[JPRT, 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2008
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 31, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
(Star Print)
2008 ANNUAL REPORT
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2008
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 31, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2008
(Star Print) 44-748 PDF
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio Chairman
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MAX BAUCUS, Montana
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California CARL LEVIN, Michigan
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State
HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor
CHRISTOPHER PADILLA, Department of Commerce
DAVID KRAMER, Department of State
Douglas Grob, Staff Director
Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
CO N T E N T S
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Page
Preface.......................................................... 1
General Overview................................................. 3
I. Executive Summary and Recommendations......................... 8
Findings and Recommendations by Substantive Area............. 8
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 27
II. Human Rights................................................. 32
Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants................... 32
Worker Rights................................................ 41
Freedom of Expression........................................ 57
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 73
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 94
Population Planning.......................................... 96
Freedom of Residence......................................... 103
Liberty of Movement.......................................... 113
Status of Women.............................................. 115
Human Trafficking............................................ 118
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 124
Public Health................................................ 128
Environment.................................................. 133
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games............................ 139
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 144
Civil Society................................................ 144
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 147
Commercial Rule of Law....................................... 153
Access to Justice............................................ 163
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 168
V. Tibet......................................................... 182
VI. Developments in Hong Kong.................................... 205
VII. Endnotes.................................................... 212
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
2008 ANNUAL REPORT
Preface
The findings of the Commission's 2008 Annual Report prompt
us to consider not simply what the Chinese government and
Communist Party may do in the months and years ahead, but what
we must do differently in view of developments in China over
the last year. We understand that China today is significantly
changed from the China of several decades ago, and that the
challenges facing its people and leaders are complex. As the
United States engages China, it is also vital that our nation
pursue the issues that are the charge of this Commission:
individual human rights, including worker rights, and the
safeguards of the rule of law. As China plays an increasingly
significant role in the international community, this report
describes how China repeatedly has failed to abide by its
commitments to internationally recognized standards. Therefore
it is vital that there be continuing assessment of China's
commitments. This is not a matter of one country meddling in
the affairs of another. Other nations, including ours, have
both the responsibility and a legitimate interest in ensuring
compliance with international commitments. It is in this
context, as Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, that we submit the Commission's
2008 Annual Report.
This year the international community watched with dismay
as Chinese authorities responded with overwhelming force to a
wave of public protests that spread across Tibetan areas of
China. Amidst the astonishment with which people around the
world more recently witnessed the spectacular opening
ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games and China's
effective management of the Games, Chinese authorities failed
to fulfill several Olympics-related commitments--including
commitments to press freedom, media access, the free flow of
information, and freedom of assembly. The Chinese government's
and Communist Party's continuing crackdown on China's ethnic
minority citizens, ongoing manipulation of the media, and
heightened repression of rights defenders reveal a level of
state control over society that is incompatible with the
development of the rule of law. The cases of well over a
thousand of the political and religious prisoners languishing
in jails and prisons in China today are documented by the
Commission's publicly accessible Political Prisoner Database.
During the past 12 months, the Chinese government and
Communist Party have outlined legislative and regulatory
developments in areas such as anti-monopoly, open government
information, collective contracting, employment promotion,
regulation of the legal profession, and intellectual property,
among others. Based on China's record of past enforcement,
these new measures will require consistent and transparent
implementation if they are to fulfill the government's stated
objectives. China's record on human rights and the development
of the rule of law over the last year continued to reflect the
following troubling trends: (1) heightened intolerance of
citizen activism and suppression of information on matters of
public concern; (2) ongoing instrumental use of law for
political purposes; (3) stepped up efforts to insulate the
central leadership from the backlash of national policy
failures; and (4) heightened reliance on emergency measures as
instruments of social control. The Chinese government and
Communist Party continue to equate citizen activism and public
protest with ``social
instability'' and ``social unrest.'' China's increasingly
active and engaged citizenry is one of China's most important
resources for addressing the myriad public policy problems the
Chinese people face, including food safety, forced labor,
environmental degradation, and corruption. Citizen engagement,
not repression, is the path to the effective implementation of
basic human rights, and to the ability of all people in China
to live under the rule of law.
Sander M. Levin, Chairman Byron L. Dorgan, Co-Chairman
General Overview
Over the last year, the following general trends with
regard to human rights and the development of the rule of law
have been evident in China:
1. The Chinese government's and Communist Party's
intolerance of citizen activism increased, as did the
suppression by authorities of information on matters of public
concern.
2. The instrumental use of law for political purposes
continued, and intensified in some areas, notwithstanding
developments in areas such as death penalty reform, anti-
monopoly, open government information, employment promotion,
and collective labor contracting.
3. Official efforts to insulate the central leadership from
the backlash of national policy failures continued, as efforts
to prevent ``sensitive'' disputes from entering legal channels
that lead to Beijing intensified.
4. In the wake of Tibetan protests, the Sichuan earthquake,
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and, most recently, a food
safety crisis involving tainted milk products, the stake that
Chinese citizens and citizens of other countries have in
improved governance in China continued to rise. The Chinese
government's and Communist Party's increasing reliance on
emergency measures as instruments of social control over the
last year underscored the downside risk of insufficient or
ineffective rule of law reforms.
INTOLERANCE OF CITIZEN ACTIVISM
The clearest manifestations of Chinese government and
Communist Party intolerance of citizen activism during the past
year were the detention, ``patriotic education,'' isolation,
and deaths of Tibetans following protests in Tibetan areas of
China. Authorities failed to distinguish between peaceful
protesters and rioters as required under both Chinese law and
international human rights norms. Heightened intolerance of
peaceful protest also was evident in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the aftermath of demonstrations in
Hoten and amid security preparations for the 2008 Olympic
Games. Participants in the Hoten demonstrations protested
government policies against a backdrop of rising controls and
repressive measures in the XUAR, including wide-scale
detentions, restrictions on Uyghurs' freedom to travel, and
heightened surveillance over religious activities and religious
practitioners.
Illegal detentions and harassment of dissidents and
petitioners followed the Chinese government and Communist
Party's instructions to officials to ensure a ``harmonious''
and dissent-free Olympics. Individuals detained for circulating
a ``We Want Human Rights, Not Olympics'' petition are now
serving sentences in prison and ``reeducation through labor''
(RTL) centers. The government designated special locations or
``zones'' for public protest during the 2008 Olympic Games, but
no protests received approval, and the harassment of applicants
for protest permits has been reported. Authorities also
harassed legal advocates connected to religion-related cases
and active in defending religious groups. Such harassment
intensified in the run-up to and during the 2008 Olympic Games.
Advocates and rights defenders were placed under 24-hour police
surveillance during the resumption of the U.S.-China Human
Rights Dialogue held in Beijing, and also during a visit to
Beijing by Members of the U.S. Congress. Central and local
officials also tightened controls over political organizations
and political party figures affiliated with parties other than
the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Central authorities took
steps to quell burgeoning public discussion of the merits of
eliminating or phasing out the one-child population planning
policy. Authorities targeted a number of HIV/AIDS and other
health advocacy organizations, and shut down or removed content
from their Web sites.
INSTRUMENTAL USE OF LAW FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES
Chinese authorities' use of law as an instrument of
politics continued unabated, and intensified in some areas.
Provisions in Internet regulations that prohibit content deemed
``harmful to the honor or interests of the nation'' and
``disrupting the solidarity of peoples,'' supplied ``legal''
justification for the censorship of Internet content deemed
politically sensitive. The crime of ``inciting subversion of
state power'' under Article 105, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal
Law continued to be a principal tool for punishing those who
peacefully criticized the Chinese government or who advocated
for human rights on the Internet. Chinese government
authorities particularly targeted persons who openly tied their
criticism to China's hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games or
handling of the Sichuan earthquake. Legal provisions that
prohibit the incitement of others ``to split the state or
undermine unity of the country'' (Criminal Law, Article 103)
have been invoked to punish Tibetans for peaceful expressions
of support for the Dalai Lama or for their wish for Tibetan
independence. Possession of a photograph of the Dalai Lama or a
copy of one of his speeches continued to serve as evidence of
``splittism.'' National and local measures regulating Tibetan
Buddhism, and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, prioritize
fulfillment of government and Party political objectives and
fail to protect Tibetan culture, language, or religion.
Pursuant to a 1999 Decision of the National People's Congress
Standing Committee that established a ban on ``cult
organizations,'' the Chinese government continued to detain and
punish Falun Gong practitioners and members of other spiritual
and religious groups.
Legal provisions concerning national unity, internal
security, social order, and the promotion of a ``harmonious
society'' that were included in new legislation and regulations
in 2006 and 2007 were invoked in cases of detention and
imprisonment in the last year. China's legal and judicial
authorities continued to deny fundamental procedural
protections (such as access to a lawyer or a public trial) to
those accused of state security crimes. The number of cases in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of state security crimes,
including cases involving peaceful expression or religious
practice, remains high. Officials continued to use the charge
of ``illegal operation of a business'' as a pretext to detain
or convict individuals who publish religious materials or other
materials deemed ``sensitive.''
The Chinese government requires Home Return Permits (HRP)
for Hong Kong and Macau residents who are Chinese citizens to
visit the mainland. The Chinese government confiscated the HRPs
of citizens deemed prone to overstep the limits of ``normal''
or ``approved'' activities, and continued to deny the issuance
of HRPs to 12 pro-democracy members of Hong Kong's Legislative
Council allegedly for their support of Tiananmen Square
protesters in 1989 and their criticism of the Chinese
government. In the past year, authorities confiscated, revoked,
denied entry, or refused to renew or accept the passport
applications of several known dissidents, and denied entry to a
Hong Kong reporter covering the 2008 Olympic Games for a pro-
democracy Chinese-language newspaper.
INSULATION OF THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP FROM THE BACKLASH OF POLICY
FAILURE
One objective of China's new Law on Emergency Response,
which took effect on November 1, 2007, is to ``prevent minor
mishaps from turning into major public crises'' according to
legislators cited in official reports. Shortly after the
Sichuan earthquake in May, the Supreme People's Court issued a
Circular titled, ``Completing Trial Work During the Earthquake
Disaster Relief Period to Earnestly Safeguard Social
Stability'' instructing courts to ``exercise caution in
examining and docketing'' cases that are ``socially sensitive''
or ``collective'' (e.g., multiple plaintiffs litigating
collectively), and ``to use mediation to achieve reconciliation
through the withdrawal of charges to resolve disputes.'' In the
wake of the earthquake, Party officials directed Chinese media
and news editors to focus on ``positive'' stories that
projected national unity and stability, and in the run-up to
the 2008 Olympic Games ordered the media to avoid ``negative
stories'' such as those relating to air quality and food safety
problems.
Following Tibetan protests this spring, which involved
thousands of protesters, Chinese authorities repeatedly placed
blame on the actions of ``a small handful'' of ``rioters'' and
``unlawful elements.'' The emphasis on ``a small handful,''
combined with propaganda that holds the Dalai Lama personally
accountable for events and developments, appears to be a
strategy aimed at prompting Chinese citizens to rally around
the government, and to pre-empt their pressing the government
to explain the frustration and anger of the large number of
Tibetan protesters. Authorities have revealed little
information about the names of Tibetans detained, the charges
(if any) against them, the locations of courts handling the
cases, or the location of facilities where protesters have been
or remain detained or imprisoned. As a result, China's non-
Tibetan citizens are even less likely than before to raise
questions or complaints about China's Tibet policy.
RISING STAKES OF LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA
In part due to China's increasing engagement with the world
economy, events within China have had an increasing influence
on its neighbors and trading partners. Unsafe Chinese exports
continue to demonstrate the rising stakes of China's relative
lack of government transparency, its weak legal institutions,
and the Chinese government's failure to enforce its own product
safety laws. China's global reach also affords the government
an array of levers through which to reward overseas entities
who support or remain silent on domestic Chinese human rights
abuses, while penalizing those who criticize the Chinese
government's practices. China's actions related to Darfur,
Sudan, may be understood, at least in part, in this context.
Government and Party rhetoric warning against foreign
influence became more strident in the last year. The Commission
also observed detentions of ethnic minority citizens active in
international arenas or perceived to have ties with overseas
groups. In the past year, authorities targeted some Chinese
religious adherents with ties to foreign co-religionists for
harassment, detention, and other abuses. In the region along
China's border with North Korea, authorities reportedly shut
down churches found to have ties with South Koreans or other
foreign nationals.
The rising stakes of legal reform also became increasingly
evident in the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector over
the last year. China's new Corporate Income Tax Law, which took
effect on January 1, 2008, encourages public and corporate
charitable donations through the provision of tax benefits.
Increases in corporate donations and support for NGO activities
in the wake of this year's earthquake in Sichuan may have been
attributable in part to these provisions. The majority of NGOs
in China, however, regardless of their registration status,
cannot engage in fundraising activities because charity-related
laws only allow a small number of government-approved
foundations to collect and distribute donations. This
restriction posed significant challenges for the provision of
victims' support services in the aftermath of the May Sichuan
earthquake, when unprecedented donations overwhelmed the
government. China also is an origin, transit, and destination
country for human trafficking. Chinese trafficking victims can
be found in Europe, Africa, Latin America, Northeast Asia, and
North America. Trafficking victims from Southeast Asia, the
Russian Far East, Mongolia, and North Korea are trafficked to
China, where victims are much in need of support services. The
small number of government-approved foundations and the limited
capacity to manage funds continued to impact the availability
of victims' support and social services.
Even as the Commission highlights these areas of concern,
China over the past year has outlined a number of laws and
regulations that have the potential to produce positive results
if central and local government departments and Party officials
prove their ability and willingness to implement them
faithfully. Developments in areas such as anti-monopoly, open
government information, collective contracting, employment
promotion, regulation of the legal profession, and intellectual
property, among others, are reported in detail in the pages
that follow. The past year also marked the first time that
Chinese courts mandated criminal punishment in a sexual
harassment case, and issued a civil protection order in a
divorce case involving domestic violence. And, as the
Commission
reported last year, the resumption of the Supreme People's
Court's review of death penalty sentences was a significant
development for China's criminal justice system. Since January
1, 2007, when the death penalty reform took effect, the Chinese
government has reported a 30-percent decrease in the number of
death sentences. The Commission will continue to monitor the
effectiveness of China's implementation of the rule of law and
human rights in the year ahead.
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated in
and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this
Annual Report, including its findings, views, and
recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of
individual Executive Branch members or the policies of the
Administration.
I. Executive Summary and Recommendations
Findings and Recommendations by Substantive Area
A summary of findings for the last year follows below for
each area that the Commission monitors. In each area, the
Commission has identified a set of specific findings that merit
attention over the next year, and, in accordance with the
Commission's mandate, a set of recommendations to the President
and the Congress for legislative or executive action.
RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS AND DEFENDANTS
Findings
The rights of criminal suspects and defendants
continued to fall far short of the rights guaranteed in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
as well as rights provided for under China's Criminal
Procedure Law (CPL) and Constitution.
The Lawyers' Law was revised to enhance the
rights of criminal defense lawyers, but some provisions
in the revised law conflict with the Criminal Procedure
Law.
Since the Supreme People's Court (SPC)
reclaimed its authority to review death penalty
sentences as of January 1, 2007, the SPC has overturned
15 percent of all death sentences handed down by lower
courts (through the first half of 2008). During 2007,
30 percent fewer death sentences were reportedly meted
out, compared with the number of death sentences in
2006. The number of executions carried out annually
remains a state secret, however.
Chinese authorities continued to imprison
individuals who were sentenced for political crimes,
including ``counter-revolutionary'' crimes that no
longer exist under the current Criminal Law.
Individuals involved in the 1989 democracy protests are
still being held in prisons in China.
Misuse of police power and arbitrary detention
remain serious problems. Police officers illegally
monitored and subjected to arbitrary ``house arrest''
human rights lawyers and other advocates in Beijing and
elsewhere in connection with the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games.
Local officials continued to abuse police
power to suppress public protests. Following numerous
clashes between police and civilians, the central
government promulgated new rules that hold local
officials responsible for misusing police power in
``mass incidents'' and for mishandling grievances.
Recommendations
Sponsor technical assistance programs to support
judicial reform and revisions to the Criminal Procedure
Law and to ensure their effective implementation, with
the aim of bringing China's criminal justice system
into conformance with the standards set forth in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Press the Chinese government to amend state secrets
laws and related regulations that prohibit making
public the number of executions carried out in China,
and to implement such provisions effectively.
Continue to call on the Chinese government to release
those prisoners still in prison for
counterrevolutionary and other
political crimes, including those imprisoned for their
involvement in the 1989 democracy protests, as well as
other prisoners included in this report and in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
WORKER RIGHTS
Findings
Workers in China still are not guaranteed
either in law or in practice full worker rights in
accordance with international standards. China's laws,
regulations, and governing practices continue to deny
workers fundamental rights, including, but not limited
to, the right to organize into independent unions.
Workers who tried to establish independent associations
or organize demonstrations continue to risk harassment,
detention, and other abuses. Residency restrictions
continue to present hardships for workers who migrate
for jobs to urban areas. Tight controls over civil
society organizations hinder the ability of citizen
groups to champion worker rights.
Labor disputes and protests intensified during
2008. Management's failure to pay wage arrears,
overtime, severance pay, or social security
contributions, were the most common causes. Social and
economic changes, weak legislative frameworks, and
ineffective or selective enforcement continue to
engender abuses ranging from forced labor and child
labor, to violations of health and safety standards,
wage arrearages, and loss of job benefits.
The discovery of an extensive forced labor
network in Guangdong province this year revealed
authorities' inability to enforce basic protections for
workers against China's powerfully embedded labor
trafficking networks.
Three major national labor-related laws took
effect this year: Labor Contract Law and new Employment
Promotion Law took effect on January 1, 2008, and
China's new Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law
took effect on May 1, 2008.
Recommendations
Fund multi-year pilot projects that showcase the
experience of collective bargaining in action for both
Chinese workers and All China Federation of Trade Union
(ACFTU) officials. Where possible, prioritize programs
that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective
bargaining pilot projects even in factories that do not
have an official union presence.
Expand multi-year funding for conferences in China on
collective bargaining that bring together worker
representatives, labor rights NGO representatives,
labor lawyers, academics, ACFTU officials, and
government officials.
Support the production and distribution in various
formats (print, online, video, etc.) of bilingual
English-Chinese ``how-to'' materials on conducting
elections of worker representatives, and on conducting
collective bargaining.
Fund projects that prioritize the large-scale
compilation and analysis of Chinese labor dispute
litigation and arbitration cases, leading ultimately to
the publication and dissemination of bilingual English-
Chinese casebooks that may be used as a common
reference resource by workers, arbitrators, judges,
lawyers, employers, unions, and law schools in China.
Support capacity building programs to strengthen
Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in
defending the rights of workers.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Findings
The Chinese government and Communist Party
continued to deny Chinese citizens the ability to fully
exercise their rights to free expression.
The government and Party's efforts to project
a ``positive'' image before and during the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games were accompanied by increases in
the frequency and extent of official violations of the
right to free expression.
Official censorship and manipulation of the
press and Internet for political purposes intensified
in connection with both Tibetan protests that began in
March 2008 and the Olympics.
Chinese officials failed to fully implement
legal provisions granting press freedom to foreign
reporters in accordance with agreements made as a
condition of hosting the Olympics, and which the
International Olympic Committee requires of all Olympic
host cities.
The government and Party continued to deny
Chinese citizens the ability to speak to journalists
without fear of intimidation or reprisal.
Officials continued to use vague laws to
punish journalists, writers, rights advocates,
publishers, and others for peacefully exercising their
right to free expression. Those who criticized China in
the context of the Olympics were targeted more
intensely. Restraints on publishing remained in place.
Authorities responsible for implementing a new
national
regulation on open government information retained
broad discretion on the release of government
information. Open government information measures
enabled officials to promote images of openness, and
quickly to provide official versions of events, while
officials maintained the ability at the same time to
censor unauthorized accounts.
Recommendations
Support Federal funding for the study of press and
Internet censorship methods, practices, and capacities
in China. Promote programs that offer Chinese citizens
access to human rights-related and other information
currently unavailable to them. Sponsor programs that
disseminate through radio, television, or the Internet
Chinese-language ``how-to'' information and programming
on the use by citizens of open government information
provisions on the books.
Support the development of ``how-to'' materials for
U.S. citizens, companies, and organizations in China on
the use of the Regulations on Open Government
Information and other records-access provisions in
Chinese central and local-level laws and regulations.
Support development of materials that provide guidance
to U.S. companies in China on how the Chinese
government may require them to support restrictions on
freedom of expression and best practices to minimize or
avoid such risks.
In official correspondence with Chinese counterparts,
include statements calling for the release of political
prisoners named in this report who have been punished
for peaceful expression, including: Yang Chunlin (land
rights activist sentenced to five years' imprisonment
in March 2008 after organizing a ``We Want Human
Rights, Not Olympics'' petition); Yang Maodong (legal
activist and writer whose pen name is Guo Feixiong,
sentenced to five years' imprisonment in November 2007
for unauthorized publishing); Lu Gengsong (writer
sentenced to four years' imprisonment in February 2008
for his online criticism of the Chinese government);
and other prisoners included in this report and in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Findings
The Chinese government and Communist Party
continued to deny Chinese citizens the ability to fully
exercise their right to freedom of religion. The
Chinese government continued in the past year to
subject religion to a strict regulatory framework that
represses many forms of religious and spiritual
activities protected under international human rights
law, including in treaties China has signed or
ratified. The Chinese government continued its policy
of recognizing only select religious communities for
limited state protections, and of not protecting the
religious and spiritual activities of all individuals
and communities within China as required under China's
international legal obligations.
Religious adherents remained subject to tight
controls over their religious activities, and some
citizens met with harassment, detention, imprisonment,
and other abuses because of their religious or
spiritual practices.
The Chinese government and Communist Party
sounded alarms against foreign ``infiltration'' in the
name of religion, and took measures to hinder citizens'
freedom to engage with foreign co-religionists.
President and Party General Secretary Hu
Jintao called for recognizing a ``positive role'' for
religious communities within Chinese society, but
officials also continued to affirm the government and
Party's policy of control over religion.
The central government's ``6-10 Office''
(established in 1999 to implement the policy that
outlaws Falun Gong) issued an internal directive to
local governments nationwide mandating propaganda
activities to prevent Falun Gong from ``interfering
with or harming'' the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.
Beijing and Shanghai Public Security Bureaus also
issued local directives providing rewards for
informants who report Falun Gong activities to the
police. Stories published in the state-controlled
media, as well as statements made by Chinese officials,
sought to link Falun Gong with terrorist threats in the
lead-up to the Olympics.
Recommendations
Include in China-related legislation and statements,
calls for the Chinese government to guarantee freedom
of religion to all Chinese citizens in accordance with
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined,
detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing
their right to freedom of religion (including the right
to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such prisoners
include Adil Qarim (imam in Xinjiang detained during a
security roundup in August); Alimjan Himit (house
church leader in detention on charges of subverting
state power and endangering national security); Gong
Shengliang (founder of unregistered church who
continues to serve a life sentence); Jia Zhiguo
(unregistered bishop repeatedly detained by Chinese
authorities and confined to his home since his most
recent release from detention on September 18, 2008);
Phurbu Tsering (Tibetan Buddhist teacher and head of a
Tibetan Buddhist nunnery whom authorities detained in
May 2008); Wang Zhiwen (Falun Gong practitioner who
continues to serve a 16-year sentence for alleged
crimes related to cults and acquiring state secrets);
and other prisoners included in this report and in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Support continued funding for non-governmental
organizations that collect information on conditions
for religious freedom in China and that inform Chinese
citizens of how to defend their right to freedom of
religion against Chinese government abuses. Encourage
U.S. government-funded programs to orient priorities
toward expanded coverage of different religious and
spiritual communities within China.
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
Authorities continued to repress citizen
activism by ethnic minorities in China, especially
within Tibetan areas of China, the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region (IMAR). [See findings for Xinjiang and Tibet for
additional information.] In the past year, authorities
in the IMAR punished ethnic minority rights advocates
as well as citizens perceived to have links with ethnic
rights organizations, intensifying a trend noted by the
Commission in 2007.
The government reported taking steps in the
past year to improve economic and social conditions for
ethnic minorities. It remains unclear whether such
measures have been effectively implemented and include
safeguards to protect ethnic minority rights and to
solicit input from local communities. Ongoing
development efforts in ethnic minority areas have
brought mixed results for ethnic minority communities.
The Chinese government continued in the past
year to
protect some aspects of ethnic minority rights.
However, shortcomings in both the substance and the
implementation of Chinese ethnic minority policies
prevented ethnic minority citizens from enjoying their
rights in line with domestic Chinese law and
international legal standards. Ethnic minority citizens
of China do not enjoy the ``right to administer their
internal affairs'' as guaranteed to them in Chinese
law.
Recommendations
China-related legislation should include language
that calls on Chinese authorities to formulate and
implement China's ethnic minority autonomy system in a
manner that respects ethnic minorities' ``right to
administer their internal affairs'' as guaranteed to
them in Chinese law.
Call for the release of citizens imprisoned for
advocating ethnic minority rights, including Mongol
activist Hada (serving a 15-year sentence after
pursuing activities to promote ethnic minority rights
and democracy), as well as other prisoners mentioned in
this report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Fund rule of law programs and exchanges that raise
awareness among Chinese leaders of different models for
governance that protect ethnic minorities' rights and
allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy over their
affairs. Support funding for non-governmental
organizations to continue or develop programs that
address ethnic minority issues within China, including
task-oriented training programs that build capacity for
sustainable development among ethnic minorities and
programs that research rights abuses in the Inner
Mongolia
Autonomous Region, as well as in other regions. (Also
see recommendations for Tibet and Xinjiang.)
Support funding for programs at U.S. universities to
teach ethnic minority languages used in China, to
better preserve these languages as the Chinese
government implements programs to strengthen the use of
Mandarin within China and to better prepare the
international community to study and understand
conditions for ethnic minorities in China.
POPULATION PLANNING
Findings
The Chinese government announced that parents
who lost an only child in the May 2008 Sichuan
earthquake would be permitted to have another child if
they applied for a government-issued certificate.
The National Population and Family Planning
Commission (NPFPC) issued a directive imposing higher
``social compensation fees'' levied according to income
on couples who violate the one-child rule. Under the
directive, urban families who violate the one-child
rule risk having officials apply negative marks on
financial credit records.
Reports of forced abortions, forced
sterilizations, and police beatings related to
population planning policies continued. In some areas,
government campaigns to forcibly sterilize women who
have more than one female child included government
payments to informants.
A brief public discussion about the continued
necessity of the one-child policy reportedly prompted
the NPFPC Minister to issue a statement that China
would ``by no means waver'' in its population planning
policies for ``at least the next decade.''
Recommendations
Urge Chinese officials to cease all coercive
measures, including forced abortion and sterilization,
to enforce birth control quotas. Urge the Chinese
government to dismantle its system of coercive
population controls, while funding programs that inform
Chinese officials of the importance of respecting
citizens' diverse beliefs.
Urge Chinese officials to release promptly Chen
Guangcheng, imprisoned in Linyi city, Shandong
province, after exposing forced sterilizations, forced
abortions, beatings, and other abuses carried out by
Linyi population planning officials.
Encourage Chinese officials to permit greater public
discussion and debate concerning population planning
policies and to demonstrate greater responsiveness to
public concerns. Impress upon China's leaders the
importance of promoting legal aid and training programs
that help citizens pursue compensation and other
remedies against the state for injury suffered as a
result of official abuse related to China's population
planning policies. Provisions in China's Law on State
Compensation provide for such remedies for citizens
subject to abuse and personal injury by administrative
officials, including population planning officials.
Provide funding and support for the development of
programs and international cooperation in this area.
FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE
Findings
China's household registration (hukou) system
remains as a foundation for discrimination and the
violation of the rights of rural migrants in urban
areas. In security preparations for the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games, officials throughout the country
intensified inspections of migrants' hukou status. The
rights of migrants without legal residency status were
placed at increased risk, especially in urban areas
where employment and social benefits are linked to
hukou status.
Recent hukou reforms have relaxed restrictions
on citizens' choice of permanent place of residence,
but implementation at the local level has been uneven.
Jiangsu and Yunnan provinces and Shenzhen city
implemented major hukou reforms. Fiscal pressure
associated with the provision of services to rising
numbers of hukou holders prompted Zhuhai city to
suspend its hukou application process.
Recommendations
Initiate a program of U.S.-China bilateral
cooperation that revives sister-city and sister-state/
province exchanges as a vehicle for the discussion of
ideas on migrant issues among local officials. Engage
in international dialogue on migration and hukou reform
to develop effective models for China's reform efforts.
Enlist the support of the business community in
encouraging measures to equalize citizens' ability to
change their residence, and to eliminate outstanding
rules that link hukou status to access to public
services like healthcare and education. Recognize as
good corporate citizens U.S. businesses in China with
corporate social responsibility programs that address
migrant issues in meaningful ways (e.g., awareness
campaigns to eliminate discrimination against migrants
and their children, and to reduce migrants'
vulnerability to exploitation).
LIBERTY OF MOVEMENT
Findings
China strictly controlled citizens' movement
between the mainland and the special administrative
regions (SAR) of Hong Kong and Macau. Officials used
the granting and denial of ``Home Return Permits'' to
limit access to the mainland by SAR-based pro-democracy
activists.
The use of extralegal house arrest to control
or punish religious adherents, activists, or rights
defenders deemed to act outside approved parameters
intensified during the past year.
Chinese authorities continued to use arbitrary
restrictions on individual liberty of movement for
retaliatory purposes. Authorities placed the family
members of rights advocates under house arrest in
retaliation for their advocacy activities.
In the past year, authorities confiscated,
revoked, denied entry, or refused to renew or accept
the passport applications of several known dissidents.
Recommendations
Call for China's granting Home Return Permits to Hong
Kong- and Macau-based Chinese advocates.
In press statements, letters, and town hall meetings,
spotlight the issue of arbitrary restrictions on
individual liberty of movement, including limitations
on Yuan Weijing and Zeng Jinyan, who have been under
house arrest because of their spouses' activism.
Urge Chinese officials to consider passport renewals
of dissidents and raise the issue of arbitrary denial
of entry.
STATUS OF WOMEN
Findings
Women continued to encounter gender-based
discrimination, especially with respect to their
exercise of land and property rights, and when
attempting to access benefits associated with their
village hukous (household registration). Chinese women,
especially migrant, impoverished, and ethnic minority
women, continue to be unaware of their legal options
when their rights are violated.
Coercive population planning policies remain
in place in violation of internationally recognized
human rights.
This year marked the first time that a Chinese
court mandated criminal punishment in a sexual
harassment case. A Chinese court this year issued the
first civil protection order in a divorce case
involving domestic violence.
Women have the right to vote and run in
village committee elections, but continue to occupy a
disproportionately low number of seats, Communist Party
posts, government offices, and positions of significant
power.
Reliable statistical information and other
data that are disaggregated by sex and region are
insufficient, posing challenges for Chinese women's
rights advocacy organizations seeking to assess the
effectiveness with which the Communist Party and
government policies designed to help women are
implemented.
Recommendations
Initiate new bilateral exchanges between U.S. and
Chinese law enforcement, judicial officials, and civil
society organizations geared toward expanding
comprehensive social services for women, including
literacy programs that focus on combating illiteracy
among women, longer-term options for sheltering
domestic violence survivors, and psychological
counseling and suicide prevention programs, especially
in rural areas.
Urge Chinese counterparts to support initiatives that
help raise public awareness of women's issues and
rights, especially as they affect migrant women, women
from rural communities, and ethnic minority women.
Fund non-governmental organizations that provide
training to independent Chinese groups that in turn
train legal officials and social service providers in
women's issues and rights, work on domestic violence
and sexual harassment issues, and that strengthen
collection and publication of data on issues affecting
women.
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Findings
The Chinese government lacks a comprehensive
anti-trafficking policy to combat all forms of
trafficking. The government's definition of trafficking
is narrow, and focuses on the abduction and selling of
women and children. The National Plan of Action on
Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-
2012), released in December 2007, neglects male adults,
who are often targeted for forced labor.
The Chinese government has not fulfilled its
counter-trafficking-related international obligations,
and has obstructed the independent operation of non-
governmental and international organizations that offer
assistance on trafficking issues.
Incidents this year involving child labor in
Guangdong province and forced labor in Heilongjiang
reflect legal and administrative weaknesses in China's
anti-trafficking enforcement.
Recommendations
Urge Chinese government officials to sign and ratify
the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, to revise the
government's definition of trafficking and reform its
anti-trafficking laws to align with international
standards, and to abide by its international
obligations with regard to North Korean refugees who
become trafficking victims.
Encourage Chinese embassy officials in the United
States to better protect Chinese citizens who have been
trafficked here by issuing the necessary travel
documents and other documentation to trafficking
victims in a timely manner.
Fund research on trafficking-related issues in China,
including the interplay between population planning
policies, trafficking, and adoption.
Support bilateral exchanges between U.S. and Chinese
law enforcement officials and civil society
organizations that work on trafficking.
NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA
Findings
In the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympic Games, Chinese central and local authorities
stepped up efforts to locate and forcibly repatriate
North Korean refugees hiding in China. Border
surveillance and crackdowns against refugees and the
ethnic Korean citizens of China who harbored them
intensified.
Penalties for harboring North Korean refugees
reportedly were increased, including higher fines.
Searches by public security officials of the homes of
ethnic Koreans living in villages and towns near the
border intensified.
The central government ordered provincial
religious affairs bureaus to investigate religious
communities for signs of involvement with foreign co-
religionists. Churches in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous
Prefecture in Jilin province that were found to have
ties to South Koreans or other foreign nationals were
shut down.
Chinese local authorities near the border with
North Korea continued to deny access to education and
other public goods for the children of North Korean
women married to Chinese citizens. Chinese government
officials contravened guarantees under the PRC
Nationality Law (Article 4) and Compulsory Education
Law (Article 5) by refusing to register the children of
these couples to their father's hukou (household
registration) without proof of the mother's status.
Recommendations
Establish a task force to examine and support the
efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees to gain unfettered access to North Korean
refugees in China, and to recommend a strategy for
creating incentives for China to honor its obligations
under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol by desisting from the
forced repatriation of North Korean refugees, and
terminating the policy of automatically classifying all
undocumented North Korean border crossers as ``illegal
economic migrants.''
Support U.S. Government legal cooperation funding
with China to assist with the drafting of national
refugee regulations that provide formal and transparent
procedures for the review of North Korean claims to
refugee status.
PUBLIC HEALTH
Findings
China's Minister of Health stated for the
first time that all persons have the right to basic
healthcare regardless of age, gender, occupation,
economic status, or place of residence.
The effectiveness of central government
policies to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS remained
limited by Chinese leaders' concerns over uncontrolled
citizen activism and foreign-affiliated non-
governmental organizations.
Discrimination against persons with Hepatitis
B Virus (HBV) remained widespread.
HBV carriers, many with the assistance of
legal advocacy groups, brought employment
discrimination lawsuits under anti-discrimination
provisions in China's new Employment Promotion Law that
took effect this year. The first such case
resulted in a court-ordered settlement and damage
award.
China's first employment discrimination case
involving mental depression resulted in a damage award
and reinstatement of employment.
Recommendations
Call on the Chinese government to ease restrictions
on civil society groups and provide more support to
U.S. organizations that address HIV/AIDS and HBV. A
robust civil society is critical to achieving the
government's goal of prevention and treatment of HIV/
AIDS and HBV.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on
effective implementation of the Employment Promotion
Law and related regulations which prohibit
discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS,
HBV, and other illnesses in hiring and in the
workplace.
ENVIRONMENT
Findings
Experts encountered difficulties accessing
information on pollutants and in charting Beijing's
progress toward achieving its environment-related
Olympic bid commitments.
The structure of incentives at the local level
in China does not encourage action in favor of greater
environmental protection. Penalties for violations
remain low, and enforcement
capacity remains insufficient.
As the central government issues legislative
and regulatory measures aimed at reducing greenhouse
gases, implementation and enforcement at the local
level remains a challenge. According to a study
released in October 2008 by the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, China's emissions of greenhouse gases could
double in the next two decades.
Concerns over environmental degradation and
the government's perceived lack of transparency and
solicitation of public input have sparked protests in
major urban centers. Environmental protesters in urban
areas tended to organize protests through the Internet
and other forms of electronic communication. Urban
protests were relatively peaceful.
Environmental protests in rural areas more
frequently involved violent clashes with public
security officers.
Recommendations
Support technical assistance programs aimed at
enhancing public participation in environmental impact
hearings and improving the ability of environmental
protection bureaus to respond to information requests
from citizens under new open government information
regulations.
When arranging travel to China, request meetings with
officials from the central government to discuss
environmental governance best practices. In those
meetings, emphasize the importance of enhancing the
capacity and power of the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP) by providing it with more staff and
resources and shifting control of local environmental
protection bureaus from local governments to the MEP.
Encourage bilateral and exchange programs to
identify and catalogue the sources and amount of
greenhouse gas emissions. Expand support for the U.S.
EPA-China Environmental Law Initiative and for
bilateral exchange programs relating to environmental
protection and governance.
Call attention to China's practice of criminally
punishing citizens who peacefully disseminate
information relating to environmental hazards and
emergencies. Urge Chinese officials to release
freelance writer Chen Daojun, who was detained on
suspicion of ``inciting splittism'' under Article 103
of the Criminal Law, after he published an article on a
foreign Web site calling for a halt in construction of
a chemical plant near Chengdu, citing environmental
concerns. Also urge Chinese officials to release other
environmental activists including those whose cases are
described in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Encourage legal assistance programs aimed to create
incentives for government and business to build
partnerships that reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
deploying renewable energy and developing next
generation low carbon technologies. Encourage bilateral
cooperation and exchange programs whereby both the
United States and China work to develop a roadmap for
reducing emissions that is acceptable to both developed
and developing countries.
CIVIL SOCIETY
Findings
There were 387,000 registered civil society
organizations (CSOs) in China, including 3,259 legal
aid organizations, by the end of 2007, up from 354,000
in 2006 and 154,000 in 2000.
Chinese authorities strengthened control over
civil society and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), especially in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games.
China has an urgent need for legal reform in
the non-profit sector, including in the management and
registration of NGOs, in the regulation of charitable
activities and donations, and in the provision of
social services to victims of human trafficking, forced
labor, and natural disasters. These needs became more
pronounced following the discovery last spring of
another extensive forced labor network in Guangdong
province, and after the May Sichuan earthquake.
The Corporate Income Tax Law, effective on
January 1, 2008, encourages public and corporate
charitable donations through the provision of tax
benefits. Corporate donations and support for NGO
activities increased during this year.
Recommendations
Facilitate dialogue and consultation among Chinese
officials, NGOs, and rights advocates. Increase
exchanges between NGO leaders from the United States
and China, and bolster program funding to support civil
society development and capacity building in China.
Encourage U.S. companies operating in China to make
in-kind pro bono contributions to the NGO sector (e.g.,
by reserving places for representatives of Chinese NGOs
to participate free of charge in corporate training
programs in China that provide organizational and
management skills).
INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Findings
The direct election of government officials by
non-Party members remained rare, the range of positions
filled through elections narrow in scope and strictly
confined to the local level, and mostly in villages.
Some localities implemented a new pilot
project called ``open recommendations, direct
elections.'' According to this model of local Party
leadership election, the general public participates
during the candidate nomination stage only. All local
Party members--not just officials--may participate in
the final casting of ballots.
Local leaders in Shenzhen proposed making the
city a ``special political zone'' for the trial of
political reforms. The Shenzhen Municipal Party
Committee approved a plan for electoral and governance
reform.
The 17th Party Congress in October 2007 failed
to produce a sustained program of significant political
reform. The Party Congress prepared for a likely
leadership transition in 2012 and promoted ideas such
as ``scientific development'' and ``inner-party
democracy.''
Recommendations
Support research on recent efforts in China's Special
Economic Zones to expand experimentation with
democratic models of public participation in local
policymaking.
Press Chinese officials to revive and expand
engagement with international NGOs specializing in
election monitoring.
COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW
Findings
China continues to deviate in both law and
practice from World Trade Organization (WTO) norms and
other international economic norms. In a dispute
concerning China's legal and administrative measures
affecting imports of auto parts, the WTO Dispute
Resolution Body (DSB) ruled against China, in China's
first legal defeat since its accession to the WTO. In
two WTO dispute cases brought against China by the
United States and Mexico pertaining to Chinese export
and import substitution subsidies prohibited by WTO
rules, China agreed in settlements with both countries
to eliminate the subsidies.
China's new Anti-Monopoly Law, which took
effect in August 2008, may have a significant impact on
the development of commercial rule of law in China, if
it can be transparently and fairly implemented.
China's new National Intellectual Property
Strategy does not fully specify plans to address well-
documented deficiencies in China's institutions for
intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement.
Local governments in China are applying the
rhetoric and tools of IPR protection to traditional
knowledge possessed by China's ethnic minority groups,
but it remains unclear whether China's legal and
administrative institutions provide ways to accomplish
this in a manner that protects the rights of ethnic
minorities.
A food safety crisis in September 2008
involving tainted milk powder illustrated the
ineffectiveness of China's ``Special War'' on product
quality, declared in August 2007. China's food safety
and product quality problems do not stem from a failure
to legislate on the issue, but rather from duplicative
legislation and ineffective implementation.
New Land Registration Measures implement
China's Property Law in part by addressing a deficiency
in China's ``dual registration system'' for land and
buildings, and consolidating the registration of both
land and buildings under a single local government
entity.
Recommendations
Convey to the Chinese government that international
criticism of China continues because, in spite of what
the Chinese government has written into its laws and
regulations, China's leaders in practice have failed to
abide by their commitments, including commitments to
WTO and other international economic norms, to worker
rights, and to the free flow of information on which
further development of the commercial rule of law
depends.
Convey to the Chinese government that rapid
production of new legislation by itself is not a sign
of progress. Rather, new and existing laws and
regulations must be coupled with consistent,
transparent, and effective implementation that meets
international standards and protects individuals'
fundamental rights. Failure to do so risks undermining
even well-intended law, no matter how well-crafted on
paper, and diminishes not only the credibility of
China's stated commitments to reform but also the
integrity of China's legal and regulatory institutions.
Convey to the Chinese government that China's repeated
failure to live up to its international commitments has
seriously damaged its credibility.
Convey to the Chinese government that its
increasingly significant role in the international
community also requires an increasing respect for and
enforcement of its commitments to that community.
Monitoring China's compliance with its commitments to
the international community is not meddling, but rather
is in the interests of all members of the international
community.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Findings
The intimidation and harassment of lawyers by
government and Party officials in China intensified
during the past year. Lawyers were pressured not to
take on politically sensitive cases, including the
representation of Tibetans charged with crimes in
connection with the March protests and parents seeking
compensation for injuries their children sustained from
drinking melamine-tainted milk. The authorities refused
to renew the lawyers' license of renowned human rights
lawyer Teng Biao for his involvement in the effort to
represent the Tibetans and his work on other human
rights cases.
Stronger Communist Party control over the
judiciary was evident during this past year, reflected
by the election as president of the Supreme People's
Court of Wang Shengjun, who rose to power through the
public security and political-legal committee systems.
President Hu Jintao instructed the courts, police, and
procuratorates to uphold the ``three supremes''--the
Party's cause, the people's interests, and the
Constitution and laws.
Recommendations
Support funding for technical assistance programs on
best practices in structuring independent lawyers'
associations and self-governance of the bar.
XINJIANG
Findings
Human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained severe, and
repression increased in the past year. Authorities
tightened repression amid preparations for the 2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games, limited reports of
terrorist and criminal activity, and protests among
ethnic minorities.
The Chinese government used anti-terrorism
campaigns as a pretext for enforcing repressive
security measures, especially among the ethnic Uyghur
population, including wide-scale detentions,
inspections of households, restrictions on Uyghurs'
domestic and international travel, restrictions on
peaceful protest, and increased controls over religious
activity and religious practitioners.
Anti-terrorism and anti-crime campaigns have
resulted in the imprisonment of Uyghurs for peaceful
expressions of dissent, religious practice, and other
non-violent activities.
The government also continued to strengthen
policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and
promoting assimilation. Policies in areas such as
language use, development, and migration have
disadvantaged local ethnic minority residents and have
positioned the XUAR to undergo broad cultural and
demographic shifts in coming decades.
In the past year, the Commission also observed
continuing problems in the XUAR government's treatment
of civil society groups, labor policies, population
planning practices, judicial capacity, and government
policy toward Uyghur refugees and other individuals
returned to China under the sway of China's influence
in other countries.
Recommendations
Support legislation that expands U.S. Government
resources for raising awareness of human rights
conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) and for protecting Uyghur culture.
Raise concern about conditions in the XUAR to Chinese
officials and stress that protecting the rights of XUAR
residents is a crucial step for securing true stability
in the region. Condemn the use of the global war on
terror as a pretext for suppressing human rights. Call
for the release of citizens imprisoned for advocating
ethnic minority rights or for their personal connection
to rights advocates, including: Nurmemet Yasin
(sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison after writing
a short story); Abdulghani Memetemin (sentenced in 2003
to 20 years in prison for providing information on
government repression to an overseas human rights
organization); and Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim (adult
children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in 2006
and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively, for
alleged economic and ``secessionist'' crimes); and
other prisoners mentioned in this report and the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Support funding for non-governmental organizations
that address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable
them to continue to gather information on conditions in
the region and develop programs to help Uyghurs
increase their capacity to defend their rights and
protect their culture, language, and heritage.
Indicate to Chinese officials that Members of the
U.S. Congress and Administration are aware that Chinese
authorities themselves have called for improving
conditions in the XUAR judiciary. Urge officials to
take steps to address problems stemming from the lack
of personnel proficient in ethnic minority languages.
Call on rule of law programs that operate within China
to devote resources to the training of legal personnel
who are able to serve the legal needs of ethnic
minority communities within the XUAR.
TIBET
Findings
As a result of the Chinese government
crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries,
nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave
of Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008,
Chinese government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of
speech, religion, and association has increased to what
may be the highest level since approximately 1983, when
Tibetans were able to set about reviving Tibetan
Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.
The status of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue
deteriorated after the March 2008 protests and may
require remedial measures before the dialogue can
resume focus on its principal objective--resolving the
Tibet issue. China's leadership blamed the Dalai Lama
and ``the Dalai Clique'' for the Tibetan protests and
rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising
Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies that deprive
Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected
under China's Constitution and legal system. The Party
hardened policy toward the Dalai Lama, increased
attacks on the Dalai Lama's legitimacy as a religious
leader, and asserted that he is a criminal bent on
splitting China.
State repression of Tibetan Buddhism has
reached its highest level since the Commission began to
report on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in
2002. Chinese government and Party policy toward
Tibetan Buddhists' practice of their religion played a
central role in stoking frustration that resulted in
the cascade of Tibetan protests that began on March 10,
2008. Reports have identified hundreds of Tibetan
Buddhist monks and nuns whom security officials
detained for participating in the protests, as well as
members of Tibetan secular society who supported them.
Chinese government interference with the
norms of Tibetan Buddhism and unrelenting antagonism
toward the Dalai Lama, one of the religion's foremost
teachers, serves to deepen division and distrust
between Tibetan Buddhists and the government and
Communist Party. The government seeks to use legal
measures to remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
Authorities in one Tibetan autonomous prefecture have
announced unprecedented measures that seek to punish
monks, nuns, religious teachers, and monastic officials
accused of involvement in political protests in the
prefecture.
The Chinese government undermines the
prospects for stability in the Tibetan autonomous areas
of China by implementing economic development and
educational policy in a manner that results in
disadvantages for Tibetans. Weak implementation of the
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law has been a principal
factor exacerbating Tibetan frustration by preventing
Tibetans from using lawful means to protect their
culture, language, and religion.
At no time since Tibetans resumed political
activism in 1987 has the magnitude and severity of
consequences to Tibetans (named and unnamed) who
protested against the Chinese government been as great
as it is now upon the release of the Commission's 2008
Annual Report. Unless Chinese authorities have released
without charge a very high proportion of the Tibetans
reportedly detained as a result of peaceful activity or
expression on or after March 10, 2008, the resulting
surge in the number of Tibetan political prisoners may
prove to be the largest increase in such prisoners that
has occurred under China's current Constitution and
Criminal Law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Convey to the Chinese government the heightened
importance and urgency of moving beyond the setback in
dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives
following the March 2008 protests. A Chinese government
decision to engage the Dalai Lama in substantive
dialogue can result in a durable and mutually
beneficial outcome for Chinese and Tibetans, and
improve the outlook for local and regional security in
the coming decades.
Convey to the Chinese government, in light of the
tragic consequences of the Tibetan protests and the
continuing tension in Tibetan Buddhist institutions
across the Tibetan plateau, the urgent importance of:
reducing the level of state antagonism toward the Dalai
Lama; ceasing aggressive campaigns of ``patriotic
education'' that can result in further stress to local
stability; respecting Tibetan Buddhists' right to
freedom of religion, including to identify and educate
religious teachers in a manner consistent with their
preferences and traditions; and using state powers such
as passing laws and issuing regulations to protect the
religious freedom of Tibetans instead of
remolding Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
Continue to urge the Chinese government to allow
international observers to visit Gedun Choekyi Nyima,
the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized, and
his parents.
In light of the heightened pressure on Tibetans and
their communities following the March protests,
increase funding for U.S. non-governmental
organizations to develop programs that can assist
Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully
protect and develop their culture, language, and
heritage; that can help to improve education, economic,
and health conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in
Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable
benefits without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans
into these areas.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance of
distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and
rioters, honoring the Chinese Constitution's reference
to the freedoms of speech and association, and not
treating peaceful protest as a crime. Request that the
Chinese government provide details about Tibetans
detained or charged with protest-related crimes,
including: each person's name; the charges (if any)
against each person; the name and location of the
prosecuting office (``procuratorate'') and court
handling each case; the availability of legal counsel
to each defendant; and the name of each facility where
such persons are detained or imprisoned. Request that
Chinese authorities allow access by diplomats and other
international observers to the trials of such persons.
Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with
Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are
imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of
human rights. Representative examples include: former
Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-
year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing
posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in
prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life
imprisonment for printing leaflets); reincarnated lama
Bangri Chogtrul (serving a sentence of 18 years
commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting
splittism''); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8
years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a
public festival).
The United States should continue to seek a consulate
in Lhasa in order to provide services to Americans in
Western China. With the closest consulate in Chengdu, a
1,500 mile bus ride from the Tibetan capital of Lhasa,
American travelers are largely without assistance in
Western China. This was recently underscored during
unrest in Lhasa when U.S. citizens could not get out
and American diplomats could not enter the Tibetan
Autonomous Region.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 22 to
1.
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http://
ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on
one prisoner, or on groups of prisoners. Consult a
prisoner's database record for more detailed
information about the prisoner's case, including his or
her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials
have violated, stage in the legal process, and location
of detention or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations traveling to
China to present Chinese officials with lists of
political and religious prisoners compiled from
database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and private
citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city
relationships with China to explore the database, and
to advocate for the release of political and religious
prisoners in China.
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY
The Commission's Annual Report provides information about
Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the context of
specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the
abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party and government's
application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the
Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online
database maintained by the Commission, for its own advocacy and
research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report,
and routinely uses the database to prepare summaries of
information about political and religious prisoners for Members
of Congress and Administration officials.
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-
specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this
Annual Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at http://
ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available
at: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.)
The PPD has served, since its launch in November 2004, as a
unique and powerful resource for governments, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and individuals
who research political and religious imprisonment in China, or
that advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The most important
feature of the PPD is that it is structured as a genuine
database and uses a powerful query engine. Though completely
Web-based, it is not an archive that uses a simple or advanced
search tool, nor is it a library of Web pages and files.
The PPD received approximately 23,000 online requests for
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending July 31,
2008. During the entire period of PPD operation beginning in
late 2004, approximately 36 percent of the requests for
information have originated from government (.gov) Internet
domains, 17 percent from network (.net) domains, 10 percent
from international domains, 8 percent from commercial (.com)
domains, 2 percent from education (.edu) domains, and 2 percent
from organization (.org) domains. Approximately 20 percent of
the requests have been from numerical Internet addresses that
do not provide information about the name of an organization or
the type of domain.
POLITICAL PRISONERS
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on
their areas of expertise. The staff seek to provide objective
analysis of information about individual prisoners, and about
events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of October 31, 2008, the PPD contained information on
4,793 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,088 are cases of political and religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
3,705 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, executed or to have escaped. The Commission
notes that there are considerably more than 1,088 cases of
current political and religious imprisonment in China. The
Commission staff works on an ongoing basis to add cases of
political and religious imprisonment to the PPD.
During 2008, the Commission for the first time published a
series of lists of current religious and political prisoners.
The number of prisoners rose unusually steeply from list to
list, principally as a result of the Commission's ongoing work
creating new case records for the large number of Tibetan
protesters detained from March 2008 onward. On June 26, 2008,
the Commission published a list of 734 current religious and
political prisoners in China.\2\ On August 7, 2008, the
Commission posted on its Web site a list of 920 political
prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or
imprisoned in China. The August 7 PPD list was arranged in
reverse chronological order by date of detention, placing the
most recent detentions first and facilitating a review of
detention and imprisonment in the months preceding the 2008
Beijing Olympic Games.
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their
extensive experience and data on political and religious
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the
database.\3\ The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner
information, as well as on
information provided by NGOs, other groups that specialize in
promoting human rights and opposing political and religious
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.
DATABASE TECHNOLOGY
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment
in China. The first component of an upgrade to the database
will be available for public use before the end of 2008 and
additional upgrade components will be available in 2009. The
upgrade will leverage the capacity of the Commission's
information and technology resources to support research,
reporting, and advocacy by the U.S. Congress and
Administration, and by the public, on behalf of political and
religious prisoners in China.
Upgrading the Database To Leverage Impact
The Commission began work to upgrade the PPD soon after
publication of the 2007 Annual Report. The component of the
upgrade that will be available for public use before the end of
2008 will increase the number of types of information available
from 19 to 40. The upgrade will allow users to query for and
retrieve information such as the names and locations of the
courts that convicted political and religious prisoners, and
the dates of key events in the legal process such as sentencing
and decision upon appeal. The users will be able to download
PPD information as Microsoft Excel or Adobe PDF files more
easily--whether for a single prisoner record, a group of
records that satisfies a user's query, or all of the records
available in the database. [See image, ``CECC PPD: Sample
Appearance of a Record Summary Page After Forthcoming
Upgrade,'' below.]
Many records contain a short summary of the case that
includes basic details about the political or religious
imprisonment and the legal process leading to imprisonment. The
upgrade will increase the length of the short summary about a
prisoner and enable the PPD to provide Web links in a short
summary that can open
reports, articles, and texts of laws that are available on the
Commission's Web site or on other Web sites. Web links in
Commission reports and articles will be able to open a
prisoner's PPD record.
Powerful Queries Provide Useful Responses
Each prisoner's record describes the type of human rights
violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These include violations of the right to peaceful
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and free
expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social
or political change and to criticize government policy or
government officials. Users may search for prisoners by name,
using either the Latin alphabet or Chinese characters. The PPD
allows users to construct queries that include one or more
types of data, including personal information or information
about imprisonment. [See box, ``Tutorial: How to Use the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database,'' below.]
Providing Information to Users While Respecting Their Privacy
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission, and
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tutorial
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
How To Use the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constructing a Query
Detailed PPD query instructions are available on the Commission's Web
site at: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/instructions.php
An illustrated PPD User Guide is available as a PDF download from the
PPD Web site (http://ppd.cecc.gov) by clicking ``Help'' and then
clicking ``User Guide.''
Step One: Select the Fields To Query
Click ``Create a New Query.''
Select the ``fields'' (types of information) to query from the
``Available Fields'' box (on the left) and use the ``>'' button to move
those fields to the ``Selected Fields to Search On'' box (on the
right).
Example: To search for the prisoners and detainees that the Commission
knows or believes are currently imprisoned or detained, select
``detention status'' from the list of available fields and move it to
the list of fields to search.
Step Two: Define Search Criteria
Click ``Next Step.''
For each field that a query will search, a user must specify
the search criteria.
Example: Select the status designations that indicate that a prisoner is
currently detained or imprisoned. To do so, select all of the following
from the ``Value(s)'' list: DET, DET?, DET/bail, HOUSE, and HOUSE?
(Click ``Help'' for information about PPD fields.)
Step Three: Define the Sort Order for Query Results
Click ``Next Step.''
Users may choose not to sort query results, or to choose up to
three fields by which to arrange the query results.
Example: To arrange the query results by prisoner names in alphabetical
order, select ``main (or religious) name'' from the uppermost ``sort
by'' list.
Or, to arrange the query results in reverse chronological order, with
the most recent detentions first, select ``date of detention'' from the
uppermost ``sort by'' list AND tick the ``descending'' box.
Step Four: Review and Save or Run the Query
Click ``Next Step.''
Users that have established a CECC PPD login can review the
query, name the query, and then save and run the query.
Users that have not established a CECC PPD login can review the
query and run the query, but (at present) cannot save the query.
Example 1: Users that have established a CECC PPD login: Review the
summary of Steps 1, 2, and 3. Edit any step by clicking ``EDIT'' for
that step. If desired, type a name such as ``Currently detained,
imprisoned'' into the ``Save As'' box. Then click ``Save'' or ``Save
and Run.''
Example 2: Users without a CECC PPD login: Review the summary of Steps
1, 2, and 3. Edit any step by clicking ``EDIT'' for that step. Then
click ``Run.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Human Rights
Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants
INTRODUCTION
The Tibetan protests, the Sichuan earthquake, the unrest in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and a spate of
bombings and ``mass incidents'' across China in 2008 threatened
to
derail the Chinese leaders' desire for a successful 2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games. As a result, suppressing dissent
and maintaining stability took on an even greater than usual
importance in the run-up to the Olympics. Abuse of police power
was used to this end, and the rights of criminal suspects and
defendants, as well as ordinary citizens, were violated. For
example, in the aftermath of the March 14 protests in the
Tibetan areas of China, Tibetans were subjected to arbitrary
detention and torture, and denied access to counsel; in
Sichuan, grieving parents seeking justice for their children
who were buried under collapsed schools were arbitrarily
detained and beaten by police.\1\ In the XUAR, police
reportedly detained all non-resident Uyghurs in the city of
Korla in mid-August, who were told that they would be confined
through the Olympics.\2\ In order to maintain the appearance of
a ``harmonious'' Olympics, Beijing Public Security Bureau
officers and domestic security protection officers (guobao) put
numerous human rights activists, lawyers, and intellectuals
under illegal house arrest or forced them to leave Beijing for
the duration of the Olympics.\3\ Moreover, Beijing law
enforcement officials arbitrarily detained or sentenced to
reeducation through labor (RTL) several citizens who applied to
hold peaceful protests in the ``protest'' parks.\4\
Despite the heightened use of coercive state power and the
deteriorating human rights situation in China during the past
year, there were several developments with respect to the
rights of criminal suspects and defendants in China during
2008. First, since January 1, 2007, when the Supreme People's
Court resumed its review of death penalty cases to prevent
miscarriages of justice and reduce the number of executions in
China, the Chinese government reported a 30 percent decrease in
the number of death sentences.\5\ Second, the revised Lawyers'
Law, which contains provisions aimed at combating some of the
difficulties criminal defense lawyers face in representing
their clients, took effect on June 1, 2008.\6\ It remains to be
seen how the revised Lawyers' Law will be implemented,
particularly given that several of its provisions conflict with
the Criminal Procedure Law.
ABUSE OF POLICE POWER
Suppression of Dissent
The Chinese leadership's desire to ensure a ``harmonious''
and dissent-free Olympics led to numerous incidents of
persecution, illegal detention, and harassment of peaceful
activists and petitioners by public security and guobao
officers. As security in Beijing intensified in the lead-up to
the Olympics, prominent Beijing-based public intellectual and
activist Liu Xiaobo told Agence France-Presse that the security
crackdown was ``partly to prevent terrorism but even more of
the public security power is being used to silence political
dissent and keep domestic discontent away from the Games.'' \7\
For example, in July, Beijing-based Pastor Zhang Mingxuan,
president of the Chinese House Church Alliance, and his wife
were arbitrarily forced to leave Beijing because, as Zhang
reported, public security officers did not want him to meet
with foreigners during the Olympics.\8\ Public security
officers also forced blogger and activist Zeng Jinyan, the wife
of imprisoned human rights activist Hu Jia, to leave Beijing
with their child on August 7, the day before the start of the
Olympics.\9\ Such arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty
violate Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), as well as China's own laws.\10\
Public Protests
As the Commission reported last year, the abuse of police
power by local government and Party officials to quell public
protests and ``mass incidents'' is a growing problem in
China.\11\ Numerous clashes between public security officers
and civilians during the spring and summer of 2008 prompted the
central government to issue new rules that hold local officials
responsible for mishandling grievances and for arbitrary use of
police power in dealing with complaints and protests.\12\
According to the new rules, officials ``who violate laws and
regulations in using police force to handle mass incidents''
will face punishment.\13\ The largest protest-turned-riot,
involving at least 10,000 people--some reports had 30,000\14\--
occurred in Weng'an, Guizhou province, in late June, and was
triggered by a perceived police coverup of an alleged rape and
murder of a teenage student.\15\ Top local state and Party
officials were dismissed for ``severe malfeasance,'' including
abuse of police power, in dealing with citizens' underlying
grievances that were the root cause of the unrest.\16\ In mid-
July, police and rubber farmers clashed in Menglian county,
Yunnan province, regarding a conflict of economic interests
between the farmers and the management of the Menglian rubber
company.\17\ Top Yunnan officials held local cadres responsible
for the protest-turned-riot, which left two farmers dead and
more than 50 public security officers and farmers injured,
citing poor governance and failure to properly manage the
business dispute.\18\ The Party official responsible for law
enforcement in the area was sacked and other officials were
disciplined.\19\
ARBITRARY DETENTION
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD)
defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be ``arbitrary''
if it meets one of the following criteria: (1) there is clearly
no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an
individual is deprived of his liberty for having exercised
rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR); (3) there is grave non-compliance
with fair trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other
international human rights instruments.\20\
Arbitrary detention, a widespread problem in China, takes
several forms, including extralegal detention such as ``soft
detention'' (ruanjin)--commonly referred to as ``house arrest''
\21\--which is most frequently used against petitioners and
activists and occurs entirely outside the legal system;
detention and imprisonment for the peaceful expression of civil
and political rights; and administrative detention for which
criminal procedure protections are not available. The Chinese
authorities continue combating another form of arbitrary
detention the Commission has reported on in previous years,
illegal extended detention. Illegal extended detention occurs
when suspects and defendants are detained beyond the maximum
time periods for detention at a given stage in the criminal
process set forth in China's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). The
Supreme People's Procuratorate work report submitted to the
National People's Congress in March noted that in 2003 there
were 24,921 cases of illegal extended detention and only 85
such cases in 2007.\22\
Extralegal Detention
In contravention of Chinese law and the prohibitions
against arbitrary detention contained in the UDHR and the
ICCPR, Chinese authorities subjected Chinese citizens to at
least three forms of extralegal detention during the past year:
(1) arbitrary house arrest and control, (2) detention in
``black jails,'' and (3) shuanggui (often translated as
``double regulation'' or ``double designation''), a form of
detention used on Party members.\23\
arbitrary house arrest and control
Many rights defense (weiquan) activists, lawyers, and their
spouses were subjected to arbitrary house arrest, or ``soft
detention'' (ruanjin,) during the past year.\24\ Extralegal
house arrest is frequently accompanied by tight surveillance
and monitoring by public security or guobao officers, or hired
``guards.'' \25\ House arrest was applied unevenly during the
past year; in some cases it meant total confinement in one's
home and in other cases the ``controlled person'' could leave
his or her home to run errands or go to work, but was strictly
surveilled.\26\ Hu Jia's wife, blogger and activist Zeng
Jinyan, has been under constant surveillance since Hu Jia's
detention on December 27, 2007.\27\ Yuan Weijing, wife of
imprisoned legal advocate and rights defender Chen Guangcheng,
along with the couple's young daughter, has been subjected to
extralegal house arrest for three years. In early July, she
reported that there were more people monitoring her than
usual--about 40 people divided into two shifts.\28\ Public
security officers and private ``guards,'' aided by surveillance
cameras, continue to monitor Shanghai-based rights lawyer Zheng
Enchong around the clock.\29\ In early July, Zheng was
reportedly placed under total home confinement and not
permitted to leave his apartment.\30\
black jails
``Black jails'' are illegal detention centers primarily
used to hold petitioners who have gone to Beijing to exercise
their right under Chinese law to petition against injustices
committed by local officials. These secret jails exist entirely
outside the legal system.\31\ Detainees in black jails are
deprived of their right to be free from arbitrary deprivation
of personal liberty guaranteed under China's Constitution, the
UDHR, and the ICCPR.\32\
Black jails in Beijing are run by the Beijing liaison
offices of local governments. Petitioners are held illegally
for days or even months, without adequate food and healthcare,
and are frequently beaten by hired ``guards.'' \33\ According
to the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, these black jails operate ``under the eyes of the
Beijing police and often with their cooperation.'' \34\ The
petitioners are detained until they are ``escorted'' back to
their hometowns. Local officials in turn have sent many of the
forcibly returned petitioners to local black jails.\35\ Amnesty
International reports that the roundups and detention of
petitioners in Beijing is reminiscent of the ``custody and
repatriation'' system--``the abolition of which in 2003 was
presented by the authorities as a major human rights
improvement.'' \36\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shuanggui_Extralegal Detention of Party Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Shuanggui'' (often translated as ``double regulation'' or ``double
designation''), refers to the process of summoning a target of
investigation to appear at a designated place at a designated time.\37\
It is a form of extralegal detention used for investigating Communist
Party members.\38\ Shuanggui was introduced in 1994 and is used by
Communist Party commissions for discipline inspection primarily against
officials suspected of corruption.\39\ Shuanggui not only contravenes
the right to be free from arbitrary detention guaranteed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, but also violates Chinese law.\40\
Restrictions on personal liberty can only be authorized pursuant to
legislation passed by the National People's Congress or its Standing
Committee, but shuanggui is supported only by Party documents.\41\
Shuanggui targets are generally held incommunicado and the protections
for criminal suspects contained in the Criminal Procedure Law do not
apply.\42\
With shuanggui, the Party is able to control corruption
investigations. The Party can decide which cases and what evidence gets
transferred to the procuratorate, and which cases are handled
internally as a matter of Party discipline.\43\ As Flora Sapio, a
Chinese criminal law and procedure expert, observed: ``Were the party
to relinquish its dominance over the policing of corrupt officials, it
would lose an important component of its legitimacy. By dictating who
should be punished and who should not, the Party can avoid the shame
that would be caused by a thorough investigation on corruption.'' \44\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shuanggui_Extralegal Detention of Party Members--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several high-ranking officials were subjected to shuanggui during
2008. Wang Yi, a former top official at the China Development Bank and
former vice-chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission,
China's stock regulator, was detained by Party discipline inspection
officials on corruption charges.\45\ A high-ranking official at the
Ministry of Commerce, Guo Jingyi, was placed under shuanggui for
suspected bribery.\46\ In October 2008, Huang Songyou, a vice president
of the Supreme People's Court, was detained by Party officials in
connection with a corruption scandal.\47\ In April, Zeng Jinchun, a
former top-ranking Party secretary for the discipline inspection
commission in Chenzhou, Hunan province, was put on trial for
corruption. His case highlighted another problematic aspect of the
shuanggui system--the virtually unchecked power of high-ranking
discipline inspection officials. According to Caijing Magazine, Zeng
had used shuanggui as a ``potent weapon . . . to make money, maintain
control, and silenc[e] opponents.'' \48\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Political Crimes
During the past year, the Chinese government continued to
harass, detain, and imprison citizens for the peaceful exercise
of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Chinese
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For
example, on April 3, human rights defender Hu Jia was convicted
of ``inciting subversion of state power'' and sentenced to
three years and six months' imprisonment for expressing
dissenting views in essays posted on the Internet and in
interviews with foreign media.\49\ [See Section II--Freedom of
Expression.] The number of arrests for crimes of ``endangering
state security,'' which replaced ``counterrevolutionary''
crimes in the 1997 Criminal Law, continues to rise.\50\
Research based on official Chinese statistics conducted by the
Dui Hua Foundation found that arrests for ``endangering state
security'' crimes doubled in 2006 over 2005, and that in 2007
the number of such arrests--742--was the highest since
1999.\51\
The Chinese government continues to hold in prison
individuals who were sentenced for crimes of
``counterrevolution'' that were removed from the Criminal Law
in 1997 and for charges relating to the 1989 democracy
protests. John Kamm of the Dui Hua Foundation estimates that
more than 150 ``counterrevolutionaries'' remain in prison in
China.\52\ As of 2004, at least 130 people were still serving
sentences related to the 1989 democracy protests, according to
Human Rights Watch.\53\ Hu Shigen, who served 16 years in
prison for ``counterrevolutionary'' crimes relating to his role
in establishing the China Freedom and Democracy Party and an
independent labor union, was released in August.\54\
Reeducation Through Labor
The reeducation through labor (RTL) system operates outside
of the judicial system and the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL); it
is an administrative measure that enables Chinese law
enforcement officials to detain Chinese citizens for up to four
years.\55\ As Professor Jerome Cohen explained recently, RTL
enables the police to ``punish anyone for virtually anything,''
without the accused having the benefit of ``the modest
protections'' of the CPL.\56\ According to Chinese government
statistics, more than 500,000 individuals were serving
sentences in 310 RTL centers in 2005.\57\ The list of offenses
punishable by RTL is vaguely defined, and RTL is frequently
used against petitioners, activists, house church leaders,
Falun Gong adherents, and others deemed to be
``troublemakers.'' \58\ The Chinese authorities used RTL during
this past year to punish and silence dissent. For example,
Chinese officials in Heilongjiang sentenced Liu Jie, a
petitioners' rights activist, to 18 months of RTL in November
2007 after she released a public letter signed by 12,150
petitioners to the 17th Party Congress calling for political
and legal reforms.\59\ Tianjin-based activist Zheng Mingfang
was reportedly sentenced to two years of RTL in April 2008 for
collecting signatures for a petition calling for the release of
Hu Jia.\60\ In June 2008, officials in Sichuan detained and
later sentenced Liu Shaokun, a middle school teacher, to one
year of reeducation through labor after he posted photos of
collapsed schools online and criticized their construction in a
media interview.\61\
RTL has long been criticized by the international community
as contravening rights set forth in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as well as China's own laws.\62\ Activists and
scholars within China continue to call for the abolition of
RTL. In November 2007, 69 renowned lawyers, legal scholars, and
public intellectuals submitted a proposal to the National
People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) requesting that it
conduct a constitutional review of the RTL system.\63\ In July
2008, over 15,000 Chinese citizens, led by numerous legal
scholars and lawyers, signed a petition to abolish RTL and
circulated a citizens' draft proposal (gongmin jianyigao) of a
``Law on the Correction of Unlawful Acts'' (weifa xingwei
jiaozhi fa) to replace RTL.\64\
TORTURE AND ABUSE IN CUSTODY
Torture is illegal in China, and although China's leaders
have made some efforts to curb the use of torture by law
enforcement officials, reports of widespread torture and abuse
continue.\65\ Manfred Nowak, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture, noted in 2006 that China lacked necessary procedural
safeguards to make the prohibition on torture effective: these
include, among others, the presumption of innocence, the right
to remain silent, the right of habeas corpus, and timely access
to counsel.\66\ During this past year, human rights lawyers and
activists, Falun Gong adherents, and Tibetans detained in the
wake of the March protests were among those subjected to
torture and abuse in custody.\67\ The Uyghur Human Rights
Project, a U.S.-based non-governmental organization, reported
that torture and forced confessions of Uyghurs at the hands of
law enforcement officials is commonplace.\68\ Legal activist
and writer Yang Maodong (also known as Guo Feixiong),\69\ has
reportedly been subjected repeatedly to shocks from electric
batons, and according to Yang's wife, has five or six scars on
his body that she called ``traces of torture.'' \70\ In late
September 2007, after sending a detailed letter to the U.S.
Congress about the ``human rights disaster'' in China while
serving a three-year sentence for ``inciting subversion'' at
his home under residential surveillance, rights lawyer Gao
Zhisheng disappeared.\71\ During his two-month disappearance,
he was reportedly struck repeatedly with electric batons.\72\
According to the Falun Dafa Information Center, since the
beginning of 2008 at least nine Falun Gong adherents in Beijing
have died in police custody.\73\ In April, Falun Gong adherent
and popular Beijing-based folk singer Yu Zhou died in police
custody within two weeks of being detained on his way home from
a concert.\74\ [See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Falun
Gong.] There have been reports of torture of Tibetan detainees
in the aftermath of the March protests in the Tibetan areas of
China. TibetInfoNet reported, for example, that four Labrang
Tashikhyil Monastery monks were beaten so badly in detention
that they were unable to walk unaided.\75\ Deaths resulting
from torture during interrogations have also been reported.\76\
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
Most Chinese defendants confront the criminal process and
trial without the assistance of an attorney, despite the right
to legal assistance provided under Article 14(3)(d) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\77\ The
public security bureaus and procuratorates must notify criminal
defendants of their right to apply for legal aid, and lawyers
are required to do some pro bono work each year, but because of
the intimidation lawyers routinely face in handling criminal
cases, many lawyers shy away from taking them.\78\ An estimated
70 percent of criminal cases proceed without a defense lawyer's
involvement.\79\ When lawyers do defend criminal cases, they
face substantial obstacles in preparing a defense.\80\ The
``three difficulties'' that the Commission reported on last
year--gaining access to detained clients, reviewing the
prosecutors' case files, and collecting evidence--are endemic
and undermine lawyers' ability to effectively defend their
clients.\81\ Article 306 of the Criminal Law, the lawyer-
perjury statute, makes defense lawyers vulnerable to
prosecution for falsifying or tampering with evidence.\82\ If a
defendant recants an earlier statement, for example, the lawyer
may be detained for suborning perjury.\83\ Prosecutors have
used Article 306 to threaten and intimidate defense lawyers,
particularly in sensitive cases.\84\ According to Human Rights
Watch, lawyers ``may decide to defend clients less forcefully
than they otherwise would for fear of displeasing the
prosecution.'' \85\
An important development for criminal suspects and
defendants and defense lawyers during this past year was the
implementation of the revised Lawyers' Law on June 1, which
contains several provisions that address the ``three
difficulties.'' \86\ Most significantly, the revised Lawyers'
Law provides that lawyers have an unequivocal right (you quan)
to meet with detained suspects and defendants.\87\ However,
this and several other revisions to the Lawyers' Law are
inconsistent with the Criminal Procedure Law.\88\ There has
been much commentary in the Chinese media and on law-related
Web sites regarding the conflicts between the two laws, and
concern that the revised Lawyers' Law will not be implemented
effectively.\89\ Indeed, there were reports after the revised
Lawyers' Law took effect of defense lawyers nonetheless being
denied access to their clients.\90\ In mid-August, the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC), which is
authorized to interpret laws, weighed in. In a reply (dafu) to
a request by a member of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference that the NPC unify the content of the
two laws, the NPCSC stated that the more recent law (i.e., the
Lawyers' Law) takes precedence over the earlier law, and thus
the revised Lawyers' Law should be followed if there are
conflicts with the CPL.\91\
FAIRNESS OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
Extremely high conviction rates in criminal cases are due
in part to the lack of fairness of criminal trials, and the
``three difficulties'' that hinder criminal defense lawyers'
ability to defend their clients, discussed above.\92\ Public
security officers often deny suspects and defendants access to
counsel and use lengthy pre-trial detention to extract
confessions under duress or torture.\93\ They also use
detention and intimidation to obtain statements from
``witnesses.'' \94\
There is a strong presumption of guilt in criminal cases,
and a guilty verdict is a virtual certainty in politically
sensitive cases.\95\ The procedural rights of political
dissidents and other targeted groups, such as Falun Gong
adherents, house church pastors, and ethnic minority activists,
are frequently violated.\96\ Hu Jia was subjected to torture
and to almost daily interrogations lasting from 6 to 14 hours
at a time during his first month of detention.\97\ Public
security officers used ``abduction, detention, and threats'' to
coerce Hu's friends to become ``witnesses.'' \98\ As is the
case in the overwhelming majority of trials in China, no
witnesses appeared in court during Hu's trial, so the defense
attorneys had no opportunity to cross-examine them about their
statements.\99\
The little that is known about the trials of 30 Tibetans in
Lhasa city in April suggests that they were not fair. Human
Rights Watch reported that in mid-March, the Tibet Autonomous
Region Communist Party secretary urged that there be ``quick
arrests, quick hearings, and quick sentencings'' of those
involved in the protests.\100\ Xinhua reported on April 29 that
the sentences, ranging from three years to life imprisonment,
were pronounced publicly.\101\ According to Human Rights Watch,
the actual trials were conducted in secret earlier in
April.\102\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders stated that most of
the defendants were reportedly tortured and forced to confess,
and that the families of the defendants reportedly were too
afraid to contact the rights defense lawyers from Beijing and
elsewhere who had offered to assist.\103\
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Commission reported last year about the initial results
of the Supreme People's Court (SPC) reassertion of its legal
authority to review all death penalty cases in order to limit
the use of the death penalty to only the most serious criminal
cases and to prevent miscarriages of justice.\104\ During 2007,
the first year in which the SPC review of death penalty
sentences was restored, 30 percent fewer death sentences were
meted out, compared with the number of death sentences in
2006.\105\ The SPC overturned 15 percent of all death sentences
handed down by lower courts in 2007 and the first half of
2008.\106\ Gao Jinghong, presiding judge of the SPC's Third
Criminal Law Court, stated that the majority of the death
sentences that were overturned in 2008 were due to insufficient
evidence or because the death sentence was inappropriate.\107\
Outgoing SPC President Xiao Yang reported at the National
People's Congress session in March: ``The SPC has been working
to
ensure that the capital punishment only applies to the very few
number of felons who committed extremely serious, atrocious
crimes that lead to grave social consequences.'' \108\ As a
result of the SPC reasserting its review authority, lower
courts have reportedly become more cautious in handing out
death sentences.\109\ Moreover, the SPC stated that 2007 was
the first year that the number of death sentences with a two-
year suspension (i.e., if no crime is committed during the
first two years of imprisonment, the death sentence is reduced
to life imprisonment) exceeded the number of death sentences to
be carried out immediately.\110\
China's Criminal Law includes 68 capital offenses, many of
which are for non-violent crimes such as drug trafficking,
official corruption, and leaking state secrets abroad.\111\ The
government does not publish official statistics on the number
of executions, and this figure remains a state secret.\112\
Amnesty International reported in April that of the countries
that have capital punishment, China was the leader with at
least 470 executions, but indicated that this figure serves as
``an absolute minimum'' because the number was based on public
reports.\113\ The Dui Hua Foundation estimates that 5,000
people were executed in 2007.\114\
Wang Shengjun, the new president of the SPC, created a
controversy during his first few months in office when he
stated that one of the factors that should be weighed in
deciding whether a convicted defendant should be sentenced to
death is popular will.\115\ His statement does not appear to
have affected the progress of the death penalty procedural
reforms.
Worker Rights
INTRODUCTION
Workers in China still are not guaranteed either in law or
in practice full worker rights in accordance with international
standards. China's laws, regulations, and governing practices
continue to deny workers fundamental rights, including, but not
limited to, the right to organize into independent unions.\1\
Labor disputes and protests became increasingly intense and
well-organized across China during 2008. Management's failure
to pay wage arrears, overtime, severance pay, or social
security contributions, were the most common causes. Social and
economic changes, weak legislative frameworks, and ineffective
or selective enforcement continue to engender abuses ranging
from forced labor and child labor, to violations of health and
safety standards, wage arrearages, and loss of job benefits.
Residency restrictions continue to present hardships for
workers who migrate for jobs in urban areas. Tight controls
over civil society organizations hinder the ability of citizen
groups to champion for worker rights.
Significant obstacles--and risks--exist for workers in
China who attempt to protect their rights.\2\ Workers who try
to establish independent associations or organize
demonstrations continue to risk arrest and imprisonment.\3\
Labor rights activist Hu Shigen (Hu Shenglun), was released
from Beijing No. 2 prison on August 26, 2008, having served
most of a 20-year sentence he received in 1994 for ``organizing
and leading a counterrevolutionary group'' and ``engaging in
counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement'' after he
helped to establish the China Freedom and Democracy Party and
the China Free Trade Union Preparatory Committee.\4\ As
detailed in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, other
independent labor organizers continue to serve long jail terms.
Several high profile incidents during 2008 underscored the
inhumane conditions and weak protections under which many
Chinese continue to work. The discovery in Dongguan of yet
another extensive forced labor network, less than a year after
the discovery in 2007 of a massive network in Shanxi province,
showed the difficulties even China's paramount leaders face in
enforcing the most basic protections for workers against
China's powerfully embedded labor trafficking networks.\5\ As
detailed below [see box titled Forced Labor], it also revealed
local officials' stunning defiance of Premier Wen's and
President Hu's instructions last year to eradicate forced labor
networks. Article 244 of the PRC Criminal Law makes forced
labor a crime.\6\ Events in 2008 showed the deterrent value of
this provision to be woefully inadequate. Some Chinese
companies, including firms who manufactured products for the
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, reportedly relied on
subcontractors who employed children aged 12 to 13 years.\7\
China's legislative and regulatory landscape for worker
rights changed during 2008, as three major national labor-
related laws outlining a number of legal protections for
workers took effect. The new PRC Labor Contract Law and new PRC
Employment Promotion Law took effect on January 1, 2008, and
the new PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law took
effect on May 1, 2008.\8\
Some prominent labor advocates suggest that, with the new
Labor Contract Law now in effect, China's new legislative
framework ``is more than sufficient for the development of
collective bargaining in China.'' \9\ The biggest obstacle,
they claim, ``is not the lack of legislation, but the inability
of the official trade union to act as a proper representative
trade union.'' \10\ The law entrenches the role of the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in contract
negotiations.\11\ But the Labor Contract Law does not include
provisions to guarantee equal bargaining power between workers
and employers. The ACFTU is China's only legal trade union, and
it is required by the Trade Union Law to ``uphold the
leadership of the Communist Party.'' \12\ The vast majority of
``trade unions'' in enterprises effectively remain under the de
facto control of management.\13\
At the same time, some experts caution against dismissing
enterprise trade unions set up by the ACFTU as hollow shells. A
study by Anita Chan, an expert on Chinese labor issues at the
Australian National University, found ``workers who take an
active interest in their store union, and at least in one case,
an elected rank and file trade union chair using the trade
union platform to actively defend workers' interests.'' \14\
When given the space to struggle against management
through existing legal and institutional structures, if
competent and committed leadership emerges, [Chinese
workers] are willing to rally around it.\15\
At the same time, companies, schools, and other employers--
including some government offices--began taking action to evade
the Labor Contract Law's provisions even before the law took
effect on January 1, 2008, and afterwards.\16\ Only in some
isolated cases have local courts been effective in invalidating
corporate policies and procedures found to contravene the new
laws in ways that
infringe on worker rights.\17\ Model contracts produced by
local
governments, and purportedly designed to comply with the new
legislative framework, have been found by researchers and labor
advocates to contain both restrictions on industrial action and
provisions that contradict newly legislated protections for
workers.\18\ The new legislative framework's imprecision limits
some provisions that are potentially beneficial to workers. The
Implementing Regulations for the PRC Labor Contract Law, which
were issued and became effective on September 18, 2008, may
address only some of these problems.\19\
Inflation, shortages of skilled labor in particular
locales,\20\ yuan appreciation, rising taxes, increasingly
stringent environmental regulations, rising materials costs,
and sunsetting government subsidies were among the many factors
besides the new labor legislation that appeared to play
significant roles in raising operating costs that, in turn,
have prompted some foreign businesses to reevaluate operations
in China during 2008.\21\ New labor legislation makes ongoing
non-compliance with requirements governing benefits, wages, and
working conditions more costly. For employers with longstanding
non-compliant practices, moving from general non-compliance to
general compliance may prove to be an expensive proposition.
But employers who have been generally compliant are not
expected to experience dramatic cost increases as a result of
the new legislative framework.\22\ According to the Hong Kong-
based IHLO,\23\ one result of the new legislative framework, if
implemented,
will not necessarily be the automatic improvement of
workers rights and living conditions but perhaps the
shift in industrial relations to a situation where
employers no longer routinely flout the laws--as is
common now--but instead seek to legally circumvent the
new law. Thus we will see rising numbers of companies
employing part time workers with working hours just
under the amount needed for them to be covered by the
new law, or employers ensuring the bare minimum are
contained in the new contracts--even if all workers get
a copy.\24\
Following the opening of trade union branches in many Wal-
Mart stores in China in 2006,\25\ Wal-Mart's Shenyang store
signed a collective contract with the local trade union in July
2008.\26\ (Shenyang city issued Regulations on Collective
Contracts in August 2007.\27\) Wal-Mart's collective contract
sets employees' wages above the legal minimum, guarantees two
years of annual pay
increases, and provides for overtime, paid vacations, and
social security contributions.\28\ Shortly after concluding the
Shenyang collective contract, Wal-Mart concluded collective
contracts in several other of its stores in China, and
indicated its intention to conclude collective labor contracts
at all of its stores in China during 2008.\29\ ACFTU officials
reportedly have stated that 80 percent of the top 500 global
corporations operating in China would have unions by the end of
September 2008.\30\ In July 2008, Nike, Adidas, Speedo, and
Umbro among others formed a working group in cooperation with
NGOs and trade unions to promote trade unionism and collective
bargaining in China.\31\ In a posting dated July 2008, the Web
site of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions acknowledged
collective bargaining as an internationally recognized norm for
labor contracting.\32\
NATIONAL LEVEL LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Labor Contract Law
The PRC's new Labor Contract Law took effect on January 1,
2008.\33\ In addition to soliciting public comments on multiple
draft versions of the law, the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security also sought technical assistance from U.S. experts in
drafting the law. In 2005 and 2006, a U.S. Department of Labor-
funded technical cooperation project sponsored a series of
workshops and a study tour for Chinese officials who requested
to be briefed on U.S. best practices in employment
relationships, termination of contracts, part-time employment,
regulation of labor recruitment, U.S. Wage and Hour
regulations, the means of protecting worker rights, the means
of enhancing compliance, and training for investigations.\34\
The Labor Contract Law governs the contractual relationship
between workers and employers from enterprises, individual
economic organizations, and private non-enterprise units.\35\
The law expands requirements in the PRC's 1994 Labor Law that
mandate the signing of labor contracts.\36\ It requires workers
and employers to establish a written contract in order to begin
a labor relation\37\ and creates the presumption of an open-
ended contract if the parties have not concluded a written
contract within one year from the start of employment.\38\ The
law also includes provisions that allow certain workers with
existing fixed-term contracts to transition to open-ended
employment.\39\
The law mandates that contracts specify matters including
working hours, compensation, social insurance, and protections
against occupational hazards. In addition, the employer and
worker may add contractual provisions for probationary periods,
training, supplementary benefits, and insurance.\40\ The basic
provisions on establishing contracts accompany a series of
other stipulations within the law that attempt to regularize
the status of workers employed through staffing agencies;
strengthen protections in the event of job dismissals; and
establish a framework for penalizing non-compliance with the
law.\41\
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law
The PRC's new Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law
took effect on May 1, 2008. During the drafting process, a
vice-chair of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress described
the purpose of the law as ``strengthening mediation and
improving arbitration so as to help fairly solve labor disputes
without going to court and thus safeguard employee's legitimate
rights and promote social harmony'' [emphasis added].\42\ As
compared with the system of handling labor disputes provided
for in the 1993 Regulations on the Handling of Labor Disputes
in Enterprises and the 1994 Labor Law, the new law appears to
expand the range of cases covered by the legal system.\43\
Compared with the previous system, the framework set forth
under the new law expands channels available for mediation,\44\
makes arbitration committee rulings in routine cases legally
binding,\45\ modifies the burden of production in favor of
employees,\46\ revises choice of venue provisions in favor of
employees by prioritizing the location where a labor contract
is performed over the employer's location as the venue for
dispute resolution,\47\ abolishes the arbitration application
fee,\48\ and extends the time limit for filing an arbitration
case from 60 days to one year from the date of the alleged
infringement while shortening the period of arbitration.\49\
When an arbitration committee does not take a case, complaining
parties retain the right to file a civil suit.\50\ Arbitration
committees have found themselves suddenly short-staffed in the
wake of a significant spike in the number of labor dispute
cases filed following implementation of this law and the Labor
Contract Law.\51\
Employment Promotion Law
In August 2007, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress adopted an Employment Promotion Law,
effective January 1, 2008, that stipulates measures relating to
the promotion of employment growth and equal access to
employment.\52\ In addition to containing provisions aimed at
prohibiting discrimination based on factors including
ethnicity, race, sex, and religious belief,\53\ the law
addresses the equal right to work for women and ethnic
minorities;\54\ specifies disabled people's right to work;\55\
stipulates that rural workers' access to work should ``be equal
to'' urban workers;\56\ and forbids employers from refusing to
hire carriers of infectious diseases.\57\ The law also allows
workers to initiate lawsuits in the event of
discrimination.\58\ [See Section II--Status of Women for more
information.]
Some aspects of the law are potentially problematic. One
article provides that ``the state encourages workers to develop
correct job selection concepts.'' \59\ Another provision carves
out a role for Communist Party-controlled organizations like
the Communist Youth League to aid in implementation of the
law,\60\ which may dampen the role of civil society groups that
promote implementation in ways that challenge Party policy.
Potentially beneficial safeguards also face barriers due to a
lack of clearly defined terms. A provision to promote the
employment of workers with ``employment hardship,'' for
example, defines this category of workers in general terms but
leaves precise details to local authorities, introducing the
possibility of uneven protections that reduce the law's overall
impact.\61\ In addition, the law specifies the establishment of
an unemployment insurance system, but provides no extensive
details on implementation.\62\
The Employment Promotion Law's anti-discrimination
provisions received particular attention during 2008. Under the
law, ``employers can not refuse employment to prospective
employees because they have or carry a communicable disease.''
\63\ On January 3--just two days after the law took effect--a
court in Dongguan, Guangdong province, announced a court-
mediated settlement in the first Hepatitis B Virus (HBV)
discrimination case heard in the province. Under the
settlement, the Hong Kong-owned Vtech corporation was ordered
to pay 24,000 yuan (US$3,494) to a job applicant it had refused
to hire on the grounds that he carried HBV.\64\ It is worth
noting that the plaintiff reportedly sought help during this
process from an online HBV support group.\65\ Such civil
society organizations are playing an increasingly important
role in China today, even as official crackdown places many of
them, their founders, personnel, and clients at risk of
harassment, arrest, detention, or imprisonment. [See Section
II--Public Health and Section III--Civil Society.]
On April 2, 2008, another court-mediated civil suit
resulted in compensation awarded to an individual in Shanghai
whose employment offer was rescinded due to his HBV status.\66\
The Shanghai Public Health Bureau reportedly eliminated routine
HBV testing for prospective employees the same day.\67\ On June
18, 2008, a labor dispute arbitration committee (LDAC) ruled on
China's first employment discrimination case involving mental
depression.\68\ The case involved an employee dismissed from
IBM's Shanghai subsidiary, and resulted in a monetary award and
reinstatement of employment. The Pudong LDAC ruled according to
provisions of the Labor Contract Law and Employment Promotion
Law.
LOCAL-LEVEL LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
A number of localities in China announced initiatives in
the areas of collective contracting, labor dispute settlement,
and oversight of the business sector during 2008. Guangdong
province, Hebei province, Shenzhen city, and Hangzhou city
provide representative examples.\69\
Guangdong
As the rest of the country waited for the State Council to
release for public comment its much debated Draft Implementing
Regulations for the Labor Contract Law, the Guangdong
provincial High People's Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration
Commission on June 23, 2008, jointly issued a Guiding Opinion
on Implementing the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law
and Labor Contract Law.\70\ The Guiding Opinion includes
provisions aimed at unifying judicial and arbitral standards
and fostering joint judicial and arbitral announcements in
order to reduce inconsistencies between arbitration panels and
courts, thereby allowing lawyers and litigants to better
anticipate both timing and substance of rulings, thereby
increasing the likelihood of informal settlement and reduced
litigation and arbitration caseloads,\71\ which spiked in
Guangdong during 2008.\72\ A number of scholars and
practitioners have challenged the legal authority of the
Guangdong Guiding Opinion to clarify national law. Guangzhou
authorities concede that the Guiding Opinion is for
``reference'' only.\73\
Hebei
China's first provincial-level legislation on collective
consultations, Hebei province's Regulations on Enterprise
Collective Consultations between Labor and Management took
effect on January 1, 2008.\74\ The Hebei Regulations stipulate
that negotiations between labor and management ``should be open
and equal, seek consensus, and assign equal weight to the
interests of the enterprise and the workers.'' \75\ The
Regulations provide for democratic election of workers'
representatives in the absence of a union, but, in the presence
of a union, workers' representatives are to be recommended by
the union, and reviewed by the workers' congress.\76\
Provisions stipulate representation in equal numbers for labor
and management during negotiations, and a limit on the number
of outside parties.\77\
The Regulations address methods and times of wage payment,
subsidies and allowances, holidays, sick leave and maternity
leave, and length and conditions of renewal of the collective
labor contract. The Regulations specify that wages under the
collective contract must be at least the local minimum wage,
and that wages under individual workers' contracts must be at
least that specified in the collective contract. While the
Regulations specify that negotiations should be ``legal open
and on equal terms,'' \78\ they do not legally require the All
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) to negotiate
collectively.\79\
Shenzhen
Shenzhen city issued Implementing Regulations for the Trade
Union Law in July 2008. Instead of ``collective
consultations,'' the term used in most labor legislation across
China,\80\ the Shenzhen Regulations use the term ``collective
bargaining.'' \81\ The Regulations emphasize the role of the
trade union in representing workers in negotiations with
management.\82\ In a move that could lessen trade union
dependence on enterprises, the Regulations require the
municipal branch of the trade union to provide local trade
union officials with a monthly subsidy.\83\ Other provisions in
the Shenzhen Regulations place collective bargaining at the
center of trade union responsibilities.\84\ The ``supervision''
of grassroots unions by higher level unions remains, however,
and mechanisms whereby lower level officials can hold higher
level union officials to account are lacking.\85\
Shenzhen also issued a new Regulation on the Promotion of
Harmonious Labor Relations, due to take effect in November
2008.\86\ Legislation from Singapore, Hong Kong, the United
States, and Europe were referred to as models during drafting,
and a draft regulation was produced through consultation and
collaboration among city labor officials, enterprise managers,
and employee representatives. Submitted for public comment on
June 2, 2008, the draft was
published in all major local newspapers and received nationwide
attention.\87\ In particular, the Shenzhen draft regulations
brought into public discussion the sensitive subject of strike
action, prompting one local official openly to speculate that
the right to strike in China--a right not contained in China's
Constitution--would be ``only one step away.'' \88\ Such
optimism was reported openly in the official media, as was the
characterization of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions'
inability to organize workers as ``an embarrassing joke.'' \89\
The Regulation addresses the mediation of labor
disputes\90\ and includes a chapter on collective
consultation.\91\ For strikes or stoppages that interrupt the
provision of essential public services, place public safety or
the economy at risk, the Shenzhen Regulation provides for
``return-to-work orders.'' \92\ Under this provision, local
government officials may order a 30-day ``cooling off'' period
during which the strike or stoppage is suspended and work
resumes with both sides--management and labor--ordered to
exercise restraint with respect to any behavior that could
aggravate the--ongoing--dispute. At the same time, labor
bureaus, trade unions, and management are required to work
toward formal resolution of the
dispute. Because the draft includes no provisions to limit the
government's use of ``return-to-work orders,'' it leaves open
the possibility that the orders may be abused by labor
officials to suppress strikes and other worker actions
summarily.
The Shenzhen Regulation establishes a ``labor relations
credit rating system.'' \93\ Under this provision, local labor
bureaus collect information on specific worker rights
violations and, within seven working days after issuing an
administrative punishment decision, enter the information into
a labor relations rating database. An enterprise whose
information appears in the database loses or risks losing
government investment and procurement benefits and
opportunities. The ultimate impact of this system remains an
open question because ratings ultimately are assigned by
government labor bureaus and not by employees or their elected
representatives.
Hangzhou
Hangzhou city has implemented an ``early warning'' system
for wage payment violations. Under this system, as soon as
authorities determine that a company has failed to pay workers'
salaries for one month or more, or that arrears total 50,000
yuan or more and involve 30 or more employees, authorities
notify employees to take action to protect their rights and
interests.\94\ This new system is in the early stages of
implementation, and data on its performance and impact as yet
are unavailable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor Dispute Cases Increase With New Labor Legislation
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following implementation of the Labor Contract Law and the Employment
Promotion Law, both of which took effect on January 1, 2008, and the
new Law on the Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, which took
effect May 1, 2008, locales have reported surges in the filing of labor
dispute cases.\95\ A majority of cases have involved non-payment of
salaries and wages in arrears.\96\ While implementation of the new
legislative framework contributed to the rise in labor disputes during
2008, other factors contributed as well. Yuan appreciation, inflation,
and more stringent environmental protection requirements increased
operating costs, prompting relocation of some factories to lower cost
centers outside of China (e.g., Vietnam). In some cases where firms
attempted to liquidate plant assets before settling unpaid wages,
workers reportedly have been making use of litigation and arbitration
to assert legal claims to plant assets, but success rates in litigation
are not known at this time.
The increase in labor dispute caseload has created staffing problems
that have contributed in some locales to non-compliance with legally
mandated 60-day deadlines for the resolution of disputes.\97\ This
problem has been exacerbated by methods for setting staffing levels of
local labor bureaus. Staffing levels are determined, in part, based on
the official census. The official census, in turn, is based on the
registered population, and typically excludes the largely unregistered
migrant worker population. In many areas, the majority of workers
filing labor dispute cases have been migrants, and, as a result, would
not be reflected in staffing plans formulated using standard methods.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SIGNIFICANT LABOR ACTIONS DURING 2007-2008
High profile strikes remain rare in China. China's first
major pilots' strike occurred during 2008, as did other
significant work stoppages and protests over the last 12
months.\98\ Officials increasingly and more vocally began
calling for legislative and regulatory action to govern, rather
than to suppress, strikes and other work stoppages.\99\
March 2008 saw multiple labor actions by civilian airline
pilots in China. In early March 2008, pilots from Wuhan East
Star Airlines and Shanghai Airlines called in sick en masse. On
March 31, pilots from Yunnan Airlines, a subsidiary of China
Eastern Airlines, protested low pay by landing at their
destinations, but then not permitting passengers to disembark
before taking off again and flying back to their points of
origin.\100\ As reported by Xinhua, the pilots, the oldest of
whom had been with the airline since 1995, had complained that
workloads were ``too heavy and involved immense pressure,'' and
that the ``return flights'' were protest actions.\101\ Shortly
thereafter, 13 pilots collectively submitted their
resignations, which the company reportedly rejected
immediately.\102\ One editorial in the state-controlled
Economic Observer Online suggested that the pilots' actions
might have been preempted if they had enjoyed the benefit of
effective union representation in their dealings with airline
management.\103\
Under the terms of contracts each pilot previously had
signed with the airline, the airline was permitted to impose
fines on pilots for resigning. Most contracts between pilots
and state-owned carriers in China impose heavy penalties on
pilots for resignation ``to prevent them from breaking away
from the company,'' according to a prominent Chinese legal
expert, as quoted by Xinhua.\104\ Chinese airlines face
increasing difficulty recruiting qualified pilots, with a large
number of pilot jobs unfilled and resignations on the
rise.\105\ On September 10, 2008, the Intermediate People's
Court in Wuhan city, Hubei province, ordered 10 of the original
13 pilots to pay to the airline fines totaling 8 million yuan
(US$1 million). The 8-million-yuan figure reportedly is roughly
equivalent to the amount the airline invested in training the
10 pilots.\106\ Initially the airline had sought 100 million
yuan in compensation claiming it would suffer heavy losses if
the pilots resigned.\107\ After the judgment was announced, one
pilot reportedly ``feared the company will not accept the
result, and refuse to give back [his] pilot [certificate].''
\108\
In April 2008, Students and Scholars Against Corporate
Misbehavior (SACOM), a Hong Kong-based NGO,\109\ alleged
occupational safety and labor law violations at five firms,
including Nine Dragons (ND Paper), a major Chinese paper
manufacturer. Nine Dragons' CEO was elected in January to the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a
central-level leadership organ.\110\ Following an
investigation, the Guangdong Provincial Federation of Trade
Unions issued a report on May 26 that included findings of
mistreatment of both managers and workers. In addition to
unsafe working conditions--the company reported over 50
industrial accidents, including 2 deaths and 8 serious injuries
in the last year--the Union found the company's imposition of
excessive penalties on employees to be a serious problem--fines
totaling over 1 million yuan were imposed on over 70 percent of
the company's workforce last year.\111\ The union has received
no worker complaints, according to a union official.\112\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Migrant Workers
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are more than 170 million migrant workers in China, according to
official statistics.\113\ Chinese migrants face numerous obstacles in
the protection of their labor rights, and employers have exploited
migrant workers' uprooted status to deny them fair working
conditions.\114\ In February 2008, migrant workers for the first time
joined the ranks of China's National People's Congress Deputies.\115\
In July 2008, China's Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
established a new Department of Migrant Workers' Affairs. The new
department will focus attention on problems that disproportionately
affect migrant workers, such as wages arrears, access to social
security and pension benefits, and discrimination. The department has
announced its intention to focus attention on labor contracts for
migrant workers.\116\ There were isolated reports during 2008 of
migrant workers litigating and winning compensation for workplace
injuries.\117\
Non-payment of wages owed to migrant workers is rampant in China. The
problem is particularly severe in the construction industry. Rural
workers move frequently, and, when injured on the job, often return
home, with no choice but to forfeit social insurance benefits. As a
result, many migrant workers think of their contributions into the
social insurance schemes as moneys they will not recover when needed,
and some refuse to pay.\118\
Next to unpaid wages, access to and portability of pension and social
security benefits were among the most serious problems migrant workers
faced during 2008. Local rules and regulations make it extremely
difficult for migrant workers to remit their pension and social
security benefits to their hometowns. Many of these same rules severely
restrict the portability of pension and social security contributions
made by workers and employers in locales in which workers are
temporarily employed.\119\ Some localities began actively to address
this problem during 2008. In Suzhou city, Jiangsu province, for
example, migrant workers now are permitted to transfer pensions to
their home location if the government department designated to receive
the pension in the remote location agrees.\120\
Under the new Labor Contract Law, labor contracts must require social
security payments by both the worker and the employer. Local
regulations in some locales, however, do not permit migrant workers,
who typically reside in localities only for the duration of the project
for which they are employed, to reclaim employers' social security and
pension contributions when their work is done and they prepare to move
on. In such circumstances, the accrued employer contributions remain
with the local government. Some migrant workers, therefore, understand
a labor contract only as a document requiring the payment by them of
contributions for which they will have to expend effort later to
recoup. For them, the perceived financial benefits of not signing a
labor contract today outweigh the promise of untested legal protections
in the future. As a result, some migrant workers, even those who are
fully aware they have a legally enforceable right to work under a labor
contract, refuse to sign labor contracts nonetheless because provisions
originally designed to protect them are perceived to run counter to
their short-term interests.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Migrant Workers--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The household registration (hukou) system perpetuates much of the
discrimination that migrant workers confront. It remains to be seen
whether the Department of Migrant Workers' Affairs will be permitted to
emerge as a force for the reform or dismantling of the hukou system. A
number of bureaucracies, including local public security bureaus, have
vested interests in the perpetuation of the hukou system. As a result,
the institutional challenges the new department faces are not
insignificant.\121\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WORKING CONDITIONS
While migrant workers face disproportionate obstacles and
risks in protecting their rights in China, poor working
conditions--from insufficient wage guarantees, long working
hours and uncompensated overtime, deficiencies in benefits, and
workplace accidents, particularly for miners--impact Chinese
workers, migrant and non-migrant alike.
Wages
The 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers,
and assigns local governments to set wage standards for each
region.\122\ The new Labor Contract Law improves formal
monitoring requirements to verify workers receive minimum
wages. Article 74 requires local labor bureaus to monitor labor
practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage standards.
Article 85 imposes legal liability on employers who pay rates
below minimum wage. In addition, Article 72 guarantees minimum
hourly wages for part-time workers.\123\
Illegal labor practices have undermined minimum wage
guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, especially
for migrant workers. Subcontracting practices within industry
exacerbate the problem of wage arrearages. When investors and
developers default on their payments to construction companies,
workers at the end of the chain of labor subcontractors lack
the means to recover wages from the original defaulters.
Subcontractors, including companies that operate illegally,
neglect their own duties to pay laborers and leave workers
without any direct avenue to demand their salaries. In 2007,
the Commission reported a steady increase in the number of
workers who turned to labor arbitration to settle their
disputes with employers.\124\ As detailed below, this trend
appears to have continued.\125\
Working Hours
Chinese labor law mandates a maximum 8-hour workday and 44-
hour average workweek.\126\ Forced overtime and workdays much
longer than the legally mandated maximum are not uncommon,
especially in export sectors, where some employers avoid paying
overtime rates by compensating workers on a piece-rate basis
with quotas high enough to avoid requirements to pay overtime
wages.\127\ It has been reported that suppliers in China avoid
exposing themselves to claims of requiring illegal, long hours
by hiring firms that help them set up double booking systems
for foreign importers who aim to adhere to Chinese rules and
regulations. These firms not only help suppliers prepare books
to pass audits, but also coach managers and employees on
answers to give the auditors.\128\
Benefits
Gaps in social security and labor insurance coverage remain
widespread in China. Under Chinese labor law, local governments
bear responsibility for providing coverage for retirement,
illness or injury, occupational injuries, joblessness, and
childbirth.\129\ This means that systemic deficiencies in local
governance exacerbate shortcomings in the provision of social
security benefits. Improved oversight of social security
benefits funds has been the focus of attention in some locales,
but problems remain.\130\
Mine Accidents
China's mining sector continues to have high accident and
death rates. Miners are limited in their ability to promote
safer working conditions in part due to legal obstacles to
independent worker organizing. Market-oriented reforms since
the 1980s led to the privatization of operations at thousands
of formerly state-run mines. Facilities operated by private
contractors failed to maintain even the minimum mine safety
standards and practices that were upheld under state control,
and unsafe mines remain in operation.\131\ Collusion between
mine operators and local government officials reportedly
remains widespread; in some cases, miners reportedly may earn
higher than average wages for working in unsafe mines.\132\
Media control following accidents remains strong. Central
government directives encourage local governments to pressure
bereaved families into signing compensation agreements, and to
condition out-of-court compensation settlements on forfeiture
by bereaved families of their rights to seek further
compensation through the court system. There have been reports
of local officials preempting class actions by prohibiting
contact among members of bereaved families in order to
forestall coordination.\133\
CHILD LABOR
In spite of legal measures to prohibit the practice of
child labor in China, child labor remains a persistent
problem.\134\ As a member of the International Labour
Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions
on the elimination of child labor.\135\ China's Labor Law and
related legislation prohibit the employment of minors under
16,\136\ and both national and local legal provisions
prohibiting child labor stipulate a series of fines for
employing children.\137\ Under the Criminal Law, employers and
supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for
forcing children to work under conditions of extreme
danger.\138\ Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have
dulled the effects of these legal measures. The overall extent
of child labor in China is unclear in part because the
government classifies data on the matter as ``highly secret.''
\139\
Child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors
as well as small workshops and businesses, including textile,
toy, and shoe manufacturing enterprises.\140\ Many underage
laborers reportedly are in their teens, typically ranging from
13 to 15 years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the
education system and labor shortages of adult workers.\141\
Children in detention facilities also have been subjected to
forced labor.\142\ Events during 2008,
especially the Dongguan forced labor scandal, highlighted the
existence of what the ILO terms the ``worst forms of child
labor.'' \143\
Reports of children as young as 12 years old working in the
production of merchandise for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in
Beijing only underscored the Chinese government's inability to
prevent child labor.\144\
The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of
child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat
it,\145\ permits ``work-study'' programs and activities that in
practical terms perpetuate the practice of child labor, and are
tantamount to official endorsement of it.\146\ Under work-study
programs implemented in various parts of China, children who
are elementary school students pick crops and engage in other
physical labor.\147\ [See Section IV--Xinjiang for more
information on conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.]
