ruling in 1999 (see Section 6.b.), the minimum public sector wage
increased to $104 (G$19,000) per month. Although enforcement mechanisms
existed, it was difficult to put them into practice, and unorganized
workers, particularly women and children in the informal private
sector, often were paid less than what was required legally. The legal
minimum wage for the public sector was insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family.
The Shops Act and the Factories Act set hours of employment, which
vary by industry and sector. In general work in excess of an 8-hour day
or a 44-hour week required payment of an overtime rate. However, if the
initial contract stipulated a 48-hour workweek, then the overtime rate
applied only for hours worked in excess of 48 hours. The law does not
require at least a 24-hour rest period each week.
The Factories Act also establishes workplace safety and health
standards. The Ministry of Labor implemented programs in the workplace
to promote HIV/AIDS awareness and provide information on related health
issues in order to combat discrimination. The Occupational Health and
Safety Division of the Ministry of Labor was charged with conducting
factory inspections and investigating complaints of substandard
workplace conditions. The ILO's Committee of Experts criticized the
Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to protect workers
adequately who use chemical substances that were proven to be
carcinogenic. As with its other responsibilities, inadequate resources
prevented the Ministry from effectively carrying out this function.
Workers could not remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardizing continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, and there was some evidence that women
were brought into the country from Brazil to work in clubs and bars,
and that women from Colombia and the Dominican Republic were trafficked
through Guyana to Suriname, where they were reportedly trained to
become sex workers in Europe.
There were reports of child prostitution, by teenagers in cities
and in remote gold mining areas in Amerindian communities.
There were also occasional reports of trafficking in persons of
Chinese and South Asian origin, who would immigrate illegally to the
United States under conditions amounting to debt bondage. Persons
providing fraudulent documents for the purpose of facilitating illegal
immigration can be charged with obtaining money under false pretenses,
which carries a small fine and a 6-month prison sentence. Some fraud
cases were prosecuted during the year.
__________
HAITI
Haiti is a republic with an elected president and a bicameral
legislature. The 1987 Constitution remains in force, but many of its
provisions were not respected in practice. The political impasse and
political violence stemming from controversial results of May 2000
legislative and local elections continued during the year. In May 2000,
the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) manipulated the results of the
election to ensure that Fanmi Lavalas (FL) maintained control of the
Senate. The opposition parties boycotted July 2000 runoff elections and
the November 2000 presidential elections, in which Jean-Bertrand
Aristide was elected with extremely low voter turnout. Efforts by the
Organization of American States (OAS) to resolve the dispute were not
successful. The 1987 Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice and remained
largely weak and corrupt, as well as subject to interference by the
executive and legislative branches.
The Government established the Haitian National Police (HNP) in
1995 as the sole security force in the country after disbanding the
Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H). Despite a cadre of competent and
committed officers trained by U.S., French, and Canadian authorities,
HNP officials at all levels were implicated in corruption,
incompetence, and narcotics trafficking. The HNP failed to pursue
criminals, promoting a growing condition of judicial impunity. The HNP
is officially an autonomous civilian institution; however, political
leaders increasingly exercised control over elements of the police and
influenced it for personal or political gain. President Aristide filled
many key HNP positions with political allies lacking experience,
training, and credibility. Some parliamentarians, mayors, and members
of local government councils (CASECs) exercised arrest authority
without legal sanction. The HNP has a variety of specialized units,
including a crisis response unit (SWAT); a crowd control unit (CIMO)
serving Port-au-Prince and the Western department; crowd control units
(UDMOs) serving each of the remaining eight departments; and a small
Coast Guard unit. The Special Brigades (BS) reportedly carry out
politically motivated executions and is comprised of pro-FL
paramilitaries. The large and well-funded Presidential Security Unit
was officially part of the HNP, but had a stand-alone budget and was
administratively and functionally independent. Civilian deaths and
serious injuries resulted from the inability of HNP, CIMO and SWAT
units to maintain order. Some members of the HNP committed human rights
abuses during the year.
The country has a market-based economy and state-controlled
utilities, and its economic situation worsened significantly during the
year. A small elite controlled much of the country's wealth, but two-
thirds of the estimated 8 million citizens worked in subsistence
agriculture and were extremely poor. The informal sector accounted for
approximately 70 percent of all economic activity, making taxation
problematic. Remittances, estimated at $800 million in 2001, were a
growing revenue source. Textiles accounted for approximately 85 percent
of exports, but assembled goods, leather goods, and handicrafts also
provided limited export revenue. The country imported 60 percent of its
food, but produced mangoes, cocoa, essential oils, and coffee for
export. The Haitian Institute for Statistics calculated a negative
growth rate of 0.9 percent for this fiscal year. Inflation was
approximately 14.8 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, with political
and civil officials implicated in serious abuses. There were credible
reports of extrajudicial killings by members of the HNP. Police
officers used excessive--and sometimes deadly--force in making arrests
or controlling demonstrations and were rarely punished for such acts.
Attacks on journalists and political dissenters by Fanmi Lavalas
supporters continued. Prison conditions improved slightly, but were
still poor and prisoners with valid release orders continued to be held
in defiance of these orders. Legal impunity remained a major problem,
and police and judicial officials often failed to respect legal
provisions or pursue and prosecute suspected violators. The media was
largely free and often critical of the Government, but most journalists
practiced some form of self-censorship. From July through December,
several radio stations closed down temporarily due to intimidation and
threats. Abuse of children and violence and societal discrimination
against women remained problems. Internal trafficking of children and
child labor, especially in domestic servitude, remained a problem.
Haiti was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group
to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul,
Republic of Korea, as an observer.
In January the OAS noted a worsening political, economic and social
situation in the country in Resolution 806, calling for improvements in
human rights and urging the Government to work toward ending all forms
of political violence. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) visited in May and August to examine the status of human rights
and the events of December 17, 2001 when an unknown number of
unidentified gunmen attacked the National Palace in Port-au-Prince; 8
persons reportedly died and 15 persons were injured. Following the
attack, progovernment groups attacked opposition members' offices and
homes; one opposition member was killed. In June the OAS also began a
Special Mission to Haiti to strengthen democratic institutions, with a
focus on justice and human rights. In September OAS Resolution 822
called for a thorough inquiry into all politically motivated crimes,
including the violence of December 17, 2001, and cited the need to
strengthen independent police and judicial institutions to combat
impunity.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Other Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were
credible reports of extrajudicial killings by members of the HNP and
municipal government officials.
On January 6, Deputy Jocelyn Saint Louis of Saint Raphael shot and
killed commune mayor Sernand Severe following an elections-related feud
and the death of the deputy's nephew during a violent confrontation
between the mayor and his supporters and the deputy's family and
bodyguards. On February 5, the legislature lifted Saint Louis' immunity
and he was still in pretrial detention at year's end.
On May 25, the HNP killed three youths from Cite Soleil, a Port-au-
Prince slum. The authorities had not undertaken an investigation into
the killing by year's end.
On July 5, the security guard for a government official in the town
of Hinche beat a farmer to death for trespassing on land belonging to
the official. There were no arrests or judicial action in this matter
by year's end.
On July 29, under the orders of the mayor of Nan Chale, near Port
de Paix, persons armed with stones, sticks and machetes beat a group of
farmers involved in a land dispute. The armed individuals returned
later that day in an HNP vehicle, and attacked and burned homes, and
beat the residents. One resident died.
On November 28, Belladere Justice of the Peace Christophe Lozama, a
reputed drug-dealer with close ties to FL, was shot during a clash with
opposition demonstrators in Kenp, outside of Las Cahobas. On December
10, armed men broke into Las Cahobas jail, shooting and killing four
persons and freeing four detainees--two of whom were opposition members
arrested for Lozama's murder. Human rights workers investigating the
incident reported that the police lacked the will to conduct a fair
investigation into the case and noted that authorities targeted anti-FL
demonstrators for questioning and arrest.
On December 8, armed men dressed in black identified as HNP took
three brothers, Angelot and Andy Philippe, and Vladimir Sanon, from
their home in Carrefour in Port-au-Prince. Later that day their bodies
were found with gunshot wounds and taken to the city morgue. The boys
had previously protested the December 1 police robbery and shooting of
their friend, Marcellus Bongue. Authorities have not arrested and no
examining judge has questioned any of the three policemen whom
eyewitnesses identified as the last persons seen with the brothers.
In September an investigating judge indicted 10 people in
connection with the December 2001 killing of journalist Brignol Lindor;
however, he did not indict Petit Goave deputy mayor Duby Bony, who
allegedly incited the murder when he said Lindor should be met with
zero tolerance. By year's end, police had arrested only three of those
indicted (see Section 2.a.).
The April 2000 killing of popular Radio Haiti-Inter host and
journalist Jean Leopold Dominique, known for his criticism of the
Government and of former coup leaders, remained unsolved. In April
investigating judge Claudy Gassant resigned from the case and fled the
country, claiming fear for his life. By mid-September Bernard St. Vil,
the third judge assigned to the murder investigation, had questioned 12
persons, including Senator Dany Toussaint, considered a major suspect
in the case; however, the Senate did not lift his parliamentary
immunity.
There was no progress in several other high-profile killings,
including those of Amos Jeannot (killed in 2000), Senator Yvon
Toussaint and Jean Lamy (killed in 1999), and Chenel Gracien and Jean
Pierre Louis (both killed in 1998). On April 12, investigating Judge
Jocelyne Pierre interviewed Jackson Joanis, former head of the police
antigang unit, regarding the 1994 murder of Jean Marie Vincent.
Officially charged with murder, Joanis remained in pretrial detention
in Petionville police station. Little action was taken on the ongoing
investigation into the 1993 massacre of Cite Soleil residents by
members of the FAd'H and an allied paramilitary group, the
Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH).
Vigilante killings are a long established practice in the country;
however, their incidence increased following President Aristide's
``zero tolerance'' exhortation to police and citizens to bypass the
judicial system if they caught criminals in the act. During the year,
human rights organizations, journalists, and opposition groups
criticized the Government's support for this practice.
On May 31, residents of Cazeau lynched a thief. On July 5, an angry
crowd pursued an Hinche city official's security agent who had beaten a
peasant to death. They found him taking refuge at the local bishop's
residence, stoned him to death, and ransacked the building. The HNP,
saying it was powerless, did not respond to the bishop's calls. On July
15, a group of stevedore union members seized a low-level manager at
the Port Authority and burned him alive during a clash with members of
another union after the deaths of the stevedore union president and his
colleague. The stevedores alleged that the manager had been involved in
the union leader's death.
On March 27, months after issuance of an arrest warrant, police
arrested Ronald Camille ``Cadavre'' for the September 2001 killing of
activist Fritzner Jean. In December, due to serious illness,
authorities transferred Camille from the national penitentiary to Saint
Francois de Sales, a private hospital, where he remained at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were credible reports of politically
motivated disappearances.
On September 17, members of the HNP reportedly detained Felix Bien
Aime, a gangster with government ties implicated in the events of
December 2001 and in the 1999 Fort Mercredi massacre and two of his
colleagues, Paul Mauzac Jean and Djal Normil. Despite demonstrations by
Bien Aime's supporters, the HNP refused to comment on his detention or
whereabouts. Human rights organizations believe that all three were
killed.
On October 14, police arrested and beat two members of the
Konvansyon Inite Demokratik (KID) opposition party, David Barjon and
Jean Lafouche, after an argument over public housing. Their whereabouts
remained unknown. The HNP did not commented on the case nor kept a
written record of the arrest. Human rights organizations believe they
were killed.
On October 23, the chief of the police unit assigned to the
National Palace, Paul Voltaire, disappeared. He had reportedly
uncovered a drug-trafficking ring involving progovernment supporters.
Human rights organizations believe he was killed.
On October 26, authorities arrested former soccer player Emmanuel
Auguste and took him to Carrefour police station. Family members
visited him there that day. By the next day, Auguste had disappeared.
Human rights organizations believe he was killed.
On November 13, ex-military officer and former Petionville police
commissaire, Jean Lewis Bourgouin, disappeared. He reportedly was a
close friend of Guy Philippe, an anti-Aristide former military officer.
Human rights organizations believe he was killed.
There has been no further investigation of the human remains found
at Titanyen but during the year there were frequent reports of new
human remains found at Titanyen and other locations.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1987 Constitution prohibits the use of unnecessary
force or restraint, psychological pressure, or brutality by the
security forces; however, members of the security forces continued to
violate these provisions. Police officers used excessive and sometimes
deadly force in making arrests or controlling demonstrations and were
rarely punished for such acts (see Section 1.a.). Torture and other
forms of abuse were reported.
Police mistreatment of suspects at the time of arrest and during
detention remained common in all parts of the country. Beating with
fists, sticks, and belts was the most common form of abuse. Persons who
reported such abuse often had visible injuries consistent with the
alleged mistreatment. There were also isolated allegations of torture
by electric shock. Mistreatment also took the form of withholding
medical treatment from injured jail inmates.
The Government's record of disciplining police officers implicated
in these offenses was inconsistent. Police were rarely prosecuted for
abuse of detainees but were sometimes fined. Often the HNP simply fired
officers guilty of flagrant abuses. The HNP Inspector General requested
the removal of 88 police officers charged with abuse since January
2001; however, many were still on the payroll at year's end.
Despite substantial international assistance and some initial
progress, the HNP was largely an ineffective institution with
inadequate government support. Most new cadets entered through a
competitive selection process, but the Government appointed more than
half based on political and personal favoritism. In August a new class
of 872 recruits began training.
CIMO was often accused of using excessive force against
demonstrators (see Section 2.b.).
Locally elected officials allied with the FL increasingly exercised
unauthorized law enforcement functions. The mayors of Hinche, Maissade,
Miragoane, and Petit Goave employed small paramilitary groups to
victimize and control local populations. These groups engaged in
torture, property damage, and theft, and were usually better armed than
local police. In rural areas, members and agents of CASECs illegally
assumed police functions such as serving warrants, arresting the
accused, taking testimony (often for a fee), and seizing private
property. Locally elected officials often abused citizens based on
perceived political disloyalty, accusing them of attempts to
destabilize the Government.
The Government did not pursue investigations of Maissade mayor
Willot Joseph or Hinche mayor Dongo Joseph for their involvement in
March 2001 attacks on two judges investigating their paramilitary
group's beatings of opposition members in July 2000. In April 2001,
authorities had arrested and then provisionally released Dongo Joseph.
In December 2001, he resigned as mayor and was replaced by James
Joseph, a member of the same paramilitary group. Dongo Joseph was
reportedly working for the Ministry of Interior at year's end.
Prison conditions remained poor. The Penitentiary Administration
Management (DAP) made some progress in improving prison administration
and warden training. Prisoners and detainees continued to suffer from a
lack of basic hygiene, malnutrition, poor quality health care, and, in
some facilities, 24-hour confinement. Most prisons periodically
suffered from lack of water, especially in the provinces. The incidence
of preventable diseases such as beriberi, AIDS, and tuberculosis
increased. The total prisoner population remained at approximately
3,600. However, the number of inmates incarcerated at the National
Penitentiary dropped from 1,899 to 1,700 by year's end, due in part to
concerted efforts to resolve cases.
Overcrowding prevented the separation of violent from nonviolent
prisoners or convicts from those in pretrial detention. Many were
incarcerated in temporary holding cells, particularly in the provinces.
Prison officials confirmed reports by international human rights
observers of instances of inmate abuse by prison personnel; however, no
statistics were available. Prisoners and detainees, ignorant of legal
rights or doubtful officials would respond positively, rarely filed
official complaints. During the year, 30 guards were subjected to
disciplinary action--18 were fired, 5 were temporarily suspended, and 7
were fined.
The Government established a commission to investigate the 2001
riot at the National Penitentiary but the commission has not published
a report of its findings. Authorities transferred some prisoners to
other facilities a week after the riot.
The Government's Office of Citizen Protection monitored prison
conditions and offered training to prison administrators on criminal
procedures, particularly the constitutional requirement limiting
preventive detention (garde a vu) to 48 hours. The U.N. Development
Program (UNDP) continued technical assistance to the DAP, focusing on
midlevel warden training and management information. The National
Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR) actively monitored prison
conditions in cooperation with the DAP, which offered a prisoners'
rights awareness campaign and morale-boosting activities including a
soccer tournament.
During the year, the DAP began objective testing of prison
physicians and nurses to weed out those who were inadequately trained.
Doctors were available in the capital but were less frequently
available to those incarcerated in the provinces. Nurses did not
conduct daily checkups on the physical condition of inmates. Dispensary
supplies were limited, and family members often had to purchase needed
medication. The DAP improved medicine procurement and distribution, and
in June a new consultant for medical services began work at the
National Penitentiary.
Fort National prison in Port-au-Prince is the only prison facility
expressly for women and juveniles. In other prison facilities, women
are housed in cells separate from men. However, in January 2000, U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy
reported, based on her 1999 visit, that most female prisoners share
living quarters with male prisoners. This subjects women to violence
and sexual abuse.
In October Natacha Jean-Jacques, a 17 year old girl in pre-trial
detention at Fort National (Port-au-Prince's female prison) since March
2000, gave birth to a son. In February she had reported to prison
authorities that Ilus Denasty, a medical assistant, had raped her on
February 19, after she refused his advances during a medical
consultation. The DAP subsequently transferred the director of the
prison and prison guards implicated in the rape, and recommended to the
district attorney that charges be brought against Denasty. The trial
for Jean-Jacques, originally detained and charged for homicide, had not
occurred by year's end.
Due to overcrowding, juveniles often were held with adults.
The authorities freely permitted the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), the Haitian Red Cross, and other human rights groups
to enter prisons and police stations, monitor conditions, and assist
prisoners and detainees with medical care, food, and legal aid. The
Director General of the HNP and the DAP cooperated with the ICRC and
the UNDP.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. The Constitution
stipulates that a person may be arrested only if apprehended during the
commission of a crime, or on the basis of a written order by a legally
competent official, such as a justice of the peace or magistrate. The
authorities can only execute these orders between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00
p.m. and must bring the detainee before a judge within 48 hours of
arrest. In practice, officials frequently ignored these provisions.
There were also instances of arrests by security forces and local
officials lacking proper authority; mayors and members of local CASECs
sometimes arrested persons in under-policed rural areas (see Sections
1.c. and 6.a.). Judges often issued arrest warrants with little or no
evidence (see Section 1.f.). Locally elected officials and local HNP
increasingly arrested spouses and other family members when they were
unable to locate a suspect. Occasionally parents ask a judge to
imprison a delinquent child.
Certain police jurisdictions routinely disregarded the 48-hour
requirement and some detainees were held for years in pretrial
detention. Although the 48-hour rule was violated in all parts of the
country, it was most often and most flagrantly ignored in Jeremie, Cap
Haitien, Petionville, and the Delmas commissariat of Port-au-Prince.
Police or other government officials often apprehended people without
warrants, or on warrants not issued by a duly authorized official.
Moreover, arrests sometimes were made on charges such as sorcery or
debt with no basis in law. The authorities frequently detained
individuals on unspecified charges or pending investigation. The
Government often resorted to arrest and detention on false charges or
on the charge of ``plotting against the security of the State,''
particularly in political or personal vendettas. Detainees were
generally allowed access to family members and a lawyer of their own
choosing. Many detainees could not afford the services of an attorney,
and the Government did not provide free counsel. Bail is available at
the discretion of the investigative judge (juge d'instruction). Bail
hearings are not automatic, and judges usually granted bail only for
minor cases and based on compelling humanitarian grounds such as a need
for medical attention.
Prolonged pretrial detention was a serious problem. Judicial delays
left an estimated 78 percent of the country's prison population
awaiting trial (see Section 1.e.). The problem was most extreme in
Port-au-Prince, with 88 percent of National Penitentiary inmates in
pretrial detention status. Eighty-six percent of females and 95 percent
of minor detainees were in pretrial detention. The Justice Ministry
made efforts to address the problem: between May and September,
Minister of Justice Brown ordered the release of 60 pretrial detainees,
and 6 judicial officials newly assigned to the National Penitentiary in
May 2001 freed detainees in 120 out of the 178 cases reviewed (see
Section 1.c.). The prolonged detention of persons with valid release
orders continued to be a problem (see Section 1.e.).
Prisoners with histories of opposition to the Government or
affiliation with the Duvalier or de facto regimes were affected
disproportionately by prolonged pretrial detention. By year's end,
political prisoners still held despite valid release orders included
Esteve Conserve, Leonard Lucas, Alexandre Paul, Jean-Michel Richardson,
and Jean Enel Samedi. However, authorities released Leoncefils Ceance,
Jean-Robert Lherisson, Rilande Louis, and Calero Vivas Fabien.
Prosper Avril, former general and President of the military
government from 1988 to 1990, remained incarcerated at the National
Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince at year's end. In May 2001, the
authorities had arrested Avril during a book promotion tour and charged
him with plotting against the State. In March the Gonaives Court of
Appeals ruled this arrest illegal and ordered his release, which
occurred on April 12. However, the authorities immediately rearrested
him on new charges of complicity in a 1990 massacre of peasants in
Piatre. Following self-imposed exile abroad in April, Judge Henry
Kesner Noel admitted he had inserted Avril's name in the list of
accused perpetrators of the Piatre massacre on the instruction of
officials close to President Aristide. On October 22, the Gonaives
Court of Appeals ruled the April arrest illegal and ordered Avril's
release; however, the district attorney's office in Port-au-Prince did
not comply. Avril remained incarcerated at year's end.
On September 23, police arrested Rosemond Jean, leader of
CONOSOVIC, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) advocating government
reimbursement of deposits lost in failed cooperative schemes) on
charges of weapons possession and criminal conspiracy. On September 30,
Jean's attorney filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus, noting arresting
officers had not had an arrest or search warrant. As of year's end, the
court had not yet ruled, and Jean remained incarcerated.
The Constitution prohibits the involuntary exile of citizens, and
there were no reports of its use. Self-imposed internal and external
exile were common among opponents of the regime.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary was subject
to significant influence by the executive and legislative branches.
Years of extensive corruption and governmental neglect left the poorly
organized judicial system largely moribund. Judges assigned to
politically sensitive cases complained about interference by the
executive branch (see Section 1.a.).
At the lowest level of the justice system, justices of the peace
issue warrants, adjudicate minor infractions, mediate cases, take
depositions, and refer cases to prosecutors or higher judicial
officials. Investigating magistrates and public prosecutors cooperate
in the development of more serious cases, which are tried by the judges
of the first instance courts. Thirty appeals court judges hear cases
referred from the first instance courts, and the 11-member Court of
Cassation, the country's highest court, addresses questions of
procedure and constitutionality. In Port-au-Prince, seven judges sit on
a special labor court with jurisdiction over labor disputes, but in the
provinces courts of first instance adjudicate such cases.
The judicial apparatus follows a civil law system based on the
Napoleonic Code; the Criminal Code dates from 1832, although it has
been amended in some instances. The Constitution provides for the right
to a fair public trial; wever, this right was abridged widely in
practice. The Constitution also expressly denies police and judicial
authorities the right to interrogate suspects unless legal counsel or a
representative of the suspect's choice was present or they waive this
right; this right was also abridged in practice. While trials are
public, most accused persons cannot afford legal counsel for
interrogation or trial, and the law does not require that the
Government provide legal representation. Despite the efforts of local
human rights groups and the international community to provide free
legal aid, many interrogations occurred without presence of counsel.
However, some defendants had access to counsel during trials. The
Constitution provides defendants with a presumption of innocence and
the right to be present at trial, to confront witnesses against them,
and to present witnesses and evidence in their own behalf; however, in
practice corrupt and uneducated judges frequently denied defendants
these rights.
Systemic problems including underfunding and a shortage of
adequately trained and qualified justices of the peace, judges, and
prosecutors created a huge backlog of criminal cases, with many
detainees waiting months or even years in pretrial detention for a
court date (see Section 1.d.). There was no legal redress for prolonged
pretrial detention following acquittal or dismissal of charges.
In most regions, judges lacked the basic resources (such as office
space, legal reference texts, and supplies) to perform their duties.
Professional competence was sometimes lacking as well. The qualifying
yearlong course at the Magistrates' school requires no previous legal
training. On September 13, 29 judges graduated from this course and in
October a new class of at least 9 students began. Judges increasingly
conducted legal proceedings exclusively in Creole rather than French,
but language remained a significant barrier to full access to the
judicial system (see Section 5). UNDP, supported by the Government,
provided additional training for many segments of the judicial system,
including new judges and attorneys.
The Constitution sets varying tenure periods for judges above the
level of justice of the peace. However, in practice the Ministry of
Justice exercised appointment and administrative oversight over the
judiciary, prosecutors, and court staff. This Ministry can remove
justices of the peace and in practice has occasionally dismissed judges
above this level. During the year, citizens filed approximately 180
complaints against judges with the Ministry of Justice.
The Code of Criminal Procedure does not assign clear responsibility
to investigate crimes, dividing the authority among police, justices of
the peace, prosecutors, and investigative magistrates. Examining
magistrates often received files that were empty or missing police
reports. Autopsies were conducted only rarely, and autopsy reports
seldom issued. The Code provides for 2 criminal court sessions
(``assizes'') per year in each of the 15 first instance jurisdictions
for all major crimes requiring a jury trial; each session generally
lasts for 2 weeks. During the year, the Port-au-Prince jurisdiction,
largest in terms of caseload, met once for 1 week and heard only 7
homicide cases. Criminal assizes in Port-au-Prince have met only once a
year since 1998, with the last meeting held in July.
Following the IAHCR's August 26-29 visit evaluating the status of
human rights, the OAS expressed its deep concern about the rule of law,
the lack of judicial independence, and impunity (see Section 4). The
OAS Special Rapporteur recommended that the Government ``take steps to
ensure the autonomy, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary.''
During this visit the OAS held a 2-day seminar instructing local
attorneys and officials about human rights law. During the year a local
NGO, working with the International Foundation for Elections Systems
(IFES) and the Dominican Republic NGO Foundation for
Institutionalization and Justice (FINJUS), conducted education
campaigns on judicial reform and promotion of judicial independence.
The Government has limited the return of criminal deportees from
the United States to 600 per year, creating a large backlog of Haitian
criminals in the United States waiting to be deported. Upon their
return to the country, criminal deportees are detained until a family
member agrees to take custody of them and their release order is
processed. This generally takes one to two months, but has lasted as
long as four months in unusual instances.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits interference with privacy,
family, home, or correspondence; however, police and other security
force elements routinely conducted searches without warrants.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected those rights in practice. Several times during the year, the
Government publicly demonstrated strong support for free expression;
however, there were several documented attacks on members of the press.
Print and electronic media freely criticized the Government and
opposition. However, in practice most media admitted to some self-
censorship to avoid offending sponsors or the politically influential.
There were two French-language newspapers in the country, Le
Nouvelliste and L'Union, with a combined circulation of less than
20,000 readers. L'Union is a government-run newspaper; its editor was
the Secretary of State for Communication. Le Nouvelliste and some
irregularly printed papers were frequently critical of government
policies. There was virtually no Creole-language press.
With a literacy rate of approximately 52 percent and limited access
to television, the most important medium is radio, especially those
stations broadcasting in Creole. There are 275 private radio stations,
with 43 in the capital alone. Most carried a mix of music, news, and
talk show programs that many citizens regard as their only opportunity
to speak out on a variety of political, social, and economic issues.
Uncensored foreign satellite and cable broadcasts were available but
limited in impact: most citizens could not afford televisions. The few
stations carrying news or opinion broadcasts freely expressed a wide
range of political viewpoints.
Although most radio stations and other forms of telecommunications
were nominally independent, they are subject to a 1997 law designating
the State sole owner and proprietor of the airwaves. The State leases
broadcast rights to private enterprises, retaining preemption rights in
the event of a national emergency, including natural disasters. The
Government did not exercise this right in practice.
There were several attacks on, or threats against, journalists
during the year, and the legal system provided limited protection or
redress. Journalists were accused of destabilizing the Government and
often subjected to anonymous threats of violence, including threats of
kidnaping and murder. Police and government officials often failed to
protect journalists during civil unrest. The NGO Reporters Without
Borders and local journalists' associations continued to protest
attacks in prior years and called on the Government to provide
security. The Government failed to do so, despite frequent expressions
of support for free expression. The public and Popular Organizations
(OPs) sometimes threatened journalists covering protests, civil unrest,
and other large group events. In such cases, the Government's inability
or unwillingness to provide adequate security to media outlets and
journalists and tacit encouragement of ``zero tolerance'' contributed
to an increased sense of vulnerability among members of the media who
criticized the Government or FL. In the wake of the violence of
December 17, 2001, 24 journalists or their family members went into
self-imposed exile or sought refuge in an embassy, including
journalists from Radio Caraibes, Radio Galaxie, Radio Ibo, Radio
Metropole, and Radio Vision 2000.
On September 4, IACHR announced that the ``murder of journalists in
Haiti, along with a large number of complaints regarding harassment and
threats against journalists, the media, and other social communicators,
have created an unfavorable environment for freedom of expression.''
The IACHR Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression concluded that
those whose freedom of expression is curtailed ``cannot always rely on
effective judicial protection to detect those responsible, to put a
stop to intimidation, and ensure reparation for the damage done.'' The
IACHR urged the Government to ensure full exercise of the right to
freedom of expression without being exposed to reprisals (see Section
4). The Special Rapporteur also recommended that the country amend its
laws on contempt of public authority and the criminalization of
offensive language when referring to government officials.
From September 21 through 27, a U.N. independent expert on human
rights conducted a fact-finding mission and cited impunity and threats
to free expression as major concerns. The expert found that journalists
were often forced to practice self-censorship.
On February 9, police arrested radio journalist Genet Morin of the
Magic Stereo station and several members of the KID party, and held
them without charges (see Section 3). Authorities released Morin 5 days
later under pressure from local and international human rights and
journalist organizations. It was unclear whether police targeted him as
a journalist or because he was with KID members.
On May 27, Saint Raphael HNP arrested journalists Darwin Saint-
Julien and Allan Deshommes and 11 others, and transferred them by
helicopter to the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince. The two
journalists had been covering a demonstration by peasant activists from
the leftist political group Batay Ouvriye when armed local residents
attacked the crowd. During the clash, two local residents died. The
journalists, one of whom had suffered severe machete injuries, were
held without charges until June 8. Police cited the journalists'
alleged political beliefs, specifically opposition to private sector
investment, as justification for the arrest (see Section 6.a.).
In July Saint Marc police arrested the 82-year-old mother of a
journalist and detained her for 8 days without charges. Her son had
refused to retract an earlier report critical of a judge. The same
month, Grand Goave mayor, Rigaud Xavier, slapped a journalist in court.
The mayor was pressured to resign, but prosecutors brought no charges
against him.
On September 16, Judge Fritzner Duclaire indicted 10 OP members for
the December 2001 killing of Petit-Goave journalist, Brignol Lindor.
Police had only arrested three persons by year's end (see Section
1.a.).
On September 10, the Association of Haitian Journalists submitted a
formal protest regarding tax bills on nongovernment-affiliated media.
Many media owners felt these bills were political reprisals based on
earlier presidential comments that those who did not pay their taxes
should not criticize the Government. The Director of Income Tax and
media owners resolved the dispute amicably, with some owners receiving
a payment schedule and others new audits.
On September 26, Radio Kiskeya temporarily went off the air after
receiving threats that an OP was going to attack the station. Radio
Caraibes suspended news broadcasts to show solidarity with the
threatened station. On September 27, three men threatened to set fire
to Radio Ibo and the station closed briefly. The Secretary of State for
Communication and the Prime Minister later visited Radio Kiskeya to
support its operations. In a speech on October 10, President Aristide
accused the media of involvement in a plot to destroy the Government,
asserted an unspecified group was trying to denigrate the Government by
saying it did not encourage a free press, and said fabricated threats
to the media were the true threat to press liberty. FL leadership
broadcast the same statements as part of an orchestrated campaign in
the provinces and Port-au-Prince prior to the October 10 speech,
repeating them in subsequent weeks.
There was no investigation into the December 2000 killing of sports
broadcaster Geral Denoze. Investigations into the April 2000 killing of
prominent radio commentator and journalist Jean Dominique and a
security guard continued during the year, with a large gap between the
resignation of one investigating judge and presidential appointment of
a successor (see Section 1.a.). Local and international human rights
groups frequently criticized the slow pace of the Dominique
investigation. On the evening of December 25 in Petionville, armed men
attempting to enter the home of Michele Montas, Dominique's widow, shot
and killed Maxime Seide, her bodyguard. Bernard Sainvil, the judge
investigating Dominique's murder, had previously announced that he
would submit his findings in December. By year's end, he had not yet
sent his report to the district attorney.
On November 21 members of the paramilitary group ``Cannibal Army,''
after pelting student protestors with stones, chased a group of seven
journalists into the local bishop's residence (see Section 2.b).
Gonaives police did not intervene. On November 26, after threatening to
do so, Metayer supporters set fire to Radio Etincelle, where three of
the journalists worked. On November 28, in coordination with the
Government, the President of the Association for Haitian Journalists,
Guy Delva, other journalists, and CIMO police units accompanied the
seven journalists out of Gonaives. They subsequently went into hiding,
where they remained at year's end.
On July 15, Israel Jacky Cantave, a Radio Caraibes journalist, and
a colleague disappeared in an apparent kidnaping. Cantave and his
severely beaten associate reappeared after a full day of public and
government outcry. Cantave and his family left for France shortly after
his reappearance, citing continued threats. In mid-August police
reported their investigation did not support Cantave's account,
suggesting the kidnaping had been a hoax. The authorities have filed no
charges of kidnaping or filing a false report but the case remains
open.
Foreign journalists generally traveled without hindrance from the
authorities. The Government did not censor books or films. However, on
September 18 special police forces shut down an open-air concert of the
popular music group, Boukman Eksperyans, as it began a song critical of
the Government.
The Government did not limit access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom. However, in
August some State University of Haiti students protested the
appointment of interim rectors, saying the Government exerted too much
political influence over the university (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly. Although a variety of organizations
were able to exercise this right without hindrance throughout the year,
numerous violations of this freedom occurred in the provinces. CIMO was
routinely accused of using excessive force against demonstrators (see
Section 1.c.). Civil society groups were sometimes refused permits to
assemble, most often in Central Plateau department. Authorities
frequently failed to provide security for opposition parties or other
groups conducting peaceful demonstrations. Authorities often
transported pro-Aristide supporters, armed and unarmed, to announced
opposition events and failed to arrest them for throwing rocks or
bottles at the demonstrators.
On June 4, the HNP severely beat dozens of demonstrators demanding
access to electrical services. On July 27, when armed men (including a
CASEC) disrupted a meeting of farmers in the town of Torbeck, police
reacted by arresting several of the farmers. In early September, CIMO
agents in Mirogoane shot two people and used tear gas on residents
demanding public services such as electricity, potable water, and
better roads and telephone service. On September 2, CIMO agents used
batons to beat demonstrators demanding compensation for losses at
failed cooperatives in Port-au-Prince.
In several cases, police inaction allowed organized political
militants to violate freedom of assembly rights, and there were
numerous violent political demonstrations (see Section 1.a.). On August
14 and 22, groups with pro-Aristide banners and leaflets attacked
students demonstrating against the replacement of the rector and vice-
rectors of the State University of Haiti. Police present at the scene
of the attacks did nothing to prevent or end these attacks. In
September the OP Bale Woze, known for attacks on political opponents of
FL and led by Saint Marc Parliamentary Deputy Emmaus Maillet, announced
it would not permit any anti-FL demonstrations in Saint Marc. A few
days later, pro-FL supporters repeating that sentiment in Gonaives
clashed with opposition protestors. Eight opposition demonstrators were
shot in the ensuing violence.
On November 17, antigovernment demonstrations commemorating the
Battle of Vertieres in Cap Haitien peacefully protested government
policies and called for President Aristide's departure. Police units
protected the participants from groups of progovernment supporter
harassment. On November 18, armed members of the FL informed government
employees who had participated in anti-Aristide demonstrations, that,
in contravention of labor laws, they had been fired.
In Petit Goave on November 20, police shot and injured eight
students initially protesting school fees, corruption, and lack of
public services and later denouncing the FL government and calling for
President Aristide's departure. Police shot one of the students. On
November 21, anti-Aristide student protestors in Petit Goave, Gonaives,
and Port-au-Prince called for his resignation. Police in Petit Goave
and Port au Prince attempted to maintain order and protect the
demonstrators. In Gonaives, pro-FL members of the paramilitary group
``Cannibal Army'' threw rocks at the students and chased a group of
seven journalists into the local bishop's residence (see Section 2.a.).
Gonaives police did not intervene.
On November 22, pro-FL supporters blocked main roads in Port-au-
Prince with barricades, flaming tires, and parades, effectively halting
all business and educational activity. Police and other vehicles
bearing official plates passed the roadblocks, and other vehicles were
stopped and shaken down for money.
Having obtained the necessary permit, several groups of opposition
members in Port au Prince scheduled an anti-government demonstration
for December 3, the anniversary of Brignol Lindor's murder. By 9 a.m.,
pro-Aristide supporters, some armed with guns or bullwhips, occupied
the location of the proposed march, beat some would-be participants and
threatened others. The scheduled commemorative march did not occur. At
the State University of Haiti, BS police units beat some students, two
of whom were hospitalized. On December 3 in Cap Haitien, pro-FL
supporters attempted to halt anti-Aristide demonstrations by throwing
rocks and bottles. Opposition protestors responded in kind. Police used
teargas to disperse the crowd.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. The Penal Code
requires prior government approval for any association of more than 20
persons that seeks tax benefits and official recognition from the
Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the right to
practice all religions and faiths, provided that practice does not
disturb law and order, and the Government generally respected this
right in practice.
In many respects, Roman Catholicism retained its traditional
primacy among the country's religions. However, Protestant
denominations (primarily Methodist and Baptist) have overtaken the
Catholic Church with regard to active members. A large segment of the
population practiced Christianity as well as Voudou, a traditional
religion derived in part from West African beliefs. While there were
associations of Voudou practitioners and priests, there was no
organized hierarchy. Official recognition by the Ministry of Religious
Affairs gives religious organizations legal standing and tax exempt
status, and extends civil recognition to church documents. In April
2001, the Ministry of Religion officially recognized the first Voudou
church, the Eglise Vodou d'Ayiti.
Accusations of sorcery, particularly in rural areas, have led to
mob violence and killings, and Voudou practitioners were targeted in
some cases.
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2002 International
Religious Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
An unknown number of undocumented migrants left the country by sea
or land to seek better economic opportunities. The Government's
National Migration Office (ONM) was responsible for assisting citizens
repatriated from other countries (including the Dominican Republic, the
Bahamas, Cuba, and the United States) and frequently provided small
sums of money to repatriated migrants for transportation. The ONM
recorded 8,902 citizens formally repatriated during the fiscal year.
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the
Dominican Republic deported approximately 500 Haitians each month.
There were reliable reports of family separation and maltreatment of
Haitians by Dominican soldiers during the year. There were no credible
reports of government mistreatment of repatriated migrants.
The law provides for granting of asylum and refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The question of provision of first
asylum did not arise. During the year, the Government took no action on
its only official asylum claim, brought by a person who had deserted
from a third country's army, and his family. Several claimants from
Cuba and Sierra Leone were advised by police instead to seek asylum at
an embassy or in the Dominican Republic. Both groups reportedly had
left Haiti by year's end.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully. In practice, the political system remained in
transition from a dictatorial system to a more open and competitive
one. The dominant FL political party manipulated legislative elections
and exaggerated electoral participation in the 2000 presidential
elections. The FL controls all branches of government, including the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In November 2000, former
President Aristide faced only token opposition and was elected to a 5-
year term with a reported 91.5 percent of the votes cast. Most local
and regional elected leaders were members of the FL.
Under the Constitution and electoral law, a candidate for the
Senate or Chamber of Deputies must receive an absolute majority of
votes cast to be elected in the first round of voting. If no candidate
receives a majority, a second round runoff is required. Election
observers, including the OAS, described the May 2000 legislative and
local elections as generally free and fair despite irregular ballot
tabulation, numerous reports of ballot theft, and significant candidate
and observer intimidation. However, the CEP manipulated election
results to ensure that Fanmi Lavalas won 16 of the 17 Senate seats,
tabulating only those votes cast for the top four vote getters in each
department rather than all valid votes cast. By setting a lower
threshold for the absolute majority vote required under the
Constitution, this eliminated runoff elections. The OAS Electoral
Observation Mission questioned this methodology, which it characterized
as a serious error.
Government refusal to correct these manipulations led to a
political standoff between the FL and the opposition Democratic
Convergence (CD). OAS-sponsored negotiations between the Government and
opposition over the May election results continued through the summer
with few results. On September 4, the OAS unanimously approved
Resolution 822, delinking international economic assistance from the
signing of an FL/CD accord. It called on the Government to implement
previous OAS resolutions, expressed the expectation that the Government
would hold legislative and local elections in 2003, and called on the
Government to create a favorable security climate, implement a
disarmament plan, strengthen independent police and judicial
institutions in order to combat impunity, and participate in the
formation of a credible Provisional Electoral Counsel by November 4 and
an Electoral Guarantees Commission (CGE) by December 4. The resolution
broadened the mandate of the OAS Special Mission to assist the
Government in undertaking its obligations and to monitor and evaluate
those efforts. By November 20, eight of the entities comprising the CEP
had nominated a representative, though not officially sworn them in.
Convergence had not put forth a representative. In reaction to the
repression of opposition and student demonstrations on December 3,
several CEP sectors considered imposing new conditions for their full
participation in the CEP. OAS policy remained focused on implementation
of Resolution 822, of which formation of a CEP is a key provision. By
year's end neither the new CEP nor CGE had formed.
Pursuant to OAS Resolutions 806 in January, and 822 in September,
the Government invited a three-member OAS special inquiry commission to
investigate the December 2001 attacks on members of opposition parties.
In July the commission concluded that the attack on the palace was not
an attempted coup d'etat, and that the political opposition had not
participated in the planning or execution of the attack on the palace.
Furthermore, the commission determined that the subsequent attacks on
the opposition would not have occurred without police complicity. Under
international pressure, the Government agreed to pay reparations to the
victims and publish a report of actions taken against persons
implicated in the events. The Government's September 12 interim report
was deemed insufficient to meet these requirements. By year's end, some
accounts had been settled but negotiations over the amount of
reparations were still ongoing for several others, including the two
largest--OPL and MOCHRENA.
On July 4, police arrested Amiot Metayer a suspect in the December
violence, on unrelated charges. However, on August 2, armed men
attacked Gonaives prison and freed Metayer and 158 others. Since the
escape, Metayer has frequently appeared in public and the authorities
have not attempted to rearrest him. On November 28, the Government-
appointed delegate to Gonaives, Kenaz Jean-Baptiste, resigned, days
after Metayer and his supporters, the ``Cannibal Army,'' publicly
agitated for her departure. The Government replaced her with Metayer's
preferred candidate, Ketlene Thelemaque.
Increasingly, affiliation with the FL was required for government
employment, and political patronage was widespread. It was common for
political appointees to use their positions for personal enrichment.
Many of the 2,500 to 3,500 officers on the official HNP payroll were
ghost officers who did not actually work.
There were fewer overt attacks on opposition leaders than in 2001,
although there were numerous credible threats. The Government continued
to accuse opposition supporters of plotting against the State. Members
of opposition parties and their supporters faced the constant threat of
arrest. In mid-February the police arrested 14 persons, most of them
members of the KID political party, on charges of plotting against the
State and participating in kidnapings for profit. Most remained in jail
for months despite the widespread perception that the charges were
without foundation.
On February 10, unknown persons killed the deputy from Gonaives,
Marc Andre Dirogene, a FL member. Dirogene had written a letter to
then-Prime Minister Cherestal, denouncing corruption at the Gonaives
port and customs office. Cherestal reportedly sent a copy of the letter
to the FL controlled port and custom authorities, where Amiot Metayer's
brother has a prominent post.
On June 24, authorities interrogated 20 CD supporters, detaining
11, after unknown armed men shot and killed a family of 5 in Belladere.
Observers claimed that the authorities politicized the crime to
implicate CD members.
On August 22, police beat CD leader Gabriel Fortune, a former Les
Cayes deputy, following a routine traffic stop.
On October 15, authorities arrested and beat two KID party members
involved in an argument over public housing, but did not arrest other
parties to the dispute. The whereabouts of the two men remained unknown
at year's end and human rights organizations believed that they were
dead.
After the November 28 shooting of Belladere Justice of the Peace,
Christophe Lozama, in a clash between FL and anti-FL demonstrators,
authorities targeted anti-FL protestors for questioning and arrest
despite eyewitness accounts that he had been shot by FL supporters.
Human rights investigators concluded that pro-government officials
exploited Lozama's murder to justify political repression of opposition
members in Las Cahobas (see Section 1.a).
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics
or government. The monetary deposit required of female candidates for
political office (if sponsored by a recognized party) is one-half that
required of male candidates. At year's end 3 of the 81 deputies were
women, and there were 6 women among the 19 senators. Five of the 16
ministers in the Government were women. During the year eight senators
resigned and the deputy of Gonaives was killed.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials
generally acknowledged their views but often failed to implement
recommendations. The Government permitted special missions and the
continued presence of U.N. bodies and other international organizations
such as the International Red Cross, the U.N. Independent Expert on
Human Rights, the U.N. Development Fund, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, and the OAS Special Mission's human rights office.
However, threats and intimidation from unknown sources against domestic
NGOs continued during the year.
The number of groups that monitor human rights has grown. Human
rights organizations increasingly turned to issues that they had not
previously addressed, including prison conditions, the widespread lack
of health facilities, and impunity for criminals. Local officials often
attempted to control and sought financial support from domestic human
rights groups, as well as other local NGOs. Especially in Gonaives, the
Les Cayes region and in the Central Plateau, local officials and their
supporters often harassed, refused permits to assemble, and threatened
NGOs. Some government officials resented international grants to NGOs
and asserted that those monies should be available to the Government.
In January, Patrick Merisier, a field monitor covering the south
for the NCHR received leaflets at his home, warning that he would be
killed if he did not stop his human rights monitoring and radio
broadcasts about the subject. On February 22, two men shot Merisier,
and he went into hiding. Authorities have not opened an investigation
into the case.
On July 24, two HNP and three armed civilians illegally arrested
human rights attorney Fleury Lysias, who was beaten when he refused to
pay for his release. Upon learning of his human rights affiliations,
Lysias' captors broke his arm and damaged his eardrum. Lysias visited
the HNP's Inspector General office three times to request a formal
investigation into the case. No investigation had taken place by year's
end.
At the national and international levels, human rights
organizations have been active and effective in monitoring human rights
issues, and met frequently with government officials. Human rights
organizations, including the Platform of Haitian Human Rights
Organizations, the NCHR, the Lawyers' Committee for the Respect of
Individual Rights, the Ecumenical Center of Human Rights (CEDH) and the
Catholic Bishops' National Commission on Justice and Peace, made
frequent media appearances and published objective reports on
violations. All reported receiving threats as a result of their work.
In June the OAS began a Special Mission to Haiti to strengthen
democratic institutions, with a primary focus on justice and human
rights. The resident OAS human rights officers' mandates were limited
to training in human rights and strengthening institutional capacity
(see Section 2.a.).
Investigators made no arrests or progress in the 1999 attempted
killing of human rights activist Pierre Esperance, NCHR country
director. The HNP's investigation remained open in this case, but by
all accounts was inactive.
The Office of the Protector of Citizens (OPC), an ombudsman-like
office provided for by the Constitution, received complaints of abuse
at all levels of government. From September 2001 to October, the OPC
received and investigated 488 complaints and resolved 50. More than
half related to police abuse; the others were brought often by
government employees and involved labor disputes. The Government did
not directly impede OPC investigations but did not always respond to
its requests for information. Local human rights organizations did not
view the office as an advocate or interlocutor with the Government, and
often did not file complaints with the OPC, reporting that OPC did not
play an active role following up on human rights complaints. During the
year, following the appointment of Necker Dessables, a respected human
rights advocate, relations between the OPC and major human rights
organizations such as the Platform for Human Rights and the Lawyers
Committee for the Respect of Individual Rights (CARLI), improved. In
addition to investigating complaints and monitoring prison conditions,
the OPC conducted a number of training seminars throughout the year,
focusing on civic education in schools and criminal procedure for penal
system officials. The OPC had budgetary problems and employed only four
investigators.
The Parliament's Justice and Human Rights Committee, created in
2000, did not have a high profile and focused largely on judicial
issues during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution does not specifically prohibit discrimination on
the grounds of race, sex, disability, language, or social status. It
does provide for equal working conditions regardless of sex, beliefs,
or marital status. However, there was no effective governmental
mechanism to administer or enforce these provisions.
Women.--The law provides penalties for rape and domestic violence;
however, the Government did not enforce these provisions adequately.
According to women's rights groups, rape and other abuse of women was
common, both within and outside marriage. Women's shelters and
organizations reported that girls and women in the ``quartiers
populaires'' (slums) like Cite Soleil and Martissant are frequently
raped and harassed by local armed thugs. Police authorities rarely
arrest the perpetrators or investigate the incident, and the victims
sometimes suffer further harassment in retaliation. Natacha Jean
Jacques, an adolescent girl from Martissant who was detained in 2000
for murder and then raped by a prison official, had previously filed a
police complaint against several young men, including the murder
victim, after they sexually harassed and threatened her. After her
complaint to the police, the group of young men she had accused went to
her house and confronted the girl. According to witnesses, Jean Jacques
killed the victim with a knife that one of the men had dropped. She
remained incarcerated and had not faced trial by year's end (see
Section 1.c).
A 1998 study by the Haitian Center for Research and Action for the
Promotion of Women documented widespread rape and violence against
women. The report also found that many women did not report these forms
of abuse due to fear, shame, or lack of confidence in judicial
remedies. A 1999 survey by UNICEF of violence against women found that
37 percent of women reported they were victims of sexual violence or
reported knowing a woman who had been; another 33 percent reported
being victims of other types of physical abuse. There were no
government-sponsored programs for victims of violence. The Criminal
Code excuses a husband who murders his wife or her partner upon
catching them in the act of adultery in his home, but a wife who kills
her husband under similar circumstances is not excused.
The law does not prohibit specifically sexual harassment, although
the Labor Code states that men and women have the same rights and
obligations. Sexual harassment of female workers was a problem,
especially in the assembly sector (see Section 6.b.).
Women do not enjoy the same social and economic status as men. In
some social strata, tradition limits women's roles. A majority of
peasant women remain in traditional occupations of farming, marketing,
and domestic labor. Very poor female heads of household in urban areas
also often find their employment opportunities limited to traditional
roles in domestic labor and sales. Laws governing child support
recognize the widespread practice of multiple-father families but were
rarely enforced. Female employees in private industry or service jobs,
including government jobs, were seldom promoted to supervisory
positions. However, well-educated women have occupied prominent
positions in both the private and public sector in the past several
years.
The Ministry of Women's Affairs is charged with promoting and
defending the rights of women and ensuring that they attain an equal
status in society, but had few resources at its disposal and was able
to accomplish little in this regard.
Domestic women's rights groups were small, localized, and received
little publicity.
Children.--Government health care and education programs for
children were inadequate. Malnutrition was a problem; approximately 23
percent of all children under 5 were chronically malnourished. The
Government has a school nutrition program, administered through the
Office of National Development and supported by foreign donors. Through
this program, health clinics and dispensaries have begun to distribute
donated food to children.
The Constitution and the law provide for free and compulsory
primary education; however, in practice most rural families had no
access to public schools. The costs of school fees, books, materials,
and uniforms, even in public schools, were prohibitive for most
families, and an estimated 90 percent of schools were private. Schools
were dilapidated and understaffed. According to the Government, 40
percent of children never attend school; of those who do, less than 15
percent graduate from secondary school. The Ministry of Education
estimated primary school enrollment at 65 percent. Poorer families
sometimes ration education money to pay school fees only for male
children.
Child abuse was a problem. Radio commercials urged parents not to
abuse their children physically or mentally. There was some anecdotal
evidence that in very poor families, caretakers deprive the youngest
children of food to feed older, income-generating children.
In September 2001, Parliament passed a law banning corporal
punishment of children, which ordered all schools to post clearly their
disciplinary policies. It also called for the establishment of a
commission to determine appropriate school disciplinary measures. In
practice, corporal punishment was accepted as a form of discipline.
Port-au-Prince's large population of street children included many
domestic servants (restaveks) who were dismissed from or fled
employers' homes (see Section 6.f.). The Ministry of Social Affairs
provided some assistance to street children.
Several international and local NGOs worked on children's issues.
For example, the Haitian Coalition for the Defense of the Rights of the
Child (COHADDE) promotes children's rights by conducting awareness
raising activities.
Persons with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that persons
with disabilities shall have the means to ensure their autonomy,
education, and independence. However, there was no legislation to
implement these constitutional provisions or to mandate provision of
access to buildings for persons with disabilities. Given the severe
poverty in which most citizens live, those with disabilities faced a
particularly harsh existence even though they did not face overt
mistreatment. Disabled beggars were common on the streets of Port-au-
Prince and other towns.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 99 percent of
Haitians are descendants, in whole or in part, of African slaves who
won a war of independence from France in 1804. The remaining population
is of European, Middle Eastern, North American, or Latin American
origin. The law makes no distinction based on race. However,
longstanding social and political animosities were often tied to
cultural identification, skin color, and overlapping issues of class in
a starkly nonegalitarian society. Some of these animosities date back
to before the country's revolutionary period.
Racial distinctions tend to parallel social and economic strata.
Mulattos generally belong to the wealthiest classes of society.
Mulattos historically have been targets of sporadic attacks because
they were perceived as wealthy.
The Government recognizes two official languages: Creole, spoken by
virtually all Haitians; and French, limited to approximately 20 percent
of the population including the economic elite. Lack of French-language
skills limited access to political and economic opportunities for the
majority of the population. Although Creole was used in parliamentary
debate in the Lower House of Parliament, the Government prepared most
official documents only in French. Language also remained a significant
barrier to full access to the judicial system (see Section 1.e.).
Despite the Government's literacy promotion, many Creole speakers were
illiterate.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1987 Constitution and the Labor
Code provide for the right of association. Public sector workers are
organized pursuant to Article 31 of the 1987 Constitution.
The law protects union activities and prohibits a closed shop. For
legal recognition the law also requires that a union, which must have a
minimum of 10 members, register with the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs within 60 days of its formation. The Labor Code does not
require prior approval before any association is established. Unions
are subject to the same registration requirements as other associations
(see Section 2.b.). The law prohibits employers, management, and anyone
who represents the interests of employers from joining a union.
In theory unions are independent of the Government and political
parties. Nine principal labor federations represented approximately 5
percent of the total labor force of approximately 2.8 million persons,
including the approximately 2 to 3 percent working in the industrial
sector. Union membership has decreased significantly, but remains
active in the public sector. Some union representatives asserted that
union activists not affiliated with the Government were forced into
self-exile.
Several unions have pending grievances over worker rights
violations against the Government before the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions. These include the National Confederation of Haitian Teachers
(CNEH), the Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH), and the
General Independent Organization of Haitian Workers. Three major
teachers' unions--the CNEH, the National Union of Trained Teachers, and
the High School Teacher's Union--accused the Ministry of National
Education of unfair labor practices. They accused the Education
Ministry of implementing changes in a labor contract without advance
notification or due opportunity to negotiate changes. Public school
teachers have not yet received a 32 percent cost of living adjustment
that the Minister of Education promised in 1997, and at year's end, had
not received a paycheck since October.
Labor unions reported several cases of threats and arrests during
the year. Leaders of several major labor confederations reported
receiving threats and demands to support the Fanmi Lavalas party. In
March police beat members of a textile union demonstrating for
compensation after being fired. On May 27, armed supporters of San
Raphael municipal authorities attacked a group of Batay Ouvriye
activists attempting to organize agricultural workers and negotiate
their right to exploit fallow land (see Section 2.a.). Two
demonstrators and one local official supporter died. Police arrested 11
persons, including 2 journalists. On August 21, all but two labor union
leaders, Jeremie Dorvil and Urbain Garcon, were released. They remained
incarcerated until December 2, when they were freed. There was no
progress in the investigation of the 2000 killing of CATH member Elison
Merzilus.
On June 19, the ILO criticized the Government for not having
considered the input of the union sector in selecting the June ILO
conference delegation. Sector representatives asserted that the
Minister of Social Affairs selected only progovernment delegates.
Union leaders asserted that some employers in the private
industrial sector dismissed individuals for participation in union
organizing activities. In 2000 the ILO criticized the Labor Code for
its failure to include a specific provision providing protection
against antiunion discrimination at the time of hiring.
Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies. Each of the principal labor
federations maintained some fraternal relations with various
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
protects trade union organizing activities and stipulates fines for
those who interfere with this right but does not provide for
reinstatement of workers fired for trade union activities. No fines
were issued during the year. Unions generally were free to pursue their
goals, although the Government made little effort to enforce the law.
Organized labor activity was concentrated in the Port-au-Prince
area, in state enterprises and in the civil service. High unemployment
rates and antiunion sentiment among some factory workers and most
employers limited the success of union organizing efforts.
Collective bargaining was nonexistent, and employers set wages
unilaterally. The Labor Code does not distinguish between industries
producing for the local market and those producing for export.
Employees in the export-oriented assembly sector enjoyed better than
average wages and benefits. However, frequent verbal abuse and
intimidation of workers and organizers was a problem in the assembly
sector. Female workers in the assembly sector reported that some
employers sexually harassed female workers with impunity. Women also
reported that while most assembly sector workers were women, virtually
all supervisors were men. Workers had access to labor courts (Tribunaux
de Travail) set up to resolve common labor-management disputes. The
courts function under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs and adjudicate minor conflicts, but unions stated that
the process is inefficient. Seven labor courts operate in Port-au-
Prince, and in the provinces plaintiffs utilize municipal courts.
The Labor Code provides for the right to strike, except for
managers, administrators, other heads of establishments, and public
utility service workers. The Labor Code defines public utility service
employees as essential workers who ``cannot suspend their activities
without causing serious harm to public health and security.'' There
were few public sector strikes during the year. In May hospital
residents went on strike to protest lack of supplies and the diversion
of existing supplies to administrators. When the Government intervened
and provided additional materials, residents resumed work. On November
20, emergency room workers at Port-au-Prince's only public hospital,
the Hospital of the State University of Haiti, went on strike
protesting a lack of security. That day an armed person entered the
emergency room, and searched for and killed a patient admitted the
previous evening. The strike was ongoing at year's end and surgical,
physician and nursing services had completely stopped.
There were no export processing zones. However, the Government's 5-
year economic program calls for the creation of two export processing
zones, one in Cabaret and another in Cap Haitien. The Government passed
legislation governing free trade zones, and signed an agreement with a
Dominican textile company to build a production facility in a newly
established free trade zone on the border near Ouanaminthe. Batay
Ouvriye vehemently opposed the project and progress has stalled pending
legislative authorization of the land concession. The authorization had
not been granted by year's end.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Labor Code prohibits
forced or bonded labor for adults and minors; however, the Government
failed to enforce this law for children, who continued to be subjected
to forced domestic labor as restaveks in urban households under
conditions that amount to slavery (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
Most Haitians who work in the Dominican Republic went there freely;
however, there were cases of trafficking rings coercing Haitian workers
to work in Dominican sugar cane fields. Internal trafficking in
children as restaveks was the most serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum employment age in all sectors is 15 years,
with the exception of domestic service, for which the minimum is 12
years of age. The Labor Code prohibits minors from working under
dangerous conditions, and prohibits night work in industrial
enterprises for minors under 18. There is also a legal provision for
employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16 as apprentices.
Fierce adult competition for jobs ensured child labor was not a factor
in the industrial sector; however, children under the age of 15
commonly worked at informal sector jobs to supplement family income.
Children also commonly worked with parents on small family farms,
although the high unemployment rate among adults kept children from
employment on commercial farms in significant numbers. The Labor Code
prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, forced child labor
was a problem (see Section 6.c.). Government agencies lack the
resources to enforce relevant laws and regulations effectively.
According to COHADDE, children worked primarily as domestic servants
(restaveks); however, some worked on the street as vendors or beggars,
and some were involved in prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
The Government designated the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs'
Social Welfare and Research Institute (IBESR) to implement and enforce
child labor laws and regulations. The Government did not devote
adequate resources and oversight to child labor policies. The budget
for the entire Ministry is far below what is needed to fund adequately
programs to investigate exploitative child labor cases throughout the
country.
The IBESR coordinated efforts with the Ministries of Justice,
Education, and Foreign Affairs, as well as local and international
agencies, to formulate and enforce child labor policies. The Government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ILO/IPEC (International
Program for the Elimination of Child Labor) in 1999. IPEC began a Child
Labor Project in January 2000, scheduled to end in December, and
developed a framework of action focusing on institutional capacity
building, prevention through awareness-raising, and direct assistance
to victims of child labor. A much-lauded government-sponsored hot line
for children in crisis operated only during regular business hours and
had limited resources and access to safe shelters. In August NCHR-New
York inaugurated a program to prevent the restavek practice, improve
living conditions for and rescue these children, and reintegrate them
into society (see Section 6.f.).
The Government has not ratified and does not adhere to ILO
Convention 182 on Child Labor. It has not defined ``worst forms of
child labor'' or ``hazardous work.''
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum daily wage,
established in 1995 by the Tripartite Commission of Salaried Workers,
whose six members were appointed by the President (two representatives
each of labor, employers, and government), is approximately $0.96 (36
gourdes). This wage was insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Some workers were paid on a piece-rate
basis, and may earn more than the minimum wage. The majority of
citizens worked in the informal sector and subsistence agriculture,
where minimum wage legislation does not apply and wages of $0.40 (15
gourdes) a day were common. Many women worked as domestic employees,
where minimum wage legislation also does not apply.
The Labor Code governs individual employment contracts. It sets the
standard workday at 8 hours and the workweek at 48 hours, with 24 hours
of rest on Sunday. However, HNP officers worked 12-hour shifts 6 days
per week, in apparent violation of the Labor Code. The code also
establishes minimum health and safety regulations. The industrial and
assembly sectors largely observed these guidelines. However, the
Ministry of Social Affairs did not enforce work hours or health and
safety regulations.
The assembly sector published a voluntary code of conduct in 1999,
committing signatories to a number of measures designed to raise
industry standards, including payment of the minimum wage and the
prohibition of child labor. Employers in the assembly sector generally
paid the minimum wage or higher. Working conditions were also generally
better in this sector. There were no reports of child labor in this
sector.
There was no formal data, but unions allege that job-related
injuries were prevalent in the construction industry and public works
sectors. With more than 50 percent of the population unemployed,
workers were not able to exercise the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and internal trafficking of children was a problem. Haiti
also was a country of origin for trafficked children. Haitians
trafficked overseas were sent largely to the Dominican Republic, the
U.S., Europe (mainly France), and Canada. In August UNICEF reported
that between 2,000 and 3,000 Haitian children are trafficked to the
Dominican Republic each year. The findings are the result of a joint
UNICEF/International Organization for Migration (OIM) study. However,
most trafficking occurs within the country's borders and involves
children. Children were primarily trafficked for labor, but some were
trafficked for purposes of prostitution.
Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent
city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called
``restavek'' (``lives with'' in Creole), and frequently received
financial compensation. The practice of sending children, mainly girls,
to work as domestic servants in exchange for that child's room and
board has existed in the country for centuries. While some restaveks
received adequate care including an education, the Ministry of Social
Affairs believes that many employers compelled the children to work
long hours, provided them little nourishment, and frequently beat and
abused them. The majority of restaveks worked in homes where the yearly
income was very low, so conditions, food, and education for
nonbiological children were not priorities.
In a 1998 study, UNICEF estimated that 250,000 to 300,000 children
were victims of this form of servitude, although a government-supported
study reported only 90,000 to 120,000 restaveks. UNICEF reported that
the average restavek was between 11 and 14 years of age; however, more
than 20 percent were between the ages 4 and 10, and 85 percent were
girls. Rape by host family members was reported by 23 percent of these
girls, 15 percent of whom became pregnant. Nearly 77 percent of all
restaveks had never attended school. Among those who had, only 2
percent reached secondary school. The law requires that restaveks 15
years of age and older be paid not less than one half the amount paid
to an adult servant hired to perform similar work, in addition to room
and board. To avoid this obligation, employers dismiss many restaveks
before they reach that age.
Most local human rights groups did not consider this practice abuse
nor did they work to improve the situation of restavek children. The
Ministry of Social Affairs claimed little power to stop this practice,
which it regarded as economically motivated and citing a lack of
financial resources, no longer employed monitors to oversee the welfare
of restavek children. Society held such children in little regard.
The Government acknowledged the problem of internal trafficking and
took steps to address it, despite severe resource constraints. The
Government devoted the bulk of its entire social welfare budget to
combating the trafficking of children. For example, the Government ran
a media campaign to prevent the mistreatment of children and maintained
a hot line for victims. However, these efforts resulted in the removal
of less than 200 children from abusive households during the year.
Government officials placed rescued victims in shelters and in the care
of local NGOs. The ILO, at the Government's request, is developing a
framework to address the gap between practice, national legislation,
and international standards with regard to combating trafficking in
children. There was no evidence that the authorities were complicit in
trafficking.
----------
HONDURAS
Honduras is a constitutional democracy, with a president and a
unicameral congress elected by separate ballot for 4-year terms. The
multiparty political system is dominated by two traditional parties,
the Nationalists and the Liberals. In November 2001, voters elected
Ricardo Maduro of the Nationalist Party president in elections that
domestic and international observers judged to be generally free and
fair. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,
the judiciary is poorly staffed and equipped, often ineffective, and
subject to corruption and political influence.
The Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) include the army, the air force,
and the navy. A 1999 constitutional amendment established direct
civilian control over the armed forces through a civilian Minister of
Defense. The amendment also replaced the position of the armed forces
commander in chief with that of Chief of the Joint Staff. In 2001 the
Organic Law of the Armed Forces solidified civilian control over the
military, a process that took a decade. The National Preventive Police
(formerly a paramilitary force known as the FUSEP) were placed under
civilian control in 1997. The Ministry of Public Security oversees
police operations, and the police are responsible for all public
security issues. The military are authorized to support law enforcement
activities with police upon presidential directive. During the year,
nearly half of all military personnel were assigned continuously to
joint patrols with police to prevent and combat high levels of criminal
and gang activity. The civilian authorities maintained effective
control of these joint security forces. The police committed most human
rights abuses during the year; however, the military committed abuses
in the past.
The market economy is based primarily on agriculture and,
increasingly, on the maquiladora (assembly manufacturing for export)
industry. The country has a population of 6.5 million. Approximately 33
percent of the labor force works in agriculture, followed by 24 percent
in commerce, and 15 percent in manufacturing. The principal export
crops are coffee and bananas; these, along with ``value added'' income
from the maquiladora industry and remittances from citizens living
abroad, are the leading sources of foreign exchange. Nontraditional
products, such as melons, pineapples, and shrimp, play a growing role
in the economy. Economic growth remains muted due to record low
worldwide coffee prices and sluggish activity in the maquiladora
sector. The Central Bank estimated growth for the year at 2.0 percent.
About two-thirds of the country's households live in poverty, and 40
percent of the population lives on less than $1.00 per day.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members
of the police committed extrajudicial killings. Well-organized private
and vigilante security forces were believed to have committed a number
of arbitrary and summary executions. Human rights groups accused former
security force officials and the business community of colluding to
organize ``death squads'' to commit extrajudicial, summary, and
arbitrary executions, particularly of youth. Security force personnel
beat and otherwise abused detainees and other persons. Prison
conditions remained harsh, and detainees generally did not receive due
process. There was considerable impunity for members of the economic,
military, and official elite. A weak, underfunded, and often corrupt
judicial system contributed to human rights problems. Although the
courts considered allegations of human rights violations or common
crimes against armed forces personnel, and some cases went to trial,
there were few, if any, convictions. While no senior government
official, politician, bureaucrat, or member of the business elite was
convicted of crimes, a number were under investigation during the year.
The Government removed or demoted some military officials, police
officers, police agents and investigators, and judges from office on
corruption and other charges. With the full implementation of the new
Criminal Procedures Code and an oral accusatory system, lengthy
pretrial detention in new cases was less common than in the past;
however, cases from previous years remained subject to delays. On
occasion the authorities conducted illegal searches. Other human rights
problems included violence and discrimination against women, child
prostitution, abuse of children, discrimination against indigenous
people, and trafficking in persons. The Government did not enforce
effectively all labor laws. Many workers in the private sector were
forced to work unpaid overtime. Child labor was a problem, particularly
in rural areas, in the informal economy, and in some export
agriculture, but generally not in the export-processing sector.
Honduras was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening
Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in
Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings by government agents; however, members of
the security forces were suspected of direct involvement in
approximately 24 of the estimated 1,250 extrajudicial, arbitrary, and
summary killings of youth under age 22 and minors from 1998 to June.
There was a slight improvement in the Government's ability to
investigate or prosecute suspects in the killings of children and
youth. According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Casa
Alianza, information on murders collected from press reports show that
the average number of killings of children and youth through June
increased by 16 percent over the first 6 months of 2001, rising from
197 to 230 murders. During the first 6 months of the year, the average
number of killings of children by firearms increased 46 percent from 52
minors in 2001 to 76 in 2002. During the year, no perpetrator was
identified in an average of 60-70 percent of the killings; gangs were
suspected in 15-20 percent of killings; police, private guards, or
neighborhood vigilante groups were suspected in 5 percent of killings,
and 10-15 percent of killings were drive-by shootings usually involving
a truck, often without license plates. A majority, but by no means all,
of the victims were gang members. According to Casa Alianza, 549
children and youth age 23 and under were killed during the year.
In April unknown persons killed two youths and an adult in a sugar
cane field outside San Pedro Sula after they were forced into a gray
pickup by six heavily armed men dressed in bullet proof vests and
showing police identification. One of the youths was suspected by
police of gang activity. On May 12, assailants armed with AK-47s who
were driving a red pickup in Tegucigalpa, shot and killed two youths,
ages 18 and 21, with no known gang or criminal background and wounded
three other persons. On September 25, a group of armed men in a pickup
murdered five youths in Tegucigalpa, mimicking a 1995 torture and
murder of youths. The 1995 case was under consideration by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (see Section 1.c.).
In a January report on violent deaths of children and youths, the
National Human Rights Commission, an autonomous government agency,
reviewed the evidence and interviewed youths in detention who had been
threatened or who had survived an attempted killing. Those who survived
attacks identified the perpetrators as police or as heavily armed older
men in vehicles who would either confuse the victims with gang signs or
ask victims to take off shirts to show whether the victims had gang-
related tattoos. In early September, the Ministry of Public Security
established a special investigative unit on child murders to follow
through on cases. Casa Alianza provided information on 15 cases of
murders of minors in which police were suspected of involvement. As a
result of the investigations, in October the authorities arrested
Walter Enrique Moncada Duarte, a former policeman, for the 1999 murder
of minor Alexander Reyes. In September the IACHR Special Rapporteur for
Children visited the country to review the situation of extrajudicial,
arbitrary, and summary killings of youths and children. In September
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary, and Summary
Executions released a report based on her August 2001 visit that
claimed that security forces were involved in covering up their
involvement in some of the summary killings of youth and children, and
that some of the murders involved police. In October a special inter-
agency Presidential Commission, consisting of the Ministry of Justice
and government, the Attorney General, the Institute for Family and
Children, the Human Rights Commission, and the nongovernmental
Institutional Coordinator of Child Rights Group issued a report that
identified 574 cases of summary killings of minors and 18-year-olds, of
which 140 occurred in the first half of the year and 276 occurred in
2001. Despite increased attention to the problem by the Government,
perpetrators of killings against youth and minors continued to act with
impunity.
Human rights groups alleged that individual members of the security
forces worked with civilian (including vigilante) groups and used
unwarranted lethal force against supposed habitual criminals or
suspected gang members, as well as against other youths not known to be
involved in criminal activity. Several groups and families of the
victims pushed for investigations into specific incidents, while others
claimed to have provided public prosecutors with evidence of collusion
between police elements and business leaders with regard to these
murders. The Ministry of Public Security, which was the focus of human
rights criticism, publicly denied accusations that the police force as
a whole was involved in extrajudicial killings, although it
acknowledged that individual police had been investigated for
participation in extrajudicial killings.
In September the Director of Internal Affairs of the police force
announced that she would continue investigating high-level officials
whom she alleged had been involved either directly or indirectly in at
least 20 extrajudicial killings, not necessarily of youths, over the
previous 4 years (see Section 1.c.). During the year, the authorities
sought or detained a number of police officials for their involvement
in the killings of various individuals, some of whom were minors. There
is an outstanding arrest warrant for police officer Juan Carlos Bonilla
who is wanted for suspected involvement in an extrajudicial killing. At
year's end he had not been arrested.
On August 26, presumed members of an organized crime gang, the
Barrera Herrera brothers, killed human rights activist Jose Santos
Callejas, treasurer of the local office of the national NGO Human
Rights Committee, in his home near the city of La Ceiba. Preliminary
investigations indicated that the gang had threatened Callejas after he
positively identified them to the police as having committed a murder.
Police authorities and the Human Rights Committee were investigating
the involvement of individual police officers in Callejas' killing. At
year's end, no suspects had been captured.
In May a minor died in custody, supposedly of asthma. He showed
signs of mistreatment, and there was no autopsy. The Ministry of Public
Security reported that the minor had been in the custody of the Public
Ministry. No action had been taken by the end of the year. In May
prison guards shot and killed three prisoners during a prison riot
between gangs and the regular prison population in Choluteca. There
were a number of other deaths due to prison violence (see Section
1.c.).
There were no developments in the February 2001 murder case of the
son of a Potrerillos, Cortes department, mayoral candidate and his
friend.
There was no more information on the November 2001 case of police
involvement in the killing of the Chorti indigenous person Isidro
Geronimo during a demonstration.
At year's end, no suspects were under arrest for the November 2001
murder of Nationalist Party congressional candidate Angel Pacheco Leon
in Valle department.
In April the courts sentenced policeman Cesar Montoya to 6 year's
imprisonment for the January 2000 killing of 17-year-old Edie Donaire.
Police agents illegally detained the boy, handcuffed him for 2 days,
and shot him in the legs when he attempted to escape. He then bled to
death. This was the first sentence imposed for the murder of a minor
since tracking of the youth killings began in January 1998. However,
Casa Alianza protested what it alleged was a light sentence. In
September the courts sentenced a policeman to 24 years in prison for
the 1995 rape and murder of a 14-year-old street child. These two
sentences signaled a reversal in the trend of impunity for police
officials in extrajudicial killings.
Approximately 20 active and former military and police officials
continued to face criminal charges on human rights abuses during the
1980s in various courts during the year. Most officials were accused of
illegal detention and murder because disappearance is not a crime under
the new or previous criminal codes (see Section 1.b.). Human rights
abuses committed before March 1985 are adjudicated under the 1906
Criminal Code. Crimes after that date were prosecuted and judged under
the new Criminal Code as revised in 1997 and 1999. Courts do not accept
cases if the body of the victim has not been recovered and positively
identified. An identified body allows families and human rights
organizations to bring a case of suspected human rights abuse to court.
There were no exhumations of clandestine graves during the year. Human
rights organizations believed that more uncovered graves do exist;
however, they need to have sufficient evidence to identify the buried
bodies in suspected graves to improve the likelihood of successful
prosecution. Human rights organizations continue to seek information
using grass-roots contacts and other sources outside the Government
that would lead to exhumations that would advance prosecutions.
In May and July, police arrested Jose Angel Rosa and Jorge Adolfo
Chavez Hernandez, a former member of Battalion 3-16, for the 1998
murder of environmental activist and Catacamas town councilman Carlos
Antonio Luna Lopez. The arrests occurred after both the prosecuting
attorney and judge in the case received death threats. In May the local
judge resigned from the court because of these death threats. At the
end of the year, former security official Jose Marcos Hernandez
Hernandez and two other suspects remained at large. One other suspect
in the murder, Oscar Aurelio ``Machetillo'' Rodriguez Molina, remained
in prison at year's end.
Various witnesses, survivors, and former HOAF personnel charged
that members of the now-disbanded army Intelligence Battalion 3-16
kidnaped, tortured, and killed many of the 184 persons who disappeared
during the 1980s. The Public Ministry was not able to bring new cases
to court due to lack of evidence (see Section 1.b.).
There was no action in the 1988 political murders of social
activists Miguel Angel Pavon and Moises Landaverde; in 2000 a court
issued an arrest warrant for suspect Jaime Ramirez Raudales, also known
as Jaime Rosales, a former member of Battalion 3-16; however, he
remained at large at year's end. Mario Astrubal Quinonez, another
suspect in the murders, was presumed dead after a 1998 hurricane swept
away the neighborhood where he lived.
The 1982 case of Nelson MacKay Echevarria and Miguel Francisco
Carias is one of the best-documented cases and includes witnesses;
however, charges against both of the retired officials accused in the
case were dropped. In 2001 a judge dismissed charges against retired
Colonel Alexander Hernandez Santos due to insufficient evidence for the
illegal detention and murder of MacKay, as well as charges stemming
from the kidnaping of Carias, who was found alive next to MacKay's
corpse (see Section 1.c.). In January Hernandez Santos was released
from prison when charges in the Avilez and Espinoza case were dismissed
temporarily and charges in the illegal detention and attempted murder
of six university students were reduced (see Section 1.c.). Charges
against retired Major Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa were dismissed and
Trejo Rosa was released from prison in 2001.
No information was available regarding the Public Ministry's appeal
to reinstate charges against retired General Daniel Bali Castillo and
retired Colonel Manuel Enrique Suarez Benavides for the 1982 deaths of
Adan Avilez Funez and Nicaraguan citizen Amado Espinoza Paz. In January
Alexander Hernandez Santos, also wanted for involvement in the murders,
was freed on bail due to a lower court's decision. In May the appeals
court overturned the lower court's decision and reissued an arrest
warrant for Hernandez Santos, who was also implicated in the MacKay
murder and the kidnaping of six university students (see Section 1.c.).
At the end of the reporting period, Santos remained at large. In early
May, the Choluteca district court reissued a 1996 arrest warrant for
Juan Evangelista Lopez Grijalba, but subsequently rescinded it in late
May for lack of evidence. The Public Ministry appealed the decision,
but the appeals court upheld the lower court's decision. The Public
Ministry then appealed the appeals court ruling to the Supreme Court,
where it was pending at year's end. The case against former police
Major Marco Antonio Matute Lagos was dismissed for lack of merit in
1999.
Former security officials Jose Marcos Hernandez Hernandez, Dimas
Carvajal Gomez, German Antonio McNeill Ulloa, and Juan Blas Salazar
Meza remained in custody during the year to begin trial proceedings for
the 1982 murder of student activist Luis Manuel Figueroa in Choluteca
department. On April 22, Salazar Meza turned 60 and thus was eligible
to be transferred to house arrest. He was released from prison after
paying a $3,000 (50,000 Lempiras) fine on an unrelated drug trafficking
conviction. The case went to full trial review, and the four officials
were awaiting sentencing at the end of the year. Salazar Meza also was
questioned for his involvement in the kidnaping of six university
students (see Section 1.c.).
In the July 1982 murder case of university student Hans Madisson,
the Public Ministry requested that the Canadian government provide
testimony of witnesses who had fled the country and applied for asylum
in Canada. At year's end, the Public Ministry had not received a
response to the request for further DNA testing to identify positively
the body and to continue the case against Captain Billy Joya Amendola,
which was dismissed for lack of evidence in May 2001. There was no
information available regarding the Public Ministry's appeal of a 1999
ruling by a lower court that found former army Chief of Staff Oscar
Hernandez Chavez not guilty in the same case.
During the year the Public Ministry charged Jose Barrera Martinez,
a witness in cases related to Billy Joya Amendola and Alexander
Hernandez Santos, with providing false testimony. Barrera rescinded his
original written testimony regarding clandestine graves and human
rights cases, which he used to request asylum in Canada. When Barrera
was deported from Canada in 2001, he declared that his original
testimony was false, even though that information led to the uncovering
of clandestine gravesites.
Violent crime continued to fuel the growth of private, often
unlicensed guard services, and of volunteer groups that patrolled their
neighborhoods or municipalities to deter crime. During the year there
was an average of 3 to 10 violent deaths per day. Vigilante justice led
to the killing of known and suspected criminals, as well as of youth in
gangs, street children, and youth not known to be involved in criminal
activity (see Section 5). Neighborhood watch groups called Citizen
Security Councils (CSCs) originally were authorized by a previous
Minister of Security, and some of them were accused of taking the law
into their own hands. Human rights groups criticized the CSCs, which
they viewed as active participants in the increasing number of unlawful
and summary killings. Human rights activists continued to state
publicly their belief that some of the CSCs, as well as private
security companies with ties to former military or police officials,
were acting as vigilantes or death squads, especially targeting youth,
with the tacit complicity of the police. According to human rights
groups, the CSCs with the greatest number of incidents of violent
deaths committed by vigilante committees were in the municipalities
surrounding San Pedro Sula. The Ministry of Public Security announced
that it would work with city officials to assure that vigilante
committees not operate with official support. In June the Ministry of
Public Security announced that all arms, including those of private
security firms, would have to be registered.
In September the Attorney General declared that violent deaths
overall were 10 percent less than the previous year. He rejected the
idea that death squads were involved in killing youth and children;
however, he acknowledged that individual police and vigilante groups
were involved in some killings.
Several ``murders for hire'' occurred during the year, usually
related to land disputes or criminal activities. In April four landless
farmers were killed and one guard was injured when the farmers
attempted to take over land also claimed by a subsidiary of an
international company. There was no information on the proceedings at
year's end.
No more information was available regarding the 2001 murders of the
Peralta Torres family, farmers' cooperative president Felix Roque, or
Carlos Flores, nor the suspicious death of farmers' cooperative
president Jose Antonio Santos Lopez. There were no developments in the
2000 murder cases of social activist Jairo Amilcar Ayala Nunez;
community leader Ruben Elvir; forestry cooperative officials Marciano
Martinez Ramirez and Victor Manuel Almendares; or of the 2000 murders
of Concepcion Alvarez and his family, Copan mayor Hugo Alvarado, or the
1999 murder of Cabanas mayor Juan Ramon Alvarado--all of whom were
killed in land disputes.
No more information was available on the March 2000 murders of
Chorti indigenous Vicente Ramirez, Enecon Ramirez, Antonio Garcia, and
Domingo Mejia.
The October 2000 complaint filed by Casa Alianza with the IACHR
regarding the illegal detention and murder by police of four youths in
1995 remained under investigation by the Commission at the end of the
year. During the year, Casa Alianza appended a 1998 case to the 1995
IACHR complaint for the torture and murder of two minors in Progreso in
which police were suspected of involvement. Casa Alianza had a total of
six cases before the Commission.
In December the authorities reported that gang members killed at
least 10 police officers during the year. On November 17, members of a
gang shot and killed a police investigator near his home in
Comayaguela. A search led to the capture of 5 gang members in
possession of a list containing the names of approximately 20 police
officers that they had allegedly planned to kill in the next few days.
b. Disappearance.--The law does not prohibit forced disappearance;
however, there were no reports of disappearances during the year.
There were no developments in the June 2001 case of former
guerrilla Rigoberto Martinez Lagos. He was seen last leaving his house
in Tegucigalpa to meet a police investigative agent regarding a stolen
car. According to human rights groups, when his wife called the
telephone number that he had provided, she spoke with police who
assured her that he would return.
In cases where significant information is available, but no body
has been identified, the Public Ministry's Human Rights office attempts
to uncover evidence that could lead to clandestine graves. During the
year, the Public Ministry requested information on the 1988
disappearance of student activist Carlos Roberto Velasquez Ilovares
from the HOAF, but the Ministry found nothing. Only a few bodies were
found of the 184 persons who have been documented as disappearances.
There was no change in status in the 1988 disappearance of Roger
Gonzalez Zelaya or the 1981 disappearance of Jose Eduardo Lopez.
There were no exhumations during the year. The courts adjudicated
some pending cases involving political disappearances from the 1980s as
murders (see Section 1.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were
isolated instances in which officials employed such practices. In
addition, police beatings and other alleged abuses of detainees
remained problems.
The police force, which includes the Preventive Police and the
Criminal Investigative Unit (DGIC), is subject to investigation by the
Internal Affairs office regarding illegal activities. The Internal
Affairs office reports to the Attorney General's office, where a
decision is made either to prosecute the offender or to return the case
to the Minister of Security for administrative action. The Preventive
Police and the DGIC each have an Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR), which conduct internal reviews of police misconduct such as off-
duty criminal conduct and ethics violations. An OPR ruling is reported
to the Minister of Security, who can take disciplinary action or direct
a supervisor to decide upon disciplinary action for minor infractions.
During the year, the Minister of Security moved the OPR to a limited
access area, which drastically reduced the number of complaints that
individuals lodged against police during the year.
The Ministry of Public Security fired more than 300 police
personnel in both the DGIC and the Preventive Police for corruption,
criminal activity, and abuse of authority. During the year, the Organic
Police Law was enacted, which allows security officials and agents to
be fired without requiring proof of incompetent, corrupt, or abusive
behavior. In September the Director of Internal Affairs of the police
force announced that high-level officials had been involved either
directly or indirectly in at least 20 extrajudicial killings of
presumed delinquents (see Section 1.a.). At the end of the reporting
period, the Attorney General's office had begun bringing some cases to
prosecution. During the year, the Public Ministry also investigated
complaints of prison abuse.
A public feud between the Public Ministry and the Security Ministry
continued to create friction. While local prosecutors were able to work
in police stations, they did not always maintain good relations with
the police investigators.
No more information was available regarding the three army officers
who were under investigation for having beaten and threatened eight
recruits in 2000.
In June 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that illegal detention and
attempted murder, of which some military officials were accused, were
not covered by the 1987 and 1991 Amnesty Laws, a ruling that allowed
for the criminal prosecution of military officers accused of the 1982
kidnaping and torture of six university students (see Section 1.e.). As
a result of the ruling, amnesty laws were no longer applicable in this
case for: Alexander Hernandez Santos, Juan Blas Salazar Meza, Manuel de
Jesus Trejo Rosa, Juan Evangelista Lopez Grijalba, retired Captain
Billy Hernando Joya Amendola, retired General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez,
Roberto Arnaldo Erazo Paz, Jorge Antonio Padilla Torres, and Colonel
Julio Cesar Funez Alvarez.
In November 2001, the court reduced the charges faced by retired
Colonel Alexander Hernandez Santos to illegal detention only, and
dropped the charges for attempted murder, for his participation in the
kidnaping and torture of six university students in 1982. In January
Hernandez was released from prison; however, he is wanted in the 1982
Avilez and Espinoza murders (see Section 1.a.). At year's end, Juan
Blas Salazar Meza was under house arrest and being questioned for his
participation in the illegal detention of the six students. He did not
qualify for bail because he was awaiting sentencing in the 1982 murder
of Luis Miguel Figueroa (see Section 1.a.). At year's end, retired
Captain Billy Joya Amendola was free on bail while awaiting further
questioning. In May the District Attorney's office requested that the
court issue arrest warrants for two retired colonels, Juan Evangelista
Lopez Grijalba and Julio Cesar Funez Alvarez, in the case of the six
university students, but the courts had not issued the requested arrest
warrants by year's end. Retired General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez, the
owner of the property in the Amarateca Valley of Francisco Morazan
department where the 1982 incidents occurred, was under house arrest at
year's end, under charges of complicity. During the year there was an
outstanding arrest warrant for Roberto Arnaldo Erazo Paz. Manuel de
Jesus Trejo Rosa was released on bail in 2000. Charges against Jorge
Antonio Padilla Torres were dropped in 2001 due to lack of evidence.
All charges against Juan Ramon Pena Paz were dropped; he was accused
wrongly because he shared the same last name as another suspect.
The Public Ministry's appeal of the decision to drop charges
against Alexander Hernandez Santos and Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa for
the 1982 kidnaping of Miguel Francisco Carias was pending at year's end
(see Section 2.a.).
Police occasionally used force against demonstrators; in May and in
August, a number of persons were injured (see Section 2.b.).
In May the December 2001 Police and Social Order Law took effect.
The new law defines the different roles of national and municipal
police and describes the activities that police undertake. The law
outlines when police can use force and when they should assist
citizens, limits how demonstrations can be carried out (see Section
2.b.), gives authority to police to remove landless farmers who take
over land, and defines public order. It allows prostitution, but
outlaws brothels, madams, and pimps, while offering rehabilitation (see
Section 5). The law permits police to detain gang members, drunkards,
truants, and vagrants without warrants, and to fine parents who deny
education to their children. During the year, police carried out two
operations in June and September in which they rounded up 200-300
minors and adults loitering in the streets and detained them for a day,
putting the adults to work on street cleaning. Human rights and gay
rights organizations criticized the new law, alleging that it
restricted freedom of assembly.
In a number of instances, the security forces actively dislodged
farmers and indigenous groups from lands in dispute. Sometimes this
government action was legitimate, because the National Agrarian
Institute (INA) did not substantiate the farmers' and indigenous
groups' claims under land reform laws or ancestral titles. In other
cases, the action taken in support of local landowners who exercised
undue influence over local security officials, including in some cases
obtaining a legal order when the justification for the order was
questionable (see Sections 1.a., 1.f., and 5).
The police forces are underfunded, undertrained, and understaffed,
and corruption is a serious problem. There is widespread public
frustration at the inability of the security forces to prevent and
control crime. During the year, under the new administration, police
and military jointly patrolled the streets and petty crime fell
significantly. While gang violence and intimidation on the streets
declined, gangs continued to intimidate, threaten, and rob passengers
on public transportation. Kidnapings of the wealthy and well-known
continued at the same rate as in 2001, but more perpetrators were
identified and prosecuted compared with the previous year. While
investigation into crimes improved during the year, the public
continued to believe that corrupt security personnel were complicit in
the high crime rate (see Section 1.a.).
The Law of the Rehabilitation of the Delinquent establishes
regulations for prison conditions, including minimum conditions of
sanitation and security for prisoners; however, prison conditions were
harsh and prison security was poor. The Ministry of Public Security
maintains prison facilities. Retired military officers work as guards
in some areas, and some Preventive Police are used as guards. Prisoners
suffered from severe overcrowding, malnutrition, and a lack of adequate
sanitation, and allegedly were subjected to various other abuses,
including rape by other prisoners. Pretrial detainees generally were
not separated from convicted prisoners. The 24 penal centers held over
12,500 prisoners, more than twice their intended capacity; more than 88
percent of all prisoners were pretrial detainees (see Section 1.d.).
Prison escapes, through bribery or other means, remained a frequent
occurrence. In May prison guards shot and killed three prisoners in a
prison riot between gangs and the regular prison population in
Choluteca. About 3 percent of prisoners were thought to be gang
members.
Prison disturbances, caused primarily by harsh conditions and
intergang violence, occurred throughout the year in the larger
facilities of San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, and Choluteca. A number of
gang members were killed in prison, reportedly by other gangs. In
January convicted kidnaper Javier Cruz was found hanged in his cell in
San Pedro Sula; a criminal court was investigating the incident at
year's end. There were no developments in the two San Pedro Sula prison
hangings from 2001. During the year, prison authorities continued to
move prisoners of opposing gangs into different facilities to reduce
intergang tensions and violence.
More often than not, for lack of alternative facilities, wardens
housed the mentally ill, although there is a National Mental Hospital,
and those with tuberculosis and other infectious diseases among the
general prison population. In July the National Human Rights Commission
and the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights accused prison officials of
using excessive force against prisoners. Practices reported include
beatings, isolation, threats, electric shocks, and immersion in water.
A 2001 National University's Medical College study reported a 7
percent HIV/AIDS infection rate among prisoners. Male prisoners with
money routinely bought private cells, decent food, and permission for
conjugal visits, while prisoners without money often lacked basic
necessities, as well as legal assistance. The prison system budgets
about $0.50 (8.13 lempiras) per day for food and medicine for each
prisoner. Prisoners were allowed visits and in many cases relied on
outside help to survive, as the prison system could not provide
adequate or sufficient food.
During the year, the warden of the Tela prison who was accused of
abusive treatment was moved to a different position.
The NGO Human Rights Committee continued government-funded programs
to train police and prison personnel to avoid committing acts of
torture, to train and rehabilitate prisoners, and to arrange for
periodic inspections of prisons. The Center for the Prevention,
Treatment, and Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture and Their Families
provided health and social services to prisoners in the main
penitentiary in Tamara.
The Government delayed its plan for a model prison farm due to
budget constraints.
Women generally were incarcerated in separate facilities under
conditions similar to those of male prisoners; however, female
prisoners do not have conjugal visit privileges. Four percent of the
prison population was female. Children up to age 2 can live with their
mothers in prison.
The Government operates juvenile detention centers in Tamara, El
Carmen, and El Hatillo; all are located in or near Tegucigalpa or San
Pedro Sula. Although there was a lack of juvenile detention facilities,
minors were detained infrequently in adult prisons. In May a minor died
of asthma while being held in an adult cell (see Section 1.a.). Casa
Alianza reported that the Government responded quickly to complaints of
minors in adult prisons and no longer routinely housed juvenile
offenders in adult prisons. The Government and Casa Alianza agreed to
earmark $182,000 (3 million lempiras) compensatory payments under an
IACHR agreement to assist juvenile offenders. Approximately 24 of the
300 juvenile offenders who served time in adult prisons from 1995 to
1999 were compensated.
There were no developments in the Casa Alianza complaint to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding four minors tortured in
a Comayagua prison in 1990.
The Government generally permitted prison visits by independent
human rights observers. The 2001 order by the General Director of
Prisons barring access to district attorneys had not been implemented
by the end of the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
authorities occasionally failed to observe these prohibitions. The law
states that the police may arrest a person only with a court order,
unless the arrest is made during the commission of a crime, and that
they must clearly inform the person of the grounds for the arrest. The
Preventive Police detain suspects and can investigate only petty
crimes. The police must bring a detainee before a competent authority
within 24 hours; the judge or district attorney then must issue an
initial, temporary holding order within 24 hours, make an initial
decision within 6 days, and conduct a preliminary investigation to
decide whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant further
investigation. Less stringent rules of detention apply when the police
catch a suspect in a criminal act; in that case, the authorities may
hold a suspect for up to 6 days before a temporary holding order is
issued.
While bail is legally available, it is granted primarily for
medical reasons; however, procedures in such cases are confused and
unclear. Poor defendants, even when represented by a public defender,
seldom are able to take advantage of bail (see Section 1.e.). Lengthy
pretrial detention was a serious problem; during the year, an estimated
88 percent of the prison population was awaiting trial and sentencing
(see Section 1.c.).
The 1996 Unsentenced Prisoner Law mandates the release from prison
of any detainee whose case has not come to trial and whose time in
detention exceeds the maximum prison sentence for the crime of which he
is accused. However, the antiquated criminal justice system, judicial
inefficiency and corruption, and lack of resources clog the criminal
system with pretrial detainees, many of whom already have served time
in prison equivalent to the maximum allowable for the crime of which
they were accused. In April 2000, the Government estimated that as many
as 3,017 prisoners qualified for release under the Unsentenced Prisoner
Law, that 3 officers were required to monitor each detainee, and that
the annual cost of enforcing this law was approximately $6.7 million
(100 million lempiras). The Criminal Procedures Code that went into
full effect in February limits pretrial detention to 1 year if the
greatest penalty for a crime is less than 6 years and to 2 years if the
penalty for the crime is 6 years or greater. The Code is not
retroactive, so individuals who have already served their sentence but
whose case has not been reviewed will remain in jail until the judge
reviews the case. Many prisoners under the old system remained in jail
after being acquitted or completing their sentences, due to the failure
of responsible officials to process their releases. The new Code allows
house arrest until trial of persons over the age of 60 accused of
nonfelony crimes, women who are pregnant or lactating, and the
terminally ill.
Neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code explicitly prohibits
exile, but it was not used as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was poorly staffed and
equipped, often ineffective, and subject to corruption. While the
Government respected constitutional provisions in principle,
implementation was weak and uneven in practice. A number of factors
limited the effectiveness of the system. Both the judiciary and the
Public Ministry suffered from inadequate funding; low wages and lack of
internal controls made judicial and law enforcement officials
susceptible to bribery; and powerful special interests still exercised
influence and often prevailed in the courts. Many elected politicians
enjoy constitutional immunity due to the privilege of their office.
During the year the full application of the Criminal Procedures Code
and the establishment of a new Supreme Court slightly improved the
judicial system.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial. This right
improved in practice over the year with the full implementation of the
Criminal Procedures Code. The new code establishes an oral accusatory
system to replace the written, inquisitorial trial system for all new
criminal cases. Trials are decided by three judges, one at each stage
of the trial. The new system allows for plea-bargaining and for all
indigent suspects to have appointed legal counsel. The Government began
oral proceedings in May. The new code works on the basis of the
presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, and respect for
the dignity and liberty of the accused. It also expressly prohibits
incarceration without a judicial order. Since the implementation of the
new code, there was some improvement in the legal system's fairness
toward those charged with crimes.
An accused person has the right to an initial hearing by a judge,
to bail, to an attorney provided by the State if necessary, and to
appeal. The rights of defendants often were not observed under the 1984
Code. Under the 1984 Code, all stages of the trial process were
conducted in writing and, at the judge's discretion, could be declared
secret and, thus, even less public than normal. All trials are public
under the new Code.
The April 2001 constitutional amendment to restructure the Supreme
Court and create an independent judiciary took effect during the year.
In January a special nominating committee representing 5 sectors of
civil society (one representative each from labor unions, employer
associations, civil society, the bar association, and the human rights
ombudsman), selected 45 nominees from more than 200 applicants for a
new 15-member, seven-year-term Supreme Court. The Congress then
selected 15 judges from the 45 nominees, and on January 25, the
magistrates took the oath of office. The Supreme Court, in turn, names
all lower court judges. There are 10 appeals courts, 67 courts of first
instance with general jurisdiction, and 326 justice of the peace courts
with limited jurisdiction. Human rights groups expressed concern that
the 8-7 split between the Nationalist and Liberal Parties on the court
was not likely to depoliticize Supreme Court appointments. In May the
courts were reorganized to divide case management into two systems, one
following the old, written administrative court procedures, and the
other following the new, oral accusatorial method of the Criminal
Procedures Code. During the year, 35 percent of 140,000 pending cases
under the previous procedure were dismissed or resolved; however, no
system was in place to release pretrial detainees affected by the
closure of these cases. Through September the new system registered
8,000 cases, of which 800 were in trial proceedings at year's end. On
November 5, the Supreme Court named a new Court of Appeals in
Tegucigalpa, after having ousted the entire three-member court on
October 23 in the midst of allegations of corruption and impropriety.
The Supreme Court also replaced judges in San Pedro Sula who were
accused of corruption.
On December 4, the Supreme Court took the first step in analyzing
constitutional amendments proposed by Congress that would give Congress
unfettered power to interpret the constitutionality of laws that it
passes. The Constitutional Chamber of the Court asked Congress to
explain why it attempted to alter the Constitution in a manner that
ostensibly usurped traditional judicial authority. If the amendments
become effective, the judiciary will lose its authority to construe the
Constitution, and Congress will be free to interpret the
constitutionality of laws with a two-thirds majority vote. In November
the National Human Rights Commission filed a lawsuit asking that the
Supreme Court declare the proposals unconstitutional and in violation
of the separation of powers provision in the Constitution.
The new Criminal Procedures Code gave the Public Ministry the
responsibility to initiate criminal proceedings but left the
investigative police in charge of investigations. Under the old system,
which remained in effect for crimes committed before February, judges
were in charge of investigations, as well as of trials and sentencing.
Under the 1984 Code of Criminal Procedures, judges, the police, public
officials, and individual citizens can initiate criminal proceedings.
The lack of clear duties under the 1984 code created friction between
the police and the prosecutors after the establishment of the Public
Ministry in the mid-1990s.
Under the 1984 code, defendants and their attorneys were not always
genuine participants in the process, despite rights accorded under law.
Defendants could confront witnesses against them and present evidence
on their own behalf, but only through the judge. By law defendants and
their attorneys were entitled to review government-held evidence
relevant to their cases, but this right was not always respected in
practice. The 1999 Criminal Procedures Code, fully implemented in
February, provides defendants with additional rights that reduce their
likelihood of being detained, including strict timelines for actions
during the criminal process, which some critics warn may reduce the
conviction rate of hardened criminals. Public officials assert that the
new code will reduce the number of pretrial detainees and will
establish procedures so that detainees will not be held in prison
beyond their maximum prison term.
A public defender program provides assistance to those unable to
afford an adequate defense. There are over 200 public defenders
providing free legal services nationally to 50 percent of the prison
population; however, it is difficult for public defenders to meet the
heavy demands of an unautomated, inadequately funded, and labor-
intensive criminal justice system. Under the Criminal Procedures Code
cases can be dismissed if a suspect does not have legal representation.
Of all oral trials processed during the year, 83 percent of defendants
used public defenders. The demands placed on the public defender system
severely overtaxed its resources.
A 1998 Supreme Court instruction held judges personally accountable
for reducing the number of backlogged cases. The order separates judges
into pretrial investigative judges and trial and sentencing judges. The
Court also created a program to monitor and enforce compliance with
these measures. The Court's instruction was intended to ensure more
effective protection for the rights of the accused to a timely and
effective defense. It had little effect under the old system, but the
new Criminal Procedures Code allows for plea-bargaining to reduce the
caseload and to prioritize serious crimes for prosecution.
Modest progress was made in previous years toward implementing a
judicial career system to enhance the qualifications of sitting judges;
depoliticize the appointment process; and address problems of
corruption, clientism, patronage, and influence-peddling within the
judiciary. Nonetheless, many courts remain staffed by politically
selected judges and by unqualified clerks who are inefficient and
subject to influence from special interests. The reforms have not been
implemented fully or effectively. Public accountability or official
sanction for misconduct is minimal. However, the Supreme Court
dismissed more than 19 judges on various charges, including corruption,
during the year.
A special prosecutor and a judge investigating the 1998 murder of a
town councilman reported receiving death threats (see Section 1.a.).
The Supreme Court's rulings on the 1987 and 1991 amnesty laws
declared its application unconstitutional for nine military officials
accused in the illegal detention and attempted murder of six university
students. In 1998 the Court determined that while the amnesty laws were
constitutional, amnesty appeals would have to be decided on their
individual merits. In June 2000, the Court first ruled that laws
providing amnesty protection to present and former military officials
were inapplicable to common crimes, such as illegal detention and
homicide, which some officials were alleged to have committed. In
August 2000, the court clarified its June ruling by applying it only to
the 1982 illegal detention and attempted murder of six university
students (see Section 1.c.). It held that the amnesty laws would
continue to apply to all military defendants until specific grounds for
exclusion of amnesty were applied in that case. The general
interpretation of the Court's rulings is that the accused cannot
request amnesty until the case has been brought before a judge and the
judge has begun deliberations. Thus, military officials may request
amnesty, but only if the case has gone to trial. The Public Ministry
has the right to challenge the applicability of those laws to specific
investigations of past human rights abuses.
By the end of the year, the new Supreme Court had not yet ruled on
the appeal by the defense to reduce charges of attempted murder brought
against Alexander Hernandez in the case of the six university students.
Two other officials received reduced sentences and were let out on bail
when previous Supreme Courts ruled that attempted murder could not be
proven, thus establishing that no one could be charged with the crime
(see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides broad immunity to members of Congress and
government officials. Membership in both the National Congress and the
Central American Parliament confers legal immunity from prosecution.
That immunity extends to candidates running for office and to acts
committed before taking office. An April 2000 General Law of Immunities
did little to foster transparency and accountability in government. In
fact, the new law requires that cases of white-collar crime brought
against public officials with immunity first must be adjudicated
through administrative procedures before any criminal proceedings are
initiated. In addition, the new law bestows immunity to citizens upon
party nomination to run for public office. The law continues to require
a vote of Congress to deprive an individual of his or her immunity,
although such individual may be arrested if caught in the act of
endangering the life or physical integrity of another. During the year,
government authorities asked Congress to remove the immunity of 34
Congresspersons and Central American parliamentarians. Only Congressman
David Romero was stripped of his immunity to face charges of raping his
stepdaughter. A warrant was out for his arrest, but he was at large at
year's end.
Over the past 8 years, the Public Ministry has taken steps to
investigate and charge not only military officers for human rights
violations, but also recently retired heads of the armed forces for
corruption, illicit enrichment, and white collar crimes, as well as
ranking officials of the three previous governments for abuses of
power, fraud, and diversion of public funds and resources. However, at
year's end, very few of those accused had been tried or convicted. Some
of these individuals maintained immunity from prosecution because they
were in elected office or are running for office.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution specifies that a person's home is
inviolable, that persons employed by the State may enter only with the
owner's consent or with the prior authorization of a competent legal
authority, and that entry may take place only between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.
There is an exception that allows entry at any time in the event of an
emergency or to prevent the commission of a crime. In May President
Maduro decreed that kidnaping constituted an immediate threat, and that
no arrest warrant was needed if the kidnaped person's life was in
danger. In June as a result of a high profile kidnaping and murder, the
Government decreed that searches could be executed without warrants and
at any hour when someone's life was threatened. However, as in previous
years, there were credible charges that police personnel failed at
times to obtain the needed authorization before entering a private
home. Coordination among the police, the courts, and the Public
Ministry remained weak; however, it improved when the prosecuting
attorneys expanded their work day to include nights and weekends.
In a number of instances, private and public security forces
actively dislodged farmers and indigenous groups who claimed ownership
of lands based on land reform laws or ancestral titles to property (see
Section 5). In May four farmers in Balfate, Atlantida department were
killed when trying to establish a land claim on property owned by a
subsidiary of a multinational company. A number of farm cooperatives
experience constant threats of dislocation from local police and
military authorities who support local landowners. In the past, some
individuals who lost disputed lands to farmer cooperatives as a result
of government adjudication killed cooperative leaders.
The Government generally respected the privacy of correspondence.
Despite reforms to the civil service system, party membership is
often necessary to obtain or retain government employment.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities generally
respected these rights in practice, with some important exceptions. The
new Police and Social Order Law restricts demonstrators from using
statements that could incite people to riot. Some journalists admitted
to self-censorship when their reporting threatened the political or
economic interests of media owners. A small number of powerful business
magnates with intersecting business interests, political loyalties, and
family ties own many news media. Systemic national problems, such as
corruption and endemic conflicts of interest, also limit the
development of the news media. For example, of the four national
newspapers, one is run by a Congressman and another is run by a former
Liberal Party president.
The Government has various means to influence news reporting of its
activities, such as the granting or denial of access to government
officials, which is crucial for news reporters, editors, and media
owners. Other methods are more subtle, such as the coveted privilege to
accompany the President on his official travels. Journalists who
accompany the President on such occasions do so at the expense of the
Government, which grants or withholds invitations for such travel at
will. The Government also has considerable influence on the print media
through its ability to grant or withhold official advertisements funded
with public monies.
The comparatively little investigative journalism that took place
focused on noncontroversial issues. When the news media attempted to
report in depth on national politicians or official corruption, they
continued to face obstacles, such as external pressures to desist from
their investigations, artificially tight reporting deadlines, and a
lack of access to government information and independent sources.
The news media also continued to suffer from internal corruption,
politicization, and outside influences. Payments to journalists to
investigate or suppress certain stories continued, although no
individual journalist was accused publicly of engaging in the practice.
News directors and editors acknowledged their inability to halt the
practice.
The new Maduro government used the ``Cadena Nacional,'' a complete
preemption of all television and radio broadcasting, to present
bimonthly presidential addresses.
One potentially abusive practice continued to be the granting of
awards to individual reporters on ``Journalists' Day.'' In May all
three branches of the Government and several private organizations,
including chambers of commerce, bestowed numerous awards, some
accompanied by substantial sums of cash, on the ``best'' journalists.
Rather than being tied to a specific accomplishment--a particular
article or series, or even a lifetime's body of work--most awards were
granted without any published criteria to beat reporters assigned to
the granting institution. Some of these awards appeared to be deserved;
however, many observers viewed them as little more than acknowledgments
by the granting institutions of perceived services rendered.
Because President Maduro had limited ties to the media, some
journalists took the opportunity to increase reporting on sensitive
topics. In the past, there were credible reports of media owners'
repression against individual journalists who criticized the
Government, actively criticized freedom of the press, or otherwise
reported on issues sensitive to powerful interests in the country.
During the year there were no reports of dismissals or threats against
journalists.
No more information was available on the television reporter who
sued the Security Ministry over the loss of an eye in an unprovoked
altercation with a police officer in 2000. No more information was
available on the 2000 drive-by shooting of Radio Progreso news director
Julio Cesar Pineda Alvarado, who suffered a head wound in the attack.
The Government did not restrict Internet access.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice; however, police used force
to disperse several protests, resulting in a number of injuries.
During the year, incidents in which farmers or local populations
took over roadways in Yoro, Comayagua, and Francisco Morazan
departments met with police resistance. Police used tear gas and riot
troops to clear roadways, injuring a number of persons in each
incident.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The dominant religion, Catholicism, does not affect adversely
the religious freedom of others. The Government prohibits immigration
of foreign missionaries who practice religions that claim to use
witchcraft or satanic rituals.
