[Senate Prints 109-63]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 109-63
_______________________________________________________________________
IRAN'S POLITICAL/NUCLEAR AMBITIONS
AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
__________
A COMPILATION OF
STATEMENTS BY WITNESSES
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Ninth Congress
Second Session
May 17 and 18, 2006
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
27-613 WASHINGTON : 2006
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Introduction........................................... v
Day One--May 17, 2006
Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.............................................. 1
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.............................................. 4
Honorable Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, DC...................... 7
Dr. David Albright, President and Founder, Institute for Science
and International Security (ISIS), Washington, DC.............. 15
Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow and Director of Research,
Saban Center for Middle East Policy, the Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC................................................. 28
Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, Iran Analyst, International Crisis Group,
Washington, DC................................................. 36
Dr. Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director for Research, the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC................. 43
Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs, The
Nixon Center, Washington, DC................................... 50
Day Two--May, 18, 2006
Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.............................................. 55
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member, U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations................................. 57
Honorable Frank G. Wisner, Vice Chairman for External Affairs,
American International Group, Inc., New York, New York......... 59
Dr. Vali R. Nasr, Professor of Middle East and South Asia
Politics, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California...................... 66
Ms. Julia Nanay, Senior Director, PFC Energy, Washington, DC..... 70
Mr. James A. Phillips, Research Fellow for Middle Eastern
Affairs, the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC........ 74
(iii)
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LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
----------
May 26, 2006.
Dear Colleague:
The challenges and threats posed by Iran to the United
States and the rest of the world continue to demand our
attention and analysis. In order to gain a better understanding
of how we may address these issues as they confront us, the
Committee on Foreign Relations held a series of hearings on May
17 and 18, 2006, entitled ``Iran's Political/Nuclear Ambitions
and U.S. Policy Options.'' We believe that the witnesses'
testimonies can be helpful in preparing members for subsequent
Senate debate on this matter of national security and have
gathered them into this committee print.
The first panel on May 17 focused on the status of Iran's
nuclear program. Testimony was heard from the Honorable Robert
J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and Dr. David Albright, President of the
Institute for Science and International Security. The second
panel discussed Iran's motivations and strategies. We heard
from Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, the Director of Research of the
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings
Institution; Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, Iran Analyst at the
International Crisis Group; Dr. Patrick Clawson, Deputy
Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and
Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at
The Nixon Center.
On May 18 we heard from a variety of experts regarding U.S.
policy options towards Iran. The panel consisted of the
Honorable Frank G. Wisner, former Ambassador to India and
currently Vice Chairman for External Affairs at the American
International Group; Dr. Vali R. Nasr, Professor of National
Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California; Ms. Julia Nanay, Senior Director at PFC
Energy; and Mr. James A. Phillips, a Research Fellow in Middle
Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Member.
(v)
Day One--May 17, 2006
Opening Statement
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
may 17, 2006
----------
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to examine the
situation in Iran and options for U.S. policy. We will have a
second hearing on this topic tomorrow. As the American people
and policy makers debate our course in Iran, I am hopeful that
this committee can contribute by being a bipartisan forum for
clarifying the diplomatic situation and evaluating policy
options. Our intent is to inform our own policymaking role, as
well as help stimulate constructive public debate.
President Bush has announced that the United States remains
committed to exhausting all diplomatic options with respect to
Iran. The United States and its allies at the United Nations
have been pressing for multilateral diplomatic and economic
sanctions under Chapter 7. There is widespread agreement that
Iran has sought to deceive the international community about
its nuclear intentions. Tehran's decision to move ahead with
uranium enrichment was condemned by the international
community, but efforts to attain a Security Council consensus
on a firm response to Iran's actions have not been successful.
American policy in the near term will be defined by efforts
to convince the international community of our commitment to
diplomacy and to build a broad multilateral and international
coalition against Iran's nuclear ambitions. I believe that this
is the strategy that Iran fears most. Last minute negotiations,
letters to President Bush, and feigned interest in compromises
are just a few of the transparent efforts Tehran has undertaken
to split the international community. We must overcome Iran's
efforts with patient diplomatic spadework.
We have stated that no option is off the table. Although
direct talks with Iran come with difficulties and risks, we
cannot rule out their utility, particularly as they relate to
our primary effort to build an international coalition.
Secretary Baker's talks with Iraqi leaders in 1991 were
distasteful, but proved to be a gesture that displayed
America's hope for a peaceful settlement and built
international equity for all steps in our response. The United
States has the diplomatic prowess to attain a strong
multilateral response and win the international debate. We must
be prepared to commit the time, energy, and resources necessary
to win this diplomatic battle.
Retaining all communication tools is also important because
they may be necessary to avoid a tragic miscalculation by the
Iranians. Analysts in our intelligence agencies and State
Department do not regard the Tehran regime as irrational, but
the framework for their decision-making is very different from
our own. We must understand that they are interpreting our
actions in ways that we do not always discern. If one overlays
these perceptual differences with demagogic rhetoric, historic
suspicion, and high political stakes, the possibility for
miscalculation increases exponentially. Our policies and our
communications must be clear, precise, and confident, without
becoming inflexible. In some situations, this delicate
diplomatic balance can best be achieved through direct
communications.
Some have expressed frustration with the administration's
coalition-building approach and have advocated quick, punitive,
and unilateral sanctions focused on international companies
doing business in Iran. Secretary Rice has stated that such a
policy: ``Would complicate our ability to work successfully
with our allies to counter the threat posed by Iran. It would
narrow in important ways the President's flexibility in the
implementation of Iran sanctions, create tensions with
countries whose help we need in dealing with Iran, and shift
focus away from Iran's actions and spotlight differences
between us and our allies. This could play into Iran's hands as
it attempts to divide the U.S. from the international community
as well as to sow division between the EU-3, China, and
Russia.''
Unilateral sanctions targeting European and Asian
corporations do not appear to be an effective way to secure
long-term commitments from their host governments on a
multilateral approach to the threat posed by Iran. As such,
they are likely to be counterproductive, as the Bush
administration has asserted.
As part of our diplomatic efforts, the administration
should consider how the NATO alliance might be utilized to
strengthen our position. NATO is the principal defense and
security organization of the trans-Atlantic community. NATO has
become the preeminent strategic forum for broader security
cooperation with Japan, Australia, and members of the
Partnership for Peace in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It also
is facilitating closer ties with North African countries
through the Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO is the only entity
that has successfully developed and implemented a strategy of
deterrence and containment against a nuclear-armed enemy. The
Alliance provides us with an effective and experienced
infrastructure capable of supplementing our activities at the
U.N. and implementing an international coalition's strategy
towards Iran.
I would underscore a final point as the Congress and the
administration move forward with decisions pertaining to Iran.
Even as we work quickly, we must calibrate our response with
the long term in mind. The issues related to Iran's pursuit of
nuclear weapons, its role in the Persian Gulf region, and its
impact on world energy markets will not be addressed with a
single act or policy, be it military, economic, or diplomatic.
The American people must know that whatever policy options are
chosen will likely require years, if not decades, of intense
vigilance and diplomatic follow-up.
To assist us in our deliberations today, we welcome two
distinguished panels of experts. The first panel will discuss
the status of Iran's nuclear program. We are joined by the
Honorable Robert Einhorn, a Senior Adviser at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and Dr. David Albright,
President of the Institute for Science and International
Security. Our second panel will discuss Iran's motivations and
strategies. Joining us will be Dr. Ken Pollack, the Director of
the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings
Institution; Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert with the
International Crisis Group; Dr. Patrick Clawson, Deputy
Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and
Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at
The Nixon Center.
We thank our witnesses for being with us today, and we look
forward to their insights.
Opening Statement
SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 17, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for calling this hearing. And I
welcome an impressive group of experts. It will not be a
surprise that I am very much in agreement with the Chairman's
statement.
Unfortunately, the administration has chosen not to send a
senior official to be a part of these hearings. That is a
mistake.
If the administration wants to avoid a repeat of the Iraq
fiasco, it must begin to do what it initially failed to do in
that arena: level with the American people about what is at
stake and what its strategy is. Platitudes like ``all options
are on the table'' and ``we're pursuing diplomacy'' aren't good
enough.
Dodging congressional hearings is not a good start to what
promises to be one of the most challenging problems facing our
country over the next several years.
Let me state what the potential problem is: a nuclear-armed
Iran. That would put the bomb in the hands of a radical
theocracy, swimming on a sea of high priced oil, whose
president has denied the holocaust, threatened to wipe Israel
off the map and to attack us.
In my view, Iran probably would not use a weapon against us
or Israel or give the technology to terrorists. But it would
feel emboldened to make even more mischief in the region. And
if Iran gets the bomb, that could well fuel an arms race with
Sunni Arab countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, making an
already volatile region even more dangerous.
But I believe we have time: most published reports conclude
Iran is unlikely to develop a weapon for at least another five
years. The critical question is: how do we use that time to
persuade Iran to forego nuclear weapons?
For now, the administration seems to have settled on a
diplomatic course. That's the right course--but it seems to be
pursuing it with one hand tied behind its back, and without
providing the answers to critical questions that we need to
shape a smart policy.
For example, our allies in Europe are working on a package
of incentives that are meant to be a final offer to Iran. What
is our role in developing these incentives? How seriously can
Iran take any offer from Europe--say on matters related to
security guarantees--if the United States is not part of the
deal?
Why are we in a posture of--in effect--negotiating with the
negotiators? Wouldn't it save some trouble and confusion to be
in the room along with our allies as well as Russia and China?
The press reports that if the Iranians spurn the European
offer, the U.S. and its allies will move to sanction Iran
either through the United Nations Security Council or, failing
that, through a coalition of like-minded nations.
What costs will these sanctions entail for Iran, for us,
and for key countries we need on our side? How vulnerable is
Iran to a ban on imports of gasoline or exports of crude? What
would be the impact on oil markets and at the local gas pump if
Iranian crude were removed from the market? Why isn't the
administration doing more to prepare the public for the
sacrifice sanctions would entail as the Iranian leadership is
preparing their public?
More broadly, what are the chances that Europe, Russia, and
China will agree to sanctions if they believe the U.S. has not
explored every diplomatic avenue, including direct talks with
Tehran?
Is the administration committed to regime change in Iran?
Would it be prepared to abandon it as part of a package of
security guarantees in a negotiated settlement of the nuclear
issue?
Is the administration's funding of democracy activities
inside Iran the best way to promote internal reform, or is that
literally the ``kiss of death'' for Iranian democrats? How do
we tap into the deep desire for change, particularly among the
majority of the Iranian population which was born after the
Islamic Revolution?
I wish we had someone here today from the administration to
answer these questions. It is time for a full public airing of
the choices before us.
Let me state my recommended policy up front.
Last week, the Iranian President sent a letter to President
Bush. The letter won't be nominated for the Nobel Prize for
Literature--or for Peace. But the content or style of the
letter is not the point, nor is the identity of the sender. I
have not been alone in suggesting that we should respond--not
to the letter we received, but with our own ideas on how to
move forward.
I would go a step further. We shouldn't respond to
President Ahmedinejad. President Bush should write to the man
who has the final say in Iran--Ayatollah Khamenei.
I would make the letter public and I would include a call
for direct talks with Iran--anywhere, anytime, with everything
on the table.
We should be willing to talk about all the issues that
divide us: the nuclear program, terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Israeli-Palestinian peace, sanctions, and security.
We should lay out for Iran's leader--and especially for its
people ``what the future could look like if Iran renounces its
nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism--and what the
future could look like if it does not.
Would Iran respond favorably? I don't know, but in recent
months, Iran has indicated a readiness to engage.
Indeed, an Iranian outline for a grand bargain was
communicated to the Bush administration three years ago. While
the government in Tehran has changed since then, Iran's
fundamental positions likely have not. If anything the regime
is now more comfortable with the reformists purged from the
Majlis and the presidency.
Four years ago, when I was chairman of this committee, I
called publicly for a dialogue between members of Congress and
the Iranian Majlis. Senator Hagel joined me in that effort.
That call--from two senators--sparked an intense debate in Iran
that lasted several weeks. The reformist press embraced it. The
hard-liners condemned it. The government couldn't figure out
how to respond.
If two senators can spark that kind of debate, imagine what
the President could do.
I believe that an offer of direct dialogue would place
enormous pressure on the Iranian leadership--from their own
people and from the international community. Iranian leaders
would face a stark choice--reject the overture and risk
complete isolation and an angry public, or accept it and start
down a path that would require Iran to alter its nuclear
ambitions.
Talking to Tehran would not reward bad behavior or
legitimize the regime. Talking is something we have done with
virtually every other country on earth, including the former
Soviet Union--which posed an existential threat to us--and
unsavory regimes like the ones in North Korea and Libya.
Demonstrating that we made a serious attempt at diplomacy
is also the best way to keep others on board for tougher
actions if Iran fails to respond.
It would be a wise course of action for any administration.
But for this administration, with its blemished record in Iraq,
it is not simply a wise choice--it is a requirement. The
threshold of trust is much higher. If the administration wants
to convince our allies and others to place serious pressure on
Iran, it must walk the extra diplomatic mile.
I hope that we can proceed with the wisdom that this moment
requires. How the Iran crisis is handled will help determine
international security for a generation, if not longer.
I look forward to the testimony.
Prepared Statement
HONORABLE ROBERT J. EINHORN
Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 17, 2006
----------
THE IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to
appear before the committee this morning.
Developments over the last 10 months--including Iran's
abrogation in July of its agreement with the EU3 (Britain,
France, and Germany), its resumption in August of uranium
conversion at Isfahan, the end of its voluntary implementation
of the IAEA Additional Protocol, the weak U.N. Security Council
Presidential statement issued at the end of March, Iran's
production of enriched uranium at Natanz, and the inability so
far of the five Security Council Permanent Members to agree on
a Chapter 7 resolution--have created a widespread impression
that Iran's quest for a fissile material production capability
is progressing more rapidly than expected and is essentially
unstoppable.
Fostering that impression--and the belief that the
international community has little choice but to accommodate to
the reality of an Iranian enrichment program--is very much part
of Iran's game plan. But despite the significant progress Iran
has made, Iran's claims that it has mastered centrifuge
enrichment are premature; it still has far to go before it can
produce either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or nuclear
weapons; and its willingness to negotiate an end to its
enrichment and reprocessing programs has yet to be put to a
serious test.
Evaluating recent Iranian progress
As documented by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in its report of April 28, 2006, Iran has indeed passed
some important milestones in recent months. Since September
2005, it has produced over 110 tonnes of uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility,
enough gaseous uranium feedstock for over 20 nuclear weapons.
After ending its suspension of enrichment activities in
January, it fed UF6 into a single P-1 centrifuge
machine, then into 10-machine and 20-machine cascades, and then
moved quickly to a 164-machine cascade (a key building block in
a centrifuge enrichment facility) where it successfully
enriched uranium to around 3.6%. Meanwhile, Iran has been
assembling two additional 164-machine cascades at its Pilot
Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), one which is about to begin
enrichment operations and the other which should be ready by
June. In addition, the Iranians announced that they would begin
installing the first 3000-machine module of their industrial-
scale enrichment facility in the fourth quarter of 2006.
On the basis of these developments, Iran's leaders are
claiming that they have now mastered centrifuge enrichment
technology and that it is too late to stop them. They go so far
as to say that, even if existing nuclear facilities were
destroyed, they have reached a stage where they could re-
generate their program quickly and confidently, with little
loss of time. But such claims are premature.
The Iranians have cut corners in their research and
development effort in order to register the accomplishments
listed in the IAEA's report. Standard practice would have
required them to run the 164-machine cascade with
UF6 on an uninterrupted basis for up to six months
or more before gaining confidence in its operation. Instead of
proceeding in parallel to assemble and operate additional
cascades, the efficient operation of the initial cascade would
first have been demonstrated. To verify the ability to
manufacture centrifuges indigenously, the experimental cascade
would have relied on machines made in Iran rather than
imported, and it would have been heavily instrumented to
measure performance. And before introducing UF6 into
the cascades, any impurities in the uranium gas that could
damage the centrifuges would have been addressed and
eliminated.But the Iranians deviated from standard practice.
Apparently intent mainly on demonstrating publicly the ability
to reach a significant enrichment level, they ran the cascade
with UF6 for less than two weeks. A significant
portion of the experimental cascade may have consisted of
centrifuges imported from the A.Q. Khan network rather than
produced indigenously. Moreover, little of the equipment
normally used to measure performance seems to have been used
during the short experimental run. And instead of taking the
time to fix the problems in the Isfahan conversion process that
have produced impurities in the UF6, the Iranians
seem to have chosen to use the impure UF6 and accept
the risk of having to replace any centrifuges damaged as a
result.
Iran's research and development efforts to date seem to
have been driven by political rather than technical
considerations. By giving highest priority to achieving and
announcing the ability to produce uranium enriched to 3.6%, the
Iranians wanted to present the world with a fait accompli--to
demonstrate that they already have an enrichment capability and
that continued efforts to stop them would be futile. Moreover,
fearing (despite their determined show of self-confidence) that
they may eventually be forced to accept another freeze on their
program, they wanted to establish the highest possible baseline
for such a freeze--thus, accelerating the operation of the
second and third cascades at the PFEP and starting installation
of the 3000-machine module this year at the industrial-scale
facility. And not least, Iran's leaders saw the early
announcement of the enrichment breakthrough as a way of
boosting national pride and building domestic support for the
regime, especially in anticipation of international pressures
and possible hardships to follow.
Having taken a series of short-cuts largely for political
reasons, Iran presumably will now have to do the thorough
developmental and testing activities it would normally have
done earlier. That will take considerable time, and is probably
one reason why the Iranians are saying they would be prepared
to negotiate a deferral of industrial-scale enrichment if the
Europeans and others will agree to accept continued R&D
activities on a pilot scale.
So recent reports regarding progress in Iran's nuclear
program, especially boastful accounts coming from Tehran, have
created the somewhat misleading picture that Iran's efforts
have accelerated to an alarming degree. While Iran has indeed
reached some key milestones of late, the basic timelines for
Iran achieving a nuclear weapons capability--in particular, the
capability to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon--
have not significantly changed.
Timeline for producing HEU
One of the best recent analyses in the open literature of
Iran's timeline for producing HEU was done by David
Albright.\1\ Since he's a witness at today's hearing and
available to explain his analysis, I'll just cite his
conclusion--that whether Iran builds a clandestine enrichment
plant with 1500 P-1 centrifuges or breaks out of the NPT and
uses its first module of 3000 P-1 centrifuges at its
industrial-scale facility, the earliest it could produce enough
HEU for a single nuclear weapon would probably be three years
from now, or 2009. Albright emphasizes that this is a worst-
case assessment and that Iran is likely to take longer if, for
example, it needs additional time to manufacture and install
the necessary number of centrifuges and overcome the normal
technical difficulties that arise in seeking to operate a
number of cascades in a single production unit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ``The Clock is Ticking,
But How Fast?'' The Institute for Science and International Security
(ISIS), March 27, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte seems to
believe Iran will probably take longer than three years. In
testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February
2006, he said that, if Iran continues its present efforts, it
``will likely have the capability to produce a nuclear weapon
within the next decade.'' A National Intelligence Estimate on
Iran produced last year reportedly judged that Iran could have
a nuclear weapon in from five to ten years.
Large margins of uncertainty inevitably surround judgments
of when Iran will or could have nuclear weapons or the fissile
materials to build them. Some of the biggest unknowns relate to
Iran's intentions--whether it is determined to produce HEU and
acquire nuclear weapons as soon as possible; whether--and for
how long--it is willing to stop at an LEU production capability
while deferring decisions on HEU production and weaponization;
or whether it is prepared to forgo, temporarily or
indefinitely, the capability to produce even LEU in order to
avoid penalties or gain rewards.
Other uncertainties about the pace of Iran's nuclear
program relate more to capabilities. If Iran cannot readily
overcome the technical problems that typically accompany start-
up enrichment operations, the timeframe will lengthen. If,
however, Iran can soon learn to master the much more efficient
P-2 centrifuge design and build P-2 enrichment units, the
timeframe will shorten. Iran's ability to procure materials,
equipment, and technology from abroad will also affect the pace
of its nuclear program, although imports will be much more
important in the case of Iran's industrial-scale enrichment
facility, which still requires large quantities of specialized
materials and equipment, than in the case of a pilot-scale
facility. Indeed, even if it were possible to cut off its
access to foreign supplies, Iran probably already possesses
within its territory all the materials and equipment it needs
to set up a 1500- or 3000-machine centrifuge facility and
produce enough HEU for a small nuclear weapons stockpile.
A key variable affecting the pace of Iran's nuclear program
is whether--and the extent to which--Iran has a clandestine
nuclear program parallel to its overt program. Obviously, a
successfully hidden conversion plant and enrichment facility
would invalidate current estimates and eventually confront the
United States and its allies with a sudden, major security
threat. But even undetected activities of less importance
(e.g., manufacture of centrifuge components or assembly of
centrifuges) could have a substantial impact on timeframes for
producing HEU or nuclear weapons.
Monitoring Iran's program--the role of the IAEA
The IAEA plays a critical role in narrowing our
uncertainties about Iran's nuclear program. But IAEA monitoring
of Iran's program has serious limitations, especially given
Tehran's decision in February to cease implementation of the
Additional Protocol and its overall failure to meet the IAEA's
requirements for transparency and cooperation.
The Agency's presence in Iran, even with the less intrusive
verification rights contained in the IAEA-Iran Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement (as compared to the Additional Protocol),
provides a strong basis for monitoring declared nuclear
facilities and activities in Iran. Agency inspectors can
measure accurately how much UF6 is produced at Isfahan and
verify that it is not being diverted to a covert enrichment
plant. They know how much enriched uranium is being produced at
Natanz and can be confident that no HEU is being produced there
and that no Natanz-produced LEU is being sent to a covert
enrichment facility to be further enriched to weapons grade.
Frequent IAEA visits also enable us to keep track of progress
in assembling and operating cascades at the PFEP, in
constructing and operating the heavy water production plant and
heavy-water research reactor at Arak, and in building the
industrial-scale enrichment plant at Natanz. This information
is crucial in understanding the nature and pace of Iran's
acquisition of a fissile material production capability.
