EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (HISTORICAL SERIES)

[Senate Prints 110-20]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Prt. 110-20

EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(HISTORICAL SERIES)
=======================================================================

VOLUME XIX

__________

NINETIETH CONGRESS

first session

1967

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
90th Congress, First Session

J.W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana EUGENE J. McCARTHY, Minnesota
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon BOURKE HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOSEPH S. CLARK, Pennsylvania JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
110th Congress, First Session

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Meyers, Jr., Minority Staff Director

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
90th Congress, First Session

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JACK MILLER, Iowa
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN G. TOWER, Texas
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia
Charles B. Kirbow, Chief Clerk
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
110th Congress, First Session

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY M. CHAMBLISS, Georgia
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK J. PRYOR, Arkansas ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN CORNYN, Texas
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Mike Kostiw, Minority Staff Director

C O N T E N T S

----------
Pages
Preface.......................................................... IX
Future Hearings, January 11...................................... 1
The World Situation, January 16.................................. 39
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Subcommittees and Hearings Procedures, January 24................ 113
Minutes, January 24.............................................. 129
Minutes, January 25.............................................. 130
Minutes, January 26.............................................. 131
The Situation in Indonesia, January 30........................... 133
Testimony of Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
Background Briefing on Disarmament Problems, February 3.......... 159
Testimony of Richard Helms, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Status of Development of Ballistic and Anti-Ballistic Systems in
U.S., and Briefing on Non-Proliferation Treaty, February 6..... 193
Testimony of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense
Research and Engineering; and Hon. William C. Foster,
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Military Assistance to Latin America, February 6................. 217
Testimony of Gen. Robert Porter, Southern Military Command
Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense
Deployment/Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological
Agents in Warfare/Sales of Military Equipment by the United
States, February 7............................................. 245
Testimony of Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Minutes, February 27............................................. 274
Minutes, February 28............................................. 275
Minutes, February 28............................................. 276
Minutes, March 1................................................. 277
Sales of Military Equipment by United States, March 2............ 279
Testimony of John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Policy Implications of Armament and Disarmament Problems, March 3 289
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Adrian S.
Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Minutes, March 6................................................. 311
Minutes, March 13................................................ 312
Arms Sales to Iran, March 14..................................... 313
Testimony of Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Logistics Negotiations
Minutes, March 16................................................ 330
Minutes, March 20................................................ 331
Briefing on Africa, March 28..................................... 333
Testimony of John Palmer II, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
Minutes, March 30................................................ 366
Minutes, April 3................................................. 367
Additional Military Assistance to Pakistan, April 5.............. 369
Testimony of William J. Handley, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, April 6................................................. 391
Minutes, April 13................................................ 392
Minutes, April 13................................................ 393
Minutes, April 14................................................ 394
Minutes, April 18................................................ 395
Minutes, April 19................................................ 396
Minutes, April 20................................................ 397
Minutes, April 21................................................ 398
Minutes, April 24................................................ 399
Minutes, April 25................................................ 400
United States Troops in Europe, April 26......................... 401
Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; and
Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of State
Minutes, April 26................................................ 414
Briefing on Yemen and Greek Situations, April 28................. 415
Testimony of Lucious D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, May 2................................................... 442
Minutes, May 2................................................... 443
United States Troops in Europe, May 3............................ 445
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Eugene V.
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Minutes, May 4................................................... 457
Discussion of Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, May 5... 459
Testimony of Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency
The Situation in Poland, May 15.................................. 471
Testimony of John A. Gronouski, U.S. Ambassador to Poland
Discussion Regarding the Secretary of State's Testimony, May 16.. 505
Minutes, May 16.................................................. 520
Minutes, May 16.................................................. 521
Briefing on Deployment of Antiballistic Missiles and Non-
Proliferation Treaty, May 18................................... 523
Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control
and Disar- mament Agency
United States Foreign Policy With Respect to the Middle East and
Vietnam, May 23................................................ 539
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 1.................... 587
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Robert S.
McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, June 5.................................................. 624
Minutes, June 5.................................................. 625
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 7.................... 627
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 8.................................................. 657
Briefing on Vietnam, June 8...................................... 659
Testimony of William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 8.................... 697
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 9.................... 705
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 20................................................. 729
Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, June 22............... 731
Testimony of Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Secretary of State
for Politico- Military Affairs
Minutes, June 22................................................. 738
Minutes, June 27................................................. 739
Briefing on Glassboro Talks, June 28............................. 741
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 29................................................. 775
Minutes, July 10................................................. 776
Minutes, July 11................................................. 777
Briefing on the Congo Situation, July 11......................... 779
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, July 12................................................. 825
Minutes, July 13................................................. 826
Minutes, July 25................................................. 827
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, July 26.......................... 829
Testimony of Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, July 27................................................. 854
Minutes, August 1................................................ 855
Minutes, August 22............................................... 856
Minutes, September 12............................................ 857
Minutes, September 22............................................ 858
Minutes, October 2............................................... 859
Minutes, October 6............................................... 860
Minutes, October 10.............................................. 861
Minutes, October 11.............................................. 862
Minutes, October 23.............................................. 863
Minutes, October 23.............................................. 864
Minutes, October 31.............................................. 865
Minutes, October 31.............................................. 866
Minutes, November 1.............................................. 867
Minutes, November 2.............................................. 868
Need for Open Hearing with Secretary Rusk on U.S. Policy Toward
Southeast Asia, November 7..................................... 869
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, November 16............................................. 926
Briefing on the Vietnam Situation, November 16................... 927
Testimony of Elsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South
Vietnam
Minutes, November 17............................................. 972
Motions Regarding Testimony by the Secretary of State, November
30............................................................. 973
Minutes, December 7.............................................. 991
Minutes, December 8.............................................. 992
Minutes, December 12............................................. 993
Briefing on Greece and the Middle East, December 14.............. 995
Testimony of Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Briefing on News Stories on the NLF in Saigon and the U.N.,
December 14.................................................... 1027
Testimony of Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of
State
Minutes, December 15............................................. 1065

APPENDICES

A. Committee on Foreign Relations Publication for 1967: Hearings,
Committee Prints, Senate Documents and Reports................. 1067
B. Volumes Published to Date in the Historical Series............ 1071
PREFACE

----------

``You certainly are getting more than your share of
crises,'' one senator commiserated with Secretary of State Dean
Rusk during an executive session of the Foreign Relations
Committee in 1967. Although national attention necessarily
focused on the war in Vietnam, where the United States had sent
a half million troops and spent billions of dollars to fight a
war that had come to seem endless, foreign policy crises were
erupting around the world that year at an alarming rate.
Members of the Foreign Relations Committee displayed
mounting skepticism about Vietnam, discounting the overly
optimistic reports they received from the State Department and
from U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elsworth Bunker.
Increasingly, committee members looked toward a negotiated
settlement as more likely than a military victory in Vietnam.
Because of such attitudes, the administration of President
Lyndon B. Johnson kept the committee at arm's length on
anything related to the war. Secretary Rusk cancelled scheduled
appearances to testify so often during the year that Senator
Albert Gore, Sr., complained of seriously impaired
communications between the committee and the State Department.
Instead of Vietnam, therefore, the committee devoted its
hearings to the state of the world, from a coup in Greece to a
war in the Middle East and a rebellion in the Congo. However,
members always kept in mind the potential connections between
the Vietnam war and events occurring elsewhere.
Committee members worried that America's preoccupation with
Vietnam could serve as an invitation to troublemaking in Asia,
Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Committee chairman J.
William Fulbright cited involvement in Southeast Asia as having
hindered the United States' response to the ``Six-Day War''
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. ``I do not hesitate to
make a decision that the Middle East is far more important to
the security of this country than Vietnam,'' Senator Fulbright
lectured Secretary Rusk--who earlier that year had assured the
committee he did not foresee a war in the Middle East. In his
own explanation of the world situation, Secretary Rusk insisted
that the United States was fighting communist aggression where
it existed, not communism as an ideology in the abstract. He
wanted to assure the committee that despite the war, the
Johnson administration sought detente with the Soviet Union,
but committee members remained dubious. By the year's end,
Senator Claiborne Pell chided an assistant secretary of state
that the administration seemed to see everything that happened
anywhere as ``one vast Communist plot, and that what went on in
any part of the world had its effect in any other part of the
world because the strings are all being pulled from one
place.''
Through its hearings, the committee also demonstrated
concern over the ``militarization'' of U.S. foreign policy.
Subcommittees devoted a great deal of time to examining arms
sales in the Middle East and in the Indian-Pakistani
territorial disputes, and followed closely the development of
anti-ballistic missile systems and the negotiations for nuclear
non-proliferation. Senator Eugene McCarthy complained that the
Johnson administration had embraced an arms sales philosophy
that unless the United States sold arms to other countries it
would lose its influence over the policies of those countries.
Vietnam and its larger implications caused committee
members to ponder the Senate's constitutional responsibilities
over foreign policy. When President Johnson sent planes to the
Congo, Senator Fulbright raised the possibility of the
president sending as many troops as he wanted without
congressional authorization. ``I do not see that it would be
entirely inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place,'' the
chairman said to Secretary Rusk. ``How many did you send to the
Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have sent
100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not sent
100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it
desirable.'' He added, ``I do not know where you draw the line
here.'' During another closed committee meeting, Senator
Fulbright complained to his colleagues: ``I get fed up with
being told we are committed to something all the time,'' simply
because the president said the nation is committed. That was
not what he meant by commitment, Fulbright asserted: ``I think
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.''
Committee members of both parties agreed that a Republican
Policy Committee report had asked the single pertinent question
of the year: what is our national interest in Southeast Asia?
For all their efforts, the committee could never get a
satisfactory response from the Johnson administration.
Admitting his mistake in supporting the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and his assumption that President Johnson had not
intended to widen the war, Fulbright lamented that the war had
``grown so gradually that we never have been able quite to get
the full impact of where we are going.'' That sense of drift
and helplessness pervades these hearings.
The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents
the editor's choice of the material possessing the most
usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads,
editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings,
are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material
deleted (other than ``off the record'' references for which no
transcripts were made) has been noted in the appropriate
places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes
of those sessions, in chronological sequences. Unpublished
transcripts and other records of the committee for 1967 are
deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to
researchers under the access rules of that agency. Some
transcripts may require further declassification procedures.
In accordance with the general policy of the series,
portions of the volumes were submitted to the Departments of
State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for
review and comment.
The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to
the Senate Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in
approving the release of those sessions in which its members
participated.
This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A.
Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.

FUTURE HEARINGS

----------

Wednesday, January 11, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr.
Henderson of the committee staff.
The Chairman. I think the committee will come to order. We
have a quorum here.
Congratulations to everybody and the committee in
particular. We have a quorum the first morning.

reduction of u.s. forces in europe

Well, gentlemen, the main purpose of this is just to
discuss a variety of things. One of the letters I suppose we
ought to take up first is Senator Mansfield's. I have a letter
here signed yesterday addressed to me about Senate Resolution
300 which was introduced last summer regarding how a
substantial reduction in U.S. forces permanently stationed in
Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our
resolve or agreement to meet our commitments under the North
Atlantic Treaty.
This letter was addressed to me personally, asking if I
wished to join in its sponsorship, but the reason I bring it up
here----
Senator Mundt. Who wrote the letter?
The Chairman. Mike Mansfield. He introduced the resolution
last summer.
The reason I am bringing it up here is not whether I should
sign it or not but is about its procedure. He proposes, I
think, to take this up on the floor without any committee
dealing.
Now, when this matter was considered before on increasing
from two to six, we had extensive hearings. This committee and
Armed Services.
As a procedural matter it seems to me very bad not to send
this kind of resolution to some committee because, well from
your point of view, no Republicans participated. This came out
of the Democratic Policy Committee. If we start the precedent
of resolutions going direct to the floor from the Policy
Committee, it seems to me it is very objectionable.
What I thought, if the committee thought well of it, was
for the committee to authorize me to write a letter requesting
that it be submitted to this committee.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very
brief comment that I have prepared on this matter. It is my
hope that we can confirm the Mansfield resolution relative to
troop assignment to NATO----
The Chairman. Speak a little louder. I cannot hear you.
Senator Morse. It is my hope that we can confirm the
Mansfield resolution relative to troop assignments to NATO and
that it will be referred to this committee. Since the committee
held extensive hearings last year on NATO, additional hearings
may not be necessary although there have been rather dramatic
changes in Germany and in German attitudes toward Eastern
Europe since our hearings. In any case, I think the resolution
should be referred to this committee and reported out before it
goes before the Senate.

role of the policy committee

The Party Policy Committee should not become a substitute
for a standing legislative committee, and I agree with the
Chairman that I think that a resolution of this importance
should be submitted to the committee first and not go to the
floor of the Senate.
As you know, that has been my position for many years in
the Senate, that committees should not be by-passed. You always
have the protection, if it becomes necessary, of sending a
legislative matter to a committee under instructions and you
always have the protection of discharging a committee if the
committee seeks to bury the legislation.
But I speak respectfully, I think if this is still the
position of the majority leader, and I am surprised it is,
because I thought I read in the paper some time ago a statement
attributed to him that he was not insisting on the matter going
directly to the floor.
The Chairman. I make it clear this letter does not insist
on it. But I thought it was his idea before that it do that,
and I was anticipating this question and that is why I brought
it here. He did expect it to be taken up, I think, last summer
without going to the committee.
Senator Morse. He did. He made this argument, but I only
want to say, and I close, that I would support the suggestion
of the chairman that the letter be sent to the majority leader
advising that it go to the Foreign Relations Committee to hear
it.
In fairness to the Armed Services Committee, I want to say
it may very well be that it should go to the Foreign Relations
Committee and then to the Armed Services Committee or possibly
that we have joint hearings on it, but I do not think that the
Foreign Relations Committee should give up what I think is its
right to pass on this resolution because of its clear foreign
policy import.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with what has
been said, with what you say and what Senator Morse says.

problems with joint hearings

Personally, I would just like to see it referred to this
committee with the idea that we could act on it and then refer
it to the Armed Services Committee, if we felt proper, rather
than having joint hearings. Those hearings were pretty painful
proceedings.
The Chairman. There are too many people.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, and if it is authorized I will make
a motion to the effect that the chairman be instructed to
follow that course.
The Chairman. Yes, that is in order.
Is there any further discussion?
Senator Hickenlooper?

military v. foreign policy

Senator Hickenlooper. I have some reservations on this.
First, I thoroughly agree that under no circumstances should
this--if we can prevent it--resolution go directly to the floor
from a strictly party committee such as the Republican Policy
Committee or the Democrat Policy Committee, or anything else. I
think it is a terrible practice.
Number two, I would like to hear a little bit more
justification why it should go to this committee rather than
the Armed Services Committee. I think maybe it should, at least
we should have something to say about it, but it seems to me
that the question of the reduction in force in Europe under an
alliance agreement, and that is what it is over there, that is
primarily either a professional area or a top executive area
discussion on national defense.
Senator Morse. Would you yield, Bourke, on that point?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I just want to have some
discussion, I am not committed.
Senator Morse. I only make a one sentence comment. The
original commitment came from this committee. The original NATO
commitment was a Foreign Relations Committee matter.
Senator Hickenlooper. We do not handle the military conduct
of the war; we may sign a treaty.
Senator Morse. But there is no question of military under
this treaty because it is the relationship to foreign policy.
Senator Sparkman. I think this is wrapped up in foreign
policy implications.

a political matter

The Chairman. I think so, too. To me this is not a war.
This is political judgment as to the relationship between
Western Europe, ourselves, and Russia. The reason for NATO
really was fear of invasion of Western Europe by Russia and
this entails, in my view, essentially a political judgment as
to what those relations are now and whether or not there is
justification for the continuation of, well, NATO as such, and
certainly how much you do in pursuance of NATO.
I would think as between the two this is far more a
political matter at this stage than it is military.
Frank was the NATO man last year. What do you say?
Senator Church. Well, I would agree with that, Mr.
Chairman, particularly inasmuch as the level of troops to be
maintained there turns on political considerations fully as
much as military considerations. In fact, the major arguments
for retaining so large a force had been based in recent years
not upon a military assessment, but rather upon the political
consequences of reductions, particularly West Germany, and of
course the whole Gaullist attitude toward the disposition of
American forces is a political one.
It seems to me that it is all inextricably bound into
foreign policy considerations.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

INTERNAL SENATE POLITICS

Senator Clark. I would certainly support this motion, but I
am a little bit concerned about the internal Senate politics of
this and wondering whether we cannot get off on perhaps a
little better foot in this session than we have sometimes in
the past. Whether it would be desirable for the chairman before
he writes a letter to sit down with Dick Russell and Senator
Mansfield and see if some amicable arrangement agreeable to all
three could be worked out.
Now, Stuart is not here; he wants to come. Maybe I am not
as good a mind reader as I think I am, but he is on both Armed
Services and this committee, and I suspect that he would be a
little bit upset if we were to assert sole jurisdiction.
John Sparkman will remember that at that meeting of the
NATO Parliamentarians in Paris in November, which he and I both
attended, there were a couple of pretty belligerent fellows
from the House of Representatives who really kind of took the
point of view that NATO is primarily a military alliance. They
were not much in favor of any efforts to get a better
relationship either with de Gaulle--you remember at that
briefing, John, those fellows gave Chip Bohlen and Cleveland
such a bad time, and I know that the NATO Parliamentarian group
is kind of split on the political committee which would rather
switch than fight and the military committee which wanted to
relieve tensions. I believe it might be worthwhile to see if we
cannot work out an arrangement with the Armed Services.
I agree that joint hearings are kind of rough. There are
too many people. But maybe some sort of genius can come along
which would work out a friendly relationship, either refer it
here first and there second, or get some kind of an agreement
that a committee of the two committees should sit, just in the
interests of hoping that the 90th Congress will not get off on
yackety yack between the Armed Services and the Foreign
Relations Committees which we are going to have on Vietnam
anyway.
The Chairman. That is a good suggestion. I would like to
work it out, and I do not think you meant to be exclusive.
Senator Morse. Not at all. I made the point maybe we ought
to have joint meetings.
The Chairman. I would object because they are unwieldy and
difficult to conduct when you have got that many people. And I
would think it would be better to have it here and then Armed
Services.
What do you think about that? I think Joe has a point.
Senator Sparkman. I think it is a good idea.
The Chairman. I do not want to have a row and have a
contest right off the bat. Do you think it would just be better
I talk to Mike Mansfield about it? But I would like to be able
to say the committee feels it ought to come here.
Is there anybody who does not feel that way?

ADVISE THE LEADERSHIP

Senator Morse. I think, Mr. Chairman, that you ought to
talk to Mike and also talk to Everett Dirksen and probably the
two of them together. I am sure they do not agree but
nevertheless I think that it is important that the minority
leader be advised, too.
Senator Clark. Do you not think you ought to talk to Dick,
too?
Senator Morse. I think that was agreed.
The Chairman. How do you feel about that? I do not want to
say. Do you feel they ought to come here?

USURPATION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES

Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have an interest in it, but
I feel that probably 60 percent of the interest is in the Armed
Services Committee or should be, and I go a step further. We
have noticed in the last year or two or three the usurpation of
certain fields of activity that ought to be in the Foreign
Relations Committee taken up by other committees, and we get
our tail over the dashboard a little bit on that. I guess there
is not much we can do about that. But we can, of course--this
may be the committee's area of responsibility, but we are
getting into other fields, I suppose. I just feel that 40
percent of it is probably here and 60 percent belongs to Armed
Services Committee. I think both committees ought to take a
look at it, but not with a joint meeting. I agree it is almost
impossible to get any satisfactory results.

CREATE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES

Senator Morse. It is possible, Mr. Chairman, to have one of
Joe's suggestions where you can have two subcommittees or a
subcommittee of each of the two committees hold the hearings
and report to their full committee.
The Chairman. That is a possibility. What does the
committee think about that?
Senator Clark. Why do you not explore it with Mike and
Dick?
The Chairman. I will be glad to explore it. I wanted an
expression of how you feel about it. Do you all, Karl, do you
think we have an interest?
Senator Mundt. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think in this
particular instance we have a better claim to jurisdiction than
the Armed Services Committee.
The Chairman. That is what I wondered.
Senator Mundt. What Frank says is exactly right. It is the
political implications we are going to listen to mostly. They
are not going to talk about the fear of an immediate invasion
from Russia. If there have been any military affairs
implications it must be connected with the war in Vietnam in
some way, about the deployment of troops. But I do not want to
get into a quarrel with the other group either.
I would think we could pass some kind of a resolution
saying that the Foreign Relations Committee feels that there
should be hearings, whether we want to have participation or
something, and I do not know how far we have to go in
nursemaiding the Armed Services Committee on these matters.
It is perfectly all right to consult, but I think you would
be fortified if you went there and said, ``We are going to have
them. We didn't want to have a quarrel. Do you want to have
subcommittees, joint committees?''
Do you want them to come in tandem or how, but I definitely
feel we ought to have a hearing.
Senator Carlson. I agree with the chairman on it.
Senator Aiken. We ought to look it over. The military
aspect, as Karl says, will probably relate to deployment of
troops that might be taken out there.
The Chairman. It is just more what you do with the troops,
whether or not you go here or over to Vietnam. That is a matter
which is military.
Senator Aiken. We have a political and economic situation
involved.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I think this idea of having
two subcommittees could work, but I think it would be
preferable to have it before the full Foreign Relations
Committee, although that could be explored.
The Chairman. Well, then, if I understand it correctly I
will take it up and talk to the majority leader about it, and I
assume we will probably then talk either with him or separately
with Dick Russell and the Republican leader.
Well, that disposes of that.

TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY RUSK

I think you have already had notice that the Secretary,
Secretary Rusk, has agreed to come in executive session on
January 16 and in open session on January 23. He called me and
asked, requested, that our hearings not go longer than a full
morning, that is when it is in open, because of the strain and
the lights and so on. He is assuming there will be television--
I do not know whether there will or not. I guess there will;
there usually is when he appears. And I said that I thought
that was a reasonable request. He said he would rather, because
of the strain and the lights. So I said we would agree to have
it run one day up until 1 o'clock, say.
Mr. Marcy brings up a question that is always a difficult
one. He says that Senator Symington cannot come on the 16th. He
wishes it to go on the 17th, and this creates a problem that if
we wanted to run over in executive session--what I said about
going in the afternoon applies only to open session with lights
and all that. It does not apply to executive session. He would
not be free on the afternoon of the 17th.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, I would like to bring up a point
here, too, if I can.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Pell. And that is I realize it is a good idea for a
few people questioning because it goes through with greater
ease, but when meetings are scheduled for Monday morning at 10,
it is very difficult sometimes for those of us who, if we have
a speaking engagement--I may be in the minority on this, I do
not know if anybody else shares the same view, and as a matter
of routine when we have the choice and initiative, could not
meetings be scheduled for Tuesday mornings and not Monday
mornings?
The Chairman. Well, Tuesdays are our regular meetings for
the conduct of our regular business such as I have got--I have
got several other items I am coming to; for example, the
consular agreement mentioned last night. Katzenbach came and
said he wanted us to take it up, and we have hearings. If you
mean we will not just utilize Monday, it is going to make it
very difficult. That means Friday, too.
Senator Pell. Fridays it does not mean because people do
shove off, they shove off in the afternoon but maybe I am the
only one, in which case I withdraw my point, but----
The Chairman. I would like to accommodate the members. How
do you members, all of you, feel about Monday? We are going to
have an awful heavy schedule because there are a number of
things I am going to mention in a minute.
Senator Mundt. I would rather have Monday than Friday.
Senator Hickenlooper. We have other meetings and it could
be Tuesday.
Senator Aiken. Get it over with.
Senator Pell. I am in a minority so I withdraw.
The Chairman. You do not live far away so you cannot get
back on Monday.
Senator Pell. I made two speaking engagements that day.
The Chairman. You do not speak on Sunday, do you?
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Pell. So I am in the same condition on the 23rd
where I probably will not be able to be here.
The Chairman. Well, you know, as big a committee as this
is, there is going to be somebody, I think, nearly every day,
and we just almost have to proceed in some way.
Senator Pell. Yes.
The Chairman. With that understanding, the executive is on
the 16th and open on the 23rd.

SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE

By the way, did the Steering Committee take action on the
size of the committee?
Senator Clark. Yes; this has to still be off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]

APPEARANCE BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA

The Chairman. McNamara, we have contacted McNamara. His
position is simply that he would like to appear before Armed
Services before this committee, and I wrote to Russell and he
feels that way. So he will appear there first and the date has
not been set, has it, Marcy, you have not heard any further
about it?
Mr. Marcy. No, sir.
The Chairman. It is not that he does not want to come, but
simply he would like to appear in public before that committee
and then we will have him as it is agreeable after that.
I mentioned the consular agreement. The President, as you
know, mentioned it last night. Katzenbach has already----
Senator Hickenlooper. He mentioned so much last night I
must have missed that.
The Chairman. It was buried down----
Senator Sparkman. With east and west trade.
The Chairman. But Katzenbach came up and said they are
anxious to proceed with it.
The question is what do you think about hearings? We have
had some hearings. It is my understanding that--in fact, I have
some letters here, limited to official use, from Douglas
MacArthur referring to Mr. Hoover's attitude toward this, and I
understand Mr. Hoover feels that his former testimony may have
been--I do not know whether you would say distorted a bit. He
is not adamant against this at all. If I understand it
correctly he simply made the observation that it would entail
additional surveillance, I guess you would say. But he is not
of the view that it should not be done is the way I understand
it. You can look at it if you like.

MISINFORMATION ON CONSULAR TREATY

Senator Carlson. I want to say on this consular treaty, our
people may be getting misinformed. I am getting a lot of mail
and we ought to have some additional hearings.
The Chairman. The Liberty Lobby has mounted a strong
campaign against it, relying I think primarily on the former
testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.
Senator Carlson. If we have a hearing, it may clear up some
of this.
The Chairman. I think we should, too. Does everybody
believe that?
Senator Sparkman. I do.
The Chairman. Any objection?
Senator Clark. If I may make one very brief comment, when I
was in Russia in November and before I went, when I talked with
Dobrynin\1\ in a briefing, the Russians really could not care
less about this consular treaty because they think it is so
much more to our advantage than it is to theirs, with which I
agree, that they are not pushing particularly hard. I think it
is very much to our advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chairman. I do, too. I think it is to our advantage.
Senator Sparkman. I think it would ease a lot of pain if
you could get a modification of Hoover's statement because it
has been----
Senator Dodd. Is this on the troop commitment to Western
Europe?
The Chairman. We have discussed that. We wanted to bring it
up after you got here. We discussed that at some length.

SENSE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I almost mentioned in the
caucus yesterday but I did not, the Democratic caucus, that I
am fairly certain that it was the sense of the majority, if not
all of the members of the Policy Committee, that this should be
referred to a joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committee, and when the majority leader did not bring
it up, I mentioned it to somebody who was sitting there, who
was on the Policy Committee, and he said he understood
Mansfield was going to take it up with you as to what would be
the preference. But I know that my feeling, as the only member
of both committees, was that it should go before a joint
committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations.
It is clear that it involves both committees very
fundamentally and very definitely, and in their mission, you
might say, so I hope it would be agreeable to this committee.
The Chairman. We have just discussed it. It is agreeable, I
mean in the sense of jurisdiction. There was quite a strong
sentiment if you got both full committees together it is
unwieldy. We suggested that it either go to the committees
successively, one and then the other, or a joint subcommittee
so you do not have so many people at one time where it is
unsatisfactory.
Senator Symington. I only wanted to report to you the way
it was left in the Policy Committee.
The Chairman. What would you think of it going to this
committee first and then that committee?
Senator Symington. I think that would be wrong. I would
rather see a joint subcommittee.
The Chairman. You would rather have a joint subcommittee.
Senator Symington. Yes, because there is so much work
involved.
The Chairman. Take eight or ten of this committee and join
with them together.
Senator Symington. That is right; this committee has a
tremendous amount of work and we have this draft law, as well
as appropriations and authorizations. There was some
resistance, I think it is fair to say, to doing it at all
because of the amount of work involved. This time I think we
ought to either fish or cut bait, because of these tremendous
expenses abroad. They are absolutely incredible under the
circumstances in the amount of money they are asking for in the
Far East and the amount of bodies they are asking for.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I say--Tom and Stu were
not here--I would much prefer the joint subcommittee to going
to one committee or the other first because, let us face it,
there is a psychological barrier there, people being what they
are, and if it comes here first, people on the Armed Services
Committee, some, will psychologically be disturbed. If it is
the other way, there will be some here. I think a joint
subcommittee would be much better than going to one committee
first and then the other. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that
having a joint hearing of the two full committees is very
unwieldy. I do not think it is necessary
After all, each full committee will take it up on the basis
of the report of their subcommittee.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, can I put in a plug, in
passing, for a more frequent use of subcommittees, either ad
hoc or the standing subcommittees, in order to expedite our
work?
The Chairman. Mr. Marcy and I have been talking about that
and we will talk about it further, I mean with the committee. I
think you are right, we ought to use that more. If I understand
it and everybody is agreeable to the Senator from Missouri's
suggestion preferring the joint subcommittee meeting.
Senator Morse. On Joe's subcommittee comment, I would like
to say that later in the morning I have on my agenda to raise
with the committee a subcommittee matter. I will cover it then,
and I quite agree with Joe.

RESCHEDULING SECRETARY RUSK'S TESTIMONY

Senator Symington. Can I bring up something you passed on?
I have a very important engagement next Sunday, almost as
important as the U.N. organization in 1945, when the Kansas
City Chiefs are going to show the National Football League they
have got the thing sewed up as much as they think they have.
With that premise, I was hoping that perhaps Secretary Rusk
could come on Tuesday. I talked to Carl about it and I talked
to the Secretary about it, because it is impossible for me to
get back here in time in the morning. I just thought, I would
hope, that you could because there is no way I can get back at
10 o'clock on Monday morning. I could get back in the
afternoon, but I would hope--the Secretary said it would be all
right with him if it would be all right with you. He did on the
17th. I spoke to him and he spoke to Carl, and I asked Carl to
speak to you.
Senator Pell. I subscribe, for the reason I already said,
to what Stuart said. Monday morning at 10 is very difficult.
Friday mornings at 10 we are around. But Monday morning is very
difficult.
Senator Symington. I am going to try to hold all my
engagements to weekends the way this thing happened last year,
but this makes Monday morning difficult.
Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me any member of
this committee who cannot be here Monday morning can afford to
buy a Sunday paper and learn everything that we will be told
Monday morning.
Senator Sparkman. Did you see Bart Starr's picture, you
know, big color?
Senator Symington. I would like to ask this question. If it
is going to be a question that he could come back in the
afternoon on Monday but he could not do it on Tuesday, then if
I can get here in time for Monday afternoon, could we have an
agreement that he will be back Monday afternoon?
The Chairman. Oh, sure.
Senator Symington. I withdraw my objections.
The Chairman. That was one of the main reasons we preferred
Monday was the fact he could be here in the afternoon because
it is likely we would not get through with him in any case.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I be the devil's
advocate for just a moment?
The Chairman. Yes.

SENATORS ACCOMMODATING THEMSELVES TO COMMITTEE SCHEDULE

Senator Morse. I am very fond of the Senator from Missouri,
as he knows. I am talking now of any relationships to any
requests that have been made. It is my opinion that the
efficiency of this committee was greatly interfered with last
year because of the generosity of our chairman in trying to
accommodate the personal requests of members of the committee.
I think this is the time for us to adopt a procedure policy at
the beginning of the session as follows: Namely, that although
we would like to have people at our meetings that cannot be
there, we have just got to accommodate ourselves to the
committee schedule, and, if we cannot be there, we cannot be
there. But I do not see, Mr. Chairman, how you can run this
committee if you never knew whether or not a date you have set
is one that you are going to be able to carry out.
I would like to suggest that as a matter of policy, we
decide this morning that if we cannot be at the meetings, that
if just too bad, but we are going to have to accommodate
ourselves to the schedule.
Senator Symington. There is one point about that if the
Senator will bear with me, because a great many of this
committee are members of the Finance Committee on both sides of
the aisle, which I am not, and I find there is a great deal of
adjustment of the dates on the Finance and Foreign Relations
Committees. Inasmuch as I am the sole member on Armed Services,
I hope my beloved friend from the State of Oregon will not
object to working it out. Even when I am here, I get badly
stuck between two----
Senator Morse. You missed my point. My point is that the
chairman has got to work out what should be our schedule of
hearings. He has to do it with other committees and find out
what our membership and conflict is with other committees. But
my point is he has to work out a schedule and we have to follow
the schedule.
Every time you get an exception, may I say, for X or Y on
this committee, you inconvenience A and B. They may not say
anything, but every time you change it A and B are discommoded
and I think we have to have a schedule to follow.

CONFLICTS WITH OTHER COMMITTEES

The Chairman. May I say I talked to Marcy at length about
this. One reason for Monday is that it is one of the days where
practically no other committees meet and we thought--Tuesday is
a favorite day for all committees, and you run these conflicts
you are talking about, membership in other meetings.
Take Senator Gore. He is a very high ranking man on
Finance. He likes to be there, and I like to have him there
because I cannot go to it. They always meet on Tuesday, is that
not correct, practically always, on other days. Mondays was one
of the reasons why it looks inconvenient from your point of
view. It is free from those other conflicts more than most days
of the week.
Senator Pell. The only question that comes to my mind is
the planning ahead. Sometimes you want to make one day in your
home area; should it be a weekday, should it be a Monday, or
should it be a Friday? We have to weigh these things. As a rule
I thought--I have always got the feeling that Monday was
probably the better day to choose as opposed to Friday. Monday
morning, as happens in Senator Symington's case, is the
earliest to get back.
The Chairman. He is only going to be out there once. He
will be very disillusioned about that.
Senator Pell. Friday, on the other hand, people may leave
but they always leave in the afternoon.
Senator Morse. We have to cancel some meetings. I canceled
a meeting up in George Aiken's state. I was supposed to lecture
up there in the university. I notified them I could not do it
and I canceled it.
The Chairman. I would like to do the best I can with the
committee. I need guidance. We thought this was an idea. I will
do anything that the consensus believes in.
Senator Carlson. I just want to say this. I want the
chairman to set the meetings. I am going to have to miss some.
But I do not want anything to interfere with this meeting next
Sunday in San Francisco. I want the Senator from Missouri to be
there and bring back the bacon.

PROBLEMS TRAVELING TO THE WEST

Senator Mundt. I think what Wayne said makes a lot of
sense. I would like to add one little codicil. If you will
follow the practice of what you have done here of giving us a
little advance notice, like a week, we can adjust to your
schedule. I agree you cannot change your schedule for an
individual member without interfering with some other member.
We have an altogether different problem out West from what Clay
has. He cannot be back Monday morning. I cannot get back home
unless I leave Friday morning, so it varies. Set it and give us
a week or so notice and we will adjust, like Wayne canceled a
meeting.
The Chairman. I am certainly open to suggestions, and Mr.
Marcy has been around here a long time. He sort of thought
Mondays and Tuesdays--Tuesdays are our regular days and Monday
would fit in as well as any day with anybody. But I do not want
to be arbitrary about it. As far as I am concerned, it is about
half dozen of one and six of the other.
Senator Symington. One more point I have following Karl's
point, too. If we do try to go out on weekends, which is what I
am going to do this year, then I respectfully say because of
the problem of getting back from your state and my state that
Tuesday and Wednesday would be better than Monday and Tuesday.
If you come back Sunday, you fly all day Sunday night which
cripples you a little bit and you can get back sometime Monday,
and then Tuesday and Wednesday it gives you a chance to get out
Friday. It takes you a little longer than it does me.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are you establishing a Tuesday to
Thursday club?
Senator Symington. Thursday is Armed Services.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. I will talk to Mr. Marcy further. Personally,
it does not make much difference to me. I am perfectly
agreeable to any way. I would just like to accommodate as many
as possible and get as many people here. We did pretty well
last year.

THE SPACE TREATY

Let me go over a few other things. The space treaty is one
which we anticipate will be signed this month and they will, I
know, they have already mentioned it, want it acted on quickly
because of their--they think it is psychologically important.
Katzenbach has mentioned it, and so that is another matter
which I am sure we will have hearings on. This is what I meant
a moment ago. We are going to have to utilize more than Monday
and Tuesday. This is just starting with Rusk. I think we are
going to be Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday very likely when you
get into these other matters that I mentioned.
[Discussion off the record.]

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

The Chairman. Then we have a few other things. These things
bother me, no end. I wonder what you all think or should we
just forget about them. I get these letters all the time. They
come here you know, there are--I mean on the human rights
things, what do you all think about those? Should we forget
them or should we act on them? You have been to the U.N.--by
the way, I think we ought to have a time set aside--I want to
hear what the Senator from Idaho has to say about his
experience in the U.N. But this is a matter particularly
relating to the U.N. What do you think about it?
Senator Church. Of course there is a good deal of feeling
up there that is adverse to the United States on this matter
because although we have voted finally for the approval of
these conventions, we have never ratified any of them. As time
has passed, more and more comment, adverse comment, has
developed against us on the ground that we are not really for
these conventions and the proof of it is that, although we go
through the motions in the U.N. where they have been approved
by very large majorities, we have failed to ratify these
conventions and make them a part--make them binding treaties.
I have not studied the conventions very carefully, but I
think with the possibility of certain reservations that may be
necessary, we could proceed with hearings, obviously secure the
ratification of some of the conventions without any difficulty.
Senator Dodd. Is the Genocide Convention one of those?
Senator Church. Yes, it is one of those. But I think if we
were to move on any one, perhaps the one that would encounter
the least difficulty, it would be helpful to us with the U.N.
We really do not care about these and we know the African and
Asian countries are quite--they put a lot of store in these
conventions.
Senator Sparkman. When you refer to the human rights
convention, is that an old one or was it passed in the U.N.
either this or last year?
Senator Church. This relates, it relates back several
years.
The Chairman. It is an old one, the one I had in mind.
Mr. Marcy. There are three of those that have been up here
since, in the Kennedy regime--yes, they came July of '63. There
is one on the convention of political rights for women. There
is another one, the convention concerning the abolition of
forced labor. There is a third, a supplementary convention on
the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, an institution of
practices similar to slavery, and then there is the genocide
convention, which has been with us since 1949.
Senator Sparkman. Those three that you mentioned
specifically though, they are relatively new.
Mr. Marcy. They are, yes.
Senator Sparkman. I think they were adopted in that
preceding session of the General Assembly. The genocide is old,
and I think there is a human rights with it also, adopted way
back in '57.

DIFFICULT FOR OTHER NATIONS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. POSITION

Senator Church. Just a reading of these, particularly
reference to slavery and women's rights and that kind of thing,
it is very difficult for many of these countries to understand
why the United States with all our talk of democratic rights
and individual liberties and equality and so forth cannot find
it possible to ratify conventions against slavery.
Senator Hickenlooper. One reason they do not understand
some of those things, they do not understand the American
system of government. They do not understand these treaties can
abrogate or replace under certain conditions some of the
provisions of our Constitution.
Senator Church. I know.
Senator Hickenlooper. For one I am not for letting the
African countries run this country through emotion or
otherwise. They have been doing it for a little while, and I
think it is time we stopped letting them be influential on
these things.
May I say most of these conventions, I think, can be worked
out, as Frank said, and made satisfactory.
Senator Sparkman. I was going to ask if we should act
favorably on these last three, and I understand or from what I
have heard about them, they are more or less--they are more or
less unobjectionable. Would that ease your situation?
Senator Church. John, I think anything that would break the
ice to show that we are prepared to follow through, and we will
hold hearings, and I think ratification of one or two of these
would be extremely helpful to the United States.
Senator Sparkman. I think a couple of them could be done,
maybe three of them if I heard correctly about them. But so far
as the old human rights and the genocide, those old ones, there
are about three of them are there not, two or three, I just do
not believe there is any chance.
Senator Church. Forget the old ones and take the three most
recent ones.
Senator Church. We have some constitutional problems, as
Bourke said, and we have to look at them. But there is a
possibility of ratification of some of them.

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Senator Pell. I would like to also, Mr. Chairman, having
had some contact with the U.N., put in a strong plug of support
for Frank's view, and I would like to particularly hope we
would not put out a hand on considering the genocide convention
because I think it is the most important one in the whole
crowd. I think the genocide convention is as important as it
was when it was considered in the late forties, and I would
hope very much indeed we would consider it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Have you studied what it will do to
the Federal Constitution?
Senator Pell. I studied it, I read it, and I realize the
problems.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is what has been holding it up
all these years.
Senator Pell. I am well aware of it.

SUBCOMMITTEE SITUATION

Senator Morse. I think here is the place where you could
assign to a subcommittee the consideration of this matter to
report to the full committee, for example, under the direction
of Senator Church. Let us face it, you cannot begin to handle
all the things that are going to come before this full
committee, if the full committee retains jurisdiction over all
of them. I think this is as good a place as any for me to renew
my proposal of last year that the full committee should approve
and authorize a program of activity for its subcommittees. The
Mansfield resolution, the Vietnam hearings, the outer space
treaty are items that will occupy the full committee, along
with others. The final report of the Committee on the
Reorganization of Congress shows this committee held far more
full committee hearings in the 88th Congress than any other
Senate committee. We held 196. The next high number was the
Commerce Committee with 127. But Foreign Relations had only 33
subcommittee meetings in the 88th Congress whereas Commerce had
116.
The full committee will have a heavy schedule of major
business in 1967. But I do not think our activity should be
limited to what the full committee can handle.
The arms races in Latin America and the Middle East are
possibilities for such a subcommittee. So is a full review of
the Alliance for Progress and many other items that could be
handled either under existing subcommittees, or special ad hoc
committees.
Mr. Chairman, let us face it with the kind of a setup we
have in this committee for your subcommittees, they are going
to be appendages, in my judgment, with very little
effectiveness. I speak most respectfully because of my high
regard for our staff, but this staff cannot handle full
committee business and subcommittee business.
This committee has, in my judgment, unlike most committees
in the Senate, never sought to get the financial support, the
staff support, that a Foreign Relations Committee ought to
have. I renew my suggestion that you take these subcommittees,
you recognize that their staffs be enlarged, that they be given
staff, under the supervision of the chairman and the
professional director of the staff, Mr. Marcy.

LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

But let me as a special pleader tell you about my problem
in the Latin American subcommittee. I cannot possibly carry on
what needs to be done on the Latin American subcommittee if I
am going to have to rely on the existing staff. Carl Marcy and
Pat Holt and Lowenstein and the rest of them cannot possibly
give to me the professional assistance that I need to conduct
the kind of hearings that ought to be conducted on Latin
America. Alliance for Progress ought to be gone into.
I want to say that I have already had two conferences with
Assistant Secretary Sol Linowitz, who by the way, has made a
tremendously favorable impression on me. He talked to me before
the President sent him to Latin America. He talked to me after
he came back. I want to have an early meeting of the
subcommittee in the late afternoon in which I would invite the
full committee, to which I would always invite the full
committee if I am given jurisdiction to conduct some of these
things, and have him brief us. I think he is terrific in his
understanding already of Latin American policy.
But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, we are just kidding
ourselves if you think that these subcommittees of this
committee are more than facades. We have no real jurisdiction.
We have no staff, we have no financial resources, and I would
propose a complete reorganization of the subcommittee setup,
under the control of the Chairman, but with authority for us to
go ahead and conduct the studies that the full committee will
never get around to conducting.
I think what is needed, Mr. Chairman, we cannot do it this
morning, but you ought to get Carl Marcy and his staff to work
with some of us on various plans for a reorganization of
subcommittees. I would like to see not only my committee, but I
would like to see the NATO committee, I would like to see the
other subcommittees, start subcommittee hearings this year that
amount to something.
Senator Clark. Would you yield for just a second?
Senator Morse. I am all through. I yield.

COMPARISON TO LABOR COMMITTEE

Senator Clark. I would like you to comment to the chairman
about the experience you and I both had with the Labor
Committee where we could not possibly get through the workload.
Senator Morse. That is probably why it makes me a biased
witness. We have on the Labor Committee real jurisdiction given
to the subcommittees. We have our staff, and I think, for
example, you check them for security, you approve of them on
this committee, but you give these subcommittees the needed
staff they need to do this job.
Let us face it. Marcy and his associates just cannot be of
service to these subcommittees and be of service to the full
committee to the degree that we are going to need their service
unless you are willing to make the fight to enlarge the
subcommittee staffs with some jurisdiction given to the
chairman of each subcommittee under your direction, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sparkman asked to comment. He has to
go. Did you want to comment on it?
Senator Sparkman. Well, I merely say this. I have always
inclined toward as many meetings by the full committee as
possible for the consideration of matters. But I realize there
is a lot of truth in what the senator says, particularly with
reference to the time element and also with this problem that
we have of getting a quorum present because of conflict with
other committees.
But any way we go at it we are going to have our hands
full.
Senator Morse. Sure.
Senator Sparkman. That is all I care to say.
The Chairman. Senator Gore?

THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator Gore. I wanted to raise a question about a
subcommittee, the Disarmament Subcommittee, of which I happen
to be the chairman. The most interesting and entreating
paragraph in the president's speech last night was the one
which seemed to me to be addressed directly to the Soviet Union
rather than to us, and that is on the antimissile program. Here
is a disarmament question per se, and if it would be agreeable
with the subcommittee, with the full committee, I would propose
to have some hearings on this. However, it is matter of such
overweening importance, I would not wish to go into it if the
full committee wishes to do so. If the full committee can find
time to do so, fine. But it seems to me here is something of
mutual interest to the United States and to the Soviet Union,
the two countries being the only ones with the technological
competency to create such systems, and yet this has been a
decision that has been procrastinating now for many, many
months. How long it can safely be postponed without reaching
some agreement is a matter, I think, of urgency.
Of course in my view it would be far preferable that the
United States and the Soviet Union mutually agree to abstain
from such a costly and wasteful expenditure, but it is very
dangerous to this country, in my view, to procrastinate until
the Soviet Union may suddenly have a fait accompli and we are
left second.
So it seems to me this is a subject which either the full
committee or the subcommittee should examine. I am willing to
see either done, and I want to submit it to you.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support Albert
as a member of this subcommittee. I think this is probably the
most important single foreign policy matter that confronts us
today, a good deal more important than things that are
considered to be vital.

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

If we get ourselves into another escalation of this arms
race by the placement of antiballistic missiles around Moscow,
Leningrad, and Washington, and New York, the total cost is
going to be well over 20 billions of dollars.
Senator Symington. Eight months of the Vietnamese war.
Senator Clark. It is absolutely and fully for either
country to do it, and I think a skillful agreement pushed by
this committee could get us off the hook because it is not
outside of the Soviet's interests either.
The Chairman. That is one thing that pleased me last night
because he decided two things. From the intelligence community
it is my best information they do not believe that the Soviets
are very far along on this ABM at all. The only one that is
being currently pushed is around Moscow. It has very limited
possibilities and it is the only one, and I think he is quite
right in taking a further look. It is my impression that is
what he has in mind in the meantime, to do the best he can
diplomatically to try to----
Senator Gore. I raise no critical comment. I say this is
just a matter of such overweening importance that either this
committee or the subcommittee should go into it.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word?

THE AMOUNT OF WORK

First I agree without any reservation of any kind with the
position taken by the Senator from Oregon. In fact, the Chair
will remember I presented this to him sometime back.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Symington. Because in my opinion this is the most
important committee, so long as it does not get subordinated to
the executive branch, in the Congress of the United States.
Now knowing Senator Gore, I think it would be a wonderful
thing if he could really get his teeth into this disarmament
thing.
You can do it as well as anybody around, but you have so
doggone much else to do.
The Armed Services Committee is a very important committee,
especially because it authorizes well over 60 percent, I think,
now of the budget, the United States budget. We could not do
anything that really meant anything if we did not have some
major subcommittee like Stennis's Military Preparedness
Subcommittee and Jackson's Military Construction Committee. The
Military Preparedness Subcommittee has a complete staff, with a
great many members, and they are all excellent people.
Now, everything is done just like when we testified. I used
to testify from the executive branch to committees. The
chairman of the committee is always the chairman of any
subcommittee, if he wants to be there. At times the chairman
would come in. If Mahon has a meeting and Cannon would come in,
he immediately would chair the meeting.
But from your standpoint, your health, the amount of work,
the way the world is today, I just do not think you can take it
and at the same time do a good job without impairment to your
health. I just could not be more serious about this.
One other point; just before I left, Doug MacArthur came
down to see me, and he was very upset about the Middle East.
That is the little subcommittee I happen to be the chairman of,
and he told me all about it and he said he felt that the
Israelis made a very serious mistake.

VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Well, I came back from the Far East last week through the
Middle East, and putting it mildly, in my opinion, they sure
did make a serious mistake. I spent a couple of days with Luke
Battle in Cairo, who is a very bright fellow and seemed to be
fully up on it, and has an excellent staff and then I went up
and had a long talk with Hussein in Jordan, who in my opinion
fully expects to be assassinated. He is our one great friend we
have out there.
I talked to Levi Eshkol and I did not pull any punches, and
I said, ``This is going to hurt you a lot more than anything
you have done since the state was formed in 1948.''
I talked to Abba Eban, I talked to General Moshe Dayan who
is out, the military hero.
I then stopped to talk in Athens--I spent a good many hours
with Walworth Barbour, the ambassador to Israel.
I went to Athens, and I had another break. In Athens is an
ambassador, a seasoned fellow who was formerly an assistant
secretary of state. Phil Talbot, our ambassador, and I spent a
good many hours with him, and he said, ``You see, the story
going around the Middle East and based on my experience is just
plain murder,'' he said. ``The Israelis attacked Jordan because
they knew Jordan was a friend of the U.S., but they did not
attack Syria or UAR, especially Syria, because they felt they
were friends of the Soviets,'' and also my impression was very
definitely that the UAR is moving quietly but definitely into,
further into, the Soviet bloc.
Well, these things are the kind of things, just thinking
out loud, if you could have some hearings on and just to get
information, because I noticed since I have got back that
everything that I did in Israel was very well covered by the
press, pictures in my own home town paper and that kind of
stuff, whereas there was none of it, you might say, on the Arab
side.
I am not choosing up sides. I do think they made a bad
mistake on this and their arguments are very specious as to why
they did it. I do think if we have any friend in the Arab
world, it is Hussein, and I do think he is in very serious
trouble.
So these are the kinds of things that if you held some
hearings, I think you could bring out and get a better grasp
of.
Just like I would sure like to see Albert get into this
disarmament thing and have some hearings about this situation,
because actually, without violating any security or anything,
the hearing that you, Bourke, and I went to the other day, I
was impressed with the fact that the information we got was not
coordinated or was not the same as the information released
recently by the Secretary of Defense to the American people on
that particular subject.
So you just have a lot of information floating around, and
if you do not fragment this committee into subcommittees with
some authority and some staff, always subject to the approval
of you and the full committee, I just do not think you can do
the job the way the world is today. End of statement.

COMMITTEE'S USE OF SUBCOMMITTEES

Senator Morse. I would like to have further discussion of
it at our meetings after the evidence is brought in. I want to
stress what Stu said in his last statement. My proposal does
not involve any independence of the subcommittees. My proposal
involves your approval in your capacity as chairman, and it
involves the approval of the full committee with regard to the
subject matters taken up. But once assigned to the
subcommittee, then the subcommittee will do what it does in
other committees, it acts for the full committee and reports
back to the full committee.
You know I never have hearings without sending each one of
you a letter inviting you to come to the hearings. I have not
talked to the staff. I have my information from other sources,
so I do not think it would be proper for me to involve the
staff in the inquiries that I have made. But I would like to
get all sides of it and all the facts.
I think you will find that of the major committees of the
Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is the most
understaffed. The Foreign Relations Committee in a sense has
sort of a closed staff, a very small number of people, highly
qualified. There is no reason why a subcommittee should not be
authorized to select a subcommittee staff of two or three
people representing--serving both the majority and the minority
of the subcommittee as qualified as the people on the full
committee staff, with an expertise on the work of that
subcommittee, in the jurisdiction of that subcommittee.

SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF

My question to you is: Why is it that the Foreign Relations
Committee maintains as small a staff as we maintain when we are
up against the State Department and the Pentagon building with
almost unlimited staff to draw on? Why have we kept this staff
as small as we have kept it in comparison with other staffs?
Take the Labor Committee. We far exceed this committee, Armed
Services Committee, Stu has already stated.
I just want to say part of our problem is we do not have
the assistance that we need as members of this committee to do
our job, and I think we ought to change the staff policy of the
committee.
The Chairman. Well, I am very glad to hear this discussion.
What do you think over here on this side about it, Bourke and
George?
Senator Hickenlooper. I think you run a tremendous danger
just like other committees have run. I think a lot of these
committees have run just clear out of the reservation on their
subcommittees, vast staffs that they have set up, and they
become autonomous subcommittees practically. I think it is hard
to justify it except to give a lot of jobs to a lot of people
and a lot of autonomy to a lot of folks.
That is just the practical answer. You have asked me and I
tell you.
The Chairman. I want to know----
Senator Symington. Would you feel that way about it if you
had a Republican President and were chairman of this committee?
Senator Hickenlooper. I had thought about it during eight
years of the Eisenhower Administration.
The Chairman. George, what do you think?
Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I try to practice what I
preach. I find in my own office that if they pushed up a little
bit to get their work done, they do a whale of a lot better
work than they do if there are too many people in the office.
Nobody wants to do it if they have one too many. But if they
are pushed up they take it and go and do it.

REPORTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator Hickenlooper. What Senator Morse said about his
Latin American Subcommittee, I have been on that subcommittee.
I have been on it ever since it was set up. I read every report
Pat Holt has put in about the investigations of these countries
in Latin America. I think they are more profound and more
penetrating than any subcommittee hearing that we could have
here on that subject.
Now, I don't mean to say we should not----
Senator Morse. But those very reports ought to be the basis
for a thorough and intensive study and investigation of the
subcommittee.
Senator Hickenlooper. He is very thorough and his
observations over the years have been very accurate.
Senator Morse. With all due respect to Pat Holt, he is no
substitute for the Senatorial responsibilities of the members.
Senator Hickenlooper. No.
Senator Morse. That is what you are going to make it if you
are going to turn the investigation over to the staff members.
Senator Hickenlooper. Not until there is reason to think
the staff member is inaccurate.
Senator Morse. But the point is he doesn't begin, his
reports don't begin to cover the type of study I am talking
about.

BACKGROUND ON STAFF AND SUBCOMMITTEES

Mr. Marcy. Senator, I might just remind the committee on a
little background on this.
In 1958, a subcommittee was created, of which Senator
Sparkman was chairman, to look into the whole staff problem. At
that time the committee, that is the subcommittee, recommended
to the full committee, that the present structure continue to
exist. At that time, it pointed out that the staff had six
professionals and eight clerical employees. The final
conclusion, except insofar as the subcommittee recommended the
addition of one employee to assist in the coordinating
functions in connection with the visits of distinguished
foreign visitors, that is Miss [Milrae] Jensen, it did not
believe that there should be any additions to the staff at the
present time.
Now, that was in 1958.
Senator Clark. Nine years ago. The world has sure changed
since then.
The Chairman. May I say, last year we utilized, I thought
very effectively, five ad hoc subcommittees, assigning certain
jobs to them, and they did a lot of work and reported a lot of
bills. The tax conventions, in particular, and claims
convention, legislation under Senator Sparkman.
I think we have got to move in some degree in this
connection. It is a question of how much, in my opinion, and
also it is not easy to get good qualified staff people. You
look around here and it is hard to get them, the ones that are
really qualified for this kind of work like our professional
staff.
Senator Pell?

BRINGING STAFF TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS

Senator Pell. There is another problem here along the line
of what Wayne said, which is that this is the only--it maybe a
very good idea, I haven't made up my own mind--but this is the
only committee, I believe, in the Congress where you can't
bring your own staff people in with you, and so when you have a
continuing responsibility on a specific subject that you are
following it leaves you a little scattered, because there is no
staff man you can talk to.
The Chairman. Harry Byrd never allowed one of my staff to
go to the Finance Committee. I don't think they do under any
circumstances.
Isn't that right?
Senator Dodd. We don't in Judiciary.
The Chairman. It is the custom.
Senator Dodd. We don't do it in Judiciary.
The Chairman You do not?
Senator Dodd. No.
The Chairman. I don't think it is peculiar at all.
Senator Pell. I am sorry.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd?

FOCUS ON BIG PROBLEMS AS A TOTALITY

Senator Dodd. I don't know whether it is improper or not
but I would like to hear from the staff, what they think about
this.
The Chairman. Sure, it is not improper. We have talked
about this before.
Go ahead.
Mr. Marcy. Well, Senator, this, as the members know, comes
up about every two or three years and it seems always to boil
itself down to a very fundamental question as to whether the
committee wants to focus on fairly big kinds of problems as a
totality, which is the way the committee has generally done, or
whether it wants to break up into sort of a series of
subcommittees, each going in sort of a different direction.
Senator Symington. That is not so.
Mr. Marcy. I might say that the staff has for some time
thought that it might be advisable to set up one or two, we
thought mostly in terms of one, one subcommittee which would be
kind of a continuing thing with a separate staff. It would be
assigned to specific kinds of things.
I think, for example, the problem would be illustrated if
we tried to hold hearings during the next two months on, say,
the subject of the Middle East, disarmament and the Alliance
for Progress. I think they need to be approached in sort of
separate way.

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL

Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, I am generally in sympathy
with the position of the Senator form Oregon and the Senator
from Missouri. I think the experiment of the ad hoc committees
has been a rather successful one.
Furthermore, I don't think this committee is getting its
work done functioning as it has been functioning over the
years. I think that is quite evident in terms of the things we
haven't taken up, and in terms of the extravagant amount of
time we have had to spend on foreign aid and that sort of
thing.
So that we are not really penetrating many of these
questions as thoroughly as we should.
I think that in light, and this is no reflection on the
staff, I think this is the finest professional staff that I
know anything about, but in light of our experience with the ad
hoc committees, I don't see why we couldn't retain for the full
committee the most important things that we want to look at as
a whole committee, and give some of these subcommittees
assignments of a substantive character. Let them conduct
hearings; let them bring in their recommendations, and print
hearings for the full committee to review.
Senator Morse. Certainly.
Senator Church. And the full committee has the final say.
Set it up in such a way that we won't proliferate all over the
place. Establish the limits and give the chairman of the full
committee the final say concerning the work of the
subcommittees which they would take up.
Senator Morse. That is all I have asked for.
Senator Church. I mean this is a perfectly reasonable
request.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
The Chairman. Yes.

COMMITTEE HAS GAINED IMPORTANCE

Senator Gore. I think we are picking ourselves to pieces
here. I think introspection is good, but I would like to call
attention to one thing. We had a quorum this morning. Two years
ago the Chairman was complaining nobody ever attended meetings.
This committee has attained an importance in the last year that
it hasn't had in a long time. I think hearings before the
American people not only rehabilitated this committee in its
importance, but did more than anyone thing has done in a decade
to restore the co-equal status of the Legislative Branch with
the Executive. The public hearings we had, whether you agree
with what was said here or there or disagree, had an impact on
the American people no other committee of either house of
Congress has done since I have been a member of the body, which
has been 28 years now.
So I think that while we are finding fault with ourselves,
let us recall that what the committee as a whole did last year
was the single most important thing that this or any other
committee, in my opinion, has done in a long time.
So let us improve through ad hoc, through subcommittees,
through staff, but let us not forget that the most important
thing is this committee as a whole, playing its constitutional
function in the open before the American people.
Senator Church. I agree with that.

HAVE A SUBCOMMITTEE HANDLE NATO MATTERS

The Chairman. Let me say one thing. Last year I was more
than willing to have a subcommittee handle NATO and we got to
talking about it and it looked like we were downgrading NATO if
we don't have a full committee.
Remember that?
Should it be a full or subcommittee? I was for it and I
intended it for it. You went over there and when we got down
there they put it up to me, ``If you do that, it will look as
though you are not really interested in NATO,'' so they put the
pressure on me. I had to do it. That is what happened. I was
all for it.
Senator Church. That may have been a subject----
The Chairman. I mean this is what you often run into. On
these other things, the things I mentioned, there were five
subcommittees. No one thought those were so important that it
had to be full, and they went off very well and you did the
work well.
We can do that more. I am perfectly willing to do it. We
have already talked about this morning a subcommittee to meet
with Armed Services on these troops in Europe. I am all for it.
I think it would be a good idea.
Senator Church. I just wanted to say one thing. I should
think some of these U.N. conventions, for example, could be
taken up by a subcommittee.
The Chairman. I do, too.
Senator Church. And hearings held and printed hearings
distributed.
The Chairman. I do, too. I am all for this.
I do think if we move in this direction--last year I said
we will try these ad hoc and see how they work and if they work
well, we will do more of it.
I am all for it. I think we do have a couple of more staff
men, but they are hard to get. The committee did look over a
lot of them and you would be surprised how difficult it is to
get good ones.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two
points.

EXERCISE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

First, I would thoroughly agree the committee is not
getting its work done as expeditiously as it could and I think
the ad hoc device is an excellent thing, two or three members
well-informed and then report to the full committee for action.
So, as Senator Mansfield pointed out to all committee chairmen
including you, he believes this is a session where we ought to
exercise our oversight function, and a large part of this
committee is not legislative but oversight--Vietnam. NATO
hearings are an example.
The Chairman. That is an example.
Senator Clark. You cannot carry on more than one or two of
those things a year if you are going to have the full committee
do it, if you, Mr. Chairman, have to be the fellow out there in
the front all the time.
Now, it is true, the argument is made and to some extent it
is downgraded. But I call on my colleague from Oregon to point
out whenever they have a problem involving education they go to
the Senator from Oregon and not to the chairman of the
committee, Senator Hill, who is a wonderful magnificent
committee chairman I serve under. When they went to go to the
man on manpower problems, they come to me. But in the course of
a not too long period of time, you get the press oriented to
the fact the committee is organized so that most of the
committee work is done at a subcommittee level.
When you come to the full committee you have the most
gracious and able man in the Senate, of course present company
excepted, but we have to break down so the subcommittees can
have more status than they have now. It won't be done
overnight.

INACTIVE SUBCOMMITTEES

I have one more point. I serve on three subcommittees--
Disarmament, Economic Institutions and Tom Dodd's economic aid
problem. Those subcommittees have been pretty darned inactive
during the last two years I have been on the committees and why
have they been inactive--to some extent because the chairmen
have been too busy, but to a very large extent they have no
staff to organize witnesses, to handle it.
I think if you take those three subcommittees,
International Institutions, Disarmament, and Financial and
Economic Interests Overseas, one good staff man could start off
serving those three subcommittees as a start.
Now, Mr. William Bader has competence in that particular
area, and if we find that he can't do it by himself with those
three subcommittees maybe we ought to get more staff.
I don't have a shadow of a doubt that Wayne Morse has got
to have at least one man and maybe more to handle this Latin
American problem because Pat Holt can't do it.

GIVE FOREIGN AID BILL TO A SUBCOMMITTEE

The Chairman. Let me make one observation. You know the
Foreign Aid bill is long with this committee. What percentage
of those hearings were on foreign aid, you mentioned a great
number. About 30 or 40 percent. And it has disrupted this
committee for years. You know how much time it takes.
Senator Dodd. Couldn't you give that to a subcommittee?
The Chairman. Well, it has always been considered so
controversial and so difficult that the full committee handles
it. I would be perfectly willing to try a subcommittee.
Does everybody think that could be done with a
subcommittee?
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say,
first, my remark to Bourke was pretty fresh and I didn't mean
it that way and I regret saying it that way. I think he knows
how I feel.
I want to apologize for that crack. It really wasn't a
crack.
Senator Hickenlooper. Then there is no need to apologize
for it.
Senator Symington. Well, bless your heart.
The thing that worries me is, I am not a lawyer and nearly
everybody else here is, but I used to have a lot of experience
in management. For a good many years of my life, I went into
sick businesses and tried to work them out and they are still
going, if I may make that immodest remark.

ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH

There comes a time when anything you do grows to a point
where you have to make major basic changes in organization, and
I say organizational structure along with it, functional
structure. You have to have an organization, reorganization of
your chart, and then you have to have a functional
reorganization. I know that they put a book out, the
Metropolitan Club had its 100th Anniversary and it said all the
members of the State Department were founders of it, and I
think 37 was the total members of the State Department in
Washington.
When my wife's grandfather was Secretary of State, John
Hay, at the turn of the century, there were just over a hundred
people in the State Department at that time.
The Chairman. The whole department?
Senator Symington. The whole department.
Senator Hickenlooper. They did pretty well.
Senator Aiken. That is good.
Senator Symington. We had the two greatest allies the world
has known, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, too.
But to me it just seems as we watch the growth by hundreds
and hundreds of thousands, I think millions would be fair, of
the administrative branch and nobody has more respect for this
staff than I do and I always get a good rapid answer from Carl
Marcy or anybody else on the staff. It isn't that at all to me.
It is just a case of getting organized to handle the workload
which is infinitely more today, plus what Albert said about the
interests of the people.

THE COMMITTEE GOT PEOPLE INTERESTED IN FOREIGN POLICY

The one great thing that this committee did last year, it
got the people interested in the foreign policy of the United
States to an extent that they never even dreamed about, in my
opinion, that is when I get back to the hustings. It is going
to be much more, it is not going to be less, because now the
people are really interested in it and there is a lot of doubt
about this tremendous ground war in Asia, and a lot of
nervousness about this situation in the Middle East, and a lot
of work which has been done incidental to our occupation in
Europe and so on.
I know it is hard to get staff people, but I would say it
is a lot easier to get staff people into this problem today
than three or four years ago because there is a lot of interest
in it and good people follow where the interest goes. And I
hope this could be considered not as a criticism of the staff
and not as a criticism of the committee and, above all, not
criticism of you because you are the one more than anyone else
in the United States who has gotten the American people
interested in foreign policy.

A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM

I would hope it would be recognized on a management basis.
There is nobody I respect more than Bourke. He is your ranking
member, people like George Aiken next to him, nearly all over
there feel the way you do about most of these problems, the
senior members of the committee. We just have a management
problem on our hands and it was the kind of thing I was deep
in, it was my life's work 20 years ago, and I think we have got
to face up to the management problem.
The staff situation, a lot of things that could be done,
you could approve, have people, final approval, you could have
the top of your own staff consulted with your own final
decision on members of the subcommittee staff. Just thinking
off the top of my head it might be an excellent idea not to put
the subcommittees on television. God knows I wouldn't like to
try to get some real facts and dig in on the Arab-Israeli
problem on television and so forth and so on.
The Chairman. That would be explosive.
Senator Symington. There are a lot of ways that you could
bind this thing and the way the thing ran. This isn't the
committee with the least staff by any means, with all due
respect to my friend from Oregon.
The Agriculture Committee is a committee that has got for
my money much the least staff as against the money involved and
so forth and so on.
The Chairman. Finance has had no staff until this year.
Senator Symington. My experience on the Agriculture
Committee, I mean on the steering committee, and I know, Joe,
they spend their time up there, instead of fighting to get on
the committee, they spend their time fighting not to get on the
Agriculture Committee.
The Chairman. George wanted to say something. He has been
waiting here.
Senator Symington. I am all through now. But I think it is
a management problem here we are discussing today at least as
much as anything else.
The Chairman. George?

AD HOC VERSUS AD INFINITUM

Senator Aiken. I have been listening very attentively to
the discussion relative to ad hoc committees and the staffing
of ad hoc committees, and I am sure if they were well staffed
they would have some very interesting staff meetings.
But I also have a great regard for the intelligence and
education of my chairman and I wanted to ask him what is the
distance between ad hoc and ad infinitum.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, getting back to the overall
thing----
The Chairman. I don't know.
Senator Gore. I guess you assigned me more ad hoc duties
last year than anyone.
The Chairman. I think more individual bills you handled
than any of them.
Senator Gore. Well, some of them we reported and the
committee acted upon in the Senate and some of them we reported
on unfavorably, and I think events have sustained us. I am
willing to do whatever you want me to do in that regard.

PROVOKING PUBLIC DISCUSSION

But, again, I repeat, the overall function of this
committee, as Stu Symington said, touched the American people.
It stimulated an awareness and a study. It provoked study and
discussion groups all over the United States.
I would like to see us conduct another hearing of a level
that would challenge the intelligent and public spirited people
of the country.
For instance, what are the valid indices of the great
decisions today of a preeminent world power. Are we stuck with
shibboleths, are there abstractions that have emotional and
political appeal on which we should not base decisions? Where
are we? What is our position in the world, and why?
It seems to me if you could get some of the eminent
scholars of the country once again, not to examine whether we
should or should not be in Vietnam, that is past, but to
examine the position of this country in the world of today's
technology, that we could once again play an important role in
public education and once again assert the constitutional
importance of the Senate.

STATE DEPARTMENT OPPOSITION TO AN EFFECTIVE COMMITTEE

Senator Morse. I want to say the Senator from Oregon is not
going to take the rap that he gets from certain quarters
because the subcommittee on Latin America is not conducting the
hearings it ought to be conducting. They should be conducted
and conducted under your jurisdiction. I am not asking the
subcommittee appoint staff but asking that you and the full
committee appoint them. I am pointing out that nothing I have
heard this morning justifies keeping the staff at its small
number. We can get people. Sure it is hard to get them. Sure we
can enlarge the staff by getting qualified people and we should
do it.
I want to say no member of this staff in my judgment can
serve as a substitute for the responsibilities of the
committee. Pat Holt makes very fine reports, but those reports
ought to be conducted under the direction of the subcommittee
and they ought to be subject to review by the subcommittee, and
we ought to be able to call people in and determine whether or
not they stand up.
I think they will stand up. But the State Department would
love to have some of these subcommittees continue to be
ineffective.
The last thing Rusk and Rostow and Gordon want is a vital
working effective subcommittee on Latin America, but you had
better keep your eyes on Latin America, may I say to this
committee, because you have got great problems and trouble
stirring themselves up in Latin America, and the subcommittee
should do the job on the subject and not Pat Holt, in effect
operating somewhat independent of the subcommittee. All I am
asking for is that you enlarge your staff, that you can take
complete jurisdiction over the subjects that will be taken up
by your subcommittee and that we get on with the job of doing
what--let's face it, this full committee is never going to do
in regard to the Latin American problem because you haven't got
time to do it, but the subcommittee can.
You would know when we would have our meeting, we wouldn't
be interfering with your jurisdiction. I would have them at
night, if necessary, but we would do the work.
But I only want to say as chairman of this subcommittee
that the full committee is letting down the subcommittee, in my
judgment, speaking as its chairman. I don't care how many
members on the subcommittee want to let the present
arrangements continue. It is not a good arrangement, and you
are not going to do the job on Latin America and you either get
a new subcommittee, if you want to get a new chairman, go ahead
and get him, but I want to say I am going to continue to
express why this subcommittee is not doing its job. It is not
doing the job because it isn't properly staffed.

AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GREAT POWER

The Chairman. Well, I certainly am glad to have this
discussion, and I will talk with the staff and see if we can
come up with some concrete suggestion and maybe look into the
matter of getting some more.
I don't want to go too far, but I certainly think we ought
to move in this direction and we will do it better.
I want to make a comment here, Senator Gore brought up a
question which was the last item on my agenda and the time is
almost running out.
The staff and I have been discussing this during this
interim and I think you are quite right. We had a general
subject that we are talking about called American
responsibilities as a great power, a general subject to survey
in some open hearings--of course we expect to start out in the
usual way with whatever the administration wishes to say on
this with Secretary Rusk and McNamara and others, that is the
foreign policy prospects for '67. In that anything may be
discussed, and this subject, general subject would be involved.
I wanted to raise this question with you, a subject, for
example, of this which we kicked around here at some length,
the nature of our commitments, this nature of our being
committed all the time.
A number of these treaties, the President last night
referred to them, and he is going to live up to all of them. We
made a great many treaties during the 50's, a review of this as
a part of this overall review of our relations as the greatest
power in the world today and what that means.
Another one was this man Edwin Reischauer is back. I have
been thinking about, I would certainly personally like very
much to have him. He ought to be as well qualified as anybody,
for example, to discuss our relations with the whole Pacific
area, not just Vietnam but he is especially qualified, it seems
to me, to testify about our relations with Japan, China, the
whole area of which Vietnam is simply one part.
Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.

AN EXAMINATION FOR OUR OWN EDUCATION

The Chairman. This is the way we have been thinking about
it and it is what I wanted to bring up.
What does the committee think about it?
I think it is on all fours with what the Senator from
Tennessee stated. I completely agree with that. This is an area
in which the full committee----
Senator Gore. But an examination----
The Chairman. That is correct. My own view is not at all we
are attacking anybody. This is an examination for our own
education, our own benefit as well as the public as to what
kind of a role should the United States play under these
present circumstances, and this is a complicated matter. It
sounds vague but it is very real.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, could I make one brief
comment?
The Chairman. Does this appeal to you?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Senator Clark. It appeals to me very much.
I would like to make one brief comment to my very good
friend Carl Marcy for whom I have the most profound admiration
as a magnificent chief of this committee, but I hope when he
starts to look around for a new staff man, Carl, we won't have
as one of the criteria a timid little Ph.D. who is prepared to
wipe the dandruff off the shoulders of members of this
committee. I think that is what you mean.
The Chairman. I don't know what you mean. Maybe Mr. Marcy
does.
[Discussion off the record.]

A COMBINATION OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCES

Senator Symington. I think it would be a wonderful thing to
get Reischauer. I stayed twice with him in Tokyo.
The Chairman. He is an example. I hope we can get other
people.
You necessarily, when you get outside of the government,
are going to be confronted with the difficulty of getting
people who have a combination of actual experiences, as he has,
plus a sufficient historical, political, social background and
so on, and that he can relate it to us. This is difficult to
get those people.
Senator Clark. We have no finer fellow on the staff than
Jim Lowenstein, with whom I spent a month with in Europe who is
absolutely terrific. He came to this committee from a good spot
in the State Department because he thought he could be more
useful here.
The Chairman. We have a new one we haven't used much who
will turn out the same way, and he is Bader. He was in the
State Department and it was partly because of Jim Lowenstein
and everyone seemed to agree.
Senator Pell. I came in and became a Senator. [Laughter.]

TESTIMONY FROM LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS

Senator Morse. Bill, I don't know whether you can get--
whether protocol stops you or other restrictions do, but I wish
we could get in Edward E. Rice, who is our consul general in
Hong Kong, if our State Department will come and let him
testify in executive session.
The Chairman. It is a great problem.
I would like to have some of these lower level people. The
State Department seems to take the view the Secretary ought to
talk for them. They don't want their underlings to testify. I
hate to embarrass the underlings because they might fire them.
I would like to do it, personally. I agree with you.
Senator Morse. Carl Marcy can tell you if you get a
briefing that we got in Hong Kong from Rice, it is far
different from what the Secretary tells you when he comes in
here.
The Chairman. Well, I have the same feeling.
What can we do about it, as a practical matter?
Senator Symington. I can tell you what we can do about it.
We ran into exactly the same thing in the Armed Services
Committee, and I think I was the one who suggested first that
we put the witnesses under oath. Then we had the Preparedness
Subcommittee, under John Stennis, an able, fair, efficient
fellow, and these fellows come in and we tell him who we want
as witnesses. We don't let them tell us who we want as
witnesses, and we pull in two or three fliers in Vietnam and
they are under oath so they can go right back and say, ``You
don't want me to perjure myself, do you?'' And they come up
there and they give us more information in less time as against
all this stuff that we get from the Joint Chiefs, you see.
We really begin to cut the mustard as to what the facts
are.

DOVES AND HAWKS

One thing I don't know and that worries me a very great
deal, based on my relationship with this government, is whether
there is any accuracy in the fact that essentially McNamara is
a dove and essentially Rusk is a hawk and the degree of it. I
do know that when I talk to Walt Rostow who is now in a
protective position as part of the Executive Branch that he was
pretty darned hawkish, you see.
Well, I think it might be, I certainly would subscribe to
what Neil Sheehan wrote in the New York Times the other day
after this last trip of mine, not a dove but no longer a hawk.
When these fellows come down like the JCS they can't cross
a ``t'' or dot an ``i'' that isn't approved by higher
authority.
So it seems to me if we had a subcommittee operating on the
theory of getting the facts from less important people, and you
come in and run the committee any time you want to handle it
and call the people in here, I think to call in some of these
ambassadors from outside this country and if necessary put them
under oath.

TESTIMONY FROM JOURNALISTS

The Chairman. Let me ask you--I am glad to have this angle.
The other angle that bothers me--I would like to have
newspapermen. We went over this in the Dominican thing.
Does the committee feel that this is unfeasible?
Some of these people have more experience.
Senator Symington. I don't know, but I know one thing. You
have the right as chairman of this committee to ask anybody in
this government because we put the money up.
Senator Pell. I think you have the right to ask foreigners,
too.
The Chairman. We have never done it. These are the
precedents which this committee has had long before I came
here. It seems to me that we ought to have a little greater
freedom to ask anybody who appeals to us.
Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.
The Chairman. These have been traditions, and I thought it
ought to be the decision of the committee.
Do you think we ought to contemplate, I will certainly
submit any of these changes to the committee, but shall we
investigate it, for purposes of discussion?
Senator Morse. I think so because we are entitled to give
the American people the facts they are entitled to receive from
any source.

JEOPARDIZING SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS

Senator Hickenlooper. This is the old story with this
committee and other committees to try to get in subordinate
officials to try to get them to testify when their own necks
are out eight feet. If they offend their superiors, they will
get their heads chopped off and you just put them there and put
them under the guillotine.
Look at [Otto] Otepka, sitting there in the State
Department being there for two years because he told the truth
to the [Thomas] Dodd committee and they just, they have got him
sitting over there, nothing to do and they are trying to get
rid of him, but they don't have a case against him.
You have got----
Senator Symington. In 1948, I bucked the Secretary of
Defense as Secretary of the Air Force. In 1949, Mr. Truman had
a meeting in the cabinet room and he said, ``I want everybody
here to support this budget whether they like it or not and if
they don't want to support it I want them to say so now.''
A lot of people in the room, but he looked at me the whole
time he was saying it, and I said, ``I just want to ask you one
question and then I will make up my mind. Are you asking me to
go up on the Hill and perjure myself?''
And he looked at me for about 15 seconds and he said,
``Will you give me your word of honor you didn't instigate the
question?''
And I said, ``I will,'' and he said, ``Go up there and tell
them what you believe.''
If you get these fellows and put them under oath and put
them--it is pretty tough if anybody above them, and we will
know about it soon enough if they are castigated for perjuring
themselves before this committee in order to follow a party
line.
Senator Hickenlooper. Stu, nobody knows better than you do
it doesn't happen the next week after they do it. It happens
two years later when they find themselves going down the hall
and pretty soon the door opens and they fall off and you can't
go back and prove it.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. That has been a helpful session.
[Discussion off the record.]

PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES

The Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Marcy to try to contact
these people along these lines, if you have any suggestion
about it. Some of them I mentioned, if this meets with your
approval, the Communist world in '67, some hearing on this
subject. I would like to have men like George Kennan and
Schulman who are the recognized authorities on that subject.
Does that suit you?
Senator Gore. Yes.
The Chairman. And Asia, the Pacific.
Senator Gore. We not only need to examine ourselves in this
world, but we need to examine our adversaries in this world.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Gore. In order to determine our place.
The Chairman. And our relations to them, what they are like
and our relations.
Senator Gore. What are our dangers, prospects and
limitations.
The Chairman. For example, this subject has been suggested,
Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, that type of thing
may have a man like Reischauer, he is the best type of man I
can think of to best describe what is presently the situation
in Japan, the Far East. He is a long time scholar of China. If
anybody could interpret that situation, it seems to me he would
be as good as anybody.
But that is the type of hearing.
This is strictly educational, not intended to attack
anybody at all, simply the information of what it is like out
there, what these people think and what our relations to them
ought to be.
Does that make sense to you?
Senator Gore. Yes.

CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

The Chairman. And on down, the changing American attitudes
towards foreign policy. I mean what is going to here, our
attitude, what we are afflicted with, what limitations and so
on, and the nature of U.S. commitments.
We talked about this last year. It seems to me we ought to
clarify this matter.
I get so fed up with being told we are committed to
something all the time, which I don't think is so. What makes
the commitment is having the President say we are committed,
and I don't think that is what I mean by commitment. I think
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.
Senator Gore. SEATO committed us to confer.
The Chairman. I think they absolutely misrepresent what
SEATO is. He repeated it again. Of course that is what Rusk has
been saying over the past couple of years. He didn't say it in
the beginning, but he is saying it now.
When you read what Dulles said SEATO meant it isn't what
they now say it means.
Senator Gore. It isn't what Rusk said at the beginning.
The Chairman. Well, if I understand it, that is the way we
will proceed. Who can we get on some of these? I would like to
have James Gavin again on that----
Senator Pell. Matthew Ridgway maybe.
The Chairman. And Ridgway. Who we can get.
Senator Pell. I think Ridgway is more coherent in his
arguments.

SCHOLARS AND GENERALS

The Chairman. Gavin we had, and I thought he did a very
good job. It is perfectly all right to have them both. The
reason I do is we naturally have to have so many scholars
because they are available and I would like to use whatever
generals we can to offset the attitude we are stacking these
hearings and not having generals.
Whatever generals that are called at all reasonably I would
like to have them not because I have such respect personally,
they are wiser than others, but to offset the emotional
prejudice in some quarters against the scholars.
Does that make sense to you?
Senator Pell. Perfectly.
The Chairman. The same with this fellow Griffith. He is a
scholar. He was as good as you can find among the generals, and
lived in China and he has a reasonable attitude. It offsets the
criticism they offered toward people like Fairbank and Bartlett
and others.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ John K. Fairbank, Professor of Asian History at Harvard, and
Ruhl J. Bartlett, Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Marcy. Do you want to mention----
The Chairman. Did either one of you see Alf Landon's speech
that he made in Kansas three months ago?
Well, it is a remarkable speech. I couldn't believe it, and
I am all for having him. I never dreamed of having a fellow
like that but he made a speech I think you would thoroughly
approve of, and I think it would be very good politically to
have him sandwiched in among these scholars. The speech is
available if either one of you have time to read it. I am sure
you would approve it, and coming from that quarter it
absolutely knocked me out of my chair.
It is amazing, he is quite a fellow, at least from this
speech.

INVITE SUGGESTIONS FOR WITNESSES

Senator Gore. Why don't you invite all members of the
committee to suggest possible witnesses. We would not be
obligated to invite all, but out of the suggestions might come
a very helpful suggestion?
The Chairman. I have no objection other than the personal
relations. They have a feeling if they submit some, we have 19
members and if you don't take them they will be offended.
Senator Pell. I think you are right.
The Chairman. If they put in a friend or a fellow----
Senator Gore. I withdraw it.
In other words, I am asked to submit a man and then you
didn't invite him. I withdraw the suggestion.
The Chairman. You can get into awful serious trouble.
Last year the way we did it was this way, Albert, after
thinking about it. The way that was done--I didn't know a lot
of the people--I asked Carl and the fellow Robertson who is the
China expert in the Library, Far East, and Barnett of Columbia
who is a recognized authority. I didn't have anything really to
do with it. I didn't know most of those people. They got
together, surveyed the situation and tried to fit the man to
the subject and that is the way they were selected until the
very end when Bourke said to me, ``I think we ought to have
somebody on our side,'' and I said, ``These aren't on my side,
they are supposed to be the best there are.''
Well, anyway, that is the way we got the other three. It
didn't work too bad in this sense, Albert, because after we got
through these, then Bourke, we satisfied--he submitted those
three names and he was satisfied.
If we started out, I imagine we would have had 15 names,
Mundt's and various ones, all of them had submitted them and we
hadn't got them, I am afraid they would be mad.
But those three satisfied him.
What we want is not quantity but quality if we can get it,
the very best that we can get. I don't want to get just one
point of view. I would like to get people who have had
experiences who can give both points of view or whatever points
of view there are.

A NEW POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

Senator Gore. Well, just as last year, as more or less of a
tangential effect of our Vietnam hearing, the hearing created a
new political atmosphere in which the administration had some
maneuverability with respect to China, it seems to me if we
could get the proper erudition on the subject many of the World
War II dogmas could be examined and I have an idea many of them
are not very valid any more.
The Chairman. I agree with you, I am sure.
Senator Gore. And yet we need the study ourselves, but
perhaps even more importantly for the American people.
The Chairman. That is right. That is what I meant. We ought
to be the forum for, the sounding board for these scholars and
thoughtful people who have no other way of reaching the
American people. I mean these people we had, Fairbank, nobody
ever heard of him. He could write a book or article or write a
speech and he wouldn't get beyond the 200 people who read him
but with this forum, in a way he reached millions of people,
and that is what I think we can do. It is a question of getting
people who really know this subject. I thought we did pretty
well: we had darned good people.

BUSINESSMEN AS WITNESSES

Senator Pell. In this connection, most of the witnesses we
had were scholars. I was able to get a passport validated for
an American businessman from Textron, a friend of mine, a
businessman. If he succeeds in getting in, somebody who can
speak firsthand as a man with considerable intellectual
curiosity, a lawyer, and he believes in opening up contacts
there, that would have even more of an impact.
The Chairman. You remember this man Blackie who was head of
Caterpillar? We had him on East-West Trade. He was smart and he
made a good witness. That is a top businessman in this country.
Senator Pell. Even better than a general.
The Chairman. He is one of the most successful businessmen
in the country with worldwide business and he made a good
witness on East-West trade. That is a thing which I think could
well be involved.

EDUCATING THE ADMINISTRATION

Senator Gore. Not only do we educate the American people
and ourselves but again referring, adverting to the China
hearings, I think the Administration got a little light on it
as much as we did.
The Chairman. The Administration needs it as much as we do.
Senator Gore. I believe they welcomed the effect and
reacted to it.
The Chairman. They do on China. They got miffed on Vietnam
because they thought it challenged their policy.
Senator Gore. I mean China.
The Chairman. I think that is correct.

TRIP TO CAMBODIA

Senator Pell. Speaking on firsthand knowledge, too, is
there any more on the trip to Cambodia? I talked to Carl about
it. I don't think there was. As I understand it, we are waiting
now a little bit on our dignity. Shouldn't we reactivate it?
Mr. Marcy. The latest on that was that the Cambodians
advised that we not press it, not respond affirmatively to
their invitation to come until Prince Sihanouk was back from
some medical treatment in Paris.
The Chairman. That is right.
He went to France.
Mr. Marcy. He is still in Paris. They expect him back some
time in February.
Senator Pell. Late January.
Mr. Marcy. I am sure we really can't get a reply from them
until he really does get back, but in late January or early
February it would be appropriate either for us or for them, I
think, to open the question again. We can do it simply by
telephoning New York.
Senator Pell. The reason I wanted to raise it is just
simply to get three senators to make plans to go two or three
weeks. The best time would be in January during a slack period,
and I didn't know.
The Chairman. Can I try out another idea?
Senator Pell. Couldn't we agree on this before leaving
this? Would it seem agreeable about making a phone call before
the end of the month?
The Chairman. Yes, inquire as to when.
Mr. Marcy. I think we ought to wait until the Prince is
back, because what they will do is to fire off an inquiry to
Cambodia.
Senator Pell. Let's find out from the State Department so
we will know when he is back.
The Chairman. State Department when he is back, and then
put the inquiry. Sure, that is right.

HAVE A HISTORIAN TESTIFY

We had a subject here, changing American attitude toward
foreign policy. This is kind of a historical thing, what do you
think about a man like [Henry Steele] Commager or [Arthur]
Schlesinger?
Senator Gore. Change and the need for change.
The Chairman. In connection with it. If it is not changing
enough, how it ought to change. This is more or less a
historical review type of thing in which I think is the process
of self-analysis along the line you are thinking that in order
to change, in order to see we have to analyze what we have
thought as to how relative it is to present conditions and how
it originated, the kind of a forum of self-analysis.
Senator Gore. May I make a suggestion? Does this appeal to
you----
[Discussion off the record.]

JUSTIFICATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

The Chairman. Let me try another thing on you.
I say this if we have these hearings you can't keep from
appealing our involvements, and I think the issue for the
justification about our involvement is still the crucial one.
What bothers me and a lot of the people who don't like this is
I don't feel there is valid justification for our ever having
become involved and, therefore, the way they pursue it and so
on just doesn't go down with me. I think we are in a false
position, and the quicker we liquidate it in a reasonably
dignified manner the better. I don't think it is a matter
purely of manners, you might say, and dignity of a great
country. You just drop it and get out. You have to have an
acceptable form of negotiation to get yourself out, to
extricate yourself. As far as the hearings, Albert, I don't
want to announce them and don't want to say this is just
another Vietnam hearing. I want that to be developed as a part
of an overall examination of our relations and our
responsibilities as the most powerful country in the world to
the rest of humanity, is more or less the way I want it to come
up.
Does that make sense?
Senator Gore. Yes, you can't ignore it. It is a part.
The Chairman. It is a part but I don't wish to have it said
we are just again attacking this problem because the
administration will get its back up and the people will say I
am trying to pursue an old vendetta.

A LITTLE SELF-CRITICISM

Senator Pell. Couldn't we do it with a little bit of
modesty and criticism and self-criticism by suggesting we are
doing now what we should have done five years ago as far as
Thailand goes by doing that saying we should have done this in
Vietnam in '61 and didn't but we are going to do it, by God
now?
The Chairman. I have tried to be as contrite as I can in
the Tonkin Gulf and others. I didn't realize what we are
getting into, and I am quite willing to say I was shortsighted.
I had no idea that we were going to go this way.
Senator Pell. This would be a good opening.
The Chairman. That is honest with me. I had no idea. I
thought when I was on this and with this President, I thought
he was just as determined as I was to keep out of a major war
out there. That is what I believed in 1964.
Senator Gore. I assume that what the President said last
night--since we decided to send troops to Vietnam he was using
an editorial ``we.''
The Chairman. I think so. [Laughter.]
Does that meet with your general idea of how we should
proceed on this, on the people? I have got some others here.
Hutchins is very outspoken on this. These are people. Bob
Hutchins. This Eric Fromm has written a lot on this. Some
people think he is a Communist, I don't think he is, but I
don't know whether it would be safe to have him or not. He
lives in Mexico.
Senator Pell. Hutchins.
The Chairman. We will try to see what we can do.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed, subject
to call of the chair.]

THE WORLD SITUATION

----------

January 16, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Senator McGee, Assistant Secretary Douglas
MacArthur III, Deputy Assistant Secretary H.G. Torbert, Jr.,
Mr. Ernest Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State, Major A.B. Outlaw, Department of Defense.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman,
Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.
Mr. Chairman. Well, we will come to order.
We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of
State, but before we proceed, I want to welcome the new member,
Senator Cooper, from Kentucky.
We are very pleased, indeed, to have you on the committee,
and we are sure you will make a great contribution to the
deliberation of the committee.
Senator Carlson. We are delighted.
The Chairman. After seeing the new Republicans yesterday, I
am bound to congratulate them on the quality of their new crop.
Senator Aiken. We accept the congratulations.
Senator Cooper. I am glad to be on the committee.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you
and assume you would like to give us a kind of a rundown of the
general situation before we have questions, if that is
agreeable.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I
would like to start by paying my personal compliments to
Senator Cooper. Not only has he had a very distinguished
service as a Senator, but he was one of our great ambassadors
in an earlier day, and I am proud to be associated with him on
this committee.
If it is agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I might comment fairly
briefly on certain important developments that have occurred
since the Congress adjourned and then go as promptly as
possible into comments and discussions and questions.

TURMOIL IN CHINA

First, I think perhaps the most important single thing that
is happening in the world today is happening in mainland China.
We believe that it is very important even though we do not know
exactly what is happening there. It is the kind of ignorance
which does not embarrass us too much because it seems fairly
obvious that the leadership in China is not exactly clear on
what is happening.
But the combination of a struggle among individuals with
regard to the succession to Mao and some ideological debates
within the top leadership that occurred last summer that we are
gradually becoming aware of, and perhaps some revival of
regional difference and regional influences in China have
created a situation of considerable turmoil.
I would caution members of the committee about drawing too
many conclusions too rapidly about the news, that is, the
normal press dispatches, particularly those that are based upon
posters in Peking, but we do know that there seems to be a
considerable struggle between the apparatus of the Communist
Party in China, or considerable elements of the apparatus of
the party, and the so called Red Guards under the leadership of
Mao Tse-tung, with the army playing a somewhat equivocal role,
perhaps in between.

SHIFTS IN CHINESE LEADERSHIP

Just to indicate the confusion that exists there reflected
in our own lack of understanding of exactly what is happening,
Lin Piao has not been heard from for about two months, since
November, even though Mao had nominated him to be his successor
and had highlighted his role up to this point. He has dropped
out of the picture temporarily. I can be incorrect by the end
of the day because he may reappear.
There was a report this morning that Liu Shao-chi, who was
demoted in the party, the chief of state, so-called, is out in
western China. If this is so, this could be of some importance
because we have had some indication that the regional armies
are playing something of an independent role here. We are
keeping this point in mind because Lin Piao has his army around
Peking and presumably he would have had a considerable
advantage in the Peking area. But Chen Yi, who was under attack
by the Red Guards, has long connections with an army which is
in the southwest of China, and the supposition is that he has
at least some independence of position because he has the
support of his own former army in another part of the country.
We do know that Chou En-lai seems to be trying to play a
mediating role among the different elements, and he is a fairly
key figure to keep your eyes on in this situation. If he is
able to bring Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi and some of these
different elements in some standdown on hostilities, then it
may be that the regime could be reconstituted, perhaps somewhat
weakened, on the basis that it existed say two weeks ago. But
the leadership, undoubtedly they are eyeing each other among
themselves.
We do know that there have been considerable acts of
violence in different parts of the country, that railways have
been interrupted, that factories have been shut down because of
strikes, that very large numbers of workers seem now to be
moving into Peking itself with divided loyalties, and almost
anything can happen.

POSTPONEMENT OF WARSAW TALKS

The most immediate impact upon us is that they have asked
us to postpone our next talk in Warsaw for two weeks for what
they call administrative reasons. It may be that the ambassador
there is going back to Peking or has gone back for a visit. It
may be there is some difficulty about what line he is to take
in issuing his instructions.
It is interesting to note that Peking's diplomats in about
25 countries have been going home in considerable numbers in
the last two weeks, indicating that they expected to be back in
their post in about 60 days. We, of course, are watching this
very carefully to see whether it might in any way be connected
with some foreign adventure somewhere. But the pattern does not
seem to indicate that, and it looks more like something
connected with the cultural revolution, perhaps indoctrination
of the diplomatic corps or purge of the diplomatic corps. We
just cannot yet say. But we would expect to have our next talk
with Peking in Warsaw in February. If that is postponed again,
I think that perhaps will be a reflection of the disturbances
going on in China.
Senator Aiken. When was the last talk?
Secretary Rusk. The last talk was, I think, in September.

NO ROLE FOR NATIONALIST FORCES

There is one point that has come into public attention I
would just mention in order to discount completely. That is,
any suggestion that the Nationalist forces on Taiwan have any
role to play here, or intend to play any role here, or have any
capability of moving onto the mainland to interfere in this
situation. This talk out of Taiwan is talk, and they have now
said publicly in the last few days that they acknowledge the
requirement of an agreement with us before they make any move
under the security and arrangements we had with them in the
middle of the fifties. They know we are not going to give them
that commitment, and I think that that situation is more talk
than anything else.
We have not yet seen any direct connection between the
events in China and in moves outward from China. There is
always the possibility that people who are in that kind of
trouble at home might try to unify themselves or try to divert
attention from their own problems through some international
adventure, but we do not see the displacement of military
forces or other indications suggesting that they plan to
intervene in South Vietnam.

RISK OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR

I noticed over the weekend a report from a French editor
that there was some sort of an agreement between Peking and the
United States on the basis of which they would stay out of
Vietnam, that is, if we would not attack China, that we would
not ourselves invade North Vietnam and we would not bomb the
dikes. I do not know of any such agreement. There has never
been any exchange on that between ourselves and Peking.
We have assumed that, of course, if we attack China we
would be at war with China. We have assumed if we were to move
land forces north of the 17th Parallel that that would raise
very substantially the risks of a Chinese intervention, but for
reasons of our own, including humanitarian reasons, we have not
had the intention of bombing those dikes in the Red River
Valley. They could cause very, very heavy flooding and ruin a
great many civilians up there.
But we have had the impression from time to time through
third parties that Peking's basic attitude was if we leave them
alone, they will leave us alone, and that certainly is all
right with us, but we do not know to what extent we can rely on
that.
All I am saying on the merits is there is something in
those three points mentioned by the French editor, but we are
not aware of any agreement or any communication from Peking to
that effect.
The closest thing to it was a comment passed along by a
third-country diplomat shortly after a press conference in
which I had said that the idea of a sanctuary is dead. I was
referring there to North Vietnam, but Peking said--told a
third-country diplomat, in essence, that if the United States
leaves Peking alone, they would leave us alone, but that was
about a year and a half ago, and coincides somewhat in time
with the events allegedly spoken about by the French editor.

EFFECT OF CHINESE EVENTS ON HANOI

Now, on Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, we do not see that the
events in mainland China have significantly affected the
Vietnam situation with possibly two exceptions. One is that
there seems to be some reaction in Hanoi against the events in
China. The speculation is to the point as to whether events in
China are giving Hanoi any larger freedom of action in this
situation, whether that might open up possibilities for
contacts that did not exist before.
Secondly, we do have contacts and----
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I cannot report----

HANOI'S READINESS TO TALK

Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask the Secretary, has it not
been characteristic of wars in the past when one side is losing
and feels it is on the verge of collapse, then it wants to talk
and is willing to talk? Is there anything significant in the
fact that the rumblings out of Hanoi seem to be a little more
conversational than they were in the past?
Secretary Rusk. I would not want to leave the impression,
Senator, that the contacts that have existed lately really are
pointed toward a readiness or desire to talk. There are a good
many things that have been put to the other side from our
direction that have had no response. That might change at
almost any time.
There are those who think they may be somewhat more willing
to talk, but we have not been able to dig that out in any fully
satisfactory way, and, in general, the answer to your question
is yes.

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES REFUSED TO TALK

The Chairman. How about our situation, we were told two
years ago that you--we refused to talk because we were losing.
It was just the opposite.
Secretary Rusk. That is not correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Which is not correct, that we were told it or
it was not true?
Secretary Rusk. I mean what you were told was not correct.
The full story of that is not on the record, and one of the key
witnesses there is now dead, Adlai Stevenson. There were
contacts before, during, and after that particular episode with
the other side. We were misled as to the channels that were
being used during that period.
I was told, for example, that the Soviet Foreign Office
knew nothing about this, that this was not known to the Soviet
ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko and so forth. Then a year or so
later I was told this had been actively discussed with Mr.
Andrei Gromyko during a period when I was regularly in touch
with him and the matter did not come up, and I was told under
no circumstances should we raise it. Further, we did tell the
Secretary General if he had a channel to go back and explore it
and try to develop it further and see more about the situation
with whom one talks and what about. Insofar as I know, he never
did that.
Adlai Stevenson, the week before he died, on the BBC in
London said that he was never very clear about with whom the
talks were supposed to be held and on what subject.
Now the problem about surfacing that whole business is that
it would get in the way of contacts through the Soviet Union.
Hanoi has flatly and categorically denied it. The possibilities
of channels of the sort that were discussed at that time have
been further explored without results, and we prefer to deal
with this kind of a question with regard to the future rather
than trying to just rehash the past.
But the story, as I knew it, is not the one that is
generally talked about in regard to that episode.

CESSATION OF THE BOMBING

The principal point that is being raised now in contacts is
the question of a--is an unconditional and permanent cessation
of the bombing. I point out those two words because this is
rather different from what was said last autumn. Last autumn
the suggestion was made in a number of quarters, including
Communist quarters, that a suspension of the bombing for a
period of time might make it possible to develop the basis of
discussion of some more toward negotiations, and we suspended
the bombing for twice as long as had been suggested to us by
key elements on the other side, and without result.
Now, the price has gone up very considerably. They are
saying unconditional and permanent or they say unconditional
and definitive or, in that Harrison Salisbury view,
unconditional and for good. That is a rather different problem
than a temporary suspension.
The other side has told us that the temporary suspension is
nothing but an ultimatum; that this matter has to be taken up
on the basis of a complete and permanent stoppage.
At the same time we are not able to get anything from the
other side at all about what they would do if the bombing
stopped, and we have been probing on that point, continue to
probe it, are doing so now, as to what the effect would be.

U THANT'S THREE POINTS

Secretary General U Thant has his three points. The first
that we stop the bombing. The second, there be a mutual de-
escalation, and the third, there be negotiations with the Viet
Cong.
We have said so far as the first point is concerned, okay,
what about the second point? On that there has been nothing,
Hanoi has rejected U Thant's second point, mutual de-escalation
of the violence, and has said with regard to U Thant's third
point that the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, is the
sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.
Those who call upon us to accept U Thant's three points
usually do not take into account the fact that Hanoi has
already categorically rejected points two and three. We
continue to try to find some sort of an indication or
suggestion, informal or otherwise, private or public, as to
what the result will be if we stop the bombing and no one yet
has been able or willing to tell us what that could be.

FIVE YEARS SUSPENSION

The fact that they are calling for a permanent stoppage of
the bombing makes it a very serious problem, because we have
had now, experiences with three periods in which there was no
bombing, five years, five weeks, five days, and we know that
the infiltration simply continued.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary--Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Mansfield. What do you mean five years suspension?
Secretary Rusk. Well, there was no bombing for five years
from 1960 when they announced publicly they were going to seize
South Vietnam. They moved the entire 325th Division of the
North Vietnamese Regular Army into South Vietnam before we
started the bombing. During that five-year period when there
was no bombing of North Vietnam, we went to the Laos
Conference, we made major concessions, as some persons saw it,
took the Soviet nominee to be prime minister of Laos and
accepted the coalition government worked out among the three
elements there. We got no exchange for that, no performance
whatever on the other side with respect to North Vietnamese
troops in Laos or the use of Laos as an infiltration route to
the south, or ability of the coalition government to function
in Laos or the ability of the ICC to function in Laos. During
all that period there were literally hundreds of contacts with
the--in South Vietnam and there we did not see any peace in
South Vietnam.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, I think you are going
back a long way and stretching it pretty thin when you use the
five years, five weeks, and five days analogy, because in 1960
how many troops did we have in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. We had----
Senator Mansfield. Very few.
Secretary Rusk. We had about 600 and a military aid mission
there.
Senator Mansfield. We had no air forces of any kind, and I
am not at all sure we were even instructing the South
Vietnamese air force. If my information is correct, and it is
from the Defense Department, the organized cadres did not come
down from the north until 1964. At that time they were
identifiable, and I think I can reinforce those figures and
that fact.
Secretary Rusk. You mean organized units of the North
Vietnamese Regular Army?
Senator Mansfield. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is different than cadres, I
think, Senator, because they were infiltrating cadres including
North Vietnamese long before 1964. Organized elements of the
North Vietnamese Army, I think I would agree with you.
Senator Mansfield. Cadres and organized units and, if my
memory is correct, the figure was 400 at the end of 1964, and
that figure was supplied to me by the Department of Defense.

U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

I note that you call Souvanna Phouma the Soviet nominee for
prime minister of Laos who we decided to accept after we had
rejected and kicked him out two years previously, which was a
serious mistake on our part, as a result of the Geneva Accord
on Laos.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Mansfield. Was Souvanna Phouma not our nominee,
too?
Secretary Rusk. He came to be when we accepted him, but
there was another prime minister that the Eisenhower
Administration had recognized in 1960.
Senator Mansfield. That is true, and during that time I
think we had a very large part to play in ousting Souvanna
Phouma, undermining his position, and helping to create the
situation which developed in Laos in those years, is that
correct? I think your ambassador had something to do with it at
the State Department.
Secretary Rusk. I think there is something in that, yes.
Senator Mansfield. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I will have
something else later.
The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

STEPS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary Rusk. Well, the key question in Vietnam at the
present time is the question of whether we can get steps taken
by both sides to move this matter towards a peaceful solution
either at the conference table or through negotiations or de
facto. And at the present time I cannot report to the committee
we have had any indication from the other side what any
reciprocal step might be, although there are many
opportunities, many ways, many channels by which that could be
taken up.

FRANCE AND NATO

As far as that is concerned, there is a pretty clear
understanding now between the 14 on the one side and France on
the other as to where the dividing line is and those NATO
matters in which France will participate and will not
participate. The 14 have constituted themselves into a defense
planning committee. France does not attempt to interfere in the
activities of the 14, or to veto or obstruct what the 14 feel
that they must do.
France, on the other hand, does take part in the political
discussions that go on in the council of the 15, and there
seems to be a pretty clear understanding now as to just where
one starts and the other leaves off.
At our last NATO meeting it was a good business-like
meeting, and I think we transacted our business more
efficiently than we have for some time, the 14 dealing with the
military and the 15 taking up the political matters.
I think the most interesting thing is the full exploration
which is being made by practically all of its members on
relations with the east.
We had before us at our last NATO meeting a report, I
think, that has been made available to the committee, a report
of contacts between members of NATO and Eastern European
countries of a period of about six months, and there were about
185 of those contacts in terms of exchanging visits or exchange
of visits or exchange of delegations and things of that sort.

GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

It is quite interesting to see that the new government in
the Federal Republic apparently has decided it is going to
explore the possibilities of improved relations with Eastern
Europe. There are delegations in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland to look at that situation. They apparently have come to
the conclusion that 20 years of harsh confrontation has not
moved them any nearer reunification or settlement of the German
question, and they are prepared now to explore the possibility
of improved relations to see whether that might not reduce the
fear of the Germans among some of the small Eastern European
countries, open up better contacts between West and East
Germans and perhaps bring about a political situation
atmosphere in which some movement can be made in the direction
of reunification.

SOVIET ROLE IN VIETNAM

Let me say as far as we are concerned, we were interested
that when Gromyko came to the United Nations Assembly last year
and visited Washington briefly, as well as from contacts we
have had with him since then, is that the Soviet Union has not
taken the view that because of Vietnam there is nothing to
discuss. They have been prepared to sit down and talk about
particular issues with us despite Vietnam.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. If you want to refer to this problem on the
public record, you can go back to the Bucharest communique of
the Warsaw Pact countries in July in which the Eastern European
countries called upon the U.S. to comply with the 1954 and 1962
agreements. Our answer to them was, ``all right, we agree to
that, let's get going.''
The difficulty is that Moscow does not feel that it is in a
position to take a public political initiative with Hanoi in
such things as calling a conference or authorizing the ICC to
take up some of the chores that we would hope it would take up,
because it seems to be immobilized by the problem with China
and also somewhat handicapped by its relative lack of influence
in Hanoi itself.
So we have felt that we ought to go ahead and try to
discuss other subjects with the Soviet Union, to see whether we
find other points of agreement.

CONSULAR AGREEMENT

As you know, we did conclude a civil area agreement, We
hope very much that the Senate will find it possible to approve
the consular agreement during the present session. In passing,
Mr. Chairman, let me repeat here, from our point of view at the
present time what is important about that treaty is not the
possibility that we might open up consulates. That we could do
today under existing legislation, one consulate in one place
and one consulate in another. Ninety-five percent of our
interest in this treaty is in those provisions providing
consular access and protection for American citizens traveling
and living in the Soviet Union. I told the committee when we
were discussing that earlier that as far as consulates are
concerned, we would be prepared to consult further with the
committee before moving to establish the consulates, but we do
have need for consular access to American citizens. They are
traveling in the Soviet Union in larger and larger numbers.
Many of our tourists, despite certain education we try to give
them before they go, do some of the things in the Soviet Union
that tourists do in many countries such as manipulating
currency and picking up souvenirs and things of that sort, and
it makes it very difficult for us to give them reasonable
protection without the formal agreements of a consular
convention.
Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, Mr. Secretary, if you
would care to comment----
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir?

GIVING RUSSIA MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS

Senator Hickenlooper. With me, the one hurt under the
saddle of this consular treaty is why do we have to give the
Russians under the Most Favored Nations clause extend to all
other countries, 20 or whatever it is, immunity from
prosecution for crime by the employee nationals of a country. I
could go as far as the consular official, something of that
kind, although we do not do it to any other country. We will
have to extend it under the Most Favored Nations clause, as I
understand it. Why do we have to do it with the Russians?
Secretary Rusk. I think the point on which a judgment will
have to be made, Senator, is whether our interest in the
reciprocal privilege is not stronger than their interest on
this point. You see, our problem with our own employees in the
Soviet Union is a far more severe one than problems we would
have here, but this is one of those questions on which----
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the thing that is unclear to
me.
I cannot rationalize that in my own mind nor can I quite
understand the reason for it. Go ahead.
Secretary Rusk. That is right. Let me get some material
down on that in the terms of numbers and in terms of our
interest on----
Senator Hickenlooper. I think we have numbers on it. I
think I have numbers in my files on the thing and that is what
mystifies me. The more information I get, the more I am
confused, so I do not know, maybe I had better just stay as I
am.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I do think he ought to provide
the rest of us, however, with the memorandum, because I do not
have the figures.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. We had some figures, but maybe we ought to be
brought up to date. We had some.
Senator Morse. In the committee file?
The Chairman. Yes, about the number of Americans going
there and Russians here, showing in my view we had much more to
gain than they did by giving this protection.
Senator Hickenlooper. Also the number of immunities we
grant. It is my understanding that there would be 400 and some.
I do not mean to get into an extended discussion of it, but
there would be 400 and some other employees.
The Chairman. That could be mutually controlled.
Senator Hickenlooper. By other countries which we would
have to extend to consulate officials and employees who are
nationals of the sending country.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, the point--I realize you do
not want to go into that in great detail, but on the matter of
Most Favored Nations treatment for other countries, that would
only occur where they would be prepared to give us reciprocal
arrangements. We know some of these other countries are not
interested in giving us that privilege. Therefore, this would
not come into operation. So, we will have to try to find out
informally if we can----
Senator Hickenlooper. Perhaps some of them would not ask
for it.

GERMAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

The Chairman. Were you going to say something more about
the Germans?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
The Chairman. I thought you were going into this recent
meeting of Kurt Kiesinger and Charles de Gaulle. What is your
interpretation?
Secretary Rusk. Our interpretation of that is that the new
German government wants to find out whether it can get a more
relaxed relationship with President de Gaulle. They felt that
they were caught up--the Germans felt they were caught up in
some sort of special bilateral issue between Paris and
Washington. There probably were some feelings on President de
Gaulle's part about the role of the United States in Europe as
well as in other world affairs, but basically the issue was
between President de Gaulle and the other 14.
It is our impression that the new German government will
try to move on those points where it can move with France, but
within the limits of a basic commitment to NATO, and without
creating a big gap between Bonn and the United States and some
of the largest issues.
We ourselves have told the Germans and the French that the
United States has a basic interest in good relations between
Germany and France. After all, two world wars came about
because these two countries started fighting each other.
We do believe that it is important that Germany improve her
relations without going down the same route as President de
Gaulle in certain subjects, particularly, for example, NATO,
but we will have to see.
I think the atmosphere at this last meeting was good, but I
do not have the impression that the Germans changed underlying
basic policy toward NATO.
What was important, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that de
Gaulle, as well as we, have encouraged the new German
government to explore the possibilities of improved relations
with the East on the ground that we have tried over a period of
20 years another approach, the Adenauer approach in effect. Now
another approach might be more promising for the longer range
future, depending a good deal, of course, on what the reaction
of Eastern Europe would be.
I would like to come back to that from two or three
different points of view, if I may, and I am going to try not
to take too much of your time, but I think the committee would
be interested in the present state of play of the
nonproliferation treaty.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

The parliamentary situation is that there is no agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union as yet on
particular language for a nonproliferation treaty. However,
there is some language which we think the Soviet Union would
probably accept which might be acceptable to us, depending upon
the consensus we might reach among allies. It is very important
that you understand that we have not agreed with the Soviet
Union, but that we are discussing this language with our
allies.
The language itself, and I will pass this around the table
for anyone to see, the language itself stems right out of our
own national legislation in this field. Each nuclear weapons
state, party to this treaty, undertakes not to transmit to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or
indirectly.
As I say, that is what our national legislation at present
says.
I think it is quite important that if this language becomes
acceptable to note that a good deal of underbrush has been
worked out and cast aside. For example, the Soviets agree that
we are talking about warheads and we are not talking about
delivery vehicles and that is a very important advance.
Secondly, they agree that they are not talking about what
happens in case of war, in which event a treaty of this sort
disappears. The Soviet allies in Eastern Europe have delivery
vehicles and, in the event of war, presumably warheads would be
made available to them. The same thing would happen in NATO if
that terrible situation ever came about. Third, they are not
talking about how an alliance makes the overriding political
decision to go to war, which seemed at one point to be part of
the problem.

A METAPHYSICAL POINT

We have discussed centering around an almost metaphysical
point. Mr. Gromyko illustrated it with a little diagram in
which he said that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear
weapons to a non-nuclear power.
All right, no difficulty about that.
Secondly, that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear powers through an alliance.
No problem on that.
Then we got into difficulty when he said and cannot
transfer weapons or control over them to an alliance itself,
that is stopping there. And this got into all sorts of
metaphysical problems about just what is the alliance apart
from its members, and got confused with the question of the
political decisions of an alliance, about whether to go to war
or not and matters of that sort.
This language here that I just mentioned seems to cut
through that and concentrate on the hardware, the actual
nuclear warheads.
Now, we have discussed this and I would appreciate it very
much if members of the committee would make no reference to
this outside because we have discussed this with the four
members of NATO who are members of the Geneva Conference, that
is, the other three, Britain, Italy and Canada.
We are also discussing it with the Germans, and we are also
discussing it in a preliminary way with the Japanese.
We will shortly be discussing it with the rest of the NATO
members.

ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY

I am encouraged to believe that at least as far as the NATO
countries are concerned, including Germany, this is probably
going to prove acceptable and, therefore, I think we can
assume----
Senator Lausche. Did you say it will be acceptable to
Germany?
Secretary Rusk. That is the present indication. They have
had some problems about such things as the European Clause,
reserving a right for a unified Europe to have its own nuclear
force. But it now seems clear to them that if a unified Europe
comes about through the political consolidation of the present
European members that it would be a nuclear power through
direct succession from France and, say, Great Britain. That if
there are other arrangements which may come 10, 20 years in the
future that they could invoke the review clauses that would be
in such a treaty or if necessary, actually withdraw from the
treaty.
Let me say, that we will be in consultation with the
appropriate committees of the Congress on this before any
agreement is given to any language that might be developed
here.
But I just wanted to let the committee know we think there
has been some movement.

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

But there are two other problems that are of major
importance in the nonproliferation matter that you should know
about. One is that the non-nuclear countries, such as India and
Japan, are going to raise or likely to raise some very, very
difficult problems. For example, both of them say, ``Well, now,
it is all very well to get rid of nuclear weapons or for us to
foreswear nuclear weapons, but we need to reserve the right to
have nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes.''
Nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is a bomb for all
practical purposes. We hope to be able to work out among the
nuclear powers, at least some of the nuclear powers, a
procedure by which we can make peaceful uses of explosives
available to non-nuclear countries, under some arrangements by
which you make a judgment on its feasibility and desirability
and so forth. So, if Mauritania wants a harbor and applies to
the nuclear powers to explode a device there and dig them a
harbor, there will be some way in which this can be done.
Otherwise, some of the non-nuclear countries are likely to use
this at least as a pretext for not coming into this treaty.
Secondly, there is a very difficult question about
safeguards. We feel ourselves that this non-proliferation
treaty would be a very important instrument which to deal with
the safeguards problem. When you look ahead over the next
several years, with the rapid developments of nuclear power,
there is going to be enough fuel lying around to make a
considerable number of bombs a day within the next decade or
so, or by 1980, and so a general application of a safeguard
system is extremely important.
The Soviets are more or less disinterested in safeguards in
this situation. But they, I think, would take it, provided we
could all take the IAEA safeguard, the Vienna safeguards.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ International Atomic Energy Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE EURATOM PROBLEM

Then we run into the Euratom problem because the five
members who are members of Euratom are unwilling to accept IAEA
rather than their own safeguard, worked out among them. In that
matter France has a veto. So, I want to alert you to the fact
even though we got agreement on Article I, there are tough
problems remaining. We need to do something about.
Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, are all five of those
countries strongly opposed to IAEA?
Secretary Rusk. No, Senator, you are quite right. I think
four out of the five would probably accept IAEA safeguards.
Senator Clark. Are you sure France would not?
Secretary Rusk. This is being tested, now. But the trouble
is their attitude toward a non-proliferation treaty is frigid.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. The present indication is they would not
now sign a non-proliferation treaty although they might do it
at a later stage. They tell us they won't get in the way of a
non-proliferation treaty, but that is about as far as we can go
along this line.
Mr. Chairman. I talked a little longer that I had planned
to.

SITUATION IN ISRAEL

The Chairman. Just one other subject before you go on. I
wonder about Israel. There seems to be, from this morning's
press, a very dangerous situation there. Could you say a word
about it?
Secretary Rusk. The issue at the present time centers along
the Israeli-Syrian border. There are three elements in the
problem in terms of repose in the area. One is the activities
of a Fatah organization of terrorists, who we think are not
directly and actively supported by any of the governments
concerned. Particularly not by Jordan, who has been trying to
operate against them but who use Syrian and Jordanian territory
for acts of sabotage and terror over the Israeli border.
On that particular point, Jordan and Israel have greatly
increased their police action on their respective sides of the
border to try to deal with that activity as a police matter.
There is a more complicated matter between Israel and
Syria. At the time of the armistice, Syrian forces were
occupying a strip within the historical boundaries of the
mandate. Under the armistice, Syrian forces withdrew from that
strip under demilitarized regulations. Israel claims since this
was territory within the mandate and is Israeli territory, and
they claim to exercise sovereignty over the subject as to
demilitarized regulations.
The Syrians claim this has never been legally established,
and so you have both Israeli and Syrian farmers in this strip.
Arms are fired into the area from the Syrian side typically,
with response from the Israeli side. Israelis patrol on
occasion in this area with their own armored vehicles, so you
have a continuation of this particular kind of struggle.

DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR WAR

I don't myself, think, sir, that this is likely to lead to
a major war.
The Chairman. You do not?
Secretary Rusk. Athough--because I don't think, for
example, the Syrians are particularly interested in it. We know
the Israelis are not interested in a major war in this
situation, but it is a very troublesome problem as to how you
handle these repeated acts of terror back and forth across the
border, particularly in that area.
General Bull, the head of the U.N. force out there, is
trying to make some arrangement--the Arabs would say, ``Let the
U.N. forces take charge in this demilitarized area and provide
the police forces,'' while the Israeli and Syrian farmers go
ahead with their agricultural work. As a matter of fact,
farmers on both sides apparently get along pretty well until
somebody from outside the demilitarized zone starts shooting in
from outside the area.
But that is about the situation, Mr. Chairman. It is tense,
but we don't----
The Chairman. You don't expect a major war?
Secretary Rusk. We don't expect a major war.

U.S. OBJECTIVES REGARDING CHINA

The Chairman. I wonder, you started out on China and you
said you thought it was probably the most important matter at
the moment, I wonder if you could briefly say what our attitude
or policy is toward China. What is our objective with regard to
China at the moment or to put it another way, is our policy to
continue nonintervention and to continue all possible means to
exclude them from the U.N. and so on? Would you say just very
briefly what our attitude is?
Secretary Rusk. I think our principal problem we have with
China is the one which a foreign minister of an eastern
European country described as moving Peking to peaceful
coexistence and the issue we have in trying to organize a
durable peace in the Pacific Ocean basin.
But as far as Peking is concerned, the key question turns
out to be always the attitude toward Formosa. In our bilateral
talks with them, as I have indicated to the committee, before
they start and end with a statement by the Peking
representative that ``There is nothing to discuss unless you
are prepared to surrender Formosa,'' and when we say we can't
surrender these 13 or 14 million people contrary to their will,
then nothing else happens. That is, we have tried to talk about
disarmament, tried to talk about Southeast Asia, exchanges,
exchange of plant material, for example, relevant to the food
problem and things of that sort, scientists, scholars, newsmen,
and so forth.
The same issue remains in the United Nations. The question
of what to do about Peking is coupled with the question of what
to do with the Republic of China. If we are not prepared to
surrender Formosa, then Peking is not going to talk to us
bilaterally about serious matters in any responsible sense. If
the United Nations is not prepared to expel the Republic of
China, then the problem remains about where it is.
We are continuing our contacts with Peking, but it comes
back to that question as to what you do about the 13 or 14
million people there, as well as in the longer run, what their
attitude is going to be toward what the Soviets call peaceful
coexistence.
The Chairman. You sum up there is no change in that
situation, no movement?
Secretary Rusk. No present change indicated.
The Chairman. No present change.
Secretary Rusk. For the reasons I stated.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Chairman. Could you restate for the record the
objectives of our policy in Southeast Asia? What is it we are
seeking now to achieve there?
Secretary Rusk. We should like to see an accord with our
treaty commitments there through a situation in which in the
first place our allies are safe and secure, in which the
smaller countries of Southeast Asia are free to live their own
national existence under what policies they wish, but living in
peace with their neighbors across their frontiers. We have said
many times we consider that as far as what used to be Indo-
China is concerned, we consider the 1954 and 1962 agreements to
be an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. That if the
movement of men and arms from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
would stop, we could work out the peace very quickly, and we do
believe those '54 and '62 agreements do provide such a basis.
But that the countries with whom we are allied in Southeast
Asia, that means the Philippines and Thailand, ought to be free
from molestation.
We have no objection to their being non-aligned if that is
their wish. We supported the non-alignments of Laos and of
Cambodia, of Burma, any of those countries that want to be non-
aligned, but we are concerned about the stability of peace in
the area.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

I have, Mr. Chairman, made a few notes on the so-called 14
points that were used last year as they have developed during
the course of the year, and I will be glad to pass those around
for anyone who wishes to have a look at them.
We have not released these to the press in their present
form, although I think everything that is on these three pages
has been said publicly at one time or another, but Mr. Marcy
might want to have these.

SEATO OBLIGATIONS

The Chairman. One reason I asked you that was because I
heard a part of your appearance on that early morning show, I
think a week or maybe ten days ago.
Secretary Rusk. Today Show.
The Chairman. Perhaps, and you correct me if I misstate
this, you said one of the reasons we are there is in accordance
with obligations in the SEATO Treaty. But beyond and above that
is the necessity for stopping the, I think, tendency or
inclination to aggression. Was that a correct statement or not?
Do you remember how you put it?
Secretary Rusk. I don't recall that I put it just that way.
I did point out----
The Chairman. You put it correctly.
Secretary Rusk. I did point out that we ourselves have a
very important stake in the organization of a durable peace in
the Pacific. We have alliances with Korea and Japan and the
Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New
Zealand. And our interest in a stable peace in the Pacific
compares to our interest in such a peace in the Atlantic.
I would be glad to get--I don't happen to have a transcript
with me, Mr. Chairman, but we have not set ourselves up to play
the role of general policeman in the world. I think the last
time we gave an account of various crises there were about
seventy, and we took an interest in about six of them over the
various years, but we do have specific commitments and we do
feel these specific commitments are very important to the
possibility of organizing peace.
The Chairman. I thought perhaps I misunderstood you, that
there was something beyond those specific commitments in the
way of aggression that was, I thought you gave in detail. I
could be wrong about that.

SECRET REPORT ON BOMBING POLICY

Mr. Chalmers Roberts recently had a story from which I
quote:

There is a top secret report by the Central Intelligence
Agency and Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency casting doubt
on the military efficacy of bombing.