In September 2000, the Congress adopted a controversial measure
requiring that, beginning in 2001, all school classes begin with 10
minutes of readings from the Bible; however, the legislation had not
been put into effect.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, the International Office of Migration, and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
asylum and grants asylum or refugee status in accordance with the terms
of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the
year. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. General elections were held in November 2001, and
on January 28, Ricardo Maduro Joest was sworn in as President for a 4-
year term.
Citizens choose a president, three vice presidents, and members of
the National Congress by free, secret, and direct, balloting every 4
years. In 1997 voters for the first time were able to cast separate
ballots for the President, Congresspersons, and mayors, making
individual elected officials more representative and accountable.
Suffrage is universal; however, neither the clergy nor members of the
military or civilian security forces are permitted to vote. In the 2001
elections, voting was expanded to include Hondurans resident in five
cities in the United States, of whom only 1,000 voted. Any citizen born
in Honduras or abroad of Honduran parentage may hold office, except for
members of the clergy, the armed forces, and the police.
The investigation into the 2001 election-eve murder of Angel
Pacheco, Nationalist Party congressional candidate from Valle
department, had uncovered no suspects at year's end (see Section 1.a.).
A new political party may gain legal status by obtaining 20,000
signatures and establishing party organizations in at least half of the
country's 18 departments. There are five recognized parties. The
Democratic Unification Party was established by decree as a result of
the Esquipulas peace accords.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or
minorities in government and politics. The Government established the
National Women's Institute a number of years ago to address women's
issues. The 2000 Law of Gender Equality mandated that 30 percent of all
candidates nominated for public office by recognized political parties
be women. Congresswomen and women's groups strongly criticized all five
parties for their lack of female representation in the congressional
slates after the November 2001 elections. There were 5 women in the
128-seat legislature. There were nine female justices, one of whom was
president, on the Supreme Court and three female ministers in the
Cabinet.
There were few indigenous people in leadership positions in
government or politics. There were 3 indigenous or Garifuna (Afro-
Caribbean) persons in the 128-seat legislature.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operated without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperated with these
groups and were responsive to their views.
One human rights group received death threats during the year and
another announced that security forces harassed its members after they
spoke out in support of investigations into extrajudicial killings
committed by police.
In August human rights worker Jose Santos Callejas was killed in
Atlantida in a criminal assault related to his human rights activism
(see Section 1.a).
In September the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Arbitrary, and Summary Executions published the report on her visit to
the country to meet with government, human rights, and children's
organizations (see Section 1.a.).
In March Congress chose Ramon Custodio Lopez to replace Leo
Valladares Lanza as Human Rights Commissioner of the National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC), an autonomous government institution. He
holds a 6-year term. The NHRC director has free access to all civilian
and military institutions and detention centers and is supposed to
perform his functions with complete immunity and autonomy. The
Government generally cooperated with the NHRC and invited the Human
Rights Ombudsman to work on interagency commissions dealing with rule
of law issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution bans discrimination based on race or sex. The
Constitution also bans discrimination on the basis of class; however,
in practice, the political, military, and social elites generally
enjoyed impunity under the legal system. Members of these groups rarely
were arrested or jailed; the President, cabinet ministers, and
legislators all enjoy legal immunity (see Section 1.e.).
Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. The Penal Code
classifies domestic violence and sexual harassment as crimes, with
penalties of 2 to 4 years' and 1 to 3 years' imprisonment,
respectively. In February 2000, the Pan-American Health Organization
reported that 60 percent of women had been victims of domestic
violence. In September 2000, the U.N. Population Fund estimated that 8
of every 10 women suffered from domestic violence.
Over the year, the Public Ministry reported that it received an
average of 341 allegations of domestic violence each month in the
capital city of Tegucigalpa alone. In August a woman was sentenced
under the new Criminal Procedures Code to 30 years for killing her
abusive husband earlier in the year.
The 1997 Law Against Domestic Violence was intended to strengthen
the rights of women and increase the penalties for crimes of domestic
violence. In practice the law does not impose any fines, and the only
sanctions are community service and 24-hour preventive detention if the
aggressor is caught in the act. The Penal Code includes the crime of
intrafamily violence and disobeying authorities, in the case that an
aggressor does not obey a restraining order. Three years' imprisonment
per incident is the maximum sentence. During the year, many cases were
resolved because the Government began to fund special courts to hear
only cases of domestic violence.
The Government works with women's groups to provide specialized
training to police officials on enforcing the Law Against Domestic
Violence. There are few shelters specifically for battered women. The
Government operates 1 shelter that can accommodate 10 women and their
families. Six private centers for battered women offer legal, medical,
and psychological assistance, but not physical shelter.
The penalties for rape are relatively light, ranging from 3 to 9
years' imprisonment. All rapes are considered public crimes, so a
rapist can be prosecuted even if the victim does not want to press
charges.
The law does not prohibit adult prostitution, but child
prostitution is illegal; the law prohibits promoting or facilitating
the prostitution of adults.
Women were trafficked for sexual exploitation and debt bondage (see
Section 6.f.).
The law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace; however, it
continued to be a problem.
Women, who make up 36 percent of the work force, were represented
in at least small numbers in most professions, but cultural attitudes
limited their career opportunities. Under the law, women have equal
access to educational opportunities and slightly more girls complete
grade school and high school than boys. The law requires employers to
pay women equal wages for equivalent work, but employers often classify
women's jobs as less demanding than those of men to justify paying them
lower salaries. The Inter-Institutional Technical Committee on Gender
supported gender units in five government ministries, and there is a
special working women's division in the Ministry of Labor to coordinate
government assistance programs that have a gender focus and that are
targeted for women.
Workers in the textile export industries reported that they were
required to take preemployment pregnancy tests (see Section 6.e.).
The Government maintained the cabinet-level position directing the
National Women's Institute which develops women and gender policy (see
Section 3).
Children.--Although the Government allocated 23.7 percent of its
total expenditures for the year to basic education through the ninth
grade (including salaries of teachers and administrators), funding
remained insufficient to address the educational needs of the country's
youth. The Government provides free, universal, and compulsory
education through the age of 13; however, the Government estimated that
as many as 65,000 children ages 6 through 12 fail to receive schooling
of any kind each year; of these, almost 10,000 will never attend
primary school. Slightly more girls attend primary and high school than
boys, and older boys often drop out to assist their family by working.
The Government increased its national school capacity by approximately
50,000 children during the year.
The Government allocated 10 percent of its total expenditure to the
health sector. Media reports indicated that up to 40 percent of
children under the age of 5 years suffer from chronic malnutrition. The
Government estimated that 7,000 children (40 of every 1,000) under age
5 die each year because of inadequate health care.
The 1996 Code of Childhood and Adolescence covers the rights,
liberties, and protection of children. It established prison sentences
of up to 3 years for persons convicted of child abuse. In the major
cities of San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa, with a combined population of
682,400 minors, the Public Ministry received a total of 2,500
complaints of child abuse.
Child prostitution is a problem in some tourist and border areas of
the country.
Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Government was unable to improve the living conditions or
reduce the numbers of street children and youth (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.). The Government and children's rights organizations estimate the
number of street children at 20,000, only half of whom have shelter on
any given day. Many street children have been sexually molested or
exploited. Approximately 30 percent of the street children and youth in
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, the two largest population centers,
were reported to be HIV-positive. Over 75 percent of street children
live on the streets because of severe family problems; 30 percent
simply were abandoned. The Tegucigalpa city administration runs 12
temporary shelters with a total capacity of 240 children.
Abuse of youth and children in poor neighborhoods and in gangs is a
serious problem. Both the police and members of the general population
engaged in violence against poor youth and children; some of these
children were involved in criminal activities, but many were not (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Police were found to be responsible for some
of the murders of approximately 500 children, only some of whom lived
on the street, who were killed summarily in ``social cleansing''
killings between January 1998 and August (see Section 1.a.). In April
the first policeman to be sentenced for raping and killing a minor was
sentenced to 24 years (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Security
authorities' abuse of street children decreased significantly in the
late 1990s after Casa Alianza trained the Preventive Police on
treatment of children and youth for 2 years; it is still a problem,
although the situation has improved significantly. Casa Alianza no
longer trains police recruits at the National Police Academy in La Paz
department. During the year, the Human Rights Committee signed an
agreement with the Ministry of Public Security to provide human rights
training.
International and national human rights groups implicated public
and private security force personnel, vigilante groups, and business
leaders in many juvenile deaths (see Section 1.a.).
Persons with Disabilities.--There are no formal barriers to
participation by an estimated 700,000 persons with disabilities in
employment, education, or health care; however, there is no specific
statutory or constitutional protection for them. There is no
legislation that requires access by persons with disabilities to
government buildings or commercial establishments. In May the Honduran
Coordinating Group of Institutions and Associations of Rehabilitation,
30 organizations that work with the disabled, demanded that Congress
support their activities with $3.09 million (51 million lempiras),
which the Government had promised the groups earlier in the year. In
2001 the National University began providing classes in Honduran Sign
Language.
Indigenous Persons.--Some 490,000 persons, constituting 9 percent
of the general population, are members of indigenous and Afro-Caribbean
ethnic groups. The Miskitos, Tawahkas, Pech, Tolupans, Lencas, Chortis,
Nahual, Islanders, and Garifunas live in 362 communities and generally
have little or no political power to make decisions affecting their
lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.
Most indigenous land rights are communal, providing land use rights to
individual members of the ethnic group. Indigenous and ancestral lands
often are defined poorly in documents dating back to the mid-19th
century. Both indigenous and non-indigenous communities have criticized
the Government's exploitation of timber; however, government policy
over natural resources changed during the year and reportedly included
greater local participation.
Land disputes are common among all sectors of society; however, the
lack of clear title and property boundaries of indigenous land claims
often leads to conflicts between such groups as landless mestizo
farmers who clear and occupy land for subsistence farming, local and
national elites who encroach on indigenous land to engage in illegal
logging, and various government entities (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
During the year, 12 Tolupan were killed in Yoro department in separate
incidents because they opposed illegal logging and usurpation of their
ancestral lands. Tolupan leaders implicated sawmill owners, police,
district attorneys, and the Governmental Honduran Forest Development
Corporation in these murders. By the end of the year no action had been
taken in any of the cases. The Government worked with various
indigenous groups on management plans for public and ancestral lands
that they occupy. Expanded coverage of the national cadastral registry,
property titling, and government land registries has the potential to
reduce violence related to land disputes. In recent years security
officials and private landowners have been accused of participating in
about a dozen murders of Lencas and Garifunas in conflicts over
indigenous land claims.
The courts commonly deny legal recourse to indigenous groups and
often show bias in favor of nonindigenous parties of means and
influence. Failure to obtain legal redress frequently causes indigenous
groups to attempt to regain land through invasions of private property,
which usually provoke the authorities into retaliating forcefully. The
Government is somewhat responsive to indigenous land claims; however,
numerous cases remained unresolved because of conflicting claims by
influential individuals.
During the year, the National Agrarian Institute (INA) reduced its
issuance of titles to indigenous groups in the new administration
because of lack of funds to compensate private owners and due to
expected changes in land use laws. INA continued to play a weak role in
mediating land claims of indigenous and farmer groups.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the legal right to form
and join labor unions; unions generally are independent of the
Government and of political parties. Most farmer organizations are
affiliated directly with the labor movement. Unions occasionally hold
public demonstrations against government policies and make extensive
use of the news media to advance their views. However, only about 14
percent of the work force is unionized, and the economic and political
influence of organized labor has diminished in the past several years.
Public sector unions have greater strength than private sector unions.
Companies with unions are closed shops. During the year, the
International Labor Organization (ILO) noted that various provisions in
the labor law restrict freedom of association, including the
prohibition of more than 1 trade union in a single enterprise, the
requirement of more than 30 workers to constitute a trade union, and
the requirement that trade union organizations must include more than
90 percent Honduran membership.
The labor movement consists of three national labor confederations:
the General Council of Workers (CGT), the Confederation of Honduran
Workers (CTH), and the Unitary Confederation of Honduran Workers
(CUTH).
A number of private firms have instituted ``solidarity''
associations, essentially aimed at providing credit and other services
to workers and managers who are members of the associations.
Representatives of most organized labor groups criticize these
associations, asserting that they do not permit strikes; have
inadequate grievance procedures; are meant to displace genuine,
independent trade unions; and are employer-dominated. Because of the
restriction of one union per workplace, a solidarity association can
not compete with an independent union if the union is the first to be
established. However, neither can a union replace a solidarity
association.
The Labor Code prohibits retribution by employers for trade union
activity; however, it is a common occurrence. Some employers have
threatened to close down unionized companies and have harassed workers
seeking to unionize, in some cases dismissing them outright. Workers
often accept dismissal with severance pay rather than wait for a court
resolution. Some foreign companies close operations when they are
notified that workers seek union representation; one such case occurred
during the year. The labor courts routinely consider hundreds of
appeals from workers seeking reinstatement and back wages from
companies that fired them for engaging in union organizing activities.
Once a union is recognized, employers actually dismiss relatively few
workers for union activity. However, the right of collective bargaining
is not granted easily, even once a union is recognized. Cases of
firings and harassment serve to discourage workers elsewhere from
attempting to organize. The ILO again reiterated its recommendation for
the Government to provide for adequate protection, particularly
effective and dissuasive sanctions, against acts of anti-union
discrimination for trade union membership or activities and against
acts of interference by employers or their organization in trade union
activities.
Workers in both unionized and nonunionized companies are protected
by the Labor Code, which gives them the right to seek redress from the
Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Labor applied the law in several
cases, pressuring employers to observe the code. Labor or civil courts
can require employers to rehire employees fired for union activity, but
such rulings are uncommon. Collective bargaining agreements between
management and unions generally contain a clause prohibiting
retaliation against any worker who participates in a strike or other
union activity.
The Labor Code explicitly prohibits blacklisting; however, there
was credible evidence that blacklisting occurred in the assembly
manufacturing for export firms, known as maquiladoras. A number of
maquila workers who were fired for union activity report being hired
for 1 or 2 weeks and then being let go with no explanation. Maquila
employees report seeing computer records that include previous union
membership in personnel records, and employers have told previously
unionized workers that they are unemployable because of their previous
union activity.
When a union is formed, its organizers must submit a list of
founding members to the Ministry of Labor as part of the process of
obtaining official recognition. However, before official recognition is
granted, the Ministry of Labor must inform the company of the impending
union organization. At times companies receive the list illegally from
workers or from Labor Ministry inspectors willing to take a bribe. The
Ministry of Labor has not always been able to provide effective
protection to labor organizers. During the year the Ministry of Labor
improved its administrative procedures to reduce unethical behavior of
its officials regarding union organizing. There were fewer reports of
inspectors selling the names of employees involved in forming a union
to the management of the company compared with previous years.
The three national labor confederations maintain close ties with
various international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
protects the rights to organize and to bargain collectively.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, along with a
wide range of other basic labor rights, which the authorities generally
respect in practice. The civil service code denies the right to strike
to all government workers, other than employees of state-owned
enterprises. Nonetheless, civil servants often engage in illegal work
stoppages without experiencing reprisals. The ILO reported that
federations and confederations are prohibited from calling strikes, and
that a two-thirds majority of the votes of the total membership of the
trade union organization is required to call a strike; the ILO asserts
that these requirements restrict freedom of association.
The public sector held pervasive and long-lasting strikes
throughout the year. High school teachers were on strike for more than
2 months demanding additional salary raises.
The same labor regulations apply in the export processing zones
(EPZs) as in the rest of private industry. There are approximately 20
EPZs. Each EPZ provides space for between 4 and 10 companies. There are
approximately 200 export-oriented assembly manufacturing firms located
inside and outside EPZs. The Honduran Association of Maquiladores (AHM)
and worker representatives routinely meet to reduce potential tensions
within the industry. At year's end, approximately 40 of the country's
200 maquiladora firms were unionized.
In 1997 the AHM adopted a voluntary code of conduct governing
salaries and working conditions in the industry and recognizing
workers' right to organize. Members of AHM, both industrial park owners
and company owners, are asked to sign the code of conduct to join the
AHM. The conditions are not monitored or verified by the AHM, but the
AHM does act as arbiter when unions, the Ministry of Labor, or other
partners complain about labor conditions in a factory. Workers and
supervisors were trained on the elements of this code during the year.
Organized labor has equivalent rights and protection inside and outside
EPZs.
In the absence of unions and collective bargaining, the management
of several plants in free trade zones have instituted solidarity
associations that, to some extent, function as ``company unions'' for
the purposes of setting wages and negotiating working conditions.
Others use the minimum wage to set starting salaries and adjust wage
scales by negotiating with common groups of plant workers and other
employees, based on seniority, skills, categories of work, and other
criteria (see Section 6.e.).
Labor leaders accuse the Government of allowing private companies
to act contrary to the Labor Code. They criticize the Ministry of Labor
for not enforcing the Labor Code, for taking too long to make
decisions, and for being timid and indifferent to workers' needs.
Industry leaders, in turn, contend that the obsolete and cumbersome
Labor Code discourages foreign investment and requires significant
amendment. The Ministry of Labor sought to address these deficiencies
by requesting increased funding in the Government's budget, by
dismissing or transferring Ministry of Labor employees whose
performance was unsatisfactory, by opening more regional offices to
facilitate worker access to Ministry of Labor services, and by
conducting a painstaking, ongoing review of the Labor Code since 1995.
During the year the Ministry of Labor continued its work to strengthen
a special maquiladora office and an office for female workers.
A 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Ministry of
Labor and the Office of the United States Trade Representative calling
for greater enforcement of the Labor Code has resulted in some
progress. However, labor unions charge that the Ministry of Labor has
not made sufficient progress toward enforcing the code, especially in
training its labor inspectors and in conducting inspections of the
maquiladora industry. The Government has acknowledged that it does not
yet adhere completely to international labor standards. In 1997 the
country, in conjunction with other Central American nations, agreed to
fund a regional program to modernize the inspection and labor
management functions of all regional labor ministries. In August and
September 2000, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to abide by
the terms of the 1995 MOU and to take additional steps to strengthen
enforcement of the Labor Code.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution and the
law prohibit forced or bonded labor, including by children; however,
there were credible allegations of compulsory overtime at maquiladora
plants, particularly for women, who make up an estimated 80 percent of
the work force in the maquiladora sector.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code prohibit the
employment of minors under the age of 16, except that a child who is 14
years of age is permitted to work with parental and Ministry of Labor
permission; however, child labor is a problem. According to the
Ministry of Labor, human rights groups, and children's rights
organizations, an estimated 400,000 children work illegally. The
Children's Code prohibits a child of 14 years of age or younger from
working, even with parental permission, and establishes prison
sentences of 3 to 5 years for persons who allow children to work
illegally. This law is not enforced in practice. An employer who
legally hires a 15-year-old must certify that the child has finished,
or is finishing, his compulsory schooling. The Ministry of Labor grants
a limited number of work permits to 15-year-old children each year.
The Ministry of Labor does not enforce effectively child labor laws
outside the maquiladora sector. Violations of the Labor Code occur
frequently in rural areas and in small companies. Significant child
labor problems exist in family farming, agricultural export (including
the melon, coffee and sugarcane industries), and small-scale services
and commerce. A May 2001 household survey reported that 9.2 percent of
children between ages 5 and 15 were working, and that 26 percent of
children ages 11 through 15 work. Many children also work in the
construction industry, on family farms, as street vendors, or in small
workshops to supplement the family income. Boys between the ages of 13
and 18 work on lobster boats, where they dive illegally with little
safety or health protection. Children who work on melon farms were
exposed to pesticides and long hours.
The employment of children under the legal working age in the
maquiladora sector may occur, but not on a large scale. (Younger
children sometimes obtain work permits by fraud or purchase forged
permits.) During the year, one foreign firm in the maquiladora sector
was reported to employ minors, and the Ministry of Labor took action to
penalize the employer and assure that minors no longer work at the
plant.
During the year, the new administration swore in new members of the
interagency National Commission for the Gradual and Progressive
Eradication of Child Labor, created in 1998. In September 2001, the
employers' association launched a campaign to raise awareness of the
law among its members. In May the ILO Office on the Eradication of
Child Labor launched its programs focused on the eradication of the
worst forms of child labor in melon and coffee production.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In May minimum wages, that were
renegotiated went into effect. The agreement included a voluntary price
freeze on a basic basket of consumer goods and public services. During
the year, however, market pressures pushed up prices leading labor
leaders to protest the violation of the agreement. Daily pay rates vary
by sector of the economy. The lowest minimum wage occurs in the
nonexport agricultural sector, where it ranges from $2.64 to $3.70
(43.60 to 61.23 lempiras) per day, depending on the size of the firm.
The highest minimum wage is $4.57 (75.50 lempiras) per day in the
export and financial sectors. All workers are entitled to a bonus
equivalent to a month's salary in June and December every year. The
Constitution and the Labor Code stipulate that all labor must be paid
fairly; however, the Ministry of Labor lacks the personnel and other
resources for effective enforcement. The minimum wage is insufficient
to provide a decent standard of living (above the poverty line) for a
worker and family.
As a result of the October 2000 negotiated agreement on the minimum
wage, the Government committed itself to establishing an Economic and
Social Council within which the Government, the private sector, and
labor and social groups would debate wages and other labor issues, as
well as national social policy. In March the Council was sworn in.
The law prescribes a maximum 8-hour workday and a 44-hour workweek.
There is a requirement of at least one 24-hour rest period every 8
days. The Labor Code provides for a paid vacation of 10 workdays after
1 year, and of 20 workdays after 4 years. The law requires overtime
payment for hours in excess of the standard. There are prohibitions on
excessive compulsory overtime. However, employers frequently ignored
these regulations due to the high level of unemployment and
underemployment and the lack of effective enforcement by the Ministry
of Labor. Foreign workers enjoy equal protection under the law,
although the process for a foreigner to obtain a work permit from the
Ministry of Labor is cumbersome.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing national
occupational health and safety laws, but does not do so consistently or
effectively. During the year, the Ministry of Labor received technical
assistance and equipment to improve its regulatory capacity. There are
16 occupational health and safety inspectors throughout the country.
The informal sector, comprising more than 70 percent of all employment,
is regulated and monitored poorly. Worker safety standards also are
poorly enforced in the construction industry. Some complaints alleged
that foreign factory managers failed to comply with the occupational
health and safety aspects of Labor Code regulations in factories
located in the free-trade zones and in private industrial parks (see
Section 6.b.). There is no provision allowing a worker to leave a
dangerous work situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
Labor unions, women's groups, and human rights groups report
receiving complaints from workers in textile export industries that
include: illegal preemployment pregnancy tests, severely limited access
to medical services, verbal abuse, no freedom to organize unions, and
forced and unpaid overtime. The Ministry of Labor has increased its
responsiveness to these complaints, according to the same
organizations.
The Government, private sector, and worker representatives
participated in a regional program to improve occupational safety and
health conditions throughout Central America. This program aimed to
strengthen regional labor codes and the enforcement capabilities of the
Central American labor ministries in these fields.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Legal Code includes provisions that
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, it is a problem. Honduras is
primarily a source, but also a transit, country for trafficked children
and women to neighboring countries and the United States. According to
Casa Alianza, Honduran children, especially young girls, are trafficked
by criminal groups to other Central American countries for purposes of
sexual exploitation. There are reports that trafficking in women and
children also occurs within the country's borders. There were reports
during the year that girls and women were trafficked to Guatemala,
Mexico, and the United States for purposes of prostitution. An April
raid in Texas uncovered a prostitution ring run by Hondurans in which
more than three dozen Honduran women and girls had been trafficked to
the United States and were subject to sexual exploitation and debt
bondage.
Reports from Casa Alianza in 2000 asserted that approximately 250
Honduran children in Canada were coerced into prostitution or the sale
of illicit narcotics. Honduran authorities did not repatriate any of
the minors involved despite 2000 press reports that indicated the
Government was taking action. Canadian authorities cooperated with
Honduras during the year to identify and repatriate the minors.
Charges were dropped in the February 2000 case of a San Pedro Sula
judge accused of kidnaping six minors with intent to sell them. During
the year the Government continued to work with the Government of Mexico
to repatriate over 200 Honduran minors working as prostitutes in
southern Mexico. In 2000 a local children's rights group charged that
498 children had been reported missing from 1986 to 2000, including 22
children in 2001. The group asserted that local kidnapers receive an
average of $133 (2,000 lempiras) per child, each of whom subsequently
is sold abroad for $10,000 to $15,000. No more information was
available on this case at year's end.
The law prohibits trafficking in persons and provides for sentences
of between 6 and 9 years imprisonment; the penalty is increased if the
traffickers are government or public employees, or if the victim
suffers ``loss of liberty'' or is killed. The Government and Justice
Ministry, through its General Directorate for Population and Migration,
is responsible for enforcing the country's immigration laws although it
does not have arrest powers. However, corruption, a lack of resources,
and weak police and court systems hinder law enforcement efforts. While
traffickers have been arrested, the Government has not prosecuted any
cases.
The Government does not provide economic aid to victims or
potential victims of trafficking. During the year, an interagency
working group to limit trafficking was inaugurated. In 2000 the
Government inaugurated two centers in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula to
assist citizens deported from other countries to relocate in Honduras.
The centers' activities continued during the year, with the assistance
of several international organizations.
__________
JAMAICA
Jamaica is a constitutional parliamentary democracy and a member of
the Commonwealth of Nations. Two political parties have alternated in
power since the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1944;
however, in October general elections, Prime Minister P.J. Patterson's
People's National Party (PNP) won an unprecedented fourth consecutive
term. The PNP won 34 of the 60 seats in Parliament after a tense
campaign that was less violent than previous elections. International
observers found that intimidation of voters and party agents was a
problem during the general elections. The judiciary was generally
independent but lacked adequate resources.
The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) had primary responsibility for
internal security, assisted by the Island Special Constabulary Force.
The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF--army, air wing, and coast guard) was
charged with national defense, marine narcotics interdiction, and JCF
support. The JDF had no mandate to maintain law and order and no powers
of arrest, unless so ordered by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister
occasionally gave the JDF powers to cordon and search. The Ministry of
National Security oversaw the JCF and the JDF. Civilian authorities
generally maintained effective control of the security forces; however,
some members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
The market economy was based largely on tourism, production of
primary products (bauxite and alumina, sugar, bananas), and
remittances. The country's population was approximately 2.6 million.
The Government promoted private investment to stimulate economic growth
and modernization, pursuing in the process a difficult program of
structural adjustment. The economy grew by an estimated 0.5-1.0 percent
during the year, compared with 1.7 percent in 2001. There was a large
gap between the wealthy and the impoverished.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members
of the security forces committed some unlawful killings. Police and
prison guards abused detainees and prisoners. Although the Government
moved to investigate incidents of police abuses and punish some of
those police involved, continued impunity for police who commit abuses
remained a problem. Prison and jail conditions remained poor;
overcrowding, brutality against detainees, and poor sanitary conditions
were problems. There were reports of arbitrary arrest and detention.
The judicial system was overburdened, and lengthy delays in trials were
common. Violence and discrimination against women remained problems.
There were cases of societal discrimination against persons with
disabilities and members of the Rastafarian religion. Violence against
suspected homosexuals occurred. Child labor was a problem, as was child
prostitution. Mob violence against and vigilante killings of those
suspected of breaking the law remained a problem. Jamaica was invited
by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were at least
5--and possibly as many as 12--politically motivated killings during
the year, committed by supporters of various political factions. The
police committed some unlawful or unwarranted killings during the year.
Although there is a history of political violence and killings in
the period leading up to elections, the last three general elections
were relatively calm (see Section 3).
On January 3, unidentified gunmen shot and burned to death seven
persons, including two children, in a nighttime attack in the 100 Lane
area of Kingston, a community linked to the PNP. Police at a nearby
station failed to respond to the attack. Police believed that the
incident was a reprisal for a January 1 attack in the Jamaica Labor
Party (JLP)-controlled Parke Lane area in which one person was killed.
Most observers believed that both incidents were criminal reprisal
killings, rather than politically motivated murders.
In August three persons were shot and killed, and another was shot
and injured after a dispute over the removal of political graffiti in
Spanish Town, St. Catherine parish. The placement of political flags
led to increased tension and the murders of JLP supporters. In
September 2 people were killed and at least 13 wounded in a series of
drive-by shootings between rival political enclaves in central
Kingston. In response to these incidents and other threats of violence,
the newly appointed Political Ombudsman went to the scene to reduce
tensions (see Section 4).
On October 16 (election day), seven people, including a child and
three women, were murdered in the early morning in Rock Hall, St.
Andrew. The first murder was that of a JLP political worker killed near
a polling station; then members of two families were killed at their
homes. The victorious opposition candidate for the area expressed
concern that the killings were politically motivated. In December the
police arrested two 17-year-olds and charged them with seven counts of
murder. The police linked the killings to a gang conflict involving a
stolen gun.
The police frequently employed lethal force in apprehending
criminal suspects. During the year, there were 149 deaths, including
those of 16 police officers, during police encounters with criminals,
compared with 163 such deaths in 2001. While allegations of ``police
murder'' were frequent, the validity of many of the allegations was
suspect. The country faced a critical crime situation with a homicide
rate exceeding 40 per 100,000 persons. Well-armed gangs that trafficked
in narcotics and guns controlled many inner-city communities. The gangs
often were equipped better than the police force and conducted
coordinated ambushes of joint security patrols. There were targeted
assaults against police officers and their families.
The JCF conducted both administrative and criminal investigations
into all incidents involving fatal shootings by the police. The Bureau
of Special Investigations (BSI) within the JCF specifically addressed
police shootings; the BSI employed 29 investigators. The BSI
supplemented the JCF Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), which
investigated police corruption and other misconduct, and the civilian
Police Public Complaints Authority (PPCA), which oversaw investigations
of the other two bodies and could initiate its own investigations. The
PPCA had 13 investigators.
On July 22, police shot and killed 7-year-old Romaine Edwards
during what police said was a shoot-out with gangsters in Lawrence
Tavern, St. Andrew. Area residents agreed there was no shoot-out
between police and gunmen. The authorities subsequently transferred all
seven officers from Lawrence Tavern to another police station. The BSI
immediately took the case, which was still under investigation at
year's end.
On November 15, the police allegedly shot and killed a 24-year-old
mentally retarded man, Daemon Roache, in Kingston while in pursuit of
three robbers. Residents claimed police shot Roache in the back and
head. Over 100 residents protested the shooting, and a human rights NGO
criticized the police action. At year's end, the BSI was investigating
the incident.
During the year, at least five detainees died while in police
lockups; some of the deaths involved negligence (see Section 1.c.).
In December 2001, police shot and killed 26-year-old Dave Steele
after a vehicular pursuit in Trelawny. Police said that they fired
warning shots, but witnesses said that police shot Steele in the back
after he exited the car. A 300-person crowd demonstrated following the
incident and erected roadblocks. On July 30, the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) ruled that a special constable should be charged
with the murder, and the case was before the courts at year's end.
The case of a farmer killed by police in January 2001 remained
pending before the DPP at year's end.
On October 3, a 10-member jury for the coroner's inquest into the
March 2001 killings of seven youths by the police Crime Management Unit
in Braeton, St. Catherine parish, found the police ``not criminally
responsible'' by a 6 to 4 vote. By law, a jury comprising seven or more
persons cannot have more than two dissenters; if it does, the Coroner
may hold a new inquest or the resident magistrate may refer the case to
the DPP for a ruling. An Amnesty International press release called the
inquest ``deeply flawed'' and asked the DPP immediately to instigate
criminal proceedings against the police officers involved.
In July 2001, a joint police-army operation entered Tivoli Gardens,
West Kingston, reportedly to search for an arms cache following months
of unrest in West Kingston. During the operation, 25 civilians, 1
policeman, and 1 soldier were killed in violence that lasted for
several days. The police said that they came under heavy fire from
gunmen. The opposition leader, who was the parliamentarian for Tivoli
Gardens, contended that the police operation was intended to discredit
him before national elections. The Prime Minister established a
Commission of Inquiry, which concluded in June that the events were not
political and that the police acted with restraint. The Commission
blamed the violence on the presence of drugs in the neighborhood and
the proliferation of guns and ammunition in the hands of civilians.
Also in June, the opposition leader released an affidavit that
suggested that politically fueled rivalries and police inaction in the
face of the imminent melee were to blame for the outbreak of
disturbances. Amnesty International representatives expressed concern
that the inquiry did not conform to international standards.
In October 2001, police killed Andrew Stephens, a JLP ``don'' (gang
leader), reportedly in a shoot-out. In March the police sent the case
to the DPP, where it remained at year's end.
In July a court acquitted a policewoman of murder in the 2000
shooting of a man in Farm district, Clarendon parish.
In May 2001, a coroner's inquest recommended that all the police
involved in the 1999 death of Patrick Genius should be held criminally
responsible. In December 2001, the DPP ruled that there was
insufficient evidence to support a criminal case against the police.
The Supreme Court refused an appeal brought by Genius' mother. On
October 31, the Full Court, made up of the Chief Justice and two other
justices, ruled that the lawyers may challenge the DPP's decision,
which required the DPP to reconsider whether to prosecute the police
involved. Human rights groups praised the decision; the case remained
before the Full Court at year's end.
In 1999 nine soldiers and four policemen severely beat Michael
Gayle, described as a paranoid schizophrenic, after he tried to pass
through a roadblock near his home after curfew. Gayle died as the
result of internal injuries; at the coroner's inquest, the jury
returned a majority verdict that all police and military personnel on
duty at the roadblock at that time should be charged with manslaughter.
However, no criminal charges were filed, and the DPP closed the case in
December 2001. In March the local human rights group Jamaicans for
Justice presented a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights regarding the case; responses to the petition were in progress
at year's end.
The JCF undertook an initiative of ``community policing'' to
address the problem of long-standing antipathy between the security
forces and many poor inner-city neighborhoods. For example, designated
policemen walk beats and interact with members of the community on a
daily basis. The Human Rights Advisor to the Minister of National
Security and Justice worked to educate JCF trainees and junior officers
to respect citizens' rights. The Jamaica Chamber of Commerce Inner-City
Development Committee and the Jamaica Social Investment Fund
distributed a Police Code of Conduct and a Charter of Citizen's Rights
to police officers and citizens. The Police Federation conducted
lectures to educate policemen in citizens' rights. The Government, the
Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights, and foreign governments
developed human rights materials to be used in all subjects at the
primary and secondary levels, which were being tested in selected
classrooms at year's end. The JCF policy statement on the use of force
incorporated U.N.-approved language on basic principles on the use of
force and firearms by law enforcement officials.
Vigilantism and spontaneous mob killings in response to crime
continued to be a problem. There were at least 11 vigilante killings
during the year, the motives for which varied--some victims were
targeted, while others were the result of spontaneous mob action. On
July 20, an angry mob of local residents beat and then burned to death
a man accused of committing several rapes and robberies in St.
Catherine. On August 18, a mob stabbed a bus driver 56 times and
slashed his throat after an altercation between the driver and a
passenger left the passenger injured. Human rights advocates contended
that police did not consider such murders a priority and expressed
concern that the perpetrators rarely were charged.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other abuse of prisoners and
detainees; however, reports of physical abuse of prisoners by guards
continued, despite efforts by the Government to remove abusive guards
and improve procedures. There were also credible reports that police
abused detainees in lockups.
In July 2001, after demonstrators blocked parish roads to protest
demolition of 17 squatter homes, local police and the JCF Mobile
Reserve Unit attempted to disperse the crowd, using tear gas, batons,
and firing live ammunition in the air. Prime Minister Patterson
requested a report on the demolition operation and a review of
procedures for ejecting squatters, and the OPR investigated accusations
of police excesses. In January the BSI submitted the case to the DPP,
where it remained at year's end.
In April the DPP ruled that two police officers should be charged
with wounding with intent and malicious destruction of property for a
June 2000 incident in which police fired on a minibus when the driver
failed to stop at a roadblock. The police concluded an investigation
into the incident and sent it to the DPP's office in September 2001.
The case was before the courts at year's end.
Prison conditions remained poor; overcrowding, inadequate diet,
poor sanitary conditions, and insufficient medical care were typical.
There were no reports of prison riots. The majority of pretrial
detainees were held in police lockups. After an April escape from the
Spanish Town lockup, the Minister of National Security ordered the
Horizon Remand Center to receive prisoners, which immediately eased
overcrowding in lockups.
On March 24, a prisoner at Mandeville police station died after
being beaten by other prisoners at the lockup. The authorities charged
five members of the police force with failing to carry out proper
supervision and suspended two police constables. The Public Defender
began proceedings to obtain compensation from the Government on behalf
of the victim.
On March 25, a prisoner at Bull Bay lockup died in police custody.
On August 30, a prisoner in a Manchester lockup died in police custody.
Both cases were being investigated at year's end.
In March media reports stated that mentally ill inmates were being
used as sex slaves in prison. A former medical officer and a
psychiatrist at the St. Catherine Adult Correctional Facility said that
mentally ill inmates and other ``weaklings'' had been raped repeatedly,
and that prison officials were aware of the problem.
On May 7, two Remand Center wardens were kept hostage for over 2
hours in a security post. On July 8, the JDF took operational control
of the Remand Center after one detainee escaped and others attacked a
correctional officer; at year's end, the center remained under JDF
control.
Between July and August 2001, four detainees who were held at the
Hunt's Bay police station lockup in Portmore, St. Catherine parish,
died under unexplained circumstances. In May the DPP ruled that the
case should be sent to the Kingston Criminal Court, where charges were
pending against the Hunt's Bay wardens at year's end. An April 2001
Amnesty International report documented severe overcrowding (more than
three times intended capacity), cells without lighting or sanitation,
and lack of medical care and adequate food in the Hunt's Bay lockup.
The report detailed frequent and credible allegations of police abuse
in lockups, including severe beatings, mock executions, and rape.
Although Hunt's Bay lockup closed in 2001, the authorities reopened it
during the year.
A separate prison for women--the Ft. Augusta Women's Prison--was
housed in a 19th century fort. Sanitary conditions were poor, although
far less so than in the men's prisons because there was less
overcrowding. Ft. Augusta was also relatively safer and had less
violence than the men's prisons. However, inmates at Ft. Augusta
complained of other inmates carrying knives and other weapons.
The Constitution prohibits the incarceration of children in adult
prisons; however, in practice some juveniles were held with adults. A
1999 Human Rights Watch report criticized the conditions in which
juveniles were held. The Government charged Ministry of Health officers
with finding appropriate ``places of safety'' for juveniles, and
adopted new procedures, which were considered effective on the whole.
On March 26, two toddlers ended up in a police cell with their
mothers but were released after the intervention of a senior police
officer. The Office of the Public Defender and the police each began
investigations into the incident, and in December the Attorney
General's Office paid each mother approximately $1,050 (J$50,000) in
compensation.
In 2000 the Court of Appeals ruled that it was unconstitutional for
juveniles to be held ``at the Governor General's pleasure.'' This
referred to a section of the Juveniles Act that provides that persons
under the age of 18 who commit a capital crime must have their death
sentence commuted; however, they could be held for an indeterminate
time at the Governor General's discretion and were subject to
incarceration in an adult prison. In November the Government argued its
appeal of the ruling before the judicial committee of the Privy Council
in the United Kingdom, which had not ruled at year's end.
In general, the Government allowed private groups, voluntary
organizations, international human rights organizations, and the media
to visit prisons and monitor prison conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Jamaica Constabulary
Force Act permits the arrest of persons ``reasonably suspected'' of
having committed a crime. There were some reported incidents of
arbitrary arrest during the year, and the authorities continued to
detain suspects, especially those from poor neighborhoods, without
bringing them before a judge within the prescribed period.
In March 2001, a magistrate's court freed a 76-year-old man who had
been held in prison for 29 years without trial because he had been
judged unfit to plead due to mental illness. Following public scrutiny,
the Government acted swiftly to determine the number of such cases
(which human rights advocates estimated at between 200 and 500) and
bring them before the courts. During the year, between 20 and 25
mentally ill persons were released, and human rights organizations
helped some of them to file false imprisonment cases against the
Government. Each new ``unfit to plead'' case must be brought to the
court's attention once per month, and human rights organizations were
satisfied that such persons were less likely to be forgotten.
The law requires police to present a detainee in court within a
reasonable time period, but the authorities continued to detain
suspects beyond such a period, which the Government attributed to an
overburdened court system that could not accommodate large numbers of
such presentations in a timely manner (see Section 1.e.). Magistrates
inquired at least once a week into the welfare of each person listed by
the JCF as detained. There was a functioning bail system.
Foreign prisoners must pay for their own deportation when they have
completed their sentences. If they could not afford to pay, they were
jailed until relatives or consulates could arrange for transportation.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports
that it occurred.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, which generally existed in practice. However,
the judicial system was overburdened and operated with inadequate
resources.
Three courts handle criminal matters at the trial level. Resident
magistrates try lesser offenses (misdemeanors). A Supreme Court judge
tries more serious felonies, except for felonies involving firearms,
which are tried before a judge of the Gun Court. Defendants had the
right to appeal a conviction in any of the three trial courts to the
Court of Appeal, which is the highest court in the country. This appeal
process resulted in frequent delays. The Constitution allows the Court
of Appeal and the Parliament, as well as defendants in civil and
criminal cases, and plaintiffs in civil cases, to refer cases to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom as a
final court of appeal.
The lack of sufficient staff and resources hindered due process.
For example, the media reported in August that 80 percent of coroner's
inquests ordered by the DPP were yet to be held. The BSI also was faced
with a large backlog. As of December 1, the BSI had investigated 521 of
976 shooting incidents during the year. Trials in many cases were
delayed for years, and other cases were dismissed because files could
not be located. A night court had some success in reducing the backlog
of cases.
The defendant's right to counsel is well established. Legal aid
attorneys were available to defend the indigent, except those charged
with certain offenses under the Money Laundering Act or Dangerous Drugs
Act. The Public Defender may bring cases for persons who have had their
constitutional rights violated. The Public Defender's Office contracted
private attorneys to represent clients. There were sufficient funds and
legal aid attorneys to meet demand.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary intrusion by the
State into the private life of an individual. The revised Jamaica
Constabulary Force Act gives security personnel broad powers of search
and seizure similar to those granted by the former Suppression of
Crimes Act. The act allows search without a warrant of a person on
board or disembarking a ship or boat, if a police officer has good
reason to be suspicious. In practice, the police conducted searches
without warrants. There were no allegations of unauthorized wiretapping
by the police.
In 2000 the media reported allegations that a special police unit
wiretapped telephones without proper authorization in an investigation
of police involvement in narcotics trafficking. Following an
investigation, in July 2001, the DPP ordered that the civilian head of
the unit and two telephone company employees be charged with
interfering in the operation of a public utility. In December the case
against the two employees was scheduled for a hearing; the other person
was thought to be living outside the country.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
The four largest newspapers, all privately owned, regularly
reported on alleged human rights abuses, particularly those involving
the JCF. Foreign publications were widely available. There were 3
television stations and 16 radio stations. The Government's
broadcasting commission has the right to regulate programming during
emergencies. Foreign television transmissions were unregulated and
widely available through satellite antennas and cable operators.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. There were several community protests
against police actions during the year. Residents staged demonstrations
to protest incidents such as the alleged unwarranted police killing of
a man in December 2001, and the July police killing of a child (see
Section 1.a.).
Security personnel generally acted with restraint during public
demonstrations. In August local police units used tear gas against
protesting residents and fired into the air during a violent protest
against the alleged police killing of a man in Trench Town. The police
alleged that the man was a wanted murderer who engaged them in a gun
battle.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
Members of the Rastafarian community complained that law
enforcement officials unfairly targeted them. However, it was not clear
whether such complaints reflected discrimination on the basis of
religious belief or due to the group's illegal use of marijuana, which
is used as part of Rastafarian religious practice. Rastafarianism is
not a recognized religion under the law. In January the Public
Defender's office brought a case to the Constitutional Court to gain
government support of Rastafarianism as a religion, which was scheduled
for a hearing in February 2003.
Rastafarians had no right to prison visits by Rastafarian clergy.
In August 2001, the Public Defender's Office filed a lawsuit against
the Government on behalf of a Rastafarian prisoner who charged that he
was denied the right to worship. The prisoner complained that he had no
access to the ministrations by clergy afforded to prisoners of other
religions. The Commissioner of Corrections and Attorney General were
named as respondents; the suit had yet to be heard.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
The Government provided asylum or refugee status in accordance with
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
established a committee and formal procedures to review claims to
refugee status. In November 2001, a group of 128 Haitians arrived in
the country. According to immigration officials, 122 were judged to be
economic migrants and were not considered for asylum. The other six
Haitians were considered for asylum; their appeals were heard on
September 2, and they were granted asylum. The committee denied all
claims to refugee status by Cubans during the year.
The issue of first asylum did not arise during the year.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in periodic
elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. All citizens age 18
and over had the right to vote by secret ballot. However, voters living
in ``garrison communities'' in inner-city areas dominated by one of the
two major political parties faced substantial influence and pressure
from politically connected gangs and young men hired by political
parties, which impeded the free exercise of their right to vote.
Although there is a history of political violence and killings in the
period leading up to elections, the October 16 elections were less
violent than previous general elections. There were some reports of
intimidation of voters and party agents.
Two political parties--the PNP and the JLP--have alternated in
power since the first elections in 1944; however, Prime Minister P.J.
Patterson's PNP won an unprecedented fourth consecutive term and 34 of
the 60 seats in Parliament in the October elections. The opposition JLP
held 26 seats; none of the other parties won a seat or received a
significant percentage of votes in any constituency.
Improvements in the electoral system, including introduction of new
voter's identification cards, the inclusion of voter's pictures on the
voter's list, and fingerprinting of voters at registration helped to
reduce fraudulent voting, which was more prevalent in 1997 elections.
Incidents of violence and intimidation--including killings,
gunfire, and stone throwing--occurred throughout the election period
(see Section 1.a.). After campaign rallies of both parties, opposing
party supporters stoned buses carrying home rally-goers, resulting in
minor injuries. The police rerouted buses to minimize confrontations
between party supporters. The security forces controlled violence and
generally acted with restraint throughout the election period. Most
killings were attributed to criminal rather than political motives.
During the general election campaign, both international and local
observer groups concluded that the occurrence of violence, although
reduced, continued to be a serious concern in the electoral process.
Problems persisted in the garrison communities, including intimidation
of party agents and voters of nondominant parties and restrictions on
the movement of voters and election workers. International observers
found that intimidation of voters and poll workers appeared to decrease
relative to past elections, but was still a problem. They found that
the election preparations showed significant advances over the past,
and that the security forces played a critical role on election day in
maintaining peace and order. The international observers lauded the
Code of Conduct, the central Elections Center, and the office of the
Political Ombudsman as advances over the 1997 elections.
There were no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
politics. Women held about 8 percent of all political offices and 30
percent of the senior civil service positions. Three of the 17 cabinet
members were women, one of whom was also the PNP General Secretary.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operated without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. The Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights was the
country's only formal organization concerned with all aspects of human
rights. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Jamaicans for Justice
was a human rights group created in 1999 in response to concerns about
police impunity; it focused on the issues of extrajudicial killing and
excessive use of force by the police. Jamaicans for Justice reported
that undercover police regularly attended its meetings. The group wrote
a weekly newspaper column and had a cordial relationship with the
police. For example, following the April killing of a police constable,
the group called that killing an ``attack on the justice system.''
government officials generally were cooperative and responsive to the
views of human rights organizations. However, in June the Attorney
General and Minister of Justice responded to NGO scrutiny of the
Government's handling of specific human rights abuses such as the
Breaton and Gayle cases (see Section 1.a.). He stated that judging a
country's human rights record solely on abuses carried out by members
of the security forces ``cannot serve the cause of protecting the
rights of our citizens in a comprehensive and wholesome manner.''
The Public Defender's Office brings cases on behalf of those who
charged that their constitutional rights were violated. The office
incorporated the former post of Parliamentary Ombudsman, intended to
provide citizens protection against abuses of state power and damage
caused by unjustifiable administrative inaction, and expanded that role
to include protection of citizens whose constitutional rights were
infringed. The office contracted private attorneys to bring suits
against the Government on behalf of private citizens. During the year,
the Public Defender successfully sought compensation for a number of
citizens, including two jailed toddlers (see Section 1.c.) and a
prisoner who had his hand broken by a warden at St. Catherine prison.
The Public Defender also was seeking compensation for a police officer
who had his murder conviction overturned by the Privy Council. That
officer spent 11 years in prison, and his Privy Council appeal was held
up for 5 years due to the State's failure to provide the court
reporter's notes to the Privy Council.
On July 26, the Senate approved the Political Ombudsman (Interim)
Act, which separated the functions of the Political Ombudsman from the
Public Defender's Office. The Political Ombudsman became a functionary
of the Parliament, charged with monitoring the actions of political
parties and their supporters in an effort to reduce political violence
(see Sections 1.a. and 3). The Political Ombudsman is charged
officially with investigating any action taken by a political party, or
its members or supporters, that may constitute a breach of any
agreement or code (such as the Code of Political Conduct, signed by
party leaders in June), or is likely to prejudice good relations
between supporters of the political parties. The act also empowers the
Political Ombudsman to appoint a tribunal or political party
representatives to investigate complaints.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
of origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex. The Government
generally enforced these prohibitions in practice, except for
widespread discrimination on the basis of political opinion in the
distribution of scarce governmental benefits, including employment,
especially in the garrison communities (see Section 3).
The Jamaica Forum for Lesbians, All Sexuals, and Gays released
testimony alleging human rights abuses, including police harassment,
arbitrary detention, mob attacks, stabbing, harassment of gay patients
by hospital staff, and targeted shootings of homosexuals. In October
the United Kingdom granted three gay men asylum based on their fear of
persecution in Jamaica, and other such asylum applications reportedly
were pending. Individuals committed acts of violence against suspected
homosexuals; for example, in May a neighbor broke into a private home
and caught two boys in a homosexual act. He called other neighbors who
joined him in the home. The neighbors beat the boys until they fled,
leaving their clothing behind.
Women.--Social and cultural traditions perpetuate violence against
women, including spousal abuse. Violence against women was widespread,
but many women were reluctant to acknowledge or report abusive
behavior, leading to wide variations in estimates of its extent. During
the year, the number of reported incidents of rape decreased by 4
percent; however, NGOs stressed that the vast majority of rapes were
not reported. The JCF rape investigative and juvenile unit, which was
headed by a female deputy superintendent, handled sex crimes. The
Domestic Violence Act provides remedies for domestic violence,
including restraining orders and other noncustodial sentencing.
Breaching a restraining order is punishable by a fine of up to about
$200 (J$10,000) and 6 months' imprisonment.
There is no legislation that addresses sexual harassment, and it
was a problem. There were no reports of sexual harassment of women by
the police. Some observers believed that women did not report such
incidents because there was no legal remedy.
The law prohibits prostitution; however, it was widespread,
especially in tourist areas.
The Constitution and the Employment Act accord women full legal
equality; however, in practice women suffered from discrimination in
the workplace and often earned less than their male counterparts. The
Bureau of Women's Affairs, reporting to the Minister of Development,
oversaw programs to protect the legal rights of women. These programs
had limited effect but raised the awareness of problems affecting
women. During the year, the Bureau completed a review of a number of
laws for gender bias and forwarded this review to Parliament.
There was an active community of women's rights groups. A month
before the October election, 25 NGOs presented their ``Women's
Manifesto,'' which particularly noted the ``lack of national attention
to sexual crimes'' and called on candidates and parties to commit to
principles of the manifesto. Chief among the groups' concerns was the
prevalence of a societal indifference toward, or acceptance of, rape
and other sexual crimes against women and girls. The launch had
moderate media support and coverage but little impact on election
debates. Women's groups were concerned with a wide range of issues,
including violence against women, political representation, employment,
and the image of women presented in the media.
Children.--The Government was committed to improving children's
welfare. The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Culture was responsible
for implementation of the Government's programs for children. The
Educational Act stipulates that all children between 6 and 12 years of
age must attend elementary school. However, due to economic
circumstances, thousands of children were kept home to help with
housework and avoid school fees.
A National Youth Development Center, part of the Ministry of
Education, Youth, and Culture, coordinated youth programs.
There was no societal pattern of abuse of children; however, there
were numerous reports of rape and incest, especially in inner cities.
NGOs reported that inner city ``dons'' or community leaders and
sometimes even fathers initiated sex with young girls as a ``right.''
There were 270 reported cases of carnal abuse--sex with girls under
16--during the year. The Government expressed concern about child abuse
and admitted that incidents were underreported. Child prostitution was
a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Juvenile Act addresses several areas related to the protection
of children, including the prevention of cruelty, a prohibition on
causing or allowing juvenile begging, the power to bring juveniles in
need of care or protection before a juvenile court, the treatment of
juvenile offenders, the regulation and supervision of children's homes,
and restrictions on employment of juveniles. However, resource
constraints resulted in juveniles ``in need of care or protection''
being incarcerated in police lockups with adults (see Section l.c.).
In 2001 the Government began the Possibilities Program to alleviate
the problems of street children; the program included a care center, a
resocializing center, and three skills centers.
Persons with Disabilities.--No laws mandate accessibility for
persons with disabilities, who encountered discrimination in employment
and denial of access to schools. Several government agencies and NGOs
provided services and employment to various groups of persons with
disabilities. The Minister of State for Labor and Social Security, who
is blind, reported that out of a disabled population of approximately
250,000, only about 200 persons were gainfully employed--90 percent by
the Government. The Government trained persons with disabilities for
jobs within the information technology sector, and added two buses
equipped with hydraulic lifts for wheelchairs during the year. In 2001
it was reported that numerous persons declared unfit to plead remained
in prison without trial (see Section 1.d.). Human rights organizations
were satisfied with the Chief Justice's order that each ``unfit to
plead'' case be brought to the court's attention once a month.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to
form or join a trade union, and unions function freely and
independently of the Government. The Labor Relations and Industrial
Disputes Act (LRIDA) defines worker rights. There was a spectrum of
national unions, some of which were affiliated with political parties.
Between 10 and 15 percent of the work force was unionized. The
country's poor economy led to a decline in union membership. Some
companies laid off union workers then rehired them as contractors with
reduced pay and benefits. The LRIDA prohibits antiunion discrimination,
and employees may not be fired solely for union membership. The
authorities enforced this law effectively.
All major trade unions were affiliated with some major regional or
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There were no
reports of government interference with union organizing efforts during
the year. Judicial and police authorities effectively enforced the
LRIDA and other labor regulations. All parties were committed firmly to
collective bargaining in contract negotiations, even in some nonunion
settings. An independent Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT) hears cases
where management and labor fail to reach agreement. Any cases not
resolved by the IDT pass to the civil courts. The IDT generally handled
35 to 40 cases each year. Most were decided within 90 days, but some
took longer to resolve due to the complexity of the dispute or delays
requested by the parties.
Collective bargaining is denied to a bargaining unit if no single
union represents at least 40 percent of the workers in the unit in
question, or when the union seeking recognition for collective
bargaining purposes does not obtain 50 percent of the votes of the
total number of workers (whether or not they are affiliated with the
union). The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
(COE) considered that where there was no collective bargaining
agreement and where a trade union did not obtain 50 percent of the
votes of the total number of workers, that union should be able to
negotiate at least on behalf of its own members. The COE requested the
Government to take necessary measures to amend this legislation. The
Government contended that this would unduly lengthen negotiations.
The LRIDA neither authorizes nor prohibits the right to strike, but
strikes did occur. Striking workers could interrupt work without
criminal liability but could not be assured of keeping their jobs.
Other than in the case of prison guards, there was no evidence of any
workers losing their jobs over a strike action. Workers in 10 broad
categories of ``essential services'' are prohibited from striking, a
provision the ILO repeatedly criticized as overly inclusive.
There were a few strikes during the year. In November electric
utility company workers defied a 30-day injunction against strike
action issued by the Supreme Court and staged a brief strike. At year's
end, the Ministry of Labor was involved, and negotiations continued.
Beginning in 1999, prison guards conducted an islandwide sickout to
protest the proposed reappointment of the Commissioner of Corrections.
When 800 guards failed to comply with an order to return to work, the
authorities placed them on forced leave at one-fourth pay, brought
disciplinary charges against the guards, and declared the work stoppage
illegal. On May 13, the Public Services Commission accepted the
petition from the National Security Minister not to proceed with
charges against those correctional officers who accepted the negotiated
agreement between the Government and their unions, and 616 warders were
reinstated. They were expected to receive approximately $9.4 million
(J$450 million) in back wages.
Domestic labor laws applied equally to the ``free zones'' (export
processing zones). However, there were no unionized companies in any of
the 3 publicly owned zones, which employed 7,813 workers. Organizers
attributed this circumstance to resistance to organizing efforts by
foreign owners in the zones, but attempts to organize plants within the
zones continued. Company-controlled ``workers' councils'' handled
grievance resolution at most free zone companies, but they did not
negotiate wages and conditions with management. Management determined
wages and benefits within the free zones. The Ministry of Labor is
required to perform comprehensive factory inspections in the free zones
once each year, and in practice it performs them at 6- to 9-month
intervals. There were no reports of substandard or unsafe conditions in
the free zone factories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution does
not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by either adults or
children, but there were no reports that this practice occurred.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Juvenile Act provides that children under the age of
12 shall not be employed except by parents or guardians, and that such
employment may be only in domestic, agricultural, or horticultural
work. It also prohibits children under the age of 15 from industrial
employment. The police are mandated with conducting child labor
inspections, and the Ministry of Health is charged with finding places
of safety for children. However, according to Ministry officials,
resources to investigate exploitative child labor were insufficient.
Children under the age of 12 were seen peddling goods and services or
begging on city streets. There were also reports that underage children
were employed illegally in fishing communities and in prostitution (see
Section 5).
With assistance from the ILO's International Program for the
Elimination of Child Labor, the Government undertook several sector-
specific programs to study and combat child labor. These included a
data collection component, awareness raising activities, and direct
action to identify and withdraw children from the worst forms of child
labor, particularly prostitution, fishing, tourism, and the informal
sectors. An ILO adviser overseeing the project was assigned to the
Labor Ministry and conducting various assessments of the problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the minimum
wage, after receiving recommendations from the National Minimum Wage
Advisory Commission. The minimum wage, raised from $25 (J$1,200) to $38
(J$1,800) per week during the year, was considered to be inadequate to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
workers were paid more than the legal minimum, except in the tourism
industry. Work over 40 hours per week or 8 hours per day must be
compensated at overtime rates, a provision that was observed widely.
The Labor Ministry's Industrial Safety Division sets and enforces
industrial health and safety standards, which were considered adequate.
Public service staff reductions in the Ministries of Labor, Finance,
National Security, and the Public Service contributed to the
difficulties in enforcing workplace regulations.
Industrial accident rates, particularly in the bauxite and alumina
industry, remained low. The law provides workers with the right to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
their continued employment if they are trade union members or covered
by the Factories Act. The law does not specifically protect other
categories of workers in those circumstances.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, there are laws against assault and
fraud, and other laws establish various immigration and customs
regulations. A 2000 ILO study found child prostitution, involving girls
as young as 10 years old, to be a widespread problem in all parts of
the country. Other than that, there were no confirmed reports that
persons were trafficked to, from, or within the country.
__________
MEXICO
Mexico is a federal republic composed of 31 states and a federal
district, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. In
July 2000, voters elected President Vicente Fox Quesada of the Alliance
for Change Coalition in historic elections that observers judged to be
generally free and fair, and that ended the Institutional Revolutionary
Party's (PRI) 71-year hold on the presidency. The peace process in
Chiapas between the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) and the
Government remained stalled. The EZLN has been silent since the passing
of the Indigenous Rights and Culture law in August of 2001. There has
been no dialogue between the EZLN and the Government since then because
the EZLN refused to meet with the Government's representative, Luis H.
Alvarez. Sporadic outbursts of politically motivated violence continued
to occur throughout the country, particularly in the southern states of
Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The judiciary is generally independent;
however, on occasion, it was influenced by government authorities
particularly at the state level. Corruption, inefficiency, impunity,
disregard of the law, and lack of training are major problems.
The police forces, which include federal and state judicial police,
the Federal Preventive Police (PFP), municipal police, and various
police auxiliary forces, have primary responsibility for law
enforcement and maintenance of order within the country. However, the
military played a large role in some law enforcement functions,
primarily counternarcotics. There were approximately 5,300 active duty
military personnel in the PFP as permitted by the 1972 Firearms and
Explosives Law. Elected civilian officials maintain effective control
over the police and the military; however, corruption is widespread
within police ranks and also is a problem in the military. The military
maintained a strong presence in the state of Chiapas and a lesser, but
still significant, deployment in Guerrero. Military personnel and
police officers committed human rights abuses.
During the year, the market-based economy began a slow recovery
after the 2001 global economic slowdown. In 2001 the country's
population was estimated at 98.8 million persons. Gross Domestic
Product grew at an annualized rate of 2.1 percent during the first half
of the year after declining by 0.3 percent in 2001. The rate of
inflation was 4.4 percent. Leading exports included petroleum,
automobiles, and manufactured and assembled products, including
electronics and consumer goods. During the year, industrial production
slowly recovered after contracting by 2.5 percent in 2001. Over the
last year, automobile production, a key sector, fell by 2.7 percent;
however, economic forecasters anticipate automobile production will
grow in the future. Average wages increased by 5.8 percent during the
year, slightly higher than the 5.5 percent rate of inflation in the
same period in 2001 and higher than the Government's target rate of 4.5
percent. An estimated 25 percent of the population resides in rural
areas where subsistence agriculture is common. Income distribution
remains skewed: in 2000, the top 10 percent of the population received
37.8 percent of total income while the bottom 20 percent earned an
estimated 3.6 percent.
The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remained in several areas, and in
some states, especially Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas, where a poor
climate of respect for human rights presented special concern. Federal
and state law enforcement officials and one member of the military were
accused of committing unlawful killings. There were reports of
vigilante killings. There were documented reports of disappearances.
The police sometimes tortured persons to obtain information.
Prosecutors used this evidence in courts, and the courts continued to
admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture. There were cases
of police torture of suspects in custody that resulted in deaths.
Impunity remained a problem among the security forces, although the
Government continued to sanction public officials, police officers, and
members of the military. Widespread police corruption and alleged
police involvement in narcotics-related crime continued, and police
abuse and inefficiency hampered investigations. Narcotics-related
killings and violence increased, particularly in the northern states
and Mexico City. Prison conditions were poor. The police continued to
arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. Lengthy pretrial detention,
lack of due process, and judicial inefficiency and corruption
persisted. The authorities on occasion violated citizens' privacy.
Indigenous people's access to the justice system continued to be
inadequate. There were reports of forced sterilizations in marginalized
communities, especially indigenous areas. Human rights groups reported
that armed civilian groups in the state of Chiapas continued to commit
human rights abuses, and some observers alleged that the Government
used excessive force during incidents of conflict with likely
sympathizers of rebel groups in Chiapas and Guerrero. There was an
increase in confrontations between armed civilian groups and
sympathizers of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). Isolated
guerrilla attacks against government property and personnel continued;
however, there were fewer such attacks than in previous years.
Journalists investigating drug trafficking occasionally were threatened
by narcotics traffickers, primarily in the northern states. Corrupt
members of the police sometimes violated the rights of illegal
immigrants. Human rights workers continued to be subjected to attacks
and harassment. Violence and discrimination against women, indigenous
people, religious minorities, homosexuals, and individuals with HIV/
AIDs persisted. Sexual exploitation of children continued to be a
problem. There were credible reports of limits on freedom of
association and worker rights. There was extensive child labor in
agriculture and the informal economy. Trafficking in persons, including
children, remained a problem, and there were credible reports that
police and other officials were involved in trafficking. Mexico was
invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend
the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
The Government continued to take important steps to improve the
human rights situation; however, its efforts continued to meet with
limited success in many areas. In addition, it increased its efforts to
enhance cooperation with the international community and with domestic
human rights groups during the year. The coordination of the Inter-
Secretarial Commission on Human Rights, composed of members from the
secretariats of government (SEGOB), Foreign Relations (SRE), Defense
(SEDENA), the Attorney General's office (PGR) and others, has passed
from the SRE to the SEGOB, with the added participation of civil
society and human rights NGOs as permanent members rather than as
observers. On July 30, the Secretary of government, Santiago Creel,
announced the creation of a new sub-secretariat for human rights tasked
with attending efficiently to political and social conflicts,
fortifying relations with Congress to promote human rights-related
legislation, and emphasizing the President's commitment to human
rights. The new sub-secretary had not been named at year's end. On July
1, Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda and U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCHR) Mary Robinson jointly announced the establishment
of a UNHRC office in Mexico. The office will help the Government
undertake a study of the human rights situation in the country and to
formulate a national human rights program. On November 11, President
Fox met with Amnesty International secretary general Irene Kahn who
reproached the President for the lack of progress in the investigation
of the death of Digna Ochoa and the lack of a cohesive national human
rights plan. Fox emphasized the Government's commitment to human
rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Members of the
security forces and federal and state police were accused of committing
a number of killings during the year.
On March 29, members of Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) under
the PGR's office arrested Guillermo Velez Mendoza for suspected
involvement in a kidnaping case. Velez died in the custody of the AFI
agents 5 hours later. Varied initial reports stated that Velez died of
natural causes while in custody, while being subdued during an attempt
to escape, or as the result of a fall; however, subsequent
investigations revealed that he died from asphyxiation while being
tortured. On May 14, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) ruled
that Velez was subjected to ``arbitrary detention, cruel and degrading
treatment and homicide.'' On August 8, the Mexico State Attorney
General's office ordered (PGJEM) the arrest of five AFI agents for
being accessories to aggravated homicide, acting against the
administration of justice, and abusing authority. One of the agents,
commander Hugo Armando Muro Arellano, who is suspected of applying the
headlock which resulted in Velez' death, was freed on bail and was a
fugitive at year's end.
On May 20, elements of the Federal District Secretariat of Public
Security (SSP) arrested Jose Gabriel Martinez Romero, an active duty
major in the Armed Forces, in a hotel in Mexico City for disorderly
conduct and possession of a gun and transported him to a PGR sub-
delegation office in Azcapotzalco. Police found him dead in the back of
the vehicle when it arrived at the PGR office. Investigations revealed
that cause of death was pulmonary arrest and hemorrhage of the
pancreas. The authorities implicated 25 police officers in the death.
At year's end, 6 officers were released, 17 remained in custody pending
further investigation, and 2 had not been found.
On May 24, a group of soldiers shot at a group of Central American
migrants, killing two Hondurans, Elmer Alexander Pacheco Barahona and
another youth only known as David, both age 16, and wounding two,
Pacheco's brother Antonio and Jose Rodolfo Rivas Ramirez from El
Salvador. In November the authorities arrested and charged soldier
Ricardo Olvera Venegas with the killing of two youths.
On May 28, in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, Francisco Medellin
Alberto died in custody during an interrogation by the ministerial
police who arrested him on suspicion of robbing an automatic teller
machine. The PGR confirmed that Medellin died of asphyxiation while
apparently being tortured in the basement of the Ministerial Police
building. Two police agents abandoned the body at the University
Hospital. Suspects Juan Manuel Gutierrez Navarro, Juan Cruz Rosales,
and Sergio Martinez Acosta had been arrested, and Jorge Julio
Estupinian de la Rosa was a fugitive at year's end. Three other police
agents are suspected of involvement in the death. The investigation
continued at year's end.
On June 17, Roberto Carlos Mendoza Zuniga died in his cell at the
PGR in San Nicolas, Nuevo Leon state from a gunshot wound inflicted by
police agent Alejandro Huerta Rivera during a scuffle with Mendoza
after his arrest on June 15 for possession of marijuana and
drunkenness. Huerta Rivera and another agent, Cesar Alberto Perez
Melendez, were arrested in connection with the death. The investigation
continued at year's end.
On June 11, SSP agents shot Josue Ulises Banda Cruz, age 17, while
he was running away from police. The police proceeded to load Banda
into the police car and drove off. His body was found in front of a
house in Colonia Granjas in Mexico City a short time later. The Federal
District Human Rights Commission (CDHDF) condemned the police actions.
Sixty-two police were under investigation by Federal District
authorities for suspected involvement or cover up in the crime. David
Leon Mendez, director of the Sector Police, was temporarily suspended
pending investigation into his part in covering up for two police
officers sought in the case.
On May 31, an undetermined number of assailants shot and killed 26
peasant farmers near Agua Fria, Oaxaca. Police arrested 16 persons from
Santo Domingo Tejomulco in connection with the crime. The National
Human Rights Commission (CNDH) determined that the killing was part of
an ongoing land dispute between the two communities dating back to 1935
and called on state judicial authorities to continue to investigate the
killing.
There were no significant developments in the investigation into
the October 2001 death of human rights defender Digna Ochoa y Placido
(see Section 4).
At year's end, government authorities were investigating the July
2001 killing of Everardo Obregon Sosa, a municipal Democratic
Revolutionary Party (PRD) leader in Culiacan, Sinaloa.
During the year, federal judges denied the request for release of
federal police officers Jorge Encarnacion Perez Barreto and Fabian
Garcia Venegas, accused of killing Hector Manuel Bear Alvarez and
wounding six other persons in May 2001. Both officers remained in
prison at year's end. Fabian Garcia Venegas, had other outstanding
charges against him, including abuse of prisoners (see Section 1.c.).
During the year, the Mexico State Human Rights Commission (CEDH)
completed its investigation of the June 2001 death of Alfonso Escamilla
Casimiro in his cell in Teoloyucan, Mexico state and made a six-point
recommendation to the Teoloyucan Municipal Police, including the
investigation of three agents of the Transit and Public Security Office
and three members of the Office of Civil Protection and Firemen. The
Municipal Police completed four of the recommendations, and partially
completed two others. The Municipal Police declined to investigate the
public servants due to lack of evidence.
At year's end, it was not known whether judicial proceedings had
begun against Vicente Pena Zuniga, Efrain Cruz Bruno, and Nicasio
Bernardino Lopez for the May 2001 killing of Fidel Bautista Mejia in
Putla, Oaxaca.
There were no significant developments in the investigation of the
May 2001 killing of Jesus Carrola, former chief of the Mexico City
judicial police force, and his two brothers. The Mexico City Human
Rights Office (CDHDF) found that there had been a violation of human
rights; however, the CDHDF closed the case in June 2001.
No information from Military Justice was available concerning the
charges against military personnel for the separate January 2001
killings of Esteban Martinez Nazario and Rodrigo Torres Silvain.
On August 13, judicial policemen Luis Carlos Morales Romo, Jose
Isable Vargas Davila, Armando Ovando Rios and Marco Antonio Constantino
Gonzalez were tried and found guilty of homicide and aggravated robbery
for the 2001 killing of 10-year-old Roberto Blancas.
There were no developments in the investigation of the November
2001 abduction and killing of Raul Varela Meza, Juan Antonio Chavez,
Eduardo Ramirez, and Lorenzo Barraza in Ciudad Juarez.
There were several killings of journalists during the year,
allegedly by narcotics traffickers (see Section 2.a.).
There were a number of deaths in prisons during the year. The CNDH
investigated three cases during the year. Two were confirmed to be
suicides and one was under investigation at year's end.
There were numerous reports of executions carried out by rival drug
gangs, whose members included both active and former federal, state,
and municipal security personnel. Throughout the country, but
particularly in the northern border states, violence related to
narcotics trafficking continued. The preliminary number of documented
deaths related to narcotics trafficking for the year was 123; however,
the final confirmed number may be significantly greater. Most of the
deaths were execution style killings. Between January and August 31, 57
murders with presumed or proven drug connections occurred in the Ciudad
Juarez area, a 62 percent increase over the number of killings in the
same period last year.
On November 12, heavily-armed assailants killed four police
officers and wounded five in a shootout in Sinaloa's capital city of
Culiacan. The police wounded three of the attackers, and one of them
later died in a hospital. Police had not commented officially on a
motive by year's end. Sinaloa has been plagued with drug-related
shootings in the past.
In November the governor of Nayarit state asked federal authorities
to help investigate a series of violent incidents in the state's
mountain region. The incidents began in July and resulted in at least
eight deaths, including that of a police officer, a state government
employee, and a city councilman in La Yesca. Local law enforcement
officials stated that these incidents were nothing other than the work
of common bandits. However, local residents alleged that guerrilla
groups committed the killings. State and federal authorities determined
that the violent incidents were the work of ordinary criminals and
launched a public information campaign.
The police and military were accused of committing serious human
rights violations as they carried out the Government's efforts to
combat drug cartels. In the first 80 days of the Fox administration,
there were nearly 2,000 arrests nationwide connected to drug
trafficking. There were several instances in which members of security
forces, including military elements, have been apprehended for working
for or with narcotics traffickers.
On June 7, two soldiers from the 37th Infantry Battalion and two
indigenous local residents were killed in the vicinity of Huecato,
Michoacan, during a gun battle when a routine patrol came across a
group of indigenous people who were allegedly engaged in illegal
logging. A third soldier was injured. It was not clear who started the
shooting. No formal complaint had been made to either the state or
national commission on human rights regarding the initial incident. The
Congressional Human Rights Commission for the state of Michoacan
reportedly initiated an investigation.
In December 2001, Jose Romualdo Quintero Carrizoza was arrested in
Tijuana, Baja California, in an anti-kidnaping operation. Subsequent
investigations between authorities in Baja California and Sinaloa and
fingerprint matches identified Quintero as being one of the
perpetrators of the February 2001 killing of 12 persons in the town of
El Limoncito, Sinaloa. Investigations into the case continued at year's
end.
There were no developments in the 2000 hanging deaths near El
Quelite, Sinaloa state of five men with known drug connections whom
witnesses alleged were detained by individuals in PFP uniforms.
Investigations into the presumed suicide of Jose Manuel Urbina, who
was found drowned in a Durango state security facility in 2000, found
that Urbina had hidden from police officers in the water cistern of the
house where he was being held. The police officers were given
administrative sanctions for dereliction of duty. The policemen were
drinking that night and did not realize Urbina had hidden in the
cistern.
On November 13, press sources reported that 18 persons were
sentenced to 36 years and 3 months in prison for their participation in
the killings of 45 persons in Acteal, in the Chenalho municipality of
Chiapas in 1997. Twenty-nine arrest warrants were still outstanding at
year's end. During a visit to Mexico in July, Juan Mendez, president of
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHCR), met with NGOs and
family members to follow up on progress made on the Acteal case.
In January the Attorney General of Military Justice announced the
reopening of the investigation of the 1995 death of Air Force
Lieutenant Jose Raul Vargas Cortez. The current Secretary of Defense
ordered the investigation reopened to determine if there were errors or
omissions in the case.
In June the Congress of Guerrero state requested that federal
authorities reopen the investigation into the 1995 Aguas Blancas
massacre of 17 indigenous farmers. Both the federal and state
governments previously had considered the case resolved.
On August 18, unknown armed assailants killed a PGR official and
wounded a judicial police agent in El Bosque municipality, Chiapas. On
September 5, seven inmates escaped from the state penitentiary in
Mexicali, Baja California; three of the inmates still at large from the
escape were implicated in the execution-style killing of three state
police agents early in the year (see Section 1.c.). On September 9,
unknown assailants killed one policeman and wounded two in an ambush in
El Bosque. The federal Attorney General's office was investigating the
August incident at year's end. On October 4, state police arrested two
individuals in connection with the September incident and charged them
with homicide, robbery, and illegal weapons possession.
Investigations continued into the 2001 killings of two federal
judges in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state.
There were no developments during the year related to the June 2000
ambush in El Bosque that left seven Chiapas state policemen dead. In
2000, the PGR arrested PRI supporter Alberto Patishtan Gomez and EZLN
supporter Salvador Lopez Gonzalez in connection with the ambush, on
charges of murder, robbery, and possession of illegal weapons. The PGR
charged that Patishtan and Lopez were part of an armed 10-person group
that carried out the attack. Patishtan later was released for lack of
evidence and the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas Human Rights Center
continued to maintain Lopez's innocence, claiming there was
insufficient proof against him as well. He remained in custody at
year's end.
In August Omar Alberto Morales Patino, former head of the federal
police in Casas Grandes and Parral, Chihuahua, was arrested in the
state of Mexico and charged with the murders of several informants in
Chihuahua in 2000.
There were incidents of vigilante justice. In January a crowd in
Puebla killed Silvestre Portillo as he tried to escape after robbing
money that was destined for an education, health, and nutrition
program. In June a crowd in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas,
presuming that Domingo Santiz Diaz and Pascual N. (last name unknown)
were responsible for the death of Diego Gomez Gomez, treasurer of the
La Candelaria community education committee, lynched them and severely
beat two other persons. On December 5, two thieves caught in the act of
trying to rob a taxi were lynched in the Milpa Alta area on the
outskirts of Mexico City.
b. Disappearance.--There continued to be credible reports of
disappearances. NGO sources continued to report that many disappearance
cases were in fact cases of prolonged detention by security forces (see
Section 1.d.)
On June 3, the CDHDF concluded that at least two members of the
Federal District Judicial Police, Leticia Cordero Becerra and Luis
Jaffet Rodriguez Jasso, were involved in the March 14 disappearance of
Jesus Angel Gutierrez Olvera who was forced into a waiting automobile.
Witnesses identified Ricardo Sanchez Vascoy, another judicial
policeman, as having demanded money from Gutierrez the day before the
disappearance occurred. The implicated police officers were questioned
but denied any involvement. The investigation continued at year's end.
On October 11, the Interamerican Human Rights Commission requested
protection for Gutierrez' mother, Leonor Olvera.
On March 14, the Guerrero state Human Rights Commission (CEDH)
called on the state Attorney General's office (PGJE) to process
judicially a number of police suspected of being involved in the June
2001 disappearance of Faustino Jimenez Alvarez. The report criticized
the PGJE for failing to forward a copy of the investigation and for
denying the CEDH permission to participate in the preliminary
investigation. The CEDH also requested protection for the wife of
Jimenez Alvarez, stating that she could be the subject of reprisals. At
year's end, members of the Peace Brigades International provided her
with an escort.
In July Jose Luis Soberanes, President of the CNDH, criticized the
Government for not acting upon the recommendations contained in the
November 2001 CNDH's Special Program on the Presumed Disappeared
(PREDES) report on the presumed forced disappearances of 532 persons,
the majority dating from the 1970s. He alleged that although the
Government had accepted the report's recommendations by creating a
Special Prosecutor For Investigating Acts Committed Directly or
Indirectly by Public Servants that Probably Constitute Federal Crimes
Against Persons Associated with Social and Political Movements of the
Past (Special Prosecutor), it had failed to act upon them.
Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, the Special Prosecutor, continued his
investigations into the disappearances of 532 persons and the killings
in October 1968 and June 1971. His office created a national register
for indigents to verify if anyone related to the disappearances during
the ``dirty war'' of the 1960s and 1970s may have been released, but
with deteriorated mental faculties. The office also produced a DNA data
bank with 112 blood samples to be used to identify remains found in
clandestine cemeteries.
In an unprecedented move, the Special Prosecutor called former
President Luis Echeverria to testify on his involvement in the October
1968 killings in Tlatelolco when he was Secretary of government and the
June 1971 ``Jueves de Corpus'' killings during his presidency. On July
9, Echeverria appeared before the Special Prosecutor to hear more than
150 questions; however, he failed to reappear later to answer the
questions, even though his attorneys had been granted an extension of
40 days.
On November 6, Alfonso Martinez Dominguez, Head of Federal District
government during the events in 1971, died without answering questions
posed to him during an August 22 questioning by Carrillo Prieto. On
November 11, the special prosecutor called retired General Luis
Gutierrez Oropeza, head of the Presidential Security (EMP) during 1968,
to testify. Oropeza requested an extension of time to answer in written
form 36 questions posed by the special prosecutor's office. On December
12, Oropeza answered most of the questions in written form. He admitted
that he had sent elements of the Army to the plaza, but denied posting
sharpshooters on roofs.
On March 14, the Guerrero CEDH published a recommendation against
16 members of the state judicial police for arbitrary detention and
forced disappearance in the 2000 disappearance of Maximo Marcial
Jaimes.
On September 26, the Attorney General of Military Justice (PGJM)
indicted Generals Francisco Quiros Hermosillo and Arturo Acosta
Chaparro on charges of aggravated homicide during the so-called ``Dirty
War''. The generals are accused of the death and disappearance of over
130 persons in the state of Guerrero during the period 1971-78. On
November 1, an all-military panel found the generals guilty of crimes
against public health (narcotics-related), but innocent on charges of
conspiracy and bribery. The generals received sentences of 16 and 15
years respectively, were stripped of their rank and benefits, and
received fines of approximately $150 (1,500 pesos). The generals
immediately appealed their convictions. They will remain in custody
until the trial for the human rights-related charges concludes.
The Specialized Unit for Combating Organized Crime (UEDO) announced
that there were 350 kidnapings for ransom during the first 8 months of
the year compared with 732 kidnapings in 2001; however, many kidnapings
were not reported. The UEDO also reported that it had broken up 20
kidnaping rings and arrested 75 persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture; however, it
continued to be a serious problem. The Constitution excludes as
evidence confessions obtained in the absence of the accused person's
defense attorney, and the law excludes coerced confessions, including
those extracted under torture (see Section 1.e.). To be admissible as
evidence, confessions must be made to the Public Ministry or a judge
and in the presence of a defense attorney. However, the police
regularly obtain information through torture, prosecutors use this
evidence in courts, and the courts continue to admit as evidence
confessions extracted under torture. The military also has been accused
of using torture. According to a July 2001 Amnesty International
report, victims and human rights workers who report or criticize the
practice of torture often were the targets of intimidation. Many
victims were afraid to report or follow through on complaints against
the police, thereby hampering prosecution of the perpetrators.
The CDHDF reported that it had received 87 complaints of torture in
the Federal District during the year. In 23 cases, the victims did not
pursue their complaints. In August the Secretariat of Foreign Relations
stated that torture is a common practice in the country; however, the
lack of a law that provides a legal definition of torture has made it
difficult to identify and eradicate. It is classified as abuse of
authority or injury and therefore, a crime.
In August Roberto Garreton, the representative for Latin America to
the UNHCHR, stated that torture continued in the country; however, he
stated that he had seen positive changes since he last visited the
country in 1998.
The Miguel Agustin Pro Center for Human Rights (PRODH) documented
16 cases of torture in the first 6 months of the year. The police or
the military in Colima, Guerrero, Chiapas, the Federal District,
Jalisco, Sinaloa, Queretaro and Nuevo Leon tortured a total of 35
persons, with involvement by the judicial police in 12 cases.
In April the CNDH reported that the PGR had the most complaints of
torture among federal agencies. On October 10, the PGR inaugurated new
``Units for the Protection of Human Rights,'' which are responsible for
overseeing that the PGR as an agency respects human rights.
The authorities rarely punish officials for torture, which
continues to occur in large part because confessions are the primary
evidence in many criminal convictions. Many human rights groups link
torture to the prevalence of arbitrary detention and claim that torture
often follows an arbitrary arrest, sometimes without a warrant, as
police or prosecutors attempt to justify the detention by securing a
confession to a crime (see Section 1.d.). Poorly trained and
inadequately equipped to investigate crimes, police officers often
attempted to solve crimes by rounding up likely suspects and then
extracting confessions from them by force. In July 2001, Amnesty
International alleged that as a result those responsible for 95 percent
of recorded crimes never are apprehended and brought to justice.
By year's end, no official results of the PGR internal
investigation into the April 2001 federal police beating of Angel Abel
Duran had been released.
During the year, the Mexico state CEDH closed its investigation
into the 2001 beating of Alvaro Rayon because it was unable to locate
him at the address that he provided, and he failed to provide more
information on the incident.
There were no developments in the February 2001 torture of Norberto
Jesus Suarez Gomez, the head of the PGR's Chihuahua state office. The
PGR had accepted the CNDH's recommendations and suspended 16 officials
pending criminal and administrative investigations. Suarez remained in
custody on illegal enrichment charges.
On September 18, the Michoacan state human rights office reversed
its March 2001 dismissal of allegations made by Ivan Ramirez and Israel
Molina that they were tortured in 2000 in Nueva Italia because it
determined that its original investigation had not been conducted
properly.
There were no developments in the 2000 case of Jose Luis Mendez
Briano and Fernando Martinez Beltran, who allegedly were tortured after
being arrested while making their getaway from a robbery.
There were no developments in the case of the former president of
the Guerrero state PRD, David Molina Francisco, who alleged that he was
held hostage for 40 hours by military personnel in April 2000. In June
2000, the Guerrero CEDH forwarded the case to the CNDH for further
investigation.
A 1998 report by the IACHR described a definite pattern of rape and
sexual assault against women committed by members of the security
forces. The Commission stated that some women had been assaulted
sexually by law enforcement officials, particularly those in detention,
or had been assaulted by others with the officials' consent.
On February 16, in Acatepec, Guerrero members of the 41st Infantry
Battalion allegedly raped 17-year-old Valentina Rosendo Cantu when she
was washing clothes by a creek. On March 22, in Ayutla, Guerrero three
soldiers from the 41st Infantry Battalion allegedly raped Ines
Hernandez Ortega in her home. Eight other soldiers stole some meat she
had in the house. CNDH officials were investigating these rapes. SEDENA
denied the accusations; however, it promised to assist civil
authorities in the investigations.
Many citizens distrust the justice system, including law
enforcement officials, and are reluctant to register official
complaints.
By year's end, the PGR had not finished preparing a manual called
``Procedure Model for the Detection of Torture'' based on the UNHCHR's
manual for training on the investigation and documentation of torture,
based on the Istanbul Protocol.
Police abuse and inefficiency hamper investigations. In November
2001, the bodies of eight young women who had been raped and killed
were found in an empty lot adjacent to a busy intersection in Ciudad
Juarez. State authorities arrested two bus drivers accused of the
crimes within 3 days but the drivers alleged their confessions were
obtained under torture. Their attorney was subsequently shot and killed
by the State Police following a high-speed car chase during which the
attorney called his father and reported that he was being pursued. The
police originally alleged that he had died of injuries received when
his car crashed but were forced to retract that information when it was
revealed that he had been shot in the head. The officers involved in
the case were questioned but never charged nor disciplined. As of
September, they continued in their official capacity. The bus drivers
remain jailed pending sentencing (see Section 5). There have been 325
women killed in Ciudad Juarez since 1993.
Police corruption is a problem. Police have been involved in
kidnapings, armed robbery, and extortion, as well as protection of
criminals and drug traffickers. There have been more arrests of
security forces this year. For example, the Public Safety Secretary for
the Federal District (SSP), Marcelo Ebrard Casaubon, cracked down
during the year on police corruption and abuses. At year's end, 72 SSP
officers had been incarcerated, 26 for homicide and the remainder for
other violations including robbery. Police corruption is a problem. On
April 10, troops from the Army and agents from the AFI supervised by
the Special Branches of the PRG lured over 150 municipal and state
police officers from throughout northern Baja California for a meeting,
then arrested more than 50 officers for corruption. Several of those
arrested were high-ranking police officials, including the police chief
of Tijuana. Military aircraft flew a number of these officers to Mexico
City. Many were later released by the authorities.
During the year, the Internal Affairs Division of the Chihuahua
state Judicial Police investigated approximately 104 complaints against
police officials for corruption, bribery, threats, abuse, murder, and
kidnaping. Among the cases being investigated was the murder of a
former state police officer by a member of the special Joint Federal-
State Anti-Organized Crime Unit called Grupo Orion. In January the
interim mayor of Ciudad Juarez dismissed 140 city police for drug
abuse, theft, and running protection rackets for drug smugglers.
In the past, there were reports that police extorted money from
street children, at times abused homosexuals (see Section 5), and
violated the rights of illegal immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
Prison conditions remained poor. Many prisons are staffed by
undertrained and corrupt guards. Prisoners complain that they must
purchase food, medicine, and other necessities from guards or bribe
guards to allow the goods to be brought in from outside. In many
prisons inmates exercise authority, displacing prison officials.
Influence peddling, drug and arms trafficking, coercion, violence,
sexual abuse, and protection payoffs are the chief methods of control
used by prisoners against their fellow inmates. Prisons vary widely in
their ability to meet basic needs of life, keep prisoners safe and
healthy, and provide opportunities for work and education; however,
almost all fall short of these aspirations.
The penal system consists of 448 facilities: 5 federal
penitentiaries, 8 federal district prisons, 336 state prisons, and 99
municipal and regional jails. According to the Public Security
Secretariat, as of July, there were 174,057 prisoners; 101,485 were
serving their sentence, and 62,572 were awaiting sentence. Although the
Constitution calls for separation of convicted criminals from detainees
held in custody, in practice these requirements were disregarded
routinely as a result of overcrowding. Prison overcrowding continued to
be a common problem, despite an early release program endorsed by the
CNDH, legal reforms that reduced the number of crimes that carry
mandatory prison sentences, and the construction of new prisons.
According to the Secretariat for Public Security, the country's 446
penal facilities are overpopulated by approximately 28 percent; 174,057
prisoners are being held in facilities that have a capacity of 136,447
prisoners. In July the Secretariat announced that Baja California at
189 percent and Sonora at 130 percent, were the most overpopulated
state prison systems; in Nayarit the rate of overpopulation is 75
percent, in Chiapas 98 percent, in Sonora 82 percent, in Tamaulipas 66
percent, in Oaxaca 21 percent, in Puebla 25 percent, and in the Federal
District 53 percent. The prisons with the largest overpopulation are:
Reclusorio Norte, Reclusorio Oriente, and Reclusorio Sur in Mexico
City, the state prison in Ciudad Juarez, and La Mesa prison in Tijuana.
In July the Secretariat reported that the total capacity of existing
facilities in Mexico City is 14,864; however, they held slightly more
than 22,814 inmates.
At year's end, the population of the prisons in Ciudad Juarez was
3,628. In August the director of the state penitentiary stated that
1,537 inmates slept in the corridors of the prison because there were
neither beds nor cells for them as a result of overcrowding. A new
prison originally scheduled for completion in 2000 may be completed by
late 2003.
Health and sanitary conditions are poor. In 2000, doctors at a
prison in Nuevo Laredo resigned, citing unhealthy conditions such as
inadequate food and water as the reason for their resignations. They
stated that conditions such as mange, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis are
known to the authorities who fail to take any action to treat and
segregate sick inmates. In March 2001, the CNDH reported that HIV/AIDS
and associated illnesses were the leading cause of death among inmates
in the Federal District. The deaths of 20 inmates from HIV/AIDS-related
complications in 2000 underlined the need for awareness, prevention,
and treatment programs. The CNDH also noted that HIV-positive prisoners
are subject to mistreatment and discrimination in prisons (see Section
5). For example, the Multisectoral Group of Citizens with HIV/AIDS
claimed in 2001 that 30 HIV-infected inmates in the state prison in
Merida, Yucatan suffered discriminatory treatment and insufficient
access to health care. There were no developments in the case of
Eugenio Almaraz Garcia, who died in 2000 from presumed neglect by the
director of the Pochutla, Oaxaca prison.
In August approximately 2,000 federal, state, and municipal police
agents, as well as military elements, participated in a surprise dawn
raid to transfer 2,200 inmates from La Mesa prison in Tijuana, Baja
California to a new prison at El Hongo, Tecate, Baja California and
other installations. La Mesa housed 6,400 inmates in a facility
designed for 1,800. The CNDH has labeled it the worst detention
facility in the country. Cells were converted into apartments and sold
for $300 (3,000 pesos) per month in a facility where 4,500 prisoners
had neither a cell nor bed in which to sleep. An entire city existed
within the prison complete with 150 commercial enterprises, such as
stores, taco stands, and restaurants, all run by inmates. Prisoners'
spouses and children (100 women and 220 children) lived with them
within the prison.
Female prisoners are held separately from men. Women make up
approximately 4.5 percent or 7,841 of the 174,057 total prison
population. Of the 448 prison facilities in the country, 230 of them
house female prisoners. A new prison for men was under construction in
Mexico City during the year and expected to be completed in March of
2003. The prison will have the capacity to house 2,346, thereby
alleviating some of the prison overcrowding in the Federal District.
In April the Director of the State Penitentiary (CERESO) in Ciudad
Juarez announced that the authorities had dismantled a prostitution
ring in the CERESO. In addition, prison authorities discovered that
prostitutes from the outside were operating within the prison walls
during visiting hours.
Juveniles are held separately from adults.
Drug use continued to be a major problem in the Ciudad Juarez
prison, with over 70 percent of the prisoners suffering some form of
addiction. A new rehabilitation program in the prison can accommodate
only 70 prisoners at a time. On March 23 and 24, prisoners in Ciudad
Juarez rioted, demanding drugs and protesting an attempt by prison
authorities to slow the flow of drugs into the prison. Major structural
damage, including looting of the infirmary, occurred. In September 130
prisoners suffering from withdrawal symptoms in the prison in Chihuahua
City rioted, destroying part of the cellblocks and damaging the
infirmary. In the aftermath of the riots, prisoners who participated in
the violence, as well as some who did not, were transferred to other
prisons. Families of the transferred prisoners were unable to locate
them. In April and September, inmates in the Ciudad Juarez prison were
killed, reportedly for drug-related business. In May the authorities
found a tunnel that went from outside the walls of the prison into the
area of the prison in which most drug traffickers are held. The
juvenile detention center in Ciudad Juarez suffered two riots during
the year. On June 22, juveniles rioted, severely damaging one of the
buildings, after a guard allegedly beat a detainee. On February 7,
several members of a gang started a disturbance to cover their plans
for an escape. Others joined in and by the time state police had
quelled the riot, over 100 juveniles had taken part.
There is no specific law or regulation that prohibits human rights
organizations or other NGOs from visiting prisons, and some do;
however, in practice, the CNDH and state human rights commissions
conduct the majority of prison visits focused on human rights issues.
In July the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regional
office in San Cristobal de la Casas and the Government agreed that the
ICRC could visit prisoners in Chiapas, Queretaro, and Tabasco with only
prior notification of the visit to prison authorities. The ICRC
notifies the Ministry of Foreign Relations and receives prior
permission to make prison visits to other areas of the country.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the police continued
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily (see Section 1.b.). Arbitrary
arrest and detention continued to be among the most common human rights
abuses. Legally, a prosecutor may hold a detainee no more than 48 hours
before he must present the accused to a judge, except when the accused
is caught in the act or within 72 hours of committing a crime. In June
2001, the federal legislature criminalized forced disappearance,
including illegal detentions; the law also prohibits sponsoring or
covering up an illegal detention (see Section 1.b.).
NGO sources report that a great number of disappearances eventually
are found to be cases of arbitrary detention by security forces (see
Section 1.b.). Many human rights groups link torture to the prevalence
of arbitrary detention and claim that torture often follows an
arbitrary arrest, sometimes without a warrant, as police or prosecutors
attempt to justify the detention by securing a confession to a crime
(see Section 1.c.). According to PRODH, incommunicado detention is a
frequent practice (see Section 1.c.).
Reports of arbitrary detention occurred with greatest frequency in
Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, the Federal District, and Tabasco. The
states' attorney general personnel, state police, and the army were the
most frequent abusers of detention laws. In June 2001, the newspaper La
Jornada reported that between January and June 2001, the Attorney
General's office had received 62 complaints for arbitrary detention and
an equal number for detentions longer than the legal limit. During the
year, the CNDH reported that it had received 293 complaints, 18 for
alleged torture, against the PGR, making it the Government agency with
the most complaints lodged against it.
From October 26 to November 6, a U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention visited the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Jalisco, Mexico, and
the Federal District. The group concluded that arbitrary arrest in the
country was generated by corruption and the notorious impunity enjoyed
by those who commit it--police and military--and by the tolerance of
this practice within the police structure.
In February Amnesty International reported the continued use of
arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment by government
authorities, especially state government authorities, carrying out
policing operations.
In June 2001, the CNDH reported that arbitrary detentions
constituted a common practice of the Federal Judicial Police (since
reorganized and renamed as the AFI) as well as of other police bodies,
and urged the PRG and the SSP to expand human rights training
concerning arbitrary detention; to issue specific orders to their
police forces to halt arbitrary detentions immediately; and to instruct
prosecutors to protect persons who may have been detained arbitrarily.
In February the UNHRC declared illegal and arbitrary the 1999
capture of four suspected members of the Revolutionary Army of the
Insurgent People (ERPI)--Jacobo Silva Nogales, Carlos Gracia Rosales,
Gloria Arana Agis and Felicitas Padilla Navas--accused of organized
crime, storing firearms, and possession of ammunition. The Commission
stated that the Universal Human Rights Declaration and the Treaty on
International Civil and Political Rights had been violated. However,
the four remained in detention at year's end pending the decision of
the first district judge in Toluca.
In February the Mexico state human rights commission (CDHEM)
recommended that the mayor of Atizapan take action against Rosendo
Rojas, a municipal police officer, who took a minor from his classroom
and detained him illegally following a fight with another student
outside the school grounds. The CDHEM also recommended that the
municipal police receive training regarding arrest and detention. The
police officer in question was being held on charges of murdering
another minor at year's end.
In July the CNDH issued a recommendation with respect to the
arbitrary detention and abuse of 69 members of the San Jose community
in Chiapas. At least 40 were injured during a July 2001 Judicial Police
operation to rescue 6 government employees who were being held by local
sympathizers of the Regional Independent Campesino Movement-National
Ayala Plan Coordinator (MOCRI-CNPA) as a form of protest.
The Constitution provides that the authorities must sentence an
accused person within 4 months of detention if the alleged crime
carries a sentence of less than 2 years, or within 1 year if the crime
carries a longer sentence. In practice, judicial and police authorities
frequently ignored these time limits (see Section 1.e.). Criminal
defendants often were held with convicted prisoners (see Section 1.c.).
There were previous reports that police demanded bribes to release
suspects (see Section 1.c.). Many detainees reported that judicial
officials often solicited bribes in exchange for not pressing charges
(see Section 1.e.). Those able to pay were released from custody.
Corruption is rampant throughout the criminal justice system.
Judges often failed to sentence indigenous detainees within legally
mandated periods (see Section 1.e.). In 1996 the CNDH reviewed 8,661
files of indigenous persons who were detained and recommended the
immediate release of 1,727 persons. In 1999 the CNDH signed an accord
with the Secretariat of government, the PGR, the Federal Institute of
the Public Defense office, and the National Indigenous Institute (INI)
to develop a program for the early release of indigenous prisoners in
federal prisons. INI intervention resulted in the early release of 802
indigenous prisoners in 1998, 1,197 in 1999, 596 in 2000, and the
preliminary figure of 531 in 2001.
In September President Fox reported that 107 prisoners associated
with the EZLN had been freed as a result of coordinated efforts of the
Commission for Peace (COCOPA) and federal and local authorities. Under
the National Indigenous Institute's (INI) Program for the Procurement
of Justice for the Indigenous Peoples, the Federal government, through
the PGR, SSP, CNDH and the Federal Institute of Public Defenders, 1,105
local and federal prisoners have been released in the past 18 months.
The PGR, through its Special Prosecutor for the Attention of Indigenous
Affairs, was working on 1,300 cases to request minimum sentences or
transfers to social readaptation centers.
Federal prosecutors continued to adhere to the INI's recommendation
that they drop charges against indigenous first-time offenders accused
of drug cultivation, as drug traffickers often forced indigenous
defendants, who were not aware of the legal significance of their
actions, to grow the crops. The INI also supports programs to provide
translators for indigenous defendants and to assist them in obtaining
bail bonds.
Some human rights groups have claimed that activists arrested in
connection with civil disobedience activities are in fact political
detainees. The Government asserts that the system fairly prosecutes
those charged in sometimes violent land invasions for common crimes,
such as homicide and damage to property.
The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is generally
independent; however, on occasion, especially at the state level, it
has been influenced by government authorities. Corruption,
inefficiency, impunity, disregard of the law, and lack of training
continue to be major problems. Judicial reforms have begun to address
some of these problems, but full resolution of these problems requires
significant additional time and effort. In 1999 the Congress and the
states passed constitutional reforms designed to streamline the
administration of justice and repeal archaic laws. Human rights groups
criticized these reforms, claiming that they effectively allow
prosecutors to disregard defendants' allegations of violation of due
process during criminal proceedings.
In April U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, Dato Param Cumaraswamy, issued a 52-page report regarding the
evaluation mission that he conducted in May 2001. In his report, he
questioned the independence and effectiveness of judicial power in the
country. He expressed concern about the lack of knowledge that judges
have regarding international law, particularly human rights, and their
ignorance of indigenous uses and customs. He wrote that 50-70 percent
of the judges in the country were corrupt. In reply, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court questioned how the Special Rapporteur could reach
his conclusions when he only visited two states and the Federal
District.
During the year, the Federal Judicial Council continued to
strengthen administrative control over the judiciary, investigated
cases of corruption, and removed some corrupt judges. In 2000, the
Institute for Professional Training of the Mexico City Attorney
General's office initiated workshops and courses directed at officials
who deal with prosecutions, including the prosecutor's office, official
secretaries, judicial police, and police group leaders. The course
material encompassed case management, scientific investigation
techniques, legal framework, and evidence collection. These workshops
and courses continued through year's end. However, at year's end, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) reported that little had been done to remedy the
systemic problems of the justice system, which allowed human rights
abuses to go uninvestigated and unpunished. In December 2000, HRW
asserted that deficiencies in the administration of justice still were
a major concern, and repeated its 1999 statement that judicial reforms
have done little to improve the problems that plague the justice
system. The December 2000 report stated that prosecutors not only
ignored abuses by police but also fabricated evidence. Judicial
oversight was seriously inadequate as the courts accepted evidence
obtained through human rights violations (see Section 1.c.), and judges
cited legal precedents that weakened human rights protections.
By year's end, six judges or magistrates had been dismissed since
January 2000, only one of these for corruption. In February 3 employees
of the Federal District Superior Court were sentenced to 63 months in
prison for aggravated extortion. In June Fernando Alonso Lopez Murillo,
a federal judge, was suspended from his duties while being investigated
for a series of irregular findings in high profile narcotics
trafficking cases. In the most prominent case, Lopez Murillo reduced
the sentence imposed on and dismissed some of the weapons charges
against Hector Luis Palma, a major drug trafficking figure. Eventually
Palma paid a fine rather than go to jail. Lopez Murillo also dismissed
charges against another known trafficker, Oscar Malherbe.
The federal court system consists of a Supreme Court, 91 circuit
courts of appeal, 49 courts of appeal, and 185 district courts.
Based on the Napoleonic Code, the trial system consists of a series
of fact-gathering hearings at which the court receives documentary
evidence or testimony. However, in July 2001 Amnesty International
alleged that judges often are not present at hearings when defendants
give testimony. Court officials may add notarized documents that are
not authenticated into the case file. A judge in chambers reviews the
case file and then issues a final, written ruling. The record of the
proceeding is not available to the general public; only the parties
have access to the official file, although by special motion the victim
may have access to it.
The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to attend
the hearings and challenge the evidence or testimony presented, and the
Government generally respected these rights in practice. In general
court hearings are open to the public, and it is common to find not
only the accused, but also relatives of the accused and journalists in
the courtroom. However, human rights groups complained that many
hearings take place in busy judicial offices where the public generally
must stand at a distance and often cannot hear the proceedings well. In
some courtrooms glass or plastic panels have been placed between the
tables where the proceedings take place and the public.
While there is a constitutional right to an attorney at all stages
of criminal proceedings, in practice the authorities often did not
ensure adequate representation for many poor defendants. Moreover, the
public defender system is not adequate to meet the demand, although
improvements in salaries and benefits have ameliorated this situation.
Attorneys are not always available during the questioning of
defendants; in some instances a defense attorney may attempt to
represent several clients simultaneously by entering different rooms to
certify formally that he was present, although he did not actually
attend the full proceedings. Prosecutor salaries and benefits vary by
region and agency. Federal prosecutors usually are paid better than
state prosecutors.
In the case of indigenous defendants, many of whom do not speak
Spanish, the situation is often worse. The law calls for translation
services to be available at all stages of the criminal process;
however, the courts do not routinely furnish translators for indigenous
defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings, and thus defendants
may be unaware of the status of their cases. Provision of translators
to non-Spanish speaking defendants, including indigenous ones, is
provided for but poorly implemented, resulting in prisoners being
convicted without fully understanding the documents they have been
required to sign. The CNDH, through the Fourth Inspector General's
office, has a program to assist incarcerated indigenous defendants. The
INI also has judicial assistance programs for indigenous defendants and
provides counsel on their behalf. The INI also distributes legal,
educational, and informational material in indigenous languages.
A particularly serious abuse of due process is the prosecution's
ability to base its case on evidence gathered by means of torture.
While torture itself is a criminal act, judges allow statements coerced
through torture to be used as evidence against the accused (see Section
1.c.) and confessions are the primary evidence in many criminal
convictions. A number of NGOs declared that judges give greater
evidentiary value to the first declaration of a defendant, thus
providing prosecutors an incentive to obtain an incriminating first
confession and making it difficult for defendants to overturn such
declarations.
The law does not require civil trials of soldiers involved in civil
crimes, and the military continued to handle such cases. The
Constitution provides for military jurisdiction for crimes or offenses
involving any violation of military discipline. In cases in which a
member of the military commits a crime and is arrested by civil
authorities, the military has the right to request the immediate
transfer of the case to military jurisdiction. In August the judicial
branch reaffirmed that members of the military assigned to the PFP
would be tried by military courts unless a civilian was involved. The
ruling came as the result of a court case involving an active duty
military member of the PFP. A military judge declared that he was not
competent to hear the case because ``military commissioned into the PFP
are temporarily separated from the armed services and work for a
civilian entity''. A civilian judge who received the case declared that
the perpetrator was military and was under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Defense. The case was returned to the military court. In
this instance the court ruled that because the PFP member was
considered on active duty--obeying military orders and technically
dependent on the Military Police--and therefore, administratively under
the Secretary of Defense, and the victim was also active duty military,
the military court had jurisdiction over the case.
On September 26, the PGJM indicted Generals Humberto Quiros
Hermosillo and Arturo Acosta, on charges of aggravated homicide during
the ``Dirty War''. The generals are accused of the death and
disappearance of over 130 individuals in the state of Guerrero during
the period 1971-78. Human rights organizations called into question the
indictment and the fact that the generals would not be tried by
civilian courts, but rather in military courts. The generals remained
in custody as an investigation into charges of narcotics trafficking
and assisting the Ciudad Juarez-based Amado Carrillo drug cartel
continued.
In December 2001, Human Rights Watch issued a report that called on
the Government to end military jurisdiction over all cases involving
human rights violations. The report found that the military justice
system lacks transparency because civilians are barred from monitoring
the progress of investigations. In addition, investigations by the
military are not accountable to civilian authorities.
On February 7, the Government released General Jose Francisco
Gallardo Rodriguez. His sentence was reduced under the Code of Military
Justice to 8 years, the minimum time to be served under his two
nonconcurrent sentences of 14 years each, which Gallardo completed in
November 2001. During the year, Gallardo continued to maintain his
innocence and worked to clear his name.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
privacy, family, home, and correspondence, and the law requires search
warrants; however, in the past there were credible reports that
unlawful searches without warrants were common, and there were reports
of such searches during the year (see Section 1.c.).
The law allows for electronic surveillance with a judicial order.
The law prohibits electronic surveillance for electoral, civil,
commercial, labor, or administrative purposes. However, there were
reports of illegal surveillance during the year.
In January police arrested three persons when they were replacing a
tape recorder in a telephone switch in Polanco, an affluent sector of
the Federal District. The three persons initially claimed to be
employees of the local telephone company and then claimed to be working
for a private law firm. No reason was given for the placement of a
recorder at the switch. Investigation into the case was ongoing at
year's end. Two days earlier, two persons were seen placing a tape
recorder at a TELMEX drop in Lomas de Chapultepec, an area of Mexico
City where many affluent families live.
In February the Queretaro state human rights ombudsman Bernardo
Romero accused the state's governor of intimidation through telephonic
espionage. The governor denied the claims and demanded presentation of
evidence. Romero said he also had received telephonic threats and sent
a letter to the PRODH director requesting the intervention of the
IAHCR.
In May microphones were found in the office of the Federal District
Secretary of Finance. Federal District Head of government Andres Manuel
Lopez Obrador demanded that the Federal government investigate.
Wiretapping is a federal crime.
In July the Congress of the state of Mexico approved a law that
would allow the Attorney General to solicit permission from a federal
judge to wiretap and to have access to bank accounts as part of the
investigative process against organized crime. The Federal District
Attorney General supported the measure calling the current process
bureaucratic and slow.
The Constitution states that all persons have the right to make
free, responsible, and informed decisions on the number of children
they choose to have. The 1984 General Health Law provides for criminal
action against those who pressure a woman to undergo sterilization
procedures or perform such procedures without a woman's consent. In
September 2001, Rodrigo Aguilar Martinez, president of the Episcopal
Commission for the Family of the Roman Catholic Church, told the press
that public health institutions ``frequently'' performed sterilizations
in marginalized communities, especially indigenous areas. Aguilar
claimed that priests and religious workers working in these areas were
familiar with the problem, but that it was difficult to prove these
cases if individuals decided to present their complaint to judicial
authorities. Aguilar's claims have not been corroborated by government
sources, but various social welfare observers believed that forced
sterilization occurred, although the incidence of these procedures is
difficult to quantify. Women may not realize that procedures have been
performed until after the fact, and many victims allegedly were
reluctant to file complaints, although there are mechanisms for filing
formal complaints with the National Medical Arbitration Commission and
with national and state human rights commissions. In 2000 the CNDH
office in Chiapas reported that in some indigenous communities women
chose sterilization, but then due to fear of reprisal from their
husbands reported that it was forced upon them or that they simply did
not understand the nature of the procedure.