While the IAEA can effectively monitor declared nuclear
facilities and activities as long as the Agency has access to
them, monitoring confidence drops off rapidly at undeclared
locations or if inspectors are no longer given access to
declared sites. In the latter case, such as in the event of NPT
withdrawal and termination of IAEA verification, Iran could
proceed without international scrutiny to use previously
monitored facilities to produce fissile material, either by
starting from natural uranium or boosting previously
safeguarded LEU to HEU.
Even if Iran remains in the NPT, monitoring undeclared
locations is a formidable challenge, especially given Iran's
20-year track record of what the IAEA calls its ``many failures
and breaches of its obligations to comply'' with its NPT
safeguards agreement and given its February decision no longer
to act as if bound by the Additional Protocol. In its April
28th report, the IAEA cites numerous ``gaps in the Agency's
knowledge'' that have sustained or even heightened ``concern''
that Iran may be pursuing nuclear weapons. Among the IAEA's
concerns are that Iran is not being honest about the extent of
its work on P-2 centrifuges, that Iran took fuller advantage of
a 1987 offer by A.K. Khan's network than it is admitting, that
procurement of dual-use equipment (e.g., mass spectrometers)
was related to a weapons program, that Iran's military is
heavily involved in the nuclear program, that experiments with
plutonium, polonium, and uranium metal point to a weapons
program, and that Iran may be engaged in nuclear-related high
explosives testing and missile re-entry vehicle design.
These concerns, and the IAEA's judgment that Iran is not
providing the Agency ``full transparency and active
cooperation,'' have brought the IAEA to the sobering admission
that it ``is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide
assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in Iran.'' The April 28th report goes on to say that
``additional transparency measures, including access to
documentation, dual use equipment, and relevant individuals''--
all of which have been specifically requested by the IAEA Board
of Governors but denied by Iran--will be required if the Agency
is to be able to do its job.
Iran's decision to stop implementing the Additional
Protocol (AP) has hampered the IAEA's work. But implementation
of the AP is not enough. The AP has its own limitations. Unlike
what many observers believe, it does not provide for
``anywhere, anytime'' inspections. It does not, for example,
authorize investigation of suspected weaponization activities
or allow access to military facilities where no nuclear
materials are believed to be present. That is why the IAEA
Board has several times requested, unsuccessfully, that Iran
accept verification procedures going beyond what is required by
the AP.The IAEA must be given stronger tools to perform its
verification mission in Iran, and that will require action by
the United Nations Security Council. The IAEA Director General
should be asked to determine what additional verification
authorities the Agency would need to carry out its mandate in
Iran. If required, those authorities should go well beyond what
is contained in the existing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
or even the Additional Protocol. The Security Council should
then take a decision to grant the IAEA those additional
authorities.
Enhanced verification tools would not be a panacea. Even if
Iran complied with a Security Council directive to cooperate
with them, more intrusive methods would not necessarily be
capable of uncovering all undeclared nuclear activities. For
example, a relatively small clandestine centrifuge enrichment
plant (e.g., 1500 centrifuges) might still be difficult to
detect. But stronger verification tools would give the
international community significantly more confidence than it
currently has in the ability to detect and deter violations.
Persuading Iran to forgo its enrichment program
The absence so far of a clear-cut IAEA determination that
Iran is seeking nuclear weapons has made it very difficult to
build strong international support for a strategy capable of
persuading Iran to give up its enrichment capability. Indeed,
under present circumstances, the prospects for heading off an
Iranian fissile material production capability by means short
of the use of military force do not look very good.
Iran's leaders have done an effective job convincing the
Iranian public that an indigenous enrichment capability is an
Iranian right that is essential to national dignity,
technological advancement, and energy independence and must
never be given up. While influential Iranians occasionally
express concern about the potential consequences of pursuing an
enrichment program in defiance of the international community,
the regime can be expected to remain on course barring a major
shift in the currently perceived balance of benefits and risks.
The risks, at this stage at least, appear manageable.
Tehran probably believes the likelihood of military strikes has
increased in recent months but remains remote given
Washington's preoccupation with Iraq and its appreciation of
Iran's many options to retaliate. The Russians and Chinese have
so far remained stalwart in their opposition to sanctions and a
Chapter 7 resolution. Even if resistance in Moscow and Beijing
eroded, the Iranians may calculate that any sanctions adopted
would be weak and easily weathered and that tougher measures
(such as those affecting oil and gas markets) would be avoided
on the assumption--actively promoted by Tehran--that they would
hurt the West more than Iran.
Not only do the risks of continuing enrichment seem
limited, but the benefits of giving up the enrichment program
also currently appear small (especially when compared to the
perceived security, geo-political, and prestige benefits of
acquiring a nuclear weapons option). The economic,
technological, and political incentives offered by the
Europeans last July apparently didn't impress the Iranians, who
probably recognize that, without U.S. support, those benefits
may not fully materialize. More fundamentally, Iran's leaders
may see little sense in giving up their trump card in a deal
with the Europeans if they believe they'd still face a U.S.
government intent on pursuing a policy of regime change.
If the international community is to have any chance of
persuading Iran to give up its enrichment capability (and its
nuclear weapons option), it must radically alter Tehran's
current calculus of benefit and risk.Part of the equation is
stronger sticks. Iran must face the credible threat of
increasingly severe penalties--ranging from travel bans, asset
freezes, and political gestures to investment and trade
restrictions to even the use of military force. Russia and
China, in particular, must be persuaded that such threats are
necessary and not counterproductive. But they will be prepared
to join in threatening such penalties only if Iran is also
offered incentives that they believe could get Iran to accept
the deal and therefore avoid the need to implement the
penalties.
And so the other part of the equation is more attractive
carrots. Possible incentives for Iran have been widely
discussed, including the kinds of commercial and technological
cooperation offered by the Europeans last July, membership in
the World Trade Organization, lifting of existing U.S. economic
sanctions, military confidence-building arrangements in the
Gulf region, and so forth. But the carrot likely to be most
influential in Tehran would be the prospect of a less
threatening and more normal relationship with the United
States--and specifically a recognition in Washington that
regime change in Tehran should be the prerogative of the
Iranian people and not the policy of the U.S.
Direct engagement between the U.S. and Iran
The most effective way to offer the incentive of a more
normal, less threatening relationship with the United States--
and indeed the only way it would be credible--is through
direct, face-to-face discussions involving American and Iranian
representatives. Bilateral U.S.-Iranian contacts could take
place within the framework of a multilateral process that also
included Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China--analogous
to the Six Party Talks that have provided an acceptable context
for bilateral meetings between the U.S. and North Korea during
the last year or so.
The agenda for U.S.-Iranian discussions should not be
confined to the nuclear issue. It should instead cover the full
range of issues that divide the two countries, including U.S.
concerns about Iran's support for Middle East terrorist groups,
its role in Iraq, its alleged harboring of al-Qaeda operatives,
its policies toward Israel, and its treatment of its own
people. Iran undoubtedly will have its own list of issues and
demands. The purpose of the talks would be to explore whether
U.S. concerns can be met and whether the interests of the two
countries can be reconciled. Only by addressing the broad range
of issues can prospects for normalization be assessed. And only
the prospect of normalized bilateral relations can provide the
context in which Iran is likely to consider suspending its
enrichment program and giving up its aspiration for nuclear
weapons.
At various times during the past decade, the U.S. and Iran
have both been interested in bilateral engagement, but never at
the same time. In recent weeks and months, the Iranians have
been sending signals--however mixed and confusing--that they
might be ready. But it is the U.S. administration that is now
resisting.
Asked recently whether the Bush administration is willing
to engage directly with Iran, Secretary Rice replied: ``What is
to be gained if Iran is not prepared to show that it is ready
to accede to the demands of the international community?'' But
do we really expect Iran to meet our demands even before
sitting down to talk with us--before knowing what it might
receive in return? Do we realistically think our current
bargaining position is so strong?
There seems to be a strong conviction within the
administration that talking to the current regime in Tehran
will give it legitimacy and sustain it in power, whereas
pressuring and isolating it will divide the leaders from the
people and perhaps even result in regime change and more
acceptable policies on the nuclear issue and other issues. But
most experts on Iran tend to believe just the opposite--that
external pressures will unite the Iranian public behind the
regime and its nuclear policies, while engagement will magnify
the fissures that have begun to appear within the Iranian
leadership and perhaps produce significant changes in policy,
including on the nuclear issue.
In London this Friday, the P-5 countries plus Germany are
scheduled to meet to consider a European-drafted package
proposal for Iran. It is an opportunity to make the major
changes in Iran's calculation of benefits and risks that will
be necessary to induce Tehran to give up its enrichment
capability. To have that effect, the Russians and Chinese
should agree that the package will require stiff penalties if
Iran does not accept a reasonable offer. The Europeans should
provide incentives more attractive than those contained in
their July proposal. And the U.S. should be prepared to engage
in direct talks with the Iranians within a multilateral
framework.
Such a package would be the first real test of whether Iran
is willing to give up its quest for a nuclear weapons
capability. If the Iranians are determined to proceed with
their nuclear plans come what may, they will fail the test. But
that will at least put the U.S. and the Europeans in a stronger
position to rally the international community behind a longer-
term strategy to demonstrate to Iran that it has much to lose
and little to gain by staying on its present course.
Despite recent progress in Iran's enrichment program, Iran
is still years away from being able to produce a nuclear
weapon. But it will not be long--perhaps several months to a
year--before Iran is confident in its ability to enrich uranium
efficiently in overt or clandestine production units large
enough to produce bomb quantities of HEU in less than a year.
It is therefore important that the U.S. and the other key
states move quickly to construct and present a package that
gives Iran a stark choice--it can be a pariah with nuclear
weapons or a well-integrated, respected member of the
international community, with normal relations with the U.S.,
without them.
Prepared Statement
DR. DAVID ALBRIGHT
President and Founder, Institute for Science and International Security
(ISIS), Washington, DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 17, 2006
----------
Iran is now on the verge of mastering a critical step in
building and operating a gas centrifuge plant that would be
able to produce significant quantities of enriched uranium for
either peaceful or military purposes. However, Iran can be
expected to face serious technical hurdles before it can
produce significant quantities of enriched uranium.
In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on
February 2, 2006, John Negroponte, Director of National
Intelligence, stated that Iran is judged as probably having
neither a nuclear weapon nor the necessary fissile material for
a weapon. He added that if Iran continues on its current path,
it ``will likely have the capability to produce a nuclear
weapon within the next decade.'' The basis for this estimate
remains classified, although press reports state that Iran's
lack of knowledge and experience in building and running large
numbers of centrifuges is an important consideration. Many
interpret Negroponte's remark to mean that Iran will need 5-10
years before it possesses nuclear weapons.
Estimates of the amount of time Iran needs to get its first
nuclear weapon are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. Many
questions about Iran's technical nuclear capabilities and its
plans to build nuclear weapons remain unanswered. In addition,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is unable to
verify that Iran has fully declared its nuclear activities. It
still cannot state conclusively that Iran does not conduct
secret uranium enrichment activities. Nonetheless, because of
over three years of inspections, the IAEA has developed
considerable knowledge about Iran's nuclear program and
identified the main uncertainties in its knowledge about that
program. The remaining uncertainties appear to exclude the
existence of undeclared nuclear facilities large enough to
significantly shift projections of the amount of time Iran
would need to produce nuclear weapons. However, these
uncertainties also suggest that Iran intends to develop a
nuclear weapons capability, enabling it to build deliverable
nuclear weapons once the regime's leaders make to a decision to
do so.
To understand the assumptions, key information,
calculations, and uncertainties driving estimates of the
timelines, I present two ``worst-case'' estimates of the time
Iran would need to build its first nuclear weapon. In both of
these estimates, which involve the production of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and cover the more likely scenarios,
Iran appears to need at least three years, or until 2009,
before it could have enough HEU to make a nuclear weapon. Given
the technical difficulty of the task, it could take Iran
longer.
Before discussing these estimates, I will provide
background information on Iran's nuclear program and discuss
recent developments in Iran's gas centrifuge program. In
particular, I will discuss several of Iran's recent progress
and problems in its centrifuge program that affect these
estimates.
Iran's Nuclear Program
Iran has invested heavily in nuclear industries in the last
twenty years. It has sought a wide range of items overseas,
including nuclear reactors, uranium conversion facilities,
heavy water production plants, fuel fabrication plants, and
uranium enrichment facilities. Many of its overseas purchases
were thwarted, such as multiple efforts to buy research
reactors and an attempt to purchase a turn-key gas centrifuge
plant from Russia in 1995. However, in general, Iran found
suppliers to provide the wherewithal to build nuclear
facilities. A. Q. Khan and business associates in Europe and
the Middle East provided Iran the ability to build and operate
gas centrifuges. Without their assistance, Iran would have
likely been unable to develop a gas centrifuge program.
Iran's current nuclear infrastructure is impressive.
Although many key facilities are not finished, Iran is close to
operating a large power reactor at Bushehr and has started or
is close to operating several relatively large fuel cycle
facilities. Following the end of the suspension embodied in its
November 2004 agreement with the European Union, Iran resumed
operating its uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz. Table 1
summarizes the main nuclear facilities in Iran.
Most of Iran's foreign procurement for its fuel cycle
facilities occurred in secret, and several of the associated
nuclear materials and facilities were not declared to the IAEA,
as Iran was required to do under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Appendix 1 lists Iran's many violations of its
safeguards agreement and important incidences of its lack of
cooperation with the IAEA.
If Iran finishes its declared nuclear facilities, it would
have a capability to produce HEU and plutonium for nuclear
weapons. At that point, Iran could decide to change the purpose
of its safeguarded nuclear facilities and rapidly dedicate them
to nuclear weapons purposes.
Under current and expected developments, Iran's gas
centrifuge program provides the quickest route to the
indigenous production of nuclear explosive materials. As a
result, the gas centrifuge program is the main focus of my
testimony.
However, Iran is also progressing on developing an
indigenous method to produce plutonium. It continues to build a
heavy water reactor at Arak, despite repeated international
requests that Iran discontinue this project. Iranian officials
have stated that the reactor is scheduled to be completed in
2009, although this schedule may not be met due to problems in
building and starting up such a reactor. When fully
operational, the reactor is estimated to be able to produce
about 9 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per year, enough
for two nuclear weapons per year. Iran has told the IAEA that
it does not intend to build reprocessing facilities to separate
plutonium from this reactor. It did state that it was planning
to build hot cells to separate ``long-lived radioisotopes,''
but said that it was having problems obtaining the necessary
manipulators and lead glass windows. IAEA investigations into
Iran's past reprocessing activities continue.
Iran Breaks the Suspension on Enrichment Activities
Iran ended the suspension on enrichment and enrichment-
related activities in January 2006. Its actions appear aimed at
finishing the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz this
year and, soon afterward, starting to install centrifuges in
the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the main underground
enrichment facility at Natanz slated to hold eventually about
50,000 centrifuges.
In early January 2006, Iran removed 52 seals applied by the
IAEA that verified the suspension of Iran's P-1 centrifuge
uranium enrichment program. The seals were located at the
Natanz, Pars Trash, and Farayand Technique sites, Iran's main
centrifuge facilities. On February 11, Iran started to enrich
uranium in a small number of centrifuges at Natanz, bringing to
a halt Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment that had lasted
since October 2003. A few days earlier, Iran moved to end its
implementation of the Additional Protocol, an advanced
safeguards agreement created in the 1990s to fix traditional
safeguards' inability to provide adequate assurance that a
country does not have undeclared nuclear facilities or
materials.
After removing seals, Iran started to substantially
renovate key portions of the PFEP. Iran began construction on
the PFEP in secret in 2001, and it installed up to 200
centrifuges in 2002 and 2003. The PFEP is designed to hold up
to six 164-machine cascades, groups of centrifuges connected
together by pipes, in addition to smaller test cascades, for a
total of about 1,000 centrifuges.
At Natanz and Farayand Technique, Iran quickly restarted
testing centrifuge rotors and checking centrifuge components to
determine if they are manufactured precisely enough to use in a
centrifuge. By early March, Iran had restarted enriching
uranium at the pilot plant in 10- and 20-centrifuge cascades.
On April 13, 2006, Iran announced that it had produced low
enriched uranium in its 164 machine cascade, finished in the
fall of 2003 but never operated with uranium hexafluoride prior
to the suspension of enrichment that started in October 2003 as
a result of an agreement between the European Union and Iran
reached in Tehran. Soon afterward, it announced that it had
enriched uranium up to a level of almost 5 percent.
Restarting the 164-machine cascade took several months.
Iran had to repair damaged centrifuges. According to IAEA
reports, many centrifuges crashed or broke when the cascade was
shut down at the start of the suspension in 2003. Before
introducing uranium hexafluoride, it had to reconnect all the
pipes, establish a vacuum inside the cascade, and prepare the
cascade for operation with uranium hexafluoride.
The initial performance of the P-1 centrifuges in this
cascade has been less than expected. Based on statements on
state-run television on April 12, 2006 by the Gholam-Reza
Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the
average annualized output of the centrifuges in this cascade is
relatively low.\1\ In the same interview, he implied that he
expects that the average output of each P1 centrifuge will
almost double in the main plant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The annualized average output of each centrifuge was about 1.4
separative work units per machine per year, based on Aqazadeh's
statement of a maximum feed rate of 70 grams per hour and the
production of 7 grams per hour of 3.5 percent enriched uranium. The
feed and product rate imply a tails assay of 0.4 percent. This
relatively low output could mean that the aluminum centrifuge rotors
are spinning at a lower speed than possible. For the main plant, he
said that 48,000 centrifuges would produce 30 tonnes of low enriched
uranium per year. Assuming a tails assay of 0.4 percent and a product
of 3.5 percent enriched uranium, the estimated average output of each
machine would be about 2.3 swu/yr. With an assumed tails assay of 0.3
percent, the estimated output rises to 2.7 swu/yr, high for a Pakistani
P1 design, but theoretically possible if the centrifuge is further
optimized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Iranians have not yet run this cascade
continuously to produce enriched uranium. One report stated
that the cascade operated with uranium hexafluoride only about
half of its first month of operation, although it continued to
operate under vacuum the rest of the time. The Iranian
centrifuge operators do not yet have sufficient understanding
of cascade operation and must conduct a series of longer tests
to develop a deeper understanding of the cascade.
The IAEA reported in April that Iran was building the
second and third cascades at the PFEP. A senior diplomat in
Vienna said in a recent interview that the second cascade could
start in May and the third one could start in June. This
schedule would allow Iran to test multiple cascades running in
parallel, a necessary step prior to building a centrifuge plant
composed of such cascades. The diplomat speculated that Iran
could continue with this pattern, installing the fourth and
fifth in July and August, respectively. He stated that the slot
for the sixth cascade is currently being occupied by the 10-
and 20-machine cascades.
Iran would likely want to run its cascades individually and
in parallel for several months to ensure that no significant
problems develop and to gain confidence that it can reliably
enrich uranium in the cascades. Problems could include
excessive vibration of the centrifuges, motor or power
failures, pressure and temperature instabilities, or breakdown
of the vacuum. Iran may also want to test any emergency systems
designed to shut down the cascade without losing many
centrifuges in the event of a major failure. Absent major
problems, Iran is expected to need roughly six months or more
to demonstrate successful operation of its cascades and their
associated emergency and control systems.
Once Iran overcomes the technical hurdle of operating its
demonstration cascades, it can duplicate them and create larger
cascades. Iran would then be ready to build a centrifuge plant
able to produce significant amounts of enriched uranium either
for peaceful purposes or for nuclear weapons. However, Iran may
encounter additional problems when it tries to build and
operate a centrifuge plant.
As of late April, according to the IAEA, Iran was not
moving aggressively to finish the FEP in preparation for
installing the first module. Earlier, it moved process tanks
and an autoclave, used to heat uranium hexafluoride into a gas
prior to insertion into centrifuge cascades, into the FEP at
Natanz. Iran told the IAEA that it intends to start the
installation of the first 3,000 P1 centrifuges, called the
first module, in the underground cascade halls at the FEP in
the fourth quarter of 2006. Iran still needs to finish the
basic infrastructure, including installing electrical cables. A
key question is whether Iran has procured or manufactured all
the equipment it needs to finish the first module. In addition,
questions remain about the number of centrifuges Iran has in-
hand and the quantity it would still need to manufacture
indigenously to exacting specifications, a task that many
countries have found challenging.
The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan has
continued to operate since its restart in August 2005,
following the breakdown in the suspension mandated by the
November 2004 agreement between Iran and the European Union. By
late February 2006, Iran had produced about 85 tonnes of
uranium hexafluoride, where the quantity refers to uranium
mass. This amount had increased to about 110 tonnes in April.
With roughly 5 tonnes needed to make enough HEU for a nuclear
weapon, this stock represents enough natural uranium
hexafluoride for roughly 20 nuclear weapons. Although Iran's
uranium hexafluoride reportedly contains impurities that can
interfere with the operation of centrifuges and reduce their
output, IAEA experts believe that Iran can overcome this
problem. Iran is known to be working to improve the purity of
the uranium hexafluoride produced at the UCF. Nonetheless, if
necessary, Iran could use its existing stock of impure
material, if it had no other material. It could take additional
steps to purify this uranium hexafluoride, or it could use the
material in its own centrifuges and experience reduced output
and a higher centrifuge failure rate.
Worst-Case Estimates
Developing an answer to how soon Iran could produce enough
HEU for a nuclear weapon is complicated and fraught with
uncertainty. Beyond the technical uncertainties, several other
important factors are unknown. Will Iran develop a nuclear
weapons capability but produce only low enriched uranium for
nuclear power reactors and not any highly enriched uranium?
Will Iran withdraw from the NPT, expel inspectors, and
concentrate on building secret nuclear facilities? How does
Iran perceive the risks of particular actions, such as
producing HEU in the pilot plant? What resources will Iran
apply to finishing its uranium enrichment facilities? Will
there be military strikes against Iranian nuclear sites?