Is there such a report?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that--there are many examinations of
that question. I don't think there is a report that is looked
at frequently.
The Chairman. A recent report.
Secretary Rusk. I think the key points that are made in
these examinations is that the bombing has not stopped the
infiltration, that it has not brought the other side to the
conference table, but that from an operational point of view in
terms of lines of communication and the capacity of the other
side to sustain his effort, the expense to him of sustaining
his effort, shows that the bombing does impose upon him a very
substantial additional burden.
The Chairman. Is that the principal reason for maintaining
the bombing, the burden it imposes on the North?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is an important reason. I think,
also, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at a situation where North
Vietnam could be safe and comfortable, and undisturbed while it
sends its armed forces and arms into South Vietnam, that the
prospect that this war would last a long time is greatly
strengthened.
I don't know what the incentive would be for North Vietnam
to stop doing what it is doing if it could be completely
comfortable.
The Chairman. It is an ideal situation for it to occupy,
sit there safe without being afraid of any damage being done to
them while our men and South Vietnamese men are being killed.

NOT FIGHTING COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

This question has been asked me on one or two occasions
along this line: In the State of the Union Message the
President used the word ``Communist'' six times in discussing
the situation in Vietnam. But in talking about the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and China he did not use the word once.
If it is United States policy to fight communism as an ideology
in Vietnam, what is the position with regard to building
bridges with Communists in Eastern Europe?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think the point is that we are
not fighting communism as an ideology. We are not undertaking a
world crusade to do that. What we are doing, as we have done
before, is resist aggression by these Communist countries
against those with whom we have commitments and/or in whom we
have a vital stake. I said that because we did go to the aid of
Greece without a treaty obligation. We went to the aid of Korea
without a treaty obligation.
But this point arises, for example, in connection with the
question as to whether we are at the front edges of a detente
with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. We think we well
might be, we hope we are, and we will explore every possibility
of contributing to that detente.
But we didn't get there, we didn't get to this present
position by giving away Azerbaijan or Greece to the guerrillas
or the eastern provinces of Turkey or Berlin or Korea or the
Congo and some of these other situations. It has been a long
and difficult path to the point where there is considerable
prudence on both sides.
What we would hope to see is a corresponding prudence of
the eastern wing, the Asian wing; of the Communist Party, which
has isolated itself even within the Communist world, largely
because of its excessive militancy, and there is some
possibility of that when we see the shape of the second
generation of leadership in Peking, and this may come sooner
than sometimes we think, there may be a little more prudence
there.

NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS

We do have a second generation now present in the Soviet
Union. There is no longer an old Bolshevik in the government of
the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan was the last one.
There seems to be some prudence there.
I don't want to exaggerate that because when we look at
what the Soviets are doing in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and
Somalia, we still have some problems, but we are prepared to
contribute to that possibility of detente if we can manage it.
So, this is not a general question of ideology. These are
specific acts taken against countries with whom we have treaty
commitments.

COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

The Chairman. Is it fair to say if the North Vietnamese
were not Communists that we would have intervened in this case?
Do you think we would or would not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think when you gentlemen approved
the Southeast Asia Treaty, when it was signed, it was made
clear by the government at that time that treaty referred only
to Communist aggression. I think the thinking behind that was
that neighborhood quarrels across frontiers are not the
problems that are going to inflame the entire world. We didn't
get involved when Algeria and Morocco were shooting each other,
and we haven't gotten involved in a lot of these neighborhood
disputes, but where you have pressures outward from a regime
which proclaims that it is going after the world revolution and
supported by militant minds, then you have the possibilities of
a momentum of aggression that deeply threatens the
possibilities of the peace of the world.
The Chairman. Do you think that this is realistic to apply
to a country of 14 million people that were about to take over
the world or even planning to?
Secretary Rusk. It is not just these people. Their big
brothers to the North have also announced they are going after
some of these other countries, like Thailand.
The Chairman. Then it is the Communists--what I am trying
to clarify is, is this the overshadowing reason because they
are Communists or not? Is this in your opinion, and the
Department, or the government's opinion, the principal reason
we are there because they are Communists and part of an
international conspiracy?
Secretary Rusk. That is what the SEATO Treaty----
The Chairman. What do you think? I was trying to pick your
brains.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, there is a difference
between those quarrels which have a built-in insatiable
appetite on one side, and there is a world revolution----
The Chairman. Is that characteristic of North Vietnam in
your opinion?
Secretary Rusk. And Peking, yes. I mean----
The Chairman. Then, if you change it a little, then it is
Peking, is this Peking's aggression we are dealing with? I am
just trying to take one step at a time.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we haven't made a special point that
this is Peking's aggression, but Peking's support of Hanoi in
this matter is crucial to Hanoi's position, and if Peking
showed the slightest interest in peace in this situation my
guess is that peace could be arranged rather quickly.

CONFUSION OVER U.S. INTERVENTION

The Chairman. But this is the point that I think is behind
much of the confusion and perhaps the dissent that you--I
think, the government objects to. If we can clarify it, I think
it would be very useful to those of us who are called upon to
clarify it nearly every day. To our constituents and otherwise,
as to just why it is we are there, what makes this quarrel so
important.
You have already said you didn't intervene in these other
areas, Tunisia, Algeria. You didn't intervene in other places,
but you did here.
Now, why is it that this is so peculiar?
First, let me, let's eliminate it, it isn't because North
Vietnam is so powerful that it threatens the peace of the world
in itself as a country, is it?
Secretary Rusk. It threatens the peace of Southeast Asia,
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.
The Chairman. But if it wasn't Communist, what in your
opinion would we have done, would we have intervened?
Secretary Rusk. My guess is if it were not Communist it
would not be doing what it is doing. If you look at the
actions----
The Chairman. Why would you guess that? I don't follow that
at all. I mean, the Germans haven't resorted to force, but they
certainly are eager for reunification of their country, and
there are very substantial reasons. But here I think it would
be natural that these people would want to reunify their
country. Every country seems to want to do that.
Secretary Rusk. And if the people themselves deciding these
questions freely on their own in the two parts of the countries
involved were to agree on reunification, we would not object to
that.
It is the attempt to impose reunification by force that we
objected to, we would in Germany and we would in Korea.

U.S. OPPOSITION TO VIETNAMESE ELECTION

The Chairman. We did object to an election in '56, didn't
we? We objected to an election being held at that time, and I
understood from what people have written about it because we
thought if you had an election it would be reunified under Ho
Chi Minh.
Secretary Rusk. Incidentally, I have not been able to find
in the record instructions to our embassy saying that we
opposed elections out there. I have been trying to find what
the instructions were during that period. But at that time, Mr.
Chairman, it seemed to be obvious to everybody that there was
no possibility of a free election in the North and, therefore,
the question was do you have free elections in the South only
with everything rigged in the North?
General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1956, I think it is in your
committee report, I have brought up at a public hearing last
year, General Giap in 1956 described what was happening in the
North during that period and the mistakes they made in terms of
terror and intimidation and torture and things of that sort. He
was very frank about it. And it was the judgment at that time
in Saigon that under those circumstances a free election was
simply not possible, apart from the problems they might have
had in South Vietnam about free elections.
The Chairman. That makes free elections, I guess--I don't
know any other way, however, to bring this to issue.

GRADUAL NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Senator Lausche. Will the chairman point out to me so that
I will be able to better understand what he is aiming to prove,
is it your position that we should pull out?
The Chairman. No, I don't think that is feasible. I wish we
never had been involved.
Mr. Max Frankel said the other day, he is one of the people
more or less sympathetic with our position there. He says if
the matter was up today for our sending five hundred thousand
troops from ab initio--from the beginning--to save Saigon, we
wouldn't do it. The reason we are there is because of the very
gradual nature of the involvement, a little at a time, a little
more and a little more and finally we find ourselves there.
This is his theory, and I was trying to really see if the
Secretary could give me information that is better able to
answer questions as to why we are involved here.
Is it fear of Vietnam? No. Is it because of China, and if
so, is there evidence China is a very aggressive nation, and
should we be fearful of China and try to destroy her now? I
don't know what we want to do with her. I just wondered.

A LARGER CONTEXT

Secretary Rusk. I don't want to take up an undue amount of
time, but I would just like to pull back a step or two and take
a look at this in a somewhat larger context.
The Chairman. I think that is good.
Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy, President Johnson and
their Secretary of State have not come to the Senate with
additional alliances. President Kennedy came down here with a
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Johnson has concluded the
Civil Air Agreement. He presented you the consular agreement,
and he hopes we can present you with an East-West Trade
Agreement. He presented you with a space treaty, and we hope we
can present you with a nonproliferation treaty.
But after the war during the 50's at a time when the
Communist world was pressing almost on all fronts, and
resorting to armed force and a number of circumstances, we made
some alliances in the interest of building a stable peace in
the world.
Now, in the case of the SEATO Treaty, the administration at
that time, and the Senate said that each party recognizes that
aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would
endanger its own peace and safety and agrees it will in that
event act to meet the common danger and so forth.
Now, if this matter were presented afresh today, I mean if,
say, yesterday there was the kind of an invasion of South
Vietnam that occurred in Korea by organized divisions publicly
and formally coming across the demarcation line, I am not at
all clear that Mr. Frankel is right in saying that we couldn't
do it. I think that is something that the President and the
leadership would have to look at and look at in terms of what
happens in the world if we fail to meet one of these solemn
treaty commitments in the organization of peace.

WORKING TOWARD DETENTE

I point out since 1947, we have spent something on the
order of $900 billion in defense budgets and fantastic
resources. And we have only barely by the skin of our teeth
been able to come to a position where there may be some
possibility of enough prudence on both sides to work toward
some sort of a detente, say, between ourselves and eastern
Europe. We are only four or five years away from a major crisis
over Berlin and only five years ago from a most horrible crisis
over Cuban missiles. It only has been a very narrow thing that
we begin to see the possibility of something like peaceful
coexistence with some sort of real content in the expression
opening up here.
I think the overriding question is how do you organize a
durable peace. And it is not for me to be presumptuous, Mr.
Chairman, but I think it is worth your committee's considering
whether it might wish to address itself to that problem, taking
into account such changes as might have occurred since 1945,
since the United Nations Charter was signed, to see what the
changes are, if any, what they mean and how these changes bear
upon the general problem of organizing a durable peace in the
world.

APPREHENSIONS ABOUT ESCALATION OF THE WAR

The Chairman. Well, of course, what bothers me is I think
we are more apprehensive, I am today, than at any other time. I
am more apprehensive than 20 years ago. I am apprehensive about
this war and its escalation. I don't want to prolong this.
I want to call on Mr. Mansfield. I want to again recall for
the record in your own Department of State memorandum of March
8, 1965 which was entitled ``Legal basis for U.S. action in
Vietnam,'' that your own statement refers to the U.N. Charter
and the Geneva Accords and didn't even mention the SEATO
Treaty. This is what causes so much trouble with us, trying to
understand it.
It wasn't until recently that the SEATO Treaty has been
given in justification for this involvement, and I am still
very puzzled about it.
Mr. Mansfield?

THE SEATO TREATY

Senator Lausche. Will you re-read that SEATO Treaty
declaring why these nations have joined in the compact? That is
considered as a challenge to their own security.
Secretary Rusk. In the preamble they said, among other
things:

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and
to uphold the principles of democracy and individual liberty
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well being and
development of all peoples in the Treaty area, intending to
declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any
potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties standing
together in the area, and desiring further to coordinate their
efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace
and security.

But there was added by the United States the understanding
in the treaty, that the United States, in executing the present
treaty, does so with the understanding that its recognition of
the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement
with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only
to communist aggression.
The reason for that was that it was not the desire to
become involved in other kinds of neighborhood disputes,
particularly, for example, the Pakistan-India dispute and I
gather Senator Mansfield may recall this better than I. And I
gather when Mr. Dulles made it clear that this was the
interpretation of the United States, that there was a period of
24 hours or more when the Pakistan representative was very
uncertain about whether Pakistan would sign it or not. That is
my recollection of what the record shows.
The Chairman. I don't think it was contemplated that we
would intervene in a civil war on account of this, either.
Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been in and
out.
I noticed some other items we have on this suggested agenda
here,\2\ I don't know whether you have seen them or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ MEMORANDUM
Suggested Areas of Questioning for Secretary Rusk, January 16, 1967
1. Vietnam
a. Effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam;
b. Indications of willingness to negotiate on part of North Vietnam
and National Liberation Front;
c. Progress of pacification;
d. Political developments in South Vietnam;
e. United States military activity in the Mekong Delta;
f. Basis for statistics on incidents, casualties, desertions, etc.
2. Thailand
a. Scale and targets of counterinsurgency efforts;
b. United States role in counterinsurgency;
c. United States military buildup on Thailand;
d. Are Thai troops being sent to Vietnam?
3. Significance of Current Uproar in China
4. Prospects for a Non-Proliferation Agreement
5. Soviet Deployment of a Limited Anti-Ballistic Missile System
6. Prelimary Findings of the Tripartite Working Group on NATO Force
Levels in Europe
7. Reasons for Delaying Food Shipments to India and Estimate of
Future Indian Requirements
8. Situation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa Generally
9. Implications of Military Aid and Sales in Latin America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Rusk. I haven't seen it.
Senator Sparkman. That I might ask you rather briefly
about.
First, have you asked questions about Thailand?
The Chairman. No, I did not.
Go ahead.

THE SITUATION IN THAILAND

Senator Sparkman. I wonder if you can give us something
about the Thailand situation, first of all. Just what are we up
against there and what are the prospects?
Secretary Rusk. At the present time, there are several
hundred, rather than several thousand trained guerrillas
operating in the northeastern part of the country. This is a
rather remote area, and has been difficult for the government
to organize its police and security forces on as tight a basis
as would be necessary to deal with such small numbers of
guerrillas.
We also know in North Vietnam there is a training camp for
Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam to enter Thailand.
We know that Thailand is under pressure from its north and
northeast, but we feel unless there is a major increase in the
effort made by the North Vietnamese or the Chinese coming
directly down from China that the Thais seem to have the
capability of dealing with this. They have been very careful
themselves not to have U.S. soldiers involved in their
activities in the villages. We have helped them with
transportation into the general areas on occasion through
helicopter lifts. But beyond that, Thailand is a member of the
SEATO Treaty, is supporting the effort in Vietnam, has made
certain of its facilities available to us and to our armed
forces, and is contributing certain forces to South Vietnam.
On the internal side, they are doing reasonably well on the
economic side. They are now working on a constitution
acquisition that is led by Prince Huan, who served here once as
ambassador. In the months ahead, it is possible they will
promulgate that constitution and move toward a more elected
government than they have at the present time.

HANOI'S OPPOSITION TO U.S BASES IN THAILAND

Senator Sparkman. I notice the New York Times had quite an
article in a recent issue, as did the Washington Evening Star.
The New York Times article is entitled ``Hanoi Demands Thai Ban
on U.S. Use of Bases.'' Just how strong is their demand and do
they threaten action in the event that----
Secretary Rusk. Well, they are taking action at the present
time within the limits of these guerrilla operations that I
mentioned.
Senator Sparkman. Are they under the direction of Hanoi?
Secretary Rusk. Well they are being trained in North
Vietnam.
There is a Thai training camp there. We have taken pictures
of it. We have prisoners who tell us where it is and what goes
on there.
They then apparently infiltrate through the northern part
of Laos into the northeastern part of Thailand.

THE MEKONG VALLEY

Senator Sparkman. Just as a matter of curiosity, I saw
somewhere reference to that northeast section of Thailand along
the Mekong River saying it was the poorest section of the
country. I thought that was a very fertile valley.
Secretary Rusk. The Mekong Valley itself is reasonably
fertile. They were damaged by the heavy floods that occurred
along that part of the Mekong this past year, both in Laos and
in northeast Thailand. But I think one of the principal reasons
for the backwardness of northeast Thailand when you look at it,
is more generally, rather than just in the river valley where
there is communication by river, is lack of communications and
mountain jungle, undeveloped in the usual sense. I think it's
the lack of communications that is the principal problem in
terms of both development and security. It is somewhat like the
northeast corridor of Cambodia in that respect where we know
the Viet Cong are using Cambodian territory. We don't think
with the approval or the permission of Prince Sihanouk but yet
it is remote and rugged terrain into which his own security
forces can't go to monitor the situation in any way.

PRESS COVERAGE OF A HUSH-HUSH OPERATION

Senator Sparkman. In that same issue of the The Star there
was a headline ``14 million dollars annual savings possible by
the B-52 use of those bases,'' Is that a pretty reasonable
evaluation?
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are some operations advantages
in the short run compared with the several hours from Guam. The
bases there are not at the present time fitted for B-52
operations. This is a question for the future. No decision has
been made. The Thais apparently would be agreeable but we
ourselves have not made a final decision on that point.
Senator Sparkman. Why have we had such little discussion
publicly of what we are doing in Thailand? Is it a hush-hush
operation? The papers seem to get hold of it somehow.
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are two or three reasons. One
is that we do not wish officially to talk about which
particular operations go from which bases, but more importantly
the Thais themselves feel that the settlement of the situation
in Southeast Asia would be facilitated if these matters are not
made major matters of public prestige and things of that sort.
We are in Thailand. The Thai Government has a veto on that. We
think they themselves will say more about this fairly shortly.
But they have been very insistent upon not going into details
because they say that in the Southeast Asian situation it is
better to try to keep the Vietnam situation from a political
point of view in as narrow channels as possible in order not be
get the problems of a settlement too complicated.
These are open secrets. The only problem is how far we go
in confirming officially what goes on.
Senator Sparkman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. In order to avoid the Thai sensibilities.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have lots of questions
but everybody around the table wants a chance to ask, so I will
pass.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

RESTRAINTS ON BOMBING

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the
question which Senator Fulbright asked you and which was
discussed with respect to the bombing, whether or not that had
any effect of lessening or diminishing the activities of the
North Vietnamese, does the fact that we don't bomb a lot of
military targets up there lessen the probability of quieting
them down? In other words, the stories we get here are that
Russian MIGs sit on the airfield up there and our pilots are
forbidden to bomb those airfields or destroy those Russian MIGs
sitting there.
Then we get the argument which doesn't appeal to me very
much, if we bomb these they will just move into the air bases
in China and if we bomb those then the fat will be in the fire.
Is it not a fact we are not bombing many targets in North
Vietnam which would really hurt their military efforts?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the list of important targets that
could be called military targets that have not been bombed is
really relatively small, Senator.
Senator Hickenlooper. Quite important, though, aren't they?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I suppose in one sense the most
important of these would be the Haiphong harbor and there are
one or two plants inside the perimeter of Hanoi. For example,
there is a steel plant, a cement plant which would have some
direct relationship to their operations.
We have kept the airfields outside of the immediate Hanoi
area out of our operation because it takes a great deal of
striking to do it, and the repair of an airfield is not too
complicated a matter.
Senator Hickenlooper. But the destruction of MIGs would be.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. Actually, the MIGs have not been all
that much of a problem in terms of our own forces. We have felt
that, and I don't want to preclude what the future might hold
in this in either direction, but we have felt we ought to try
to keep the situation within certain limits, if we can find
some possibility that the other side is prepared to talk sense
about peace in this situation.
You know we have had some recent MIG 21 engagements in
which I think some nine MIGs were shot down. Which were at
least about half of what they had there. The MIGs have not
given us much trouble nor indeed have the SAM sites in the
main. The principal problem has come from the conventional
anti-aircraft scattered all over the place. There are other
factors to be taken into account about the airfields. They are
very, very heavily protected by anti-aircraft. The prospects of
substantial losses on our side are pretty good, and the
question is as to whether the losses would be larger if we held
our hand and took on these follows in the air. But, again,
these are tactical decisions the Commander in Chief would have
to make at the end of the day, and I wouldn't want to foreclose
the future.

TARGETS ARE AUTHORIZED FROM WASHINGTON

Senator Hickenlooper. Are those decisions made in South
Vietnam or are they made over here at the pentagon?
Secretary Rusk. The principal fixed targets are authorized
from Washington.
Now, there are certain areas in what is called route
reconnaissance authorized for the purpose of hitting trucks and
barges and other things that are moving supplies to the south.
But the principal fixed targets are authorized from here in
light of the recommendation from the field and from the Joint
Chiefs.
One of the factors, I might add that are taken into account
in regard to those fixed targets is the prospect of civilian
casualties and one of the columns in which you take up these
questions shows the probable civilian casualties, and there
have been some targets which have been taken off the list
because of the prospect of significance of civilian casualties.

IMPACT OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this question. I want
to hurry on because I have a good many questions to ask here:
Would you care to venture an opinion as to what would have
happened by now in Indonesia under Sukarno's leadership if we
had not stood fast in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. It is very hard to be precise about that--
--
Senator Hickenlooper. I know you can't----
Secretary Rusk. I am inclined myself, Senator, to think
that there was a connection but not a decisive one, that in the
event of October a year ago, in Jakarta this was a PKT
operation with some Chinese help, that did not expect to rely
upon the presence of Chinese armed forces from China. They
almost succeeded and came within a gnat's eyelash of
succeeding. They got six generals and had they gotten two more
the thing would have been over.
But I think the presence of U.S. and British forces in
Southeast Asia, a combination of them there, did lead these
generals to believe they at least would not be subject to major
intervention from China. Now, saving Haidsah----
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Hickenlooper. Would you say if we had not been in
South Vietnam, communism would have made tremendous strides in
Indonesia.
Secretary Rusk. That would be the implication of what he
said, of his remark; but I would be inclined to discount his
remarks somewhat.
I do feel, Senator, that what is--that the stand we have
taken in Vietnam has made a considerable difference to all of
those free countries in Asia, the ten, for example, who met in
Korea this past year and affirmed their support of South
Vietnam and expressed their appreciation for those giving help,
both Asian and non-Asian, and from Korea and Japan right around
through, all the way to India, there is a confidence that, I
think, would not have been there, that is making some
difference as to how they comport themselves.

THE RHODESIAN SITUATION

Senator Hickenlooper. I want to move on for just a quick
question or two here: As you know, and I have talked to you
about this, the Rhodesian situation troubles me very greatly,
and I was greatly disturbed when the President signed the
executive order of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on
January 5th.
I fail to agree with him in my own mind. I suppose I can
rationalize it if I go way-round rationalization, as to why did
he undertake to attempt to destroy one of the most progressive
and successful governments and economies in all Africa by this
kind of action. I understand the sovereignty theory and all
that that is being advanced. I don't happen to agree with it,
but I understand it, I understand what it is. What are we
trying to do there?
Secretary Rusk. Well, first, Senator, we feel that this is,
in the first instance, a problem for the Commonwealth,
Britain----
Senator Hickenlooper. Why did we get into it?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we didn't buy into it ourselves, on
our own initiative. We didn't go around drumming up business on
this one. It was presented to us in the first instance by joint
action and joint position by some 18 members of the
Commonwealth, and a reference of this question to the Security
Council by the Commonwealth.
Now we are sitting in the Security Council, and when it
comes before the Council we have to ourselves decide what
attitude we take. The United Kingdom introduced a resolution.
We had to vote yes or no or abstain. We did help to fend off
much more extreme resolutions in the Security Council, for
example, the use of force, but we have felt that basically,
quite frankly, that the attitude of the Commonwealth is sound
in this situation, that the Rhodesian question is, in fact, a
threat to the peace in the longer run unless there is some
modification of view. What we have been hoping all along was
that discussions would lead to a peaceful settlement of the
situation. They came very close in the conversations on the
cruiser Tiger between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian
Smith, but it broke down apparently on the issues as to which
side was going to trust the other during the interim period of
about three months.
Now the hope is that when the present Rhodesian leadership
looks down the longer range of the future, that they will
become convinced that further negotiations and talk are
required, and that the British would also take that view,
although both sides have become very grumpy about further talks
at the present time.
This is not a matter which has to be settled overnight, but
there surely has to be some movement toward a settlement with
which the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia can live and with
which their neighbors can live. Otherwise you are going to have
a situation in which all sorts of people would be mobilizing
themselves to try to prevent the movement into this part of
Africa of an apartheid approach.
The Communist world will seize these issues and exploit
them to a very considerable extent. So we feel that the Ian
Smith regime must make some adjustments here in order to get
this on the track of peaceful settlement that its own 4 million
majority can live with.

THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Senator Hickenlooper. The net result of the British
position and ours would seem to me to be--or would seem to me
to be the destruction of Southern Rhodesia, that is, in other
words, for a viable going economy to be turned over to the
natives over there, who mentally are not capable of running a
government with the same success that it is being run now.
Secretary Rusk. Excuse me----
Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead.
Secretary Rusk. Well, please.
In the first place, Senator, I do not believe that the
Africans either in Rhodesia or outside Rhodesia would require
that the government of Rhodesia be required to be turned over
overnight all of a sudden to blacks.
Senator Hickenlooper. That has been the case in most other
countries in Africa, has it not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that has been true--well, they have a
white member of the cabinet in Tanzania; I think they have
white members in Kenya, and Liberia, they have worked out
relations between the races in a rather constructive fashion.
One of the problems in the Rhodesian matter is that it is
the kind of an issue that could destroy the working
relationships between the whites and blacks in that government
even in those countries where the working relationships are
sound and in reasonably good order. But we do feel that--and
this is the Commonwealth view--that there needs to be some
movement in this matter. There are many interim steps to be
taken which would bring more repose in this situation.
Now, if Ian Smith were to permit some of those interim
steps, the stake could be worked out.
Again let me say that the Tiger agreement represented some
of those interim steps and apparently the key point on which
that broke down was the question of who would be responsible
for law and order in the country during an interim period when
a new constitution would be promulgated and on the basis of
which Rhodesia would become independent. That constitution
itself would itself have included interim steps rather than a
final solution and apparently the cabinet in Salisbury would
not agree to let the Governor General have control of the
security forces of the country during that brief interim period
before a new constitution might be promulgated and that is
where it broke down.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think my time is up.

LEGAL MEMORANDUM

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief memorandum
here on some of the legal aspects and charter aspects. I might
give this to Mr. Marcy in case any members of the committee
might wish to have a look at it.
The Chairman. Senator Morse.
Senator Lausche. Could copies be provided of that legal
memorandum?
Senator Morse. The committee can provide them.
The Chairman. The committee can make copies if you want
one.
The Senator from Oregon.
Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I shall confine my questions
to certain problems that I think have arisen as a result of U
Thant's proposals. I shall read this legal memorandum that you
have just referred to with great care.

DISAGREEMENT OVER SEATO

I only want to say in passing, by way of a caveat, of
course, I do not share in any degree the State Department's
position on SEATO. I think that the chairman has pointed out
here the March 8, 1965, memorandum as to the administration's
legal justification for its involvement with North Vietnam. It
does not even whisper about SEATO within the realm of sound
international law.
I think all the rationalization, in my judgment--that is my
characterization of the State Department on SEATO in recent
times--is an afterthought, and I think completely unsound in
international law, but I shall discuss that in further detail
elsewhere.

CONFIDENCE IN U THANT

But what does bother me, Mr. Secretary--and you can be very
helpful to us in what I think is a growing confusion in the
country in regard to our relations to U Thant, I do not sit
here holding any brief for him. I want your help on it,
however.
We certainly took the position that we wanted him to be
continued as Secretary General. We were one of those who urged
it upon him, some would say did more than urge, but we urged
it. He has been proposing variable formats for trying to pave
the way for negotiations and every time he does, it seems that
we get into controversy with him. It seems that we are the ones
that get into controversy with him. I do not find any other
nations that have been in controversy with him, at least it has
not been reported. Perhaps you can tell us if they do, and that
is one of the things I want to find out.
If we have the confidence that we expressed in him when we
urged his reappointment as Secretary General, why do we not
take the position that if he will set up a procedure for
triparty negotiations, we will look with great favor on it. Why
do we take the position that, as you expressed again this
morning, that we will not stop the bombing unless he can come
in and give us assurance of some kind of reciprocal action on
the part of North Vietnam? Is that a price that we should exact
until we have first found out what he can do with cessation of
bombing? I do not know whether he can deliver anything or not.
But I seriously doubt whether a continuation of our bombing is
justifiable on the basis of the argument you make this morning
when U Thant is telling the world that the United States ought
to stop bombing first.
U Thant is telling the world now that he disagrees that
Vietnam is of vital security interest to the United States. It
seems to me he has put us in a pretty bad light in the world,
and I wonder if the proper response is for us to simply reject
him or reject his ideas rather than make a plea here again
through the procedures of the United Nations for a United
Nations' manifestation backing him up and assuming their
peacekeeping obligations under the Charter.
That is broad outline. I only want to raise----
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Morse [continuing]. The question so you can talk to
this committee about why we are taking the attitude toward U
Thant that the public statements of you and our Administration
have been taking.

U THANT'S POSITION ON THE BOMBING

Secretary Rusk. Senator, first, on the question of stopping
the bombing, bear in mind that the other side is now very
specifically saying that this must be unconditional and
permanent, and this is a major step. There are three divisions
in and just north of the demilitarized zone today.
Senator Morse. Does he agree with that?
Secretary Rusk. Agree with that?
Senator Morse. Does U Thant agree with that? Is that what U
Thant means when he says we should stop the bombing?
Secretary Rusk. We have said--but U Thant is not the man
who makes this judgment. It is the other side who has to make
the judgment.
Senator Morse. He is the one who is making the proposals to
both sides, and we immediately reject his proposal about
stopping the bombing which I have not understood. If it is
true, I would like to have you tell me.
Secretary Rusk. I beg your pardon, we have not rejected his
proposal of stopping the bombing. We have said, ``Okay, that is
possible, what about point two,'' which is the mutual de-
escalation of the violence on both sides, and on that he has
not had anything whatever from the other side.
Senator Morse. I understand that.
Secretary Rusk. And the other side says, ``It is none of
your business.''
Senator Morse. I understand that. But my point is you have
to have a starting point here, and my point is when we say we
are not going to stop the bombing until U Thant delivers
reciprocity, we give the impression--I understand our points--
but we give the impression that we are the ones that right off
the bat throw in a block that makes it impossible for him to
act.

OPPOSITION TO U THANT'S PROPOSALS

Secretary Rusk. You mentioned one point about other
countries. The ambassadors of seven Asian nations, including
Japan, Malaysia, Laos, called on him the other day to take
strong exception to what he said in his press conference about
the security significance of Vietnam in this present
situtation. I might say they did that without any encouragement
from us. We did not stimulate them to do that, and I gather
that Australia and New Zealand are also doing the same thing
when they heard about the Asian move.
But Hanoi has rejected strongly U Thant's second and third
points, second point, mutual de-escalation of the violence,
and, third, on U Thant's point about the Liberation Front they
have said the Liberation Front is the sole spokesman for the
South Vietnamese.
Now, Senator, it seems to me there are two, as far as peace
is concerned, as it affects the United States. There are two
most elementary facts in this situation. One is substantial
numbers of the North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam
and our bombing in North Vietnam. All right, why can we not get
rid of both of those at the same time, why can we not get rid
of both of those together? We have not been able--and I can
assure you, sir, we have scoured the earth on it--to get
anybody to give us any indication as to what would happen. They
do not even say they would come to a conference without doing
anything on the ground. They do not--let me illustrate the
point.

THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE

Very recently, during the two-day Christmas truce, when the
hour arrived, hundreds of vessels, most of them small, but
about 18 of them fairly good sized, suddenly made a dash along
the coast of North Vietnam to resupply their forces north of
the DMZ. They were all loaded and ready to go, just as Olympic
dash men at the starting point. They came down, they unloaded
several thousand tons of supplies and then scattered again
before the truce is over, you see.
Now, we need to have some indication that that is not going
to be the effect of stopping the bombing, that something is
going to happen on the ground that moves this toward peace.
Otherwise, we simply give them an unlimited and an indefinite
capability of doing it the comfortable way of sending their
people south and taking their time and being safe and secure
and not have anything to worry about at home.
This, I think, would be a very serious thing.
Now, we are trying to find out the answer to a secondary
question. If people cannot tell us what Hanoi would do if we
stopped bombing, they at least can tell us what they would do.
Moscow, Eastern Europe, U Thant and the rest of them, India,
what they would do if we stopped the bombing. There is no
response from the other side.
I would be interested in your own view as to whether this
would make any difference to your own position, Senator, if we
stopped the bombing and there was no response. Quite frankly,
we have not----

U.S. SHOULD NOT BE FIGHTING U THANT

Senator Morse. You ought to take judicial notice that would
make a difference with me. You ought to know me well enough for
this. My difference with you is we are laying down conditions
precedent that are not going to be accepted apparently even by
U Thant, and if we are going to try to work through U Thant, we
ought to give--make some attempt to see what he can deliver. If
we have made a bad bargain on U Thant, if we are now already
discovering that he cannot give us the leadership because of
the conditions he imposes, then let us face up to that.
I think we are getting a bad image created around the world
in regard to our relationships with U Thant. I think we should
not be fighting with U Thant at the present time.
Secretary Rusk. Well, when U Thant says, for example, that
he does not believe that the security of Southeast Asia is of
strategic importance to the West, there is nothing in his
present responsibility or his background of experience that
makes his judgment on that matter of very much importance. He
is not responsible for the strategic interests of the West.
Senator Morse. He certainly comes from a country that sits
on the front door of China, and Burma does not seem to be as
concerned about China as we are.
[Discussion off the record.]

THE DOMINO THEORY

Secretary Rusk. Mr. U Thant also said that he does not
believe in the domino theory. I do not believe in the domino
theory myself, and I have said that many times. The theory is
the theory of the world revolution pursued by militant means.
He mentioned countries X, Y, and Z. Hanoi, with the help of
Peking, has already named the countries X, Y, and Z. Vietnam is
X, Laos is Y, and Thailand is Z. So, I personally do not feel
when Mr. U Thant makes a statement of this sort by silence we
indicate that somehow we agree with him. We supported him for
Secretary General not because he and we would agree on every
one of the hundred or more items that might be on the agenda of
the U.N. or on an item like this which is not on the agenda of
the U.N. and he opposes putting it on the agenda of the U.N.,
but because he has on the whole done a good job as Secretary
General and the prospect was that he would be a considerably
better Secretary General than any of the alternatives that
seemed to be around.

ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator Morse. I will not take more time other than to make
a comment on the last observation you made. Sure he is
Secretary General of the United Nations, but he is not
independent in his responsibilities to the organization, to
both branches of the organization, and I repeat, I would like
to bring this before the Security Council. After all, I think
the Security Council ought to sit down and go over his
proposals, because they relate to the image of the United
Nations, but I think we, on the other hand, ought to insist
that that Security Council stand up and be counted, either with
a veto or with a vote, an affirmative vote. I want to get
ourselves out of the position where we seem in many quarters to
be giving the impression that we are holding the United Nations
off. I would like to put the heat on that Security Council and
get a vote up or down, and I think the Secretary General ought
to be asked to sit down with that Security Council and go over
these proposals of his. He sits there as Secretary General and
makes these announcements that are going to affect the members
of the organization, and then a nation individually and
unilaterally, the United States in this instance, takes him on.
I do not think we should be in that position. I think the
United Nations, to whom he is responsible and of whom he is an
agent, ought to be taking him on.
Secretary Rusk. You know, I would not dispute that point
with you too much, Senator. There is pending before the
Security Council a resolution by which the Security Council
would call upon the parties to engage in negotiations for a
peace in Southeast Asia. It does not have the votes on the
Security Council for a variety of reasons. The Soviets would
veto. But there are others influenced in part by U Thant who
say----
Senator Lausche. Why not let the Soviets veto?
Secretary Rusk. But there are others who say that since
Hanoi and Peking say this is not the business of the United
Nations, that if the Security Council takes up this question,
and tried to get into it, that this would get in the way of a
use of the machinery which Hanoi and Peking say is the
appropriate machinery, namely, the Geneva machinery.
When this point was made by the Soviet delegate, Mr. Arthur
Goldberg said that is fine with us, let us use the Geneva
machinery, in which case the Soviet ambassador said, ``No, no,
we can't use that.''
This matter has been one way or another before the United
Nations at least a dozen times, and I have an up-to-date
memorandum on this point which I will be glad to furnish Mr.
Marcy for the committee.

A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield for one clarifying
thing?
You said no one would be more alarmed than Burma, unless it
be Thailand, if we pull out of Southeast Asia, which seems to
imply that you feel we have a permanent presence there.
Secretary Rusk. No.
The Chairman. That is the interpretation of it.
Secretary Rusk. No, I meant under present circumstances. I
am not saying what you would do if we have peace. Our Manila
declaration on that is quite specific on that point.

FORMAL ACTION RATHER THAN BACK SCENE NEGOTIATING

Senator Morse. You must not take more time on that, and if
you will only pardon me, I want to make this observation. I
just do not buy the argument that Hanoi and Peking should be
telling the United Nations what to do. The Charter makes
perfectly clear if there was a threat to the peace by a non-
member, the members, the signatories, have the job of enforcing
the peace. It is the primary purpose of the Charter. All the
other things that the United Nations do are ancillary to it.
The real reason for it was to enforce the peace.
I would put France and Russia, as the Senator from Ohio
said--with a veto, if they want to veto it, let them do it. But
the important thing is it would help clarify the situation.
Instead of giving the impression that the United States is
doing a lot of back scene negotiating, which isn't what the
Charter calls for--the Charter calls for formal action under
the juridical process thereof, and we ought to insist on it.
Secretary Rusk. I have some sympathy with that point.
The Chairman. Senator Aiken.
Senator Morse. The sad part of it is if we could closet
ourselves longer we might find ourselves in more agreement.
Senator Aiken. First, let me say I agree with the Secretary
that not only would Burma but every other country in Southeast
Asia be alarmed if we pulled out completely from that area.
My questions will be short and along a different line.

U.S. TRADE WITH CAMBODIA

Mr. Secretary, to what extent is our trade with Cambodia--
to what extent has it been increasing?
Secretary Rusk. I do not have the trade figures. Our
tourism has been more or less holding up. I would have to get
the figures on trade.
Senator Aiken. And we are now supplying some oil to
Cambodia?
Secretary Rusk. American companies----
Senator Aiken. Yes.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Provide oil in Cambodia and up
the Mekong River to South Vietnam.

CHINESE STEEL

Senator Aiken. That is right. But in that connection I read
last month the United States, through Bombay, had purchased a
very substantial amount of steel manufactured in China for use
in South Vietnam.
Then about two weeks ago there was another news item to the
effect that a freighter carrying steel from Bombay to the
United States had gotten into trouble or been sunk or
something.
Are American companies buying Chinese steel through Bombay
for use in this country?
Secretary Rusk. No. We tried to look into that. I think the
allegation was that this was a transaction through Singapore.
Senator Aiken. No question--no one questions that.
Secretary Rusk. But the information we have is that this
did not occur; that the steel was resold at Singapore to known
customers; these were not in Vietnam. I can't find any
substance to that.
Senator Aiken. The ship that got into trouble was
reportedly headed toward the United States. I did not know that
India had a surplus of steel.
Secretary Rusk. This sounds--I had not put my attention on
this shipping from Bombay to the United States.
Senator Aiken. But isn't it true that Communist countries
and Western countries do conduct considerable business with
each other through third parties?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is true.
Senator Aiken. There is no question about that, and that--
--
Secretary Rusk. Let us leave this off the tape.
[Discussion off the record.]

ESTABLISHING A BASE IN THE DELTA

Senator Aiken. I notice there was quite a lot made in the
news lately about establishing a base in the Delta. Is that
being constructed as a permanent base?
Secretary Rusk. I saw a report this morning that one of the
amphibious operations was off-loading to go back to its main
base. I think there may be some U.S. forces at some point in
the Delta.
Part of the Delta is in the immediate Saigon area. For
example, Long An Province, we have had some forces there for
some time. But I think the major effort at the present time is
in the Saigon area and particularly northwest of Saigon to try
to break the flow of men and supplies that might be coming from
the Delta up into the Third, Second and First Corps.
I just do not know what the future will hold on this. There
is no policy problem in my mind about doing in the Fourth Corps
what we are doing in the First, Second and Third. But there are
practical problems of how you best use your forces, under what
circumstances.

GUANTANAMOS IN VIETNAM

Senator Aiken. Isn't it quite likely when the situation
over there quiets down--I do not mean comes to an end, but
quiets down--or phases out, fades out somewhat, that we will
have one or two Guantanamos along the Coast of Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, no. On that, sir, we have no interest
in maintaining a permanent position in South Vietnam.
This Cam Ranh Bay facility is a very substantial facility,
but David Lilienthal is on his way over there now to help work
out plans for conversion to civilian use in case of peace.
We have no desire, and we publicly have committed ourselves
to this many times, to maintain neither bases or troop presence
in South Vietnam if there is peace there.
Sentor Aiken. We have presence in Cuba. The difference is
we do not try to run the Cuban government from Guantanamo.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Aiken. But why isn't a permanent base at Cam Ranh
Bay or some other place just as logical as Guantanamo?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have bases in the Philippines and
in Okinawa, and we thought this might be a contribution towards
the possibilities of peaceful settlement to make it clear we
were not looking for a permanent position, a permanent
presence, military presence, in South Vietnam.

RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Sentor Aiken. Another thing that puzzles me somewhat is the
fact that while the President is trying to get on friendlier
terms with Russia, that we are furnishing the Russians with the
most beautiful target practice they ever had in perfecting
their new antiaircraft weapons, as I understand it. We have had
nearly 600 planes shot down over North Vietnam. Don't we ever
talk to the Russians about that?
Secretary Rusk. Not very much about that precise point. The
SAM missiles have been fired over 1,000 times, and I think that
only 30 of them have effected a hit.
Purely in military terms, I am not drawing any political
implication from this at all. I think that technical or the
tactical advantages, perhaps, are on our side in terms of
learning how to handle surface-to-air missiles.
Senator Aiken. Of course, if they only get a missile out of
a thousand shots----
Secretary Rusk. They have sent their top missile men out of
Vietnam to find out what is the matter, and we know this is a
major discovery they have made, and that is that their SAM
missiles are not very effective.
Senator Aiken. They must have fired 600,000 shots to get
those 600 planes.
Secretary Rusk. No. Most of the planes that have been lost
have been lost to conventional anti-aircraft fire as the plane
goes in for particular targets.
Senator Aiken. Have the Russians been furnishing anti-
aircraft guns to them?
Secretary Rusk. Some of it, and some come from China.
Senator Aiken. And they have been perfecting their anti-
aircraft weapons without any risk themselves.
Secretary Rusk. Possibly.
Senator Aiken. I thought it might be well to speak to them
about it quietly, in a soft tone of voice, maybe of what they
will be doing wrong.
Secretary Rusk. If they could translate their position
there into influence on Hanoi, to get going on the 1954 and
1962 agreements, there would be very substantial advantages to
us.

INCREASE IN NATIONALISM

Senator Aiken. There really is an increase in political
nationalism throughout the world, is there not? Aren't the
countries really more nationalistic than they have been for
some time?
Secretary Rusk. If you would look at the world as a whole,
perhaps slightly, but I do not think it has changed too much
over the decades.
Senator Aiken. In most cases where it puts up barriers,
international economics have a tendency to knock them flat, do
they not?
Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.
Senator Aiken. In other words, trade is important, and the
greatest potential wealth of the world, the trading area of the
world, is Southeast Asia, assuming that their purchasing power
can be developed.
Secretary Rusk. There has been a pretty steady growth in
regional economic arrangements, not just in the Common Market,
but in Central America particularly. Now they are talking very
actively about a broader Latin American free trade. You get
that same movement now among the free countries of Asia, so
that you have that over against the national feelings.
Senator Aiken. I have no more questions, but I have an idea
it is going to take a while to get out of Southeast Asia as it
did in the Philippines, and that was some time. We were there
50 years officially.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

THE THINKING BEHIND SEATO

Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I want to explore through
questions and your answers what the predominating thinking in
the fifties when we signed the various treaties related to
Southeast Asia in inducing us to sign those treaties.
Secretary Rusk. I think the most succinct statement--pardon
me, excuse me.
Senator Lausche. I begin with the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty signed September 8, 1954. I understand, of
course, my colleagues understand, that the President of that
year, Eisenhower, sent that treaty to the Senate to be
approved; is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And that treaty contained Article IV which
reads:

Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed
attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against
any State or Territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement
may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and
safety, and agree that it will in that event act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Senator Dodd. Is that the SEATO Treaty?
Senator Lausche. That is the Treaty.
Secretary Rusk. Article IV, paragraph 1.
Senator Lausche. Yes. In other words, when that treaty was
signed, the President of the United States, the Secretary of
State, and the Senate declared to the world that our security
was involved whenever armed attack was made upon any one of the
nations that subscribed to that treaty, is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And the nations that signed the treaty
were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, Cambodia,
Laos.
Secretary Rusk. Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were
protocol states. They did not sign the treaty but were covered
by the special protocol.
Senator Lausche. I see, there is a note there.

ANZUS TREATY

Now then, I go to the next treaty, and that is ANZUS, that
is a treaty made with Australia, I suppose, New Zealand, and
the United States?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. That treaty was signed in September 1951,
and at that time Truman was President?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. Do you recall who was Secretary of State?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Dean Acheson.
Senator Lausche. And that treaty came up to the Senate for
confirmation.
Now, I read from Article IV of that treaty:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

In order words, in 1951 on September 1, it was the firm
thinking of the Senate, President Truman and Secretary Acheson
and, I suppose, the government in general, that our security
was involved if any one of the signatories to that treaty were
attacked. Am I correct in that?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

MUTUAL COOPERATION TREATY WITH JAPAN

Senator Lausche. I now go to the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan
signed January 19, 1960, at which time Eisenhower was
President. Who was Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Christian Herter.
Senator Lausche. Herter.
Secretary Rusk. In 1960.
Senator Lausche. Article V of that treaty reads:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
party in the territories under administration of Japan would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.

That was again a declaration of our interest in Southeast
Asia and the relationship that it had to our own security.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, pardon me just a moment. I think
in the Japan treaty, that was limited to attack on Japan. I do
not think that treaty got into Southeast Asia, did it?
Senator Lausche. Well, whatever it is----
Secretary Rusk. I think so.
Senator Lausche. That is the language. You are familiar
with it.

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN

Now then, here is the next treaty, the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.
Article V reads:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West
Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.

That was signed December 2, 1954; Eisenhower President,
Dulles Secretary of State.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. I suppose the Senate, made up of members
who are at this table today--and I will want the staff to put
in the record how the votes were cast at that time----
Senator Morse. I voted against it.
Senator Lausche. Then you are consistent.
Senator Morse. I did not want to put the staff to work.

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA

Senator Lausche. I now go to the Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October
1953, Article III:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the Parties in territories now under their
respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by
one of the Parties is lawfully brought under the administrative
control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger.

THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Now, I ask you, has there been a single treaty entered into
with Asian nations and Southeast Asia that did not declare that
our security was involved and that, therefore, we entered into
those agreements?
Secretary Rusk. That underlying concept is in each of the
treaties we have in the Pacific Ocean area, in Asia.
Senator Lausche. Now, Eisenhower was President under most
of them. When Truman went into Korea, what was the motivation
for going into Korea at that time? Did it have underlying it
this same principle about the security of the United States
being involved?
Secretary Rusk. The basic view as to where the security
interests of the United States lay was the same. It had not
been put in treaty form at the time of the North Korean attack
on South Korea.
Senator Lausche. It was put into the treaty, in treaty
form, after Eisenhower took office.
Secretary Rusk. In 1953, yes, sir.

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND VIETNAM

Senator Lausche. Now we have Truman and Eisenhower, and I
now come to Kennedy.
When Kennedy became President, how many troops were in
South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. There were about 650 U.S. military there as
a part of the military assistance mission.
Senator Lausche. How many were there when he tragically
lost his life?
Secretary Rusk. Approximately 20,000, sir.
Senator Lausche. Did he, by expanding the number of troops
that were there, give indication of his judgment that we could
not allow South Vietnam to be taken over by the Communists
through aggression?
Secretary Rusk. He did, sir. The first thing he tried to
do, if I might take a moment, is to explore fully the
possibilities of a peaceful settlement. He talked about this
with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. It appeared that
the two of them had reached agreement on Laos on the basis that
everybody get out of Laos and leave this small land-locked
country to take care of themselves.
He was unable to get agreement on South Vietnam at the
Vienna meeting, and you remember he sent some special missions
out there, among them General Maxwell Taylor, to take a look at
the situation to see what needed to be done in the light of the
situation, and so when he examined it fully and he had on the
one side no prospect that there was agreement with the
Communist world on Vietnam, and on the other side our
commitment, and the situation, he moved substantially to
strengthen our participation there.
Senator Lausche. So you have Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson of the belief that our security and safety is
involved in what happens in Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And you have Acheson, Dulles, Herter--was
there any other Secretary of State----
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
Senator Lausche. And yourself.

THE POSSIBILITY OF DETENTE

Now then, that goes back 15, 20 years ago, what has changed
since that time that should induce us to believe that our
nation's security and safety have no relationship to what
happens in Southeast Asia?
Secretary Rusk. I think the principal changes in this
regard have not yet been fully developed. But I would say there
are the beginnings of the possibility of a detente and peaceful
co-existence with the countries of Eastern Europe. That is one
element of the situation which affects the problem.
Secondly, the authorities in Peking are coming to the
watershed of the transfer of power to the next generation, and
have found that a policy of extreme militancy has isolated them
within the Communist world, and that has had its repercussions
inside China.
Third is the development of nuclear weapons by Peking and,
therefore, the increasing importance of stabilizing the
situation and trying to organize a peace in the Pacific and to
induce there some of the same prudence that we begin to see
with our relations toward Eastern Europe. Those are the
principal changes since that period.

UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES UNCHANGED

Senator Lausche. All right. But with those changes can you
take those changes as the basis of saying that all that was
declared in these treaties by the Senate and by the President
and the Secretaries of State was erroneous and that those
reasons no longer exist for our being in Southeast Asia?
Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so. I think the
underlying principles remain the same. They would, over time,
Senator, be reduced in importance if there were some peace. In
other words, the way not to have an alliance to come into
operation is for nations to leave each other alone in
situations of this sort.
Senator Lausche. All right.

CHINA'S POLICY ON VIETNAM

Now I go to just one more question and then I will close. I
have the four points that have been submitted by Mao. Point
number four:

The internal affairs of South Vietnam should be settled by
the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the
program of the NFLSV.

I suppose that is the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. Has there been any yielding on that point
four by Mao?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it might be avoiding
confusion if we referred to that as Ho Chi Minh's point three,
however it might have appeared there in what you have.
Senator Lausche. All right.
Secretary Rusk. We have not seen a revision of that, and if
I could say this off the tape----
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Lausche. This final question.
Senator Mundt. Will you yield? What has happened?
Secretary Rusk. We have not had a reply on that particular
point. We have offered them alternative language, and we have
had no reply.

THE LAOTIAN AGREEMENT

Senator Lausche. Now, the Laos Treaty or protocol, whatever
you call it, was signed in 1962?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. The agreement provided for the withdrawal
of all troops of all foreign nations?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. Specific points were designated where the
departure was to be made so that the three countries, I assume
Canada----
Secretary Rusk. India and Poland.
Senator Lausche [continuing]. Poland and India would be
able to tell whether they had left.
Have United States troops left Laos?
Secretary Rusk. They left as soon as that agreement was
concluded, sir.
Senator Lausche. Have the Communists complied with that
agreement?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir. Our estimate is that the level of
North Vietnamese forces in Laos never dropped below 6,000.
Senator Lausche. That is all.
Senator Pell. May I just interpolate to clarify the record.
Aren't there still elements of American activity in Laos that
are not of a formal military nature, that would balance that
6,000?
Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact, we now carry out
certain military operations in Laos, but the point is that we
complied with that agreement and would be prepared today to
comply with it 1,000 percent if we can get anybody else to.
The Chairman. Did you give the alternative language to
point three that the Senator asked you about?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir; I did not, and I would prefer not
to, Senator, if I may. As a matter of fact, what we suggested
was very much like----
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to
point six at the bottom of the first page where we have added
to the original point, ``We will be prepared to accept
preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points
as a basis for negotiations.''
I think that is all we should say about that at the present
time in order to keep open the possibilities they just might
come back.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?

WHEN THIS WAR IS OVER

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I shall be brief. I was
interested in your comments in response to Senator Aiken's
question about at the end of hostilities this war is over and
our boys are coming home; we are moving out of Southeast Asia.
Based on the past in Korea and Cuba, and our great investment
in this area where we have now probably the finest docking
facilities of any place in the Southeast Asia area except
Japan--we have great airfields; great air bases, do you think
the surrounding countries would permit us to move out any more
than they would permit us to move out now?
Secretary Rusk. The seven nations, Senator Carlson, which
have forces in South Vietnam, said in the Manila communique
that allied forces shall be withdrawn, after close
consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the
North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus
subsides; that those forces will be withdrawn as soon as
possible and not later than six months after the above
conditions have been fulfilled.
We have since World War II, or including World War II, had
very large and important military facilities in connection with
various enterprises that we have gone into, and we have
demonstrated a capability of withdrawing from those facilities
at the end of the period when they were needed.
Our hope is that Cam Ranh Bay, for example, which is a
spectacularly effective and beautiful natural harbor, could
become a major port for the service of the upper two-thirds of
South Vietnam, and it should be converted to civilian,
industrial and trading purposes.
Mr. David Lilienthal is going to be helping us on
developing those plans. I think the seven nations who are most
directly involved in this situation have agreed among
themselves on this point.
Now, if at some time in the future the assault on South
Vietnam were renewed, then the governments at that time would
have to decide what to do about it. But we want to make it
clear that we are not after any special military position in
Southeast Asia as far as we are concerned.

MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

Senator Carlson. With that last statement I fully agree,
and I can see that we are not. But also I can see, looking
further into the future, if we do not maintain substantial
forces in that area, what is there to prevent the Red Chinese
from going down and taking over the greatest facilities ever
constructed in that area, and they could do it very easily?
Secretary Rusk. The prospect that the United States would
once again meet its treaty commitments and would join with
others to prevent that occurring.
Senator Carlson. That is the point I am making. We do not
want to get committed to a position here where after a few
years, after terrific loss of life and great expenditures of
funds, we have to get back, and some day soon I trust we will
reach agreement when that war will end, and whenever it does
end, that decision is going to have to be made despite your
Manila agreement.
I think we have to look that one over because we have
invested men and material in this operation, and it just looks
to me, I think we are making a big mistake if we go out and
tell the people of the United States--I know it was made, I
read your Manila declaration--that we will soon move out of
there. I do not think we should do that.
Secretary Rusk. Under certain conditions.
Senator Carlson. Well, those conditions, I think, will
develop very rapidly after the conclusion of this war. I hope
they do not, but I think we have again assumed the
responsibility in Southeast Asia, I don't say whether we should
or should not, but I think we are going to have to meet that
issue, and I hope the administration and the government itself
does not lead our people to believe on the day this war is
over, six months after, the declaration says we are coming
home. I hope we do, but I can see another issue.
You know, I have been interested in the tone of the Hearst
publications on this war, and they have been in thorough
support of the President and in its operation. But in this last
issue--and I assume you may have read it--they said they were
fearful that world opinion is having too much influence on the
operation of this war.

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

I think there is some danger of world opinion, NATO--we
have discussed all these projects, NATO, Rhodesia--I think we
are in Rhodesia because of the African opinion, not because of
Great Britain. I do not think we are obligated. I think we made
a mistake, and I think if world opinion enters into this
Vietnam situation we will be caught in a bind. I hope we are
not.
I cannot help but bring it up this morning because I am
fearful of the future.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, perhaps what I said earlier was
too broad on the Rhodesian matter. I believe that in the U.S.
national interests and our own interests in the entire
continent of Africa, as to what happens in that country, I
think it was necessary for us to take a stand as we did on
Rhodesia. I did not want to----
Senator Carlson. I appreciate your position, Mr. Secretary,
but you and I and the Commerce Department have had about 14,
16, 18 months of discussion on some of our problems in South
Africa when it comes to selling airplanes. I know you are
familiar with it, selling planes for dollars to the Republic of
South Africa, and it was finally resolved in favor of the
United States, but only after, I would say, 18 months of
bickering and discussions, and it was resolved because Great
Britain was going to sell those planes and use U.S. engines.
I appreciate the Secretary's action in this. I think it was
right, but I know this situation, if we get involved and too
carried away by pressure from other countries and forget our
own nation, I do not like to say that, but we get carried away
in this world opinion matter. I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDITIONS

I have two questions, Mr. Secretary. I thought I heard you
say that North Vietnamese had proposed three different sets of
conditions, unconditional with respect to the bombing,
unconditional and for good, unconditional and definitive, but
the third one escaped me.
Secretary Rusk. These were three different ways of what
appear to us to be saying the same thing, permanent,
definitively, and for good. Whether these are differences in
different translations of the same Vietnamese words I am not
quite sure. Harrison Salisbury said in an interview
unconditionally and for good. Another statement put in
definitively. But the word ``permanently'' is the most frequent
word they use in that regard. At all times they say
unconditional.
Senator Dodd. I see.

THE INDONESIAN SITUATION

The second question I would like to ask is with respect to
the Indonesian situation. I am not clear what your position is.
I understood you to say that you would not go so far as to say
our presence in Vietnam was decisive.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would quite frankly be very
comfortable about saying to you that what we are doing in
Vietnam was the decisive influence on the events in Indonesia.
I cannot in candor say that.
Senator Dodd. Would you say----
Secretary Rusk. But what I said was that I thought it had
some influence. How much I am not quite sure. I did say that
prominent officials of Indonesia said to us that it did have a
decisive influence, but it is hard to answer that question
accurately and specifically.
I did not want to be in a position of exaggerating that
particular point as far as we look at the situation. I have no
doubt that it had some influence, and it might have had even
more influence if the Chinese had attempted to send their own
armed forces by sea to reinforce the PKI during that period,
you see.
The fact that the Seventh Fleet was there and the British
Fleet was there, and so forth, this could have made quite a
difference, of course.
Senator Dodd. Would you say that a long term effort to help
Indonesia in our aid program, in, I assume, other respects
certainly helped those or, Ices in Indonesia to compel the
efforts to overturn the government?
Secretary Rusk. I think it proved in hindsight to have been
very useful for the United States over the years to keep some
sort of contact going and alive even though there were times
when it was painful to do so.
Senator Dodd. Yes, I was critical of it, so I am giving you
an opportunity to get even. But I take it that it did pay off
and that with our presence in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. I think it is just not on the military
side, although that turned out to be useful, but our labor
unions have had very important and constructive relationships
with some of the labor unions in Indonesia, and our university
people in the same way. There were times when it was very
difficult to keep those going for reasons on both sides, some
of which you will remember.
But I think, on the whole, it has demonstrated that in that
instance certainly patience and a little persistence turned out
to be a good thing.

INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

Senator Dodd. I put it essentially that it seems to me our
policy with respect to Indonesia, and in continuing to try to
give them assistance in all of the respects you have mentioned
and others, and our presence in South Vietnam, did have a very
strong influence on the outcome of the struggle in Indonesia
between the Communist forces or pro-Communist forces, and those
other forces more friendly to the West, is that right?
Secretary Rusk. I think it has an important influence,
Senator.
I think it had an important influence.
Senator Dodd. It certainly did appear to the people in that
respect.
Secretary Rusk. I think I ought to say when the moment of
truth came in Indonesia, as it did, between these opposing
troops, we were not involved in that in any way. Maybe these
people would ask the question, ``If you were not, why weren't
you?'' But there was a wholly Indonesian problem here, and we
were not involved in it surreptitiously or otherwise, except
for these overt reasons, the public reasons, we were in Vietnam
and had maintained the contacts, and everybody would know we
would be sympathetic if the Indonesians found a way to fend off
the attempt of the PKI to seize power.
Senator Dodd. It certainly would be fair to say, would it
not, that all of the things we did do and tried to do in
Indonesia itself, and our presence in South Vietnam, certainly
influenced the thinking of the Indonesian people in this
critical hour.
Secretary Rusk. I think that is fair, sir.
Senator Dodd. That is all I have.
The Chairman. Senator Williams.

U.S. AND BRITISH POLICIES TOWARD RHODESIA

Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, in general, I have been
supporting your positions that you have taken in South Vietnam.
It is a little hard for me to understand why we have just
joined Great Britain in imposing economic sanctions on
Rhodesia, but I noticed in the press the other day that Great
Britain is selling fertilizer and chemicals to Castro, going to
finance a plant, and also continuing to trade, as we
understand, with both North Vietnam and China. How can we
reconcile those two positions, particularly when Great Britain
itself is one of the members of SEATO?
Secretary Rusk. First, sir, on the Rhodesian matter, this
is not a matter which was purely bilateral between us and
Britain, a commitment by the United States in support of
Britain because it was Britain. We have, in fact, at times had
some margins of difference with Britain over the Rhodesian
question, both in the direction of pursuing the talks more and
in the direction of being careful about the general attitude of
the African countries.
We were acting in the Rhodesian thing as a matter of
national interest in respect of the total continent there, as a
factor over and above different from the attitude of Britain.

FLAGSHIPS OUT OF HONG KONG

Secondly, Britain is not itself trading with North Vietnam,
with the exception of an occasional flagship out of Hong Kong
controlled by a company in Hong Kong.
Senator Williams. Isn't that to a certain extent like some
of our American companies owning under a Panamanian flag?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, it is possible, sir. But they do not
feel they have the kind of control in that situation in the
colony there and, Senator, one reason, since this trade is
almost minuscule, one reason that I personally feel somewhat
relaxed about it, is I do not want to have the question put to
us if we do those things to Hong Kong which causes the people
on the mainland to go after Hong Kong, is the U.S. going to
help them in Hong Kong, and I do not want to have anything to
do with that problem.
Senator Williams. To the extent we understand, and I have
seen this excuse before, but Great Britain has control over the
ships going into Hong Kong.
Do I understand these same ships, using the flag from Hong
Kong, British-owned ships, can continue to trade with Rhodesia
and not be subject to this blockage and Great Britain has no
control over those companies and cannot stop them?
Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so.
Senator Williams. It has stopped them in Rhodesia.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Williams. And they would stop them in North Vietnam
on the same basis if they wanted to, couldn't they?
Secretary Rusk. It would require legislation, I believe.
Senator Williams. It did not require legislation in
Rhodesia.
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, it was an Order in Council
with respect to Rhodesia.
Senator Williams. Now, the fertilizer plant which she is
financing for Mr. Castro.
Secretary Rusk. We do not like that and other countries in
this hemisphere do not like it and have expressed our views
very strongly in London. Britain has a different policy than we
do on this, and we haven't been able to prevail. That is the
way it is. Here is a point in which we and they simply disagree
on.

CHINESE STEEL SHIPMENTS

Senator Williams. One final question. I notice it was first
reported in the London Observer, in which these steel shipments
to which another member referred----
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Williams. I read that story and, as I read the
story, we gave the official explanation that this steel was in
short supply and that it had been purchased and we were going
to stop it. Did we----
Secretary Rusk. No.
Senator Williams. Did we completely deny there was any such
transaction at all and that story was false?
Secretary Rusk. When something like that comes in we first
try to find out what the facts are. We investigated this. The
Singapore Government has denied it and has accounted to us for
the steel shipments that they got out of China through Hong
Kong, and where that steel went, and the record shows that the
steel went to places other than Vietnam. So that my answer to
you today is, to the best of our ability to proceed to find
out, there was nothing in that story.
Senator Williams. And it did not ultimately end up in South
Vietnam at all?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir. I am not suggesting
that all the trading that goes on there may not be some things
brought out of China through Hong Kong that may not turn up
anywhere, including this country, through a third or fourth
country trading. But we did look into the steel matter, and we
have been able to locate where that steel went. It did not go
to Vietnam.
Senator Williams. Thank you.
Secretary Rusk. I will get the committee the details.
Senator Aiken. It did not go to Wilmington.
Secretary Rusk. Not to Wilmington. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Clark.

THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SITUATION

Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your
comments on the antiballistic missile situation with respect to
the policy of the Department. Also, how much can you tell us
about what Ambassador Thompson is up to, what you and Mr.
Dobrynin have been able to achieve, and generally speaking
whether you have read Roswell Gilpatric's article in the New
York Times of yesterday, and whether you are generally in
sympathy with the point of view he expressed, which is we ought
to do everything feasible to prevent an escalation of the arms
race by either Russia or ourselves of the ballistic missiles.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, could we, perhaps, leave this
part of it off the tape?
[Discussion off the record.]

TAKING OVER THE WAR FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator Clark. I would like to move into one more question.
What is the rationale, Mr. Secretary, behind or, perhaps, are
the press reports true, that we are committed to moving in
force into the Mekong Delta in order to take over the
responsibilities in that area that South Vietnam has hitherto
attempted to carry on? What is the rationale behind the search
and destroy massive maneuvers in the Iron Triangle? Are we
still committed to an increasing policy of taking over from the
South Vietnamese the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and what is
our own view as to whether this will not result in casualties
far beyond any productive results?
Secretary Rusk. First, on the Iron Triangle, this has been
an area near Saigon which has been a major Viet Cong
headquarters and supply center for a long time, and out of that
come raids and operations against communications as well as
against the city itself.
It is a relatively lightly populated area. As you know, we
are moving the civilians out as the operation proceeds. But as
far as the U.S. taking over the main battle is concerned, I
just noticed in the daily military report this morning that I
see every day, that the operations of battalion size or larger
going on yesterday, I have the figure here exactly, I think
there were 11 U.S., 2 allied, other allies, and something like
18 or 20 South Vietnamese.
The South Vietnamese are engaging in full operations. We
are trying to get them moved toward pacification, which is
something of a misleading term in this sense, that does not
mean the South Vietnamese are going to take fewer casualties.
This pacification effort is a very mean part of the war, but it
is something the South Vietnamese may be better able and fitted
to do than we in working in the villages and rooting out the
Viet Cong from the rest of the population.
The Mekong Delta, part of this is immediately adjacent to
Saigon. We are interested very much in securing the Saigon
area. The Delta is a source of rice and men for the Viet Cong
in Corps One, Two and Three. I think it is a tactical matter as
to which of the 43 provinces our forces operate in primarily,
and which are primarily for the South Vietnamese forces.

A 100 PERCENT AMERICAN WAR

Senator Clark. I would suggest, Mr. Secretary, it is much
more strategic than tactical, and it is another obvious
indication, if it is true we are moving in for the first time
in force in the Mekong Delta, that we are slowly but surely
making this a 100 percent American war, and I would like your
comments on that.
Secretary Rusk. Well, the record of operations, the record
of casualties, the missions performed just do not show it,
Senator. As I say, I have the figure here----
Senator Clark. Well, they certainly did a few months ago,
Mr. Secretary, when American casualties increased, and they
have drastically increased all through 1966, and the South
Vietnamese casualties for several weeks were less than ours.
I would find it a little surprising if you would deny that
we have been more and more involved in search and destroy
operations in South Vietnam with an ever-increasing list of
American casualties--that is true, is it not?
Secretary Rusk. I did not say that. I was saying yesterday
in operations of battalion size or larger there were 11 U.S.
and 22 South Vietnamese. They were carrying on twice as many
operations in numbers.

U.S. SUFFERING MORE CASUALTIES

Senator Clark. I do not want to get into an argument with
you. I have this map here. You remember the fuss I made about
this matter a year ago. It looks like we have not any more
ground, and we have suffered many casualties. The casualties
are what bother me. We talk an awful lot about the strategic
value. What gets me down is we are not really paying enough
attention to how many American boys are getting killed.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, you are not more concerned with
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young men
who were betrayed into World War II because the governments
refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in the world.
I hate these casualties just as much----
Senator Clark. Would you mind if I give my entire attention
to you, and let your staff assistant postpone his comments?
Secretary Rusk. I say you are not more concerned with
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young
people that was betrayed into World War II with tens of
millions of casualties all over the world because the
governments of that day, including the Government of the United
States, refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in
the world.
Now, we have taken 190,000 casualties since 1945 all over
the world, and it is bloody and difficult and burdensome, but
the effort has been, and is beginning to show some signs of
paying off that we can organize a peace before we let this go
down the chute-the-chute to World War III. This is what it is
all about, and these casualties being undertaken out there are
highly relevant to the question of whether we are going to
organize some peace, or whether most of the world is going to
go up in flames one of these days.
Senator Clark. Well, I think that is where you and I find
ourselves in disagreement, and I do not think it desirable, Mr.
Chairman, to pursue it any further at this point. I think we
can organize the peace without getting all these Americans
killed.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Senator Clark. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

NUCLEAR WARHEAD DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Senator Mundt. Did I understand you to say in this proposed
proliferation or non-proliferation treaty, it would not include
the delivery systems?
Secretary Rusk. It concentrates on the nuclear warheads and
does not try to deal with the question of delivery systems.
Sentor Mundt. Why not?
Secretary Rusk. Because the effect is to prevent the spread
of warheads, whereas delivery systems can be everything from
ordinary aircraft to artillery, to anything else, and it would
be awfully hard to combine a delivery system into a non-
proliferation treaty.
Senator Mundt. From our standpoint vis-a-vis, China isn't
there a problem of getting a delivery system? They have got the
bomb.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we would be interested in finding a
way to keep them out of the ICBM business or IRBM business. But
they have got delivery systems now, ordinary aircraft or the
most shortranged missiles or presumably they will eventually
develop atomic capability with artillery. So the delivery
problem is a different problem from that of the warhead.
Senator Mundt. The problem is they do not have a delivery
system from their standpoint, but they are going to get one.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
Senator Mundt. And I think a non-proliferation treaty that
ignores that is good for others but no good for us.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think the problem of delivery
systems is a special and, in some respects, a more complicated
question. For example, if you get into the delivery system
business, should we go back to the Baruch proposals or not?
This sounds these days like a rather wild idea, but would the
security of the United States be enhanced if the world went
completely conventional again? Now, if we say, no, we have got
to have missile deterrence ourselves, then getting some control
of these on the part of other countries is going to be
extremely difficult.
Senator Mundt. Don't you think we have to say yes to that
question?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we ought to think about it
more than we have thought about it in the last few years
because we sort of have taken it for granted that somehow we
have to have a nuclear force ourselves.
I think one of the great tragedies myself was--well, so
much has happened since--that the Baruch proposals were not
accepted.
Senator Mundt. I agree.

NO QUID PRO QUO WITH BRITAIN

Like most of others who have commented on Rhodesia, I am
rather completely disenchanted with the way we have been sucked
into the situation over there. Let me ask you this direct
question: Before we yielded so quickly to the persuasiveness of
Great Britain, as if we were still a colony of theirs as we
were before 1776, have we ever tried to make an agreement in
which we would obtain a quid pro quo with her relative to this
business in Cuba, with respect to the trouble in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we did not make a condition with
respect to a quid pro quo. We have discussed this in relation
to other questions where we would hope to get some more
cooperation from them, and one reason for it is there are
nineteen members of the Commonwealth involved in this, and the
general membership in the United Nations, so a quid pro quo by
a particular member would not be responsive to our national
interests in dealing with problems in Africa or our problems
relating to the very existence of the Commonwealth, or our
interests as expressed in the United Nations.
Senator Mundt. Except that they needed us for the sanctions
program.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think if we had taken the other
view on this that, perhaps, some of our friends in Britain
would have simply used that to say, ``Well, you see, we were
prepared to do this, but the Americans are not going to back us
up,'' and they would have used it to get them off the hook.
Senator Mundt. Do you really think in your own mind a
program of sanctions, short of a military blockade, can ever
bring Rhodesia to its knees?
Senator Mundt. Well, I think, sir, the problem is not so
much bringing them to their knees in that sense.
Senator Mundt. Trying to get them to do what we want.
Secretary Rusk. So much as bringing them into a discussion
where they would be willing to make more sense than they have
thus far.

ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

Senator Mundt. It seems to me the most you can hope for if
our sanctions proceed is bringing a consolidation of South
Africa and Rhodesia into a compact or making them one country,
and then you magnify the problems.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe South Africa is going to
substitute itself for the rest of the world in Rhodesian trade.
This is a very serious problem for South Africa. I do not think
the Portuguese will do it. The Portuguese do say, if sanctions
are applied, that they must apply them at the source and not
try to use Portugal as the policeman simply because they have
an adjacent territory.
Senator Mundt. Do I interpret your statement that you
believe South Africa is not going to send oil to Rhodesia?
Secretary Rusk. The question is whether they will send oil
in quantities additional to the normal flow, which was not
particularly large, and that is the question.
We had hoped South Africa would stay out of this so there
cannot be raised the fairly serious problems of sanctions
against South Africa. We objected to those at the United
Nations.
Senator Mundt. Do you think South Africa is going to
continue or discontinue shipping oil?
Secretary Rusk. I would be surprised if they cut off the
oil below the levels which were going in before the sanctions
were applied. I would be somewhat surprised on that. What I do
not know the answer to is whether they would increase that
supply of oil.
Senator Mundt. If they continue at the same rate this is OK
with Rhodesia. They got by before this.
Secretary Rusk. Rhodesian oil is coming in through other
channels, Mozambique as well.

SOME REDUCTION IN TENSIONS

Senator Mundt. Let me ask you a hypothetical question. Just
how do you define, let us say we have got countries A and B--I
do not have to identify them--any particular countries who have
been quarreling and are suspicious of each other, and you have
a detente. What do you have?
Secretary Rusk. I got trapped on that one in a press
conference. They asked me that, and I said I did not think we
could see a detente, but I can see some reduction of tensions,
and one of the reporters looked it up in the dictionary and
said that detente means reduction of tensions.
But I think, in the first instance, the notion of detente--
to pull away from each other on those matters--that could mean
war. That is in connection with which it was intended, and I
think we are beginning to see some more prudent attitude in
Eastern Europe, and I am speaking of the thinking of the
smaller Eastern European countries, some.
It takes a good many swallows to make a summer, and you
have to probe this pretty carefully, but we would like to keep
up with the possibilities on our own side----
Senator Mundt. Let me put it this way: Suppose country A is
at war with country C, and we are trying to get a detente with
country B. Country B is hoping that country C defeats country A
or kills country A's boys. Can we conceivably have a detente
under those circumstances?
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is applying that specifically to
the Soviet Union and to North Vietnam----
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. And the United States.
Senator Mundt. And the United States.
Secretary Rusk. Because if, as I think it would be true--I
think the Soviet Union would be satisfied to see this South
Asian matter settled on the basis of the 1954 and 1962
agreements--then we have a more complicated situation than a
more harsh all-out--I hope myself that attitude on the part of
the Soviet Union can be translated into some effective
influence or effective international action to help to bring
this matter to a peaceful conclusion.

SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

I do not think we ourselves on our side should say that
because the Soviet Union is giving assistance to North Vietnam
and----
Senator Mundt. She is supplying every sophisticated weapon
they use in Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. Whatever sophisticated weapons they have,
such as SAM missiles and MIG 21, radar----
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Those things particularly. I
think it would be to our advantage not to let this get into a
completely black and white, implacable hostility kind of
situation and thereby reduce our room for some maneuver and,
indeed, some assistance when the time comes. When the time
comes----
Senator Mundt. You have got, on the one hand, the theory,
how well-grounded and how firm you never told us, that the
Russians would really like this thing settled on the basis of
the time before it started. That is the theory. How well-
documented it is I do not know.
But the fact that they are continuing to supply every
sophisticated weapon, that needs to be stubborn to the
fulfillment of that theory. If the theory is sound, it seems to
me, the Russians have it so easily available to sort of talk to
Hanoi saying, ``We are about fed up supplying all these
sophisticated weapons, we are going to reduce the supply or cut
it off,'' and I see no support for the theory in terms of the
action. I do not know where you get your theory. Maybe it is
whispered in your ear by some diplomat, maybe he is sincere and
maybe not. But I see no overt evidence at all.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is hard to get the overt evidence,
Senator, and in dealing with these people one has to recognize
that you can be wrong tomorrow morning at nine o'clock on a
proposition like that.
But one of the questions to which we have not got a full
answer to is this pause in the cessation of bombing. If these
people cannot deliver Hanoi and say what Hanoi can do, perhaps
they can at least tell us what they can do, so it is in this
context that your question comes up, and we have not found out
what the answer to that is yet, but this is the kind of
question we are working on all the time.

DIVIDENDS FROM THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Senator Mundt. One other point. Speaking as a supporter of
the State Department's foreign policy, I have been a little bit
disappointed in your testimony today on two points. You have
sort of shot out of the saddle two of the justifications which
I have made publicly at home, which are in my own mind reasons
for supporting the foreign policy and the war in Vietnam, and I
was a little bit disappointed when you said that you did not
believe that one of the dividends from our efforts in Vietnam
was the rather salutary developments which have been occurring
in Indonesia. I have said I thought they were connected.
You have been very careful to point out you feel if there
is any relationship it is very remote.
The other disappointment is I supported reluctantly the
plea that you made when you came into the Senate and to the
House and said that Sukarno says, ``The hell with American
aid,'' and they voted against it in the House, and you came
here and said that we have to continue some of our aid to keep
certain government functions going if we were either to prevent
a Communist takeover from China or to get a good leader who
would be more neutral from the standpoint of isms, Americanism
and communism, if something happened to Sukarno and he died or
was replaced.
Now, you have told us that you do not believe that that aid
that you induced us to give you--the Senate wrote some nice
ambiguous language--could be continued.
Now you tell us you do not think that was very important in
building up the stable elements over there enabling them to
survive and get some kind of government which is not controlled
by Sukarno.
You shot out of the saddle two of the bases of my support.
I may not be as enthusiastic----
Secretary Rusk. There may be some misunderstanding on your
second point. I did not want to diminish the second point at
all. I did add the comment that it was not in the military
channels that these relations are productive, but through the
trade unions and the universities.
Senator Mundt. All of which could have gone on without your
coming here and pleading with us to override the House of
Representatives, that we were going to save the situation, we
had better support it, and we did.
Secretary Rusk. I had not supposed I had minimized in my
discussions----
Senator Mundt. I am sure you minimized it in my mind when
you put it to what the labor unions and the cultural exchanges
had done. You certainly minimized it to me.

A QUESTION OF EMPHASIS

Secretary Rusk. On the first question, there is a question
of emphasis. My own inclination on most of these questions is
to be a little moderate about claiming direct results from
particular things, particularly when the situation in Indonesia
was very complicated.
There was a connection. I am sure there was a connection. I
am sure the present Indonesian leaders felt there was a
connection. I just did not want to say to you that because--I
do not believe that our being in Vietnam played a decisive role
at the key time in Indonesia. There were good Indonesian
explanations for much of this. I am sure that had a
constructive and helpful influence, but at least as Secretary
of State I ought to feel that I ought not myself to exaggerate
this.
Now, look at the possibilities. Sukarno is still there. We
think that he is under control. We think that the new
government will remain in power, but if that should change----
Senator Mundt. Do you think our pulling out of Vietnam
would enhance or decrease Sukarno's chances?
Secretary Rusk. I think it would greatly enhance it; it
would enhance it. Let me go back to my mood of moderation.
Senator Mundt. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Pell?

U.N. ROLE IN RHODESIAN SANCTIONS

Senator Pell. I think I sympathize with you when I see all
the foreign policies represented around the table here.
Is not our imposition of sanctions in Rhodesia basically
the result of our membership in the United Nations?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Pell. I think this is a point which should be on
the record. We have received many benefits, including the
avoidance of civil wars through the U.N., and it involves
certain responsibilities, too.
I understand from press reports that a new Under Secretary
of State for Administration will be appointed, and I would like
to leave with you the thought, obviously in this executive
session it can be said but not in the open session, perhaps--
that I would hope that the appointment would be a man of very
broad gauge, not a professional administrator or a man in that
line, but a man who could give to whatever changes are
necessary the internal direction rather than relying for
external direction.
I did not know that that or if that would coincide with
your views. I realize it may be a little premature to discuss
this.
Secretary Rusk. This is a matter that is under
consideration by the President, and presumably a nomination
will be coming forward in due course.
Senator Pell. I would hope a broad gauge non-professional
administrator would be chosen.

RESULTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Next, if we get to the conference table in Vietnam and
reach an agreement with the North, and follow out our present,
which I think are correct, intentions, withdrawing from
Southeast Asia, would it not be a problem of fact that in
several years Vietnam would be unified, probably under a
nationalist, technically Communist leadership, and would that
not be the probable result through peaceful means?
Secretary Rusk. I would not think so, Senator.
Over this period of time, the last twenty years, North
Vietnam has become thoroughly consolidated as a Communist
system. South Vietnam has rejected the Communist system for
itself. You have the same problems in the two parts of Korea
and the two parts of Germany.
I think North Vietnam is not going to be interested in
reunification on a non-Communist basis and, by and large, I say
that may be an oversimplification, but I think that is true,
and I think South Vietnam is not going to be interested in
reunification on a Communist basis. These Buddhists and
Catholics and Montagnards and Cambodians and northern refugees,
apparently while disagreeing among themselves on many other
things, seem to agree on that. So if this is left to the free
choices of the people in the two parts of Vietnam, I think it
is rather unlikely that there will be reunification any time
soon.

LET PEOPLE DECIDE THROUGH ELECTIONS

Senator Pell. You would not think some sort of government
like that in Yugoslavia, where each side gives in the other
direction, would probably emerge, and to my mind it would not
be a bad thing from the viewpoint of American national
interest.
Secretary Rusk. Well, time factors, I can think if there is
moderation of Communist organization and techniques and peace
coexistence coming out of Mainland China and that sort of
thing, that in the longest run you may have some drawing
together, just as we hope that somehow the West Germans and the
East Germans can find ways to draw together despite these large
ideological conflicts. But I do not see that as anything that
is going to contribute to the settlement of this present
situation other than the willingness, as we have expressed it,
to let that question be decided by the people themselves in
their own way through free elections.

THE ADVANTAGE OF NEGOTIATING

Senator Pell. Then would you believe there is any validity
to the theory that the North Vietnamese really do not wish to
come to the conference table, that they would see the
possibility to achieving the objectives becoming, but that they
consider their achieving the results of world revolution better
by continuing the military level of activities, and it is to
our advantage to get them to the conference table more than
theirs?
Secretary Rusk. Well, clearly they do not see much
advantage to them in coming to the conference table because
they have had hundreds of chances to and have consistently said
no.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, and also at least in my own view,
the possibility of attaining success in coming to a conference
table, from what their overt objectives are?
Secretary Rusk. That is right. I do not believe they make
the judgment if they came to the conference table they would
get what they said they wanted to get in 1960. I think that is
right.

DANGEROUS SITUATION IN CHINA

Senator Pell. Do you believe the situation is extra
dangerous in Vietnam now where we see in China the opposing
forces struggling with the Mao forces, of an effort being made
to divert the attention of the Chinese people from internal
difficulties and to attempt external intervention such as they
did in India several years ago?
Secretary Rusk. This is a possibility one has to watch.
Quite frankly, we do not see the situation in China developing
that way at the present time, but we are keeping a very close
eye on it. We do not see troop movements. We do not see
statements from leaders, either privately or publicly,
indicating that that is what they have in mind. But it is
theoretically a possibility, and we are watching very closely.

NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER

Senator Pell. What would be the present proportions of new
increments of manpower on the opposition side in South Vietnam
of local recruitment versus infiltration? Would it be about 60-
40 ratio?
Secretary Rusk. For the most recent three or four months, I
would have to check the figures on that. I would think that
probably 60-40 is not too far off.
Senator Pell. Sixty local, forty from the North?
Secretary Rusk. Probably.
Senator Pell. And the weapons we have captured, are they
divided up what percent between West and East?
Secretary Rusk. I would have to check the latest figures on
that. Most of the weapons we are getting now are Chinese
manufactured, but I would have to check that.
Senator Pell. The substantial majority would be, you say?
Secretary Rusk. That is right. You see, the Liberation
Front Forces and the North Vietnamese Forces unified their
weaponry about a year ago, went to the same caliber. It
happened to be caliber for which our ammunition is not
suitable, so they not only brought in the weapons buy they have
to continue to bring in the ammunition to keep them supplied.
These are submachine guns, the rifles, the carbines, light
machine guns, things of that sort.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Senator Pell. As you know, we have had some interest for
some time in this question of civilian casualties, and I am
well aware of the horrible tortures, murders of our friends in
South Vietnam.
Why has it proved so difficult to get anywhere near so
general an estimate now for a year and a half, where we have
been sparring on this question, as to the real extent of the
civilian casualties in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, one of the problems is we do not have
exact information on who might be in a particular place when it
is struck. For example, on a POL dump, there are no houses
around it, and that kind of thing, who happens to be there at
the time.
Another problem is whom would you classify as civilians for
this purpose? The truck drivers in a convoy coming down the
road toward the South, a line of coolies bringing in packs on
their backs, coming into the--toward the--South? If you hit a
railway bridge and there are people there working on the
bridge, are they Chinese construction engineer soldiers or are
they civilians? There are some very difficult questions of
classification.
But I would comment, Senator, that I do not know that there
has ever been any struggle anywhere in which such extraordinary
efforts are made, both in the field and back here, to try to
minimize or eliminate what might be called innocent civilian
casualties.
Now, they have occurred. But on the fixed targets, that is
as compared with the route reconnaissance along the routes of
infiltration, the fixed targets have produced a surprisingly
small number of civilian casualties.
Senator Pell. I would agree with everything you have said,
but I think those of us who have been pressing this question
really wanted education.

COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTIONS

I noticed the latent hostility in Germany, what hostility
there is to the United States, which is based on the effect of
civilian casualties from raids, and it still remains a certain
amount. It is never expressed.
I am wondering if these casualties are large, as they would
seem to be, if, perhaps, some of our actions are
counterproductive, and to arrive at that, that we press for an
estimate, merely in terms of thousands. But when we get a
figure of 100 civilian casualties in a six-month period, there
is obviously something a little off.
Secretary Rusk. The only figure of that kind I heard was
identifiable civilian casualties inflicted by operations of our
own forces.
Senator Pell. In South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. In South Vietnam.
Senator Pell. Even that seems modest.
Secretary Rusk. That you can be somewhat more accurate
about than what is happening in North Vietnam.
Senator Pell. Thank you.

A REFERENDUM IN TAIWAN

One final question, trying to see a way out of our present
impasse in our relations with China: In your view, and you have
much knowledge in this area in the light of your previous
responsibilities and work--what would be the result of a
referendum in Formosa or Taiwan between--an open referendum
between--the Chiang Kai-shek government and some other
government?
Secretary Rusk. Some other government in Formosa?
Senator Pell. A local Taiwanese government, Taiwan
candidates. You know, the figures are about ten percent of the
Taiwanese are represented in the Parliament, whereas they make
up about 80 percent of the people, et cetera, 90 percent or 80
percent.
Secretary Rusk. I would think at some point such a
plebiscite might indicate that the Formosans would like to have
more of a Formosan control over their own affairs.
As you know, the theory of the present government there is
based upon the theory that it is a Mainland, an all-China
government, in which the Formosan Province is one of the
provinces.
But my impression is that the purely Formosan Nationalist
feeling, on the one side, and in its relation to the
Mainlanders, on the other, is somewhat more relaxed in the ten
years certainly than it was at the very beginning when there
were some pretty harsh feelings there.
I suppose about 80 to 90 percent of the enlisted personnel
of the present armed forces, the present army, of the Republic
of China are now Formosan personnel.
Senator Pell. Might not this be one of the eventual
approaches to getting us off our present wicket when the time
comes, and there is need for a change of administration there
anyway?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think it would make the slightest
difference to Peking.
Senator Pell. It would not?
Secretary Rusk. No. They want it and they just say, ``It is
ours and we have got to have it.'' There never has been any--
and they won't even renounce the use of force in the Straits of
Formosa. You remember the Eisenhower Administration in the mid-
fifties began talking with the Chinese and tried to get a
mutual declaration of the renunciation of force in the Straits
of Formosa. We continued that ever since. Never the slightest
indication of Peking that they would be interested in that
Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Case.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

QUESTIONING THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA

Mr. Secretary, following Senator Pell's suggestion implicit
in one of his questions as to whether the North Vietnamese and,
presumably, the Chinese might be quite uninterested in
negotiations because they expect to get more out of continuing
their current operation than through any negotiations. It seems
to me there is a relation between that possibility and the
possibility that I have not heard our policy contemplate, that
in the end it may not be what we hoped, Russia and the U.S.
against China, but rather Russia and China against the United
States, and that we are falling into, unfortunately--I am
thinking of the broadest terms now--maybe a trap, if you will,
maybe nothing as explicit as this, but this may be the
consequence, and I am not at all sure that we are right.
Even those liberals who say the ancient antagonisms between
China and Russia are going to make everything all right for us,
I am not at all sure that they are concerned about destroying
the only obstacle to world Communism, the United States of
America, that that may not override these things, at least in
the short run or in the middle time.
I wonder if you would just talk a little about this. Maybe
we, in our own interests, including, of course, the interests
of world peace, too, are on the wrong track here in thinking
that containment of China, which I have supported, as you know,
up to now, is a desirable thing, on the analogy to the position
in Western Europe, defense against--I mean standing, creating
the bulwark against expansion of Russia, believing as you have
suggested too, with you, if we had done something about Hitler
we would not have had World War II and all the rest of it.
I wonder if I am right about this, and whether we may not
be getting bogged down and trapped into doing a thing which is
going to take more and more of our strength and render us in a
position where we will be really vulnerable to this other
combination which we do not contemplate.

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

Secretary Rusk. One of the real possibilities is an
eventual reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union.
Senator Case. I do not mean to just be happy with each
other, I mean they would be after us.
Secretary Rusk. I understand.
The key point would be on what general basis of policy
would that reconciliation occur. There are a good many in
Eastern Europe who insist it would not be possible because of
the dynamics between the Communist world for that
reconciliation to occur on the basis of the militancy of
Peking; that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would not and
could not move in that direction. I am not so sure of that.
That is a possibility.
The other would be a reconciliation on the basis of what
might be called the peaceful co-existence. Now, we just have no
way of knowing these things.
I do feel, Senator Case, that if Hanoi and Peking could
demonstrate to the Communist world that the policy of militancy
is the way to get ahead successfully with the world revolution,
that we are in greater danger of having the combined Communist
world getting together directly and fundamentally opposed to
the interests of the free world. That would be a very dangerous
situation.
No, I limited my own remarks to what I believe to be the
present attitude of the Soviet Union on Vietnam, and to a
somewhat moderately optimistic view as to the possibilities of
some further improvement of relations with Eastern Europe.
But these other possibilities are very much there and very
much in our minds.
It seems to me that the possibility of a combination that
is militantly hostile to the United States would be encouraged
by a demonstration by one or another of these members of the
Communist world that an aggression in the face of a security
treaty of the United States can successfully be carried out.
Senator Case. This is an effect.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I know.

GETTING INVOLVED IN A PERIPHERAL AREA

Senator Case. I just wonder if we are taking into account
the other possibility sufficiently as to get ourselves more and
more involved in this particular area that is rather peripheral
to them and really not at all hurting them at all, not hurting
Russia one bit. They are not much involved.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have had some of the same
considerations to deal with in connection with the Greek
guerrillas and the Berlin blockade and other such issues where
the combined weight of the Communist world posed a threat that
we had very much in mind at that time.
Senator Case. Indeed we have. But we never have gotten
ourselves involved with a half million men or whatever the
numbers.

ANTAGONISM WITH THE TWO COMMUNIST POWERS

The Chairman. Would the Senator yield there on that
question of their policy. Wouldn't the obvious reason be their
antagonism to us? That is the policy they could get together
on, not on one of these ideological reasons.
Senator Case. Yes indeed, and I think the Secretary
understood that was the thrust of my remarks.
Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield? Isn't their
antagonism toward us generated by their political philosophy,
that is, the international Communist philosophy? I do not think
it is a personal antagonism generated from anything except
their ideology.
Senator Case. This is my belief. This is my concern, based
on their desire to destroy the only real block in their way.
Secretary Rusk. You see, if all the countries lived between
us and these two Communist powers, were genuinely secure and
were not living under fear, and some of them have not been
subjected to attack by these countries, we would not have
anything to fight these two countries about. We are not going
to fight the Soviet Union over polar bears in the Arctic, and
we are not going to set off missiles against each other merely
because there are missiles over there.
The principal issues on which we and the Soviet Union could
get into a war under present circumstances have to do with the
security of Western Europe.
There are some in Western Europe who think they are somehow
part of a third world that unfortunately has been caught up in
a great controversy between us and the Soviet Union. To me,
this is a great misunderstanding of the situation.
If Western Europe were secure--Western Europe is the
issue--if Western Europe were secure we would not have put $900
billion in the defense budgets since 1947, and the same thing
will be true of Mainland China.
If Korea and Japan and the Philippines and these other
countries had a reasonable chance of living peacefully next
door to this giant there without being subjected to the
pressures of the world revolution, and they are there, I think
we ought not to decide prematurely that they are not there,
they could live peacefully there and then we have no problems
out in that part of the world except trade and other kinds of
relationships.

WORLD REVOLUTION

The Chairman. I get lost on that phrase ``world
revolution.'' You tried to describe detente. What is the world
revolution?
Secretary Rusk. The Communist doctrine that the world
should be and is going to be reorganized on a Communist basis
under the leadership of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Now, you see a very primitive form of this out of Mao Tse-
Tung. It is getting to be more sophisticated in Eastern Europe,
but these fellows still are pretty serious about this business.
Now, this revolutionary force has lost, perhaps, some of
its clan in Eastern Europe. They are a little more middle-aged,
and have got more of a stake in what they have been able to
build up, and they may be getting a little tired with the more
military aspect of what they have been doing.
Senator Hickenlooper. You mean they have two pigs?
Secretary Rusk. They have two pigs. [Laughter.]
But this is not true of the others, apparently these
veterans of the Long March in China, although one would have to
take into account they have been more prudent in action than
they have been in their words and doctrine.

IS WORLD REVOLUTION ACTIVELY THREATENED?

The Chairman. What have they done to support your theory
that the world revolution is actively threatened? What do you
consider the Chinese have done? I do not wish to interrupt you,
I do not know----
Senator Case. I think we are probing really the same
purpose.
The Chairman. I am just trying to probe what this world
revolution is that you have in mind. Is there any doctrine or
any actions which have been taken in support?
Senator Case. I would not want to take a chance that there
is not. Frankly, I think there is. In general, I have a
somewhat different view than you do as to the desirability of
protecting ourselves about a Russian treaty.
The Chairman. It is not what you are thinking about it, but
it is what the Secretary is thinking about it.
Secretary Rusk. You are not asking questions about the
doctrine, at the moment, I mean----
The Chairman. If I understood you, the world revolution
here is a major reason for our involvement, that is the way the
Senator put it. I was very intrigued by the way the Senator put
It. We might be falling into a trap. This has occurred to us
when we saw that article out of China some time ago in which it
was said, ``We are very obliged to the U.S. for bringing their
men and treasure. We couldn't get at them if they stayed at
home. It is the only way we can get at them, their coming here
and getting bogged down. We should be very appreciative to the
government of the United States for giving us the opportunity
to destroy it.''
That is what reminded me of what the Senator said.
Secretary Rusk. Is this Hanoi or Peking?
The Chairman. That came out of Peking. It was a very long
article which came out a couple of months ago. You saw it?
Senator Pell. No, I did not. Who wrote it?
The Chairman. It came out of People's Daily. It was picked
up in the usual way. Don't you have that, Mr. Marcy? Anyway, I
know we can find it.
Senator Pell. I would like to see it. This is exactly the
theory I was advancing.
The Chairman. It was picked up from the People's Daily and
reprinted in the New York Times. I thought that is exactly what
you had in mind.
Senator Case. I had this in mind.

AMERICAN OVERCOMMITMENT

The Chairman. It has occurred to me. Are we being drawn
into one place where we can be destroyed? This is what some of
our witnesses said last year. Are we becoming overcommitted to
where our great wealth and manpower are being bogged down in an
area which, as the Senator so well said, is not costing the
opposition any substantial manpower or money? It is a very
serious question.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, when one looks back to some of
these other crises, when the guerrillas were thirty miles from
Athens in great strength from Athens, Greece, and the winter
weather fell in on the Berlin airlift, and we were in that tiny
perimeter in Pusan or even in the first week of the Cuban
missile crisis, the situation is more manageable.
Senator Case. It was said we only won that one because
Yugoslavia took a turn.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it took a turn. Maybe this one is
going to be influenced by the presence of the problems in
Mainland China.
The Chairman. It did not take a turn by bombing but for
entirely different reasons.
Senator Case. I know. This is the only reason firmness
suggests. I must profess that I am for all this. I want to be
reassured we are not getting in so deep that we are in a bog.
The Chairman. Well, you asked a very pertinent question.
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe Peking is glad to see us
in Southeast Asia. I do not believe that for a minute.
Senator Case. In one sense, no.

NOT HAVE TREATIES DISRUPTED BY A BLUFF

The Chairman. I am sure in one sense, no. But if they must
have it out this is the way. If they are convinced we are going
to attack them any way, this is a good way.
Senator Case. I am sure what you did, Mr. Secretary, in
answering this man from South Dakota, upset this man, and it
upset me, too. I have regarded what we have done as pretty
important to our success in holding the line all over the
world, taking a stand here and making your position more
credible with the Russians and with everybody else, and also in
having some rather specific effects and giving tone to the
whole free effort in an effort to keep the world free in
Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk. I hope I did not detract at all from that
view. I certainly----
Senator Case. Say it again because, you know, if you did
detract.
Secretary Rusk. No. I was commenting specifically about its
relation to Indonesia.
Senator Case. You mean just cause and effect, one, two,
like that?
Secretary Rusk. No. On the larger question as to what these
great security treaties mean in terms of keeping the peace, to
me the greatest danger in the world would be to have these
treaties be interpreted by the other side as a bluff, because
we have been tested at times when had they judged we were
bluffing great catastrophe would have resulted. The Berlin
crisis of 1961-1962, the Cuban missile crisis were two recent
examples of this.
The most utter dangers are involved in that problem, and we
are all--we all have to approach them, it seems to me, on our
knees because it is awfully hard to be absolutely certain on
such questions.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. Am I allowed to ask questions?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.

NORTH VIETNAM'S TERMS ON BOMBING CESSATION

Senator Cooper. Mr. Secretary, my question goes to the
declaration of North Vietnam that there must be a cessation of
bombing of North Vietnam. I am not clear as to the exact
wording of the declaration, if it is an exact wording. Did
North Vietnam expressly state that there must be a permanent
cessation of bombing or did it just state that there must be a
cessation of bombing without the fixing of any limits upon the
cessation of bombing?
Secretary Rusk. The most--the usual phrase there is
unconditional and permanent. Now in the phraseology that you
get in different ways, public and private, the permanent part--
unconditional was always there. The permanent has been
described another way as definitively which, I suppose, is
permanent; and, as Harrison Salisbury in his interview put it,
for good, which is the same thing, I suppose, as permanent. In
other words, this framing of the issue has been put to us as
unconditional permanent, and this is coupled with the excuses
that were given to us when the thirty-seven-day pause was
finished earlier this year, when nothing happened, when we
paused for twice as long, as had been suggested to us that we
pause.
They said, ``Well, a suspension is an ultimatum. You can't
expect people to pick up the question of peace under an
ultimatum of that sort,'' and the general attitude now on the
other side seems to be that unless it is unconditional and
permanent, anything less than that as a stoppage of the bombing
would be interpreted as an ultimatum.
Now, of course, one can look at the question as to whether
you simply stop without saying, but they would either insist
upon a clarification of that point or would interpret for
themselves as unconditional and permanent, and then if we found
we had to resume the bombing for military reasons, then we
could carry the burden of having acted in breach of faith, you
see.
So we feel that these are issues of such importance that we
ought to have some indications on the other side as to what
would happen if we stopped the bombing, and thus far we have
not been able to get any.

VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BY ELECTION

Senator Cooper. I will be brief on this question because I
am sure you have developed it in sessions at which, of course,
I was not present. But, as I understand it, the United States
has said it would accept this basis of negotiation, the
adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords.
As I remember, those accords called for general elections
throughout all Vietnam two years later and, I assume, with the
idea that a government would be established for all Vietnam.
Beginning with the French and then with the United States,
it seems to me, our course has been to establish a separate
government for South Vietnam, and for many reasons. But how
would the United States resolve that question when it now
states that it would not adhere to the Geneva Accords? How
would it resolve the question of the government for all of the
South Vietnamese as distinguished from what would seem to have
been our policy and the French policy before to establish a
government in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. I think we have two elements there. First,
we have said the South Vietnamese ought to have a chance in
free elections to determine what their own government should
be, and that the question of reunification should be decided by
the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam through free elections
or free choice.
The 1954 agreements, by providing for elections on that
issue, presumably meant that this was to be by consent of the
peoples concerned.
The same issue arises both in Korea and in Germany, where
you have other divided countries.
I do not myself think, Senator, that in terms of settling
the problem that we now have in Vietnam that the question of
reunification by peaceful means is likely to be the great
obstacle to a possible settlement. The problem is whether we
can get the other side to hold its hand in trying to bring
about reunification by force.
Senator Cooper. That is all.
The Chairman. I have one or two questions.

THE QUAKERS IN CANADA

Do you know, Mr. Secretary, about a case that was sent to
me involving the Quakers in Canada, that the Treasury of the
United States issued a circular to all the banks in the United
States directing them not to honor a check payable to the
Quakers of Canada? Are you familiar with that?
Secretary Rusk. No sir; I am not. I had not heard of it
before.
The Chairman. Well, it came to me with a photostat of the
order, and I wondered if there is any authority for such an
order from the Treasury.
Secretary Rusk. It sounds to me as though this might be one
of the foreign assets control problems. If the Quakers were
using these funds to send assistance to North Vietnam----
The Chairman. That is correct. Is there such authority that
the Quakers--well, the Quakers state they are sending it North
and South. They do this--they are not involved in this
political thing. They are doing humanitarian work, and a friend
sent me the letter. I don't have the letter anyway. I forgot
how it went--I wrote a letter to the Treasury, but have had no
response. Is that as far as you know, within the power, the
authority of the Treasury?
Secretary Rusk. I would think so, sir, under the foreign
assets control legislation.
Sentor Hickenlooper. What kind of a check?
The Chairman. I did not send a check. Anyway this person,
an American citizen, writes a check on the First National Bank
of Washington, sends it to the Quakers in Canada, and the bank
here is directed by the Treasury not to honor a check payable
to the Quakers of Canada.
Secretary Rusk. I would have to look into the specific case
because I just am not informed about it.
The Chairman. I was a little surprised that we had that
authority. I thought you could donate money to the Quakers.
Secretary Rusk. I believe donations outside the United
States are not income tax deductible in the usual case.
Senator Pell. That is absolutely correct.
The Chairman. Well, they are to Israel, aren't they?
Secretary Rusk. That is a legal sense, that is to the
organized charities organized in this country under the laws of
this country.

DRAWING THE U.S. INTO A LAND WAR IN ASIA

The Chairman. In response to Senator Case's question--he
has disappeared--but the staff just handed me an article \2\
which I had not seen, from the War/Peace Report of October 1966
which says:

\2\ ``Peking and the U.S. Are Both Winning.''

It is frightening as well as paradoxical that almost
identical political assessments are being made in Peking and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington concerning the war in Vietnam.

I won't read it all. It says:

On the other side, well-informed U.N. Eastern European
diplomats report the perception of the same reality is quite
different when viewed from Peking. These observers state Maoist
Peking has had, from the beginning, a three-fold strategy based
upon the assumption of an ultimate inevitable war with American
imperialism: First to draw the U.S. into a major land
engagement in Asia, preferably not on Chinese soil (these
observers believe Korea was China's, not the Soviet's
initiative); second, to shift the American-Chinese
confrontation to an American-Soviet confrontation; third, to
use Vietnam and the underdeveloped world as a vehicle to change
Russian foreign policy, or failing that, to discredit it.

I had not seen it but it is on all fours with this other
idea that this----
Secretary Rusk. They said that Korea was on China's
initiative and not the Soviets'?
The Chairman. Just the opposite.
Secretary Rusk. These observers believe----
The Chairman. Yes, the observers believe that Korea was
China's not the Soviets' initiative. I also had thought it was
the Soviets'.
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe that at all.
The Chairman. But in any case, the first point, they feel
since a conflict is inevitable, this is the best thing for them
on the same theory as the Senator from New Jersey advanced.

DULLES ON SEATO

The Chairman. I want to come back to one thing, one very
interesting thing, you said. But before I do that I want to
read a very short statement of Mr. Dulles.
You had, and the administration, correctly I think from its
point of view, is now dwelling upon SEATO, but this is what
Secretary Dulles said to us, and it has some bearing on our
interpretation of it, and I think the way you should use it now
is saying what the Senate did. Here is a quote from Secretary
Dulles.
Secretary Rusk. Is that from your committee report?
The Chairman. That is right.
Secretary Rusk. What page?
The Chairman. Page 8.

We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the
United States military establishment to form an arm of defense
in this area.

He is speaking about SEATO.

We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking
power. That we made clear to our associates in the treaty and
that is our policy.
It would involve in the opinion of our military advisers an
injudicious over-extension of our military power if we were to
try to build up that kind of an organization in Southeast Asia.
We do not have the adequate forces to do it, and I believe
that if there should be open armed attack in that area the most
effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression
rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to
try to fight a ground war.

I always put it in the record to show that some of us who
were here and voted for those treaties voted for them in view
of the interpretation given to us by the Secretary of State at
that time which, I thought, and I know others must have been
influenced by the idea, that it was not an engagement to put in
a land army in a big war on the land. This was about the same
time that some of our leading military authorities were also
saying, such as Gen. Douglas MacArthur, that the last thing we
ought to do is mount a big land war on the Continent of Asia.
So I would submit that the conditions are very different
today in what we are doing from what many of us legitimately
understood was involved in that treaty.

ALTERNATIVE TO MASSIVE RETALIATION

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on
this?
Mr. Chairman. Yes, you may. I was just trying to put
another point of view, but go ahead. You may comment.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that discussion, it seems to me, goes
to the point as to whether, as in NATO, it was proposed in
SEATO to build up standing forces of the alliance in the area
in time of peace, and it was pointed out not.
Secondly, I would point out that at that time the
alternative defense notion was massive retaliation, and had
that been explored more fully at the time, I would suspect that
the alternative Mr. Dulles had in mind as to the kind of thing
we were doing here was massive retaliation, which we have
stayed away from in this present situation.
The Chairman. That may be, but the point is to me that
those of us who were here in voting for this, our judgment, I
feel, certainly mine, was influenced by the representations as
to what we were engaged in, what undertaking we were actually
making.

COMPARISON TO TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

I would say the same way with the Tonkin Gulf thing. I
think the changes, as today, the circumstances are very
different from what they were then. We had a very small group.
Today we have nearly approaching, I guess, 400,000 to 500,000
men in the area. It is costing $20, $25 billion, and so forth.
I think the change in the circumstances today as of the time of
the Tonkin Gulf are very dramatic indeed, and I, for one--I
have already confessed my error--was influenced very greatly by
the political situation at the time, and I was supporting the
President, who was the then candidate for 1964, and that he was
then advocating a policy of not enlarging the war and,
therefore, I supported his recommendation on the Tonkin Bay.
You are legitimately correct in saying, yes, you supported
it. It is legitimate to respond that I certainly did not
anticipate doing what we are doing. I do not particularly like
to have this always thrown up, ``Well, look, you voted for
this.'' I do not consider we did vote for what we are doing now
at all. The circumstances were very, very different.

U.S. TROOPS TO NATO

Senator Hickenlooper. If the Senator will yield to me, I
will call his attention to the fact when we were considering
the NATO organization we were told very emphatically, and the
word ``emphatically'' was used in the testimony, that we were
not going to send any troops to Europe or anything like that.
The Chairman. I think that is correct.
Senator Hickenlooper. Within four months, we had four
divisions on the way.
The Chairman. Yes. But we did right after that, the very
question of whether we should send additional forces was
submitted to the Senate, and the Senate had a long and thorough
and acrimonious debate on the subject and specifically
authorized it. You remember that.
Senator Hickenlooper. After the troops went.
The Chairman. Well, they at least paid some attention to
the constitutional idea that we participate in these things.
Senator Hickenlooper. I am just saying these things happen
at times.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS EXPECTED

The Chairman. I do not particularly like the Tonkin Bay
being thrown up at this time that that is the authority for you
to do what you are now doing. In fact, I thought in supporting
the President as of that date in August of 1964, that I was
supporting a man who was going to do exactly the opposite. Now
he is doing precisely what his opponent said he would do, and
this is a very curious turn of fate. There is not much I can do
about it publicly, at least, but anyway that is a fact of the
matter.
Secretary Rusk. One of the key elements, of course, in that
problem is what the other side is doing all the time. These
fellows keep marching down from the North. At some point
somebody has to make a decision that ``You get out of the
way,'' or you shoot them.

A GENERATION BETRAYED BY WORLD WAR II

The Chairman. These are interesting subjects you brought
up. I think the one Senator Case brought up is very interesting
and worth further thought. Here is one you make. I think this
is what you said a moment ago. You belong to a generation that
was betrayed into World War I----
Secretary Rusk. World War II.
The Chairman. World War II, I am sorry, because the
governments refused to organize the peace of the world.
The question, however, it seems to me, is, the big
question, does this war, as we are now prosecuting it, does it
obstruct or does it promote the organizing of peace. You assume
that this war is an essential and important part that is
designed to organize the peace of the world. Well, my own
feeling is in view of developments that were beginning to take
place when this war got really hot, that it more likely would
prove in the light of history to obstruct the detente that you
mentioned, certainly with the Russians, and detente generally
in Europe as between Western Europe and the Russians, not just
between us, and the very question is, you assume it, I think
the question at issue is, does this war, as we now prosecute
it, does it help organize the peace.
You say the reason you are so interested in pursuing this
is you felt betrayed, and you do not want to do that again. I
think you are assuming the question at issue.
Secretary Rusk. I do not think it is an assumption that was
just pulled out of the air. In 1961, Chairman Khrushchev said
to President Kennedy, in effect, ``Get your troops out of
Berlin or there will be war,'' and President Kennedy had to say
to him, ``Well, Mr. Chairman, then there will be war,'' and it
was extremely important that Mr. Khrushchev believe the
President of the United States on that point, otherwise we
might well have had war.
The same thing at the time of the Cuban missile crisis
where it was necessary to say to Chairman Khrushchev, ``The
missiles will have to go, Mr. Chairman. We hope they can go by
peaceful means, but they must go.''
If the Chairman, if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed
President Kennedy in that situation, we could have had an even
greater catastrophe than in the Berlin matter.
Now, it is a very serious thing to create the impression
that our mutual security treaties are bluffs.

HOW ARE CUBA AND BERLIN RELEVANT TO VIETNAM?

The Chairman. But there are two cases that I think most of
us--I never did question your correctness in both cases because
there was a valid reason for it. Now, go ahead, here is South
Vietnam. Why is it relevant? Why is what you did in Berlin
relevant as to the case in Vietnam? I do not see the relevancy.
I believe they do not believe you because you are in there on a
false basis. They respected what you said in Cuba and in
Berlin. Why is it they do not do it in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. The relevance, the first instance, it seems
to me, Mr. Chairman, that if you make a commitment like the
SEATO Treaty, and then demonstrate that it is a bluff, there is
a great risk that they will consider as bluffs your attitude in
these other crises.
The Chairman. You see, you are assuming the question at
issue again. The Senator from Oregon and myself and a lot of
other people do not believe the SEATO Treaty covers this case,
and neither did you until the last two years.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I beg your pardon. If you
want the full record on this----
The Chairman. Well, the State Department did not. I just
gave you the reference.
Secretary Rusk. I am talking about what was said at every
SEATO Ministers meeting since I have been Secretary of State
and the communiques of the SEATO Ministers and the statements
made by President Kennedy. I have not looked at that memorandum
that you referred to of March 1965.
The Chairman. This is a State Department memorandum, not
mine.
Secretary Rusk. I understand. There were a good many other
memoranda in which the SEATO Treaty was talked about along the
way and in public statements and in communiques, and in press
conferences of President Kennedy, and so forth, and there was
certainly no possibility of doubt that in the case----

CLIENT STATES IN SEATO

The Chairman. Isn't it odd that the other SEATO Members do
not agree with you as to its applicability here? None of them
have felt obliged because of this SEATO Treaty to come and
discharge their duties. Are we the only people who have respect
for our international----
Secretary Rusk. Five of them are there, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I admit outside of our clients, I mean the
independent countries.
Secretary Rusk. If you call the clients those that agree
with us, and non-clients those that do not agree with us----
The Chairman. I call a client the ones you put so much
money in them that you dominate their policies and they will do
anything to continue to get enormous aid from you, that you
buy. That is what I call a client.
Secretary Rusk. We have not bought Australia and New
Zealand. They are not client states.
The Chairman. They are not paid very much either. I am
talking about Korea in which you paid vast sums, and I am
speaking of the Philippines in which you not only gave them
very large commitments but I was told two days ago you are now
coming up for a new item for the Philippines in the AID program
and, of course, Thailand, in which you are simply covering them
up with gold. Those are the client states, and they are the
ones that are doing most of the burden.
Secretary Rusk. But they are also the states that live
under the gun of danger out here and have the greatest interest
in resisting what is being done there by Hanoi.
The Chairman. I suppose India and Japan are not interested.
They are not in danger, if there is a danger.
Senator Aiken. I do not understand why you call them
clients. They do not pay us for our services. We pay them. I
would say they are beneficiaries instead of clients.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, it is both ways. They dominate our
policy, I guess. We are the captives of the government of the
Philippines, Thailand and Formosa.

HOW TO ORGANIZE THE PEACE

Well, I wanted to get to--I got diverted--what is your idea
of how to organize the peace today?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is a very long subject, but in
essence I would say look at Article I of the United Nations
Charter where it talks about the necessity for suppressing acts
of aggression and breaches of the peace, settling disputes by
peaceful means. Article II, the next paragraph, goes on to talk
about self-determination. Surely, if we draw anything at all
from our experience in the last decade, it is that those who
start a process of aggression develop the momentum of
aggression if it is not checked. And no one has been able to
demonstrate to me that the things which these events have in
common are irrelevant.
Now, everyone knows that every human action has its unique
aspects. One burglar is John Doe, and another burglar is
Richard Roe, and each action is unique in some respects. But it
is what they have in common that puts them in prison.
The Chairman. I was hoping you would say the U.N., and I
would hope that we would rely on the U.N. But what we are
really doing is going on our own. These are our own programs.
It is not the U.N. The U.N. has nothing to do with it. This is
a big difference between this and Korea.
One reason, I think, there was little dissent about Korea
is that it was a collective action. It is true we furnished
most of the sinews because we had it, but we had the support
and approval of the United Nations. That is the only idea I
have about organizing the peace is the U.N. But this does not
seem to be in accord with that policy. That is one of the
things why I asked that question.
Secretary Rusk. Well, again the Korean matter was unique in
the U.N. system because of the accident that the Soviet Union
was absent from--they were absent from the Security Council
when the decisive decisions were taken there.
The Chairman. But the Soviet Union has not vetoed any
action here.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEATO AND NATO

Secretary Rusk. But NATO is not subject to formal action by
the United Nations. If there is an attack on a member of NATO--
--
The Chairman. But, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Dulles specifically
distinguished this from NATO. He said it is not like NATO.
Secretary Rusk. But not in every respect. It was
distinguished from NATO in the formulation that was used for
these later treaties, and I think you will find in the record
that he says that the differences are insignificant; that the
difference in the wording arose out of the issue raised, I
think, by Senator Taft and others as to whether the language of
the NATO treaty itself would, in effect, repeal the
constitutional processes here, that an attack on one is an
attack on all, and in order not to have that occur, they went
to the formulation, which Senator Lausche read in these other
treaties, which was somewhat different from the NATO language.
But Secretary Dulles in one of these hearings indicated that
the difference was insubstantial.
The Chairman. Well, I will stop with one last thing. I
wondered, because I am always asked this, and I am always asked
by the press, what is the response to the question, are you
optimistic or pessimistic about the situation? They will ask
it. They always do, nearly the first question, when they say
was the Secretary optimistic or pessimistic. How did he feel
about this?
Secretary Rusk. Usually at press conferences when that
question is put to me I usually do not answer it in those
terms.
The Chairman. What do you say?
Secretary Rusk. Because it is much too complicated a
situation altogether.

A REQUEST FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION

Senator Morse. I have one question and one request for
information and, Mr. Secretary, it may involve a matter of
policy and, as you know, if it does I follow your decision on
policy.
Before I make the request, we can certainly have it on a
secret basis, I would like to get it on a public basis, if
possible, because we cannot avoid the fact that in public
discussion among our people in this country these days great
concern is expressed over whether this is becoming
predominantly an American or an Asian war. In fact, there are
certain political points of view within the ranks of the
Republican Party that it ought to be turned over to the Asians.
I have not taken that position completely, but I do think
the American people are entitled to the information that I now
would like to have you supply for public discussion, but if you
decide after consultation with the administration that it
cannot be supplied publicly, at least I would like to have it
made a part of this record, and I would like to use it for the
public, if possible.

STATISTICS ON CASUALTIES

What were the Vietnamese casualties in 1964, 1965 and 1966,
including their fatalities and their wounded?
What were the U.S. casualties during the last three years?
Supply the number of Vietnam infiltrating in 1964, 1965,
1966.
Four, the number of Viet Cong recruited in South Vietnam in
1964, 1965, and 1966.
Five, the desertion rates from the South Vietnamese army in
1964, 1965, and 1966, compared with the Viet Cong's desertion
rates.
Now, we have some of these figures provided to the
committee by the Defense Department, but they are classified.
They show that in 1966, and this is the point Senator Clark was
talking about, that the number of Americans killed in action
quadrupled while the number of Vietnamese killed in action was
less by way of 20 percent, and that despite bombing North
Vietnam infiltration almost tripled in 1966.
Of course, these figures also have to be compared in
relationship to the number of personnel in the American forces
and the South Vietnamese forces, and what is known about the
number of personnel in the Viet Cong forces.
The thrust of my request is obvious. I would like to have
the statistical material bearing on the question of great
public concern these days as to whether or not the United
States is taking over the war and the South Vietnamese, as far
as fighting is concerned, are being let out more and more of
responsibility, because if we are going to have a drive for the
war to be taken over by Asians, an all-Asian conference, as has
been proposed by some, I think the American people ought to
have the statistical material that I asked for.
Secretary Rusk. We will see what we can do on that. I think
we have much harder information on certain of those points than
we have on the others. For example, on the defections from the
Viet Cong, we can count somewhat more than 20,000 in 1966 who
come in to get their cards in the Chiu Hoi program and go on to
get resettled and get jobs.
They tell us for every one who comes over officially, maybe
three or four others simply go off to their farms, and the
desertions are not desertions from the South Vietnamese to the
Viet Cong, but simply people who go back to their farms,
people, like people in this country during the Civil War at
frequent intervals. But we will try our best to get you the
figures and see whether we can make them public. I think a good
many of these figures can be made public. Some of them are
public, but I will try to pull them together for you.

THE U.N. AND RHODESIA

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question: If I
understand when we were talking about Rhodesia you were stating
that was not a bilateral action, that we were pulled into
Rhodesia because of our obligations under the U.N. charter; is
that right?
Secretary Rusk. I said it was not just a bilateral matter,
that we had important national interests of our own involved in
this question under the charter in relation to the United
Nations structure, in relation to our own interests in Africa,
as well as our interests in the Commonwealth.
Senator Mundt. How do you respond to Dean Acheson's
statement--I know you have read this--in which he said that
such a situation in the U.N. charter is plain. Chapter I,
Article II, paragraph 7 applies unequivocally that the United
Nations shall not intervene in matters which are within the
internal jurisdiction of any state.
Secretary Rusk. I gave--did I give you that, Mr. Marcy--
that memorandum on the legal--I think the key point here is
that Article II, paragraph 7, the charter provision does not
brand as illegal intervention. The action of the Security
Council taken at the request of a member state concerned, in
this case the United Kingdom--from a legal point of view, the
responsibilities for Rhodesia continue to rest with the United
Kingdom. No one has recognized Rhodesia. I do not think any
country in the world including South Africa has recognized
Rhodesia as an independent state, and Article II, paragraph 7--
--
Senator Mundt. It says any member state or does he say any
state?
Secretary Rusk. Article II, paragraph 7--do you have a copy
of the Charter--expressly provides that the principle of non-
intervention contained in that article shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under chapter 7. So from
the Charter point of view there seems to be little doubt about
that, but I will leave this memorandum for you to study,
Senator. You may not agree with all of it.
Senator Mundt. I hate to see student and teacher disagree.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is a matter of some pain to me,
Senator.
Senator Mundt. Probably more to you than to me. It has
raised a lot of questions in my correspondence, but I cannot
answer them.
The Chairman. Any other question?
Senator Mundt. No.
Secretary Rusk. I am talking about the last sentence.
The Chairman. I guess that is all.

INDONESIAN VIEWS ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

One thing I did have, I do not know whether it is
important. Maybe you can clear it very quickly. You mentioned a
prominent official of Indonesia. Did he express himself on the
bombing in the north? What was it you said about him?
Secretary Rusk. It had to do with whether our being in
Vietnam had any bearing on the situation in Indonesia.
The Chairman. You said he did.
Secretary Rusk. He said it was a very important thing.
The Chairman. Didn't I see where he thought it would be
very wise to suspend the bombing in the North? Is that correct
or not? I thought he did.
Secretary Rusk. It is possible. I have not noted what he
said.
The Chairman. He denied that he said it. It was reported,
was it not, in the press?
Secretary Rusk. Could we check that point, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. That is all, unless you have anything further
to say.
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
I believe you are scheduled to come in open session next
week, Monday, is that right?
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.
The Chairman. All right. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was
adjourned.]

SUBCOMMITTEES AND HEARINGS PROCEDURES

----------

Tuesday, January 24, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:00 noon, in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr.
Lowenstein of the committee staff.

CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATIONS

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
First, is there any motion on the people we just heard,\1\
that is----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Committee heard in open session the following nominations:
Clarence A. Boonstra to be Ambassador to Costa Rica; John F. Henning to
be Ambassador to New Zealand; David S. King to be Ambassador to the
Malagasy Republic; Robert L. Payton to be Ambassador to the Federal
Republic of Cameroon; William B. Buffum to be Deputy Representative to
the U.N.; and Arthur E. Goldschmidt to be Representative to the
Economic and Social Council of the U.N.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that from small a to
small f inclusive be recommended for confirmation.
Senator Morse. Second it.
The Chairman. You heard the motion and the second. Is there
any discussion? Any questions? All in favor of the motion say
``aye.''
[Chorus of ``aye.'']
The Chairman. Opposed, ``no.''
[No response.]
The Chairman. The ``ayes'' have it.
As I said, we will take the other two tomorrow. We have Mr.
William S. Gaud. I will announce that the committee will meet
tomorrow at 10:30. We do not think it will take too long, but
we had already agreed. Mr. Gaud has a matter to present to the
committee.
There are two or three other matters.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF AND EXPENSES

First, on the committee.
Mr. Marcy, will you present the bill. It has to be approved
and get on its way to go through the procedures.
Mr. Marcy. Yes.
Normally at this time of the year the committee approves a
sum for additional staff and expenses for the balance of this
year.
Last year, the committee approved and the Senate approved
$200,000 for committee expenses. Of that $200,000, the
committee spent $144,289, so we have a balance of $55,000 left.
This would mean that the committee could get along next
year on the same amount, $200,000, but if there is any
inclination for special kinds of activities to be undertaken,
the committee might want to request $250,000.
The Chairman. The reason for that was the discussion that
took place at the last meeting where there were several people
who desired that we try to find some extra staff members. They
do not have to spend it, but if you want to leave it, I mean
make available an amount we could use, and if we possibly can
find somebody, why, we will.
Senator Lausche. Carl, was the full appropriation for the
whole fiscal year $200,000?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. And we got along with $200,000?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. Now you say we can get along the next year
unless we expand our staff and services.
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Mundt. Did I misunderstand your word, Carl, I
thought you said we got along with $160,000.
Mr. Marcy. That is correct. We have $55,000 unexpended at
the end of the year.
Senator Lausche. Where do you get the money for the next
six months of the fiscal year?
Mr. Marcy. We do not operate on a fiscal year.
Senator Sparkman. We are on a calendar year, January 30 to
January 30.
Senator Lausche. You have $50,000 left?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.