Central government legislation allows this form of child
labor. National provisions prohibiting child labor provide that
``education practice labor'' and vocational skills training
labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational
institutes do not constitute the use of child labor when such
activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the
students.\148\ The Education Law supports schools that
establish work-study and other programs, provided that the
programs do not negatively affect normal studies.\149\ A
nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary and
secondary school students outlines the general terms of such
programs, which it says are meant to cultivate morals,
contribute to production outputs, and generate resources for
improving schools.\150\ These provisions contravene China's
obligations as a Member State to ILO conventions prohibiting
child labor.\151\ In 2006, the ILO's Committee of Experts on
the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations
``expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of children under
18 years performing forced labor not only in the framework of
re-educational and reformative measures, but also in regular
work programs at school.'' \152\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced Labor
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 28, 2008, Chinese media reported that more than 1,000
children had been trafficked from Liangshan, Sichuan province, to work
in factories across the Pearl River Delta.\153\ Local police sources
were quoted as saying that, over the course of two days, at least 167
children trafficked from Sichuan had been rescued. Another government
official allegedly reported that a team of 20 officials from the
Liangshan region had arrived in Dongguan to help repatriate the
children.\154\ Dongguan's Deputy Mayor, however, told a press
conference that the government had investigated over 3,600 companies
employing 450,000 people, and that, ``in the factories we inspected, we
did not come across any large-scale use of child labor. There might be
some child labor from Liangshan, but at present we just don't have the
evidence.'' \155\
In part because the scandal was contemporaneous with coverage of the
May 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the Olympic torch procession, press
coverage was less extensive than that received by the Shanxi brick kiln
forced labor scandal of 2007 and similar reported incidents dating back
to 2003.\156\ The persistence of forced labor networks revealed
stunning defiance by local officials of the central leadership's
instructions last year, following the Shanxi brick kiln scandal, to
investigate and to put an end to forced labor. Following as it did on
the heels of last year's events in Shanxi, the Dongguan scandal reveals
the weakness even of China's paramount leaders in enforcing the most
basic of worker rights against China's powerfully embedded labor
trafficking networks.\157\
Article 244 of the PRC's Criminal Law makes forced labor a crime.
Events in 2008 showed the deterrent value of this provision to be
inadequate at best under current conditions.\158\ Current law applies
only to legally recognized employers and does not apply to individuals
or illegal workplaces. As the Commission noted in its last Annual
Report, the All-China Lawyers Association in June 2007 asked the
National People's Congress Standing Committee to introduce new
legislation making slavery a criminal charge.\159\ It is unclear at the
time of this writing whether such legislation is in process. However,
in March 2008, members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) recommended to the CPPCC (which is not a lawmaking
body) that the Criminal Law be amended to criminalize ``violently
forcing labor.'' \160\
The aftermath of these scandals has revealed a more general lack of
victims support services in China. Officials regarded wages in arrears
as the central issue, not criminal assault and unlawful deprivation of
liberty.\161\ Under the All China Lawyers Association's Guiding Opinion
on the Handling of Collective Cases, lawyers who file collective suits
(the Chinese analog of class actions) on behalf of former forced
laborers, are required to report all relevant details of the case to
local government officials, regardless of whether those officials
themselves are the target of the suit. There are no conflict of
interest exemptions or provisions. The Opinion stipulates that ``after
accepting a collective case lawyers must promptly explain the facts
through the appropriate channels to the government organizations
involved.'' \162\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced Labor--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As reported in the Commission's 2007 Annual Report, in May and June
2007, Chinese media and Internet activists uncovered a network of
forced labor in brick kilns in Shanxi and Henan provinces. On April 1,
2008, the Linfen Municipal Intermediate People's Court accepted a civil
suit filed by four of the brick kiln workers, against five defendants
who had been criminally prosecuted in August 2007 and are currently
serving prison terms.\163\ Plaintiffs reportedly are seeking damages
for lost earnings, physical injury, and mental distress.
The strategy in filing the case, according to their lawyers, is to
prompt the Linfen government--not the defendants--to settle directly,
to contribute to a court-awarded settlement, or both. Legislators and
legal scholars revising the PRC's Law on State Compensation have
promoted the establishment by local governments of compensation funds
to provide damages to victims in criminal cases in which there is no
realistic prospect of damages paid by criminal defendants.\164\ To the
extent that this case publicizes the utility of such local compensation
funds, it may help propel the development of public interest litigation
in China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL COOPERATION
Pursuant to Letters of Understanding renewed in 2007
between the United States Department of Labor and two Chinese
government agencies, the two countries continued to conduct
cooperative activities during 2008 on wage and hour laws,
occupational safety and health, mine safety, and pension
oversight, with pledges by both sides to continue cooperative
activities for three more years. In addition, implementation of
two other cooperative agreements signed in 2007 in the areas of
unemployment insurance program administration and labor
statistics continued apace in 2008.\165\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's International Worker Rights Commitments
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China is
obligated to respect a basic set of internationally recognized labor
rights for workers, including freedom of association and the
``effective recognition'' of the right to collective bargaining.\166\
China is also a permanent member of the ILO's governing body.\167\ The
ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
(1998 Declaration) commits ILO members ``to respect, to promote and to
realize'' these fundamental rights based on ``the very fact of [ILO]
membership.'' \168\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's International Worker Rights Commitments--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ILO's eight core conventions articulate the scope of worker rights
and principles enumerated in the 1998 Declaration. Each member is
committed to respect the fundamental right or principle addressed in
each core convention, even if that member state has not ratified the
convention. China has ratified four of the eight ILO core conventions,
including two core conventions on the abolition of child labor (No. 138
and No. 182) and two on non-discrimination in employment and occupation
(No. 100 and No. 111).\169\ The ILO has reported that the Chinese
government is preparing to ratify the two core conventions on forced
labor (No. 29 and No. 105).\170\ Chinese labor law on paper generally
incorporates the basic obligations of the ILO's eight core conventions,
with the exception of the provisions relating to the freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining,\171\ but many of
these obligations remain unrealized in practice.
The Chinese government is a state party to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which guarantees the
right of workers to strike, the right of workers to organize
independent unions, the right of trade unions to function freely, the
right of trade unions to establish national federations or
confederations, and the right of the latter to form or join
international trade union organizations.\172\ In ratifying the ICESCR,
the Chinese government made a reservation to Article 8(1)(a), which
guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. The government
asserts that application of the article should be consistent with
Chinese law, which does not allow for the creation of independent trade
unions.\173\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Expression
INTRODUCTION
Over the past year, the Chinese government and Communist
Party continued to deny Chinese citizens the ability to fully
exercise their rights to free expression. In its 2007 Annual
Report, the Commission noted that China lacked a free press and
that Chinese officials provided only limited government
transparency, practiced pervasive censorship of the Internet
and other electronic media, and placed prior restraints on a
citizen's ability to freely publish.\1\ This past year, the
Commission has observed little to no improvement on these
issues. To the contrary, censorship and manipulation of the
press and Internet for political purposes worsened due to major
events, including Tibetan protests that began in March 2008 and
China's hosting of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. The
Chinese government continued to impose prior restraints on the
publication of printed and online material. Authorities
continued to punish religious practitioners for publishing or
distributing religious materials without government permission.
[See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Controls Over Religious
Publications.] Officials continued to use vague laws to punish
journalists, writers, rights advocates, and others for
peacefully exercising their right to free expression,
particularly those who criticized the government or Party in
the context of the Olympics. Officials also continued to
restrict the freedom of expression of Uyghurs [see Section IV--
Xinjiang--Controls Over Free Expression in Xinjiang] and to
harass foreign journalists, despite a pledge to grant them
greater press freedom for the Olympics [see Section II--2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games--Commitment to Foreign
Journalists].
Over the past year, the government continued its gradual
policy of increasing citizen access to government-held
information. Officials, however, maintained broad discretion on
the release of government information. Open government
information measures
enabled officials to promote images of openness, and quickly to
provide official versions of events, while officials maintained
the ability at the same time to censor unauthorized accounts.
The spread of the Internet and cell phones as mediums for
expression continued to pose a challenge to the Party, a trend
noted in the Commission's 2007 Annual Report.\2\ Internet and
cell phone use continues to grow. By the end of June 2008, the
number of Internet and cell phone users in China had risen to
253 million\3\ and 601 million,\4\ respectively, increases of
56 percent and 20 percent over the previous year.\5\ As the
Commission noted in its 2007 Annual Report, Chinese citizens
used these technologies to raise public awareness and protest
government policies,\6\ a trend that continued this past
year.\7\ Officials, however, continued to punish citizens who
used these technologies to organize protests or to share
politically sensitive information.\8\
CHINESE CITIZENS ENTITLED TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, SPEECH, PRESS
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and committed
to ratify, provides:
``1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.'' \9\
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a
similar provision.\10\ Article 35 of China's Constitution
states: ``Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association,
of procession, and of demonstration.'' \11\
International human rights standards allow for restrictions
on freedom of expression under limited circumstances. Article
19 of the ICCPR provides that such restrictions must be
``provided by law'' and ``necessary'' for the ``respect of the
rights or reputations of others,'' ``protection of national
security or of public order (ordre public),'' or ``of public
health or morals.'' \12\ Chinese officials say that their
restrictions on freedom of expression are ``in accordance with
law,'' \13\ and at times cite national security or public
safety concerns.\14\ Chinese law, however, does not require
officials to prove that their actions are ``necessary'' to
protect ``national security'' or ``public order'' and only
vaguely defines crimes of ``endangering national security'' or
``disturbing public order,'' allowing officials broad
discretion to punish peaceful activity.'' \15\
GOVERNMENT'S LIMITED STEPS TOWARD OPENNESS
Over the past year, the government continued its gradual
policy of increasing citizen access to government-held
information. Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao
issued statements endorsing greater government transparency,
echoing similar calls in recent years.\16\ As noted in the
Commission's 2007 Annual Report, the first national Regulations
on Open Government Information (OGI regulation) went into
effect in May 2008, giving citizens the right to request
government information and calling on government agencies at
all levels to proactively disclose ``vital'' information to the
public in a timely manner.\17\ [See addendum at the end of this
section for Commission analysis of the OGI regulation.] The
government and Communist Party reportedly increased media
access to the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 and the March
2008 meetings of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference and National People's Congress (NPC), although
official media appeared to exaggerate the actual
improvement.\18\ In April 2008, the NPC Standing Committee
announced that it would begin releasing draft laws to the
public for review.\19\ The Standing Committee generally does
not have the power to draft criminal and civil legislation,
however, meaning such important laws are not covered by the new
policy.\20\
Systemic obstacles to obtaining information from the
Chinese government have limited the impact of the OGI
regulation. The Commission noted a few of these obstacles, such
as China's state secrets laws and the lack of a free press, in
its 2007 Annual Report.\21\ As noted in that report, the OGI
regulation contains a state secrets exception giving officials
broad discretion to withhold information.\22\ Since the
regulation took effect, mainland Chinese and Hong Kong news
organizations reported that some officials have been evasive or
uncooperative when handling information requests and have cited
the ``state secrets'' exception in refusing to disclose
information.\23\ The central government issued an opinion in
April 2008 imposing a purpose test on information requests,
saying that officials could deny requests for information not
related to the requesting party's ``production, livelihood and
scientific and technological research.'' \24\ China's lack of
an independent judiciary has further hindered effective
implementation of the OGI regulation. Chinese courts have been
reluctant to accept disclosure cases and had not ordered any
government agencies to release information as of September
2008.\25\
With few checks on their power to withhold information,
officials continued to keep critical information from the
public. In September 2008, for example, officials in
Shijiazhuang city, Hebei province, reportedly waited more than
a month before informing provincial officials about complaints
of contaminated milk, which resulted in at least four deaths
and injuries to thousands of infants.\26\ An editor of the
Southern Weekend, a Chinese newspaper with a reputation for
more independent reporting, revealed on his blog that the paper
had discovered cases of sick children in July but were unable
to publish the stories because of censorship before the 2008
Olympic Games.\27\ In the run-up to the Olympics in August,
propaganda officials issued several directives to domestic
journalists, one of which warned editors that ``all food safety
issues . . . is off limits.'' \28\ After the milk scandal broke
open, officials ordered journalists to follow the ``official''
line and banned commentaries and news features about the
tainted milk products.\29\ At least one Chinese journalist
publicly criticized this censorship and called for press
freedom.\30\ [For more information on the government's handling
of the milk crisis, see Section III--Commercial Rule of Law--
Food and Product Safety.]
In some cases this past year, officials and the state-
controlled media provided information about politically
sensitive events more quickly than they might have in the past,
but such moves were not necessarily a sign of greater openness.
As noted in a Newsweek article by Jonathan Ansfield, Xinhua's
English news service reported an attack that killed at least 16
policemen in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on August 4,
2008, more than an hour before the Chinese version and little
more than three hours after the event occurred.\31\ Ansfield
notes, however, that Chinese journalists told him that this
unusual speed was ``no fluke,'' but rather the result of a top
Party propaganda official ordering journalists at central news
organizations to take the initiative to report ``major sudden
incidents'' in order to ``get the official scoop on events
before overseas media do, particularly around the time of the
Olympic Games.'' One journalist called it a ``form of
progress'' as it allowed them to report sensitive news before
receiving specific instructions from propaganda authorities,
but it only applied to central media outlets like Xinhua, and
journalists were aware that they must still toe the Party line
and that not all stories could be covered this way.\32\
In May 2008, foreign observers noted that Chinese officials
responded to the devastating Sichuan earthquake with unusual
openness.\33\ The more open response of China's media, however,
was in part due to large numbers of domestic reporters defying
an initial ban on traveling to the disaster areas and other
factors beyond the government's control.\34\ Nevertheless,
officials sought to take credit for the ``openness'' for
propaganda purposes. A Xinhua article described the response as
showing ``unprecedented transparency,'' gave credit to recent
reforms including the OGI regulation, and noted the ``positive
response from domestic and international observers alike,''
making no mention of the original ban on travel or subsequent
orders by Party and government officials dictating how the
media should cover the event.\35\ [For more information on
Party and government censorship of the media following the May
2008 Sichuan earthquake, see box titled Tibetan Protests,
Sichuan Earthquake, Olympics below.]
CENSORSHIP OF THE MEDIA AND INTERNET SERVES THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT'S
INTERESTS
Censorship of Media and Publishing
The Communist Party continues to control what journalists
may write or broadcast. In a June 2008 speech, President and
Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reiterated the Chinese
media's subordinate role to the Party, telling journalists they
must ``serve socialism'' and the Party.\36\ The Party's Central
Propaganda Department (CPD) issues directives that Chinese
journalists must follow. The directives do not meet the
international human rights standard requirement that they be
``prescribed by law'' since they are issued by a Party entity,
rather than pursuant to legislation issued by one of the organs
authorized to pass legislation under the PRC Legislation Law.
Reporters have no legal recourse to challenge such
restrictions. Those that cross the line are subject to firing
or removal of content. In November 2007, the CPD ordered the
dismissal of a journalist who wrote about a major railroad line
built with substandard materials.\37\ In July 2008, officials
pulled the Beijing News from stands after it published a photo
of injured protesters at the 1989 Tiananmen Square
demonstrations.\38\
The Chinese government relies on prior restraints on
publishing, including licensing and other regulatory
requirements, to restrict free expression.\39\ Anyone wishing
to publish a book, newspaper, or magazine, or to work legally
as a journalist, must obtain a license from the government's
press regulator. The Chinese government forbids private
publishing of religious materials and restricts the production
of religious publications to state-licensed enterprises. Such
restrictions have a chilling effect, and officials use them as
a pretext to punish free expression. Shi Weihan, owner of a
Christian bookstore in Beijing, was detained in November 2007
and accused of illegally printing and distributing religious
literature.\40\ In June 2008, authorities detained Ha Jingbo
and Jiang Ruoling, two middle school teachers from Dongfeng
county in Jilin province, for distributing educational leaflets
about Falun Gong.\41\ In November 2007, a court in Guangdong
province sentenced legal activist and writer Yang Maodong (who
uses the pen name Guo Feixiong) to five years' imprisonment for
``illegal operation of a business,'' for using another book's
publication number, the quantity of which the government
limits, to publish his own book. Local officials were
apparently angry at Guo's book, which concerned a political
scandal.\42\
In May 2008, new book publishing regulations went into
effect. Similar to other publishing regulations in China, the
new regulations require book publishers to ``insist on Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought'' and ``the correct guidance of
public opinion,'' to have a government-approved sponsor and
meet financial requirements, and to abide by the government's
plans for the ``number, structure, and distribution'' of
publishing units.\43\ Officials continued to target political
and religious publications as part of an ongoing campaign to
``clean up'' the publishing industry.\44\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to control the
Internet through an effective and pervasive system that relies on
government regulation and public officials and Internet companies
monitoring and censoring online content. China's measures to control
the Internet do not conform to international standards for freedom of
expression because they not only address issues of public concern such
as pornography, privacy protection, and spam, but also content
officials deem politically unacceptable. China's top officials continue
to signal that its control over the Internet is motivated by political
concerns. In his June 2008 speech, President Hu Jintao reiterated the
importance of co-opting the Internet as a ``forward position for
disseminating socialist advanced culture.'' \45\
All Web sites hosted in China must either be licensed by or registered
with the government,\46\ and sites providing news content or audio and
video services require additional license or registration.\47\
In September 2007, the Shanghai Daily reported that officials
shut down 9,593 unregistered Web sites, in a move that occurred just
before the 17th Party Congress in October.\48\
In May 2008, officials reportedly ordered a domestic human
rights Web site to shut down for failing to have the proper
license.\49\
This past year, Chinese officials also targeted audio and video
hosting Web sites, whose content is increasingly popular but more
difficult to censor, as well as online maps.
Provisions that went into effect in January 2008 reiterated
the licensing requirement for audio and video Web sites and now
require them to be state-owned or state-controlled.\50\
In March 2008, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and
Television reported the results of a two-month crackdown, saying that
it shut down 25 video Web sites and warned 32 others for, among other
things, failing to have the proper license or ``endangering the
security and interests of the state.'' \51\
Following the Tibetan protests that began in March, access to
the U.S.-based video sharing Web site YouTube.com was reportedly
blocked after dozens of videos about the protests showed up on the
site.\52\ No footage of the protests was found on the Chinese-based
video Web sites 56.com, Youku.com, and Tudou.com.\53\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 2008, the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping
issued an opinion telling online map providers that they must obtain
the appropriate licenses and avoid ``geographical information that
could harm national security.'' \54\
In April 2008, officials began a year-long campaign to remove
``illegal'' maps on the Internet, including those that commit
``errors'' such as identifying Taiwan as separate from China.\55\
Officials continued to use their control over the connection between
China and the global Internet to block access to politically sensitive
foreign-based Web sites, while also policing domestic content.\56\ Over
the past year, media reports and testing done by OpenNet Initiative
indicated that access within China to the Web sites for foreign or Hong
Kong news organizations such as Guardian, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Hong
Kong-based Apple Daily, Radio Free Asia, and Voice of America, human
rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Reporters Without
Borders, Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights in China, and
Human Rights Watch, and sites relating to Tibetans, Uyghurs, Taiwan,
Chinese activists, and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests was
blocked at various times.\57\ In response to foreign reporters'
complaints over blocked Web sites, a Chinese Olympics official publicly
acknowledged in late July 2008 that sites relating to Falun Gong were
blocked and would remain blocked despite the Olympics. Following those
complaints, foreign media reported that some previously blocked sites,
including those for Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
Radio Free Asia, became accessible at the Olympic village.\58\ Domestic
Web sites continued to be targeted as well. In the first half of 2008,
officials reportedly ordered several HIV/AIDS Web sites to shut down or
remove content.\59\ In addition, the Commission has received no
indication that access to its Web site has become available in China.
The government compels companies providing Internet services in China,
including those based in other countries, to monitor and record the
online activities of its customers, to filter and delete information
the government considers ``harmful'' or politically sensitive, and to
report suspicious activity to authorities.\60\ An October 2007 report
on Chinese Internet censorship released by Reporters Without Borders
and Chinese Human Rights Defenders and written by an unnamed Chinese
employee of an Internet company said that there were between 400 and
500 banned key words and that companies censored these words to avoid
fines.\61\ Internet users in China frequently complain that censors
remove their postings or prevent them from appearing at all.\62\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such censorship is particularly evident before or after events
perceived by the Party to be politically sensitive. After Tibetan
protests began in March 2008, foreign media reported that searches on
the popular Chinese search engine Baidu and Google for news stories on
Tibet turned up no protest news in the top results or inaccessible
links.\63\ In April 2008, Chinese media reported that Baidu, Google,
and Yahoo China were censoring searches that contained the word
``Carrefour,'' a French department store, amid public outcry over
protests during the Paris leg of the Olympic torch relay.\64\ In the
run-up to the Olympics, public officials across China ordered hotels to
ensure that they had installed Internet security systems capable of
monitoring and censoring users' Internet activities.\65\ In October
2008, Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia issued a report
detailing a large-scale surveillance system of Internet text messages
sent by customers of Tom-Skype, a joint venture between a Chinese
company and eBay, which owns Skype. They found that text messages
relating to Falun Gong, Taiwan independence, the Chinese Communist
Party, and words such as democracy, earthquake, and milk powder had
been censored, and that customers' personal information, text messages,
and chat conversations between users in China and outside China had
been recorded.\66\ Skype's president said that the company was aware
that the Chinese government was monitoring chat messages but not that
its Chinese partner was storing those messages deemed politically
sensitive.\67\
The Communist Party also continued to directly order the removal of
content or hire citizens to go online to influence public debate. In
September 2008, Party propaganda officials ordered major financial Web
sites to remove ``negative'' reports regarding China's stock markets
amid a sharp downturn.\68\ According to one expert on Chinese media,
the Party has funded training for an estimated 280,000 Web commentators
whose task is to promote the Party's views in online chat rooms and
forums, and to report ``dangerous'' content to authorities.\69\
Rebecca Mackinnon, an expert on China's Internet controls, said in
August 2008 that Internet users in China now faced a ``more targeted
and subtle approach to censorship than before.'' \70\ She said blog
postings about politically sensitive events were quickly taken down,
while controlled reporting in Chinese media was allowed. She said the
``strategy seems clear: Give China's professional journalists a longer
leash to cover breaking news even if it's not positive--since the news
will come out anyway and unlike bloggers, the journalists are still on
a leash.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrictions Bolster Image of Party and Government
The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to use
the media and Internet to project an image of stability and
harmony and ensure that the Party and central government are
reflected positively. Such measures increase in the run-up to
major political meetings and public events and following
disasters and incidents of civil unrest or citizen activism.
Three events this past year--Tibetan protests that began in
March, the devastating Sichuan earthquake in May, and China's
preparations for and hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games in
August--illustrate the ways the Party and government restrict
free expression in an attempt to manipulate public opinion in
their favor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibetan Protests, Sichuan Earthquake, Olympics
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibetan Protests
Chinese media initially devoted little coverage to a series of
protests in Tibetan areas that began in March 2008.\71\ Web sites
censored searches for news reports and footage of the protests, and
some foreign Web sites and foreign satellite news telecasts about the
protests were blocked.\72\ [See Censorship of the Media and Internet
Serves the Party and Government's Interests--Internet Censorship
earlier in this section.] When Chinese media stepped up reporting on
the protests, they focused on violence committed against the ethnic Han
population and denounced the Dalai Lama as a ``wolf with the face of a
human and the heart of a beast.'' \73\ Chinese media also described
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi as a ``disgusting figure'' and
attacked the foreign media for its ``biased'' coverage.\74\ Officials
expelled foreign journalists from Tibetan areas where reported protests
had occurred and barred them from entering those areas, a move the head
of the International Olympic Committee said contravened China's Olympic
promise to provide greater press freedom to foreign journalists.\75\
Cell phone, landline, and Internet transmissions were also reportedly
disrupted in Tibetan areas of western China, adding to the difficulty
of accessing information.\76\ [See Section V--Tibet for more
information on the protests.]
Sichuan Earthquake
Media access in the immediate aftermath of an 8.0 magnitude earthquake
that hit Sichuan province on May 12, 2008, and killed nearly 70,000,
was more open compared to previous natural disasters. Chinese
television aired extensive and graphic live coverage from disaster
areas and foreign reporters operated with few restrictions.\77\
Propaganda officials, however, had initially ordered most journalists
not to travel to disaster areas.\78\ After the order was ignored,
public officials rescinded the original order, but instructed the
domestic media to highlight the government's proactive response, avoid
``negative'' stories, and promote ``national unity'' and ``stability.''
\79\ Officials later ordered domestic media not to report on protests
by grieving parents, forcibly removed parents from protest sites, and
briefly detained foreign reporters trying to cover the protests.\80\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibetan Protests, Sichuan Earthquake, Olympics--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing Olympics
In his June 2008 speech, President Hu Jintao told journalists to pay
special attention to their coverage of the Olympics and said their
first priority is to ``correctly guide opinion.'' \81\ In a January
2008 speech to propaganda officials, Hu urged them to improve China's
international image.\82\ From November 2007 to July 2008, propaganda
officials issued several directives ordering journalists to avoid
numerous topics for the Olympics, including air quality, food safety,
protest zones designated for the games, and the performance of Chinese
athletes.\83\ One directive ordered them to counter the ``negative''
publicity stemming from protests along the Olympic torch relay by
quickly producing reports that toed the Party line, as part of an
``unprecedented, ferocious media war against the biased western
press.'' \84\ An ongoing campaign to weed out ``illegal publications''
focused this past year on creating a ``positive public opinion
environment'' for the Olympics.\85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SELECTIVE USE OF LAWS TO PUNISH POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTIVISTS
Officials continued to use vague laws to punish
journalists, writers, rights advocates, and others for
peacefully exercising their right to free expression,
particularly those who criticized the Chinese government and
Communist Party in the context of the Olympics. In 2006, the UN
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted that China's vaguely
defined crimes of endangering state security, splittism,
subverting state power, and supplying state secrets left
``their application open to abuse particularly of the rights to
freedom of religion, speech, and assembly,'' and recommended
the abolition of such ``political crimes.'' \86\ Among the most
popular of these provisions to punish peaceful expression
continued to be the ``inciting subversion of state power''
crime under Article 105(2) of the Criminal Law.\87\ Among those
punished for this crime included outspoken health and
environmental activist Hu Jia and land rights activist Yang
Chunlin, after each tied their criticisms of the government and
Party to the Olympics, and freelance writer Lu Gengsong, for
his online essays. [See box titled Inciting Subversion:
Punishment of Activists and Writers below.] Hu and Yang's
arrests came despite claims by the Chinese foreign minister in
February that it is ``impossible'' for someone in China to be
arrested for saying ``human rights are more important than the
Olympics.'' Officials targeted others for criticizing the
government's response to the Sichuan earthquake. Sichuan
officials detained retired professor Zeng Hongling in June 2008
on charges of ``inciting subversion'' after she posted articles
online alleging corruption and poor living conditions in areas
affected by the earthquake.\88\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inciting Subversion: Punishment of Activists and Writers
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 105(2) of the PRC Criminal Law reads in part: ``[w]hoever
incites others by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to
subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years'' \89\
Hu Jia\90\
Background: Well-known HIV/AIDS and environmental activist who for years
has been an outspoken advocate for human rights and chronicler of
rights abuses and who made extensive use of the Internet in his work.
Hu had numerous run-ins with police, including spending more than 200
days under virtual house arrest before his formal detention in December
2007.\91\ A month before his January 2008 arrest, Hu provided testimony
before the European Parliament and criticized China's human rights
record and the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX
Olympiad.\92\
Sentence and Alleged Criminal Activity: On April 3, 2008, the Beijing
No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Hu to three years and six
months' imprisonment.\93\ Alleged ``subversive'' activities included
posting essays online critical of the government's harassment of rights
defenders and approach to governing Hong Kong, and making
``subversive'' comments to foreign reporters.
Yang Chunlin\94\
Background: Land rights activist who gathered more than 10,000
signatures for a petition titled ``We Want Human Rights, Not the
Olympics,'' which was also posted on the Internet. Most of the
signatories were farmers seeking redress for land that officials
allegedly took from them. Fellow petition organizers Yu Changwu and
Wang Guilin were sentenced to reeducation through labor for two years
and one-and-a-half years, respectively, for their advocacy on behalf of
farmers in Fujin city, Heilongjiang province.\95\
Sentence and Alleged Criminal Activity: On March 24, 2008, the Jiamusi
Intermediate People's Court in Heilongjiang sentenced Yang to five
years' imprisonment for inciting subversion. Prosecutors accused Yang
of writing essays critical of the Communist Party and alleged that the
petition received heavy foreign media coverage that harmed China's
image abroad. Prosecutors also accused Yang of accepting 10,000 yuan
(US$1,430) from a ``hostile'' foreign group.\96\
Lu Gengsong\97\
Background: Freelance writer who has written about corrupt local
officials who seize land in deals with property developers.\98\
Sentence and Alleged Criminal Activity: On February 5, 2008, the
Hangzhou Intermediate People's Court affirmed Lu's four-year sentence.
Alleged ``subversive'' activities included publishing on foreign Web
sites essays that questioned the legitimacy of the Party-led government
and called on activists, intellectuals, and religious activists to join
together in opposition. The court made no attempt to determine the
actual threat posed by the essays, none of which specifically called
for violence.\99\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officials also relied on vague charges of disturbing public
order, inciting a disturbance, possessing state secrets, or
inciting splittism, to punish free expression. Officials in
Hubei province sentenced petitioner Wang Guilan to 15 months'
reeducation through labor for disturbing social order after she
spoke with a foreign reporter during the Olympics.\100\ In June
2008, officials in Sichuan province detained and later
sentenced Liu Shaokun, a middle school teacher, to one year of
reeducation through labor after he posted photos of collapsed
schools online and criticized their construction in a media
interview.\101\ In another earthquake-related case, Sichuan
officials arrested Huang Qi in July after he posted an article
on his Web site detailing parents' demands for compensation and
an investigation into the collapse of schools that took their
children's lives.\102\ Officials charged Huang, founder of the
rights advocacy Web site 64tianwang.com, with illegally
possessing state secrets.\103\ In another state secrets case,
officials released Hong Kong journalist Ching Cheong in
February 2008, after he served almost two years of a five-year
sentence.\104\ Ching was convicted of passing state secrets to
a Taiwan foundation in a case that critics said lacked
transparency and relied on weak evidence.\105\ Officials in
Chengdu city, Sichuan province, detained freelance writer and
journalist Chen Daojun in May 2008 on charges of inciting
splittism,\106\ a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal
Law,\107\ after he published an article on a foreign Web site
calling for a halt in construction of a chemical plant, citing
environmental concerns.\108\
In its 2007 Annual Report, the Commission noted that
Chinese officials' application of Article 25 of the Public
Security Administration Punishment Law,\109\ which prohibits
spreading rumors to
disturb public order, threatened the free flow of
information.\110\ Officials continued to apply this provision
broadly to detain citizens for sharing information following
emergencies\111\ or for organizing protests over the
Internet.\112\ After a train collision in Shandong province,
officials sentenced one citizen to five days of administrative
detention for posting another person's Internet message, which
contained what turned out to be inaccurate claims about the
collision, even though few people viewed the post.\113\
Following a May 2008 protest against a chemical plant in
Chengdu, officials put three activists under administrative
detention pursuant to Article 25 for using the Internet to
spread rumors and incite an illegal demonstration.\114\ In May,
a top editor at Southern Metropolitan Daily wrote an editorial
criticizing the Chinese public security's application of
``spreading rumors'' provisions, saying it had a chilling
effect on people's willingness to share information during
public emergencies such as the Sichuan earthquake.\115\
Officials also restricted individuals' freedom of
expression by placing conditions on their release on bail or
suspended sentence. Officials in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region accused Internet essayist Wang Dejia of ``inciting
subversion,'' and released him on bail in January 2008, only
after he agreed to stop posting online essays critical of the
Chinese government and speaking with foreign journalists.\116\
Officials in Hubei province detained essayist Du Daobin in July
for allegedly violating the terms of his suspended sentence by
publishing articles overseas, days before his sentence was to
expire.\117\
HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF CITIZENS TO PREVENT FREE EXPRESSION
Officials continued to harass citizens and warn them not to
express opinions, particularly to foreign journalists and
dignitaries. Plainclothes officers seized legal activist and
law professor Teng Biao outside his home in Beijing in February
2008, placed a sack over his head, and drove him away to be
questioned.\118\ They warned him to stop writing articles
criticizing China's human rights record and the Olympics or
risk losing his university post and going to jail.\119\ In May,
security personnel warned Zeng Jinyan, rights activist and wife
of imprisoned human rights activist Hu Jia, that she would be
prevented from leaving her home because ``a U.S. delegation
wants to meet with you,'' referring to U.S. officials who had
traveled to Beijing for the U.S.-China Human Rights
Dialogue.\120\ Officials warned two human rights lawyers, Mo
Shaoping and Zhang Xingshui, not to attend a May 27 lunch with
Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer, who was taking part
in the dialogue.\121\ In late June, officials detained or put
under house arrest a group of human rights lawyers to prevent
them from attending a dinner in Beijing with U.S.
Representatives Chris Smith and Frank Wolf.\122\
CHINESE GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT RESTRICTIONS ON FREE EXPRESSION ARE
BASED IN LAW
Officials continued to justify restrictions on freedom of
expression with an appeal to laws, without regard to whether
such laws or their application violate international human
rights standards:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Human Rights
Official Claim Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship: In April 2008, after The government's Internet
the International Olympic Committee regulations prohibit
expressed concern about Internet content such as
censorship following the Tibetan pornography, online
protests, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs gambling, invasions of
spokesperson said the Chinese privacy, and intellectual
government's regulation of the Internet property violations.\124\
is ``in line with general international Such regulations, however,
practice'' and ``the main reason for also allow Chinese
inaccessibility of foreign websites in officials to censor
China is that they spread information politically sensitive
prohibited by Chinese law.'' \123\ content through provisions
that prohibit information
vaguely defined as
``harmful to the honor or
interests of the nation''
or ``disrupting the
solidarity of peoples.''
\125\ The result is that
the government continues to
block access to a number of
foreign news Web sites and
Web sites promoting human
rights and, along with
Internet companies in
China, frequently removes
and censors political
content.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Human Rights
Official Claim Standards--Continued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imprisonment of Critics: In March 2008,
Premier Wen Jiabao described as
``totally unfounded'' the allegation
that the government is cracking down
on dissidents before the Olympics. He
said ``China is a country under the
rule of law'' and that cases such as
Hu Jia's would be ``dealt with in
accordance with the law.'' \126\
The UN Working Group on
Travel Restrictions on Foreign The travel ban to Tibetan areas
Reporters: In March 2008, a foreign appeared much broader than
ministry spokesperson defended a necessary to protect foreign
travel ban to Tibetan areas following journalists. The borders of
reported protests as a measure the closed-off areas extended
intended to ensure the safety of far beyond reported protest
journalists and added ``it is legal sites.\129\ The government's
and responsible for local governments attempts to otherwise censor
to take some restrictive measures.'' and manipulate information
\128\ about the protests on the
Internet and in Chinese media
strongly suggest that the near
total ban on foreign
journalists except for a few
unsupervised tours was
motivated by political rather
than safety concerns.
Furthermore, officials
initially allowed foreign
journalists open access to
disaster zones following the
May 2008 Sichuan earthquake,
areas that also posed a threat
to the physical safety of the
journalists.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHINESE CITIZENS CONTINUE TO SEEK FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Citizens continue to seek ways to freely express their
ideas and share information over the Internet and in the press.
So many Chinese journalists rushed to the disaster areas
following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake that propaganda
officials rescinded an earlier prohibition on such travel.\130\
Despite restrictions on reporting the controversy surrounding
the collapse of shoddily constructed schools, investigative
journalists at Southern Weekend and Caijing continued to report
the story.\131\ Chinese citizens organized demonstrations
against a chemical plant in Chengdu in May and against the
proposed extension of the maglev train line in Shanghai using
text messages.\132\ [For more information on these protests,
see Section II--Environment.] Dozens of Chinese lawyers,
academics, and writers signed an open letter condemning the
arrest of human rights activist Hu Jia.\133\ In June 2008,
Radio Free Asia reported that dozens of rights lawyers and
scholars had begun an online free speech forum.\134\
Citizens and some Chinese media and editorialists continue
to question government measures that restrict freedom of
expression.\135\ A January 2008 Southern Metropolitan Daily
editorial criticized the regulations calling for state
ownership of audio and video hosting Web sites as ``restraining
the civil right of social expression in the era of the
Internet.'' \136\ At the trial of land rights activist Yang
Chunlin, defense lawyers argued that Chinese officials'
application of the inciting subversion provision was likely to
result in punishing free speech because of its vagueness and
that neither the Supreme People's Court nor the National
People's Congress Standing Committee had interpreted the law to
provide guidance to citizens on the boundaries of free
speech.\137\ More than 14,000 Chinese citizens signed an open
letter released to the public on January 1, 2008, urging the
Chinese government to ratify the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights before the 2008 Olympic Games
``without reservations.'' \138\ One of the letter's
recommendations called on the Chinese government to allow
freedom of speech and to protect the press and publishing.
Addendum
CHINA COMMITS TO ``OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION'' (OGI) EFFECTIVE MAY 1,
2008
In a move intended to combat corruption, increase public
oversight and participation in government, and allow citizens
access to government-held information, the State Council on
April 5, 2007, issued the first national Regulations on Open
Government Information (OGI Regulation), which took effect May
1, 2008.\139\ Implementation begins at a time when the need for
greater transparency in the areas of environmental health, land
disputes, disease, and food, drug, and product safety has
become apparent. The time lag between issue and effective date
provided citizens and government departments a one-year
preparatory period.
The national regulation may alter relations between
citizens and traditionally protective government bureaucracies.
But it is not entirely a new development. While the overall
impact of the national regulation remains unclear, over 30
provincial and city-level governments throughout China as well
as central government agencies and departments have adopted OGI
rules in the last several years. Guangzhou, which was the first
municipality to do so in 2002, and Shanghai, which issued its
regulations in 2004, are but two examples. As implementation of
the national OGI Regulation proceeds, a number of issues merit
attention, the following among them:
Two Main Features of OGI
Government agencies at all levels have an affirmative
obligation to disclose certain information, generally within 20
business days. This includes information that ``involves the
vital interests of citizens,'' with emphasis on information
relating to, among other items, environmental protection,
public health, food, drug, and product quality, sudden
emergencies, and land appropriation and compensation.
Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations
(Requesting Parties) may request information and are entitled
to receive a reply within 15 business days and no later than 30
business days. Requesting Parties can challenge a denial of
access to information by filing a report with a higher-level or
supervisory agency or designated open government information
department or by applying for administrative reconsideration or
filing an administrative lawsuit.
Areas To Watch During Implementation
No clear presumption of disclosure. Premier Wen Jiabao
urged officials to proceed with implementation ``insisting that
disclosure be the principle, non-disclosure the exception.''
Chinese scholars and international experts, however, note that
the national OGI Regulation does not set forth a clear
presumption of disclosure. On this point it differs from
earlier local-level OGI regulations and similar measures in
other countries.
Certain provisions may discourage officials from disclosing
information. Under the OGI Regulation, officials who withhold
information the disclosure of which is required under the
Regulation may face both administrative and criminal penalties.
At the same time, however, the OGI Regulation stipulates that
officials must not disclose information involving ``state
secrets, commercial secrets, or individual privacy,'' and must
set up mechanisms to examine the secrecy of information
requested. This emphasis on safeguarding secrecy and the
breadth and vagueness of the definition of ``state secrets''
under Chinese law may encourage officials to err on the side of
non-disclosure. The regulation also prohibits officials from
disclosing information that might ``endanger state security,
public security, economic security, and social stability.''
Agencies and personnel who fail to ``establish and perfect''
secrecy examination mechanisms or who disclose information
later deemed exempt from disclosure under the OGI Regulation
may face administrative or criminal punishment.
Requesting Parties may be denied access if the request
fails to meet a recognized purpose. An opinion issued by the
State Council General Office on April 29, 2008, states that
officials may deny requests if the information has no relation
to the Requesting Party's ``production, livelihood and
scientific and technological research.'' This reflects language
in Article 13 of the OGI Regulation that says Requesting
Parties may request information ``based on the special needs of
such matters as their own production, livelihood and scientific
and technological research.'' This introduction of an apparent
purpose test differs from earlier local-level OGI regulations
and international practice. Furthermore, another provision in
the OGI Regulation which sets forth the information to be
included in a request, does not instruct the Requesting Party
to indicate the purpose of the request.
Requesting Parties lack an independent review channel to
enforce the OGI. Some Chinese scholars have noted that the OGI
Regulation's relief provisions constrain citizens from using
the courts to challenge decisions that deny requests for
information. Because China's courts are subordinate to the
National People's Congress Standing Committee and the Communist
Party, ``it can be anticipated that enforcement of emerging
information rights in China, even with the adoption of the
State Council OGI Regulations, will continue to face high
hurdles within the existing court system.'' While it is still
too early to tell, one scholar notes that it may be possible,
however, to achieve some independent review of non-political
cases through creation of tribunals or commissions designed to
handle OGI cases.
Sufficiency of funding, preparedness, and public awareness.
For many departments, OGI implementation may amount to an
unfunded mandate. Many agencies face resource constraints or
rely on funding sources predisposed to favor non-disclosure.
Local governments may not favor information disclosure that
could negatively impact local business. Local environmental
protection bureaus, for example, which are funded by local
governments, may not receive funding adequate to implement OGI
effectively. Already, a number of localities failed to meet a
March 2008 deadline to make catalogues and guides intended to
assist parties in requesting information available to the
public. This resulted in part from inadequate funding and
technical expertise. While the government has focused on
training officials, it has been less active in raising public
awareness.
Access to information may not apply to media, whether
foreign or domestic. The national OGI Regulation applies to
``citizens, legal persons, and other organizations.'' This
suggests its applicability to foreigners remains open to
interpretation during implementation. It also remains unclear
whether journalists in general may request access to
information under the national regulation. Some Chinese experts
argue that the regulation clearly applies to news
organizations, which have the status of ``legal persons or
other organizations,'' and journalists, who have the status of
``citizens,'' although foreign journalists may not be covered
because they are not citizens. Some local-level OGI regulations
in existence prior to the national regulation made clear its
applicability to foreigners. The Guangzhou regulation, for
example, provides that foreigners, stateless persons, and
foreign organizations have the same rights and obligations to
request information, limited to the extent that the requesting
party's country or region of origin imposes restrictions on
government information access to Chinese citizens. It remains
to be seen whether the national OGI Regulation will be
implemented so as to trump local OGI rules that are broader in
application or whether the national regulation will be
interpreted in a similarly broad fashion.
Freedom of Religion
INTRODUCTION
Religious repression and persecution as detailed by the
Commission in all previous Annual Reports persisted during this
reporting year and intensified in the run-up to and during the
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. In the past year, religious
adherents remained subject to tight controls over their
religious activities, and some citizens met with harassment,
detention, imprisonment, and other abuses because of their
religious or spiritual practices. The government sounded alarms
against foreign ``infiltration'' in the name of religion,\1\
and took measures to hinder citizens' freedom to engage with
foreign co-religionists.\2\ Moderate gains in using the legal
system to challenge official abuses\3\ were offset by the
continuation of repressive policies and official harassment of
some religious believers.
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
deny Chinese citizens the ability to fully exercise their
rights to freedom of religion.\4\ The Chinese government
subjects religion to a strict regulatory framework that
represses many forms of religious and spiritual activities
protected under international human rights law, including in
treaties China has signed or ratified.\5\ Although some Chinese
citizens are able to practice their faith within government
confines,\6\ where some, but not all, Chinese citizens are
allowed to do so, and where members of China's five state-
sanctioned religious communities\7\ also face tight controls
over their
religious activities, the Chinese government has failed in its
obligation to guarantee citizens freedom of religion.
The government and Communist Party remain hostile toward
religion. The government and Party articulate a limited degree
of tolerance for religion as a means of mobilizing support for
their authority, and not as a commitment to promoting religious
freedom. In the past year, President and Party General
Secretary Hu Jintao called for recognizing a ``positive role''
for religious communities within Chinese society,\8\ but
officials also continued to affirm the government and Party's
policy of control over religion. In 2008, Ye Xiaowen, Director
of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, stated, ``We
should not expand religions, but strive to let existing
religions do more for the motherland's reunification, national
unity, economic development and social stability.'' \9\
CHINA'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RELIGION
The Chinese government's legal framework for religion
reflects rule by law rather than rule of law. Legal protections
for religious activities are limited in scope, condition many
activities on government oversight or approval, and apply only
to state-sanctioned
religious communities. Vague language and inconsistent
implementation further hinder the effectiveness of these
limited protections.\10\ After passing the Regulation on
Religious Affairs (RRA)\11\ in 2004, the central government
issued a series of supplementary regulations between 2005 and
2007 that elaborate on controls stipulated within the RRA. [For
more information, see box titled Timeline: Regulation of
Religion below.] The central government did not publicize any
additional regulations on religion in late 2007 or in 2008,
prior to the publication of the Commission's 2008 Annual
Report. Based on Commission staff monitoring, the pace of
issuing comprehensive regulations on religion at the provincial
level slowed in the past year.\12\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Timeline: Regulation of Religion
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2004, the State Council issued the Regulation on Religious Affairs
(RRA), marking the first national-level comprehensive regulation on
religion. Since then, the government has not issued one consolidated
set of implementing provisions, as some observers anticipated, but
rather expanded upon specific articles within the RRA by issuing legal
measures (banfa) regarding these articles. In addition, the State
Administration for Religious Affairs continues to publicize a book of
interpretations of the RRA that elaborates on each article of the
regulation.\13\ The list below provides a brief chronology of the
central government's legislative activity in the area of religion since
the RRA's promulgation.\14\
Measures on the Examination, Approval, and Registration of
Venues for Religious Activity, issued April 21, 2005.
Measures for Putting Religious Personnel on File, issued
December 29, 2006.
Measures for Putting on File the Main Religious Personnel of
Venues for Religious Activities, issued December 29, 2006.
Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living
Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, issued July 18, 2007.
Measures on Establishing Religious Schools, issued August 1,
2007.
Measures Regarding Chinese Muslims Registering to Go Abroad on
Pilgrimages (Trial Measures), undated (estimated date 2006).
Some local governments have also reported amending or issuing new
comprehensive regulations on religious affairs. Provincial-level areas
reporting on such developments include:\15\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 (Date of issue or 2007 (Date of issue or 2008 (Date of issue or
2005 (Date of issue or amendment) amendment) amendment) amendment)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shanghai Municipality Regulation on Zhejiang Province Anhui Province Shaanxi Province
Religious Affairs. Regulation on Regulation on Regulation on
Religious Affairs. Religious Affairs Religious Affairs.
(amended in 2006 and
again in 2007).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Henan Province Regulation on Anhui Province Hebei Province
Religious Affairs. Regulation on Regulation on
Religious Affairs Religious Affairs.
(amended in 2006 and
again in 2007).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 (Date of issue or 2007 (Date of issue or 2008 (Date of issue or
2005 (Date of issue or amendment) amendment) amendment) amendment)--Continued
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shanxi Province Regulation on Beijing Municipality Jiangxi Province
Religious Affairs. Regulation on Regulation on
Religious Affairs. Religious Affairs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chongqing Municipality
Regulation on
Religious Affairs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hunan Province
Regulation on
Religious Affairs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liaoning Province
Regulation on
Religious Affairs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sichuan Province
Regulation on
Religious Affairs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibet Autonomous
Region Implementing
Measures for the
``Regulation on
Religious Affairs''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESTRICTIONS ON CHILDREN'S FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Children continued in the past year to face restrictions on
their right to practice religion. Although a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs official said in 2005 that no laws restrict
minors from holding religious beliefs and that parents may give
their children a religious education,\16\ recent legislation
has not articulated a guarantee of these rights. In addition,
regulations from some provinces penalize acts such as
``instigating'' minors to believe in religion or accepting them
into a religion.\17\ In practice, children in some areas of
China have been able to participate in religious activities at
registered and unregistered venues,\18\ but in other areas,
they have been
restricted from participating in religious services or
receiving a
religious education.\19\ [For information on recently reported
restrictions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, see
China's Religious Communities--Islam within this section.]
CONTROLS OVER RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONS
The Chinese government forbids private publishing of
religious materials and restricts the production of religious
publications to state-licensed enterprises.\20\ Controls over
the publication of religious materials and restrictions on
their sale have led to a reported shortage of Bibles and other
publications.\21\ Authorities continue to detain or imprison
religious adherents who publish or distribute religious
materials without permission, in some cases charging people
with the crime of ``illegal operation of a business.'' People
detained in the past year because of activities or alleged
activities receiving, preparing, or distributing religious
texts include Dong Yutao, Shi Weihan, Ha Jingbo, and Jiang
Ruoling. Wang Zaiqing and Zhou Heng, imprisoned and detained,
respectively, on similar grounds in 2006 and 2007, were
released in the past year. [See box titled Religious Prisoners
below for additional information.]
Authorities also have continued campaigns to restrict
``illegal'' religious publications. In January 2008,
authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
announced ``illegal'' religious and political publications
would be the focal point of a censorship campaign in the
region.\22\ The announcement followed reports in earlier years
of broad censorship of various religious and spiritual
materials. In 2005, authorities reported confiscating 4.62
million items of Falun Gong and ``other cult organization
propaganda material'' nationwide.\23\ Authorities in the Tibet
Autonomous Region confiscated 54 items described as ``Dalai
Lama splittist group reactionary publications.'' \24\ In August
2007, authorities in the XUAR capital of Urumqi reported
destroying over 25,000 ``illegal'' religious books.\25\
CHINA'S RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
The government recognizes only Buddhism, Catholicism,
Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism for limited state
protections\26\ and exerts control over the internal affairs of
these groups. It uses a variety of methods within and outside
its legal system to penalize citizens who practice religion
outside of approved parameters.\27\ At the same time,
variations in government implementation of religious policy
have enabled a number of unregistered and unrecognized
religious communities to operate in China.\28\
Buddhism
In recent years authorities have reported closing or
demolishing unregistered Buddhist and Daoist temples, including
temples that incorporate practices the government deems as
feudal superstitions.\29\ In a 2008 interview, Ye Xiaowen,
Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs,
admonished against ``build[ing] temples and Buddha statues
indiscriminately.'' \30\ In the past year, local authorities
also reported suspending the operations of registered temples
for failure to adhere to the national Regulation on Religious
Affairs\31\ and confiscating ``illegal'' Buddhist compact
discs.\32\
Buddhist leaders and practitioners continue to face
sanctions for expressing their opinions outside government-
approved parameters. In late 2007, authorities prevented
Buddhist monk Shengguan from attending a human rights
conference in another province. Authorities had dismissed
Shengguan from his temple directorship in 2006 for leading a
religious ceremony commemorating victims of the Tiananmen
crackdown and for challenging corruption among government
officials and the Buddhist Association.\33\
Tibetan Buddhism
State repression of Tibetan Buddhism has reached its
highest level since the Commission began to report on religious
freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in 2002.\34\ Chinese government
and Party policy toward Tibetan Buddhists' practice of their
religion played a central role in stoking frustration that
resulted in the cascade of Tibetan protests that began on March
10, 2008. Chinese government interference with the norms of
Tibetan Buddhism and unrelenting antagonism toward the Dalai
Lama, one of the religion's foremost teachers, serve to deepen
division and distrust between Tibetan Buddhists and the
government and Communist Party. The government seeks to use
legal measures to remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
Authorities in one Tibetan autonomous prefecture have announced
unprecedented measures that seek to punish monks, nuns,
religious teachers, and monastic officials accused of
involvement in political protests in the prefecture. [For more
information, see Section V--Tibet.]
Catholicism
The state-controlled Chinese Catholic church continues to
deny its members the freedom to pursue full communion and free
communications with the Holy See and other Catholic
institutions outside of China. In the past year, the Commission
observed ongoing harassment and detention of Catholics in
China, especially unregistered bishops and priests; further
restrictions on access to pilgrimage sites; continuing
negotiations and disputes over the return of confiscated church
property; and ongoing tensions with the Holy See, despite a
shift toward re-accommodating discreet Holy See involvement in
the appointment of bishops for the state-controlled church.
harassment, detention, and other abuses
Catholics who choose not to join the state-controlled
church, as well as registered church members or leaders who run
afoul of the state-controlled church's policies, remain subject
to harassment, detention, and other abuses. The Commission
noted an increase in harassment and detention of unregistered
Catholics in 2005, after the Regulation on Religious Affairs
entered into force.\35\ The government targets unregistered
bishops in particular. The bishops, approximately 40 in total,
are reported to remain in detention, confinement in their
homes, in hiding, or under strict surveillance by the
government.\36\ In the past year, authorities continued their
pattern of detention and harassment of Jia Zhiguo, the
unregistered bishop of Zhengding diocese in Hebei province.
[For more information, see box titled Religious Prisoners
below.] The condition of some unregistered bishops, such as Su
Zhimin, who was detained in 1997, remains unknown.\37\ In the
run-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, authorities
reportedly restricted the activities of other unregistered
bishops and priests and placed some under confinement.\38\ A
court in Hebei province sentenced unregistered priest Wang
Zhong to three years' imprisonment in November 2007 after he
organized a ceremony in July to consecrate a new church
registered with the government.\39\ Reports indicate that other
priests, such as Lu Genjun, remain in custody from detentions
in past years.\40\
access to religious sites and return of religious property
In the past year, authorities continued to restrict
Catholics'
access to sites of religious significance. Authorities in
Shanghai implemented measures to prevent Catholic pilgrims from
visiting the Marian Shrine of Sheshan in May 2008.\41\
Authorities also detained some unregistered leaders to prevent
them from visiting the shrine.\42\ The restrictions accompany
longstanding limits on Catholics' freedom to visit the Marian
Shrine of Donglu, in Hebei province, following a crackdown on
pilgrimages there in the mid-1990s.\43\
The return of church property confiscated in previous
decades remained a contentious issue. In the past year,
authorities returned church property to the registered diocese
of Shanghai, but officials in Shanxi province refused to return
property to Catholics there, some of whom met with physical
attack while protesting.\44\
bishop appointment and china-holy see relations
The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)
exercises influence over the selection of bishops for the
registered church in China, including through coercion of
bishops to officiate ordinations, but in recent years the CPA
has tolerated discreet involvement by the Holy See in the
selection of some bishops.\45\ The CPA directed the ordination
of a total of five bishops in 2007 all of whom had Holy See
approval, after breaking with the practice of selecting Holy
See-approved bishops for some appointments in 2006.\46\
In late 2007, authorities again took steps to block
Catholics'
access to an open letter sent to them by Pope Benedict XVI and
subjected local Catholic leaders to political reeducation for
their distribution of the text.\47\ The letter, originally
released in June 2007, had urged reconciliation between
registered and unregistered Catholic communities in China.\48\
The Chinese government does not maintain diplomatic
relations with the Vatican. Chinese officials visited Vatican
City in May 2008 during a performance there by Chinese
musicians, but the visit did not result in concrete steps
toward establishing relations.\49\ In August, overseas media
reported that in an interview with Italian television, Beijing
Bishop Li Shan ``said relations with the Vatican are improving
and that [Li] would welcome a papal visit to China.'' \50\
Travel to the region, by both registered and unregistered
bishops, has been a sensitive issue. While organizers of the
October 2008 12th General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops did
not invite mainland bishops to attend this year, mainland
bishops invited to the event in 2005 were denied permission to
participate by the CPA.\51\ In recent years authorities have
punished unregistered bishops for their travel to the
region.\52\
Daoism
In recent years authorities have reported closing or
demolishing unregistered Buddhist and Daoist temples, including
temples that incorporate practices the government deems as
feudal superstitions.\53\ Daoist leaders remain subject to
state control and scrutiny over internal doctrine.\54\ In 2008,
the national Daoist Association of China implemented measures
for confirming Daoist personnel that require them to support
the leadership of the Communist Party and subject personnel to
penalties for engaging in activities deemed to involve ``feudal
superstition'' or ``cults.'' \55\ The government co-opts Daoist
communities to support Party propaganda campaigns. In 2008, the
head of the national Daoist Association declared Daoists'
opposition to the ``splittist'' policies of the Dalai Lama and
said that Daoists call on ``hoodwinked'' Tibetans to ``repent''
their ways.\56\
Folk Beliefs
Local governments in China have continued to take steps
that provide some recognition for folk beliefs, but that also
subject such practices to formal government scrutiny.\57\ In
2007, Hunan province passed a set of provisional measures
marking China's first provincial-level legislation on venues
for folk beliefs. The measures provide a degree of legal status
to some venues for folk belief activities, which may signify a
broader trend in accommodating some folk belief practices, but
also give authorities the discretion to deny state sanction to
those venues deemed to support cults or superstitions. Although
the State Administration for Religious Affairs maintains an
office that carries out research and formulates policy
positions on folk beliefs and religious communities outside the
five recognized groups, neither this national office nor the
adoption of the Hunan measures indicate that government
officials have officially expanded the definition of protected
forms of religious expression to fully encompass folk belief
practices.\58\ [See box titled
Regulation of Folk Beliefs below.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulation of Folk Beliefs
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hunan Province Provisional Measures for the Management of Venues
for Folk Belief Activities (Provisional Measures), issued by the Hunan
province Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) in August 2007, mark China's
first comprehensive provincial-level legal measures dedicated solely to
activities related to folk beliefs.\59\ The Provisional Measures
articulate some protection for venues for folk belief activities, but
also subject such sites to requirements that are stricter than those
imposed on general venues for religious activities. Key features of the
Provisional Measures include:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulation of Folk Beliefs--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defining Venues for Folk Belief Activities. The measures
define venues for folk belief activities to mean temples with ``the
characteristics of primitiveness, localism, diversity, historical
tradition, and primordial religions.'' They also extend the
definition to temples for ethnic minority beliefs. They exclude the
``religious activity venues'' of China's five recognized religions,
as well as Confucian temples and ancestral halls. Venues for folk
belief activities are forbidden from carrying out such ``feudal
superstitious'' activities as rites to expel illness and exorcise
demons [qubing gangui], ``spreading rumors to deceive people,''
performing trance dances [tiaoshen fangyin], and other ``illegal''
activities.
Registering Venues. The Provisional Measures provide for the
registration of existing folk belief activity venues, but do not
establish a mechanism to allow for the construction and subsequent
registration of new sites. The measures state that ``in principle,''
no new venues for folk belief activities may be built, and ``in
general,'' no venues that have been destroyed may be rebuilt. The
measures allow for the rebuilding of venues of ``historical stature''
and ``great influence'' upon consent of the provincial RAB. The
requirements are stricter than those provided for in the national
Regulation on Religious Affairs and related measures on registering
religious venues, as well as those in provincial regulations.
Registering Communities. Unlike regulations that apply to
Buddhists, Catholics, Daoists, Muslims, and Protestants, the
Provisional Measures do not provide a framework for organizing and
registering communities of people who practice folk beliefs.
Government and Party Control. Although all national and
local regulations on religion establish active state control over
religious organizations and venues, the Provisional Measures are more
explicit in providing for direct state control. The measures state
that members of a venue's management committee must endorse the
leadership of the Communist Party, as well as submit to the
administrative management of the government.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Islam
Authorities increased repression of Islam in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the past year, while the
government and Party continued to strictly control the practice
of Islam in other parts of the country. The Commission observed
broad measures implemented in the XUAR to increase monitoring
and control over religious communities and leaders; steps to
restrict pilgrimages and the observance of religious holidays
and customs; and continued measures to restrict children's
freedom of religion. Throughout China, Muslims remained subject
to state-sanctioned interpretations of their faith and to tight
state control over their pilgrimage activities.
increased repression in xinjiang
Authorities increased repression in the XUAR amid
preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games,
protests in Uyghur and Tibetan areas of China, and government
reports of terrorist and criminal activity in the region.
During the year, local governments throughout the XUAR reported
on measures to tighten control over religion, including
measures to increase surveillance of mosques, religious
leaders, and practitioners; gather information on
practitioners' religious activities; curb ``illegal'' scripture
readings; and increase accountability among implementing
officials. Authorities connected control of religious affairs
with measures to promote ``social stability'' and continued
longstanding campaigns to link Islam to ``extremism'' and the
threat of terrorism.\60\ [See box titled Religious Prisoners
below for information on religion-related detentions from the
past year and Section IV--Xinjiang--box titled Increased
Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics for more
information.] In September 2008, XUAR chair Nur Bekri called
for strengthening controls over religion and for increasing
political training of religious leaders.\61\ Amid preparations
in the XUAR for the Olympics, overseas media reported in June
that authorities in Aqsu district razed a privately built
mosque for refusing to post pro-Olympics posters.\62\
Local authorities and educational institutions in the XUAR
continued in 2007 and 2008 to impose restrictions on the
observance of the holiday of Ramadan, including restrictions on
state employees' observance of the holiday and prohibitions on
closing restaurants during periods of fasting.\63\ Overseas
media reported on the detention of two Muslim restaurant
managers for failing to abide by instructions to keep
restaurants open.\64\ Authorities intensified limits on the
observance of Ramadan with measures to curb broader religious
and cultural practices.\65\ Some local governments reported on
measures to prevent women from wearing head coverings.\66\ In
March, women in Hoten district who demonstrated against various
human rights abuses in the region protested admonishments
against such apparel issued during a government campaign to
promote stability.\67\
The XUAR government continues to maintain the harshest
legal restrictions on children's right to practice religion.
Regionwide legal measures forbid parents and guardians from
allowing minors to engage in religious activity.\68\ In August
2008, authorities reportedly forced the return of Uyghur
children studying religion in another province and detained
them in the XUAR for engaging in ``illegal religious
activities.'' \69\ Local governments continued to implement
restrictions on children's freedom of religion, taking steps
including monitoring students' eating habits during Ramadan and
strengthening education in atheism, as part of broader controls
over religion implemented in the past year.\70\ Overseas
sources have
reported that some local governments have enforced restrictions
on mosque entry by minors, as well as other populations.\71\
[For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see
Section IV--Xinjiang.]
restrictions on the freedom to make overseas pilgrimages
XUAR authorities continued in the past year to support
measures to prevent Muslims from making pilgrimages outside of
state channels, following the confiscation of Muslims'
passports in summer 2007 to restrict private pilgrimages.\72\
Officials also reportedly imposed extra restrictions on
Uyghurs' participation in state-sanctioned pilgrimages.\73\
According to overseas media, authorities reportedly gave prison
sentences to five Uyghur clerics for arranging pilgrimages
without government permission.\74\
The central government continued to maintain limits on all
Muslims' pilgrimage activities, after intensifying state
controls over the hajj in 2006.\75\ While the government
permitted more than 10,000 Muslims to make the pilgrimage to
Mecca under official auspices in 2007,\76\ pilgrims had to
abide by state controls over the trip. Among various controls,
participants have been subject to ``patriotic education'' prior
to departure\77\ and to restrictions on their activities within
Mecca in a stated effort to guard against contact with ``East
Turkistan forces'' and other ``enemy forces.'' \78\
continuing controls over internal affairs and doctrine
The government continued to tightly control the internal
affairs of Muslim communities. The state-controlled Islamic
Association of China aligns Muslim practice to government and
Party goals by
directing the confirmation and ongoing political indoctrination
of religious leaders, publication of religious texts, and
content of sermons.\79\ In the past year, authorities called
for continued measures to control religious doctrine. In a 2008
interview, Ye Xiaowen, head of the State Administration for
Religious Affairs, justified state interference in the
interpretation of Islamic doctrine on the grounds of ``public
interests.'' \80\ According to a 2008 report from the Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region, a Communist Party official who took part
in leading ``study classes'' for Muslim personnel in the region
called for ``creatively interpreting and improving'' religious
doctrine.\81\
Protestantism
Members of China's state-controlled Protestant church
remain subject to controls over their internal affairs and
doctrine, while members of unregistered church communities and
members of registered churches who run afoul of state policy
remain subject to
arbitrary harassment, detention, and imprisonment, as well as
closure of churches and confiscation of church property. In the
past year, the Commission noted increased repression of
unregistered church leaders and members in the run-up to the
Olympics, including an increase in the number of reported
detentions; increased reports of repercussions for Chinese
Protestants who interact with foreign co-religionists or
foreign visitors; and ongoing efforts to control Protestant
doctrine and co-opt church members to meet government and
Communist Party goals.
harassment, detention, and other abuses
Unregistered Protestant groups and registered churches that
run afoul of Communist Party policy remain vulnerable to
government crackdowns, as evidenced by reports of disruptions
of church services and hundreds of detentions of Protestants in
the past year. At the same time, variations in implementation
of government policy have enabled some unregistered house
churches to meet openly. Unregistered groups include those
estimated to be in over 300 networks of house churches.\82\
China Aid Association (CAA), a U.S.-based organization that
monitors freedom of religion for Chinese Protestants, marked a
rise in the reported number of Protestants detained in 2007, up
to 693 people compared to 650 in 2006, with reported total
detentions near or above 100 people in Beijing, Henan province,
and Shandong province.\83\ Unregistered church members who
followed practices the government deemed ``cults'' were among
groups vulnerable to detention.\84\ [An extrajudicial security
apparatus called the 6-10 Office monitors and leads the
suppression of groups that the government deems to be ``cult
organizations,'' including groups that self-identify as
Christian. See Falun Gong--Background: Anti-``Cult''
Institutions--6-10 Office in this section for more
information.] The CAA also noted an increase in the number of
people subjected to abuse while in detention, including
``beating, torture and psychological abuse.'' \85\ Detentions
were accompanied by damage to property, including two reported
church demolitions in 2007 in Heilongjiang province and one in
Hubei province.\86\ During raids on house churches, authorities
confiscated property including Bibles and other religious
materials.\87\ In January 2008, authorities beat house church
members in Yunnan province who asked for the return of
confiscated property.\88\
In 2008 the CAA described a ``significant deterioration''
in conditions for house church Protestants in the run-up to the
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, including ``significant
measures taken against key unregistered churches in Beijing,''
and a campaign against house churches in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.\89\ It reported in August that some house
church leaders were forced to sign an agreement restricting
their religious activities in the period surrounding the
Olympics.\90\ Harassment of at least one prominent leader of
unregistered Protestants, Chinese House Church Alliance
president Zhang Mingxuan, persisted until the conclusion of the
Paralympic Games in mid-September.\91\ While many reported
detentions have not been long-term or resulted in formal legal
charges,\92\ authorities also continued in the past year to
pursue formal criminal charges against some Protestant house
church leaders and members, and also sentenced some people to
reeducation through labor.\93\ [See box titled Religious
Prisoners below.]
House church members made limited gains in using the legal
system to challenge official abuses. In November 2007, house
church members in Shandong province secured the return of their
property after filing suit against the local public security
bureau, following public security officers' confiscation of
Bibles, computers, and other goods during a raid earlier in the
year.\94\ In September 2008, a house church in Chengdu filed
suit against a county-level religious affairs bureau (RAB),
reportedly the first case of its kind, for shutting down church
services earlier in the year.\95\ The Chengdu RAB reportedly
later issued a decision condemning the county bureau's
actions.\96\
freedom to interact with foreign co-religionists and foreign
visitors
In late 2007 and 2008, authorities targeted and detained
Chinese Protestants with ties to foreign co-religionists and
targeted foreign Protestants for penalties or expulsion from
China.\97\ [For additional information, see box titled
Religious Prisoners below.] The actions came as officials
warned foreign groups throughout 2007 to abide by Chinese
restrictions on religion and pledged harsh measures to ``strike
hard'' against communities including ``hostile'' religious
groups in the run-up to the Olympics and the 17th Party
Congress.\98\
Authorities also took steps in the past year to limit
religious activists' and rights defenders' interaction with
visiting overseas government delegations. Beijing officials
detained Hua Huiqi and his brother in August as the two planned
to visit a church that was scheduled to host U.S. President
George W. Bush. Hua, who was also harassed by authorities
earlier in the summer, escaped detention and reportedly remains
in hiding.\99\ Officials harassed or detained rights defense
lawyers, including those active in religion cases, to prevent
them from meeting with Members of the U.S. Congress in late
June.\100\ While Chinese House Church Alliance president Zhang
Mingxuan met with the delegation, authorities placed him under
surveillance after the event. Authorities later forcibly moved
Zhang from Beijing until permitting him to return in September.
Zhang was able to briefly resume house church services
afterward, but Zhang and his wife were subsequently detained in
October and his sons beaten. In June Beijing public security
officers detained Zhang for two days for attempting to meet
with a
European Union representative.\101\ Authorities placed under
surveillance a number of Beijing activists, including religious
rights activists, during the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue
in late May.\102\
controls over doctrine
China's state-controlled Protestant church continued to
interfere in internal church doctrine and to co-opt registered
religious communities to meet Party goals. The state-controlled
Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), which leads the
registered Protestant church in China, suppresses
denominational differences among Protestants and imposes a
Communist Party-defined theology, called ``theological
construction,'' on registered seminaries that, according to one
TSPM official, will ``weaken those aspects within Christian
faith that do not conform with the socialist society.'' \103\
In 2008, Ye Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for
Religious Affairs, said the government should support
theological studies by the Protestant church aimed at
``resist[ing] foreigners making use of religion to engage in
infiltration.'' \104\ In an October 2007 interview, Cao
Shengjie, head of the state-controlled China Christian Council,
expressed concern about ``social problems'' that she said
stemmed from a lack of properly trained preachers and resulting
``misinterpretations'' of doctrine.\105\
Other Religious Communities
In the past year, the Chinese government did not make
progress in removing its framework of recognizing only select
religious communities for limited state protections, nor did it
formally approve any additional communities. Chinese government
regulations permit foreign religious communities, including
communities not recognized as domestic religions by the
government, to hold services for expatriates, but Chinese
citizens are not allowed to participate.\106\ Variations in
implementation have enabled some Chinese citizens affiliated
with non-recognized religious communities to gather for
worship, including a report in 2006 that Chinese members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints met for services in
Beijing.\107\ In addition, while the central government does
not recognize the Orthodox Church, some local governments
permit the church to operate, in a limited number of cases
recognizing the church within regulations on religion.\108\ In
2008, authorities allowed Chinese Orthodox Christians in
Beijing to hold Easter celebrations at a local church.\109\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Religious Prisoners
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities continue to detain, formally arrest, and in some cases
imprison Chinese citizens because of their religious activities or for
protesting Chinese policies on religion.\110\ Known cases from the past
year and new developments in previously reported cases include:
Adil Qarim, an imam at a mosque in Kucha county, Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), whom authorities detained during a
security roundup in the aftermath of a reported series of bomb
attacks in the county on August 10. An individual accused of
involvement in the August 10 incident had attended the mosque. Adil
Qarim denied having any links to the attacks. His current whereabouts
are unknown.
Alimjan Himit (Alimujiang Yimiti), a house church leader in
the XUAR detained on January 12, 2008, and charged with subverting
state power and endangering national security. Alimjan Himit had
previously worked as the branch manager of a foreign-owned company
shut down for ``engaging in illegal religious infiltration
activities.'' A court in Kashgar tried the case on May 27, 2008, and
returned it to the procuratorate due to ``insufficient evidence,''
but authorities have kept Alimjan Himit in detention.
Ha Jingbo and Jiang Ruoling, two middle school teachers from
Dongfeng county in Jilin province, whom authorities detained in June
2008 for distributing educational leaflets about Falun Gong. After
taking the two women to the Dayang Public Security Bureau, male
officers severely beat them in an attempt to coerce confessions. The
women are currently held in Dongfeng County Detention Center on
unknown charges.
Jia Zhiguo, the unregistered bishop of Zhengding diocese,
Hebei province, who was imprisoned for approximately 20 years and
since 2004 has been detained multiple times, often over religious
holidays. Authorities detained Jia in August 2007 because he removed
a sign authorities placed on his church, identifying it as affiliated
with the state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association. Authorities
released him from detention on December 14, 2007, but placed him
under confinement in his home. Authorities detained him again on
August 24, 2008, and released him into residential surveillance on
September 18.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Religious Prisoners--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mutellip (Mutallip) Hajim, a jade merchant and father of
eight detained by XUAR authorities in January 2008 in apparent
retribution for his activities helping underground Muslim schools, as
well as for supporting the families of prisoners and for violating
population planning requirements. Mutellip Hajim reportedly died in
detention after being subjected to torture, and his corpse was
returned to his family on March 3, 2008, with orders not to publicize
his death.
Phurbu Tsering, a Tibetan Buddhist trulku (a teacher that
Tibetan Buddhists believe is a reincarnation) who founded and headed
a Tibetan Buddhist nunnery in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
Sichuan province, and whom public security officials detained on May
18 or 19, 2008. A few days earlier security forces detained more than
50 of the nuns he taught after they staged a political demonstration.
The nuns were angry because patriotic education teams had attempted
to force them to denounce the Dalai Lama and their teacher, Phurbu
Tsering.
Shi Weihan, owner of a Christian bookstore in Beijing, whom
authorities detained on November 28, 2007, accusing him of illegally
printing and distributing religious literature. Because of
``insufficient evidence,'' authorities released Shi on bail on
January 4, 2008, but detained him again on March 19, 2008.
Tagpa Rigsang, a 26-year-old Tibetan Buddhist trulku from a
Qinghai province monastery who was studying at Sera Monastery in
Lhasa, and one of approximately 16 monks detained on March 10, 2008,
for staging a political protest near Lhasa's Jokhang Temple. On March
24, the Lhasa procuratorate approved the formal arrest of 13 of the
monks, including Tagpa Rigsang, on charges of ``illegal assembly.''
Wang Zaiqing, a house church pastor first detained on April
28, 2006, in Huainan city, Anhui province, for printing and
distributing Bibles and other religious materials without government
authorization. Authorities charged Wang with ``illegal operation of a
business,'' a crime under Article 225 of the Criminal Law. On October
9, 2006, the Tianjia'an District People's Court in Huainan sentenced
him to two years' imprisonment. Wang is presumed to have been
released from prison at the expiration of his sentence on April 27,
2008.
Yang Xiyao, a 68-year-old resident of Yanshan county in
Hebei province, whom authorities detained on May 20, 2008, after
raiding his home and confiscating Falun Gong publications. Yang
served 6 years of a 10-year prison sentence in Baoding Prison from
2000 to 2006 for professing belief in Falun Gong. Officials released
him in 2006 to receive medical treatment for heart palpitations and
injuries reportedly caused by torture. Yang is once again in Baoding
Prison. It is unclear whether he is continuing to serve his existing
sentence, or if officials extended his sentence as a result of new
criminal charges.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Religious Prisoners--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Jianlin and Zhang Li, Catholic priests affiliated with
an unregistered church in Hebei province whom authorities detained in
May 2008 as they intended to travel to the Marian Shrine of Sheshan
in Shanghai. As of July 2008, overseas organizations reported that
the two remained in detention.
Zhou Heng, a house church leader and bookstore manager in
the XUAR detained on August 3, 2007, while he was picking up a
shipment of books reported to be Bibles donated by overseas churches
for free distribution in China. Zhou was charged with ``illegal
operation of a business.'' Procuratorate authorities returned the
case to the public security bureau in November due to ``insufficient
evidence'' but continued to hold Zhou Heng in custody until dropping
the charges against him and releasing him on February 19, 2008.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITIES BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
The Chinese government permits, and in some cases,
sponsors, the social welfare activities of recognized religious
communities where such activities do not conflict with Party
goals.\111\ State-sanctioned religious groups took part in
relief efforts for victims of the May 2008 Sichuan
earthquake,\112\ but authorities reportedly detained some
members of non-registered religious communities to prevent them
from providing aid.\113\ In 2008, the government permitted a
Taiwan-based Buddhist civil society organization to establish
an office on the mainland, the first time authorities have
allowed a group headed by a non-resident legal representative
to operate in this capacity.\114\
Falun Gong
On June 10, 1999, former President Jiang Zemin and
Politburo member Luo Gan established an extrajudicial security
apparatus called the ``6-10 Office.'' \115\ This entity was
charged with the mission of enforcing a ban on Falun Gong and
carrying out a crackdown against its practitioners, which
commenced on July 22, 1999, when the government formally
outlawed the movement.\116\ Falun Gong practitioners describe
it as a ``traditional Chinese spiritual discipline that is
Buddhist in nature,'' which consists of ``moral teachings, a
meditation, and four gentle exercises that resemble tai-chi and
are known in Chinese culture as `qigong.' '' \117\ Tens of
millions of Chinese citizens practiced Falun Gong in the 1990s
and adherents to the spiritual movement inside of China are
estimated to still number in the hundreds of thousands despite
the government's ongoing crackdown.\118\
The central government intensified its nine-year campaign
of persecution against Falun Gong practitioners in the months
leading up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. Chinese
security forces continued to detain and imprison Falun Gong
practitioners and subjected some who refused to disavow the
practice to torture and other forms of abuse in reeducation
through labor (RTL) camps and other detention facilities.\119\
In September 2007, Zhou Yongkang, then-Minister of Public
Security and current member of the Politburo Standing
Committee, ordered that all police and public security forces
``strike hard on overseas and domestic hostile forces, ethnic
splittists, religious extremists, violent terrorists, and the
Falun Gong cult'' to safeguard ``social stability'' for the
17th Party Congress and the Olympics.\120\ Official accounts of
the crackdown were publicly available on Web sites for all 31
of China's provincial-level jurisdictions in 2007-2008.\121\
Since the government outlawed Falun Gong in July 1999, it
has detained thousands--most likely hundreds of thousands--of
practitioners.\122\ Chinese government Web sites regularly
report detentions of Falun Gong ``criminal suspects'' and some
provincial and local authorities offer rewards as high as 5,000
yuan (US$732) to informants who report Falun Gong ``escaped
criminals.'' \123\ In July, Chinese state media reported the
arrest of 25 Falun Gong practitioners and the destruction of 7
Falun Gong publishing operations in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.\124\ In 2007, Yingshang county government in
Anhui province revealed that it had detained 13 ``Falun Gong
and other cult criminals,'' held another in ``public security
detention,'' and ``reeducated and reprimanded'' more than
1,600.\125\ During the same period, Miyi county in Sichuan
province recorded detentions of 62 practitioners as part of its
``strike hard'' campaign and claimed to have ``transformed'' 14
of them.\126\ Relying on reports from practitioners and their
families in China, sources outside of China, not all of whom
are themselves Falun Gong practitioners, estimate that Chinese
authorities detained ``at least 8,037'' practitioners between
December 2007 and the end of June 2008 in a nationwide pre-
Olympics crackdown.\127\ International observers believe that
Falun Gong practitioners constitute a large percentage--some
say as many as half--of the total number of Chinese imprisoned
in RTL camps.\128\ Falun Gong sources report that at least
200,000 practitioners are being held in RTL and other forms of
detention.\129\ As of April 2008, Falun Gong sources in the
United States had documented over 3,000 deaths of practitioners
as a result of government persecution as well as over 63,000
cases of torture since 1999.\130\ From 2000 to 2005, Falun Gong
practitioners accounted for 66 percent of all cases of alleged
torture by Chinese authorities reported to the UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture.\131\
As this Commission reported in 2006, Chinese government
persecution of Falun Gong practitioners contravenes the
standards in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which China has signed but not
ratified.\132\ The Chinese government asserts its anti-Falun
Gong campaign is necessary to protect public safety, order, and
morals in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution.\133\
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, however, has
rejected this argument.\134\
background: anti-``cult'' institutions
6-10 Office
Publicly available government documents detail the central
role of the 6-10 Office in the persecution of Falun Gong. Since
its inception, the 6-10 Office has also expanded its targets to
include other religious and qigong groups that the central
government deems ``harmful.'' \135\ According to Nanjing City
Public Security provisions
published in June 2008, the 6-10 Office is at the forefront of
``organizing and leading the struggle against Falun Gong.'' Its
responsibilities include ``directing investigations into
significant cases,'' ``digging deep to uncover covert plots and
organizers,'' ``gathering intelligence,'' and ``organizing and
coordinating the prevention, control, and punishment of Falun
Gong and other harmful qigong organizations by municipal public
security forces.'' \136\ A notice posted on a Yunnan provincial
government Web site in March 2008 declares that the government
must ``sternly guard against'' Falun Gong, calling it a
``cultic, anti-Communist Party, anti-socialist organization.''
It warns government workers that ``if [you] hear of Falun Gong
reactionary propaganda immediately notify your unit leader and
the public security `610' Office.'' \137\
An April 2008 notice posted on the Gutian county government
Web site in Fujian province describes the central government's
``basic policy'' outlawing the practice of Falun Gong and
outlines five primary tasks to implement: (1) ``explicitly
order the dissemination of information regarding the ban [on
Falun Gong],'' (2) ``carry out comprehensive administration [of
the policy],'' (3) ``fully utilize all legal weapons, sternly
punish the criminal activities of cult ringleaders and key
members,'' (4) ``do a good job at transformation through
reeducation for the great majority of practitioners,'' and (5)
``prevent external cults from seeping into the area, reduce the
conditions that allow cults to propagate.'' \138\
Several reports mention ``three zeroes'' that security
officials should aim to achieve. An official report from the
Communist Party Political-Legal Committee of Wuling district in
the city of Changde in Hunan province urges cadres to
``resolutely achieve the `three zeroes goal' in 6-10 management
work,'' which is defined as ``no petitions in Beijing, zero
incidents of local assemblies and protests, zero incidents of
interference with television broadcasts.'' \139\ The same
report also stresses the need to carry out four tasks to this
end: (1) ``strengthen the prevention, control, and management
[of Falun Gong] and conscientiously keep an unflinching eye on
Falun Gong practitioners,'' (2) ``strengthen the use of
transformation through reeducation as a line of attack against
their fortifications, use all your might to transform obstinate
Falun Gong elements,'' (3) ``strengthen strikes against and
punishment of [Falun Gong], give the `Falun Gong' underground
gang a forceful scare,'' and (4) ``strengthen anti-cult
cautionary education, reinforce the people's ability to
recognize, prevent, and oppose cults.'' \140\
Aggressive surveillance is a key aspect of the 6-10
Office's work. The Wuling Party Political-Legal Committee
describes having implemented a set of three ``responsibility
measures'' to ensure that ``more than 600 Falun Gong
practitioners'' are closely monitored by the district police,
neighborhood committee, and their own relatives.\141\ The
Committee also instructs security officials to organize an
``inspect and control'' system whereby local police are to
conduct home ``visits'' of Falun Gong practitioners three times
per day.\142\ In order to monitor more ``die-hard''
practitioners, public security forces are to form an
``inspection and control small group'' to carry out ``24-hour
surveillance.'' \143\ A county report from Jiangxi province
also stresses the need to ``dispatch inspection and control
personnel'' during ``important periods of time'' in order to
ascertain a practitioner's ``movement 24 hours a day,'' and
report ``unusual situations'' in a timely manner to the 6-10
Office.\144\ In addition to surveillance, the 6-10 Office is
also required to develop broad ``intelligence channels'' that
allow them to ``know whenever the enemy moves.'' \145\
6-10 Offices throughout China maintain extrajudicial
``transformation through reeducation'' facilities that are used
specifically to detain Falun Gong practitioners who have
completed terms in reeducation through labor (RTL) camps but
whom authorities refuse to release.\146\ The term
``transformation through reeducation'' (jiaoyu zhuanhua)
describes a process of ideological reprogramming whereby
practitioners are subjected to various methods of physical and
psychological coercion until they recant their belief in Falun
Gong.\147\ In 2002, local officials in Hunan joined with the 6-
10 Office to establish a ``transformation through reeducation
camp'' for Falun Gong practitioners where ``management
methods'' such as solitary confinement are employed. Four years
after opening, the camp claimed a ``transformation rate'' of 70
percent for the 77 detainees in custody.\148\ In reporting on a
transformation camp in Weifang city in 2000, Pulitzer Prize
winner Ian Johnson writes that it was ``at these unofficial
prisons that the killings [of Falun Gong practitioners]
occurred.'' \149\
Chinese government sources contain many references to the
6-10 Office calling for the ``punishment'' (chengzhi) of Falun
Gong practitioners.\150\ In Hunan's Changde city, Wuling
district officials boast of having ``cracked'' 31 Falun Gong
cases that produced 33 ``public security detentions,'' 19
``reeducation through labor sentences,'' 29 ``criminal
detentions,'' 20 ``arrests,'' as well as the ``destruction of
12 underground nests'' between 2002 and 2006.\151\ A city
government Web site in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
lauded a security official for his role in ``striking against''
and ``disposing of'' over 1,000 cases involving ``core
members'' of Falun Gong and the Disciples sect.\152\ A report
to the 9th CCP Representative Assembly in Guandu District of
Kunming City in Yunnan province acknowledges the capture of
``26 Falun Gong criminal suspects'' in 2005. Eleven of these
``suspects'' were formally arrested and six were sentenced to
RTL camps.\153\ Officials from a township in Anhui province
posted a report stating that after several years of ``strikes
against and cleansing'' (daji qingli) of Falun Gong, the
majority of local practitioners had ``realized their errors and
mended their ways.'' \154\
Gao Zhisheng, a lawyer who has defended various Chinese
activists, exposed numerous forms of torture and violence
employed by the 6-10 Office against Falun Gong
practitioners.\155\ Gao describes the 6-10 Office as a
``Gestapo-like organization'' with ``powers that no civilized
state in the world would even consider trying to obtain.'' He
further notes that ``of all the true accounts of incredible
violence that I have heard, of all the records of the
government's inhuman torture of its own people, what has shaken
me most is the routine practice on the part of the 6-10 Office
and the police of assaulting women's genitals.'' \156\ Gao went
missing in September 2007 following the public release of a
letter he sent to the U.S. Congress and remains in detention at
an undisclosed location.\157\
Anti-Cult Associations
Working in concert with the 6-10 Office to undermine
Chinese citizens' right to believe in and practice Falun Gong
and other banned religious sects is a national network of
``anti-cult associations'' (fanxiejiao xiehui).\158\ Local
anti-cult associations can be found at the provincial, county,
municipal, and neighborhood level.\159\ Such associations have
emerged as a prominent information channel for the government's
campaign against Falun Gong, as they widely disseminate anti-
Falun Gong propaganda by holding study sessions and other
community activities to raise ``anti-cult awareness.'' \160\
The Beijing-based China Anti-Cult Association was founded in
November 2000 and claims to be a ``non-profit, social welfare
organization'' that was ``voluntarily formed'' and ``registered
according to the law.'' \161\ The government's hand, however,
can be clearly discerned in the publications and activities of
anti-cult associations. An anti-cult association in Guizhou
province admitted in one report that it was founded ``under the
leadership of the Party and government.'' \162\ Anti-cult
association publications often expose connections with the 6-10
Office.\163\ A May 2007 report from Changchun revealed that the
Jilin Provincial Anti-Cult Association partnered with
provincial and municipal 6-10 Offices to ``jointly organize and
launch'' anti-cult activities at 87 middle schools throughout
the provincial capital.\164\
directives and measures related to falun gong and the olympics
In April 2008, the central government 6-10 Office issued an
internal directive to local governments nationwide mandating
propaganda activities to prevent Falun Gong from ``interfering
with or harming'' the Olympics.\165\ References to the
directive appear on official Web sites in every province and at
every level of government.\166\ Most official reports focus on
demonstrating that local authorities have stepped up security
and fulfilled the requirement to ``educate'' target audiences
on the directive's content.\167\ Local authorities distributed
the directive widely in an effort to raise public awareness.
References can be found on various Web sites ranging from
public entities with indirect relations with the state (state-
run enterprises, public schools, universities, parks, TV
stations, meteorological bureaus, etc.) to commercial and
social entities with no obvious ties to the state.\168\ Anti-
cult associations also actively circulated and promoted the 6-
10 Office's Olympic directive.\169\
Olympic and municipal officials in Shanghai and Beijing
also issued directives pertaining to Falun Gong in the lead-up
to the 2008 Olympic Games. The Shanghai Public Security Bureau
sent a warning to Falun Gong practitioners and other dissidents
in April 2008 demanding that they remain in the city during the
Olympics and report to the public security office at least once
a week until the end of October. The notice threatened to
detain or punish anyone who violates the order.\170\ In
November 2007, Beijing Olympic organizers reminded visitors to
the games that possession of Falun Gong writings is strictly
forbidden and that no
exceptions would be made for international visitors.\171\ The
Beijing Public Security Bureau issued a public notice offering
a reward of up to 500,000 yuan (US$73,100) for informants who
report Falun Gong plans to ``sabotage'' the Olympics.\172\ From
January to June 2008, public security agents reportedly
arrested at least 208 practitioners from all 18 districts and
counties in Beijing municipality. Falun Gong sources have
documented the names and other information for 141 of the 208
practitioners who were detained in Beijing, 30 of whom are now
reportedly being held in reeducation through labor camps with
sentences as long as two-and-a-half years.\173\
Chinese security officials made statements prior to the
Olympics that sought to link Falun Gong with terrorist threats,
but produced no evidence to substantiate these claims.\174\
Tian Yixiang, the head of the Military Affairs Department of
the Beijing Olympics Protection Group, listed Falun Gong among
the groups that might ``use various means, even extreme
violence, to interfere with or harm the smooth execution of the
Olympic Games.'' \175\ Li Wei, Chairman of the Center for
Counterterrorism Studies at the quasi-official China Institute
of Contemporary International Relations, categorized Falun Gong
as among the top five terrorist threats to the 2008 Olympic
Games.\176\
domestic institutional sources of anti-falun gong activity
The PRC Constitution stipulates that the state ``protects
the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals
residing abroad and protects the lawful rights and interests of
returned Chinese and of the family members of Chinese nationals
residing abroad.'' \177\ The primary government institution to
which the Constitution assigns this role is the State Council--
the executive body at the pinnacle of state power and
administration.\178\ Within the State Council, the office
responsible for implementing this mandate is the State
Council's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO).
In 2001, then OCAO director, Guo Dongpo, urged cadres to
``wake up and see that the struggle with the `Falun Gong' cult
is a serious political struggle.'' \179\ Guo called for
marshalling OCAO resources to ``unite all powers that can be
united . . . make them understand and support the Chinese
government's position and policy of handling the `Falun Gong'
problem according to the law.'' Guo also called for ``striking
against the overseas forces of the `Falun Gong' cult, stop them
from spreading, and eliminate their bad influence.'' \180\ An
official report on the January 2007 OCAO directors' meeting, in
which OCAO provincial and municipal leaders gathered with the
national leadership in Beijing, stated that the ``OCAO also
coordinates the launching of anti `Falun Gong' struggles
overseas by relevant departments.'' \181\
A 2005 OCAO report urges overseas Chinese and returned
overseas Chinese to ``firmly establish the concept of `greater
overseas Chinese affairs,' '' and to ``aggressively expand
domestic Chinese and overseas Chinese friendship ties.''
Specifically, overseas Chinese should ``aggressively expand the
struggle with Taiwanese independence forces, the Falun Gong
cult, ethnic separatism and other enemy forces in order to
contribute to the defense of state security.'' \182\ A similar
provincial report published on the OCAO Web site devotes a
section to ``resolutely implementing and executing the Party
line, the Party's guiding principles, and the Party's
policies.'' Within this section, OCAO cadres are called to
``attach a high degree of importance to launching struggles to
oppose the `Falun Gong' cult and to the work of `safeguarding
stability.' '' \183\ In an OCAO online research journal, a
cadre from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
discusses the formation of an ``Overseas Chinese Work Corps.''
The cadre writes that within the XUAR Overseas Chinese Work
Corps system, ``more than 30,000 overseas Chinese'' operate
under the ``correct leadership of the Party Work Corps,'' and
are charged with ``resolutely implementing and executing each
and every policy task in the Party's and nation's overseas
Chinese work.'' One such policy task is defined as ``launching
a resolute struggle against enemy forces, ethnic separatists,
Taiwanese independence forces, and the Falun Gong cult
organization.'' \184\
In 2006, Chen Yujie, the Director of the OCAO, ``expressed
his admiration'' to a visiting delegation of overseas Chinese
and Chinese-Americans from Chicago for their ``positive
contributions'' in the ``struggle against `Falun Gong' and
other enemy forces.'' \185\ Reports of similar appeals to take
action against Falun Gong have appeared in Europe, with the
China Anti-Cult Association taking a leading role in spreading
anti-Falun Gong propaganda there.\186\ In September 2008, the
OCAO Web site reported that the Chinese Ambassador to Argentina
attended an award ceremony in which a local Chinese man was
honored for ``organizing members of the China Peaceful
Unification Promotion Association of Argentina to aggressively
struggle against `Falun Gong' elements and Tibetan
independence'' during the Olympic torch relay.\187\
In July 2008, the OCAO held a meeting in Beijing to discuss
their ``integrated preparations and deployment during the
Olympic period.'' A high-ranking official used this occasion to
stress to OCAO cadres that ``inviting overseas Chinese to
attend the opening and closing ceremonies is a heavy task for
our office. We must adopt strict organizational measures,
thorough security services, and good security defense.''
Immediately thereafter, the official reminded his audience to
``strengthen network security protections and the security of
internal office secrets'' because ``the activities of Falun
Gong elements grow wilder by the day.'' \188\
Ethnic Minority Rights
Ethnic minority citizens of China do not enjoy the ``right
to administer their internal affairs'' as guaranteed to them in
law.\1\ In 2008, Tibetans and Uyghurs in China demonstrated
against government policy toward their communities,
underscoring the failures of the government to provide
meaningful autonomy in designated ethnic minority regions and
to safeguard the rights of ethnic minorities throughout
China.\2\ Although the Chinese government protects some aspects
of ethnic minority rights and is more tolerant of ethnic
minority communities that do not overtly challenge state
policies, shortcomings in both the substance and the
implementation of Chinese ethnic minority policies prevent
ethnic minority citizens from enjoying their rights in line
with domestic Chinese law and international legal standards.\3\
Authorities continued in 2008 to repress citizen activism
by ethnic minorities in China. [For more information on
government
responses to protests in Tibetan and Uyghur areas, see Section
II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, Section II--
Freedom of Expression, Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--
Tibet. For information on ethnic Koreans, see Section II--North
Korean Refugees in China.] In the past year, authorities in the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) punished ethnic
minority rights advocates as well as citizens perceived to have
links with ethnic rights organizations, intensifying a trend
noted by the Commission in its 2007 Annual Report.\4\ In July,
authorities in the IMAR detained businessman Burildguun for
alleged ties to an overseas Mongolian political group.\5\ In
March, authorities detained writer Naranbilig for 20 days in
connection with his plans to attend the UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues and with his broader activities advocating
for the rights of ethnic Mongols. The same month, authorities
also detained activist Tsebegjab for his alleged ties to
overseas Mongolian activists. Authorities later placed both
Naranbilig and Tsebegjab under confinement in their homes.\6\
In January, authorities at the Beijing airport detained
Jiranbayariin Soyolt, a native of the IMAR and citizen of
Mongolia who had been active in promoting ethnic minority
rights in the IMAR. Chinese officials released him in June and
returned him to Mongolia.\7\ Some of the activists had drawn
attention to Chinese government practices infringing on the
rights of ethnic Mongols. Longstanding government policies in
the IMAR have disrupted traditional pastoralist livelihoods,
forced resettlement and assimilation, and reduced the use of
the Mongolian language.\8\ IMAR authorities have taken steps in
recent years to spur the use of Mongolian, including through
legislation implemented in 2005,\9\ but officials found in 2007
that ``serious problems'' remained in promoting the
language.\10\
The government reported taking steps in the past year to
improve economic and social conditions for ethnic minorities.
It
remains unclear, however, whether the new measures have been
effectively implemented and include safeguards to protect
ethnic minority rights and to solicit input from local
communities. As the Commission noted in past reports,
development efforts have brought mixed results for ethnic
minority communities.\11\ In 2008 Premier Wen Jiabao announced
more support for rural ethnic minority regions, but also tied
economic improvement to the resettlement of villages.\12\
Officials reported in the past year continuing
efforts to promote compulsory education in ethnic minority
areas\13\ and taking steps to cultivate more ethnic minority
cadres.\14\ The Guizhou provincial government continued efforts
in 2008 to apply intellectual property protection to
traditional knowledge used by ethnic minority communities. [See
Section III--Commercial Rule of Law for an analysis of this
development.] In 2008, authorities reported positively on
implementation of a five-year development program for ethnic
minorities and ethnic minority regions that was issued in 2007
and first reported on by the Commission in its 2007 Annual
Report.\15\ Although the program supports potentially
beneficial reforms, it also includes measures designed to
monitor and report on ethnic relations and perceived threats to
stability.\16\ In 2007, central government authorities reported
on researching strategies to monitor and report on ethnic
relations.\17\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prisoner Profile: Hada
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2008 detentions of Burildguun, Naranbilig, Tsebegjab, and
Jiranbayariin Soyolt underscore the repercussions ethnic Mongols have
faced for advocating ethnic minority rights and challenging Chinese
policy in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR). Bookstore owner
Hada continues to serve a 15-year sentence for his activities promoting
ethnic minority rights and democracy. A brief chronology of his case
follows.\18\
1992: Hada founds the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance to
promote self-determination and democracy in Inner Mongolia.
1995: Authorities detain Hada on December 11 after he organizes
peaceful protests for ethnic rights in the IMAR capital of Hohhot.
1996: The Hohhot Intermediate People's Court sentences Hada on
November 11 to 15 years' imprisonment for ``splittism'' and
``espionage.'' Fellow activist Tegexi receives a 10-year sentence at
the same trial for ``splittism'' and is released in early December
2002.
1997: The Inner Mongolia High People's Court rejects Hada's
appeal.
2006: Authorities detain Hada's wife Xinna and son Uiles while
the two attend the trial of ethnic Mongol physician Naguunbilig and his
spouse Daguulaa. Authorities reportedly beat Uiles for over 20 minutes
while holding him in custody. Authorities release Xinna after 3 hours
in custody, but order Uiles to spend 13 days in detention at the Hohhot
City Detention Center.
2008: Hada remains in the Inner Mongolia No. 4 Prison in
Chifeng, where he is reported to be in poor health, has been denied
proper medical treatment, and has been subjected to routine physical
abuse. He is due for release from prison on December 10, 2010.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Planning
INTRODUCTION
China's population planning policies in both their nature
and implementation constitute human rights violations according
to international standards. During 2008, the central government
ruled out change to the policy for at least a decade.
Population planning policies limit most women in urban areas to
bearing one child, while permitting slightly more than half of
women in rural areas to bear a second child if their first
child is female.\1\ In the past year, the National Population
and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) retired some of its more
strident slogans (e.g., ``one more baby means one more tomb'')
in an effort to soften the public presentation of its policies,
but no corresponding steps were taken to end or change the
coercive nature of these policies.\2\ Central and local
authorities continued to strictly control the reproductive
lives of Chinese women through an all-encompassing system of
family planning regulations in which the state is directly
involved in the reproductive decisions of its citizens. Local
officials and state-run work units monitor women's reproductive
cycles in order to prevent unauthorized births. The government
requires married couples to obtain a birth permit before they
can lawfully bear a child and forces them to use contraception
at other times. Violators of the policy are routinely punished
with exorbitant fines, and in some cases, subjected to forced
sterilization, forced abortion, arbitrary detention, and
torture.\3\
Although implementation tends to vary across localities,
the government's population planning laws and regulations
contravene international human rights standards by limiting the
number of children that women may bear and by coercing
compliance with population targets through heavy fines.\4\ For
example, the Population and Family Planning Law, which became
effective in 2002, is not consistent with the standards set by
the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action
of the Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development.\5\ Controls
imposed on Chinese women and their families, and additional
abuses engendered by the system, from forced abortion to
discriminatory policies against ``out-of-plan'' children, also
violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women,\6\ Convention on the
Rights of the Child,\7\ and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.\8\ As a state party to
these treaties, China is bound to uphold their terms.
``SOCIAL COMPENSATION FEES''
The NPFPC issued a directive in September 2007 calling for
``social compensation fees'' to be levied at higher levels
according to income in order to discourage affluent Chinese
from having more children than the law allows. It also warned
urban residents that violations of the population planning
regulations would now result in negative marks taken against
their financial credit records.\9\ ``Social compensation fees''
(shehui baoyang fei) are penalties or fines that local
governments assess against couples who give birth to an
unapproved child. For certain couples, these fines pose a
dilemma between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring
devastating financial costs. Often with court approval, family
planning officials are allowed to take ``forcible'' action
against families who are not willing or able to pay the fines.
These ``forcible'' actions include the confiscation of family
belongings and the destruction of the violators' homes.\10\
Provincial governments have also introduced new punitive
measures--including the threat of job loss or demotion, denial
of
promotion, expulsion from the Party, and destruction of
personal property--as a supplement to standard fines for all
violators, regardless of their economic status.\11\ Hunan,
Shaanxi, and Guangdong were among the first provinces to
immediately target ``elite'' segments of the population with
new penalties.\12\ Less than a month after the NPFPC directive
was issued, Hunan adopted a new penalty standard equal to two
to six times the violator's income for the previous year for
each ``illegal conception.'' For each child conceived after the
first ``unauthorized birth,'' a fine equal to three times the
violator's income is imposed, which is in addition to the
standard penalty. For children conceived out of wedlock,
violators face a fine of six to eight times their income from
the previous year.\13\
Following suit in 2008, the Beijing Population and Family
Planning Commission began drafting a proposal to penalize more
affluent and socially prominent violators of the policy by
placing their names on a financial blacklist and by banning
them from receiving civic awards or honors.\14\ Other provinces
are widely publicizing ``unlawful'' births in an effort to
shame violators into compliance. Henan and Zhejiang provinces,
for example, have adopted measures to ``expose celebrities and
high-income people who violate the family planning policy'' and
thereby tarnish their reputations.\15\ In January 2008, the
Hubei Provincial Party Committee and government issued a three-
year ban on government employment and called for revocation of
Party membership for violators of the population planning
policies.\16\ In 2007, Hubei expelled 500 Party cadres and
dismissed 395 government officials, including 3 provincial
lawmakers and 4 members of the local Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), for having ``unauthorized''
children.\17\ At least one county in Hubei has also begun to
deny retirement benefits to teachers who violate birth
quotas.\18\ Hunan disqualified 31 candidates for the local
People's Congresses and CPPCC in November 2007, while Liaoning
province barred 21 lawmakers from parliamentary duties in
2008.\19\ One former CPPCC member and owner of a cement company
in Hubei was fined 765,500 yuan (US$105,000) for fathering a
second child without the government's permission.\20\ In 2007,
Hubei punished 93,000 violators of population regulations and
collected a total of 230 million yuan (US$33.5 million) in
``social compensation fees.'' \21\ Local authorities often use
legal action and coercive measures to collect money from poor
citizens who cannot afford to pay the fees.\22\
IMPLEMENTATION
The use of coercive measures in the enforcement of
population planning policies remains commonplace despite
provisions for the punishment of abuses perpetrated by
officials outlined in the Population and Family Planning
Law.\23\ The same law requires that local family planning
bureaus conduct regular pregnancy tests on married women and
administer unspecified ``follow-up'' services.\24\ The
population planning regulations of at least 18 of China's 31
provincial-level jurisdictions permit officials to take steps
to ensure that birth quotas are not exceeded; these steps
include forced abortion.\25\ In some cases, local officials
coerce abortions even in the third trimester.\26\ ``Termination
of pregnancy'' is explicitly required if a pregnancy does not
conform with provincial population planning regulations in
Anhui, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, Liaoning, and
Ningxia provinces. In 10 other provinces--Fujian, Guizhou,
Guangdong, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shanxi, Shaanxi,
and Yunnan--population planning officials are authorized to
take ``remedial measures'' to deal with ``unlawful''
births.\27\
In April 2008, population planning officials in the town of
Zhubao in Shandong province ``detained and beat'' the sister of
a woman who had illegally conceived a second child, in an
attempt to compel the pregnant woman to undergo an
abortion.\28\ Chen Guangcheng, a legal advocate and rights
defender from nearby Linyi city, was sentenced to more than
four years in prison in 2006 for exposing widespread abuses by
local family planning officials. In April 2008, Chen filed a
lawsuit alleging that Linyi officials had ``trumped up
charges'' against him in ``retaliation'' for his efforts to
expose their misdeeds. Chen also wrote a detailed letter to the
president of the Supreme People's Court and the procurator-
general at the Supreme People's Procuratorate to protest his
imprisonment and petition for release.\29\ In 2007 and 2008,
prison
authorities prevented Chen from communicating with his family,
refused a request for medical parole, and accused him of having
``illicit relations with a foreign country.'' \30\ Chen's wife,
Yuan Weijing, confirmed that cases of forced abortion and other
abuses have resurfaced in Shandong in 2008. She remains under
constant police surveillance because of her husband's prior
advocacy.\31\ In March 2008, family planning officials in
Zhengzhou city, the capital of Henan province, forcibly
detained a 23-year-old unmarried woman who was seven months
pregnant. Officials reportedly tied her to a bed, induced
labor, and killed the newborn upon delivery.\32\ Regulations in
most provinces forbid a single woman to have a child and
residency permit regulations often deny registry to children
born out of wedlock.\33\ ``Out-of-plan'' children in China,
those whose birth violated population planning regulations, are
frequently denied access to education and face hurdles to
finding legitimate employment.\34\
Recent reports indicate many localities continue to use
forced sterilization to enforce population planning rules. One
report
describes lessons learned by Gansu provincial family planning
officials from a recent visit to Shanxi province. It emphasizes
the
importance of ``firmly grasping the long-term implementation of
effective contraception, especially persevering to the end with
the sterilization of households with two female children.''
\35\ In spring 2008, in a reported effort to meet local targets
for sterilization, authorities in Tongwei county in Gansu
province allegedly forcibly sterilized and detained for two
months a Tibetan woman who had abided by local population
planning requirements.\36\ Most ethnic minorities in rural
areas, such as Tibetans, are officially permitted to have more
than one child under population planning regulations. In some
localities, officials impose restrictions nevertheless.
According to overseas Uyghur rights observers, Chinese
authorities have carried out forced sterilizations and
abortions against Uyghur women.\37\ In the aforementioned case
of forced sterilization of a Tibetan woman in Gansu province,
local officials were reportedly motivated by the promise of
promotion and a monetary reward equal to three months' pay for
performing a set number of sterilization procedures within
their locality.\38\
The linking of job promotion with an official's ability to
meet or exceed such targets occurs in many provinces and
provides a powerful structural incentive for officials to
employ coercive measures in order to meet population goals.\39\
In a July 2006 speech, a Tongwei county official highlighted
the county's failure to reach sterilization quotas and
admonished local family planning workers to ``continue to keep
the sterilization of households with two girls . . . as your
focus.'' \40\ The official urged his subordinates to do the
following:
From the beginning to the end, each village and town
must give the highest priority to the tubal ligation of
women who have given birth to two girls, especially
within those villages where these women have not yet
had their tubes tied. We must demonstrate dogged
determination and break the normal procedures. We
should solder this assignment to the bodies of every
cadre. Set the time and set the assignment. On multiple
levels and using different channels, we should obtain
information on spouses who are attempting to flee the
county. By hook or crook, we must carry out
contraceptive measures and every village must meet at
least one of its target assignments.\41\
The Tongwei official's reference to demonstrating ``dogged
determination'' and breaking the ``normal procedures'' signals
official tolerance of abuses perpetuated by family planning
cadres against violators of population planning regulations. As
noted in the Commission's last report, for example, large-scale
protests erupted in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in 2007
after local officials carried out forced abortions,
sterilizations, and the looting of homes to punish violators of
the policy.\42\
Local governments often offer monetary incentives and other
benefits to informants who report violations of population
planning regulations. The Tongwei county government named 2008
the ``year of fundamental construction'' for population
planning and unveiled a ``peaceful life project'' of various
social welfare initiatives for sterilized rural women with two
female children.\43\ In September 2007, the Tongwei County
Population Bureau began to give monetary incentives to
informants who report unsterilized households with two female
children and to women who voluntarily undergo tubal
ligation.\44\ According to the announcement, informants are
guaranteed ``strict secrecy'' and a ``one-time payment of 3,000
yuan (US$438).'' Women who voluntarily take the initiative to
arrange for a sterilization procedure with the local government
are promised the same reward given to informants as well as a
``social security deposit'' of 1,000 yuan (US$146) and an
additional one-time
reward of 10,000 yuan (US$1,459).\45\ At least three localities
in Henan province have also adopted monetary incentives for
compliance with population planning regulations, providing a
``one-time reward of 3,000-5,000 yuan [US$438 to US$729] for
[couples who abandon] plans to have a second child.'' \46\
The utilization of positive incentives for compliance with
birth quotas and sterilization policies in Henan and Gansu
provinces reflects an emerging national pattern, but thus far
incentives for compliance have only been implemented in
addition to, rather than in place of, longstanding coercive
measures. In November 2007, the central government issued a
directive to encourage this ``benefit-oriented mechanism'' in
population planning, which offers financial rewards in the
areas of housing, healthcare, education, and poverty
alleviation to compliant couples in rural areas.\47\ Examples
of these benefits include government-provided insurance for
compliant families and education subsidies for girls who are
their families' only child.\48\ Some provinces have also eased
restrictions to allow younger couples who come from single-
child families to give birth to two children. The National
Population and Family Planning Commission's (NPFPC) original
directive indicated that couples from one-child families in 27
provinces would enjoy this exemption, but in 2007, a NPFPC
spokesman claimed that the exemption applied to all such
couples nationwide with the sole exception of Henan
province.\49\ Like other population policies, implementation is
likely uneven across provinces.