Before developing a timeline, it is necessary to estimate
how much HEU Iran would need to make a nuclear weapon. Many
assessments cite 25 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium (HEU
containing more than 90 percent uranium 235) as the minimum
amount necessary for a crude, implosion-type fission weapon of
the type Iran is expected to build. However, the experience of
similar proliferant states such as Iraq leads to lower
quantities. In 1990, Iraq initially planned to use 15 kilograms
of weapon-grade uranium in its implosion design. An
unclassified design using almost 20 kilograms was calculated in
a study co-authored by Theodore Taylor and Albright in about
1990. Thus, an Iranian nuclear weapon could be expected to need
about 15-20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium. A larger
quantity of HEU is needed than the exact amount placed into the
weapon because of inevitable losses during processing, but such
losses can be kept to less than 20 percent with care and the
recovered material recycled into successive weapons. Thus, for
the estimates presented here, a crude fission weapon is
estimated to require 15-20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium.
Scenario I--Clandestine Centrifuge Plant
Iran's most direct path to obtaining HEU for nuclear
weapons is building a relatively small gas centrifuge plant
that can make weapon-grade uranium directly from natural
uranium.\2\ If Iran built such a plant openly, it would be an
acknowledgement that it seeks nuclear weapons. As a result,
Iran is likely to pursue such a path in utmost secrecy, without
declaring to the IAEA the facility and any associated uranium
hexafluoride production facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Alternatively, Iran could secretly build a ``topping plant'' of
about 500 centrifuges and use a stock of low enriched uranium produced
in the pilot plant as feed to produce HEU. However, the estimated
timeline for this alternative route is not significantly different from
the one outlined in this scenario and is not considered further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without the Additional Protocol in effect, however, the
IAEA faces a difficult challenge discovering such a clandestine
facility, even as Iran installs centrifuges at Natanz to
produce low enriched uranium. The IAEA has already reported
that it can no longer monitor effectively centrifuge
components, unless they are at Natanz and within areas subject
to IAEA containment and surveillance. When Iran halted its
adherence to the Additional Protocol, the IAEA lost access to
centrifuge production and storage facilities. Alternatively,
Iran may feel less assured about successfully deceiving the
inspectors and proceed with such a plant only after withdrawing
from the NPT and asking inspectors to leave. In either case,
U.S., Israeli, and European intelligence agencies would be
unlikely to locate precisely this facility.
The key to predicting a timeline is understanding the pace
and scope of Iran's gas centrifuge program, for example the
schedule for establishing a centrifuge plant large enough to
make enough HEU for one nuclear weapon per year. Such a
clandestine facility would require about 1,500-1,800 P1
centrifuges with an average capacity of about 2.5-3 swus per
year. These values for separative work are at the high end of
the possible output of Iran's P1 centrifuge; actual values may
be less.
A capacity of 4,500 swus per year is sufficient to produce
about 28 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium per year, assuming
continuous operation and a tails assay of 0.5 percent, where
tails assay is the fraction of uranium 235 in the waste stream.
This is a relatively high tails assay, but such a tails assay
is common in initial nuclear weapons programs. As a program
matures and grows, it typically reduces the tails assay to
about 0.4 percent and perhaps later to 0.3 percent to conserve
uranium supplies.
Iran has enough components for up to 5,000 centrifuges,
according to senior diplomats in Vienna. However, other senior
diplomats said that Iran may not have 5,000 of all components,
and many components are not expected to pass quality control.
In total, Iran is estimated to have in-hand enough good
components for at least an additional 1,000 to 2,000
centrifuges, beyond the roughly 800 centrifuges already slated
for the pilot plant at Natanz. Iran could also build new
centrifuge components, and in fact may have already started to
do so.
If Iran had decided to build a clandestine plant in early
2006, it could assemble enough additional usable centrifuges
for this plant of 1,500-1,800 centrifuges in about 15-18
months, or by about mid-2007. It would need to assemble at the
upper limit of its past rate of about 70-100 centrifuges per
month to accomplish this goal. If necessary, Iran could also
increase the centrifuge assembly rate, for example by
increasing the number of shifts from one to two per day,
according to diplomats in Vienna.
In the meantime, Iran would need to identify a new facility
where it could install centrifuge cascades, since it is
unlikely to choose Natanz as the location of a secret plant. It
would also need to install electrical, cooling, control and
emergency equipment, feed and withdrawal systems, and other
peripheral equipment. It would then need to integrate all these
systems, test them, and commission the plant. Iran could start
immediately to accomplish these steps, even before the final
testing of the 164 machine cascades at Natanz, but final
completion of the clandestine plant is highly unlikely before
the end of 2007.
Given another year to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon,
where some inefficiency in the plant is expected, and a few
more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran
could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009. By this time, Iran
is assessed to have had sufficient time to prepare the other
components of a nuclear weapon, although the weapon may not be
small enough to be deliverable by a ballistic missile.
This result reflects a worst-case assessment, and Iran can
be expected to take longer. Iran is likely to encounter
technical difficulties that would delay bringing a centrifuge
plant into operation. The output of its centrifuges may not
achieve the higher value used in this assessment. Other factors
causing delay include Iran having trouble in the manufacturing
and installation of so many centrifuges and cascades in such a
short time period, or Iran taking longer than expected to
overcome difficulties in operating the cascades as a single
production unit or in commissioning the secret centrifuge
plant.
Scenario II--Break Out Using FEP
Iran has stated its intention to start installing
centrifuges in late 2006 in its first module of 3,000
centrifuges in the underground halls of FEP at Natanz. This
module would give Iran another way to produce HEU for nuclear
weapons, even though the module is being designed to produce
low enriched uranium. Once Iran has an adequate stock of LEU,
the time to produce enough HEU for a nuclear weapon in this
facility could be dramatically shortened.
At above rates of centrifuge assembly, and assuming that
Iran has or can produce enough new P1 centrifuge components and
associated equipment, Iran could finish producing 3,000
centrifuges for this module sometime in 2008. Although cascades
would be expected to be built before all the centrifuges are
assembled, Iran will probably need at least another year to
finish this module, placing the completion date in 2009 or
2010. Unexpected complications could delay the commissioning
date. On the other hand, Iran could accelerate the pace by
manufacturing, assembling, and installing centrifuges more
quickly. Given all the difficult tasks that must be
accomplished, however, Iran is unlikely to commission this
module much before the start of 2009.
If Iran decided to make HEU in this module, it would have
several alternatives. Because of the small throughput and great
operational flexibility of centrifuges, HEU for nuclear weapons
could be produced by reconfiguring the cascades in the module
or batch recycling where the cascade product is used as feed
for subsequent cycles of enrichment in the same cascade.
Reconfiguration could be as straightforward as connecting
separate cascades in series and selecting carefully the places
where new pipes interconnect the cascades. The Iranian module
is slated to be composed of 164-centrifuge cascades operating
together under one control system. In such a case,
reconfiguration would not require the disassembly of the
individual cascades, and it could be accomplished within days.
In this case, the loss of enrichment output can be less than
ten percent, although the final enrichment level of the HEU may
reach only 80 percent, sufficient for use in an existing
implosion design albeit with a lower explosive yield. With a
reconfigured plant, and starting with natural uranium, 20
kilograms of HEU uranium could be produced within four to six
months. If Iran waited until it had produced a stock of LEU and
used this stock as the initial feedstock, it could produce 20
kilograms in about one to two months.
Batch recycling would entail putting the cascade product
back through the cascade several times, without the need to
change the basic setup of the cascade. Cascades of the type
expected at Natanz could produce weapon-grade uranium after
roughly four or five recycles, starting with natural uranium.
Twenty kilograms of weapon-grade uranium could be produced in
about six to twelve months. If the batch operation started with
an existing stock of LEU, the time to produce 20 kilograms of
weapon-grade uranium would drop to about one to two months.
Whether using batch recycling or reconfiguration, Iran
could produce in 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz enough HEU for its
first nuclear weapon in less than a year. Iran could do so in
considerably less than a year, if it used an existing stock of
LEU as the initial feed. It is likely that Iran would operate
the module to make LEU so that any production of HEU would be
expected to happen quickly.
Using either break-out approach, Iran is not likely to have
enough HEU for a nuclear weapon until 2009. This timeline is
similar to that outlined in the clandestine plant scenario. In
addition, technical obstacles may further delay the operation
of the module in the FEP.
Conclusion
The international community needs to be committed to a
diplomatic solution that results in an agreement whereby Iran
voluntarily forswears having any deployed enrichment
capability. Looking at a timeline of at least three years
before Iran could have a nuclear weapons capability means that
there is still time to pursue aggressive diplomatic options,
and time for measures such as sanctions to have an effect, if
they become necessary.
In the short-term, it is imperative for the international
community to intensify its efforts to disrupt or slow Iran's
overseas acquisition of dual-use items for its centrifuge
program and other nuclear programs. Iran continues to seek
centrifuge-related items aboard, but it has encountered greater
difficulty acquiring these items because of the increased
scrutiny by key supplier states. As Iran seeks these items in a
larger number of countries, greater efforts will be required to
thwart Iran from succeeding.
It is vital to understand what Iran has accomplished, what
it still has to learn, and when it will reach a point when a
plan to pursue nuclear weapons covertly or openly could succeed
more quickly than the international community could react.
Although these estimates include significant uncertainties,
they reinforce the view that Iran must foreswear any deployed
enrichment capability and accept adequate inspections.
Otherwise, we risk a seismic shift in the balance of power in
the region.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity Location
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uranium Mining and Milling............. Saghand Mine and Mill
Gchine Mine and Mill
Nuclear Research....................... Jabr Ibn Havan Multipurpose
& Development........................ Laboratories (JHL)
Radiochemistry Laboratories of
TNRC
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory
(UCL)
Research reactors at Esfahan
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon
Radioisotope Production
Facility (MIX Facility)
Uranium Conversion..................... Uranium Conversion Facility
(UCF)
Centrifuge Research.................... Kalaye Electric Company
& Development........................ Farayand Technique
and Manufacturing.................... Pars Trash
Other centrifuge manufacturing
sites
Centrifuge Uranium..................... Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at
Enrichment........................... Natanz
Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz
Laser Uranium Enrichment............... Lashkar Ab'ad
Karaj Agricultural and Medical
Center
Fuel Fabrication....................... Fuel Fabrication Laboratory
(FFL)
Zirconium Production Plant
(ZPP)
Fuel Manufacturing Plant
Heavy Water-Related Facilities......... Heavy Water Production Plant
IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor
Hot Cells
Nuclear Power Generation............... Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
(BNPP)
Waste Disposal......................... Anarak
Suspect Sites.......................... Parchin, Lavisan-Shian
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix 1--Iran's Safeguards Violations
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found
that Iran violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and its related safeguards agreement for many years. Iran's
violations and eventual--though still incomplete--cooperation
with the IAEA can be divided into four eras or stages.
First Stage: up to mid-2002
In the first stage, beginning in the mid-1980s to early
1990s and continuing until mid-2002, Iran violated its
safeguards agreement by pursuing undeclared fuel cycle
activities with little scrutiny by the IAEA or member states.
Although the IAEA and member states were collecting information
about Iranian violations, they were reluctant to act publicly.
Second Stage: 2002-2003
The second stage began in August 2002 when the National
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) made the first of many
public revelations about secret Iranian nuclear facilities,
revealing the Natanz and Arak nuclear sites and ended in late
2003. After pressure from the IAEA and further public
revelations about the Natanz site by ISIS, Iran finally allowed
the IAEA to visit Natanz in February 2003, and that month Iran
began to reveal some of its violations. However, the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran denied many of the accusations, and
blocked access by the IAEA to suspect sites. During this time,
Iran's leadership seemed to be torn between acting cooperative
and protecting their nuclear secrets at all costs. Despite many
efforts by Iran to hide its past and current activities,
however, the IAEA, with assistance from member states, NCRI,
and ISIS, revealed several more secret nuclear activities and
facilities.
In his November 2004 safeguards report to the IAEA Board of
Governors, the Director General detailed Iran's failures to
implement its safeguards agreement that had been uncovered
through this period. The violations include Iran's failure to
report activities related to nuclear material, the failure to
declare the existence of relevant nuclear facilities, the
failure to provide design data for a number of facilities, and
the ``failure on many occasions to cooperate to facilitate the
implementation of safeguards, as evidenced by extensive
concealment activities.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ International Atomic Energy Agency, ``Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,'' GOV/2004/83, 15
November 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the IAEA, Iran failed to declare six major
activities related to nuclear material:
Iran failed to report that it had imported natural
uranium (1,000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of
UF4, and 400 kg of UO2) from
China in 1991 and its transfer for processing. Iran
acknowledged the import in February 2003.
It failed to report that it had used the imported
uranium to test parts of its uranium conversion
process, such as uranium dissolution, purification
using pulse columns, and the production of uranium
metal, and the associated production and loss of
nuclear material. Iran acknowledged this failure in
February 2003.
Iran failed to report that it had used 1.9 kg of the
imported UF6 to test P1 centrifuges at the
Kalaye Electric Company centrifuge workshop in 1999 and
2002. In its October 2003 declaration, Iran said it
first fed UF6 into a centrifuge in 1999 and
in 2002 fed UF6 into as many as 19
centrifuges. Iran also failed to declare the associated
production of enriched and depleted uranium.
It failed to report that in 1993 it had imported 50
kg of natural uranium metal, and that it used 8 kg of
this for atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS)
experiments at Tehran Nuclear Research Center from 1999
to 2000 and 22 kg for AVLIS experiments at Lashkar
Ab'ad from 2002 to 2003.\2\ Iran acknowledged these
activities in its October 2003 declaration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ International Atomic Energy Agency, ``Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,'' GOV/2003/75, 10
November 2003, Annex 1, p. 2.
Iran failed to report that it had used imported
depleted UO2, depleted U308, and
natural U308 to produce UO2,
UO3, UF4, UF6, and
ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC) at the Esfahan Nuclear
Technology Center and the Tehran Nuclear Research
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Center.
It failed to report that it had produced
UO2 targets, irradiated them in the Tehran
Research Reactor, and then separated the plutonium from
the irradiated targets. Iran also failed to report the
production and transfer of waste associated with these
activities and that it had stored unprocessed
irradiated targets at the Tehran Nuclear Research
Center. In meetings with the IAEA following its October
2003 declaration, Iran said that it conducted the
plutonium separation experiments between 1988 and 1993
using shielded glove boxes at the Tehran Nuclear
Research Center.
According to the IAEA, Iran failed to declare the existence
of key nuclear facilities and failed to provide design
information, or updated design information, for a number of
facilities. Iran failed to declare the existence of the pilot
enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop,
the laser enrichment facility at Tehran Nuclear Research
Center, and the pilot laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab'ad.
Iran failed to provide design information for the
facilities where the uranium imported in 1991 was received,
stored, and processed, including at Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose
Laboratories, Tehran Research Reactor, Esfahan Nuclear
Technology Center, and the waste storage facilities at Esfahan
and Anarak. Iran also failed to provide design information for
the facilities at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and the
Tehran Nuclear Research Center where Iran produced
UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6
and AUC using imported depleted UO2, depleted
U308, and natural U308. Iran failed to
provide design information for the waste storage facilities at
Esfahan and Anarak in a timely manner. It failed to provide
design information for locations where wastes resulting from
undeclared activities were processed and stored, including the
waste storage facility at Karaj. And it failed to provide
design information for the Tehran Research Reactor, in relation
to the irradiation of uranium targets, the facility at the
Tehran Nuclear Research Center where Iran separated plutonium,
and the center's waste handling facility.
Third Stage: End of 2003-2005
The third stage, from October 2003 to the end of 2005,
could be called the ``Rowhani era,'' because Hassan Rowhani,
then head of Iran's National Security Council, took the lead
from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in the fall of 2003
and attempted to convince the international community that Iran
would now be transparent and cooperate fully with the IAEA.
Facing a deadline set by the IAEA Board of Governors, on
October 21, 2003 Iran made an extensive written declaration to
the IAEA of its past nuclear activities, which revealed a
number of additional safeguards violations, and Iran agreed to
sign the Additional Protocol.
According to the IAEA Director General's November 15, 2004
report to the Board of Governors, ``Since October 2003, Iran's
cooperation has improved appreciably, although information has
continued in some cases to be slow in coming and provided in
reaction to Agency requests. Since December 2003, Iran has
facilitated in a timely manner Agency access under its
Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear
materials and facilities, as well as other locations in the
country, and has permitted the Agency to take environmental
samples as requested by the Agency.''
However, despite better cooperation, a number of new
questions have been raised. For example, Iran's work on
developing P2 centrifuges, which Iran had failed to declare in
its declaration in October 2003, is not fully understood by the
Agency. In addition, Iran has not allowed the IAEA sufficient
visits to suspect sites at Parchin that are involved in
research and development of high explosives. In proceeding with
construction of tunnels at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology
Centre before it had told the IAEA, Iran failed to honor its
commitment to tell the IAEA about plans to construct new
facilities.
Iran has not permitted the IAEA adequate information about
and access to dual-use equipment and materials procured by the
Physics Research Center for its Lavisan-Shian site that could
be used in a gas centrifuge program. Except in one case, Iran
has also refused repeated IAEA requests to interview
individuals involved in the acquisition of these items. In the
one case where the IAEA recently interviewed a former head of
the Physics Research Center and took environmental samples of
some of the equipment he presented to the inspectors, it
detected traces of HEU on some vacuum equipment. This result
links this equipment to the gas centrifuge program and
contradicts Iranian denials about its relationship to the
centrifuge program.
In addition, the IAEA has questions about a range of
studies and documents that could have a military nuclear
dimension. The documents include a 15-page document that
describes the production of uranium metal from uranium
hexafluoride and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium
into hemispheres, activities typically associated with a
nuclear weapons program. Iran declared that it received the
document unsolicited from agents of the Khan network and that
it has never used the document. Because this document was part
of a package of detailed documents available from the Khan
network related to the production of nuclear weapon components
made from depleted uranium and HEU, the IAEA remains concerned
that Iran may have received more documents in the package and
conducted undeclared activities associated with these
documents.
Another set of documents were located on a laptop computer
that was brought out of Iran and provided to the United States,
which in turn shared part of the information with the IAEA. The
studies relate to a ``Green Salt Project,'' high explosives
testing, and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle that
appears able to carry a nuclear warhead. Although this
information is not a smoking gun, it suggests the existence of
a military-run nuclear weapons program. Iran has refused to
answer questions about the last two areas and offered
inadequate answers about the Green Salt Project.
A number of questions from before October 2003 also remain
unanswered, pending new information or further analysis, such
as the source of low enriched uranium and some HEU
contamination on Iran's P1 centrifuges and the timeline of
Iran's plutonium separation activities.
Fourth Stage: 2006-Present
In the fourth stage, starting in early 2006 and continuing
until today, Iran has broken the suspension and halted its
adherence to the Additional Protocol. The IAEA is making
minimal progress in answering its outstanding questions and
concerns or in confirming the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities. It has also lost access to key
centrifuge production and storage facilities, which would
enable inspectors to determine the rate and status of Iran's
production of centrifuges. This knowledge is especially
relevant to concerns of a possible covert enrichment program.
Prepared Statement of
DR. KENNETH M. POLLACK
Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 17, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, other distinguished members of
the committee, it is an honor to appear here today to discuss a
matter of such importance to our Nation.
As with all writing about Iran's political process, it is
important to be humble about what we can know. Our sources of
information about Iranian decisionmaking are miserable and the
Iranian governmental process is labyrinthine and unpredictable
even for the most subtle and knowledgeable observers inside
Iran and out. Even Iran's public opinion is difficult to
discern because the regime works hard to control sources of
information, punishes dissent, and hinders the efforts of
disinterested pollsters. Consequently, we are all ``reading tea
leaves'' when it comes to trying to predict Iran's behavior,
especially on an issue as important and heavily debated as this
one. All that any of us can offer is an educated guess as to
what the Iranians are thinking and how they may react.
With that caveat in mind, I believe that Iran's interest in
nuclear weapons is both wide and deep, but it is not
adamantine. The issue, as always in politics, is not whether
Iran wants to see its nuclear program through to completion but
what it would be willing to sacrifice to keep it. On this
matter, I believe the Iranians would be willing to sacrifice a
fair amount, but hardly everything. What this suggests then is
that convincing Iran to give up its nuclear program is going to
require very considerable inducements, both positive and
negative, but that it is not impossible to do so.
IRAN'S STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
Setting aside the question of whether Iran is determinedly
seeking actual nuclear weapons or simply the capability to
produce fissile material (and thereby be in a position to
acquire the weapons themselves rapidly), there is ample reason
to believe that Iranians would want nuclear weapons.
Deterrence. It has become a cliche in the United States to
note that Iran lives in a tough neighborhood. Iranian leaders
in Tehran can objectively look out beyond Iran's borders and
see a wide range of potential threats, from chaos and civil war
in Iraq or Afghanistan, to a nuclear-armed Pakistan, to Israel
over the horizon, to American forces arrayed all along Iran's
borders. What's more, Tehran's relations are strained or
antagonistic with many of its neighbors, and even those with
correct relations with the Islamic Republic tend to view it
with considerable suspicion. Thus, the Iranians can honestly
point to a wide range of threats and serious concerns for their
security, although the fact that their own actions have been
responsible for much of the animosity they face is probably
lost on most of them.
In other words, possession of nuclear weapons makes sense
from an Iranian perspective for purely defensive reasons. While
nuclear weapons cannot solve all of Iran's security problems,
they can solve some, and in so doing might make dealing with
the rest much easier. At the most extreme, Iran is unlikely to
be able to deter a determined American military operation
without a nuclear arsenal. This lesson has no doubt been driven
home to the Iranians by the divergent experiences of Iraq and
North Korea, the two other members of President Bush's ``Axis
of Evil.'' North Korea is believed to possess nuclear weapons
and so the United States has not attacked it and is being
forced to engage with Pyongyang. On the other hand, Saddam
Hussein's Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons--but was
believed to be trying to acquire them--and so the United States
was willing to invade and overturn the Ba'thist regime. It is
hard to imagine that the leadership in Tehran did not see this
as a very simple set of reinforcing conclusions: If you have
nuclear weapons, the United States will not dare use force
against you, but if you don't, you are vulnerable.
Prestige. We should never forget that the Iranians see
themselves as the lineal descendants of a 2,500-year-old
civilization that bequeathed to the world its first superpower
(the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great, Darius, and Xerxes),
and a long string of great powers from the Parthians to the
Sassanids to the Safavids. Only very recently, as measured by
the full tale of human history, has Persian power been
supplanted in the region by European and eventually American
power. A great many Iranians believe that their country's
history, experience, and natural resources mandate for it a
role as one of the world's great powers and the dominant force
in southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.