MONEY TO HIRE ADDITIONAL STAFF

Senator Church. You mean by that, Carl, there is room in
the present budget to hire additional staff people without
enlarging it over the amount we spent last year?
The Chairman. It depends on the hearings and the travel. It
was lower last year than usual, but there was such vigorous
complaint the other day that I said if the committee means what
it said we would give them some leeway. We do not spend it
anyway. Mr. Marcy, I think, has been extremely careful. I do
not know of any major committee that spent as little as this
one.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I raise two questions?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Morse. Carl stated we had some left. We do not have
any left, do we? Didn't that revert?
Mr. Marcy. That reverts.
The Chairman. That reverts. What he meant is we did not
expend it. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, there is going to be an
effort----
The Chairman. Senator Morse. He was about to say something.

EXPANDING THE SUBCOMMITTEES

Senator Morse. I want the attention of Senator Clark and
some others who expressed to me an interest in expanding the
programs of some of our subcommittees.
I have pending--I won't have time to take it up this
morning--my first draft of a proposal for doing some work on
the Subcommittee on Latin America that I think we have got to
do or we are going to be open to two problems.
One, you have got other committees of the Congress doing
it; you have got a jurisdictional problem here. I do not want
to go into that now, but we have some other committees in the
Congress that, in my judgment, are invading the prerogatives of
the Foreign Relations Committee in Latin America; and, second,
I think we ought to do it as a matter of Senate duty.
I do not think you can let this Latin American area go
without more interest being expressed in it by the Foreign
Relations Committee, and I certainly would not favor our
spending any money that we do not need to spend.
On the other hand, whatever you ask for now is the maximum
that you are probably going to get. I do not think we ought to
come in later supplementarily, and asking for more money, and I
would suggest that to play safe we ask for $250,000.
The Chairman. It does not commit us to spend it. We have
not spent it for last year or any year previously, but if we
need it, it is there. There is no commitment that you have to
spend it.
Senator Morse. No.

A REASONABLE PRESENTATION TO THE RULES COMMITTEE

Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell and I are on the
Rules Committee, and these money appropriations come up there.
Senator Pell. Senator Cooper also.
Senator Clark. Yes, Senator Cooper. I thoroughly agree with
Senator Morse, but before we go in for $250,000, which we may
not spend, Carl ought to have a reasonable presentation to the
Rules Committee as to how we spend it, otherwise there will be
criticisms.
Senator Morse. My only feeling is we can probably do it on
$200,000 in view of what we did not spend last year. We
probably could do it on $200,000.
At the same time, I would not want to ask for $200,000 and
then in the next few meetings of this committee, the committee
agrees there ought to be increased staff of the subcommittees.
Senator Clark. would like to see Mr. Marcy make up a
presentation which can be presented to the Rules Committee.
Senator Marcy. I do have such a budget here, but it will
not deal with the particular investigation. For example, last
year of the full amount of $200,000, the committee budget
showed $163,000 for salaries; employee contributions $21,000;
reimbursement payments to agencies $4,000; travel $6,000;
witnesses for hearings $6,000; office expenses $4,600; and
another amount of $3,000.
That was for the full amount of $200,000.
Now, actually, the way the amounts were expended, I will
just give you a few illustrative amounts here. While we asked
for $163,000 for salaries, we spent $118,000. While we asked
for $6,000 for travel, we actually spent $17,000. That was
because at the time that the committee appropriated the funds
or authorized the amounts last year, the committee had not
decided to hold hearings on Vietnam, NATO, and China.

AREAS FOR INVESTIGATION

Senator Clark. Of course, Mr. Chairman, we really ought to
make the basic decision as to what we want to do with the
committee this year before we prepare the bill, which is
probably going to be impossible to do in this meeting in ten
minutes.
I would certainly like to strongly endorse the position of
the Senator from Oregon that we ought to have a pretty
comprehensive look at Latin America. I believe Senator Gore,
the chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I certainly
agree with him, think we ought to take a good hard look at the
Disarmament Agency, and I have no doubt there are other areas
of countries as a result of my trip to Eastern Europe and the
Middle East. Some Senators will feel we ought to be conducting
much more effective oversight than we do at present. But my own
point is we ought to make this policy decision and then ask
Carl to make up a budget. We have the cart before the horse,
and since we have to do it this way, I would rather see us ask
for $250,000, and if we do not have to spend it, we will not
spend it.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this: It may
be the cart is before the horse, but it is just something that
cannot very well be avoided because this present fund expires
January 30, and we need to get action before the end of the
month.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman.

CAREFUL HANDLING OF FUNDS

Senator Sparkman. Wait a minute.
Now, the experience of this committee in the past, I think,
and Carl will bear me out on this, has been one of very good
husbanding of the funds that we have gotten. I think it will
show that some years we have turned back a very large amount.
Other years it has been a lesser amount. You cannot predict it
with any precision. But what we do not spend goes back into the
Treasury, so it seems to me that certainly we can trust the
careful handling of the funds, but that we ought to allow
ourselves elbow room so that we can do what we decide we ought
to do in this committee and, therefore, I would recommend the
larger amount. If it is in order, I would like to make a motion
to agree on that.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

SUBSTITUTE MOTION

Senator Lausche. I offer a substitute, and that is that the
amount be kept at $200,000. We are faced with the
responsibility of answering to the people of the United States
whether we are going to keep expenses at present levels or
reduce them, on the one hand; or extend them, on the other, and
impose new taxes.
When the time comes for imposing new taxes, the probability
is that there will be a wave of opposition to it. My belief is
that we ought to begin with the committee's indicating that we
are exerting every effort possible to escape the obligation of
imposing new taxes, or if we have to do so, impose them in the
least amounts possible.
We had $200,000 last year; we spent $150,000. That would
indicate to me that there is a latitude of $50,000 with which
to do the work that might be in excess of what was done last
year.
I make this proposal also because it has become thoroughly
apparent that if there has been neglect, and I am not saying
that it prevails in this committee, because another committee
on which I serve has increased its amount by $200,000 in the
last three years. We should begin here, and that is where I
propose to begin.
The Chairman. You heard the motion. The substitute motion
is to ask for $200,000. Is there any further discussion?

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I was late for this committee
because I was detained in the committee presided over by your
distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Mr. John McClellan.\2\
The staff had prepared a proposed spending program, and by
unanimous action our committee there, operating pretty much on
the philosophy that Frank Lausche has mentioned, cut it down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Government Operations Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Morse. How much is the total?
Senator Mundt. It is a big committee, a quarter of a
million dollars. They asked for about $1,250,000, and we cut it
down.
Senator Morse. It is the very committee, may I say most
respectfully, which, in my judgment, is planning some work in
Latin America that ought to be subordinated to the Foreign
Relations Committee.
Senator Mundt. Not that I know of. They never mentioned it.
You are thinking of Vietnam.
Senator Morse. You have the Judiciary Committee with
$2,600,000 plus, with some of the subcommittees with $500,000.
Senator Mundt. I am talking about Government Operations.
Senator Morse. I know, but I also bring in the other
Committees.
Senator Mundt. So far as I know, they are not talking about
Latin America. There is a possibility of investigating AID in
Vietnam.

WHOSE OX IS BEING GORED

Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, you remember--I am rather
reluctant to give my views on this--but serving on the Rules
Committee we do have this experience: when the committee
chairmen come in for additional funds, if they are supported by
a plan of what is intended to do, I think the Rules Committee
is very generous in approving their request. But I think if
some budget is not made out, there will be a tendency to cut it
out somewhat, and that has been our practice in the Rules
Committee. So I would say if you are going to ask for $250,000,
it ought to be supported by some plan.
The Chairman. May I ask you members of the Rules Committee,
are you likely to cut back? If he only asked for $200,000, are
you going to cut it back along with everybody?
Senator Cooper. Not $200,000.
The Chairman. Because this committee asked for very little.
For example, the committee he mentioned was $1,000,000.
Senator Clark. I would like to say something about the
tactics, if you do not mind. It depends on whose ox is being
gored. There are certain committees which are absolutely
sacrosanct, and they get whatever they want, and other
committees do not get what they want. This does not represent
my philosophy, but it does that of the Rules Committee. I think
this committee's requests are extremely modest.
The Chairman. I think so, too. The Judiciary Committee is
$2,670,000. And they have subcommittees: the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly asks for $560,000; Constitutional
Rights, $205,000; Internal Security, $437,000; Juvenile
Delinquency, $260,000.
Senator Clark. Which is not within their jurisdiction.
The Chairman. They total $2,670,000. I do not want to do
anything outrageous.

CONDEMNING OTHER COMMITTEES' EXTRAVAGANCES

Senator Lausche. The weakness of our position is that in
this room we condemn this, but when we go to the floor nobody
utters a word. I think that we can justifiably and honestly
defend our position. I think that that expenditure is
completely unjustified, and it sort of corroborates the
extravagance in the committees.
Senator Pell. No one had the gumption to say so.
Senator Lausche. No one complains. We consider each
committee sacrosanct. Allen Ellender goes up on the floor and
makes the argument, and only the walls listen to him.
Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, the question here is how much
money should this committee have. I think that it is perfectly
clear that we did not have the kind of staff help we could
efficiently use in the various subcommittees, and we are not
getting the job done that we should get done. I mean there is
no reason why we should limit ourselves with a staff that is
inadequate.
The Chairman. If the committee will have order. I was sorry
to arouse such a big controversy. I did not know there would be
such a big row. We did not spend the $200,000. Obviously we
have room there. If people feel so strongly about it, I would
rather go on $200,000, and if we need it, why, we can ask for a
supplemental. I think the Rules Committee people--I am
perfectly willing to abide by what your advice is because we
can ask for more. I have asked the staff to try to follow out
what was suggested here the other day to look for some people
and see--we have already appointed two new subcommittees, and
we are going to try to staff them and get some people. We are
moving in that direction. If you think this is outrageous, I am
perfectly willing to stay with it.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, let us vote.
The Chairman. All right, let us vote.

SUBCOMMITTEES NEED A COMMITMENT FROM THE FULL COMMITTEE

Senator Morse. One minute, before you vote. I would like to
have one minute.
We have started a discussion, and a very fruitful
discussion in this committee about expanding the work of the
subcommittees.
The Chairman. That is right.
Senator Morse. Because we feel they ought to be expanded.
You cannot expand the work of the subcommittees unless the
chairman of the subcommittees can get some commitment from this
full committee as to what the budget is going to allow them.
You are not going to be able to do that on the basis of the old
judgment, in my opinion, because your $153,000 expenditure last
year was low for the reason we did not undertake the type of
program in the subcommittees that ought to have been
undertaken. I certainly think that if you just ask for $200,000
you are going to encourage encroachments upon the jurisdiction
of this committee from other committees, and I think we ought
to ask for $250,000 or $225,000. You ought to go before that
committee and make the case before the Rules Committee. This is
what we intend to do that we have not been doing, and that
ought to be done. If you do not do that, you are going to be in
a position where they would be justified in cutting back on
your budget.
If you say you were going to ask for no more money, and we
are going to do a larger program, the Rules Committee would
have a basis for cutting back. I think you ought to ask for the
$250,000 and make your case before the committee.

DEFEAT OF THE SUBSTITUTE MOTION

The Chairman. All right, let us vote on it.
Senator Cooper. Let me say this, if I can.
I am on both committees. If this committee does appear and
sustain its request for $250,000, of course, I will vote for it
today. I just will say that.
The Chairman. Do you want to call the roll?
Senator Pell. What are we voting on exactly?
The Chairman. The substitute of the Senator from Ohio. He
wishes to stay at $200,000.
Senator Pell. If you want it $250,000, you vote no.
The Chairman. You vote no.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Senator Lausche. And when you do that you are mistaken.
Senator Pell. I often am.
The Chairman. Call the roll.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
Mr. Morse.
Senator Morse. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
Mr. Lausche.
Senator Lausche. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
Senator Church. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
The Chairman. I will vote Symington no. He did leave his
proxy.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. Clark.
Senator Clark. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Pell.
Senator Pell. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
Mr. Hickenlooper.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Carlson.
Senator Carlson. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Mundt.
Senator Mundt. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
Senator Case. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
Senator Cooper. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Ten nays and four ayes.
The Chairman. The substitute failed.

ADOPTION OF THE MOTION

Now can we vote. Do we need a roll call or can we go by a
voice vote?
Senator Lausche. I wanted to be registered as voting no.
Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, in view of my vote, I want
to state this. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee,
which really is a small committee, and I am a member of it, is
asking for $225,000, and I just could not conceive that this
committee should get less.
The Chairman. We won't spend it unless we need it.
Senator Lausche. Will you assign someone to work for me
especially with this extra $50,000 as the chairman of the
Southeast Asia Subcommittee, a very important one?
Senator Morse. You bet it is.
The Chairman. I have some other questions here now.
Ambassador Goldberg----
Senator Clark. We did not vote.
The Chairman. All in favor of the motion of the Senator
from Alabama say aye.
[Chorus of ``aye.'']
The Chairman. Opposed, no.
Senator Lausche. No.
Senator Hickenlooper. No.
The Chairman. The record will show the Senator from Ohio
votes no.

INVITATION FOR THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE U.N.

Ambassador Goldberg--let me go back. Mr. U Thant sent me an
invitation inviting the committee to come to New York and have
lunch with him, and so on.
Goldberg came here right after that and we had a
conversation about it. He strongly recommends that it be
enlarged rather than just go for a luncheon with U Thant. He
would like for the committee to agree to come up there and he,
if I understood him correctly, offered to make the arrangements
for transportation, and to spend a day and to meet with a
series of delegations or people from various parts; in other
words, perhaps two or three from Western Europe, and two or
three or more.
He is going to undertake to set this up, if we agree. He is
going to manage this for us, with the idea of giving us an
opportunity to hear the views and exchange views with people
from various parts of the world. Latin America would be a
group; one from Western Europe; one from Eastern Europe; the
Middle East, and so on. I cannot give you all the details.
What I wanted to do today is to find out whether or not the
committee is interested. It would entail going up and spending
the day, all day, in these various meetings, among other
things, as I understand it, a luncheon with Mr. U Thant.
The suggested period would be--and this has got to be
subject, of course, to negotiation, but I could not be very
specific because I had not had an opportunity to ask you--March
15th to 16th or the 22nd and 23rd. I just wanted to know
whether the committee is interested or not. I do not want to
get out on a limb and say we are, and not have but one or two
go.
What is the sentiment of the committee?
Senator Morse. I think we ought to have the advice of Case
and Church first.
The Chairman. It is purely for our information.

A USEFUL TRIP

Senator Church. I am strongly, I am very favorably,
disposed. I think that the more this committee can learn as a
committee about the situation in New York, the more familiar we
are with the U.N. and with our own mission, and with the
Secretariat and with U Thant, with the views that are so
pervasive there on matters that are critical to our own
national interest, the better. Since I think this is the most
appropriate way to do it and the most effective way to do it, I
would hope that the committee would be interested in Goldberg's
invitation.
I have told Goldberg I am strongly in favor of this. I
would hope that as many members of the committee as possible
would go. I think it would be useful.
The Chairman. I sort of felt that unless as many as ten
wanted to go it would not look right. If as many as ten wanted
to go--not everybody has to go.
Senator Clark. I wonder if we would not want to ask the
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also.
The Chairman. Then you get too many if they all went.
Senator Case. They will take care of that.
The Chairman. What do you think about the idea? Do you wish
me to work out a day, and would you say as many as ten would
go?
I would like all of them to go, but I do not want to just
have three or four go and have all this sort of trouble.

INVITATION FROM U THANT

Senator Lausche. From whom is the principal invitation? Is
it from U Thant?
The Chairman. It started with U Thant. I had a letter over
there. It came some time ago. He would be glad to have a
luncheon, invite us all to luncheon, and this kind of grew out
of it.
Senator Lausche. I do not want to dignify U Thant, and
especially on the basis of what Senator Morse said the other
day, of his statements around the world, and if we are going to
go----
Senator Morse. What statements?
Senator Lausche. The other day in our discussions you
pointed out that U Thant is our choice and he was making
attacks upon us.
Senator Hickenlooper. I cannot hear what you are saying,
Frank.
Senator Case. He is everybody's choice, Frank, is what you
are saying.
Senator Lausche. U Thant has been making statements that
are not helpful to our cause in the world as it stands today,
and I do not want to dignify him by going to New York with him
being the principal inviter. I look upon it differently if the
principal invitation comes from Goldberg.
Senator Church. May I say something on that?
My understanding on that is the principal invitation comes
from our Ambassador to us.
Senator Lausche. If we go there we ought to put U Thant in
the background.
Senator Church. Yes. During the fall, a group of
Congressmen did come up at Goldberg's invitation. They did come
to the American Mission for briefings. They then lunched with U
Thant, and went through the Secretariat and visited the
principal U.N. buildings, and this is what Goldberg has in
mind.
The Chairman. That is my understanding, that it would be
one of a whole series of meetings that would take place
practically all day. My guess would be we would want to leave,
we will say, around 8:00 or 8:30. We would come back that
night. We do not spend the night there. You do not have to
register in hotels or anything else is the way I understand it
is to be done.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. I am in favor
of the idea, and I will go.
Senator Pell. So am I.
The Chairman. Let me have a show of hands of who would be
willing to go who are here.
[There was a showing of hands.]
Senator Case. Could I just say one thing. I suggest we keep
down the social side of it.
Senator Mundt. You are going to have to adjust to the
Senate schedule.

THE TEN-MINUTE RULE FOR QUESTIONING

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I move that in the open
public hearings that there be applied the ten-minute rule. I
will not discuss the issue, and let this whole body act upon
it.
The Chairman. Of course, I am perfectly willing for the
committee to act on it. We tried it last year and we have also
had two meetings this year without it, and in my view it worked
better without it than it did with it. Yesterday the total time
consumed was less than an average of ten minutes for everybody
there. Now practically everybody was there yesterday, and I
would prefer to try it without it. If it becomes intolerable,
why, we can revert to it.
We also tried it when the Secretary was here and it went
very smoothly, which is the normal way. But if you wish----
Senator Lausche. What did you mean yesterday when you said
to me in private that you had so many complaints about the
application of the ten-minute rule----
The Chairman. You were one who complained last year about
how unsatisfactory it is in circumstances that you only have
ten minutes.
Senator Lausche. No, I never complained about that.
The Chairman. Last year you did and so did others.
Senator Lausche. No, I did not.
The Chairman. But anyway if you wish to vote on it----
Senator Morse. I think we ought to have discussion on it. I
am a great believer in self-discipline.
The Chairman. That is what we tried yesterday, and I would
prefer to go that way.

THE MINORITY NEEDS MORE TIME

Senator Case. I think, as a matter of fact, Frank, you
spoke to me about this before. There are times when you are in
the minority and you would need and require more than the ten
minutes that would be attributable to one member to present
that minority position fairly, and I think this is a good idea.
Senator Lausche. I will not argue the matter. Each one
knows how he has--the juniors how much they sit back and
finally leave the meeting because they never get to them.
Senator Case. Sometimes we ought to start at the bottom.
That is the only change.
Senator Pell. Maybe we could have a compromise. The
chairman could present a little bell to us and ring it after
ten minutes. We do not have to stop, but at least we would not
forget that ten minutes had gone by.
The Chairman. I thought yesterday everybody was very,
very----
Senator Lausche. Yesterday there was self-imposed adherence
to the rule.
The Chairman. That is right. So was their----
Senator Lausche. Are you recommending a substitute?
Senator Pell. No. I was being flip.
Senator McCarthy. What is the substitute?
Senator Lausche. Let us have the question.
Senator Pell. Do you want a vote, really?

TABLE THE MOTION

Senator Case. I move the motion be tabled for the time
being.
The Chairman. The Senator moves it be tabled for the time
being.
Senator Morse. Second.
The Chairman. All in favor of the tabling say ``aye.''
(Chorus of ``aye.'')
The Chairman. Call the roll, Mr. Kuhl.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
Mr. Morse.
Senator Morse. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
Mr. Lausche.
Senator Lausche. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
Senator Church. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
The Chairman. No--aye, I mean.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. Clark.
Mr. Pell.
Senator Pell. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Hickenlooper.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
Mr. Carlson.
Senator Carlson. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Mundt.
Senator Mundt. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
Senator Case. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
Senator Cooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Eight yeas and five nays.
The Chairman. The motion is tabled.
Senator Lausche. All right, you poor junior, weep.

INVITATION TO JOURNALISTS TO TESTIFY

The Chairman. I want to ask the guidance of the committee
on this.
There have been two members who raised this question, and I
have raised it, too, about having some witnesses in Executive
Session.
What would be the committee's view about asking one or more
of the three Americans, Harrison Salisbury, Harry S. Ashmore
and William C. Baggs, who have been in North Vietnam, to come
to executive session and answer questions and brief the
committee?
Are you interested or not? I can have them with coffee,
without it, or does the committee wish to have it as an
informal executive session without any publicity?
Senator Pell. As one member I would strongly support it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Who are the three?
The Chairman. The three who have been there--Salisbury,
Baggs and Ashmore. One is a former editor who is now working
for the center, but Baggs is the editor of a Florida paper.
Salisbury is on the New York Times. Ashmore has been on various
papers, but is not presently on a paper. They are all
newspapermen.
Senator Lausche. Why do you want them in executive session?
Senator Morse. Why in executive session?
The Chairman. I do not care, but if you want it in open----
Senator Morse. If you want them in executive session for
security reasons, that is something else.
The Chairman. I was personally curious to hear their
reports and details, and minor details that they have not had
in their reports. I have read what has been in the paper, but
these are the only Americans of this caliber--there have been
Women's Strikes for Peace, and so on, that I thought they might
not have quite the same attitude.
Senator Cooper. A minister.
The Chairman. These people are trained observers.
Regardless that their views may be on policy, they are
observers, and I would be interested in hearing them. I want to
know if the whole committee is interested, and should I ask for
a--I can have either kind, whatever the committee wishes.

WITNESSES SCHEDULED TO APPEAR

Senator Lausche. May I ask what witnesses you have
scheduled to appear.
The Chairman. In open?
Senator Lausche. There are certain witnesses that will take
one side. Those names I have seen scheduled. Now, what
witnesses do you have other than the State Department
representatives who will take the side affirming what is being
done in South Vietnam now?
The Chairman. Well, I don't know what side these people are
going to take on that. The only two that are firmly set are for
next Monday and Tuesday, Kennan and Reischauer.
Senator Case. George Kennan?
The Chairman. George Kennan, and former Ambassador
Reischauer. They are both former ambassadors.
Senator Lausche. Outside of the State witnesses.
The Chairman. We have asked the Secretary of Defense, and
the Secretary of State agreed to come yesterday, but then, you
know about that, he wrote a letter and requested it be changed
from that hearing to the one we had. He still is in the
position of coming at a later date, and McNamara has asked to
be delayed until after he had finished his other hearing.
Senator Lausche. That is not an answer to my question. You
have outsiders. Kennan, I know how he will testify.
The Chairman. Well, I do not.

DO THEY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION?

Senator Lausche. But what outsiders are there that you can
know in advance they are supporting the government's position?
We have not----
The Chairman. I do not ask them, any of them, are they
going to support the government's position. In fact, Mr.
Reischauer is not testifying directly. I cannot control what he
testifies to because I cannot control the committee's
questions, but it is generally on our relations with the Far
East, Japan and--well, the Far East. He has been a long-time
scholar of China.
Senator Lausche. Bill, may I suggest that you hold this
over until tomorrow's meeting, the decision on these three men.
The Chairman. On Salisbury, Ashmore and Baggs?
Senator Lausche. Yes. I may want to offer other names to
come in.
The Chairman. Well, this is certainly not intended to be
exclusive. These are just people who have been there.
Senator Lausche. We can decide the whole thing tomorrow.
The Chairman. Of course, these other hearings, there are
several other names that are under consideration that have not
been invited yet.
Senator Lausche. Who are they?
The Chairman. Mr. Alf Landon is one of them who I think
might be----
Senator Hickenlooper. When did Alf come back from South
Vietnam?

A BROADER SERIES OF HEARINGS THAN VIETNAM

The Chairman. This is not on South Vietnam alone. These
hearings, as I have tried to make very plain in the paper, are
not just hearings on South Vietnam. They are on the overall
general position of the United States in the present world.
Now, some of them will be asked questions about Vietnam.
But yesterday, much to my surprise, nobody asked the Secretary
of State any questions on Vietnam, and it might be the same
with other witnesses, but it is much broader, a much broader
series of hearings than just Vietnam.
But, as I say, I cannot guarantee that people won't ask
about Vietnam. If they want to they can ask anything they like.
Senator Lausche. I think it was a good thing nobody opened
the thing up.
The Chairman. It was all right with me. But when you say
Vietnam, the subject matter with Kennan is not Vietnam. Now,
you may ask him about Vietnam. The subject matter is the
relations of this country with the Communist world. He has long
experience in this area, and if you want to ask him about
Vietnam, all right. But you do not have to.
My main interest with Kennan is what is his attitude about
how our relations with Russia, in particular, and the Communist
world in general as they are developing, and what is our
policy. Is it promoting it or not.

OTHER WITNESSES

Senator Lausche. You mentioned Alf Landon. Who else?
The Chairman. He is one who Senator Carlson----
Senator Carlson. I want to say this for Alf Landon. We had
a lecture series started under his name at Kansas University.
We are going to have some outstanding people following him in
the last two or three months. Alf made an excellent statement,
and some day I want to put it in the record.
The Chairman. I read it, and I want to endorse what you are
saying. I thought it was a remarkably intelligent piece.
Senator Carlson. I have asked Governor Landon about coming
back here, and he called me just before I came back to
Washington that he has had a bad back problem. I hope the
Chairman won't invite him until later.
The Chairman. Of course it would have to be at his
convenience.
Senator Case. I would like to ask for one more. I would
like to hear McGeorge Bundy.
Senator Pell. How about General Curtis Le May, to get
another view, and an extreme view. I think it might be
interesting.
Senator Hickenlooper. He is no more extreme on his side
than some of these people.
Senator Pell. That is what I am saying.
Senator Hickenlooper. We are asking a bunch of extremists
to come in here.
The Chairman. I sent a letter the other day asking the
ranking minority member for suggestions of who he wanted for
witnesses.
Senator Lausche. Who else?

FORMER CIA AGENT

The Chairman. There is another who came to see me. This is
in the Executive record--I would just throw it out for your
consideration. An unusual fellow as far as I am concerned, and
I never heard of him before, but he was born in Korea. He came
here in 1930. He is a naturalized American, and he spent 20
years as a CIA agent largely in research, but he is in the CIA,
or he was in the CIA, from 1946 to 1965. I have never before
run into a man with this kind of particular experience, and he
is a Korean by birth, but an American by naturalization.
I was going to raise him just because I thought you would
find him interesting; I did, because I never had seen a fellow
with this kind of experience.
Senator McCarthy. Can former CIA members talk to this
committee?
The Chairman. I asked about this. He asked to see me; I
never heard of the fellow. He wrote me a letter a month ago and
asked to come and talk to me. His name is Chowe.
Senator Lausche. What is his name?
The Chairman. Chowe. Anyway, there are a number of people
of this kind. I think the fellow was very interesting. He can
give you a different slant on many different things. He does
not undertake to say you are right or wrong in Vietnam. I did
not ask him about that. I asked him about a lot of other
things. He volunteered them. As a matter of fact, he came and
volunteered the story about a great deal of information I had
never heard about in the CIA.
Senator Lausche. Hold these over until tomorrow.
The Chairman. These are not final decisions. I am asking
for guidance. What I really wanted to know is, because the
staff has to get in contact, whether the committee generally is
interested in Salisbury because, if not, I do not want to
invite him to the committee. If we have him at all I will have
him to tea or lunch or something of that kind. That is all in
the world I want to know. If you want him in open session and
the committee feels that way, that is also possible.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that we have these
witnesses that the chairman has mentioned, and that the
chairman and Senator Hickenlooper do as they did last year,
serve as a screening committee for any additional witnesses
that anyone may suggest, and that you two decide on the type of
people to have and set the time.
The Chairman. It is not exclusive. If you want someone
else, all you need to do is suggest him, Frank.
Senator Lausche. I challenge the right to act on this at
this time. We do not have a quorum.
The Chairman. I do not know if that takes action, but that
is all right. I was simply seeking the sentiment of the
committee on these people.
[Whereupon, the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:04 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse (subcommittee chairman), Fulbright,
Sparkman, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
The meeting was held to discuss proposed amendments to the
OAS charter and the current treaty negotiations with Panama,
and also to discuss the prospects for the OAS summit meeting.
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary for American Republics
Affairs, accompanied by John N. Irwin, Special Ambassador for
negotiation of Panama Canal Treaty; Sol Linowitz, Ambassador to
the OAS; and Robert F. Woodward, Assistant to Ambassador Irwin,
appeared before the group.
For a record of the proceeding, see the official
transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 12:30 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore,
Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
The committee discussed whether to hold further hearings on
Ex. D. 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. It
was agreed that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover would be asked to come
before the committee and also that time would be set aside to
hear public witnesses.
William S. Gaud, Administrator of AID, accompanied by
Daniel Steiner, William C. Gibbons, and Charles D. Paolitto,
testified on the subject: ``Presidential determination to
increase the number of countries receiving development and
technical assistance.''
For a record of the proceedings, see the official
transcript.
[The committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee),
Clark, Pell, and Aiken.
The subcommittee discussed the content of hearings to be
held and possible witnesses.
For a record of the proceedings, see the official
transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 10:55 p.m.]

THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA

----------

Monday, January 30, 1967

[Editor's Note.--On September 30, 1965, junior level
military officers staged a coup against the Indonesian high
command, killing five generals and wounding the chief of staff,
Gen. Abul Haris Nasution. Other military forces under Gen.
Suharto suppressed the coup, blamed the uprising on the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and set about eliminating it
in a bloody counter-coup. President Achmed Sukarno, who had
ruled Indonesia since 1945, remained in office following these
events, but in January 1967, the Armed Forces Information
Center published an article accusing Sukarno of complicity with
the Communist plotters. The Provisional People's Consultative
Congress investigated the charges and on March 12, 1967 removed
Sukarno's executive and ceremonial powers, making Gen. Suharto
the acting president.]

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Frank Lausche (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield,
Gore, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
Also Present: Senator McGee.
Carl Marcy and Norvill Jones of the committee staff.
Senator Lausche. I think we might as well get started.
Mr. Green, this is a meeting of the members of the
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and such other senators
who will appear.
We want to hear from you your observations on what the
conditions are in Indonesia. If you will proceed with the
presentation of your views, and later open yourself to
questions, we will appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARSHALL GREEN, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR
TO INDONESIA; ACCOMPANIED BY H.G. TORBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Ambassador Green. Thank you very much, Senator. I
understand I am speaking in closed session or executive
session.
Senator Carlson. Yes.
Ambassador Green. Because I want to speak with candor.
Well, I think as Senator McGee will testify--he has just
been out there--there has been a tremendous change around in
the past year. I was confirmed in the next room here in June,
1965. I went out there the next month and at that time the
whole country was slipping towards the Red camp. Some people
thought it already had joined the Red camp.
Senator Lausche. When was that?
Ambassador Green. That was July 21st that I arrived in
Jakarta.
This was a time when they were stoning our consulates and
Embassy and we were harassed at every turn. The communist power
was growing. Sukarno on August 17, 1965, spoke about the
Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. That is how far this thing
had gone.

GREAT CHANGE IN ONE YEAR

Well, the whole situation, of course, as you know, has
changed in the course of this past year due to events which I
will come back to, and today the Communist Party in Indonesia
has been banned. The relations with Peking are almost at a
breaking point. In other words, they share our assessment of
Peking's menace to that part of the world. They have ended the
confrontation. They have rejoined the United Nations. They have
rejoined all of these specialized agencies of the United
Nations. They are participating actively in the new regional
community in Southeast Asia and they are looking for good
relations with all the countries that can help them.
Now, that means Eastern European countries as well as, of
course, the Western countries and Japan. This has not been very
easy in terms of their relations with the Soviet Union because
they have banned the Communist Party. But the Soviets have
helped them in the past, particularly in military assistance,
and they hope to receive that assistance.
So this has been the great change that has taken place in
one year.
I suppose that there is no place in the world in modern
times where there has been such an abrupt shift around as there
has been in Indonesia in the last year and a half. Certainly I
say that on the basis of 23 years of working in the Far East.
Now, the big event that changed all this, as you know, was
the abortive coup that was launched by the Communists and some
of their friends on September 30, 1965.

COMMUNIST ALLIES

Senator Lausche. When you say by some of the Communists,
whom do you mean?
Ambassador Green. By the Communist Party, and I said some
of their friends who were working on the outside.
Senator Lausche. Who were they?
Ambassador Green. Well, for example, Subandrio, who is not
a declared member of the Communist Party but, according to the
trials that have taken place now, he was involved in this plot.
Senator Lausche. Were there any other outside nations
involved?
Ambassador Green. No. Well, Communist China may well have
been involved. We have not proved it, But there is
circumstantial evidence that points to involvement.

ABORTIVE COUP

Now, what happened in this abortive coup was that the PKI,
which is the Communist Party, moved swiftly in an effort to
kill the top seven generals. They succeeded in killing five of
them two of them escaped, General Nasution and General Suharto.
That was a mighty lucky thing because these two surviving
generals moved fast and brought in the Siliwangi Division which
is the local division up there in Bandung, and they suppressed
the coup in the Jakarta area within a matter of days.
They then faced a tremendous task of how to move against
the Communists who were all over the country. It was an
enormously powerful party, as you know, the largest in the
world outside of the Communist bloc or the Sino-Soviet
countries, with the possible exception of Italy.
They face an enormous task, but they have proven themselves
capable of meeting that challenge.
Now, in the course of the next month, month and a half,
there now appears to have been a very bloody aftermath to this
abortive coup. The pictures of the killed generals and how they
were killed; the accounts of how they were tortured by the
Women's Communist Organization; how their bodies had been
heaved into the crocodile hole, which is up near the air base.
These bodies then being exhumed. They were photographed and the
photographs were sent all around the country and this touched
off a very sharp wave of reaction in the local communities.

BLOODY AFTERMATH OF THE COUP

As a result of this, the Moslems and others moved against
the local Communist organization, the farm levels and villages,
not so much in the cities and towns. This all happened in the
countryside and I estimated when I came back here in February
that 300,000 people had been killed in this bloody aftermath,
which had been many times the number that have been killed in
South Vietnam since the war started. Since that time, I think
we would up that estimate to perhaps close to 500,000 people
that have been killed in this aftermath. Of course, nobody
knows. We merely judge it by whole villages that have been
depopulated.
The Island of Bali, for example, which is a small island,
4,000 square miles, there were about perhaps 100,000 people
that were killed there alone. There was something of a holy war
reaction. In the case of Bali, it is not Moslem. It is Hindu.
But they had a religious way of life. The Communists tried to
secularize it and this was the reaction of the people once they
realized the Communists were on the run and the army was on
their side.
In the case of East Java, it was the reaction of the
Moslems more than any other religious group that resulted in
this decimation. So the military had definitely gained the
upper hand. It squashed the Communist coup effort and by
November and December they were really in a position to take
over the reins of government.

THE PROBLEM OF SUKARNO

However, they had counted on President Sukarno moving over
either on to their side or keeping quiet, moving into the
background. But Sukarno at that time more or less thumbed his
nose in their face and has been doing it ever since. So they
were then faced with the problem, are we going to move against
Sukarno and all the people that support Sukarno--you know, he
has been called the George Washington of Indonesia--or are we
going to move against him with all the consequences that might
be entailed in a civil war?
They decided they would not do so. They still hoped that
the President could be brought around. Well, he wasn't. And the
minute that Sukarno realized that Nasution and Suharto were not
going to move against him, he was then emboldened to come back
and begin to get back some more of his friends into the top
places of government. As a matter of fact, in February of 1966,
he dismissed Gene Suharto and he named one of the worst
cabinets in Indonesia. Of course, there are no Communists, but
it is nevertheless one of the worst cabinets that has ever been
named in Indonesia. This started off, touched off, the large
scale student demonstrations. Where there have been hundreds
and thousands before, you know, there were tens thousands that
were out on the street and that atmosphere.

SUHARTO GIVEN SPECIAL POWERS

Then Suharto went to President Sukarno and said: I cannot
be held responsible for the security of this country unless you
give me broad responsibilities for handling all security
matters in this country. He was given those special powers by
Sukarno who had no choice.
Since that time, Suharto has broadly interpreted these
powers to run the country and he has done it just that way. The
only thing he hasn't done is that he has not moved abruptly
against President Sukarno. He has pressured him. He has reduced
his powers. He has chipped away his power base and he has done
it very successfully, but he hasn't totally eliminated it.
Well, we are faced today with I would say two principal
problems, one on the political side and one on the economic
side.

POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES

On the political side is this power struggle that
continues, or you could rephrase it, the problem of what to do
with President Sukarno. His power is going down and down and I
just saw a news ticker that indicates that the palace is
surrounded with students at this moment. What they are going to
do, I don't know. They apparently have switched the guards.
This may be for the President's own protection rather than they
are going to take any sudden movement against him. I do not
think that General Suharto will move abruptly against the
President, to arrest him or to exile him or to shoot him or
anything like that. I think he will continue to pursue what he
calls the constitutional course of action to get the MPRS,
which is their super Parliament, to pass some kind of law
against the President or to take some action against the
President by impeachment, but he is not going to act outside
the constitutional framework.
The reason I think partly is because he wants to avoid
civil strife. He doesn't want to start a tradition of coups and
counter-coups. He wants to establish as far as possible the
constitutional base and preserve that tradition in his country.

SUKARNO IS A COMMON TARGET

But also I think that Suharto has been very wily. He
realizes that as long as the President is around, that he
becomes the target of the students, of their army, of the
intelligentsia, of the commercial groups. He is the common
target and this keeps the new order, as we might call the group
around General Suharto--it keeps them together with a common
focus. He can also make a scapegoat of the President. As long
as he is around, everybody is critical of Sukarno for being
responsible for the economic chaos of the country and this, of
course, has happened. So he has his reasons for handling the
job the way he does.
In any event, the retention of Sukarno, although it does
involve a number of problems, has not prevented the new
government from moving ahead and doing the things that are
required in the circumstances. He has been a drag. He has
pulled the clock back sometimes, but the clock nevertheless has
moved forward and a lot of things have been changed in
Indonesia, almost all of them for the better.

QUESTION OF STABILIZATION

This raises the second major problem that is facing
Indonesia today, and that is the question of stabilization. The
economic chaos left by 10 or 15 years of Sukarno's jingoism was
one of the worst that I know of in modern history. They were
left with a debt of $2.7 billion, about half of that owed to
the Soviet Union, about $200 million or so owed to the United
States.
Of course, there are a lot of other creditor countries as
well. The infrastructure of the country had deteriorated during
this time. The roads, railroads, airlines are in miserable
shape. Only about 30 percent of the shipping tonnage is
operable today. Meanwhile, the cost of living has shot way up
under runaway inflation.
Between mid-1965 and mid-1966 the cost of living went up 20
times, 2,000 percent.
Senator Lausche. Since when?
Ambassador Green. In that one year's time, between the
middle of 1965 and the middle of 1966, the cost of living went
up 20 times. The money inflated in that same period by 7\1/2\
times. The exports which had been $800 million a year back in
1965 had all slumped down to about $500 million a year in 1965,
over that 10-year span. Everything was running downhill. It was
one of the few countries in the Far East, that and Burma, I
guess, where there has been a deterioration in the per capita
or GNP over the last 10 years.
So this is the situation that General Suharto inherited.
Now, he had the wisdom to turn to a group of first-rate
economists who worked in the University of Indonesia. All of
them I would say had been trained in the United States, three
of them at the University of California, one at Harvard--he
overcame that handicap. I went to Yale. And one from MIT.
Now, these men are all first-rate economists. They gave him
sound advice on how to approach the problem. One of the things
they urged was that Indonesia should rejoin the International
Monetary Fund and IBRD. They should get a team of IMF men out
there to help out with their problems. This would be a sure way
to restoring some confidence in Indonesia in the international
banking and governmental circles.
So Suharto turned to these people. They drew up a
stabilization plan and I say that plan has been a first-rate
plan in every sense of the word.

STABILIZATION MEANS HARDSHIP

Now, this is not easy to accomplish because stabilization
means hardship. It means stringencies and it always is
accompanied by a certain political risk, particularly with
Sukarno around, where he might be able to take advantage of the
objections and feelings of the people and their political
leaders. But that has not happened. The stabilization plan that
calls for a balanced budget in calendar 1967 has passed the
Parliament without any objections. They have instituted the
plan now and, as a result of it, prices of foodstuffs have been
level for the last 3\1/2\ months, even though----
Senator Lausche. I think we had better go upstairs.
Senator Sparkman. This is a roll call. We will be back in
just a few minutes.
[A short recess was taken.]

WILL SUKARNO BE TRIED?

Senator Sparkman. Is there any likelihood that Sukarno will
be tried?
Ambassador Green. He will be tried in a certain sense. He
may be tried in a certain sense by the MPRS which is sort of
the super parliament, constituent assembly, in March. Whether,
as I say, it will be impeachment proceedings or censure,
whether it will be calling for the resignation of the
President, whether it will be a call for his exile or not, no
one knows. Nobody knows what action will be taken.

A SOUND PLAN FOR STABILIZATION

Senator Lausche. You were discussing the economic
situation, I think when we left.
Amssador Green. Yes, I am not sure exactly at what point I
broke off, but I was describing the fact that General Suharto
had turned to a group of good economists as well as to the
International Monetary Fund for advice. They came up with a
sound plan for stabilization. They moved ahead with their plan,
as a result of which the cost of food has stabilized. The cost
of textiles has actually gone down. Some other costs have gone
up. But that was anticipated because they were withdrawing
subsidies--electricity, transportation--and, of course, that
was passed on to the consumer. That was all part of the
stabilization plan.
Anyway, we think they are doing very well on this plan,
moving ahead in a determined way, and obviously this relates
very directly to whether or not other countries are going to be
able to assist Indonesia, because people do not want to put
money into any economy where it just goes down the rat hole of
inflation.

INDONESIANS NEED DEBT RELIEF

Now, assuming that the Indonesians continue to manage their
economy well and there is the right managerial follow-through,
which is always uncertain, they are still going to be dependent
upon whether or not they can get adequate debt relief because,
as I said, they built up this huge debt of $2.7 billion. If you
service that debt in one year, that would be almost as much as
their total foreign exchange earnings for that year. Therefore,
they obviously have got to reschedule the whole debt.
They have had meetings now, in Tokyo, in Paris, another one
in Amsterdam. There seems to be general agreement among the
Western creditors' group--that includes the United States,
Japan, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, a number of other
countries--that Indonesia should be given rather sweeping,
almost standstill debt relief this coming year.
Senator Aiken. Private creditors, too?
Ambassador Green. The private credit has not yet been
resolved, but presumably it will be along the same lines. Then
at the end of this year, calendar 1967, there will be another
meeting to see whether or not it has to be extended. It
probably will. Meanwhile they will resolve the future long-
range debt by rescheduling over a longer period of time.
Now, no one knows what the East European group will do, but
it looks as though they will be giving them liberal debt relief
as well. Therefore, if all goes according to Hoyle, as it seems
to be going, that problem will be satisfactorily resolved.
In addition to that, even if they get virtually total debt
relief this year, this calendar year, they are going to need
something between $170 million and $300 million--let us say
$225 million of new net foreign aid in order to balance their
budget. And our approach to this problem is that we want to be
sure, first of all, that there is a liberal debt relief and,
secondly, with regard to net aid, that other countries do their
fair share.
Now, what fair share is I don't know. But we will be
talking in Amsterdam at the end of February about the general
principles of future assistance. We will not probably go into a
pledging session with them, but we will talk about the general
principles that will guide us.
So those are the two main problems--the political and the
economic problems.

THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN ASIA

I think sometimes that our focus is so much on the
immediate problem, let us say on the Communist menace in some
countries, or in the case of Asia, how you deal with Sukarno,
that if you were to remove that immediate problem you would
have beyond it another range of mountains. It would be a big
and vast one and, in the case of Indonesia, once this problem
of Sukarno is out of the way and stabilization programs move
ahead satisfactorily, there will still be a lot of problems.
The whole question of how you bring a traditional society
into the modern age is involved here, problems of corruption
and nepotism, what we call baptism, which is the adulation of a
man like Sukarno, a charismatic personality.
The problem of how to reach agreement--mushiwara--people
talking back and forth and reaching a consensus, which is fine
in the village council, but in the modern state is a rather
painstaking, lengthy process. All those problems.

THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY MIX

How is the new government going to establish a political
base when two or three of the major parties now outlawed--how
are they going to get back on the political scene? Will they
become a part of the political base of this new government
under General Suharto? The problems of how--what kind of a mix
between civilians and military should you have in the
government? These are all parts of this overall problem of
moving from the traditional into a modern state.
Now, if I could just touch on one of those problems, the
problem of the civilian-military mix, this is a military
government in many ways. General Suharto is the First Minister
and he is obviously calling the signals. But he is drawing on
the advice, as I just pointed out, now in the economic field of
these economic specialists at the University of Indonesia and
on outside consultants.
General Suharto also turns to Adam Malik who is the Foreign
Minister and head of the political section of the government.
Adam Malik is in my opinion one of the outstanding leaders in
East Asia today. There are other good civilian leaders, too.
So what we have today is the best carburetorization between
the civilian and military, just about the right mix, because
the military are just enough involved in the government--it is
not a junta government--just enough involved so that they take
a responsible attitude towards the total operations of the
government. Yet they are not so far in the government that they
have taken it over and monopolized it themselves and have
excluded good civilians which, of course, would lose for them
the support of the students, the intellectuals, and some of the
commercial types.
Now, there are nevertheless problems, of course, for a
government made up of civilians and military this way when you
run into difficulties in the economic front, or when some of
the politicians talk out of turn that oppose you. There is a
natural temptation for military leaders to try to suppress the
civilian segments. I don't think that General Suharto will do
that. I think he recognizes the importance of maintaining this
kind of mix that I just referred to now. So far these three
leading men--we call them the Triumvirate--made up of General
Suharto, General Nasution and Adam Malik, and the Sultan of
Djogjakarta, make a good team indeed and General Suharto has
the wide respect as a leader. Malik commands widespread
admiration for his tactical brilliance and for how to get
things done as well as for his general views and philosophy. I
think the Sultan of Djogjakarta is widely liked if not beloved
because he comes from central Java where indeed most of the
resistance to the modernization takes place and where President
Sukarno has most of his strength.
Senator Aiken. He speaks for industry.
Ambassador Green. He does, indeed, and he is a very nice
gentleman and I think anyone here would agree. Together they
make up a very good team, I think.

QUALITIES OF THE NEW LEADERS

As far as our overall--I must just say one more thing about
this team. One of the qualities that seems to me that they all
have in common is that they are working for the country and not
for themselves. In general, President Sukarno, if he is ever
held up in the judgment of history, it will seem to me his
greatest failing was that he was out for his own glory, a
policy of self-glorification, and the people were the victims
of this policy. These people are approaching their tasks not
for their own personal gain, but for the gain of the country.
Another thing about them is determination. Because there
had been so many people killed in this last year or two in
Indonesia, and because in a way there is a terrible retribution
if the Communists or their friends ever get back again, they
are more determined that they have to succeed. Human survival
is at stake here.
Another quality it seems to me is moderation, pragmatism. I
have seen the same thing throughout East Asia in the last few
years. It has been the movement from the ideological attachment
of the first generation of revolutionary leaders to the
modernists who are basically pragmatists and are concerned with
the problems of modernization and development as opposed to the
problems of a country winning its independence. This country
has gained its independence now.
These are qualities of leadership and to me they are very
important ones. They are men we can talk with and deal with
reasonably.

U.S. POLICIES TOWARD INDONESIA

Now, as far as our own policies towards Indonesia are
concerned, basically we believe exactly what the Indonesian
leadership believes in. We believe in the unity of Indonesia. I
started right out with that because there has been some
question in the past. We believe in the unity. We believe in
the progress and stability, political-economic stability, of
Indonesia. These are basic policies. Those, of course, are the
policies of the new government, too, and when we say why do
Indonesians and Americans get along, it seems to me one of the
basic reasons we get along with the new government is we are
basically attached to the same objectives and principles.
I think if I may say so, as a matter of personal judgment,
very privately, of course, I think they appreciate what we are
doing in Vietnam. Certainly they are deadly opposed to the
Communists and they are opposed to Peking's policies. As far as
the policies for carrying out these broad objectives are
concerned, obviously they need assistance badly as I have just
said.
It falls principally in the economic sector. And also I
think certain civic actions support, not with lethal weapons,
but for certain spare parts and other things to help them get
with the civic action program. These are going to be involved.
Now, we have a great opportunity in Indonesia because we
started with the tabula rasa--all the aid was practically wound
up--of trying to approach our problems on as broad a
multilateral basis as possible. This may not be possible the
first year or the second year, but because we are already
talking with these other creditor group countries in Tokyo,
Paris, now Amsterdam, and since you have to approach the whole
problem of the debt rescheduling and further assistance, really
it is one single problem. We are getting more and more
agreement on the principles involved in assistance to Indonesia
and we want Indonesia to come up with the help of the
International Monetary Fund, again part, you might say, of a
multilateral approach, with what are indeed their most urgent
needs, have these things carefully reviewed by the INF, and
then these things put up to the other countries so they can
decide in what ways they can assist Indonesia in the most
meaningful way possible.
I am very hopeful that this approach will work. If we do, I
think we can avoid lots of the troubles and pitfalls of the
past.

A SENSE OF MISSION

I mentioned specific action just now. It seems to me that
there is particular relevance to the needs for civil action
programs in Indonesia because the military have all this
knowhow. They have all this equipment, and, of course, they
have the authority as well.
Meanwhile they have ended confrontation. They had to
mothball almost all this fleet they have got from the Soviet
Union and a result of all that is that a lot of officers are
without jobs. It is important that they have a sense of mission
and that the mission relates the needs of the people, and they
have turned to us and asked us for help in that regard. I have
discussed this thing in Washington. I think there is increasing
recognition of the importance of helping them out on a low-
cost, high-impact program, especially in central and Eastern
Java where most of the people live.
I might say that 70 percent of the Indonesian people live
on the island of Java which you can see is but a small slice of
the geography of the vast sprawling country, larger than the
rest of Southeast Asia put together. And I think that we will
have other advantages as well, tactical advantages, in our
personal relationships with the military and of helping
preserve the same kinds of approach and attitude.
Well, if I could just wind up because I know you have lots
of questions, Senator. I just wanted to end up by saying, as I
said to you in the beginning before some of your colleagues
arrived, it has been a tremendous year and a half of transition
and the transition in my opinion has been almost uniformly for
the good: the confrontation over; the rejoining of the United
Nations; the launching of what so far has been an effective
stabilization program; the banning of communism from Indo-China
and, of course, it has problems, as I said, with their
relations with the Soviet Union and for the overall; the new
leadership and qualities of the new leaders; for those things I
think we have much to be thankful. I think we have a good group
we can work with. I don't think there is any group we can
expect on the present scene or in the predictable future that
will be as good as this one. I hope we will be able to give
them the requisite help, along with other countries, doing it
as much as possible with this multilateral approach that I know
you have discussed in this committee.

AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL IN INDONESIA

Senator Lausche. Thank you. I just want to put a few
questions to inform those members who were not present when you
began to testify about what you said.
What is the significance of July 21st that you mentioned?
Ambassador Green. That is simply the date I arrived in
Indonesia, having been confirmed in the next room.
Senator Case. What could be more pertinent?
Senator Lausche. Now, then, you stated there was a
tremendous and miraculous change between what you saw when you
came and what the condition is now.
Ambassador Green. For which I bear no responsibility.

CHINESE-INDONESIAN AXIS

Senator Lausche. Now, then, you spoke about an axis. The
Peking-Hanoi----
Ambassador Green. Pyongyang-Jakarta axis.
Senator Lausche. And that was in the making.
Ambassador Green. Sukarno announced this on August 17,
1965. He said that we had this axis. I am not sure it was ever
worked out in any formal way, but he was boasting that there
was such an axis.
Senator Lausche. Peking-Hanoi,----
Ambassador Green. The axis actually had five countries
involved. Indonesia, China, Red China, North Vietnam, North
Korea, and Cambodia. But I might say he never consulted
Cambodia and Monsignor was quite angry when he heard about it.
Senator Lausche. That was the axis that was being
discussed.
Ambassador Green. He announced it when Chen Yi was there as
his distinguished advisor.

INDONESIAN COUP

Senator Lausche. When did the coup occur?
Ambassador Green. September 30, in the wee hours of the
morning. Actually, October 1st.
Senator Lausche. And the object of the coup was to
eliminate the seven military leaders.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. They eliminated five, but two survived?
Ambassador Green. Correct.
Senator Lausche. And the survival of the two produced this
encouraging situation that now prevails.
Ambassador Green. If two generals had not survived,
Nasution and Suharto, it is possible that no one would have
moved rapidly and quashed the coup.
Senator Lausche. Now, then, after that they took pictures
of the hideous brutalities that were committed upon these five.
Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. And the nation became informed about it
and with that there was seething indignation and a purpose to
eliminate the Communists. You estimate 300,000 were killed. The
present calculation is that there were 500,000.
Ambassador Green. Some people think there were 500,000.
Some think there were more. Some think less. But I would up my
estimate from 300,000.
Senator Lausche. Now, there was economic chaos produced by
Sukarno leaving a debt of $2,700 million.
Ambassador Green. Right.
Senator Lausche. The nations who are creditors have
extended the time of the payment of debts, but in addition to
that, there is need of $225 million of new foreign aid.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. And it is a purpose that that foreign aid
may be provided by us and other nations of the world.
Now, all right. Mike?
Senator Mansfield. I have no questions.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

Senator Sparkman. Just a question. Is there any military
included in that request? Military assistance?
Ambassador Green. In that figure of $225 million? No, sir.
Senator Sparkman. Does Indonesia look for military
assistance?
Ambassador Green. It does.
Senator Sparkman. Ought we to give it?
Ambassador Green. Now, I must correct my statement. When I
said $225 million, if you are including in that figure
assistance from the Soviet Union as well, which I believe it
would be, the Indonesians would like to get some spare parts
for military equipment that they had already received from the
Soviet bloc. So that would be part of it. But not a major part,
a small part.
Senator Sparkman. Now, let me ask you----
Senator Case. In this $225 million calculation--is that
overall or just for----
Ambassador Green. That is overall. And that $225 million,
as I say, I was hitting between two outside figures of $160
million to $300 million, something in that range. But $225
million would be acceptable.

ROLE OF GEN. NASUTION

Senator Sparkman. We used to hear a good bit about a man
named Nasution.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. What has happened to him?
Ambassador Green. General Nasution, who was one of the two
surviving generals----.
Senator Sparkman. Is he one that you named?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Sparkman. He and Suharto were the two that
survived.
Ambassador Green. That is right. But Suharto has moved out
into the No. 1 position and General Nasution is the president
of this MPRS, constituent assembly, or super Parliament,
whatever you want to call it.
Senator Lausche. John, may I ask him to redescribe what
they showed to the people of the country that infuriated them
into taking the lives of these 300,000. You spoke about the
bodies and the alligator pits and so on.
Ambassador Green. Yes. What had happened was that these
murdered generals--there were five of them--one or two had been
shot and killed right at the beginning, but three of them at
least were not dead when they picked them up. They took them up
to the Halim Air Base and there these three surviving generals
were tortured to death, slashed slowly to death by Gerwani,
which is the Communist women's organization. When their
lacerated bodies, which meanwhile had been dumped into the
crocodile hole which is the name of sort of a pit down there,
when they had been exhumed three or four days later, the army
saw to it that pictures of this grisly scene were widely
publicized all around the country. Meanwhile, in the
countryside where the village folk had been living under the
increasing pressures of the Communists, the atmosphere was
already one of dry tinder and this was the spark that lit the
whole thing and sent it into such violent conflagration.
Senator Sparkman. Some of General Nasution's children were
killed.
Ambassador Green. His daughter was killed, and this is very
material, Senator, because this produced something of an
emotional reaction. This little girl was an innocent victim,
shot to death.
Senator Lausche. Frank?

FOREIGN AID TO INDONESIA

Senator Carlson. Just one or two questions. How much
foreign aid are we giving now, if any?
Ambassador Green. We are.
Senator Carlson. Grants in aid and loans?
Ambassador Green. We are giving the Indonesians about $48
million or $49 million in P.L. 480, Title V assistance. These
are dollar sales.
This represents mostly cotton, 225,000 bales plus 100,000
tons of rice. This already has been agreed to. All of it hasn't
arrived yet, but most of it is there by now.
In addition to that, there is $10 million in a spare parts
loan again, to be repaid in 20 years, I believe.
In addition to that, maybe there is a million dollars or so
in grant assistance for educational purposes as well as for a
food-for-work program which is really grant in aid, although it
is provided in the form of cracked corn and vegetable oil.

REASONS FOR SOVIET AID

Senator Carlson. In view of the fact that so many of the
Communists were killed during the blood bath, how can we expect
the Soviet Union to give aid or continue to give aid?
Ambassador Green. Because they have put such a tremendous
investment in Asia I suppose they want it covered. It is a
terribly important country, the fifth largest in the world.
Some people say the third richest in the world. And the Soviets
have, as I pointed out, invested $1.4 billion in aid. They want
to cover that.
Also I think they are hopeful that in the long run there
will be a recovery of the Communist Party. Meanwhile they damn
the Chinese for having driven the Communist Party in this
direction and they sort of damn us in a very faint way for
being imperialists, and maybe we are getting in too close with
the new government. They keep making rumbles on this from
Moscow, but I think if I were in the Soviet position, I would
be acting very much the way they do.
Now, they are obviously deeply perplexed. It is not easy
for them to give assistance to Indonesia when Indonesia is
banning the Communist Party.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT WELCOME

One thing I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, is that
one of the things the new government is welcoming is foreign
investment. This is another 180 degree change in policy. The
first conversation I had with General Suharto on May 27, 1966,
he raised the question of how they were going to develop the
outer islands. I said I felt private investment, foreign
investment, was the soundest way. There wasn't that kind of
money. The government didnt have that kind of money. Well, not
as a result of that, but I merely mention it, this was the
first time the subject was discussed with the General. Now they
have changed their foreign investment policy to attract foreign
capital investment, as a result of which the Hotel Indonesia is
jam packed with potential foreign investors out there looking
into the possibilities.
Meanwhile, the law has been changed to favor foreign
investment and protect foreign investors, and they have
discovered, they think, oil in the Java Sea, no point deeper
than 180 feet, and if this oil finding turns out to be what
they think it is, maybe a second Gulf of Mexico.
Senator Lausche. Mike.
Senator Mansfield. Nothing.
Senator Lausche. Karl?

RELATIONS BETWEEN SUHARTO AND NASUTION

Senator Mundt. Curiously enough, of all places, we have a
lot of South Dakota businessmen out in Indonesia. How they ever
found it I don't know, but I have been in close touch with them
and they are pretty high on this Nasution. They seem to feel
that if elections were held, he might wind up as the President,
as the best counter against the Communists rather than Suharto,
a fine fellow and honest, but who doesn't seem to have the
outgoing personality that appeals to the masses.
Would you comment on that?
Ambassador Green. General Nasution has a bit of this
charisma quality maybe, and certainly Mrs. Nasution does, too.
They are both highly popular. But I think there is no question
that General Suharto is very much the man the people are
looking to these days for leadership, that General Nasution has
been in charge of the army many years and he is senior in the
army ranks. The relation between Suharto and Nasution is good.
Nasution comes from Sumatro for one thing, and Suharto comes
from Java. Since 70 percent of the people come from Java, this
is an important factor.
I would hope very much that Nasution and Suharto could
continue their harmonious relationship. It is productive,
helpful. One thing Nasution has lost a bit of standing with
students for is because in November-December, 1965, when he was
in charge, he stood back from facing down Sukarno. Then Sukarno
dismissed him in the cabinet shift of February 23, 1966, and
that was quite a blow to his prestige. He recovered a good deal
of that prestige. He is more outspoken in his opposition to
Sukarno than is Suharto.

COULD SUKARNO RETURN TO POWER

Senator Mundt. Can you envision any contingency whereby
Sukarno might get back into power?
Ambassador Green. Oh, I could. It is conceivable that he
could come back if their whole stabilization program should go
on the rocks and they couldn't make a go of things, and if the
new order, as they call the group around General Suharto, was
not able to maintain the unity, which is terribly important. If
things began to slip up, then Sukarno might look pretty good in
retrospect. So that there is a possibility of coming back.
I think the chances are definitely against him, but I don't
think we should rule it out.
Senator Lausche. Will you tell Senator Mundt what you
stated a moment ago about there being a bit of craftiness in
the operation of Suharto in allowing Sukarno to still remain in
the picture.
Ambassador Green. Yes. His reason for keeping Sukarno on is
partly this. He doesn't want to risk civil war, although I
don't think that that would be the result of moving sharply
against Sukarno today. Nevertheless, that has been one reason,
partly because Sukarno was the old commander-in-chief, the
George Washington of Indonesia, as they always say.
But I think it is also because he wanted to use Sukarno as
a scapegoat, to have him there so that he could be the focus of
resentment. After all, he is the man who is responsible for
this mess. Leave him on and people are reminded of that fact.
If he goes in exile, by this time people might be criticizing
the new government for some of the problems which really are
described as Sukarno's folly.
Also you maintain better unity in what you call the new
order, which is made up of rather disparate forces like the
military and the students, the business community, if they have
a common target and they are all against Sukarno, most of them.
This helps to make unity.
So I think in his rather clever Javanese way Suharto has
handled this thing quite well. But, you know, you can't go on
playing that game forever. There comes a time when your
administration can suffer, you might say almost from tired--
when you have to spend so much time putting out the fire
Sukarno lights, hand-holding, going to palace functions which
are interminable, and also because students begin to get pretty
angry if you haven't moved against him in a final way.
It is also confusing to the outside world--I have been
around the country just now talking with a lot of people--that
Sukarno is lingering on this way. It does confuse a lot of
people as to what the new Indonesia adds up to.
Senator Mundt. That is all.
Senator Lausche. Al.

STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

Senator Gore. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you speak of the
students in the sense of organization, of unity. Is this a
rabble or is there some organization in this?
Ambassador Green. The students are extremely well
organized, not throughout the country but in the West Java area
and some of the other main population centers of Indonesia.
They are very well organized. There are two principal
organizations, the Kami--not our kind of Commies--these are the
university students, and the Kappi which are the high school
students.
These two groups are very violently anti-Sukarno and anti-
Communist, and so forth. You will find slogans put out by the
students that are the same throughout the country on the same
day, which shows you how well they are organized.
They are in close touch with General Suharto and the
military. They have been working very closely with him. They
haven't always agreed. Sometimes they are restrictive, but I
would say they had acted in a very responsible way so far. They
haven't been a rabble.
Now, there are other students that aren't members of these
groups, particularly in a place like Surabia, Eastern Java,
that are under the domination of other elements that are
against the Kami. But the Kami and Kappi, these two huge
student organizations, nevertheless represent the increasing
view of the student population of Indonesia and today command
good slice of the student population's support.

A VOLATILE ELEMENT

Senator Gore. The reason I asked the question, we see ``the
students'' in many parts of the world being propagandized and
utilized. It seems to be a very volatile element and might be a
source of danger as well as strength.
Ambassador Green. Suharto recognizes that very point. He
doesn't want to have Parliament in the streets. He recognizes
the students' feelings, on the other hand. This is one of the
reasons why Suharto has wanted to move in a constitutional way.
This is a very important consideration, that he wants to have
enough forward motion against Sukarno and his ilk to chip away
from their power and debase them eventually, but he wants to do
it in a constitutional way, partly so that the students don't
get the idea that this is the way to change governments.
Senator Gore. Of course, we see another example of
students, youth, in the Red Guard in Red China. Now, they can
be put to evil as well as good purposes.
About two or three years ago, Mr. Ambassador, we were told
in executive session that we had continued small amounts of
military aid to the military leaders largely to keep liaison
with them, that several of this group that were liquidated had
received their military education in the United States, and
that this aid at the proper and crucial time might prove to
have been very valuable to us.
Can you shed any light on that now?

PARTICIPANTS TRAINING PROGRAM

Ambassador Green. I think our Participants Training Program
in the past has been very useful. There were about, oh, I
guess, 8,000 or so Indonesian students in the United States,
and this included several thousand of the military. And I do
think this had a very important result. As I look back over our
old aid program, it wasn't so bad after all. In fact, we did a
pretty good job, I think. And there were some scatteration
projects and all that kind of stuff. But one area where we did
the best of all is in the human resources field, training of
people.
Senator Sparkman. One of those----
Ambassador Green. This would be the Participants Training
Program bringing people under either our AID program, or under
the State Department Cultural Program, or under the Military
Assistance Program.
Senator Sparkman. One of those hangover programs was also
one of communications which I believe served a good end with
the Armed Forces.
Ambassador Green. Yes, that is right.
Senator Sparkman. During the revolution.

PHILCO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Senator Lausche. Speak on that because they came before us
specially in this room----
Senator Sparkman. To continue it.
Senator Lausche [continuing]. Urging that we provide them
with money to install a communications system which was
presented to us as being essential to keeping a line in
Indonesia. You know of what I speak?
Ambassador Green. I know exactly what you are referring to.
You are referring--you are talking about the Philco
Troposcatter System. Well, this system--I am not enough of a
specialist to judge this one. This is up to the Indonesians to
judge on their own account.
The trouble with Philco was it was very expensive and it
would take a long, long time to build it. There may be cheaper
and better ways of building a communications network for
Indonesia. I grant that the building of a good communications
network is essential and it is true that the link that was
already established under Philco between Jakarta and Bandung
was a fairly important factor in the quick reaction of these
two surviving generals.
Senator Lausche. That is the point.
Senator Gore. Yes. So overall you say----
Ambassador Green. But I think you have to be careful on
this one because there are other kinds of communications
networks. Some of them may be considerably cheaper and more
within the means of the Indonesians to support.

CONTINUATION OF U.S. AID

Senator Gore. To come back to the overall question of aid,
is it your conclusion that the continuation of U.S. aid
programs even in miniscule amounts had considerable
significance ultimately in the showdown?
Ambassador Green. I think that the aid program which we had
of $800 million of U.S. assistance--maybe in the 10 or 12 year
period up until 1965--I think it was a good aid program by and
large. There were some things that obviously weren't as good,
but by and large it was a good aid program. The Indonesians
knew it and today in retrospect it looks darn good because out
of the $800 million that we gave Indonesia at that time, only
29 percent of it was repayable in dollars. So that we didn't
leave them saddled with a debt the way the Soviet Union did,
for example.
Therefore, that is one factor.
Our training program, as I said before, left a long term
good result. The turnkey plus projects we had for helping to
build a factory with another one of our loans, and then we saw
to it that that factory was managed by our people until they
were prepared to take it over. Then they took it over, and when
they took it over, they were able to operate it as indeed they
are today.
The two big projects that we helped them with in fertilizer
and cement are operating at almost 100 percent capacity and
they are the only two big factories in the country of that size
operating anywhere near 100 percent capacity because of the way
this thing was handled.

MULTILATERAL AID

Senator Case. Mr. Ambassador, I don't know whether I missed
something coming in late or not, but have you laid out a
specific program or is this general background on the role of
foreign aid?
Ambassador Green. What I was talking of was in just general
terms, but we haven't reached a point of setting out
specifically what we will do in this calendar year of this next
fiscal year. We are talking about it still in the Department,
but as you can see from my remarks, I think it is very
important that we lend a helping hand to Indonesia, but we do
it as far as possible in consultation with other countries,
other creditors, and that we do our share, but we see to it
that other countries do theirs as well.
Senator Case. This is an ideal time, isn't it, to get
multilateral operations going because we are doing nothing now.
Ambassador Green. Yes, it is. To the extent that it is
possible to do.
Senator Case. We have to realize----
Ambassador Green. We are already discussing these things
with other creditors and we don't want, for example, a country
to give Indonesia short term credit because that is just going
to compound the problems of the debt rescheduling two or three
years from now. We want to be sure that the terms of assistance
other countries give to Indonesia comports with their overall
debt problem and rescheduling problem and our own assistance,
and we are hopeful that the Soviet bloc will give Indonesia the
kind of debt relief that we are giving. I think they will from
what I have heard.
Senator Mundt. If they don't, are you going to change your
mind about giving relief?
Ambassador Green. Well, I think this is going to raise a
very serious problem obviously, and I think the Indonesians
know that.

INDONESIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Senator Case. How close are they to being self-sufficient
in food?
Ambassador Green. Well----
Senator Case. Is this one of the----
Ambassador Green. The growing population of Java is the
reason why they are in a food deficit position today. The
population increases there over 2\1/2\ percent every year. It
is one of the most overcrowded bits of real estate in the world
today. And they live in the illusion that people can move to
these outlying islands. They don't figure the tremendous cost
of resettlement which makes this prohibitive. Also people that
go to these islands find it forbidding and they tend to come
back.
Senator Case. You mean cold?
Ambassador Green. No. They find that there is no rice--
other kinds of food. They miss their old homestead, rather
typical.
Now, as the population of Java increases, it has moved from
a position of at one time exporting rice to the outlying areas
to a position where it exports nothing except officials and
problems. And obviously there is a major problem in facing up
to family planning, or whatever you want to call it.
The Indonesians are too preoccupied with other questions
right now that they really haven't done much in this field.
Senator Case. This is a good time to get going on that,
too.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lausche. Senator Cooper?

COMMUNISTS KILLED DURING COUNTER-COUP

Senator Cooper. You said an estimate of 300,000 to 500,000
were killed. Is it correct that 25 percent of the population in
Indonesia is Communist?
Ambassador Green. You could argue that at one point there
were as many as 25 percent of the Indonesians who in one way or
another supported either the Communist Party or one of its
front groups.
Senator Cooper. The Communist Party at one time did have
support of many peasants, people in the countryside, also the
army.
Ambassador Green. The Communist Party itself had 3 million
at one time. It now appears that some of those members weren't
very strong members, but anyway, it had 3 million membership,
and then outside that 3 million, there were about 22 million or
so who supported these different front activities.
Senator Cooper. Java was one of the chief seats of
Communist strength.
Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.

SUKARNO IS DISCREDITED

Senator Cooper. What you said a while ago, they couldn't
hold up the fact that Sukarno still had some strength, that
plus the large number of Communists remaining--would you say
there is still some danger of a return of Sukarno?
Ambassador Green. I doubt the danger of Sukarno's return is
very great. I would say that the odds were almost overwhelming
against Sukarno getting back on the scene again. He is very
widely discredited and the very fact that things were so bad in
the past--he let things run so badly down hill and they are
suffering so much as a result. It has tended to discredit his
image even further.
He has refused to denounce the Communists and this, of
course, has affected him even more.
Now, these 25 million people who supported the Communists
one way or another, a lot of those were people just sort of
being on the bandwagon for their own safety. They were
anticipating a slide into the Communist camp and they wanted to
protect themselves come the events.

PROBLEMS WITH MALAYSIA

Senator Cooper. Has the problem with Malaysia been settled?
Ambassador Green. I think it has been settled. There are
somethings, loose ends that have to be tied up. They don't have
normal diplomatic relations now with Malaysia, but the
relationships between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur are I must say
very, very close indeed. They are fellow Moslem countries and
in a way they are two brothers who have discovered the folly of
their having been at each other's throats for so long.
Senator Cooper. You think the present government is making
progress economically and in a fiscal way to give some strength
to Indonesia.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Cooper. To correct some of the chaos that you
described.
Ambassador Green. Very definitely. And better than I would
have anticipated three or four months ago.
Senator Lausche. Do you have another question?

DEFINING INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

Senator Case. Just one question. You used--you use it all
the time--what do you mean by Communist? I am not being funny.
I really mean when you say this you have a specific thing in
your mind. Are you talking about the influence of China, the
influence of Russia?
Ambassador Green. Well, each time I use it it might be in a
little different context, but when I was talking about PKI, the
efforts to seize power, I was referring to the organization,
the leaders. The leaders in Indonesia, but operating I think
with the aid and comfort and fiscal support in some ways from
Communist China.
Senator Case. Pretty much Chinese? Is Russia in there at
all?
Ambassador Green. No, I do think Russia has been
disillusioned, became increasingly disillusioned with the PKI,
the Communist Party of Indonesia, because it came very
definitely under Peking's influence and Russia therefore moved
from a position of supporting the PKI to a position of
supporting the Indonesian government. This happened in about
1963, 1964, 1965, in that period.
Senator Case. Was Russia involved in the coup?
Ambassador Green. No, in no way.
Senator Case. Thank you.

WAS THE U.S. INVOLVED IN THE COUP?

Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the coup?
Ambassador Green. No, sir.
Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the previous attempt
at a coup about four years ago?
Ambassador Green. No. I don't think so.
Senator Fulbright. CIA played no part in it?
Ambassador Green. You mean 1958?
Senator Fulbright. Yes.
Ambassador Green. Well, I think there was definitely some
sympathy for the break-away group.
Senator Fulbright. We had no part in that?
Ambassador Green. I was not involved in the events and I am
afraid I cannot answer.
Senator Fulbright. You don't know about it. You haven't
heard about it?
Ambassador Green. I don't know for sure what happened.
Senator Fulbright. They don't tell you about any of the
past history in these places when you are assigned to a
country?
Ambassador Green. Well, I can glean a number of things,
Senator.
Senator Fulbright. You don't know whether CIA was involved
or not. And we were not involved in this coup.
Ambassador Green. No, sir. Definitely not.
Senator Fulbright. We have been told that this would not
have taken place had we not been doing what we were doing in
Vietnam. Is that correct?
Ambassador Green. Oh, I wouldn't say it is correct to say
it wouldn't have taken place. I think that as I was saying
perhaps before you came in----
Senator Fulbright. I'm sorry I was late. I had another
engagement and I couldn't be in on time.

A FORWARD FLOW OF A RED TIDE

Ambassador Green. I think when these two surviving generals
faced this tremendous Communist menace, several days after the
abortive coup, that they had a tremendous problem because not
only did you have this important Communist Party and all these
sympathizers we were just talking about here, too but the
Communists had infiltrated into the armed forces. As a matter
of fact, one of the first things that the military had to do
was to relieve several battalions in central Java and put them
into obscure locations where they couldn't be in harm's way.
And, of course, the air force commander was involved in the
coup. And so was all of that, and Sukarno's feelings being what
they were suspected of being, sympathetic to the Communists,
the new emerging government, Suharto and Nasution, were faced,
as I say, with a tremendous problem. Had there been at that
point a forward flow of a Red tide which might have been the
result of our not being firm in Vietnam, then I think events
could have developed in a somewhat different way.
I think for one thing the generals might not have been so
determined and I think the Communists might have been more
emboldened to resist.
Senator Fulbright. What do you mean by the forward flow of
the Red tide? That is very colorful language. What is the Red
tide?
Senator Case. You have to write books if you are going to
use language like that.

CHINA AND RUSSIA IN VIETNAM

Ambassador Green. I don't write books, but what I meant was
that if there hadn't been any interposition of American
strength between the Communist pressures from the north and
Indonesia itself, if the Indonesian leadership had felt that
there was no protection and in fact China was the wave of the
future and that there was a threat from the north----
Senator Fulbright. Is it China you believe that is
occupying Vietnam?
Ambassador Green. I don't think it is occupying Vietnam,
but I think it is supporting North Vietnam.
Senator Fulbright. Yes, it is. And so is Russia. Russia is
supporting them more than China now, isn't it?
Ambassador Green. I don't know.
Senator Fulbright. Wouldn't you say the Russian support
today is greater, more valuable to Vietnam than the Chinese?
Ambassador Green. I don't know the answer to that.
Senator Fulbright. You said a moment ago the Russians had
shifted from supporting the Chinese in Indonesia to supporting
the government, is that right? Didn't you say a moment ago that
the Russians had shifted their position from support of the PKI
to the support of the government?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Fulbright. Or did I misunderstand?
Ambassador Green. That is correct.

CHINESE OBJECTIVES IN ASIA

Senator Fulbright. Don't you consider the Russians part of
the Red tide, or is it only the Chinese?
Ambassador Green. Not the way I was using the words Red
tide then--figuratively.
Senator Fulbright. Are only the Chinese Communists bad and
not the Russians?
Ambassador Green. I look upon the Russian and the Chinese
objectives in this part of the world as quite different. I look
upon the Chinese purposes as more expansionist than Russia in
this part of the world.
Senator Fulbright. Why do you?
Ambassador Green. Because I don't see any evidence that the
Russians are on the move to take over any of this part of the
world.
Senator Fulbright. Well, what is the evidence that the
Chinese are moving to take it over?
Ambassador Green. I think that they are supporting directly
or indirectly, for example, the troubles in the Northeast
Thailand front and their broadcasts and statements are all of
an incendiary nature to support the so-called wars of
liberation in this part of the world.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think that broadcasting
statements are in themselves aggression?
Ambassador Green. Well, if they say it and if they appear
to mean it, why wouldn't it be so, particularly since they are
giving aid and comfort to the so-called Thai liberation
movement?
Senator Fulbright. The Thai liberation. You shifted to the
Thais. How many Chinese do they have in Thailand in this
attack?
Ambassador Green. I don't know of any Chinese that they
have.
Senator Fulbright. No.
Ambassador Green. But this is the question of giving
support by radio broadcasts, propaganda, and I don't know what
kind of agents they have operating down there. It is because
this Thai--this group that they have in Hunan Province, the
Thai liberation group there, that has been under the Chinese
Communist wing for some time now and have intentions for taking
over Thailand.

NO USE OF CHINESE TROOPS

Senator Fulbright. Do you know of any Chinese troops that
are outside of their border in this area?
Ambassador Green. No.
Senator Fulbright. Outside of their border in any area?
Ambassador Green. Well, they have been in the case of India
but they came down----
Senator Fulbright. Presently?
Ambassador Green. At present, I don't know of any Chinese.
Senator Fulbright. Well, I don't know what you mean by the
Red tide is slowing over their area.
Ambassador Green. Well, I didn't say that the Red tide was
just China. I said that the Red tide was Hanoi, Peking. I
didn't--I said I didn't think it was Russia.

IS VIETNAM A THREAT TO INDONESIA?

Senator Fulbright. Well, then, leaving out China and
Russia, do you think that Vietnam as such, either North or
South, is a threat to Indonesian security?
Ambassador Green. Indirectly. I think if North Vietnam were
to take over by force South Vietnam, have success in that
endeavor, that it would have an impact upon----
Senator Fulbright. What would----
Ambassador Green.--Indonesians.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think there would be a threat to
Indonesia?
Ambassador Green. Well, it is hard to say. It is a
speculative situation.
Senator Fulbright. Well, if you can't say----
Ambassador Green. I can't say in exactly what way.
Senator Fulbright. I can't either, but you leave the
impression that there is a great threat. I am just trying to
develop why you think so. Do they have any navy or air force?
Could they attack Indonesia?
Ambassador Green. I think if they succeed in their
aggressive efforts and take over South Vietnam, if this is the
condition which you propose to me, if they get away with it, I
think that other countries in the area will feel that much less
secure, that is all. They will not act with the same degree of
determination that in the case of Indonesia your Communists,
pro-Communist groups there, would be the more emboldened and it
will have a certain sapping affect.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID

Senator Fulbright. On the aid, you are advocating a
bilateral program with Indonesia? Direct aid from the United
States?
Ambassador Green. I said I believed that to the maximum
extent possible we should approach this problem on a
multilateral basis. I didn't think we would be able to achieve
that maybe this year or even the next, but we should make every
effort to do so. I therefore thought this year we would have to
approach it on a bilateral basis, but to pursue a policy of
maximum coordination of our information; disclosure of what we
intend to do and other countries are intending to do, and to
try to bring multilateral organizations like the Asian
Development Bank, the IMF, into the act as far as possible.
Senator Fulbright. How much are you advocating? Do you know
what they are asking for?
Ambassador Green. They haven't asked us for a specific
figure, but I said that their requirements might run in the
range, let us say, of $225 million in net new foreign aid this
calendar year and that I thought we should do our fair share,
and I didn't attempt to say what that would be. And we should
approach the problem in such a way to try to maximize foreign
contributions.
Senator Fulbright. How much military aid? Is that economic
or both?
Ambassador Green. I was talking there about economic aid. I
am not recommending any military hardware; that is to say, any
lethal weapons, but I do think a modest support of their civic
action program would be desirable.
Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lausche. Any other questions?

REIMBURSEMENT OF AMERICANS FOR PROPERTY

Senator Aiken. I would like to ask one question.
To what extent has Indonesia reimbursed Americans for
expropriated property?
Ambassador Green. Well, there has been no reimbursement of
expropriated property simply because they haven't claimed to
have expropriated any property. There were certain American
companies that were forced out and in the case of the rubber
companies actually they bought those assets of Goodyear and
U.S. Rubber. They forced Goodyear out of the Bogor tire
factory, but now Goodyear is talking about resuming management
of the factory.
They have established a board, interagency board, to
discuss claims of any American investor who claims that his
property has been forced out of his hands either with a view to
compensation or with a view to restoration.
Senator Aiken. Is the oil finding a ready market? Does what
oil they produce find a ready market now?
Ambassador Green. Yes, it does.
Senator Aiken. Produced by American companies for the
Indonesian government?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Aiken. What do the oil people mean when they say
they felt they could handle that business better than the
government could?
Ambassador Green. Well, the American oil companies--there
are two big ones, Caltex and Stanback--they have been studying
operations now although they were almost forced out of business
the year before last, and they are operating as a private
company. They give the Indonesians 60 percent of the profits.
Senator Aiken. And they are quite optimistic about not
extending any serious loss, aren't they, in the long run?
Ambassador Green. That is right. I think they were very
worried at one time, one of our principal problems.

USE OF U.S. AID

Senator Aiken. I was just wondering if we give the
government their material aid, cash aid, whether that would be
used to pay off, to pay for some of the expropriated property.
Ambassador Green. No. I think that----
Senator Aiken. You think it wouldn't. Not even the rubber
people.
Ambassador Green. No.

SUKARNO'S PLAN FOR AN AXIS

Senator Lausche. To get the record complete, you began to
state earlier the statements made by Sukarno about this axis of
Indonesia, Hanoi and Cambodia, Peking and a fifth.
Ambassador Green. Pyongyang, North Korea.
Senator Lausche. What did Sukarno say on that subject? Did
you say that he had made a statement?
Ambassador Green. Oh, yes. He made it on August 17th. He
merely announced where the country was going and that now they
are establishing this axis. He mentioned those five capitals as
being partners working together. He said it in the presence of
hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands, in the
physical presence, and over the radio and television to the
whole country.
Senator Lausche. That was a statement made----
Ambassador Green. By him.
Senator Lausche. Over the radio to all of the people of his
country.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Lausche. That this axis was established.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. Identify the countries again in the axis.
Ambassador Green. Communist China, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia.
Senator Lausche. Five countries.
Ambassador Green. But he did it without ever asking
Cambodia.
Senator Lausche. Anything further?
Senator Cooper. No. I think it was very fine to hear from
you, so clear, so helpful.
Senator Lausche. Thanks. Thanks very much for a very
thorough report, and I am grateful to you.

U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM

I would like to put this question. In your opinion, would
our position in Southeast Asia, if we pulled out of south
Vietnam, be as formidable as it is now in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Taiwan and Japan?
Ambassador Green. I think that it would be. Our strong
stand in South Vietnam has provided a kind of shield behind
which these countries have felt capable, emboldened to move
ahead with trying to put their houses in order the way in fact
this happened in Indonesia. Had there not been this
interposition of American strength--people may not like this
term--the Red tide, but I still do, I do not think that it is
likely that the Indonesian leaders, the new military leaders,
would have acted in as determined a way as they did.
Now, I think it is very important that we not say this
publicly because Indonesia wants to take credit for its own
actions. We don't want to look as though we are always taking
credit. That is why we haven't said it, but that is the way I
feel.
Senator Lausche. Yes, and I think you have exactly stated
the position that we are in. But to me it seems that to claim
that our presence did not give courage and strength to those
people is absurd and cannot be maintained.
Thanks very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

----------

Friday, February 3, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright (chairman of
the full committee), Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Dodd,
Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl and Mr. Bader, of the
committee staff.
Senator Gore. The committee will come to order.
This afternoon the Subcommittee on Disarmament begins a
series of hearings on the current disarmament and armament
problems. It would appear that we have come to a critical
moment in this general area. The country has before it
enormously important decisions affecting not only our national
security and allocation of our resources, but the whole
organization of our economic and national life. I refer
specifically to the immediate anti-ballistic missile question,
but there are also important issues developing in the
nonproliferation area as well as the sale of conventional arms.
Chairman Fulbright shares the belief of the subcommittee
that the subjects I have mentioned are of great importance and
that it might be useful for the subcommittee to hold hearings.
Because these issues are extremely complex, I believe it
would be useful to explore the question of what we know--that
is, what our government knows and what we do not know about
what others are doing as a necessary background of knowledge to
an examination of the policy implications of the decisions now
under consideration. In order to ensure that we have a sound
and accurate base of information on which to base our
discussions and possible judgments, I have invited Mr. Helms of
the Central Intelligence Agency to give to the subcommittee a
thorough briefing.
Mr. Helms, we are pleased to have you here this afternoon.
Please be assured that we appreciate the sensitivity of the
information you bring. Please proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
ACCOMPANIED BY CARL E. DUCKETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, AND JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
introduce Mr. Carl Duckett, who is the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology in the Central Intelligence Agency, who
has come with me in the event you desire to ask me any highly
technical questions about missiles and weapons and so forth.
Senator Gore. Maybe for the sake of the record, he should
give his full name and title.
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. Mr. Carl Ernest Duckett, and I am
the Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the CIA.
Senator Clark. D-u-c-k-e-t-t?
Mr. Duckett. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I understand you wish me to
discuss today the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and
Communist China, touching on the related economic and political
considerations. I would also like to cover in very brief form
some of the problems of nuclear proliferation in other
countries.
I want to give the general thrust of the present situation
and also to cover what we believe to be the future trends.
Now, we all recognize that we could spend an entire day on
a detailed discussion of the strengths and the hardware of the
Russian and Chinese military establishments. So I will attempt
to cover this in the briefest compass I can and I hope will
give it enough information so that it will enable you to ask
the kinds of questions that will be of interest to you.

SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

First, I would like to cover the Soviet strategic attack
forces.
ICBM's
I. The new Soviet ICBM's--which we call the third
generation--are coming into operational status now at a rapid
rate.
A. At this time last year, the count had been stable at
about 225 for a good year and a half.
1. The Soviets at that point had completed their
deployment of the first and second generation missiles.
2. In 1964, however, they began their new program,
comprising two new missile systems.
B. One of these, we call the SS-9. It is a large and
accurate missile which can carry a [deleted] megaton warhead
5,000 miles, or a [deleted] megaton warhead about 7,000 miles.
C. The other, the SS-11, is less accurate and smaller. We
estimate the maximum yield of its warhead at [deleted]
megatons.
II. The silos for these new ICBM's become operational, at
present rate of construction, two years or little more after
they are started. As a result, the estimated number of
operational launchers has already moved up from that plateau of
225, which I just mentioned, to about 385.
A. Our current National Intelligence Estimate, issued about
60 days ago, concludes that by the middle of this year the
Soviet Union will have about 425 to 485 ICBM's ready to launch.
By mid-1968, the figure should be 670 to 765.
1. These short-term estimates, of course, can be
based on the number of silos already under
construction, making allowance for acceleration or
delay in the pace of completion.
B. At longer range, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force
will have somewhere between 800 and 1,100 operational launchers
four years from now, in mid-1971 to be specific.

CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVIET ICBM FORCE

III. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The
present deployment is also changing the character of the Soviet
ICBM force.
A. First, it is going to be harder to knock out. All of the
new launchers are in hardened silos with each silo at least
three miles from its nearest neighbor.
1. Two-thirds of the first and second generation
ICBM's were exposed on launching pads. [deleted]
The new mix means that by the middle of next year,
about 80 percent of the operational launchers will be
hardened, and there will be [deleted]
B. Secondly, the main emphasis of the new deployment is on
the SS-11 system. By mid-1968, there may be as many as 400 of
these, making up more than half of the Soviet force.
1. The SS-9 system has the accuracy and the big
warhead needed to attack hardened military targets.
2. The contrast, the SS-11, with less accuracy and a
much smaller warhead yield, is more suitable for large,
soft targets. In other words, it has been referred to
as a city buster.
The Soviets, by putting their missile force in silos
and concentrating on the SS-11, are working for what we
call ``assured destruction''--that is, the capability
to destroy a significant portion of the population and
resources of the United States even if U.S. missiles
should strike first.
IV. This improvement of strategic attack capabilities is
bound to give the Soviet leaders greatly increased confidence
that they have achieved a sufficient ``assured destruction''
capability to serve as a deterrent.
A. We do not believe, however, that between now and the
mid-1970s the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough to
consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United
States.

SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR ATTACK

V. Let me review briefly the status of the remainder of the
Soviet capability for strategic attack.
First, Medium Range and Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles:
A. There have been no major changes during the past year in
the Soviet Intermediate-range and Medium-range ballistic
missile force.
1. There are about 100 intermediate and 600 medium-
range operational launchers.
2. About 90 percent of the sites are in the Western
USSR, constituting a massive threat to Europe.
3. We do not expect much change over the next 10
years in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, but, again,
the character will probably change.
4. As the existing systems become obsolete, launchers
on soft pads will be phased out. Present research and
development also suggests that the Soviets are working
for mobile systems, and solid fuel. They have paraded
prototypes of mobile missiles, including one which they
called a mobile ICBM, and they have tested a solid-
fueled missile to about 3,000 miles, which is right on
the borderline between Intermediate and
Intercontinental range.
Now, for the Soviet Submarine Force:
B. It has a growing missile capability.
1. A nuclear-powered submarine now under construction
is the first unit of a new class which will apparently
carry eight or more tubes for submerged launch of a new
missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles, and this
is a brand new submarine.
Senator Gore. Is this single head or multiple head?
Mr. Helms. Single head. We know of no multiple
warheads in the Soviet Union inventory.
2. A few operational submarines have been converted
to fire a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged.
3. The rest of the missile units have to launch from
the surface.
4. There are 36 submarines, with about 100 launchers
altogether for ballistic missiles, in the Soviet
submarine inventory. Most or these missiles have a
range of 350 miles.
5. Another 47 submarines carry a total of about 250
cruise missiles, with the primary mission of attacking
naval task forces. This missile has a range of about
450 miles.
6. About 45 of the 360 Soviet submarines are nuclear-
powered. The power plants are noisier than ours, and
Soviet skippers slow down to less than 10 knots they
want to try to avoid detection.

SOVIET BOMBER PROGRAM

Long Range Aviation:
C. As for strategic air threat, Soviet Long Range Aviation
now consists of 950 to 1,000 bomber and tanker aircraft. The
number is declining slowly, and there has been no evidence of
any new Soviet heavy bomber program.
1. The Soviets have about 200 heavy bombers, some of
which are used as tankers. We estimate that they could
mount a strike of about 100 aircraft on two-way
missions against the United States.
2. The rest of Long Range Aviation consists of
medium-range aircraft, featuring the super-sonic-dash
BLINDER medium bomber. We expect the mediums would be
used primarily to attack U.S. and allied targets on the
Eurasian landmass.
3. The Air Force, however, has two major
reservations--that is our Air Force. One is that we
believe that long range aviation is likely to have a
new heavy bomber in the next few years. The other is
the Air Force calculation that in all-out war, 300
medium bombers could be used to supplement the 100
heavies in an attack on targets in the United States.
I cite this because this is an Air Force disagreement
in the intelligence estimates, and I wanted you to be
aware of it.
4. The Soviets have developed air-to-surface missiles
to extend the operational usefulness of manned
aircraft. They appear to be having trouble, however,
with the missiles designed for the BLINDER. The
principal operational missile at present delivers a
nuclear warhead about 350 miles, with a terminal speed
approaching twice the speed of sound.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Now, may I turn to Soviet strategic defense.
I. The status of Soviet strategic defense is the subject of
a sharp difference of opinion in the intelligence community
over Soviet anti-missile capability. So that we can have a
clear understanding of the controversy, let me point out that
it involves two separate missile systems.
The first system is referred to as the Moscow System.
A. Around Moscow, the Soviets are indeed deploying an array
of missiles and radars conclusively demonstrated to be an ABM
system.
B. Part of the system should be operational this year and
the entire complex by about 1970.
C. When it is finished, Moscow will be protected by about
100 solid-fuel missiles that can reach out several hundred
miles and explode a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere.
1. We think the system would have a good capability
against a limited number of existing missiles, but it
doesn't have what it takes to cope with a major attack,
or with the penetration aids that incoming missiles
will have in the future.
2. The intelligence community is agreed on this
evaluation of the Moscow System.

EARLY WARNING RADARS

D. The system starts with early warning radars in
northwestern Russia that cover the avenues of approach for
missiles coming from the continental United States. They can
probably detect a missile as much as 1,600 miles away.
1. These radars are now being calibrated, and should
be operational this year or early in 1968.
E. Nearer Moscow, there is a big radar which acquires the
incoming missile from the early warning facilities, tracks it,
and probably assigns targets if there are a number of them
coming in.
F. Finally, at a dozen sites forming a ring about 50 miles
from the center of Moscow, are the engagement radars, which aim
the missiles on their nearby launchers and track them to the
target.
G. We have recently calculated that this system--including
all of the radars but not the developing and testing--will have
cost the Soviets the equivalent of about three billion U.S.
dollars, from the start of construction through 1970.
H. This system I have just described is unique to Moscow.
You only have to think for a minute about what Moscow has meant
in Russian history to realize that the Soviets will defend
Moscow with any system that might help, regardless of cost,
effectiveness, or feasibility.
I. We have seen no indication that this system will be used
anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

THE TALLINN SYSTEM

Now, let us leave Moscow and look at the other defensive
missile deployment.
This one is being deployed extensively. We call it the
Tallinn System after the city in Estonia where the first such
complex was built.
The Tallinn System is the object of controversy that I have
just mentioned because so far there just isn't enough hard
evidence to be positive of its purpose.
A. CIA believes that this system is more likely to be a
defense against high-flying, high-speed aircraft and other
aerodynamic vehicles. This is the conclusion of the current
estimate.
B. The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile, with a secondary mission against aerodynamic
vehicles. This is the view of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force.
Senator Gore. Would you read that sentence again?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile with a secondary mission against aerodynamic
vehicles.
This is the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army
Intelligence, and, Air Force Intelligence.
C. Both views rely on inferences drawn from deployment
patterns, the nature of associated radars, Soviet requirements,
and, other similar factors.
1. Neither side can line up enough evidence to
disprove the other view.
II. So far we have evidence of 26 complexes for the Tallinn
System. Some of them form a forward defense against the
northwestern Soviet Union, while others are situated for local
defense of specific targets.
We think that more than 20 of these complexes can be
operational this year. At the present pace of deployment, the
Soviet Union would have about 75 of them by 1972--I say could
have.
A. Most of the complexes have three sites, with six
launchers at each site. The 26 complexes now under construction
will apparently have a total of about 550 launchers.
B. On the basis of the evidence at hand we believe the
Tallinn System missile will probably reach to a ceiling of
about 100,000 feet, with a slant range of as much as 100
nautical miles.
It could engage manned aircraft flying at three-and-a-half
times the speed of sound.
Further, some of the Tallinn System locations do not have
the early warning and long range radar coverage that an
effective antiballistic missile system would have to have.

REST OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PICTURE

III. The rest of the Soviet strategic defense picture is
relatively static.
A. New jet fighter aircraft which are now becoming
operational will give the Soviet Union improved all-weather
capability, and greater interceptor range.
B. There are about 1,000 sites in the Soviet Union for the
SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Performance in North
Vietnam has not been particularly impressive--more than 1,500
missiles have been fired to bring down a maximum of 44 manned,
American aircraft. The SA-2 has an inherent blind spot against
aircraft operating below 1,000 feet.
C. The SA-3 system is supposed to be more effective at low
altitudes, but the Soviets have deployed it to only about 110
sites in the Soviet Union. This suggests that it has not come
up to expectations.
General Purpose Forces:
About two thirds of Soviet military manpower--some 2
million men--are in what we call general purpose forces: the
ground forces, tactical air, and tactical navy.
A. The number of divisions has remained fairly constant.
There are 109 divisions almost completely equipped and ready
for early commitment to battle.
1. Their manning ranges from about 60 percent of
wartime levels in the Soviet interior, to 90 percent in
Eastern Europe
2. Another 32 cadre divisions have only about 20
percent of full strength.
B. The Soviets are gradually but steadily improving the
ground forces weapons.
C. They are also making a start in developing strike forces
which they could use for action at distant points--a Soviet
shortcoming until now.
1. Airlift is being improved, a marine corps has been
created, and there has been an increase in airborne and
amphibious maneuvers.
D. The Soviets continue to help the modernization and
improvement of the East European satellite forces. The East
Europeans can now contribute about one million men in 42
divisions for Warsaw Pact needs.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING

I. [deleted]
A. The Soviets have run their underground test program at a
leisurely pace--slightly over one shot a month over the past
two years. [deleted]
C. In early 1965, the Soviets conducted the first test in a
program to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.
1. This test, the most spectacular of the series, was
a [deleted] explosion which dammed the Shagan River
near the Semipalatinsk test site.
D. [Deleted.]
E. There were underground shots at Ufa, just west of the
Urals, in 1965, and at Azgir, north of the Caspian, in 1966,
which probably tested a technique for stimulating the flow from
oil and gas deposits.
II. [Deleted.]
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, is it orderly to ask a
question?
Senator Gore. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. Should we wait until the end?
Senator Gore. I believe it might be better to wait until
the end.
Senator Dodd. I did not want to make notes because then I
will forget.
Senator Gore. I think it might be well to make notes with
the understanding of the staff that the notes will be destroyed
after the briefing.
Proceed.

PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Mr. Helms. The Soviet Economy.
I. The Soviet economy continues to have problems, notably
with the allocation of critical resources. Over the next few
years we do not expect that the growth of the Soviet GNP will
match the performance of the 1950's.
A. The Soviet GNP and total Soviet industrial production
are each a little less than half of ours,
B. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union virtually matches our
defense effort, mainly because the Soviet consumer is way down
in the pecking order when it comes to allocating output.
C. Military and space spending remained fairly constant
between 1962 and 1965, but we estimate that outlays in 1966
were up about 7 percent.
1. The state budget for 1967 includes an admitted
increase of 1.1 billion rubles for defense, and hidden
allocations elsewhere in the budget may make the actual
increase considerably larger.
D. For our purposes today, let me just say that we conclude
that the Soviet economy will come up with whatever expenditures
are considered desirable for defense, no matter what the
condition of the rest of the economy.

SOVIET POLICY

I. In the Kremlin today, the General Secretary of the
Party, Leonid Brezhnev, seems to have the most important voice
in making key assignments, and he is getting more and more of
the spotlight.
A. The Soviet leadership, however, was brought into power
in reaction to Khrushchev's erratic personal leadership, and it
is still functioning by and large as a collective government.
B. That means that it is a relatively cautious government,
not given to radical departures from established policies and
procedures.
C. The present leadership stands better with the military,
as far as we can judge, and this is largely because it has
dropped Khrushchev's attempts to cut back on military spending.
II. Domestic pre-occupation centers on the economy. It has
been so hard to reach decisions on resource allocations that
the Soviets are in the second year of their present Five-Year
Plan, and the plan itself has not received final approval yet.

SOVIET DISPUTE WITH CHINA

III. In foreign affairs, the overriding concern right now
is the dispute with Communist China.
A. Tension between Moscow and Peking has intensified
markedly in recent months, as you all have seen in the
newspapers. The Soviets feel they have gotten the upper hand in
the world Communist movement, and they are beginning to behave
somewhat more boldly.
1. For instance, they are again trying to convoke an
international meeting to condemn the Chinese.
2. The Soviets have exploited Peking's rejection of
appeals for united Communist action in support of North
Vietnam.
3. Peking's retort has been that Moscow is secretly
conspiring with the United States against the Asian
Communists.
4. Moscow, to avoid giving any substance to the
Chinese charges, has been taking the line publicly that
there can be little advance in U.S.-Soviet relations
until the Vietnam conflict is settled.
B. The Kremlin has made it clear in private, however, that
the Soviet Union wants to keep lines of communication with
Washington open, despite the strains and constraints imposed by
the Vietnamese fighting and sensitivity to charges of Soviet-
U.S. collusion.
1. If it were not for Vietnam, the Soviet leaders
would probably prefer to resume the dialogue with
Washington on matters which are of greater concern to
Soviet national interests, such as European security,
arms control, and East-West trade.
2. The agreements recently reached on civil air
routes and the peaceful use of outer space showed that
limited cooperation is still possible.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks on the Soviet
weapons systems, on their economy and political approach, and I
would now go over to China.

CHINESE COMMUNISTS' NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I would first like to talk about Chinese Communist advanced
weapons.
I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted effort--on
their own and with overriding priorities--to develop modern
weapons for strategic attack. They are devoting increasing
resources to missiles and nuclear weapons.
A. [Deleted.]
B. We estimate that they could begin to deploy a medium-
range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead this year, and
their first crude ICBM's in the early 1970s.
II. [Deleted.]
C. The tests indicate that the Chinese can manufacture
nuclear bombs which can be carried by their medium bombers--
about a dozen old TU-4 BULLS similar to our B-29, and two TU-16
BADGER jet bombers.
1. [Deleted.]
2. Their likely immediate goals, however, are
probably warheads for short- and medium-range missiles,
and possibly a weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet
bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of these aircraft,
which have a better chance of reaching a defended
target than the BULLS.
D. In the present state of Chinese technology, any weapons
they might make now would be crude and inefficient by our
standards. By Far Eastern standards, however, they are a
significant addition to Chinese military prestige.

CHINESE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

III. The Chinese probably started their missile development
by test-firing Soviet MRBM's given them before the Sino-Soviet
split in 1960.
A. They may have begun testing their own native versions as
early as 1963.
B. Now they are apparently working on several surface-to-
surface missile programs.
1. The pace of activity at Shuang-cheng-tzu has
increased sharply since the fall of 1965. They
apparently are conducting more MRBM firings, and they
recently built a new launch complex, possibly for
training troops in the launching procedures.
C. During the past year they have also built a very large
launch complex, which we call Complex B. The reports we have on
the size of the facilities indicate that this complex is for a
large missile, probably an ICBM. This missile could also be
used as a space booster.
1. Complex B probably will be ready for firings by
the latter part of 1967, but we have no evidence that
the Chinese have any ICBM components so far. Therefore,
we cannot say whether an ICBM vehicle will be ready for
test flights that soon.
2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably successful
flight test program, within the next year or so, they
probably could have a few ICBMs deployed by the early
1970s.
3. These probably would be inferior in reliability
and accuracy by U.S. standards, and also by Soviet
standards, but they could--in Chinese eyes--constitute
a limited inter-continental deterrent.
D. The Chinese Communists have built one copy of the Soviet
G-class submarine. In the Soviet fleet, this class is armed
with three ballistic missiles 350-mile range. We have to assume
that the Chinese are working on a missile to fit the submarine.

CHINESE CONVENTIONAL FORCES

I would like now to turn to Chinese conventional military
forces.
I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons, the
military power of Communist China for some years to come will
derive primarily from the numerical strength of its enormous
ground forces--about 2,300,000 men--and great reserves of
manpower.
II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and about a
dozen armor and artillery divisions in the Chinese Communist
Army, concentrated in the heavily populated regions of eastern
China.
A. The Chinese Army has the capability to overrun any of
its mainland neighbors in short order, provided it does not run
into significant opposition from a major power.
1. It has demonstrated its ability to move and fight
with primitive transportation and rudimentary logistic
support.
2. If it should come to all-out war, however, the
Chinese will be badly hampered by shortages of armor,
heavy ordnance, mechanized transport, and fuel.
III. The Chinese Air Force and Navy are oriented primarily
toward defensive missions.
A. The bomber force at present consists of 250 jet light
bombers, which I mentioned a few moments ago as BEAGLES. We
believe the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet mediums
about 1968.
B. The bulk of the jet fighters consist of about 1,900 MIG-
15s and MIG-17s, obtained 10 or more years ago.
1. Over the past two years, the Chinese have begun
assembling supersonic MIG-19s in an aircraft plant at
Shen-yang, known better as Mukden, in Manchuria which
was provided by the Soviets before 1960. The Chinese
inventory of MIG-19s has risen from 150 to about 350,
and they have been able to supply another 50 to
Pakistan in 1966.
2. The Chinese have about 35 of the Mach-two, delta-
wing MIG-21s, supplied by the Soviet Union in the early
1960s.
IV. Peking's Navy is the weakest element of the Chinese
armed forces.
A. It has the world's fourth largest undersea fleet, with
34 submarines, most of them medium-range torpedo attack boats.
They have no experience in extended operations, however, and
most of their training appears to take place within 20 miles of
the coast.
B. The Chinese are building submarines, destroyer escorts,
and guided-missile patrol boats. They have four obsolete
destroyers, six new DEs, and 11 patrol boats.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

I would like now to turn to Chinese political developments.
I. Communist China is being racked by the greatest
political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung took control in 1949.
A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and more
inflexible.
1. He is clearly concerned that his Communist Party
is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and
cannot be relied on to keep China on the right track
after he is gone.
2. The teenaged millions of the Red Guard are
supposed to rekindle that zeal with their youthful and
unbridled enthusiasm.
3. When Mao reappeared last summer after a protracted
absence from public view, he passed over the men who
had been the heads of the party hierarchy and named
Defense Minister Lin Piao as Number Two Man--in effect,
Mao's designated successor.
B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution is probably
primarily a drive to reshape the Communist Party, or replace it
with a more reliable, more fanatical, and younger version.
C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao, it has become
a naked struggle for power and for survival.
II. It is difficult to determine from day to day where the
cultural revolution stands, who is on which side, or who is
going to come out on top. The struggle seems to have entered a
critical phase in January.
A. The most dramatic development has been Mao's call for
the Red Army to back up the Red Guards and eliminate resistance
to the cultural revolution.
1. We had been speculating when the resistance first
developed that the army would have been called in even
earlier if there had been no doubts about its
reliability.
2. Now there is evidence that the armed forces are
considerably less than monolithic in their loyalty to
Mao and Lin.
III. When and how will the turmoil in Peking finally be
resolved?
A. We have no idea. The opposing forces, judging by the
protracted struggle, must be quite evenly matched. If the clash
between workers and Red Guards spread--particularly if the
army's loyalties are divided--then we may soon see something
for which there is no other term but Civil War.
1. Some days, it looks as though the opposing
elements are digging in for a long winter of political
trench warfare.
2. The next day, a war of movement and a showdown
appears imminent.
3. I would say it is still too early to speculate
usefully on the outcome.
B. There are two points, however, which we can make.
1. First, as long as China's leaders are pre-occupied
with this internal wrangling, they will find it
difficult to reach agreement on any new policy lines.
So, we do not expect any radical departures from
existing policies.
2. Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason for
suspecting that there will be any dilution of Peking's
implacable hostility to the United States.

CHINA'S ECONOMY

I would like to now turn to the Chinese economy.
A. China has regained only part of the ground lost when the
Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960 and Soviet aid was
withdrawn.
1. Prospects to regain the momentum of the 1950's
appear remote, even without the disruption of the
``cultural revolution.''
2. The longer the political upheaval lasts, the
greater the likelihood of severe damage to the economy.
3. There have already been extensive strikes,
shutdowns, and disruption of transportation.
B. It has taken an overriding priority on defense to permit
the progress China has made in advanced weapons.
1. One of the ministries hard hit by the waves of
political purges and poster denunciations has been a
ministry directly related to the missile effort.
C. Stagnation in agriculture remains the chief obstacle to
a resumption of adequate economic growth.
1. Peking claims a record harvest in 1966, but actual
grain production was somewhat lower in 1966 than in
1955.
2. It was not much above the level of 10 years ago,
when there were almost 150 million fewer people to
feed.
3. There were localized ration cuts, and it was only
thanks to grain imports that the average ration could
be kept above the lean levels of the poor year of 1960.
4. China imported more than 5 million tons of grain
from the Free World in 1966, and will probably have to
import substantially more this year.
I now would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the subject of
nuclear proliferation.
[Deleted.]

INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

II. The Indian attitude toward development of nuclear
weapons has been complicated by Peking's nuclear capability.
A. Prime Minister Gandhi has maintained the government's
``no bomb'' nuclear policy despite criticisms in Parliament.
1. Both the Prime Minister and the new Chairman of
the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sarabhai, have
stated that India's present economic and industrial
position does not permit launching a nuclear weapons
project, particularly from the viewpoint of developing
delivery systems.
B. [Deleted.]
1. An agreement with Canada, however, stipulates that
plutonium produced in the one reactor now operational
will be used only for peaceful purposes.
2. Two other reactors which will be operational in
1969 and 1970 are covered by safeguards.
Other Countries:

ISOTOPE SEPARATION

III. I would like to end the discussion of proliferation
with a brief mention of isotope separation.
A. [Deleted.]
B. U.S. experience has shown that for the production of
moderate quantities of uranium-235, the centrifuge process is
economically attractive in comparison with the gaseous
diffusion process.
C. [Deleted.]
D. We believe however, that none of the countries working
on the process has yet developed a centrifuge to the point
where an economical plant of production size could be built.

CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. Chairman, I have, or I am prepared, to discuss two
other matters, if you choose, these having to do with the
Chinese contribution to North Vietnam and the possibility of
Chinese intervention in North Vietnam, It is not strictly the
topic that we have agreed that I would discuss, but if you had
any interest in this, I would be glad to cover it.
Senator Gore. What is the pleasure of the committee?
I would like to hear it. Yes, we would.
Mr. Helms. We estimate that there are 26,000 to 48,000
Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam.
Senator Gore. What is the figure?
Mr. Helms. 26,000 to 48,000. There is a wide spread there
because we have no way of actually counting the number of
individual Chinese. We simply know the units that are there and
what the units are for, and these units are of a kind that do
not have a very specific table of organization and personnel.
They can be larger or smaller, depending on how you want to use
them. And we have been trying to narrow this figure, but the
only thing we can say now is that the range is between 26,000
and 48,000.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in
context?
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Symington. Are they, Mr. Helms, logistic or combat
troops or both?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. This is what I wanted to cover, Senator
Symington.
Senator Symington. I am sorry.
Mr. Helms. Thank you.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Mr. Helms. As far as we can determine, there are no ground
combat formations.
B. Evidence shows that there are two antiaircraft artillery
divisions and possibly elements of two more, manning the 85-
millimeter and 100-millimeter guns defending some of the key
targets.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

C. The rest of the Chinese personnel are mainly railway,
engineer, and logistic units, building airfields, bridges, and
the like, laying track, and keeping the supplies moving. In
other words, there are no combat personnel, I repeat.
Senator Gore. You would not regard the manning of anti-
aircraft guns as combat?
Mr. Helms. Well, not in the sense that it is used in the
military technology.
Senator Gore. I understand.
Mr. Helms. In other words, these are not fellows manning
guns shooting at other soldiers.They are fellows manning anti-
aircraft guns.
Senator Gore. Shooting Americans down.
Mr. Helms. That is the idea, but they are not combat forces
in the way the military uses the terms.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Senator Aiken. Our witness stated yesterday, that what he
could learn from the time he was there, Russian SAM's are
comparatively ineffective, and most of our planes are brought
down by conventional weapons.
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Senator Aiken. If that is correct, I have to reverse my
opinion.
Mr. Helms. The reason for this, Senator Aiken, if I may
take just a moment, is that by having a mix of surface-to-air
missiles and antiaircraft guns, the surface-to-air missiles are
quite effective at certain altitudes. Therefore, our planes, to
avoid them, go in on the deck, and in that way they just run
into the antiaircraft fire. And there is enough of it so there
is just no way of missing it, and this is why so many have been
brought down by AA rather than surface-to-air missiles.
Senator Aiken. But you do not think I am too far wrong in
not crediting the Russians for their firing.
Mr. Helms. I do not.
Senator Gore. It is for the purpose of avoiding the SAM
fire that they come in on the deck, so to speak.
Mr. Helms. That is right. So, I think the question comes
down as to who is manning the antiaircraft guns, and they are
being manned by a variety of personnel.

POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Now, may I discuss just a moment our beliefs about the
possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.
VI. We believe that there are three situations in which
Peking would feel obliged to intervene in force in the
Vietnamese fighting.
A. One of these would arise from U.S. air strikes against
targets in China. In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi
asked the British Charge in Peking to pass along a warning to
this effect.
B. The second circumstance which would trigger Chinese
intervention would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam.
Chinese leaders passed this word to a visiting delegation from
Ghana, shortly before Chen Yi talked with the British.
C. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi Government
should seem imminent, China might probably move into North
Vietnam to ``restore order.''
VII. It is always dangerous to assume that the Chinese are
going to be guided by rational decisions, but we believe that
Peking is bound to feel that the domestic political turmoil and
the intensification of the dispute with Moscow leaves China
less ready than it might otherwise be to engage in direct
hostilities with the United States.
A. Another factor which would contribute to increased
Chinese caution would be a growing belief in Peking that the
United States is determined to persevere, over the short run at
least, in the Vietnamese war.

THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY HAS BEEN RAISED

B. We think, therefore, that the threshold of sensitivity--
the level at which Peking would feel forced to fight--has
probably been raised a degree or two.
1. For example, a shallow incursion by U.S. troops
into the Demilitarized Zone between North and South
Vietnam might be less likely today to trigger a Chinese
reaction than it would have in 1965.
C. Chinese statements concerning the ``inevitability'' of
war with the U.S. now appear only infrequently.
1. Peking has made no mention of ``volunteers'' for
Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except for brief
flurries last summer and again in December, after
bombings in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong.
2. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese must
bear the primary responsibility for fighting; in recent
months this theme has been given additional emphasis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.

SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ANTI-MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

Beginning where you began, with a few questions, will you
or your assistant give us an estimate of the lead or advantage
which the Soviets may have over the United States in the
development and deployment of anti-missile missiles at this
time? I would want to know the extent of the tests of anti-
ballistic missiles which they conducted before entering the
test treaty, concluding the test treaty, and also if you think
their underground tests, particularly the last ones, had some
bearing upon anti-ballistic missiles.
Now, this is a big question. Divide it into about three
parts.
Mr. Helms. I understand and I would like very much to have
Mr. Duckett answer it.
But, before I do, sir, may I explain one thing. We in the
Agency are not competent to talk about the United States
forces. In the first place, we have never kept track in the
Agency of what the United States has in its arsenal. We have
not made what are referred to as net estimates--in other words,
a comparison of where the Soviets stand and where the United
States stands in various weaponry, for the very simple reason
that our charter is to take care of countries outside of the
United States and not to involve ourselves in these comparisons
in the United States.
That is for the Department of Defense or the State
Department or for somebody else to do, so I would like us, if
we may, to confine our remarks to the Soviet systems rather
than the U.S. systems.
Senator Gore. I agree.
Mr. Duckett. Sir, if I could discuss the Soviet anti-
ballistic missile capability in two contexts.
First, the development or the technical capability of the
system; and secondly, its development status, because both are
pertinent and are different.
From a developmental standpoint, the test program has been
a long one, starting certainly by 1960.

VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK

The components which we can now identify in that system we
described as around Moscow, are components which we feel limit
the system in two key ways: One, it appears there will be a
rather limited number of interceptor missiles involved, at
least in this initial deployment, and that means by definition,
therefore, only a limited number of targets can be attacked.
So this would make it vulnerable, if you will, to what you
would call a saturation attack.
Secondly, we believe that the kinds of radars we see are
the types which cannot contain much of the sophistication which
the United States has felt would be desirable to handle a
complex type of attack, and by complex here I mean an attack
including decoys, penetration aids, and other devices to make
the radar have a difficult time separating out the actual bomb.
We do not believe the system has any appreciable capability
to handle that type of attack.
Senator Gore. You mean when you refer to separation out of
the actual bomb, the incoming missile being fired at Russia?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, that is correct.
In other words, if there are in that attack, not only
bombs, but also various penetration devices to attempt to hide,
if you would, or to prevent the radar determining which is the
real bomb, we think this system would have difficulty handling
that type of attack.
So, those are the limitations. The limitation with regard
to number of interceptors, and its apparent lack of ability to
handle what we would call a sophisticated attack.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOSCOW SYSTEM

Now, as to deployment status, it is difficult to pick
particular dates here and the reason is that the deployment of
the Moscow System has not gone at a steady pace. As best we can
determine, and for reasons we cannot determine, possibly
technical, the deployment has not started and proceeded at a
steady rate from the beginning. Rather, there have been periods
when there was relative inactivity around these installations
suggesting that there was some modification or change taking
place.
You see, therefore, sir, until we know that one of these
sites is totally operational, we cannot say that there will not
be other delays or changes in the pace of construction.
We do recognize, however, that at least the first of these
Moscow installations will probably be ready, if there is no
further disruption, by sometime during the latter part of the
year.

HOW AN ABM DEFENSE WOULD WORK

Senator Gore. Now, just here. Senator Aiken and I have some
small advantage over other members of the committee in that we
have heard the technicians in the Atomic Energy Commission
describe the manner of operation of an anti-ballistic missile
missile defense.
Would you, for the benefit of the committee, describe
theoretically how this system will operate? First, I think you
would perhaps agree that this system was tested by the Soviets
in perhaps 1961.
Mr. Duckett. Yes.
Senator Pell. Also, how classified is this?
Mr. Helms. As far as the classification is concerned,
Senator Pell, what we are talking about now has about the
highest classification we have.
Senator Pell. Thank you. I was wondering if some of these
theories have been in the press.
Mr. Helms. But when we are talking about this anti-
ballistic missile system, it involves all the collection
devices at the disposition of the United States Government and
some of these we are trying very hard, at least as to their
quality, to keep as secret as we possibly can, so nothing can
be more highly classified than what we are talking about now.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Mr. Duckett. Sir, I think if I may, I could best treat the
question of how the systems work by giving a very brief
description and then being most happy to amplify on any part of
that that I could.
May I again remind the chairman that I am referring to the
Moscow System only in this conversation.
That system we are certain employs a very large, long-range
type of missile. Although we cannot give precise numbers as to
range and altitude, we do believe its range and altitude both
are measured in hundreds of miles, and that would say that one
of the characteristics of this system would be that it would
intercept the incoming missiles well outside of the atmosphere.

THE MEANING OF INTERCEPTION

Senator Gore. When you use the word ``intercept'' many
people have an idea that they are going to have a head-on
collision. You don't mean that at all?
Mr. Duckett. No, sir. Obviously, the question of the
relative closeness that is required for killing the incoming
missile is a function of the type of kill mechanism which this
missile will employ, and my honest answer is we do not know the
precise kill mechanism and thus cannot describe precisely how
close an intercept would be required for a kill.

KILL MECHANISMS

Senator Gore. Well, what are the possible kill mechanisms?
Mr. Duckett. The possible kill mechanisms which we have
studied are what I would call normal nuclear effects, meaning
gamma rays and other forms of radiation. X-rays have caused
more concern, I believe, because X-ray effects are far more
pronounced outside of the atmosphere.
Senator Gore. In terms of distance, say their radar detects
an incoming missile, and they wish to fire an interceptor
missile, and it explodes in the projected trajectory of the
incoming missile. By use of gamma and ordinary nucleonic rays,
what would be the range of destruction?
Mr. Duckett. Sir, I will say in all honesty I don't believe
that we in the United States know from our own measurement
programs a very precise answer to that question.
I think there is a considerable uncertainty based on the
advice we could get from the experts, but certainly if one is
talking about the gamma radiations, the kind of numbers that we
are advised by our experts are, in fact, measured in ones, or
at most, tens of kilometers for any of these effects. In other
words, a fairly close intercept is required for these types of
mechanisms.

DEFENSE AGAINST THE POLARIS

Senator Aiken. I was going to ask whether you would
estimate that the defense against the ICBM was more effective
than the defense against the Polaris.
Mr. Duckett. I see.
Senator Aiken. I think that is important. I have had a
feeling that the Polaris can hit them if they get too bold.
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, I believe I can answer, Senator, in
this way: The radar systems which I have referred to, that are
part of this Moscow System, and also the radars which are
situated to the north of Moscow, are not situated in such a way
that they could cover more than a small part of what we would
call the Polaris threat zone. That is, there are no radars
which we have identified which are pointed, for example,
towards the Mediterranean or towards Spain, and thus if Polaris
were fired from that area today, we do not have identified, at
least, any Soviet radar which would be likely to detect them.
Thus, I would have to say that our best evidence today is
that the Moscow system is deployed primarily, if not entirely,
towards the ICBM threat.
Senator Aiken. And the Polaris is possibly our major
deterrent to avoid a war?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. We do not see what we would identify
as a capability against Polaris.
Senator Aiken. Yes.

DEFENSIVE AREA AROUND MOSCOW

Senator Gore. Well, proceeding with the possible mechanism,
do I deduce from what you say that if the defending missiles'
detonation depends upon gamma, and for want of a better word
orthodox nucleonic rays, you would have a defense area ranging
from a four to a hundred square mile area?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, sir, if you are
referring to the entire area around Moscow defended--I am not
sure that I understand.
Senator Gore. Now, here is the detonation----
Mr. Duckett. Around any detonation.
Senator Gore [continuing]. Of the anti-missile missile in
the calculated trajectory of an incoming missile.
Mr. Duckett. I understand.
Senator Gore. How large an area is created by a ball of
fire, a ball of rays? Would this be, you say, a mile if you go
a mile in all directions----
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Or if it is 10 miles in all directions?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, again here I would re-emphasize
that I don't believe that we have agreed figures even in the
United States on these kinds of questions. But I know of no one
who believes that what I think we are both agreeing we could
refer to as conventional radiation, would be likely to afford a
kill of an incoming weapon for any distance greater than, say,
one mile. And that would be a one-mile sphere, actually, one
mile in any direction.
Senator Gore. A sphere two miles in diameter?
Mr. Duckett. Two miles in diameter, correct, sir.
Senator Gore. All right.

EFFECT OF X-RAYS ON WEAPONS

Now, if they depend upon X-rays, what would be the area?
Mr. Duckett. All right, sir.
I think, again, Mr. Chairman, this is an even more
controversial figure, and may I say that certainly I am well
aware we feel that it is an important thing to be aware of,
that there are figures by various U.S. scientists that extend
out to hundreds, to literally thousands of miles with various
theories of how X-rays might affect a weapon.
So, we simply do not have from the advice we have been able
to acquire any number which I can quote to you as a figure
representing X-ray effects.
I would add, therefore, that we do not believe today that
we have any mechanism available to use that allows us to state
with any certainty what kill distance the Soviets might achieve
with X-rays.
I believe it is accepted, however, by most U.S. scientists
that this would be, in fact, a distance measured in tens and
possibly even out to a hundred miles or more, and it is
certainly a far greater distance than the conventional kill
technique.
Senator Sparkman. You mean in diameter or radius?
Mr. Duckett. Senator Sparkman, I am referring here to the
actual distance from the burst to the actual warhead.
Senator Sparkman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Duckett. And that distance, as I am saying, and in some
people's minds, is tens of miles and in others it is in
hundreds of miles, and we don't know the answer.
Senator Gore. So, within the order of estimates, you would
have a ball of X-rays with estimates of its extent ranging from
a ball of X-rays with a radius of 20 miles up to a radius of
two to three hundred miles?
Mr. Duckett. Yes.
Senator Gore. Of course, if this were perfected, why then,
the defense is calculated to come within the proximity of an
incoming missile much more readily.
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.