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CRISES
The government's aim in relaxing birth quotas for couples
from one-child families is to address a rising demographic
crisis caused by three decades of restrictive population
planning, but experts believe these efforts can only mitigate,
not solve, trends that are already set in motion.\50\ China now
faces two emerging demographic trends caused by population
planning that could start to undermine its economic growth
within the next decade: (1) a ``graying'' society in which the
elderly population increases disproportionately to the working
age population and creates pressure on young adults who must
support a larger number of elderly dependents with no
assistance from siblings, and (2) an artificially low fertility
rate that will reduce the number of potential workers.\51\
Another demographic challenge that China presently
confronts is a severely skewed sex ratio. In 2000, the most
recent year for which national census data is available, the
male-to-female sex ratio for the infant-to-four year old age
group was reportedly 120.8 males for every 100 females. This is
far above the global norm of roughly 105 males for every 100
females.\52\ At least five provinces--Jiangsu, Guangdong,
Hainan, Anhui, and Henan--reported ratios over 130 in 2005.\53\
In 2007, the central government estimated that China has 37
million more males than females.\54\ By 2020, the Chinese
government estimates that there will be at least 30 million men
of marriageable age that may be unable to find a spouse.\55\
Such a situation could fuel petty crime, prostitution, human
trafficking, drug abuse, and HIV/STD transmission.\56\ Some
political scientists argue that large numbers of ``surplus
males'' could create social conditions that the Chinese
government may choose to address by expanding military
enlistment.\57\
In response to strict birth limits imposed by the
government, Chinese couples often engage in sex-selective
abortion to ensure that they have a son, especially rural
couples whose first child is a girl.\58\ For this reason,
China's skewed sex ratio is largely attributable to its
population planning policies and a traditional cultural
preference for sons. Comparing China's skewed sex ratio with
global averages, one economist estimates that more than 12
million girls were unaccounted for by the 2000 census, many of
whom may have been aborted upon discovery of the sex of the
fetus.\59\ A UN expert based in Beijing estimates that by 2014
the number of ``missing women'' in China will reach between 40
to 60 million.\60\ In 2006, the National People's Congress
Standing Committee considered, but did not pass, a proposed
amendment to the Criminal Law that would have criminalized sex-
selective abortion.\61\ While at least one provincial
government has passed regulations imposing fines on women who
undergo sex-selective abortions and on the health organizations
that perform them,\62\ the central government has taken no
other action at the national level.
In July 2008, Chinese authorities admitted that the country
now has more than 100 million people with no siblings, which
critics charge has deleterious effects on the social
development of Chinese youth who are treated like ``little
emperors'' within their homes.\63\ Many Chinese blame the
population policies for social problems as diverse as rising
crime among young men, obesity and selfishness among urban
youth, and the growing prevalence of divorce among young
couples from single-child families.\64\
SIGNS OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG OFFICIALS
Population planning has been largely off-limits as a topic
for public debate, but some officials began to speak out on the
issue over the past year.\65\ In March 2007, 29 delegates to
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference called
for eliminating the one-child policy entirely because of the
developmental and social problems that it caused China's
youth.\66\ In February 2008, Zhao Baige, Vice-Minister of the
National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC),
told reporters that the government was considering changing the
population planning policy ``incrementally.'' \67\ Shortly
thereafter, a deputy to the National People's Congress called
for replacing the current policy with a new formula that
encourages all couples to have one child, allows them to have
two, prohibits them from having three, and rewards them for
having none.\68\ Zhang Weiqing, the Minister of the NPFPC,
moved quickly to quell the discussion by issuing an emphatic
statement that China would ``by no means waver'' in its
population planning policies for ``at least the next decade.''
\69\ The emergence of different views from Chinese official
circles suggests the existence of previously unobserved debates
within the Party regarding the future of the population
planning policy. Restrictions on the public expression of
dissent by ordinary citizens continue to obscure outsiders'
ability to discern trends in the relative support and
opposition to such regulations among the general Chinese
populace. The Commission will continue to monitor and
investigate these trends as greater information becomes
available.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sichuan Earthquake
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 12, 2008, a powerful earthquake struck Sichuan province leading
to the death of more than 80,000 people. Among the dead were thousands
of children who lost their lives when school buildings collapsed. Many
parents were left to face an uncertain future without the support
system traditionally provided by one's offspring. This natural disaster
exposed the deep resentment that many Chinese citizens harbor toward
the nation's population planning policies as manifested in the
emotional protests against the shoddy construction of public schools
and local authorities who failed to rapidly rescue trapped
schoolchildren.\70\
The Sichuan Population and Family Planning Commission
estimates that at least 7,000 children from one-child families were
killed and more than 16,000 were injured. More precise statistics are
still being compiled.\71\
In May 2008, the government announced that parents who lost
their only children in the earthquake would be permitted to have
another child if they applied for a certificate from the Chengdu
Population and Family Planning Commission.\72\
In June 2008, the National Population and Family Planning
Commission sent a team of medical personnel to the earthquake zone to
perform operations to reverse sterilization procedures for parents who
lost their only child and want to have another.\73\ In-vitro
fertilization was also offered to eligible couples.\74\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Residence
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese government continues to enforce the household
registration (hukou) system to limit the rights of Chinese
citizens to choose their permanent place of residence. Since
the enforcement of the Regulations on Household Registration in
1958,\1\ the division between rural and urban hukous has
prevented rural residents who migrate to cities from accessing
healthcare, education, ownership of property, legal
compensation, and other social welfare programs.\2\
Consequently, the hukou system has become a foundation of
discrimination and violation of the right to equality for
Chinese citizens who hope to change their residence.\3\
Security preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games
resulted in heightened scrutiny of the hukou status of migrants
throughout China. In January, Beijing officials ordered public
security bureaus to intensify inspections of migrants without a
Beijing hukou to ensure security during the Olympics.\4\ In
July, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
launched a house-to-house search campaign reportedly targeting
the migrant population and other groups on the eve of the
Olympics.\5\ Some migrants reportedly believe that the
government's intensified checks are aimed at preventing
protests and incidents that Chinese authorities think could mar
the government's and Communist Party's image.\6\
The government's restriction on residence is inconsistent
with the right to freedom of residence and the right to
equality as defined by international human rights standards.\7\
Therefore, some have pursued legal action to challenge the
system. A lawyer, Cheng Hai, filed a lawsuit against Beijing
Public Security Bureau on February 25, 2008, requesting that
the Beijing Changping People's Court revoke his temporary
resident permit registration at the Changping district police
station.\8\ Cheng said Beijing Public Security Bureau's
requirement of a temporary permit conflicts with more than 10
superior laws, including a citizen's right to equal treatment
stipulated in the Constitution.\9\
RECENT HUKOU REFORMS
Since the economic reform period in the late 1970s, former
farmers and laid-off state-owned business employees without
urban hukou began relocating to cities in search of higher
earnings, becoming the so-called ``floating population.'' \10\
To accommodate the surplus of rural labor and the labor demand
in urban areas, national and local authorities implemented
reforms to enhance the mobility of rural residents.\11\
However, recent reforms only allow migrants to change hukou if
they meet criteria that generally favor senior Communist Party
officials, as well as the wealthy and educated.\12\ Those
without a stable job, a stable place of residence, or family
connections to urban hukou holders still face obstacles to
obtaining city hukou.
[Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms is a representative, non-
comprehensive survey of local Chinese government hukou reforms
enacted from 2005 through August 2008.]
Generally, these reforms require that rural migrants have
(1) a ``stable job or source of income'' and (2) lived in a
``stable place of residence for a specified period of time'' as
conditions for obtaining local hukou. Some also require a
college education. Most of the reforms still exclude the vast
majority of Chinese migrants who often work as manual laborers
and live in temporary accommodations.
Most recently, Jiangsu province loosened its hukou
application requirements, allowing migrants with special skills
and contributions as well as their family members to relocate,
even if they do not own local property.\13\ Yunnan province
issued an opinion on September 3, 2007, replacing the two-tier
agriculture and non-agriculture system with one unified
resident permit. The opinion states that individuals with a
legal permanent residence, long-term employment contract, and
stable source of income are eligible to apply for a hukou.\14\
Shenzhen city began a new residency card system on August 1,
2008,\15\ abolishing the city's temporary resident card system
in place since 1984.\16\ The measures stipulate that all
citizens between 16 and 60 years old can register for a
residency permit if they have been working in Shenzhen for more
than 30 days without permanent residency status. Individuals
over 60 are permitted to apply if they own property, invest in,
or work for local enterprise, or bring technical expertise to
the city. New permit holders will be entitled to a range of
free public services. Children of permit holders will have
access to local schools.\17\
REMAINING CHALLENGES
Since 1984, the central government has sanctioned a locally
based migrant registration system.\18\ Nevertheless, uneven
implementation of hukou reform at the local level has dulled
the impact of national calls for change. Some recent instances
highlight
remaining challenges.
In January 2008, a high school girl in Beijing
attempted suicide after learning that she was unable to
register for the college entrance examination without a
Beijing hukou, prompting public outcry over the slow
pace of hukou reform.\19\
In April 2008, Zhuhai city, Guangdong
province, suspended its hukou application process due
to increased fiscal pressure of providing services to
hukou holders, raising doubts over migrant integration
with limited resources.\20\
Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms
This table provides a representative sample of local Chinese government hukou reforms enacted between 2005 and August 2008. The first two pages of the table provide examples of hukou reforms
at the provincial level; the remaining pages provide examples at the level of municipality, autonomous region, special economic zones and non-provincial-level city. Reforms are categorized
according to two sets of key features. The first set includes three common eligibility requirements (income, residence and education or skill level). The second set includes two main policies
discussed in the main body of this section (the elimination of agricultural/non-agricultural distinction, and the provision of benefits to new hukou holders). An ``X'' under ``income,''
``residence'' or ``education or skill'' indicates that the hukou reform in question demands that hukou applicants meet eligibility requirements in these areas respectively. An ``X'' under
``Eliminate Agricultural/Non-Agricultural Distinction'' indicates that the reform includes provisions that address the elimination of the agricultural/non-agricultural distinction. An ``X''
under ``Benefits'' indicates that the reform includes the provision of benefits to new hukou holders.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Reform Features
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Eligibility Requirements Policy
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Province Date Sources Eliminate Description and Past Reforms
Education Agricultural/Non-
Income Residence or Skill Agricultural Benefits
Distinction
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhejiang 5/3/2006 Reform Reported in X X X X X The provisions abolish the agricultural/non-agricultural
(Reported) Xinhua\21\ classification system. In order to apply for a hukou,
individuals must possess a lawful permanent residence and be
stably employed. Urban public employment agencies at all
levels should provide career guidance, job recommendations,
and legal advice free of charge to migrant workers from rural
areas seeking employment.
The 2006 reforms build on reforms instituted in 2002\22\ at the
county and small city levels to grant a hukou to individuals
with a fixed place of residence, a stable source of income, or
those holding advanced degrees.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liaoning 4/20/2007 Reform Reported in X X The provisions abolish the agricultural/non-agricultural
(Reported) Liaoning classification system. The provisions only require that an
Provincial individual have a legal, permanent residence in a city to be
Population and eligible for a hukou.
Family Planning
Commission
News\23\
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yunnan 1/1/2008 Yunnan Government X X X The opinion abolishes the agricultural/non-agricultural system.
(Effective) Opinion\24\ The opinion states that individuals with a legal permanent
residence, long-term employment contract, and stable source of
income are eligible to apply for a hukou.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Reform Features
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Eligibility Requirements Policy
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Municipality Date Sources Eliminate Description and Past Reforms
Education Agricultural/Non-
Income Residence or Skill Agricultural Benefits
Distinction
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing 4/19/2007 Reform Reported X X X X The new measures relax restrictions for a hukou registration
(Effective) in Sina\25\ in Beijing. Children are permitted to adopt the household
registration of their father. Age restrictions for hukou are
eliminated. Previous regulations provided migrant workers
with medical insurance and gave their children equal access
to schooling. Earlier city regulations directed county-level
governments to grant a hukou to individuals with a fixed
place of residence or a stable source of income.
Under past reforms,\26\ citizens who meet professional,
educational, or investment requirements are eligible to apply
for a hukou.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chongqing 10/19/2007 Reform Reported X X X X X The five-year plan aims to abolish Chongqing's agricultural/
(Reported) in Xinhua\27\ non-agricultural registration system, replacing it with a
single ``Chongqing Residency Permit'' scheme. It also
provides government support for job skills training, migrant
education, sanitation, housing, and social security.
Past reforms\28\ mandated that nine districts pilot the hukou
reform. Individuals with purchased property (30 sq/m per
person), a college level of education, or a stable income can
apply for a hukou.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Reform Features
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Eligibility Requirements Policy
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous Region Date Sources Eliminate Description and Past Reforms
Education Agricultural/Non-
Income Residence or Skill Agricultural Benefits
Distinction
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 4/6/2005 Guangxi X X X X The circular abolishes the agricultural/non-agricultural
Region (Issued) Government classification system, replacing it with a unified
Circular\29\ ``residency permit system.'' Individuals who have their own
residences are eligible to apply. Science and technology
workers are eligible for a hukou. Migrant workers with a
stable labor contract or a long-term lease can also establish
a hukou.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Reform Features
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Eligibility Requirements Policy
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Economic Zone Date Sources Eliminate Description and Past Reforms
Education Agricultural/Non-
Income Residence or Skill Agricultural Benefits
Distinction
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhuhai 4/9/2008 Reform Reported X X Zhuhai suspended the application process for residency on April
(Suspended) in Xinhua\30\ 9, 2008. Government officials cited increased fiscal pressure
on the municipality as the primary reason for withdrawing its
hukou reforms.
In recent years, the Zhuhai government had introduced a number
of measures to improve living and welfare conditions for
migrants, including 12 years of free education for children,
medical insurance, and free bus travel for the elderly.
People buying new apartments of no less than 75 sq/m in Zhuhai
were allowed to apply for a hukou.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shenzhe 8/1/2008 Shenzhen City X X X X X The measures stipulate that individuals aged 16 to 60 who have
n (Effective) Temporary been working in Shenzhen for more than 30 days are eligible to
Measures on apply for a hukou at their local police station. Individuals
Resident over 60 are permitted to apply if they own property, invest in
Permits\31\ or work for a local enterprise, or bring technical expertise to
the city. New permit holders will be entitled to a range of
free public services. Children of permit holders will also be
entitled to the same compulsory education as their permanent
peers, and families will be able to apply for low-cost housing.
Under previous reforms, six categories of people, including
those working, investing, or starting up a business in
Shenzhen, or who had a lawful residence in Shenzhen, were
permitted to apply for a hukou. In 2006, Shenzhen decided to
include new residents in the city's retirement pension plan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Reform Features
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Eligibility Requirements Policy
Non-Provincial-Level City -------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Sources Eliminate Description and Past Reforms
Education Agricultural/Non-
Income Residence or Skill Agricultural Benefits
Distinction
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhengzhou, 11/2/2005 Reform Reported X X In November 2001, the city provided a hukou to people who had
Henan (Reported) in China relatives living in Zhengzhou. However, increased pressure
Daily\32\ on transportation, education, and healthcare as well as a
rise in crime forced the city to cancel the measure three
years later.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xi'an, Shaanxi 2/27/2006 Xi'an City X X X X The provisions abolish the agricultural/non-agricultural
(Effective) Temporary classification system, replacing it with a ``residency
Provisions\33\ permit system.'' Scientists, engineers, and PhD recipients
are encouraged to apply for a hukou. Individuals with a
stable income and permanent housing are eligible to apply.
The government announced plans to implement the management
system in three districts and expand it citywide within
three years.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chengdu, Sichuan 10/20/2006 Chengdu CXty X X X The opinion abolishes the agricultural/non-agricultural
(Effective) Public Security system. Individuals who have purchased property or investors
Bureau who have committed over 2 million yuan to an industry are
Regulations\34\ eligible to apply for a hukou. The opinion stipulates that
individuals who hold a bachelor's degree or higher may also
establish a hukou in Chengdu. Individuals who have lived in
the city temporarily for three years, have a legal permanent
residence, and a working contract are eligible to apply for
a hukou.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qingdao, Shandong 8/1/2007 Qingdao City X X X X The circular abolishes the agricultural/non-agricultural
(Effective) Government classification system. Individuals with a PhD or who possess
Circular\35\ technical skills may apply for a Qingdao hukou, as may
individuals who pay 10,000 yuan in taxes for one year.
Individuals with a residence and a steady source of income
also are eligible to apply for a hukou.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty of Movement
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese government continues to enforce restrictions on
citizens' liberty of movement within the country, in violation
of international human rights standards.\1\ Chinese citizens
who are mainland residents must obtain travel permits from
their local government to leave the mainland, including to
enter into the special administrative regions (SAR) of Hong
Kong and Macau.\2\ SAR residents are required to have a ``Home
Return Permit'' (HRP) to visit the mainland.\3\ The Chinese
government for two decades has denied the issuance of HRPs to
12 pro-democracy members of the Legislative Council of Hong
Kong because of their support for protesters at Tiananmen
Square in 1989, criticism of the Chinese government and
Communist Party, or other reasons.\4\ Officials also
arbitrarily confiscate HRPs to deny entry of citizens deemed to
act outside permitted limits. On July 1, Norman Choy, a
reporter covering the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games for the
Hong Kong-based pro-democracy Chinese-language newspaper Apple
Daily, was denied entry at the Beijing airport. Authorities
confiscated Choy's HRP and repatriated him, citing the national
security law.\5\
RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS CITIZENS AND ACTIVISTS
The Chinese government controls or punishes religious
adherents, activists, or rights defenders deemed to act outside
approved parameters by restricting their liberty of movement.
The authorities use methods such as extralegal house arrest
(see Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants--
Arbitrary Detention--Arbitrary House Arrest and Control for a
more detailed analysis of
extralegal house arrest), detention, and surveillance. Recent
cases include:
Zeng Jinyan, blogger and spouse of imprisoned
human rights activist Hu Jia, has been placed under
house arrest and heightened surveillance with limited
Internet connectivity since Hu's detention on December
27, 2007.\6\ During the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic
Games, the authorities forced Zeng and her infant
daughter to leave Beijing for Dalian, and confined them
in a hotel for 16 days with limited communications with
family.\7\
The Uyghur community in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region has reported restrictions on air
travel within the country in the run-up to and during
the 2008 Olympic Games.\8\
During the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue in
late May, authorities placed under surveillance a
number of Beijing
activists, including a member of the China Democracy
Party, religious rights activists, and veterans of the
1989 Tiananmen democracy protests.\9\
During an official visit by Members of the
U.S. Congress in late June, eight Beijing-based human
rights lawyers were placed under house arrest
apparently to prevent them from meeting.\10\
In April, authorities in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region placed Mongolian rights activist and
journalist Naranbilig under house arrest after
detaining him for 20 days in March and April.\11\
Yuan Weijing, spouse of imprisoned legal
advocate and rights defender Chen Guangcheng, has been
under house arrest since August 2005.\12\
[See Section II--Freedom of Religion and Ethnic Minority
Rights for more information.]
FREE ENTRY/EXIT FROM CHINA
The Chinese government continues to restrict citizens'
right to entry into and exit from the country, contravening
international human rights standards.\13\ In the past year,
authorities arbitrarily issued, confiscated, revoked, or denied
the application for passports to activists deemed to pose a
``possible threat to state security or national interests,''
\14\ which is inconsistent with Article 2 of the Passport
Law.\15\
During the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, a number of
dissidents including Wang Dan,\16\ Yang Jianli,\17\ and Zhou
Jian,\18\ were barred from entry into Hong Kong. Chinese
authorities have refused to renew Wang's passport since 2003
and Yang has a valid passport.\19\ Tsering Woeser, a well-known
Tibetan writer, filed a lawsuit against the Chinese government
in July for denying her a passport for over three years.\20\
The Chaoyang People's Court in Beijing on May 14, 2008,
upheld an administrative decision that barred Yuan Weijing, the
spouse of jailed blind activist and barefoot lawyer Chen
Guangcheng, from leaving the country in August 2007 to receive
an award on her husband's behalf in the Philippines.\21\ Teng
Biao, a prominent human rights lawyer, told reporters in March
2008 that the authorities had seized his passport. Around the
same time, the police warned him of potential detention unless
he stopped talking to foreign media and writing about human
rights abuses.\22\Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region authorities continued to support measures to prevent
Muslims from making pilgrimages outside of state channels,
following the confiscation of Muslims' passports in summer 2007
to restrict private pilgrimages.\23\
[See Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and
Defendants, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Religion, and
Section V--Tibet for more information.]
Status of Women
INTRODUCTION
The Commission's 2007 Annual Report noted that
discrimination against women in China remained widespread,
equal access to justice has been slow to develop, and that
Chinese women, especially migrant, impoverished, and ethnic
minority women, tended to be unaware of their legal options
when their rights are violated, in spite of considerable
efforts by Chinese officials and women's organizations to build
protections for women into the law.\1\ The Commission notes
that the past year marked the first time that Chinese courts
mandated criminal punishment in a sexual harassment case and
issued a civil protection order in a divorce case involving
domestic violence.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
State protections against sexual harassment remain limited.
The number of sexual harassment complaints, however, increased
since the Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
(LPWRI) was amended in 2005.\2\ The LPWRI prohibits sexual
harassment and domestic violence and requires state government
assistance to women to assert their rights in court.\3\
At least one court case from the past year issued criminal
penalties for sexual harassment. In June 2008, the Gaoxin
People's Court in Chengdu, citing the Criminal Law rather than
the LPWRI, sentenced a human resources manager at a high-tech
firm to five months' criminal detention, which marks the first
time someone has been criminally punished for sexual harassment
in China.\4\
While the Chengdu case is an important development,
significant obstacles remain for plaintiffs in winning sexual
harassment cases. Before the Chengdu case, almost all
plaintiffs who lost their cases did so for ``lack of
evidence.'' \5\ In addition, courts in China often view sexual
harassment as a moral issue and therefore defendants receive
lenient legal punishment that involves issuing an apology and
paying limited compensation.\6\ Victims fear retaliation for
reporting cases of sexual harassment, especially since
companies and government agencies in China are not required to
have a sexual harassment policy and companies are not held
responsible for the sexual harassment of their staff.\7\
Domestic violence remains a significant problem in China,
with 29.7 to 35.5 percent of Chinese families reportedly
experiencing some form of violence, and women making up 90
percent of the victims.\8\ Some local officials have taken
positive steps to enhance legal protections for domestic
violence victims. In July 2008, the Chong'an People's Court in
Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, announced a pilot project that
designated a panel of judges, including a representative from
the local women's federation, to handle all domestic violence-
related divorce cases.\9\ In August 2008, that same court
issued the first protective order to a domestic violence victim
in a civil proceeding.\10\
To overcome victims' difficulty in obtaining adequate
evidence of their abuse, judicial agencies and women's
federations in at least 21 provinces have established domestic
violence injury appraisal centers.\11\ The number of shelters
for domestic violence victims has also increased.\12\
GENDER DISPARITIES
Political Participation and Decisionmaking
While the government has supported women's right to vote
and run in village committee elections, few women hold
positions with decisionmaking power in the upper echelons of
the Communist Party or government. Women make up just 20
percent of the Party and hold some 40 percent of government
posts.\13\ Less than 8 percent of the Central Communist Party
Committee (CCPC) is comprised of women; only one woman is a
member of the CCPC's Politburo, and no women sit on the
Politburo Standing Committee.\14\ During the past year women
headed 2 of the country's 28 ministries, and one woman is the
governor of a province.\15\
Health
The government announced an action plan to boost women's
health by providing basic healthcare services to women in urban
and rural areas, as part of a package of initiatives known as
``Healthy China 2020.'' Maternity deaths in rural areas in 2006
were almost double the number in urban areas, with the
disparity even greater between eastern provinces and other
areas.\16\ The government has pledged by 2015 to improve
healthcare services so that all women can give birth in
hospitals and maternal and infant mortality rates are cut.\17\
Access to Rural Land Allocation and Compensation
Women continue to experience gender-based discrimination
when attempting to access benefits associated with their
village hukous (household registration), including their right
to land and property. In many of these cases, village rules
contravene national laws and regulations, yet they are still
enforced by village officials.\18\
Women who are especially vulnerable to discrimination
include ``married-out women,'' widowed women, but also women
who come from a ``two-daughter household,'' and women who
remarry after divorce or who marry a divorced man.\19\
``Married-out women'' are women who have either married men
from other villages, but whose hukous remain in their
birthplace, whose hukous are transferred from one place back to
their birthplace, or whose hukous are transferred to their
husbands' village.\20\ For more information on cases that were
resolved, both judicially and extrajudicially, in the woman's
favor, see box titled ``Results for Women: Two Hukou Cases''
below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Results for Women: Two Hukou Cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heilongjiang Province
A Heilongjiang province village leader told a woman who had married
someone with a Sichuan hukou (household registration) that their son
could only have a local village hukou if she signed an agreement to
never seek land in the village. After the woman sought their
assistance, the county women's federation, along with other local
officials, worked with the village committee to reach a solution. The
women's federation pointed out to village members that such action
violated the PRC Law on Land Contracts in Rural Areas and the Law on
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (LPWRI). Finally, the
village committee and village representatives agreed to give the
woman's son local hukou status and consideration for land
allocation.\21\
Henan Province
A village in Dengzhou city, Henan province, issued rules stipulating
that women who were not married and did not reside in the village would
have to verify their single status in order to receive land
compensation. After two female migrant workers from the village filed a
suit, the Dengzhou People's Court ruled that the village's rules were
void and that the group must provide the two women with 750 yuan
(US$110) each for land compensation within five days. If the group did
not do so, they would have to pay double the amount in accordance with
Article 232 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law.\22\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Trafficking
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese government faces lingering challenges in its
efforts to eliminate human trafficking, despite making
significant strides to combat the problem. The Commission's
2007 Annual Report noted that the Chinese government has taken
steps to increase public awareness, expand the availability of
social services, and improve international cooperation.\1\ The
government needs to do more, however, to detect and protect
victims, including victims trafficked for labor exploitation
and Chinese citizens trafficked abroad. The lack of a
comprehensive anti-trafficking policy to combat all forms of
trafficking continues to hamper China's effort to combat
trafficking.
The government has not fulfilled its international
obligations to combat trafficking and it obstructs the
independent operation of non-governmental and international
organizations that offer assistance on trafficking issues. At
the same time, recent statements from central government
officials, as well as the State Council's release of the
National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and
Children (2008-2012), indicate high-level support for--and more
focus on--proactive ways to address trafficking.
SCOPE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN CHINA
China is a country of origin, transit, and destination for
human trafficking. Domestic trafficking for sexual
exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage comprise the
majority of trafficking cases.\2\ Women and children, who make
up 90 percent of these cases, are often trafficked from poorer
or more remote areas to more prosperous locations, such as
provinces along China's east coast.\3\ The Ministry of Public
Security estimates that 10,000 women and children are abducted
and sold each year, and the International Labour Organization
(ILO) estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 people are trafficked
annually.\4\
Chinese citizens are trafficked to other countries in Asia
and other parts of the world for commercial sexual exploitation
or exploitative labor.\5\ Foreign victims are trafficked into
China from Burma, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Russia.
Many of these victims are women trafficked for commercial
sexual exploitation, forced marriage, or forced labor.\6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Root Causes of Human Trafficking in China
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic Disparity and Migration: Economic development, the
liberalization of some hukou (household registration) requirements, and
increasing inequality among localities create incentives for people to
migrate for work and marriage, but these opportunities also leave men,
women, and children vulnerable to trafficking.\7\ There are an
estimated 170 million migrant workers in China, with official data
indicating that 60 percent of labor migration among and within
provinces occurs through irregular channels.\8\ Of women who migrate,
an estimated 30 percent do so for marriage. Some of these women end up
being ``bought'' and ``sold'' as wives by men who want to bypass the
high costs of dowries for marriage in rural areas.\9\
Gender Imbalance Linked to Population Planning Policies and the
Preference for Sons: Population planning policies and a preference for
sons exacerbate imbalanced sex ratios in China, which contributes to
the trafficking of women and children for forced or abusive marriages
and false adoptions.\10\
Population Planning Policies and the Preference for Sons: Since
the early 1980s, the government's population planning policy has
limited most women in urban areas to bearing one child, while
permitting many women in rural China, among other exceptions, to bear a
second child if their first child is female.\11\ Officials have
enforced compliance with the policy through a system marked by
pervasive propaganda, mandatory monitoring of women's reproductive
cycles, mandatory contraception, mandatory birth permits, coercive
fines for failure to comply, and in some cases, forced sterilization
and abortion.\12\ A preference for sons is especially strong in certain
areas\13\ and is tied to conceptions of gender inequality and
traditional gender roles.
Impact on Marriage: Men seeking to marry, especially in areas
with severely unbalanced sex ratios, may try to ``purchase'' a
wife.\14\ It is unclear what percentage of the women in this situation
has been trafficked. However, this practice provides incentives for
traffickers to abduct and ``sell'' women. It is also exacerbated by
population planning policies. While experts consider a normal male-
female birth ratio to be between 103 and 107:100, ratios in China stand
at roughly 118 male births to 100 female births, with higher rates in
some parts of the country and for second births.\15\ Some experts
believe the gender imbalance contributes to the trafficking of women
into China as brides from neighboring countries such as Mongolia, North
Korea, Russia, and countries in Southeast Asia.\16\
Impact on Adoption: Individuals or families who cannot have a
child or son of their own due to biological reasons, population
planning policies, the Adoption Law, or other reasons may sometimes
attempt to ``purchase'' a child. When force, fraud, or coercion is
involved, these become child trafficking cases. In some cases,
traffickers presented the child as their own so that the buyers did not
know the child has been trafficked.\17\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHINA'S NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION
The State Council issued the National Plan of Action on
Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) on
December 13, 2007. This first and long-awaited national plan
formalizes cooperation among agencies and establishes a
national information and reporting system.\18\ The plan sets
specific targets and outlines measures for the prevention of
trafficking, prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims,
and strengthening of international cooperation. The plan
designates the Ministry of Public Security as the lead agency
in implementing the plan, and calls for coordination among 28
agencies. The plan, with a focus on women and children,
neglects male adults, who are often targeted for forced
labor.\19\ Several localities, including Guizhou, Hainan, and
Fujian provinces, and Hanzhong city, Shaanxi province, have
issued their own plans to implement the National Plan.\20\
Various government agencies have also hosted training workshops
on implementing the plan, often in collaboration with
international organizations.\21\ It is unclear, however, if
there are funds allocated to support implementation by local
and provincial governments.\22\
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The release of its national plan fulfills an obligation
made by the Chinese government to the Coordinated Mekong
Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking (COMMIT), and
coincided with China's hosting of the COMMIT Second Inter-
Ministerial Meeting on December 12-14, 2007.\23\ COMMIT is a
regional government initiative, supported by the United Nations
Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), to foster
cooperation between countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-region,
including China, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and
Burma.\24\ The joint declaration signed at the meeting
reaffirmed cooperation between the countries and pledged for
the first time to include ``civil society groups'' in future
anti-trafficking efforts.\25\ It is unclear, however, to what
extent civil society groups will be included in future anti-
trafficking efforts in China.
The Chinese government has not signed the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking In Persons,
Especially Women and Children (the TIP Protocol), which
supplements the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime.\26\ The TIP Protocol contains the first
legally binding global definition of trafficking and obligates
state parties to criminalize trafficking-related offenses
mentioned in the protocol.\27\ The Chinese government has been
``considering'' the signing and ratification of the TIP
Protocol for the past few years, and one of the work items for
the State Council's National Working Committee on Children and
Women in 2007 was to research the feasibility of ratifying the
protocol.\28\ At an August 2007 conference in Yunnan province,
participants noted that even though there is limited overlap
between the TIP Protocol's definition and China's definition of
trafficking, China's laws and regulations already include more
than 95 percent of the protocol's contents. Experts stated that
the time was ripe for China to sign the TIP Protocol, and to
consider how to align the two definitions so that China can
more easily engage in international cooperation.\29\ UNIAP and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted an international seminar
on the TIP Protocol in October 2008.\30\
The Chinese government has ratified earlier UN conventions
that relate to human trafficking, including the Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Worst Forms of
Child Labour Convention, which legally bind the government to
prohibit, prevent, and eliminate the trafficking of women and
children.\31\ The Chinese government's forcible return of
refugees to North Korea, however, contravenes its obligations
under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol. The government classifies all North
Koreans who enter China without documentation as illegal
economic migrants and forcibly repatriates them to North Korea,
even though they meet the definition of refugees under
international law.\32\ The practice leaves trafficked North
Korean refugees in China without legal alternatives besides
repatriation to North Korea, where they face retribution or
hardship. Trafficking of North Korean women remains pervasive.
Women comprise two-thirds of the tens of thousands of North
Korean refugees hiding in China.\33\ Although many North Korean
women initially enter China voluntarily, it is estimated that
up to 70 to 80 percent of these undocumented women become
victims of trafficking.\34\ Traffickers sell them into forced
marriage, commercial sexual exploitation, or exploitative
labor.\35\ [For more information, see Section II--North Korean
Refugees in China.]
PREVENTION AND PROTECTION
The Chinese government has made noticeable trafficking
prevention efforts by raising public awareness and providing
training for officials on certain forms of trafficking.\36\
They are often tied to other awareness-raising programs,
including those aimed at keeping children in school, and
programs providing vocational training, awareness of legal
rights, gender equality training, and poverty
alleviation assistance.\37\ In addition, the Chinese
government, in
cooperation with international organizations and the All China
Women's Federation (ACWF), has conducted training for law
enforcement and border officials on identifying and assisting
victims.\38\
While China has made efforts since 2001 to offer victim
services, these services remain limited in scope and funding.
Law enforcement officials previously had returned trafficked
victims who
escaped to those who trafficked them, and local officials
issued marriage licenses despite evidence that a bride had been
trafficked into forced marriage.\39\ The government provides
some funds for the protection of Chinese victims who are
trafficked internally.\40\ The Ministry of Public Security, the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the ACWF have opened shelters
and rehabilitation centers.\41\ Victim care remains
insufficient, however, as existing shelters tend to be
temporary, not exclusively for trafficking victims, and provide
little or no care to returned victims.\42\ Chinese authorities
reportedly punish returned Chinese citizens who were trafficked
abroad, for acts committed as a direct result of being
trafficked, including
violation of immigration controls.\43\ As for, or in terms of,
victim repatriation and protection, while the Chinese
government has created programs to increase cross-border
collaboration, these efforts remain inadequate to address
victims' needs.\44\
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT
The Chinese government punishes traffickers who engage in
the crimes of trafficking in women and children. It
investigates and prosecutes trafficking crimes, especially
domestic cases, and those involving the abduction of women for
forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.\45\ Article
240 of the Criminal Law allows punishment up to death for the
crime of human trafficking.\46\
Public security officials launched a nationwide campaign
focused on the problem of forced labor and involuntary
servitude following incidents of trafficking for forced labor
in brick kilns in Shanxi and Henan provinces in 2007.\47\ The
problem persisted in 2008, however, as illustrated by cases of
trafficking for forced labor in Heilongjiang province and for
child labor in Guangdong factories in 2008.\48\ Authorities
have taken limited actions against trafficking-related
corruption. Officials were reportedly convicted of commercial
sexual exploitation and ``issuing visas to facilitate
trafficking'' in 2004 and 2005.\49\ Official reports state that
no government officials have been involved in trafficking cases
handled by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) up to
2006.\50\
Public security officials resolved more than 27,280
trafficking cases, rescued more than 54,121 victims, and
arrested more than 25,000 traffickers from 2001 to 2005.\51\
Data suggests that the MPS resolves between 80 to 90 percent of
the cases it registers annually.\52\ The MPS referred 3,144 out
of 5,043 individuals, or 62.3 percent, for prosecution in
2004.\53\ In 2000, the courts sentenced more than 11,000 out of
19,000 individuals, or about 58 percent of those arrested, to
punishment that included the death penalty.\54\ Between 2006
and March 2007, officials rescued at least 371 victims and
arrested 415 traffickers.\55\
Chinese regulatory documents and official statistics do not
reflect China's current trafficking situation. This disconnect
has important implications for China's anti-trafficking work,
including prosecution efforts, protection of victims, and
funding. Observers note that MPS data on trafficking are
sometimes conflated with smuggling figures and reflect a
continued lack of understanding by officials on the issue of
trafficking.\56\ It is also unclear to what extent the rights
of criminal defendants were upheld.
The Chinese government in recent years has announced a
decrease in the number of trafficking cases registered by the
MPS, a decrease in the number of trafficking cases adjudicated
by the courts, and a reduction in the number of cross-border
cases.\57\ Although the MPS stated that trafficking-related
crimes in parts of China have been effectively contained based
on the decreasing number of trafficking cases,\58\ the decrease
is in fact due to fewer cases of abduction and selling of women
and children.\59\ The MPS has also confirmed an increasing
number of forced labor, commercial sexual exploitation, illegal
adoption, gang-related, and cross-border trafficking cases in
recent years.\60\
There have been legislative proposals in recent years
calling for the revision of Articles 241 and 244 of the
Criminal Law to increase punishment for those who ``purchase''
trafficked women and children and those who directly force
others to work by restricting their personal freedom.\61\ Party
officials, scholars, and media articles have called for the
revision of the Criminal Law, replacing the ``trafficking of
women and children'' with the broader ``trafficking of
persons.'' \62\
TRANSPARENCY
Key information regarding the government's anti-trafficking
efforts is not readily available. The U.S. Department of State
has noted that ``Chinese government data is difficult to
verify,'' and government funding for anti-trafficking efforts
and conviction data is not easily obtainable.\63\ The lack of
key information makes it difficult for the public and other
individuals to assess the government's efforts in combating
trafficking.
In an effort to increase public oversight and participation
in government, and allow citizens access to government-held
information, the State Council issued the first national
Regulations on Open Government Information, which became
effective on May 1, 2008. These regulations may allow
individuals to request trafficking figures from the Ministry of
Public Security (MPS) and local public security bureaus, but
officials may use exceptions in the regulations to refuse the
release of this information.\64\ Local government proposals to
increase budget transparency may also provide accessible
information to the public on the amount of government funding
available for anti-trafficking efforts.\65\
North Korean Refugees in China
INTRODUCTION
In the year leading up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic
Games, Chinese central and local authorities stepped up efforts
to locate and forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees hiding
in China in violation of their commitments to these refugees
under international law.\1\ The Chinese government intensified
border surveillance, called on the North Korean government to
tighten border security, and carried out periodic crackdowns
against refugees and Chinese citizens who harbor them. The
government routinely fines and imprisons Chinese citizens who
provide material assistance or refuge to North Koreans.
BORDER CRACKDOWN: INSPECTIONS, SURVEILLANCE, AND FINES
In April 2008, Chinese public security agents conducted
daily inspections of the homes of Chinese citizens of Korean
descent living in villages and towns near the border.\2\ One
resident reported that penalties for harboring refugees now
include imprisonment and fines ranging from 8,000 to 10,000
yuan (US$1,150-1,445).\3\ A U.S.-based NGO that works along the
border estimates on the basis of eyewitness reports that 30
percent of refugees have been caught and repatriated as a
result of the recent house inspections.\4\ Recent interviews
conducted with residents of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous
Prefecture (YKAP) in Jilin province found that local
authorities were repatriating ``several hundred'' refugees per
month.\5\ Chinese border agents have installed electronic
sensors along the river to detect incoming refugees while
reports of executions of outgoing and repatriated refugees by
North Korean security agents have risen in 2008.\6\ In 2007,
North Korea began construction of a 10-kilometer wire-mesh
fence near the Chinese city of Dandong to deter would-be
refugees, not far from where a fence was erected by Chinese
authorities in late 2006.\7\ One Christian activist working
along the border indicated that North Korea may have raised the
salaries of border guards and installed senior guards along the
border in an apparent effort to stop them from accepting bribes
from refugees.\8\ At least one refugee account supports this
claim by attesting to a recent tripling of the rate required to
bribe border guards from 500 yuan (US$72) to 1,500 yuan
(US$216).\9\
The intensified crackdown against North Korean refugees by
Chinese authorities has reportedly extended to harassment of
religious communities along the border. The central government
reportedly has ordered provincial religious affairs bureaus to
investigate religious communities for signs of involvement with
foreign co-religionists. In Yanbian, this campaign has resulted
in the shutting down of churches found to have ties to South
Koreans or other foreign nationals.\10\ Shelters for refugees
set up to look like commercial lodging have also been raided
and closed.\11\ To further persuade Chinese citizens to shun
refugees, the government provides financial incentives to
informants who disclose the locations of refugees. The YKAP
government ordered in spring 2008 that the local departments of
public security and religious affairs raise the incentive pay
given to informants by 16-fold from 500 yuan to at least 8,000
yuan (US$1,171), which is more than half the average annual
income in China.\12\
The State Department reports that Chinese authorities
continue to detain humanitarian activists who attempt to
transport North Korean asylum seekers to third countries, and
in many cases, charge them with human smuggling.\13\ Multiple
checkpoints were set up in 2008 along the road from the border
crossing at Tumen to Longjing and security agents have blocked
the ``underground railroads'' that refugees use to travel from
the border region to seek shelter at embassies in Beijing.\14\
Not only are Chinese authorities taking measures to prevent
citizens from helping refugees who have crossed the border into
China, but they reportedly are now placing restrictions on
citizens who attempt to provide food to malnourished relatives
and associates in North Korea. Chinese authorities have
reportedly imposed strict limits on the quantity of food (200
kg) that Chinese citizens can transport to North Korea when
they visit relatives or do business there.\15\
UNLAWFUL REPATRIATION
In the past year, China's unlawful repatriation of North
Korean refugees continued.\16\ Plainclothes Chinese security
agents carried out a massive raid in the city of Shenyang in
Liaoning province on March 17, leading to the detention of
around 40 North Korean refugees. Chinese authorities also
detained four North Korean refugees on March 5 at a local
restaurant in Shenyang and two others attempting to cross the
Tumen River along the border.\17\ Researchers have found that
the constant fear of arrest and deportation in China coupled
with the experience of persecution and hunger in North Korea
cause enormous psychological hardship for North Korean
refugees. A recent large-scale survey concluded that many North
Korean refugees ``suffer severe psychological stress akin to
post-traumatic stress disorder.'' When asked which factors most
fuel their anxiety, 67 percent of refugees answered ``arrest.''
\18\ Repatriated refugees routinely face the threat of
arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and capital punishment upon
return to North Korea.\19\
As reported by the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom, North Korean refugees face a dual threat of
arrest by Chinese security agents and abduction by North Korean
agents operating clandestinely on the Chinese side of the
border.\20\ According to three former North Korean agents who
defected to South Korea, North Korean authorities have
instructed public security agents to infiltrate ethnic Korean
churches in China and to capture refugees by posing as
religious leaders or converts. These former agents also
described how repatriated refugees are ``brutally
interrogated'' by the counterintelligence department of the
National Security Agency (bowibu), North Korea's political
police.\21\ Interrogations aim to determine if refugees had
contact with South Korean churches or other Christian groups in
China. Belief in Christianity is targeted as a political
offense in North Korea, punishable by execution or an extended
stay in a prison labor camp.\22\
TRAFFICKING AND DENIAL OF EDUCATION
Female refugees must elude human traffickers in addition to
Chinese and North Korean security agents.\23\ Lacking legal
status or economic opportunities, North Korean women who cross
the border are frequently picked up by traffickers and sold
into marriage with Chinese nationals. In some cases,
traffickers arrange for women to cross the border on the
pretense that food and legitimate work awaits, but upon arrival
in China, they are forced into prostitution or underground
labor markets.\24\ Although the central government has taken
some minor steps to address the trafficking problem along its
borders with Vietnam and Burma, it continues to ignore North
Korean trafficking victims and refuses to provide them with
legal alternatives to repatriation.\25\ [See Section II--Human
Trafficking.]
Another problem that stems from China's unlawful
repatriation policy is the denial of education and other public
goods for the children of North Korean women married to Chinese
citizens.\26\ Chinese law guarantees that all children born in
China to at least one parent of Chinese nationality are
afforded citizenship.\27\ It also decrees that all children who
are six years old shall enroll in school and receive nine years
of compulsory and free education, regardless of sex,
nationality, or race.\28\ Chinese citizens married to women
from North Korea cannot exercise this right on behalf of their
children because the child must be added to the father's
household
registration (hukou) in order to enroll for school. Some local
authorities along the border reportedly refuse to perform hukou
registration for the children without seeing documentation that
the mother is either a citizen, has been repatriated, or has
run away.\29\ This extralegal requirement imposed exclusively
on the children of one Chinese and one North Korean parent by
local authorities contravenes Chinese law and violates China's
commitments under international law.\30\
REEMERGENCE OF FAMINE CONDITIONS
North Koreans who enter China do so for diverse reasons,
which include fleeing from political oppression in some cases.
Chief among these reasons is the pursuit of the basic
necessities to survive, as North Korea suffers from chronic
food shortages.\31\ Recent reports suggest that widespread
hunger has reemerged as the food supply in North Korea has
rapidly deteriorated to a level that could cause numerous
hunger-related deaths if left unchecked.\32\ It is important to
note that hunger and poverty as motivating factors for refugees
are intrinsically linked to the prevailing political system in
North Korea. Central authorities control food availability, and
food distribution is carried out in accordance with the
recipient's perceived loyalty and utility to the ruling
party.\33\ The fact that food deprivation is mandated by the
North Korean political system, along with its treatment of
repatriated refugees as criminals and traitors, undercuts
China's assertion that North Koreans who cross the border are
``illegal economic migrants'' and obligates China to provide
North Koreans with unfettered access to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for adjudication of their
refugee status and swift resettlement.\34\ In 2008, however,
China not only continued to refuse to recognize the refugee
status of North Koreans, it also pressured the UNHCR to deny
assistance to North Korean refugees who reached Beijing in the
lead-up to or during the Olympics.\35\
Public Health
INTRODUCTION
Minister of Health Chen Zhu acknowledged for the first time
in January 2008 that all persons had the right to basic
healthcare regardless of age, gender, occupation, economic
status, or place of residence. Chen also acknowledged that the
allocation of funds had been ``skewed'' to favor large urban
hospitals.\1\ Statistics for 2007 show that 16.7 percent of
medical workers provide care in rural areas where 60 percent of
China's population lives.\2\
Access to healthcare continues to be a significant
challenge for the Chinese government. The government's policy
of fiscal decentralization and requiring hospitals to generate
their own revenue has led to a drop in government funding of
healthcare and a focus on generating sales profits by over-
prescribing drugs.\3\
Demographic changes in the last two decades, including an
aging population and mass migration from rural to urban areas,
have heightened strain on the healthcare system.\4\ Healthcare
costs have soared and an increasing number of people cannot
access medical care.\5\
A survey conducted by China's National Bureau of
Statistics, released in January 2008, revealed that medical
costs are the Chinese people's top concern.\6\ Quality of care
varies significantly among regions and income groups. Urban-
rural gaps remain in health indicators such as life expectancy
and maternal and infant mortality rates.\7\ Individuals in
Guizhou province, for example, live on average 13 years less
than persons living in Shanghai.\8\ Health insurance coverage
varies widely between rural and urban areas.\9\ Participation
in China's Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) does not
guarantee affordable or quality healthcare because a low
reimbursement rate, a lack of coverage for preventative or
outpatient care, and inadequate medical resources present
additional hurdles to adequate healthcare.\10\
HEALTHCARE REFORM
China's central government allocated 83.2 billion yuan
(US$11.7 billion) in 2008 to ``reform and develop'' the health
sector, with a particular emphasis on modernizing facilities at
the urban community and village level.\11\ The 2008 funding
level represented an increase from the 66.5 billion yuan
allocated in 2007. The boost in expenditure followed the 2007
government announcement of plans to release a new national
medical reform plan, and comes at a time of rising healthcare
costs and a shortage of affordable healthcare.\12\ The
government has not posted the draft plan for public comment,
but held a meeting in April to hear opinions from selected
individuals.\13\
According to Vice Health Minister Gao Qiang, ``the aim [of
the plan] is to provide safe, effective, convenient, and low-
cost public health and basic medical service to both rural and
urban citizens.'' \14\
Goals mentioned in the reform plan include:
Enroll all rural residents in the rural
cooperative medical system by the end of 2008.
Enroll all urban residents in the basic health
insurance scheme by the end of 2010.
Continue to improve medical services at the
county, township, and village levels.
Control drug prices and ensure their supply.
Expand free immunization programs.\15\
RURAL HEALTHCARE
The Chinese central government has announced plans to
increase public spending on healthcare in rural and remote
areas, with particular attention to China's western and
interior areas.\16\
Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) coverage increased
by the end of 2007 to 730 million individuals, or 86 percent of
the rural population, an increase of 35 percent over February
2007.\17\ Central and local governments planned to increase
their 2008 RCMS contributions from 40 yuan to 80 yuan
(US$11.52) per participant in an effort to attract more
participants.\18\ Under the scheme, individuals will likely
increase their contribution from 10 to as much as 20 yuan.\19\
The central government allocated 10.1 billion yuan for RCMS in
2007, an increase of 5.8 billion yuan from 2006.\20\
URBAN HEALTHCARE
The Chinese government mandates employers to provide Basic
Health Insurance (BHI).\21\ The government announced a plan to
expand coverage to all urban residents on a trial basis in
2007.\22\ The plan is to enroll all urban residents in BHI by
2010. The plan would emphasize coverage of major illnesses for
persons known to have greater need along with greater
difficulty accessing healthcare services, including minors and
the elderly.\23\
The government established pilot BHI programs in 88 cities
in 2007 and is implementing nearly triple that number in 2008
with the aim of expanding the total coverage area to 317 cities
by the end of 2008.\24\ The official goal is to cover another
30 million non-working urban residents by the end of 2008.\25\
The Chinese government reports that 223 million of 500 million
urban residents (44.6 percent) received BHI coverage in 2007,
including 40.68 million non-working urban residents, an overall
increase of 63 million from 2006.\26\ The average annual
premium is 236 yuan for adults and 97 yuan for children.\27\
A recent survey reportedly found that between October and
December 2007, the number of patients who refused medical
treatment out of fear of high costs decreased by 10
percent.\28\ The Chinese government reportedly provides
financial assistance to those living in poverty.\29\
HIV/AIDS
Chinese leaders' concerns about uncontrolled citizen
activism and foreign-affiliated non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) limit the effectiveness of central government policies
to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. Official figures estimate
that in 2007 there were 700,000 people in China with HIV,
including 85,000 with AIDS, an increase over 2005 of 50,000
people with HIV.\30\
Discrimination and social stigma against people living with
HIV/AIDS (PLWH) remain rampant.\31\ For example, 55 percent of
private sector survey respondents ``strongly believed'' PLWH
should be segregated.\32\ A lack of trust between some local
officials and PLWH and their advocates hinders cooperative
efforts to reduce stigma.\33\ This is especially true in Henan
province, the focal point of media attention surrounding
unsanitary blood collection centers in the 1990s that were
reportedly fueled by official complicity. While Henan officials
have made free treatment available to PLWH, some officials
remain hesitant and even hostile to working with NGOs.\34\
The Chinese government continues to place restrictions on
travel for persons who have or are suspected of having HIV/
AIDS. Chinese citizens who live abroad for more than a year or
work in the international transportation sector are required to
take an HIV test.\35\ Foreigners planning to live in China for
more than a year must also take an HIV test and present the
results to a local public security bureau along with the rest
of their application for a residency permit.\36\ The government
has pledged to remove legal prohibitions preventing HIV
carriers from entering China in 2009.\37\
In spite of cooperative partnerships with international
organizations and the private sector, the Chinese government
continues to harass HIV/AIDS-related organizations, Web sites,
and activists that it deems to be a threat. In the past year,
officials cited legal measures and pressured third parties,
such as Internet service providers, to block access to Web
sites and restrict the rights of activists. Some examples
include:
In May 2008, the local public security
bureau's Internet surveillance division reportedly
ordered the closure of the Web site of AIDS Museum run
by HIV/AIDS activist Chang Kun because it contained
information about ``firearms and ammunition.'' Shaanxi
province officials shut down another of Chang's Web
sites, AIDS Wikipedia, from February 20 to March 12,
2008, reportedly because of an article about farmland
confiscation on the site.
Beijing Public Security Bureau's Internet
surveillance division asked Aizhixing Center in March
2008 to remove ``illegal information,'' specifically
sensitive information about HIV/AIDS. The ``illegal
information'' was an Aizhixing statement on human
rights activist and HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia's
disappearance two years ago. Officials subsequently
blocked access to the Web site for a period of time,
and put Wan Yanhai, founder of Aizhixing, under 24-hour
surveillance for four days.
Officials ordered the cancellation of a
conference scheduled for late July and early August
2007 in Guangzhou on the legal rights of those affected
by HIV/AIDS. The conference would have brought together
50 Chinese and international HIV/AIDS activists and
experts. Authorities reportedly thought the subject
matter and the involvement of foreigners was ``too
sensitive.'' \38\ [For more information, see Section
III--Civil Society.]
HEPATITIS B
China has approximately 120 million Hepatitis B Virus (HBV)
carriers and some 300,000 people die annually from Hepatitis B-
related diseases.\39\ Discrimination against HBV carriers
remains widespread.\40\ Recent laws and regulations explicitly
forbid employment discrimination against persons with
infectious diseases,
including HBV, and mandate a fine for violating employers. The
Employment Promotion Law, which went into effect on January 1,
2008, prohibits employers from refusing to hire applicants on
the grounds that they carry infectious diseases and allows
workers to file a lawsuit against employers.\41\ The
Regulations on Employment Services and Employment Management,
which also went into effect on January 1, state that employers
cannot reject applicants due to their HBV status or force
employees or applicants to take an HBV test. Violating
employers can be fined up to 1,000 yuan and sued.\42\
HBV activists praised the Regulations on Employment
Services and Employment Management.\43\ These new initiatives
build on policy since 2004 that forbid discrimination against
persons with infectious diseases.\44\ Legal prohibitions
remain, however, that forbid HBV carriers from working in
certain sectors such as the food industry.\45\
HBV carriers, often working with legal advocacy groups,
have brought employment discrimination lawsuits. Laws such as
the Employment Promotion Law, which prohibits discrimination in
employment, have played a role in the court's decision in at
least one case.\46\ Many of these cases have resulted in court-
ordered settlements or have brought about changes in policy and
public awareness. In October 2007, China held its first
national conference on HBV discrimination in Zhengzhou city,
Henan province, which brought together over 50 civil rights
activists and people living with HBV.\47\ [For more information
on legal advocacy efforts and the results of several HBV
discrimination cases in the past year, see box below.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anti-HBV Discrimination Cases and Advocacy Efforts in the Past Year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 2007: A Foshan-based subsidiary of a Taiwanese company dropped
its plan to test all its employees for Hepatitis B Virus (HBV) after
Yirenping, a legal advocacy and support group, made the company's HBV
testing plan public. Yirenping distributed fliers explaining that the
mandatory testing was illegal and encouraged the company's employees
``to protect their rights.'' Local officials sent health inspectors to
the company on the designated testing day, and issued a circular
mandating punishment for any company that forced its employees to take
an HBV test. The subsidiary agreed to forgo mandatory HBV testing in
the future.\48\
January 2008: In a court-mediated settlement, the Dongguan Municipal
People's Court ordered the Vtech Corporation to pay 24,000 yuan
(US$3,494) to a job applicant denied employment on the basis of his HBV
status. The applicant, a university graduate, applied for a job in 2006
and passed the company's recruitment exams, but was refused an offer of
a position after his medical test showed he was HBV positive. This was
the first HBV discrimination case heard in a Guangdong province
court.\49\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anti-HBV Discrimination Cases and Advocacy Efforts in the Past Year--
Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2008: The Shanghai Intermediate People's Court mediated a
settlement in favor of a job applicant whose employment offer was
withdrawn due to his HBV status. The applicant had sued the Shanghai-
based subsidiary of a Taiwanese company in February 2007 for 12,800
yuan (US$1,863) in potential earning losses and 50,000 yuan (US$7,277)
in emotional damages. In October 2007, the Nanhui District Court
awarded the applicant 5,000 yuan in compensation. Rejecting the award,
the applicant appealed to the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court,
which heard the case in December. The Shanghai Health Bureau mandated
that HBV testing no longer be routine for job applicants, adding that
applicants can only be tested per their own request or if the employer
can prove that the job is legally prohibited for HBV carriers.\50\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there have been successful anti-HBV discrimination
cases, the Chinese government continues to control HBV-related
rights activism. In November 2007, Beijing authorities closed
the largest online forum for HBV carriers, Gandan Xiangzhao
(``In the Hepatitis B Camp''), citing the forum's failure to
apply for and set up a record with the Beijing Communication
Administration (BCA).\51\ Web sites that provide medical
treatment and health information services are required to seek
approval from the Beijing Health Bureau and then submit an
application with the BCA.\52\ An official reportedly told Lu
Jun, the forum's operator, that the forum was blocked because
of the Olympics. People could access the site for a brief
period after Lu changed the host to an overseas server but
authorities blocked it again in May 2008.\53\
MENTAL HEALTH
Beijing's Regulation on Mental Health, which took effect in
March 2007, requires that reviews of involuntary admissions be
completed ``within three months.'' \54\ In its 2007 Annual
Report, the Commission noted that the three-month provision
would enable security officials to remove individuals from the
streets of Beijing to mental health facilities for the duration
of the 2008 Olympic Games, or longer, and still be within the
letter of the law.\55\ Chinese leaders expanded state
supervision of mental health patients in Beijing and other
cities during the Olympics. Patients staying in open-style
wards were allowed to leave only at certain times under
supervision.\56\
Other recent developments signal some improvement for the
rights of persons with mental illness. In June 2008, a Shanghai
labor dispute arbitration committee ordered IBM to pay 57,000
yuan in compensation for firing an employee after he was
diagnosed with depression. The committee also ordered IBM to
reactivate its contract with the employee.\57\ A Ministry of
Health (MOH) circular released in April 2008 stipulates that
hospitals must obtain approval from MOH before conducting
neurosurgical operations to treat mental disorders or starting
clinical research. In addition, each operation should be
approved by the hospital's ethical committee, with hospitals
and doctors subject to punishment if they violate the
circular.\58\
Environment
During the past year, the central government and Communist
Party leadership have paid increasing attention to
environmental protection. For example, the State Environmental
Protection Administration (SEPA) was upgraded to ministerial
status in March.\1\ The number of staff of the newly renamed
Ministry of Environmental Protection's (MEP) office in Beijing
increased from 250 to 300,\2\ and three departments were added
in July to monitor pollution, control total emissions, and
conduct educational outreach.\3\
Although it is not yet clear if the status upgrade will lead to
heightened decisionmaking and enforcement power for the
historically weak and resource-challenged environmental
protection agency, the MEP's ``bark'' is getting louder.\4\ In
mid-September, the MEP warned the leaders of the 21 provincial-
level governments that they would be held personally
responsible for failing to clean up China's major rivers and
lakes.\5\
Creating an incentive structure at the local level that
encourages environmental protection has been a challenge for
the central government.\6\ The central government stipulated
last year, however, that 60 percent of all local officials'
career prospects will be tied to their environmental protection
efforts on a five-year basis.\7\ Local officials who fail to
meet their targets will become ineligible to receive
promotions.\8\ MEP and other agencies also released a 35-
billion-yuan five-year plan in 2008 to improve the enforcement
capacity of environmental bureaus, including upgrades in
existing monitoring and emergency response systems.\9\
China's environmental crisis has emerged in recent years as
one of the country's most rapidly growing causes of citizen
activism. Last year, the Commission noted that participation in
environmental protests has risen in recent years, particularly
among urban middle-class residents; this trend continued in
2008. Official responses to environment-related activism
included suppression of citizen protests, as well as limited
steps to increase public access to information. Urban middle-
class residents showed an increased willingness to protest
injustice and malfeasance, as demonstrated by the protests
against a chemical plant in Xiamen, the Shanghai maglev train
extension, and a Chengdu chemical plant. [For more information
on the Xiamen, Shanghai and Chengdu protests, see box below.]
GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND THE ``GREEN OLYMPICS''
The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX
Olympiad pledged to make preparations for the 2008 Olympic
Games transparent; however, observers voiced concerns over the
difficulty in accessing information on pollutants and charting
Beijing's progress toward achieving its bid commitments.\10\
Beijing promised in its Olympic bid to achieve objectives in
the city's environmental master plan three years ahead of
schedule, with the completion of 20 major projects by 2007.\11\
Beijing's bid also promised that air quality would meet World
Health Organization (WHO) standards and that the city's
drinking water, which it said met WHO standards, would continue
to be protected.\12\ While Beijing fulfilled many of its
commitments, Chinese academics and other experts questioned the
completeness and accuracy of the government's air pollution
data.\13\ For example, one analyst contends that the Beijing
Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) dropped monitoring sites
in locations with poor air quality in order to boost its
overall air quality figures.\14\
It remains to be seen whether the Chinese government's
efforts to meet the environmental targets for the Olympics will
lead to long-term improvements in environmental protection.
Amid criticism that Beijing's air pollution data did not
include ozone and PM2.5 (i.e., particulate matter that is 2.5
micrometers or smaller in diameter), the Beijing EPB announced
in August 2008 that it may begin monitoring the two pollutants
next year.\15\
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PROTESTS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT
This past year, the government took limited steps to
increase public access to environmental information. In May
2008, the Measures on Open Environmental Information (Measures)
became effective, along with national open government
information (OGI) regulations.\16\ The Measures standardize the
disclosure of environmental information by government agencies
and enterprises, and provide the public with the right to
request government information.\17\ The Measures also encourage
enterprises to voluntarily disclose information and require
EPBs to compile lists of enterprises whose pollution discharge
exceeds standards.\18\ Citizens have already begun making
information requests to EPBs, but how responsive officials will
be remains to be seen.\19\ Incentives for local governments to
attract investment could hinder EPBs from receiving the funding
they need to implement the Measures. The Measures also prohibit
EPBs from disclosing information that involves state secrets,
an exception that gives the government broad latitude to
withhold information from the public.\20\ In terms of
implementation, the ministry appears understaffed, with only
three staff responsible for open government information.\21\
Public protests over environmental degradation have
increased in recent years. An official noted in 2006 that there
were more than 51,000 disputes relating to environmental
pollution in 2005, and that mass protests involving pollution
issues had risen 29 percent per year in recent years.\22\ Urban
middle-class residents have shown an increased willingness to
protest environmental injustice and malfeasance.\23\ These
protests have largely not involved environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), but rather groups formed ad
hoc through blogs, text messaging, and Internet chat rooms.\24\
In contrast with protests in urban areas, rural protests are
more likely to end in violent clashes with public security
officials.\25\ The public has succeeded in several protests,
such as the protest against the Xiamen plant, to halt
construction of a project. In cases where citizen activists
succeeded, local or higher-level officials also opposed the
project.\26\ In most cases, participants initially sought other
ways to resolve their grievances, such as through petitions or
requests for more information from the government.\27\ When
these methods failed to elicit a response, participants took to
the streets to protest.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Protests
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazardous Chemical Plant Protest in Xiamen
Officials in the southeastern port city of Xiamen, Fujian province,
planned to build and operate a 300-acre 10.8-billion-yuan (then US$1.4
billion) hazardous chemical (paraxylene or ``PX'') plant.\28\ In March
2007, central government officials criticized the project's safety.\29\
Officials in Xiamen did not publicize these concerns, however, and made
sure local media touted the project's economic benefits. A local
resident who became aware of the concerns used his blog to organize
opposition to the PX plant, telling readers the plant would hurt the
local property market and tourism industry. Word spread quickly over
the Internet.\30\ In a city of less than three million people,
individuals sent out approximately one million text messages in May
2007 objecting to the plant's construction.\31\ Real estate prices in
the Haicang district began to fall as public concern increased.\32\
On May 29, Xiamen leaders briefed the Fujian provincial party
committee about the project's status and public concern surrounding the
project. On May 30, a Xiamen official announced that construction on
the project would be halted.\33\ Demonstrations, nonetheless, still
occurred on June 1 and 2 that involved thousands of people ``taking a
stroll,'' demanding that government stop the project completely rather
than simply suspend it.\34\
The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) announced on
June 7, 2007, that an expert committee would carry out environmental
impact assessments (EIA) for key regions and industries to ensure that
development in these areas took environmental factors into
consideration.\35\ Acting on SEPA's recommendation, the Xiamen
government announced on the same day that the project's construction
would depend on a planning EIA of Haicang district.\36\ In response to
the experience in Xiamen and other places, SEPA announced in March 2008
that the draft Planning EIA Regulation would be reviewed and released
possibly at the end of 2008.\37\ The planning EIA, in contrast to a
project EIA, would consider the environmental impact of major projects
on a larger area.\38\
The Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences, charged with
performing the EIA, published its report on December 5, which concluded
that the Haicang district was ``too small . . . for the diffusion of
atmospheric pollution.'' \39\ An abridged version was posted for public
comment and citizens were allowed to send their comments via Internet,
mail, and telephone over the next 10 days.\40\ Two government-organized
public forums were held on December 13 and 14. Nearly 90 percent of the
107 public citizens and 14 out of 15 of the local people's congress and
CPPCC members who attended the forums voiced their disapproval of the
PX plant project.\41\ The citizens were randomly selected during a live
drawing on TV from a pool of 624 people who had signed up to
participate. Critics were allowed to observe the selection process. An
online poll on the Xiamen government's Web site on whether the plant
should be built was disabled after the first day due to ``technical
difficulties.'' A Xiamen official noted that the poll was disabled
because the technical setup allowed people to vote more than once.
Voting from the first day indicated that over 90 percent of the 58,000
votes were against the plant's location in Xiamen.\42\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Protests--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Xiamen deputy secretary-general noted that the transparency during
the selection process was a first for Xiamen, and that public
participation would probably continue in the future for important
projects but not for lesser ones.\43\ An environmentalist noted that:
``This is the first time public opinion was properly expressed through
official channels and had an impact on government policies.'' \44\
Fujian provincial and Xiamen municipal governments agreed at the end
of 2007 to relocate the plant to Fujian's Gulei Peninsula, near
Zhangzhou city, pending approval from the central government and the
project's investor.\45\ Xiamen Mayor Liu Cigui confirmed in March 2008
that a relocation of the plant is ``likely.'' \46\
Shortly thereafter, rumors circulated that the PX plant would be moved
to Gulei Peninsula, and local environmental activists started passing
out fliers documenting risks associated with the plant. These
developments reportedly led to decreases in real estate prices and an
increase in citizen concern over their health and livelihoods, since
many in the area depended on fishing for their income.\47\ From
February 29 to March 3, 2008, initially peaceful protests involving
thousands of people took place in several fishing towns,\48\ but at
times the protests turned violent as protesters clashed with public
security officials. Several people were injured and public security
officers took approximately 15 people into custody.\49\ No official
announcement has been made regarding the plant's status at the time of
writing. A Guangzhou Daily writer noted, however, that ``any victory
has its cost, and this triumph by Xiamen residents merely transfers the
cost of victory to the Gulei Peninsula, to Zhangpu county farmers who
lack a strong public voice.'' \50\
Shanghai Residents Protest Maglev Extension
Suburban Shanghai residents publicly objected to the proposed
extension of Shanghai's high-speed magnetic levitation (maglev) train.
The Shanghai government planned to extend the line by 20 miles through
Shanghai.\51\ During the first half of 2007, homeowners close to the
proposed route demonstrated, hung banners, and signed petitions
protesting the plan, expressing concern about electromagnetic
radiation, noise pollution, and the adverse effect of the rail line on
their home property values.\52\ Protesters earned a temporary reprieve
in May 2007 when the local government announced that the project would
be suspended. A Shanghai People's Congress official was reported as
saying that the public's concern about radiation was one of the reasons
the project had been stopped.\53\ In December 2007, the government
posted a new route proposal on an obscure Web site.\54\ In January
2008, thousands of residents gathered in Shanghai's People's Square,
many carrying signs and chanting slogans against the maglev
extension.\55\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Protests--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like protesters in Xiamen, the loosely organized Shanghai residents
preferred to call their gathering a ``collective walk'' rather than a
protest.\56\ Their grievances included concerns about not only
radiation, noise, and threatened property values, but also the lack of
public consultation regarding the project proposal.\57\ The project
appears to be on hold at the moment. It was not included on Shanghai's
list of projects for 2008, and its ultimate fate remains unclear.\58\
The maglev extension is reportedly being reviewed by central government
regulators.\59\
Protest in Chengdu: Taking a ``Stroll''
About 200 people ``strolled'' the streets of Chengdu, the capital of
Sichuan province, on May 4, 2008, to protest the operation of a nearby
ethylene plant and crude oil refinery.\60\ The peaceful two-hour
protest arose out of concern that the factories would pollute Chengdu's
air and water and would affect the health of residents.\61\
Construction had not yet started on one plant, while the other plant
had already been built.\62\ Some individuals noted that the plants
would bring jobs and development to the area, and would boost ethylene-
related production. Others expressed concern that the project had not
passed proper environmental procedures, such as an environmental impact
assessment and a public hearing.\63\ The building of the crude oil
refinery was approved by the National Development and Reform Commission
on April 21, 2008.\64\ In the aftermath of the earthquake that hit
Sichuan on May 12, officials have reportedly decided to review the
project after factories in the area experienced chemical leaks.\65\
Protesters organized through Web sites, blogs, e-mails, and cell phone
text messaging.\66\ They called the event a ``stroll'' to avoid having
to apply for a permit, which officials rarely grant. Dozens of public
security officials accompanied the protesters, photographing and
videorecording the protest.\67\ Following the protest, officials
detained one organizer for using the Internet to start rumors and
incite a disturbance and two more people for participating in an
illegal demonstration. They warned others for disseminating harmful
information on the Internet. Authorities detained Chen Daojun on May 9
for suspicion of inciting ``splittism,'' a crime under Article 103 of
the Criminal Law, after he published an article on a foreign Web site
calling for a halt in construction of the chemical plant, citing
environmental concerns.\68\ Officials brought other individuals into
police custody for questioning and beat at least one person.\69\ They
also deleted some of the protesters' online articles.\70\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ENVIRONMENTAL TOLL OF THE SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE
Although it is too early to assess the full environmental
consequences of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, some of the
environmental effects and challenges were apparent shortly
after the earthquake hit. According to the World Resources
Institute, the most pressing concerns are disposal of debris
from buildings
destroyed by the earthquake, ecosystem and habitat loss, water
contamination, and destruction of arable land.\71\
Moreover, numerous chemical factories, as well as nuclear
facilities and research sites, are located in the quake region.
As of late May, experts reportedly identified 50 buried
radioactive ``sources,'' apparently primarily from materials
used in hospitals, factories, and laboratories.\72\ While 35 of
the 50 ``sources'' had been moved to safe areas, the remaining
15 were inaccessible.\73\ Although Chinese officials assured
the public that the nuclear facilities in the quake region were
all safe, and a global network of sensors supported by the
United Nations detected no radioactive leaks in the quake
region, some nuclear scientists expressed doubts, because
Beijing was silent with respect to details about specific
facilities.\74\ More than 100 chemical plants are located in
the quake zone, and according to the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP) approximately 75 percent of the plants stopped
production because of damage after the earthquake.\75\ The
environmental and health consequences of several accidental
leaks and spills reported as of late May remain unclear.\76\
Chinese officials and others have also voiced concerns about
weakened and cracked dams in the quake region.\77\ Furthermore,
the MEP reported that the environmental monitoring system in
the quake region was severely damaged, further complicating the
task of protecting the local environment.\78\
In late June, the MEP reported that the drinking water and
air in Sichuan and other areas affected by the quake had been
tested and found to be safe.\79\ In light of the earthquake,
the National Development and Reform Commission is rethinking a
plan to expand Sichuan's nuclear industry, which had included
construction of a nuclear power station 200 kilometers from the
epicenter of the earthquake.\80\
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games
CHINA'S OLYMPIC COMMITMENTS AND PLEDGES
In bidding for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, China
explicitly tied its hosting of the event with human rights.
Hours before the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
announced in July 2001 that it would award the Olympics to
China, Beijing Mayor and Beijing Organizing Committee for the
Games of the XXIX Olympiad President Liu Qi told IOC members
that the Olympics ``will help promote our economic and social
progress and will also benefit the further development of our
human rights cause.'' \1\ As winner of the bid, Chinese
officials agreed to be bound by Olympic documents that included
commitments relating to press freedom for foreign journalists,
the environment in Beijing, and protection of Olympic
intellectual property.\2\ [See Section II--Environment--
Government Transparency and the ``Green Olympics'' for more
information on the environmental commitments.] In 2002, Chinese
officials issued an Olympic Action Plan, which though not
binding, made broad claims about how China would prepare for
the Olympics, including that it would be ``open in every aspect
to the rest of the country and the whole world.'' \3\
DETERIORATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE AND DURING OLYMPICS
The Chinese government and Communist Party's determination
to host a successful Olympics and ensure a ``positive'' image
before the event led to an overall deterioration in freedom of
expression, freedom of religion, and other human rights,
particularly this past year. Restrictions on domestic media
increased in order to create a ``positive'' public opinion
environment for the Olympics.\4\ Officials detained and
harassed vocal critics of the government and Party, targeting
individuals who had tied their criticism with China's hosting
of the Olympics, made critical comments to foreign reporters or
foreign officials, or sought to defend groups out of favor with
the government.\5\ [See Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
In the period just before the Olympics, officials sought to
ensure that persons they deemed to be potential
``troublemakers'' left Beijing, remained in their homes, or
were kept under closer watch. In July 2008, Radio Free Asia
reported that security officials had ordered activists Qi
Zhiyong and Jiang Qisheng, and legal scholar Zhang Zuhua, to
leave Beijing for the Olympics, tightened surveillance of
rights defense lawyers Li Fangping and Zheng Enchong, former
China Democracy Party member Zha Jianguo, and Yuan Weijing,
wife of imprisoned legal advocate and rights defender Chen
Guangcheng, and kept Jia Jianying, wife of imprisoned democracy
activist He Depu, confined to her home.\6\ Beijing public
security officials detained thousands of petitioners, while
local and provincial officials reportedly sent personnel to the
capital to repatriate, sometimes forcefully, residents who had
come to Beijing to petition the government.\7\ Shanghai public
security officials reportedly barred dissidents from leaving
Shanghai and banned them from speaking to foreign reporters.\8\
In September 2006, Beijing officials dismissed allegations that
the city was proposing to expel one million migrant workers
during the Olympics, but migrant workers reported in July 2008
that authorities were ordering them to leave Beijing.\9\ In
February 2008, Beijing officials said that no one had been
forcibly relocated due to construction of Olympic venues, but
residents and non-governmental organizations reported forced
relocations, allegations of embezzled compensation, and lack of
notice and public participation in the relocation process.\10\
Officials targeted religious practitioners and ethnic
minorities. To prevent any disruption of the Olympic torch
relay as it passed through parts of the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region in June 2008, officials reportedly detained
thousands of citizens and required Muslim religious officials
to receive ``political education'' on ``protecting'' the
Olympics.\11\ [See Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the
Olympics in this section.] Unregistered religious communities
reported increased harassment and abuse in the run-up to the
Olympics. Officials expelled Pastor Zhang Mingxuan, president
of the Chinese House Church Alliance, from Beijing in July,
then detained him for 23 days and barred him from returning to
Beijing until after the Paralympics ended in September.\12\
Security officials also implemented a widespread campaign to
round up and intimidate Falun Gong practitioners
nationwide.\13\ [See Directives and Measures Related to Falun
Gong and the Olympics in this section.]
China announced in July 2008 that it would set up protest
zones for the Olympics but Beijing's Public Security Bureau
reported on August 18 that of the 77 applications received, 74
had been withdrawn and none had been approved.\14\ Officials
reportedly harassed or detained several citizens who had
applied to protest.\15\ After two women in their late seventies
applied to protest the government's alleged failure to
compensate them for demolishing their homes, officials
sentenced them to one year of reeducation through labor for
disturbing public order.\16\ Human Rights in China reported in
late August that officials later rescinded the decision.\17\
COMMITMENT TO FOREIGN JOURNALISTS
Chinese officials failed to fully implement temporary
regulations granting foreign journalists greater freedoms
before and during the Olympics. Officials had issued the
regulations, effective from January 2007 to October 2008,
promising there would be ``no restrictions'' on foreign
journalists reporting on the Olympics.\18\ In its 2007 Annual
Report, the Commission recommended that Members urge Chinese
officials to live up to this commitment, and noted at the time
that fulfillment had been ``incomplete at best.'' \19\ Over the
past year, foreign journalists reported occasions where access
improved, most notably just after the May 2008 Sichuan
earthquake, but overall, harassment appeared to worsen.\20\
Officials barred foreign journalists from covering the Tibetan
protests that began in March 2008, and also prevented them from
covering protests by grieving parents after the earthquake.\21\
In July 2008, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China
(FCCC) stated that the Chinese government ``has not yet lived
up to its Olympic promise.'' \22\ As of September 11, FCCC had
reported 176 incidents of ``reporting interference'' against
foreign journalists in 2008, (including 60 cases during the
Olympic period that began with the opening of the Olympic media
center on July 25), more than the total reported for all of
2007.\23\ FCCC and Human Rights Watch also noted intimidation
of journalists' sources and Chinese colleagues.\24\ As the
Olympics approached, authorities took other measures to limit
the activities of foreign journalists, including tightening
control over the selection of Chinese citizens who work for
foreign journalists, proposing limits on live coverage from
Tiananmen Square and the Forbidden City, and blocking access to
Web sites in press facilities for foreign journalists at
Olympic venues.\25\
On October 17, 2008, a Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson announced the State Council's issuance of the
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on News Covering
Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies
and Foreign Journalists, which make permanent freedoms
introduced under the temporary Olympic regulations.\26\ Prior
to the Olympic regulations, rules from 1990 required foreign
reporters to obtain the approval of a local foreign affairs
office before reporting outside of Beijing, a process that
sometimes took days.\27\ Like the Olympic regulations, the new
regulations allow journalists to travel to much of China for
reporting without prior approval and require that they only
obtain the consent of the individual or organization to be
interviewed.\28\ The spokesperson noted, however, that
government approval would still be required for travel to the
Tibet Autonomous Region and other areas closed to foreign
reporters.\29\ The new regulations do not affect the status of
domestic journalists, who continue to be subject to the same
restrictions as in the past, with no sign that officials are
considering any measures to grant them greater freedom. [See
Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
INCREASED REPRESSION IN XINJIANG DURING THE OLYMPICS
Officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
reiterated a pledge in August 2008 to use harsh security
measures to crack down against the government-designated
``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.\30\
On August 13, Wang Lequan, XUAR Communist Party Chair,
described the battle against the ``three forces'' as a ``life
or death struggle'' and pledged to ``strike hard'' against
their activities. XUAR Party Committee Standing Committee
member Zhu Hailun reiterated the call to ``strike hard'' at an
August 18 meeting. The announcements followed the release of
limited information on terrorist and criminal activity in the
region and came amid a series of measures that increased
repression in the XUAR. The measures build off of earlier
campaigns to tighten repression in the region, including
efforts to tighten control as the Olympic torch passed through
the region in June. Reported measures implemented in the run-up
to and during the Olympics include:
Wide-scale Detentions. Authorities have
carried out wide-scale detentions as part of security
campaigns in cities throughout the XUAR, according to a
report from the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Reported
measures include ``security sweeps'' resulting in mass
detentions in the Kashgar area and Kucha county,
including blanket detentions in Kucha of young people
who have been abroad; the detention of non-resident
Uyghurs in Korla city; the forced return of Uyghur
children studying religion in another province and
their detention in the XUAR for engaging in ``illegal
religious activities''; and the detention of family
members or associates of people suspected to be
involved in terrorist activity.
Restrictions on Uyghurs' Domestic and
International Travel. Authorities reportedly continued
to hold Uyghurs' passports over the summer, building
off of a campaign in 2007 to confiscate Muslims'
passports and prevent them from making overseas
pilgrimages, according to reports from overseas media.
Authorities also coupled restrictions on overseas
travel with reported measures to limit Uyghurs' travel
within China.
Controls Over Religion. XUAR officials have
enforced a series of measures that ratchet up control
over religious practice in the region, according to
reports from Chinese and overseas sources. Authorities
in Yengisheher county in Kashgar district issued
accountability measures on August 5 to hold local
officials responsible for high-level surveillance of
religious activity in the region. Also in August,
authorities in Peyziwat county, Kashgar district,
called for ``enhancing management'' of groups including
religious figures as part of broader government and
Party measures of ``prevention'' and ``attack.'' The
previous month, authorities in Mongghulkure county, Ili
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, called for strengthening
management of religious affairs; inspecting all mosques
and venues for religious activity; curbing ``illegal''
recitations of scripture and non-government-approved
pilgrimages; and ``penetrating'' groups of
religious believers to understand their ways of
thinking. Authorities in Lop county, Hoten district,
have been forcing women to remove head coverings in a
stated effort to promote ``women for the new era.''
Authorities have also continued to enforce measures to
restrict observance of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan,
which, in 2008, took place in September.\31\
Controls Over Free Expression. Authorities in
the XUAR ordered some Uyghur Web sites to shut down
their bulletin board services (BBS) during the
Olympics, according to Radio Free Asia. In a review of
Uyghur Web sites carried out during the Olympics,
Commission staff found that BBS on the Web sites
Diyarim, Orkhun, and Alkuyi had been suspended. The BBS
Web page on Diyarim contained the message, ``[L]et's
protect stability with full strength and create a
peaceful environment for the Olympic Games[!] Please
visit other Diyarim pages[.]'' The message on the BBS
Web page on Orkhun stated, ``Based on the requirements
of the work units concerned, the Orkhun Uyghur history
Web site has been closed until August 25 because of the
Olympic Games.''
Inspections of Households in Ghulja.
Authorities in the predominantly ethnic minority city
of Ghulja searched homes in the area in July in a
campaign described by a Chinese official as aimed at
rooting out ``illegal activities'' and finding
residents living without proper documentation,
according to Radio Free Asia.
DIRECTIVES AND MEASURES RELATED TO FALUN GONG AND THE OLYMPICS
In April 2008, the central government 6-10 Office issued an
internal directive to local governments nationwide mandating
propaganda activities to prevent Falun Gong from ``interfering
with or harming'' the Olympics.\32\ References to the directive
appear on official Web sites in every province and at every
level of government.\33\ Most official reports focus on
demonstrating that local authorities have stepped up security
and fulfilled the requirement to ``educate'' target audiences
on the directive's content.\34\ Local authorities distributed
the directive widely in an effort to raise public awareness.
References can be found on various Web sites ranging from
public entities with indirect relations with the state (state-
run enterprises, public schools, universities, parks, TV
stations, meteorological bureaus, etc.) to commercial and
social entities with no obvious ties to the state.\35\ Anti-
Cult Associations also actively circulated and promoted the 6-
10 Office's Olympic directive.\36\
Olympic and municipal officials in Shanghai and Beijing
also issued directives pertaining to Falun Gong in the lead-up
to the Olympics. The Shanghai Public Security Bureau sent a
warning to Falun Gong practitioners and other dissidents in
April 2008 demanding that they remain in the city during the
Olympics and report to the public security office at least once
a week until the end of October. The notice threatened to
detain or punish anyone who violates the order.\37\ In November
2007, Beijing Olympic organizers reminded visitors to the games
that possession of Falun Gong writings is strictly forbidden
and that no exceptions would be made for international
visitors.\38\ The Beijing Public Security Bureau issued a
public notice offering a reward of up to 500,000 yuan
(US$73,100) for informants who report Falun Gong plans to
``sabotage'' the Olympics.\39\ From January to June 2008,
public security agents reportedly arrested at least 208
practitioners from all 18 districts and counties in Beijing
municipality. Falun Gong sources have documented the names and
other information for 141 of the 208 practitioners who were
detained in Beijing, 30 of whom are now reportedly being held
in reeducation through labor camps with sentences as long as
two-and-a-half years.\40\
Chinese security officials made statements prior to the
Olympics that sought to link Falun Gong with terrorist threats,
but produced no evidence to substantiate these claims.\41\ Tian
Yixiang, head of the Military Affairs Department of the Beijing
Olympics Protection Group, listed Falun Gong among the groups
that might ``use various means, even extreme violence, to
interfere with or harm the smooth execution of the Olympic
Games.'' \42\ Li Wei, Chairman of the Center for
Counterterrorism Studies at the quasi-official China Institute
of Contemporary International Relations, categorized Falun Gong
as among the top five terrorist threats to the Games.\43\
[See Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong for coverage of
protest and dissent in Hong Kong during the 2008 Olympic
Games.]
III. Development of the Rule of Law
Civil Society
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese government has strengthened control over civil
society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs),\1\
especially in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic
Games.\2\ Although the government has acknowledged the
contributions of civil society organizations (CSOs),\3\
especially in the aftermath of the May 2008 Sichuan
earthquake,\4\ legal constraints and heightened surveillance
continue to limit civil society activities in China.
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
Political and economic reforms since the late 1970s have
created more space for citizen participation in society.\5\
Chinese citizens, often unsatisfied with government response to
rising social problems, have learned to pursue justice through
self-help and self-organizing.\6\
There were 387,000 registered civil society organizations
(CSOs) in China, including 3,259 legal aid organizations\7\ by
the end of 2007, up from 354,000 in 2006 and 154,000 in
2000.\8\ To obtain NGO status, organizations must have a
sponsor organization, i.e., a government or a Communist Party
organization, to support the initial registration, and apply to
a government department for review and approval.\9\ Although
the government controls registered organizations to some
degree, some NGOs are still able to operate with certain
independence.\10\
The constraints on NGO registration are inconsistent with
the right to freedom of association as defined by Article 22 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), of which China is a signatory.\11\ They also lead many
organizations to operate without formal legal status.\12\ Some
grassroots NGOs have had to register as commercial entities and
have been unable to solicit funding or receive donations.\13\
The majority of NGOs in China, regardless of their
registration status, cannot engage in fundraising activities
because charity-related laws only allow a small number of
government-approved foundations to collect and distribute
donations.\14\ This restriction has posed significant
challenges in the aftermath of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake
when unprecedented donations\15\ overwhelmed the government.
The small number of government-approved foundations and the
government's limited capacity to manage funds have obstructed
relief operations and resulted in public outcry for charity
reform.\16\
For years, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has considered
legal reforms to regulate the civil society sector, including
the management and registration of NGOs as well as their
charity activities.\17\ In 2008, officials reportedly held
consultative meetings to draft amendments to the 1998
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social
Organizations.\18\ Nevertheless, the government remains wary
that stronger NGOs and civil society will reduce its control
over society.\19\
INTOLERANCE OF NGO ACTIVISM
The Chinese government systematically restricts the
development of civil society. It has heightened surveillance of
NGO advocates since a series of democratic revolutions in other
parts of the world in 2005.\20\ The government's crackdown on
civil society organizations intensified in the lead-up to the
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games,\21\ silencing voices of
dissent in the name of national security and social
stability.\22\
The Chinese government and Communist Party ban activities
of certain CSOs, such as political parties and religious groups
independent of government control, and cracks down on their
leaders.\23\
Authorities reportedly have harassed non-
Communist political party leaders such as Guo Quan, the
Acting Chair of the New People's Party and a former
scholar in Nanjing,\24\ and members of the China
Democracy Party including Yue Tianxiang,\25\ Xie
Changfa,\26\ and Huang Xiaoqin.\27\
In July, China Aid Association reported that
Beijing police forced Zhang Mingxuan, president of the
Chinese House Church Alliance, and his wife to live on
the streets after Zhang met with a U.S. Congressional
delegation.\28\ Authorities later detained Zhang and
his wife two days before the opening of the
Olympics.\29\
Officials ordered China Development Brief, a
Beijing-based non-profit online publication that
reports on civil society news and connects NGOs in
China, to discontinue its Chinese edition in July
2007.\30\ Later in September 2007, officials denied the
re-entry of Nick Young, founder of the publication,
citing Article 12 of the Immigration Law.\31\
In the area of HIV/AIDS, officials curbed the
activities of organizations and activists.\32\
The Xincai People's Court convicted Wang
Xiaoqiao, an AIDS activist from Henan province,
of ``extortion'' and sentenced her to one year
in prison on August 12.\33\ Wang had been
detained since November 27, 2007, when
petitioning to the Henan government for her
husband, who contracted HIV/AIDS through a
blood transfusion.\34\
In May, authorities reportedly ordered the
closure of the ``AIDS Museum'' Web site,
www.aidsmuseum.cn, a platform for HIV/AIDS
information exchange.\35\
Police reportedly harassed HIV/AIDS activist
Wan Yanhai in May during the U.S.-China Human
Rights Dialogue. Wan was put under 24-hour
police surveillance for four days. Several
other human rights activists reportedly had
similar experiences during the same time.\36\
Public security officials sentenced human
rights activist Hu Jia, who has advocated on
behalf of people living with HIV/AIDS, to three
years and six months in prison for ``inciting
subversion of state power'' on April 3. [See
Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and
Defendants for more detailed information about
Hu Jia.\37\]
Officials banned a conference scheduled for
late July and early August 2007 in Guangzhou on
the legal rights of those infected with HIV.
The conference would have brought together 50
Chinese and international HIV/AIDS activists
and experts. One of the conference organizers,
the New York-based Asia Catalyst, suggested
that authorities canceled the conference
because the subject matter and the involvement
of foreigners were ``too sensitive.'' \38\
Leading HIV/AIDS experts and advocates from
around the world submitted an open letter dated
September 27, 2007, to the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) expressing
concern over Chinese government actions against
the AIDS work of Chinese NGOs and advocates,
including Li Dan. State security officials held
Li, founder of the China Orchid AIDS Project
and winner of the 2005 Reebok Human Rights
Award, in custody in Beijing for 24 hours on
July 26, 2007. The China Orchid AIDS Project
was the co-organizer of the canceled conference
in August.\39\
[See Section II--Worker Rights, Freedom of Religion, Status
of Women, and Environment for more information.]
ROLE OF BUSINESS SECTOR
China encourages the business sector to engage in civil
society activities and to support NGOs. The Public Welfare
Donations Law and the Corporate Income Tax Law encourage public
and corporate donations by providing tax benefits.\40\ As a
result, international and domestic companies made significant
contributions to relief efforts in the aftermath of the Sichuan
earthquake.\41\ In addition to charitable giving, China also
sets policy guidelines to encourage corporate social
responsibility.\42\ Since 2005, President Hu Jintao's
``Harmonious Society'' \43\ vision had promoted the widespread
adoption of corporate social responsibility initiatives in
China.\44\ While Chinese companies recognize certain human
rights, they reflect government positions more explicitly in
their human rights policies.\45\ Chinese government also
compels corporations, including the Internet and media
companies, to assist in censorship to restrict freedom of
expression.
[See Section II--Freedom of Expression for more
information.]
Institutions of Democratic Governance
INTRODUCTION
During 2008, China implemented some limited reforms to
increase public participation, including greater public
involvement in the selection of officials in some localities.
However, the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly on political
power remains firmly intact. Reforms have not removed barriers
to the formation of competing political parties or an
independent judiciary. Thirty years after the launch of the
reform era and nearly 60 years after the founding of the
People's Republic of China, the basic structure of China's
government--an authoritarian political system controlled by the
top leaders of the Communist Party--remains unchanged.
The Communist Party exercises control over government and
society through networks of Party committees, which exist at
all levels in government, legislative, judicial, and security
organs; major social groups (including unions); enterprises;
and the People's Liberation Army. Party committees formulate
all major state policies before the government implements them.
Party secretaries who chair Party committees simultaneously
hold corresponding government positions, retaining final
decisionmaking authority on most issues.\1\ The vast majority
of government leadership positions remain the exclusive domain
of Party members, with a few token non-Communist officials
relegated to mostly symbolic positions.\2\
FORMAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS: ``GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY''
In the 20 years that have now passed since the Chinese
government introduced direct elections at the village level,
the gradual expansion of elections to higher levels of
government has largely stalled. The direct election of
officials by ordinary Chinese citizens remains narrow in scope
and strictly confined to the local level. None of the Party or
government officials at the municipal, provincial, or national
level are directly elected by Chinese citizens. Chinese
citizens are formally permitted to directly elect officials for
just three types of local governing institutions: villagers
committees in rural areas, residents committees in urban areas,
and local legislatures--known as People's Congresses--at the
township and county levels.\3\ In 2001, the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party declared that directly electing
a township head was unconstitutional.\4\
In light of the restrictions imposed from the center, some
townships have experimented with models of indirect elections
that
provide for a limited degree of public participation and a
greater
degree of rank-and-file party participation in the selection of
township leaders. Elections of villagers committees occur
regularly every three years, and in 2008, elections were
scheduled to be held for about half of the more than 620,000
villagers committees across China.\5\ Since 1995, the Party has
experimented with reforms that allow a limited degree of
citizen participation in the selection of local Party cadres,
but the Party retains tight control over the candidate pool and
the selection process. For example, by 2002, a few thousand
townships had participated in a model of indirect elections
known as ``open recommendation and selection'' (gongtui
gongxuan). This approach to township elections allows any adult
resident in a community to declare his or her candidacy for
township head, but direct participation in the process
essentially stops there for the general public. The residents
committee is responsible for narrowing the pool of candidates
to two finalists from whom the local People's Congress chooses
the winner in a caucus.\6\ In total, approximately 200-300
people typically participate in the selection process under
``open recommendation and selection.'' \7\
Following the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, a number
of localities have utilized the notion of ``inner-party
democracy'' to promote movement toward a more participatory
model of local Party leadership election. The most prominent of
these efforts is a new pilot project called ``open
recommendations, direct elections'' (gongtui zhixuan). This
method of conducting elections is characterized by the adoption
of ``three recommendations, two announcements, and one
election.'' \8\ Candidates are first recommended by rank-and-
file Party members, the local Party organization, and most
importantly, the general public. Second, the residents
committee evaluates the qualifications of the recommended
candidates and publicly announces the candidates they have
approved to run in the ``election.'' Finally, at the local
Party convention, all Party members in attendance--not just
Party leaders or representatives--cast ballots to determine the
final winner(s).\9\
In 2007-2008, reports of localities introducing the ``open
recommendations, direct elections'' pilot project surfaced from
provinces ranging from the relatively affluent (Shanghai,
Guangdong) to the generally underdeveloped (Guangxi).\10\ In
Guizhou province, the Party Committee Secretary for a small
township was directly elected by 234 local Party members who
attended an election rally in April 2008. The secretary was
chosen among two final candidates who were selected from a pool
of 35 total candidates through ``such procedures as eligibility
screening, theory examinations, open recommendation rallies,
and focal-point inspections.'' \11\ In September 2007, direct
election of township officials was administered for the first
time in seven townships simultaneously in Yunnan province.\12\
In January 2008, Ningbo city in Zhejiang province became the
first city in the nation in which all of the city's
neighborhoods practice ``direct elections'' of residents
committees.\13\ A village in Hunan's Xiangxi Autonomous
Prefecture held that area's first ``no-candidate direct
election'' for five village leadership positions in May
2008.\14\ The Ministry of Civil Affairs defines a
``no-candidate'' election as one in which no candidates are
predetermined prior to election day and any individual villager
can nominate himself or herself for consideration.\15\
Some localities have also established mechanisms aimed at
soliciting the views of the general public on issues of
governance. A village in Anhui province instituted a ``villager
discussion system'' in which the second weekend of every month
is designated as a time when villagers meet to ``discuss,
deliberate, and evaluate'' current issues before the community
in the presence of leaders from the villagers committee. The
county of which this township is a part has also opened a
``villager discussion room'' in each of its 120 administrative
villages where villagers can meet with leaders at times outside
of the designated weekend.\16\ A similar ``villager
deliberation system'' exists in a small mountain village in
Jiangxi in which elected villager representatives can introduce
proposals and make critiques of village affairs and cadre
performance.\17\ Since 2004, another county in Jiangxi has
gradually expanded an inner-party voting system in which town
and village authorities discuss ``matters of great concern
within the party'' and put them to a vote by secret ballot
among all Party members and some villager representatives. In
2007, such votes were reportedly held on 1,128 matters
throughout the county with 1,017 of the ballot decisions fully
adopted and executed by the authorities.\18\
Although to a lesser extent than many counties and
townships, some municipal governments also rolled out new
initiatives aimed at broadening civic participation in
governance. The Nanjing city government, in particular, took
two steps that were largely unprecedented. First, 16 candidates
vying for 4 positions in the city government--directors of the
labor, drug surveillance, tourism, and government
administration bureaus--participated in the country's first
televised debate in April 2008. The candidates each gave a
five-minute speech and answered questions. The studio audience
of more than 240 people, reportedly from diverse backgrounds,
was allowed to comment and vote on the candidates. Three
candidates with the most votes for each position were then
``recommended'' to the Nanjing Party Committee and its Standing
Committee for final selection.\19\ Second, Nanjing authorities
decided in late 2007 to allow migrant workers to stand for
election as deputies to the county and township people's
congresses for the first time.\20\
TAKING A ``SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE'' TO THE NEXT LEVEL: ``SPECIAL
POLITICAL ZONES? ''
In recent years, the city of Shenzhen in Guangdong
province, a bustling metropolis of 10 million people bordering
Hong Kong, has proven to be a dynamic center of political
experimentalism. The Shenzhen municipal government has been
proactive in promoting the ``open recommendation, direct
elections'' model throughout every district in the city with
direct elections occurring in 80 percent of resident
committees.\21\ In 2005, Yantian district became the first in
the nation to directly elect residents committees that were
legally defined as grassroots autonomous mass
organizations.\22\ Luohu district has also distinguished itself
by conducting so-called ``double elections'' whereby Party
rank-and-file members are allowed to directly elect
representatives to the district Party branch as well as its
secretary and deputy secretary.\23\
A number of Shenzhen city officials and academics have
called for the transformation of Shenzhen into a ``special
political zone'' that would serve as a democratic laboratory in
the same way that it served as a capitalist laboratory in the
beginning of the reform era.\24\ In March 2008, the Guangdong
Party Secretary rejected that proposal as too radical and
instead encouraged Shenzhen to focus on building ``socialist
democracy''--the Party's watchword for allowing marginal public
participation in politics while preserving its monopoly on
power.\25\ Undeterred, the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee
approved a ``breakthrough'' reform plan three months later,
which if implemented, could require that multiple candidates
for mayor be presented for a vote before the local People's
Congress, introduce competitive elections for members of that
body,
expand its supervisory powers over the executive, and promote
judicial independence.\26\ Shenzhen's reform plan did not
include a timetable for implementation and it is unclear if
central authorities will permit reforms to go as far as the
proposal recommends. The Commission will monitor closely and
assess the progress that Shenzhen achieves toward this end.
THE 17TH PARTY CONGRESS
A sustained program of significant political reform was
absent from the agenda of the 17th Party Congress in October
2007. Instead, the Party focused largely on setting the stage
for a likely leadership transition in 2012 and reaffirming the
importance of pursuing sustainable economic growth through
Party General Secretary Hu Jintao's ``scientific development
concept.'' \27\ ``Inner-party democracy,'' a recurring idea in
the rhetoric of the current Chinese leadership, dominated the
statements regarding political reform at the Congress. Hu
appeared to open the door for incremental political reforms at
the local level when he declared that the Party would ``spread
the practice in which candidates for leading positions in
primary party organizations are recommended both by party
members and the public in an open manner and by the party
organization at the next higher level, gradually extend direct
election of leading members in grass-roots party organizations
to more places, and explore various ways to expand inner-party
democracy at the primary level.'' \28\
Any chance that the Party might allow movement toward true
political pluralism or show greater tolerance for organized
political dissent was lost by Hu's call to ``firmly uphold the
centralized and unified leadership of the party.'' \29\ Less
than a month after the Party Congress, Hu's message was echoed
in the text of a White Paper published by the State Council
entitled ``China's Political Party System.'' The document
praised China's ``multi-party cooperation system'' that
preserves the Communist Party's absolute dominance and
``replaces confrontation and contention with cooperation and
consultation'' so as to safeguard ``social and political
stability and solidarity.'' It concludes with a final
assessment that the ``multi-party cooperation system'' is
``inevitable, innovative, and superior.'' \30\ The so-called
``multi-party cooperation system'' refers to seven nominal
political parties that the Communist Party permits to exist in
a subordinate role at the margins of the political process. The
Communist Party has strongly repressed attempts to organize
independent parties outside of these seven, such as the China
Democracy Party.\31\ Another State Council White Paper, the
first ever on the rule of law, was published in February 2008.
It also emphasizes that the Communist Party is ``always'' the
``core'' leadership, which has ``consolidated'' its ``ruling
position'' through promoting and adhering to the law.\32\ To
the extent that the 17th Party Congress appeared to approve of
greater political participation at the local level, the
available evidence suggests that it aims to make China's
authoritarian system more sustainable rather than creating
space for a potential challenger to the Party's legitimacy.\33\
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN LAWMAKING
In his report at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007,
President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao said the Party
must ``expand the citizens' orderly participation in political
affairs at each level and in every field'' and that ``in
principle, public hearings must be held for the formulation of
laws, regulations and policies that bear closely on the
interests of the public.'' \34\ In April 2008, the National
People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) announced that
draft laws under its consideration would ``in general'' all be
made public for review.\35\ The State Council issued an opinion
in May calling on city and county governments to solicit the
public's input in formulating policies that ``have a close
relationship to interests directly affecting the people.'' \36\
Local governments
continued to pass measures establishing procedures for public
participation at hearings.\37\ According to a central
government news organization in January, more than 70 percent
of county-level governments had set up procedures for holding
public hearings or panel discussions to solicit input on
proposed laws.\38\ The official China Daily reported in October
a proposal in Gansu province to allow citizens to directly
propose legislation.\39\ Official media cast these initiatives
in a positive light.\40\
At the national level, the NPCSC's decision to make draft
laws public has led to publication of some major laws. Xinhua
reported that on the same day NPC officials announced the new
policy, a draft of a new food safety law was made public.\41\
Chinese law, however, grants the NPCSC the power to draft only
certain laws, while the NPC itself has the direct power to
enact and amend basic laws such as important criminal or civil
legislation.\42\ Thus, much anticipated amendments to the PRC
Criminal Procedure Law, which officials have been considering
revising for several years, would not have to be made public in
draft form under the policy introduced in April.\43\
One new regulation that authorities never released in draft
form for public comment, according to one observer, is the new
open government information (OGI) regulation that took effect
in May 2008.\44\ The OGI regulation is intended to increase
public access to government information, but lacks a clear
presumption of disclosure.\45\ The regulation's ``state
secrets'' exception and penalties for failure to ``establish
and perfect'' procedures for making secrecy determinations may
encourage officials to err on the side of non-disclosure
instead of open government information. Furthermore, on the eve
of OGI's effective date, the central government further
broadened officials' discretion to withhold information when it
issued an opinion saying officials could deny requests for
information not related to the requesting party's ``production,
livelihood and scientific and technological research.'' \46\
This introduction of an apparent purpose test differs from
earlier local-level OGI regulations and international
practice.\47\ Initial reports from Mainland Chinese and Hong
Kong media indicated that some officials were being evasive or
uncooperative in handling requests for information.\48\
Local measures providing for public hearings empower local
officials to decide which members of the public may attend or
offer testimony at hearings.\49\ Xiong Lei, a former editor at
Xinhua, wrote in the July 2008 issue of the China Society for
Human Rights Studies' magazine that this created problems since
the government sponsor's ``independence is questionable.'' \50\
She also said that provisions for public participation had been
``sporadically written'' into some laws and that ``public
participation is mostly witnessed in hearings on pricing,
legislation and some administrative moves, but is absent in
many projects immediately affecting people's life, like land
leasing, neighborhood renovation and city renewal projects.''
Local measures also provide little guidance on what weight to
give input from hearings. One local measure stipulated that
hearing summaries, which are prepared by the government
sponsor, should be an ``important reference'' for
policymaking.\51\ According to mainland Chinese and Hong Kong
media reports, at two public hearings in December 2007
concerning public opposition to the construction of a chemical
plant in Xiamen [see Section II--Environment], officials
selected citizens randomly during a live drawing on television
from a pool of 624 people who had signed up to participate.
Officials also allowed observers to monitor the selection
process.\52\ Following the hearings, officials decided to move
the plant, and the China Daily admonished local officials in
January 2008, saying that if they had ``invited local residents
to weigh in on the matter before the plan had been approved,
all the troubles might have been avoided.'' \53\
Commercial Rule of Law
INTRODUCTION
As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China is
bound by commitments outlined under both the WTO agreements and
China's accession documents.\1\ These commitments require that
the Chinese government ensure non-discrimination in the
administration of trade-related measures, and prompt
publication of all laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and
administrative rulings relating to trade. Over the past year,
concerns have persisted over China's continued deviation from
WTO norms in both law and practice. China's uneven
implementation of its WTO commitments pursuant to its
obligations as a member of the WTO have led to multiple WTO
challenges against China.\2\ [See box at the end of this
section.]
The new PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, which took effect in August
2008, heralds the potential for structural change that may have
a significant impact on the development of commercial rule of
law in China. China's new National Strategy for Intellectual
Property, on the other hand, is similar to China's past
approaches to the enforcement of intellectual property
protection, which have been largely unsuccessful. Implementing
measures related to land and property rights, and enterprise
income tax also had an impact on China's development of the
commercial rule of law in the last year. Tightened visa
restrictions in the period around the 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympic Games impacted operations across commercial sectors
significantly.\3\
China has taken steps over the last year to increase
opportunities for interested parties to become aware of and
engaged in the development of new laws and regulations, and the
formulation of amendments to existing laws and regulations. The
National People's Congress (NPC) and China's State Council
Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) separately took steps to
establish public notice-and-comment systems for proposed laws
and regulations. On April 21, 2008, the NPC announced that in
principle the NPC Standing Committee would release the full
text of draft laws, on its Web site, for public comment.\4\
[See Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance, Public
Participation in Lawmaking.] This announcement helped to
formalize a process that the NPC had practiced on select laws
over the last year (for instance, on a new draft Food Safety
Law in March, and on the latest draft of the proposed new
patent law, which the NPC posted on its Web site with an
invitation to comment on September 8, 2008; in a similar vein,
the Supreme People's Court released a draft interpretation of
the PRC Property Law for public comment on June 16, 2008\5\).
In addition, the SCLAO committed, as part of ongoing work on
transparency under the U.S./China Strategic Economic Dialogue
(SED), to publish on its Web site all trade- and economic-
related administrative regulations and departmental rules that
are proposed for adoption, and to provide a public comment
period of not less than 30 days from the date of
publication.\6\ Comment procedures are intended to afford
interested parties, including both foreign and domestic firms
and trade associations, some limited opportunities to offer
input prior to implementation. China must ensure full and
consistent implementation and institute additional efforts to
fully develop strong rule of law before these steps may be
deemed positive.
ANTI-MONOPOLY
The new PRC Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) took effect on August
1, 2008,\7\ but the text of the law did not fully specify who
would be responsible for its enforcement.\8\ The law created an
Anti-Monopoly Commission under the State Council but the
government did not announce until earlier this year that three
government entities would share responsibility for enforcement:
the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), and the State Administration for Industry
and Commerce (SAIC). The Anti-Monopoly Commission's role is to
coordinate the enforcement activities of these three
entities.\9\ Competition matters previously were dealt with
under provisions in China's 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition
Law\10\ and 1997 Price Law.\11\ The AML codifies doctrines of
state action that have prompted some experts, both in China and
outside, to liken it to a ``new Economic Constitution.'' \12\
There appear to have been several motivations for issuing
the AML. One main motivation appears to have been to strengthen
the legal foundation for China's transition to a market
economy. Some legislators reportedly perceived a need to curb
government power and combat local protectionism.\13\ The AML
has an entire chapter devoted to ``Abuse of Administrative
Powers to Eliminate or Restrict Competition.'' \14\ At the same
time, the AML also contains a provision that seemingly grants
privileges to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in
sectors important to national security and the economy.\15\
Other Chinese legislators reportedly feared that superior
access to capital might enable foreign firms to attain dominant
positions in specific industries in China.\16\ However, this
concern does not appear to have been the main motivation for
the law.\17\
Within a month after the AML took effect, there were
reports of at least four antitrust cases filed (though not
necessarily accepted), including cases that targeted a state
agency,\18\ and also a petition filed asking the government to
open an investigation against Microsoft.\19\ In addition, a
number of implementing rules and regulations remain in the
pipeline. The United States has provided technical assistance
funding to the American Chamber of Commerce in China to
increase dialogue and cooperation with Chinese enforcement
officials during the law's implementation.\20\
The AML includes a national security provision as follows:
If the merger with or acquisition of domestic
enterprises by foreign investors or other forms of
concentration involving foreign investors concerns
national security, in addition to the review of
concentration of undertakings in
accordance with the provisions of this Law, it shall be
examined for national security review in accordance
with relevant regulations of the State.\21\
The ultimate impact of this provision, whether negative or
positive, remains unclear. Attorneys practicing in China are
watching to see whether the approval of some mergers may be
conditioned on commitments to licensing.\22\ Guidelines issued
by the Supreme People's Court at the time the AML took effect
indicated that anti-monopoly civil cases would be decided by
the intellectual property divisions of people's courts. This
was motivated in part to take advantage of these divisions'
relative professionalism and sophistication compared with other
courts, specifically their familiarity with complex legal,
technical and economic matters.\23\
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The State Council issued its Outline of the National
Intellectual Property Strategy (National Strategy) on June 5,
2008.\24\ The National Strategy calls for the establishment of
mechanisms to coordinate bureaucracies with overlapping
responsibilities, but does not fully specify plans to achieve
those goals.\25\ There is little that addresses the need for
coordination between administrative authorities, who handle
most intellectual property (IP) enforcement in China, and
public security bureaus--a need that was highlighted in this
year's United States Trade Representative Special 301
Report.\26\ Finally, the National Strategy's call for
``innovation'' appears at odds with its rhetoric of ``self-
reliance.'' Its introduction of the new concept of ``self-
reliant innovation'' may suggest tensions at the top over the
future direction of China's IP policy. If such tensions are
more pronounced than before, they may have negative
implications for China's ability to perform on its stated
commitments to improve IP enforcement going forward.