To the legacy of Persia's imperial greatness can be added
the pride of the Islamic Revolution, which since 1978 has
reinforced to many Iranians the sense that their nation has
been marked by destiny to play a leading (perhaps ``the''
leading) role in the region and the Islamic world. Although
many Iranians have soured on the revolution, others continue to
see it as vital to Iran's mission in the world and many more
still see it as another sign that Iran should be the
intellectual, diplomatic, and military hegemon of the region.
Persian pride appears to be another motivation in Iran's
pursuit of nuclear enrichment capability, if not actual nuclear
weapons. Acquiring nuclear weapons would give Iran a status
that only a very few other nations possess. It would
immediately catapult Iran into the ``big leagues'' of world
politics. It would likely force other states to pay more
attention to Iran's aspirations and wishes. Here the recent
model that seems to stand out in the minds of many Iranians is
India, whose development of nuclear weapons--and their
acceptance by the international community--has been a critical
element of New Delhi's acceptance as one of the great powers of
the world, whose views should be considered on any matter of
importance. Since this is the position to which many Iranians
seem to aspire, matching India in the nuclear realm also
appears to be a self-evident necessity for Iran.
Export of the Revolution. For at least some Iranians,
typically referred to as the ``radical hardliners,'' Ayatollah
Khomeini's dream of exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution to the
rest of the Muslim world (and possibly even beyond) is yet
another motive. Throughout the 1980s and, to a lesser extent
during the early 1990s, Iran attempted to realize this dream by
attempting to subvert reactionary Middle Eastern governments
and assist would-be revolutionaries in those same countries.
Iranian efforts in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and
even Lebanon were all motivated in part or in whole by this
goal. But Iran's efforts in these countries triggered the
animosity of the United States and in at least one case (Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war) prompted limited but direct American
military intervention against Iran. In Lebanon, Iranian actions
were part of what inspired American intervention there, and in
Saudi Arabia, Iranian activities sparked other aggressive
American responses as well as prompting debate in Washington
over whether to mount retaliatory military actions against the
Islamic Republic.
For still other Iranians, another motivation to acquire
nuclear weapons appears to be the related goal of waging war
against the United States. This is an offensive version of the
deterrence argument above that is also closely related to
export of the revolution. Proponents of this motivation
continue to see the world as Khomeini described it--as a battle
between the forces of good, represented by Iran, and the forces
of evil, represented by the United States. In this worldview,
Iran will not just face endless attack by the United States but
it will also face constant opposition to its efforts to export
the revolution from the United States. Therefore, Iran must
have the power to drive out American influence from the region
and prevent the United States from keeping Iran from achieving
its destiny.
For Iranians holding either or both of these more offensive
rationales, acquisition of nuclear weapons would also appear to
be vital because it would be the only sure way to limit or
preclude an American military response for Iranian asymmetric
warfare, terrorism, and subversion against the United States
and its conservative allies in the region.
MOTIVATIONS VS. PRIORITIES
The Iranians clearly have a range of powerful motivations,
strategic, ideological, and psychological, for desiring an
arsenal of nuclear weapons--or at least the capability to
manufacture such weapons in short order. Nevertheless, it would
be a mistake to confuse motivations with a universal and
indomitable determination to do so. The history of the past 60
years demonstrates that other states with equal or greater
strategic need, ideological justification, and/or psychological
desire for nuclear weapons ultimately chose either not to
pursue them at all or to give up their pursuit midstream:
In the 1960s it was considered a foregone conclusion
that Egypt would develop a nuclear weapon as its
strategic and psychological incentives were even more
compelling than Iran's are today. Egypt was locked in a
conflict with a nuclear-armed Israel which resulted in
four mostly disastrous wars (for Egypt) in 25 years,
and Cairo aspired to be the ``leader of the Arab
world.'' Yet Egypt shut down its nuclear weapons
program entirely of its own volition because the
Egyptian leadership concluded that it had higher
priorities which the pursuit of nuclear weapons were
undermining.
Leaders in Italy, Australia, Sweden, Japan, and
South Korea considered developing nuclear weapons at
various points, and the Italians and Australians
actually made some considerable progress toward that
goal. However, all of them decided that nuclear weapons
would be counterproductive to other, higher priorities,
and that they could find ways to deal with their
security problems (including even South Korea) through
other means.
Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan went even further
in the early 1990s, voluntarily surrendering the
nuclear arsenals that they had inherited from the
Soviet Union. Although many Western academic
strategists believed that they were insane to do so,
all three recognized that the security benefits from
possessing nuclear weapons were outweighed by the
diplomatic and economic benefits of giving them up and
strong economies and good relations with the rest of
the world were of far greater importance to them.
Finally, there is the example of Libya, long one of
the Middle East's worst rogue states, which agreed to
give up its nuclear program in December 2003 after 10
years of U.N. sanctions convinced Muammar Qadhafi that
his pursuit of the bomb was not worth the devastation
of Libya's economy and international relationships.
What these examples demonstrate is that it is entirely
possible for the international community to dissuade states
from trying to acquire nuclear weapons and even persuade them
to give them up, even when those states have compelling
strategic rationales for possessing the weapons. In every case,
the key has been to create a powerful set of positive
incentives and negative disincentives geared to the priorities
of the state in question.
Iran's political leadership is divided over its nuclear
program in important ways. While the available evidence
suggests that most Iranian leaders would like at least a
nuclear weapons capability (if not the weapons themselves), it
also indicates that they differ widely in the priority they
ascribe to this goal. For instance, in an interview in 2002,
then Minister of Defense, Ali Shamkhani, warned that the
``existence of nuclear weapons will turn us into a threat to
others that could be exploited in a dangerous way to harm our
relations with the countries of the region.'' More important
still, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has warned
that ``If there [are] domestic and foreign conflicts, foreign
capital will not flow into the country. In fact, such conflicts
will lead to the flight of capital from this country.''
Statements like these demonstrate that important Iranian
leaders do not regard possession of nuclear weapons either as
an unvarnished blessing or Iran's highest priority.
The same appears to hold true for the Iranian populace, as
best we can discern it. When Iranians took to the polls in the
spring of 2005 to elect a new president, they did not vote for
Mr. Ahmedinejad because he was determined to acquire nuclear
weapons. Instead, they voted for him because he promised to
reform Iran's economy and curb the rampant corruption that is
the principal blight on the economy. Anecdotal evidence has
repeatedly confirmed that for the Iranian people, ``it's the
economy, stupid.'' Of course, many average Iranians continue to
voice their support for Iran's nuclear program and even for
acquisition for nuclear weapons, but stated in a vacuum (i.e.,
without regard for potential tradeoffs) such sentiments are
meaningless. As a friend of mine, a Swedish diplomat, put it to
me, ``If you were to ask Swedes whether Sweden should have a
nuclear weapon, most of them would probably say `yes' too,
until you told them that it would come at the cost of isolation
or even sanctions.''
What's more, the regime appears to be well aware of this.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his allies have tried hard to
steer clear of policy paths that would cause Iran's European
and Japanese trading partners to impose economic sanctions on
Tehran, even being willing to agree to suspend Iran's nuclear
program in 2003 to avoid such a fate. It is noteworthy that
while President Ahmedinejad and his hardline colleagues in
Iran's Foreign Ministry regularly reject foreign overtures to
deal with Iran's nuclear program, Khamenei's people have just
as frequently contradicted the hardliners by announcing a
willingness to negotiate. Thus it was Ahmedinejad's Foreign
Ministry that rejected the 2005 Russian proposal to allow Iran
to enrich uranium at Russian facilities, but days later
National Security Adviser (and Khamenei protege) Ali Larijani
accepted the Russian offer to start a dialogue on this
proposal, almost certainly in an effort to drag out
negotiations, postpone U.N. Security Council action, and
possibly harden Russia's support for Tehran's position.
It is also important to note that the regime itself has
scrupulously maintained that the nuclear program is about
securing Iran's energy needs (so that it can export more oil
and gas) and developing a high-tech industry. While there are a
number of logical and evidentiary problems with these claims,
what is critical is that they are designed to portray Iran's
nuclear program as necessary to Iran's economy, not its
security. Indeed, Tehran is so paranoid about this that it
temporarily evicted CNN's bureau from Iran when a CNN
interpreter mistranslated ``nuclear power'' as ``nuclear
weapons'' in a speech of Ahmedinejad's. This too makes clear
that the regime shares the belief that if the Iranian people
were ever forced to choose between the nuclear program and
economic health, they would choose the latter.
SQUARING THE CIRCLE
This discussion suggests that convincing Iran to give up
its nuclear program is going to be tough. The Iranians are not
going to do so willingly. But it also tells me that doing so
should not be impossible, because there are Iranians--both the
bulk of the people and important members of the regime--for
whom nuclear weapons are desirable, perhaps even important, but
neither essential nor even their first priority.
Another comparison is useful to illustrate this point.
North Korea's calculus regarding nuclear weapons was clearly
different from Iran's. For Pyongyang, its nuclear weapons
program was its highest priority and it was willing to tolerate
hardships that few other countries (including even Iran) would
be willing to. Ultimately, North Korea accepted the devastation
of its economy, the impoverishment of its citizenry, and having
3 million of its people starve to death to hold onto its
nuclear weapons program. If the same could be said about Iran
then it probably would be impossible to convince Iran to give
up its nuclear program; however, there is no Iranian or Iran
expert who believes that this is the case. There is absolutely
no evidence that Tehran would be willing to tolerate the
extremes of sacrifice that North Korea did. Instead, the
evidence suggests exactly the opposite, that Iran would be more
like Libya: Difficult, but hardly impossible to convince.
The key then is for the United States and its allies to
compel the Iranians to choose between their nuclear program and
their highest priority--their economic well-being. The way of
doing so is now well-explicated, including in my own work.
Briefly, it would involve a multilateral sanctions regime that
would gradually shut down Western (ideally the OECD, but
initially perhaps just the G-7) investment in Iran,
particularly its gas and oil sectors, in response to continued
Iranian recalcitrance. Even with oil prices above $60 per
barrel, Iran is desperate for Western investment capital
because corruption is sucking the oil revenues right out of the
system and thus having little impact on the overall economy.
Despite the claims of some that Russia and China could make up
for any loss capital from Europe and Japan, the fact is that
their economies are still roughly a decade away from being in a
position to do so. Simultaneously, as we did with the Libyans,
in return for Iran agreeing to abandon its nuclear program and
do so in verifiable fashion, the West (or the U.N. Security
Council) would offer Tehran a package of incentives to include
admission to the WTO and integration into the global economy, a
lifting of U.S. economic sanctions (assuming that, like Libya,
Iran renounced terrorism as well) and a universal settlement of
all outstanding claims, investment guarantees to make investing
in Iran more attractive for Western companies, provision of
properly safeguarded light water reactors, terms for giving
Tehran access to enrichment technology (without the feedstock
materials, the equipment, or the spent fuel), security
guarantees, and ideally a new security architecture in the
Persian Gulf similar to the Organization of Security and
Cooperation in Europe that would allow Iran to address its
legitimate security concerns through a peaceful process of
dialogue and, eventually, arms control.
Presenting such a package would make clear to the Iranian
people and their leadership that their country really did have
just two choices. They could retain their nuclear program (and
their support for terrorism) and they would become an
international outcast and have their economy slowly crippled by
sanctions. Or they could give up these two things and enjoy all
of the benefits of the international community that they ever
dreamed of.
Two additional caveats suggested by the discussion of
Iranian motives and priorities are also in order here. First,
the package would have to make very clear that all Iran has to
give up is its pursuit of nuclear weapons--not nuclear energy
or nuclear technology--to get all of the benefits promised. Any
ambiguity here would allow Iran's hardliners to continue to
proffer the canard that Iran's nuclear program is about its
economy, thus engaging Iran's highest priority and making it
less likely that the Iranian people would favor it.
Second, both the carrots and the sticks employed by the
international community are going to have to be very big. Iran
has major strategic, ideological, and psychological equities
attached to its nuclear program and it will not budge easily.
Small carrots, like those offered by President Bush on March
10, 2005 (admission to the WTO and sale of spare parts for
Boeing passenger aircraft), or simply deals for nuclear
reactors and technology, are probably not going to be adequate.
The Iranian people will have to believe that there is a huge
pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, especially if they are
going to be able to help Iran's more pragmatic leaders defeat
Tehran's hardliners in what is likely to be a knock-down, drag-
out internal political battle. Similarly, no one should be
under the misimpression that Iran will accept such a deal
without the threat of very serious economic sanctions. Indeed,
it seems likely that the international community, or merely the
West acting outside the United Nations in multilateral fashion,
will have to impose strong sanctions on Iran and keep them in
place for some time before Tehran accedes. As noted above, it
took 10 years for Libya to come to terms, although the Libya
sanctions were relatively light as far as sanctions go.
Moreover, throughout the 1990s the European countries
threatened Iran with sanctions for its bad behavior but never,
ever followed through on their threats no matter how outrageous
Iran's behavior. Consequently, it appears that Iran does not
believe that the Europeans will be willing to impose such
sanctions, let alone maintain them for very long. This is the
root of Tehran's current strategy of brinksmanship: The
Iranians seem certain that, in the end, the Europeans will balk
and when that happens, the crisis will be over and they can go
back to both pursuing nuclear weapons and enjoying trade and
investment from Europe. Thus their strategy is to give on
nothing and force the Europeans either to make good on their
threats or, as Tehran seems to believe, admit that they are
bluffing. For this reason, the Iranians are probably going to
have see the Europeans actually impose meaningful sanctions and
be willing to hold them in place for some time before Tehran
actually believes the Europeans mean business.
None of this should be terribly heartening, but neither
should it cause us to lose heart. We always knew that
convincing states like Iran that have a range of important
rationales for pursuing a nuclear capability to give it up is
difficult. But few things in the worlds of politics and
diplomacy are impossible, and there is good reason to believe
that Iran can be dissuaded from its current course if the
United States and its allies in Europe and Asia can forge a
common position and make clear to Iran that pursuit of a
nuclear weapon will cost it what most Iranians value the most.
Prepared Statement of
MR. KARIM SADJADPOUR
Iran Analyst, International Crisis Group, Washington, DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 17, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, thank you for allowing me,
on behalf of the International Crisis Group, the privilege to
discuss before you the fate and relationship of the two
countries which I care most deeply about, the United States and
Iran.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, I fear we are on a
collision course with decidedly devastating consequences for
the future of the U.S.'s international standing, nuclear
nonproliferation, Middle East peace and security, and Iran's
evolution toward a society which respects the human rights and
civil liberties of its citizens. What was once described as a
game of chess has evolved into a game of chicken: The United
States and Iran are like two cars moving head on with
increasing velocity. Most concerning is that neither side
believes that it serves its interests to slow down or get out
of the way.
The policy stances of both sides have the merit of being
clear: Washington sincerely doubts that Tehran's intentions are
peaceful, and refuses to ``reward bad behavior'' or ``confer
legitimacy'' on the Iranian regime by talking to it. Tehran,
meanwhile, believes that the nuclear issue is simply a pretext
used by the United States to cover its regime change ambitions,
and that agreeing to compromise on its ``legal NPT rights''
would not allay U.S. pressure, but on the contrary be perceived
by Washington as a sign of weakness that would only invite
further pressure. Operating under this premise, Iran's
leadership believes it must not relent from its position,
especially when oil prices soar, its hand in Iraq is strong,
and there is still no indication that a more conciliatory
Iranian approach would beget a more conciliatory U.S. response.
I do not believe that a nuclear-armed Iran is inevitable.
Nor do I believe that a firm decision has been made in Tehran
to pursue the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Despite current
ominous trends I remain hopeful that the Iranian people's
aspirations to live in a more open society at peace with the
outside world is a worthy goal which will one day be realized.
But I believe the probability of achieving either of these two
salient goals--preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and forwarding
the cause of Iranian democracy--is highly unlikely in the
context of current U.S. policy toward Iran.
Over three decades of U.S. attempts to change Iranian
behavior by isolating it politically and economically have
borne little fruit: 27 years after the 1979 revolution, Iran
continues to sit atop the State Department's list of the
world's state sponsors of terror, continues to play an
unconstructive role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
continues to expand its military arsenal, and continues to
repress its own population. If U.S. policy toward Iran were a
business model, it would have been scrapped long ago for
failing to achieve its bottom line.
I. TEHRAN'S CALCULATIONS: THE INTERNAL NUCLEAR DEBATE
Iran's senior leadership has always attempted to project a
unified mindset regarding the nuclear issue, but in reality the
country's ruling elites are divided into three broad
categories: Those who favor pursuit of the nuclear project at
all costs; those who wish to pursue it without sacrificing
diplomatic interests; and those who argue for a suspension of
activities to build trust and allow for a full fuel cycle down
the road. Understanding and exploiting these differences should
be a key component of any diplomatic approach.
The first group, sympathizers of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, comprises ideologues and confrontationists who
romanticize the defiance of the revolution's early days. They
believe that former President Mohammed Khatami's ``detente''
foreign policy projected an image of weakness while achieving
little for Tehran other than membership in the ``Axis of
Evil.'' In contrast, they favor an uncompromising approach, in
some cases going as far as to advocate that Iran withdraw from
the NPT, unequivocally pursue its nuclear ambitions, and dare
the international community to react. This group advocates
measures such as withholding oil exports and cutting diplomatic
ties with countries that side against Iran, confident that
``the West needs Iran more than we need them.'' While 2 to 3
years ago such views were on the fringe, with the recent
elections they have gained increased relevance and credibility.
Like the confrontationists, the second group is highly
cynical of Western (particularly U.S.) intentions, and argues
that Iran is ``bound by national duty'' to pursue its
``inalienable'' right to enrich uranium. Unlike them, however,
they favor working within an international framework. Iran's
lead nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani is perhaps the best
representative of this group, arguing simultaneously, perhaps
inconsistently, that Iran must neither succumb to ``Western
double standards'' nor abandon diplomacy. ``The West wants two
classes of nations,'' Larijani frequently says. ``Those that
have nuclear technology and can be advanced, and nations that
must be restricted to produce only tomato juice and air
conditioners . . . [But] a country's survival depends on its
political and diplomatic ties. You can't live in isolation.''
The third, more conciliatory group, arguably most
representative of popular sentiment, is currently the least
influential. After months of silence, however, they are
increasingly beginning to make their voices heard. Former
president Khatami and former lead nuclear negotiator Hassan
Rowhani have criticized their successor's disregard for
diplomacy, and the country's largest reform party recently
urged the government to voluntarily suspend all nuclear fuel
cycle work. Believing the costs of nuclear intransigence to be
greater than its benefits, they argue that Iran should freeze
its enrichment activities in order to build confidence and
assuage international concerns. This group welcomes diplomacy
and has consistently backed direct talks with the United
States, convinced that the Europeans are incapable of providing
the political, economic, and security dividends Iran seeks.
Signing off on all major decision in Iran is Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose 17-year track record suggests a
leader who wants neither confrontation nor accommodation with
the West. Yet decisions in Iran are made by consensus rather
than decree, and at the moment Ayatollah Khamenei appears more
influenced by advisors who argue--with some plausibility--that
nothing short of regime change will satisfy the United States,
and that retreating on the nuclear question will only display
weakness. If there is to be clash with the United States,
Tehran's hardliners want it to occur on their terms, when oil
prices are high and the United States is bogged down in Iraq.
II. AHMADINEJAD AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
If Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election proved anything, it is
that the Iranian regime is far from monolithic and Iranian
politics are far from predictable. While his triumph last June
was widely viewed as a consolidation of power by the nation's
conservatives, differences among conservatives have never been
greater than today. And though it was widely assumed that he
would focus on domestic economic affairs and have minimal
influence over Iran's foreign policy, in the 9 months since his
inauguration Ahmadinejad's impact on Iran's foreign relations
has been nothing short of monumental.
Ahmadinejad's assertiveness and outspokenness has surprised
many. During his election campaign he criticized Iran's
previous nuclear negotiating team for being ``frightened,'' and
as president he disbanded it in favor of his own. He is said to
have personally authored the provocative speech he delivered at
the U.N. Security Council last September, and to have penned
his recent 18-page letter to President Bush. Ahmadinejad also
has repeatedly issued provocative, bellicose statements on
Israel that go beyond what the Supreme Leader or others in the
leadership have pronounced.
By most accounts, the president's style has irked the
country's entrenched political elite. Senior officials have
complained that he ``doesn't play by the rules,'' and displays
a surprising lack of respect for the Islamic Republic's
protocols and hierarchy. Rather than defer to the elders of the
revolution on matters as significant as the nuclear issue or
U.S.-Iran relations, he has tried to present himself as a force
that cannot be bypassed. Indeed, political rivalries once kept
under wraps are now playing out in the open. Last month, for
example, Ahmadinejad's eagerly anticipated announcement that
Iran had successfully operated a centrifuge cascade was
preemptively leaked by Rafsanjani to the Kuwaiti press. More
recently, when news came out that he had written an
unprecedented letter to President Bush, former lead nuclear
negotiator Hassan Rowhani quickly countered by releasing a
concise, two-page compromise proposal to Time Magazine--
seemingly sending a message to the West that he is an
alternative messenger with an alternative message.
Ahmadinejad's behavior can be explained on two counts. To
some extent, it is a function of his ambiguous relationship
with Ayatollah Khamenei. The two men have decidedly different
post-revolution experiences and responsibilities: Ahmadinejad
and his peers' most salient experience was fighting in the
battlefields during the Iran-Iraq war whereas Ayatollah
Khamenei was serving as president, and faced with the day-to-
day dilemmas of governing a country embroiled in a full-blown
war and facing near total political, economic, and diplomatic
isolation. Wary of repeating this experience, the Supreme
Leader has more than once publicly downplayed Ahmadinejad's
fiery pronouncements. Yet, at the same time, there is evidence
that Khamenei appreciates Ahmadinejad's anticorruption campaign
and his commitment to revolutionary ideals, and finds comfort
in working with a junior president who is seemingly loyal to
him and at the same time makes him look like a moderate.