In compliance with a CNDH recommendation, in April state
authorities provided compensation of $2,040 (20,000 pesos) each to 16
persons who were sterilized by state health officials in Guerrero in
1998.
In February the CNDH reported that in 2001 it had received seven
complaints of forced sterilizations. On December 16, the CNDH reported
that local community health practitioners have forced birth control
methods (IUD for women, vasectomies for men) on indigenous patients
without their informed consent. Many of these patients neither read nor
write Spanish and sign medical consent documents that they do not
understand by means of a fingerprint.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--There were numerous allegations of the use of
excessive force and the violation of international humanitarian law.
During much of the year, the Government maintained approximately 14,000
to 20,000 troops in selected areas of Chiapas, and a smaller number in
Guerrero. Two relatively small rebel groups, the Popular Revolutionary
Army (EPR) and the Revolutionary Army of the People's Insurgency
(ERPI), continued to be problems in Guerrero. Incidents of conflict in
Chiapas between security forces and EZLN sympathizers, and in Guerrero
between the army and the EPR and the ERPI, led to accusations of the
use of excessive force; however, the confused circumstances of these
clashes made those allegations difficult to substantiate.
The peace process in Chiapas between the EZLN and the Government
remained at a standstill. There has been no communication between the
EZLN and the Government since April 2001. In July the PRODH said the
impasse demonstrates that the Government lacks a cohesive strategy to
attend to the conflict in Chiapas. In August the current president of
the Peace Commission (COCOPA), Felipe de Jesus Vicencio Alvarez, said
that the commission was working on an initiative to revive the peace
process talks.
The Government maintained a military presence in parts of Chiapas.
Some NGOs continued to call the military's presence threatening and
intimidating to the indigenous population. In July and August, NGOs
reported an increased military presence in Chiapas. Military
authorities claimed that the perceived increase was due to troop
rotations and more patrolling.
On May 14, the International Civil Commission for Observance of
Human Rights (CCIODH) reported that military over-flights, along with a
gradual increase in military patrols and checkpoints had caused special
concern to the indigenous communities in Chiapas. The commission also
said the military units harassed and intimidated the indigenous
population by improvising checkpoints around towns.
In May the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (Frayba)
released a 245-page report that documented the displacement since 1995
of more than 12,000 persons from 2,400 families in Chiapas. The report
accused the Government of being responsible for the displacements and
not keeping its constitutional commitment to provide for the security
of its citizens as well as its obligation to provide humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) under international
law, including human and humanitarian rights.
In July the PRODH stated that social justice in Chiapas depended in
great measure on whether reconciliation process can reconstruct the
social fabric that had been deteriorating for 8 years. It said that
armed civilian groups constitute a latent threat because they continue
to operate and provoke displacements of persons.
Human rights organizations have documented 45 human rights
violations in Chiapas during the first 6 months of the year, 20 by the
military, 11 by state public security agents, 8 by the state judicial
police, 4 by federal judicial police, 1 by municipal police and 1 by
the PFP. There were also 14 incursions by the military into
communities, 9 patrols, 6 interrogations, 3 incidents of weapon
firings, 2 eviction threats, two illegal detentions at checkpoints, 1
intrusive search, and 1 case of destruction of property. In addition,
armed civilian groups committed three human rights violations.
Human rights NGOs complained about the intimidation of the
indigenous population in Salto de Agua, Palenque, and Masoha Shucja in
the northern part of Chiapas. They accused soldiers of entering
communities and, in some cases, firing automatic weapons. In one case,
in Shucja, a military officer identified as Captain Vincente Ambriz
Ronces arrived 30 minutes after the alleged shooting occurred to
investigate the incident. Military authorities described the incidents
as soldiers' hunting for iguanas.
SEDENA, in coordination with the CNDH and state human rights
commissions, provides its officers with a 4-month human rights course
to teach officers to be human rights trainers. These officers (183 so
far) are responsible for training at the different unit level within
the Army and Air Force. By year's end, SEDENA had not created a
military human rights ombudsman as suggested by UNHCHR Robinson in
1999.
There were credible reports of violent incidents and killings
committed by armed civilian groups and local political factions in
Chiapas. On March 22, a confrontation between supposed members of PRI
and PRD led to the killing of one person and the wounding of three
others.
On August 7, Jose Lopez Santiz, an EZLN sympathizer, was killed
near the community of August 6, close to the city of Altamirano
Chiapas. An 11-year-old witness identified the killer as Baltazar
Alfonso, a businessman from Altamirano. Lopez had reportedly received
death threats from local members of the PRI. Police opened an
investigation into the killing. Chiapas state governor Pablo Salazar
Mendiguchia and government secretary Emilio Zebadua Gonzalez traveled
to Altamirano to try to defuse tensions caused by the fear that the
Lopez' associates would seek revenge. Salazar promised to bring the
killers to justice.
There were violent confrontations between EZLN sympathizers and
armed civilian groups during the year. On August 26, two EZLN
sympathizers were killed in Amaytik, Ocosingo municipality, in Chiapas.
The state Attorney General attributed the killings to an ``inter-
family'' problem.
Human rights NGOs have accused the Salazar administration of
tolerating armed civilian groups. In September Salazar called for the
PGR to determine if armed civilian groups were present in Chiapas.
Salazar said in an interview that he could neither confirm nor deny the
existence of armed civilian groups and believed that it was the
responsibility of the PGR to investigate.
On September 13, Chiapas state police arrested 26 members of the
``Peace and Justice'' group. Human rights NGOs attribute more than 300
killings between 1995 and 1998 to the group. Although originally
identified as part of the PRI organization, in 2000 the group supported
Salazar because the PRI would not give it political positions at the
state and local level. The police arrested the members in the group's
stronghold of Tila, in northern Chiapas. Sabelino Torres Martinez,
identified by the state Attorney General's office as one of the leaders
of ``Peace and Justice'', faced charges of homicide, causing bodily
harm, and illegal possession of firearms.
On August 26, at least two persons died and seven were injured in a
clash between EZLN sympathizers and alleged armed civilian groups near
Amaitic, a town in Ocosingo, Chiapas, according to the authorities of
the autonomous municipality Ricardo Flores Magon and press reports. The
Attorney General's office attributed the clash to a dispute between
families. The report could not be confirmed.
In September Oaxaca Ministerial Police arrested Antonio Roque Cruz,
former mayor of Santiago Amiltepec, and 11 other persons who were
carrying large caliber weapons. Roque is suspected of being a member of
a paramilitary group and responsible for the February 2 deaths of Maria
Magdalena Torres Torres and Lorenzo Lopez Jimenez.
On May 30, Erika Zamora and Efren Cortes Chavez were freed from
prison after a federal tribunal absolved them of the charge of inciting
rebellion and conspiracy, in connection with the 1998 battle in El
Charco, Guerrero, between the military and alleged elements of the ERPI
guerrilla group that resulted in the killing of 12 persons. In 1998
they were found innocent of organized crime, terrorism, and storing
weapons.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice; however, harassment of journalists
by various sources, especially by narcotics trafficking organizations
in the northern part of country, continued during the year. The mass
media are not subject to formal censorship by the Government; however,
there were in the past reports of some self-censorship. In addition,
violence and threats against journalists primarily by narcotics
traffickers and on occasion by the authorities hindered press freedom.
Nonetheless the freedom and independence of the media continued to
expand. Many observers believe that drug trafficking organizations or
corrupt security personnel in their pay carried out most of the attacks
on the media.
The traditionally close relationship between the Government and the
media that tilted coverage and editorial opinion in the Government's
favor during 71 years of PRI rule changed significantly. The Government
no longer controls the import and sales of newsprint, but does retain
control over broadcasting licensing, which critics claim led some
broadcast media to practice self-censorship. However, the two principal
television networks, Televisa and TV Azteca, frequently criticized and
challenged government actions at the federal, state, and municipal
levels. On October 10, the Federal government, by presidential decree,
reduced its right to use 12.5 percent of broadcast time to 18 minutes
of television and 35 minutes of radio broadcast time per day. Official
advertising in the media continued, but state and municipal governments
were more likely to purchase news coverage, via news articles known as
``gacetillas,'' than the Federal government. In the past, there were
allegations of cash and noncash payments to journalists; however, there
were no major allegations during the year.
On June 11, President Fox signed the Law for Transparency and
Access to Information, enabling the public to request and receive
information from all state entities, as well as from public and private
agencies that manage public funds. The law had not been fully
implemented throughout the country by year's end. The opening of
previously sealed files caused a reexamination of many painful episodes
in the country's history, such as the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre and the
1971 ``Jueves de Corpus'' massacre. Past presidents such as Luis
Echeverria and Jose Lopez Portillo have been called to testify about
their involvement in these massacres (see section 1.b.).
The numerous attacks on journalists constituted the most serious
problem for press freedom. The Committee for the Protection of
Journalists and Media Communications reported that in 1999 there was a
decline in the number of acts of intimidation, including physical
attacks, threats, and detentions, against journalists; from 202 in 1998
to 135 in 1999. A 1999 report issued by 4 NGOs recorded 240 attacks of
various types against journalists during 1998, compared with 187 during
1997. These numbers included all aggressive acts against the media as
reported in the media. According to the report, government institutions
(including federal, state, and local police) or officials were
responsible for 41 percent of the incidents. However, in August, Juan
Francisco Ealy Ortiz, the country's representative on the IAPA's
Commission on Freedom of the Press and Information, reported that acts
of intimidation against journalists by narcotics traffickers had
replaced official harassment by earlier administrations as the most
serious threats that journalists face in the country. Francisco Barron,
Director of Communication at the National Center of Social
Communication, an NGO, added that the Fox Administration was more
willing to investigate corrupt government officials alleged to be
working in collusion with narcotics traffickers.
Outright attacks and intimidation of journalists are underreported,
and there are no comprehensive nationwide studies of these incidents.
In addition, the Government has not investigated sufficiently the cases
that were reported, such as those included in the ``Damages
Inventory,'' a summary published by the Protection Network of
Journalism and Media (PNJM). The PNJM reported that there were 101
incidents of press intimidation and harassment in 2000, down from 135
cases reported in 1999. Abuses against the press included physical
assaults, legal complaints against journalists, and threats. Sixty-one
percent of these complaints were directed against print journalists.
The PNJM observed that direct aggression against the media and
journalists was declining; however, pressure groups were increasingly
using broadly interpreted or discretional legal maneuvers to work
against press freedom.
Forty-eight percent of all acts of harassment against journalists
occurred in the Federal District. States reporting the next largest
amounts of harassment were Guerrero, with 8 percent of all cases, and
Chihuahua, with 5 percent of all cases. Harassment was also reported in
the states of San Luis Potosi, Baja California, Campeche, Mexico,
Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, and Veracruz.
On May 31, Gustavo Ramos, president of the Fresnillo Autonomous
University (UAF) board of directors, and Rector Jesus Bonilla Elizondo
assaulted Humberto Casarez from the Imagen newspaper published in
Fresnillo, Zacatecas state, after it published information on alleged
acts of corruption by the UAF directors. On June 24, officers from the
Pachuca, Hidalgo state municipal police assaulted Inving Leftor Magain,
a camera operator for Telemundo, while he and 20 other journalists
covered a demonstration. Lefor subsequently filed a lawsuit against
municipal police.
The International Press Institute reported that three journalists
were murdered during the year.
On January 18, two gunmen shot and killed Felix Alonso Fernandez
Garcia, editor of the weekly magazine Nueva Opcion, in Miguel Aleman,
Tamaulipas state. Shortly before his killing, Fernandez had received
death threats for his reporting about alleged links between the city's
former mayor and drug traffickers.
On February 1, an unidentified assailant killed Julio Samuel
Morales Ferron, columnist for the daily El Sol de Medio Dia, in Mexico
City.
On October 11, an explosion in his apartment killed Jose Miranda
Virgen, journalist and vice president of the daily El Sur de Veracruz.
The police stated that a gas leak had caused the explosion; however,
local media noted that the apartment's living room had received more
damage than the kitchen when the leak supposedly occurred. Pablo Robles
Barajas, the newspaper's director general noted that Miranda had just
written a series of articles linking state police officers to drug
traffickers. The Association of Veracruz Journalists (APEV) asked
Veracruz Governor Miguel Aleman to order the state attorney general's
office (PJEV) to investigate the case. Aleman issued the order, and the
PJEV ruled that the explosion was accidental. The APEV disagreed with
the PJEV's conclusion.
The International Press Institute reported that in May Eduardo
Lopez Betancourt, a contributor to the newspapers Excelsior and Mexico
Hoy and the magazine La Crisis, was forced to leave the country
temporarily after unknown individuals threatened to kill his son.
Tamaulipas authorities continue to investigate whether the March
2001 murder of Saul Martinez of the Matamoros newspaper El Imparcial,
was related to articles he wrote on illegal migrant smuggling and
government corruption.
There were no new developments in the investigation into the
February 2001 killing of Jose Luis Ortega Mata, editor of the weekly
Semanario de Ojinaga based in Ojinaga, Chihuahua.
The Interamerican Press Society and the Committee for the
Protection of Journalists (CPJ) reported that Jose Ramirez Puente, the
host of a popular radio news program in Ciudad Juarez who was killed in
2000, was an undercover informant for the Investigation and National
Security Center (CISEN). Investigations are underway to determine if
his murder was linked to his work as a journalist or as an informant
for CISEN. Following his murder, state judicial police found eight bags
of marijuana weighing about two pounds each in the trunk of the car.
Puente's relatives claimed the marijuana was planted, and the case was
transferred to federal jurisdiction. Since 2001 several members of the
federal police force in Chihuahua have been dismissed for corruption.
On May 30, a three-judge appeals panel sentenced two men to a 13-
year prison term for the 1998 murder of San Antonio Express-News
reporter Philip True. The unanimous ruling overturned an August 2001
verdict acquitting the men.
There are approximately 300 newspapers operating (including local).
Of these, there are approximately 10 main national newspapers. None are
operated by the Government; however, the Government does operate
several radio stations, two national television channels, and some
local stations. Public universities run most of the public media.
Television news independence has been enhanced by greater political
pluralism, generational change in media leadership, and growing
competition for advertisers and viewers which continued to separate
government and media interests. Moreover, as much of the national media
has developed higher journalistic standards and independence in recent
years, government influence has declined. The media showed a high
degree of editorial independence, particularly in the capital and other
major urban centers. Direct criticism of the Government, especially in
radio and the print media, was common.
The CPJ believes that the country's criminal defamation law
violates the basic freedom of expression and that no journalist should
be jailed for his work. On March 11, the authorities arrested Maria
Esther Martinez, of the daily La Union de Morelos for defamation after
she had criticized the state Attorney General's office and the
Ministerial Police. On April 1, police arrested Raquel Urban Hernandez
of the weekly Reporteros Informando published in Ecatepec, Mexico state
for defamation over a November 2001 article that criticized PAN
legislator Alejandro Gamino Palacios for his alleged implication in the
rape of a minor. She was released on bail. On May 8, Alejandro Junco de
la Vega, president and publisher of the Mexico City daily Reforma was
charged with defamation over a September 2001 article that charged that
the Grand Commission of the Mexico state Chamber of Deputies had issued
irregular payments of $101,789 (969,000 pesos) to seven deputies. In
April 2001, former Mexico City mayor Rosario Robles Berlanga brought
changes of defamation against Junco and Carolina Pavon, a Reforma
reporter, over an April 2001 story in which Pavon reported official
allegations that almost 10 percent of the mayoral administration's 2000
budget had disappeared. In May the Writers in Prison Committee, a NGO,
noted that the case was still being investigated by the Mexico City
Attorney General's Office. Junco continues as Reforma's owner and Pavon
continues to write for the city section of Reforma.
On August 19, the PGJE arrested journalist Isabel Arvide at the
airport in Chihuahua City and charged her with criminal defamation, a
charge that carries a possible sentence of 6 months to 2 years in
prison. In June 2001, Arvide published an article on her web site and
in the Mexico City daily Milenio that accused Osvaldo Rodriguez
Borunda, owner of the Chihuahua newspaper El Diario, of involvement in
drug trafficking and money laundering. Arvide was released on August 20
after posting a bond of $10,000 (100,000 pesos). Arvide alleged that
PRI national president Roberto Madrazo lured her to Chihuahua under
false pretenses as part of a press contingency, specifically to be
arrested, since the charges are state charges not enforceable in
another state.
On October 17, Judge Catalina Reuiz Pacheco agreed to consider an
application for the arrest of Oscar Cantu Murguia, editor of the daily
Norte de Ciudad Juarez, and seven of his journalists; Armando Delgado,
Manuel Aguirre, Gaudalupe Salcido, Rosa Isela Perez, Francisco Lujan,
Antonio Flores, and Carlos Huertas. In January former Ciudad Juarez
mayor Manuel Quevedo Reyes filed a complaint after the newspaper
published a series of articles that alleged that the state government
had paid an inflated price for land that Quevedo sold it. Arrest
warrants were issued for the eight journalists. In November a federal
judge granted one of the journalists, Armando Delgado, a legal
injunction (amparo) to protect him from arrest and to determine if the
state attorney general's office violated his rights by not permitting
him to defend himself against the charges. In October the Inter-
American Press Association accused Chihuahua Governor Patricio Martinez
of using the state justice system to silence journalists. In October,
the CNDH sent an official to Ciudad Juarez to investigate the case.
In June and December, the NGO Reporters sans frontieres reported
that several journalists had been summoned to appear in court to reveal
their sources. On June 12, Maribel Gutierrez, of the daily El Sure
published in Acapulco, was questioned regarding her sources for
articles that she wrote on the murder of Digna Ochoa (see Sections 1.a.
and 4.) On November 18, journalists Enrique Mendez, Gustavo Castillo,
Ruben Villalpando, Andrea Becerril, Ciro Perez, and Roberto Garduno, of
the daily La Jornada, were summoned regarding their sources for an
article concerning a corruption scandal in the public petroleum company
Pemex. On December 3, Daniel Moreno, news director for the daily El
Universal, was questioned regarding his sources for an article
published on June 16 regarding the same scandal. On November 17, CNDH
President Jose Luis Soberanes affirmed that it is the right and
obligation of journalists to refuse to reveal their sources. The CNDH
emphasized that the continual summons of journalists intimidated and
inhibited those who provide information. On December 4, Attorney
General Rafael Macedo said that the purpose of summoning journalists to
reveal their sources of information was to prevent public officials
from ``leaking'' information. After public outcry over the PGR's
actions, the PGR stopped summoning journalists to testify about their
sources; however, this retreat did not rule out the possibility that
the PGR would utilize similar techniques in the future.
On January 20, Ruben Rosas, Zamira Izaguirre, Jose Antonio Tirado
and Jose Loya, anchors of a Ciudad Juarez radio station, protested
publicly the cancellation of their radio show, allegedly due to
pressure by the governor of Chihuahua state. According to the
journalists' statements, the governor pressured the radio station to
cancel their show after they harshly criticized the inefficiency of the
authorities in solving the women's homicide cases in Ciudad Juarez (see
Section 1.a. and 5). The Chihuahua state government denied all the
accusations.
There continued to be no information on the whereabouts of Valentin
Davila Martinez, a journalist with Radio Canon, who was reported as
missing in Ciudad Juarez in August 2001.
The PGR closed its investigation into the 2000 death of Jose
Ramirez Puente, the host of a popular radio news program in Ciudad
Juarez as unsolved; however, an investigation by the state PGJ remained
open at year's end but without any leads.
The Government does not restrict Internet access, which is widely
available across the nation, especially in major cities. Some segments
of the population, predominantly the poor and the elderly, cannot
afford to use the Internet or do not possess sufficient computer
skills. The Government is attempting to broaden Internet usage in rural
areas via the ``e-Mexico program.''
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. The only requirement for holding
demonstrations is that groups that wish to meet in public areas must
inform local police authorities in advance. Organized, peaceful
demonstrations occurred frequently throughout the country.
There were many demonstrations during the year. From March 8-13 a
group of women marched from Chihuahua City to Ciudad Juarez to protest
the continued murders of women in Ciudad Juarez and the lack of
interest displayed by authorities. Representatives of NGOs and
relatives of murdered women participated in the march. On March 13,
when the protesters arrived at the kilometer 38 checkpoint in Ciudad
Juarez, a group of approximately 50 persons associated with the PRI
party attempted unsuccessfully to stop the marchers from entering the
city. However, several marchers were injured.
Until August there were routine demonstrations staged by small land
owners from San Salvador Atenco, in Mexico state to protest an October
2001 expropriation decree signed by President Fox to use land in Atenco
to build a new airport for Mexico City. Over the course of 10 months,
the peasant land owners staged demonstrations to protest the planned
expropriation of their properties at the low price of $0.70 (7 pesos)
per square meter. On July 11, the landowners seized local government
officials and demanded the release of 13 protesters arrested during the
riot, including 2 protest leaders. Both the hostages and the detained
protestors were eventually released. One arrested protester, who
suffered from various medical ailments that were aggravated by injuries
sustained during his arrest, died after being transferred from prison
to a hospital. The peasants claimed that he had died from lack of
prompt medical attention and demanded an investigation into his death.
On August 1, the Secretary of Transportation announced that the
Government would not proceed with plans to expropriate land to build
the airport.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Political
parties, opposition groups, and independent associations functioned
freely without government interference or restriction. The Federal
Electoral Code recognizes national political parties as well as
political associations. Political associations can participate in
elections through an agreement with a political party; however, they
cannot use their names or symbols during the election campaigns.
Political parties do not have legal status until they receive their
official designation from the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The
IFE has recognized 10 political parties and 36 political groups.
Parties must receive at least 2 percent of the vote in national
elections to maintain their registration. In July the IFE announced
that political groups had presented 11 requests for formal
registration; however, only 2, Mexico Possible and Liberal Progressive
Party, had met the requirements for recognition.
Citizens are free to associate and may form private or charitable
associations. However, in 1998 the Mexico City legislature passed a law
that gave the city government more influence over private charities.
According to the Secretariat of government's Directorate of Liaison
with Social and Civil Organizations, there are 5,339 NGOs active in the
country, which play an important and vocal role in the promotion of
civil society.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and Congress may not enact laws that establish or prohibit
any religion. The Government generally respected this right in
practice; however, there were some restrictions at the local level.
State and municipal governments generally protected this right;
however, some village and tribal officials infringed on religious
freedom, especially in the South. A generally amicable relationship
among the various religions in society contributed to religious
freedom; however, in some parts of southern Mexico, political,
cultural, and religious tensions continued to limit the free practice
of religion within some communities. Most such incidents occurred in
the state of Chiapas.
Religious associations must register with the Under Secretariat of
Religious Affairs of the Federal Secretariat of government (SSAR) to
operate legally. Although the Government rejects applications because
of incomplete documentation, the registration process is routine. An
estimated 5,871 religious associations are registered.
To be registered as a religious association, a group must
articulate its fundamental doctrines and religious beliefs, must not be
organized primarily to make money, and must not promote acts physically
harmful or dangerous to its members. Religious groups must be
registered to apply for official building permits, to receive tax
exemptions, and to hold religious meetings outside of their places of
worship.
The SSAR promotes religious tolerance and investigates cases of
religious intolerance. All religious associations have equal access to
the SSAR for registering complaints.
The Constitution provides that education should not privilege one
religion over another. Religious instruction is prohibited in public
schools; however, religious associations are free to maintain their own
private schools, which receive no public funds.
The Government requires religious groups to apply for a permit to
construct new buildings or to convert existing buildings into new
churches.
The Constitution bars members of the clergy from holding public
office, advocating partisan political views, supporting political
candidates, or opposing the laws or institutions of the State.
To visit the country for religious purposes, foreign religious
workers must secure government permission. The Federal government
limits the number of visas each religious group is allowed. However,
the Government has granted 33,930 such visas since 1994.
There were incidents of violence between religious groups,
principally in Chiapas during the year. The situation in Chiapas is a
result of a complex mix of economic, ethnic, political, and religious
tensions. There is a history of religious intolerance in, and
expulsions from, certain indigenous communities whose residents follow
syncretistic (Catholic/Mayan) religious practices and view other
religious practices as a threat to indigenous culture. In parts of
Chiapas, local leaders of indigenous communities sometimes regard
evangelical groups as unwelcome outside influences and potential
economic and political threats. As a result, these leaders sometimes
acquiesced in, or actually ordered, the harassment or expulsion of
individuals belonging primarily, but not exclusively, to Protestant
evangelical groups. In many cases, these expulsions involved the
burning of homes and crops, closing down of churches, beatings, and,
occasionally, killings.
The most common incidents of intolerance arose in connection with
traditional community celebrations. Protestant evangelicals often
resist making financial donations demanded by community norms that will
go partly to local celebrations of Catholic religious holidays and
resist participating in festivals involving alcohol. The abuse related
to these and other incidents apparently did not occur solely and
exclusively on the basis of religion. While religious differences were
often a prominent feature of such incidents, ethnic differences, land
disputes, and struggles over local political and economic power were
most often the basic cause of the problems.
On March 4, traditionalists burned the houses of 4 evangelical
families in Mitzinton, where some 30 persons lived. One of the houses
also reportedly had 17 bullet marks in it. Two hundred Protestant
evangelicals left the community in March, in response to threats of
expulsion, but returned on April 3 despite fear of further threats.
Protestant community members have been dissatisfied with the Government
response to the incidents. The State Attorney General's office has
initiated an investigation.
On May 1, approximately 20 Protestant evangelical Tzotzil community
members, along with 2 National Action Party (PAN) council members, were
harassed and detained by local leaders on charges of ``religious and
political intolerance.'' On May 6, in the community of Botatulan, six
members of Jehovah's Witnesses were reputedly stopped by local leaders
who demanded $500 (5,000 pesos) in return for releasing them. These
detentions have not been verified.
Tension between Catholic/Mayan syncretists and evangelical groups
continues to be a problem in the municipality of San Juan Chamula.
Approximately 130 children of evangelicals have been denied access to
the local public schools in 6 communities every year since 1994. On
August 19, a confrontation between traditionalist Catholics and
Protestant evangelicals in the community of Tzaljaltetic, in the
municipality of San Juan Chamula, left five persons wounded. The
incident occurred when Catholics did not allow Protestant parents to
register their children at the local school. The Chiapas state
Secretariat of government (SEGOB) initiated a dialogue with both
parties to reach an agreement and avoid future confrontations.
In addition, local traditionalist/syncretist leaders in San Juan
Chamula suspended services by Roman Catholic clergy in the municipality
and later expelled two priests and a deacon from the area. On May 8,
police arrested a Roman Catholic teacher after discovering a cache of
arms and explosives in his cottage in San Juan Chamula. A Roman
Catholic vicar in the community charged that the weapons were planted
by Protestant leaders.
In February traditionalist Catholic community members in the
community of San Juan Metaltepec Mixes, Oaxaca expelled a group of 20
Protestant evangelical families for their religious beliefs. This
report could not be verified.
On November 5, a group of indigenous families who were Jehovah's
Witnesses abandoned their homes in the the communities of Tzajaltetic
and Botatulan, in the municipality of San Juan Chamula in Chiapas. The
group fled for fear of attacks against them by local bands of
Catholics. They have been taken in by family members living in San
Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas.
On November 14, seven indigenous persons were wounded in a clash in
the community of Tzetelton, in the municipality of San Juan Chamula in
Chiapas. According to press reports, a group of indigenous Protestants
attacked a group of Roman Catholics when the Catholics were meeting to
plan for the December 12 Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe.
On November 27, according to press reports four persons were hurt
in a confrontation between two groups belonging to the same religion in
the community San Pablo Atlazalpa, in Chalco, in Mexico state. The
incident occured when a group denominated ``liberals'' entered the
local church of St. Peter and Paul to protest the naming of a new
parish priest. The liberals clashed with another group of
traditionlists within the church who support the newly named priest.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
Corrupt police sometimes violated the rights of illegal immigrants.
Illegal immigrants rarely file charges in cases of crimes committed
against them, because the authorities generally deport immediately such
persons who come to their attention; many pending cases brought by
illegal immigrants are subject to dismissal because the complainant is
no longer present in the country.
From February 25 to March 18, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights of Migrants, Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, visited the country to
highlight the dangers of commercial sexual exploitation and trafficking
in women and unaccompanied minors, many originating from Honduras,
Guatemala, and El Salvador.
On July 25-31, Juan Mendez, IACHR President and Special Rapporteur
for Migrant Workers and Their Families, visited the country and
expressed concern about the security of migrants transiting the
country. He also noted problems with overcrowding in migrant detention
centers.
There also were credible reports that police, immigration, and
customs officials were involved in the trafficking of illegal migrants.
In April local police arrested 4 AFI agents in Chiapas for
transporting 26 undocumented Central American migrants. Two other
likely agents escaped in an unmarked vehicle with no license plates.
In August 2001, the CNDH opened its first office along the border
with Guatemala in Tapachula, Chiapas to receive and attend to
complaints of human rights violations from migrants, both documented
and undocumented. Although the CNDH office received various complaints
by migrants including assault, rape, and extortion, the cases are
rarely pursued because the migrant departs the area and does not stay
to provide follow-up information. According to the CNDH, the principal
points of entry for migrants are Comalapa, Suchiate, and Tuxtla Chico.
Migrants who transit a halfway house in southern Chiapas have
complained to the director about the double dangers of extortion by the
authorities and robbery and killings by an organized gang called
``Maras Salvatruchas'' who prey on migrants coming from the south.
Reports of injury to and harassment of undocumented migrants
continued around the country during the year (see Section 1.a.).
On August 19-28, the U.N. Special Representative for Internally
Displaced Persons, Francis Mading Deng, visited the country to review
the situation of internally displaced person. According to different
NGOs who met with Deng, there are over 640 families that had been
displaced by various conflicts. The 1998 killings in El Charco
displaced an estimated 400 families according to the head of the
Independent Organization of Mixtec and Tlapanec People. During the
year, FRAYBA published a study that found that 2,453 families totaling
12,080 persons were internally displaced from 1994 to 2000. Sporadic
violence attributed variously to religious, political, land or economic
disputes caused persons to flee their homes for fear for their lives,
returning only when they felt that the potential threat had abated.
The law provides for the protection of foreigners who might face
political persecution if they were to return to their countries of
origin. The law includes provisions for the granting of asylum and
refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The issue of providing
first asylum did not arise during the year. The Government accepts the
principle of first asylum and reviews each claim on a case-by-case
basis with the assistance of the office of the UNHCR. Since the start
of the year, the UNHCR office in Mexico City no longer processes
refugee documentation for cases in the country. Government authorities
now process all refugee documentation.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through periodic elections. As a result of
electoral reforms approved and implemented in recent years, the
political process and especially the electoral process have become more
transparent. While elections are open and generally fair, some abuses
continued to occur. Prior to the 2000 presidential election, the PRI
had dominated politics, controlled the Federal government, and won
every presidential election since its founding in 1929. However, in
2000, voters elected President Vicente Fox, a member of the National
Action Party and candidate of the Alliance for Change Coalition, with
43.3 percent of the vote. Observers, both international and domestic,
judged the elections, which ended the PRI's 71-year hold on the
presidency, to be generally free and fair.
The legislature amended the Constitution in 2000 to allow eligible
citizens who are abroad to vote in presidential elections; however, the
Senate failed to act on the necessary implementing legislation that
would have made overseas voting possible in the 2000 election due to
differences over the costs and requirements for voting. The national
debate regarding overseas voting for the 2006 presidential elections
continued during the year.
Presidents are elected every 6 years and cannot be reelected.
The IFE, operating with full autonomy, arranged and supervised the
2000 federal elections. It standardized the voter registration list and
recruited and trained thousands of civil society volunteers to serve as
independent electoral workers at the voting booths. The IFE also
provided support to state electoral institutes in running state and
local elections and was instrumental in overhauling electoral district
boundaries to reflect demographic shifts. In October the IFE announced
new security features in voting credentials, including digitized
photography and personalized microtext.
In the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI holds 208 seats; the PAN 207;
the PRD 54; the Green Ecologist Party (PVEM) 16; the Labor Party (PT)
8; Democracy Convergence (CD) 1; the Nationalist Society Party (PSN) 3;
and the Social Alliance Party (PAS) 2. There is one independent in the
Chamber. The PRI holds 60 seats in the Senate; the PAN 46; the PRD 16;
the PVEM 5; and the CD 1. Legislators can and do on occasion change
their party affiliation.
On the state level, the PRI holds governorships in 17 states, the
PAN 8, the PRD 2, PRD-PT, PRD-PVEM, and PRD-PAN coalitions 4. On the
municipal level, multi-party pluralism is well established. The PRD
governs the Federal District, and the PAN governs 13 of the 20 largest
cities.
In February and March, all three major political parties held
elections for top party posts. Only the party leadership voted in the
PAN election. The PRI and PRD held popular elections to elect new party
leaders. The PRI elections were open to anyone, regardless of political
affiliation. The PRD's election was open only to registered PRD party
members. Both elections were accompanied by accusations of fraud. The
PRI candidate won the election by less than one percent of the vote in
a contest marked by allegations of fraud on both sides. For example, in
1 town in Oaxaca with 1,200 registered voters, 1,100 persons voted,
with 1,099 votes going to 1 candidate. The PRD vote was marked more by
disorganization than voter fraud. On election day, many polling places
were not installed and others had not received ballots or voting boxes.
Elections in one state, Hidalgo, were voided due to irregularities
detected by election observers in the state level organization.
There have been controversies over state and municipal elections.
In July 2001, the PRI appealed the results of the July 1 Ciudad Juarez
mayoral elections, called in favor of the PAN candidate, on the basis
of alleged irregularities at polling places and the improper conduct by
the city's PAN administration in favor of the PAN candidate. In August
2001, the State Electoral Institute ruled in favor of the PRI. The PAN
appealed the state level decision to the TEPJF, the ultimate court of
appeal on election matters. The annulment of that election was upheld
and a new mayoral election scheduled for May 12. The same two
candidates, backed by PRI (this time with a coalition of smaller
parties) and PAN, faced off with the identical result: the PAN
candidate won by less than 4 percent of the vote. PRI and its coalition
again appealed that result. The State Electoral Tribunal again annulled
the election, and PAN appealed that result to the federal level. On
July 11, members of the PAN and the PRI fought each other with sticks,
knives, and chairs. On July 24, the Federal Electoral Tribunal upheld
the election result and invalidated the annulment of the election at
the state level. On July 27, the new Mayor, Jesus Alfredo Delgado, was
sworn into office to serve the remainder of his original 3-year term.
On February 17, the State of Quitana Roo held municipal elections.
The PRI won every election except in the city of Cancun where the PVEM
was victorious. However, on March 13, the state electoral tribunal
annulled the municipal election in Cancun, based on the claim that it
had found alleged irregularities in approximately 21 percent of the
polling place in the city. On April 8, the Federal Electoral Tribunal
ratified unanimously PVEM candidate Garcia Zalvidea's election as
Cancun mayor. The state PRI party and PRI-controlled state government
accepted the decision.
There are no legal barriers to participation in politics by women.
There are 23 women in the 128-seat Senate and 87 women in the 500-seat
lower house. There are three women in the Cabinet and one female
justice on the Supreme Court. No women serve as governors, although
there have been female governors in the past. Nine women serve in the
Mexico City cabinet, and 13 of the city's 23 key officials are women.
Many state electoral codes provide that no more than 70 to 80
percent of candidates can be of the same gender. All political parties
are attempting to increase the number of women who run for elected
office through formal and informal means. Some utilized quotas
requiring that a certain percentage of candidates on a party list are
female. However, in practice, women more often were put forward as
substitute candidates who have little chance of serving unless the
titular candidate leaves office. The PRD's membership is 48 percent
female; its leadership is 27 percent female, 26 percent of its
representatives and 12 percent of its senators are female, and it has a
female party president. The PAN has utilized more informal methods to
increase female registration. An estimated 24 percent of its leadership
is female, and close to 17 percent of representatives and 13 percent of
its senators are female. PRI party rules mandate that 30 percent of its
federal candidates be women. An estimated 24 percent of the party
leadership, including its Secretary General, 16 percent of its
representatives, and 18 percent of its senators are female.
There are no legal barriers to participation in politics by members
of minorities or persons of indigenous descent; however, there were no
statistics available regarding minority participation in the
Government.
Constitutional changes in 1996 expanded the rights of indigenous
people to elect representatives to local office according to ``usages
and customs,'' rather than federal and state electoral law. Only the
states of Oaxaca and Quintana Roo have enacted implementing legislation
to effect such local elections. Traditional customs vary from village
to village. In some villages, women do not have the right to vote or to
hold office. In others they can vote but not hold office.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate largely without
government restriction, investigating allegations of human rights
abuses and publishing their findings on human rights cases. According
to the Secretariat of government's Directorate of Liaison with Social
and Civil Organizations, there are 979 human rights NGOs in the
country. Government officials have met with NGOs in an effort to become
more cooperative and responsive to NGO views.
In 2000, President Fox eased entry requirements for those
interested in observing human rights conditions. They must agree to
observe the country's laws.
Reports of harassment, attacks, and detentions against human rights
workers have diminished; however, they continued to occur. PRODH
documented more than 12 instances of aggression against human rights
defenders.
On January 14, unknown gunman fired on the home of the Chiapas CEDH
president Pedro Lopez Hernandez, in Tuxtla Gutierrez. There were
accusations between the ombudsman and the state governor that the state
government was behind the shooting. In May police arrested Nicolas
Acero Nandayapa and Venturiano Ruiz Macias for the shooting. On October
12, Lopez Hernandez presented a complaint before the PGR of harassment
by state authorities. Press reports said Lopez Hernandez was preparing
to take his case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.
Investigation into the shooting continued at year's end.
On March 18, in Mexico City, human rights lawyer Barbara Zamora, a
colleague of slain human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa and legal
representative for the Ochoa family, received a threat via e-mail.
On April 11, Maria Guadalupe Morfin Otero, ex-president of the
Jalisco state human rights commission received at her home in
Guadalajara a telephonic threat of death if she continued to pursue a
court injunction (amparo) against the state Congress. Morfin alleged
that the Congress impeded her from a second term in office without
foundation and without an objective evaluation of her work. In December
PRODH announced that it would present the case before the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission.
On July 16, Arturo Requesens, a member of the Christian Action for
the Abolishment of Torture, received death threats for his
investigations into the disappearance of Jesus Angel Gutierrez
Oliveras.
There were several instances of harassment in Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua during the year. At the close of 2001, women from NGOs
complained to the CNDH that they received threats via fax and telephone
because of their participation in the investigation of the murdered
women in Ciudad Juarez. In January the spokesperson of the Juarez
Coordinator Pro Women Victoria Caraveo Vallina, who had been receiving
threatening calls, and her mother were assaulted in separate incidents
near their home. On March 27, unknown assailants killed the 73-year-old
step-mother of human rights activist Astrid Gonzalez, one of the
founders of the group Women for Juarez and the director of a program
called ``Stop Crime'' that offers rewards for the capture of killers of
women on the northern border.
In its 2002 report, Amnesty International noted that human rights
defenders and journalists continued to be harassed and were the victims
of death threats.
In July Renato Sales, the Mexico City Attorney General's office
Special Prosecutor investigating the 2001 death of Digna Ochoa y
Placido, resigned from the case after information leaked to the press
that the PGJDF was seriously considering the hypothesis that Ochoa's
death was a suicide. PGJDF Attorney General Bernardo Batiz appointed a
three-person panel to select A replacement for Sales. The new Special
Prosecutor, Margarita Guerra, a criminal court magistrate in the PGJDF,
took over the Ochoa investigation on August 1.
There were no developments in the investigation of death threats
against Arturo Solis, president of the Center of Border Studies and the
Promotion of Human Rights. He received these threats after he publicly
accused federal immigration agents in Tamaulipas of involvement in
illegal immigrant trafficking in 2000 (see Section 2.d.).
There were no developments in the investigations into robberies of
the home and office of Angelica Ayala Ortiz, vice president of LIMEDDH.
Investigations into both cases were ongoing at year's end.
The PRODH has criticized the Government's actions to protect human
rights workers as inadequate. The PRODH advocates adoption of measures
to promote awareness of the importance of human rights work and to
investigate cases of threats, intimidation, and attacks against human
rights workers. In November and December 2001, SEGOB developed a plan
in collaboration with NGOs to provide enhanced protective measures for
human rights activists and to determine the circumstances and
conditions under which this assistance may be provided.
The CNDH has improved its credibility steadily since its
establishment by the Government in 1990. The Senate, instead of the
President, now appoints the commission's president, although some NGOs
feared that this would make the CNDH more susceptible to political
pressure. In 1999 the Senate named legal scholar Jose Luis Soberanes to
a 5-year term as CNDH president, replacing the sitting president prior
to the expiration of her term. Although most NGOs have a favorable
opinion of the CNDH, many are critical of its method of presenting
information, especially the reporting of compliance with
recommendations, which is mandated by statute. However, in a public
opinion survey in May 2001, a majority of respondents indicated that
they felt the CNDH was an institution that offered services of
protection, defense, and consultation to the population.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides that men and women are equal before the
law, and that education should avoid ``privileges of race, religion,
groups, sexes, or individual''; however, these provisions were not
enforced effectively, although the Government continued to make
progress in efforts to do so.
In June the 24th Gay-Lesbian Pride parade occurred in Mexico City
with the participation of an estimated 35,000 persons and 70
organizations without incident.
In the most recent National Survey on Political Culture and Citizen
Practices, the National Center for the Prevention and Control of AIDS
(CENSIDA) announced that the rates of rejection of homosexuals by both
those who considered themselves liberals and those who classified
themselves as conservatives were almost the same: 37 and 39 percent
respectively. The same survey found that 66 percent of respondents
would not share a home with a homosexual.
Individuals suffering from HIV/AIDS are victims of prejudice.
In the same CENSIDA survey, 57 percent of the persons surveyed said
they would not live with someone infected with HIV.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involve
domestic and sexual violence. Both are widespread and vastly
underreported. A 1997 law criminalized intrafamily violence,
established protective measures for victims, and provided public
education on the domestic violence problem. The law provides for fines
equal to 30 to 180 days' pay and the detention of violators for up to
36 hours. The Center for Attention to Intrafamily Violence reported in
2000 that it received between 50 to 60 complaints nationwide every day.
In January the ``Casa de la Mujer'' in Merida, Yucatan reported
receiving 160 cases daily of domestic violence. According to a 1999
survey by the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and
Computation, some form of domestic abuse occurs in one of every three
homes. The victim seeks help in only one of every six homes suffering
from domestic abuse. Women are reluctant to report abuse or file
charges, and the police are reluctant to intervene in what society
considers a private matter. Many police also are inexperienced in these
areas and unfamiliar with appropriate investigative techniques,
although some have received training on these problems.
According to the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion
of Human Rights (CMDPDH), over 1 million women each year seek emergency
medical treatment for injuries caused by domestic violence. Groups such
as the NGO Center for Research and Care of Women are attempting to
counter the widespread view of domestic violence as private, normal
behavior and to deter future violence. Within the CNDH's First
Inspector General's office, the General Coordinating Office devotes all
of its time to issues relating to women, children, and the family.
In September Nuevo Laredo became the first municipality in
Tamaulipas state to enforce a 1999 domestic violence law. The law not
only provides protection to the victim from physical, psycho-emotional,
and sexual aggression from the immediate family but also any extended
family. The law provides, at no cost to the victim, refuge, medical
attention, legal counsel, and the assistance of social workers.
A 1997 law expanded the definition of rape to include spousal rape,
applying to both married or common-law couples. Under certain
circumstances limited to the statutory rape of a minor between the ages
of 12 and 18, the Criminal Code allows a judge to dismiss charges if
the persons involved voluntarily marry. In practice this provision is
invoked rarely.
In November 2001, the bodies of eight young women who had been
raped and murdered were found in an empty lot adjacent to a busy
intersection in Ciudad Juarez. State authorities arrested two bus
drivers accused of the crimes within 3 days but the drivers allege
their confessions were obtained under torture. Their attorney was
subsequently shot and killed by the State Police following a high-speed
car chase during which the attorney called his father and reported that
he was being pursued. The police originally alleged that he had died of
injuries received when his car crashed but were forced to retract that
information when it was revealed that he had been shot in the head. The
officers involved in the case were questioned but never charged nor
disciplined. They continue in their official capacity. The bus drivers
remained jailed pending sentencing at year's end. On December 6, the
Chihuahua State Supreme court upheld the decision of a lower court's
sentence against Carlos Barrientos Vidales, Charly Ceniceros Garcia and
Romel Omar Ceniceros Garcia, members of the gang ``Rebeldes'' who were
detained in 1996, for their participation in the murders of at least 10
women in Ciudad Juarez on the orders of Abdel Latif Sharif. There were
two disappearances of young women in Ciudad Juarez in December. No
arrests have been made in either case.
The State Attorney General's office claimed that following DNA
identification, it had identified positively six of the eight murdered
women, whose bodies the families had buried; however, subsequent
information revealed that the identifications had been mistaken. When
the families demanded additional DNA tests, the State Police claimed
the DNA evidence had been lost.
On February 11-12, Marta Altolaguirre Larrondo, the IACHR Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Women visited Ciudad Juarez and expressed
her dismay at the lethargy displayed by the state and federal
authorities in investigating the death of 268 women since 1993.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Federal Criminal Code includes penalties for sexual harassment,
but victims must press charges. Many female victims were reluctant to
come forward, and cases were difficult to prove. Sexual harassment in
the workplace is widespread. In May 2001, the CDHDF estimated that at
least 80 percent of the women who work in Mexico City have experienced
sexual harassment.
Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
neither the authorities nor society in general respect this in
practice. The legal treatment of women's rights is uneven. Women have
the right to own property in their own names and to file for separation
and divorce. However, in some states a woman may not bring suit to
establish paternity and thereby obtain child support unless the child
was a product of rape or cohabitation, the child resides with the
father, or there is written proof of paternity.
The Constitution and labor laws provide that women shall have the
same rights and obligations as men, and that ``equal pay shall be given
for equal work performed in equal jobs, hours of work, and conditions
of efficiency.'' However, women in the work force generally are paid
less than their male counterparts and are concentrated in lower-paying
occupations. In February, the sub-secretariat of Educational Services
in the Secretariat of Education said that the top 10 percent of the
highest paid men earn 50 percent more than the top 10 percent of
highest paid women, and that the bottom 10 percent of the lowest paid
men earn 25 to 27 percent more than the bottom 10 percent of the lowest
paid women.
Labor law provides extensive maternity protection, including 6
weeks' leave before and after childbirth and time off for breast
feeding in adequate and hygienic surroundings provided by the employer.
Employers are required to provide a pregnant woman with full pay, are
prohibited from dismissing her, and must remove her from heavy or
dangerous work or exposure to toxic substances. To avoid these
expensive requirements, some employers, including some in the maquila
industry, reportedly violate these provisions by requiring pregnancy
tests in preemployment physicals, by regular examinations and inquiries
into women's reproductive status (including additional pregnancy
tests), by exposing pregnant women to difficult or hazardous conditions
to make them quit, or by dismissing them. In September the Veracruz
state office of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Security reported
that it had turned over approximately 160 cases of women that were
dismissed from their workplace because they were pregnant. The office
said that the figure amounted to only 10 percent of the total
complaints received.
The Secretariat of Labor makes safety and hygiene inspections in
private factories and public institutions to protect the labor rights
of workers (see Section 6.e.).
There were reports that public health institutions performed forced
sterilizations in marginalized indigenous areas (see Sections 1.c. and
1.f.).
On March 8, the National Women's Institute (NWI) began operating.
This new agency is expected to coordinate tasks previously carried out
by the National Women's Program (PRONAM), such as making
recommendations to the Government regarding women's issues, and working
with government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs to
support women's causes. The NWI and the National Statistics Institute
tracked gender-specific statistics to ascertain more accurately the
status of women. The International Labor Organization (ILO), the
Secretariats of Labor and Foreign Relations, and the National Women's
Institute have all promoted the equal status of women in the workplace.
In October 2001, NWI launched its Pro-Equality program, designed to
institutionalize a gender perspective within the Federal government. In
addition, there are several local groups that actively support women's
rights.
The Friends House (Casa Amiga) in Ciudad Juarez provides shelter
for women and children in extreme need, advocates for the legal rights
of women and children in the state of Chihuahua, and works closely with
the sexual trauma assault resource crisis center in El Paso, Texas. It
also provides training to police and administers outreach programs. The
Fundemos Foundation in Guadalajara promotes legal reforms to protect
victims of domestic violence and participates in the state coordinating
body for women's organizations.
Children.--The Government maintains several programs to promote
child welfare that support maternal and infant health, provide stipends
for educating poor children, subsidize food, and provide social
workers; however, problems in children's health and education remain.
The CNDH received complaints about the services provided by the
Secretary of Health, the Secretary of Education (SEP), and the
Institute of Social Security. Children under the age of 15 make up 34
percent of the population, and the median age of the population is 21.
Nine years of education are compulsory, and parents are legally liable
for their children's attendance; however, SEP and the Sierra
Neighborhood Foundation have maintained that only approximately 30
percent of youths between 15 and 20 years of age attend school.
According to a 1998 academic study, in most areas of the country, girls
and boys attend school at similar rates. In marginalized rural areas,
national statistical agencies report that 60 percent of girls attend
primary school compared with 70 percent of boys. Scholarships offered
to families of the abject poor under the Government's ``Progresa''
antipoverty program kept an additional 100,000 children in school in
1999, and according to Progresa, that number increased by 18 percent in
2000. Progresa incorporated 763,000 new families into the program
during the year.
The National Public Health Institute's 2000 National Nutrition
Survey reported that 3 million children under the age of 5 suffered
some form of malnutrition, and a 1999 national nutrition survey stated
that the same number suffer anemia, while another 2 million children
chronically were malnourished. The mortality rate for children under 5
years of age was 33 per 1,000 live births, according to UNICEF figures.
The National Institute for the Integral Development of the Family
(DIF) received an average of approximately 35,000 complaints per year
of physical and mental abuse against children, the majority in the
Federal District, Mexico State, and Nuevo Leon. In April 2001, the
Federal Chamber of Deputies Committee for Vulnerable Groups estimated
that some 300 children die every year due to domestic violence.
Child prostitution and pornography are felonies under the law;
however, sexual exploitation is a problem. Under a 2000 law, anyone
convicted of corrupting a minor under 16 years of age by introducing
the minor to pornography, prostitution, or any sexual exploitation can
be sentenced to 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. If parents or guardians
are convicted of a crime, they automatically lose custody of their
children. If convicted, accomplices to sexual abuse or exploitation may
be imprisoned for 6 to 10 years. When physical or psychological
violence is used to abuse sexually or profit from children's
exploitation, the minimum and maximum penalties for these crimes are
increased by up to one-half. A 2000 DIF/UNICEF report estimated that
16,000 children below the age of 17 were victims of some form of sexual
exploitation. The localities of Acapulco, Cancun, Ciudad Juarez,
Guadalajara, Tapachula, and Tijuana accounted for over one-fourth of
that figure (4,600). In 2000, the Mexico City attorney general's office
and the Mexico City Human Rights Commission reported that nearly 12,000
children in Mexico City were exploited sexually.
Trafficking in children for the purpose of sexual exploitation was
a problem (see Section 6.f.). In 2000 the PGR established the Special
Prosecutor's Office for Attention to Crimes of Trafficking in Children.
Televisa news reported that an estimated 18,000 children a year were
kidnaped in Mexico.
Child labor is a problem, particularly among migrant farming
families (see Section 6.d.). The Government has attempted to make
schooling easier for the children of such families by making their
educational credentials transferable.
In 2000 the Congress passed a constitutional amendment to protect
the rights of children and teenagers and ensure respect for their
dignity. The amendment also increased penalties for the sexual abuse or
exploitation of children. In 2000 the Congress also passed the
Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents Law. This law
provides for the right to life, nondiscrimination, healthy living
conditions, protection against threats to liberty and physical abuse, a
healthy family life, health services, equal treatment for persons with
disabilities, education, pursuit of happiness, and freedom of thought
and expression. Penalties for violation of this law include fines of
500 to 1,000 times Mexico City's minimum wage and possible
imprisonment.
Press reports cited a 1998-99 DIF study that estimated that some
130,000 minors in 101 cities were living in the streets. The NGO
Mexican Association of Childhood and Youth reported that there was a
large population, estimated at 42,000, of vulnerable street children in
Mexico City. Street children often become involved with alcohol, drugs,
prostitution, petty thievery, and increasingly, violent crimes. In the
past, there were charges that corrupt police officials sometimes
exploited these children by pressuring them to commit petty crimes and
extorting money from them. In March 2001, the DIF began a program aimed
at street children, focusing initially on 3,000 children in Mexico
City, Puebla, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juarez. On
April 17, 17-year-old Jose Luis Juarez Tinoco, a street youth, died
after having been raped and strangled in Mexico City.
The Government and various NGOs have programs to protect the rights
of children and to instill inter-generational respect for human rights
through educational programs. During the year, the PGR, the National
Women's Institute, UNICEF, and DIF sponsored a program called ``Open
your Eyes, But Don't Close your Mouth'' to encourage citizens to
denounce crimes, especially child prostitution and child pornography.
On October 23, the CNDH submitted its recommendation no. 39/2002
directed toward the Secretary of Education, concerning sexual abuses of
minors and the possible existence of a child pornography ring in
schools within the public education system. The recommendation called
for administrative sanction against the school director, a full
investigation into the case and psychiatric help for the children and
their parents.
On December 10, President Fox unveiled the program ``An Appropriate
Mexico for Infancy and Adolescence 2002-2010'', elaborated with the
participation of 25 institutions and in collaboration with UNICEF. The
program is designed to cater to the more vulnerable children belonging
to indigenous groups, migrants, children with disabilities, and street
children. The National Council for Infancy and Adolescence is charged
with the implementation of the program. The program is an action plan
to diminish child poverty, malnutrition, and abandonment, and childhood
sicknesses such as obesity, AIDS, and infant mortality.
Persons with Disabilities.--Estimates of the number of persons with
disabilities range from 2 to 10 million. In the 2000 census, 1.8
million persons identified themselves as having a disability, although
2.2 million persons chose not to specify whether or not they had a
disability. According to the President's Office for the Promotion and
Social Integration of Persons with Disabilities, there are estimated to
be 250,000 new cases a year of persons with disabilities owing to
accidents, births, or diseases. According to the National Institute for
Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI) there are 988 registered
institutions of or for persons with disabilities. In Mexico City, 166
NGOs address problems affecting persons with physical disabilities.
In 2001 the President unveiled the National Public Access Program,
designed to provide equal access and rights to persons with
disabilities. The program will evaluate and improve accessibility for
more than 4,000 federal buildings, including offices, hospitals,
airports, and bus stations. In December President Fox reiterated his
administration's promise to make government buildings accessible to
people with different disabilities. The evaluation program was ongoing
at year's end.
In October, Federal District head of government Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador announced that in 2003 the number of persons with disabilities
receiving aid in the Federal District's will increase from 40,000 to
50,000.
On December 3, President Fox accompanied by the Secretary of Labor
and the national DIF director, unveiled the ``Labor Integration
Program'' to promote the hiring of persons with disabilities by the
private sector. The program was supported by the Confederation of
Industrial Chambers of Mexico (CONCAMIN).
The DIF has 62 Rehabilitation Centers in 31 states and the Federal
District and more than 600 Basic Rehabilitation Units throughout the
country.
A total of 27 of the 31 states have laws protecting persons with
disabilities. Local law requires access for persons with disabilities
to public facilities in Mexico City, but not elsewhere in the country.
In practice most public buildings and facilities in Mexico City do not
comply with the law. The Federal District also mandated access for
children with physical disabilities to all public and private schools.
The Mexico City Secretary of Education, Health, and Social Development
stated previously that 78 percent of these children received some
schooling. In 2000, the President's Office announced that 90,000
children with disabilities were integrated into a regular education
system between 1994 and 2000.
In August the Federal District Electoral Institute (IEDF) announced
that it would facilitate voting for persons with disabilities. Voting
booths would be made wider and shorter for people in wheelchairs;
however, ramps leading to the voting booths for wheelchairs would not
be installed. Ballot boxes with Braille writing, and a special ballot
holder and marker for those with limited fine motor skills will be
available.
Indigenous Persons.--The indigenous population has been long
subject to discrimination, repression, and marginalization. In December
2000, the Fox administration created the Office of Development of
Indigenous People, within the presidency to work with the National
Indigenous Institute (INI) to attend to indigenous affairs. In its
``National Program for the Development of Indigenous Peoples 2001-
2006'', the INI estimated the registered indigenous population at 8.4
million, while the estimated overall population was 12.7 million.
Estimates from other organizations vary from 8 to 10 million. The
report lists: 6 million native indigenous dialect speakers over 5 years
of age, 1.3 million children under 5 who live in households of native
indigenous dialect speakers, and 1.1 million individuals who identified
themselves as indigenous, but do not speak an indigenous dialect.
Indigenous people are located principally in the central and southern
regions and represent 37 percent of the population in the states of
Oaxaca and Yucatan. However, these groups have remained largely outside
the political and economic mainstream, as a result of longstanding
patterns of economic and social development. In many cases, their
ability to participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultural
traditions, and allocation of natural resources is negligible.
In 2000 President Fox submitted to Congress the Indigenous Rights
and Culture bill (COCOPA), a package of constitutional reforms that
codified the San Andres Accords. In April 2001, the Senate and Lower
House passed an amended version of the Indigenous Rights and Culture
bill, and the bill became law in August 2001. The bill addressed
government recognition of indigenous people; their right to internal
self-government; the legal standing of traditional forms of justice;
indigenous input into national, state, and municipal development plans;
and control over natural resources.
The EZLN opposed the revised bill's subjection of indigenous rights
and autonomy to existing federal, state, and municipal laws and
jurisdictions, provisions not contained in the original COCOPA
proposal.
Various state governments and multiple indigenous groups launched
more than 300 challenges to the reform's constitutionality. Opponents
claimed that the process by which the reform was amended contravened
international norms and conventions, specifically ILO Convention 169 on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which requires public participation in
the development of legislation that affects the lives of indigenous
people.
On September 6, the Supreme Court ruled that it did not have the
authority to analyze legislated changes to the Constitution and that
therefore, the August 2001 changes to the Indigenous Rights Law remain
valid and beyond the Court's jurisdiction to approve, modify, or
strike. The ruling closed the judicial door to changing the law. A
multitude of indigenous and human rights NGOs, as well as state and
local governments, declared their dissatisfaction with the decision.
Governments and NGOs fear that the decision may lead to renewed
violence, as Indigenous groups perceive that they have used their last
legal option, and their only alternative is more radical protest.
In April CNDH President Jose Luis Soberanes stated that the
indigenous people remain third-class citizens. Indigenous people do not
receive social justice, he added, and there is no indication that the
State has the intention of paying its historic debt.
Sporadic outbursts of politically motivated and land dispute
violence continued to occur in the southern states of Chiapas,
Guerrero, and Oaxaca. Land disputes going back decades are also a cause
of tension in the indigenous regions, especially in Oaxaca, Guerrero,
and Chiapas (see Section 1.a.).
Judges often failed to sentence indigenous detainees within legally
mandated periods (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). However, federal
prosecutors drop drug charges against indigenous defendants whom drug
traffickers forced to grow illegal crops, and the INI supports programs
to provide translators and bail assistance to indigenous defendants
(see Section 1.d.).
Indigenous people do not live on autonomous reservations, although
some indigenous communities exercise considerable local control over
economic, political, and social issues. In the State of Oaxaca, for
example, 70 percent of the 570 municipalities are governed according to
the indigenous regime of usages and customs, which may not follow
democratic norms such as the secret ballot, universal suffrage, and
political affiliation (see Section 3). These communities apply
traditional practices to resolve disputes and to choose local
officials. In 1998 Quintana Roo's State Legislature passed a similar
usages and customs law. While the laws allow communities in these
states to elect officials according to their traditions, these usages
and customs tend to exclude women from the political process. Usages
and customs also often infringe on other rights of women.
There were reports that public health institutions performed forced
sterilizations in marginalized indigenous areas (see Section 1.f.).
The law provides some protection for indigenous people, and the
Government provides support for indigenous communities through social
and economic assistance programs, legal provisions, and social welfare
programs. Budget constraints prevented these measures from meeting the
needs of all indigenous people.
The General Education Act provides that educational instruction
shall be conducted in the national language, Spanish, without prejudice
to the protection and promotion of indigenous languages. However, many
indigenous persons speak only their native languages.
The President created the sub-cabinet Office for the Development of
Indigenous Peoples led by Xochitl Galvez to complement the efforts of
the INI, the CNDH, and various NGOs, which operate programs to educate
indigenous groups about their political and human rights. The
Government generally professed respect for indigenous people's desire
to retain elements of their traditional culture in practice. The CNDH's
Office of the Fourth Inspector General reviews and investigates
violations of indigenous rights. More than 130 NGOs are dedicated to
the promotion and protection of indigenous rights.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Federal
Labor Law (LFT) provide workers with the right to form and join trade
unions of their choice. Approximately 25 percent of the total work
force is unionized, mostly in the formal sector, where approximately
one-half the labor force is employed.
No prior approval is needed to form unions; however, they must
register with the Federal Labor Secretariat (STPS) or state labor
boards (JLCA) to function legally. Registration requirements are not
onerous. In 2001 46 new labor unions registered with the STPS or the
JLCA, and approximately 50 percent of these were independent of the
main labor centrals. However, the STPS or the JLCA occasionally have
withheld or delayed registration of unions. For example, in October
2001 the STPS declared itself incompetent to register a union to
represent professional soccer players, arguing that guaranteeing union
representation to sports professionals is not a federal function. In
April a labor judge in Mexico City ruled against the STPS, and the STPS
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The court ruled against the
union, upholding the argument of the Secretariat that the Federal
Conciliation and Arbitration Board was not competent to register the
union. However, the Court did say that the football players' union
could register with any state or local conciliation and arbitration
board, and that that registration would be considered valid in the
whole country.
The STPS and the JLCA have registered unions that turned out to be
run by extortionists or labor racketeers falsely claiming to represent
workers. To remedy this problem, STPS officials required evidence that
unions were genuine and representative. Genuine unions can demonstrate
that they actually have members and represent the workers at the
workplace. Some labor organizations have complained that they have
found it difficult to obtain registration, especially from some local
conciliation and arbitration boards.
The Federal Labor Board (JFCA) and the JLCA are tripartite and
include the Government, union, and employer representatives. Although
trade union presence on the boards usually is a positive feature, it
can sometimes lead to unfair partiality in representation disputes.
Trade union registration was the subject of follow-up activities
pursuant to a 1995 agreement reached in ministerial consultations under
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
Unions form federations and confederations freely without
government approval. Most unions belong to such bodies, which also must
register to have legal status. The largest trade union central is the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), traditionally a part of the
labor sector of the PRI, but affiliation is by individual unions.
The Mexican Workers' Regional Confederation, the Revolutionary
Worker and Peasant Confederation, and most of the separate national
unions, smaller confederations, and federations in the Labor Congress
(CT) also are allied with the PRI. However, several unions did not ally
themselves with the PRI, including SNTE, the large teacher's union,
which severed its PRI ties a decade ago, and freed its minority
factions--including the CNTE, a breakaway teachers' union--to cooperate
openly with other parties, particularly the PRD. In April 2001, the
Federal Employee Union Federation (FSTSE) ended its long-standing
relationship with the PRI. There also are a few small labor federations
and independent unions outside the CT not allied with the PRI. One is
the small, left-of-center Authentic Labor Front (FAT). Most FAT members
sympathize with the PRD, but the FAT is independent and not formally
tied to the PRD. In 1997 160 labor organizations representing workers
in the private and public sectors, led by the telephone workers and
social security workers unions, formed the National Union of Workers--a
labor central in competition with the officially recognized CT.
PRI-affiliated union officers traditionally helped select, ran as,
and campaigned for PRI candidates in federal and state elections and
supported past PRI government policies at crucial moments. The CT,
especially the CTM, was well represented in the PRI senatorial and
congressional delegations, although its numbers diminished
significantly after the 1997 and the 2000 elections.
The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has found that certain
restrictions in federal employee labor law, adopted at FSTSE request,
violate ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association. These restrictions
allow only one union per jurisdiction, forbid union members from
quitting the union, and prohibit reelection of union officials. In 1998
the COE and the ILO Committee on Application of Standards reiterated
their criticism and asked the Government to amend the law. The
Government responded to the criticism with subsequent labor reforms. A
1999 Supreme Court decision permits the formation and recognition of
more than one union per federal entity. In April 2001, the Supreme
Court ruled that Articles 395 and 413 of the LFT were unconstitutional
because they violated the constitutional provision for freedom of
association. This decision permitted recognition of multiple unions at
a company, and workers may obtain and retain employment whether or not
they are associated with a union.
In April 2001, the Congress approved a package of constitutional
reforms on indigenous rights and culture (see Section 5). Critics argue
the approved reforms fail to meet the Government's obligations to ILO
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. In the report prepared
for the June Conference, the COE noted numerous complaints of
noncompliance with Convention 169 and stated that although the
constitutional reforms published in the Official Bulletin ``cover a
large part of the subjects covered by the Convention,'' the COE was
aware that the reforms were controversial and was examining them in
detail.
The country's record for internal union democracy and transparency
was spotty. Some unions were democratic, but corruption and strong-arm
tactics were common in others.
In a case involving freedom of association linked to the right to
organize unions, in 1997 a total of 10 unions and 24 additional
organizations, including NGOs and human rights groups, jointly filed a
submission with the U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO) alleging
that a CTM-affiliated union used strong-arm tactics to intimidate
workers so that they would not vote in favor of a rival union to
represent workers at a plant in Mexico state. This submission also
alleged violations of health and safety regulations. The Canadian NAO
also received a submission on this case in 1998. The U.S. NAO issued a
report in 1998 that recommended ministerial consultations. A May 2000
agreement between the U.S. and Mexican Labor Secretaries and adhered to
by the Canadian Labor Minister provided that the Mexican Labor
Secretariat hold a trilateral public seminar regarding labor boards and
their members and officials; their structure and responsibilities; the
rules and procedures to assure impartiality, as well as their role in
the process for gaining the right to a collective bargaining contract.
Consistent with the Joint Statement on Ministerial Consultations
released on June 12, the seminar is to take place in Monterrey, Nuevo
Leon, Mexico; however, it had not been scheduled by year's end.
The Constitution and the LFT protect labor organizations from
government interference in their internal affairs, including strike
decisions. However, this also can protect undemocratic or corrupt union
leaders. The law still permits closed shop and exclusion clauses,
allowing union leaders to vet and veto new hires and to force dismissal
of anyone the union expels. Such clauses are common in collective
bargaining agreements.
Employer organizations slowed efforts to push for labor law reform
early in 1999 and entered into ongoing discussions with the Government
and labor unions about reforming the LFT's rules of procedure.
Government, employers, and unions had negotiated reforms through
tripartite national agreements and collective bargaining at the
enterprise level. Reforms were effected also through cooperation in
programs to increase, and compensate for, productivity. Government,
national labor unions, and employer organizations met periodically
throughout the year to discuss ways and means of cooperation to boost
productivity, wages, and competitiveness. The STPS sponsored a
reformatted restructured committee that was working on draft labor
legislation to present to Congress at year's end. On December 12, a
group of 17 members from the PRI, the PAN, and the Green Ecologist
Party introduced the labor reform bill to the Chamber of Deputies
plenum, that in turn referred it to the appropriate committees.
Congress did not act on the legislation prior to adjourning for the
year on December 15.
Unions are free to affiliate with, and increasingly are interested
in actively participating in, trade union internationals.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Interest by a few employees, or a union strike notice,
compels an employer either to recognize a union and negotiate with it
or to ask the federal or state labor board to hold a union recognition
election. LFT pro-union provisions led some employers to seek out or
create independent ``white'' or company unions as an alternative to
mainstream national or local unions. Representation elections are
traditionally open, not secret. Traditionally, management and union
officials are present with the presiding labor board official when
workers openly declare their votes, one by one. Such open recounts,
which in the past have resulted in the intimidation of prounion workers
and in reprisals against them, are prevailing practice but are not
required by law or regulation. Secret ballots are held when all parties
agree. Moves to change that arrangement began early in the year. The
draft bill contains provision for secret ballot elections as long as
there are at least two contenders. The bill, however, is not yet law.
On March 5, workers, dissatisfied with benefit and salary
negotiations at Alcoa Plant Number 2 in Piedras Negras, Coahuila, voted
to replace the union representation of the CTM with an independent
union, Comite Fronterizo de Obreros (CFO). In spite of enduring
harassment and violence allegedly from the CTM, workers handed victory
to the CFO by 300 votes, a 20 percent margin. This election was
noteworthy because it occurred by secret ballot. On October 18, workers
at Alcoa Plant #1 elected new union representatives by secret ballot.
The slate entitled ``For Unity'' received 400 more votes than were cast
for the slate sponsored by CTM leader Leocadio Hernandez. The union
committee of Plant #2 assisted the independent union in achieving its
victory at Plant #1. At year's end, local labor authorities had not
granted registration to either new union.
In July the National Administrative Office (NAO) in Washington D.C.
charged with oversight of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation declined to accept a submission from the AFL-CIO,
protesting that a lack of secret ballots during a March 2001 election
at a foreign-owned company in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas. The NAO argued
that Mexican labor law recognizes the rights of freedom of association
and to bargain collectively, but has no provision governing the use of
secret ballots in trade union representation elections.
The 2002 Human Rights Watch World Report stated that collective
bargaining agreements negotiated between management and probusiness and
nonindependent unions frequently hindered legitimate organizing
activity. The report stated that in other cases employers' hiring
practices, such as the use of subcontractors and ``permanent
temporary'' workers, impeded workers from organizing.
Wage restraints no longer exist, except for those caused by
recession or an employer's difficult situation. Wages in most union
contracts appeared to keep pace with or ahead of inflation, but most
workers had not yet regained buying power lost over the past decade.
The Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to strike. The
law requires 6 to 10 days' advance strike notice, followed by brief
government mediation. If federal or state authorities rule a strike
``nonexistent'' or ``illicit,'' employees must remain at work, return
to work within 24 hours, or face dismissal. If they rule a strike
legal, the company or unit must shut down completely, management
officials may not enter the premises until the strike is over, and the
company may not hire replacements for striking workers. Provisions for
maintaining essential services are not onerous. The law also makes
filing a strike notice an effective, commonly used threat that protects
a failing company's assets from creditors and courts until an agreement
is reached on severance pay. Although few strikes actually occur,
informal stoppages are fairly common, but uncounted in statistics, and
seldom last long enough to be recognized or ruled out of order. The law
permits public sector strikes, but formal public sector strikes are
rare. Informal ones are more frequent. There were 43 strikes from
January through November. According to the Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare, in the two years that the Fox administration has been
in office there have been 82 strikes at the federal level.
The public sector is almost completely organized. Industrial areas
are organized heavily. Even states with little industry have transport
and public employee unions, and rural peasant organizations are
omnipresent. The law protects workers from antiunion discrimination,
but enforcement is uneven in the few states with low unionization.
Unionization and wage levels in the in-bond export sector varied by
area and sophistication of the manufacturing process. The National
Council of the In-Bond Export Manufacturing Industry claims that its
members employ approximately 1.1 million persons. According to INEGI,
there are 3,204 active maquiladora plants in the country. Wages have
been slightly higher and job creation has been greater in this sector
than in more traditional manufacturing. Compensation packages in the
maquiladora sector still were lower than in the traditional
manufacturing sector. There was no evidence that the Government opposed
unionization of the plants, although the maquiladora sector tends to be
under state jurisdiction. Protection contracts, to which the workforce
is not privy, are used in the maquila sector and elsewhere to
discourage the development of authentic unions. These contracts are
collective bargaining agreements negotiated and signed by management
and a representative of a so-called labor organization, sometimes even
prior to the hiring of a single worker.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, which includes forced and bonded labor by
children; however, trafficking in persons, including children, for
sexual exploitation and forced labor is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
There also were cases of abuses of refugees and undocumented immigrants
(see Section 2.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits children under 14 years of age
from working and sets the minimum legal work age at 14 years; however,
child labor is a problem. Those between the ages of 14 and 16 may work
only limited hours, with no night or hazardous work, which generally
makes hiring them uneconomical. Enforcement was reasonably good at
large and medium-sized companies, especially in maquiladoras and
industries under federal jurisdiction. Enforcement was inadequate at
many small companies and in agriculture and construction. It was nearly
absent in the informal sector, and the Government's efforts to enforce
the law stalled.
A 2000 report published by UNICEF and the National Action
Commission in Favor of Children estimated that approximately 3.5
million children between the ages of 6 and 18 work regularly.
Approximately 1.5 million children work in agriculture, particularly in
the northern states. In 1999 UNICEF and the DIF, estimated that 150,000
children work in the 100 largest cities.
Reliable current statistics on child labor in the country do not
exist. In 1996 the ILO reported that 18 percent of children 12 to 14
years of age work, often for parents or relatives. Most child labor is
in the informal sector (including myriad underage street vendors),
family-owned workshops, or in agriculture and rural areas. Mexico
City's central market employs approximately 11,000 minors between the
ages of 7 and 18, who work as cart-pushers, kitchen help, and vendors.
In 1999 UNICEF and DIF estimated that 135,000 children worked on the
city streets. The children do not receive a fixed wage, and most work
long shifts, starting in the early morning hours. The CTM agricultural
union's success years earlier in obtaining free transport for migrant
seasonal workers from southern states to fields in the north
inadvertently led to a significant increase in child labor. The union
and employers were unable to convince indigenous farm workers to leave
their families at home, and many settled near work sites in the north.
The union has had some limited success in negotiating with employers to
finance education in Spanish and indigenous languages near work sites
and in obtaining social security child care centers, but it has had
difficulty in persuading member families not to bring their children
into the fields. Many urban child workers are migrants from rural
areas, are illiterate, and have parents who are unemployed.
The Government's antipoverty program works to keep poor children in
school as an alternative to work (see Section 5). The Government of the
Federal District implemented a law adopted in 1999 that increased
limitations on working hours and conditions for children employed as
supermarket baggers and automotive attendants.
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, which includes forced and
bonded labor by children; however, trafficking in children is a problem
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution and the LFT
provide for a daily minimum wage. The tripartite National Minimum Wage
Commission (government, labor, and employers) usually sets minimum wage
rates each December, effective on January 1, but any of the three
parties can ask that the wage commission reconvene during the year to
consider a changed situation. In December 2001, the wage commission
adopted an average 5.8 percent increase, effective on January 1, based
in part on the Government's projection of a 4.5 percent annual
inflation rate.
In Acapulco, Mexico City and nearby industrial areas, southeast
Veracruz state's refining and petrochemical zone, and most border
areas, the minimum daily wage was set at $4.43 (42.15 pesos). In
Guadalajara, Monterrey, and other advanced industrialized areas, the
minimum daily wage was $4.22 (40.10 pesos). In other areas, it was
$4.03 (38.30 pesos). There are higher minimums for some occupations,
such as the building trades.
The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Few workers (approximately 16 percent) earn only the
minimum wage; most workers earn multiples of the minimum wage, and
industrial workers average three to four times the minimum wage,
earning more at larger, more advanced, and prosperous enterprises.
The law and contract arrangements provide workers with extensive
additional benefits. Legally required benefits include free social
security medical treatment, pensions, individual worker housing and
retirement accounts, Christmas bonuses, paid vacations, and profit
sharing. Employer costs for these benefits add from approximately 27
percent of base salaries at marginal enterprises to over 100 percent at
major firms with good union contracts. In addition, employers
frequently subsidize the cost of meals, transportation, and day care
for children, and pay bonuses for punctuality and productivity.
The LFT sets six 8-hour days as the legal workweek, but with pay
for 56 hours. For most industrial workers, especially under union
contract, the true workweek is 42 hours, although they are paid for 7
full 8-hour days. This is one reason why unions vigorously defend the
legal ban on hourly wages. Workers asked to exceed 3 hours of overtime
per day or required to work overtime on 3 consecutive days must be paid
triple the normal wage.
There are 11 special labor arbitration and conciliation boards (in
Queretaro, Pachuca, Ciudad del Carmen, Zacatecas, Orizaba, Ciudad
Juarez, Cancun, Colima, La Paz, Reynosa, and Tijuana) and 4 more state
offices of the STPS to make it more convenient for workers to file
complaints and bring other actions before the labor court system.
The law requires employers to observe occupational safety and
health regulations, issued jointly by the STPS and the Social Security
Institute (IMSS), and to pay contributions that vary according to their
workplace safety and health experience ratings. LFT-mandated joint
management and labor committees set standards and are responsible for
workplace enforcement in plants and offices. These committees meet at
least monthly to consider workplace needs and file copies of their
minutes with federal labor inspectors. Federal and state authorities
exchange information.
STPS and IMSS officials continued to report that compliance is
reasonably good at most large companies. However, because smaller firms
are far more numerous and so much more difficult to monitor, these
officials were unable to draw any general conclusions about their
compliance. There were not enough federal inspectors to enforce
effectively health and safety standards at smaller firms. There are
special problems in construction, where unskilled, untrained, poorly
educated, transient labor is common, especially at many small sites and
companies. Many unions, particularly in construction, are not organized
effectively to provide training, to encourage members to work safely
and healthily, to participate in the joint committees, or to insist on
their rights.
To protect the rights of workers, the Secretariat of Labor made
9,593 safety and hygiene inspections in private factories and public
institutions through August and estimated that it would complete 13,790
by the end of the year. However, while the Government increased the
number of federal inspectors in 1997 and concluded agreements with more
states to expand and better coordinate labor inspections, the 3,204
maquila plants far exceed the 253 federal inspectors.
In July and October, a bilateral working group of government
experts on occupational safety and health issues held its first two
meetings. This group will discuss and review issues raised in the
public communications, formulate technical recommendations for
consideration by governments, develop and evaluate technical
cooperation projects occupational safety and health for improving
occupational safety and health in the workplace, and identify other
occupational safety and health issues appropriate for bilateral
cooperation.
Many agricultural workers are internal migrants, who often travel
with their families, including young children. They often are paid by
volume of the work they produce, rather than by the day. Working
conditions vary by area of the country and from one locality to
another. In the past, allegations were made that workers, including
young children accompanying them, have been exposed to pesticides and
other chemicals.
Individual employees or unions also may complain directly to
inspectors or safety and health officials. Workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations without jeopardizing their
employment. Plaintiffs may bring complaints before the federal labor
board at no cost to themselves.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons. Trafficking is a serious problem, and there were credible
reports that police, immigration, and customs officials were involved
in the trafficking of such persons (see Section 2.d.).
Mexico is a source country for trafficked persons to the United
States, and to a lesser extent Canada, and a transit country for
persons from various countries, especially Central America and to a
much smaller extent Brazil and Eastern Europe. It is a destination
country for children trafficked from Central America, especially from
Honduras to Tapachula, Chiapas. Salvadorans, Hondurans, and
Guatemalans, especially children, are trafficked into the country for
prostitution, particularly on the southern border. Internal
trafficking, including of children for sexual exploitation, also is a
problem.
In 2001 DIF and UNICEF reported that an estimated 16,000 children
were victims of sexual exploitation, including prostitution. Most were
Mexican, although there were significant numbers from Central America--
principally Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In many cases, those
who brought them in the country promised them employment in legitimate
occupations. Thereafter they were sold to the owners of bars and other
establishments and then forced into prostitution to ``pay off their
debts.'' This debt peonage often never ends because the children accrue
more debt for their meals and housing. The owners sold or traded the
children among themselves. Other children were transported to Mexico
City for ``training'' and then were sent to centers of tourism. Some
children are trafficked to the U.S. and Canada. In an ongoing study,
DIF and UNICEF reported that the largest concentration of exploited
children were found in Acapulco, Guerrero; Tijuana, Baja California;
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua; Cancun, Quintana Roo; Guadalajara, Jalisco;
and Tapachula, Chiapas.
There are no specific laws that prohibit the trafficking of
persons, although immigration laws, the federal organized crime law,
and federal and state penal codes contain provisions that may be used
to prosecute traffickers of undocumented migrants, women, and children.
Laws pertaining to trafficking in persons are Article 138 of the
Immigration Law, and the Federal Organized Crime Law of the Federal
Penal Code. There also are laws prohibiting the sexual abuse or
exploitation of children and forced labor by children (see Sections 5
and 6.c.). The PRG and the INM are the agencies responsible for
enforcing antitrafficking laws; however, there is no special program to
combat trafficking. In 2000 the PRG established the Special
Prosecutor's Office for Attention to Crimes of Trafficking in Children
(see Section 5). The Government prosecutes cases against traffickers,
but no statistics were available.
The Government has a Plan of Action to Prevent, Attend, and
Eradicate the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors. The program is
administered through the DIF and is supported by numerous executive and
legislative branch entities. The Chihuahua state Attorney General's
Office runs a series of self-awareness programs to educate women about
the many dangers confronting them in Ciudad Juarez. There also have
been campaigns to prevent illegal migration and migrant smuggling.
The Government has strengthened significantly its cooperation with
other countries. In 2000 the Honduran government stated that it was
working to repatriate from Mexico approximately 400 Honduran girls,
between the ages of 10 and 16 years, who after unsuccessfully having
tried to enter the U.S. illegally were forced into prostitution in
Mexico.
The Government supports general prevention campaigns for children
and women, and administers assistance programs for children repatriated
to Mexico. The legal framework exists to protect the victims of
trafficking and provide social services to these victims. However, in
practice persons illegally in the country usually are deported.
Numerous NGOs work on related issues such as migrant trafficking,
child prostitution, sexual exploitation, and women's rights (see
Sections 2.d. and 5).
__________
NICARAGUA
Nicaragua is a constitutional democracy, with a directly elected
president, vice president, and unicameral legislature. In November
2001, voters elected Enrique Bolanos Geyer of the Liberal
Constitutionalist Party (PLC) as President in a generally free and fair
election. The Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) is an independent fourth
branch of government; however it was subject to political influence.
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the
judiciary was susceptible to political and financial influence.
The President is the supreme chief of the national defense and
security forces. Former President Aleman established the first civilian
defense ministry upon his inauguration in 1997; however, the Minister
of Defense has limited authority over the military under the
Constitution. The Ministry of government oversees the National Police,
which is charged formally with internal security; however, the police
share this responsibility with the army in rural areas. The National
Police continued to reduce the role of voluntary police (private
citizens contracted by the National Police to help fill staffing gaps)
in law enforcement. Use of voluntary police was discontinued in
Managua; however, it continued in rural areas. The civilian authorities
generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Some
members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
The market-based economy is predominantly agricultural; coffee,
seafood, sugar, beef, light manufacturing, and tourism are key sectors.
The country's population is approximately 5.3 million. A worldwide drop
in coffee prices, the lack of an adequate legal framework to give
confidence to domestic and foreign investors, a fragile banking system,
large external debt, inflation, and unresolved property disputes and
unclear land titles stemming from massive confiscations by the
Sandinista government in the 1980s limited economic growth. The economy
grew by 3 percent in real terms in 2001; however, the growth rate was
expected to decline to approximately 1 percent during the year. The
annual rate of consumer price inflation was expected to be 4 percent
during the year, marking the fourth consecutive year of single-digit
increases. While the official projection of unemployment was 11
percent, unofficial estimates of combined unemployment and
underemployment remained as high as 40 to 50 percent. The economy
remained heavily dependent on foreign aid and remittances from abroad.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remain in some areas. At year's
end, there were ongoing investigations of those members of the security
forces who were accused of having committed unlawful killings. Police
continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. Some detainees
credibly alleged that they were tortured. Prison and police holding
cell conditions remained harsh, and overcrowding increased. Security
forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens; however, the number
of such reports decreased during the year. The Government effectively
punished some of those who committed abuses; however, a degree of
impunity persisted. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in
trials increased significantly. The 2001 Criminal Procedures Code took
effect at year's end. The judiciary is subject at times to political
influence and corruption. The Supreme Court ended its 5-year structural
reform program of the judicial system with mixed success. The weakness
of the judiciary continued to hamper prosecution of human rights
abusers in some cases. The Human Rights Ombudsman made publicized
recommendations during the year that openly challenged the actions of
the security forces. Violence against women, including domestic abuse
and rape, remained a concern. Discrimination against women was endemic.
Violence against children and child prostitution continued.
Discrimination against indigenous people also occurred. Child labor
continued to exist. Concern over violation of labor rights in free
trade zones continued. There were several documented reports of
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation.
Nicaragua was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening
Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in
Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
The civil war formally concluded in June 1990 with the
demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN, or ``contras'').
However, the rule of law and basic infrastructure do not extend to all
rural areas. Despite the Government's disarmament campaigns, many
citizens, especially in rural areas, are heavily armed.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials; however, the
police received 20 allegations of unlawful killings by police; each of
these was referred by the Inspector General of the police to the
courts. All of the cases were pending before the courts at year's end.
The Inspector General's Office of the National Police received 20
reports of police killing of alleged criminals and 103 reports of
instances in which police seriously wounded criminal suspects while
attempting to arrest them. The Inspector General remands to the court
system for review all cases in which police use deadly force; however,
the courts often take considerable time to process these cases and many
of the cases never reach a final resolution in the court system (see
Section 1.e.). The police do not make a final decision on cases sent to
the courts until the courts respond with a verdict. While the police
await the decisions from the courts, the Inspector General's Office
normally applies a mild punishment, such as suspension or confinement
to precinct. Of the 139 cases the Inspector General remanded to the
courts during the year, 1 case had been completely adjudicated by the
courts by year's end. In January police Captain Arnulfo Rocha Mora shot
and killed 31-year-old Santos Jose Polanco in Teustepe. A judge in
Boaco indicted Captain Rocha for excessive force. Rocha claimed that he
shot Polanco in self-defense and he was appealing the indictment at
year's end. The police relocated Captain Rocha and allowed him to
continue his duties while the appeal was underway. On August 11, police
officer Carlos Martinez Castillo shot and killed 37-year-old Jose
Sabino Martinez Mendoza, a suspected trafficker in aliens or narcotics,
in Villa Venezuela, a suburb of Managua, after he failed to stop at a
police checkpoint. When Mendoza fled on foot after abandoning his
truck, the police fired warning shots. When Mendoza did not heed the
warning, Castillo shot him in the head. Police accused five men
traveling with Mendoza of being illegal immigrants. Although the courts
acquitted four of the men, the authorities deported all five. In August
a court acquitted officer Castillo of first degree murder and
manslaughter.
By February, a joint police-military operation effectively had
neutralized remnants of the pro-Sandinista ``Andres Castro United
Front'' (FUAC) when it killed nearly 60 alleged FUAC members who had
engaged in murder, kidnaping for ransom, and armed robbery in the north
and north-central regions of the country since their disarmament in
1999. The Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), a leading human
rights group, alleged that the army committed at least six human rights
violations during the operation. Press reports indicated that the
security forces beheaded some of the FUAC fighters. The army insisted
that it had used necessary force to ensure domestic security during a
legitimate operation. The army claimed that it had looked into these
charges; however, it did not launch a formal investigation.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law makes the use of torture a punishable crime;
however, police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There
were numerous credible reports that police beat or physically
mistreated detainees, often to obtain confessions. CENIDH received 422
complaints of torture or degrading treatment by the authorities during
the year and verified 201 of these. The Inspector General's Office
recorded 620 complaints of mistreatment by police, including those
submitted by CENIDH, and found 191 to have merit. The Inspector General
punished 351 officers in these cases. Among the complaints were 103
instances in which police seriously wounded criminal suspects while
attempting to arrest them. By year's end, the police had dishonorably
discharged 7 officers and referred 139 officers to the courts.
The National Police reduced the law enforcement role of voluntary
police, private citizens used on a volunteer basis to help fill
staffing gaps in several precincts. The National Police provide them
with a uniform, and in some cases, with a gun, at the discretion of the
police chief. Voluntary police do not receive a salary or professional
training. The police can apply no administrative sanctions to the
volunteers, other than to terminate their status. In 2000 former Chief
of Police Franco Montealegre terminated the use of voluntary police in
Managua; however, as of September, there were 1,681 voluntary police
outside of Managua, a 22 percent decrease from the 2,170 in 2001.
Several were implicated in human rights abuses during the year.
The Inspector General's Office investigated allegations of abuse by
the regular police and sanctioned the offenders in many cases; however,
a degree of impunity persisted. Inadequate budget support for the
National Police hampered efforts to improve police performance and
resulted in a continuing shortage of officers. However, international
assistance programs provided the police with extensive training during
the year.
The Inspector General's Office reported that it received a total of
399 complaints of human rights violations by police officers during the
year, including complaints forwarded by the Office of Civil Inspection
for Professional Responsibility, and found 85 to have merit. The
Inspector General's Office punished a total of 131 officers for
violations of human rights. Of those punished, the police discharged 1
officer dishonorably, remanded 50 to the courts, and gave the rest
lesser punishments, including demotion, suspension, and loss of pay.
On February 23, a group of nearly 30 police, led by Captain Maribel
Ruiz Lovo, wounded 15 people as they attempted to evict 13 families who
were allegedly squatting on disputed land on the island of Ometepe.
Civil District Judge Gloria Maria Arauz and Municipal Judge Hazel
Sandino ordered the eviction. Police Subcommissioner Fidel Dominguez
Alvarez authorized the eviction action. The police encountered violent
resistance from the evictees and responded forcefully to them, up to
and including firing their weapons. The evictees were reportedly
unarmed, except for crude weapons such as rocks and sticks. The Supreme
Court (CSJ) launched an immediate investigation of Judges Arauz and
Sandino's roles in the case, and, less than a month later, both were
dismissed from their judicial posts. The Police Inspector General
immediately formed a special commission to investigate the police
personnel involved and suspended Subcommissioner Alvarez during the
investigation. In May a court convicted eight police officers involved
in the raid, including Subcommissioner Alvarez and Captain Ruiz Lovo,
and sentenced them to various terms in prison. The officers' appeals of
their convictions were pending at year's end.
On March 16, Rivas police officers Justo Alcocer Fajardo and Jorge
Ferrey allegedly beat 19-year-old Nestor Guadamuz Marenco, who
eventually died of his injuries. A Rivas court detained the officers
for 5 months during the ensuing investigation and trial. The trial
ended in an acquittal, and both officers continued to serve on the
police force at year's end.
On April 19, a female detainee accused a guard, William Jesus
Hernandez Mendez, of rape. An investigation by the Internal Affairs
Office verified the allegations against Mendez based on forensic
evidence. A court acquitted Mendez; however, the police gave him a
dishonorable discharge for violating prison regulations prohibiting
sexual relations between prisoners and guards.
On July 15, a female prisoner in the Chinandega prison accused two
guards, Felix Bertilio Moreno and Mariano Romero, of rape. The
authorities detained them on July 16. An independent forensic scientist
found no signs of violence and believed the incident to be consensual.
The victim dropped the charges and the officers were released. However,
the officers were stripped of their rank.
During the year, the police did not launch an investigation into
the January 2001 police beating of Pedro Antonio Castro Baltodano in
Managua. They maintained that no police personnel were involved in
spite of allegations to the contrary by the Nicaraguan Association for
Human Rights (ANPDH). It does not appear that any formal investigation
will be initiated.
The trial of police officer Bismark Laguna for the June 2001
shooting of gang members Juan Carlos Mendoza and Lenin Calderon Mendoza
in San Isidro, Matagalpa remained stalled and unresolved at year's end.
Laguna was allowed to remain free pending the trial's conclusion. The
presiding judge, Carla Emilia Lopez, said that the case was bogged down
by a lack of interest on the part of the involved parties. There
appeared little chance that a judgment would ever be made in the trial.
Various NGOs provided the police and the army with human rights
training (see Section 4).
Prison conditions remained harsh. The number of prisoners who spent
6 months or more incarcerated without a trial increased significantly
(see Section 1.d.). According to government statistics, the prisons,
with an official capacity of 5,132, had a total inmate population of
5,624 in December, compared with 5,060 in November 2001 and 4,903 in
September 2000. Detainees were held separately from convicted prisoners
(see Section 1.e.).
Prison guards received human rights training from NGOs and the
Catholic Church and generally treated prisoners well, although there
were some reports of abuses. There were no reports of riots or other
violence during the year.
The prison system remained underfunded and medical attention ranged
from inadequate to nonexistent. Medical care available to prisoners
fell far short of basic needs. For example, for all 8 penitentiaries
and 5,624 prisoners, prison authorities maintained a staff of 24
specialists, including doctors, psychologists, teachers, and social
workers. Prison authorities also reported that 49 percent of prisoners
were without beds; these prisoners slept on concrete beds or floors.
Several churches, national and international NGOs donated foodstuffs,
beds, and medicine to the prison system to help alleviate shortfalls.
Prison officials calculated that the daily expenditure per prisoner for
food was about $0.50 (6 cordobas) and reported that the annual budget
for food remained constant. There was some improvement in prison food,
but malnutrition remained a problem in local jails and police holding
cells. Many prisoners also received additional food from visiting
family and friends. Some prisons and many police holding cells were
dark, poorly ventilated, and unhygienic. Conditions in jails and
holding cells remained harsh. Police station holding cells were
severely overcrowded. Suspects regularly were left in these cells
during their trials, since budgetary shortfalls often restricted the
use of fuel for frequent transfers to distant courtrooms. At the
Bluefields jail, there were only 2 showers and 4 toilets for more than
105 prisoners. The authorities occasionally released detainees when
they no longer could feed them. Only Managua has a separate prison for
women; outside the Managua area, women were housed in separate wings in
prison facilities and were guarded by female custodians. As of
December, females made up 3.8 percent of the prison population. The
Public Defender's office assigned two full-time employees to work with
the women's prison system to help ensure its proper functioning in
areas such as timely release of inmates granted parole. As of December,
1 percent of the prison population was between the ages of 15 and 18,
less than a quarter of what it was in 1999. All youths were housed in
separate prison cells from adults; the youths were on a different
schedule for mealtime and recreational activities.
In August Casa Alianza and the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office
published a survey of 85 underaged detainees throughout the penal
system. According to the survey, the police did not inform over 21
percent of the respondents why they were being detained at the time of
their arrest, the police mistreated 47 percent, and 48 percent said
that they were detained 3 days or more before seeing a judge. Fully
half said they were not aware of being assigned a defense attorney, and
24 percent said they were incarcerated with adults. The Director of
Prison Systems maintained that children were held in separate cells and
that their rights generally were respected.
In September Casa Alianza and the Center for Justice and
International Law presented a complaint to the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission regarding the 1999 suicide of 16-year-old Wilmer
Gonzalez Rojas inside the adult jail in Tipitapa. The IACHR had not
decided whether to accept the case by year's end.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention by the police remained a problem. The Police Functions Law
requires police to obtain a warrant prior to detaining a suspect and to
notify family members of the detainee's whereabouts within 24 hours.
Compliance with this law increased significantly since 1999, largely
due to pressure from the Police Internal Affairs office and support for
compliance from the Chief of Police. Detainees do not have the right to
an attorney until they have been charged formally with a crime. Local
human rights groups were critical of the law for providing inadequate
judicial oversight of police arrests.
Police may hold a suspect legally for 48 hours before they must
bring the person before a judge to decide if charges should be brought.
The judge then either must order the accused released or transferred to
jail. Although cumbersome, this law was observed more closely than in
the past, and few prisoners were held illegally beyond the 48-hour
deadline (see Section 1.c.). The number of prisoners who spent 6 months
or more incarcerated without a trial increased significantly. In 2000,
the Criminal Chamber of the CSJ ordered all local magistrates to give
priority to those cases involving pretrial prisoners with 6 months or
more of incarceration. However, according to government statistics, 10
percent of 5,624 prisoners had been in jail for 6 months or longer
without a trial, up from 2 percent in 2001 and 4 percent in 2000.
Statistics from the Department of Prisons indicated that 26 percent of
all prisoners being held were awaiting final verdicts. Exile is not
practiced. There were no reports of political violence against any
citizens returning from civil war era self-imposed exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was susceptible to
corruption and political influence. The judiciary was hampered by
arcane legal codes, prosecutors who played a passive role, an
underfunded and understaffed Public Defender's Office, judges and
lawyers who often lacked sufficient training or education, and
corruption. Many judges did not have previous experience as lawyers.
Judges' political sympathies, acceptance of bribes, or influence from
political leaders reportedly often influenced judicial actions and
findings.
The judicial system comprises both civil and military courts. The
16-member Supreme Court is the system's highest court, and in addition
to administering the judicial system, is responsible for nominating all
appellate and lower court judges. The Court is divided into specialized
chambers on administrative, criminal, constitutional, and civil
matters. Under the Law of the Child and Family, which took effect in
1998, the Attorney General's Office rather than the police investigate
crimes committed by and against juveniles. The 1994 military code
requires the civilian court system to try members of the military
charged with common crimes. A 5-year administration of justice reform
program, begun in 1997, achieved a number of its objectives, including
a Judicial Organic Law and a new Criminal Procedures Code; however, the
revision of the country's outdated Penal Code remained bottled up in
the National Assembly. The 1999 Judicial Organic Law contained a
provision that established minimum professional standards for judicial
appointees. However, a Judicial Career law to establish a more
professional and independent judiciary remained in the National
Assembly for consideration and action at year's end. In December, the
2001 Criminal Procedures Code entered into effect. It will alter
significantly the way that trials are held. Instead of the Napoleonic
trial system that emphasizes the role of magistrates and written
evidence, the new system will be an adversarial-style system that
allows oral arguments from both the defense and the prosecution. The
Assembly began the process to approve a new Penal Code in 2000;
however, an extended political dispute between the administration and
the Assembly delayed the legislation. Nonetheless, in June the Penal
Code was modified to include certain economic crimes, including illegal
enrichment. In 1999 the National Assembly approved a reform of the
Public Ministry that streamlined the judicial process by separating the
defense and the prosecutorial functions. Specifically, the reform
transferred powers from the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduria) to
a newly created Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia), which is
charged with prosecuting criminal cases. In November 2001, the National
Assembly elected Julio Centeno Gomez to the new position of Fiscal
General. The Procuraduria continued to have the responsibility to
defend the Government against legal action taken by private or other
public actors. In addition, the Procuraduria was empowered to prosecute
criminally persons when the state has been aggrieved; for example, the
misappropriation of government funds by public officials. In 2000 the
Government opened new property tribunals to handle cases concerning
seized properties. In November, the CSJ consolidated these tribunals
into a single tribunal due to budgetary concerns (see Section 1.f.).
The civil and criminal courts continued to expedite the judicial
process for those in prison without a prior court hearing; however, the
number of suspects in prison awaiting trial increased. Human rights and
lawyers' groups in general continued to complain about the delay of
justice, sometimes for years, caused by judicial inaction.
Judges appeared susceptible to corruption and political influence.
The shelving of politically charged cases or rulings in favor of the
politically connected party remained the most common manifestations of
judicial corruption. The Supreme Court's campaign to reduce
incompetence and corruption in the judiciary slowed during the year.
Since the campaign began in 1997, the CSJ has removed a total of 105
judges--more than one-third of the 300 judges in the system; however,
only one judge was removed during the year.
In criminal cases, the accused has the right to legal counsel, and
defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Judicial
Organic Law provided for the establishment of a Public Defender's
Office to represent indigent defendants. The office in Managua
maintained a staff of 13 appointed public defenders throughout the
year; however, more were needed. The court requested funding for 26
additional public defenders to be located outside of Managua, but only
one of these requests was approved for Ciudad Dario. Elsewhere in the
country where public defenders were not available, the system in effect
before the passage of the Judicial Organic law continued in use. Under
that system, the presiding judge appointed attorneys from a standard
list to represent indigent defendants; however, many attorneys paid a
fine of about $7.00 (100 cordobas) rather than represent such clients
because the State did not pay for attorneys for the indigent.
According to press accounts, the number of indigent defendants who
went to trial without an attorney to represent them decreased, despite
difficulties in fully implementing the provisions of the Judicial
Organic law. However, high-ranking officials in the Public Defender's
Office complained that they continued to find judges willing to
sentence defendants without the presence of a public defender. Until
the end of the year, the country used the Napoleonic legal system.
Police had to present a detained suspect before a judge within 48
hours, who had to hold a preliminary hearing within 10 days. These
constitutionally mandated deadlines were usually observed. If a judge
ruled the suspect was provisionally guilty at the preliminary hearing,
the suspect was sent to trial. While awaiting and undergoing trial,
suspects were often held in custody. The trial consisted of hearings
held by the judge to investigate the matter further, followed by a
review of the written record of the hearings by a 5-member jury, which
would issue a final decision. Very simple cases or those with high
profile or outside interest could be resolved quickly, but others
languished for months. Although the legal limit for resolution is 6
months, 560 suspects were held without trial for longer periods,
according to the CSJ. On December 24, an entirely different system of
prosecuting criminal cases entered into effect. The new penal process
is more adversarial and transparent and relies more on the initiative
of prosecutors and less on the initiative of judges and magistrates to
file charges. It prescribes an arraignment at which a judge decides
whether to send the case to trial or dismiss it. Once the case reaches
trial, the judge takes a neutral presiding role, and both sides present
oral arguments to a jury. The new system will be applied initially to
the most serious offenses. By December 2003, the new system will apply
to all criminal cases. The new system offers greater transparency by
allowing the accused greater access to the process. However, its
implementation could cause more trial delays as the judicial system
adjusts to a radically different process, including potentially serious
staffing shortfalls for prosecutors and public defenders, since they,
rather than judges, take the lead in conducting trials under the new
system. The country still lacks an effective civil law system. Many
criminal cases are really civil disputes. Often the effect of a
criminal proceeding in these matters is to force one party to concede
to the party with more influence over the judge rather than face the
prospect of detention in jail. In addition, this civil-based criminal
caseload diverts resources from an overburdened Public Prosecutor's
Office that otherwise could be directed toward genuine criminal
matters. There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against these
abuses, and the Government generally respected these provisions in
practice. The Constitution stipulates that all persons have the right
to privacy of their family and to the inviolability of their home,
correspondence, and communications; requires warrants for searches of
private homes; and excludes from legal proceedings illegally seized
letters, documents, and private papers. The 1979-91 Sandinista regime
expropriated nearly 20,000 properties from Somoza regime officials and
thousands of others, including those who remained out of the country
for more than 6 months. These property confiscations are considered
legal, as are subsequent transfers of the property to third parties, as
long as the confiscations were conducted according to the law in effect
at the time of confiscation. The law provides claimants to confiscated
property two methods of resolution. An administrative claim process
allows compensation with long-term low-interest government bonds or, in
a few cases, return of the property or land swaps. Bond compensation
generally is unattractive to claimants, since it is based on the
property's taxable value rather than market value, and makes no
provision for lost profits or interest due since the date of
confiscation. Furthermore, compensation is paid in 15-year bonds with
below-market interest rates. As of mid-year, newly issued bonds of this
type sold at 37 percent of face value. Press reports indicated that at
the end of June, a total of 7,488 persons had resolved their property
cases. In 2000 the Government established five Property Appeals
Tribunals that have procedures including mediation, binding
arbitration, and expedited trials. As of August, the tribunals reported
that 338 cases had been filed. Of these, 184 had passed through the
mediation process, 62 (18 percent) of which were settled through
mediated agreements. When mediation was not successful, the cases were
moved on to arbitration or were returned to district courts for
expedited trials. As of July, 44 cases had gone to arbitration;
however, none had completed that stage. In November, the CSJ
consolidated all 5 tribunals into a single tribunal due to budgetary
concerns. The tribunals receive property cases passed to them by the
regular courts and, upon conclusion of mediation or arbitration, return
the final decision to the appropriate regular court, which issues a
court order containing the terms of the final mediation or arbitration
results. Most confiscated property claimants using the judicial system
do not elect arbitration because the arbitrators are costly. Therefore,
most cases not successfully mediated return to district courts for
trial. The tribunals appear to be biased in favor of the current
occupants of confiscated properties, even when they did not obtain the
properties in accordance with Sandinista laws. These tribunals, like
the judicial system as a whole, appeared to be subject to political and
personal manipulation.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. However, several constitutional
provisions potentially qualify freedom of the press. The 1987
Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right to accurate
information, thereby providing an exception by which the freedom to
publish information that the Government deems inaccurate could be
abridged. Although the right to information cannot be subject to
censorship, the law establishes a retroactive liability, defined as a
social responsibility, implying the potential for sanctions against the
press. Although the legislature did not modify these provisions in the
1995 constitutional reforms, the Government did not invoke these
provisions to suppress the media. In March 2001, the National Assembly
unanimously approved a law proposing a professional journalists' guild.
The journalistic community was divided sharply over whether such a law
would improve the quality of journalism or merely restrict freedom of
speech and of the press. The vagueness of language concerning the
Government's role in establishing and regulating journalists' salaries,
and its possible role in governing a professional journalists'
association--and thereby journalism itself in the country--remained a
concern to many observers. The law was to take effect with stipulations
that formation of the guild occur within 3 months. However, the
commission that would structure the journalists' guild had not been
established by year's end due to conflicts between rival journalist
associations whose members were to be grandfathered into the guild.
Consequently, the law had no practical consequence during the year.
The privately owned print media, the broadcast media, and academic
circles freely and openly discussed diverse viewpoints in public
discourse without government interference. News media covered a series
of scandals and allegations of government corruption very openly and
without restriction. However, in October the Government closed down
radio station ``La Poderosa,'' run by supporters of former President
Aleman, when it determined that the license held by Coprosa, a Catholic
Church-affiliated NGO, was invalid because Coprosa had not completed
all of the requirements to register legally as an NGO with the Ministry
of government. Other media and some political leaders sharply
criticized the closing of La Poderosa while at the same time stressing
the need for all media to follow ethical standards and engage in better
self-regulation. La Poderosa had broadcast language that sometimes
incited attacks on the personal security of President Bolanos and other
public officials. The Bolanos administration attempted to standardize
the way that governmental advertising funds were allocated to the
various media outlets by implementing a system based on market share.
This forced some smaller media outlets to close because the media were
largely dependent upon government funding, and there was not enough
private advertising to support them.
There was one instance of possible media intimidation during the
year. In July the police detained Luis Felipe Palacios, a reporter for
La Prensa, the country's largest newspaper, to question him regarding a
story that alleged that Major General Roberto Calderon, Inspector
General of the Army, was involved in trafficking arms and drugs.
Accompanied by other La Prensa staff, a police escort took Palacios to
the criminal investigation headquarters of the national police. There,
investigator Dennis Tinoco allegedly threatened to arrest photographer
Manuel Esquivel, who had accompanied the La Prensa group, for taking
his picture, and refused to relent until the film was removed from the
camera and exposed. Palacios was then interviewed briefly and released.
Tinoco maintained that he had ordered the police interview to pursue
any legitimate leads into criminal acts alleged by the story. The
police subsequently closed the case and publicly apologized for the
incident after intense criticism from a wide range of media outlets and
civil society groups, who viewed the incident as a clear intention to
intimidate Palacios into not reporting on a sensitive case involving a
senior military officer.
In October Tirso Moreno was arrested and charged with kidnaping and
endangerment after he broke into the offices of the newspaper La
Prensa, fired shots in the air, and held a dozen staff hostages for
several hours. Moreno blamed La Prensa's reporting on corruption during
the Aleman administration for the death of Aleman's son earlier in the
day. Moreno was provisionally convicted on these charges, but the
prosecutor appealed the decision, seeking the more serious charges of
assault and attempted homicide. By year's end, there was no decision on
this appeal. The Inter-American Press Association condemned the attack
on La Prensa.
The news medium with the largest national audience is radio;
however, polls show that television is the primary source of news in
the cities. There are 174 chartered radio stations in the country, 68
AM stations and 106 FM stations; listeners receive a wide variety of
political viewpoints, especially on the 67 stations based in Managua.
There are 12 Managua-based television stations, 7 of which carry news
programming, some with noticeable partisan political content. In
addition, there are 70 cable television franchises that offer services
in most large and medium-sized cities.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association The Constitution
recognizes the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission, and
the Government generally respected this right in practice. However, the
Constitution also recognizes the right to public assembly,
demonstration, and mobilization in conformity with the law, and the law
requires demonstrators to obtain permission for a rally or march by
registering its planned size and location with the police. The
authorities routinely granted such permission; however, many groups
claimed that the process was too cumbersome and chose not to register.
The Constitution provides for the right to organize or affiliate with
political parties, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. Opposition and independent associations functioned freely
without government interference or restriction. Private associations do
not have legal status to conduct private fund raising or receive public
financial support until they receive authorization from the National
Assembly, which confers it routinely.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The Government's requirements for legal recognition of a
church are similar to its requirements for other private associations
(see Section 2.b.). A church must apply for ``Personeria Juridica''
(legal standing), which must be approved by the National Assembly.