The language in which the National Strategy presents
China's commitments on matters related to intellectual property
rights (IPR) enforcement is excessively vague. Vague pledges by
themselves will not achieve the objective of fulfilling IPR
commitments. Pledges to ``strengthen'' the system, and make it
``sound'' and ``effective'' do not lend themselves well to
objective assessment of China's performance in fulfilling (or
failing to fulfill) its commitments to enforce IPR. For
instance, the National Strategy mentions the protection of
trade secrets, stating that ``the behavior of stealing trade
secrets should be severely punished in accordance with law.''
\27\ However, it says little else to specify in detail how this
objective is to be implemented or achieved effectively. As a
result, to protect trade secrets, firms must rely heavily on
provisions governing employee non-competition agreements in the
new PRC Labor Contract Law, which has been in effect only since
January 2008, and implementing regulations which were issued
only in September.\28\
The National Strategy is the work of the National Working
Group for Intellectual Property Rights Protection, which was
established in 2005 for the purpose of coordinating IP policies
among 12 government agencies and ministries that make IP-
related policy. The Working Group has 13 members, including
officials from the Ministry of Commerce, State Intellectual
Property Office, Customs, Supreme People's Court, and State
Administration for Industry and Commerce. In addition to
promising amendments to China's patent,\29\ trademark, and
copyright laws, the National Strategy proposes to investigate
the possible establishment of specialized IP courts, including
a central IP court in Beijing for cases involving highly
technical matters, and a special court for IP appeals.\30\
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
concluded in April that ``rampant counterfeiting and piracy
problems have continued to plague China,'' noting that the
``goal of significantly reducing IPR infringement throughout
China has not yet been achieved.'' \31\ The World Trade
Organization's (WTO) Trade Policy Review noted that,
``(q)uestions remain about the sufficiency of fines and
criminal penalties to deter IPR violations.'' \32\ USTR has
argued that, under China's criminal IPR thresholds, its
prosecutors and judges cannot, as a matter of law, act in ways
that allow China to meet its obligations under the WTO's Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement.\33\ USTR also has argued that China's customs
regulations do not grant Chinese customs officials the
authority or discretion to act in accordance with the TRIPS
Agreement, and China's Copyright Law conflicts with China's
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.\34\ In material
submitted before a WTO panel in April 2008, USTR argued that
``the safe harbors from criminal liability created by China's
high thresholds for criminal liability (i.e., minimum values or
volumes required to initiate criminal prosecution, normally
calculated on the basis of the infringer's actual or marked
price) continue to be a major reason for the lack of an
effective criminal deterrent. These safe harbors are among the
matters for which the United States has requested WTO dispute
settlement with China.'' \35\
Most IPR enforcement in China is handled by administrative
authorities, not courts, and, because administrative fines are
low, they amount to no more than a cost of doing business for
IPR infringers, instead of as deterrents to infringing
activity. Difficulties in initiating and transferring cases for
criminal prosecution and low civil damages also contribute
significantly to inadequate IPR enforcement, and also offer
little to deter infringement. IPR enforcement at the local
level in China also is hampered by poor coordination among
government departments, local protectionism, lack of training,
non-transparent processes, and corruption. As a result, piracy
and counterfeiting levels in China remain high even as the
number of IPR cases in Chinese courts increases. USTR notes,
for example, that China's May 2006 Regulations on the
Protection of Copyright Over Information Networks, fail to
implement fully the World Intellectual Property Organization
Internet Treaties to which China acceded last year.\36\
According to USTR, ``(u)nauthorized retransmission of live
sports telecasts over the Internet is reportedly becoming an
increasing problem internationally, particularly in China.''
\37\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IPR and Ethnic Minority Economic Development
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Guizhou province, authorities are drafting legislation that treats
the indigenous knowledge possessed by ethnic minority citizens as
intellectual property.\38\ The Guizhou provincial Intellectual Property
Office has been developing an IPR-based regulatory system for
traditional know-how related to the cultivation of special forms of
rice, medicinal plants, and other knowledge, such as embroidery
techniques, for which there is known market potential. Officials have
publicized the effort as part of China's national efforts to strengthen
and align IPR enforcement in China with international standards and
with China's international obligations. They also have cast it as
development policy for the benefit of ethnic minority citizens.\39\
Specialists in sustainable development note that the most recent
(August 2008) draft of China's proposed new patent law is silent on
traditional knowledge. ``As it stands, the draft provides no
safeguards, no restrictions, against outright `biopiracy' in terms of
traditional knowledge.'' \40\ To the extent that the ability to patent
inventions based on traditional knowledge appeals to investors, and
their prohibition may turn potential investors away, the Chinese
government may not wish to prohibit patents on traditional knowledge.
Moreover, some development specialists note that, ``a lot of groups,
especially indigenous peoples, don't want to see patent law extended to
traditional knowledge.'' \41\
The application of IP to traditional knowledge may give farmers
leverage over companies wishing to market local products produced with
traditional know-how. At the same time, it is not clear whether Chinese
law does or can effectively address methods for deciding whether IP
rights and royalties must be shared among communities or collectives in
a manner that protects the rights of ethnic minorities.\42\ It remains
to be seen whether the ``protection'' of ethnic minorities' traditional
knowledge in the long-run will safeguard ethnic minority rights.\43\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOD AND PRODUCT SAFETY
In August 2007, after a series of safety scares involving
Chinese products worldwide, China's Commerce Minister called
for a ``Special War'' against unsafe food and inferior product
quality.\44\ A food safety crisis in September 2008 involving
tainted milk products (milk, milk powder, infant formula, cake,
candy, and chocolate) that have killed at least four children
and sickened more than 60,000 others, illustrated the
ineffectiveness of China's ``Special War.'' The Commission's
2007 Annual Report included extended coverage of the
significant challenges China faces in the area of food and
product safety.\45\ Regulatory fragmentation, insufficient
oversight, and the censorship practices of the Chinese
government and Communist Party have contributed to a sharp rise
in domestic and international concern over food safety and
product quality problems in China.
On September 15, 2008, Xinhua announced the arrest of
individuals involved in the contamination, sale, and
distribution of tainted milk products on charges of ``producing
and selling toxic and hazardous food'' under the PRC Food
Hygiene Law.\46\ In addition, Xinhua reported on September 22
that the director of China's General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine had stepped down, and
that the Communist Party chief and mayor of Shijiazhuang, Hebei
province were sacked.\47\ (Hebei is the headquarters of the
Sanlu Group, the dairy producer implicated in the scandal.) The
Party chief reportedly ``was removed for delaying the reporting
of the issue to higher authorities and incompetence'' in
accordance with the PRC Civil Servants Law\48\ and the State
Council Regulation on the Punishment of Civil Servants of
Administrative Organs.\49\ These measures provide that
administrative
officials who fail to fulfill their duties and cause avoidable
severe accidents as a result face removal and punishment.
The government reportedly said that Sanlu ``had first
received complaints about its powder in March 2008 and had
recalled some products but delayed reporting the problems to
the government or the public.'' \50\ A Central Propaganda
Department directive reportedly sent to newspaper editors in
June included restrictions on coverage of politically sensitive
topics during the Olympics, saying that coverage of ``all food
safety issues . . . is off-limits.'' \51\
China's food safety and product quality problems do not
stem from a failure to legislate on the issue, but rather from
duplicative legislation and ineffective implementation. China's
legislation on the issue includes, for example, the Food
Hygiene Law, Product Quality Law, Agricultural Product Quality
Safety Law, Consumer Rights Protection Law, State Council Rules
on Strengthening Supervision and Management of Food Safety, and
National Plan for Major Food Safety Emergencies. These laws and
regulations create overlapping portfolios and less than clear
lines of responsibility among multiple regulatory actors,
including the State Administration for Industry and Commerce,
the State Food and Drug Administration, the General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine, the Standardization Administration, the Ministry of
Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of
Commerce. A new draft Food Safety Law that aims to consolidate
the regulatory and legislative landscape governing food safety
and product quality, and that provides for penalties up to life
imprisonment, was released for comment in April 2008,\52\ and
debated in August 2008.\53\ It is now reportedly being
revisited in light of the present food safety crisis.
LAND AND PROPERTY
Arable land is perhaps China's most important non-renewable
resource. But it is rapidly shrinking as a result of
urbanization and the conversion of farmland to industrial use.
Land-use efficiency and the conservation of undeveloped land
have motivated the government's efforts in the last year to
clarify procedures concerning interests in land and related
property. The PRC Property Law, which took effect on October 1,
2007, consolidated China's various laws affecting both public
and private property. Property in China heretofore had been
governed by a diffuse network of legal provisions distributed
across several laws (primarily the General Principles of Civil
Law, the Land Administration Law, the Urban Real Estate
Administration Law, the Law on Rural Land Contracting, and the
Securities Law). [See the Commission's 2007 Annual Report for
discussion of the Property Law.\54\]
New Land Registration Measures,\55\ which were issued in
December 2007, and took effect February 1, 2008, effectively
serve as
implementation rules for key provisions in the Property
Law.\56\ Under Land Registration Rules issued in 1995, there
were separate registration systems, at separate government
departments for buildings and the land on which they were
built. Property disputes and illegal property transfers have
been attributed to the confusion caused by this dual-
registration system. The new Land Registration Measures address
the confusion prompted by the dual-registration system by
requiring that registration of both buildings and land now be
handled by a single local government authority.\57\ This is
significant in part because, under Article 16 of the Property
Law, registration is the method through which interests in land
are created.\58\ Another significant related development in the
last year was the implementation of the PRC Urban and Rural
Planning Law, issued in October 2007, and effective January 1,
2008,\59\ replacing the PRC Urban Planning Law.\60\ The new
Urban and Rural Planning Law brings rural land within China's
land planning system, such that all rural land use now must
comply with official government planning department plans.
Finally, in June, the Supreme People's Court published a draft
judicial interpretation of the PRC Property Law for public
comment.\61\
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) state that ``each member shall . . . avoid
manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over
other members.'' \62\ While the yuan has appreciated against
the dollar since mid-2005, it remains significantly
undervalued. The United States and other IMF members have
continued to urge China to change its exchange rate policy.
Some prominent economists and former IMF officials have taken
the view that ``China's exchange rate and related policies are
in clear violation of Article IV Section 1(iii) [of the IMF
Articles of Agreement].'' \63\ The Deputy Director of the Asia
and Pacific Department of the IMF has concluded that,
``[b]ecause China has persisted in heavily managing its
exchange rate, it has created for itself a major problem with
macroeconomic control.'' \64\ China's regular intervention in
the exchange market to resist appreciation of the yuan has been
``persistent, one-way, and growing in size,'' according to
leading economists who gathered in Washington, DC, to debate
China's exchange rate policy in October 2007.\65\
ENTERPRISE INCOME TAX
The new PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law, issued in March
2007, and Implementing Regulations issued in December 2007,
both took effect on January 1, 2008. The new law consolidates
the two tax regimes set forth under the PRC Foreign Investment
Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Law (1991) and the Interim
Measures of Enterprise Income Tax (1993).\66\ Until now,
separate tax regimes for domestic and foreign invested
enterprises had been an important part of China's overall
scheme for attracting foreign investment. The new Enterprise
Income Tax Law's regime is more industry focused. Industry-
based incentives favor companies engaged in advanced
technology, environmental protection, agriculture, utilities,
water conservation, high technology, forestry, animal
husbandry, fisheries and infrastructure construction, venture
capital, and enterprises supporting disadvantaged groups.\67\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WTO Disputes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, China has been respondent in 11 World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute cases, and complainant in 3 cases.\68\ The following
provides an overview of ongoing WTO disputes filed against China.
Automobile Parts
On July 18, 2008, following complaints by the European Communities,
the United States, and Canada regarding China's legal and
administrative measures affecting imports of automobile parts, the WTO
Dispute Resolution Body (DSB) ruled against China, in its first legal
defeat since its accession to the WTO.\69\ The panel found that Chinese
measures ``accord imported auto parts less favorable treatment than
like domestic auto parts.'' \70\ Specifically, Chinese tax measures on
imported auto parts were found to result in unfair competition and
violated international trade rules. China appealed the ruling in
September 2008.\71\
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products
In March 2008, the WTO Director-General composed a dispute-settlement
panel in relation to a dispute in which the United States challenged
legal and administrative measures issued by the Chinese government that
``restrict trading rights with respect to imported films for theatrical
release, audiovisual home entertainment products (e.g., video cassettes
and DVDs), sound recordings and publications (e.g., books, magazines,
newspapers, and electronic publications)''; and ``certain measures that
restrict market access for, or discriminate against, foreign suppliers
of distribution services for publications and foreign suppliers of
audiovisual services (including distribution services) for audiovisual
home entertainment products.'' \72\ The panel announced on September
22, 2008, that it expects to issue its final report in February
2009.\73\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WTO Disputes--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Information Services
Also in March 2008, the United States and European Union requested
consultations in a dispute pertaining to several legal and
administrative measures issued by the Chinese government that empower
China's state-run Xinhua News Agency to act as the regulatory and
approval authority for foreign news agencies and for foreign financial
information providers in China.\74\ Xinhua requires foreign suppliers
to operate in China only through agents designated by Xinhua, and does
not permit them directly to solicit subscriptions for their services in
China.\75\ The measures in dispute have permitted Xinhua to designate a
branch of Xinhua as the only agent, and to make the renewal of foreign
financial information suppliers' licenses conditional upon the
signature of agent agreements with the Xinhua branch. The measures also
have permitted Xinhua to require, as a condition of license renewal,
the release by foreign suppliers of detailed and confidential
information concerning their financial information services and their
customers and detailed information regarding their financial
information services contracts with foreign suppliers.
The United States, European Union, and Canada contend that individuals
within Xinhua appear to be participants in Xinhua's commercial
activities that compete with foreign service suppliers, and that
``China thus appears to have failed to provide a regulatory authority
that is separate from and not accountable to a service supplier that
authority regulates.'' Because the Chinese measures impose market
access restrictions and discriminatory requirements on foreign firms in
China, the United States contends China has failed to live up to its
commitments under various provisions of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, the WTO's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement, and China's Protocol of Accession.\76\ Canada
requested consultations in a similar dispute in June 2008,\77\ which
the United States requested to join in July 2008.\78\
Intellectual Property
In December 2007, the WTO Director-General composed a panel in
relation to a dispute in which the United States challenged
deficiencies in China's intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
and enforcement regime attributable to weaknesses in China's legal
institutions and systems of policy implementation.\79\ The DSB expects
to issue a Panel Report in this dispute in November 2008.\80\ [See
Intellectual Property in this section above.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WTO Disputes--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsidies
In July 2007, the United States and Mexico requested the establishment
of a panel to review Chinese export and import-substitution subsidies
prohibited by WTO rules.\81\ The United States and Mexico alleged that
a number of legal and administrative measures issued by the Chinese
government provide refunds, reductions, or exemptions to enterprises in
China on the condition that those enterprises purchase domestic over
imported goods, or on the condition that those enterprises meet certain
export performance criteria.\82\ In December 2007, China and the United
States informed the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that they had
reached an agreement in this dispute, in the form of a memorandum of
understanding.\83\ In February 2008, China and Mexico informed the DSB
that they also had reached an agreement in a similar dispute.\84\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADDENDUM: U.S. JOINT COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE
On September 15-16, 2008, U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos M.
Gutierrez and U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab,
together with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan, held the 19th
U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) at the
Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba
Linda, California. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ed Schafer
also participated. This meeting marked the 25th anniversary of
the founding of the JCCT in 1983. The JCCT is a high-level
government-to-government forum for addressing trade and
investment issues. At the 19th JCCT, a number of agreements
were reached on issues of concern to American businesses in
several areas including intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection, healthcare,
agriculture, and information security, among others. On IPR
protection, China and the United States agreed to continue
pursuing cooperative activities on such issues as: IPR and
innovation, including China's development of guidelines on IPR
and standards; public-private discussions on copyright and
Internet piracy challenges, including infringement on user-
generated content sites; reducing the sale of pirated and
counterfeit goods at wholesale and retail markets; and other
issues of mutual interest. On healthcare, China agreed to
remove remaining redundancies in testing and certifying
imported medical devices, and the United States and China
agreed to continue cooperation to close loopholes that allow
the sale of bulk chemicals to downstream drug counterfeiters.
On agriculture, China lifted avian influenza-related bans on
poultry imports from six U.S. states--Connecticut, Nebraska,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia--and
agreed to work jointly to address remaining bans on poultry
from Virginia and Arkansas; and China agreed to immediately
allow seven U.S. poultry processing plants to resume exports to
China. On information security, China announced that it will
delay publication of final rules on information security
certification that would have potentially barred several types
of U.S. products from China's market, pending further mutual
discussion of issues related to information security.\85\
Access to Justice
INTRODUCTION
Chinese citizens continue to face obstacles in seeking
remedies to government actions that violate their legal rights.
External government and Communist Party controls continue to
limit the independence of the judiciary. During the past year,
local government and Party officials have stepped up the
intimidation and harassment of human rights lawyers and
advocates, and lawyers have been pressured not to take on
``sensitive'' cases.
Chinese law includes judicial and administrative mechanisms
that allow citizens to challenge government actions, including
administrative litigation in courts and administrative
reconsideration in government agencies. Chinese law also
permits citizens to petition the government through the xinfang
(``letters and visits'') system. Chinese authorities, however,
impose punishments on local
officials based on the mere existence of petitions in their
jurisdiction. Local officials face heavier punishments for
petitions involving greater numbers of people and petitions
directed at higher levels, creating an incentive for
petitioners to organize large-scale petitions to pressure local
officials to act. At the same time, it gives local authorities
an interest in suppressing mass petitions and preventing
petitioners from approaching higher authorities.\1\
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
International human rights standards require effective
remedies for official violations of citizen rights. Article 8
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
``Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.'' \2\ Article
2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) requires that all parties to the ICCPR ensure that
persons whose rights or freedoms are violated ``have an
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.'' \3\
ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND HARASSMENT OF LAWYERS
China's Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs\4\
lowered litigation fees, and the Measures for the
Administration of Lawyers' Fees\5\ helped to regulate price
gouging by attorneys. At the same time that China has promoted
efforts to expand legal assistance to citizens, however, the
government also has harassed, intimidated, or detained lawyers
and other human rights defenders who challenge government
abuses. As shown by an extensive study conducted by Human
Rights Watch, violence and intimidation by the Chinese
government and Communist Party directed against lawyers has
become extreme.\6\
Criminal defense lawyers are vulnerable to prosecution for
the crime of ``falsifying evidence'' under Article 306 of the
Criminal Law, which Human Rights Watch observes has been used
to intimidate and threaten lawyers.\7\ Criminal defense lawyers
also face significant obstacles in representing their clients,
including lack of access to detained suspects and defendants,
lack of access to case files, and limitations on their ability
to collect evidence.\8\ [See Section II--Rights of Criminal
Suspects and Defendants.] The legal profession is not
independent, and the Ministry of Justice has authority over
lawyers, law firms, and bar associations.\9\ Government
authorities have used their control over the annual renewal of
lawyers' licenses to punish and intimidate lawyers who take on
sensitive cases.\10\
For example, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders
(CHRD), 30 Tibetans who were detained and tried in April 2008
after the March protests were denied their right to have legal
assistance of their own choosing.\11\ Twenty-one lawyers who,
in an open letter posted on the Internet, had volunteered free
legal representation to detained Tibetans, received warnings
from Chinese authorities not to take on such cases.\12\ The
Tibetan defendants were reportedly represented by government-
appointed attorneys at trial.\13\ Teng Biao, a well-known legal
activist and law professor, told the South China Morning Post,
``The relatives of the defendants [were] under even bigger
pressure than us. They didn't dare to come to us.'' \14\ CHRD
reported that most of the 21 lawyers were summoned by
authorities for questioning and threatened with punishment if
they persisted in attempting to represent the Tibetans.\15\
Many were placed under police surveillance, and the process for
annual renewal of their lawyers' licenses (usually completed by
the end of May) was suspended.\16\ All of the lawyers except
Teng Biao eventually had their licenses renewed.\17\ Teng Biao
told Agence France-Presse in early June that he believed the
authorities refused to renew his license not only because of
his role in the offer to provide free legal representation to
the Tibetans but also for his other human rights defense
work.\18\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lawyers Told Not To Take Tainted Milk Cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese authorities are preventing citizens with grievances related to
tainted milk products from using the judicial system to seek redress.
They have invoked the importance of ``maintaining social stability'' in
seeking to thwart efforts to organize large groups of angry citizens
through collective lawsuits.\19\
By early October, more than 100 lawyers nationwide had joined forces
to offer free legal aid to the parents of babies who had fallen sick
from tainted milk.\20\ Many of the lawyers have been pressured to
withdraw from the group.\21\ Judicial authorities in Henan, for
example, have pressured more than 20 Henan lawyers to rescind their
offers to assist the parents.\22\ One of the lawyers, Chang Boyang,
told the Associated Press that he was informed that if he did not
withdraw, he and his firm would be ``dealt with.'' \23\ Judicial
authorities in some provinces have told volunteer lawyers that
litigation could lead to ``social unrest.'' \24\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lawyers Told Not To Take Tainted Milk Cases--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Li Fangping, one of the lead attorneys organizing the effort, told the
Chinese financial magazine Caijing that because courts are permitted
not to accept lawsuits on ``social stability'' grounds, filing a
lawsuit for damages relating to public incidents presents a
challenge.\25\ Li was urged by the government-controlled Beijing
Lawyers' Association ``to put faith in the party and government.'' \26\
By the middle of October, three individual lawsuits had been filed
separately on behalf of infants who had become sick or died from being
fed melamine-tainted milk in Guangdong, Gansu, and Henan provinces.\27\
The Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court refused to receive the
lawsuit, and instead treated it as a petition.\28\ The court in Gansu
province stated that it could not accept the case until it had further
direction from above.\29\ The first lawsuit against Sanlu, the Chinese
dairy products company at the center of the tainted milk powder crisis,
was filed on September 22 in Henan province; a month later the court
still had not announced whether it would accept the case, exceeding the
seven-day time limit set forth in the PRC Civil Procedure Law for
determining whether to accept or reject a case.\30\ Parents and lawyers
have reportedly been informed by government authorities that the
parents' claims can be handled through out-of-court compensation.\31\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF STATE ACTION
Chinese law provides methods for citizens to seek a remedy
when they believe the government has violated their rights.
These
methods allow Chinese citizens limited legal recourse against
individual officials or local governments who exceed their
authority.\32\ Under the Administrative Reconsideration Law
(ARL), Chinese citizens may submit an application to an
administrative agency for
administrative review of specific government actions.\33\ Under
the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), citizens may file a
lawsuit in a people's court to challenge certain government
actions.\34\ The State Compensation Law authorizes citizens to
seek compensation for illegal government acts along with an ARL
or ALL action, or present their claims directly to the relevant
government bureau.\35\ Citizens face obstacles, however, in
filing suits against local officials or government entities,
particularly in ``sensitive'' cases. Earlier this year, courts
in Sichuan refused to hear cases against local officials
brought by parents of children who were killed in school
collapses during the May 12 Sichuan earthquake.\36\
CITIZEN PETITIONING
Since the 1950s, xinfang (``letters and visits'') offices
have been an avenue outside the judicial system for citizens to
present their grievances.\37\ Under the 2005 National
Regulations on Letters and Visits, citizens may ``give
information, make comments or suggestions, or lodge
complaints'' to xinfang bureaus of local governments and their
departments.\38\ Although Chinese citizens have a legal right
to petition and there is an extensive ``letters and visits''
bureaucracy to handle petitions, the reality is that
``officials at all levels of government have a vested interest
in preventing petitioners from speaking up about mistreatment
and injustices they have suffered.'' \39\
In its last Annual Report, the Commission noted the large
``clean- up'' operation of petitioners in Beijing, which
resulted in the detention of over 700 individuals, in advance
of the annual March meeting of the National People's
Congress.\40\ As Human Rights Watch suggested, this roundup of
petitioners was a ``grand rehearsal'' for the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games.\41\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders
concluded in March 2008 that ``illegal interception and
arbitrary detention of petitioners'' had become ``more
systematic and extensive'' during the past year, particularly
in Beijing in the run-up to the Olympics.\42\ [See Section II--
Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, for a discussion of
the ``black jails'' used in Beijing and elsewhere to detain
petitioners.]
PROSPECTS
Prospects for improved access to justice in China have
dimmed during the last year due to the Chinese government's
failure to afford basic legal protections to protesters, the
Beijing Olympic Games organizers' decision to bar petitioners
from Beijing,\43\ the politicization of the courts and
continuing problems with corruption,\44\ and ongoing harassment
and intimidation of lawyers.\45\
After the earthquake in Sichuan, the Supreme People's Court
(SPC) quickly issued a ``Circular on Completing Judicial Work
During the Earthquake Disaster Relief Period to Earnestly
Safeguard Social Stability in the Disaster Area.'' \46\ The
Circular calls on judges to ``make best efforts to use
mediation or reconciliation through the withdrawal of charges
as the method to resolve disputes.'' \47\ Like the Emergency
Response Law that took effect in November 2007,\48\ the
emphasis appears to be on preventing isolated events from
blossoming into national problems.
During the past year, Hu Jintao's administration appears to
have enhanced the Communist Party's control over the
judiciary.\49\ President Hu has ordered the courts,
procuratorates, and public security bureaus to uphold the
``three supremes''--the Party's cause, the people's interest,
and the constitution and laws.\50\ Wang Shengjun, the new
president of the Supreme People's Court (SPC), has instructed
courts to study the ``three supremes.'' Wang--who did not
attend law school and has no experience as a judge, prosecutor,
lawyer, or legal scholar--appears to have been selected not for
his law credentials, but because he is a ``trusted party
functionary.'' \51\ Where Wang Shengjun's predecessor Xiao Yang
was a distinguished legal scholar and prosecutor before
becoming president of the SPC, Wang rose to his new position
through the public security and political-legal affairs
apparatus.\52\ Wang previously was the head of the Anhui
provincial public security department and was promoted to the
Central Political and Legal Affairs Committee in 1993.\53\
In February, the PRC State Council issued a white paper
titled, ``China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the
Rule of Law,'' which noted the damage that official corruption
has caused to the development of China's legal system.\54\ The
conclusion of the rule of law white paper states in part:
China's legal construction is still facing some
problems: The development of democracy and the rule of
law still falls short of the needs of economic and
social development; the legal framework . . . calls for
further improvement; in some regions and departments,
laws are not
observed, or strictly enforced, violators are not
brought to justice; local protectionism, departmental
protectionism and difficulties in law enforcement occur
from time to time; some government functionaries take
bribes and bend the law, abuse their power when
executing the law, abuse their authority to override
the law, and substitute their words for the law, thus
bringing damage to the socialist rule of law. . . .\55\
During the past year, the Chinese leadership has stepped up
its efforts to rein in official corruption. In September 2007,
the government established its first National Bureau of
Corruption Prevention.\56\ The Web site of the new
anticorruption bureau reportedly crashed only a day or two
after its roll-out, overwhelmed by the large number of people
attempting to log on to register complaints.\57\ This June, the
Party announced its first five-year plan to prevent and punish
corruption.\58\
The outgoing top prosecutor told the National People's
Congress (NPC) this March that during the past five years
nearly 14,000 officials at or above the county level were
investigated for embezzlement, bribery, or misappropriation of
public funds--of these, 35 officials were at the provincial or
ministerial level and 930 at the municipal level.\59\ Xiao
Yang, the former president of the Supreme People's Court, told
the NPC this March that court trials involving corruption cases
during the past five years were up more than 12 percent
compared with the previous five years.\60\ Moreover, during
2008, there was a spate of high-profile corruption
investigations and trials, including the conviction in April of
former Shanghai Party chief and Politburo member Chen Liangyu,
who was sentenced to 18 years in prison for bribery and abuse
of power in connection with the Shanghai pension fund
scandal.\61\
At the March 2007 NPC session, Xiao Yang stated that he had
continuing fears about the ``grave situation'' of judicial
corruption.\62\ In March 2008, Xiao Yang reported that during
the previous year 218 judges had been punished for abuse of
judicial power and
corruption.\63\ In October 2008, a vice president of the
Supreme People's Court, Huang Songyou, was placed under Party
``double regulation'' (shuanggui) for his alleged role in a
corruption scandal
involving a former top official at the Guangdong High People's
Court.\64\ [See Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and
Defendants--Shuanggui: Extralegal Detention of Party Members.]
IV. Xinjiang
Human Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
INTRODUCTION
Human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) remain severe, and repression increased in the
past year. As detailed by the Commission in past Annual
Reports,\1\ the government uses anti-terrorism campaigns as a
pretext for enforcing repressive security measures and for
controlling expressions of religious and ethnic identity,
especially among the ethnic Uyghur population, within which it
alleges the presence of separatist activity. It enforces
``strike hard'' anti-crime campaigns against the government-
designated ``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and
extremism to imprison Uyghurs for peaceful expressions of
dissent,
religious practice, and other non-violent activities. In the
past year, the government used these longstanding campaigns as
a springboard to increase repressive practices amid
preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, reports
of terrorist activity, and protests among ethnic minorities. In
the past year, the government also continued to strengthen
policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and promoting
assimilation. Policies in areas such as language use,
development, and migration have disadvantaged local ethnic
minority residents and have positioned the XUAR to undergo
broad cultural and demographic shifts in coming decades.
Government policy in the XUAR violates China's own laws and
contravenes China's international obligations to safeguard the
human rights of XUAR residents. The government has failed to
implement its legally stipulated ``regional ethnic autonomy''
system in a manner that provides XUAR residents with meaningful
control over their own affairs. Instead, authorities exert
central and local government control at a level antithetical to
regional autonomy. Government policies violate the basic human
rights of XUAR residents and have a disparate impact on ethnic
minorities.\2\
ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES, ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGNS, AND SECURITY MEASURES
The Chinese government uses anti-terrorism campaigns as a
pretext for enforcing harsh security policies in the XUAR. In
the past year the government used security preparations for the
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, reports of terrorist
activity, and protests in Tibetan areas of China and within the
XUAR as platforms for advancing repressive security measures in
the region. In spring 2008, the Chinese government claimed it
had broken up three terrorist plots to disrupt the Olympics, as
well as an attempted terrorist attack on an aircraft. As in the
past,\3\ however, the government provided scant evidence to
back up its claims and continued to enforce restrictions on
free press that hindered efforts to report on the region.\4\
During the same period, local governments implemented a series
of measures to tighten security, restrict religious activity,
and hinder citizen activism.\5\ In March 2008, authorities in
Hoten district suppressed demonstrations by Uyghurs calling for
human rights and detained protesters.\6\ The government
continued to implement repressive security measures throughout
the summer, during which time the Olympic torch passed through
the XUAR in June\7\ and as the government provided limited
reports of terrorist and criminal activity in the region in
August.\8\ Measures reported by Chinese government sources or
overseas observers included wide-scale detentions, inspections
of households, restrictions on Uyghurs' domestic and
international travel, controls over Uyghur Web sites, and
increased surveillance over XUAR religious personnel, mosques,
and religious practitioners, as well as increased monitoring of
other populations.\9\ [For more information, see box titled
Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics below.]
Authorities in cities outside of the XUAR also increased
controls over Uyghur residents leading up to and during the
Olympics.\10\ In the aftermath of the Olympics, XUAR chair Nur
Bekri outlined increased measures to ``strike hard'' against
perceived threats in the region, casting blame on U.S.-based
Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer and ``western hostile
forces.'' \11\ Local governments and other authorities reported
carrying out propaganda education campaigns, and in September,
XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan described plans to
launch regionwide anti-separatism education later in the
year.\12\
``Strike hard'' anti-crime campaigns in the region have
resulted in high rates of incarceration of Uyghurs in the
XUAR.\13\ Statistics from official Chinese sources indicate
that cases of endangering state security from the region
account for a significant percentage of the nationwide total,
in some years possibly comprising most of the cases in
China.\14\ In 2007, the head of the Xinjiang High People's
Court said that the region bears an ``extremely strenuous''
caseload for crimes involving endangering state security.\15\
In August 2008, Chinese media reported that XUAR courts would
``regard ensuring [state] security and social stability [as]
their primary task.'' \16\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) reiterated a
pledge in August 2008 to use harsh security measures to crack down
against the government-designated ``three forces'' of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism.\17\ On August 13, Wang Lequan, XUAR
Communist Party Chair, described the battle against the ``three
forces'' as a ``life or death struggle'' and pledged to ``strike hard''
against their activities. XUAR Party Committee Standing Committee
member Zhu Hailun reiterated the call to ``strike hard'' at an August
18 meeting. The announcements followed the release of limited
information on terrorist and criminal activity in the region and came
amid a series of measures that increased repression in the XUAR. The
measures build off of earlier campaigns to tighten repression in the
region, including efforts to tighten control as the Olympic torch
passed through the region in June. Reported measures implemented in the
run-up to and during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games include:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wide-scale Detentions. Authorities have carried out wide-
scale detentions as part of security campaigns in cities throughout
the XUAR, according to a report from the Uyghur Human Rights Project.
Reported measures include ``security sweeps'' resulting in mass
detentions in the Kashgar area and Kucha county, including blanket
detentions in Kucha of young people who have been abroad; the
detention of non-resident Uyghurs in Korla city; the forced return of
Uyghur children studying religion in another province and their
detention in the XUAR for engaging in ``illegal religious
activities''; and the detention of family members or associates of
people suspected to be involved in terrorist activity.
Restrictions on Uyghurs' Domestic and International Travel.
Authorities reportedly continued to hold Uyghurs' passports over the
summer, building off of a campaign in 2007 to confiscate Muslims'
passports and prevent them from making overseas pilgrimages,
according to reports from overseas media. Authorities also coupled
restrictions on overseas travel with reported measures to limit
Uyghurs' travel within China.
Controls Over Religion. XUAR officials have enforced a series
of measures that ratchet up control over religious practice in the
region, according to reports from Chinese and overseas sources.
Authorities in Yengisheher county in Kashgar district issued
accountability measures on August 5 to hold local officials
responsible for high-level surveillance of religious activity in the
region. Also in August, authorities in Peyziwat county, Kashgar
district, called for ``enhancing management'' of groups including
religious figures as part of broader government and Party measures of
``prevention'' and ``attack.'' The previous month, authorities in
Mongghulkure county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, called for
strengthening management of religious affairs; inspecting all mosques
and venues for religious activity; curbing ``illegal'' recitations of
scripture and non-government-approved pilgrimages; and
``penetrating'' groups of religious believers to understand their
ways of thinking. Authorities in Lop county, Hoten district, have
been forcing women to remove head coverings in a stated effort to
promote ``women for the new era.'' Authorities have also continued to
enforce measures to restrict observance of the Muslim holiday of
Ramadan, which, in 2008, took place in September.\18\
Controls Over Free Expression. Authorities in the XUAR
ordered some Uyghur Web sites to shut down their bulletin board
services (BBS) during the Olympics, according to Radio Free Asia. In
a review of Uyghur Web sites carried out during the Olympics,
Commission staff found that BBSs on the Web sites Diyarim, Orkhun,
and Alkuyi had been suspended. The BBS Web page on Diyarim contained
the message, ``[L]et's protect stability with full strength and
create a peaceful environment for the Olympic Games[!] Please visit
other Diyarim pages[.]'' The message on the BBS Web page on Orkhun
stated, ``Based on the requirements of the work units concerned, the
Orkhun Uyghur history Web site has been closed until August 25
because of the Olympic Games.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspections of Households in Ghulja. Authorities in the
predominantly ethnic minority city of Ghulja searched homes in the
area in July in a campaign described by a Chinese official as aimed
at rooting out ``illegal activities'' and finding residents living
without proper documentation, according to Radio Free Asia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN XINJIANG
The government imposes harsh restrictions over religious
practice in the XUAR. [For detailed information, see Section
II--Freedom of Religion--China's Religious Communities--Islam.]
CONTROLS OVER FREE EXPRESSION IN XINJIANG
Authorities in the XUAR repress free speech. Authorities
have levied prison sentences on individuals for forms of
expression ranging from conducting historical research to
writing literature. [For more information on these cases, see
box titled Speaking Out: Uyghurs Punished for Free Speech in
Xinjiang below.] In August 2008, Mehbube Ablesh, an employee in
the advertising department at the Xinjiang People's Radio
Station was fired from her job and detained in apparent
connection to her writings on the Internet that were critical
of the government.\19\ The government engages in broad
censorship of political and religious materials. In 2008, the
XUAR Propaganda Bureau announced it would make ``illegal''
political and religious publications the focal point of its
campaign to ``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal
Publications.'' \20\ The focus on religious and political
materials builds off of earlier campaigns to root out such
publications.\21\ Also in 2008, officials in Atush city
reported finding ``illegal'' portraits of Uyghur activist
Rebiya Kadeer and pictures with religious content.\22\ [For
more information on Rebiya Kadeer, see box titled The Chinese
Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer below.] In addition,
authorities closed some Uyghur-language Internet discussion
forums during the period of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic
Games.\23\
Central and local authorities further regulate religious
expression by controlling the contents of materials published
by the
Islamic Association of China, a Communist Party ``mass
organization'' that, along with local branches, controls Muslim
practice in China.\24\ Authorities have detained individuals
for their possession of unauthorized religious texts.\25\
LANGUAGE POLICY AND ``BILINGUAL'' EDUCATION IN XINJIANG
In recent years the XUAR government has taken steps to
diminish the use of ethnic minority languages in XUAR schools
via
``bilingual'' and other educational policies that place primacy
on Mandarin, such as by eliminating ethnic minority language
instruction or relegating it solely to language arts
classes.\26\ The policies contravene provisions in Chinese law
to protect ethnic minority languages and promote their use as
regional lingua franca.\27\ According to reports from official
Chinese media, by 2006, the number of students receiving
``bilingual'' education in the XUAR had expanded 50-fold within
six years.\28\ Although the long-term impact remains unclear,
sustained implementation of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual''
education and other language policies increases the risk that
Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages are eventually
reduced to cultural relics rather than actively used languages
in the XUAR. [For more information on ``bilingual'' education,
see Addendum: ``Bilingual'' Education in Xinjiang at the end of
this section.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaking Out: Uyghurs Punished for Free Speech in Xinjiang
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As detailed by the Commission in past Annual Reports,\29\ Chinese
authorities have detained or imprisoned ethnic Uyghurs for various
forms of peaceful expression, including non-violent dissent. Such cases
include:
Tohti Tunyaz, a Uyghur historian living in Japan whom Chinese
authorities detained in 1998 while he was visiting the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to conduct research. He received an
11-year sentence in 1999 for ``stealing state secrets'' and
``inciting splittism,'' based on a list of documents he had collected
from official sources during the course of his research, and on a
``separatist'' book he had allegedly published.\30\
Abduhelil Zunun, who received a 20-year sentence in November
2001 after translating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into
the Uyghur language.\31\
Abdulghani Memetemin, a journalist sentenced to nine years'
imprisonment in 2003 after providing information on government
repression against Uyghurs to an overseas organization. Authorities
characterized this act as ``supplying state secrets to an
organization outside the country.''
Abdulla Jamal, a teacher arrested in 2005 for writing a
manuscript that authorities claimed incited separatism.\32\
Nurmemet Yasin, a writer who received a 10-year sentence in
2005 for ``inciting splittism'' after he wrote a story about a caged
bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom.\33\
Korash Huseyin, chief editor of the journal that published
Yasin's story, who received a three-year sentence in 2005 for
``dereliction of duty.'' Huseyin's sentence expired in February 2008,
and he is presumed to have since been released from prison.\34\
Mehbube Ablesh, an employee in the advertising department at
the Xinjiang People's Radio Station, who was fired from her job in
August 2008 and detained in apparent connection to her writings on
the Internet that were critical of government policies, including
bilingual education.\35\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIVIL SOCIETY IN XINJIANG
XUAR government policy hinders the growth of civil society
in the region. Authorities have banned gatherings of private
Islam-centered social groups, which had aimed at addressing
social problems like drug use and alcoholism.\36\ Fears of
citizen activism have prompted the suppression of locally led
political movements, including demonstrations in Hoten district
in March led by women protesting repressive policies in the
region.\37\ Government policy in the XUAR also affects the work
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that aim to research
conditions in the region. In July 2007, authorities in Beijing
ordered the Beijing-based foreign NGO publication China
Development Brief to stop publishing its Chinese-language
edition and accused the English-language editor of having ties
to Xinjiang ``separatist'' groups.\38\ Though the charge of
contact with these groups may have served as a cover for other
motivations for barring the publication,\39\ that authorities
wield contact with overseas Uyghur organizations as such a
pretext presents a chilling effect on organizations that
research the XUAR.\40\ [For more information, see Section III--
Civil Society.]
MIGRATION AND POPULATION PLANNING POLICIES IN XINJIANG
While the Commission supports Chinese government
liberalizations that give citizens more choices to determine
their places of residence,\41\ the Commission remains concerned
about government policies that use economic and social
benefits\42\ to channel migration to the XUAR and engineer
demographic changes in the region.\43\ The government has
touted migration policies as a means to promote development and
ensure ``stability'' and ``ethnic unity.'' \44\ Demographic
shifts have skewed employment prospects in favor of Han Chinese
and funneled resources in their favor.\45\ In addition,
migration also has created heavy social and linguistic
pressures on local ethnic minority residents.\46\
The Commission also remains concerned that while the
government promotes migration to the region,\47\ it implements
policies that target birth rates among local ethnic minority
groups to reduce population increases.\48\ In 2008, the
government reported that the XUAR had achieved 65,000 fewer
births in 2007 under policies of providing rewards to families
who had fewer children than legally permitted.\49\ Overseas
Uyghur rights advocates have reported that authorities have
carried out forced sterilizations and forced abortions to
implement population planning policies.\50\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government has waged a longstanding campaign against Uyghur rights
activist Rebiya Kadeer. Authorities sentenced her in 2000 to eight
years in prison for ``supplying state secrets or intelligence to
entities outside China,'' after she sent newspaper clippings to her
husband in the United States. Kadeer has reported that before her
release on medical parole in 2005, Chinese authorities threatened
repercussions against her family members and business interests if she
discussed Uyghur human rights issues in exile. Soon after Kadeer moved
to the United States, authorities began a campaign of harassment
against her family members remaining in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), culminating in the imprisonment of two of her sons in
2006 and 2007.\51\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2005, authorities detained Aysham Kerim and Ruzi
Mamat, two employees at Kadeer's trading company in the XUAR, and
attempted to take her son, Ablikim Abdureyim, into detention.
Authorities ransacked the company offices at the same time and
confiscated documents. Authorities released Aysham Kerim and Ruzi
Mamat in December 2005, after detaining them for seven months without
charges.\52\
In August 2005, Radio Free Asia reported that authorities in
the XUAR had formed a special office to monitor Kadeer's relatives
and business ties in the XUAR. Around the same time, authorities
detained two of Kadeer's relatives to pressure them to turn in their
passports.\53\
In April 2006, authorities held Kadeer's son, Alim Abdureyim,
in custody and informed him that he was under suspicion for evading
taxes.\54\
Authorities held Alim in custody again in late May 2006,
along with his brother, Ablikim, and sister, Roshengul, and
authorities later placed Alim and Ablikim in criminal detention and
Roshengul under house arrest. Authorities beat Alim and Ablikim while
in custody. In June, authorities took their brother Kahar into
custody as well and charged him with tax evasion, Alim with tax
evasion and splittism, and Ablikim with subversion of state power.
Alim reportedly confessed to the charges against him after being
tortured. During the same period, authorities placed Kadeer's brother
under house arrest and other family members under surveillance,
including grandchildren whom authorities prevented from leaving home
to attend school.\55\
On November 27, 2006, an Urumqi court sentenced Alim to seven
years in prison and fined him 500,000 yuan (US$62,500) for tax
evasion. The court imposed a 100,000 yuan (US$12,500) fine on Kahar,
also for tax evasion. Kadeer described the cases against her sons as
a ``vendetta'' against her. Sources had informed her that authorities
would offer leniency to her children if she refrained from
participating in a November 26 election for presidency of the World
Uyghur Congress.\56\
An Urumqi court sentenced Ablikim to nine years in prison and
three years' deprivation of political rights on April 17, 2007, for
``instigating and engaging in secessionist activities,'' alleging he
disseminated pro-secession articles, planned to incite anti-
government protest, and wrote an essay misrepresenting human rights
conditions in the XUAR.\57\ Both Alim and Ablikim remain in prison,
where they are reported to have been tortured and abused, and where
Ablikim is reported to be in poor physical health without adequate
medical care.\58\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN XINJIANG
Development policies in the XUAR have brought mixed results
for ethnic minority residents. While economic reforms and
development projects have raised living standards in the
region,\59\ they also have spurred migration,\60\ strained
local resources,\61\ and disproportionately benefited Han
Chinese.\62\ Han benefit through
development projects focused on Han-majority regions and
development-related employment prospects that privilege Han
areas and Han employees.\63\ Development policies in the XUAR
reflect tight central government control over the region\64\
and are intertwined with policies to promote ``social
stability.'' \65\ In the past year, the government reported on
development projects directed at improving conditions for
ethnic minority residents, but the overall impact remains
unclear.\66\
LABOR CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG
The government enforces repressive labor policies,
including measures that have a disproportionate negative impact
on ethnic minorities. While the Chinese government continues to
fill local jobs in the XUAR with migrant labor, it also
maintains programs that send young ethnic minorities to work in
factories in China's interior.\67\ Authorities reportedly have
coerced participation and subjected workers to abusive labor
practices.\68\ In addition, in 2007 and 2008, overseas media
reported that authorities in the XUAR continued to impose
forced labor on area farmers in predominantly ethnic minority
regions.\69\ The XUAR government also continues to impose
forced labor on local students to meet yearly harvesting
quotas. In 2007, Chinese media reported that work-study
programs requiring students to pick cotton have decreased in
recent years, but also reported that some 1 million students
picked cotton in the region that year.\70\ In addition, both
public and private employers continue to enforce discriminatory
job hiring practices that limit job prospects for ethnic
minorities.\71\ [For more information on labor conditions, see
Addendum: Labor Conditions in Xinjiang at the end of this
section.]
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN XINJIANG
Ethnic minority residents in the XUAR face special barriers
to accessing China's legal system. In addition to financial
shortfalls and general personnel shortages, the XUAR judicial
system lacks a sufficient number of legal personnel and
translators who speak ethnic minority languages, entrenching
systemic procedural irregularities into the judicial process
and undercutting legal bases that guarantee the use of ethnic
minority languages in judicial proceedings.\72\ [For detailed
information, see Addendum: Access to Justice in Xinjiang.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spotlight: Uyghur Refugees and Migrants
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese government repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) has forced some Uyghurs into exile, where, depending on their
destination or transit country, they face an uncertain legal status,
barriers to local asylum proceedings, and risk of refoulement to China
under the sway of Chinese influence and in violation of international
protections. Uyghur migrants outside the refugee and asylum-seeker
population also face dangers, as China's increasing influence in
neighboring countries has made Uyghur migrant communities there
vulnerable to harassment and to deportation proceedings without
adequate safeguards. A summary of key concerns follows:\73\
China's Increasing Influence\74\
China has exerted a strong influence on neighboring countries
through mechanisms including bilateral agreements and the multi-
country Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Under the SCO, member countries agree to cooperate in anti-
terrorism activities. China has been a key player in advancing
cooperation and promoting campaigns that use the fight against
terrorism as a pretext for repressive policies against Uyghurs both
inside and outside China.
Vulnerabilities Outside China
In some neighboring countries, Uyghurs are unable to apply
for asylum locally, increasing their vulnerability as they seek other
forms of protection, such as by applying for refugee status through
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and resettling in a
third country.\75\
In one neighboring country, Chinese influence reportedly has
swayed authorities to block Uyghurs' access to local asylum
proceedings, while letting asylum seekers of most other
nationalities apply.
Access to local asylum proceedings would increase the likelihood
that authorities safeguard the rights of asylum seekers during the
refugee status determination process. In one of China's neighboring
countries, for example, extradition proceedings are suspended for
individuals who seek asylum locally.
Some countries have extradited Uyghurs with UNHCR refugee
status to China, where they have faced abuse, imprisonment, and risk
of execution.\76\ In other cases, the UNHCR has been unable to gain
access to individuals who want to initiate asylum proceedings,
including some people who reportedly have been deported to China
without adequate safeguards.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spotlight: Uyghur Refugees and Migrants--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Violations of International Law
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees\77\
forbids the return of refugees to ``the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.''
Under the Convention Against Torture,\78\ ``No State Party
shall expel, return (`refouler') or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.''
China violates international protections for freedom of
movement\79\ by denying travel documents to family members of
refugees who are entitled to derivative refugee status.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADDENDUM: ``BILINGUAL'' EDUCATION IN XINJIANG
In recent years the XUAR government has taken steps to
diminish the use of ethnic minority languages via ``bilingual''
and other educational policies that place primacy on Mandarin,
such as by eliminating ethnic minority language instruction or
relegating it solely to language arts classes.\80\ Authorities
justify ``bilingual'' education as a way of ``raising the
quality'' of ethnic minority students and tie knowledge of
Mandarin to campaigns promoting patriotism and ethnic
unity.\81\ XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan noted in
2005 that XUAR authorities are ``resolutely determined'' to
promote Mandarin language use, which he found ``an extremely
serious political issue.'' \82\ He has also stated that ethnic
minority languages lack the content to express complex
concepts.\83\
XUAR language policies violate Chinese laws that protect
and promote the use of ethnic minority languages, which form
part of broader legal guarantees to protect ethnic minority
rights and allow autonomy in ethnic minority regions. For
example, Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 10
of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) guarantee that
ethnic minorities have ``the freedom to use and develop'' their
languages.\84\ In the area of education, Article 37 of the REAL
stipulates that ``[s]chools (classes) and other educational
organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students
should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages
and use these languages as the media of instruction.'' \85\
While educational programs that diminish the use of ethnic
minority languages respond to a growing need for fluency in
Mandarin to achieve educational and professional advancement,
XUAR officials do not acknowledge that the need stems from
official failures to implement autonomy in ethnic minority
regions as provided for in Chinese law.\86\
Government efforts to limit minority language use have
intensified in recent years, through both ``bilingual''
programs and other efforts. In 2004, the XUAR government issued
a directive to accelerate the development of ``bilingual''
education.\87\ According to a 2005 Xinjiang Daily article, many
``bilingual'' programs have moved from offering only math and
science classes in Mandarin to teaching the entire curriculum
in Mandarin, except in classes devoted specifically to
minority-language study.\88\ In 2006, authorities in the
predominantly Uyghur city of Atush announced that all first-
grade elementary school classes would teach in Mandarin Chinese
beginning in September 2006 and that all primary and secondary
schools would be required to teach exclusively in Mandarin by
2012.\89\ According to a report from official Chinese media, by
2006, the number of students receiving ``bilingual'' education
in the XUAR had expanded 50-fold within six years.\90\
According to 2007 figures reported by the Xinjiang Education
Department, more than 474,500 ethnic minority students in
preschool, elementary school, and secondary school programs,
including vocational programs, took classes that employed
``bilingual education.'' According to the Xinjiang Education
Department, the figure accounts for almost 20 percent of the
ethnic minority student population and excludes those students
studying in longstanding programs that track ethnic minority
students into Mandarin Chinese schooling.\91\ In contrast, in
1999, experimental ``bilingual'' classes reportedly reach 2,629
students through 27 secondary schools.\92\ The government
prepared a draft opinion in 2008 that details steps to further
expand ``bilingual'' education.\93\
Authorities also have limited opportunities for XUAR
residents to obtain higher education and vocational education
in ethnic minority languages, thereby diminishing the value of
ethnic minority languages in XUAR schooling and creating an
incentive for younger students to study in Mandarin instead of
ethnic minority languages. In May 2002, the XUAR government
announced that Xinjiang University would change its medium of
instruction to Mandarin Chinese in first- and second-year
classes.\94\ In 2005, authorities announced plans to offer two-
year vocational degrees through programs that offer instruction
entirely in Mandarin Chinese.\95\ Recruitment materials for
2007 for the Xinjiang Preschool Teachers College stated that
all classes offered would be taught in Mandarin.\96\
XUAR authorities also have expanded ``bilingual'' education
policies to the preschool level, and provide material
incentives to
attract students. Authorities issued an opinion in 2005 to
bolster ``bilingual'' education in XUAR preschools and prepared
a draft opinion on further expanding ``bilingual'' education,
including preschool education, in 2008.\97\ In 2006, official
media reported the government would invest 430 million yuan
(US$59.76 million) over five years to support ``bilingual''
preschool programs in seven prefectures and would aim to reach
a target rate of over 85 percent of rural ethnic minority
children in all counties and municipalities able to enroll in
two years of ``bilingual'' preschool education by 2010.\98\ The
following year, the XUAR Department of Finance allotted 70.39
million yuan (US$9.78 million) to cover
material subsidies for both students and teachers in
``bilingual'' preschool programs.\99\ In February 2007,
authorities in the XUAR implemented a program to send student-
teachers from the Xinjiang Preschool Teachers College to
preschools in Kashgar prefecture to supplement the area's
shortage of ``bilingual'' teaching staff, providing financial
and other incentives to the student-teachers in the
program.\100\ In 2008, the government appeared to have pushed
back its timeline for reaching target enrollment rates, while
investing more money to bring this goal to fruition, perhaps
signifying a firmer and more realistic commitment to promoting
``bilingual'' preschool education. The government pledged 3.75
billion yuan (US$549 million) in 2008 for ``bilingual''
preschool education and called for achieving a target rate of
over 85 percent of ethnic minority children in rural areas
receiving ``bilingual'' education by 2012.\101\ While the
current scope of the program's coverage varies by locality,
news from local governments indicates that ``bilingual''
preschool programs are already widespread in some areas.\102\
According to 2007 figures from the Xinjiang Education
Department, 180,458 ethnic minority children received
``bilingual'' preschool education.\103\
The government's language policies have impacted ethnic
minority teachers' job prospects. Ethnic minority teachers who
do not speak Mandarin must face additional language
requirements that are not imposed on monolingual Mandarin-
speaking teachers. Teachers have reportedly faced dismissal or
transfers to non-teaching positions for failure to conform to
new language requirements.\104\
The Chinese government's current stance on ``bilingual''
education hinders productive dialogue on ways to carry forward
policies in a manner to protect ethnic minority languages. In
March 2008, XUAR Chair Nur Bekri described criticisms of
``bilingual'' education as an attack from the ``three forces''
of terrorism, separatism, and extremism operating outside
China. He also claimed that ``bilingual'' education in the
region equally valued ethnic minority languages and Mandarin,
despite evidence of the focus on Mandarin from sources
including official Chinese media.\105\
Although the long-term impact remains unclear, sustained
implementation of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual'' education and
other language policies increases the risk that Uyghur and
other ethnic
minority languages are eventually reduced to cultural relics
rather than actively used languages in the XUAR.
ADDENDUM: LABOR CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG
Labor Transfers
While the Chinese government continues to fill local jobs
in the XUAR with migrant labor, it also maintains programs that
send young ethnic minorities to work in factories in China's
interior under conditions reported to be abusive. Overseas
sources indicate that local authorities have coerced
participation and mistreated workers. According to a 2008
report issued by an overseas human rights organization, local
officials, following direction from higher levels of
government, have used ``deception, pressure, and threats''
toward young women and their families to gain recruits into the
labor transfer program. Women interviewed for the report
described working under abusive labor conditions after being
transferred to interior factories through the state-sponsored
programs.\106\ In 2007, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on local
authorities who recruited women under false pretenses to work
in Shandong province.\107\
Forced Labor
In 2007 and 2008, overseas media reported that authorities
in the XUAR continued to impose forced labor on area farmers.
According to reports from RFA, based on official Chinese
sources and on information provided through interviews with
officials and residents in the XUAR, in 2007 authorities in
Yeken (Yarkand) county required 100,000 farmers to turn
uncultivated land into a nut production base. The farmers,
whose work included building roadways, forest belts, and
irrigation canals, reportedly received no pay for their work.
One resident interviewed by RFA said that residents who refused
to do the work were fined for each day of labor missed.\108\
The Kashgar district government, which publicized information
about the land cultivation project, including the scope of
labor involved and the projects completed, did not describe how
the labor force was recruited or compensated.\109\ Authorities
reportedly continued to carry out forced labor in 2008,
requiring local residents in the southern XUAR to plant trees
and build irrigation works.\110\
``Work-Study'' Programs
The XUAR government imposes forced labor on local students
to meet yearly harvesting quotas. Acting under central
government authority bolstered by local legal directives, XUAR
authorities implement the use of student labor, including labor
by young children, via work-study programs to harvest crops and
do other work. Students work under arduous conditions and do
not receive pay for their work. While ``work-study'' programs
exist elsewhere in China, the XUAR work-study program also
reflects features unique to the region. The central government
holds close control over both the general XUAR economy and
through its directly administered Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps farms, where some of the region's cotton is
harvested. The central government placed special focus on
supporting the XUAR's cotton industry during its 11th Five-Year
Program, and central, rather than local, authorities reportedly
made the decision to launch the comprehensive work-study
program to pick cotton in the XUAR. In 2007, Chinese media
reported that work-study programs requiring students to pick
cotton have decreased in recent years, but also reported that
some 1 million students picked cotton in the region that
year.\111\
ADDENDUM: ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN XINJIANG
Ethnic minority residents in the XUAR face special barriers
to accessing China's legal system. In addition to financial
shortfalls and general personnel shortages, the XUAR judicial
system lacks a sufficient number of legal personnel and
translators who speak ethnic minority languages, entrenching
systemic procedural irregularities into the judicial process
and presenting barriers to citizens' right to have legal
proceedings conducted in their native language.\112\ According
to 2007 reports from the Chinese media, 1,948 of 4,552 judges
in the XUAR were ethnic minorities, and as of September of that
year, 380 lawyers, or 17 percent of the region's total, were
ethnic minorities. The reports did not identify the language
capabilities of these groups.\113\ A law office reported as
China's first bilingual operation opened in the XUAR in
2006.\114\
Recent measures to address shortcomings in the XUAR
judicial system may have mixed results in meeting the needs of
ethnic minority residents. Efforts to dispatch legal workers to
rural areas may strengthen privilege for Mandarin Chinese if
new personnel are not required to speak ethnic minority
languages.\115\ Other steps may bring improvements. In 2007,
the Ili Lawyers Association in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture, for example, reportedly encouraged law offices to
increase efforts to recruit ethnic minority graduates who
majored in law in college or other higher education
programs.\116\ In September 2007, the government announced a
program to train 200 native Mandarin-speaking college students
each year in ethnic minority languages, with the goal of
addressing general shortages of interpreters.\117\
The government ties some judicial reform efforts to
government campaigns to promote ``stability'' and fight the
government-designated ``three forces'' of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism. In August 2007, the Supreme People's
Court (SPC) announced it had launched a work program to have
judicial institutions nationwide aid XUAR courts, describing
having stability in the region as part of its strategy for the
project.\118\ Jiang Xingchang, vice president of the SPC, said
that China continued to face plots by ``hostile forces in the
West'' to westernize and divide China, and that ``religious
extremism'' and ``international terrorism'' remain ``fully
active'' in the XUAR, while ethnic separatists inside and
outside the country continue ``sabotage activities.'' \119\
Jiang also stated that personnel of the appropriate political
mindset should be selected for judicial exchange programs in
the XUAR.\120\ In August 2008, Chinese media reported that XUAR
courts would ``regard ensuring [state] security and social
stability [as] their primary task.'' \121\
V. Tibet
Findings
As a result of the Chinese government
crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries,
nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave
of Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008,
Chinese government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of
speech, religion, and association has increased to what
may be the highest level since approximately 1983, when
Tibetans were able to set about reviving Tibetan
Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.
The status of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue
deteriorated after the March 2008 protests and may
require remedial measures before the dialogue can
resume focus on its principal objective--resolving the
Tibet issue. China's leadership blamed the Dalai Lama
and ``the Dalai Clique'' for the Tibetan protests and
rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising
Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies that deprive
Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected
under China's Constitution and legal system. The Party
hardened policy toward the Dalai Lama, increased
attacks on the Dalai Lama's
legitimacy as a religious leader, and asserted that he
is a criminal bent on splitting China.
State repression of Tibetan Buddhism has
reached its highest level since the Commission began to
report on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in
2002. Chinese government and Party policy toward
Tibetan Buddhists' practice of their religion played a
central role in stoking frustration that resulted in
the cascade of Tibetan protests that began on March 10,
2008. Reports have identified hundreds of Tibetan
Buddhist monks and nuns whom security officials
detained for participating in the protests, as well as
members of Tibetan secular society who supported them.
Chinese government interference with the
norms of Tibetan Buddhism and unrelenting antagonism
toward the Dalai Lama, one of the religion's foremost
teachers, serves to deepen division and distrust
between Tibetan Buddhists and the government and
Communist Party. The government seeks to use legal
measures to remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
Authorities in one Tibetan autonomous prefecture have
announced unprecedented measures that seek to punish
monks, nuns, religious teachers, and monastic officials
accused of
involvement in political protests in the prefecture.
The Chinese government undermines the
prospects for stability in the Tibetan autonomous areas
of China by implementing economic development and
educational policy in a manner that results in
disadvantages for Tibetans. Weak implementation of the
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law has been a principal
factor exacerbating Tibetan frustration by preventing
Tibetans from using lawful means to protect their
culture, language, and religion.
At no time since Tibetans resumed political
activism in 1987 has the magnitude and severity of
consequences to Tibetans (named and unnamed) who
protested against the Chinese government been as great
as it is now upon the release of the Commission's 2008
Annual Report. Unless Chinese authorities have released
without charge a very high proportion of the Tibetans
reportedly detained as a result of peaceful activity or
expression on or after March 10, 2008, the resulting
surge in the number of Tibetan political prisoners may
prove to be the largest increase in such prisoners that
has occurred under China's current Constitution and
Criminal Law.
INTRODUCTION: TIBETAN PROTESTS ON AN UNPRECEDENTED SCALE
The Tibet section of the 2008 Annual Report focuses on the
unprecedented cascade of Tibetan protests that began in Lhasa
on March 10, 2008,\1\ and by the end of March had swept across
much of the ethnic Tibetan areas of China.\2\ No peacetime
Chinese government\3\ has been confronted by expressions of
Tibetan discontent as widely dispersed and sustained since the
Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of
China in 1949. Two key factors distinguish the current protests
from the March 10, 1959, Lhasa uprising that followed the Dalai
Lama's escape from Tibet, and the March 5-7, 1989, protests and
rioting that led to the imposition of martial law in Lhasa.
First, the 2008 protests spread far beyond Lhasa and the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR). Second, protests continued to occur
even after Chinese security forces established and maintained
lockdowns.
As a result of the Chinese government crackdown beginning
in March 2008 on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries,
schools, and workplaces, the repression of the freedoms of
speech, religion, and association has increased to what may be
the highest level since approximately 1983, when Tibetans were
able to set about reviving Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and
nunneries.\4\ The Commission has reported since releasing its
first Annual Report in 2002 on underlying human rights issues
that played important roles in the 2008 Tibetan protests.\5\
The Commission's 2007 Annual Report observed that then-
declining numbers of political detentions of monks and nuns
showed that state repression of Tibetan Buddhism may have
resulted in a more subdued monastic community--and that such a
decline concurrent with a high level of monastic resentment
against Chinese policies suggested that the potential for
resurgent political protest exists.
Tibetan protesters resorted to rioting in a total of 12
county-level areas, according to official Chinese media
reports,\6\ but Tibetan protests (generally peaceful) took
place in more than 40 additional county-level areas.\7\ China's
state-run media generally reported only the protests during
which some Tibetans turned to violence, and characterized all
of the participants linked to such events as ``rioters.''
Rioting took place in Lhasa city on March 14,\8\ in Aba (Ngaba)
county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan
province, on March 16,\9\ and in six counties in Gannan
(Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, from
March 14-19.\10\ International media and non-governmental
organization reports noted that Tibetans attacked ethnic Han
and Hui individuals and businesses.\11\ The Lhasa rioting
resulted in substantial property damage and at least 19 deaths,
according to official reports; the actual death toll could be
much higher (see Consequences of the Protests: Death,
Detention, Patriotic Education, Isolation in this section).\12\
[See figure titled Map of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level
Areas below and Addendum: List of Tibetan Protest Sites,
County-level Areas at the end of this section.]
Peaceful Tibetan protesters called for Tibetan
independence, the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet,\13\ the release
of the Panchen Lama,\14\ and freedom of religion generally.\15\
Many, but not all, of the protests began at Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries and nunneries,\16\ the institutions impacted most
negatively by Chinese government regulation of Tibetan Buddhism
and Party policy toward the Dalai Lama, whom most Tibetan
Buddhists regard as their spiritual leader.\17\ Monastic
protests gained support from members of Tibetan secular
society.\18\ The large scale of Tibetan participation in the
protests--at substantial peril to the protesters--reflects the
urgency of the underlying issues and the imperative for Chinese
authorities and Tibetans to work together to resolve them.
TIBETAN FRUSTRATION: FACTORS UNDERLYING THE PROTESTS
China's leadership blamed the Dalai Lama and ``the Dalai
Clique'' for the Tibetan protests and rioting in the run-up to
the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games,\19\ and did not
acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese
policies toward Tibetans. A senior TAR Party official used
language that attributed directly to the Dalai Lama violent
activity during rioting such as ``beating, smashing, looting,
and burning.'' \20\
Chinese government policies that deprive Tibetans of rights
and freedoms nominally protected under China's Constitution and
legal system have been the root cause of the protests and
riots. Party control over China's legislative, governmental,
and policymaking process, as well as contradictory provisions
in Chinese laws and regulations, support the government's
unrestricted ability to implement unpopular programs among
Tibetans. Heightened state interference with Tibetan Buddhist
norms since 2005 has left the
religion especially hard-hit.\21\ [See Heightened Repression of
Tibetan Buddhism in this section.] The unproductive dialogue
between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives,
along with the lurid invective of the Party's anti-Dalai
campaign, frustrate Tibetan hopes for improved relations with
the Chinese government, and strike at Tibetan sensibilities.
Policy Toward the Dalai Lama
The Party hardened policy toward the Dalai Lama in the wake
of the Tibetan protests, increasing attacks on the Dalai Lama's
legitimacy as a religious leader, and asserting that he is a
criminal bent on splitting China.\22\ ``Even the Lord Buddha
will definitely not tolerate this honey-mouthed and dagger-
hearted Dalai Lama, the scum of Buddhism, an insane ruffian and
a beast in a human shape!'' said the Party-run Tibet Daily.\23\
Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Zhang Qingli likened
the Dalai Lama to ``a jackal and wolf cloaked in a [monk's
robe]'' and called for a ``people's war'' against threats to
stability and unity that he blamed on ``the Dalai Clique.''
\24\ Officials launched aggressive reimplementation of
political indoctrination campaigns\25\ across the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China, and sought to compel Tibetans to
denounce the Dalai Lama\26\ and sometimes to state that he was
responsible for the protest and riot activity.\27\
Chinese government officials have intensified their
campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama by holding him directly
responsible for Tibetan violence committed during rioting, and
seeking to tie him to allegations of Tibetan ``terrorist''
objectives and activity. A Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
spokesman claimed on April 1,\28\ but provided no credible
evidence to prove, that the Dalai Lama is responsible for the
objectives and activities of two Tibetan NGOs based in India--
the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and the Tibetan People's
Uprising Movement (TPUM). TPUM\29\ and the TYC,\30\ according
to their Web sites, seek Tibetan independence, thereby
rejecting the Dalai Lama's autonomy-based Middle Way
Approach.\31\ TPUM's ``Declaration'' states, ``The Tibetan
People's Uprising Movement is a global movement of Tibetans
inside and outside of Tibet taking control of our political
destiny by engaging in direct action to end China's illegal and
brutal occupation of our country. Through unified and strategic
campaigns we will seize the Olympic spotlight and shine it on
China's shameful repression inside Tibet, thereby denying China
the international acceptance and approval it so fervently
desires.'' \32\
The MPS claimed, but did not substantiate, that the TYC and
other unnamed groups provided two classes on how to carry out
terrorist activities.\33\ According to China's state-run media,
after monks in the eastern TAR allegedly carried out a series
of small bombings in April, the alleged bombers confessed
that--by listening to radio broadcasts--they ``were following
separatist propaganda from the Dalai Lama.'' \34\ A Chinese
security official told a Western media organization in October
that on September 23, 2008, the Changdu (Chamdo) Intermediate
People's Court sentenced several of the monks to terms of
imprisonment for ``terrorist actions.'' \35\ According to an
international media agency report, in December 2005 then-TYC
President Kalsang Phuntsok said: ``[We] have a youth section
which is not so much influenced by the Buddhist philosophy.
They are very much attracted by the movements which are going
on all over the world, mostly violence-infested movements, and
people see they are achieving results. They look around
everywhere, whether it's Israel or Palestine or the Middle
East--these give them every reason to believe in every
[violent] movement that is being waged on this Earth.'' \36\
According to a Tibetan media report, former TYC President
Lhasang Tsering told about 200 young Tibetans gathered at a
public forum in India in February 2007 that the 2008 Beijing
Olympics provide ``an amazing opportunity as we can fight them
when they would be most needed to be `well-behaved.' '' He told
the audience, ``For a committed activist you don't need CIA's
support to cut a telephone line in Beijing or throw an iron rod
on the power cables in Shanghai. These kinds of sabotages can
be done by any ordinary person, and can weaken the power from
inside. Sometimes the whole city goes dark by one simple but
technically correct act.'' \37\
The Dalai Lama, however, has expressed no support for the
political objectives or methods of TPUM or the TYC, and has
maintained his consistently pacifist counsel to Tibetans--
wherever they live. In an April 6 statement, the Dalai Lama
appealed to Tibetans to ``practice non-violence and not waver
from this path, however serious the situation might be.'' He
urged Tibetans living in exile to ``not engage in any action
that could be even remotely interpreted as violent.'' \38\ He
continued to reiterate his explicit support for China's role as
the Olympics host throughout the period of the protests and
their aftermath.\39\
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama or His Representatives
U.S. government policy recognizes the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR) and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in
other provinces to be a part of China.\40\ The U.S. State
Department's 2008 Report on Tibet Negotiations observed that
the Dalai Lama ``represents the views of the vast majority of
Tibetans and his moral and spiritual authority helps to unite
the Tibetan community inside and outside of China.'' President
George W. Bush met in September 2007 with President Hu Jintao
at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in Sydney,
Australia, and told Hu that if Chinese leaders ``were to sit
down with the Dalai Lama they would find him a man of peace and
reconciliation.'' \41\ The Report on Tibet Negotiations stated:
The United States encourages China and the Dalai Lama
to hold direct and substantive discussions aimed at
resolution of differences at an early date, without
preconditions. The Administration believes that
dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama or his
representatives will alleviate tensions in Tibetan
areas and contribute to the overall stability of
China.\42\
The U.S. Congress awarded the Congressional Gold Medal to
the Dalai Lama on October 17, 2007.\43\ The congressional act
providing for the award found that the Dalai Lama ``is the
unrivaled spiritual and cultural leader of the Tibetan people,
and has used his leadership to promote democracy, freedom, and
peace for the Tibetan people through a negotiated settlement of
the Tibet issue, based on
autonomy within the People's Republic of China.'' \44\
The status of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue, which resumed
in 2002,\45\ deteriorated after the March 2008 protests from a
condition characterized by the absence of evident progress, to
one that may require remedial measures before the dialogue can
resume focus on its principal objective--resolving the Tibet
issue. The Chinese government and the Dalai Lama continue to
maintain their fundamental positions toward the dialogue. [See
CECC 2007 Annual
Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, for
additional information.]
The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy Lodi Gyari and Envoy Kelsang
Gyaltsen met on May 4, 2008, in Shenzhen city, Guangdong
province, for an ``informal meeting'' \46\ with Communist Party
United Front Work Department (UFWD) Executive Deputy Head Zhu
Weiqun and Deputy Head Sita (Sithar).\47\ The purpose of the
meeting, Gyari said on May 8, was to discuss the ``critical
situation in Tibet'' and to reach a decision to continue formal
discussions.\48\ The envoys called on Chinese authorities to
release prisoners (Tibetan protesters), allow injured persons
(protesters) to receive adequate medical treatment, and allow
``unfettered access'' to Tibetan areas by tourists and media
organizations.\49\ The Dalai Lama included similar points in an
April 6 statement that he addressed to Tibetans worldwide\50\
and reiterated them as his priorities in a May 25 interview
with a Western newspaper.\51\ President Hu Jintao said on May
7, soon after the Shenzhen meeting, ``We hope that the Dalai
Lama side take[s] concrete actions to show its sincerity by
earnestly stopping activities involving splitting the
motherland, instigating violence and disrupting the Beijing
Olympics so as to create conditions for next consultation.''
\52\
On July 1 and 2, 2008, the Dalai Lama's envoys met in
Beijing with UFWD officials, including UFWD Head Du Qinglin,
for the seventh round of formal dialogue.\53\ The Chinese team
presented the envoys a set of new preconditions (the ``four no
supports'')\54\ that intensify the Chinese government and Party
campaign to hold the Dalai Lama personally accountable for
Tibetan views and activities that he does not support and that
contradict his policies and guidance.\55\ A UFWD spokesman
described the four types of activity that the Dalai Lama must
not support as: (1) attempting to disrupt the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games; (2) inciting violence (during Tibetan
protests); (3) alleged ``terrorist activities'' by a Tibetan
NGO; and (4) seeking Tibetan independence.\56\ Du Qinglin
demanded that the Dalai Lama ``should openly and explicitly
promise'' to fulfill the requirements of the ``four no
supports'' and ``prove it in his actions.'' \57\ The demands
pressure the Dalai Lama to serve as an active proponent of
Chinese government political objectives as a precondition to
continuing a dialogue that seeks to resolve political issues,
and to take action to alter the political positions and
activities of Tibetans within China and internationally.\58\
After the Beijing talks, Chinese officials and the Dalai
Lama's envoys both stated that continuing the dialogue is in
jeopardy and depends on measures that the other side should
undertake. A UFWD official said that if ``the Dalai side''
could not ``materialize'' the ``four no supports,'' then
``there would hardly be the atmosphere and conditions required
for the contacts and discussions between the two sides.'' \59\
Special Envoy Lodi Gyari said that the Tibetan delegation had
been ``compelled to candidly convey to our counterparts that in
the absence of serious and sincere commitment on their part the
continuation of the present dialogue process would serve no
purpose.'' \60\
Heightened Repression of Tibetan Buddhism
State repression of Tibetan Buddhism in 2008 has reached
the highest level since the Commission began to report on
religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in 2002. Chinese
government and Party policy toward Tibetan Buddhists' practice
of their religion played a central role in stoking frustration
that resulted in the cascade of Tibetan protests that started
on March 10, 2008, when approximately 300 Drepung Monastery
monks attempted a protest march in Lhasa.\61\ The protests
spread quickly across the Tibetan plateau and involved a large
but undetermined number of Tibetan Buddhist monastic
institutions and thousands of monks and nuns.\62\ [See figure
titled Map of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level Areas above
and Addendum: List of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level Areas
at the end of this section.]
Reports have identified hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist monks
and nuns whom security officials detained for participating in
the protests,\63\ as well as members of Tibetan secular society
who supported them. Peaceful protesters raised Tibetan Buddhist
issues by calling for the return of the Dalai Lama,\64\ the
release of the Panchen Lama (Gedun Choekyi Nyima),\65\ and
freedom of religion generally.\66\ [See box titled The Panchen
Lama and the Golden Urn: China's Model for Selecting the Next
Dalai Lama.] Details about the detainees' well-being and status
under the Chinese legal system are few. Armed security forces
maintained heightened security at some monasteries and
nunneries after the protests as authorities conducted
aggressive campaigns of patriotic education (``love the
country, love religion'').\67\ Demands that monks and nuns sign
statements denouncing the Dalai Lama angered monks and nuns and
prompted a second wave of protests and detentions.\68\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Panchen Lama and the Golden Urn: China's Model for Selecting the
Next Dalai Lama
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy the Dalai Lama recognized as the Panchen
Lama in May 1995, turned 19 years old in April 2008. Chinese
authorities have held him and his parents incommunicado in an unknown
location since May 17, 1995,\69\ three days after the Dalai Lama
announced his recognition of Gedun Choekyi Nyima.\70\ The Chinese
government told the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion in
September 2005 that Gedun Choekyi Nyima is leading a ``normal, happy
life and receiving a good cultural education.'' \71\ A TAR official
described Gedun Choekyi Nyima in July 2007 as a ``patriotic'' boy who
is ``living a normal life in Tibet'' and ``studying at a senior high
school'' and ``does not want his life to be disturbed.'' \72\ The
Chinese government has provided no information to support the statement
that Gedun Choekyi Nyima is in the TAR or any other Tibetan area of
China.
The State Council declared the Dalai Lama's 1995 announcement
``illegal and invalid'' \73\ and installed Gyaltsen Norbu, whose
appointment continues to stir widespread resentment among Tibetans--
evidenced by Tibetan protesters' calls in March 2008 for Chinese
authorities to ``release'' Gedun Choekyi Nyima.\74\ Party officials
assert that the next Dalai Lama will be selected in the same manner as
Gyaltsen Norbu: by drawing a name from a golden urn. Ye Xiaowen,
Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), and
an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee,\75\ said
in an interview published on March 13, 2008, that SARA would ``take
control'' of identifying the next Dalai Lama using ``historical
conventions.'' One of those conventions would be drawing a lot from an
urn containing the names of three government-approved candidates to be
the ``soul boy'' (reincarnated lama).\76\
Ye's reference to ``historical conventions'' refers to a 1792 Qing
Dynasty edict demanding that the Tibetan government in Lhasa reform
religious, administrative, economic, and military practices to suit the
Qing court.\77\ The first of the edict's 29 articles directed that the
Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama be selected by drawing lots from a golden
urn, and that a high-ranking imperial official must be present to
confirm the result.\78\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE NORM FOR TIBETAN BUDDHISM: SYSTEMATIC STATE INTERFERENCE
Chinese government interference with the norms of Tibetan
Buddhism and unrelenting antagonism toward the Dalai Lama, one
of the religion's foremost teachers, serves to deepen division
and
distrust between Tibetan Buddhists and the government and
Communist Party. As the Commission's 2007 Annual Report
documented, law, regulation, and policy that seek to prevent or
punish Tibetan Buddhist devotion to the Dalai Lama, categorize
him as a ``splittist'' (a criminal under Chinese law\79\), and
that set aside centuries of religious tradition\80\ create
obstacles of profound implications for Tibetan Buddhists.\81\
Legal and regulatory interference with Tibetan Buddhism
antagonizes Tibetans in general, but it is especially harmful
to Tibetans who regard the Dalai Lama (in his capacity as the
spiritual leader of the Gelug tradition of Tibetan
Buddhism\82\) as their guide on what Buddhists believe is the
path toward enlightenment.
The function and legitimacy of Tibetan Buddhism--the core
of Tibetan culture--has been especially hard-hit since 2005.
Legal measures closely regulating monastic life in the TAR took
effect in January 2007.\83\ Nationwide measures establishing
state supervision of the centuries-old Tibetan tradition of
identifying, seating, and educating boys whom Tibetans believe
are reincarnations of Buddhist teachers took effect in
September 2007.\84\ The government seeks to use such legal
measures to remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state, and to
use legal pressure to compel Tibetan acceptance of such
measures. For example, a February 2008 Tibet Daily report
provided information about conditions in TAR monasteries and
nunneries less than one month before the protests erupted.\85\
The TAR procuratorate reported that it had ``targeted monks and
nuns'' with campaigns on ```love the country and love religion'
thinking'' (patriotic education), and implemented measures
linked to the government and Party's ``integrated management of
the temples.'' \86\
THE GANZI MEASURES: PUNISHING ``MONK AND NUN TROUBLEMAKERS''
The government of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, issued on June 28, 2008,
with immediate effect, unprecedented measures that seek to
punish or eliminate from the prefecture's Tibetan Buddhist
institution those monks, nuns, religious teachers, and monastic
officials whom public security officials accuse of involvement
in political protests in the prefecture.\87\ Of 125 documented
Tibetan protests across the Tibetan plateau from March 10 to
June 22, at least 44 took place in Ganzi TAP according to an
August 5 advocacy group report.\88\ Protesters at 40 of the 44
documented protests included Tibetan monks or nuns.\89\ Nearly
38,000 Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns were residents of 515
monasteries and nunneries in Ganzi TAP as of 2005, according to
the Sichuan Daily.\90\ Ganzi TAP has been the site of more
known political detentions of Tibetans by Chinese authorities
than any other TAP outside the TAR since the current period of
Tibetan political activism began in 1987,\91\ based on data
available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
(PPD).\92\
The ``Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious
Monasteries and Individual Monks and Nuns'' (the Ganzi
Measures) took effect on the date they were issued and punish
speech and association, not violent activity:
In order to defend social stability, socialist law and
the basic interests of the people, the measures listed
below have been resolutely drafted for dealing clearly
with participants in illegal activities aimed at
inciting the division of nationalities, such as
shouting reactionary slogans, distributing reactionary
writings, flying and popularizing the ``snow lion
flag'' and holding illegal demonstrations.\93\
The Ganzi Measures appear to apply some punishments that
may be without precedent in post-Mao Zedong China and that,
based on Commission staff analysis, do not appear to have a
clear basis in national legal measures that establish central
government regulatory power over religious activity in China.
Such measures include the 2004 Regulation on Religious
Affairs\94\ and the 2007 Management Measures for the
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism.\95\ For
example, punishments in some cases can include the partial
destruction or closure of a monastery or nunnery.\96\ In other
cases, authorities may punish a trulku (a teacher that Tibetan
Buddhists believe is a reincarnation) by stripping the trulku
of his religious position and function.\97\ [See Addendum: The
June 2008 Ganzi Measures: Dealing Strictly With Troublemaking
Monks, Nuns, and Monasteries.]
Weak Implementation of Regional Ethnic Autonomy
Tibetan protesters, in their widespread calls for Tibetan
independence, provided an unprecedented de facto referendum
rejecting China's implementation of its constitutionally
enshrined regional ethnic autonomy system.\98\ The Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law\99\ (REAL) is the state's principal legal
instrument for managing the affairs of ethnic minorities. Its
weak implementation has prevented Tibetans from using lawful
means to protect their culture, language, and religion. This
has exacerbated Tibetan frustration. The Chinese leadership's
refusal to recognize the REAL's failure to fulfill the law's
premise that it guarantees ethnic minorities the ``right to
administer their internal affairs'' could expose the leadership
to further increases in Tibetan resentment, continued calls for
Tibetan independence, and the risk of local instability. [See
box titled Impediments to Regional Ethnic Autonomy: Conflicts
Within and Between Laws below.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impediments to Regional Ethnic Autonomy: Conflicts Within and Between
Laws
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Premise of Autonomy
The REAL's Preamble asserts that the regional ethnic autonomy system
``reflects the state's full respect for and guarantee of ethnic
minorities' right to administer their internal affairs,'' and ``has
played an enormous role in giving full play to ethnic minorities'
enthusiasm for being masters over their own affairs.'' \100\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impediments to Regional Ethnic Autonomy: Conflicts Within and Between
Laws--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conflicts That Impede Autonomy
Article 3 obligates ethnic autonomous governments to apply the
decisions of higher-level authorities under ``the principle of
democratic centralism''--a system that is more consultative than
democratic. A Chinese government White Paper said that democratic
centralism ``requires that the majority be respected while the minority
is protected.'' \101\
Article 7 sets aside ethnic minority rights to ``administer
their internal affairs'' by subordinating ethnic autonomous governments
to every higher level of government authority.\102\
Article 12 provides a basis for establishing boundaries of
ethnic autonomous areas that can reflect factors such as ``historical
background'' and ``the relationship among the various nationalities''--
but it is Beijing's view of history and ethnic relations that
determines whether the REAL unites--or divides--territory where ethnic
minority groups live.\103\
Article 19 (and Constitution Article 116) provide ethnic
autonomous congresses the power to enact autonomy or self-governing
regulations ``in the light of the political, economic, and cultural
characteristics'' of the relevant ethnic group(s)\104\--but China's
Legislation Law intrudes upon the right of ethnic minority people's
congresses to issue such regulations.\105\
Article 20 provides ethnic autonomous governments the right to
apply to a higher-level state agency to alter or cancel the
implementation of a ``resolution, decision, order, or instruction'' if
it does not ``suit the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area''
\106\--but the Legislation Law bars ethnic autonomous governments from
enacting any variance to the laws and regulations that matter the most:
those that are ``dedicated to matters concerning ethnic autonomous
areas.'' \107\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic Development vs. Ethnic Minorities' Autonomous Rights
The Chinese government undermines the prospects for
stability in Tibetan autonomous areas of China by implementing
economic development and educational policy in a manner that
results in disadvantages for Tibetans. In a November 2007
academic thesis, Dr. Andrew Fischer analyzed the relationship
in Tibetan areas of China between ``economic polarisation,
social exclusion, and social conflict.'' \108\ ``The
exclusionary experiences of Tibetans in different tiers of the
labor market are interlinked through polarisation,'' he said,
``and operate along educational or cultural axes of
disadvantage''--with the result that ``class grievances mutate
into cross-class collective grievances.'' \109\ The relevance
of the point is evident in the social and professional range of
Tibetan protesters who were not monks and nuns: business
operators, workers, university graduates, junior high school
students, farmers, and nomads.
The Chinese government facilitates resentment among non-
monastic Tibetans against the increasing Han dominance in
economic and cultural spheres principally by failing to empower
local Tibetan autonomous governments to protect Tibetan
interests. Among the consequences are the decline of the
use\110\ and teaching\111\ of Tibetan language, and educational
and training programs that leave Tibetans poorly prepared to
compete in a Han-dominated job market.\112\ Fischer observes in
a forthcoming paper that preferential policies toward Tibetans
are not as important in ``dealing with disjunctures across
changing educational and employment systems'' as achieving
``holistic political representation and decision making of
minority groups.'' \113\
The Qinghai-Tibet railway, a premier project of the Great
Western Development program\114\ that entered service in July
2006,\115\ is an example of how Chinese policies prioritize
accelerating economic development over protecting ethnic
minorities' rights of autonomy. The impact of the Qinghai-Tibet
railway could overwhelm Tibetans and sharply increase pressure
on the Tibetan culture. Based on Commission analysis of
fragmentary and sometimes contradictory information, more than
a half million passengers, most of whom are likely to be ethnic
Han, may have traveled during the first 18 months of railway
operation (July 2006 through December 2007) to the TAR to seek
work, trade, and business opportunities.\116\
The Chinese government announced in January 2008 steps
toward building a new railway that will open up the eastern TAR
and Ganzi (Kardze) TAP--areas where Tibetan protesters have
been active--to population influx from one of China's most
populous provinces.\117\ The railway will originate in Chengdu
city, the capital of Sichuan province, and traverse Kangding
(Dartsedo), Yajiang (Nyagchukha), Litang (Lithang), and Batang
(Bathang) counties in Ganzi TAP before entering the TAR near
Mangkang (Markham) county in Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, based
on a China Daily sketch.\118\
A Ministry of Railways spokesman said in August 2008 that
the government expects to complete construction by 2020 of six
rail lines feeding the Qinghai-Tibet railway.\119\ Authorities
had announced two of the rail lines (Lhasa-Rikaze and Lhasa-
Linzhi) previously.\120\ The spokesman did not provide any
information about the railway route between Golmud city and
Chengdu city. Depending on the government's economic,
political, and geographic objectives, the route could traverse
a number of Tibetan autonomous areas, including one or both of
Yushu and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in Qinghai province, and one or
both of Ganzi TAP and Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture in Sichuan province.\121\ Such a route would pass
through some of the most remote Tibetan autonomous areas--areas
where remoteness and the unavailability of high-capacity
transportation links have helped the proportion of Tibetan
population to remain relatively high.\122\
A five-year TAR government economic development program
announced in the aftermath of the Tibetan protests indicates
that government policy will prioritize and accelerate
industrial expansion and resource extraction.\123\ TAR economic
commission director Li Xia said that the government ``will pool
21.17 billion yuan (about 3 billion U.S. dollars) for 10 mining
projects, four construction and building material enterprises,
three medicine and food plants, and five industrial development
zones in five years.'' \124\ The government expects the
projects to be operational by 2013, Li said.\125\ The report
did not disclose details about the source of the funding for
the projects, the location of the industrial development zones,
or the extent to which authorities expect the new projects to
attract non-Tibetans to the TAR to seek employment. The total
cost of the 22 projects will be equal to approximately two-
thirds of the 33 billion yuan cost of constructing the Qinghai-
Tibet railway.\126\
Another state-run program that prioritizes economic
development by settling Tibetan nomads into compact communities
is nearing completion throughout Tibetan areas, disrupting an
important sector of the Tibetan culture and economy.\127\
Nomads participated in the wave of protests following March 10
in substantial numbers, placing some Tibetan counties on the
protest map for the first time\128\ since the current period of
Tibetan political activism began in 1987.\129\
Consequences of the Protests: Death, Detention, Patriotic Education,
Isolation
At no time since Tibetans resumed political activism in
1987 has the magnitude and severity of consequences to Tibetans
(named and unnamed) who protested against the Chinese
government been as great as it is now upon the release of the
Commission's 2008 Annual Report. Few details are available
about the thousands of Tibetans whom Chinese security officials
detained, beat, fired on, or otherwise harmed as armed forces
suppressed protests or riots and maintained security lockdowns.
China's state-run media reported extensively on personal injury
and property damage that Tibetan rioters caused from March 14
to 19 in locations such as Lhasa city, Aba county, and Gannan
TAP, but authorities provided few details about the thousands
of Tibetans whom they acknowledge detaining as a result of the
incidents. Moreover, officials have provided little information
about the suppression of peaceful Tibetan protests that took
place over a period of weeks in more than 40 counties where
Chinese state media did not report rioting, and where security
officials reportedly detained thousands more Tibetans.\130\
[See Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants for
more information about legal process and abuse of Tibetan
detainees.]
death
At least 218 Tibetans had died by June as the result of
Chinese security forces using lethal force (such as gunfire)
against Tibetan protesters, or from severe abuse (such as
beating and torture), according to an August 21 Tibetan
government-in-exile (TGiE) report.\131\ The Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy
reported on June 20 that ``more than 100'' Tibetans had
died.\132\ Neither organization commented publicly on the
substantial difference between the estimates. If a report is
accurate that, on March 28, authorities cremated near Lhasa
more than 80 (apparently unidentified) bodies of Tibetans
killed in connection with protest (or riot) activity, then a
full accounting of all of the casualties may never occur.\133\
The March 14 Lhasa protests and rioting resulted in the
largest number of Tibetan fatalities reported for a single
incident. On March 16, the TGiE reported that ``at least 80
people were killed'' on March 14 in Lhasa.\134\ Jampa Phuntsog
(Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of the TAR government, denied at a
March 17 press conference, however, that security forces
carried or used ``any destructive weapons'' as they suppressed
the March 14 riot.\135\ Additional incidents of lethal weapons
fire against Tibetan protesters took place on at least six
occasions outside the TAR, according to NGO and media reports:
on March 11 in Daocheng (Dabpa) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan
province;\136\ March 16 in Aba county, Aba prefecture, Sichuan
province;\137\ March 16 (or March 18) in Maqu county, Gannan
TAP, Gansu province;\138\ March 18 in Ganzi county, Ganzi
TAP;\139\ March 24 in Luhuo (Draggo) county, Ganzi TAP;\140\
and on April 3 in Ganzi county.\141\ Up to 15 Tibetans were
reportedly wounded by weapons fire on April 5 in Daofu (Dawu)
county, Ganzi TAP, but no fatalities were reported.\142\ The
Dalai Lama issued statements on March 18\143\ and April 6\144\
appealing to Tibetans to refrain from violent activity.
Chinese officials have not acknowledged the deaths of
Tibetan protesters as the result of lethal force used by
Chinese security forces.\145\ Instead, state-run media has
emphasized the consequences of Tibetan violence, especially the
deaths of 18 civilians and 1 policeman in the March 14 Lhasa
riot.\146\ International media and non-governmental
organizations also reported Tibetan violence, sometimes
resulting in death, against ethnic Han and Hui individuals in
Lhasa.\147\
detention
Unless Chinese authorities have released without charge a
very high proportion of the Tibetans reportedly detained as a
result of peaceful activity or expression on or after March 10,
2008, the resulting surge in the number of Tibetan political
prisoners may prove to be the largest increase in such
prisoners\148\ that has occurred under China's current
Constitution\149\ and Criminal Law.\150\ The current period of
Tibetan political activism began in 1987. [See chart titled
Tibetan Political Detention by Year, 1987-2008 below.]
Chinese security officials detained thousands of Tibetans,
first in connection with the cascade of protests (and sometimes
rioting) followed by the imposition of security lockdowns at
protest locations, and then as monks, nuns, and other Tibetans
expressed anger at the aggressive reimplementation of political
indoctrination campaigns, including patriotic education.
China's state-run media acknowledged in reports in March and
April 2008 that a total of 4,434 persons characterized as
``rioters'' had either surrendered to security forces or were
detained by them in nine counties where rioting reportedly took
place between March 14 and 19.\151\ The nine counties were
located in Lhasa municipality and Gannan TAP. The reports did
not name or provide detailed information about any of the
detainees. Two official reports on April 9\152\ and one report
on June 21\153\ disclosed the release of a total of 3,027 of
the 4,434 persons who reportedly surrendered or were detained.
The June 21 report (on Lhasa) noted that the persons released
had ``expressed regret for conducting minor crimes.'' \154\
Based on the April 9 and June 21 reports, the status of more
than 1,200 of the persons who had surrendered or been detained
remained unknown.\155\ [For detailed information, see table
titled Official Chinese Sources: Detention, Surrender, and
Release of Alleged ``Rioters'' below.]
Official Chinese Sources: Detention, Surrender, and Release of Alleged ``Rioters''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Linzhou
county, Aba
March 14 county,
Lhasa city, March 14 Gannan TAP, March 14-19 rioting March 18
rioting Xinhua, rioting Xinhua, April Tibet rioting Total
April 9\156\ 9\157\ Daily, Xinhua,
March March
19\158\ 25\159\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surrender: Total 362 2,204 (incl. 519 monks) 94 381 3,041
Surrender: Released 328 1,870 (incl. 413 monks)
Surrender: Formal arrest
Surrender: Remain detained 34 334 (incl. 106 monks)
Police detention: Total 953 440 (incl. 170 monks) 1,393
Police detention: Released
Police detention: Formal 403 8
arrest
Police detention: Remain
detained
Total: Surrendered or detained 1,315 2,644 94 381 4,434
Total: Remain detained 116 116
(Reports as of June) China Daily, June
21\160\
Total: Sentenced 42 42
(Reports as of June) China Daily, June 21
Total: Released 1,157 1,870 3,027
(Reports as of June) China Daily, June 21 Xinhua, April 9
Total: Status unknown 0 774 94 381 1,249
(Reports as of June)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese authorities had by late June provided detailed
legal process information about only a few dozen of the
protest- and riot-related cases that may have reached trial in
the Lhasa area, and no information about a possibly greater
number of prosecutions that could take place in other locations
across the Tibetan protest area. All but 14\161\ of the
individual cases known to the Commission about which China
disclosed criminal charge information
involved charges of violent or ordinary crime committed during
activity characterized as rioting.
The largest such disclosure of official information was on
the Lhasa Intermediate People's Court April 29, 2008,
sentencing of 30 Tibetans to imprisonment for periods ranging
from three years to life.\162\ The court convicted the
defendants for crimes described as ``arson, looting, picking
quarrels and provoking troubles, assembling a crowd to storm
state organs, disrupting public service, and theft.'' \163\ A
Lhasa court convicted an additional 12 persons on similar
charges on June 19 and 20, bringing to 42 the total of
officially acknowledged convictions linked to alleged riot-
related activity in Lhasa municipality, according to an
official report.\164\ An additional 116 persons were awaiting
trial.\165\ A Party-run Web site disclosed on March 30 a
reshuffling of TAR court and procuratorate personnel that could
have facilitated an increase in case handling capacity by the
two intermediate people's courts located nearest to Lhasa.\166\
An official Chinese report disclosed on July 11 that on June 19
and 20 four local courts in Lhasa and Shannan (Lhoka)
Prefecture sentenced an additional 12 persons to imprisonment
for alleged involvement in the Lhasa rioting.\167\ The same
report disclosed that courts had not yet sentenced anyone to
death in connection with alleged rioting, but that 116 persons
``were on trial'' and that Chinese law would determine whether
some of the persons tried would be sentenced to execution.\168\
The most extensive NGO compilation of detailed information
about the detention of Tibetans resulting from the protests has
been an April 25, 2008, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (TCHRD) list of 518 Tibetans.\169\ Media
organizations and NGOs continued to report additional
detentions during the months preceding publication of the
Commission's Annual Report. Two reports released in August by
different Tibetan reporting agencies placed the total number of
Tibetan detentions since March 10 at 6,705 and ``over 6,500''
respectively.\170\ Neither report provided any information
about the number of detainees who had been released or remain
detained, or who had been sentenced to imprisonment or
reeducation through labor (RTL). Security officials in the TAR
``deported'' on April 25 to Qinghai province 675 monks,
including 405 monks studying at Drepung Monastery and 205 monks
studying at Sera Monastery, according to an August 28 media
organization report.\171\ Many of the monks were originally
from Qinghai; others were from Tibetan autonomous areas of
Sichuan province.\172\ ``All'' of the monks from Qinghai
remained detained in their hometowns, according to the report,
which did not name any of the detainees and provided few
details about detainees' current locations.\173\ The 610
Drepung and Sera monks removed from the TAR were among a total
of approximately 950 monks authorities detained from the two
monasteries on April 10 and April 14, according to the same
report.\174\
patriotic education
The Party responded to the Tibetan protests with further
escalation of the very political indoctrination campaigns, such
as patriotic education (``love the country, love religion''),
that helped to
provoke Tibetans into protesting in the first place.\175\ Party
Secretary Zhang Qingli issued an order on April 3 that
officials across the TAR must conduct patriotic education
programs at monastic institutions, workplaces, businesses, and
schools, and require participants to sign denunciations of the
Dalai Lama, according to a media report.\176\ The Tibet Daily
reported that the Party had organized a teleconference to warn
cadres against ``war-weariness'' and to conduct educational
activities that would ``remove the scales'' from the eyes of
the ``vast masses'' so that they would ``see clearly what Dalai
really wants and what he has already done.'' \177\ According to
another Tibet Daily report, the Lhasa city school system
trained nearly 3,700 patriotic education ``core instructors''
who lectured a total of nearly 180,000 persons who attended a
total of more than 1,000 lectures.\178\ Officials in Tibetan
autonomous areas outside the TAR launched political
indoctrination campaigns\179\ in prefectures where protests
took place,\180\ as well as in locations where protests were
not reported.\181\
The aggressive new patriotic education campaigns fueled a
second wave of protests and detentions that began in April and
continued as the Commission prepared the 2008 Annual Report.
Authorities may have detained hundreds of monks, nuns, and
other Tibetans as the result of incidents arising from Tibetan
refusals to fulfill the demands of patriotic education
instructors.\182\ Government measures to prevent information
from reaching international observers have hindered an accurate
assessment of the full impact of patriotic education and other
political indoctrination programs on Tibetan communities. In
addition to the standard demand that monks and nuns denounce
the Dalai Lama, officials sought to pressure senior Tibetan
Buddhist figures\183\ and ordinary monks, nuns, and
villagers\184\ to affirm support for the Chinese government
assertion that the Dalai Lama was responsible for the protests
and rioting. Authorities in some cases vandalized or destroyed
images of the Dalai Lama, offending monks and nuns and
prompting comparisons with the Cultural Revolution.\185\
Security forces responded to an April 3 protest resulting from
patriotic education in Ganzi county with lethal weapons
fire.\186\
isolation
Chinese security officials imposed and maintained measures
that isolated Tibetan communities from each other and from the
outside world as the Tibetan protests spread and the Chinese
government response gathered momentum. Authorities confiscated
cell phones and computers, turned off cellular transmission
facilities, and interfered with Internet access, according to
accounts.\187\ Authorities threatened Tibetans with punishment
if they shared information about Tibetan fatalities or
detentions.\188\
The Chinese government continued to deny international
journalists and foreign tourists access to the TAR after
dropping plans to reopen the region to such visitors on May
1.\189\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Qin Gang
confirmed on June 12, 2008, that the TAR remained temporarily
closed to foreign journalists and blamed the closure on ``the
Dalai Clique.'' \190\ The level of access by foreign
journalists and tourists to Tibetan autonomous areas located in
other provinces--which unlike the TAR do not require special
permits of foreigners for entry--varied during the post-March
10 period. [See Section II--Freedom of Expression--Restrictions
Bolster Image of Party and Government.] The Dalai Lama stated
in a May 25 interview that the most important gesture he would
like to see from the Chinese government would be to permit
international journalists to travel to the Tibetan areas of
China to ``look, investigate, so the picture becomes clear.''
\191\
Long-term Implications of the Tibetan Protests
Chinese government decisions guiding recovery from the wave
of protests (and rioting) could alter the outlook for the
Tibetan culture, religion, language, and heritage. Continuing
with the current mix of policy, law, and implementation, and
waiting for the Dalai Lama to pass away so that Chinese
officials can supervise the installation of a Dalai Lama whom
Tibetans are unlikely to accept, could result in heightened
risks to local and regional security for decades to come.
A Chinese government decision to fulfill the Constitution's
guarantees of the freedoms of speech, religion, and
association; to ensure that laws and regulations on regional
ethnic autonomy deliver to Tibetans the right to ``administer
their internal affairs''; and to engage the Dalai Lama in
substantive dialogue on the Tibet issue, can result in a
durable and mutually beneficial outcome for Chinese and
Tibetans.
Tibetan Political Imprisonment: No News of Early Release, Sentence
Reduction
The Commission is not aware of any reports of Tibetan
political prisoners to whom Chinese authorities granted a
sentence reduction or an early release from imprisonment during
the past year. The Dui Hua Foundation noted in a June 17, 2008,
report that it had not seen any such developments recently, and
that cases involving the charge of splittism\192\ are being
``strictly handled.'' \193\ Officials rarely grant clemency to
Tibetan or Uyghur political prisoners, who are typically
charged with splittism, Dui Hua said.\194\
The Commission is not aware of new developments in the
cases of Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso\195\ (detained in 1996 and
serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing leaflets,
distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans
in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub\196\ (sentenced in 2000 to
life imprisonment for printing leaflets); reincarnated lama
Bangri Chogtrul\197\ (detained in 1999 and serving a sentence
of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting
splittism''); or nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced in November
2007 to 8 years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at
a public festival).
Addendum: List of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level Areas
County-level areas and cities where peaceful Tibetan
protests (and in some cases, riots) reportedly took place from
March 10, 2008, through the end of April. Multiple protests
took place in several counties.
Beijing municipality (1)
Beijing municipality (1): Beijing city.
Tibet Autonomous Region (17)
Lhasa municipality (7): Lasa (Lhasa) city,
Linzhou (Lhundrub) county, Dangxiong (Damshung) county,
Qushui (Chushur) county, Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen)
county, Dazi (Tagtse) county, Mozhugongka (Maldro
Gongkar) county.
Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture (4): Jiangda
(Jomda) county, Gongjue (Gonjo) county, Basu (Pashoe)
county, Mangkang (Markham) county.
Shannan (Lhoka) prefecture (1): Zhanang
(Dranang) county.
Rikaze (Shigatse) prefecture (2): Rikaze city,
Sajia (Sakya) county.
Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture (2): Naqu county, Suo
(Sog) county.
Ali (Ngari) prefecture (1): Ritu (Ruthog)
county.
Qinghai province (13)
Xining municipality (1): Xining city.
Haidong prefecture (1): Hualong Hui Autonomous
County.
Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
(TAP) (3): Tongren (Rebgong) county, Jianzha (Chentsa)
county, Zeku (Tsekhog) county, Henan (Yulgan) Mongol
Autonomous county.
Hainan TAP (4): Gonghe (Chabcha) county,
Tongde (Gepasumdo) county, Xinghai (Tsigorthang)
county, Guinan (Mangra) county.
Guoluo (Golog) TAP (3): Banma (Pema) county,
Dari (Darlag) county, Jiuzhi (Chigdril) county.
Yushu (Yulshul) TAP (1): Yushu (Kyegudo)
county.
Gansu province (7)
Lanzhou municipality (1): Lanzhou city.
Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (6): Hezuo (Tsoe) city,
Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Luqu (Luchu) county, Maqu
(Machu) county, Diebu (Thewo) county, Zhuoni (Chone)
county.
Sichuan province (17)
Chengdu municipality (1): Chengdu city.
Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture (5): Ma'erkang (Barkham) county, Songpan
(Zungchu) county, Ruo'ergai (Dzoege) county, Aba
county, Rangtang (Dzamthang) county.
Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (11): Kangding (Dartsedo)
county, Daocheng (Dabpa) county, Yajiang (Nyagchukha)
county, Litang (Lithang) county, Xinlong (Nyagrong)
county, Daofu (Tawu) county, Luhuo (Draggo) county,
Ganzi county, Dege county, Shiqu (Sershul) county, Seda
(Serthar) county.
Addendum
THE JUNE 2008 GANZI MEASURES: DEALING STRICTLY WITH TROUBLEMAKING
MONKS, NUNS, AND MONASTERIES
The government of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP), located in Sichuan province, issued with
immediate effect on June 28, 2008, the ``Measures for Dealing
Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and Individual Monks and
Nuns'' (Ganzi Measures).\198\ The Ganzi Measures are divided
into three groups: Articles 1 to 4 deal with ``monk and nun
troublemakers''; Articles 5 to 9 address ``troublemaking
monasteries''; Articles 10 to 12 seek to punish management
officials of monasteries and nunneries who failed to ``fulfill
their responsibilities.''
Based on Commission staff analysis, some punishments do not
appear to have a clear basis in national legal measures that
establish central government regulatory power over religious
activity in China. Three examples are:
The punitive demolition of lawfully
constructed monastic residences;
The punitive reduction of the number of
lawfully registered monks or nuns entitled to reside at
a monastery or nunnery; and
The punitive removal from a reincarnated
Tibetan Buddhist teacher of his religious position and
function.
MONKS AND NUNS: REEDUCATION, CRIMINAL CHARGES, EXPULSION
Articles 1 to 4 divide punishment for monks and nuns into
four levels of severity. Determinants include official
assessment of whether an alleged offense is ``minor'' or
``serious,'' whether or not a monk or nun is cooperative and
provides a written statement of guilt, and whether a monk or
nun is ``stubborn.''
Articles 1 to 3 impose ``reeducation.'' Article 1 applies
the least level of punishment and allows a monk or nun to
undergo reeducation in a family household if the head of
household serves as guarantor that the monk or nun will remain
inside the house and ``strictly follow reeducation.'' Articles
2 and 3 require that reeducation take place ``in custody,'' but
the measures do not specify the type of facility in which the
monk or nun will be confined while under custody.
Article 4 provides for punishment ``according to law'' for
activities such as ``instigating splittism and disturbances''
(e.g., prosecution in a court on charges such as Article 103 of
China's Criminal Law (inciting ``splittism''), or Article 293
(``creating disturbances'')). Other activities punishable by
law are ``hatching conspiracies,'' ``forming organizations,''
and ``taking a leading role.''
Articles 3 and 4 include expulsion of a monk or nun from a
monastery or nunnery and permanent revocation of official
status as a monk or nun.
MONASTERIES AND NUNNERIES: SHRINKING SOME, CLOSING OTHERS
Articles 5 to 9 describe ``cleansing and rectification'' of
monasteries and nunneries, a process that penalizes the
institution of Tibetan Buddhism.
Article 5 provides rectification for monasteries and
nunneries where 10 percent to 30 percent of monks and nuns
participated in ``disturbances.'' The monastery or nunnery will
be sealed off, searched, religious activity suspended, and
``suspect persons detained according to law.''
Article 6 provides for rectification of Democratic
Management Committees (DMCs) at monasteries and nunneries where
DMC members ``participated in disturbances.'' Local government
officials may take over the management of a monastery or
nunnery if they deem ``suitable personnel'' to be unavailable.
Normal management functions of monasteries and nunneries will
be suspended while a DMC undergoes rectification.
Article 7 provides for expelling monks and nuns from
monasteries and nunneries and annulling their official status
as ``religious practitioners'' if they do not ``assist''
officials conducting rectification, refuse to be photographed
and registered, leave a monastery or nunnery without
permission, or fail to ``correct themselves'' during
reeducation.
Article 7 provides for the demolition of monastic
residences that were occupied by monks or nuns that officials
expel. (The Commission is not aware of a national or provincial
legal measure that provides for the demolition of monastic
residences as punishment for offenses such as those listed in
Article 7. Based on information available to the Commission,
monasteries and nunneries apply for and receive permission from
local government officials to renovate or construct monastic
residences.\199\ The Ganzi Measures do not make clear whether
the residences of monks and nuns expelled under Articles 3 and
4 will also be demolished.)
Article 8 requires re-registration of all monks and nuns
resident at monasteries and nunneries involved in
``disturbances.''