Moreover, Khamenei judges various government officials by their
results: In this case, he may well consider that during his
relatively short tenure Ahmadinejad has accomplished more
progress on the nuclear file than in the previous 2\1/2\ years
of negotiations with Europe.
While Ahmadinejad's behavior has caused disquiet among the
political elite, his standing on the Iranian street is more
difficult to assess. On one hand he has failed to deliver on
his core electoral promise, namely that he would ``put the oil
money on people's dinner tables''; since his inauguration last
August the country has experienced massive capital flight,
foreign investment has dropped precipitously, and Tehran's
stock exchange has lost nearly a third of its value. Most
noticeably for the Iranian people, inflation has increased
dramatically, and unemployment has also risen.
Still, Ahmadinejad continues to enjoy some backing, a
result of his populist rhetoric, pious ways, humble lifestyle,
and fiery nationalism. Aware that he lacks support among the
urban middle and upper classes, he instead has courted
economically disenfranchised Iranians in smaller towns and far-
off provinces, promising loans and debt-relief. Realizing that
he lacks favor among the country's top elite--technocrats,
business mangers, journalists, academics, and even senior
clerics--he curries favor with the country's paramilitary
groups, such as the bassij; has attempted to co-opt the
country's military forces by providing numerous projects in the
construction and development sector to Revolutionary Guard
commanders; and has formed close alliances with powerful
hardline clerics in Qom, such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. All in
all, he has managed through his nationalist rhetoric and
postures to set the tone for Iranian foreign policy in a way
that few had anticipated beforehand.
III. IRAN'S DOMESTIC EVOLUTION
Despite concerns about Ahmadinejad and his team's desires
to return to the early days of the revolution, societal reform
in Iran is a train that has left the tracks. While it may be
slowed down at times, and will certainly face delays and
obstacles, it is process that will be near impossible to
reverse, for sheer demographic reasons: Two-thirds of Iranians
are under 33 years old; they increasingly are connected to the
outside world via satellite television and the Internet; and
they have no special affinity for a revolution they did not
experience and a revolutionary government which has not been
able to meet their economic expectations.
Indeed, for the vast majority of Iranians the priority is
economic rather than political deliverance. This is not to say
that democracy and human rights are not important concerns, but
that for a majority of Iranians they come second. As a Tehran
laborer once explained to me, ``When your stomach is empty you
don't cry for democracy, you cry for bread!''
While throughout the country Iranians' sense of alienation
vis-a-vis their leaders is palpable, despite these socio-
economic discontents people have become increasingly
disillusioned with politics. In 1997, 2000, and 2001 they went
to the polls in overwhelming numbers, twice to elect President
Khatami and once to elect a reform-minded Parliament, yet saw
insufficient returns on their civic investments. As a Tehran-
based intellectual once told me, ``People's political
frustration is to be expected. It's like exercising every day
for 6 years and not seeing any results. Soon you are going to
stop going to the gym.''
What's more, without a clear alternative model or
alternative leadership, the deep-seated desire for economic,
political, and social reform among many Iranians is tempered by
a strong aversion to unrest, uncertainty, and insecurity.
Having already experienced one tumultuous revolution (or in the
case of Iran's youth, the aftermath of one tumultuous
revolution) and a brutal 8-year war with Iraq, Iranians have
few concrete ideas as to how change should take place other
than it ought to occur bedun-e khoonrizi--``without
bloodshed.''
The post-war turbulence and insecurity in next-door
neighbor Iraq has made Iranians even wearier about the
prospects of a sudden political upheaval or a quick-fix
solution. As opposed to the aftermath of the U.S. removal of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, when some Iranians could be heard
naively romanticizing about the prospects of a swift U.S.
intervention in Tehran, today it is rare to find any Iranians
who see Iraq as a model for change, or look to their Western
neighbor with envy. In the widely echoed words of one middle-
class, middle-aged Tehran resident, ``When we look at what's
going on in Iraq, it seems that the real choice is not one
between democracy or authoritarianism, but between stability or
unrest. People may not be happy in Iran, but no one wants
unrest.''
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
1. To effectively counter Tehran's confrontationists, the United States
must simultaneously strengthen its pragmatists
While the United States should make clear that a bellicose
Iranian policy will not reap rewards, it should also clarify
that a conciliatory and compromising Iranian stance would
trigger reciprocal steps. A broader diplomatic accommodation--
Iran forsaking domestic uranium enrichment and modifying its
objectionable domestic and regional behavior in exchange for
improved bilateral relations, security assurances, and a
lifting of sanctions--is the preferred option. But given the
depth of mutual mistrust and ill will, it may not be possible
to achieve this at the moment.
A smaller bargain proposed by the International Crisis
Group would be to offer Iran a ``delayed, limited enrichment
scheme,'' acknowledging its eventual right, after several years
of a total freeze, to operate a small-scale uranium enrichment
facility under an intrusive inspections regime, making clear
that a military program would not be tolerated.
In both instances the logic is similar: To strengthen the
hand of Iranians who are pressing for a more accommodating
foreign and nuclear policy, they need to have a realistic and
appealing alternative to point to.
2. Dialogue does not equal appeasement and certainly not indifference
to human rights abuses
It is important that we disabuse ourselves of the notion
that dialogue is tantamount to appeasement, or would be
``selling out'' the Iranian people's aspirations for a more
representative government. Quite the contrary: Opinion polls
suggest that upward of 75 percent of Iranians want their
government to have relations with the United States. Iranian
democratic activists like female former MP Fatemeh
Haghighatjou--currently a fellow at MIT--have long argued that
a U.S.-Iran diplomatic accommodation is crucial for domestic
change to take place in Iran. Embarking on a comprehensive
dialogue with Iran would provide the United States with the
opportunity to match its rhetorical commitment to Iranian
democracy and human rights with action, instead of
ineffectively, and at times counterproductively, trying to
promote it from afar.
Greater economic and cultural contacts with the outside
world, combined with continued international insistence on
political reform and respect for human rights, would strengthen
Iran's burgeoning civil society; not weaken it, and dilute the
conservatives' hold on power rather than fortify it.
3. A sudden upheaval or abrupt political change in Iran is unlikely to
be for the better
John Limbert, the erudite Iran scholar and talented former
U.S. diplomat (taken hostage in Iran for 444 days) once
reflected on the 1979 Iranian revolution that his liberal-
minded Iranian friends ``who could write penetrating analyses
and biting editorials'' lacked the stomach to ``throw acid,
break up meetings, beat up opponents, trash opposition
newspapers, and organize street gangs . . . and engage in the
brutality that wins revolutions.''
Today we should be similarly sober about the realities of a
short-term upheaval in Iran. There currently exists no
credible, organized alternative to the status quo whether
within Iran or in the diaspora. And despite the fact that a
majority of Iranians favor a more tolerant, democratic system,
there is little evidence to believe that in the event of a
sudden uprising it would be Iranian democrats who come to
power, especially in a country with nearly 150,000
revolutionary guardsmen and 2 million members of the bassij,
whose livelihood, in many cases, depends on the continuation of
the status quo.
4. The United States should make it clear that it has no intention of
undermining Iran's territorial integrity
While a diversity of opinion exists among Iranians
regarding the country's nuclear ambitions, the maintenance of
the country's territorial integrity is an issue which unites
the vast majority of countrymen of all ethnic, religious, and
political persuasions. Amid widespread concern and rumors in
Iran that the United States is flirting with a strategy of
supporting ethnic Iranian separatists groups, Washington should
do its utmost to reassure the Iranian people that such concerns
are unfounded.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, I believe there are two
equally plausible visions for Iran's future. One is a hostile,
backward-looking nation increasingly isolated from the
international community, but with enough oil wealth to fund
military and paramilitary groups which repress popular demand
for change. Despite popular discontent, such a situation could
be sustainable in Iran for years if not decades; an Islamic
Cuba, with potentially a nuclear weapon.
The second scenario is of a country which has made amends
with the United States, is reintegrated into the international
community, experiences large flows of foreign investment, a
strengthened middle class, a burgeoning private sector, and a
free flow of tourists and members of the Iranian diaspora
visiting freely. It is this scenario which will provide fertile
ground for Iran's transition to a more tolerant and democratic
system at peace with the international community.
Prepared Statement of
DR. PATRICK CLAWSON
Deputy Director for Research, the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, Washington, DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 17, 2006
----------
If Iran saw its nuclear program as essential to defending
the country's very existence--the way Israel and Pakistan view
their nuclear programs--then economic considerations would make
little difference to Iran's calculations. But defense is not
the principal factor behind the Iranian nuclear program.
Rather, Iran's principal motives for its nuclear program are
the pursuit of prestige and influence. Iranian leaders
consistently present the nuclear program as an accomplishment
of Iranian science and as evidence that Iran is an advanced
modern industrial power. They also argue that Western
opposition to Iran's nuclear ambitions are an effort to keep
Iran down, to prevent the country from assuming its rightful
place as a leader in the region and the broader Muslim world.
They play to Iranians' national pride, to their sense that Iran
is naturally a great power--not to any sense that Iran is so
threatened that it must take desperate steps to defend itself.
The challenge for the West is to persuade Iran's
powerholders that the nuclear program will not advance Iran's
prestige and influence. Economic instruments can play a role in
this regard, though they are most unlikely to be sufficient by
themselves.
IRANIAN SELF-ASSURANCE
Unfortunately, the West's ability to press Iran has eroded
in recent years. Iran's leaders are now remarkably self-
assured, given the conjunction of favorable circumstances,
including the end to threats to Iran from Iraq and Afghanistan;
the United States being tied down in Iraq; and victories by
pro-Iranian forces in Iraqi and Palestinian elections. Economic
factors play no small part in this self-assurance, as
documented by the recent International Monetary Fund report
(the source of all the economic figures I cite, unless
otherwise noted). Oil and gas exports have shot up from $23
billion in 2002/03 to $55 billion this year, driven entirely by
higher prices (Iran got $23 per barrel in 2002/03 and will get
$55 this year). The oil exports have swelled government coffers
allowing an explosion of off-budget spending that has sent
economic growth shooting up to an average of 6.2 percent a year
(discounting for inflation) from 2002/03 to this year. Foreign
exchange reserves have shot up to $47 billion, more than twice
the size of all foreign debt, and are expected to rise further
to $62 billion by the end of this year.
In light of the favorable strategic situation, many in the
Iranian leadership are no longer convinced that it must
maintain strong ties with Russia and Europe, nor do they think
that these relationships have brought Iran any benefits to
date. To the extent that this self-reliant attitude prevails,
it will be harder to persuade Iran to cooperate with the
international community. However, if the great powers can
remind Iran about the true danger of isolation, the terms of
the nuclear debate in Iran will change. Conceding will be
difficult for Iran, but the Islamic Republic has in the past
made difficult compromises with its revolutionary principles,
such as ending the Iran-Iraq war.
Complicating the situation is that Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems to welcome the prospect of an attack
on Iran as a means to rekindle the lost fervor of the early
revolutionary days. While he represents a dangerous and growing
element in the Iranian elite, the real power holder has been
the Supreme Leader (who is exactly what the title suggests),
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. For the last 18 years, Khamenei has
preferred low-level confrontation with the West--just enough to
keep the revolutionary spirit alive, but not enough to risk
open hostilities. For now, Khamenei seems to think that the
West, despite its tough rhetoric, will do nothing to stop
Ahmadinejad, so why not let him push ahead.
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY
Having pegged his reputation on his ability to help the
ordinary man, Ahmadinejad faces serious problems: The economy
is a mess, his policies are disastrous, and Iranians'
expectations are sky-high. The World Bank's 2003 report about
Iran noted, ``Despite the growth in the 1990s, GDP per capita
in 2000 is still 30 percent below what it was in the mid-1970s,
compared with a near doubling for the rest of the world.''
Iranians are galled to find that their country has slipped
badly behind the Arabs on the south side of the Persian Gulf,
whom they traditionally have regarded as their social
inferiors. Thanks to the tens of thousands of Iranians living
in Dubai, Iranians know full well that Dubai is booming because
it has embraced globalization, while their country falls ever
farther behind, trapped by its suspicion of the West.
Ahmadinejad's policy is based on producing everything at
home and creating barriers to trade--he has no use for
globalization. His government has been discouraging foreign
investors, for instance, refusing to allow Renault to use the
billion-dollar facility it built in Iran to build an
inexpensive car for the Asian market. The recent Iranian boom
has been based almost entirely on profligate government
spending which cannot last forever. Despite the flood of oil
money, government policies are such that the IMF warns the
budget will fall back into deficit again within 2 years even if
oil prices remain sky-high.
The recent massive government spending has led to several
years of solid growth, yet it has barely dented the country's
long-term economic problems. While reported unemployment fell
to an 8-year low of 10.3 percent last year, job creation
remains insufficient to absorb the 700,000 young people
entering the job market each year. The IMF forecasts that even
if oil prices remain at their present high level, unemployment
will steadily increase in years to come. In its 2003 report,
the usually sober and understated World Bank summed up the
``daunting unemployment challenge'' with strong words: ``Unless
the country moves quickly to a faster path of growth with
employment, discontent and disenchantment could threaten its
economic, social, and political system.''
Economic and political frustration is feeding social
problems. One is chronic drug problem, with the Iranian
Government acknowledging that 2 million people use narcotics,
mainly opium; other estimates are higher. Divorce is on the
rise; one study found that 30 percent of newlyweds got divorced
within 3 years. Another is increasing prostitution; the
official estimate is 300,000 prostitutes. There have been a
number of corruption scandals involving judges and government
social workers involved in prostituting young girls. Instead of
making reforms that would allow entrepreneurs to create jobs,
the political elite is more comfortable with the ``solution''
of rising emigration rates, especially among the well educated.
In sum, many of Iran's best and brightest are leaving the
country, and a growing number of those remaining are at risk of
becoming an underclass.
BUSINESS CONFIDENCE: THE ACHILLES' HEEL
Given that inappropriate government policies are already
making the Iranian business community nervous, international
pressure on the economy could have a major impact on business
confidence. ``The [Tehran stack market has shown to be
hypersensitive to political issues (such as the course of the
nuclear enrichment negotiations), as well as domestic economic
policy uncertainties,'' writes the state-owned Karafarin Bank
in its Survey of the Iranian Economy far October-December 20.
In 2005, the stock market index fell 26 percent. At the same
time, the banking system was hit by a crisis from dishonored
promissory notes, primarily by big firms unable to pay their
debts.
With even Iranian fans nervous about business conditions,
there are excellent opportunities to press foreign firms to
reduce their presence in Iran. There have already been some
notable successes in this regard. Strict U.S. Treasury
application of existing rules about fund transfers--such as
those to prevent transfer of funds to terrorists and weapons of
mass destruction proliferators--led the two largest Swiss
banks (UBS and Credit Swiss) and a large British bank (HSBC) to
decide recently that Iran was not an attractive place to do
business, so they stopped taking new business. The impact that
this is having was well described by the state-owned Karafarin
Bank in its Survey of the Iranian Economy for October-December
2005:
Most probably, the fear of imposition of sanctions by
the U.N. against Iran, in connection with the nuclear
enrichment issue, has reduced the reliability of
Iranian banks as international trading partners. In
other words, despite [an] important balance of payments
surplus, Iranian banks have been facing difficulties
dealing with their otherwise cooperative
correspondents. This may prove to be for the banks and
the country as a whole, [sic] one of the most important
obstacles to hurdle in the months to came.
There is much scope for working with U.S. allies to more
vigorously apply restrictions an financial transactions and
trade with Iran. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1373 and
1540 call on countries to adopt and enforce effective controls
on funds and services that would contribute to terrorism and
WMD proliferation respectively. The United States and its
allies can approach countries to ask what are they doing to
implement these resolutions regarding Iran, especially in light
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decisions
finding Iran has violated its safeguards agreements with the
IAEA. Industrial firms can be warned about the many items which
could be diverted from their declared peaceful intentions to be
used instead in the nuclear program. Banks can be cautioned
about the negative publicity as well as regulatory
complications if they were found to be facillitating shady
businesses. European governments excel at using such quiet
warnings, which can be very effective at persuading firms that
the Iran market is not worth the risks; indeed, a number of
European governments seem already to be passing such warnings.
The U.S. Treasury has a well-oiled machinery for implementing
restrictions, and its warnings to banks can be particularly
effective since few banks in the world are willing to risk
being cut off from dealings with the U.S. financial system.
That same machinery could be extended to press firms
considering investments in the Iranian oil and gas industry.
Tighter restrictions are ``de facto sanctions'' which have
many advantages over formal sanctions imposed by the U.N.
Security Council. Russia and China have no veto over tightening
restrictions. In the best of cases, obtaining Security Council
consensus for action takes a long time, whereas tightening
restrictions can be done much more quickly. Action by the
Security Council provides Ahmadinejad with a banner around
which he can rally nationalist reaction, claiming that the
country is under attack. By contrast, tighter restrictions
operate under the public's radar screen, while their impact is
fully felt by the business community--which in Iran means first
and foremost the revolutionary elite which behind the scenes
controls the economy as fully as it does the political system.
OIL'S MIXED ROLE
Given that Iran's goal is to use its nuclear program to
achieve influence and prestige, fewer instruments would seem
better suited to that task than its oil exports. It has been
suggested that were Iran to make good on threats to cut off its
oil exports of 2.5 million barrels/day, this action would hurt
the West so much it might have to back off on its pressure
against Iran's nuclear program.
Perhaps--but perhaps not. The present tight world oil
market will not last forever. Production outside of OPEC is
increasing, not least under the stimulus of high prices, and
the return of Katrina-damaged facilities will only add to the
higher output. Despite the red-hot Chinese and Indian
economies, world demand is growing more slowly as price
influences consumption. It is not beyond the realm of
possibility that within the next few years, oil markets could
become much more slack. After all, that was the experience
after both the 1973-74 and 1980-81 price increases: Within 4
years, the oil market got soft. In short, the more time that
passes, the less may be Iran's strategic leverage regarding
oil.
Indeed, the world oil situation is already changing, though
that fact is obscured by the fears of consumers and speculation
of traders. In April 2006, world oil production was 1 million
barrels/day higher than demand, according to the prestigious
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. Plus OPEC countries--principally
Saudi Arabia--had excess production capacity of about 1.5
million barrels/day, and the world refinery situation is
changing such that the heavier Saudi crude oils could be more
readily absorbed (last year when Saudi Arabia wanted to sell
additional oil to offset post-Katrina price spikes, refineries
were unable to take advantage of the exceptionally low prices
offered). Those two factors alone could have made up for a
cutoff in Iranian oil exports, even without the use of the
West's approximately 1.4 billion barrels in strategic reserves,
which are the equivalent of 560 days of Iranian exports
(figures from the International Energy Agency).
Were Iran to cut off its oil exports, the impact on the
Iranian economy would be considerable. To be sure, Iran's ample
foreign exchange reserves would cushion the impact, but those
reserves would only be sufficient to pay for a year's imports
(or, if Iran cut back imports to the bone, for 2 year's imports
at that low level). And the Iranian Government relies on oil
revenue to fund 75 percent of its expenditures, according to
Karafarin Bank (the IMF reports are not much help on this
issue, because the government has taken to conducting so many
of its operations outside the budget through various shady
accounts).
Perhaps the most immediate Iranian vulnerability regarding
oil is its dependence on imported gasoline, which provide about
40 percent of the 350,000 barrels of gasoline sold daily.
However, this vulnerability is less than meets the eye. The
price of gasoline at the pump is 800 rials per liter, or about
35 cents a gallon. Such a ridiculously cheap price encourages
rampant smuggling of gasoline to neighboring countries, such as
Turkey and Pakistan, where gasoline prices are more than ten
times higher than in Iran. Plus the low pump price leads to
excessive gasoline consumption that gives Tehran some of the
world's most polluted air; schools frequently have to close
because it would be unhealthy for children to go outside. And
the low gasoline price results in a massive loss of government
revenue; just the cost of distributing the fuel after it leaves
the refinery gate is more than what the customer pays. The IMF
and World Bank have spent years documenting in great detail the
pernicious economic and health impact of the excessive gasoline
consumption. In short, there are few steps which would help the
Iranian economy more than forcing a reduction in gasoline
consumption. And the Iranian Government is well along with
plans to ration gasoline from September 2006--plans which would
allow a quick response in the event of a gasoline import
cutoff.
A final word about the role of oil in thinking about Iran's
nuclear program. It is tempting to assume that Iran can use its
oil riches to influence the decisions of other governments.
However, there is remarkably little evidence that Iran has
successfully used oil to induce other countries to turn a blind
eye to its nuclear violations. Consider for instance that the
great power most reluctant to press Iran has been Russia, which
is a fellow oil exporter and could therefore benefit if Iranian
oil were kept off the market. Indeed, there is little reason to
think that Moscow's approach has been affected by any economic
consideration, which is not surprising given the remarkably
favorable economic circumstances Russia finds itself in, with
the main dilemma facing the government being how much of the
vast budget surplus to spend and how much to save. As for
Iranian efforts to use oil projects to influence China, Japan,
or India, they seem to have had little impact, in part perhaps
because Iran has been unwilling to offer particularly
attractive terms to foreign investors. The eye-poppingly large
deals announced with great fanfare have all run into serious
difficulties over the terms and conditions.
THE LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
Economic instruments alone are unlikely to be sufficient to
persuade Iran to freeze its nuclear program. The principal
levers of power in Iran are in the hands of revolutionaries who
are not motivated primarily by economic concerns, while those
who care about the state of the economy do not have sufficient
influence on their own to persuade the real powerholders to
change policies. Success at influencing Iranian policy is much
more likely if action on the economic front is combined with
action on other fronts. In particular, the security apparatus--
especially the Revolutionary Guards--are a vital power center
in Iran. They need to be convinced that the current nuclear
policies are threatening Iran's security, because Iran's
neighbors and the great powers will react in ways that will
hurt Iran. If Iran makes the gulf a more dangerous place, then
the United States and other powers will need to deploy more
powerful military assets to the region, if for no other reason
to protect shipping from Iranian threats to close the Strait of
Hormuz. And Iran's nuclear program could start an arms race,
which the Gulf Arab monarchies and Turkey would win, since
compared to Iran they are both richer and have better ties with
the world's principal arms suppliers.