Following Assembly approval, a church must register with the Ministry
of government as an association or a foundation. The Roman Catholic
Church is not an official state religion; however, it enjoys a close
relationship with the Government. The Roman Catholic Church is the most
politically active religious denomination and has significant political
influence. Catholic Church leaders routinely meet with senior
government officials. The historical position of the Church is such
that most religiously affiliated monuments and memorials are related to
the Catholic Church. At times there have been allegations that
government officials have provided financial assistance to the Catholic
Church. However, the predominance of the Catholic Church did not have a
negative impact on the religious freedom of other religions.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Freedom
Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation The Constitution provides for the right to
travel and reside anywhere in the country and to enter and exit the
country freely, and the Government generally respected these rights in
practice. In 1998 the Government abolished a requirement that citizens
and residents obtain an exit visa to leave the country. The right of
citizens to return to the country is not established in the
Constitution, but in practice the Government did not restrict anyone's
return. The Constitution was amended in January 2000 to affirm that
citizens cannot be deprived of their citizenship, and that citizenship
is not lost by acquiring another citizenship. However, the Constitution
retains certain citizenship requirements for high-level government
officials, including the provision that they must renounce citizenship
of other countries at least 4 years prior to their election or
appointment.
In December the CSJ determined that the Government's May 2000
decision to nullify retroactively the citizenship of Jose Antonio
Alvarado was unconstitutional, and that Alvarado had never lost his
Nicaraguan citizenship. In June 2001, without waiting for a ruling from
the CSJ, the CSE had disqualified Alvarado from running as the Vice
Presidential candidate in the 2001 national election. This decision was
widely portrayed as a political effort by then-President Aleman to
block Alvarado's candidacy.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for asylum, and refugees
cannot be expelled to the country that persecuted them. The issue of
the provision of first asylum did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: the Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. National elections were held in November 2001.
The 1995 reforms to the 1987 Constitution established a more equal
distribution of power and authority among the four coequal branches of
government. The President heads the Executive Branch and a Cabinet
appointed by the President, who is both head of state and head of
government, as well as supreme chief of the defense and security
forces. The Vice President has no constitutionally mandated duties or
powers. Both the President and Vice President are elected to 5-year
terms by direct popular vote, with the possibility of a runoff election
between the top two candidates if one does not obtain at least 35
percent of the vote on the first ballot. The Constitution does not
permit the president to hold consecutive terms in office. A single-
chamber, 92-member National Assembly exercises legislative power. In
2001 voters elected 90 members, including 20 deputies from nationwide
lists and 70 from lists presented in each of the 15 departments and the
2 autonomous regions. Under the constitutional reforms of 2000, the
outgoing President and the presidential candidate receiving the second
highest number of votes are each given seats in the National Assembly.
Members elected concurrently with the President and Vice President in
2001 are scheduled to complete their 5-year terms on January 9, 2007.
The Supreme Electoral Council is an independent fourth branch of
government. However, the CSE has been seriously undermined by internal
political disputes (see Section 5). The constitutional reforms of 2000
changed the requirements that a presidential candidate must meet to
avoid a second-round runoff election; expanded the Supreme Court from
12 to 16 judges; expanded the CSE from 5 to 7 magistrates; imposed a
requirement for a two-thirds majority vote in the assembly, rather than
the previous qualified majority vote, to lift the President's immunity
from prosecution; and replaced the single comptroller general with a 5-
person collegial body charged with investigating allegations of
wrongdoing or financial malfeasance by government officials. In
addition, a political party loses its legal status if it obtains less
than 4 percent of the vote in a general election. Based on this
provision, the CSE declared the vast majority of parties ineligible to
field candidates in the 2001 general elections--only 3 national parties
competed in the elections, compared with over 20 parties in the 1996
elections. In November the CSJ overturned the CSE's exclusion of 29
parties from participation in previous elections as unconstitutional.
In November 2001, generally free and fair national elections were held
under the auspices of the CSE. Voters elected Enrique Bolanos Geyer of
the Liberal Constitutionalist Party as President with 56 percent of the
vote; Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega received 42 percent. In the
simultaneous legislative elections, the ruling PLC alliance won 52
deputy seats, the FSLN won 37, and the Conservative Party (PC) won 1
seat. CSE reports indicated that over 90 percent of eligible voters
were registered; the CSE also announced that more than 92 percent of
eligible voters cast ballots. The FSLN alleged that irregularities in
vote counting reduced the number of seats that it received in the
Assembly, and the PC stated that the two main parties were trying to
exclude it from the Assembly.
In March Judge Gertrudis Arias named former President Aleman in a
corruption case involving the diversion of government funds from a
state-owned television station, Channel 6, to businesses owned by
Aleman, his relatives, and his associates. She did not indict him
because he enjoyed immunity from prosecution as a National Assembly
Deputy. In August, President Bolanos accused Aleman of diverting over
$100 million (1 billion, 400 million cordobas) from government coffers
for personal benefit. Judge Juana Mendez named him in the case that was
subsequently opened, but could not indict him because of his
parliamentary immunity. In December, the National Assembly, by a
majority vote, lifted his immunity. Judge Iliana Perez immediately
placed him under house arrest for embezzlement and money laundering,
and he remained under house arrest at the end of the year.
In September, in what was widely considered a political decision,
Judge Mendez named President Bolanos, Vice President Rizo, and about 30
other leaders of the PLC in a campaign finance case. The case involved
the alleged misuse of government funds and foreign government donations
in the PLC's municipal election campaign in 2000 and its national
election campaign in 2001. Requests to lift the immunity of President
Bolanos, Vice President Rizo, and several National Assembly Deputies
were pending in the National Assembly at year's end.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women,
indigenous people, and other minorities in government and politics.
Women served as President and Vice President until January 1997, and a
woman served as president of the CSE until January 2000. In addition, 3
of the 16 Supreme Court justices were female until July, when the terms
of 5 justices, including one woman, ended. On October 25, the
Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) elected Alba Luz
Ramos as President, the first woman President in the history of the
Court. Women held ministerial, vice ministerial, and other senior
positions in government; and voters elected 21 women to the National
Assembly in November 2001, out of a total of 90 elected members. Women
hold approximately 70 percent of the judgeships in the country. Two
members of the National Assembly claim indigenous heritage. To ensure
participation by indigenous groups, political parties must include on
their party tickets a certain percentage of candidates from the various
indigenous populations.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
With some exceptions, human rights groups operated without
government interference. The largest group to deal with general issues
of human rights was CENIDH. Many other groups focused on a particular
area of human rights, such as Casa Alianza which primarily focuses on
children's issues, and the Women's Network, which addressed domestic
violence and other women's issues. CENIDH continued to conduct human
rights workshops at the police training academy, at various police
headquarters, and with army units throughout the country. Some military
officers received internationally sponsored human rights training.
The Organization of American States (OAS) Technical Cooperation
Mission (TCM) focused on the 13 municipalities affected most adversely
by the decade-long civil war and worked on conflict resolution,
reconciliation, improving local government, and extending legal
infrastructure. The TCM and Catholic Relief Services helped maintain
more than 200 peace commissions in the northern and central parts of
the country, intended to give inhabitants of the area a sustainable
means of dispute resolution, a means of monitoring human rights abuses,
and a vehicle for expressing their concerns to government authorities.
Many of the commissions operated in areas that were without any
governmental presence and served as surrogates for absent police and
courts. The Government granted legal standing to additional such
grassroots organizations during the year. Some peace commission members
initially reported that soldiers, rural police, and local residents
sometimes misunderstood their efforts at advocacy on behalf of jailed
criminals, interpreting them as challenges to law enforcement
officials' authority. However, over the past several years, the
commissions continued to report increased support from all elements
they serve, including law enforcement.
The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (PPDDH), the autonomous
government-financed human rights office, struggled with budget
shortfalls and intraoffice discord. A 1995 law created the PPDDH, with
the Ombudsman to be elected by the National Assembly; however, it was
not until 1999 that the National Assembly elected Benjamin Perez,
formerly the head of the Assembly's Human Rights Commission, as the
country's first Ombudsman. There also are Special Ombudsmen for
Children's Issues, Women's Issues, and Indigenous Affairs. The PPDDH
began to investigate actively human rights violations during 2000, and
Perez demonstrated his independence from the Aleman administration,
pursuing cases even if they contradicted government policies. For
example, the PPHHD weighed in heavily against the CSE's decision
regarding Jose Antonio Alvarado, which Aleman supported (see Section
2.d.). The Aleman administration cut the budget of the Ombudsman's
office by nearly 40 percent. As a result of serious government-wide
budget constraints, the PPDDH budget has not been restored or increased
under the Bolanos administration, and the reduced operating budget has
limited the effectiveness of the office and its ability to establish
regional offices throughout the country. In July a public dispute
between Perez and two of his Special Ombudsmen who wanted to have a
greater hand in the direction of the office further undermined the
PPDDH. After more than a month of rancorous charges and counter-
charges, the three came to what they said was an amicable resolution of
the dispute.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of birth,
nationality, political belief, race, gender, language, opinion,
national origin, economic condition, or social condition; however, in
practice the Government made little or no effort to combat
discrimination. Few, if any, discrimination suits or formal complaints
were filed with government officials.
Women.--The most prevalent violations of women's rights involved
domestic and sexual violence, which were widespread and underreported.
The National Police reported that of 41,487 reports filed by women
between January and December, including reports filed at the Women's
Commissariats through November, more than 19,788 concerned physical or
sexual abuse, a 47 percent increase in the number of reported cases
from 2001. The 1996 Law against Aggression against Women reformed the
Criminal Code to criminalize domestic violence and to provide up to 6
years' imprisonment for those found guilty of such violence. The law
also provided for the issuance of restraining orders in cases in which
women fear for their safety. The National Police, as well as local
human rights groups, confirmed that while police sometimes intervened
to prevent domestic violence, they rarely prosecuted perpetrators
because victims often refused to press charges. Those cases that
actually reached the courts usually resulted in not guilty verdicts due
to judicial inexperience with, and lack of legal training related to,
proper judicial handling of such violence. In October the National
Police Women's Commissariats as well as a number of human rights
advocates expressed reservations about the potentially negative impact
of the adversarial nature of hearing cases under the new Criminal
Procedures Code. Advocates expressed concern that victims of domestic
violence could be less likely to bring charges under the new process
since the victims, under the new system, have to face their abusers
directly and have no assurance the abusers will be jailed. Under the
old system, those accused of domestic violence were usually jailed
while the judge investigated the case and made a preliminary ruling, a
period of up to 10 days. This ``cooling-off'' period was seen as
providing some protection to the victim. Advocates also fear that many
judges could put undue pressure on domestic violence victims to use
alternate mediation rather than endure a trial, in which they will face
cross-examination.
The Criminal Code provides punishment for sexual abuse and
stipulates that any person convicted of physically abusing or raping
another person can be sentenced to between 9 months and 4 years in
prison. According to statistics from the National Police, the police
received 1,308 rape complaints during the year compared to 1,170
reported instances of rape in 2001. Many women are reluctant to report
abuse or file charges due to the social stigma attached to victims of
rape. The police manage 13 women's commissariats in 13 cities with a
total staff of 75 people. Each commissariat is located adjacent to a
police station and is supposed to be staffed by six police officers,
two social workers, one psychologist, and one lawyer. However, due to a
lack of funding, the staff size is often limited to a far smaller
number. The commissariats provide both social and legal help to women
and mediate spousal conflicts. They also investigate and help to
prosecute criminal complaints and refer victims to other governmental
and nongovernmental assistance agencies. As of November, the
commissariats processed a total of 2,363 cases--1,867 cases of domestic
violence and 496 cases of sexual infractions.
In May the Appeals Court denied the appeal by Zoilamerica Narvaez
of the December 2001 decision of Judge Juana Mendez to drop sexual
molestation, harassment, and rape charges against Daniel Ortega on the
grounds that the 5-year statute of limitations had expired. The case
was before the Supreme Court at year's end. On March 4, the IACHR held
a hearing on the Narvaez case, focusing on the issue of whether the
Government had denied Narvaez due process. The Government subsequently
expressed its willingness to accept an ``amicable solution'' to the
dispute, discussions on which were underway at year's end. Prostitution
is legal and common. According to a number of sources, including the
Director of Police Criminal Investigations, Julio Gonzalez, and the
Director of Police Economic Investigations, Carlos Bandana, prostitutes
in the country work without a pimp, since prostitution is legal but
pimping is not. Statistics from the Women's Commissariats showed only
three cases of pimping for the year throughout the country. A number of
studies supported this, including an intensive diagnostic done during
the year by the University of Central America in the tourist city of
Granada, in which all the under-aged prostitutes interviewed told the
researchers that they operated on their own. In Managua most
prostitutes work on the streets, clandestinely in nightclubs and bars,
or offer sexual services in massage parlors. In towns along the Pan
American Highway, women and girls sell sexual services to truck drivers
and other travelers, who are often foreigners driving north from Costa
Rica. In port cities such as Corinto, the primary clientele are
sailors. Corinto is unusual in that prostitutes receive medical
examinations and a card certifying that they are free of disease. In
addition, prostitutes in Corinto reportedly often work together to
maintain a rudimentary price-setting structure that enabled them to
earn much more than they would in other areas. However, in most areas,
prostitutes do not have access to medical screening or treatment.
There were credible reports of isolated cases of the trafficking of
women for prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits sexual
harassment in the workplace; however, it continued to be a problem.
Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
discrimination against women persisted. According to a poll released in
April 2000 by the Nicaraguan Women's Institute in conjunction with the
Government, women comprised approximately 61 percent of the public
sector labor force, a number much larger than in the private sector. It
also showed that even with comparable educational backgrounds, salaries
for male and female workers differed significantly, with men sometimes
making twice as much as women in the same positions. Even with similar
qualifications, men advanced more quickly than women. Women constitute
the majority of workers in the traditionally low-paid education and
health service sectors. According to a 1998 ``Nicaraguan Survey on
Demographics and Health'' by the National Statistical Institute, women
have equal or somewhat better access to education than men, especially
in urban areas. Women are generally underpaid, but the majority of
women have some type of employment. An October 2001 International Labor
Organization (ILO) study concluded that of the 561,000 employed women,
184,000 were self-employed and 377,000 were salaried workers. More than
92 percent of women capable of employment have some type of job.
There are many NGO and government programs that target
discrimination against women, mostly by analyzing the status of women
in the workplace. For example, the Program for Reform and Modernization
of the Public Sector, directed by the Vice President, was formed in
1998 in an attempt to publicize issues of gender discrimination by
collecting statistics on salary differences and hiring techniques in
the public sector. The initiative produced a number of publications on
the subject of women in the workplace, including an extensive study in
2000 of women working in the public sector and a manual distributed to
managers in the public sector during the year that outlined procedures
to prevent gender discrimination in the workplace.
Children.--The Government publicly expressed its commitment to
children's human rights and welfare; however, government-wide budget
constraints prevented it from providing adequate funding levels to
children's programs or primary education. A constitutional provision
known as the 6 percent rule automatically allots 6 percent of the
annual budget to a higher education consortium, often at the expense of
funding for primary and secondary education programs. Children 15 years
of age and younger made up approximately 39 percent of the population.
Education is compulsory through the sixth grade, but this provision is
not enforced, and 20 percent of the population was classified as
illiterate. According to census figures from 2001, primary school
enrollment rates for boys and girls were estimated at 75 and 80 percent
respectively, up from 73 and 75 percent in 1995. However, secondary
school enrollment rates dropped to 35 and 45 percent from 1995 levels
of 39 and 47 percent. Juvenile offenders under the age of 17 comprise
less than one percent of offenders incarcerated. This low figure is
largely attributed to the leniency given to juvenile offenders by the
Children's Code, which rarely gives jail time to juveniles. During the
year, 47 minors died as a result of violent crime. During the same
period, victims of rape included 277 children under the age of 13 and
658 between the ages of 13 and 17. There were an estimated 1,216
reported cases of child abuse (physical and psychological), 314 cases
of child kidnaping, and 100 children who disappeared. The national
police estimated that about 63 percent of sexual abuse victims were
under the age of 18, and that 36 percent were younger than 13. A study
by the University of Leon indicated that 27 percent of girls and 20
percent of boys experienced sexual abuse. According to a Ministry of
Labor study, over 676,000 children are at-risk and exposed daily to
violence, abuse, exploitation, and neglect. According to UNICEF, this
number is expected to increase because the population of children under
the age of 5 years who live on the streets is growing.
According to local media and the Ministry of the Family, the
incidence of child prostitution increased, especially in Managua, and
near border cities and ports (see Section 6.f.).
The Child and Family Law provides that juvenile prisoners can no
longer be held in adult facilities or for more than 24 hours without
being charged (see Section 1.c.). Child labor is a problem (see Section
6.d.).
Persons with Disabilities.--In 1998 the Ministry of Health created
a National Council for Rehabilitation to address the needs of the
600,000 citizens with some type of disability, only 3 percent of whom
received medical treatment. Through its clinics and hospitals, the
Government provides care to war veterans and other disabled persons,
but the quality of care is generally poor. However, with assistance
from international NGOs, foreign governments, and the public health
care system, the Government has procured thousands of prostheses and
other medical equipment for veterans and former resistance members.
Despite some efforts, the Government's past role in helping the
disabled is minimal and often has been criticized. It has not
legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility to buildings for the
disabled. In the spring of 2000, the Ministry of the Family announced
that it would cut a considerable amount of financial support for the
Blue Bird Protection Association that sheltered about 100 persons with
disabilities, aged from 10 months to 40 years old, who are considered
unable to care for themselves. Although the Ministry had agreed to
cover a significant percentage of the Association's budget, its failure
to do so forced the Association's employees to go without pay, and
resulted in a significant decrease in medicinal, clothing, and food
supplies. Many organizations that help the disabled called for the
Government to focus more attention on the needs and interests of
persons with disabilities; however, the Government did not restore
funding for the shelter. The Blue Bird Protection Association continued
to operate the shelter with funds from private organizations, which
hold an annual telethon to help raise funds.
The 1995 Law to Protect Disabled People states that companies are
obligated to contract persons with disabilities, that such disabilities
cannot affect their salaries, and that they must be considered equal to
other workers. However, representatives of the Danish Association of
Disability noted that this law rarely is put into practice. This
organization implemented a program called Prodinic, with the objective
of strengthening the country's disabled associations by assisting 20
different groups in Managua, Masaya, Leon, Juigalpa, and Esteli. This
group is lobbying for easier access to transportation and travel for
the disabled throughout the country.
Indigenous Persons.--Indigenous people constitute approximately 5
percent of the country's population and live primarily in the Northern
Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAN) and Southern Autonomous Atlantic
Region (RAAS). The RAAN and the RAAS, which were created in 1987 out of
the former department of Zelaya and which border the Caribbean Sea,
constitute 47 percent of the national territory, but only 12 percent of
the population. Based on 1998 information from the Center for
Investigation and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast and other
sources, the 4 major identifiable indigenous groups are the Miskito
(with approximately 100,000 members), the Sumo (10,000), the Garifuna
(3,000), and the Rama (1,000). The indigenous people of the RAAN,
primarily the Miskito and the Sumo, have a political party known as
Yatama, which has representation in regional and municipal councils. In
2000 the CSE ruled that the Yatama political party did not meet the
qualifications to participate in the November 2000 municipal elections;
however, it reversed its decision following the election after a high
rate of abstentions in Yatama-dominated areas and threats of violence
by Yatama supporters. Yatama was allowed to run departmental candidates
for the National Assembly in the November 2001 national elections (see
Section 3).
In March the CSE held sparsely attended elections for the RAAN and
RAAS Regional Councils. The Regional Councils, created by the 1987 Law
of Autonomy, are delegated limited authority to administer the
economic, environmental, and cultural resources of the Atlantic Coastal
Regions and to represent the political interests of the indigenous
populations before central government institutions. The Councils are
each composed of 45 elected members plus the region's delegation to the
National Assembly; in the RAAN there are three Assembly Delegates, in
the RAAS, two. Thus the RAAN Council has a total of 48 members, the
RAAS, 47. The Regional Councils met in May, as required by law, to
select their respective governors and executive councils to oversee the
day-to-day administration of the regions. The CSE, which has a PLC
majority, refused to recognize these elections, which resulted in
executive councils and governors that did not favor the ruling PLC. The
delay continued for nearly 4 months in the RAAN and 9 months in the
RAAS, leaving the Autonomous Regions without a regional government
during this time. In the RAAN, Yatama became the power broker when
neither of the national political parties managed to gain an outright
majority in the 48-member Regional Council. Yatama formed a coalition
with the FSLN and in May elected an executive council and governor in a
raucous election in which the PLC-affiliated CSE magistrates and the
PLC Regional Council Members refused to participate. The CSJ ruled that
the CSE had to reconvene the Regional Council, hold a new election for
the Executive Council, and properly certify the election, which it
finally did at the end of June. In the RAAS, the PLC held a substantial
majority of the 47-member Regional Council; however, because of
technical irregularities with the CSE's administration of the election,
the CSJ once again ruled that the Regional Council had to reelect the
Regional Governor and Executive Council. A critical number of PLC
Regional Council members refused to back their party's candidates for
governor and executive council, leaving no majority in place. Maverick
PLC members eventually formed a majority coalition with the FSLN and
elected their own slate of regional officials. However, the election
could not be certified because no one had been elected to replace the
CSE President, Roberto Rivas, whose term had expired in July.
Without any authorities in place to administer them, many regional
and municipal projects in the RAAN and the RAAS were suspended,
although the problem became more acute in the RAAS, where the
uncertainty continued longer. The RAAS had no one with the authority to
negotiate for funds from the national government or foreign donors, and
government salaries could not be paid. This furthered public
perceptions of central government neglect, and led to threats of
violence and the takeover of public facilities by frustrated citizens.
The 1987 Autonomy Law requires the Government to consult indigenous
people regarding the exploitation of their areas' resources; however,
indigenous people claim that the central government often made
decisions without adequate community consultation. For example, in July
the central government decided to announce its intention to solicit
bids for oil and gas exploration off the Atlantic coast without
consulting with either regional leaders or communities.
In August 2001, the IACHR determined that the Government violated
the human rights of the Awas Tingni (Sumo) Community by granting 30-
year logging licenses to foreign companies on nearly 153.2 thousand
acres of Sumo ancestral lands without consulting the Sumo. The
Commission ruled that the country's legal protections for indigenous
lands were ``illusory and ineffective'' and ordered the Government to
establish new legal mechanisms to demarcate the traditional lands of
all indigenous communities in the country within 15 months. The
Commission also ordered the Government to pay $30,000 (420,000
cordobas) to the Sumo and to invest $50,000 (700 thousand cordobas) in
projects beneficial to the Sumo. Pursuant to the IACHR's decision, the
Government paid the $30,000 and said it was committed to funding more
than $50,000 in Sumo community projects. The Ministry of Agriculture,
the Office of Property Affairs in the Ministry of Finance, the regional
authorities on the Atlantic Coast, and the Special Ombudsman for
Indigenous Affairs formed a commission that proposed a number of legal
changes and mechanisms to the National Assembly, including the clear
demarcation and protection of indigenous lands. This legislation was
voted into law in December, meeting the IACHR deadline, although there
were serious reservations about how it would be implemented.
As in previous years, some indigenous groups complained that
central government authorities excluded the indigenous people of the
Atlantic coast from meaningful participation in decisions affecting
their lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural
resources. A few residents of the RAAN threatened to take up arms to
fight for independence from Managua if their needs were not addressed,
but there is little concern that these isolated statements represent a
threat by the indigenous communities.
On April 8, unknown persons shot and killed Francisco Jose Garcia
Valle, husband of Dr. Maria Acosta, a lawyer for indigenous rights in
the Atlantic Coast known for her work fighting the controversial sale
by a private individual of the Pearl Cays off the coast. Garcia was a
professor at a local university but not involved with his wife's
political work. The circumstances surrounding his death sparked
suspicions that it was a politically motivated murder by Acosta's
opponents. The police investigating the crime later determined that
three tenants of the family's rental apartment committed the homicide,
and that robbery had not been a motive. Press reports indicated that at
least one of the suspected killers, Ivan Rivera, was employed as a
chauffeur and security guard by the Pearl Cays' realtor, who was
suspected to be the intellectual author of the crime. A judge issued an
arrest warrant against Rivera but absolved the realtor. The police
reportedly matched the 25-caliber murder weapon to one registered to
the realtor, who alleged that the police falsified the ballistics
report. By year's end, the police had not yet captured Rivera, but did
arrest one of his suspected accomplices, who confirmed that Rivera led
that group and committed the murder.
Government health care exists in the Atlantic Coast towns of Puerto
Cabezas, Siuna, and Bluefields, but a majority of indigenous people in
rural areas had no access to modern health care. Critics of government
policy cited extremely high unemployment rates among the indigenous,
but calculation of reliable employment statistics was complicated
because most of the working indigenous population on the Atlantic Coast
is engaged in subsistence fishing, farming, and mining.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens are of mixed
background, and ethnicity is not a barrier to political or economic
success. However, various indigenous and ethnic groups from both the
RAAN and the RAAS sometimes linked the Government's lack of resources
devoted to the Atlantic Coast to ethnic, racial, and religious
minorities that predominate in that region. In contrast with the rest
of the country, the region's racial makeup tends to be black and
Amerindian, while its religious makeup is principally composed of
various Protestant denominations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of workers to organize voluntarily in unions, and the Labor Code
that entered into effect in 1996 reaffirmed this right. The ILO has
criticized various provisions in the Labor Code that remain below
international standards. All public and private sector workers, except
those in the military and the police, may form and join unions of their
own choosing, and they exercise this right extensively. The Labor Code
permits the existence of more than one union, representing the same
group of workers, at any place of employment. To become a union, a
group of at least 20 persons must petition the Ministry of Labor for
legal status and the right to engage in collective bargaining (see
Section 6.b.). The Labor Code legally recognizes cooperatives, into
which many transportation and agricultural workers are organized.
Representatives of most organized labor groups criticize these
cooperatives, and assert that they do not permit strikes; have
inadequate grievance procedures; are meant to displace genuine,
independent trade unions; and are dominated by employers. According to
the Ministry of Labor, approximately 15 percent of the work force is
unionized. Unions are independent of the Government, although most are
affiliated with political parties to varying degrees.
The Labor Code provides protected status to union leaders,
requiring that companies receive permission from the Ministry of Labor
after having shown just cause to fire union executive board members.
Such protection is limited to nine individuals per union. However, the
Labor Code allows businesses to fire any employee, including union
organizers, provided the business pays the employee double the normal
severance pay. Business leaders sometimes use this practice to stymie
unionization attempts. Unions freely form or join federations or
confederations and affiliate with and participate in international
bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to bargain collectively, and the
1996 Labor Code reaffirmed this right. The Government generally sought
to foster resolution of pressing labor conflicts (usually in the public
sector) through informal negotiations rather than through formal
administrative or judicial processes. According to the 1996 Code,
companies engaged in disputes with employees must negotiate with the
employees' union if the employees are thus organized. However, the
possible existence of more than one union at any place of employment
means that several unions, each with different demands, can coexist at
any one enterprise. Similarly, management may sign collective
bargaining agreements with each union. The Constitution recognizes the
right to strike; however, legal strikes are rare. The Labor Code
requires a majority vote of all the workers in an enterprise to call a
strike. The Labor Code requires that before a union may strike, it must
first receive approval from the Labor Ministry. To obtain approval, the
union must go through a process that requires good faith negotiation
with management. The Labor Ministry asserts that it would take
approximately 6 months for a union to go through the entire process to
be permitted to have a legal strike. Observers contend that the process
is inappropriately lengthy and so complex that there have been only
three legal strikes since the 1996 Labor Code came into effect;
however, there have been several illegal strikes.
The Labor Code prohibits retribution against strikers and union
leaders for legal strikes. However, this protection may be withdrawn in
the case of an illegal strike. Workers involved in illegal strikes
often lose their jobs. There were several allegations of violations of
the right to organize. The Ministry of Labor investigated these
allegations and concluded that employers acted within the law, taking
advantage of the extensive administrative requirements necessary to
declare a strike legal. Notwithstanding the legality of employer
actions, the result was to weaken significantly an important union in
the free trade zone (FTZ), the Sandinista Workers Central (CST). In the
last few years, though not during the year, the CST declared several
strikes without first exhausting the very lengthy and complex
administrative process of getting the required majority of the workers.
Consequently, the Ministry of Labor consistently ruled the strikes
illegal. Employers then fired the striking workers based on the
Ministry's ruling. In essence, employers took advantage of the
extensive administrative requirements required to declare a strike
legal and the CST's failure to follow the prescribed rules. The 2001
appeal by the textile firm Mil Colores of a judge's order reinstating
Juan Carlos Smith Flores was pending at year's end.
On October 11, 2001, the CST workers elected Maria Elia Martinez
Rivas as union Secretary General. To comply with the 20-member
requirement and avoid being decertified, the CST union enlisted new
members. On February 8, Mil Colores fired Rivas who claimed that she
did not infringe on any regulations and had never received a reprimand.
Rivas, with the aid of the CST, took the issue to court and alleged
that, by impeding the workers' right to organize, Mil Colores violated
the Constitution, laws, human rights, and international agreements
ratified by the country. Her case was pending at year's end.
Other than the Mil Colores incident, there were no other
significant labor disputes during the year.
There are 39 enterprises operating in the Government-run FTZ,
employing approximately 25,000 workers. Labor laws apply equally in the
FTZs, except for the minimum wage which varies by industry. In
addition, there are 5 authorized private FTZs; the 11 enterprises in
these zones employ some 17,000 workers, for a total of 42,000 workers
in all FTZs. Approximately half the workers in the Government-run FTZ
are represented by a union organization; however, only about 10 percent
of them are actual union members. While some of these unions have real
collective bargaining power, others are primarily symbolic. The
Ministry of Labor reports that there were eight collective bargaining
agreements in effect in the FTZs and five in the negotiation process.
Union organizing efforts have encountered strong employer opposition in
the FTZs.
In response to longstanding complaints by union representatives
that the Ministry of Labor poorly enforced the Labor Code in the FTZs,
in 1997 the Ministry opened an office in the Managua FTZ to ensure that
the code was being enforced. FTZ officials claim that, due to memories
of the corrupt and ineffective unions of the 1980s, many workers in the
FTZ enterprises simply have no interest in unionizing. They also claim
that wages and working conditions in FTZ enterprises are better than
the national average. For example, some FTZ enterprises assert that
they pay wages that average over $192 (2,400 cordobas) per month,
almost three times the minimum wage.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor but does not specifically address
forced or bonded labor by children, and such practices occur. The
Ministry of Labor continued to report that some children were forced to
beg by their parents, and that some were rented by their parents to
organizers of child beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.).
In December, Hansae S.A, a Korean garment factory in the Free Trade
Zone, violated the overtime provisions of the Nicaraguan labor code.
Whereas the code permits overtime of no more than 3 hours per day and
no more than 9 hours per week, labor unions and the Ministry of Labor
charged, and Hansae officials admitted, that some employees at Hansae
were working far in excess of the permitted number of hours. In some
cases, employees were required to stay overnight, making for a 24-hour
workday, two or three times a month. Hansae officials explained that
the practice was recent and that it was due to unusually high demand
for their products. The Hansae General Manager promised to discontinue
the practice. According to union officials, the violation did not
recur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution provides for the protection of children's
rights and prohibits child labor that can affect normal childhood
development or interfere with the obligatory school year; however,
child labor is a problem. Comprehensive labor legislation protects
children up to the age of 18. The Constitution also provides protection
from any type of economic or social exploitation. The law prohibits
child labor in areas such as mines and garbage dumps and imposes heavy
fines for illegal employment. The 1996 Labor Code raised the age at
which children may begin working with parental permission from 12 to 14
years. Parental permission to work also is required for 15- and 16-
year-olds. The law limits the workday for such children to 6 hours and
prohibits night work. However, because of the economic needs of many
families, a cultural legacy of child work among peasants, and lack of
effective government enforcement mechanisms, child labor rules rarely
are enforced except in the small formal sector of the economy.
There are no reliable figures regarding the number of working
children, but the Government reports that child labor occurs in both
urban and rural areas. The Ministry of Labor estimates that
approximately 300,000 children are employed; CENIDH estimates that
there are approximately 322,000 working children. Over 148,000 children
are employed in rural areas at coffee, tobacco, rice, and banana
plantations. In Managua over 6,000 children work on city streets,
selling merchandise, cleaning automobile windows, or begging. According
to a 1998 UNICEF report, approximately 42 percent of children between
the ages of 6 and 9 work. A 1996 study by the National Commission
against Child Labor concluded that over 161,000 children between 10 and
19 years of age worked, including approximately 109,000 employed in
rural areas on coffee, tobacco, rice, and banana plantations. The study
found that 6,219 children worked in urban areas as beggars, self-
employed car washers, or parking attendants. The Ministry of Labor
continues to report that some children were forced to beg by their
parents, and that some were rented by their parents to organizers of
child beggars. Child prostitution is a serious problem (see Section
6.f.).
The Ministry of Labor established an inspection unit to monitor
occupational safety and health in the agricultural sector, signed
agreements with nightclubs and restaurant owners who pledged to comply
with labor laws and issued a resolution in 1999 prohibiting employment
of minors specifically in the FTZs. The Ministry of Family sponsors
several programs that target working minors. These programs, which
cover up to 10,000 children nationwide, include childcare services,
return-to-school programs, and technical and vocational training. The
programs also include training for parents and teachers. The Ministry
of the Family, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education,
established a program--known as the Traffic Light Plan--to keep 647
children off city intersections where they wash windshields, sell
fruit, or beg for money from motorists stopped at red lights. The
program provides housing for the 75 percent of these children who are
homeless and schooling for the 60 percent who are school dropouts. The
Ministry of Family reports that out of 600 children in the Traffic
Light Plan, 498 (or 83 percent) returned to school. The remainder
returned to the intersections to work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The statutory minimum wage is
set through tripartite (business, government, and labor) negotiations
and must be approved by the National Assembly. A different minimum
wage, which must be reviewed every 6 months, applies to each sector of
the economy. A new minimum wage scale took effect in April. The
majority of workers earn well above the statutory minimum rates.
Ministry of Labor statistics indicated that during the year, the
average minimum wage, i.e., the actual minimum wage paid by employers
for each sector, was $72 (1,058 cordobas) overall. By sector, the
average minimum wage was as follows: agriculture, $45 (661 cordobas
plus food); fisheries, $56 (818 cordobas); mining, $137 (1,994
cordobas); industrial manufacture, $74 (1,086 cordobas); electric, gas,
and water utilities $117 (1,711 cordobas); construction, $119 (1,740
cordobas); restaurants and hotels, $95 (1,383 cordobas);
transportation, $102 (1,495 cordobas); banking, $92 (1,341 cordobas);
community and social services, $71 (1,038 cordobas); and central and
municipal government (includes health and education employees), $51
(743 cordobas). Even the average minimum wage does not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. In every sector, the
average minimum wage falls below the Government estimate of what an
urban family must spend each month for a basic basket of goods ($141 or
2,065 cordobas).
The Labor Code incorporates the constitutionally mandated 8-hour
workday; the standard legal workweek is a maximum of 48 hours, with 1
day of rest weekly. The 1996 code established severance pay at from 1
to 5 months, depending on the duration of employment and the
circumstances of firing. However, persons fired for cause may be denied
severance pay through a process that requires employers to demonstrate
proof of worker misconduct. The code also established an employer's
obligation to provide housing to employees who are assigned temporarily
to areas beyond commuting distance.
The Labor Code seeks to bring the country into compliance with
international standards and norms of workplace hygiene and safety, but
the Ministry of Labor's Office of Hygiene and Occupational Security
lacks adequate staff and resources to enforce these provisions. The
code gives workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous
workplace situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
During the year, there were a number of incidents concerning worker
injuries that reflected unacceptable conditions of work. On April 12,
Jose de Jesus Miranda Perez received second degree burns from a steam
press at the Rocedes plant, an FTZ factory. The Ministry of Labor fined
the Rocedes plant $667 (10,000 cordobas).
On June 23, Deyson Joel Herrera, age 19, lost part of his finger at
the Nien Hsing International plant, located within a FTZ. After
completing an accident report, Herrera was taken to the hospital, where
the doctor attached what remained of the finger. When Herrera returned
to the doctor on June 28 he was told that the health care contract with
Nien Hsing International had ended, and that Herrera could no longer
receive treatment.
On July 2, Orlin Frank Meza Orozco received second degree burns at
the Chentex plant, located within an FTZ. Orozco was taken to the
hospital where he received treatment.
In August Ericka Morales, the Rocedes factory supervisor attacked
Maria Ramona Beltran Espinoza. Morales struck Espinoza with a metal bar
after she inquired about her brother's wages, which she claimed had not
been paid. Rocedes then terminated Espinoza's contract. Espinoza went
to the Ministry of Labor for aid; however, the Ministry claimed that it
could pursue no legal actions, as Espinoza was no longer an employee at
the Rocedes plant.
The enactment of a 2001 law aimed at foreign companies prompted the
filing of claims on behalf of thousands of banana workers seeking
damages for exposure to the pesticide DBCP in the 1970s and 1980s when
its use was legal in the country. The Attorney General's Office
prepared an advisory opinion that questioned the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the law.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Nicaragua has a statute that
specifically prohibits trafficking in persons and assigns a penalty of
up to 10 years in prison. While the preconditions for trafficking
exist, there is little documented evidence of a substantial trafficking
problem within the country; however, there is some limited evidence
that the country is a source for trafficking in women and children to
other countries for purposes of sexual exploitation. The Government
instituted an awareness campaign with border police and immigration
officials at entry points to Honduras to identify and question young
women who are not accompanied by family members. In addition, the
Government formed a 56-member Anti-Trafficking in Persons Unit within
the police. According to the Ministry of Labor, strip clubs are
inspected several times each year to ensure that there are no underage
workers at these clubs.
The law does not make prostitution illegal, though it bans its
promotion; however, the Child and Family Law, which took effect in
1998, defines statutory rape as sexual relations with children 13 years
old and younger. Therefore, there is no legal prohibition on
prostitution by juveniles 14 and older. According to a number of
sources, including the Director of Police Criminal Investigations,
Julio Gonzalez, and the Director of Police Economic Investigations,
Carlos Bandana, prostitutes in the country work without a pimp, since
prostitution is legal but pimping is not. Statistics from the Women's
Commissariats showed only three cases of pimping for the year
throughout the country. A number of studies support this, including an
intensive diagnostic done during the year by the University of Central
America in the tourist city of Granada, in which all the under-aged
prostitutes interviewed told the researchers that they operated on
their own. Although national figures are not available, a study
conducted in Managua in 1998 found that 40 percent of the 1,200
prostitutes in the city were under the age of 18. No numbers were
available for other cities, but in 1998 UNICEF reported that teenage
sexual exploitation had increased in recent years in rural areas,
border cities, ports, and in Managua. UNICEF also noted significant
growth in prostitution among children between the ages of 12 and 16 in
towns where taxi drivers were said to serve as middlemen. OAS personnel
in the country also noted an increase in prostitution among girls as
young as 10 years of age; in rural areas, their clients are often truck
drivers and other travelers, including foreigners, who patronize
prostitutes in towns along the Pan American Highway. From December 1998
to May 1999, the Ministry of the Family sponsored an investigation into
child prostitution in five municipalities. Of the more than 300
children surveyed, 82 percent reported that they had started engaging
in prostitution within the past year. Many of those surveyed said that
they engaged in prostitution to buy basic necessities such as food and
clothing, or to support a drug habit. A 1999 survey by the NGO Casa
Alianza reported that of 520 children, 504 admitted to using drugs,
usually glue. There have been cases of adults who exchange sexual
favors with street children in return for glue. In 1999 a National
Forum against the Sexual and Commercial Exploitation of Children and
Adolescents was created to fight for children's rights and bring this
issue to the public's attention. During the year, it held a number of
public forums on children's issues and trafficking in persons and
distributed a number of substantial anti-trafficking publications to
the public.
According to press reports, five Nicaraguan women, ages 20-25, were
taken to Guatemala by Janeth Esperanza Rivera in May. Rivera promised
the women jobs as sales clerks, and a better life in Guatemala. Upon
arriving in Guatemala, Rivera sold the women to a group of unidentified
men, who locked them up in a room. The women were only allowed out to
be prostituted. This continued for 5 days, until 4 of the women escaped
and reported the incident to the Guatemalan police. Rivera was captured
and a police investigation of her records revealed Rivera had been
trafficking women into Guatemala for months. None of the women from the
previous trafficking have been located or interviewed.
In October police detained three 17-year-old women near the town of
Chinandega traveling to Guatemala. The women were being driven to
Guatemala to work in brothels there. Although the women indicated they
were not deceived or coerced into going, their travel and work was
being facilitated by three alleged traffickers, who were detained by
police. The three facilitators were charged with trafficking, but a
court in Chinandega acquitted them due to a lack of evidence that
trafficking had occurred.
----------
PANAMA
Panama is a representative democracy with an elected executive
composed of a president and 2 vice presidents, an elected 71-member
unicameral legislature, and an appointed judiciary. In 1999 voters
elected President Mireya Moscoso of the Arnulfista party. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the
judicial system was subject to corruption and political manipulation.
Panama has had no military forces since 1989. The Panamanian Public
Forces consisted of the Panamanian National Police (PNP), the National
Maritime Service (SMN), the National Air Service (SAN), and the
Institutional Protection Service (SPI). A 1994 constitutional amendment
formally prohibits the establishment of a permanent military, although
it contains a provision for the temporary formation of a ``special
police force'' to protect the borders in case of a ``threat of external
aggression.'' The Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), a semiautonomous
body with leadership appointed by the Supreme Court, was a separate
branch of law enforcement under the Attorney General's Office that
performed criminal investigations in support of public prosecutors. The
Ministry of government and Justice oversaw the PNP, the SMN, and the
SAN; the Ministry of the Presidency supervised the SPI. Police forces
responded to civilian authority, had civilian directors, and had
internal review procedures to deal with police misconduct. There were
occasional reports of abuse by some members of the security forces.
The economy, which uses the U.S. dollar as currency (calling it the
Balboa), was based primarily on a well developed services sector that
accounted for about 80 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The
country had an estimated population of 2.9 million. GDP growth was
negligible for the past 2 years, poverty worsened, and income
distribution remained highly skewed, with growing disparities between
rich and poor. Unemployment was officially estimated at 13.7 percent;
however, private economists believed that it might be several points
higher.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be serious problems in several
areas. Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, was a recurrent
problem of the prison system. Overall prison conditions remained harsh,
with periodic outbreaks of internal prison violence. Prolonged pretrial
detention was a problem. The judiciary was subject to political
manipulation, and the criminal justice system was inefficient and often
corrupt. There were complaints that in some cases police failed to
follow legal requirements and conducted unauthorized searches and
monitored communications. The media were subject to political pressure,
libel suits, and punitive action by the Government. Violence against
women remained a serious problem. Women held some high positions in
government, including the presidency; however, discrimination against
women persisted. Discrimination against indigenous people, blacks, and
ethnic minorities continued to be a problem. Worker rights were limited
in export processing zones. Child labor was a problem. Trafficking in
persons was a continuing problem. Panama was invited by the Community
of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second
CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents.
On July 15, a 13-year-old indigenous Wounaan girl, Aida (or Ayda)
Chirimia, in the Darien village of Biroquera, was shot and killed by a
single bullet from a 7.62 millimeter machine gun, reportedly within the
local national police compound. The PNP reported that the gun fell and
went off accidentally; there were no indications of suicide or a self-
inflicted accident. No autopsy was performed. When the gun was sent to
the PTJ, reportedly the pin had been mashed, making an investigation
nearly impossible. At year's end, the PNP was awaiting ballistic test
results from the Public Ministry, which was in charge of the overall
investigation. Meanwhile, the Wounaan leaders had access to a volunteer
lawyers' association.
In August 2001, the bodies of two men were found at the beach of
Punta Chame. Their deaths were linked to two off-duty PNP officers who
were dismissed and detained. An investigation into the killings,
conducted by the Fourth Superior Prosecutor, continued at year's end.
In April the Truth Commission, established by President Moscoso in
January 2001 to investigate killings and disappearances believed to
have occurred under the 1968-89 military dictatorship, released its
final report (see Sections 1.b and 4.) Among the cases the Commission
investigated was that of an unmarked grave discovered in 1999 on the
grounds of a former military base near Panama City that contained the
remains of leftist leader Heliodoro Portugal. Three former members of
the National Guard--captains Rigoberto Garibaldo, Aquilino Seiro, and
Moises Correa--were linked to Portugal's kidnaping and killing. The
authorities placed Garibaldo under house arrest, forbade the two others
from leaving the country, and reopened the case.
Guerrillas from the terrorist organization Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other Colombian armed groups operated
along the border with Colombia and reportedly made occasional deeper
incursions into the country. In December a decapitated body was found
washed ashore near Jaque, Darien Province. At year's end, the case was
under investigation.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In August and October 2001, and again in January, a team of foreign
forensic anthropologists carried out investigations for the Truth
Commission. The team located human remains in numerous locations in
five provinces of the country. DNA tests on most of the remains located
were underway, but only the remains of Heliodoro Portugal had been
positively identified. On December 19, the head of the Truth Commission
asked the Attorney General to reopen investigations into four
additional disappearances from the late 1960s and early 1970s (see
Sections 1.a. and 4).
The Hector Gallego Committee for Disappeared Relatives maintained a
list of 120 persons who disappeared during the military dictatorships
and who remained missing.
FARC guerrillas (and possibly other Colombian armed groups)
reportedly engaged in occasional kidnapings of persons along the border
with Colombia; they also harassed and raped residents in Darien
Province.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of measures that could
harm the physical, mental, or moral integrity of prisoners or
detainees, and the public security forces generally performed in a
professional and restrained manner. However, there was at least one
reported case of excessive use of force against prison inmates during
the year, and abuse by prison guards was an occasional problem. The
General Penitentiary Directorate (DGSP) asserted that the problem had
been reduced and that only minor incidents occurred.
The law providing the legal basis for the PNP includes specific
guidelines for the use of force, including deadly force; requires that
police officers respect human rights; and prohibits instigation or
tolerance of torture, cruelty, or other inhuman or degrading behavior.
Although not all PNP personnel were trained in the use of force, the
PNP provided more training during the year.
The PTJ and the PNP have offices of professional responsibility
that act as internal affairs organs to hold officers accountable for
their actions. Both have staffs of independent investigators as well as
administrative authority to open internal investigations. In both
organizations, a defined legal process is followed in which, upon
completion of the process, the respective director of the PTJ or PNP
has the final authority to determine the disposition of each case. The
PNP deputy director and secretary general addressed human rights
problems that arose in the police force. The offices of professional
responsibility were well known in the community, and the rate of
complaints remained generally constant in the PTJ office. During the
year, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman received 62 complaints
against the police for abuse of authority (see Section 4). Through late
December, the PNP Office of Professional Responsibility received 568
complaints, an average of 11 complaints per week, an increase from 10
per week in 2001. The office investigated and closed 179 complaints
without action, dismissed 41 cases for lack of sufficient evidence,
penalized officers in 59 cases, and dismissed 29 officers for
corruption, burglary, or bribery. Penalties included reduction in rank,
dismissal, and in severe cases, criminal prosecution.
The PTJ received complaints from the public, and officers could
make anonymous complaints of corruption and other problems. By late
December, the PTJ Office of Professional Responsibility had conducted
210 investigations, which resulted in the dismissal of 21 agents. The
majority of open cases were for mishandling official property such as
misplacing guns or radios, and misconduct or improper behavior when off
duty.
Corruption among police officers remained a problem. In some cases,
PNP and PTJ directors enforced other disciplinary measures against
officers with proven involvement in illicit activities; however, both
organizations only reacted to egregious abuses, due to a lack of staff,
independence, and institutional priority.
During the year, police generally exercised restraint in their
treatment of street protesters. In August rioting broke out in Colon
for 2 days, and the PNP fired rubber bullets not aimed directly at the
protesters (see Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions remained harsh and, in some cases, life
threatening, due largely to budget constraints. As of December, the
prison system, which had an official capacity for 7,348 persons, held
10,529 prisoners. Most prisons were dilapidated and overcrowded,
although Nueva Esperanza prison was newly refurbished. Many of the
problems within the prisons resulted not only from obvious overcrowding
but also from the lack of separation of inmates according to the type
or severity of the crime committed. Pretrial detainees shared cells
with sentenced prisoners, in part due to lack of space.
Medical care was inadequate, and prisoners sometimes suffered
because of the negligence of the guards. Tuberculosis, AIDS, and other
communicable diseases were common among the prison population. The
European Union funded some legal, medical, and dental staff for
prisons, and there was at least one doctor in each major facility. As
of December, there were a total of 18 deaths in prisons during the
year: 15 from illnesses, 2 from inmate murder, and 1 suicide.
There were some minor improvements in the prison system overall,
including more training of civilian prison guards and PNP guards, who
received courses on inmates' rights and penitentiary procedures,
especially targeted at new officers and custodians. Other improvements
included limited Internet access and computer literacy training for the
first time in some women's prisons, more opportunities for work and
training in prison, and more construction of new facilities.
Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, was a recurrent
problem. Police officials acknowledged that they received and
investigated 27 cases during the year; 20 for abuse of authority, and 7
for mistreatment of prisoners.
In November PNP guards reportedly hit and sprayed tear gas on 18
prisoners in the David prison; 2 were sent to the local hospital. Some
prisoners then began a limited hunger strike. The Minister of
government and Justice ordered an investigation, and the PTJ director
said that such events occurred on a regular basis in the prisons. At
year's end, the Public Ministry was investigating the incident.
In one high-profile case of guard abuse, 10 members of the PNP were
suspended for beating naked prisoners with baseball bats in the (since
closed) Modelo prison in 1998; they were convicted and jailed awaiting
sentencing at year's end.
The main prisons in Panama City included La Joya (a maximum-
security facility), Tinajitas, the Feminine Center (women's prison),
and the Juvenile Detention Center. Two additional facilities, La Joyita
and El Renacer, held inmates generally accused of less serious crimes.
La Joya, holding most prisoners accused of serious crimes, had a
planned capacity of 1,500 but housed 2,278 inmates in December. Gang
violence was a problem. Conditions at La Joyita remained problematic,
including inmate claims of severe overcrowding, poor sanitation, and
abuses by prison custodians against inmates. At year's end, the
facility held 2,444 inmates; it was designed to hold 1,770 inmates.
Conditions on the island penal colony of Coiba remained harsh and
dangerous. The DGSP no longer sent inmates to Coiba and planned to
close it; in December the number of inmates had dropped to 52, compared
with 114 in 2000. Coiba prisoners suffered from malnutrition and
shortages of potable water.
Prison conditions in Colon province also were harsh. Although Nueva
Esperanza, a consolidation and update of an older prison in Colon,
opened during the year, by December its intended capacity of 800 was
already exceeded, as it held 1,222 prisoners. In Nueva Esperanza, both
male and female pavilions had separate sections for inmates convicted
of administrative felonies, so they were not put together with inmates
convicted of violent crimes. The former public prison frequently had no
running water or functioning sewage system and failed to provide the
most basic health needs, and the DGSP no longer had any inmates there.
The PNP still used it for short periods of time when they had a
detainee under their responsibility, but transferred persons to Nueva
Esperanza prison as soon as possible.
There were prisons of significant size in David and Santiago. Small
jails attached to local police stations around the country sometimes
housed prisoners for the entire length of their sentence. The
authorities frequently did not address cases of abuse and neglect in
these provincial jails, due to their low profile in the prison system.
Early in the year, the Ombudsman visited La Chorrera prison in Panama
province to highlight the extremely delapidated conditions there.
In December 25 prisoners in the Santiago prison in Veraguas
province initiated a hunger strike to protest ``physical and social
mistreatment'' by jail authorities, alleging that they did not provide
medical care, damaged inmates' personal effects, and made family visits
difficult. The penal authorities denied these claims and asserted that
these prisoners were treated well, and often had relatives and friends
bring in drugs and weapons. At year's end, the matter was under
investigation.
The DGSP largely depended on 1,500 PNP officers to supply both
internal and perimeter security at all prisons. There were over 250
civilian corrections officers (or ``custodians''), but due to
insufficient funding, the DGSP was not able to hire new civilian
custodians during the year. As a result, regular PNP officers still
were used to fill staffing gaps. PNP officers were sometimes untrained
for prison duty and found the assignment distasteful, which contributed
to tension and abuses within the prison system. The Government sent 30
civilian custodians to a 4-month training program in Colombia.
Custodians handled inmates within La Joya, El Renacer, and the central
women's prison, which used only female guards. The DGSP did not have
authority to discipline prison guards with criminal or civil sanctions;
only the PNP disciplinary board could sanction a PNP agent or a
custodian.
Throughout the country, conditions at women's prisons and at
juvenile detention centers were noticeably better than at adult male
prisons. However, female prisoners, especially those in the primary
detention area, reportedly suffered from overcrowding, poor medical
care, and lack of basic supplies for personal hygiene.
There was one modern juvenile detention center near Panama City;
however, several juvenile detention centers throughout the country
suffered from inadequate resources to provide for education or adequate
supervision of children, many of whom spent the majority of their time
in a bare cell.
About 9 percent of prison inmates were foreigners (primarily
Colombians), most of whom were serving sentences on drug charges.
Although Panama and Colombia had a prisoner exchange treaty, the
Government complained that Colombia did not respond or was very slow to
comply with requests to accept prisoners, reportedly due to overcrowded
conditions in Colombian prisons.
The law and the Penal Code provide for conditional release programs
for inmates charged with minor offenses who have served a substantial
part of their sentence; however, this provision was not implemented
consistently in practice. A conditional release program was part of the
organizational reforms that authorities introduced in 1998. During the
year, the DGSP provided conditional release forms to the President for
her signature in a more timely manner than in previous years.
The Government generally allowed prison visits by independent human
rights observers. However, the authorities arranged appointments ahead
of time, and monitors generally spoke to prisoners in the presence of
guards or administrators. Prisoners expressed fear of retaliation if
they complained. Justicia y Paz, the Catholic Church's human rights
monitoring group, brings prison abuses to the attention of the
authorities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that arrests must be carried out with a warrant issued by
the appropriate authorities, and the Government generally respected
this provision in practice. Exceptions were permitted when an officer
apprehended a person during the commission of a crime, or when an
individual interfered with an officer's actions. The Constitution also
provides that suspects are to be brought promptly before a judge;
however, lack of prompt arraignment remained a problem during the year.
The law requires the arresting officer to inform the detainee
immediately of the reasons for arrest or detention and of the right to
immediate legal counsel, to be provided to the indigent by the State
(see Section 1.e.). Police arrested and detained children for minor
infractions during neighborhood sweeps (see Section 5).
The Constitution also provides for judicial review of the legality
of detention and mandates the immediate release of any person detained
or arrested illegally. The Constitution prohibits police from detaining
suspects for more than 24 hours without bringing them before a judge.
Under the law, the preliminary investigation phase may last from 8 days
to 2 months and the follow-on investigation phase another 2 to 4
months, depending on the number of suspects. The courts frequently
granted extensions of time limits, leaving those accused in detention
for long periods without having been charged formally. The law permits
these extensions; however, many legal authorities (including court
officials) criticized judges for excessive use of this measure.
Extended pretrial detention continued to be one of the most serious
human rights problems, due in part to the elaborate notification phase
in criminal cases. According to government statistics, as of December,
5,821 prisoners were pretrial detainees, or about 55 percent of the
prison population. The average period of pretrial custody was 12
months, and pretrial detention in excess of the maximum sentence for
the alleged crime was common.
Legal alternatives to prison existed; however, they were not
implemented widely. Options such as house arrest were used in some
cases involving the elderly or minors but required that the defendants
have access to and understanding of their legal options. There was a
limited program of work or study in lieu of some sentences.
The Constitution prohibits exile; there were no reports of forced
exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was susceptible to
corruption and outside influence, including manipulation by other
branches of government.
The President appoints nine Supreme Court magistrates to 10-year
terms, subject to Legislative Assembly ratification. The Supreme Court
magistrates appoint appellate (Superior Tribunal) judges, who, in turn,
appoint circuit and municipal court judges in their respective
jurisdictions. Judicial appointments are supposed to be made under a
merit-based system, but the top-down appointment system lent itself to
political influence and undue interference by higher-level judges in
lower-level cases in which they often had no jurisdiction.
At the local level, mayors appoint administrative judges, or
``corregidores,'' who exercise jurisdiction over minor civil cases and
who hold wide powers to arrest and to impose fines or jail sentences of
up to 1 year. In the past this system had serious shortcomings:
Defendants lacked adequate procedural safeguards; administrative judges
outside of Panama City usually were not attorneys; many had not
completed secondary education; and some were corrupt. In practice,
appeal procedures were nonexistent. The authorities encouraged
corregidores to improve their procedures, and the number of local
sentences imposed declined from 3,000 to 500 over 3 years. Nonetheless,
affluent defendants still tended to pay fines while poorer defendants
went to jail, which contributed to prison overcrowding (see Section
1.c.).
In 1998 the Inter-American Development Bank loaned the Government
$18.9 million to reform the judicial system; the Government contributed
another $8.1 million to the program. Intended to improve judicial
training, strengthen the investigative capabilities of the Attorney
General's office, and reduce the civil courts' backlog of cases, the
program was scheduled to continue through 2004.
The Constitution provides that persons charged with crimes have the
right to counsel, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to
refrain from incriminating themselves or close relatives, and to be
tried only once for a given offense. If not under pretrial detention,
the accused could be present with counsel during the investigative
phase of the proceeding. Judges could order the presence of pretrial
detainees for the rendering or amplification of statements, or for
confronting witnesses. Trials were conducted on the basis of evidence
presented by the public prosecutor. Under limited circumstances, the
law permits trials without the accused being present. The Constitution
and the Criminal Procedure Code provide for trial by jury at the
defendant's election, but only in cases where at least one of the
charges is murder.
The Constitution obliges the Government to provide public defenders
for the indigent. However, many public defenders were appointed late in
the investigation, after the prosecutor already had evaluated the bulk
of the evidence and decided either to recommend trial or to dismiss the
charges. Public defenders' caseloads remained extremely high, averaging
some 550 cases per attorney per year. Only 5 new public defenders have
been hired since 1992; there were 38 nationwide, with a similar number
of assistants. This heavy workload undermined the quality of
representation, with many prisoners meeting their public defender for
the first time on the day of trial. The inadequate number of public
defenders also caused a backlog in trial dates, which also contributed
to the problem of prison overcrowding.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, private papers, and telephonic communications, and the Government
generally respected these rights in practice; however, there were
complaints that in some cases law enforcement authorities failed to
follow legal requirements and conducted unauthorized searches. In an
effort to prevent unauthorized searches, the Public Ministry placed a
representative, whose job was to approve searches, in each of the PTJ's
divisions. The authorities may not enter private residences except with
the owner's permission or by written order from the appropriate
authority for specific purposes, such as entry to assist the victims of
crime or disaster or to conduct lawful health and safety inspections.
The authorities may not examine private papers and correspondence,
except as properly authorized by competent legal authority and in the
presence of the owner, a family member, or two neighbors.
Although the Constitution prohibits all wiretapping, the Government
maintained that wiretapping with judicial approval was legal, and that
the Attorney General may authorize a wiretap when confronted with
probable cause in a serious crime. The law allows the Public Ministry
to engage in undercover operations, including ``videotaping and
recording of conversations and telephonic communications.'' In November
a controversy developed when it was reported that wiretapping took
place under presidential authority for alleged national security
reasons. The Supreme Court had not issued a final ruling on whether
wiretapping was constitutional, but it remained an established
practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government sometimes
did not respect these rights in practice, and at times the media were
subject to political and economic pressure. The Government and public
figures made frequent use of libel and ``disrespect for authority''
laws to confront and attempt to intimidate journalists who allegedly
were ``irresponsible'' or who besmirched the honor of a particular
government institution or leader.
There was an active and often adversarial press and a broad range
of print and electronic media outlets, including newspapers, radio and
television broadcasts, and domestic and foreign cable stations. Five
national daily newspapers, 4 commercial television stations, 2
educational television stations, and approximately 100 radio stations
provided a broad choice of informational sources; all were privately or
institutionally owned except for 1 government-owned television station.
The law prohibits newspapers from holding radio and television
concessions, and vice versa. While many media outlets took identifiable
editorial positions, the media carried a wide variety of political
commentaries and other perspectives, both local and foreign. There was
a concentration of control of television outlets in the hands of close
relatives and associates of former President Perez Balladares, who was
a member of the largest opposition party.
Domestic and foreign journalists worked and traveled freely
throughout the country. The law requires directors and deputy directors
of media outlets to be citizens.
On January 22, a new ``transparency law'' took effect, providing
for the public to obtain information from and about public entities. In
June the President issued an executive decree, ostensibly codifying the
law, but which severely limited it by imposing new and highly
cumbersome regulations for those wishing to acquire public information.
Several dozen requests were made under the new law, and most were not
honored by the institutions; through October, 45 had been appealed to
various courts but only 8 were approved. The Ombudsman and other groups
asked that the decree be declared unconstitutional. The Solicitor
General opined that it was unlawful and asked for a three-member bench
of the Supreme Court to review it, which was underway at year's end.
Under ``gag laws'' dating from the military dictatorship, the
Government has legal authority to prosecute media owners and reporters
for criminal libel and calumny. A special executive branch authority
had discretionary powers to administer the libel laws, which provided
for fines and imprisonment for up to 2 years. Under the statute,
opinions, comments, or criticism of government officials acting in
their official capacity were exempted specifically from libel
prosecution; however, a section of the law allowed for the immediate
sanctioning of journalists who showed ``disrespect'' for the office of
certain government officials. A 1999 law eliminated gag laws; however,
legal actions against many journalists remained pending, and vestiges
of the former gag laws still provided a means for charging journalists
with defamation. The IACHR, the Inter-American Press Association,
Reporters Without Borders, and other groups criticized these measures
as efforts to censor the press. The domestic media faced increased
pressure during the year from elements in the Government for
criticizing policies or officials. As of December, the Ombudsman
reported 50 active cases of journalists facing defamation charges
brought under the criminal justice system. In 40 completed cases, the
courts sentenced journalists in 23 instances; the others were dismissed
or the accused found not guilty.
The appeal of El Siglo newspaper editor Carlos Singares of his 1999
conviction for criminal libel and his sentence to 20 months in prison
was pending at year's end. While Singares was in jail due to articles
accusing Attorney General Jose Antonio Sossa of illicit activities, a
court sentenced him to 20 months in prison for criminal libel against
former President Perez Balladares. Singares was free during his appeal.
A court upheld the 2000 conviction of Jean Marcel Chery, a reporter
for the daily newspaper Panama America, for criminal libel and
confirmed the sentence of 18 months in jail and a fine of $400.
In September 2001, the Moscoso Administration ordered the arrest of
Ubaldo Davis and Joel Diaz, two editors of the weekly tabloid La
Cascara, for libel and for impugning the honor of various
administration officials, including the President. In July a court
acquitted Diaz but found Davis guilty and sentenced him to 14 months in
prison and a suspension from practicing his profession for 12 months.
The judge allowed the prison sentence to be replaced by a $1,500 fine,
which Davis appealed, but an appellate court upheld the judge's
decision.
In October 2001, a former vice president filed charges against
editorial cartoonist Julio Briceno for lampooning him in the daily
newspaper La Prensa. Briceno asked that the case be dismissed; during
the year his request was denied, as was an appeal, and he could not
leave the country pending trial.
In 1998 then-PNP Director Jose Luis Sosa used the libel laws to
bring charges against law professor and former Moscoso adviser Miguel
Bernal for statements that criticized the PNP. In May 2001, Bernal
appealed, which was denied in September 2001. Bernal then appealed the
denial, and in May a judge dismissed the case. Human rights advocates
called it a victory for press freedom.
The press laws provide for the establishment of a censorship board,
which monitored radio transmissions and had the authority to fine
stations that violated norms regarding vulgar, profane, or obscene
language.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. No authorization is needed
for outdoor assembly, although prior notification for administrative
purposes is required. Throughout much of the year, police showed
restraint and professionalism while monitoring large protests by
students, political activists, prisoners, and workers; however, police
commonly used tear gas against protesters.
There were several public demonstrations throughout the year,
including a major public protest against corruption held in Panama
City. Several times during the year, rural groups protested against the
presence of Panama Canal authorities in the watershed and potential
expansion of the canal. In August rioting broke out in Colon for 2
days, ostensibly to protest the persistently high unemployment there.
Stores and street markets were shut down, and protesters reportedly
damaged a few cars. The PNP fired rubber bullets not aimed directly at
protesters, who responded with marbles.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Citizens had the
right to form associations and professional or civic groups. New
political parties must meet strict membership and organizational
standards to gain official recognition and participate in national
campaigns.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, although recognizing
Catholicism as ``the religion of the majority of Panamanians,''
provides for free exercise of all religious beliefs, provided that
``Christian morality and public order'' are respected. The Government
generally respected religious freedom in practice, and there was a
broad diversity of religions.
The Constitution prohibits clerics from holding public office,
except as related to social assistance, education, or scientific
research. However, Catholicism enjoyed certain state-sanctioned
advantages over other faiths. For example, the Constitution mandates
that Catholicism be taught in public schools, although parents had the
right to exempt their children from religious instruction.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. The
Government enforced exit permit requirements for foreigners who
overstayed their initial visas. A 9:00 p.m. curfew for unaccompanied
minors in the Panama City area remained in effect, although enforcement
generally was lax.
The law provides for granting refugee status in accordance with the
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. A 1998 decree grants protection to all persons entering the
country due to ``state persecution based on race, gender, religion,
nationality, social group, or political opinion.'' The decree grants 2
months' temporary protection to ``displaced persons'' in the case of a
large influx. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
criticized the decree because it put persons at risk for forced
repatriation within a few weeks of entering the country, without
analysis of their possible refugee status. In practice, the Government
did not enforce the 2-month time limit. The Government has not forcibly
repatriated displaced Colombians, and many Colombians have lived in the
country for years without formal refugee status.
The 1998 decree contains provisions for first asylum, and there
were 87 new asylum applications during the first 6 months of the year.
During the year, the authorities granted refugee status to 47
Colombians, rejected 26 applications, and asked 10 applicants for more
information. The Government generally cooperated with the office of the
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
However, the Government generally was reluctant to classify displaced
Colombians as refugees because of historic ties and the amount of
movement between border communities. The UNHCR regularly visited the
country to monitor and to aid displaced Colombians. The authorities
refused entry to many Colombians who arrived by air and could not show
that they had at least $500.
Large groups of displaced persons periodically fled violence in
Colombia by crossing the border into Panama. In 1999 approximately 800
Colombians fled violence in the Colombian town of Jurado and settled in
the Darien town of Jaque. Since their arrival, the Government has
cooperated with the Catholic Church and the UNHCR to provide these
displaced persons with humanitarian assistance. It was difficult to
estimate the number of displaced persons living temporarily in Darien
because many entered and departed over short periods of time; others
were in transit and hoped to go to other nations; and many did not
report to any government office or NGO. There also were a number of
citizens from countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and African
nations living there. Estimates of Colombians living in the Darien
varied from 500 to 2,000; most placed the number around 1,500.
According to the UNHCR, there were 763 Colombians under temporary
protective status in the country.
The Government offered Colombians the chance to participate in a
voluntary repatriation program in coordination with the Government of
Colombia, and many agreed to return. The Government, along with the
UNHCR and the Catholic Church, provided displaced Colombians with food,
medical care, and access to public services, including schools and
clinics. The Government provided these services in Jaque and other
areas of the Darien. However, many displaced Colombians living along
the remote Darien border area were beyond the reach of organized
assistance from the Government, the UNHCR, or the Church.
Colombian migration significantly increased pressures on local
populations in the Darien and caused the displacement of Panamanian
citizens. In addition, the Government suspected that Colombian
migration concealed or attracted the presence of armed Colombian groups
in the Darien region (see Sections 1.a and 1.b.). The effects of
Colombian migration also were evident in Panama City and Colon, where
large populations of Colombians have settled. Late in the year, the new
Minister of government and Justice ordered a census of Colombians
living in the country.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution; however, throughout the year, there were
unconfirmed reports that the police along the border, on a case-by-case
basis, required Colombians to return to Colombia.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government, and citizens freely exercised this right in the 1999
general elections. The Constitution provides for a representative
democracy with direct popular election by secret ballot of the
President, two vice presidents, legislators, and local representatives
every 5 years. Naturalized citizens may not hold certain categories of
elective office. The independent Electoral Tribunal arranges and
supervises elections. While the Constitution provides for independent
legislative and judicial branches, the executive dominated in practice.
The Government respected the rights of its citizens to join any
political party, propagate their views, and vote for candidates of
their choice.
In May 1999, Arnulfista presidential candidate Mireya Moscoso
defeated Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate Martin Torrijos
and Christian Democratic Party candidate Alberto Vallarino, winning
44.8 percent of the popular vote. Domestic and international observers
characterized the elections as generally free and fair; however,
several local contests were marred by reports of vote buying. Until
September 2000, President Moscoso maintained a one-vote majority in the
Legislative Assembly, which she lost when the party's coalition
realigned. In September Moscoso's party regained control of the
Assembly through an ad hoc coalition that included renegade opposition
party legislators.
In October there was a possible theft of citizen identity cards,
which could be used to commit electoral fraud. The electoral tribunal
took a series of measure to restore citizen confidence and to issue
new, more secure, identity cards. It also turned to the international
community to request assistance to monitor the election process and to
restore the integrity of the electoral system.
Several members of the main opposition PRD party alleged that there
was undue presidential influence over the judiciary and the electoral
tribunal, which heard a case of expulsion against one of the renegade
PRD legislators as the Assembly leadership was being selected. PRD
officials also asserted that appointments to the Supreme Court were
made to lay the groundwork for potential electoral fraud in 2004.
There were no legal barriers to participation in government or
politics by women, members of minorities, or persons of indigenous
descent, and women's participation increased in the past several years.
Mireya Moscoso was the country's first female president. Women held 7
of 71 Legislative Assembly seats; a woman served as the Assembly's
first vice president in 1999-2000, another woman held this position for
the 2000-2001 legislative period, and a third woman was elected for the
2001-02 period. Three women held positions in the 13-member Cabinet, 1
female judge remained on the Supreme Court, and a woman was the
director of the Public Registry.
The Government provided semiautonomous status to several indigenous
groups in their homelands, including the Kuna Yala, Ngobe-Bugle, Embera
Wounaan, Kuna de Madungandi, and Kuna de Wargandi comarcas (reserves).
There were dedicated seats for two Kuna Yala legislators in the
Legislative Assembly, and three will be added for the Ngobe-Bugle
comarca in the 2004 elections. Neither the Madugandi nor the Embera-
Wounaan reserve had its own dedicated legislators, but each had a
separate governor. In addition to the two Kuna Yala seats, legislators
who were Ngobe-Bugle and Embera represented other districts in the
Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights organizations, including both religious and secular
groups, operated without government restrictions. These organizations
carried out a full range of activities, including investigations and
dissemination of their findings. Organizations generally had access to
government officials while conducting investigations.
The office of Human Rights Ombudsman received complaints from
citizens regarding abuses or violations committed by public servants or
government institutions, collected information, confronted accused
public institutions or employees, and conducted studies to promote
international human rights standards. Although the Ombudsman had no
coercive authority beyond moral suasion, he could confront public
institutions and employees with their misdeeds. In March 2001, the
Legislative Assembly elected attorney Juan Antonio Tejada Espino as
Ombudsman for a 5-year term.
For the 12 months ending in March, the Ombudsman's Office received
798 complaints against the Government. Of this number, 765 were against
public institutions, and 33 were against businesses operating under a
government concession. During the year, the Ombudsman acted as a
mediator between the Government and medical associations in a 15-day
medical strike; highlighted dangerous conditions in Chorrera and other
prisons; encouraged the President's office to publish all its official
expenses (salaries, trips, etc.); published a report on the Truth
Commission and persons who disappeared; and assisted in two cases of
citizens held abroad.
On April 18, the Truth Commission presented its final report to
President Moscoso and Attorney General Sossa (see Sections 1.a. and
1.b.). The Commission collected eyewitness testimonials, domestic and
foreign government documents, and anonymous information and received
support from foreign forensic anthropologists to aid in its
investigations. Ultimately, the commission investigated 110 cases,
concluding that 70 persons were murdered, while 40 were still missing.
One-half the cases were from 1969-72, 20 percent related to 1973-83,
and 28 percent were from 1984-89. Eleven of the 1984-89 victims were
murdered during the October 1989 attempted coup.
Although the official mandate of the Commission ended with its
report, an office with a scaled-down staff continued to operate,
awaiting DNA test results and excavating identified sites that were not
completed during the Commission's 15-month mandate. This office
continued to press the Public Ministry to open or reopen cases based on
findings in its report. Additionally, and with COFADEPA (Committee of
the Relatives of Panama's Disappeared) support, the Commission called
upon the Government to create a public memorial and an official holiday
in honor of the victims, to compensate victims' families, to bring
human rights violators to justice, and to teach children about human
rights violations in school. Although the Foreign Minister said that
the Government should compensate victims' families, it took no action
in response to these recommendations by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits either special privileges or
discrimination on the basis of race, birth status, social class, sex,
or political views. However, societal prejudices persisted. Cases of
discrimination were difficult to prove, and legal remedies for victims
were complicated, time-consuming, and costly. There were unconfirmed
reports of violence perpetrated against homosexual men.
Women.--Domestic violence against women continued to be a serious
problem. The 1995 Family Code criminalized family violence (including
psychological, physical, or sexual abuse), but convictions were rare
unless a death occurred. In September 2001, the code was revised to
strengthen the penalties for domestic violence and to include penalties
for domestic sexual assault. The PTJ registered 1,801 cases of domestic
violence during the year, compared with 673 during 2001. As of
November, the PTJ also received 506 cases of rape and 99 cases of
attempted rape during the year, compared with 395 cases of rape and 82
cases of attempted rape in all of 2001. The Center for Women's
Development estimated that victims reported as few as 20 percent of
sexual assaults to judicial or law enforcement authorities. Spouses or
other family members frequently were the perpetrators. The Foundation
for the Promotion of the Woman, among other women's advocacy groups and
government agencies, operated programs to assist victims of abuse and
to educate women on their legal rights.
Trafficking in women was a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Labor Code prohibits sexual harassment; however, it remained a
problem. Anecdotal evidence suggested that many women were
propositioned for sexual favors at the time of their initial job
interview.
The 1995 Family Code recognizes joint or common property in
marriages. However, insufficient resources hampered government efforts
to enforce the code's provisions effectively. According to a Supreme
Court justice, 80 family judges were required to handle this caseload;
however, only 20 had been appointed due to lack of resources.
The Constitution mandates equal pay for men and women in equivalent
jobs, but wages paid to women were on average 30 to 35 percent lower
and increased at a slower rate. There were credible reports of
irregular hiring practices based upon age and ``appearance.'' A 1998
law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
The Ministry of Women, Youth, Family, and Childhood was largely a
consolidation of departments previously operating in other government
ministries, and its activities did not attract a great deal of public
attention. Through the National Directorate of Women and the Center for
Gender Training, the Ministry promoted equality of women in the
workplace and equal pay for equal work, attempted to reduce sexual
harassment, and advocated legal reforms. A number of private women's
rights groups concentrated on disseminating information about women's
rights, countering domestic abuse, enhancing employment and other
skills, and pressing for legal reforms.
Children.--Minors (under 18 years of age) represented 37 percent of
the population. Education is compulsory through the equivalent of 9th
grade, but children did not always attend school due to traditional
attitudes, financial considerations of the family, lack of
transportation, and insufficient government resources to enforce the
requirement. The problem was most extreme in Darien Province and among
indigenous groups. The Government furnished basic health care for
children through local clinics run by the Ministry of Health, but
clinics were difficult to reach from rural areas and often lacked
medicine. A central children's hospital in Panama City operated with
government funds as well as private donations.
The Ministry of Women, Youth, Family, and Childhood concentrated on
child welfare problems such as children begging in the streets and
roaming cities at night, infant and child malnutrition, and juvenile
delinquency and gangs. The Ministry also sponsored a youth conference
that attracted several thousand participants. A U.N. Development
Program report showed that despite a relatively high proportion of
public spending devoted to social programs, poor results on human
development indicators suggested that the funds were not used
efficiently.
The Superior Tribunal for Minors and Superior Tribunal for Families
are judicial authorities charged with overseeing the protection and
care of minors. The Minister of Women, Youth, Family, and Childhood
acted much like an ombudsman, and the office proposed and reviewed laws
and monitored government performance. Through November the PTJ
registered 224 cases of child abuse, compared with 102 through
September 2001. Neglect of children was a problem. Malnutrition and
inadequate medical care were generalized problems, most severe among
rural indigenous groups. Child labor and trafficking in children were
problems (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.).
Inadequate resources and training available to the family courts
resulted in several controversial decisions, including one highly
publicized case in which a child was returned to an abusive situation.
Juvenile courts continued to report a high incidence of juvenile
delinquency in major urban areas. The authorities reported a continued
increase in such crimes as drug trafficking, armed robberies,
kidnapings, car thefts, and murders attributed to juveniles. Youth
participation in criminal gangs was an increasing problem. Police
arrested and detained children for minor infractions during
neighborhood sweeps.
Persons with Disabilities.--The Ministry of Education was
responsible for educating and training minors with disabilities, while
the Ministry of Women, Youth, Family, and Childhood protected the
rights of adults with disabilities. Children with disabilities
traditionally were separated from the general population; however, a
2000 law required schools to integrate children with special needs into
the student body, and this law generally was enforced.
The Department of Labor was responsible for placing workers with
disabilities in suitable jobs. Placement remained difficult despite a
1993 executive order granting tax incentives to firms that hire
disabled employees. Persons with disabilities also tended to be paid
less than employees without disabilities for performing the same job.
Panama City's building code requires that all new construction
projects be accessible to persons with disabilities, with fines from
$100 to $500 for noncompliance. A national law with similar
requirements for new construction projects generally was enforced.
Awareness of disability issues has increased, and commercial
establishments increasingly provided and enforced handicapped parking
spaces. However, basic services such as handicapped-accessible
sidewalks and bathrooms were largely unavailable.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution protects the ethnic identity
and native languages of indigenous people and requires the Government
to provide bilingual literacy programs in indigenous communities.
Indigenous people have legal rights and take part in decisions
affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of
natural resources. Indigenous people numbered approximately 229,000 (8
percent of the population) and had the same political and legal rights
as other citizens. The Government has passed legislation setting aside
indigenous reserves for five of the country's seven native groups,
including the Embera-Wounaan, Ngobe-Bugle, and Kuna. Tribal chiefs
governed each reserve; they met in a general congress at regular
intervals. The much smaller Bri-Bri (1,500 members) and Naso (2,800
members) tribes did not have enclaves; they resided near the border
with Costa Rica. The Ministry of government and Justice in Panama City
maintained an Office of Indigenous Policy. Federal law is the ultimate
authority on indigenous reserves, but local groups were allowed
considerable local autonomy. For example, the Government recognized
traditional indigenous marriage rites as the equivalent of a civil
ceremony. Laws protect intellectual property rights of indigenous
artwork and set up regulations for artisan fairs. Despite legal
protection and formal equality, indigenous people generally had
relatively higher levels of poverty, disease, malnutrition, and
illiteracy than the rest of the population. The poverty rate among the
entire indigenous population was estimated between 85 and 96 percent,
depending on the group. Discrimination against indigenous people,
although generally not overt, was widespread.
In July a 13-year-old indigenous Wounaan girl was shot and killed,
apparently by accident, in a PNP compound (see Section 1.a.). Some
indigenous leaders in Darien Province asked the PNP not to locate
police compounds so close to or directly in a comarca and claimed that
the PNP presence interfered with their culture and daily activities.
The PNP stated that the police needed to be there precisely to protect
the area from attacks from neighboring Colombia, and other indigenous
groups asked the PNP to stay where they were.
Although their population suffers from poverty and malnutrition,
Kuna leaders have succeeded in enforcing their territorial boundaries
and maintaining their cultural integrity. A 190-acre Kuna Wargandi
reserve was created in 2000. There were two Kuna legislators (see
Section 3). Other indigenous groups had not succeeded in using their
autonomy to preserve their culture or develop economic independence.
Most lived in extreme poverty and isolation. Illiteracy among
indigenous groups was almost 50 percent, compared with 10 percent among
the population as a whole.
Since indigenous populations infrequently mastered Spanish and were
unfamiliar with the legal system, they often misunderstood their rights
and failed to employ legal channels when threatened. The problem was
exacerbated by government inattention to indigenous problems. For
example, many Embera-Wounaan in the Darien were forced out of their
reserves due to encroachment by settlers, loggers, and Colombian
immigrants. The Ngobe also were under threat due to the isolation of
their reserves, encroachment by settlers, and generalized poverty.
Indigenous workers consistently did not receive the basic rights
provided by the Labor Code, such as minimum wage, social security
benefits, termination pay, and job security. Indigenous laborers in the
country's sugar, coffee, and banana plantations worked under worse
conditions than their nonindigenous counterparts. Indigenous migrant
workers were unlikely to be provided with housing or food, and their
children were much more likely to work long hours of heavy farm labor
than nonindigenous children (see Section 6.d.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is racially
diverse, and minority groups generally have been integrated into
mainstream society with overall success. However, discrimination
against the country's newer immigrants, especially Chinese, often was
overt. There were an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons of Chinese
descent or admixture. Cultural differences and language difficulties
hindered and possibly prevented many Chinese immigrants from fully
integrating into mainstream society. In addition, Panamanians often
resented Chinese immigrants. Racial slurs directed at Asians were used
openly among the general population, and substantial numbers of first
generation resident Chinese frequently were treated as second-class
citizens. However, second and third generation Chinese were seen as
distinct from recent immigrants and generally were accepted in society.
Middle Eastern and Indian residents, like the Chinese, also
suffered from racially motivated discriminatory treatment. All three
groups operated much of the country's retail trade, particularly in
urban areas. Legal and illegal immigrants, especially Chinese, were
accorded fewer legal protections than were citizens for their trade
activities. A constitutional provision reserving retail trade for
Panamanian citizens was not enforced in practice; however, immigrants
legally could not own their businesses and sometimes encountered
bureaucratic difficulties in practicing their professions.
Racism against blacks occurred, although it generally was expressed
in more subtle terms. Afro-Panamanians made up about 14 percent of the
population; mixed black and mestizo accounted for about 40 percent;
however, blacks were conspicuously absent from positions of political
and economic power. Antillean blacks, often identifiable by dress and
speech pattern, were a particular target for racial slurs and poor
treatment by citizens and by Spanish-speaking blacks. Their geographic
clustering in the economically depressed province of Colon and poorer
neighborhoods of Panama City heightened their isolation from mainstream
society. Black canal workers traditionally commanded significantly
greater financial resources compared with blacks elsewhere in society,
but many retired or emigrated, and there was some anecdotal evidence
that the rest were being replaced by white personnel. Mainstream
political elites generally were unconcerned by the economic and social
problems of black populations and a concomitant rise in drug use,
crime, and gang violence. The country's white elite successfully
marginalized citizens with darker skin through preferential hiring
practices in the private sector and manipulation of government
resources in the public sector. The predominately Afro-Panamanian city
of Colon, on the Caribbean coast and the country's second largest city,
suffered from a conspicuous lack of government services.
Racial discrimination against all ethnic groups was evident in the
workplace. In general, light-skinned persons were represented
disproportionately in management positions and jobs that required
dealing with the public (such as bank tellers and receptionists).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers had the right
to form and join unions of their choice, subject to the union's
registration by the Government. A 1995 labor code reform established
the minimum size of unions at 40 workers and streamlined the
accreditation and registration process for unions by providing that if
the Government does not respond to an application within 15 days, the
union automatically gains recognition with all rights and privileges
under the law. Employees of small companies may organize under a larger
umbrella group of employees with similar skills and form a union as
long as they number at least 40. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) repeatedly criticized this 40-person limit and asked the
Government to change it, with no response. The reformed code also
allowed labor leaders to keep their union positions if fired from their
jobs.
In February 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled
that the firing in 1990 of 270 public sector electricity and
telecommunications workers, which the Government justified based upon
``public good'' provisions in the law and the Constitution, was not
legal and proper. The Court gave the Government until June 30, 2003, to
present a report to justify its decision and recommended that the
workers be compensated, and that the Government also pay a fine. At
year's end, the Labor Ministry was preparing a response to the Court's
decision.
Approximately 10 percent of the total employed labor force was
organized. There were 341 active unions, grouped under 39 federations
and 10 confederations representing approximately 130,000 members in the
private sector. Neither the Government nor political parties outwardly
controlled or financed unions; however, the Government and political
parties exercised political, ideological, or financial influence over
some unions. The labor sector traditionally supported the PRD.
The 1994 Civil Service Law permits most government workers to form
public employee associations and federations and establishes their
right to represent members in collective bargaining with their
respective agencies. It also provides a small core of civil servants
with the right to strike, bargain collectively, and evade summary
dismissal, except for those in areas vital to public welfare and
security, such as the police and health workers. However, the law has
proven insufficient to protect the country's 150,000 government
workers, because only a small percentage were career members of the
administrative civil service and therefore enjoyed job security. While
the right to strike applied to some of the 10,000 career members, it
did not apply to the approximately 140,000 other government workers.
Public workers formed a union, but it had very limited rights and could
not strike or bargain collectively. The ILO's Committee of Experts has
observed for some years that the prohibition of public servants'
associations is inconsistent with the country's obligations under ILO
Convention 87.
The law governing the autonomous Panama Canal Authority prohibits
the right to strike for its 9,000 employees, but does allow unions to
organize and to bargain collectively on such issues as hours and
safety.
Union organizations at every level may and do affiliate with
international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
provides most workers, including all private sector workers, with the
right to organize and bargain collectively, and unions exercised it
widely. The law protects union workers from antiunion discrimination
and requires employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
The Ministry of Labor had mechanisms to resolve such complaints. The
Civil Service Law allows most public employees to organize and bargain
collectively and grants some of them a limited right to strike;
however, 140,000 government workers did not have the right to bargain
collectively or to strike. The 1994 Civil Service Act requires that at
least 50 percent of the workforce continue to work in order to provide
minimum service. The Labor Code establishes a conciliation board in the
Ministry of Labor to resolve labor complaints and provides a procedure
for arbitration.
In 1999 the Supreme Court ruled that an article of the Labor Code
that obligated private sector strikers to submit to binding arbitration
after a given period was unconstitutional. There were some strikes and
protests during the year, especially in the banana and construction
industries. None of the strikes led to widespread violence.
Employers commonly hired temporary workers to circumvent labor code
requirements for permanent workers. Temporary workers were excluded
from social security benefits, job security, and vacation time. In
lower-skilled service jobs, employers often had some employees under
``3-month contracts'' for years, sometimes sent such employees home for
a month, and then rehired them. Employers also circumvented the law
requiring a 2-week notice for discharges by laying off some employees 1
day before the 3-month time period expired, or 1 week before a holiday.
In addition, due to labor laws that made it difficult to fire employees
of 2 years or more, it was not uncommon to hire workers for 1 year and
11 months and then to lay them off.
Labor law requires companies to submit copies of all labor
contracts for permanent workers to the Labor Ministry for review to
ensure compliance and requires the Labor Ministry to conduct periodic
inspections of the work force. The Labor Ministry may levy fines
against companies not in compliance with the law. However, these
measures proved ineffective in practice. According to union sources,
the practice of ``blank'' contracts that did not specify starting
dates, in order that the employer could avoid longevity issues, was
becoming more widespread.
Over the past 6 years, the Government issued cabinet decrees that
precluded effective organization of unions in export processing zones
(EPZs), including by restricting strikes and permitting negotiations
with workers who are represented by a union. Unions asserted that this
latter practice resulted in negotiations with employee groups that were
dominated by employers. There were no collective bargaining contracts
in the EPZs. The law requires mandatory arbitration of disputes, and it
allows for the participation of an unrepresentative worker delegate in
the tripartite (government, labor, and industry) arbitration
commission. A strike is considered legal only after 36 workdays of
conciliation were exhausted; otherwise, striking workers could be fined
or fired. A 1998 ILO ruling noted that this regulation did not mention
arbitration or specify procedures to resolve disputes in the courts and
called on the Government to amend the EPZ labor regulations to conform
with international norms; however, the Government did not make any
changes in response to the ruling. Minimum wage provisions did not
apply in the EPZs.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Labor Code prohibits
forced or bonded labor by adults and children; however, trafficking in
women and children was a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under
14 years of age with some exceptions, and also prohibits the employment
of children under age 15 if the child has not completed primary school.
However, a 2000 government report estimated that 27,000 children
between the ages of 12 and 14 work. Children under age 16 legally
cannot work overtime, and those under age 18 cannot work at night.
Children between the ages of 12 and 15 may perform light farm or
domestic work, with the authorization of the Labor Ministry, as long as
it does not interfere with their schooling. Many children reportedly
worked on rural coffee and sugar plantations, as well as in the
informal sector of the economy. The Labor Code provides that children
between the ages of 14 and 16 may work 6-hour shifts per day that do
not exceed 36 hours a week. The Labor Code includes a prohibition on
employment of minors under the age of 18 in hazardous labor. The
Ministry of Labor enforced these provisions in response to complaints
and could order the termination of unauthorized employment. The
Government acknowledged that it was unable to enforce some child labor
provisions in rural areas, and it conducted only limited inspections,
due to insufficient staff.
Child labor violations occurred most frequently in rural areas,
during the harvest of sugar cane, coffee, bananas, and tomatoes. Farm
owners usually paid according to the amount harvested, leading many
laborers to bring their young children to the fields to help with the
work. In many small rural communities, the entire able-bodied
population participated in the harvest, and parents were not willing to
leave their children behind unattended. Many children also were
involved extensively in subsistence agriculture producing coffee and
sugar; they worked with their families or were employed by independent
plantations.
The problem of child labor in agricultural areas appeared to fall
most heavily on indigenous families, who often were forced to migrate
out of their isolated reserves in search of paid work (see Section 5).
These frequent migrations not only interrupted schooling but also left
the family vulnerable to sometimes unscrupulous contractors. The
Government claimed that due to insufficient staff, it was unable to
enforce child labor provisions in rural areas such as in the coffee and
banana plantations near the border with Costa Rica, where government
resources were especially scarce and children faced difficult
conditions (see Section 6.e.).
Urban supermarkets used an estimated 1,500 children who bagged
groceries for tips. Some of the children were as young as age 9, and
many of them worked late hours, in violation of the Labor Code. Some
supermarket managers claimed that the children actually were not
employed by their firm, despite the fact that ``baggers'' conformed to
schedules, wore uniforms, complied with company codes of conduct, and
took orders from managers as if they were direct employees. The
Government failed to act to reduce the general problem of urban child
labor and did not challenge the larger supermarket chains where large
numbers of children worked. Urban child labor problems also included
children working as street vendors or performers, washing cars, and
running errands for businesses or local criminal groups.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes
minimum wage rates for specific regions and for most categories of
labor. The minimum wage ranged from $0.80 per hour to $1.50 per hour,
depending on the region and sector. This wage was not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The
Government last raised the base minimum wage in 2000 by approximately
13 percent. With inflation below 3 percent per year and despite
strenuous private sector objections, the Government undertook a legally
required review of the minimum wage in August but had not altered it by
year's end. Most workers formally employed in urban areas earned the
minimum wage or more; however, about one-third of the population worked
in the large informal sector and earned far below the minimum wage.
This was particularly the case in most rural areas, where unskilled
laborers earned $3 to $6 per day, without benefits; the Government did
not enforce labor laws in most rural areas. Public sector workers did
not fall under the Labor Code and did not always receive the minimum
wage. The minimum wage did not apply in the EPZs (see Section 6.b.).
The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 48 hours and
provides for at least one 24-hour rest period weekly.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing health and
safety standards and generally did so. The standards are fairly broad
and generally emphasize safety over long-term health hazards.
Inspectors from both the Labor Ministry and the occupational health
section in the Social Security Administration conducted periodic
inspections of hazardous employment sites and responded to complaints;
however, the Government failed adequately to enforce health and safety
standards. Construction workers and their employers were notoriously
lax about conforming to basic safety measures. In rural areas, the most
severe lack of oversight in basic safety measures occurred in the
banana industry, where poisoning by chemical agents was a recurrent
problem. Workers complained of sterility and of adverse skin conditions
as a result of exposure to the chemicals. In several plantations,
indigenous workers were not provided with shelters, sanitary or cooking
facilities, or fresh water; they also did not have machetes or gloves
for their work. Complaints of health problems also continued in the
cement and milling industries.
The law protects from dismissal workers who file requests for
health and safety inspections. Workers also have the right to remove
themselves from situations that present an immediate health or safety
hazard without jeopardizing their employment. They generally were not
allowed to do so if the threat was not immediate but may request a
health and safety inspection to determine the extent and nature of the
hazard.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prohibits trafficking in
women and children; however, trafficking remained a problem. The Penal
Code provides for prison sentences of 2 to 4 years for the promotion or
facilitation of the entry to or exit from the country of a person for
the purposes of prostitution. In some circumstances, the penalty is
increased to 6 years. Minor corruption, legal technicalities, and lack
of resources contributed to the Government's inability to combat the
problem fully. Traffickers occasionally bribed or evaded local law
enforcement officials. Prostitution is not illegal; most prostitutes
came with that explicit intention. During the year, police and
immigration officials occasionally conducted raids on houses of
prostitution.
The country was a destination for women and girls trafficked for
sexual purposes from Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Trafficking
in women and girls for sexual purposes occurred within the country, but
the extent of the practice was unknown.
According to a report by the NGO International Human Rights Law
Institute, trafficking assumed a cover of legality under a visa program
for ``alternadoras'' (escorts) managed by the Directorate of Migration
and the Ministry of Labor. In 2000 more than 700 women from Colombia
were granted such visas for temporary work, stating the club or massage
parlor where they intended to work, so most came with the explicit
intention of prostitution rather than being deceived with promises of
other employment. During the year, only about 40-50 alternadora visas
were granted.
The country was primarily a transit point for aliens seeking to
reach the United States, some of whom were trafficked into indentured
servitude. The majority of the estimated 30,000 aliens transiting
Panama originated in Ecuador and Peru, but a significant and increasing
number came from India and China. Their travel was facilitated by a
network of alien smugglers, travel agents, hotels, and safe houses.
Prosecutions were rare, but one person was convicted for alien
smuggling during the year. Anecdotal evidence indicated that illegal
aliens transiting through the country were subject to frequent
hardship. They commonly were deprived of adequate food and shelter.
Chinese aliens particularly were vulnerable to poor treatment, and
ultimately those trafficked for the purpose of forced labor were
coerced into working off their debt, which could be as high as $30,000,
as indentured servants. The Government did not conduct educational
campaigns to warn of the dangers of trafficking, and there were no
programs to aid victims.
__________
PARAGUAY
Paraguay is a constitutional republic with three branches of
government. The President is the Head of government and Head of State;
he cannot succeed himself. Colorado Party Senator Luis Gonzalez Macchi
assumed the presidency in March 1999; in August 2000, voters elected
Julio Cesar Franco of the Liberal Party to be Vice President. The
bicameral Congress is made up of a 45-member Senate and an 80-member
Chamber of Deputies. The Colorado Party, the dominant political party,
holds a plurality in both houses of Congress. The Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary; however, the courts remained inefficient
and subject to corruption and political pressure, although the Supreme
Court continued to undertake judicial reforms to root out undue
influence and corruption.
The military generally no longer plays an overt role in politics;
however, members of two army units and a group of National Police
officers participated in an attempted coup in 2000. The National Police
has responsibility for maintaining internal security and public order
and reports to the Ministry of the Interior. The civilian authorities
generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Members
of the security forces committed some human rights abuses.
The country has a market economy with a large state presence and a
large informal sector. The population is approximately 5.8 million. In
2001 the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $1,510 was lower in
real terms than it was 10 years earlier, and the Central Bank projected
negative 2.5 percent growth for 2002. An estimated 32 percent of the
population was employed in agriculture, which provided 30 percent of
the GDP and more than 90 percent of export earnings. The informal
economy, estimated to equal the value of the formal sector, also has
shrunk considerably in recent years.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in most areas; however, there were serious problems in some areas.
There were killings by the police and military. Incidents of torture
and abuse of convicted prisoners and other detainees continued,
including an unresolved case of abduction and torture of two kidnaping
suspects, allegedly directed by government agents. The human rights
ombudsman prosecuted cases of human rights abuses committed during the
1954-89 Stroessner regime. Conditions in prisons throughout the country
were substandard, marked by overcrowding and poor safety and control of
inmates. Treatment of conscripts improved. Other problems included
arbitrary arrests and detention, lengthy pretrial detention, corruption
and inefficiency in the judiciary, and infringements on citizens'
privacy rights. The Government's Inter-Institutional Commission on
Human Rights took steps to reduce illegal military conscription;
however, recruitment and conscription of underage minors continued.
Police used force against nonviolent demonstrators. Violence and
discrimination against women, abuse of children, and discrimination
against persons with disabilities and indigenous people were problems.
Worker rights were not protected adequately, and child labor existed.
Paraguay was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening
Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in
Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The police and
military were responsible for some killings involving the use of
unwarranted or excessive force. There were reports of police officers
killing persons while acting outside the scope of their duties, of
deaths in custody, and of the killing of a military conscript.
Officers Nelson Mora Leguizamon, Sinecio Camacho, and Edgar Herrera
Caballero were charged in the May shooting death of taxi driver Carlos
Villagra Lovera in Asuncion.
In June demonstrator Calixto Cabral was shot and killed in Caacupe
when National Police officers attempted to stop him and others opposed
to the privatization of a telephone utility from marching to Asuncion.
An investigation continued at year's end.
In September Tacumbu Prison inmate Gustavo Ramon Portillo allegedly
killed fellow inmate Luis Alberto Martinez during an argument in the
prison.
In October police officers Edison Torres, Roque ``Rambo'' Fretes,
and Rodolfo Fernandez were arrested in connection with the October
shooting death of Cinthia Fretes. Witnesses reportedly said that the
officers fired upon a vehicle in which several people, including
Cinthia Fretes, were riding. The investigation was pending at year's
end.
In November police in Ciudad del Este charged police officer Adan
Ramirez Olazar with the November shooting death of Roberto Carlos
Paniagua Jara. Ramirez Olazar reportedly shot Panigua while he was
trying to mediate a dispute between the police officer and a third man.
The trial was pending at year's end.
In November underage military conscript Luis Fernando Bobadilla
Acuna died of a gunshot wound while on duty. Military authorities
determined preliminarily that the death was accidental, but family
members contended that he was murdered. An investigation continued at
year's end (see Section 1.f.).
Off-duty police officers Juan Carlos Ocholasky, Reinaldo Dario
Nunez Rojas, and Richard Jimenez Perez were convicted in the September
2001 murder of Jose Vera, whom they kidnaped in Asuncion and tortured
before shooting him to death.
In April prosecutors recommended that nine police officers
implicated in the November 2001 shooting death of Miguel Casco
Valdovinos each be sentenced to 25 years in prison. Casco Valdovinos
died in Curuguaty while in police custody.
In August the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch
(HRW) asked the Government to investigate deaths among military
recruits in the armed forces. HRW indicated that it had received
information that 111 recruits had died while in service since 1989, the
majority of whom were under 18 years of age, and noted that most of the
investigations of these deaths had not been resolved (see Section
1.f.).
In September police officer Pedro Recalde Aguilar was sentenced to
22 years in jail for killing two men in 1998.
In September lawyers from the NGO Committee of Churches petitioned
the Foreign Ministry to continue prosecuting a motion to extradite
Alfredo Stroessner from Brazil to stand trial for a murder committed in
1987. A December 2001 petition to extradite Stroessner for the 1976
killings of Rodolfo and Benjamin Ramirez remained pending at year's
end.
No information was available on investigations in the case of a 14-
year-old inmate at the Neuropsychiatric Hospital in Asuncion who died
in 2000 (see Section 5).
In the continuing investigation of the 1999 death of Jose ``Coco''
Villar, whom police officers allegedly shot and killed, a judge ordered
a new forensic examination after an investigation proved that an
earlier examination was falsified. The investigation was underway at
year's end.
At year's end, prosecutors still were investigating the 2000 death
of a juvenile military recruit, Pedro Centurion.
In the case of the 1999 killing of Vice President Luis Maria Argana
and seven antigovernment protesters (see Section 1.d.), sanctions
against three of the four alleged ringleaders were discontinued. Former
army commander Lino Oviedo faced charges in connection with these
killings; at year's end, Oviedo remained in Brazil (see Section 1.d.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture as well as cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment; however, torture
(primarily beatings) and brutal and degrading treatment of convicted
prisoners and other detainees continued. The Paraguay Human Rights
Coordinating Board (CODEHUPY)--a group of 32 NGOs, civic organizations,
and trade unions--reported several cases of police torture and other
abusive treatment of persons, including women and children, designed to
extract confessions, punish escape attempts, or intimidate detainees.
The Attorney General's office and the NGO Committee of Churches
compiled numerous examples of police abuse.
In January law enforcement agents from the Attorney General's
office allegedly kidnaped leftist political figures Juan Arrom and
Asuncion Marti, tortured them, and threatened their lives. Arrom and
Marti, suspects in the kidnaping of Maria Bordon de Debernardi,
allegedly were held for 2 weeks and freed by family members who said
they were tipped off by neighbors and police. Interior Minister Julio
Cesar Fanego, Justice and Labor Minister Silvio Ferreira, Police Chief
Blas Chamorro, and Investigations Chief Roberto Gonzalez Cuquejo all
resigned shortly after the Arrom/Marti incident. Two police officers
were arrested and then released, and another continued under
investigation. Arrom and Marti alleged that Fanego and Ferreira knew
that they were being held against their will but did nothing. No
charges were filed against the former ministers. The Government's
national intelligence service was disbanded because of information
compiled during the investigation of the Arrom and Marti kidnaping. The
Government complied with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights'
(IACHR) request for information on the case. In December prosecutors
filed kidnaping charges against Arrom and Marti; at year's end, they
remained free on bail pending trial.
In January lawyers for the country's Human Rights Commission
alleged that police officers tortured Victor Colman and Jorge Samudio,
later charged in the Debernardi kidnaping, after arresting the two men.
The Interior Ministry denied that its officers had tortured the men,
acknowledging only that they suffered bruises while being arrested.
In May five military recruits claimed they were tortured while in
service at the First Cavalry Regiment in Pozo Colorado. Hugo Espinola,
Mario Guerrero Gonzalez, Hugo Omar Rojas Gimenez, Jose Asuncion Aguero,
and Mario Gamarra alleged that their superiors in the regiment
physically, sexually, and psychologically mistreated them. Four of the
men escaped the Pozo Colorado barracks and reached help after walking
12 miles through the night; the fifth was recaptured by the military.
Authorities had not resolved the case by year's end.
In May 2000, several persons arrested during the state of exception
following the abortive 2000 coup reported being tortured during their
detention (see Sections 1.d. and 3). Some of these persons reported
that former Interior Minister (and current legislator) Walter Bower
witnessed and encouraged the beatings of suspects in three unrelated
cases. Press reports also connected Bower to the torture of eight
peasants in Concepcion in 2000; police reportedly beat them in Bower's
presence after they were arrested for illegally cutting down trees. In
August 2001, prosecutors charged Bower with torture and other crimes
for his actions following the abortive coup. In December Saul Leonardo
Franco filed a complaint alleging that Bower and three police officers
tortured him following the failed coup attempt. Criminal actions
against Bower remained pending at year's end; however, there were no
significant developments during the year. In October commentators
alleged that courts were delaying consideration of the case.
Police used force to disperse protesters on several occasions,
sometimes killing or seriously injuring civilians (see Sections 1.a.
and 2.b.).
Hundreds of cases of torture and abuses remained pending from the
1954-89 Stroessner regime. Under the Constitution, the Defensor del
Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsman) prosecutes cases seeking monetary
compensation for human rights abuses committed during the Stroessner
regime. Since his appointment in November 2001, the ombudsman has ruled
that 35 persons were entitled to compensation for torture,
imprisonment, and other human rights violations suffered during the
Stroessner regime. More than 140 cases have been filed. In June the
Government gave the Ombudsman an additional 36 months to adjudicate
these cases.
The Ombudsman maintains documents related to abuses committed
during the Stroessner regime in an ``Archives of Terror'' that are
available for research by academics and the general public. During the
investigation of the Arrom/Marti abduction, authorities discovered
additional documents that were added to the Archives.
In April a review tribunal found that Captain Napoleon Ortigoza had
been detained unjustly for 25 years during the Stroessner dictatorship
and awarded him $1 million (7 billion guaranies) in compensation. In
September Nemesio Barreto Monzon filed a formal charge with the
Attorney General's office alleging that Stroessner, former Interior
Minister Sabino Montanaro, and other officials tortured him in 1974
because of his political affiliation; the case was pending at year's
end.
In April a trial judge issued a detention order against Stroessner
and his Interior Minister Sabino Montanaro in the 1987 torture and
death of Celestine Perez de Almada. While the order showed continued
interest in following up on wrongs from that regime, it had little
practical effect since Stroessner and Montanaro have lived in Brazil
and Honduras, respectively, since 1989. In September the Supreme Court
denied Ramon Duarte Vera's habeas corpus seeking to be freed from
prison pending his appeal of his conviction for torture and attempted
murder in 1959, during the Stroessner regime.
Prison facilities were deficient, and prison conditions were
extremely poor. Overcrowding, unsanitary living conditions, and
mistreatment were the most serious problems affecting all prisoners.
Tacumbu Prison--the largest in Asuncion--was built to hold 800 inmates
but housed more than 2,100, two-thirds of whom were awaiting trial. In
October the Office of Penal Institutions noted that more than 100
inmates in the Tacumbu Prison suffered from serious illness: 8 suffered
from HIV, 70 from syphilis, 32 from tuberculosis, and 47 from mental
diseases. Other regional prisons generally held approximately three
times more inmates than originally planned. UNICEF reported that
conditions were substandard in other facilities around the country,
especially in the Coronel Oviedo prison, where more than 500 inmates
were confined in a facility built for 100.
Security was a problem throughout the prison system. For example,
there were approximately 120 guards for more than 2,100 prisoners at
Tacumbu Prison. In July inmates held two guards prisoner for several
hours until Justice and Labor Minister Diego Abente negotiated an end
to the siege. Inmates frequently had weapons, particularly at Emboscada
in Minas. During prison searches in March, guards found drugs and
knives in inmates' possession in Tacumbu and in Abraham Cue in San Juan
Bautista. During a July riot in Emboscada, two inmates were killed, one
by gunshots from prison guards. In August inmates in the Emboscada and
Itagua facilities killed two fellow juvenile inmates. In April inmate
Ruben Insfran hanged himself in the Tacumbu facility.
Escapes were frequent; for example, in September Vicente Urdina
Chamorro, convicted of domestic violence, escaped from Tacumbu. The
press also reported numerous escapes and attempted escapes from the
Itagua facility. In February authorities thwarted a major escape
attempt from the maximum-security facility in Emboscada when the murder
of inmate Leonardo Meza prompted a surprise inspection.
At the Asuncion women's prison, Buen Pastor, there were several
reported rapes of prisoners by their guards, although laws governing
prisons forbid male guards in the women's prisons. In August inmates in
Buen Pastor rioted after the prison warden was replaced following
reports of narcotics use among inmates; drugs also were found in the
warden's office. Still, conditions in the women's prison were better
and less crowded than at Tacumbu. A small number of women were housed
in predominantly male facilities, where they were segregated from the
male population. After the August riots, prison officials transferred
19 female inmates to the all-male Emboscada maximum-security prison to
separate them from the general population.
The Congressional Human Rights Commission criticized the prisons
for their poor nutritional standards. Prisons generally served one meal
a day, and prisoners seldom got vegetables, fruit, or a meat protein
source, unless they had individual means to purchase them.
In June the IACHR referred a long-standing complaint against
conditions in Panchito Lopez, the former youth detention center, to the
Inter-American Court for Human Rights. The complaint, filed by the NGOs
Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) and Tekojoja alleged
that prison officials had violated the human rights of youth offenders
at Panchito Lopez from 1996 until the facility burned in 2001.
In September the Ministry of Justice and Labor replaced the warden
and senior security officials at the Emboscada prison after reports
that officials were beating and torturing prisoners. In July
authorities fired the officials in charge of the Tacumbu Prison and
charged them after learning that officials and inmates were operating a
stolen car ring out of the facility.
The Government, led by Justice and Labor Minister Diego Abente,
took some steps to improve prison conditions. Work continued on new
juvenile facilities at Itagua and Fernando de la Mora prisons. While
pretrial detainees were not held separately from convicted prisoners,
in January the Ministry of Justice decreed that convicted inmates would
be segregated from those who were held awaiting trial. The new
administration at Tacumbu made several immediate changes, including
closing the areas where more affluent prisoners paid for more
comfortable accommodations. To increase accountability, in January a
judge ordered that authorities provide national identification cards to
prisoners.
The Government permitted independent monitoring of prison
conditions by human rights organizations. Amnesty International and
diplomatic representatives have been granted access to prisons on
announced and unannounced visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention were persistent problems. The Constitution prohibits
detention without an arrest warrant signed by a judge and stipulates
that any person arrested must appear before a judge within 24 hours to
make a statement. The police may arrest persons without a warrant if
they catch them in the act of committing a crime, but they must notify
a prosecutor within 6 hours. In practice the authorities did not always
comply with these provisions.