SOVIET MISSILE TESTS

Senator Gore. Now, I don't want to ask too many questions
myself, but I think a very crucial question here is whether or
not the Soviets tested X-rays or gamma rays in their tests in
1961. They did, as I understand it, fire a missile through the
ball of rays with radar observation.
Can you give us a description of that?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, there were tests conducted in
the fall of 1961 and again in the fall of 1962 which did
involve nuclear explosions in the area where the developmental
work on the antiballistic missile program has been conducted.
Those tests involved a series of bursts. However, our best
information is that all of the nuclear bursts were, in fact, on
the missile that was fired into the area rather than bursts
that were on the interceptor missile coming out of the
antiballistic missile combination. So, I would like to express
first that we have no knowledge of any tests where, in fact, an
interceptor missile carrying a nuclear warhead has been
conducted by the Soviets.
However, in these tests, it is true that in addition to the
missile which was on the actual warhead, which did burst, it
was followed in some cases by one additional missile and in
other cases by two additional missiles, which were simply
following along the same trajectory so as to pass through, if
you will, the area where the detonation had occurred.
[Deleted.] We believe that the most likely reason for these
tests was to determine the effect of this nuclear explosion on
the radar equipment on the ground.
I base that on----

TESTING THE BLACKOUT EFFECT

Senator Gore. In other words, the test may have been
testing the blackout effect?
Mr. Duckett. Precisely.
Senator Gore. Interference with communications?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I refer specifically to the
testing to determine if, in fact, the radar on the ground could
see through the nuclear cloud and pick up an incoming missile
through that cloud.
I stress here, however, that whereas we state we believe
this is the most likely purpose of these tests, we certainly
much accept that depending on how extensively they monitored
and measured these tests, it is certainly possible effects data
could have been acquired even though this would not have been
the primary purpose.
[Deleted.]

U.S. NEWS ARTICLE ON SOVIET TESTING

Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, may I point out for just a moment,
that in the February 6 issue of U.S. News and World Report,
there is an article on this subject which starts on page 36 and
runs across the top of the page and which is rather a scary
article. We have examined this very carefully and can find no
evidence that anyone has in support of this article which says
the Soviet know about the X-ray effects, and they were testing
it and so forth. We have analyzed it very carefully and we
believe what Mr. Duckett has just told you and not what appears
in this article and other publications.
Senator Gore. I certainly don't want to over-step my time.
I suggest that we first conclude our questions with respect to
the Soviets and take them up topic by topic as Mr. Helms
presented them.
Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. No questions right now.
Senator Gore. Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Mr. Helms, I want to ask one question. I was rather shocked
to see the size and caliber of the United Arab Republic Air
Force, the number of first-class MIGs they had, et cetera.
I was also surprised to see their relatively heavy
development in submarines, especially because of their getting
closer to the Communists and, therefore, the availability to
their submarine developments, two Russian submarines, et
cetera.
With that premise, it looks to me as if there could be some
trouble there. [Deleted.]
As far as the aircraft are concerned, they figure they can
stand off what the Egyptians have now and also on the ground.

KEEPING INDIA FROM BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator Symington. There is only one other question that
interests me. And I am very interested in these hearings that
Senator Gore is conducting because if you do not put the cork
in this proliferation, I think we are going to blow ourselves
up in due course.
When we continue to feed those cows in India, do we have
any specifications about what they should or should not do in
nuclear fashion? Do we discuss it with them? Do you know of any
discussion in your agency or in the State Department about it,
letting us know what they are doing if we continue to feed them
and their cattle. I say that in a somewhat snide manner, but I
see 2 million more tons going out today and so forth.
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, this is probably not my proper field,
but I do sit in meetings in the executive branch. And you do
know that the Administration is very conscious of this problem
[Deleted.] and doing everything they can to keep track of any
activity in this field, and I think we are pretty well
informed, Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. When do you think they will have some
nuclear weapons that they could deliver on their friends, the
Pakistanis, or the Chinese?
Mr. Helms. I do not think they have started to build them.
Senator Symington. Yes.

U.S. ABM SYSTEM

One more question, which if you do not want to answer, I
would be regretful, but understanding, perhaps--there is quite
a discussion going on now in a good many different places among
a good many different experts about whether we should build an
antiballistic ballistic missile or whether we should proceed on
it. Based on your knowledge of what you have been testifying
about, would you think we should go ahead now or do you think
we should wait until these discussions are over, which is the
position of Dr. Foster, or do you think we should not go ahead
or do you think it is beyond your province? There are four of
them.
Mr. Helms. Senator, I believe that is beyond my province. I
beg your indulgence.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.

COLLAPSE OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have to go. I wonder if I
may ask this rather quick and rather innocuous question.
I was interested in your giving the three conditions under
which China might enter the Vietnam war.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Sparkman. I think it was Harrison Salisbury
yesterday, was it not, who gave three conditions. I noticed a
little variation, but not very much. You said, or I believe he
said, an attack on the Chinese territory, invasion of the
north, or an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war. Were
those not the three that he gave, as I recall?
Senator Gore. Mr. Helms gave as the third one the imminent
collapse of the Hanoi regime. Maybe, they were about the same
thing.
Senator Sparkman. I said there was very little difference.
I just wondered whether you meant the same thing. I think he
related it to an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war.
Mr. Helms. Senator Sparkman, to me it is not the same
thing.
Senator Sparkman. Not the same thing.
Mr. Helms. When we talk about the collapse of the Hanoi
government, we mean it's going out of business, the collapse of
order and government and all the rest of it in Hanoi. In other
words, that they have had it, to use the vernacular. I do not
think the Chinese would come in because Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh
decided he wanted to alter the course of the war, change its
character or stop it.
Senator Sparkman. He said an effort to make Hanoi continue
the war.

COLLAPSE OF MAO'S GOVERNMENT

Talking about the collapse of the Hanoi government, is
there any likelihood that Mao's government might collapse?
Mr. Helms. We do not know, sir. There is always that
possibility.
Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, Senator Clark said he
would yield to one more question.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

When I was out there a year ago, Mr. Helms, I talked to
everybody in the windows, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, above all
Hong Kong, Mr. Wells, et cetera. I could find nobody in the
State Department or military or the Agency that felt any amount
of bombing including civilian bombing of Hanoi would bring in
the Red Chinese into North Vietnam and, therefore, I have been
especially intrigued with all this--well, I will not use the
word, because we are on the record, but about the dangers of
the bombing.
On the other hand, I found about half of the people who
felt they would come in if we went into North Vietnam, and all
the people felt they would come in if we went into North
Vietnam with ground troops, around Haiphong or Hanoi, because
that would show we were trying to take over a government,
instead of taking over land.
Is there any change in that position now as far as your
Agency is concerned?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. The way you gave this, I am not sure
which was Agency position, and which was State, and which was
Defense and so on.
Senator Symington. I want to be sure. I do not want in any
way to have a trap question. I found nobody, either in State or
the military, who felt any amount of bombing or any amount of
air attack would bring in the Chinese.
Mr. Helms. That is our belief, unless it collapsed the
Hanoi government.
Senator Symington. Your last answer is the reason I asked
the question.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.

U.S. WEAPONS COULD DESTROY MOSCOW

Senator Clark. Mr. Helms, I have drawn a tentative
conclusion from what you and Mr. Duckett have testified to, and
I wonder if I am right, that despite the Moscow system the
various United States weapons systems could today destroy
Moscow.
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Senator Clark. That is right.

CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY

Now, you spoke of the Chinese conventional threat, and if
they had a capability outside their borders to attack
successfully their neighbors unless a military power, such as
the United States, intervened. In your judgment, does the
present political turmoil in China affect their external
military capability, or is it likely to, if that turmoil
continues?
Mr. Helms. Senator Clark, until now we have not seen any
evidence that it has affected their military capability. I
think it has--it could. I do not think there is any doubt about
it. I think the extent to which the army gets involved in
domestic matters with the Red Guard and other things could very
well affect their capacity to move in an assertive and an
aggressive way. We rather have the impression that the Chinese
are inward these days. That does not mean they are not manning
their radars, flying their aircraft, marching their troops, and
all the rest of it. They are. That goes on as it always has.
But it could be affected over the long term by this increasing
amount of disorder.
Senator Clark. But do you think at the present time, and I
am thinking more of logistics than I am of their firepower, do
you think they have a logistical capability of moving
successfully pretty far outside their own borders in the
absence of resistance from a major military power?
I was thinking about the Indians.
Mr. Helms. I would not like to leave that impression,
because the Chinese army has a very limited truck park, and
when they extend their logistic lines as far as Tibet and over
into the area where they would have to go down into India, they
are stretched pretty thin, indeed. I think there is a very real
question as to how far they could go in India and maintain
their forces.
Senator Clark. How about northeast Thailand?
Mr. Helms. That is a different problem. They could walk
down there rather than in India.

CURTAILING INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Clark. Our friend, Mr. Joseph Alsop, from day to
day expresses his views about the situation in the Vietnamese
war. What can you tell us as to the accuracy of his recent
views that the rate of infiltration from North to South Vietnam
has been very seriously curtailed as a result of various steps
which we have taken? And what can you also tell us as to the
accuracy of his view that, I think it is his view, by
implication at least, that we have so successfully curtailed
that rate of infiltration that our enemies in Vietnam are going
to have to rely from here on in primarily on Viet Cong
guerrillas who, in turn, are becoming younger and younger and
less and less effective, and they are running out of troops?
Mr. Helms. Senator Clark. I want to answer your question as
forthrightly as a man can answer it. So, let me step back just
a minute and say that we in the administration have permitted a
situation to develop in which the same sets of figures are used
by different people in different ways by adding them up and
subtracting from them and so forth to the point where there is
such a confusion about infiltration rates that an honest man
has a very hard time laying his hand on anything that makes
very much sense.
So, rather than answering Mr. Alsop's contention, I would
like to answer your question this way: We believe that the
North Vietnamese have the capability of infiltrating into the
South the number of troops that they need, require, or think
they need to maintain their forces there.
Senator Clark. Just a couple of more questions.

ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I am just as concerned as Senator Symington about the
danger in the arms race in the Middle East. I, too, have just
come back from there, although I did not go into the matter in
nearly as great a depth as Senator Symington.
I got the general impression based on conversations I had
with politicians, and with one conversation I had with the
Israeli chief of military intelligence, that the UAR does not
presently want to go to war with Israel because they are afraid
they would get licked. The Israelis know this. And that the
balance of power for the foreseeable future, as between the
Arab states, which more or less ring Israel, and the Israelis,
is such, that there is no present danger of an Arab attack on
Israel. How would you explain that?
Mr. Helms. I think that is correct. I would subscribe to
that. I do not think there is any doubt that the Israeli army
is far more competent than the Egyptian or any combination of
Arab armies. Their air force is much better and much better
manned.
I recognize that one should be very careful in using
characterizations, but the Egyptians have not shown any great
capability to man very well the sophisticated equipment which
the Soviets have given them. The Israelis are far better at
this and, therefore, I do not believe that any single Arab
state or probably any combination of them intends to attack
Israel these days.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator Clark. I also got the view over there that the
Russians, as a political matter, were looking with rather
covetous eyes on the other end of the Red Sea, the Aden area
and the Somalia area. And that their support of the UAR in
Yemen and their view that the British pretty soon are going to
get out of Aden, and the thought that de Gaulle was shortly
going to conduct a plebiscite to see whether he should give up
French Somaliland, posed a pretty considerable threat that the
vacuum thus created might be filled, not directly by the
Russians, but by Russian--if at least not satellites, at least
allies who would be Russian oriented.
Would you comment on that?
Mr. Helms. We agree with your assessment.

SUBCOMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION

Senator Gore. With due apologies to my colleagues, could we
not stay a little more along the line of the jurisdiction of
this subcommittee.
Senator Clark. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, if you will
excuse me saying so, and I hope you would agree with me, that
the conventional arms race in the Middle East is a problem for
the Disarmament Subcommittee of a high order of priority. These
questions of mine were intended to develop what could be done
to terminate an arms race in the interests of arms control and
disarmament.
Senator Gore. All right, proceed.
Senator Symington. Maybe it is my fault, because I was
trying in the conventional--this growing conventional danger of
the UAR with the reaction on the part of the Israelis
[Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Well, I certainly do not mean to imply that
the arms race in the Middle East is not of great importance. I
guess I had just overly anticipated that we would stay on the
ballistic and antiballistic development today. But if members
desire to go elsewhere, proceed.
Senator Clark. No, I only had one more question.
Senator Symington. It is probably my fault.
[Deleted.]
Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Senator Cooper? Senator Pell?

JET AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

Senator Pell. One question, along the line of Senator
Symington and Senator Clark, is we were informed by the
committee, and I am sure everybody else knows, that we were
giving a rather large supply of brand new jet airplanes, I
think, to Jordan. Would that not very much upset the present
balance from an intelligence viewpoint? Is Jordan at the low
end of the balance of terror, or whatever it is called, in that
part of the world?
Mr. Helms. The jet aircraft that we give to Jordan is not
going to upset the balance of power in the Middle East in a way
that would be dangerous in our opinion. In the first place, the
Jordanians have been one of the Arab countries that has taken a
rather moderate road, as you know, and has stood for peace and
quiet in the area. These jet planes, obviously the Israelis
object to it, and come in and make comments about it, and put
all the pressure on our government they can about it, but they
are not fearful of them.
Senator Pell. Thank you. No further questions.

MOSCOW MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Senator Gore. Well, I have a few more questions on the
question of ballistic defense before going to the Chinese
situation.
Now, you have indicated your judgment that, even with the
operational deployment of the Moscow System, that with a
multiple attack of sophisticated weapons without question the
screen could be successfully penetrated. Do you mean
sufficiently to destroy Moscow?
Mr. Helms. We believe so, sir. Yes.
Senator Gore. You believe so.
Now, if the Soviets successfully deployed one system around
Moscow, to what extent would this imply that the deployment of
additional systems or a multiplication of that system, or an
integration of that system with others, could possibly
neutralize or minimize the effect of an offense against them?
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as I mentioned, we do not see any
evidence whatsoever that this Moscow System exists anywhere
else in the Soviet Union, or that they intend to install it
anywhere else in the Soviet Union. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that in the year 1967, if the United States were to
attack the Soviet Union, we would obliterate the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Well, that is not the purport of my question.

THE TALLINN SYSTEM

My question was, is the nature of this system such that if
it, in fact, should be multiplied----
Mr. Helms. I see.
Senator Gore [continuing]. What would be the defense
potential?
Mr. Helms. Well, it would be better than the Tallinn System
that they are presently installing. It would do a better job
than the Tallinn System which they are installing, but we
believe it would have the same defects that the Moscow System
presently has and that, therefore, we would be able to
penetrate it.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Now, coming to the Tallinn system, I have heard scientists
express the view that it is primarily for ballistic defense.
Others, as you say, including your judgment, say that it is
primarily for high defense against high, fast-flying planes.
Now, assuming that it had both capabilities, which I think
from all I have heard is likely to be the case, to what extent
it has capability is a matter of disagreement. But assuming
that it has dual capability, to what extent would it serve as
an initiation or a beginning of deployment of more so-called
Moscow Systems? Are they radically different, or are their
radars and other components, computable and supplementary?
Mr. Helms. They are sufficiently different that we do not
believe that they would be interchangeable and that you could
mix one with the other.
Senator Gore. Then, to bring this to a conclusion, you do
not now foresee a sufficient deployment of either the Moscow
System or the Tallinn system, or a multiplication or merging of
these two which would compromise seriously our strategy of
deterrence, our ability to destroy?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Gore. Before going to the Chinese situation, are
there other questions with respect to the Russian?
Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. No, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Senator Cooper?

IF RUSSIA MADE THE FIRST STRIKE

Senator Cooper. Would it be the same answer if Russia made
the first strike?
Mr. Helms. I beg your pardon, sir?
Senator Cooper. Suppose Russia made the first strike, would
your answer be the same?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, it is my understanding of American
capability that we could still do the job even if they made the
first strike. That is the basis on which our forces are
deployed at the present time.
Senator Cooper. With the added factor of the installation
of this system?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Now, going----
Senator Symington. Just one point. I think the questions
that you have raised are terribly pertinent because our problem
is to gauge, as the ABM decision comes up for decision by
people--Senator Gore, as you know, serves on the Joint Atomic
Energy Commission--the nature and the degree of the anti-
ballistic development in the Soviet Union, correct?
Senator Gore. Yes.

FRIGHT-MONGERING ABOUT ABM

Senator Symington. With that premise, what you say to us
today, as I understand it, is that they have a very high degree
of development, very possibly around Moscow, but it is not
carried out in the rest of the country.
Mr. Helms. Correct.
Senator Symington. Is that correct?
Mr. Helms. Correct.
Senator Symington. And that does not bear out a lot of the
fright-mongering that has been going on.
I am not saying we shouldn't have an ABM system, but I am
saying you cleared that completely to me this afternoon, that
their very highly developed unit is only around one city, is
that correct?
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pell. May I ask a question?
Senator Gore. Yes.

RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT AIMED AGAINST U.S.

Senator Pell. Are there any signs of any development vis-a-
vis China or is the whole defense to ICBM's launched from the
Continental United States?
Mr. Helms. So far the deployment looks to us as though it
was designed: (a) against the United States, in other words,
the normal missile path over which we would fire our missiles;
and (b) to defend certain particular industrial complexes
inside the Soviet Union.
We see no deployment thus far that we believe is directed
specifically at China.
Senator Pell. Thank you.

GANTRY DEVICES

Senator Gore. Now, coming to the Chinese situation, you
gave some adjectives, which I don't recall, in describing the
size of the complex for missile firing and weaponry
development. Would you break this down into gantry size? What
size thrust, what size launching pad, what size gantry do you
find?
Mr. Helms. May I ask Mr. Duckett to answer that? I have
forgotten the numbers.
Senator Pell. The what?
Senator Gore. Gantry.
I believe ours at Cape Kennedy run to--what height?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, the gantry device involved for
the Saturn V, which, of course, is the very monstrous space
launcher, is something over 500 feet in height. However, the
more conventional missile associated or weapon associated
gantries would be customarily in the two to three hundred foot
height for our, say, Titan-Atlas type systems.
Senator Gore. In other words, if we were going to test an
ICBM of five to seven thousand miles, we would use a gantry of
in the order of 200, 250 feet?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. I would add, Mr. Chairman, however,
that that in itself wouldn't, we would feel, be a guide of good
criterion because the Minuteman is launched with little, if
any, sort of a gantry at all. But I believe if I have captured
the sense of the Chairman's question, that I could best answer
the Chinese one this way. [Deleted.]
Senator Gore. In other words, to elaborate this point----
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Do you think insofar as the gantry device is
concerned, or the launching pad complex, that they are now
constructing or have constructed such facilities to test an
ICBM?
Mr. Duckett. We do believe, sir, that is the most likely
function for this new launch facility, [deleted.]
[Discussion off the record.]

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Senator Pell. Wouldn't it be sound psychological warfare
for the Chinese to build at very little expense a bamboo
illusionary gantry to make us think they have this capability
when they really didn't?
Senator Gore. Again, off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. Back on the record.
Will you proceed?
You said that there were two measurements that you were
undertaking to determine. One was the size and height. What is
the other one?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, if I may go off the record again
for just a moment.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. Back on the record.

NUCLEAR THREAT FROM CHINA

In the committee hearings earlier this week, I felt it
necessary on two occasions to express some reservation to the
statements of two eminent elder statesmen of the country, whose
statements seem to me to downgrade the nuclear threat from Red
China.
From what you gentlemen have said to us, they are nearing
the test stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile. They
have had several tests of nuclear devices. Have those devices
been equal to the device with which we destroyed Hiroshima?
Mr. Helms. You answer that.
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, certainly the devices, and
particularly the last one, are well beyond the capability of
our Hiroshima bomb.
Senator Gore. That ran to the order of [deleted] as
powerful?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. My understanding of the Hiroshima
bomb was on the order of 20 kilotons and in the case of the
most recent Chinese tests we believe that its yield was on the
order of [deleted].
Therefore, more than a factor of [deleted] in terms of
yield.
Senator Gore. Then, if China had one intercontinental
ballistic missile, with a warhead equal to [deleted] the weapon
that obliterated Hiroshima, and it should be trained on Tokyo
or New Delhi or even toward a Soviet city, it would surely be
something that could not be ignored.
Mr. Helms. It could not be ignored in any sense.
Senator Gore. Or for that matter on Saigon.
Mr. Helms. Or on Saigon.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

Senator Gore. Now, what is your projection of the nuclear
stockpile which China has now or will have two, five, seven
years from now, in that order?
Mr. Helms. Would you answer that, Carl, if you can.
Mr. Duckett. I would like to answer part of the question
and then I will have to get the specific projections.
I would answer that part of the question dealing with
today's stockpile, and, that is, that we believe that it is
most likely that [deleted].
Senator Gore. How large a gaseous diffusion plant do they
have?
Mr. Duckett. This part, sir, I am willing to check some
documents or offer to give you the numbers because I would hate
to have those wrong. I don't trust my head to give you that, so
I would prefer either to give you this later or attempt to dig
it out of my material.
I don't have that clearly in hand.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. May I ask
one question?
Senator Gore. Yes, indeed.

CHINA AS A SERIOUS NUCLEAR MENACE

Senator Symington. Mr. Helms, in a very broad way, when do
you think the Chinese will be a serious nuclear menace to the
security of the United States? What time period, very broad
guesstimate.
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as best we can estimate it, and I
want to say I am terribly anxious not to mislead you, and I am
making these estimates with the information we have available.
But it is not adequate, in my opinion. We are talking about the
middle 1970's, but I don't know whether that is a good estimate
or not.
Senator Symington. That is what I wanted to know.
Senator Gore. Excuse me, I was talking to somebody else.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. Well, back on the record.

DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

The Chinese are giving top priority, are they not, to the
development of a nuclear capability?
Mr. Helms. This they are certainly doing.
Senator Gore. [Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Do they have reactors to make plutonium?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Senator Gore. When would they have----
Mr. Helms. [Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Yes.
Now, just in a general way, when would you estimate that
the Chinese would have a stockpile of weapons in the order of a
number, say, from one to 500?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, we have to date been unable to
actually estimate that they will stockpile numbers in the
hundreds. I say that not to infer that we do not think they
will at some date stockpile numbers such as that. Rather, to
illustrate that we believe that into the, well, into the
1970's, they will be forced to use those facilities which we
now know about. We do not see those facilities producing
numbers in the hundreds of stockpiled weapons as far ahead as
we can project from those with reasonable confidence.
So, I would simply say that our estimating to date is on
much lesser numbers. And we will certainly provide to you,
preferring to do it in a more precise way, those numbers in
this nearer term period up into the early and mid `70's. But
this does not include the hundreds of weapons in any case, sir.

THE DANGERS OF GUESSING

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me, I would
just like to congratulate the witnesses on the conservation of
their statements and their bearing upon on what is really
known. We have seen in the past the temptation to make real
guesses into guesstimates, and I congratulate you on not
guessing. This is one of the greatest dangers on which
decisions are somewhat untenable.
Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir.

THE U.S. IS LIGHT YEARS AHEAD OF EVERYONE ELSE

Senator Cooper. What are the factors which inhibit an early
developmental capability to strike the United States?
Mr. Helms. Sir, they just have got to develop the
industrial equipment and the knowhow and all the rest of the
things to do these things, and they are in a pretty primitive
state. I think it is important that we realize that the Soviets
and the United States are light years ahead of anybody else in
the world in these fields, particularly when it comes to the
industrialization that is necessary to do this. The Chinese are
just going to have a very difficult time catching up.
But we believe that they have the capacity, the manpower
and so forth to do it, and they will get there eventually.
Senator Gore. Of course, this is a factor, it seems to me,
which may be a very troublesome and perhaps a limiting one upon
the Soviets in reaching the feeling of freedom to conclude an
agreement with us with respect to ABM vis-a-vis the United
States and Russia. That is why I was particularly interested in
developing this at this point, not so much as to when it would
be a threat to the United States, but as to its immediate
effect upon this drive by our government to conclude an
agreement with the Soviets.
Mr. Helms. Of course, this is quite possible, Mr. Chairman.
I mean what is going on in the Soviet mind on this problem is
very hard to get at, but I think you put your finger on
something that may turn out to be the case. They may say this
isn't directed at you, but we still have a problem, and that is
on our landmass, and we don't have the Pacific Ocean protecting
us.
Senator Gore. Yes. In other words, if they have a hundred
weapons aimed at the cities of Russia, and if they set up a
deterrence of their own vis-a-vis China and Russia, then all
this will be in addition to their huge land army.
Obviously, we haven't gone into the proliferation
negotiations at all.

AN ABM MORATORIUM

Now, if the United States and the Soviet Union do agree to
a moratorium on ABM, what assurances could we have, what
verification, what type of verification could we have that they
were complying with this?
Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Gore, I think that this
verification problem, as you know, has been about as
controversial in the disarmament field. I confidently feel that
we could in the intelligence community tell whether or not the
Soviets were complying about an anti-ballistic missile system.
This is the kind of system, in order to operate, that has to
have some exposure, and I think we could keep track of that
pretty well. This is not to say, if I may say so, that I would
necessarily like to go into a meeting of the executive branch
of the Government and put my hand in the fire for this because
there are certain problems which could develop in our lives
that might make this difficult for us. But in the state of the
art in 1967 we could verify it.
Senator Gore. You think you could verify it?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Senator Gore. Particularly the installation of a system of
the sophistication of the Moscow System?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, because these radars are big, and they
are exposed.
Senator Gore. They have to be exposed to operate.
Mr. Helms. That is right, and they have to be big.
Senator Gore. Well, it is 25 until 5 and I suppose--Senator
Cooper, do you have a question before we conclude?
Senator Cooper. No, thank you.
Senator Gore. We want to thank you. It is entirely possible
that other members of the subcommittee would have some
questions, and, in fact, we will want to talk with you about
the non-proliferation situation a little further.
We will have to call you when we can arrange a date.
Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to appear at any
time.
Senator Gore. Thank you. You have been very helpful.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee recessed,
subject to call of the chair.]

STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC AND ANTI-BALLISTIC SYSTEMS IN U.S.,
AND BRIEFING ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

----------

Monday, February 6, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The, subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m.,
in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Lausche, Clark, Pell,
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Lt. Col. E. L. Harper, USAF; Lt. Col. A. B.
Outlaw, USAF; Col. Wm. B. Arnold, USAF; Maj. Christopher, ACDA,
Congressional Liaison; Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency; Herbert Scoville, Jr.,
Assistant Director, Science & Technology Bureau; and Charles N.
Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the committee staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN S. FOSTER Jr., DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

* * * * * * *

CONTROVERSY OVER VALUE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 4]

The first controversy arose around the question, ``Could a
bullet hit a bullet?'' This phase passed, first when
calculations showed the feasibility of such an intercept, and
later and most definitely when successful intercepts of actual
ICBM targets fired from Vandenberg AFB were accomplished by the
old NlKE ZEUS system in 1962-63. We had 10 out of 14 successful
intercepts with the average miss distance less than 470 feet--a
distance at which destruction is assured from a nuclear burst.
After this ``simple'' problem was solved, it was realized
that the offense would replace the easy-to-intercept single
warhead with clouds of objects, or take other deceptive
measures. Examples of these objects were decoys designed to
look like warheads to the radar, and chaff designed to conceal
the warhead in a cloud of light objects. Against those more
sophisticated targets there was a necessity for the defense to
discriminate among them so as to know which objects to take
under fire. Hence, many objects might have to be tracked and
observed simultaneously. Also, it might be necessary for the
defense to wait for atmospheric reentry of the targets and rely
on slow-down and burn-up of the lighter objects before this
discrimination could be accomplished.
If you turn to the page and then turn the whole assembly
sidesways, you will see a figure which depicts the kind of
things that go on under the worst conditions during an attack.
Up in the right-hand corner, you see a cloud. This is
intended to represent the situation when there are large
numbers of objects coming in a very large distribution of
chaff. The radar, and looking at it at a distance of several
hundred miles, sees it merely as a cloud, and can acquire and
track that cloud as it comes into the vicinity of the target.
When the cloud has reached a distance of about a hundred
miles, it then is possible for the radar to distinguish
different objects within the cloud, and to make a designation
on several of them.
Subsequently, however, if you get to the lower left-hand,
you will see that the cloud itself stops, and at ranges of 25
to 50 miles one would expect to see individual objects
penetrating through the atmosphere toward the target. As you
see in this case, some of them are indicated as radiating.--
radar jamming--and others are merely decoys looking like
reentry vehicles. Still others must be considered to be reentry
vehicles including thermonuclear war heads.

DEFECTS OF NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM WERE REMOVED

Turn now back to the middle of page 2. The old NIKE ZEUS
system, when confronted with these more sophisticated targets,
had two fatal defects. One was that it used what are now
considered to be old-fashioned mechanical radars, which had to
be mechanically slewed or pointed at each target in turn. This
required a matter of seconds.
One practically had to have a radar for each target. The
ZEUS missile could not be delayed in firing until atmospheric
reentry of the targets took place, because it was too slow.
Hence, discrimination could not be aided by atmospheric
filtering.
Because of these defects, the NIKE X concept was born.
First, the mechanical radars of NIKE ZEUS were replaced by
phased array radars, which by varying the electrical phase of
the power over the face of a fixed antenna array could change
the direction of the radar beam in a matter of microseconds
(Figure 2). This imparted a capability of tracking many objects
simultaneously, and thus removed one of the ZEUS defects.
Second, a very high-performance short-range interceptor
missile, the SPRINT was introduced, capable of flying to 80,000
feet in 10 seconds. It was smaller, cheaper, and had much
higher acceleration than ZEUS, and thus could afford to wait
until reentry of the targets before being committed to fire.
Atmospheric filtering was now feasible, and the remaining
targets could be attacked with the high firepower SPRINT'.
The old ZEUS interceptor was retained in the system for
long range attacks on simple targets. We now had two
interceptors--the ZEUS weighing 24,000 pounds, three-stage,
carrying a nuclear [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept
out to about 75 miles; and the SPRINT, 7,400 pounds, two-stage,
carrying a [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept out to
about 20 miles.
The NIKE X development, initiated in 1963, was thus much
more effective than the old ZEUS system. It must be noted,
however, that it was essentially a ``terminal defense'' system.
The SPRINT effective radius was about 20 miles, which meant
that it could only defend cities or selected sites. Hence,
since it is obviously impractical to deploy terminal defenses
at every small city or village in the United States, it was
subject to a by-pass attack. That is to say, an enemy could
always target the undefended cities and obtain high casualties.
This option was available even to unsophisticated opponents.
The sophisticated opponent, by concentrating his firepower,
could overwhelm the defense at any selected defended site.

DEVELOPMENT OF ``AREA DEFENSE''

The next important development in defense effectiveness
came with the introduction of ``area defense'' in the period
1964-65. I would like to define the term ``area defense.'' The
concept is presented pictorially in Figure 3.
The detection sensor is the Perimeter Acquisition Radar
(PAR) which detects ballistic missiles at long ranges of
approximately 1,600 n.m. This is about the range at which an
incoming missile appears above the horizon. The PAR radar
tracks the incoming missile and predicts its future path. To
intercept the incoming missile, we employ the SPARTAN missile
which is a long range interceptor developed from the old NIKE-
ZEUS. Once the PAR radar has predicted the future path of the
target, a SPARTAN missile is fired so as to intercept it.
Senator Clark. Well, it is a missile, isn't it? It is also
a target.
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Gore. It is your target.
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Clark. It is their missile.
Dr. Foster. Well, their missile is a complete system on the
pad. Shortly after boost the re-entry vehicle and multiple
object if there are to be multiple objects are severed off.
Senator Clark. It is semantics, but I want to clear what
you are talking about. What you mean is that the object which
is intended to explode on American target is what you are
talking about when you say you are going to intercept it at
1,660 miles.
Dr. Forster. Yes, that is correct. Acquire at 1,600 miles
and subsequently intercept it at some shorter distances.
Senator Clark. Yes.
Dr. Foster. This interceptor has a range of over 400 miles,
and intercepts the incoming missile well above the atmosphere.
Because of its long range, the SPARTAN can intercept incoming
missiles directed at targets several hundred miles from the
SPARTAN battery location. Thus, because each SPARTAN battery
can defend a fairly large area, it requires only about 14
batteries to provide coverage of the entire continental United
States. The SPARTAN missile is guided by a missile site radar
(MSR) which is associated with each battery. The PAR radars
would be defended with short range high performance SPRINT
missiles to prevent their being targeted first to blind the
defense.

CHANGE IN CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS

The advance which made area defense feasible was a change
in the concept of the nuclear warhead. The SPARTAN warhead is a
high-yield nuclear warhead with a high-energy X-ray output
(``the hot bomb''). Such a warhead, and particularly a large-
yield warhead, substantially increases the kill radius of the
interceptor at altitudes of, say, 300,000 feet.
Senator Clark. When you say kill radius, you are talking
about killing the missile and not killing a lot of people?
Dr. Foster. That is correct. It is the radius at which we
can be confident of killing----
Senator Clark. Destroying?
Dr. Foster [continuing]. An incoming warhead.
Senator Gore. Well,----
Dr. Foster. Destroying it.
Senator Gore. Since Senator Clark has made this
interruption, I Wonder if you could indicate here just what
would be the kill radius from X-rays?
Dr. Foster. The kill radius from X-rays takes place above a
hundred thousand feet as the major mechanism for kill of enemy
warheads, and above these altitudes the kill radius is assumed
to be about 10 miles against hardened Soviet warheads.
Senator Gore. When you say, let's understand what you mean.
If we are speaking of the same term when we are saying radius,
are you speaking of five miles each way from the detonation?
Dr. Foster. I mean 10 miles each way.
Senator Gore. Then you are speaking 20 miles radius?
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, I am speaking of a sphere 20 miles in
diameter. If there are any objects within that sphere with our
explosion at the center, then we would believe that they are
destroyed.
Now, in actual fact today the community would agree that we
would destroy the existing--the system we are talking about,
could, if it were deployed destroy the existing Soviet warheads
at much greater distances.
Senator Gore. When you reduce your diameter of the sphere
to 20 miles you think that would be the minimum of any
foreseeable sophistication of incoming weapons?
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is
possible in time to configure re-entry vehicle and the
thermonuclear warheads within them so that they could sustain
even greater x-ray intensities than those I have indicated. The
number of 10 miles I associate with the kind of hardening that
can be achieved by the Soviets during the few years after our
initial deployment of such a system.
Senator Gore. What do you mean a few years, just an order?
Dr. Foster. Five years.
Senator Gore. And say it would take us three years to
deploy.
Dr. Foster. We could have a system, say, by 1973 and I
would claim that the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic
missile defense would be about 10 miles against Soviet radar--
excuse me, Soviet reentry vehicles in the field through until
1978.

LENGTH OF TIME TO IMPROVE U.S. OFFENSE

Senator Gore. A very pertinent question here is the time
element with respect to our own improvement of reentry of our
own missiles. The Soviets are now deploying a system, the
Tallinn System, over some 26 other areas. How long will--if we
proceed upon the tactical philosophy of improving our offense
as the best defense, in what period of time will we be able to
accomplish this hardening and improvement which you think it
would take the Soviets five years to accomplish?
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have, as you know, been
working aggressively on this general area ever since 1961, and
currently have in our missiles the products of the program. We
are, however, continuing to increase the hardness of the
reentry vehicle so although the systems deployed by 1969 will
be harder than those currently deployed and those by 1971 will
be still harder. I believe I may have given the committee some
misunderstanding with respect to your earlier question.
It is not so much-- the kill radius that we talked about
for the U.S. high-yield warhead associated with SPARTAN is not
so much to make sure that we can kill the object we are aiming
at. We can surely do that because, as I indicated, we had been
able in 1962 and '63 to bring a missile to within a few hundred
feet of an incoming ICBM.
It is important, however, because it forces the enemy, if
he wishes to attack with many objects coming in simultaneously
from one missile, to put each of these objects a large distance
from its neighbors, and so in trying to kill them all at once
we can only be sure of killing things out to a radius of 10
miles.
Senator Clark. From where?
Dr. Foster. From the point of detonation. All of the other
objects, if they are to still survive, must be outside of that.
That then forces the enemy to either use lighter warheads,
lighter objects that he can throw to larger distances, or more
propellant to throw them to larger distances, or more
propellant to throw them to larger distances.
Well, to continue----

DEVELOPMENT OF PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR (PAR)

Senator Aiken. May I ask you one question there? Is it
possible to change direction of a missile at specified
distances from the target?
Dr. Foster During flight, Senator?
Senator Aiken. Yes.
Dr. Foster. Yes, it is.
Senator Aiken. And have you developed a PAR so that it will
adapt itself to change in the direction of the missile?
Dr. Foster. Yes, we have, Senator.
Senator Aiken. Our defenses, will they change with the
direction?
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is a particular feature of the PAR
radar.
Senator Aiken. That is a particular feature of PAR?
Dr. Foster. That it can track essentially instantaneously
over a large volume of the sky.

POSEIDON MISSILE

Senator Gore. Doctor Foster, as I recall it, the C.I.A. was
unable to verify that the Soviets had accomplished a multiple
warhead missile such as our Poseidon. How far are we along in
the development of a multiple warhead missile?
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have
already deployed in the Polaris system the A-3 missile--excuse
me, the A-3 contains three separate warheads.
Senator Gore. Yes. But the Poseidon has----
Dr. Foster. The Poseidon could have as many as 14 separate
warheads.
Senator Gore. That is what I thought. When will this be----
Dr. Foster. That is to be deployed beginning 1970.
Senator Gore. And our nuclear submarines will be redesigned
to carry the Poseidon instead of the Polaris?
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Clark. Is this a big job of redesigning?
Dr. Foster. Yes, it is a fairly thorough redesign.
Senator Aiken. You want to change the design of the
submarine?
Dr. Foster. No, it is not so much----
Senator Aiken. Torpedo tubes or what?
Dr. Foster. It is not so much the redesign of the
submarine. The boats are essentially the same.
One uses new equipment in the control of the missile.
Senator Aiken. I see.
Dr. Foster. And, of course, a brand new missile that is to
go basically in the same tubes.
Senator Gore. There are, of course, some differences in
assessment of our intelligence units. I wonder in this instance
if the Armed Services intelligence would agree with the C.I.A.
that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have developed
a multiple head.
Dr. Foster. I believe the intelligence community is in
agreement that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have
developed a multiple warhead capability.
Senator Gore. Has their science academy announced such?
Have the Soviets made claims of such?
Dr. Foster. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to draw your attention to a terribly important
difference between multiple warheads and the so-called MIRV.
Multiple warheads as it is used in the A-3 missile simply means
three, in this case, three warheads on a single missile. And a
plan----
Senator Gore. Will you say that again?
Dr. Foster. The current missile aboard Polaris submarines--
--
Senator Gore. You are speaking of our missiles now?
Dr. Foster. That is correct; yes--has three warheads on the
top of the missile.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. The design is such that after the missile is
fired and the reentry vehicle section is separated from the
rest of the booster system the separate warheads and their
reentry vehicles are directed to separate trajectories in
space, such that they would fall on the ground at different
times but make approximately an equilateral triangle with their
aim point, with their impact points around the central aiming
point. This separation----
Senator Gore. In other words, they would arrive on the same
target but with different trajectories and, therefore,
different times?
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct. They burst with a
separation distance of about two kilometers on a side.
Now, that separation, that deployment arrangement, is
designed in at the factory, so to speak.
Now, there is a quite different system to be aboard the
Poseidon and the Minuteman III. This system involves an
entirely separate propulsion system after the burnout of the
last stage. This propulsion system has guidance and a program
to take each of its payloads to a different target that is put
on the guidance by the commander of the vehicle.
Senator Gore. This is the MIRV?
Dr. Foster. This is the MIRV.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. This propulsion system, then, under the
direction of guidance, orients the whole vehicle on a
trajectory which will load to impact on a specified point. At
that stage, it eases off one of the payloads, which will then
subsequently go to that impact point. The propulsion system,
then, again under the direction of the guidance, reorients the
remainder of the payload on to a new target. When it is on the
course toward the new target, it eases off a second payload,
and so on, until it is discharged, in the case of Poseidon, as
much as 14 different reentry vehicles.
Senator Gore. One of the 14 is discharged?
Dr. Foster. That is correct. But not at high velocity.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Cooper. May I ask a question?
The A-3 then is directed toward one target?
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Cooper. The other systems you talk about, the
Poseidon and the Minuteman----
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Cooper [continuing]. The payloads, as you call it,
could be separated and they could be directed to----
Dr. Foster Different cities.
Senator Cooper [continuing]. As many targets as it is
desired.
Dr. Foster. That is correct.

MISSILE ACQUISITION

And continuing, Mr. Chairman, this high yield warhead in
the SPARTAN has a substantially increased kill radius for the
interceptor at altitudes about 300,000 feet. The lethal range
increases from a few hundred feet to several miles.
Consequently, the offense is unable to rely on relatively
small clouds of confusing objects a few miles in radius.
To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor----
Senator Gore. What do you mean clouds? You don't mean
natural clouds?
Dr. Foster. No. sir.
Senator Gore. The cloud created by the----
Dr. Foster. A dispersal of the large mass of tinfoil. Call
it chaff.
Senator Gore. In other words, artificial clouds?
Dr. Foster. Yes. Artificial.
I believe you can see it on Figure 1.
Senator Gore. I saw that. But I wanted to be sure--you are
not speaking of any sort of possible natural phenomenon?
Dr. Foster. No, sir, I am not.
Senator Gore. No matter how intense it might be?
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Gore. Okay.

SPARTAN REPLACED THE ZEUS

Dr. Foster. To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor
than the old ZEUS missile was required. The SPARTAN missile
weighs about 35,000 pounds, is three-stage, carries a [deleted]
warhead, and is designed to intercept at about 300 miles or
more.
With the introduction of SPARTAN, the ZEUS interceptor was
no longer required--in effect, the SPARTAN replaced the ZEUS.
Figure 4 shows the ``footprint'' on a map of the U.S.
defended by a SPARTAN battery. A footprint is the area defended
by SPARTAN from a specific direction of attack. The SPARTAN
might intercept directly overhead an ICBM aimed at a point
several hundred miles away.
Comparatively few SPARTAN batteries can defend the whole
United States from simple attacks. Figure 5 shows an example of
14 SPARTAN batteries, with four PAR radars located across the
northern U.S. border, defending against an ICBM threat from the
Chinese Peoples Republic.
Senator Clark. That is what CPR means?
Dr. Foster. Yes.
You will note I said simple attacks. It is still possible
for a sophisticated opponent, by warheading hardening and by
separating his incoming clouds of objects into widely separated
clumps, to confuse the defense and make the firepower demands
on SPARTAN too high. In this case, terminal defense SPRINT's
must be relied upon if we are to furnish a defense.
Senator Gore. I am violating may own suggestion, but maybe
we had better reconsider. I find this so difficult that it may
be helpful to others as well as me to ask a few questions as we
go along.
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

DEFENSE AGAINST A SIMPLE ATTACK

Senator Gore. Now, do I correctly understand that this
defense against a so-called simple attack described here on
Figure 5 that that would be roughly what is referred to in the
press, otherwise as the thin defense?
Dr. Foster. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. That is the system, the cost of which would
be anticipated, say from four to six billion dollars?
Dr. Foster. For the defense of the United States only would
be in the vicinity of three to four billion.
Senator Cooper. How much?
Dr. Foster. Three to four billion.
Senator Gore. That is the defense against the relatively
unsophisticated weapons which the Chinese are now developing?
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Senator Clark. Would you yield, Albert?
Senator Gore. No, anybody. Let's just ask some questions as
we go along.

COST OF CITIES' DEFENSE

Senator Clark. The thing that bothers me is he says on page
6, which he hasn't got to yet, that the cost of the 25-city
defense would be $10 billion of the 50 cities defense $20
billion. So, I wondered how that correlated with the very much
lower figure which you just mentioned.
Of course, he has not gotten to it.
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, if I may I would like to read
that point and then answer the question.

DEFINITION OF A BATTERY

Senator Cooper. May I ask a question here? Will you define
battery?
Dr. Foster. A battery, Senator, is a site. A location where
one has a radar and a number of defensive missiles.
Senator Cooper. I notice in your first drawing on page 4,
what you call the SPARTAN footprint.
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that indicates----
Senator Cooper. Would it need more than one battery to
protect that footprint area?
Dr. Foster. No, sir. Rreferring again to Figure 4, you see
an area outlined there in the central portion, in the northeast
portion, of the United States. In the upper region of that
area, you will notice a dark triangle. That is intended to
indicate the point at which the radar and the SPARTAN missiles
are located.
Senator Cooper. Yes.
Dr. Foster. From that point then the missile can defend the
area indicated by the surrounding line.
Senator Clark. What do those little plus signs mean?
Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, those are the intersection
of the lines of longitude and latitude.
Senator Cooper. Would a battery have several missiles?
Dr. Foster. Oh, yes. It could have, for example, 20 or 30
missiles.
Senator Cooper. To protect an area such as designated on
the map, do you have any idea how many missiles would be
required?
Dr. Foster. We would plan on 20 to 30.
Senator Cooper. Twenty to thirty?
Senator Clark. Looking at Figure 5 which you mentioned,
would you define what the phrase at the top of the figure means
``Minimum Energy (23) Attack from E. China.'' What does that
mean?
Dr. Foster. It refers to an attack coming from the eastern
portion of China, attempting to get maximum range from the
missile, which, in turn, would amount to a reentry vehicle
coming into the United States at an angle of 23 degrees from
the horizon.
Senator Clark. What does minimum energy mean?
Dr. Foster. Yes, I am afraid I forgot to take that----
Senator Clark. I thought it meant 23 missiles.
Dr. Foster. I forgot to take that technical designation off
the graph.
Senator Gore. I hope that my colleagues will now see why
twice last week I felt the necessity of raising a reservation
at the hearing with Ambassador Kennan and Ambassador Reischauer
who tended to downgrade the importance of the Chinese
development.
When the Secretary of Defense tells us that he anticipates,
and the C.I.A., and the Atomic Energy Commission tell us that
they expect the Chinese to test an intercontinental ballistic
missile of from five to seven thousand mile range this coming
summer, and that we see from satellite pictures that their
laboratories for nuclear development are as large as ours, in
some cases larger, than it is anticipated that the Chinese will
have the capability of making just such an unsophisticated
nuclear ballistic missile attack on the United States as this
defense in Figure 5 is calculated to provide a defense against.
It that true?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The defense position as
indicated by Figure 5 as designed to provide defense of the
United States against Chinese attack amounting to tens of
missiles successfully reaching the area of the United States.
Senator Gore. Well, for the benefit of my colleagues, the
Atomic Energy experts estimated that within five years the
Chinese would likely have both missile and warheads in the
order of hundreds.
I don't know that--now, the C.I.A., may I say, the other
Friday did not agree with that estimate. They did not exactly
put an estimate upon time, and since you----
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I will check for the record. I
believe we cannot give you hard evidence to support several, to
report a statement, saying that, to the effect that the Chinese
could have several hundred warhead in five years.
Senator Gore. I didn't say several!
Dr. Foster. A hundred.
Senator Gore. They were asked the question, not by me but I
think by Senator Pastore, whether in five years their stockpile
would be termed in dozens and hundreds or in thousands. There
were three experts there and, as I recall it, they conferred
among themselves and thought it more nearly would be measured
by hundreds rather than dozens or thousands. That is a very
inexact estimate, but if this is designed to protect, say,
against tens----
Dr. Foster. Successfully reaching the United States.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. That means one would have to multiply by two or
three to take care of reliability, lack of reliability.
Senator Gore. I am not trying to specify the danger, but I
am trying to indicate to my colleagues this certainly is not
something that can be taken lightly.

TESTIMONY OF INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS

Senator Clark. Albert could you clarify for the record who
these experts were; were these Atomic Energy employees?
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Clark. And not CIA and not Pentagon?
Senator Gore. One of them is the head of the Los Alamos
Laboratory, and the other was Dr. Brandbury. I can get that for
you, if you would like.
I think we should have them here, too.
Senator Clark. I think so, too. Because I take it from what
you say, and I didn't know it, that the Atomic Energy
Commission has its own bunch of intelligence experts who may
not agree with either DOD intelligence or CIA intelligence. Is
that correct?
Senator Gore. Well, I think--well, the Atomic Energy
Commission has a great deal of intelligence work which they
have done with respect to detonations by any country. They play
a very little role in the intelligence effort with respect to
proliferation.
Senator Clark. Which would overlap the covering of the same
subject by DOD intelligence and CIA intelligence.
Senator Gore. I think that is a reasonable statement.
Do you agree with that, Doctor?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
[Deleted.]
Senator Clark. But sometimes don't agree. At least, I
gather from what you said----
Dr. Foster. That is correct, yes.
Senator Gore. But, by and large, [deleted].
Dr. Foster. Yes, when Mr. Helms or Mr. McNamara gives a
statement on what the community's position is, it has always
included a full treatment of the opinions and thoughts and
ideas of the technical members of the Atomic Energy
Commission's laboratories.
Senator Clark. Were those the only three who do this
detailed technical intelligence work for our Government--DOD,
CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission? For example, nobody over
at ACDA does any of this?
Dr. Foster. No, sir, I believe the answer to your question
is correct.
Senator Gore. What about NASA?
Dr. Foster. They do not generally get into this work.
Senator Gore. You have then these three agencies.
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Gore. If it is agreeable with the subcommittee,
since we have had the CIA and the DOD, it might be well to have
the AEC.
Senator Clark. I would think so.
Senator Gore. Would you agree, Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. Yes.

MINIMUM ENERGY ATTACK

Senator Clark. Before you leave this, Dr. Foster, I wonder
if you could define a little more in layman's terms than you
have so far what this phrase on figure 5, ``Minimum Energy (23)
Attack from East China.'' means. I have particular reference to
what you mean by minimum energy, and again because I did not
get it the last time, what 23 stands for.
Dr. Foster. Yes, Senator. Imagine stepping back 5,000 or
10,000 miles from the earth and see what is happening from a
point on earth. One can launch a missile and have it cover a
trajectory of a few thousand miles and land at another point.
One has the option of deciding just how the missile reentry
vehicle reenters the atmosphere. One can, so to speak, loft the
missile. One can point it up to a very high angle, and have it
go rather far from the earth, and then come in to the target
very steeply.
Senator Clark. Like a lob in tennis as opposed to a drive.
Dr. Foster. Exactly. However, if you wanted to get maximum
range, you would not lob it quite so highly. So this refers to
angles that are of a trajectory that are set to give you the
maximum range, and hence--or to reach those targets, use
minimum energy. That is what the minimum energy refers to. 23
degrees refers to the angle between the line left by the
reentry vehicle and the horizon, horizontal.
Senator Clark. And your opinion is, I think I have got it
right, you opinion is that such an attack is a definite
possibility from the Chinese People's Republic with a total of
missiles in the general vicinity more or less of a hundred
within how long a time?
Dr. Foster. I do not recall the intelligence estimates on
this for a hundred missiles.
Senator Clark. Just give us a wide range.
Dr. Foster. For example, I will correct this for the record
if I may. I recall that one could have--the estimate is that
one could have about ten missiles by 1972 to '73, and 30, a
significant number of missile, by 1974 to '75.
Senator Clark. That is good enough for me.

* * * * * * *

Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. McNamara's posture
statement treats that subject very, very carefully. Let me try
to help here.
From the point of view of providing assured destruction of
the Soviet Union, that is to say from the point of view of
having enough military capability in the United States so that
our strategic forces could absorb an all-out attack by the
Soviet Union and to, in turn, deliver destruction that we would
consider totally unacceptable to them on to the Soviet Union,
it is Mr. McNamara's position, and I agree, that the deployment
of ballistic missile defenses by the United States is not
required.
Senator Gore. That is vis-a-vis the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Dr. Foster. Or for that matter China.
Senator Gore. Well, China's power of defenses as of now is
nowhere in the order of the Soviets.
Dr. Foster. So, from that point of view of maintaining
assured destruction capability of the United States, there is
no need to deploy new or for the foreseeable future ballistic
missile defenses.

DEFENSE SECRETARY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBALLISTIC DEFENSE [P. 10]

Senator Gore. What you are really saying here, it seems to
me, is that the Soviet deployment of the Moscow and Tallinn
systems do not compromise our power of retaliation. Therefore,
it does not compromise the strategy of deterrence.
Dr. Foster. The Soviet deployment of ballistic missile
defensive systems does affect the ability of equipment to
penetrate and so as we see them deploy----
Senator Gore. You said that.
Dr. Foster [continuing]. Initiate whatever changes are
necessary to make the penetration.
Senator Gore. I understand. But you say that we are capable
of making such improvement in our missiles that regardless of
the defenses now envisioned within their capability----
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Gore [continuing]. That we will continue to have an
assured capacity of sufficient destruction in the Soviet Union
that we would have a retaliatory threat, even after the Soviets
made a first attack, of sufficient magnitude that it would not
seriously compromise our strategy of deterrence.
Dr. Foster. Yes. That is correct.
Senator Gore. Now, what I am trying to understand is the
position of the Department of Defense. As you know, of course,
Mr. Vance will be here and you referred to him before. What I
am trying to get at is what is the position of the Department
of Defense, or what is your own view of the necessity of
building at some appropriate time a defense against a Chinese
threat such as is contemplated within that possibility of your
figure 5? Do I make myself clear?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

* * * * * * *

ADEQUACY OF U.S. SILOS [P. 11]

Dr. Foster. Well, Senator, the ballistic missile defense
system--excuse me, components that we have developed over the
last several years can be used to protect the United States
population, as I have indicated, against Soviet attacks, if
they are light, and they can be used to protect us against
Chinese attack.
They, however, can also be deployed to protect our
MINUTEMAN-silos.
The reason we might want to do that is simply because in
the last two years the Soviets have concentrated on increasing
the number of their hardened and dispersed ICBMs. As a
consequence, they can soon--could soon have the capability to
destroy a large number of U.S. MINUTEMEN if they chose to put
accurate guidance in their current designs. They do not at the
moment have accurate guidance. So the Soviets cannot, in my
opinion, have any substantial effect on MINUTEMAN deployment.
If however, in the future they were to get an accurate
delivery capability, then they could indeed begin to take out
substantial numbers of our MINUTEMAN force.
Our response to this degradation could take a number of
forms. One that is being seriously considered is the deployment
of a ballistic missile defense system of those silos.
Senator Gore. Another are submarines.
Dr. Foster. Yes. We could put in additional or improved
submarines.
Senator Gore. Another possibly would be a moveable
launching pad?
Dr. Foster. On land.
Senator Gore. On land?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Are there others?
Dr. Foster. Yes. We could deploy a larger missile in or
near the current fixed MINUTEMAN sites and provide defense
again for that.
Senator Gore. I do not understand.
Dr. Foster. One of the concerns about the current MINUTEMAN
in the event of a substantial increase in Soviet capabilities
is its limited payload, and so one might think of an improved
capability involving a 5,000 to 10,000 pound payload missile
installed essentially in the current MINUTEMAN network. Such a
missile would have a substantially higher value than the
current MINUTEMAN, and hence would--the defense of such missile
would be far more attractive
Senator Gore. I understand. You said larger missiles with
better defenses.
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Gore. Okay. So you have these four ways in which
you might react if the Soviets developed or perfected a
guidance system which would give them the capability of taking
out MINUTEMAN silos.
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Gore. Any further questions, Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. No.

* * * * * * *

Dr. Foster. Penetration aids program.
You will note that I have described a flexible set of
building blocks consisting of PAR and MSR radars and two types
of interceptor missiles, SPARTAN and SPRINT. We also have a
very large, sophisticated radar called TACMAR, designed
specifically against sophisticated attacks. They can be put
together in various ways to provide varying levels of defense
against different threats.
For example, if we wished to defend the United States
against a large Soviet attack, we would provide an overlay of
an area defense such as I have described. As I mentioned
earlier, however, it would be necessary to depend primarily on
terminal SPRINT defenses, including TACMARS, at selected
cities. A 25-city defense (including the area component) would
cost about $10 billion. A 50-city defense would cost almost $20
billion.

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 12]

As a matter of technical judgment, I believe that these
larger deployments carry with them technical risks. The
likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the
deployment of significant U.S. defenses increases the technical
uncertainty of the defensive system. In the absence of
atmospheric nuclear tests, we simply cannot calculate all the
effects of many simultaneous nuclear explosions. We would have
to expect that in an all-out exchange, dozen of their warheads
would likely explode in our cities.
By the way--this is likely whether or not we have
atmospheric tests.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that sums up the technical
assessment of BMD. It has changed greatly in recent years and
no doubt will continue to change. That is why, even in the
absence of a deployment decision, a high-priority R&D program
is so necessary.

BIOLOGICAL DAMAGE RESULTING FROM DETONATIONS

Senator Gore. I would say to the subcommittee that Dr.
Foster has requested, if possible, he would like to be excused
pretty soon. How urgent is this, Doctor?
Dr. Foster. It is not very urgent, Mr. Chairman. I am at
your convenience.
Senator Gore. Thank you, Doctor.
I would like explore one question with you and then yield
to my colleagues. At our last tests in the atmosphere over
Johnson Island, communication was knocked out for a period of
hours. I realize that this communication may not have been at
frequencies which our signal system in the missiles may operate
at, but it does raise a very serious problem, a very serious
danger, it seems to me, that the detonation of a nuclear
explosion designed specifically to conglomerate communication
might compromise our own radar signal systems. Do I
sufficiently describe the problem to elicit an answer?
Dr. Foster. You certainly do, Mr. Chairman.
We were aware in the 1958 period and subsequently that
detonations at high altitudes could give rise to
electromagnetic signals of rather high intensity and hence we
planned those experiments in 1962.
As a result of the measurements that were taken, all of the
subsequent studies of our assured destruction forces, as well
as our ballistic missile defense examinations, have included a
thorough consideration of these effects. Specifically, for
example, we have chosen the frequencies of the ballistic
missile defense systems in the NIKE-ZEUS program so as to
minimize these effects. Our communications program involving
satellites is designed in large measure to avoid disruption of
the service because of this effect. In our offensive forces,
the MINUTEMAN and POSEIDON are being configured so that
warheads in those missiles can be burst at very high altitude
so as to maximize the difficulties that are inherent in any
Soviet systems.
Senator Gore. Let us see if I understand what you said in
your last statement. Our own offensive missiles are being
configured and designed so as to explode at varying altitudes,
thus complicating, if not compromising or minimizing, the
effect of the Soviet antiballistic missile defense system.
Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid I was not
sufficiently clear on that point.
Senator Gore. Is that true? Are we seeking to?
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, to maximize the disturbance on
communications, one must burst the warhead not near the ground
but near the top of the atmosphere. To do so, however, requires
that you have the necessary command mechanisms in the missile
system, and what I indicated was that in our advanced POLARIS
and MINUTEMAN systems we are going to have a procedure and a
configuration such that if desired we can burst the warheads at
the optimum altitude to cause the greatest electromagnetic
disturbance to communications in the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Well then, the answer is yes.
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Now, turning it again to our defense problem,
will you describe the possibility of the Soviets and possibly
later the Chinese utilizing electronics in the same way to
disturb our own detection defense, if we relied upon such a
system?
Dr. Foster. All right. This is in the event we deployed a
ballistic missile defense.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. What measures are we taking, have we taken, or
would we take, to minimize the possibility of disruption.
Senator Gore. With what possible success or failure.
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have recently, on
considering the NIKE X system, changed the frequency of the PAR
radar, the perimeter acquisition radar, which I described
earlier, so as to minimize the difficulty from this particular
tactic.
At the very outset the frequencies of MSR and TACMAR radars
were sufficiently high so that the disturbances that could be
caused by such tactics were very temporary.
Senator Gore. Well, very temporary--if it is a matter of
seconds it might be fatal.
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, the whole engagement takes
place over 5 to 10 minutes on any one threat, and the blackout
to our high frequency radars occurs over a few tens of seconds
to a minute. It is that kind of a time scale.
Senator Gore. I know on one of your tables here we are able
to--the missile, a possible hostile missile, would appear over
the horizon at, say, 300 seconds from the time of our earliest
possible interception. If you have say in the case of a
multiple warhead, and there is this cloud of tinfoil or chaff
as you refer to it, and then there is a period of detecting
which is the decoy and which is the real McCoy, you have a
matter of seconds, very few seconds involved. That is why I
asked you the possible duration of this electronic blackout.
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
I do not want to try to predict the final tactical solution
that we will have for this threat you describe. One of the
solutions is as follows:
If we see coming over the horizon at a range of 1,500 miles
a steady stream of chaff and even possibly can see objects
within the chaff, one tactic we have is as follows: We wait for
two or three minutes until the chaff has come perhaps halfway,
and if we are attempting to--and then we might attempt to
attack the whole length of the chaff simultaneously. So, we
would first send a missile that would go out to, perhaps, 500
miles range, and then subsequently others at shorter ranges all
timed to burst at once. So, it would be in a sense like Bunker
Hill, and the whole threat, volume would be taken out at one
time. We would then wait for----
Senator Gore. Is this going to be a human decision sitting
at a key or is this going to be an electronic decision
predetermined?
Dr. Foster. I think a bit of each, Mr. Chairman. You are
however, describing an extremely advanced threat.
Senator Gore. I understand----
Senator Aiken. They depend on computers, Mr. Chairman. It
probably will get there three months late like social security
checks.
Senator Gore. I hope not.
Dr. Foster. Any objects which remain, the hard objects
would subsequently then come and reach the atmosphere and would
have to penetrate. Those that appeared as real objects would
then be attacked by SPRINT. The SPRINT has a nuclear warhead.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. The warhead, however, has a very low yield and
is mainly fusion and so there is little blackout and, as a
consequence, there is esentially no blackout associated with
this aspect of the engagement.
Senator Gore. Well, I am overstepping my allotment of time.
I wanted to ask one perhaps less technical question, but one
which has disturbed me a great deal in thinking about this, and
yet I have not heard anyone discuss it for a long while.
Another result of I believe our last atmospheric test in
the Pacific was that it blinded rabbits hundreds of miles away.
We are speaking here of a possible defense system of SPRINT
missiles which have a maximum range of 20 miles and if we are
defending our cities with SPRINT missiles, and a multiple
attack comes in, and we have this series of nuclear explosions
overhead, just coming to the biological question, what is the
danger of blindness or other effects of blast and radiation?
Dr. Foster Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be concerned
with two kinds of effects. The first, as you indicate, is
blindness. There, I believe, the problem was not SPRINT but the
SPARTAN explosions.
If the SPARTAN missile were to be commanded to detonate its
warhead at altitudes above 350,000 feet, we have no serious
problems. If, however, for some reason, and this is not in the
general plan, it is forced to detonate it, at, say 100,000
feet, then we could have some serious cases of blindness,
although, of course, that difficulty would be minor compared
with the consequences of having had the enemy warhead penetrate
to the ground. So in the current use----
Senator Gore. It would be a hard choice between being
killed or blinded.
Dr. Foster. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. The
individual----
Senator Gore. I would choose to be blind for a while.
Dr. Foster. Yes. The individual would have to be looking up
at that time in about the right direction to cause serious
trouble.
Senator Gore. How did it happen that these rabbits were
looking up? Did they not--with the detonation instinctively
flicker in that direction?
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, the damage is caused
substantially before the eye can close, and we arranged to have
the rabbits despite their desires, looking up in that
direction.
Senator Gore. That is a technical question.
Dr. Foster. In summary, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that
in the normal deployment and tactics of the NIKE X system that
there would be any serious damage either to our population or
to the Canadians north of us in the event we had SPARTAN
detonations, detonations of the SPARTAN warhead.
The other question, of course, is the fallout, and in this
case also the bursts are at heights well above the ground, so
that there is no problem with fallout at least in the nearterm.
It would nevertheless raise the activity in the atmosphere. It
would be subsequent activity, and radiation damage.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
Senator Clark. Dr. Foster, how far away are we from
deployment of both SPARTAN and SPRINT if we were to make a
decision right now to go ahead and deploy them?
Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, that with an orderly
deployment, that is to say doing it right, and that being the
guiding rule in the deployment, we would not have an initial
operating capability of the first battery until 1971.
Senator Clark. And in order to create the situation
revealed by your figure 5, how long would that take?
Dr. Foster. That could be completed by mid-1973.
Senator Clark. And could you state precisely what the cost
of deployment of the SPRINT and SPARTAN would be on that time
schedule to the extent indicated by our figure 5?
Dr. Foster. Yes. That would be $3 billion to $4 billion,
and then if one wanted to, in addition, deploy, extend the
equipment to give the necessary coverage of the MINUTEMAN
system, that would take, extend it, another six months and
would increase the costs another billion dollars.

FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

Senator Clark. This is exclusive of any fallout shelter
program, is it not?
Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
Senator Clark. Would you recommend such a fallout shelter
program if we decided to deploy?
Dr. Foster. Yes, I believe I would, and that amounts to
about $800 million above the current plan.
Senator Clark. For the entire country.
Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
Senator Clark I take it from the answer to the questions
addressed to you by Senator Gore that you are not particularly
disturbed about the radioactive fallout aspect of a deployment
and actual use of SPARTAN and SPRINT. Is that correct?
Dr. Foster. That is correct, Senator. However, I would be
very disturbed with the fallout associated with the all-out
thermonuclear exchange.
Senator Clark. Of course, I assume that would be
devastating.
Dr. Foster. Yes. To be more specific, I do not believe that
blindness or fallout are aspects of our current concept of NIKE
X which should be considered in any way as a serious
limitation.

DEPLOYMENT OF NIKE X'S

Senator Clark. Have we deployed any NIKE X's yet?
Dr. Foster. No, sir. We have not. We are in the process of
deploying prototype models to Kwajalein so that we can check
out a system. That will not be completed until 1967.

* * * * * * *

ESTIMATED U.S. DEATHS IN EVENTS OF ALL-OUT ENEMY ATTACK [P. 14]

Senator Clark. If you would turn to page 6 of your
statement and the last sentence on page 6 which I quote: ``We
would have to expect that in an all-out exchange dozens of
their warheads would likely explode in our cities.'' With what
estimate of human casualties?
Dr. Foster. Tens of millions.

* * * * * * *

Dr. Foster. Let me try to start anew. In the event of no
defense and an all-out attack by the Soviet Union on the United
States, 150 million could be killed.
If we deployed a very large ballistic missile defense
system----
Senator Clark. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT.
Dr. Foster. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT and all the radar
and so forth--let us say it involved $20 billion so that we
would have 7,000 or 8,000 SPRINTS and 1,000 or more SPARTANS,
and if the Soviets took no measures to penetrate that defense
of ours, then we could cut our losses to a few tens of
millions.

* * * * * * *

TESTING OF INCOMING MISSILES [P. 23]

Senator Gore. I have one question about research and
development that I can just hardly resist asking here. I
realize that even though we decide against the deployment of--I
say we, the government, decides against the deployment of an
ABM system, it is absolutely necessary to continue research and
development both with respect to ascertaining as much as
possible of what improvements in ballistic defense the Soviets
may be able to make, and what hardening and improvement of our
own offensive capability is necessary, and also this latter
about which I wish to ask a question.
What would be within our technical capability by way of
deployment of ballistic defense in the event that we later
decided upon such an installation? Now, with that background to
my question, how do you test, how do you measure, say, over
Kwajahein and over Johnson Island you have the firing
theoretically of incoming missiles, and from another island or
from another location you fire an interceptor missile. I
realize or I think I realize that by telemetry of the various
kinds you can measure the proximity of the exchange. But how
would you measure the possibility of X-ray or gamma ray
penetration of the incoming missile when you neither generate
the X-ray or gamma ray by your interceptor missile nor have the
effect of such on the theoretically attacking missile?
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, that is an extremely critical
question. As you indicate, we do plan to direct against
Kwajalein Minuteman and Poseidon missiles configured so as to
represent the most effective means of penetrating ballistic
missile defenses. We will be able to see on the radar, with
several radars, just how that attack looks.
We can, at the same time, direct one or more SPARTANS and
SPRINTS into the general area and simulate an attack, the
intercept of an attack, at several altitudes.
That, as you indicate, however, is not enough because we do
not know the effectiveness of these defensive warheads without
actual nuclear explosions.
It is for that reason that a fair fraction of our current
underground test program involves the detonation of specially-
tailored nuclear warheads so as to provide the X-rays and the
gamma rays and the neutrons of the various types for radiation
of our hardened reentry vehicles, and for that matter our own
SPARTA and SPRINT warheads, so as to make sure that they do not
destroy one another.
In the last three years we have had a whole series of very
complicated experiments which prove, first, that our offensive
warheads will work and, second, that they are as hard as we say
or if we find them to be vulnerable we fix them, and then
measure to see that they are, indeed, repaired.
So, this underground program is a very vital part of
maintaining the effectiveness of our offensive force to provide
a sure destruction.
Senator Gore. Can you measure underground the potentiality
for generating X-rays and gamma rays and also measure the
deposition of those X-ray on various types of missiles?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We can and we do.

SOVIET ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

Senator Gore. Now, one question leads to so many. The
Soviets in 1961 did conduct, and with multiple radar
observation, the actual atmospheric detonation of a nuclear
weapon and the penetration of that sphere of influence, for
want of a better word, by another missile with radar
observation in it in 1961.
Now, to what extent do those atmospheric tests on ballistic
defense which they conducted give them an advantage over what
we can do with underground tests?
Dr. Foster. One cannot know what the Soviets learned in
detail from their atmospheric experiments. We can only form a
judgment. In my judgment what they learned in those tests is
very small compared with what we have subsequently learned in
our underground program.
We, ourselves, had a number of experiments in the
atmospheric series, as you know, and we learned some things
which have turned out to be of great importance in the design
not only of our offensive but our defensive systems. I suspect
it is the same way with the Soviets.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark?
Senator Clark. May I ask one question that will take only
thirty seconds?
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Clark. Would I be justified in assuming that a
comprehensive test ban between ourselves and the Soviet Union,
adequately policed and enforced, could bring further research
and development into antiballistic missile system pretty much
to a halt on both sides?
Dr. Foster. I cannot speak for the Soviet Union. However, I
do not think it would bring ballistic missile defense research
and development to a complete halt in this country.
Senator Clark. Would it cripple it?
Dr. Foster. It would have a very serious effect on it, yes.
Senator Clark. Presumably, it would have the same effect on
the Soviets.
Dr. Foster. Yes; and, of course, it would seriously affect
our confidence in its effectiveness particularly against
sophisticated attack.
Senator Clark. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Well, rather arbitrarily we must say thank
you.
Dr. Foster. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to leave
that last question without----
Senator Gore. Let the record show that you were excused,
but were unready to go.
Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman, I am worried because the
question of complete cessation involves to my mind, not so much
its effect on a ballistic missile defense program, but its
effect on the maintenance of our assured destruction
capability.
Senator Clark. Yes. But at that point, we turn to reliance
on international cooperation, adequately policed, as opposed to
conflict, as evidenced by further research in lethal weapons of
destruction.
Dr. Foster. Yes, I understand. If one can be sure that we
are no longer relying on an assured destruction capability,
then my concern would disappear.
Senator Hickenlooper. Of course, you would have a very
interesting section to your question, adequately policed.
Senator Clark. That is what we are going to ask Mr. William
Foster about.
Senator Gore. The committee thanks you very much. You have
been very forthright, and I think very able. There are many,
many unresolved questions. I dare say before we finally
conclude, we will request you to come back for a return
engagement.

* * * * * * *

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Subcommittee on Disarmament

STAFF MEMORANDUM

Suggested Questions for William C. Foster, Director of the
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Non-Proliferation Treaty
1. How will a non-proliferation treaty help to keep those
nations you believe closest to the threshold of nuclear weapons
from deciding to build a bomb? In other words, why do we want a
non-proliferation treaty?
2. In 1965 the Indian delegate to the ENDC said that it is
an ``unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-
proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-
nuclear countries while the nuclear powers continue to hold on
to privileged status or club membership by retaining and even
increasing their deadly stockpiles . . .'' How would you answer
this charge that a non-proliferation agreement without other
disarmament measures is an unrealistic and irrational
proposition? Do you think India will sign a nonproliferation
treaty?
3. What is the Germans' problem with a non-proliferation
treaty? How could we meet their objections?
4. What are the prospects for denuclearized zones--such as
in Africa or the Caribbean? There are reports that the United
States is insisting on the right to transit nuclear weapons
through the Panama Canal in any such zone. Is this true?
Comprehensive Test Ban
1. Would you agree that the most meaningful way to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons is a comprehensive test ban?
2. Has the United States or the Soviet Union technically
violated the partial test ban by spreading debris from an
underground test beyond territorial boundaries? If so, why
haven't such charges been brought by one side or the other?
Conventional Arms Sales
1. A recent study of conventional arms sales done by the
staff of the Committee said that ACDA did not have a
significant role in the arms sales process. Do you agree?
2. Do you agree with another conclusion of the study that
policy coordination in the arms sales field is weak?
3. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, as I understand it,
is the forum established by the Secretary of State for the
coordination of major foreign policy decisions. Last week this
group discussed a major arms sale to Morocco. Did a
representative from ACDA attend that meeting?
4. How many professionals in the Arms Control & Disarmament
Agency work full time on conventional arms control?
Anti-Ballistic Missiles
1. What effect would an ABM arms race have on arms control
measures now under consideration, such as a non-proliferation
treaty or an underground test ban?

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA

----------

Monday, February 6, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in
room S-116 the Capitol, Senator Wayne Morse (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Sparkman, Gore,
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt of the committee
staff.
Senator Morse. Gentlemen, this is a long standing tradition
in this committee. We meet informally. We take a record, but it
is an executive record, and it is available to you and to us
only from the point of reference. No announcements are made as
far as this committee is concerned. I have found--I don't know
what Frank would say--that I would rather have one of these
meetings than three or four formal meetings. This is where you
learn what is really going on in the executive branch. As far
as I am concerned, we will do more of it this year, Frank, when
we get together with the AID people.
I met a scientist down at the White House this afternoon.
They are going to send up his name and a memorandum to me,
Pat--a man who will be in charge of the agricultural program in
AID in Latin America. He has had a long and distinguished
service in the Department of Agriculture. I think his last name
is Wilcox.
Senator Carlson. We had Wilcox over here in the
Congressional Library for years, and he moved down to the
Department.
Senator Morse. No, not that Wilcox. This man used to be a
professor in Minnesota. It is this kind of a meeting that helps
us. That is why we thought that you ought to chat with us first
about whatever you care to in regard to the great Panama
experience you had, and then the command that you have no. What
you think of this military aid program in Latin America. What
you think the problems are. We have one or two questions to ask
you later, but I would rather have you visit with us first.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT PORTER, SOUTHERN MILITARY COMMAND,
ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT S. SMITH, PLANS AND
POLICY OFFICE, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND ROBERT R. CORRIGAN,
POLITICAL ADVISOR TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

General Porter. First, I think I should tell you a little
bit about my background. I have heard of Senator Morse, and I
have known Senator Carlson over the years.
I went to West Point in 1926 from Nebraska, and I have been
on military duty since that time. I have lived in every part of
the world except Southeast Asia. That is the part I don't know
anything about. Most of my time was either in Europe or in the
Middle East, until I was sent down to Panama two years ago. I
have just finished two years in Panama. I have traveled a great
deal, studying the problem, getting acquainted with our people,
the ambassador as well as the local people. I guess we have
clocked altogether over 250,000 miles of travel in the last two
years.
The thing that has startled me about Panama and about the
whole area was, frankly, how little I knew about it from having
worked here. I thought I knew the problem from the military
point of view because I had working plans and policy in the
Pentagon, and I worked in the National Security Council
Planning Board for two years when President Eisenhower was the
President, and have seen things. I thought I knew what was
going on. I didn't realize that these countries are so
different. It is just astounding.

SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

The situation is--dynamic isn't a very good word, but the
situation is changing so rapidly in these countries that the
situation today, I know, for example, in Venezuela, will be
different in three or four months.
Just as an example, the Minister of Defense was up here as
a guest of Secretary McNamara the first of November, Minister
Gomez from Venezuela. He told McNamara, ``We have no problem as
far as internal security is concerned. Well, within ten days
all hell had broken loose again.
Of course, this time it culminated with them going into the
university, and they found in the university that this was
really the headquarters for the guerrillas. The arsenal was
there. I had heard a joke on this Venezuelan situation from an
educator friend. I have two brothers who are professors, and I
met this man through my brother. He said he was in Venezuela,
and he saw a sign indicating an art class. He was lost, and he
had little time anyway. He went up to the top floor to see
where this art class was, and found that they were painting
``Yankee Go Home'' signs, and they were actually getting credit
in the university.
Senator Morse. It is a public scandal.
General Porter. And they were teaching commercial art
there.
Well, this was last year that this happened. But it just
shows the situation. Well, of course, Gomez had said that he
had no problem.
I think a lot of this problem is what the head committee
that is working for the guerrillas, if they decided they are
going to stay in the background, or whether they are going to
go into an act of insurgency.

CUBANS IN VENEZEULA

Senator Morse. Pat points out to me that ten days or two
weeks ago, a group of Cubans was alleged to have landed in
Venezuela, and they haven't been apprehended yet. Apparently,
it is pretty reliable that they landed, isn't it?
Mr. Holt. So I am told, but the general would know a little
better than I do, I am sure.
Senator Morse. Why wouldn't the military establishment of
Venezuela, I suppose this is possible--you would think they
would get some trace of them, wouldn't you?
General Porter. No, I am not certain. With the size and the
long coastline of Venezuela--people can come ashore in Oregon,
and you wouldn't know about it. Actually with our Coast Guard,
we are as well organized if not better than the Venezuelans. I
made landings on beaches where we had gotten supplies in time
of war. If you come in at night, you can just disappear,
particularly if you have got friends there that have things
organized.
Senator Morse. Yes, they could have advance agents there.
General Porter. And right now, from what I can understand
about the situation in Venezuela, the Cubans are supporting
Douglas Dravo and his faction of the FALN,\1\ and if the thing
has all been taped, and where I read, things that have been
said at the Havana conference, there is extensive coordination
beginning to come from Cuba.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This could well have been worked out, and they would know
where they were coming.
Senator Morse. General, this is Senator Gore of Tennessee,
General Porter. The general has just started to chat with us.
We started with Panama, but we got off and were talking about
the Venezuelan situation. He thinks it will have its effect.

ATTITUDE OF THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE

What do you think about the general attitude on the part of
the Panamanian people as different from their government toward
the United States? Do you think the conditions have improved
over what they were a couple of years ago?
General Porter. Well, of course, I am still learning in
Panama. I do feel that the Panamanian people as a people, the
little man, has a tie with the Panama Canal, and he has a lot
of good image of us and of Americans because of his tie with
the Panama Canal.
For example, the President started out as a truck driver,
President Robles. He was a truck driver. That was his first
job. The first money he got was as a truck driver. Well, he is
really one of the best friends we have got down there. He is
having a hell of a time now because he is trying to hold the
coalition government together, and most of the people in the
coalition think they would make a better President than he is.
Senator Gore. You know we are afflicted with a little of
that now and then here.
General Porter. But his instincts are good. He is a
religious man, and he thinks the students ought to be
responsible. He backed Zaguardia law and order.
Senator Morse. Senator Hickenlooper, this is General
Porter.
Senator Hickenlooper. Hello, General. Nice to see you
indeed.
General Porter. We were just talking a little bit about
Panama. It is a tricky situation, because the press is hostile
to us.
Senator Morse. Senator Cooper, this is General Porter.

THE RIOT IN PANAMA WAS PLANNED

Senator Hickenlooper. General, I was in Panama. I left
about 7 o'clock on the morning that bloody riot broke out down
there.
General Porter. This was in January '64?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. I came on to Washington.
General Porter. It looked spontaneous. It was planned by
someone, and this is part of the problem, particularly with the
university down there, and the group in the university planning
these things to take advantage of what well could be a
legitimate grievance.

MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA

Senator Morse. Am I correctly advised, General, that it
falls under your jurisdiction to make recommendations to the
administration regarding the whole question of the military aid
program to Latin America? Does that fall under your bailiwick?
General Porter. Yes. I am sort of the field man, I guess
you would say, for the Department of Defense in the Latin
American area. I am the senior military man in the area, and we
get the country programs together as they come out of each of
the countries, put them into a package and send them to Defense
with our recommendations.
Now, of course, there are guidelines which are provided not
only by the Congress, but by the administration as to how we
are going to proceed, but I tried to make a program out of
these.
Senator Morse. That is why we would like to have your frank
appraisal of the situation. Within the committee, I think this
is a fair statement to say, there is a division of point of
view in regard to military aid to Latin America, in these
general respects. Not that there is any difference of opinion
that aid isn't needed.
There is a difference of opinion as to the type of aid, and
as to the amount of aid, and as to whether or not the
governments themselves are doing all they can for themselves.
For example, we have been cutting aid on this committee less
than the House. It works out as a compromise in conference with
the House each year. We got it down to $85 million, didn't we,
Carl?
Mr. Marcy. That was the cash amount.
Senator Morse. One of the questions they suggested I ask
you, that you are free to discuss, is where are the cuts to be
made to come within the $85 million statutory ceiling on sales
and grants. Are all sales handled from Washington, or does the
General have a voice in them?
General Porter. Well, you have asked me about four
questions.
Senator Morse. I know. I just wanted to throw it out on top
of the table. You kick it around in your own way.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY

General Porter. Okay. Let me begin by saying that as far as
the Military Assistance Program is concerned, it took me about
a year to make up my mind on the Military Assistance Program as
to just what it was doing and what it could contribute in Latin
America, because there the situation varies so from country to
country.
I can see a country like Colombia, where there is an active
insurgency which has been going on actually as a result of the
Bogatacia in 1948. It has been going on and originally you
couldn't tell whether these were bandits or people that were
just outside the pale, because of the acts that they had
committed in the early fifties, or just what it was.
But in the two years I have been down there, it is very
obvious that much of this so-called banditry throughout the
countryside in Colombia, and most of these countries, has been
stopped. And what we are dealing with are actually groups that
are trying to pull the government down and get the support of
the people to begin bringing communism into these countries.
Now, also, as I have gone around and looked at the
countries and gotten acquainted with the military, these people
are quite different from the men that I knew when I was a young
lieutenant at Reilly, and the Chileans would come up and go to
school with us and so on. The playboy is gone from the younger
military people, and the impression, as I have gotten
acquainted with senior commanders, they are really in the
twentieth century. They are working very hard and are very much
interested in the nation-building problems that they have got
in their countries.

DISCIPLINED MILITARY OFFICERS

Now I had always thought of the Latin American military,
based on what I had read and what I had been taught when I was
in school, that they were a bunch of parasites and were really
beyond the pale. This isn't the case at all, and particularly
the younger officers, the officers that have been through our
school here during the last twenty years. They think pretty
much the way an American military man does.
They are a disciplined group, and their interest is in
supporting their country. They have many of the same instincts
I have when somebody says something about the United States
which I don't like. Why my blood pressure goes up. They have
that same instinct.
In these countries where their literacy rate is low, they
are hard at work teaching the youngsters that come in. And most
countries have the draft, teaching them to read and write, and
they are working now, most of the countries are beginning to
have a program where they are teaching the man a trade, so when
he finishes, he has a trade and can go back to being a plumber,
electrician, carpenter.
Otherwise when they get out of the service and they haven't
anything to do, they have been taught to fire a rifle. Of
course, they probably knew how to do that, or at least throw a
machete or a knife, as a youngster, because the law of survival
is pretty much the rule down there.
But they are teaching these people a useful trade, so that
they aren't suckers for somebody that has some money who is
going to recruit a private gang or get themselves involved, and
it turns out he is in a guerrilla action too. So, I think this
is a constructive thing that I didn't know existed when I went
down to Panama two years ago.
Senator Morse. May I interrupt you. This is Senator
McCarthy, General Porter, and Mr. Corrigan and Colonel Smith.

MOTIVATION AND EQUIPMENT

General Porter. One of the problems that we face in all of
these countries is to give these men, if they have gone into
the military service, they must have the same motivation I had
when I went to West Point in 1926. I wanted to be a soldier,
and I have really never quite gotten over it. I can't explain
quite why. Some people become ministers, and I sometimes wonder
why they do that.
They have a motivation in this regard, but unless they have
the equipment with which to train, and they have had the basic
education and technical knowledge that can teach men to stand
and be shot at in time of struggle and strife, you haven't got
much to deal with.
One of the problems that I have seen down there is that
unless these youngsters are motivated to train their men, they
are going to become a bunch of bums eventually. From what I
have seen and heard----
Senator Morse. Senator Sparkman, this is General Porter.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, sir, General. Glad to see you again.
I am not going to be able to stay long. I wanted to come in for
such time as I could.
General Porter. The motivation of these people has to be
kept in mind, particularly if you are trying to deal with them
as the senior commander. And all of these people are now having
problems with equipment which they bought from us, either at
the end of World War II, or which was given to them at that
time, or it came in under the Military Assistance Program after
we had such a program, because it is getting to be about twenty
years old.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are you talking about the people in
Panama?
General Porter. I am talking generally.
Senator Morse. About Latin America.
General Porter. Now I trained at the beginning of World War
II with a broom in a Jeep. That was an anti-tank gun. It worked
all right out on maneuvers, but when you tried to fire,
assuming you were firing with it, you are in trouble. I am just
using that as an illustration.
It is a question of getting these people on motivation more
than anything else. All these countries have problems now of
trying to hold a high quality man in the military. The next few
years are going to be very critical.
Senator Morse. Come up here, Senator. Senator Aiken, this
is General Porter. Behind you is Colonel Smith. You know the
secretary across from you.
Senator Aiken. I have seen him around.

QUESTIONS THE EQUIPMENT SENT TO LATIN AMERICA

Senator Morse. One of the things that we kick around up
here, and I have discussed frequently, is the type of equipment
that we are supplying. Questions are raised why tanks, why late
model military aircraft, why so much heavy equipment? Why
submarines and destroyers?
Why not the type of equipment that they need for
maintaining internal disorder rather than the type of equipment
that it is alleged we supply them which is used between
nations? Everybody knows they are not going to war against each
other down there, for many reasons, and that the type of our
equipment is subject to question.
The argument is made, take the Argentine Military
Establishment there, is all out of proportion as to the number
of officers to the rank and file. That is typical of some other
military establishments, it is alleged.
Now it is questions such as that that you could help
clarify very much, because we don't claim to have the expertise
that qualifies us to say. But, nevertheless, it gets into your
debates on this whole matter of military aid. You get the
argument that if we don't supply the equipment, they will go to
Russia, France or Czechoslovakia. Some take the position, well,
let them go. Let us supply them with the things that will help
develop them economically rather than militarily.

SITUATION IN PERU

The charge is made that some of the countries like Peru,
the Indians fill the rank and file, and the sons of the
families of the wealthy fill the officership. You know the
argument. But I have the job as chairman here of throwing them
out on the table and you commenting on them.
General Porter. Let me take this last one first. Actually
the Minister of Defense, General Arbelu, is a full-blooded
Indian. Now there was a time in Peru when what you say was
true, but there is great change taking place in all of these
countries, and right now in Peru the Indian is beginning to be
brought into the fringes of the money economy.
For example, up at Cusco, where I was in August, the Army
is running an experimental farm where they have 60 families
teaching them agriculture, and they have some men who were
doing their service up there, and they are training them in the
trades courses. It is potato country, but also they are
teaching them to handle livestock, chickens.
In two years, they have taken these Indian families--cocoa
was one of their sources of getting through the day, and of
course it has a numbing effect. It is a form of drug. Cocoa,
liquor and beans were pretty much all they had to eat. Now
these people are beginning to wear the clothes that they wear
down in the low countries. In other words, they are beginning
to get away from the Indian clothes and are beginning to wear
western clothes.
They are going into a protein diet. And this hacienda,
which is a big one, and it never paid its way in the last 25
years, is in the black, through methods that are being taught
these people.
It is interesting that as they come in, all of them, whole
families are learning to read and write. So that these are
things that are taking place.
Now the officer corps in all of these countries is no
longer from the oligarchy. It is coming in from the middle
class, and this Indian I am telling you about, who is the
number one military man in Peru today, he worked his way up
through the ranks. But what you say was true 15 years ago.

SITUATION IN BRAZIL

We are in a state of change down there, great change. This
is one of the encouraging things to me, that the officers are
beginning to come up from the ranks, or they are coming up from
the middle class, or the lower middle class, and they have the
interests of their people very much at heart.
For example, in Brazil, I was in Northeastern Brazil last
spring. We were up in the area where the sugar plantations are,
and these big land holdings, and the most critical people of
the slowness of Castelo Branco with his land reform program
were the military officers. We were going out to see a road
project. We had an engineer building a farm-to-market road, so
they get their produce out of the interior.

``YOUR FORCES ARE TOO BIG''

When you look at all of the projects, everybody has his pet
project that he wants to get pushed to the front. There is
about 25 or 30 years' progress, and they are trying to get it
all done in one or two years. It is a question of how much you
can force things like this, and come out without anything
besides chaos and strife.
Now on the side of the military establishments, I have
worked with foreign military forces before I went down there. I
was out in the Middle East and worked with Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan for two years in this organization, and I know pretty
much the problem in that area, and you hear these criticisms
there too. The threat, as we see it, to these countries, and
the reason they need forces, and what they say the threat is,
and why they have forces, is quite different.
I haven't been able to rationalize with them to the extent
that I can come right out and say, ``Your forces are too big.''
I have brought out this subject several times. But I am really
not in a position, in spite of the fact I can see the threat to
them pretty well, to say move over, and I will tell you how to
run your Army, or I will tell you how to run your Air Force or
your Navy, because my usefulness is done if I did that.
When you look at the problems in Argentina and the
communications problem they have in areas between Corrientes
and Mendoza, and when you go down to the south country, it is a
hell of a big country. Communications are not too good. And by
our standards of what would be required if we had mobile
reserves and transports to get them around, and what they need
are quite different.
Then in Brazil, I brought up this matter of size of forces,
and they said, ``Well, these men that we are getting into the
Army, we are teaching them to read and write. If they weren't
in the Army, where would they be? They would be unemployed, and
they wouldn't be learning a trade. They wouldn't be learning to
read and write.''

AN ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY SERVICE

Senator McCarthy. General, could I raise a question at that
point. This is one of the questions that bothers me. You make
the Army really the best profession in the country. You said
earlier that if you didn't give them advanced equipment that
the best men would be lost.
Where would they go, to other professions? If so, would
that be bad? Do you have to put them in the Army in order to
teach them to read and write? I think this was one of the basic
questions that concerns those of us who are really looking at
this thing. You say they wouldn't learn to read and write if we
didn't put them in the Army.
General Porter. You have three questions here. Let's take
one at a time.
Senator McCarthy. I know it. They are all questions you
made. I just wanted to back you up on it to see if there isn't
an alternative.
General Porter. And your questions are darn good questions,
and I am not sure whether I can answer to your satisfaction.
All these countries have something like a draft law, and they
will get the men. Now the men that normally they are drafting
into the Army, if they are already students, they have
exemptions the way we have in our country, and they are not
going to be drawn into the Army.
Senator McCarthy. Of course, we are doing the same thing in
our draft now.
General Porter. That is right.
Senator McCarthy. Teaching them to read and write.
General Porter. And I worked that a hell of a lot of my
time.
Senator McCarthy. That is right.
General Porter. But a lot of these people are outside of
the money economy. A lot of them have never worn shoes. Their
basic habits of sanitation and so on are very primitive.
Now if these people aren't drawn into the Army and pulled
out of their farm community, they would probably never get out
of it, because the school situation in a country like Brazil is
really quite discouraging. You have been down there. You have
seen it. Wouldn't you agree with that, Bob?
Now what we are doing with a lot of these boys that are
coming out, we are bringing them into the twentieth century. In
the coastal country I would agree with what you say. When you
get into Sao Paulo, the Rio complex, and up to Belo Horizonte,
I think that in that area, yes, they would have an opportunity.
But you get into the northeast, up into the back country of
Recife, they are just going to exist there all their lives.
This is one way of helping prime this pump. Teach them a trade
and bring them along.

TEACHING SOLDIERS TO READ AND WRITE

Senator Hickenlooper. General, is it fair to say that when
they go into the Army, they are under a discipline to read and
write?
General Porter. That is right.
Senator Hickenlooper. And if they are not in the Army,
their own discipline is not sufficient to give them any
stimulus to learn to read and write?
General Porter. That is absolutely right. Not only that,
but when they began to get hope, and a lot of these people, you
look at them, they are not well when they are small, and they
grow up and have been undernourished all their life. I was
talking to people down in the Amazon about this. I was asking a
doctor in Peru about the health of the people in the Amazon
Basin. She said a lot of these people endemically, by the time
they are old enough to live and do a man's work, haven't the
strength to do it because of the ailments that they have got.
Senator Hickenlooper. Do you know Dr. Popano who ran that
agricultural farm? He died here a short time ago.
General Porter. I have read about him.
Mr. Corrigan. Yes.I knew him very well.
Senator Hickenlooper. When I was down there I stayed all
night at the farm, just about that very thing you are talking
about. He ran that school, getting these youngsters in from all
over Central America theoretically. He had some from Colombia.
He said a startling thing. He got them in there; they would
come in as freshmen. It would take them about four to six weeks
to get the worms out of them. That is number one.
Then he said within three months they would gain 40 to 60
pounds just by getting a reasonable diet. Then he said they
were ready to learn. He said before that they were indolent.
They didn't have the stimulus.
General Porter. To go back to Senator McCarthy's question,
I feel that probably, and this is just off the top of my head,
15 or 20 percent of the people that go into the Army might go
ahead and get a third grade education or a fourth grade
education anyway. The group that is being called into the Army.
But the rest of them would not, and they would have less than a
50/50 chance of meeting a decent wage during their lifetime
unless they could learn to read and write.

LENGTH OF SERVICE

Senator Cooper. What is the length of service in these
countries? What does it average, and what do these men do when
they get out of the Army? Does what they learn there carry on
in civilian life?
General Porter. It varies. The minimum tour is a year. In
some countries it is two years.
For example, in some of the countries, if a man shows an
interest in getting a trade, they will extend his service until
he can become a plumber or a bricklayer or a carpenter. The
Army has vocational schools where they are training them to do
this. They are getting ready to do this in Guatemala, for
example. They are doing this in Peru. They are doing this in
Colombia. But it varies, Senator, from country to country.
Now these people will normally go back to their village
initially. How long they will stay there depends on whether
they can make a contribution when they get back. But if they
have a trade and can do such things as bricklaying, they are
short of people that can do this all over the country or if
they can fix a radio set or do primitive electrical wiring.
So the chances are better that they are going to stay and
work in the countryside and make a decent living there, or
begin to, if they have the trade. Otherwise, their having seen
the city, they are going to drift back.

MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS

Senator Morse. I think it would be helpful to the
committee, if you gentlemen of the committee agree with me, if
the general would explain to us how the sales programs are
handled.
You have got an $85 million ceiling, so-called. How are the
sales programs handled? Are they handled in Washington? Does
the General Staff handle them? Who makes the selection? To what
extent do we turn down their requests for purchase? I think we
are pretty ignorant about that up here, at least I am. I wish
you would explain that to us.
General Porter. Well, the sales program is handled pretty
much out of Washington. We are just in the throes of changing
now actually, and I think Mr. McMillan is coming over here to
testify tomorrow. At least, I was told that. He is to come over
here tomorrow.
Senator Morse. Before Armed Services.
General Porter. I think that is right. The sales program
has been handled directly from Washington. It has been that way
for a long time, principally because from the very beginning,
when the Latin American countries wanted to buy something in
the United States, the military attache went over to State,
talked to them in State. Then referred them to people in
defense, and passed on the shopping list of the things that
they said they needed. Then they would indicate encouragement
or discouragement. I will be very honest and say that in the
two years I have been down country, I have felt that the Latin
Americans felt very discouraged about trying to buy from us,
feeling that we did everything we could to slow down selling
them anything, even spare parts for equipment they had.
It has come about in part because of the procedures we
have. They have to get an export license, and they come up.
They go over to the Pentagon and get a quotation if they want
to buy from the military. Then they send that down country. At
that time. we are notified in Panama, my headquarters, that
they are going to buy or want to buy. Normally then we make a
comment as to whether we think that is needed or not. There are
cases where I have found out about it afterwards.
Senator Hickenlooper. Don't they submit it to you first?
General Porter. No.
Senator Hickenlooper. They don't say, ``We have the
recommendation''?
General Porter. No, because it comes in through their
attache, you see. Now this is in a state of flux, and they are
beginning to draw our people in country into it, but this has
been handled this way in the last 40 years, and we are just in
the state of trying to change it.

$85 MILLION CEILING

This $85 million ceiling that the Senate put on this year
is forcing us to do that. You see the policy that Mr. McNamara
has announced is that if they will buy, we will take it out of
the grant program. So this is an oversimplification of the
ground rules. It would take 15 minutes with a prepared paper to
give you an accurate statement. But this is pretty much the
intent.
That anybody who has the money and will buy, they would
take priority. Well, this is throwing my programs for these
countries, making them damned complicated, because I am not
certain as to just how much of this money is going to be
available to buy spare parts and to buy weapons and the things
that I need in these 20 programs.
I will say this: That every request to buy that has come in
here in my 20 years down country has really been looked at
carefully by both the people in State and Defense, to see
whether it was in our interests to sell.

A LOT OF LOST MOTION

Senator Hickenlooper. It seems to me there is a lot of lost
motion in that--probably there is a good reason for it, I don't
know. It would seem to me that the best way to do it is if
Country X wants certain equipment, they should submit it to the
local people, and there should be a recommendation that this is
either excessive or it has utility, or if available and if
compatible with other programs, it should be granted. Then come
up here and get the job done, instead of rushing up here and
back three or four times, and so on.
General Porter. I think that the procedure you are
suggesting is one that is under consideration now, but we
haven't had this fully established.
Senator Hickenlooper. We haven't abolished the Commission
for the widows of the War of 1845, I guess. It takes a long
time to get these things done.
General Porter. You run into additional things. There are a
number of purchasing missions, for example, here in Washington
from these countries. I feel that people down country would
prefer to come in, the military people would be very happy and
prefer to come in this way, but this is the way they have been
doing it for 25 years.

GRANTS CAN BE A WINDFALL

It would be useful to us, because we could get a better fix
on what the requirements were, and our people in country would
know about them too. But in some of these countries where they
have limited means and they get a windfall of $100,000, the
equivalent of that in foreign exchange, they are going to get
it spent and committed before the end of the fiscal year, just
the way some of our people do here, particularly when you have
crying needs. They are going to get the first thing that they
can.
Senator Morse. They come up here from State and the
Pentagon Building through their officials. The State and the
Pentagon Building get in touch with you then to get your
recommendation before you go ahead and make any arrangements
with them?
General Porter. That is right. Normally I know about it.
There have been cases where I haven't, but I think this is the
exception.
Senator Morse. I think it is so important if you are going
to do it, as Senator Hickenlooper says, it is the cart before
the horse. If you are going to do it that way, they certainly
ought to get back to you for your recommendation.
General Porter. Actually, what I have found out in my two
years down there is that the Latin American is not a program or
a plan, whatever he is, whether wearing a civilian or military
suit. They sort of live from hand to mouth. One of the things I
have been trying to do is get these people working, and I know
they are working through the Alliance for Progress to do the
same thing, to try to get them to chalk out where they are
going to be in five years, and how they will get there in the
most economical way. We are just beginning to make some
progress.
Senator Hickenlooper. They can always do it manana.

A NEW BREED OF MILITARY OFFICERS

General Porter. But we are getting a new breed down there
now. Truly there are a lot of people that are beginning to see
that unless they program ahead, they are going to be blown by
the wind, and they are never going to get to their destination.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think they have a lot of capable
people in each of these countries, but the question of the
percentage of the influence and control that those capable
people have realized, what you are saying, how much authority
they have from time to time.
General Porter. Well, it has been encouraging in the two
years I have been down there to see that the military are doing
better now than they were two years ago, and not so much
through anything I have been able to do except to just beating
away on them. And this matter that unless you know where you
are going, how you are ever going to get there. You just start
out in a certain direction, and you wander and are blown around
by the winds.

SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

For example, in Argentina, we had just gotten the Argentine
military to develop for themselves a five-year program to try
to improve their forces. In doing that, it was interesting to
see from the beginning what they needed.
They were beginning to cut back in the size of forces and
equipment. For example, this A4B deal. They were going to
retire, as I recall, two planes for each A4B that they were to
get, and they were to get 50.
Actually, we began to show them that they could do better
than that, because the maintenance problems in trying to train
the pilots, they do the same training program and keep their
pilots proficient with less planes than what they planned to
buy. But they had never faced up to these things until we began
talking to them and getting this sort of thing worked out.
Going back to my life as a young lieutenant in the early
days here, we were pretty provincial in those days too. When
you face up to the fact that most of these countries are about
50 years behind us in planning and programming techniques, and
in their sense of responsibility and in their schooling, it is
pretty hard to bring them up to 1967 when they are in 1920 or
1927 in a lot of their thinking and in a lot of their
activities.

FORMULA FOR CUTTING OFF FUNDS

Senator Morse. When Congress put a ceiling on, speaking
hypothetically now, like the $85 million ceiling, and State and
the Pentagon have to cut under that ceiling, is there any
particular formula that is followed as to whether the cut will
be taken off of grants or taken off of sales?
General Porter. Well, let me explain how our programs are
put together.
Senator Morse. That is what we need.
General Porter. We have a table that shows the money amount
under the $55 million ceiling that was on before the $85
million was put on. We had a table which showed the amount.
They put in what was called defense articles for each country
under that $55 million ceiling. Added to that was a certain
amount for training. And then the overhead and administrative
costs and the program were involved.
At that time under the $55 million ceiling on defense
articles, there was no ceiling on sales, you see, the amount of
credits that could be developed. I want you to listen to this,
Bob, because he helps put the programs together in country. I
am explaining how we put the program together.
Now under that table 36, as they call it, that is showing
what money could be available, based on programs and
discussions that come out of the countries. Then we go ahead
and put a program together.
Now with the $85 million ceiling that had been put on, this
actually was about a 60 percent cut in each of these programs,
if you took it right across the board, because of the sales
that would have to be accommodated under this $85 million
ceiling. So, we went back to work and began to see what we
would do, what programs we would defer, based on the
programming ahead.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Mr. McNamara requires us to have a 5-year program for each
of these countries. The only thing we could do would be to take
certain types of equipment that weren't as much needed for
modernization, and looking at the threat that was in the
country and the state of training of people, and people that
had gone into the program, get them trained. Start training,
for example, on communications equipment or something like
that, so it wouldn't create complete chaos in these countries
due to this change in policy, which came from the $85 million
ceiling.
For example, it takes about 50 weeks' training to get a
radio operator trained to run a military radio these days. We
have to put him in training far enough ahead so that when the
equipment gets there, we can marry him up with this piece of
equipment.
Now in doing that, we fixed up some articles or lists from
each of the countries to get a deferred list of items that
would not be funded in each of these countries until we could
see how the sales program worked out. It is pretty difficult 18
months ahead of time to see what foreign exchange they are
going to have available in country, and what the credit is
going to be from country to country.
This list is being held together intact over in the
Department of Defense now, but it is not being funded under the
'67 program until we see what money is available for grant aid.
But the Pentagon agreed, I pushed them, to go ahead with the
grant program higher than the sales figure in that the material
that was in the grant program was so important, particularly
during this year, to the continuity of operations in country.
For example, where there are spare parts; some replacement
vehicles; communications vehicles; certain aircraft that are
needed; batteries, a lot of things. Batteries, for example, for
a submarine which needs to be fixed. If we just stop this in
mid-stream, it would do nothing but create chaos in all twenty
countries.
My interest is in trying to get in any change of policy to
get an orderly change so that we don't completely wreck their
military establishments in one or two years. Now this list that
we have now, that we have what, $11 million?
Colonel Smith. $11.1 million. Yes, sir.
General Porter. In checking today and talking to the people
in the Pentagon on what the military purchasing commissions
here are talking to them about, it looks as if we are going to
have to go back into our grant aid programs again to try to see
what more we can get out of them. In other words, the grant
program is going to take another beating. I don't know whether
I have answered your question.

THE LOAN PROGRAM

Senator Morse. It helps very much. Before I call on Pat for
a supplement, there is another facet of this that I would like
to have you explain to us. You have got the grants, and you
have got the purchases, grants and sales.
Now, we have the loan program. That is causing some
confusion up here. Last year at the last session a bill was
offered for the calendar, and went over, and it will be up
shortly. As I recall, Pat--Carl, this is that loan bill that
came out of Armed Services--it was three destroyers for Brazil,
two for Argentina, one for Colombia, and a submarine for Chile
and a submarine for--it was Colombia, I guess.
Mr. Holt. Three destroyers for Argentina, two for Brazil,
one submarine for Chile, one destroyer for Colombia, two
destroyer escorts for----
Senator Morse. No airplanes?
Mr. Holt. This is just naval.
Colonel Smith. This is what?
Mr. Holt. This is the '66 bill that didn't pass.
Senator Morse. It didn't pass. It was held up. We took the
position it ought to get into Foreign Relations for review too.
They got it on the calendar the last week as I recall, and it
raised some questions. Now I understand that there is a
proposal, based upon the 1965 Loan Act, for a destroyer to be
loaned to the Argentine.
Mr. Holt. If I understand it correctly, there was
legislation passed in '64 or '65.
Senator Morse. Sixty-five.
Colonel Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Holt. Authorizing the loan of destroyers for Argentina.
Colonel Smith. Three for Brazil, two for Argentina. Chile
was cut out and so was Peru.
Mr. Holt. Right. But this has never been fully implemented,
and it is not proposed to do so.
Colonel Smith. It has never been fully implemented, and it
is being considered for implementation. As a matter of fact,
they have gone for the one destroyer for Brazil as of today.
The situation is about halfway through the rebuild for Brazil.
General Porter. These destroyers, the U.S. offered the
Brazilians and Argentina destroyers which were of early World
War II vintage, and the cost to them of repairing these
destroyers was how much, Bob, a couple of million dollars?
Colonel Smith. About $5 million.
General Porter. I know, but between the A, B and C type,
there is about $1 or $2 million more to repair a C type than a
B type.--
Colonel Smith. That is right.
General Porter. To get it so it would be of any use to
them. Of course they were trying to get C and O to give them,
make D type available. And he said no they are out in Vietnam.
So there has been a lot of study of this type C destroyer on
the part of both Brazil and Argentina, to try to find the
destroyers that are in the best condition.
They have been studying these ships for six to eight
months, trying to find a ship that they thought would be worth
rehabilitating, you see, because we have taken out of mothballs
naturally the best and put them back in the fleet to use them
out in Vietnam.
Colonel Smith. Senator, it doesn't cost the taxpayer now on
these loans. The country receiving the loan, for example,
Brazil, pays this rehabilitation activation cost. In fact, on
the $85 million ceiling-- a few words about title X. The value
of the hull itself is charged against this ceiling. There is no
U.S. money spent on these destroyers when they are loaned, and
we have a recapture clause at any time.

WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY

Senator Morse. What can we say about the nature of this
equipment in answer to the charge that this is the type of
equipment that we shouldn't be making available? That we should
make a different type of military equipment available to them?
Who am I to say? I don't know what type of equipment they
ought to have. The argument is that this kind of equipment
isn't necessary to maintain internal order. It isn't necessary
to protect them from a Communist coup. They need helicopters
and light equipment for that, and personnel for that, rather
than this heavy equipment constantly building up the military
establishment.
It goes back to the first point, however, that the General
made very early here in the day. If we are going to get the
class of personnel that you want, referring to what you say,
you have got to have training in all the various aspects of
military operation.
General Porter. Let's just talk a minute about the Navy
problem in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. They
are the countries that are the leaders down there as far as the
Navy is concerned.
These countries live by the sea. When we started in with
this, under the Rio Treaty--and are talking about Western
Hemisphere defense--this was going to be a partnership, and all
of our bilateral with them back in the early fifties was to be
a joint effort.

SWITCHING INTERNAL SECURITY

Now we started during the Kennedy administration, right
after Cuba, we began switching over to internal security. But
we never really went down to renegotiate these bilaterals.
In some of these countries, they still are thinking in
those terms. But actually you look at the situation in Brazil,
or Argentina, with their long coastline and the responsibility
that the Argentina navy has for the south country in Argentina.
I don't say that the destroyer is what is actually needed. I am
not sure what they need because they are doing all sorts of
things. They are the administrators for that southern area of
Argentina.
But they need destroyers to deal with the policing of their
maritime provinces in the south. The seas are bad. Their Navy
is something like ours. They have Air, they have Marines, they
have pretty much a complete force, but they are trying to
police these maritime areas principally with their forces.

THE PANAMA CANAL PROBLEM

From where I sit in Panama looking at the Panama Canal
problem, we have taken the Panama Canal as a commerce route
that will always be open. If anything did happen there, and I
should probably cross myself and knock on wood because
hopefully we will never get into this situation, then all of
our shipping between the east and west coasts is going to have
to make that long route down there. The smaller craft are going
to go through the Magellan Straits and a the big craft are
going to go around the Cape. Then because of the weather,
Navies of Argentina and Chile are going to have to lead a lot
of these merchant ships by the hand, because there is no coast
guard as such.
The Navy handles the coast guard operations for the whole
country, and then destroyers are about the smallest craft that
can live in some of the high seas you get down in the south
country there around the Cape of both sides.

NAVAL ROLE IN CHILE AND ARGENTINA

Yet, for example, in Chile, down in the straits of
Magellan, I was down in December and studied that thing because
of its strategic position. You have 49 knot winds. That is the
ordinary, day in and day out blow that they have down where the
Straits of Magellan exit into the Pacific Ocean. There are
terrible storms there all the time.
I really feel, and I didn't feel strongly on this until I
went down there on this and studied these problems, that there
is a deep water role for the Navy of Argentina and Chile.
That doesn't mean they need aircraft carriers or cruisers,
but they need destroyers. They need craft that will stand up in
bad weather because merchant ships get into distress and they
have to police the southern waters.
Brazil with its big coastline and its problems is really a
maritime power because of overseas trade. The same way with
Peru. Between 95 and 100 percent of their trade goes by ship,
and the other less than 5 percent by air.
That is the only way they can get the stuff out. These
countries have a tradition, a naval tradition. As a soldier it
is sort of hard for me to explain what a Navy tradition is, but
they have very capable people, and Peru is probably the best.
Chile comes next. But these destroyers are really needed by
these countries, not for the guns on them, but for the role it
permits them to provide as far as their country is concerned.

BAD STRATEGY

Senator Morse. What are we going to say to the argument--
and I am just putting this out in our own executive session
before it goes to the floor--that if we expand the loan
program, which is what this '66 bill allegedly attempts to do,
and therefore was a runaround the $85 million--and there was a
demand to block it until we looked at it longer--what are we
going to say to the argument that if you are going to put a
ceiling on for grants and sales, then subsequently come around
with a loan program that loans a great deal of equipment,
whatever its value is, that amounts in fact, to increasing the
ceiling. Therefore, the legislation ought to put one ceiling
and say to the Pentagon Building that this covers loans, and it
covers grants and it covers sales.
I think it was bad strategy, just giving you my opinion.
Carl, you listen to this. You were in on this discussion we had
at the end of a year when they brought up at the last minute
this loan bill, and it stirred up such a hornet's nest around
here.
General Porter. This is on the Navy ships?
Senator Morse. Yes, on the Navy ships. What are we going to
say to meet the argument that the Pentagon Building should come
in with one package, and that legislation in a given session
shouldn't wait until after the foreign aid bill is passed. Then
they lose out, say, in the foreign aid bill by getting a lower
ceiling than they wanted, and then subsequently give us an end
run play with a proposal for a lot of loans of equipment, which
in effect breaks the ceiling? How are we going to meet this
next year?
Mr. Marcy. Let me add one thing, Senator. The other fact
that is added there is sales. You see, in effect, when you make
a sale of military equipment, you are using part of the
economic strength of that country to buy the military equipment
which in turn means perhaps you have to increase the economic
aid. So sales, grants and loans are all combined.
Colonel Smith. I don't believe Senator Morse's point here
is that your present, the last Fulbright amendment, included
grants, sales and these ship loans.
Senator McCarthy. It didn't include the ships.
Colonel Smith. They all counted under your $85 million
ceiling.
You must be referring to a bill with which we are not
familiar.
Senator Morse. This is a question of fact that I didn't
cover. I am glad I raised it. The $85 million also included the
loans.
Colonel Smith. It included ship loans unless there is
wording in this new bill that exempts it from the ceiling.

VALUE OF SHIPS COUNTED AGAINST THE CEILING

Senator McCarthy. I thought the ships were granted by a
separate act that had no relationship to the ceiling.
Colonel Smith. They are granted, Senator, by Title 10 code
as a separate act. However, by the Fulbright amendment, their
value counts against the ceiling.
Senator Corrigan. And their rehabilitation.
Colonel Smith. The rehabilitation would count if the U.S.
does it. If they do it, it does not count.
Senator Morse. The Colonel says they must do it.
General Porter. We are telling them they must do it, but
this is still being worked out because they are so short of
money.
Colonel Smith. If they borrow money to do it, it counts
under the ceiling or even if we guarantee the loan.
Senator McCarthy. You mean if the Defense Department does.
Colonel Smith. That is correct, sir.

EXPORT-IMPORT LOANS

Senator McCarthy. Are the Export-Import loans guaranteed by
the Defense Department or are they separate?
Colonel Smith. No, sir. Export-Import guarantees certain
reverse loans.
Senator McCarthy. They don't count, the Export-Import
loans, for the shipment of military equipment would not be
included.
Colonel Smith. If it is military equipment sponsored by
DOD, it counts against the ceiling.
Senator McCarthy. I see, but if it were an entirely private
sale?
Colonel Smith. Private sales do not count.
Senator McCarthy. Approve it, you would still have to
approve the private sale.
Colonel Smith. If they were to get an Export-Import loan
without Defense Department guarantee, which is almost
impossible, it would not count. But that has never happened.
Export-Import will not touch this normally.
Senator McCarthy. Didn't they buy some arms from this
fellow over in Alexandria because it was cheaper to buy from
him than from the Defense Department, last year, Venezuela did?
Colonel Smith. Venezuela? If they did, and they didn't get
a loan through the DOD----
Senator McCarthy. That would be outside the scope.
Colonel Smith. It would be outside the scope.

SALE OF AIRPLANES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA

Senator McCarthy. Let me ask about a specific sale or
transfer. The 50 airplanes, what are they getting, 25?
Colonel Smith. Twenty-five.
Senator McCarthy. They asked for 50, and they will probably
get the other 25. You don't think so?
Colonel Smith. I don't think so.
General Porter. We don't see where they are going to come
from.
Senator McCarthy. We originally approved 50 though. So the
reason we are not selling them 50 is that we don't have them?
General Porter. That is right.
Senator McCarthy. At the time, the Chileans argued that
anything you could do to cut it down was good from their point
of view. They said, ``If they get 50, we have got to have 30
just for political purposes.'' Now why couldn't we have said 25
in the first place instead of 50, so the Chileans could then
say, ``They got 25, we have to buy 15.'' We went for 50, and
now we say they really don't need 50, 25 will do. This is the
kind of game they play, and I don't understand.
General Porter. This interplay between Argentina and Chile,
from where I sat, didn't look the same way to me.
Senator McCarthy. That is what the Ambassador told me.
General Porter. He was trying to make a case and make a
name for himself by using Argentina as a lever to get us to go
ahead and sell F-5's.
Senator McCarthy. His first position was don't sell to
Argentina; we won't buy any.
General Porter. He was speaking for himself.
Senator McCarthy. I thought he was speaking for the
Christian Democrats. He is the number two man.

AIRCRAFT FOR PILOT TRAINING

General Porter. I know, but actually the military had to
have replacement aircraft to keep their pilots in training.
They were so short of aircraft that they had to find aircraft
from some place. General Rosavitz, when I first went down to
Chile, was talking about trying to find an aircraft that he
could use for pilot training, and we offered him an F-86. Well,
the F-86 has some wing problems. By the time they got through
with the wing modification, they would have a lot of money tied
up in those aircraft, more than he felt they were worth.
Now this was the reason that the Argentine went to the A4B,
instead of the F-86.
Rosavitz, though, was prepared to take an aircraft that
would keep the pilot training going. But Tomich up here got
into the act. The first thing you know, this had political
overtones, and we had a so-called arms race, competition
between Argentina and Chile. This would never have happened had
this been handled only on the military circuit, and had we been
able to say, ``Look, come 1970 there will be a new aircraft
that you can go ahead with, put your money in for 10 or 15
years available, so you can keep your pilots going.''
A lot of these pilots go into civil air work down there,
and they have used the military as a recruiting ground for
their civil air fleet which makes sense. We are doing it here
if we can. We are having trouble keeping military pilots in the
Air Force now, flying DC-6's and 7's.

ARMS RACE WAS JUST A DEVICE

I will be very honest with you, and please don't ever use
this. But this whole business of an arms race between Chile and
Argentina was a device used on the part of the Chileans, hoping
that they could shake us loose from F-5 earlier. It was picked
up by the newspapers because the newspapers down there are
pretty much hostile to Frei, and the first thing you know, it
is taken from one country to another and the thing just
snowballs.
Senator McCarthy. Who wanted to shake loose the F-5's, the
government or the military?
General Porter. These Air Forces in South America would
like very much to have the F-5 because they see it as an
airplane that is easy to maintain over the long term, in the
next 15 year. They feel that within 15 years a propeller-driven
airplane in the commercial world is going to be pretty much a
thing of the past. They are looking to their pilot training, as
General Rosavitz said to me, trying to keep the seed alive.
Also we are working to try to get some sort of a counter-
insurgency aircraft going, which would be a propeller-driven
job. But that hasn't been coming along too well, and we
couldn't offer them and suggest that they put their money into
an F-5 or something like that because we didn't have anything
we could promise them.

HOW THE FIGURE WAS REACHED

Senator McCarthy. What about the question of the number, 50
as against 30 in Chile, which was the Chilean number they
insisted they would need to offset 50 advanced jet aircraft in
Argentina? Why not 25 and 15? I mean what are they worth, $2
million a piece roughly?
General Porter. Here is the way the 50 figure was arrived
at.
There were certain squadrons of aircraft in Argentina that
needed to be replaced. In doing that, they had a certain number
of aircraft, and I can't recall the exact figure, I think
something like 80, that they were going to replace, either 100
or 80, that they were going to replace with these 50 aircraft.
They figured with the pilots, if they stood down from these
80 aircraft, they could keep their training going with the 50
aircraft.
Senator McCarthy. I want it clear I don't think there is
danger of military action between Chile and Argentina.
General Porter. No, and the military down there knows this
is not going to be.

A QUESTION OF APPEARANCES

Senator McCarthy. It becomes a question of appearances and
of politics and of the economic consequences of this sort of
thing. You talk about training in these F-5's and whatever
other jets they have got. The word I get is that the experience
of these pilots in these hot fighter planes doesn't qualify
them for commercial use. Our airlines are short of pilots, but
they are saying they are not getting the kind of men out of
these hot jets that they used to get out of the military. They
don't make good pilots on a commercial jet.
General Porter. I think that is a matter of opinion. As a
soldier I am not qualified to answer that sort of question.
Senator McCarthy. I don't know whether that is true or not,
but that is what I am told. Then they say we go to South
America and they want to train them on hot jets so they can
transfer them to commercial flying. It would be better to
transfer them to jet transports or something like that.
General Porter. This speed of aircraft, this A4B is below
Mach 1, so it really isn't a supersonic plane. The F-5 is just
over. So we are not talking about these really advanced jets,
and so on. This 30 versus 50, this is the first time I have
heard that, Mr. Senator.
Senator McCarthy. That was the Tomich ratio as I heard it
the first time. That if it was cut down they wouldn't need as
many.
General Porter. I really think this ploy on the part of the
Chileans shows how desperately they want us to sell them
aircraft. They would have bought the A4B. They would have
bought anything that would fly if it would get them a
reasonable aircraft, but we didn't have it, you see, and with
procedures and our policy, the F-5 was not in sight for at
least five years.

BRITISH PLANE

Senator McCarthy. How good a plane is this British one they
are buying now?
General Porter. Well, our people say it is a pretty good
plane. It won't do the things actually that the F-5 will do for
them.
Senator McCarthy. It is supersonic?
General Porter. No, it isn't. It is subsonic. In a dive it
will break the sound barrier.
Senator McCarthy. You can do that with most any airplane,
can't you? You mean it can go supersonic and come out of it?
General Porter. That is right. It has to go into a dive to
do it, but it isn't truly a supersonic plane. We haven't got
any down there. Now going to newspapers, the Peruvians have
been looking at some that the British have, this Electric.
Senator McCarthy. The lightening? That is what they sold
Saudi Arabia.
Colonel Smith. The aircraft is good, Senator. The question
is how long they will continue support of the aircraft.
General Porter. This is a problem. Now on this particular
thing of support, the thing that the Latin American military is
concerned about, they feel if they can't come to us and buy and
they go to Europe and buy, they are going to pay more to begin
with. Then there isn't the assurance that there will be the
spare parts, and they know that they are going to have to tool
up again to get the spare parts, which means another contract.
The maintenance of it will be much higher than it would be if
they can get into our market.

MC NAMARA'S HARD-NOSED POSITION ON GRANTS

Senator Morse. You have been very generous with your time.
I only have three quick questions to ask now.
It has been reported to us, though not reliably, that the
Secretary of Defense has recommended against the continuation
of the grant program for the military equipment to Latin
America. I would like to know whether or not that is true.
Second, has the State Department agreed with him?
General Porter. I am not certain that you should ask me
that question.
Senator Morse. All right. That is all I need to know.
General Porter. Because I am a subordinate over there. I
could tell you what my view was as to the importance of the
military program down there, but I am not in the policy-making
business. I make recommendations.
Mr. Corrigan. Could I say--I am with the State Department,
and I am Political Advisor to General Porter. I think I can
merely tell you that I have been in the State Department for
the last few days talking with some people about a lower level
over there in the Latin American section, and they tell me that
this is true.
That apparently Mr. NcNamara is taking a hard-nosed
viewpoint that grant military assistance should stop rather
precipitously within a year or two. ARA, the Latin American
section, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, is taking very strong exception to
this. He thinks that such abrupt stoppage of the grant military
assistance program would be mischievous and counterproductive
at a time when we don't know exactly where we are going in our
relationship with Latin America. He thinks eventually that
perhaps there should be a diminution of it, but it should be
more orderly and not a meat-ax approach.
I understand that last Friday there was a meeting on this,
a so-called interdepartmental regional group meeting, IRV, and
there Mr. Lincoln Gordon did take a strong position that he
disagreed with the McNamara position, which was expounded at
that meeting by a representative of Mr. McNamara's office.
I understand Mr. McNamara's representative, on the other
hand, did hold to his guns, and that this matter is being
referred up to what we call the senior interdepartmental group,
which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. If they don't
come to an agreement there, the matter would be referred to the
President.