Much as pressure should be applied on several fronts rather
than just on the economy, so inducements offered Iran should
take multiple forms rather than only being trade and investment
incentives. Indeed, economic inducements look suspiciously like
bribes paid for bad behavior. Besides being odious, such bribes
give the impression that bad behavior is more profitable than
good behavior. Pro-Western reformers were unable to secure a
trade agreement with Europe or substantial U.S. relaxation of
its economic sanctions despite their obvious interest in
improving relations, but now it appears that anti-Western
hardliners may achieve those objectives--which suggests that
Iran would be well advised to be obnoxious rather than
cooperative. No matter how creatively one designs or packages
economic inducements, they will inevitably look like reward for
bad behavior.
A much more appropriate form of inducement would be
security inducements. Such security inducements should be
designed to counter the argument that Iran needs nuclear
weapons for its defense. There are many confidence- and
security-building measures and arms control measures that would
provide gains for both Iran and the West, similar to the way
such steps reduced tensions between the old Warsaw Pact and
NATO during the cold war. One example would be an agreement to
reduce the risk of incidents at sea between the United States
and Iranian navies.
A further security inducement which the United States could
offer would be to address the reported concern that the Bush
administration's real goal is regime change in Iran and that
the Bush administration will use force to that end. Such
complaints sound peculiar coming from an Iranian Government
whose president lectures President Bush on why the United
States should abandon its liberal democracy and who sponsored a
conference last fall on the theme ``The World Without Zionism
and America''--a government which regularly organizes mass
demonstrations filled with the chant ``Death to America.''
Perhaps we should take as a compliment that Iran's hardliners
expect the United States to be more restrained than they are;
we certainly do not organize terror attacks to blow up their
barracks the way they did at Khobar Towers in 1996 or in Beirut
in 1983.
It would of course be inappropriate for the U.S. Government
to offer any security guarantees to the Iranian or any other
government; what government is in power in another country is
up to the people of that country to decide. But what Washington
could offer Tehran would be a ``conditional security
assurance''--jargon for the simple proposition, ``We will not
attack you if you do not attack us.'' To clarify what that
means, the U.S. Government should spell out:
``Just as you criticize us for our liberal
democracy, we will remain free to criticize you for
your undemocratic violations of human rights.
``Just as you spend tens of millions on radio and
television broadcasting to our country to propagate
your views, so we will remain free to support
broadcasts to Iran.
``Just as you tightly restrict trade with America,
we will remain free to restrict trade with Iran.''
Such a conditional security assurance might not be all that
Iranian hardliners want, but at the very least, it would help
in the battle to influence European and Middle Eastern opinion
that the United States is being reasonable and Iran is not.
Since Iran's main objective in pursuing its nuclear program is
to gain influence and prestige, Washington's strategy should be
to show that Tehran's obstinate nuclear stance is undermining
Iran's influence.
Prepared Statement
DR. GEOFFREY KEMP
Director of Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center, Washington,
DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 17, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to
you and your colleagues about a matter of grave importance to
the United States, namely Iran's behavior and its nuclear
program. The committee has asked me to comment on three
subjects:
Can Russia and China be helpful in pressuring Iran
to change its present course?
What are the attitudes of Iran's neighbors to the
current regime and the course it has chosen to pursue?
Do opportunities exist in the region for those
seeking to contain Iran?
I will add a fourth issue:
The need for continued U.S.-EU cooperation
Can Russia and China be helpful in pressuring Iran to change its
present course?
There is no doubt, in my opinion, that Russia is the key
player on this matter and that with adroit diplomacy it would
have been possible to obtain the cooperation of the Putin
government to put far more pressure on the Iranian regime to
put limits on its nuclear program. In the event of Russian
cooperation it is unlikely that China would be the lone
dissenter to joint pressure against the Islamic Republic.
However we have not handled the Russia portfolio with
skill. Russia sees Iran as a cooperative partner in an unstable
part of the world straddling the Caucuses and Central Asia. In
contrast the U.S. policy toward Russia's ``near abroad'' is
seen in Moscow to be provocative. The laudatory objective of
the Bush administration is to nurture more freedom in Eurasia
and to develop multiple pipeline routes in the context of
energy security. However in the specific context of persuading
Russia that it is in its interests to turn on one of its
partners, Iran, it must be asked what it is we are offering the
Russians to make this difficult choice worthwhile? Russians
privately tell you that if the Americans want to deal on Iran
then it would require some quid pro quo, such as not
encouraging Ukraine to join NATO or not deliberately making
provocative speeches in the region a few weeks before the G-8
Summit in St. Petersburg. I would have to conclude that while
there are good arguments for being critical of Russia and being
supportive of neighbors such as Ukraine and Georgia, the Baltic
states, and Kazakhstan, such pronouncements are
counterproductive in the context of Iran policy.
Seen from the Russian point of view, not only are we
interfering in their backyard, but if we eventually improve
relations with Iran as part of some ultimate ``grand bargain''
and remove economic sanctions then Russia stands to lose a
great deal of economic leverage in that country while
witnessing the return of the United States and all that entails
for the region.
A similar set of tradeoffs could be made in the context of
China. China is not unhappy to see us struggling in the Middle
East, even though it does not want to see a failure in Iraq.
Neither does it want to see an Iranian nuclear program. Yet
China, too, would need some quid pro quo to put serious
pressure on Iran.
What are the attitudes of Iran's neighbors to the current regime?
Iran's neighbors have different specific problems with the
current leadership in Tehran but all are concerned about its
nuclear program. Most of Iraq's Shi'a leaders owe a big debt to
Iran and have nurtured close ties with the Mullahs while making
it clear that they do not wish to establish a Shia theocracy in
Iraq. Turkey and Iran share common concerns about the evolving
Kurdish region in northern Iraq. The Sunni Arab states are all
fearful of Iran's hegemonic tendencies and talk about a ``Shia
Crescent'' running from Iran, through Iraq into Syria and
Lebanon. The Gulf states with significant Shia populations,
notably Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, worry about domestic
pressure. The UAE has a long-standing territorial dispute with
Iran. Qatar has become a firm military ally of the U.S. Oman is
probably the least worried about Iran, though this could
change.
How to assess the impact of Iran's nuclear program on Gulf
security? There is a major difference between Saudi Arabia and
the smaller GCC countries, because of Saudi Arabia's size,
budget, infrastructure, and regional aspirations. For instance,
unilateral options open to the smaller Gulf states in the event
of an Iranian bomb are very limited. Saudi Arabia, however, has
the capacity and the wealth to consider some form of nuclear
deterrent, most likely in cooperation with another country,
such as Pakistan. Saudi Arabia already has Chinese SS-2 medium
range missiles in its current inventory. It is not unreasonable
to assume that Saudi Arabia could engage in nuclear purchases,
either the basic fissile materials to make a bomb or a finished
product. Furthermore, it is not only an Iranian bomb that could
motivate Saudi Arabia to consider such an option. The
propensity of Saudi Arabia to think about a nuclear option is
related to the state of its relationship with the United
States, which, until recently, was always considered the
protector of the Kingdom in the last resort.
Aside from Saudi Arabia's reaction, the most likely initial
response of the gulf countries to the news of an Iranian
nuclear weapons program will be concern about possible U.S. and
Israeli preemptive military actions. The Bush administration
and Israeli leaders have both made it clear that the Islamic
Republic's possession of the bomb will be an intolerable
threat.
However, since the Iraqi war and the unreliability of
western intelligence concerning Iraq's WMD programs, the case
for preemptive war against supposedly proliferant states has
been weakened and, therefore, the political costs of
undertaking such action in the future have become much higher.
If there is uncertainty with intelligence about an Iranian
bomb, the United States and Israel will have problems garnering
support for military action. Even if the evidence is
overwhelming and highly convincing (i.e., Iran either tests a
nuclear device or announces it is building the bomb), there
will be reluctance to endorse U.S.-Israeli military action for
fear of the chaos this could bring to the gulf and the region.
Do opportunities exist in the region for those seeking to contain Iran?
An Iranian nuclear program means the United States will
have strong reasons to maintain its military presence in the
Gulf States. The nature and purpose of enhanced military
cooperation between the United States and the Arabian Peninsula
could take many forms. The most important component would be a
counterdeterrent to indicate to Iran that any efforts to use
nuclear weapons to intimidate or blackmail would be challenged
by the United States. The credibility of this counterdeterrent
would be linked to the vulnerability of U.S. forces and U.S.
targets themselves to Iranian intimidation. And here we are
referring to regional targets. Iran is not expected to deploy
an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the
continental United States for many, many years. It is difficult
to see under what circumstances Iran could use its nuclear
weapons in anger, except for in some suicidal spasm similar to
the scenarios that were heard so frequently with respect to
Saddam Hussein and his capacity for a glorious Gotterdammerung
ending to his fiefdom.
Need for Continued U.S.-EU Cooperation
The Iranian Government feels sufficiently confident of its
diplomatic position on the nuclear program, at both the United
Nations and the IAEA, to run the risk of a major confrontation
with the United States and Europe. The key test will be whether
the United States and Europe can continue to address this issue
from the same set of principles and talking points. Much will
depend on whether the Europeans are now finally prepared to
join the United States on imposing economic sanctions on Iran
if pressures from the IAEA at the Security Council fail. The
Iranian nuclear issue will be a test not only of U.S.-European
relations, but of European resolve as well. It is important to
note how far out on a limb the European governments,
particularly Britain, France, and Germany, have gone in
proposing this agreement and what a challenge they face if the
Iranians continue their nuclear enrichment program.
Iran's leaders appear to have calculated that they can
withstand the diplomatic pressure they are likely to face and
that even if sanctions are imposed Iran has the will and
financial resources to ride them out. It remains to be seen
what the long-term implications of this are for both Iran's
domestic politics and its actions in Iraq. If the United States
and Europe increase their rhetoric against the Iranians, and if
sanctions begin to hurt Tehran, Iran may use its bargaining
chips in Iraq at a critical moment in its post-Saddam political
evolution. The linkage between the Iran's nuclear issue and its
role in Iraq is becoming clearer.
Despite Iran's gleeful defiance of the international
community on the nuclear issue, it would be unwise for Iran's
leaders to take their current good luck for granted. The
Islamic Republic faces significant social and economic
challenges that can only be made more difficult by alienating
the West. The embarrassing and unacceptable statements by its
new President calling for Israel's destruction, while a popular
theme in many Islamic countries, have harmed Iran's
international image and caused further anxiety with his
behavior at home. Regionally, Iran has poor relations with its
Arab neighbors, and it cannot be assumed that Iraq's Shiite
community will remain friendly and grateful indefinitely.
Iran's vital national interests could be helped by ending the
standoff with the United States. Likewise, the United States
has more to gain than lose if it adopts a more coherent and
pragmatic policy toward the Islamic Republic.
Day Two--May 18, 2006
Opening Statement
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 18, 2006
----------
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to continue our
examination of U.S. policy toward Iran. This is the second
hearing of our two-part series. Yesterday, we focused our
attention on the status of Iran's nuclear program and on
analysis of Iran's motivations and strategies. Today, we will
evaluate the options available to deal with this challenge.
The Bush administration has been attempting to build a
cohesive international coalition capable of applying economic
and diplomatic pressure on Iran that would have the potential
to dissuade it from continuing its drive toward a nuclear
weapons capability. Though efforts to attain a Security Council
consensus on a firm response to Iran's actions have not been
successful--primarily because of resistance from Russia and
China--diplomacy backed by multi-lateral sanctions remains the
focus of U.S. policy.
Our witnesses yesterday judged that Iranian acquisition of
nuclear weapons is not inevitable, though they underscored that
a nuclear weapons capability is an extremely important Iranian
goal that would be given up only grudgingly. They noted that
the Iranian leadership is pursuing nuclear weapons for a number
of reasons, including self-defense, Iranian national pride, and
regional influence. But as several of our witnesses asserted,
the Iranian leadership is faced with economic problems that
could be exacerbated by multi-lateral sanctions and
international isolation. In contrast, a verifiable resolution
of the nuclear problem could result in long-term economic
benefits flowing to Iran, including much-needed Western
investment in the energy sector. Our witnesses also emphasized
that Iran's government is far from a monolith. Factions and
personalities in Tehran have varying priorities that could lead
to diplomatic opportunities.
The witnesses generally shared the view that no diplomatic
options, including direct talks, should be taken off the table.
Direct talks may in some circumstances be useful in
demonstrating to our allies our commitment to diplomacy,
dispelling anti-American rumors among the Iranian people,
preventing Iranian misinterpretation of our goals, or reducing
the risk of accidental escalation. Our policies and our
communications must be clear, precise, and confident, without
becoming inflexible.
I noted a comment by Dr. Henry Kissinger in an op-ed on
Iran that appeared in Tuesday's Washington Post. Dr. Kissinger
wrote: ``The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is
comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold
War: i.e., no preemptive challenge to the external security of
the adversary, but firm resistance to attempts to project its
power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about
internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that
caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev to a dialogue within weeks of labeling the Soviet
Union the `evil empire.' ''
Dr. Kissinger's analogy, as well as the testimony that we
heard yesterday, reinforce the point that Iran poses a
sophisticated policy challenge that will require the nuanced
use of a range of diplomatic and economic tools.
To discuss how such tools might be applied, we are joined
by four distinguished experts. We welcome the Honorable Frank
Wisner, former Ambassador to India and currently Vice Chairman
for External Affairs at the American International Group; Dr.
Vali Nasr, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, California; Ms. Julia
Nanay, a Senior Director at PFC Energy in Washington; and Mr.
James Phillips, a Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Affairs at
the Heritage Foundation.
We thank our witnesses for joining us today, and we look
forward to their insights on the policy options open to the
United States.
Opening Statement
SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 18, 2006
----------
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our witnesses.
Yesterday, we heard from several well-informed witnesses on
Iran's nuclear program. We also heard about Iran's motivations,
the attitude of its population, and its vulnerability to
economic sanctions. Today, I look forward to hearing about the
options before us.
This hearing is timely. Our European allies are crafting a
package of incentives and, if they fail, sanctions that will be
presented to Iran.
Their first objective is to secure Chinese and Russian
support for the entire package, so that Iran will understand
that it faces UN Security Council mandated sanctions if it
rejects the offer.
If Russia and China balk at supporting the package, there
is talk of the U.S. and Europe forming our own sanctions
coalition. We heard yesterday that Iran is already feeling some
pressure as investors and banks pull back from Iran in
anticipation of sanctions.
But achieving broad-based agreement on sanctions cannot be
the sum total of a diplomatic strategy for Iran. Sanctions are
at best one tool to achieve our broader objectives, including
ending Iran's uranium enrichment activities.
We need greater clarity on our precise goals--clarity the
Bush administration has thus far failed to provide.
If our goal is regime change, then that argues for an
aggressive set of policies that will likely alienate most of
friends, particularly in the wake of Iraq.
If our goal is to see Iran's threatening behavior end in
the short-term--while working for long-term change--then that
argues for a policy that many could likely support.
Yesterday, I recommended that President Bush respond to the
recent letter sent by the Iranian President, but he should
write to the man who has the final say in Iran--Ayatollah
Khamenei.
I would make the letter public and I would include a call
for direct talks with Iran--anywhere, anytime, with everything
on the table.
We should be willing to talk about all the issues that
divide us: the nuclear program, terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Israeli-Palestinian peace, sanctions, and security.
We should lay out for Iran's leader--and especially for its
people--what the future could look like if Iran renounces its
nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism--and what the
future could look like if it does not.
As I said yesterday, I don't know for certain how Iran
would respond, but I believe that an offer of direct dialogue
would place enormous pressure on the Iranian leadership--from
their own people and from the international community.
Iranian leaders would face a stark choice--reject the
overture and risk complete isolation and an angry public, or
accept it and start down a path that would require Iran to
alter its nuclear ambitions.
Talking to Tehran would not reward bad behavior or
legitimize the regime. Talking is something we have done with
virtually every other country on earth, including unsavory
regimes like the ones in North Korea and Libya.
Demonstrating that we made a serious attempt at diplomacy
is also the best way to keep others on board for tougher
actions if Iran fails to respond.
If the administration wants to convince our allies and
others to place serious pressure on Iran, it must walk the
extra diplomatic mile.
I look forward to the testimony.
Prepared Statement
HONORABLE FRANK G. WISNER
Vice Chairman for External Affairs, American International Group, Inc.,
New York, New York
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 18, 2006
----------
The United States, the international community and Iran are
in crisis. The crisis broke out last year in the wake of Iran's
decision to proceed with its nuclear enrichment program and
limit its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. But the crisis runs deeper. It is rooted in broad
international concern over Iran's clandestine efforts to
develop an enrichment program, which have put into question the
spirit of Iran's compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In fact, the origins of the crisis are long standing. For
over a quarter of a century and as a result of the overthrow of
the Shah's regime, Iran's clerically dominated government has
been at odds with the United States and frequently with its
neighbors. The regime's aggressive assertion of its religious
identity has frightened Sunni Muslim nations in the Gulf, the
Middle East and elsewhere in the region. Iran's espousal of
Hezbollah and Hamas has put the country on the front lines of
the war against terror. The Iranian leadership's unwillingness
to accept the existence of the State of Israel has further
undermined the ability of the United States to find common
ground with it.
In response to the Iranian Government's policies and the
principles it espouses, the United States, during the Bush
administration, has identified Iran as an opponent of the
United States and a candidate for ``regime change.'' The
Congress' involvement in legislation to fund activities which
would undermine clerical rule in Iran has sent the strong
signal of aggressive American intent. To a nation historically
under siege and more recently at odds with the United States,
these threats have hit hard and have stirred broad Iranian
insecurities.
I come to this meeting over the future of American policy
toward Iran, having read Iran's history closely and having
followed attentively its recent actions and our relationship. I
bring to this session my thirty-seven years of experience in
our Nation's diplomatic service as well as a four year
association with ``track two'' discussions with knowledgeable
Iranians. These discussions have been organized under the
auspices of the United Nations' Association of the United
States (UNA-USA). The results have been regularly shared with
officials of the United States government.
In addition, I represented the United States Government in
1997 in discussions with Russia's authorities over the transfer
of missile technology from the Russian Federation to Iran. This
said, I have no access to official intelligence on Iran, its
nuclear program nor the workings of Iranian domestic politics.
In presenting my conclusions today, I do not speak for the
American International Group, where I serve as Vice Chairman,
External Affairs. My views are entirely my own.
I intend, in the course of my testimony, to answer four
questions: (1) Will Iran develop a nuclear weapon; (2) Is that
outcome imminent; (3) Is Iran's leadership united behind the
development of a nuclear weapon and (4) What is the way ahead
for the United States.
Will Iran develop a nuclear weapon?
The answer to that question is not obvious. It is clear
Iran believes it has the right to enrich uranium and fuel a
nuclear power system. Iran further argues that this right is
part of its commitment to the NPT. It is also true that Iran
has pursued a nuclear ambition since the days of the Shah.
Finally, it is obvious that Iran has developed its fuel
enrichment system clandestinely and in violation of its
international obligations.
It is my view that Iran has not made a nuclear weapons
decision and that its house is divided on the subject. There
are Iranians who believe Iran would be better off with a
nuclear weapon; there are others who argue that a weapon will
increase the dangers which Iran faces. Virtually all Iranians,
including those who live outside the country, share the opinion
that their country needs nuclear power and that an enrichment
program is a legitimate assertion of the nation's right.
Moreover, the nuclear program has become in Iranian eyes a
question of national honor and prestige.
It is possible that Iran will proceed down the path of
enrichment, stopping just short of a nuclear weapon, leaving
open the option to acquire such a capacity. Given Iran's
dangerous record on other fronts and the lack of confidence in
its government's behavior, that outcome is unacceptable to the
United States and our friends in Europe. In a word, we must
deal with the nuclear issue and seek to contain it.
Is a weapon imminent?
Again, I advise caution in concluding that the United
States faces an immediate, threat. Estimates of the time it
would take Iran to assemble adequate amounts of fissionable
material vary sharply. Like you, I have seen figures that range
from three to ten years, depending on the urgency with which
Iran pursues the goal, the technology and resources available
to it and the international environment. The design and
weaponization of a nuclear device is another matter but not one
for ``tomorrow morning.'' I argue, therefore, that we have time
to consider carefully our strategy for dealing with the very
real threat which Iran's enrichment program poses. There need
be no rush to judgment; and we have time to explore and
exercise the option of diplomacy.
Let me make this point in a different way.
Is Iran's leadership united behind the development of a nuclear weapon?
Once again my experience leads me to be careful about
concluding Iran's leadership and political class are united.
Those, who state with confidence that they know Iran's
intentions, have been consistently wrong. Our insights into the
politics of the clerical regime are limited; our estrangement
from Iran has impeded serious analysis of political trends and
developments. This state of affairs is regrettable and I
suggest it is in the interests of the United States to increase
the attention we pay to Iran, its politics, economics and
social trends--within government and in academic and research
communities.
It is my view that Iran's leadership, broadly defined, is
not united on a wide range of issues of national importance,
including nuclear weaponization. Power is divided. The Supreme
Leader retains control over Iran's Revolutionary Guards, its
intelligence services and the nuclear program. Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, the President and author of deeply offensive and
inflammatory statements about Israel, the region, Iran's
nuclear intentions and the United States, does not directly
control these institutions and programs. But he won the
election to the Presidency with a solid majority and with
clerical sympathy. Today he is playing Iranian politics with
consummate skill. Ahmadinejad will be a significant factor in
Iranian politics for years to come. He has developed a strong
base among young Iranians and he appeals effectively to the
street's instincts. Moreover he enjoys substantial standing
with the Supreme Leader and the Guardians. In the election
campaign and his brief time in office Ahmadinejad has eclipsed
the reformers; his leverage in Iranian politics is rising. This
said, so are his opponents who are questioning the President's
assertions about national security policy and his profligate
interventions in the economy.
Finally, it has been my experience that the exercise of
power has the potential of educating its holders in the
realities of international and domestic life. This has been
Iran's recent experience. The country's original revolutionary
fervor has run thin. We are in Ahmadinejad's early days. There
is more to come, but the present situation of crisis
strengthens the Iranian President's hand. There is reason
therefore to lessen, if we can, the intensity of the present
crisis.
What are the United States choices?