Article 8 reduces the total number of monks and nuns
permitted to reside at monasteries and nunneries involved in
``disturbances'' by the number of monks or nuns who are
expelled from each monastery or nunnery. (Once officials reduce
the number of monks and nuns permitted to reside at a monastery
or nunnery, restoring the number of monks and nuns to its
previous level would require coordination between a monastery
or nunnery's Democratic Management Committee,\200\ a state-
controlled Buddhist association, and the local
government.\201\)
Article 9 provides for the investigation, loss of status as
a ``registered religious institution,'' and closure of a
monastery or nunnery if officials determine that a DMC does not
improve after rectification, or if monks or nuns ``go out again
and make trouble.'' (Once a monastery or nunnery is de-
registered and closed, provisions of the Regulation on
Religious Affairs would require provincial-level approval
before the monastery or nunnery could be re-established.\202\)
MONASTIC OFFICIALS, TEACHERS, AND TRULKUS: PUBLIC HUMILIATION, LOSS OF
POSITION
Articles 10 to 12 punish members of a monastery or
nunnery's DMC that do not maintain control of monks and nuns
and ``take a clear stand on the issue'' (e.g., uphold
government and Party policy). All three measures refer to DMC
officials including monks, khenpos (abbots), geshes (teachers
who have attained the most advanced degree of monastic
education), and trulkus (teachers that Tibetan Buddhists
believe are reincarnated).
Article 10 provides for ``careful scrutiny'' of mistakes,
criticism, and reeducation of DMC members that were ``not
directly involved in disturbances,'' but that failed to ``take
a clear stand on the issue,'' investigate and discipline monks
and nuns that protested, or that were ``lax'' or deemed to have
committed ``instances of poor management.''
Article 11 provides for television and newspaper coverage
of ``detailed examination'' of DMC members before a monastic
assembly if DMC members are ``two-faced'' or fail to ``make
their attitude clear.'' Such DMC members must submit a
``written guarantee'' (presumably of correct behavior) at the
publicized event.
Article 12 provides for punishment under China's Criminal
Law as well as loss of government, consultative, and religious
positions for DMC members that ``collude with foreign
separatists'' (a probable reference to the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan Buddhist monastic community in other countries),
``assist'' protests, ``tolerate'' protests, or ``incite''
others to protest. Officials will strip trulkus accused of such
behavior of ``the right to hold the incarnation lineage.'' (The
Commission is not aware of a legal basis in China's national
regulations on religion for stripping a trulku of ``the right''
to be a trulku. The 2007 Management Measures for the
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism (MMR)
provide detailed regulation of the process of identifying,
seating, and educating a reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist
teacher--including regulation of whether or not a reincarnated
teacher is entitled to reincarnate once again.\203\ The MMR
does not, however, provide a process whereby the state may
``strip'' a trulku of his religious position and function.)
VI. Developments in Hong Kong
INTRODUCTION
The United States supports a stable, autonomous Hong Kong
under the ``one country, two systems'' formula articulated in
the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.\1\ The
people of Hong Kong enjoy the benefits of an independent
judiciary\2\ and an open society in which the freedoms of
religion, speech, and assembly are respected. The Commission
notes, however, that full democracy in Hong Kong has been
delayed again at least until 2017 by the Chinese central
government. The Commission strongly supports the provisions of
the Basic Law that provide for the election of the Chief
Executive and the entire Legislative Council through universal
suffrage, and highlights the importance of the central
government's obligation to give Hong Kong the ``high degree of
autonomy'' promised in the Basic Law.
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
Although the Basic Law promises democracy through universal
suffrage to the people of Hong Kong,\3\ the central government
continued to obstruct progress toward the fulfillment of that
promise by refusing to allow constitutional and electoral
reforms to proceed in the near term. The National People's
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued a decision in
December 2007 prohibiting the people of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR) from directly electing both the
Chief Executive and the entire Legislative Council (LegCo) in
2012.\4\ This decision marked the second time in less than four
years that the NPCSC has issued a formal ruling to delay the
commencement of universal suffrage in Hong Kong.\5\
The NPCSC's decision to further postpone electoral reforms
came despite public polling that demonstrated widespread
popular support for 2012 as the start date for universal
suffrage in Hong Kong.\6\ Three short weeks before the NPCSC
made its position known, Anson Chan, a candidate who ran on a
platform that called for universal suffrage in 2012, won a
directly elected seat in the LegCo. Chan won the support of
54.6 percent of voters in the Hong Kong Island district,
defeating her main opponent, Regina Ip, who advocated 2017 as a
possible date for direct election.\7\ In July 2007, the HKSAR
government issued a Green Paper on Constitutional Development
to consult the public on plans for implementing universal
suffrage for the Chief Executive.\8\ The public's views were
consolidated into a report and submitted to the NPCSC more than
two weeks before it issued its decision in December 2007. The
HKSAR report stated that ``implementing universal suffrage for
the Chief Executive first in 2012 is the expectation of more
than half of the public, as reflected in the opinion polls;
this expectation should be taken seriously and given
consideration.'' \9\ In spite of these indications of broad
support for universal suffrage, the NPCSC ruled out that
possibility for 2012 without offering a justification for its
decision.\10\
The NPCSC decision, however, stated that the election of
the fifth Chief Executive in 2017 ``may be implemented by the
method of universal suffrage.'' Thereafter, all members of the
Legislative Council may be elected by universal suffrage in
2020 at the earliest.\11\ On the day that the NPCSC released
its decision, Qiao Xiaoyang, Deputy Secretary General of the
NPCSC, personally conveyed its message to a symposium on the
future of Hong Kong's political development. Qiao said that the
decision ``made clear'' the ``timetable for universal
elections'' and that it indicated that ``the Chief Executive
can be elected through universal suffrage in 2017.'' \12\ The
Chief Executive is currently selected by an 800-member Election
Committee that includes representatives from Hong Kong's
functional constituencies, ex-officio members (members of the
Legislative Council, Hong Kong deputies to the National
People's Congress, and Hong Kong representatives to the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference), and religious
representatives. Only half of the Legislative Council's 60
seats are currently
returned by direct elections. The remaining seats are chosen by
functional constituency voters, who are largely comprised of
representatives of business interests that are pro-status quo
and unwilling to challenge the central government.\13\ In
September 2008, the lack of electoral reform depressed voter
enthusiasm, as turnout for the LegCo election fell more than 10
percentage points from 2004. Advocates for greater democracy
retained roughly the same level of support (24 seats in the 60-
member Legislature--a loss of 2 seats) despite the retirement
of several prominent senior leaders, while pro-business leaders
struggled amidst a climate that favored bread-and-butter
economic issues.\14\
Several remaining hurdles must be removed before universal
suffrage can be achieved in Hong Kong, including the future of
functional constituency seats and the method of candidate
selection. The NPCSC's decision stipulated that any proposal to
change the current selection methods to direct election by
universal suffrage must originate from the HKSAR government, be
approved by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council,
and be subjected to final approval by the NPCSC.\15\ Proponents
of democracy in Hong Kong are concerned that the ultimate
proposal introduced by the government could fall short of
genuine democracy. Zhang Xiaoming, a Deputy Director of the
State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, fueled
concern in Hong Kong when he stated earlier this year that the
functional constituency seats are not necessarily in conflict
with universal suffrage.\16\ Zhang's comments were later echoed
by Chief Executive Donald Tsang, who said during a May 2008
LegCo session, ``I believe under some kind of arrangements,
functional constituencies can achieve the principles of equal
and universal suffrage.'' \17\ Some lawmakers also expressed
concerns that restrictions on candidacy might be imposed to
screen out or otherwise exclude certain figures from
consideration in the nomination process for the Chief
Executive.\18\ The NPCSC's December 2007 decision insisted that
candidates for Chief Executive shall continue to be nominated
by an Election Committee after universal suffrage is
implemented.\19\
THE 2008 OLYMPICS: PROTEST & DISSENT IN HONG KONG
In 2008, the HKSAR government denied entry into the
territory to human rights activists planning to protest during
Olympic events, giving rise to concern that Hong Kong's
autonomy has eroded in the 10 years since its handover to the
People's Republic of China. During the April torch relay, the
government denied entry into Hong Kong to three Danish human
rights activists who intended to protest. The Immigration
Department declined to comment on the case but reiterated that
the department had a duty to ``uphold effective immigration
controls.'' \20\ Some sources also alleged that a Tibetan monk
traveling to Hong Kong for a religious seminar at the same time
was stopped on arrival at the airport and forced to fly to
another destination.\21\ In addition to these incidents, the
government barred at least four other activists from Hong Kong
prior to the torch relay.\22\ The HKSAR Security Bureau
submitted a report to the Legislative Counsel in May that
defended its policy barring activists and warned that the
government would not welcome ``any person (who) seeks to damage
the solemnity of the Olympics.'' \23\
In August, obstruction of protests and barring of activists
continued as Hong Kong served as the host city for the 2008
Olympic equestrian events. Hong Kong immigration officers
deported Yang Jianli, a prominent Chinese pro-democracy
activist who lives in exile in the United States, upon his
arrival in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Falun Dafa Association also
said that three Falun Gong practitioners--two Taiwanese and one
American--were denied entry to the city in August.\24\ Local
activists complained that the designated protest zones were too
far from the Olympic venue, and two protesters who entered the
venue were quickly removed by security when they attempted to
display a Tibetan flag.\25\ Security officials also evicted
Leung Kwok-hung, a pro-democracy lawmaker in Hong Kong, and his
friend from an Olympic event for shouting slogans and holding
up a banner promoting human rights.\26\
Two weeks after the Olympic closing ceremony, the HKSAR
government called for public consultation regarding the city's
human rights situation. The results of this consultation are to
be included in a larger report that the central government will
submit to the UN Human Rights Council.\27\ The Commission is
concerned that efforts to prevent protest during the Olympic
period represent a compromise of Hong Kong's political
autonomy, and over the coming year will monitor the
government's response to these concerns as expressed by the
people of Hong Kong.
[See Section II--2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games.]
Appendix: China's International Human Rights Commitments
The Universal Declaration enshrines a core set of rights
and freedoms that individuals everywhere enjoy. China voted to
adopt the Universal Declaration in 1948, and the current
Chinese government has continued to commit itself to upholding
human rights through international agreements and its own
domestic law. In March 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated
China's commitment to ratify the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, saying it would do so ``as soon as
possible.'' \1\ The chart below lists what action China has
taken on major human rights treaties and protocols to the
treaties.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ratification
Convention or Protocol Status Reservations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Covenant on Ratified March 27, The application of
Economic, Social and Cultural 2001. article 8.1(a) of
Rights the Covenant to
the People's
Republic of China
shall be
consistent with
the relevant
provisions of the
Constitution of
the People's
Republic of
China, Trade
Union Law of the
People's Republic
of China and
Labor Law of the
People's Republic
of China.
International Covenant on Civil Signed October 5,
and Political Rights 1998; not yet
ratified.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the Neither signed nor
International Covenant on Civil ratified.
and Political Rights
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second Optional Protocol to the Neither signed nor
International Covenant on Civil ratified.
and Political Rights
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Convention on the Acceded to The People's
Elimination of All Forms of December 29, 1981. Republic of China
Racial Discrimination has reservations
on the provisions
of article 22 of
the Convention
and will not be
bound by it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Elimination of Ratified November The People's
All Forms of Discrimination 18, 1980. Republic of China
Against Women does not consider
itself bound by
paragraph 1 of
article 29 of the
Convention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the Neither signed nor
Convention on the Elimination ratified.
of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Rights of the Ratified March 3, The People's
Child 1992. Republic of China
shall fulfill its
obligations
provided by
article 6 of the
Convention under
the prerequisite
that the
Convention
accords with the
provisions of
article 25
concerning family
planning of the
Constitution of
the People's
Republic of China
and in conformity
with the
provisions of
article 2 of the
Law of Minor
Children of the
People's Republic
of China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the Ratified February
Convention on the Rights of the 20, 2008.
Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the Ratified December
Convention on the Rights of the 3, 2002.
Child on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention Against Torture and Ratified October 1. The Chinese
Other Cruel, Inhuman or 4, 1988. Government does
Degrading Treatment or not recognize the
Punishment competence of the
Committee Against
Torture as
provided for in
article 20 of the
Convention. 2.
The Chinese
Government does
not consider
itself bound by
paragraph 1 of
article 30 of the
Convention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the Neither signed nor
Convention Against Torture and ratified.
Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention Relating to the Acceded to [Subject to]
Status of Refugees September 24, reservations on
1982. the following
articles: 1. The
latter half of
article 14, which
reads ``In the
territory of any
other Contracting
State, he shall
be accorded the
same protection
as is accorded in
that territory to
nationals of the
country in which
he has his
habitual
residence.'' 2.
Article 16 (3).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protocol Relating to the Status Acceded to
of Refugees September 24,
1982.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Prevention and Ratified April 18,
Punishment of the Crime of 1983.
Genocide
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention Against Transnational Ratified September
Organized Crime 23, 2003.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress Neither signed nor
and Punish Trafficking in ratified.
Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the
United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized
Crime
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protocol Against the Smuggling Neither signed nor
of Migrants by Land, Sea and ratified.
Air, supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Protection of Neither signed nor
the Rights of All Migrant ratified.
Workers and Members of Their
Families
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Rights of Ratified August 1,
Persons With Disabilities 2008.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the Neither signed nor
Convention on the Rights of ratified.
Persons With Disabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ratification of the International Labour Organization Fundamental Conventions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced Labor Freedom of Association Discrimination Child Labor
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. 29 C. 105 C. 87 C. 98 C. 100 C. 111 C. 138 C. 182
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not ratified. Not ratified.... Not ratified.... Not ratified.... Ratified Ratified Ratified April Ratified August
November 2, January 12, 28, 1999. 8, 2002.
1990. 2006.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. Endnotes
Voted to adopt: Representatives Levin, Kaptur, Udall,
Honda, Walz, Smith, Manzullo, Royce, and Pitts; Senators Dorgan,
Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, Brown, Hagel, Smith, and Martinez; Under
Secretary Dobriansky, Assistant Secretary Hill, Deputy Secretary
Radzely, Under Secretary Padilla, and Assistant Secretary Kramer.
Voted not to adopt: Senator Brownback.
Notes to Section I--Executive Summary and Recommendations
\1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion,
freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to
advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize
government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative,
not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or
imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by
China's law and Constitution, or by international law, or both.
\2\ CECC Commissioner Christopher Smith and former Commissioner
Frank Wolf handed this list to former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing
during a visit to Beijing at the end of June, 2008. It was the first
time that Members of the U.S. Congress provided to Chinese officials a
prisoner list derived from the PPD. Jim Yardley, ``China Blocks U.S.
Legislators' Meeting,'' New York Times (Online), 2 July 08.
\3\ The Tibet Information Network (TIN) ceased operations in
September 2005.
Notes to Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants
\1\ ``Police Detain Parents After China Quake City Protest,''
Reuters (Online), 21 June 08.
\2\ Uyghur American Association (Online), ``The Uyghur American
Association Warns of Fierce Repression in Post-Olympic East
Turkestan,'' 22 August 08.
\3\ See, e.g., ``Under Olympics House Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 28 July 08; Dan Martin, ``Beijing Goes Into `Fortress Mode'
with Tightened Security Prior to Olympics,'' Agence France-Presse, 22
July 08 (Open Source Center, 22 July 08).
\4\ ``Grannies Vow to Fight on After Punishment for Olympic
Protests,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), reprinted in Yahoo!, 22
August 08.
\5\ Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``Welcome Reduction in Use of
Capital Punishment in China,'' 27 June 08.
\6\ PRC Law on Lawyers, enacted 1 January 97, amended 28 October
07.
\7\ Martin, ``Beijing Goes into `Fortress Mode.' ''
\8\ Kristine Kwok, ``Police Force Pastor to Leave Beijing,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 20 July 08.
\9\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Update on Imprisoned
Activist Hu Jia and His Wife Zeng Jinyan,'' 25 August 08; Audra Ang,
``Detained Chinese Activist Returns to Beijing,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 26 August 08.
\10\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9
[hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 9 [hereinafter ICCPR].
\11\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 45-47.
\12\ Chris Buckley, ``China Vows to Punish Officials Who Fuel
Unrest,'' Reuters, reprinted in Guardian (Online), 25 July 08.
In addition to the unrest in Weng'an, Guizhou province and Menglian
county, Yunnan province, the following are representative examples of
other clashes between police and civilians that occurred during the
summer of 2008: (1) hundreds of supporters and relatives of a high
school boy who was beaten to death at school in Qianjiang city, Hubei
province, clashed with police in late June (Ding Xiao, ``Hubei Clashes
Over Dead Boy,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 26 June 08); (2) in mid-
July, after a worker was reportedly beaten by a police officer and
subsequently detained while attempting to obtain a residence permit in
the town of Kanmen, Yuhuan county, Zhejiang province, hundreds of
migrant workers attacked the police station (Hong Kong Information
Center for Human Rights and Democracy, ``PRC Hebei Villagers Said Set
Off Explosion at Country Police Station on 9 Jul,'' 20 July 08 (Open
Source Center, 20 July 08)) .
\13\ Buckley, ``China Vows to Punish Officials Who Fuel Unrest.''
\14\ Simon Elegant, ``China Protests: A New Approach,'' Time
(Online), 4 July 08; ``China Focus: Police Attacked in South China Over
Controversial Death of Motorcyclist,'' Xinhua (Online), 18 July 08
(Open Source Center, 18 July 08).
\15\ Li Datong, ``The Weng'an Model: China's Fix-it Governance,''
openDemocracy (Online), 30 July 08.
\16\ Elegant, ``China Protests: A New Approach''; Li Datong, ``The
Weng'an Model: China's Fix-it Governance.''
\17\ See, e.g., Chow Chung-yan, ``City Leaders Disciplined Over
Fatal Yunnan Riots,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 5 September
08; ``Summary: Yunnan Provincial Party Committee Punishes Cadres Over
Menglian Incident,'' China News Agency, 4 September 08 (Open Source
Center, 4 September 08); ``Two Killed in Yunnan Mass Action,'' China
Daily (Online), 21 July 08.
\18\ Chow Chung-yan, ``City Leaders Disciplined Over Fatal Yunnan
Riots''; Li Hanyong, ``Yunnan Province Adopts Effective Measures to
Channel the Masses' Emotions and Appropriately Handle the Menglian
Clash Incident to Maintain Stability in the Border Area,'' 21 July 08
(Open Source Center, 21 July 08).
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (Online), Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet No.
26. Examples of the first category include individuals who are kept in
detention after the completion of their prison sentences or despite an
amnesty law applicable to them, or in violation of domestic law or
relevant international instruments. The rights and freedoms protected
under the second category include those in Articles 7, 10, 13, 14, 18,
19, and 21 of the UDHR and in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27 of
the ICCPR. The ICCPR provides that the deprivation of an individual's
liberty is permissible only ``on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law,'' and that an individual must
be promptly informed of the reasons for his detention and any charges
against him or her.
\21\ Brad Adams, ``Hard Facts on `Soft Arrests' in China,'' Wall
Street Journal (Online), 25 May 07. Adams translates ruanjin as ``soft
arrest''; Chinese Human Rights Defenders translates the term as ``soft
detention.'' See Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), Dancing in
Shackles: A Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, May 2008
[hereinafter Dancing in Shackles].
\22\ Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report, 10 March 08, 5
(Open Source Center, 22 March 08).
\23\ Flora Sapio, ``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,''
China Information, 2008, 26, note 1 (noting that shuanggui has been
translated as ``double regulation'' or ``double designation'')
[hereinafter Shuanggui]; Shen Hu, ``Quiet Factory Buzzes with Graft
Scandals,'' Caijing (Online), 26 August 08 (translating shuanggui as
``double regulation'').
\24\ See, e.g., ``Under Olympics House Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Dancing in Shackles; Human Rights Watch
(Online), ``Walking on Thin Ice'': Control, Intimidation and Harassment
of Lawyers in China, April 2008 [hereinafter ``Walking on Thin Ice''].
\25\ ``Under Olympics House Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, Dancing in Shackles; Human Rights Watch,
``Walking on Thin Ice''; Adams, ``Hard Facts on `Soft Arrests' in
China.''
\26\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2007, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau), 11 March 08; Edward Cody, ``China
Uses Heavy Hand Even With Its Gadflies,'' Washington Post (Online), 9
April 08.
\27\ Zeng Jinyan, ``Open Letter to Plainclothes Police'' [Zhi
bianyi jingcha de gongkai xin], posted on Zeng Jinyan's blog, Liao Liao
Yuan, 30 May 08; Audra Ang, ``Detained Chinese Activist Returns to
Beijing.''
\28\ ``Under Olympics House Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia; Ben
Blanchard, ``China Dissident's Wife Appeals for End to Harassment,''
Reuters (Online), 24 July 08.
\29\ ``Lawyer's Fight for Property Rights,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in International Herald Tribune (Online), 9 May 08.
\30\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Lawyer Zheng
Enchong Once Again Confined to his Home'' [Zheng Enchong lushi zaici
zaodao ruanjin], 07 July 08.
\31\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook
2007-2008, 1 August 08, 4 [hereinafter China Human Rights Yearbook].
\32\ Ibid.
\33\ Amnesty International (Online), People's Republic of China:
The Olympics Countdown--Crackdown on Activists Threatens Olympics
Legacy,'' 1 April 08 [hereinafter Crackdown on Activists]; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook, 4-5.
\34\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook,
4.
\35\ Amnesty International, Crackdown on Activists; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook, 8.
\36\ Amnesty International, Crackdown on Activists.
\37\ Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 20 September 06, Written
Statement Submitted by Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, NYU Law
School.
\38\ Sapio, ``Shuanggui,'' 7; Human Rights and the Rule of Law in
China, Written Statement Submitted by Jerome A. Cohen.
\39\ Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, Written Statement
Submitted by Jerome A. Cohen.
\40\ See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December
48, art. 9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66,
entry into force 23 March 76, art. 9.
\41\ Sapio, ``Shuanggui,'' 23-24.
\42\ Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, Written Statement
Submitted by Jerome A. Cohen.
\43\ Sapio, ``Shuanggui,'' 21.
\44\ Ibid.
\45\ See, e.g., ``Reports: Vice Chairman of China Development Bank
Facing Probe for Alleged Corruption,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
International Herald Tribune (Online), 19 June 08; Jamil Anderlini,
``Beijing Detains Senior Official in Anti-Corruption Investigation,''
Financial Times, 26 June 08.
\46\ Teng Xiaomeng, ``Investigations into Guo Jingyi's `Double
Regulations,' '' 21st Century Business Herald, 2 September 08 (Open
Source Center, 18 September 08).
\47\ Vivian Wu, ``High Court Judge Placed Under Party
Investigation,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 18 October 08;
Zhang Lisheng, ``Court Director Investigated: Report,'' China Daily
(Online), 11 July 08.
\48\ Luo Changping and Ouyang Hongliang, ``Who Disciplines Corrupt
Disciplinarians?,'' Caijing (Online), 19 June 08.
\49\ For more information about Hu Jia and others imprisoned for
political crimes, see their records of detention searchable through the
CECC's Political Prisoner Database.
\50\ Donald Clarke, Wrongs and Rights: A Human Rights Analysis of
China's Revised Criminal Law, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1998,
43; ``New Statistics Point to Dramatic Increase in Chinese Political
Arrests in 2006,'' Dui Hua News (Online), 27 November 07; ``Statistics
Show Chinese Political Arrests Rose Again in 2007,'' Dui Hua News
(Online), 16 March 08.
\51\ ``New Statistics Point to Dramatic Increase in Chinese
Political Arrests in 2006,'' Dui Hua News; ``Statistics Show Chinese
Political Arrests Rose Again in 2007,'' Dui Hua News.
\52\ Charles Hutzler, ``Rights Activist Urges China To Grant
Olympic Pardon,'' Associated Press (Online), 8 May 08.
\53\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Free Tiananmen Prisoners
Before Olympics: Dozens Still in Prison on 19th Anniversary of
Massacre,'' 2 June 08.
\54\ Benjamin Kang Lim, ``China Frees Dissident Hu After 16 years
in Prison,'' Reuters, reprinted in Guardian (Online), 26 August 08.
\55\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 39.
\56\ Jerome Cohen, ``Triumph and Adversity: China's Distinctive
Authoritarian Regime,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 4 September
08.
\57\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 39-40 (U.S. Department of State,
Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2006, China, sec.1.d.).
\58\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 39-40; Amnesty
International (Online), 2008 Annual Report for China, 28 May 08; Cohen,
``Triumph and Adversity.''
\59\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``CHRD Urges China To
End Torture of Detained Human Rights Activist,'' 22 August 08; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook, 152. For more
information about Liu Jie, see her record of detention searchable
through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.
\60\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Zheng Mingfang,
Petitioner and Activist, Sent to Re-education through Labor,'' 20 April
08; Li Rongtian, ``Tianjin Human Rights Defender Zheng Mingfang
Arrested'' [Tianjinshi weiquan renshi Zheng Mingfang bei daibu], Radio
Free Asia (Online), 3 March 08. For more information about Zheng
Mingfang, see her record of detention searchable through the CECC's
Political Prisoner Database.
\61\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Press Release: Family Visits
Still Denied to Sichuan School Teacher Punished After Quake-Zone
Visit,'' 29 July 08; Graham Bowley, ``Sichuan Teacher Punished for
Quake Photos, Rights Group Says,'' New York Times (Online), 31 July 08.
In September 2008, Human Rights in China reported that Liu was released
on September 24 and allowed to serve his sentence outside of the labor
camp. Human Rights in China (Online), ``Sichuan Teacher, Liu Shaokun,
Was Released To Serve His Reeducation-Through-Labor Sentence Outside of
Labor Camp,'' 26 September 08.
\62\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 39; Human Rights in China
(Online), ``Reeducation Through Labor: A Summary of Regulatory Issues
and Concerns,'' 1 February 01; Human Rights Watch (Online),
``Reeducation Through Labor in China,'' 1998; Amnesty International
(Online), ``Abolishing `Re-education Through Labour' and Other Forms of
Punitive Administration Detention: An Opportunity To Bring the Law into
Line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,''
12 May 06.
\63\ Thomas Kellogg and Keith Hand, ``NPCSC: The Vanguard of
China's Constitution?,'' Jamestown Foundation China Brief (Online)
(vol. 8, issue 2, 17 January 08); Chen Liang, ``Legal Academics Start
Process to Submit the Reeducation through Labor System for
Constitutional Review'' [Faxuejie tiqing laojiao zhidu qidong weixian
shencha], Southern Weekend (Online), 5 December 07.
\64\ ``Reeducation Through Labor Inappropriate, More Than 10,000
Scholars Petition To Abolish RTL'' [Laojiao zhidu bu shiyi shangwan
ming Zhongguo zuezhe yu feichu], China Times (Online), 9 July 08;
Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Abolish
Reeducation Through Labor System, Build a Rule-of-Law Country--15,339
Chinese Citizens Propose Unlawful Behavior Corrections Law (Citizens'
Draft Proposal)'' [Feichu laodong jiaoyang zhidu, jianshe fazhi
guojia--15,339 ming Zhongguo gongmin tichu weifa xingwei jiaozhifa
(gongmin jianyigao)], 7 July 08.
\65\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Events of 2007,''
January 2008; U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China; Gao Zhisheng, ``Open Letter to the United
States Congress,'' 12 September 07, reprinted in Epoch Times (Online),
27 September 07; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 43-44.
\66\ Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mission to
China, 10 March 06, para. 54 [hereinafter Nowak Report].
\67\ Gao Zhisheng, ``Open Letter to the United States Congress'';
Coalition To Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (CIPFG)
(Online), ``Torture Outside the Olympic Village: A Guide to China's
Labor Camps,'' 3 August 08.
\68\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), A ``Life or Death
Struggle'' in East Turkestan: Uyghurs Face Unprecedented Persecution in
Post-Olympic Period, 4 September 08, 3, 10.
\69\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook,
135-36. For more information about Yang Maodong (Guo Feixiong), see his
record of detention searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner
Database.
\70\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights
Yearbook, 135-36; Reporters Without Borders (Online), ``Detained Cyber-
dissident Has Been on Hunger Strike for Nearly 80 Days,'' 27 February
08; U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China; Zhang Min, ``Lawyer Mo Shaoping Briefly
Discusses China's Coerced Confessions and Legislative Shortcomings''
[Mo Shaoping lushi jiantan Zhongguo xingxun bikong yu lifa qianque],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 December 07.
\71\ Gao Zhisheng, ``Open Letter to the United States Congress.''
For more information about Gao Zhisheng, see his record of detention
searchable through CECC's Political Prisoner Database.
\72\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook
2007-2008, 29; Yu Hang and Lillian Chang, ``Source Reveals Torture of
Gao Zhisheng and Family,'' Epoch Times (Online), 8 August 08.
\73\ Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Behind the Olympic
Spectacle: A Journalist's Walking Guide to the Persecution of Falun
Gong in Beijing,'' 3 August 08.
\74\ Michael Sheridan, ``Yu Zhou Dies as China Launches Pre-Olympic
Purge of Falun Gong,'' Times Online, 20 April 08.
\75\ TibetInfoNet (Online), ``Punitive Expeditions,'' 30 June 08.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 47; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook, 103.
\78\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 47; PRC Law on Lawyers,
enacted 26 August 80, amended 15 May 96, and 28 October 07, art. 42;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook, 103; Tom
Kellogg, ``A Case for the Defense,'' China Rights Forum (Online), No. 2
(2003); Terence C. Halliday and Sida Liu, ``Birth of a Liberal
Movement? Looking Through a One-Way Mirror at Lawyers' Defence of
Criminal Defendants in China,'' in Fighting for Political Freedom:
Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism, ed.
Terence C. Halliday et al. (Oxford: Onati IISL, 2007), 72.
\79\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook,
103; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 47.
\80\ Halliday and Liu, ``Birth of a Liberal Movement? '' 72-75;
Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Walking on Thin Ice'': Control,
Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China, April 2008.
\81\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 47; Halliday and Liu,
``Birth of a Liberal Movement? '', 72-75; Human Rights Watch, ``Walking
on Thin Ice.''
\82\ Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice''; Halliday and Liu,
``Birth of a Liberal Movement?,'' 72; CECC, 2002 Annual Report, 2
October 02, 32.
\83\ Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice''; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, Dancing in Shackles.
\84\ Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice''; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, Dancing in Shackles; Halliday and Liu, ``Birth of a
Liberal Movement? ''
\85\ Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice.''
\86\ PRC Law on Lawyers, enacted 26 August 80, amended 15 May 96,
and 28 October 07.
\87\ According to a 2006 Chinese study cited in Human Rights
Watch's report, ``Walking on Thin Ice,'' access to detained clients
``remains the biggest and most often seen problem of criminal defense
lawyers.'' Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice,'' note 154.
\88\ Hou Yijun, ``The New Lawyers' Law and the Criminal Procedure
Law Have Three Major Conflicts'' [Xin lushifa yu xingsufa cun san da
chongtu], Beijing Youth Daily, 6 June 08.
\89\ See, e.g., Hou Yijun, ``The New Lawyers' Law and the Criminal
Procedure Law Have Three Major Conflicts''; ``Implementation of New
Lawyers' Law Will Have ``Three Major Difficulties'' [Xin lushifa shishi
you ``san danan''], Dayoo.com, reprinted in All China Lawyers
Association (Online), 29 May 08; Huang Zhihe, ``More Thoughts on the
Progress and Deficiencies of the New Lawyers' Law'' [Zaitan xin lushifa
de jinbu yu buzu], All China Lawyers Association (Online), 29 May 08.
\90\ Yan Xiu, ``Huang Qi's Wife and Lawyer Still Have Not Been Able
to See Him'' [Qizi he weituo lushi reng bu neng jian Huang Qi], Radio
Free Asia (Online), 10 June 08; Human Rights in China (Online),
``Revised `Lawyers Law' Fails to Protect Lawyers,'' 19 June 08; Lin
Shiyu, ``Lawyer Blocked from Meeting with Client Sues Public Security
Bureau'' [Shenqing huijian shou zu'ai lushi qisu gonganju],
Procuratorial Daily, reprinted in Justice Net (Online), 1 July 08.
\91\ ``NPC Standing Committee's Reply to Lawyer's Proposal''
[Quanguo renda dui lushi ti'an de dafu], All China Lawyers Association
(Online), 15 August 08.
\92\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 51. See also official data included
in ``(Two Sessions Authorized Release) Supreme People's Court Report,''
Xinhua (Online), 22 March 08; Halliday and Liu, ``Birth of a Liberal
Movement? '' 87 (noting the persistence of a less than 1 percent
acquittal rate in criminal cases).
\93\ Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice.''
\94\ Jerome A. Cohen and Eva Pils, ``Hu Jia in China's Legal
Labyrinth,'' Far Eastern Economic Review (Online), May 2008.
\95\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 43, 51; Nowak Report, para. 54 &
note 62.
\96\ Human Rights in China, Empty Promises: Human Rights
Protections and China's Criminal Procedure Law in Practice, 2001, 85-
86; Randall Peerenboom, ``Out of the Pan and Into the Fire: Well-
Intentioned but Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of
Administrative Detention in China,'' 98 Northwestern University Law
Review, 991, 994-95 (2004); Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March
Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, 2002), 137.
\97\ Cohen and Pils, ``Hu Jia in China's Legal Labyrinth.''
\98\ Ibid.
\99\ Jerome Cohen, ``The Plight of China's Criminal Defence
Lawyers,'' 33 HKLJ 231, 241-242 (2003); Worden, ``Law and its Limits in
China''; CECC Staff Interviews.
\100\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Tibetan Protestors Denied Fair
Trial: Sentenced in Secret After Party Urges `Quick Hearings,' '' 30
April 08.
\101\ Jia Lijun, ``Judgments Pronounced Publicly on Some Defendants
Involved in Lhasa's `14 March' Incident,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 April 08
(Open Source Center, 29 April 08); Henry Sanderson, ``China Sentences
30 people--Some to Life--over Tibet Riots,'' Associated Press (Online),
29 April 08.
\102\ Human Rights Watch, ``Tibetan Protestors Denied Fair Trial.''
\103\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Tibetans Sentenced without
Fair Trial,'' 2 May 08.
\104\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 52-55.
\105\ ``China Sees 30 Pct Drop in Death Penalty,'' Xinhua (Online),
9 May 08.
\106\ ``China's Top Court Rejects 15 Percent of Death Sentences,''
Reuters (Online), 8 March 08; Xie Chuanjiao, ``Top Court Overturns 15%
Death Sentences in 1st Half Year,'' China Daily (Online), 27 June 08.
\107\ Xie Chuanjiao, ``Top Court Overturns 15% Death Sentences in
1st Half Year''; Chen Su, ``China's SPC Overturned 15% of Death
Sentences'' [Zhongguo zuigao fayuan tuifan 15% sixing panjue], Voice of
America (Online), 28 June 08.
\108\ ``Top Judge: Death Sentences Meted Out Only to `Tiny Number
of Felons' in China,'' Xinhua (Online), 10 March 08.
\109\ ``Top Judge: Death Sentences Meted Out Only to `Tiny Number
of Felons' in China''; Xie Chuanjiao, ``Fewer Executions After Legal
Reform,'' China Daily (Online), 8 June 07.
\110\ ``China's Top Court Rejects 15 Percent of Death Sentences,''
Reuters; `` `Hold the Execution,' the Supreme People's Court Overturns
15 Percent of Death Sentences'' [`Dao xia liu ren,' yi cheng ban sixing
an jing zuigao fayuan fuhe hou bohui], Beijing Morning News, posted on
China News Net (Online), 8 March 08.
\111\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 52; Jerome Cohen, ``A Slow March to
Legal Reform,'' Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2007; Dui Hua
Foundation (Online), ``Welcome Reduction in Use of Capital Punishment
in China,'' 27 June 08.
\112\ See, e.g., Wang Guangze, ``The Mystery of China's Death
Penalty Figures,'' China Rights Forum (Human Rights in China, No. 2,
2007), 41; ``PRC FM Spokesman Defends Keeping PRC Execution Statistics
Secret,'' Agence France-Presse, 5 February 04 (Open Source Center, 5
February 04); Jerome Cohen, ``A Slow March to Legal Reform.''
\113\ Amnesty International (Online), ``Death Sentences and
Executions in 2007,'' 15 April 08; ``PRC FM Spokesman Says Conditions
`Not Ripe' for China to Abolish Death Penalty,'' Agence France-Presse
(Online), 15 April 08.
\114\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Welcome Reduction in Use of Capital
Punishment in China.''
\115\ Antoaneta Bezlova, ``China Mulls Death Penalty Reform,'' Asia
Times (Online), 17 June 08.
Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
\1\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Are Trade Union and Labour
Officials in Guangdong Beginning To Take Their Responsibilities
Seriously? '' 28 February 08. See also, for example, ``Shuangyashan
City of Heilongjiang Province Dispatches Troops to Stop Nearly 10,000
Laid-off Workers from Taking Their Petition to Beijing,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 24 June 08. ``Migrant Workers Beaten for Asking for Back
Pay'' [Mingong tao xin zao bao'an bao da, yu yi tiao lou xiang weixie],
People's Picture Net, reprinted in news163.com (Online), 22 July 08.
\2\ See, for example, ``Shuangyashan City of Heilongjiang Province
Dispatches Troops to Stop Nearly 10,000 Laid-off Workers from Taking
Their Petition to Beijing'' [Heilongjiang sheng shuangyashan shi
chudong quanbu jingli jiezhi jin wan ming maiduan gongren shangfang],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 June 08. ``Migrant Workers Beaten for
Asking for Back Pay,'' People's Picture Net.
\3\ See, for example, International Trade Union Confederation
(Online), ``China: Workers Arrested While Participating in Collective
Protest Action,'' 6 March 08; ``Shuangyashan City of Heilongjiang
Province Dispatches Troops to Stop Nearly 10,000 Laid-off Workers from
Taking Their Petition to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia.
\4\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.
\5\ Russell Hsiao, ``Child Labor Ring Exposed in Guangdong,'' China
Brief, Volume 8, Issue 10, Jamestown Foundation (Online), 13 May 08.
\6\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 244 (``Where an employer, in violation of the laws
and regulations on labor administration, compels its employees to work
by restricting their personal freedom, if the circumstances are
serious, the persons who are directly responsible for the offence shall
be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or
criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined.'')
\7\ See, e.g., Michael Bristow, ``Olympic Firm Admits Child
Labor,'' BBC (Online), 13 June 07. On the use of child labor in Africa
in the manufacture of Olympic medals for the Beijing Olympic Summer
Games, see, for example, ``Child Labor; Seeking Social Harmony;
Expanding Alliances,'' International Herald Tribune (Online), 14 August
08.
\8\ Other legislative and regulatory activity occurred at both the
central and local levels. See for example, Implementing Regulations for
the PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa
shishi tiaoli], issued and effective 18 September 08. In an effort to
clarify provisions in the Employment Promotion Law before it took
effect, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security issued new
Regulations on Employment Services and Employment Management (Jiuye
fuwu yu jiuye guanli guiding) on November 5, 2008, which took effect on
January 1, 2008. China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Ministry of Labour
Tightens Controls on Employment Discrimination,'' 19 June 08; The
Ministry of Labor and Social Security's Decision on Abolishing Some
Regulations Concerning Labor and Social Security [Laodong he shehui
baozhang bu guanyu feizhi bufen laodong he shehui baozhang guizhang de
jueding], issued 9 November 07. A number of local regulations took
effect during 2008, as detailed in the main body of this section. See
subsections below on Collective Contracting and Local-level Legislative
and Regulatory Developments. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``Are
Trade Union and Labour Officials in Guangdong Beginning to Take Their
Responsibilities Seriously? ''
\9\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Are Trade Union and Labour Officials
in Guangdong Beginning to Take Their Responsibilities Seriously? ''
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ See the discussion of the ``Labor Contract Law,'' infra, for
more information.
\12\ PRC Trade Union Law, enacted 3 April 92, amended 27 October
01, art. 2, 4.
\13\ See, for example, China Labour Bulletin Research Report No. 4
(Online), ``Breaking the Impasse: Promoting Worker Involvement in the
Collective Bargaining and Contracts Process,'' 4, November 2007.
\14\ Anita Chan, ``The Emergence of Real Trade Unionism in Wal-Mart
Stores,'' China Labor News Translations (Online), 4 May 08.
\15\ Ibid.
\16\ ``Sichuan Post Office Evades New Labor Law Provisions for
Long-Term Employees by Requiring Them To Resign and Sign New Contract''
[Sichuan youzhengju feifa jie pin daliang yuangong], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 14 December 07. ``Mass Layoffs? In Booming China? '' Forbes
(Online), 13 November 07. China Labor Bulletin (Online), ``Employers
Sacking Workers Before the Labor Contract Law Is Implemented,'' 14
September 07. See also China Labor Bulletin (Online), ``Is Corporate
`Wolf-culture' Devouring China's Over-worked Employees? '' 27 May 08,
for an account of how Huawei, a telecom company with 60,000 employees,
reportedly bribed 7,000 employees to resign and then re-hired them on
short-term contracts. See also ``Chinese Workers in Coca-Cola
Dispute,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 September 08.
\17\ See, for example, ``Internal Regulations Infringe on Workers
Rights, Not Given Support,'' China Women's News (Online), 15 July 08.
\18\ ICFTU/GUF/HKCTU/HKTUC Hong Kong Liaison Office (henceforth
IHLO) (Online), ``The New Contract Law of China--Opportunities and
Threats,'' December 2007.
\19\ Implementing Regulations for the PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa shishi tiaoli], issued and
effective 18 September 08.
\20\ ``Surplus Labor Pool Shrinking,'' Xinhua (Online), 14 August
08.
\21\ Ariana Eunjung Cha, ``New Law Gives Chinese Workers Power,
Gives Businesses Nightmares,'' Washington Post (Online), 14 April 08.
\22\ ``New Labour Contract Law: Myth and Reality Six Months After
Implementation,'' IHLO (Online), June 2008.
\23\ The Hong Kong Liaison Office (HLO) of the international trade
union movement (hence ``IHLO'') was founded in 1997 following
reunification of Hong Kong with the PRC. Its Board comprises
representatives of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), Global Union Federations (GUF), Hong Kong Confederation of
Trade Unions (HKCTU), and the Hong Kong Trades Union Council (HKTUC).
\24\ New Labour Contract Law: Myth and Reality Six Months After
Implementation.'' IHLO.
\25\ ``Six Unions Formed in Walmart in Six Months, Walmart
Executives Say This is Related to a Shift In Recognition About Chinese
Unions'' [Banyue nei liu jia fendian lian jian gonghui, wo'erma gaoceng
chen ci zhuanbian yu dui zhongguo gonghui de renshi youguan], Beijing
News (Online), 15 August 06; ``Number of Unions in Walmart Branches Up
To 19'' [Zhongguo wo'erma fendian gonghui zeng zhi 19 jia], Beijing
News (Online), 19 August 06; ``Wal-Mart Gets Communist Branch in
China,'' Associated Press (Online), 25 August 06; ``Commentary: Enter
the Fire-breathing Dragon? '' South China Morning Post (Online), 30
September 06; The ACFTU hoped foreign invested enterprises would be
encouraged to sign collective labor contracts. Some labor activists
have been skeptical of the ACFTU's apparent ``trickle down'' approach
to collective contracting. China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Wal-Mart
to Sign Collective Contracts at All China Stores,'' 4 August 08.
\26\ ``Wal-Mart in Pay Deals With Chinese Unions,'' Financial Times
(Online), 24 July 08. ``Trade Unions in China: Membership Required,''
Economist (Online), 31 July 08.
\27\ Shenyang City Regulation on Collective Contracts [Shenyang shi
jiti hetong guiding], effective 1 August 07. Shenyang's Regulations
stipulate that a company may be fined up to 20,000 yuan for a variety
of enumerated reasons, including rejecting a request for collective
consultations, for failing to provide relevant documentation, for
impeding the consultation process and for obstructing the conclusion or
implementation of a collective labor contract (Article 17). The
Shenyang Regulations include provisions that mandate collective
consultations and collective contracts on remuneration, work safety and
health issues for workers (Article 4), including migrant workers
(Article 7). Explicit reference is made to the Liaoning United Migrant
Workers' Union (Articles 7-9, 13). For further background, see China
Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Wal-Mart Signs Its First Collective Wage
Agreement With Employees in China,'' 16 July 08. (The mandated
involvement Migrant Workers' Union in collective consultations and
contracting expanded the Union's role, which heretofore had been
limited to providing legal aid and assistance in accessing social
services. The union was established in 2006 for the purpose of bringing
migrant workers into the ACFTU. The implementation of Shenyang's
Regulations on Collective Contracts appear to be a move in furtherance
of that objective.)
\28\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Wal-Mart Signs Its First Collective
Wage Agreement With Employees in China.''
\29\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Wal-Mart to Sign Collective
Contracts at All China Stores,'' 4 August 08.
\30\ David Barbosa, ``China Tells Businesses To Unionize,'' New
York Times (Online), 12 September 08.
\31\ ``Leading Sports Brands, Unions, NGOs Form Working Group,''
Playfair 2008 (Online), 2 July 08.
\32\ ``Walmart Signs a Collective Contract--a Review'' [Wo'ermaduo
fendian qianding jiti hetong shiping] All China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU) (Online), 31 July 08.
\33\ According to information from the ACFTU reported by CSR Asia
Weekly, the government enacted its first comprehensive labor law in
1994, and officials first proposed supplementing it with a labor
contract law in 1996. After drafting of the law stalled in 1998, work
on a new labor contract law began in 2004. ``Labor Contract Law of the
PRC,'' CSR Asia Weekly (Online), 4 July 07. ``China's Legislature
Adopts Labor Contract Law,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 June 07. The
government claimed that more than 65 percent of the comments were from
Chinese workers. ``Chinese Public Makes Over 190,000 Suggestions on
Draft Labor Contract Law,'' Xinhua, 21 April 06 (Open Source Center, 21
April 06).
\34\ CECC Staff Interviews
\35\ PRC Labor Contract Law, enacted 29 June 07, art. 2.
\36\ PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, art. 16, 19.
\37\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 10. If no contract exists at the
time the relationship starts, it must be signed within one month.
\38\ Ibid., art. 14.
\39\ Ibid., art. 14.
\40\ Ibid., art. 17.
\41\ Ibid., arts. 36-50 (on terminations generally); 57-67 (on
workers employed through staffing firms); and 80-95 (on legal
liability). See also discussion infra.
\42\ ``Law to Deal with Rising Number of Labor Disputes to Be
Enacted,'' Xinhua, 27 August 07, reprinted on the National People's
Congress Web site.
\43\ Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai fa], enacted 29 December 07,
arts. 2, 52.
\44\ Ibid., arts. 3, 10.
\45\ Ibid., art. 47. See also articles 14 and 16 with respect to
mediated outcomes. Previously, final arbitration awards were not
legally binding. Article 47 of the new law, however, changes that
(``(u)nless otherwise specified herein, the written arbitration award
in any of the following employment disputes shall be final and become
legally effective on the date it is rendered: (1) disputes involving
recovery of labor remuneration, medical bills for a work-related
injury, severance pay or damages, in an amount not exceeding the
equivalent of twelve months of the local minimum wage rate; (2)
disputes over working hours, rest, leave, social insurance, etc.
arising from the implementation of state labor standards.)
\46\ Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, arts. 6, 39, and
49.
\47\ Ibid., art. 21.
\48\ Ibid., art. 53.
\49\ Ibid., arts. 27, 29, and 43.
\50\ Ibid., art. 29.
\51\ Fiona Tam, ``Caseloads Surge as Labourers Air Gripes,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 9 July 08. ``300 Construction Workers
Demonstrate for Shirked Back Pay,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 29
October 07. ``Yunnan Peasants Owed 100 Million Yuan in Back Wages''
[Yunnan tuoqian nongmingong gongzi yiyi yuan], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 3 December 07. ``Labor Arbitration Cases in Guangzhou Have
Increased Dramatically: The Haizhu Region Witnessed a 15-fold
Increase'' [Guangzhou laodong zhongcai anjian meng zeng, Haizhuqu zeng
fuda shiwu bei], Radio Free Asia (Online), 26 March 08. See also, ``HK
Companies in PRD Embroiled in Labor Disputes,'' NewsGD.com, 10 June 08.
Apart from the overwhelming caseloads with which arbitration committees
now must contend, the new law itself also displays other deficiencies.
See, for example, China Labour Bulletin (Online) Research Reports
``Help or Hindrance to Workers: China's Institutions of Public
Redress,'' 23 April 08.
\52\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, art. 28.
In an effort to clarify provisions in the Employment Promotion Law
before it took effect, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security issued
Regulations on Employment Services and Employment Management [Jiuye
fuwu yu jiuye guanli guiding] on October 30, 2007, which took effect on
January 1, 2008. China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Ministry of Labour
Tightens Controls on Employment Discrimination,'' 19 June 08.
\53\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, art. 3. Other laws have also
included this provision. See, e.g., PRC Labor Law, art. 12.
\54\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, arts. 27, 28.
\55\ Ibid., art. 29. Interestingly, reference to the new law was
conspicuously absent in some coverage of discrimination in the official
media. See, for example, ``Disabled Yunnan Student Questions School's
Employment Discrimination [Yunnan canji daxuesheng yingpin jiaoshi
zaoju: zhiyi xiaofang jiuye qishi],'' Chuncheng Evening News, reprinted
in Xinhua (Online), 11 March 08.
\56\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, art. 31.
\57\ Ibid., art. 30.
\58\ Ibid., art. 62.
\59\ Ibid., art. 7.
\60\ Ibid., art. 9.
\61\ Ibid., art. 52.
\62\ Ibid., art. 16.
\63\ Ibid., art. 30.
\64\ ``Dongguan Court Orders Vtech to Pay Plaintiff 24,000 Yuan in
Compensation for HBV Discrimination,'' China Labour Bulletin (Online),
7 January 08.
\65\ Ibid.
\66\ Beijing Yirenping Center (Online), ``Mediation in the Second
Trial in the First Shanghai HBV Discrimination Case is Successful: The
Plaintiff Receives Satisfactory Compensation'' [Shanghai yigan qishi di
yi an ershen tiaojie chenggong yuangao huo manyi buchang], 9 April 08,
citing Shanghai Intermediate Court, civil ruling No. 4302. See also,
China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Shanghai HBV Discrimination Case
Reaches `Satisfactory' Conclusion,'' 24 April 08.
\67\ What Will Drive China's Future Legal Development? Reports from
the Field. Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
18 June 08 Testimony of Han Dongfang.
\68\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``IBM Case Highlights Work
Pressures in China's Hi-tech Industries,'' 30 June 08.
\69\ For additional examples, see also ``Zhejiang to Promote
Collective Wage Negotiation,'' CSR Asia (online), Vol. 4, Week 37, 10
September 2008. (``The Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee and Zhejiang
Provincial Government have jointly announced a document promoting
collective wage negotiations. They aim to ensure that 70% of all
enterprises and 100% of state-owned and collective enterprises adopt
the system by the end of 2010.'') Shanghai also has seen noteworthy
regulatory developments, including issuance of new Regulations on
Collective Contracting (Shanghai shi jiti hetong tiaoli) which took
effect on January 1, 2008. See also U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC)
(Online), ``Human Resources Update, China's Evolving Labor Law
Regime,'' 18 September 07.
\70\ Guangdong Province High People's Court and Guangdong Province
Labor Dispute Arbitration Commission Guiding Opinion on Implementing
the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and Labor Contract Law
[Guangdong sheng zuigao renmin fayuan, Guangdong sheng laodong zhengyi
zhongcai weiyuanhui ``Guanyu shiyong `laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai
fa,' `laodong hetong fa' ruogan wenti de zhidao yijian' ''], issued 23
June 08.
\71\ ``Labour Law: State Council Delays, as Guangdong Makes it
Better,'' China Law and Practice (Online), September 2008. Earlier, in
December 2007, Guangzhou city issued an Urgent Circular on
Strengthening the Administration of Mass Layoffs by Employers
[Guangzhou shi guanyu jiaqiang dui yongren danwei guimoxing caiyuan
guanli de jinji tongzhi], issued 16 December 07.
\72\ Tam, ``Caseloads Surge as Labourers Air Gripes''; ``Yunnan
Peasants Owed 100 million Yuan in Back Wages, Radio Free Asia. ``Labor
arbitration Cases in Guangzhou have Increased Dramatically: The Haizhu
Region Witnessed a 15-fold Increase,'' Radio Free Asia. See also, ``HK
Companies in PRD Embroiled in Labor Disputes,'' NewsGD.com.
\73\ ``Labour Law: State Council Delays, as Guangdong Makes It
Better,'' China Law and Practice. Earlier, in December 2007, Guangzhou
city issued an Urgent Circular on Strengthening the Administration of
Mass Layoffs by Employers.
\74\ ``Hebei Province Regulations on Enterprise Collective
Consultations between Labor and Management'' [Hebei sheng qiye zhigong
gongzi jiti xieshang tiaoli], issued 21 September 07. See also, China
Labour bulletin (Online), ``Hebei Takes the Lead in Implementing
Legislation on Collective Consultations,'' 30 January 08.
\75\ Ibid.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ Ibid., art. 8.
\78\ Ibid., art. 4.
\79\ Ibid.
\80\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``A Turning Point for China's
Trade Unions,'' 21 August 08; PRC Trade Union Law, art. 27. (``In case
of a work-stoppage or slow-down in an enterprise or institution, the
trade union shall, on behalf of the workers and staff members, hold
consultations with the enterprise or institution or the parties
concerned.'')
\81\ China Labour Bulletin, ``A Turning Point for China's Trade
Unions''; Shenzhen City Implementing Regulations for the Trade Union
Law, [Shenzhen shi shishi ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa''
banfa], art. 47.
\82\ China Labour Bulletin, ``A Turning Point for China's Trade
Unions''; Shenzhen City Implementing Regulations for the Trade Union
Law, [shenzhen shi shishi ``shonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa''
banfa], issued 31 July 08, Chapter 3, ``Trade Union Rights and
Obligations'' (``Gonghui de quanli he yiwu''). The Trade Union Law of
2001 refers to the trade union's role in helping the enterprise to
restore normal production in the event of a work stoppage or slowdown.
The Shenzhen regulations contain no references to such a role.
\83\ Shenzhen City Implementing Regulations for the Trade Union
Law, art. 36. See also, China Labour Bulletin, ``A Turning Point for
China's Trade Unions.''
\84\ Shenzhen City Implementing Regulations for the Trade Union
Law. See especially arts. 18(3), 27-31, 44 and 45.
\85\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``A Turning Point for China's
Trade Unions,'' 21 August 08. The Regulations require union committees
to submit candidate lists to the union at the next level up for
approval before holding elections for workplace union officials. See
Shenzhen City Implementing Regulations for the Trade Union Law, art.
11.
\86\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``New Shenzhen Labor
Regulations Offer Hope for the Future,'' 13 Aug 08. Draft Regulations
on the Growth and Development of Harmonious Labor Relations in the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone [Shenzhen jingji tequ goujian he fazhan
hexie laodong guanxi ruogan guiding (cao an)]. The Draft Regulations
were approved by the Shenzhen Municipal People's Congress on 23
September 2008 as the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Regulations on
Promotion of Harmonious Labor Relations [Shenzhen jingji tequ hexie
laodong guanxi cujin tiaoli], effective 1 November 2008. See China
Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Shenzhen Labour Regulations Modified With
Some Gains and Some Losses for Workers,'' 8 October 2008. Commission
analysis of the final Regulations, including comparison with the Draft
Regulations discussed herein, will be published during the Commission's
2009 reporting cycle.
\87\ China Labour Bulletin, ``New Shenzhen Labor Regulations Offer
Hope for the Future.''
\88\ Chen Yu, ``Shenzhen is One Step Away from the Right to
Strike,'' New Express, 5 June 08, reprinted in China Labour Bulletin,
17 June 08. China Labour Bulletin, ``New Shenzhen Labor Regulations
Offer Hope for the Future.''
\89\ Chen Yu, ``Shenzhen is One Step Away from the Right to
Strike.''
\90\ China Labour Bulletin, ``New Shenzhen Labor Regulations Offer
Hope for the Future''; Draft Regulations on the Growth and Development
of Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone,
art. 45. Article 45 stipulates that, in the event of major labor
disputes, members of the municipal or district labor relations
committee may organize mediation proceedings according to a ``special
mediation'' system. As written, this system perpetuates the direct
involvement of government in labor dispute resolution.
\91\ China Labour Bulletin, ``New Shenzhen Labor Regulations Offer
Hope for the Future''; Draft Regulations on the Growth and Development
of Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone,
chapter 3. Under Article 20 of the Shenzhen Draft regulations, ``If
production and business operations make it necessary to prolong working
hours, the employer may decide or agree to do so by means of collective
consultation or a collective contract in accordance with the law,
provided that the workers give their free consent and their health is
ensured.'' This stands in contrast with Article 41 of the Labor Law,
under which employers may, after consulting with the trade union and
workers, temporarily prolong working hours as production or businesses
operations require.
\92\ China Labour Bulletin, ``New Shenzhen Labor Regulations Offer
Hope for the Future''; Draft Regulations on the Growth and Development
of Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone,
art. 47.
\93\ Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Regulations on Promotion of
Harmonious Labor Relations [Shenzhen jingji tequ hexie laodong guanxi
cujin tiaoli], art. 39. China Labour Bulletin, ``New Shenzhen Labor
Regulations Offer Hope for the Future''; Draft Regulations on the
Growth and Development of Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone, art. 35.
\94\ ``Hangzhou Arranges Back Pay Early Warning Mechanism,'' CSR
China (Online), 26 August 08.
\95\ Tam, ``Caseloads Surge as Labourers Air Gripes.''
\96\ Tam, ``Caseloads Surge as Labourers Air Gripes;'' ``Labor
Arbitration Cases in Guangzhou have Increased Dramatically: The Haizhu
Region Witnessed a 15-fold Increase,'' Radio Free Asia. See also, ``HK
Companies in PRD Embroiled in Labor Disputes,'' NewsGD.com; ``300
Construction Workers Demonstrate for Shirked Back Pay,'' Radio Free
Asia; ``Yunnan Peasants Owed 100 million Yuan in Back Wages,'' Radio
Free Asia.
\97\ ``Labor Arbitration Cases in Guangzhou Have Increased
Dramatically: The Haizhu Region Witnessed a 15-fold Increase,'' Radio
Free Asia. See also, ``HK Companies in PRD Embroiled in Labor
Disputes,'' NewsGD.com.
\98\ See, for example, ``Multinationals Face Chinese Labor Clout,''
Caijing (Online), 12 June 08; ``Behind the Defiance in the Skies''
[Fanhang shijian zhong de zhidu quexian], Economic Observer Online
(Online), 15 April 08 (English version published 22 April 08); ``China
Pay Row Pilots `Turn Back,' '' BBC (Online), 3 April 08; ``Pilots Set
to Win Deal After Strike,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 3 April
08; ``China Eastern Airlines Suspends Two Officials Over Flight
Disruptions,'' CSR Asia (Online), 9 April 08; ``Licenses of Protest
Pilots Cancelled,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 3 July 08;
``Thousands Strike Over Pay Deductions At South China Factory,'' Radio
Free Asia (Online), 28 November 07; ``Shanghai's Korean Invested
Chongming Enterprises Wage Disputes: 600 Workers Stage Sit In''
[Shanghai chongming han zi qiye qianxin jiufen liubai duo gongren reng
zai jing zuo], Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 November 07; Fiona Tam,
``Shenzhen Strike Strands Thousands,'' South China Morning Post
(Online), 30 August 08; ``Migrant Workers Riot in Eastern China
[Zhejiang],'' Associated Press, reprinted in International Herald
Tribune (Online), 14 July 08. Hong Kong Information Center for Human
Rights and Democracy, ``PRC: 10,000 Peasant Workers Clash With Police
in Zhejiang's Ningbo, Some Nabbed,'' 5 September 08 (Open Source
Center, 5 September 08); ``Masseurs in Shenzhen Protest Against
Layoffs,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 25 December 2007.
\99\ Chen Yu, ``Shenzhen is One Step Away from the Right to
Strike.'' See also China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Shenzhen Trade
Union Sees Strikes as a Natural Phenomenon,'' 15 April 08.
\100\ ``China Eastern Airlines Pilots Accept Verdict on Contract
Dispute,'' Xinhua (Online), 12 September 08. ``Chinese Pilots Ordered
to Pay Compensation for Resignation,'' Agence France-Presse (Online),
12 September 08. Sun Liping, ``Behind the Defiance in the Skies,''
Economic Observer Online (Online), 15 April 08; ``China Pay Row Pilots
`Turn Back,' '' BBC (Online), 3 April 08; ``Pilots Set to Win Deal
After Strike,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 3 April 08; ``China
Eastern Airlines Suspends Two Officials Over Flight Disruptions,'' CSR
Asia (Online), 9 April 08; ``Licenses of Protest Pilots Cancelled,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 3 July 08.
\101\ Ibid.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ Sun Liping, ``Behind the Defiance in the Skies.''
\104\ ``China Eastern Airlines Pilots Accept Verdict on Contract
Dispute,'' Xinhua. ``Chinese Pilots Ordered to Pay Compensation for
Resignation,'' Agence France-Presse. Some pilots, however, have
prevailed in court. On August 27, 2008, the Shunyi District Court in
Beijing ruled that a pilot with Xinhua Airlines could resign without
compensating the airline. A local labor arbitration committee had ruled
in April in the pilot's favor on the question of termination, but the
committee made no decision on compensation claimed by both sides. Both
the airline and the pilot pursued their claims in court. The Shunyi
District Court ruled that, under China's Labor Law, the pilot had a
right to resign without fine or penalty. The court rejected the pilot's
claims for seniority and bonus payments, but awarded him 7,800 yuan in
back pay and overtime. See ``Chinese Pilot Wins Landmark Labor Suit,''
Xinhua (Online), 28 August 08.
\105\ See ``Chinese Pilot Wins Landmark Labor Suit,'' Xinhua.
\106\ ``China Eastern Airlines Pilots Accept Verdict on Contract
Dispute,'' Xinhua. ``Chinese Pilots Ordered to Pay Compensation for
Resignation.'' Agence France-Presse.
\107\ Ibid.
\108\ Ibid.
\109\ ``Nine Dragons Paper: Sweatshop Paper,'' Students and
Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM) (Online), 18 June 08.
\110\ The point is worth noting because another firm (Topstar
Lighting Co. Ltd, a General Electric supplier), with a similar record
of violations, received relatively less favorable treatment. See
``Guangdong Provincial ACFTU Finds Itself in Muddy Waters,'' IHLO
(Online), May 08.
\111\ Fu Yanyan, ``Papermaker's Labor Tension Sparks Debate,''
Caijing (Online), 28 May 08.
\112\ Ibid.
\113\ This figure has been confirmed by Chinese Ministry of Labor
officials; CECC Staff Interview.
\114\ See, for example, Human Rights Watch (Online), `` `One Year
of My Blood'--Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in Beijing''
12 March 08. In addition, a 2006 report from the State Council Research
Office found that wages for migrant workers are ``universally low;''
workplaces lack ``the most basic labor protection[s];'' migrant workers
``engage in overly intensive labor for excessively long hours,''
without a guaranteed right to rest; and migrant workers are ``unable to
obtain . . . employment rights and public employment services'' on a
par with permanent urban residents. Translated portions of the study,
conducted by the State Council Research Office Study Group and
originally published as the book China Peasant Worker Research Report
in April 2006, is available at ``PRC: Excerpts of State Council
Research Report on Migrant Workers'' (Open Source Center, 12 September
07).
\115\ ``Three Rural Migrant Workers Enter China's Top
Legislature,'' Xinhua (Online), 28 February 08.
\116\ ``State Council Migrant Workers Office: Migrant Workers Labor
Contract Handbook to Be Published'' [Guowuyuan nonggongban: nongmingong
jianyi laodong hetong wenben youwang chutai], People's Daily (Online),
12 August 08.
\117\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Migrant Workers Start To
Win Significant Compensation Awards in the Courts,'' 8 January 08.
\118\ Li Bingqin and Peng Huamin, ``The Social Protection of Rural
Workers in the Construction Industry in Urban China,'' LSE Research
Paper No. 113, November 2006.
\119\ See, for example, Anita Chan, ``Systematic Government Theft
of Migrant Workers' Retirement Pensions,'' China Labor News
Translations (Online), 13 July 08.
\120\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``New Migrant Worker
Department Faces a Daunting Task,'' 22 July 08.
\121\ Ibid.
\122\ PRC Labor Law, art. 48.
\123\ PRC Labor Contract Law, arts. 72, 74, 85.
\124\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 66; See also, Ministry of Labor and
Social Security (Online), ``2006 Statistical Communique on the
Development of Labor and Social Security Affairs'' [2006 niandu laodong
he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbu], last visited 10 October
07. For statistics by year, see data from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China Web site. See also Guan Xiaofeng, ``Labor Disputes
Threaten Stability,'' China Daily, 30 January 07 (Open Source Center,
30 January 07); ``China To Enact Law To Deal With Rising Number of
Labor Disputes,'' Xinhua, 26 August 07 (Open Source Center, 26 August
07).
\125\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Help or Hindrance to Workers:
China's Institutions of Public Redress,'' 2.
\126\ PRC Labor Law, art. 36.
\127\ China Labor Bulletin (Online), ``Falling Through the Floor:
Migrant Women Workers' Quest for Decent Work in Dongguan, China,''
September 2006, 6, 10, 15.
\128\ Dexter Roberts and Pete Engardio, ``Secrets, Lies, and
Sweatshops,'' Business Week (Online), 27 November 06.
\129\ PRC Labor Law, art. 73.
\130\ See, for example, ``Guangxi Labor Security Supervision
Approach Implemented In September,'' China CSR (Online), 28 August 08.
``Hubei Tieshu Group Retired Workers Demand Court Action on Judicial
Decision'' [Hubei tieshu jituan tuixiu zhigong yaoqiu fayuan zhixing
laodong panjue], Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch (Minzhu Guancha)
(Online), 12 June 08.
\131\ ``China Mine Explosion `Kills 20,' '' BBC Asia (Online), 22
January 08; France-Presse (Online), 8 September 08; Mine Collapse Kills
9, Injures 11,'' China Daily (Online), 6 June 08.
\132\ ``Why Chinese Coal Miners Are Willing to Risk Their Lives,''
CSR Asia (Online), 12 December 07; Deaths in Coal Mine Explosion
[Shanxi yuxian meikuang fasheng meichen baozha 5 ren siwang],
Chinanews.com (Online), 22 May 08;'' Scramble Continues in Coal
Country,'' New York Times (Online), 9 February 08; Leak Kills 29
Chinese Miners,'' BBC Asia (Online), 9 November 07; Mine Blast Death
Toll Rises to 104,'' Reuters (Online), 7 December 07. The second worst
coal mine disaster in the history of contemporary China occurred in
August 2007, when 172 miners drowned underground after the Wenhe River
flooded and poured 12 million cubic meters of water into the Huayuan
coal mine in Shandong province. With 3,786 miners killed in 2007,
according to official figures, China's coal mines are the world's
deadliest--in spite of the fact that mining accident and death rates
have declined over the last five years. In February 2008, nine miners
were killed in a gas explosion at a mine in Shaanxi province. ``China
Mine Blast Kills 9 Amid New Drive for Coal,'' Reuters, 3 February 08.
The accident came three days after President Hu personally visited
mines in a neighboring province and paid tribute to miners who worked
through the Spring Festival in order to maximize coal production
levels. On January 31, 2008, President Hu Jintao visited coal fields in
Datong, Shanxi Province and inspected Qinhuangdao Port, Hebei province,
a major transportation hub for much of Shanxi's coal. According to
Chinese media reports, at the time of President Hu's visit, which
followed major snow storms in many parts of China, ``miners at the
Datangtashan coal mine in Datong had been working overtime in
temperatures of minus 20 degrees Celsius to increase supply.''
According to official reports, ``[President Hu] asked the miners to
produce as much coal as they could safely to provide more fuel for
generating electricity amid a nation-wide shortage. `Disaster-hit areas
need coal and the power plants need coal,' Hu told administrators and
workers of the mine, saying that coal supply had been a crucial part in
fighting the snow disaster. `I pay an early new year call here to those
miners who will not go back home to celebrate the Spring Festival for
the coal production.' '' ``Hu Urges Coal Mines, Ports to Safeguard
Supplies,'' Xinhua (Online), 31 January 08;
\133\ China Labour Bulletin Research Report (Online), ``Bone and
Blood: The Price of Coal in China,'' No. 6, 17 March 08.
\134\ See, for example, ``Enterprises Were Found to Use Child
Workers without Employment Contracts and Workers' Insurance in
Zhaoqing, Guangdong'' [Zhaoqing bufen qiye yong tonggong wu hetong que
baoxian], Xinhua (Online), 6 August 08.
\135\ ILO Convention (No. 138) concerning Minimum Age for Admission
to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labor, 17 June 99.
\136\ PRC Labor Law, art. 15. See also Law on the Protection of
Minors, enacted 4 September 91, art. 28. See generally Provisions on
Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding],
issued 1 October 02.
\137\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor, art. 6. See
also, for example, ``Legal Announcement--Zhejiang Determines Four
Circumstances that Define Use of Child Labor'' [Fazhi bobao: Zhejiang
jieding shiyong tonggong si zhong qingxing], China Woman (Online), 26
July 08.
\138\ This provision was added into the fourth amendment to the
Criminal Law in 2002. Fourth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa xiuzheng
an (si)], issued 28 December 02. See also PRC Criminal Law, art. 244.
\139\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Small Hands: A Survey
Report on Child Labor in China,'' September 07, 3.
\140\ Ibid., 8.
\141\ Ibid., 15, 22, 25-32.
\142\ For more information on this phenomenon, see International
Labour Organization (Online), Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations Worst Forms of Child
Labor Convention, 1999 (No. 182) China (ratification: 2002)
Observation, CEACR 2006/77th Session, 2006.
\143\ See, e.g., ILO Convention (No. 182) concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour, art. 3, defining such labor to include forced or
compulsory labor.
\144\ See, e.g., ``Olympic Firm Admits Child Labor,'' BBC. On the
use of child labor in Africa in the manufacture of Olympic medals for
the Beijing Olympic Summer Games, see, for example, ``Child Labor;
Seeking Social Harmony; Expanding Alliances,'' International Herald
Tribune.
\145\ For the government response to forced labor in brick kilns,
including child labor, see, e.g., Zhang Pinghui, ``Crackdown on Slave
Labor Nationwide--State Council Vows To End Enslavement,'' South China
Morning Post (Online), 21 June 07.
\146\ ``China Urged to End `Child Labor' in Schools,'' Reuters
(Online), 3 December 07; Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: End
Child Labor in State Schools,'' 3 December 07.
\147\ Ibid.
\148\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor, art. 13.
\149\ PRC Education Law, issued 18 March 95, art. 58.
\150\ See generally ``Regulation on Nationwide Temporary Work-Study
Labor for Secondary and Elementary Schools'' [Quanguo zhong xiaoxue
qingongjianxue zanxing gongzuo tiaoli], issued 20 February 83.
\151\ ILO Convention 138 permits vocational education for underage
minors only where it is an ``integral part'' of a course of study or
training course. ILO Convention 182 obligates Member States to
eliminate the ``worst forms of child labor,'' including ``forced or
compulsory labor.'' ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for
Admission to Employment; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour.
\152\ Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,
1999 (No. 182) China (ratification: 2002) Observation, CEACR 2006/77th
Session, International Labour Organization, 2006.
\153\ ``Large Numbers `Kidnapped' from the Mountains into the Pearl
River Delta'' [Zouchu dashan dapi bei `guai' zhusanjiao], Southern
Metropolitan Daily, 28 April 08; ``Police Find Sichuan Children Sold as
Workers,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 1 May 08; ``Investigation
into Child Slavery Launched,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 1 May
08. See also David Barboza, ``Child Labor Rings Reach China's Distant
Villages,'' New York Times (Online), 10 May 08.
\154\ ``Large Numbers ``Kidnapped'' from the Mountains into the
Pearl River Delta,'', Southern Metropolitan Daily; ``Police Find
Sichuan Children Sold as Workers,'' South China Morning Post;
``Investigation into Child Slavery Launched,'' South China Morning Post
(Online).
\155\ Li Aoxue, ``Investigation Confirms Use of Child Labor,''
China Daily (Online), 2 May 08. ``Guangdong Denies Child Slave
Reports,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 7 May 08; ``Dongguan:
Inspection of 3,629 Enterprises Reveals No Child Labor So far''
[Dongguan: Paicha 3,629 jia zhiye zanwei faxian Sichuan Liangzhou
tonggong], Guangzhou Daily, 1 May 08; China Labour Bulletin (Online),
``Authorities Attempt to Play-down Dongguan Child Labor Scandal,'' 2
May 08.
\156\ For a fully hyperlinked compilation of Chinese press stories
on the Shanxi forced labor scandal of 2007 and its aftermath, see China
Labour Bulletin (Online), ``From Shanxi to Dongguan, Slave Labor is
Still in Business,'' 21 May 08. See also, CECC, 2007 Annual Report,
Section on Worker Rights, 56-72.
\157\ ``Commentary: Liu Hongbo: Reappearance of Brick Kiln Official
Is not Necessarily Strange'' [Liu hongbo: heiyao guanyuan fuchu bubi
cheng qiqiao], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 16 April 08;
``Editorial: Brick Kiln Official's Reappearance Uncovers a Scar that
has not Fully Healed'' [She hei zhuanyao guanyuan fuchu, jiekai
shangwei guanyu de shangba], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 16
April 08; ``Female Official Removed After Brick Kiln Incident
Reappears; It Has not yet been Made Public that She Was Appointed as
Assistant District Head for Yaodu County'' [Hei zhuanyao shijian bei
che guanyuan fuchu weijing gongshi ji bei renming yaodu qu quzhang
zhuli], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 15 April 08.
\158\ PRC Criminal Law, art. 244. (``Where an employer, in
violation of the laws and regulations on labor administration, compels
its employees to work by restricting their personal freedom, if the
circumstances are serious, the persons who are directly responsible for
the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more
than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only,
be fined.'')
\159\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 72, citing Ng Tze-wei, ``Lawyers'
Group Calls for Anti-Slavery Law,'' South China Morning Post (Online),
10 July 07.
\160\ ``Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Proposes
Making the Violent Forcing of Someone to Work a Crime in Response to
Brick Kiln Cases'' [Zhengxie weiyuan zhendui hei zhuanyao an tiyi she
baoli qiangpo laodong zui], Procuratorial Daily (Online), 11 March 08;
``Commentary: This Is Slavery, but There Is no Slavery Charge'' [Zhe
shi nuyi, que meiyou nuli zuiming], Southern Metropolitan Daily
(Online) 9 April 08.
\161\ The local government paid victims in Hongdong wages in
arrears and ``sympathy'' money (weiwenjin). China Labour Bulletin,
``From Shanxi to Dongguan, Slave Labor is Still in Business.''
\162\ All China Lawyers Association's Guiding Opinion on the
Handling of Collective Cases [Zhonghua quanguo lushi xiehui guanyu
lushi banli quntixing anjian zhidao yijian], issued 20 March 06. The
Opinion stipulates that, ``after a lawyer agrees to take on a
collective case they must enter into prompt and full communication with
the judicial authorities, and give a factual account of the situation,
highlighting points needing attention.'' The Opinion also stipulates
that ``after accepting a collective case lawyers must promptly explain
the facts through the appropriate channels to the government
organizations involved.''
\163\ ``Official Defends Response to Forced Labor Scandal,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008. China Labour
Bulletin (Online), ``Former Slave Labourers File Civil Suit against
Their Oppressors,'' 11 April 2008.
\164\ CECC Staff Interview.
\165\ Ibid.
\166\ These other rights are ``the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.'' ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, 18 June 98, International Labour Organization (Online), art. 2
[hereinafter ILO Declaration].
\167\ See ``ILO Tripartite Constituents in China,'' International
Labour Organization (Online), viewed September 27, 2007.
\168\ ILO Declaration, art. 2. China has been a member of the ILO
since its founding in 1919. For more information, see the country
profile on China in the ILO database of labor, social security and
human rights legislation (NATLEX) (Online).
\169\ International Labour Organization (Online), ``Ratifications
of the Fundamental Human Rights Conventions by Country,'' 11 September
07.
\170\ International Labour Organization, Committee on Legal Issues
and International Labour Standards (Online), ``Ratification and
Promotion of Fundamental ILO Conventions,'' 300th Session Governing
Body, Geneva, November 2007. Item 20: ``China has not yet ratified
Conventions Nos 29, 87, 98 and 105. In September 2007, the Government
indicated that cooperation with the ILO was continuing regarding the
ratification of Conventions Nos 29 and 105, which would be ratified
when effective implementation was ensured. With regard to Conventions
Nos 87 and 98, the Government indicated that it continued to promote
capacity building for workers' and employers' organizations as well as
collective bargaining. It expressed interest in continued collaboration
with the ILO on these Conventions.''
\171\ See generally PRC Labor Law, art. 12.
\172\ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.
\173\ Declarations and Reservations, United Nations Treaty
Collection (Online), 5 February 02. Article 10 of China's Trade Union
Law establishes the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) as the
``unified national trade union federation,'' and Article 11 mandates
that all unions must be approved by the next higher-level union body,
giving the ACFTU an absolute veto over the establishment of any local
union and the legal authority to block independent labor associations.
PRC Trade Union Law, art. 10, 11.
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
\1\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 73, 74.
\2\ Ibid., 85-87.
\3\ China Internet Network Information Center (Online) [hereinafter
CNNIC], ``CNNIC Releases the 22nd Statistical Report on the Internet
Development in China,'' 31 July 08.
\4\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (Online),
``Nation's Cell Phone Users Breaks 600 Million, Telecommunications
Industry Increases by 25.9%'' [Wo guo yidong dianhua yonghu tupo liuyi
hu dianxin yewu zongliang tongbi zengzhang 25.9%], 23 July 08.
\5\ In June 2007, the number of Internet users in China reached 162
million. CNNIC, ``The 20th CNNIC Statistical Survey Report on the
Internet Development in China,'' July 2007, 9. The change from 162
million to 253 million is a 56 percent increase. In June 2007, the
number of cell phone users in China was 501 million. Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (Online), ``June 2007
Telecommunications Industry Statistics Monthly Report'' [2007 nian 6
yue tongxin hangye tongji yuebao], 25 July 07. The change from 501
million to 601 million is a 20 percent increase.
\6\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 86.
\7\ David Eimer, ``Mobile Dissent,'' South China Morning Post
(Online), 14 May 08; Quentin Sommerville, ``Well-Heeled Protests Hit
Shanghai,'' BBC (Online), 14 January 08.
\8\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Cyber
Activists Detained for `Inciting' Anti-Pollution March in Chengdu,'' 12
May 08; Zhang Dongfeng, ``Shandong Top Secret: Netizen Who Forwarded
Inaccurate Post About Jiaoji Railway Train Collision Is Detained by
Police'' [Shandong gaomi yi wangyou zhuanfa jiaoji tielu huoche
xiangzhuang shishi tiezi bei jingfang juliu], Southern Metropolitan
Daily (Online), 5 May 08.
\9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by General Assembly resolution 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 19 [hereinafter ICCPR]. In March 2008, Premier
Wen Jiabao reiterated China's commitment to ratify the ICCPR, saying
``we are conducting inter-agency coordination to address the issue of
compatibility between China's domestic laws and international law so as
to ratify the Covenant as soon as possible.'' Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (Online), ``Premier Wen Jiabao Answered Questions at Press
Conference,'' 18 March 08.
\10\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48, art. 19
[hereinafter UDHR].
\11\ PRC Constitution, art. 35. Article 51, however, states: ``The
exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their
freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state,
of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and
rights of other citizens.'' PRC Constitution, art. 51.
\12\ ICCPR, art. 19. Article 29 of the UDHR states the following:
``everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined
by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.''
\13\ See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Premier Wen Jiabao
Answered Questions at Press Conference.''
\14\ See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on March 25,
2008,'' 26 March 08.
\15\ Following its 2005 visit to China, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention noted that the vague definition of crimes of
endangering national security, splitting the state, subverting state
power, and supplying state secrets ``leaves their application open to
abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and
assembly.'' It recommended that political crimes ``that leave large
discretion to law enforcement and prosecution authorities such as
`endangering national security,' `subverting State power,' `undermining
the unity of the country,' `supplying of State secrets to individuals
abroad,' etc. should be abolished.'' Manfred Nowak, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Mission to China, 10 March 06, para. 34,
82(s). In a January 2008 report, Chinese Human Rights Defenders studied
41 cases from 2000 to 2007 in which officials used the ``inciting
subversion'' provision of the Criminal Law (Article 105(2)) to punish
Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of expression.
It found that in such cases ``[t]he `evidence' often consists of no
more than the writings of an individual or simply shows that he/she
circulated certain articles containing dissenting views, without any
effort to show that the expression had any potential or real subversive
effect. That is to say, speech in and of itself is interpreted as
constituting incitement of subversion. . . .'' Chinese Human Rights
Defenders (Online), ``Inciting Subversion of State Power: A Legal Tool
for Prosecuting Free Speech in China,'' 8 January 08.
\16\ ``Analysis: PRC--Despite Claims, Limited Transparency Seen at
`Two Sessions,' '' Open Source Center, 26 March 08 (Open Source Center,
26 March 08); ``Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government,''
Xinhua (Online), 19 March 08; ``Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 17th
Party Congress'' [Hu jintao zai dang de shiqi da shang de baogao],
Xinhua (Online), 24 October 07.
\17\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 75; ``China Commits to `Open
Government Information' Effective May 1, 2008,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
\18\ ``Analysis: Limited Transparency Seen at `Two Sessions,' ''
Open Source Center; ``CPC Promises Broader Information Access to Media
During Crucial Congress,'' Xinhua (Online), 14 October 07.
\19\ ``New Measures To Promote Scientific Issuance of Laws,
Democratic Issuance of Laws'' [Tuijin kexue lifa, minzhu lifa de xin
jucuo], Xinhua (Online), 19 April 08.
\20\ PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 7.
\21\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 73.
\22\ Ibid., 75.
\23\ David Bandurski, ``China Newsweekly: Government `Cold' on
`Information Openness,' '' China Media Project (Online), 31 July 08;
Han Yong, ``Open Information: Citizens' `Hot' and the Government's
`Cold' Stand in Stark Contrast'' [Xinxi gongkai: gongmin ``re'' he
zhengfu ``leng'' xingcheng xianming dui bi], China News.com, reprinted
in Xinhua Baoye Net (Online), 22 July 08; Owen Fletcher, ``China's
Transparency Is Just Thin Air,'' Asia Times (Online), 12 September 08.
\24\ Opinions on Several Questions Regarding the People's Republic
of China Regulations on Open Government Information [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli ruogan wenti de yijian], issued
30 April 08, art. 14. This apparent purpose test differs from
international practice. Jamie P. Horsley, ``China Adopts First
Nationwide Open Government Information Regulations,'' Freedominfo.org
(Online), 9 May 07.
\25\ Fletcher, ``China's Transparency Is Just Thin Air.''
\26\ Edward Wong, ``Mayor in China Fired in Milk Scandal,'' 18
September 08.
\27\ Jim Yardley and David Barboza, ``Despite Warnings, China's
Regulators Failed to Stop Tainted Milk,'' New York Times (Online), 26
September 08.
\28\ ``Propaganda Officials Issue 21 Restrictions on Domestic
Coverage of Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), 22 August 08.
\29\ Raymond Li, ``Censorship Hammer Comes Down Over Scandal,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 16 September 08.
\30\ Xin Yu, ``Ling Cangzhou Writes Essay Criticizing Toxic Milk
Powder Scandal and Calling for Press Freedom,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 18 September 08.
\31\ Jonathan Ansfield, ``Even the Propaganda Dept Wants Records
Broken,'' Newsweek (Online), 4 August 08. For an English article from
Xinhua on the day of the incident, see ``Police Station Raided in West
China, Terrorists Suspected,'' Xinhua (Online), 4 August 08.
\32\ Ansfield, ``Even Propaganda Dept Wants Records Broken.''
\33\ See, e.g., Ching-Ching Ni, ``China Saw New Freedoms With TV
Quake Coverage,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 23 May 08.
\34\ Howard W. French, ``Earthquake Opens Gap in Controls on
Media,'' New York Times (Online), 18 May 08; ``China's Earthquake
Coverage More Open But Not Uncensored,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 2.
\35\ Meng Na, Lu Chuanzhong, ``Gov't Transparency in Quake
Relief.''
\36\ ``Speech by Hu Jintao Delivered While Inspecting the Work of
Renmin Ribao'' [Zai renmin ribao she kaocha gongzuo shi de jianghua],
People's Daily (Online), 21 June 08.
\37\ Edward Cody, ``Chinese Muckraking a High-Stakes Gamble,''
Washington Post (Online), 12 November 07.
\38\ ``China Paper Censored for Breach,'' BBC (Online), 25 July 08.
\39\ As noted in the Commission's 2006 Annual Report: ``The Chinese
government imposes a strict licensing scheme on news and information
media that includes oversight by government agencies with discretion to
grant, deny, and rescind licenses based on political and economic
criteria.'' CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 25.
\40\ See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Religious Prisoners and
the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information about Shi's
case.
\41\ See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Religious Prisoners and
the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information about these
cases.
\42\ ``Guo Feixiong Sentenced to Five Years for Illegal Business
Operation,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 5.
\43\ Provisions on the Administration of Book Publishing [Tushu
chuban guanli guiding], issued 21 February 08, arts. 3, 9.
\44\ See, e.g., ``Institutional Structure Has New Breakthrough,
Great Achievement for 2007 `Anti-Pornography, Illegal Material'
Campaign, Noticeable Change in Market Practices'' [Gongzuo jizhi qude
xin tupo yanli chachu yi pi da'an yanan 2007 nian ``shaohuang dafei''
chengxiao xianzhe shichang mingxian gaiguan], Sweep Away Pornography
and Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force (Online), 14 January
08.
\45\ ``Speech by Hu Jintao While Inspecting Renmin Ribao,''
People's Daily.
\46\ All commercial Web sites must obtain a government license.
Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services
[Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00. All non-
commercial Web site operators must register. Registration
Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information
Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an guanli banfa],
issued 28 January 05. Because the MII's registration system gives the
government discretion to reject an application based on content (i.e.,
whether the Web site operator intends to post ``news,'' and if so,
whether it is authorized to do so), it is qualitatively different from
registration which all Web site operators must undertake with a domain
registrar, and constitutes a de facto licensing scheme.
\47\ Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information
Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25
September 05, arts. 5, 11, 12; Provisions on the Administration of
Internet Video and Audio Programming Services [Hulianwang shiting jiemu
fuwu guanli guiding], issued 20 December 07, art. 7.
\48\ Lydia Chen, ``China Disconnects 18,400 Illegal Websites,''
Shanghai Daily (Online), 11 September 07.
\49\ ``Mainland's `China Rights Defense' Shut Down'' [Dalu
``weiquan zhongguo'' zao guanbi], Boxun (Online), 11 May 08.
\50\ ``New Internet Regulations Tighten State Control Over Audio
and Video Content,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
March/April 2008, 3.
\51\ Ibid.
\52\ ``Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following
Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May
2008, 2.
\53\ Ibid.
\54\ Opinion Regarding Strengthening Monitoring of Internet Maps
and Geographic Information Services Web Sites [Guanyu jiaqiang
hulianwang ditu he dili xinxi fuwu wangzhan jianguan de yijian], issued
25 February 08, art. 5.
\55\ ``Problem That Most Online Maps of China Involves Secrets and
Other Problems Are Prominent, Eight Departments Administering''
[Dabufen wangshang zhongguo ditu shemi deng wenti tuchu ba bumen
zhili], People's Daily (Online), 5 May 08.
\56\ OpenNet Initiative (Online), ``Internet Filtering in China in
2004-2005: A Country Study,'' 14 April 05; ``Censorship of Internet and
Foreign News Broadcasts Following Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
\57\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Restrictions on Net Access in China Seem
Relaxed,'' New York Times (Online), 1 August 08; ``Censorship of
Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following Tibetan Protests,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2; OpenNet
Initiative (Online), ``ONI Analysis of Internet Filtering During
Beijing Olympic Games: Week 1,'' 19 August 08. OpenNet Initiative
comprises researchers at the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for
International Studies, University of Toronto, Berkman Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, the Advanced Network Research
Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge, and
the Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University.
\58\ ``The Human Toll of the Olympics,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, August 2008, 2.
\59\ ``China Continues to Crack Down on HIV/AIDS Web Sites and
Activists,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008,
3.
\60\ See, e.g., Provisions on the Administration of Internet News
Information Services, arts. 19, 20, 21; ``Officials Order Hotels To
Step Up Monitoring and Censorship of Internet,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (Online), 1 August 08.
\61\ Reporters Without Borders and China Human Rights Defenders
(Online), Journey to the Heart of Internet Censorship, October 2007;
``Censor's Grip Tightening on Internet in China,'' Reuters (Online), 10
October 08.
\62\ ``PRC Netizens on Major BBS Complain of Censorship,'' Open
Source Center, 20 August 08 (Open Source Center, 20 August 08).
\63\ ``Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following
Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May
2008, 2.
\64\ ``A Number of Search Engine Web Sites Screen `Carrefour' ''
[Duojia wangluo sousuo yinqing pingbi ``jialefu''], Southern
Metropolitan Daily (Online), 30 April 08.
\65\ ``Officials Order Hotels To Step Up Monitoring and Censorship
of Internet,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 1
August 08.
\66\ John Markoff, ``Surveillance of Skype Messages Found in
China,'' New York Times (Online), 2 October 08; Nart Villeneuve,
Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia (Online), Breaching Trust: An
Analysis of Surveillance and Security Practices on China's Tom-Skype
Platform, 1 October 08.
\67\ Marguerite Reardon, ``Skype: We Didn't Know About Security
Issues,'' CNet (Online), 3 October 08.
\68\ Daniel Ren, ``Beijing Censors Financial Websites,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 10 September 08.
\69\ David Bandurski, ``China's Guerrilla War for the Web,'' Far
Eastern Economic Review (Online), July/August 2008.
\70\ Rebecca MacKinnon, ``The Chinese Censorship Foreigners Don't
See,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 14 August 08.
\71\ Loretta Chao, ``News of Protests Is Hard to Find In China--in
Media or Online,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 18 March 08.
\72\ ``Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following
Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May
2008, 2.
\73\ Ibid.
\74\ Ibid. See also, ``China's Propaganda on Tibet a Verbal Blast
from the Past,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 16 April 08;
``Commentary: On Hypocricy of Pelosi's Double Standards,'' Xinhua
(Online), 13 April 08.
\75\ ``China Blocks Foreign Reporters From Covering Tibetan
Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
2-3; Maureen Fan, ``Olympic Chief Vows Free Speech Defense,''
Washington Post (Online), 11 April 08.
\76\ ``Communication Disruptions in Tibetan Areas Impede Flow of
Information,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June
2008, 3.
\77\ Andrew Jacobs, ``A Rescue in China, Uncensored,'' New York
Times (Online), 14 May 08; Tini Tran, ``China Media Unusually
Aggressive in Covering Quake,'' Associated Press (Online), 14 May 08;
Nicholas Zamiska and Juliet Ye, ``Xinhua Goes Beyond Propaganda,'' Wall
Street Journal (Online), 14 May 08.
\78\ French, ``Earthquake Opens Gap in Controls on Media.''
\79\ ``Central Propaganda Departments and Main News Media To Do
Good Reporting on Anti-Earthquake Disaster Relief'' [Zhongyang
xuanchuanbumen he zhuyao xinwen meiti zuohao kangzhen jiuzai baodao],
Xinhua (Online), 14 May 08; ``Kong Yufang Demands News Media to
Conscientiously Perform Reporting on Quake Aftermath and Relief
Efforts'' [Kong yufang yaoqiu xinwen meiti zuohao kangzhen jiuzai
baodao gongzuo], Xinhua (Online), 15 May 08; ``Li Changchun Visits,
Salutes Journalists on Quake Resistance, Disaster Relief'' [Li
changchun kanwang weiwen kangzhen jiuzai xinwen gongzuozhe], Xinhua
(Online), 17 May 08; ``Liu Yunshan's Condolences and Instructions
Regarding News Reporting Work on the Quake Relief Efforts'' [Liu
yunshan guanyu kangzhen jiuzai xinwen baodao gongzuo de weiwen he
zhishi], Sichuan Daily (Online), 15 May 08.
\80\ Geoffrey York, ``Beijing Can't Muzzle Outrage over Deadly
Collapsed Schools,'' Globe and Mail (Online), 16 June 08. Central
officials have noted their concern about local officials denying access
to certain areas and promised foreign reporters to ``resolve it.''
James Areddy, ``China Stifles Parents' Complaints About Collapsed
Schools,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 18 June 08.
\81\ ``Speech by Hu Jintao While Inspecting Renmin Ribao,''
People's Daily.
\82\ Christopher Bodeen, ``China Calls for Stepped-Up Propaganda,''
Associated Press (Online), 23 January 08; ``Hu Jintao's Speech Before
National Propaganda and Ideological Work Meeting of Representatives''
[Hu jintao tong quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi daibiao
zuotan], Xinhua (Online), 22 January 08.
\83\ ``Central Propaganda Department Restricts Reporting on Air
Quality, Food Safety,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
January 2008, 3; ``Propaganda Officials Issue 21 Restrictions,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
\84\ Peter Simpson, ``Screws Tighten on Mainland Journalists,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 12 August 08.
\85\ Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications
Task Force (Online), ``Continue the Spirit of the Rescue Effort, For
the Olympics Create a Wonderful Cultural Environment and Promote
Positive Public Opinion'' [Dali fayang kangzhen jiuzai jingshen wei
Beijing aoyunhui chenggong juban chuangzao lianghao shichang wenhua
huanjing he yulun fenwei], 29 May 08.
\86\ Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture,
para. 34, 82(s).
\87\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 105.
\88\ Minnie Chan, ``Activist Held for Subversion After Accusing
Officials of Graft,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 19 June 08.
\89\ PRC Criminal Law, art. 105.
\90\ ``Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months'
Imprisonment,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/
April 2008, 1.
\91\ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, ``Hu Jia Formally Arrested:
Human Rights in Olympic Spotlight,'' 31 January 08.
\92\ Ibid.
\93\ ``CECC Translation: Hu Jia's Criminal Judgment,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 2.
\94\ ``Land Rights Activist Yang Chunlin Sentenced to Five Years,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008, 1.
\95\ Ibid.
\96\ Ibid.
\97\ ``Zhejiang Court Affirms Lu Gengsong Sentence; CECC
Translation of Decision,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 5.
\98\ Evan Osnos, ``In China, Uncovering Crime Is Also One, As It
Cracks Down on Corruption, Nation also Rounds Up a Writer Who Condemned
the Offense,'' Chicago Tribune (Online), 30 January 08.
\99\ ``Zhejiang Court Affirms Lu Gengsong Sentence; CECC
Translation of Decision,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 5.
\100\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Olympics Crackdown
Continues as Another Activist is Sent to Labor Camp,'' 31 August 08.
\101\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Press Release: Family
Visits Still Denied to Sichuan School Teacher Punished after Quake-Zone
Visit,'' 29 July 08. In September 2008, Human Rights in China reported
that Liu was released on September 24 and allowed to serve his sentence
outside of the labor camp. Human Rights in China (Online), ``Sichuan
Teacher, Liu Shaokun, Was Released To Serve His Reeducation-Through-
Labor Sentence Outside of Labor Camp,'' 26 September 08.
\102\ Jake Hooker, ``Voice Seeking Answers for Parents About a
School Collapse is Silenced,'' New York Times (Online), 11 July 08.
\103\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Human Rights
Defender Huang Qi Formally Charged with Illegally Possessing State
Secrets,'' 18 July 08.
\104\ David Lague, ``China Frees Hong Kong Journalist,'' New York
Times (Online), 6 February 08.
\105\ ``Beijing Court Rejects Ching Cheong's Appeal, Affirms Five-
Year Sentence,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
December 2006, 4-5.
\106\ ``Chengdu Police Punish Those Using Internet To Spread Rumors
About Sichuan Petrochemical Project'' [Chengdu jingfang chufa liyong
Sichuan shihua xiangmu wangshang sanbu yaoyanzhe], Sichuan Daily
(Online), 10 May 08; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Cyber Activists
Detained.''
\107\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 103.
\108\ Pen American Center (Online), ``Chen Daojun Detained as
Crackdown Intensifies in China During Olympic Torch Relay,'' 12 May 08;
Chen Daojun, ``Quickly Together, People of Chengdu Facing Extinction''
[Gankuai qilai, mianlin juezhong de chengde ren], China EWeekly
(Online), 5 May 08.
\109\ Article 25 of the Public Security Administration Punishment
Law provides for detention of five to 10 days for, among other things,
``spreading rumors; making false reports of dangerous conditions,
epidemics, or police situations; or using other means to intentionally
disturb public order.'' PRC Public Security Administration Punishment
Law, enacted 28 August 05, art. 25.
\110\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 76.
\111\ ``Chongqing Police Detain Two for Spreading Rumors About
Earthquake Disaster Conditions'' [Chongqing jingfang juliu liangming
sanbuo dizhenqing yaoyan renyuan], Xinhua (Online), 14 May 08.
\112\ ``Chengdu Police Punish Those Using Internet To Spread Rumors
About Sichuan Petrochemical Project'' [Chengdu jingfang chufa liyong
Sichuan shihua xiangmu wangshang sanbu yaoyanzhe], Sichuan Daily
(Online), 10 May 08; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Cyber Activists
Detained.''
\113\ Zhang Dongfeng, ``Shandong Top Secret.''
\114\ ``Chengdu Police Punish Those Using Internet,'' Sichuan
Daily; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Cyber Activists Detained.''
\115\ Chang Ping, ``When Encountering a Strong Shock, Please Make
Allowances for the Masses' Demand for Information'' [Zaofeng qiangzhen,
qing tiliang minzhong de xinxi keqiu], Southern Metropolitan Daily
(Online), 13 May 08.
\116\ ``Wang Dejia, Shi Weihan Released on Bail,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 5.
\117\ ``Dissident Jailed Ahead of Olympics,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 22 July 08.
\118\ ``Foreign Minister `Freedom of Speech' Comments At Odds With
Arrests, Detentions,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
March/April 2008, 2-3.
\119\ Ibid. In September, Teng and Hu co-wrote a letter titled
``The Real China Before the Olympics,'' which criticized Beijing for
failing to live up to its promise to improve human rights for the
Olympics.
\120\ ``Harassment of Beijing-based Activists During the U.S.-China
Human Rights Dialogue,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 3.
\121\ Ibid.
\122\ Jill Drew and Edward Cody, ``Chinese Lawyers Arrested Before
Meeting with Congressmen,'' Washington Post (Online), 1 July 08.
\123\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on April 1, 2008,'' 2
April 08.
\124\ See, e.g., Measures for the Administration of Internet
Information Services, art. 15.
\125\ Ibid.
\126\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Premier Wen Jiabao Answered
Questions at Press Conference.''
\127\ ``Zhejiang Court Affirms Lu Gengsong Sentence; CECC
Translation of Decision,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 5.
\128\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Spokesperson Qin Gang's Press
Conference on March 25, 2008.''
\129\ ``China Blocks Foreign Reporters From Covering Tibetan
Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
2-3.
\130\ French, ``Earthquake Opens Gap in Controls on Media.''
\131\ Yang Binbin, Zhao Hejuan, Li Zhigang, Chang Hongxiao, Zhang
Yingguang, Chenzhong, Xiaolu, and Zhang Bolin, ``Why Did So Many
Sichuan Schools Collapse? '' Caijing (Online), 17 June 08; York,
``Beijing Can't Muzzle Outrage.''
\132\ Eimer, ``Mobile Dissent''; Sommerville, ``Well-Heeled
Protests Hit Shanghai.''
\133\ Lindsay Beck, ``China Hits Back at Critics of Activists'
Arrest,'' Reuters (Online), 8 January 08; ``Statement on the Criminal
Detention of Hu Jia,'' Boxun (Online), 7 January 08. Also, six
prominent activists and writers spoke candidly of the problems they
faced in a July 6 interview with the Observer. Lijia Zhang, ``China's
New Freedom Fighters,'' Observer (Online), 6 July 08.
\134\ ``Tens of Beijing Rights Lawyers and Scholars Start Online
Discussion on the Freedom of Speech'' [Shushiwei beijing weiquan lushi
ji xuezhe zhaokai wanglu yanlun ziyou taolunhui], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 23 June 08.
\135\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Journalist Calls for Press Freedom on
Release from Jail,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 April 08. (New York
Times researcher calls for greater press freedom upon release from
three-year sentence.)
\136\ ``Editorial: Cold Wind Blows On the Internet, Regulation
Mistakenly Targets Competition'' [Shelun: lengfeng chuixiang wangluo
jianguan mowu jingzheng], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 4
January 08.
\137\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Yang Chunlin
Inciting Subversion of State Power Criminal Defense Pleading'' [Yang
chunlin Shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui bianhu ci], 19 February
08.
\138\ ``Thousands of Chinese Citizens Call for Ratification of
ICCPR Before Olympics,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, February 2008, 3.
\139\ Information in this addendum is drawn from ``China Commits to
`Open Government Information' Effective May 1, 2008,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion
\1\ See discussion infra, as well as, e.g., ``Ye Xiaowen: It Is
Necessary to Firmly Resist Those Outside Our Borders Using Religion to
Carry Out Infiltration'' [Ye Xiaowen: bixu jianjue diyu jingwai liyong
zongjiao jinxing de shentou], Yaoshi Magazine, reprinted in China News
Net (Online), 3 June 08.
\2\ See discussion infra, especially China's Religious
Communities--Catholicism, China's Religious Communities--Islam, and
China's Religious Communities--Protestantism in this section.
\3\ See China's Religious Communities--Protestantism--Harassment,
Detention, and Other Abuses in this section for additional information.
\4\ This section of the Commission's Annual Report primarily uses
the expression ``freedom of religion'' but encompasses within this term
reference to the more broadly articulated freedom of ``thought,
conscience, and religion'' (see, e.g., the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly
resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18).
\5\ For protections in international law, see, e.g., UDHR, art. 18;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted
by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by General Assembly
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January
76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to ``ensure the religious and
moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents'] own
convictions''); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted
and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General Comment No. 22
to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official interpretation of freedom of
religion as articulated in the ICCPR. General Comment No. 22: The Right
to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93,
para. 1. China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to
the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to ratifying,
and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR and
reaffirmed its commitment on April 13, 2006, in its application for
membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China's top leaders have
also stated on other occasions that they are preparing for ratification
of the ICCPR, including in March 18, 2008, press conference remarks by
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in a September 6, 2005, statement by
Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress
on Law, in statements by Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour,
and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before
the French National Assembly.
\6\ See generally Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
U.S. Department of State (Online), International Religious Freedom
Report--2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 19
September 08. According to the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom, a ``zone of toleration'' exists within China for
registered religious communities acting within the parameters set by
the government. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,
``Policy Focus: China,'' 9 November 05, 4.
\7\ As discussed infra, the Chinese government recognizes only
Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism for limited
state protections.
\8\ See State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online),
``Presiding Over Political Bureau's Second Collective Study, Hu Jintao
Stresses Doing Religious Work Well'' [Hu Jintao zhuchi zhengzhiju di er
ci jiti xuexi qiangdiao zuohao zongjiao gongzuo], 20 December 07;
``Politburo Study Session Calls for Uniting Religious Communities
Around Party,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 3.
\9\ Wen Ping, ``How Was the Problem Between Religion and Socialism
Cracked--Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs Administration
Director Ye Xiaowen,'' Southern Weekend (Online), 13 March 08 (Open
Source Center, 10 April 08). For more information on Ye's remarks, see
``Government Official Reaffirms State Controls Over Religion,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 3.
\10\ For a general overview of China's legislative framework for
religion, see the CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 93 and
accompanying footnotes.
\11\ Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04.
\12\ Lack of transparency in the legislative process and lags in
reporting time make it difficult to determine with precision and
timeliness when new legislation is adopted. (For example, the Web site
of the State Administration for Religious Affairs links to only one
2005 provincial-level regulation on religion under the category of
``regional laws and regulations,'' thus providing no information on
recent legislative activity in the area of religion.) Based on ongoing
searches of legislation on the Beijing University Legal Information Net
Web site (Beida falu xinxi wang, www.chinalawinfo.com) and on central
and local government religious affairs bureau Web sites and other
Internet sites, the Commission did not find information on the passage
of new central government legislation on religion. Although some
provincial-level governments reported passing legislation on specific
aspects of the management of religious affairs, as of August 2008, the
Commission did not locate any provinces that had issued a new
comprehensive regulation on religious affairs [zongjiao shiwu tiaoli]
in the past reporting year. The Commission found only one province that
had amended an older regulation. Shaanxi Province Regulation on
Religious Affairs [Shanxisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], adopted 23
September 00, amended 30 July 08. During the period covered by the 2007
CECC Annual Report, Jiangxi province issued a regulation on religious
affairs, but this information was not included in the 2007 CECC Annual
Report. Jiangxi Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Jiangxisheng
zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 29 March 07. For more information on
recently issued regulations, see the box, inset, ``Timeline: Regulation
of Religion.''
\13\ Shuai Feng and Li Jian, Interpretation of the Regulation on
Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli shiyi], (Beijing: Beijing
Religious Culture Press, 2005).
\14\ Full citations are as follows. Measures on the Examination,
Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity [Zongjiao
huodong changsuo sheli shenpi he dengji banfa], issued 21 April 05;
Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in
Tibetan Buddhism [Cangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued
18 July 07; Measures on Establishing Religious Schools [Zongjiao
yuanxiao sheli banfa], issued 1 August 07; Measures for Putting on File
the Main Religious Personnel of Venues for Religious Activities
[Zongjiao huodong changsuo zhuyao jiaozhi renzhi bei'an banfa], issued
29 December 06; Measures for Putting on File Religious Personnel
[Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei'an banfa], issued 29 December 06;
Measures Regarding Chinese Muslims Signing Up To Go Abroad on
Pilgrimages (Trial Measures) [Zhongguo musilin chuguo chaojin baoming
paidui banfa (shixing)], undated (estimated date 2006), available on
the State Administration for Religious Affairs Web site.
\15\ Full citations are as follows. Shanghai Municipality
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Shanghaishi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
adopted 30 November 95, amended 21 April 05; Henan Province Regulation
on Religious Affairs [Henansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July
05; Shanxi Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Shanxisheng
zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 29 July 05; Zhejiang Province Regulation
on Religious Affairs [Zhejiangsheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 6
December 97, amended 29 March 06; Anhui Province Regulation on
Religious Affairs [Anhuisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 15 October
99, amended 29 June 06 and 28 February 07; Beijing Municipality
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Beijingshi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 18 July 02, amended 28 July 06; Chongqing Municipality
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Chongqingshi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 29 September 06; Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs
[Hunansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 September 06; Liaoning
Province People's Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the
Liaoning Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Liaoningsheng renmin
daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ``Liaoningsheng zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli'' de jueding], issued on 28 November 98 as the Liaoning
Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs, amended and
name changed on 1 December 06; Sichuan Province Regulation on Religious
Affairs [Sichuansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued on 9 May 00 as the
Sichuan Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs,
amended and name changed on 30 November 06; Tibet Autonomous Region
Implementing Measures for the ``Regulation on Religious Affairs''
(Trial Measures) [Zizang zizhiqu shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa
(shixing)], issued 19 September 06; Hebei Province Regulation on
Religious Affairs [Hebeisheng xongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 18 July
03, amended 14 January 07; Jiangxi Province Regulation on Religious
Affairs [Jiangxisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 29 March 07;
Shaanxi Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Shanxi zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 23 September 00, amended 30 July 08.
\16\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``MFA Spokesperson Liu
Jianchao Answers Reporters Questions'' [Waijiaobu fayanren liu jianchao
huida jizhe tiwen], 16 March 05.
\17\ See, e.g., Fujian Province Implementing Measures on the Law on
the Protection of Minors [Fujiansheng shishi ``Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo weichengnianren baohufa'' banfa], issued 21 November 94,
amended 25 October 97, art. 33; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR)
Implementing Measures on the Management of Venues for Religious
Activity [Neimenggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi
banfa], issued 23 January 96, art. 13. While the national regulation
addressed in the IMAR measures was annulled in 2005, the IMAR measures
appear to remain in force.
\18\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, International Religious Freedom Report--2006, China (includes
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September 06.
\19\ Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, International Religious
Freedom Report--2008, China. See China's Religious Communities--Islam
within this subsection for information on restrictions in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.
\20\ For more information, see ``Prior Restraints on Religious
Publishing in China,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), last visited 8 October 08.
\21\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report--2008, China.
\22\ ``Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against Political
and Religious Publications,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, February 2008, 4.
\23\ Sui Xiaofei and Qu Zhihong, ``China's Publishing Sector's
Glorious Development Must Move From Being a Great Country to a Powerful
Country'' [Woguo chubanye fanrong fazhan yao cong chuban daguo zouxiang
qiangguo], People's Daily (Online), 25 March 06.
\24\ ``Tibet `Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal
Publications' Campaign Has Clear Results'' [Xizang ``saohuang dafei''
gongzuo chengxiao xianzhu], Xinhua (Online), 18 January 06.