GRANTS VERSUS CREDIT

Senator Morse. This is a hot one up here you know, this
grant versus credit.
General Porter. You know from where I sit I think the grant
program is terribly important to us down there, because the
only way we really are going to influence and control the
introduction of weapons into South America in my judgment,
considering the nationalistic attitude of the people and their
Spanish temperament, is through collaboration, where we are
working together and we can give them advice, and say ``Look,
we will help you get this equipment if you need it and if you
can justify it.''
Now the way we are going to go, the way things are
developing now, we are not going to be able to do this.
Venezuela is a good case in point.
In Venezuela now where there are advisers, when they ask us
our views, we can tell them, but we are not privy to what is
going on in Venezuela. But if you look at the grant aid program
and look at how much budget in most of these countries is
available for modernization, replacement of old rifles with the
M-1 and things like that, you will find that the 5 percent or
so of their budget that our military assistance grant program
provides is over 50 percent of what they have for modernization
of their equipment. When you look at the trends, what this does
in the way of giving new radios to them, new equipment of that
nature, and the vehicles that will carry the radios so you can
use them out in the field, helicopters and things like that,
this is the difference between having a force which will be
able to do the job and not having it. They are pretty well
mixed up. Their budget is pretty well tied up to about 85 or 90
percent in all of these countries on fixed charges of cost of
personnel, maintaining their plant, or civic action activities,
if they are committed to road building, these educational
programs, and it is hard to smoke these things out.

NON-MILITARY COSTS FOR CONSTRUCTION

For example, in Brazil, it shows if you just look at their
budget, about 60 percent of the Brazilian budget goes into the
military. But if you actually could break out the non-military
cost of the Brazilian forces, you would find that less than six
percent of the money, looking at their overall budget, actually
goes for internal security, pure internal security or national
defense projects. About ten percent of that is going into
roadbuilding, railroad building, and other civil action
projects that they are in.
Senator Morse. Airfields.
Mr. Corrigan. And running the service up and down the
Amazon. The Navy does that, you see, and going into the back
country, the airfields and the air service, running the medical
service into those back areas. One of the most difficult things
that I have gotten into is trying to figure out just exactly
what goes into their defense appropriation and how much is
used.
It varies from country to country. In Argentina quite a lot
of the budget goes into civil action type stuff there, but the
Argentine has never admitted it was civic action, but it is up
in the northwest.

MILITARY ADVISORY GROUPS

Senator Morse. Senator McCarthy, we have one other
question, as you know, that we discussed here that I thought
the General could help us with. That deals with the military
advisory groups in these various countries.
I wanted to discuss with him if he would from the
standpoint of Nicaragua. First, what do you think is the
situation down there, and how large is our military advisory
group? To what degree, if any, do the critics which are
attributed to the military getting involved in military coups,
working with an American military advisory group. And I think
we ought to have ammunition to answer those criticisms.
Senator McCarthy. Are there any other countries that have
military advisory groups in major countries in Latin America,
or is it only United States groups there?
General Porter. In Paraguay, there is one from Argentina
and there is one from Brazil. But they are working on specific
things.
Senator McCarthy. These are Latin American countries?
General Porter. That is right.

EUROPEAN ADVISORS

Senator McCarthy. Any of the European countries?
General Porter. No. Up until World War II, yes. Germany and
France had all of them. We started in 1940 or '41.
Senator McCarthy. What is the tradition of the Brazilian
Army? Was that German-trained or not? Do you know?
General Porter. Bob, can you answer that?
Mr. Corrigan. Prior to World War II, it was. Since World
War II, it has not been.
Senator McCarthy. What about Argentina? That was German,
wasn't it?
General Porter. Bolivia was German; Chile was German.
Senator McCarthy. I know Chile was German. I thought
Argentina was not German. I wondered whether you noted any
difference in the way in which their army responded in
political crisis on the basis of whether they were German,
French or British trained.
General Porter. I think actually in Argentina the French
were there, because they are still sending French----
Senator McCarthy. I think so. Generally, where the French
are, the army is a little more political.
General Porter. Peru is French also.
Senator McCarthy. Chile was German.
General Porter. Chile is German.
Senator McCarthy. They are loyal to any administration,
aren't they?
General Porter. Yes. Bolivia was German also. But the
reasons that the Chileans are loyal to their administration is
for other reasons.
Senator McCarthy. You don't think it has anything to do
with being trained by Germans?
General Porter. No.
Mr. Corrigan. So was Brazil. They weren't too loyal when
they kicked out Goulart.
Senator McCarthy. I was thinking of that. You think most of
the army there is becoming Americanized?
General Porter. Oh yes. The German Ambassador in Panama,
who had been in Bolivia, told me he was sorry the Germans
didn't leave Bolivia sooner, because there were still some bad
effects in the Bolivian Army.
Senator McCarthy. German tradition?
General Porter. From the days of German tradition. He was
getting after me because we hadn't been able to change all of
these things. I don't think that is a very good analogy.
Senator McCarthy. It isn't analogy, but a question.
Sometimes the things run deep. But the point is now, so far as
the military advisory groups, they are either from other Latin
American countries or they are all from the United States.

SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

Senator Morse. That last ticker was that the election had
gone better than three to one for Somoza.
Senator McCarthy. Where did they get that one third?
General Porter. I think Nicaragua. This is probably as
difficult an area for me to understand as there is. I frankly,
from what I have seen of the situation there, feel that we are
dealing with probably the most backward country. I put this and
Bolivia as the two most backward countries in the area.
I think that things are much more limited there than they
are in the other Central American areas, even Honduras
included. I say this because the rule of the machete is still
pretty much the rule in Nicaragua. For example, I think I told
you this, Colonel Francisco was coming back from inspecting a
unit on the coast here about four months ago, and about 40
miles from Managua, he ran into a road jam. He got out of the
car and went walking to find out why these cars were stopped.
There were over 50 cars that were halted.
He got up at the head of the column and discovered that
there were two families that were shooting it out across the
road. This had been going on for about six hours. This was a
private feud, the Hatfields and McCoys or something like that.
By dark there were well over 100 cars that were waiting there
until dark came and the people went home and they went to
Managua.
I don't know just how you deal in our terms, in our
political life, with this sort of going on in the countryside,
you see. From what I have seen of Nicaragua, it is pretty much
a peculiar place from the word go. I just don't know how to
rationalize what goes on there.
I will say this. That La Guardia is pretty well-trained by
our standards. But when you take a Nicaraguan who is used to
this sort of life I was just telling you about, and you give
him a life, and he is provoked, up to a point he is pretty
well-disciplined. He is not going to take the brickbats on his
helmet. He is going to use his bare bayonet much more quickly.

ASSESSMENT OF GEN. SOMOZA

I really feel from what I have seen that Somoza will
probably give them a good administration. This is just my own
judgment. I don't know Somoza well. The president that had died
of a heart attack was a very, very fine man. He was loved by
the people. Aguerro, I don't know him. I don't know whether you
know him or not. He ran last time and withdrew. Do you know
Aguerro at all?
Mr. Corrigan. No. But only this morning, General, I was
reading at the State Department an analytical telegram from our
Embassy in Managua, where, reporting the results of numerous
conversations Embassy people had had with people of different
political beliefs and opinions, and even among the conservative
people of substance like in the professions and whatnot, a
number of people, these conservatives, of course, are very
unhappy about Somoza.
They feel that Somoza has exaggerated and insisted on
keeping power too long, and they are sorry that Samoza decided
to run. They would rather see the thing evolve in a way from
where maybe the Samozas would let people like Schick, who are
good people not associated with the family, but nevertheless
did move ahead and insist on running for the presidency. These
people said therefore they were not too sanguine about the way
things may develop in Nicaragua, particularly because they felt
that this fellow Taucheau is a bit of the Aryan side, that he
may be more suppressive than his brother Luis. But they all
went on to say, these opponents of Somoza, talking of the
political party who is the opposition party, they all went on
to say Aguerro would be terrible.
The point I wish to make is that apparently these people of
substance feel that this wasn't the time. They didn't have the
fellow of sufficient stature and ability to move in and change
the situation.
Senator Morse. This hotel episode would show that.
Mr. Corrigan. It was scandalous and outrageous.
Mr. Holt. You know the old saying. You can't beat somebody
with nobody. This is a lot of what is involved in Nicaragua.
This Aguerro is nobody----
Mr. Corrigan. This situation that is evolving has to
evolve, and I think this situation in the past two days will
temper this, rather than the reverse. I am inclined to hope
that he will become a little more politic, a little more bland
and a little more clever in building up his relationships than
being oppressive. This is the question. We have to see how he
evolves with power once he has power.

EXERCISING INFLUENCE

General Porter. In our military advisory group, we have
between 25 and 30 people in our mission there, Army, Navy and
Air Force total, and they are dealing with advising the
military academy.
They are working, trying to teach them how to use
communications. Teaching them to maintain their equipment. They
are working on training to try to teach them how to train
soldiers so they will stand when people are shooting at them
without running. And it is a minimum number there. I really
feel it is a benefit to us because these people are talking to
the military people, and are feeling their pulse, and it gives
us a way of restraining them.
Senator Morse. Exercising influence.
General Porter. That is right.
Senator Morse. General, you have been very, very generous.
You have too, Mr. Corrigan, and I appreciate it very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense Deployment

----------

Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Agents in Warfare

----------

Sales of Military Equipment by the United States

----------

Tuesday, February 7, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore, Sparkman, Symington, Clark, Pell,
McCarthy, and Aiken.
Also present: Senator McGee.
Captain Hibler; Mr. Knaur; Jack Stempler, Special Assistant
to Secretary of Defense; Mel Christopher, Congressional Liaison
to ACDA.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF CYRUS R. VANCE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

* * * * * * *

DR. FOSTER'S CONCLUSION ABOUT NIKE-X BEING READY FOR PRODUCTION [P. 35]

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, before you go further, I
wonder if I may break in. What was Dr. Foster's conclusion
about Nike-X being ready for production?
Mr. Vance. He indicated that we had components which would
permit us to commence the production and deployment of a Nike-X
system at this time, but he also came to the very strong
conclusion that from a technical standpoint he did not believe
that the deployment of a Nike-X system to protect against
Soviet attacks upon our population was a wise and sound course.
He thought it presented grave technical difficulties.
Senator Sparkman. Thank you.

* * * * * * *

DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION [P. 35]

Senator Gore. So as of now your decision is to defer any
deployment but to continue with research and development.
Mr. Vance. That is correct, and we have also asked this
year, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress appropriate $377 million
for FY 1968 which, together with the $168 million already
appropriated in FY 1967, could be used for production should
the talks with the Soviets fail. If they failed, the issue
could then be reconsidered and a new decision would be possible
at that time should the President choose to make it.
Senator Gore. What is the status of those discussions?
Mr. Vance. Communications have started between our two
countries. No substance has as yet been discussed between the
two countries. They have indicated an interest in such
discussions.
Senator Gore. No actual conference has occurred on it.
Mr. Vance. There has been one or, I believe, two
preliminary discussions.
Senator Gore. I see. Of reasonably high officials?
Mr. Vance. Of high officials, in which there was an
indication that they were interested in further exploring this
problem with us.
Senator Gore. Fine.

* * * * * * *

ESTIMATED COST OF TOTAL DAMAGE-LIMITING PACKAGE [P. 38]

Mr. Vance. To test the contribution that each of these
Nike-X deployments might make to our damage limiting
objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet
strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets
to the U.S. ABM deployment) to fiscal year 1976, by which time
posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place. These
forces are shown on the tables.
With respect to another table in my classified statement,
there is one very significant number--that is the total number
of ballistic missile warheads, which is the third item on this
table. That shows that in 1976 the total number of ballistic
missile warheads which the U.S. would have is 7,328. In
contrast, it is estimated that at that time the Soviets,
assuming no reaction on their part to an ABM deployment by the
United States, would be between 1,133 and 1,598.
Senator Aiken. What size warhead?
Mr. Vance. They would vary.
Senator Aiken. What is an average, would it be mostly
small?
Mr. Vance. They would be, primarily, small. I can give you
that in terms of megaton equivalents if you would like; it
would be 1,825 equivalent one megaton weapons.
Senator Aiken. Medium range or ICBM?
Mr. Vance. These are all ICBM's and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.
Senator Aiken. Never mind.
Senator Gore. Now in your estimate of 7,000 plus for the
United States----
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir?
Senator Gore. [continuing] In the event of the Poseidon
missile, are you counting that as one warhead or 14 warheads?
Mr. Vance. 14 warheads, sir.
Senator Gore. So you are really in many respects, so far as
actually the ballistic missile is concerned, the number would
be smaller.
Mr. Vance. Quite right, sir.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Senator Sparkman. Does that mean the 400 would be 5,600 out
of that 7,328?
Mr. Vance. There are 400 large submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (Poseidon class)----
Senator Sparkman. 14 times that would be--14 times 4.

RUSSIAN POLARIS DEVELOPMENT

Senator Symington. Following the chairman's question, Mr.
Secretary, have you made any provision for the logical
development of a 14-headed tube on a Polaris submarine by the
Russians in your figure?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir. We have made computations which I will
come to later on.
Senator Symington. My point is you have 1,133 and 1,598
here. Does that include 16 times 14 in it?
Mr. Vance. This assumes no reaction on the part of the
Soviet Union to a U.S. ABM deployment, which I think, as I said
before, is a most unrealistic assumption. I believe they will
react, Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. I do not mean to be short about it, but
actually these figures do not mean a lot if they have a lot of
Polaris submarines with 14 in each tube.
Mr. Vance. I am going to point out later on that I do not
think this is the posture the Soviet Union will be in if we
deploy an ABM. I think they will be forced to react and will
have substantially more warheads than shown on this table.
Senator Symington. I do not mean to labor it. But certainly
you do not mean they will develop a 14-weapon Polaris missile
just because we do not put up an ABM, do you?
Mr. Vance. They may develop a multi-warhead Polaris-type
missile. Whether it would be able to have 14 warheads or not, I
do not now know, Senator Symington; they might decide instead
simply to proliferate land-based ICBM's which also could have
multiple warheads.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Senator Gore. As I believe the CIA told us, as of now we
have no information that they have developed or are developing,
attempting to develop a multiple warhead.
Mr. Vance. That is correct. We have no information at this
point in time which leads us to believe that they are
developing multiple warheads. They may be, but we have no
information at this point.
Senator Symington. It was not too long ago that we did not
have information that they were developing Polaris submarines.
Senator Sparkman. May I ask this one question, sir?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.

RUSSIAN SAM DEFENSE SITES

Senator Sparkman. SAM sites, we have 112 and they will have
between 1,360 and 2,006. Why that great difference?
Mr. Vance. It is a difference of emphasis which they place,
as opposed to us, on defense. They have always been very, very
strong on defense, as you may know, Senator Sparkman. We feel
that they have wasted billions of dollars on their SAM defense.
Both the military and the civilians in the Defense Department
agree that despite the Soviets' massive deployment of surface-
to-air missiles, our bombers could still penetrate and that at
least 85 percent of them would get through. So that we feel
that this vast expenditure of billions of dollars by the
Soviets on SAMs in the past has been essentially a waste of
money on their part.

* * * * * * *

ESTIMATES OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES FIRST STRIKE FATALITIES [P. 41]

Mr. Vance. We believe that even if we struck first they
would still have the capability to come back and inflict that
amount of damage upon the United States. And we have reviewed,
not because we ever intended to do so, the question of whether
or not the United States could ever launch a pre-emptive strike
on the Soviet Union and receive an acceptable level of damage
in return. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and we are all in
agreement that we could not do so, even if we struck first.

* * * * * * *

Senator Gore. You and Secretary McNamara take the position
that the best, most fortuitous balance of terror so far as we
are concerned is to pay relatively small attention to defense
and maximize our power of assured destruction.
Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Senator Sparkman. I think it was Winston Churchill's
analysis that the development of atomic and nuclear weapons
would prevent a third world war; was it not?
Mr. Vance. I believe he did comment to that effect.
Senator Sparkman. Because of the horror and terror of it.
Senator Symington. I do not think that is quite right. The
development of nuclear weapons, according to a conversation I
had with him in 1954, made him feel that the British were
helpless in the future against an all-out attack. He also felt
it gave greater advantages to Russia because of the size of
their land mass, and the time involved if there was ever
another war. Therefore, it was important for us--he always
classified himself with us--to be sure that we never lowered
our deterrence.
I am inclined this morning to support the decision not to
have the ABM. I did not have the privilege of hearing Mr.
Foster yesterday. But I did hear him before the Armed Services-
Appropriations Joint Committees, and, based on his position, I
am inclined to support it. But in supporting it, I am in no way
reducing my conviction that the best way to prevent a future
war is to be sure we have adequate deterrence against Russia,
so that they know they would be destroyed if they attacked us.
Mr. Vance. I am absolutely in agreement with that. We must
assure our destruction capability.
Senator Sparkman. I am given a quote by the staff,
``Security will be the sturdy stepson of terror.''
Mr. Vance. Will be the what, sir?
Senator Sparkman. ``Will be the sturdy stepson of terror.''
I am sure that he advocated the maintenance of the deterrent
forces. But he said the maintenance of that deterrent force
would prevent World War III. I am sure he said that.
Senator Symington. An equally famous quotation is his
characterization of the ``balance of terror.'' The word
``balance'' is the important one.
Senator Sparkman. Yes.
Senator Gore. I would like to put a question here that has
been troubling me. Suppose we are convinced that despite
whatever defense systems the Soviets install, we can still
wreak this havoc in such horrible proportions as described
here. Suppose that they are convinced that their system is
impregnable. Then has not our strategy of deterrence been
compromised?
Mr. Vance. Mr. Chairman, during the last several years we
have released more information of a formerly classified nature
than ever before, because we wanted the Soviet Union to know
our capability so that they would not misinterpret our power,
and our capability to destroy them as a viable nation should
they attempt to attack us.
We have been criticized for releasing so much information,
but I think it is vitally important that the Soviet Union
should know what our capability is so they do not miscalculate.
Senator Gore. I was not referring to their information
about the number of our warheads and even the nature of the
improvements. But suppose that they have a confidence in their
defense which we do not share but which they hold? Is not the
crucial question their conception of our power of retaliation
rather than our conception of it?
Mr. Vance. It is, sir; no question about it.
Senator Symington. In other words, what the Chairman is
saying, as I understand it, it is better for us not to have the
deterrence and have them feel we do, than to have it, and have
them feel we do not.
Mr. Vance. I think it is better that we have it and they
know it.
Senator Symington. That is best.

OUR STRATEGY OF DETERMENT [P. 44]

Mr. Vance. I think that this is one valuable thing that can
come out of discussions with the Soviet Union. If we can sit
down and go through these matters with them and sit down and
very frankly discuss our capability to penetrate such system.
Senator Gore. We are going to tell them that we have 14,
multiple, 14-head warheads that can go different directions and
different trajectories.
Mr. Vance. Exactly what we would tell them I cannot say
precisely at this point. But we would be making it as clear as
clear could be that we have that capability to penetrate.
Senator Gore. Okay.
Senator Sparkman. If they have been reading our papers and
listening to radio, they would know it anyway.

* * * * * * *

COSTS OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM [P. 44]

Senator Symington. I understand. But it worries me. The
cost of the project is so heavily emphasized in the defense of
the civilians, it might cost--for example, a figure given us
was $40 billion in 10 years. At the same time the civilian
heads are so determined to pursue a war that is costing us,
according to the staff of the Appropriations Committee, $30
billion a year chasing these little people around the woods
over there in Vietnam. So if it comes down to a question of
price, I am perfectly willing to consider the civilian heads
probably better informed and better in a position to make a
decision. But it is hard for me to see why the ABM system is so
heavily defended in not being put up because of the price, $40
billion over 10 years, when we are spending somewhere between
$2 billion and $2.5 billion a month in this little country over
in Southeast Asia. That is the one thing that runs through my
mind as I read these details of the heavy costs.

* * * * * * *

INCREASE OF SOVIET SECOND STRIKE POTENTIAL [P. 45]

Mr. Vance. If the Soviets are determined to maintain an
Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that
our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in
the ``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the
levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative
but to increase the second strike damage potential of their
offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways,
by deploying a new large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or
hardened and defended), or a new submarine-launched missile
like our Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but
undefended SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability
to deploy any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads)
by the mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative
costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM
deployment with a land-mobile ICBM system. I think the table is
self-explanatory.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
Exchange (in millions) (ASSUMES SOVIET REACTION
TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Programs Soviets Strike First, U.S. Strikes First,
U.S. Retaliates Soviets Retaliate
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat. U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)...................................... 120 120+ 100 70
Posture A................................................... 120 120+ 90 70
Posture B................................................... 120 120+ 90 70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM deployment with
MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 missiles
against Posture A and 650 against Posture B) the results would
be as shown below, and this is a very significant table. It
shows very simply----
Senator Gore. We are back where we started.
Mr. Vance. [continuing] That we are back where we started.

* * * * * * *

SOVIET INCREASE OF SECOND STRIKE [P. 46]

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, if I may, before we go to
the next subject; these assumptions can be very wrong. For
example, several years ago some of us were criticized,
including President Kennedy, about a missile gap.
The fact is, if there was a missile gap it was created by
Mr. Dulles and destroyed by Mr. Dulles; eliminated would be a
better word.
Senator Gore. You mean Allen?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Between December 1959, the record will show, and August
1961, the Central Intelligence Agency, at both times under the
direction of Mr. Dulles, in four separate reductions, reduced
the number of ICBMs on launching pads in Russia 7.5 percent.
Therefore, sometimes I always worry, regardless of the
efforts made, as to the ability of any of us to know exactly
what is going on behind the Iron Curtain, although I understand
we have better results now because of satellite information.
Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
Senator Symington. But when you say that they would have no
alternative but to increase the second strike, which they would
do, for example, by developing new missiles for their Polaris-
type submarines, surely you do not mean to imply they won't do
that anyway, do you?
Mr. Vance. No, I do not mean to imply that. They might very
well.
Senator Symington. I would say that they would do it on any
basis, wouldn't you? They would make the best weapon they could
for their new Polaris submarines.
Mr. Vance. I think what they will do is assure themselves
that they maintain a sufficient capability for Assured
Destruction, so that they feel that we will not strike them
first. I think that they will do whatever is required to put
themselves in that posture, in the same fashion that we have
done in the past and will continue to do.
Senator Symington. Thank you.

DEFENSE AGAINST CHINESE CAPACITY

Senator Gore. In my view, Mr. Secretary, if we could
succeed in dissuading the Soviets from deploying their system,
this would be a very great accomplishment. I have wondered if
they were in a position to do so or would be willing to do so
in view of the Chinese--the very rapid strides they are making.
You are coming to that later?
Mr. Vance. I am coming to that, but I would be glad to
comment on that now.
I think that in any discussions we have with the Soviet
Union, both of us would reserve our rights to do what each of
us might have to do with respect to China.
Senator Gore. Could I ask a technical question right here?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Now, the deployments that are being made in
the Soviet Union now, we have been told, are aimed at or
instrumented--I have difficulty in talking in this field--
designed, I guess is a better word, to protect them against
missiles that would be coming in on trajectories which the
United States would be calculated to use in case of an attack.
Mr. Vance. That is correct. That is the way their present
system appears to be designed.
Senator Gore. Now, my question is to what extent is it
feasible and, if feasible, at what cost, for the same systems
to be designed or redesigned to provide protection against
missiles coming from the land mass of China?
Mr. Vance. I do not have an exact cost figure, but the
Soviets would have to change the placement of their radars,
they would probably also have to change the placement of some
of their missile sites, and the small missile site radars that
go with them.
I do not have an exact cost figure, but I think it would be
quite low because, as I will indicate later on, for us to build
a system which would be quite effective against the Red Chinese
would cost, we estimate, only about $3.5 billion.
Senator Gore. That is a light defense?
Mr. Vance. That is a light defense; that is right.
Senator Gore. But this does not, as I have understood this
estimate, contemplate a submarine capacity on the part of the
Chinese.
Mr. Vance. We would take care of any submarine capacity of
the Chinese through our regular antisubmarine warfare
components.
We know that they have at this point only one missile
submarine. There are no indications that they yet have any
missiles for that one submarine. They may be working on
missiles for it. But we feel confident that we could take care
of that one submarine with our current ASW forces, and we are
also confident that if they move to a bigger submarine program
that we would be able to take necessary steps to contain that
particular threat.
But, as I say, we have made no final decision with respect
to whether or not we should deploy an ABM system against the
potential Red Chinese threat because the lead time is such that
we do not have to make the decision now.

SOVIET MISSILE AND RADAR SYSTEMS

Senator Gore. One other question that is so elementary but,
nevertheless, those of us who are elementary in our level of
knowledge can only ask elementary questions. Are the silos, the
hardened silos, in which the Soviets are placing their
interceptor missiles, perpendicular or are they slanted toward
the trajectories of the missile lanes it is anticipated the
United States will use? Do the missiles take off
perpendicularly? This will give some measure of how difficult
it would be, some measure of the difficulty, if they wanted to
redesign, replace their radars and use the same missiles that
are now being installed as a defense against ours for defense
against the Chinese.
Mr. Vance. I think the determining factor is the way their
radars are placed.
Senator Symington. You have to go out of the ground
vertically.
Senator Gore. I thought so. This is what I would want to
know. This would have a bearing, this could have a bearing, if
they could use the same silos or same missiles by changing the
direction of their radars and the telemetry.
Mr. Vance. I think the critical thing is the placement of
their radars, and they would have to change the placement of
some of their radar facilities to reorient their system against
the Chinese and away from the United States.
Senator Gore. How difficult would this replacement be? I
know this must be a big installation.
Mr. Vance. It is a big installation, sir, and it is quite a
costly installation. They have two of these so-called Hen House
radars up in the northwest section of the Soviet Union, giving
coverage to the threat corridor of ICBMs coming in from the
United States, and they have one under the process of
construction called the Dog House down southwest of Moscow.
One would expect that they would have to put either Hen
House or Dog House types over to the east to take care of the
threat corridor for missiles coming in from China.
Some of the radars, such as those emplaced around Moscow,
essentially protect the city from any direction and
consequently would not have to be changed to defend against the
CPR. But the large Hen House radar, for example, essentially
covers a sector. If the Soviets were defending against China we
would expect such a radar to be oriented in that particular
direction.
Senator Gore. Now, this committee would be concerned in the
case of, including myself, of the question of the verification.
Mr. Vance. Yes.
Senator Gore. Supposing the Soviets said the silos they
were constructing, supposing they said, ``The defenses we are
deploying are safeguards against the Chinese whose hostility is
increasing toward us.''
Now, could we be reasonably certain that this would be true
or untrue?
Mr. Vance. As you know, we have a considerable and growing
unilateral capability through our satellites to determine both
the deployment of missiles and the deployment of radar systems.
As to whether or not it would be necessary to have some
form of on-site inspection in addition to our unilateral
capability is not yet clear, and this is probably one of the
issues we will have to discuss with the Soviet Union in any
talks we have with respect of a moratorium on or a cessation of
ABM deployment.
Senator Gore. One other question and then I will let you
proceed with your statement.

PROTECTION AGAINST THE EAST OR WEST

What is the relative time element in deployment of the
construction of the missile and the silo, the launching
mechanism, on the one hand, and the radar installations which
you say would be necessary to change as to location if this
cellar be, silo be, in which a missile is on station, is to be
used as protection against the East or against the West?
Mr. Vance. Are you asking me how long it would take the
Soviets or how long it would take us?
Senator Gore. Well, I am trying to get some idea, just for
my own satisfaction, if we reach such an agreement as is being
sought, which I hope we can conclude, how much reliance could
we safely place upon the Soviet word that they were deploying
as a defense against China if, in fact, the silo and missile
could be used for either, and it would require a shifting of
the radar from here to there. What I am trying to get at is
what time element would be involved in re-installation of the
radar or the necessary facilities to use this silo and this
missile as an antiballistic defense against us?
Mr. Vance. I will give you my best estimate, and I would
like to correct it for the record. I believe it will be two to
three years.
Senator Gore. Two to three years?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. If the deployment of the entire, the overall,
system runs from five to seven.
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. That is what I wanted to get.
Mr. Vance. I would like to get that for the record.
New radars and interceptor missiles, if already in
production, could probably be installed in 2-3 years.
Senator Gore. So this will be an extremely important part
of the negotiations.
Mr. Vance. I would think it would be an extremely important
part.
Senator Gore. Thank you.

* * * * * * *

RED CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT [P. 49]

Mr. Vance. With regard to the Red Chinese nuclear threat,
an austere ABM defense consisting, for example, of four PAR and
15 Missile Site Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200
Sprint missiles (the latter to protect the principal radars),
might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a
missile attack, at least through the 1970's. The total
investment cost of such a program might amount to about $3.5
billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.
The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S.
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970's is shown in
the table below:

U.S. FATALITIES
(In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Strike First
(Operational Inventory)
-------------------------
25 Missile 75 Missile
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM................................... .5 10
With ABM...................................... 0+ 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * * * *
SENSE OF URGENCY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS [P. 50]

Mr. Vance. It is very hard to give any precise figure on
this, Senator Symington. I wish I could. I think it all depends
on how the discussions seem to proceed.
If we are making progress then we would be willing to wait
longer than otherwise. But if it becomes obvious that nothing
is going to come out of these discussions, then I think that we
would have to reconsider our position more promptly. It is just
very hard to put any precise time on this.
Senator Symington. Within a year?
Mr. Vance. I think that there would be a good chance that
within a year we could know one way or the other on this.
Senator Gore. Well, that is giving us an order of time.

* * * * * * *

PRACTICABILITY OF ABM SYSTEM AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINE ATTACK [P. 52]

Mr. Vance. Antisubmarine tactics are to get the submarine
before it can fire, in other words, to track it and be on top
of it so that when it gets ready to fire, why, you can kill it.
Senator Gore. Do we know where the Soviet submarines are
all the time?
Mr. Vance. We do, with a few exceptions, We have really
extremely good information with respect to Soviet submarines.
Recently one submarine did get in close to the U.S. coast
without our knowing it was there. We had one similar case in
the Pacific where we lost one of their submarines for a while
and then picked it up. But, by and large, we have really
excellent information with respect to where Soviet submarines
are. This is done by a number of different procedures.
We have our so-called SOSUS stations, which are long-range
listening stations which can detect things hundreds of miles
away under the water. [Deleted.]
Senator Symington. Will the Senator yield? But it is much
more difficult to track a nuclear submarine than a non-nuclear
submarine, is it not?
Mr. Vance. The answer to that is no, quite frankly,
Senator, because the Soviet nuclear submarines are really quite
noisy. The most difficult ones to track right now are the
Soviet submarines which are diesel and battery powered. When
they go down to three knots on battery, then it is virtually
impossible to hear them.
Senator Symington. When I was out at Guam two months ago, I
went out on a Polaris and they tell me they are dead for sixty
days. They receive but they do not broadcast, and that they
were practically impossible to detect.
Does that mean our nuclear submarines are much easier to--
--
Mr. Vance. Our submarines are much quieter than the Soviet
submarines.
Senator Symington. But then following their development of
the art, they will be more quiet.
Mr. Vance. There is no question but we must plan on them
becoming more quiet. But at the same time we are trying to
increase our capability to detect either kind of submarine. We
are devoting a lot of effort to this.

U.S. ACTION IN EVENT OF ENEMY SUBMARINES POSITIONING OFF OUR COASTS

Senator Gore. What would we do if we discovered that a
significant number of Soviet or Chinese submarines were taking
suspicious positions off our coasts? We would become quite
alarmed and might just provoke an exchange.
Mr. Vance. If we saw such a situation developing, we would
deploy the necessary forces to contain such a threat.
Senator Symington. But if the Senator will yield, if they
want to hit you they do not have to have submarines. They could
put twenty different ships in our harbors with false bottoms,
and drop them and disappear, and nobody would know, and they
would all go off at the same time, and they would destroy
twenty ports the same as if they had dropped a delayed fuse in
the water. It is interesting from the stand-point of attack,
but it does not have to be done that way, if we want to get
technical.
Sentor Gore. This is a frightening world.
Mr. Vance. It is a frightening world, Senator; I agree.
Senator Sparkman. It becomes more so as we move along.
Mr. Vance. It does indeed.
Senator Sparkman. Let me ask one question, talking about
the ABM: Where would it fit in with the defense of Western
Europe or would it fit in? Could it be made to fit in?
Mr. Vance. It would have, in my view, a limited capability.
On the other hand, I doubt that it would prove an effective
defense just as it would not prove an effective defense here.
They could saturate it and, therefore, I think it would be an
unwise move on the part of our European allies to expend the
funds trying to protect their population, just as I feel it
would be an unwise move on our part. It just simply would not
do it.
Senator Sparkman. Then we are to regard this as a defense
of our continental nation?
Mr. Vance. Yes.
The deployments I have been discussing this morning are
protections for the continental United States, designed to
protect the continental United States.

* * * * * * *

CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER BY 1980-85 IS QUESTIONED [P. 53]

Senator Symington. To me it is a pretty tricky sentence.
Senator Gore knows more about this than I do. But, as I
remember it, the Russians were four years behind us, roughly,
on the explosion of the hydrogen weapon, and had a more
sophisticated hydrogen weapon than we did and I do not think
you can talk in any sense of the term today, the theory of it
anyway, about 1980-85 before China is a full nuclear power.
Mr. Vance. I would be the first to say that predictions
more than five years in the future are extremely risky,
Senator.
Senator Symington. I thank you for that. That was my only
point, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vance. I was trying to present it as we best saw it at
this time on the basis of the intelligence estimates which have
been made in the government.

FUTURE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY COULD ALTER BALANCE OF POWER

Senator Gore. Now, I have heard CIA, the Atomic Energy, and
your own experts on this subject. My impression of the
consensus is that by the--and indeed, Secretary McNamara said
by the mid-1970's say 1975, that the Chinese will have a
significant nuclear and intercontinental ballistic capability.
It is estimated that they will test their first ICBM this
summer in a range from 5,000 to 7,000 miles.
Should that test be successful, then one would assume it is
a question of building more of what they are testing. They have
tested nuclear weapon to the extent of 10 or 20 times in power
of the one with which we destroyed Hiroshima.
So if they, say, if by 1975 they have 100 capable of
attacking the United States, this is, it seems to me, a
significant alteration of the balance of power in the world. We
then face a threat which we have not previously faced, and they
have a deterrence not only against us but against the Soviets,
and they have a power of intimidation over their neighbors that
they had not previously had.
Would this not be a significant alteration of the balance
of power and have a significant effect upon the whole strategy
of deterrence?
Mr. Vance. It might well have a significant effect on the
balance of deterrence, and that is why I have carefully
differentiated between a system designed against the Soviet
threat and one designed against the Chinese threat.
I have merely said that as of this time, the lead times are
such that we do not feel that we have to make a decision this
year with respect to the deployment of a system oriented
against the Chinese threat.
Senator Gore. But you are holding all options with respect
to the Chinese.
Mr. Vance. We are indeed, sir.
Senator Gore. And you would expect in the negotiations the
Soviets to do the same thing.
Mr. Vance. I would, sir.
Senator Gore. Is this not possibly one of the most
complicated factors which makes it really impossible for
Russia, and more impossible, I guess, than the United States,
to negotiate and reach an agreement vis-a-vis the United States
and the U.S.S.R.? Here is this third complicating factor which
both powers must take into account and, perhaps Russia with her
proximity and her existing hostility, I do not know that the
hostility is any greater than against us, but it is certainly
an immediate thing with their border troubles and their history
of hostilities between the Chinese and the Russian people?
Mr. Vance. It is clearly a complicating factor and one
which would be a very delicate one in connection with the
discussions which we expect to have with the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Senator McGee, would you like to have a
question before we go to another phase of his testimony?
Senator McGee. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, inasmuch
as the chairman put the elementary questions because of his
elementary school understanding of this, I am at pre-school,
and maybe getting into the kindergarden today. I appreciate
your courtesy in letting me attend.
Senator Gore. Senator Aiken?

FRANCE'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator Aiken. I have not heard France mentioned at all.
Mr. Vance. In what respect, sir?
Senator Aiken. In regard to achieving capability, ICBM or
anything else. Do you write them off?
Mr. Vance. I think that in time they will achieve a limited
capability. I do not think that this limited capability will
really be a credible deterrent to the Soviet Union, and I
really do not think that the French nuclear force can be
anything but, quite frankly, a destabilizing influence in the
whole world.

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CYRUS R. VANCE BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 7, 1967 [P.
55]

* * * * * * *

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their
recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an
initial operational capability in FY 1972 a NIKE-X system which
would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and
local defense of 25 cities against a ``low'' Soviet threat.

* * * * * * *

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POSTURE A POSTURE B
---------------------------------------------------------------
Invest. Cost Invest. Cost
Number ($ Billion) Number ($ Billion)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radars:.........................................
MAR......................................... 0 0 8 $2.8
TACMAR...................................... 7 $1.9 3 0.6
PAR......................................... 6 0.8 6 0.8
MSR......................................... 26 3.8 95 8.4
Invest. Cost............................ .............. $6.5 .............. $12.6
Missiles:.......................................
SPARTAN..................................... 1200 $1.7 1200 $1.7
SPRINT...................................... 1100 0.7 7300 3.1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Invest. Cost................................ .............. $2.4 .............. $4.8
DoD Invest. Cost................................ .............. $8.9 .............. $17.4
AEC Invest. Cost................................ .............. 1.0 .............. 2.0
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total Invest. Cost (ex-R&D)............. .............. $9.9 .............. $19.4
Annual Operating Cost........................... .............. $0.38 .............. $0.72
No. of Cities w/Term. Def:...................... 25 .............. 50 ..............
IOC with Decision 1/67:......................... FY 72 .............. FY 72 ..............
Deployment Completed:........................... FY 75 .............. FY 76 ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

It is worth noting, in connection with the costs shown in
the foregoing table, that had we produced and deployed the
NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated
cost of $13 to $14 billion, most of it would have had to be
torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by
the new missiles and radars of the NlKE-X system. By the same
token other technological developments in offensive forces over
the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade
the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned.We can predict with
certainty that there will be substantial additional costs for
updating any system we might consider installing at this time
against the Soviet missile threat.
The deployment of a NIKE-X system would also require some
improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in
order to preclude the Soviets from undercutting the NIKE-X
defense; and we would want to expand and accelerate the fallout
shelter program. The investment cost (including R&D) of the
former is estimated at about $1.5 to $2.4 billion and would
provide for a small force of F-111 or F-12 type interceptors
(e.g., 48 F-11s or 32 F-12s) and about 42 airborne warning and
control aircraft (AWACS). The expanded fallout shelter program
would cost about $800 million more than the one we are now
pursuing. We would also need some of our anti-submarine warfare
forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are
not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to
be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event,
the ``current'' estimates of the investment cost of the total
Damage Limiting package would amount to at least $12.2 billion
for Posture A and at least $21.7 billion for Posture B.
To test the contribution that each of these NIKE-X
deployments might make to our Damage Limiting objectives, we
have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear
forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM
deployment) to FY 1976, by which time Posture B, the heavier
defense, could be fully in place.

PROJECTED U.S. ANO SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MID-1976
(Assuming no reaction by the Soviets to U.S. ABM deployment) *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. USSR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs (Hard Launchers)..........................................................
Large (TITAN II/SS-9 Class)................................................. 0 276-249
Small (MINUTEMAN/SS-11 Class................................................ 1000 500-950
Mobile...................................................................... 0 50-0
SLBMs...........................................................................
Large (POSEIDON Class)...................................................... 400 0
Small (POLARIS/SSN-5 Class)................................................. 128 307-399
Total No. of 8M Warheads........................................................ 7328 1133-1598
Bombers (for Intercontinental Attacks)..........................................
Heavy....................................................................... 255 70-110
Medium...................................................................... 210 300-500
ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile Defense)............................................
Area interceptors........................................................... .................................. 800-3250
Terminal Interceptors....................................................... .................................. 300-1500
Air Defense.....................................................................
Fighters.................................................................... 697 1700-2400
SAM Sites................................................................... 112 1360-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*The Soviet forces are based on extrapolation of the latest intelligence estimates.

* * * * * * *
If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured
Destruction capability against us and they believe that our
deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the
``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the levels
shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to
increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive
forces. They could do so in several different ways, one of
which is reflected in the table below: by deploying a new
large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or hardened and
defended), or a new submarine-launched missile like our
Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but undefended
SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability to deploy
any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) by the
mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to
the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment with a
hand-mobile ICBM systeem:

LEVEL OF U.S. FATALITIES WHICH SOVIETS BELIEVE WILL PROVIDE DETERRENCE a
(Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost to the Soviet of Offsetting U.S. Cost to Deploy an ABM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
40 $1 Soviet cost to $4 U.S. cost
60 $1 Soviet cost to $2 U.S. cost
90 $1 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ U.S. fatalities if U.S. strikes first and Soviets retaliate.

If the Soviets choose to respond in that way to our ABM
deployment with MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200
missiles against Posture A and 650 against Posture B), the
results would be as shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
Exchange (in millions) 1976 (Assumes Soviet
Reaction to U.S. ABM Deployment)
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Programs Soviets Strike First, U.S. Strikes First,
U.S. Retaliates Soviets Retaliate
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat. U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)........................... 120 120+ 100 70
Posture A........................................ 120 120+ 90 70
Posture B........................................ 120 120+ 90 70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and
economic capacity to offset any further Damage Limiting
measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to
maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual
certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain thelr deterrent
which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our
deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities
against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they
could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would
accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense
expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to
either side.
2. Defense Against the red Chinese Nuclear Threat
With regard to red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM
defense consisting, for example, of 4 PAR and 15 Missile Site
Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 Sprint missiles
(the latter to protect the principal radars), might offer a
high degree of protection to the nation against a missile
attack, at least through the 1970s. The total investment cost
of such a program might amount to $3.5 billion, including the
cost of the nuclear warheads.
The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S.
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown in
the table below:

U.S. FATALITIES
(In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Strike First
(Operational Inventory)
--------------------------------
25 Missiles 75 Missiles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM............................ 5 10
With ABM............................... 0+ 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

This austere defense could probably preclude damage in the
1970s almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level
it might achieve by 1980-85, additions and improvements might
be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could
probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well
beyond 1985.
It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China.
In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant
Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S.
ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not
be made now.
3. Defense of Our-Land-based ICBM Forces Against a
``Higher-Than-Expected Soviet Threat''
As I indicated earlier, our Assured Destruction capability
is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be
prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are
greater than those projected in the latest intelligence
estimates.
The most severe threat we must consider in planning our
Assured Destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet
ABM deployment combined with a deployment; of a substantial
ICBM force with a hard-target kill capability, in the form of
highly accurate ICBMs. To date, Soviet missile accuracy has
been substantially inferior to our own, and we expect it to
remain so. However, if the Soviets develop accurate Multiple
Independently-Aimed Reentry vehicles (MIRVs), they might, by
equipping their SS-9 boosters with 6 MIRVs (each with a CEP of
0.3 n. mi. and a yield of 3 MT), be able to destroy large
numbers of our Minuteman missiles. An extensive, effective
Soviet ABM system much better than the one we consider
probable) might then be able to intercept and destroy a large
part of our residual missile warheads, including those carried
by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and
defensive threats assumed here are both substantially higher
than expected.
Under the assumption that the Soviets have started the
development of highly accurate reentry vehicles (including
MIRVs) a reasonable upper limit on the build-up in their threat
would be the following:

GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET THREAT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soviet Threat to Minuteman \a\ FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-9..................................................... 180 180 180 150 100
SS-9 MIRV................................................ 0 50 100 150 200
(Six 3-megaton.
RVs/Missile).
SS-11 (improved accuracy)................................ 160 260 360 460 660
Total No. of BM Warheads................................. 340 740 1140 1510 1960
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\The older Soviet ICBMs, the current SS-ll and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles are excluded because
they do not have sufficient accuracy to post a threat to our hardened and dispersed Minuteman force.

The effect of such a deployment could be to reduce the
number of U.S. Minuteman surviving attack to the levels shown
below:

To hedge againt the possibility of such a threat to our
landbase missile forces, we have authorized the development and
production of the Poseidon. Should still additional offensive
power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we
are considering the development and deployment of a new
Advanced ICBM (a large payload missile with an as yet
undetermined basing system designed to reduce vulnerability to
such a Soviet threat.
The deployment of the NIKE-X as a defense for our Minuteman
force, however, would offer a partial substitute for the
possible further expansion of our offensive forces. The
contribution one illustrative NIKE-X deployment might make to
the survival of our Minuteman force against the greater-than-
expected Soviet threat, compared with the ``No Defense'' case
is shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Defense Case
MM Surviving............................... 800 590 390 245 160
NIKE-X Defense
ABM interceptors........................... 0 55 395 475 475
MM Surviving a............................. 800 590 515 465 390
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a The number of Minuteman ``surviving with NIKE-X Defense'' assumes the Soviets attack the defended Minuteman
silos first. They might attack our radars first if they felt they had enough information on our defenses and
were willing to gamble that we would delay launching our Minuteman for at least 15 minutes while their attack
proceeded. In that case, the number of surviving Minuteman might be 100 fewer.

But I want to emphasize that we have absolutely no direct
evidence that the Soviet Union is developing MIRVs with such
low CEPs, or, in fact, that they are developing MIRVs at all.
Indeed, the tests we have seen to date indicate a far lower
order of accuracy for Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, the
intelligence lead time would be relatively short--about two
years between the first indication of such a development effort
and the start of deployment of the systems. Therefore, in
examining the worst case, we have assumed that they could have
such an operational capability as early as FY 1971. But even
against this higher than expected combined Soviet, MIRVed
missile/ABM threat, and even without a NIKE-X defense of
Minuteman, our proposed strategic missile and bomber forces
could still inflict 40 percent or more fatalities on the Soviet
population throughout the 1969-1976 period.
More extreme threats are highly unlikely. In any event, the
changes we are now proposing in our strategic offensive forces
would make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviets, to move
in the direction of more extreme threats to our Assured
Destruction capability. If we assume, as I believe we should,
that the Soviet Union would want to reduce the vulnerability of
their own offensive forces against the possibility of a first
strike by our very accurate forces in the FY 1972-73 period,
they must further disperse and harden their strategic missiles,
which is exactly what they appear to be doing now. To do so is
expensive and for the same budget outlay results in reduced
missile payloads. Not to so would leave the Soviet force highly
vulnerable to a first strike.

* * * * * * *

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES [P. 63]

Mr. Vance. Let me give both 1967 and 1968.
Senator Symington. Fine.
Mr. Vance. I will give them to you in terms of new
obligational authority. For research, development test and
evaluation concerned with chemical and biological warfare,
there is $103 million in the 1968 budget; there is also $248
million for procurement and $12 million for operations and
maintenance, for a total FY 1968 program of $363 million.
Now, let me give you some breakdowns.
Senator Symington. I do not care about that unless you
wanted to do it. I was just thinking, I think I am right in
saying, that on chemical and biological warfare, just a quick
mathematical interpretation in my head, that you are spending
between one-fifth and one-tenth of one percent of your total in
that field.
Mr. Vance. I think that is correct. I can give you the
figures for 1967 on that.
Senator Gore. I would like to have it, if you don't mind.
Senator Symington. I just want to develop the thought. Let
me finish. I think it was about 1955 that I got a briefing on
this subject. It was not covered in the committee, and we were
spending about $50 million. I think the figures will show in
1955, or a little less, maybe $48 million in this field. I am
glad to hear we have doubled that, although we have more than
doubled our military expenditures. I am very glad this subject
has come up here this morning because I think it is one thing
that, we have gotten so interested in nuclear problems that
then the problems of a general limited war we may well have
sloughed this off a bit, and yet it seems to me that it is
terribly important, especially in the fields of killing animals
and killing people.

* * * * * * *

FISCAL YEAR 1967 AND 1968 BUDGET FIGURES [P. 64]

Senator Symington. Would you give us those figures.
Mr. Vance. Yes. With respect to 1967 the total funds are as
follows: For research development, test and evaluation, $109
million; for procurement, $169 million; and for operation and
maintenance, $12 million--for a total of $290 million.
I would like to point out one other thing if I might, and
that is the distribution of these procurement funds in the FY
1968 budget. I think it might be interesting to you. They have
gone up quite substantially this year, and the reason is that
they break down as follows: For smoke, flame and incendiary,
$160 million; for riot control agents, $7 million; for
defoliants, $46 million; for defense materiel, $15 million; and
for other chemical and biological, $20 million.
But the big increase is the result of the smoke, flame and
incendiary category which is caused by our operations in
Southeast Asia.
Senator Gore. I would like to ask a question about a
somewhat related matter here, and that is the possible use of
radioactive agents, radioactive metal pellets.
As you know, a city can be depopulated as well with
radioactivity as it can with blast.
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. What is the status of that art? What are you
spending on that or is this in the Atomic Energy field?
Mr. Vance. There has been some work done in the past on
very clean bombs which would have little blast effect but a
very heavy short-term radiation effect.
As to the amount of money which is being expended on such
weapons at this time, I simply do not know, sir. I think that
the best thing for me to do would be to supply that figure for
the record.
Senator Gore. Very well, I wish you would. It may be just a
wild dream or nightmare, but is it not technically possible to
shower a city with radioactive agents, and that any person who
stayed in the city over a period of twenty-four hours would
have a lethal dose. Therefore, if the people were adequately
warned and notified, once such city is showered with such
agents, the whole place could be depopulated; however, it might
be important industrially.
Mr. Vance. I am not an expert in this field. I know that
there are people who have done a good deal of work and who hold
a theory somewhat similar to that which you have expressed.
I hesitate to speak on how effective this could be because
I simply do not know what the state of the art is with respect
to such weapons at this point.
Senator Gore. Of course, we know that the armed services
bought some watches, wristwatches, that they had to discard in
large numbers because there was a little too much radioactivity
on the dial, but if you are not prepared on this, why, it is a
part of the whole armament and the threat today.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue
on that if I may.
Senator Gore. I did not mean to break in.
Senator Symington. The thought I wanted to express, at
first I was excited about those figures, but then when you read
them I got less excited because of the tremendous additional
effort that is being devoted to chasing these little people
around the woods. You will pardon the expression, but I am
getting a little apprehensive about the price.
I believe about twelve years ago when we had a briefing on
this, a special briefing for me and my legislative assistant at
that time, we were very interested in certain diseases,
anthrax, I remember, for cattle; tularemia, whatever the name
of that rabbit disease was.
Mr. Vance. Tularemia.
Senator Symington. Is that right?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And you had great hopes for that type
and character. But from what I have read we are only spending
around $20 million a year as against a possible hedge in a
multi-billion nuclear picture in this chemical and biological
warfare. Am I correct, based on figures you read?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir; on that type of thing. However, we
have substantial stocks in many of these items. If you would
care to I can go through the various types of stocks we have.
Senator Symington. I do not want to take too much time on
it but, Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that some time
in the future, that some time we might have a hearing on
chemical and biological warfare.
Senator Gore. Maybe we had better set a time for that.
Mr. Vance. Fine.
Senator Symington. On anything that could be lethal
delivered by a missile or any other way, suitcase, that would
not be nuclear.
Senator Gore. Is that agreeable with you, Senator Aiken?
Senator Aiken. Yes.
I was wondering about the neutron bomb, wondering what Dr.
Teller's progress is, what progress he is making with that.
Mr. Vance. That is what I was talking about before.
Senator Aiken. That is what you were talking about.
Mr. Vance. Yes.
Senator Aiken. Is he making any progress with it?
Mr. Vance. I do not know where he stands on the neutron
bomb.
Senator Aiken. I know his eyes used to shine when he
mentioned that.

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS [P. 66]

* * * * * * *

3. Military sales to developing countries have amounted to
about 10 percent of the total. I should underline the fact that
the Department of Defense does not respond independently to
requests from countries of the Middle East, Latin America,
Africa or other underdeveloped areas for the purchase of arms.
These requests are subject to the most intensive review and
debate within the U.S. Government; usually, serious efforts are
made to reduce the requests in either quantitative or
qualitative terms; non-U.S. alternative sources of supply are
often sought for foreign policy reasons, Mr. Chairman; that is
when the U.S. does not want to be involved in the case.
Senator McCarthy. Is that when you have the Germans ship
the tanks for you to Israel?
Mr. McNaughton. Senator McCarthy, we did not do that. I beg
your pardon. I thought you were talking about Iran--the Iran
case.
Senator McCarthy. No.
Mr. McNaughton. The German case to Israel about two years
ago, this was involved in that case, yes. This attempt, this
desire not to have the United States as a source of supply, and
later on, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will want to have
questions about this delicate situation in the Middle East, and
the extent to which the United States is involved.

* * * * * * *

TANK AND AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL [P. 67]

1. The first is our recent tank or aircraft sales to Israel
(1964 and 1966) were concluded primarily to prevent the
development of an arms imbalance in the area which would have
had a seriously destabilizing effect. The imbalance was being
created by a heavy infusion of modern Soviet equipment
(principally tanks and MIG 21's) to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq.
Our negotiations with Israel were protracted, and a serious
American effort was made to have them meet their requirements
from European markets. In the end, however, and especially with
respect to aircraft, available European equipment proved either
too sophisticated or too expensive; we at length acceded to
Israel's request [Deleted.] assurances from the Israelis.
[Deleted.]

SALE OF SMALL AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

Our recent, 1966, sale of a small number of aircraft to
Jordan was the result of a similarly protracted and reluctant
process. The United States Command had levied on Jordan a
requirement to acquire three squadrons of supersonic aircraft
as Jordan's contribution to the all-Arab military posture. The
U.A.C. would provide a limited sum of money (contributions from
member states); Jordan could buy western aircraft if it chose,
but the U.A.C. showed a clear preference for MIG 21s, which
were available at a cut-rate price. The pressures in the Arab
world were such that Jordan was compelled to comply. The
pressures were such that Jordan asked the U.S. to sell suitable
aircraft on generous credit terms. Over a period of 18 months,
we repeatedly insisted that Jordan explore all possibilities in
the U.K., France, Sweden and other markets; but European prices
and the credit terms proved far too severe--far beyond
purchasing power of the limited funds available from the U.A.C.
In the end, when it appeared that Jordan would be forced to
accept MIG 21s, and thus to open its country to a large Soviet
training mission and also to U.A.R. military influence--a move
which we regarded as inimical to the integrity of Jordan and a
grave danger to stability in the Middle East--we agreed to sell
Jordan a small number of F-104's from our MAP inventory. In
concluding the arrangement, we successfully reduced the
Jordanian request from 60 to 36, and consummated ultimately an
initial sale of only 12 of the 36.

MILITARY SALES TO IRAN

[Deleted.]

* * * * * * *

AMOUNT OF ARMAMENT GERMANS HAVE SOLD OR RESOLD [P. 69]

Senator Gore. The Germans say they cannot afford to buy
more arms from the United States, as I understand it, unless
they are able to sell their own surplus of old used equipment.
The question I wanted to ask you is how much armament have
the Germans sold or resold?
Mr. McNaughton. I do not have the exact figures on that,
Mr. Chairman. Let me see, I have--they both grant and sell, Mr.
Chairman. Germany both grants and sells. They also have a grant
program, and I have the figures for Turkey, for example, and I
do not have any further figures on what they have done by way
of transfer of equipment. I can get this for you.
Senator Gore. Fine. Will you supply that to us.
Mr. McNaughton. I will submit it for the record.
The information requested is classified and was furnished
separately to the committee:

MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF U.S. ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO A THIRD COUNTRY BY THE FRG, 1954-1966
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated
3rd Country Receiving Item Description Quantity How Originally Acquired How Provided by FRG? Transfer Value
from US? ($Millions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAD..................... Submachine gun, cal.45, Thompson... 500................. Nash List \1\........... Sales................... ..............
81mm Mortar........................ 30.................. Nash List............... Sales................... 0.8
Transceivers PRC 6................. 48.................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
VRC 7.............................. 24.................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
GREECE................... F-84F Aircraft..................... 69.................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Machine gun, .50 cal, Browning..... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Communications Equipment........... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... 9.5
F-84 Spare Parts................... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Prime Mover, M-4, 18-ton........... 91.................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
INDIA.................... Trainer a/c, T-6G (Harvard)........ 34.................. Nash List/Sales......... Sales................... 1.5
IRAN..................... F-86 Sabre VI Aircraft \2\......... 90.................. ........................ Sales................... ..............
Machine guns, cal.30............... 858................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Submachine gun, .45 cal............ 4,092............... Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Rifle, Recoilless, 75mm............ 339................. Nash List............... Sales................... 14.5
Rocket Launcher, 3.5".............. 658................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Ammunition......................... Misc................ Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Machine gun, cal.50, Browning...... 200................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
ISRAEL................... Anti-aircraft guns, 40mm........... 54.................. Nash List/Sales......... Grant................... ..............
Tanks, M-48........................ 60.................. Sales................... Grant................... 20.0
Helicopter, H-34................... 30.................. Sales................... Grant................... ..............
JORDAN................... Ammunition......................... Misc................ Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Rifles, M1......................... 30,100.............. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
BAR's.............................. 1,412............... Nash List............... Sales................... 1.1
Mortars, 81mm...................... 250................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
SUDAN.................... Rifles and Carbines................ 32,600.............. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Rocket Launcher M1A3............... 1,200............... Nash List............... Sales................... 2.0
Mortars, 81mm...................... 380................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Ammunition......................... Misc................ Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
TURKEY................... Aircraft, Fighter, F-84F........... 116................. Nash List............... 42 Grant & 74 Sales..... ..............
Rocket Launcher, 3.5".............. 5,000............... Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Mortar, 4.2"....................... 100................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Howitzer, 105mm, SP................ 50.................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Tank, medium, M48.................. 108................. Sales................... Sales................... 25.0
Tractors, Bulldozers, etc.......... 115................. Sales................... Grant................... ..............
Commo Equipment.................... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Machine gun, .30 cal, Browning..... 2,250............... Sales/Nash List......... Grant................... ..............
Ammunition......................... Unk................. Sales................... Grant................... ..............
VENEZUELA................ F-86K \3\.......................... 74.................. Sales................... Sales................... 2.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Nash List comprises all the military equipment and services which the U.S. has supplied the FRG under grant aid. This equipment was provided as
a part of 1954 US/FRG agreements to organize and equip German forces. Eight years later, in 1962, U.S. reversionary rights to this equipment were sold
to the FRG for $75 million. Conditions of this sale require the FRG to coordinate and obtain U.S. agreement in the transfer (sales or grant) of any
equipment to non-NATO third countries. For NATO countries, sales or grant must be coordinated for selected major items and, by subsequent agreement,
FRG aid for Greece and Turkey is coordinated to assure integration of U.S. and FRG support.
\2\ These planes were manufactured in Canada under U.S. license. Prior to provision to Iran, the FRG obtained assurance from GOI that the aircraft were
solely for Iranian use. In late 1966, it was reported that some of the planes were in Pakistan. Both the FRG and Canada protested. Iran stated that
the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair.
\3\ Produced under U.S. license in Italy for U.S. MAP use subsequently paid for by the FRG.

* * * * * * *
DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR COMPETITORS [P. 72]

Mr. McNaughton. Senator Symington, you had asked why we
draw a distinction between our competitors.
When it comes to balance of payments, of course, the
difference may not be so great, but if you are talking in terms
of whether, for example, a determined Chile, which wants jet
aircraft, is going to get aircraft from one country or another,
there is no, so far as I know, there is no real push for
Soviets sales, for example, in Latin America, although the
committee has learned there is some intelligence that there are
some overtures in this regard recently. But we do not mind much
having the British fill that need for an inexpensive aircraft
in Latin America, which is under the level that we are trying
to keep Latin America to with the Hawker Hunter in Chile.
We are trying to keep Latin America below the supersonic
aircraft at an economic level, and we have so far succeeded,
and the Hawker Hunter, in effect, was sold to Chile. We could
have had that business easily. It would have been easy to have
the business in Chile by selling more expensive F-5s which were
exactly what Chile wanted.
Saudi Arabia is a case in which the balance of
considerations, everything taken into account, we, in effect,
allowed part of that deal with Saudi Arabia to go to the United
Kingdom.
Senator McCarthy. Wasn't it on condition that they buy $300
million of F-111 from us?
Mr. McNaughton. It was more than that. I mean----
Senator McCarthy. I mean the British bought from us and you
let the British sell in Saudi Arabia.
Mr. McNaughton. $400 million worth of business in Saudi
Arabia.
Senator McCarthy. $300 million.
Mr. McNaughton. No, it was more than that, $2 billion.
Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia?
Mr. McNaughton. No, the whole deal was, the British deal--
--
Senator McCarthy. I mean you let the British sell to Saudi
Arabia.
Mr. McNaughton. About $400 million worth.
Senator McCarthy. Yes, sir.
Mr. McNaughton. Phased over a ten-year period it comes to
over $400 million.
Senator McCarthy. How much would they pay for the F-111?
Mr. McNaughton. They actually have not paid, but the deal,
as I recall it, runs in the neighborhood of $2 billion,
including the phantom and C-130 aircraft.
Mr. Vance. Approximately $2 billion, the F-111 and the
followon spares.
Senator Gore. $2 billion.
Mr. McNaughton. It is broken down into several pieces.
There is a total deal of which the F-111s are a piece.
Senator McCarthy. How much?
Mr. McNaughton. Which adds up to $2.5 billion.
Senator McCarthy. How much are they?
Mr. McNaughton. The F-111 part of this I have listed as
about $725 million.
Senator McCarthy. That is quite different.
Mr. McNaughton. Of the $2.5 billion package, there is a $2
billion package with the British, and this $2 billion package
they wanted some business running the other way. We ultimately
agreed that provided they could meet competitive terms on
price, delivery, quality, that we would buy from them or find
things to buy from them, $325 million, and the $400 million,
Senator McCarthy, that was part of that package.
Senator McCarthy. And the Hawker Hunter is part of it, too.
Mr. McNaughton. No, it is not.
Senator McCarthy. Well, you said you could have gotten the
business if you wanted to.
Mr. McNaughton. All we had to do was sell F-5s.
Senator McCarthy. Why did you not?
Mr. McNaughton. We do not want Latin America to have that
airplane.
Senator McCarthy. Well, you said the F-5 was no worse than
the Hawker Hunter.
Mr. McNaughton. No, it is a supersonic plane.
Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was the same.
Mr. McNaughton. It is hotter.
Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was roughly the
same kind. We have some subsonic planes.
Mr. McNaughton. The subsonic planes are wearing out,
Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. I think the point is that you do let some
of our allies sell, don't you, when you really could get the
business away from them if you wanted it.
Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia is a clear case.
Mr. McNaughton. That is a case for one reason. Chile is a
case for another reason.

MILITARY DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Senator McCarthy. What I am concerned about is the
manipulations concerned in the Defense Department. We sit
around here trying to be foreign policy experts, and all of
this kind of stuff is going on
[Deleted.]

* * * * * * *

POWER IMBALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 73]

Senator Symington. Right. There was a question of balance.
I want to make this point to you. I have just come back
from the Middle East. The situation in Jordan is extremely
serious. I personally hope we do everything and anything we can
to help this fellow in his problem in Jordan, but in my opinion
there is a tremendous imbalance out there as a result of what
has been going on, and I think it is operated on too classified
a basis from the Congress. I am not talking about from the
people.
For example, there is no question about it, you check it
when Mr. Battle comes back, because he briefed me at length on
it, and he is a very brilliant fellow and is coming back here
as assistant secretary. Now, today the quality of the U.A.R.
air force is fantastic as against the number and quality of the
Israeli air force.
They bought their airplanes from France because we were too
high toned to sell them, for various reasons that I have never
been able to figure out, and get the business over here. So
they buy the Mystere from France, and the new plane, whatever
it is, the Mirage, and the Russians, who are, our embassy tells
us in the highest classification, moving very rapidly into the
U.A.R., they now ship there just as an illustration. The U.A.R.
today has over four times more MIG's than the Chinese and the
North Vietnamese combined, and sixty of those MIG's are
considered the most modern that they have. This is the
information I got only last month.
Now, it is all very well to say that the Israelis can
handle the U.A.R. because of pilot security, et cetera, but any
day that the Soviets really get annoyed or there were any other
mercenaries who really knew how to fly came in to run those
U.A.R. airplanes, in my opinion, Israel is dead.

* * * * * * *

[Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was
adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met in public executive session at 10:00
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams,
and Case.
William M. Roth, nominee to be Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations, and William B. McComber, nominee to be
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, were
heard in public session and then ordered reported. William S.
Gaud, to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American
Development Bank, and Maurine B. Neuberger, to be a member of
the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, were also approved.
S. 623, the International Bridge Act of 1967, was discussed
and carried over.
The following treaties were ordered reported: Customs
Conventions: Ex. J, 89/2, on Containers; Ex. K, 89/2, on the
Temporary Importation of Professional Equipment; Ex. L, 89/2,
on the A.T.A. Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods; Ex.
M, 89/2, regarding E.C.S. Carnets for Commercial Samples; Ex.
N, 89/2, on the International Transport of Goods under cover of
T.I.R. Carnets.
Fisheries Conventions: Ex. H, 89/2, Exploration of the Sea
Convention; Ex. T, 89/2, notes Amending the Convention on Great
Lakes Fisheries; Ex. U, 89/2, International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
Maritime Conventions: Ex. Q, 89/2, Inter-American
Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne
Transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata); and Ex. R, 89/2,
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Tariff.
Discussion followed on whether or not to hold public
hearings on the Foreign Aid Bill.
[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

Tuesday, February 28, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams,
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Ex. D, 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union
was discussed and ordered reported, with minority views, by a
vote of 15-4.
S. 990, to establish a United States Committee on Human
Rights for International Human Rights Year-1968, was considered
carried over.
Discussion on educational trip to Vietnam by some members
of the committee.
[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

Tuesday, February 28, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met in executive session at 2:25 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee),
Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Case, and
Cooper.
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
accompanied by Captain Louis L. Meier (USN), appeared to
testify on the development of the Nike-X Antiballistic missile
system.
[The committee adjourned at 4:00 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

Wednesday, March 1, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Lausche, Clark, Pell,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
The subcommittee heard testimony from Gerald F. Tape,
Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Norris E. Bradbury,
Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; and Dr.
Michael M. May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,
Livermore.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNITED STATES

----------

Thursday, March 2, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
Room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright, Morse,
Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the
committee staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S MILITARY SALES PROGRAM [P. 134]

Mr. McNaughton. I want to double check this figure because
our total sales program runs about one and a half billion per
year, and how it could be a billion dollars in profits out of
one and a half billion dollars of business is a little
difficult for me to understand. I will double check that
number.
But, on the question of Senator Morse's proposal, you
cannot discuss the question of, for example, sales to Jordan,
sales to Israel, sales to Pakistan or India in open session
without risking very serious problems with the countries
involved. This is why we have requested a closed hearing on the
subject. The State Department would feel even stronger than we
do about this.

* * * * * * *

Senator Fulbright. I just did not want you to leave the
record, in answer to Senator Lausche, as if CENTO amounted to
something. The way he asked it, and you said yes, there is
CENTO, it sounded as if it was of some significance, and it
really is not.
Senator Lausche. Well, the fact is it was at one time, and
I was going to follow up with the question whether or not the
significance did exist when Russia was trying to move in on the
Congress or sometimes by press reports of speeches by my
deputy, Mr. Kuss. Generally, by the critics of the sales
program.
Mr. McNaughton. The image that is given, for example, all
the way through the committee staff report, is one of the
United States energetically seeking business.
Senator Fulbright. The same way right here.
Mr. McNaughton. This is untrue, and I think it should be
fully understood that this is untrue.
The efforts that we put into this program by a factor of
five to one are efforts to avoid selling.
Senator Fulbright. I can guarantee that is not true here.

* * * * * * *

ARMS SALES TO HELP BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SYSTEM [P. 137]

Mr. McNaughton. I can guarantee that it is true in fact. It
is my program, and this is where most of our efforts go--such
as the Iranian program, trying to find--ways to keep a country
from spending its resources on things it should not spend them
on. This is not always the case, but in no case do we practice
the hard sell, and I think that should be fully understood.
Almost 90 percent of our sales are to the industrialized
nations anyway where the problem on the first sale it does not
arise, but we do not press sales.

EXAMPLE OF A CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY

Let me read you what happened just two, three days ago when
the Air Minister Gomez from Brazil was here. Brazil is a
perfect case of what Senator Fulbright refers to where I think
almost a half billion dollars of economic grants or loans may
go in a very short period of time.
Senator Fulbright. Yes.
Mr. McNaughton. The Air Minister was here, and he told me
that Brazil is the largest country in South America. It has the
largest Air Force, but it has old and outclassed fighters and
aircraft. He wants to upgrade his Air Force, to keep it
current. To improve the morale of his pilots, he wants just 12
F-5's, the supersonic light Northrop airplane, to be delivered
within one year. He wants them by the middle of next year, and
he told us, he said, ``I don't want your grant, I don't want
your credit. All I want is an agreement that Northrop can sell
them to us,'' and the implication is, ``If you don't sell them
to us we are going to get them somewhere else.''
What I told him was, here is an extract from the memorandum
of conservation:
``When Mr. McNaughton joined the group the Minister
recounted his reasons for early acquisition of the F-5. Mr.
McNaughton stressed the following points: (a) We place emphasis
on economic and social development and were against the
diversion of resources from this important sector at this time.
``(b) That the acquisition of the F-5 by Brazil would
inevitably lead to a chain reaction demand for it by other
Latin American countries who are not able to afford such
expenditures at this time.''
This morning I find the pressure is still on. He is still
in town. The question is what do you do about it. Now, this
gets into the whole policy question of our relations with
Brazil, the State Department, AID----
Senator Fulbright. It does.
Mr. McNaughton.--DOD, who are all dealing in this problem
trying to slow down, to prevent, these proud people from buying
something they do not need, they have no business having, and
this is where I spend my time to avoid selling them and,
hopefully, to avoid having them drooling their money off
somewhere else buying Mirages or Lightnings from the British--
Mirages from the French or Lightnings from the British. This is
where the effort goes, and I would like to point out----
Senator Hickenlooper. Is your point that if we do not sell,
leaving aside entirely the aid we put into Brazil, they will
find the money some place and buy from the British and the
French. It looks like we are giving to them on the one hand,
and taking away with the other.
Mr. McNaughton. Senator Hickenlooper, this is a part----
Senator Hickenlooper. That money might as well come back
home as to go to Britain or France.
Mr. McNaughton. This is entirely correct.
What is going on there obviously is an internal political
fight within the country.
We had the same thing happen in Chile where they ended up
buying the Hawker Hunters from the British. You have an
internal fight going on there where for political reasons the
government decides they have to allocate something for this
purpose, and then the question comes up of one of restraint,
trying to hold this thing down, and Chile wanted F-5's. We
refused to sell them F-5's. We tried to sell them something
that they considered too antiquated, which would have been a
non-upgranting of their present force, and they eventually went
to Hawker Hunter.
Venezuela ended up buying aircraft from Germany. We did not
veto this. It is an F-86, not a great step forward.
Senator Lausche. Can you veto sales by Germany?
Mr. McNaughton. Well, we have a veto over resales by
Germany to non-NATO Countries.
Senator Lausche. That is our equipment that sold to
Germany?
Mr. McNaughton. That is right. But one point I think you
should understand, that these efforts, imperfect as they may
be, Senator Fulbright, are paying off in Latin America, for
example. In Brazil----
Senator Gore. In dictatorships?
Mr. McNaughton.--they are paying off in terms of military,
the size of the military establishment.
By using restraint, for example by agreeing to allow them
to have 25 A-4B's in Argentina they are replacing two squadrons
of Meteors of 50 aircraft.
In Brazil, for example, we gave them 54 T-33's to replace
50 plus 33 aircraft. They have smaller Air Forces.
There is a human, psychological, political, internal
problem that these governments have a deal with, just as you
have a deal with who sits where around the table or who is
where in the Pentagon. These problems are important to these
people and, therefore, we move slowly to contract their
expenditures on sophisticated types of equipment which, in our
view, are unnecessary to the Latin Americans.
The figures I wanted to give you, in Brazil, for example,
in 1961, they had 165 combat aircraft. The 1967 figure shows
122-165 down to 122.
Argentina has reduced combat aircraft from 275 to 125
combat aircraft.
Bolivia, from 15 down to 8 in that period.
Chile, from 57 to 48.
Now, what we have is a case in which the old Mustang, the
P-51, which used to be the airplane--well, when we finally sold
these to Latin America, they kept them for a long time. And
then they moved to the F-80, the F-86. They are now looking for
the F-5, how long can we postpone the F-5? They do not need it
at all.
Senator Gore. Why does Chile need an F-5?
Mr. McNaughton. Chile does not need an F-5.
Senator Gore. Why does Argentina need one?
Mr. McNaughton. Argentina does not need one. No one in
Latin America needs one.
Senator Gore. Why should we either give or sell them one?
Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some point when the
F-5 is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it
becomes more expensive even to maintain the old equipment than
to buy new, there will be a break point, and this could come in
1969.
Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some when the F-5
is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it becomes
more expensive even to maintain the old equipment then to buy
new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 1969.
Senator Lausche. If I may interrupt, the principle which
Senator Gore is now enunciating, that is, why should we sell it
to them, in trade with Red Russia, the proponents of trade
argue that unless we engage in trade with them, other nations
will, and that is about the same principle that you are up
against.
Mr. McNaughton. But not in Latin America. The Soviet
problem is not a problem in Latin America.
Senator Lausche. But if we do not help them along in this
internal contest, they will go to France or they will go to the
United Kingdom to acquire their planes.
Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
Now, Frei in Chile obviously had a very serious problem,
and he ended up having to decide that something of this nature
had to be done, some sophisticated aircraft had to be
purchased. His Air Force had to be upgraded to some extent in
order to maintain the political fact of balance the way he
would like it.

* * * * * * *

PUBLIC HEARING ON MILITARY EXPORT SALES [P. 140]

On the question of public hearings you, of course, should
address this question to the Secretaries involved, but my own
view is that it would be very difficult to answer the specific
questions that come up as to why sales in this case, why not in
that case. What were the other agreements that the country made
that made this a more sensible deal than appears by just a
transfer of arms, this sort of thing. This can hardly be done
in public session without gravely injuring our relations with
the countries involved.
[Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Aren't we?
Mr. McNaugthon. We are in fact, but there is an explanation
for it that cannot be given in public.
What we are trying to do is to keep this Jordan separated
from the Nasser group which is being, in effect, subsidized by
the Soviets. We are trying to keep Jordan, which is trying to
behave vis-a-vis Israel; we are trying to keep them from
falling into the grasp of a Nasserite group and, therefore, we
have to provide some arms to Jordan under various
circumstances. Israel then finds herself surrounded by the
Nasserite group, and, likewise, needs arms.
Senator Gore. Meanwhile, Jordan will not cooperate in
solving the Palestine refugee problem to which we have provided
subsidy all these years. Jordan, has no prospect of ever
becoming a viable economic state. It will be a permanent
American subsidized entity.
What is its justification?
Mr. McNaughton. Do I gather that----
Senator Lausche. May I interrupt here? I was in Israel in
November of 1955. Please take this off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]

MILITARY SALES BY RUSSIA

Senator Lausche. Do you have full information to what
extent Russia is selling military equipment to the different
nations of the world?
Mr. McNaughton. We have. I do not have it with me, Senator
Lausche.
Senator Lausche. But you have it?
Mr. McNaughton. We have, I think, fairly reliable
information on this.
Senator Lausche. Is Russia restraining itself from selling
to countries that want to buy from her?
Mr. McNaughton. It is hard, just as it is difficult for the
Senators to see from the data, that the United States is
restraining itself, I cannot say that we can see from the
evidence we have that Russia is restraining herself for
political reasons.
All we can see are the items that show up, and it runs into
$2 billion just around the Mediterranean, the southern edges of
the Mediterranean.
Senator Lausche. It has been selling to Pakistan, has it
not of late?
Mr. McNaughton. I do not have information on that in my
mind.
Senator Lausche. Maybe I am confused.
Mr. McNaughton. Let me check on that for you, Senator
Lausche, on Pakistan.
Senator Lausche. Ayub was talking about going to Russia,
was he not?
Mr. McNaughton. He was talking about going to China.
Senator Lausche. China?
Mr. McNaughton. We do have information of his getting
equipment from China.
Senator Lausche. You do not have to check it. My thought is
that while we are reviewing the military equipment we are
selling, we should also obtain detailed information about what
Russia is doing.
Mr. McNaughton. Senator Lausche, we could do that.
Senator Lausche. I am talking about our committee.
Mr. McNaughton. Not only Russia and China, but we would be
glad to make available to you what we have on this.
Senator Lausche. The issue is we do not sell whether
someone else will.
Mr. McNaughton. In some cases.
Senator Lausche. In some cases others have sold.
Mr. McNaughton. That is right.
Senator Lausche. And they are prepared to sell?
Mr. McNaughton. And in some cases we do not care, and in
some cases we do.
Now, the Pakistan case is a case of getting equipment from
China, not from the Soviet Union.
Senator Lausche. I see.
Mr. McNaughton. One hundred and seventy medium tanks and 60
MIG-19's from China to Pakistan.

* * * * * * *

EFFORTS AT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS [P. 146]

Mr. McNaughton. The second point I want to make, though, is
one I think you might discuss with witnesses from State. Not
this question about ACDA or State participation, but the
question of whether any efforts have been made to get bilateral
deals with the Soviets to cut out arms races.
Senator Clark. I think you know that my interest in affairs
of this kind. We have tried on one or two occasions to make
some progress in having them stop these sales, and we stop the
sales.
They just get incredibly linked together, and they say,
``Well, if you will take everything out of Turkey'', or
something of that nature, and where our national interest
cannot permit this to happen, so they become very, very
difficult.
Senator Clark. You agree this is a State Department and not
a Defense Department responsibility to negotiate with the
Russians?
Mr. McNaughton. That is correct. But I made a statement in
response to your statement that nothing has been done, and I
want you to know that we have made efforts along this line, and
the Committee might be interested in talking to State about it.

* * * * * * *

COPRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS [P. 146]

Mr. McNaughton. I would like to confirm that this is the
specific legislation which applies to Senator McCarthy's
question, but I suspect that is the root of the authority from
Congress.
Senator McCarthy. It is probably right. [Deleted.]

* * * * * * *

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON ARMS SALES AND GRANTS [P. 147]

Mr. McNaughton. I am prepared to answer the question,
Senator McCarthy. In cases in which we have given grant
assistance, for example, Nationalist China, if we had given
grant assistance, the country comes along, the time arrives,
when we can shift the sales along the line that Senator
Symington was talking about, then we maintain the same
relationship that we had with that country but instead of
granting equipment we sell equipment.
This will begin to happen in Greece, perhaps soon. Maybe in
3 or 4 years from now in Turkey; maybe some time in the future
in Korea. It is already happening in the Republic of China; in
Iran we see it happening.
These are cases where this shift is taking place, and the
last time I testified, Senator McCarthy, you will recall I
pointed out that the total involved of the two is remaining
about the same.
Senator McCarthy. Well, he says this has to be maintained
through the sales media.
Now, couldn't we maintain these if we simply granted the
arms to them?
Mr. McNaughton. Certainly.
Senator McCarthy. Why does he say you have to do it through
the sales media?
Mr. McNaughton. Because we assume that the grants will be
reduced as the countries become more able to pay for what they
use.
Senator McCarthy. We might be better off giving granting
them. This makes a formal commitment. Where would Nationalist
China go, for example, if we did not maintain this
relationship? Through the sales media? It is just a kind of a
wild statement, it seems to me, that does not stand up under
any kind of testing.
Mr. McNaughton. I can tell you where China would go,
Senator McCarthy. They would dig down into their socks and take
it out of their development program.
Senator McCarthy. I am talking about Nationalist China.
Mr. McNaughton. I am talking about that.
Senator Gore (presiding). What would be wrong with that?
Mr. McNaughton. Because we are interested in the economic
development of Nationalist China. This is an argument against
buying more.
Senator McCarthy. If they are going to buy it from somebody
else or not from us----
Mr. McNaughton. Or anybody.
Senator McCarthy. Anybody.
Mr. McNaughton. This is one reason why in Nationalist China
we do not insist that the whole program be sales, Mr. Chairman.

* * * * * * *

PUBLIC HEARINGS ON ARMS SALES PROGRAM [P. 148]

Senator Gore. The Secretary expressed the view from his
standpoint it would be inadvisable for the Executive Department
to testify publically on many matters. I take it that if the
full committee, insisted upon a public hearing, this would be a
matter which would address itself to your superiors and,
perhaps, even to the President.
Mr. McNaughton. I would think so, Mr. Chairman. I hope you
would consider very seriously the impact on our relations with
every country mentioned today if the whole--the deals that had
to be arranged in each of these cases, which almost necessarily
would have to be surfaced to give the full picture in each
case, were brought out in public session or if a person had to
take the Fifth, so to speak, with respect to half of each of
these pictures, because the inferences could be drawn from that
as well, I just hope you consider this, Mr. Chairman, before
you make this recommendation.

* * * * * * *

ARMS SUPPLIES TO RIVAL NATIONS [P. 149]

Senator McCarthy. What really saved us in India and
Pakistan is that the British were supplying most of the Indian
equipment and we were supplying arms to Pakistan. We did not
have to prove our superiority or they prove theirs over ours.
But if you had had Russian equipment in India and American
equipment in Pakistan, we would have said we have got to test
our equipment, we have got to prove our weapons are better than
theirs.
I think the British claimed their Centurion tank did prove
to be better than our tanks in the India-Pakistan War.
Our explanation, I understand, was that the British tank
crews were better trained. But if it had been Russian equipment
against American equipment, you would have had a hard time
settling it.
So now you get this thing up. I think you are better off if
Morocco and Algeria both were supplied by the French, or by the
Russians, or maybe both supplied by the United States, so we do
not have to prove anything if there is a border incident
between Algeria and Morocco. But we are giving airplanes and
tanks and American equipment right there today, so when the
test comes who is going to prove out to be, to have, the better
equipment or the better ally.
The test is going to be between the Centurions and the
Pattons.
The Defense Department seems to feel this is all good. With
this policy we have political control, they say. And without
it, we would lose everything.
Mr. McNaughton. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear
for the record that I disagree with Senator McCarthy's
interpretation of the defense Department's position----
Senator McCarthy. I just read it.
Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we
would encourage a war to test equipment.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
Mr. McNaughton. Or a continuation of a war.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
Mr. McNaughton. In order to prove our equipment is better
than someone else's.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say that. I said there is a
temptation to do it. It would be much harder to draw off.
Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we
would be tempted to encourage a war or continue a war.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say we would. I said we would
be tempted to prolong it in order to prove the superiority of
weapons and even to test them.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. I suggested a few days ago that in my view
you would not succeed in persuading the Russians to limit the
deployment of defensive systems so long as we were rattling our
offensive missiles and bragging about having superiority.
It seems to me if we are going to succeed in preventing
this intensification of the arms race we must negotiate some
modification of our own offensive stockpile; that offensive and
defensive measure must be taken together.
To what extent this can be accomplished, I do not know. But
I personally welcome this response from the Soviets that I just
read off the record. I want to say that.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., subcommittee adjourned.]

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

----------

Friday, March 3, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche,
Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams,
and Cooper.
Also present: Senator McGee.
Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY
ADRIAN S. FISHER, ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

* * * * * * *

SERIOUS THOUGHT NOT GIVEN TO A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 152]

Now that we are getting to a point where there might be a
treaty, they are having to face the fact that they may be
expected to close off the nuclear option by formal treaty
indefinitely into the future and, therefore, some of the
misgivings which we might have known about earlier are now
coming to the surface, because this is a major step for certain
countries in certain situations, and in this regard I would
refer to India, for example.
Here is a country looking across the mountains on Mainland
China, which is building nuclear weapons, and so the Indian
Government recognizes that this step would be for it a very
major and important decision.
We think it will make the decision in favor of the
nonproliferation. I do not think we ought to underestimate the
importance of it to them.
So it is not, I think, surprising that, when you get up to
the hurdle, there is some hesitancy about taking the hurdle. We
saw that in a minor way in the Latin American discussions of
the Latin American nuclear-free zone. When they finally got up
to the point of say, ``Let us put it on paper and signing it,''
then there were two or three countries that just were not sure
they wanted to close off this option indefinitely into the
future. They all did, but it was an illustration here in this
hemisphere of a phenomenon that is going to be observable in
other parts of the world.

POSSIBLE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

A second point has been the reluctance of some governments
to forgo the possible peaceful application of nuclear
explosives. Let us put aside for the moment whether in some
cases this might be a pretext rather than a reason, and accept
the fact that there is a valid concern about being denied the
possibilities of the use of peaceful explosions for peaceful
purposes, for civilian purposes, indefinitely into the future.
Senator Aiken. May I ask you: Is that covered in the Inter-
American Agreement?
Secretary Rusk. It was quite frankly not covered fully to
our own satisfaction because in the Inter-American Treaty they
did have some language which seemed to say if peaceful
explosions can be developed in a way that does not produce
weapons through some technical advances in the future, we do
not wish to close off that option.
In the present state of the art, we do not see that
distinction coming along. But I would like to emphasize that,
as we see this problem, peaceful explosions are, in fact,
weapons, and explosions that can dig a harbor can destroy a
city. So we do not see how you can stop proliferation by
leaving open the possibility of developing explosive
capabilities for engineering and civil purposes.
The state of the art theoretically, I suppose, could change
some time where there might be certain types of explosions that
would not have anything to do with weapons, but we do not see
it at the present time. So we feel that we cannot except
peaceful explosions from such a treaty.
However, this is a valid interest on the part of a good
many countries. We ourselves, as you know, are contemplating
the possibility of using such explosion for an Isthmian Canal.
It might well be that a country like Mauritania might wish
to have a harbor dug. It is short of a good harbor. It may be
that a good many things in many parts of the world might happen
in this connection.
We have discussed with the Soviet Union and with a good
many other governments, the possibility of trying to make some
international arrangement under which existing nuclear powers
could furnish the services of a nuclear peaceful explosion in
situations where it would be feasible from an engineering point
of view-but to do that either through IAEA in Vienna, or
perhaps, through the Security Council of the United Nations, or
through some other international arrangement, which would make
it possible for us to say to the non-nuclear countries around
the world, ``If the time comes when you need an explosion for
peaceful purposes, we would ensure that you have this service
available to you.'' That is what we would like to do.

* * * * * * *

TECHNOLOGICAL SPINOFF FROM THE WEAPONS FIELD [P.154]

Senator Rusk. Those of you on the Joint Committee, I think,
would probably agree with that. The gadgetry of weapons
introduces very little into industry as such, and has any
peaceful or industrial or commercial application. So that we
think that that is a concern that can be met on the merits, and
the German attitude seems to be reasonably relaxed on that at
the present time and in the light of technical explanations,
which have been provided.

* * * * * * *

PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS IN TREATY [P. 154]

Secretary Rusk. There is a major complication at the moment
in Euratom because Euratom has set up its own safeguards. Those
safeguards are, from a technical point of view, comparable to
the IAEA safeguards and, from the point of view of inspection
alone, would be satisfactory.
But the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, and
possibly some others, take the view that inspection of allies
by allies is not adequate and, therefore, there ought to be
more general international safeguards in order that all could
have equal assurances about the non-use of these materials for
weapons purposes.
The Euratom countries are divided on this at the present
time. It is now being studied in Euratom, and they will be
having discussion of this at a ministerial level, I understand,
later this month.
There are two or three possibilities in which this matter
might be solved. One would be for the IAEA to put in effect a
Good Housekeeping stamp of approval on the Euratom safeguards.
Another might be for the IAEA to safeguard the safeguard
system, to test it periodically to be sure that the Euratom
safeguards are working adequately.
A third might be for the members of Euratom to approach
this from a national point of view, rather than from a group
point of view, and each one of them, the non-nuclears--this
would exclude France--the non-nuclears to say, ``Well, we are
in Euratom, but where there is a Euratom facility in my country
we will accept the IAEA safeguards for that facility,'' even
though there may not be unanimity in Euratom itself.
Now, we do not exclude the possibility that France will
vote with the others and accept IAEA safeguards in Euratom, but
if France does not there still is that possibility.
I would like to raise with the committee for thought, and I
will be doing it also with the joint committee, one point that
could make some difference in the attitude of other governments
in this matter because there is a sense of discrimination if
the IAEA safeguards are to be applied solely to the non-nuclear
countries.
Now, if we, for example, were in a position to say that we
ourselves will accept IAEA safeguards on the peaceful uses
installations in our country, this could relieve the political
situation considerably with respect to this sense of
discrimination, and it might encourage some of the others to
move more forthrightly in this field.
Senator Hickenlooper. Our only trouble there would be
inspection, would it not? Do we consider our safeguards more
stringent than those of IAEA, the International Atomic Energy
Agency?
Secretary Rusk. Nevertheless, if IAEA had access to all of
our peaceful uses installations----
Senator Hickenlooper. I say that is the trouble, which is
inspection. There is the access.
Secretary Rusk. My understanding of the IAEA safeguards is
that they are so constructed as not to get into such things as
industrial secrets. Our Atomic Energy Commission has no
difficulty with this so far as our peaceful installations are
concerned. Now, weapons installations would be another matter.
But we will go into that in some detail because it has some
technical aspects. But my understanding is that the character
of the safeguards is such that you apply them at a critical
point to determine what is being done, and you do not have to
get into the question of how it is being done from a
technical----
Senator Hickenlooper. I think there are some technical
difficulties if we do get into industrial operations that
violate the rules.
Secretary Rusk. I will get Dr. Seaborg and others to
consult.
Senator Gore. In any event, the existence of the IAEA is,
despite its limitations, a definite plus. We have something
agreed upon with which to start.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Now, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept
IAEA safeguards instead of its own country, or that France
would accept it. Britain has a special problem and, perhaps,
this could be left off the tape for just a moment.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. The Soviet Union would be prepared to see a
treaty go forward without a safeguards article.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I make a respectful
suggestion that the Secretary complete his statement before we
question him, if possible, so that we will be sure we can all
be here.
Senator Gore. The Chair thinks it is a very pertinent
suggestion and agrees with it. Is there objection on the part
of the committee?
Proceed, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. Well, my remarks are quite informal at this
point, Mr. Chairman. I will bring them to a conclusion on this
matter of the nonproliferation treaty.
I was just saying that the Soviet Union would probably
accept a treaty without a safeguards provision.
We feel that a safeguards provision is very important, and
we understand that the committees here in the Senate feel that
it is very important, so we have a good deal of work to do
still on that point.

EFFECT OF TREATY ON POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

On another subject, which is potentially a source of very
great difficulty, is the effect of a nonproliferation treaty on
the political unification of Europe. Now, this involves a
matter which we have been talking with the Soviets about for
literally four or five years.
It has to do with political arrangements in Western Europe
that may or may not have anything to do with the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. I think our friends in Western Europe would
be unwilling to sign a proliferation treaty which barred the
possibility of a political unification of, say, the six states
now in the present EEC.
We ourselves do not wish to bar European unity through such
a treaty.
Senator Lausche. Who does?
Secretary Rusk. But the attitude of the Soviet Union is
likely to be very severe on this point.
Looking at it from their point of view, they would say,
``Look, how do you expect us to accept the notion of a
politically-unified Europe in which there would be Germans and
the Unified Europe would be a nuclear power by succession,''
say, from France or France and Britain if Britain is a part of
it by that time?
This is a very serious question, and one that we are likely
to have to face fairly soon now because we are getting to the
point of making clear what our respective interpretations are
on the language which your subcommittee has already had, if,
indeed, that language survives the present discussion, that is,
the present international discussion.
There are theoretically two or three ways of dealing with
this. One would be to say if you do not have a common
interpretation on so fundamental a point, then you go back to
the drawing board because you have not had a sufficient meeting
of the minds to claim that you have a treaty.
A second would be for us and other signatories to make
clear our own interpretation of that point publicly, as we
would in any event have to do in presenting such a treaty, say,
to the Senate, and then hope that the Russians would at least
be silent. We do not know whether they would be silent or
whether that would be a satisfactory solution, but it is this
point which we have had in mind when we have said to you and to
our allies that we do not have an agreement with the Soviet
Union yet on the text of a nonproliferation treaty, because the
words which you have in front of you, perhaps, conceal the
possibility of a basic misunderstanding of what the words mean.
Now, it is true that political unity of Europe is some
distance off, at best. It is possible that it may never come
into existence for other reasons entirely. It seems at this
stage to be a rather hypothetical obstacle, but we may be faced
with the problem: Do you have a treaty if the words can be
agreed at a time when beneath the surface there is a major
difference of interpretation by at least a number of the
principal signatories?
I do not want to minimize the difficulty of that problem,
and I do not want to pretend that we can see any answer at the
present time until we explore further what the Soviet attitude
on that point is likely to be. If they are willing to gamble,
this is a hypothetical question long in the future, and sign
the treaty with the full knowledge of the interpretation which
the rest of us put on it, this point, then there may be no
great difficulty.

* * * * * * *

ASSURANCES AGAINST NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL [P. 155]

Secretary Rusk. A further point that has come into the
discussion is the question of assurances, assurances to non-
nuclear countries who may think they will be subject to nuclear
blackmail. This is not so much a problem with those who are
allied, say, with the United States, countries like Japan or
our NATO allies. It is more of a problem with countries who do
not have such an alliance, such as India living next door to a
nuclear China.
This is very troublesome because for us to give anyone, for
example, the kind of assurances which might give them complete
comfort would involve a very far reaching extension of American
commitments. It could only be done by a treaty, and it would
have to be done almost on the NATO formula, that an attack on
one is an attack on all.
If a country like India is to feel that it is the
beneficiary of ironclad guarantees--and I am not at all sure
that we ourselves want to entertain the idea--that if there is
to be a nuclear exchange anywhere, from anywhere in the world,
that we insist on being a part of it.
So, this is a major problem, and it may be the key question
upon which the Indian decision would be made as to whether or
not to sign.
I do not want to suggest to this committee that we ought to
go racing down the track of providing these assurances to
individual countries in connection with a nonproliferation
treaty, but it is something which is very much worth
considering, very much worth consideration.

REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF TREATY

On the question of review and amendment, the duration of a
treaty is a matter that has been discussed. I believe you, Mr.
Chairman, have suggested a possible ten-year duration clause.
There have been suggestions from other quarters that there
might be a five-year duration clause.
One of the advantages of a shorter term--that is, some term
such as five or ten years--would be that it would tend to
eliminate certain of these hypothetical problems such as what
do you do about explosions for peaceful purposes; what do you
do about the European unity clause, and things of that sort.
But, on the other hand, if there is a termination date
there is considerable prospect that a number of countries would
race during that period--perhaps I could amend this language on
the tape--race during that period to become eight months
pregnant, and that you then might find that at the end of that
period you would have an epidemic of nuclear powers, new
nuclear powers, arriving on the scene. So, it is a troublesome
question.
It seems to me that there will be some advantages in our
having an open-ended treaty subject to periodic review. In the
present text we are talking about a review every five years.
But it may be difficult to achieve a permanent treaty, and at
some stage we may have to come back and discuss with you
whether it is better to have a treaty for a period of years
than no treaty at all, given the attitudes of a considerable
variety of governments on this subject.
At the present time, the momentum is toward a permanent
treaty, but there are one or two problems that do point back to
the possibility of, to the possible desirability of, a shorter
term treaty.
We will ourselves favor an open-ended treaty as far as time
is concerned.
Mr. Chairman, those are the key issues that are under
discussion at the present time.

PROCEDURES OF DISCUSSIONS

Procedurally, we are now discussing these matters closely
with our allies. We should hope during the course of the next
two to three weeks to bring those allied discussions to a
conclusion soon, test the allied interpretation of this
language with the Soviet Union, and then table, if possible, a
treaty in Geneva for the consideration of the Geneva
Conference, and then submission to other governments.

* * * * * * *

ABM MATTER TIED IN WITH NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 157]

Senator Rusk. You know that the President yesterday
announced that he had received from Mr. Kosygin a letter which
said that the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss both
offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and was prepared to
enter into negotiations with us to see whether steps of
disarmament could be taken in both fields.
There was no detail in the letter. It is our impression
that the Soviet Union is working on these matters within its
own structure. It, too, may have some interdepartmental
negotiations underway on this, and that they are in the process
of preparing a position on which they would enter into any
detailed discussions with us.
But we do have some impressions, not spelled out in Mr.
Kosygin's letter which was very short, and said, ``We are ready
to have discussions,'' not spelled out in his letter but
nevertheless a present picture.
You remember they rejected the notion of a freeze on
offensive and defensive weapons which we proposed in Geneva
last year.
I suppose the reason they rejected the freeze was because
they considered the existing situation unfavorable to them.
They, at the present time, seem to make it clear that they are
not interested in talking about freezes, but in mutual
limitations to an agreed level on both sides.
It is my impression--although we have no specific proof of
this--that they would expect numerical equivalence between the
Soviet Union and the United States in such negotiations. That
is a pretty difficult and complicated thing for us to accept or
to bring about or to inspect because if you get into the
questions of that sort, you get into questions of what kinds of
warheads, what kinds of megatonnage, what kinds of deliveries,
what types of missiles, a great deal of fine print which is
almost impossible to monitor in any event inside of a society
which does not accept inspection.
So that I do not want to leave any false optimism before
the committee on this matter.
We are encouraged to know that they are prepared seriously
to discuss the matter, and we will be discussing it with them.
But we do not have any reason at this point to suppose they
will think about it in terms of a freeze, nor do we have any
clear indication as to what they would do about the ABM's which
they have already deployed in the Soviet Union, in the Moscow
area.
So all that I can report on this point is that they have
agreed to talk in a more systematic and official way than had
been communicated to us earlier.
They have asked us to make any further proposals that we
might have on this matter, and those are being now prepared in
the executive branch.

* * * * * * *

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OUR STOCKPILE [P. 158]

Senator Gore. It seems to me that with the superiority
which we have publicly asserted, which may be more apparent
than real, it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviets to
agree to stop their defensive buildup. The first question I
would like to ask you relates to the public disclosure of our
stockpile.
We have been informed in the committee that megaton-wise
the stockpile vis-a-vis the US and the USSR is roughly equal.
In the number of warheads and missiles we have about a three or
three and a half to one superiority. Secretary McNamara has
publicly announced our stockpile of missiles.
I can understand he thought he would impress the Soviets
that no matter how much they deployed a defensive system our
missile offensive stockpile was so great that their defense
would be overwhelmed.
But, on the other hand, it seems to me that this gives a
weapon to the Soviet military to insist upon a defense because
we are waving our bombs and bragging about our superiority.
I wonder if you would give us your views with respect to
that.
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that in the course of NATO
discussions it was felt necessary to go into these matters in
considerable detail with our allies, and under those
circumstances the matter of--these things do tend to become
public in general orders of magnitude.
We have no doubt that the Soviet Union has known for a long
time the general order of magnitude of our stockpiles and our
weapons situation, and the fact that they have added certain
new information-gathering techniques, with which members of the
committee are familiar--some which we also have--we do not
think that this is a matter of disclosing information to the
Soviet Union, but rather telling our own people and other
peoples in the alliances the approximate situation. I doubt
that that would influence very seriously the actual negotiating
position because they know that.

* * * * * * *

DECISION TO DEPLOY ARMS DEFERRED UNTIL FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS
[P. 160]

Senator Gore. I seem to detect from your statements this
morning that the essence of the Administration decision now is
to perhaps defer a decision to proceed with deployment. I have
understood Secretary McNamara to be in opposition to deployment
even though the Soviets did not agree. Has the administration
reached a decision in that regard?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that, as you know, there are
substantial funds in the present budget for continuing with an
active research and development program for ABM's, but no final
decision has been taken with respect to deployment until we can
test a little more fully the possibilities of some agreement
with the Soviet Union.
I would not want to leave the impression that a final
decision has been made that come what may we should not deploy
anything. It may well be that in any event certain light
deployments may be felt required, for example, to protect the
strategic strike force and to maintain its deterrent
capability. But those are matters on which the executive and
the appropriate committee of Congress will be in full touch
with each other.
I think what has been done thus far is to defer a final
decision on that point until we can find out where we are in
our discussions in this matter with the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Senator Fulbright.
Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, I think it has been a
very interesting statement. I will ask a few questions
pertinent to this matter.
I understood from our briefings with the CIA and the
military that there is some difference of opinion about the
character and effectiveness of the ABM system around Moscow.
The CIA gave me the impression they did not think anything very
serious--that it was not very advanced, and that they doubted
its effectiveness. Do you have any view about this?
Secretary Rusk. My own impression, and I do not have the
exact technical reports in front of me, is that as far as the
Moscow system is concerned, it is a first generation system
which is likely to become operational within the next year or
two and that there is no doubt among the different members of
the intelligence community that this is an ABM system.
There are some other installations in other parts of the
Soviet Union about which there is some discussion as to whether
those are, in fact, serious ABM systems, or whether they are an
antiaircraft or other type system.
Senator Fulbright. That is right. I understood that, too.
But even as to the Moscow one, I gathered from Mr. Helms he was
not too upset. He left the impression with me it was a
difference in view as to its importance between him and the
military, and it could be, it is kind of a utilitarian concept
around Moscow, it could be very effective or effective against
planes but also has some capability against missiles, but they
were not too excited about it in contrast to the military.

* * * * * * *

DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ABROAD
[P. 161]

Senator Fulbright. In addition to that, you might give us
information--if you do not have it immediately, perhaps, you
could supply it for the record--on the CIA, and AID, State
Department, Agriculture, Labor employees abroad. In other
words, I think it is significant if there is going to be any
agreement either on ABM or nonproliferation or almost any field
that the Russians feel there is some degree of equivalence. We
must realize that they are not going to sign an agreement if
they think we have an insurmountable advantage. Do you agree
with that on principle?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is probably correct, Mr.
Chairman. I think that there is another possibility. Let me
contrast two situations.
Senator Fulbright. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. The one would be a formal agreement signed
by the two sides on this question. That is going to be
extremely difficult and complicated, in my judgment, because
that sort of an agreement has to be written against the
prospect of violation, and the fine print becomes extremely
complicated, and we run into the difficulty of inspection
straight away.
It is not inconceivable that there is an alternative, and
that is we both proceed by mutual example, with neither side
giving up its freedom of action, but each side acting in
relation to what the other side is doing.
Now, we did that during a period of about two years on the
Defense budgets until the situation in the Far East brought
that process----
Senator Fulbright. And you were making some progress.
Secretary Rusk. We were making some progress on that.
Senator Fulbright. I am inclined to think for the
preliminary stages this is the area where you are most likely
to make progress.
Secretary Rusk. In view of the capabilities of both sides
to keep a general eye on the situation, something like a mutual
example may be a way to get started. But I do not want to
prejudge the results. If we can work out something with the
Soviet Union, maybe it should be more precise.
Senator Fulbright. I understand.
I wonder if you would undertake to do what the military has
already done, to give the committee an estimate of the number
of persons included in these activities abroad in all of these
fields. Is there any reason why you cannot say how many CIA
agents we have abroad?
Secretary Rusk. There is some problem on that.
Senator Fulbright. Even in view of the revelations that
have been made recently?
Secretary Rusk Yes. [deleted]
Senator Fulbright. Well, I will abide by your judgment.

* * * * * * *

THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY [P. 163]

Secretary Rusk. Well I think you are right, Mr. Chairman.
On the nonproliferation matter, for example, the IAEA ought to
play a major role in regard to safeguards, perhaps in regard to
the provision of explosions for peaceful purposes.
Whether the Eastern Europeans would cooperate on a basis
that would be generally acceptable--in other words, what would
they do about a veto. We do not know what that would do. We are
prepared to go a long way in this ourselves.
Senator Fulbright. For example, when you were speaking of
the blackmail problem, of what a terrible problem it was, and I
agree with you, I would certainly hesitate about the United
States unilaterally making any assurances on protection,
because this, in a sense, puts you up as a kind of antagonist
to the Soviet Union. It seems to me in this case that some
utilization of the U.N., an agency in which both the U.S.S.R.
and the United States are influential members, will be
required. I do not see how you are going to get around those
very dilemmas you already mentioned if you do not utilize some
form of international machinery.
I was told in Sweden that there was very strong feeling
about this proliferation treaty.
There would be some public feeling against an agreement in
which the nuclear countries maintain their status quo. They
want an agreement, but they want us and the Soviet Union to at
least make some undertaking for the gradual transfer of
responsibility to an international organization.
Secretary Rusk. That is, to me, a reasonable attitude on
the part of a good many non-nuclear countries. It is a very
hard objective to achieve.
Senator Fulbright. Very.
Secretary Rusk. And, therefore, the question is do you wait
until the nuclear powers find some way to begin some nuclear
disarmament before you try for a nonproliferation treaty. What
we have tried to do with that, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to
take that problem somewhat into account in a preambular
declaration in which we all repeat the commitments we have made
to make the effort, in the United Nations resolutions and
elsewhere, and we will be sure that you have, if you do not
already have, the text on it. We are trying to work something
out on that. This is a reasonable concern of the non-nuclear
countries.
Senator Fulbright. It seemed so to me and being reasonable
they are in a position to thwart us if we do not make a gesture
by simply not signing. There is no way for us to make a country
like Sweden sign if we do not do something in this case.
Secretary Rusk. You remember in the case of Sweden, Mr.
Chairman, when they signed the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty they
reserved the right to have nuclear weapons in the future. In
other words, they said, ``We won't test, but we want the
right''----
Senator Gore. Who said that?
Secretary Rusk. Sweden.
Senator Fulbright. They are capable of making it, too. They
are very ingenious people.
Secretary Rusk. I am not sure whether it is a completely
real argument on their part. It is a good idea, but I am not
sure it is a real argument or a little defensive apparatus as
they come up to the hurdle of making a final commitment that
they won't go nuclear. I am just not sure in their particular
case.
Senator Fulbright. I imagine others though--you already
mentioned the Indians--have the same, but I expect they are not
unique among the non-nuclear powers, are they, in this
attitude?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is correct.
Senator Fulbright. I was told that several others had
exactly the same view.
I do not wish to occupy the time, although there are many
other aspects of it that I am sure can be discussed.
In conclusion, I do want to urge you to use all the
ingenuity you can, to determine whether some kind of
international organization could participate; perhaps a new
committee, within the U.N. in which the U.S.S.R. and ourselves
can have confidence. I can understand the difficulty of
involving too many countries and the difficulties that have
resulted from such large membership. But surely some devices
within that organization can be developed in which there is not
that problem, to which some of these functions can be given.
I really do not see any alternative to it. I cannot imagine
that the rest of the world will sit by idly, and even if the
Russians are not disposed to agree with us entirely at the
moment, they appear to be coming along.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that the
subcommittee has been told, and I may have to take this off the
record when the time comes, the Soviets have agreed to hold
technical talks with us on PLOWSHARE type activities.
Senator Gore. At Geneva?
Secretary Rusk. Bilaterally, and we would hope that,
perhaps, this might be an additional way in which we could get
into the question of how they and we, and maybe Britain, could
provide PLOWSHARE type services to--
Senator Fulbright. Jointly.
Secretary Rusk. Through non-nuclear countries, jointly,
through some joint arrangement.
Senator Fulbright. I would urge you to go as fast as you
can in this direction, with the least important and least
difficult step to begin with, if there is one. I had the same
thought about the importance of the Antarctic Treaty, not that
it in itself solved a lot, but a start in the right direction
was made, and I hope we will do something in this case.
Senator Gore. Senator Hickenlooper.

HAVE SOVIETS EVER MADE ANY CONCESSIONS

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any
time in recent history that the Soviets have agreed to anything
that in any way stood in the way of their advancing to at least
full equality or superiority over the United States? In other
words, have they made any real concessions of any kind? I am
not talking superficially.
Secretary Rusk. No, I understand, Senator. It was the
judgment of our experts at the time that the conclusion of the
atmospheric test ban treaty would, in fact, work to our
advantage relatively. Now, that is an arguable and debatable
point.
Senator Hickenlooper. It is so far as I am concerned.
Secretary Rusk. But this was the view that we had in front
of us at the time.
I think, broadly speaking, the answer to your question is,
No.
Senator Symington. What was the question?
Senator Hickenlooper. It was a rather long-winded and
complicated question, and I do not know that I can repeat it,
but I will try to.
Senator Symington. I would appreciate that. I could not
hear you.
Senator Hickenlooper. I asked the Secretary if he knew of
any occasion in recent history, since the Soviet Union has come
to major world power, when they have made any concessions of
any kind other than superficial ones for incidental
accommodations, where they in any way impaired their ability to
at least come equal, or superior, to the United States in
various major fields.
I understood his answer to be in the main, no, with the
exception of the Test Ban Treaty, and I have argued that point
with him. I do not quite agree with the fact that it was of any
advantage to us.

* * * * * * *

REASONABLE PARITY ASSUMED [P. 165]

Secretary Rusk. We would have great difficulty in accepting
arrangements which we felt were putting us at a disadvantage.
What we are trying to work on in these matters--and differences
of views can differ on it--is to try to get some sort of
ceiling and downward turn in the arms race in a way that does
not change the relative position of either side.

* * * * * * *

EFFECT OF BOMBING PAUSES ON NEGOTIATION EFFORTS [P. 166]

Secretary Rusk. We sent the North Vietnamese a message
which was returned to our embassy on the first day as though it
were unopened. On the first day Peking said that even if we
stopped bombing there would be no negotiations. I happened to
be in Vienna with Mr. Gromyko at the tenth anniversary of the
Austrian State Treaty on the third day of that suspension and
he told me that the pause was an insult, that it was an
ultimatum.
So that was our experience at that particular time. We did
send the other side a message, which was returned to us, trying
to elicit some response from them.
Senator Lausche. Well, then the pause was intended
definitely to lead toward an understanding that we would go to
the negotiating table.
Secretary Rusk. That was the hope at the time.
Senator Lausche. And there were communications between the
two countries in which North Vietnam completely rejected the
efforts which we made.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, they returned the communication.
Senator Lausche. Now, they returned it without opening it.
Secretary Rusk. I have no doubt they took off a copy before
they sent it back, but they gave it back to us in the same form
in which we had given it to them, sealed in the envelope.
Senator Lausche. Am I correct that in the beginning of 1966
there were 37 days of cessation?
Secretary Rusk. Running from Christmas, 1965, through----
Senator Pell. Will the Senator yield for a moment on this?
Senator Lausche. Yes.
Senator Pell. There is one further point, and, as you know,
I have been very reticent of any discussion of this subject.
But it has since come out in the press; and that is in
connection with the '65 short cessation. I think the record
should show, because as I say it has been in the press, that
there was a communication, it may have been meaningless--the
Secretary and I have discussed this privately--it may not have
been meaningless, but there was a communication from the North
Vietnamese Government at the end of that cessation of bombing
period, would that not be correct?
Secretary Rusk. In the five day?
Senator Pell. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. No.
Senator Pell. In Paris.
Secretary Rusk. Are you not perhaps thinking of the 37 day?
Senator Pell. No, I am thinking of the five-day period in
Paris when it was in the press afterward. I have never said
anything about it, but I read it in the press later.
Secretary Rusk. I know of the discussion of this subject in
connection with the 37-day suspension, but I do not recall that
this happened in the five and a half day. I will look this up.
Senator Pell. We had phone conversations, one phone
conversation or two, and the question was the communication at
the end of the period which came a few hours before the end of
the cessation of its bombing, which was resumed by the time we
got it. It had already resumed, but we were concerned about
this matter. I have never discussed this matter.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, let me check back on this. I think
we are talking about two different pauses.

* * * * * * *

HO CHI MINH COMMUNICATION TO THE POPE [P. 167]

Senator Lausche. Was there anything essentially significant
that happened with respect to this last stoppage, and that is
by way of a statement made by the ambassador of North Vietnam
to France, and a communication sent by Ho Chi Minh to the Pope.
Secretary Rusk. That came at the end of this period of six
days. You recall, Senator, that the two countries who are the
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference were then in conference in
London; Mr. Kosygin was there with Prime Minister Wilson, and
they took certain initiatives, communicating with the parties
to see if they could move the situation off center, but without
success. The Hanoi response was as contained in President Ho
Chi Minh's message to the Pope on February 13, and I will be
glad to put the text of that in the record if the Senator
wishes.

DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN ABM SYSTEM [P. 169]

Senator Williams. If we decide to deploy them, how long
would it take us to get them actually installed?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Fisher tells me--I am not familiar with
this point myself--that to deploy these missiles in suitable
arrays, with all the facilities that would go with them, would
require four to five years.
Senator Williams. What I was trying to determine is, how
far ahead in deployment are the Russians at this point, two or
three years?
Mr. Fisher. My understanding, Senator Williams, is they
have about a year to go before the initial operational
capability of a limited system around Moscow. There is
considerable argument what the other systems are. They have
about a year to go around Moscow. We have four to five to go
before our system would reach an operational capacity. That
would put them three or four ahead of us with the qualification
on it that the system around Moscow is not considered effective
against the totality of U.S. missiles. It does not provide
adequate radar coverage to protect against POLARIS missiles,
and that automatically starts an argument in the intelligence
community of what have they done it for if it is not any good,
but there is an understanding that it would not be effective
against POLARIS missiles because the radar coverage now
existing just does not cover certain segments from which
POLARIS missiles will come.

* * * * * * *

REPORTS OF U.S. ``CRISIS'' FOR WEST GERMANY [P. 175]

Secretary Rusk. Senator Symington, I think the committee
should know from the beginning of the Geneva Conference we have
had the most intimate consultation among the four NATO members
who are part of that conference, plus the German liaison
representative who is present in Geneva, that this matter has
been discussed frequently in NATO itself, and that at the
present time we are consulting with our allies before there is
an agreement with the Soviet Union.
Now some of our allies doubt what I just said. Some of them
seem to think there is an agreement under the rug we are not
disclosing. Now, for reasons that I explained to the committee
earlier this morning, this just is not true. There is a major
question of interpretation still outstanding between us and the
Soviet Union, so this is not a case of our having an agreement
with the Soviet Union under the rug on which we are consulting
with our allies in the spirit that nothing can be changed. We
are, in fact, now in process of consulting our allies prior
to--we hope to be--a final stage with the Soviet Union, and
before a treaty text is actually presented in Geneva.
Senator Symington. Well, this article worried me.
Secretary Rusk. There have been, Senator--and I may have to
deal with the record a little bit on this--there have been
certain kinds of resistances in Germany to the whole idea of a
nonproliferation treaty. First, they say that they have already
renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, therefore they do
not need a treaty. Secondly, some of them say that ``In any
event, we are prepared to take these obligations to our allies,
but we do not want to undertake obligations of the Soviet Union
and thereby give the Soviet Union a right to interfere with our
affairs here.''
Some of them have said that this would sentence them to
permanent inferiority to France inside the alliance in Europe.
Some of them have hoped that maybe this issue could be used as
a card to play in bargaining with the Soviet Union with respect
to a settlement of the German question. There have been a
combination of ideas on this subject.
Now, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have
brushed aside most of these problems in their own views about a
nonproliferation treaty, but they do have some internal
political problems with respect to it.
We will do our best to satisfy them on the fair question
such as effect on industry and peaceful uses and questions of
that sort, but there is built into a nonproliferation treaty--
there is inherent in such a treaty--a discrimination between
nuclear powers and nonnuclear powers.
The whole purpose is not to let further countries become
nuclear powers. So there is not much we can do about that, but
I think it is quite clear, Senator, that within NATO itself,
and within European NATO, leave out the United States, if the
Federal Republic of Germany should become a nuclear power, NATO
would disintegrate because the other European allies in NATO
would not be prepared to see this happen. I think the Germans
understand that, and my guess is that at the end of the day
they will sign, perhaps grumpily, but I think they will sign.

* * * * * * *

MUTUAL INTERESTS EXIST WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION [P. 176]

Now, there are some people who forget about that when they
raise questions about why we are trying to probe for points,
even small points, of possible agreement with the Soviet Union.
Now, in the case of trade, for example, Senator, basically
what we are doing, if the Congress will give us permission, is
to agree with our friends in Europe.
You will notice that for 15 years we were in a minority of
one in COCOM.
Senator Symington. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rusk. And our friends in Europe kept pushing down
the COCOM list and trading and so forth, and we were resistant
to it and finally we said, ``We will agree with you then.''

EAST-WEST TRADE

Well, that immediately created a what does this mean, you
say. In the case of trade, Eastern Europe has 24 percent of its
foreign trade with Western Europe, 1.6 percent of its trade
with us. When we say to our Congress, ``Will you give us
permission to enter into agreements where we can change our
arrangements somewhat,'' then some of our friends in Europe
say, ``Well, you are going way out of our way to make overtures
to Moscow,'' when in fact all we are doing is agreeing with our
friends in Europe.
Senator Symington. Several years ago the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce both testified in open
hearings the United States was the last developed country in
the world not doing its best to sell everything it could behind
the Iron Curtain, except in most cases sophisticated war
materials.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
Senator Symington. And yet when we try to improve our
position through trade, as I understand your point, we are
criticized by a die-hard group over here as being in effect
overly friendly with Moscow.
Secretary Rusk. I have added another point, Senator. I have
said to some of our friends in Europe of course what you would
really hope is that we continue our policy of no trade while
you continue to develop the Eastern European market without our
competition, and they have and sometimes they will say, ``Yes,
I expect that is right.''
Senator Symington. I will correct my use of the word there,
but we understand each other.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

* * * * * * *

ROLE OF ACDA IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS [P. 177]

Secretary Rusk. The Committee of Principals is made up of
those whose advice the President inevitably will want to have
and have to have before the President makes decisions on these
very important questions. That includes Defense for obvious
reasons; CIA is heavily involved because some of these issues
turn crucially on our ability to be assured that arrangements
we may propose can be monitored and inspected and verified.
So that I do not believe that the composition of the
Committee of Principals creates any distortion. The Committee
of Principals are those whose advice any president would feel
he would have to have before he made any final decision.
On the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Mr. Foster is
carrying the principal negotiations on those. He is in Geneva
now, and I am not sure that I should put this on the record, he
will shortly be visiting certain of the capitals in Europe to
go into these matters further to try to bring the NATO matter
to a conclusion.

* * * * * * *

[P. 178]

Senator Clark. Now, when you say the people at the top
level, will Ambassador Thompson stop at the Gromyko level or
will he move right up?
Secretary Rusk. No, he has talked--we would certainly think
this would certainly go to Mr. Kosygin, and, as a matter of
fact, Senator, I would probably want to take this out of the
record----
Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, this record will be closely
held, and, so far as any public release is concerned, you will
have complete discretion to change it.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, sir.
The real people on this subject, Senator Clark, are
probably in the back room of the Kremlin, those people who
almost never expose themselves internationally, but who really
join the Presidium in the actual determination of policy on
important subjects.
Senator Clark. I imagine that would include their own
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, that would include them----
Senator Clark. Their intelligence sections.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And key members of the
Presidium, who are represented publicly by Kosygin and
Brezhnev.

[P. 178]

Senator Clark. You will remember the very strong
recommendations in that regard made by Mr. Wiesner's committee.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Clark. During the ICY.
Secretary Rusk. And we pressed the regional representatives
to consider coming forward with proposals affecting their
regions; for example, Mexico and Brazil for Latin America;
Egypt and Ethiopia for the Near East and Africa and otherwise.
Very little has been done on that. But, more importantly,
Senator, I myself have discussed this on more than one occasion
with Mr. Gromyko, hoping that we and the Soviet Union quietly--
and I must take this out of the record--hoping that we and the
Soviet Union quietly could begin to concert our policy to level
off and turn downward this unfortunate neighborhood arms race
in the Near East.
Unfortunately Mr. Gromyko has said that action in the
nuclear field is the limit of their interest. They have not
been willing seriously to take up the race in conventional
arms. As you know, they are supplying substantial arms to
Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and now----
Senator Clark. Iran.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And now selling arms to Iran.
We regret this very much because we think this is an arms
race that ought to be unnecessary and that something ought to
be done about it.
If we could get some help from the Soviet Union on that, I
think we could make some headway.

AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS

Senator Clark. This might be worthwhile taking up at Geneva
at that level to start with. We would at least like to see the
Russians join with us in halting that arms race in the Middle
East.
Secretary Rusk. There may be some point in our making some
public proposals along these lines so that everybody
understands what the situation is. We would be prepared to
encourage and cooperate in any such effort, but there are
others who will not.
Senator Clark. I understand you want to get out of here by
12.
Secretary Rusk. It is up to you. It is up to you.
Senator Clark. It occurs to me that this business of the
political union of Europe as an objection to the
nonproliferation treaty might be handled, might it not, by an
escape cause and will you not have an escape clause in the
treaty anyway so that if political union became a pragmatic
matter of some urgency, they could, if they want to, get out
from under?
Secretary Rusk. A withdrawal clause.
Senator Clark. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. They could utilize a withdrawal clause.
We would like to be able to find an answer that is somewhat
better than that because that makes the proliferation treaty
itself somewhat fragile in theory anyhow.
But, Senator, I think there is an understanding among all
concerned that the political unification of Europe is quite a
distance ahead, and I hope we can find some way not to let that
presently hypothetical question bar present advance on
nonproliferation.
Senator Clark. Would you agree that if we can make some
progress with respect to the ABM discussion between the USSR
and ourselves, including the discussions for some curtailment
of offensive weapons and missiles, this might well remove the
major objections by the non-nuclear powers to the nuclear
proliferation treaty because then the presence of ourselves
would have made those concessions in terms of reducing their
own capability, which I understand India and Sweden and some
others have been asking for some time.
Secretary Rusk. I would think if we and the Soviets could
make any progress at all either in putting a ceiling on the
nuclear race or turning it down somewhat, that this could have
a very stimulating effect on the non-nuclear areas, no question
about it.
Senator Clark. This, of course, is a matter in which the
ACDA is very much interested.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Clark. The final question--how long, in your
judgment, can we make--this is a diplomatic and political
matter guided, of course, by proper military advice with
respect to deployment of ABM's. I could hope we could wait long
enough for a negotiation with the Soviets along the lines of
the Kosygin letter to proceed at the usual leisurely pace with
which the Soviets always engage in such negotiations.
Secretary Rusk. I do not want to be categoric about the
decision that the President will have to make in consultation
with congressional leaders. But it is my present view that we
would be able to wait during a very, very substantial period of
active and promising negotiations. In other words, I do not
think we are going to hurry if there is any possibility that we
can reach some result with the Soviet Union on this.
Senator Clark. I am happy to hear that. The chairman will
recall that General Wheeler testified that there was enough
money in the budget, which is coming up, to enable them to go
as far ahead as the Joint Chiefs thought they needed to with
the development and even perhaps the initial deployment of an
ABM without making a public fuss about it.
Secretary Rusk. I think that is true for the present and
under the budget that is now before the Congress.
As you know, it is now publicly known there is a difference
of view on this matter between General Wheeler and the
Secretary of Defense, and General Wheeler has spoken about the
ABM's on television, for example.
This has been a friendly disagreement, but it is an
important disagreement on that particular point. But this is a
matter where the President and the civilian leadership will
make the decision at the end of the day.