Pretrial detention remained a serious problem; an estimated 66
percent of persons in prison were held pending trial, many for months
or years after their arrest. While the law encourages speedy trials,
the Constitution permits detention without trial until the accused
completes the minimum sentence for the alleged crime, which often
occurs in practice. Judges have the discretion to permit ``substitute
measures,'' such as house arrest, in place of bail for most crimes.
Judges frequently set relatively high bail, and many accused persons
were unable to post bond. The Supreme Court and many criminal court
judges also made periodic visits to the prisons to identify and release
improperly detained individuals.
In 1999 more than 45 persons--including well-known political
figures--were arrested in connection with the 1999 assassination of
Vice President Argana and the killing of student protesters (see
Section 1.a.). Sanctions against three of the four prominent suspects,
who had been remanded to house arrest or other alternative detention,
were discontinued, and only one person remained subject to such
sanctions (see Section 1.a.).
The last of the 54 military personnel detained in 2000 for their
suspected participation in the attempted coup were released from
prison. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions of members of an
artillery battalion, and many of the other personnel were not tried or
sentenced.
The Constitution expressly prohibits exile, and the Government did
not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, politicians and other interested
parties often pressured judges, although the judiciary was not allied
with any one political group. Courts remained inefficient and subject
to corruption and political influence.
The nine-member Supreme Court appoints lower court judges and
magistrates, based upon recommendations by the Magistrate's Council.
There are five types of appellate tribunals: Civil and commercial,
criminal, labor, administrative, and juvenile. Minor courts and
justices of the peace fall within four functional areas: Civil and
commercial, criminal, labor, and juvenile. The military has its own
judicial system.
The 2000 Penal and Criminal Procedures Code provides the legal
basis for the protection of fundamental human rights. The new code
introduced expedited oral proceedings and requires prosecutors to bring
charges against accused persons within 180 days. Defendants enjoy a
presumption of innocence, and defendants and the prosecutor may present
the written testimony of witnesses as well as other evidence. The judge
alone determines guilt or innocence and decides punishment. A convicted
defendant may appeal his or her sentence to an appeals court, and the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over constitutional questions.
The new system reduced the backlog of pending criminal cases, as 95
percent of those cases active in 1999 had been resolved by March 2001.
The average length of a criminal proceeding dropped by 75 percent,
resulting in a reduction of the length of pretrial detention; however,
the average time from arrest to trial was still approximately 240 days.
The long trial period highlighted the judiciary's struggle with
inefficiency and insufficient resources.
In September the Supreme Court voided provisions of the new
criminal code that would have dismissed those cases filed under the old
system that were still pending on February 28, 2003. Human rights
advocates hailed this decision, which they felt would prevent
defendants from avoiding prosecution by delaying their cases until that
deadline.
The Constitution stipulates that all defendants have the right to
an attorney, at public expense if necessary, but this right often was
not respected in practice. Many destitute suspects received little
legal assistance, and few had access to an attorney sufficiently in
advance of the trial to prepare a defense. The 148 public defenders in
the country, including 44 in Asuncion, lacked the resources to perform
their jobs adequately.
There were no reports of political prisoners. Of the more than 45
supporters of former General Lino Oviedo who were arrested after the
1999 killings of Vice President Argana and the student protesters, 4
were awaiting prosecution at year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
They said they were being detained because of their political
opposition to President Gonzalez Macchi.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that the police may not
enter private homes except to prevent a crime in progress or when the
police possess a judicial warrant; however, at times the Government
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. While the Government and its
security forces generally did not interfere in the private lives of
citizens, human rights activists claimed that local officials and
police officers abuse their authority by entering homes or businesses
without warrants and harassing private citizens. There were allegations
that the Government occasionally spied on individuals and monitored
communications for political and security reasons.
During the year, the authorities took steps to reduce the illegal
conscription of minors, the mistreatment of recruits, and the
unexplained deaths of recruits (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The
Government's Inter-Institutional Committee, including judges,
attorneys, legislators, and NGO representatives, continued its visits
around the country during the year to inspect conscripts' records and
identify any minor soldiers. The Committee had the power to investigate
and report on abuses and conditions.
The Government established review procedures for military recruits
to prevent future enlistment of minors, although it was unclear whether
they had been implemented. The Government ordered all military officers
responsible for recruiting to ensure that all conscripts meet the
legally minimum mandated requirement age of 18 for military service.
The armed forces no longer allowed 17-year-olds to enlist with parental
permission. However, there were reported violations, including
allegations that military recruiters forced underage youths to join
units and provided them with false birth certificates and other
documentation to show them to be of age. In September and October,
Human Rights Ombudsman Manuel Paez Monges found 20 17-year-old
conscripts in the Intendencia and Navy facilities and formally
petitioned the armed forces chief to stop recruiting underage soldiers.
Since 1989, 111 underage conscripts have died while in military
service. In November underage military conscript Luis Fernando
Bobadilla Acuna died of a gunshot wound while on duty (see Section
1.a.).
There were several allegations of mistreatment of military recruits
by noncommissioned and commissioned officers (see Section 1.c.). In
June 2001, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reported
that the average age of recruits was 16.4 years and that seven underage
soldiers had died.
Human rights organizations and victims' families filed complaints
with the IACHR on behalf of five men who died--one had been beaten and
another tortured--or disappeared while in military service between 1989
and 1998. In January the Senate Human Rights Commission charged
Sigfrido Chavez Orrego with altering birth certificates of minors who
then were enlisted. Chavez Orrego allegedly forged documents for
recruits in the Second Calvary Division and in the Lower Chaco. The
charges came after visits in 2001 to military institutions by the
Government's Interinstitutional Committee.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
The print and electronic media were independently owned; some media
outlets were tied closely to political parties, particularly the
Colorado party, factions of this party, or business entities. The media
commonly criticized the Government and freely discussed opposition
viewpoints.
In February a court of appeals confirmed a fine of $90,000 (630
million guaranies) against ABC Color Editor Aldo Zuccolillo in a case
of slander brought by a senator of the Colorado Party.
In March a criminal court in Alto Parana and Canindeyu confirmed a
25-year sentence given to the man convicted of the January 2001 killing
of journalist Salvador Medina, a reporter and chairman of the board of
directors of radio station Nemity FM in Capiibary, San Pedro. Medina's
family said he received a number of threats just prior to his death
following exposes he had made in his radio broadcasts.
In July the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters
alleged that the National Telecommunications Commission, accompanied by
police, shut down radio station Nemity FM in Capiibary, for which
Medina had been a reporter and board member, and confiscated its
equipment. The Commission claimed it was enforcing a 1999 judicial
order to close the station for regulatory reasons.
In August the Senate modified provisions of the Privacy Law to
limit its effect on freedom of the press. Critics of the law argued
that while intended to protect dissemination of personal information
about individuals, in practice it limited the public's access to
information about the property and the commercial and legal affairs of
public employees.
A report issued in September by the Sindicato de Periodistas del
Paraguay (SPP), the national journalists' union, warned of ``alliances
of media owners and politicians . . . that impede the exercise of
pluralistic journalism.'' The SPP mentioned the example of Radio
Corpus, in Ciudad del Este, explaining that the station fired a
journalist who refused to do paid interviews with local politicians.
In July the Supreme Court affirmed a decision overturning ABC Color
journalist Telmo Ibanez's libel conviction, levied after his reports on
corruption among government officials in Concepcion.
There were no further developments in the 2001 case of threats
against journalist Sever del Puerto.
In September the Government closed Internet service provider Planet
after a prosecutor alleged that the company was providing international
telephone service in violation of the telecommunications laws. After 4
days, the Government dismissed the charges and allowed Planet to resume
operations.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of all citizens to peaceful assembly, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice; however, in some
cases police used violent force against nonviolent assemblies.
The law restricts demonstrations in Asuncion to certain times and
places, and specifically prohibits meetings or demonstrations in front
of the presidential palace and outside military or police barracks.
Some groups have opposed these restrictions. The law also requires that
organizers notify the Asuncion police 24 hours before any rally
downtown. In addition, the law also prohibits public gatherings in the
congressional plaza in Asuncion, the traditional focal point for many
demonstrations, during daylight hours on workdays. The police may ban a
demonstration but must provide written notification of the ban within
12 hours of receipt of the organizers' request. The law permits a
police ban only if another party already has given notice of plans for
a similar rally at the same place and time. This law does not apply to
religious processions. During the year, the Government applied this law
selectively, using it against its political opponents. The Constitution
prohibits closing roads and bridges as a form of protest; however,
demonstrators closed roads on several occasions.
Police used live ammunition and clubs against demonstrators at the
National Palace in Asuncion several times. After a February
confrontation, in which the National Police stated that its forcible
actions were necessary to control the crowd, some human rights
organizations severely criticized the police action as a return to the
state-sponsored repression of the Stroessner regime. In September the
police used force to disperse approximately 1,000 political
demonstrators from the Palace grounds. These demonstrators were
supporters of former general Lino Oviedo; their political party
subsequently filed a complaint with the IACHR, and the International
Federation of Human Rights expressed its ``extreme concern'' regarding
the ``violent police brutality'' employed. No information was available
at year's end on the IACHR's action on the complaint.
In June National Police in Caacupe used force to stop marchers
protesting the privatization of government utilities. One demonstrator
was shot and killed, and dozens of others were shot or beaten (see
Section 1.a.).
In July President Luis Gonzalez Macchi declared a state of
emergency, banning protests and authorizing arrests without warrants,
after demonstrators nationwide blocked roadways and bridges. The
demonstrators, allegedly organized by former general Lino Oviedo,
called for Gonzalez Macchi's resignation. After the protests subsided,
the President lifted the state of emergency following constitutional
procedures.
In September in Edelia, Itapua, police used force to disperse
demonstrators--who had joined nationwide protests by mechanized farmers
and others against economic conditions--after they refused to obey a
court order directing them to clear roadways.
The Constitution provides for the right of all citizens to free
association, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. The Government required that all religious groups register
with the Ministry of Education and Culture but imposed no controls on
these groups, and many informal churches existed.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens may travel within the
country with virtually no restrictions, and there generally were no
restrictions on foreign travel or emigration. However, the persons
allegedly involved with plotting the 2000 coup were not allowed to
leave the country and were required to sign in with the Justice
Ministry once a month (see Section 3). The Constitution prohibits
closing roads and bridges as a form of protest; however, protesters
closed roads on several occasions (see Section 2.b.).
The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In July the country enacted asylum
legislation based on a UNHCR model. The Government cooperated with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Immigration
Department determines each request on a case-by-case basis in
consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Relations and Interior and
the nongovernmental Committee of Churches. The issue of the provision
of first asylum did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and ability to change their government
through democratic means. Multiple parties and candidates contested the
country's leadership positions. Five parties were represented in the
Congress. The Constitution and the Electoral Code mandate general
elections every 5 years, voting by secret ballot, and universal
suffrage. Debate in Congress was free and frank. The Congress often
rejected the executive branch's proposals.
Observers from the Organization of American States characterized as
free and fair the August 2000 vice-presidential elections, the first
national executive election won by the opposition in more than 50
years. Gubernatorial elections and nationwide municipal elections were
held in April and November 2001, respectively. There were no reports of
irregularities, although the elections were marked by the lowest voter
turnout (50 percent) since the end of the Stroessner dictatorship in
1989. Political parties held primary elections in December to choose
nominees for the 2003 presidential and congressional elections.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government and politics. There were 10 women in Congress (8 of 45
senators and 2 of 80 national deputies), and women headed 3 government
ministries. The Electoral Code requires that
20 percent of each party's candidates in their internal primaries
for elective office be women. Women served as judges (although not on
the Supreme Court) and prosecutors.
Members of indigenous groups are entitled to vote, and the
percentage of indigenous people who exercised this right grew
significantly in recent years. The inhabitants of some indigenous
communities reported that they were threatened and prohibited from
fully exercising their political rights.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government did not restrict the activities of any human rights
groups or advocates; however, it had a mixed record in cooperating with
or responding to recommendations from such groups.
Local NGO human rights groups included the Committee of Churches
(an interdenominational group that monitored human rights, investigated
refugee claims, and provided legal assistance), Tekojoja (a group
dedicated to the protection of children's rights), and SERPAJ (a group
that defended conscientious objectors and provided legal assistance to
those with grievances arising from military service). CODEHUPY's annual
report highlighted abuses of police authority and mistreatment of
military recruits and noted that an impartial and corruption-free
judiciary is necessary to enforce human rights in the country. In
February the Government and the International Red Cross (ICRC) signed a
memorandum of understanding for ICRC operations in the country.
In October 2001, Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo)
Manuel Paez Monges began work as the country's human rights advocate.
His office took charge of the prosecution of 330 lawsuits seeking
compensation for human rights violations dating from the Stroessner
dictatorship (see Section 1.b.).
The Director General of Human Rights, located in the Ministry of
Justice and Labor, chaired the National Commission on Human Rights. The
Commission sponsored seminars to promote human rights awareness. The
Director General's office has access to the congressional, executive,
and judicial authorities. It does not have subpoena or prosecutorial
power, but the commission may forward information concerning human
rights abuses to the Attorney General for action. It served as a
clearinghouse for information on human rights and trained thousands of
educators in human rights law.
In 2000 the Supreme Court established an office to oversee the
conduct and prosecution of human rights cases. During the year, the
Supreme Court conducted human rights training workshops among
government agencies.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution and other laws prohibit discrimination based on
race, sex, disability, language, or social status; however, certain
groups, such as indigenous people, faced significant discrimination in
practice.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic abuse, which were underreported. Spousal abuse was
common. Although the Penal Code criminalizes spousal abuse, it
stipulates that the abuse must be habitual before being recognized as
criminal, and then it is punishable only by a fine. Thousands of women
were treated for injuries sustained in violent domestic altercations.
Between January and August 2001, the Secretariat of Women's Affairs
registered 533 cases of violence against women, a 25 percent increase
over the same period in 2000.
According to women's rights activists, official complaints rarely
were filed or were withdrawn soon after filing due to spousal
reconciliation or family pressure. In addition, the courts allow for
mediation of some family violence cases, which is not provided for by
the law. There are no specialized police units to handle complaints
involving rape. The Secretariat of Women's Affairs chaired a national
committee, made up of other government agencies and NGOs, that
developed a national plan to prevent and punish violence against women.
Under the plan, an office of care and orientation receives reports on
violence against women and coordinates responses with the National
Police, primary health care units, the Attorney General's office, and
NGOs. However, in practice these services were available only in
Asuncion. The Secretariat also conducted training courses for the
police, health care workers, prosecutors, and others.
The Women's November 25th Collective, an NGO, operated a reception
center where female victims of violence received legal, psychological,
and educational assistance. No shelters for battered and abused women
were available outside the capital of Asuncion. Most imprisoned women
reportedly were detained for assault, including murder, committed
following domestic violence.
The law prohibits the sexual exploitation of women, but the
authorities did not enforce the prohibition effectively. Prostitution
by adults is not illegal, and exploitation of women, especially teenage
prostitutes, remained a serious problem. Law enforcement officials
periodically staged raids on houses of prostitution. National daily
newspaper Noticias ran a series of features in September and October
chronicling child prostitution in Asuncion and other cities in the
country.
There were reports of trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
The Labor Code prohibits sexual harassment; however, many women in
the workplace faced sexual harassment. Claims of abuse are filed with
the courts and the Ministry of Justice and Labor. Sex-related job
discrimination continued to be widespread and widely tolerated. The
Secretariat of Women's Affairs occasionally sponsored programs intended
to give women free and equal access to employment, social security,
housing, ownership of land, and business opportunities.
Women had much higher illiteracy rates than men. A 2001 census
survey found that 15.4 percent of rural women were illiterate, compared
with 10.7 percent of rural men. In addition, maternal mortality rates
are high, and as many as 65 percent of such deaths were related to poor
medical care. Several groups worked to improve conditions for women,
including Women for Democracy, which was active in civic and electoral
education. Other groups included SUMANDO, an NGO that promoted
educational reform and voter participation in elections, and SEFEM,
which focused on women and public policy and the participation of women
in local development.
Children.--The Constitution protects certain children's rights and
stipulates that parents and the State should care for, feed, educate,
and support children. The population is very young, with an average age
of 25.3 years; 38.6 percent of the population is under age 15. A
February 2001 census survey reported that 45 percent of children age 5
or younger lived in poverty, compared with 32 percent of the general
population. Boys and girls legally are entitled to equal treatment in
education and health care. However, females had less access to
education, particularly in rural areas. The educational system did not
provide adequately for the educational needs of the population. The
Government was unable to implement fully amendments to its General
Education law, such as extending compulsory attendance through ninth
grade, because of inadequate funds. Families pay a fee to cover each
school's administrative expenses and must purchase books, uniforms, and
other supplies for their children's use. The census found that the 2001
national literacy rate was 91.6 percent.
Abuse and neglect of children was a problem. A local NGO attributed
a rise in the number of complaints of mistreatment of children during
2000 to the increased awareness of child abuse and neglect.
Sexual exploitation of children also was a problem. In a survey
released in 2001, the NGO AMAR identified 619 child victims of sexual
exploitation, the vast majority of whom lived in Asuncion and Ciudad
del Este. Approximately 33 percent of the victims were under the age of
16.
There were unsubstantiated reports of trafficking in girls for the
purpose of sexual exploitation (see Section 6.f.).
There continued to be reports of the conscription of underage youth
(see Section 1.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for equal
opportunity for persons with disabilities and mandates that the State
provide them with health care, education, recreation, and professional
training. It further requires that the State formulate a policy for the
treatment, rehabilitation, and integration into society of persons with
disabilities. However, the Congress never enacted legislation to
establish such programs or provide funding for them. Many persons with
disabilities faced significant discrimination in employment; others
were unable to seek employment because of a lack of accessible public
transportation. The law does not mandate accessibility for the persons
with disabilities, and the vast majority of the country's buildings,
both public and private, were inaccessible.
Conditions at the Neuropsychiatric Hospital in Asuncion were
substandard, and some patients reportedly were kept unclothed in cells
and were not treated for their mental illnesses. The physical
facilities of the hospital lacked running water, electricity, or even
roofs, and the hospital was severely understaffed. Children were housed
with adults in the facility and were subject to sexual assaults from
older patients. Two men were arrested and charged with sexually
assaulting inmates at the hospital. No information was available on the
Government's response to problems at this facility, including the 2001
death of an inmate (see Section 1.a.).
In June members of the Paraguayan Association of the Blind
contended that the group had received only one-third of the $30,000
(210 million guaranies) fund promised in 2001 by the Government's
Social Benefits Division. There was no information on the ultimate
disposition of these funds.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution provides indigenous people
with the right to participate in the economic, social, political, and
cultural life of the country; however, the indigenous population--
80,000, according to 2001 census data--was unassimilated and neglected.
Low wages, long work hours, infrequent payment (or nonpayment) of
wages, job insecurity, lack of access to social security benefits, and
racial discrimination were common. Numerous indigenous groups
challenged Congress's proposed changes to the Indigenous Community
Statute, which grants local groups the right to observe their
traditional lifestyles and customs. Weak organization and lack of
financial resources limited access by indigenous people to the
political and economic system. Indigenous groups relied primarily upon
parliamentary commissions to promote their particular interests. The
Constitution also protects the property interests of indigenous people,
but these rights are not codified fully. The Constitution allows Public
Ministry officials to represent indigenous people in matters involving
the protection of life and property.
Lack of access to sufficient land hindered the ability of
indigenous groups to progress economically and maintain their cultural
identity. In addition, there was insufficient police and judicial
protection from persons encroaching on indigenous lands. The
Government's National Indigenous Institute (INDI) has the authority to
purchase land on behalf of indigenous communities and to expropriate
private property under certain conditions to establish tribal
homelands. However, there were significant allegations of wrongdoing
within INDI. Furthermore, many indigenous people found it difficult to
travel to the capital to solicit land titles or process the required
documentation for land ownership.
Other significant problems facing the indigenous population
included lack of shelter and medical care, economic displacement
resulting from other groups' development and modernization, and
malnutrition. Scarce resources and limited government attention slowed
progress in dealing with these problems.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution allows both private
and public sector workers (with the exception of the armed forces and
the police) to form and join unions without government interference.
The Constitution contains several provisions that protect fundamental
worker rights, including an antidiscrimination clause, provisions for
employment tenure, severance pay for unjustified firings, collective
bargaining, and the right to strike. Approximately 121,000, or 15
percent, of workers were organized in approximately 1,600 unions.
In general unions were independent of the Government and political
parties. One of the country's three labor centrals, the Confederation
of Paraguayan Workers (CPT), was aligned closely with the ruling
Colorado Party.
All unions must be registered with the Ministry of Justice and
Labor. Although the official registration process was cumbersome and
could take a year or more due to government bureaucracy, the Ministry
of Justice and Labor issued provisional registrations within weeks of
application. Employers who wish to oppose the formation of a union can
delay union recognition by filing a writ opposing it. However, almost
all unions that request recognition eventually receive it.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
noted deficiencies in the application of certain conventions ratified
by the Government. These included conventions dealing with minimum
wage, abolition of forced labor, minimum age of employment, freedom of
association, equal remuneration, and employment policy. The ILO
specifically criticized as inconsistent with international norms
regarding the freedom of association regulations requiring a minimum of
300 workers to form a union; the imposition of excessive requirements
to be able to hold office in the executive body of a trade union; and
the submission of collective disputes to compulsory arbitration. In
response to the ILO criticism, the Ministry of Justice and Labor did
not enforce the 300-worker minimum, although the requirement remained
in the Labor Code.
The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination; however, the
firing and harassment of some union organizers and leaders in the
private sector continued. Union organizers sometimes were jailed for
their role in leading demonstrations. Fired union leaders may seek
redress in the courts, but the labor tribunals were slow to respond to
complaints and typically favored business in disputes. The courts were
not required to order the reinstatement of workers fired for union
activities. In some cases when judges ordered the reinstatement of
discharged workers, employers continued to disregard the court order
with impunity. The failure of employers to meet salary payments also
frequently precipitated labor disputes. Principal problems included
bottlenecks in the judicial system and the inability or unwillingness
of the Government to enforce labor laws. There were a number of cases
involving trade union leaders fired as long as 8 years ago that
remained pending in the courts. In May the president of a government
employees' union alleged that he had been fired because of his union
activity; at year's end, there was no information on the resolution of
his complaint. In November a union reported that officials in San
Lorenzo threatened to fire a union organizer until the union intervened
on his behalf. The ILO and the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions criticized the lack of measures to prevent antiunion
discrimination and observed that legislation does not oblige labor
courts to reinstate unfairly fired trade unionists.
There were also complaints that management created parallel or
``factory'' unions to compete with independently formed unions. There
were several cases of workers who chose not to protest due to fear of
reprisal or anticipation of government inaction.
Unions were free to form and join federations or confederations,
and they were affiliated with and participated in international labor
bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining, and this provision was generally
respected in practice. According to the Ministry of Justice and Labor,
there were approximately 30 collective bargaining agreements in place.
However, they were the exception rather than the norm in labor-
management relations and typically reaffirmed minimum standards
established by law. When wages were not set in free negotiations
between unions and employers, they were made a condition of individual
offers of employment.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, bans binding
arbitration, and prohibits retribution against strikers and leaders
carrying out routine union business; however, employers often took
action against strikers and union leaders. Voluntary arbitration
decisions are enforceable by the courts, but this mechanism rarely was
employed. Senior Labor Ministry officials were available to mediate
disputes.
There were numerous strikes by members of all three worker centrals
and smaller unions. Many of the strikes were related to the firing of
union officials, management violations of a collective contract,
management efforts to prevent the free association of workers, or
demands for benefits such as payment of the minimum wage or
contribution to the social security system. Others were directed at
broader economic issues. In May police and former employees of the
Itaipu Dam clashed in Ciudad del Este during a labor demonstration
protesting layoffs by a contractor at the dam. Thirty persons,
including 4 police officers, were injured in the confrontation, and 28
were arrested. In June employees of the telephone utility Antelco led a
series of strikes in Asuncion and throughout the country opposing the
planned privatization of that company; ultimately, the Government
decided to withdraw its plans to sell the company. In the September
``tractorazo'' strikes, farm workers throughout the country went on
strike, ceasing production and parking their vehicles on the sides of
roadways demanding reductions in the gasoline tax and water rates and
changes in other economic measures (see Section 2.b.).
There were no export processing zones. Maquiladora factories, which
assemble imported parts for re-export, have been established in the
eastern part of the country. The Mercosur trade association accepted
the country's maquiladora factories into its automotive regime. The
country's labor laws apply to maquila operators.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law prohibits forced
labor, including by children; however, cases of abuse of national
service obligations (compulsory military service for all males, unless
exempted as conscientious objectors) occurred (see Section 6.d.). There
were reports of conscripts forced to work as construction workers for
military officers in their privately owned businesses. There were
allegations of forced conscription of underage youths (see Section
1.f.).
Frequently families who could not afford to raise a child--usually
a daughter, sometimes as young as age 5--sent the child to relatives or
colleagues, who expected the child to work in exchange for room, board,
and access to education.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Director General for the Protection of Minors in the
Ministry of Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor
laws; however, in general the Government did not enforce minimum
working age regulations, and child labor was a problem. Minors between
15 and 18 years of age may work only with parental authorization and
may not be employed in dangerous or unhealthy conditions. Children
between 12 and 15 years of age may work only in family enterprises,
agriculture, or apprenticeships. The Labor Code prohibits work by
children under 12 years of age.
The 2001 census found that 5 percent of the workforce was under the
age of 14. The Statistics Bureau reported that from August to December
2000, 55 percent of boys between the ages of 10 and 19 worked.
According to the NGO Coeti, 265,000 children, or 13.6 percent of
children between the ages of 5 and 17, worked outside their homes, many
in unsafe conditions. Studies indicated that 42 percent of these
children began working by the age of 8, and some 37 percent did not
attend school. Thousands of children in urban areas, many of them
younger than 12 years of age, were engaged in informal employment, such
as selling newspapers and sundries and cleaning car windows. Many of
the children who worked on the streets suffered from malnutrition and
disease and lacked access to education. Some employers of the estimated
11,500 young girls working as domestic servants or nannies denied them
access to education and mistreated them (see Section 6.c.). Employers
sometimes filed false charges of robbery against those who sought to
leave domestic jobs and turned them over to the police. In rural areas,
children as young as 10 years of age often worked beside their parents
in the field; 88 percent of rural children in the labor force worked at
home or with family members, according to Coeti. Local human rights
groups did not regard families harvesting crops together as an abuse of
child labor.
In August more than 500 child and adolescent workers gathered to
protest adoption of ILO Convention 138, which established for the first
time a minimum working age (14).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The executive, through the
Ministry of Justice and Labor, has established a private sector minimum
wage sufficient to maintain a minimally adequate standard of living for
a worker and family. There was no public sector minimum wage. In
practice most (but not all) government agencies adjust the hours of
work for government workers to be paid at a rate comparable to the
private sector minimum wage. The minimum salary is adjusted whenever
annual inflation exceeds 10 percent, and it was approximately $136
(876,168 guaranies) per month at year's end, according to the Ministry.
However, the Ministry was unable to enforce the minimum wage and
estimated that 50 percent of workers earned less. The Labor Code
requires that domestic workers be paid at least 40 percent of the
minimum wage and allows them to work up to a 12-hour day.
The Labor Code allows for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours (42
hours for night work), with 1 day of rest. The law also provides for an
annual bonus of 1 month's salary and a minimum of 6 vacation days a
year. The law requires overtime payment for hours in excess of the
standard. However, many employers violated these provisions in
practice. There are no prohibitions on excessive compulsory overtime.
Workers in the transport sector routinely staged strikes to demand that
their employers comply with the Labor Code's provisions on working
hours, overtime, and minimum wage payments.
The Labor Code also stipulates conditions of safety, hygiene, and
comfort. The Government did not devote sufficient resources to the
Ministry of Justice and Labor and the Ministry of Health to enforce
these provisions effectively.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from situations that
endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their continued
employment, but they may not do so until such conditions were
recognized formally by the Ministries of Justice and Labor and Health.
Although there are laws intended to protect workers who file complaints
about such conditions, many employers reportedly took disciplinary
action against them.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution proscribes and the
Penal Code criminalizes trafficking in persons, but there were sporadic
reports of trafficking to and from the country for sexual purposes.
The Penal Code punishes trafficking in persons with up to 10 years
in prison; the code also outlaws compelling anyone to travel outside of
the country or to enter the country for the purpose of prostitution or
compelling a minor under 18 years of age to work as a prostitute. There
were no documented prosecutions against traffickers. The Government's
Secretariats of Women's Affairs, Children's Affairs, and Social Action
maintained an interest in trafficking.
In July the ILO completed a study of the sexual exploitation of
persons in the area near Itagua bordering Argentina and Brazil. The
survey observed children as young as 8 years of age involved in
prostitution, many to supplement their families' incomes (see Section
5). The survey was part of the ILO's 4-year program to identify and
remedy the social and legal problems leading to abuses in the region.
In September and October, the newspaper Noticias published a series
of anecdotal articles about children working as prostitutes in
Asuncion, Ciudad del Este, Ita, and other towns; they often were
recruited by boyfriends and older relatives or were runaways.
Because there were no government investigations of trafficking,
there was no information regarding methods used or persons responsible.
The NGOs Luna Nueva and Global Infancia monitored trafficking
situations that affected women and children and provided assistance to
victims.
__________
PERU
Peru is a multiparty republic that recently emerged from a decade
of authoritarian government and is undergoing a process of democratic
transformation. In November 2000, President Valentin Paniagua took
power and led a transition government after then-President Alberto
Fujimori resigned and was dismissed from office. The Government held
elections in April and June 2001, which observers considered to be
generally free and fair. Alejandro Toledo of the Peru Posible party won
the presidential runoff election with approximately 53 percent of the
vote and was inaugurated in July 2001. The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary widely was considered
corrupt and was subject to pressure from the executive over
controversial decisions favoring members of the Fujimori government.
The Government continued judicial reform efforts.
The Peruvian National Police (PNP) and the military shared
responsibility for internal security; they were under effective
civilian control. Members of the security forces committed some serious
human rights abuses.
Over the last decade, the Government transformed a heavily
regulated economy into a market-oriented one. The country's population
was approximately 27 million. Gross domestic product grew 4.8 percent
during the year, compared with only 0.2 percent growth in 2001.
Inflation, which was 0.1 percent in 2001, stayed under 1.5 percent
during the year. Major exports include copper, gold, and other
minerals, fishmeal, textiles, and agricultural products. Close to 54
percent of the population lived in poverty, earning less than $1.25 per
day; about 15 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty,
unable to meet the most basic food, shelter, and clothing requirements.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. There
were allegations of unlawful or unwarranted killings by police, and one
military recruit died as a result of abuse by superior officers. Police
tortured, beat, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison security forces
abused inmates. Torture and abuse of military recruits continued.
Impunity remained a problem, and security forces sometimes harassed
victims or other witnesses to keep them from filing charges. Overall
prison conditions remained poor and were extremely harsh in maximum-
security facilities. There continued to be reports of arbitrary arrest
and detention. Pretrial detention continued to be prolonged, and trials
were frequently subject to inordinate delays. Despite extensive changes
to reduce executive dominance over the judiciary, problems persisted,
including the general inefficiency of the system. Press freedom
improved and greater public attention was focused on the need for a
free press, although strong suspicions remained of isolated attempts by
the Government to influence the media by threats of legal or judicial
action. Violence and discrimination against women continued. Violence
against children and discrimination against persons with disabilities,
indigenous people, and racial and ethnic minorities remained problems.
Labor advocates argued that labor laws and practices restricted freedom
of association and collective bargaining rights, but a December law
addressed some of these problems. Child labor remained a serious
problem in the informal sector. Peru was invited by the Community of
Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD
Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
The terrorist organization Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) was
responsible for killings and other abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings by government agents. There
were a few allegations of unlawful or unwarranted killings by police.
One military recruit died after being tortured by superior officers.
In April police detained Andy Williams Garces during a police
surveillance operation in Piura. One officer allegedly shot Garces, who
fell into a river. Police claimed that Garces jumped into the river,
swam to the other side, and escaped. An investigation began, but no
charges have been filed, as Garces' body was not found.
On July 2, three members of a Lima municipal patrol unit and one
PNP officer detained Jose Reina Rincon, a bullfighter from Spain. Two
of the municipal guards beat Reina to death, and the four men then
dumped Reina's body at a beach near Lima. The authorities charged two
of the municipal guards with homicide and one guard along with the PNP
officer as accomplices. The investigation continued at year's end.
In October a prosecutor in Arequipa accused 24 police officers with
killing 2 persons, Fernando Talavera Soto and Edgar Pinto Quintanilla,
who died after being hit with teargas canisters during the Arequipa
protest (see Section 2.b.). The authorities charged the officers with
negligent homicide; at year's end, no trial had begun.
According to the Human Rights Commission (COMISEDH)--a
nongovernmental organization (NGO)--and a congressional subcommittee
looking into killings, torture, and mistreatment of young soldiers,
there was one report of a military recruit killed in Iquitos after
being tortured. An autopsy revealed that Pitter Rengifo Vasquez was
severely beaten before being killed allegedly by superior officers in
June.
On September 17, a Cajamarca department mayor and candidate for
reelection, Joselito Fernandez Perez, was murdered. Fernandez Perez was
part of the National Unity ticket, a nationwide, center-right umbrella
group headed by 2006 presidential hopeful Lourdes Flores. Flores and
other National Unity leaders claimed the murder was politically
motivated, particularly as two other National Unity activists were shot
in the same locality. Police arrested rival mayoral candidate Jose
Fernandez Cabana, an independent, in connection with the murder. This
appeared to be an isolated incident of election-related violence; an
investigation was underway at year's end.
For the first time, in August a court sentenced officials for human
rights crimes. In the case of the killing in 2000 of Alejandro Damian
Trujillo Llontop, the court sentenced PNP Lieutenant Cesar Gomez
Cassani and six other officers to 8 to 10 years in prison for human
rights violations related to disappearance, torture, and murder. In
early 2001, the officers were tried for Trujillo's murder, but a judge
determined that errors occurred during the deposition process and
subsequently released them. The prosecutor later brought charges
against the policemen for the human rights crime of forced
disappearance (see Section 1.e.).
In August the Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction over 15
military commandos who led the 1997 hostage rescue operation at the
Japanese ambassador's residence rested with the military court system.
The Supreme Court supported its decision to send the case to the
military court saying that the mission was carried out under a
presidential order during a state of emergency. The Court ruled that
four others--former Intelligence Service Director Vladimiro Montesinos,
former Armed Services Chief General Nicolas Hermoza, Colonel Roberto
Huaman, and Colonel Jesus Zamudio--were subject to civilian criminal
court jurisdiction. The ruling came after an investigation into reports
that the military executed Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
rebels in the aftermath of the rescue operation. At issue was whether
the officers followed an order to kill any MRTA survivors, allegedly
given by Montesinos and authorized by former President Alberto
Fujimori. At year's end, the trials were pending.
There were no developments in the cases of Juan Carlos Campos
Valentin and Graciano Rufino Martinez, who escaped from Challapalca
prison and were subsequently killed by prison officers in February
2001.
In February an investigation by the prosecutor's office in San Juan
de Lurigancho discounted accusations of torture and homicide and
determined that inmate Felipe Davila Gamarra died as a result of
injuries he received during an fight with other inmates in February
2001. The case was closed.
Initial trial proceedings were underway in civilian court against
four police officers and a military lieutenant in the May 2001 case of
Jenard Lee Rivera San Roque, who died after being detained and
allegedly tortured and beaten. Amnesty International stated that the
police attempted to prevent Rivera's family and neighbors from bringing
to justice the officers responsible for his torture and death. COMISEDH
had asked that the trial not be assigned to a military court.
There was no new information in the June 2001 case of Nazario
Victor Valencia Porras, who died after police took him to the Matucana
police station as a robbery suspect.
When charges were dropped after the prosecutor's office in Tacna
accused six National Prison Institute (INPE) officers of killing
Guillermo Navarro Rospigliosi in August 2001, COMISEDH objected to the
dismissal of charges, and an investigation was underway at year's end.
Initial trial proceedings were underway against two police officers
and a taxi driver for the crimes of torture and grave injuries followed
by death in the killing of Cesar Augusto Ayaucan Argedes in August
2001. COMISEDH appealed to have the officers detained during the trial,
but the decision from the appeals court was pending.
In December 2001, a judge sentenced PNP officer Idelso Murrugarra
Casimiro to 4 years in prison and fined him $860 (3,000 soles) for
beating and killing Carlos Lopez Flores.
In the case of Mario Clemente Guillen Mendez, a court in Chincha
acquitted five police officers in December 2000; they were accused of
torture that led to his death. The victim's family filed an appeal, and
the case went to the Supreme Court in January 2001.
Military service was no longer mandatory, but mistreatment of
military recruits continued to be a problem (see Section 1.c.). Initial
trial proceedings began regarding the case of recruit Ronald Enrique
Pena Garcia, killed in 2001. An air force lieutenant and two
noncommissioned officers were under investigation for homicide. There
were no developments in the cases of Percy Cusihualpa Franco and Isaias
Yanac Rodriguez, two military recruits who died in 2001 under
suspicious circumstances.
Initial trial proceedings continued in the case of Juan Carlos
Aliaga Mera, a former crewmember in President Fujimori's presidential
plane who was found dead in the Callao Air Group 8 Complex. His body
had a bullet wound in the head and, according to the family, showed
signs of brutal torture.
Initial trial proceedings began during the year against two police
officers for the crime of torture, among other charges, of Nelson Diaz
Marcos, who died after police in Tacna arrested him on charges of
public intoxication in 2000.
After an investigation and exhumation of the body in the case of
recruit Jose Luis Poma Payano, the prosecutor charged three air force
officers with homicide for his 2000 death. In June initial court
proceedings began, and a trial was underway. COMISEDH issued an appeal
because the prosecutor was not trying the officers for the crime of
torture. No decision had been reached on the appeal by year's end.
The authorities closed the case of Marino Fernandez Sanchez, who
died in 2000 after allegedly having been tortured by military
officials, as the cause of death was determined to be a severe case of
malnutrition.
In August 2001, Congress voted unanimously to remove former
President Fujimori's immunity from prosecution as a former head of
state. In September 2001, Fujimori was indicted on charges of murder,
causing grave injuries, and responsibility for persons who disappeared
in relation to the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos killings (see Section
1.b.). Both events were attributed to the La Colina death squad,
allegedly formed by members of army intelligence. Fujimori remained in
his parents' native Japan, where he fled in 2000. As a Japanese
citizen, he was protected from extradition. The Government continued to
pursue a diplomatic solution in order to return Fujimori to be tried in
court.
The Government continued in its efforts to arrest members of the La
Colina group. On November 18, the PNP arrested former Army death squad
leader Santiago Martin Rivas in Lima. Rivas led the La Colina death
squad that operated against suspected terrorists during the Fujimori
regime and was believed responsible for at least 25 killings, including
the murders of 9 students and a professor at La Cantuta University in
1992 and 15 persons in the Barrios Altos section of Lima in 1991. Rivas
had eluded capture since 2001 when the Inter-American Human Rights
Court overturned Fujimori's commutation of a 20-year sentence handed
down in 1995 for the La Cantuta killings. At year's end, initial trial
proceedings were underway. The authorities arrested two other La Colina
members during the year.
In April the Government paid almost $3 million (10.5 million soles)
in reparations to families of the Barrios Altos victims, in compliance
with a ruling by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
In December the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the
Government must investigate, try, and sanction those responsible for
the 1986 massacre of inmates at El Fronton jail. In October the Supreme
Council of Military Justice had upheld the exoneration of members of
the military who ended terrorist-instigated riots in three prisons at a
cost of over 200 lives. The El Fronton case was brought to the Inter-
American Court by relatives of two dead inmates who later were found
innocent of the terrorism charges on which they had been jailed.
In November 2001, the Ombudsman turned over to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission evidence of human remains in 51 mass graves,
more than half of which were located in the Ayacucho area. During the
year, the commission observed the Public Ministry's exhumations of two
common graves near Ayacucho as part of its investigation into the
political violence between 1980-2000 (see Section 4). The exhumations
served to identify victims, return victims' remains to their families,
and search for clues to identify those responsible for the killings. On
December 7, the commission issued its first official report, which
detailed a massacre where soldiers allegedly tortured and killed eight
peasants in Chuschi, near Ayacucho, on May 17, 1980. The report was
turned over to the Attorney General for further action.
Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 11 persons during the year in
the course of 154 acts of violence. There were two significant
bombings, both attributed to Sendero Luminoso. On March 20, terrorists
detonated a car bomb in a Lima suburb that killed 10 persons and
injured 38. Earlier the same day, alleged terrorists detonated a bomb
at a branch office of the Spanish-owned Telefonica company in downtown
Lima; no injuries were reported and the facility received only minor
damage. Police arrested eight Sendero Luminoso terrorists in relation
to the car bombing.
In January members of the native Aguaruna community attacked
settlers living on land claimed by the Aguaruna. A court order required
the settlers to vacate the land in the northern area of Cajamarca, but
the order was not enforced and the settlers returned. The indigenous
group killed 35 settlers, including men, women, and children, and
injured dozens in the ambush.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In May the Ombudsman's office reported that there were 6,089 cases
of forced disappearance between 1980 and 2000, which were among the
human rights abuses under investigation by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (see Section 4). The Ombudsman's office noted that the
Sendero Luminoso or Tupac Amaru rebels abducted the majority of the
victims, mainly indigenous peasants.
Few members of the security forces were accountable for their role
in disappearances, and impunity remained a problem.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and inhuman
or humiliating treatment; however, in practice torture and brutal
treatment by the security forces continued to occur. Abuse of
individuals in police custody and inmates in prison by security forces
continued to be a problem, as did torture and abuse of military
recruits. Impunity was a problem, and the authorities who committed
such abuses seldom were held responsible. A June Amnesty International
report on torture called on the authorities to take decisive action to
eradicate torture and to correct the problem of impunity.
Torture most often took place immediately following arrest. Torture
was common during police detention when families were prohibited from
visiting suspects being held incommunicado, and when attorneys had only
limited access to them (see Section 1.d.). During the year, there were
two cases of suspects dying following torture or beatings by security
officials (see Section 1.a.).
In some cases, the police and security forces threatened or
harassed victims, their relatives, and witnesses in an attempt to keep
them from filing charges of human rights violations. According to
Amnesty International and COMISEDH, several victims were too frightened
to follow through with judicial proceedings against their abusers, who
subsequently were released without being charged. COMISEDH reported 8
cases of aggravated torture by security forces, compared with 36 in
2001 and 35 in 2000.
In past years, abuse was particularly common in police cells
operated by the National Counterterrorism Directorate (DIRCOTE) and in
detention facilities on military bases, where terrorism and treason
suspects normally were held. Psychological torture and abuse, which
resulted from the harsh conditions in which detainees were held, were
more characteristic of the prisons.
On January 12, 20 police officers from the Cotabambas Police
Station tortured Renzo Vega Hidalgo. The police had arrested several
youths living in a poor settlement called ``La Casona.'' Vega, who was
19 years of age, resisted arrest and was beaten with a stick. He lost
an eye during the beating. An investigation was underway.
On August 24, police officers in Callao arrested Omar de la Cruz
for alleged involvement in a robbery. After giving his statement,
several police tortured him using rubber batons. Family members
reported to COMISEDH that de la Cruz had injuries on his head and neck
and a burn on his waist. An investigation was underway at year's end.
COMISEDH reported that the victim's family refused legal assistance due
to fear of retaliation.
In November police in Chaclacayo detained Jair Martin Rodriguez and
his brother after a series of fights in their home and in the
neighborhood. Six police officers allegedly beat Rodriguez when he
resisted being put into a cell. Rodriguez required surgery to repair
damage to a finger. At year's end, an investigation had begun.
There were no updates in the May 2001 case of inmate Teobaldo Pozo
Tupayachi, beaten at the Quencoro prison.
There were no new developments in torture cases from 1999 and 2000
involving the following victims: Catalino Daga Ruiz, Bernardo Daga
Ruiz, Mario Jimenez Roque; Julio Armando Uribe, and Victor Valle
Cabello. No further investigations into these cases were expected.
Amnesty International reported that in the 1999 case of torture and
subsequent death of Moises Paco Mayhua, a judge in Puno ruled that
there was evidence of torture. The two police officers allegedly
implicated in the torture and murder were still on active duty in
another district. Judicial hearings had begun, although the two police
officers had not yet appeared before the court.
In the case of Amador Carmen Canchaparan, whom military officials
arrested and allegedly tortured on a military base in 2000, COMISEDH
reported that a criminal court was expected to try army Major Max
Espinoza Sanchez for abuse of authority.
The Legal Defense Institute reported that in the case of the 1998
torture of Raul Teobaldo by five naval officers, only one officer
appeared for the trial in Ucayali. He was sentenced to 6 years in
prison for abusing Teobaldo but appealed his sentence to the Supreme
Court in Lima where all charges against him were dropped. At year's
end, arrest warrants were outstanding against the remaining four
officers.
There were no developments in the case of journalist Fabian Salazar
during the year. The IACHR accepted the case in 2001.
In September 2001, the Government acknowledged the infringement of
the rights of military intelligence officer Leonor La Rosa by four of
her colleagues who beat and tortured her in 1997. The Government
awarded her financial compensation in 2001. During the year, one
congressman and several military officials questioned La Rosa's claim
that her physical impairments (she is confined to a wheelchair)
occurred as the result of torture. In October two retired military
officers, accused by La Rosa of torturing her in 1997, were released
from prison after submitting writs of habeas corpus through the
civilian court.
As in previous years, NGOs and the Human Rights Ombudsman received
complaints that the military beat or otherwise mistreated some members
of the military service. Mistreatment of military recruits continued to
be a problem. There were five reported incidents of torture of military
recruits, one of which resulted in death (see Section 1.a.). At year's
end, a congressional subcommittee continued to look into killings,
torture, and mistreatment of young soldiers.
In January in Andahuaylas, a superior officer allegedly beat Freddy
Cardenas Maucaylle in punishment for poor performance during a firing
range exercise. Cardenas lost the use of his hand as a result of the
beating, but chose not to make a formal accusation against the superior
officer.
In July three superior officers allegedly drugged and sexually
assaulted soldier Rolando Quispe Berrocal in an Ayacucho barracks. The
authorities held the accused officers in a military prison and charged
them with torture; a trial in civil court was pending at year's end. In
August a military court gave a 30-day suspended sentence in solitary
confinement to Quispe Berrocal and ordered him to pay $430 (1,500
soles) in damages to the State and the military for making false
statements. Human rights advocates disputed the court's ruling and
accused military officers with obstruction of justice in this case.
In August superior officers allegedly raped recruit Edison Huamacto
Marivas. Although an investigation was underway in Lima, the victim
decided to drop the charges in order to avoid further press attention
and to forget what happened. The perpetrators were not identified.
In October in Piura, a superior officer allegedly kicked and beat
soldier Noe Moises Canales Salazar until he was unconscious after
finding him sleeping during guard duty. Canales suffered severe
internal injuries as a result of the beating and underwent two
surgeries. At year's end, the case was pending and to be tried in
civilian court.
The authorities concluded an investigation in the 2001 case of
Frank Alfredo Romero Arrieta, a military recruit who was beaten by
officers and left with serious spinal cord damage and unable to walk
normally, and charged five officers with torture. Although initial
trial proceedings had begun, a military court opened a parallel trial
during the year, charging the officers only with abuse of authority.
COMISEDH appealed to the judge in charge of the proceedings to deny
venue to the military judge.
Citizens at times took the law into their own hands, meting out
severe physical punishment to persons committing offenses such as
robbery, burglary, rape, and child molestation.
Conditions were poor to extremely harsh in all prison facilities.
About one-half of all prisoners were in facilities where the National
Police had both internal and external control; the other half were in
facilities under internal control of National Prison Institute guards
and under external control by the police. Conditions were especially
harsh in maximum-security facilities located at high altitudes. Low
budgets, severe overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and poor nutrition
and health care were serious problems. Prison guards and fellow inmates
routinely victimized prisoners.
There were no reports of security forces killing inmates during the
year. Human rights observers who monitored prison activity reported
that torture and ill treatment of prisoners by security forces occurred
during the year. Corruption was a serious problem among poorly paid
prison guards, many of whom engaged in sexual abuse, blackmail,
extortion, narcotics trafficking, and the acceptance of bribes in
exchange for favors that ranged from providing a mattress to arranging
an escape. Since prison authorities did not supply adequate bedding and
budgeted only about $0.79 (2.75 soles) per prisoner per day for food,
the families of prisoners typically had to provide for these basic
needs.
Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure hampered efforts to
improve prison living conditions. The 81 prisons and detention
facilities held 28,403 prisoners as of December. At Lima's San Juan de
Lurigancho men's prison, the country's largest, more than 7,000
prisoners lived in a facility built to accommodate 1,500. Inmates in
all prisons had only intermittent access to running water; bathing
facilities were inadequate; kitchen facilities remained generally
unhygienic; and prisoners slept in hallways and common areas due to
lack of cell space. Illegal drugs were abundant in many prisons, and
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS were reportedly at near-epidemic levels.
As of December, approximately 69 percent of all prisoners had not
been sentenced (see Section 1.d.). Pretrial detainees were held
together with convicted prisoners in most cases. Detainees held
temporarily while awaiting arraignment in Lima were not provided with
food. This temporary detention period lasted from a few hours up to 3
days. The detainees were not allowed outside for fresh air and had
restricted access to bathrooms.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported a
shortage of trained medical personnel, unreliable and insufficient
legal representation for prisoners, an insufficient number of social
workers and psychologists, and a general lack of organization in prison
administration.
According to human rights monitors, the Challapalca prison in
Tarata, Tacna, seriously violated international norms and standards,
particularly as a result of its isolation and high altitude. Located at
14,000 feet, Challapalca's freezing temperatures and oxygen-thin air
had unavoidably detrimental effects on prisoner health. The prison
could be reached only after an all-night bus ride from the nearest
population center, limiting inmates' contact with family. To relieve
some of the isolation, the ICRC funded periodic visits by families.
Hospital care was 6 to 8 hours away, depending on road conditions, by
overland transportation. Face-to-face consultations by inmates with
their attorneys were rare. Isolation or punishment cells in this prison
were extremely small and sometimes held two prisoners at a time.
Despite continued pressure from national and international human rights
groups, Challapalca remained in operation.
There were two serious hunger strikes in prisons during the year.
Roughly 900 prisoners held on terrorism and treason charges in various
facilities throughout the country staged a hunger strike from February
11 to March 13. Church officials managed to convince the prisoners to
call off the strike. Human rights observers charged that the Government
was slow to react in sending in medical personnel to attend to the
prisoners as the strike progressed. In July a second hunger strike by
nearly 90 percent of inmates in the Lurigancho prison protested harsh
prison conditions and sentencing delays; it lasted 1 week. There were
minor protests in various prisons throughout the year, but fewer in
number than in the previous year. Two inmates were killed and 41 were
injured during a violent confrontation between several cellblocks of
armed inmates at Lurigancho prison in December. An investigation was
pending at year's end.
Male and female prisoners were housed separately. In high-security
prisons, female inmates were allowed to see their children once a week.
In women's prisons, children 3 years of age and younger lived with
their jailed mothers. There were also separate juvenile facilities, in
which conditions were not as harsh as those in adult prisons.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers, including the ICRC. Members of the Ombudsman's office were
allowed to visit the naval facility in Callao for the first time in
December 2000 and continued to visit it during the year (see Section
4). As of October, the ICRC made 140 visits to inmates in prisons,
detention facilities, and juvenile detention facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There continued to be
reports of arbitrary arrest and detention. The Constitution, Criminal
Code, and antiterrorist statutes delineate the arrest and detention
process. The Constitution requires a written judicial warrant for an
arrest unless the perpetrator of a crime is caught in the act. However,
the Organic Law of the National Police permits the police to detain a
person for any investigative purpose. Although the authorities must
arraign arrested persons within 24 hours, they occasionally violated
this requirement. In cases of terrorism, drug trafficking, or
espionage, arraignment must take place within 30 days. Military
authorities must turn over persons they detain to the police within 24
hours; in remote areas, this must be accomplished as soon as
practicable. However, the authorities sometimes disregarded this
requirement. Police abuse of detainees was a problem, and the abuse
usually took place at the police station just after the arrest, while
the detainee was held incommunicado (see Section 1.c.). A 2000 law
allows the authorities to detain suspects in investigations for
corruption for up to 15 days without arraignment. The law also permits
the authorities to prohibit suspects under investigation for corruption
from traveling abroad.
Detainees have the right to a prompt judicial determination of the
legality of their detention and adjudication of habeas corpus
petitions. In the past, judges denied most requests for such hearings.
During the year, about 400 prisoners accused of treason related to
terrorism offenses filed petitions for habeas corpus. They argued that
they were convicted by hooded or ``faceless'' military courts and
requested new trials in civilian court. Judges accepted a few petitions
and ordered that prisoners be retried in civilian court, such as in the
case of Maritza Garrido Lecca, who was arrested along with Sendero
Luminoso leader Abimael Guzman. The prisoners' demands were based on
Inter-American Court and Constitutional Tribunal rulings that sentences
imposed by the military courts under the 1979 Constitution were
illegal. However, such sentences imposed in cases brought after the
1993 Constitution was adopted remain valid (see Section 1.e.).
Police may detain terrorism and treason suspects for a maximum of
15 days and hold them incommunicado for the first 10 days. Treason
suspects, who are handed over automatically to military jurisdiction,
may be held incommunicado for an additional 30 days. When suspects were
held incommunicado, attorneys had access to them only during the
preparation and the giving of sworn statements to the prosecutor.
Many detention orders remained pending against roughly 4,000
persons allegedly forced to join terrorist groups; however, in May
2001, Congress passed a law that allowed the detention orders to be
changed to summonses to appear in court if requested by the person
named in the order. Legal experts and NGOs reported that the law was
not effective, and fewer than 50 individuals had appeared before the
court to make the request, reportedly because they were distrustful of
the judicial process and feared arrest.
As of December, approximately 31 percent of a total prison
population of 28,403 were sentenced, according to INPE statistics.
About 50 percent of the prison population remained incarcerated in
Lima; of these, 56 percent had been convicted but remained unsentenced.
The IACHR and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights expressed concern
about the large number of unsentenced prisoners. There was no progress
during the year to reduce lengthy sentencing delays.
According to the INPE, the elapsed time between arrest and trial in
civil, criminal, and terrorism cases averaged between 26 and 36 months,
during which time suspects remained in detention. Those tried by
military courts on treason charges generally did not have to wait more
than 40 days for their trial; however, as trial procedures in military
courts lacked full due process protections, the speed with which trials
were conducted offered little benefit to the defendants. Once trials
concluded, prisoners often had to wait long periods before being
sentenced.
Many individuals associated with the Fujimori administration were
the targets of criminal investigations. Anticorruption legislation
enacted in 2000 gave judicial authorities expanded powers to detain
witnesses and suspects. Many of those detained under these laws
complained that the cases against them were politically motivated.
The Constitution does not permit forced exile, and the Government
did not use it in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, as an institution, the judiciary was
still recovering from the effects of 8 years (1992-2000) of intensive
manipulation by the executive branch under the Fujimori administration.
The judiciary was seen widely as the most corrupt institution in the
country. It operated independently of the executive, although President
Toledo expressed strong concerns about judicial decisions dismissing
charges of human rights violations and corruption against members of
the former Fujimori government. Judicial reform continued to be a
priority of the Government.
The 4-tier court structure consisted of lower and superior courts,
a Supreme Court of 30 judges, and a Constitutional Tribunal of 7
members. In 2000 Congress restored the powers of the independent
National Magistrates Council (CNM) to appoint, discipline, and evaluate
all judges and prosecutors who have served in their position for 7
years or more. Failure to be certified disqualified a judge or
prosecutor from ever working in that capacity again. Several of the
more than 100 judicial officials failing to gain certification filed
complaints with the IACHR that this certification process was unfair.
Under former President Fujimori, the executive branch pressured
provisional judges and prosecutors, as their employment contracts could
be cancelled without cause. Subsequent investigations showed that
former intelligence advisor Montesinos improperly influenced numerous
judges. The majority of implicated officials either resigned or were
suspended; at year's end, some were being prosecuted.
The justice system was based on the Napoleonic Code. In civilian
courts, criminal cases moved through three distinct phases. First, a
prosecutor investigated cases and submitted an opinion to a first
instance judge, who determined whether there was sufficient evidence to
open legal proceedings. If there was, the judge conducted an
investigation and, in over 90 percent of cases, determined facts, guilt
or innocence, and issued a sentence. In some cases, particularly those
involving violence or public officials, the law requires that the first
instance judge pass the results of the investigation to the superior
court for an oral trial before a three-judge panel. Anyone convicted
and sentenced by a first instance judge may appeal to the Superior
Court up to the Supreme Court. All defendants had the right to be
present at their trial. Defendants also had the right to counsel,
although the public defender system often failed to provide indigent
defendants with qualified attorneys.
There was a presumption of innocence, defendants could call
witnesses, and there was a system of bail. Attorneys had unimpeded
access to their clients.
Under the military justice system, judges in the lower courts had
the power to sentence and were required to pass judgment within 10 days
of a trial's opening. Defendants could then appeal their convictions to
the Superior Military Council, which had 10 days to make its decision.
A final appeal may be made to the Supreme Council of Military Justice,
which must issue its ruling within 5 days. At the Superior Military
Council and Supreme Council levels, a significant number of judges were
active-duty officers with little or no professional legal training.
When it resumed its mandate in 2000, one of the first acts of the
Constitutional Tribunal was to remove jurisdiction over civilians
accused of terrorism from military courts. By 2001 civilian courts were
processing the cases of 152 of the approximately 600 civilians tried in
military courts under the aggravated terrorism law, which equates
terrorism with treason. Human rights groups and legal experts charged
that vaguely worded definitions in the antiterrorism statutes often led
judges to issue sentences disproportionate to the crimes committed.
During the year, approximately 400 prisoners accused of treason related
to terrorism offenses filed petitions for habeas corpus.
Following the August 2000 Military Supreme Court decision to
nullify the terrorism conviction and life sentence of U.S. citizen Lori
Berenson, a civilian court tried her case. In June 2001, that court
found Berenson guilty of collaboration with the MRTA terrorist group
and sentenced her to 20 years in prison. Berenson's appeal to the
Supreme Court was unsuccessful, but the IACHR determined that Berenson
had not been given a fair trial. In July the Government took the matter
to the Inter-American Court; there was no indication when the Court
might rule on the appeal.
In 2001 the Inter-American Court provided the Ministry of Justice a
clarification of its 1999 ruling that two 1995 amnesty laws were
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights. These
exempted military officials from prosecution and were used to protect
officers accused of the 1991 Barrios Altos massacre. Former
intelligence adviser Montesinos faced more than 60 trials. Based on the
clarification, the Government planned to bring other members of the
security forces to justice in other human rights abuse cases (see
Section 1.a.).
In June 1999, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled
against the Government in the case of four Chileans convicted of
treason by a military tribunal and sentenced to life in prison. The
Court found that the military had denied the defendants' due process
rights and ruled that a civilian court should have had jurisdiction. In
May 2001, the Supreme Council of the Military Court invalidated an
earlier military court decision against providing new trials and
ordered new, civilian trials for the four Chileans. As of year's end,
the oral phase of the trial was expected to begin in early 2003.
A specialized terrorism chamber of the Superior Court handled
terrorism cases. The chamber is based in Lima, but its judges travel to
the provinces as needed. During the year, judges from this court
traveled around the country to hear cases of persons with old warrants
outstanding for terrorism charges (see Section 1.d.).
In late 2000, the Government established a new Pardons Commission,
which released 32 persons from prison during the year. A total of 760
persons have been pardoned and released after being accused unjustly of
terrorism since 1996. The original ad hoc Pardons Commission, with a
mandate to consider applications of those who believed themselves to be
accused unjustly of terrorism, ended its work on December 31, 1999.
NGOs advocated that the new Commission expand its review to include all
convictions and sentences rendered by military courts, but the
Government had not made a decision on the matter at year's end.
Approximately 1,500 cases were pending review.
In August the Government issued a supreme decree to award
compensation to persons released from prison through the Pardons
Commission program, as recommended by the Human Rights Ombudsman in
1999.
There were no reports of political prisoners. Sendero Luminoso and
MRTA members charged with or serving sentences for terrorism were not
considered to be political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires security forces to have a
written judicial warrant to enter a private dwelling. However, there
were reports that the authorities did not always observe this
requirement in practice.
The Constitution provides for privacy of communication. There were
few complaints that the Government violated this right.
There was no progress in the case of former army intelligence (SIE)
agent Luisa Margarita Zanatta Muedas, who fled the country in 1998,
after allegedly providing information regarding SIE wiretapping
operations. She was charged with disobedience and being absent without
permission. In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman recommended that the
Government pardon Zanatta, that the Public Ministry investigate the
wiretapping, and that Congress broaden the investigation conducted by
its committee on defense. At year's end, Zanatta's case was still under
investigation and scheduled to be tried in a military court.
In April Congress passed a new wiretapping law that expanded the
scope of officials who are authorized to request wiretapping permits to
the attorney general, district attorneys, and case prosecutors. A judge
must approve each request. The Government contended that the new law
should aid in fighting organized crime, but opponents protested that it
lends itself to civil rights violations.
A 2000 law makes military service voluntary and prohibits forced
conscription. Registration for military service remains obligatory for
men aged 18 and older. The President retains the authority to decree
the reestablishment of mandatory service. Since past efforts to
prohibit forced conscription failed, the Human Rights Ombudsman
monitored the law's implementation. As of October, the Ombudsman's
office had received eight complaints of forced conscription. There were
also reports that some young men from poor, rural areas were taken into
military service when they went to register; they were unaware that
military service was no longer mandatory. Also, in some rural areas,
families reported to human rights NGOs that their sons were taken into
the military before they turned 18. According to NGOs, the military
explained this by saying that young men who were eager to join their
ranks sometimes lied about their age.
There were no reports of forced conscription by the MRTA (most of
whose surviving members are jailed). Sendero Luminoso, however,
continued to coerce indigenous persons to join its ranks (see Section
5).
In December the Ombudman's office reported that there were new
problems involving abuses by family planning personnel during the year.
There were isolated reports that women did not take the full 72 hours
to consider their alternatives, as is required by law, before
undergoing voluntary sterilization procedures. This was generally
attributed to the fact that some women arrived at a clinic ready to
give birth and requested the sterilization procedure be performed that
day, rather than having to make arrangements to return to the clinic at
another time.
Acting on allegations that more than 300,000 women were forcibly
sterilized between 1995 and 2000 under the Fujimori administration, in
October 2001, Congress directed the Commission on Health to investigate
the voluntary surgical sterilization program. Earlier investigations of
the allegations found that primarily during 1996-97, health workers in
public hospitals and family planning clinics administered by the
Ministry of Health had induced female patients to opt for sterilization
by promising them food or another type of goods or services, or by not
providing them with complete information about available alternatives.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice; however, some problems remained.
Although the general climate for freedom of the press improved, the
Government harassed opposition journalists and those formerly with the
Fujimori regime, using real or threatened judicial sanctions.
The press represented a wide spectrum of opinion, including those
in favor of and in opposition to the Government. In the greater Lima
area, there were 25 daily newspapers, 7 television stations, 65 radio
stations, and 2 news channels on 2 commercial cable systems. There were
numerous small provincial newspapers, television and radio stations.
All were privately owned except for one government-owned daily
newspaper, one government-owned television network, and two government-
owned radio stations, none of which enjoyed a particularly large
audience, although the television network covered the nation.
Several media executives remained jailed pending investigations of
corruption charges stemming from media manipulation during the Fujimori
regime. At the end of 2001, Eduardo Calmell, former director of the
daily Expreso, fled the country after being released from prison on a
habeas corpus writ. At year's end, two minority shareholders of TV
Channel 2 and the chairman of TV Channel 10 remained in jail. Other
television executives were fugitives from justice, including the major
shareholder and chairman of TV Channel 4, the major shareholder of TV
Channel 5, and the chairman of the board of TV Channel 9.
In May the authorities placed Alex and Moises Wolfenson, the
publishers of pro-Fujimori tabloid El Chino and of opposition daily La
Razon, under house arrest on corruption charges. On June 22, a radio
station broadcast a tape in which Salomon Lerner Ghitis, the chairman
of the Government-owned Financial Corporation for Development and a
government insider, threatened Alex and Moises Wolfenson with judicial
proceedings and jail time should they continue to criticize the
Government. In September a court ratified the house arrest.
On August 1, an anticorruption judge found daily newspaper El Tio
and Editora Sport, S.A., the company that published opposition dailies
La Razon and El Chino, and El Men, guilty of corporate embezzlement for
the dealings their publishers Jose Olaya and Moises Wolfenson had with
Vladimiro Montesinos.
At year's end, the Government had not yet paid the compensation
that the Inter-American Court ordered in February 2001 to Baruch Ivcher
for violating his nationality, ownership, due process, and freedom of
expression rights. On June 20, Congress passed a law accepting an
arbitration procedure to fix the amount of compensation obtained in
such proceedings, and the executive approved the law on July 7.
In January President Toledo freed reporter Pedro Carranza, whom the
Fujimori administration accused of being an MRTA member and jailed for
8 years. Two reporters, Juan de la Matta and Javier Tuamana, were still
in prison, also accused of terrorism by the Fujimori government.
In April an anticorruption judge declared Channel 4 corporately
responsible in the corruption proceedings against owners Jose Enrique
Crousillat and Jose Francisco Crousillat, a decision upheld by the
anticorruption criminal court in September. The Government's special
prosecutor also requested that Channel 5, the Expreso newspaper, Si
magazine and other formerly pro-Fujimori media be held corporately
responsible in the proceedings against their owners. The authorities
declared that Jose Francisco Crousillat, as well as his father, Jose
Enrique Crousillat, were fugitives, which invalidated any statute of
limitations on their corruption charges. In August and September, the
court held daily tabloid Expreso, TV Channel 5, and TV Channel 4
corporately responsible for their owners' corruption charges.
Throughout the year, Genaro Delgado sought to regain control of
Panamericana Television (Channel 5) through the courts, arguing that he
was the majority stockholder. The officers of Panamericana Television
cast the case as an affront to press freedom and accused President
Toledo of intervening with the courts in Delgado's favor. The court
eventually required Delgado to secure his claim by posting bond. He
could not do so, and the case remained pending in the courts at year's
end.
A few journalists and media outlets were reportedly intimidated
during the year. According to the National Journalists Association
(ANP), 60 cases of harassment were reported through September, mainly
in the provinces. The majority of these incidents took the form of
threats of violence; threats of judicial proceedings; and charges of
slander from local politicians, police, military officials, or
businessmen.
On February 4, Army specialist and Chepen military recruitment
officer Cristobal Cardenas-Lazaro and photographer Ramon Bazan-Quiroz
physically and verbally assaulted Hector Enrique Chavarry-Carahuatay,
producer of the news program ``Democracia'' on the Frequencia Popular
radio station in Chepen. Those involved in the attack said it was in
retaliation for Chavarry-Carahuatay's frequent news stories on
corruption involving the chief of the Chepen military recruitment
office, who had allegedly been soliciting bribes from citizens applying
for military identification cards.
Also on February 4, producer Edmundo Gutierrez-Saldivar and host
Bertha Chacon-Diaz of the program ``Presencia Regional Noticias,'' on
the Oasis radio station in Quillabamba requested a personal protection
order from deputy police chief for La Convencion province, in response
to recurrent death threats from Army Major Jaime Llanos-Barron.
Gutierrez-Saldivar and Chacon-Diaz reported that they had been followed
for several days.
On August 13, a crowd of President Toledo's supporters met the
President and his wife with signs and handouts insulting opposition
media, calling them ``Montesinos's jackals'' and accusing them of
working to destabilize the Toledo administration. On August 14,
anchorman Beto Ortiz showed in his Channel 2 TV program that a
governmental organization published and distributed the handouts to the
public at the airport.
In September Gente magazine alleged being pressured by the
Government for having published material about the second wedding
between President Toledo and his wife. On October 9, the anticorruption
judge Sara Maita opened an investigation against Gente publisher
Enrique Escardo for Gente's having supported the 1996 government
decision to withdraw Baruch Ivcher's citizenship.
On October 24, a group of police officers allegedly used tear gas
and beat a number of reporters in front of the Congress, where they
were covering an event. Four journalists were injured, one of whom was
hospitalized. The Interior Minister promised an investigation, as did
President Toledo when he addressed the Inter-American Press Association
the next day.
The Government did not formally censor the media, although fears of
generating unwelcome government attention encouraged journalistic self-
censorship. The Government did not censor books, publications, films,
or plays.
The Government did not limit access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities
generally respected this right in practice. The police used tear gas
and occasionally force to disperse protesters in various demonstrations
during the year. The law does not require a permit for a public
demonstration; however, organizers must inform the Ministry of
Interior's political authority (Prefect) about the kind of
demonstration and its location. Demonstrations could be prohibited for
reasons of public safety or health. Municipal authorities routinely
granted permission for demonstrations.
Political rallies were unimpeded throughout the regional elections
campaign process. There were two incidents of violence targeted at
members of the National Unity Party in the Cajamarca area. An
independent, rival candidate was arrested for the murder of a National
Unity mayor from the Cajamarca area (see Section 1.a.).
Although most demonstrations were peaceful during the year,
protests in Arequipa, Tarapoto, Aguatia and other areas turned violent
with rock-throwing, tire-burning, looting, and other damage to public
and private property. In June the Government declared a 30-day state of
martial law in Arequipa following violent and destructive citywide
protests against energy-sector privatization plans. Similar although
smaller and less destructive protests in support of Arequipa's
privatization protest took place June 17 and 18 in the southern cities
of Moquegua, Juliaca, Cusco, and Tacna, where injuries and property
damage were reported. In October a prosecutor in Arequipa accused 24
police officers with killing Fernando Talavera Soto and Edgar Pinto
Quintanilla, who died after being hit with tear gas canisters during
the Arequipa protest (see Section 1.a.). The officers were charged with
negligent homicide; no trial had begun at year's end.
On July 17, protests by coca farmers turned violent as they
ransacked an antinarcotics NGO's office and then burned equipment and
vehicles in Aguaytia. Other groups blocked major highways with rocks
and debris during the year to protest the Government's financial
policies. According to human rights observers, the police generally
maintained order during the year without using excessive force.
There were over 3,000 protests by workers asking for higher wages
and by disgruntled citizens pressing various social and economic
demands. According to labor advocates, groups were able to express
their opinions publicly, while the National Police generally maintained
order in a lawful manner. Police occasionally used tear gas against
protesters. Police arrested some protestors during the year for violent
or destructive offenses.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
authorities generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice; however, the Catholic Church received preferential treatment
from the State. The Constitution establishes the separation of church
and state, but it also acknowledges the Catholic Church's role as ``an
important element in the historical, cultural, and moral development of
the nation.'' The Catholic Church and Catholic clergy received
preferential treatment and tangible benefits from the State in the
areas of education, taxation of personal income, remuneration and
taxation of institutional property. Teaching about Roman Catholicism in
primary and secondary schools was mandatory. By law, the military could
hire only Catholic clergy as chaplains, and Catholicism is the only
recognized religion of military personnel.
All faiths were free to establish places of worship, train clergy,
and proselytize. Religious denominations or churches were not required
to register with the Government or apply for a license. Conversion from
one religion to another was allowed, and missionaries could enter the
country and proselytize.
The Freedom of Conscience Institute (PROLIBCO), an NGO that favored
strict separation between church and state and opposed the preferential
treatment accorded to the Catholic Church, claimed that the Government
discriminated against non-Catholic groups by requiring payment of
import duties and a sales tax on Bibles brought into the country. In
May 2001, the Jehovah's Witnesses claimed that the Government denied
them tax exemption for imported Bibles and other religious educational
material. In April they filed two legal actions to uphold their right
as a nonprofit educational entity to be exonerated from payment of
duties. In May a Superior court ordered the temporary suspension of the
surety fees, but according to PROBLICO, by year's end the court had not
made a final ruling in this case.
The Ministry of Education required all primary schools, both public
and private, to follow a set Catholic religion course. Parents who did
not wish their children to participate in the mandatory religion
classes had to request an exemption in writing to the school principal.
According to PROBLICO, there were some complaints that requests for
exemptions were denied during the year. Non-Catholics who wished their
children to receive a religious education in their own faith were free
to organize such classes, at their own expense, during the weekly hour
allotted by the school for religious education, but had to supply their
own teacher.
PROLIBCO objected to the requirement to teach the Catholic religion
in the school curriculum. It claimed that the alternatives available to
non-Catholic parents violated the constitutional protection of privacy
and confidentiality of one's convictions and beliefs. PROLIBCO
supported an initiative by two nonsectarian (and antireligious)
organizations, the Lima-based Movimiento Arreligioso Peruano and Masa
Peru, to eliminate from the Constitution any reference to the Catholic
Church. In addition, PROLIBCO was seeking to collect enough signatures
to ask the Constitutional Court to rule on the 1980 Concordat signed
with the Vatican that granted special status to the Catholic Church.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of free movement; however, the authorities legally may restrict persons
with pending criminal and, in some cases, civil charges against them
from leaving the country. Police could check travelers at control
points throughout the country. There were no other political or legal
constraints on foreign travel or emigration. Repatriates, both
voluntary and involuntary, were not treated differently from other
citizens.
The Constitution prohibits the revocation of citizenship. However,
according to the Nationality Law, naturalized citizens may lose their
citizenship for, among other reasons, committing crimes against the
State, national defense, and public security, as well as for reasons
that ``affect the public interest and the national interest.''
Sendero Luminoso occasionally interrupted the free movement of
persons by setting up roadblocks in sections of the Upper Huallaga
Valley and the Apurimac and Ene River Valleys.
Political violence in the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in the
internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons and massive
migration. Despite government and NGO efforts, many internally
displaced persons (IDPs) lacked basic documentation, such as birth
certificates and voter registration cards. The Government's program for
the Repopulation and Development of Emergency Zones (PAR) provided
documentation that can be used both to request PAR assistance to return
to one's community of origin and to apply for a national identity card.
The law, which was updated in December, includes provision for
granting refugee and asylee status in accordance with the provisions of
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated with the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees in granting refugee status and recognized the
Catholic Migration Commission as the official provider of technical
assistance to refugees. The commission also advised citizens who feared
persecution at home and sought asylum abroad. As of December, the
Catholic Migration Commission reported that 83 individuals had
requested refugee status. There were 58 persons who transited another
country to ask for first asylum. The Government recognized 10
individuals as new refugees, and there were 784 refugees in the
country. Refugees were allowed to live and work without restrictions
and may apply for naturalization. The status of refugees was reviewed
annually.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right through free
and fair elections.
In July 2001, President Alejandro Toledo assumed the presidency
following a peaceful transfer of power through generally free and fair
national elections held in April and June 2001. Voting was by secret
ballot and mandatory for citizens between the ages of 18 and 70;
however, members of the armed forces and the police, as well as felons,
were ineligible to vote. As of December, Congress was considering a
bill that would give members of the armed forces and the police the
right to vote. The law bars groups that advocate the violent overthrow
of the Government from participating in the political process.
In 2000 the 120-member Congress approved the creation of multiple
district representation for electing members to Congress, which was
designed to provide better geographic representation. Following the
April 2001 elections, the party breakdown in Congress was 45 seats,
Peru Posible; 28 seats, APRA; 17 seats, Unidad Nacional; 13 seats,
Decentralized Parliamentary Union; 11 seats, Independent Moralizing
Front (FIM); 3 seats, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria; and 1 seat each for
Solucion Popular, Renacimiento Andino, and Todos Por La Victoria. The
length of a term in Congress is 5 years. The legislature functioned
independently from the executive.
The Constitution establishes three bodies to administer elections:
The National Board of Elections (JNE); the National Office of Electoral
Processes (ONPE); and the National Registry of Identification and Civil
Affairs (RENIEC). The JNE sets the legal parameters and rules on
election-related disputes and challenges. The ONPE administers
elections and the RENIEC issues election identity documents.
On November 17, over 12 million citizens cast ballots for regional
and municipal officials. Regional governments did not exist in the
political structure prior to this election. Election observers,
including the Organization of American States, and the media agreed
that the balloting and counting of votes were transparent, free, and
fair. The new regional government officials were scheduled to take
office in January 2003.
The November 17 elections were generally peaceful, although more
than 40 violent incidents were reported, primarily in the interior of
the country, including a confrontation between protesters and soldiers
guarding voting materials that resulted in two deaths. A heavy police
and military presence helped ensure order on election day. On election
day, Sendero Luminoso guerrillas fired on a police unit in La Libertad
department, but no one was injured. On November 15, Sendero Luminoso
elements killed a PNP captain in a confrontation near Ayacucho.
In July 2001, the Judicial Branch reopened the investigation into
the falsification of over 1 million voter signatures that occurred
during the 2000 elections. The authorities brought charges against Jose
Portillo, former chief of ONPE, for election fraud in relation to the
falsified signatures. As of December, Portillo remained under house
arrest and an investigation was underway.
Also in July 2001, Congress modified the election law. The
percentage of signatures required for the registration of a new
political party was reduced from 4 percent to 1 percent of the voters
who participated in the past election. The modified law prohibits
reelection of a president to successive terms.
In June Congress voted to suspend Congresswoman Martha Chavez from
her congressional duties following allegations of corruption. She was a
member of Fujimori's Cambio 90 party. Although not removed from
Congress, Chavez was barred from participation in congressional
activities. Her immunity from judicial proceedings was lifted as a
result of the vote, and a trial was pending at year's end.
Women and some minorities participated actively in government and
politics. A 2000 law states that at least 30 percent of each party's
ballot for congressional elections, and at least 25 percent of
candidates for municipal elections, must be from each sex. There were
21 women in the 120-member Congress. There was 1 woman in the 16-member
Cabinet, the Attorney General was a woman, and there was 1 woman on the
Supreme Court.
Traditionally, most leadership positions in government were held by
an elite minority of European descent. President Toledo was the
country's first elected president of mixed Caucasian and indigenous
ancestry. However, it was rare for indigenous persons, who make up more
than one-third of the population, to hold high public office. One
member of the Aymara indigenous group served in Congress and was the
head of the Committee for Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian Affairs until
July.
The Afro-Peruvian minority, unofficially estimated to be 3 to 5
percent of the total population, was not represented in the leadership
of the executive branch of the Government. There were three Afro-
Peruvian members of Congress.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government permitted numerous NGOs dedicated to monitoring and
advancing human rights to operate freely; unlike in previous years,
these groups reported no harassment or other attempts by the
authorities to hinder their operations.
Most human rights NGOs were independent and generally objective.
The National Coordinator for Human Rights (Coordinadora) was an
umbrella organization for more than 60 human rights NGOs. The
Coordinadora sought to avoid politicizing its positions on human rights
issues, although its constituent members could do so in their own
names. A number of other human rights groups associated with the
Catholic Church or with government institutions operated independently
or on the margins of the Coordinadora.
The human rights community reported that the Toledo administration
continued to work toward strengthening government-civil society
relations. Toledo named former human rights advocate Gino Costa as
Minister of Interior in July. Several other high level officials at the
Ministry of Interior had strong human rights backgrounds. Unlike in
previous years, government officials did not accuse NGOs of being
overprotective of criminals and terrorists to the detriment of victims.
There were some government complaints that the IACHR was overprotective
of terrorists.
According to COMISEDH, military commanders occasionally did not
grant access to military facilities to human rights observers. In
December 2000, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office was granted access
to the Callao naval base for the first time. The Ombudsman's office
continued to have access to the prison at the Callao naval base, as
well as other facilities during the year (see Section 1.c.). Not all
government facilities provided access to the public; NGOs may work
through the Ombudsman's office for information regarding a military
facility.
The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman received funds from the
Government and foreign governments and was considered an independent
and effective institution. Congress votes to select the Ombudsman, who
must receive at least a two-thirds majority of votes and serves a 5-
year term. The Ombudsman's office had investigative independence and
the ability to inform the public of its conclusions and
recommendations. However, the office had no enforcement mechanism other
than moral suasion. The Ombudsman's office issued reports throughout
the year on a variety of issues including forced disappearance, a
compendium on legislation for victims of terrorism, family planning
services offered by the Ministry of Health, and an annual report on the
overall human rights situation.
At year's end, there was an interim Ombudsman. The former Ombudsman
left office in 2000 to run for president in the April 2001 elections.
On April 30, Congress tried to elect a new Ombudsman, but the vote
failed to produce a required two-thirds majority. Human rights,
political, and civil society leaders criticized Congress for its
inability to come to consensus, thereby placing the institution in
jeopardy. To improve the odds that Congress will be able to reach a
consensus in the future, in September Congress changed the Ombudsman's
law to provide that Congress may vote to invite an individual to run
for Ombudsman, if at least 20 percent of Congress (24 members) vote to
support that person's candidacy. Congress anticipated that with an
initial backing of 20 percent of congressional members, a candidate
would have a better chance of receiving the required two-thirds
majority (80 votes).
In February 2001, the country returned to the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In July 1999, the Fujimori
government withdrew from the Court after the Court determined that the
Government failed to provide due process in the case of four Chileans
convicted of aggravated terrorism and treason by a military tribunal
(see Section 1.e.).
In August the IACHR reported that the Government had not complied
with Commission recommendations as it had promised to do in 159 cases
of human rights violations from past years. In August the IACHR's
Rapporteur for Peru visited the country to evaluate the Government's
progress and was to present the findings of that visit before the
Commission later in the year.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established by former
President Paniagua and strengthened by President Toledo, began work in
November 2001. The commission has a mandate to analyze the political,
social, and cultural conditions that fostered an era of violence
between May 1980 and November 2000, during which more than 25,000
persons were killed and--according to the Ombudsman in May--6,089
persons disappeared. The commission also is to clarify abuses of human
rights committed by terrorists and the State; locate the victims or
their remains; determine individual or institutional responsibility for
these violations; propose a system of reparations for the victims'
families; recommend institutional, legal, and educational reforms; and
propose initiatives designed to advance peace, the rule of law,
national reconciliation, and democracy. The commission has no authority
to prosecute alleged perpetrators. It collected testimony from 14,000
victims, victims' families, and other witnesses. The commission held
dramatic and emotional public hearings during the year where survivors
and family members of murdered or disappeared victims told of the
violence inflicted by government and paramilitary forces. On July 1,
the Government announced that it had extended the commission's working
period by 5 months, until July 2003.
There were no reports of Sendero Luminoso hampering the work of
human rights observers.
Section 5. Discrimination Based On Race, Sex, Disability, Language, Or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and
specifically prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, race,
sex, language, opinion, or economic condition. However, discrimination
against women, persons with disabilities, indigenous people, and racial
and ethnic minorities persisted, although progress was made in a number
of areas.
Women.--Violence against women, including rape, spousal abuse, and
sexual, physical, and mental abuse of women and girls was a chronic
problem. Such abuses were aggravated by insensitivity on the part of
law enforcement and judicial authorities toward the female victims. A
National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI) survey reported
that during 2000, 34 percent of women were battered by their partner,
and that 19 percent of those women were battered frequently. The survey
reported that close to 43 percent of poor women were battered. The
Ministry of Women and Social Development (MIMDES) and NGOs agreed that
many domestic abuse cases were never reported. Although official
figures for the number of arrests and convictions in abuse cases were
unavailable, NGO sources contended that the majority of reported cases
did not result in formal charges due to fear of retaliation from the
accused spouse, or because of the cost involved in pursuing a
complaint. In addition, legal and physical protection was limited by
delays in legal processes, ambiguities in the law, and lack of
alternative shelter and income for victims.
The domestic violence law gives judges and prosecutors the
authority to prevent the convicted spouse or parent from returning to
the family's home; authorizes the victim's relatives and unrelated
persons living in the home to file complaints of domestic violence; and
allows any health professional to certify injuries. In 2000 Human
Rights Watch called on the Government to improve legislation on
domestic violence by eliminating mandatory reconciliation sessions
between victims and abusers, and by providing law enforcement and
social service providers with training to improve their sensitivity to
victims' needs. In January 2001, Congress approved a law that states
that reconciliation sessions between the abuser and victim are not
required in cases of domestic violence. A 2000 law expanded the
definition of domestic violence to include sexual violence, and to
include all intimate partners whether or not the victim and perpetrator
had ever lived together.
MIMDES ran the Women's Emergency Program, which focused on the
legal, psychological, and medical problems facing women and children
who were victims of domestic violence. As of August, MIMDES operated 36
centers staffed entirely by women, bringing together representatives of
various government institutions--police, prosecutors, counselors, and
public welfare agents--to which abused women might need recourse. As of
August, these centers had assisted about 20,338 victims of domestic
violence and abuse. The monthly average of reported abuse cases was
approximately 2,500. MIMDES continued its public education campaign to
sensitize government employees and the public to domestic violence.
With NGO assistance, MIMDES educated police about domestic violence and
trained officers in all police stations in processing domestic violence
cases. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office continued to complain that
officers reacted indifferently to charges of domestic violence, even
though the law requires all police stations to receive such complaints.
According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, many rape victims
complained at court-appointed medical examiners inappropriately delved
into their sexual histories. The victims accused judges of looking more
favorably on rape victims who were virgins prior to the rape and of
believing that a woman who was raped must have enticed her attacker.
Many victims were afraid of personally filing a complaint of sexual
abuse, particularly in cases where the perpetrators were police
officers.
Prostitution is legal, but the law prohibits and sanctions
activities of those who would obtain benefits from prostitution, such
as pimps.
Sexual harassment was a problem, according to the Ombudsman's
office. The law against sexual harassment does not provide for
sanctions or sentencing but does give victims of sexual abuse the right
to abandon their job and subsequently sue their abuser. Women's rights
advocates contended that the law was completely ineffective, noting
that it had never been applied in court. In October the Congressional
Commission for Women and Social Development approved a bill that would
prohibit sexual harassment in the public sector (military, police,
etc.) and punish the offense.
In December the Ombudman's office reported that there were new
problems involving abuses by family planning personnel during the year
(see Section 1.f.).
Also in December, the Ombudsman's office reported that it had begun
documenting cases of failure by the Ministry of Health to provide
voluntary sterilizations to clients who sought such services at their
facilities. The Ministry of Health criticized the Ombudsman's office
for this statement.
The Constitution provides for equality between men and women, and
95 amendments to the Employment Promotion Law, as well as other laws
relative to marriage, divorce, and property rights, prohibit
discrimination against women. Racial and sexual discrimination in
employment advertisements or announcements of educational opportunities
were prohibited; however, they continued to occur in practice. In June
2001, the Constitutional Tribunal declared unconstitutional a 1998 law
that stripped 3,000 policewomen of their ranks as officers. The law
prohibits the arbitrary firing of pregnant women.
Traditional assumptions and misconceptions often impeded access by
women to leadership roles in both the public and private sectors. Women
primarily from the upper and upper-middle classes advanced in recent
years into leadership roles in various companies and government
agencies. Due to societal prejudice and discrimination, women
historically suffered disproportionately from the country's pervasive
poverty and unemployment.
Children.--The Government provides free, compulsory education
through secondary school. Education was generally available throughout
the country, but there was a shortage of qualified teachers, primarily
in jungle regions. Fees for uniforms and books posed problems for poor
families. Largely because of widespread poverty, approximately one-
third of all school-age children and adolescents worked during daytime
hours rather than attend school. Approximately 6 percent of children
between the ages of 6 and 12, and 17 percent of adolescents between the
ages of 12 and 17, either never attended school or abandoned their
education. Among children and adolescents who lived in poverty or
extreme poverty, the corresponding figures were 51 percent for children
aged 5 to 9 years old and 50 percent for children aged 10 to 14. School
nonattendance was highest in rural and jungle areas and affected girls
more than boys. Pregnant school-age girls had the right to begin or
continue attending school.
An INEI survey conducted during 2000 estimated that nearly 70
percent of the country's 10 million children under 18 years of age
lived in poverty; of them, roughly 20 percent lived in extreme poverty.
Approximately 25 percent of children under age 5 were malnourished. The
infant mortality rate was 39 per 1,000. According to INEI,
approximately 75 percent of children not living in poverty attended
school through the high-school level, whereas only 43 percent of
children living in poverty reached high school. Children living in
poverty averaged only 4.5 years of education compared to 9.3 years for
children living above the poverty line. Only 1.2 percent of children
living in extreme poverty attained university-level education, compared
with 25.6 percent of children who lived above the poverty line.
MIMDES's Children's Bureau coordinated child and adolescent related
government policies and programs. At the grassroots level, 1,010
Children's Rights and Welfare Protection Offices received and resolved
complaints ranging from physical and sexual abuse to child support,
abandonment, and undetermined guardianship. Provincial or district
governments operated approximately 55 percent of these offices, while
schools, churches, and NGOs ran the remaining 45 percent. Law students
staffed most of the units; only the offices in the wealthiest districts
of the country had professionally trained lawyers, psychologists, and
social workers. When these offices could not resolve cases, officials
typically referred them to the local prosecutors' offices of the Public
Ministry. Settlements adjudicated by these offices were binding legally
and had the same force as judgments entered by a court of law.
Violence against children and the sexual abuse of children were
serious problems. The INEI survey showed that an estimated 41 percent
of parents abused their children. In rural areas, this figure increased
to 55 percent. In 2000 the Municipal Ombudsman's Office for Children
and Adolescents for Lima and Callao documented 586 sexual assaults
against children 5 years of age and under; 2,937 against children aged
6 to 12; and 5,935 against children aged from 13 to 17. The report
confirmed that 70 percent of the assaults occurred in the home by a
relative or someone known to the victim and the victim's family.
According to NGOs, many abuse cases were never reported to the
authorities, since many persons believed that such problems belong
within the family and should be resolved privately. MIMDES's Women's
Emergency Program worked to address the legal, psychological, and
medical problems facing women and children who were victims of
violence.
Although laws exist that prohibit sexual abuse of minors and police
enforce such laws, there continued to be reports of child prostitution.
Street crime committed by children and adolescents, including
robbery, physical assault, and vandalism, was often gang-related. In
2001 the Government rescinded laws that allow 16- to 18-year-old
criminal gang members to be prosecuted in military courts and sentenced
to a minimum of 25 years in adult prisons (see Section 1.e.).
Child labor was a serious problem (see Section 6.d.).
The National Initiative on the Rights of the Child was the largest
NGO of its kind and coordinated the work of 27 groups concerned with
the problems of children throughout the country.
Persons with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that persons
with severe disabilities have ``the right to have their dignity
respected and to be provided by law with protection, care,
rehabilitation, and security.'' Legislation that established the
National Council for the Integration of People with Disabilities
(CONADIS) specifies rights, allowances, programs, and services. The law
prohibits discrimination, mandates that public spaces be barrier-free
and that buildings be architecturally accessible, and provides for the
appointment of a disability rights specialist in the Human Rights
Ombudsman's office. Congress passed a resolution designating 2003 as
the ``Year of the Disabled,'' to raise awareness about problems faced
by disabled citizens. In practice, however, the Government devoted
little attention and resources to persons with disabilities, who
remained economically and socially marginalized.
The 1993 census counted 288,526 persons with disabilities, or 1.3
percent of the population; however, in 2001 the Ministry of Health and
the Pan American Health Organization estimated that the actual number
of persons with disabilities could be as high as 3 million, or 13.8
percent of the population. CONADIS estimated that between 10 and 13
percent of the population was disabled.
The Government did not allocate sufficient funds to make genuine
integration of persons with disabilities into the economy possible. In
2001 Congress increased the annual budget allocated to integrate
persons with disabilities into the economy from $250,000 to $457,000
(875,000 to 1.6 million soles). Although the law prohibits
discrimination in the workplace, it is vague regarding the source of
funds to pay for the human assistance, technological support, and
environmental adaptations that often are necessary to enable workers
with disabilities to be productive. As a result, persons with
disabilities and the private agencies serving them generally relied on
public charity and on funding from international organizations.
Although construction regulations mandate barrier-free access by
persons with physical disabilities to public service buildings, little
effort was made to implement this provision. There were no
accommodations, such as interpreters for the deaf in government service
offices and Braille or recorded versions of the Constitution, which
would facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities in the
basic processes of democracy and citizenship. However, the Human Rights
Ombudsman reported that a program to facilitate voter education and
access for persons with disabilities in the 2001 elections was
successful.
According to officials of the Institute for Social Security, less
than 1 percent of persons with severe disabilities actually worked.
Among those who did, many were channeled into occupations traditionally
assumed to be ``suitable'' for persons with disabilities, such as
telephone switchboard operation and massage, in the case of the blind.
Some private companies initiated programs to hire and train persons
with disabilities, and a private foundation provided small loans to
persons with disabilities to start up businesses. Nevertheless, such
persons faced discrimination by potential employers. For example, the
statute governing the policies and procedures of the judicial branch
specifically prohibits the blind from serving as judges or prosecutors,
a provision that the National Judiciary Council has interpreted to
apply to all persons with disabilities.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination
based on race and provides for the right of all citizens to speak their
native language; however, the large population of indigenous persons
faced pervasive societal discrimination and social prejudice. Many
factors impeded their ability to participate in, and facilitated their
deliberate exclusion from, decision making directly affecting their
lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.
According to indigenous rights groups, the 1993 Constitution and
subsequent implementing legislation are less explicit about the
inalienability and unmarketability of native lands than earlier
legislation. Pervasive discrimination and social prejudice intensified
feelings of inferiority and second-class citizenship. Many indigenous
persons lacked basic documents such as a birth certificate or a voter's
registration card that normally would identify them as full citizens
and enable them to play an active part in society.
Many other factors also contributed to the marginalization of
indigenous people in society. Poor transportation, language barriers,
and communications infrastructure in the highlands and in the Amazon
jungle region made political mobilization and organization difficult.
The geographic isolation of much of the indigenous population and the
centralization of government in Lima further limited the access and
participation of indigenous people in society.
The native population of the Amazon region, estimated at between
200,000 and 300,000 persons, faced pervasive discrimination and social
prejudice. In accordance with local culture and traditions, most of the
native communities have a spiritual relationship with their land, and
the concept of land as a marketable commodity is alien to them.
Nevertheless, according to the director of the Human Rights Ombudsman's
Native Communities Program, the only right still statutorily set aside
for this native population with respect to its land is that of
``unassignability,'' which prevents the title to such lands from being
reassigned to some nonindigenous tenant by right of tenure. However,
the marketing and sale of the lands are no longer prohibited.
Indigenous groups continued to resist encroachment on their native
lands by oil exploration and drilling interests. Many indigenous
persons did not have title to the land on which they lived. For those
who did, title to land does not include mineral or other subsoil
rights, which belong to the State; this problem led to conflicts
between mining interests and indigenous communities. Indigenous groups
asserted that such encroachment often can damage the environment and
negatively affect the health of the native people. For example, the
45,000 Aguaruna and the Huambisa, who inhabit an area near the border
with Ecuador, are only two of many indigenous groups that complained
about intolerable living conditions and inaccessible public services.
In the same region, along the Pastaza River, the 4,700 members of the
Achuar people lived in 36 communities, only 12 of which had title to
their land.
Persons of indigenous descent who live in the Andean highlands
speak Aymara and Quechua, recognized as official languages. They are
ethnically distinct from the diverse indigenous groups that live on the
eastern side of the Andes and in the tropical lowlands adjacent to the
Amazon basin.
The Government's Indigenous Affairs Commission has a mandate to
coordinate state services to meet the needs of indigenous people. The
Commission, which is chaired by MIMDES, has among its members officials
from a variety of relevant ministries as well as representatives of the
indigenous peasant population in the highland and coastal areas, the
native population of the Amazon jungle, and the Afro-Peruvian
community. In 1999 Congress created an Indigenous Affairs Committee,
which served to address the needs of the indigenous communities. In
August Congress modified the committee's mandate to include indigenous
peoples from the Amazon region, and changed its name to the Amazon,
Indigenous, and Afro-Peruvian Affairs Committee.
President Toledo was the country's first elected president of mixed
Caucasian and indigenous ancestry.
The two principal NGOs that represented the interests of the native
population of the Amazon region were the Inter-Ethnic Association for
the Development of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDESEP) and the Confederation
of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP). Both organizations joined
the Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples, an umbrella body that
coordinated the activities of the country's indigenous population.
CONAP believed that mining and other development operations were
inevitable and, therefore, wanted native communities to share the
benefits. AIDESEP opposed territorial encroachments. Both AIDESEP and
CONAP were critical of the 1995 land law, which permits Amazonian land
to be bought and sold if no one is living on it or otherwise making use
of it.
Sendero Luminoso continued to be a leading violator of the rights
of indigenous people. The terrorist group continued to coerce
indigenous peasants into joining its ranks and to demand war taxes. In
December the Government announced that the police would attempt to
rescue the members of at least 200 families, primarily from the
Ashaninkas indigenous group, who were believed to be held captive by
Sendero Luminoso forces in the central jungle areas of Junin and
Ayacucho. The families were being forced to work in the cultivation of
illegal coca leaves, provide lookout protection, and to prepare meals
and perform other basic chores. Living and working conditions for the
Ashaninkas in the encampment areas were reported as inhumane.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In December 2000, Congress
passed legislation that made racial discrimination a crime, with
penalties varying from 30 to 60 days of community service. For public
officials the sentence is between 60 and 120 days of community service;
violators also were disqualified from holding public office for 3
years. The country's population includes several racial minorities, the
largest of which are persons of Asian and African descent. Afro-
Peruvians, who tended to be concentrated along the coast, often faced
discrimination and social prejudice, and they were among the poorest
groups in the country.
On April 25, the Government's Indigenous Affairs Commission
expanded to include Afro-Peruvians. In August Congress changed the name
of its committee addressing the needs of the indigenous communities in
the country, including Afro-Peruvians, to the Amazon, Indigenous, and
Afro-Peruvian Affairs Committee.
Afro-Peruvians generally did not hold leadership positions in
government, business, or the military; however, there were three Afro-
Peruvian members of Congress. Both the navy and the air force were
believed widely to follow unstated policies that exclude blacks from
the officer corps. The law prohibits newspaper employment
advertisements from specifying the race of the candidates sought, but
employers often found discreet ways to relegate blacks to low-paying
service jobs. The law prohibits various forms of discrimination by
retail establishments against prospective customers. However, the law
has not deterred discriminatory practices. Afro-Peruvians were often
portrayed unflatteringly by the entertainment industry as individuals
of questionable character.
Although citizens of Asian descent historically suffered
discrimination, their social standing improved in recent years. Many
persons of Asian descent held leadership positions in business and
government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide
for the right of association; however, worker rights advocates claimed
that the laws were overly restrictive. About 5 percent of the formal
sector workforce of 8.3 million belonged to organized labor unions.
There were approximately 12 million economically active persons in the
country, of which about 49 percent had permanent employment, 43 percent
were underemployed, and 8 percent were unemployed. Government and labor
estimates showed that well over half of all workers participated in the
informal sector of the economy or were underemployed in the formal
sector.
Labor regulations provide that workers may form unions on the basis
of their occupation, employer affiliation, or geographic territory.
Workers were not required to seek authorization prior to forming a
trade union, nor could employers legally condition employment on union
membership or nonmembership. In the past, labor advocates asserted that
laws promulgated by the Fujimori administration in 1992, as well as
provisions included in the 1993 Constitution, failed to protect the
rights of workers to form unions. Labor advocates claimed that many
workers were reluctant to organize due to fear of dismissal. In
December Congress passed a law that addressed some of the International
Labor Organization's (ILO) primary objections to the 1992 labor law.
The new law allows apprentices to join unions, reduces the number of
individuals required to form a union, recognizes the right to strike,
and allows for collective bargaining by sector.
In recent years, the ILO criticized a provision that permitted
businesses to employ up to 30 percent of their workforce from workers
between the ages of 16 to 25 in apprenticeship-type jobs; workers in
this age bracket were precluded from union membership and
participation. To address this complaint, a 2001 law reduced to 10
percent the percentage of employees that a company may employ as
apprentices between the ages of 16 and 25.
In December 2000, then-President Paniagua established a tripartite
National Labor Council for the Government, workers, and business to
address labor problems. In September 2001, President Toledo reinstalled
the National Labor Council and opened two regional councils, one in
Arequipa and one in Cusco, to address labor issues unique to each
region. The Council served to maintain a dialog between labor,
business, and the Government.
Unions represented a cross section of political opinion. Although
some unions traditionally were associated with political groups, the
law prohibits unions from engaging in explicitly political, religious,
or profit-making activities. Union leaders who ran for Congress in the
2001 elections did so without official union sponsorship. Nevertheless,
some union activists who ran for public office received unofficial
backing from their unions.
The new law passed in December addressed some of the ILO's
objections to former legislation on collective bargaining. In the past,
the main union confederations criticized the Employment Promotion Act,
amended in 1995 and 1996, for restricting the rights of workers,
including the freedom of association and the right of workers to
bargain collectively. Unions also complained that the law eliminates
the right of dismissed workers to compulsory reinstatement if they
prove that employers dismissed them unjustly. In practice, companies
sometimes offered financial compensation instead of reinstatement as
the legislation allows. Although the law prohibits companies from
firing workers solely for involvement in union activities, this
provision was not enforced rigidly. In November 2000, the ILO's
Committee of Freedom of Association recommended that the Government
enforce legislation protecting workers from dismissal on account of
membership in a union or participation in union activities. In the
first such action by the judiciary, in September the Constitutional
Tribunal ruled that a major company, Telefonica, had to rehire over 400
workers suspected of being fired for their union affiliation.
In July Congress passed a law regarding collective dismissals that
reinstated workers' rights in this area. In December the Ministry of
Labor published a list of 7,156 names of former public sector employees
who stand to benefit from the new Collective Dismissal Law. Additional
names of approximately 5,850 eligible beneficiaries were to be released
in 2003. The workers were among those deemed to have been fired
unjustly during the Fujimori administration.
There were no restrictions on the affiliation of labor unions with
international bodies. Several major unions and labor confederations
belonged to international labor organizations, the international trade
secretariats, and regional bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution recognizes the right of public and private sector workers
to organize and bargain collectively; however, it specifies that this
right must be exercised in harmony with broader social objectives.
Labor regulations provide that workers may form unions on the basis of
their occupation, employer affiliation, or geographic territory. The
law does not prohibit temporary employees from joining a union, but
they may not join the same union as permanent workers.
Union officials must be active members of their union, but the
number of individuals each union may designate as ``official'' is
limited, as is the amount of company time they may devote to union
business. There were no legal restrictions that prevented unions from
negotiating for higher levels of worker protection than the baseline
standards provided for by law. There was no legal protection against
employer interference in trade unions.
A union had to represent at least 20 workers in order to become an
official collective bargaining agent. Representatives could participate
in collective bargaining negotiations and establish negotiating
timetables. Management negotiating teams could not exceed the size of
union teams, and both sides were permitted to have attorneys and
technical experts present as advisers.
Labor regulations permit companies unilaterally to propose
temporary changes in work schedules, conditions, and wages, and to
suspend collective bargaining agreements for up to 90 days, if obliged
to do so by worsening economic circumstances or other unexpected
negative developments, provided that they give their employees at least
15 days' notice of such changes. However, worker rights advocates
alleged that, in practice, few employers respected this provision. If
workers rejected an employer's proposed changes, the Ministry of Labor
was required to resolve the dispute based on criteria of
``reasonableness'' and ``economic necessity.'' Whether the changes
proposed by employers in such instances were upheld in full or in part,
employers were required to adopt all possible measures, such as the
authorization of extra vacation time, in order to minimize the negative
economic impact on their employees.
Although a conciliation and arbitration system exists, union
officials complained that their proportionate share of the costs of
arbitration often exceeded their resources. In addition, union
officials claimed that, as the law prohibits temporary workers from
participating in the same union as permanent workers, companies have
resorted to hiring workers ``temporarily'' to prevent increases in the
number of union members. To address this concern, Congress passed a law
in 2001 that restricts the number of temporary workers hired to 20
percent of a company's work force. Some labor advocates continued to
claim that some companies did not comply with the law. Employers denied
that they were biased against unions, and argued that the labor
stability provisions of the legislation made long-term commitments to
workers too expensive.
The new labor law passed in December addressed some of the ILO's
objections to the 1992 labor law concerning the right to strike,
including a requirement that a majority of workers in an enterprise,
regardless of union membership, must vote in favor of any strike.
There were numerous labor strikes, demonstrations, and work
stoppages during the year, most of which were peaceful. The Government
took no actions to prevent the strikes or to reprimand participants.
There were confrontations between union-affiliated protesters and
police who were charged with controlling the large crowds. In a
September incident, a scuffle broke out between two rival labor
organizations, but no serious injuries or property damage occurred. No
abuses were reported when the police removed roadblocks set up by
protesters.
The law restricts unions that represent workers in public services
deemed essential by the Government from striking. However, there were
strikes during the year by public sector workers.
There were four export processing zones (EPZs). Special regulations
aimed at giving employers in EPZs and duty free zones a freer hand in
the application of the law provide for the use of temporary labor as
needed, for greater flexibility in labor contracts, and for setting
wage rates based on supply and demand. As a result, workers in such
zones had difficulty unionizing. Worker rights advocates acknowledged
that these few zones did not contribute substantively to labor's
unionizing difficulties.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, and there were no reports of forced
labor during the year. The law specifically prohibits forced or bonded
labor by children. According to MIMDES and the Ministry of Labor, there
were no reports of forced child labor. Forced labor previously was
found in the gold mining industry in the Madre de Dios area; however,
the changing nature of the industry and government efforts to regulate
it seem to have addressed the problem. NGO sources and the ILO reported
in 1999 that mechanization largely had replaced manual labor, and the
Ministry of Labor inspection programs helped deter illegal child labor
in this industry.
Sendero Luminoso held indigenous families captive in remote areas,
using their labor, including that of children, to grow food crops and
coca (see Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Child and Adolescent Code of 1992 governs child and
adolescent labor practices and restricts child labor based upon the age
of the child, hours worked, and occupation; however, child labor was a
serious problem. The legal minimum age for employment is 14; however,
children between the ages of 12 and 14 may work in certain jobs if they
obtain special permission from the Ministry of Labor and certify that
they also are attending school. In certain sectors of the economy,
higher minimums are in force: age 14 in agricultural work; age 15 in
industrial, commercial, or mining work; and age 16 in the fishing
industry. As of August, the Ministry had granted 912 permits to
children between the ages of 12 and 17 to work in compliance with labor
and education laws. The Ministry approved 1,795 of these permits in
2001. The law prohibits children from engaging in certain types of
employment, such as work underground, work that involves the lifting
and carrying of heavy weights, work where the child or adolescent is
responsible for the safety of others; night work; or any work that
jeopardizes the health of children and adolescents, puts at risk their
physical, mental, and emotional development, or prevents their regular
attendance at school. As many as 1.9 million children worked primarily
in the informal sector to help support their families. Of this total,
NGOs estimated that some 600,000 children were under the age of 12.
Human and labor rights groups criticized the modification of the
Child and Adolescent Code, passed in August 2000, that maintained the
minimum age for work at 12 years old (with government permission), and
argued that it contradicts international guidelines on the minimum age
of child workers.
Many children were pressed to help support their families from a
very early age by working in the informal economy, where the Government
did not supervise wages or working conditions. Other children and
adolescents worked either in formally established enterprises or as
unpaid workers at home. There were some reports of child prostitution
(see Section 5).
Adolescents must be authorized to work and must be registered
unless they are employed as domestic workers or as unpaid family
workers. Adolescents may only work a certain number of hours each day:
4 hours for children aged 12 through 14, and 6 hours for children aged
15 through 17. Adolescent employment must be remunerated in accordance
with the principle of equal pay for equal work. In practice, the Child
and Adolescent Code provisions were violated routinely in the informal
sector. Child and adolescent laborers worked long hours in the
agricultural sector. Other children reportedly were employed at times
in dangerous occupations or in high-risk environments, such as informal
gold mining, garbage collection, loading and unloading produce in
markets, brick making, coca cultivation, or work in stone quarries and
fireworks factories, among others. Some child and adolescent labor
tended to be seasonal.
Firms found guilty of violating child labor laws can be fined and
have their operations suspended. The Ministry of Labor's inspectors had
legal authority to investigate reports of illegal child labor
practices. Inspectors conducted routine visits without notice to areas
where child labor problems were reported. Inspectors maintained contact
with a wide variety of local NGOs, church officials, law enforcement
officials, and school officials. The Ministry reported that there were
a total of 170 labor inspectors, of which 120 worked in Lima. These
inspectors conducted all labor inspections, both for adults and
children. Labor inspections were primarily conducted in the formal
sector. The National Police and local prosecutors exercised law
enforcement authority.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides that
the State promote social and economic progress and occupational
education. It states that workers should receive a ``just and
sufficient'' wage to be determined by the Government in consultation
with labor and business representatives, as well as ``adequate
protection against arbitrary dismissal.''