\25\ ``Over 70,000 Illegal Publications `Smashed to Dust' '' [7 wan
duo ce feifa chubanwu ``fenshensuigu''], Xinjiang Legal Daily (Online),
6 August 07.
\26\ The central government has referred to the five religions as
China's main religions, but in practice the state has created a
regulatory system that institutionalizes only these five religions for
recognition and legal protection. See, e.g., State Council Information
Office, White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China [Zhongguo
de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], 1 October 97 (stating that the
religions citizens ``mainly'' follow are Buddhism, Daoism, Islam,
Catholicism, and Protestantism). Wording from this White Paper is
posted as a statement of current policy on the Web sites of the United
Front Work Department, the agency that oversees religious affairs
within the Communist Party, and the State Administration for Religious
Affairs. Some local regulations on religious affairs define religion in
China to mean only these five categories. See, e.g., Guangdong Province
Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs [Guangdongsheng
zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], adopted 26 May 00, art. 3, and Henan
Province Regulation on Religious Affairs, art. 2. There is some limited
formal tolerance outside this framework for some ethnic minority and
``folk'' religious practices. See text infra and see also Kim-Kwong
Chan and Eric R. Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: Policy,
Administration, and Regulation (Santa Barbara: Institute for the Study
of American Religion, 2005), 9-10, 15-16.
\27\ For more information, see ``Head of Religious Association:
Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (Online), 26 June 06.
\28\ See discussion infra and, e.g., U.S. Department of State,
International Religious Freedom Report--2008, China.
\29\ See, e.g., Ningdu County People's Government (Online),
``Proposal Regarding Curbing the Illegal Construction of Temples''
[Guanyu dali zhizhi feifa luan jian simiao de ti'an], 24 March 08;
Shanghai Baoshan Ethnic and Religious Affairs Office (Online),
``Dachang Demolishes Illegal Small Temple According to Law'' [Dachang
zhen yifa chaichu yichu feifa xiao miao], 1 September 06; Beilun
District People's Government Xiaogang Neighborhood Committee Office
(Online), ``Investigative Report on the Situation of Unregistered Small
Temples and Convents'' [Weijing zhengfu dengji de xiao miao xiao an
qingkuang de diaoyan baogao], 12 September 06. Yixing United Front Work
Department (Online), ``Some Reflections on Rural Religious Work in a
New Period'' [Xin shiqi nogcun zongjiao gongzuo de jidian sikao], 13
June 05.
\30\ Wen Ping, ``How Was the Problem Between Religion and Socialism
Cracked--Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs Administration
Director Ye Xiaowen.'' For additional information on this interview,
see ``Government Official Reaffirms State Controls Over Religion,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\31\ Ningbo City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau (Online),
``Yinzhou District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Implements
Rectification and Reform Toward Two Venues for Religious Activities''
[Yinzhouqu minzongju dui liang chu zongjiao huodong changsuo shixing
xianqi zhenggai], 26 November 07.
\32\ Minhou County People's Government (Online), ``Ethnicity and
Religious Work'' [Minzu yu zongjiao gongzuo], 17 September 07.
\33\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Case Update: Buddhist Monk
Shengguan Prevented From Attending Human Rights Conference,'' 10
December 07; ``Jiangxi Buddhist Master Accused of Being a Womanizer and
Driven out of Temple,'' Sing Tao Jih Pao, 25 August 06 (Open Source
Center, 27 August 06).
\34\ See Section V--Tibet, for more information on Tibetan
Buddhism, including detailed citations.
\35\ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 49.
\36\ Cardinal Kung Foundation (Online), ``Prisoners of Religious
Conscience for the Underground Roman Catholic Church in China,'' 9 July
08. For numbers of unregistered bishops, see U.S. Department of State
(Online), International Religious Freedom Report--2008, China.
\37\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information.
\38\ ``Restrictions Placed On `Underground' Priests As Olympics
Loom,'' Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 7 August 08; ``Catholics
Attend Mass Despite Warnings, Priests Taken To Guesthouses,'' Union of
Catholic Asian News (Online), 20 August 08.
\39\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information.
\40\ Ibid.
\41\ May is the period during which Catholics observe Marian month,
and in 2007, in an open letter to Catholics in China, Pope Benedict XVI
mentioned the significance of the Sheshan Shrine to the occasion. In
addition, he called for May 24 to serve as a day for Catholics
throughout the world ``to be united in prayer'' with Catholics in
China. ``Authorities Take Measures to Prevent Pilgrimage to Catholic
Shrine,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 4.
\42\ Zhang Yiming, ``Pope's Prayer for Church in China Banned in
Some Dioceses,'' AsiaNews (Online), 31 May 08; Wang Zhicheng, ``Even in
Persecution We Pray to Our Lady of Sheshan,'' AsiaNews (Online), 24 May
08.
\43\ For background, see ``China's Marian Shrines,'' AsiaNews
(Online), 27 May 04.
\44\ ``Shanghai's Byzantine Church Reopens, Attracts Catholics And
Others,'' Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 24 June 08;
``Catholics Beaten, Threatened Over Disputed Church Property,'' Union
of Catholic Asian News (Online), 11 July 08.
\45\ See CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 96-97, for information on
coercion to participate in bishop appointments in previous years.
\46\ ``Bishop Ordinations in 2007 Return to Holy See Involvement,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3.
\47\ ``Guangxi: Stop the Pope's Letter, Even by Brain Washing,''
AsiaNews (Online), 9 October 07. For more information on the letter,
see the CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 97.
\48\ ``Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops,
Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in
the People's Republic of China,'' Vatican Web site, 27 May 07. Though
dated May 27, the Holy See released the letter on June 30. ``More on
Pope's Letter to China Over Religious Freedom, Appointment of
Bishops,'' Agence France-Presse, 30 June 07 (Open Source Center, 30
June 07).
\49\ For more information on the visit of Chinese musicians to
Vatican City and attendance by Chinese officials, see ``Pope Praises
Chinese Artists For Historic Musical Performance,'' Union of Catholic
Asian News (Online), 8 May 08. For Chinese reporting on the
performance, see, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
(Online), ``Great Success for China Philharmonic Performance in Vatican
City'' [Zhongguo aiyue yuetuan fandigangcheng yanchu qude chenggong],
12 May 08.
\50\ Mike O'Sullivan, ``Divided Chinese Catholic Church Looks for
Reconciliation,'' Voice of America (Online), 23 August 08.
\51\ ``Three Chinese Bishops To Attend October Synod On Bible, No
Mainlanders Named,'' Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 12
September 08; ``Catholic Patriotic Association Leaders Deny Bishops
Permission to Attend Synod in Rome,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, October 05, 7.
\52\ In 2006, authorities detained two leaders of the unregistered
Wenzhou diocese, Peter Shao Zhumin and Paul Jiang Surang, after they
returned from a pilgrimage to Rome. Six months after their detention,
Shao and Jiang received prison sentences of 9 and 11 months,
respectively, after authorities accused them of falsifying their
passports and charged them with illegally exiting the country. ``Two
Priests Detained in Wenzhou After Arrest on Return from Europe,'' Union
of Catholic Asian News, 3 October 06; ` ``Underground' Chinese Catholic
Priests Charged, Likely To Face Trial,'' Union of Catholic Asian News
(Online), 26 October 06; ``Two Underground Priests from Wenzhou Soon To
Be Freed,'' AsiaNews, 17 May 07; ``Two Underground Priests, Arrested
After Pilgrimage, Sentenced Six Months After Arrest,'' Union of
Catholic Asian News (Online), 16 May 07. Authorities released Shao from
prison in May 2007 to obtain medical treatment. ``Jailed Wenzhou Priest
Released Provisionally for Medical Treatment,'' Union of Catholic Asian
News, 30 May 07. Authorities released Jiang in August. ``Second Of Two
Jailed Wenzhou Priests Released, Diagnosed With Heart Conditions,''
Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 29 August 07. See the CECC
Political Prisoner Database for more information. Jiang Surang is also
known by the name Jiang Sunian.
\53\ See, e.g., Ningdu County People's Government, ``Proposal
Regarding Curbing the Illegal Construction of Temples''; Shanghai
Baoshan Ethnic and Religious Affairs Office, ``Dachang Demolishes
Illegal Small Temple According to Law''; Beilun District People's
Government Xiaogang Neighborhood Committee Office, ``Investigative
Report on the Situation of Unregistered Small Temples and Convents'';
Yixing United Front Work Department, ``Some Reflections on Rural
Religious Work in a New Period.''
\54\ Jiangxi Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau (Online),
``Xinjian County Daoist Association Holds Third-Term Training Class for
Religious Personnel'' [Xinjianxian daojiao xiehui juban di san qi
jiaozhi renyuan peixunban], 21 March 08. Chengdu Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Bureau (Online), ``Comrade Zhao Lu Lectures on the Party's
Basic Policy on Religious Work for Our City's Daoist Circles'' [Zhao lu
tongzhi wei wo shi daojiao jie jiangshou dang de zongjiao gongzuo jiben
fangzhen], 10 April 08. On control over internal doctrine, see
generally ``Government Official Reaffirms State Controls Over
Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update; ``SARA
Director Calls for Continued Controls on Religion,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 8.
\55\ Measures for Confirming Daoist Personnel [Daojiao jiaozhi
renyuan rending banfa], issued 4 March 08, art. 3(1), 11(2), (3).
\56\ State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ``Chinese
Daoist Circles Firmly Oppose the Evil Act of Waving the Banner of
Religion to Try to Split Motherland'' [Zhongguo daojiao jie jianjue
fandui da zongjiao qihao fenlie zuguo de zui'e xingjing], 8 April 08.
\57\ In addition to the provincial regulation passed in Hunan,
discussed infra, lower-level governments also reported passing
legislation on folk beliefs or issuing guidance on the regulation of
folk beliefs. See, e.g., Hebei Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Department (Online), ``Xingtai City, Pingxiang County Puts Forth Our
Province's First `Provisional Measures on the Management of Folk Belief
Affairs' '' [Xingtaishi piangxiangxian qutai wo sheng shoubu ``Minjian
xinyang shiwu guanli zanxing banfa''], 16 October 07; Ningbo City
Ethnicity and Religious Affairs Bureau (Online), ``Yinzhou District
Standardizes Management of Venues for Folk Belief Activities''
[Yinzhouqu guifan minjian xinyang huodong changsuo guanli], 22 January
08. Authorities in Pingxiang county cited concerns about
``instability,'' inadequate management, and ``hidden dangers'' as
reasons for establishing the first legal measures in the province on
the management of folk beliefs, even as they also cited ``protecting
citizens' freedom of religious belief'' as another motivation for the
legislation.
\58\ ``Hunan Authorities Issue New Legal Measures To Regulate Folk
Belief Venues,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online),
14 December 07.
\59\ The Chinese term used is minjian xinyang huodong. For
additional information on these legal measures, see ``Hunan Authorities
Issue New Legal Measures To Regulate Folk Belief Venues,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
\60\ The government describes religious extremism as one of the
``three forces'' against which it has launched a ``strike-hard''
campaign. The other forces are separatism and terrorism. Local
government reported maintaining surveillance of religious practice
through a ``two-point system,'' which has been in force in recent years
and is described by local government sources as a mechanism for
maintaining regular contact with mosques and carrying out ``chats''
with religious figures. For a basic description of the two-point
system, see Aqsu Party Building (Online), ``32nd Installment'' [Di 32
qi], 18 January 05; Onsu Party Building, ``United Front Embraces the 2
Systems, Perfects the 3 Kinds of Mechanisms'' [Tongzhanbu weirao liang
xiang zhidu gaishan sanzhong jizhi], 5 April 06. For reports from the
past year on the two-point system and other measures to control
religious practice in the region, including via increased controls over
mosques and religious leaders, see, e.g., Kashgar District Government
(Online), ``Yengisar County Speech on Its Current Stance''
[Yingjishaxian biaotai fayan], 5 January 08; Qumul District Government
(Online), ``Gulshat Abduhadir Stresses at District Education Work
Meeting, Enlarge Investments for Optimal Environment'' [Gulixiati
Abudouhade'er zai diqu jiaoyu gongzuo huiyishang qiangdiao jiada touru
youhua huanjing], 9 March 08; Yeken [Yarkand] County Government
(Online), ``Yeken County Almaty Village Implements `8 Acts' To
Establish Safe and Sound Village'' [Shachexian alamaitixiang shishi
``baxiang jucuo'' chuangjian pingan xiangzhen], 16 October 07; Kashgar
District Government (Online), ``Let Society Be Stable and Harmonious,
For the People To Be Without Fear--Work Report on Poskam County
Striving to Establish a Region-Level Quiet and Stable County'' [Rang
shehui wending hexie wei baixing anjuleye--zepuxian zheng chuang
zizhiquji ping'an xian gongzuo jishi], 3 December 07; ``Crackdown on
Xinjiang Mosques, Religion,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08;
``Mongghulkure County `Protect Olympics, Protect Stability' Supervision
Group Reports Work to Ili Prefecture'' [Zhaosuxian shang yili zhou
``bao ao yun cu wending'' dudao xiaozu huibao gongzuo], Ili Peace Net
(Online), 16 July 08; Monghulkure County Promptly Arranges
Implementation of Spirit of Ili 7.13 Stability Meeting [Zhaosuxian
xunsu anpai luoshi yilizhou ``7.13'' wending huiyi jingshen], Ili Peace
Net (Online), 16 July 08; Kashgar District Government, ``Usher in the
Olympics and Ensure Stability; Jiashi People Are of One Heart and
Mind,'' 8 August 08 (Open Source Center, 8 August 08).
\61\ ``Nur Bekri's Speech at Autonomous Region Cadre Plenary
Session'' [Nu'er Baikeli zai zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang de jianghua],
Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08.
\62\ ``Uyghur Mosque Demolished,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 23
June 08; Jume, ``Mosque in Kelpin County Destroyed by the Government''
[Kelpin nahiyisi tewesidiki bir meschit hokumet teripidin
cheqiwetildi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 June 08. In response to a
question about the demolition, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesperson described the mosque as part of two ``unlawfully built
structures'' used ``without authorization'' for religious activity and
said that local residents tore down the structures on their own after
learning their construction violated Chinese law. Lin Liping and Rong
Yan, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says the Report Alleging the
`Demolition of a Mosque in Xinjiang' Grossly Untrue,'' Xinhua, 8 July
08 (Open Source Center, 8 July 08). See also ``AFP Reporters Barred
From China Village Where Mosque Was Razed,'' Agence France-Presse, 30
July 08 (Open Source Center, 30 July 08).
\63\ For examples of reported measures, see, e.g., ``Religious
Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3; Shayar County
Government (Online), ``Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang
Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During Ramadan''
[Shayaxian yingmaili zhen caiqu jiu xiang cuoshijiaqiang ``zhaiyue''
qijian guanli], 28 August 08; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County
Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security'' [Zhaosuxian wu cuoshi
tiqian zuohao zhaiyue guanli bao ao yun wending], Fazhi Xinjiang
(Online), 23 August 08; ``Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard
Stability During Ramadan'' [Xinhexian bushu zhaiyue qijian weiwen
gongzuo], Xinjiang Peace Net (Online), 2 September 08; Yopurgha County
Government (Online), ``Our County Carries Out Plans for Work on
Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan'' [Wo qu dui zhaiyue
qijian zongjiao shiwu guanli gongzuo jinxing anpai], 1 September 08;
Kuytun City Government (Online), ``Kuytun City Convenes Meeting on Work
to Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During
Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day'' [Kuitunshi zhaokai wei wen
gongzuo huiyi dui can'aohui, zhaiyue he guoqingjie qijian anquan
gongzuo jinxing anpai], 3 September 08; ``Ramadan Curbs on China's
Muslims,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 September 08.
\64\ ``Xinjiang Uyghurs Committed to Ramadan Are Detained, Retired
Han Official Criticizes Corruption'' [Xinjiang weizuren jianchi
fengzhai beiju hanren tuixiu guan pi zhengfu tanfu], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 16 September 08.
\65\ See generally Shayar County Government, ``Town of Yengi
Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen
Management During Ramadan''; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County
Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security,'' Fazhi Xinjiang;
``Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard Stability During Ramadan,''
Xinjiang Peace Net; Yopurgha County Government, ``Our County Carries
Out Plans for Work on Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan'';
Kuytun City Government, ``Kuytun City Convenes Meeting on Work to
Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During
Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day''; ``Ramadan Curbs on China's
Muslims,'' Radio Free Asia.
\66\ Shayar County Government, ``Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar
County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During
Ramadan''; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County Ensure Ramadan
Management and Olympics Security,'' Fazhi Xinjiang; ``Ramadan Curbs on
China's Muslims,'' Radio Free Asia; Weli, ``Chinese Government Now
Forcing Women in Xoten to Expose Their Faces'' [Xitay hokumiti hazir
xotende ayallarni yuzini echiwetishqa mejburlimaqta], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 27 August 08.
\67\ ``Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain
Protesters,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
3.
\68\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures of the
Law on the Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shishi
``Weichengnianren baohufa'' banfa], issued 25 September 93, art. 14. No
other provincial or national regulation on minors or on religion
contains this precise provision. Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in
China (Online), ``Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in
Xinjiang,'' April 2005, 58 (pagination follows ``text-only'' pdf
download of this report).
\69\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``A Life or Death
Struggle in East Turkestan; Uyghurs Face Unprecedented Persecution in
post-Olympic Period,'' 4 September 08, 4.
\70\ See, e.g., Shayar County Government, ``Town of Yengi Mehelle
in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management
During Ramadan''; Yopurgha County Government, ``Our County Carries Out
Plans for Work on Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan'';
Kuytun City Government, ``Kuytun City Convenes Meeting on Work to
Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During
Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day''; Kashgar District Government
(Online), ``Maralbeshi Launches Activities for Developing and
Cultivating National Spirit in Elementary and Secondary Schools Month''
[Bachu kaizhan zhongxiaoxue hongyang he peiyu minzu jingshen yue
huodong], 26 September 08; ``Qorghas County Langan Village `Attaches
Importance, Propagates, Arranges, Examines, Protects, Strikes, and
Prevents' to Do Various Work Regarding Muslim Population During
Ramadan'' [Huochengxian langan xiang ``zhong, xuan, pai, cha, bao, yan,
fang'' zuo hao musilin qunzhong zhaiyue qijian ge xiang gongzuo],
Qorghas Peace Net (Online), 27 August 08; ``Religious Repression in
Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, January 2008, 3; ``Ramadan Curbs on China's Muslims,''
Radio Free Asia.
\71\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Government Continues Restrictions on
Mosque Attendance,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
March 2006, 8; U.S. Department of State, International Religious
Freedom Report--2008, China.
\72\ See, e.g., Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government
(Online), ``Nur Bekri's Work Report at First Session of the 11th
Xinjiang Autonomous Regional People's Congress'' [Zai zizhiqu shiyi jie
renda yi ci huiyi shang nu'er baikeli suo zuo zhengfu gongzuo bao], 16
January 08; Yeken County Government, ``Yeken County Almaty Village
Implements `8 Acts' To Establish Safe and Sound Village.'' For
information on the 2007 passport restrictions, see the CECC, 2007
Annual Report, 10 October 07, 99.
\73\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report--2008, China.
\74\ ``China Jails Clerics for Planning Mecca Trips, Group Says,''
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), reprinted in Taipei Times (Online), 25
June 08. According to the DPA article, authorities also reportedly
punished the group for distributing copies of the Quran at a criminal
sentencing rally.
\75\ For more information on recent controls, see CECC 2007 Annual
Report, 99.
\76\ ``Record Number of Chinese Muslims To Make Mecca Pilgrimage,''
Xinhua, 14 November 07 (Open Source Center, 14 November 07).
\77\ Islamic Association of China, ed., Practical Pilgrimage
Handbook for Chinese Muslims [Zhongguo musilin chaojin shiyong shouce],
(Ningxia People's Publishing Company), 121.
\78\ Ibid., 106-107.
\79\ For more information on recent controls imposed on Muslim
communities across China, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September
06, 89-91, and CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 98-100.
\80\ Wen Ping, ``How Was the Problem Between Religion and Socialism
Cracked--Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs Administration
Director Ye Xiaowen.''
\81\ United Front Work Department (Online), ``Ningxia's `2008
First-Term Study Class for Muslim Personnel' Opens'' [Ningxia ``2008
nian di yi qi yisilanjiao jiaozhi renyuan dushuban'' kaixue], 14 March
08.
\82\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report--2008, China.
\83\ China Aid Association (CAA) (Online), ``Annual Report of
Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches within
Mainland China,'' February 2008, 2-3, 21, 22 (noting detentions of
roughly 100 people in each of these areas except Shandong, where the
recorded number was 334). The CAA report provides a synthesis of
reported cases annually involving harassment of Protestants and
closures of house churches. For an example of reporting from a local
government on measures against Protestants, see, e.g., Minhou County
People's Government (Online), ``Ethnicity and Religious Work.''
\84\ For a case from the last year of house church members accused
of cult involvement, see China Aid Association (Online), ``Henan
Christian Brother Bai Cheng and his Coworker Sister Zhang Yu
Released,'' 7 March 08.
\85\ China Aid Association, ``Annual Report of Persecution by the
Government on Christian House Churches within Mainland China,'' 3. For
additional information on treatment toward Protestant groups deemed
cults, see U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report--2008, China. For more information on general government policy
toward cults, see Section II--Freedom of Religion--Falun Gong.
\86\ See, e.g., China Aid Association, ``Annual Report of
Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches within
Mainland China,'' 7, 15.
\87\ See, e.g., China Aid Association, ``Annual Report of
Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches within
Mainland China,'' 9-13, 15; China Aid Association (Online), ``Shandong
House Church Raided, Hymnals and Cross Confiscated,'' 1 October 08;
U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report--2008,
China.
\88\ China Aid Association (Online), ``House Church Members Beaten
After Demanding Officials to Account for the Burning of Bibles,'' 30
January 08.
\89\ Christian Solidarity Worldwide and China Aid Association
(Online), ``China: Persecution of Protestant Christians in the Approach
to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,'' June 2008, 3, 4, 6.
\90\ China Aid Association (Online), ``Beijing House Churches
Forced to Sign Document Pledging Not to Meet During the Olympic
Games,'' 13 August 08.
\91\ China Aid Association (Online), ``Pastor Bike Mingxuan and
Wife Released from Detention but Prohibited From Returning to
Beijing,'' 29 August 08. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for
more information on Zhang, as well as discussions of his case in
Freedom to Interact with Foreign Co-Religionists and Foreign Visitors,
in this section, and Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and
Defendants, Section II--Olympics, and Section III--Civil Society.
\92\ For example, in 2006, fewer than one-sixth of reported
detentions exceeded 10 days. China Aid Association (Online), ``Annual
Report on Persecution of Chinese House Churches by Province from
January 2006 to December 2006,'' January 2007, 19.
\93\ In 2007, overseas observers recorded 16 cases of people given
criminal sentences or sentences to RTL, compared to 17 cases noted in
2006. China Aid Association (Online), ``Annual Report of Persecution by
the Government on Christian House Churches within Mainland China,'' 22.
\94\ China Aid Association (Online), ``Senior House Church Leader
Issued Open Letter to Chinese Communist Party Leader for Religious
Freedom; Shandong House Church Christians Won Legal Battle Against PSB
After Being Raided,'' 28 November 07. For more information on
challenges to government abuses, see, e.g., China Aid Association
(Online), ``4 House Church Leaders Released from Labor Camp in Hubei
Province after Unprecedented Legal Victory; Three Female Leaders Still
Held,'' 18 January 08. For more information see also the CECC, 2007
Annual Report, 10 October 07, 102.
\95\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Chengdu House Church Files
First Suit in China Against Government Religious Authority,'' 18
September 08.
\96\ ``Turn of Events in Suit Lodged Against Chengdu Religious
Affairs Bureau by Autumn Rain Blessings Church'' [Qiuyu zhi fu jiaohui
qisu chengdu shi zongjiaoju yi an chuxian zhuanzhexing bianhua], Radio
Free Asia (Online), 2 October 08.
\97\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Authorities Target Christian-Owned
Businesses for Closure,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), 16 November 07. China Aid Association (Online), ``Annual
Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches
within Mainland China,'' 3-4; China Aid Association (Online),
``Business License of Australia Company in China Revoked; Three Chinese
Employee [sic] Arrested; Company Founders Issued Urgent Open Letter to
the Chinese President,'' 21 November 07. For information on cases of
Chinese citizens targeted for their connection to foreign groups, see
also the box titled Religious Prisoners, and see the CECC 2007 Annual
Report, 94-95, for information on similar trends in early and mid-2007.
\98\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Target Christian-Owned Businesses for
Closure,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China; Michael
Bristow, ``China Tightens Grip Ahead of Congress,'' BBC (Online), 14
September 07. Kristine Kwok, ``Olympic Missionaries Warned To Follow
Rules,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 29 May 07.
\99\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``In Hiding, Beijing House
Church Activist Hua Huiqi Appeals for Help,'' 11 August 08; China Aid
Association (Online), ``Eviction of Christian Rights Activist Hua Huiqi
and Family/Behind the Scenes Surprises During U.S. Congressional
Delegation Visit in Beijing,'' 2 July 08.
\100\ China Aid Association, ``Eviction of Christian Rights
Activist Hua Huiqi and Family/Behind the Scenes Surprises During U.S.
Congressional Delegation Visit in Beijing.''
\101\ Ibid.; Kristine Kwok, ``Police Force Pastor To Leave
Beijing,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 20 July 08; China Aid
Association (Online), ``Pastor Zhang Mingxuan Given Permission to
Conduct House Church Services,'' 1 October 08; China Aid Association
(Online), ``Son of Pastor Bike Zhang in Critical Condition After Severe
Beating From PSB Officials,'' 16 October 08; China Aid Association
(Online), ``Zhang Mingxuan and Son Jian's Conditions Updated,'' 22
October 08. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more
information.
\102\ ``Harassment of Beijing-based Activists During the U.S.-China
Human Rights Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), 8 July 08.
\103\ See CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 93 for more information.
\104\ Wen Ping, ``How Was the Problem Between Religion and
Socialism Cracked--Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs
Administration Director Ye Xiaowen.'' For more information on Ye's
remarks, see ``Government Official Reaffirms State Controls Over
Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\105\ ``Cao Shengjie: Independent Development for Chinese Religions
Not To Change'' [Cao Shengjie: Zhongguo zongjiao jianchi dulizizhu
fazhan buhui gaibian], Xinhua (Online), 14 October 07. See also
``Xinjiang Authorities Target Christian-Owned Businesses for Closure,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
\106\ Only Chinese religious personnel affiliated with recognized
registered religious communities may attend such services upon
invitation to do so. Provisions on the Management of the Religious
Activities of Foreigners within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding], issued 31 January
94, art. 4; Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on the
Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners within the PRC
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli
guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00, arts. 7, 17(5).
\107\ The members met at a facility used by foreign members of the
church, but at a different time from the foreign church members. U.S.
Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report--2006,
China.
\108\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report--2008, China; Heilongjiang Regulation on the Management of
Religious Affairs [Heilongjiangsheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli],
issued 12 June 97, art. 2; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious
Activity [Nei menggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi
banfa], issued 23 January 96, art. 2.
\109\ Nailene Chou, ``Orthodox Christians Celebrate Easter with
Prayers and Music,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 1 May 08.
\110\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information
about these cases.
\111\ For general information, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 95-96.
\112\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs
(Online), ``China Protestant Circles' Contributions for Sichuan
Earthquake Disaster Area Already Exceeds 100 Million Yuan'' [Zhongguo
jidujiao jie wei sichuan dizhen zaiqu jiankuan yi chao yi yuan], 6 June
08; State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ``Hebei
Province Buddhist Association Rushes to Sichuan Earthquake Disaster
Area to Provide Disaster Relief'' [Hebeisheng fojiao xiehui jinji fu
sichuan dizhen zaiqu zhenzai], 23 May 08.
\113\ China Aid Association (Online), ``House Church Members
Detained in Guizhou Province/Government Officials Arrest Volunteer
House Church Earthquake Aid Workers,'' 20 May 08.
\114\ ``Tzu Chi Gets Nod to Set Up Charity in China,'' Central News
Agency, reprinted in China Post (Online), 28 February 08. For an
analysis of this development, see Carl Minzner, ``Mainland Authorities
Support Operations of Taiwan-Based Buddhist Civil Society
Organization,'' Chinese Law and Politics Blog (Online), 22 May 08.
\115\ The name ``6-10'' comes from the date that the office was
founded. Maria Hsia Chang, ``Falun Gong: the End of Days'' (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 9; Minnie Chan, ``Lawyer's Conviction
`Sign of Tyranny,' '' South China Morning Post (Open Source Center, 23
December 06); Human Rights Watch, ``Dangerous Meditation: China's
Campaign Against Falun Gong,'' January 2002, 36.
\116\ PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs' Decision Concerning the Ban on
Falun Dafa Research Association [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzhengbu
guanyu qudi falun dafa yanjiuhui de jueding], issued 22 July 99. For
further information, see National People's Congress Standing Committee,
Decision Regarding the Ban on Cult Organizations and the Prevention and
Punishment of Cult Activities [Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu qudi
xiejiao zuzhi, fangfan he chengzhi xiejiao huodong de jueding], issued
30 October 99; CCP Central Committee Circular on the Forbidding of
Party Members from Practicing Falun Dafa [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu
gongchandangyuan buzhun xiulian `falun dafa' de tongzhi], issued 19
July 99; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, International Religious Freedom Report--2007, China (includes
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), September 2007, 1.
\117\ Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Overview of Falun
Gong,'' 30 April 08.
\118\ Official estimates placed the number of adherents inside
China at 30 million prior to the crackdown. Falun Gong sources estimate
that there was twice that number. Chang, Falun Gong, 2; U.S. Department
of State, International Religious Freedom Report--2007, China, 2.
\119\ RTL camps are an extrajudicial system of detention without
trial in which sentences are handed down at police discretion.
According to 2005 official statistics, a total of 500,000 inmates were
held in 310 RTL camps throughout China. For RTL figure, see Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China (includes Tibet, Hong
Kong, and Macau), 11 March 08, 4. For information on Falun Gong
detainees, see U.S. Department of State, International Religious
Freedom Report--2007, China, 1; Margot O'Neill and Hamish Fitzsimmons,
``Spy Claims Terrify Falun Gong Followers,'' Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (Online), 8 June 05; Michael Sheridan, ``Yu Zhou Dies as
China Launches pre-Olympic Purge of Falun Gong,'' Times of London
(Online), 20 April 08.
\120\ Michael Bristow, ``China Tightens Grip Ahead of Congress,''
BBC (Online), 14 September 07.
\121\ The availability of these reports was determined by a
Chinese-language search performed by CECC staff from June 2008 to
August 2008. Search terms included `Falun Gong' and targeted searches
of each of China's 31 provincial-level governments.
\122\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, 18-19; Chang, Falun Gong, 10; Falun Dafa
Information Center (Online), ``Arbitrary Imprisonment and Slavery,'' 17
May 08.
\123\ Liaoyang Municipal Public Security Bureau (Online),
``Procedures for `Rewarded Reports' at the Liaoyang Municipal Public
Security Bureau's Criminal Report Center'' [Liaoyang shi gonganju
xingshi fanzui jubao zhongxin `youjiang jubao' chengxu], 11 December
06; Panjin Municipal Government Administration Public Network of China
(Online), ``Put into Practice Harmonious Ideas, Promote Social
Stability, Make an Active Contribution to the Construction of a
Harmonious Homeland: Vice Mayor Yang Zhenfu's 2007 Policy Speech''
[Jianxing hexie linian, cujin shehui wending, wei jianshe hexie jiayuan
zuo chu jiji gongxian--fushizhang Yang Zhenfu 2007 shizheng baogao], 22
March 07.
\124\ Cao Zhiheng, ``Urumqi Police Destroy Five Violent Terrorist
Gangs Plotting To Damage the Olympics'' [Wulumuqi jingfang dadiao wuge
yumou pohuai aoyun de baoli kongbu tuanhuo], Xinhua (Online), 11 July
08; Matthew Weaver, ``China Kills Five Muslim `Militants' in Olympic
Crackdown,'' Guardian (Online), 10 July 08.
\125\ Yingshang County Government (Online), ``2007 Yingshang County
Political and Legal Work Summary and 2008 Work Plan'' [2007 Nian
yingshang xian zhengfa gongzuo zongjie ji 2008 nian gongzuo jihua], 7
January 08.
\126\ Miyi County (Online), ``Miyi County 2007 Public Order
Comprehensive Administration Safety Work'' [Miyi xian 2007 niandu
shehui zhian zonghe zhili pingan chuangjian gongzuo], 9 December 07.
\127\ Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Thousands of Falun
Gong Adherents Arrested throughout China in Run up to Olympics,'' 7
July 08.
\128\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report--2007, China, 10.
\129\ Falun Dafa Information Center, ``Arbitrary Imprisonment and
Slavery.''
\130\ Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Falun Gong Deaths
Escalate as Olympics Approach,'' 8 April 08; Falun Dafa Information
Center (Online), ``Overview of Persecution,'' 4 May 08.
\131\ UN Commission on Human Rights, ``Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Manfred Nowak: Mission to China,'' 10 March 06, 15.
\132\ CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 95. Article 18(1)
of the ICCPR guarantees everyone ``the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion [and] to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship, and observance.'' International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution
2200A(XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18.
The official General Comment 22 to Article 18 states, ``The right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which includes the freedom
to hold beliefs) in article 18(1) is far-reaching and profound; it
encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction, and
the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested individually
or in community with others.'' General Comment No. 22: The Right to
Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93,
para. 1.
\133\ CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 95; UN Commission
on Human Rights, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Opinion No. 32/2005, 2 September 05 [hereafter UNWGAD
Opinions]; ``Student Imprisoned for Falun Gong Activities Becomes
Eligible for Parole,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
July 2006, 5; PRC Constitution, art. 36.
\134\ UNWGAD Opinions, Opinion No. 32/2005.
\135\ ``Countless Spies Sent Overseas,'' South China Morning Post
(Open Source Center, 10 June 05); Joseph Kahn, ``Competing for Souls:
Violence Taints Religion's Solace for China's Poor,'' New York Times
(Online), 25 November 04. For a Chinese source, refer to statement that
6-10 Office ``strikes against illegal activities of `Falun Gong' and
other cult organizations,'' in Yichun Municipal Government (Online),
``Shixi Township's Implementation Plan for Rural Anti-Cult Warning and
Education Activities'' [Shixi banshichu nongcun fanxiejiao jingshi
jiaoyu huodong shishi fangan], 9 January 04.
\136\ Notice Concerning Provisions for Nanjing City Public Security
Departments' Functional Deployment, Internal Mechanisms, and Force Size
[Shizhengfu bangongting guanyu yinfa nanjing shi gonganju zhineng
peizhi, neishe jigou he renyuan bianzhi guiding], issued 23 June 08,
art. 2(20).
\137\ Yunnan Provincial State Taxation Administration (Online),
``Suijiang County State Taxation Bureau Carries Out Stability Work
Using the `Three Upgrades' and `Two Implementations' '' [Suijiang xian
guoshuiju yi `san ge tigao' `liang ge luoshi' qieshi zuohao zongzhi he
weiwen gongzuo], 28 March 08.
\138\ Gutian County Government (Online), ``2008 Propaganda
Materials for Prevention, Warning, and Education against Cults'' [2008
Nian fangfan xiejiao jingshi jiaoyu xuanchuan cailiao], 3 April 08.
\139\ People's Government of Chengmai County (Online), ``Wang
Hanmin: Work Report on Constructing a `Peaceful Chengmai' '' [Jianshe
`pingan chengmai' gongzuo baogao: Wang Hanmin], 10 March 05; CCP
Political-Legal Committee of Wuling District (Online), ``Political and
Legal Work, This Term's Basic Situation, and Next Term's Basic Plan''
[Zhengfa gongzuo benjie jiben qingkuang ji xiajie jiben guihua], 1
October 07; Xiamen Municipal Office for the Prevention of Cults,
reprinted in Office of the Xiamen Municipal Leading Work Group for
Private Enterprise (Online), ``Preventing and Handling Cults: the
General Situation'' [Fangfan he chuli xiejiao gongzuo: gaikuang], 4
February 06.
\140\ CCP Political-Legal Committee of Wuling District, ``Political
and Legal Work.''
\141\ Ibid. For reference to the ``three responsibility measures''
consisting of district police, neighborhood committee, and their own
relatives, see Anti-Cult Association of Qiandong Neighborhood, Yunyan
District, Guiyang City, Guizhou province, reprinted in National Anti-
Cult Association (Online), ``Implement Comprehensive Administration,
Fight for Position Against `Falun Gong' '' [Shixing zonghe zhili, yu
`Falungong' zhengduo zhendi], 16 July 07.
\142\ CCP Political-Legal Committee of Wuling District, ``Political
and Legal Work.''
\143\ Ibid.
\144\ Shanggao County Government (Online), Report on the County
Trade and Economic Commission's Education and Transformation of `Falun
Gong' Personnel [Xian jingmaowei `Falun Gong' renyuan jiaoyu zhuanhua
gongzuo huibao], 29 July 08.
\145\ Lancang Lanhu Ethnic Minority Autonomous County (Online),
``Regarding the Printing & Distribution of the Notice on Lancang Lanhu
Ethnic Minority Autonomous County Provisions on the Internal Functional
Deployment and Distribution of Personnel'' [Guanyu yinfa lancang
lanhuzu zizhixian renmin zhengfu bangongshi zhineng peizhi neishe jigou
he renyuan bianzhi guiding de tongzhi], 24 December 02; ``Second
Chinese Defector Backs Chen's Claims,'' Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (Online), 7 June 05.
\146\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, 5.
\147\ Ian Johnson, ``Death Trap: How One Chinese City Resorted to
Atrocities to Control Falun Dafa,'' Wall Street Journal, reprinted in
Pulitzer Prizes (Online), 26 December 00. For discussion of
``transformation'' in Chinese sources, see Shaanxi Anti-Cult
Association, ``Thoughts on Current Transformation through Education
Work'' [Dangqian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongzuo de sikao], Kaifeng Web, 25
July 08; Cao Huaxia and Liang Haijun, ``Our Perspective on the
Transformation through Reeducation of Falun Gong Criminals'' [Jiaoyu
zhuanhua falun gong zuifan zhi wo jian], Journal of the Shanxi Cadres
School of Coal Management, March 2007; Nanjing City Gulou District
Anti-Cult Association and Jiangsu Provincial Academy of Social
Sciences, reprinted in China Anti-Cult Web (Online), ``An Exploration
of Two Rules for Transformation through Reeducation Work'' [Dui jiaoyu
zhuanhua gongzuo zhong liangge guilu de tantao], 15 July 08. For
English sources that describe general methods used against Falun Gong
in RTL camps and other detention facilities (which are similar to those
employed at transformation centers), see Human Rights Watch,
``Dangerous Meditation,'' 93; Margot O'Neill and Hamish Fitzsimmons,
``Spy Claims Terrify Falun Gong Followers,'' Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (Online), 8 June 05; Sheridan, ``Yu Zhou Dies.''
\148\ CCP Political-Legal Committee of Wuling, ``District Political
and Legal Work.''
\149\ Johnson, ``Death Trap.''
\150\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision
Regarding the Ban on Cult Organizations and the Prevention and
Punishment of Cult Activities; Yueyang Municipal Government (Online),
``Never Tire in the Punishment of Cults'' [Chengzhi xiejiao changzhua
buxie], 5 September 07.
\151\ CCP Political-Legal Committee of Wuling, ``District Political
and Legal Work.''
\152\ Aohan Banner Municipality, Chifeng Prefecture, IMAR (Online),
``A Brave Man Who Has Struggled Against Cults'' [Yu xiejiao douzheng de
yongshi], 5 December 07; The Disciples Sect, or Mentuhui (also known as
Narrow Gate), is an indigenous Chinese sect founded by a man named Ji
Sanbao in Shaanxi province in 1989. Its teachings are based on
Christianity, but the sect embraces an unorthodox view of its leader as
``living Christ.'' It was banned as a ``cult'' in 1990. Chang, Falun
Gong, 148.
\153\ Guandu District Government (Online), Report to the Ninth CCP
Representative Assembly in the Guandu District of Kunming City: 2006
Guandu District Yearbook [Zai zhongguo gongchandang kunming shi guandu
qu dijiuci daibiao dahui shang de baogao: 2006 nian guandu nianjian], 6
June 06.
\154\ Shucheng County Government (Online), ``Chengguan Township's
Operation to Attack and Clean Up `Falun Gong' Shows Results''
[Chengguan zhen daji qingli `Falun Gong' zhuanxiang xingdong xian
chengxiao], 8 April 08.
\155\ Gao has also faced government harassment for his
participation in the Christian house church movement. He does not
practice or profess a belief in Falun Gong.
\156\ Gao Zhisheng, A China More Just (San Diego: Broad Press,
2007), 136-137; Chan, ``Lawyer's Conviction `Sign of Tyranny.' ''
\157\ Amnesty International (Online), ``China: Fear for Safety,
Possible Incommunicado Detention: Gao Zhisheng,'' 28 September 07.
\158\ China Anti-Cult Association (Online), ``China Anti-Cult
Association Opens its 2007 Annual Conference in Hangzhou'' [Zhongguo
fanxiejiao xiehui 2007 nian de nianhui zai hang zhaokai], 27 November
07.
\159\ Examples include: Provincial--Changting County Party
Committee, posted on Fujian Provincial Anti-Cult Association (Online),
``Methods and Experiences Transforming Peasant `Falun Gong'
Extremists'' [Zhuanhua nongmin `fa lun gong' chimizhe de zuofa yu
tihui], 2 January 08; County--Rongchang County Government (Online),
``The First Anti-Cult Association in Chongqing Municipality is
Established in Our County'' [Wo shiqu shouge fanxiejiao xiehui zai wo
xian chengli], 7 May 08; Municipal--Laigang Anti-Cult Association
(Online) ``Laigang Earnestly Organizes and Launches a Month of
`Building Peace and Leaving Cults Far Behind' Propaganda Activities''
[Laigang renzhen zuzhi kaizhan `pingan jianshe yuanli xiejiao'
xuanchuan yue huodong], 25 March 08. Neighborhood/Community--Anti-Cult
Association of Qiandong Neighborhood, ``Implement Comprehensive
Administration.''
\160\ Dushan County Travel Bureau, ``Strengthen our Studies,
Strengthen and Increase Anti-Cult Awareness'' [Jiaqiang xuexi,
zengqiang fanxiejiao yishi], Dushan Party Committee and Dushan County
Government (Online), 6 June 08; Laigang Anti-Cult Association,
reprinted in Zhengqi Web (Online), ``Laigang Anti-Cult Association
Propaganda Activities Yield Results'' [Laigang Fanxiejiao Xiehui
Xuanjiang Huodong Qude Chengxiao], 31 July 08.
\161\ ``China Anti-Cult Associations Established in Beijing''
[Zhongguo fanxiejiao xiehui zai beijing chengli), People's Daily
(Online), 13 November 00; China Anti-Cult Association (Online),
``General Survey of the China Anti-Cult Association'' [Zhongguo
Fanxiejiao Xiehui Gaikuang], 20 August 08. The Association's Web site
suggests independence from the government by insisting that the
organization was founded by concerned citizens from the ``fields of
technology, social science, religion, law, and media.''
\162\ Anti-Cult Association of Qiandong Neighborhood, ``Implement
Comprehensive Administration.''
\163\ Shandong Province Civil Organizations Information Web
(Online), ``Liaocheng City Office of the Anti-Cult Association 2006
Work Summary and 2007 Work Plan'' [Liaocheng shi fanxiejiao xiehui
bangongshi 2006 nian gongzuo zongjie, 2007 nian gongzuo jihua), 19
April 08.
\164\ Luyuan District Government Information Center (Online),
``Seeking Truth & Pragmatism, Seizing the Moment: My District's Anti-
Cult Warning Education Work Surges Again'' [Qiuzhen wushi, qiangzhua
shiji: woqu fanxiejiao jingshi jiaoyu gongzuo zai xian gaochao], 29 May
07.
\165\ The directive is entitled ``A Propaganda Outline Regarding
the Prevention of `Falun Gong' Interference with and Harming of the
Beijing Olympics,'' or in Chinese ``Guanyu Fangfan `Falun Gong' Ganrao
Pohuai Beijing Aoyunhui de Xuanjiang Tigang.'' While references to this
directive are abundant and easy to locate on the Chinese web, the full
text does not appear to be publicly available.
\166\ Examples include: Urumqi Municipal Government, Shayibake
District, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Online), ``The Olympic
Security Work Implementation Scheme for the Friendly South District''
[Youhao nan diqu aoyun anbao gongzuo shishi fang'an], 3 April 08;
Ge'Ermu City Economic and Trade Commission (Online), ``Municipal
Economic and Trade Commission Launches Activities and Discussions
Focusing on `A Propaganda Outline Regarding the Prevention of ``Falun
Gong'' Interference with and Harming of the Beijing Olympics' '' [Shi
jingmaowei kaizhan xuanjiang `guanyu fangfan ``falun gong'' ganrao
pohuai beijing aoyunhui de xuanjiang tigang'], 4 June 08; Weining Yi
Hui Miao Ethnic Autonomous County Government (Online), ``Xiaohai
Township Launches Guarding Against `Falun Gong' Interference and
Destruction of Beijing Olympics Discussion Activities'' [Xiaohai zhen
kaizhan ``falun gong'' ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui xuanjiang
huodong], 8 July 08; Tibetan Science and Technology Committee (Online),
``The District S&T Office Studies `A Propaganda Outline Regarding the
Prevention of ``Falun Gong'' Interference with and Harming of the
Beijing Olympics' '' [Qu kejiting xuexi xuanchuan `guanyu fangfan
``falun gong' ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui de xuanjiang tigang], 13
June 08; Political and Legal Committee of Huocheng County, Ili Kazakh
Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Online),
``Huocheng County Bureau of Public Health Seriously Studies Anti-Cult
Discussion Outline'' [Huocheng xian weishengju renzhen xuexi fanxiejiao
xuanjiang tigang], 2 June 08.
\167\ Er'lianhaote City Law Enforcement Department, Xilinguole
League (Online), ``Law Enforcement Department Launches Activities to
Publicize Efforts to Guard Against `Falun Gong' Interference with
Beijing Olympics'' [Xingzheng zhifaju kaizhan fangfan ``falun gong''
ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui xuanjiang huodong], 19 June 08; Luxi
City Department of National Resources (Online), ``Luxi City National
Resources Department Launches Guarding Against `Falun Gong'
Interference and Destruction of Beijing Olympics Discussion
Activities'' [Luxi shi guotu ziyuan ju jiji kaizhan fangfan ``falun
gong'' ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui xuanjiang huodong], 26 June 08;
Qianjiang District Government (Online), ``Zhengyang Township Steadily
Carries Out Prevention and Punishment of Cults'' [Zhengyang zhen zhashi
zuohao fangchu xiejiao gongzuo], 14 June 08.
\168\ Chengdu Dayi County Adolescent Ideology and Morality
Development Network (Online), ``Propaganda and Education Activities to
Guard Against `Falun Gong' Interference with and Destruction of the
Beijing Olympics'' [Fangfan ``falun gong'' ganrao pohuai beijing
aoyunhui xuanjiang jiaoyu huodong], 13 June 08; International Cargo
Transport Limited of China (Online), ``International Cargo Transport of
China, Hangzhou Headquarters Convenes Plenary Meeting on Situation''
[Zhongguo guoji huoyun hangkong hangzhou yunying jidi zhaokai xingshi
dahui], 24 June 08; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, South China Sea
Institute of Oceanology (Online), ``Our Institute Convenes Meeting to
Discuss Protecting Stability and Defending Security Work'' [Wosuo
zhaokai weihu wending, anquan baowei yu anquan chansheng gongzuo
huiyi], 19 June 08.
\169\ Laigang Anti-Cult Association, ``Laigang Anti-Cult
Association Propaganda Activities.''
\170\ ``Shanghai To Restrict Dissidents During Olympics,''
Associated Press (Online), 24 June 08.
\171\ ``Religious Texts Allowed at Beijing Olympics, But for
Personal Use; Falun Gong Excluded,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
International Herald Tribune (Online), 7 November 07.
\172\ ``Beijing Offers Hefty Rewards for Security Threat
Information During Olympics,'' Xinhua (Online), 11 July 08.
\173\ Falun Dafa Information Center, ``Thousands of Falun Gong
Adherents Arrested.'' The list of 141 practitioners detained in Beijing
from January 2008 to June 2008 can be accessed at the Falun Dafa
Information Center's Web site.
\174\ Chinese public security officials also used supposed security
concerns to justify a request made to the government of Japan in which
they solicited information on Falun Gong practitioners residing in
Japan who might attend the Olympic Games. The Japanese government
refused to cooperate. ``China Asks Japan for Information on Falun Gong
Members Ahead of Olympics,'' Kyodo World Service (Online), 17 July 08;
Timothy Chui, ``More Games Security to Come, Says Expert,'' Hong Kong
Standard (Online), 19 May 08; Edward Cody, ``China Set to Protect
Olympics,'' Washington Post (Online), 25 July 08.
\175\ ``Interview with Tian Yixiang, Head of the Military Affairs
Department of the Beijing Olympics Protection Leading Group''
[Zhuanfang aoyun anbao xietiao gongzuo xiaozu jundui bu tian yixiang],
Outlook Weekly (Online), 8 July 08; ``PLA Has Finalized Plans to Deal
With Sudden Contingencies During Olympic Games'' [Jiefangjun aoyun
anbao budui yi zhiding chongfen cuoshi yingdui tufa shijian], China
News (Online), 8 May 08.
\176\ ``Olympic Counterterrorism Warning: Major Threats are Eastern
Turkestan, Tibetan Independence, and Falun Gong'' [Aoyun laxiang
fankong jingbao: zhuyao fangfan dongtu zangdu xiejiao falungong],
ChinaGo (Online), 24 July 08.
\177\ PRC Constitution, art. 50.
\178\ PRC Constitution, art. 89(12).
\179\ ``Guo Dongpo: Tap Into Overseas Compatriots to Expose the
False Reasoning and Heresies of `Falun Gong,' '' [Guo dongpo: fahui
haiwai tongbao zuoyong jielu ``falun gong'' waili xieshuo], China
Central Television (Online), 2 February 01.
\180\ Ibid.
\181\ Chongqing Municipal Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (Online),
``Outline on the Transmission of the Spirit of the Director's Meeting
of the National Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs'' [Quanguo qiaoban
zhuren huiyi jingshen chuanda tigang], 5 April 07.
\182\ Guo Xiangrun and Peng Fei, Luzhou Municipal Federation of
Returned Overseas Chinese, reprinted in Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
of the State Council (Online), ``Strengthen the Party's Development of
Governance Capabilities, Accelerate the Development of the China
Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese'' [Jiaqiang dang de zhizheng
nengli jianshe, cujin qiaolian shiye fazhan], 8 May 05.
\183\ Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council
(Online), ``The Exemplary Deeds of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office,
Hubei Provincial Government'' [Hubei dheng renmin zhengfu qiaowu
bangongshi xianjinshiji], 2004.
\184\ Liu Chengxuan, ``Seeking Truth and Pragmatism, Diligently
Forge Ahead With the New Dimensions of Starting Overseas Chinese Work
Corps'' [Qiuzhen wushi nuli jinqu, kaizhan bingtuan qiaowu gongzuo xin
jumian], 4 Journal of Overseas Chinese Affairs Work Research (Online),
2004.
\185\ Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council
(Online), ``Director Chen Yujie Meets with the Metro Chicago Area
United Federation of Overseas Chinese & Chinese Americans'' [Chen yujie
zhuren zai beijing huijian da zhijiage diqu hualianhui fanghuatuan], 14
June 06.
\186\ ``Delegation from China Anti-Cult Association Holds Public
Lecture in Geneva'' [Zhongguo fanxiejiao xiehui daibiaotuan zai rineiwa
juxing baogao hui], Xinhua (Online), 16 November 07; ``Delegation from
China Anti-Cult Association Holds Talks with Overseas Chinese in
Switzerland'' [Zhongguo fanxiejiao xiehui daibiaotuan tonglu rei huaren
huaqiao zuotan], Xinhua (Online), 25 March 02; ``Spain Establishes
`World Chinese and Overseas Chinese Anti-Cult Association' '' [Xibanya
chengli `shijie huaqiao huaren fanxiejiao xiehui'], People's Daily
(Online), 16 October 02.
\187\ Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council
(Online), ``Commending All of the Contributions, Chinese Immigrants
Select Argentina's `Outstanding Immigrant' '' [Zhang suozuo gongxian,
zhongguo yimin dangxuan a'genting `jiechu yimin'], 11 September 08.
\188\ Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council
(Online), ``Ma Rupei Attends Meeting Held by the Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office of the State Council To Address Integrated Preparations
& Deployment Work During the Olympic Period'' [Ma Rupei chuxi
guoqiaoban aoyun qijian zonghe zhengzhi gongzuo bushu huiyi], 14 July
08.
Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights
\1\ Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May 84, amended
28 February 01, preamble.
\2\ For more information on the protests, see Section IV--Xinjiang
and Section V--Tibet.
\3\ For additional background on ethnic minority rights, see the
``Special Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government
Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,'' CECC, 2005 Annual
Report, 11 October 05, 13-23. Regarding international human rights
standards, see, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10
December 48, arts. 2, 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of
16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 26, 27;
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 2(2); Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature,
ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20
November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, arts. 2(1), 30. See
generally, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD), adopted and opened for signature and
ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December
65, entry into force 4 January 69. Article 1(1) of CERD defines racial
discrimination to mean ``any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.''
China is a party to the ICESCR, CRC, and CERD, and a signatory to
the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to ratifying,
and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR and
reaffirmed its commitment on April 13, 2006, in its application for
membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China's top leaders have
also stated on other occasions that they are preparing for ratification
of the ICCPR, including in March 18, 2008, press conference remarks by
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in a September 6, 2005, statement by
Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress
on Law, in statements by Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour,
and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before
the French National Assembly.
\4\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 105-106.
\5\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online),
``Another Mongolian Arrested for Alleged Links with `Separatists,' '' 2
August 08.
\6\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online),
``Well-known Journalist Naranbilig under House Arrest following 20 Days
Detention,'' 28 April 08; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information
Center (Online), ``Statement of the Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues 7th Session,'' 2 May 08; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center (Online), ``Jaranbayariin Soyolt Released and
Deported Back to Mongolia,'' 19 June 08.
\7\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online),
``Mongolian Dissident Arrested in Beijing,'' 27 February 08; Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), ``China's Official
Response to Mongolia on J. Soyolt's Case,'' 4 June 08; Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Jaranbayariin Soyolt
Released and Deported Back to Mongolia.'' According to the Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, Jiranbayariin Soyolt was a
leader of a Mongolian student movement in the early 1980s. He left
China in 1992 and gained refugee status in Mongolia.
\8\ For more information on Chinese policies in the IMAR, see,
e.g., China's Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does it Protect Minority
Rights?, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate
Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University;
Uradyn E. Bulag, ``Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonization and
Ethnicity Building,'' in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed.
Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 100-
107; Naran Bilik, ``Language Education, Intellectuals and Symbolic
Representation: Being an Urban Mongolian in a New Configuration of
Social Evolution,'' in Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in
China, ed. William Safran (London: Frank Cass, 1998).
\9\ ``Regulation on Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Mongolian
Language Work'' [Neimenggu zizhiqu menggu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli],
issued 26 November 04. See also ``Inner Mongolia Government Promotes
Mongolian Language,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
September 2006, 10-11. For recent examples of steps to promote
Mongolian language use, see, e.g., State Ethnic Affairs Commission
(SEAC) (Online), ``Inner Mongolia Gives Priority to Students of
Teacher's Colleges [Majoring in] Teaching Classes in Mongolian by
Implementing Free Education'' [Neimenggu youxian dui mengguyu shouke
shifansheng shixing mianfei jiaoyu], 26 November 07; Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online),
``Inner Mongolia Increases 170 Million Yuan in Educational Expenditures
to Subsidize Lodging for Students in Classes Taught in Mongolian''
[Neimenggu xin zeng 1.7 yi yuan jiaoyu zhichu buzhu mengyu shouke jisu
xuesheng], 1 March 08.
\10\ ``31st Standing Committee Meeting of 10th Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region People's Congress Holds Group Deliberation''
[Neimenggu shi jie renda changweihui di 31 ci huiyi juxing fenzu
shenyi], Inner Mongolia News Net (Online), 29 November 07.
\11\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 106; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 17-
18.
\12\ ``Chinese Premier Pledges More Support to Poor Minority
Areas,'' Xinhua, 2 April 08 (Open Source Center, 2 April 08).
\13\ ``China's 9-Year Compulsory Education To Cover Most of Western
Areas by Year-End,'' Xinhua, 27 November 07 (Open Source Center, 27
November 07).
\14\ ``China Vows To Foster More Professional Cadres From
Minorities,'' Xinhua, 26 October 07 (Open Source Center, 26 October
07).
\15\ State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), ``Summary of One-
Year Implementation of 11th 5-Year Program for Ethnic Minority
Undertakings'' [Shaoshu minzu shiye ``shi yi wu'' guihua shishi yinian
zongshu], 29 February 08; State Council General Office Circular on
Printing and Issuing the 11th 5-Year Program for Ethnic Minority
Undertakings [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu yinfa shaoshu minzu shiye
`shiyiwu' guihua de tongzhi], issued 27 February 07. For earlier CECC
reporting on this program, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 106.
\16\ State Council General Office Circular on Printing and Issuing
the 11th 5-Year Program for Ethnic Minority Undertakings, item 2(11).
\17\ State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), ``State Ethnic
Affairs Commission Organizes and Launches Research on Ethnic Relations
Evaluation System and Early Warning Mechanism'' [Guojia minwei zuzhi
kaizhan minzu guanxi pinggu tixi he yujing jizhi yanjiu], 9 August 07.
\18\ Information based on the CECC Political Prisoner Database and
``Authorities Try Mongol Couple, Assault Son of Imprisoned Mongol
Activist,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August
2006, 2.
Notes to Section II--Population Planning
\1\ The population planning policy was first launched in 1979,
canonized as a ``fundamental state policy'' in 1982, and codified as
national law in 2002. As of 2007, 19 of China's 31 provinces--
accounting for 53.6 percent of China's population--allow rural dwellers
to have a second child if their first child is a girl. Gu Baochang, et
al., ``China's Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the
Twentieth Century,'' 33 Population and Development Review 133, 138
(2007).
\2\ ``China Changes Family Planning Slogans from `Coarse' to
`Amiable,' '' Xinhua (Online), 11 October 07; Shan Juan, ``Family
Planning Posters Toned Down,'' China Daily (Online), 12 October 07.
\3\ CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 109.
\4\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 108.
\5\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), para. 17;
Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, para.
7.2. On the concept of ``illegal pregnancy'' and its use in practice,
see Elina Hemminki, et al., ``Illegal Births and Legal Abortions--The
Case of China,'' Reproductive Health 2, no. 5 (2005).
\6\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and
accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79,
entry into force 2 September 81, art. 2, 3, 16(1)(e).
\7\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for
signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution
44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 2, 3, 4,
6, 26.
\8\ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 10 (3).
\9\ ``Family Planning Rules Tightened,'' China Daily (Online), 14
September 07; ``China Cracks Down on One-Child Violators,'' Associated
Press (Online), 14 September 07.
\10\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 08, 9.
\11\ Ibid., 9.
\12\ Ma Lie and Chen Hong, ``New Family Policy Attacks Elites'
Egos,'' China Daily (Online), 19 September 07.
\13\ ``Chinese Province Raises Fines on Wealthy Flouters of Family
Planning Laws,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 September 07; ``Hunan Writes Local
Legislation To Hold Back the Number of Wealthy Families Having More
Than One Child'' [Hunan ba ezhi furen chaosheng xinjin difang fagui],
Xinhua (Online), 14 January 08.
\14\ Tania Branigan, ``China's Celebrities `Buy' Extra Children,''
The Guardian (Online), 22 January 08; ``Hunan: Famous, Rich People Who
Violate the One Child Policy will be Entered into a Bad Credit
Blacklist'' [Hunan: Mingren furen chaosheng jiangshang xinyong
heimingdan], China Youth Daily (Online), 26 March 2007; ``Beijing to
Fine Celebrities Who Break Family Planning Rule,'' Xinhua (Online), 21
January 08.
\15\ ``Chinese Province Raises Fines,'' Xinhua.
\16\ ``Hubei Releases New Family Planning Rule: Violators Banned
from Government Service for 3 Years'' [Hubei chutai jisheng xingui:
chaosheng zhe sannian nei bude luwei gongwuyuan], Wuhan Hubei Daily
(Online), 5 January 08; Maureen Fan, ``Officials Violating `One-Child'
Policy Forced Out in China,'' Washington Post (Online), 8 January 08.
\17\ ``Last Year More than 90,000 in Hubei Exceeded One-Child
Policy, Paid 230 Million in Social Compensation Fees'' [Hubei qunian 9
wanyu ren `chaosheng' jiaona shehui fuyang fei 2.3yi yuan], Wuhan Hubei
Daily (Online), 6 January 08; ``Hubei Luminaries Fined for Flouting
Family Rules,'' China Daily (Online), 2 January 08.
\18\ ``Private Teachers Who Violate One-Child Policy Will Not
Receive Retirement Wages'' [Minban jiaoshi weifan jisheng zhengce bu
neng xiangshou tuixiu daiyu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 26 April 07.
\19\ ``Nominations for Local People's Congress and CPPCC in Henan
Blocked Due to One-Child Policy Violations'' [Renda zhengxie weiyuan
houxuanren yin weifan jihua shengyu bei foujue], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 3 November 07; ``Lawmakers Barred for Breaking One-Child
Rule,'' Xinhua (Online), 4 April 08.
\20\ ``Hubei Luminaries Fined,'' China Daily.
\21\ ``Last Year More than 90,000 in Hubei Exceeded 1 Child
Policy,'' Wuhan Hubei Daily.
\22\ Under Article 41 of the Population and Family Planning Law,
when a citizen does not pay the social compensation fee, the
``administrative department for family planning that makes the decision
on collection of the fees shall, in accordance with the law, apply to
the People's Court for enforcement.'' PRC Population and Family
Planning Law, enacted 29 December 01, art. 41; U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China, 9; CECC
Staff Interview.
\23\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law, art. 39.
\24\ Ibid., art. 33.
\25\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, 9.
\26\ ``Henan Family Planning Office Forcibly Induces Labor and
Kills Infant'' [Henan jishengban qiangxing yinchan bing shasi yinger],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 May 08.
\27\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, 9.
\28\ ``China's One-Child Policy Stays, Abuses Resurface,'' Radio
Free Asia (Online), 2 April 08.
\29\ Li Jinsong, ``Chen Guangcheng Sues Li Qun, Liu Jie, and Other
Officials for Trumped Up Charges and Retaliation'' [Chen guangcheng
konggao li qun liu jie deng shexian fanyou baofu xianhai zui zhi,
gongmin bao'an konggao han], Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 5
April 08.
\30\ ``Chen Guangcheng Discriminated Against in Prison; Wife Barred
From Leaving Home'' [Chen guangcheng yuzhong shou qishi, qizi jixu bei
boquan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 November 07; Cai Jin,
``Imprisoned Rights Defenders Guo Feixiong, Chen Guangcheng Prevented
from Communicating with Families, Lawyers Stress Constitution Provides
Freedom of Communication'' [Xianyu weiquanzhe guo feixiong chen
guangcheng jia tongxun shouzu, lushi qiangdiao xianfa fuyu gongmin
tongxun ziyou], Boxun (Online), 27 November 07; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders (Online), ``Chen Guangcheng, Human Rights Defender in Prison,
Update: Officials Ignored Requests for Medical Parole and for Filing
Complaints to Higher Court about Verdict,'' 23 March 07; Zhang Min,
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``With the Paralympics Close,
Imprisoned Blind Rights Activist Chen Guangcheng's Family Members,
Villagers, and Lawyers Have Had Cellular Communications Obstacles''
[Canao jin, yuzhong mangren weiquanzhe chen guangcheng jiaren, cunmin
ji lushi shouji tongxun zhang'ai], 3 September 08.
\31\ ``China's One-Child Policy Stays,'' Radio Free Asia.
\32\ ``Henan Family Planning Office Forcibly Induces Labor,'' Radio
Free Asia.
\33\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, 9; Howard French, ``Single Mothers in China
Forge a Difficult Path,'' New York Times (Online), 6 April 08.
\34\ He Yafu, ``Are Children of One-Child Policy Violators Chinese
Citizens'' [Heihu haizi shibushi zhongguo gongmin], China Youth Daily
(Online), 18 September 07; ``Second Child of Disabled Parents Deprived
of Education Over One-Child Policy Violation'' [Beijing chaoshenger
dushu wumen, canji fumu zou tou wulu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 13
February 08.
\35\ Gansu Provincial Government (Online), ``Gansu Provincial
Population Commission Leadership Group Goes to Shanxi to Observe and
Study'' [Gansu sheng renkou wei lingdao banzi jituan fu shanxi sheng
kaocha xuexi], 24 April 08.
\36\ ``Seeking Help: Chinese Government Begins to Force Tibetan
Women to Undergo Sterilization Procedure'' [Qiuzhu, zhongguo zhengfu
kaishi qiangzhi zangzu funu zuo jueyu shoushu], Boxun (Online), 6 June
08.
\37\ See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Rural East
Turkistan To Be `Focus' of China's Family Planning Policies,'' 15
February 06; Human Rights in China: Improving or Deteriorating
Conditions, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights,
and International Operations, Committee on International Relations,
U.S. House of Representatives, 19 April 06, Testimony of Rebiya Kadeer.
\38\ ``Seeking Help,'' Boxun.
\39\ For more information on the importance of incentive structures
for local officials in China, see Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off:
Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1999).
\40\ Tongwei County Government (Online), ``Comrade Tian Xiangrong's
Speech at the Tongwei County Lidian Meeting on Population and Family
Planning Work'' [Tian Xiangrong tongzhi zai quanxian renkou yu jihua
shengyu gongzuo lidian xianchang huiyi shang de jianghua], 31 July 06.
\41\ Ibid.
\42\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 110; U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China, 9.
\43\ Tongwei Population Bureau, Gansu Population and Family
Planning Commission (Online), ``Tongwei County Launches `Month of
Investigating and Sorting Out' and Concentrated Administrative
Activities for Basic Population and Family Planning Work'' [Tongwei
kaizhan jihua shengyu jiceng jichu gongzuo `qingcha qingli yue' jizhong
zhili huodong], 5 May 08; Tongwei Population Bureau, Gansu Population
and Family Planning Commission (Online), ``Tongwei County's `Peaceful
Life Project' of Sterilization of Rural Women with 2 Female Children
Advances Smoothly'' [Tongwei xian nongcun pinkun ernu jieza hu `anju
gongcheng' jinzhan shunli], 11 June 08.
\44\ Tongwei Population Bureau, Gansu Population and Family
Planning Commission (Online), ``Tongwei County Unveils Prizes for
Reports that Lead to Voluntary Carrying Out of Sterilization Procedures
for Rural Families with 2 Female Children'' [Tongwei xian jiji kaizhan
youjiang jubao huodong bing zhongjiang zhudong luoshi jueyu shoushu de
nongcun ernu hu jiating], 10 September 07.
\45\ Ibid.
\46\ ``Circular on the Distribution of the Henan Province
Population and Family Planning Commission's 2007 Work Summary and 2008
Essential Work Areas'' [Henan sheng renkou jisheng wei guanyu yinfa
2007 nian gongzuo zongjie he 2008 nian gongzuo yaodian de tongzhi], 19
December 07.
\47\ ``China Plans Favorable Policies for One-Child Families,''
Xinhua (Online), 19 November 07; ``China Will Speed Up Establishment of
Benefit-Oriented Mechanism in Family Planning,'' Xinhua (Online), 21
January 08.
\48\ ``Jiangxi: Government Buys Insurance for Rural Families with
Appropriate Number of Children'' [Jiangxi: zhengfu wei nongcun jisheng
jiating mai baoxian], Xinhua (Online), 5 January 07; ``Guizhou: 3000
Households Compliant with Birth Planning Receive Support to `Strengthen
Girls' '' [Guizhou 3000 jihua shengyu jiating `ziqiang nuhai' huo
bangfu], Xinhua (Online), 13 July 07.
\49\ Quanlin Qiu, ``Only-Children Parents Urged to Have Two Kids,''
China Daily (Online), 10 November 06; ``Official: Single-Child Parents
in China Can Have Second Child,'' Xinhua (Online), 11 July 07.
\50\ See Robert Stowe England, Aging China: The Demographic
Challenge to China's Economic Prospects (Westport: Praeger/CSIS, 2005).
\51\ Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 161-177.
\52\ Ibid., 171-172.
\53\ State Council National Working Committee on Children and Women
(Online), ``Adjusting Sex Ratio Imbalance Should Be Done Without
Delay'' [Zhili xingbie shiheng keburonghuan], 6 July 07.
\54\ ``China has 37 Million More Males than Females,'' People's
Daily (Online), 10 July 07; State Council National Working Committee on
Children and Women, ``Adjusting Sex Ratio Imbalance Should Be Done
Without Delay.''
\55\ James Reynolds, ``Wifeless Future for China's Men,'' BBC News
(Online), 12 February 07.
\56\ ``China Grapples with Legacy of its `Missing Girls,' '' China
Daily (Online), 15 September 04.
\57\ See Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, Bare Branches:
Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2004).
\58\ See Chu Junhong, ``Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-
Selective Abortion in Rural Central China,'' 27. Population and
Development Review 2 (2001), 259; Joseph Chamie, ``The Global Abortion
Bind: A Woman's Right to Choose Gives Way to Sex-Selection Abortions
and Dangerous Gender Imbalances,'' Yale Global (Online), 29 May 08.
\59\ Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 171-172.
\60\ ``China Grapples with Legacy of its `Missing Girls,' '' China
Daily.
\61\ ``Abortion Law Amendment to be Abolished,'' China Daily,
reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 26 June 06; Andrew Yeh, ``China Retreats
on Selective Abortion Law Plan,'' Financial Times (Online), 25 June 06.
\62\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report.
\63\ ``Chinese Policy Spawns 100 Million Only Children,''
Associated Press, reprinted in Toronto Star (Online), 8 July 08; Joshua
Kurlantzick, ``The Family Way,'' Time (Online), 29 May 08.
\64\ ``One-Child Policy Fueling Youth Crime,'' South China Morning
Post (Online), 5 December 07; ``One-Child Policy Spawns Divorces,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 1 December 07; ``One-Child Policy
Blamed for Nation of Non-Starters,'' South China Morning Post (Online),
29 October 07.
\65\ For information on the absence of public debate on population
planning issues, see Susan Greenhalgh, Just One Child: Science and
Policy in Deng's China (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2008), 3-4.
\66\ Kristine Kwok, ``Delegates Seek End to One-Child Policy,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 16 March 07.
\67\ ``China May Scrap One-Child Policy, Official Says,'' Reuters
(Online), 28 February 08.
\68\ Shi Jiangtao and Josephina Ma, ``One-Child Policy Must be
Overhauled: Deputy,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 7 March 08;
Sim Chi Yin, ``Formula To Tweak One-Child Policy,'' Straits Times
(Online), 7 March 08.
\69\ ``China Won't Waver in Family Planning Policy,'' Xinhua
(Online), 6 March 08; ``Minister Zhang Weiqing Rules Out Drastic Change
in One-Child Rule,'' China Daily (Online), 10 March 08.
\70\ Ching-Ching Ni, ``One-Child Policy Adds to the Grief of China
Quake,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 15 May 08; Kyung Lah, ``Parents'
Losses Compounded by China's One-Child Policy,'' CNN (Online), 15 May
08; Christopher Bodeen, ``China's One-Child Policy Causes Extra Pain,''
Associated Press (Online), 16 May 08.
\71\ ``China To Send Medical Team to Quake Zone for Reproduction
Surgery,'' Xinhua (Online), 6 June 08.
\72\ ``Quake Victims Allowed Extra Child,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 27 May 08; Andrew Jacobs, ``One-Child Policy Lifted for Quake
Victims,'' New York Times (Online), 27 May 08.
\73\ ``China To Send Medical Team to Quake Zone,'' Xinhua.
\74\ ``China Earthquake: IVF Offered for Grieving Parents,''
Telegraph (Online), 6 June 08.
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Residence
\1\ Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli], issued 9 January 58.
\2\ For a detailed discussion of the Chinese hukou system and
related reforms, see China's Household Registration (Hukou) System:
Discrimination and Reform, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2 September 05.
\3\ Amnesty International, China: International Migrants:
Discrimination and Abuse. The Human Cost of an Economic `Miracle,' 1
March 07.
\4\ ``Beijing To Inspect Status of Migrants'' [Beijing jiang hecha
liudong renyuan shenfen], Beijing News (Online), 13 January 08.
\5\ See, e.g., ``Urumchi City Carefully Organizes, Thoroughly
Deploys Group To Launch Series of Investigation and Rectification
Activities'' [Wulumuqi jingxin zuzhi zhoumi bushu zuzhi kaizhan yixilie
paicha zhengzhi huodong], Urumqi Peace Net (Online), 16 July 08;
``Homes Raided in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 July 08.
\6\ ``Beijing Olympic Migrant Workers Cleaned Out,'' Community TV
Network (Online), 17 July 08.
\7\ See, e.g., arts. 1 and 13(1) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly resolution
217A (III) of 10 December 48; arts. 2(2) and 12(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23
March 76. China became a signatory to ICCPR in 1998 and has committed
to ratify.
\8\ ``Lawyer Cheng Hai Sued Beijing City for Temporary Resident
Permit'' [Lushi Cheng Hai zhuanggao beijingshi banli zanzhuzheng
xingwei weifa], Procuratorial Daily (Online), 3 March 08.
\9\ ``Lawyer Cheng Hai Sued Beijing City for Temporary Resident
Permit,'' Procuratorial Daily (Online).
\10\ Dorothy J. Solinger, ``China's Floating Population:
Implications for State and Society,'' in The Paradox of China's Post-
Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1999).
\11\ ``China's Household Registration Reform: Sustained Reform
Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 7 October 05.
\12\ Fei-Ling Wang, ``Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted
People: China's Hukou System in the 2000s,'' The China Quarterly, March
2004, 122-123.
\13\ ``Jiangsu To Implement `One Card' for Floating Population's
Temporary Permit'' [Jiangsusheng jiang shixing wailairenkou zanzhuzheng
shengnei yizhengtong], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 7
August 08.
\14\ Yunnan Government Opinion Regarding Deepening Household
Registration Reform [Yunnansheng renminzhengfu guanyu shenhua huji
guanli zhidu gaige de yijian], issued 3 September 07.
\15\ See arts. 16, 19, 30, 31 of Shenzhen City Temporary Measures
on Residency Permits [Shenzhenshi juzhuzheng zanxing banfa], issued 22
May 08.
\16\ Qi Zhifeng, ``Shenzhen Begins Permanent Resident Permit System
But Still Limited to Hukou System'' [Shenzhen qiyong juzhuzheng wei
pochu huji zhidu], Voice of America (Online), 1 August 08.
\17\ Shenzhen City Temporary Measures on Residency Permits
[Shenzhenshi juzhuzheng zanxing banfa], issued 22 May 08.
\18\ Beatriz Carrillo Garcia, ``Rural-Urban Migration in China:
Temporary Migrants in Search of Permanent Settlement,'' Portal Journal
of Multidisciplinary International Studies, July 2004, 9-11.
\19\ ``High School Student without Hukou Attempted Suicide for
Unsuccessful Registration of College Entrance Exam'' [Gaosan nusheng
yiyin wu beijing hukou buneng canjia gaokao fudu zisha], Xinhua
(Online), 6 January 08.
\20\ ``Zhuhai Suspends Residency Applications,'' China Daily
(Online), 18 April 08.
\21\ Chai Jicheng, ``Zhejiang To Implement Household Registration
New Policy and To Cancel Agricultural Hukou'' [Zhejiang shixing huji
xinzheng mingnien quxiao dongye hukou], Xinhua (Online), 3 May 06.
\22\ Zhejiang People's Government Circular Regarding Public
Security Bureau's Opinion on the Reform Expansion of the Residency
Permit System [Zhejiangsheng renmin zhengfu ban'gongting zhuanfa sheng
gong'an ting guanyu jinyibu shenhua huji guanli zhidu gaige yijian de
tongzhi], issued 29 March 02.
\23\ ``Liaoning To Thoroughly Abolish Differences Between
Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Household Registration'' [Wosheng
jiang chedi quxiao nongye hukou he fei nongye hukou qubei], Liaoning
Evening News, reprinted in Liaoning Provincial Population and Family
Planning Commission News (Online), 20 April 07.
\24\ Yunnan Government Opinion Regarding Deepening Household
Registration Reform [Yunnansheng renmin zhengfu guanyu shenhua huji
guanli zhidu gaige de yijian], issued 3 September 07.
\25\ Lu Guoqiang, ``Beijing Household Registration Management To
Launch Nine New Measures'' [Beijing huji guanli guichu jiuxiang xin
jucuo], Jinghua Daily, reprinted in Sina (Online), 20 April 07.
\26\ ``Recent Chinese Hukou Reforms,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China (Online).
\27\ Jin Rong, ``Wang Yang: Chongqing Urban and Rural Hukou Same in
2012'' [Wangyang chongqing chengshiren nongcunren 2012 nian hukou
tongyang], Chongqing Business Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 19
October 07.
\28\ ``Recent Chinese Hukou Reforms,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China.
\29\ Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Circular Regarding Printing
and Distributing Implementing Measures of Reform Expansion of the
Household Registration System [Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu renmin zhengfu
ban'gongting guanyu yinfa quanqu jinyibu gaige huji guanli zhidu],
issued 6 April 05.
\30\ Guo Guoliang, Wu Buo, Li Jing, ``Guangdong Zhuhai Suspends
Hukou Transfer Due to Fiscal Pressure'' [Guangdong zhuhai yiyin
gonggong caizheng yali zanting hukou qianru], Qian Long Net, reprinted
in Zhenhai People's Government (Online), 16 April 08.
\31\ Shenzhen City Temporary Measures on Residency Permits
[Shenzhenshi juzhuzheng zanxing banfa], issued 22 May 08, effective 1
August 08.
\32\ Du Jing, ``Rural Dwellers To Be Granted Urban Rights,'' China
Daily, reprinted in PRC Central People's Government (Online), 2
November 05.
\33\ Xi'an City Temporary Provisions on Hukou Registration
[Xi'anshi qianru shiqu renkou huji zhunru zanxing guiding], issued 27
February 06.
\34\ Chengdu City Public Security Bureau Regulations on the Chengdu
City Government Opinion Regarding Expanding Household Registration
Reform and Integrating City and County [Chengdushi gong'anju guanyu
guanche zhonggong chengdu shiwei chengdushi renmin zhengfu guanyu
shenhua huji zhidu gaige shenru tuijin chengxiang yitihua de yijian
shixing de shishi xize], issued 20 October 06.
\35\ Qingdao City Government Circular Regarding Deepening Household
Registration Reform [Qingdaoshi renmin zhengfu guanyu jinyibu shenhua
huji guanli zhidu gaige de tongzhi], issued 1 August 07.
Notes to Section II--Liberty of Movement
\1\ See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December
48, art. 13(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12(1).
\2\ Bureau of Exit and Entry of the Ministry of Public Security
(Online), Permit Application Notice of Mainland Resident Travel to Hong
Kong and Macau [Wanglai gang'ao tongxingzheng he qianzhu shenqing
xuzhi], last visited 25 August 08. Mainland residents can apply for
travel permits to Hong Kong and Macau for purposes including family
visits, business, group tours, education, and others. According to
Ministry of Public Security statistics, in 2007, there were
approximately 10.5 million legal visits from mainland residents to Hong
Kong and 8.2 million to Macau. See Bureau of Exit and Entry of the
Ministry of Public Security (Online), ``2007 Mainland Resident Travel
Permits to Hong Kong and Macau'' [2007 nian pizhun neidi jumin wanglai
gang'ao diqu qingkuang], 15 April 08.
\3\ Ibid.
\4\ ``Hong Kong Celebrity's Journey to Challenge the Right to Home
Return Permit'' [Gang mingxing yongtiao huixiangzheng de pobing zhil?],
Epoch Times (Online), 30 March 08.
\5\ Ng Kang-chung, ``Apple Daily Reporter Denied Entry to
Beijing,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 4 July 08. The Beijing
Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games explained that Choy's entry
was denied because his press pass was not effective until July 8 but
did not comment on the confiscation of his Home Return Permit. Loretta
Fong, ``Apple Daily Reporter Denied Entry to Beijing Over `Invalid
Press Pass,' '' South China Morning Post (Online), 9 July 08. Choy re-
entered Beijing on July 21 and retrieved his HRP from an airport
official. See Vivian Wu, ``Banned Reporter Finally Allowed into
Beijing,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 22 July 08.
\6\ See, e.g., Ding Xiao, "Under House Arrest, Police Threaten Zeng
Jinyan With Arrest" [Zeng jinyan fankang ruanjin zao jinggao zhuabu],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 January 08; Zeng Jinyan, ``Gratitude''
[Gan'en], Zeng Jinyan's Blog, 29 March 08.
\7\ See, e.g., Zeng Jinyan, ``Recent Developments'' [Jinkuang],
Zeng Jinyan's Blog, 25 August 08; Audra Wong, "Detained Chinese
Activist Returns to Beijing," Washington Post (Online), 26 August 08.
\8\ See, e.g., Malcom Moore, "China Tightens Grip on Western
Province Xinjiang," Telegraph (Online), 8 August 08; Dan Martin,
``Uyghurs Discouraged From Air Travel Amid China's Olympic Security
Clampdown,'' Agence France-Presse, 31 July 08 (Open Source Center, 31
July 08).
\9\ ``Harassment of Beijing-based Activists During the U.S.-China
Human Rights Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), 8 July 08.
\10\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Eight Beijing
Lawyers Under House Arrest During Visit of U.S. Members of Congress''
[Beijing baming lushi yin meiyiyuan daofang er bei ruanjin], 29 June
08.
\11\ ``Mongolian Rights Advocate Released From Detention, Placed
Under House Arrest,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
June 2008.
\12\ ``Olympic Torch Relay Planned in Linyi, Monitors of Yuan
Weijing Increased to Over 40'' [Aoyun huoju niguo linyi jiankong
yuanweijing zhe zengzhi sishiduo], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 July 08.
\13\ See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December
48, arts. 13(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 12(2), (4).
\14\ Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``Welcome Return for Chinese
Dissident, Others Not Free To Travel,'' 27 August 07.
\15\ Passport Law of the People's Republic of China, enacted 29
April 06, art. 2.
\16\ ``China Blocks Wang Dan From HK Visit During Olympics,''
Reuters (Online), 23 August 08.
\17\ Nora Boustany, ``Hong Kong Bars Chinese Dissident,''
Washington Post (Online), 8 August 08.
\18\ Ibid.
\19\ ``China Blocks Wang Dan From HK Visit During Olympics,''
Reuters. Nora Boustany, ``Hong Kong Bars Chinese Dissident.''
\20\ ``Tibetan Writer, A Rare Outspoken Voice Against Beijing's
Policies, Sues Chinese Government,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
International Herald Tribune (Online), 23 July 08.
\21\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``HRIC Press Release: Wife of
Jailed Activist Targeted and Harassed,'' 14 May 08.
\22\ Jonathan Watts, ``Lawyer Missing After Criticizing China's
Human Rights Record,'' Guardian (Online), 8 March 08.
\23\ See, e.g., Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government
(Online), "Nur Bekri's Work Report At First Sessions of the 11th
Xinjiang Autonomous Regional People's Congress" [Zai zizhiqu shiyi jie
renda yi ci huiyi shang nu'er baikeli sui zuo zhengfu gongzuobao], 16
January 08; Yeken County Government (Online), ``Yeken County Almaty
Village Implements `8 Acts' To Establish Safe and Sound Village
[Shachexian alamaitixiang shishi ``baxiang jucuo'' chuangjian pingan
xiangzhen], 16 October 07. For information on the 2007 passport
restrictions, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 99.
Notes to Section II--Status of Women
\1\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 18-19.
\2\ Tania Branigan, ``Manager Becomes First Man Jailed Under
Chinese Harassment Laws,'' Guardian (Online), 16 July 08.
\3\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests,
enacted 3 April 92, amended 28 August 05; CECC, 2007 Annual Report,
115.
\4\ ``Turning off the Light and Forcefully Kissing Someone:
Workplace Sexual Harassment Case Receives Criminal Punishment'' [Guan
deng qiang wen bangongshi xingsaorao huo xing], Chengdu Commercial
Daily (Online), 15 July 08.
\5\ Fiona Tam, ``Activists Celebrate Victory in Sexual Harassment
Lawsuit,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 16 July 08.
\6\ Ibid.
\7\ Tania Branigan, ``Manager Becomes First Man Jailed Under
Chinese Harassment Laws.'' Tam, ``Activists Celebrate Victory.''
\8\ The actual incidence is believed to be higher because spousal
abuse went largely unreported. According to a 2005 survey by the All-
China Women's Federation (ACWF), domestic violence occurred in 30
percent of 270 million families. The ACWF receives 40,000 to 50,000
domestic violence-related complaints annually, with the number
increasing in recent years. The number of serious complaints filed, in
which women and children are badly beaten or even killed, is also on
the rise. Guo Yunnuo, Women's Watch--China, ``The Nature of Domestic
Violence and Measures to Counter its Existence,'' 14 August 08; Jiao
Xiaoyang, ``Call for Legislation on Domestic Violence,'' China Daily
(Online), 13 March 08; ``Combating Domestic Violence: Victims Can Apply
for Personal Safety Protective Orders'' [Fan jiating baoli: shouhairen
ke shenqing renshen baohuling], Jiangnan Evening News, reprinted in
Xinhua (Online), 16 July 08.
\9\ ``Combating Domestic Violence: Victims Can Apply for Personal
Safety Protective Orders,'' Jiangnan Evening News, reprinted in Xinhua.
\10\ ``Combating Domestic Violence: China Issues First Ruling for a
Personal Safety Protective Order'' [Fan jiabao zhongguo fachu shou ge
renshen anquan baohu caiding], Legal Daily, reprinted in Chinagate
(Online), 18 August 08.
\11\ ``Anti-Domestic Violence Drive Needs Legal Support,'' China
Daily, reprinted in China Internet Information Center (Online), 23
August 05.
\12\ ``China Sets Up Centers To Handle Domestic Violence Calls,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 14 January 08.
\13\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 117; ``Chinese Communist Party
Membership Exceeds 74 mln in 2007,'' Xinhua (Online), 1 July 08;
Maureen Fan, ``Party Looks Beyond China's `Miss Fix-It,' '' Washington
Post (Online), 21 October 07; ``Shanghai Women Prop Up `Half the Sky'
of Social and Economic Development'' [Shanghai nuxing chengqi shehui
jingji fazhan ``banbiantian''], Xinhua (Online), 21 April 08.
\14\ Jane Macartney, ``China Jails Liu Lun, Its First Office Sex
Pest,'' Times (Online), 17 July 08.
\15\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 08, Section 3; Maureen
Fan, ``Party Looks Beyond China's `Miss Fix-It.' '' Washington Post
\16\ Shan Juan, ``Women's Health in Rural Areas Targeted,'' China
Daily (Online), 3 March 08.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 118-119.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ Ibid.
\21\ ``Married-Out Woman Who Wants to Register Her Child for Hukou
Must Sign `Don't Want Land Agreement' '' [Chujia nu shengzi luohu yao
qian ``buyao tudi xieyi''], China Women's News, reprinted in Women's
Watch--China (Online), 29 May 08.
\22\ ``A Village in Henan: Single Young Women Claiming Land
Compensation Must Present Certification of Single Status'' [Henan yi
cun: weihun nu qingnian ling tudi buchangjin yao kan ``weihun zheng''],
Dahe Net, reprinted in Women's Watch--China (Online), 10 June 08.
Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking
\1\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 120.
\2\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report--China, 4 June 08,
91-94.
\3\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report--China, 5 June 06,
91.
\4\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2003, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 04, sec. 6.f;
``Action Plan To Fight Human Trafficking Finalized,'' China Daily, 13
December 07.
\5\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008,
91-92.
\6\ Ibid, 91-94.
\7\ International Labour Organization, ``Situation Analysis on
Trafficking in Girls and Young Women for Labour Exploitation within
China,'' 2005, 5; ``China's Household Registration System: Sustained
Reform Needed To Protect China's Rural Migrants,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (Online), 7 October 05, 3-4.
\8\ CECC Staff Interview. ``China Currently Has Approximately 200
Million Migrant Workers, Issues Concerning Migrant Workers Are
Comparatively Complex'' [Dangqian wo guo yue you 2 yi nongmin gong,
nongmin gong wenti jiao fuza], PRC Central People's Government
(Online), 26 January 07; ``China Plans To Combat Cross Province
Trafficking for Forced Labor'' [Zhongguo ni kua sheng liandong daji
guaimai renkou qiangpo laodong], China Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua
(Online), 5 September 07.
\9\ Margaret Y. K. Woo, ``Shaping Citizenship, Chinese Family Law
and Women,'' 15 Yale J.L. & Feminism 99, Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices--2007, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),
11 March 08, sec. 5.
\10\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report--China
2006, 91; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, sec. 5.
\11\ Some other exceptions include: those who were only children
themselves or who have a disabled child may have more than one child.
In the aftermath of the earthquake that struck Sichuan province on May
12, the government allowed families who lost their only child in the
quake to have a second child after obtaining official permission. Liz
Gooch, ``Skewed Gender Ratio Leaves Mainland Men Out in the Cold,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 16 June 08; CECC, 2006 Annual
Report, 20 September 06, 109; Andrew Jacobs, ``One-Child Policy Lifted
for Quake Victims' Parents,'' New York Times (Online), 27 May 08.
\12\ The Chinese government's population planning laws and
regulations contravene international human rights standards by limiting
the number of children that women may bear, by enforcing compliance
with population targets through heavy fines, and by discriminating
against ``out-of-plan'' children. CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20
September 06, 109.
\13\ Liz Gooch, ``Skewed Gender Ratio Leaves Mainland Men Out in
the Cold,'' South China Morning Post.
\14\ The purchase of a wife is also influenced by other reasons,
such as the health condition or age of the man. Bu Wei, ``Looking for
`the Insider's Perspective:' Human Trafficking in Sichuan,'' in Doing
Fieldwork in China, Maria Heimer and Stig Thogersen, eds. (Honolulu,
Hawai'i: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 213.
\15\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 110-111.
\16\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008,
92.
\17\ See, e.g. `` `Uncle' Sentenced to Five Years in Prison for
Trafficking Colleague's Child'' [Guaimai gongyou xiaohai ``shushu'' huo
xing wu nian], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online),
19 November 07; ``Criminal Gang Trafficked 38 Children in Three Years
from Dongguan, Ringleader Sentenced to Death'' [Fanzui tuanhuo zai
dongguan 3 nian guaimai 38 ming ertong shoufan bei pan sixing],
Southern Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in Sina.com (Online), 25
November 05.
\18\ ``China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking Aims To
Provide `Sustainable' Solutions,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, March/April 2008, 3.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ ``Guizhou People's Government General Office Circular
Regarding the Printing and Distribution of Fujian Province's Anti-
Trafficking Implementation Plan'' [Guizhou sheng renmin zhengfu
bangongting guanyu yinfa guizhou sheng fandui guaimai funu ertong
xingdong jihua 2008-2012 nien shishe fangan de tongzhi], China Law
Education (Online), 4 May 08; The People's Government of Hainan
Province (Online), ``Hainan People's Government General Office Circular
Regarding the Printing and Distribution of Hainan Province's Working
Plan To Combat the Trafficking of Women and Children'' [Hainan sheng
renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu yinfa hainan sheng fandui guaimai
funu ertong gongzuo jihua de tongzhi], 6 June 08; The People's
Government of Fujian Province (Online), ``Fujian People's Government
Circular Regarding the Printing and Distribution of Fujian Province's
Anti-Trafficking Implementation Plan (2008-2012)'' [Fujian sheng renmin
zhengfu bangongting guanyu yinfa fujian sheng fandui guimai funu ertong
xingdong shishi jihua de tongzhi], 11 June 08; The People's Government
of Hanzhong City (Online), ``Hanzhong City People's Government General
Office Circular Regarding the Printing and Distribution of Hanzhong
Plan of Action To Combat the Trafficking of Women and Children (2008-
2012)'' [Hanzhong shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu yinfa hanzhong
shi fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012) de tongzhi],
26 March 08.
\21\ ``UNIAP China Office Held An Inter-Agency Meeting,'' UNIAP
China Latest News Digest (Online), 1 August 08, 1.
\22\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008,
92.
\23\ ``China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking Aims To
Provide `Sustainable' Solutions,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, March/April 2008, 3.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Online), ``The
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its
Protocols,'' last visited 17 March 08; UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution
55/25 of 15 November 2000, entry into force 29 September 03; Protocol
To Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 2000, entry into force 25 December 03.
\27\ Ibid., arts 3, 5. The TIP protocol also establishes that
trafficked persons are victims of a crime, and contains provisions on
law enforcement, protection, and assistance. United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, ``The United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and Its Protocols''; United Nations Global Initiative
To Fight Human Trafficking, ``What Is the Importance of the Trafficking
Protocol? '' last visited 21 April 08; The Vienna Forum To Fight Human
Trafficking, Background Paper: The Effectiveness of Legal Frameworks
and Anti-Trafficking Legislation, February 2008.
\28\ Combating Human Trafficking in China, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 6 March 06, Testimony of
Ambassador John R. Miller, Director, Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State; Office of the
National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State
Council, ``National Working Committee on Women and Children's Report on
the Work Situation in 2006 and Work Items for 2007,'' undated.
\29\ ``Synopsis of UNIAP's National-Level Training Workshop''
[Lianheguo fandui guaimai renkou guojiaji peixun ban jianjie], UNIAP
China Office, reprinted in China Jiangsu Net (Online), 13 September 07.
\30\ Wang Zhuoqiong, ``China Set To Ratify UN Trafficking
Protocol,'' China Daily (Online), 24 October 08.
\31\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18
December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 6; Convention on the
Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 44/25
of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 35;
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Convention), adopted by
the 87th Session of the General Conference of the International Labour
Organization of 17 June 99, entry into force 19 November 00, art. 3.
Worst forms of child labor mentioned in the Convention include but are
not limited to the ``sale and trafficking of children,'' debt bondage,
and forced labor.
\32\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on 19 June, 2007,'' 20
June 07; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 173. Under the 1951 Convention and
its Protocol ``no Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler')
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.'' The government derives its policy of repatriating
North Koreans on a 1961 treaty and border management protocol with
North Korea signed in 1968 and 1998. Yet the 1951 Convention, its
Protocol, and the Convention Against Torture, which China has ratified,
supersedes the government's bilateral commitments with North Korea
regarding refugees. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28
July 51 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General
Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 50, art. 33. China acceded
to the Convention on September 24, 1982; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 125,
endnote 10-12.
\33\ A Struggle for Survival: Trafficking of North Korean Women,
Remarks by Mark P. Lagon, Ambassador-at-Large and Director, Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 3 March 08;
Mikyoung Kim, ``Beijing's Hot Potato: North Korean Refugees and Human
Rights Debates,'' Jamestown Foundation (Online), 16 March 05; CECC,
2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 174.
\34\ A Struggle for Survival: Trafficking of North Korean Women,
Remarks by Mark P. Lagon; Combating Human Trafficking in China, Hearing
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 6 March 06, Written
Statement of Abraham Lee, Director of Public Relations, Crossing
Borders.
\35\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment--China,
19 January 07; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices--2007, China, sec. 5.
\36\ Recent campaigns to raise public awareness use posters,
videos, pamphlets, and other forms of communication, and are directed
at women, youth, rural farmers, migrant workers, journalists, and
public officials, among others. See, e.g., Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in
Persons Report--China, 12 June 07, 81; U.S. Department of State,
Trafficking in Persons Report--China, 14 June 04, 84; U.S. Department
of State, Trafficking in Persons Report--China, 3 June 05, 83; U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report--China, 11 June 03,
47; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2006, 91.
\37\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report--China, 5 June 02,
39; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment--China,
1 February 06; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment--
China, 28 February 08; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons
Report 2003, 47; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons
Report 2005, 84; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons
Report 2006, 93; First Hand Knowledge--Voices Across the Mekong:
Community Action Against Trafficking of Children and Women, (Bangkok:
International Labour Office, 2005), 62.
\38\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2002,
39; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment
2006; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report Interim Assessment--
China, 28 February 08.
\39\ Xin Ren, ``Violence against Women under China's Economic
Modernisation: Resurgence of Women Trafficking in China,''
International Victimology, 69-73, 71 (1996).
\40\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2005,
84.
\41\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2006,
92-3; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim
Assessment 2008.
\42\ Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report
2007, 81.
\43\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2006,
92-3.
\44\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008,
92.
\45\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim
Assessment 2006.
\46\ Criminals convicted of abducting and trafficking women and
children face between five to ten years or a minimum of ten years of
fixed-term imprisonment depending on severity, a 10,000 yuan (US$1,412)
fine or confiscation of personal property, and in ``especially
serious'' cases, the death sentence and confiscation of property.
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Abduct and Traffic in
or Kidnap Women or Children [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu
weihuanhui guanyu yancheng guaimai bangjia funu ertong de fanzui fenzi
de jueding], issued and effective 4 September 91; PRC Criminal Law,
enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, art. 240.
\47\ John Ruwitch, ``Child Labor Scandal Highlights Worrying Trend
in China,'' Reuters (Online), 1 May 08.
\48\ Ibid.; ``Dozens of Slave Workers Freed in China: Report,''
Reuters (Online), 20 March 08.
\49\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2005,
84.
\50\ A Ministry of Public Security representative said that there
was no local official, including public security official, involvement
in the more than 2,500 trafficking cases that were registered in 2006.
``The Crime of Trafficking Women and Children Does Not Have a
Protective Umbrella in Our Country'' [Woguo guaimai funu ertong fanzui
meiyou baohusan], Beijing Youth Daily (Online), 15 December 07.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (Online), ``Responses to the List of Issues and Questions for
Consideration of the Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic Report of
China,'' 8 June 06, 8.
\51\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2007,
80; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, sec. 5.
\52\ ``The Crime of Trafficking Women and Children Does Not Have a
Protective Umbrella in Our Country,'' Beijing Youth Daily.
\53\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2005, China, sec. 5.
\54\ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2003, China, sec. 6.f.
\55\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2007,
80; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2007, China, sec. 5.
\56\ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2007,
80.
\57\ Ministry of Public Security (Online), ``Public Security
Agencies Adopt `Strike Hard' Measures against Criminal Acts of
Trafficking in Women and Children'' [Gong'an jiguan caiqu jiji cuoshi
yanli daji guaimai funu ertong fanzui xingwei], 12 December 07;
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (Online), ``Responses to the List of Issues and Questions for
Consideration of the Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic Report of
China,'' 8 June 06, 10; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices--2007, China, sec. 5.
\58\ An August 31, 2005, statement posted on the PRC Embassy in the
United Kingdom's Web site notes that ``more concerted efforts by the
government and local communities as well as increasing social awareness
have led to a gradual decline in China's women trafficking cases.''
Ministry of Public Security, ``Public Security Agencies Adopt `Strike
Hard' Measures against Criminal Acts of Trafficking in Women and
Children.'' See also, ``China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking
Aims To Provide `Sustainable' Solutions,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008.
\59\ Ibid.
\60\ Wang Zhuoqiong ``More Forced into Labor, Prostitution,'' China
Daily (Online), 27 July 07. The U.S. State Department noted an increase
in child trafficking in its 2007 Human Rights Report. U.S. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China, sec.
5.
\61\ See, e.g., ``Representative Zhou Jianyuan Proposes Amending
the Criminal Law To Severely Punish Buyers of Trafficked Women [Zhou
Jianyuan daibiao jianyi gai xingfa yancheng shoumai bei guaimai funu
zhe],'' Legal Daily (Online), 10 March 08; ``Representative Yuan
Jinghua: Amend the Criminal Law To Strike Hard on Crimes of Trafficking
Women and Children [Yuan Jinghua daibiao: xiugai xingfa yanda guaimai
funu ertong fanzui],'' Legal Daily (Online), 14 March 07; ``Hubei
Group's Proposal To Amend the Criminal Law: Severe Punishments for the
Crime of Trafficking Women and Children [Hubei tuan ti'an xiugai
xingfa: guaimai funu ertong zui yao zhongpan],'' Chutian City Paper
(Online), 13 March 08; ``CPPCC Members Propose Establishing the Crime
of Forced Labor through the Use of Violence as a Result of the Brick
Kiln Case'' [Zhengxie weiyuan zhendui hei zhuanyao an tiyi she baoli
qiangpo laodong zui], Yanzi Dushi Bao, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 11
March 08.
\62\ Shi Zhuanfei, ``Brief Talk on Limitations in China's Criminal
Law Regarding Crimes of Trafficking in Persons,'' 2 Seeking Truth 219,
220 (2005); Liu Xianquan, ``On Perfecting China's Punishment for
Trafficking in Persons Crimes in the Criminal Law'' [Lun woguo chengzhi
guaimai renkou fanzui de xingfa wanshan], 5 Legal Studies 93, 100
(2003). ``China Plans Cross-Province Cooperation To Attack Human
Trafficking for Forced Labor,'' China Youth Daily. As a reflection of
the government's definition of trafficking, MPS figures for trafficking
are usually labeled under ``abducting women or children'' and may be
conflated with smuggling cases. ``China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on
Trafficking Aims To Provide `Sustainable' Solutions,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008; U.S. Department of
State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2007, 80.
\63\ Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report
2006, 92.
\64\ ``China Commits to `Open Government Information' Effective May
1, 2008,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008.
\65\ The challenge here will be if the budget provided to the
public will be broken down at a level that would provide information on
anti-trafficking funds. For example, anti-trafficking funds for public
security bureaus come out of the criminal investigation unit's budget
for handling cases. While having systematic information on the amount
of this budget allocation will be helpful, the information may need to
be broken down into smaller components in order to shed light on how
much funds were used for anti-trafficking efforts. See, e.g.,
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, ``Responses to the List of Issues and Questions for
Consideration of the Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic Report of
China,'' 8 June 06, 10; ``Letting the Government's Money Box Become
More Transparent--Liaoning Province Constructs `Sunshine Financial
Administration' (Series of Reports Number 1)'' [Rang zhengfu de qiangui
gengjia touming--liaoning sheng jianshe `yangguang caizheng' xilie
baodao zhiyi], Caijing (Online), 12 October 07; ``Shanghai People's
Congress Issues Notice Regarding How Representatives Should Examine
Government Budgets'' [Shanghai renda chushu jiao daibiao ruhe shencha
zhengfu yusuan], Nanfeng Chuang, reprinted in NetEase (Online), 24
February 08; ``Promoting Sunshine Financial Administration, Shanghai
Will Implement Real-Time Supervision of Budgets'' [Tuidong yangguang
caizheng, shanghai jiang shishi yusuan zaixian shishi jiandu], Diyi
Caijing Ribao, reprinted in Sohu (Online), 31 January 08; Su Yongtong
and Zhao Lei, ``The Operation of the New Open Information Regulations
Test the Government's Ability To Reveal the Truth,'' Southern Weekend,
8 May 08 (Open Source Center, 29 July 08).
Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China
\1\ The Chinese government's repatriation of North Korean refugees
contravenes its obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1951 Convention and its
Protocol mandate that ``[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
(`refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.'' Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, 28 July 51 by the United Nations Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons
convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 50,
art. 33. China acceded to the Convention on September 24, 1982.
\2\ Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ``North Korea
Defectors Report on Current Border Situation,'' 19 June 08; ``North
Korean Defectors: China Urged To Provide Shelter to Those in Plight,''
Korea Times (Online), 26 May 08.
\3\ Prior to 2008, fines imposed on Chinese citizens who shelter
North Koreans were typically 1,000 yuan (US$125). CECC, 2006 Annual
Report, 20 September 06, 175. Life Funds for North Korean Refugees,
``North Korea Defectors Report''; Michael Sheridan, ``Refugees Shot
Fleeing North Korea,'' Times of London (Online), 29 June 2008.
\4\ ``North Korean Defectors: China Urged To Provide Shelter,''
Korea Times.
\5\ Sheridan, ``Refugees Shot Fleeing North Korea.''
\6\ Ibid. Good Friends (Online), North Korea Today, 114th Edition,
March 2008, 1-2.
\7\ ``North Korea Erects 10km Wire-Mesh Fence to Prevent Refugees
from Fleeing to China'' [Chaoxian jian shi gongli tiesi wangjia,
fangzhi nanmin taowang zhongguo], SingTao Net (Online), 27 August 07.
The fence construction may have been a response to pressure from
Beijing to halt the flow of refugees before the Olympics. See Bill
Powell, ``North Korea's Deadly Exit,'' Time (Online), 6 March 08.
\8\ Powell, ``North Korea's Deadly Exit.''
\9\ Life Funds for North Korean Refugees, ``North Korea Defectors
Report.''
\10\ Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ``China Raises
Bounty on North Korean Refugees 1600 Percent,'' 10 April 08.
\11\ Sunny Lee, ``China's `Olympic Approach' to Refugees,'' Asia
Times (Online), 26 January 08.
\12\ Life Funds for North Korean Refugees, ``China Raises Bounty.''
In 2006, China's national per capita income reached US$1,740, according
to the PRC National Bureau of Statistics. ``China's National Per Capita
Income Reaches $1,740,'' People's Daily (Online), 18 August 06.
\13\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 08, 21.
\14\ Border guards are stopping all vehicles along this road and
searching their trunks, checking ID cards, and questioning passengers
about their destination and purpose of visit. Life Funds for North
Korean Refugees, ``North Korea Defectors Report''; Lee, ``China's
`Olympic Approach' to Refugees.''
\15\ Life Funds for North Korean Refugees, ``North Korea Defectors
Report.''
\16\ For more information on how China's repatriation policy
violates the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol, please see the section on ``North Korean Refugees in
China'' from the CECC 2006 and 2007 Annual Reports.
\17\ ``Chinese Stage Sweep, Arrest 40 North Koreans,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 21 March 08.
\18\ 1,319 refugees participated in the survey. Yoonok Chang,
Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Working Paper, Migration Experiences of North
Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence from China, March 2008, 2, 9.
\19\ ``North Korea Executes 15 Attempting Escape, China Arrests 40
Refugees,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008,
3; International Crisis Group (Online), ``Perilous Journeys: The Plight
of North Koreans in China and Beyond,'' 26 October 06; United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom, ``A Prison Without Bars:
Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of
Religion or Belief in North Korea,'' March 2008.
\20\ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, ``A Prison
Without Bars,'' preface.
\21\ Ibid., preface, 4-5.
\22\ Ibid., 11, 21-22, 28.
\23\ ``Human Trafficking Thrives Across North Korea-China Border,''
Chosun Ilbo (Online), 2 March 08; Kang Shin-who, ``Korea's Cited as
Source of Sex Trafficking,'' Korea Times (Online), 5 June 08; ``U.S.
Blames China on NK Human Trafficking,'' Yonhap News Agency (Online), 8
March 08.
\24\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report--China, 4 June 08,
198-199.
\25\ Ibid., 7.
\26\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Denied Status, Denied
Education: Children of North Korean Women in China,'' April 2008.
\27\ PRC Nationality Law, effective 10 September 80, art. 4.
\28\ PRC Compulsory Education Law, enacted 12 April 86, art. 5.
\29\ Human Rights Watch, ``Denied Status, Denied Education,'' 3.
\30\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, effective 22 April 1954, art. 22; PRC Nationality Law, art. 4; PRC
Compulsory Education Law, art. 5.
\31\ A survey conducted from August 2004 to September 2005 found
that most refugees crossed the border for ``economic'' reasons. Yoonok
Chang, with Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``North Korean Refugees
in China: Evidence from a Survey,'' in The North Korean Refugee Crisis:
Human Rights and International Response, eds. Stephan Haggard and
Marcus Noland (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North
Korea, 2006), 19.
\32\ Stephan Haggard, Marcus Noland, and Erik Weeks, ``North Korea:
the Emergence of Pre-Famine Conditions,'' Vox (Online), 7 June 08; Good
Friends (Online), North Korea Today, 108th edition, January 2008, 1-3;
Good Friends (Online), North Korea Today, 109th edition, January 2008,
2; Good Friends (Online), North Korea Today, 114th edition, March 2008,
2, 4.
\33\ Joshua Kurlantzick and Jana Mason, ``North Korean Refugees:
The Chinese Dimension,'' in The North Korean Refugee Crisis: Human
Rights and International Response, eds. Stephan Haggard and Marcus
Noland (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
2006), 43.
\34\ The central authorities categorize the entire North Korean
population into three classes--core, wavering, and hostile--by which
access to food and other public goods is determined. Members of the
hostile class, an estimated 27 percent of the total population, are the
last to receive food and their inferior political status is
transferable from generation to generation. Joel R. Charny, Acts of
Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China
(Washington, DC: Refugees International, 2005), 13-14.
\35\ ``Government Grants Exit Visas to Seven North Koreans,
Pressures UNHCR in Pre-Olympic Crackdown,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 3; ``China Threatens U.N. Agency over
North Korean Refugees,'' Kyodo News (Online), 20 March 08.
Notes to Section II--Public Health
\1\ ``Gov't Promises Equitable Healthcare for All,'' China Daily,
reprinted in PRC Central People's Government (Online), 8 January 08.
\2\ Ibid.
\3\ Jonathan Watts, ``China's Health Reforms Tilt Away from the
Market,'' 371 Lancet 292, 292 (2008). See also, Gerald Bloom and
Shenglan Tang, eds., Health Care Transition in Urban China (Hants,
England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004).