ATTITUDE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Senator Clark. What is your view as to the diplomatic
desirability if India gets too difficult, giving a bilateral
guarantee to India because of the possible Chinese threat which
would seem to be a good deal greater than that against any
other country?
I can see this might cause a lot of diplomatic flap, but I
am concerned that India may balk on this nonproliferation
treaty.
Could you comment on that?
Senator Gore. He commented on that while you were out.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think this is one----
Senator Clark. Do not repeat what you said.
Secretary Rusk. It is a very, very serious question for us,
quite apart from this question for India. I do not think,
first, that India would be interested in a unilateral guarantee
by the United States alone in this matter. They would, I think,
say that it would have to be at least by the United States and
the Soviet Union acting together.
Senator Clark. This should not be too difficult for the
Soviet Union point of view.
Secretary Rusk. That could create some problems. Apparently
they have discussed that with the Soviet Union apparently
without much encouragement. But for us, Senator, there is also
a very, very major problem as to whether we ourselves want to
extend our own commitments that far. Do we pledge the lives of
a hundred million Americans in the first two hours to this end?
Senator Clark. I certainly think not.
Secretary Rusk. It is a very grave decision for us to take.
Senator Clark. Just let me interrupt, and I would think
that the Indian guarantee, if it came forward at all, would be
merely against China and not with respect to the Soviet Union,
which hopefully would join with us.
I do not think you have to worry about France and Britain
attacking India, but if the Soviet Union and ourselves were
prepared to guarantee against China, in my opinion, maybe I am
wrong, this does not confront you with the difficulty you spoke
of because, as I understand it, China has no effective air
force and our manned bombers could destroy the Chinese nuclear
capability overnight.
Maybe it raises the question of first strike.
Secretary Rusk. I would hope, Senator, that some way could
be found for the United Nations to strengthen what has been
said on this subject in such a way that countries like India
would feel sufficient reassurance to be willing and able to go
ahead with a nonproliferation policy.
Senator Gore. Senator Pell.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, first I regret not having been here when Mr.
Macomber's name was up for confirmation, and I am delighted to
see such an old friend and competent officer as he is
accompanying you for the first time. The record will show what
is said even though he is out of the room.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Senator. I am
delighted to have Mr. Macomber with me.

ABM NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

Senator Pell. Secondly, in connection with the ABM's, I am
delighted to hear that Ambassador Thompson will be occupying a
leading role as a negotiator.
Do we intend to move right into those discussions, or will
there be a time lag?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that we would like to begin
them soon rather than late. We have the impression that the
Soviets are still in the position of preparing their own
position. I do not think I said this a little earlier, but this
latest communication we had from them was an invitation for us
to present some additional views on the subject. We do not yet
have from them any that gives us a real feel of what their
approach to it is going to be, except that offensive and
defensive weapons will have to be discussed together; and,
secondly, this should be in the framework of disarmament rather
than in terms of freezes.
Senator Pell. Right.
Secretary Rusk. So that is about the only major clue we
have at the present time.
Senator Pell. Thank you.

1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL

Another question I had here was in connection with the
disarmament subject, and this is, do we ever intend to ratify
the 1925 Geneva Protocol on which I believe the U.N. Assembly
passed a resolution calling on all nations to refrain from the
use of gaseous warfare and bacteriological materials in
warfare? What is our position on that?
Secretary Rusk. May I ask Mr. Fisher to comment on that?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, the U.N. resolution, I believe the term
was, invites people to ratify the 1925 protocol. We voted for
it, in the explanation of the vote considered by various
countries through their own constitutional structures. That
convention is not now before the Senate. It was recalled, I
believe, shortly after World War II, in sort of a review by the
Foreign Relations Committee of things that had been up here for
a long while.
The real consideration, Senator Pell, is whether or not it
is best to invest the substantial effort that would be required
to get that through on the basis of the 1925 convention or
whether we should consider the problem of bringing it up to
date, try to negotiate an up-to-date treaty which takes into
account many developments since 1925, which, for example, deals
with all forms of biological warfare which are not by its terms
covered in the 1925 convention.
Senator Pell. But to interrupt for the moment, the only
thing on the table in a multilateral matter would be the 1925
convention, would it not?
Mr. Fisher. That is correct, and our feeling would be,
however, we have discussed this frankly with 5,000 scientists
who visited the President's science adviser and myself two
weeks ago, that perhaps it might be better to consider
undertaking a major study in this context looking at all the
control problems of BW and CW in a 1967 context rather than the
context of ratifying the 1925 convention.
Senator Pell. I would hope the reason that is inhibiting
you is not the fact we are occasionally using tear gas in
Vietnam.
Mr. Fisher. No. We would be perfectly clear in our own view
that incapacitants, nonlethal incapacitants, are not covered by
the 1925 convention, and any ratification, if they would have
taken place, would have made that perfectly clear.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
In connection with the words in Senator Lausche's
colloquy----
Senator Clark. Would the Senator yield for one moment?
I would like to supplement in the strongest possible way
the view Senator Pell has expressed about the high degree of
desirability of moving into the problem of arms control, in
radiological, chemical, and biological warfare. I think we have
neglected it.
Mr. Fisher. If I can comment, we have had to put the cart--
the horse research before the cart, because in many people's
minds there has been the view that this was an insoluble
problem because of the difficulties of control that the
theretofore 1925 convention was a mere paper promise and
therefore forget about it.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore,
Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper
and Case.
Michael Wood, former Director of Development, National
Student Association, and Phillip Sherburne, former President,
National Student Association, testified on the National Student
Association and the C.I.A.
[The committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1967

Arms Sales to Iran

----------

Tuesday, March 14, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Symington, Fulbright, Gore, Clark,
McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
Also present: Peter Knauer, Assistant for Congressional and
Special Projects, Office of the Director of Military
Assistance, Department of Defense; and Lt. Col. Albertus B.
Outlaw, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs).
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY J. KUSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS NEGOTIATIONS; ACCOMPANIED
BY MR. W.B. LIGON, DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST NEGOTIATING DIRECTORATE
AND ECONOMIC PLANNING-COORDINATION OASD (ISI) FOR ILN

* * * * * * *

EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISION IN IRANIAN CASE [P. 4]

Mr. Kuss. First of all, this machinery included intensive
and detailed discussions with the country itself. For several
years, we have agreed with the Government of Iran that military
supplies will not be sold or bought by them, by any country,
without clear analysis of their need and the economic
capability to support the impact of such purchases.
Secondly, a U.S. military team bringing in our unified
command and joint staff machinery, worked with the Imperial
Iranian forces in analyzing the threat and recommending the
types of equipment which would be desirable.
Simultaneously, our State Department and AID machinery, at
the embassy level, worked with the Central Bank, not just with
their defense ministry, but with the Central Bank of Iran, to
determine financial resources which would be available to meet
total Iranian development and consumption requirements as well
as the effects of contemplated military procurement on such
resources.
Both these military and economic analyses were reviewed by
the Shah, and his prime minister and other governmental
agencies of Iran, and discussed with our ambassador.
All of this information was then made available in
Washington to the State Department, AID, and Defense machinery
for further consideration.
There were many adjustments made in the application of this
machinery. Needless to say, they didn't all adopt my
recommendations. There were many changes.
On the basis of these views, a decision was made at the
highest level in the United States Government concerning the
program which we would be willing to undertake.
From the time that the Shah gave indication of his first
need for additional equipment, to the time that my office was
informed of the program to be specifically negotiated, over
nine months elapsed with consultative machinery operating in
Iran and the United States.
In the final analysis, the most surprising thing to me is
that the Shah waited nine months since he was financially
independent; certainly he is politically independent and had
achieved the approval of the Majlis in November 1965 for the
purchase of $200 million outright from any source.
This waiting period only proves to me to some extent that
he really preferred the United States to continue as principal
military supplier even though he had to wait through all of the
time for the machinery to be processed, and even though he did
not get all that he was capable of purchasing in the process,
in the first analysis.
I should like to conclude my opening remarks with a
highlight summary of the situation taken from reports by people
in our AID, Defense and political machinery, who are a lot
closer to the situation than I personally can confess to be.
These statements from our AID, political, Defense people on
the scene are as follows:
1. While Iran's economic situation is basically sound, the
United States would greatly prefer that it limit the
expenditure of further resources on military equipment. This is
an important element of what was the basis for our final
decision.
The impression is that we wished to limit the amount of
military supply that we provide.
However, there is no prospect of convincing the Shah that
Iran need not develop what he considers an adequate defense
establishment to protect his fully exposed vital oil
installations in the south. Moreover, it is in the United
States interest to maintain a close military relationship with
Iran in order to protect our interests and to enable us to
maintain a dialogue with the Shah on the broader issues of
Iranian economic development and their relationship to military
expenditures.
The United States has made significant progress in the last
two years in stimulating the Government of Iran to examine this
relationship.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN IRAN

For its own part, the Government of Iran has made great
strides in promoting economic growth in Iran, whose GNP
increased nearly 10 percent last year. Iran is credit-worthy
and, given its inability to rapidly absorb large amounts of
foreign financing for its development program, there is room
for additional military credits on reasonable terms.
Senator Hickenlooper. Given its inability?
Mr. Kuss. Yes. In other words, it can't grow up overnight.
All revenues are coming in faster than it can really spend them
on development projects.
Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, they have some extra money
left over to buy arms?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is the point I am making here.
The United States government has constantly tried to apply
brakes to Iranian military spending. Last year, although the
Shah planned $200 million in just one year from us in
purchases, in accordance with the requirements as confirmed by
the special U.S. military survey team, the U.S. government
limited the Shah to $50 million a year, with the possibility of
similar tranches over the next three-year period.
Limitations upon limitations have been placed on what he
can do with military programs.
2. Recent months have seen the steady--and I am quoting
now--continuation of a clearly visible trend toward a more
independent Iranian posture on the world scene. Developments
affecting Pakistan, one of Iran's closest allies, have
reinforced the Shah in his conviction that Iran must be
prepared to stand on its own feet. In setting his twin goals of
economic development and national defense, the Shah has linked
military security to economic and social progress, and believes
that he cannot have the latter without the former. Partly also
because of a deep-seated Iranian Nasserist antagonism and
partly because of the USSR's new policy of friendliness toward
Iran, Iran has shifted the focus of its major concern from the
threat of communism in the USSR in the north to Nasser and Arab
nationalism in the south. The Shah is acutely aware of the
vulnerability of his oil lifeline in the south to surprise
attack and the susceptibility to subversion of the Arab
minority, in Khuzestan.
The Shah feels compelled to maintain an adequate defense
establishment in face of a large-scale Soviet arms supply to
UAR, Iraq and Syria. He believes strongly that it is in the
interest of the United States, as well as Iran, that Iran be in
a position to deter or cope with regional threats rather than
calling on us a la Vietnam.
Egypt has several times Iran's arsenal.
The reason for the Shah's insistence on aircraft of the
type of F-4, and he did insist, was that even neighboring Iraq
already has delivered 18 of the all-weather Mach 2.3 MIG-21's,
whereas Iran has nothing better than day-flying Mach 1.3 F-5's.

SHAH'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

He has expressed his desire to meet his military
requirements from the United States, but he has made it
abundantly clear also that if the United States is unwilling or
unable to meet his major military requirements, he is
determined to go elsewhere to acquire what he needs.
3. The Shah's arms purchases from the Soviets are in
relatively non-sensitive areas such as trucks, armored
personnel carriers and ack-ack guns; his payments are primarily
in natural gas which for 60 years have been flared off. The
Shah's purchasing from the Soviets seems to him, and I am
reporting, seems to him, to be not without some value. He is
convinced that it will undercut Soviet propaganda about the
United States being solely arms merchants to Iran, and about
Iran's being an American puppet.
He also believes it will cause difficulties in the Soviet
relationship with Nasser and other radical Arabs.
Gentlemen, I deliberately didn't try to answer all the
questions in my opening statement but that poses a lot of
questions, I am sure.

* * * * * * *

END-USE AGREEMENT WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 7]

Mr. Bader. While you are getting that--let me ask you a
question. As I understand it, we include in our military sales
or grant agreement with West Germany a so-called end-use
agreement. Is that correct? That is, we have total veto, as Mr.
McNaughton said, over the final disposition of American
military equipment.
Mr. Kuss. That is right.
Mr. Bader. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. I negotiated them; yes, that is correct.
Mr. Bader. Fine.
So in the case of the these F-86, if they are not in Iran--
if they actually belong to Pakistan--then the West German
government and perhaps the Iranian government, if they were the
middleman in this case, have turned aside what was American
desire and policy with regard to Pakistan. Would that be
correct?
Mr. Kuss. I believe that would be correct.
May I continue my answer?
Mr. Bader. Certainly.
Mr. Kuss. To supplement what you said, let me put it in the
record that the United States was supplying military equipment
through grant and sales to Iran at the time that this
circumstance arose.
The United States approval of the German sale to Iran was
influenced by the fact that there appeared to be legitimate
requirements and the experience of the purchase would not
unduly upset the Iranian defense budget.

* * * * * * *

Senator McCarthy. I just want to know, what is the game?
Why do the Canadians do it for Germany under our license? The
Canadians don't have a serious balance of payments problem with
Germany. We do.
What are the politics of it?
Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have--I am not sure the balance of
payments is the consideration at all.
Senator McCarthy. Why? That is the question.
Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have as serious a balance of
payments problem as ourselves, if one is to talk balance of
payments, and the Canadians having financed a production line
for F-86's for themselves were in a position to provide F-86's
for Germany during the build-up period.
Senator McCarthy. Is that because we couldn't do it?
Mr. Kuss. We could have done it.
Senator McCarthy. Why didn't we? I want to know why the
Canadians with our license produced and sold it to Germany. Who
arranged this? Did this involve cooperation on the part of the
Defense Department and our manufacturers of F-86's? What I want
to get at is the process by which these complicated decisions
are made, like the one involving the sale of Lightning fighters
to Saudi Arabia, for example. We sell F-111's to England and
they in turn sell Lightning fighters to Saudi Arabia. Northrop
Aviation, however, says really what the Saudis should have are
F-5's, but, in the end, the Saudis are told: ``You really can't
go out and do the kind of thing you are urging them to do,
compete in the open market really for arms sales because
somebody just said you have got to take Lightning fighters and
we are in turn going to supply F-111's to England.''
Mr. Kuss. My answer to the first question, to start with,
first of all, the North American Aircraft Corporation has the
right to license foreign manufacturers to produce F-86 aircraft
in this case.
Senator Symington. F-86 is a North American; not Northrop?
Mr. Kuss. North American, right.
I understood the question to be F-86--has the right to--
this was some years ago, of course, with the F-86--they have
the right to license other countries to produce the F-86
aircraft with the approval of the United States Government.
They obtained that right through their contractual arrangements
with the Defense Department.
They then obtained the approval of the Office of Munitions
Control, who would also check it out with Defense, to license
Canada to produce, not only for themselves, but for other
countries as they were able to work out mutually-agreeable
sales arrangements.

TOTAL U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN [P. 8]

The United States Government, in reviewing that license,
approved it but insisted that the license itself contain a
clause that if the Canadians were to sell those airplanes to
any other country that they must get the approval of the United
States Government, specifically for that other country, number
one.
And, further, in that particular agreement, that if the
other country were to ever sell it to any other country, they
must also get the approval in succession of the United States
government.
Senator Symington. If you will yield to me a minute,
Senator--as I understand it, then, some 90 F-86's were sold by
Canada to West Germany, correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
Senator Symington. And those were sold by West Germany--
Mr. Kuss. Maybe more, sir.
Senator Symington. All right, we are talking about these
90.

* * * * * * *

MOVEMENT OF F-86'S FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN [P. 8]

Senator Symington. I understand about the initiation; I am
just talking about these planes.
They moved from West Germany into Iran, then from Iran to
Pakistan. Did we know that they had moved from Iran to Pakistan
when they did, or did we find out later?
Mr. Kuss. When we knew, and we consulted with the
Government of Canada, both the----
Senator Symington. Let me ask the question again to be sure
you understand my point.
Did we know at the time the planes moved from Iran to
Pakistan that they were going from Iran to Pakistan, after they
were sold to Iran by West Germany? Did we know it at the time?
Mr. Kuss. No.
As a deliberate plan of our own. No, we did not know.
Senator Symington. We did not know.
Senator McCarthy. I think he is saying that we didn't know
it was going to be through these three stages when we first
licensed them in Canada.
Senator Symington. Just bear with me.
Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a sale to Iran, not
Pakistan.
Senator Symington. We licensed the sale to Iran.
Senator McCarthy. You approved that one, not the next one?
Senator Symington. When did we discover Iran had moved them
into Pakistan by sale, barter or gift?
Mr. Kuss. I don't have a date here. I will be glad to
supply it for you.
Senator Symington. Roughly how many weeks or months was
it--was it some months after they went into Pakistan that we
found out that they had gone to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. It was some months, and after consultation with
Germany and Canada, both countries protested. Iran stated that
the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair. Action was taken
to try to influence the return of the aircraft to Iran. The
Federal Republic of Germany held up further sales which they
had pending at that time to Iran as a result.
At the moment on this transaction we have two points of
information which I believe that you have seen, sir. The
Washington Daily News had indicated that the aircraft had been
returned as a result of strong U.S. pressures. This return of
the aircraft is generally confirmed by DIA but we are still
waiting for specific confirmation.

* * * * * * *

BRITISH SALE OF AIRCRAFT [P. 10]

Mr. Kuss. The Lightning is a British air defense aircraft
and solely usable for that purpose and no other purpose.
Senator Symington. Right. And that plane went from
Britain----
Mr. Kuss. To Saudi Arabia.

* * * * * * *

SALE OF F-86 AIRCRAFT BY WEST GERMANY TO IRAN [P. 11]

Mr. Bader. Is this also the case, as I have heard reported,
of some 200 to 400 M-47 tanks that have gone through Merex to
Pakistan via Iran.
Mr. Kuss. There have been no M-47 tanks that have gone from
Iran to Pakistan, to my knowledge.
Mr. Bader. Fine.
The West German Government has----
Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact we have had that under
discussion with the West German Government, and we both have
held up any sale to Iran for the very purpose that we thought
they might----
Mr. Bader. They might go there.
Mr. Kuss. That they might go there.
Mr. Bader. Thank you.

F-4 SALE TO IRAN

I would like to go to the F-4 sale, Mr. Chairman, with your
permission.
Senator Symington. Very well.
Mr. Bader. Mr. Kuss, as I understand it, there are two
basic agreements between the United States Government and the
Iran Government with regard to military assistance, that is
agreements to talk about what you call in the Defense
Department hardware. First is the September 1962 memorandum of
understanding, and the second is the July 1964 memorandum of
understanding, is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
Mr. Bader. Now, in the memorandum of understanding of 1962,
we--in the major grant items there were 52 F-5's, is that
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Bader. That is roughly correct.
Now, would you explain to the subcommittee the terms of
this July 1964 memorandum of understanding? As I understand
it--and I must say I am quite confused about it--it has been
amended in August of 1966, is that correct, to allow for the F-
4 sale? Am I correct in the information that the July 1964
memorandum of understanding, as amended in August of 1966,
permits the sale to Iran of roughly $400 million of military
equipment, including the supplemental $200 million that covers
the F-4 sale?
Mr. Kuss. That is right.
Mr. Bader. That is right.
Mr. Kuss. May I say, there is one basic sales agreement and
that is the 1964 agreement. In that agreement we acquired
promises from the government of Iran that they would not
proceed at any independent pace on the purchase of this
military equipment, but that it would be subject to an annual
review of the economic availabilities of foreign exchange to
their development program as well as for other purposes. And we
did not wish to destroy that arrangement that we had achieved
from them in 1964. Thus, when we came to the conclusion that it
would be necessary to add $200 million of credit to the 1964
agreement, we thought it best to add it to an agreement under
which we had far more links, controls, reviews, analyses, if
you will, agreed to by the Government of Iran than if we were
to establish an entirely new agreement.
Mr. Bader. When did the Shah of Iran first approach the
United States about his requirement for an aircraft with the
capability beyond that of the F-5?
Mr. Kuss. From my personal knowledge, he was talking about
aircraft well beyond the F-5 before the 1964 agreement was
established.
Mr. Bader. With direct reference to the F-4's, was this in
the beginning of 1966?
Mr. Kuss. F-4s, and other aircraft, well beyond the F-5.
Senator Symington. Let me ask what counsel is interested
in, and what we are interested in: Was there mention in any of
these agreements of the F-4, the ones that they eventually got?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
Senator Symington. When was the decision made to ship F-
4's? When was the decision made and why was it made?
Mr. Kuss. May I review that----
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Kuss--For the record?
As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, there is a
tremendous amount of machinery in existence.
Senator Symington. We understand that.
Mr. Kuss. In the executive branch. One part of this
machinery was the military machinery, the joint staff
machinery, that we sent to Iran to review with the Iranian
armed forces what they stated as their requirements.
Mr. Bader. This is the so-called Peterson mission.
Mr. Kuss. This is the so-called Peterson report.
Mr. Bader. When was that issued?
Mr. Kuss. The Peterson report was issued in approximately
early '65.
Mr. Bader. The Peterson report was the basis of the
military justification for F-4's.
Mr. Kuss. Excuse me, early '66.
Mr. Bader. That was the basis for the military
justification.
Mr. Kuss. March 1966.
Mr. Bader. March 1966.
Mr. Kuss. March 1966, and in the Peterson report they
recommended that it would be necessary for F-4D aircraft, D
aircraft, be provided to combat the Mig 21's that were
available in the southern regions that the Shah was--to meet
the threat that was established.
Mr. Bader. And this was in March of 1966.
Mr. Kuss. This was in March of 1966, right.
Mr. Bader. Did the Peterson report recommend two squadrons
of F-4s which we have now sold to Iran?
Mr. Kuss. I do not recall; I would have to check.
Mr. Bader. According to the Peterson report, as I read it,
they recommended six squadrons of F-5 aircraft and one squadron
of F-4C aircraft during the fiscal year '67-'71 time frame.
Mr. Kuss. You have got to read the Peterson report in two
ways. First of all, we were anxious to keep things as
restricted as possible. The Peterson report not only gave a
report on what was within, shall we say, a constricted level,
but it also indicated that many hundreds of millions of dollars
more worth of equipment could have been justified if one were
dealing with the kind of threat that the Shah was talking about
in Iraq, Syria, and the U.A.R.
Mr. Bader. When was the decision made to go from one
squadron of F-4's, which the Peterson report recommended, to
two squadrons of F-4's which was the final agreement?
Mr. Kuss. This decision was communicated to the Shah on the
10th of August.
Mr. Bader. On the 10th of August.
Mr. Kuss. The decision was made, of course, within our own
executive branch shortly before that at the highest levels of
government.
Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the original----
Senator Symington. Excuse me just a second. You say the
highest levels of government. By that, do you mean the
President?
Mr. Bader. Yes, sir. I do.
Senator Symington. Is it true that Secretary McNamara
opposed this sale?
Mr. Kuss. Proposed?
Senator Symington. Opposed it.
Mr. Kuss. Opposed the sale?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Kuss. No, not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator Symington. Not to your knowledge. Thank you.
Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the 13 squadrons of
F-5's that were called for under the 1964 agreement?
Mr. Kuss. I would have to check that.
May I put that in the record? There is a substitution of F-
4 squadrons for F-5 squadrons, and I just want to be sure about
the numbers, and I would like to insert them.

F-5 AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES TO IRAN

Mr. Bader. It was the decision of the highest levels, that
is the President, that this would be F-4D's rather than F-4C's,
as well, that would be the latest and most sophisticated----
Mr. Kuss. F-4D's
Mr. Bader (continuing). Models coming off the line and
later models coming off the line.
Senator Symington. Who is the one who knows about these
sales?
Mr. Kuss. It all depends on which question you ask, sir.
Senator Symington. I see.
Mr. Kuss. If you want to ask the question about the model
of the F-4, I can answer that.
Senator Symington. What was the day the decision was made
to ship the F-4's?
Mr. Kuss. I believe I said it was communicated on the 10th
of August.
Senator Symington. Fine.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ABOUT SALE TO IRAN

Now, when was the Congress notified that F-4's were going
to be shipped to Iran?
Mr. Kuss. I do not believe the Congress was notified,
Senator, until Mr. McNaughton spoke on the subject.
Senator Symington. That was after it was in the press.
Mr. Kuss. Correct, sir.
Senator Symington. And we talked about governmental
machinery.
Is it the policy of the Defense Department to tell the
press before it tells the Congress about these sales?
Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact, I do not believe we told the
press. I believe the British leaked it because of competition.
It was not our doing.
Senator Symington. So the British leaked it to the American
press.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Do you know who first published it in
the United States?
Mr. Kuss. No, I do not.
Senator Symington. Do you not think that, if we sell the
most sophisticated fighter to a foreign country, that
information should be supplied to the Congress?
Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question this way:
The F-4D, as we sold it to the Iranian Government, was not the
most sophisticated fighter that we were dealing with in terms
of sales to other countries. For example, it is not the same
airplane we sold to the British.
Senator Symington. Well then, let us say the second or the
third or the fourth most sophisticated airplane.
Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question by saying
that in addition to considering the problem, there were many
security meetings held at which we reviewed the switches, the
panels, black boxes of the F-4D, which related to nuclear
capability. They were taken out. We reviewed the missile which
was related to the F-4D and substituted SIDEWINDER missiles
which had been released already.
We eliminated the SHRIKE which is used on the F-4D. We
eliminated the WALLEYE missile which is used there. We
retrofitted some of our F-4D's with CORDS and DCM and
eliminated that.
So on balance we took a decision that we felt that this
would not be a security lapse here or any sensitivity, if
things went wrong.
Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question, please.
Mr. Kuss. All right.
Senator Symington. Do you not think, if you make a sale of
a sophisticated, modern airplane to a foreign government, the
Congress should be informed of that?
Mr. Kuss. I think I can best answer that question by saying
it is not my function to determine that answer, sir.
Senator Symington. Well, then you could say this also,
could you not; that you did not inform the Congress?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And you do not know anybody who did
inform the Congress.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And to the best of your knowledge it
would have remained a secret unless a foreign country had not
leaked it to the press.

* * * * * * *

FOREIGN AND MILITARY POSITION CHANGED BY SALES [P. 14]

Senator Symington. So you knew that the sale was going to
be made before you agreed to sell them the F-4's.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir, and we protested against it
considerably. We made a major point of it in our negotiation,
and made sure that the Shah was clear that our willingness to
sell sophisticated and sensitive equipment was conditional
pending clarification of Iran's position with respect to the
purchases from the Soviet bloc.
Now, the Shah responded to us on that and noted that he
wanted to reaffirm that if it came to Soviet equipment, he
would limit it to nonsensitive equipment. He went on further in
our discussions with him on the subject to note that he had
declined to send Iranians to the U.S.S.R. for training----
Senator Symington. I understand those points.
Mr. Kuss. I think these are important.
Senator Symington. We have had that information given to us
in great detail.
Mr. Kuss. I do not think the last group were.
He has limited the Soviet technicians, only a few, to go to
Iran to instruct Iranians on maintenance. The Soviets wanted
the team to remain two years. He gave them six months. And, as
a consequence, it was on balance when you consider the
tremendous position we have there, the number of technicians we
have there, the large predominance of $1.4 billion, I think,
that it will add up to, of the military equipment that we have
provided, that we still maintained our position in a changing
world, a world in which he was growing more independent, and in
a world in which he had gas to sell that he could not sell
anywhere else.

* * * * * * *

STEEL MILL SALE BY U.S.S.R. TO IRAN [P. 15]

Senator Symington. If they are building a $280 million
steel mill and a $400 million pipeline plant, and they are
purchasing over $100 million in military equipment, would you
not say, inasmuch as all this has happened in recent months,
that the position of the Russians from an economic standpoint
was rapidly moving at least into an equilibrium with our own in
Iran?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir, I do not believe so. I have certainly
pointed out very clearly on the military side that it is not
anything like an equilibrium. It is a man trying to dart in
through the armor with a little pin.
On the economic side, I can only say that when in 1962 we
decided, the Congress, along with the Executive Branch, to
eliminate development aid for Iran, it was inevitable that Iran
was going to turn to business means in the area to find its
way. And that in 1964, the 1964 military agreement was
essentially an agreement to phase out military assistance as
well, and when you move into a situation where you no longer
are giving it away, you find that you have got to find
different ways and means of handling your problem, and you no
longer have the absolute control that we had when we were in
the position of largesse to everybody giving it away.
Senator Symington. At any time did we suggest to the
Iranians that they purchase what they needed in the way of
additional military equipment somewhere else?
Mr. Kuss. Absolutely not. We, number one, opposed the
Russian program, made a major point of this.
Senator Symington. Yes, you answered the question, if it is
no, and you explained to us that you did oppose the Russian
plan.

* * * * * * *

EVENTUAL AIRCRAFT SALES TO IRAN AND PAKISTAN [P. 16]

Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a Canadian-German
arrangement which would get them to Iran for the use of the
Iranian armed forces.
Senator Symington. Right.
How did they get to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. We found out through intelligence channels that
some of the airplanes were in Pakistan.
Senator Symington. You are going to let us know how many.
Mr. Kuss. And we are going to let you know how many, and we
also have found out that upon remonstration on our part, the
Canadian part, the German part, the newspapers have reported
that they have been returned. DIA has reported they have been
generally returned, but they are not sure about the number.
Senator Symington. Returned from where to where?
Mr. Kuss. From Pakistan to Iran.
Senator Symington. To Iran.
Did we ask the Iranians for an explanation of how they got
from Iran to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. We dealt, since our arrangements were with the
Canadians and the Germans, through the Canadians and the
Germans.
Senator Symington. Did we ask the Canadians and/or Germans
how they explained how the planes got from Iran to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is where the Germans stopped selling
any more equipment to Iran.
Senator Symington. What did the Germans say as to how they
got from Iran to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. The Germans indicated that the first Iranian
explanation was that they were in Pakistan for overhaul. As you
know, Pakistan does a great deal of overhaul for most countries
in that area. This was not satisfactory to anyone, and that is
why we have been pursuing this further.

* * * * * * *

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMS SALES [P. 17]

Senator Fulbright. But who makes the decision to sell arms?
Who determines the country's capacity to purchase without
endangering their economy? Do you as an official of the Defense
Department?
Mr. Kuss. It is my responsibility since the management for
funds must be put somewhere to see to it that that is managed
in a viable way.
But we have a government that has many elements to it and
in almost every case, and particularly in the Iranian case, the
machinery operated from the Teheran Embassy, economic aid
people, with the Central Bank people, to the AID people in
Washington, and it was as a result of their actions that the
program was reduced, the Shah requested, to a much, much
smaller program.

* * * * * * *

RATIONALE BEHIND SALE TO IRAN QUESTIONED [P. 18]

Mr. Kuss. Well, as you say, I probably wouldn't agree with
you.
Senator Fulbright. I don't think you would.
Mr. Kuss. But only because it is the machinery, the very
machinery that you propose to exercise which came to the
conclusion to provide the kind of arms and to eliminate
economic aid in 1962, to eliminate military assistance in 1964
on a phased basis, to provide arms on a very stringent basis,
and to not supply everything that the Shah wanted. It is this
very machinery that you speak of that came to that conclusion.
Senator Fulbright. I am sure Iran wants it.
I was there with Mr. Douglas Dillon in 1959. I suggested to
the Shah that if he spent money on the improvement of the
ordinary citizens, he would be more secure than trying to
protect himself with arms. But there is nothing I can do about
it, and I don't know that it does any good to bedevil you about
it. I realize you are an official in the Department of Defense.
I only hope you do not go too far in loading everybody down
with arms that can't afford it.
Mr. Kuss. Let me repeat again, Senator, that as far as the
underdeveloped country, arms sales are fairly meaningless to
us. They amount to 10 percent of our total program. My office
is occupied with doing things with people with whom we used to
be giving billions in foreign aid in our alliances.
When it comes to the application to these non-developed
countries, my responsibility is to see to it that if we do
extend credit they have got the money to repay it, that we
manage it on an appropriate basis.
Senator Fulbright. I am not arguing about their having the
money for purchases. I expect you will get it.
What they are doing is taking it out of the hides of poor
peasants. That is what is creating a politically explosive
situation.
The Shah will get the money from the Majlis. You don't
dispute that?
Mr. Kuss. Let me make that clear. The Majlis has, as you
pointed out, voted $200 million that he could spend in one
year. We didn't agree with that. We didn't agree with that at
all. We dealt with the Central Bank, Mr. Sami, whom you
probably know is a very capable man there.
Next we dealt with our economic mission in Teheran; next
with the AID group. What we dealt with was a situation which
compared what each tranche of military equipment would involve
in the way of debt pre-payment against any balance of foreign
exchange that was left over after all of the feasible projects
could be administered for the economic development program. We
dealt with that as a given factor by our AID people who did not
take the Shah's estimates of all revenues, reduced them and who
did not take all of the Shah's estimates on what his economic
programs were feasible, and the programs that we are dealing
with here, all through it have a ceiling something like this,
and this curve here is the debt pre-payment capability which
our economic advisers told us was possible after covering the
other programs.
Senator Symington. If the chairman will yield.
Senator Fulbright. I will.
Senator Symington. It would seem clear from your testimony
that you felt the Shah had a right because of danger to his
country to make arrangements to obtain these airplanes. Is that
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. All right. Now, in the Peterson report--
--
Senator Fulbright. Danger from whom?
Senator Symington. I was going to get to that. In the
Peterson report it says, and I quote: ``The combined forces of
these latter three countries represent a overwhelming military
capability vis-a-vis Iran. But for the foreseeable future the
possibility of their making such a combined assault on Iranian
forces seems quite remote. A unilateral attack of Iran by UAR
forces is unlikely. But if it should come, it would be limited
to naval action unless the Israeli issue were first resolved or
unless the UAR achieved hegemony over the minor states of the
area, a circumstance not readily foreseen.''
Now, as I understand it, therefore, you believe that the
threat comes from Syria, the UAR, and Iraq primarily, is that
correct? The Pentagon feels that way?
Mr. Kuss. That is a result of the Peterson report, yes.
Senator Symington. All right. How many Mig 21's has Iraq
got roughly? I think this is very important.
Mr. Kuss. They have 18 on hand, and I believe another 18
coming.
Senator Symington. That is 36. How many has Syria got?
Mr. Kuss. Actual order of battle on hand, 18 for Iraq,
Syria 26, 102 for UAR.
Senator Symington. Wait a minute, you are ahead of me. How
many has Iraq got?
Mr. Kuss. Eighteen.
Senator Symington. And how many do you say they are going
to have?
Mr. Kuss. My records indicate they will have 18 more.
Senator Symington. That is 36.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. How many has Syria got?
Mr. Kuss. The order of battle indicates 26 here.
Senator Symington. Twenty-six. That is a total of 62,
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Right.
Senator Symington. Now how many did you say Egypt has?
Mr. Kuss. 102. Those are just Mig-21's.
Senator Symington. But the SU-7 is an improved Mig-21, is
it not?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is 38 additional SU-7's in the
UAR.
Senator Symington. Well, I mean do you not want to include
the best they have got? The figure I got in Cairo last month
was 60 SU-7's. But you have got 38; you have 102 and 38.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. I would like to check.
Senator Symington. That is 140 and 62. That is over 200 of
the latest model fighters that those three countries have. Why
do you not sell more F-4's to Iran if you want to put them in a
balance of power position against these three countries? In
other words, what do you really do for the Shah by giving him
one or two squadrons of F-4's if your premise is correct that
these three countries are enemies and they have over a hundred
of the most modern Russian fighters. I am following Senator
Fulbright's thinking on this.

OUR MILITARY POSITION IN IRAN

You have been to Iran and so have I. It is a country where
there are very rich people and very poor people. What good does
it do to let them take their resources, and buy these airplanes
from us, if they get them at all, as against what they could do
with that money for the betterment of their economy because the
number of planes that you have agreed on does not make them
safe against these countries. Incidentally, all these latter
countries are really satellites of the Soviet Union, are they
not?
Mr. Kuss. They certainly are.
Senator Symington. Therefore, if the Soviet Union wanted to
move against Iran, the military imbalance is still stronger, is
it not?
Mr. Kuss. It certainly is. May I answer the question?
Senator Symington. I am just asking a few as we go along.
As I understand it, we are selling military equipment to
them, sophisticated military equipment; and the Soviet Union is
selling them unsophisticated military equipment, plus a
tremendous steel mill, for which they are going to be paid in
natural gas, and in oil. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Would you say that in our effort to
preserve a military position which is at best theoretical, we
are passing over the economic control of the country to the
Soviet Union?
Mr. Kuss. I do not see it that way. With a few projects, I
do not see it at all. I would believe that the relationship of
our western influence in both the economic area and the
military area is probably about on the order of the $1.4
billion military to $100 million Soviet.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN

Senator Symington. But we are putting the Soviet Union in
about equilibrium when it comes to economic control.
Mr. Kuss. I do not believe so.
Senator Symington. You do not think so?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
Senator Symington. You think we still control the economy
of Iran?
Mr. Kuss. First of all, I do not believe that the word
``control'' is one that the Soviets use.
Senator Symington. What do you think the word should be?
Mr. Kuss. I believe that the good influence, if you will,
that we have in Iran is sufficiently great, in a preponderance,
in a majority, to warrant the course of action that we took,
and that was the on balance decision of both our economists,
our political people, and our military people.
Senator Symington. You told the subcommittee this afternoon
that we did our best to prevent the sale of the Russian
military equipment to Iran, but we were unsuccessful. Is that
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And at the same time you also told the
committee that the Iranians are working out with the Russians a
big steel mill, and that they are going to have, with the help
of the British and the Russians, a $400 million gas pipeline
with which they are going to pay for this military equipment,
along with gas. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is right.
Senator Symington. So there is a major recent economic
influx of the Soviet Union into Iran, and also a major and
unprecedented movement of military equipment into Iran from the
Soviet Union, correct?
Mr. Kuss. Not in proportion to our influence.
Senator Symington. But there is a major influx.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; there has been a change.
Senator Symington. And all told, the operations of the
Soviets, economic and military together, for say the last 18
months, is greater than our own; so in effect we are moving
more out of the picture with our grant-in-aid and our military
sales, and our economic sales; and the Soviets are moving more
into the picture.
Mr. Kuss. We are----
Senator Symington. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir. We are hardly moving out of the picture
militarily. We have found other monies have been given away to
substitute for the military side of the equation.

* * * * * * *

ARMS SALES TO WEST GERMANY [P. 21]

Senator Fulbright. You said the decision to sell in Teheran
was made at the highest level after considering all aspects. I
assume you mean the relative need of their domestic economy,
and you finally came up with a decision that they needed these
arms, is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. As well as the politics of whether we can stand
the Russian situation.
Senator Fulbright. Politics.

* * * * * * *

[P. 22]

Mr. Kuss. All of these have to be considered. It has to be
required, must be more economically purchaseable in the United
States. Then they will endeavor to do it. Now, the problem
today is not in meeting the basic part of that agreement. The
problem today is essentially the basic internal German economic
problem, a budget that cannot be changed materially because of
a revenue system that is dependent upon revenues from the
States, a requirement for a complete tax reform system.
Today the German armed forces have one-half the procurement
budget in 1967 that they had in 1963. So you can imagine just
that kind of a change. Why? Because they have not been able to
go along with the increases that would have been necessary to
keep up their total establishment because of the revenue
limitations in the total federal program.
Now, this is something we cannot control It is something
that they must control, and I want to make clear that our
agreement with them is that yes, they will balance, they will
endeavor to procure equipment, if it is required, and if it is
economical to do so, and for five years they have done so.

* * * * * * *

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in
Room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
and Case.
Eugene Groves, President, National Student Association,
accompanied by Richard Stearnes, International Affairs Vice
President, testified on the association of the National Student
Association with the C.I.A.
[The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
Room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Pell,
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case and Cooper.
S. Con. Res. 16, extending greetings to Canada on the
occasion of its Centennial, was ordered reported favorably.
S. 623, International Bridge Bill, was ordered reported
favorably.
S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees who
serve in high risk situations, and for other purposes, was
discussed and no action taken.
Ex. E, 89/1, 90/1, Amendments to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, was ordered reported
favorably.
Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunication Convention,
was discussed and carried over.
Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was discussed and it
was decided to have some items clarified by someone from
downtown before further consideration.
S.J. Res. 53, recommending increased assistance to Latin
America, was discussed and a hearing set for Thursday p.m. was
moved up to Tuesday, March 21, p.m.
[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON AFRICA

----------

Tuesday, March 28, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3: 10 p.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
Also Present: Senators Symington and Carlson.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
----------

Senator McCarthy. Do you want to just talk to us, Mr.
Palmer? This is kind of a new committee, and we have no policy
with reference to Africa. If you do not have one, why we are in
good shape.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH PALMER II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: FRED L. HADSEL, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND WILLIAM E. LANG, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AFRICAN AND FOREIGN MILITARY
RIGHTS)

Mr. Palmer. Maybe between the two of us we can devise one,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCarthy. We ought to hear what it is. If you would
like to talk to us generally about two or three items that we
have indicated in the letter, why I think that would be a good
beginning.
Mr. Palmer. Fine.
You had mentioned that you would like to discuss the
military programs in Africa. Would you like to start on that,
Mr. Chairman?
Senator McCarthy. I guess that is as good as any.
Senator Hickenlooper. There are only two things I want to
discuss in Africa: Rhodesia and South Africa.

NORTH AFRICAN MILITARY PROBLEM

Senator McCarthy. Why do we not do a quick one on the North
African military problem, and then we will go to South Africa.
Mr. Palmer. Well, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, of
course this situation in North Africa has been one of
continuing concern for us. As you know, there have been
tensions in the area in the past, but they have been kept under
fairly manageable control, with the exception of one clash
between the Algerians and the Moroccans back in 1963. On the
whole, our military program in North Africa until just a couple
of years ago was a fairly modest one. We have been supplying
both Morocco and Tunisia for some time since independence with
military assistance.
Mr. Lang can give you the figures if you would like them.
But what has given the problem increased importance in the
last two or three years has been the very massive Soviet
buildup, supply of arms to Algeria. This again, of course,
during the Ben Bella regime. It has continued on under
Boumedienne and has achieved very, very substantial
proportions, about $180 million worth of military assistance to
Algeria since 1963.
It is not only the quantity of it, but it is the types of
weapons that have given both the Moroccans and the Tunisians
concern--jet bombers, fighters, surface to air missiles and
other very advanced types of equipment--with the result that
quite an imbalance has been created between the armed forces of
Algeria and those of Morocco on the one side, and Tunisia on
the other.
Now, we have done a lot of skull practice to try to get our
best estimates as to why this has come about and how it has
come about.

ALGERIA AND EGYPT

I think our best estimate involves a number of factors.
First of all, under the Ben Bella regime Algeria was, of
course, committed to export revolution. They were training
guerrillas. We have good reason to believe they trained them
for the Congo and for other areas, and it was a very
revolutionary government. Boumedienne----
Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
When Boumedienne came to power he downplayed this, and the
direction of his policy has been much more toward trying to
develop Algeria internally. Nevertheless we think that most of
these commitments were made during the Ben Bella period and
have been continued during the Boumedienne period.
As you know, Algeria emerged into independence with a Maqui
type force, and the Algerian government was faced with the
necessity of converting that into a more traditional and modern
standing army.
There was a certain amount of speculation that what may
well have happened is Ben Bella took a look at what the Soviets
were doing for Egypt and said, ``I don't really know what I
need, but you tell me what I need.'' The Soviets used this at a
time when their relationships with Algeria were extremely
favorable to try to put in a lot of equipment hoping to
ingratiate themselves and buttress their influence that really
was over and above Algeria's needs.
Then, of course----
Senator Hickenlooper. Do you mind if I interrupt?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. Is it possible that this is a squeeze
play on the part of the Russians with Egypt on the one side and
Algeria on the other, to squeeze out Libya and Tunisia.
Mr. Palmer. I think this may have been one--an original
part of the strategy.
Senator Hickenlooper. And eventually isolate Morocco and so
on.
Mr. Palmer. I think this could have been an original part
of the strategy, Senator. However, I think that Boumedienne's
relations with the Soviets have not been nearly as close as Ben
Bella's were, and I doubt if it is--nor Boumedienne's
relationships with Egypt, with Nasser are as close as Ben
Bella's were, although Boumedienne will be attending a meeting
in the next few days in Cairo along with some of the other so-
called progressives in Africa.
But thus far----
Senator McCarthy. What are the cultural differences between
Algeria and Egypt? They are considerable, are they not?
Mr. Palmer. They are considerable, yes. There is, of
course, very great, strong Berber influence on the Algerians.
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. They do consider themselves as Arabs, but as a
different type and a different part of the Arab world.
I think there are other factors, too, that led to this
massive Algerian buildup. First of all, the fact they did get a
rather bloody nose in this 1963 conflict with Morocco and also
the fact that the government in Algeria is a military regime,
and the man in power has to be in a position of reasonably
satisfying the military commanders to continue to get their
support.
So that I think the rationale, I think, and the explanation
for all of these things is found in this combination of
factors.

NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS

Now, we do not really think that the present government of
Algeria has any aggressive intentions with respect to either
Morocco or Tunisia.
Senator Hickenlooper. Why are they building up their
military forces?
Mr. Palmer. Well, as I say, I think this is partly an
inheritance of the past from the Ben Bella regime, partly
transformation of their military forces into a more traditional
army. I think it is partly an overreaction to the beating they
took in 1963. I think it is generally part of their suspicions
as a revolutionary regime that somebody may try to take their
revolution away from them. I think it is partly because they
are a military regime in and of themselves.
As I say, we do not really think that Boumedienne--who is
quite different, we think, from Ben Bella--really has any
present intention of taking a crack at either Morocco or
Tunisia, nor do I think that the Moroccans or the Tunisians
really think this is a serious present possibility. But what
worries them very much is the future.
Algeria is still not an entirely stable government by any
means. There is internal dissidence within the country. One
cannot be sure that there may not be further changes within the
country.
Furthermore, about 2,000 Algerians have gone to the Soviet
Union for military training, and although I think there is good
reason to believe that not too many of these have been
indoctrinated, nevertheless it may well be and could easily be
that a number of them have been. In the event that there was a
change of government, and given this huge military machine that
is being built up, this is what really concerns the Moroccans
and the Tunisians and has caused them to look to their own
weaknesses and to come to us in terms of assistance.
There is, of course, always the danger in the meanwhile,
too, that there may be a mishap. The border between Morocco and
Algeria is, of course, a disputed border. There has been
trouble there in the past, but since 1963--and particularly
since Boumedienne came to power--they have usually found a
peaceful means of reconciling their differences.
Moreover, the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, has
set up a commission to try to deal with this problem and to try
to bring about a reconciliation between the two. I think this
has had a deterrent and helpful effect in minimizing the
possibility of mishaps.

CONDITION OF THE MOROCCAN KING

Nevertheless, the problem of an arms race is very much
there. As you are all aware, I know, when the King of Morocco
was here very recently, he did again reiterate to us a request
that he had made some months before, which we had tried to
resist at that time, for further defensive weapons. At the time
we were resisting, of course, the full extent of the Algerian
buildup was not clear, but in view of the intervening period
and greater clarity about the extent and the quality of this
buildup, we felt that there were legitimate defensive
requirements.
Senator Hickenlooper. It seems I saw a story in the paper
that he had a heart attack just recently.
Mr. Palmer. I do not believe it was a heart attack. This is
Bourguiba, I think, that you are talking about.
Senator Hickenlooper. No, both of them.
Mr. Palmer. Well----
Senator Hickenlooper. The story I saw.
Mr. Palmer. In Hassan's case, I do not think it really can
be characterized as a heart attack. It was apparently a
circulatory ailment, and they say it was short of a heart
attack but enough to constitute a warning, so----
Senator Symington. It was an attack on the blood that did
not reach the heart.
Senator Hickenlooper. Only the red corpuscles.
Senator Symington. They do not believe in integration.
[Laughter.]

A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM

Mr. Palmer. So this is essentially the program that we have
at the present time. We have agreed to sell $14 million worth
of arms to the Moroccans. The Tunisians have also made requests
on us for additional assistance to build up a minimal deterrent
force in Tunisia. Their armed forces are extremely weak at the
present time. At their request, we have under study a program
of about $25 million spread over five years, to build their
armed forces up to give them a minimal, as I say, deterrent.
We have only committed ourselves to one year's tranche of
this, the first year for $5 million.
Senator Symington. You say ``tranche,'' that lovely little
word. You give them five years to draw on.
Mr. Palmer. No, we have only said that we would supply them
$5 million worth of equipment this year.
Senator Symington. What is the tranche aspect of that?
Mr. Palmer. Well, as I said, it is a five-year program, but
the only thing we are committed to is the first year of that at
the present time.
Senator Symington. Can I ask a question there?
Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead. You are chairman.
Senator Symington. When you have a first year commitment
and only agree to come through with the money for the first
year, how do you define the rest of the four years? Semi-
commitment, or is there some tricky word that describes that?
Mr. Palmer. Tranche was perhaps not a good word for me to
use.
Senator Symington. I was not thinking of tranche so much,
but I was thinking of how can you have a five-year agreement if
you only agree to give them the money for one year?
Mr. Palmer. No, we have not got a five-year agreement. We
gave them a report that would provide them with a minimal
defense capability over a period of five years.
Senator Symington. Who made the report?
Mr. Palmer. We did.
Senator Symington. Who is ``we''?
Mr. Palmer. Well, the Department of Defense--Bill, do you
want to speak to this?
Mr. Lang. Yes, Mr. Senator.

MILITARY TEAM IN TUNISIA

A military team went to Tunisia at the request of President
Bourguiba to see what changes or modifications of the Tunisian
armed forces would be needed to give them the best defensive
capability they could have taking into account their limited
resources.
Senator Symington. When was this?
Mr. Lang. This was a year ago last November.
Senator Symington. What was the name of the general who
headed it up?
Mr. Lang. It was not a general, but a colonel by the name
of Clowes.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, while you were gone I took
the liberty of asking a couple of questions, and I would like
to pursue them a minute.
Senator McCarthy. Go ahead.
Senator Symington. The question was a five-year agreement
with Tunisia, as a result of an investigation made by the
Department of Defense presumably, Mr. Secretary, at the request
of the State Department.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. By a Colonel Clowes, and he went over
and told Tunisia they need $25 million to have a modern----
Mr. Lang. If I may complete the discussion, Mr. Senator----
Senator Symington. Let me just see if I got it straight up
to this point: at his request we tell him he needs $25 million,
which we are going to give them on the basis of a five-year
agreement. But we only put up the money for the first year, $5
million for the first year; is that right?
Mr. Lang. I think it might be helpful, Senator, to go into
a bit more detail as to what happened to the report.
The study was made, as I said, at the request of President
Bourguiba. Colonel Clowes headed a military team which stayed
in Tunisia about three weeks, prepared a report which was
reviewed by headquarters EUCOM, Commander, European Forces,
also by the Joint Staff, and was endorsed by both.
Colonel Clowes' report made a number of recommendations
that the Tunisians should follow or carry out in reorganizing
their forces, increasing the size of their forces to a
relatively small extent, but also changing the size and
composition of their units.
The report also indicated that Tunisians would need
additional equipment which they could absorb best over a five-
year period. This was not equipment that should be poured in at
one point in time.

PLANES TO LIBYA

Senator Symington. Are you in the State Department or
Department of Defense?
Mr. Lang. I am in the Defense Department.
Senator Symington. Whom do you work for?
Mr. Lang. John McNaughton.
Senator Symington. You work for Mr. McNaughton.
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Senator Symington. You also sold some planes to Libya, have
you not?
Mr. Lang. Not as yet, sir.
Senator Symington. But you plan to.
Mr. Lang. The negotiations will be begun fairly shortly.
Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. I thought we decided we were going to
sell F-5s to Libya.
Mr. Lang. The decision has been pretty much made, but the
negotiations not.
Senator McCarthy. Is this part of a general strategic plan
for North Africa? I mean Tunisia and Libya?
Mr. Lang. When you speak of a strategic plan, sir----
Senator McCarthy. What you have recommended for Tunisia,
did you conduct the same kind of study in Libya and make these
recommendations?
Mr. Lang. No. The Libyan sales agreement is not the result
of a survey team report.
Senator Symington. What is it the result of?
Mr. Lang. The request of the Libyan government, sir.
Senator Symington. You see, some of the people in the
Department of Defense were very glad this committee was getting
into this because they did not know what was going on
themselves. So by golly, if people in your own building do not
know, then I think we are entitled to find out. I say this with
great respect, but it gets pretty complicated. At any rate, Mr.
Chairman, would it be in order, as long as we are discussing
the north littoral of Africa, that you give us a report on what
you plan in Libya?
Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. We have completed the discussion, I
take it, on Tunisia.
Senator Symington. No. I think they are all together.
Exactly. What you are doing on Libya, the information that was
volunteered to my office was that you had agreed to sell the F-
5's to Libya. So I would like to find out whether the
information I got from Mr. McNaughton's department is correct.
Would you check that out and let me know?
Mr. Lang. Yes. I can recount now.
Senator Symington. No, that is all right, but it seems to
me you said we were planning on doing it. I understand we have
done it, so I would like to have that point checked for the
record and we can supply that.
On Tunisia, as I understand, there is a team in Tunisia; in
Morocco, I have been listening to----
I am almost through, Mr. Chairman. I just want to try to
understand. We are running right across here now. It looks like
Rommel. We are moving right over here now to get this thing
organized.

ROLE OF THE FRENCH

The Algerians, when de Gaulle let them go, were French
citizens; were they not? Is that correct?
Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Algerians were French citizens before
their independence.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. They were eligible for French
citizenship.
Senator Symington. I think they actually were.
Senator Hickenlooper. Part of Metropolitan France.
Mr. Palmer. The northern departments were part of
Metropolitan France.
Senator Symington. My last question or group of questions:
We are discussing what has been done in Morocco; we will skip
Algeria for the moment anyway. We are discussing what is being
done in Tunisia. We are discussing--what is being done in
Libya. Have we discussed with the French at the diplomatic
level what we are doing in the north littoral of Africa?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, we have. They are aware----
Senator Symington. Are they aware of what we are doing in
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya?
Mr. Palmer. I think they understand the reasons for it. Of
course, their relationships with Morocco are not good at the
present time. They have not been good with Tunisia although
they are improving, and I think the French have been
understanding of the reasons why we have given assistance to
these countries.
Senator Symington. How are they with Libya?
Mr. Palmer. So far as Libya is concerned, I do not think
they have professed any interest in this.
Senator Symington. How about Algeria?
Mr. Palmer. Well, of course we have not been giving
assistance to Algeria.
Senator Symington. I just wondered what their relationship
with Algeria was.
Mr. Palmer. Oh, I see. Their relationships are clouded by a
number of financial problems at the present time. They have not
had since independence much of a military relationship with
Algeria, although they are now resuming the training of
Algerians at St. Cyr, which is the beginning of a renewed
French interest. They have sat back--we have thought somewhat
too much--and watched this Soviet buildup going on. We have
talked to them very frankly about it.
They have professed not to be concerned about it. I have
talked several times in the Quai about this myself. The last
time I talked in January, I had a feeling they were becoming
increasingly concerned about it.

FRENCH OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICY

Senator Symington. One final question. I do not want to
take too much time, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to get sort
of the package feel of this part of the world.
You say the French have understood what we are doing. Well,
I understand what we are doing, I think, especially after the
testimony. At least I understood most of what we are doing, but
do they agree to this? Do they think we are following the sound
course there? Do they approve of our arming Morocco, Tunisia,
and Libya against Algeria?
Mr. Palmer. I am not aware of any objections that they have
interposed. Are you Bill?
Mr. Lang. No.
Senator Symington. Are they putting anything up themselves
in order to help along a little bit? It is closer to them than
it is to us.
Mr. Palmer. If I can say, Senator, I would like to come
back to the Tunisian one again, too, because, as I said, we
have encouraged the Tunisians to look elsewhere for assistance
as well. We would like to spread this. We do not want to become
the sole suppliers, and so forth, and the Tunisians are talking
to both the French and the Turks. We are hopeful that they may
obtain assistance in those directions.
We would hope very much, too, the Moroccan-French
relationships would improve to the point that the French would
find it possible to do more in Morocco as well.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET INFLUENCE

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, I do not know if you can do
this under two or three general concepts, but do you look upon
the arms buildup down there primarily as kind of a North
African problem, probably psychological and traditional and at
least contained in the North African context? Egypt, Algeria,
Morocco--I believe this is the old game they have played for a
long time. You are just using slightly more sophisticated
instruments of war instead of horses and rifles.
Mr. Palmer. I would say so, yes.
Of course what is giving it an alarming dimension are the
types of equipment that the Algerians are acquiring.
Now we have got a similar sort of situation, of course, in
the horn of Africa where again the Soviets are building up the
Somalia forces in that area. This again gives us concern,
although there, of course, the disparities are on Ethiopia's
side, but of course Ethiopia is a much larger and more complex
country.
The question that arises is what the Soviet motivations are
in all of this. I think they are probably the obvious ones of
influence. I think it may also suit their purposes very well to
create pressures on the adjoining states. This is one reason we
have been so anxious to minimize U.S. supply of arms to the
adjoining states so that they will not fall in the trap, and
they recognize the trap here, too, I think.
Senator McCarthy. What do the Algerians give in exchange
for arms or the people in Somaliland?
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry, sir.
Senator McCarthy. What do they give in exchange for Soviet
arms? Are these pretty much grants? The Algerians do not have
much, do they?
Mr. Palmer. I think in the case of Algeria it is half.
Mr. Lang. It is either half and half or two-thirds, two-
thirds cash. When I say cash, credit, two-thirds credit and
one-third grant.
Senator McCarthy. How about Somalia? They do not have
anything, do they?
Mr. Lang. I think perhaps the terms are roughly the same.
We do not have really too much information on the terms.
Senator Hickenlooper. What kind of credit is it? This
credit that is used is a loose term. And the cash, what kind of
credit? Is that foreign exchange, acceptable foreign exchange,
international foreign exchange such as dollars? What is the
credit?
Mr. Lang. It may be barter arrangements, sir. As I
mentioned earlier, Senator, we really do not have that much
hard information about the terms of the agreement between the
Soviets and the Algerians.
Senator McCarthy. They do not have much to give in
exchange, do they?
Mr. Palmer. Somalia does not.
Senator McCarthy. Somalia does not have anything.
Mr. Palmer. Algeria has somewhat more because there is a
considerable amount of petroleum.
Senator Hickenlooper. They get exchange out of oil.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. But the Russians do not need that kind of
oil.
Mr. Palmer. No, but it does in hard currencies.

WHEELUS AIR BASE

Senator McCarthy. What about the overall strategic plans?
You said we made a study in Tunisia and made these
recommendations. Is this simply in terms of this North African
complex or do our recommendations there and our concessions
with reference to Libya involve somewhat more comprehensive
strategic planning than just this self-contained North African
complex?
Mr. Palmer. Well, in the case of Tunisia, of course, we are
interested in stability in the area. We are interested in the
very prowestern orientation of Tunisia. Bourguiba has been
extremely courageous in speaking out on a great many political
issues of importance to us. He supported us on Vietnam. He has
taken a very forward stance. This put him at odds with the rest
of the Arab world with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict, and
he has stood for a great deal in Africa and the Middle East.
In the case of Libya, of course, our interests there are
much more direct. We do have an extremely important facility
there in Wheelus.
Senator Symington. What is important about the Wheelus
airbase?
Mr. Palmer. In the Wheelus airbase?
Senator McCarthy. Is it just a base or is it more than
that?
Senator Symington. I have been there, and I would like to
hear the modern version.
Mr. Palmer. As the Senator knows, the importance of the
facility right now, it is supporting all of our U.S. NATO-
committed air forces in Europe, in terms of year-round gunnery
training.
Senator Symington. So if we decided to reduce our forces in
Germany, for example, that would reduce the need for the Air
Force base, would it not, at Wheelus, because that is where
they do the staging?
Mr. Palmer. In terms of the percentage that it would be
used, but you would still have the requirement of forces in
Europe that would need that type of facility.
Senator McCarthy. Fleet support, in the Mediterranean.
Mr. Palmer. No, these are basically in support of the U.S.
Air Force units in Europe.
Senator McCarthy. Is that right?
Senator Symington. In other words, as I got the story when
I was in Germany, Wheelus was very important because they could
fly to Wheelus and fly around the desert when the weather would
not let them fly in Germany.
Mr. Palmer. Precisely.
Senator Symington. You wonder, inasmuch as the weather in
England is not as good as Germany, why they built about the
greatest air force in the world in their day, but I suppose it
is more comfortable this way.
Senator McCarthy. When they decided peace will stay for a
while, they decided to establish places in good climates.
Senaor Symington. The thought occurs to me very seriously
to see it all ties in together if you are going to maintain
this picture over there, keeping these troops in Germany to the
extent that we are keeping them and not following what
President Eisenhower recommended years ago, pulling a lot of
them out, and to the degree that you do not pull them out,
Wheelus is important.
When we had the staging base complex, which was long before
the intercontinental ballistic missile, then these bases were
terribly important. They were militarily important. Now I
understand you say they are logistically important, but if
there is nothing over there to support, then they become
relatively unimportant. Is that not correct?
Mr. Lang. If there were no forces in Europe to support.
Senator Symington. Right. And we have spent a good many
hundred million dollars in Spain where we are behind the
Pyrenees. The bases there are great and the weather is just
about as good. The bases are better as a whole; more bases
there than one base at Wheelus and so forth.
So this really ties into the whole operation over there.

THE PRIMARY THREATS

I would like to ask this question: Based on what you are
saying about Somaliland, and what we really are doing is, Mr.
Chairman, we are arming all the countries that we think are for
us in case they get attacked by Somalia or Algeria--or the UAR,
of course--that is about the long and short of it, is it not?
Mr. Palmer. What we are hoping there to do is to assure a
minimal defensive posture.
Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question.
We are arming these countries in order to help them defend
themselves in case they are attacked by Somalia, Algeria, or
the UAR. Is that not correct?
Mr. Palmer. Those are the primary threats to them, yes.
Senator Symington. Or anybody else that wants to attack
them.
Mr. Palmer. Yes. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Even France.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir. But when we say arming them, Senator,
I would like to point out that we have held back and held down
very much the quantities of arms that we have made available to
these countries.
Senator Symington. We are only arming------
Mr. Palmer. To assure that they were minimal just to give
them a deterrent capability, a defense capability so they would
not be overrun before the matter could get to the U.N.

OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT

Senator Symington. How do you know whether an F-5 airplane,
which is a supersonic fighter and extremely able, can be used
offensively or defensively? That is what I do not understand.
Do you have anything in the contract that says the plane cannot
go out of Tunisia?
Mr. Lang. All of the military assistance agreements, sir,
do specify that the equipment will be used only for internal
security or self-defense.
Senator Symington. Well, suppose they figured they were
pretty confident that Libya was going to, that Algeria was
going to attack them. Does the contract say they cannot attack
Algeria unless Algeria attacks them?
Mr. Lang. Self-defense, sir, usually means that you are
attacked first.
Senator Symington. Well, I know, but you are going to arm
all these countries, and every time that happens we end up in a
war.

SOVIET ARMS IN ALGERIA

Mr. Lang. Senator, it may be helpful to give some
dimensions to the Soviet buildup or the buildup of Soviet arms
in Algeria.
Senator Symington. I will tell you what I wish you would do
for the record, Mr. Chairman, if it is in order.
I wish you would give the details of the agreements and the
wording of the agreements, if that is agreeable.
Senator McCarthy. That would be fine. Also, if we could get
a kind of total really as to what the Soviet has in this area
in contrast with what we have got here.
Mr. Lang. Would you care for some of that now, sir? I have
some of the statistics.
Mr. Palmer. I think it would help.
Senator McCarthy. I think it would. I do not know, maybe
you ought to swing it on around what we have got in other Arab
countries. So far as Egypt is concerned, it plays both ways,
does it not?
Mr. Lang. Let me speak briefly, sir, to the buildup in
Algeria and compare it to what the Tunisians and the Moroccans
now have.
Senator McCarthy. All right.
Mr. Lang. In the case of Algeria and Morocco, the size of
the armies are not too far apart; Morocco about 50,000 and
Algeria 60,000. The Tunisians have 18,000.
In terms of tanks, the Moroccans have 75. The Algerians
have 429. The Tunisians have 17.
In terms of artillery, the Moroccans have 191. Algeria 681.
I do not have the statistics for Tunisia.
Armored vehicles, Morocco 120. Algeria 535.
Jet bombers, IL-28s. Algeria 27. I think close to 30 now,
and we think they are going to 36. Morocco, none at all.
Algeria, 97 Migs including the Mig-21 series.
Senator Symington. How many?
Mr. Lang. At least 25 or more.
Senator McCarthy. Twenty-five of the 21s.
Mr. Lang. That is right. There are 97 Migs in total.
Senator Symington. Any SU-7s?
Mr. Lang. No, sir. The Moroccans now have a grand total of
13 aircraft, nine of which are Migs. You recall the Soviets had
a program in Morocco in the late fifties and early sixties, so
this is the type of imbalance that exists in Morocco.

AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST ALGERIA

Senator Symington. I would like to make this comment on the
basis of that plus the figures you have given like $25 million.
It is just a spit in the ocean what you are doing so far as
giving them an adequate defense against Algeria, especially if
the Soviets continue to build up in Algeria. Is that not a fair
statement?
Mr. Lang. The objective, Mr. Senator, is to give the
Moroccans and the Tunisians a defense capability which they
could employ taking into full account the advantages they have,
given their defensive terrain, which would enable them to hold
a major thrust for a period of some days until the U.N. or
another international body could consider the problem.
Senator Symington. Let me be straight on this, because I do
not think there is anything more important in our foreign
policy than what we are discussing today. It certainly has been
an awfully ignorant subject around the Armed Services
Committee.
I do not know how much the Foreign Relations Committee
knew, but we knew little or nothing about it on the Armed
Services Committee. Are you saying that with these amounts that
we are giving these countries that over a period of days or
weeks, whatever is necessary, that they would defend themselves
against the buildup in Algeria that you have just told us
about.
Mr. Lang. It is the judgment of the Joint Staff, sir, that
with the type of equipment and the quantities which we have
been speaking of, that the Moroccans and the Tunisians would be
able to hold against an Algerian thrust for a period of days.
Senator Symington. For how long?
Mr. Lang. This would vary, sir, where the attack would take
place. The minimum estimates are four to seven days.
Senator Symington. So we are giving them four to seven days
of hold until we can get to the United Nation. Is that it?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. Until they can get to the U.N.
Senator Symington. When you say the Joint Staff, you mean
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Palmer. The joint organization which supports the Joint
Chiefs. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And these are the figures they have
approved now to make it possible for these countries to defend
themselves against Algeria, is that correct?
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. What is the comparative strength in
hardware between Algeria and Morocco?
Mr. Lang. If I can just----
Senator Hickenlooper. As of now as against the time when
the Algerians were not successful against the Moroccans.
Mr. Lang. I do not have the statistics, Senator, with me,
but I would say----
Senator Hickenlooper. I mean the balance. Is the balance
about the same now as it was then?
Mr. Lang. No, because the Soviet buildup has taken place in
Algeria since 1964. There have been large--huge quantities of
arms going into Algeria from '64 through the present.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thanks.

COMMITMENT TO TUNISIA

Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I can clarify just
one other statement that related to Senator Symington's summing
up. We do not have a five-year commitment to Tunisia. What we
have given the Tunisians in response to their request is a
report that is based upon a five-year buildup of the Tunisian
armed forces. The only thing that we have committed ourselves
to is one year's assistance to them, and, as I say, we have
encouraged them to look to other countries to assist in
supplying equipment for the remainder.
Now, that is not to say we would not do something more in
subsequent years. But I just wanted to make that clear. We do
not a have a five-year commitment to Tunisia at the present
time.

NO DEFENSE PACT

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, could I ask, back eight or
ten years ago when we were bent on working out treaties like
CENTO and SEATO, there was some talk about an African
arrangement of some kind, as a kind of a southern tier which
would have involved what, Ethiopia, Libya, and kind of close
off Egypt, the Sudan. I think we were talking about that. Is
that idea still around?
Mr. Palmer. No. The idea is not current, Mr. Chairman, at
the present time, and I think that the nonaligned posture of
all of these countries----
Senator McCarthy. No plans for the Sudan then at the
present time.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. What were you about to say about the
nonaligned posture?
Mr. Palmer. I think the nonaligned posture of these
countries would not make such a defense arrangement possible,
even if we wanted to assume additional obligations which we
have not wanted to in that context, in that area.
Senator McCarthy. Frank, I do not know whether we need to
press this North Africa.
Senator Carlson. I have been very interested in this. I
just see a picture on this map, and I can see these countries
where the Soviet Union has been building up. I can see also
where we have our military posture.
It gets back to when, I think it was Secretary Rusk was
before our committee, he talked about the balancing of arms
between nations. In other words, if one country got a little
ahead, it was our policy to build up the neighbors. I do not
know how far we can go. Maybe we should be going more
extensively than we are, I do not know. It is a problem.
Mr. Palmer. Well, it is a difficult problem, Senator. We do
not want to see them lose their independence. At the same time,
we do not want to see them dissipate resources that should be
going into economic development, and I should add to that that
the countries themselves do not want to. Both Bourguiba and
Hassan have given very high priority to their economic
development programs, but both of them do feel that this
imbalance does threaten their security.

COMPARISON TO VIETNAM WAR

Senator Symington. Let me ask this question, if I may.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Symington. You have heard of the Vietnam war.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And we put in heaven knows what, great
tens of millions of dollars, and the people supplying the Viet
Cong have put in not even a small fraction of what we have put
in money and equipment. For example, they put in no air forces
at all really to speak of, except in North Vietnam. They have
nothing in South Vietnam.
If these people want to be independent down here, is it
necessary for us to supply them with these--with all this
equipment? Is there not a little Viet Cong in their hearts,
too, that they want to be independent and they are willing to
fight and die for what they think is right in those countries?
Mr. Palmer. I think there is that feeling, but I think that
they feel that they need a minimal capability in order to do
this. I think what we have been supplying, Senator, is a pretty
minimal capability.
Senator Symington. If we want to support the regimes in
this country, for example, as I have told the full committee
already and the Armed Services Committee, the biggest shock I
think I have ever had in armaments is the degree of the
armament of the United Arab Republic by the Soviets.
I was just in Cairo a few weeks ago, and I was surprised
the same before. They have tremendously increased their arms. I
do not think there is any remote chance if they made an all-out
attack there that anybody has the ability to defend themselves.
I would stake that on everything I have learned, assuming they
can operate the equipment.
If we are going to arm these people, and we have got a much
bigger gross national product that the Defense Department is
always talking about and justifying the budget, why do we not
really arm them?
I am only asking. Why just give them a little minimum
business to make them last a few days and then go down the
mine?
Mr. Palmer. Of course that involves a lot of recurrent
costs, Senator, that we had thought that our best posture here
was to give them a minimum capability. That is the best
judgment of our people. They should place their real reliance
on the United Nations.

EVALUATING THE EGYPTIAN BUILDING

Senator McCarthy. How do you evaluate the Egyptian buildup,
Mr. Palmer, and the Algerian one? Is this the Soviets showing
off and saying ``These are our friends,'' and saying ``Look
what we give to them''?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think that is a large element.
Senator McCarthy. They do not anticipate they will be used.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think it is a large element.
Senator McCarthy. So we take a calculated risk that this
power will not be brought into action, or, if it is, why we can
hold long enough for the U.N. to take some action.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. Is the U.N. concerned about this? Is
there any special action there?
Mr. Palmer. Yes. I started to say that King Hassan, when he
was last here in the United States, did have a talk with the
Secretary General of the United Nations in which he followed up
with a letter asking the Secretary General to intervene with
both Morocco and Algeria to see if it would not be possible to
reach some sort of an understanding to hold the level of
armaments down.
I would have to say in all confidence that I do not think
that this was handled as skillfully as it should have been by
the Moroccans because before the Secretary General had an
opportunity to explore this at all with the Algerians, where
the Moroccans published the letter, and this inevitably
resulted in a reaction from the Algerians who have taken the
position that there are a number of differences between the two
of them.
It is not only the level of armaments, but there is the
question of the disputed border. The disputed border is in the
hands of the O.A.U., and therefore----
Senator Symington. O.A.U.?
Mr. Palmer. Organization of African Unity, which is the
continental organization of African states. And that,
therefore, they did not think the United Nations was a proper
place for this.
We have been hopeful nevertheless, that at some point, if
it is not in the U.N. forum maybe in the O.A.U. forum or some
other forum, that some means can be found of trying to reach
some sort of an agreement, some sort of an accommodation with
respect to levels of forces, not only in this area but in the
area of the Horn.
But it will not be an easy thing to bring about or to
encourage.
Senator McCarthy. Well, I think maybe for today we probably
ought to leave this stand as it is. A request has been made for
additional information which I am sure you will supply.

CASH AND CREDIT

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one thing more,
just for a minute?
What are the terms of the deal with Morocco and what are
the terms of the deal from the standpoint of what Senator
Hickenlooper was referring to? We talk about credit. Could we
have the details of the deal language?
Mr. Palmer. Fine, sir.
Senator Symington. As to what we agree to take in the way
of credit terms and how much cash is involved and whether we
are using counterpart funds and whether the loans, if they have
any incident to the materials, bear an interest rate and if so
how much?
Mr. Palmer. I can give you details on the Moroccan
arrangement now, sir.
Senator Symington. You go right ahead and put it in the
record if you want, because the Chairman would like to go.
Mr. Palmer. The Moroccan package, 1965, involved 12 F-5s,
spare parts and AGE, totaled $11 million.
Senator Hickenlooper. What? How much?
Mr. Palmer. $11 million, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
Mr. Palmer. Of that $11 million, the United States made a
grant for components of $5 million; $6 million is extended in
credit. Terms, 3 percent, ten years, repayable in hard
currency, 20 semiannual payments of the same size, sir.
Senator Symington. And Tunisia?
Mr. Palmer. Tunisia the negotiations have not been
completed, sir.
Senator Symington. And Libya?
Mr. Palmer. Libya the negotiations have not started, sir.
Senator Symington. Thank you.

SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Senator McCarthy. Do you want to start on South Africa with
a statement or just a question? Do you want to give us a kind
of review on that Rhodesian sanction problem and where it is
leading and what we really have in mind?
Senator Hickenlooper. South Africa, if I may interject--
first I would like to have an explanation for the fiasco of the
Enterprise or whatever it was in Johannesburg or in Capetown.
Mr. Palmer. Capetown.
Senator Hickenlooper. To me that is the most unconscionable
thing we have done in a long time. I would like to have an
explanation that makes me feel more kindly toward our own
people for pulling that kind of a thing down there.
Mr. Palmer. Well, as you know, Senator, in 1965 the
aircraft carrier Enterprise was due to put in to South Africa
for refueling.
Senator Hickenlooper. 1965?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, just to give a piece of background on
this.
At that time, the government of the Republic of South
Africa imposed certain racial restrictions on certain
operational aspects of the visit.
Senator Hickenlooper. They did that at the time the visit
was proposed.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, in 1965.
Senator Hickenlooper. At the time the visit was proposed.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is right.
Mr. Palmer. Specifically they required that the flight
crews that would be operating planes from the ship to shore and
so forth would have to be subject to South Africa's apartheid
regulations.
Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that.
Mr. Palmer. As a result of that, a decision was made at
that time not to put Enterprise in, but to refuel at sea.
This year or last year, when the question of the FDR
transiting from Vietnam to the United States came up, the
Department of Defense took the position that there was an
operational need to go into Capetown for refueling at that
time.
I believe, and Mr. Lang can confirm this, that there were
Atlantic maneuvers going on at the present time and tankers
were not readily available to refuel at sea. Moreover, there
would have been a cost of some $250,000, I think, to refuel at
sea.
Now, at that time we made inquiries of the South African
Government as to whether or not they would impose racial
restrictions with respect to the operational aspects of the FDR
visit.
Senator Hickenlooper. Operational aspects. What do you mean
by operational?
Mr. Palmer. Flights from the carrier to the shore.
Senator Symington. What about those flights? What is the
apartheid significance of those flights?
Mr. Palmer. That they would have had to go into South
African airports, airfields, and so forth, and that any crews
on board, if there were Negroes on board, would have to use the
African facilities and would not be allowed to use the white
European facilities.

SOUTH AFRICA'S APARTHEID POLICIES

Mr. Lang. If I might, in '65, the South African Government
in effect placed a condition on us that we could not have Negro
crew members aboard the aircraft coming from the carrier to the
airfield facilities.
Senator McCarthy. Oh, the problem did not arise.
Mr. Lang. Because they did not have the apartheid
facilities for them.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
In any event, on the basis of those assurances that they
would not attach such conditions, the FDR was authorized to go
in. But shore leave was only authorized on the basis that it
would be for integrated activities, and quite a range of
integrated activities had been worked out by our embassy down
there and with various people in the community.
The commanding officer of the vessel, however, felt--and
there many other arrangements that were worked out by local
citizens and so forth that would have been segregated.
Under the circumstances it was decided that shore leave
would only be authorized on the basis of integrated activities.
The commander of the ship, with the concurrence of our
ambassador, felt that this was not really practicable and that
he could not give--if he authorized shore leave on this basis,
one could not be sure that certain members of the crew would
not be subject to South Africa's apartheid laws. Consequently,
he decided, with the ambassador's concurrence, to cancel shore
leave.

A CALCULATED INSULT

Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, it seems all the blame for
this--the buck is being passed to the commander of the vessel.
I have had some information from South Africa, not only
from Americans but others, who said that some of the newspaper
stories said it was an absolute and astounding surprise to
these people who went on board to welcome them to find out,
when they went on board for the first time, the commander of
the vessel had to tell them that all leaves would be canceled.
That was after several days of preparation, several days of
discussion, several days when the arrangements were made.
I do not care whether they landed at South Africa or not,
or went into Capetown. That is beside the point. But to go
through all of this and then do what to me appears to be--and I
would like to be straightened out on it--a calculated insult to
South Africa. I think it has all the earmarks of an actually
calculated insult.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. It was not a calculated insult. I can
assure you categorically.
Senator Hickenlooper.. It has that appearance to me.
Mr. Palmer. Senator, the problem arose from the fact, I
think, that the instructions were sent to the captain of the
vessel. I do not think the captain of the vessel should be
blamed. I certainly do not blame him--pretty much at the last
minute.
Senator Hickenlooper. I thought you said it was his
decision.
Mr. Palmer. It was his decision.
Senator Hickenlooper. What were the instructions sent to
him?
Mr. Palmer. But I think what gave rise to his problem,
Senator, was the fact that it was rather late notification to
him that the crews should only go ashore under integrated
circumstances, and he felt that this was too difficult. He felt
that this was impossible really to carry out.
Senator McCarthy. So they never told him not to put them
ashore, but merely told him if they go ashore they would have
to be integrated.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct. They could only go ashore for
integrated activities.

REACTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

Senator McCarthy. Why was that order so late in coming?
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the point.
Senator McCarthy. Was it after the congressional resolution
or whatever it was that was introduced up here? What set if
off? Anything in particular, or was it just slow in coming
downtown?
Mr. Palmer. Well, Bill, do you want to say anything?
I think it was--I am trying to reconstruct something that
took place while I was not here. As a matter of fact, I was
overseas.
Senator McCarthy. There was an earlier incident similar to
this. There was a congressional protest against landing.
Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
Senator McCarthy. Two or three years ago.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is what he was talking about.
Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
Senator Hickenlooper. The Enterprise.
Mr. Palmer. There was a lot of concern expressed in this
country about the possibility of men who had been fighting
together in Vietnam being placed in a position of then having
to subject themselves to the practices of apartheid in South
Africa. And, as I say, the decision that they should only go
ashore on an integrated basis was a rather last minute
decision. It put the captain, there is no doubt about it, in a
difficult position. He had a judgment to make. He made it with
the concurrence of our ambassador.
Senator Symington. Could I ask a question why this was not
thought out before?
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the whole burden of my
concern about this thing.
Mr. Palmer. Well, there were two things: there was this
aspect of it; and there was the operational aspect of it. The
fact that the tankers were not available; the fact that there
was a considerable sum of money involved here in refueling at
sea.
Senator Hickenlooper. But if you say it cost $250,000 not
to refuel there, have you figured out what it cost as a result
of what we did, aside from what the cost in good will was?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. You might get that up sometime.
Where did we ultimately end up by refueling?
Mr. Palmer. We refueled there, but the crew was kept on
board.
Senator Hickenlooper. So we saved the money.
Mr. Palmer. So we saved the money. Yes, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. And set back relations between our
two countries and the possibility of settling the apartheid
business by several years, I think.
Mr. Palmer. Well, we are now reviewing, as we have
indicated, the whole question of port facilities in South
Africa.

DIVERSION OF OTHER SHIPS

As you know, subsequent to that, we did divert another
vessel to Mombasa while this review is going on. We are
undertaking this with the Department of Defense and will be
reaching some policy decision.
Senator Symington. Where is Mombasa?
Mr. Palmer. In Kenya, Senator.
Senator Symington. If you could divert one to Kenya without
any danger of trouble, why could you not divert the Enterprise
to Kenya?
Mr. Palmer. The FDR?
Senator Symington. Or the FDR.
Mr. Lang. The port facilities were not adequate, sir, to
handle a ship the size of the FDR.
Senator Symington. It was the size of the ship.
Mr. Lang. Yes, the draft of the vessel.
Senator Symington. Could you not run a line out, keep her
in deep enough water to refuel it? You do not have to bring a
ship to port to refuel it.
Mr. Lang. They do not have that type of facilities in
Mombasa, sir.
Senator Symington. I see.

PROMOTING BETTER UNDERSTANDING

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I still do not know. I still
say that my whole inquiry goes not to the point that we did not
have them land at Capetown. It is the fact that for days ahead
of time they made arrangements, I am told by people who were on
the ground down there. They said the South Africans had bunting
and welcome groups.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct; they did.
Senator Hickenlooper. It was going to be a great thing for
them. And the idea around in that area was that this would do
more to get a little better understanding between South Africa
and the U.S. They tried to treat the colored people right, and
they would not isolate them off in compounds and all this sort
of stuff. Yet they just had a wet sock thrown in their faces,
not the day before or the morning before, but at the time when
they went on board the carrier to welcome them. That is the
first time they heard.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct. It happened when some of the
officials were on board.
Senator Hickenlooper. On the deck of the ship.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
Senator Hickenlooper. To me it was the most outstandingly
boorish thing I heard of from an international standpoint. In
other words, if they wanted to pass up Capetown or just go in
there to fuel and have it known in advance they were not going
to let anybody have shore leave, that is a matter of decision.
Mr. Palmer. I think all of us would agree, Senator, that
the matter was not handled as well as it should be.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is utterly inexcusable,
and I would like to go on a little bit also, if we are all
through asking about it. I do not want to stop this. I want to
go on to Rhodesia and find out some of the things we are doing
in Rhodesia. I did not want to interfere with any other
question.

U.S. FAVORS MAJORITY RULE AND SELF DETERMINATION

Senator McCarthy. That is the same question everybody is
going to ask. I will put it in these terms. Do we have a policy
of our own there, or are we really kind of riding out the
British position now hoping somehow or other this will work
out?
Mr. Palmer. In Rhodesia?
Senator McCarthy. Yes, in South Africa, in that area.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think we have very much of a policy of
our own on this, Mr. Chairman.
I think that we have historically stood for certain values
and for certain principles, including majority rule and
including self-determination, including the genuine
independence of states, including government by consent of the
governed.
Senator McCarthy. How do we implement it?
Mr. Palmer. Well, we implement it in such ways as we can.
It is certainly not uniform. Different situations call for
different means of trying to realize these objectives, I think.
Senator McCarthy. We are not prepared to go beyond the
British position, are we, on anything in this area now?
Mr. Palmer. We are not simply prepared to go beyond an
effort to resolve the situation in Rhodesia by peaceful means.
This much is very clear, and we have made this very clear to
everyone concerned, I think, Mr. Chairman.
What we have here is a declaration of independence that has
not been recognized by any country in the world, by those who
represent, say they represent, 220,000 whites in opposition to
4 million Africans. The whole thrust of the British effort in
the negotiations that have gone on now for quite some time is
to try to assure that there will be orderly and sustained
progress toward majority rule.
The British have never said that there must be, or had not
said until after the Tiger talks, that there had to be
immediate majority rule, that there could not be independence
before majority rule. But what they have said is that there
must be an understanding, there must be arrangements that would
assure that there would be unimpeded progress toward majority
rule.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Senator Hickenlooper. Is majority rule more important than
economic and social progress in a country?
Mr. Palmer. I think that they are all important, Senator. I
think that when we have economic and social progress in
Rhodesia, we have it in South Africa. But when it results, I
think, in the denial of the ability of the vast majority of the
inhabitants to be able to have some prospect of being able to
conduct their own affairs, then I think it does become a very
grave moral issue.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any degree----
Mr. Palmer. And political issue.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any way capable of
conducting their own affairs?
Mr. Palmer. No, not at the present time. I want to make
this clear again, Senator, that what we are talking about is
not immediate majority rule, but unimpeded progress toward
majority rule. This has been the issue that has been at stake.
It is not immediate majority rule. Of course there would have
to be a transition period before there was majority rule, and
the question that has been at issue here has been the return to
legality, the return to British rule in a very light sense, to
something akin to the previous arrangements until such time as
it is assured that there will be unimpeded progress toward
majority rule.
Senator Symington. I would like to ask one question on
this, if I might, Mr. Palmer.

U.S. INTERVENTION IN RHODESIAN AFFAIRS

Secretary Acheson had a letter that impressed me a great
deal in the Washington Post in which he said that under the
United Nations Charter, as I remember it--I have not read the
letter for some weeks now--but we had no right to interfere
with the internal affairs of Rhodesia.
Has that letter ever been answered by the State Department?
Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg answered that letter and I
think answered it very effectively, Senator, in a letter that
he wrote to the Washington Post on January 8.
Senator McCarthy. He used the Civil War, did he not, as the
principal defense?
Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg?
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. I do not recall.
Senator Symington. Which civil war?
Senator McCarthy. Our Civil War.
Senator Symington. The one in Rhodesia or the one in the
U.S.?
Mr. Palmer. One of Mr. Acheson's main arguments ran, of
course, to Article 27 of the Charter, the Domestic Jurisdiction
clause. Ambassador Goldberg, in replying to this, pointed out
that this is not intervention in the internal affairs of a
state because Rhodesia is not a state. It has not been
recognized as a state by anybody in the international
community.
Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
Mr. Palmer. Just a rebellious colony.
Senator Symington. Did he quote George III, too?
Senator McCarthy. Secession.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, but at least we were recognized by people
as being an independent nation.
Senator Symington. Not by a lot of people.
Mr. Palmer. Not by a lot, but we were recognized----
Senator Hickenlooper. What would be wrong with us
recognizing Rhodesia?
Mr. Palmer. But we were recognized by quite a number,
Senator, and in this case nobody has recognized Rhodesia.

U.S. AS POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD

Senator Symington. One other question I would like to ask
here. Do you think that the mantle has fallen on the United
States now to be the policeman of the world, of the free world?
Mr. Palmer. To be what?
Senator Symington. To be the policeman of the free world.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Symington. Do you know of any country that we are
not defending or protecting that is supporting us and our
policies in Vietnam?
Mr. Palmer. Do I know of any country----
Senator Symington. That we are not either defending or
financing that is supporting us in Vietnam? I am just
wondering. I looked the map over and we are apparently taking
on the defense of all these countries with either money or
troops or both. I just wondered if there was any internal paper
that we have not seen like the F-4s to Iran, for example, that
there has been some decision made that we are going to be the
defenders of the free world and that we are going to finance
them as much as possible through various international
organizations and so forth.
Have there been things written on that that is established,
an American policy in this field that we do not know about?
Mr. Palmer. Not that I am aware of, Senator.
Senator Symington. Thank you, sir.

SPECIAL SUPPLY SHIPS

Senator McCarthy. Could I ask on that point, the Senate
Armed Services Committee turned down a proposal for these
special supply ships last week. I think there were three of
them that were being proposed, but the overall plan called for
30. Do you know whether it was planned that any of the 30
should lie adjacent to any of these areas in Africa?
Mr. Palmer. I do not know.
Do you know?
Senator McCarthy. Maybe you would know.
Mr. Lang. No.
Senator McCarthy. You know the ships we are talking about.
Mr. Lang. I do, sir. I know of none that were intended for
the African area.
Senator McCarthy. Are they all related to Europe?
Senator Symington. 30 to Europe?
Senator McCarthy. I understand there were about three ships
to supply a division which would mean ten divisions somewhere
around the world that was going to be supplied when the full
plan--I assume when the full plan became operative, and I am
sure we did not plan to have ten divisions in Europe.
We do not have to press this, but when we were talking 30
ships, was it three to supply a division or was it more than
that?
Mr. Lang. I do not know, sir.
Senator McCarthy. I thought it was three was my
recollection. Was it three or was it more than that?
In any case, they were asking for three, and I assume they
had to supply divisions somewhere because we do not move----
Mr. Palmer. I would like to make it clear in this
connection----
Senator McCarthy. In any case there was no plan to have
these ships lie off the coast of South Africa or Somalia.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. Our basic policy remains as stated by
Secretary McNamara when he appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the
Department of Defense Appropriations. He said that ``We have
made it clear that our policy is to avoid active military
involvement in Africa, and we will exert all our influence to
achieve peaceful resolution of these problems.''
This remains very much our policy in this part of Africa
and all over the continent. We do not want to get militarily
involved.

SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

Senator Carlson. Getting back to Rhodesia, press dispatches
and reports from overseas, at least, indicate that the
sanctions of Great Britain are not bringing any results, that
they are going to fail. Have you any plans as to what we should
do if they do fail because we are committed to them?
Mr. Palmer. Well, I do not think it is demonstrable yet,
Senator, that they will fail.
Senator Carlson. I see.
Mr. Palmer. The program of voluntary sanctions that
preceded the program of mandatory sanctions has had
considerable effect. Granted that it is difficult to get good
large figures. Nevertheless, I think the indications are that
exports from Rhodesia dropped from about $400 million to about
$224 million in 1966, which is about a 40 percent drop. It is
expected that under the mandatory sanctions program they will
probably drop another $55 million in the first five months of
this year.
It is estimated that the gross domestic product of Rhodesia
has fallen by about 15 percent in 1966, and there will probably
be a further drop of about 10 percent this year.
I would say the two key products really are tobacco and
sugar. So far as tobacco is concerned, about 60 percent of last
year's crop remains unsold. The government has had to buy this
and has to store it, and this has created considerable
financial strains on the government.
As this year's crop, which is already being reduced as a
result, comes in and does not find a market, this will increase
the pressures.
The hope is, of course, that this will bring the Rhodesian
Government back to the negotiating table again and that it will
be possible to obtain a peaceful resolution of this problem.
Senator Carlson. Are efforts being made to do that?
Mr. Palmer. To negotiate?
Senator Carlson. Bring them back to the negotiating table.
Mr. Palmer. I do not think there are any active efforts
right at the moment, but it is certainly in everybody's mind.

SETTLING RHODESIA MATTER THROUGH THE U.N.

Senator McCarthy. Could I ask Mr. Palmer just on this one
point, Senator Hickenlooper, and I will recognize you next.
Is there any reason why Acheson's position was answered by
Goldberg and not the Secretary of State or the State
Department?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, because I think that the major
argumentation that was adducted by Mr. Acheson really ran to
positions that were taken in the United Nations.
Senator McCarthy. Does it mean we want to try to settle it
through the United Nations rather than by direct intervention?
Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
Senator McCarthy. This does not reflect a division in the
State Department which could not be presented in a statement by
the Secretary?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. These are positions which Ambassador
Goldberg had taken as our representative.
Senator Hickenlooper. What was the reason given or the
reasons taken by the United Nations in this--granting that
Rhodesia was recognized as a dependency or a colony of
Britain--what business have we got in there in Britain's
internal affairs or the United Nations either?
Mr. Palmer. Well, I think Britain does bear certain
responsibilities to the United Nations under Article 73 of the
Charter with respect to nonself-governing territories, and so
that there is a U.N. interest.
Secondly, the British themselves took the program to the--
--
Senator Hickenlooper. In the first place, Rhodesia was
self-governing for all intents and purposes over the years.
Mr. Palmer. Yes. Was self-governing until such time as it
declared itself independent and at that time, at that point,
the United Kingdom, through orders in council and so forth,
reasserted their authority over the country. So----

DID THE U.S. PRESSURE BRITISH POLICY?

Senator Symington. Always the British all over the world
have been willing to approve the caste system of a country in
order to control it up until they began losing countries. They
have no basic color problem like we have in this country. Were
their policies in Rhodesia originally formulated or developed
under our coaching while the pound was in very serious trouble
as in Henry Brandon's book, ``In the Red,'' for example,
showing how twice we fished them out?
Did we put any pressure on Great Britain with respect to
her policies in Rhodesia, or were they all Mr. Wilson's ideas
as to how they should be handled?
Mr. Palmer. They were not only Mr. Wilson's ideas but his
predecessors, I guess, as well, Senator.
Senator Symington. There has been no pressure on our part.
Mr. Palmer. There has been no pressure on our part. The
whole concept of the Central African Federation, the federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, when that still was in being, was a
British concept.
Senator Symington. I am just being educated. I have no
criticism, no implied criticism in any sense.
One other question.
Mr. Palmer. We approved that.

THE STABILITY OF AFRICA

Senator Symington. Do you think, based on your saying in
answer to Senator Hickenlooper it is not going too well, do you
think the British are going to bring Rhodesia to their knees in
due course?
Mr. Palmer. I could not say that with any confidence,
Senator. I think only time is going to prove whether this
happens or not.
Senator Symington. Do you think it would be a good thing
for the stability of Africa if they do?
Mr. Palmer. Yes. I think it would be a good thing if they
came back to constitutional rule.
Senator Hickenlooper. If the Rhodesians came back to
constitutional rule.
Senator Symington. My question was will it bring Rhodesia
to their knees.
Senator Hickenlooper. What do you mean by constitutional
rule?
Mr. Palmer. Not to their knees, Senator. If they came back
into constitutional rule, and if they would agree to guarantees
that would result in unimpeded progress toward majority rule.
Senator Hickenlooper. I do not understand what you mean by
constitutional rule. There was no constitutional rule in
Rhodesia about one-man one-vote business down there at all, was
there?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. What constitutional rule do you want
them to come back to?
Mr. Palmer. When I say constitutional rule, I mean come
back into their association with Great Britain.

DUAL FRANCHISE IN RHODESIA

Senator Hickenlooper. I see. Well, the only two viable
economies, really progressively developing viable economies in
all of Africa, I do not care where you go, are Rhodesia and
South Africa. It seems to me we are doing everything we can to
alienate them, to discourage them and to discourage their
further development, and I think both of them are trying to
make progress with some success.
They do not have apartheid in Rhodesia by law. They have
franchise, as I understand it, which anybody can qualify for,
black or white. It does not make any difference what it is.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, but it is a dual franchise, Senator,
whereby the Africans can only qualify. In practice the great
bulk of Africans, because of educational and income
qualifications, can only qualify for the B roll.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is right, but when they get the
income and educational qualifications, they qualify just the
same as the white man qualifies with education and income
qualifications. Is that not true?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, they can theoretically, but the
qualifications----
Senator Hickenlooper. I am not talking theoretically, but
legally.
Mr. Palmer. But the qualifications are put pretty high.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, $300 a year income or something
like that, and certain minimal level of education, and it
really applies to the white man.
I am told that more land in South Africa is owned by blacks
than white, or in Rhodesia, is owned by blacks than white.
Mr. Palmer. It is about evenly divided there.
Senator Hickenlooper. They have a land reform program going
there, and as fast as these people will take the education and
the training, they get land, and so on.
Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, a lot of these things, I think,
get lost in what the Rhodesians say and in what they do.

MISINFORMATION ABOUT RHODESIA

Senator Hickenlooper. I am not going on what the Rhodesians
say. I am going on what citizens from Iowa who have been down
there say. We have had several of them down there, and some
other places, and the most recent one was a man who is not
connected with government, and not connected with my state, but
has spent a great deal of time in Rhodesia and Zambia. He said
it is just unbelievable the misinformation which we get here in
this country about that situation, and nothing about the
slaughter in Zambia, that is the murders and the mass killings
in Zambia and the revolts there. Also, for instance, he said in
Rhodesia for 60 years the policemen have not carried pistols or
guns. They have got peace there, and people are satisfied. They
are making progress, and yet we kick them in the teeth.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.
Senator Hickenlooper. I have to, too.
Senator Symington. If the Senator would yield, I would like
to ask a couple of questions.

MILITARY SALES IN AFRICA

Mr. Chairman, if it was in order, I would like to ask
unanimous consent that we have the amount of military sales
and/or gifts that we have made on the continent of Africa in
the last five years. Could we have a listing of that so we get
a feel for it?
Mr. Lang. Certainly, sir.
Senator Symington. That would include such countries as
Nigeria and Liberia; some of it I am sure is small, but I think
it might be interesting to note how it has been handled on that
basis.
Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. This for the past five years?
Senator Symington. We will make it ten years if you want.
That will cover the whole development.
Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.

UNREALISTIC PROGRAMS IN AFRICA

Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have been undergoing for
some years a calculated and a definite program--I may be wrong
about this--of what we call liberty in Africa which is just as
unrealistic as it can be. But we have it on our hands now, and
all these little tribes with two huts and four yak tails have
gained independence.
Mr. Palmer. Well Senator, there is no doubt about it, the
continent is going through an extremely difficult period.
Senator Hickenlooper. We have to live with it and try to
solve it.
Mr. Palmer. A difficult period of time.
I would like to say, if I could, just in response to
several things that you have said, that I think that there are
black African states also who are making good progress towards
economic development and social development. I think the Ivory
Coast is certainly a good example of this. Tunisia, I think, is
a good example.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, you cannot say Tunisia is black
Africa. It is Arab.
Mr. Palmer. No. But I am just saying of independent Africa.
Kenya is making good progress.
Senator Hickenlooper. So long as Kenyatta stays in there
maybe we have some hope, but the old man is going to die some
day.
Mr. Palmer. But only a few years ago a lot of the Europeans
in Kenya were saying, ``You know we can never stay in Kenya
because of Kenyatta.'' Now these same people are saying, ``We
are worried about what is going to happen if something happens
to Kenyatta.''
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, we were going to have a great
time in Tanzania with Nyerere, too, but it has gone about as
far left as it can go down the drain and it is a most
disappointing place.
The Congo is a chaos and still is.
Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, I would like to speak to the
Congo, if I could, because I think there are some encouraging
developments that are taking place.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, everything is always
encouraging, I realize that, when we are projecting ourselves
into the picture.
Mr. Palmer. No, we have lots of discouraging ones, and I
would be delighted to talk about those, too.
Senator Hickenlooper. Nigeria is having its troubles.
Mr. Palmer. Nigeria is having terrible troubles, and it is
a very anxious situation.

THE BASIS OF U.S. POLICY IS COLOR

Senator Hickenlooper. We are trying to chase the Portuguese
out of Angola, and so far as I can find out the Angolans do not
want them to be chased out. But we may chase them; we may
prevail there.
Mr. Palmer. I think it is very difficult to ascertain what
the Africans want in Angola. It is very difficult to find out.
Senator Hickenlooper. We are going to teach them what they
want. I do not know.
Of course Ethiopia is a great self-determining country. I
think they have one man--one vote there. One man is the
emperor.
Senator McCarthy. I think they only have one vote.
Senator Hickenlooper. One vote, a great ally of ours.
Mr. Palmer. But I think the fundamental difference here is,
Senator, none of the distinctions are drawn on color except
when you get down into this area.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is drawn on color. I think
the basis of our policy in Africa is color and probably to
affect American elections.
Mr. Palmer. No.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is an awfully lot to
that. I think there is a lot of humanity in what we are trying
to do, too.
Mr. Palmer. There is.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is a lot of it, but I
think there is an awfully lot to influence American elections
based on color. Otherwise, there are a lot of things that we
would not need to do if we wanted to really promote these
things on the basis of long-range, sound, progressive policies.
I am not blaming you for this, do not misunderstand that.

HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN RHODESIA

Mr. Palmer. I would like to send you, Senator, if I may, a
copy of a recent speech that I have given on Rhodesia that
will, I hope, explain some of our concerns about the internal
situation in Rhodesia. I have lived there for two years,
Senator, and I must say I saw just one tremendous gap in what
people professed and what people did, such things as the Land
Apportionment Act. It does divide the land almost equally
between 220,000 whites and 4 million Africans. This is not the
whole story either, because I saw European grazing land being
burned off because of the fact that it was excess to the
grazing requirements, and just across the road saw African
cattle being slaughtered because the land could not support
them.
Now, believe me, I am not a revolutionary on matters of
this kind, and I know perfectly well that there is capital and
skills and so forth that have gone into these European
enterprises that are extremely important to the development of
that country in that part of the world.
To my mind, the important thing in that part of the world
is to try to create an atmosphere that is going to enable the
European to stay there and to continue to play his part in the
development of the country. I think this is vital in South
Africa, too.
But I am convinced, too, Senator, that unless there is more
movement, and again let me emphasize I am not saying immediate
independence by any means----
Senator Hickenlooper. That is what we are moving toward. Is
that not the whole connotation of what we are doing instead of
working along with these people to bring them up to the point
where there will be some responsible government there?
Mr. Palmer. But this is the problem, Senator, in Southern
Rhodesia, that the trend has not been in that direction. The
trend has been entirely in the opposite direction.
If you go back to Garfield Todd when he was prime minister
about eight years ago, ten years ago, I guess it is now, they
were trying to work on a policy of partnership. He was too
liberal for the white Rhodesians, and he was replaced by Edgar
Whitehead. Edward Whitehead again tried to do something about
the Land Apportionment Act, and he was replaced because of this
effort by Winston Field who was further to his right.
Winston Field in turn was replaced by Ian Smith.
Again the whole trend in Rhodesia has been toward the right
and not toward cooperation amongst the races, but to a
hardening of attitude among the races.
Now it is quite true----

TROUBLE IN ZAMBIA

Senator Hickenlooper. What is happening in Zambia?
Mr. Palmer. In Zambia there is trouble on the Copper Belt,
but a lot of this trouble arises from both communities. It is
not only from the black community but it is from the white
community. A lot of the problem in Zambia is that in the Copper
Belt a great many of the whites come from Rhodesia and come
from the Union of South Africa. So that----
Senator Hickenlooper. How many whites have they got in
Zambia?
Mr. Palmer. They have got about 70,000 or 80,000, I think,
at the present time. And I do not think that the fault all lies
on one side or all lies on the other, but Kaunda has had as a
basic tenet of his policy to try to encourage, to try to
promote good race relations in Zambia. He has tried just as
hard as Kenyatta has in Kenya.
One of the great dangers----
Senator Hickenlooper. Does he not claim he is the captive
of the revolutionary group in----
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. I think Kaunda is still very much of
an independent and very much devoted, both in words and in
actions, to good race relations in Zambia.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think so. I do not mean that.
Mr. Palmer. Yes. But the problem is that on both sides,
because of the Rhodesian problem, relationships amongst the two
races in Zambia are beginning to polarize, and this is one of
our great concerns about this. If this continues in Zambia, it
continues in Tanzania. It goes up further into East Africa, and
the same thing happens on the other extreme in South Africa.
You will have a polarization along racial lines that will
result increasingly in the thing that is to be avoided, I
think, at all costs, and that is a racial confrontation in
Africa. This is what the direction of our efforts and I think
the direction of the British efforts have been intended to help
prevent.
Senator Hickenlooper. I have taken too much time.
Senator McCarthy. I think probably we will have another
session on these in-between countries we have not taken up.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

What about Tanzania? What is the situation? Do you see the
Communist infiltration there as significant in terms of other
countries?
Mr. Palmer. In Tanzania?
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. It is significant.
Senator McCarthy. Beyond that country or just within the
country itself?
Mr. Palmer. Well, I think the influence is strongest in
Zanzibar, less strong, I would say, on the mainland, but I
would like to add to that that I think that Nyerere is still
very much of an independent African, and I do not think that he
is under any sort of control or likely to allow himself to be
placed under a position of control.
He does have certain ideas, certain concepts that I would
be critical of. He is a socialist. He wants to move Tanzania in
a socialist direction. I do not think he wants to move it in a
Communist direction. He has resorted to extensive
nationalization of the banks, of export-import houses, and to
other enterprises, particularly in the agricultural field, and
I think there is no doubt about it. He has, however, promised
to pay compensation for these.
It remains to be seen what--how this is going to work out
in practice, whether it will be--whether it will accord to our
criteria of being full and fair and prompt.
Senator McCarthy. He sat right in that chair shortly before
independence, this one right there, that spot, with a few of us
in here talking to him--in fact he was here twice, and he gave
the most stirring private enterprise discussion you ever heard
of in your life. He has apparently changed his mind 180
degrees.
Mr. Palmer. Well, there are----
Senator McCarthy. And I just think basically he believed
what he said when he was here, but I think that he possibly was
taken into camp with this fellow from Zanzibar or whoever it
was who took him over.
Mr. Palmer. Senator, I know that this is a theory, and----
Senator McCarthy. Well, somebody took him over from
Zanzibar.
Mr. Palmer. Well, I think a lot of it derives from the fact
that resources have been slow in coming into Tanzania. I think
he has been struck with the great disparity between the civil
servants and people who live in the urban areas, and those who
live in the rural areas.
Incidentally, all of his program of nationalization has
also been accompanied by some very stringent measures to place
restrictions--to cut down government salaries, to place
restrictions on ownings by civil servants, and other steps of
this kind, and I think--I am sure he is taking an ill-advised
step here. But I think he has done it essentially for Tanzania
and reasons that this is the path to take and that Tanzania has
got to look increasingly to its own resources for its
development and less to external aid.
Senator McCarthy. I think we had better finish up this
hearing.

MILITARY TROOPS IN AFRICA

Could you submit for the record a list of the countries in
which we have military aid troops in Africa and the extent of
those missions if they are not classified?
Mr. Lang. Right, sir.
Senator McCarthy. And also that aid program as it is now
contemplated and recommended. I assume it is all in the budget
somewhere. If you can take it out and send it up to us for the
record, I would appreciate it.
I appreciate very much your coming up. I do not know
whether you feel better now that there is an African
subcommittee which has been reactivated here or not. We
probably will have to wait and see, and maybe worry along with
you. It may be worse instead of better.
Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, we have a lot of problems, and I
myself greatly welcome the fact that this committee is active
again. I think it is terribly important that we talk about our
mutual concerns, and I do want you to know that I am always at
your disposition and delighted to have these opportunities.

CONFUSING INFORMATION

Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is a highly complicated
political, economic, and social problem. There is no question
about that. But I am not so sure that what we are doing in
Africa, that is the whole pattern, the whole complex, is
necessarily bringing us out on the right road. It may and it
may not. We have to rely upon two different sources of
information, those who are on the ground and see it and who are
not connected with government, and very often those who are
connected with government on the other side, and sometimes the
information does not quite dovetail.
Mr. Palmer. No, I know that.
Senator McCarthy. It is very, very confusing. I have some
letters in my file from people, as I say, in my own state who
have been over there.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, I know.
Senator McCarthy. And I have letters from others, and so
on. Some of these people I know personally. Others, I do not.
But these are good people; they are honest people. Maybe they
are not trained observers, but they simply cannot understand
it. They know what the problem is in a way. They know there is
a racial problem involved, but they seem to have the feeling
that if we gave as much patience to some of these as we do to
others we might be able to work it out.
Mr. Palmer. I think, Senator, if I would say so, I would
hope in--and in some cases I know this has been done--but I
think to understand South Africa and to understand Southern
Rhodesia, somebody also has to have some exposure to the other
states in the area in East Africa and West Africa. The reverse
of this is equally true.
I have had experience. I had four years in East Africa, and
I have two years in Rhodesia. I had three and a half years in
West Africa, in Nigeria, and I think that, as you quite rightly
say, people who are in government oftentimes get a limited
point of view.
Senator McCarthy. They may be right. I do not say they are
wrong.
Mr. Palmer. I know that. But many of these problems do tend
to merge, and what happens one place inevitably affects
another, and you do have a problem of integrity of policy and
you cannot profess certain things in some areas and not in
other areas. So all of this does present a very complicated
mosaic, I quite agree, and there are no easy or ready answers
to any of these problems.
Senator Hickenlooper. May I just ask one more question?
Senator McCarthy. Right.

SURROUNDING RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you have any sensing that there is
a long-range policy in this country to surround Rhodesia and
South Africa by other states such as taking over Southwest
Africa and, Mozambique, and Zambia and so on, and squeezing out
South Africa?
Mr. Palmer. I can----
Senator Hickenlooper. And Rhodesia.
Mr. Palmer. I can assure you categorically, Senator, that
there is no such thought or no such effort within the United
States Government that I am aware of. There may be individuals
in the United States. I am sure there are.
Senator Hickenlooper. Oh, probably.
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
Senator Hickenlooper. Probably. We had the reconstruction
people right after the Civil War that wanted to kill everybody.
Mr. Palmer. But as I indicated earlier, I think one of the
major tasks here is to assure things develop in that part of
the world so that everybody in the society plays their full
role in the development of the society.
Senator McCarthy. We will make the whole record classified.
If there is anything that you want to send up----
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
Senator McCarthy [continuing]. We will be glad to classify
the whole record if you want it that way.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. Anything else you might send up will be
subject to that reservation.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you.
Senator McCarthy. We will not call you in two or three
weeks.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Hickenlooper and
Carlson.
Discussion with Pat M. Holt of the committee staff
regarding a survey of the Alliance for Progress.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 11:25 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case and Cooper.
S.J. Res. 60, an original resolution regarding the Latin
American Summit Conference, was ordered reported by roll call
vote, 9-0. It was decided by a voice vote to make public the
proceedings of the meeting.
[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

[Editor's Note.--In 1965, when India and Pakistan clashed
over their claims to Kashmir, the United States suspended arms
shipments to both countries. The next year, it resumed shipment
of ``non-lethal'' equipment. Concerned over an escalating arms
race, the State Department announced on April 12, 1967 that the
U.S. would cease shipping military weapons to both countries,
except for spare parts for weapons already in their possession.
However, lifting the ban on spare parts aided Pakistan, whose
armed forces were largely supplied with American-made weapons,
in contrast to India, which relied on British- and Soviet-made
weapons.]
----------

Wednesday, April 5, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Symington, Sparkman, McCarthy, and
Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
Senator Symington. We will call the Subcommittee on Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs to order.
Mr. Handley, your first name is William, is it not, sir?

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE WILLIAM J. HANDLEY, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And your title?
Mr. Handley. Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near East
and South Asia.
Senator Symington. We wish to ask some questions about aid
to India and to Pakistan, primarily Pakistan.
As I understand it, all aid to India and Pakistan was
suspended in December of 1965 as one means of bringing the war
between the two countries to a halt; is that correct?
Mr. Handley. September of 1965, sir.
Senator Symington. September of 1965. And following the
Tashkent Agreement, however, which I believe was January 10,
1966----
Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
Senator Symington. [continuing]. The President authorized a
relaxation of the total ban of military shipments to both India
and Pakistan, permitting some commercial and MAP credit sales
of non-lethal military equipment; is that right?
Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
Senator Symington. John, any time you would like to
interrupt, please do.
Senator Cooper. Thank you.

NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT

Senator Symington. You may interrupt at any time or you may
comment as you would like.
As I understand it, the Department of Defense defines non-
lethal as follows: Trucks, trailers, miscellaneous wheeled
vehicles and spares; communications, radar and signal
equipment; transport, observation and trainer aircraft; unarmed
helicopters, support equipment and spares; engineering
equipment and machine tools; medical and quartermaster
equipment; and training equipment. Is that correct?
Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
Senator Symington. Those are lethal?
Mr. Handley. Non-lethal.
Senator Symington. Non-lethal; I meant non-lethal.
Suppose you furnish a helicopter without any armament. You
could make it lethal by putting armaments on it after you
received it, correct?
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir. As you could with a Jeep, which we
consider non-lethal.
Senator Symington. So the term is fairly technical, is it
not?
Mr. Handley. Well, it excludes fighter aircraft; it
excludes ammunition.
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Handley. It excludes guns, armored personnel carriers,
tanks, things of that kind.
Senator Symington. All right.

LETHAL EQUIPMENT

Now, lethal items, as I understand it, are defined as
combat aircraft and armed helicopters, armed or armored
vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers;
infantry weapons, artillery and ammunition; and spare parts in
support of all the foregoing items; is that correct?
Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
Senator Symington. Of course, you could have an unarmed
personnel carrier, and all you have to do is arm it, and it
becomes lethal, is that it?
Mr. Handley. Actually we have defined armored personnel
carriers as being lethal.
Senator Symington. What I am thinking of is you could buy
one unarmed, and they could buy the guns from Russia and put
them together, and you would have a lethal weapon, right?
Mr. Handley. Except we are not selling that type of
equipment.
Senator Symington. You sell an unarmed personnel carrier
though, do you not?
Mr. Handley. I'm afraid I might be a little bit out of my
depth on the defense side, but I do not know what an unarmed
personnel carrier is. They usually are called armored personnel
carriers.
Senator Symington. All right.
Just for the record, I want the record straight as we
pursue this subject.

PAKISTAN REQUESTED RELAXATION OF BAN

Operating under these restrictions, it is our understanding
that Pakistan asked to buy transport aircraft and spares,
unarmed helicopters, communications equipment, hand tools and
trucks, and that the further relaxation of the President's ban
on military equipment to Pakistan lifts the restriction on
spare parts for so-called lethal items listed above.
Mr. Handley. That is correct, but it is broader than that.
Senator Symington. All right.
Mr. Handley. May I----
Senator Symington. You say it any way you like to.
Mr. Handley. Since September 1965, when Secretary Rusk told
the House and Senate that new economic aid and military aid
shipments to India and Pakistan would be suspended, we have
gradually resumed economic aid as you pointed out, sir. We have
resumed the sale of non-lethal equipment as has been defined on
a case-by-case basis, every case being specifically examined.
We find at this particular moment, after having studied and
pondered this problem for a very long time, that perhaps the
best thing that the United States could do in the interest of
arms limitation, limitation of the expenditures on the defense
side, relaxation of tensions in the subcontinent, and a better
application of resources toward economic and agricultural
development, would be to modify somewhat our present extremely
restrictive arms policy.
The policy we are proposing will still be restrictive and
will be scrutinized most carefully.

REMOVAL OF FORMAL MILITARY MISSIONS

This policy has the following elements in it: We will at
the appropriate moment in the next few weeks pull out our
formal military missions in India and Pakistan. In their place,
we will have a small team working with the Ambassador, but not
as a formal military mission, which will carry out requirements
for inspection, advice to the Ambassador and advice to the
government in terms of procurement of items.
Senator Symington. When you say you will pull out a
military team and put somebody in its place, will the people
you put in their place be military people?
Mr. Handley. Yes, they will be military.
Senator Symington. How many military people have you got in
India now?
Mr. Handley. We have moved from about a hundred in each
country down to about twenty, and we see something probably in
the neighborhood of ten in each country, officers and men.
Senator Symington. What is the highest rank of the ones you
have got there now?
Mr. Handley. The highest rank we have there is a major
general.
Senator Symington. What will you have in the future?
Mr. Handley. I would think a one star general as a lead man
for prestige purposes, for contact purposes, supported by two
or three officers and several enlisted men.
Senator Symington. Senator Sparkman, if you have comments
or questions at any time, please interrupt. I just want to make
this record, and please interrupt at any time.
Senator Sparkman. Go ahead.
Senator Symington. Not interrupt, just please ask any time.
Mr. Handley. We have----

DEFINING MILITARY MISSIONS

Senator Symington. Let us get back on track. You are making
a statement, and we appreciate it. But, as I understand it, you
are talking about reducing the number of military people in
India and Pakistan, and I was talking about selling spare parts
of lethal weapons to Pakistan.
Mr. Handley. Yes, that is right.
Senator Symington. Would you tie them together?
Mr. Handley. I will tie them together, sir.
Senator Symington. All right.
Mr. Handley. One of the first steps we will take is to
change our military missions in India and Pakistan to very
small advisory groups under the Ambassador.
Senator Symington. Well now, clear me up.
Mr. Handley. A military mission----
Senator Symington. What is the difference between a
military mission and a smaller military group?
Mr. Handley. A military mission has a special role with the
local government in terms of training; it is accredited to the
local government. The government provides quarters for them,
and the rest.
Under the setup that we envisage, which still has to be
worked out in all the details, we will no longer have what is
known as a military mission. In other words our physical
military presence in both India and Pakistan will be
substantially reduced.
Senator Symington. The way you plan this in the future, is
all of this planning, you have sold yet no spare parts or
given----
Mr. Handley. No, sir.

A PROPOSED CHANGE

Senator Symington. This is just a proposed change, is that
it?
Mr. Handley. It is a proposed change which we hope to
inaugurate within the next few days.
Senator Symington. And you are discussing that with us, is
that right?
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And the proposed change is to ship spare
parts for lethal equipment, is that correct?
Mr. Handley. May I put it another way, sir. We are going to
continue to take the most restrictive view of the sale of spare
parts for previously supplied American equipment in India and
Pakistan. And there will only be sales. There will be no
grants.
Senator Symington. Lethal?
Mr. Handley. Lethal.
Senator Symington. Have we sold much lethal equipment to
India?
Mr. Handley. Not very much, sir. We have sold guns,
recoilless rifles, and machine guns, but it has been largely
communication equipment, transport equipment, and the like.
Senator Symington. All right.
Mr. Handley. But, as you know, since 1954 we have been the
major supplier of across-the-board military equipment to
Pakistan, and ever since 1954 it probably has amounted to $720
million, $730 million total.
Now, as I was saying about spare parts, our policy will be
to entertain on a case-by-case basis requests for the sale of
spare parts for previously supplied U.S. military equipment. We
will approve these only where we are convinced that the sale of
these spare parts will not add to the defense expenditures of
the country and will, in the larger sense, be helpful in arms
limitation. So that is the second point of our proposal.

SALES BY THIRD COUNTRIES

The third aspect is that we have up to now attempted to
enforce a plan--I would not say we have been completely
successful on this--on the sale by third countries of surplus
American equipment to India and Pakistan.
We will continue to discourage the sale by third countries
of surplus American equipment to India and Pakistan, but we
will examine special cases where we believe that the sale of
this equipment might, in fact, result in arms limitation or
reduction of defense expenditures.
Let me give you a hypothetical case.
Senator Symington. Don't give us a hypothetical case; give
us a case that has resulted in your change of policy.

TANKS FOR PAKISTAN

Mr. Handley. Well, we are facing at the moment the question
of tanks for Pakistan. It is quite clear that Pakistan has been
seeking in the last few months through third countries, through
Iran, through sales, purchases, the possibility of purchases in
Germany, to buy a number of tanks which are surplus in Germany.
The figures here have ranged anywhere from 50 to 600 in
terms of requests. At the same time, we know that Pakistan is
also shopping for tanks elsewhere in Western Europe, new tanks.
If it is possible to sell Pakistan X number, what it is I
do not know at this point, which in fact would be accompanied
by a phasing out in Pakistan of old tanks, and if this would
discourage Pakistan from going out and paying a lot of money
for new equipment, then we might look somewhat favorably on
such a transaction.
Senator Symington. On what kind of a transaction?
Mr. Handley. A transaction permitting the sale by Germany,
let us say, of a certain number of tanks to Pakistan if in our
judgment this would be accompanied by a resulting phasing out
in Pakistan of old tanks, and would be enough of an incentive
to Pakistan to prevent it from going out into the open market
and buying new expensive, and perhaps even more modern tanks,
such as might in fact escalate the arms race in the
subcontinent.
Senator McCarthy. May I ask a question?
Senator Symington. Senator McCarthy, will you, please, at
any time.

COMPARISON OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI TANKS

Senator McCarthy. Is the Indian tank considered superior to
the Pakistan tank?
Mr. Handley. The Indians are making their own tanks. They
have a line of tanks and they have, of course, Soviet tanks, as
well. It probably, of course is, Senator McCarthy, that the
Indians have in their inventory a variety of tanks, but they
have been moving more towards making their own tanks, which is
a Centurion type which would be the equivalent of the Pakistan
tank.
Senator McCarthy. Did they find the Centurions were
superior to the tanks the Pakistanis used in the war?
Mr. Handley. I do not think----
Senator McCarthy. At least the Pakistani fighters came off
well.
Mr. Handley. I think it was a matter of tactics to a large
extent, although I hope the other side would never hear me say
this.
Senator McCarthy. I have heard some of the military people
explain that. If that is the case, why would we want Pakistan
to have better tanks, if they have better tanks, even as
incompetent as the operators were of the Indian tanks, and----
Mr. Handley. What we were talking about in the case before
us are some M-47 tanks which are not even as good as the M-48
tanks. The Pakistanis have the most modern Pattons in their
inventory, but these would be better than some of the M-4 tanks
that date back many, many years, which might be replaced.
Senator McCarthy. You think with good operators this
inferior tank would be more than a match for----
Mr. Handley. You know the Indians did pretty well with some
of their old Sherman tanks, too.
Senator McCarthy. Yes. How do you equalize this thing? I
mean, how do you explain why the Pakistanis with our tanks and
with our tank instructors were not able to stand off the
Indians with inferior tanks and British instructors, I assume?
Mr. Handley. Well, I am not that much of a military man,
sir, to explain that. It sure happened.
Senator McCarthy. It sure happened.

SALE OF GERMAN TANKS TO PAKISTAN

Senator Symington. Let me ask you then what we are talking
about now is the sale of German tanks to Pakistan, is that
correct?
Mr. Handley. That is the specific case that is before us at
the moment.
Senator Symington. Is there going to be a sale by the
German government to Pakistan or a private corporation?
Mr. Handley. That is a good question. The Germans
approached us on this back last year, and I discussed this with
the Germans. They had a team over here and I discussed it, and
I told them our policy was not to supply, to give permission
for tanks to be shipped to the subcontinent at that time, and
this coincided pretty much with the way the German government
was feeling.
Senator Symington. You lost me. My question is are you
going to sell it through the government or are you going to
sell it through a private company?
Mr. Handley. I do not know.
Senator Symington. That is what I want to know.
Mr. Handley. I do not know because the first request we had
was the German government came to us and asked us to do this.
In the meantime----
Senator Symington. To do what?
Mr. Handley. To permit the sale of a number of M-47 tanks
to Iran.
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Handley. Now, in the meantime, we have found, of course
that----
Senator Symington. The Germans came to you and asked that
you sell some 47 tanks to Iran.
Mr. Handley. That we permit Germany to sell.
Senator Symington. Permit Germany to sell.
Mr. Handley. M-47 tanks to Iran.
Senator Symington. Right.
Mr. Handley. And based on the experience we had, the
Canadians and the Germans had, with the sale of F-85's to Iran,
there were reasonable grounds for belief exactly as to where
these tanks would go.
Senator Symington. Right.