I suggest that the nuclear stand-off with Iran will play
out over a period of time--months if not years. There are no
quick fixes and we need the time to examine, select and pursue
our options. The United Nations' Security Council is divided.
Our European friends, deeply opposed to Iran's nuclear program,
seek a diplomatic resolution.
Is there a military solution to enrichment? There is no
obvious way to deal with Iran's intention to proceed with
nuclear enrichment. It is my view that military action can only
disrupt Iranian facilities. Worse yet, the consequences of an
American attack on Iranian intentions will be severe. If Iran's
leaders have not crossed the nuclear threshold, they would in
the wake of American military action. We would have to
anticipate direct Iranian retaliation against our forces in
Iraq and other American targets in the Gulf and the Middle
East--if not beyond. I have not seen any evidence that our
intelligence is adequate to pinpoint Iran's nuclear enrichment
system and make it vulnerable to a decisive military strike.
The political consequences of an American attack would be
even more devastating. I can assure you that there will be an
eruption of protest across the Muslim world; public opinion in
allied nations would be hostile and our standing in
international fora would be undermined. We must also calculate
the economic consequences. I have no way to predict where the
price of oil will go in the wake of military action against
Iran or counter moves which impeded the Straits of Hormuz.
Military action should always be the last choice--and never
excluded. But I do not believe that we have reached the end of
the road and can therefore justify or appropriately use
military force to stop Iran's enrichment program.
Will economic sanctions deter Iran?
The United States has committed the majority of its
sanctions arsenal against Iran in the past and has few decisive
instruments left. While the possibility of greater allied
cooperation in the face of a nuclear threat is somewhat better,
our allies have been hard to bring along in the past. Ordinary
trade sanctions will be very difficult to enforce, given Iran's
long borders and proximity to trading entrepots, like Dubai.
Financial sanctions come at the cost of disruption of our
complicated, international financial system. Sanctions against
the movement of Iranian officials are hardly significant.
Sanctions generally work when they are targeted, short term and
multilateral. It is hard to imagine the Iranian nuclear crisis
being either of short duration or subject to resolution only
through the imposition of sanctions.
The case for engagement.
The first choice in conflict resolution should be
diplomacy. There are diplomatic options available to the United
States.
Does this mean that military means or sanctions have no
place in addressing the crisis we face with Iran? Of course
not. They are and must remain arrows in our quiver. Diplomacy,
without strength and the ability to deliver pressure, is rarely
successful. For the moment, military force and additional
sanctions are more effective as threats which its leaders must
contemplate.
Our leverage lies elsewhere. Iran is an isolated nation.
Apart from a few states, like Syria, whose association with
Iran is based on tactical considerations, Iran has few friends
and no allies. If the international community, notably Russia
and China, are divided from us about how to deal with Iran,
there are no divisions over the issue of Iran's nuclear
pretensions nor her historic sponsorship of violence in her
region. Cut off from acceptance within the international
community, Iran is also isolated in the mainstream of world
economics. She sells oil but she receives virtually no
investment. Existing sanctions, especially those put in place
by the United States, limit foreign capital flows. And these
sanctions can be deepened. Iran receives little to no
technology and will not as long as she to stand outside the
norms of acceptable international behavior.
Iran's isolation, born of her policies of confrontation,
aggravates her perception of threat and preoccupies her leaders
and intelligentsia. At heart, they know that Iran cannot force
her way into respectability, partnership and security. Sooner
or later, Iran must meet all of us ``half way'' or she will
remain threatened and denied the capital flows, investment
partnerships and technology her lagging economy and highly
dissatisfied and deprived population requires. In a word,
Iran's understanding of her isolation and our capacity to
sustain and intensify it are powerful weapons in addressing the
nuclear crisis we face and the other threats Iran poses to our
interests. Equally, our willingness to offer a path away from
isolation is a powerful tool.
Then how do we deal with Iran?
Our ability to respond militarily is ``on the table'' and
it should remain there. Sanctions are in place and selectively,
for example a multilateral agreement aimed at the denial of
official credits, can be added over time. We have drawn our
``lines in the sand'' and the time is right to move on and
engage Iran politically.
The time is right, moreover, to signal that the United
States not only seeks agreement which will contain the nuclear
crisis but that we are prepared to consider normalizing
relations, provided, of course, that Iran is similarly disposed
and acts accordingly. Engagement, through diplomatic dialogue,
means addressing the broad array of issues that divide Iran
from us and the international community--the issues that leave
her marginalized and insecure--in other words, the issues that
undergird distrust of Iran.
The questions, which we and Iran must address, are obvious
and they deal with subjects of vital importance to the United
States--Iran's nuclear pretensions; the future of Iraq and
Afghanistan; the security of the Gulf; the prevalence of terror
in the Middle East; political instability in the Arab East; and
peace between Israel and Palestine. The U.S. plays a very
special role in Iran's thinking. The questions she wishes to
address with us are her isolation; the sanctions' regimes she
faces; her search for acceptance in the international community
and her insecurity in a deeply troubled region. In particular,
Iran needs access to the international economy if she is to
provide employment for her young.
Our record of engagement with Islamic Iran is a poor one.
Past attempts, born of initiatives to address a single issue,
have failed. They will fail again if we and Iran do not address
the totality of our relationship and if we and Iran are not
prepared to set, as an ultimate objective, the normalization of
our relationship. And that means, simply stated, a reciprocal
readiness to live in peace and mutual respect, no matter how
sharply divided we are over our view of each others' political
systems.
History is replete with examples of the United States
finding a working basis for our relationships with those from
whom we were sharply divided over ideology, national ambition,
and questions of vital national security concern. I have in
mind our ability to find common ground, through detente, with
the erstwhile Soviet Union and through the Shanghai Communique,
with the People's Republic of China.
Engagement begins with a commitment at the top of our
political system. On our side, it starts with an undertaking by
the President to a normalized relationship. It means a
willingness to set aside the rhetoric of ``axis of evil'' and
measures legislatively mandated to undermine Iran's regime. Our
concerns are legitimately with Iran's external ambitions and
absent any confidence in those ambitions, its nuclear
intentions. Its domestic orientation is another question.
Iranians have changed their regimes in the past and they will
do so again. In a situation of greater peace and security, that
day may even come sooner. Our objective must be the stability
of the region and our interests there--not Iran's domestic
order. We have our principles; the clerics have theirs. Let's
see on whose side history sits.
I believe there is an opportunity today to pursue
engagement with Iran. Based on my assessment of Iran's
policies, I conclude that Iran's clerical leaders are more
comfortable with the country's elected government and are
willing to give it the freedom to maneuver internationally,
including with us. This was not the case in Khatami's time. In
addition Iran's leaders are less intimidated by our ability to
deliver on the threats they feel we have articulated. They know
we are bogged down in Iraq. Therefore they feel they can
approach us on a more equal footing. Our European allies want
us to enter the dialogue; Russia and China clearly share that
view. I suspect they would welcome a signal the United States
is ready to seek normalized relations with Iran and to live in
peace.
Ahmadinejad's recent letter, as bizarre and objectionable
as its content are, is based on a sense of self confidence. It
deserves an answer--not rejection. We are under no obligation
to reply to the terms which the letter offers. We are free to
state our case and spell out our objectives for a dialogue.
I do not have a neat formula to resolve the nuclear crisis.
I doubt Iran will renounce enrichment but will it enter into
cooperative, internationally based arrangements for the
production and supervision of enriched fuel? Is it possible to
find common ground over Iraq and Afghanistan where Iranian
interests have been served by the elimination of Saddam and the
Taliban? I believe so, especially if we make it clear the
United States does not intend to be a permanent fixture in Iraq
or Afghanistan and that we will not use our position in either
country to threaten Iran. Can the concerns of Sunni Arabs be
addressed? I contend there is room for a regional conference to
elaborate security guarantees. Can Iran address the dangers
posed by Hezbollah and Hamas and can Iran be brought to be a
more responsible player in the Israeli-Palestinian equation?
Perhaps, but it will be difficult. But it is reasonable to
conclude Iran sees in Hamas' victory in the Palestinian
elections a vindication and because Hamas is now in power, a
two state solution can be pursued.
This said, I return to my core contention: the starting
point in negotiations with Iran is our willingness to seek
normalization.
The United States must deal with the nuclear crisis. We
have time, leverage and the authority to do so. But to repeat,
our approach should be a broad one; aimed at a full exploration
of the several issues of concern to us and with the objective
of a normalized relationship. The history of America's dealings
with Iran should make it clear that anything less will lead to
frustration.
Opening Statement
DR. VALI R. NASR
Professor of Middle East and South Asia Politics, Department of
national Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 18, 2006
----------
Iran today presents a serious foreign policy challenge to
the United States. The growing prominence of security concerns:
escalation of tensions over Iran's continued development of a
nuclear capability, the country's role in Iraq and Afghanistan
and support for Hamas and Hezbollah have preoccupied U.S.
foreign policy. The election of a hard-line president in Iran
in 2005, who has adopted a belligerent rhetoric, has added
urgency to contending with these challenges.
The U.S. policy between 2001 and 2005 was focused on
promotion of democracy in Iran with the hope that such a
transition would result in a break through in U.S.-Iran
relations, and that in turn would solve the above mentioned
challenges. It was hoped that the example of democracy in Iraq
would undermine theocracy. Many observers looked to the
presidential elections of 2005 in Iran as an opening: expecting
that it would exacerbate internal tensions in Iran and produce
a ``Ukrainian moment.''
The election results defied expectations. The reformist
lost, and the most radical conservative forces won. The turn-
out was higher than expetced, and despite electoral
irregularities there were no wide-spread protests and a new
militant and hard-line president assumed power, and quickly
escalated tensions with the West. The United States now
confronted a more aggressive Iran at a time when the Iraq war
was taxing America's military capability, constricting its
ability to deter Iran.
Iran in particular intensified its campaign to acquire
nuclear capability, and after the break-down of negotiations
with the EU-3 became less cooperative with IAEA and less
willing to compromise. It in fact, adopted a policy of
deliberately escalating tensions, believing that it had ample
room to push for maximum gains.
It became clear that the priority for U.S. policy in its
relations with Iran would have to be first and foremost,
containment of its nuclear program; and in addition, contending
with Iran's regional role--in particular in Iraq and
Palestinian territories.
U.S. policy has since 2005 continued to look to democracy
as a solution to the Iranian challenge. There are inherent
problems in this approach:
1. The scope of intensification of Iran's nuclear
program requires a more direct and focused policy to
address specific threats and concerns. Democratization
does not amount to such a policy.
2. It is increasingly doubtful that there is in fact
a credible democracy movement in Iran, and if it is
likely to have an impact on regime behavior or
decision-making in the small policy-making window that
is available to the U.S. to deal with the nuclear
issue.
3. It is also likely that democracy promotion and
contending with security concerns regarding Iran may
not be compatible with each other, and in fact may
interfere with one another.
Prospects for Democracy in Iran
Iran today has many ingredients of democracy. It has an
educated youth (some 70% of the population), who are receptive
to western ideas, thousands of activist NGOs, more women in
universities than men, and the level of cultural dynamism that
is unique in the Middle East. Persian is today, after English
and Mandarin Chinese, the third most popular language on the
internet, and there are over eighty thousand Iranian blogs.
There are hundreds of widely read newspapers, magazines, and
periodicals, and there is relatively easy access to outside
sources of information. One third of Iranians listen to BBC
Radio, and BBC's Persian website at one point received 450,000
hits a day. Iranians watch everything from CNN to Al-Jazeera on
satellite TV. Although unelected authorities screen election
candidates, and there are deep flaws in electoral politics,
still Iranians are more familiar with the rudiments of
elections than their neighbors. Iranians take the campaigning
and voting seriously. The voting age is fifteen. An entire
generation has now grown up with ballots and electioneering,
promises from politicians, and the ideals of democracy as well
as its mechanics.
These social factors, however, have not produced democracy.
Conversely, over the past five years Iran has witnessed growing
power of conservative forces that since the 2005 elections are
consolidating their hold on power. The conservative leadership
comprise of clerics and Revolutionary Guards commanders, and
their allies in the bureaucracy, media, and private sector.
They now control all institutions of power--the executive,
legislature and judiciary--and are in command of key decision-
making bodies. Their political ethos combines loyalty to the
ideals of the revolution with an ascendant nationalism that
sees Iran as a regional power. Although Iranian society may
look like Eastern Europe of 1980s the Iranian government does
not.
The conservative leadership in Iran unlike Eastern European
governments of 1980s is not completely alienated from society,
and hence isolated and vulnerable. The ruling regime in Iran is
confident and in control, and has a base of support of around
20% (a steady number in election after election), and far from
feeling under pressure is confident of its own legitimacy and
ability to govern. It sees itself as capable to confronting
social opposition. The conservative leadership has proven
itself capable to defending its own prerogative to power. It
combines nationalism with revolutionary ideology with populism
to mobilize the poor in its own support and marginalize the
more affluent middle classes that demand democracy. The rising
price of oil has made such an approach possible. In this regard
the Iranian regime resembles Hugo Chavez's regime in Venezuela
or Evo Morales' in Bolivia.
Since 2005 elections Iran's pro-democracy forces are
demoralized and marginalized. They have lost their access to
power and are excluded from all state institutions. They are
disorganized. They lack political parties, and in-fighting has
prevented them from forming a united front before the regime.
They do not have a program of action or a platform that could
challenge the current government's foreign policy or populist
economic policies. In addition there is no wedge issue around
which they could mobilize their followers, organize
demonstrations, and build a movement. There is no major
election on the calendar for the next five years--nothing to
rally around. Escalation of tensions between U.S. and Iran--and
especially the prospects of sanctions and a military strike on
Iran--has moreover, created a rally to the flag phenomenon in
Iran--war and nationalist fervor do not favor democracy. As
strong as the demand for democracy is in Iran the democracy
movement is weak. It poses no palpable threats to regime
stability.
Contending with the Challenge
In the past five years the challenges posed by Iran to U.S.
policy have not gone away, they have in fact grown. The
prospect for democracy has in the meantime faded. It is fair to
conclude that democracy is not in the short run a solution to
the pressing problems in U.S.-Iranian relations. There is no
democratic partner organization, no clear opening, or an
election to rally around.
At the same time it is possible that contending with
pressing issues in U.S.-Iranian relations will require engaging
Iran more directly. Any conversation between U.S. and Iran that
yields results will have to contend with security guarantees
that will be sought by Iran. A key element of such a guarantee
is likely to be a removal of U.S. threat to regime survival in
Iran. Such a guarantee will run counter to the goal of
democracy promotion. Hence, not only will democracy not solve
the security challenges facing the U.S., but rather, the
solution to those challenges will adversely impact democracy-
promotion. Three considerations are important at this juncture:
1. U.S. policy-making must realize that
democratization is a long-run process in Iran. It will
not address short run problems.
2. At a time of escalating tensions between U.S. and
Iran overt U.S. support for democracy in Iran will be
counterproductive. It will cast democracy advocates as
unpatriotic. It is also likely to be futile as pro-
democracy forces are unlikely to engage the U.S. at a
time when U.S. and Iran are in conflict. Faced with a
choice between democracy or nationalism the Iranian
population will likely choose nationalism, and pro-
democracy forces will likely follow the same trend.
3. The imperative of solving short run crises
requires that policies directed at solving them be
decoupled from the long run goal of democracy
promotion.
Democracy promotion should remain a U.S. objective, and
U.S. should continue to lend its moral authority to advocating
its cause. However, the U.S. should not see this as a short run
policy or a solution to the nuclear crisis. Democracy promotion
should not be a substitute for diplomacy.
Prepared Statement
MS. JULIA NANAY
Senior Director, PFC Energy, Washington, DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 18, 2006
----------
Good morning. Senator Lugar and distinguished members of
this committee, it is a pleasure to come before you today to
address such an important topic. My name is Julia Nanay and I
am a Senior Director at PFC Energy. PFC Energy is a strategic
advisory firm, based in Washington, DC. We are advisors to the
petroleum industry on oil markets and various aspects of
investment risks related to the global petroleum environment.
Iran is a Major Risk Factor Driving Energy Prices Higher
The timing of today's hearing is important as it occurs in
an extremely volatile period for oil markets. Here are some of
the headlines from the news over the course of just a few days
May 3-May 12: Oil hovered near $75 a barrel, within striking
distance of record highs, because of mounting tension over
Iran's nuclear plans; oil held steady near $70 a barrel after
major powers failed to come up with a strategy for containing
Iran's nuclear ambitions; oil fell below $70 a barrel on hopes
tension over Iran's nuclear ambition will ease after Iran's
President made an unprecedented move to contact Washington.
Uncertainty over the ability of the markets to supply the
world's oil requirements if Iran's oil supplies were reduced
has kept oil markets on edge. The day to day volatility in
today's oil markets is driven by the news about Iran. The more
that Iran is in the news and the more that the U.S. presses for
sanctions and holds out the possibility of military action, the
higher that oil prices stay. Any news about the easing of
tensions and possible talks between the U.S. and Iran causes
the price to drop. Estimates of the Iran premium in today's oil
price run as high as $15 a barrel.
Iran's Production and Exports
Iran's oil production capacity today is about 4 million
barrels per day. Its oil production is estimated to average
3.8-3.9 million barrels per day. The country's OPEC quota is
4.11 million barrels per day. Iran's oil exports have held
steady at 2.4-2.5 million barrels per day, without any
significant drops related to tensions over the nuclear problem.
Iran's oil export policies have not changed.
Since President Ahmadinejad was elected in June 2005,
however, no new contracts for oil or gas development have been
signed. Production from Iran's existing old oil fields is being
depleted and without significant new investment, oil production
declines of at least 200,000 b/d per year are foreseen. Iran
has been unable to meet its OPEC quota because of the lag in
capacity expansion plans. The Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)
prohibits U.S. investment in Iran's oil and gas sector and has
discouraged many western companies from investing.
One solution being promoted by the government of Iran is to
dip into the Oil Stabilization Fund to finance oil and gas
developments. One idea floated in Iran is to take loans from
the Oil Stabilization Fund to spend on oil and gas fields,
using future revenues to repay the loans. Information on the
actual level of this Fund is difficult to come by since the
government has been drawing against it for various purposes.
The Oil Stabilization Fund does not show up in Iran's national
budget. It is run as an account at the Central Bank by a
handful of senior government officials. A better way to look at
the Oil Stabilization Fund would be to refer to it as a hard
currency reserve account.
The threat of additional sanctions on Iran's oil and gas
sector and the rumors about possible military action are
keeping foreign investors away from Iran. This could lead to
less oil being available from this country over time, depending
on how long the current stand off continues. In a period of
increasingly tight oil markets, this will keep a floor under
oil prices.
Countries That Buy Oil From Iran
The U.S. buys no oil from Iran. According to a report from
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in March 2006, 56% of
Iran's oil exports are to Asia and 29% to Europe. The remainder
goes to Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Japan and
China together buy over 800,000 b/d of Iran's oil exports or
over one-third. Japan is particularly dependent on Iran and the
Middle East in general since it imports every barrel it uses
and over 90% of its imports come from the Middle East. China
purchases less oil from Iran than Japan and its oil import
sources are more diversified. Angola and Russia are both large
suppliers of oil to China. Japan, therefore, is most vulnerable
to any supply interruptions from Iran.
Worries about oil disruptions from Iran are forcing
Japanese and Chinese buyers to try to diversify their import
sources. Japanese refiners have changed their purchasing
patterns to reduce Iranian volumes. Both Japan and China are
making overtures to Russia to open up East Siberia to their
companies and to allow them to help finance and build new East
Siberian export pipelines. This could pose a challenge to
western buyers of Russian crude and gas as these resources
could be diverted from the west to feed Asian buyers clamoring
for non-Middle East supplies. Chinese companies are also
becoming increasingly active in Africa. In a recent bidding
round in Angola, China's Sinopec offered a signature bonus of
$1.1 billion for two deepwater blocks offshore significantly
outbidding U.S. companies in a region that in the past was the
preserve of the U.S. and European oil industry. U.S. efforts to
further isolate Iran are being felt in ways big and small in
global petroleum markets as international investors scramble to
diversify away from the Middle East.
Still, unless there are major disruptions caused by some
sort of military intervention or sanctions on Iran's oil
exports, Iran itself is unlikely to stop or cut back the flow
of oil to its customers. For one thing, it would be reluctant
to jeopardize its contractual relationships; for another, it
would not want to lose the revenues. For every barrel of the
2.4 million barrels a day that Iran exports, it earns over $50
a barrel. Iran's net oil export revenues in 2005 were close to
$47 billion and it will earn over $50 billion in 2006.
Iran Imports Gasoline
Despite being OPEC's second largest oil producer, Iran has
a deficit in refining capacity to manufacture gasoline. Iran
uses about 422,000 b/d of gasoline and imports 170,000 b/d of
it, paying upwards of $4 billion in 2006 for these imports.
Gasoline is heavily subsidized in Iran, with the price set at
under 40 cents per gallon. $2.6 billion was withdrawn from the
Oil Stabilization Fund last year to pay for gasoline imports.
Again according to a report from the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress in March 2006, an estimated 25 percent of
Iran's gasoline imports come from Persian Gulf countries, 15
percent from India, and the remainder from a variety of
sources, including France, Turkey, Singapore, the Netherlands
and China.
At the same time, volumes equivalent to as much as half of
the amount of Iran's gasoline imports are being smuggled
abroad. Subsidized prices at home make it lucrative for
smugglers to move this product out of the country, with Iraq
being a favored market along with Pakistan. Many people in
border areas earn a living from smuggling gasoline.
Iran is looking into rationing gasoline, so that low prices
would apply to a certain level of purchases by each car owner
after which the full cost of the gasoline would be paid. This
two-tier pricing system is still being discussed but it could
be implemented later in 2006.
If gasoline import sanctions were imposed, one affect would
be to cut down on smuggling and another, to alleviate the
traffic pollution problems in Tehran. Gasoline import sanctions
might cast the U.S. in a negative light since unlike other oil
and gas sanctions, their impact would fall directly on Iran's
people.