\4\ Xie Chuanjiao, ``Aging Population a Major Challenge,'' China
Daily (Online), 12 March 07; United Nations Development Programme
(Online), ``Bridging Development Gaps in Today's China,'' 23 September
06. See also, Bloom and Shenglan Tang, eds., Health Care Transition in
Urban China.
\5\ Catharine Paddock, ``China Puts Healthcare at the Top of the
Agenda,'' Medical News Today (Online), 10 January 08.
\6\ ``Medical Service Becomes China's Most Topical Social Issue''
[Yiliao fuwu chengwei zhongguo minzhong zui guanzhu wenti], Radio Free
Asia (Online), 10 January 08.
\7\ Watts, ``China's Health Reforms Tilt Away from the Market,''
292-293.
\8\ The maternal mortality rate in Guizhou province is ten times
higher than the rate in Shanghai, while the child mortality rate before
the age of five is five times higher in Guizhou than in Shanghai.
Watts, ``China's Health Reforms Tilt Away from the Market,'' 292-293.
\9\ ``Gov't Promises Equitable Healthcare for All,'' China Daily.
\10\ Anna Lora-Wainwright, China Environmental Health Project, ``A
Village Perspective of Rural Healthcare in China,'' January 2008, 3;
``Gov't Under Pressure To Make Rural Healthcare System Work,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China.org.cn (Online), 21 April 07.
\11\ ``China To Solicit Public Opinions on Health Care Reform,''
Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People's Government (Online), 5 March
08.
\12\ ``Healthcare for All,'' China Daily (Online), 28 December 07;
``China To Solicit Public Opinions on Health Care Reform,'' Xinhua.
\13\ ``Wen: China's Health Care Reform Focuses on Public Service,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 15 April 08.
\14\ ``Looking Forward: China's Major Events in 2008,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in PRC Central People's Government (Online), 2 January 08;
Paddock, ``China Puts Healthcare at Top of Agenda.''
\15\ ``China To Expand Rural Healthcare System with Increased Fund,
Full Coverage,'' Xinhua (Online), 15 February 08; ``Looking Forward:
China's Major Events in 2008,'' Xinhua; 08; ``In 2008, China's Rural
Cooperative Medical System Subsidies Will Double, Scope to Increase''
[2008 nian woguo xin nong he buzhu biaozhun fanfan fanwei kuoda],
Xinhua (Online), 15 February 08; Josephine Ma, ``Experts Doubt
Financing of Public Hospitals,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 6
March 08.
\16\ Ministry of Health (Online), ``Circular Regarding the
Completion of Rural Cooperative Medical System Work in 2008'' [Guanyu
zuohao 2008 nian xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao gongzuo de tongzhi], 13
March 08.
\17\ ``Insurers Eyeing Rural Medical Care,'' Xinhua, reprinted in
China Daily (Online), 27 March 08; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October
07, 132.
\18\ ``China's Rural Cooperative Medical System Subsidies Will
Double,'' Xinhua.
\19\ ``China To Increase Subsidies for Rural Co-op Medical
Scheme,'' Xinhua (Online), 7 January 08.
\20\ ``China To Provide Basic Medical Care for All Rural Residents
by 2010,'' Xinhua (Online), 2 November 07.
\21\ Dong Zhixin, ``China Expands Basic Health Insurance,'' China
Daily (Online), 5 April 07.
\22\ Ibid.
\23\ Watts, ``China's Health Reforms Tilt Away from the Market,''
292-293; Shan Juan, ``Medicare Scheme To Go Nationwide,'' China Daily
(Online), 27 February 08.
\24\ Shan Juan, ``Medicare Scheme To Go Nationwide,'' China Daily
(Online), 27 February 08.
\25\ ``Gov't Promises Equitable Healthcare for All,'' China Daily.
\26\ ``Basic Urban Medical Insurance Covers More People,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 21 May 08; CECC, 2007 Annual Report,
132; Shan Juan, ``Medicare Scheme To Go Nationwide''; ``More Urban
Chinese Receive Healthcare Benefits,'' Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central
People's Government (Online), 13 December 07.
\27\ Shan Juan, ``Medicare Scheme To Go Nationwide.''
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ ``Basic Urban Medical Insurance Covers More People,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 21 May 08; CECC, 2007 Annual Report,
132; Shan Juan, ``Medicare Scheme To Go Nationwide''; ``More Urban
Chinese Receive Healthcare Benefits,'' Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central
People's Government (Online), 13 December 07.
\30\ Of the 50,000 new cases, 44.7 percent were passed through
heterosexual sex, 42 percent from intravenous drug use, 11.2 percent
from men having sex with men, and 1.1 percent from mother to infant
transmission. China has 223,501 registered HIV/AIDS victims as of 2007.
United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, UNGASS
Country Progress Report, P.R. China, January 2008, 4-5; ``China
Launches Nationwide AIDS Prevention, Care Program,'' Xinhua (Online),
28 March 08; Jonathan Watts, ``Sex, Drugs, and HIV/AIDS in China,'' 371
Lancet 103, 104 (2008).
\31\ ``HIV/AIDS Discrimination Widespread in China--U.N.,'' Reuters
(Online), 28 November 07; United Nations General Assembly Special
Session on HIV/AIDS, UNGASS Country Progress Report, P.R. China,
January 2008, 8-9.
\32\ Wen Chihua, ``China's Market Supervisor Joins War Against
AIDS,'' Xinhua (Online), 8 April 08.
\33\ China Development Brief (Online), ``AIDS: Anger and
Recrimination Block Progress in Henan,'' 14 January 08.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ ``Chinese To Undergo Compulsory HIV Testing If Abroad for More
Than One Year,'' Xinhua (Online), 30 November 07.
\36\ Watts, ``Sex, Drugs, and HIV/AIDS in China.''
\37\ ``Chinese To Undergo Compulsory HIV Testing If Abroad for More
Than One Year,'' Xinhua; Shan Juan, ``HIV/AIDS Travel Ban To Be
Lifted,'' China Daily (Online), 6 August 08.
\38\ ``China Continues To Crack Down on HIV/AIDS Web Sites and
Activists,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008,
3.
\39\ ``Infection Rate Lowers for Hepatitis B,'' Shanghai Daily,
reprinted in China Internet Information Center (Online), 21 April 08.
\40\ Ibid.
\41\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 131.
\42\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Dongguan Court Orders Vtech
To Pay Plaintiff 24,000 Yuan in Compensation for HBV Discrimination,''
7 January 08.
\43\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Ministry of Labour Tightens
Controls on Employment Discrimination,'' 9 November 07.
\44\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Five Thousand Petitioners
Demand Hewlett-Packard Take Action Against Hepatitis B
Discrimination,'' 3 September 07.
\45\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 131.
\46\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Dongguan Court Orders Vtech
To Pay Plaintiff 24,000 Yuan.''
\47\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Fighting Back: People Living
with Hepatitis B Stand Up for Their Rights,'' 12 October 07.
\48\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Pressure on Companies'
Illegal HBV Testing Begins To Pay Dividends,'' 13 March 08.
\49\ The applicant sought assistance from the HBV Internet forum,
GanDan XiangZhao, and initiated a civil suit in January 2007. He
claimed 690 yuan (US$101) for ``loss of work time'' and 50,000 yuan
(US$7,280) in emotional damages. China Labour Bulletin (Online),
``Dongguan Court Orders Vtech To Pay Plaintiff 24,000 Yuan.''
\50\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Shanghai HBV Discrimination
Case Reaches Satisfactory Conclusion,'' 24 April 08; Cao Li,
``Hepatitis-B Sufferer Files Job Discrimination Suit,'' China Daily
(Online), 28 February 07.
\51\ ``Beijing Authorities Shut Down Online Forum for Hepatitis B
Carriers'' [Yigan xiedaizhe gongyi wangzhan bei guanbi], Radio Free
Asia (Online), 29 November 07.
\52\ One person mentioned the forum may have been closed because it
helps HBV carriers from across China safeguard their rights. ``Beijing
Authorities Shut Down Online Forum for Hepatitis B Carriers,'' Radio
Free Asia; Beijing Interim Measures on Administration of Medical
Treatment and Health Information Services Over the Internet [Beijing
hulianwang yiliao weisheng xinxi fuwu guanli banfa (zhanxing)], issued
27 March 01, arts. 2, 3, 7.
\53\ Robin Kwong, ``Group Warns China on Website Shutdown,''
Financial Times (Online), 25 June 08; Kelly Chen, ``Hepatitis Activist
Wages War on Prejudice,'' South China Morning Post, 13 July 08 (Open
Source Center, 14 July 08).
\54\ Beijjing Muncipality Regulations on Mental Health [Beijing shi
jingshen weisheng tiaoli], issued 8 December 06.
\55\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 127.
\56\ Murie Dickie, ``Beijing Hospitals Lock Psychiatric Wards,''
Financial Times (Online), 14 August 08.
\57\ ``IBM Found Guilty of Job Discrimination in Shanghai,'' China
Daily (Online), 24 June 08.
\58\ ``Hospitals Need Approval Before Neurosurgical Operations To
Treat Mental Diseases,'' Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People's
Government (Online), 25 April 08.
Notes to Section II--Environment
\1\ Gang He, World Resources Institute (Online), ``China's New
Ministry of Environmental Protection Begins to Bark, but Still Lacks in
Bite,'' 17 July 08; ``SEPA Issues Measures on Open Environmental
Information,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 5.
\2\ ``China's Environment Watchdog Expands,'' Xinhua (Online), 5
August 08.
\3\ Li Jing, ``Environment Ministry Adds 2 Departments,'' China
Daily (Online), 11 July 08; ``China's Environment Watchdog Expands,''
Xinhua. As the central government issues legislative and regulatory
measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gases, implementation and
enforcement at the local level remains a challenge. According to a
study released in October by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, China's
emissions of greenhouse gases could double in the next two decades.
See, e.g., Chris Buckley, ``China Report Warns of Greenhouse Gas
Leap,'' Reuters (Online), 22 October 08; ``China Warns of Huge Rise in
Emissions,'' NewScientist.com (Online), 22 October 08; Elizabeth
Economy, ``China vs. Earth,'' The Nation (Online), 7 May 07.
\4\ Gang He, ``China's New Ministry of Environmental Protection
Begins to Bark''; Charlie McElwee, ``More Tough Talk,'' China
Environmental Law Blog (Online), 18 September 08.
\5\ See, e.g., Charlie McElwee, ``More Tough Talk''; ``Local
Officials to Pay Price of Environmental Failures,'' Xinhua, reprinted
on China Internet Information Center, 12 September 08.
\6\ Gang He, ``China's New Ministry of Environmental Protection
Begins to Bark.''
\7\ Fu Jing, ``Green Axe Hangs Over Local Officials,'' China Daily
(Online), 15 August 08.
\8\ Ibid.
\9\ ``Environmental Watchdogs To Sharpen Teeth,'' China Daily
(Online), 16 April 08.
\10\ `` `Green Olympics' Commitments Raise Concerns Over
Transparency and Implementation,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, January 2008, 2.
\11\ The projects include infrastructure improvements addressing
air and water quality, waste management, and energy. `` `Green
Olympics' Commitments,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, 2.
\12\ Beijing officials point to the city meeting its 2007 target of
245 days of ``blue skies'' as an indicator of improved air quality. But
it remains to be seen if Beijing's air quality during the Olympics--
determined by measuring the levels of four pollutants--will meet
promised World Health Organization (WHO) standards. Levels of sulfur
dioxide meet current WHO standards but particulate matter 10 levels do
not meet these standards. For a summary of the three areas of
environmental commitments for the Beijing Olympics, see ``Zhang Lijun:
Two Measures To Ensure that Air Quality Meets Standards During the
Beijing Olympics Period'' [Zhang Lijun: liang cuoshi quebao beijing
aoyunhui qijian kongqi zhiliang dabiao], Xinhua (Online), 11 March 08.
See also, United Nations Environmental Programme, Beijing 2008 Olympic
Games--An Environmental Review, 25 October 07, 27; `` `Green Olympics'
Commitments,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 2;
``Beijing Squeaks by To Hit `Blue Sky' Target,'' Reuters (Online), 30
December 07; Greenpeace (Online), China after the Olympics: Lessons
from Beijing, 28 July 08, 13-14.
\13\ UNEP will be conducting a post-Games environmental assessment.
United Nations Environmental Programme, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games--An
Environmental Review, 20; Shi Jiangtao, ``Hazy on the Detail,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 14 May 08.
\14\ Austin Ramzy, ``Is Beijing Manipulating Air Pollution
Statistics? '' Time (Online), 17 March 08.
\15\ ``Official: China To Continue Anti-Pollution Campaigns After
Olympics,'' Xinhua (Online), 4 August 08; `` `Green Olympics'
Commitments,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 2.
\16\ ``SEPA Issues Measures on Open Environmental Information,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 5.
\17\ The Measures require environmental protection bureaus (EPBs)
to disclose information on ``environmental quality conditions'' and to
take no longer than 30 business days to reply to requests for
information. EPBs must also disclose environmental statistics,
information on sudden environmental incidents, and the outcomes of
petition letters and complaints, among other items. ``SEPA Issues
Measures on Open Environmental Information,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, 5.
\18\ Such enterprises must disclose information regarding their
major pollutants, environmental protection facilities, and
environmental emergency plans within 30 days of appearing on the list.
``SEPA Issues Measures on Open Environmental Information,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 5.
\19\ Su Yongtong and Zhao Lei, ``The Operation of the New Open
Information Regulations Test the Government's Ability To Reveal the
Truth,'' Southern Weekend, 8 May 08 (Open Source Center, 12 May 08).
\20\ Measures on Open Environmental Information (Trial) [Huanjing
xinxi gongkai banfa (shixing)], issued 11 April 07, art. 12.
Furthermore, Article 17 of the measures provides for an EPB to reject a
request if the information ``does not fall within the scope of
disclosure,'' ``the law provides that disclosure is not within a
department's responsibility,'' the information ``does not exist,'' or
``the content for which the application is being made is unclear.''
``SEPA Issues Measures on Open Environmental Information,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 5.
\21\ Su Yongtong and Zhao Lei, ``The Operation of the New Open
Information Regulations Test the Government's Ability To Reveal the
Truth,'' Southern Weekend, 8 May 08 (Open Source Center, 29 July 08).
\22\ ``SEPA Director Says Public Protests Over Pollution Rising by
29 Percent Per Year,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
June 2006, 13-14.
\23\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 136; Candy Zeng,
``Green Challenge to China's Mega-Projects,'' Asia Times (Online), 20
March 08; Diao Jicheng, ``Dissatisfied at the Government Constructing
Petrochemical Plants, 300 Chengdu Residents `Take a Stroll,' '' Wen Wei
Po, 6 May 08 (Open Source Center, 12 May 08).
\24\ ``Relief Work May Help Speed Up Growth of Ad-Hoc Activism,''
Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post (Online), 9 June 08; Zhu
Hongjun and Su Yongtong, ``The People and Wisdom Changed Xiamen,''
Southern Weekend (Online), 19 December 07, translated on the Web site
of EastSouthWestNorth.
\25\ Joey Liu, ``Chemical Plant Not Dead Yet, Officials Say,''
South China Morning Post, 19 December 07 (Open Source Center, 19
December 07); Edward Wong, ``In China City, Protesters See Pollution
Risk of New Plant,'' New York Times (Online), 6 May 08.
\26\ Xiamen residents benefited from the concerns of 105 members of
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, expressed in
March 2007, as well as the support of several local deputies to the
National People's Congress. In the Guangzhou case, 14 Guangdong
legislators voiced worries about pollution from the proposed $5 billion
Sinopec-Kuwait refinery project, which may have influenced the decision
to await approval from the Ministry for Environmental Protection before
proceeding with construction. ``Xiamen Suspends Controversial Chemical
Project,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 30 May 07; Wang
Er, ``Xiamen Again Says `No' to PX Project,'' Caijing (Online), 19
December 07. The National Development and Reform Commission had
approved the refinery project at the end of 2007. Candy Zeng, ``Green
Challenge to China's Mega-Projects.''
\27\ For example, see ``East China Maglev Project Suspended Amid
Radiation Concerns,'' Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 27
May 07; Xie Liangbing, ``Xiamen PX Incident: Expression of Popular
Opinion in the New Media Era,'' China Newsweek (Online), 11 June 07,
translated on the Web site of Danwei.org; Edward Wong, ``In China City,
Protesters See Pollution Risk of New Plant.''
\28\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 86; CECC Staff Interview; Xie
Liangbing, ``Xiamen PX Incident.''
\29\ ``Xiamen Suspends Controversial Chemical Project,'' Xinhua.
\30\ People used online forums to also discuss concerns over
pollution at other chemical plants in Haicang district as well as the
effect on other places should the plant be relocated there. Joey Liu,
``Chemical Plant Not Dead Yet, Officials Say''; ``People vs. Chemical
Plant,'' Zhongguo Wang (Online), 14 January 08; Zhu Hongjun, ``Xiamen
Calls An Abrupt Halt to the PX Project To Deal With the Public
Crisis,'' Southern Weekend (Online), 28 May 07, translated on the Web
site of EastSouthWestNorth.
\31\ Officials reportedly screened the text message and made it
difficult to send or receive the message after a while. Xie Liangbing,
``Xiamen PX Incident.'' The plant is slated to produce 800,000 tons of
paraxylene and generate about 80 billion yuan (then US$10.45 billion)
in annual revenue, which would have been a significant boost to
Xiamen's GDP of 112.6 billion yuan in 2006. ``People vs. Chemical
Plant,'' Zhongguo Wang; ``Xiamen Suspends Controversial Chemical
Project,'' Xinhua; Edward Cody, ``Text Messages Giving Voice to
Chinese,'' Washington Post (Online), 28 June 07.
\32\ Zhu Hongjun, ``Xiamen Calls An Abrupt Halt to the PX
Project.''
\33\ Ibid.
\34\ The exact number of people who ``took a stroll'' is unknown. A
Wen Wei Po article June 3, 2007, mentions close to 1,000 people while a
June 13 Straits Times article puts the number at more than 10,000. A
Washington Post article dated June 28 puts the number at 8,000 to
10,000 the first day and 4,000 to 5,000 the second day. ``Xiamen
Police-Civilian Standoff Over Call To Halt Chemical Plant,'' Wen Wei
Po, 3 June 07 (Open Source Center, 4 June 07); Chua Chin Hon, ``Firm
Tries To Quash Fears Over Chemical Factory--It Says Paraxylene, Used in
Polyester and Fabrics, Is no More Dangerous Than Petrol,'' Straits
Times, 13 June 07 (Open Source Center, 13 June 07); Cody, ``Text
Messages Giving Voice to Chinese.''
\35\ ``China To Improve Environmental Assessment After
Controversial PX Project,'' Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People's
Government (Online), 23 June 07.
\36\ The Xiamen government also mailed out approximately 250,000
booklets titled ``How much do you know about PX'' in June. Zhu Hongjun,
``Behind the Scenes in Xiamen,'' Southern Weekend (Online), 19 December
07, translated on the Web site of EastSouthWestNorth; Zhu Hongjun and
Su Yongtong, ``The People and Wisdom Changed Xiamen''; ``Citizens to
Rejoin Debate Over Controversial Plant,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China
Daily (Online), 5 December 07.
\37\ Sun Xiaohua, ``Planning Regulation To Be Ready By Year End,''
China Daily (Online), 28 April 08.
\38\ Ibid.
\39\ ``Citizens to Rejoin Debate Over Controversial Plant,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 5 December 07; Zhu Hongjun
and Su Yongtong, ``The People and Wisdom Changed Xiamen.''
\40\ ``Citizens to Rejoin Debate Over Controversial Plant,''
Xinhua; Joey Liu, ``Xiamen Residents Say No to Toxic Plant,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 15 December 07.
\41\ Zhu Hongjun, ``Behind the Scenes in Xiamen''; Joey Liu,
``Xiamen Residents Say No to Toxic Plant''; Wang Er, ``Xiamen Again
Says `No' to PX Project.''
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ Zhu Hongjun, ``Behind the Scenes in Xiamen.''
\44\ Laura Belle Kearns, China Elections and Governance, ``Xiamen
PX: Have the Chinese People Found Their Voice? '' 19 January 08.
\45\ Zhu Hongjun, ``Behind the Scenes in Xiamen''; Candy Zeng,
``Green Challenge to China's Mega-Projects''; ``Xiamen Mayor:
Controversial Chemical Plant To Be Relocated After Public Protest,''
Xinhua (Online), 7 March 08.
\46\ ``Xiamen Mayor: Controversial Chemical Plant To Be Relocated
After Public Protest,'' Xinhua.
\47\ It appears that Gulei Peninsula officials welcomed the
project. Zhu Hongjun and Su Yongtong, ``The People and Wisdom Changed
Xiamen''; Edward Cody, ``Thousands Clash with Police in S. China;
Rumors of Chemical Factory Construction Spark Four Days of
Demonstrations,'' Washington Post (Online), 4 March 08.
\48\ The Washington Post reported that at least 10,000 people
participated in the protests at some point. Cody, ``Thousands Clash
with Police in S. China''; Joey Liu, ``Chemical Plant Plan Enrages
Islanders,'' South China Morning Post, 3 March 08 (Open Source Center,
3 March 08).
\49\ Cody, ``Thousands Clash with Police in S. China.''
\50\ ``Victory of Public Opinion in Xiamen Isn't Really a Victory
for the Common People'' [Xiamen minyi de shengli bingfei shumin de
shengli], Guangzhou Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 26 December
07.
\51\ ``Shanghai Maglev Extension Not on 2008 Start List,'' Reuters
(Online), 6 March 08.
\52\ Howard French, ``Plan to Extend Shanghai Rail Line Stirs
Middle Class to Protest,'' New York Times (Online), 27 January 08;
Howard French, ``Ire Over Shanghai Rail Line May Signal Turning
Point,'' New York Times (Online), 10 August 07.
\53\ Howard French, ``Ire Over Shanghai Rail Line May Signal
Turning Point''; Josephine Ma, ``Work On Maglev Reignites Protests,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 11 January 08; ``East China Maglev
Project Suspended Amid Radiation Concerns,'' Xinhua (Online), 27 May
07.
\54\ Howard French, ``Plan to Extend Shanghai Rail Line Stirs
Middle Class to Protest.''
\55\ Ibid.
\56\ Ibid.
\57\ Ibid.
\58\ ``Shanghai Maglev Extension Not on 2008 Start List,'' Reuters.
\59\ Fang Yan, ``High-speed Rail Plan may Delay China Maglev--
Mayor'', Reuters (Online), 2 September 08; ``East China Maglev Project
Suspended,'' Xinhua.
\60\ The number of protesters is unclear. A New York Times article
dated May 6 places the number of protesters at 400 to 500, while a Wen
Wei Po article from the same date mentions 300 protesters. The two
plants were to be located 35 kilometers (22 miles) northwest from the
center of Chengdu in Pengzhou. The two plants, a joint venture between
the Sichuan provincial government and PetroChina, had a combined budget
of 50 billion yuan (US$5.5 billion). The ethylene plant had an annual
production capacity of 800,000 tons, and the other plant, an oil
refinery, had an annual production capacity of 10 million tons.
``Chengdu's `Stroll': A Rational Expression of Popular Will'' [Chengdu
``sanbu:'' lixing de minyi biaoda], Beijing News (Online), 6 May 08;
``200 Chengdu Citizens `Take a Stroll' To Protest Chemical Plants''
[Rong liangbai ren ``sanbu'' dizhi jian huagong xiangmu], Beijing News
(Online), 5 May 08; Edward Wong, ``In China City, Protesters See
Pollution Risk of New Plant,'' New York Times (Online), 6 May 08; Diao
Jicheng, ``Dissatisfied at the Government Constructing Petrochemical
Plants, 300 Chengdu Residents `Take a Stroll,' '' Wen Wei Po, 6 May 08
(Open Source Center, 12 May 08).
\61\ ``200 Chengdu Citizens `Take a Stroll' To Protest Chemical
Plants,'' Beijing News; Wong, ``In China City, Protesters See Pollution
Risk of New Plant.''
\62\ ``200 Chengdu Citizens `Take a Stroll' To Protest Chemical
Plants,'' Beijing News.
\63\ ``200 Chengdu Citizens `Take a Stroll' To Protest Chemical
Plants,'' Beijing News; Wong, ``In China City, Protesters See Pollution
Risk of New Plant.''
\64\ ``200 Chengdu Citizens `Take a Stroll' To Protest Chemical
Plants,'' Beijing News.
\65\ ``Relief Work May Help Speed Up Growth of Ad-Hoc Activism,''
Reuters; ``Petrochina Reviews Plan for 50b Yuan Plant in Quake Zone,''
South China Morning Post, 16 May 08 (Open Source Center, 16 May 08).
\66\ One text message read: ``Protect our Chengdu, safeguard our
homeland. Stay away from the threat of pollution. Restore the clear
water and green mountains of Sichuan.'' A Chengdu resident posted a
message online in April that said, ``On 4 May from 1500 to 1700, stroll
between Jiuyan Bridge and Wangjiang Tower. No banners, no slogans,
don't assemble, don't demonstrate.'' Wong, ``In China City, Protesters
See Pollution Risk of New Plant''; Huang Zhiling, ``Chengdu People Walk
to Express Environmental Concerns,'' China Daily (Online), 6 May 08;
Diao Jicheng, ``Dissatisfied at the Government Constructing
Petrochemical Plants.''
\67\ Diao Jicheng, ``Dissatisfied at the Government Constructing
Petrochemical Plants''; ``China Social Unrest Briefing 1-14 May 08,''
BBC, 14 May 08 (Open Source Center, 14 May 08).
\68\ Pen American Center (Online), ``Chen Daojun Detained as
Crackdown Intensifies in China During Olympic Torch Relay,'' 12 May 08;
Chen Daojun, ``Quickly Together, People of Chengdu Facing Extinction''
[Gankuai qilai, mianlin juezhong de chengdu ren], China EWeekly
(Online), 5 May 08.
\69\ ``May 4 `Collective Stroll' Organizer Detained Because of
Sending Text Message Calling for Others to Take Another `Stroll' ''
[Wusi ``jiti sanbu'' gugan chengyuan yin fa duanxin haozhao zaici sanbu
zao juliu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 May 08; Wu Maosheng, ``Two or
Three Incidents Involving Author Chen Yunfei--A Public Citizen is
Born'' [Ji Chen Yunfei xiansheng er san shi--yi ge gongmin de
dansheng], New Century Net (Online), 22 July 08.
\70\ ``May 4 `Collective Stroll' Organizer Detained,'' Radio Free
Asia; ``Chengdu Police Punish Those Who Used the Sichuan Petrochemical
Project To Disseminate Rumors Over the Internet'' [Chengdu jingfang
chufa liyong sichuan shihua xiangmu wang shang sanbu yaoyan zhe],
Sichuan Daily (Online), 10 May 08.
\71\ Gang He, ``Environmental Challenges after China's Sichuan
Earthquake,'' World Resources Institute, Earthtrends (Online), 24 June
08.
\72\ ``Nuclear Facilities in Quake Regions Safe,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Internet Information Center (Online), 23 May 08;
William Broad, ``Global Monitor Finds No Radioactive Leaks in Quake
Zone,'' New York Times (Online), 22 May 08; William Foreman, ``China
Contains Radiation in Quake Disaster Zone,'' Associated Press (Online),
24 May 08.
\73\ ``Nuclear Facilities in Quake Regions Safe,'' Xinhua.
\74\ Broad, ``Global Monitor Finds No Radioactive Leaks in Quake
Zone.''
\75\ Foreman, ``China Contains Radiation in Quake Disaster Zone.''
\76\ Ouyang Hongliang, ``Shifang's Chemical Fertilizer Plants
Leak,'' Caijing (Online), 19 May 08.
\77\ ``China Quake Risk to Dams, Nuclear Sites,'' Reuters,
reprinted in Australian (Online), 15 May 08.
\78\ ``Nuclear Facilities in Quake Regions Safe,'' Xinhua.
\79\ ``No Major Pollution in Quake Zone,'' Xinhua, reprinted in PRC
Central People's Government (Online), 20 June 08.
\80\ Hepeng Jia, ``China Assesses Sichuan Earthquake's
Environmental Costs,'' Royal Society of Chemistry, Chemistry World
(Online), 18 June 08.
Notes to Section II--2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games
\1\ Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Games, ``Mr. Liu Qi's
Speech,'' 13 July 01. See, also, ``Journalists To Write Whatever They
Like If Beijing Holds 2008 Games,'' China Daily (Online), 12 July 01
(event ``not only promotes our economy but also enhances all social
conditions, including education, health and human rights'').
\2\ Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Games, Beijing Candidature
Files, ``Volume I--Introduction,'' last visited 15 September 08, 15;
Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Games, Beijing Candidature Files,
``Volume I--Theme 4 Environmental Protection and Meteorology,'' last
visited 15 September 08, 55; Official Website of the Beijing 2008
Games, Beijing Candidature Files, ``Volume III--Introduction,'' last
visited 15 September 08, 5.
\3\ Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Beijing
Olympic Action Plan, ``I. Overall Strategic Concept--3. Strategic
Principles,'' 10 September 03.
\4\ See, e.g., ``Propaganda Chiefs Order Editors To `Toe the Line'
in Bid To Counter Bad Games Publicity,'' South China Morning Post
(Online), 13 November 07.
\5\ ``Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months'
Imprisonment,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/
April 2008, 1; ``Land Rights Activist Yang Chunlin Sentenced to Five
Years,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/April
2008, 1; Jim Yardley, ``China Disbars Lawyers Who Offered to Defend
Tibetans,'' New York Times (Online), 4 June 08. See, also, Amnesty
International (Online), ``The Olympics Countdown--Crackdown on
Activists Threatens Olympics Legacy,'' 1 April 08, 1. Amnesty observed:
``Peaceful human rights activists, and others who have publicly
criticized government policy, have been targeted in the official pre-
Olympics `clean up', in an apparent attempt to portray a `stable' or
`harmonious' image to the world by August 2008.''
\6\ ``Under Olympics House Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 25
July 08; Ding Xiao, ``Lawyers Have Become a Target of Beijing Olympics
Security Precautions'' [Lushi cheng Jing ao anbao fangfan duixiang],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 July 08; Ding Xiao, ``Olympic Security
Requires Dissident Intellectuals To Leave Beijing for Travel'' [Aoyun
anbao yaoqiu yiyi zhishifenzi li Jing luyou], Radio Free Asia (Online),
31 July 08.
\7\ Amnesty International, ``The Olympics Countdown,'' 1; ``Beijing
Employs Both Soft and Hard Tactics To Drive Out All Petitioners,''
Oriental Daily, 17 July 08.
\8\ Bill Savadore, ``Shanghai Bars Dissidents from Speaking to
Foreign Journalists,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 25 June 08.
\9\ ``Beijing Sweeps Out Migrants in Pre-Games Clean-up,'' Agence
France-Presse (Online), 24 July 08; ``No Workers Will Be Sent Home,''
China Daily (Online), 16 September 06.
\10\ Maureen Fan, ``China Defends Relocation Policy,'' Washington
Post (Online), 20 February 08; Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
(Online), ``Fair Play for Housing Rights: Mega-Events, Olympic Games
and Housing Rights,'' June 2007, 159; Chinese Human Rights Defenders
(Online), ``Survey of Land Expropriation in 2008 Beijing Olympics Main
Competition Venue Areas'' [2008 nian beijing aoyun zhuchang guan diqu
shidi nongmin diaocha baogao], 4 February 08.
\11\ ``China Clampdown for Olympic Torch in Xinjiang: Residents,
Exiles,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 15 June 08.
\12\ Kristine Kwok, ``Police Force Pastor To Leave Beijing,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 20 July 08; China Aid Association
(Online), ``Pastor Bike Mingxuan and Wife Released From Detention But
Prohibited From Returning to Beijing,'' 29 August 08.
\13\ Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Thousands of Falun
Gong Adherents Arrested Throughout China in Run Up to Olympics,'' 7
July 08.
\14\ ``Beijing Public Security Bureau: Since August 77 Applications
for Assembly or Demonstrations Have Been Received'' [Beijing gonganju:
8 yue yilai gong diedai shenqing jihui youxing shi wei 77 qi], Xinhua,
reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 18 August 08; Jim Yardley,
``China Sets Zones for Olympic Protests,'' New York Times (Online), 24
July 08.
\15\ ``Grannies Vow To Fight on After Punishment for Olympic
Protests,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 22 August 08; Andrew Jacobs,
``Would-Be Protester Detained in China,'' New York Times (Online), 18
August 08.
\16\ ``Grannies Vow To Fight,'' Agence France-Presse.
\17\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Authorities Relent on
Reeducation-Through-Labor Sentence for Elderly Women who Applied for
Protest Permit,'' 29 August 08.
\18\ ``Chinese Government Relaxes Restrictions on Foreign
Journalists for Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), 30 November 07.
\19\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 11.
\20\ ``China's Earthquake Coverage More Open but Not Uncensored,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 2.
\21\ ``China Blocks Foreign Reporters From Covering Tibetan
Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
2-3; ``China's Earthquake Coverage More Open But Not Uncensored,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 2.
\22\ Foreign Correspondents Club of China (Online), ``Chinese
Government Should Live Up to Olympic Spirit With Enduring Commitment to
Free Reporting,'' 8 July 08.
\23\ Foreign Correspondents Club of China (Online), ``Reporting
Interference Tally,'' visited on 21 October 08.
\24\ Foreign Correspondents Club of China (Online), ``2007 Survey
on Reporting Conditions,'' 1 August 07; Foreign Correspondents Club of
China, ``FCCC: China Fails''; Human Rights Watch (Online), ``IV.
Harassment of Foreign Correspondents' Chinese Staff and Sources,'' 3
October 07.
\25\ Reporters Without Borders (Online), ``Disturbing New
Regulations Prior to Olympic Games, Increased Control in Sichuan,'' 10
June 08; Stephen Wade, ``Networks, Olympics Organizers Clash,''
Associated Press (Online), 8 June 08; ``The Human Toll of the
Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 1
August 08; ``Media Free To Roam in China During 2008 Games,'' Reuters,
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 27 September 06.
\26\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign Ministry News
Department Head Liu Jianchao Hosts Sino-Foreign Journalists Press
Conference on State Council's Promulgation of the Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent
Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists'' [Waijiaobu
xinwen si sizhang liu jianchao jiu guowuyuan panbu shishi ``zhonghua
renmin gongheguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli''
juxing zhongwai jizhe hui], 17 October 08.
\27\ Regulations Concerning Foreign Journalists and Permanent
Offices of Foreign News Agencies [Waiguo jizhe he waiguo changzhu
xinwen jigou guanli tiaoli], issued 19 January 90, art. 15; ``Analysis:
China's New Foreign Media Rules an Important Step Toward Making China
More Open,'' Xinhua (Online), 20 October 08.
\28\ Regulations of the People's Republic of China on News Covering
Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies and
Foreign Journalists [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen
jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli], issued 17 October 08, art. 17.
\29\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Liu Jianchao Hosts Sino-Foreign
Journalists Press Conference.''
\30\ Except where otherwise noted, information in this boxed
subsection is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang
During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), forthcoming.
\31\ Information in this bulleted item, other than information on
Ramadan, is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang
During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), forthcoming. For information on controls over Ramadan, see,
e.g., Shayar County Government (Online), ``Town of Yengi Mehelle in
Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures To Strengthen Management
During Ramadan'' [Shaya xian yingmaili zhen caiqu jiu xiang
cuoshijiaqiang ``zhaiyue'' qijian guanli], 28 August 08; ``Five
Measures from Mongghulkure County Ensure Ramadan Management and
Olympics Security'' [Zhaosu xian wu cuoshi tiqian zuohao zhaiyue guanli
bao ao yun wending], Fazhi Xinjiang (Online), 23 August 08; ``Toqsu
County Deploys Work to Safeguard Stability During Ramadan'' [Xinhe xian
bushu zhaiyue qijian weiwen gongzuo], Xinjiang Peace Net (Online), 2
September 08.
\32\ The directive is entitled ``A Propaganda Outline Regarding the
Prevention of `Falun Gong' Interference with and Harming of the Beijing
Olympics,'' or in Chinese ``Guanyu Fangfan `Falun Gong' Ganrao Pohuai
Beijing Aoyunhui de Xuanjiang Tigang.'' While references to this
directive are abundant and easy to locate on the Chinese Web, the full
text does not appear to be publicly available.
\33\ Examples include: Urumqi Municipal Government, Shayibake
District, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Online), ``The Olympic
Security Work Implementation Scheme for the Friendly South District''
[Youhao nan diqu aoyun anbao gongzuo shishi fang'an], 3 April 08;
Ge'Ermu City Economic and Trade Commission (Online), ``Municipal
Economic and Trade Commission Launches Activities and Discussions
Focusing on `A Propaganda Outline Regarding the Prevention of ``Falun
Gong'' Interference with and Harming of the Beijing Olympics' '' [Shi
jingmaowei kaizhan xuanjiang `guanyu fangfan ``falun gong'' ganrao
pohuai beijing aoyunhui de xuanjiang tigang'], 4 June 08; Weining Yi
Hui Miao Ethnic Autonomous County Government (Online), ``Xiaohai
Township Launches Guarding Against `Falun Gong' Interference and
Destruction of Beijing Olympics Discussion Activities'' [Xiaohai zhen
kaizhan ``falun gong'' ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui xuanjiang
huodong], 8 July 08; Tibetan Science and Technology Committee (Online),
``The District S&T Office Studies `A Propaganda Outline Regarding the
Prevention of `Falun Gong' Interference with and Harming of the Beijing
Olympics' '' [Qu kejiting xuexi xuanchuan `guanyu fangfan ``falun gong'
ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui de xuanjiang tigang], 13 June 08;
Political and Legal Committee of Huocheng County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Online), ``Huocheng
County Bureau of Public Health Seriously Studies Anti-Cult Discussion
Outline'' [Huocheng xian weishengju renzhen xuexi fanxiejiao xuanjiang
tigang], 2 June 08.
\34\ Er'lianhaote City Law Enforcement Department, Xilinguole
League (Online), ``Law Enforcement Department Launches Activities to
Publicize Efforts to Guard Against `Falun Gong' Interference with
Beijing Olympics'' [Xingzheng zhifaju kaizhan fangfan ``falun gong''
ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui xuanjiang huodong], 19 June 08; Luxi
City Department of National Resources (Online), ``Luxi City National
Resources Department Launches Guarding Against `Falun Gong'
Interference and Destruction of Beijing Olympics Discussion
Activities'' [Luxi shi guotu ziyuan ju jiji kaizhan fangfan ``falun
gong'' ganrao pohuai beijing aoyunhui xuanjiang huodong], 26 June 08;
Qianjiang District Government (Online), ``Zhengyang Township Steadily
Carries Out Prevention and Punishment of Cults'' [Zhengyang zhen zhashi
zuohao fangchu xiejiao gongzuo], 14 June 08.
\35\ Chengdu Dayi County Adolescent Ideology and Morality
Development Network (Online), ``Propaganda and Education Activities to
Guard Against `Falun Gong' Interference with and Destruction of the
Beijing Olympics'' [Fangfan ``falun gong'' ganrao pohuai beijing
aoyunhui xuanjiang jiaoyu huodong], 13 June 08; International Cargo
Transport Limited of China (Online), ``International Cargo Transport of
China, Hangzhou Headquarters Convenes Plenary Meeting on Situation''
[Zhongguo guoji huoyun hangkong hangzhou yunying jidi zhaokai xingshi
dahui], 24 June 08; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, South China Sea
Institute of Oceanology (Online), ``Our Institute Convenes Meeting to
Discuss Protecting Stability and Defending Security Work'' [Wosuo
zhaokai weihu wending, anquan baowei yu anquan chansheng gongzuo
huiyi], 19 June 08.
\36\ Laigang Anti-Cult Association, reprinted in Zhengqi Web
(Online), ``Laigang Anti-Cult Association Propaganda Activities Yield
Results,'' [Laigang fanxiejiao xiehui xuanjiang huodong qude
chengxiao], 31 July 08.
\37\ ``Shanghai To Restrict Dissidents During Olympics,''
Associated Press (Online), 24 June 08.
\38\ ``Religious Texts Allowed at Beijing Olympics, But for
Personal Use; Falun Gong Excluded,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
International Herald Tribune (Online), 7 November 07.
\39\ ``Beijing Offers Hefty Rewards for Security Threat Information
During Olympics,'' Xinhua (Online), 11 July 08.
\40\ Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Thousands of Falun
Gong Adherents Arrested Throughout China in Run Up to Olympics,'' 7
July 08. The list of 141 practitioners detained in Beijing from January
2008 to June 2008 can be accessed at http://faluninfo.net/media/doc/
2008/07/141-new-cases.pdf.
\41\ Chinese public security officials also used supposed security
concerns to justify a request made to the government of Japan in which
they solicited information on Falun Gong practitioners based in Japan
who might attend the Games. The Japanese government refused to
cooperate. ``China Asks Japan for Information on Falun Gong Members
Ahead of Olympics,'' Kyodo World Service (Online), 17 July 08; Timothy
Chui, ``More Games Security To Come, Says Expert,'' Hong Kong Standard
(Online), 19 May 08; Edward Cody, ``China Set to Protect Olympics,''
Washington Post (Online), 25 July 08.
\42\ ``Interview with Tian Yixiang, Head of the Military Affairs
Department of the Beijing Olympics Protection Leading Group''
[Zhuanfang aoyun anbao xietiao gongzuo xiaozu jundui bu tian yixiang],
Outlook Weekly (Online), 8 July 08; ``PLA Has Finalized Plans to Deal
With Sudden Contingencies During Olympic Games'' [Jiefangjun aoyun
anbao budui yi zhiding chongfen cuoshi yingdui tufa shijian], China
News (Online), 8 May 08.
\43\ ``Olympic Counterterrorism Warning: Major Threats are Eastern
Turkestan, Tibetan Independence, and Falun Gong'' [Aoyun laxiang
fankong jingbao: zhuyao fangfan dongtu zangdu xiejiao falungong],
ChinaGo (Online), 24 July 08.
Notes to Section III--Civil Society
\1\ Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, and Regina List,
Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, ``Global Civil Society:
An Overview,'' 2003, 7-8. Civil society sector, non-governmental
organizations, or civil society organizations generally refer to a
broad array of organizations that are essentially private, i.e.,
outside the institutional structures of government; that are not
primarily commercial and do not exist primarily to distribute profits
to their directors or owners; that are self-governing; and that people
are free to join or support voluntarily.
\2\ See, e.g., Henry Sanderson, ``China Crackdown Targets Critics
Ahead of Olympics,'' Associated Press (Online), 11 July 08; Jill Drew,
``China's Silencing Season: Activist Journalists and Lawyers Jailed,
Harassed in Far-Reaching Pre-Olympic Operation,'' Washington Post
(Online), 10 July 08; ``As Olympics Approach, Oppressive Grip
Tightens,'' Epoch Times (Online), 9 July 08; ``Blockade of NGO Websites
Seen As Pre-Olympic Crackdown,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 25
June 08.
\3\ Xiong Lei, Worldwatch Institute, "Civil Society Emerging Around
Calls for Sustainable Urbanization," 26 April 07.
\4\ See, e.g., Wang Yingchun, ``NGOs Play Greater Role in Post-
Disaster Reconstruction'' [NGO zai zaihou chongjian zhongde youshi
jiang geng mingxian], China Economic Herald (Online), 2 June 08; Wang
Zhuoqiong, ``CPC Official Praises NGOs' Role in Relief Work,'' China
Daily (Online), 27 May 08.
\5\ Liu Xiaobo, ``The Rise of Civil Society in China,'' 3 China
Rights Forum, 16, 16-17 (2003).
\6\ See, e.g., Zhang Ye, Brookings Institute (Online), ``China's
Emerging Civil Society," June 2003, 9-11; Guobin Yang, ``Environmental
NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,'' 181 China Quarterly 46, 54-
55 (2005); Huang An, ``Workers' `Self-Help' Efforts Under
Globalization,'' South Wind Window [Nanfengchuang], translated by China
Labor News Translation, 16 November 07.
\7\ ``Nearly 2.37 Million Chinese Receive Legal Aid in Past Five
Years,'' Xinhua (Online), 4 September 08. Since the adoption of the
Regulation on Legal Aid in 2003, 2.37 million people have received
legal assistance in 1.35 million cases. The government spent 76 million
U.S. dollars on legal aid in 2007. There were 12,285 full-time legal
aid personnel, including 5,927 lawyers and 76,890 registered
volunteers, in 3,239 legal aid organizations by the end of 2007.
\8\ Ministry of Civil Affairs (Online), 2007 Civil Affairs
Development Statistics Report (Civil Society Organizations), June 2008.
According to this report, there were 212,000 social organizations
(shehui tuanti), 174,000 non-governmental and non-commercial
enterprises (minban feiqiye), and 1,340 foundations (jijinhui) at the
end of 2007.
\9\ Regulations on the Management of Foundations [Jijin hui guanli
tiaoli], issued 8 March 04, effective 1 June 04; Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti
dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98; Temporary
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental,
Non-Commercial Enterprises [Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing
tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98.
\10\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State (Online), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007,
China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 08.
\11\ Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests, art. 22, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 79.
\12\ Many NGOs encounter difficulty in securing a sponsor
organization and have to struggle for legitimacy. U.S. Embassy in
Beijing (Online), ``Chinese NGOs--Carving A Niche within Constraints,''
20 January 03.
\13\ Ibid.
\14\ Only organizations registered for ``public fundraising''
purposes can collect donations, and only registered public welfare
organizations can receive donations. As a result, the government
monopolizes domestic philanthropy through the Red Cross Society of
China and China Charity Federation. Regulations on the Management of
Foundations [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli], issued 8 March 04, arts. 3, 25,
40; Public Welfare Donations Law [Zhonghuarenmin gongheguo gongyishiye
juanzengfa], enacted 28 June 99, arts. 3, 10. The Ministry of Civil
Affairs issued a public notice (No. 108) on June 10, 2008, stating that
organizations without registered purpose for public fundraising can
apply for approval to solicit funding and goods for quake relief.
Ministry of Civil Affairs Public Announcement: Number 108 [Minzheng bu
gong gao di 108 hao], issued 10 June 08.
\15\ ``Management of Earthquake Donation Tests the Chinese
Government,'' ChinaStakes.com, 3 June 08.
\16\ ``Quake Shakes `Official' Charities in China,'' Caijing
(Online), 30 June 08; Xie Kangbao, China Development Brief (Online),
``Wenchuan Earthquake: NGOs' Growth and Challenges'' [Wenchuan dizhen:
NGO de shenzhang yu jiannan tupo], 4 June 08.
\17\ Winny Wang, ``China's First Charity Law Under Discussion,''
Shanghai Daily (Online), 22 August 07.
\18\ Bureau of Management of Social Organizations of Shanghai City
(Online), ``State Council Legal Office Goes to Shanghai to Investigate
Provisional Regulations on NGOs'' [Guowuyuan fazhiban fuhu diaoyan
minban feiqiye danwei guanli zhanxing tiaoli], 25 June 08; Wu Xiaofeng
and Wang Feng, ``Ministry of Civil Affairs: Revisions to the
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations
Are Underway'' [Minzhengbu shehuituanti dengjiguanli tiaoli xiuding
gongzuo zhengzai jinxing], Legal Daily (Online), 3 August 08.
\19\ See, e.g., Mary-Anne Toy, ``China Fears the Power of Its
Society,'' Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 10 June 08; China
Development Brief (Online), ``Full Steam Ahead for `Charity' Even as
Brakes Are Applied to NGOs,'' 20 October 07.
\20\ Yongding, ``China's Color-Coded Crackdown,'' Foreign Policy
(Online), 18 October 05.
\21\ Jill Drew and Maureen Fan, ``China Falls Short on Vows for
Olympics,'' Washington Post (Online), 21 April 08.
\22\ See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices--2007, China; Human Rights Watch (Online), ``World
Report 2008: China,'' 31 January 08.
\23\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Essential Background: Overview
of Human Rights Issues in China,'' 1 January 04.
\24\ Xin Yu, "Authorties Surrounded Guo Quan After His Article
Critical of the Olympics" [Guo quan wangshang fabiao piping aoyun
wenzhang shou dangju daliang renyuan baowei], Radio Free Asia (Online),
11 August 08.
\25\ ``China Democracy Party's Yue Tianxiang Taken by Shanghai
Police Without Reason'' [Zhongguo mingzhudang yue tianxiang bei
shanghai jingfang wugu daizou wenhua], Boxun (Online), 19 June 08.
\26\ ``Hunan China Democracy Party's Xie Changfa Detained for
`Inciting Subversion' '' [Hunan minzhudang renshi xie changfa beiyi
shexian dianfu guojia zhengquanzui juyi], Boxun (Online), 19 July 08.
\27\ ``Police Continue To Suppress China Democracy Party's Huang
Xiaoqin After Jail Release'' [Zhongguo minzhudang huang xiaoqin
chuyuhou jixu shoudao gongan daya], Boxun (Online), 6 July 08.
\28\ See, e.g., Ethan Cole, "Chinese House Church Head Forced to
Live on Streets," Christian Post, reprinted in Christian Today
(Online), 21 July 08; China Aid Association (Online), ``President of
Chinese House Church Alliance Forced to Live on Streets,'' 18 July 08.
\29\ China Aid Association (Online), ``International Petition
Campaign Launched to Free Arrested Senior House Church Leader, Pastor
Zhang ``Bike'' Mingxuan,'' 26 August 08.
\30\ Nick Young, China Development Brief (Online), ``Message from
the Editor,'' 12 July 07. Later in October of 2007, the editor decided
to discontinue the entire publication.
\31\ Ibid., 10 October 07. An alien considered a potential threat
to China's national security and public order shall not be permitted to
enter China. Law of the People's Republic of China on Control of the
Entry and Exit of Aliens [Zhonghuarenmin gongheguo waiguoren rujing
chujing guanlifa], enacted 22 November 85, art. 12.
\32\ ``China Continues to Crack Down on HIV/AIDS Web Sites and
Activists,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 25
June 08.
\33\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Detained AIDS
Activist Quietly Sentenced After Long Delay,'' 26 August 08.
\34\ Aizhixing Research Institute, ``Call for Wang Xiaoqiao's
Immediate Release without Conditions'' [Wang xiaoqiao an jintian
kaiting women huyu liji wutiaojianshifang], reprinted in Boxun
(Online), 12 June 08.
\35\ Gao Shan, ``China AIDS Museum Website Shut Down by
Authorities'' [Zhongguo aizibing buowuguan wangzhan zaodao guanbi],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 May 08.
\36\ See, e.g., Calum MacLeod, ``China Activists Harassed for
Speaking on Human Rights,'' USA Today (Online), 27 May 08; ``Activists
Complain of Harassment Before U.S., China Human Rights Talks,''
Associated Press (Online), 27 May 08; Human Rights in China (Online),
``Press Release: HRIC Deplores Intimidation of Rights Activists Ahead
of U.S.-China Talks on Human Rights,'' 27 May 08.
\37\ ``Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months'
Imprisonment,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/
April 2008, 1; ``Beijing Court Tries Hu Jia, Official Abuses
Reported,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 28
March 08; ``Beijing Public Security Officials Formally Arrest Activist
Hu Jia,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008,
2.
\38\ Daniel Schearf, ``Chinese Authorities Prevent Multinational
AIDS Rights Conference,'' Voice of America (Online), 29 July 07.
\39\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Letter to Peter Piot, Executive
Director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS,'' 27
September 07.
\40\ Public Welfare Donations Law, enacted 28 June 99, effective 1
September 99, arts. 24, 25, 26, 27; Corporate Income Tax Law
[Zhonghuarenmin gongheguo qiyesuode shuifa], enacted 16 March 07,
effective 1 January 08, art. 26(4).
\41\ ``Companies Rush to Show Generosity Over China Earthquake,''
Agence France-Presse (Online), 2 June 08.
\42\ See, e.g., CSR Guideline for State-Owned Enterprises (SOE)
[Guanyu zhongyang qiye luxing shehui zeren de zhidao yijian], issued 12
December 07; Geoffrey See, ``Harmonious Corporate Social Responsibility
in China: More Prophesy Than Reality? '' ChinaCSR (Online), 12 June 08.
\43\ ``Harmonious Society,'' People's Daily (Online), 29 September
07.
\44\ Christopher C. Pinney, Boston College Center for Corporate
Citizenship (Online), ``Why China Will Define the Future Corporate
Citizenship,'' February 2008.
\45\ John Ruggie, ``Human Rights Policies of Chinese Companies:
Results from a Survey,'' conducted under the mandate of the UN
Secretary-General's Special Representative for Business and Human
Rights, Business and Human Rights Resource Center (Online), September
2007, 7.
Notes to Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance
\1\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 143-144.
\2\ Walter C. Clemens Jr., ``China: Alternative Futures,'' 32
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 1 (1999).
\3\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 144.
\4\ Li Lianjiang, ``The Politics of Introducing Direct Township
Elections in China,'' 171 China Quarterly 704 (2002).
\5\ ``Backgrounder: Key Facts and Figures about Rural Democracy,''
Xinhua (Online), 31 January 08.
\6\ John L. Thornton, ``Long Time Coming: the Prospects for
Democracy in China,'' Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.
\7\ Some experts also translate the phrase as ``public
recommendation, public election.'' Joseph Fewsmith, ``Staying in Power:
What Does the Chinese Communist Party Have to Do?,'' in China's
Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, ed. Cheng Li
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 222-223.
\8\ Liu Zhaoyang, ``Highlights from `Open Recommendations, Direct
Elections' Held for Party Organizations in 7 Eastern Communities in
Jinan'' [Jinan qi dong shequ dang zuzhi `gongtui zhixuan' ceji],
Xinhua, reprinted in Dazhong Ribao (Online), 17 April 08.
\9\ Liu Zhaoyang, ``Highlights from `Open Recommendations, Direct
Elections' ''; Wang Yongbing, ``A Survey of Open Recommendation, Direct
Elections for Village and Town Committees in Sichuan's Pingchang
County'' [Sichuan sheng pingchang xian xiangzhen dangwei gongtui
zhixuan diaocha], 10 China Reform Magazine, reprinted in Jinyueya.cn
(Online), 2007.
\10\ ``City's Grassroots Party Organizations Launch Comprehensive
Experiments with `Open Recommendation, Direct Elections' this Year''
[Benshi jiceng dangzuzhi jinnian quanmian shidian `gongtui zhixuan'],
Liberation Daily (Online), 21 February 08; ``16 Villages/Communities
Experiment with Open Recommendation, Direct Election of the Secretary
of the Branch Party Organization'' [16 Ge cun/shequ shidian dang zuzhi
shuji gongtui zhixuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 14 March
08; Xu Dekun, ``Breaking Through the Promotion by `Village Official'
Way of Thinking: Our District Opens the Curtain on `Open
Recommendation, Direct Election' for `Village Official' Work'' [Chongpo
`cunguan' xuanba de siwei dingshi: wo qu lakai `gongtui, zhixuan'
`cunguan' gongzuo xumu], Guangxi Daily (Online), 11 April 08.
\11\ Liu Chaodan and Li Kai, ``Who Will Be the Town's Party
Committee Secretary? Whoever Is Chosen by the Party Members and the
Masses'' [Shei dang zhen dangwei shuji, dangyuan qunzhong shuo le
suan], Guizhou Daily (Online), 28 April 08. For more information on
electoral experiments held in Guiyang, the capital of Guizhou, see Sean
Ding, ``Guiyang's Experiment with Democracy,'' Tips & Links, No. 37,
China Elections and Governance (Online), 25 July 08.
\12\ Feng Jianhua, ``Experimenting with Democracy: A Look at the
Grass-roots Election in Yunnan Province,'' Beijing Review (Online), 25
March 08.
\13\ ``Ningbo: All Residents Committees Have Changed to Direct
Election'' [Ningbo: shequ juwei quanbu gai zhixuan], People's Daily
(Online), 15 January 08.
\14\ Zhang Xianghe, `` `Village Official' Direct Elections''
[`Cunguan' Zhixuan], Hunan Daily (Online), 3 June 08.
\15\ ``Backgrounder: Key Facts and Figures about Rural Democracy,''
Xinhua.
\16\ ``Highlights: Report on Village Democracy in China, 10-29 June
2008,'' Open Source Center, 29 June 08 (citing Anhui Daily, 23 June 08,
report on `villager discussion' system in Hexing village, Guangde
county).
\17\ ``Democratic Management of Village Affairs Wins the People's
Hearts'' [Minzhu guanli cunwu ying minxin], Jiangxi Daily (Online), 21
June 08.
\18\ ``Xingzi County's Innovative Decisionmaking System: Expanding
Inner-Party Democracy'' [Xingzi chuangxin juece jizhi: kuoda dangnei
minzhu], Jiangxi Daily (Online), 2 May 08.
\19\ Wu Nanlan, ``Candidates' TV Debate a First for China,'' China
Internet Information Center (Online), 3 April 08.
\20\ Huang Shan, ``Migrant Workers' Deputies Voted in via Direct
Elections,'' China Internet Information Center (Online), 8 November 07.
\21\ Lu Xianbing, ``Direct Election of the District Residents
Committees Passes 80 Percent,'' [Ge qu juweihui zhixuan jun chao ba
cheng], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 10 June 08; Lu Xianbing,
``The First Direct Elections for Residents Committees to Happen This
Year'' [Jinnian shouge zhixuan juweihui yansheng], Southern
Metropolitan Daily (Online), 29 April 08.
\22\ ``Candidates Campaign With Poise, District Government Foots
the Bill: the Yantian Model of Community Grass-roots Democracy Matures
with Each Passing Day in 2nd Direct Election'' [Houxuanren dadafangfang
lapiao, quzhengfu tongtongkuaikuai chuqian: shequ jiceng minzhu
`yantian moshi' liangci zhixuan zhong riqu chengshou], Southern
Metropolitan Daily (Online), 29 May 08.
\23\ Ye Minghua, ``Change of Leader of General Party Branch
Attracts `After 80': Luohu's First Residents Committees Try Out `Double
Direct Elections,' '' [Dang zongzhi huanjie xiyin ``80 hou'': Luohu
shouge shequ dangzuzhi shixing ``shuang zhixuan''], Southern Daily
(Online), 18 April 08.
\24\ ``Shenzhen Reforms to District Head Elections Draw Foreign
Attention, Sends Out Signal of a Special Political Zone'' [Shenzhen
quzhang xuanju gaige yin haiwai guanzhu, shifang zhengzhi tequ xinhao],
International Herald Leader (Xinhua), reprinted in Ouhai District
Government (Online), 20 June 08; Edward Cody, ``Pioneering Chinese City
Offers a Peek at Political Ferment,'' Washington Post (Online), 30 June
08.
\25\ The CCP's ``socialist democracy'' is not to be confused with
democratic socialism, such as that of certain European countries, which
is often praised by democratic advocates in China. Joseph Fewsmith,
``Democracy is a Good Thing,'' 22 China Leadership Monitor, Fall 2007,
5; Cody, ``Pioneering Chinese City.''
\26\ Cody, ``Pioneering Chinese City''; Zhong Wu, ``A Shock to
`Hand-Raising Robots' '' Asia Times (Online), 31 July 08; ``At the
Forward Position of Opening & Reform: Shenzhen Wants To Play the Role
of Head Soldier Again'' [Gaige kaifang de qianyan: Shenzhen yu zai
banyan ``paitou bing'' juese], China.com, reprinted in China Union
(Online), 29 July 08.
\27\ Joseph Fewsmith, ``The 17th Party Congress: Informal Politics
and Formal Institutions,'' 23 China Leadership Monitor, Winter 2008, 1-
2; Alice Miller, ``China's New Party Leadership,'' 23 China Leadership
Monitor, Winter 2008, 1-7.
\28\ ``Full Text of Report Delivered by Hu Jintao at 17th Party
Congress,'' CCTV, 15 October 07 (Open Source Center, 15 October 07).
\29\ Mure Dickie, ``Hu Promises Wider Party Democracy,'' Financial
Times (Online), 15 October 07.
\30\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's
Political Party System, Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 15
November 07.
\31\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Nipped in the Bud: The
Suppression of the China Democracy Party,'' Vol. 12, No. 5, September
00.
\32\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's
Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, 28 February 08;
``Analysis: PRC White Paper on Rule of Law Stresses Progress, Party
Dominance,'' Open Source Center, 25 March 08.
\33\ Andrew J. Nathan, ``China's Political Trajectory: What are the
Chinese Saying?,'' in China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects
for Democracy, ed. Cheng Li (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2008), 39.
\34\ ``Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 17th Party Congress,''
Xinhua (Online), 24 October 07.
\35\ ``New Measures To Promote Scientific Issuance of Laws,
Democratic Issuance of Laws'' [Tuijin kexue lifa, minzhu lifa de xin
jucuo], Xinhua (Online), 19 April 08.
\36\ State Council Decision Regarding Strengthening City and County
Governance According to Law [Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang shi xian zhengfu
yifa xingzheng de jueding], issued 5 May 08, art. 7.
\37\ See, e.g., Qianxinan Prefecture Temporary Measures on Hearings
on Major Administrative Policies [Qianxi'nanzhou zhongda xingzheng
juece tingzheng zhanxing banfa], issued 4 March 08.
\38\ Li Xiaohua, He Shan, ``More Political Participation for
Chinese Citizens,'' China.org.cn (Online), 15 January 08.
\39\ ``Residents Try Their Hands at Lawmaking,'' China Daily
(Online), 10 October 07.
\40\ Ibid.
\41\ ``China Publishes Draft Regulation on Food Safety to Solicit
Public Opinion,'' Xinhua (Online), 21 April 08.
\42\ PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 7.
\43\ In September 2005, Xinhua reported that Chinese officials were
considering revisions to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law in preparation
for ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
``Amendments to Criminal Procedure Law Likely,'' Xinhua (Online), 8
September 05.
\44\ Jamie P. Horsley, ``China Adopts First Nationwide Open
Government Information Regulations,'' Freedominfo.org (Online), 9 May
07.
\45\ ``China Commits to `Open Government Information' Effective May
1, 2008,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
\46\ Opinions on Several Questions Regarding the People's Republic
of China Regulations on Open Government Information [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli ruogan wenti de yijian], issued
30 April 08, art. 14; Horsely, ``China Adopts Open Government
Information Regulations.''
\47\ Among the problems cited in the 2007 Annual Report included a
``state secrets'' exception that gives officials broad discretion to
withhold information. CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 75.
\48\ ``Open Information: Citizens' `Hot' and the Government's
`Cold' Stand in Stark Contrast'' [Xinxi gongkai: gongmin ``re'' he
zhengfu ``leng'' xingcheng xianming dui bi], China News Network
(Online), 22 July 08; David Bandurski, ``China Newsweekly: Government
`Cold' on `Information Openness,' '' China Media Project (Online), 31
July 08.
\49\ See, e.g., Qianxinan Prefecture Temporary Measures on Hearings
on Major Administrative Policies, art. 6.
\50\ Xiong Lei, ``Public Participation and Human Rights
Guarantee,'' China Society for Human Rights Studies (Online), July
2008.
\51\ Qianxinan Prefecture Temporary Measures on Hearings on Major
Administrative Policies, art. 30.
\52\ Zhu Hongjun, ``First Public Response from Xiamen Officials,
What Happened Behind the Scenes of Public Participation? '' [Xiamen
guanfang shouci gongkai huiying gongzhong canyu beihou fasheng shenme?]
Southern Weekend (Online), 19 December 07; Joey Liu, ``Xiamen Residents
say No to Toxic Plant,'' South China Morning Post, 15 December 07 (Open
Source Center, 15 December 07); Wang Er, ``Xiamen Again Says `No' to PX
Project,'' Caijing (Online), 19 December 07.
\53\ Cai Dingjian, ``Making Room for Public Participation,'' China
Daily (Online), 21 January 08.
Notes to Section III--Commercial Rule of Law
\1\ A complete and up-to-date compilation of key information on
China's participation in the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO], including principal accession documents (Working Party report,
protocol of accession, General Council decision), schedules, trade
policy reviews and dispute case documents can be found at the WTO web
site at www.wto.org.
\2\ Ibid. See also Office of the United States Trade Representative
[hereinafter USTR] Web site at www.ustr.gov.
\3\ Barbara Demick, ``China Tightens Visa Restrictions as Olympics
Near,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 1 July 08; ``China Toughens Visa
Policies Before Olympics,'' Associated Press (Online), 6 May 08.
\4\ ``New Measures To Promote Scientific Issuance of Laws,
Democratic Issuance of Laws'' [Tuijin kexue lifa, minzhu lifa de xin
jucuo], Xinhua (Online), 19 April 08.
\5\ ``Supreme People's Court Publishes Draft Judicial
Interpretation of the Property Law for Public Comment,'' Supreme
People's Court (Online), 6 June 08.
\6\ U.S. Department of Treasury (Online), ``Joint U.S.-China Fact
Sheet, Fourth U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue,'' 18 June 08.
\7\ PRC Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), issued 30 August 07, effective 1
August 08. See also ``Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement: Rough Road Ahead''
[Fan longduan zhifa qianlu qiqu], Caijing (Online), 21 July 08. For
commentary in English on the AML and an unofficial English translation,
see Nathan Bush, ``The PRC Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and
Challenges Ahead,'' Antitrust Source (Online), October 2007. See also
Xiaoye Wang, ``Highlights of China's New Anti-Monopoly Law,'' 75
Antitrust Law Journal, no. 1, 133 (2008). A number of implementing
rules and regulations are in the pipeline, but some were issued around
the time the AML took effect, including: Rules of the State Council on
Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings [Guowuyuan
guanyu jingyingzhe jizhong shenbao biaozhun de guiding], adopted 1
August 08, issued and effective 3 August 08, and Supreme People's Court
Notice on Serious Study and Implementation of the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law
[Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renzhen xuexi he guanche zhonghua renmin
gongheguo fanlongduan fa de tongzhi], issued and effective 28 July 08.
See also Chen Yonghui, ``Circular of the Supreme People's Court
Requires Conscientiously Hearing All Kinds of Anti-Monopoly Cases
According to Law'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan tongzhi yaoqiu qieshi yifa
shenlihao gelei fanlongduan anjian], Supreme People's Court (Online),
31 July 08.
\8\ ``Anti-Monopoly Law Commission in Force,'' China Daily
(Online), 16 July 08.
\9\ Andrew Batson, ``China Creates Antitrust Commission,'' Wall
Street Journal (Online), 15 September 08.
\10\ PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law, issued 2 September 93,
effective 1 December 93. Specifically, Articles 6 (exclusive dealing by
firms in a dominant market position), 11 (predatory pricing,), 12 (tied
selling), and 15 (bid rigging).
\11\ PRC Price Law, issued 29 December 97, effective 1 May 98.
Specifically, Articles 14(1) (price-fixing) and 14(2) (predatory
pricing).
\12\ Guo Xiaoyu, `` `The Economic Constitution' A Sword Pointing at
Monopoly Behavior'' [``Jingji xianfa'' jian zhi longduan xingwei],
Legal Daily (Online), 26 August 07. See also Paul Jones, ``China's New
Anti-Monopoly Law: An Economic Constitution for the New Market Economy?
'' 3 China Law Reporter 5 (September 2007), 3.
\13\ Jones, ``China's New Anti-Monopoly Law.''
\14\ AML, art. 5.
\15\ AML, art. 7. (Article 7 provides that, ``in industries that
implicate national economic vitality and national security, which are
controlled by state-owned enterprises, and in industries in which there
are legal monopolies, the state shall protect the lawful business
activities of those enterprises, supervise and control their conducts
and prices for the products and services pursuant to law, protect the
interests of consumers, and promote technological progress.'') SOEs
account for 35 percent of China's GDP and enjoy monopoly positions in
some sectors. World Trade Organization (Online), Trade Policy Review
Report by the Secretariat China, 16 April 08, xi-xii.
\16\ See, for example: Yang Fan, ``Are M&As Suffocating Chinese
Businesses? '' Beijing Review (Online), 4 June 07; ``Chinese Lawmakers
Call for Cautious Handling of Foreign Mergers,'' Xinhua, reprinted in
People's Daily (Online), 4 March 07; ``Improved Laws Sought on M&A by
Foreign Firms,'' Shanghai Daily, 5 March 07; Wang Jun, ``A Law To Curb
Monopoly-Finally,'' Beijing Review, 13 July 06. Previously existing
regulations on mergers and acquisitions by foreign firms include
Regulations on Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors, issued on 6 August 06, effective 8 September 06 (issued
jointly by the Ministry of Commerce, the State Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission, the State Taxation Administration, the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, the China Securities
Regulatory Commission, and the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange), superseding Temporary Regulations on Mergers and
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, issued 7
March 03.
\17\ Jones, ``China's New Anti-Monopoly Law, 10.
\18\ Zhu Tao, ``Antitrust Claim Puts State Agency on Trial,''
Caijing (Online), 27 August 08; CECC Staff Interviews.
\19\ ``Microsoft Faces an Antitrust Investigation,'' Caijing
(Online), 26 August 08.
\20\ United States Trade and Development Agency, ``USTDA Initiative
Promotes U.S.-China Cooperation Towards Effective Anti-Monopoly Law
Implementation,'' 7 March 08.
\21\ AML, art. 31.
\22\ See Steve Dickinson, ``National Security Review Under China's
New Anti-Monopoly Law,'' China Law Blog (Online), 29 August 08; Jason
Subler, ``China's Landmark Antimonopoly Law Finally Taking Effect,''
Reuters, reprinted in International Herald Tribune (Online), 31 July
08. For a useful compilation of quotes expressing concern, see ``PRC's
Anti-Monopoly Law: Well-known Trademarks and Traditional Chinese Brands
Are Part of National Security,'' IP Dragon, 1 September 08. See also
``Anti-Monopoly Civil Cases To Be Decided by Intellectual Property
Courts'' [Fan longduan minshi an guikou zhishichanquanting shenpan],
Caijing (Online), 31 July 08.
\23\ Supreme People's Court Notice on Serious Study and
Implementation of the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law; ``Anti-Monopoly Civil
Cases,'' Caijing.
\24\ State Council, Outline of the National Intellectual Property
Strategy, 5 June 08; China's State Intellectual Property Office, Fully
Implement the National Intellectual Property Strategy, 13 June 08;
Ministry of Commerce, National Office of Rectification and
Standardization of Market Economic Order, and State Intellectual
Property Office, China's Action Plan on IPR Protection 2008, 18 March
08.
\25\ State Council, Outline of the National Intellectual Property
Strategy. Paragraphs 16, 53, 59, 61, 63, for example.
\26\ Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 Special
301 Report, 21, 25, 30, 31.
\27\ Section 4, paragraph 29 constitutes the entire section on
trade secrets, quoted here in its entirety: ``Guide market entities in
establishing a trade secret management system in accordance with law.
The behavior of stealing trade secret should be severely punished in
accordance with law. Properly balance the need for protecting trade
secret and the freedom to choose employment and balance non-competition
undertaken by insiders and the need for normal personnel flow to
safeguard employees' lawful rights and interests.'' State Council,
Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy.
\28\ The PRC Labor Contract Law (articles 23, 24) restricts the use
of non-competition agreements. Only senior managers and employees with
access to trade secrets can be required to sign. Moreover, agreements
may not remain valid for more than two years, may apply only within a
reasonably limited geographic area and employers must compensate the
employee for being bound by the agreement during the time it is in
effect. PRC Labor Contract Law, adopted 29 June 07, arts. 23, 24.
\29\ The NPC published proposed amendments to the patent law on its
Web site asking for comments on September 8, 2008.
\30\ State Council, Outline of the National Intellectual Property
Strategy, Section V(iv), paragraph 45.
\31\ Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 Special
301 Report, 2, 10, 19.
\32\ World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Report.
\33\ Office of the United States Trade Representative Closing
Statement of the United States of America at the First Substantive
Meeting of the Panel, China --Measures Affecting The Protection And
Enforcement Of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362, 16 April 08,
paragraph 16.
\34\ Ibid., paragraph 17, 23.
\35\ Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 Special
301 Report, 21.
\36\ Ibid., 22; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 155.
\37\ Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 Special
301 Report, 10.
\38\ Guizhou Province Intellectual Property Rights Highlights for
2008 [2008 Nian guizhou zhishi chanquan gongzuo yaodian], State
Intellectual Property Office (Online), 6 June 08, referring to Guizhou
Province Regulations on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Over Traditional Knowledge [Guizhou sheng chuantong zhishi
zhishichanquan baohu tiaoli]. See also Guizhou Province Intellectual
Property Strategy Outline (2006-2015) [Guizhou sheng zhishi chanquan
zhanlue gangyao (2006-2015)] issued 29 August 2006; ``Prospects for the
Development of Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Over
Traditional Knowledge in Guizhou'' [Guizhou kaizhan chuantong zhishi
chanquan baohu difang lifa de kexing xing] Guizhou Province
Intellectual Property Office (Online), no date; ``Guizhou Province
Officially Launches Legislative Research on the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights Over Traditional Knowledge'' [Guizhou
zhengshi hudongsheng chuantong zhishi zhishi chanquan baohu lifa
diaoyan gongzuo] China Biodiversity IP News Online. 23 Feb 06;
``Protecting Traditions,'' Xinhua, reprinted in State Intellectual
Property Office (Online), 7 January 08; Richard Stone, ``Chinese
Province Crafts Pioneering Law To Thwart Biopiracy,'' Science, 9 May
08; ``Guizhou Province Drafts Regulation To Protect Traditional
Knowledge,'' IP Dragon (Online), 8 March 07; ``China Moves To Protect
Traditional Knowledge,'' Xinhua, 3 March 07; ``Province Crafts New Law
To Protect Traditional Arts, Medicine,'' Xinhua (Online), 24 December
07.
\39\ ``Guizhou is regarded as an undeveloped province. Its
scientific level is relatively low, but it's rich in traditional
knowledge. Because we lack the means to turn knowledge into innovation,
we have to protect the knowledge for future development,'' Guizhou
Intellectual Property Office Deputy Director quoted in Stone, ``Chinese
Province Crafts Pioneering Law.''
\40\ ``China's New Draft Patent Law: Comment from GRAIN,'' GRAIN
(Online), 25 September 08. (``As it stands, the draft provides no
safeguards, no restrictions, against outright `biopiracy' in terms of
traditional knowledge.'') ``GRAIN is an international non-governmental
organisation which promotes the sustainable management and use of
agricultural biodiversity based on people's control over genetic
resources and local knowledge.'' (www.grain.org/about/).
\41\ Ibid. (``. . . as soon as these laws start talking about
traditional knowledge, for example based on trade agreements, it can
mean the government is starting to treat traditional knowledge as
intellectual property. But the reality is that the Chinese government
is keen to convert the nation's wealth of traditional medicinal
knowledge into tangible `benefits.' '').
\42\ According to environmental lawyer Shalini Bhutani, ``[a]n IP
system inherently based on private rights may not have solutions for
the `protection' of traditional knowledge, which is a shared
heritage.'' Quoted by Stone, ``Chinese Province Crafts Pioneering
Law.''
\43\ ``(T)raditional knowledge only means traditional scientific
knowledge. But our understanding is that it also includes traditional
culture,'' the Guizhou Intellectual Property Office Deputy Director is
reported to have said. See Ibid.
\44\ ``MOFCOM Minister Calls for `Special War' on Product
Quality,'' China Daily, 27 August 07; `` `Special War' Launched To
Raise Quality in China,'' China Daily, 24 August 07.
\45\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 168-179.
\46\ PRC Food Hygiene Law, issued 30 October 95; ``China's Chief
Quality Supervisor Resigns Amid Public Grumbles Over Tainted Milk,''
Xinhua (Online), 22 September 08.
\47\ ``China's Chief Quality Supervisor Resigns,'' Xinhua.
\48\ PRC Civil Servant Law, issued 27 April 05, effective 1 January
06.
\49\ Regulations on the Punishment of Civil Servants of
Administrative Organs [Xingzheng jiguan gongwuyuan chufen tiaoli],
issued 22 April 07, effective 6 January 07.
\50\ See, e.g., David Barboza, ``China Detains 19 as Toxic Formula
Sickens Hundreds of Infants,'' New York Times (Online), 14 September
08; Joe McDonald, ``Chinese Dairy Knew Milk Fault Weeks Before
Recall,'' 13 September 08; ``China Dairy Firm Knew of Toxic Milk for
Months: State Media,'' Agence France-Presse, 23 September 08.
\51\ ``Propaganda Officials Issue 21 Restrictions on Domestic
Coverage of Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), 22 August 08.
\52\ See, e.g., ``China Food Safety Law To Allow for Life in
Jail,'' Reuters (Online), 20 April 08; Henry Sanderson, ``China
Proposes Food Safety Laws,'' Christian Science Monitor (Online), 23
April 08; ``China Publishes Draft Regulation on Food Safety to Solicit
Public Opinion,'' Xinhua (Online), 21 April 08; ``China's Top
Legislator Promises More Public Participation in Food Safety
Legislation,'' Xinhua, 8 March 08.
\53\ ``China's Top Lawmakers To Review Food Safety Law: State
Media,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 18 August 08.
\54\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 165.
\55\ Ministry of Land and Resources, Land Registration Measures
[Tudi dengji banfa], issued 30 December 07, effective 1 February 08.
\56\ Ashley Howlett and Li Hong, ``New Registration Measures
Provide Clarity for China Land Owners,'' China Law and Practice
(Online), May 2008.
\57\ Land Registration Measures, art. 75.
\58\ Another noteworthy land and property-related regulation that
took effect during 2008 is the State Council's Circular on Promoting
Land Conservation and Improving the Efficiency of Land Use [Guanyu
cujin jieyue jiyue yong di de tongzhi], January 3, 2008. See Paul D.
McKenzie, Gregory Sin Oon Tan, `` `New' Regulations on Land
Conservation in the Peoples' Republic of China,'' Morrison & Foerster
LLP (Online), 25 August 08.
\59\ PRC Urban and Rural Planning Law, issued 28 October 07,
effective 1 January 08.
\60\ PRC Urban Planning Law [Chengshi guihua fa], issued 26
December 89, effective 1 April 90, replaced as of 1 January 08 by the
new PRC Urban and Rural Planning Law [Cheng xiang guihua fa] (see note
59).
\61\ ``Supreme People's Court Publishes Draft Judicial
Interpretation of the Property Law,'' Supreme People's Court.
\62\ Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July
22, 1944, art. IV-- Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements,
Section 1--General Obligations of Members, subsection (iii),
International Monetary Fund (Online).
\63\ Michael Mussa, ``IMF Surveillance over China's Exchange Rate
Policy,'' in Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy, eds. Morris
Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute
for International Economics, April 2008), 62.
\64\ ``Comments by Steven Dunaway, Deputy Director, Asia and
Pacific Department of the International Monetary Fund, on a paper: IMF
Surveillance Over China's Exchange Rate by Michael Mussa, at the
Peterson Institute Conference on China's Exchange Rate Policy,''
International Monetary Fund (Online), 19 October 07.
\65\ Goldstein, ``China's Exchange Rate Policy,'' 17; Mussa, ``IMF
Surveillance over China's Exchange Rate Policy,'' 71.
\66\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 163-164.
\67\ Arculli Fong & Ng/King and Wood, ``China: New Implementing
Regulations and Notice in Respect of the PRC Enterprise Income Tax
Law,'' International Tax Review (Online), February 08; Stephen Nelson,
``The PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law and its Impact on Foreign
Investments,'' 3 China Law Reporter, May 2007.
\68\ World Trade Organization (Online), Member Information, ``China
and the WTO,'' www.wto.org/english/thewto--e/countries--e/china--e.htm,
last visited 9 October 08.
\69\ World Trade Organization (Online), Disputes DS339 (European
Communities) DS340 (United States) and DS342 (Canada), China--Measures
Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts WTO Doc. Nos. 08-3275, 08-3276
and 08-3277, 18 July 08.
\70\ Ibid.
\71\ World Trade Organization (Online), Disputes DS339 (European
Communities) DS340 (United States) and DS342 (Canada), China--Measures
Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, Notification of an Appeal by the
People's Republic of China, WTO Doc. No. 08-4387, 22 September 08.
\72\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS363, China--
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, Constitution of
the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, WTO Doc.
No.08-1380, 28 March 08; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
the United States, WTO Doc. No. 07-4406, 11 October 07.
\73\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS363, China--
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, Communication from
the Chairman of the Panel, WTO Doc. No. 08-4453, 23 September 08.
\74\ World Trade Organization (Online), China--Measures Affecting
Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information
Suppliers., Disputes DS372 and DS373, Request for Consultations by the
European Communities, WTO Doc. No. 08-0979, 5 March 08, Request for
Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc. No. 08-0981, 5 March 08.
\75\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS373, China--
Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial
Information Suppliers, Request for Consultations by the United States,
WTO Doc. No. 08-0981, 5 March 08.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS378, China--
Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial
Information Suppliers, Request for Consultations by the Canada, WTO
Doc. No. 08-2985, 23 June 08.
\78\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS378, China--
Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial
Information Suppliers, Request to Join Consultations, Communication
from the United States, WTO Doc. No. 08-3221, 4 July 08.
\79\ See, e.g., World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS362,
``China -- Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights,'' Constitution of the Panel Established
at the Request of the United States, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc.
No. 07-5564. 13 December 07; United States Trade Representative (USTR)
(Online), ``WTO Case Challenging Weaknesses in China's Legal Regime for
Protection and Enforcement of Copyrights and Trademarks,'' Trade
Delivers, April 2007; USTR (Online), ``United States Files WTO Cases
Against China Over Deficiencies in China's Intellectual Property Rights
Laws and Market Access Barriers to Copyright-Based Industries,'' 9
April 07.
\80\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS362, ``China --
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights,'' Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, WTO
Doc. No. 08-3478, 18 July 08.
\81\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS358, China --
Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes
and Other Payments, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the
United States, WTO Doc. No. 07-2980, 13 July 2007; Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by Mexico, WTO Doc. No., 07-3005, 13 July
2007. See also USTR (Online), ``United States Requests WTO Panel in
Challenge to China's Prohibited Subsidies,'' 12 July 07; USTR (Online),
``United States Files WTO Case Against China Over Prohibited
Subsidies,'' 2 February 07.
\82\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS358, China --
Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes
and Other Payments, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the
United States. World Trade Organization Document Number 07-2980, 13
July 07; World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS359, China --
Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes
and Other Payments, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico,
WTO Doc. No. 07-3005, 13 July 07. See also Frances Williams, ``WTO
Probes China's Export Subsidy Claims,'' Financial Times (Online), 31
August 07.
\83\ World Trade Organization (Online), Dispute DS358, China --
Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes
and Other Payments, Communication from China and the United States, WTO
Doc. No. 08-0025, 4 January 08.
\84\ World Trade Organization, Dispute DS359, China -- Certain
Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and
Other Payments. Communication from China and Mexico, WTO Doc. No. 08-
0639, 13 February 08.
\85\ A full list of outcomes from the 19th JCCT may be found at:
http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases--FactSheets/PROD01--
007242.
Notes to Section III--Access to Justice
\1\ See Carl Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese
Legal Institutions,'' 42 Stanford Journal of International Law 103,
151-57 (2006).
\2\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 8
[hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 9 [hereinafter ICCPR].
\3\ ICCPR, art. 2.
China has signed, but has not yet ratified, the ICCPR. The Chinese
government has committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its
laws into conformity with the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commitment as
recently as March 18, 2008, when Premier Wen Jiabao told a press
conference that China is ``conducting interagency coordination to
address the issue of compatibility between China's domestic laws and
international law so as to ratify the [ICCPR] as soon as possible.''
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Premier Wen Jiabao Answered
Questions at Press Conference,'' 18 March 08. China's top leaders have
previously stated on at least four separate occasions that they are
preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including on April 13, 2006,
in China's application for membership in the UN Human Rights Council in
a September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member and State Councilor
Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress on Law, in statements by Premier Wen
during his May 2005 Europe tour, and in a January 27, 2004 speech by
Chinese President Hu Jintao before the French National Assembly.
\4\ Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs [Susong feiyong
jiaona banfa], issued 19 December 06, effective 4 January 07.
\5\ Measures for the Administration of Lawyers' Fees [Lushi fuwu
shoufei guanli banfa], issued 13 April 06, effective 1 December 06.
\6\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Walking on Thin Ice'': Control,
Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China, April 2008.
\7\ Ibid., 55.
\8\ Ibid., 62.
\9\ Ibid., 13-14.
\10\ Ibid., 87-88.
\11\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Tibetans Sentenced
without Fair Trial; Lawyers Offering Aid Face Punishment,'' 2 May 08.
\12\ See, e.g., ``Human Rights in China (Online), ``Chinese
Authorities Target Lawyers Offering Legal Assistance to Tibetans,'' 9
April 08; Cheng Hai, ``21 Mainland Lawyers Willing to Offer Legal
Assistance to Detained Tibetans'' [21 ming dalu lushi yuanyi wei bei bu
zangmin tigong falu bangzhu], Canyu, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 8
April 08.
\13\ ``Lawyers Face Loss of Licenses After Offer to Tibetans,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 10 May 08; Human Rights Watch
(Online), ``Tibetan Protestors Denied Fair Trial: Sentenced in Secret
After Party Urges `Quick Hearings,' '' 30 April 08; ``Judges and
Lawyers: Rioters in Lhasa Unrest Receive Fair Trial,'' Xinhua (Online),
1 May 08.
\14\ ``Lawyers Face Loss of Licenses After Offer to Tibetans,''
South China Morning Post.
\15\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Tibetans Sentenced without
Fair Trial''; Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice,'' 62 (quoting
a Beijing lawyer who had volunteered to represent Tibetans detained in
the wake of protests in Lhasa: ``We were warned not to represent
Tibetans.'').
\16\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Tibetans Sentenced Without
Fair Trial.''
\17\ Jiang Tianyong, China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group
(Online), ``Victory for Rule of Law--My Lawyer's License Has Been
Renewed'' [Fazhi de shengli--wo yi tongguo lushi zhiyezheng nianjian
zhuce], 30 June 08.
\18\ ``China Slaps Ban on Lawyers Who Offered Legal Aid to
Tibetans,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 4 June 08.
\19\ See, e.g., ``Milk Scandal: Government Fears Social Protests,
Threatens Lawyers,'' AsiaNews.it, 23 September 08; Peter Ford, ``What
China's Tainted Milk May Not Bring: Lawsuits,'' Christian Science
Monitor (Online), 22 September 08.
\20\ Edward Wong, ``Courts Compound Pain of China's Tainted Milk,''
New York Times (Online), 16 October 08.
\21\ ``Milk Parents May Sue in U.S.,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 22
October 08; Ye Doudou, ``When Calamity Strikes, Who Should Pay? ''
Caijing (Online), 7 October 08.
\22\ Minnie Chan, ``Don't Aid Milk-Scandal Victims, Lawyers
Urged,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 8 October 08.
\23\ Gillian Wong, ``Chinese Lawyers Face Pressure To Drop Milk
Cases,'' Associated Press (Online), 7 October 08.
\24\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Lawyers Warned to Shun Milk Suits,'' South China
Morning Post (Online), 23 September 08.
\25\ Ye Doudou, ``When Calamity Strikes, Who Should Pay? ''
\26\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Lawyers Warned to Shun Milk Suits.''
\27\ See, e.g., Chan, ``Don't Aid Milk-Scandal Victims''; Ng Tze-
wei, ``Sanlu Court Action Put on Hold,'' South China Morning Post
(Online), 16 October 08.
\28\ ``Sanlu Suit Gets Cool Reception in Court,'' South China
Morning Post (Online), 9 October 08.
\29\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Sanlu Court Action Put on Hold.''
\30\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Sanlu Court Action Put on Hold''; PRC Civil
Procedure Law, enacted 9 April 91, amended 28 October 07, art. 112.
\31\ See, e.g.,Wong, ``Courts Compound Pain of China's Tainted
Milk''; Ford, ``What China's Tainted Milk May Not Bring: Lawsuits.''
\32\ Under the national Regulations on Letters and Visits, citizens
may ``give information, make comments or suggestions, or lodge
complaints'' to xinfang (letters and visits) bureaus of local
governments and their departments. Regulations on Letters and Visits
[Xinfang tiaoli], issued 10 January 05, arts. 3, 6.
\33\ PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, enacted 29 April 99,
arts. 6, 14.
\34\ PRC Administrative Litigation Law, enacted 4 April 89, arts.
11, 12.
\35\ PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, art. 9.
\36\ Parents in Dujiangyan, for example, tried to file a lawsuit in
which they sought compensation and an apology from the government. The
court refused to accept their suit. One parent told the Associated
Press, ``We tried the law, and if the law can't solve the problem, how
do we solve it? '' Cara Anna, ``China Cordons Off Schools Collapsed by
Quake,'' Associated Press (Online), reprinted in Yahoo!, 4 June 08.
Some parents who engaged in protests outside local government buildings
were beaten up, and others were detained. See ``Police Detain Parents
After China Quake City Protest,'' Reuters (Online), 21 June 08.
\37\ Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal
Institutions,'' 115-16.
\38\ Regulations on Letters and Visits, arts. 3, 6.
\39\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook
2007-2008 (August 2008), 40.
\40\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 38.
\41\ Ibid.
\42\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, China Human Rights Yearbook
2007-2008, 40 (reproducing report titled ``Silencing Complaints: Human
Rights Abuses Against Petitioners in China,'' 14 March 08).
\43\ See, e.g., Mark Magnier, ``Fun May Be a Casualty of Beijing's
Effort at Perfect Olympic Games,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 26 July
08; Willy Lam, ``China Tries to Put Its Best Face Forward,'' Asia Times
(Online), 6 August 08.
\44\ See, e.g., Willy Lam, ``The CCP Strengthens Control Over the
Judiciary,'' China Brief (Online), 3 July 08; Jerome Cohen, ``Body Blow
for the Judiciary,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 18 October 08.
\45\ Human Rights Watch, ``Walking on Thin Ice.''
\46\ Supreme People's Court Circular on Completing Trial Work
During the Earthquake Disaster Relief Period to Earnestly Safeguard
Social Stability in the Disaster Area [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu yifa
zuohao kangzhen jiu zaiqijian shenpan gongzuo qieshi weihu zai qu
shehui wending de tongzhi], issued 26 May 2008.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ PRC Emergency Response Law, issued 30 August 2007.
\49\ Lam, ``The CCP Strengthens Control Over the Judiciary'';
Cohen, ``Body Blow for the Judiciary.''
\50\ Lam, ``The CCP Strengthens Control Over the Judiciary.''
\51\ Ibid.
\52\ ``Wang Shengjun Elected China's Top Judge,'' Xinhua, reprinted
in China Legal Publicity (Online), 16 March 08.
\53\ Lam, ``The CCP Strengthens Control Over the Judiciary.''
\54\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's
Efforts and Achievements In Promoting the Rule of Law, Xinhua (Online),
28 February 08.
\55\ Ibid.
\56\ ``New Plan To Improve Anti-corruption System,'' Xinhua
(Online), 14 December 07.
\57\ ``Chinese Premier Pledges Renewed Fight Against Corruption,
Singles Out Government Officials,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
International Herald Tribune (Online), 1 May 08.
\58\ ``CPC Publicizes Five-year Anti-Corruption Plan,'' Xinhua
(Online), 23 June 08.
\59\ ``China Vows No Mercy to Corruption,'' Xinhua, reprinted in
PRC Central Government (Online), 10 March 08.
\60\ Ibid.
\61\ See, e.g., Xie Chuanjiao, ``Corruption Prosecution A New
High,'' China Daily (Online), 10 July 08; ``Former Shanghai Party Chief
Gets 18-Year Term for Bribery,'' Xinhua, 11 April 08 (Open Source
Center, 11 April 08); Wang Heyan, et al., ``End of the Line for a
Shanghai Scandal,'' Caijing (Online), 1 April 08.
\62\ Xie Chuanjiao, ``Chief Judge Pledges to Fight Judicial
Corruption,'' China Daily (Online), 24 March 07.
\63\ ``(Two Sessions Authorized Release) Supreme People's Court
Report,'' Xinhua, 22 March 08 (Open Source Center, 22 March 08).
\64\ Vivian Wu, ``High Court Judge Placed Under Party
Investigation,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 18 October 08;
Zhang Lisheng, ``Court Director Investigated: Report,'' China Daily
(Online), 11 July 08.
Notes to Section IV--Xinjiang
\1\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 106-108;
CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 90-91; CECC, 2005 Annual
Report, 11 October 05, 21-23.
\2\ For detailed information, including information on China's
domestic and international obligations toward ethnic minorities, see
Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, as well as the section on ``Ethnic
Minority Rights'' in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 105-108 and ``Special
Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,'' CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 13-23.
\3\ The government has long claimed the continued existence of
terrorist and separatist threats through spurious statistics and shoddy
factual support. For an analysis of Chinese reporting on terrorist
activity, see ``Uighurs Face Extreme Security Measures; Official
Statements on Terrorism Conflict,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, May 2006, 12.
\4\ For an analysis of Chinese reporting on one of the alleged
terrorist plots and on the aircraft attack, see ``Xinjiang Authorities
Pledge Crackdown Against `Three Forces,' '' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008, 2. For more information on two of
the alleged terrorist plots, see ``Ministry of Public Security
Circulates Notice on Recently Cracking 2 Cases of Plots To Carry Out
Terrorist Activity'' [Gong'anbu tongbao jinqi pohuo de liangqi cehua
shishi baoli kongbu huodong anjian], Tianshan Net (Online), 10 March
08.
\5\ For reporting from local Xinjiang government Web sites, see,
e.g., Kashgar District Government (Online), ``Let Society Be Stable and
Harmonious, For the People To Be Without Fear--Work Report on Poskam
County Striving To Establish a Region-Level Quiet and Stable County''
[Rang shehui wending hexie wei baixing anjuleye--zepuxian zheng chuang
zizhiquji ping'an xian gongzuo jishi], 3 December 07; Qumul District
Government (Online), ``Gulshat Abduhadir Stresses at District Education
Work Meeting, Enlarge Investments for Optimal Environment'' [Gulixiati
Abudouhade'er zai diqu jiaoyu gongzuo huiyishang qiangdiao jiada touru
youhua huanjing], 9 March 08; Kashgar District Government (Online),
``Yengi Sheher County Takes Forceful Measures to Strengthen Carrying
Out of Current Stability Work'' [Shulexian caiqu youli cuoshi jiaqiang
zuohao dangqian wending gongzuo], 31 March 08; Kashgar District
Government (Online), ``Firmly Grasp Stability Work without Slackening,
Protect Smooth Carrying Out of the Olympics'' [Hen zhua wei wen
gongzuobuxiedai bao aoyunhui shunli juban], 31 March 08; Kashgar
District Government (Online), ``122 Members of `Work Team Dispatched to
Rural Posts for Olympics Safety and Security' Go to Countryside in
Yorpugha County'' [Yuepuhuxian 122 ming ``ao yun an bao paizhu xiangcun
gongzuo duiyuan'' xiacun], 28 March 08. For an example of a security
measure aimed at XUAR residents living in other parts of China, see
``Kashgar District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission Enters into
Friendly Cooperation with Wuhan City Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Commission'' [Kashi diqu minzongwei yu wuhanshi minzongwei jiewei
youhao xiezuo danwei], China Ethnicities News (Online), 28 February 08.
Overseas organizations reported on the imposition of martial order
within Ghulja in late March and April and on curfews in multiple
cities. Local government Web sites within China appear not to have
publicized the curfews. International Campaign for Tibet (Online),
``Tibetan Students Hold Vigil in Beijing; Curfew Imposed in Xinjiang
Towns,'' 17 March 08; ``FYI--Kashgar, Xinjiang PRC Media Not Observed
To Report Alleged Curfew,'' Open Source Center, 19 March 08; ``FYI--
Hotan, Xinjiang PRC Media Not Observed To Report Alleged Curfew,'' Open
Source Center, 19 March 08; ``Chinese Government Exercises Martial
Alert in Ghulja'' [Xitay hokumiti ghuljida herbiy halet yurguzuwatidu],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 April 08; ``Curfew in Xinjiang Town After
Police Raids,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 March 08.
\6\ ``Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain
Protesters,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
3.
\7\ ``The Human Toll of the Olympics,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, August 2008, 2-8.
\8\ For information on these attacks as reported by official
Chinese media, see, e.g., ``Police Station Raided in West China's
Xinjiang, Terrorist Plot Suspected,'' Xinhua, 4 August 08 (Open Source
Center, 4 August 08); ``Xinjiang Official Calls Monday's Raid on Border
Police a Terrorist Attack,'' Xinhua, 5 August 08 (Open Source Center, 5
August 08); ``Bombings Kill Eight, Injure Four in China's Xinjiang,''
Xinhua, 10 August 08 (Open Source Center, 12 August 08); Mao Yong and
Zhao Chunhui, ``(Explosions in Xinjiang's Kuqa) Violent Terrorism in
Kuqa County, Xinjiang, Effectively Dealt With,'' Xinhua, 10 August 08
(Open Source Center, 10 August 08); ``Three Security Staff Killed in
Attack at Road Checkpoint in Xinjiang,'' Xinhua (Online), 12 August 08.
For an updated report by foreign media on one of the events, see Edward
Wong, ``Doubt Arises in Account of an Attack in China,'' New York Times
(Online), 28 September 08.
\9\ For an overview of these reported measures, see box titled
Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics in this section,
which is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in
Lead-up To and During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (Online), 7 October 08. See specific sources at, e.g., Uyghur
Human Rights Project (Online), ``A Life or Death Struggle in East
Turkestan; Uyghurs Face Unprecedented Persecution in post-Olympic
Period,'' 4 September 08, 4-7; ``Homes Raided in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 23 July 08; Jume, ``Public Security Office Police in
Ghulja City Ransack Uyghurs' Homes'' [Ghulja shehiri j x idarisi
saqchiliri uyghurlarning oylirini axturmaqta], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 17 July 08; ``The Human Toll of the Olympics,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update; Dan Martin, ``Uyghurs Discouraged
From Air Travel Amid China's Olympic Security Clampdown,'' Agence
France-Presse, 31 July 08 (Open Source Center, 31 July 08); Malcom
Moore, ``China Tightens Grip on Western Province Xinjiang,'' Telegraph
(Online), 8 August 08; Gulchehre, ``Chinese Authorities Close Some
Uyghur Discussion Web Sites During Olympics'' [Xitay dairiliri olimpik
mezgilide bir qisim uyghur munazire tor betlirini taqidi], Radio Free
Asia (Online), 14 August 08; ``Crackdown on Xinjiang Mosques,
Religion,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08; ``Mongghulkure
County `Protect Olympics, Protect Stability' Supervision Group Reports
Work to Ili Prefecture'' [Zhaosuxian shang yili zhou ``bao ao yun cu
wending'' dudao xiaozu huibao gongzuo], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July
08; ``Mongghulkure County Promptly Arranges Implementation of Spirit of
Ili 7.13 Stability Meeting'' [Zhaosuxian xunsu anpai luoshi yili zhou
``7.13'' wending huiyi jingshen], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July 08;
Kashgar District Government, ``Usher in the Olympics and Ensure
Stability; Jiashi People Are of One Heart and Mind,'' 8 August 08 (Open
Source Center, 8 August 08). See also Controls over Free Expression in
Xinjiang in this section for more information on controls over Web
sites.
\10\ Jake Hooker, ``China Steps Up Scrutiny of a Minority in
Beijing,'' New York Times (Online), 13 August 08; Josephine Ma,
``Beijing Security Already High, With More Police Checks on Uygurs
And,'' [sic] South China Morning Post, 5 August 08 (Open Source Center,
5 August 08); ``Hotels in All Locations Must Report Tibetans, Uyghurs
and Other Ethnic Minority Guests'' [Gedi luguan dei tongbao jiangzang
deng shaoshu minzu zhuke], Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 July 08;
``Beijing and Shanghai Strengthen Inspection and Control of Uyghurs and
Tibetans on Eve of Olympics'' [Ao yun qianxi jing hu jiaqiang dui weizu
zangzuren de jiankong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 July 08; ``Olympic
Terror Clampdown Targets Beijing Uighurs After Attacks,'' Bloomberg
(Online), 18 August 08.
\11\ ``Nur Bekri's Speech at Autonomous Region Cadre Plenary
Session'' [Nu'er Baikeli zai zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang de jianghua],
Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08. For an example of mention of
Rebiya Kadeer in local government reports, see ``Firmly Grasp the
Overall Situation, Unite the Masses, Conscientiously Forge Firm
Foundation to Protect Stability'' [Bawo daju tuanjie qunzhong qieshi da
lao weiwen jichu], Ili News Net (Online), 21 September 08.
\12\ For reports from local offices and governments, see, e.g.,
``Zhang Yun Stresses: Make Firm Push To Deepen Educational Activities''
[Zhang yun qiangdiao: zhashi ba zhuti jiaoyu huodong tuixiang shenru],
Ili News Net (Online), 25 September 08; ``Must Have Vigorous Education
Propaganda'' [Zhuti jiaoyu xuanchuan bixu honghonglielie], Ili Daily
News reprinted in Ili News Net (Online), 16 September 08; ``Autonomous
Region Youth League Committee Launches Ethnic Unity Education Practicum
Activities'' [Zizhiqu tuanwei kaizhan minzu tuanjie jiaoyu shijian
huodong], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 12 September 08. For Wang's
comments, see ``Autonomous Region Convenes Cadre Plenary Session on
Making Concerted Efforts to Safeguard Xinjiang's Social and Political
Stability'' [Zizhiqu zhaokai ganbu dahui qixinxieli weihu xinjiang
shehui zhengzhi wending], Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08;
``Wang Lequan's Speech at Autonomous Region 5th Commendation Meeting on
Advancement of Ethnic Unity'' [Wang Lequan zai zizhiqu di wu ci minzu
tuanjie jinbu biaozhang dahui shang de jianghua], Tianshan Net
(Online), 16 September 08.
\13\ For an overview of incarceration trends from the mid-1990s
onward, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 107 and accompanying footnotes.
\14\ According to the head of the XUAR High People's Court, since
2003, XUAR courts have accepted a yearly average of roughly 150 cases
involving endangering state security. ``Work Regarding Courts
Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts is Launched'' [Quanguo fayuan
duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo qidong], Xinhua (Online), 14
August 07. Nationwide, the number of arrests between 2003 and 2006 for
endangering state security numbered 336, 426, 296, and 604
respectively, and the number of such cases that authorities began to
prosecute in 2005 and 2006 were 185 and 258 respectively, indicating
that cases from the XUAR constituted a significant total percentage
both of arrests and prosecutions for endangering state security. The
Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``New Statistics Point to Dramatic
Increase in Chinese Political Arrests in 2006,'' 27 November 07; The
Dui Hua Foundation (Online), `` `Endangering State Security' Arrests
Rise More than 25% in 2004,'' Dialogue Newsletter, Winter 2006.
\15\ ``Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts
is Launched,'' Xinhua.
\16\ Yan Wenlu, ``Xinjiang Higher People's Court To Sternly Crack
Down on Crimes of the `Three Forces' in Accordance With the Law,''
China News Agency, 15 August 08 (Open Source Center, 15 August 08).
\17\ Except where otherwise noted, information in this boxed
subsection is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang
in Lead-up To and During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission
on China.
\18\ Information in this bulleted item, other than information on
Ramadan, is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in
Lead-up To and During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China. For information on controls over Ramadan, see, e.g., Shayar
County Government (Online), ``Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County
Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures To Strengthen Management During Ramadan''
[Shayaxian yingmaili zhen caiqu jiu xiang cuoshijiaqiang ``zhaiyue''
qijian guanli], 28 August 08; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County
Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security'' [Zhaosuxian wu cuoshi
tiqian zuohao zhaiyue guanli bao ao yun wending], Fazhi Xinjiang
(Online), 23 August 08; ``Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard
Stability During Ramadan'' [Xinhexian bushu zhaiyue qijian weiwen
gongzuo], Xinjiang Peace Net (Online), 2 September 08. See also Section
II--Freedom of Religion--China's Religious Communities--Islam.
\19\ ``Uyghur Radio Worker Sacked, Detained,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 8 September 08; ``Supplementary Information on Prisoner
Mehbube Ablesh'' [Tutqun mehbube ablesh heqqide toluqlima melumatlar],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 September 08; ``Uyghur Staff Member in
Xinjiang Criticizes Government, Is Arrested'' [Xinjiang weizu yuangong
piping zhengfu bei jubu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 September 08.
\20\ While ``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal
Publications'' campaigns targeting a range of materials exist
throughout China, authorities in the XUAR target religious and
political materials also as part of broader controls in the region over
Islamic practice and other expressions of ethnic identity among the
Uyghur population. ``Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against
Political and Religious Publications,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, February 2008, 4.
\21\ In May 2006, for example, XUAR authorities launched a month-
long campaign aimed at rooting out ``illegal'' political and religious
publications in which they reported finding `` `the existence of books
with seriously harmful religious inclinations,'' and Uyghur-language
religious materials with ``unhealthy content.'' ``Xinjiang Government
Seizes, Confiscates Political and Religious Publications,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 7-8. In February 2006,
authorities confiscated ``illegal'' religious materials during a
surprise inspection of the ethnic minority language publishing market,
as part of a campaign that included focus on materials of an
``illegal'' political nature, those that propagate ethnic separatism,
or those of a religious nature. ``Xinjiang Cracks Down on `Illegal'
Religious Publications,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, April 2006, 9.
\22\ ``Atush Launches Clean-up Operation in Publishing Market''
[Atushi shi kaizhan chubanwu shichang zhuanxiang zhili xingdong],
Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Peace Net (Online), 11 July 08;
Jume, ``Chinese Government Starts Urgent Search Activities on Streets
of Atush'' [Xitay hokumiti atush shehiridiki dukan-restilerde jiddiy
axturush herikiti bashlidi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 July 08.
\23\ Gulchehre, ``Chinese Authorities Close Some Uyghur Discussion
Web Sites During Olympics'' [Xitay dairiliri olimpik mezgilide bir
qisim uyghur munazire tor betlirini taqidi], Radio Free Asia (Online),
14 August 08. In a review of Uyghur Web sites carried out on August 18
and 19, 2008, Commission staff found that the bulletin board services
(BBS) on the Web sites www.diyarim.com, www.orkhun.com, and
www.alkuyi.com blocked normal message-posting functions and carried
messages calling for stability during the Olympics games or noting the
closure of the site's BBS. In June, 2008, overseas media noted the
closure of the Web site Uyghur Online due to perceived ties with
overseas ``extremists.'' See ``Uyghur Web Site Shut Down,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 12 June 08. See also ``Notice Concerning the Closure of
Uyghur Online'' [Guanyu weiwuer zai xian bei guanbi de tongzhi],
available at http://www.uighuronline.cn/ (last visited 19 May 2008). As
of September 11, 2008, Commission staff observed that the site was in
operation again.
\24\ For information on the Islamic Association of China's
publishing activities and state controls over the interpretation of
religious texts, see ``SARA Director Calls for Continued Controls on
Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September
2006, 8, and ``Islamic Congress Establishes Hajj Office, Issues New
Rules,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 12-
13.
\25\ ``Teacher and 37 Students Detained for Sudying [sic] Koran in
China: Rights Group'' Agence France-Presse, 15 August 05 (Open Source
Center, 15 August 05); ``Three Detained in East Turkistan for `Illegal'
Religious Text,'' Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), 3 August 05;
Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online), ``Devastating
Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,'' April 2005, 70
(pagination follows ``text-only'' pdf download of this report).
\26\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Government Promotes Mandarin Chinese Use
Through Bilingual Education,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, January 2006, 17-18; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic
Affairs Commission (Online), ``This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track
Middle Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try `Bilingual' Education'' [Jin
qiu xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi chuzhong changshi ``shuangyu''
jiaoyu], reprinted on the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 9
May 08.
\27\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 4, 121, and Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, art.
10, 21. Chinese law also promotes education in ethnic minority
languages. See REAL, art. 37. 2005 Implementing Provisions for the REAL
affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also
place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting ``bilingual''
education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on
Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL Implementing
Provisions) [Guowuyuan shishi ``Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu
zizhifa'' ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, art. 22.
\28\ ``Xinjiang Bilingual Education Students Increase 50-fold in 6
Years'' [Xinjiang shuangyu xuesheng liu nien zengzhang 50 bei],
Xinjiang Economic News, via Tianshan Net (Online), 31 October 06.
\29\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 107; CECC, 2006 Annual
Report, 91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 22-23.
\30\ The Xinjiang High People's Court rejected his appeal in
February 2000, but changed the ``stealing'' state secrets charge to
``unlawfully obtaining'' them. In 2001, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention found his imprisonment arbitrary and in violation
of his right to freedom of thought, expression, and opinion. See the
CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information on Tohti Tunyaz's
case and the other cases cited in this section.
\31\ The precise charges levied against Abduhelil Zunun are
unavailable, but Human Rights Watch reported that his sentence took
place at a mass sentencing rally to punish terrorist and separatist
activities. Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China Human Rights Update,''
15 February 02. See also the CECC Political Prisoner Database.
\32\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.
Sentencing information on the case and Abdulla Jamal's current
whereabouts are not known.
\33\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ ``Uyghur Radio Worker Sacked, Detained,'' Radio Free Asia;
``Supplementary Information on Prisoner Mehbube Ablesh,'' Radio Free
Asia; ``Uyghur Staff Member in Xinjiang Criticizes Government, Is
Arrested,'' Radio Free Asia. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database
for more details.
\36\ For a discussion of these groups, known as meshrep in Uyghur,
see, e.g., Jay Dautcher, ``Public Health and Social Pathologies in
Xinjiang,'' in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick
Starr (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 285-6.