In March 2000, the Government raised the statutory minimum wage
from $117 (410 soles) a month to $128 (450 soles), which was not
considered sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. The Government estimated the poverty line to be
approximately $45 (157 soles) a month per person. However, this figure
varied from region to region. Actual figures from INEI's 2001 survey
showed the poverty line for Lima at $75 (260 soles) a month per person,
compared to $43 (147 soles) for the rural jungle. According to some
estimates, as much as half the work force earned the minimum wage or
below, because such a great proportion worked in the informal sector,
which was largely unregulated. The Ministry of Labor was responsible
for enforcing the minimum wage.
A 2001 law increased the Labor Ministry's ability to enforce
compliance with laws requiring businesses to pay social security and
other benefits.
The Constitution provides for a 48-hour workweek, a weekly day of
rest, and an annual vacation. In addition, it prohibits discrimination
in the workplace, although discrimination continued to be a problem in
practice. A Supreme Decree states that all workers should work no more
than 8 hours per day; however, labor advocates complained in recent
years that workers were pressured to work longer hours to avoid
dismissal. In February President Toledo signed into law a bill that
requires companies to pay overtime to employees who work more than 8
hours, to provide additional compensation for work at night, and to
provide a 45-minute meal break to employees during their 8-hour shift.
Labor, business, and the Government reported that the majority of
companies in the formal sector were complying with the new law.
While occupational health and safety standards exist, the
Government lacked the resources to monitor firms or enforce compliance.
Labor advocates continued to argue that the Government dedicated
insufficient resources to enforce existing legislation. In September
2001, the Minister of Labor announced that 80 percent of the companies
inspected were found to be in compliance with labor laws. The
compliance estimate remained consistent throughout the year. The
Ministry of Labor continued to receive worker complaints and intervened
in hundreds of cases. When firms were found to be in violation of the
law, the Government sanctioned them with fines or, in some cases,
closure. In cases of industrial accidents, the level of compensation
awarded to the injured employee usually was determined by agreement
between the employer and the individual involved. The worker did not
need to prove an employer's culpability in order to obtain compensation
for work-related injuries. No provisions exist in law for workers to
remove themselves from potentially dangerous work situations without
jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--A 1999 law prohibits trafficking in
persons and alien smuggling, which is defined as promoting, executing,
or assisting in the illegal entry or exit of persons from the country.
Laws prohibiting kidnaping, sexual abuse of minors, and illegal
employment were enforced and could also be used to sanction traffickers
in persons. There were no programs to educate vulnerable groups about
the dangers of trafficking or to assist victims.
While there were no other reports of trafficking in persons, child
prostitution was a problem (see Section 5).
There were two reports in 2001 that persons were trafficked from
the country. Early that year, three women in their twenties were forced
into prostitution in Korea after they were ostensibly hired as domestic
workers. In May 2001, a Peruvian intermediary contracted three men to
work as mechanics in Abu Dhabi. The men alleged that once they arrived
in Abu Dhabi, their employer took away their passports and never paid
them for work performed over several months. With assistance from a
foreign consulate in Abu Dhabi and an NGO, the men were repatriated in
October 2001.
__________
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
Saint Kitts and Nevis is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy, a
federation, and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The
Constitution provides the smaller island of Nevis considerable self-
government under a premier, as well as the right to secede from the
Federation in accordance with certain enumerated procedures. The
Government consists of a prime minister, a cabinet, and a unicameral
legislative assembly. The Governor General, appointed by the British
monarch, is the titular head of state, with largely ceremonial powers.
In elections in March 2000, Prime Minister Denzil Douglas's St. Kitts
and Nevis Labour Party won all 8 St. Kitts seats of the 11 seats in the
legislature, and Douglas remained Prime Minister. In elections in Nevis
on September 7, 2001, Premier Vance Amory's Concerned Citizens Movement
(CCM) won four of the five seats in the Nevis Assembly. The judiciary
was generally independent; however, intimidation of witnesses in high
profile, drug-related cases has been a problem.
The security forces consisted of a small police force, which
included a 50-person Special Services Unit that received some light
infantry training, a coast guard, and a small defense force. The forces
were controlled by and responsive to the Government. There were
occasional allegations of abuse by the police.
The mixed economy was based on sugar cane, tourism, and light
industry. The country's population was approximately 46,000. Most
commercial enterprises were privately owned, but a state corporation
owned the sugar industry and 85 percent of arable land. In 2001 sugar
production increased by 30 percent, but export earnings remained
constant due to exchange rate fluctuations; economic activity slowed
significantly in the manufacturing and construction industries. The
unemployment rate was estimated at 5 percent. Preliminary estimates for
real economic growth suggested a 2 percent decline for the year.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were problems in some areas. Poor prison conditions, apparent
intimidation of witnesses and jurors, government restrictions on
opposition access to government-controlled media, and violence against
women were the principal problems. Saint Kitts and Nevis was invited by
the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary of unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture or other
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the
authorities generally observed this prohibition in practice. However,
there were occasional allegations of excessive use of force by the
police, particularly during the annual Carnival celebration and at
other special events.
The police force continued to conduct its own internal
investigation when complaints were made against its members. There were
11 complaints filed in 2001, 5 of which addressed police searches based
on warrants (see Section 1.f.); no more recent information was
available.
Prison conditions were overcrowded, and resources remained limited.
The prison on Saint Kitts, built in 1840, was designed to accommodate
60 inmates but was renovated to increase capacity and housed over 140
prisoners; some prisoners slept on mats on the floor. A prison on Nevis
housed 30 inmates. In both prisons pretrial detainees were segregated
from convicted prisoners. Female inmates were segregated from male
prisoners, and juveniles were segregated from adult prisoners. Corporal
punishment is legal; a court can order that an accused person receive
lashes if found guilty.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers. In addition, the Ministry of National Security appointed
``visiting justices,'' who were volunteers that oversaw the treatment
of prisoners. The prison staff periodically received training in human
rights.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
respected these provisions in practice. The law requires that persons
detained be charged within 48 hours or be released. If charged, the
police must bring a detainee before a court within 72 hours. Family
members, attorneys, and clergy were permitted to visit detainees
regularly.
Neither the Constitution nor the law prohibit forced exile, but the
Government did not use it in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, intimidation of witnesses and potential
intimidation of jurors in high profile, drug-related cases was a
problem. The Government did not take any concrete steps to protect
witnesses, judges, and jurors, although it continued to explore the
possibility of a program to do so through the Caribbean Community.
The court system includes a high court and four magistrate's courts
at the local level, with the right of appeal to the Eastern Caribbean
Court of Appeal. Final appeal may be made to the Privy Council in the
United Kingdom. Free legal assistance was available for indigent
defendants in capital cases only.
The Constitution provides that every person accused of a crime must
receive a fair, speedy, and public trial, and these requirements
generally were observed. At year's end, there were 49 persons in
``remand'' (detention pending trial or further court action). The
length of remand varied according to offense and charges; persons may
be held for days, weeks, or months. There is no system of parole,
although there was public discussion about starting a parole system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
Government generally respected these prohibitions in practice. The law
requires judicially issued warrants to search private homes. The police
received complaints during the year regarding police improprieties in
the process of investigating reported crimes, such as taking personal
photographs of a victim and unnecessarily exposing a victim by bringing
potential suspects to the victim's home for identification. The
authorities took disciplinary action against one officer involved.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities generally
respected these provisions in practice; however, there were allegations
during the year that the ruling party limited opponents' access to the
media.
These concerns were muted somewhat by the grant of broadcast
licenses to several independent radio stations.
There were three independent weekly newspapers; in addition, each
of the major political parties published a weekly or biweekly
newspaper. The publications were free to criticize the Government and
did so regularly and vigorously. International news publications were
readily available.
The Government privatized the Government-owned radio station,
although the Government continued to appoint three of its five board
members. Three other stations had been in operation since before the
Labour Party came into office in 1995. In addition, three privately
owned radio stations received licenses and began operating in 2001-02.
A radio station in Nevis that operated on AM since 1989 received an FM
license but was not yet operating on the new frequency at year's end.
The opposition People's Action Movement (PAM) party alleged that
the Labour Party blocked PAM's access to the broadcast media through
its control of the national television and radio broadcasting
facilities. However, the PAM acknowledged that it had increased
accessibility to the media since several additional radio stations were
granted licenses.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly and for the right of
association, and the Government generally respected these rights in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
existed. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during
the year. There were no reports of forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government by peaceful means, and citizens exercised this right in
practice through periodic elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. A multiparty political system existed, in which political
parties were free to conduct their activities; however, an opposition
party alleged that the ruling party restricted access to the media (see
Section 2.a.). All citizens 18 years of age and older may register and
vote by secret ballot. Despite some irregularities, orderly general
elections were held in 2000, and Nevis elections were conducted
peacefully in September 2001.
The Legislative Assembly has 11 elected seats: 8 for St. Kitts and
3 for Nevis. The Labour Party held all eight St. Kitts seats in the
legislature; opposition parties held the other three seats. The PAM
lost its one seat in the 2000 election. In addition to the 11 elected
Members of Parliament, there were 3 appointed members called Senators.
The Governor General appoints the three Senators, two on recommendation
of the Prime Minister and one on the recommendation of the Leader of
the Opposition. The island of Nevis has considerable self-government,
with its own premier and legislature. In the 2001 Nevis elections,
Premier Amory's CCM won four of the five seats in the Nevis Assembly.
In accordance with its rights under the Constitution, in 1996 the
Nevis Assembly initiated steps towards secession from the Federation,
the most recent being a referendum in 1998 that failed to secure the
required two-thirds majority for secession. Following the referendum,
the Government established a Constitutional Commission to review the
arrangements between the two islands. In October when a Select
Committee of the National Assembly reviewed the commission's report,
the CCM again raised the issue of secession. The Government suggested
that the issue be handled in the constitutional reform process and
proposed granting greater autonomy to the Nevis island government and
the Nevis Assembly.
Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of
political opinion or affiliation, the former opposition party PAM
alleged widespread employment discrimination by the St. Kitts and Nevis
Labour Party against public sector employment of persons perceived to
be PAM supporters. In the case of one person whom the PAM leadership
claimed had not been paid, the Government asserted that this
individual, while a Minister in the Government, received fees for legal
services from two government institutions and that, therefore, it was
entitled to offset her pension by the amount of fees received. The
matter was before the courts at year's end.
The PAM claimed that electoral reform is needed to correct
inequities and to prevent irregularities in voting, asserting that in
the last election, the Government unduly influenced voters by providing
airfare and hotel accommodations to overseas citizens willing to return
to vote. The PAM also claimed that 17-year-olds voted even though the
law requires a minimum age of 18, and that some people voted more than
once by voting in different jurisdictions. Citing these irregularities,
the PAM proposed that photographic voter identification cards be
issued, and the existing register of voters nullified. The PAM also
recommended changes to the electoral commission to correct what it
perceived as a bias toward the party in power. The PAM criticized the
Government's failure to appoint any PAM representatives to the Select
Committee of the National Assembly on Constitutional Reform, which will
take up matters of electoral reform.
There were no impediments in law or in practice to the
participation of women in leadership roles in government and politics.
There were 2 women in the National Assembly, 1 woman in the Cabinet, 3
of 4 magistrates were women, the court registrar was female, and 5 of
11 permanent secretaries were female. In addition, in Nevis, one
Cabinet member and the president of the House of Assembly were female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights
groups formed during the year. There were no requests for
investigations or visits by international human rights groups during
the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
of origin, birth out of wedlock, political opinion or affiliation,
color, sex, or creed, and the Government generally respected these
provisions in practice.
Women.--According to a government official, violence against women
was a problem. A 2000 Domestic Violence Act criminalizes domestic
violence and provides penalties for abusers. Although many women were
reluctant to file complaints or pursue them in the courts, there were
publicly reported cases of both domestic violence and rape, and a few
convictions. The Department of Gender Affairs, under the Ministry of
Social Development, Community, and Gender Affairs, was active in the
areas of domestic violence, spousal abuse, and abandonment. It offered
counseling for victims of abuse and conducted training on domestic
violence and gender violence for officials of the police and fire
departments, nurses, school guidance counselors, and other government
employees. There was no separate domestic violence unit in the police
force.
The role of women in society is not restricted by law but was
circumscribed by culture and tradition. There was no overt societal
discrimination against women in employment, although analyses suggested
that women did not occupy as many senior positions as men did. The
Department of Gender Affairs conducted programs addressing poverty and
health and promoting institutional mechanisms to advance the status of
women and leadership positions for women. It operated three programs
for rural women, providing them market skills and training as
entrepreneurs. The Department provided clients assistance with problems
such as lack of housing, unemployment, child care, technical training,
and personal development. It also ran a ``Return Teen Mothers to School
Program'' to encourage young mothers to complete their education. The
Department produced three handbooks on sexual harassment, equal
opportunity and employment, and equal pay for work of equal value. The
Department continued its programs focusing on men as perpetrators of
crimes of violence against women.
Prostitution is illegal and was not considered to be a problem.
There were no laws covering sexual harassment, which the Department
of Gender Affairs considered to be a growing problem.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare and has incorporated most of the provisions of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child into domestic legislation. The
law mandates compulsory education up to the age of 16; it was free and
universal. Over 98 percent of children completed school. Under the law,
the age of consent is 16. During the year, the authorities brought
charges in three cases involving alleged sexual activity with minors.
Persons with Disabilities.--Although there is no legislation to
protect persons with disabilities or to mandate accessibility for them,
the Constitution and the Government prohibit discrimination in
employment, education, and other state services.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions. The law
permits the police, civil service, and other organizations to organize
associations that serve as unions. The major labor union, the St. Kitts
Trades and Labour Union (SKTLU) was associated closely with the St.
Kitts and Nevis Labour Party and was active in all sectors of the
economy. The opposition PAM party alleged that the ruling party used
its influence to try to stifle other unions that would threaten the
SKTLU in the workplace. In 2000 two taxi drivers' associations were
formed, and the existing teachers' union became more active.
In December PAM and the teachers' union alleged that the Labour
Party abused parliamentary privilege by making defamatory statements
which, had they been made outside Parliament, could have been subject
to legal charges. PAM stated that disparaging comments about the
president of the teachers' unions were intended to stifle that union's
growing (400-member) strength.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination but does not require
employers found guilty of such action to rehire employees fired for
union activities. However, the employer must pay lost wages and
severance pay to employees who had worked at least 1 year, based upon
length of their service. There was no legislation governing the
organization and representation of workers, and employers were not
bound legally to recognize a union, but in practice employers did so if
a majority of workers polled wished to organize.
Unions were free to form federations or confederations and to
affiliate with international organizations. The islands' unions
maintained a variety of international ties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
are free to organize and to negotiate for better wages and benefits for
union members. Collective bargaining takes place on a workplace-by-
workplace basis, not industrywide. The Labor Commissioner and Labor
Officers mediate disputes between labor and management on an ad hoc
basis. However, in practice few disputes actually went to the
Commissioner for resolution. If neither the Commissioner nor the
Ministry of Labor is able to resolve the dispute, the law allows for a
case to be brought before a civil court.
The right to strike, while not specified by law, is well
established and respected in practice. Restrictions on striking by
workers who provide essential services, such as the police and civil
servants, were enforced by established practice and custom, but not by
law. There were no major strikes during the year.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits slavery and forced labor, and they did not occur in practice.
While neither the Constitution nor the law specifically address bonded
labor, it was not a problem in practice.
Prisoners can be required to work if their sentence was more than
30 days and stipulated ``hard labor''; they received a small stipend
for this work paid upon discharge.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is addressed in the Employment of Women, Young
Persons, and Children Act, as well as the 1966 Employment of Children
Ordinance. The ordinance outlaws slavery, servitude, and forced labor.
At year's end, both laws were amended to set the minimum legal working
age at 16 years. The Labor Ministry relied heavily on school truancy
officers and the community affairs division to monitor compliance,
which they generally did effectively.
Agriculture, domestic service, and illicit activities were areas in
which juveniles found work. In rural families engaged in livestock
farming and vegetable production, children often were required to
assist as part of family efforts at subsistence. Girls often engaged in
domestic service. Such labor included family-oriented work where
children were made to look after younger siblings or ailing parents and
grandparents at the expense of their schooling. Children often worked
in other households as domestic servants or babysitters. There were no
reported cases of child labor during the year, and no cases of child
labor have ever been brought to the attention of the Department of
Labor, which is empowered to investigate and address complaints of
child labor.
At year's end, child labor laws were being reviewed under a program
of labor legislation review and update that began in 1999 with the 1986
Protection of Employment Act.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates for various
categories of workers, such as domestic servants, retail employees,
casino workers, and skilled workers, were last updated in 1994, and
manufacturing sector wages were revised in 1996. The average wage
varied from $67.42 (EC$180) per week for full-time domestic workers to
$166.10 (EC$443.50) per week for skilled workers. These provided a
barely adequate living for a wage earner and family; many workers
supplemented wages by keeping small animals such as goats and chickens.
The Labor Commission undertook regular wage inspections and special
investigations when it received complaints; it required employers found
in violation to pay back wages. Workers who were laid off for more than
12 weeks received a lump sum payment from the Government based on
previous earnings and length of service.
The law provides for a 40- to 44-hour workweek, but the common
practice was 40 hours in 5 days. Although not required by law, workers
receive at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The law provides
that workers receive a minimum annual vacation of 14 working days.
While there were no specific health and safety regulations, the
Factories Law provides general health and safety guidance to Labor
Ministry inspectors. The Labor Commission settles disputes over safety
conditions. Workers had the right to report unsafe work environments
without jeopardy to continued employment; inspectors then investigate
such claims, and workers may leave such locations without jeopardy to
their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
An ``economic citizenship'' program allowed foreign investors to
purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures involving an
investment of at least $250,000 (EC$675,000) in real estate, plus a
registration fee of $35,000 (EC$94,500) for the head of household
(amounts vary for other family members). This program reportedly
facilitated the illegal immigration of persons from China and other
countries to North America where, in some instances, criminal
organizations that provided the funds to such persons forced them to
work under conditions similar to bonded labor until their debt was
repaid. The Government denied any knowledge of illegal immigration
facilitated through this program and asserted that applicants were
adequately screened.
----------
SAINT LUCIA
Saint Lucia is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member
of the Commonwealth of Nations. The head of state was Queen Elizabeth
II, represented by a Governor General, who has some residual powers
under the Constitution that can be used at the Governor's General's
discretion. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which usually represent
the majority party in the bicameral Parliament, exercised most of the
power. In generally free and fair elections on December 3, 2001, Prime
Minister Dr. Kenny Anthony's Saint Lucia Labour Party (SLP) retained
power, winning 14 seats in the 17-member House of Assembly. The
judiciary was generally independent.
The Royal Saint Lucia Police was the only security force and
included a small unit called the Special Services Unit (which had some
paramilitary training) and a coast guard unit. They were controlled by
and responsive to the Government. There were occasional allegations of
abuse by the police.
The country's market-based economy depended upon tourism and banana
exports as the principal sources of foreign exchange. The population
was approximately 158,000. Although tropical storm Lili destroyed more
than 65 percent of the banana crop in September, construction work,
agricultural output, and income from tourism were expected to increase
during the year. In 2001 the real economic growth rate was a negative
5.3 percent, unemployment was 18.9 percent, and the rate of inflation
was 1.9 percent.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; the authorities continued to investigate a killing committed
by police in 2000. There were some allegations of physical abuse of
suspects and prisoners by the police; poor prison conditions, long
delays in trials and sentencing, incidents of mob attacks on suspected
criminals, domestic violence against women, and child abuse also were
problems. Saint Lucia was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD)
Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial
Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents.
At year's end, the Government had not concluded its investigation
into the 2000 killing by police of escaped prisoner Alfred Harding. A
jury returned a verdict of accidental death in the case involving the
2000 police shooting of Paul Hamilton.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there
were no reports of torture or other cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment or punishment during the year. Although no official
complaints were filed, prisoners and suspects complained of physical
abuse by police and prison officers.
During the year, the police force, with assistance from a team of
British experts, prepared a 5-year plan, which includes community-based
policing, crime prevention, increased professionalization, and
attention to complaint investigation and internal review. In 2001 the
Canadian government provided an officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police to act as Deputy Commissioner of Police in order to strengthen
personnel procedures; his contract concluded in April. The police force
added 50 new officers to bring its strength to over 700, and an
additional 30 new officers were in training at year's end.
Prison conditions at the main prison in Castries continued to be
poor, and overcrowding remained a severe problem. Lax security controls
in an urban setting enabled weapons to be easily smuggled into the
prison by relatives or be thrown over the prison walls. The focus of
the correction program was containment; there were no training or
rehabilitation programs, although there were a few craft programs.
Although there were different wings for prisoners requiring
different levels of security, prisoners who were charged with crimes
but not yet convicted were incarcerated with the convicts. In July the
Government transferred 11 prisoners to a prison on Grenada for more
than 2 months in order to defuse a tense situation at the prison that
developed when rival drug gangs carried their conflicts inside the
prison. While the prisoners were on Grenada, the Government undertook
some repairs to the main prison in order to strengthen the facility.
In December there were 455 inmates in the main prison facility,
which was built to house 80 inmates. Fifty young offenders (ages 18 to
20) were kept apart from older inmates. Sanitation was a particular
problem, with open pit latrines for prisoners. Construction of a new
prison facility near Dennery was just completed at year's end. It has
separate facilities for females, young offenders, and those awaiting
trial. It also has space set aside for rehabilitation programs, as well
as a magistrate's courtroom. The Government hired and trained 78 new
correctional officers to provide additional staff for the new prison;
their training included segments on human rights.
In December there were 10 female prisoners in a separate prison
facility for women, but they will be moved to the new prison in January
2003. Conditions in the women's facility were somewhat better than
those at the men's prison. A boys' training school housed juveniles
between 12 and 18 years of age; it will operate separately from the new
prison.
The Government permitted prison visits by human rights observers.
In addition, nine private sector volunteers appointed as ``visiting
justices'' by the Ministry of Home Affairs visited prisoners
periodically.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or imprisonment and requires a court hearing
72 hours after detention, and the Government generally adhered to these
provisions in practice. However, in the past, authorities had held
prisoners for years on remand after charging them. There was no
constitutional requirement for a speedy trial, but the Government
planned to use the magistrate's court in the new prison to reduce
processing time for court hearings after detention. Those charged with
serious crimes spent an estimated 6 months to 1 year on remand;
however, those charged with petty offenses often received speedy
trials, particularly if victims or witnesses might leave the island.
The Government did not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice.
There are two levels of courts, which are the Courts of Summary
Jurisdiction (Magistrate's Courts) and the High Court. Both levels have
civil and criminal authority. The lower courts accept civil claims up
to about $1,850 (EC$5,000) and criminal cases generally classified as
``petty.'' The High Court has unlimited authority in both civil and
criminal cases. All cases can be appealed to the Eastern Caribbean
Court of Appeal. Cases also may be appealed to the Privy Council in
London as the final court of appeal.
The Constitution requires public trials before an independent and
impartial court and, in cases involving capital punishment, provision
of legal counsel for those who cannot afford a defense attorney. In
criminal cases not involving capital punishment, defendants must obtain
their own legal counsel. Defendants were entitled to select their own
legal counsel, were presumed innocent until proven guilty in court, and
had the right of appeal. The authorities observed both constitutional
and statutory requirements for fair public trials.
The court system continued to face a serious backlog of cases. In
November 2001, the Government appointed two new magistrates. The
average time for a trial took 3 to 6 months in the magistrate's courts
and 6 to 12 months for criminal cases. In an effort to speed up the
court process, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court held training in
October for court personnel in the areas of caseflow management and
records management.
Citizens took justice into their own hands by attacking individuals
suspected of committing crimes. In September residents in Soucis
attacked a man suspected of robbing an elderly shopkeeper. In October
the press reported that villagers in Anse La Raye chased a man
suspected of involvement in the death of 70-year-old John Cadasse; he
ran away, but the police arrested him and held him at year's end
pending an investigation.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such actions, and
government authorities generally respected these prohibitions in
practice. Violations were subject to effective legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
There were four major privately owned newspapers, two privately
owned radio stations, one partially government-funded radio station,
one government-operated television station that began operating in
October, and two private television stations. These media carried a
spectrum of political opinion and often were critical of the
Government. The radio stations' discussion and call-in programs allowed
persons to express their views. The two private television stations
also covered a wide range of views. In addition, there was subscription
cable television service, which provided programming from a variety of
sources, such as CNN and the BBC.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the
Government generally respected these rights in practice.
The law requires permits for public meetings and demonstrations if
they are to be held in public places, such as on streets or sidewalks
or in parks. The police routinely granted such permits; the rare
refusal generally stemmed from the failure of organizers to request the
permit in a timely manner, normally 72 hours before the event.
In September the police denied a request by the United Workers
Party (UWP) for a permit to march in front of the Parliament building,
on the basis that the Public Order Act prohibits marches in such
locations between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. The UWP was protesting the
retention of Walter Francois, an elected Member of Parliament who
allegedly misrepresented his academic credentials. Despite the lack of
a permit to hold an organized protest, a number of persons picketed in
front of the Parliament.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
At year's end, there was still no resolution in the case of the two
men accused of attacking a Sunday Mass in a Roman Catholic Church in
December 2000, which was scheduled for a court hearing in February
2003. The men, believed to be Rastafarian, were charged with murder and
arson for their alleged role in the attack in which a nun and a
worshipper were killed and a priest was doused with gasoline and set on
fire. Thirteen persons were hospitalized for treatment of knife wounds
and burns, including the priest, who died in April 2001 as a result of
blood clots, which may have been an existing condition prior to the
attack.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
existed. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
during the year. There were no reports of the forced expulsion of any
persons having a claim to refugee status; however, government practice
remained undefined.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government, and exercised
that right in generally free and fair elections on December 3, 2001,
when Prime Minister Anthony's SLP defeated the UWP, led by Morella
Joseph. The SLP won 14 of 17 seats and the UWP won 3. The other
opposition parties--the National Alliance, led by former SLP Foreign
Minister George Odlum; the STAFF (Sou Tout Apwe Fete Fini) Party; and
the St. Lucia Freedom Party--did not win any seats. The SLP capitalized
on the failure of the opposition forces to unite in a national
coalition due to a leadership struggle between Odlum and Sir John
Compton, founder of the UWP and a former Prime Minister. Only 52
percent of those eligible voted, and the SLP won 55 percent of the
popular vote.
Under the Constitution, general elections must be held at least
every 5 years by secret ballot, but may be held earlier at the
discretion of the Government in power. The Governor General appoints
the 11-member Senate, which includes 2 independents.
Popularly elected local governments in the 10 administrative
divisions (towns and villages) perform such tasks as regulation of
sanitation and markets and maintenance of cemeteries and secondary
roads.
There were no legal impediments to participation by women and
minorities in government and politics, and 8 women competed in the 2001
elections in a field of 45 candidates for 17 positions. Voters elected
two women to the House of Assembly, and there were four appointed
female Senators. Two of the 13 members of the Cabinet were women, as
was the Governor General.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally did not restrict international or
nongovernmental investigations of alleged violations of human rights.
Although the Government officially cooperated with such investigations,
observers noted occasional reluctance by lower officials to cooperate.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
Neither the Constitution nor the law address discrimination
specifically; however, government policy was nondiscriminatory in the
areas of housing, jobs, education, and opportunity for advancement.
Women.--Violence against women was recognized as a serious problem.
The Government did not prosecute crimes of violence against women
unless the victim pressed charges. Most charges involving domestic
violence must be brought under the ordinary Civil Code, but rape and
other crimes were subject to the Criminal Code. A family court heard
cases of domestic violence and crimes against women and children. The
police force conducted some training for police officers responsible
for investigating rape and other crimes against women. Late in the
year, the police established a special unit to deal with domestic
violence; the sole female sergeant in this section worked closely with
the Ministry of Home Affairs and Gender Affairs. Police and courts
enforced laws to protect women against abuse, although police were
hesitant to intervene in domestic disputes, and many victims were
reluctant to report cases of domestic violence and rape or to press
charges.
The Domestic Violence Act allows a judge to issue a protection
order prohibiting an abuser from entering or remaining in the place
where the victim is. It also allows the judge to order that an abuser's
name be removed from housing leases or rental agreements, with the
effect that the abuser no longer would have the right to live in the
same residence as the victim.
The Saint Lucia Crisis Center for Women, a nongovernmental
organization located in Castries, monitored cases of physical and
emotional abuse and helped clients to deal with such problems as
incest, nonpayment of child support, alcohol and drug abuse,
homelessness, custody, and visitation rights. The Crisis Center
reported 213 new cases during the year, brought by 52 men and 161
women, and 768 repeat cases. There were 56 new cases of spousal abuse
and 6 sexual abuse cases, including 4 alleged rapes and 2 cases of
incest. A recent project on Women, Gender, and Poverty in the Windward
Islands sponsored by the Crisis Center focused on the problems faced by
women farmers who were displaced by the downturns in the banana
industry. Since its opening in September 2001, the Women's Support
Center, a government shelter for abused persons, assisted approximately
40 women with more than 100 children.
Women's affairs were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home
Affairs and Gender Affairs. The Ministry was responsible for protecting
women's rights in domestic violence cases and preventing discrimination
against women, including ensuring equal treatment in employment.
Children.--The Government gave high priority to improving
educational opportunities and health care for children. Education was
compulsory from age 5 through 15; registration fees were required.
Approximately one-third of primary school children continued on to
secondary schools, and the drop out rate from primary to secondary
school was higher for boys than for girls. Government clinics provided
prenatal care, immunization, child health care, and health education
services.
The Saint Lucia Crisis Center reported that the incidence of child
abuse remained high; it received 24 new cases involving child abuse
during the year. As there was no welfare system in place, parents of
sexually abused children sometimes declined to press sexual assault
charges against the abuser in exchange for financial contributions
toward the welfare of any babies born of such abuse. In September the
press reported that a 10-year-old gave birth and that an 11-year-old
was pregnant.
Persons with Disabilities.--No specific legislation protects the
rights of persons with disabilities, nor mandates provision of access
to buildings or government services for them. Several government
buildings added ramps to provide access. There was no rehabilitation
facility for persons with physical disabilities, although the Health
Ministry operated a community-based rehabilitation program in
residents' homes. There were schools for the deaf and for the blind up
to the secondary level. There also was a school for persons with mental
disabilities. Several blind persons worked at banks.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution specifies the right
of workers to form or belong to trade unions under the broader rubric
of the right of association. Most public sector employees and about 20
percent of the total work force was unionized. The law prohibits
antiunion discrimination by employers, and there were effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints. It also requires that employers
reinstate workers fired for union activities.
Unions were independent of government and were free to choose their
own representatives in often vigorously contested elections. There were
no restrictions on the formation of national labor federations. Several
of the major unions belonged to an umbrella grouping called the
Industrial Solidarity Pact that dealt with certain political matters.
Unions were free to affiliate with international organizations, and
some did so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
legal right to engage in collective bargaining, and they fully
exercised this right in practice. The Registration of Trade Unions and
Employer Organizations Act provides for compulsory recognition of
unions and regulates internal union governance. Since it entered into
effect in January 2000, it resulted in increased organizational
activity by unions. There were three major unions--the National Workers
Union, the Civil Service Association, and the Seamen, Waterfront, and
General Workers Union--plus specialized unions for nurses and teachers.
Strikes in both the public and private sectors were legal, but
there were many avenues through collective bargaining agreements and
government procedures that may preclude a strike. The law prohibits
members of the police and fire departments from striking. Other
``essential services'' workers--water and sewer authority workers,
electric utility workers, nurses, and doctors--must give 30 days'
notice before striking.
Labor law is applicable in the export processing zones (EPZs), and
there were no administrative or legal impediments to union organizing
or collective bargaining in those zones. Although many firms resisted
union efforts to organize in the EPZs, the new registration law
appeared to have a positive influence on organizing efforts.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Government prohibits
forced or bonded labor, and it was not known to occur. While there is
no specific prohibition of forced or bonded labor by children, there
were no reports of such practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Minors were protected legally from economic exploitation
by several legislative acts, including the Employment of Women, Young
Persons, and Children Act, which provides for a minimum legal working
age of 14 years. The Government was in the process of updating the
Labor Code to set the minimum legal working age at 16 years. The
minimum legal working age for industrial work is 18 years. Child labor
existed to some degree in the rural areas, primarily where larger,
stronger, school-age children helped harvest bananas from family trees.
Children also typically worked in urban food stalls or sold
confectionery on sidewalks. However, these activities occurred on
nonschool days and during festivals. The Department of Labor of the
Ministry of Labor Relations, Public Service, and Cooperatives was
responsible for enforcing statutes regulating child labor. Employer
penalties for violating the 1938 child labor laws, which were being
updated, were $3.55 (EC$9.60) for a first offense and $8.88 (EC$24) for
a second offense. There were no formal reports of violations of child
labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage regulations in
effect since 1985 set wages for a limited number of occupations. The
minimum monthly wage for office clerks was $111 (EC$300), for shop
assistants $74 (EC$200), and for messengers $59 (EC$160). The minimum
wage was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family, but most categories of workers received much higher
wages based on prevailing market conditions. The 1999 Minimum Wage Act
established a commission responsible for setting a minimum wage level;
it met during the year but had not finished its work by year's end.
There is no legislated workweek, although the common practice was
to work 40 hours in 5 days. Special legislation covers hours that shop
assistants, agricultural workers, domestics, and persons in industrial
establishments may work.
Occupational health and safety regulations were relatively well
developed; however, there was only one qualified inspector for the
entire country, although the other nine inspectors included some review
of health and safety conditions in their general inspections. The
Ministry enforced the act through threat of closure of the business if
it discovered violations and the violator did not correct them.
However, actual closures rarely occurred because of lack of staff and
resources. Workers were free to leave a dangerous workplace situation
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked to, from, or within the country.
__________
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a multiparty, parliamentary
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime
minister, a cabinet, and a unicameral legislative assembly compose the
Government. The Governor General, appointed by the British monarch, was
the titular head of state, with largely ceremonial powers. In October
2000, Prime Minister Sir James F. Mitchell of the New Democratic Party
(NDP) resigned, following divisive general strikes during the spring,
and Arnhim Eustace, an NDP parliamentarian, replaced him. In March 2001
elections that were generally free and fair, the Unity Labor Party
(ULP) won 12 of the 15 parliamentary seats, and ULP leader Ralph
Gonsalves became the new Prime Minister. The NDP had held power for 17
years. The judiciary was generally independent.
The Royal St. Vincent Police, the only security force in the
country, included a coast guard and a small Special Services Unit (SSU)
with some paramilitary training, which often was accused of using
excessive force. The force was controlled by and responsive to the
Government, but police continued to commit some human rights abuses.
The market-based economy relied heavily on its supply of natural
resources, including agricultural products such as bananas and
arrowroot, as well as on the tourist industry. The country's population
was approximately 113,000, and much of the labor force was engaged in
agriculture. Bananas were the leading export and a major source of
foreign exchange earnings. However, the banana industry was declining,
and the growing tourism sector has become the leading earner of foreign
exchange. Foreign remittances, an important source of income, declined.
Unemployment was estimated to be between 25 and 40 percent, and real
gross domestic product declined by 0.6 percent in 2001, compared with
an increase of 2.1 percent in 2000.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were problems in a few areas. The SSU was accused of one killing.
Other principal human rights problems included instances of excessive
use of force by police, the Government's failure to punish adequately
those responsible for such abuses, poor prison conditions, and an
overburdened court system. Violence against women and abuse of children
also were problems. St. Vincent and the Grenadines was invited by the
Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November
2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a
participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In September police shot and killed Othis Rhyne in his home on the
island of Canouan in the course of executing a search warrant for
illegal drugs. Newspaper reports focussed on a statement in the
official press release from the police force indicating that Rhyne was
shot not during but after a struggle with a police constable. The
Police Department and a new Oversight Committee investigated the
shooting. The Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) determined that
there was insufficient evidence to bring charges again the police.
In March the authorities charged Prison Superintendent Eric
Rodriguez with murder for the November 2001 death of inmate Kingsley
Henry during a disturbance in the prison courtyard. The Superintendent
claimed to have fired warning shots in the air to quell the riot;
Henry, who received a bullet wound, died in the hospital. The DPP said
that forensic evidence proved that the bullet that killed Henry was
fired from Rodriguez's gun, and that three inmates claimed to have seen
the Superintendent intentionally shoot an unarmed Henry from close
range after he left the main yard and the disturbance at the prison had
been quelled. However, at the trial in July, the High Court held that
the prosecution had failed to make a case, and Rodriguez was acquitted.
The Prime Minister reinstated Rodriguez to his post as Prison
Superintendent a few days later (see Section 1.c).
In the December 2000 police killing of Ezekiel ``Zulu'' Alexander
during a chase, the President of the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Human Rights Association (SVGHRA) asserted that it was unnecessary,
irresponsible, and unlawful. An inquest determined that one of the two
policemen was liable for unlawful killing. The policeman was charged
with manslaughter but was acquitted in an October trial.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other forms of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. However, regional
human rights groups noted that a high percentage of convictions were
based on confessions. One human rights group believed that some of
these confessions resulted from unwarranted police practices, including
the use of physical force during detention, illegal search and seizure,
and failure to inform properly those arrested of their rights.
In 2001 there were at least two cases of persons shot and injured
in their homes by police who pursued them to enforce outstanding
warrants for unpaid court fines. After police wounded Denzil Grant on
the island of Bequia, the police filed assault charges against him in
Magistrate's Court claiming that he had attacked the police with a
cutlass. The magistrate found Grant guilty of attacking the police but
only reprimanded and discharged him. The finding of guilt, however,
effectively nullified any claim he might have had against the police
for wounding him.
The Government established an Oversight Committee to monitor police
activity and hear public complaints about police misconduct; members
included a former attorney general and a religious leader. The
committee reported to the Minister of National Security and to the
Minister of Legal Affairs and actively participated in investigations
during the year. The SVGHRA participated in two training seminars for
police officers covering human rights and domestic violence.
Prison conditions were poor. Prison buildings were antiquated and
overcrowded, with one holding more than 300 inmates in a building
designed for 75; these conditions resulted in serious health and safety
problems. The main prison is a four-building compound located in
Kingstown. Pretrial detainees were held with convicted prisoners.
A 2001 report on prison conditions concluded that the main prison
was ``a university for crime'' due to endemic violence, understaffing,
underpaid guards, uncontrolled weapons and drugs, an increase in HIV/
AIDS, and prevalence of unhygienic conditions such as missing toilets.
The report stated that inmates received protection from internal
violence through their membership in gangs. The report documented that
after a prisoner was released, he was expected to throw alcohol,
weapons, and drugs back over the prison wall for use by his gang. If a
prisoner did not and, as frequently happened, returned to jail, he
would be beaten severely. In addition, according to the report, a
prisoner could expect to be stabbed sometime during his imprisonment.
The report also noted that police and guards conducted sporadic,
infrequent, and inefficient searches of the prison.
Toward the end of the year, the Government announced plans to build
a new $4.8 million (EC$13 million) prison in Bellisle on the west
coast. The new facility was designed to hold 400 male inmates, with
separate areas for juveniles and first-time offenders.
In the January 2001 stabbing of then-Superintendent Leroy Latchman,
followed days later by the killing of two inmates (one of whom
allegedly had attacked Latchman), there was a preliminary inquiry, and
the case was heard in the High Court in October. The court acquitted
the accused inmates, ruling that the prosecution failed to make a case.
In July 2001, the Government hired a new Superintendent of Prisons,
Eric Rodriguez, who reportedly ended the practice of inmates seeking
protection from prison gangs. He also began in-house training of guards
and arranged for guards to be trained in Barbados. There were 72 guards
for 300 male inmates, and there were plans to increase the staff by 20
new guards. A rehabilitation program began, and inmates received
contracts and jobs with local entrepreneurs. A school program began
with courses in carpentry, tailoring, baking, and mechanical
engineering.
In November 2001, inmate Kingsley Henry was shot and killed during
a disturbance at the prison. The Prison Superintendent was charged with
murder and taken into custody, but was later discharged when the High
Court determined that the prosecution had not made a case (see Section
1.a.).
Inmates were allowed to speak freely with their lawyers, but a
human rights lawyer asserted that there is an existing rule that a
prison officer must stand not only within sight, but also within
hearing of the inmate and his lawyer. Prison officials countered that
an attorney may request that a guard not be within hearing range while
discussing specifics of an inmate's case.
Female inmates were housed in a separate section in the Fort
Charlotte prison. A family court handled criminal cases for minors up
to age 16. Children may be charged and convicted as criminals from the
age of 16. In such cases, children then may be jailed with older
criminals. Conditions were inadequate for juvenile offenders, but there
were plans to place first-time offenders in Fort Charlotte.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that persons detained for criminal offenses must receive a
fair hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial court, and the
Government generally respected these provisions in practice; however,
complaints continued regarding police practices in bringing cases to
court. Although there were only three official magistrates, the
registrar of the High Court and the presiding judge of the family court
effectively served as magistrates when called upon to do so. Some
defense attorneys claimed that there were 6- to 12-month delays in
preliminary inquiries for serious crimes.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it was not used in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent and impartial judiciary, and the Government generally
respected this provision in practice.
The judiciary consists of lower courts and a High Court, with
appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and final appeal to the
Privy Council in the United Kingdom. There were three official
magistrates, including the Chief Magistrate, a senior magistrate, and
one other magistrate. In addition, the Registrar of the High Court had
the authority to sit as a magistrate if called upon. The Chief
Magistrate was also president of the family court. At year's end, the
Eastern Caribbean nations were still considering proposals to create a
new Caribbean court of justice to hear final appeals.
The Constitution provides for public trials. The court appointed
attorneys for indigent defendants only when the defendant was charged
with a capital offense. Defendants were presumed innocent until proven
guilty and may appeal verdicts and penalties. The backlog of pending
cases was reduced, even though the magistrate's court in Kingstown
lacked a full complement of magistrates.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary search and
seizure or other government intrusions into the private life of
individual citizens, and there were no reports of such abuses during
the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
There were two major newspapers and numerous smaller, partisan
publications; all were privately owned, and most were openly critical
of the Government's policies. There were no reports of government
censorship or interference with the operation of the press during the
year. However, individual journalists believed that government
advertising, a significant source of revenue, sometimes was withheld
from newspapers that published articles unfavorable to the Government.
On September 16, editors from various Caribbean countries met in
Barbados to lay the groundwork for an Eastern Caribbean Press Council.
During the meeting, the journalists agreed to regulate themselves in
accordance with a Code of Ethics, which was adopted in November. Two
newspapers in St. Vincent agreed to participate.
The sole television station in St. Vincent was privately owned and
operated without government interference. Satellite dishes were popular
among those who could afford them. There was also a cable system with
mainly North American programming that had over 300 subscribers. There
were seven radio stations, one of which was government-owned.
In September Prime Minister Gonsalves, in his personal capacity,
filed slander charges against Edward Lynch, a popular radio talk show
host, and BDS Limited, the company that owned the radio station.
Gonsalves alleged that Lynch, the host of a radio program sponsored by
the opposition New Democratic Party, slandered Gonsalves by wrongly
insinuating that he used public funds to pay for airline tickets to
Rome for his daughter and mother. The matter was still before the court
at year's end.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them
in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law
enforcement officials unfairly targeted them. However, it was not clear
whether such complaints reflect discrimination on the basis of
religious belief by authorities or simply enforcement of laws against
marijuana, which is used as part of Rastafarian religious practice.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government generally respected them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
existed. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
during the year. A Red Cross representative served as the honorary
liaison with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through
regularly scheduled free and fair elections. The country has a long
history of multiparty parliamentary democracy. The Constitution
provides for general elections at least every 5 years. During the 1998
election, the ruling New Democratic Party won 8 of 15 seats in
Parliament, despite losing the popular vote by 55 to 45 percent to the
opposition Unity Labour Party. Calling this outcome an ``overt
manifestation of rejection by the public'' of Prime Minister Mitchell's
government, the ULP claimed election fraud and demanded new elections.
The Prime Minister refused the ULP demand. Subsequent demonstrations
led to internal pressures and to an agreement brokered by members of
the Caribbean Community that elections would be held in 2001. In
November 2000, leaders of the three political parties signed a ``Code
of Conduct'' intended to govern the campaign period, including a pledge
of equal time on local radio and other electronic media and an
agreement not to incite or encourage violence. The parties generally
adhered to the code during the campaign.
On March 28, 2001, elections were held in accordance with the
agreement. There was no serious violence, and observers declared the
voting to be generally free and fair. The opposition ULP won 12 out of
the Parliament's 15 elected seats, and Dr. Ralph Gonsalves became Prime
Minister, ending 17 years of NDP rule. Former Prime Minister Arnhim
Eustace, who had taken over leadership of the NDP and become Prime
Minister in 2000, was one of three NDP candidates to win a seat.
In addition to the 15 elected Members of Parliament, the Governor
General appoints 6 more members, 4 on the nomination of the Prime
Minister and 2 on the nomination of the Leader of the Opposition. These
nominated members, who are called Senators, have the same privileges as
the elected members except that they are not permitted to vote on a
motion of no confidence brought against the Government.
There were no legal impediments to women's full participation in
politics or government. In March 2001, voters elected two women to
Parliament; they also served as cabinet ministers--the Minister of
Tourism and the Minister of Social Services. There were two female
Senators. The Deputy Governor General and the Attorney General were
also female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Opposition political groups and the press often commented on human
rights matters of local concern. The SVGHRA monitored government and
police activities, especially with respect to treatment of prisoners,
publicizing any cases of abuse. The SVGHRA participated in training
seminars. The Government generally was responsive to public and private
inquiries about its human rights practices.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law
regardless of race or sex, and the Government generally adhered to this
provision in practice.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence,
remained a serious problem. The Domestic Violence/Matrimonial
Proceedings Act and the more accessible Domestic Violence Summary
Proceedings Act provide for protective orders, as well as occupation
and tenancy orders; the former only is accessible through the High
Court, but the latter can be obtained without the services of a lawyer
in family court. As part of a human rights education program, the
SVGHRA conducted numerous seminars and workshops throughout the country
to familiarize citizens with their rights. Increasing numbers of women
came forward with domestic violence complaints. Development banks
provide funding through the Caribbean Association for Family Research
and Action for a program of Domestic Violence Prevention, Training, and
Intervention. Police received training on domestic abuse, emphasizing
the need to file reports and, if there was sufficient evidence, to
initiate court proceedings. To counter the social pressure on victims
to drop charges, some courts imposed fines against people who brought
charges but did not testify. Depending on the magnitude of the offense
and the age of the victim, the punishment for rape generally was 10 or
more years in prison. Sentences of 20 years have been handed down for
sexual assault of very young minors.
A 1995 amendment to the Child Support Law allows for payments
ordered by the courts, even when notice of an appeal has been filed.
Previously, fathers who had been ordered to pay child support could
appeal decisions and not pay while the appeal was being heard. This
resulted in a huge backlog of appeal cases and effectively reduced the
number of mothers and children receiving support payments. There was a
family court in the capital city of Kingstown with one magistrate.
According to the SVGHRA, because there were only a few bailiffs to
service the country, summonses often were not served on time for cases
scheduled to be heard in court.
The Office of Gender Affairs was under the Ministry of Education,
Women's Affairs, and Culture. This office assisted the National Council
of Women with seminars, training programs, and public relations. The
minimum wage law specifies that women should receive equal pay for
equal work.
Marion House, an independent social services agency, was
established in 1989 to provide counseling and therapy services. Four
trained counselors and one foreign volunteer who is a clinical
psychologist staff it. In 2001 the organization moved to a new building
paid for with funds provided by the European Union, and it earned
income by renting out office space to a government agency.
Children.--Education is not compulsory, but the Government
investigated cases in which children were withdrawn from school before
the age of 16. The Government cited lack of funding for new schools as
an obstacle to making education compulsory. As a supplement to
secondary school, the Government sponsored the Youth Empowerment
Program, which was an apprenticeship program for young adults
interested in learning a trade. Approximately 440 youths were enrolled
in this program, earning a stipend of about $148 (EC$400) a month. The
teachers' union estimated that between 8 and 10 percent of secondary
school-age children did not attend school during the year. Despite the
Government's efforts to support health and welfare standards, the
infant mortality rate still was very high at 21 deaths per 1,000 live
births, in part due to the large number of children born to teenage
mothers.
The Domestic Violence Summary Proceedings Act provides a limited
legal framework for the protection of children. Nevertheless, reports
of child abuse remained high and were on the increase. The Family
Services Department, Ministry of Social Development, was the Government
agency responsible for monitoring and protecting the welfare of
children. The police were the enforcement arm; the Family Services
Department referred all reports of child abuse to the police for
action.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no specific legislation
addressing persons with disabilities, and the circumstances for such
persons were generally difficult. Most persons with severe disabilities
rarely left their homes because of the poor road system and lack of
affordable wheelchairs. The Government partially supported a school for
persons with disabilities, which had two branches. A separate, small
rehabilitation center treated about five persons daily.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Citizens had the right to form unions
and organize employees under the constitutional provisions for freedom
of association; however, there was no law that requires employers to
recognize unions. Less than 10 percent of the work force was unionized.
The Trade Unions Act covers registration of unions; a draft Labor
Relations Act under debate included a proposal for employer recognition
of trade unions. The constitutional prohibition against discrimination
could be applied to antiunion discrimination; however, in practice few
such complaints were lodged because employers cited other reasons for
dismissal.
The Protection of Employment Act provides for compensation and
worker rights, but these were restricted to protection from summary
dismissal without compensation and reinstatement or severance pay if
unfairly dismissed. The law provides a severance package of 2 weeks'
pay for each year of service, with a maximum of 52 weeks. The
Government's proposed Employment Relations Act would repeal the
Protection of Employment Act and provide for enhanced worker rights.
Unions had the right to affiliate with international bodies, and
they did so in practice.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There were no
legal obstacles to organizing unions; however, no law requires
employers to recognize a particular union as an exclusive bargaining
agent. The Trade Dispute, Arbitration, and Inquiry Act provides that if
both parties to a dispute consent to arbitration, the Minister of Labor
can appoint an arbitration committee from the private sector to hear
the matter.
There was no general prohibition against strikes; however, the
Essential Services Act prohibits persons providing such services
(defined as electricity, water, hospital, and police) from striking. In
January workers at the St. Vincent Marketing Corporation went on strike
for 2 days to protest the layoff of 28 employees. The Ministers of
Labor and Agriculture interceded, and the employer agreed to take back
the workers, some of whom chose voluntary severance instead of
returning to work.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children, and it was not
known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum working age at 16 years of age,
and workers may receive a national insurance card at that age. The
Ministry of Labor monitored and enforced this provision, and employers
generally respected it in practice. The Labor Inspectorate at the
Department of Labor received, investigated, and addressed child labor
complaints. Labor officers in this unit conducted general inspections
of work places annually. The age of leaving school at the primary level
was 15 years; when these pupils left school, they usually were absorbed
into the labor market disguised as apprentices. There was no known
child labor except for children working on family-owned banana
plantations, particularly during harvest time, or in family-owned
cottage industries. The Government has partnered with the
nongovernmental sector, including UNICEF, in an antipoverty strategy
aimed at improving economic opportunities for youth.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum
wages, which were last promulgated in 1989. They varied by sector and
type of work and were specified for several skilled categories,
including attendants, packers, cleaners, porters, watchmen, and clerks.
In agriculture the wage for workers provided shelter was $6.74 (EC$18)
per day; industrial workers earned $7.49 (EC$20) per day. In many
sectors, the minimum wage was not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family, but most workers earned
more than the minimum. By law, the Wages Council should meet every 2
years to review the minimum wage, but it had not met since 1989. A new
Wages Council was appointed in March 2001 following the elections; it
met and submitted minimum wage recommendations to the Government, which
held a town meeting in October to solicit public comment prior to
consideration of a new minimum wage, scheduled to be submitted to
Parliament in 2003.
The law prescribes workweek length according to category; for
example, industrial employees work 40 hours a week, store clerks work
44 hours a week, and agricultural workers either 30 or 40 hours per
week. The law provides workers a minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks
after 1 year's service.
According to the Ministry of Labor, legislation concerning
occupational safety and health is outdated. The most recent
legislation, the Factories Act of 1955, has some regulations concerning
factories, but enforcement of these regulations was ineffective. At
year's end, the Government was reviewing this act and other laws and
proposed to limit the exposure of agricultural workers to hazardous
substances. Trade unions addressed some violations relating to safety
gear, long overtime hours, and the safety of machinery. There were some
reports of significant visual impairment by visual display unit
workers, and some reports of hearing impairment by power station and
stone crushing employees. The law does not address specifically whether
workers have the right to remove themselves from work situations that
endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their continued
employment, but it stipulates conditions under which plants must be
maintained. Failure to do so would constitute a breach, which might
cover a worker who refused to work under these conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons
were trafficked to, from, or within the country during the year.
__________
SURINAME
The Government is still in the process of institutionalizing
democratic, constitutional rule in the country. After generally free
and fair elections in May 2000, the 51-member National Assembly elected
Ronald Venetiaan of the National Party of Suriname (NPS) as President
in August 2000; he replaced Jules Wijdenbosch of the National
Democratic Party (NDP). Venetiaan previously served as President in
1991-96. The judiciary was generally independent, although it was
inefficient.
The armed forces were responsible for national security and border
and immigration control; they were under the effective control of the
civilian Minister of Defense. Civilian police bore primary
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order; they reported to
the Ministry of Justice and Police. During the year, the military
helped the police maintain security in remote communities near large
enterprises and conducted joint patrols with the police on an ad hoc
basis to combat crime on highways. The first Venetiaan government had
reformed the military in 1995-96 by purging military officers and
supporters of former dictator Desi Bouterse, who ruled the country in
the 1980s. Bouterse's NDP won 10 seats in the National Assembly in
2000, 1 of which he occupies. Over the past few years, the NDP's
influence within the military declined steadily; however, Bouterse
still retained influence with some military officers. The military
police continued to maintain responsibility for control of the
country's borders and airports, but it had not investigated civilian
crimes since 1989. Members of the police and prison guards committed
some human rights abuses.
The mixed economy depended heavily on the export of bauxite
derivatives. The country's population was approximately 450,000. The
Government and state-owned companies employed over half the working
population. Unregulated gold mining was an increasingly important
economic activity that highlighted a lack of land rights for indigenous
and tribal peoples and had a serious negative environmental impact.
Estimated gross domestic product grew by approximately 3 percent. The
inflation rate was 28.3 percent, compared with 4.2 percent in 2001 and
82 percent in 2000. Poverty was widespread; one report estimated that
85 percent of families lived below the poverty line.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remained in some areas. Police
mistreated detainees, particularly during arrests; guards abused
prisoners; and local detention facilities remained overcrowded. Lengthy
pretrial detention was a problem, and the judiciary suffered from
ineffectiveness and a huge case backlog due to the shortage of judges.
Media self-censorship continued. Societal discrimination against women,
minorities, and tribal people persisted. Violence against women and
trafficking in women and girls were problems. Suriname was invited by
the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the
November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents.
In August 2001, there was one report of an alleged police killing
in the town of Albina, on the border with French Guiana. When the
police took a man into custody on suspicion of motor bike theft, they
took him to a detention area and handcuffed him. He allegedly tried to
escape and was shot in the back of the head without warning. The
victim's family called for an investigation into the shooting.
According to Moiwana '86, a human rights group, the responsible police
officer was tried in March, found guilty, and sentenced to 5 years in
prison.
The Government did not address many past abuses, and they continued
to be a focus of concern. The authorities took no action against prison
guards who allegedly beat a prisoner to death in 1993. There was no
investigation into the 1986 massacre of more than 50 civilians at the
village of Moiwana; however, according to various human rights groups,
the Venetiaan government appeared to be interested in investigating the
Moiwana case but did not actually begin an investigation. In 1997
Moiwana '86 took the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR), which gave the Government until December 1 to report on
the status of its investigation.
After the elections in 2000, there were calls for the new
government to launch an investigation into the December 1982 killings
by the Bouterse regime of 15 prominent political, labor, business, and
media leaders before the 18-year statute of limitations expired in
December 2000. In October 2000, the Court of Justice began hearings on
the killings in response to a request from relatives of the victims.
Bouterse's lawyer sought to postpone the hearings, but the court denied
his request. The court heard testimony from the victims' relatives,
human rights activists, and the prosecutor's office, which had not yet
made any investigation into the killings. Previously, Bouterse himself
had requested an investigation, after the victims' relatives asked a
Dutch court to prosecute him in that country. In September 2001, the
Dutch court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction, but the Dutch High
Court later ruled that some of the charges against Bouterse could be
prosecuted in the Netherlands. Following an order from the Court of
Justice, an examining judge continued an investigation into the
killings. During the year, two rogatory commissions visited the
Netherlands to gather testimony, and with the collection of testimony
completed, Dutch forensic experts arrived to examine exhumed bodies.
However, no suspects were charged or brought to trial by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
However, the Government had yet to take any action to investigate
allegations of some disappearances that occurred under previous
regimes.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits inhuman treatment or
punishment; however, human rights groups continued to express concern
about official mistreatment and have documented cases of police
mistreatment of detainees, particularly during arrests, and guard abuse
of prisoners.
Citizens filed a total of 235 cases with the Personnel
Investigation Department (OPZ), the majority of which were for physical
mistreatment. The OPZ is an office within the Police Department that is
responsible for investigating complaints against officers. It makes
recommendations regarding whether or not an officer should be punished
internally, or if criminal charges should be brought. The authorities
arrested 10 officers and relieved 22 officers from their duties. Police
officers have been charged with brutality, but no figures were
available regarding sentencing.
Beatings by police were common. Police officers, who were not
trained in prison work, served as the jailers at local detention
facilities, a situation that human rights groups asserted contributed
to the abuses. There were three prisons and several detention
facilities at police stations, where arrestees were detained until they
appeared before a judge for trial. Human rights activists were
concerned about conditions in the prisons and especially about
conditions in local detention facilities, which remained overcrowded.
At police stations, guards allowed detainees no exercise and only
rarely permitted them to leave their cells. Detainees and human rights
groups also complained about inadequate meals, although families were
permitted and encouraged to provide food to incarcerated relatives.
There was no consideration for persons who required a specific diet for
religious reasons. Human rights monitors reported that guards
mistreated detainees, and that medical care and living conditions were
inadequate.
Prison conditions were poor, and in many cases they did not meet
international standards. Violence among prisoners was common, and the
authorities usually did not punish prisoners for violence against other
prisoners. Some prison facilities were renovated in recent years, which
improved health and safety conditions. However, most facilities,
especially older jails, remained unsanitary and seriously overcrowded,
with as many as four times the number of detainees for which they were
designed.
Conditions in women's jail and prison facilities were, in general,
better than those in the men's facilities. There was a wing of an adult
prison for boys under age 18 who had committed serious crimes. Juvenile
facilities for boys between the ages of 10 and 18 within the adult
prison were adequate; educational and recreational facilities were
provided. There was no separate facility for girls under the age of 18,
who were housed within the women's detention center and in the women's
section of one of the prison complexes.
Since 1996 Moiwana '86 has monitored the condition of prisoners.
Representatives of the group reported that in general they had access
to prisoners and received cooperation from prison officials on routine
matters. When requesting access to individual prisoners, human rights
observers generally gained access quickly. However, if an individual
had filed a complaint with the organization claiming physical
mistreatment, access often was delayed. The authorities granted the
group permission to visit one prison on a regular basis, on the
condition that they meet with the head of the prison following such
visits. Moiwana '86 reported that the authorities granted all requests
for prison visits during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally respected
these provisions in practice. However, delays caused prisoners who
appealed their sentences to remain in prison until a ruling was reached
on their appeal, even if they had served the full term of their
original sentence. Lawyers filed complaints, but the problem was not
resolved.
The law provides that the police may detain for investigation for
up to 14 days a person suspected of committing a crime for which the
sentence is longer than 4 years. During the 14-day period, the law also
permits incommunicado detention, which must be authorized by an
assistant district attorney or a police inspector. Within the 14-day
period, the police must bring the accused before a prosecutor to be
charged formally. If additional time is needed to investigate the
charge, a prosecutor may authorize the police to detain the suspect for
an additional 30 days. Upon the expiration of the initial 44 days, a
judge of instruction may authorize the police to hold the suspect for
up to 120 additional days, in 30-day increments (for a total of 164
days), before the case is tried. The judge of instruction has the power
to authorize release on bail, but that power was used rarely, if ever.
In July 2001, there was a fire in the lower courthouse, which caused a
delay both in investigations and in court proceedings. As a result, in
August 2001 the Government enacted emergency legislation that
lengthened the initial period an inmate may be held without judicial
appearance to 120 days. A judge may extend the period twice by 30 days.
Pretrial detainees, who constituted a large percentage of inmates,
routinely were held without being brought before a judge. The average
length of pretrial detention varied; for lesser crimes it was from 30
to 45 days, while for more serious crimes, the maximum time usually was
utilized. Detainees often were held in overcrowded detention cells at
local police stations. A steadily growing number of persons who already
had been convicted but not yet placed in prisons due to a lack of space
in prison facilities were held in police custody or detention cells.
The military police continued to observe the requirement to hand
over to the civil police civilians arrested for committing a crime in
their presence.
The Constitution does not address exile; however, it was not used
in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, disputes over the appointment of judges
to the bench undermined the independence of the judiciary in recent
years. In 2000 the President appointed a new Solicitor General, and the
Court of Justice confirmed him in September 2001. The President had yet
to confirm the Acting Attorney General, although he has served in that
position since 2000. Appointment as Attorney General is a lifetime
position. As a result of the conflict from previous years, the
effectiveness of the civilian and military courts still was limited in
practice, but at year's end the judiciary appeared to be acting
generally independently, albeit inefficiently, since it was hampered by
a large case backlog.
The judicial system consisted of three lower courts and an appeals
court, which was called the Court of Justice; there was no Supreme
Court. The Government had not yet appointed a permanent president for
the Court of Justice. There were only seven judges and five acting
judges in the judiciary. The 1987 Constitution calls for the
establishment of an independent constitutional court; the National
Assembly debated creating such a court since then, but had not done so.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial in
which defendants have the right to counsel if needed. The courts assign
lawyers in private practice to defend indigent prisoners and pay
lawyers from public funds. However, the court-assigned lawyers, of whom
there were four, usually only appeared at the trial. According to
Moiwana '86, sometimes these lawyers did not appear at all. The courts
must, and in practice did, free a detainee who was not tried within the
164-day period. Trials were before a single judge, with the right of
appeal. Due to the shortage of judges, there was a backlog of cases of
1 year for civil cases and up to 6 months for criminal cases.
Military personnel generally were not subject to civilian criminal
law. A member of the armed forces accused of a crime immediately came
under military jurisdiction, and military police were responsible for
all such investigations. Military prosecutions were directed by an
officer on the public prosecutor's staff and took place in separate
courts before two military judges and one civilian judge. The military
courts followed the same rules of procedure as the civil courts. There
was no appeal from the military to the civil system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy.
The law requires warrants, which are issued by quasi-judicial officers
who supervise criminal investigations, for searches. The police
obtained them in the great majority of investigations. While in the
past there were complaints of surveillance of human rights workers by
members of the military police and the Central Intelligence and
Security Service, none were reported during the year. There was still a
threat of forced resettlement of indigenous populations due to the
granting of timber and gold concessions (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights; however, some media members continued to
practice occasional self-censorship because of the history of
intimidation and reprisals by certain elements of the former military
leadership.
In July the daily newspaper De West was threatened in connection
with its coverage of weapons theft from the Government's Central
Intelligence and Security Service. In April 2000, that newspaper had
been firebombed, but no suspects were arrested. According to De West,
police knew the perpetrator of the crime.
There were 3 daily newspapers, 11 television stations, and about 25
radio stations. Three television stations and two radio stations were
owned publicly. Three companies, one owned publicly, provided cable
television, which included foreign channels. Many television and radio
stations broadcast only in a limited area. Two companies, one private
and one public, offered unrestricted access to electronic media.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. Despite a law from the 1930s
requiring a permit to hold a public demonstration or gathering, the
authorities allowed public marches to proceed without permits, if they
were orderly and guided by police.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
For more detailed information see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may change their residence and
workplaces freely and may travel abroad as they wish. Political
dissidents who emigrated during the years of military rule were welcome
to return. Few of them chose to do so, generally for economic reasons.
Citizenship was not revoked for political reasons.
Although it is possible for persons to be granted refugee status
under special circumstances, there are no provisions in the law for
granting asylum or refugee status in accordance with the standards of
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. There were no such requests during the year.
The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for this right, but in the past the
military prevented its effective exercise. Although the military twice
transferred power to elected civilian governments following coups, 2000
marked the second time since independence from the Netherlands in 1975
that one elected government succeeded another in accordance with
constitutional provisions. The Government is still in the process of
institutionalizing democratic, constitutional rule.
The Constitution stipulates that power and authority rest with the
citizens and provides for the right to change the Government through
the direct election by secret ballot of a National Assembly of 51
members every 5 years. The National Assembly then elects the President
by a two-thirds majority vote. If the legislature is unable to do so,
as was the case both in the 1991 and 1996 national elections, the
Constitution provides that a national people's assembly, composed of
Members of Parliament and regional and local officials, shall elect the
President.
The law allows early elections with the concurrence of both the
National Assembly and the President; in May 1999, widespread street
demonstrations triggered by the declining economy forced the Government
of then-President Wijdenbosch to call early elections, which were held
in May 2000. After those elections, which observers considered to be
generally free and fair, the National Assembly elected NPS leader
Ronald Venetiaan as President in August 2000.
The Constitution provides for the organization and functioning of
political parties. Many parties and political coalitions were
represented in the National Assembly. President Venetiaan formed a
cabinet from members of the New Front coalition, comprised of the NPS,
a predominantly Creole party; the Progressive Reform Party, a
predominantly Hindustani party; the Suriname Labor Party, a political
wing of the largest labor union; and Pertjaja Luhur, a predominantly
Javanese party.
There were historical and cultural impediments to equal
participation by women in leadership positions in government and
political parties. In the past, most women were expected to fulfill the
roles of housewife and mother, thereby limiting opportunities to gain
political experience or position. Participation by women in politics
(and other fields) generally was considered inappropriate. While women
made limited gains in attaining political power in recent years,
political circles remained under the influence of traditional male-
dominated groups, and women were disadvantaged in seeking high public
office. There were 10 women in the 51-seat National Assembly; in 2000
the Assembly appointed a woman as vice chairperson. The Cabinet
included one woman as Minister of Foreign Affairs, another as Minister
of Internal Affairs, and a third as Deputy Minister of Social Affairs.
In February 2001, the first female member of the Court of Justice was
sworn in.
Although the Constitution prohibits racial and religious
discrimination, several factors limited the participation of Maroons
(descendants of escaped slaves who fled to the interior to avoid
recapture) and Amerindians in the political process. Most of the
country's political activity took place in the capital and a narrow
belt running east and west of it along the coast. The Maroons and
Amerindians were concentrated in remote areas in the interior and
therefore had limited access to, and influence on, the political
process. Voters elected the first Amerindians to the National Assembly
in 1996. In the May 2000 elections, voters elected eight Maroons and
one Amerindian to the National Assembly. There were no Maroons or
Amerindians in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operated without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases;
however, government officials generally were not cooperative or
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution and laws, with the exception of certain ethnic
marriage laws, do not differentiate among citizens on the basis of
their ethnic origins, religious affiliations, or other cultural
differences. However, in practice several groups within society
suffered various forms of discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women was a problem. The law does not
differentiate between domestic violence and other forms of assault. The
Government has not addressed specifically the problem of violence
against women. According to a national women's group, victims continued
to report cases of violence against women and complained of an
inadequate response from the Government and society to what appeared to
be a trend of increasing family violence. No reliable statistics were
available as to the extent of the problem. However, Stop the Violence
Against Women, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), stated that among
those women who reported their abuse to the group, the average abused
woman was married, between the ages of 25 and 50, had two to three
children, and was employed in a low-paying job. Although the police
were reluctant to intervene in instances of domestic violence, a
national women's group noted that police attitudes improved
significantly as a result of training conducted in 1999. For example,
two police stations opened victim's rooms, the first in Nickerie in
2000 and the second during the year in Paramaribo, to provide better
services to victims of all kinds of crimes. The Government planned to
open a victim's room in every police station.
Rape is illegal, but spousal rape was not against the law. During
the year, there were 50 prosecutions for rape, with 38 convictions;
sentences ranged from 12 months to 5 years.
There were no specific laws to protect women against sexual
exploitation. Prostitution is illegal; however, law enforcement
officials did not enforce prostitution laws or arrest women for
prostitution unless they were working on the street. Police allowed
many ``brothel-type'' establishments to operate, and officials asserted
that they made random checks on the brothels twice a month to see if
women were being abused or held against their will. In spite of this
effort, there were credible reports of trafficking in women for
prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
There were no laws prohibiting sexual harassment, and it did occur.
Women had the right to equal access to education, employment, and
property. Nevertheless, social pressures and customs, especially in
rural areas, inhibited their full exercise of these rights,
particularly in the areas of marriage and inheritance. Women
experienced economic discrimination in access to employment and in
rates of pay for the same or substantially similar work. A report
published in March showed that 89 percent of women were employed in
entry-level positions, 9 percent had mid-level jobs, and 3 percent held
management positions. More than 60 percent of women worked in
traditionally female administrative or secretarial jobs. The Government
did not make specific efforts to combat economic discrimination. In
February the Government ratified the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against women; as a
result, it has to adjust existing legislation to bring it into
compliance with the Convention.
There was a National Gender Bureau in the Ministry of Home Affairs,
which prepared an Integral Gender Action plan for 2000-2005 and
appointed a program manager for gender policy in June 2001. However,
its effectiveness was limited severely by financial and staffing
constraints. The principal concerns of women's groups were political
representation, economic vulnerability, violence, and discrimination.
Children.--The Government allocated only limited resources to
ensure safeguards for the human rights and welfare of children. School
is compulsory until 12 years of age, but some school-age children did
not have access to education due to a lack of transportation,
facilities, or teachers. School attendance was free; however, most
public schools imposed a nominal enrollment fee, ranging from $4 to $24
(Sf10,000 to Sf60,000) a year. If a family was unable to pay, the
Government provided assistance. Families must supply uniforms, books,
and miscellaneous supplies. Approximately 70 percent of children in
cities attended school. Children in the interior did not receive the
same level of education as those in the city, and as few as 40 percent
actually attended school. Children faced increasing economic pressure
to discontinue their education in order to work (see Section 6.d.).
There was no legal difference in the treatment of girls and boys in
education or health care services, and in practice both were treated
fairly equally.
There were continuing reports of malnutrition among poor children,
but it was difficult to quantify the extent of the problem. In the
capital, where most of the country's population was concentrated, there
were several orphanages and one privately funded shelter for sexually
abused children. Elsewhere, distressed children usually relied on the
resources of their extended families.
There was no societal pattern of abuse directed against children;
however, some children were exploited sexually, and there were credible
reports of trafficking in girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
There was increased awareness of sexual abuse of children during the
year, although the number of reports declined. During the year, a local
NGO mounted a campaign against child sexual abuse in a newspaper and on
the radio to increase awareness.
The legal age of sexual consent is 14; however, it was not enforced
strictly, and the Asian Marriage Law sets the marriage age for children
of Asian descent at 13 years for girls and 15 years for boys.
Otherwise, individuals of Asian descent must be 30 years old to marry
without parental permission.
Persons with Disabilities.--There were no laws concerning persons
with disabilities and no provisions for making private or public
buildings accessible to them. There were also no laws mandating that
they be given equal consideration when seeking jobs or housing.
However, there were some training programs for the blind and others
with disabilities. In practice persons with disabilities suffered from
discrimination when applying for jobs and services.
Indigenous Persons.--The Constitution affords no special protection
for, or recognition of, indigenous people. Most Amerindians suffered a
number of disadvantages and had only limited ability to participate in
decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and natural
resources. The country's political life, educational opportunities, and
jobs were concentrated in the capital and its environs, while the
majority of Amerindians (as well as Maroons) lived in the interior.
Government services in the interior were largely unavailable, and much
of the infrastructure was destroyed during the 1986-91 insurgencies;
progress in reestablishing services and rebuilding the infrastructure
was very slow.
The Government-appointed Consultative Council for the Development
of the Interior, provided for in the 1992 peace accords that formally
ended the insurgencies, included representatives of the Maroon and
Amerindian communities. However, the Government did not consult with
representatives of these communities about the granting of gold and
timber concessions on indigenous and tribal lands. Following
demonstrations in July 2001 by veterans of the Jungle Commando, who
played a large role in the insurgencies, their de facto leader Ronny
Brunswijk met with the Minister of Regional Development. The meeting
resulted in a promise of quarterly meetings to monitor implementation
of the 2001 Lelydorp Accord, which superseded the 1992 peace accords.
The Government began integrating former Jungle Commando members into
the police but had not implemented the native land rights portion of
the agreement.
Organizations representing Maroon and Amerindian communities
complained that small-scale mining operations, mainly by illegal
Brazilian gold miners, dug trenches that cut residents off from their
agricultural land and threatened to drive them away from their
traditional settlements. Mercury runoff from these operations also
contaminated and threatened traditional food source areas.
The Maroon and Amerindian populations still faced problems with
illegal and uncontrolled logging and mining. In October 2000, the
Vereniging van Saramakaanse Gezagdragers, an organization representing
12 Saramaccaner villages, filed a petition with the IACHR claiming that
lumber operations, mostly by Chinese-owned concessions, were
threatening their way of life. The villagers sought observance of a
1762 treaty between their ancestors and Dutch colonial authorities,
which granted ownership of the interior to the tribes as long as they
occupied the land. At year's end, the case was still pending, and the
Government had not investigated the alleged claims.
A major bauxite producer had continued problems with Maroon groups;
the Maroons claimed that the concessions were located on tribal land,
and the company claimed infringement on its concessions. The company
depended upon the police and army to monitor the area and prevent
conflict.
Maroon and Amerindian groups continued to cooperate with each other
in order to exercise their rights more effectively. During an annual
meeting in September, the Association of Indigenous Village Chiefs
discussed socioeconomic problems, land rights, nature reserves, and
biodiversity. The leaders wanted the Government to honor provisions of
the peace accords with the Jungle Commando in 1991 and with the
Tucajana Amazones in 1992 to establish economic zones around both
Maroon and indigenous communities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution protects the right
of workers to associate and to choose their representatives
democratically. Nearly 60 percent of the work force was organized into
unions, and most unions belonged to one of the country's six major
labor federations. Unions were independent of the Government but played
an active role in politics. The small Labor Party historically was a
very influential force in government.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and there
are effective mechanisms for resolving complaints of such
discrimination. Employers must have prior permission from the Ministry
of Labor to fire workers, except when discharging an employee for
cause. The Labor Ministry individually reviews dismissals for cause; if
it finds a discharge unjustified, the employee must be reinstated.
There were no restrictions on unions' international activities.
Unions were active members of both the International Labor Organization
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution explicitly recognizes these rights, and the authorities
respected them in practice. Collective bargaining agreements covered
approximately 50 percent of the labor force. Bauxite industry workers
were organized, but gold miners were not.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Civil servants
have the right to strike, and strikes in both the public and private
sectors were common as workers tried to regain wages lost to inflation
in previous years.
There were a number of strikes during the year. Striking fire
fighters refused to assist a driver who was trapped following a
collision; as a result, the driver died. The police union went on
strike, but called it off after 3 days when the Government began a
court case against the union. Other strikes involved government day
care workers, banana workers, and a union representing workers
manufacturing consumer goods.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor. The law prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children; however, child prostitution did occur (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 14 years;
however, the Ministry of Labor and the police enforced this law only
sporadically. Children under 14 years of age worked as street vendors,
newspaper sellers, or shop assistants. Working hours for youths were
not limited in comparison with the regular work force. Although
government figures reported that only 2 percent of children were
economically active, another survey found that 50 percent of children
between the ages of 4 and 14 years were economically active, working
mainly in the informal sector. The Government has not ratified the
International Labor Organization's Convention 182 on elimination of the
worst forms of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no minimum wage
legislation. Including a cost of living allowance, the lowest wage for
civil servants was about $138 (Sf386,000) per month. This salary level
made it very difficult to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Government employees, who constituted approximately
50 percent of the work force of 100,000 persons, frequently
supplemented their salaries with second or third jobs, often in the
informal sector. The President and Council of Ministers set and approve
civil service wage increases.
Work in excess of 9 hours per day or 45 hours per week on a regular
basis required special government permission, which was granted
routinely. Such overtime work earned premium pay. The law requires one
24-hour rest period per week.
A 10- to 12-member inspectorate in the Occupational Health and
Safety Division of the Ministry of Labor was responsible for enforcing
legislated occupational safety and health regulations. Resource
constraints and lack of trained personnel precluded the division from
making regular inspections of industry. There was no law authorizing
workers to refuse to work in circumstances they deem unsafe; they must
appeal to the inspectorate to declare the workplace situation unsafe.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The only laws that prohibit trafficking
in persons were dated ``white slavery'' laws that were enforced rarely
and applied only to women and children. There were credible reports of
trafficking in women and girls within the country and to the country
for prostitution. The country also was a transit point for trafficking.
Women and girls from the interior were brought to the capital city and
also to various gold mining locations in the interior. Several clubs in
the capital were known for recruiting women from Brazil, Colombia,
Venezuela, and the Caribbean (Guyana, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic). While prostitution is illegal, the law was not enforced. The
police had an informal agreement with many ``hotel'' or brothel owners
to allow them to proceed with their business as long as they did not
hold the women's passports and the women were not mistreated. Random
checks were performed on the establishments weekly; in several
instances, police officers worked as advisers to the owners.
Brothel owners often attempted to hold airline tickets for women
they had paid to bring to the country to ensure that the women
completed their contracts. The police arranged a compromise with the
brothels and the prostitutes that when disagreements arose, the police
would hold the ticket until an agreement was reached. There were some
reported instances of individuals brought to the country under false
pretenses and then forced to work as prostitutes. In cases where the
victims were able to alert the police, the police helped them to return
to their country of origin at the victims' expense. In 2001 one club
owner in Paramaribo was convicted in Brazil for trafficking in women.
There were credible reports of individuals using the country as a
transit point to transport Brazilian women to Europe and the United
States for purposes of prostitution. In addition, alien smuggling
organizations used the country as an intermediate destination to
smuggle Chinese and Indian nationals, including women and girls, to the
United States, where frequently they were forced into bonded-labor
situations.
__________
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, is a
parliamentary democracy in which there have been generally free and
fair elections since independence from the United Kingdom in 1962.
Parliament elects a president, whose office is largely ceremonial but
does have some appointive power.
When the December 2001 elections produced an 18-18 balance in
Parliament between the United National Congress (UNC) and People's
National Movement (PNM), both parties agreed to allow President A.N.R.
Robinson to designate the new Prime Minister. However, when the
President selected the PNM's Patrick Manning, the UNC refused to abide
by the decision, and the deadlocked Parliament was unable to pass
legislation or elect a speaker for 9 months, until new elections on
October 7 yielded a 20 to 16 working majority for Manning and the PNM.
A 12-member elected House of Assembly handled local matters on the
island of Tobago. The judiciary was generally independent.
The Ministry of National Security oversaw the police service and
the defense force, rendering them responsive to civilian authority. An
independent body, the Police Service Commission, made all personnel
decisions in the Police Service, and the Ministry had little direct
influence over changes in senior positions. There were credible reports
that police and prison guards committed some human rights abuses.
Oil and natural gas production and related downstream petrochemical
industries, including ammonia and methanol production, provided the
base for the market-based economy. The country's population was
approximately 1.3 million. The service sector was the largest employer,
although industrialization and associated plant construction created
many jobs in the construction industry. Agriculture, while contributing
only 4 percent to gross domestic product, remained an important
employer, both at the subsistence and commercial level. Unemployment,
at a reported 11 percent, contributed to a skewed income distribution.
The economic growth rate was approximately 2.7 percent during the year.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provided effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Nonetheless, there were reports of
police and guard abuse of prisoners. Poor prison conditions and
significant violence against women remained problems. Trinidad and
Tobago was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening
Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in
Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by
the Government or its agents.
At year's end, a pretrial hearing began in the case of former
cabinet minister Danrajh Singh, charged for the 1999 murder of
politician Hanraj Sumairsingh, and the trial was set for 2003. Despite
public speculation about possible political motives for the murder,
there were indications that corruption may have been the root of the
incident.
On August 27, police arrested three prison guards in connection
with the June 2001 death of prisoner Anton Cooper. The circumstances
surrounding the death, and the slow pace of the investigation, provoked
widespread criticism. At year's end, the three guards were charged with
murder, and a preliminary inquiry was underway in Magistrate's Court.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
were credible reports of police and prison personnel abusing prisoners
in incidents that involved beating, pushing, and verbal insults. An
Amnesty International report stated that use of excessive force and ill
treatment of prisoners and suspects by police and guards continued. The
Commissioner of Police admitted that there were frequent citizen
allegations of police brutality, but he asserted that such claims often
were ``counter-claims'' by citizens who had been arrested for crimes.
In June Sudesh Samaroo claimed that police officers beat him,
abducted him from his home, taunted him, and threw him from a cliff
before he managed to escape. The Police Complaints Authority opened an
investigation into the charges, and the investigation continued at
year's end.
In September prison authorities opened an investigation into claims
by death row inmate Damian Ramiah that he had been severely beaten by
prison officers on July 30.
In November Keyon Anthony charged that police officers severely
beat him during a search for an illegal firearm; he never was charged
with a crime. Anthony brought his allegations to the Police Complaints
Authority.
Police corruption continued to be a problem. An independent body,
the Police Complaints Authority, received complaints about the conduct
of any police officer, monitored the investigation of complaints, and
determined disciplinary measures where appropriate, including
dismissal. However, Public Service Commission restrictions limited
oversight authority to impose final discipline through dismissals.
Several citizens' complaints alleging police corruption were lodged
during the year. For example, in June residents of the town of Los
Bajos appealed to the Commissioner of Police to protect them from three
``rogue'' police officers who allegedly made a practice of planting
drugs on young men in order to arrest them. In December Allan Saran
confessed to involvement in the kidnaping for ransom of a Port of Spain
resident (subsequently freed) and identified two police officers as
accomplices.
Prison conditions at two of the three largest men's prisons
generally met international standards. However, conditions were worse
at the Frederick Street Prison in Port of Spain, which dates from the
1830s. It was designed for 250 inmates but housed approximately 800
prisoners in December. Diseases such as chicken pox, tuberculosis, HIV/
AIDS, and viruses spread easily, and prisoners had to purchase their
own medication. The Commissioner of Prisons reported that the prison
system held 4,090 inmates at year's end. Overcrowding was a problem in
4 of 8 facilities, where 2,290 inmates were housed in prisons built for
980. A new maximum security prison, opened in late 1998, has a capacity
of 2,450. However, at year's end, it was not fully operational, held
approximately 800 inmates, and had done little to relieve the
overcrowding in the detention system.
On November 11, overcrowding caused a riot in the detention
facility at the Port of Spain Magistrate's Court when officers
attempted to house 80 detainees in cells built for 40 persons.
Pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted prisoners,
although they could be in the remand section of the same facilities as
convicted prisoners.
Conditions at the women's prison generally met international
standards. Children between the ages of 15 and 19 were held at the
Youth Training Center. Younger children were sent to the Boy's
Industrial School.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers, but the Ministry of National Security must approve each
visit.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government generally
observed this prohibition.
A police officer may arrest a person either based on a warrant
issued or authorized by a magistrate or without a warrant when the
officer witnesses commission of the alleged offense. For less serious
offenses, the authorities typically brought the accused before a
magistrate by way of a summons, requiring the accused to appear within
48 hours, at which time the accused could enter a plea. For more
serious offenses, when the accused was brought before the court, the
magistrate proceeded with a preliminary inquiry or, alternatively,
committed the accused to prison on remand or allowed the accused to
post bail until the inquiry. In practice, serious offenders also were
charged within 48 hours following arrest.
The court could and did customarily grant bail to any person
charged with any offense other than murder, treason, piracy, hijacking,
or for any other offense for which death was the penalty fixed by law.
In cases in which bail was refused, magistrates advised the accused of
their right to an attorney and, with few exceptions, allowed them
access to an attorney once they were in custody and prior to any
interrogation. Police had the authority, under the Summary Courts Act,
to grant bail to individuals charged with summary offenses. In July a
Princes Town magistrate criticized police for applying this bail policy
inconsistently, granting bail in some cases and refusing it in others.
In February the Government launched Operation Anaconda, a police
action which promised to address the problem of crime through a new
zero-tolerance policy. Press reports indicated the program had led to
the arrests of more than 500 people by June. That month laborer Andy
Anderson Ashby brought suit against the Attorney General alleging that
he had been arrested in connection with an Operation Anaconda exercise
and detained for almost 36 hours without being charged. At year's end,
the Police Complaints Authority was still investigating Ashby's claim.
The Minister of National Security may authorize preventive
detention in order to prevent actions prejudicial to public safety,
public order, or national defense, and the Minister must state the
grounds for the detention. There were no reports that the authorities
abused this procedure.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it was not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice. The judiciary provided citizens with a fair
judicial process.
The Judiciary was divided into a Supreme Court of Judicature and
the Magistracy. The Supreme Court was composed of the Court of Appeal
and the High Court; the Magistracy included the summary courts and the
petty civil courts.
All criminal proceedings commenced with the filing of a complaint
in the summary court. Minor offenses were tried before the magistrate.
For more serious offenses, the magistrate must conduct a preliminary
inquiry. If there was sufficient evidence to support the charge, the
accused was committed to stand trial before a judge and jury of the
High Court. All civil matters were heard by the High Court. Both civil
and criminal appeals may be filed with the local court of appeal and
ultimately to the Privy Council in London.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
independent judiciary vigorously enforced this right. All criminal
defendants had the right to an attorney. In practice the courts
sometimes appointed attorneys for those persons charged with indictable
offenses (serious crimes) if they could not retain one on their own
behalf. The law requires that a person accused of murder have an
attorney. An indigent person may refuse to accept an assigned attorney
for cause and may obtain a replacement.
Despite serious efforts to improve the administration of justice,
problems remained in some areas. Trial delays, while not as extensive
as in past years, remained a problem: adults prosecuted for serious
offenses were committed for trial or discharged in 2 to 3 years in
capital cases or within 5 years in noncapital cases; minors were tried
or discharged within 1 year. The High Court showed improvement in
reducing trial backlogs, but they remained significant at the
magistrate court level. To help improve efficiency, the courts
introduced computer-aided transcription to more speedily and
efficiently create a record.
The death penalty was mandatory in all murder convictions for
persons 18 years of age or older; convicted minors were jailed pending
a presidential pardon. In July Caribbean Justice, a nongovernmental
organization (NGO), issued a statement that the law did not allow for
consideration of mitigating factors in murder cases that might warrant
a lesser sentence.
In 2000 Parliament passed the Integrity in Public Life Act, which
established an Integrity Commission with jurisdiction and control over
the financial activities and ethical conduct of persons in public life
and persons exercising public functions. The act was used as the basis
for investigations of the activities of several public officials,
including former Prime Minister Panday, in the months prior to the
October 7 elections. At year's end, Panday had been arraigned in
Magistrate's Court, and a trial date set for early 2003. The Panday
case was the first filed under the new act.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, and the Government
generally respected these prohibitions in practice; however, citizens
periodically complained of abuse of power by the state. In August
Margaret Rowley of the town of Moruga claimed that local police
forcibly entered her home to execute a search warrant and broke doors,
a window, and furniture in the home.
On July 31, a court struck down as unconstitutional a section of
the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2000, which gave police the power to
inspect bank records of any individual upon the authority of a judge.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. An independent press and a
functioning democratic political system combined to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press.
The four major daily newspapers freely and often criticized the
Government in editorials. Widely read weekly tabloids tended to be
extremely critical of the Government. All newspapers were privately
owned. The two local television newscasts, one of which appears on a
state-owned station, were sometimes critical of the Government but
generally did not editorialize.
Over the past several years, the Media Association of Trinidad and
Tobago and the Publishers' Association expressed concern about the
media's treatment by, and access to, the Government. For its part, the
Government sometimes charged unfair treatment by the media, which the
press viewed as unwarranted criticism.
A Board of Film Censors was authorized to ban films that it
considered to be against public order and decency or contrary to the
public interest. This included films that it believed may be
controversial in matters of religion or race, or that contain seditious
propaganda. In practice films rarely were banned.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
The Government did not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. The police routinely granted the
required advance permits for street marches, demonstrations, or other
outdoor public meetings. Amendments to the Summary Offences Act require
that permits for public meetings and rallies be applied for 48 hours in
advance instead of 24 hours, and make it an offense to hold a public
meeting without a permit under the guise of conducting an exempted
religious, educational, recreational, or sports function.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Registration or
other governmental permission to form private associations was not
required.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
The Government limited the number of foreign missionaries allowed
to enter the country to 30 per denomination. Missionaries had to meet
standard requirements for an entry visa, must represent a registered
religious group, and could not remain in the country for more than 3
years.
The Government was known to monitor closely only one religiously
affiliated group, a radical Muslim organization called the Jamaat al
Muslimeen, some members of which attempted a coup in 1990. The
Government's surveillance focused on the group's repeated attempts to
seize control of state-owned property adjoining its central mosque and
on any actions intended to incite civil unrest.
Citizens occasionally complained about the efforts of some groups
to proselytize in neighborhoods where another religion was dominant.
The most frequent public complaints came from Hindu religious leaders
against evangelical and Pentecostal Christians. Such complaints
mirrored the racial tensions that at times arose between the Afro-
Trinidadian and Indo-Trinidadian communities.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
In 2000 the Government acceded to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Because of legislative
delays caused by the parliamentary deadlock during the year, the
Government had not yet passed legislation to implement obligations
accepted under the Convention, although the authorities generally
cooperated with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Until Parliament approves the legislation, the Ministry of
National Security's Immigration Division handled any requests for
asylum on a case-by-case basis; reportedly fewer than 10 had been
received in the past 40 years. In practice, the authorities placed
asylum seekers in the care of a local NGO pending resolution of their
cases, which were reviewed by the office of the UNHCR.
During the year, there were two cases of first asylum. The
authorities detained Sierra Leonean Alie Marah in prison for 15 months
as an illegal immigrant. When Marah requested asylum, the Government
released him to the NGO. The Government denied asylum to the second
claimant, a Cuban national.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic elections, held on the basis of universal suffrage.
The Constitution extends the right to vote to citizens as well as to
legal residents at least 18 years of age who are citizens of other
Commonwealth countries. Parliamentary elections were held at intervals
not to exceed 5 years, and elections for the Tobago House of Assembly
occurred every 4 years. The most recent general election was held on
October 7, and observers found it to be generally free and fair.
The two major political parties were the People's National Movement
and the United National Congress. The PNM was primarily but not
exclusively Afro-Trinidadian; the UNC was primarily but not exclusively
Indo-Trinidadian. General elections held on December 10, 2001, resulted
in an evenly divided Parliament, with both major parties winning 18
seats in the 36-member House of Representatives. Both parties agreed to
allow President A.N.R. Robinson to break the deadlock by appointing the
Prime Minister. When the President appointed PNM leader Patrick
Manning, the UNC called the decision unconstitutional and refused to
participate in an agreement on the appointment of a Parliamentary
Speaker, among other things. With the Parliament unable to form a
majority, Manning called new elections for October 7. In spite of
inflammatory campaigning by both parties, those elections proceeded
peacefully and resulted in an uncontested 20 to 16 majority for the
PNM. Following the elections, the authorities charged the campaign
manager for one newly elected PNM parliamentarian with interfering with
a ballot box. There were other, unsubstantiated, complaints of
interference at some polling stations.
There were no specific laws that restrict the participation of
women or minorities in government or the political parties. Women
comprised slightly more than half of all registered voters in the
country, and the voters elected 7 women to the 36-seat House of
Representatives on October 7, up from 6 women in the previous
Parliament. There were 9 women in the 31-member Senate and 8 women in
the 25-member Cabinet.
Both major political parties reached out to ethnic minority voters,
and ethnic minorities occupied significant positions in government.
Senator Howard Chin Lee, PNM member and Minister of National Security,
and Gerald Yetming, Member of Parliament from the UNC, were both ethnic
Chinese. Chinese were the third largest distinct ethnic group,
representing approximately 1 percent of the population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operated without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. While government officials generally were cooperative,
the Government responded strongly to Amnesty International's criticism
of prison conditions and due process. An independent Ombudsman received
complaints relating to governmental administrative issues and
investigated complaints of human rights abuse. The Ombudsman could make
recommendations but did not have authority to force government offices
to take action.
In 1998 the Government sought to curtail appeals by death row
inmates to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and
the U.N. Human Rights Committee. The Government's moves were prompted
by a Privy Council ruling that failure to execute a condemned prisoner
within 5 years of sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Constitution. To meet this 5-year deadline, the
Government sought to impose time limits on the IACHR and the U.N.
Committee to ensure that applications before these bodies were
completed within 8 months. In 1999 the Government withdrew from the
American Convention on Human Rights following a required 1-year notice.
However, the Privy Council subsequently ruled that by ratifying a
treaty that provides for individual access to an international body,
the Government made that process part of the domestic criminal justice
system, thereby extending the scope of the due process clause of the
Constitution, and that executing a prisoner with such an appeal pending
would constitute a violation of due process.
In June the Inter-American Court of Human Rights cited the
Government for violating the American Convention on Human Rights by
executing inmates who had unresolved appeals pending before the IACHR
and ordered the Government to pay more than $2.9 million to the
families and attorneys of several death row inmates. The Government
contested the Court's findings, saying that the executions in question
had been carried out in accordance with applicable law.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Government generally respected in practice the constitutional
provisions for fundamental human rights and freedoms for all without
discrimination based on race, origin, color, religion, or sex.
Women.--Physical abuse of women continued to be a significant
problem. There was increased media coverage of domestic abuse cases and
signs of a shift in public opinion, which previously had held that such
cases were a private matter, and the Government improved aid for
victims. Murder, rape, and other crimes against women were reported
frequently, but it was believed that many sexual crimes were
unreported. The establishment of a community police division improved
police responsiveness to reports of domestic abuse, but some police
officers were reportedly unsympathetic or reluctant to pursue such
cases, resulting in underreporting of crimes of violence against women.
The Police Service reported 565 complaints of spousal abuse through
October, but the actual incidence of such abuse was considered to be
much higher. Two government ministries, operating independently,
directed the NGOs that ran most of the country's social programs
addressing domestic violence, including five shelters for battered
women.
Rape, spousal abuse, and spousal rape were criminal offenses. A
rape crisis center offered counseling for rape victims and perpetrators
on a voluntary basis. Since 1996 the Government operated a 24-hour
domestic violence hot line, which received calls and referred victims
to shelters, counseling, or other assistance. The hot line was for
victims of rape, domestic violence, or other violence against women and
received approximately 1,650 calls during the year.
Prostitution is illegal, and the authorities brought charges of
soliciting for the purpose of prostitution against 19 persons during
the year. Of those, 18 were female and 1 male.
The law does not prohibit sexual harassment, and it was a problem.
Many women held positions in business, the professions, and
government. Nevertheless, men still tended to hold most senior
positions. There was no law or regulation requiring equal pay for equal
work.
Women's participation in education has been virtually equal to that
of men, according to a UNESCO report, which showed that women's
literacy rates and primary school enrollment in the country during
1990-98 were almost the same as the corresponding rates for males, with
women exceeding men in years spent in school and in secondary school
enrollment ratios.
The Division of Gender Affairs in the Ministry of Community
Development and Gender Affairs was charged with protecting women's
rights in all aspects of government and legislation. Several active
women's rights groups also existed.
Children.--The Government's ability to protect children's welfare
was challenged by a lack of funds and expanding social needs. Education
was free and compulsory through primary school, usually ending at 11 or
12 years of age. Some parts of the public school system seriously
failed to meet the needs of the school age population due to
overcrowding, substandard physical facilities, and occasional classroom
violence by gangs. The Government committed resources to building new
facilities and expanded access to free secondary education.
There was no societal pattern of abuse directed at children. The
Domestic Violence Act provides protection for children abused at home.
If they were removed from the home, abused children usually were placed
with relatives. If there was no relative who could take them, there
were several government institutions and NGOs that accepted children
for placement.
The Miscellaneous Provisions (Children) Act of 2000 increased the
upper age in the definition of a child from 14 to 18 years of age,
abolished corporal punishment as a penal sanction for children under
18, and prohibited sentencing a person between 14 and 18 years of age
to prison. A companion law established a new Children's Authority to
license and monitor community residences, foster homes, and nurseries,
and to investigate complaints about the care of children in such
locations. At year's end, the act had not yet been proclaimed, as the
Government was taking steps to appoint a board to manage the new
authority.
The law prohibits child prostitution, and the police reported no
cases of it during the year. However, there were anecdotal but
unconfirmed reports of child prostitution in the recent past (see
Section 6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--There is no legislation that
specifically enumerates or protects the rights of persons with
disabilities or mandates the provision of access to buildings or
services. The lack of access to transportation, buildings, and
sidewalks was a major obstacle for persons with disabilities. The
Government provided some public assistance and partial funding to a
variety of NGOs, which in turn provide direct services to members or
clients with disabilities.
Indigenous Persons.--Members of a very small group in the
population identify themselves as descendants of the original
Amerindian population of the country. They maintain social ties with
each other and other aboriginal groups and were not subject to
discrimination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Various ethnic and religious
groups live together peacefully, generally respecting one another's
beliefs and practices. However, at times racial tensions appeared
between Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians, which each make up
about 40 percent of the population. The private sector was dominated by
Indo-Trinidadians and persons of European, Middle Eastern, or Asian
descent. Indo-Trinidadians predominated in agriculture. Afro-
Trinidadians were employed in disproportionate numbers in the civil
service, police, and military. Some Indo-Trinidadians asserted that
they were excluded from equal representation in the civil service due
to racial discrimination.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1972 Industrial Relations Act
(IRA) provides that all workers, including those in state-owned
enterprises, may form or join unions of their own choosing without
prior authorization. The IRA provides for the mandatory recognition of
trade unions when a union satisfies the Registration Recognition and
Certification Board that it represents 51 percent or more of the
workers in a specified bargaining unit. Union membership has declined,
with an estimated 15 to 25 percent of the work force organized in
approximately 19 active unions. Most unions were independent of
government or political party control, although the Sugar Workers'
Union historically was allied with the UNC.
The law prohibits antiunion activities before a union is registered
legally, and the Ministry of Labor enforced this provision when it
received a complaint. A union also may bring a request for enforcement
to the Industrial Court, which may order employers who are found guilty
of antiunion activities to reinstate workers and pay compensation or
impose other penalties including imprisonment. When necessary the
Ministry of Labor's conciliation service determines which unions should
have senior status.
Unions freely joined federations and affiliated with international
bodies. There were no restrictions on international travel or contacts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The IRA
establishes the right of workers to collective bargaining. The
conciliation service maintained statistical information regarding the
number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements and the
number of antiunion complaints filed.
All employees except those in ``essential services,'' which include
the police and many other government employees, had the right to
strike. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the
Government's definition of essential services as being overly broad and
has requested that the legislation be amended. There were significant
strikes during the year, including a 9-day work stoppage by physicians
employed by the Ministry of Health. The Industrial Court found that the
action violated the prohibition against denying essential services. The
doctors denied that their work stoppage constituted a strike but
returned to work after a court injunction. In October and November,
approximately 2,000 construction workers went on strike at a methanol
plant at Point Lisas.
The Labor Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and
provides for grievance procedures if needed. A special section of the
Industrial Court handles mandatory arbitration cases. Arbitration
agreements are enforceable and can be appealed only to the Industrial
Court. Most observers considered this court to be impartial; it
consisted of government, business, and labor representatives.
There were several export processing zones (EPZs). The same labor
laws applied in the EPZs as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The law does not
prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor, but there were no reports
that it was practiced. There were also no reports of forced or bonded
labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal age for workers is 12 years. Children
from 12 to 14 years of age may work only in family businesses. Children
under the age of 18 legally may work only during daylight hours, with
the exception of 16- to 18-year-olds, who may work at night in sugar
factories. The Ministry of Labor and Small and Micro-Enterprises was
responsible for enforcing child labor provisions, but enforcement was
lax because there were no established mechanisms for receiving,
investigating, and addressing child labor complaints.
There was no organized exploitation of child labor, but a UNICEF
study estimated that 1.2 percent of children from 5 to 14 years of age
were engaged in paid work, and that 0.3 percent were engaged in unpaid
work for someone other than a family member. An ILO study reported that
children engaged in several types of work, including scavenging,
agriculture, domestic work, street vending, and commercial sexual
activity.
The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on elimination
of the worst forms of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1998 Minimum Wages Act
established a minimum wage of about $1.10 (TT$7.00) per hour. Actual
wages varied considerably among industries, and while the minimum wage
did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family,
most workers earned more than the minimum. The Ministry of Labor
enforced the minimum wage regulations.
The Minimum Wages Act also established a 40-hour workweek, time-
and-one-half pay for the first 4 hours of overtime on a workday, double
pay for the next 4 hours, and triple pay thereafter. For Sundays,
holidays, and off days, the act also provides for double pay for the
first 8 hours and triple pay thereafter. Daily rest periods and paid
annual leave formed part of most employment agreements.
The Factories and Ordinance Bill of 1948 sets requirements for
health and safety standards in certain industries and provides for
inspections to monitor and enforce compliance. The IRA protects workers
who file complaints with the Ministry of Labor regarding illegal or
hazardous working conditions. If it is determined upon inspection that
hazardous conditions exist in the workplace, the worker is absolved for
refusing to comply with an order that would have placed him or her in
danger.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--While there were no laws that
specifically address trafficking in persons, the illegality of such
acts was covered broadly in a variety of laws that addressed kidnaping,
labor conditions, pimping and prostitution, slavery, and indentured
servitude.
Although child prostitution was illegal and the police reported no
cases of it during the year, the ILO and some local officials provided
anecdotal but unconfirmed reports of child prostitution in the recent
past.
__________
URUGUAY
The Oriental Republic of Uruguay is a constitutional republic with
an elected president and a bicameral legislature. In 1999 in free and
fair elections voters elected Senator Jorge Batlle of the Colorado
party as President; he assumed office on March 1, 2000, for a 5-year
term. In legislative elections in 1999 the left-of-center Broad Front
coalition won approximately 40 percent of the vote in a four-party
race, thus constituting the largest congressional bloc. The two
traditional parties, the Colorados and the Blancos, which collaborate
in a coalition-style arrangement, together control over half of the
seats in the legislature. The judiciary is independent.
The Interior Ministry administers the country's police departments
and the prison system and is responsible for domestic security and
public safety. The military is responsible for external security within
the prison system. Civilian authorities exercise effective control over
the security forces. There were reports of police violence, including
abuse of prisoners in the jails and in police stations, which were
investigated by the Ministry of the Interior.
The economy is a mixture of private and state enterprises and is
heavily dependent on agricultural exports and agroindustry. The leading
exports are meat, leather, and rice. The country's population is
estimated at 3.2 million. The unemployment rate was 20 percent at
year's end. The economy contracted by 7.8 percent in the first half of
the year, following a decline of 1.3 percent in 2001.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary generally provided effective means
of dealing with individual instances of abuse; however, there were
problems in some areas, principally poor prison conditions and delays
in the judicial process. Court cases sometimes last for many years,
resulting in lengthy pretrial detention. Violence against women and
some discrimination against women and the black minority were problems.
There were several reports of trafficking in persons. Uruguay was
invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend
the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the
Government or its agents. At least 14 prisoners died at the hands of
other prisoners or in suspicious circumstances (see Section 1.c.).
The 1986 Amnesty Law prohibits criminal prosecution of members of
the security forces who perpetrated extrajudicial killings, torture,
and other abuses during the 12 years of military rule from 1973-85.
However, some victims and relatives of victims had success using the
civilian courts to seek redress. Court actions that sought to work
around the Amnesty Law included a lawsuit filed in August by Argentine
poet Juan Gelman and the potential prosecution of officials in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the dictatorship.
In a new attempt to bring accountability for human rights
violations committed by the military government, on October 18, a
criminal court issued an indictment for deprivation of liberty against
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan Carlos Blanco in connection
with the disappearance of Elena Quinteros, who was allegedly abducted
from the Venezuelan Embassy in 1976. Documents reportedly implicated
Blanco and two other former Foreign Ministry officials, who are not
covered by the Amnesty Law, in the decision not to return Quinteros to
the Venezuelans with whom she had sought asylum.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The 1986 Amnesty Law required the Government to investigate the
fate of those citizens who were detained and who then disappeared
during the dictatorship; the first three administrations following the
return to democracy consistently refused to do so. In 2000 the
Government for the first time undertook such an effort, and these
efforts continued during the year.
In 2000 President Batlle created a National Peace Commission to
clarify the fate of 179 Uruguayans believed to have disappeared for
political reasons during the dictatorship (137 in Argentina, 30 in
Uruguay, 7 in Chile, 3 in Paraguay, 1 in Bolivia, and 1 in Brazil). The
Commission was charged with receiving and analyzing information
relevant to the disappeared persons. It was to prepare individual
summaries of its conclusions as to the fate of each person and to
recommend legal measures that the Government should adopt to compensate
the families of the victims and resolve the victims' legal status, such
as by declaring them legally dead. By year's end, the Peace Commission
had resolved or reported to families on 24 of 30 cases. The
Commission's final report--published in November--concluded that the
fates of 20 percent of the missing Uruguayans was probably cremation
and burial at sea.
Some persons have sought justice in non-Uruguayan courts for human
rights violations that occurred during military rule. During the year,
Sara Mendez--who had filed papers in an Argentine court accusing five
retired members of the Uruguayan military with the 1976 kidnaping of
her infant from her Buenos Aires home--was reunited with her son in
Buenos Aires, largely through the efforts of an Uruguayan senator.
An Italian prosecutor continued to investigate charges brought in
an Italian court in 1999 against four present and former members of the
military and one police officer accused of responsibility in the
disappearance of eight Italian-Uruguayan dual nationals.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
were reports of abuse of prisoners, many of which have been
investigated by the Government.
The judicial and parliamentary branches of government are
responsible for investigating specific allegations of abuse. An
internal police investigative unit receives complaints from any person
concerning possible noncriminal police abuse of power, but it is
understaffed and only can issue recommendations for disciplinary
action. Ministry of Interior authorities act promptly if accusations of
alleged police brutality are reported. Police officers charged with
less serious crimes may continue on active duty; those charged with
more serious crimes are separated from active service until a court
resolves their cases. The 1995 Public Security Law requires a
proportional use of force by the police and the use of weapons only as
a last resort, and this law was respected in practice.
At least eight police officers were jailed for abusing detainees in
Maldonado and Salto. Over 400 police officers reportedly have been
indicted in the last 3 years for violations ranging from corruption to
abuse. There were also numerous reports of abuse of prisoners inside
the prison system. Human rights groups and an organization of the
families of prisoners filed several complaints about abuse, including
routine beatings in processing; routine hazing and beatings of
prisoners during searches; poor quality and insufficient quantities of
food, bedding, and clothing; and poor access to medical care.
Conditions in prisons were poor and deteriorated in the last year.
Due to worsening budget problems and the destruction of Libertad prison
during a riot in March, overcrowding increased. There were 5,400
prisoners in prison facilities designed to hold only 2,940 prisoners,
causing sanitation, social, and health problems in the major
facilities. In March a prison riot lasting several days in Libertad
prison in San Jose Province left the prison mostly uninhabitable.
Despite its current official capacity of zero, several hundred
prisoners continued to be housed within the ruined prison. As a
temporary solution, the Government resorted to lodging some of the
overflow prisoners within modified shipping containers. To alleviate
overcrowding, the Government purchased modular cells providing secure,
sanitary holding facilities for up to 600 prisoners. A new director of
prisons, reported to be ``tough but fair,'' has undertaken to correct
some of the causes of the riot problem by ending corruption and unfair
practices. The director announced that in the event of another riot,
the guards will be instructed to use arms as necessary to suppress the
riot.
In addition to overcrowding, the penal system suffered from
understaffing, instances of corruption, and physical violence. In April
National Prison director Carlos de Avila and other officials were
convicted of taking bribes in exchange for transferring prisoners to
better facilities. Narcotics, weapons, and cell phones were smuggled
into several facilities, allegedly with the collusion of an official.
Family visitation, in which family members carry in food to supplement
a prisoner's diet, was allowed but is made very difficult as the family
members are strip-searched in unhygienic conditions and subjected to
invasive searches.
Prison deaths rose sharply. In the first half of the year, 14
prisoners died in hangings, stabbings, or burnings either self-
inflicted or perpetrated by other prisoners. In the 2 months following
the riot in Libertad and the subsequent replacement of the prison's
director, five inmates died, resulting in an official investigation
urged by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Servicio Paz y Justicia
(SERPAJ) and the families of the victims. While there was no evidence
of staff involvement in these deaths, prisoners and their families
complained of institutionalized physical abuse in some facilities.
Prisoners were not always separated according to the severity of their
crimes. Human rights organizations were not given free access to the
prisons; the Government cited safety concerns as the reason.