SALES TO IRAN

Mr. Handley. We have now in the Office of Munitions Control
a request from a firm for permission to sell spare parts for
tanks to Iran up to 600 of these tanks, and we have had
reports--this is through a private organization.
Senator Symington. What private organization?
Mr. Handley. This particular one is called Levy.
Senator Symington. How do you spell it?
Mr. Handley. L-e-v-y.
Senator Symington. Is it owned in Germany?
Mr. Handley. This is a Canadian owned company, as I
understand, which is tied in, as I understand it--I am not
completely sure because it is very difficult to sort out some
of the relationships with the arms people of the world--with
the Merex Company.
Senator Symington. I hope it is as difficult for them to
sort it out as it is to us.
Senator McCarthy. Is that the same company that sold the F-
86's?
Mr. Handley. The Merex Company.
Senator McCarthy. Is that a real company?
Mr. Handley. Yes, it is.
Senator Symington. Is that a Canadian company?
Mr. Handley. Levy may have a connection with Merex. As of
this moment I cannot tell you exactly what this is. I am still
trying.
Senator Symington. The Canadian company is Levy?
Mr. Handley. Levy.
Senator Symington. And they may have a connection with
Merex?
Mr. Handley. They may have a connection with Merex.
Senator Symington. Do you know who owns the stock of these
companies?
Mr. Handley. No.
Senator Symington. You do not know whether Canadians or
Germans or Americans or who own any of the stock?
Mr. Handley. I do not. Merex, I assume, is a German
company.
Senator Symington. Well, but you do not know who owns the
stock.
Mr. Handley. No.
Senator Symington. It could be owned by the Swiss or the
Greeks or anybody.
Mr. Handley. It could be. I really do not have--I do not
know, sir.
Senator McCarthy. Could someone in the State Department
give us a line?
Mr. Handley. I am digging into it as best I can. It is a
cobweb.
Senator McCarthy. It gets pretty interesting.
Senator Symington. Yes, it certainly does.
While we are on this, as I understand it, Iran has bought
600 M-47 tanks from a private U.S. firm exporting through
Canada. Do you know about that?
Mr. Handley. No, sir. I believe, to my knowledge, they have
not bought. To my knowledge, they are seeking to buy.
Senator Symington. To buy.
Mr. Handley. And right before us at the moment in, as I
said, the Office of Munitions Control is a request to sell
these tanks, and one of the----
Senator Symington. A request from whom?
Mr. Handley. A request from the Levy Company.
Senator Symington. In Canada?
Mr. Handley. In Canada, but they went to Canada first----
Senator Symington. Levy is a Canadian company.
Mr. Handley. That is right, but there is an American
affiliate, as I understand it.
Senator Symington. I see. I asked is this an American firm.
I asked you whether it was Canadian or American.
Mr. Handley. It is an American affiliate of a Canadian
firm.
Senator Symington. Is it a separate corporation from the
Canadian?
Mr. Handley. I will have to check.
Senator Symington. Then the question would be have they got
a sales office in this country or is it an incorporated
subsidiary or co-partner in this country? I'm just speaking for
the record. And who owns the stock of the Levy Company.
Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir.
Senator Symington. You do not know that?
Mr. Handley. I do not.
Senator Symington. Who approached you from Levy?
Mr. Handley. They did not approach me personally.
Senator Symington. Whom did they approach?
Mr. Handley. There is a request now before the Office of
Munitions Control of the Department of State.
Senator Symington. Who made the request?
Mr. Handley. The Levy Company.
Senator Symington. Yes, but who is the Levy Company?
Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir.
Senator Symington. Give us a name, will you do that?
Mr. Handley. I will do that.
Senator Symington. Supply it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The record should indicate that the Office of Munitions
Control, Department of State, now has pending an application of
Levy Auto Parts, Inc., Dupont Circle Building, 1346 Connecticut
Avenue, Washington, D.C. for the sale to Iran of spare parts
for 600 M-47 tanks, and not for the sale of tanks themselves.
The application is dated March 29, 1967 and was signed by Fred
Williams.

Senator McCarthy. Give us the whole procedure of how Levy
comes from the Canadian government. Why does it have to come to
the U.S. Government, and also who owns Merex.
Mr. Handley. Merex is a German company.
Senator McCarthy. How does the Canadian company come across
here to get permission to sell? Do they have patents that
somehow are affected? Let us have the story on it.

AMOUNT OF SILVER HELD IN PAKISTAN

Can I ask two questions because I have got to go to another
committee meeting?
Senator Symington. Yes, indeed, please do.
Senator McCarthy. Could you for this same record check out
what is the best estimate that we have about the amount of
silver or how much is held in Pakistan?
Mr. Handley. Silver in Pakistan?
Senator McCarthy. Since we are giving them credit, we are
giving them wheat for nothing, the estimate of India and
Pakistan is together they may have 7 or 8 billion dollars.
Senator Symington. In India, they estimate they have 6
billion ounces of silver at $1.29 an ounce.
Senator McCarthy. And Pakistan has got, I think, about a
third of that, if you can find out whether this is the case.
Senator Symington. Would you do that?
Mr. Handley. Yes.
Senator Symington. Gene, is it all right if we have the
estimated amount of gold that is in hoarding, too?
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
[The information referred to follows:

The Indian Government's official gold reserves are relatively
modest--about $240 million at the present time. No information is
available on the official silver holdings. Various guesses have been
made regarding the quantity of gold and silver (bullion or otherwise)
in private hands in India, but we are not aware of any estimate by the
Indian Government or of any reliable estimate by any other source.
It has been traditional for the people of India to put their
private savings into one form or another of precious metal. The Indian
Government is trying to channel savings out of precious metals and into
banks. Progress is being made and, as banks become more popular, the
private demand for gold and silver should one day decrease.
The Government of Pakistan has official gold holdings of $52.9
million. As in the case of India, we have no information from any
source on official silver holdings, nor any reliable estimate of
private holdings of either gold or silver.

PRESSURE ON GERMANS

Senator McCarthy. The other question is how does this tie
into the announcement that we are not pressuring Germany to buy
additional arms from us? Does it mean the Germans sell off
these old tanks, and will we replace them with superior tanks?
They announced the withdrawal of 150,000 troops. What do you
have in mind as to selling weapons to Germany to make up for
that withdrawal?
Mr. Handley. I cannot say offhand whether there is any
connection.
Senator McCarthy. I do not want you to answer that now.
Mr. Handley. I see. But offhand I would say so far as my
particular headaches are concerned, these are quite apart,
because my headaches are how to find some way to control the
arms situation between India and Pakistan.
Senator McCarthy. We will give you something else to
explain to us, what they are going to do with Germany.
Senator Symington. Let us put it this way: When we ask a
question of you that has to do with State, that does not have
to do with you, then you can say that you simply do not know,
and you can supply it for the record, because we figure when we
are talking with you we are talking to the State Department.
Thank you, Gene.
[The information referred to follows:]

The degree of U.S. control over military materiel of U.S. origin in
Germany which is excess to FRG requirements depends upon the manner in
which the FRG acquired the materiel and the proposed ultimate
destination of the materiel. One category includes the military
equipment acquired by the FRG through grant military assistance from
the U.S. The FRG purchased the residual or reversionary rights to this
materiel by agreement with the U.S. in 1962. By the terms of the
agreement, the FRG must consult with the U.S. Government and secure our
approval for disposition of materiel to other than NATO countries. The
tanks in question fall in this category.
Another category of military equipment of U.S. origin is that
purchased by the FRG under the terms of our foreign military sales
arrangement, which require that the FRG obtain USG concurrence prior to
disposition to a third country, whether NATO or non-NATO. The ultimate
destination and end-user country must be approved by the United States
Government even when the FRG decides to make sales to a third country
through a private munitions dealer or organization. The FRG obtains
assurances from the third country that no transshipment will be made
across national boundaries without consultation with, and consent of,
the FRG; in turn, the FRG is under obligation to obtain the agreement
of the U.S. Government in such cases.
The FRG has agreed to purchase certain of its military equipment
requirements from the United States to help offset the foreign exchange
cost of maintaining U.S. military forces in Germany. However, there is
no requirement that the FRG buy any particular equipment; it itself
determines what it should purchase. Furthermore, we have no agreement
with the FRG to sell or otherwise supply equipment to replace any U.S.-
origin equipment which may be disposed of by the FRG.

DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING SPARE PARTS

Mr. Handley. May I continue with the general line of our
supply policy as we see it?
One is pull out the military missions in India and
Pakistan. Two is to continue to take a very negative view of
spare parts for lethal equipment unless we are quite convinced
that this will not add to the problem.
Senator Symington. You have mentioned that three times, at
least, and it inspires me to ask a question. You say unless you
are convinced. How do you obtain that conviction?
Mr. Handley. Well, we will have to look into each case.
Take the case of Pakistan which has 104's and B-57's for
which they cannot really get spare parts anywhere, so far as we
can tell. For their F-86's or for some of their tanks we have
been able to, but for the 104's and the 57's, it is
extraordinarily difficult to get spare parts except directly
from the United States.
If it reaches the point where it seems to us that the
Pakistanis may consider just junking their 104's and 57's, and
then going on to a new expenditure of money for new aircraft,
and maybe more aircraft and more sophisticated aircraft, it
might make sense to sell spare parts.
Senator Symington. It might. But then you have a lot of
things to consider in a case like that. For example, we are
flying 104's today against Vietnam, so it is not an obsolete
aircraft in any sense of the word. The question would be what
you would get that would be more sophisticated, and the 104 is
a major aspect of all European holdings.
Mr. Handley. It is a temptation to get them.

CHANGING POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN

Senator Symington. What it looks to us is that you are
changing your military sales policy toward Pakistan, and
inasmuch as India does not get this type and character of
equipment from us, that you may not be changing it toward
India. Is that a fair surmise?
Mr. Handley. May I go around the line?
Senator Symington. Well, just answer the question.
Mr. Handley. I do not think so.
Senator Symington. We do not sell India any aircraft.
Mr. Handley. No, sir.
Senator Symington. Therefore, there is no question of
whether they would buy a more sophisticated aircraft if they
did not buy from us.
Mr. Handley. But India has had access to Britain, to the
Soviet Union.
Senator Symington. Yes. But we do not sell them any
aircraft, so it would not be a question of spare parts.
Mr. Handley. But what we have in mind for India in terms of
this military supply policy, I think, is compensating in terms
of what India needs.
Senator Symington. Well now, are you saying that you would
sell spare parts to India of the things that India has bought
from us?
Mr. Handley. Yes, but in fact it is not the same dimension.
Senator Symington. Well, that is right; that is right. I
know a little bit about this, too. I have been out there in
both countries and looked at it in great detail.
Mr. Handley. That is right. What India might want from us
is much more on the credit sales side of certain equipment, and
we would plan to continue the credit sales program that we have
had.

A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE

Senator Symington. I do not want to labor it with you,
understand me, but the point is what you are doing, inasmuch as
we have not sold any sophisticated military equipment to India
and have sold a great deal of very sophisticated military
equipment to Pakistan, is that you are going to sell lethal
spare parts to keep the Pakistani sophisticated lethal
equipment going and it does not mean very much to India whether
we do or whether we do not do it. That is the only----
Mr. Handley. Yes, I understand your point, sir.
Senator Symington. That is the only inference you can draw
from it.
What you are doing is you have decided that you are going
to sell spare parts to Pakistan for their sophisticated lethal
military equipment, that you either are or are not. That is
what is up now.
Mr. Handley. That is the particular thing that is up now,
yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Let me go on here just for the record a
bit. We have just had a few points we wanted to present to you
here by the staff which they brought up.
In September of 1965, the Secretary of State made the
following commitment in a message read to the House of
Representatives:
The United States has suspended military aid shipments to
both India and Pakistan, in keeping with its announced policy
of full support for the efforts of the Security Council and of
the Secretary General. The executive branch will consult fully
with appropriate Members of the Congress about the situation in
the subcontinent and the conditions under which military aid
might be resumed.
Do you feel that is what you are doing now; you are telling
us that military aid might be resumed?
Mr. Handley. Actually the military aid part has been the
credit sales for non-lethal equipment, and we consulted earlier
on that.
Senator Symington. All right.
Mr. Handley. In fact, the sales, cash sales for dollars,
cash on the barrel head for spare parts, are not aid in the
strict sense. There are no aid funds, military aid funds, that
will be used in that, but since it is an important policy,
sir----
Senator Symington. Right, I understand that. I think this
is an important hearing. I want to make the record here and
just so we understand what it is we are getting at.
Secretary Rusk renewed this commitment to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on September 13 and October 13,
1965.
On April 20, 1966, Secretary McNamara told the Senate
Appropriations Committee that the United States had decided to
renew aid to Pakistan and India of ``non-lethal military
equipment on a case-by-case basis.'' That is April 20, 1966.
Now, during the September 13, 1965 briefing of the
Committee on the Indian-Pakistan war, Secretary Rusk said that
Pakistan and India had violated the law and were no longer
eligible for assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
Secretary McNamara testified in 1966:

Well, I think it should be conditioned primarily on an
understanding that Pakistan would live at peace with her neighbor,
India, and secondarily, upon understanding that Pakistan would devote
the majority of her own resources to what is and can be the only
permanent foundation to stability in her own country--economic
development. I think those two conditions should take priority over any
others.

RED CHINA'S AID TO PAKISTAN

Now, some questions we would like to ask here. According to
the press, Pakistan has received from Red China 200 tanks and
125 aircraft, including MIG-19's and IL-28 bombers. Do you know
anything about that?
Mr. Handley. On the tanks I think the figure given as far
as our intelligence tells us is essentially accurate. I have a
range of 170 to 230, something like that, so 200 is a fairly
good figure.
On the planes, I think that is high. Our figure is somewhat
lower than that. It is a combination of IL-27's, I think. This
is one squadron, I believe, 12, however you figure it. It may
be two squadrons, but 12, and I think around 60 MIG-19's, 60,
70 MIG-19's. So it is somewhat less than the total you have
given there. But the tank figure seems essentially to
correspond with our intelligence figures.
Senator Symington. Now, we also understand that since the
India-Pakistan War, Pakistan has acquired around 100 F-86's. Is
that roughly right?
Mr. Handley. I understand that it is around 90 that they
presumably were able to obtain through this arrangement between
Iran, Germany, and Canada.

CORPORATE INTEREST

Senator Symington. That is the one where the Merex
Corporation comes into it?
Mr. Handley. The Merex Corporation comes into it.
Senator Symington. Is the Levy Corporation in it, too?
Mr. Handley. I do not know. I am still not sure. I go back
again to the relationship between the Levy Corporation and the
Merex Corporation. They may, in fact, be competitors.
Senator Symington. Yes. But you are going to find out about
the Merex Corporation.
Mr. Handley. We will do the best we can, sir.
Senator Symington. Those airplanes were sold by Canada to
Germany?
Mr. Handley. That is correct--no, Canada to Iran, sir. I
beg your pardon, they were sold by Canada to Germany, and then
Germany sold them to Iran after----
Senator Symington. But Merex was in there, was it not?
Mr. Handley. Yes.
Senator Symington. Did the Canadian government buy them
from Canada?
Mr. Handley. The German government bought them from Canada
originally.
Senator Symington. I mean the German government.
Mr. Handley. The German government bought them from Canada
originally.
Senator Symington. Who did they buy them from in Canada?
Did they buy them from the Canadian government?
Mr. Handley. The Canadian government. It is a NATO
arrangement, and I suppose that is how----
Senator Symington. I would like to know. But they could
have bought them from a Canadian corporation, could they not?
Mr. Handley. They could have, but may impression is that
this was a part of the establishment in Germany of an air
capability supplied by the government of Canada under a NATO
arrangement, and that these planes became surplus, and that the
Germans got permission from the Canadians to sell them to the
Iranians.
Senator Symington. But then the Germans sold them to Merex,
is that right?
Mr. Handley. Through Merex, as I understand it.
Senator Symington. Well, I mean, what is Merex?
Mr. Handley. To Iran.
Senator Symington. Is Merex a company?
Mr. Handley. M-e-r-e-x.
Senator Symington. Is it a company to make a profit, or is
it just a screen? In other words, when the German government
sold them to Merex----
Mr. Handley. Merex bought them, was the intermediary
between Iran and the German government.
Senator Symington. Did Merex pay the German government for
them?
Mr. Handley. I do not know. I presume so.
Senator Symington. In other words, is Merex an agent of the
German government or is it a corporation separate from the
German government?
Mr. Handley. As I said, I'm not quite sure of the exact
corporate structure.
Senator Symington. All right. Then you find out about that
for us.
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

MEREX AG Rheinstrasse 156-158, 5302 Bonn-Beuel, West Germany is a
private corporation established in 1963, and is controlled by MEREX AG
of Vevey, Switzerland. The major shareholder of the Swiss corporation
is reported to be Mr. Gearhard Mertins, who is also head of the German
firm.
Levy Auto Parts Company, a division of Levy Industries Limited,
1400 Weston Road, Toronto 15, Ontario, Canada, is a limited company and
was established in 1927.
A U.S. affiliate of the Canadian parent firm, Levy Auto Parts, Inc.
of 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., was incorporated in
the State of Delaware on June 16, 1949, and is registered with the
Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State. Fred Williams,
of the same Washington address, represents the firm here.
Information is not available as to any direct corporate ties
between MEREX AG and Levy Auto Parts.

TRANSFER FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN

Senator Symington. When Merex sold them to Iran, did they
sell them at a higher price than they bought them from the
German government?
Mr. Handley. That I do not know.
Senator Symington. You do not know that.
When Iran sold them to Pakistan, did they sell them for a
higher price than they bought them for?
Mr. Handley. Of course, the Iranians would not admit that
they have been transferred to Pakistan. In other words, we have
no understanding of what kind of arrangement, who has the
title, etc., between Iran and Pakistan.
Senator Symington. They may be rented by Iran to Pakistan.
Mr. Handley. They may be, whatever the arrangements are,
but we assume the Pakistanis feel that they have some kind
control over these aircraft.
Senator Symington. Well then, in other words, they could be
sold--what we would like to know is the nature of the sale and/
or the lease between Iran and Pakistan.
Mr. Handley. That, sir, would be extraordinarily difficult.
I just do not see----
Senator Symington. The Iranians would not tell us that?
Mr. Handley. Well, that opens up a wide range of diplomatic
questions. This began with the Canadian sale, the Canadian
permission to Germany. From Germany, then it was sold to Iran
and, presumably, from Iran, transferred to Pakistan.

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

Senator Symington. But don't we have any sort of
relationship with the Iranians? We were very close to them at
one time, the last time I had been out there. If we have given
them nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars of military
equipment, would it not be in order for us to ask what kind of
a deal they made with Pakistan on 100 F-86's that ``We wouldn't
sell you and that you bought from Canada through Germany.''
Wouldn't that be a fair question to ask, being partners in
the business of protecting freedom?
Mr. Handley. I think it would be a very difficult question
to put across.
Senator Symington. Wouldn't it be a fair question, don't
you think, to ask them? Here we are giving them----
Mr. Handley. An interesting question.
Senator Symington. Here we are giving them hundreds of
millions of dollars in airplanes and equipment, and we thought
we had an arrangement worked out. We told the world and the
Indians, too, and then they are violating that agreement by
letting planes slide into Pakistan from Iran on terms that we
do not know about. Wouldn't it be fair to ask them what the
terms were?
Mr. Handley. Well, I think in the process of doing so you
break quite a bit of crockery, Senator, with the diplomatic
relations.
Senator Symington. All they would have to say is, ``No, we
won't tell you.''
Mr. Handley. All right. They could say, ``No.''
Senator Symington. Why would you have to break any
crockery?
Mr. Handley. That then if you happened to believe that they
are not telling the truth, there is a certain kind of problem
there. You understand the difficulties.
Senator Symington. Are you saying you do not think they
would tell us the truth?
Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir. I would just hate to
speculate on exactly how you go through that particular kind of
diplomatic exchange.
Senator Symington. I think you lose me on this. I do not
quite follow you on it.
Mr. Handley. Let me say this, Senator. We will do the best
we can to find out through every possible means exactly what
has gone on in this transaction.
Senator Symington. All right, fine, sir.

DISCUSSIONS AT SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

When this matter came up of changing the policy incident to
the sale of lethal spares to Pakistan, was this discussed at
all with the Senior Interdepartmental Group?
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Was it gone over extensively by them?
Mr. Handley. The whole policy has been gone over
thoroughly.
Senator Symington. And their decision is to do it?
Mr. Handley. The decision is to carry out, among other
things, our total policy which we hope is aimed at giving us
control, some influence, I should put it, over arms procurement
in the subcontinent.
Senator Symington. Under the terms of the Foreign
Assistance Act, do you feel that Pakistan is now eligible for
assistance of this character?
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Does the United States intend to move
from supplying Pakistan with lethal spares to supplying some of
this lethal equipment? Is there any plan?
Mr. Handley. New lethal equipment?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Handley. No, sir.
Senator Symington. Just spares?
Mr. Handley. Just spares.
Senator Symington. I understand.
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.

REPLACING PLANES ACCIDENTALLY DESTROYED

The one qualification I would say is that we have no case
of this kind before us at the moment, but should there be an
accident, and one plane be totally destroyed, we would consider
replacing that plane, but we have no case of that kind before
us. We preserve that for the future.
Senator Symington. How do you know you would consider that?
Mr. Handley. We have considered that possibility, and
should it come up----
Senator Symington. Suppose the Iranians told you they had
lost a plane to Pakistan, but they had actually moved it into
Pakistan. How would you decide that?
Mr. Handley. You mean not Iran, sir. We are talking about
Pakistan.
Senator Symington. I know. But I meant suppose Pakistan
slides a few back to Iran and said they had lost them.
Mr. Handley. But I am talking we would have to verify it.
We would have to see it. We would have to see the wreckage.
Senator Symington. The reason I asked that was you did not
know how many Iranian F-86's had gone into Pakistan or how many
had gotten back.
Mr. Handley. I see. There is going to be a tough one there,
but I want to be absolutely candid with you. Our policy is not
to sell new lethal equipment. We have no case of this kind
before us at the moment, but we can see a possibility of this.
Senator Symington. What you are really saying is you would
be willing to consider maintaining the Pakistan air force,
etc., at the same level it is today but not increasing it, is
that correct?
Mr. Handley. At the same level as we know to be U.S.-
supplied equipment.
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. But not increasing it.
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. So if they drop 10 planes, they all had
been caught in a storm, we would consider replacing those 10
planes?
Mr. Handley. I think unit by unit we would take a look at
it.

BALANCING THE SITUATION

Senator Symington. I am only asking. I just want to get the
feel of it, you see, because we have been told here we are
balancing the situation. We balanced the strength against
Israel against the strength of the UAR, and we balanced the
strength of Pakistan against the strength of India. We balanced
the strength of Nasser against the strength of Iran, and we are
doing a lot of balancing. You all are; we are not. We are just
trying to follow the act, and I just wondered if that is what
was in your mind, that we, at the U.S. supply level of
sophisticated lethal military equipment, it is your
understanding that we will consider maintaining it at that
level.
Mr. Handley. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. I am
not quite sure that you can make a 100 percent statement of
that kind, but that is generally----
Senator Symington. But not increasing its sophistication.
Mr. Handley. At this stage, no, sir. We have no intention
at this particular moment to sell any new equipment, much less
more modern equipment in terms of lethal equipment to either
India or Pakistan.
Senator Symington. To either India or Pakistan.
Mr. Handley. That is right.
Now, on the non-lethal side, it would be different.
Senator Symington. I understand.

A CO-SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

As in the Iranian case, have we now put ourselves in the
position of being a co-supplier of military equipment to a
country also receiving military aid? I guess the answer is yes.
Mr. Handley. Yes, because they received equipment from
Communist China. But obviously it is totally different from
what it was between 1954 and 1965 when we were the major
suppliers.
What we would like to do, Senator, and this is part of our
policy here, is to try to get Pakistan in a position to
maintain what it considers to be its legitimate security needs
that it will buy from the West.
Senator Symington. What you consider their legitimate
security needs they do not consider their legitimate security
needs, you see. What impressed me is, first, Nehru says that he
is never going to be an armed country, and so we ship him blank
billions of dollars of wheat. Then he goes and buys the biggest
air force in the Middle East from Britain. Then Pakistan milks
us, and I think that is a fair term after listening personally
to Ayub Khan many times, for all they can get out of us in the
way of military equipment. They then buy a lot more of it from
behind the Iron Curtain; and then Iran, who I have been so fond
of that I hardly would like to use the word ``Milk,'' but they
do the same thing. They bought all they could from us, and then
they buy a lot from behind the Iron Curtain.
So what interests me from my limited military background is
the balancing act that the State Department puts on with the
Department of Defense as to what is the balance. Where is the
balance and, as I understand it, from what you have said today,
we intend to maintain this balance. I get very interested in
the rules as to what is balance, you see.
For example, if we sell a lot of 104 airplanes, which today
is a very good, modern interceptor fighter, to Pakistan in
order to balance with India, and then Pakistan buys a great
many more or a good many more MIG planes from China, if we
agree to replace what we sold them after knowing that they
bought planes from Russia or China, aren't we increasing
automatically the balance against India?
Mr. Handley. We are not going to sell any 104's. We sold
them--
Senator Symington. Let me be sure you understand my point.
We put 100 104's into Pakistan.
Mr. Handley. No, sir.
Senator Symington. Then we put 10 in.
Mr. Handley. Twelve.
Senator Symington. All right. We put a squadron in, I
remember. So we put 12 in there to balance against India.
After we put those 12 in there, then they buy or are given
or get on some basis, some more fighter planes. If we agree to
replace any of the lost F-104's, don't we automatically
increase by the replacement the balance against India as to
what we thought was the balance when we sold them the original
12?
Mr. Handley. Senator, that point I made was to tell you
everything exactly, the last thought that we had as to the
total range.
Now, I can assure you that all the people I have been
talking to in the State Department, including myself, would
take a very limited view of how this would be applied. But to
think of every possible contingency where you might have a
situation come up where there was--
Senator Symington. I just want to be sure we understand
each other. We say the Indians have 20 of something, and we
say, therefore, we are going to give the Pakistanis 12. That
makes a balance, right? And after they have milked us for all
they can get, and I was in on those negotiations, which were
12, then they buy six MIG's, which gives them 18. So they are
in balance right away. They have got 18 as against India's 20
unless India gets some more.
Mr. Handley. But India has been buying from the Soviet
Union and has a production line, a MIG production line.
Senator Symington. That is what I am getting at. Are we
trying now to equalize Pakistan's balance?
Mr. Handley. Not in that sense, sir.
Senator Symington. Not in that sense.

THE TEMPTATION TO ACQUIRE A NEW SQUADRON

Mr. Handley. Not in that sense. The idea would be this, if
there is a principle behind it: If there were a plane lost, and
you could not make a wing or a squadron, then there might be a
temptation to go out and get a new squadron from some place
else. If by replacing one plane we could sort of keep this
phased down for a year or two--
Senator Symington. You mentioned that temptation several
times. I know if I want a drink, it is a temptation to see the
bottle. But I am not quite sure how you define a temptation to
them. What do they say, ``Either you give us another plane or
we are going out and buy another squadron?'' How would that
temptation work out?
Mr. Handley. Well, there is pressure, any time you have a
military situation, on the politicians, and in this particular
case the politicians, at least the top politician, happens to
be a military man, too, and I think it is not--
Senator Symington. The top politician, the Shah and his
brother-in-law, have the Air Force. I guess that is right.
Bill, have you any questions you would like to ask?
Mr. Bader. No, sir; I think you covered them all.
Senator Symington. John, have you any questions you want to
ask?
Senator Sparkman. No. This thing is a great puzzle to me.
It is hard to follow.
Senator Symington. I think it is one of the greatest
balancing acts I have ever seen, and I want to get in on it to
understand how you balance it.
Mr. Handley. We are going to try our best.
Senator Sparkman. You are going to do what?
Mr. Handley. To try our best to do what we can to encourage
restraint in the military expenditures of the subcontinent,
using every device we can, diplomatic device, with our allies,
with the World Bank or economic aid, our own policies, so that
the resources go into food, economic development, and not into
this type of hardware. This policy gives us that much more
flexibility.

TRAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL

Now, there is one point I did not cover, sir, which I think
I should cover. We have no grant money. We are asking for grant
money except in one area, and that is to provide, if they want
it, continental training in the continental United States for a
limited number of military personnel from India and Pakistan.
That might run $100,000 a year, $200,000.
Senator Symington. Training pilots?
Mr. Handley. Officers, military people.
Senator Symington. Train pilots?
Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir.
Senator Symington. Train pilots or mechanics or
electronics?
Mr. Handley. Electronics; that is right.
Senator Symington. You do not know what kind of training?
Mr. Handley. I do not know yet, but we are putting this
aside as a possibility.
Senator Symington. As long as you are putting this aside as
a possibility, let me put this aside as a possibility. How do
you think some of the people who beat on us for being merchants
of death for supplying these arms to Pakistan and India would
feel if the Dallas News busted out that we are training 50
Pakistan pilots in Texas? How would you feel about that?
Mr. Handley. Frankly, I do not think that problem will
arise that way.
Senator Symington. But you brought it up, that is the only
reason. You ``arose'' it, so I would like to ``arise'' it with
you.
Mr. Handley. I just do not know what kind of training that
will be. But obviously it will be infantry training,
intelligence training, engineering training.
Senator Symington. Infantry, intelligence, engineering.
That leaves everything aside. They have no navy, so you are
saying it will be everything except air.
Mr. Handley. It could be all of these things, but I do not
know what it will be at the moment.
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Handley. But as we sketch out rather than nibble here
and there, we are trying to frame an overall approach, too--
Senator Symington. When you say ``we,'' who do you mean?
Mr. Handley. That is the U.S. Government, the State
Department, the Defense Department, the policy of the U.S.
government.
Senator Symington. Mr. Handley, who do you work for?
Mr. Handley. My new boss is going to be Mr. Battle. I used
to work for Mr. Raymond Hare, who was Assistant Secretary of
State.
Senator Symington. You are in State. You are going to work
with Mr. Battle?
Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.

RATIONALE FOR TRAINING MILITARY

Senator Sparkman. Let me ask this question: Why would we
train at our expense military officers and personnel of India
and Pakistan? We sell them the materials, do we not?
Mr. Handley. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. Hard money. Then why should we establish
a grant to train their officers for them? What obligation is
there from us to them in how they might use their trained
personnel?
Mr. Handley. Well, I think, sir, this is as much on the
political side as it is actually on the training side. The
contacts between the officers of India and the United States,
and contacts between U.S. and Pakistan. India has, I suppose,
the second largest army in the free world at the moment.
Certainly--
Senator Symington. But what is the answer to the question?
Mr. Handley. Well, the answer to the question, I think, is
contacts between the Indian Armed Forces and the United States
Armed Forces.
Senator Sparkman. It seems to me our interest over the past
several years is to keep them from fighting each other, and we
cut off the arms aid with that in mind.
Mr. Handley. That is right.
Senator Sparkman. Now, if we start building up trained
forces, isn't that an incentive to fight rather than
discouragement?

INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

Mr. Handley. Senator Sparkman, I take it that India's major
apprehension today is still Communist China.
Senator Symington. So?
Mr. Handley. That there is a partial interest here.
Senator Sparkman. If we give training to India looking
toward the Chinese frontier, then we have to give a similar
amount to Pakistan to balance the act, is that right?
Mr. Handley. I do not know how much of this training they
will really want, but I am----
Senator Symington. That is not the answer to the question.
What is the answer to the question?
Senator Sparkman. It seems to me it is not a question of
what they want, but it is a question of what obligation is
there on our part.
Mr. Handley. It is in our interest, sir.
Senator Symington. To give them training.
Yes, in what way does it serve our interests?
Mr. Handley. Our interests, as I said earlier, are in
contacts with the officers corps of India and Pakistan,
opportunities for them to be in the United States, to train in
the United States, opportunities in the case certainly of India
to think about the possibility of what might happen if the
Chinese came over the border.
Senator Symington. Let me ask the question again that
Senator Sparkman just asked because I am not clear on the
answer.
Senator Sparkman asked you if India increased their army,
or we agreed to help train their army in order to fight
Communist China, which you said you felt was their primary
enemy, would they then feel obligated in balancing off a
situation to do the same for Pakistan? Could you give us an
answer, ``Not necessarily,'' or ``Yes,'' or ``No,'' on that
one?
Mr. Handley. I would say that you have to offer training to
both sides if you are going to----
Senator Symington. There is your answer.
Mr. Handley. If I may qualify that after I have made the
yes answer, I think we are talking about actually a very small
range of training. But there is just this possibility that I
mentioned.
Senator Sparkman. So far as I am concerned, I could see
justification in helping India train officers aimed at the
Chinese attack. But I do not see that that would require us
then to train that number of Pakistanis, and I do not see that
it would get away from the old problem of greater danger for
war the stronger we make them.
Senator Symington. John, if I may go off the record a
minute.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Symington. John, have you anything else?
Senator Sparkman. Nothing more. It has been interesting.
Senator Symington. Thank you very much. All we wanted to
get is information. We are not looking for any trouble.
Mr. Handley. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Human Rights Conventions
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper and Cooper.
Ex. J, 88/1, Convention on the Political Rights of Women;
Ex. K, 88/1, Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced
Labor; and Ex. L, 88/1, Supplemental Slavery Convention; were
discussed and it was decided to wait until the American Bar
Association could express themselves before taking action.
[The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 10:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committees on the
Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The combined subcommittee met in executive session at 9:40
a.m., room S-208, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Mansfield (Chairman), Fulbright,
Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper and Aiken, representing the
Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Stennis, Symington,
Jackson, Miller and Pearson representing the Armed Services
Committee.
The first order of business was to elect Senator Mansfield
as chairman, and Senator Stennis as vice-chairman.
The group discussed when the first subcommittee meeting
should be held and who should be heard.
[The combined subcommittee adjourned at 10:00 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 3:00 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Symington and Fulbright.
Samuel Cummings, President, International Armament
Corporation (INTERAMCO), accompanied by Richard S. Winter, vice
president, testified on Additional Military Assistance to
Pakistan.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper,
and Cooper.
C. Hoyt Price, Department of State, answered questions of
the committee on Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunications
Convention, and it was then ordered reported favorably by voice
vote.
The routine Foreign Service Lists dated March 9, 22, and 23
were discussed and carried over.
Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was ordered reported
unanimously by a roll call vote.
The following nominees were ordered reported favorably:
Rutherford M. Poats, to be Deputy Administrator, AID; Claude G.
Ross, to be Ambassador to Haiti; and John C. Bullitt, to be
Assistant Administrator for the Far East, AID.
The committee also discussed the following: hearings on
foreign aid; hearings on the U.N.; further hearings on Vietnam;
a briefing by Vice President Humphrey on his recent trip;
letter re: appointment of ambassador to Hungary; and the IMG.
[The committee adjourned at 11:20 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt,
Case, and Cooper.
The Foreign Service Lists of March 9, 22, and 23 were
ordered reported by voice vote.
The nominations of Arthur J. Goldberg, William B. Buffum,
Richard F. Pedersen, Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, and Samuel C.
Adams, to be representatives of the U.S. to the Fifth Special
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and
Garland R. Farmer and Michael Iovenko, as alternates, were
ordered reported.
S. 624, providing for increases in annuities payable from
the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund, was ordered
reported with amendments, subject to the approval of Senator
Williams.
S. 1029, providing for increased benefits for government
employees serving in hazardous areas, was ordered reported with
amendments.
S. 1030, Informational Media Guaranty Bill, was considered
but held over for further hearings.
[The Committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committees
on the Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The combined subcommittee met in executive session at 12:35
p.m., in room S-208, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Mansfield (Chairman), Fulbright,
Sparkman, and Hickenlooper, representing the Committee on
Foreign Relations; Senators Jackson, Miller, and Pearson
representing the Armed Services Committee.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss trying to get
Secretary of Defense McNamara to appear alone before the
subcommittee next week.
[The combined subcommittee adjourned at 12:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:35 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Symington, McCarthy, Pell, Aiken, and
Cooper.
Townsend W. Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense,
accompanied by Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Regional Director,
Near East and South Asia, Department of Defense, and Lt. Col.
John Black, Department of Defense, testified on military
assistance to Pakistan and India.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 3:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:05 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Symington, Sparkman, Pell, Hickenlooper,
and Aiken.
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, accompanied by John Owens, Greek Desk, and
Kay Folger, Special Assistant for Congressional Relations,
briefed the group on the Greek situation.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:50 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, APRIL 24, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:05 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Fulbright,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.
Briefing on the meeting of American Chiefs of State at
Punta del Este by Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State
for InterAmerican Affairs; Sol Linowitz, U.S. Representative to
the Council of the OAS. Joseph W. Barr, Undersecretary of the
Treasury, and Winthrop Knowlton, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs, testified on the Inter-
American Development Bank.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Symington and Hickenlooper.
Townsend W. Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense,
accompanied by Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Regional Director,
Near East and South Asia, Department of Defense, and Lt. Col.
John Black, Department of Defense, continued discussion of
military assistance to Pakistan and India.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:55 p.m.]

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE

----------

Wednesday, April 26, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Combined Subcommittee on Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committee on the
Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Mike Mansfield (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present representing the Committee on Foreign Relations:
Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and
Aiken.
Representing the Senate Committee on Armed Services:
Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Miller, and Pearson.
Also present: Senators Lausche and Cooper.
Mr. Marcy and Mr. Lowenstein of the Committee on Foreign
Relations staff; Mr. Braswell of the Committee on Armed
Services staff; and Miss Stabler of the Library of Congress.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

* * * * * * *

[P. 5]

The trilateral discussions were precipitated, as you
recall, by the difficulties encountered last fall with the
German-U.S. and German-U.K. offset arrangements. For the past
six years, the United States and the Federal Republic have had
military offset arrangements of approximately $675 million a
year covering the foreign exchange costs of U.S. deployments in
Germany. I provided details of the arrangement in my letter to
you, Mr. Chairman, in my letter of last week. The net of the
situation is that, after fulfilling the 1961-62 and 1963-64
agreements, the Germans ran into serious difficulties in the
1965-66 two-year period: They met only a little more than one-
half of the contemplated level of orders by December 31, 1966,
the end of the two-year period for orders; and, for the
payments period, which ran for the two fiscal years ending June
30, 1967, they are as of now approximately $335 million short
in payments. They have assured us they will make up that
shortage by the end of the period before July 1. But, because
their payments to the U.S. Treasury will have outpaced
disbursements required to U.S. manufacturers on account of
their orders, the Federal Republic will find itself with pre-
payments on the military account, or ``overhang,'' of perhaps
$950 million on July 1 of this year. The ``overhang,'' combined
with a serious budgetary situation in Germany, has led them to
predict only minimal new payments to us in our fiscal year 1968
and not much more in our fiscal year 1969.
This obviously has created a serious problem for us.

WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

At the same time, we were faced with what appeared to be a
slackening of effort by our Allies. (Germany, for example,
after increasing her military budget 50 percent between 1961
and 1963, then leveled off its defense budget.)

* * * * * * *

BURDEN SHARING IN THE ALLIANCE [P. 6]

In this environment, the question of burden-sharing in the
Alliance had to be examined. The United States has a per capita
gross national product at least 50 percent higher than that of
any of its European NATO allies; still, that taken into
account, our allies appear to ask less of themselves than they
do of us. They devote a much smaller percent of their gross
national product to their armed forces and they have fewer men
per thousand in uniform. Their forces are weaker in firepower,
weaker in endurance, and less ready than ours.

* * * * * * *

U.S. PROPOSALS FOR ROTATION OF TROOPS [P. 7]

Regarding the Army, we have, as you know, 5 division
forces, or 224,000 men, in Germany. The one division involved
in the rotation plan is the 24th Infantry Division. At least
one brigade of that division and some divisional command and
control units--some 4,000 to 5,000 men--will be in Germany at
all times. The other two brigades and an appropriate share of
divisional and non-divisional support units--totaling
approximately 28,000 men, about two-thirds of a U.S. division
force--will be removed from Germany to the U.S.
Once a year, all three brigades will be in Germany for
exercises involving the entire division. The rotation plan
provides that the three brigades will succeed each other in
Germany--each brigade in turn remaining in Germany, on
temporary duty status, for a period of six months. The forces
redeployed to the U.S. will be maintained in a high state of
readiness, and equipment will be maintained in Germany in
sufficient quantity and readiness to ensure that the forces can
be redeployed to Germany within 30 days.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SAVINGS

I expect this plan to save the United States more than $70
million in balance-of-payments costs annually.
On the Air Force side: We have 676 fighter, reconnaissance,
and air defense aircraft in Europe; and, of those, 486 are
tactical fighters. The Air Force units involved in the rotation
are the three tactical fighter wings, totaling 216 aircraft,
now based in Germany. Five squadrons of each of the wings, or
72 of the 216 aircraft, will be in Germany at all times, (they
will be located on two or three bases, with the remainder of
the four bases maintained as dispersed operating bases); 144 of
the aircraft and up to 6,500 men will be redeployed to the U.S.
All 216 of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a year
for exercises. The aircraft in the U.S. will be at a high state
of readiness to assure their rapid deployment to Europe, within
five days, if necessary.
We estimate the balance-of-payments saving resulting from
the plan to be $16 million a year.
First movements under the Army-Air Force rotational program
are planned to take place soon after January 1, 1968. We expect
to have the plan fully in operation by June 30, but we shall do
so only to the extent that we can return the units in the times
I have described.
The ground and air units affected by the move, whether at
their U.S. or German bases, will remain fully committed to
NATO.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDATION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended against any
redeployments now, including those I have just outlined,
emphasizing their belief that in some contingencies the warning
may not be sufficient to permit the forces to be returned to
Europe in times I have specified.
The Germans have expressed concerns about our proposed
rotation plan, which we are now discussing with them. These
concerns stem from the combination of a number of their views.
They tend to give the Warsaw Pact forces more credit, and NATO
forces less credit, than we do; they tend to expect less
warning time than we do; and they associate physical presence
of U.S. forces with the U.S. political commitment and therefore
fear that the redeployment of some of these forces implies
reduction in the U.S. commitment. The Germans are particularly
concerned about the Air Force aspects of the plan, and that
part especially is still under active discussion.
My own view is that--because of the political warning time
and the speed with which reinforcements can be made--we can
operate under the rotational plan I have described without
significantly reducing our military effectiveness. It is
possible that, if we left critical political factors aside--
which we of course cannot--but if we can, it is possible that a
rotation plan of perhaps twice the magnitude I have described
could be put into effect without reducing the effectiveness of
our military forces. I feel confident that adjustments going
beyond that level of magnitude, twice, that I have outlined,
would result in cutting U.S. combat power--a move that would be
dangerous because I am convinced that one of the main reasons
East-West relations have improved is the strength of the West
and the demonstrated will of the West to use that strength if
necessary in defense. It is the Secretary of State's judgment
that a redeployment of a magnitude greater than the one-
division three-air wing rotational plan could not be made at
this time without traumatic psychological impact in Germany
and, as a matter of fact, throughout NATO. Therefore, putting
together the political and military factors involved, the
Administration cannot now recommend more than the rotation plan
that I described earlier.
Any redeployment of U.S. forces involves a risk of Soviet
misinterpretation. There is a possibility, however, that a
small redeployment of the kind that I proposed might be used to
help induce a corresponding Soviet move, in line with the
suggestion in the President's speech of October 7, 1966. Some
experts believe that for political and military reasons the
Soviets will not be willing to reduce their military presence
in Eastern Europe in the near future no matter what we do. But
the first move on our part in the direction of troop reductions
would be politically significant in itself, as a step away from
the cold war atmosphere. And it would give the Soviets some
incentive to respond.
These, Mr. Chairman, are the ingredients of the package
being discussed in the trilateral talks. We do not now have any
plans for any redeployment beyond those I have described today;
we do not consider that the international situation justifies
any further redeployments at this time. We would, of course
consult with the Congress as well as our NATO allies before any
further redeployments.

* * * * * * *

POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 16]

Senator Jackson. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the
possibility of the Soviets making, say, a limited move in
Western Europe in light of developments in Asia, isn't there
also the possibility of trouble in the Middle East?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, Senator Jackson. I think that we
should be sensitive to the possibility that the Soviets would
move on any one of several different fronts for a variety of
reasons, among them, perhaps, being the desire to put greater
pressure on us at the time we are involved in Southeast Asia.
Senator Jackson. Well, the reason I mentioned the Middle
East--I was not excluding, of course, other areas of the
world--but I had in mind the possibility of having to move
troops from Europe as we did in the Lebanon crisis.
My recollection is that we moved troops from Germany by
airlift into Lebanon during that particular period, was it
1959? Therefore, the fact that we have a good force in Europe
is of equal importance to problems that might occur on the
flanks, is it not?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, although I think that we might
prefer in that situation to move troops from the United States,
and we are seeking to maintain our readiness to do so if
required.
Senator Jackson. I was thinking of airlift problems and
other matters that might, from a time point of view,
necessitate the movement of some forces from Germany to the
Middle East should that situation arise.

WISDOM OF RESOLUTION ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS AT PRESENT TIME

In your judgment, would it be wise for the Senate to take
action on a resolution calling for a reduction of forces in
Europe at this time in light of present conditions?
Secretary McNamara. I believe it would be unwise, Senator
Jackson.
I think there is such a ferment in Europe at this time that
such action by the Senate might well be misconstrued.
The foundation of the defense of Europe is, of course, the
political commitment of the United States to that defense. For
either the Western Europeans or the Soviets to begin to doubt
the force of that political commitment, I think our own
security would be impaired, and it would be almost as serious
for the Western Europeans to doubt it as it would be for the
Soviets to doubt it.
Let me read to you a cable that I brought with me, which
just came in a day or two ago. This is a report of a German
Cabinet meeting of a week ago, and to show you the mood in
Europe today as it might be affected by a Senate Resolution, I
read these sentences. This is reporting the German Cabinet
meeting itself:

There was vociferous and, at times, emotional debate over
the proposed withdrawal of U.S. aircraft.
This is a proposal I just read to you.
Kiesinger, the Chancellor, contended that American motives
behind this move which would entail the withdrawal of a limited
number of personnel, and only a limited savings, had little to
do with the American offset problem but was more likely part of
a scheme to denuclearize Europe. That is the scheme they have
charged me with before.
This analysis by the Chancellor found nearly unanimous
support in the Council and encouraged some of those present to
voice misgivings of the American intentions and the general
dependability of the Americans as an ally. It was agreed to
inform the Americans that the massive withdrawal of American
fighter-bombers from Germany was totally unacceptable.

I mention this simply to indicate that they are very much
concerned by our actions, and they are concerned not only as to
their military impact but as an indication of our political
decision. I think, therefore, that a resolution by the Senate
at this time urging withdrawals substantially larger than those
we are proposing would have serious political disadvantages to
us.

* * * * * * *

BURDEN-SHARING OF EUROPEAN NATIONS [P. 19]

Senator Jackson. Are some European nations paying more of
their part than some Americans give them credit for?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, I think they are. And I said, in
general, their contribution as a percentage of GNP is a measure
of their general contribution to defense. But having said that,
I must say that, in my opinion, the Europeans are not
contributing their own fair share, and in making that statement
I know I provide ammunition to those of us who wish to reduce
our support of the common defense.
But I make that statement not on the basis of the
percentage of GNP contribution that they are making but the
percentage of our men in uniform. I think this is, perhaps, a
more valid measure of our individual contributions to our joint
defense, and here we find that the major European countries
such as the United Kingdom and France and the Federal Republic,
have roughly half as many men in uniform per thousand of
population as we did before the expansion of our forces
associated with Southeast Asia.

* * * * * * *

SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS [P. 24]

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you consider that our presence in
Europe in strength, as at present, is an integral part of the
Southeast Asia situation, or is it a separate and unrelated
matter?
Secretary McNamara. I think they are linked together by the
Soviet strategy which is to put pressure on the West wherever
it perceives weakness.
In this particular situation there is a further problem
brought about by the pressure on the Soviet Union by North
Vietnam and China to relieve the U.S. pressure on Southeast
Asia by a diversionary move some place else in the world.
So that we have the normal Soviet strategy of probing for
weakness wherever they find it in the West, accentuated in this
case by pressure from their own allies to relieve the pressure
of the U.S. military forces on them by diversionary political
or military attacks against us elsewhere.

* * * * * * *

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPE COUNTRIES [P. 27]

Secretary McNamara. I do not believe there is any
significant move under way by any major countries to reduce
their military establishments.
I think there is great pressure on the defense budgets to
try to reduce them as a percentage of gross national product.
But I do not believe that need entail, nor do they plan that it
will entail, a reduction in the actual military force.
Now, that is a general statement. There are a few, perhaps,
exceptions to it. I think, perhaps, Belgium, a very small
power, is planning a possible reduction in strength. But there
is no major reduction in military strength planned by any of
the major NATO countries that I know of.
Senator Symington. The table of defense expenditures as a
percent of GNP for NATO countries you have submitted to the
combined subcommittee shows that taking the figures from 1950
to the present of GNP devoted to defense reached a new low in
1966 for Belgium, France, Greece, The Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and Canada, and was within 0.3 percent of a new low in
the case of Denmark and Norway.
Doesn't this trend indicate a diminishing desire within
NATO to maintain troop strength at the present level?
Secretary McNamara. No, sir; I do not think so, because
troop strengths can be maintained at the present level without
maintaining defense expenditures at a constant percentage of
gross national product and, I think, by the way, that article
overstates the reduction of defense expenditures as a
percentage of gross national product.
Roughly they have been constant in recent years. They have
not been increasing as we have thought they should. There are
some indications of some of the nations, Germany included, who
would like to reduce the percentage of defense as a percentage
of gross national product, but not reduce the strength of their
forces.

* * * * * * *

CHANGE OF NUCLEAR POWER BALANCE [P. 28]

Secretary McNamara. I would like two or three points in
response. First, it is true that at the time we entered NATO we
did not have the strategic nuclear forces that we have today.
We did not have the Polaris missiles and we did not have the
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
But, of course, at that time we had a near monopoly of
strategic nuclear power, a monopoly we no longer possess,
because while we have increased the efficiency of our strategic
nuclear forces during this 15-year period the Soviets have
actually acquired a strategic nuclear force. This significantly
changes the military utility of our force and narrows the
extent to which that force is both a deterrent and a response
to potential Soviet aggression, and increases, therefore, the
requirement for conventional forces of the kind we presently
have in Western Europe.
Furthermore, I think the point that Senator Fulbright made
a few minutes ago is very important. It is essential that we
recognize it today, that the operations in Southeast Asia do
put pressure on the Soviet Union because of their interest in
and support for North Vietnam, and possibly China, to engage us
in operations elsewhere in the world, and to apply political
and/or military pressure against us to that end, and beyond all
that, as we know, the Soviet basic strategy does not appear to
have changed and as recently as my tenure as Secretary of
Defense, they applied military pressure against us in Western
Europe.
So for all these reasons I think the force that we have
there today is not only required today but I think it will be
required in the near term future as well.

* * * * * * *

GERMAN ARMS SALES TO THIRD COUNTRIES [P. 28]

It has now been determined that much of this equipment has
been resold through an international arms broker to countries
such as the Chad, Iran, Israel, the Sudan, and Pakistan. These
countries have apparently paid a great many times more for this
equipment than the price the United States received from West
Germany.
Most of these surplus arms have been sold through the Merex
Corporation, a German company operating out of Bonn. Merex
operations extend around the world. They have been closely
connected with Interarmco, a large American arms dealer. In
addition, it is believed by some that Merex serves as part of
the West German Intelligence apparatus. It would appear that
Germany uses this private corporation for two reasons: (1) to
spare its government the embarrassment of selling arms of
American origin directly to countries where the United States
is telling its people it is attempting to control the arms
race; and (2) to prevent the United States from knowing what
actually happens to the arms after the sale to Merex so the
Germans can live up to their agreement with us to let us know
of ultimate disposal.
As but one example of Merex operations is the sale of some
90 F-86 aircraft to Pakistan. The sale was arranged at a time
when the United States was trying to prevent arms from entering
Pakistan. The West German government told the United States
that these aircraft were going to Iran. Nevertheless, people in
our government are confident that the West Germans knew these
aircraft were actually going to Pakistan; hence it would appear
deliberate deception on West Germany's part.
The evidence suggests that the West German government, in
its desire to make a profit off its surplus equipment, has
acted and is continuing to act in a way that is against the
United States' efforts to dampen arms races. With its great
reservoir of surplus military equipment of American origin,
West Germany has the means to stimulate arms races throughout
the underdeveloped world. The irony is that the East Germans
are making a heavy profit on the sale of U.S. equipment, not
only that sold to them but also that given to them.
Would you care to comment on those observations?
Secretary McNamara. Yes. May I do so for the record,
Senator Symington? I am not familiar with the operations of the
Merex Corporation to which you refer. I do know something about
the alleged sale of F-86 aircraft to Pakistan. I do not believe
any such sale did occur in the form in which you outlined it or
in which the statement refers to it.
But I would like to check the details and respond fully for
the record.
I will say simply one thing in passing. I know of no effort
by the German government or no evidence of any effort by them
to mislead us as to sales of arms to other nations. There is at
times a difference of opinion between us, perhaps, as to
whether such arms should be sold to other nations, but this
difference of opinion results from their discussion with us of
potential sales and from our exercise of our right to prevent
such sales.
Senator Symington. Well, maybe it is because I used to be
in business, but I hate to be badly outtraded, and I think we
have been in this case.
Secretary McNamara. I do, too.

* * * * * * *

REDEPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL FIGHTERS [P. 33]

Senator Miller. Though what you are proposing would reduce
the number of our tactical fighters by about 30 percent, do you
think it is still consistent with not reducing our military
effectiveness?
Secretary McNamara. I do, indeed, because those fighters
can be returned to Europe within five days, which is less time
than the estimated period of military warning estimated at
between 11 and 15 days.
Senator Miller. One thing that bothers me about the
redeployment is that if the Soviet Union wishes to harass us,
all they have to do is start building up some pressure which
would mean probably calling back these redeployed forces. We
would have the leadtime necessary to have them ready, and then
the pressure or the tension could be relaxed. But I can
visualize an on-again off-again situation which would be very
harassing and very expensive.
Secretary McNamara. Of course, it would be equally
harassing and expensive to the Soviets.
It would be negligible. It would not be a major military
operation, and it would not involve major costs, and we would
be prepared to do it at such times as it appeared necessary.
Senator Miller. I understand that the JCS are opposed to
your plan.
Secretary McNamara. That is correct; on military grounds,
that is correct.
Senator Miller. I mean they are not in favor of this
redeployment of 30 percent of our fighters, and I think this
28,000 members of the brigades.
Secretary McNamara. They do not recommend it.
Senator Miller. What is their reason for it?
Secretary McNamara. They believe, particularly with respect
to the ground forces, that the period of warning may be less
than the time required to redeploy the forces to Europe.
We have stated that we will be capable of redeploying them
to Europe within 30 days. The Joint Chiefs state that the
period of warning may not exceed 11 to 15 days. In that case, I
think their statement is subject to question because while the
period of military warning may be only 11 to 15 days, almost
surely there will be political tension over an extended period
in excess of 11 to 15 days, and this constitutes warning as
well.
So from my point of view, I think we can redeploy the
forces within a period of political and military warning. They
do not, and they, therefore, do not recommend the rotational
program I have outlined to you.

* * * * * * *

PRACTICAL POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE [P. 35]

Senator Pearson. What effect did the British withdrawal
have upon their idea--of their psychology, and so forth?
Secretary McNamara. I think that they will recognize it for
what it is, a very, very small change in a very small force,
thereby not affecting in any fundamental way the balance of
power between the East and West.
In any case, the political leaders of Western Europe have
just very practical political problems. There is great pressure
on them to meet these unfulfilled demands of their people.
It is recognized their contribution under any reasonable
set of assumption of our common defense will be small. It is
believed that the period of relative peace over the past five
years will continue and, therefore, that they can avoid
increasing their budget in proportion to their gross national
product.
I am not supporting this. I am simply trying to explain it,
because, quite frankly, for those of us who have to deal with
it everyday, and who are charged by the President with trying
to change those attitudes, it is a very frustrating role.
But I would point out we have made some progress. It is a
fact that the effectiveness of the non-U.S. divisions in
Western Europe has increased dramatically in the past six
years. Norstad said it increased 50 percent between 1961 and
1964. It is a fact that the Germans increased their budget 50
percent between 1961 and 1963. It is a fact that the Germans
bought from us $3 billion worth of new equipment in the last
six years, so they have made progress.
Senator Pearson. I think so.
Secretary McNamara. The military strength has increased,
and I think it would be very shortsighted were we, in a fit of
pique, and I recognize the basis for the fit of pique, but were
we in a fit of pique to begin to tear down our common defense.

CONVENTIONAL RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WARFARE

Senator Pearson. Let me ask you just this: Incidentally,
the commander of the Seventh Army in Heidelberg, probably in
February some time, indicated to me that it was his judgment
that any military action would open with a nuclear shot in a
race to the sea across the traditional invasion boundary across
the North. But he also said something else that really set me
back, and that was the maintenance of a large conventional
military force in Western Europe might be necessary because a
nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States
would destroy the industrial capacity of both nations, leaving
only Western Europe as the industrial prize of the world.
Would you comment on that?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, I would. May I say, first, that
his view that----
Senator Pearson. I think he is retired now, incidentally.
Secretary McNamara. He would have been retired earlier if I
had ever heard that, I can tell you that. But may I say that
his view as to the most probable form of initiation of military
contact between East and West is not shared by the Joint
Chiefs. They do not believe that conflict between East and West
will break out initially by a nuclear exchange. They think
quite the contrary, that non-nuclear action will almost surely
precede nuclear action, and we must be prepared to deter such
non-nuclear action by the maintenance of adequate conventional
forces.
Secondly, I never heard a more absurd statement than his
statement to you that a nuclear war between the Soviet Union
and the West would preserve Western Europe unscathed. I think
that is the least likely of the series of possible outcomes.

* * * * * * *

IMPACT IN GERMANY AND NATO OF U.S. TROOP REDEPLOYMENT [P. 36]

Senator Pearson. Just for the record, I take it that, Mr.
McNamara, you agree with the Secretary of State's estimate that
any redeployment beyond that which is presently contemplated
would, as I take it, as a direct quote, ``have a traumatic
psychological impact in Germany and in NATO.''
Secretary McNamara. Yes, I do agree with that at this time.
I do think, however, and I think he would agree, we should
begin to move in our conversations with our allies so that over
a period of time they will find politically-acceptable moves
that we think are in our common military interest.
The problem is they attach a political significance to the
move that it is not intended to have, and that makes it
militarily unacceptable as well as politically unacceptable,
and it is that misinterpretation of a potential military move,
I think, we must seek to overcome in the months and years
ahead.

* * * * * * *

REQUESTS TO THE GENERAL [P. 38]

Senator Mansfield. Senator Miller, you had a question?
Senator Miller. Just one brief one.
I notice that you say the Germans are particularly
concerned about the Air Force aspects of that plan, and that
part is still under active discussion. Is it your evaluation
that possibly the plan might be modified to eliminate the Air
Force aspect?
Secretary McNamara. I do not see any reason why it should
not be from a military point of view. These discussions are
going on. I do not try to anticipate their conclusion. So I
really cannot give you an answer, but militarily it is sound.
Senator Miller. Thank you.
Senator Mansfield. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS DeB. KATZENBACH, ACTING
SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY EUGENE V. ROSTOW, UNDER
SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

* * * * * * *

IS THERE A DANGER IN PURSUING WAR IN VIETNAM? [P. 48]

Senator Fulbright. Do you think there is a danger that, if
we pursue the war in Vietnam to a military victory, this might
precipitate China----
Mr. Katzenbach. I think the Administration has recognized
the fact that Communist China is right there supporting the
government of Vietnam, and Soviet Russia has been throughout
supporting the government in Vietnam, and those are
considerations which have to weigh importantly on decisions to
be made. In answer to your prior question, Senator, I think I
understand what you mean. I have no indication that the Soviet
Union would stand aside if China came in. I would be rather
surprised if they stayed aside. I think they would stay where
they are.

* * * * * * *

MUTUAL RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION [P. 52]

Senator Miller. Mr. McNamara testified first, and I quote
him now: ``A first move on our part in the direction of troop
reductions''--and by that he was referring to the recommended
redeployment figures--``would be politically significant in
itself, and a step away from the cold war atmosphere. And it
would give the Soviets some incentive to respond.''
Then he went on, in my colloquy with him, and indicated
that he did not have much confidence that there would be such a
response from the Soviet Union.
Do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, Senator, I do agree with it.

* * * * * * *

MEANS OF EFFECTING A MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION [P. 53]

Mr. Rostow. There is very active work and thought and
preparation going on in NATO, Senator Miller, both in the
context of these talks and the next stage of these talks in the
Defense Planning Committee, and in the re-thinking about the
future tasks of NATO and of the procedures for carrying out
those tasks. We are now actively discussing whether bilateral
approaches or collective approaches to the subject of Soviets
in this regard are better, whether discussions with them of
troop levels should come first, second, or third in connection
with other activities toward achieving a detente in Europe. It
is an extremely active area on the whole Alliance front and
when we say here that studies are going on, we don't mean to
brush it under the rug. This is something to which we and our
allies are giving intense consideration, and I think rather
hopeful consideration.

* * * * * * *

RISK OF GIVING THE SOVIET UNION AN INCORRECT SIGNAL [P. 55]

Senator Miller. One last question, Mr. Chairman, and I will
be brief.
While Mr. McNamara and you shared the belief that you did
not have much confidence that the plan that he set forth was
going to result in some kind of a mutual reduction, at the same
time he expressed confidence that there would not be a reverse
response, such as a probe. Do you share that assessment?
Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, I do. I agree with him that a
rotational system of this type despite some reservations of the
Joint Chiefs would not be sufficient to permit the Soviet Union
to miscalculate on this. I would go further on this and say in
terms of just what you were asking, Senator, to establish some
capacity, to experiment with a movement of troops of this type,
I would regard as an affirmative step that even could be
helpful in terms of looking at it down the road as another
measure with respect to withdrawals as far as the Soviet Union
and we were concerned without losing the essential capacity.
So I am interested in it because I think it is an
interesting experiment from which we can learn a good deal
about the movement of troops and how long it does really take
and how effective this is, and what public attitudes towards
this may be.
I think it would be good to adjust the European thinking to
the fact that we could move rapidly in this way, where they can
visibly see our capacity, to move in this way. I think it would
be helpful on the political and psychological problems.
[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene on Wednesday, May 7, 1967.]

MINUTES

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Clark, and
Pell.
Informal briefing from Vice President Humphrey on his trip
to Europe.
No transcript was made of the meeting.

BRIEFING ON YEMEN AND GREEK SITUATIONS

----------

FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in.
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright, Gore,
Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Cooper and Javits.
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
Senator Symington. The subcommittee will come to order.
The Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs is
meeting this morning to hear the Assistant Secretary of State
who is charged with that part of the world, to discuss the
latest developments in Yemen, Greece and other aspects of his
domain that he would like to talk about.
We are very glad to have you with us this morning, Mr.
Secretary. Have you a prepared statement, or would you care to
discuss this orally?

STATEMENT OF HON. LUCIUS D. BATTLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, NEA, ACCOMPANIED BY H. DANIEL BREWSTER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR
FOR GREECE; WILLIAM D. BREWER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR ARABIA; AND
MISS K. FOLGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared statement, as
I understand that this is to be an executive session, to be
very frank with you.
Senator Symington. Nothing will be published that you do
not want to have published.
Mr. Battle. I wish to be very frank with the committee, as
I always try to be.
As mentioned in my confirmation hearing, at our last
session, I told you that I was deeply disturbed about the
number of problems in the Middle East. I would like to
particularly emphasize this morning the new serious situation
in Yemen and, secondly, to bring you up to date on the Greece
situation that I discussed in detail a week ago today.
As far as Yemen is concerned, we have had a series of
developments over the last few days that are very disturbing.
For many months there have been harassments of the Americans in
Yemen of various kinds, some of them trivial, some thoroughly
irritating. Occasionally, we have had serious developments,
such as beginning the night of the 25th, two nights ago, in
which there was a charge that a bazooka was fired into an
ammunition dump near Ta'izz, and as stated in the later press
statements, that it practically destroyed the city.
We have in Ta'izz an AID Mission--that is not the capital
of the country--and military officers and men came over to the
compound which had been closed for several hours under the
curfew, and all of our people had checked in. They came with
dogs, and went directly to the house of one of our Public Roads
Bureau men named Stephen Oppalous. They then arrested four of
our people. A mob formed--a very large mob, numbering at its
height about 3,000 people. They went to our embassy, sacked the
place, pulled out the plumbing, destroyed automobiles, and
broke windows. They did everything that you could think of.
Our four people were detained----
Senator Hickenlooper. Do we have Marine guards there?
Mr. Battle. Have we?
Mr. Brewer. This is the branch office, in Ta'izz. We only
have one embassy proper in Sanaa.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. PERSONNEL

Mr. Battle. Last night, we had a news ticker that the Yemen
Republican Government wanted to terminate the AID agreement
under which we were operating there, and a departure of our AID
Mission; that there was a plan to bring charges against these
people--to try two of the four people that they had arrested.
And this, obviously, created a very serious situation.
We have concluded that we must move as quietly and as
quickly as we can to withdraw our people from the area. And we
must, I think, do this. Of course the problem now is to try to
assure that these two men who are still under arrest--two have
been released; there are two still under detention--and there
is not complete clarity as to the intentions with respect to
them. Public statements are that they are to be tried. The
statements that we have had are that it is something less than
that. It has been said that they will be retained for further
investigation. We have been given a notice which is in the
process of translation, and we do not have the note, so this is
not completely clear whether they are to be tried or not. But
the evidence would certainly point to their intention to
humiliate us. Justice in Yemen is a fantasy--it could not be
more ridiculous.
I think we have a very delicate situation to protect our
people. I think it is our first and primary concern at the
moment. We have approximately sixty official Americans there.
The total Americans in the country are around 100, including a
few missionaries, 94 to 95, and we are doing----
Senator Symington. There are 100 Americans including
missionaries. What about the 94 and 95, just to be sure?
Mr. Battle. As nearly as we can give that to you; they are
not absolutely clear for the following reasons. There are a few
Yemeni board people who have American passports. We do not know
exactly how many. There are no clearly stated facts. One, for
example, some time ago came back here, and changed his mind at
the airport. There are a few in that category. We have nine
Baptist missionaries, a few miles north of Ta'izz. There are
one or two Catholic missionaries. There may be a few others in
this area. These are the approximate numbers, as best as I can
give them to you.
We will try to give you a complete breakdown, but I doubt
if we can.
Senator Symington. What is the total number of Americans?
Mr. Brewer. The total is of the order of about 160 or 165.
Mr. Battle. That is including the missionaries. This is in
Yemen.
I think that we must maintain enough of a staff in our
embassy to do what we can to protect our own people.
Our instructions last night--we got them in the middle of
the night--were to begin to prepare to get them out of there,
and we are trying to arrange transportation as best we can. We
are not saying that we are evacuating. We are simply
withdrawing as rapidly as we can.
I think it is our hope, of course, that Yemen will let us
withdraw people peacefully without any difficulty. It is a
highly volatile situation. They are very unpredictable people.
We are considering several ways of getting them out. The
most desirable and the most likely is to charter an airplane,
probably one of the Ethiopian airplanes, if the Yemenis will
let it in. We are also checking ships. Over the night we tried
to locate American shipping in the area that might have come
through the canal heading south, or either way, for that
matter. There is, for example, an American destroyer in the
vicinity. There are other ways in which we might be able to
offer assistance.

EGYPTIAN INVOLVEMENT IN YEMEN CRISIS

Let me talk a little bit about the background of this and
give you as much of an assessment as I can.
I think there is absolutely no doubt that the local
Egyptians are back of this. I think that there is room for
uncertainty as to whether it is Cairo-directed or not. I had
the Egyptian Ambassador in yesterday morning and informed him
that it was absolutely clear that these people were in the
hands of the Egyptian military. There could not be any argument
about this; this could not be argued. Both the Egyptian, the
civil and the military in Ta'izz are engaged in this.
We have had several conversations in Cairo. We have several
bits of information on this. It is not clear whether it was
directed by them or not. They are both in Yemen and in Egypt,
those who would like nothing better than to have the United
States thrown out of both places, for that matter. There are
others who have tried over the past to try to keep us in Yemen
with the hope that we would not withdraw our recognition of
Yemen and would stay there.
At this stage, the evidence is about 50-50, according to
our intelligence people. I think we have to be very careful, to
deal very firmly with the Egyptians, whether they have directed
it or not. They alone have the authority to bring about a
change in it, and I think that we must take a very firm
position with them.
Our charge d'affaires, under instructions from us, informed
the foreign minister last night that this would have a very
direct bearing on our relations with the Egyptians for years to
come. We are not trying to deal with whether they started it or
not, but I think that without any doubt they have the
authority--they have sufficient leverage there to help us deal
with the situation effectively and to permit our people to
leave.

CONDITION OF KING SAUD

King Saud is in Cairo. As you know, it is a rather
ridiculous situation. King Saud is old and has pretty well had
it.
Senator Hickenlooper. He is nowhere near as old as I am.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Battle. I apologize for the comment. [Laughter.]
Senator Aiken. He has had it--that is the difference.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Battle. He is much, much older than you are. He did not
even remember where he was, who had him there. He forgot the
name of the Vice President of Egypt who took him down there. He
is nothing. He has no status with the Saudi Arabians. He has
for years fought with Nasser. They threatened to assassinate
each other at various times, but they have made up now. It is a
very cold, calculating kind of relationship. And that is all it
is.
Senator Hickenlooper. It is the Middle East.
Mr. Battle. It is the Middle East, yes, sir. But for the
moment, I think that what we want to try to do is do what we
can to protect our people there, to withdraw as quietly and
with as little sensation as possible, to try to get out those
people that we have there, to try to keep this from getting out
of hand.
We must not, I think, break relations at this point,
because it is important that we have somebody there to protect
our own people. Our people have diplomatic immunity. If anybody
will be safe in the country, I am certain that our charge
d'affaires and one or two people protecting him will be
protected. I feel that we cannot at this stage walk out of the
situation.
I would like to withhold my judgment on whether it is wise
for us to break relations in the days ahead. Clearly at this
moment we must try to pull out all of these people whose lives
may be in danger. The situation is such that it may be very,
very difficult. But to break relations, no.
Obviously, aid is finished. It has not amounted to a great
deal. It has been $2.4 million for this current fiscal year. It
is completing a road project begun some years ago, and various
water well diggings, sanitation, things of that sort.
That, sir, is it in a broad sense.

AMERICANS ARRESTED IN YEMEN

Senator Symington. They arrested four people?
Mr. Battle. They arrested four. They released two. Their
public statement says that they are going to try them. I do not
want to ask for that public statement.
Senator Hickenlooper. It says what?
Mr. Battle. That they will try these two. That is what came
on the ticker last night, but this is not the phrase that is
used in the message that we have so far. Before we respond
publicly, I do not want to get them in the position where they
have to charge them. The phrase they used in the telegram that
we received this morning indicates that these two, that is,
their cases, will have to be studied further. If this is an
effort on their part to withdraw from the trial, I should think
it likely, because a trial there would be a mockery and a
disgrace. I hope that we can avoid having our people go through
with it.
Senator Cooper. Who are the two?
Mr. Battle. One is named Hartman and another Liapis, both
Bureau of Public Roads people.
This is the most obviously trumped up charge that I have
seen in a long time. These people, according to the telegrams
that we have, were locked in our own campsite in the compound,
under the curfew law. They brought a dog in, and it went
directly to the house that they wanted. There was something
there. It is pretty malicious and ridiculous. It is even more
ridiculous, because in the interrogation of this man, they
brought in what was obviously a moron, an idiot, who was said
to be in the last stages of some kind of disease. They asked
him if he could identify the two people whom he had seen
engaged in bazooka firing, and he pointed to Liapis and then he
pointed to the general who was holding the investigation which,
I think, pretty clearly proves that he did not know what was
going on.
Senator Hickenlooper. He probably was right.
Senator Aiken. Anyway, in that respect.
Senator Symington. Have you any questions that you would
like to ask, Senator Fulbright.

EXECUTIONS IN GREECE

Senator Fulbright. First, before I ask any questions, let
me say that I received in the mail at seven o'clock a special
delivery, this communication from a resident of the Twin City
area, and I thought that I would convey this to you. These are
people who are disturbed about the execution of people in
Greece. So I could not think of anything better than to give it
to you.
Mr. Battle. Thank you, sir.
Senator Fulbright. It came from the vicinity of
Minneapolis-St. Paul.
Mr. Battle. I hope very much to deal with this problem when
we finish with Yemen.
Senator Fulbright. I might follow that up. I had telephone
calls the night before last, about 10 o'clock, from a lawyer
who said that his wife was acquainted with Papandreou who
taught at the University of California. They were extremely
concerned that he was going to be executed for having tried to
maintain a democratic government in Greece, and asked if there
was anything that I could do. I said that I could not do
anything other than to put it up to the State Department; I
have no possible way of influencing that government. He said
that he was sending this to me in the morning mail, material
which, I believe, is sufficient so that they can make a plea to
their government. It seems to me that they are preparing to
execute him. That is all I know. They sent it to me for the
reason that I am the chairman of the committee. And that is the
same reason why I am giving it to you this morning. This man
feels that maybe just because of personal vengeance it will be
done.
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that, sir. We
have been very concerned about all of these things. Obviously,
if Andreas Papandreou is executed, there will be a tremendous
problem both here and in Greece. He is very widely known here.
He has many friends here. We have on eight occasions sent
messages to our embassy there. We have taken this matter up
with various people in the top structure of the government. We
have been assured, although not specifically said--as to
Andreas--we have been assured that no harm will come to either
of them. To our best knowledge he is clearly under arrest, but
we have no reason to believe at the moment that he is being
mistreated.

U.S. PREOCCUPATION WITH VIETNAM

Senator Fulbright. What has happened as to Yemen and in
Greece to me has a bearing on Vietnam. I think that our
preoccupation with that and our concentration of forces of all
kinds on Vietnam will be an invitation to many people--not just
Russians, but anyone who has resentment or a problem against
our interest--to take steps, because they feel that there is
nothing that we can do about it. I think that this is a perfect
illustration of what Gavin told the committee last year, that
this will expose us in any number of places around the world,
to provide occasions for people of various kinds. I would
recommend to the high echelon in our government that they might
possibly reconsider our war in Vietnam and to consider what
influence you have and means you have available to do
something.
Mr. Battle. May I respond to that?
Mr. Chairman, in my confirmation hearing you will recall I
told you and told the committee that I was very disturbed by
many things going on in my area. I am very hopeful of getting
as much time from this subcommittee and the full committee as
possible to look into this. I have been very pleased to have
the opportunity to get up as quickly as I was permitted to do
on the Greek situation, and again, this morning, the Yemeni
situation, so that we can work together on the problem.
I would like to bring the committee up-to-date on Greece,
if I may, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. OVER-COMMITMENT ABROAD

Senator Symington. Before you do that, I want to associate
myself with what the chairman has said. I want to state that
after being in Japan and in Europe in April, that I am
completely convinced that we are over-committed. I would like
to leave this comparison with you.
It looks like the United States was in the ring, let us
say, in a fight, and everybody says, ``This is the greatest
fighter that the world has ever known.'' Round after round, he
is totally ineffectual, after putting in one-half million
people and a giant fleet, and a good many billion dollars. As
the rounds go on you feel, ``Heh, we thought that this fellow
was the champ. We are beginning to think''--and I do not want
to use the expression about my country, and I got a very
definite impression of that in Europe a year ago--I got a more
definite impression when I went to Greece in January that they
cannot figure out why we cannot do better if we are going to
stay out there, after all of these people and all these
gigantic sums of money are being spent. So here it is.
I think, if you will look at the report that I made to
Senator Fulbright and to Senator Russell last January--a report
that is not yet declassified--you will find that I predicted
that this would happen. I think that we have just got to get
ready for it.
If I may respectfully say so, I think that we have got to
figure out where we are going to get the additional people and
equipment to handle these additional problems. We have not got
much left, unless we truly go on a mobilization basis, to take
care of many more of these.

FIGHTING WITH ONE ARM

Senator Hickenlooper. I do not want my silence to mean that
I agree with everything that has been said here. I think that
your illustration of the champ in the ring is a very apt one,
but I do not think that the champ can fight with one arm taped
to his back. He can only fight contenders if he has both hands,
but not with one hand.
I believe that Senator Fulbright was there, if I remember,
when we were talking about Laos--that meeting with Senator
Kennedy.
We are there. The trouble there is that we are not allowed
to win it. That is not the champ's fault, necessarily; somebody
has bound his ankle.
Senator Symington. They do not know all of those things.
They just see him working at it.
Senator Hickenlooper. I know that.
There is the fact that we cannot attack the harbors, and
the like.
Senator Fulbright. You can. They can attack anything that
they want to. He can bomb Peking.
Senator Hickenlooper. The military arm cannot use what they
have got.
Senator Symington. I do not think that we have any
difference here about what is happening to the so-called champ.
Maybe it is because they have bound his arms; maybe because
they bound his nose; maybe it is because he is not much good
fundamentally anyway against people who want to fight in their
own country. I do not know what the reason is. I think it ought
to be considered. One of the things that I would like to have
asked General Westmoreland is why out of the five bases they
attacked, they attacked the regions first and left the big base
for the last, which means that they will have a great many more
aircraft and small arms around if you have a policy that you
are not allowed to attack. Now we have broken the policy and
maybe in a certain number of days or weeks, we will attack
these places. It will cost us just that many more American
planes, because of the nature of the way the operation is being
conducted.
I just wanted to associate myself with the general
unhappiness about accomplishments. I did not want to get into a
dialogue.
Senator Hickenlooper. If we do not do something pretty
quickly about Yemen we will be in the same kind of a position
there where we can be justifiably criticized.
Senator Symington. What do you think we should do?
Senator Hickenlooper. I do not know, from all of the
information that is available. We sit here at this great
distance and try to mastermind this, these military and sea
operations. There was a time when we could send a couple of
cruisers over there and would say, ``Look, you violated all of
the comity of all international conduct here. You either put up
or shut up.''
Now I do not know whether that is justified, but I do not
know whether it is overall feasible in a general operation,
once we sit around and let these people kick us all over the
place and do not do a thing about it. We talk, talk, talk,
talk. They keep running right over us, and expect to continue
doing so. They can do it next week, and the week after.

FORTRESS AMERICA

Senator Symington. I would like to ask the Chairman, what
would you do?
Senator Fulbright. In Yemen?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Senator Fulbright. I am not at all sure, because I do not
know what we can do. What do we have available to do it with?
If we send in cruisers, I do not know why the Russians cannot
do it, too. This is not like it was in the old days. I think I
do not know right off the bat what to do, preoccupied as we
are.
Senator Hickenlooper. Just succumb to the Reds and the
subversives and everybody else in the world and retire into the
fortress of America, and build a wall around here and say,
``Let the rest of the world go any way they want to.''

OTHER MISSIONS HAVE WITHDRAWN

Senator Symington. What do you think that we should do?
Senator Aiken. I said a year ago to fight a war with
restrictions and regulations and things that go with fighting
and winning a war. If those who sell materials want profits
from the war, they do not want to pay for the war in any way,
it seems.
Senator Symington. I meant specifically on Yemen.
Senator Aiken. Oh, Yemen.
Senator Symington. Yes, sir.
Senator Aiken. Well, there are a lot of people there today,
I know.
Mr. Battle. There are only a few missions there. The
Italians are there.
Senator Aiken. Have they just gotten out?
Mr. Battle. The Germans and the British have gone. Who else
is there now? There are a few left there. The French are not
there.
Senator Hickenlooper. They have more sense than we do.
Senator Aiken. We are the only ones in the whole area
there.
Senator Symington. What would you do?
Senator Cooper. How many are there? Are we doing all we can
to get them out?
Mr. Battle. May I tell you one thing that we have done? I
must be very careful about this.
Senator Symington. We will go off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Symington. Back on the record.

U.S. OVERTURES TO EGYPT

Mr. Battle. Our efforts in Egypt at this time are limited.
There are still things they want from us.
Senator Hickenlooper. They are not yet hungry, but they
will be hungry.
Mr. Battle. They will be hungry, right, but they are
looking for some things. They would like to see us at this
stage help them on a few things. They are particularly eager to
get this stabilization agreement with the IMF.
Senator Hickenlooper. We have pressure on it right now.
Mr. Battle. Through some oil companies, because of
contracts, they want some concessions. That is American
enterprise, the American system. There are a lot of other
things that are necessary to support industrial contracts.
The oil is a possibility. They are in a very vulnerable
situation there. Because Egypt needs them and they will let
them go on operating. They will let them stay, I believe they
will, for the time being.
The only hope I have, the thing that troubled me when I
first got to Egypt, was that I could not see an end in sight to
the Public Law 480 program, an artificial relationship which we
did not like. And the Egyptians did not like it. But when the
oil was struck, that is the first time that it could see a
natural tie to us based on economic factors of trade rather
than aid. I hope that the oil project has and will in time tie
more to the West by natural trade processes and give them the
money to buy their own food. This is to me the only hope that I
can see to normalize our relationship.
I do not think that the oil at the moment is quite enough
to solve their economic problems, but it will help. It may come
very close to equalling what our food was worth at the maximum
point that we put it in there, in the neighborhood of $100
million a year.

SITUATION IN ADEN

Senator Symington. The purpose of this meeting is a report
from you in Yemen. I think that we are clear as to what the
situation is in that sector. We are also clear what you plan to
do about it.
Now as to the question of Aden being very important in this
whole picture, could you explain that before we get out of this
subject and turn to Greece for a minute?
Mr. Battle. Well, Aden, as you know, the British have been
there. They are pulling out. Their departure, I think, is
projected and that departure has created a vacuum that both
Faisal and Nasser are concerned about, Faisal with very good
reason. I have some doubt that Nasser wants to make a direct
military effort in Aden. I think he wants a government there
that is friendly to him, responsive to him and as nearly in his
direction as possible, but he hopes to achieve it through other
than military means, if at all possible.
In the last analysis, I do not know what will happen. This
is my view on the situation as of this time.
The only hope that I have been able to see if the British
pull out--I agree that is a sad thing--but if the British go--
and I am told that they are going--I think that we have got to
try to work in an international presence, if we can possibly do
it.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

Senator Hickenlooper. If something does not happen the
Russians will move in, as sure as the sun will come up.
Mr. Battle. Or the Egyptians under the direction of the
Russians.
Senator Hickenlooper. He has been under their control for a
long time.
Senator Aiken. Have they not some provision at Djibouti?
Mr. Battle. They have not followed that. I have not
followed the geographical problem there. I am not familiar with
the area.
Mr. Brewer. I think that it is true that Djibouti can
provide some bunkering facilities that were formerly provided
by Aden, but they get their own bunkering in Djibouti from the
refinery, a substantial portion of it. This could be changed
over time, but if there is a serious situation?
Senator Aiken. They can go through there.
Mr. Brewer. In a sense, that is something that Djibouti
cannot meet.
Mr. Battle. To continue on Aden, Mr. Chairman, I see the
chance of chaos there, which is very great, once the British
withdraw. There are many elements there. There are various
political forces at work there, which make it very confusing.
It is very difficult to be sure who is backing whom at any
given time. For example, I just heard yesterday of an anti
anti-terrorist group which shows how many groups there are
there working. The most important one, and the most active one,
is the Egyptian one. They have been, I think, as much as anyone
group responsible for the terrorism and for the difficulty. The
relationship of Ta'izz to Aden is fairly close. It is closer to
the south. Ta'izz is to the south of Aden. And in the presence
of some of these groups that have been responsible for some of
the actions taken is one of the reasons that we had hoped to
maintain a place there. This obviously is going to be a long
and, I think, tedious one, and if we have to get out of there,
we will, unless we do something very quickly--we will not have
anything there shortly otherwise.
We are going to lose a little bit in terms of our
development in what is going on there. This is an important
center of the Egyptian activity.
Senator Symington. In Aden?
Mr. Battle. Ta'izz where we have these people.

APPEALS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Hickenlooper. What about these other affiliations?
Mr. Battle. You mean in terms of what?
Senator Hickenlooper. These affiliations in the whole
complex--what about that?
Mr. Battle. Well, sir, the Saudi Arabians----
Senator Hickenlooper. I mean the South Arabians.
Mr. Battle. The South Arabians. There is no agreement on
what ought to happen. There is a split between these various
protectorates and various groups throughout the south portion
there, but we have hoped that we could get some kind of a
coalition with the United Nations to pave the way for free
elections and some kind of United Nations presence that would
keep these various forces that you are concerned about from
moving in and trying to take over.
Senator Fulbright. That is up to the United Nations?
Mr. Battle. It is not up to us. We have supported every
action that has been taken. The recent United Nations mission
that was sent out accomplished nothing, sir. I went out. It was
an absolute fiasco.
Senator Hickenlooper. They were there about three days.
Mr. Battle. After an incredible series of places.
Senator Hickenlooper. They were supposed to be in there for
quite a while, but they left in three days.
Mr. Battle. It is so complicated that it is hard to say. I
think that everybody feels badly. One issue was whether they
would get----
Senator Symington. Are you talking about the United Nations
mission?
Mr. Battle. The United Nations mission that went there
about three weeks ago.
Senator Symington. Who were they?
Mr. Battle. They are still in being.
Senator Symington. Who was on the mission?
Mr. Brewer. Venezuela, Mali and Afghanistan. Venezuela is
chairman.
Senator Fulbright. Mali and who?
Mr. Brewer. We had a very great difficulty in getting
anybody.
Senator Symington. Let me get that. I want to remember
that. They represented Ambassador Goldberg and Secretary U
Thant. What were they going to do when they went there?
Mr. Battle. They were there under a United Nations
resolution that had almost unanimous agreement. I think that
there were two or three abstentions. Egypt bought it. Everybody
bought it. They were to go there to study the situation and to
make recommendations to the United Nations with respect to the
future of that area. Nothing came of it. They got into a series
of incidents, in some cases over trivial matters, for example,
the inspection of their baggage--the question of whether they
could go on television came up. There were all sorts of
ridiculous things.
Senator Hickenlooper. They got out in three days?
Mr. Battle. They went to Geneva and stayed there for a few
days, I think, 13 hours with George Brown who told me. I
happened to see him when he was here for the SEATO Conference
there. He said it was in terrible fashion. He spent 13 hours.
They are still in existence.
Senator Symington. Let us go off the record for a moment.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Symington. Back on the record.
Senator Aiken. Why do we not turn some of them over to
Russia?

OFFICIAL DATE OF WITHDRAWAL

Senator Symington. Will you continue?
Mr. Battle. It is the intention of the Executive Branch of
the government, through a series of meetings with all agencies,
to see what we can do about Aden. I have no cure-all for it,
Mr. Chairman. I wish I could tell you that I did. We are
working on it. I have been deeply disturbed about it before I
left Cairo. I think it is a very serious problem and closely
related to Yemen, but I do not know what the answer is.
Senator Symington. What is the date for getting out?
Mr. Battle. The official date is by 1968. There is a
possibility of advancing this.
Senator Symington. There is no intention on our part of
getting in there.
Senator Hickenlooper. We could get in there by furnishing a
little money to keep the people there.

AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE

Senator Symington. We have just come up with $35 million to
keep the people in Yemen. Let me ask you this question: Is it
possible for the United Nations to put a team in there of some
sort?
Mr. Battle. This has been my hope, Senator. I thought that
the presence of an international force, even an entire Arab
force, would help. This is what we have to consider. I think a
United Nations presence is the only thing that I can think of,
but given the experiences that we have had with that
distinguished mission that has just been out there, I am
discouraged. It is not over yet. I think that we still have to
point to the United Nations. We still have to try to build an
international presence that will permit a coalition government
of some kind on an interim basis with the United Nations
presence in the hope that in time we can have free elections.
And if we can, if a coalition. government can be created that
has any chance of interim survival--if we can recognize a
United Nations-blessed coalition government, with the weight of
the international community behind it, I think that we can keep
ourselves from a direct commitment but to back up such a
structure as we are able to get in these which, I hope, will
keep it from having chaos after the British withdraw.
It is a hope. I can give you no guarantee of it myself. But
I have the hope, as you know, by Monday or Tuesday--this is
completely a hope--we will have some ideas that we have not had
yet.
Senator Symington. Does anybody have any comments or
questions further with respect to Yemen or Aden?
We will go off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Symington. Back on the record.
Mr. Battle, I share your comments. I think that we have to
be for something. If we can put an interim thing in there with
the United Nations blessing and hold the line and try to keep
chaos from developing, even the chances of a free election at
the moment are very slim--we have got to point a direction.
Senator Aiken. I think that King Faisal possesses a good
share of common sense.
Mr. Battle. And common sense is a rather rare commodity.
Senator Symington. Keep us posted on this, Mr. Secretary.
Do you have a question?
Senator Cooper. When did this government come into being?
Mr. Battle. In December of 1962.
Senator Aiken. It was the United Nations before that.
Mr. Battle. We recognized fairly soon after the revolution.
Mr. Brewer. We recognized it, that is, the earlier royalty
government.
Mr. Battle. That is right.

AIR MILES FROM CAIRO TO TA'IZZ

Senator Symington. How many air miles is it from Cairo to
Ta'izz, roughly--200 miles as a guess?
Mr. Brewer. It is more than 500 miles. I would say around
1,000.
Mr. Battle. I would guess that it would be about that,
because it is a four-hour air flight.
Mr. Brewer. It is three hours from Yemen.
Mr. Battle. I can find out exactly, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is not that important.
Senator Aiken. That is quite a substantial distance.
What is the present force that is there from Egypt?
Mr. Battle. It is down now to around 37, 38 thousand--a
reduction from 70 thousand down to around 30 thousand, but this
does not mean that he is withdrawing his troops. He has
consolidated them. That is better from his point of view. They
are not spread out as much as they were.
Senator Cooper. It is the same distance from Cairo to
Rome--about the same distance.
Mr. Brewer. About 1,500 miles.
Mr. Bader. It is about 1,500 miles.
Senator Fulbright. Do you want to say some more about
Greece?
Senator Symington. Will you keep us posted on this?
Mr. Battle. I will.
Senator Symington. On the developments in Yemen. All right,
now, will you tell us about----
Senator Hickenlooper. 1,500 miles?
Senator Symington. Is that not amazing, these distances. It
is hard to believe.

COUP IN GREECE

We will leave the subject of Yemen and Aden. Tell us a
little bit about Greece.
Mr. Battle. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I met with this subcommittee
a week ago today, which was the morning after the coup occurred
in the afternoon. I gave you a number of statements that were
based then on the situation as we knew it. They have proved
fairly accurate, as I told you.
In a general way, at that time as to the situation these
statements have been proved to be correct. Those factors are
the following: This is a coup of the Colonels and a Brigadier
General. They are oriented to the right politically. They have
had little experience in government.
The coup occurred. It was very carefully planned. They
executed it in a very effective manner from their point of
view.
It is absolutely clear to us now that the King did not know
anything about it, and, in fact, until recent days has been
rather critical of the proposition, the way it was handled and
many other aspects of the coup. The coup group have affirmed
most vigorously in public and in private statements its desires
to continue its relationship with NATO, which is the
cornerstone of its policy. It is pro-western. In fact, one
member of the government said, ``We are with you whether you
want it or not.''
The King's situation in this is as follows: He has not yet
signed the decree suspending various provisions of the
constitution. He has refused to sign the decree, putting into
effect martial law.
Senator Hickenlooper. I thought that he had.
Mr. Battle. It has been claimed from the beginning that he
did do this, Senator, but up until the last conversation that
our Ambassador had with him he said that he still had not
signed the decree, even though they had said publicly, ``I have
done so.'' He made a great point as to two or three articles
that were suspended, one regarding capital punishment. We are
assured by him that he has not done it. It was done in his
name. However, they tried to put the entire coup efforts as
originally done in the name of the King. However, in the
statement yesterday, Papadopoulos admitted publicly that this
was arranged by them and without the King's knowledge; that
there was no foreign element involved in it.
As far as our position in this is concerned, here is what
we believed. The coup was obviously accomplished, and any
resort to any other constitutional process is very disturbing
to us. The coup has occurred, however.
The first few days, I cautioned this committee when I
talked with you last week that any statement by us criticizing
the coup or appearing to lend support to any dissident elements
within the country could well bring about an effort towards a
countercoup, and even possibly a civil war which would be very
bloody. It would result, in my judgment, in either an extreme
left wing dictatorship or an extreme right wing dictatorship.
I think the chances of that occurring lessen each day as
time goes on, but it is still present.

THE KING SHOULD REMAIN IN GREECE

As far as our position on this is concerned, we believe
that the King's position is that he remain in Greece and in a
very, very difficult situation. In the initial stages, we have
taken the position that the King is the most stable element we
have there. We have felt that he must try to exercise his own
impact on the situation as rapidly as possible to get this
stamp on the government and its actions and composition.
For example, we have had in mind a civilianization of the
cabinet which he has succeeded in doing. The cabinet is not a
distinguished one. There is very little reason that it is
particularly good, but it looks a little bit better as time
goes on.
He has brought in a wider representation of the country. It
is made up of a combination of military figures, a few senior
civil servants, including the Supreme Court Justices who are
less important than they are in this country, but one of them,
at least, has a certain popular following and a certain
distinction.
We believe that the coup group needs the King. We believe
the coup group needs us, if it means what it says publicly. We
believe that we must try to exercise caution, without taking
such actions as to bring about these dangers of a civil war in
the situation.
The suggestion was made to more and more representatives of
the country, hopefully, to get a return to the constitutional
process as soon as possible.
The King has made a statement that he hopes that there will
be a return to constitutional processes.
There has been one press report that Papadopoulos has made
a similar statement. It's probably not true, or we would have
known about it by this time.

U.S. COOL TO COUP GOVERNMENT

So as far as our own actions are concerned, we have been
extremely cool towards the coup government. We only yesterday--
I think we have done it--I authorized yesterday the Embassy to
respond to a routine note from the Foreign Ministry simply
informing us that they were in business. That is the first
official communication that we have had with them, but the
British and others are going ahead. We felt that this was no
question of recognition involved, from the legal point of view;
that we are better staying there, trying to maintain such
efforts as we can and to hope that we can influence the
situation.
It will be noted that in the two or three days which have
elapsed, we made a statement that we were reviewing the
question of the military assistance program. What we have
actually done is that we have stopped all major equipment
shipments.
Senator Fulbright. How large is that?
Mr. Battle. $65 million, sir.
Mr. Brewer. $65 million, sir.
Senator Symington. And what does that amount to? In what
kind?
Mr. Battle. The kinds are the major equipment. We are
trying to locate all of the equipment that is about to go
there. We have not made a basic decision with respect to
military assistance. For the information of the committee, the
practical effect is that the reason we have said that I wanted
to do as much as we can--I want to keep dangling the question
of what we are going to do. The effect, so far as we are
concerned, is that we have stopped tanks, we have stopped the
airplanes, to the extent that we control that.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN GREECE

Senator Fulbright. How large a military presence do we have
there--how many military personnel?
Mr. Brewer. There are over 6,000, including families.
Senator Fulbright. I mean military personnel--3,000, are
there?
Mr. Brewer. Just about.
Senator Symington. The military themselves. Not the people
who are civilians, but the military--is it 3,000?
Mr. Brewer. I can get you the exact figures. [Note: 3,285]
Senator Fulbright. How many [deleted] would that be?
Mr. Battle. I do not know.
Senator Fulbright. Are you sure they have nothing to do
with this?
Mr. Battle. I am. I am absolutely sure.
Senator Fulbright. I was thinking about the takeover. Is
there any indication there?

ROLE OF PAPANDREOU

Mr. Battle. I would not put it in those words. As you know,
an election was called for May 28. The largest party is the
party headed by George Papandreou, who has been a moderate. He
has not been an extreme moderate. He has not taken an extreme
position. His health, however, is not good. He is not a young
man. His son, Andreas, around whom much of the center of the
storm has centered, has been exactly, well, what his political
thoughts are no one can be sure. He has, however, based on the
view of those people who know, been drifting steadily to the
left for some time.
Senator Gore. Who is that?
Senator Fulbright. You named Andreas.
Mr. Battle. He has been drifting steadily to the left.
Senator Fulbright. He is anti-American.
Mr. Battle. Also, anti-American.
Senator Fulbright. Do you equate anti-American with being a
Communist?
Mr. Battle. What I am trying to say, Senator, is that at
least as to the question of what he is doing, in the eyes of
the conservative party--in the eyes of the King--he is their
enemy. Now Communist, I hate to say that--I do not think that
he was.
Senator Fulbright. At least, in the views of the King?
Mr. Battle. He was in the eyes of the conservatives and in
the eyes of the King there, he was their enemy.

ROLE OF THE QUEEN MOTHER

Senator Fulbright. Is the Queen Mother in Athens?
Mr. Battle. To the best of our knowledge she is there.
Senator Fulbright. Do you know anything about whether she
was in this?
Mr. Battle. We have no knowledge about anything whatever.
We have heard very little about her in any of the official
telegrams or communications that we have had about the Queen
Mother.
Mr. Brewer. She has been standing well away from it. The
inference we have gotten is that her influence over the last
few years has been certainly on the downgrade.

SPLIT BETWEEN GEORGE AND ANDREAS PAPANDREOU

Senator Symington. When I was there in January, I am almost
certain that the Ambassador told me that there was a major
split between George and Andreas.
Mr. Battle. There was, indeed, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. With both of them in jail. Did they meet
in the van or what happened? As I understand, George is as
opposed to the King as anyone, but that there was a great deal
of respect for him in the country.
Mr. Battle. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Andreas was supposed to be opposed to
his father, because his father was not enough opposed to the
King. There was not much respect for him in the country.
Mr. Battle. Your statement is generally correct, sir. As
George over recent months has become more defiant, the two have
tended to make up and they have come together both personally
and politically over recent months. It was generally believed
that if the Center Union won an election, that while George may
be the head--the titular head of the party--Andreas would be
the leader of that party.
Senator Fulbright. And try to get rid of the King, is that
it?
Mr. Battle. That is what they suspected. Was there ever a
flat statement about that?
Mr. Brewer. The campaign took the form in the last few days
of stating, ``You are not King of the Hellens--you are King of
the Conservative Party.'' This was stated both by George and
Andreas in the last week.
Senator Symington. What this really gets down to is that
the military coup was to prevent an election, does it not?
Mr. Battle. To prevent an election of what they thought
would be a clearly anti-monarchist and very left wing group in
their opinion.
Senator Gore. Which they thought would win.
Mr. Battle. Which they thought would win, yes, sir. The
Center Union Party is the largest party. We think, probably,
they would have won.
Senator Symington. Let me ask a very delicate question. I
mean it very sincerely, however. If it looked as though they
were going to lose this election, it would be smart for the
King to approve clandestinely the overthrow and have it appear
that he did not want it.
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, yes, it would have been, but we
do not think that is what happened. If you will let me go off
the record here.
Senator Symington. Yes, off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]

ROLE OF TURKEY

How about the Turks?
Mr. Battle. The Turks have been very cool and detached,
waiting to see. They are obviously concerned about this. At the
first blush of this thing, we got off a message to our
ambassador to caution them about doing anything that would
exacerbate the situation. We have been watching the situation.
We have found no effort of any kind of move in on top of what
is happening in Greece. There are rumors, of course. But there
is no indication. We suspect that everybody is a little
nervous. We expect that the coup in Greece does not want to
take on any more than it has. It has ahead of it economic and
political problems. We doubt that they want to get into the
Cyprus thing.
Senator Symington. Have you any questions, Senator Gore?

U.S. AMBASSADOR CALLS ON THE KING

Senator Gore. I have a high regard for Phil Talbot. I would
expect him to add to the coolness and the discretion.
Has there been any publicity in Greece of his calling upon
the King? I saw something about it in the press.
Mr. Battle. There have been numerous accounts here of his
calls on the King. The press in Athens is completely under the
control of the coup group.
Mr. Brewer. He has made three calls on the King. That fact
is known, but the contents of his calls, if any reports have
gotten out, is pure speculation.
Mr. Battle. I have not seen any report in the press as to
his calls--any attention to it in Athens.
Mr. Brewer. Other than the fact that he has made the calls,
nothing further.
Mr. Battle. The foreign press has reported it, but the
Greek press has not.
Mr. Brewer. It is a censored press and they are not talking
about it.
Senator Gore. Have we maintained any contact through
[deleted] or otherwise with Papandreou?
Mr. Battle. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Brewer. Margaret Papandreou has been herself to the
Embassy on a number of occasions. She is an American citizen.
She came in with her father and her son on the very first
morning. We have been in touch with her repeatedly about what
the status is of Andreas. She has been sending him clothing. He
has asked for sunglasses and she sent those out to him. We have
been in close touch that way, but otherwise not.

KEEPING CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES

Senator Gore. We may be fortunate to have this contact,
because obviously there is widespread support for this majority
party, and for this leader who is now, I suppose, out. In the
event that they have a civil war it might be well that we keep
some contact with both sides.
Mr. Battle. I agree thoroughly. The thing that we want if
possible is to have something to obviate a civil war and a
great upheaval there. The consequences of that would be
disastrous.
Senator Gore. It could be a touchstone for a war.
Mr. Battle. Yes. I think that we have to be very cautious
about this. We do not want to go too far in either approving or
disapproving the current regime. If we are too disapproving of
it we will stimulate reaction which will be an excuse for
somebody to try to do something.
Mr. Brewer. We have had contacts with George Mavros, who is
a member of the Center Union Party, one of the co-leaders of
this group, who came to the Embassy and gave us his idea of
what we should do about the coup and so on. So we are
constantly in contact with both sides.
Senator Gore. What were his ideas?
Mr. Brewer. Well, they were much like the ideas that were
expressed by the King; namely, that we have got to work from
here--maybe we can get participation of all sides and make what
would be called an ecumenical government. He would like to be
Prime Minister of that.

RESISTANCE TO THE COUP

Senator Gore. Has the Embassy had any indication from any
of the leaders of the party that hostile, physical military
action was contemplated? Do we have any information of any
organized resistance to the coup?
Mr. Battle. No.
Senator Gore. Does the military have a monopoly on weaponry
in the country.
Mr. Battle. The bulk of it certainly is in their hands. I
am sure, however, there are guns in caves and what have you in
typically Greek way, but the bulk of the military weaponry is
controlled by the coup group.
Senator Gore. Are any of the deposed military, senior
military leaders of a political bent that might encourage them
to supply a movement with weapons, sufficient for such a
proposed movement?
Mr. Battle. I am not aware of any.
Mr. Brewer. The military, by and large, those who have been
deposed, are just as conservative as the others. I do not think
that they would go to the Russians for support for arms.
Senator Gore. In the event that someone like Albania, or
some other group--I do not want to rule out another function of
the Communist Party moving in--in the event that the Communists
saw fit to exploit this, do we have any indication of any
leadership through which they would do such?
Mr. Battle. I would imagine, Senator Gore, I would judge
that over the period that led to this you will find a
polarization of the right and the left. And you would feel the
effects of this. What group, if any, could emerge as the leader
of this counter-effort, if it was made, whether it would be
supported by Communists or not is anybody's guess. We know who
a great many of the top leaders are, and as we have said, they
are under arrest. Do you have any comment?

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MILITARY

Mr. Brewer. Maybe the answer to this is that the military
can be identified in their vote in any national election. In
the last election the military vote nationwide was 12 percent,
with 1.3 percent among the 180,000 being military. That was the
vote. The rest was divided between the Center Union Party and
the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party ran about 65-66
percent, and the Center Union 35 percent, at a time when the
Center Union won the national election it was 53 percent. So
that gives you the relation in the army of the people who are
trained in that respect.
At one place there have been a couple of shots fired.
Reportedly, there was very little resistance and that was put
down immediately.
Without making any guess, Crete is the place, the center of
the Republican forces; that is, the center of the anti-
monarchist forces. Most of the deputies from Crete are close
Andreas and George Papandreou supporters. That is the island
where you have the vote running about 75 percent for that
group, and if someone were to get something started--if I were
picking a mountain top like this one, that is the island.
Senator Gore. When you say ``force,'' you mean political
force?
Mr. Brewer. That is right. On the military side, I do not
see it in the army as such.

SOVIET REACTION TO GREEK COUP

Senator Gore. One other question. What has been the
reaction of the Soviets to this?
Mr. Brewer. So far as we know--I will check this out
further--it has been very quiet. They do spread the sort of
stuff that we had last night that Glezos was about to be shot.
This is the Communist type of thing. He is a pro-Communist
Deputy who was liberated and won a seat in Parliament. His name
is the only Greek Communist name that means anything worldwide.
In East Berlin about six years ago they were carrying signs to
free him from jail. This is a name that has international
stature. They have started that campaign.
I am sure that the Soviets are in on that.
Mr. Battle. The Russians have put out the charges that we
were behind the coup--not the Embassy in Athens, to my
knowledge.
Mr. Brewer. The Moscow Radio is saying it all of the time
and this is one reason that I think that Papadopoulos met this
head-on by saying the King is not involved--nobody is
involved--I did this on my own.
Senator Symington. He is the head man?
Mr. Brewer. He is the head one.
Senator Symington. Is he a military man, and how old is he?
Mr. Battle. He is about 48, I believe.

EGYPT, THE U.S. AND YEMEN

Senator Gore. One more question. Do you think that they
want our AID officials out in Yemen? Is this because of
Nationalism or is this Cairo, or is this anti-Americanism? How
about AID officials becoming persona non grata? Is it for some
particular involvement or some activity?
Mr. Battle. We know of no reason whatever for this
particular incident. It is the most clear-cut case of a trumped
up charge. The direction from which this came we do not know.
It is perfectly clear that the local Egyptians, both military
and civil, are involved in this in Yemen. Whether this is
Cairo-directed, we cannot be sure. However, as I said before
you came in, Cairo has leverage to do something about this with
Yemen. In my talks yesterday with the Ambassador and in the
follow-up talks with the Foreign Minister in Cairo, we have
made it very clear to them that we look to them to try to help
us in this situation, and that if they fail to do so this is
going to have a very bad effect between them and us. We cannot
pin anything down but we know that locally they are involved. I
have some doubt that they have directed it from Cairo. I think
that the Cairo government itself, however, is divided and has
been for many months. I have had many talks with them as to
whether they want us in Yemen or not. One faction would like
nothing better than to see us thrown out of there. Another
faction, I think, is the faction that would like to see
relations between Egypt and us improved.
They are more cautious and would not want to see us forced
out of there. They are split in Cairo. I think they are split
in the same lines in Yemen, but without any doubt local
Egyptians are involved and without doubt Cairo had the
leverage, if they wished to use it, to bring about help.
Senator Gore. Thank you.

DIFFERENCES WITH THE BRITISH

Senator Symington. In reviewing the staff's analysis of
Yemen, as I understand it, we are on a different side than the
British, so far as governments are concerned?
Mr. Battle. The British have never recognized the Yemen
Government that came into power.
Senator Symington. No, according to this memo I have the
Argentines, Belgium and Canada. Why is that--why is that? Tell
me why would we recognize along with the Red Chinese, the
Ethiopians, Iraq, and so did Russia? Why did we recognize the
government and have this split? Therefore, we are supporting
the republicans, and the British are supporting the royalists.
Is that not a strange situation because of the Aden situation
right next to it?
Mr. Battle. It goes back almost five years. At the time
that recognition was made, the thought was that this was a
truly liberal response to an unpalatable regime, and that there
were reasons for the change--that the Republican regime was a
truly liberal government that was going to try to respond to
the needs of the people and help a very bad situation. The
British never agreed with it, and many others did not.
Senator Symington. In this case, we are on the side of
Nasser, and the British are opposed to it.
Mr. Battle. I would not say on the side of Nasser. We
recognize them, but I think that our goal and purpose there is
very different. We are not on the side of Nasser.
Senator Symington. I may have over-simplified it. We are
supplying materials and aid to the same government that Nasser
is supplying soldiers to.
Mr. Battle. That is right. Our aid has, however, been
primarily, as I said, $2.4 million in this fiscal year, mainly
in the completion of a road project begun a long time ago and
well digging, sanitation help and things of that sort.
Mr. Brewer. These are all prior to the revolution.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ROYALISTS

Senator Symington. I have three staff questions that I
would like to ask:

Which Middle East countries were giving military assistance
to the royalists in Yemen?

Mr. Battle. The military assistance--the bulk of it, comes
from Saudi Arabia. There have been reports of the Iranians
putting in equipment there. There have been so many cases that
the Jordanians were helping one degree or another. Is there
anybody else?
Mr. Brewer. No.
Senator Symington.

Which Arab countries are giving military assistance to the
republicans?

Mr. Battle. The bulk of it is very largely coming from
Egypt, and I think it is fairly clear that the Russians have
underwritten part of it.
Senator Symington. It is absolutely amazing the way that
these are cork-screwed around.
The second question:

Is any sizable amount of American-made military equipment
being used by either side in the conflict? Is the Shah of Iran
sending American equipment into Yemen?

Mr. Battle. Sizable, no, sir. I do not think that there
have been reports or, rather, I do believe that there have been
reports at various times of individual rifles and things of
American origin popping up, but not, certainly, in sizable
amounts.

SUPPORT FROM THE SHAH OF IRAN

Senator Symington. Now the second part of the question
which I have already read----

Is the Shah of Iran sending American equipment into Yemen?

Mr. Battle. I have had no reports of that. Will you answer
that?
Mr. Brewer. This is very obscure. There have apparently
been caches of equipment which originated in the United States
which have been taken from royalist caves. The republicans have
said, and the allegations have been made that it was from Iran,
but there has been no substance to show that.
Mr. Battle. It has been small--it has not been large. There
have been many rumors that the Shah was becoming increasingly
interested in this, was helping it. Perhaps, that might be.
Senator Symington. This is extremely important, and I know
that many of the senators are interested in this, as well as
the Chairman. Just what is going on in Iran from the standpoint
of arms. But as I see it now it is getting to be a real
crossword puzzle, because the Shah is receiving $100 million of
Russian military equipment because he is afraid of Nasser, yet
he is slipping him some military equipment into Yemen in
support of Nasser.
Mr. Battle. No, in support of the Royalists.
Senator Symington. He supports the Royalists--he and the
British are on one side in Yemen?
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And we and the Egyptians are on the
other side in Yemen.
Mr. Battle. I do not like to put it on the side of the
Egyptians. We are not.
Senator Symington. We are giving them help, supporting the
same people that they are giving arms to.
Mr. Brewer. We are not giving them.
Mr. Battle. The only aid project is the one I mentioned.
Senator Symington. What do we give them in the matter of
aid?
Mr. Battle. $2.4 million for this fiscal year which will,
obviously, over now, which is the completion work on a road
that we started some years ago, some well digging equipment,
sanitation equipment, health, that kind of thing.
Senator Symington. We are giving them a road so that they
can move fast and making them healthy, and the others are
giving them guns that shoot, but we are not supporting them. I
am being a little sarcastic on purpose.

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE EFFORTS IN YEMEN

Mr. Battle. Let me make one other point. This is a terribly
complicated situation. The Russians and the Chinese have been
making quite an effort in Yemen. The Chinese and the Russians
we think may be competing with each other.
Senator Symington. And us.
Mr. Battle. And us, yes. The reason that the Soviets have
been interested in keeping the Egyptians in there is for their
own interest, obviously. Over recent weeks they have been
evidencing a desire to deal directly with the Yemeni
government, rather than through the Egyptians, which the
Egyptians appear not to have liked and have gone along with
them. One of the reasons that we have thought that we ought to
stay in there in a modest way is to keep from abdicating the
situation to the Chinese and the Russians. That is our aid
program; it is in that modest way. It was to counter and not
walk off a situation where we thought for a lot of reasons it
would be better to be off-stage there and not abdicate
completely to either the Soviets or the Chinese domination. We
are coming off awfully close to having exactly that now.
Senator Symington. With the committee's permission, I would
like to insert as part of the record this excellent statement
made in the staff memorandum as to the situation in Yemen which
verifies this as being accurate and of major importance. I will
not bother you any more at this time, Mr. Secretary, it getting
closer to the time for adjourning. There are nine questions
here about Greece. Would you be good enough to answer those for
the record. I think we have covered many of them. I know that
we have covered some of them. I am not sure that we have
covered all of them. They are very well put together.
Mr. Battle. I will do that.
Senator Symington. That is all I have. We will make this a
part of the record then at this point.
[The staff memorandum referred to follows:]

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

April 28, 1967

Subcommittee on Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

STAFF MEMORANDUM

The Political Situation in Greece
The leaders of the military coup, which took place on April
20, 1967, seem to be in full control of the Greek Government.
King Constantine presided over a cabinet meeting on April 26,
1967, thus giving the regime an aura of constitutional
legitimacy.
The military junta is reportedly led by Colonel George
Papadopoulos. There is no evidence of dissension within the
ranks of the armed services.
According to Colonel Papadopoulos, the King was unaware of
this coup. The King now seems to be in a position somewhere
between the military on the one hand and the conservative
civilian opposition on the other. How much influence he has in
either directing the present government or guiding political
events in the near future is not clear.
Most of those arrested on political charges last week have
been released. Former Prime Minister George Papandreou and his
son, Andreas, are still in prison, along with about a thousand
people considered to be left wing.
Questions
1. Were American officials in contact with any members of
the new military government immediately before the coup? Did we
have any indications that the King was going to move against
Papandreou but was beaten to the punch by the new military
rulers?
2. The statements of the new government as to what is wrong
in Greece--such as corruption, and unrest among the farmers--
sound very much like the complaints of Andreas Papandreou. What
is the difference between what this military government thinks
is wrong with Greece and what the Papandreous think?
3. Now that the military government is installed, what are
the major problems with which it must deal?
4. What will the United States reaction be if the new Greek
government sends delegates to the NATO Parliamentarian's
meeting or the Interparliamentary Union?
5. Greece has been in a state of political crisis for 22
months. Has there been a major policy review of our relations
with Greece during that time?
6. What is the status of our military aid program at this
covered time?
7. What consultation over the Greek situation has taken
place to date in the North Atlantic Council? Do you expect the
subject to be brought up?
8. How will we react if the King is removed or becomes a
puppet of the junta?
9. Since the military men who staged the coup are mostly
American trained and the equipment they used of American
origin, isn't our silence on Greece generally taken as a sign
that we support the new leaders?

Senator Symington. Is there anything that you would like to
ask, Senator Pell?

OPPOSITION TO ALL COUPS

Senator Pell. Just one particular point.
Senator Symington. You go right ahead.
Senator Pell. I do not think that this has been covered.
There was another situation that I think should be covered.
Some years ago, I remember that there was going to be an
election held in a certain country, and when the election was
held that you wished to have held--I made this prediction at
that time--that they would go ahead and have their putsch,
which they did. And it seems to me that this is a very real
analysis of what happened in Greece. Now there will be a very
real analogy of what has happened in Greece. Now there will be
an election in a month or two and as a result in the probable
election is the attitude on the part of some would not have
affected but very few votes of the majority of the people.
I cannot get through my dull brain what the difference is
between these two. We protested the one to the high heavens,
and are not intended to protest the other. I think we should
protest it. We are up to the point that we are against a coup
either way.
If it had resulted in blood being shed, blood is being shed
all over the world equally for other reasons. Why are we not
making a protest here?
Mr. Battle. In the first instance, we did not want the coup
to occur. I reviewed it just before you came in.
The second point is that our response is contained in the
information that you asked the last time we were here to check
where coups have been had. I have a list of those. We have had
the historian working on this since you raised the question. In
many instances we have refrained from statements, depending on
what we thought about the situation. I have that list for you.
I have the statement for the record. That will list the number
of cases where we failed to respond.
The reason I feel that we do as we do, particularly in
this, in the first stages of this if we had, in fact, said that
we did not like the coup, we ran the risk of being the reason
for a counter effort with a coalition of liberal and leftist
forces which could have caused great civil unrest and have
resulted in a civil war in Greece. That is the reason. We do
not like it. The desire to simply say something that reflected
our own thoughts on it was very great, but if we had made such
a statement I think that the consequences of it in the initial
stages might very well have been the means of civil war in
Greece with the possibility of a dictatorship of the left or of
the right emerging from this, neither one of which we wanted.
Senator Symington. You might have gotten some Turkish
interest in the situation.
Mr. Battle. I think as to Cyprus, the consequences of this
were very bad. I think that we have had some success on this. I
am in no way saying that I am happy with any of it. We have
tried to get the King to take the lead. We have tried to get
the King to broaden the government and the cabinet. The King
has stood up to the coup by refusing to sign the original
papers, the decrees that would have suspended the constitution
and declared martial law. He still has not signed them. The
press says that he has. Yesterday the coup admitted publicly
that this was not known to the King--it was not backed by the
King--they went ahead by themselves.
I think we have managed to distinguish the King's position
from the coup's position.
Senator Symington. As I said, also, what the Secretary told
us this morning is that the position is completely fluid. We
are not taking any firm position, we are just waiting and
watching. It is a very good question, a very logical question.

NEED FOR U.S. STATEMENT

Senator Pell. I do not like Russia. I do not like the
situation in some places. But the reason that we are willing,
apparently, to shed blood and to shed other people's blood is
so that we can produce a government that can presumably have
the capacity to perform effectively in the area. If we are
faced with civil war and blood being shed or a right-wing
dictatorship, do we prefer the right-wing dictatorship and not
having blood being shed for it?
Mr. Battle. I prefer this, too.
Senator Pell. Should we not make a statement?
Mr. Battle. They have written two or three statements. I do
not prepare how we say this without having effects there that
would be unknown and we could see the end of the line.
Senator Pell. It might be extremely possible to do so.
Mr. Battle. Not if it brings about a civil war and a left-
wing dictatorship.
Senator Pell. You believe that a left-wing dictatorship is
worse? We might not have a sheer democracy?
Mr. Battle. We are perfectly certain that the King has made
a statement calling for a return to the constitutional
processes. I think we can endorse that statement. We have been
pressing them to make their own statement. Instead of saying
that the coup is bad, we have come out and said or will say
that we are for the constitutional processes, which, in effect,
to anyone who reads carefully would be about the same thing.
I think that the dangers of a counter coup, the thing that
I talked about, will lessen each day, but, particularly as long
as the King is making his own effort to get the government
moving in the direction that he wants it to move and that we
want it to move, I think that we have made some progress. I do
not find it very attractive just sitting and saying nothing,
either. On the other hand, the consequences seem to us worse
than the statement. The statement relieves us of, perhaps, a
desire to comment on the situation. I hope that we are going to
be able to endorse the very specific steps they take which will
affect them, and that we will say that we are in favor of
constitutional processes, not coups, rather than taking the
risk of a statement, the consequences of which we did not see.
We can make an argument for that.
Senator Pell. Just one more question.
I would hope that the administration could express its
views.
I would request that the historian also, if you would, dig
up a collection of the right-wing coups that the United States
has refrained from publicly criticizing, and if you will, to
submit that statement to us.
Mr. Battle. It will take a few weeks.
Senator Pell. I thank you for it.
Mr. Battle. I will feel free to make this statement when I
see that.
Senator Symington. Senator Javits would like very much to
talk with you. That is all for today.
Senator Pell. That is all I have in my mind.
Senator Symington. The hearing is terminated subject to the
call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 o'clock a.m., the subcommittee
recessed, subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1997

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche,
Church, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, and Hickenlooper.
S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees in high-
risk situations, came up for further consideration and was
carried over.
An original resolution (S. Res. 115) authorizing members of
the Senate to respond to official invitations was considered
and ordered reported without objection.
H.R. 3399, to authorize the extension of the life of the
Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission to November 6, 1968, was
ordered without objection.
Ex. G, 90/1, Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, was
ordered reported by voice vote.
S. 1030, the Informational Media Guaranty Bill, was
discussed and carried over.
Ex. G, 88/1, Conventions Concerning International Exchange
of Publications and Documents was ordered reported.
Ex. A, 90/1, Amendment to Article 109 of the United Nations
Charter was also ordered reported.
Ex. C, 87/2, ILO Convention No. 116; Ex. G., 89/2, ILO
Convention No. 122 concerning employment policy; and S.J. Res.
71, were all carried over.
Senator Gore asked and received permission to print the
hearings of the Disarmament Subcommittee.
The committee discussed the nomination of Rutherford M.
Poats before adjourning.
[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1997

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 2:30 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche,
Symington, and Cooper.
Asian Development Bank affairs briefing by Eugene R. Black,
Special Advisor to the President, accompanied by Joseph W.
Barr, Under Secretary of the Treasury.
[The committee adjourned at 4:25 p.m.]

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE

----------

Wednesday, May 3, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committee on the
Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Mike Mansfield (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present representing the Committee on Foreign Relations:
Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper,
and Aiken.
Representing the Senate Committee on Armed Services:
Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Miller, and Pearson.
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Lowenstein of the Committee
on Foreign Relations staff; Mr. Kirbow and Mr. Braswell of the
Committee on Armed Services staff; and Miss Stabler of the
Library of Congress.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY
EUGENE V. ROSTOW, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

* * * * * * *

IMPORTANCE OF A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY [P. 58]

Secretary Rusk. The first has to do with the matter of
deterrence. By the middle of the 1950's a nuclear exchange
became an operational possibility. President Eisenhower in his
second term, and President Kennedy and President Johnson, have
had to think about problems that no other President has ever
had to think about.
Now both we and the Soviet Union understand a great deal
about what a nuclear exchange would mean. We are not sure that
other governments, including many governments in NATO, have
really entered deeply into that question, but I am convinced--
and, as I say, who knows what the right answers are--I am
convinced that nuclear power alone is not a deterrent to less
than all-out war, because moving promptly to nuclear war is so
irrational that none will believe it. The Russians won't
believe it, we won't believe it, and our allies won't believe
it.
Therefore, unless there is a conventional capability to
deter the less than all-out nuclear war, we run the risk of not
having a deterrent at all. So that is one point I just wish to
suggest for the subcommittee to think about.
The second has to do with a point that was mentioned
briefly, I believe, in your earlier hearing with Mr. Katzenbach
and with Mr. McNamara that I would like to emphasize very
strongly, and that is that in the event of a crisis, it is
extremely important for the chiefs of government of their time
to have a number of options open to them.
The problem of managing a crisis is much more crucial today
than ever before in our history, and it would be most
unfortunate if in a matter of hours or even in a matter of a
very few days the chiefs of government of NATO were faced with
a choice between nuclear war on the one side and surrender on
the other.
Now, U.S. forces in the central front of NATO are 20
percent of the ground forces. It is very important, it seems to
me, to preserve for the President of the United States some
options in the opening stages of a crisis, to gain some time to
find out for certain what the purposes of the other side are,
to give the processes of contact and consultation some chance
to resolve the crisis before it is too late.
These two points mean to me quite frankly that those who
talk about a ``plateglass'' doctrine are just not really in
touch with reality. I do not believe that the chiefs of
government of NATO would move to nuclear war in the first 48
hours if there were a conventional clash for then it means the
last decision they will make. It will mean utter destruction of
their countries, and it would mean the loss in this country of
probably 100 million people in the first hour or so. Chiefs of
governments simply are not going to rush into that decision.
So I would hope that we would relate the conventional--we
and our European friends--would relate the conventional forces
of NATO with, first, deterrence, a realistic view of
deterrence; and, secondly, maintaining the options so that
crises can be managed without the destruction of a good part of
the Northern Hemisphere, if possible.

PROPOSED TROOP ROTATIONAL PLAN

Now, we have been consulting, as the Members know, about
the possibility of utilizing mobility and testing the dual
basing concept in order to bring back to this country certain
ground and air units.
As the chairman has pointed out--and, Mr. Chairman, I very
much appreciate your comments on that subject--we have in mind,
as Secretary McNamara expressed here the other day, that we
would rotate back to this country roughly two-thirds of one
division element of strength. That includes the brigades
themselves plus certain support, comparable support units, and
rotate back a portion of our fighter-bomber air wings.
Since that meeting we have had further discussions in the
tripartite groups, and because of the high proportion of our
fighter-bombers to NATO total fighter-bomber strength, we did
think that it was wise, in view of the political and military
reactions among our allies, to reduce the number of aircraft
that we expected to rotate back to this country from 144 to 98,
and to make comparable upward adjustments in the ground force
rotation. The total rotational plan would be approximately the
same, but the mix between ground and air would be somewhat
different.