\37\ ``Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain
Protesters,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\38\ The editor has surmised that the charge may have been based on
e-mail correspondence the China Development Brief initiated with a
Uyghur diaspora organization while conducting research. Nick Young,
``Message from the Editor,'' China Development Brief (Online), 12 July
07; Nick Young, ``Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit,'' Christian
Science Monitor (Online), 4 December 07.
\39\ Authorities also accused the publication's English-language
editor of conducting ``unauthorized surveys'' and forced the
publication's closing during a period of heightened scrutiny over local
and foreign civil society organizations throughout China. Nick Young,
``Message from the Editor,'' China Development Brief (Online), Nick
Young, ``Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit.'' For more information
on civil society groups in China, see Section III--Civil Society as
well as CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 141-143.
\40\ In the course of an interview with Chinese officials, the
editor of the China Development Brief (CDB) critiqued repressive
policies in the XUAR, comments which he believes might have shut down
further negotiations with authorities on ways to salvage CDB. Nick
Young, ``Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit.''
\41\ While the government continues to impose hukou, or household
registration requirements, that place restrictions on citizens' ability
to formally change their place of residence and receive social services
and other benefits in their new homes, limited hukou reforms and other
policies have nonetheless given citizens more leeway to migrate
internally within China than in previous decades. For more information
on freedom of residence, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and CECC,
2007 Annual Report, 111-113.
\42\ See, e.g., REAL Implementing Provisions, art. 29. For
additional information, see, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in
Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' East-
West Center Washington 2004, Policy Studies 11, 24-26.
\43\ Earlier government policies, including forced resettlement to
the region, have already resulted in broad demographic shifts in the
XUAR. According to an official government census, in 1953, Han Chinese
constituted 6 percent of the XUAR's population of 4.87 million, while
Uyghurs made up 75 percent. In contrast, the 2000 census listed the Han
population at 40.57 percent and Uyghurs at 45.21 percent of a total
population of 18.46 million. Scholar Stanley Toops has noted that Han
migration since the 1950s is responsible for the ``bulk'' of the XUAR's
high population growth in the past half century. Stanley Toops,
``Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949,'' East-West
Center Washington Working Papers No. 1, May 04, 1. See also ``Xinjiang
Focuses on Reducing Births in Minority Areas to Curb Population
Growth,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006,
15-16; ``Xinjiang Reports High Rate of Population Increase,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 16-17.
\44\ State Administration for Ethnic Affairs (Online), ``Important
Meaning'' [Zhongyao yiyi], 13 July 04.
\45\ See Development Policy in Xinjiang in this section for more
information.
\46\ Scholar Gardner Bovingdon notes that ``Han immigration and
state policies have dramatically increased the pressure on Uyghurs to
assimilate linguistically and culturally, seemingly contradicting the
explicit protections of the constitution and the laws on autonomy[.]''
Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and
Uyghur Discontent,'' 47.
\47\ As noted above, Han migration has resulted in high population
growth in the region. Stanley Toops, ``Demographics and Development in
Xinjiang after 1949,'' 1.
\48\ ``Xinjiang Focuses on Reducing Births in Minority Areas to
Curb Population Growth,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update.
\49\ ``Last Year, 65,000 Fewer People Were Born in Xinjiang''
[Qunian xinjiang shao chusheng 6.5 wan ren], Xinjiang Metropolitan
News, reprinted in Tianshan Net, 28 February 08. Although the
government has implemented policies throughout China to reward families
who comply with various population planning dictates, it also continues
to punish non-compliance. See Section II--Population Planning, for more
information. The XUAR regulation on population planning allows urban
Han Chinese couples to have one child, urban ethnic minority couples
and rural Han Chinese couples to have two, and rural ethnic minority
couples to have three. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on
Population and Family Planning [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 28 November 02, amended 26 November 04
and 25 May 06, art. 15. While this legislation indicates some
flexibility to adapt national legislation to suit ``local conditions,''
as stipulated in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, XUAR residents
nonetheless lack the autonomy to choose not to implement any limits at
all on childbearing. REAL, art. 4, 44. For information on the limits of
the legal framework for autonomy, see, e.g., CECC, 2005 Annual Report,
15-17. Scholar Gardner Bovingdon discusses the role of population
planning requirements within the context of the regional ethnic
autonomy system in Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist
Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' 26.
\50\ See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Rural East
Turkistan To Be `Focus' of China's Family Planning Policies,'' 15
February 06; Human Rights in China: Improving or Deteriorating
Conditions? Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights,
and International Operations, Committee on International Relations,
U.S. House of Representatives, 19 April 06, Testimony of Rebiya Kadeer.
\51\ For more details, see the CECC Political Prisoner Database as
well as the sources cited below.
\52\ ``Chinese Police Attempt to Take into Custody Son of Uighur
Activist Rebiya Kadeer,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2005, 10; ``Rebiya Kadeer's Employees Released After
Seven-Month Detention,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, February 2006, 4-5.
\53\ ``Xinjiang Police Form Special Unit To Investigate Exiled
Activist Rebiya Kadeer,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, October 2005, 7-8.
\54\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Question Rebiya Kadeer's Son, Name Him
a Criminal Suspect,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
May 2006, 5-6.
\55\ ``Rebiya Kadeer's Sons Charged With State Security and
Economic Crimes,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July
2006, 3-4.
\56\ ``Rebiya Kadeer's Sons Receive Prison Sentence, Fines, for
Alleged Economic Crimes,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, December 2006, 15-16.
\57\ Uyghur American Association (Online), ``Son of Rebiya Kadeer
Sentenced to Nine Years in Prison on Charges of `Secessionism,' '' 17
April 07.
\58\ Uyghur American Association (Online), ``Rebiya Kadeer's
Imprisoned Son in Urgent Need of Medical Treatment,'' 11 December 07.
\59\ See, e.g., Calla Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' in
Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, 188 (noting improvements in
transport and communications that have produced ``broad benefits'' in
the region.); Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist
Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' 38.
\60\ State Administration for Ethnic Affairs (Online), ``Important
Meaning.''
\61\ Stanley W. Toops, ``The Ecology of Xinjiang: A Focus on
Water,'' in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, 270-271.
\62\ Although the Chinese government does not aggregate economic
data by ethnic group, scholars who have looked at other indicators have
noted that the most prosperous regions in the XUAR are those with
majority Han populations. Areas in the XUAR with overwhelmingly ethnic
minority populations remain the region's poorest. Weimer, ``The Economy
of Xinjiang,'' 177-180; David Bachman, ``Making Xinjiang Safe for the
Han? '' in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165-168.
\63\ Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' 179-180; Bachman,
``Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? '' 167-168; Ildiko Beller-Hann,
``Temperamental Neighbors: Uighur-Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest
China,'' in Gunther Schlee, ed., Imagined Differences: Hatred and the
Construction of Identity (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 65.
\64\ See Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' 163 (noting strong
government control over both oil and gas reserves and over the general
economy).
\65\ Scholar Calla Weimer has noted that ``in an effort to ensure
stability in a frontier area,'' the central government ``has more
actively asserted its control over development in Xinjiang than in any
other region.'' Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' 164. For
statements connecting development projects to stability, see, e.g.,
``While Joining NPC Deputies From Xinjiang in Discussing and Examining
the Government's Work Report, General Hu Jintao Stresses That It Is
Necessary To Firmly Grasp the Opportunity To Carry out the Large-Scale
Development of the Western Region and Continuously Create a New
Situation in the Development of Various Undertakings in Xinjiang,''
Xinjiang Daily, 9 March 08 (Open Source Center, 15 March 08); ``State
Council Made Major Strategic Plans To Further Promote Xinjiang's
Economic, Social Development,'' Xinjiang Daily, 3 October 07 (Open
Source Center, 3 October 07); Kashgar District Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Commission (Online), ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chair
Ismail Tiliwaldi Attends Ceremony for Laying Foundation for Kashgar-
Hoten Highway'' [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu zhuxi simayi tieliwaerdi
chuxi kashi zhi hetian gaodengji gonglu dianji yishi], reprinted on the
State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 20 November 07.
\66\ In 2007, the government announced that it had invested over
231 million yuan from 2001-2006 in funds to support ethnic minority
development, using the money for healthcare, education, cultural
undertakings, and broadcast communications. It also announced plans to
increase funds for 2007. ``State Invests 300 Million Yuan in 7 Years to
Support Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Economic Development'' [Guojia 7 nian
tou 3 yi yuan fuchi xinjiang shaoshu minzu jingji fazhan], Xinjiang
Daily (Online), 17 September 07.
\67\ For Chinese media reports on the programs, see, e.g., ``Money
From Our Kids Has Come'' [Zan haizi jiqian laile], Tianshan Net
(Online), 25 June 07; Qarghiliq County Government (Online), ``Leaving
Home for the Wide World, Qarghiliq County's Second Batch of 313 Young
Girls Go to Tianjian To Start Their Undertakings'' [Zouchu jiamen
tiandi kuan yecheng xian di er pi 313 ming nu qingnian fu tianjin
chuangye], 17 April 07. For statistics on the makeup of the labor force
and number of people transferred from Kashgar district, see ``160 Rural
Women from Kashgar Go to Tianjin To Apply Their Labor'' [Xinjiang kashi
160 ming nongcun funu fu tianjin wugong], Urumqi Evening News,
reprinted in Tianshan Net, 19 March 07.
\68\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Deception, Pressure,
and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China,'' 8
February 08; Trafficking in China, Briefing of the Congressional Human
Rights Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives, 31 October 07, Testimony
of Rebiya Kadeer, President of the Uyghur American Association;
``Uyghur Girls Forced Into Labor Far From Home By Local Chinese
Officials,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 July 07.
\69\ For information on forced labor (hashar, also sometimes
translated as ``corvee labor'') in English, see Radio Free Asia's blog
``RFA Unplugged.'' ``Forced, Unpaid Labor for Uyghurs in China's Almond
Groves,'' RFA Unplugged (Online), 9 April 07. For Uyghur-language
reporting on the topic, see Gulchehre, ``Forced Labor Started Once
Again in Kashgar Countryside'' [Qeshqer yezilirida hashar yene
bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 February 07; Gulchehre,
``100,000 Farmers in Yeken [Yarkand] Caught Up in Wide-Scale Forced
Labor'' [Yekende yuz ming dehqan keng kolemlik hashargha tutuldi],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 March 07; Gulchehre, ``Wide-Scale Forced
Labor Started Again in Kashgar Countryside'' [Qeshqer yezilirida keng
kolemlik hashar yene bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 March 08.
For Chinese government reporting on the topic, see Kashgar District
Government (Online), ``Yeken [Yarkand] County Starts Springtime Wave to
Cultivate Desert Land'' [Shachexian xianqi chunji gebi kaihuang zaotian
rechao], 9 March 07; Kashgar District Government (Online), ``100,000
Rural Laborers Build Pistachio Base in Yeken [Yarkand] County''
[Shachexian shi wan nongmingong jianshe kaixinguo jidi], 20 March 07.
\70\ ``Work-Study Programs Using Child Labor Continue in
Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 5. See also ``Xinjiang Government Continues Controversial `Work-
Study' Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
November 2006, 11.
\71\ ``Civil Servant Recruitment in Xinjiang Favors Han Chinese,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August 2006, 6;
``Xinjiang Government Says Ethnic Han Chinese Will Get 500 of 700 New
Civil Service Appointments,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (Online), 7 April 05; CECC Staff Interviews. In addition, new
requirements imposed through the government's ``bilingual'' education
policies disadvantage the job prospects of ethnic minority teachers.
For more information, see Addendum: ``Bilingual'' Education in Xinjiang
at the end of this section.
\72\ According to one report, personnel shortcomings have meant
that ``there is no way to guarantee the use of ethnic minority
languages to carry out litigation.'' ``Meticulously Picking Talent:
Problem of Faultline in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at
Improvement'' [Jingxin linxuan rencai xinjiang faguan duanceng wenti
chubu huanjie], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 06. See also ``Lack
of Ethnic Minority Judges in Xinjiang Basic-Level Courts Especially
Prominent'' [Xinjiang jiceng fayuan shaoshu minzu faguan buzu youwei
tuchu], Xinhua (Online), 22 November 07; ``Courts throughout Country to
Join Forces to Help Xinjiang'' [Quanguo fayuan jiang heli yuan jiang],
Tianshan Net (Online), 20 August 07. The shortage of legal personnel
and interpreters who speak ethnic minority languages also impacts legal
proceedings outside the XUAR, especially since the Supreme People's
Court returned to the process of reviewing all death sentences levied
within China. See ``China Exclusive: More Ethnic Judges, Translators
Needed To Cope With Stricter Death Penalty,'' Xinhua, 13 March 07 (Open
Source Center, 13 March 07). For legal bases to have judicial
proceedings conducted in one's native language, see, e.g., PRC
Constitution, art. 134; REAL, art. 47; Criminal Procedure Law, enacted
1 January 79, amended 17 March 96, art. 9; Administrative Procedure
Law, enacted 4 April 89, art. 8; Civil Procedure Law, enacted 9 April
91, amended 28 October 07, art. 11; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work [Xinjiang weiwu'er
zizhiqu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], adopted 25 September 93, amended
20 September 02, art. 12.
\73\ Information within is based on CECC Staff Interviews except
where otherwise noted.
\74\ For background information, including reports from China and
neighboring countries along with reports from overseas observers, see,
e.g., Li Zhongfa, ``Hu Jintao Holds Talks With Kyrgyz President
Bakiyev,'' Xinhua, 9 June 06 (Open Source Center, 11 June 06);
``Cooperation With China Strengthened: Uzbek President,'' Xinhua, 19
June 06 (Open Source Center, 10 June 06); ``China's `Uyghur Problem'
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,'' Hearing on China's Role in
the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?, U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 3-4 August 06, Testimony of Dru Gladney,
Professor of Asian Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa; ``China
Tightly Controls the Cradles of the `Xinjiang Independence' Forces,''
Ta Kung Pao, 25 August 06 (Open Source Center, 26 August 06); ``China
To Urge Tougher Counter-Terrorism Measures at SCO 22 Sep Session,''
Agence France-Presse, 21 September 06 (Open Source Center, 21 September
06); Tao Shelan, ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chairman Ismail
Tiliwaldi: Clamping Down On Terrorism Is Common Aspiration of Peace-
Loving People,'' China News Agency, 16 May 07 (Open Source Center, 19
May 07); ``SCO Nations End Consultations on Anti-Terrorism Military
Exercise,'' Xinhua, 19 May 07 (Open Source Center, 19 May 07); Yu Sui,
``Hu's Visit Set To Boost Regional Cooperation,'' China Daily, 14
August 07 (Open Source Center, 14 August 07); Erica Marat, ``Chinese
Migrants Face Discrimination in Kyrgyzstan,'' Jamestown Foundation
(Online), 28 February 08; Robert Sutter, ``Durability in China's
Strategy Toward Central Asia--Reasons for Optimism,'' China and Eurasia
Forum Quarterly, Volume 6, No. 1, 2008, 3-10. See also the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Web site at www.setsco.org.
\75\ CECC Staff Interviews. Barriers to local asylum proceedings
have resulted in problems including statelessness. For more
information, see, e.g., Refugees International (Online), ``Kazakhstan:
Neglecting Refugees, Engendering Statelessness,'' 21 December 07;
Refugees International (Online), ``Kyrgyz Republic: Powerful Neighbors
Imperil Protection and Create Statelessness,'' 20 December 07; Refugees
International (Online), ``Refugee Voices: Uighurs in Kyrgyz Republic,''
9 January 08.
\76\ CECC Staff Interviews; Amnesty International (Online),
``Central Asia Summary of Human Rights Concerns January 2006-March
2007,'' 2007; Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online),
``Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,'' 24;
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State
(Online), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2005, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 8 March 06.
\77\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July
51 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status
of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly
resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 50, art. 33.
\78\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, art. 3(1).
\79\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2).
\80\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Government Promotes Mandarin Chinese Use
Through Bilingual Education,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, January 2006, 17-18; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic
Affairs Commission, ``This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track Middle
Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try `Bilingual' Education'' [Jin qiu
xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi chuzhong changshi ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu],
reprinted on the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 9 May 08.
\81\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang's First Round of Love My China Ethnic
Minority Youth Bilingual Oral Speech Contest Opens'' [Xinjiang shoujie
ai wo zhonghua shaoshu minzu shao'er shuangyu kouyu dasai qimu],
Tianshan Net (Online), 15 September 06; Kashgar District Government
(Online), ``Love My China Bilingual Speech Contest Enters Semi-Finals''
[Ai wo zhonghua shuangyu dasai jinru fusai], 31 October 06.
\82\ ``Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of
Politicians Managing Education'' [Wang Lequan qiangdiao: jianding
luoshi zhengzhijia ban jiaoyu yuanze], Xinhua Economic News, reprinted
in Xinhua, 26 April 05.
\83\ Cited in Arienne M. Dwyer, ``The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur
Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse,'' East-West Center
Washington 2005, Policy Studies 15, 37.
\84\ For these and other protections, see, e.g., PRC Constitution,
arts. 4, 121 and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May
84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21.
\85\ REAL, art. 37. 2005 Implementing Provisions for the REAL
affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also
place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting ``bilingual''
education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on
Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL Implementing
Provisions) [Guowuyuan shishi ``Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu
zizhifa'' ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, art. 22.
\86\ `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages
in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, March/April 2008, 3; ``Xinjiang Official Describes Plan to
Expand Use of Mandarin in Minority Schools,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 13.
\87\ ``Decision Concerning the Vigorous Promotion of `Bilingual'
Education Work'' [Guanyu dali tuijin ``shuangyu'' jiaoxue gongzuo de
jueding], cited in e.g., `` `Eight Questions' About Xinjiang
`Bilingual' Education Work'' [Xinjiang ``shuangyu'' jiaoxue gongzuo
``ba wen''], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 March 08.
\88\ ``Results of Xinjiang's Promotion of `Bilingual Education'
Remarkable'' [Xinjiang tuijin ``shuangyu jiaoxue'' chengxiao xianzhu],
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 7 December 05.
\89\ ``City in Xinjiang Mandates Exclusive Use of Mandarin Chinese
in Schools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September
2006, 9-10.
\90\ ``Xinjiang Bilingual Education Students Increase 50-fold in 6
Years'' [Xinjiang shuangyu xuesheng liu nian zengzhang 50 bei],
Xinjiang Economic News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 31 October
06.
\91\ Xinjiang Education Department (Online), ``Notice Concerning
Soliciting Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable
Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary
``Bilingual'' Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)' ''
[Guanyu zhengqiu ``guanyu jiji, wentuode tuijin shaoshu minzu xueqian
he zhongxiaoxue `shuangyu' jiaoxue gongzuo de yijian (zhengqiu
yijian)'' yijian de tongzhi], 5 May 08.
\92\ ``Results of Xinjiang's Promotion of `Bilingual Education'
Remarkable,'' Xinjiang Daily.
\93\ Xinjiang Education Department, ``Notice Concerning Soliciting
Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of
Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary ``Bilingual''
Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).' ''
\94\ Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, ``Language Blow for China's Muslims,''
BBC (Online), 1 June 2002.
\95\ ``Xinjiang Vocational Schools To Implement Two-Year Education
System, Basic Courses Taught in Mandarin'' [Xinjiang zhiye yuanxiao
jiang shixing liang nian zhi jiaoyu jichuke shiyong hanyu jiangke],
Urumqi Evening News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 27 July 2005.
\96\ In contrast, an undated description of the college, available
on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site, describes the institution as
a combined ethnic minority-Han school that teaches in Mandarin, Uyghur,
and Kazakh. `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority
Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update.
\97\ Opinion Concerning the Strengthening of Ethnic Minority
Preschool ``Bilingual'' Education [Guanyu jiaqiang shaoshu minzu
xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu de yijian], issued 2005, as cited in ``
`Eight Questions' About Xinjiang `Bilingual' Education Work,'' Tianshan
Net. Commission staff was unable to locate the original text of this
opinion. See also Xinjiang Education Department, ``Notice Concerning
Soliciting Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable
Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary
``Bilingual'' Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).' ''
\98\ ``Xinjiang Makes 5-Year 430 Million Yuan Investment To Develop
Rural Preschool `Bilingual' Education'' [Xinjiang 5 nian touru 4.3 yi
fazhan nongcun xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], Xinjiang Economic News,
reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 10 October 06; `` `Bilingual'
Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang
Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update. These
plans may have stemmed from direction in the 2005 opinion on preschool
``bilingual'' education. See Opinion Concerning the Strengthening of
Ethnic Minority Preschool ``Bilingual'' Education [Guanyu jiaqiang
shaoshu minzu xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu de yijian], issued 2005, as
cited in `` `Eight Questions' About Xinjiang `Bilingual' Education
Work,'' Tianshan Net. Commission staff was unable to locate the
original text of this opinion.
\99\ ``[XUAR] Department of Finance Allocates 70.39 Million Yuan To
Support Preschool `Bilingual' Education'' [Caizhengting xiabo 7039 wan
yuan zhichi xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 12
November 07; `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority
Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update. The subsidies include 1.5 yuan each day per child for daily
expenses, 20 yuan yearly per child for teaching materials, and a 400
yuan monthly subsidy per teacher. The government had announced
subsidies for ``bilingual'' preschool education at least as early as
2005. ``Xinjiang Official Describes Plan to Expand Use of Mandarin in
Minority Schools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\100\ ``105 Teachers College Students Go to Kashgar, Xinjiang To
Support Educational Undertakings'' [105 ming shifansheng fu xinjiang
kashi zhijiao], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted in Tianshan Net
(Online), 28 February 08; `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic
Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update.
\101\ ``State To Invest 3.75 Billion Yuan To Support Xinjiang
`Bilingual' Preschool Education'' [Guojia jiang touru 37.5 yi yuan
zhichi xinjiang xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted
in Tianshan Net (Online), 12 September 08.
\102\ In June 2007, official media reported that 42.8 percent of
rural preschool-age children in Yengisheher county, Kashgar district,
were enrolled in ``bilingual'' preschool programs. ``40 Percent of
Rural Youngsters of Appropriate Age Attend `Bilingual' Preschools,
`Bilingual' Preschool Education Welcomed by the Farmers of
Yengisheher'' [Si cheng nongcun shiling ertong jiudu ``shuangyu''
you'eryuan xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu shou shule nongmin huanying],
Xinjiang Daily (Online), 22 June 07. In December 2007, official media
reported that in 2008, all urban ethnic minority children and 90
percent of rural preschool-age ethnic minority children in Bayin'gholin
Mongol Autonomous Prefecture--which has a predominantly Uyghur ethnic
minority population--would receive ``bilingual'' education. ``Ethnic
Minority Youngsters of the Appropriate Age Receive `Bilingual'
Education'' [Shaoshu minzu shiling ertong jieshou ``shuangyu''
jiaoxue], Tianshan Net (Online), 26 December 07. The article also noted
that all urban elementary school students in first grade and higher
would receive ``bilingual'' education, as would over 80 percent of
their rural counterparts. For statistics on the ethnic minority
population within the prefecture, see ``Introduction to the General
Situation in the Bayin'gholin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture''
[Bayinguoleng menggu zizhizhou gaikuang jianjie], Xinjiang Investment
Net (Online), 24 December 07.
\103\ Xinjiang Education Department, ``Notice Concerning Soliciting
Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of
Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary ``Bilingual''
Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).' ''
\104\ See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Uyghur
Language Under Attack: The Myth of `Bilingual' Education in the
People's Republic of China,'' 24 July 07, 8-9; ``Atush Starts Mandarin
Chinese-Strengthening Training Class in Shenyang'' [Atushi kaiban fu
shenyang jiaoshi hanyu qianghua peixunban], Qizilsu News, reprinted on
the Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Government Web site, 16 August
06; ``China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 16 March 04. See also Xinjiang Education Department,
``Notice Concerning Soliciting Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the
Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and
Elementary and Secondary ``Bilingual'' Education Work (Draft for
Soliciting Opinions).' '' The opinion calls for giving ``appropriate
placements'' to older teachers with poor Mandarin skills.
\105\ ``Autonomous Region Chair Nur Bekri Responds to Separatists'
Attack on Bilingual Education'' [Zizhiqu zhuxi nu'er baikeli huiying
fenlie fenzi dui shuangyu jiaoyu gongji], Xinjiang Metropolitan News,
reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 5 March 08; `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces
Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\106\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Deception, Pressure,
and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China,'' 8
February 08, 4-6.
\107\ ``Uyghur Girls Forced Into Labor Far From Home By Local
Chinese Officials,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 July 07.
\108\ Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that the government announced
in 2004 that all forced labor (hashar, sometimes also translated as
``corvee labor'') would be abolished by the end of 2005. While one
government official whom RFA broadcasters contacted said that workers
were paid and would become owners of the base, another official
contacted by RFA said that the laborers would not be paid. The spouse
of a third official, who answered a telephone call from RFA, surmised
that workers would not be paid. A farmer contacted by RFA reported that
20 laborers per small village were required to work at the site without
pay, and were required to pay a fine if they refused. For information
in English, see RFA's blog ``RFA Unplugged.'' ``Forced, Unpaid Labor
for Uyghurs in China's Almond Groves,'' RFA Unplugged (Online), 9 April
07. For Uyghur-language reporting on the topic, see, e.g., Gulchehre,
``Forced Labor Started Once Again in Kashgar Villages'' [Qeshqer
yezilirida hashar yene bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 February
07; Gulchehre, ``100,000 Farmers in Yeken [County] Involved in Wide-
Scale Forced Labor'' [Yekende yuz ming dehqan keng kolemlik hashargha
tutuldi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 March 07.
\109\ Kashgar District Government (Online), ``Yeken [Yarkand]
County Starts Springtime Wave To Cultivate Desert Land'' [Shachexian
xianqi chunji gebi kaihuang zaotian rechao], 9 March 07; Kashgar
District Government (Online), ``100,000 Rural Laborers Build Pistachio
Base in Yeken [Yarkand] County'' [Shachexian 10 wan nongmingong jianshe
kaixinguo jidi], 20 March 07.
\110\ Gulchehre, ``Forced Labor Begins Again on Wide Scale in
Kashgar Villages'' [Qeshqer yezilirida keng kolemlik hashar yene
bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 March 08.
\111\ ``Work-Study Programs Using Child Labor Continue in
Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 5; ``Xinjiang Government Continues Controversial `Work-Study'
Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November
2006, 11.
\112\ According to one report, personnel shortcomings have meant
that ``there is no way to guarantee the use of ethnic minority
languages to carry out litigation.'' ``Meticulously Picking Talent:
Problem of Faultline in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at
Improvement'' [Jingxin linxuan rencai xinjiang faguan duanceng wenti
chubu huanjie], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 06. See also ``Lack
of Ethnic Minority Judges in Xinjiang Basic-Level Courts Especially
Prominent'' [Xinjiang jiceng fayuan shaoshu minzu faguan buzu youwei
tuchu], Xinhua (Online), 22 November 07; ``Courts Throughout Country To
Join Forces To Help Xinjiang'' [Quanguo fayuan jiang heli yuan jiang],
Tianshan Net (Online), 20 August 07. The shortage of legal personnel
and interpreters who speak ethnic minority languages also impacts legal
proceedings outside the XUAR, especially since the Supreme People's
Court returned to the process of reviewing all death sentences levied
within China. See ``China Exclusive: More Ethnic Judges, Translators
Needed To Cope With Stricter Death Penalty,'' Xinhua, 13 March 07 (Open
Source Center, 13 March 07). For legal bases to have judicial
proceedings conducted in one's native language, see, e.g., PRC
Constitution, art. 134; Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 May
84, amended 28 February 01, art. 47; Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1
January 79, amended 17 March 96, art. 9; Administrative Procedure Law,
enacted 4 April 89, art. 8; Civil Procedure Law, enacted 9 April 91,
amended 28 October 07, art. 11; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work [Xinjiang weiwu'er
zizhiqu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], issued 25 September 93, amended 20
September 02, art. 12.
\113\ ``Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts
Is Launched'' [Quanguo fayuan duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo
qidong], Xinhua (Online), 14 August 07; ``Xinjiang Actively Constructs
Troops of Ethnic Minority Lawyers'' [Xinjiang jiji jianshe shaoshu
minzu lushi duiwu], Xinhua, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 15
October 07. There were 316 ethnic minority lawyers, or 15 percent of
the total population, in 2006. ``Xinjiang Bilingual Lawyers and Courts
Develop with Grace'' [Xinjiang shuangyu lushi fating zhan fengcai],
Tianshan Net (Online), 19 May 2006. For information on conditions in an
individual prefecture, see a description of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture, which has 23 ethnic minority lawyers out of a total of 163,
in ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Sorely Lacks Ethnic Minority
Lawyers'' [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shaoshu minzu lushi qique], Uyghur
Online, 20 April 07.
\114\ ``First Bilingual Law Firm in China Hangs Out Its Shingle''
[Guonei shoujia shuangyu lushisuo jiepai], Xinjiang Legal Daily
(Online), 30 March 06.
\115\ For an example of efforts to promote staffing in underserved
areas, see, e.g., ``Meticulously Picking Talent: Problem of Faultline
in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at Improvement,'' Tianshan Net.
\116\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Sorely Lacks Ethnic
Minority Lawyers,'' Uyghur Online.
\117\ ``Our Region Acts to Train Minority-Han High-Level Bilingual
Talent'' [Woqu chutai jucuo peiyang minhan jiantong gao cengci shuangyu
rencai], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 27 September 07.
\118\ ``Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts
Is Launched,'' Xinhua.
\119\ Ibid.
\120\ Supreme People's Court, ``National Forum Opens To Discuss
Courts' Work To Assist Their Counterparts in Xinjiang--Jiang Xingchang
Calls For Forming a Long-Term Mechanism To Assist Xinjiang and Raise
the Judicial Capability of Its Courts,'' 14 August 07 (Open Source
Center, 20 August 07).
\121\ Yan Wenlu, ``Xinjiang Higher People's Court To Sternly Crack
Down on Crimes of the `Three Forces' in Accordance With the Law,''
China News Agency, 15 August 08 (Open Source Center, 15 August 08).
Notes to Section V--Tibet
\1\ ``China Detains Tibetan Monks Protesting on Key Anniversary,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 March 08.
\2\ See The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace, Hearing of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 23 April 08, Written
Statement Submitted by Steven Marshall, Senior Advisor, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China. See also, ``Protests Fueled by Patriotic
Education Continue Amidst Lockdowns,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China (Online), 10 April 08.
\3\ Intermittent armed conflict between Tibetans and the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) took place at various times and locations
following establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1,
1949, and continued through the 1950s as the PLA cemented political
control in ethnic Tibetan areas that today comprise the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR), the 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs),
and 2 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TACs) located in Qinghai, Gansu,
Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces.
\4\ The past 25 years (since approximately 1983) in the Tibetan
areas of China have been characterized by factors including the Tibetan
rebuilding of the Tibetan Buddhist monastic institution and the
resumption of Tibetan Buddhism as a central (though constrained)
feature in the lives of most Tibetans. See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) (Online), ``Human Rights Situation
in Tibet: Annual Report 2005,'' 118. TCHRD notes in note 72 that the
period from 1983 to 1987 ``was one of rapid growth for monasteries and
nunneries.'' Tibet Information Network, ``News Review No. 26: Reports
From Tibet, 1997,'' April 1998, 4. The news summary notes, ``Until 1983
some 70 monks at Drepung monastery were married men with families.''
\5\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, Section IV. ``Tibet:
Special Focus for 2007'' provides an overview of Commission Annual
Report coverage since 2002 of key Tibetan issues.
\6\ The 12 county-level areas are: Lhasa city, Duilongdeqing
(Toelung Dechen), Linzhou (Lhundrub), and Dazi (Tagtse) counties,
located in Lhasa municipality in the TAR; Aba (Ngaba) and Ruo'ergai
(Dzoege) counties, located in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture in Sichuan province; and Xiahe (Sangchu), Maqu (Machu), Luqu
(Luchu), Zhuoni (Chone), and Diebu (Thewo) counties, and Hezuo (Tsoe)
city, located in Gannan (Kanlho) TAP in Gansu province. ``Judgments
Pronounced Publicly on Some Defendants Involved in Lhasa's `14 March'
Incident,'' Xinhua, 29 April 08 (Open Source Center, 30 April 08). The
Xinhua article refers to five monks sentenced for rioting in Dechen
township of Duilongdeqing county. ``94 Criminal Suspects in Linzhou
County Surrender Themselves to Justice,'' Tibet Daily, 19 March 08
(Open Source Center, 19 March 08). The Tibet Daily article reports the
surrender of persons allegedly involved in ``serious incidents of
beating, smashing, looting, and burning'' in Linzhou county. ``Tibet
Issues Arrest Warrants for 16 Suspects In Riot,'' Xinhua (Online), 5
April 08. According to the April article in Xinhua, the 16 suspects
allegedly took part in a March 15 riot in Dechen township, located in
Dazi county. ``Police: Four Rioters Wounded Sunday in Aba of SW
China,'' Xinhua (Online), 20 March 08. The Xinhua article from March
reports Tibetan rioting in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang
Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province. Security forces reportedly
shot and wounded four Tibetans. (The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy reported on March 18 that security forces shot and killed
at least 18 Tibetans.) ``Lies Cannot Conceal Evil Nature,'' Sichuan
Daily, 10 April 08 (Open Source Center, 16 April 08). The Sichuan Daily
article alleges that on March 15, Lhamo Kirti (Tagtsang Lhamo)
Monastery monks attacked government offices, police stations, and
shops. Similar incidents reportedly took place elsewhere in Ruo'ergai.
``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua (Online), 9
April 08. According to this Xinhua article: ``From March 14 to 19,
assaults, vandalism, looting and arson occurred in the Xiahe, Maqu,
Luqu, Jone, Hezuo and Diebu areas of Gannan . . . .''
\7\ ``Protests Fueled by Patriotic Education Continue Amidst
Lockdowns,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 10
April 08.
\8\ ``Dalai-Backed Violence Scars Lhasa,'' Xinhua (Online), 15
March 08; ``China Clamps Down on Tibetan Protests As Many Deaths,
Injuries Reported,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 March 08; Jim
Yardley, ``Chinese Police Clash With Tibet Protesters,'' New York Times
(Online), 15 March 08.
\9\ ``Police, Officials Hurt in Sichuan Riots,'' Xinhua (Online),
20 March 08; ``Violence, Protests Spread From Tibet to Western China,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 08; Benjamin Kang Lim and Chris
Buckley, ``Tibetan Riots Spread, Security Lockdown in Lhasa,'' Reuters
(Online), 16 March 08.
\10\ ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua;
TibetInfoNet (Online), `` `The World Will Not Look Away.'
Demonstrations in Amdo Machu and Region,'' 17 March 08.
\11\ Jill Drew, ``Tibet Protests Turn Violent, Shops Burn in
Lhasa,'' Washington Post (Online), 14 March 08. According to the
report, ``The confrontations, initially led by monks, were joined
Friday by hundreds of Tibetan civilians, who began attacking shops
owned by ethnic Han and Hui Chinese. Street fights between Tibetans and
Chinese continued into the night, according to reports from the
region.'' International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibet at a
Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China's New Crackdown,'' 5
August 08, 54. The report quotes an eyewitness description of activity
on March 14 near Ramoche Temple in Lhasa: ``Then they poured into
Tromsikhang [the market at the corner of Barkhor Street] from Ramoche
Temple. On the way, many shops owned by Chinese and Chinese Muslims
(Hui) were destroyed.''
\12\ ``Number of Rioters Surrendering to Police Tops 280 in
Lhasa,'' Xinhua (Online), 26 March 08 (``Rioters [in Lhasa] . . .
attacked schools, banks, hospitals, shops, government offices,
utilities and state media offices. Damage is estimated at more than 244
million yuan (34.4 million U.S. dollars).''); ``More Than 200 Injured,
Shops Set Alight in Aba Riot,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily
(Online), 3 April 08 (``More than 200 people were injured and 24 shops
and 81 vehicles were set alight in the March 16 riot in the Aba Tibetan
and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of southwestern China, an official said
Thursday.''); ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua
(``From March 14 to 19, assaults, vandalism, looting and arson occurred
in the Xiahe, Maqu, Luqu, Jone, Hezuo and Diebu areas of Gannan,
leaving 94 people injured and incurring 230 million yuan (32.8 million
U.S. dollars) in damages.'')
\13\ See, e.g., Jim Yardley, ``Tibetans Clash With Chinese Police
in 2nd City,'' New York Times (Online), 16 March 08. The New York Times
reported that according to a Tibetan in India who spoke by phone to
Tibetan protesters in Xiahe county, Gansu province, thousands of
protesters on March 16 shouted slogans including, ``The Dalai Lama must
return to Tibet.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Scores of Tibetans Arrested for Peaceful Protest in
Lhasa,'' 11 March 08. On March 10 in Guinan (Mangra) county, Qinghai
province, a few hundred protesters shouted slogans calling for the
Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Around 40 Middle School Students Arrested in
Marthang,'' 17 March 08. Approximately 100 Tibetan middle school
students in Hongyuan (Kakhog, or Marthang) county, Sichuan province,
demonstrated inside the school compound, calling for the return of the
Dalai Lama to Tibet.
\14\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Protest Erupts After Prayer for Deceased in Drango
County,'' 25 March 08. More than 400 monks in Luhuo (Draggo) county,
Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province, shouted slogans on March 25 including,
``Release [the] Panchen Lama.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Hundreds of Tibetans Protested in Chentsa, Malho
`TAP,' Qinghai Province,'' 25 March 08. Hundreds of Tibetans protesting
on March 22 in Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai
province, carried photographs of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, and
shouted slogans including, ``Release the eleventh Panchen Lama Erdeni
Gedun Choekyi Nyima.'' ``Latest Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 March 08. More than 1,000 monks and other
Tibetans shouted slogans on March 18 in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, including, ``Release the Panchen Lama.''
\15\ See, e.g., ``Tibet Update (1),'' China Digital Times (Online),
last visited on 18 June 08. The Drepung monks ``joined the peaceful
demonstration, demanding the freedom for religious belief.'' In another
protest, several hundred Labrang Tashikhyil monks and ordinary citizens
staged a protest march on March 14 and shouted slogans including,
``Return us to religion freedom.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``China Detains Drakar and Gaden Choeling Nuns in
Kardze,'' 17 May 08. Two nuns were detained for calling for religious
freedom, among other things. The detentions sparked a larger protest
resulting in the detention of at least 10 more nuns. ``Tibet Monks
Disrupt Tour by Journalists,'' Associated Press, reprinted in New York
Times (Online), 27 March 08. On March 27, a group of Jokhang Temple
monks shouted that there was no religious freedom when a group of
international journalists on a government-handled tour visited the
temple.
\16\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Climate of Fear
as Olympic Torch Arrives in Lhasa,'' 20 June 08. According to ICT, of
125 ``separate incidents of dissent'' that the organization documented,
``47 have been carried out by monks, 44 by laypeople, and 28 by both
monks and laypeople.''
\17\ The Dalai Lama is the foremost religious teacher of the Gelug
tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, whose adherents at present are more
numerous than those of other traditions of Tibetan Buddhism such as the
Nyingma, Kargyu, and Sakya. The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to
Peace, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 23 April 08, Written
Statement Submitted by John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State.
Deputy Secretary Negroponte described the Dalai Lama as ``the
undisputed spiritual leader of the Tibetan people,'' and ``the
spiritual leader of the vast majority of Tibetans.''
\18\ See, for example, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Mobile Phone Pictures Depict Intensity of
Demonstration in Amdo Labrang,'' 14 March 08. A protest demonstration
by Labrang Tashikhyil monks ``eventually grew into thousands when
laypeople also joined in.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``At Least Eight Shot Dead in Tongkor Monastery in
Kardze,'' 5 April 08. Approximately 300 Tongkor Monastery monks
marching in protest toward government offices were ``later joined by
hundreds of laypeople.'' ``Tibetans Wounded in Sichuan Protest,'' Radio
Free Asia (Online), 5 April 08. ``Local people'' joined protesting
monks from Nyatso Monastery (referred to as ``Mintso'' in the article),
increasing the crowd to about 1,000 persons.
\19\ ``Door of Dialogue Still Opens to Dalai: Premier,'' Xinhua
(Online), 18 March 08. ``There are ample facts and plenty of evidence
to prove that the riot in Lhasa was organized, premeditated,
masterminded and incited by the Dalai Lama clique, said Wen.''
\20\ ``Hao Peng: Patriotic Education Should Be Reinforced Among
Buddhist Monks at Monasteries,'' China Tibet News, 5 April 08 (Open
Source Center, 10 April 08). Speaking to the Tashilhunpo Monastery
Democratic Management Committee, Deputy Party Secretary Hao Peng called
on the committee to ``educate the masses of monks so that they can see
clearly the true colors of Dalai and recognize that Dalai has not been
a Buddhist monk since a long time ago but a politician that engages
himself in the evil deeds of separating the motherland by means of
beating, smashing, looting, and burning under the disguise of a lama
and under the signboard of Buddhism . . . .''
\21\ Significant factors were Zhang Qingli's arrival in the TAR as
Acting Party Secretary in November 2005, his promotion to TAR Party
Secretary in May 2006, the TAR government Standing Committee's issuance
of the TAR Implementing Measures for the ``Regulation on Religious
Affairs'' in September 2006, and the State Administration for Religious
Affairs issuance in July 2007 of the Measures on the Management of the
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism. ``Zhang Qingli
Becomes New Party Chief of Tibet,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 May 07;
``Xinjiang Communist Party Official Promoted to Acting Secretary of the
Tibet Autonomous Region,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, January 2006, 19; Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures
for the ``Regulation on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Zizang
zizhiqu shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)] [hereinafter
TAR 2006 Measures], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07;
State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management
of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan
fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 13 July 07, effective 1
September 07.
\22\ For example, ``Chinese Foreign Ministry Says: We Hope the
Dalai Will Treasure the Opportunity of Consultation, and Stop his
Separatist and Sabotage Activities,'' Xinhua, 29 April 08 (Open Source
Center, 29 April 08). Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Jiang Yu
said on April 29, ``We hope the Dalai will treasure the opportunity of
consultation, stop his violent and criminal activities with concrete
actions, stop his activities to interrupt and sabotage the Beijing
Olympic Games, and stop his activities to split the motherland so as to
create conditions for the next consultation.''
\23\ ``Dalai Lama, Wolf in Human Shape,'' China Tibet News, 21
March 08 (Open Source Center, 24 March 08).
\24\ ``Unifying the Masses' Hearts and Will To Fight a People's War
Against Separatism and To Maintain Stability: The Tibet Autonomous
Region Holds a Video/Telephone Conference on Handling the `3.14
Incident' and Maintaining the Region's Stability; Zhang Qingli Gives
Important Speech,'' China Tibet News, 19 March 08 (Open Source Center,
19 March 08).
\25\ ``State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu
Heads Central Work Team on Tibet Inspection,'' China Tibet News, 25
March 08 (Open Source Center, 25 March 08). Meng Jianzhu said, ``[W]e
must continue to deepen education in patriotism in the monasteries and
temples, and unfold in depth there propaganda and education in the
ethnic and religious policies and the legal system . . . .'' ``Hongyuan
Begins `Maintaining Stable Thinking Among the Masses' Educational
Campaign,'' Sichuan News, 27 March 08 (Open Source Center, 27 March
08). OSC summary: officials in Hongyuan County began a campaign to show
herdsmen and local farmers the ``truth'' of the March 14 events in
Lhasa. ``Qiang Wei Stresses the Importance of Resolutely and
Unswervingly Struggling Against Separatism, Safeguarding Stability, and
Promoting Unity,'' Qinghai Daily, 29 March 08 (Open Source Center, 1
April 08) (``We should continuously step up the education campaign and
extensively reveal the true features of the Dalai clique in separating
the motherland and sabotaging national unity. We should carry on legal
system education with a great fanfare. We should make more efforts in
providing public opinion guidance.''); Jill Drew, ``In Tibetan
Monasteries, the Heavy Hand of the Party,'' Washington Post (Online), 6
April 08 (``After widespread protests swept the Tibetan plateau last
month, Chinese leaders responded with a combination of arrests,
interrogations and vigorous education campaigns.''); Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar
Choedhe Monastery Arrested for Opposing the `Patriotic Re-education'
Campaign,'' 31 May 08 (``The stipulated two-months' renewed ``Patriotic
re-education'' campaign launched at the beginning of April following
unprecedented protests across Tibetan plateau since 10 March, not only
permeates the monastic institutions but also government employees,
security forces, farmers, nomads, private entrepreneurs and educational
institutions.'').
\26\ See, for example, Woeser (Oezer), ``Woeser: Tibet Update (May
1-6, 2008),'' China Digital Times (Online), last visited 4 June 08.
April 30, Gonsar Monastery, Dege county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan
province: ``[T]he work team force the monks to sign their names in the
official document entitled ``Expose and Criticize the Dalai Separatist
Clique'', and also demanded each monk to hand in two photos to paste on
the document.'' Woeser, ``Tibet Update (2),'' China Digital Times
(Online), last visited 12 June 08. April 12, Ganzi TAP: officials told
``religious leaders and other figures'' attending ``emergency
meetings'' in Ganzi's 18 counties to sign documents ``opposing the
Dalai Lama.''
\27\ See, for example, ``Personalities From All Walks of Life in
Qinghai Province Strongly Condemn Lhasa Violent Crime Incident,''
Qinghai Daily, 1 April 08 (Open Source Center, 7 April 08). ``Cadre
conferences, meetings of villagers, seminars of non-Party personages,
and seminars of religious figures have been convened in various
locations in our province in recent days, to continue to expose and
criticize the Dalai Lama clique's reactionary nature and its monstrous
crimes which disrupt stability in Tibet.'' ``Update for Friday, 4 April
08,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 4 April 08. April 2,
Bathang Choede Monastery, Batang (Bathang) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP,
Sichuan province: officials pressured 200 monks to sign a statement
alleging that the Dalai Lama ``was responsible for inciting the recent
demonstrations in Tibet.'' The monks refused to sign the document,
resulting in an argument with officials that led to the detention of
five monks, including abbot Jigme Dorje and disciplinarian Yeshe.
\28\ ``China Publishes Evidences of Dalai Clique's Masterminding of
Riots,'' Xinhua (Online), 1 April 08. ``Solid facts showed that the
unrest in Lhasa, the capital of southwest China's Tibet Autonomous
Region, was organized, premeditated, masterminded and instigated by the
Dalai clique and its `Tibet independence' forces.'' ``Subsequently, the
`Tibet independence' forces in the United States proposed the idea of
the `Tibetan People's Uprising Movement.' Senior officials of the Dalai
clique studied and approved the plan. They believed that 2008 would be
their last chance to achieve `Tibet independence' and decided to use
the `favorable opportunity' before the Olympics to stage sabotage
activities in the Tibetan-inhabited areas in China.''
\29\ Tibetan People's Uprising Movement (Online), ``Press Release:
Launch of the Tibetan People's Uprising Movement,'' 4 January 08. TPUM
was established in January 2008 as ``a new coordinated Tibetan
resistance effort in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.'' The
alliance consists of five Tibetan organizations: the TYC, the Tibetan
Women's Association, the Gu Chu Sum Movement of Tibet (an organization
established by former Tibetan political prisoners), the National
Democratic Party of Tibet, and the India chapter of Students for a Free
Tibet. TYC President Tsewang Rigzin described TPUM as ``a unified
movement to bring about an end to Chinese rule in Tibet.''
\30\ Tibetan Youth Congress (Online), ``About Us,'' last visited 3
June 08. The TYC was established in October 1970. Among the four
``tasks'' assigned to TYC members are, ``To dedicate oneself to the
task of serving one's country and people under the guidance of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Spiritual and Temporal Ruler of Tibet,''
and, ``To struggle for the total independence of Tibet even at the cost
of one's life.'' (The TYC does not, however, accept the Dalai Lama's
guidance on seeking ``genuine autonomy'' for ``Tibet'' under Chinese
sovereignty, nor does the TYC expressly disavow the use of violence in
the campaign for independence.)
\31\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``His
Holiness's Middle Way Approach For Resolving the Issue of Tibet,'' last
visited 3 June 08.
\32\ Tibetan People's Uprising Movement (Online), ``Background,''
last visited 16 September 08.
\33\ ``China Publishes Evidences of Dalai Clique's Masterminding of
Riots,'' Xinhua. ``To implement the `Tibetan People's Uprising
Movement,' the `Tibetan Youth Congress' and other `Tibet independence'
organizations held two training classes on how to carry out violent,
terrorist activities.''
\34\ The English language version of the Xinhua report attributed
the monks' actions to ``the Dalai Lama.'' The Chinese language version,
however, attributed the monks' actions to ``the Dalai clique.''
Substituting ``Dalai Lama'' in the English language version for ``Dalai
clique'' in the original Chinese version indicates the level of state-
run media interest in associating nominally ``terrorist'' events with
the Dalai Lama, especially in international (English) reporting,
whether or not there is a factual basis for doing so. ``Police in Tibet
Arrest 16 Monks as Bombing Suspects,'' Xinhua (Online), 5 June 08;
``Individual Monks in Changdu Area Carried Out Bombings To Echo the `14
March' Incident. Public Security Organs in Tibet Cracked Three Cases in
a Row and Daunted the `Tibet Independence' Forces,'' Xinhua, 5 June 08
(Open Source Center, 6 June 08).
\35\ ``Tibetans Jailed For Blasts,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 2
October 08. According to the article, the court sentenced four Oezer
(Oser) Monastery monks and a total of five monks from Gonsar Monastery
and Khenpa Lung Monastery to imprisonment for involvement in setting
off a series of small explosions in Mangkang (Markham) county. An
official told RFA that the blasts caused no casualties and minimal
damage to government property.
\36\ Terry Friel, ``Dalai Lama Rejects Tibetan Buddhist Praise of
China,'' Reuters (Online), 29 December 05.
\37\ ``Think Like a Mosquito--Lhasang,'' Phayul (Online), 25
February 07; Tibetan Youth Congress (Online), ``Lhasang Tsering''
[short bio], last visited 2 August 07. Lhasang Tsering served as TYC
President from 1986 to 1990.
\38\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Statement of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans,'' 6 April 08.
\39\ Ibid. On the Olympics, the Dalai Lama said, ``I have from the
very beginning supported the holding of these Games in Beijing. My
position on this remains unchanged. I feel the Tibetans should not
cause any hindrance to the Games.''
\40\ Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, U.S.
Department of State, Report on Tibet Negotiations, April 2008. The
Report is mandated by Section 611 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, 2003.
\41\ Ibid.
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ H.R. Con. Res. 196, 110th Cong. (2007) (``Authorizing the use
of the Rotunda and grounds of the Capitol for a ceremony to award the
Congressional Gold Medal to Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai
Lama.'') The House Concurrent Resolution provided for the award
ceremony to take place in the Capitol Rotunda, and for the Capitol
grounds to be available for a public event sponsored by the
International Campaign for Tibet.
\44\ S. 2784, Fourteenth Dalai Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act,
The Library of Congress (Online), enacted 27 September 06;
International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``U.S. Congress Passes Bill
To Award the Dalai Lama the Congressional Gold Medal: Bill Cosponsored
by 387 Members of U.S. House and Senate,'' 13 September 06. The bill
was introduced as S. 2782 by Senators Dianne Feinstein and Craig
Thomas, and as H.R. 4562 by Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Tom
Lantos.
\45\ ``Dalai Lama's Envoys To Begin China Visit on May 3,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 4 May 08. The
report lists the six previous sessions of dialogue: September 2002,
May-June 2003, September 2004, June-July 2005, February 2006, and June-
July 2007. All of them took place in China except in 2005, when the
envoys met their counterparts in Bern, Switzerland.
\46\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 8
May 08.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ Ibid.
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Statement of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans,'' 6 April 08.
\51\ ``Full Transcript of Interview with the Dalai Lama,''
Financial Times (Online), 25 May 08. In response to the question,
``What are your priorities for these talks? '' the Dalai Lama said,
``Stop the arrests, and release [the arrested].'' To the question,
``[I]f there were one or two gestures or concrete gestures that the
Chinese could make, what would they be, to pass your test? '' the Dalai
Lama responded, ``Then stop, inside Tibet, arresting and torture. This
must stop. And then they should bring proper medical facilities. And
most important, international media should be allowed there, should go
there, and look, investigate, so the picture becomes clear.''
\52\ ``President Hu: Next Contact With Dalai Lama To Be Held at
Appropriate Time,'' Xinhua (Online), 7 May 08.
\53\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 5
July 08.
\54\ ``The Responsible Person of the Central United Front Work
Department Answers Xinhua Reporter's Questions on the Recent Contact
with Dalai Lama's Personal Representatives,'' Xinhua, 6 July 08 (Open
Source Center, 7 July 08).
\55\ ``China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional
Preconditions to Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (Online), 30 July 08. The Dalai Lama has expressed support for
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games; he counsels Tibetans not to engage in
violent activity; he does not lead the Tibetan Youth Congress (which
does not support the Dalai Lama's Middle Way Approach); he seeks
``genuine autonomy,'' not independence. The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy
said in his July 5, 2008, statement that the envoys ``categorically
rejected the Chinese attempt to label [the TYC] as a violent and
terrorist organization.''
\56\ ``The Responsible Person of the Central United Front Work
Department Answers Xinhua Reporter's Questions on the Recent Contact
with Dalai Lama's Personal Representatives,'' Xinhua. ``Comrade Du
Qinglin raised in clear-cut terms a requirement of `four no support's'
for Dalai; in other words, if Dalai Lama truly wished to do something
useful for the country, the nation, and the well-being of the Tibetan
people in his remaining years, he should give an open and explicit
promise and take corresponding actions in the forms of giving no
support for activities that aimed to disturb and sabotage the Beijing
Olympic Games, giving no support for and making no attempt to conspire
and incite violent criminal activities, giving no support for and
taking earnest steps to check the violent terrorist activities of the
`Tibetan Youth Association,' and giving no support for any
[propositions] or activities that sought to achieve `Tibet
independence' and split the motherland.''
\57\ ``Beijing Holds Talks With Dalai's Representatives,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 3 July 08.
\58\ ``China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional
Preconditions to Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China. For example, Chinese government pressure on the Dalai Lama to
take action against ``propositions or activities'' in support of
Tibetan independence is important because Chinese government targets
are not limited to plans or activities that include violence--Chinese
targets include a point of view and the peaceful expression of it. Many
of the countries where Tibetans live, including India, have
constitutions that protect the freedom of speech and governments that
strive to respect that freedom.
\59\ ``The Responsible Person of the Central United Front Work
Department Answers Xinhua Reporter's Questions on the Recent Contact
with Dalai Lama's Personal Representatives,'' Xinhua.
\60\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari.'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
\61\ ``Tibet Update (1),'' China Digital Times (Online), last
visited on 18 June 08. Drepung monks ``joined the peaceful
demonstration, demanding the freedom for religious belief.'' ``Ethnic
Unrest Continues in China,'' New York Times (Online), 5 April 08.
``Tibet was shaken by protests last month by Buddhist monks demanding
religious freedoms.''
\62\ Some of the protests reportedly involved hundreds or even
thousands of monks. ``The Dalai Clique's Scheme To Undermine Tibet's
Social Stability Is Doomed to Failure,'' Xinhua, 16 March 08 (Open
Source Center, 17 March 08). Reports that 300 Drepung Monastery monks
protested in Lhasa on March 10. ``Chinese Police Fire Tear-Gas at
Protesting Tibetan Monks,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 March 08.
Reports that an estimated 500-600 Sera Monastery monks protested in
Lhasa on March 11. International Campaign for Tibet (Online),
``Protests Spread Throughout Tibet: Thousands Gather in Towns and
Monasteries,'' 16 March 08. Reports that more than 1,000 Kirti
Monastery monks protested in Aba county (Aba Tibetan and Qiang
Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province) on March 16. (Rioting also
took place at the same location on the same date.)
\63\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Provisional List of Known Tibetan Arrestees--Updated on 25
April [2008].'' Of the 518 persons named on the list, 232 are monks
(none are nuns). (Chinese authorities reportedly detained a substantial
number of monks and nuns in the period following the publication date
of the TCHRD list.)
\64\ See, e.g., Jim Yardley, ``Tibetans Clash With Chinese Police
in 2nd City,'' New York Times (Online), 16 March 08. According to a
Tibetan in India who spoke by phone to Tibetan protesters in Xiahe
county, Gansu province, thousands of protesters on March 16 shouted
slogans including, ``The Dalai Lama must return to Tibet.'' Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``Scores of Tibetans
Arrested for Peaceful Protest in Lhasa,'' 11 March 08. On March 10 in
Guinan (Mangra) county, Qinghai province, a few hundred protesters
shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``Around 40 Middle
School Students Arrested in Marthang,'' 17 March 08. Approximately 100
Tibetan middle school students in Hongyuan (Kakhog, or Marthang)
county, Sichuan Province demonstrated inside the school compound,
calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet.
\65\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Protest Erupts After Prayer for Deceased in Drango
County,'' 25 March 08. More than 400 monks in Luhuo (Draggo) county,
Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province, shouted slogans on March 25 including,
``Release [the] Panchen Lama.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Hundreds of Tibetans Protested in Chentsa, Malho
`TAP,' Qinghai Province,'' 25 March 08. Hundreds of Tibetans protesting
on March 22 in Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai
province, carried photographs of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, and
shouted slogans including, ``Release the eleventh Panchen Lama Erdeni
Gedun Choekyi Nyima.'' ``Latest Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 March 08. More than 1,000 monks and other
Tibetans shouted slogans on March 18 in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, including, ``Release the Panchen Lama.''
\66\ See, e.g., ``Tibet Update (1),'' China Digital Times. The
Drepung monks ``joined the peaceful demonstration, demanding the
freedom for religious belief.'' In another protest, several hundred
Labrang Tashikhyil monks and ordinary citizens staged a protest march
on March 14 and shouted slogans including, ``Return us to religion
freedom.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``China Detains Drakar and Gaden Choeling Nuns in Kardze,'' 17 May 08.
Two nuns were detained for calling for religious freedom, among other
things. The detentions sparked a larger protest resulting in the
detention of at least 10 more nuns. ``Tibet Monks Disrupt Tour by
Journalists,'' Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online),
27 March 08. On March 27, a group of Jokhang Temple monks shouted that
there was no religious freedom when a group of international
journalists on a government-handled tour visited the temple.
\67\ ``A Reader for Advocating Science and Technology and Doing
Away With Superstitions'' (translated by International Campaign for
Tibet in When the Sky Fell to Earth: The New Crackdown on Buddhism in
Tibet, 2004). ``Conducting patriotic education among the monks and nuns
in the monasteries is an important aspect of strengthening the
management of religious affairs by the government. . . . Dalai's bloc
has never stopped penetrating and engaging in splittist activities in
our region under the support of international antagonistic forces. . .
. The monks and nuns should be religious professionals who love the
country, love religion, obey the discipline, and abide by the law.''
\68\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for
Opposing the `Patriotic Re-education' Campaign,'' 31 May 08;
International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``More Than 80 Nuns Detained
After Peaceful Protests Continue in Kham,'' 30 May 08; Tibetan Centre
for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 55 Nuns of
Pang-ri Nunnery for Protesting,'' 17 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 16 Monks for Defying
`Patriotic Re-education' '' 15 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy (Online), ``Monks of Drepung Monastery Detained During
Patriotic Education Campaign,'' 14 April 08.
\69\ ``Chronology of Events Surrounding Recognition of 11th Panchen
Lama,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile, reprinted in World Tibet Network
News (Online), 6 August 02.
\70\ P. Jeffrey Hopkins, ``The Identification of the Eleventh
Panchen Lama,'' University of Virginia, Center for South Asian Studies
Newsletter, Fall 1995.
\71\ UN Commission on Human Rights (Online), ``Summary of Cases
Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received,'' 27 March 06, 24-25.
The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief sent a request
to the Chinese government for information about Gedun Choekyi Nyima on
June 9, 2005. The Chinese government provided a response on September
7, 2005.
\72\ ``Official Urges Dalai Lama To Abandon Secessionist,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 29 July 07.
\73\ ``It Is Both Illegal and Invalid for the Dalai Lama to
Universally Identify the Reincarnated Soul Boy of the Panchen Lama,''
People's Daily, 1 December 95 (Open Source Center, 1 December 95).
\74\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Protest Erupts After Prayer for Deceased in Drango County.'' More
than 400 monks in Luhuo (Draggo) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province,
shouted slogans on March 25 including, ``Release [the] Panchen Lama.''
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Hundreds of Tibetans
Protested in Chentsa, Malho `TAP,' Qinghai Province.'' Hundreds of
Tibetans protesting on March 22 in Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan
(Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, carried photographs of the Dalai Lama
and Panchen Lama, and shouted slogans including, ``Release the eleventh
Panchen Lama Erdeni Gedun Choekyi Nyima.'' ``Latest Updates on Tibet
Demonstrations,'' Radio Free Asia. More than 1,000 monks and other
Tibetans shouted slogans on March 18 in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, including, ``Release the Panchen Lama.''
\75\ ``List of Alternate Members of 17th CPC Central Committee,''
Xinhua (Online), 21 October 07.
\76\ ``How Was the Problem Between Religion and Socialism Cracked--
Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs Administration Director Ye
Xiaowen,'' Southern Weekend, 13 March 08 (Open Source Center, 10 April
08).
\77\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Did Tibet Become an
Independent Country after the Revolution of 1911? '' 15 November 00.
``In 1792 the twenty-nine-article Imperial Ordinance was issued. It
stipulated in explicit terms for the reincarnation of the Living
Buddhas in Tibet as well as the administrative, military and foreign
affairs.'' (The edict sought to impose Qing control over religious,
administrative, military, fiscal, commercial, and foreign affairs. The
edict demanded that the Amban, ``Resident Official'' representing the
imperial court, would have equal status to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas,
and function as the supervisor of the Tibetan administration.)
\78\ ``Chinese-Installed Panchen Lama Pledges To Meet Communist
Party Expectations,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
January 2006, 3.
\79\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 103 (``organize, plot or carry out the scheme of
splitting the State or undermining unity of the country''; ``incites
others to split the State or undermine unity of the country'').
\80\ Tibetan and Himalayan Digital Library (Online), ``The
Periodization of Tibetan History: General Chronology,'' last visited 18
June 08. Sonam Gyatso (1543-1588), the Third Dalai Lama, was the first
person to have the title. The first and second Dalai Lamas were
recognized posthumously.
\81\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 191-197.
\82\ The Dalai Lama is the foremost religious teacher of the Gelug
tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, whose adherents are more numerous than
those of other traditions of Tibetan Buddhism such as the Nyingma,
Kargyu, and Sakya.
\83\ Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the
``Regulation on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Zizang zizhiqu
shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)] [hereinafter TAR 2006
Measures], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07.
\84\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the
Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism
[Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 13 July 07,
effective 1 September 07.
\85\ ``Tibet Procuratorial Organs Carry Out `Anti-Secession
Struggle' Intensively,'' Tibet Daily, 13 February 08 (Open Source
Center, 14 March 08).
\86\ Ibid.
\87\ Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and
Individual Monks and Nuns [hereinafter Ganzi Measures], Order from the
People's Government of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, No. 2,
issued 28 June 08 with immediate effect, translated from Tibetan
language in International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``New Measures
Reveal Government Plan To Purge Monasteries and Restrict Buddhist
Practice,'' 30 July 08.
\88\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibet at a
Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China's New Crackdown,'' 5
August 08, 3, 22-23. ICT states that the actual number of protests is
certain to be higher than 125.
\89\ Ibid.
\90\ Sichuan Province Party Committee Policy Research Office,
``Improve Capacity to Resolve Minority Issues, Make Efforts to Build a
Harmonious Ganzi,'' 10 August 05. According to the Sichuan Province
Party Committee Policy Research Office, August 10, 2005 report, there
are 515 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Ganzi Prefecture and 37,916
monks and nuns, which represent 4.49 percent of the prefecture's total
population. ``Facts and Figures of Tibetan Development,'' Xinhua
(Online), 27 March 08. In comparison, there are 46,000 Tibetan Buddhist
monks and nuns in the entire TAR. CECC Staff Interview, September 2003.
According to a Chinese official, there are approximately 21,000 monks
and nuns in Qinghai province.
\91\ The current period of Tibetan political activism began on
September 27, 1987, when 21 monks from Drepung Monastery staged a
peaceful protest march in Lhasa, calling for Tibetan freedom. It was
the first Tibetan political protest in China in the post-Cultural
Revolution period that was internationally reported.
\92\ As of October 31, 2008, the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database (PPD) contained records of 2,534 Tibetan political prisoners
detained or imprisoned since 1987. Of those 2,534 Tibetan political
prisoners and detainees, 543 are known or believed to be currently
detained or imprisoned. The rest are known or believed to have been
released or to have escaped or died. Of the 2,534 Tibetans who became
political prisoners or detainees since 1987, 321 of them were residents
of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), according to PPD
information. Of the 321 Tibetan residents of Ganzi TAP who became
political prisoners or detainees since 1987, 199 of them are known or
believed to be currently detained or imprisoned. Of the 199 Tibetan
residents of Ganzi TAP who are known or believed to be currently
detained or imprisoned, 179 of them have been detained during the
period beginning March 10, 2008. Due to the large number of detentions
of Tibetan protesters since March 10, 2008, and a lack of complete
information about the detentions, the PPD does not contain information
on a large number of Tibetans detained since that date.
\93\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Measures Reveal
Government Plan To Purge Monasteries and Restrict Buddhist Practice.''
\94\ Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04, translated on the Web site of China Elections
and Governance.
\95\ Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living
Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, issued 13 July 07.
\96\ Ganzi Measures, art. 7, provides for the demolition of
monastic residential quarters under certain circumstances. Ganzi
Measures, art. 9, provides for revocation of a monastery or nunnery's
registration followed by closure of the monastery or nunnery under
certain circumstances.
\97\ Ganzi Measures, art. 12, provides for stripping a trulku of
``the right to hold the incarnation lineage.''
\98\ PRC Constitution, art. 4 (``The people of all nationalities
have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written
languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.''),
arts. 112-122.
\99\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [hereinafter REAL], enacted
31 May 84, amended 28 February 01. The REAL's Preamble asserts that the
ethnic autonomy system ``reflects the state's full respect for and
guarantee of ethnic minorities' right to administer their internal
affairs'' and gives ``full play to ethnic minorities' enthusiasm for
being masters over their own affairs.''
\100\ REAL, Preamble. ``Regional ethnic autonomy reflects the
state's full respect for and guarantee of ethnic minorities' right to
administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the principle of
equality, unity and common prosperity for all nationalities.''
``Regional ethnic autonomy has played an enormous role in giving
full play to ethnic minorities' enthusiasm for being masters over their
own affairs, in developing among them a socialist relationship of
equality, unity and mutual assistance, in consolidating the unification
of the country and in promoting socialist construction in the ethnic
autonomous areas and the rest of the country.''
\101\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on Building of
Political Democracy in China [Zhongguo de minzhuzhengzhi jianshe], 19
October 05. ``Democratic centralism is the fundamental principle of
organization and leadership of state power in China. When democratic
centralism is practiced, it requires that we give full play to
democracy and discuss matters of concern collectively, so that people's
wishes and demands are fully expressed and reflected. Then, all the
correct opinions are pooled, and decisions are made collectively so
that the people's wishes and demands are realized and met. The practice
of democratic centralism also requires that `the majority be respected
while the minority is protected.' We are against the anarchic call for
`democracy for all,' and against anybody placing his own will above
that of the collective.''
\102\ REAL, art. 7. ``Institutions of self-government in ethnic
autonomous areas shall place the interests of the state as a whole
above all else and actively fulfill all tasks assigned by state
institutions at higher levels.''
\103\ PRC Constitution, art. 62(12), 89(15). (Only the National
People's Congress (NPC) and State Council have the constitutional
authority to approve the establishment of autonomous regions,
prefectures, and counties, and to alter their boundaries.)
\104\ REAL, art. 19. ``The people's congresses of ethnic autonomous
areas shall have the power to enact self-governing regulations and
separate regulations in the light of the political, economic and
cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the
areas concerned. . . .'' PRC Constitution, art. 116. ``People's
congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact
autonomy regulations and specific regulations in the light of the
political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or
nationalities in the areas concerned.''
\105\ PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 9. ``In the
event that no national law has been enacted in respect of a matter
enumerated in Article 8 hereof, the [NPC] and the Standing Committee
thereof have the power to make a decision to enable the State Council
to enact administrative regulations in respect of part of the matters
concerned for the time being, except where the matter relates to crime
and criminal sanctions, the deprivation of a citizen's political
rights, compulsory measure and penalty restricting the personal freedom
of a citizen, and the judicial system.''
\106\ REAL, art. 20. ``If a resolution, decision, order, or
instruction of a state agency at a higher level does not suit the
actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous agency of
the area may report for the approval of that higher level state agency
to either implement it with certain alterations or cease implementing
it altogether. . . .''
\107\ PRC Legislation Law, art. 66. ``. . . An autonomous decree or
special decree may vary the provisions of a law or administrative
regulation, provided that any such variance may not violate the basic
principles thereof, and no variance is allowed in respect of any
provision of the Constitution or the Law on Ethnic Area Autonomy and
provisions of any other law or administrative regulations which are
dedicated to matters concerning ethnic autonomous areas.''
\108\ Andrew Martin Fischer, ``From Labour Polarisation to Urban
Employment Exclusion,'' in A Theory of Polarisation, Exclusion and
Conflict within Disempowered Development: The Case of Contemporary
Tibet in China (Thesis with London School of Economics, November 2007).
Dr. Fischer conducted fieldwork in the TAR and Qinghai, Gansu, and
Sichuan provinces.
\109\ Ibid., 30-31.
\110\ TAR Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the
Tibetan Language, adopted July 9, 1987, by the Fifth Session of the
Fourth TAR People's Congress, and amended on May 22, 2002, by the Fifth
Session of the Seventh TAR People's Congress, arts. 3-5. In 2002, the
TAR People's Congress revised the 1987 TAR Regulations on the Study,
Use, and Development of the Tibetan Language, ending the precedence of
the Tibetan language by authorizing the use of ``either or both'' of
Mandarin and Tibetan languages in most areas of government work.
\111\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 08. ``In middle and
high schools--even some officially designated as Tibetan schools--
teachers often used Tibetan only to teach classes in Tibetan language,
literature, and culture and taught all other classes in Chinese.''
\112\ CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 169, citing Ma
Rong and Tanzen Lhundup, ``Temporary Migrants in Lhasa in 2005,''
Section IV(4.8), Table 14. Based on a survey published by Chinese
academics Ma Rong and Tanzen Lhundup, the rate of illiteracy among
Tibetan migrants (32.3 percent) was almost 10 times higher than for Han
migrants (3.3 percent), and Han migrants were better prepared to secure
jobs that require skills learned in junior or senior middle school. Of
the migrants surveyed, Han reached junior or senior middle school at
about twice the rate of Tibetans: 53.7 percent of Han compared to 26
percent of Tibetans reached junior middle school, and 19.4 percent of
Han compared to 9 percent of Tibetans reached senior middle school.
\113\ Andrew Martin Fischer, ``Educating for Exclusion in Western
China: Structural and Institutional Foundations of Conflict in the
Tibetan Areas of Qinghai,'' CRISE Working Paper, Oxford: Centre for
Research on Inequality, Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House,
2008 (forthcoming). Dr. Fischer conducted field work in Qinghai
province.
\114\ Li Dezhu, ``Large-Scale Development of Western China and
China's Nationality Problem,'' Seeking Truth, 15 June 00 (Open Source
Center, 15 June 00). Li Dezhu (Li Dek Su) addresses the social and
ethnic implications of the program that Jiang Zemin launched in 1999.
Li states that the program is intended to ``accelerate economic and
social development of the western region and the minority nationality
regions in particular.''
\115\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway Ready for Operation on July 1,''
Xinhua (Online), 29 June 06. Zhu Zhensheng, the vice director of an
office managing the railway, said that the railway startup is one year
ahead of schedule due to ``good construction, environment, and safety
conditions.''
\116\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway Statistics Add to Confusion, Mask
Impact on Local Population,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, February 2008, 4.
\117\ ``Province To Be Transport Hub,'' China Daily (Online), 23
January 08. Sichuan province Governor Jiang Jufeng and Party Secretary
Liu Qibao signed an agreement on January 10, 2008, with Minister of
Railways Liu Zhijun to include the ``Sichuan-Tibet railway'' in the
national railway network plan.
\118\ Ibid.
\119\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway To Get Six New Lines,'' China Daily
(Online), 17 August 08. ``The six new tracks include one from Lhasa to
Nyingchi [Linzhi] and one from Lhasa to Xigaze [Rikaze], both in the
Tibet autonomous region. Three tracks will originate from Golmud in
Qinghai province and run to Chengdu in Sichuan province, Dunhuang in
Gansu province, and Kuerle [Ku'erle] of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region. The sixth will link Xining, capital of Qinghai, with Zhangye in
Gansu.''
\120\ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September
2006, 14; ``Government Announces Extension of Qinghai-Tibet Railway to
Rikaze,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 28
August 06.
\121\ CECC staff map analysis. A more northerly Golmud-Chengdu
route could traverse southern portions of Hainan (Tsolho) and Huangnan
(Malho) TAPs in Qinghai province and Gannan (Kanlho) TAP in Gansu
province before entering Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in
Sichuan province.
\122\ Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of
China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic
Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic
Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-4. Based on official 2000
census data, Tibetans made up 91.6 percent of the Guoluo TAP population
(126,395 Tibetans among 137,940 total population) and 97.1 percent of
the Yushu TAP population (255,167 Tibetans among 262,661 total
population). In Ganzi TAP's three northernmost counties, Dege, Seda
(Serthar), and Shiqu (Sershul), Tibetans made up 96.5 percent of the
population (162,974 Tibetans among 168,928 total population). In three
of the northernmost Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture
counties--Aba, Ruo'ergai (Dzoege), and Hongyuan (Marthang, or Kakhog)--
Tibetans made up 88 percent of the population (145,706 Tibetans among
165,656 total population).
\123\ ``Tibet Plans Huge Industrial Investment,'' Xinhua (Online),
5 September 08. According to the Xinhua report: ``Industrial
development in Tibet had remained inactive for a long time and the
sector only accounted for 7.5 percent of the region's overall gross
domestic product last year, official statistics showed. The 22 projects
are expected to speed up development of other industrial fields and the
comprehensive economic growth.''
\124\ Ibid. According to the report, of the 21.17 billion yuan
total allocated to the 22 projects, ``the mining sector will absorb
15.9 billion yuan and the industrial zones will take 3.45 billion
yuan.''
\125\ Ibid.
\126\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway Transports 5.95 Mln Tourists,''
Xinhua (Online), 8 February 08; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 167. The 33
billion yuan construction cost was approximately US$4.12 billion in
2006.
\127\ Human Rights Watch (Online), `` `No One Has the Liberty To
Refuse'--Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan,
and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' 11 June 07.
\128\ For example, incidents of political protest were reported in
nomadic areas such as Banma (Pema), Jiuzhi (Chigdril), and Dari
(Darlag) counties in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province. ``Latest
Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 26 March 08. Banma county: ``After the arrival and the
subsequent tight restrictions by Chinese military forces in Pema
County, a protest was held during which the people demanded concrete
results in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. The same evening in Panchen,
Pangrue and Markhog villages, Tibetans held peaceful demonstrations.''
``Latest Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 23 March 08. Jiuzhi county: ``Around 500 monks and lay people
from Palyul village are holding a sit-down on a hill-top to demand that
Karwang Nyima Rinpoche (Dharthang Monastery head) not be harassed by
the Chinese military. The people have also demanded the United Nations,
U.S. and other countries intervene to resolve the issue.'' ``Latest
Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 22 March 08. Dari county: ``Around 200 protesters (including
many horsemen) held protests in Toema and Meyma villages.''
\129\ The current period of Tibetan political activism began on
September 27, 1987, when 21 monks from Drepung Monastery staged a
peaceful protest march in Lhasa, calling for Tibetan freedom. It was
the first Tibetan political protest in China in the post-Cultural
Revolution period that was internationally reported.
\130\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``Tensions Are High as the Olympic Torch Arrives in Lhasa,'' 20 June
08. TCHRD reports that it ``has recorded the arrests or arbitrary
detention of more than 6,500 Tibetans.'' (The report provides no
information about whether or not, and to what extent, this figure
includes more than 4,000 Tibetans whom official Chinese news media
reported surrendered or were detained by police in connection to
alleged rioting.)
\131\ ``Latest Casualty Figures in Tibet,'' Tibetan Government-in-
Exile (Online), 21 August 08. ``Update on Death Toll from Tibet
Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 26 March 08.
The report lists the first 40 names published by the TGiE of Tibetans
allegedly killed by Chinese security forces.
\132\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tensions Are
High as the Olympic Torch Arrives in Lhasa.''
\133\ ``Update on Tibet, 1 May 2008,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 1 May 08. The report alleges that on March 28, Chinese
security forces cremated ``around 83 corpses'' in a crematorium in
Duilongdeqing county near Lhasa in an attempt to destroy ``evidence
related to the recent protests.'' The report described the corpses as
``dead bodies of people who have been killed since the March 14 protest
in Tibet,'' but did not disclose how the location, time, or cause of
any of the deaths was established reliably.
\134\ ``Update on Tibet Demonstration,'' Tibetan Government-in-
Exile (Online), 16 March 08.
\135\ ``Governor Denies Use of Lethal Force in Lhasa Riot,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 17 March 08. ``Throughout
the process, [security forces] did not carry or use any destructive
weapons, but tear gas and water cannons were employed,'' Jampa Phuntsog
told reporters in Beijing.
\136\ ``Complete One-Week Update on Tibet Protests,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 18 March 08. The TGiE reports 3 Tibetans
shot and killed and 10 others shot and injured.
\137\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``Middle School Student Shot Dead in Ngaba County,'' 19 March 08. ``At
least 23 people including as young as 16 years old student, Lhundup
Tso, were confirmed dead following Chinese Armed police shot many
rounds of live ammunitions into the protesters . . . .''
\138\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Monks, Nomads
Protest as Demonstrations Spread Across Entire Tibetan Plateau,'' 19
March 08. On March 16 protesters stoned government offices and burned a
police station and vehicles before 11 truckloads of security personnel
``suppressed the protests.'' ``The number of casualties was unclear,
although one source that could not be confirmed indicated there could
be as many as 19 deaths.'' ``Latest Update on Tibet Protests,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 18 March 08. In a report dated March 18,
and beneath the subheading ``18th March, 2008,'' the TGiE report
states, ``During the protest in Machu County that continued from
yesterday, People's Armed Police (PAP) shot dead nineteen peaceful
protesters this morning as confirmed by a source.'' TibetInfoNet
(Online), `` `The World Will Not Look Away.' Demonstrations in Amdo
Machu and Region,'' 19 March 08. TibetInfoNet, like the ICT report,
reported that the protest took place on March 16, resulted in
significant property destruction, and was suppressed by 11 truckloads
of security personnel. But, according to TibetInfoNet, no casualties
were reported.
\139\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``At
Least Three Tibetans Shot Dead in Kardze Protest,'' 18 March 08.
According to the report, security forces firing indiscriminately shot
and killed three Tibetans and injured 15 more when hundreds of Tibetans
gathered in the town market and shouted slogans calling for
independence and the Dalai Lama's long life.
\140\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``One
Shot Dead and Another in Critical Condition in Drango Protest,'' 24
March 08. According to the report, security officials killed one person
and critically wounded another when they fired indiscriminately on
about 200 protesters shouting slogans calling for independence and the
Dalai Lama's long life as they marched toward township offices.
\141\ ``Chinese Police Fire on Tibetan Protesters, Death Toll
Unknown,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 April 08; Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``At Least Eight Shot Dead in
Tongkor Monastery in Kardze,'' 5 April 08. According to TCHRD, security
forces opened fire on and killed as many as 15 Tibetans, including
monks of Tongkor Monastery. A monastic protest supported by local
villagers developed after monks refused to cooperate with officials
conducting ``patriotic education,'' and the officials responded by
detaining an elderly monk.
\142\ ``Tibetans Wounded in Sichuan Protest,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 5 April 08; ``Troops Settle Down in China's Restive
Sichuan,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 April 08. Ordinary Tibetans
joined monks of Nyatso Monastery in a peaceful procession to protest
the deaths of Tibetans killed during recent protests. Security forces
opened fire on the protesters at crossroads when officials allowed
monks to continue, but not the ordinary Tibetans, who began to chant
slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's long life and objecting to
Tibetans' lack of freedom.
\143\ ``Dalai Lama Says Will Quit if Violence Out Of Control,''
Reuters, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 18 March 08. The Dalai
Lama said, ``If things become out of control then my only option is to
completely resign. . . . Please help stop violence from Chinese side
and also from Tibetan side.''
\144\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Statement
of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans,'' 6 April 08. ``I want
to reiterate and appeal once again to Tibetans to practice non-violence
and not waver from this path, however serious the situation might be.''
\145\ For example, China's state-run media reported that security
forces in Aba county fired on and wounded four Tibetan protesters on
March 16. TCHRD reported that security forces fired on and killed at
least 23 Tibetans in the Aba protest. Xinhua characterized the incident
as a ``riot''; TCHRD described it as a ``peaceful protest.'' ``Police:
Four Rioters Wounded Sunday in Aba of SW China,'' Xinhua (Online), 20
March 08. Police fired on and wounded four rioters ``out of self
defense,'' a police official said. Tibetans ``destroyed 15 police
vehicles and more than 20 office facilities,'' according to the report.
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Middle School Student
Shot Dead in Ngaba County.'' TCHRD reports the death of ``[a]t least 23
people'' and injuries to ``scores'' of protesters during ``the peaceful
demonstration.''
\146\ State Council Information Office, ``Ministry of Public
Security Holds News Conference To Brief the Press on the Latest
Situation of Cracking Cases of 14 March Incident and Make Public the
Names of Victims,'' 1 April 08 (Open Source Center, 2 April 08); ``Baby
Burned to Death in Lhasa Riot Fire,'' China Daily (Online), 24 March
08. ``At least 18 civilians and one police officer have been confirmed
killed in the unrest in Lhasa, which also saw 382 injured.''
\147\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibet at a
Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China's New Crackdown,'' 5
August 08, 17, 54. According to the report, on March 14 in Lhasa
``Chinese shops were burnt, and Chinese people were beaten severely and
killed.'' ``Transcript: James Miles Interview on Tibet, CNN (Online),
20 March 08. Miles witnessed the March 14 Lhasa riot and told CNN,
``What I saw was calculated targeted violence against an ethnic group,
or I should say two ethnic groups, primarily ethnic Han Chinese living
in Lhasa, but also members of the Muslim Hui minority in Lhasa.''
Miles, who did not witness lethal violence, said, ``But I can do no
more really on the basis of what I saw then say there was a probability
that some ethnic Chinese were killed in this violence, and also a
probability that some Tibetans, Tibetan rioters themselves were killed
by members of the security forces.''
\148\ The largest number of political detentions of Tibetans
reported internationally as the result of a distinct sequence of
political events that took place during the period of the current
Chinese Constitution and Criminal Law, and before the cascade of
Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008, resulted from the Lhasa
protests of March 5 to 7, 1989. The Commission's Political Prisoner
Database contains information on fewer than 200 cases of Tibetan
political prisoners whose imprisonment may be linked to the March 1989
political events. The Tibet Information Network reported that at least
1,000 Tibetans were detained in connection with the incident. (Tibet
Information Network, ``A Struggle of Blood and Fire: The Imposition of
Martial Law in 1989 and the Lhasa Uprising in 1959,'' 25 February 99.)
\149\ The current Constitution of the People's Republic of China is
the fourth. The National People's Congress passed the current
Constitution on December 4, 1982; it was most recently amended on March
14, 2004.
\150\ The National People's Congress passed the Criminal Law on
July 1, 1979; it was most recently amended on June 29, 2006.
\151\ The figures reported below (953, 362, 2,204, 8, 432, 94, and
381) total 4,434 persons who surrendered to security officials or were
detained by them during the period March 14 to 19 in the nine county-
level areas named in the reports: Lhasa, Linzhou, Aba, Xiahe, Maqu,
Luqu, Zhuoni, Hezuo, and Diebu. ``953 Suspects in Lhasa Riots
Detained,'' Xinhua (Online), 9 April 08. TAR government Chairman Jampa
Phuntsog told reporters that police had detained ``953 people who were
suspected of participating in the March 14 violence in Lhasa,'' and
that another 362 persons ``delivered themselves to the law
enforcement.'' ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,''
Xinhua (Online), 9 April 08. Acting head of the Gannan TAP government
told reporters that 2,204 persons (including 519 monks) had surrendered
to police in connection with riots in the prefecture, and that police
had ``formally arrested eight people suspected of participating in the
riots and put another 432, including 170 monks, in temporary custody.''
The report said, ``From March 14 to 19, assaults, vandalism, looting
and arson occurred in the Xiahe, Maqu, Luqu, [Zhuoni], Hezuo and Diebu
areas of Gannan. . . .'' ``94 Criminal Suspects in Linzhou County
Surrender Themselves to Justice,'' Tibet Daily, reprinted in China
Tibet News, 19 March 08 (Open Source Center, 19 March 08). ``Awed by
the powerful legal and policy offensives, 94 criminal suspects in
Linzhou County who were involved in serious incidents of beating,
smashing, looting, and burning surrendered themselves to justice by
2400 hours on 17 March.'' ``381 Rioters in Aba County Surrender to
Police,'' Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 25 March 08.
``A total of 381 people involved in the riots in Aba county of Sichuan
Province have surrendered themselves to the police as of Monday [March
17] noon . . . . Law enforcement authorities . . . issued a notice . .
. urging those who had taken part in the riots on March 16 to submit
themselves within ten days.''
\152\ ``953 Suspects in Lhasa Riots Detained,'' Xinhua; ``Media
Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua.
\153\ ``42 Rioters Sentenced to Prison,'' China Daily (Online), 21
June 08.
\154\ Ibid.
\155\ ``Officials Report Release of More Than 3,000 of the More
Than 4,400 Detained Tibetan `Rioters' '' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China (Online), 9 July 08.
\156\ ``953 Suspects in Lhasa Riots Detained,'' Xinhua (Online), 9
April 08.
\157\ ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua
(Online), 9 April 08.
\158\ ``94 Criminal Suspects in Linzhou County Surrender Themselves
to Justice,'' Tibet Daily, reprinted in China Tibet News, 19 March 08
(Open Source Center, 19 March 08).
\159\ ``381 Rioters in Aba County Surrender to Police,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in People's Daily, 25 March 08.
\160\ ``42 Rioters Sentenced to Prison,'' China Daily (Online), 21
June 08.
\161\ ``Lhasa City People's Procuratorate Gives Permission To
Arrest the First Suspect Who Held Up a Reactionary Flag,'' China Tibet
News, 25 March 08 (Open Source Center, 27 March 08). At least 13 monks
of a group of 15 monks apprehended while protesting near Lhasa's
Jokhang Temple were charged with unlawful assembly. A 14th monk may
have been charged with separatism for displaying a Tibetan flag.
\162\ ``Judgments Pronounced Publicly on Some Defendants Involved
in Lhasa's `14 March' Incident,'' Xinhua, 29 April 08 (Open Source
Center, 30 April 08). ``Total jailed over Lhasa violence rises to 30,''
Xinhua (Online), 29 April 08. Three defendants were sentenced to life
imprisonment; the rest received sentences to fixed term imprisonment
ranging from 3 to 20 years. Monk Pasang, whom authorities accused of
leading a group of 10 persons (including 5 monks) in Duilongdeqing
county ``to destroy the local government office, smash or burn down 11
shops and rob their valuables, and attack policemen on duty,'' received
a life sentence. Two of the monks who ``followed'' Pasang were
sentenced to 20 years in prison; the other three received 15-year
sentences.
\163\ Ibid.
\164\ ``Tibet Confident on Security During Olympic Torch Relay,''
Xinhua (Online), 21 June 08. The article does not name the court (``the
local court'') or provide details about any of the cases.
\165\ Ibid.
\166\ ``List of Appointments and Removals by the Tibet Autonomous
Regional People's Congress Standing Committee,'' China Tibet News, 30
March 08 (Open Source Center, 30 March 08). Although it is not clear
whether or not the reshuffle was linked to the large number of protest-
and riot-related cases, all of the appointments were to the Rikaze
(Shigatse) and Shannan (Lhoka) prefectural procuratorates and courts,
the two locations most easily and quickly reached from Lhasa. It is
also possible that the transfers were part of a five-yearly reshuffle
coordinated with central government changes.
\167\ ``No Death Penalty Handed Down So Far Over Lhasa Violence,''
Xinhua (Online), 11 July 08. The report provided information based on
statements by TAR government Executive Chairman Pema Trinley (Palma
Trily, Baima Chilie).
\168\ Ibid.
\169\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Provisional
List of Known Tibetan Arrestees--Updated on 25 April 2008.''
\170\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``Olympics and Tibet Under a Cloud of Repression,'' 7 August 08;
``Latest Casualty Figures in Tibet,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
\171\ ``Tibetan Monks Still Held in Qinghai,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 28 August 08. ``The remaining 57 monks from outlying areas
were said to have been taken from smaller Lhasa monasteries.'' (The
report did not specify the location of the ``outlying areas.'')
\172\ Ibid. Monks from Tibetan areas in Sichuan province (``Kham'')
``are still being held . . . in Golmud'' (Ge'ermu city, a principal
city in Qinghai, located on the Qinghai-Tibet railway). ``The number of
those still in detention [in Golmud] cannot be independently
confirmed.''
\173\ Ibid. RFA described the source of the information as ``an
authoritative source who spoke on condition of anonymity.'' (The report
did not name any of the monks and provided information of the specific
location of relatively few.)
\174\ Ibid. The source told RFA, ``On April 10 in the afternoon,
security forces detained 550 monks from Drepung monastery, took them to
the Nyethang Military School, and detained them on the school campus.''
[Nyethang (Nedang) is a township located in Qushui (Chushur) county,
adjacent to Lhasa city.] ``Then, on the night of April 14, a huge
contingent of Chinese security forces arrived at Sera monastery and
took away about 400 monks and detained them at a military prison in
Tsal Gungthang.'' [Tsal Gungthang is a township under the
administration of Lhasa city.] (Other published reports have referred
to detentions of substantial numbers of monks from Drepung and Sera
monasteries on or about those dates.)
\175\ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 83. Officials had already been
intensifying the ``patriotic education'' program in Tibetan monastic
institutions since 2005.
\176\ ``In Tibetan Monasteries, the Heavy Hand of the Party,''
Washington Post (Online), 3 June 08.
\177\ ``Successfully Handling the Work of Maintaining Social
Stability in All Aspects in a Comprehensive, Deepgoing, and Down-to-
Earth Manner,'' Tibet Daily, reprinted in China Tibet News, 3 April 08
(Open Source Center, 06 April 08).
\178\ ``Lhasa's Education System Makes Constant Efforts To Deepen
Education in Patriotism,'' Xinhua, 17 July 08 (Open Source Center, 18
August 08). ``A total of 3,691 core instructors were specially assigned
and properly trained, and 1,057 lecture sessions were held in the
course of the drive, attended by 179,476 people. In addition, 219
people took to the floor to tell their story to 94,708 listeners in 193
sessions, and 265 and 718 sessions were held respectively to greet the
Beijing Olympics and denounce the criminal conduct of the Dalai
separatist clique. Furthermore, 2,533 oath-taking sessions were held
for participants to pledge themselves to safeguard the motherland's
unification, oppose ethnic separatism . . . [ellipsis as published].''
\179\ Campaigns were not limited to Party propaganda on religion,
but also included legal, economic, and historical themes emphasizing
the well-being of the Tibetan people under the Communist Party and the
Chinese government. See, e.g., ``China's Tibetan Affairs Expert Says
There Is a Need To Pay Attention to Educating Young Monks of Tibetan
Buddhism,'' Xinhua, 2 April 08 (Open Source Center, 3 April 08);
``Qiang Wei Stresses the Importance of Resolutely and Unswervingly
Struggling Against Separatism, Safeguarding Stability, and Promoting
Unity,'' Qinghai Daily, 29 March 08 (Open Source Center, 1 April 08);
``While Conducting Investigation and Studies in Gannan Prefecture, Liu
Lijun Stresses Need to Effectively Carry Out in a Down-to-Earth Manner
Work on Propaganda and Education in Legal Knowledge at Monasteries of
Tibetan Buddhism,'' Gansu Daily, 4 April 08 (Open Source Center, 26
April 08).
\180\ ``Hongyuan Begins `Maintaining Stable Thinking Among the
Masses' Educational Campaign,'' Sichuan News Net, 27 March 08 (Open
Source Center, 27 March 08). OSC summarizes an article on political
education in Hongyuan (Kakhog, or Marthang) county in Aba prefecture
(where non-violent protests were reported). ``Qiang Wei Stresses the
Importance of Resolutely and Unswervingly Struggling Against
Separatism, Safeguarding Stability, and Promoting Unity,'' Qinghai
Daily. The Qinghai Party Secretary called for stepping up political
education in Huangnan (Malho) TAP (where non-violent protests were
reported). ``While Conducting Investigation and Studies in Gannan
Prefecture, Liu Lijun Stresses Need to Effectively Carry Out in a Down-
to-Earth Manner Work on Propaganda and Education in Legal Knowledge at
Monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism,'' Gansu Daily. A senior Gansu Party
official called for propaganda campaigns and tighter control of
monasteries in Gannan TAP (where non-violent protests and rioting were
reported.)
\181\ See, e.g., ``A Briefing Meeting on the Work of Safeguarding
Stability in Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Is Held in Xihai Town
on 28 March,'' Qinghai Daily, 31 March 08 (Open Source Center, 2 April
08). Senior Party officials in Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (where no protests
were reported) detailed efforts to step up political indoctrination.
\182\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for
Opposing the `Patriotic Re-education' Campaign,'' 31 May 08;
International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``More Than 80 Nuns Detained
After Peaceful Protests Continue in Kham,'' 30 May 08; Tibetan Centre
for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 55 Nuns of
Pang-ri Nunnery for Protesting,'' 17 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 16 monks for Defying
`Patriotic Re-education,' '' 15 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy (Online), ``Monks of Drepung Monastery Detained During
Patriotic Education Campaign,'' 14 April 08.
\183\ ``Abbots, Lamas Refuse To Denounce Dalai Lama,'' Phayul
(Online), 30 March 08. Officials in Shiqu (Sershul) county, Ganzi TAP,
convened a meeting of senior Tibetan Buddhist figures from the county's
43 monasteries to launch a patriotic education campaign. The officials
said that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile had
masterminded the protests across the Tibetan area of China, and told
the monastic representatives to provide critical statements about the
protests and to launch signature campaigns criticizing the protests.
``China Steps Up Crackdown in Tibet,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 17
April 08. Officials told (apparently senior) Tibetan Buddhist monks
attending an April 12 meeting in Kangding, the capital of Ganzi TAP,
that, among other things, monks and nuns in the prefecture should
denounce the Dalai Lama as a separatist and state that the Dalai Lama
and Tibetan government-in-exile were responsible for the ``unrest'' in
Tibetan areas. RFA cited as the source a monk in India who cited monks
who attended the meeting. ``Tibet Update (3) April 15 - 27,'' China
Digital Times (Online), last visited 19 June 08. The report refers to
an emergency meeting in Ganzi TAP of the heads of all prefecture's
monasteries and of various work units. All the attendees were told to
acknowledge that the protest incidents were masterminded by the Dalai
clique.
\184\ ``Update for Friday, 4 April 2008,'' Tibetan Government-in-
Exile (Online), 4 April 08. Work teams conducting patriotic education
pressured 200 monks at Bathang Choede Monastery in Batang county, Ganzi
TAP, to sign statements supporting the Chinese government position that
the Dalai Lama was responsible for inciting the Tibetan protests. All
of the monks refused. Officials detained five monks, including the
abbot. ``Updates on Tibet, 19 April 2008,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 19 April 08. Officials summoned villagers to meetings in
several locations in Yajiang (Nyagchukha) county, Ganzi TAP, and told
them to sign a statement saying that the Dalai Lama had instigated the
recent unrest. Some villagers walked out of such meetings.
\185\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Mass Detentions
of Monks, Suicides and Despair as Enforced Condemnation of Dalai Lama
Provokes Dissent,'' 29 April 08. The article provides photographic
images of defaced images of the Dalai Lama at Kirti Monastery in Aba
prefecture. ``Tibet Update (3) April 15 - 27,'' China Digital Times.
The report describes an April 17 search of Rongbo Gonchen Monastery in
Huangnan (Malho) TAP: ``Next they searched the living quarters of the
monks, confiscated the Dalai Lama's photos and DVDs. They also
arbitrarily destroy[ed] articles, and stole the monks' possessions.''
\186\ ``Chinese Police Fire on Tibetan Protesters, Death Toll
Unknown,'' Radio Free Asia; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``At Least Eight Shot Dead in Tongkor Monastery in Kardze.''
\187\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for Opposing
the `Patriotic Re-education' Campaign.'' ``[C]ell phones were known to
have been confiscated to curb the report of the incident from leaking
to the outside world. . . .'' ``Update on Tibet, 9 May 2008,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 9 May 08. Referring to police raid on
Ratoe Monastery, near Lhasa: ``. . . mobile phones belonging to 70
monks' were confiscated. In addition, the telephone of the monastery
was confiscated too.'' ``Tibet Update (2),'' China Digital Times
(Online), last visited 15 June 08. Referring to Tongkor Monastery in
Ganzi county: ``Each room in the monks' living quarters was searched
and all cell phones were confiscated.'' International Campaign for
Tibet (Online), ``Monks reveal concerns about Chinese allegations on
weapons caches, views on Olympics,'' 16 April 08. Referring to Tibetan
protest areas generally: ``[A]uthorities have confiscated cellphones
and computers, turned off cellular transmission facilities or cut
landlines, and interfered with internet access, according to various
reports received by ICT.'' ``2,000 Tibetans Defy Sichuan Crackdown as
China Admits Shooting,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 March 08.
Referring to Lhasa: ``Another man said many people had been arrested
but it was hard to know exactly who, because the authorities had cut
off the mobile phone network.'' ``Police Seize Weapons, Ammunition in
Southwestern China Monastery,'' Xinhua (Online), 30 March 08. Referring
to objects, including weapons, seized at Kirti Monastery in Aba county:
``. . . communication facilities including satellite phones, receivers
for overseas TV channels, fax machines and computers were
confiscated.''
\188\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``12 Monks of
Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for Opposing the `Patriotic
Re-education' Campaign.'' ``[T]he monks were even known to have been
threaten[ed] with dire consequences if found `leaking' the information
to the outside world.'' ``Update on Tibet, May 31, 2008,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 31 May 08. Referring to Ramoche Monastery
in Lhasa: ``[A]ll three monks . . . were again arrested by the
concerned local Chinese officials on 26 May for keeping in contact with
outsiders through phone calls. They are suspected of sharing
information with the outside world.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy (Online), ``A Former Chief of Rong Gonchen Monastery in
Critical Condition,'' 18 April 08. Referring to Rongbo Gonchen
Monastery in Tongren county: ``The Chinese authorities have issued
terse warning to the monks about leaking the information to the outside
world following the severe crackdown by the Chinese authorities.''
\189\ ``Tibet To Reopen to Tourists on May 1,'' Xinhua, reprinted
in China Daily (Online), 3 April 08.
\190\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Transcript of Regular News
Conference by PRC Foreign Ministry on 12 June 2008, Moderated by
Spokesman Qin Gang,'' 12 June 08 (Open Source Center, 12 June 08).
After MFA Spokesman Qin Gang stated that the Chinese government is
``not to blame'' for the closure of Tibetan areas to journalists
following the `` `3.14' serious violent criminal incidents,'' a
journalist asked, ``Who is to blame, then? '' Qin replied, ``Do you
really have no idea? Of course, it is the Dalai clique.''
\191\ ``Full Transcript of Interview with the Dalai Lama,''
Financial Times (Online), 25 May 08. ``Then stop, inside Tibet,
arresting and torture. This must stop. And then they should bring
proper medical facilities. And most important, international media
should be allowed there, should go there, and look, investigate, so the
picture becomes clear.''
\192\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 103 (``organize, plot or carry out the scheme of
splitting the State or undermining unity of the country''; ``incites
others to split the State or undermine unity of the country'').
\193\ Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``Sentence Reductions for
Political Prisoners More Than Previously Thought,'' 17 June 08.
\194\ Ibid.
\195\ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 112. Jigme Gyatso
was sentenced in 1996 to 15 years' imprisonment for counterrevolution.
Chinese officials told a UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
(UNWGAD) delegation in September 2004 that he was guilty of ``planning
to found an illegal organization and seeking to divide the country and
damage its unity.'' Another UNWGAD opinion on the case found that
``there is nothing to indicate that the `illegal organization' . . .
ever advocated violence, war, national, racial, or religious hatred,
and that Jigme Gyatso was ``merely exercising the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly with others in order to express opinions.''
\196\ Ibid., 111-112. Choeying Khedrub, a monk of Tsanden Monastery
in the TAR, was sentenced in 2000 to life imprisonment for his role in
a group of men who allegedly printed pro-independence leaflets.
According to information that the Chinese government provided to the
United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), he was
found guilty of endangering state security and ``supporting splittist
activities of the Dalai clique.'' The UNWGAD reports that the Chinese
response ``mentions no evidence in support of the charges, or if they
used violence in their activities,'' and finds that the government
``appears'' to have misused the charge of endangering state security.
\197\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 210. Bangri Chogtrul
(Jigme Tenzin Nyima), who lived as a householder in Lhasa and managed a
children's home along with his wife, was convicted of inciting
splittism and sentenced to life imprisonment in a closed court in Lhasa
in September 2000. ``Lhasa Court Commutes Life Sentence for Children's
Home Director to 19 Years,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, April 2006, 16. The sentencing document lists evidence against
Bangri Chogtrul that includes meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting a
donation for the home from a foundation in India, and a business
relationship with a Tibetan contractor who lowered a Chinese flag in
Lhasa in 1999 and tried to blow himself up. Jigme Tenzin Nyima
acknowledged meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting the contribution, and
knowing the contractor, but he denied the charges against him and
rejected the court's portrayal of events.
\198\ Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and
Individual Monks and Nuns [hereinafter Ganzi Measures], Order from the
People's Government of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, No. 2,
issued 28 June 08, translated from Tibetan language in International
Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``New Measures Reveal Government Plan To
Purge Monasteries and Restrict Buddhist Practice,'' 30 July 08.
\199\ The Commission does not have relevant information about
Sichuan province or Ganzi TAP regulations. See, however, Tibet
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ``Regulation on
Religious Affairs'' [hereinafter TAR 2006 Measures], issued by the
Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government
on September 19, 2006, art. 16. ``To rebuild, expand, or repair venues
for religious activities, a petition for examination and approval is
made to the prefectural (city) administrative office (people's
government) religious affairs department in the locality, after
obtaining the consent of the county-level people's government religious
affairs department in the locality. . . .''
\200\ Monks or nuns who administer a monastery or nunnery form the
Democratic Management Committee (DMC). DMC members must implement Party
policies on religion and ensure that monks and nuns obey government
regulations on religious practice.
\201\ The Commission does not have relevant information about
Sichuan province or Ganzi TAP regulations. See, however, Tibet
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ``Regulation on
Religious Affairs'' [hereinafter TAR 2006 Measures], issued by the
Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government
on September 19, 2006, arts. 19, 29. Article 19 stipulates: ``Venues
for religious activities recruit religious personnel, and handle
procedures for their confirmation and for placing [the matter] on
record on the basis of [the venues'] ability for self-cultivation,
management ability, and the economic capacity of their religious
adherents, as well as on the basis of the relevant provisions of the
state and autonomous region.'' Article 29 states that ``religious
personnel'' may not ``engage in professional religious activities''
until their status as a religious professional is confirmed by a
``religious organization'' (a state-controlled Buddhist association)
and reported for the record to the religious affairs bureau of a local
government at county-level or above. (Based on Commission staff
analysis, a monastery or nunnery is unlikely to succeed in increasing
the number of resident monks or nuns unless the local government
endorses the increase.)
\202\ Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, translated on the Web site of China
Elections and Governance, art. 13. Government officials at the county,
prefectural, and provincial levels are involved in the approval process
for establishing a ``site for religious activity.''
\203\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the
Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism
[Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 13 July 07,
arts. 3-5.
Notes to Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong
\1\ United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102-
383, enacted 4 April 90; The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, enacted 4
April 90; Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, adopted 19 December 84.
\2\ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 115-116.
\3\ Universal suffrage is described as the ``ultimate aim'' in the
Basic Law. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, arts. 45, 68.
\4\ Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief
Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for
Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage,
issued 29 December 2007.
\5\ The first instance came in April 2004 when the NPCSC ruled
against universal suffrage for the 2007 Chief Executive election and
the 2008 LegCo election. For more information, see CECC, 2004 Annual
Report, 5 October 04, 104-106.
\6\ Ying-Kit Lai, ``New Poll Confirms People's Support for
Universal Suffrage,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 13 August 07.
\7\ Donald Greenlees, ``Democracy Advocate Wins in Hong Kong,'' New
York Times (Online), 3 December 07; ``Democracy Champion Wins HK
Poll,'' BBC (Online), 2 December 07.
\8\ Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(Online), Green Paper on Constitutional Development, July 2007.
\9\ Donald Tsang (Chief Executive of the HKSAR), Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Online), ``Report on the
Public Consultation on Constitutional Development and on Whether There
Is a Need To Amend the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2012'', 12
December 07.
\10\ ``Hong Kong `To Elect its Leader by 2017' '' BBC (Online), 29
December 07.
\11\ Decision of the Standing Committee on Methods for Selecting
the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Forming the Legislative Council, and on Issues Relating to Universal
Suffrage; Qiao Xiaoyang, ``Marching Toward a New Course for Democratic
Development in Hong Kong with One Mind and Joined in Common Effort''
[Jixin xieli maixiang xianggang minzhu fazhan xin licheng], Speech
Delivered at the Forum on Hong Kong's Political Development, 29
December 07.
\12\ Qiao Xiaoyang, ``Marching Toward a New Course for Democratic
Development in Hong Kong.''
\13\ Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Registration and Electoral Office (Online), ``The Third Term Chief
Executive Election: Election Committee,'' 7 February 07; Keith
Bradsher, ``China Plans to Allow Hong Kong a Bigger Voice in Choosing
its Leaders,'' New York Times (Online), 25 September 05; Human Rights
Watch (Online), ``A Question of Patriotism: Human Rights and
Democratization in Hong Kong,'' 9 September 04, 33-34; Alvin Y. So,
``The Tiananmen Incident, Patten's Electoral Reforms, and the Roots of
Contested Democracy in Hong Kong,'' in The Challenge of Hong Kong's
Reintegration with China, ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ.
Press 1997), 70-72.
\14\ Keith Bradsher, ``On Economy, Voters Move to the Left in Hong
Kong,'' New York Times (Online), 8 September 08; ``Democrats Face Key
Test as Hong Kong Votes,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 7 September
08.
\15\ Decision of the Standing Committee on Methods for Selecting
the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Forming the Legislative Council, and on Issues Relating to Universal
Suffrage.
\16\ Jimmy Chueng, `` `Fake' Voting Model Would Backfire, Lawmaker
Warns,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 9 February 2008.
\17\ Ambrose Leung and Albert Wong, ``Tsang Hints Legco Trade Seats
May Be Retained,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 16 May 08.
\18\ Chris Yeung, ``Change of Tack,'' South China Morning Post
(Online), 22 January 08.
\19\ Decision of the Standing Committee on Methods for Selecting
the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Forming the Legislative Council, and on Issues Relating to Universal
Suffrage.
\20\ Anne Marie Roantree and James Pomfret, ``Olympic Torch
Protesters Denied Entry to Hong Kong,'' Reuters (Online), 27 April 08;
Keith Bradsher, ``Torch Nears, Posing Test of Autonomy in Hong Kong,''
New York Times (Online), 29 April 08.
\21\ Jimmy Cheung, et al., ``Barring of Rights Activists
Criticized,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 29 April 08; Bradsher,
``Torch Nears, Posing Test of Autonomy in Hong Kong.''
\22\ ``Olympic Torch Arrives in Hong Kong,'' Associated Press
(Online), 30 April 08; ``Hong Kong Authorities Bar at Least 7 Activists
From Olympic Torch Relay,'' Voice of America (Online), 30 April 08.
\23\ James Pomfret, ``Hong Kong Says Olympic Trouble-Makers Not
Welcome,'' Reuters (Online), 6 May 08; ``Warning Goes Out to the
Olympic Spoilers,'' Standard (Online), 2 April 08.
\24\ Dennis Chong, ``Overseas Dissidents Arrive in HK with Plan To
Confront Authorities,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 8 August 08;
Nora Boustany, ``Hong Kong Bars Chinese Dissident,'' Washington Post
(Online), 7 August 08.
\25\ Peter So and Martin Wong, ``HK Protest Sites `Far from Venues'
'' South China Morning Post (Online), 31 July 08; ``Tight Rein Kept on
Tibet, Rights Protesters,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 10
August 08; ``Tibetan Independence Supporters are Taken Away at the
Olympic Equestrian Racetrack'' [Zhichi zangdu renshi zai aoyun mashu
saichang shitu kangyi bei daizou], Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 August
08.
\26\ ``Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Activist Ejected from Olympic
Venue,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 9 August 08.
\27\ Hong Kong Special Administration Region, Information Services
Department (Online), ``Views Sought on Human Rights Report,'' 2
September 08.