According to press reports and the regional AIDS rights
organization ASEPO (Asociacion de Ser Positivo), the majority of
prisoners infected with HIV and AIDS did not receive adequate treatment
or medication. The extent of the infection and transmission rates of
the disease within the inmate population was unknown.
Female prisoners were held in separate facilities from male
prisoners with the exception of the Artigas prison, in which women were
housed in a separate facility within the prison. In general conditions
for female prisoners were significantly better than for male prisoners
due to their smaller population and the availability of training and
education opportunities.
Minors were held in institutions operated by the National Institute
for Minors (INAME). While it is legal to house juvenile prisoners
convicted of violent crimes within the same prisons as adults, this was
not done in practice. Juveniles who committed serious crimes were
incarcerated in juvenile detention centers, which resemble traditional
jails and have cells. However, conditions in some of these facilities
were as bad as in the adult versions, with some youths permitted to
leave their cells only 1 hour per day.
Juvenile offenders who were not considered to pose a threat to
society were placed in halfway house facilities, oriented towards
rehabilitation. These facilities provided educational, vocational, and
other opportunities, and the juvenile offenders were able to enter and
leave without restriction. Some human rights groups expressed concern
with reports that the Ministry of the Interior was considering mixing
youth and adult populations, such as at La Tablada, a facility run by
the National Institute for Minors (INAME).
The Government--citing safety reasons--did not permit general
prison visits by independent human rights observers during the year.
However, inmate visitation continued and foreign diplomats could visit
prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires the police to have a written warrant issued by a judge before
making an arrest, and the authorities generally respected this
provision in practice. The only exception is when the police apprehend
the accused during commission of a crime. The Constitution also
provides the accused with the right to a judicial determination of the
legality of detention and requires that the detaining authority explain
the legal grounds for the detention. In 2000 the President signed a new
law that obligates police officers to inform individuals of the reason
for their arrest. Police may hold a detainee incommunicado for 24 hours
before presenting the case to a judge, at which time the detainee has
the right to counsel. It was during this period of time that police
sometimes abused detainees.
The law stipulates that confessions obtained by the police before a
detainee appears before a judge and attorney (without the police
present) have no validity. Further, should a detainee claim that he has
been mistreated, by law the judge must investigate the charge.
If the detainee cannot afford a lawyer, the courts appoint a public
defender. If the crime carries a penalty of at least 2 years in prison,
the accused person is confined during the judge's investigation of the
charges unless the authorities agree to release the person on bail
(which seldom happens). As a result, in 2000 approximately 73 percent
of all persons incarcerated were awaiting a final decision in their
case. However, these figures may be misleading because only those
committing more serious crimes were actually jailed while waiting for
the judge to investigate charges. The majority of people facing charges
were not jailed. The length of time the accused spends in jail pending
trial also varies depending on the complexity of the case and the size
of the judge's docket. The uncertainty respecting length of
imprisonment contributed to tension in the prisons.
The Government does not use forced exile. The Constitution provides
that in extreme cases of national emergency an individual may be given
the option to leave the country as an alternative to trial or
imprisonment; however, this option has not been exercised for at least
2 decades.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice.
The Supreme Court heads the judiciary system and supervises the
work of the lower courts. A parallel military court system operates
under a Military Justice Code. Two military justices sit on the Supreme
Court but participate only in cases involving the military. Military
justice applies to civilians only during a state of war or
insurrection.
Trial proceedings usually are based on written arguments to the
judge, which are not made public routinely. Only the judge, prosecutor,
and defense attorney have access to all documents that form part of the
written record. Individual judges may hear oral arguments at their
option. Most judges choose the written method, a major factor slowing
the judicial process. There is no legal provision against self-
incrimination, and judges may compel defendants to answer any question
they pose. Either the defense attorney or the prosecutor may appeal
convictions to a higher court, which may acquit the person of the
crime, confirm the conviction, or reduce or increase the sentence.
A 1997 law to reform and modernize the Criminal Code provides for
more oral argument by prosecution and defense attorneys, less
investigative responsibility for judges, and is expected to accelerate
the pace of criminal trials. Budget constraints resulted in
postponement of the law's implementation to 2004.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
Government generally respected these prohibitions in practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the authorities sometimes
limited freedom of the press and the authorities may abridge these
rights if persons are deemed to be inciting violence or ``insulting the
nation.'' All elements of the political spectrum freely expressed their
viewpoints in both print and broadcast media.
Montevideo has 5 daily newspapers and 10 widely read weeklies;
there are also approximately 80 other weekly and a few daily newspapers
throughout the country. Montevideo has one government-affiliated and
three commercial television stations. There are about 150 radio
stations, 34 television stations, and 200 cable television stations in
the country.
The law stipulates that expression and communication of thoughts
and opinions are free, within the limits contained in the Constitution,
and it outlines methods of responding to ``inexact or aggravating
information.'' The law provides for between 3 months' and 2 years'
imprisonment for ``knowingly divulging false news that causes a grave
disturbance to the public peace or a grave prejudice to economic
interests of the State'' or for ``insulting the nation, the State, or
their powers.'' The authorities rarely used this law and did not do so
during the year.
Human rights activists and journalists alleged that state
enterprises such as the telephone and electric companies on occasion
withheld advertising from independent media that were critical of the
Government and favored media friendly to the Government with extensive
paid advertising. There were a few reports that stories critical of the
Government were edited to be less critical or dropped altogether. There
were reports of at least two journalists who were fired for criticizing
the Government too harshly.
Access to the Internet was available and unrestricted.
The national university is autonomous, and the Government did not
restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly and association, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
In May, as in prior years, thousands of persons marched in memory
of the persons who disappeared during the rule of the dictatorship (see
Section 1.b.). Several demonstrations, including relatively large
rallies and marches, protested the Government's decision to condemn
Cuba for human rights violations. The demonstrators were allowed to
march and express themselves freely. Protests and demonstrations about
economic conditions, labor issues, bio-technical issues, and student
issues took place without interference.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
There is a strict separation of church and state, and religious
instruction in public schools is prohibited.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
The Government grants refugee status in accordance with the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. The Government grants asylum only for political crimes as set
forth in the 1928 Treaty of Havana, the 1889 Treaty of Montevideo, and
the 1954 Caracas Convention. The Government cooperated with the office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government grants
first asylum in cases in which a refugee's claims are verified by the
UNHCR. The Government continued to cooperate with international
organizations to provide temporary residence to human rights advocates
who claim that they are subject to persecution in their home country;
if still at risk after 1 year, the person may apply for refugee status.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The country is a multiparty democracy with
mandatory voting for those 18 years of age or older. The Colorado
party, the National (Blanco) party, and the Broad Front coalition are
the major political groupings.
In November 1999, in free and fair elections, voters elected
Senator Jorge Batlle of the Colorado party President, and he assumed
office on March 1, 2000, for a 5-year term. In legislative elections in
October 1999, the left-of-center Broad Front coalition won
approximately 40 percent of the vote in a four-party race, thus
constituting the largest congressional bloc. The two traditional
parties, the Colorados and the Blancos, which collaborate in a
coalition-style arrangement, together controlled over half of the seats
in the legislature.
Women participated actively in the political process and
government. Three of 30 senators and 13 of 99 deputies were women. None
of the 13 cabinet ministers were women. There were no female justices
on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials
are generally cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination based on race,
sex, religion, or disability. Despite these provisions, societal
discrimination against some groups existed.
Women.--Violence against women continued to be a serious problem. A
1999 Ministry of Public Health study projected that within 5 years,
domestic violence would constitute the second most prevalent threat to
public health, after traffic accidents. The law provides for sentences
of 6 months to 2 years in prison for a person found guilty of
committing an act of violence or of making continuing threats to cause
bodily injury to persons related emotionally or legally to the
perpetrator. The state-owned telephone company provided a free
nationwide hot line answered by trained NGO employees for victims of
domestic violence. Between January and September, the service received
2,596 calls, a rate lower than in previous years. Persons calling the
hot line were provided counseling, free legal advice, and may be
referred to NGOs that can provide further social services. A 2000 law
increased sentences for rape and certain other sexually related crimes.
The Criminal Code covers spousal abuse and spousal rape, although
criminal charges rarely were initiated for those crimes.
A government office of assistance for victims of domestic violence
trains police how to resolve complaints of violence against women. A
directorate within the Ministry of Interior continued a public
awareness campaign about domestic violence and operated community
assistance centers where abuse victims receive information and
referrals to government and private organizations in their area that
aid abused women. Both the Ministry of Interior and NGOs operated
shelters in which abused women and their families could seek temporary
refuge. However, the country's economic crisis threatened assistance to
an increasing number of victims of domestic violence, as lack of
funding led to closure of a number of centers.
The law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace; however, few
such complaints were filed, leading some to conclude that it was not a
problem.
Women enjoyed equality under the law in the workplace but faced
discrimination stemming from traditional attitudes and practices.
However, there never have been any cases brought under the law. The
work force exhibited segregation by gender. Women, who made up almost
one-half the work force, tended to be concentrated in lower paying
jobs. Women's salaries averaged two-thirds those of men, continuing a
gradual improvement with respect to pay equity. Approximately 60
percent of the students at the public university were women. Women
often pursued professional careers but were underrepresented in
traditionally male-dominated professions.
In 2000 the first four female military officers were commissioned
by the air force, and in 2001 the first four female cadets graduated
from the army's military academy.
A small institute in the Ministry of Education coordinates
government programs for women. There are a number of active women's
rights groups, and many of their activities remained centered on
followup to the platform of action of the 1995 U.N. Conference on
Women.
Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting
children's rights and welfare, and it regarded the education and health
of children as a top priority. The National Institute for Minors
(INAME) oversees implementation of the Government's programs for
children but receives only limited funding for programs. The Government
provided free compulsory kindergarten, primary, and secondary
education, and 95 percent of children completed their primary
education. Girls and boys were treated similarly. Free education was
available through the undergraduate level at the national university.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Minors under the
age of 18 are not subject to criminal trial but receive special
treatment with special judges and, when sentenced, stay in institutions
run by INAME for the period determined by the judge; these institutions
emphasize the rehabilitation of minors. INAME maintained an extensive
network of programs, including shelters for at-risk children. INAME
also operated a confidential hot line for children who were victims of
domestic abuse.
UNICEF estimated that 40 percent of children under the age of 5
live in the poorest 20 percent of homes. While health care is free to
all citizens, the Government with the help of UNICEF has undertaken a
program to educate parents regarding the need for regular checkups and
immunization.
Although there were few substantiating statistics, polls and
arrests of children participating in sexual work indicated that child
prostitution existed. INAME has never conducted research on the subject
of child prostitution, and no NGO specifically addressed the problem
(see Section 6.f.)
The State of Maldonado announced that child prostitution and sexual
tourism had increased and identified 70 locations where this had
occurred. For the first time, there were isolated reports of male
prostitution. The economic crisis impacted child prostitution.
Anecdotal evidence indicated that in recent years child prostitution
has increased, especially in the interior of the country. Children's
rights NGOs and the media received reports that minors resorted to
prostitution as a means of survival in rural areas where unemployment
was more than 20 percent.
In Montevideo police discovered a child prostitution ring involving
40 minors with children as young as the age of 13. Additionally,
according to NGO experts, 30 of 83 of the ``massage spas'' in
Montevideo worked with children and adolescents, many of whom were
contracted out to clients as prostitutes. The minimum working age in
these ``spas'' is 16, but children as young as 13 were found.
Prostitution is legal in Uruguay, and there is no law specifically
prohibiting participation by minors. The Government created the
Interdepartmental Commission for the Prevention and Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation, which--with INAME--is responsible
for creating the national plan of action. In March the commission
announced the plan, which includes education programs.
Persons with Disabilities.--There was no discrimination against
persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision
of other state services.
A national disabilities commission oversees implementation of a law
on the rights of persons with disabilities. Although the law mandates
accessibility for persons with disabilities only to new buildings or
public services, the Government provided access to a number of existing
buildings. The law reserves 4 percent of public sector jobs for persons
with disabilities. The country has a generally excellent mental health
system and an interest in the rights of persons with mental
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's Afro-Uruguayan
minority, estimated at 5.9 percent of the population, continued to face
societal discrimination. A 1999 study by the NGO Mundo Afro found that
the illiteracy rate among black women was twice the national average,
that the percentage of black women who had pursued higher education was
one-third that of the general population, and that one-half of Afro-
Uruguayan women worked as household domestics. With the exception of an
alternate deputy, there were no Afro-Uruguayans in Congress, and blacks
were practically unrepresented in the bureaucratic and academic
sectors.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution states that laws
should promote the organization of trade unions and the creation of
arbitration bodies; however, there is almost no legislation
specifically entitling workers to form and join unions of their choice.
Unions traditionally organize and operate free of government
regulation. Civil servants, employees of state-run enterprises, and
private enterprise workers may join unions. Unionization was high in
the public sector (over 80 percent) and low in the private sector
(under 5 percent). Labor unions were independent of political party
control but traditionally associated more closely with the left-of-
center Broad Front political coalition.
A Ministry of Labor commission investigates antiunion
discrimination claims filed by union members. There have been no such
claims since 2000. Labor unions have complained that some businesses
have encouraged formation of worker cooperatives, which served to
reduce their labor costs. Although such cooperatives did not
necessarily affect workers' social insurance and other public benefits,
this outsourcing could reduce workers' job security, result in a loss
of seniority, and weaken the power of trade unions and of collective
bargaining.
There are mechanisms for resolving workers' complaints against
employers, but unions complained that these mechanisms sometimes were
applied arbitrarily. The law generally prohibits discriminatory acts by
employers, including arbitrary dismissals for union activity. Unions
maintained that organizers were dismissed for fabricated reasons, thus
allowing employers to avoid penalties under the law.
At the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Governing Body
meeting in March, the Association of Workers and Employees brought
allegations against the Government concerning antiunion measures,
involving collective bargaining and disciplinary measures against trade
union officials and workers. At the ILO's governing meeting in June,
the Association of Bank Employees of Uruguay brought allegations
against the Government concerning antiunion dismissals, threats of
dismissal, and irregular denouncement of a collective agreement. Both
complaints remained pending at year's end.
There are no restrictions on the right of unions to form
confederations or to affiliate with international trade union groups;
however, the one national confederation has chosen not to affiliate
officially with any of the world federations. Some individual unions
are affiliated with international trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining between companies and their unions determines a number of
private sector salaries. The executive branch, acting independently,
determines public sector salaries. There are no laws prohibiting
antiunion discrimination, but a 1993 executive decree established fines
for employers engaging in antiunion activities. The law does not
require employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities and
does not require employers to pay an indemnity to such workers. In
cases of legal challenges by union members for unlawful firings, courts
tend to impose indemnization levels that are higher than those normally
paid to dismissed workers. The ILO's Committee of Experts found that
imposition of a fine ``provided for by law in all cases of unjustified
dismissal when the real motive is trade union membership or activity''
is an inadequate protection against anti-union discrimination.
The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike. The
Government may legally compel workers to work during a strike if they
perform an essential service which, if interrupted, ``could cause a
grave prejudice or risk, provoking suffering to part or all of the
society.'' A few strikes took place in the transportation and education
sectors. The University of the Republic was shut down by a student
union strike lasting more than a month.
All labor legislation fully covers workers employed in the eight
special export zones. There are no unions in these zones because the
few workers employed there were not in traditionally organizable
occupations, that is, one in which a number of workers are employed in
a non-professional capacity.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children, and the
Government generally enforced this prohibition effectively; however,
there was one report that one child was trafficked into forced labor
(see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Child Labor Code protects children; the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security is responsible for enforcing the law. Some
children worked as street vendors in the expanding informal sector
(which accounts for 48 percent of total employment in the country) or
in the agrarian sector, which generally were regulated less strictly
and where pay was lower. The law does not permit minors under the age
of 14 to work, and this was generally enforced in practice. Minors
between the ages of 14 and 15 were granted permission to work only in
extremely rare circumstances and even then usually only to work with
other members of their families. Minors between the ages of 15 and 18
require government permission to work, and such permission is not
granted for dangerous, fatiguing, or night work.
Permission to work is only granted to minors who have completed 9
years of compulsory education or who remain enrolled in school and are
working toward completing the period of compulsory education. Controls
over salaries and hours for children are more strict than those for
adults. Children over the age of 16 may sue in court for payment of
wages, and children have the legal right to dispose of their own
income. A program by INAME and an NGO to pay $83 (1,000 pesos) per
month to parents who take their children off the streets and send them
to school continued during the year. This amount approximated what a
child might earn working on the street. In 1999 the Government created
a National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor, which
continued to work on creating a national action plan to combat child
labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor
effectively enforces a legislated minimum monthly wage which is in
effect in both the public and private sectors. The Ministry adjusts the
minimum wage whenever it adjusts public sector wages. The minimum wage,
set in 2001 at approximately $80 (1,092 pesos) per month, functions
more as an index for calculating wage rates than as a true measure of
minimum subsistence levels, and it would not provide a decent standard
of living for a worker and family. The vast majority of workers earn
more than the minimum wage.
The standard workweek is 48 hours in industry and 44 hours in
commerce, with a 36-hour break each week. The law stipulates that
industrial workers receive overtime compensation for work in excess of
48 hours and that workers are entitled to 20 days of paid vacation
after a year of employment.
The law protects foreign workers and does not discriminate against
them. However, in order to receive official protection, the companies
that employ foreign workers must report them as employees. Many
workers--both native and foreign--worked off the books and thus
forfeited certain legal protections.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Security enforces legislation
regulating health and safety conditions in a generally effective
manner. However, some of the regulations cover urban industrial workers
more adequately than rural and agricultural workers. Workers have the
right to remove themselves from what they consider hazardous or
dangerous conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons; and there were some infrequent cases
involving trafficking of women and, particularly, child prostitution
(see Section 5).
Trafficking workers from other South American countries continued.
Police arrested persons involved with the trafficking and false
documentation of Peruvian women in Uruguay. Some women were employed as
domestics, fulfilling a demand for cheap, full-time household labor.
The women were recruited in Peru, provided transportation and
documentation, obliged to repay the traffickers over time, often
exceeding 5 years. Others, destined for the United States, were
provided with falsified birth certificates to obtain national
identification cards and Uruguayan passports. While 6 women in the ring
were arrested, authorities estimated that more than 20 Peruvians might
have been trafficked through the country in this manner. One Peruvian
minor captured during the arrest was repatriated.
More than eight Cuban nationals were detained for using false
documents provided by traffickers, allegedly in the United States.
Isolated cases of trafficking in persons for labor were reported.
Five Indonesian workers from a South Korean fishing vessel alleged that
their employers beat them, subjected them to 94-hour work weeks, and
set them ashore when in port to avoid feeding and caring for them.
Foreign consular officials confirmed that these allegations were not
uncommon in the region but stated that lack of involvement by the host
countries made such practices difficult to detect and prevent.
There were no reliable estimates on the number of Uruguayan women
who worked as prostitutes abroad--generally in Europe and Australia--or
on the proportion who were induced into such work by fraud or were
subjected to conditions approaching servitude. Families of three women
who disappeared from Maldonado in the last decade (the last in 2000)
renewed demands for an investigation of the disappearances. Recent
reports of disappearances among young females in Maldonado gave rise to
speculation that the three women may have been trafficked to Europe.
The Ministry of the Interior has primary responsibility for
investigating trafficking cases.
__________
VENEZUELA
Venezuela is a constitutional democracy with a president and
unicameral legislature in which citizens periodically choose their
representatives in free and fair multiparty elections. In addition to
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the
Constitution provides for a ``Citizen Power'' branch of government--
which includes the Ombudsman, the Public Prosecutor, and the Controller
General--and an ``Electoral Power'' branch, the National Electoral
Council (CNE). In July 2000, following a long and controversial
process, voters elected President Hugo Chavez of the Fifth Republic
Movement (MVR) in generally free and fair elections. The MVR and the
pro-Chavez Movimiento a Socialismo (MAS) party won 92 seats in the 165-
member legislature. Subsequent party splits reduced the pro-Chavez
members to 84 seats. In December 2000, the National Assembly appointed
members of the Citizen Power and Supreme Court in a manner that many
observers criticized as unconstitutional. The civilian judiciary is
legally independent; however, it was highly inefficient and sometimes
corrupt, and judges at all levels were subject to influence from a
number of sources, including the executive branch.
In April the country experienced a temporary alteration of
constitutional order. When an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 persons
participated in a march in downtown Caracas to demand President
Chavez's resignation, gunfire broke out, resulting in as many as 18
deaths and more than 100 injuries, with dead and injured on both sides.
Military officers took President Chavez into custody, and opposition
business leader Pedro Carmona proclaimed himself as interim president.
On April 14, troops loyal to Chavez returned him to power.
On December 2, the political opposition called a national work
stoppage to protest the Government and for the resignation of President
Chavez. On December 4, the petroleum sector joined the stoppage, which
continued at year's end.
The security apparatus includes civilian and military elements,
both accountable to elected authorities. Active and retired military
officers held high-ranking government positions. Two of the 14 members
of the President's Cabinet were retired career military officers. The
presidents of two major state-owned corporations--Corporacion
Venezolana de Guayana and CITGO--were active duty military officers.
The military was involved heavily with public service projects. The
Defense Ministry controls the General Directorate for Military
Intelligence (DIM), which is responsible for collecting intelligence
related to national security and sovereignty. The National Guard, an
active branch of the military, has arrest powers and is largely
responsible for maintaining public order, guarding the exterior of key
government installations and prisons, conducting counternarcotics
operations, monitoring borders, and providing law enforcement in remote
areas. The Interior and Justice Ministry controls the Investigative and
Criminal Police Corps (CICPC), which conducts most criminal
investigations, and the Directorate for Intelligence and Prevention
Services (DISIP), which is primarily responsible for investigating
cases of corruption, subversion, and arms trafficking. Municipal mayors
and state governors are responsible for local and state police forces,
and maintain independence from the central government. Often, mayors
and governors look to the National Guard for the top leadership for
state and municipal police forces. The Caracas Metropolitan Police is
the main civilian police force in the five municipalities that form the
Federal District and was headed by a career police officer, rather than
a military officer. The Government intervened in the administration of
the Metropolitan Police in November, alleging that the police force was
repressing pro-government protests. The issue was not resolved at year-
end. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control
over security forces, members of the security forces committed numerous
and serious human rights abuses during the year.
The country has abundant natural resources and a market-based
economy; however, the vast majority of natural resource extraction and
production was done by entities owned and operated wholly or in part by
the Government. The country's population was approximately 24.9
million. Oil accounted for 26 percent of gross domestic product (GDP),
48 percent of government revenues, and 80 percent of the country's
exports in 2001. Following economic growth of 2.8 percent in 2001, the
country experienced a severe economic crisis. Severe political unrest
disrupted productivity and discouraged investment. The Government faced
a strong recession with negative growth of 7.1 percent in the first
half of the year, a significant budget deficit (approximately 7 percent
of GDP), a sharply depreciated currency (nearly 100 percent), and an
inability to obtain financing in international markets. A national work
stoppage interrupted oil production, closed ports to imports and
exports, and disrupted domestic production throughout December.
Official figures place overall negative growth for the year at 7
percent; unofficial estimates range up to 9 percent. Wages did not keep
pace with inflation, which exceeded 40 percent during the year. In
addition, income was distributed unevenly, with approximately 60
percent of the population living at or below the 2001 poverty line of
$500 monthly per household.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained. The
police and military committed extrajudicial killings of criminal
suspects. The police allegedly had links to vigilante death squads
responsible for dozens of killings in seven states. Investigations into
the forced disappearances by the security forces of criminal suspects
remained extremely slow. Torture and abuse of detainees persisted, and
the Government failed to punish police and security officers guilty of
abuses. Prison conditions remained harsh; violence and overcrowding was
so severe as to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. Arbitrary
arrests and detentions increased. Impunity was one of the country's
most serious human rights problems. Police rarely arrested suspects,
and when they did, the suspects often were soon set free. Crimes
involving human rights abuses did not proceed to trial due to judicial
and administrative delays. Lengthy pretrial detention and corruption
and severe inefficiency in the judicial and law enforcement systems
also were problems.
The Government conducted illegal wiretapping of private citizens.
Government intimidation was serious problem. The President, officials
in his administration, and members of his political party frequently
spoke out against the media, the political opposition, labor unions,
the courts, the Church, and human rights groups. Many persons
interpreted these remarks as tacit approval of violence, and they
threatened, intimidated, or even physically harmed several individuals
from groups opposed to Chavez during the year. The Government abused
its power to require television and radio stations to air numerous
speeches by President Chavez, other government officials, and other
programming favorable to the Government, and by cutting the
transmission of television stations that refused to air progovernment
material on April 9-11. Violence and discrimination against women,
abuse of children, discrimination against people with disabilities, and
inadequate protection of the rights of indigenous people remained
problems. Although concern over labor rights remained, the atmosphere
for independent labor unions remained good. Child labor increased as
economic conditions worsened. Trafficking in persons was a problem,
although the Government took steps to reduce corruption among
immigration authorities. Venezuela was invited by the Community of
Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD
Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, members of the political
opposition received death threats and were the victims of intimidation
by government supporters. The security forces continued to commit
extrajudicial killings, primarily of criminal suspects, although at a
lower level than 2001. The Venezuelan Program of Action and Education
in Human Rights (PROVEA), a respected human rights nongovernmental
organization (NGO), documented 137 extrajudicial killings from October
2001 through September, compared with 212 killings from October 2000 to
June 2001. These figures reflected a range of killings in different
situations committed by organizations with varying levels of control
and responsibilities and included summary executions of criminal
suspects and deaths resulting from mistreatment while in custody.
Police continued to fire on criminal suspects who disobeyed orders to
halt.
The Government rarely prosecuted perpetrators of extrajudicial
killings. The police often failed to investigate crimes allegedly
committed by their colleagues and characterized incidents of
extrajudicial killings as ``confrontations,'' even when eyewitness
testimony and evidence strongly indicated otherwise. In addition, the
civilian judicial system struggled to implement the 1999 Organic
Criminal Procedures Code (COPP) and remained highly inefficient and
sometimes corrupt (see Section 1.e.). In the small number of cases in
which the courts convicted perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and
other abuses, sentences frequently were light, or the convictions were
overturned on appeal. Unlike common criminals, members of the security
forces charged with or convicted of crimes rarely spent much time in
prison.
Federal and state police continued to investigate vigilante ``death
squads'' with apparent police ties that may be responsible for up to 48
killings in several states, including Portuguesa, Yaracuy, Anzoategui,
Bolivar, Miranda, Aragua, and Falcon. In almost all cases, the victims
were young, poor, and had criminal records. According to NGO reports,
oftentimes the killers first demanded money from the victims, and when
they were not able to pay, they were killed.
In October 2001, Human Rights Ombudsman German Mundarain called for
``urgent intervention'' by the federal government into the operations
of state level police in seven states, in response to what he termed
increasing numbers of extrajudicial killings that may have police
connections. Neither the Attorney General's office nor the Ministry of
the Interior acted. In conjunction with human rights NGO Red de Apoyo,
the Human Rights Ombudsman's office conducted training sessions for the
police in Portuguesa. According to the Public Ministry, there were 38
extrajudicial killings or forced disappearances in 18 of the country's
23 states during the year.
The majority of extrajudicial killings by security forces were
attributed to state and municipal police forces that report to local
officials and often had little training or supervision. The killings
often involved a person mistaken for a criminal or alleged to have
committed a crime. In other cases, human rights organizations reported
that police officers acted at the behest of criminals who paid the
officers to kill their enemies for them. There historically had been no
investigation into these cases, but the CICPC investigated some cases
during the year.
On April 15, municipal police officers from the town of Caroni shot
33-year-old Luis Beltran Yendis, according to human rights NGO Humana
Dignitas. Beltran told the officers he had never had trouble with the
police before. The police took Mr. Beltran outside where he was
overpowered and then shot in the legs. Neighbors and family members
witnessed the officers taking custody of Beltran, who was otherwise in
good condition. At the police station, family members were told he had
died of two gunshot wounds to the chest and could be found at the city
morgue. There was no investigation reported.
Humana Dignitas also reported that on June 8, officers from the
Special Operations Tactical Brigade (BTOE) of Ciudad Guayana shot 35-
year-old labor activist Milton Jose Zuleta after he exited his home
with his arms raised. At an officer's order, he turned around and then
was shot and beaten by one of the officers. Mr. Zuleta's wife called
for help; she was restrained by another police officer. When she tried
to go outside to see her husband, she was hit in the head with the butt
of the officer's gun. Zuleta was shot again and taken into custody. He
later died. Medical reports indicated that he died from 10 bullet
wounds. Humana Dignitas received information leading them to believe
Zuleta was targeted for murder because of his activity in his labor
union.
Humana Dignitas reported that on April 19, in San Felix, Bolivar
state, municipal police forces killed 15-year-old Jose Gregorio Lopez
without provocation while he was riding his bicycle. Witnesses reported
seeing an officer plant a gun beneath a tree. The case was awaiting
trial at year's end.
In August the press reported that officers from the CICPC began an
investigation into the deaths of two persons who died in police
custody. CICPC officers took Henry Alberto Marimon Villafane and Jose
Antonio Gordon into custody in El Tigre, Anzoategui state. Police later
discovered their charred bodies in a burned out car that belonged to
one of the victims. There was no action taken in this case.
In September the press reported that officers from the Libertador
municipality police force killed 22-year-old Adolfo Arcia and 19-year-
old Elvis Montesinos. The officers had stopped the two men and their
friends as they were returning home in a taxi. The men were told to get
out of the taxi and were forced onto the ground. The police received
gunfire from a nearby hill, at which point the men got up and ran.
Montesinos and Arcia were hit in the back during the gunfire but were
able to reach a nearby hospital. Before they could be attended, police
officers detained them and told their friends they were taking them to
a second hospital. Later that evening, the family located the pair,
dead, at a third hospital. A CICPC investigation was pending at year's
end.
Security forces also killed some prisoners; however, the majority
of the inmate deaths during the year resulted from gang confrontations,
riots, fires, and generally unsanitary and unsafe conditions in prison
facilities (see Section 1.c.).
There were no developments in the case of army Lieutenant
Alessandro Siccat, who sprayed and ignited paint thinner in the holding
cell of three allegedly disobedient soldiers in January 2001. Two men
were seriously burned; a third, Jesus Alberto Febres, died as a result
of burns. A military court convicted Siccat; however, the Attorney
General appealed, and in October 2001, the Supreme Court granted a
civilian court jurisdiction (see Section 1.e.).
There were no new developments in the investigation into the June
2000 killings by the Caracas Metropolitan Police of Ronny Tovar,
Francisco Mister, and Luis Hernandez.
There were mob lynchings of known criminals who preyed on residents
of poor neighborhoods.
b. Disappearance.--The Constitution prohibits forced disappearance,
and there were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
during the year. The Constitution also states that an individual must
refuse to obey an order to commit such a crime and provides for the
prosecution of the intellectual author of the crime.
Government agents were suspected in the forced disappearances of at
least four alleged criminal suspects and other individuals in Vargas
state during a crackdown on looters following flooding in 1999. In
September 2001, the Attorney General announced that formal charges had
been filed against two DISIP agents in a Vargas court; however, there
was no progress in the case.
In September an appeals court dismissed the case against DISIP
Commissioner Jose Yanez Casimiro and retired Commissioner General
Justiniano Martinez Carreno in the 1999 disappearances of Oscar Blanco
Romero and Marco Monasterio. On February 22, the Vargas state penal
court dismissed the charges against the two men because the witnesses
could not identify them. COFAVIC, working on behalf of the victims'
families, appealed the decision. The families of the victims, as well
as the lawyers for COFAVIC, claimed the hearing was unfair because they
were not given ample opportunity to speak before the court.
There were reports that Colombian guerrillas kidnaped persons for
ransom. According to the National Federation of Cattlemen, 60 persons
had been kidnaped as of June, compared with 94 in all of 2001. As of
June, Colombian guerrillas still held 20 of the 94 landowners kidnaped
in 2001.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and the holding of
detainees incommunicado, provides for the prosecution of officials who
instigate or tolerate torture, and grants victims the right to medical
rehabilitation. Detainees have the right to a judicial determination of
the legality of their detention within 3 days. However, security forces
continued to torture and abuse detainees physically and
psychologically. This abuse most commonly consisted of beatings during
arrest or interrogation, but there also were incidents in which the
security forces used near-suffocation and other forms of torture that
left no telltale signs. Most victims came from the poorest and least
influential parts of society.
PROVEA documented 324 cases of torture, beatings, and other abuse
from October 2001 through September (affecting 1,064 victims), compared
with 340 cases from October 2000 through September 2001 (affecting 667
victims).
Torture, like extrajudicial killings, continued because the
Government did not ensure independent investigation of complaints. The
Institute of Forensic Medicine is part of the CICPC, which contributed
to a climate of impunity, since its doctors were unlikely to be
impartial in their examinations of cases that involved torture by CICPC
members. Very few cases of torture resulted in convictions.
Police officers and National Guard troops at times harassed or
humiliated victims. For example, in April the National Guard harassed
missionaries from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
(Mormons), by conducting strip searches and intimidating them (see
Section 2.c.).
General prison conditions continued to be harsh due to
underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff, and violence by
guards and inmates. Despite the implementation of the COPP, the prison
population was 117 percent of capacity. Twenty-two of the country's 30
prisons were overpopulated, some severely, according to the Ministry of
the Interior and Justice. Overcrowding in some prisons was so severe as
to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. According to the
Ministry of the Interior and Justice, 48 percent of all prisoners were
in pretrial detention.
Underfunding compounded the degradation of even model prisons.
Attempts to relieve overcrowding by transferring prisoners worsened
conditions in other facilities. The prisons often lacked such basic
equipment as telephones in the prison director's office. Prisoners
often complained of food and water shortages.
The Government failed to provide adequate prison security.
According to the Ministry of Interior and Justice, there were 244
deaths and 1,249 injuries from violence in jails from October 2001
through September. Security forces committed a small number of the
killings in prisons, and many prisoners died as a consequence of poor
sanitary conditions, poor diet, and inadequate medical care. However,
most inmate deaths resulted from prisoner-on-prisoner violence, riots,
fires, and from generally unsafe conditions in prison facilities.
Prisoners reported that the prison officials allowed the prisoners
to fight among themselves. For example, in the prison in Barcelona,
prisoners claimed that prison officials permitted the more violent
prisoners to kill each other to get rid of difficult prisoners, and did
nothing to help those who were seriously injured, leaving them to die.
Prisoners reported cases in which other prisoners disappeared after
being injured in fights.
Prison employees reported that grenades and guns were present in
some prisons. In May prison guards discovered grenades at San Antonio
prison in Margarita. Guards reported similar access to weapons since
February in Barcelona prison, in Anzoategui state. The National
Director of Prisons launched an investigation into the National Guard
because several of the weapons in the prisoners' possession had been
decommissioned from the National Guard.
Inmates often had to pay guards and other inmates to obtain
necessities such as space in a cell, a bed, and food. Because of the
prison food's low quality and insufficient quantity, most prisoners get
their food from their families, by paying prison guards, or in barter
with other prisoners. Many inmates also profited from exploiting and
abusing others, especially as convicted murderers and rapists often
were housed with unsentenced or first-time petty offenders. Gang-
related violence and extortion was fueled by the substantial
trafficking in arms and drugs that occurred in prisons.
Prison officials often illegally demanded payment from prisoners
for transportation to judicial proceedings (see Section 1.e.).
Women inmates were held in separate prisons, where conditions
generally were better than those in the men's facilities. Security
forces and law enforcement authorities often imprisoned minors together
with adults, even though separate facilities existed for juveniles.
Because reform institutions were filled to capacity, hundreds of
children accused of infractions were confined in juvenile detention
centers where they were crowded into small, filthy cells, fed only once
a day, and forced to sleep on bare concrete floors.
Despite resistance from the Catholic Church and NGOs, the
Government sporadically used the National Guard, normally charged with
exterior prison security, to maintain internal control of prisons.
The Government permitted prison visits by independent human rights
observers; however, guards were often unaware of international law, and
sometimes refused entry to consular representatives unless they
submitted to strip searches.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
1999 COPP provide for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention;
however, the security forces continued to arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily.
There continued to be arbitrary detentions by the Caracas
Metropolitan Police, the DISIP, municipal police forces, the National
Guard, and the CICPC, especially during anticrime sweeps in
impoverished sections of major cities. PROVEA documented 4,549 persons
detained in sweeps from October 2001 through September, compared with
4,243 persons detained in sweeps from October 2000 through September
2001.
Human rights activists in border areas alleged that security forces
continued to detain individuals and groups arbitrarily, citing the need
to examine identity documents. Hundreds of Colombian nationals were
detained and deported without due process (see Section 2.d.).
The COPP stated that a person accused of a crime cannot be
incarcerated during criminal proceedings unless that person was caught
in the act of committing a crime, or a judge determines that there was
a danger that the accused may flee or impede the investigation. The law
provides for the right to a judicial determination of the legality of
the detention within 72 hours. Persons accused of crimes must be
brought before a judge within 24 hours of arrest or be freed pending
charges. In no case may the detention of a person accused of a crime
exceed the possible minimum sentence for the crime committed, nor may
it exceed 2 years. However, confusion over the COPP still exists, and
arbitrary arrests continued to be common. Police on the streets were
not well trained, and often abused their power for either personal or
political reasons. In 2001 the National Assembly broadened the
definition of the ``in flagranti'' circumstances in which a person may
be apprehended and lengthened slightly the time provided to police to
present charges prior to the release of an arrested individual (see
Section 1.e.). Human rights groups claimed this change led to an
increase in detentions.
Under the COPP, persons accused of petty crimes who had not been
convicted but already had been in custody 2 years or the minimum
sentence possible for that crime (whichever is less) are to be released
if they passed a psychiatric examination. Under the provisions and
benefits provided by the law, approximately 9,000 prisoners were
released in 2000, the last year for which statistics were available.
There were approximately 19,368 prisoners as of August, 48.27 percent
of whom had not been convicted of a crime.
In April, during the short-lived government of Pedro Carmona,
military officers held President Chavez for 36 hours against his will.
Additionally, security forces conducted raids without warrants and took
some Chavez supporters into custody illegally, including National
Assembly deputy Tarek Willian Saab, a member of the Chavez-aligned MVR.
According to COFAVIC, a large crowd had gathered around Saab's home,
threatening him and his family. When the local police arrived to
protect Saab, DISIP forces also arrived and took Saab into custody. He
was held incommunicado for several hours.
Forced exile is illegal; however, during the short-lived Carmona
government in April, military officials attempted to force the exile of
President Chavez.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judiciary is legally
independent; however, it was highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt,
and judges were subject to influence from a number of sources,
including the executive branch.
The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Court, which is the
court of final appeal; the Public Prosecutor, who provides opinions to
the courts on prosecution of criminal cases and brings to the attention
of the proper authorities cases of public employee misconduct and
violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners or accused
persons; the Ministry of Interior and Justice, which manages the
national police force (CICPC), files complaints in criminal courts, and
oversees the prisons; and the Executive Directorate of the Magistrature
(DEM), which oversees the lower courts as well as the selection and
training of judges. The lower court system includes district and
municipal courts as well as trial and appeal courts that deal with
civil and criminal matters.
The 1999 COPP provides for the right to a fair trial and considers
the accused innocent until proven guilty in a court. However, under the
previous secretive inquisitorial code, the presumption of innocence
generally was not respected nor accepted. The system was corrupt,
paper-intensive, costly, and time-consuming. Judges were underpaid,
poorly disciplined, and susceptible to political influence. The COPP
introduced for the first time open, public trials with oral proceedings
and verdicts by juries or panels of judges. The adversarial system also
establishes the right to plead guilty and make reparation agreements;
however, lengthy delays in trials remained common.
The Government continued to implement the COPP, which altered the
fundamental concept of how justice is carried out, the legal procedures
involved, and the respective roles of the police, judges, and lawyers.
The police no longer detained persons arbitrarily for up to 8 days (see
Section 1.d.) and worked under the supervision of a prosecutor; judges
ceased to be investigators and arbiters of law; and prosecutors and
defense attorneys assumed both roles respectively.
A November 2001 amendment to the 1999 COPP strengthens out-of-court
settlements and increases victims' rights to compensation; provides
physical protection to crime victims during trials; bolsters the work
of juries for some crimes and eliminates them for others; eliminates
some sentence reduction benefits for jailed criminals; and expands
powers of detention (see Section 1.d.).
The law provides for public defenders for those unable to afford an
attorney; however, there were not enough public defenders. According to
statistics from the DEM, there were 531 public defense attorneys for
the entire country, of which 164 were dedicated exclusively to juvenile
cases and 367 for all other cases. Public defenders handled more than
63,000 cases throughout the country, with an average caseload of 150
cases per public defender. In some states, the average annual caseload
was as high as 520 per public defender.
Prison officials often illegally demanded payment from prisoners
for transportation to judicial proceedings. Those who were unable to
pay often were forced to forgo their hearings (see Section 1.c.).
During the year, the DEM suspended and removed judges based on
charges of incompetence or corruption. Judges were suspended with pay;
however, some observers challenged that the judges' right to appeal was
restricted. The Government held competitive examinations to fill
judicial vacancies, beginning in Miranda and Vargas states in January
2001. Judges with pending cases against them were not eligible to take
the examinations, and judges who have been reprimanded had points
deducted from their scores. However, the slow pace at which suspended
or fired judges were replaced meant that, as of November, fewer than 25
percent of the judges in the country were permanent.
The military courts continued to implement a reform similar to the
COPP in the military justice system. The Constitution established that
trials for military personnel charged with human rights abuses would be
held in civilian rather than military courts. However, the provision
does not apply to cases that predate the 1999 Constitution, and there
was no implementing law for the provision. There was no progress in the
January 2001 case of army Lieutenant Alessandro Siccat (see Section
1.a.). In October 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that civilian courts
should hear the case. The Court declared the court-martial and sentence
null and void, and sent the case to a state civilian court in Maracay.
Siccat remained detained at year's end and awaiting trial in Aragua
state at year's end. His court appearance has been suspended twice.
Human rights NGOs continued to express concern that the Supreme
Court's selection of military judges from a list of candidates provided
by the Minister of Defense links the careers of military judges to the
high command, making them more responsive to the views of their
military leaders and influencing them to act slowly in cases in which
the military is implicated. However, human rights groups noted the
Ministry of Defense's decision in 2001 to publish its judge candidate
lists and called this a step toward greater transparency in this
process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Constitutional provisions prohibit arbitrary
interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence; however,
the security forces continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights
by conducting searches of homes without warrants, especially during
anticrime sweeps in impoverished neighborhoods. Reports of illegal
wiretapping and invasion of privacy by the security forces increased
during the year. On various occasions, progovernment legislators made
public surreptitiously taped conversations, such as one between labor
leader Carlos Ortega and former President Carlos Andres Perez. The
conversation was political in nature, not criminal. The Minister of
Justice and Interior denied authorizing the taping.
In June a group of MVR deputies made public a recording of two
telephone conversations between journalist Patricia Poleo and one of
her contacts. Poleo filed a complaint with the Attorney General's
office and with the Organization of American States (OAS). The
journalist also complained she was the victim of government
surveillance. In August Chacao municipality police disrupted DISIP
surveillance of Chacao Mayor Leopoldo Lopez, a Chavez critic.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. However, press freedom deteriorated
significantly during the year. Violence and threats of violence against
the media increased markedly during the year, as did government
intimidation. As a result, self-censorship by the media was thought to
be widespread.
Individuals and the media freely and publicly criticized the
Government; however, as noted by the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission's (IAHRC) Special Reporter on Press Freedom, reprisals and
threats of violence against journalists and media organizations
restricted freedom of expression in practice. In addition, some
individuals reported that the Government recorded and aired publicly
private telephone conversations, restricting freedom of speech (see
Section 1.f.).
Print and electronic media were independent. The Government had a
national television station, a national radio network, and a newswire
service whose directors were named by the President. The President had
a weekly call-in show on television and radio. Since April these shows
aired only on state media; commercial television and radio were not
obligated simultaneously to broadcast the program, as was true before
April. Independent media observers criticized the state media for
extreme progovernment politicization. State media employees complained
about purges of employees considered to be anti-Chavez, and some
employees of state-owned Radio Nacional and Venezolana de Television
claimed they have lost their jobs because of their political views.
Community media, including radio and TV stations, also existed. These
are distinct from mainstream commercial media in legal status,
frequency licensing requirements, and advertising regulations. Most
community media were new and were progovernment in editorial policy.
Media analysts, journalists, and other observers alleged that the
criminal defamation and libel laws were used to intimidate or harass
the media. Because of the lengthy process and considerable legal costs,
some observers regarded these lawsuits, or threats of lawsuits, as
examples of attempts to intimidate journalists and discourage
investigative journalism. The editor of ``La Razon'' newspaper remained
overseas because of one such long-running lawsuit.
The Constitution states that all persons have the right to
``timely, true, and impartial'' information, without censorship. This
``true information'' article raised concerns in the domestic and
international media that it could be used by the Government to censor
or intimidate the press. The Constitution also provides for the ``right
to reply'' for individuals who believe they are portrayed inaccurately
in media reports. Media figures criticized the Supreme Court's 2001
ruling that established criteria for determining and exercising the
right to timely, true, and impartial information. President Chavez has
demanded a right to reply on several occasions. However, some
individuals named by the President in his weekly national radio show
complained that they have not been granted the right to reply.
The Constitution declared that it is ``contrary to the freedom of
information'' for a medium to ``emit negative or critical concepts
about ideas, thoughts, judgments, rulings, etc.,'' without indicating
what is being criticized. The ruling set criteria to establish whether
a media report is ``true'' or not, according to the Constitution.
Violations include expressing opinions that contain statements that are
``out of context, disconnected, or unnecessary for the topic, or
offensive, insidious, or degrading expressions unconnected to the
topic, or unnecessary for the forming of public opinion.'' The ruling
affirms that information can be censored prior to publication if it
violates Article 57 of the Constitution, which prohibits anonymous
authorship, war propaganda, and messages that promote discrimination or
religious intolerance. The Court also ruled that it is ``restrictive of
true and impartial information'' if a majority of a medium's writers of
editorial articles express the same ideological tendency, unless that
medium openly declares itself to be a party to those views. The
domestic media and international organizations such as the Inter-
American Press Association (IAPA) and the Committee for the Protection
of Journalists criticized the Court's ruling.
A 1994 law requires practicing journalists to have journalism
degrees and be members of the National College of Journalists. These
requirements are waived for foreigners and for opinion columnists, on
the grounds of tolerance of free speech.
In October 2001, the President accused television station
Globovision of engaging in a ``campaign of lies'' against the
Government. President Chavez warned Globovision's director Alberto
Federico Ravell and its owner Nelson Mezerhane that if they did not
reconsider their broadcasts, he would ``be forced to activate
mechanisms in defense of the national interest, truth, and public
order'' and that their actions might have ``legal consequences.''
President Chavez noted that the ``airwaves belong to the State,''
announced that he had ordered the National Telecommunications
Commission (Conatel) to investigate the station, and warned that the
station's broadcast licenses might be reviewed. In October 2001,
Conatel announced that it was opening administrative proceedings
against Globovision to determine if the station had violated broadcast
content regulations. The situation continued at year's end.
International organizations and domestic journalists charged the
Government with encouraging a climate of hostility toward the media
that jeopardizes freedom of the press. In September the IAPA expressed
its concern for ``the serious deterioration of press freedom in
Venezuela due to a climate of intimidation and physical attacks against
journalists and media outlets, as well as a legal and judicial system,
that threatens the free practice of journalism.'' In its annual report
released to the General Assembly in October, IAPA stated that ``freedom
of expression is exposed to a series of risks that are not limited to
simple threats or to abuses that compromise its existence, but include
serious measures and revenge for exercising that freedom.''
The law allows the Government to call national broadcasts (cadenas)
requiring all broadcast media to pre-empt scheduled programming and
transmit the broadcasts in their entirety. Domestic and international
observers criticized the Government for excessive abuse of this right.
For example, April 8 and 9, the Government aired more than 30 cadenas
to block commercial broadcast media reporting on massive opposition
demonstrations.
The Government influenced the press through licensing requirements
for journalists, broadcast licensing concessions for television and
radio stations, and lucrative public sector advertising.
Some commercial radio stations complained that the allocation of
broadcasting frequencies to community radios was not in accordance with
existing broadcast regulations. On April 12 and 13, several community
media charged that state security agents of the short-lived Carmona
government entered their installations and harassed their employees.
The Government denied equal access to official events. In August
the Government and government supporters restricted private media's
access to cover government-sponsored events. Between August and
December, guards at the presidential palace occasionally turned away
reporters from private stations, and in December restricted their
access altogether. State controlled television and radio stations
continued to have full access.
The Telecommunications Law of 2000 establishes that the President,
``when he judges it convenient to the interests of the nation, or when
required for reasons of public order or security, can suspend
telecommunications broadcasts, in conformity with the Constitution.''
Some observers believed that this article might allow the suspension of
media broadcasts for vague and arbitrary reasons. The President
referred to this law many times and threatened to revoke commercial
broadcast licenses. Many media professionals complained that
investigations of television and radio stations by state broadcast
regulation agency Conatel were politically motivated.
On April 11, the Government shut the television signals of
Venevision, Televen, RCTV, Globovision, and CMT for several hours. In
addition, armed troops from the DIM also surrounded the CMT building
for several hours trapping station employees inside.
There were numerous allegations of government pressure against the
media. President Chavez repeatedly singled out media owners and editors
by name and charged that the media provoked political unrest. The
statements resulted in a precarious situation for journalists, who were
frequently attacked and harassed.
President Chavez also publicly accused media owners and
institutions of tax evasion. Media figures charged that the Government
used ongoing tax cases and tax investigations to pressure media owners
and cited as an example, on May 3, the announcements of Conatel
investigations of commercial televisions.
On January 17, the National Assembly passed a resolution calling on
media owners to discuss and adopt a Code of Ethics. The media rejected
the resolution as inappropriate state interference.
On March 13, state news agency Venpres characterized several media
figures as narco-journalists. The Committee to Protect Journalists
criticized the article as an obvious government effort to defame.
There were credible reports of state security agents spying on,
harassing, intimidating, and physically attacking journalists. Some
security agents masqueraded as journalists and photographed or filmed
antigovernment speeches and gatherings. There were numerous cases of
wiretaps of journalists, media owners, and media's telephones,
apparently without legal authorization (see Section 1.f.).
In January 600 journalists severely criticized the systematic
verbal aggression, principally from the President, and charged that the
President's rhetoric stigmatized them and led to physical and verbal
aggressions by supporters of the regime. The press workers and
photographers syndicate also criticized the derogatory, unfair, and
inconsiderate rhetoric. The IACHR ordered protective measures for
numerous individual journalists and for many television stations and
newspapers. The country remained on International Press Institute's
``watch list'' of countries where there was a growing tendency toward
suppression or restriction of press freedom.
Violence and threats of violence against the media increased
markedly during the year. On April 11, newspaper photographer Jorge
Tortoza was killed and several others were injured during
demonstrations. In August progovernment protesters shot a television
cameraman while he was covering the event. During the year, according
to media sources and published reports, at least 7 reporters were shot
and more than 80 were physically attacked, including with weapons such
as clubs, knives, rocks, and battery acid while covering street
demonstrations and political rallies. Five were victims of crime under
suspicious circumstances; nearly 100 reported having received threats,
in some instances telephoned death threats. At least 28 individuals and
media organizations requested and received protective measures from the
IAHRC. There were many incidents of vandalism, theft, and destruction
of media vehicles, cameras, and other equipment, including several
incidents caught on videotape. At least 13 media vehicles were
vandalized and 4 television cameras and 2 microwave transmitters were
destroyed.
Violent or threatening demonstrations occurred at several media
offices. In January government supporters, some armed with baseball
bats and sticks, demonstrated in front of the newspaper El Nacional and
chanted ``Tell the truth or we will burn you down.'' There were
recurrent demonstrations in front of the studios of RCTV during the
year. On December 9, in an action severely criticized by OAS Secretary
General Cesar Gaviria, government supporters, in some instances
accompanied by pro-government deputies from the National Assembly,
simultaneously surrounded and attacked 33 media installations
throughout the country, causing significant damage.
There were numerous bomb threats and several explosive devices
attacks against the media. On January 31, an assailant threw a firebomb
at the offices of Asi es la Noticia newspaper after its director
published a video alleging ties between the Government and Colombian
guerrillas. In July an assailant threw a fragmentation grenade at the
studios of Globovision television. On September 12, four incendiary
devices were thrown at the studios of Promar TV. In November an
incendiary device exploded in Globovision television's parking lot,
destroying two vehicles and part of the building.
On April 13, progovernment crowds assembled at private television
stations and demanded access to the studios. The demonstrators forced
the stations to air messages by demonstration leaders and to
rebroadcast state television programming. On April 14, most Caracas
newspapers did not publish because progovernment crowds forced the
abandonment of the newspaper buildings.
Venevision journalists outside Caracas were threatened with
violence and in several instances were forced into hiding. Several
journalists, fearing for their safety, fled the country. Pro-Chavez
demonstrators took over various radio stations to convene supporters
``to defend the revolution.''
Although there was no official censorship of cultural activities,
violent protests also were aimed at political satirists and political
comedy shows perceived by demonstrators as being critical of President
Chavez.
The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
While academic freedom traditionally has been respected, the
autonomy of the country's universities was threatened during the year.
Public institutions of higher education designated as ``experimental
universities'' are governed by Superior Councils, to which the
Government may appoint a majority of members. The Government
successfully replaced the leadership of other universities, mostly in
the interior of the country, with political allies.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the
Government generally respected these rights in practice. Public
meetings, including those of all political parties, generally were held
unimpeded. The Government required permits for public marches but did
not deny them for political reasons. The Metropolitan Police reported
that, although both opposition and progovernment marches took place
during the year, only opposition-march organizers requested permits.
The Constitution prohibits the use of firearms to control peaceful
demonstrations. Supporters and opponents of President Chavez repeatedly
demonstrated in the streets of the capital and other cities during the
year. Several demonstrations resulted in injuries or loss of life. Both
the authorities and the demonstrators used firearms (including military
weapons), tear gas, and billy clubs against each other.
There were allegations that the Metropolitan Police used excessive
force during various demonstrations. Several witnesses reported seeing
Metropolitan Police officers firing on progovernment demonstrators
during the April 11 protests and in the subsequent days of mass looting
throughout Caracas. The President criticized the Metropolitan Police
for firing on a group of progovernment demonstrators as they protested
a Supreme Court decision in August.
Professional and academic associations generally operated without
interference; however, in 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that NGOs that
receive funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are not
Venezuelan are not part of ``civil society'' and therefore may not
represent Venezuelan citizens in court or bring their own legal
actions; Religious organizations are not part of civil society and are
subject to the same restrictions; and the Government has an obligation
to ensure that NGOs are ``democratic in nature'' and therefore the
internal elections of nonprofit groups (such as for boards of
directors) can be regulated by the National Electoral Council. The
Government has not moved to implement the Court's decision.
Following months of tension, the Confederation of Venezuelan
Workers and Fedecamaras, the country's largest business federation,
called a national strike and opposition groups organized a protest
march for April 11. As the crowd of approximately 400,000 to 600,000
marchers approached the presidential palace, National Guard officers
prevented the marchers from advancing. Unidentified shooters fired on
the crowd, and at least four men were filmed firing from Puente
Llaguno, a pedestrian overpass. Metropolitan Police officers escorting
the marchers also fired their weapons. Both sides claimed the other
fired first. Although no official count exists, COFAVIC reported that
at least 19 persons died, at least 17 of whom were anti-Chavez
demonstrators. Four men identified shooting from Puente Llaguno were
arrested and were awaiting trial at year's end. During the march,
President Chavez ordered the implementation of ``Plan Avila,'' a civil
defense plan intended to mobilize troops to protect the presidential
palace from attack. Military officers refused to implement this plan,
claiming it would have violated the human rights of the civilian
demonstrators.
After April opposition groups requested permission to demonstrate
at the presidential palace on several occasions, but were not granted
permission for security reasons. Government supporters regularly
congregated there to show their support for the president, although
they did not hold organized marches, and therefore did not require
permits. In September President Chavez issued a decree establishing
eight security zones within Caracas. The decrees gave the central
government rather than municipal officials the authority to permit
demonstrations there. The zones included areas around military
installations, state television and radio stations, and PDVSA
headquarters. Opposition groups criticized these security zones as a
restriction on the right of assembly. As of November, the Government
had not used the decrees to hinder freedom of assembly.
The Metropolitan Police and National Guard used tear gas to
restrain crowds in the April 11 demonstrations, and there was evidence
that National Guard troops shot at demonstrators. The Metropolitan
Police, in turn, fired on progovernment supporters. In August
Metropolitan Police used tear gas and a water cannon against pro-Chavez
protesters at various demonstrations against the Supreme Court. The
President accused the Metropolitan Police of committing human rights
violations during these protests. During one demonstration, National
Guard officers received gunfire from the crowd, including fire from
semiautomatic weapons, at which point they returned fire. Several
demonstrators were injured.
In November members of opposition political parties and civil
society marched to CNE headquarters to deliver more than 2 million
signatures to request a consultative referendum. Marchers battled to
deliver the signatures amidst violent demonstrations by government
supporters. Although the Government sent emissaries to try to
discourage the violence, the crowds fired guns and threw rocks and
bottles at the marchers and Metropolitan Police. The National Guard
eventually dispersed the crowd.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, on the condition that the practice of a religion not violate
public morality, decency, or the public order, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice.
In 1964 the Government and the Holy See signed a concordat that
underscores the country's historical ties to the Roman Catholic Church
and provides government subsidies to the Church, including to its
social programs and schools. During the year, this money was not
disbursed due to budget shortages. Other religious groups are free to
establish and run their own schools, but they do not receive subsidies
from the Government.
Each local religious group must register with the Directorate of
Justice and Religion in the Ministry of Interior and Justice to hold
legal status as a religious organization and to own property. The
requirements for registration were largely administrative. However,
some groups complained that the process of registration was slow and
inefficient. A special visa is required for foreign missionaries to
enter the country, which is obtained through consulates abroad.
Missionaries were not refused entry generally, but many complained that
due to general bureaucratic inefficiency the Government often took
months or years to process a request.
Archbishop Balthazar Porras, president of the Venezuelan Episcopal
Conference, complained to the Vatican in September about what he
characterized as increased government attacks on the Catholic Church.
For example, on January 25, Chavez said that the Catholic Church was
one of Venezuela's problems and that it was a tumor that must be
eradicated. Members of the Church, including Monsignor Porras, reported
being threatened, and one priest, Father Juan Manuel Fernandez was
shot. There has been no investigation into these crimes.
Some foreign missionaries complained that members of the National
Guard harassed them. In May the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints (Mormons) reported that the National Guard harassed two of its
missionaries in Tachira state. According to church officials, National
Guard troops stopped missionaries at a checkpoint on two occasions and
told them to strip. On one occasion, the officer asked one of the
missionaries to surrender his foreign passport. When the missionary
resisted, the officer made him strip completely naked and demanded that
he jump up and down, while other guards laughed at him. The
missionary's clothes and body were not searched.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of citizens and legal residents to travel within the country and to go
abroad and return, and the Government generally respected these rights
in practice. However, the Government may suspend the freedom to travel.
The Government also restricted foreign travel for persons being
investigated for criminal activities. In addition, the Government
requires citizens and foreigners resident in the country who are
departing the country with minors to present to immigration officials
proof of authorization from the minors' parents.
There is still a large population of internally displaced persons
following the 1999 floods during which more than 250,000 persons lost
their homes. Although many of those affected were relocated to other
communities in the interior of the country, thousands returned and live
in shantytowns in and around Caracas.
The Constitution recognizes and provides for the right to asylum
and refugee status. Both the Constitution and the Organic Refugee Law
that came into effect in October 2001 are in accordance with the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. The law is designed to expand the legal rights of refugees,
contains a broad definition of the conditions that would entitle
individuals to refugee status, commits the Government to an active role
in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees, and creates an
institutional body to make refugee and asylum status determinations. In
August President Chavez inaugurated a new office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in San Cristobal, Tachira state.
Implementing regulations for the Refugee Law have not been drafted,
and training for border officials was poor. As a result, there was no
formal mechanism for those seeking asylum to legalize their refugee
status. During the year, the UNHCR worked with the Attorney General's
office to investigate cases on an ad hoc basis to speed the
Commission's ability to decide a case once it is formed. UNHCR reported
that files were often lost or misplaced, since the Attorney General's
Office had no fixed department to centralize the processing of these
cases. UNHCR also noted that the investigation of refugee claims was
flawed. For example, for family groups, the review process involved
only the head of the family, even when the dependents' cases may be
more compelling from a humanitarian standpoint.
Persons who applied formally for refugee status were given no
provisional documentation that legalized their presence in the country.
Therefore, they had no legal protection, and could not legally work,
attend public school, or receive public health services. National Guard
troops rarely investigated the cases of undocumented aliens found at
security checkpoints along the border before deporting them.
As of October, there were approximately 200 persons in the country
who had been granted refugee status from prior years, and approximately
1,000 additional refugee claims pending.
In theory, the Government provides first asylum. However, the
Government denied the existence of all but a small number of Colombians
who crossed the border and claimed to be fleeing paramilitary
incursions. It called the Colombians, whose presence it did
acknowledge, ``displaced persons in transit''--a term that does not
exist in public international law. According to UNHCR, the number of
small groups entering the country, including individuals and small
family groups, increased. In these cases, the persons often chose to
blend into the local population rather than apply for formal refugee
status.
There were no reports of forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution. However, the National Guard in the
border region in Zulia, Tachira, and Apure states, reported that they
deported on average 42 Colombian nationals per day. As of September,
they deported 9,533 persons. Although the law requires the authorities
to take 30 days to investigate each undocumented persons case, this was
done only rarely.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. The Constitution provides for the direct election of the
President and unicameral National Assembly, as well as of state
governors, state legislative councils, and local governments. Political
parties organize, and their candidates are allowed freely to run for
office and to seek the support of voters. The President has extensive
powers and the legislature appoints the members of the Supreme Court,
the CNE, and the Citizen Power consisting of the Ombudsman, Public
Prosecutor, and Controller General.
In 1999 the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) drafted and
submitted to a popular referendum a new Constitution, which went into
effect in December 1999. The ANC also decreed new general elections. In
July 2000, in voting that observers from the OAS and various countries
judged to be generally free and fair, voters elected President Chavez,
with 59 percent of the vote. Chavez's supporters won a majority (92
seats) in the 165-seat National Assembly. His supporters also won half
the governorships.
In December 2000, the National Assembly appointed members of the
Supreme Court and the Citizen Power in a process that was criticized by
the political opposition, the media, and NGOs as unconstitutional.
These groups argued that the procedures set forth in the 1999
Constitution regarding civil society participation in the selection
process were not followed. The outgoing Ombudsman and others challenged
the selection procedure but lost the appeal.
Displeased with President Hugo Chavez, several opposition groups
and political parties sought to remove him from power throughout the
year. In April military officers illegally detained Chavez, and
opposition business leader Pedro Carmona, without any constitutional
authority, declared himself President. Their principal legal avenues
were to try to convict the President of a crime, to hold a non-binding
referendum to remove him from the presidency, and to pass a
constitutional amendment to shorten his term of office.
In April the country experienced a temporary alteration of
constitutional order. Political opposition leaders, business
associations, and labor leaders organized various public demonstrations
and work stoppages opposing President Hugo Chavez beginning in late
December 2001. On April 11, an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 people
participated in a march in downtown Caracas to demand President
Chavez's resignation. When the march approached central Caracas, the
Government cut the transmission of private television stations that
refused to broadcast a series of presidential speeches. As marchers
changed course and approached the Presidential Palace, gunfire broke
out, resulting in as many as 18 deaths and more than 100 injuries, with
dead and injured on both sides. Military officers announced they would
not follow presidential orders to attack the marchers and took
President Chavez into custody. Opposition business leader Pedro Carmona
proclaimed himself as interim president when General Lucas Rincon
Romero, Inspector General of the Armed Forces, announced Chavez had
resigned the presidency. Carmona dissolved the National Assembly, the
Supreme Court, and suspended the Constitution. DISIP officers arrested
officials of the Chavez government. Between April 12 and 14, Chavez
supporters turned out and looting broke out in some areas of Caracas,
resulting in more deaths and injuries. On April 14, troops loyal to
Chavez returned him to power. An investigation into the April 11
shootings, plagued by irregularities, has failed to result in any
convictions.
Women and minorities participated fully in government and politics.
The National Assembly's Family, Women, and Youth Committee promotes
political opportunities for women. In the July 2000 elections, women
won 20 seats in the 165-seat Assembly. There were 4 women in the 18-
member Cabinet.
Indigenous people traditionally have not been integrated fully into
the political system due to low voter turnout, geographic isolation,
and limited economic and educational opportunities. The 1999
Constitution reserved three seats in the National Assembly for
indigenous people, and these seats were filled in the July 2000
election. There were no indigenous members in the Cabinet. One of the
Vice Presidents of the National Assembly was an indigenous person.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of independent domestic and international human
rights groups generally operated without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials were occasionally responsive to their views.
However, NGOs objected to a November 2000 Supreme Court ruling that
NGOs that receive funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are
not Venezuelan were not part of civil society. The ruling concluded
that such NGOs may not represent citizens in court or bring their own
legal actions, and that NGOs are subject to government regulation of
their internal leadership selection should they be found to be
``undemocratic in nature'' (see Section 2.b.). This ruling has not
impeded the work of NGOs.
Several human rights NGOs received an increased number of threats
and intimidation by government representatives and government
supporters.
A Caracas NGO that works on behalf of victims of violence, COFAVIC,
received e-mail and telephone threats beginning in January from
Bolivarian Circles and persons who identified themselves as Chavez
supporters. The Attorney General's office and Human Rights Ombudsman's
office did not pursue requests by COFAVIC for investigations of this
harassment. In May COFAVIC filed a complaint with the IACHR. The IACHR
recommended that the Government provide police protection to COFAVIC's
offices and director. It also called for the Government to investigate
COFAVIC's claims and speak out against the intimidation of human rights
organizations. The Government did not respond to this request. The
Metropolitan Police provided bodyguards for the COFAVIC director and
protection in and around COFAVIC's office.
The Ombudsman is responsible for compelling the Government to
adhere to the Constitution and laws and, together with the Public
Prosecutor and Controller General, makes up the Citizen Power branch of
government. In 2000 the National Assembly named attorney German
Mundarain as the new Ombudsman (see Section 3). Since his appointment,
Mundarain has used his position to urge broad consensus on human rights
issues. However, human rights NGOs claimed that the Ombudsman's office
had acted on only a small number of cases presented to it. Many critics
claimed that the Ombudsman was not truly impartial.
Human rights groups remained concerned about the Chavez
administration's lack of a human rights agenda and lack of support for
the national human rights agenda formulated by the previous government.
There have been no meetings between President Chavez and NGOs to
discuss human rights issues since 1999. However, NGOs have developed
relationships with specific government bodies such as the Ministry of
Education (to develop educational materials on human rights), the
Foreign Ministry (to discuss the resolution of existing human rights
cases against the Government in international courts), and the National
Assembly (to discuss proposed legislation affecting human rights). The
Government also continued to fail to support the National Human Rights
Commission created in 1996 to coordinate government human rights
programs and to serve as a forum for dialog with NGOs.
The Defense Ministry's human rights office continued to conduct
courses as part of the armed forces' training curriculum. Human rights
NGOs complained that the Ministry still rejected the validity of their
reports of alleged human rights violations by the armed forces and
remained unwilling to provide evidence to refute the charges, citing
confidentiality regulations.
Following the violence of April 11-14, several NGOs, political
parties, and observers called for the creation of a truth commission.
National Assembly deputies introduced legislation to create one;
however, it did not pass.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of
politics, age, race, sex, creed, or any other condition, and the law
prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, sex, or disability.
However, the Government did not protect women adequately against
societal and domestic violence and did not ensure the disabled access
to jobs and public services, nor did it safeguard adequately the rights
of indigenous people during the year.
There were no new developments in the 2000 case that state police
in Valencia, Carabobo state, detained four transgendered persons and
held them incommunicado for 2 days without food or drinking water. The
family of one of the detainees filed a formal complaint with the Public
Ministry.
Women.--Violence against women continued to be a problem, and women
faced substantial institutional and societal prejudice with respect to
rape and domestic violence during the year. Domestic violence against
women was very common and was aggravated by the country's economic
difficulties. There were 8,411 cases of domestic violence reported to
the authorities during the year. Many domestic violence cases were not
reported to the police. The police generally were unwilling to
intervene to prevent domestic violence, and the courts rarely
prosecuted those accused of such abuse, according to local monitors. In
addition, poor women generally were unaware of legal remedies and have
little access to them. The law requires police to report domestic
violence and obligates hospital personnel to advise the authorities
when it admits patients who are victims of domestic abuse cases.
Rape is extremely difficult to prove, requiring at a minimum
medical examination within 48 hours of the crime. A provision in the
Penal Code also provides that an adult man guilty of raping an adult
woman with whom he is acquainted can avoid punishment if, before
sentencing, he marries the victim. Few police officers were trained to
assist rape victims. During the year, the police received 3,492 reports
of rape. However, women's organizations asserted that these figures
were low and did not accurately portray the problem of rape and sexual
assault. They claimed that many victims did not report the incident or
press charges due to societal pressure and their own feelings of guilt.
There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain for purposes
of prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment in the workplace was a common problem but was not
a criminal offense.
Women gradually surmounted many of the barriers to their full
participation in political and economic life; nonetheless, they still
were underrepresented in leadership positions and, on average, earned
30 percent less than men. Women accounted for approximately half the
student body of most universities and advanced in many professions,
including medicine and law. As of November, 70 women were in training
at the Army's military academy, 100 were in training at the Naval
academy, 39 were at the Air Force academy, and 75 were in training at
the National Guard academy. A 2000 government decision allowed women to
attend military academies and serve in expanded roles as officers in
the armed forces. Women and men were legally equal in marriage.
The Constitution provides for sexual equality in exercising the
right to work. The 1990 Labor Code specifies that employers must not
discriminate against women with regard to pay or working conditions,
must not fire them during pregnancy or for 1 year after giving birth,
must grant them unpaid leave and benefits for 6 weeks before the birth
of a child and 12 weeks after, and must provide them with 10 weeks of
unpaid leave if they legally adopt children under 3 years of age.
According to the Ministry of Labor and the Confederation of Venezuelan
Workers (CTV), the country's major labor federation, these regulations
were enforced in the formal sector, although social security payments
often were delayed.
In 2001 the National Institute for Women (formerly the National
Women's Council)--an agency of the Presidency with representation from
the Ministries of Justice, Education, Family, Health, and Labor--
designed two programs to assist women in need and enhanced the economic
independence of women. The first program was the ``Women's Bank'' to
provide small-scale financing to micro-enterprises run by women. In
February the Government said that $10 million (15 billion bolivars) had
been placed into this fund. However, the fund did not publish its
balances, and it was not controlled by the Ministry of Finance. There
were allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the fund. The
second initiative was the Women's Shelters Program--the construction of
a series of centers to receive, care for, and rehabilitate women in
distress.
There were a number of NGOs concerned with domestic violence, sex
education, and economic discrimination. However, the recommendations of
these groups were not implemented widely by the police or other
concerned government agencies.
Children.--The Organic Procedural Law on Adolescents and Children
establishes legal protection of children under the age of 18,
regardless of nationality; however, observers expressed concern over
the slow implementation of the law's provisions. Government
expenditures on education, health, and social services decreased during
the year due to a weakening economy and government budget deficits.
Primary and secondary education was chronically underfunded. According
to the Constitution, the State is to provide free education up to the
university-preparatory level (15 or 16 years old) and the law provides
for universal, compulsory, and free education; however, an estimated 57
percent of children left school before the 9th grade.
In addition, approximately 1 million children were not eligible to
receive government assistance, including public education, because they
were either illegal aliens, or their births were not documented
properly, according to the annual report of the NGO Community Centers
for Learning (CECODAP). A 1998 government regulation requires hospitals
to register the births of all children, but a government program of
sending teams into poor neighborhoods to register minors has been
discontinued. Many children remain undocumented.
According to a 2001 report by CECODAP, approximately 25 percent of
children under the age of 15 had a nutritional deficit. Substandard
conditions contributed to the increase in preventable diseases that
were leading causes of infant mortality.
Increasing poverty raised the level of stress within families and
led to a rise in the number of abandoned children and to more child
abuse. Reports of child abuse were rare due to a fear of entanglement
with the authorities and societal ingrained attitudes regarding family
privacy. The judicial system, although slow, ensured that in most
situations children were removed from abusive households once a case
had been reported. However, public facilities for such children are
inadequate and had poorly trained staff.
There were reports that children from other South American
countries, especially Ecuador, were trafficked to work in Caracas as
street vendors and housemaids (see Section 6.f.).
According to CECODAP, approximately 1.6 million children worked in
the country, mostly in the informal sector where they worked as street
vendors or as beggars. An estimated 206,000 children were involved in
prostitution, drug trafficking, and petty crime.
The authorities in Caracas and several other jurisdictions tried to
cope with the phenomenon of street children by continuing to impose
curfews for unsupervised minors. Children's rights advocates claimed
that curfews permitted the police to act arbitrarily and detain persons
who had committed no crime. Because reform institutions were filled to
capacity, hundreds of children accused of infractions, such as curfew
violations, were confined in juvenile detention centers (see Section
1.c.).
Children's rights advocates continued to criticize the Government's
lack of success in reuniting children and parents who were separated in
the flooding in Vargas state in 1999. At year's end, some children
remained missing. The Ombudsman's office continued to investigate
whether some of these children may have been trafficked (see Section
6.f.).
Persons with Disabilities.--Persons with disabilities had minimal
access to public transportation, and ramps were practically
nonexistent, even in government buildings. According to local
advocates, persons with disabilities were discriminated against in many
sectors, including education, health care, and employment.
A comprehensive 1993 law to protect the rights of persons with
disabilities requires that all newly constructed or renovated public
parks and buildings provide access. The law also forbids discrimination
in employment practices and in the provision of public services.
However, the Government had not made a significant effort to implement
the law, inform the public of it, or try to change societal prejudice
against persons with disabilities.
There were no reports of discrimination against persons with mental
disabilities.
Indigenous Persons.--Although the law prohibits discrimination
based on ethnic origin, members of the country's indigenous population
frequently suffered from inattention to and violation of their rights.
There were approximately 316,000 indigenous people in 27 ethnic groups.
Many indigenous people were isolated from modern civilization and lack
access to basic health and educational facilities. High rates of
cholera, hepatitis B, malaria, and other diseases plagued their
communities.
The Constitution creates three seats in the National Assembly for
indigenous people and also provides for ``the protection of indigenous
communities and their progressive incorporation into the life of the
nation.'' Nonetheless, local political authorities seldom took account
of the interests of indigenous people when making decisions affecting
their lands, cultures, and traditions, or the allocation of natural
resources. As farmers and miners intruded on their habitats, indigenous
communities faced deforestation and water pollution. Few indigenous
persons held title to their land, but many did not want to because most
indigenous groups rejected the concept of individual property. Instead,
they called on the Government to recognize lands traditionally
inhabited by them as territories belonging to each respective
indigenous group.
In July 2001, four members of the Pume indigenous people in Apure
state were killed during an apparent effort to take control of the land
they occupied, according to a Pume woman who witnessed the incident.
The family of four--Cruz (age 50), Lorenzo (age 28), Ana Maria (age
25), and Rosa Maria Flores (age 9)--were attacked by nonindigenous
persons armed with machetes and firearms. Another Pume member, Carmen
Flores, witnessed the killings and escaped unnoticed. In August 2001,
two persons were arrested in connection with the killings. In November
2001, a court found them innocent and they were released. In July the
Supreme Court reopened the case and ordered that the two men be
detained.
The Yanomami, among the most isolated of the indigenous people,
have been subjected to persistent incursions into their territory by
illegal gold miners, who have introduced both diseases and social ills.
Members of the Warao indigenous group of Delta Amacuro state
continued to migrate during the year from their homelands in the swampy
Orinoco delta to Caracas, where they live in the streets, selling
handicrafts and begging. The Warao claim that flooding and petroleum
exploration have eroded their traditional means of survival: Fishing
and horticulture. The Caracas city government and the Metropolitan
Police maintained a policy of forcing the Warao to return to the delta
by rounding them up and loading them onto buses. In 1998, the last year
for which estimates are available, they returned at least 15 groups
averaging 100 Warao each. Many of the Warao nevertheless return to
Caracas, citing lack of jobs and money in the delta and their ability
to earn approximately $112 (130,000 bolivars) per week in handouts in
Caracas.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and the 1990
Labor Code recognize and encourage the right of workers to organize;
however, concerns over labor rights continued. According to the
Constitution, all workers, without prejudice or need of previous
authorization, have the right to form freely unions that they believe
can help them defend their rights and interests, as well as the right
to join--or refrain from joining--these organizations. The 1990 Labor
Code extends the right to form and join unions of their choosing to all
private and public sector employees, except members of the armed
forces. The Constitution provides that labor organizations are not
subject to intervention, suspension, or administrative dissolution, and
workers are protected against any discrimination or measure contrary to
this right. Labor organizers and leaders may not be removed from their
positions during the period of time or under the conditions in which
they exercise their leadership functions. However, Articles 23 and 95
of the Constitution, which provide for freedom of association, are
contradicted by Article 293, which gives the National Electoral Council
the authority to administer the internal elections of labor
confederations. This article is in violation of the Government's
commitments to ILO Conventions 87 and 98 and has been the subject of a
long-running dispute between the Government and the ILO.
The ILO repeatedly expressed concerns that the 1990 Labor Code
violates freedom of association by requiring a high number of workers
(100 workers) to form self-employed workers' trade unions and a high
number of employers to form employer trade unions (10 employers). The
ILO noted that the long and detailed list of duties assigned to
workers' and employers' organizations and the requirement that foreign
workers must be resident in the country for more than 10 years in order
to hold trade union offices also violates freedom of association.
Despite ILO objections, the Government continued to insist on the
CNE's oversight authority for labor leadership elections. However, in
practice CNE authorities took a broad interpretation of the
requirement, allowing the individual union and federation elections to
proceed uninterrupted under the authority of the CTV, and generally
limiting its activities to an advisory role.
In June the Government, labor, and business representatives
participated in the annual ILO Conference. Although the Government
pondered accrediting someone other than Ortega to represent labor, the
Supreme Court ruled that Ortega was the proper representative. The
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
criticized the country for its violations for the second year in a row.
The Government responded that labor law reform was under debate in the
National Assembly.
The Labor Code mandates registration of unions with the Ministry of
Labor, but it limits the Ministry's discretion by specifying that
registration may not be denied if the proper documents (a record of the
founding meeting, the statutes, and membership list) are submitted.
Only a judge may dissolve a union, and only for reasons listed in the
law.
The law also prohibits employers from interfering in the formation
of unions or in their activities and from stipulating as a condition of
employment that new workers must abstain from union activity or must
join a specified union. The Constitution prohibits measures that
``alter the sanctity and progressiveness'' of labor rights and worker
benefits, declares labor rights to be irrevocable, and provides that
ambiguities regarding the application or interpretation of norms are to
be applied in the manner most favorable to the worker.
Ministry of Labor inspectors hear complaints regarding violations
of these regulations and traditionally impose a maximum fine of twice
the monthly minimum wage for a first infraction. Under the
Constitution, union officials have special protection from dismissal.
Under the 1990 Labor Code, if a judge determines that any worker was
fired for union activity, the worker is entitled to back pay plus
either reinstatement or payment of a substantial sum of money, which
varies according to the worker's seniority.
Approximately 10 to 12 percent of the 10-million-member national
labor force were unionized. One major union confederation (the CTV),
three small union confederations, and a number of independent unions
operated freely. The CTV represented most of the unionized workers and
was especially strong in the public sector; its membership was
approximately 900,000 workers. The CTV's top leadership included
members of several political parties, but the majority affiliated with
one of the traditional parties, Democratic Action (AD) or the Christian
Democrats (COPEI). The CTV and the AD traditionally influenced each
other. The Bolivarian Workers Force (FBT) tried to organize unions
within the CTV and participated in the CTV internal elections held in
October 2001.
There were no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
organizations, and many union organizations were active
internationally; however, a November 2000 Supreme Court ruling
regarding the legal rights of NGOs that receive funding from foreign
sources has the potential to restrict the international affiliations of
union organizers (see Section 2.b.).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--According to
the Constitution, all public and private sector workers have the right
to voluntary collective bargaining and to arrive at collective
bargaining agreements, without any additional requirements other than
those established by the law. The Constitution provides that the
Government is to ensure development of collective bargaining and to
establish conditions favorable to collective relationships and the
resolution of labor conflicts. The 1990 Labor Code stipulates that
employers must negotiate a collective contract with the union that
represents the majority of their workers. The ILO repeatedly expressed
concerns that this provision restricts freedom of association and in
March 2000 requested that the Government amend it so that ``in cases
where no union organization represents an absolute majority of workers,
minority organizations may jointly negotiate a collective agreement on
behalf of their members.'' The Code contains a provision stating that
wages may be raised by administrative decree, provided that the
legislature approves the decree.
During the year, the conflict between the Government and the CTV
intensified, with the labor confederation participating in both a
national work stoppage in December 2001, several massive antigovernment
demonstrations, and the general strike in April that led to the brief
overthrow of President Chavez. The national work stoppage that
contributed to Chavez's brief downfall began with a protest at the
state oil concern PDVSA after Chavez fired the company's board of
directors. This led to sympathy strikes at several PDVSA outlets and
culminated with the CTV convoking a national work stoppage. After the
second day of the stoppage, the CTV called a general strike on April
10, but it did so as a consensus of its executive committee without
consulting the rank-and-file. CTV President Ortega went into hiding for
a brief period after President Chavez returned to power. Meanwhile, he
and the CTV's Executive Committee--four progovernment labor leaders
have refused to take their seats--has become increasingly committed to
Chavez's removal from office.
In October 2001, the CTV elected Carlos Ortega Secretary General.
Both sides lodged numerous protests of fraud, but the Chavez
government, which had endorsed FBT candidate Artistobulo Isturiz,
claimed massive fraud had decided the election and refused to recognize
Ortega as the winner. Ortega continued to occupy the office without the
official election certification by the CNE. The lack of recognition
prevented government-labor dialog on issues such as the minimum wage
and collective contract negotiations.
The Constitution and the 1990 Labor Code recognize the right of all
public and private sector workers to strike in accordance with
conditions established by labor law. However, public servants may
strike only if the strike does not cause ``irreparable damage to the
population or to institutions.'' Replacement workers are not permitted
during legal strikes. The 1990 Labor Code allows the President to order
public or private sector strikers back to work and to submit their
dispute to arbitration if the strike ``puts in immediate danger the
lives or security of all or part of the population.'' During the year,
most strikes were brief and occurred among government employees such as
petroleum workers, health workers in public hospitals and clinics,
teachers, and transportation workers.
In August Caracas subway workers struck for 1 day to protest their
collective contract, which expired 3 years ago. This strike was
resolved when the Ministry of Labor offered the workers a bonus of
nearly $6,000 per worker. The Ministry did not initiate talks to
negotiate a new contract. Shortly thereafter, workers of the state-
owned aluminum company also struck to protest their contract, expecting
a similar settlement. In all, more than 600 collective contracts
required renegotiation.
Labor law and practice are the same in the sole export processing
zone, located in Punto Fijo, Falcon state, as in the rest of the
country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.--The 1990 Labor Code
states that no one may ``obligate others to work against their will,''
and such practices generally were not known to occur. Apart from the
general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law does not prohibit
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices
generally were not known to occur; however, there were reports of
trafficking in children for employment purposes (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1990 Labor Code and the Tutelary Law for Minors
contain provisions to protect children from exploitation in the
workplace. The Ministry of Labor and the National Institute for Minors
enforce child labor policies effectively in the formal sector of the
economy but less so in the informal sector, in which an estimated 1.1
million children worked. According to UNICEF, approximately 2.5 percent
of children were in the labor market, and they worked in agriculture,
as artisans, in offices, and in the services sector.
The 1990 Labor Code allows children between the ages of 12 and 14
to work only if the National Institute for Minors or the Labor Ministry
grants special permission. It states that children between the ages of
14 and 16 may not work without the permission of their legal guardians.
Minors may not work in mines or smelting factories; in occupations that
risk life or health, or could damage intellectual or moral development;
or in public spectacles. The Constitution prohibits adolescents from
working in jobs that will affect their development.
Those under 16 years of age may by law work no more than 6 hours
per day or 30 hours per week. Minors under the age of 18 may work only
between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The estimated 1.2 million children who worked
in the informal sector, mostly as street vendors, generally worked more
hours than the total permitted under the law. A 1996 survey of working
children found that half of the children worked both morning and
afternoon, and 64.5 percent worked 6 or 7 days a week. The Government's
Central Office of Statistics and Information reported that 12 percent
of the country's children between the ages of 10 and 17 were working,
had worked at some time, or were seeking work. Of that number,
approximately 70 percent work in the informal sector of the economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides
workers with the right to a salary that is sufficient to allow them to
live with dignity, and provides them and their families with the right
to basic material, social, and intellectual necessities. The
Constitution obliges the State to provide public and private sector
workers with an annually adjusted minimum wage, using the cost of the
basic basket of necessities as a reference point. Under the 1990 Labor
Code, minimum wage rates are set by administrative decree, which the
legislature may suspend or ratify but may not change. The law excludes
only domestic workers and concierges from coverage under the minimum
wage decrees. In July the Government raised the minimum wage for public
and private employees by 10 percent. Following the increase, the
monthly minimum wage at present exchange rates is $163 (190,080
bolivars) in the private sector for urban workers, $150 (174,240
bolivars) for employees of small and medium-sized companies, and $150
(174,072 bolivars) for rural workers. The increase applied only to
those already earning the minimum wage-approximately 15 percent of the
labor force. Total take-home pay in the private sector, the product of
a presidential decree, was at least equal to that received by public
sector minimum wage workers. Fringe benefits that were added to these
minimum figures generally increased wages by about one-third. However,
even with these benefits, the minimum wage was not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Unions
noted that a worker's income was often less than the cost of basic
monthly food for a family of five, estimated by the Government's
Central Office of Statistics and Information. The basic basket, which
includes medical care, transportation, clothing, and housing, in
addition to food, totaled $828 (960,000 bolivars) for August. The
Ministry of Labor enforced minimum wage rates effectively in the formal
sector of the economy, but approximately one-half of the population
works in the informal sector where labor laws and protections generally
were not enforced.
The Constitution stipulates that the workday may not exceed 8 hours
daily or 44 hours weekly and that night work may not exceed 7 hours
daily or 35 hours weekly. Managers are prohibited from obligating
employees to work additional overtime, and workers have the right to
weekly time away from work and annual paid vacations. Some unions, such
as the petroleum workers' union, have negotiated a 40-hour week.
Overtime may not exceed 2 hours daily, 10 hours weekly, or 100 hours
annually, and may not be paid at a rate less than time-and-one-half.
The Ministry of Labor effectively enforced these standards in the
formal sector.
The Constitution provides for secure, hygienic, and adequate
working conditions; however, the authorities have not yet promulgated
regulations to implement the 1986 Health and Safety Law, which was not
enforced. The delay is due largely to concern that the law provides
penal sanctions against management when violations of health and safety
occur and that there is ambiguity in the law over what constitutes a
violation. The Labor Code states that employers are obligated to pay
specified amounts (up to a maximum of 25 times the minimum monthly
salary) to workers for accidents or occupational illnesses, regardless
of who is responsible for the injury.
The Code also requires that workplaces maintain ``sufficient
protection for health and life against sickness and accidents,'' and it
imposes fines ranging from one-quarter to twice the minimum monthly
salary for first infractions. However, in practice Ministry of Labor
inspectors seldom closed unsafe job sites. Under the law, workers may
remove themselves from dangerous workplace situations without jeopardy
to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking
in persons; however, there is no implementing law specifically for
prosecution of all forms of trafficking in persons, and trafficking was
a problem. Trafficking may be prosecuted under laws against forced
disappearance and kidnaping (punishable by 2 to 4 years' imprisonment)
and, in the case of children, under the 2000 Organic Law to Protect
Children and Adolescents (which carries a penalty of 1 to 10 months in
jail for trafficking in children). There were reports that the country
was a source, destination and transit country for trafficked men,
women, and children during the year. However, no figures were available
from either government or NGO sources, and it was difficult to gauge
the extent of the problem. The authorities showed little awareness of
the problem of trafficking in persons. An underdeveloped legal
framework, corruption among immigration authorities, and the ease with
which fraudulent Venezuelan passports, identity cards, and birth
certificates were obtained created favorable conditions for
trafficking. However, there were no reports or evidence of involvement
in trafficking by government officials, and the Government took steps
to reduce corruption among immigration officials by replacing
immigration inspectors at the Simon Bolivar International Airport in
Maiquetia.
There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain for purposes
of prostitution. There also were reports that children from other South
American countries, especially Ecuador, were trafficked to work in
Caracas as street vendors and housemaids. In October a smuggling ring
was discovered in which children from Equador were smuggled through the
country to their waiting parents in the U.S. Chinese nationals
trafficked to the U.S. via countries bordering Venezuela transitted the
country. The Ombudsman's office continues to investigate whether some
of the children separated from their parents in the December 1999
flooding in Vargas state may have been trafficked. It also was believed
widely that young women were lured from rural areas to urban centers by
misleading newspaper advertisements promising domestic or other
employment and educational opportunities; they then became victims of
sexual exploitation. Organized criminal groups, possibly including
Colombian drug traffickers, Ecuadorian citizens, and Chinese mafia
groups, reportedly were behind some of these trafficking activities.
The Government did not prosecute any individuals for trafficking in
persons during the year. Government efforts to prevent and prosecute
trafficking, which were rare, are the responsibility of the Public
Prosecutor's Family Protection Directorate and the National Institutes
for Women and Minors. Female victims of trafficking have recourse to
the Government's national system of women's shelters (see Section 5).
NGOs such as CECODAP and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
also were involved in activities to combat trafficking. There were no
efforts or surveys planned or underway to document the extent and
nature of trafficking in the country. However, in January the
Government did provide some assistance to apparent victims of
trafficking from various West African countries who landed on the coast
of Sucre state. The group claimed that it had been abandoned at sea by
a Turkish cargo ship that, for a fee, had brought them from Africa to
find work in an undetermined country.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
Notes on Preparation of the Country Reports
The annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are based on
information available from a wide variety of sources, including U.S.
and foreign government officials, victims of human rights abuse,
academic and congressional studies, and reports from the press,
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
concerned with human rights. We find particularly helpful, and make
reference in the reports to, the role of NGOs, ranging from groups
within a single country to those that concern themselves with human
rights worldwide. While much of the information that we use is already
public, information on particular abuses frequently cannot be
attributed, for obvious reasons, to specific sources.
By law we must submit the Country Reports to Congress by February
25. To comply with this requirement, we provide guidance to U.S.
diplomatic missions in July for submission of draft reports in
September and October, which we update at year's end as necessary.
Other offices in the Department of State provide contributions, and the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor prepares a final draft.
Because of the preparation time required, it is possible that yearend
developments may not be reflected fully. We make every effort to
include reference to major events or significant changes in trends.
We have attempted to make the reports as comprehensive, objective,
and uniform as possible in both scope and quality of coverage. We have
paid particular attention to attaining a high standard of consistency
in the reports despite the multiplicity of sources and the obvious
problems associated with varying degrees of access to information,
structural differences in political and social systems, and differing
trends in world opinion regarding human rights practices in specific
countries.
Evaluating the credibility of reports of human rights abuses often
is difficult. With the exception of some terrorist organizations, most
opposition groups and certainly most governments deny that they commit
human rights abuses and usually go to great lengths to conceal any
evidence of such acts. There are often few eyewitnesses to specific
abuses, and they frequently are intimidated or otherwise prevented from
reporting what they know. On the other hand, individuals and groups
opposed to a particular government sometimes have powerful incentives
to exaggerate or fabricate abuses, and some governments similarly
distort or exaggerate abuses attributed to opposition groups. We have
made every effort to identify those groups, for example, government
forces or terrorists, that are believed, based on all the evidence
available, to have committed human rights abuses. Where credible
evidence is lacking, we have tried to indicate why it is not available.
Many governments that profess to oppose human rights abuses in fact
secretly order or tacitly condone them or simply lack the will or the
ability to control those responsible for them. Consequently, in judging
a government's policy, the reports look beyond statements of policy or
intent and examine what a government has done to prevent human rights
abuses, including the extent to which it investigates, brings to trial,
and appropriately punishes those who commit such abuses.
To increase uniformity, the introduction of each country's report
contains a brief setting that provides the context for reviewing its
human rights performance. A description of the political framework and
the role of security agencies in human rights is followed by a brief
paragraph on the economy. The introduction concludes with an overview
of human rights developments during the calendar year that mentions
specific areas (for example, torture, freedom of speech and of the
press, discrimination) where abuses and problems occurred.
We have continued the effort from previous years to expand coverage
of human rights problems affecting women, children, persons with
disabilities, and indigenous people in the reports. The appropriate
section of each country report discusses any abuses that are targeted
specifically against women (for example, rape or other violence
perpetrated by governmental or organized opposition forces, or
discriminatory laws or regulations). In Section 5, we discuss
socioeconomic discrimination; societal violence against women,
children, persons with disabilities, or ethnic minorities; and the
efforts, if any, of governments to combat these problems.
The following notes on specific section headings in each country
report are not meant to be comprehensive descriptions of each subject
but to provide an overview of the key issues covered and to show the
overall organization of subjects:
Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Includes killings in
which there is evidence of government involvement without due process
of law or of political motivation by government or by opposition
groups. Also covers extrajudicial killings (for example, the
deliberate, illegal, or excessive use of lethal force by the police,
security forces, or other agents of the State), as well as killings
committed by police or security forces that resulted in the unintended
death of persons without due process of law (for example, mistargeted
bombing or shelling or killing of bystanders). Excludes combat deaths
and killings by common criminals, if the likelihood of political
motivation can be ruled out (see also ``Internal Conflicts'' below).
Although mentioned briefly here, deaths in detention due to official
negligence are covered in detail in the section on ``Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.''
Disappearance.--Covers cases in which political motivation appears
likely and in which the victims have not been found or perpetrators
have not been identified. Cases eventually classed as political
killings in which the bodies of those missing are discovered also are
covered in the above section, while those eventually identified as
arrest or detention may be covered under ``Arbitrary Arrest, Detention,
or Exile.''
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Defines torture as an extremely severe form of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, committed by or at the
instigation of government forces or opposition groups, with specific
intent of causing extremely severe pain or suffering, whether mental or
physical. Concentrates discussion on actual practices, not on whether
they fit any precise definition, and includes use of physical and other
force that may fall short of torture but which is cruel, inhuman, or
degrading. Covers prison conditions, including information based on
international standards, and deaths in prison due to negligence by
government officials.
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Covers cases in which
detainees, including political detainees, are held in official custody
without being charged or, if charged, are denied a public preliminary
judicial hearing within a reasonable period. Also discusses whether,
and under what circumstances, governments exile citizens.
Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Describes briefly the court system
and evaluates whether there is an independent judiciary and whether
trials are both fair and public (failure to hold any trial is noted in
the section above). Includes discussion of ``political prisoners''
(political detainees are covered above), defined as those convicted and
imprisoned essentially for political beliefs or nonviolent acts of
dissent or expression, regardless of the actual legal charge.
Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Discusses the ``passive'' right of the individual to
noninterference by the State. Includes the right to receive foreign
publications, for example, while the right to publish is discussed
under ``Freedom of Speech and Press.'' Includes the right to be free
from coercive population control measures, including coerced abortion
and involuntary sterilization but does not include cultural or
traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, which are
addressed in Section 5.
Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--An optional section for use in describing abuses
that occur in countries experiencing significant internal armed
conflict. Includes indiscriminate, nonselective killings arising from
excessive use of force, for example, by police in putting down
demonstrations, or by the shelling of villages (deliberate, targeted
killing is discussed in the section on ``Arbitrary or Unlawful
Deprivation of Life'' ). Also includes abuses against civilian
noncombatants. For countries where use of this section would be
inappropriate, that is, where there is no significant internal
conflict, lethal use of excessive force by security forces is discussed
in the section on ``Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life'';
nonlethal excessive force is discussed in the section on ``Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.''
Freedom of Speech and Press.--Evaluates whether these freedoms
exist and describes any direct or indirect restrictions. Includes
discussion of academic freedom.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Evaluates the
ability of individuals and groups (including political parties) to
exercise these freedoms. Includes the ability of trade associations,
professional bodies, and similar groups to maintain relations or
affiliate with recognized international bodies in their fields. The
right of labor to associate, organize, and bargain collectively is
discussed under the section on ``Worker Rights'' (see Appendix B).
Freedom of Religion.--Discusses whether the Constitution or laws
provide for the right of citizens of any religious belief to worship
free of government interference and whether the government generally
respects that right. Includes the freedom to publish religious
documents in foreign languages; addresses the treatment of foreign
clergy and whether religious belief or lack thereof affects membership
in a ruling party, a career in government, or ability to obtain
services and privileges available to other citizens.
Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,
and Repatriation.--Includes discussion of forced resettlement;
``refugees'' may refer to persons displaced by civil strife or natural
disaster as well as persons who are ``refugees'' within the meaning of
the Refugee Act of 1980, that is, persons with a ``well-founded fear of
persecution'' in their country of origin or, if stateless, in their
country of habitual residence, on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
Government.--Discusses the extent to which citizens have freedom of
political choice and have the legal right and ability in practice to
change the laws and officials that govern them. Assesses whether
elections are free and fair.
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.--Discusses whether
the government permits the free functioning of local human rights
groups (including the right to investigate and publish their findings
on alleged human rights abuses) and whether they are subject to
reprisal by government or other forces. Also discusses whether the
government grants access to and cooperates with outside entities
(including foreign human rights organizations, international
organizations, and foreign governments) interested in human rights
developments in the country.
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language,
or Social Status.--Contains a subheading on Women, Children, and
Persons with Disabilities. As appropriate also includes subheadings on
Indigenous People, Religious Minorities, and National/Racial/Ethnic
Minorities. Discrimination against other groups is discussed in the
introductory paragraph(s) of the section. Addresses discrimination and
abuses not discussed elsewhere in the report, focusing on laws,
regulations, or state practices that are inconsistent with equal access
to housing, employment, education, health care, or other governmental
benefits for members of specific groups. (Abuses by government or
opposition forces, such as killing, torture and other violence, or
restriction of voting rights or free speech targeted against specific
groups would be discussed under the appropriate preceding sections.)
Discusses societal violence against women, e.g., ``dowry deaths,''
``honor killings,'' wife beating, rape, female genital mutilation, and
government tolerance of such under the subheading on women. Discusses
the extent to which the law provides for, and the government enforces,
equality of economic opportunity for women. Discusses violence or other
abuse against children under that subheading. Discusses the extent to
which persons with disabilities, including persons with mental illness,
are subject to discrimination in, among other things, employment,
education, and the provision of other government services.
Worker Rights.--See Appendix B.
APPENDIX B
Reporting on Worker Rights
The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act requires
reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary countries. It states that
internationally recognized worker rights include: ``(A) the right of
association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a
minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health.'' All five aspects of worker rights are
discussed in each country report under the section heading ``Worker
Rights.'' An additional subsection, listed as (F), addresses
trafficking in persons. The discussion of worker rights considers not
only laws and regulations but also their practical implementation and
takes into account the following additional guidelines:
A. The Right of Association has been defined by the International
Labor Organization (ILO) to include the right of workers and employers
to establish and join organizations of their own choosing without
previous authorization; to draw up their own constitutions and rules,
elect their representatives, and formulate their programs; to join in
confederations and affiliate with international organizations; and to
be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative
authority.
The right of association includes the right of workers to strike.
While strikes may be restricted in essential services, the interruption
of which would endanger the life, personal safety, or health of a
significant portion of the population, and in the public sector, these
restrictions must be offset by adequate safeguards for the interests of
the workers concerned (for example, mechanisms for mediation and
arbitration, due process, and the right to judicial review of legal
actions). Reporting on restrictions on the ability of workers to strike
generally includes information on any procedures that may exist for
safeguarding workers' interests.
B. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively includes the
right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and
settlement of disputes with employers, the right to protection against
interference, and the right to protection against acts of antiunion
discrimination. Governments should promote mechanisms for voluntary
negotiations between employers and workers and their organizations.
Coverage of the right to organize and bargain collectively includes a
review of the extent to which collective bargaining takes place and the
extent to which unions, both in law and practice, effectively are
protected against antiunion discrimination.
C. Forced or Compulsory Labor is defined as work or service exacted
under the menace of penalty and for which a person has not volunteered.
``Work or service'' does not apply where obligations are imposed to
undergo education or training. ``Menace of penalty'' includes loss of
rights or privileges as well as penal sanctions. The ILO has exempted
the following from its definition of forced labor: compulsory military
service, normal civic obligations, certain forms of prison labor,
emergencies, and minor communal services. Forced labor should not be
used as a means of: (1) mobilizing and using labor for purposes of
economic development; (2) racial, social, national, or religious
discrimination; (3) political coercion or education, or as a punishment
for holding or expressing political or ideological views opposed to the
established political, social, or economic system; (4) labor
discipline; or (5) as a punishment for having participated in strikes.
Constitutional provisions concerning the obligation of citizens to work
do not violate this right so long as they do not take the form of legal
obligations enforced by sanctions and are consistent with the principle
of ``freely chosen employment.''
D. Minimum Age for Employment of Children concerns the effective
abolition of child labor by raising the minimum age for employment to a
level consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of
young people. ILO Convention 182 on the ``worst forms of child labor,''
which had been ratified by 113 countries by the end of the year,
identifies anyone under the age of 18 as a child and specifies certain
types of employment as ``the worst forms of child labor.'' These worst
forms of labor include slavery, debt bondage, forced labor, forced
recruitment into armed conflict, child prostitution and pornography,
involvement in illicit activity such as drug production or trafficking,
and ``work which, by its nature, or the circumstances in which it is
carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals or
children.'' ILO Convention 182 permits the employment of children
between the ages of 16 and 18 in what the convention describes as an
``unhealthy environment,'' if adequate protective measures have been
taken.
E. Acceptable Conditions of Work refers to the establishment and
maintenance of mechanisms, adapted to national conditions, that provide
for minimum working standards, that is: wages that provide a decent
living for workers and their families; working hours that do not exceed
48 hours per week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified number of
annual paid leave days; and minimum conditions for the protection of
the safety and health of workers. Differences in the levels of economic
development are taken into account in the formulation of
internationally recognized labor standards. For example, many ILO
standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their
scope and coverage. They also may permit governments a wide choice in
their implementation, including progressive implementation, by enabling
them to accept a standard in part or subject to specified exceptions.
Governments are expected to take steps over time to achieve the higher
levels specified in such standards. However, this flexibility applies
only to internationally recognized standards concerning working
conditions. The ILO permits no flexibility in the acceptance of the
basic human rights standards, that is, freedom of association, the
right to organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced
labor, and the absence of discrimination.
F. Trafficking In Persons is defined as all acts involving the
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person (man, woman, or child) for labor or services, through the use of
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Sex trafficking is the
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for the purpose of a commercial sex act induced by force, fraud,
or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has
not attained 18 years of age. Reporting describes any legal
prohibitions against trafficking; the extent to which the government
enforces these prohibitions; the extent and nature of trafficking in
persons to, from, or within the country, other geographic regions or
countries affected by the traffic; the participation, facilitation,
involvement or complicity of any government agents in trafficking; and
aid or protection available to victims.
APPENDIX C--International Human Rights Conventions
[See the footnotes for a key to the International Human Rights Conventions listed here.]