U.S. Policy Options in the Oil and Gas Sector
About 60 percent of Iran's export earnings come from the
oil and gas sector and 40 to 50 percent of the government's
revenues. Investments in Iran's oil and gas sector are already
dramatically reduced and timetables delayed due to the
sanctions currently in place, as well as weak terms on offer
under the buyback contract model. Short of disrupting Iran's
oil trade with sanctions on oil exports, which would drive up
oil prices and negatively impact the U.S. economy, there is
limited impact to be gained for the world community from any
other additional sanctions on Iran's oil and gas industry. In a
market where companies and countries seek to secure their
economic lifelines through access to oil and gas, the idea that
you can create a fool-proof sanctions system targeted at any
oil and gas producer is a non-starter. There will always be
those who violate the sanctions.
Sanctions on gasoline imports would be disruptive and would
result in creating dislocations in Iran's economy. However,
their impact would be offset to some extent by the likely
elimination of the smuggling of gasoline to neighboring
countries. Such targeted sanctions will have their own
unintended consequences of probably encouraging the smuggling
of gasoline from such offshore sources as Dubai from where many
products already enter Iran.
The U.S. has to weigh carefully what it wants to gain from
such sanctions. The cut off of gasoline imports could just be
another item on a list of sanctions already imposed on Iran,
which certainly creates problems for the government but then
results in adjustments without seriously undermining the
government's power or changing its behavior with regard to
nuclear enrichment.
Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline
Finally, just a few words about the status of this
pipeline. This is a project that has been talked about for many
years and it is still being discussed. Let's put it in the
context of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline which at 1,780
km is 1,000 kms shorter than the 2,775 km Iran-Pakistan-India
pipeline. It took almost a decade for BTC to be realized from
first project appraisal and this is a pipeline that had private
oil company investment and where BP took a strong lead.
Constructing and financing such multibillion dollar projects is
difficult and expensive and it takes serious commitment from
all parties. With an estimated $7 billion price tag, the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline still has a long way to go before it
can be considered a serious project. While the energy is
clearly needed by Pakistan and India, there is no agreement in
place yet among the three countries to build the pipeline, with
the question of who would pay for it not even addressed.
Prepared Statement
MR. JAMES A. PHILLIPS
Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs, the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, the Heritage Foundation,
Washington, DC
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 18, 2006
----------
Thank you Mr Chairman and distinguished members of the
committee for this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy regarding
Iran's nuclear program.
The efforts of the United States and its allies to dissuade
Iran from pursuing its long-sought goal of attaining a nuclear
weapons capability have so far failed to yield satisfactory
results. Iran made temporary tactical concessions in October
2003 under strong international pressure to temporarily freeze
its uranium enrichment operations and submit to increased
inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Tehran feared that referral to the
Security Council could result in diplomatic isolation, economic
sanctions, or possible military attack. It undoubtedly also was
motivated by the examples set by the rapid overthrow of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Husseinss
regime in Iraq in early 2003 by U.S.-led coalitions.
Tehran made enough tactical concessions to stave off
international sanctions and engage the European Union in
diplomatic negotiations led by Britain, France, and Germany
(the EU-3) to temporarily defuse the crisis. But Tehran later
dropped the charade of negotiations after it apparently
concluded that the international situation had shifted in its
favor. It now apparently believes that it is in a much stronger
position due to the continued need for U.S. military forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan; the rise in oil prices which has given it
greater bargaining leverage with oil importers; and its
diplomatic cultivation of China and Russia, which can dilute or
veto resolutions brought before the U.N. Security Council.
The installation of a new hard-line government led by
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005 also was a major
factor that led Tehran to renege on its agreement with the EU-
3. Iran's new president is firmly committed to Iran's nuclear
program and vehemently criticized Iran's previous government
for making too many concessions in past negotiations with the
EU-3. Shortly thereafter Iran resumed operations at the Isfahan
uranium conversion facility, converting yellowcake into uranium
hexafluoride, a preliminary step before enrichment. In January
2006 Iran announced its intention to resume uranium enrichment
activities and removed IAEA seals at its Natanz facility. Iran
remains determined to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle,
which would eventually give it the fissile material for a
nuclear weapons capability. Thus far, Iran has escaped paying
any significant price for its apparent violations of its
commitments under the NPT and failure to fully cooperate with
the IAEA.
The U.S. should mobilize an international coalition to
raise the diplomatic, economic, domestic political, and
potential military costs to Tehran of continuing to flout its
obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreements. This
``coalition of the willing'' should seek to isolate the
Ahmadinejad regime, weaken it through targeted economic
sanctions, explain to the Iranian people why their government's
nuclear policies will impose economic costs and military risks
on them, contain Iran's military power, and encourage
democratic change. If Tehran persists in its drive for nuclear
weapons despite these escalating pressures, then the United
States should consider military options to set back the Iranian
nuclear weapons program.
The Growing Threat of Ahmadinejad's Iran
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rose up through the ranks of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the praetorian guard
dedicated to advancing and exporting the revolution that
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini inspired in Iran in 1978-1979.
Ahmadinejad is a true believer in Khomeini's radical vision of
Iran's role as the vanguard of a global Islamic revolution. He
has lambasted the U.S. as ``a failing power'' and a threat to
the Muslim world.
In sharp contrast to his predecessor, former President
Mohammad Khatami, who advocated a conciliatory ``dialogue of
civilizations'' but was blocked by the strong opposition of the
ideological hardliners, Ahmadinijad has returned to the fiery
rhetoric of the Khomeini era. In September he delivered a
truculent speech at the United Nations, warning foreign
governments against meddling in Iranian affairs. On October 26,
he made a venomous speech attacking Israel in which he quoted
Khomeini: ``As the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the
map.''
Ahmadinejad's vehement return to Khomeini's radical line
has been accompanied by a purge of pragmatists and reformers
within the regime. Forty of Iran's senior ambassadors have been
recalled from overseas posts, including diplomats who were
involved in the EU-3 negotiations in Britain, France, Germany,
and at the United Nations in Geneva. Ahmadinejad has appointed
many of his IRGC cronies to key positions throughout the
government.
Iran also has been increasingly aggressive in stirring up
trouble inside Iraq. In October, the British government charged
that the Iranians had supplied sophisticated bombs with shaped
charges capable of penetrating armor to clients in Iraq who
used them in a series of attacks on British forces in southern
Iraq. Iran also has given discreet support to insurgents such
as Moqtada al-Sadr, who twice has led Shiite uprisings against
coalition forces and the Iraqi government.
Iranian hardliners undoubtedly fear that a stable
democratic Iraq would present a dangerous alternative model of
government that could undermine their own authority. They know
that Iraq's pre-eminent Shiite religious leader, Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose religious authority is greater
than that of any member of Iran's ruling clerical regime,
rejects Khomeini's radical ideology and advocates traditional
Shiite religious doctrines. Although Iran continues to enjoy
considerable influence with many Iraqi Shiites, particularly
with Iraq's Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
and the Dawa Party, the moderate influence of Sistani dilutes
their own revolutionary influence. Therefore, Tehran plays a
double game in Iraq, using the young firebrand al-Sadr to
undermine Sistani and keep pressure on the U.S. military to
withdraw, while still maintaining good relations with Shiite
political parties who revere Sistani and need continued
American support.
In addition to its destabilizing role in Iraq, Iran
continues to be the word's leading sponsor of terrorism.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently called Iran ``the
central banker'' of international terrorism. It has close ties
to the Lebanon-based Hezballah terrorist group, which it
organized and continues to finance, arm, and train. Tehran also
has supported a wide variety of Palestinian terrorist groups,
including Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well
as Afghan extremists such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Iran was
involved in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19
American military personnel deployed in Saudi Arabia. Moreover,
Iran reportedly continues to give sanctuary to elements of al-
Qaeda, including at least one of Osama bin Laden's sons, Saad
bin Laden, and Saif al-Adil, a top operations coordinator.
This long and deep involvement in terrorism, continued
hostility to the United States, and repeated threats to destroy
Israel, provide a strong warning against the dangers of
allowing such a radical regime to develop nuclear weapons.
Leading an International Response to Iran's Nuclear Challenge
Diplomatic efforts centered on the United Nations to
pressure Iran to abandon its clandestine nuclear efforts are
unlikely to solve the problem, in part due to the institutional
weaknesses of the U.N. Security Council, where a lack of
consensus often leads to paralysis or lowest common denominator
policies that are not effective. Nevertheless, the Bush
administration must resolutely press the diplomatic case at the
Security Council to set the stage and improve the U.S. position
in the push for possible diplomatic and economic sanctions
targeted at Iran's recalcitrant regime, or, as a last resort,
possible future military action.
Another goal should be to make sure that the end result of
the Security Council's interactions with Iran clearly lays the
responsibility of any failure on Tehran, not Washington.
Washington should seek to focus the Security Council debate on
the critical issue--the threat posed by Iran's nuclear
program--not the broader question of whether to seek a
multilateral ``grand bargain'' with an untrustworthy
revolutionary power that exploited and sabotaged past American
efforts to stage a rapprochement under the Carter and Reagan
administrations and failed to respond to the tentative detente
offered by the Clinton administration. Getting drawn into a
multilateral dialogue with Iran through the auspices of the
United Nations would allow Iran to divert attention from its
safeguard violations and history of terrorism, while subjecting
the United States to growing international pressure to bribe
Iran with diplomatic carrots to comply with international legal
commitments that it already has violated and could renege on
again in the future.
Iran already has provided ample evidence that it has no
intention to fully cooperate with the IAEA or end the uranium
enrichment activities that eventually will give it a nuclear
weapons capability. If it merely seeks a nuclear power
capability for economic reasons, as it insists, then it would
not have rejected the Russian offer to enrich uranium at
facilities in Russia, which would have saved it considerable
costs in building and operating uranium enrichment facilities.
Moreover, Iran also would have received additional economic
benefits from the EU-3 if it had not broken off those
negotiations.
Under these circumstances, the EU-3's recent undertaking to
put together a new package of incentives for Iran is the
triumph of wishful thinking over experience. Beginning a new
round of negotiations while Iran continues to work to perfect
its uranium enrichment technology will enable Tehran to buy
time for its nuclear weapons program, forestall sanctions, and
weaken the perceived costs of violating the nuclear non-
proliferation regime in the eyes of other countries who may
consider following Iran's path. To change Iran's course, the
EU-3 should be considering larger disincentives, not just
larger incentives.
Forge a Coalition to Impose the Strongest Possible Sanctions on the
Iranian Regime
Although it has greatly benefited from the recent spike in
world oil and natural gas prices, Iran's economic future is not
a promising one. The mullahs have sabotaged economic growth
through the expansion of state control of the economy, economic
mismanagement and corruption. Annual per capita income is only
about two thirds of what it was at the time of the 1979
revolution. The situation is likely to get worse as President
Ahmadinejad follows through on his populist promises to
increase subsidies and give Iran's poor a greater share of
Iran's oil wealth.
Iranians are sending large amounts of their capital out of
the country due to fears over the potentially disastrous
policies of the new government. Shortly after Ahmadinejad gave
his October 26 speech threatening Israel, Iran's stock market
plunged to its lowest level in two years. Many Iranian
businessmen understand, even if Ahmadinejad does not, that
Iran's economic future depends on access to world markets,
foreign investment, and trade.
The U.S. should push for the strongest possible sanctions
at the UN Security Council. But experience has demonstrated
that Washington cannot rely on the UN to halt the Iranian
nuclear program. Russia and China, who have extensive economic,
military, and energy ties to Iran, may veto or dilute any
effective resolution. The U.S. therefore should make
contingency plans to work with Britain, France, Germany, the
EU, and Japan to impose sanctions outside the UN framework if
necessary.
An international ban on the import of Iranian oil is a non-
starter. It is unrealistic to expect oil importers to stop
importing Iranian oil in a tight, high-priced oil market.
Instead, the focus should be on denying Iran loans, foreign
investment, and favorable trade deals. Washington should
cooperate with other countries to deny Iran loans from
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and
to deny Iran loans for a proposed natural gas pipeline to India
via Pakistan.
Although Iran is one of the world's leading oil exporters,
it is also an importer of gasoline due to mismanagement and
inadequate investment in its refinery infrastructure. An
international ban on gasoline exports to Iran would deprive
Tehran of approximately 40 percent of its daily gasoline
consumption. This would significantly drive up the price of
Iranian gasoline and underscore to the Iranian people the
shortsighted policies of Iran's ruling regime.
In addition to economic sanctions, the U.S. should press
its allies and other countries to ban nuclear assistance, arms
sales, and the export of dual use technology to Iran. Symbolic
sanctions, such as a travel ban on Iranian officials or ban on
Iranian participation in international sports events, would
drive home to the Iranian people that international opposition
to Iran's nuclear program is widespread and not an artificial
issue created by the United States, as their government claims.
Support Iran's Democratic Opposition.
The Bush administration has correctly aligned the U.S. with
the Iranian people in their efforts to build a true democracy,
but it has held back from a policy of regime change, partly in
deference to the EU-3 negotiations with Iran about its nuclear
program. However, now that it is clear that Iran has reneged on
its promises to the EU-3, Washington should discreetly aid all
Iranian groups that support democracy and reject terrorism,
either through direct grants or indirectly through
nongovernmental organizations. The Iran Freedom and Support Act
of 2005 (H.R. 282 and S. 333), currently under consideration by
Congress would authorize such aid and tighten U.S. economic
sanctions on Iran.
Iran has a well-educated group of young reformers who seek
to replace Iran's current mullahcracy with a genuine democracy
that is accountable to the Iranian people. They have been
demoralized by the failure of former President Khatami to live
up to his promises of reform and his lack of support for the
student uprisings of 1999, but are likely to be re-energized by
a brewing popular disenchantment with the policies of
Ahmadinejad's hard-liners.
The U.S. and its allies should discreetly support all
Iranian opposition groups that reject terrorism and advocate
democracy by publicizing their activities internationally and
within Iran, giving them organizational training indirectly
through western NGOs, and inviting them to attend international
conferences and workshops outside Iran, preferably in European
or other countries where Iranians could travel relatively
freely with minimal fear of being penalized upon their return
to Iran.
Educational exchanges with western students would be an
important avenue for bolstering and opening up communication
with Iran's restive students, who historically have played a
leading role in Iran's reform movements. Women's groups also
could play a key role in strengthening support for political
reforms among young Iranian women, a key element opposing the
restoration of harsh social restrictions by Iran's resurgent
Islamic ideologues.
The United States also should covertly subsidize opposition
publications and organizing efforts, as it did to aid the anti-
communist opposition during the Cold War in Europe and Asia.
But such programs should be strictly segregated from the public
outreach efforts of the U.S. and its allies, to avoid putting
Iranian participants in international forums at risk of arrest
or persecution when they return home.
The United States should not try to play favorites among
the various Iranian opposition groups, but should encourage
them to cooperate under the umbrella of the broadest possible
coalition. But Washington should rule out support for the
People's Mujahideen Organization (PMO), which is also known as
the Mujahideen Khalq, or its front group, the National Council
of Resistance. The PMO is a non-democratic Marxist terrorist
group that was part of the broad revolutionary coalition that
overthrew the Shah, but was purged in 1981 and aligned itself
with Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.
While this cult-like group is one of the best-organized
exile organizations, it has little support inside Iran because
of its alliance with arch-enemy Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.
Moreover, the PMO resorted to terrorism against the Shah's
regime and was responsible for the assassinations of at least
four American military officers in Iran during the 1970s. It
demonstrated in support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979 and against the release of the American hostages in
1981. The U.S. cannot afford to support an organization with
such a long history of terrorism, if it expects Tehran to halt
its own terrorism.
Launch a Public Diplomacy Campaign to Explain to the Iranian People How
the Regime's Nuclear Weapons Program and Hard-Line Policies
Hurt Their Economic and National Interests
Iran's clerical regime has tightened its grip on the media
in recent years, shutting down more than 100 independent
newspapers, jailing journalists, closing down websites, and
arresting bloggers. The U.S. and its allies should work to
defeat the regime's suppression of independent media by
increasing Farsi broadcasts by government sponsored media such
as the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe (Radio Farda), and
other information sources. The free flow of information is an
important prerequisite for the free flow of political ideas.
The Iranian people need access to information about the
activities of Iranian opposition groups, both within and
outside Iran, and the plight of dissidents.
The internet is a growing source of unfiltered information
for many Iranians, particularly Iranian students. Farsi is
reportedly the fourth most popular language used online and
there has been a proliferation of political blogs devoted to
Iranian issues. The U.S. should consider ways of assisting
Iranians outside the country to establish politically-oriented
websites that could be accessed by activists and other
interested people inside Iran.
Mobilize Allies to Contain and Deter Iran.
The bellicose resurgence of Iran's hardliners, Iran's
continued support for terrorism, and the prospective emergence
of a nuclear Iran pose threats to many countries. President
Ahmadinejad's belligerence gives Washington greater opportunity
to mobilize other states, particularly those living in growing
shadow of Iranian power. The United States should maintain a
strong naval and air presence in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran
and strengthen military cooperation with the Gulf States.
The U.S. and its European allies should strengthen
military, intelligence, and security cooperation with
threatened states, such as Iraq, Turkey, Israel and the members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), which was founded
in 1981 to provide collective security for Arab states
threatened by Iran. Such a coalition could help contain the
expansion of Iranian power and possibly would cooperate in
facilitating military action, if necessary against Iran.
Washington could also offer to deploy or transfer anti-
ballistic missile defense systems to threatened states, enhance
joint military planning, and step up joint military and naval
exercises. In particular, the U.S. and its allies should stage
multilateral naval exercises to demonstrate the will and
capability to defeat Tehran's threats to block the Strait of
Hormuz, through which flow about one fifth of the world's oil
exports.
Prepare for the Use of Military Force As a Last Resort
A strong U.S. military posture is essential to dissuading
and deterring Iran from fielding nuclear weapons and supporting
terrorism, and when necessary responding decisively and
effectively to Iranian threats. To deal with a nuclear or
terrorist threat from Iran several military capabilities are
particularly important. They include (1) expanding and
strengthening the proliferation security initiative; (2)
theater missile defense; (3) robust special operations forces
and human intelligence (HUMINT) assets; (4) assured access to
bases and staging areas in the theater for both special
operations and conventional ground, air, and sea forces, and;
(5) Energy security preparations.
Proliferation security initiative (PSI). PSI is a multi-
national effort to track down and breakup networks that
proliferate chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
technologies and materials. The administration should field
more modern capabilities that can provide the right
intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and interdiction
assets for the U.S. military. In particular, modernization of
Coast Guard and Naval forces that can help prevent seaborne
trafficking of weapons material is vital.
Theater Missile Defense (TMD). TMD is also essential.
Missile defenses provide the means to intercept a ballistic
missile in flight and destroy it before the missile can deliver
a nuclear warhead to its target. The United States should work
with its friends and allies to provide theater missile defense
to countries in the region. The United States should continue
to pursue a mix of air, land, and sea-based missile defense
systems.
Special Operations Forces and HUMINT. These military and
intelligence assets provide the capacity for focused operations
against specific targets. Today, these forces are
overstretched, performing many missions in the global war on
terrorism. The Pentagon must end the use of special operations
for training foreign militaries and other tasks that can be
done by conventional military units. In addition, the
administration must bolster the ranks of the special forces and
HUMINT assets that might be required to operate in Iran,
ensuring they have the right language skills, area knowledge,
and detailed, actionable intelligence.
Theater Access. The United States must ensure it retains
the means to deploy and sustain forces in the theater. The
Pentagon should work to secure a variety of basing options for
staging military operations. In addition, the military must
have robust means to ensure its ability to operate in the Gulf
and defeat ``anti-access'' weapons that Iran might employ such
as cruise missiles, sea-based mines, terrorist attacks, and
biological or chemical weapons.
Energy Security Preparations. In the event of a military
clash with the United States, Iran undoubtedly will try to
follow through on its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz to
oil tankers and disrupt oil exports from other Persian Gulf oil
exporters. Washington should take immediate steps to limit the
future impact of such oil supply disruptions by working with
the Arab gulf states to help them reduce the vulnerability of
their oil infrastructure to Iranian military and terrorist
attacks; pressing U.S. allies and other oil importers to expand
their strategic oil stockpiles; encouraging Saudi Arabia to
expand its excess oil production capacity; and asking Saudi
Arabia to upgrade the Trans Saudi Arabian pipeline to increase
its capacity and make preparations to bring the Iraq-Saudi
pipeline back online to reroute oil exports away from the
Persian Gulf to the Red Sea oil export terminals.
The Nightmare Scenario of a Nuclear Iran
There is no guaranteed policy that can halt the Iranian
nuclear program short of war, and even a military campaign may
only delay Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.
But U.S. policymaking regarding the Iranian nuclear issue
inevitably boils down to a search for the least-bad option. And
as potentially costly and risky as a preventive war against
Iran would be, allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would
result in far heavier potential costs and risks.
The U.S. probably would be able to deter Iran from a direct
nuclear attack on American or Israeli targets by threatening
massive retaliation and the assured destruction of the Iranian
regime. But there is a lingering doubt that a leader such as
President Ahmadinejad, who reportedly harbors apocalyptic
religious beliefs regarding the return of the Mahdi, would have
the same cost-benefit calculus about a nuclear war as other
leaders. The bellicose leader, who boldly called for Israel to
be ``wiped off the map'' before he acquired a nuclear weapon,
might be sorely tempted to follow through on his threat after
he acquired one. Moreover, his regime might risk passing
nuclear weapons off to terrorist surrogates in hopes of
escaping retaliation for a nuclear surprise attack launched by
an unknown attacker.
Even if Iran could be deterred from considering such
attacks, an Iranian nuclear breakout would undermine the NPT
and trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could
lead Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Algeria to build or
acquire their own nuclear weapons. Each new nuclear power would
multiply the risks and uncertainties in an already volatile
region.
Iran also may be emboldened to step up its support of
terrorism and subversion, calculating that its nuclear
capability would deter a military response. An Iranian
miscalculation could easily lead to a future military clash
with the United States or an American ally that would impose
exponentially higher costs than a war with a non-nuclear Iran.
Even if it could not threaten a nuclear missile attack on U.S.
territory for many years, Tehran could credibly threaten to
target the Saudi oil fields with a nuclear weapon, thereby
gaining a potent blackmail threat over the world economy.
I believe that Senator John McCain was correct when he
concisely stated: ``There is only one thing worse than the U.S.
exercising a military option, and that is a nuclear-armed
Iran.''