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Country A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
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Afghanistan..................... P -- -- P -- P P P -- P P P P P P -- -- -- -- -- -- S P P
Albania*........................ P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Algeria......................... P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P
Andorra......................... -- -- -- -- -- P P -- P -- -- -- S S -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P S P
Angola.......................... -- P P -- P P P -- -- P -- P -- P P P P -- P P -- P -- P
Antigua & Barbuda............... P P P P P P P -- -- 1 P P P -- -- P P -- P P P P P P
Argentina....................... -- P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Armenia......................... -- -- -- P -- P P -- P -- -- -- P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Australia....................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Austria......................... P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Azerbaijan...................... P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P -- P -- -- P P P
Bahamas......................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P -- -- P P -- P P P P -- P
Bahrain......................... P P -- P -- P P -- -- -- P P P -- -- -- -- -- -- P P P P P
Bangladesh...................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P
Barbados........................ P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P -- P
Belarus......................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Belgium......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Belize.......................... 1 P P P P P P -- -- -- 1 P P P S P P -- P P P P P P
Benin........................... 2 P P -- P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Bhutan*......................... -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- S -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- P
Bolivia......................... P -- P S P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Bosnia & Herz................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Botswana........................ 1 P P -- P P P -- -- -- 1 P P P -- P P -- P P P P P P
Brazil.......................... P P -- P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Brunei*......................... 1 -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- P
Bulgaria........................ 2 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Burkina Faso.................... -- P P P P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Burma........................... P P P P -- P P S -- S -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- P
Burundi......................... -- P P P P P P -- -- P -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Cambodia........................ -- P P P P P P -- -- S P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Cameroon........................ P P P -- P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Canada.......................... P -- P P -- P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Cape Verde...................... -- P P -- P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P -- P -- -- P P P P P
Cen. African Rep................ 2 P P -- P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P -- P
Chad............................ -- P P -- P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Chile........................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
China........................... 2 -- -- P -- P P -- -- P -- -- P S P P P -- P P P P P P
Hong Kong..................... P -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P P P
Macau to 12-19-99............. -- -- -- P -- -- -- P -- -- P -- P P P P P -- -- -- -- P P P
Macau from 12-20-99........... -- -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P --
China........................... -- -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
(Taiwan only)*................ P -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- P P -- P S S -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Colombia........................ S P P P P P P -- -- P -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Comoros......................... -- P P -- P P P -- -- -- -- P S -- -- -- -- -- -- P P P S P
``Congo, Dem. Rep. of''......... -- P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
``Congo, Republic of''.......... 2 P P -- P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P -- P
Cook Islands.................... -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- --
Costa Rica...................... -- P P P P P P -- -- P -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Cote D'Ivoire................... 2 P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Croatia......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Cuba............................ P P P P P P P P -- P P P P -- -- -- -- -- P P P P P P
Cyprus.......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Czech Republic.................. 2 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Denmark......................... P P P P P P P S P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P
Djibouti........................ -- P P -- P P P P -- -- P P -- P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Dominica........................ P P P -- P P P -- -- 1 P P -- P P P P P P P P P P --
Dom. Republic................... S P P S P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P S P
Ecuador......................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Egypt........................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
El Salvador..................... -- P -- P -- P P -- -- S S P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Equatorial Guinea............... -- P P -- P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Eritrea......................... -- P P -- P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P -- -- -- P -- -- P -- P
Estonia......................... 2 P P P P P P -- P -- -- P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Ethiopia........................ P -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Fiji............................ P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P -- -- P P -- P -- -- P -- P
Finland......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
France.......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Gabon........................... -- P P P P P P -- -- P -- P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Gambia.......................... 1 P P P P P P -- -- -- 1 P P P P P P -- P P P P S P
Georgia......................... -- P P P P P P -- P -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Germany......................... P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Ghana........................... 2 P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Greece.......................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Grenada......................... 1 P P 1 P P P -- -- 1 1 P S P P -- -- P -- P P P -- P
Guatemala....................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Guinea.......................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Guinea-Bissau................... -- P -- -- P P P -- -- -- -- P S S P P P -- -- P P P S P
Guyana.......................... 1 P P -- P P P -- -- -- 1 P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P
Haiti........................... 2 P P P P P P P -- P P P P P -- P P P -- -- -- P -- P
Holy See........................ -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- P P -- -- P P -- P P
Honduras........................ -- P P P P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Hungary......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Iceland......................... -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
India........................... P P -- P -- P P P -- P P P P P P -- -- -- -- -- -- P S P
Indonesia....................... -- P P -- P P P -- -- P -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- P P P
Iran............................ S P -- P -- P P S -- -- P P P P P P P -- -- S -- -- S P
Iraq............................ P P -- P P P P P -- -- P P P P P -- -- -- P -- -- P -- P
Ireland......................... P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Israel.......................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P -- -- P P P
Italy........................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Jamaica......................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P -- P
Japan........................... -- P P -- P P P P -- P -- -- P P P P P -- P -- -- P P P
Jordan.......................... P P -- P P P P P -- P P P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P
Kazakhstan...................... -- P P P P P P -- -- P -- P P -- -- P P -- P P P P P P
Kenya........................... -- P -- -- P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Kiribati*....................... 1 P P -- P P P -- -- 1 1 P -- 1 1 -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- P
Korea, Dem. Rep. of*............ -- -- -- P -- P P -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- P -- P -- P
Korea, Rep. of.................. -- -- -- P -- P P P -- P -- -- P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Kuwait.......................... P P P P -- P P P -- -- P P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P
Kyrgyzstan...................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Laos............................ -- P -- P -- P P P -- P P -- P S S -- -- -- -- P P P -- P
Latvia.......................... 2 -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Lebanon......................... 2 P -- P P P P -- -- P -- P P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P
Lesotho......................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Liberia......................... P P P P P P P S -- S S P P S S P P -- -- P P P -- P
Libya........................... P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P
Liechtenstein*.................. -- -- -- P -- P P -- P -- -- -- P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Lithuania....................... S P P P P P P -- P -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Luxembourg...................... -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Macedonia, F.Y.R.O.............. 2 P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Madagascar...................... P P P -- P P P S -- P P -- P P -- -- P P P P P P S P
Malawi.......................... P P P -- P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Malaysia........................ -- P -- P P P P -- -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- P -- P
Maldives*....................... -- -- -- P -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- P P P -- P
Mali............................ P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Malta........................... P P P -- P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Marshall Islands*............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P
Mauritania...................... P P P -- P P P P -- P P P P -- -- P P -- P P P P -- P
Mauritius....................... P P -- -- P P P -- -- P P P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P
Mexico.......................... P P P P -- P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P -- P P P
Micronesia*..................... -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- P
Moldova......................... -- P P P P P P -- P P -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Monaco*......................... P -- -- P -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P P P P -- -- -- P P -- P P
Mongolia........................ P -- P P P P P -- -- P P -- P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P
Morocco......................... P P -- P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P S S P P P
Mozambique...................... -- -- P P P P P -- -- -- -- P P -- P P -- -- P P P P P P
Namibia......................... -- P P P P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P
Nauru*.......................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- S S -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- S P
Nepal........................... P P -- P P P P P -- P P -- P P P -- -- -- P -- -- P P P
Netherlands..................... P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
New Zealand..................... P P -- P -- P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Nicaragua....................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P S P
Niger........................... P P P -- P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Nigeria......................... P P P -- P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Niue............................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P
Norway.......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Oman*........................... -- P -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- P
Pakistan........................ P P P P P P P P -- P P P P -- -- -- -- -- -- S S P -- P
Palau........................... -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- P
Panama.......................... S P P P P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Papua New Guinea................ P P P P P P P -- -- P -- P P -- -- P P -- P -- -- P -- P
Paraguay........................ -- P P P P P P -- -- P -- P S P P P P P -- P P P P P
Peru............................ -- P P P P P P -- -- P S P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Philippines..................... P -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P S P P P P
Poland.......................... 2 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Portugal........................ 2 P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Qatar........................... -- P -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- -- P P
Romania......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Russia.......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Rwanda.......................... -- P P P P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P P -- P P P P -- P
Samoa*.......................... -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- P P P -- P
San Marino...................... -- P P -- P P P -- P -- P P P P P -- -- -- P P P -- S P
Sao Tome & Principe............. -- -- P -- P P P -- -- -- -- -- S S S P P -- -- P P S S P
Saudi Arabia.................... P P -- P -- P P -- -- -- P P P -- -- -- -- -- -- P P P P P
Senegal......................... 2 P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Serbia & Montenegro............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- --
Seychelles...................... 2 P P P P P P P -- 1 P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Sierra Leone.................... P P P -- P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Singapore....................... -- P -- P P P P P -- -- P -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- P
Slovak Republic................. 2 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Slovenia........................ -- P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Solomon Islands................. P P -- -- -- P P -- -- P P -- 1 -- 1 P P -- -- P P P -- P
Somalia......................... -- P -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P -- -- -- -- -- P P S
South Africa*................... P P P P P P P P -- S -- P P P S P P -- P P P P P P
Spain........................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Sri Lanka....................... P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P -- -- -- P -- -- P P P
St. Kitts & Nevis*.............. 1 P P -- P P P -- -- 1 1 P -- -- -- P -- -- -- P P P -- P
St. Lucia....................... P P P 1 P P P -- -- 1 P P P -- -- -- -- -- -- P P P -- P
St. Vincent*.................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P -- -- -- P P P P P
Sudan........................... P P -- -- P P P -- -- -- P P P P P P P -- -- -- -- -- S P
Suriname........................ 2 P P -- P P P -- -- 1 P P P P P P P P -- P P P -- P
Swaziland....................... 1 P P -- P P P -- -- P 1 P P -- -- P P -- P P P -- -- P
Sweden.......................... P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P
Switzerland..................... P P P P P P P -- P -- P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Syria........................... P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P -- -- -- P P -- -- -- P
Tajikistan*..................... -- P P -- P P P P -- P -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Tanzania........................ P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P -- P
Thailand........................ -- P -- -- -- P P -- -- P -- P P P P -- -- -- -- -- -- P -- P
Togo............................ 2 P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Tonga*.......................... 1 -- -- P -- P P -- -- 1 1 1 P -- -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- P
Trinidad & Tobago............... P P P -- P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P -- P
Tunisia......................... P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Turkey.......................... P P P P P P P -- P P P P P S S P P -- P -- -- P P P
Turkmenistan.................... P P P -- P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Tuvalu*......................... 1 -- -- -- -- P P -- -- 1 1 -- -- 1 -- P P -- -- -- -- P -- P
Uganda.......................... P P -- P P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- -- P P P P P
Ukraine......................... P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
United Arab Emir................ -- P -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P P P -- -- P
United Kingdom.................. P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
United States................... P -- -- P -- P P -- -- P P P P P S -- P S -- S S S P S
Uruguay......................... P P P P P P P -- -- S P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Uzbekistan...................... -- P -- P P P -- -- P -- P P P P -- -- -- -- P P P P P P
Vanuatu*........................ -- -- -- -- -- P P -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- P P P -- P
Venezuela....................... -- P P P P P P P -- P -- P P P P -- P P P P P P P P
Vietnam*........................ P -- -- P -- P P -- -- -- -- -- P P P -- -- -- -- P -- P -- P
Yemen........................... P P P P P P P P -- P -- P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Yugoslavia...................... P P P P P P P P -- P P -- P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Zambia.......................... P P P -- P P P -- -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P P P
Zimbabwe........................ 1 P -- P P P P P -- P P P P P P P P -- P P P P -- P
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Party S = Signatory * designates a non-ILO member
1 = Based on general declaration concerning treaty obligations prior to independence.
2 = Party to 1926 Convention only.
========================================================================================================================================================
Key to Human Rights Conventions: A--Slavery B--ILO Convention 29 C--ILO Convention 87 D-- Genocide E--ILO Convention 98 F--Prisoners of War G--
Civilians in War H--Traffic in Persons I--European HR Conv. J--Pol. Rights of Women K--Suppl. Slavery Conv. L--ILO Convention 105 M--Racial
Discrimination N--Civil and Pol. Rights O--Econ./Soc./Cul. Rights P--UN Refugee Convention Q--UN Refugee Protocol R--American HR Conv. S--ILO
Convention 138 T--Geneva Protocol I U--Geneva Protocol II V--Disc. Against Women W--Torture X--Rights of the Child
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX D
International Human Rights Conventions
A. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of September
25,1926, as amended by the Protocol of December 7, 1953.
B. Convention Concerning Forced Labor of June 28, 1930 (ILO
Convention 29).
C. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize of July 9, 1948 (ILO Convention 87).
D. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of December 9, 1948.
E. Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively of July 1, 1949 (ILO
Convention 98).
F. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12, 1949.
G. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949.
H. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of March 21, 1950.
I. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.
J. Convention on the Political Rights of Women of March 31, 1953.
K. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of September
7, 1956.
L. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor of June 25,
1957 (ILO Convention 105).
M. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination of December 21, 1965.
N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
December 16, 1966.
O. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
of December 16, 1966.
P. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951.
Q. Protocol Relating to the Status Of Refugees of January 31,
1967.
R. American Convention on Human Rights of November 22, 1969.
S. Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
of June 26, 1973 (ILO Convention 138).
T. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 8, 1977.
U. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of June 8, 1977.
V. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women of December 18, 1979.
W. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December 10, 1984.
X. Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989.
APPENDIX E.--U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Country/Account Summaries (`Spigots') FY 2002
($ in thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peace
Countries/Accounts CSH DA ESF FMF FSA IMET INCLE MRA NADR Corps PKO SEED Other Total P.L. 480
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa
Africa Crisis Response -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 -- -- 15,000 --
Training.................
Africa Regional........... 44,233 63,660 -- -- -- -- 7,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 115,393 46,394
Africa Regional Fund...... -- -- 49,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 49,000 --
Africa Regional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39,905 -- -- 39,905 --
Peacekeeping.............
African Development Bank.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,100 5,100 --
African Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,542 16,542 --
Foundation...............
African Development Fund.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100,000 100,000 --
Agriculture Initiative.... -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Angola.................... 6,056 5,118 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,870 -- -- -- -- 14,044 31,616
Anti-Corruption Initiative -- 300 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 300 --
ATA Regional-Africa....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,639 -- -- -- -- 2,639 --
Benin..................... 7,743 8,982 -- -- -- 502 -- -- -- 2,280 -- -- -- 19,507 4,687
Botswana.................. -- -- -- 1,000 -- 692 -- -- -- 215 -- -- -- 1,907 --
Burkina Faso.............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,824 -- -- -- 1,824 10,345
Burundi................... 400 4,200 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,600 2,496
Cameroon.................. -- -- -- -- -- 193 -- -- -- 2,861 -- -- -- 3,054 284
Cape Verde................ -- -- -- -- -- 146 -- -- -- 1,258 -- -- -- 1,404 3,774
Central African Republic.. -- -- -- -- -- 128 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 128 760
Chad...................... -- -- -- -- -- 216 -- -- 350 -- -- -- -- 566 3,743
Cote d'Ivoire............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,952 -- -- -- 2,952 --
Countries in Transition... -- -- 40,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 40,000 --
Democratic Republic of 21,178 4,773 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,951 11,555
Congo....................
Djibouti.................. -- -- -- 1,500 -- 163 -- -- 404 -- -- -- -- 2,067 1,059
Education for Development -- 5,000 15,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,000 --
and Democracy............
Education Initiative...... -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
Eritrea................... 5,350 5,558 -- 250 -- 340 -- -- 1,602 -- -- -- -- 13,100 5,564
Ethiopia.................. 23,057 20,200 -- 2,250 -- 445 -- -- 1,275 -- -- -- -- 47,227 58,423
Gabon..................... -- -- -- -- -- 157 -- -- -- 2,085 -- -- -- 2,242 --
Gambia.................... -- -- -- -- -- 48 -- -- -- 1,674 -- -- -- 1,722 136
Ghana..................... 18,655 15,963 -- 400 -- 482 -- -- -- 2,465 -- -- -- 37,965 12,407
Guinea.................... 6,700 15,442 -- -- -- 266 -- -- 103 2,478 -- -- -- 24,989 6,818
Guinea-Bissau............. -- -- -- -- -- 69 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 69 1,298
Kenya..................... 27,563 13,547 -- 15,000 -- 486 -- -- -- 3,205 -- -- -- 59,801 17,682
Lesotho................... -- -- -- -- -- 96 -- -- -- 1,978 -- -- -- 2,074 --
Liberia................... 1,600 3,725 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,325 5,643
Madagascar................ 8,725 10,540 -- -- -- 208 -- -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- 21,473 8,503
Malawi.................... 15,540 13,829 -- -- -- 385 -- -- -- 2,242 -- -- -- 31,996 13,699
Mali...................... 14,488 21,688 -- -- -- 342 -- -- -- 2,741 -- -- -- 39,259 1,355
Mauritania................ -- -- -- -- -- 130 -- -- -- 1,733 -- -- -- 1,863 3,213
Mauritius................. -- -- -- -- -- 93 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 93 --
Mozambique................ 17,677 22,438 -- -- -- 153 -- -- 2,259 1,494 -- -- -- 44,021 18,448
MRA Africa................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 187,500 -- -- -- -- -- 187,500 --
Namibia................... 1,850 8,183 -- -- -- 208 -- -- 65 1,762 -- -- -- 12,068 --
Niger..................... -- -- -- -- -- 132 -- -- -- 2,202 -- -- -- 2,334 10,214
Nigeria................... 36,066 21,968 -- 6,000 -- 750 -- -- 1,449 -- -- -- -- 66,233 --
REDSO/ESA................. 9,475 15,859 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,334 --
Regional Center for South -- 20,117 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,117 --
Africa...................
Regional Organizations.... -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Republic of the Congo..... -- -- -- -- -- 140 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 140 --
Rwanda.................... 12,100 6,402 -- -- -- -- -- -- 350 -- -- -- -- 18,852 14,498
Safe Skies................ -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Sao Tome and Principe..... -- -- -- -- -- 112 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 112 --
Senegal................... 15,005 13,950 -- 400 -- 931 -- -- 92 3,001 -- -- -- 33,379 1,790
Seychelles................ -- -- -- -- -- 40 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 40 --
Sierra Leone.............. 841 6,413 9,000 -- -- 177 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,431 24,355
Somalia................... 500 2,267 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,200 -- -- -- -- 3,967 19,729
South Africa.............. 20,404 37,304 -- 6,700 -- 1,471 -- -- -- 2,152 -- -- -- 68,031 --
Sudan..................... 500 10,631 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,131 60,190
Swaziland................. -- -- -- -- -- 84 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 84 --
Tanzania.................. 16,700 8,108 -- -- -- 275 -- -- -- 2,652 -- -- -- 27,735 4,827
Togo...................... -- -- -- -- -- 83 -- -- -- 2,143 -- -- -- 2,226 --
Uganda.................... 33,650 24,724 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,119 -- -- -- 59,493 22,591
West Africa Regional...... 19,473 10,773 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 30,246 1,173
Zambia.................... 30,700 14,822 -- -- -- 189 -- -- 816 2,859 -- -- -- 49,386 8,060
Zimbabwe.................. 6,450 2,512 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 339 -- -- -- 9,301 25,522
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Africa................ 422,679 453,996 120,000 33,500 -- 10,332 7,500 187,500 15,474 53,714 54,905 -- 121,642 1,481,242 462,851
================================================================================================================================================================================================
East Asia and the Pacific
ATA Regional-East Asia and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,472 -- -- -- -- 5,472 --
the Pacific..............
Burma..................... -- -- 6,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,500 --
Cambodia.................. 15,000 -- 20,000 -- -- -- -- -- 2,290 -- -- -- -- 37,290 1,085
China..................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,595 -- -- -- 1,595 --
China Rule of Law......... -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
East Asia and Pacific -- -- 3,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,500 --
Environmental Initiative.
East Timor................ -- -- 25,000 1,000 -- 43 -- -- -- 612 7,103 -- -- 33,758 --
Indonesia................. 35,568 38,704 50,000 -- -- 405 4,000 -- 8,000 -- -- -- -- 136,677 5,670
KEDO...................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 90,500 -- -- -- -- 90,500 --
Kiribati.................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,037 -- -- -- 1,037 --
Laos...................... 1,000 1,000 -- -- -- -- 4,200 -- 1,328 -- -- -- -- 7,528 513
Malaysia.................. -- -- -- -- -- 831 -- -- 150 -- -- -- -- 981 --
Micronesia................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,735 -- -- -- 1,735 --
Mongolia.................. -- -- 12,000 2,000 -- 686 -- -- -- 1,710 -- -- -- 16,396 --
MRA East Asia............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,625 -- -- -- -- -- 15,625 --
Papua New Guinea.......... -- -- -- -- -- 206 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 206 --
Philippines............... 25,599 24,459 33,000 44,000 -- 2,025 -- -- 95 2,169 -- -- -- 131,347 --
Regional Democracy........ -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Regional Security Fund.... -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 250 --
Regional Women's Issues... -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Samoa..................... -- -- -- -- -- 113 -- -- -- 1,212 -- -- -- 1,325 --
Solomon Islands........... -- -- -- -- -- 146 -- -- -- 28 -- -- -- 174 --
South Pacific Fisheries... -- -- 14,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 --
Thailand.................. 1,000 750 -- 1,300 -- 1,748 4,000 -- 720 1,267 -- -- -- 10,785 --
Tonga..................... -- -- -- -- -- 115 -- -- -- 1,043 -- -- -- 1,158 --
Vanuatu................... -- -- -- -- -- 95 -- -- -- 1,212 -- -- -- 1,307 --
Vietnam................... 4,106 6,950 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,520 -- -- -- -- 12,576 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total East Asia and the 82,273 71,863 178,250 48,300 -- 6,413 12,200 15,625 110,075 13,620 7,103 -- -- 545,722 7,268
Pacific....................
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Europe and Eurasia
Albania................... -- -- -- 4,000 -- 866 -- -- 450 -- -- 35,250 -- 40,566 --
Armenia................... -- -- -- 4,000 90,200 75 -- -- 1,800 1,417 -- -- -- 97,492 911
ATA Regional-Europe and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19,666 -- -- -- -- 19,666 --
Eurasia..................
Azerbaijan................ -- -- -- 4,000 43,510 377 -- -- 4,880 -- 1,000 -- -- 53,767 2,239
Belarus................... -- -- -- -- 10,572 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,572 --
Bosnia and Herzegovina.... -- -- -- 2,250 -- 800 -- -- -- -- -- 65,005 -- 68,055 --
Bulgaria.................. -- -- -- 8,500 -- 1,212 -- -- 1,390 2,158 -- 34,100 -- 47,360 --
Croatia................... -- -- -- 5,000 -- 593 -- -- 40 -- -- 44,000 -- 49,633 --
Cyprus.................... -- -- 15,000 -- -- -- -- -- 55 -- -- -- -- 15,055 --
Czech Republic............ -- -- -- 10,000 -- 1,800 -- -- 200 -- -- -- -- 12,000 --
Estonia................... -- -- -- 6,250 -- 1,036 -- -- 268 373 -- -- -- 7,927 --
European Bank for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,779 35,779 --
Reconstruction and
Development..............
Federal Republic of -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 165,000 -- 165,000 1,738
Yugoslavia...............
Georgia................... -- -- -- 31,000 89,807 889 -- -- 1,100 1,182 340 -- -- 124,318 --
Greece.................... -- -- -- -- -- 499 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 499 --
Hungary................... -- -- -- 10,000 -- 1,789 -- -- 240 -- -- -- -- 12,029 --
International Fund for -- -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 --
Ireland..................
Irish Visa Program........ -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Kazakhstan................ -- -- -- 4,750 47,315 893 -- -- 2,655 2,254 -- -- -- 57,867 --
Kosovo.................... 131 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 118,000 -- 118,131 --
Kyrgyz Republic........... -- -- -- 11,000 71,989 600 -- -- -- 1,063 -- -- -- 84,652 --
Latvia.................... -- -- -- 6,250 -- 1,047 -- -- 1,113 363 -- -- -- 8,773 --
Lithuania................. -- -- -- 6,593 -- 1,019 -- -- 748 362 -- -- -- 8,722 --
Macedonia................. -- -- -- 10,500 -- 579 -- -- 180 341 -- 49,506 -- 61,106 --
Malta..................... -- -- -- 1,000 -- 295 -- -- 119 -- -- -- -- 1,414 --
Moldova................... -- -- -- 1,250 35,946 889 -- -- -- 1,757 -- -- -- 39,842 --
MRA Europe................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 81,520 -- -- -- -- -- 81,520 --
NIS Regional Export -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- -- 500 --
Controls.................
OSCE Bosnia............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,022 -- -- 20,022 --
OSCE Croatia.............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,900 -- -- 2,900 --
OSCE Kosovo............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,400 -- -- 15,400 --
OSCE Regional-Europe...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12,275 -- -- 12,275 --
Poland.................... -- -- -- 12,000 -- 1,891 -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- 14,191 --
Portugal.................. -- -- -- -- -- 720 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 720 --
Regional FSA.............. -- -- -- -- 68,681 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 68,681 --
Regional SEED............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 74,139 -- 74,139 --
Romania................... -- -- -- 9,000 -- 1,356 -- -- 1,336 3,178 -- 36,000 -- 50,870 --
Russia.................... -- -- -- -- 159,083 -- -- -- 1,500 3,734 -- -- -- 164,317 --
Science Centers/Bio -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 67,000 -- -- -- -- 67,000 --
Redirection..............
Slovakia.................. -- -- -- 7,750 -- 845 -- -- 407 616 -- -- -- 9,618 --
Slovenia.................. -- -- -- 4,000 -- 827 -- -- 350 -- -- -- -- 5,177 --
Tajikistan................ -- -- -- 3,700 56,372 259 -- -- 7,500 -- -- -- -- 67,831 26,227
Turkey.................... -- -- 200,000 48,000 -- 2,756 -- -- 2,200 -- -- -- -- 252,956 --
Turkmenistan.............. -- -- -- -- 11,398 388 -- -- 7,000 893 -- -- -- 19,679 --
Ukraine................... -- -- -- 4,000 154,937 1,638 -- -- 800 4,252 1,000 -- -- 166,627 --
Uzbekistan................ -- -- -- 36,207 118,190 880 -- -- 4,300 828 -- -- -- --
160,405
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Europe and Eurasia.... 131 -- 245,000 251,000 958,000 26,818 -- 81,520 128,097 24,771 52,937 621,000 35,779 2,425,053 31,115
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Near East
Algeria................... -- -- -- -- -- 67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 67 2,009
ATA Regional-Near East -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,272 -- -- -- -- 11,272 --
Asia.....................
Bahrain................... -- -- -- 28,500 -- 395 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 28,895 --
Egypt..................... -- -- 655,000 1,300,000 -- 1,217 -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- 1,956,267 3,839
Iraq Opposition........... -- -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 --
Israel.................... -- -- 720,000 2,040,000 -- -- -- -- 28,000 -- -- -- -- 2,788,000 --
Jordan.................... -- -- 250,000 100,000 -- 2,012 -- -- 1,595 1,597 -- -- -- 355,204 --
Lebanon................... -- 600 35,000 -- -- 568 -- -- 1,200 -- -- -- -- 37,368 --
Middle East Democracy..... -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Middle East Multilaterals. -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Middle East Partnership -- -- 20,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,000 --
Initiative...............
Middle East Regional -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Cooperation..............
Morocco................... 4,600 5,766 -- 3,500 -- 1,041 -- -- -- 2,718 -- -- -- 17,625 --
MRA Near East............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 102,900 -- -- -- -- -- 102,900 --
MRA Refugees to Israel.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 --
Multinational Force and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,015 -- -- 16,015 --
Observers................
Oman...................... -- -- -- 25,000 -- 481 -- -- 515 -- -- -- -- 25,996 --
Saudi Arabia.............. -- -- -- -- -- 24 -- -- 30 -- -- -- -- 54 --
Tunisia................... -- -- -- 3,500 -- 1,013 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,513 --
U.S. North Africa Economic -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Partnership..............
United Arab Emirates...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 350 -- -- -- -- 350 --
West Bank/Gaza............ -- -- 72,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 72,000 --
Yemen..................... -- -- 8,000 20,000 -- 488 -- -- 800 -- -- -- -- 29,288 395
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Near East............. 4,600 6,366 1,802,000 3,520,500 -- 7,306 -- 162,900 43,812 4,315 16,015 -- -- 5,567,814 6,243
================================================================================================================================================================================================
South Asia
Afghanistan............... 29,000 10,701 105,250 57,256 -- -- 66,000 -- 43,434 -- 23,949 -- 191,000 526,590 159,472
ATA Regional-South Asia... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,882 -- -- -- -- 6,882 --
Bangladesh................ 39,950 21,670 3,000 -- -- 648 -- -- -- 581 -- -- -- 65,849 23,974
India..................... 41,678 29,200 7,000 -- -- 1,012 -- -- 800 -- -- -- -- 79,690 93,679
Maldives.................. -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 125 --
MRA South Asia............ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 146,600 -- -- -- -- -- 146,600 --
Nepal..................... 20,000 7,597 3,000 14,000 -- 377 -- -- -- 2,111 -- -- -- 47,085 2,352
Pakistan.................. 14,000 10,000 624,500 75,000 -- 894 90,500 -- 10,100 -- 220,000 -- -- 1,044,994 5,134
South Asia Regional Funds. -- -- 3,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,500 --
Sri Lanka................. 300 5,150 3,000 -- -- 259 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,709 1,325
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total South Asia.......... 144,928 84,318 749,250 146,256 -- 3,315 156,500 146,600 61,216 2,692 243,949 -- 191,000 1,930,024 285,936
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Western Hemisphere
Administration of Justice. -- -- 8,663 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,663 --
Argentina................. -- -- -- 1,000 -- 1,025 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,025 --
ATA Regional-Western -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,531 -- -- -- -- 2,531 --
Hemisphere...............
Bahamas................... -- -- -- 100 -- 144 1,200 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,444 --
Belize.................... -- -- -- 200 -- 212 -- -- -- 1,464 -- -- -- 1,876 --
Bolivia................... 19,690 12,853 10,000 500 -- 712 87,600 -- -- 2,922 -- -- -- 134,277 19,566
Brazil.................... 9,150 4,799 -- -- -- 437 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,386 --
Caribbean Regional........ 3,550 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,550 --
Centers for Educational -- -- 7,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,000 --
Excellence...............
Central American Regional. 4,000 15,792 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19,792 --
Chile..................... -- -- -- 500 -- 570 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,070 --
Colombia.................. -- -- -- -- -- 1,180 379,900 -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- 406,080 --
Costa Rica................ -- -- -- -- -- 389 -- -- -- 899 -- -- -- 1,288 --
Cuba...................... -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Dominican Republic........ 9,532 6,450 2,300 350 -- 527 -- -- -- 3,121 -- -- -- 22,280 --
Eastern Caribbean......... -- -- 10,800 2,000 -- 672 -- -- -- 2,019 -- -- -- 15,491 --
Ecuador................... -- 6,840 15,000 3,000 -- 625 25,000 -- 370 2,813 -- -- -- 53,648 1,530
El Salvador............... 15,653 45,640 25,200 1,000 -- 814 -- -- -- 2,463 -- -- -- 90,770 --
Guatemala................. 15,700 12,320 10,000 -- -- 350 3,500 -- -- 4,255 -- -- -- 46,125 21,502
Guyana.................... 1,000 3,100 -- 200 -- 294 -- -- -- 1,083 -- -- -- 5,677 --
Haiti..................... 638 250 30,000 300 -- 14 -- -- -- 1,504 91 -- -- 32,797 23,128
Honduras.................. 13,177 15,430 1,000 -- -- 655 -- -- -- 4,081 -- -- -- 34,343 6,436
Inter-American Foundation. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,107 13,107 --
Inter-American Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18,000 18,000 --
Corporation..............
Jamaica................... 3,121 9,471 1,532 600 -- 586 1,550 -- -- 2,242 -- -- -- 19,102 --
LAC Regional.............. 9,434 39,910 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 49,344 --
Latin America Regional.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
Mexico.................... 5,509 7,715 10,000 -- -- 944 37,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 61,168 --
MRA Western Hemisphere.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,723 -- -- -- -- -- 13,723 --
Nicaragua................. 8,470 16,602 2,800 500 -- 372 -- -- -- 2,639 -- -- -- 31,383 15,136
OAS Development Assistance -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,500 5,500 --
Programs.................
OAS Fund for Strengthening -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,500 2,500 --
Democracy................
OAS/IADB Demining......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,695 -- -- -- -- 1,695 --
Panama.................... -- 4,500 4,205 -- -- 178 5,000 -- -- 2,299 -- -- -- 16,182 --
Paraguay.................. 2,525 3,600 3,500 -- -- 360 -- -- -- 3,228 -- -- -- 13,213 --
Peru...................... 23,666 14,969 14,500 -- -- 518 142,500 -- 225 848 -- -- -- 197,226 37,035
Peru-Ecuador Peace........ -- -- 4,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,500 --
Suriname.................. -- -- -- 150 -- 147 -- -- -- 843 -- -- -- 1,140 --
Trinidad and Tobago....... -- -- -- 300 -- 132 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 432 --
Uruguay................... -- -- -- 1,000 -- 464 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,464 --
Venezuela................. -- -- 500 -- -- 500 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 --
WHA Regional Border -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Control..................
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Western Hemisphere.... 144,815 220,241 166,500 11,700 -- 12,821 708,250 13,723 29,821 38,723 91 -- 39,107 1,385,792 124,333
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Global
Asia Regional............. -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,050 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,050 --
Asia-Near East Regional... 16,226 46,769 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 62,995 --
Asian Development Fund.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 98,017 98,017 --
ATA Program Management.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,247 -- -- -- -- 13,247 --
ATA WMD Preparedness -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Program..................
CT Engagement w/Allies.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
CTBT International -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,566 -- -- -- -- 16,566 --
Monitoring System........
Debt Restructuring........ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 229,000 229,000 --
Demining Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- -- 500 --
Expenses.................
Demining Crosscutting -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,962 -- -- -- -- 3,962 --
Initiatives..............
Demining Mine Surveys..... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,284 -- -- -- -- 3,284 --
Demining Research and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 600 -- -- -- -- 600 --
Training.................
Democracy, Conflict & 25,893 66,269 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 92,162 --
Humanitarian Assistance..
Development Credit Program- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,500 7,500 --
Admin. Exp...............
DSCA Administrative Costs. -- -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
E-IMET Schools............ -- -- -- -- -- 2,600 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,600 --
Economic Growth, -- 182,297 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 182,297 --
Agriculture and Trade....
Enhanced International -- -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Peacekeeping Capabilities
Export Control Program -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 445 -- -- -- -- 445 --
Administration...........
Export Control Regional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,580 -- -- -- -- 2,580 --
Advisors.................
Export-Import Bank- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 63,000 63,000 --
Administrative Expenses..
Export-Import Bank-Direct -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (25,000) (25,000) --
Loans, Negative Subsidies
Export-Import Bank-Loan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 727,323 727,323 --
Subsidy..................
FMF Administrative Costs.. -- -- -- 35,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,000 --
General Costs............. -- -- -- -- -- 395 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 395 --
Global Development -- 20,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,000 --
Alliance.................
Global Environment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100,500 100,500 --
Facility.................
Global Health............. 322,766 3,714 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 326,480 --
Human Rights and Democracy -- -- 13,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 --
Funds....................
INL Anticrime Programs.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,330 -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,330 --
International Atomic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 -- -- -- -- 50,000 --
Energy Agency Voluntary
Contribution.............
International Civil -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 300 300 --
Aviation Organization....
International Conservation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,700 7,700 --
Programs.................
International -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,750 1,750 --
Contributions for
Scientific, Educational,
and Cultural Activities..
International Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 792,400 792,400 --
Association..............
International Disaster -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 235,500 235,500 --
Assistance...............
International Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,000 20,000 --
Agricultural Development.
International Law -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 --
Enforcement Academies....
International -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 --
Organizations............
International 297,500 7,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 305,000 --
Organizations/
Partnerships.............
International Panel on -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,400 7,400 --
Climate Change/UN
Framework Convention on
Climate Change...........
Interregional Aviation -- -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 --
Support..................
Montreal Protocol -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 25,000 --
Multilateral Fund........
MRA Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,000 -- -- -- -- -- 16,000 --
Expenses.................
MRA Migration............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,132 -- -- -- -- -- 15,132 --
MRA Multiregional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 56,000 -- -- -- -- -- 56,000 --
Activities...............
MRA Refugee Admissions.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 110,000 -- -- -- -- -- 110,000 --
Multilateral Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 5,000 --
Guarantee Agency.........
Muslim Secondary Exchange -- -- 7,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,000 --
Program..................
NADR Regional Export -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,030 -- -- -- -- 1,030 --
Controls.................
New Course Development.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,791 -- -- -- -- 4,791 --
Non-Proliferation and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 -- -- -- -- 14,000 --
Disarmament Fund.........
Oceans, Environmental and -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Science Initiative.......
OPCW Volumtary -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Contribution.............
OPIC-Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 38,608 38,608 --
Expenses.................
OPIC-Net Offsetting -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (259,608) (259,608) --
Collections..............
Partnership to Eliminate -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Sweatshops...............
Peace Corps Other......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 141,065 -- -- -- 141,065 --
Policy Initiatives........ 289 8,437 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,726 21,675
Prepositioned Stocks...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19,399
Program & Policy 5,400 6,230 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,630 --
Coordination.............
Program Development and -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 --
Support..................
Regional Advisors Training -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 200 -- -- -- -- 200 --
Regional Narc. Training -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
and Demand Reduction.....
Systems Support and -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 --
Upgrades.................
Terrorist Financing....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
Terrorist Interdiction -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18,000 -- -- -- -- 18,000 --
Program..................
Trade and Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,024 50,024 --
Agency...................
Trafficking in Persons.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,670 -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,670 --
Transition Initiatives.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 50,000 --
Treasury Technical -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,500 9,500 --
Assistance...............
U.S. Emergency Refugee and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 15,000 --
Migration Assistance Fund
UN Development Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 1,000 --
Women....................
UN Development Program.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 97,100 97,100 --
UN Environment Program.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,750 10,750 --
UN Voluntary Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,500 1,500 --
Technical Cooperation in
the Field of Human Rights
UN Voluntary Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 5,000 --
Victims of Torture.......
USAID Inspector General -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 31,500 31,500 --
Operating Expenses.......
USAID Operating Expenses.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 564,000 564,000 --
USAID Security............ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 2,000 --
World Food Program........ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 6,000 --
World Meteorological -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 2,000 --
Organization.............
World Trade Organization.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 1,000 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Global................ 668,074 341,216 28,000 41,000 -- 2,995 144,550 197,132 146,205 141,065 -- -- 2,920,764 4,631,001 41,074
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Total FY-2002............... 1,467,500 1,178,000 3,289,000 4,052,256 958,000 70,000 1,029,00 805,000 534,700 278,900 375,000 621,000 3,308,292 17,966,648 958,820
0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX E.--U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Country/Account Summaries (`Spigots') FY 2003
($ in thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peace
Countries/Accounts CSH DA ESF FMF FSA IMET INCLE MRA NADR Corps PKO SEED Other Total P.L. 480
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa
Africa Crisis Response -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- 10,000 --
Training.................
Africa Regional........... 33,915 102,646 -- -- -- -- 7,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 143,561 --
Africa Regional Fund...... -- -- 32,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 32,000 --
Africa Regional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 30,000 -- -- 30,000 --
Peacekeeping.............
African Development Bank.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,104 5,104 --
African Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,542 16,542 --
Foundation...............
African Development Fund.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 118,073 118,073 --
Agriculture Initiative.... -- 20,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,000 --
Angola.................... 5,400 2,750 -- -- -- 100 -- -- 3,500 -- -- -- -- 11,750 8,004
Anti-Corruption Initiative -- 7,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,500 --
ATA Regional-Africa....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,296 -- -- -- -- 5,296 --
Benin..................... 6,343 7,923 -- -- -- 400 -- -- -- 2,678 -- -- -- 17,344 4,023
Botswana.................. -- -- -- 1,000 -- 600 -- -- -- 1,209 -- -- -- 2,809 --
Burkina Faso.............. -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- 2,509 -- -- -- 2,559 10,121
Burundi................... 500 3,500 -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,050 --
Cameroon.................. -- -- -- -- -- 200 -- -- -- 2,996 -- -- -- 3,196 --
Cape Verde................ -- -- -- -- -- 120 -- -- -- 1,352 -- -- -- 1,472 3,500
Central African Republic.. -- -- -- -- -- 110 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 110 --
Chad...................... -- -- -- -- -- 130 -- -- 350 1,073 -- -- -- 1,553 --
Comoros................... -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 --
Cote d'Ivoire............. -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- 1,244 -- -- -- 1,294 --
Countries in Transition... -- -- 31,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 31,000 --
Democratic Republic of 13,476 10,024 -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 23,550 --
Congo....................
Djibouti.................. -- -- -- -- -- 185 -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- 435 --
ECOWAS.................... -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 --
Education Initiative...... -- 22,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 22,000 --
Equatorial Guinea......... -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 --
Eritrea................... 5,400 4,619 -- 500 -- 400 -- -- 1,100 -- -- -- -- 12,019 1,908
Ethiopia.................. 31,950 18,104 -- 500 -- 500 -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- 52,054 27,281
Gabon..................... -- -- -- -- -- 160 -- -- -- 2,424 -- -- -- 2,584 --
Gambia.................... -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- 2,033 -- -- -- 2,083 --
Ghana..................... 20,055 18,688 -- 500 -- 500 -- -- -- 2,742 -- -- -- 42,485 14,951
Guinea.................... 7,160 15,765 -- -- -- 250 -- -- -- 2,812 -- -- -- 25,987 3,441
Guinea-Bissau............. -- -- -- -- -- 75 -- -- 200 -- -- -- -- 275 --
Kenya..................... 33,413 13,280 -- 1,500 -- 600 -- -- -- 3,283 -- -- -- 52,076 12,134
Lesotho................... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- 2,281 -- -- -- 2,381 --
Liberia................... 2,100 3,100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,200 1,027
Madagascar................ 8,493 9,785 -- -- -- 170 -- -- -- 1,970 -- -- -- 20,418 10,732
Malawi.................... 17,480 13,397 -- -- -- 360 -- -- -- 2,611 -- -- -- 33,848 6,290
Mali...................... 13,288 21,340 -- -- -- 325 -- -- -- 3,538 -- -- -- 38,491 --
Mauritania................ -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- 200 1,932 -- -- -- 2,232 3,493
Mauritius................. -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 --
Military Health Affairs... -- -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Mozambique................ 21,800 23,692 -- -- -- 215 -- -- 3,130 2,066 -- -- -- 50,903 16,871
MRA Africa................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 187,500 -- -- -- -- -- 187,500 --
Namibia................... 1,900 5,080 -- -- -- 200 -- -- 90 2,459 -- -- -- 9,729 --
Niger..................... -- -- -- -- -- 110 -- -- -- 2,527 -- -- -- 2,637 6,868
Nigeria................... 41,356 23,879 -- 6,000 -- 800 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 72,035 --
REDSO/ESA................. 9,125 13,163 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 22,288 --
Regional Center for South -- 24,731 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24,731 --
Africa...................
Regional Organizations.... -- -- 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 --
Republic of the Congo..... -- -- -- -- -- 110 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 110 --
Rwanda.................... 12,150 6,023 -- -- -- 150 -- -- 450 -- -- -- -- 18,773 10,978
Safe Skies................ -- -- 8,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,000 --
Sao Tome and Principe..... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 --
Senegal................... 14,762 13,618 -- 500 -- 900 -- -- -- 3,454 -- -- -- 33,234 --
Seychelles................ -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 --
Sierra Leone.............. 468 3,400 -- -- -- 250 -- -- 200 -- -- -- -- 4,318 --
Somalia................... 200 2,700 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,200 -- -- -- -- 4,100 --
South Africa.............. 25,150 36,278 -- 6,000 -- 1,450 -- -- -- 2,622 -- -- -- 71,500 --
Sudan..................... 300 22,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 22,300 --
Swaziland................. -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- 1,313 -- -- -- 1,413 --
Tanzania.................. 22,490 10,446 -- -- -- 230 -- -- -- 3,041 -- -- -- 36,207 --
Togo...................... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- 2,310 -- -- -- 2,410 --
Trade Initiative.......... -- 15,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 --
Uganda.................... 38,559 24,385 -- -- -- 170 -- -- -- 1,410 -- -- -- 64,524 15,880
West Africa Regional...... 19,631 8,018 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 27,649 3,190
Zambia.................... 37,404 12,881 -- -- -- 225 -- -- 700 3,443 -- -- -- 54,653 --
Zimbabwe.................. 14,223 1,885 -- -- -- -- -- -- 270 -- -- -- -- 16,378 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Africa................ 458,491 541,600 77,000 18,500 -- 11,095 7,000 187,500 17,936 63,332 40,000 -- 139,719 1,562,173 160,692
================================================================================================================================================================================================
East Asia and the Pacific
ATA Regional-East Asia and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,366 -- -- -- -- 2,366 --
the Pacific..............
Burma..................... -- -- 6,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,500 --
Cambodia.................. 22,500 -- 17,000 -- -- 200 -- -- 3,020 -- -- -- -- 42,720 --
China..................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,104 -- -- -- 2,104 --
China Rule of Law......... -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
East Timor................ -- -- 19,000 2,000 -- 100 -- -- -- 1,329 5,000 -- -- 27,429 --
Fiji...................... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- 1,363 -- -- -- 1,463 --
Indonesia................. 32,568 38,704 60,000 -- -- 400 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 131,672 10,245
KEDO...................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 75,000 -- -- -- -- 75,000 --
Kiribati.................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,182 -- -- -- 1,182 --
Laos...................... 1,000 1,000 -- -- -- 100 3,000 -- 1,200 -- -- -- -- 6,300 --
Malaysia.................. -- -- -- -- -- 800 -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- 1,100 --
Micronesia................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,866 -- -- -- 1,866 --
Mongolia.................. -- -- 12,000 1,000 -- 725 -- -- -- 1,859 -- -- -- 15,584 --
MRA East Asia............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,500 -- -- -- -- -- 15,500 --
Papua New Guinea.......... -- -- -- -- -- 240 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 240 --
Philippines............... 24,550 26,609 20,000 20,000 -- 2,400 -- -- -- 2,611 -- -- -- 96,170 --
Regional Democracy........ -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Regional Security Fund.... -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 250 --
Regional Women's Issues... -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Samoa..................... -- -- -- -- -- 120 -- -- -- 1,345 -- -- -- 1,465 --
Solomon Islands........... -- -- -- -- -- 150 -- -- -- 27 -- -- -- 177 --
South Pacific Fisheries... -- -- 18,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18,000 --
Thailand.................. 1,000 2,250 -- 2,000 -- 1,750 3,750 -- 50 1,694 -- -- -- 12,494 --
Tonga..................... -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- -- -- 1,071 -- -- -- 1,196 --
Vanuatu................... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- 1,414 -- -- -- 1,514 --
Vietnam................... 4,006 8,450 -- -- -- 100 -- -- 1,750 -- -- -- -- 14,306 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total East Asia and the 85,624 77,013 166,750 25,000 -- 7,410 6,750 15,500 83,686 17,865 5,000 -- -- 490,598 10,245
Pacific....................
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Europe and Eurasia
Albania................... -- -- -- 5,000 -- 900 -- -- 490 1,227 -- 28,000 -- 35,617 --
Armenia................... -- -- -- 3,000 70,000 750 -- -- 2,600 1,535 -- -- -- 77,885 --
ATA Regional-Europe and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17,517 -- -- -- -- 17,517 --
Eurasia..................
Azerbaijan................ -- -- -- 3,000 46,000 750 -- -- 3,230 1,223 -- -- -- 54,203 --
Belarus................... -- -- -- -- 9,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,500 --
Bosnia and Herzegovina.... -- -- -- 2,500 -- 900 -- -- 30 -- -- 50,000 -- 53,430 --
Bulgaria.................. -- -- -- 9,500 -- 1,350 -- -- 730 2,744 -- 28,000 -- 42,324 --
Croatia................... -- -- -- 6,000 -- 700 -- -- 90 -- -- 30,000 -- 36,790 --
Cyprus.................... -- -- 15,000 -- -- -- -- -- 260 -- -- -- -- 15,260 --
Czech Republic............ -- -- -- 11,000 -- 1,900 -- -- 400 -- -- -- -- 13,300 --
Estonia................... -- -- -- 6,750 -- 1,100 -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- 7,950 --
European Bank for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,805 35,805 --
Reconstruction and
Development..............
Federal Republic of -- -- -- 1,000 -- 300 -- -- 100 -- -- 135,000 -- 136,400 --
Yugoslavia...............
Georgia................... -- -- -- 7,000 87,000 1,200 -- -- 1,100 1,404 -- -- -- 97,704 --
Greece.................... -- -- -- -- -- 600 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 600 --
Hungary................... -- -- -- 11,000 -- 1,900 -- -- 270 -- -- -- -- 13,170 --
International Fund for -- -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 --
Ireland..................
Irish Visa Program........ -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Kazakhstan................ -- -- -- 3,000 43,000 1,000 -- -- 1,950 2,783 -- -- -- 51,733 --
Kosovo.................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 85,000 -- 85,000 --
Kyrgyz Republic........... -- -- -- 4,000 36,000 1,100 -- -- 1,200 1,304 -- -- -- 43,604 --
Latvia.................... -- -- -- 7,000 -- 1,100 -- -- 1,600 -- -- -- -- 9,700 --
Lithuania................. -- -- -- 7,500 -- 1,100 -- -- 920 -- -- -- -- 9,520 --
Macedonia................. -- -- -- 11,000 -- 650 -- -- 190 1,138 -- 50,000 -- 62,978 --
Malta..................... -- -- -- 1,000 -- 300 -- -- 480 -- -- -- -- 1,780 --
Moldova................... -- -- -- 1,500 32,500 900 -- -- 2,320 2,135 -- -- -- 39,355 --
MRA Europe................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 77,000 -- -- -- -- -- 77,000 --
NIS Regional Export -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- -- 500 --
Controls.................
OSCE Bosnia............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17,500 -- -- 17,500 --
OSCE Croatia.............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,300 -- -- 2,300 --
OSCE Kosovo............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12,500 -- -- 12,500 --
OSCE Regional-Europe...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,550 -- -- 14,550 --
Poland.................... -- -- -- 13,000 -- 2,000 -- -- 600 -- -- -- -- 15,600 --
Portugal.................. -- -- -- -- -- 850 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 850 --
Regional FSA.............. -- -- -- -- 67,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 67,000 --
Regional SEED............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 -- 60,000 --
Romania................... -- -- -- 10,000 -- 1,500 -- -- 560 3,656 -- 29,000 -- 44,716 --
Russia.................... -- -- -- -- 148,000 800 -- -- 3,980 2,465 -- -- -- 155,245 --
Science Centers/Bio -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 52,000 -- -- -- -- 52,000 --
Redirection..............
Slovakia.................. -- -- -- 9,000 -- 950 -- -- 700 -- -- -- -- 10,650 --
Slovenia.................. -- -- -- 5,000 -- 950 -- -- 550 -- -- -- -- 6,500 --
Tajikistan................ -- -- -- -- 22,500 350 -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- 22,900 --
Turkey.................... -- -- -- 17,500 -- 2,800 -- -- 600 -- -- -- -- 20,900 --
Turkmenistan.............. -- -- -- 700 7,000 450 -- -- 50 1,460 -- -- -- 9,660 --
Ukraine................... -- -- -- 4,000 155,000 1,700 -- -- 3,050 4,723 -- -- -- 168,473 --
Uzbekistan................ -- -- -- 8,750 31,500 1,200 -- -- 1,200 1,952 -- -- -- 44,602 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Europe and Eurasia.... -- -- 44,000 168,700 755,000 32,050 -- 77,000 99,417 29,749 46,850 495,000 35,805 1,783,571 --
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Near East
Algeria................... -- -- -- -- -- 550 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 550 --
ATA Regional-Near East -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,012 -- -- -- -- 9,012 --
Asia.....................
Bahrain................... -- -- -- -- -- 450 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 450 --
Egypt..................... -- -- 615,000 1,300,000 -- 1,200 -- -- 135 -- -- -- -- 1,916,335 --
Iraq Opposition........... -- -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 --
Israel.................... -- -- 800,000 2,100,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,900,000 --
Jordan.................... -- -- 250,000 198,000 -- 2,400 -- -- 1,000 1,035 -- -- -- 452,435 --
Lebanon................... -- 500 32,000 -- -- 700 -- -- 900 -- -- -- -- 34,100 --
Middle East Democracy..... -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Middle East Multilaterals. -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Middle East Regional -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Cooperation..............
Morocco................... -- 6,713 -- 5,000 -- 1,500 -- -- -- 3,333 -- -- -- 16,546 --
MRA Near East............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 102,500 -- -- -- -- -- 102,500 --
MRA Refugees to Israel.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 --
Multinational Force and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,400 -- -- 16,400 --
Observers................
Oman...................... -- -- -- 20,000 -- 750 -- -- 150 -- -- -- -- 20,900 --
Saudi Arabia.............. -- -- -- -- -- 25 -- -- 80 -- -- -- -- 105 --
Tunisia................... -- -- -- 5,000 -- 1,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,500 --
U.S. North Africa Economic -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Partnership..............
United Arab Emirates...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 350 -- -- -- -- 350 --
West Bank/Gaza............ -- -- 75,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 125,000 --
Yemen..................... -- -- 10,000 2,000 -- 650 -- -- 915 -- -- -- -- 13,565 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Near East............. -- 7,213 1,824,000 3,630,000 -- 9,725 -- 162,500 12,542 4,368 16,400 -- 50,000 5,716,748 --
================================================================================================================================================================================================
South Asia
ATA Regional-South Asia... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,867 -- -- -- -- 9,867 --
Bangladesh................ 33,700 24,720 7,000 -- -- 750 -- -- -- 1,017 -- -- -- 67,187 45,083
India..................... 40,785 34,400 25,000 50,000 -- 1,000 -- -- 1,750 -- -- -- -- 152,935 91,288
Maldives.................. -- -- -- -- -- 150 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 150 --
MRA South Asia............ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 30,300 -- -- -- -- -- 30,300 --
Nepal..................... 20,449 11,247 6,000 3,000 -- 500 -- -- -- 2,264 -- -- -- 43,460 --
Pakistan.................. 12,500 37,500 200,000 50,000 -- 1,000 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 305,000 --
South Asia Regional Funds. -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Southwest Asia Initiatives -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Sri Lanka................. 300 5,750 4,000 -- -- 350 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,400 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total South Asia............ 107,734 113,617 244,000 103,000 -- 3,750 7,000 30,300 11,617 3,281 -- -- -- 624,299 136,371
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Western Hemisphere
Administration of Justice. -- -- 11,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,000 --
Argentina................. -- -- -- 2,000 -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
ATA Regional-Western -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,442 -- -- -- -- 8,442 --
Hemisphere...............
Bahamas................... -- -- -- 100 -- 140 1,200 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,440 --
Belize.................... -- -- -- 300 -- 175 -- -- -- 1,555 -- -- -- 2,030 --
Bolivia................... 18,513 12,230 10,000 2,000 -- 800 91,000 -- -- 3,032 -- -- -- 137,575 21,525
Brazil.................... 11,821 6,680 -- -- -- 500 12,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 31,001 --
Caribbean Regional........ 4,688 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,688 --
Central American Regional. 5,412 20,142 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,554 --
Chile..................... -- -- -- 1,000 -- 600 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,600 --
Colombia.................. -- -- -- 98,000 -- 1,180 439,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 538,180 --
Costa Rica................ -- -- -- -- -- 400 -- -- -- 1,191 -- -- -- 1,591 --
Cuba...................... -- -- 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 --
Dominican Republic........ 11,409 8,000 3,500 320 -- 500 -- -- -- 3,296 -- -- -- 27,025 --
Eastern Caribbean......... -- -- -- 2,130 -- 700 -- -- -- 2,608 -- -- -- 5,438 --
Ecuador................... -- 7,130 20,000 1,000 -- 650 37,000 -- 250 3,028 -- -- -- 69,058 --
El Salvador............... 9,636 24,096 -- 2,500 -- 900 -- -- -- 2,760 -- -- -- 39,892 --
FTAA Technical Assistance. -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 --
Guatemala................. 11,739 14,960 7,500 -- -- 350 3,400 -- -- 4,740 -- -- -- 42,689 18,013
Guyana.................... 1,000 2,180 -- 400 -- 275 -- -- -- 1,268 -- -- -- 5,123 --
Haiti..................... 14,000 11,000 -- 400 -- 50 -- -- -- 1,689 -- -- -- 27,139 22,375
Honduras.................. 12,561 22,530 -- -- -- 650 -- -- -- 4,320 -- -- -- 40,061 5,191
Inter-American Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 29,591 29,591 --
Bank-Multilateral
Investment Fund..........
Inter-American Foundation. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 14,000 --
Inter-American Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 30,352 30,352 --
Corporation..............
Jamaica................... 3,070 13,710 -- 700 -- 600 1,300 -- -- 2,424 -- -- -- 21,804 --
LAC Regional.............. 6,813 53,462 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 60,275 --
Latin America Regional.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,500 --
Mexico.................... 6,200 12,165 12,000 -- -- 1,250 12,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 43,615 --
MRA Western Hemisphere.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 --
Nicaragua................. 7,606 19,730 -- 500 -- 400 -- -- 200 2,874 -- -- -- 31,310 10,363
OAS Development Assistance -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,500 5,500 --
Programs.................
OAS Fund for Strengthening -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,500 2,500 --
Democracy................
OAS/IADB Demining......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,100 -- -- -- -- 1,100 --
Panama.................... -- 7,000 3,500 1,000 -- 200 9,000 -- -- 2,408 -- -- -- 23,108 --
Paraguay.................. 2,025 4,600 3,500 -- -- 300 -- -- 100 3,419 -- -- -- 13,944 --
Peru...................... 22,027 18,870 10,000 1,000 -- 600 135,000 -- 175 1,270 -- -- -- 188,942 25,053
Peru-Ecuador Peace........ -- -- 4,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,500 --
Suriname.................. -- -- -- 250 -- 150 -- -- -- 925 -- -- -- 1,325 --
Third Border Initiative... -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Trinidad and Tobago....... -- -- -- 400 -- 150 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 550 --
Uruguay................... -- -- -- 1,000 -- 450 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,450 --
Venezuela................. -- -- 500 -- -- 700 8,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,200 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Western Hemisphere.... 148,520 268,485 96,000 115,000 -- 13,670 758,400 14,500 10,267 42,807 -- -- 81,943 1,549,592 102,520
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Global
Asia Regional............. -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,500 --
Asia-Near East Regional... 17,742 55,305 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 73,047 --
Asian Development Fund.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 147,386 147,386 --
ATA Program Management.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,700 -- -- -- -- 10,700 --
ATA WMD Preparedness -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- 1,000 --
Program..................
Civilian Police Program... -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
CTBT International -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18,200 -- -- -- -- 18,200 --
Monitoring System........
Demining Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 675 -- -- -- -- 675 --
Expenses.................
Demining Crosscutting -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,740 -- -- -- -- 5,740 --
Initiatives..............
Demining Mine Surveys..... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,070 -- -- -- -- 5,070 --
Demining New Country -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,730 -- -- -- -- 6,730 --
Programs.................
Demining Research and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,525 -- -- -- -- 1,525 --
Training.................
Democracy, Conflict & 23,800 76,300 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100,100 --
Humanitarian Assistance..
Development Credit Program- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,500 7,500 --
Admin. Exp...............
E-IMET Schools............ -- -- -- -- -- 1,800 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,800 --
Economic Growth, -- 154,800 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 154,800 --
Agriculture and Trade....
Enhanced International -- -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Peacekeeping Capabilities
Export Control Program -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- -- 500 --
Administration...........
Export Control Regional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,895 -- -- -- -- 5,895 --
Advisors.................
Export-Import Bank- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 68,327 68,327 --
Administrative Expenses..
Export-Import Bank-Direct -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (13,000) (13,000) --
Loans, Negative Subsidies
Export-Import Bank-Loan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 541,400 541,400 --
Subsidy..................
FMF Administrative Costs.. -- -- -- 37,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 37,000 --
General Costs............. -- -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500 --
Global Development -- 30,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 30,000 --
Alliance.................
Global Environment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 177,813 177,813 --
Facility.................
Global Health............. 301,000 3,800 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 304,800 --
Human Rights and Democracy -- -- 12,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12,000 --
Funds....................
INL Anticrime Programs.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 --
International Atomic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 -- -- -- -- 50,000 --
Energy Agency Voluntary
Contribution.............
International Civil -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 300 300 --
Aviation Organization....
International Conservation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,225 6,225 --
Programs.................
International -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,750 1,750 --
Contributions for
Scientific, Educational,
and Cultural Activities..
International Development -- -- -- -- -- -- D-- -- -- -- -- -- 874,338 874,338 --
Association..............
International Disaster -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 235,500 235,500 --
Assistance...............
International Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,004 15,004 --
Agricultural Development.
International Law -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 --
Enforcement Academies....
International -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 --
Organizations............
International 326,356 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 331,356 --
Organizations/
Partnerships.............
International Panel on -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,600 5,600 --
Climate Change/UN
Framework Convention on
Climate Change...........
International Trust Fund- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
NADR.....................
Interregional Aviation -- -- -- -- -- -- 65,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 65,000 --
Support..................
Montreal Protocol -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 23,000 23,000 --
Multilateral Fund........
MRA Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,000 -- -- -- -- -- 16,000 --
Expenses.................
MRA Migration............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,700 -- -- -- -- -- 15,700 --
MRA Multiregional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 56,000 -- -- -- -- -- 56,000 --
Activities...............
MRA Refugee Admissions.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 130,000 -- -- -- -- -- 130,000 --
Multilateral Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,631 3,631 --
Guarantee Agency.........
NADR Regional Export -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 900 -- -- -- -- 900 --
Controls.................
Non-Proliferation and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 -- -- -- -- 15,000 --
Disarmament Fund.........
Oceans, Environmental and -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Science Initiative.......
OPIC-Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39,885 39,885 --
Expenses.................
OPIC-Credit Funding....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24,000 24,000 --
OPIC-Net Offsetting -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (291,000) (291,000) --
Collections..............
Partnership to Eliminate -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Sweatshops...............
Peace Corps Other......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 155,598 -- -- -- 155,598 --
Policy Initiatives........ -- 25,000 20,250 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 51,250 775,172
Program & Policy 4,700 7,400 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12,100 --
Coordination.............
Program Development and -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,850 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,850 --
Support..................
Regional Narc. Training -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
and Demand Reduction.....
Reserve to be Allocated... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 25,000 --
Systems Support and -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Upgrades.................
Terrorist Interdiction -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Program..................
Trade and Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 44,512 44,512 --
Agency...................
Trafficking in Persons.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
Transition Initiatives.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 55,000 55,000 --
Treasury Technical -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 10,000 --
Assistance...............
U.S. Emergency Refugee and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 15,000 --
Migration Assistance Fund
UN Children's Fund........ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 120,000 120,000 --
UN Development Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 1,000 --
Women....................
UN Development Program.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100,000 100,000 --
UN Environment Program.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,025 10,025 --
UN Voluntary Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,500 1,500 --
Technical Cooperation in
the Field of Human Rights
UN Voluntary Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 5,000 --
Victims of Torture.......
USAID Capital Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 95,000 95,000 --
Fund.....................
USAID Inspector General -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 32,700 32,700 --
Operating Expenses.......
USAID Operating Expenses.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 572,200 572,200 --
World Meteorological -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 2,000 --
Organization.............
World Trade Organization.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 1,000 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Global................ 673,598 357,605 38,250 47,000 -- 2,300 148,850 217,700 136,935 155,598 -- -- 2,957,596 4,735,432 775,172
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Total FY 2003............... 1,473,967 1,365,533 2,490,000 4,107,200 755,000 80,000 928,000 705,000 372,400 317,000 108,250 495,000 3,265,063 16,462,413 1,185,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX E.--U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Country/Account Summaries (`Spigots') FY 2004
($ in thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peace
Countries/Accounts CSH DA ESF FMF FSA IMET INCLE MRA NADR Corps PKO SEED Other Total P.L. 480
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa
Africa Regional........... 33,420 64,976 -- -- -- -- 7,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 105,396 --
Africa Regional Fund...... -- -- 14,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 --
Africa Regional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,000 -- -- 9,000 --
Peacekeeping.............
African Contingency -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 -- -- 15,000 --
Operations Training and
Assistance...............
African Development Bank.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,105 5,105 --
African Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17,689 17,689 --
Foundation...............
African Development Fund.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 118,081 118,081 --
Agriculture Initiative.... -- 43,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 43,000 --
Angola.................... 11,200 2,500 3,500 -- -- 100 -- -- 5,300 -- -- -- -- 22,600 7,538
Anti-Corruption Initiative -- 6,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 --
ATA Regional-Africa....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,906 -- -- -- -- 4,906 --
Benin..................... 7,529 6,892 -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- 3,079 -- -- -- 18,000 4,699
Botswana.................. -- -- -- 1,000 -- 700 -- -- -- 1,565 -- -- -- 3,265 --
Burkina Faso.............. -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- 2,964 -- -- -- 3,014 8,353
Burundi................... 2,500 1,800 3,500 -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,900 9,500
Cameroon.................. -- -- -- -- -- 200 -- -- -- 3,534 -- -- -- 3,734 --
Cape Verde................ -- -- -- -- -- 120 -- -- -- 1,498 -- -- -- 1,618 3,499
Central African Republic.. -- -- -- -- -- 150 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 150 --
Chad...................... -- -- -- -- -- 150 -- -- 650 1,302 -- -- -- 2,102 2,327
Comoros................... -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 --
Congo Basin Forest -- 15,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 --
Partnership..............
Cote d'Ivoire............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,728 -- -- -- 1,728 --
Democratic Republic of 18,086 6,082 4,250 -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 28,518 --
Congo....................
Djibouti.................. -- -- -- 2,000 -- 225 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,225 --
ECOWAS.................... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 --
Education Initiative...... -- 50,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 --
Equatorial Guinea......... -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 --
Eritrea................... 5,400 840 -- 500 -- 450 -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- 8,190 2,256
Ethiopia.................. 37,168 15,438 5,000 500 -- 570 -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- 58,976 20,803
Gabon..................... -- -- -- -- -- 160 -- -- -- 2,809 -- -- -- 2,969 --
Gambia.................... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- 2,477 -- -- -- 2,577 --
Ghana..................... 22,220 14,575 -- 500 -- 500 -- -- -- 3,421 -- -- -- 41,216 21,767
Guinea.................... 6,659 11,095 -- -- -- 350 -- -- -- 3,325 -- -- -- 21,429 4,474
Guinea-Bissau............. -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 --
Kenya..................... 38,513 3,776 8,000 6,500 -- 600 -- -- -- 3,915 -- -- -- 61,304 14,262
Lesotho................... -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- -- -- 2,755 -- -- -- 2,880 --
Liberia................... 2,045 1,100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,145 --
Madagascar................ 8,915 10,945 -- -- -- 200 -- -- -- 2,596 -- -- -- 22,656 12,590
Malawi.................... 21,919 10,555 -- -- -- 360 -- -- -- 2,555 -- -- -- 35,389 4,918
Mali...................... 12,659 17,027 -- -- -- 350 -- -- -- 4,399 -- -- -- 34,435 --
Mauritania................ -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- -- 100 2,373 -- -- -- 2,598 3,204
Mauritius................. -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 125 --
Military Health Affairs... -- -- -- 1,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,500 --
Mozambique................ 24,200 16,061 -- -- -- 225 -- -- 1,750 2,469 -- -- -- 44,705 16,659
MRA Africa................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 209,070 -- -- -- -- -- 209,070 --
Namibia................... 2,500 4,932 -- -- -- 225 -- -- 150 3,050 -- -- -- 10,857 --
Niger..................... -- -- -- -- -- 200 -- -- -- 3,138 -- -- -- 3,338 6,953
Nigeria................... 46,300 12,639 5,000 4,000 -- 850 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 68,789 --
REDSO/ESA................. 14,887 7,404 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 22,291 --
Regional Center for South -- 12,771 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12,771 --
Africa...................
Regional Organizations.... -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Republic of the Congo..... -- -- -- -- -- 110 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 110 --
Rwanda.................... 14,506 4,810 -- -- -- 175 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19,491 12,438
Safe Skies................ -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Sao Tome and Principe..... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 --
Senegal................... 15,825 12,209 -- 500 -- 1,000 -- -- -- 4,036 -- -- -- 33,570 5,387
Seychelles................ -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 --
Sierra Leone.............. 500 3,727 5,000 -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,527 --
Somalia................... 411 965 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,300 -- -- -- -- 2,676 --
South Africa.............. 31,628 27,457 2,000 6,000 -- 1,600 -- -- 50 3,293 -- -- -- 72,028 --
Sudan..................... 16,426 49,613 15,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 81,039 --
Swaziland................. -- -- -- -- -- 135 -- -- -- 1,572 -- -- -- 1,707 --
Tanzania.................. 25,164 3,227 -- -- -- 230 -- -- -- 3,829 -- -- -- 32,450 --
Togo...................... -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- -- -- 2,746 -- -- -- 2,871 --
Trade Initiative.......... -- 25,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 --
Uganda.................... 41,795 20,273 -- -- -- 200 -- -- -- 1,723 -- -- -- 63,991 18,520
West Africa Regional...... 23,800 5,878 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 29,678 1,779
Zambia.................... 40,095 9,632 -- -- -- 225 -- -- 300 4,003 -- -- -- 54,255 3,100
Zimbabwe.................. 15,835 746 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20,581 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Africa................ 542,105 498,945 77,250 23,000 -- 12,510 7,000 209,070 15,806 76,154 24,000 -- 140,875 1,626,715 185,026
================================================================================================================================================================================================
East Asia and the Pacific
ASEAN Regional............ -- -- 2,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,500 --
ATA Regional-East Asia and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,656 -- -- -- -- 5,656 --
the Pacific..............
Burma..................... 2,500 -- 6,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,000 --
Cambodia.................. 22,800 2,000 15,000 -- -- 200 -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- 43,000 --
China..................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,372 -- -- -- 2,372 --
East Timor................ -- -- 13,500 2,000 -- 150 -- -- -- 1,559 2,000 -- -- 19,209 --
Fiji...................... -- -- -- -- -- 200 -- -- -- 1,557 -- -- -- 1,757 --
Indonesia................. 29,250 31,691 60,000 -- -- 600 -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- 125,541 11,194
Kiribati.................. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,342 -- -- -- 1,342 --
Laos...................... 1,350 -- -- -- -- 100 3,000 -- 1,700 -- -- -- -- 6,150 --
Malaysia.................. -- -- -- -- -- 1,200 -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- 1,300 --
Micronesia................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,021 -- -- -- 2,021 --
Mongolia.................. -- -- 10,000 1,000 -- 850 -- -- -- 2,073 -- -- -- 13,923 --
MRA East Asia............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,260 -- -- -- -- -- 14,260 --
Papua New Guinea.......... -- -- -- -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 300 --
Philippines............... 22,000 23,068 20,000 17,000 -- 2,700 2,000 -- -- 2,946 -- -- -- 89,714 --
Regional Democracy........ -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Regional Security Fund.... -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 250 --
Regional Women's Issues... -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Samoa..................... -- -- -- -- -- 150 -- -- -- 1,524 -- -- -- 1,674 --
Solomon Islands........... -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 --
South Pacific Fisheries... -- -- 18,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18,000 --
Southeast Asia Regional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 700 -- -- -- -- 700 --
Funds....................
Thailand.................. 3,000 750 -- 1,000 -- 2,450 2,000 -- 1,500 1,922 -- -- -- 12,622 --
Tonga..................... -- -- -- -- -- 125 -- -- -- 1,145 -- -- -- 1,270 --
Vanuatu................... -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- 1,572 -- -- -- 1,672 --
Vietnam................... 7,200 4,000 -- -- -- 100 -- -- 1,650 -- -- -- -- 12,950 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total East Asia and the 88,100 61,509 152,750 21,000 -- 9,275 7,000 14,260 18,306 20,033 2,000 -- -- 394,233 11,194
Pacific....................
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Europe and Eurasia
Albania................... -- -- -- 4,000 -- 975 -- -- 500 1,467 -- 28,000 -- 34,942 --
Armenia................... -- -- -- 2,500 49,500 900 -- -- 1,000 1,685 -- -- -- 55,585 --
ATA Regional-Europe and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19,051 -- -- -- -- 19,051 --
Eurasia..................
Azerbaijan................ -- -- -- 2,500 41,500 900 -- -- 3,300 1,402 -- -- -- 49,602 --
Belarus................... -- -- -- -- 8,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,000 --
Bosnia and Herzegovina.... -- -- -- 2,000 -- 900 -- -- 800 -- -- 44,000 -- 47,700 --
Bulgaria.................. -- -- -- 8,500 -- 1,350 -- -- 700 3,040 -- 28,000 -- 41,590 --
Croatia................... -- -- -- 5,000 -- 800 -- -- 750 -- -- 25,000 -- 31,550 --
Cyprus.................... -- -- 7,500 -- -- -- -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- 7,800 --
Czech Republic............ -- -- -- 10,000 -- 1,900 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,900 --
Estonia................... -- -- -- 6,250 -- 1,200 -- -- 1,750 -- -- -- -- 9,200 --
European Bank for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,431 35,431 --
Reconstruction and
Development..............
Federal Republic of -- -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- 750 -- -- 113,000 -- 114,250 --
Yugoslavia...............
Georgia................... -- -- -- 10,000 75,000 1,300 -- -- 2,100 1,529 -- -- -- 89,929 --
Greece.................... -- -- -- -- -- 600 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 600 --
Hungary................... -- -- -- 10,000 -- 1,900 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,900 --
International Fund for -- -- 8,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,500 --
Ireland..................
Irish Visa Program........ -- -- 4,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,000 --
Kazakhstan................ -- -- -- 3,000 32,000 1,200 -- -- 2,200 3,130 -- -- -- 41,530 --
Kosovo.................... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 79,000 -- 79,000 --
Kyrgyz Republic........... -- -- -- 6,000 40,000 1,200 -- -- 1,400 1,673 -- -- -- 50,273 --
Latvia.................... -- -- -- 6,250 -- 1,200 -- -- 1,800 -- -- -- -- 9,250 --
Lithuania................. -- -- -- 7,000 -- 1,200 -- -- 1,800 -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
Macedonia................. -- -- -- 10,000 -- 700 -- -- 300 1,389 -- 39,000 -- 51,389 --
Malta..................... -- -- -- 1,000 -- 250 -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- 1,350 --
Moldova................... -- -- -- 1,000 23,000 1,000 -- -- 1,000 2,398 -- -- -- 28,398 --
MRA Europe................ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 58,100 -- -- -- -- -- 58,100 --
NIS Regional Export -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,400 -- -- -- -- 1,400 --
Controls.................
OSCE Bosnia............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,800 -- -- 11,800 --
OSCE Croatia.............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 900 -- -- 900 --
OSCE Kosovo............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,500 -- -- 9,500 --
OSCE Regional-Europe...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,300 -- -- 9,300 --
Poland.................... -- -- -- 12,000 -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 --
Portugal.................. -- -- -- -- -- 850 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 850 --
Regional FSA.............. -- -- -- -- 55,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 55,000 --
Regional SEED............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 51,000 -- 51,000 --
Romania................... -- -- -- 9,000 -- 1,500 -- -- 1,000 3,962 -- 28,000 -- 43,462 --
Russia.................... -- -- -- -- 73,000 800 -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- 76,800 --
Science Centers/Bio -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 59,000 -- -- -- -- 59,000 --
Redirection..............
Slovakia.................. -- -- -- 8,000 -- 950 -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- 9,250 --
Slovenia.................. -- -- -- 4,000 -- 950 -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- 5,250 --
Tajikistan................ -- -- -- 700 35,000 400 -- -- 300 -- -- -- -- 36,400 10,400
Turkey.................... -- -- 200,000 50,000 -- 5,000 -- -- 600 -- -- -- -- 255,600 --
Turkmenistan.............. -- -- -- 700 8,000 450 -- -- 200 1,795 -- -- -- 11,145 --
Ukraine................... -- -- -- 3,000 94,000 1,700 -- -- 2,000 5,410 -- -- -- 106,110 --
Uzbekistan................ -- -- -- 10,000 42,000 1,600 -- -- 1,400 2,461 -- -- -- 57,461 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Europe and Eurasia.... -- -- 220,000 192,400 576,000 36,175 -- 58,100 109,101 31,341 31,500 435,000 35,431 1,725,048 10,400
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Near East
Algeria................... -- -- -- -- -- 550 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 550 --
ATA Regional-Near East -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,087 -- -- -- -- 13,087 --
Asia.....................
Bahrain................... -- -- -- 25,000 -- 600 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,600 --
Egypt..................... -- -- 575,000 1,300,000 -- 1,200 -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- 1,876,450 --
Israel.................... -- -- 480,000 2,160,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,640,000 --
Jordan.................... -- -- 250,000 206,000 -- 2,900 -- -- 1,250 2,326 -- -- -- 462,476 --
Lebanon................... -- 500 32,000 -- -- 700 -- -- 900 -- -- -- -- 34,100 --
Middle East Multilaterals. -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Middle East Partnership -- -- 145,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 145,000 --
Initiative...............
Middle East Regional -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Cooperation..............
Morocco................... -- 5,400 -- 10,000 -- 1,750 -- -- -- 3,714 -- -- -- 20,864 --
MRA Near East............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 102,320 -- -- -- -- -- 102,320 --
MRA Refugees to Israel.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 --
Multinational Force and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,400 -- -- 16,400 --
Observers................
Oman...................... -- -- -- 25,000 -- 1,000 -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- 26,100 --
Saudi Arabia.............. -- -- -- -- -- 25 -- -- 80 -- -- -- -- 105 --
Tunisia................... -- -- -- 10,000 -- 1,750 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,750 --
United Arab Emirates...... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 250 -- -- -- -- 250 --
West Bank/Gaza............ -- -- 75,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 75,000 --
Yemen..................... -- -- 15,000 15,000 -- 1,000 -- -- 850 -- -- -- -- 31,850 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Near East............. -- 5,900 1,580,000 3,751,000 -- 11,475 -- 152,320 16,767 6,040 16,400 -- -- 5,539,902 --
================================================================================================================================================================================================
South Asia
Afghanistan............... 21,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 -- 600 40,000 -- 18,950 -- 20,000 -- -- 550,550 --
ATA Regional-South Asia... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,219 -- -- -- -- 5,219 --
Bangladesh................ 32,000 18,850 6,000 -- -- 800 -- -- -- 1,255 -- -- -- 58,905 45,445
India..................... 40,800 27,100 20,000 5,000 -- 1,250 -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- 95,150 45,000
Maldives.................. -- -- -- -- -- 175 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 175 --
MRA South Asia............ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 79,040 -- -- -- -- -- 79,040 --
Nepal..................... 18,500 14,311 6,000 10,000 -- 600 -- -- -- 2,402 -- -- -- 51,813 --
Pakistan.................. 25,000 50,000 200,000 75,000 -- 1,250 38,000 -- 6,000 -- -- -- -- 395,250 --
South Asia Regional Funds. -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Sri Lanka................. 500 5,000 14,000 1,000 -- 500 -- -- 1,700 -- 1,000 -- -- 23,700 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total South Asia............ 137,800 265,261 398,000 241,000 -- 5,175 78,000 79,040 32,869 3,657 21,000 -- -- 1,261,802 90,445
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Western Hemisphere
Administration of Justice. -- -- 7,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,000 --
Argentina................. -- -- -- 1,500 -- 1,100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,600 --
ATA Regional-Western -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,297 -- -- -- -- 2,297 --
Hemisphere...............
Bahamas................... -- -- -- 100 -- 140 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,240 --
Belize.................... -- -- -- 200 -- 200 -- -- -- 1,680 -- -- -- 2,080 --
Bolivia................... 14,402 11,380 8,000 4,000 -- 900 91,000 -- -- 3,294 -- -- -- 132,976 21,655
Brazil.................... 12,011 8,222 -- -- -- 500 12,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 32,733 --
Caribbean Regional........ 6,532 3,480 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,012 --
Central American Regional. 7,628 17,231 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24,859 --
Chile..................... -- -- -- 500 -- 600 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,100 --
Colombia.................. -- -- -- 110,000 -- 1,600 463,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 574,600 --
Costa Rica................ -- -- -- -- -- 400 -- -- -- 1,374 -- -- -- 1,774 --
Cuba...................... -- -- 7,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,000 --
Dominican Republic........ 13,110 10,600 3,000 320 -- 500 -- -- -- 3,630 -- -- -- 31,160 --
Eastern Caribbean......... -- -- -- 2,000 -- 700 -- -- -- 2,939 -- -- -- 5,639 --
Ecuador................... 300 7,130 14,000 15,000 -- 650 35,000 -- -- 3,311 -- -- -- 75,391 --
El Salvador............... 6,334 28,712 -- 2,000 -- 900 -- -- -- 3,113 -- -- -- 41,059 --
Guatemala................. 10,250 10,700 5,000 -- -- 350 3,000 -- -- 5,164 -- -- -- 34,464 19,030
Guyana.................... 2,000 2,750 -- 100 -- 275 -- -- -- 1,413 -- -- -- 6,538 --
Haiti..................... 21,826 7,150 -- 330 -- 200 -- -- -- 1,929 -- -- -- 31,435 23,847
Honduras.................. 13,861 22,226 -- -- -- 650 -- -- -- 4,306 -- -- -- 41,043 5,365
Inter-American Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 32,614 32,614 --
Bank-Multilateral
Investment Fund..........
Inter-American Foundation. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,185 15,185 --
Inter-American Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 30,898 30,898 --
Corporation..............
Jamaica................... 3,407 13,060 -- 600 -- 600 1,500 -- -- 2,754 -- -- -- 21,921 --
LAC Regional.............. 5,161 38,338 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 43,499 --
Latin America Regional.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Mexico.................... 4,976 12,265 12,000 -- -- 1,275 37,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 67,516 --
MRA Western Hemisphere.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 21,000 -- -- -- -- -- 21,000 --
Nicaragua................. 6,855 24,152 -- 500 -- 400 -- -- 300 3,236 -- -- -- 35,443 10,565
OAS Development Assistance -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,500 5,500 --
Programs.................
OAS Fund for Strengthening -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,500 2,500 --
Democracy................
OAS/IADB Demining......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Panama.................... -- 5,750 3,500 2,500 -- 200 9,000 -- 50 2,678 -- -- -- 23,678 --
Paraguay.................. 2,025 4,000 3,500 -- -- 300 -- -- -- 3,815 -- -- -- 13,640 --
Peru...................... 16,732 15,316 9,000 2,000 -- 700 116,000 -- -- 1,455 -- -- -- 161,203 20,472
Peru-Ecuador Peace........ -- -- 4,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,500 --
South American Regional... 1,154 2,400 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,554 --
Suriname.................. -- -- -- 150 -- 150 -- -- -- 1,021 -- -- -- 1,321 --
Third Border Initiative... -- -- 9,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,000 --
Trinidad and Tobago....... -- -- -- 300 -- 150 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 450 --
Uruguay................... -- -- -- 1,000 -- 450 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,450 --
Venezuela................. -- -- 500 -- -- 700 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,200 --
WHA Regional.............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50 -- -- -- -- 50 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Western Hemisphere.... 148,564 244,862 86,000 143,100 -- 14,590 778,500 21,000 5,697 47,112 -- -- 86,697 1,576,122 100,934
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Global
Asia Regional............. -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 --
Asia-Near East Regional... 14,418 26,218 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 40,636 --
Asian Development Fund.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 151,921 151,921 --
ATA Program Management.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19,300 -- -- -- -- 19,300 --
Civilian Police Program... -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,700 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,700 --
CT Engagement w/Allies.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,500 -- -- -- -- 2,500 --
CTBT International -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19,300 -- -- -- -- 19,300 --
Monitoring System........
Debt Restructuring........ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 395,000 395,000 --
Demining Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 900 -- -- -- -- 900 --
Expenses.................
Demining Crosscutting -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,975 -- -- -- -- 4,975 --
Initiatives..............
Demining Mine Surveys..... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,000 -- -- -- -- 3,000 --
Demining New Country -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,500 -- -- -- -- 3,500 --
Programs.................
Demining Research and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,525 -- -- -- -- 1,525 --
Training.................
Democracy, Conflict & 3,050 69,452 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 72,502 --
Humanitarian Assistance..
Development Credit Program- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8,000 8,000 --
Admin. Exp...............
E-IMET Schools............ -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Economic Growth, -- 149,703 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 149,703 --
Agriculture and Trade....
Emergency Plan for AIDS -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 450,000 450,000 --
Relief...................
Enhanced International -- -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Peacekeeping Capabilities
Export Control Program -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 650 -- -- -- -- 650 --
Administration...........
Export Control Regional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,020 -- -- -- -- 6,020 --
Advisors.................
Export-Import Bank- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 76,575 76,575 --
Administrative Expenses..
Export-Import Bank-Direct -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (113,000) (113,000) --
Loans, Negative Subsidies
Famine Fund............... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 200,000 200,000 --
FMF Administrative Costs.. -- -- -- 40,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 40,500 --
General Costs............. -- -- -- -- -- 500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500 --
Global Development -- 15,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,000 --
Alliance.................
Global Environment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 184,997 184,997 --
Facility.................
Global Health............. 306,063 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 306,063 --
Human Rights and Democracy -- -- 17,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17,000 --
Funds....................
INL Anticrime Programs.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,000 --
International Atomic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000 -- -- -- -- 50,000 --
Energy Agency Voluntary
Contribution.............
International Civil -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 1,000 --
Aviation Organization....
International Conservation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,225 6,225 --
Programs.................
International -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 500 500 --
Contributions for
Scientific, Educational,
and Cultural Activities..
International Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 976,825 976,825 --
Association..............
International Disaster -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 235,500 235,500 --
Assistance...............
International Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15,004 15,004 --
Agricultural Development.
International Law -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,500 --
Enforcement Academies....
International -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,000 --
Organizations............
International 251,500 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 251,500 --
Organizations/
Partnerships.............
International Panel on -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,600 5,600 --
Climate Change/UN
Framework Convention on
Climate Change...........
International Trust Fund- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
NADR.....................
Interregional Aviation -- -- -- -- -- -- 70,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 70,000 --
Support..................
Legislative and Public -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Affairs..................
Millenium Challenge -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,300,000 1,300,000 --
Account..................
Mobile Emergency Training -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
Team.....................
Montreal Protocol -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 21,000 21,000 --
Multilateral Fund........
MRA Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18,500 -- -- -- -- -- 18,500 --
Expenses.................
MRA Migration............. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16,500 -- -- -- -- -- 16,500 --
MRA Multiregional -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 55,657 -- -- -- -- -- 55,657 --
Activities...............
MRA Refugee Admissions.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 135,750 -- -- -- -- -- 135,750 --
Multilateral Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4,002 4,002 --
Guarantee Agency.........
NADR Regional Export -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,200 -- -- -- -- 1,200 --
Controls.................
New Course Development.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,184 -- -- -- -- 2,184 --
Non-Proliferation and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,000 -- -- -- -- 35,000 --
Disarmament Fund.........
Oceans, Environmental and -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Science Initiative.......
OPIC-Administrative -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42,385 42,385 --
Expenses.................
OPIC-Credit Funding....... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24,000 24,000 --
OPIC-Net Offsetting -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (264,385) (264,385) --
Collections..............
Partnership to Eliminate -- -- 2,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 --
Sweatshops...............
Peace Corps Other......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 174,663 -- -- -- 174,663 --
Policy Initiatives........ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 787,001
Program & Policy 3,400 6,150 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9,550 --
Coordination.............
Program Development and -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,850 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,850 --
Support..................
Program Equipment......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,500 -- -- -- -- 5,500 --
Regional Narc. Training -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
and Demand Reduction.....
Reserve to be Allocated... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25,000 25,000 --
SA/LW Conference.......... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100 -- -- -- -- 100 --
Systems Support and -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 --
Upgrades.................
Terrorist Interdiction -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,000 -- -- -- -- 11,000 --
Program..................
Trade and Development -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 60,000 60,000 --
Agency...................
Trafficking in Persons.... -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,000 --
Transition Initiatives.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 55,000 55,000 --
Treasury Technical -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14,000 14,000 --
Assistance...............
U.S. Emergency Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100,000 100,000 --
Complex Foreign Crises...
U.S. Emergency Refugee and -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 40,000 40,000 --
Migration Assistance Fund
UN Children's Fund........ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 120,000 120,000 --
UN Development Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 1,000 --
Women....................
UN Development Program.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100,000 100,000 --
UN Environment Program.... -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 10,025 10,025 --
UN Guards Contingent in -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 700 700 --
Iraq.....................
UN Voluntary Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,500 1,500 --
Technical Cooperation in
the Field of Human Rights
UN Voluntary Fund for -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5,000 5,000 --
Victims of Torture.......
United Nations Crime -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 --
Center...................
USAID Capital Investment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 146,300 146,300 --
Fund.....................
USAID Inspector General -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,000 35,000 --
Operating Expenses.......
USAID Operating Expenses.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 604,100 604,100 --
World Food Program........ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,000 6,000 --
World Meteorological -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2,000 2,000 --
Organization.............
World Trade Organization.. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,000 1,000 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Global................ 578,431 268,523 21,000 42,500 -- 2,500 145,050 226,407 186,654 174,663 -- -- 5,047,774 6,693,502 787,001
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Total FY 2004............... 1,495,000 1,345,000 2,535,000 4,414,000 576,000 91,700 1,015,55 760,197 385,200 359,000 94,900 435,000 5,310,777 18,817,324 1,185,000
0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX F--58th UNHRC Voting Record
Resolutions Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its Fifty-
Eighth Session
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Method of Agenda
Year/No. Title adoption\1\ item
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002/1 Situation of human rights roll-call vote 4
in the occupied (44/2/7)
Palestinian territory.
2002/2 Strengthening of the without a vote 4
Office of the United
Nations High
Commissioner for Human
Rights.
2002/3 Situation in occupied recorded vote 5
Palestine. (52/1/0)
2002/4 Question of Western without a vote 5
Sahara.
2002/5 The use of mercenaries as recorded vote 5
a means of violating (36/8/9)
human rights and
impeding the exercise of
the right of peoples to
self-determination.
2002/6 Human rights in the recorded vote 8
occupied Syrian Golan. (34/1/18)
2002/7 Israeli settlements in recorded vote 8
the occupied Arab (52/1/0)
territories.
2002/8 Question of the violation recorded vote 8
of human rights in the (40/5/7)
occupied Arab
territories, including
Palestine.
2002/9 Combatting defamation of recorded vote 6
religions. (30/15/8)
2002/10 Human rights situation of recorded vote 9
the Lebanese detainees (34/2/17)
in Israel.
2002/11 Assistance to Equatorial recorded vote 9
Guinea in the field of (32/1/20)
human rights.
2002/12 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Burundi.
2002/13 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in parts of south-
eastern Europe.
2002/14 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
2002/15 Situation of human rights recorded vote 9
in Iraq. (28/4/21)
2002/16 Situation of human rights recorded vote 9
in the Sudan. (25/24/4)
2002/17 Cooperation with without a vote 9
representatives of
United Nations human
rights bodies.
2002/18 Situation of human rights recorded vote 9
in Cuba. (23/21/9)
2002/19 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Afghanistan.
2002/20 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Sierra Leone.
2002/21 Adequate housing as a without a vote 10
component of the right
to an adequate standard
of living.
2002/22 Human rights and recorded vote 10
unilateral coercive (38/6/9)
measures.
2002/23 The right to education... without a vote 10
2002/24 Question of the without a vote 10
realization in all
countries of the
economic, social and
cultural rights
contained in the
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and in the
International Covenant
on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and
study of special
problems which the
developing countries
face in their efforts to
achieve human rights.
2002/25 The right to food........ without a vote 10
2002/26 Promotion of the without a vote 10
enjoyment of the
cultural rights of
everyone and the respect
for the different
cultural identities.
2002/27 Adverse effects of the recorded vote 10
illicit movement and (37/14/2)
dumping of toxic and
dangerous products and
wastes on the enjoyment
of human rights.
2002/28 Globalization and its recorded vote 10
impact on the full (38/15/0)
enjoyment of human
rights.
2002/29 Effects of structural recorded vote 10
adjustment policies and (29/15/9)
foreign debt on the full
enjoyment of all human
rights, particularly
economic, social and
cultural rights.
2002/30 Human rights and extreme without a vote 10
poverty.
2002/31 The right of everyone to without a vote 10
the enjoyment of the
highest attainable
standard of physical and
mental health.
2002/32 Access to medication in without a vote 10
the context of pandemics
such as HIV/AIDS.
2002/33 Draft optional protocol recorded vote 11
to the Convention (29/10/14)
against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
2002/34 Strengthening of popular recorded vote 11
participation, equity, (29/7/17)
social justice and non-
discrimination as
essential foundations of
democracy.
2002/35 Human rights and recorded vote 11
terrorism. (32/0/21)
2002/36 Extrajudicial, summary or recorded vote 11
arbitrary executions. (36/2/14)
2002/37 Integrity of the judicial recorded vote 11
system. (34/0/19)
2002/38 Torture and other cruel, without a vote 11
inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
2002/39 The incompatibility without a vote 11
between democracy and
racism.
2002/40 Elimination of all forms without a vote 11
of religious intolerance.
2002/41 Question of enforced or without a vote 11
involuntary
disappearances.
2002/42 Question of arbitrary without a vote 11
detention.
2002/43 Independence and without a vote 11
impartiality of the
judiciary, jurors and
assessors and the
independence of lawyers.
2002/44 The right to restitution, without a vote 11
compensation and
rehabilitation for
victims of grave
violations of human
rights and fundamental
freedoms.
2002/45 Conscientious objection without a vote 11
to military service.
2002/46 Further measures to recorded vote (43/ 11
promote and consolidate 0/9)
democracy.
2002/47 Human rights in the without a vote 11
administration of
justice, in particular
juvenile justice.
2002/48 The right to freedom of without a vote 11
opinion and expression.
2002/49 Women's equal ownership, without a vote 10
access to and control
over land and the equal
rights to own property
and to adequate housing.
2002/50 Integrating the human without a vote 12
rights of women
throughout the United
Nations system.
2002/51 Traffic in women and without a vote 12
girls.
2002/52 Elimination of violence without a vote 12
against women.
2002/53 Abduction of children without a vote 13
from northern Uganda.
2002/54 International Convention without a vote 14
on the Protection of the
Rights of all Migrant
Workers and Members of
Their Families.
2002/55 Tolerance and pluralism without a vote 14
as indivisible elements
in the promotion and
protection of human
rights.
2002/56 Internally displaced without a vote 14
persons.
2002/57 Rights of persons without a vote 14
belonging to national or
ethnic, religious and
linguistic minorities.
2002/58 Violence against women without a vote 14
migrant workers.
2002/59 Protection of migrants without a vote 14
and their families.
2002/60 Missing persons.......... without a vote 14
2002/61 Human rights of persons without a vote 14
with disabilities.
2002/62 Human rights of migrants. without a vote 14
2002/63 Working Group on without a vote 15
Indigenous Populations
of the Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and
Protection of Human
Rights and the
International Decade of
the World's Indigenous
People.
2002/64 Working Group of the without a vote 15
Commission on Human
Rights to elaborate a
draft declaration in
accordance with
paragraph 5 of General
Assembly resolution 49/
214 of 23 December 1994.
2002/65 Human rights and without a vote 15
indigenous issues.
2002/66 The work of the Sub- without a vote 16
Commission on the
Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights.
2002/67 Situation of human rights without a vote 9
in Myanmar.
2002/68 Racism, racial recorded vote (37/ 6
discrimination, 11/5)
xenophobia and related
intolerance.
2002/69 The right to development. recorded vote (38/ 7
0/15)
2002/70 Human rights defenders... without a vote 17
2002/71 Promotion of the right of recorded vote (33/ 17
peoples to peace. 15/5)
2002/72 Promotion of a democratic recorded vote (32/ 17
and equitable 15/6)
international order.
2002/73 Human rights and recorded vote (38/ 17
international solidarity. 15/0)
2002/74 United Nations decade for without a vote 17
human rights education
(1995-2004).
2002/75 Human rights and the without a vote 17
environment as part of
sustainable development.
2002/76 The role of good without a vote 17
governance in the
promotion of human
rights.
2002/77 The question of the death recorded vote (25/ 17
penalty. 20/8)
2002/78 Status of the without a vote 17
International Covenants
on Human Rights.
2002/79 Impunity................. without a vote 17
2002/80 Composition of the staff recorded vote (36/ 18
of the Office of the 14/3)
United Nations High
Commissioner for Human
Rights.
2002/81 Protection of United without a vote 18
Nations personnel.
2002/82 Regional cooperation for without a vote 18
the promotion and
protection of human
rights in the Asian and
Pacific region.
2002/83 National institutions for without a vote 18
the promotion and
protection of human
rights.
2002/84 Human rights and thematic without a vote 18
procedures.
2002/85 Effective implementation without a vote 18
of international
instruments on human
rights, including
reporting obligations
under international
instruments on human
rights.
2002/86 Enhancement of recorded vote (40/ 17
international 0/13)
cooperation in the field
of human rights.
2002/87 Advisory services and without a vote 19
technical cooperation in
the field of human
rights.
2002/88 Assistance to Somalia in without a vote 19
the field of human
rights.
2002/89 Situation of human rights without a vote 19
in Cambodia.
2002/90 Situation of human rights recorded vote (33/ 4
in the occupied 1/19)
Palestinian territory.
2002/91 Enhancement of the recorded vote (36/ 3
effectiveness of the 0/17)
working methods of the
Commission.
2002/92 Rights of the child...... without a vote 13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In the case of a vote, the figures in brackets represent: votes in
favor/votes against/abstentions.
APPENDIX G--United Nations Commission on Human Rights Voting History, 1997-2000
(Table 1 of 2.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuba China-No Action Iran
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
97 98 99 2000 95* 95* 97 99 2000 97 98 99 GA 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA-15
Algeria..................................................................................... a y n y y a
Burundi..................................................................................... n y a
Cameroon.................................................................................... y n a
Djibouti.................................................................................... n
DROC........................................................................................ n n n y y y a a n
Liberia..................................................................................... a n a a y a n
Libya....................................................................................... n
Madagascar.................................................................................. a a a n y y y a a a a
Mauritius................................................................................... a a a a a a y y y
Niger....................................................................................... n n a y a n
Nigeria..................................................................................... n y a a
Senegal..................................................................................... a a a a a a n n n
South Africa................................................................................ n n n n n a a a a
Swaziland................................................................................... a n a a
Zambia...................................................................................... n y a a
Botswana.................................................................................... a a a y y y a a a
Congo-B..................................................................................... n n n y y n y n n
Morocco..................................................................................... a y y y y n n n n
Rwanda...................................................................................... n n a n a a y y
Sudan....................................................................................... n n n y n y y n n n n
Tunisia..................................................................................... a n n a a a n n n
================================================================================================================================================================================================
ASIA-12
China....................................................................................... n n n n y n y y y n n n n n
India....................................................................................... n n n n y n y y y n n n n n
Indonesia................................................................................... n n n n y n y y y n n n n n
Japan....................................................................................... y y y y n y n n n y y y y y
Korea....................................................................................... y y y y a a a a a a a a a a
Malaysia.................................................................................... a n y n y n n n
Pakistan.................................................................................... a n n n y n y y y n n n n n
Qatar....................................................................................... n a y y n n n
Saudi Arabia................................................................................ n
Syria....................................................................................... n
Thailand.................................................................................... a
Vietnam..................................................................................... n
Bangladesh.................................................................................. a a a a y n y y y n n n n n
Bhutan...................................................................................... n n n n y n y y y a n n n n
Nepal....................................................................................... a a a a y n y y y a a a n n
Philippines................................................................................. a a a a n a a a a a n n n n
Sri Lanka................................................................................... a a n a y n y y y a a n n n
================================================================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC-11
Argentina................................................................................... y y y y a a a y y a a a
Brazil...................................................................................... a a a a a a a y y y y
Colombia.................................................................................... a a a a a y y n a n n a
Costa Rica.................................................................................. y
Cuba........................................................................................ n n n n y n y y y n n n n n
Ecuador..................................................................................... a a y a n y a a a y y y y y
Guatemala................................................................................... a a y a n y y y y
Mexico...................................................................................... a a n a a a a a a y a a a a
Peru........................................................................................ a n n y n y y y a a a
Uruguay..................................................................................... y y a
Venezuela................................................................................... a n n a a y y y n n n
Chile....................................................................................... y a y y a a n a a y y y y y
El Salvador................................................................................. y y a y n y n n n y y y y y
================================================================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO-5
Czech Repub................................................................................. y y y y n n n y y y y y
Latvia...................................................................................... y y n n y y y
Poland...................................................................................... y y y n y n n y y y y
Romania..................................................................................... y y n y a abs y y y
Russia...................................................................................... a n n n n n a y y y y a a n
================================================================================================================================================================================================
WEOG-10
Belgium..................................................................................... y
Canada...................................................................................... y y y y n y n n n y y y y y
France...................................................................................... y y y y n y n n n y y y y y
Germany..................................................................................... y y y y n y n n n y y y y y
Italy....................................................................................... y y y y n y n n n y y y y y
Norway...................................................................................... y y n n y y y y
Portugal.................................................................................... y n n y y y
Spain....................................................................................... y n y y
UK.......................................................................................... y y y y n y n n n y y y y y
US.......................................................................................... y y y y n y n n n y y y y y
Luxembourg.................................................................................. y y y n n y y y y
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
yes......................................................................................... 12 13 16 17 9 11 10 12 14 16 17 17 20 18
no.......................................................................................... 5 9 13 14 11 9 9 13 16 6 6 10 16 12
abstain..................................................................................... 9 7 6 8 6 6 6 10 8 4 6 9 14 10
================================================================================================================================================================================================
Final CHR Vote
yes......................................................................................... 19 16 21 21 22 20 27 22 22 26 23 23 22
no.......................................................................................... 10 19 20 18 22 21 17 17 18 7 14 16 20
abstain..................................................................................... 24 18 12 14 09 12 9 14 12 19 16 14 11
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
** Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
Countries in italic left the Commission this year.
APPENDIX G--United Nations Commission on Human Rights Voting History, 1997-2000
(Table 2 of 2.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq Sudan FRY Chech Democ
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
97 98 99 GA 2000 97 98 99 GA 2000 97 98 99 GA 2000 2000 99 2000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA-15
Algeria.................................... a a c n c y
Burundi.................................... a ** y y y
Cameroon................................... a a a
Djibouti................................... a n y
DROC....................................... y a a c a c n c a y a y
Liberia.................................... y a c ** y y abs y y
Libya...................................... n n y
Madagascar................................. a a a a c a c ** c a y y a n y y
Mauritius.................................. y y y c y ** a y y y y y
Niger...................................... a a c a y y y y y y
Nigeria.................................... a a a a y a a y
Senegal.................................... y y y y c a c a ** y y y y a y y
South Africa............................... y y y y c y c y c y a y y
AFRICA-15 (Continued)
Swaziland.................................. y y a ** a y a y
Zambia..................................... y a a ** y a y y
Botswana................................... y y y y y c y y y y y y y y y
Congo-B.................................... a a a a a c a ** a a a a n y a
Morocco.................................... a a a a a c n ** y y y y abs y y
Rwanda..................................... a y y c a c ** a y y y y a
Sudan...................................... a a n a c n c n a y y y y a y a
Tunisia.................................... a a a a c a c a ** y y y y a y y
========================================================================================================================================================
ASIA-12
China...................................... a a a a a c n c n a c a a a a n a a
India...................................... a a a a a c n c n a c a a a a n y y
Indonesia.................................. a a a a a c n c n a c y y y y a y y
Japan...................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y a y y
Korea...................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y a y
Malaysia................................... a a a c a a c y y
Pakistan................................... a a a a a c n c n a c y y y y y y a
Qatar...................................... a a c n a y y y y y a
Saudi Arabia............................... y n y
Syria...................................... a n y
ASIA-12 (Continued)
Thailand................................... a y y
Vietnam.................................... a n a
Bangladesh................................. a a a a a c a c a a c y y y y a y y
Bhutan..................................... a y y y y c a c a a c y y y y a y a
Nepal...................................... a a a a a c a c a a c y a y a a y y
Philippines................................ a a y a y c a c a ** c y y y y a y y
Sri Lanka.................................. a a a a a c a c a a c a y y y n y y
========================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC-11
Argentina.................................. y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
Brazil..................................... y y y y c y y ** c y y y a y
Colombia................................... y y y y c c y ** c y y y a y y
Costa Rica................................. y y y
Cuba....................................... a a a a a c n c n a c a a a a n a a
Ecuador.................................... y y y y y c y c y ** c y y y y a y y
Guatemala.................................. y y y y y c y y y y y y a y y
Mexico..................................... y a y y y c y c y a c y a y y a y y
Peru....................................... y y y y y c y ** y y y y a y y
Uruguay.................................... y y c y c y y
Venezuela.................................. a y y a y c y ** y y y y a y y
Chile...................................... y y y y y c y c y ** c y y y y y y y
El Salvador................................ y y y y y c y c y ** c y y y y y y y
========================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO-5
Czech Repub................................ y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
Latvia..................................... y y y c y y y y y y y y
Poland..................................... y y y y c y c y y y y y y y y y
Romania.................................... y y y c y y y y y y y y
Russia..................................... y a y y a c y c y a c a n n n n y y
========================================================================================================================================================
WEOG-10
Belgium.................................... y y y
Canada..................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
France..................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
Germany.................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
Italy...................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
Norway..................................... y y y y y c y y y y y y y y y
Portugal................................... y y y c y y y y y y y
Spain...................................... y y y y y y y y
UK......................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
US......................................... y y y y y c y c y y c y y y y y y y
Luxembourg................................. y y y y y c y y y y y y y y y
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
yes........................................ 18 18 26 33 25 c 20 c 30 c 23 28 43 32 20 40 45
no......................................... 0 0 0 1 0 c 5 c 13 c 0 1 1 1 5 0 0
abstain.................................... 8 11 9 13 14 c 4 c 6 c 6 6 7 6 13 2 4
========================================================================================================================================================
Final CHR Vote
yes........................................ 31 32 35 32 c 31 c 28 c 41 46 44 25 51 45
no......................................... 0 0 0 0 c 6 c 0 c 9 1 1 7 0 0
abstain.................................... 22 21 18 21 c 16 c 24 c 12 6 8 19 2 8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
** Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
Countries in italic left the Commission this year.
APPENDIX G--United Nations Commission on Human Rights Voting History, 1999-2002
(Table 1 of 2.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuba China* Iran Iraq
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
99 00 01 02 99 00 01 99 00 01 02 99 00 01 02 GA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA-15
Algeria (03).................................................................. n n y n n n n a
Burkina Faso (05)............................................................. a
Cameroon (03)................................................................. y y y a a a a a
DROC (03)..................................................................... n x n y x a a n a a a a
Gabon (05).................................................................... y
Kenya (03).................................................................... a a y a a a a a
Libya (03).................................................................... n n y n n n n n
Senegal (03).................................................................. a a a a a a a n n n n y y y y y
Sierra Leone (04)............................................................. a a a a
South Africa (03)............................................................. n n n n a a a a y y a a
Sudan (04).................................................................... n n n y y n n n a a n n
Swaziland (05)................................................................ a n a n a a a a y y y y
AFRICA-15 (Continued)
Togo (04)..................................................................... n n a a
Uganda (04)................................................................... a a a a
Zimbabwe (05)................................................................. a
================================================================================================================================================================================================
ASIA-12
Bahrain (04).................................................................. n n a a
China (05).................................................................... n n n n y y y n n n n a a a a a
India (03).................................................................... n n n n y y y n n n n a a a a a
Japan (05).................................................................... y y y y n n n y y y y y y y y y
Korea (04).................................................................... y y y y a a a a a a a y y y y y
Malaysia (03)................................................................. n n y n n a a a
Pakistan (04)................................................................. n n n n y y y n n n n a a a a a
Saudi Arabia (03)............................................................. n n y n n y y a
Sri Lanka (05)................................................................ n a y n n a a a
Syria (03).................................................................... n n y n n a n n
Thailand (03)................................................................. a a y a a a a a
Vietnam (03).................................................................. n n y n n a a a
================================================================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC-11
Argentina (05)................................................................ y y y y a a a a a a y y y y y y
Brazil (05)................................................................... a a a a a y a a y y y y
Chile (04).................................................................... y y y a a y y a y y y y
Costa Rica (03)............................................................... y y n y y y y y
Cuba (03)..................................................................... n n n n y y y n n n n a a a a a
Guatemala (03)................................................................ a y y y a n n y y y a y y y y y
Mexico (04)................................................................... n a a y a a a a a y y y y y y y
GRULAC-11 (Continued)
Paraguay (05)................................................................. y
Peru (03)..................................................................... n n a y y y a a a y y y y y y y
Uruguay (03).................................................................. y y y a a a a a y y y y
Venezuela (03)................................................................ n n n n y y y n n n n y a a a a
================================================================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO-5
Armenia (04).................................................................. a n y y
Croatia (04).................................................................. y y y y
Poland (03)................................................................... y y y y n n n y y y y y y y y y
Russia (03)................................................................... n n n n y y y a n n n y a a a a
Ukraine (05).................................................................. y
================================================================================================================================================================================================
WEOG-10
Australia (05)................................................................ y
Austria (04).................................................................. y y y y
Belgium (03).................................................................. y y n y y y y y
Canada (03)................................................................... y y y y n n n y y y y y y y y y
France (04)................................................................... y y y y n n n y y y y y y y y y
Germany (05).................................................................. y y y y n n n y y y y y y y y y
Ireland (05).................................................................. y
Sweden (04)................................................................... y y y y
UK (03)....................................................................... y y y y n n n y y y y y y y y y
US (05)....................................................................... y y y n n n y y y y y y y
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Vote
yes........................................................................... 21 21 22 23 22 22 23 23 22 21 19 35 32 30 28 97
no............................................................................ 20 18 20 21 17 18 17 16 20 17 20 0 0 3 4 3
abstain....................................................................... 12 14 10 9 14 12 12 14 11 15 14 18 21 19 21 77
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* China 95: tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
** Sudan was not a roll call vote, thus no official count.
***Zim = Zimbabwe: no-action vote.
Countries in bold were new to the CHR in 2003.
Numbers within parenthesis in the year a country's term ends.
GA total votes = the entire GA body.
APPENDIX G--United Nations Commission on Human Rights Voting History, 1999-2002
(Table 2 of 2.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sudan** Chechn Democ Zim***
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
99 00 01 02 GA 00 01 02 99 00 01 02 02
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA-15
Algeria (03)............................................ a n n a a y y y
Burkina Faso (05)....................................... n
Cameroon (03)........................................... a n a a a y y a
DROC (03)............................................... c a n n a n y a y y
Gabon (05).............................................. n
AFRICA-15 (Continued)
Kenya (03).............................................. a n a n n y y y
Libya (03).............................................. a n n n a a a y
Senegal (03)............................................ c ** a n a a a a y y y y y
Sierra Leone (04)....................................... n n a a y
South Africa (03)....................................... c y a n y a y y y y
Sudan (04).............................................. c a n n a n a a a y
Swaziland (05).......................................... ** a n n a a n y a a y
Togo (04)............................................... n n n y
Uganda (04)............................................. y a a y y
Zimbabwe (05)........................................... n
========================================================================================================================================================
ASIA-12
Bahrain (04)............................................ n n a y y
China (05).............................................. c a a n n n n n a a a a y
India (03).............................................. c a a n n n n n y y y y y
Japan (05).............................................. c y y y y a a a y y y y n
Korea (04).............................................. c y y y y a a a y y y y n
Malaysia (03)........................................... a n n a a y y y
Pakistan (04)........................................... c a a n n y y a y a y y y
Saudi Arabia (03)....................................... a n n y a a a y
Sri Lanka (05).......................................... c a a n y y
Syria (03).............................................. a n n a n a a y
Thailand (03)........................................... a a a a a y y y
Vietnam (03)............................................ a n n n n a a y
========================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC-11
Argentina (05).......................................... c y y y y y a a y y y y n
Brazil (05)............................................. ** y y y a a a y y y a
Chile (04).............................................. c y y y y a y y y n
Costa Rica (03)......................................... y y y a y y y n
Cuba (03)............................................... c a a n n n n n a a a a y
Guatemala (03).......................................... c y y y y a y y y y y y n
Mexico (04)............................................. c a y y y a y y y y y y n
Paraguay (05)........................................... y
GRULAC-11 (Continued)
Peru (03)............................................... c ** y y y a a a y y y y n
Uruguay (03)............................................ a y y y a a y y y n
Venezuela (03).......................................... c ** y a y a n n y y y y a
========================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO-5
Armenia (04)............................................ a n y n
Croatia (04)............................................ y y a y n
Poland (03)............................................. c y y y y y y y y y y y n
Russia (03)............................................. c a y n n n n n y y y y y
Ukraine (05)............................................ n
========================================================================================================================================================
WEOG-10
Australia (05).......................................... y
Austria (04)............................................ y y y y n
Belgium (03)............................................ y y y y y y y n
Canada (03)............................................. c y y y y y y y y y y y n
France (04)............................................. c y y y y y y y y y y y n
Germany (05)............................................ c y y y y y y y y y y y n
Ireland (05)............................................ y
Sweden (04)............................................. y y y y n
UK (03)................................................. c y y y y y y y y y y y n
US (05)................................................. c a a y y y y y y
========================================================================================================================================================
Final Vote
yes..................................................... c 28 28 25 80 25 22 15 51 45 44 43 26
no...................................................... c 0 0 24 62 7 12 16 0 0 0 0 24
abstain................................................. c 24 25 4 33 19 19 22 2 8 9 9 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* China 95: tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
** Sudan was not a roll call vote, thus no official count.
***Zim = Zimbabwe: no-action vote.
Countries in bold were new to the CHR in 2003.
Numbers within parenthesis in the year a country's term ends.
GA total votes = the entire GA body.
APPENDIX H.--UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of
the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
Now, therefore, The General Assembly, proclaims this Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international,
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of an kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust,
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
Article 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before
the law.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 11
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public
trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty without any limitation due to race,
of any penal offence on account of nationality or religion, have the
any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.
Article 13
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
Article 14
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 15
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor be
denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 16
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and
at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 17
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.
Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 22
1. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality.
Article 23
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay
for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration insuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to
all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that
shall be given to their children.
Article 27
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.
Article 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein.
Hundred and eighty-third plenary meeting
Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly,
December 10, 1948
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