* * * * * * *

(The prepared statement of Secretary Rusk follows:)

For political and military reasons, we have therefore
concluded that substantial, balanced NATO forces, including
United States forces, are still required. I believe this
proposition is generally accepted in this country as elsewhere.
The question, therefore, has arisen not in terms of whether
American forces are still needed on the ground in Europe. The
question has been posed in terms of whether the present levels
of those forces could not be safely reduced.
The Administration seriously examines this question each
year. Last year it undertook a special and intensive review in
the Trilateral discussions among the United States, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic. Those Trilateral discussions
ended last week in London. They were successful in providing a
good basis of understanding. The matter will be discussed
further, as it should be, within NATO. We believe it important
that the final agreement be reached in this Allied framework.
Our own redeployment plan has been explained in detail by
Secretary McNamara. What he told you of the Army and Air Force
rotation plan--the units and men involved, the timetable--still
holds with one exception.
The German authorities were concerned about the
redeployment of a substantial portion of the three tactical
fighter wings now based in Germany, and as a result of further
discussion with them, we have amended that portion of the plan.
It is now agreed that 120 of the 216 aircraft involved will
remain in Germany. 96 of the aircraft will be redeployed to the
U.S. All 216 of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a
year for exercises. A compatible adjustment will be made
upwards in the redeployment of the ground forces which Mr.
McNamara described.

* * * * * * *
LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEPENDS ON SOVIET RESPONSE [P. 63]

Senator Stennis. Mr. Secretary, as I understand now, your
position is to stop where you are now after you have covered
this 18,000 plus the 21,000 dependents, 35,000 additional
military, as I get your figure.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we think, sir, that this level of
conventional forces in NATO is about where we ought to be. When
you say stop now, this depends upon one very important factor,
and that is what the response, if any, of the Soviet Union will
be on this issue.
Senator Stennis. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. I will submit to the committee a statement
which Mr. Kosygin made in London on this point which seemed to
harden their position on the question of mutual withdrawals of
forces from Central Europe because he seemed to connect the
withdrawal of Soviet forces with the final confirmation of the
existing boundaries in Central Europe, meaning particularly the
stabilization of the German Democratic Republic and the
consolidation of the status quo.
If that is their position then this is somewhat of a
retreat from some of the impressions we have had before.
Now, quite frankly, I do not know at this point whether the
Soviets will react either by a direct approach, as one or
another member of NATO will almost surely make in the weeks and
months ahead, or by the process of what has come to be called
mutual examples.
We will watch that very closely. I am inclined to believe
that the Soviets will not negotiate at this point on mutual
withdrawal of forces because they are apparently nervous about
being charged with negotiating a mutual withdrawal in Central
Europe in a way that would release U.S. forces for Vietnam and
bring them under the fire of China.
My guess is that if there is any prospect of any movement
on this it is likely to come without agreement, but through
what is called mutual example, that they simply take certain
steps. We have had one or two intelligence rumors that there
might have been some movement of Soviet forces out of East
Germany. We are trying to check that. We have no confirmation
of that at the present time. But I think, sir, that if the
Soviets were to show some real interest in this problem this
could, in turn, be taken into account by NATO as to what forces
are required in NATO.

BASIS OF DECISION TO REDUCE TROOP STRENGTH

Senator Stennis. I have not had much to say about this
matter. Frankly, I have felt for some time that perhaps we
could reduce some of our supply troops over there and a lot of
the dependents and help this balance and payments situation.
You could perhaps withdraw some of the military. But I have
been opposed to the idea of just going in and doing it
arbitrarily, particularly with this war going on. As I see it,
it is getting worse, and I have thought, with the greatest
deference, that it is a mistake to bring up a resolution, to go
any further than you gentlemen have gone. But I am glad that
you have seen fit to do what you have because I know you
thought it was safe to do it.
Now, how much of your decision though was based on saving
money and how much was based on lessening tensions, if I may
put it that way? You have already mentioned both.
Secretary Rusk. There was a mix. There were a good many
elements that went into the picture.

* * * * * * *

WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM ADEN [P. 69]

Next to Yemen is Aden, and in Aden when the British pull
out in 1968, there is going to be nothing left but the
Communist countries.
My point is why isn't it much more important for us, if we
support British troops anywhere, if we are going to continue
this subsidizing of British troops somewhere, to subsidize them
in Aden instead of Germany?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we are very much disturbed about
Britain's pulling out of Aden before there is some stability in
that area. I do not have the impression that this is a matter
that the British are treating solely as a financial problem.
They have not indicated to us that financial help would solve
the problem as far as they are concerned.
We would hope that they would not pull out in the middle of
this order and pressures against Aden from the Yemen. We
continue to consult with them on that, to emphasize that point
to them.
Secondly, we do believe that the other members of NATO, the
European members of NATO, ought to get more interested in the
Near East, which is immediately adjacent to their own NATO
European area, and the resources of which are important to
Europe, even though we ourselves have major investments there.
So I would not quarrel with your concern about what is
happening in the Middle East in that particular spot right at
this moment.
Whether we can get the British to continue to pack the load
there until there is some assurance of real stability, very
frankly today I cannot say.
On the European side, what we have tried to do is to come
to a trilateral arrangement which would make sense among the
three governments involved.
Now, in this package, for example, it has been very
important for us to be told by the Bundesbank that it will
continue its practice of not converting dollars into gold as a
part of a policy of international monetary cooperation.
Senator Symington. I saw that statement this morning.
Secretary Rusk. And working with our own Treasury in trying
to do something about the whole question of monetary liquidity.
These things all merge into each other.
I would suppose that the trilateral discussions would stand
on their own merits both on the financial side and on the
military side.
But, Senator, I wish I could give you some comfort about
the Middle East this morning. But I just cannot, quite frankly,
and that question is not resolved.
We ourselves would not want to be called on to fill a
vacuum.

* * * * * * *

BASIS FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM ADEN [P. 71]

Senator Symington. Do you think the British would stay in
Aden if the United States offered to offset the foreign
exchange cost of the British presence in Aden for the purchase
of military equipment?
Secretary Rusk. I would doubt it; I would doubt it very
strongly.
Senator Symington. Why is that? Their economy could fold up
if they lose their Middle East oil.
Secretary Rusk. We have made that argument to them very
strongly.

* * * * * * *

U.S. STATURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 71]

Secretary Rusk. On the matter of the Yemen: Again I would
not want to argue with you very hard on that point, but I would
urge you to consider withholding such a resolution until we see
whether we can get these two fellows out of the pokey whom the
Yemenis are holding, because we ourselves have this point very
much under consideration as to whether we ought to try to
maintain relations with the Yemen. But we have not said
anything about it. And I think it would be rather dangerous to
say anything about it until we get these two men out of jail
because we would like to rescue them.
Senator Hickenlooper. You had better get them out very
quickly because I am going to file the resolution before very
long. I considered filing it today.
Secretary Rusk. As you know, our relations with Egypt have
been deteriorating pretty badly because of the attitude of
Nasser himself. In his speech yesterday it was about as bad a
speech as he has made in two years.
Senator Hickenlooper. I was going to suggest that speech
yesterday was just a continuation of the vituperation.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.

RUMORED IMF LOAN TO EGYPT

Senator Hickenlooper. What is there to the rumor that the
International Monetary Fund is going to make Nasser an $80
million loan, or something like that, to tide him over.
Secretary Rusk. May I ask Mr. Rostow to comment?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
Mr. Rostow. We have been approached over a period of months
by the government of the UAR for improvement of relations and
indeed for preparing a list of conditions that we would think
appropriate on the basis of which we could encourage private
investment, private American investment, in the UAR, and to get
their debt situation----
Senator Hickenlooper. Would any private investing companies
be foolhardy enough to invest there as long as this situation
exists?
Mr. Rostow. Well, I mean there are two American oil
companies that have contracts and are proceeding for the
development of oil there, but we have told them in the last few
days that the developments in Yemen and the change in the
situation now precipitated by this new speech of Nasser are
very serious indeed and would require us to reconsider all the
steps that have been considered so far, and we have just
stopped working on those.
The fund--they have resisted negotiations with the fund for
a long time. We urged--we said it was inexpendable for
improvement of relations, and the fund has worked out
tentatively a deal with them and some of the other European
creditors which was by way of preparation for a program of
encouraging private investment in Egypt.
Of course these things are all superseded now by the
political development to which you and Senator Symington have
referred, but the government of the UAR seems to have been
proceeding on two paths and the two paths were totally
inconsistent.
We were perfectly willing to talk with them about the
possibility of improving relations on terms we regard as fair.
But now, of course, we are taking a totally different line. At
the same time we are in active consultation with other
governments about the possibility of joint concerted diplomatic
action in that whole area in the interest of containing these
dangers to which you refer.
Secretary Rusk. I would have to report, Senator, that there
has been a curious inattention on the part of our European
friends in NATO to this area even though it is right next to
them. At the last ministerial meeting of NATO, I proposed there
be an immediate meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the
Near East. The response was, ``Well, Christmas holidays are
coming and then New Year's holidays are coming and maybe we can
have a meeting sometime maybe a month from now,'' that kind of
thing.
We are trying to stir up our Western European friends to
this problem because they have at least as much interest in
this as we have and perhaps more in the longer run.

* * * * * * *

RUMORED SOVIET DIVERSIONARY MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 74]

Senator Jackson. What do you see as the most likely thrust
which they might get us engaged in in the Middle East at this
point? Like my colleagues around the table, I am terribly
concerned about the Middle East, and I think this is a likely
area in which they could move with some profit, as well as a
diversion.
Secretary Rusk. I would think it is rather unlikely,
Senator, that they would move with their own armed forces in
the Middle East. I think they might support or encourage
Nasser. That has some complications in it. Nasser is not all
that reliable from their point of view. There seems to be some
rivalry within the Arab world between Algeria and Egypt
although both seem to be reasonably friendly with the Soviet
Union.
I think the situation is much more volatile than that. We
know that there are differences of view among some of the
leaders in Cairo as well as differences of view among leaders
in the Yemen, and there is one possibility, and one does not
rely on this, that Nasser will find that those leaders who
neglect their own people and the economies of their own
countries to go adventuring abroad to get in trouble. He is in
a very desperate situation from an economic point of view and
will have to be very careful about the conditions on which the
World Bank or anybody else, the Monetary Fund, would bail him
out.
So I think the likelihood is that the problem is going to
be primarily Egyptian policy supported by the Soviet Union
rather than overt moves by the Soviets themselves.
Senator Jackson. Are the Soviets gaining more and more
influence within the United Arab Republic?
Secretary Rusk. I would think as far as Nasser is
concerned, yes, and there are a good many others in Egypt that
we hear from from time to time who are very much concerned
about this. One of the problems is to get access to Nasser and
to get moderate voices heard by Nasser.
There are a number of people who have talked to us, top
Egyptians who have talked to us--and I would have to take this
off the record----
[Discussion off the record.]

WISDOM OF RESOLUTION ON TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Senator Jackson. Do you think it would be wise, Mr.
Secretary, at this time for the Senate to pass a resolution
calling for a substantial reduction of American forces in
Europe?
Secretary Rusk. I would think, sir, that a resolution which
would go beyond the measures that have already been discussed
could be quite disadvantageous and could get in the way, for
example, of the possibility of getting comparable steps taken
by the Soviet Union.
About a year ago I would have said that there was some
possibility that the Soviet Union would get seriously
interested in a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe.
Some of their own Warsaw Pact countries were getting restive
about the costs of some of these forces. You know, Rumania has
quit paying their share of those forces, at least that is my
understanding.
But I think the combination of pressure from China and the
charge that they would be reducing forces to relieve pressure
on American forces so that we could move them to Vietnam, and
the idea that if they just sit tight we will be reducing our
forces anyhow, has put the Soviet possibility somewhat in the
background.
Senator Jackson. They have been on notice for this event
for a long, long time.
Secretary Rusk. And I would think that a resolution, for
example, that went beyond what we are doing would greatly
reduce the chances of getting any serious interest in the
Soviet Union in reducing their forces.
Senator Jackson. Well, the example problem is a difficult
one. You will recall that we did suggest to the Soviets that
they cut back on their fissionable material production after we
made our announcement about the cutback on the fissionable
material and the closing of certain reactors. The fact of the
matter is, as I recall, Mr. Khruschev had announced that there
would be a cutback because they were not going to complete
certain facilities in the Soviet Union. Instead, they went
ahead and finished their facilities and actually increased
their production of fissionable material.
I would agree with you. It would seem logical at this point
in time, with the ideological feud between the Soviets and the
Chinese, that if they do move any troops from Europe, rather
than agree to any kind of a mutual bilateral understanding, the
Chinese are causing so much trouble that they had to move some
of their troops to that area.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, we understand that they have moved
some of their forces to the Far East along the China border,
with limited numbers still, but those have come from within the
Soviet Union and not out of East Germany.
Senator Jackson. Not from Central Europe.
Secretary Rusk. But we are trying to check on occasional
rumors we get about some occasional forces out of East Germany.
Whether these are simply reduction of forces or just what they
would be, we just do not know. We have not been able to confirm
it as yet.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

Senator Jackson. There is one other point I wanted to
allude to. Is it not true that if we get ourselves into a
situation where the West Germans are making too large a
contribution of forces in Central Europe that the opportunity
of improving relations with Eastern Europe will be somewhat
jeopardized and any hope of trying to work out any unification
of Germany will be likewise jeopardized?
Secretary Rusk. I think that will be true, sir, if the West
German forces were to go significantly beyond the general level
of 12 divisions and forces of that order of magnitude.
We do not expect that despite the slowdown that the Soviet
Union and East Germany have recommended to other countries of
Eastern Europe, that in the months ahead there will be some
additional agreements between the Federal Republic and certain
of the other Eastern European countries along the lines of the
Rumanian agreement.
But this is not only a problem for Eastern Europe, Senator,
it would be a real problem for Western Europe.
Senator Jackson. It would be a problem within NATO.
Secretary Rusk. It would be a problem within NATO because
there are a good many members who would be nervous about
Germany having the dominant position inside NATO.
Senator Jackson. There are two aspects here.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Jackson. The impact on Eastern European countries
as well as on the NATO community.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Jackson. The idea of an integrated force was in
substantial part to deal with the German problem.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Jackson. And it was in this way that Germany could
make a contribution of forces to Europe's defense yet avoid the
ancient fears of the German General Staff. Is this not correct?
Secretary Rusk. It is a very important political fact in
NATO that all German forces are assigned to NATO. This is a
very important political fact with NATO quite apart from
Eastern Europe.

ROTATION OF DIVISION RETURNING FROM EUROPE

Senator Jackson. As I understand it, and this point has
been raised a couple of times there during the hearings, is it
not correct that the division coming back to the States would
be available for Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. It is not correct, sir.
Senator Jackson. As I understand the situation, all we are
really doing is bringing the division back here, with one
brigade in Europe at all times, and instead of having them
located and housed in Germany, they will be in the United
States. In that way there will be a continuing commitment to
NATO, with the ability to move them literally overnight into
the pre-positioned areas with the supporting elements
available.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, to be confirmed by my defense
colleague, my understanding of the arrangement is that the
brigades would succeed each other in periods of about six
months.
Senator Jackson. Rotated.
Secretary Rusk. There will always be one brigade there, and
the Division Headquarters, once a year the entire division
would be together, but because this six-month period is at
least that short, it is possible for all of the dependents to
be back in this country. Naturally under those circumstances
the other two brigades must be always available to return
immediately to NATO if required.

* * * * * * *

DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN TRILATERAL AGREEMENT

Senator Sparkman. Was there any difficulty inside the three
countries in arriving at this agreement or was it pretty well
agreed to?
Secretary Rusk. Well, there were times when it was
difficult in detail, particularly on the financial arrangements
between the Germans and the British. They were bargaining with
each other pretty hard just where they would come out on that
situation and each moved substantially toward each other before
it was over. The gap was rather wide.

* * * * * * *

MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 79]

Senator Church. This then is an abandonment of what had
been our position that the Germans ought to pay for the out-of-
pocket costs--that is, for the gold drain costs--of the
maintenance of American forces in Europe.
Secretary Rusk. Well, the problem was never whether they
would pay as a budget matter, but whether they would deal with
the foreign exchange ramifications of it.
Senator Church. But we did have an agreement with them, did
we not, in which they said they would do this?
Secretary Rusk. For a period of 6 years we had an agreement
on that. They now have a backlog of what, $900 million of
deposits here in this country under those arrangements from
which they are taking steps in the monetary field to assure
that the balance of payments is not loaded on the United States
under these arrangements.
Senator Church. Well, although I am trying to follow your
argument, nonetheless it seems to me to be the truth that the
Germans have receded from a position that they had heretofore
taken concerning taking care of our gold drain costs.
Secretary Rusk. By purchases of hardware.
Senator Church. Right, by purchases of hardware.
Secretary Rusk. By purchases of hardware, that is right.
Senator Church. And we are now entering into a new
arrangement which is less advantageous to us in terms of the
gold drain. If the Germans believed that the maintenance of any
army of this size was really essential to their security, they
would be willing to continue it to pay for the gold drain costs
of the United States. That is the point I make.

EFFECT OF THE ARRANGEMENT [P. 80]

Secretary Rusk. Well, they have some problems too about the
other side of this, you see, as to whether they can, in fact,
both as a budgetary matter and as a matter of utilizing the
hardware reasonably efficiently, continue indefinitely on the
two-year arrangement that we had which was frankly very
favorable to us.
Do you want to comment additionally on this, Mr. Rostow?
Mr. Rostow. We regard, and the Treasury regards, the
monetary arrangements that have now been made by way of
modification of the old offset plan as extremely advantageous
to us, and to our general monetary position in the world.

* * * * * * *

DETERRENT VALUE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS [P. 86]

Senator Miller. I do not believe I would categorize the
Cuban missile crisis as one of the greatest crises facing
mankind. I heard President Kennedy make a statement that one
nuclear missile alighting on the United States would mean a
nuclear missile would land on the Soviet Union. I thought he
handled the situation very well. Because he handled it that way
and indicated our resolve, I frankly did not think it was an
earth shattering crisis as some people have said, because I
never felt that the Soviet leaders were about to commit
suicide. I give them credit for being rather cool, calculating,
logical people. They understood loud and clear President
Kennedy's statement that that is exactly what would happen if
they pressed the situation into a nuclear exchange.
Senator Rusk. Senator, it turned out that that was the way
it was. We were very conscious of the possibility of irrational
action on the other side. There was a moment there when Mr.
Krushchev appeared to be very distraught, and you always have
to leave some room for irrational conduct on the other side.
These are things which they have to emphasize as well as we on
our side.

* * * * * * *

ENCOURAGEMENT OF A MUTUAL RESPONSE [P. 87]

Senator Miller. Assuming there is no overt act as to
willingness to negotiate, and I am sure you have considered
this very carefully and given this your evaluation, would it
not be a practical step to provide that within one year these
forces will be returned to let the Soviet Union know that if
they have a mutual reduction then we will let it stay here; if
they do not, then we are back over there, and a sort of a one-
year invitation for this mutual response from them.
I am thinking in terms of the long-range results, not so
much from the standpoint of preserving the NATO military
capability as encouraging a mutual response that you talk
about, and here we give them one year, and if they do not
respond, then back to Europe go these forces.
Then maybe six months later we might try it again, the idea
being to encourage the mutual response showing that if they do
not respond then we are back where we started.
I am wondering if you might have pursued this.
Senator Rusk. Senator, I am sympathetic with the idea of
trying to find ways and means of stimulating mutual response. I
am not at all sure that two-thirds of a division, for example,
would pack enough weight to make this difference in Soviet
policy. There are some 26 divisions of NATO in Central Europe;
there are very large Warsaw Pact forces.
If we were talking of five divisions or something, it is
conceivable this might have that kind of negotiating weight.
But we will test the Soviets in the next several months and see
what happens.
I do not believe this will pack enough weight to make a
difference with it.
Senator Miller. Perhaps you could bring this out in
discussions with the other NATO states or ministers. If the
Soviets do not make a response, then we will consider bringing
back rather than just leaving alone, so they will know or have
the assurance that if there is no response, then we may even
bring them back over.
I recognize if we have a large reduction this might provide
for more of a mutual response than a smaller one, but we can
still try a smaller one.
I have nothing further.
Mr. Rusk. It is an interesting idea, and we will mull over
it a bit.

* * * * * * *

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., room
S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore and Carlson.
Also present: Senator McGee.
Jack Hood Vaughn, Director, Peace Corps, accompanied by Mr.
Brent Ashabranner, Acting Deputy Director, and Mr. Eric
Stevenson, General Counsel, testified on S. 1031, the Peace
Corps Authorization Bill.
[The committee adjourned at 11:35 a.m.]

DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

----------

Friday, May 5, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Aiken, and
Carlson.
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
Senator Symington. The meeting will come to order.
We have convened the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs this afternoon to continue our inquiry into some
of the most difficult problems facing the United States in that
troubled area of the world. As these hearings have progressed,
it has become apparent that the illicit flow of military
equipment of American origin into the area is a serious
problem. We have discovered that information on how these arms
get to the Middle East, who profits from these deals, and where
the equipment eventually winds up, is very hard to find. We
have therefore asked Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll,
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to join us this
afternoon in the hope that he can enlighten the subcommittee on
these matters.
General Carroll, it is a special privilege and pleasure for
me to see you again, sir. We have been friends for about 25
years, and we all know of your superb record in this and other
fields.
I might add General Carroll was formerly with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and perhaps is the only person who Mr.
J. Edgar Hoover approved leaving the agency permanently, which
was to the benefit of the Air Force.
Have you a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF LT. GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAIN FRANK M. MURPHY,
U.S.N., CHIEF OF WESTERN AREA OFFICE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY; AND CHARLES H. FORE, JR., MIDDLE EAST ANALYST, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General Carroll. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not. I was not
cognizant exactly of what it was that the committee might like
to question me about.
Senator Symington. May I ask my senior colleagues here,
would it be in order if I asked some questions, Senator Aiken?
Senator Aiken. I would think so. I like to have him come up
without a prepared statement and then he does not have to clear
it with any security officers.
Senator Symington. I believe we will leave that remark
right on the record.

MILITARY SURPLUS IN EUROPE

General Carroll, can you give us the details on the numbers
and kind of surplus military equipment of American origin now
in the European surplus market?
General Carroll. Mr. Chairman, I can present to you the
estimate which we have in DIA relative to this surplus, and our
estimate is predicted upon our cognizance of the kind of
equipment which is required in the tables of organization, and
equipment of the forces of the particular countries concerned.
West Germany has a considerable amount of U.S. military
equipment, which it considers surplus, and which incidentally
it is anxious to sell.
I could list the major items for you, sir.
Senator Symington. If you would just run through them and
then furnish any details for the record.
General Caroll. All right, sir.
106 105-millimeter howitzers; 55 155-millimeter howitzers;
16 8-inch howitzers; 193 light tanks, 76-millimeter guns; 200
medium tanks; 90-millimeter guns; 300 recoilless rifles; 75-
millimeter; 14,200 rocket launchers, 3.5-inch; and, in the Air
Force items, 47 F-86K fighters; 41 F-84F fighter bombers; 48
RF-84F fighter reconnaissance planes.
As to France, France has a considerable amount of military
equipment of U.S. origin, but only the following is believed to
be surplus: In Army equipment, 100 120-millimeter and 4.2-inch
mortars; 252 light tanks, M-4; and 7,000 trucks, two and a half
tons and over.
In Air Force items, 50 NlKE missiles; 47 F-84F fighter
bombers; and 15 RF-84F fighter reconnaissance planes.
Belgium has approximately 25 to 30 F-84F aircraft which are
believed surplus.
The Netherlands is believed to have had about 20 surplus F-
84F aircraft. All, however, are believed to have been
redistributed to Turkey.
A former U.S. PC-468 subchaser was loaned to Nigeria and
subsequently sold to it.
Norway has about 30 F-86F aircraft believed surplus and
about 30 more, we believe, will become surplus when sufficient
numbers of F-5s are received.
Portugal has about 38 F-86Gs in storage due to lack of
spare parts but, so far as we know, has no plans to sell them.
Spain has 40 F-86Fs in storage as logistic backup. All of
its 130 F-86s are to be phased out by 1971. But no evidence is
available concerning their eventual disposition.
Italy has 40 F-86Es which are nonflyable and being
cannibalized; 8 F-84Fs are inactive. About 65 F-86Ks will be
phased out in 1969, and at this time would be considered
surplus.
Those represent the major items as known to us which we
feel fall in the surplus categories.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
How much additional equipment can we expect to flow into
that market over the next five years? Would you like to furnish
a figure for the record on that?
General Carroll. I believe that I could come up with an
estimate of it, Senator.
Senator Symington. Would you do that? Furnish it for the
record.
[The material referred to follows.]

ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONAL SURPLUS MATERIAL

Additional military equipment of American origin that is
estimated to become surplus to West European needs over the
next five years follows:

BELGIUM

Army: 503 Medium Tanks (5 M-4, 150 M-26, 8 M-46, 340 M-47)
Air Force: 141 Aircraft (85 F-84F, 20 RF-84F, 25 C-119g, 5
C-47, 2 C-54, 4 C-118)

FRANCE

Air Force: 72 F-l00 Aircraft

ITALY

Air Force: 240 Aircraft (66 F-86K, 40 F-86E, 74 F-84F, 20
C-119J, 40 C-119G)

THE NETHERLANDS

Air Force: 75 F-84F Aircraft

PORTUGAL

Air Force: 50 F-86F Aircraft

SPAIN

Air Force: 150 Aircraft (125 F-86F, 25 T-33)

WEST GERMANY

Army: 407 Light Tanks, M-41; 600 Medium Tanks, M-47; 356
Tank Recovery Vehicles, M-47; 2,150 Armored Personnel Carriers
HS-30; 500 80-mm Mortars; 331 Howitzers (216 105-mm, towed
M2A1; 64 105-mm, SP M-52; 41 155-mm, SP M-44)

* * * * * * *

[Deleted.]

FLOW OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN

Senator Symington. How much equipment of American origin
has been sold, to the best of your knowledge, by private firms
to Iran over the last two years, and who handled the sales?
General Carroll. The largest sale that I know of that was
made to Iran by private firms over the past couple of years was
the sale of the 90 F-86 Sabre aircraft to Iran.
As I know you are aware, Mr. Chairman, these F-86 aircraft
which were surplus to the German inventory were Canadian-
manufactured aircraft, and the sale was consummated on the
basis of an end use agreement certification which was given by
Iran through a lieutenant general of the Supreme Iranian
General Staff to the Federal Government of Germany.
I know you are also aware of the fact that Iran was merely
the ostensible purchaser and recipient and that the aircraft
flowed rather rapidly through Iran to Pakistan.
Senator Symington. Do we know anything about the details of
prices on these sales?
General Carroll. All I know about that, sir, is that it was
supposed to be a $10 million sale [deleted].
Senator Symington. You do not know what General Toufanian
received, if anything.
General Carroll. My information is that General Toufanian
was to receive 5 percent of the sales price, which would have
amounted to $500,000. It is also my understanding that he
received $60,000 of this amount and was pressing for the
remainder, but Merex was rather slow in responding on the
grounds that they had lost money on the sale, that actually
they had underestimated their costs in conjunction with it.
Senator Symington. Is General Toufanian still with the
Iranian armed forces?
General Carroll. So far as I know, yes, sir.

SOVIETS AND CHINESE IN YEMEN AND ADEN

Senator Symington. I would like to skip a minute now and go
down to the question of Yemen and Aden. Would you have any
thoughts when the British move out of Aden in 1968 about what
the Soviets and the Chinese would do?
General Carroll. Well, I would feel, first of all, that the
prime frontrunner in endeavoring to capitalize upon the moveout
of the British from that section of the world at that point in
time would be the UAR, with the Soviet Union rendering a
combination of support and instigation to them.
So far as the Chinese are concerned, thus far they have not
been active in Yemen from a military assistance standpoint,
although they have to a limited economic extent, and I feel
that they would endeavor to flow into the vacuum that would be
created, but I feel also that they would be maneuvering in an
area where the UAR and Soviet Union, through the UAR, would
have an opportunity to predominate.
Senator Symington. We are talking about Yemen now.
General Carroll. That is correct, sir. Yemen and Aden.
Senator Symington. Both.
General Carroll. Both.
Senator Symington. Just as a matter of interest, how did it
come that we were backing, with the Chinese and Nasser and the
Russians, one government in Yemen, and the British were backing
the other, with the Canadians?
General Carroll. I am afraid that is a question that
involved political consideration, Mr. Chairman. That would be
beyond my ken competence to judge.

AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN YEMEN

Senator Symington. How much military equipment of American
origin is being used in Yemen now?
General Carroll. Well, first of all, the Yemen-Arab
Republic forces have, so far as I know, no U.S. origin military
equipment since in the main they are being supplied by the UAR,
and arms and munitions available to the UAR in the main are
supplied by the Soviet Union.
Insofar as the royalist forces are concerned, I do recall
that some time ago the Egyptian commander in Yemen exhibited to
our embassy personnel, including our defense attache there, a
50-caliber machine gun and some boxes of ammunition which bore
a MAP insignia and indicated an off-loading at a Saudi Arabian
port. The purpose of this, of course, was to contend that U.S.
equipment was finding its way via Saudi Arabia into the hands
of the royalists for sabotage and other purposes.
[Deleted.]
About a month after the arrival of an Iranian port, this
equipment was transshipped to Saudi Arabia. I do not know the
amount, but we have reports to the effect that a certain amount
of this ultimately found its way into the hands of the
royalists in Yemen. That is about all, sir.

SOURCE OF EGYPTIAN EQUIPMENT

I do know that in Yemen the Egyptians are currently
training a liberation force of the Front for the Liberation of
South Yemen and that they are supposed to have some 81-
millimeter mortars of U.S. origin. Where they were acquired, I
do not know, although there has been a substantial amount of
that kind of equipment available in various places in the
world.
Senator Symington. So what it amounts to is that Merex
would sell it to either side, finance, anywhere they wanted to.
General Carroll. No, sir, I am sorry if I conveyed that
impression.
[Deleted.]
Senator Symington. Where did Nasser get the--where did the
Republic army get the American 81 equipment?
General Carroll. I do not know, but I would doubt very,
very much that it was associated in any way with the sale of
surplus equipment out of Germany.
Senator Symington. I see.
Well, I have one final question, and then I am going to ask
if you could excuse me, if Senator Aiken would chair this a
little longer, or Senator Carlson. If not, would you answer
questions for the counsel for the record, because I promised
that I would be at his hearing at 3:30 because he had something
he had to do and if I would chair that for him.

TANKS TO IRAN

But I would like to ask this question: One other thing we
have not covered are the tanks to Iran, but I would like to
ask, the idea, as I understand it, is that the State
Department, the Pentagon or both together tried to balance this
situation, and I was terribly shocked to find how magnificently
modern the UAR air force was when I went through there in
January 1966. That was nailed down and verified in January
1967.
For example, they have 49 of the new SU-7, which is better
than the best Migs.
General Carroll. That is correct.
Senator Symington. There are none of those in the Far East
at all, and they had over 101 Migs which are as good as those
in the Far East.
Under these circumstances, who does this balancing act,
because I am convinced they are much superior to the equipment
of the Israelis, who, as you know, are having trouble with the
other countries.
Who is the one who does the balancing, is that done in
State, to the best of your knowledge, or is that done in
Defense, or do you not know?
General Carroll. This involves policy determinations that I
do not participate in, although I do make contributions to the
information being considered insofar as order of battle is
concerned.

SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT

It has been well known, of course, in the past ten years
that well in excess of a billion dollars' worth of military
assistance has been provided to the UAR by the Soviet Union,
and they are being provided by the Soviets with very modern
equipment in air as you have just mentioned, sir, also in their
naval forces as well as in their ground forces.
On the other hand, I think one should bear in mind that the
Egyptians have not demonstrated a capacity to utilize the
equipment in a manner proportionate with the performance
characteristic effectiveness of the equipment as is
demonstrated by the 71,000 troops which they have had in Yemen,
without----
Senator Symington. Of course they could always get people
to operate them for them on a lend-lease basis, as happened in
North Korea.
General Carroll. That is correct.
Senator Symington. I would like to mention, if I may, to
you, Senator Aiken and Senator Carlson, that our next step is
to State Department--correct, Mr. Bader?--as we want to pursue
this to find out some of these questions.
In the meantime Senator, I promised John Stennis I would go
over to this hearing and chair it, and if you or Senator
Carlson could stay here, I would appreciate it, and Mr. Bader,
will you ask any questions that you want to in order to make
the record clear as long as we have the good fortune to have
General Carroll with us.
Senator Bader. Yes, sir, I would be delighted to.
Senator Aiken. This is all Greek to me, Stu.
Senator Symington. You handle it any way you want to.

HOLDING OF HOSTAGES

Senator Aiken. There are political philosophies which I
would be more interested in.
Do you have any information on Tai'zz, in regard to our two
hostages? I assume they were hostages.
General Carroll. They have still in detention, Senator.
Senator Aiken. Yes.
General Carroll. And ostensibly they are to be tried. On
the other hand, we do receive indications to the effect that
the powers that be in Cairo have urged caution on the part of
their military commander in Yemen in the treatment of these
prisoners.
[Deleted.]
Senator Aiken. Yes.
General Carroll. At this time, I believe 3,500 Egyptians
over the past ten years have been trained in the Soviet Union,
and this training is continuing. Soviet instructors also head
up the staffs in the armed forces academies, and so there are
substantial efforts underway to improve the level of training
of the Egyptian forces.
Senator Aiken. Do you see anything to indicate that the
British may not pull out of Aden?
General Carroll. On the contrary, so far as my
understanding is concerned, they intend to.
Senator Aiken. Fast, I would suppose.
General Carroll. I suppose so.
Senator Aiken. I would not blame them.
What about Djibouti?

SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Senator Aiken. The situation over around Djibouti in
Somalia and in there. Have you followed that? Is there trouble
brewing in that area, too?
General Carroll. Well, since the election in French
Somaliland has come out the way that it has, the situation has
quieted to some extent.
Senator Aiken. It has not been fully accepted though, has
it?
General Carroll. Not by all parties concerned, no, sir.
Senator Aiken. No.
General Carroll. Of course the Ethiopians are most happy
with the manner in which the election evolved. As for the rural
population in French Somaliland, I believe the solution which
has been arrived at thus far is acceptable to them. However, a
substantial portion of the population in the main city is not
particularly happy.

MILITARY JUNTA IN GREECE

Senator Aiken. Have you had any recent information on
Greece? It seems almost like a disturbing quiet at present.
General Carroll. I believe that is attributable to the firm
grip that the military junta has on the country at this time.
Senator Aiken. But every Greek in this country seems to be
disapproving, and it seems to me if they are disapproving,
their relatives back home are equally upset.
General Carroll. I am sure this must be true because there
must be substantial segments of the Greek population who feel
the coup was a blow to the democratic philosophy of Greece and
the democratic aspirations of that country.
On the other hand, the source of trouble to the present
rulers would be expected primarily to stem from some of the
more radical groups, and particularly the leftists, and they
have undertaken to remove from current circulation those that
they could identify as representing a current danger to the
regime.
Senator Aiken. Frank, have you any questions?
Senator Carlson. Just one or two questions.

VALUE OF SURPLUS EQUIPMENT

In this illicit movement of all these arms material and
equipment, where do these folks who are in this business
[deleted] secure this type of weapons? Is some of it U.S.
surplus material that has been disposed of and given to other
countries, sold, or is this other countries' surplus?
General Carroll. Well, surplus equipment, Senator, happens
to represent a very desirable source of supply not only because
of its availability but generally because of its less costly
aspects.
The kind of equipment which is surplus today would not be
sought with any special effort by countries with advanced
military capabilities.
In the main, it is the relatively under-developed countries
that are most desirous of acquiring equipment which is surplus
to other nations, bearing in mind that it is surplus to other
nations primarily because of the fact that they consider it
obsolete. But everything is relative in this field, and it
happens to represent highly desirable equipment to the
underdeveloped countries.
It so happens that the spotlight tends to be focused at
this point in time on surplus materials because a substantial
amount of it is generating especially in Western Europe at this
time, because of the modernization of the forces there. A
substantial amount of the military equipment which comprised
the equipment of the forces had been provided to them by the
United States during the buildup of NATO under the military
assistance program. It is this equipment which is now becoming
surplus because of the modernization of the forces of these
nations.
At the same time, because of the interregional disputes and
conflicts, which the chairman mentioned when we first started,
there is sort of an arms race particularly in the Mid East, and
certain countries are casting covetous eyes on this equipment
which appears to be available in Western Europe.
However, surplus equipment is only one of the sources of
such equipment, and the purchasing country as well as the arms
brokers who might be used, seek to make purchases of newly
manufactured equipment from other countries, although in such
instances frequently one has to wait perhaps a protracted
period of time because of manufacturing lead time requirements.

SURPLUS TANKS

Senator Carlson. You mentioned, for instance, that
Germany--you mentioned several European countries, but Germany,
I made some notes here, 193 tanks were, you said, surplus.
General Carroll. It must be----
Senator Carlson. Did I write it down wrong?
General Carroll. A good deal more than that. The 193
referred to one particular type of tank.
Senator Carlson. Was this German?
General Carroll. But Germany has many more tanks than that
in surplus.
Senator Carlson. The question I wanted to ask now, were
those surplus American tanks, German tanks, or what?
General Carroll. The ones I was referring to, sir, are
surplus U.S. origin tanks.
Senator Carlson. U.S. origin tanks.
General Carroll. In addition to that, they well could have
many more which are of German origin.
Senator Carlson. I see.
Well, my thinking was these tanks, while they may call them
surplus and they may be outmoded, they are still probably very
good, useful pieces of equipment for certain places.
General Carroll. They certainly are. That is why they are
sought after so persistently.
Senator Carlson. Well now, you mentioned--and I believe
that I would be interested in it--that these people who traffic
in the sales of military equipment, they also sell new
equipment. I assume they can get people to buy them.
General Carroll. That is correct.
For example, Interarmco has exclusive sales rights to newly
manufactured equipment produced in a couple of the Scandinavian
countries and Holland.
Senator Carlson. And out of the United States?
General Carroll. No. I doubt that they have any such
exclusive rights out of the United States, but I do not know.

INTERNATIONAL ARMS DEALERS

Senator Carlson. I had an interesting experience along this
line a few years ago. I was down at the Dominican Republic when
we placed limitations of shipments of weapons into that
country, and I spent about a week down there at the sugar
operations. I was out to a beach on a Sunday afternoon and here
comes an American citizen--of course everything was so
secretive down there they said do not talk in an automobile
because it may be bugged, and you had to be awfully careful--
and this American comes along with one of the classiest dames
you ever saw on the beach, and she was French they told me.
They said, ``Well, he is in the Dominican Republic selling arms
from Czechoslovakia.'' I just wondered how general that was
over the world as you run into it, where we try to put
limitations on it.
General Carroll. I would say it is quite active all over
the world.
Senator Carlson. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Aiken. I thought the Dominican Republic had its own
small arms plant.
General Carroll. That is right, sir.
Senator Aiken. General, I have no more questions. I am here
trying to learn a little. I am not even a member of Senator
Symington's subcommittee.
Senator Carlson. I am not either.
Senator Aiken. Because my interests happen to be the
Western Hemisphere, but I realize there is a very short
distance around the world now.
General Carroll. That is right, sir.
Senator Aiken. And when we get the supersonic, it will be
even shorter.
I have nothing further.
Do you have anything, Carl?
Mr. Marcy. Mr. Bader, just to make the record complete.
Mr. Bader. Senator, I have just three questions.

TANKS TO BECOME SURPLUS

Senator Symington wanted to make the record clear on
certain points, and I thought I might ask this just for the
record.
General, we have heard estimates as to the number of 5,000
tanks of American origin which would be on the international
market by 1970. I wonder if you might verify that. The question
has been raised before early in the testimony.
Senator Aiken. You are speaking of surplus.
Mr. Bader. Surplus in Europe alone.
General Carroll. I am not in a position to respond to that
question at this time. I could undertake to see if I could
accumulate that kind of data.
Mr. Bader. Could you, sir, for the record? I think it would
be of interest.
[The material referred to follows.]

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TANKS TO BECOME SURPLUS

Of the approximately 7,500 tanks of American origin in the
inventories of West European nations, 646 are now believed to be
surplus and 1,510 more are expected to become so within the next five
years. Thus, a total of 2,156 tanks are expected to be surplus by 1972,
and of this number only about 1,500 tanks are expected to be surplus by
1970.
[Deleted.]

INSPECTION TEAMS APPRAISING TANKS

Mr. Bader. I have a contract here dated 19 January 1967
between the Levy Autoparts Company, which has been mentioned,
and General Toufanian, who has just been mentioned as the 5
percenter in Iran. This is for 600 M-47 tanks to be sold to
Iran through General Toufanian.
[Deleted.]
Mr. Bader. So if this contract were fulfilled, it would
mean that 600 tanks of American origin would go from West
Germany to Pakistan.
General Carroll. I would feel that it is the U.S.
government's surplus tanks that this contract is referring to
because the Iranians were endeavoring at the same time to
acquire the M-41 and M-47 tanks out to German surplus.
I do not know if a particular source is specified in the
contract. I would assume that it is not.
Mr. Bader. It is not.
General Carroll. The particular type tank----
Mr. Bader. Just a particular type tank.
General Carroll.----would of course in the main represent
U.S. origin tanks in the surplus West German inventory.
Mr. Bader. According to your figures, just one last
comment.
If that deal is consummated, General Toufanian will receive
$400 for his----
[Deleted.]

CANADIAN ROLE IN ARMS SALES

Senator Aiken. Now, I think you have helped me more than I
thought at first. Some of us are going to Ottawa next week with
Canadian officials and all members of the legislature, too, and
they are likely to be a little critical of us, our army's
disposal and so forth.
[Deleted.]
General Carroll. Yes sir.
Senator Aiken. The Canadian government, as a whole, is not
a big supplier of arms anywhere.
General Carroll. I do not believe so, sir.
Senator Aiken. They are not. I am glad to hear that so we
will not misjudge them if they criticize us. They are likely to
criticize us in our sales of arms, though.

PAYMENTS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

[Deleted.]
General Carroll. Usually the arms broker, either by taking
the initiative himself or on the basis of being contacted by a
prospective buyer, will undertake to formulate an agreement
with the buyer and thereafter go out to get the equipment.
Senator Carlson. Well, this is, of course, I assume, part
of our equipment we have given Germany in order to build up
their defenses. Am I right?
General Carroll. I am sorry, sir, I missed that point.
Senator Carlson. I am wondering if this some of the
military equipment we have furnished the German government or
their defense administration in order to strengthen them
militarily? I mean we have given it to them or have we sold it
to them or have they bought it----
General Carroll. First of all, this is equipment which the
United States government did furnish under the Military
Assistance Program to the West German government, and I believe
the committee has previously been advised that a few years ago,
I believe it was 1962, the United States government sold its
reversionary rights in that equipment to the West German
government.
Senator Carlson. I see.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Aiken. Anything further?
We thank you, General Carroll----
General Carroll. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Aiken.--For talking to at least one rank amateur.
Senator Carlson. That is right. That is true here, too, but
it is interesting, and I want to say many thanks.
General Carroll. Well, thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure
to see you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

THE SITUATION IN POLAND

[Editor's Note.--In November 1966, Poland's representative on the
International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski, proposed to U.S.
Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge that Poland serve as an
intermediary to set up a meeting between U.S. and North Vietnamese
officials. In early December, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki
reported that Hanoi had agreed to hold discussions in Warsaw. However,
after U.S. warplanes bombed an area near Hanoi on December 13-14, North
Vietnam withdrew its acceptance.]
----------

Monday, May 15, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator John J. Sparkman (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Fulbright,
Symington, McCarthy, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and
Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Lowenstein
for the committee staff.
Senator Sparkman. The subcommittee will come to order.
The Subcommittee on European Affairs this morning is
holding an informal session with the Honorable John A.
Gronouski, United States Ambassador to Poland. Ambassador
Gronouski has been in Washington for consultation and he kindly
expressed his willingness to meet with interested committee
members.
Mr. Ambassador, we are very pleased to have you here with
us today. I expect that you already have in mind the kinds of
topics for discussion which you believe will be of most concern
to us. And I certainly have no intention of trying to restrict
your operating freedom in this regard. At the same time, I am
sure that all of us will be particularly interested in your
views in connection with the much advertised, but futile
efforts last December to arrange contacts with the North
Vietnamese through the Warsaw mechanism. You will, of course,
have noted Mr. Hightower's Associated Press article of May 9,
and quite possibly the letter of Richard Hudson of the New York
Times of May 12. We would welcome any clarification of this
episode which you might be able to provide for us.
Beyond that, we would be glad to have your views on the
current scene in Poland, with particular reference to Polish
policies toward the Soviet Union and toward developments in
other Eastern European countries. In addition, we would expect
to discuss such elements of our foreign policy as the East-West
trade issue and the encouragement of an atmosphere leading
towards detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.
With this very general guidance, Mr. Ambassador, I hope
that you will launch into these subjects in any way you please.
You handle it in your own way. We are very glad to have you
come here.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JOHN A. GRONOUSKI, UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO POLAND; ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR H.J. TORBERT;
AND WILLIAM A. BUELL, JR., EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

Ambassador Gronouski. I am very glad to be here, Senator.
Being an old Postmaster General, being on the Hill in that
capacity, and this is a different problem.
Senator Sparkman. A new setup of cooperation.
Ambassador Gronouski. Which, by the way, is a good idea.
I do not have any prepared statement. I will try to cover
these things that you have raised in an informal way. There are
a lot of elements. I am very glad to be here. I will come to
the Vietnam business a little later, if that is all right.
Senator Sparkman. That is all right.
Ambassador Gronouski. There are a lot of elements in the
whole Eastern European situation that I think we ought to
continue to try to develop. It has almost become a truism to
say now that things are not quite so monolithic as they once
were. But I hasten to add that they are not quite so
independent as some people hopefully wish and think they were.
Yet I think that there are some very fundamental changes going
on, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia and in Hungary,
which is regarded as the old bloc area, that is to say, and not
to say anything about Yugoslavia which, I understand, you are
leaving out of this discussion--except to say that they have
gone so far beyond anything of the rest of Eastern Europe that
they are a separate subject unto themselves.
I will intersperse, however, a comment on Yugoslavia, only
insofar as it has an impact on Eastern Europe. One of the
things that is of continual interest and discussion in Poland,
particularly among the younger groups and the people working
for the planning authorities, foreign trade, the younger
economists----
Senator Sparkman. Did you say ``younger economists'' or
``Communists''?
Ambassador Gronouski. The younger economists, yes.
Senator Aiken. Economists?
Ambassador Gronouski. Economists, yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. Who are also Communists?
Ambassador Gronouski. Also Communists.
Senator Sparkman. That is what I was trying to understand.
Ambassador Gronouski. Actually only five percent of the
people of Poland are members of the Communist Party. Whether
they are Communists or not is academic. That is one thing in
that they are part of the bureaucratic structure, and they
support it.

FRUSTRATIONS OF THE POLES

The other side of the coin is that among many of the
younger Poles who are well-trained in this generation, that
have gone to college since the war, et cetera, there is not the
same ideological commitment that you find with most of the
older ones. And you find a wide variety of people who are
basically existing with frustrations for the lack of progress
in the economic area and who see opportunity for change and
look across to the other side, who are, in fact, pushing some
changes, but who recognize that there are other men up in the
Politburo who are very conservative and that those like
Gomulka, that his ideology is regarded as ultrareactionary in
contrast to the others, and in turn are being imposed to
change, and yet imposed with the necessity for change in order
to make the economy viable at all, that there must be change.
There are a good many people who are certainly not in control,
but in junior positions in that part of the operation who are
very anxious for very substantial changes and are pushing for
them and are doing this. They have not been terribly
successful, but it is highly interesting to see them there, to
see them pushing for the change that I have spoken of.

LOOKING TO YUGOSLAVIA AND MOSCOW

What I wanted to mention about Yugoslavia is that I do not
regard Yugoslavia in the area as being that which is
categorized as the Eastern European countries. Part of them are
looking to Yugoslavia, hoping that Yugoslavia will fail, and
part of them are hoping that Yugoslavia will succeed. And I
think that----
Senator Hickenlooper. What is the rationale of those who
hope that Yugoslavia will fail?
Ambassador Gronouski. Those are the conservatives who do
not want to see the kind of liberalization of the economy that
the other group wants to see. And I think that one of the
things which I always have in mind is important in terms of the
long-term impact on Eastern Europe of the success in the kind
of changes that are going on which are very fundamental in
Yugoslavia.
Senator Hickenlooper. Excuse me for having interrupted.
Ambassador Gronouski. Surely.
Senator Hickenlooper. If I may continue, do these people
who want to see Yugoslavia fail--do they want to see them
reoriented towards the Moscow discipline?
Ambassador Gronouski. Not necessarily. Not towards Moscow
discipline, but rather they are very concerned about the
decentralization of not only the economic control, but other
controls that are going on there. You do not quite get the
feeling that you did before in Poland or in any of these other
countries, that they want countries to be Moscow oriented. They
are Moscow oriented, but they are very concerned about their
independence.
Senator Aiken. By Moscow, you mean Moscow as the
decisionmaking center, the Lenin Moscow, pure communism?
Ambassador Gronouski. It has gone beyond that. They use
Lenin as the symbol.
Senator Aiken. Lenin as the symbol?
Ambassador Gronouski. A symbol for the movement. Lenin is a
symbol of goodness. But there is talk about the procedures that
are going on.
Of course, what they have come to realize in the Eastern
European countries--and I presume to some degree in the Soviet
Union--but I see it more in the three countries that I have
just mentioned, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary--they have
come to realize that the economic system that they have is not
a very viable system. It does not work very well. It has worked
well in the post-war period because this was the period of
building up after the war. Poland was literally destroyed. They
could not make an error during this period--and they put their
resources, their transportation, their utilities, their
apartments or their factories, all had a high marginal rate of
return and, consequently, represented a move towards high
growth--8 or 9 percent growth rate in the last twenty years in
Poland which is a very successful rate of growth.
The productivity of labor is very low. Interest in trading
with the West is very high with them. And the output is such
that quality output is very difficult for them, to enable them
to sell in the West. And they recognize, at least a good many
of them, the inefficiencies that are developing.

COMPARISON TO WEST GERMANY

Senator Hickenlooper. How do they reconcile the difference
between the development of their system and that of West
Germany and West Berlin?
Ambassador Gronouski. Partly because in Poland----
Senator Hickenlooper. What is the rationale there?
Ambassador Gronouski. Partly because they started from
scratch.
Senator Hickenlooper. So did West Germany and West Berlin.
Ambassador Gronouski. Probably not as much from scratch as
they did--as it was in Poland--not as much destruction in
Germany. Poland had one out of five killed. Their people in
engineering and the professions, all of the educated categories
were pretty well wiped out. Warsaw was about 80 percent
destroyed.
Senator Hickenlooper. Also, very definitely in West
Germany, highways and everything else were destroyed.
Ambassador Gronouski. Secondly, they sustained losses. They
make the point that the Marshall Plan and United States aid
made contributions, plus the fact that the Marshall aid was
turned down by them. That is something that they do not talk
about, but nonetheless it is a fact.
Senator Sparkman. Poland tried to take it.
Ambassador Gronouski. Poland wanted to take it.
Senator Sparkman. And Czechoslovakia.
Ambassador Gronouski. And the Soviets did not want them to
do so.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is true. The Russians turned it
down.
Ambassador Gronouski. They cannot make a case for it.
Senator Hickenlooper. I do not think they can make a good
case for doing that, but I just wondered how they rationalized
it.

SLOW PROGRESS IN POLAND

Ambassador Gronouski. There was the destruction of the
population by the war. And there were those who wanted to move
towards reconstruction and the like, who wanted to move ahead.
Beyond that, your younger people, to make it very clear, they
feel that it is the lack of incentive--it is the lack of
authority at the plant level--it is, in effect, political
rather than technical management of the economy. And so you
find that in the last few years, that is, the last couple or
two or three years, they are slowly moving forward--some think
much too slowly. Obviously it is much too slowly, but they are
adopting some of the ideas that we have had over here for many
years. For instance, profits used to be a dirty word, but
profits are now the basis for judging the effectiveness of a
program. It is pretty much the same type that we have, except
that it is a public enterprise. They have introduced the whole
concept of interest rates. And they talk about bankers
controlling, whether or not they can invest or not.
They realized a great deficiency, but they have not done a
whole lot in the pricing system. That is actually idiotic.
Therefore, it does not contribute much towards the total
organization. It does not contribute. It rather holds back the
efficient organization of the economic system, because the
management of a firm or an industry is dealing with quite an
unreal prospect. It is administering the price structure that
goes back over the years, that has a pricing structure which
has very little relationship one to another. They have not done
much in Poland to improve the pricing structure. But
nonetheless, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, they are
officially now taking the position that they have got to move
to greater incentives for labor and management. They have to
decentralize economic controls. They have to give more to the
firms and the industries engaging in national trade. They have
got to reorient their economy in the direction of quality,
rather than quantitative measures that were set, because they
have come to realize that it does no good to produce 100,000
pairs of shoes that people will not buy--that just making
100,000 pairs of shoes does not help.

EAST-WEST TRADE

Senator Aiken. What about trade between the East and the
West--what does that amount to?
Ambassador Gronouski. About 35 percent West.
Senator Aiken. 35 percent West?
Ambassador Gronouski. It is a little higher than the
average.
Senator Aiken. Yugoslavia is nearly 70 percent.
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. One of the figures I was trying
to bring up. There is a great desire to move. That is one of
the problems that they have.
There is a great interest in western technology as there is
through all of Europe. There is great interest in Poland in
greater effort right now towards that.
Senator Aiken. What percentage of the grain is required to
be sold to the government now? At one time is was 80 percent.
It went down--it went down to about 15 percent, did it not?
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. It is something between 10 and
15 percent.
Senator Aiken. That is about where we are.
Ambassador Gronouski. Actually, Poland is unique in that
they do have 85 or 90 percent of agriculture that is private
agriculture.
Senator Aiken. Any government operations in agriculture
were given up voluntarily?
Ambassador Gronouski. After 1956, yes, that is right. After
1956, when Gomulka took over, there was an entirely new policy
to sell off the farms.
Senator Aiken. They did not have to go in and take it.
Ambassador Gronouski. Actually we do not find anybody in
the government who is interested in state ownership or anybody
in the party who is.

CLOSER RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Ambassador, in the May 13 newsletter
it was written, ``We are trying now to save something from the
ruins by promoting closer relationships between Warsaw, East
Berlin and Prague.''
Would you care to comment on that?
Ambassador Gronouski. Well, the so-called West German moves
toward the East which culminated in relations with Romania. At
this point in time it looked like it would include Bulgaria,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but it was very much slowed down in
terms regarded as nationalism. Poland played a big role along
this line at the Warsaw meeting in February, on the 8th, 9th,
and 10th. Poland took the lead in that meeting, with Soviet
backing and at the insistence of Ulbricht of East Germany, to
put a halt to the rather rapid movement that was happening in
that part of the world. They never did expect that Hungary,
Bulgaria and Romania would long remain away from relations with
the Germans. They explained it on the basis that these three
countries have a concern for Germany that Poland did not have
in the war, that it was a question of survival on the part of
Poland. But in a sense, that the southern tier, these three
southern states, even Czechoslovakia, are becoming very
interested in relations with West Germany in developing along
these lines. I suppose that there is something to that judgment
on the part of Poles, because of their inherent fear of West
Germany and the Soviets, because Poland and East Germany are
acting as buffers as to West Germany and the Czechoslovakians,
partly because their border is common with Germany. They have
problems with Germany, and they have developed a little bloc
within the bloc at this point in time. I think there is
something, therefore, to the point that was made.

POLISH VIEWS OF U.S. POLICIES

Senator Sparkman. Do you detect any feeling on the part of
the Poles that the United States in its policies toward Europe
places undue emphasis on our relations with West Germany?
Ambassador Gronouski. Oh, yes.
Senator Sparkman. Is this a sore spot with them?
Ambassador Gronouski. It is a sore spot with them. It is a
burning question with them. They feel very strongly that the
United States has a policy that does not put pressure on
Germany but on them. I tried to convince them from time to time
that sometimes when one country tries to impose its will
directly on another country publicly, that sets back a
development that might happen if the pressure was not there. It
is not at all certain that the United States will be in that
position to be of help to the German and Polish situation. But,
basically, they feel that we have been much in supporting the
Germans and the rearmament, and this sort of thing. That is
understandable, because, after all, Germany has gone in that
direction before.

POLAND AND EAST GERMANY

Senator Sparkman. What distinction, if any, do you make
between the policies of Gomulka in Poland and Ulbricht in East
Germany in reference to the domestic political situation in our
relationships with Moscow?
Ambassador Gronouski. Unfortunately I have never been in
East Germany to go into that, so I do not have any first-hand
feeling about it. You will find in Poland, more so, I think,
than any of the Eastern European countries, a considerable
relaxation ever since 1956 in the attitudes towards this in
personal expressions of an individual. We have no difficulty,
for example, associating with anybody that we want to associate
with and in asking any questions or in having to confine any
dinner conversations or cocktail party conversations with the
people. There are various expressions and viewpoints on a
variety of many issues without any concern. Everybody feels, of
course, that they may have bugs all over the living room. They
assume that. And yet you will find Poles, rather responsible
government people, in responsible government positions,
expressing freely attitudes that are quite different.
Senator Aiken. There are some very good anti-Communist
jokes.
Ambassador Gronouski. There are millions of them. You hear
them all over.
Senator Aiken. They are about the best I have heard
anywhere.

POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator Sparkman. What about Poland's position in regard to
the ambassadorship to the United States? Is there likely to be
any change in their attitude?
Ambassador Gronouski. They have appointed an ambassador.
Senator Sparkman. They have now?
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. There is a technicality in
Poland. It has to go to the council to be finalized, but they
have appointed, a month or so ago, one of the most able
diplomats to Washington, the Director General of the Foreign
Office, who was the Ambassador to the United Nations. This is
something that we cannot talk about publicly until they
announce it.
Senator Sparkman. Very good.
Are there any other questions before we move to the Vietnam
matter?

TAKING TROOPS OUT OF EUROPE

Senator Symington. I would like to ask a question and to
present a view to you, sir. What is your position with respect
to the growing problem that we have with regard to such matters
as that of Mr. Ashmore,\1\ having come back from North Vietnam
saying that they say that they could handle two million
Americans if necessary in this war. I think that if we are
going to utilize the technological expertise that we have, they
might be right, that is, unless we do so. We need trained
people very badly. That is consistently brought up in the Armed
Services Committee. We have been cannibalizing heavily
equipment all over the world in order to take care of Vietnam.
We are very short, for example, in Germany and in Europe of the
required number of helicopters. Therefore, some of us have felt
that if that point developed within the cold war that it might
justify taking troops out of Europe. We have so many other
places that we have to cover. We have 85,000 Americans in Japan
and over 60,000 troops in Korea. We have over 900,000 total
people in Europe. That is a heavy financial drain. But the main
thing is that we need certain types of people very, very badly
if we continue the war in its present stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Arkansas journalist Harry Ashmore had visited North Vietnam in
January, 1967.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are some of us who have felt that we could take
troops out of Europe. When we do that, we run into the
Europeaneers.
What is the reaction in Poland, behind the Curtain, for
that matter?
There are two angles. First, would there be any change,
some Senators talk about, commensurate reduction of Russian
troops. Secondly, is it of great interest over there whether we
do it on any basis in Poland?
Ambassador Gronouski. It is of great interest, but the most
constructive conversation I have had on the reduction happened
about a week ago. I went into this whole discussion with some
of the foreign office people. It was stated that, really, they
are very interested in this kind of thing to get the Soviets
and United States to pull back. While Vietnam is going on it
was stated, ``We really cannot do this sort of thing. And the
reason we cannot do it is that if in any way we let the United
States withdraw troops from Germany, then in a sense you are
using the withdrawals of more troops for Vietnam, and Hanoi is
very upset with us because we are taking the pressure from
Europe off the United States and providing the United States
with more troops available for Vietnam--for the Vietnam
situation.''
So they conclude that this is not the time to talk about
these things, because they cannot do it in terms of their
relationship to Hanoi. It was an interesting proposition.

REDUCTION OF SOVIET TROOP LEVELS

Senator Symington. I will ask one more question. Do you
think that they would do it if it was not for the Vietnam war--
that they would not have any objection and that they might
actually take troops out themselves?
Ambassador Gronouski. I do not know, because they are very
capable in talking about the possibility of what they might do,
and then when the situation arises, they do not do it. I am not
at all sure that they would. I am not at all sure that the
Soviet Union's best interests would be to reduce the twenty-two
divisions they have in Germany, because I think that they feel
very strongly that they have got to maintain a pretty large
troop concentration next to West Germany. I am not sure that
they would. I think that there is a possibility that it would
be much greater with the Vietnam thing out of the way, but I
would not predict that they would.

IMPROVING TRADE WITH POLAND

I want to make one other observation, if I may. There is a
whole series of legislation, proposed legislation or idea,
which I think is of vital interest to our national interest in
all of Eastern Europe. I am talking about the matter of a week
or two or so ago on the Import-Export Bank which was voted out,
and the issuance of trade credits bill which was voted out,
something that probably is not as big as others. From the point
of view of Poland, however, it is tremendously important. We
were very pleased to see it was voted out of this committee
last week. It is the program which is vitally important to
Poland where we will have something like $1.5 million a year in
the field of news media, magazines, movies, books, and the
like, books which can be read and seen and understood and
discussed by the Poles. They could not have without this
program which I think is fundamentally a program which is as
good as we have in terms of improving the situation and in
moderating their views. It is something that ultimately comes
up for appropriation again, and I think it is of critical
importance.
We have just negotiated with the Poles $500,000 for English
language teaching, which requires an appropriation which I
think is something that has been as good as anything in the
last ten or fifteen years having to do with Poland. It is just
now that we have been successful in getting the program
started, and I think it will be vitally important over the next
ten years. There will be a great demand for the English
language there.
All of these programs, it seems to me, aim at giving
fundamental support to the kind of measures that are developing
in all of these countries towards liberalization of their
economic aspects of their society.
When you talk about liberalization of their economy, it is
only economics that we are talking about. But as I think we can
see in Yugoslavia, it has gone considerably further than
anywhere else. As the economy is liberalized, there is the
change in everything that is going to occur in the whole fabric
of their society. It develops a concept of being a manager who
is a technical man, who is not an ideological man, and thus he
is given authority. And these kinds of leadership help. I think
it is vitally important in terms of our own long-term national
interests to develop programs such as evolved in the East-West
trade policy which does not affect Poles particularly, such as
the favored nation treatment. It will affect the rest of
Eastern Europe, in the availability of export-import guarantees
to American manufacturers in many areas in developing trade in
Eastern Europe.
Senator Aiken. Are there any manufacturers who have any
branch plants which have opened up there?
Ambassador Gronouski. No, none at all. But I think that the
development of the trade connections would be tremendously
important, because it orients the whole trading pattern towards
the West. It has a tremendous impact on their trade.
Senator Sparkman. Are you through?
Senator Symington. I was just going to ask another
question.

TRADE AND THE WARSAW PACT

Senator Sparkman. What effect would that have upon the
Warsaw Pact?
Ambassador Gronouski. Poland will continue to be a key
member of the Warsaw Pact.
Senator Sparkman. That involves the trade situation, too,
does it not?
Ambassador Gronouski. The Eastern trade?
Senator Sparkman. Yes.
Ambassador Gronouski. The point is that so many of these
countries have found that they are competing rather than being
complementary. There is a great interest, even though they give
all kinds of lip service to it and work towards it--and the
Poles do more than most to try to encourage it--nevertheless
they are aware that their system is not enough for them and
they are tremendously interested in looking westward. It seems
to me that we ought to help them look westward. I think it is
not just good in our relations to Eastern Europe that this is
important, but in terms of our leadership role in West Germany.
I think that this is important, because if the United States
does not take the lead in this area, somebody else will.
Western Europe is not going to keep the wall up in this area. I
think Western Europe is wise in not doing it.
Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
Go ahead.
Senator Symington. Mr. Ambassador, I could not agree with
you more. You have answered my questions. For years around here
I have been saying more trade for many different regions would
help.
Ambassador Gronouski. What strikes me is that every
businessman who comes over to Poland has this same impression.
Senator Symington. We had the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Secretary of Commerce before this committee, let me say,
two or three years ago. I asked both of them if there was any
developed country in the world except the United States that
was not doing its best to develop to the best of its ability to
buy and sell behind the Iron Curtain. Are we not the only ones
who do not? We are defending most of them and financing a lot
of them. And the answer of Secretary Dillon and of Secretary
Hodges was, ``Not one.'' Whether it be Communist or otherwise,
some day we will need the volume to get the price and to
improve the market that these people can offer once developed.
And if so, we are going to have contributed something that is
going to be helpful. Otherwise, it will be very damaging to
capitalism if we do not.
Ambassador Gronouski. I think what is so important in this
whole thing is that it is sometimes overlooked in our relations
with Western Europe that it is important to move in these
directions, not just in Eastern Europe but otherwise.

TRADING WITH COMMUNISTS DURING VIETNAM WAR

Let me raise one more point, if I may. This is a question
that I often get--very often. How can we talk in the terms of
trade and development with Eastern Europe when Eastern Europe
is helping Vietnam and sending munitions, killing our boys, and
so forth. My answer to that, I think, is pretty simple.
Basically our policy is aimed or should be aimed certainly
at the long-run problem of avoiding World War III. It sounds
mundane, but it is a fact, to avoid that--reducing the tension.
And the real fundamental strain is still centered in Europe. If
we are going to have World War III, it will be one way or
another in Europe.
Senator Symington. You can give them another reason. We
have increased the sale of arms to anybody who will pay for
them or has a reasonable good credit standing, or even if they
do not. We have increased it from $300 million to $1.7 billion
in the last five years all over the world. So any criticism by
Americans that the Russian stuff is being shipped into Vietnam
can be pretty easily answered by the policy of this
administration and the previous administration, which is to
sell all of the war materials they can get their hands on,
providing they can make a profit on it.
Ambassador Gronouski. At any rate, if because of the
Vietnam war we build a wall and create tensions and try not to
reduce the chances in Europe, what we are doing, ultimately, is
creating a condition for something that is going to be much
more damaging and much more explosive and more costly in lives
than Vietnam happens to be today. So it is a very short-sighted
notion, it seems to me, to think in terms of forgetting this
whole power concentration in Europe because of the Vietnam war
that is going on. It is a self-defeating proposition.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Pell wants to ask you some
questions.

ODER NIESE BOUNDARY

Senator Pell. What is the reaction now in Poland that the
Eastern Frontier is up for grabs by the West?
Ambassador Gronouski. You are talking about the Niese Oder
boundary?
Senator Pell. Yes.
Ambassador Gronouski. There are two things that I can say
about that.
In the first place, despite the fact that they really do
not expect any of the nations, even the United States or
anybody else, to permit any change right now in that boundary,
they certainly think that the Soviet Union would not permit it
if anybody did. Nevertheless, they look towards the future.
Until the Germans flatly assure them that there is no change
contemplated, they are concerned that in the future the whole
pattern of the world relationships may change. They remember
the 1939 pact between Hitler and Stalin. They are not at all
ultimately confident that the Russians would--they would not
say this publicly--but they have a latent fear that it may
change, even though at the present it doesn't look like it
might. They have a genuine fear of Germany. It is not all
public relations and propaganda. Every family has lost
something in World War II--some five or six million killed out
of 30 million. So there is a genuine fear. But beyond that, if
Gomulka did not have the Niese Oder line, he would have to
invent something, because it is the one area where he gets a
very real rapport with the church, with the Polish people, with
the American Poles--with the Poles around the world--and it is
the one area that he has that he uses all of the time. In every
speech, it is the Niese Oder or Germany fascism. Had this been
recognized by the Germans, say, ten years ago, I am convinced
that there would not be the present situation. Gomulka would
have had a lot more difficult time selling himself, selling his
relationship with the Soviet Union which is basically sold to
the Poles on the basis of the defense against the Germans.
I think that the whole situation would be a lot more
untenable for Gomulka at this point.

GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR

Senator Pell. As you may recall, I am not the only one who
felt that we must keep this line. Would you agree with my view
that this is probably the cement that keeps the Soviet Union
and Poland under Soviet Union domination in foreign relations
more than any other single factor, that they are the sole
guarantor of the Western Frontier?
Ambassador Gronouski. Well, there are two things. That is,
in itself--but, also, even among Poles who are anti-Soviet and
there are a lot of Poles who do not like the Russians--
actually, there are jokes on that--I will not take the time to
tell them, but the Poles are not terribly keen on the Russians.
They do not say it publicly, but they say it privately.
I think there are two things. One, the Oder Niese line
itself; and two, the long-run concern of the revival of
militarism in Germany.
Even if the Niese Oder line was settled it would not
destroy the whole fear, because they have had two recent
occasions, in World War I and World War II, which they remember
very vividly, especially World War II.
I do not think that the Niese Oder line would resolve this
thing, but it would lower the level.
Senator Pell. Would you or would you not agree with my
thought that it is the biggest single factor keeping the Poles
under Soviet domination in foreign policy?
Ambassador Gronouski. I do not think I would. I think that
it is an important factor, but I think that the boundary
between Poland and Russia----
Senator Pell. What would be a greater factor that would
keep them under Soviet foreign policy?
Ambassador Gronouski. I think that the geography is
concerned--they are sitting right next to each other.
Senator Cooper. What was the answer?
Ambassador Gronouski. I think it is a matter of the
geography. They are sitting right next to each other.

ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Senator Pell. Along the same line, with reference to the
Catholic bishops, with the Catholic dioceses being redrawn so
that the bishops in the Niese Oder part now report to
Wyszynski, and the others to Germany, do they still have the
confusion with the new bishops reporting to Germany?
Ambassador Gronouski. The condition is not in this respect,
because the bishops in the Western territory report to
Wyszynski, but the real thing is that of the Vatican, that the
Vatican has not made them permanent. I cannot remember the
terminology here, but they are kind of temporary bishops. They
do not have the permanence of a bishop in the old Polish
territory. And it would be tantamount to Vatican recognition of
the Niese Oder line if they changed the status of it. They do
report to Wyszynski, but they do not have technically the same
status as the bishops throughout the Western part, and this is
part of the argument that is going on between the Vatican and
Poland.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Senator Mundt. Do you have any unanswered questions?
Senator Sparkman. I suggest that we later go into this
other program.
Senator Mundt. How much of a military establishment do they
have?
Ambassador Gronouski. They have a very substantial military
establishment. The equipment is quite modern. This is
integrated with the Warsaw Pact.
Senator Mundt. Is it completely controlled by the Polish
government?
Ambassador Gronouski. Oh, yes. It is controlled by the
Poles, but nonetheless it is integrated with the Russians and
the others in the Pact.
Senator Sparkman. It is led by a Russian General, is it
not?
Ambassador Gronouski. He was thrown out in 1956. That was
one of the Gomulka changes.

POLISH SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Mundt. What is the extent of their aid to North
Vietnam, that is, by Poland?
Ambassador Gronouski. It is pretty hard to nail it down.
Basically, from all I can gather it is relatively small. The
reason for that is that they talk a lot more than they do.
Every speech they give, they talk about helping Vietnam in the
North. I think it is easier said than done. It is a rather poor
country. They have tremendous development problems internally.
I think that they give as little as they can get away with.
That does not mean to say that they are not doing it, but I do
not think that it has any effect.
Senator Mundt. It is an issue.
Ambassador Gronouski. I have tried to nail it down. I have
been told point blank by them that it is not military. I do not
necessarily believe it. I do not think it is anything big. It
has been said it is so and so. As I say, I do not take that at
face value, but I am convinced, nonetheless, it is very small.

IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS

Senator Mundt. In connection with the understanding to
establish more East-West trade, have you noticed any lessening
of resistance to such East-West relationships?
Ambassador Gronouski. We have a good program. Two things
happened in the last six weeks that no one predicted would
happen during this period of Vietnam.
One, they have agreed to use Public Law 480 currency for
the language program, a very major program which will be run
jointly by American universities and Polish educational people.
This is going to have an extraordinary impact in Poland. And,
as I say, it was greatly unexpected. I was sort of pessimistic
myself. They agreed to it.
Secondly, the Ford Foundation program in Poland was ended
in 1964. It was broken off. A month or so ago, the Ford
Foundation revived it and there will be about 60 Poles coming
to the United States every year on this program, something that
I think is quite striking in this period of time.
Senator Mundt. How about the USIA exchange program?
Ambassador Gronouski. The only limitation that has happened
is that our cultural exchange budget has been cut. Last year,
we had 274. This year, it has been cut down to 74. The problem
really is that we are lessening the program, not them. We have
a lot of students both ways. We have three professors full-
time, three major universities in Poland. We have lecturers
coming over all of the time. One was the Council of Economic
Advisers, the chairman under President Eisenhower--I cannot
think of his name.
Senator Sparkman. Arthur Burns.
Ambassador Gronouski. Burns was over there. The Professor
of International Law from Harvard was there a while back. There
is a continuous stream coming over. Every day I get a checklist
of Poles coming to the United States for one reason or another.
I get a list every day that long (indicating).

USIA LIBRARY IN POLAND

Senator Mundt. Do you have the USIA there? That is, any of
their libraries?
Ambassador Gronouski. We have a library there. We show many
films. We have a big film library, and a quarter of a million
students borrowed these last year.
Senator Mundt. How do you go into that?
Ambassador Gronouski. They come into this library of ours,
which is open ten hours a day, all day long. It is used. We
show films about once a week, both in Posen and in Warsaw. They
are standing in line there. Under the IMB program, we have one-
half million American books of all kinds.
Senator Mundt. The IMB program was put into operation when
I was in the House. I think it was primarily operated in areas
where we did not have information libraries, so that they could
get books, American newspapers and the like.
Ambassador Gronouski. We only have a library. It is very
limited. All over the country there is about one-half million
dollars worth of books, newspapers and magazines. ``Dr.
Kildare'' is very much liked. Maybe he is not the head of it,
but the fact is that he is a favorite with them, and that is
very important.
We had someone go up to a little town and he heard rumors
that it was going to be cut off. We had not already notified
them. This little guy said to Fisher, one of our attaches,
``You are not going to take that out, are you?''
These have tremendous impact. There is no program at all
that I can think of that is more important than this.
Senator Mundt. Have you made a study of the USIA programs?
Ambassador Gronouski. They are very widely used. The IMB
and all of them. In fact, I am always intrigued by the fact
that despite, for instance, the fact that there was just a
little line in our English language program in the newspapers,
everywhere I go people know about it.
I had a newspaperman explain to me that we should not worry
so much about what is in the paper, for the simple reason that
the Poles have become sophisticated and they know that they
have only one line in all of the papers, and they listen to all
of these other sources, and they make up their minds. You see
it all of the time.
Senator Mundt. One final question.
Ambassador Gronouski. If I may, I might say, by the way,
that I talked with Leonard Marks about this. I think that it
would be more effective if he had a little more power to get
in.

RADIO TRANSMITTERS

Senator Mundt. How about the transmitters--from what
transmitter do you get this?
Ambassador Gronouski. It comes, I think, from--I am not
sure.
Senator Mundt. If they would have more power it would help.
Senator Fulbright. It comes in from North Carolina, I
believe.
Ambassador Gronouski. I am not sure where it comes from. I
have never gotten into the technical side of it.

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

Senator Mundt. What experience, if any, or knowledge have
you, if any, as to the church and its relationships?
Ambassador Gronouski. Cardinal Wyszynski does just about
what he pleases. There are a lot of churches. They are filled
every Sunday, with a good mix of ages. There is a continual
battle going on between the Cardinal and the government, but
basically it is pretty vigorous.
Senator Mundt. Does the government per se operate any
antichurch programs to discourage church attendance and the
like?
Ambassador Gronouski. Not obviously, no.
Senator Mundt. No?
Ambassador Gronouski. Their big fight with the church is as
to certain things. You heard it back here, the thousand years
of Polish history that the church celebrated. They got into a
big conflict over there about it.
When the Polish Bishops last December sent a letter to the
German Bishops, there was a big flap over that. Why? Because
the government officials took the position that this was
interfering in politics.
There is a continual harassment operation going on, but the
church survives very well. It is the biggest church in Eastern
Europe.

DUPLICATIVE SERVICES

Senator Fulbright. There is one other thing. I did not get
your answer to Senator Mundt's question. Why can they not do
under the USIA whatever they are doing under IMB? The reason I
ask is that Senator Ellender in the Committee on Appropriations
had voted to stop the IMB. They have not voted to stop the
program under USIA for the supplying of books and magazines. In
fact, they make the point that you are duplicating--that the
USIA is authorized to do anything that the IMB can do. What is
the answer to that?
Ambassador Gronouski. Where do they duplicate? The IMB is
quite a different program.
Senator Fulbright. I know it is a different program, but it
is a matter of money that they are asking for now, for $10
million in a revolving fund. If you gave the USIA the
equivalent amount of money, why can they not do it?
Ambassador Gronouski. Because the Poles deal with the
publishers here. They buy the books for their normal
distribution channels. The USIA has no access to those channels
and could not possibly get access to those channels. We do not
act as a purchaser of books and put them in the stores and the
like.
Senator Mundt. You put out book programs in many instances.
Ambassador Gronouski. The Poles, I am sure----
Senator Fulbright. They buy books.
Senator Mundt. They have subscriptions.
Ambassador Gronouski. I am sure that the Poles would not
let the USIA operate in this way. It is one thing for the book
dealers to do it and the people in the theater to buy
playwrights, et cetera. They deal directly. And in what except
for the financial arrangements in a kind of commercial-like
deal.

GOVERNMENT VERSUS PRIVATE INDUSTRY

If the USIA came in and tried to replace this, you have the
United States government agency trying to dominate the reading
that is going on in Poland. The government would not buy it at
all. Yet we are getting the thing across.
Senator Fulbright. Offhand, since they do everything
through the government, they do not have private industry, why
do they prefer to do business with private companies here,
rather than the government? It has not occurred to me that it
was the real reason. Well, why, if that is the case, I do not
care about it.
Ambassador Gronouski. Also, if we did it we would have to
appropriate the money.
Senator Fulbright. We are appropriating the money anyway.
We are asking now to appropriate about $10 million in a
revolving fund to be kept at that level by an appropriation of
dollars. This figment that it is done otherwise is not going
down so well. It has not been accepted by the people. It is
just a dollar appropriation that they are asking for. Senator
Ellender appeared before the committee. He was very much
concerned about it. The committee has voted. Rather than
precipitate a big squabble about it, I wonder if it could not
be done in any other way. If you say it cannot, all right.
Ambassador Gronouski. I am sure that the program does not
operate in this kind of way, that is, if it does not, it will
not operate. The USIA will not be permitted to do it. I think
it is the better way, at least it gets them the books, their
plays in these various areas, developing the kind of contacts
with American publishers, American firms which, in the long
pull, may well have a real effect.
Senator Cooper. They buy direct?
Ambassador Gronouski. They buy direct. We give them the
outlets. The USIA people in Poland manage this program and
negotiate the areas in which they can buy. So it is in terms of
the broad outlook something that is done between the USIA and
the government, but in terms of the specifics it is done by the
people. There is a teacher who wants a planning book of the
United States, and we put in an order for it. It is a
diversified thing among all of the people who are involved in
this sort of thing. It is not shoved down their throats. They
get the book.
We are going to have a book fair going on at the end of
this month. There will be over fifteen publishers there to
display their books. They have these teachers come in and they
get ideas for textbooks.
The writers can see these novels and what-have-you. It is a
very diversified approach. I think it is the best approach.
Senator Fulbright. That was one thing. Does anyone wish to
proceed with this other matter?
Ambassador Gronouski. The chairman raised a question
earlier.

POLISH ROLE IN VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS

Senator Sparkman. Have you read Hightower's article?
Ambassador Gronouski. I have not read the other one.
Senator Sparkman. The letter in the New York Times takes a
different tack with this. I think the principal difference is
that it was on December 3rd and 4th--whereas Hightower does not
mention that.
Senator Fulbright. The main difference is that he mentions
the bombing on the 2nd and the 3rd--let me read----
Ambassador Gronouski. Actually, the bombing on the 3rd is
the question that was raised.
Let me get at the beginning of this. I was not involved in
all of the pieces of this whole Vietnam affair, but I think
that it is in December from the things that occurred.
The Lodge talks were in Saigon. I will tell you my
impressions of that. I think that the Secretary is going to
talk about this whole picture later in the week with you. I am
not competent to talk beyond what I participated in. By the
way, the Hightower story, except for a certain degree of
details, covers pretty well what happened.
Senator Fulbright. It is fairly accurate?
Ambassador Gronouski. It is fairly accurate. I quarrel with
the details, but in terms otherwise it is all right.
Essentially, I got into the act on a Saturday night, on
December 3rd, I believe, when I got a wire from the department
indicating that the Poles, Mr. Lewanowski and Mr. Lodge, had
been talking about a meeting on the 6th of December between the
North Vietnamese and a representative in Warsaw which would be
myself. It began, approximately, to talk about negotiations.
And they said that I should expect a call from the foreign
office. I did get a call on Monday morning and met with Mr.
Rapacki who is the Foreign Minister. In the meantime, I got a
whole lot of stuff briefing me on what the conversations had
been that had gone on in Saigon. Mr. Rapacki then simply
recounted to me the conversations that they thought had gone on
and raised two questions.

BOMBING OF HANOI

One, what we had said in Saigon were the basis that we
expected to draw the principles, the ten points that Lewanowski
had presented to Lodge, that is, when he came back from Hanoi.
We made the point that this, of course, is to have negotiations
until some of the points would have to be interpreted and
clarified.
Either that day or the next day, in talking about the
bombing, the bombing of Hanoi had occurred, and that Hanoi had
received a bad effect in the situation--at any rate, we talked
between the 3rd and the 4th, and after that we had a whole
series of talks up to the 10th or the 12th.
I think I satisfied them that the question of clarification
or interpretation was something that we always have to do--that
we tend to generalizations that would be interpreted
differently by any two people, and that we were entering it in
good faith and that, inevitably, I used the example from our
past conversations about it, I pointed out that the same thing
does not mean the same thing to people at any time. This is
what negotiations were all about, one of the things.
I was very disappointed during that period ten or twelve
days after the 3rd, because there seemed to be a kind of
feeling that we were going to have this meeting, and we had
many conversations about it, and yet nothing was materializing.
The body had not been produced. And the bombing had not been
reduced.
Each time I tried to pin them down, ``If there are any
problems, we can start talking about them. And you and I can
never solve this in doing this.'' He put me off. And I so
reported to Washington.
Senator Symington. Who put you off?
Ambassador Gronouski. Rapacki. I could never get him pinned
down.
Senator Mundt. For what reason--what did he say?
Ambassador Gronouski. He mentioned the bombing
clarification. At one point he seemed to be resolved with the
clarification and that there was no bombing going on. He
probably thought that was not the problem at that time, at any
rate.
He had made the point very strongly that we ought to be
very careful on the bombing at this time--Hanoi gets very
nervous and is not likely to look upon this as conducive to
carrying this out, or the talks.
There was a period after that when we had--I do not know
how many conversations, but I am sure it was at least one a
day--we almost lived together--and I kept trying to pin him
down. I tried to get him to say, ``What has Hanoi said?'' I
could never get him to say it. He is a diplomatic artist. I
like him. But doggone, I never could get him pinned down. He is
an expert in circumlocution. You never quit or you never walk
away saying, ``He answered my question.'' He is very, very
adroit.
At any rate, this went on until the 13th. Of course, the
bombing happened on the 13th which resulted in him calling me
the next day and saying, ``This breaks off our conversations.''

POLES WERE TALKING WITH THE VIETNAMESE

Of course, we have not been very close to him up to then. I
could not get to him. I kept wanting to know, for instance,
``Just what is Hanoi saying so that maybe I can interpret it to
my government and maybe we can get a better answer.''
He was never where he would tell me, or what Hanoi was
saying. He never did at any point in the whole conversation
tell me directly that he ever talked to Hanoi. I felt that he
was talking to Hanoi. I do not know it for a fact. It was very
difficult in this whole series of conversations.
I felt that he was talking to Hanoi. I felt that he was
trying to do something with the good-will. I could see a lot of
reasons why ending the Vietnam war was useful to the Poles in
terms of their own diplomatic position. They are really
concerned with Central Europe. They do not want the Soviet
Union distracted from Central Europe. They even want us
involved in Central Europe, really, when it comes right down to
it. They do not want this kind of distraction. During that
period of long meetings every day, from the 3rd to the 13th, I
was never successful in getting him pinned down on any one of
these various questions. He would allude to the attitudes of
Hanoi. He would allude to the possibilities of the meeting, but
I could not get him to say, ``Well, this is exactly what Hanoi
said. This is Hanoi's position.'' I could not get him, of
course, to produce the body. I pressed it very hard, because I
repeated many times that, ``If we are going to get moving, we
have got to get the ground work laid. Let us have one meeting
to see if it will work. What can we lose? We have gone this
far, let us move on.''
It never happened.
On the 14th he called me in and said that he would break--
that this was the last with Hanoi and the Poles agreed with
him. The situation was very bad.

TEN-MILE BOMBING LIMIT AROUND HANOI

Subsequently, after discussing it telegraphically with the
department--I did come home on December 23rd to discuss it; I
was here one day--I came back from Washington feeling that I
really needed to get this thing off dead center, because there
was this bombing of Hanoi where they lived that was continually
emphasized that I got from Rapacki. So I arrived in Warsaw at
six o'clock--that was in the evening--and got a meeting with
him at seven o'clock. I told him that afternoon or the
afternoon I had left, yes, that afternoon I had left
Washington--this was Christmas eve--that we had already put in
orders not to bomb within a ten-mile limit surrounding Hanoi.
We had a very good hour and a half discussion. I walked away
from that meeting thinking, ``We are on track.''
Senator Symington. Ten miles?
Ambassador Gronouski. Ten miles, circle.
Senator Cooper. A radius of ten miles?
Ambassador Gronouski. A ten-mile radius. I walked away from
that meeting feeling very good and so reported to Washington
that Rapacki made it very clear to me in many ways, including
the fact that he thanks me for going to Washington and
everything--he said, ``Now, this is really something I can go
to Hanoi with and talk to them about.''
I felt at the time that Rapacki was very optimistic, that
the thing was on the road; at least that was my impression--
that is what I reported back to Washington.
I did not hear anything until the 20th. That was when Mr.
Michalowski, who is going to be the Ambassador here and is very
much involved in the Vietnam question, called me and asked me
if it was statute or nautical miles. I told him nautical miles.
I think I felt that, ``We are now on the track.''
Then I waited until the 30th, I believe. I think it was the
30th of December when, at six o'clock in the evening, I was
called in by Rapacki. I never saw Rapacki and Lewanowski so
crestfallen in countenance as they were. They started out by
saying that the Polish government would have no alternative but
to withdraw from the discussion and expressed the thought,
perhaps, that this will be helpful anyway, in the future. But
he gave me the clear feeling that while they have felt that
this was an out, it was not. He also gave me some talk about if
we had done this on the 3rd, maybe it would have happened. I
felt that Rapacki was very much disappointed, that he had
thought that we had enough now to convince Hanoi. Publicly, you
will never get this out of them, but this was my genuine
feeling after I walked out of that meeting. I was crestfallen
myself.
Other things happened at this time that we do not know
about. I think that there was some contact in Moscow in this
period, but I only know this kind of second-hand. I did not get
any report on it.

POLISH SINCERITY

Senator Cooper. Can you give us any specific reasons why at
this time?
Ambassador Gronouski. He said that Hanoi just said stop.
Senator Cooper. He did not say why Hanoi asked him to stop?
Ambassador Gronouski. Except he did talk about the bombing
and the clarification situation.
Senator Symington. Do you think that he was insincere
anytime in negotiations, or he was trying to get us to stop the
bombing?
Ambassador Gronouski. I felt that there was a degree of
sincerity on the part of the Poles. These things are always
mixed. They are not with us, either, you know. I thought that
there was a degree of sincerity by the Poles, but the Poles
probably had a very thin thread to rely on in their talks with
Hanoi and that there really was not--that they were better that
they were hoping that if they could get a good enough package
and nail this down well enough from the point of Hanoi, that
they had enough contact with Hanoi that they could convince
them to meet. I do not think they had it, but, again, you never
know. I have a feeling that the Poles were hopeful, but did not
have much to go on, but they were trying.
Senator Cooper. He had been to Hanoi?
Ambassador Gronouski. Who?
Senator Cooper. Lewanowski.
Ambassador Gronouski. He was the Commissioner. In fact, he
is just leaving there now. But Lewanowski back in the Harriman
days, in the bombing pause, Lewanowski was the foreign officer
who was delegated to the Vietnam situation, and he is going to
be the Ambassador here. He had gone to Hanoi for about
seventeen or eighteen days during the bombing pause. I was
convinced then that they were doing their damndest to talk
Hanoi into meeting with us. I do not know what this is worth,
but I met Lewanowski the day he came back, on a Saturday, and
the first thing he said to me, ``Goddamn those Chinese.''
Senator Cooper. What?
Ambassador Gronouski. Lewanowski.
Senator Sparkman. Go ahead.
Ambassador Gronouski. ``Goddamn those Chinese.''
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Rapacki did not go to Saigon.
Ambassador Gronouski. No, not at any time.
Senator Sparkman. Or his intermediary--it was the
commissioner?
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. All right. Do you have some more
questions?
Senator Cooper. I have some more questions, but I have to
leave.

A FORTUNATE APPOINTMENT

Senator Fulbright. Before I forget it, I just want to say
that everything that I have heard from the people, newspapers
and other places, it is to the fact that you have done a very
good job in Poland. One does not always have that opportunity
to say that. I want to compliment you on your work. It has been
a very fortunate appointment.
What you said earlier I thought was extremely good. At this
point I do not think there is much more that we can do, unless
you can read their minds.

VIETNAMESE IN WARSAW

So far as you know, there were never any representatives of
Hanoi in Warsaw during this time?
Ambassador Gronouski. The Ambassador was there all of the
time, the North Vietnamese Ambassador. The two ambassadors were
going to meet.
Senator Fulbright. Who was that?
Ambassador Gronouski. I cannot remember his name.
Senator Fulbright. That was the plan?
Ambassador Gronouski. That was the plan. I was standing in
the wings and he was, as I was.
Senator Fulbright. You never had met with him?
Ambassador Gronouski. I never have, no.
Senator Fulbright. You have never seen him?
Ambassador Gronouski. I have seen him at cocktail parties.
Senator Fulbright. But never officially?
Ambassador Gronouski. Never officially.
Senator Fulbright. The most surprising thing that I do not
understand is why they would have made the move. If I
understand it correctly, the Polish diplomat, Lewanowski, was
in Saigon together with, I believe, the French Ambassador.
Ambassador Gronouski. It was Orlando, the Italian.
Senator Fulbright. Orlando called and discussed this matter
with Lodge, is that it?
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. In fact, my recollection is that
Orlando really got Lodge and Lewanowski back together in June.
Senator Sparkman. You understand that the Polish gentleman
was a member of the Commission.
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes, of the Commission.

AMBASSADOR LODGE'S BLESSING

Senator Fulbright. And then as I understand it, if I do
correctly, Lodge gave his blessing and said to the Pole, ``Why,
yes, if you can do anything, do it. We would be interested.''
Is that about correct?
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes.
Senator Fulbright. Then he went to Hanoi?
Ambassador Gronouski. Prior to that Lodge explained in a
fairly long conversation what our attitudes were and answered a
lot of questions. I cannot remember the specifics of it now,
but it is the so-called ten points. Lodge did not present ten
points. He discussed them, but Lewanowski summarized these into
ten points. He went to Hanoi.
Senator Fulbright. He went to Hanoi?
Ambassador Gronouski. And talked to Hanoi, and came back
and told Lodge that there was a possibility of this meeting in
Warsaw.

NEGOTIATING A SECOND STAGE

Senator Fulbright. At that time they laid down those
conditions about stopping the bombing?
Ambassador Gronouski. No, no. One of the propositions of
the ten points which was appealing to both the Poles, and I
thought to Hanoi, too, was that there would be a two-stage
proposition, the A and the B stages.
The ``A'' stage would be to stop the bombing of Hanoi and,
consequently, in terms of face and all of that. And previous
commitments, statements that Hanoi had made this would happen
without any necessity of saying ``This is it.'' But in these
negotiations we were going to carry out in Warsaw, this two-
stage proposition would be developed where we would agree ahead
of time what this second stage would be which would be that
both sides would pull back, which was rather indeterminate. But
we would negotiate some way to indicate maybe two or three
weeks after the bombing stopped that something else would
happen and both sides would pull back.
The action that Hanoi made would be what we did with regard
to the bombing on the ground. I think this was the thing that
was very intriguing to the Poles. I thought it was a good
thing, because it would avoid Hanoi which has become so
committed to this. ``We will not do anything until the bombing
is stopped''--the bombing is stopped unilaterally and,
therefore, we have agreed to take these two steps. It was very
clearly pointed out to them that this would be a highly secret
thing and there would be no leaking of the proposition ahead of
time.
Senator Mundt. Was this bombing all over or what?
Ambassador Gronouski. The bombing of the North.
Senator Mundt. Rather than the ten-mile radius or all of
North Vietnam bombing?
Ambassador Gronouski. All bombing in the North.
Senator Sparkman. May I bring this up? I have to leave. In
your talks with the Chinese has this matter ever been
discussed? Have they ever thrown any light on this regarding
North Vietnam?
Ambassador Gronouski. The Chinese, unfortunately, I think
it is important to say, that they go on. I enjoy the talks; we
have good conversations with them. It is kind of fun for me,
but not much happens in these talks. They are even tougher than
Hanoi, because they say that all troops must leave before we
even start talking.
Senator Sparkman. I am sorry that I have to leave, but I
have a matter here that I have to attend to on the floor.
Ambassador Gronouski. I have enjoyed having met you.
Senator Sparkman. I join with the chairman in what he said
about the reports regarding your excellent work. Thank you very
much.
Ambassador Gronouski. Thank you.

WHY THE U.S. BOMBED HANOI

Senator Fulbright (presiding). One last point on the
meeting while you are on that point. Did Rapacki tell you,
after we had bombed Hanoi--was it on the 3rd or the 2nd--that
while there was no condition that we would stop bombing, they
certainly understood that it was not an escalation of the
bombing. Is that what he told you?
Ambassador Gronouski. That is right. He said that certainly
this is not going to do you any good in getting these
negotiations going, and----
Senator Fulbright. What did our government tell you? Why
did we bomb Hanoi at that time?
Ambassador Gronouski. Essentially that it was unrelated to
the peace talks; that this area had been bombed some time
before--I think it was back in April or May or June--somewhere
in there; that there was positively the pattern of bombing--it
has not gotten in there before--but it was certainly unrelated
to the peace talks; and also--or I may have interjected this
myself--I made the point that we must realize on both sides
that things are going on. The war still continues. Let us get
the meeting going and we can stop all of this very quickly,
because some were worried about that time that there was a
bridge blown up near Saigon. There was a bomb thrown into some
barracks or a theater or something. I said, ``This is something
that inevitably happens. The war is going on and both sides are
going to be irritated.'' There certainly was no attempt, no
notion that this was an attempt to throw cold water on the
negotiations. That is absolutely wrong. Let us get the meeting
on the 6th going and I am sure that we can in a day or two get
all of the bombing in North Vietnam stopped.

BOMBING UNRELATED TO NEGOTIATIONS

Senator Fulbright. When you say it was unrelated to it,
what that means is that our government did not do that
intentionally in order to stop the bombing talks, is that it?
Ambassador Gronouski. That is right. It was part of a
general military plan which had been in effect for some time,
because there was a suggestion raised--Rapacki made the point
that he felt personally that Johnson was very well intentioned
in this. He wondered if maybe some military commander did not
want the talks to go on, which was not the case, that this was
a target that had been put in the general plan for some time,
that this happened--conditions were right to bomb it at that
particular date.
Senator Fulbright. Was it on the 16th?
Ambassador Gronouski. On the 13th.
Senator Fulbright. The next bombing, that is the same
attitude?
Ambassador Gronouski. After that bombing it broke off the
talks with Rapacki.
Senator Fulbright. Our attitude was that that had no
relationship?
Ambassador Gronouski. That is right.
Senator Fulbright. That may or may not be hard to take.
They had no relationships to these two?
Ambassador Gronouski. I went back on my own at the 15th or
so to see Rapacki again and I told him that--Rapacki and I have
pretty good personal relationships--I told him that in every
kind of situation like this things are fouled up in the
process, but that they had no point--and I was in discussion
with Washington. I was hopeful that we could make some progress
along some of the lines that he suggested, to keep cool for a
while, and let us go back to this thing. Then I did get the
message from Washington very shortly thereafter indicating that
we would not bomb around Hanoi, but that we should get some
assurances from Hanoi that they would not be blowing up shops
in Saigon, so that the whole series of discussions thereafter--
we finally ended up, as I said, on the 22nd, when I was back
here the 23rd, unilaterally, which would not go beyond the----

INSTRUCTIONS FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT

Senator Fulbright. Did our government ever supply you with
any minimum or with any instructions as to what to talk about
in case you did have conversations?
Ambassador Gronouski. They supplied me with instructions on
several of the ten points in the event that we had the first
meeting, that I should discuss about four or five or ten points
and schedule further meetings. I did not have discussions
beyond that, but I had plenty to talk about the first several
meetings. There were about four points that they gave me, very
detailed run-down, for the clarification process. In that
Hightower story, there is a minor point, but when we talked--
every time we talked about interpretation and clarification I
made the point that this is what these meetings are all about,
to get them going and we will do it in the meeting. Hightower
seemed to think that we wanted to clarify it before the meeting
started, which is wrong. We were talking in terms of
clarification during the first meetings.

WORK DONE DURING BOMBING PAUSES

Senator Symington. I have seen some pictures of what has
happened in Hanoi and down through South Vietnam in the four
days of the holiday season which are the most outstanding
things that I have ever seen in my life.
Ambassador Gronouski. All of those ships.
Senator Symington. The way the steel mills, the pictures of
the steel mills show some of the new steel barges that they
have built, under construction--it was interesting to me that
in the last two days that they did nothing, just clean as the
day before they started the holiday. It showed that they made
all of that preparation. Possibly they are killing Marines
right now with the stuff that they brought down.
I do not agree with my colleagues that we ought to stop the
air bombing. If we hit them on their military targets that will
bring success to us. I have been there three times in eighteen
months and in my own opinion we are getting absolutely nowhere.
The slight military advantage that we may be getting, I think,
is more offset than what we are losing politically and
economically. The only chance we have is doing the same that so
many Americans want us to do or to stop doing. I want to be
very frank about it. That is my position.
What I would like to know from you is there anything that
would lead you to feel that there was any sincerity in the
North Vietnamese approach, or was there any approach to you. In
other words, that we merely stopped for four months because
they were looking for something or they were not?
Maybe that they thought that we cheated them, but we
stopped six times and nothing has ever come out of it. It gives
them a tremendous opportunity to resupply themselves which is
the guts of all good movements of armed forces.

WAS THE BOMBING A MISTAKE

Is there anything in your opinion that would lead you to
feel that a mistake was made to a point where we did bomb on
the 13th of December, or was it just the start of a charade, in
your opinion, from the beginning, without the Poles--I am not
talking about the Poles, I am just talking about Hanoi?
Ambassador Gronouski. I think that we have a period there
of 7 or 8 days where we had a very calm reasonable discussion
with Rapacki. I feel that during these 8 or 10 days he would
like to have gotten something going. I do not think that he
could.
Senator Symington. You think that extended back to Hanoi?
Ambassador Gronouski. I was the greatest wishful thinker in
the world. The hope was father to my thoughts. I thought that
maybe we had it. But two things make me think not.
In the first place, we had about 8 or 9 days before the
13th when something could and I thought should have happened.
There was not any bombing of Hanoi in this period, and it did
not happen.
I got all kinds of circumlocution on this.
The other thing is that I thought the two stage proposition
was a magnificent out for Hanoi where we would actually
unilaterally stop the bombing. Of course, there would be prior
agreements privately that something would happen in a couple or
three weeks, but it would happen on both sides. And, therefore,
that Hanoi would be off the hook in terms of reacting to the
stopping of the bombing and that business. It seems to me that
this should have been tremendously appealing. I felt it was
tremendously appealing to the Poles, but nothing happened.
So despite all of my wishes and hopes--and I will have to
admit that some of my telegrams were wishful thinking--I have
come to the conclusion that I really do not think that there
was a lot of sincerity from Hanoi's side. I think there was
less from Hanoi's side than the Poles hoped there was.
Senator Symington. That was the thrust of my question. Let
me ask you one more question.

MERITS OF ANOTHER BOMBING PAUSE

Senator Fulbright. Before you get off that. Does he think
anything can be done?
Senator Symington. I was going to ask that.
Senator Fulbright. Okay.
Senator Symington. From your standpoint, based on your
background, you know what this war is doing to the American
people--from the standpoint of our political conditions around
the world and our economy and from the standpoint of the
division in the country--I had a letter the other day from my
good friend General Gavin--I do not agree with some of his
thinking--in which he said that this country was more divided
than it has been since the Civil War. I think he is right from
what I get in my own State. In any case, I would like to ask of
you this question. Do you yourself feel that another bombing
pause voluntarily on our part would have some quid pro quo and
that it would be in the best interests of the United States?
Ambassador Gronouski. I have explored this over and over
again with the Poles.
Senator Symington. I ask with the greatest sincerity.
Ambassador Gronouski. I have told the Poles in the past
many times. I said, ``I cannot guarantee anything.'' I have
done this on my own. I have said, ``I cannot guarantee
anything, God knows I do not make foreign policy but, at least,
I can talk to people who do. And if you can give me an
indication of some reciprocal action that will be taken by
Hanoi, I think that I can get the bombing stopped in 24 hours.
And I, certainly, will get in an airplane and fly home and try
to convince the President. So give me some reaction--just give
me something to talk about.''
I said, ``There are all kind of pressures in the United
States on the President. There is some for stop and some for
continuing. Give me a little ammunition to support those who
want to stop it. Do you have the contacts with Hanoi--get
something from them.''

POLES CANNOT EXPLAIN HANOI'S POSITION

And it was disappointing. With regularity I would get the
reaction, ``We cannot do this--nothing will happen unless you
stop. We cannot tell you what will happen if you stop or if
anything will happen.''
I did get that. I had this statement from every level, from
Rapacki on down for at least 50 times since I have brought it
up since the time of the visit in last June. I have got nothing
to indicate that the Poles have any confidence in anything
happening. All they do is say, ``Nothing will happen unless you
do this,'' but they cannot throw in the other half of it and
they will not and they say it. My own feeling is that the best
of both worlds is represented by the A and B proposition in the
10 points. I hope sometime we can go into that.
Senator Symington. The only reason I asked the question, I
am a neophyte on this diplomatic proposition. The fight in the
air is the only thing that is hurting them. We are not doing
very well, because of the limitations on us--maybe that would
not do well even if we took the limitations off. My personal
impression is that they put in these tremendous concentrated
efforts to stop the air affair, because it is the only thing
that hurts them. They do not have very much respect for human
life, any more than for a dog--probably less than for a good
milk cow.
Ambassador Gronouski. We cannot get to an intermediary. I
have stayed awake nights thinking about it--why we cannot get
at least some indication on their part. I told Rapacki, ``Do
not tell me what Hanoi will do--give me something very specific
what you think Hanoi will do.''
Senator Symington. According to some good writers they are
trying to put us on the ground which I think would be
disastrous. Thank you very much.
Senator Fulbright. Senator Pell has some questions.
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION

There are just two questions. One, are you familiar with
the round robin letter sent about January 24 to----
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes.
Senator Pell. Are you familiar with the expression droit
reconnaitre, concerning its translation?
Ambassador Gronouski. I sure am, but I cannot remember what
the words are now.
Senator Pell. Droit reconnaitre. Now the question here is
as you know that the Vietnamese translation into English gave
the hard version of it, and they said that we must accept it.
We went back to Vietnam on that and said, ``Is this really what
you mean?'' Or, ``Do you mean the alternative? What do you
consider it to mean?''
Did it come to you in Warsaw?
Ambassador Gronouski. Rapacki raised that question. He
thought that there was a difference. We so reported it to
Washington. They checked it with the British. I do not know all
that went on here, but I do know that the British were asked to
investigate it. They investigated it with Moscow--that would be
the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow. I do not know where
else we might have checked. I know that there was a lot of
query about that. The answer we got which I went over Monday--
this was on Saturday--I went over Monday and talked to Rapacki
and I said, ``All of our indications are that this distinction
that you draw is not considered a distinction by the North
Vietnamese.''
Senator Pell. Did the North Vietnamese come back to you, to
Rapacki or to the Polish delegate in Hanoi, indicating that you
ought to consider it, that it would be acceptable?
Ambassador Gronouski. Nothing happened in Warsaw with the
North Vietnamese. Simply Rapacki expressing his own views.
Senator Pell. But it ought to be considered?
Ambassador Gronouski. We ought to look at this as the
softer one. I, frankly, do not think--I thought it was a
mountain made out of a mole hill. I do not think either
formulation--I mean, when you read the whole context of the
letter, I did not feel that it made that much difference in the
letter. Perhaps it did. So that we did investigate. I do not
know how far we went. I know from the British Ambassador who
was in Moscow at the time that he was the one who went to check
with the Ambassador--I know from him that he is the one that
called on the North Vietnamese late that Saturday night to find
out officially which interpretation was correct. And Grimelow,
who I regard as one of the most able British diplomats I have
met, reported back to London, which went to Washington. ``What
you have termed the hard language was the proper language to
use.''
Senator Pell. I am not sure that I would agree with you on
that, in this letter--that the single guiding point from the
American standpoint----
Ambassador Gronouski. There is another section in that
letter.
Do you have the whole letter there?
Senator Pell. Yes.
Ambassador Gronouski. There is another section to that
letter.
Senator Pell. I would like to put it into the record, if
you will permit it.
Senator Fulbright. Yes, you may do so. It will be made a
part of the record.
[A related document follows:]

A Probe for Peace That Failed

BY JOHN M. HIGHTOWER

Associated Press Staff Writer
For more than four months, from mid-December to late April,
President Johnson held U.S. bombers away from the North
Vietnamese capital of Hanoi in an effort to find out whether
President Ho Chi Minh would open secret peace talks or take
steps to scale down the war.
North Vietnam was informed of what Johnson was doing and
was invited to respond.
The story of what happened, beginning last November with a
Polish maneuver, now can be told as it is known in official
Washington. It has been pieced together in a weeks-long check
of various sources. It can be told now because the episode is
closed, although officials believe some of the work done may
contribute eventually to peace in Vietnam.
Through Polish and other diplomatic channels word was sent
to Hanoi last December that if Hanoi would take some parallel
step to de-escalate the fighting, the United States would be
prepared to make other moves, Hanoi, campaigning to halt all
bombing of North Vietnam, never accepted the offer.

STRUCK AGAIN 2 WEEKS AGO

The gambit thus failed and two weeks ago U.S. bombers
struck again inside the previously forbidden Hanoi circle--10
nautical miles from the center of the city.
The last previous time the bombs exploded so close to
Hanoi's center, it was during a peace probe initiated by
Poland. Polish diplomats claimed that that bombing, Dec. 13-14,
wrecked one of the most hopeful approaches to peace in the
recent history of the war. U.S. officials refute the claim, but
can't be sure.
Out of that failure, however, arose the four-month Hanoi
bomb limitation.
Events began with Januz Lewandowski, a Polish diplomat on
the International Control Commission in Vietnam.
Late last November Lewandowski went to Hanoi and spent 10
days talking with diplomats and North Vietnamese officials.
When he returned to Saigon about Dec. 1, he met secretly with
U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the Italian Embassy.

10 POINTS PROPOSED

Lewandowski told Lodge he believed North Vietnam was
prepared to open secret exploratory discussions with the United
States. He did not interpose the condition that the United
States would have to call off unconditionally the bombing of
the North.
The Polish diplomat gave Lodge a 10-point statement of
topics and principles for the proposed talks. The statement
constituted a Polish summary of what the United States would be
willing to talk about, presumably based on published
declarations and previous talks Lewandowski had with Lodge.
Lewandowski said the North Vietnamese were also willing to talk
about these points.
The 10 points covered such topics as halting hostilities,
the independence of South Vietnam, the principle of U.S.
willingness to withdraw its forces when that independence was
assured and the role of elections in organizing the government
in the South.
There was also provision for discussing Hanoi's terms for a
peaceful settlement as well as any other peace terms that might
be thrown into the talks.
President Johnson and his advisers, quickly notified by
Lodge, were interested in the possibility a serious opportunity
for negotiations might be at hand. Polish diplomats had already
told Americans they believed Hanoi was about ready to hold
secret exploratory talks even though the bombing continued.
President Johnson decided that with some clarification the
10-point statement could serve as a basis for talks with North
Vietnam.
In about 48 hours Rusk instructed Lodge to inform
Lewandowski that the United States was ready to talk and was
interested in clarification. He also told him the United States
was prepared to shift the contact to Warsaw and to meet there
with a representative from North Vietnam.
One point stated the United States would not insist that
North Vietnam acknowledge publicly the presence of its forces
in South Vietnam. The Johnson administration decided this
should be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to
be covered up for facesaving purposes, then the North
Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn from the south.''

GRONOUSKI MADE CHIEF CONTACT

Lewandowski was informed of this and other clarification
points. The others seemed mainly matters of wording. But this
one was obviously substantial.
In Warsaw, President Johnson's ambassador, John A.
Gronouski received instructions making him the U.S.
representative and briefing him on U.S.-Vietnamese policy.
Gronouski met with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki and
found Rapacki strenuously objected to any clarification on any
of the 10 points. Rapacki warned against wrecking the whole
action at the outset.
Between Polish and U.S. versions of the incident there is
some difference at this point. The Polish view has been
reported to be that the United States wanted to get its
clarification before the secret talks opened. The Washington
version is that the United States was making known its desire
for clarification in the talks.

RESISTANCE CAUSED CONCERN

Rapacki's strong resistance to the clarification proposal
caused some concern in Washington where officials were not sure
the Poles had any commitment from North Vietnam to go into the
talks. Some high officials here doubted that Rapacki was in
fact relaying U.S. views and readiness for talks to Hanoi.
So far as can be determined from responsible informants,
President Johnson sometime earlier approved air strikes close
in to Hanoi with raid and truck centers as targets. Generally
the United States had avoided strikes at the city.
Informants now say an important element in the
administration decision not to suspend the bombing plan was an
attack by Communist forces on Saigon's main airfield and an
unsuccessful try to blow up a major bridge in Saigon.
Officials said diplomats are always moving about on one
peace hope or another and that lack of a firm commitment for
talks also was influential in the bombing decision.

INFLUENCED BY BASIC STRATEGY

Furthermore, Johnson administration policymakers presumably
were influenced by their own basic strategy of keeping heavy
military pressure on North Vietnam.
Before any North Vietnamese representative showed up for
the meeting, U.S. planes carried out the Dec. 13-14 raids on
the outskirts of Hanoi. Some planes, at least, flew directly
over the heart of the city. Antiaircraft fire was heavy and
North Vietnamese fighters rose to the defense. Some explosives
fell in the city proper.
Thereupon, North Vietnam raised a protest--which stirred up
angry demonstrations in many countries--that the United States
had deliberately bombed the civilian population of Hanoi. U.S.
denials fell on skeptical ears and did little to quiet the
worldwide uproar.
hanoi no longer interested
It later became known in Washington that one or two planes had in
fact jettisoned their bombs over the city when they were attacked but
officials insisted heatedly that no civilian bombing was ever
deliberate.
Shortly after the Dec. 13-14 incident, Rapacki reportedly told the
United States that North Vietnam had made clear it no longer was
interested in the planned talks because of the bombing of Hanoi. Soon
afterward this Polish version of the collapse of the plan was made
public informally by diplomats of the United Nations.
U.S. officials publicly refuted the charge but privately said that
while the attack at Hanoi might have collapsed the Polish plan, it also
might have presented Hanoi or Warsaw with a convenient excuse for not
going through with it.
felt chances were over-rated
Some officials here felt the Warsaw government had overrated the
chances of Hanoi's agreeing to talk.
At that point President Johnson had two obvious interests so far as
further attacks on Hanoi were concerned. Assuming he still hoped the
Polish plan might work he needed to get it active again if possible. He
also needed to avoid fueling further worldwide indignation.
The United States sent word to Rapacki through Gronouski, according
to diplomatic sources, that it would not bomb inside the circle of 10
nautical miles around Hanoi and that this should get the Polish plan
back on the track. According to these sources, Rapacki went back to
Hanoi, but Hanoi said no.
Here again U.S. officials are skeptical that Warsaw ever had a firm
commitment or Hanoi a serious intention to open secret talks.
johnson sends new word
Johnson decided to make the Hanoi no-bomb ring something more than
simply an effort to revive the Polish plan. He sent word to North
Vietnam through various channels that the United States was not only
interested in opening peace talks but also was interested in practical
steps to scale down the war.
No responsive action was asked of the North Vietnamese. But they
were informed that if they wished to make any move in any area of the
war to curtail military operations, the United States would be alert
and responsive. U.S. officials say North Vietnam never picked up the
offer.
The Hanoi bomb limitation extended over the most intense period of
peace probing in which the United States had engaged since the long
bombing pause during the Christmas-New Year season of 1965-66.
There were truces at Christmas and New Year but the real focus of
peace hopes was toward the lunar new year holiday in February.
Beginning in January the United States sent four messages to Hanoi
containing peace proposals.
The climax came in early February when President Johnson personally
sent to Ho Chi Minh a letter making a new proposal for secret talks and
offering to halt all bombing of North Vietnam if Ho would stop
infiltration and military supplies from north to south.
The President's letter constituted a personal rejection of Ho's
demand for unconditional stoppage of the bombing. Ho, in reply, renewed
his call for an unconditional halt in the bombing of the north.
______

Effect of Bombings on Warsaw Talks

To the Editor:
The Washington news dispatch of John M. Hightower of the Associated
Press published May 9 throws new light on the events of last November
and December, when the United States and North Vietnam seemed the
closest yet to direct, secret negotiations.
I have also written about these events, on the basis of very well-
informed sources in and around the United Nations. However, in some
important respects the story I got is different from Mr. Hightower's.
There is agreement that on or about Dec. 1 Polish Ambassador Janusz
Lewandowski informed U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon that
Hanoi was ready to hold secret talks with the United States in Warsaw
without demanding prior cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. But
Hightower does not mention the bombings in the Hanoi area of Dec. 2 and
4, and leaves the impression that only the bombings of Hanoi on Dec.
13-14 caused the North Vietnamese to lose-interest in the talks.
major attacks
As I got the story, on Dec. 3 Lewandowski complained strongly to
Lodge about the bombing of Dec. 2, stating that although Hanoi would
talk while the bombing was going on, it would not accept escalation at
the same time. (The Times reported on Dec. 3: ``Waves of United States
fighter-bombers made their second closest strike to Hanoi. * * *'')
Lodge replied that such attacks were planned long in advance.
On Dec. 4 another major attack was made on the Hanoi area. During
this period the first talk between United States and North Vietnamese
representatives, which had been set for about Dec. 6, was postponed.
In Warsaw, in a series of talks between Polish Foreign Minister
Adam Rapacki and U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski, two main problems were
discussed: Hanoi's protests over the Dec. 2 and 4 bombings and
Washington's request for clarification of the tenpoint statement which
the Poles said Hanoi would accept as a basis for the U.S.--North
Vietnamese meetings.
Hightower's account indicated that only the latter problem was at
issue, and he reported, ``Officials commented that diplomats were
always involved in pursuing one peace hope or another and said that
lack of a firm commitment for talks also was influential in the
decision to go ahead with the bombing.''
But since, according to my information, Hanoi had agreed to talk
but was protesting against escalation, it is hard to believe the Dec.
13-14 bombing of Hanoi was not closely connected with the negotiations.
One can speculate that the bombing was carried out either deliberately
to disrupt the talks or to bring pressure on North Vietnam to accept
some pre-condition to the talks.
troops in south
The most important new element in Hightower's account was on the
nature of the clarification sought by the United States. He reported:
``One of the ten points provided that the United States would not
insist that North Vietnam acknowledge publicly the presence of its
forces in South Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this should
be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to be covered up
for facesaving purposes, then the North Vietnamese forces would be
withdrawn from the South.''
Such a ``clarification'' was in reality a demand that the North
Vietnamese cease aid to the Vietcong, without in any way limiting
United States action in the South. Thus it may well be that the Dec.
13-14 bombing of Hanoi was an effort to force North Vietnam to accept
this ``clarification.'' As of now, this seems the most logical
explanation of this strange episode.
Richard Hudson,
Editor, War/Peace Report, New York, May 10, 1967.

RECOGNITION OF THE NLF

Ambassador Gronouski. Where are we looking for this? I kind
of lost this a little bit.
Senator Pell. It is about the recognition of the National
Liberation Party.
Ambassador Gronouski. What was the other item?
Senator Pell. This is the hard line what was considered.
Ambassador Gronouski. That is the single guiding point in
that letter.
Senator Pell. Here is another one that ought to be
considered. My understanding was that Hanoi had come back and
said, ``We can take the soft translation'' or, maybe, in view
of the situation, we can take it either way you want--should we
not then have taken the softer one is what is really meant.
Ambassador Gronouski. The talks definitive on this, and
that is, to be able to do so, I would have to review my notes.
I do not have them here. They are in Warsaw. I, particularly,
the conversation that I had with Ambassador Brimelow, who was
the guy in London who actually went to call on him----
Senator Pell. He went to Hanoi?
Ambassador Gronouski. No, no, Brimelow was the Minister in
Moscow. He is now the Ambassador in Poland. I have gotten to
know him personally.
Senator Pell. Is he Polish or British?
Ambassador Gronouski. Brimelow is the man who will get his
instructions from London to talk to the Ambassador or the
Embassy in Moscow for clarification on that terminology. And my
recollection--and God knows it is a long time ago--but my
recollection is that Brimelow reported back that it was the
proper interpretation out of the Moscow Embassy of Hanoi. I do
not want to swear by that. I want to check on it first.

NO DIRECT QUERY TO HANOI

Senator Pell. Do you have any recollection that Rapacki
went out to check this out?
Ambassador Gronouski. No, I do not believe they did. After
the bombing resumed they asked us why didn't we ask Lewanowski
to do it, but they did not do it on their own hook.
Senator Pell. Right. So that there is no further light that
you can shed on this particular incident?
Ambassador Gronouski. No. I do not know what all went on
after I sent this telegram in on Rapacki asking us to consider
this.
Senator Pell. I sort of come back to this point, because
the information I had was a little different. I may be informed
incorrectly.
I had understood that a direct query went back to Hanoi.
Ambassador Gronouski. No. I remember very specifically that
after the whole thing was over and the bombing had been resumed
on Tuesday morning, I saw Rapacki, and he said--I must have
raised the question with what their people said, and he said,
``Why did you not ask us to ask them?''
Senator Pell. A good question. And to repeat the question
that you got out of Moscow, it was the hard line?
Ambassador Gronouski. I will check my records on that, if
you prefer.
Senator Pell. I am very much interested.
Ambassador Gronouski. I will send it back when I get back
to Warsaw--I will go through it and send it back to the
department. I cannot remember specifically now.
Senator Pell. It disturbs me, because we have had other
incidents where it seemed that if we wanted to follow the
softer interpretation it might have been different.

KEEPING CHINA OUT OF THE WAR

My other question is much more specific. What action do you
think it would take to bring the Chinese into the war in
Vietnam, in the light of your conversations?
Ambassador Gronouski. I frankly think that I am about--I do
not even feel embarrassed by saying I do not know, because I do
not think that anybody else knows. Certainly, there is nothing
in my conversations that I have had that would indicate either
that they would come in or not. They talk about that they will
support them all the way. I think it is really polemics.
Senator Pell. You have given them certain assurances which
they have you feel kept them out?
Ambassador Gronouski. Not as many as the newspapers say we
have. We have had no agreement with them over in Warsaw that
people talk about. I do not know anything about that. It must
have happened when I was not there.
Senator Pell. Would you hazard a guess that a land invasion
would bring them in--would you hazard such a guess?
Ambassador Gronouski. I believe that would be a calculated
risk. I would be worried about it.
Senator Pell. Do you think that complete annihilation of
Hanoi would bring them in?
Ambassador Gronouski. I do not want to guess on that.
I do not think that I have the basis for judging that. I
really do not know.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Ambassador Gronouski. I do get the notion that the land
invasion might bring them in.

NORTH VIETNAMESE INTEREST IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

Senator Fulbright. Do you get the notion that they do not
wish to make any compromise and that there is not much point in
having negotiations?
Ambassador Gronouski. I do not know. Let me tell you a
conversation that I had about two weeks ago with Lewanowski. I
went over and asked him to intercede on the prisoner business
when they were parading prisoners through their streets. They
have in the past interceded in time of trial. They agree with
us and flatly say that they agree with us, that Hanoi ought to
abide by the Geneva Convention, but this last time I talked to
him he said, ``Look, we would like to do it, but I cannot tell
you whether we will, because we have to judge whether we ought
to use our good offices with them for the purpose when there
might be a possibility that we can engage ourselves in a larger
question, which is resolving the war itself.''
The Poles are, interestingly enough, even after the two
times they have tried, last January and this December, they
have indicated that they have tried and nothing has happened.
They still leave open the door to participate as one does not
always know what they mean by the things, but, certainly, they
have given every impression to me that if they thought that
there was any possibility that they would be involved in this
again themselves.
Senator Fulbright. Did they give you the impression that
after the bombing on the 13th they would believe that North
Vietnam, that they, the Poles, would believe that North Vietnam
is not really interested in further efforts to negotiation
because they do not believe that the United States seriously
wishes to negotiate--that they only expect a surrender--is that
why they bomb?
Ambassador Gronouski. Well, I think that you will get--I do
get that line of thought from the Poles very often. I do not
think that they fully agree with it themselves, but I think
that in terms of their relationships with Hanoi they must
maintain their relationships in what they regard as necessary
in maintaining the credibility with them. I think that they
must go along a certain line. And I think that this line is one
that presents itself. I do not believe they feel it. I think
that the Poles do.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think that they do?
Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. I am absolutely certain.
Senator Pell. What about terms?
Ambassador Gronouski. Well, I think that is a little
uncertain because it seems to me that if we do not want to
negotiate entirely on their terms, as I said a little while
ago, I think that the proposals contained in the ten points are
a logical and reasonable approach to negotiation where we would
solve their problems with respect to a unilateral cessation of
bombing, but have an understanding earlier than that, that
something will happen later, after a time has passed. And when
you say on their terms, on our terms--I do not know any terms
that we can offer them, because I do not even know that we can
stop bombing as they ask for. And the Poles will not in any way
tell me that. This is what flusters me.
Senator Fulbright. Do you have anything further? We could
go on. There is much more to try to understand, although I
think that we would be rehashing it.
Thank you very much for coming here. I think that you have
done a good job with the Poles. It is too bad that we cannot do
something about Hanoi. Maybe we can.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

DISCUSSION REGARDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TESTIMONY

----------

Tuesday, May 16, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
Room S-116, the Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Gore, Church, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Williams, Mundt and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Holt of the
Committee staff.
[S. 1030, the Information Media Guaranty bill was again
reported.]
The Chairman. Any other votes?
I wanted to bring up another matter. I have already
explained to most of the people about Rusk withdrawing this
morning. He has offered to come back on Friday or Monday.
Monday is out because of a unanimous consent on another matter
of the Senator from Connecticut. I don't know about Friday. I
am a little inclined to feel he is so reluctant to come and so
on. What does the committee wish to do?
Senator McCarthy. Tell him to send up that tape recording.
The Chairman. This is perhaps the second or third time that
he has this year agreed to come and then very near the last
minute said he couldn't come for one reason or another of his
own choosing. So that is the situation. Is it the sense of the
committee that we will not urge him to come any more?
It is understood. I have written him a letter we would be
glad to hear him any time.
Senator Williams. Is that Secretary Rusk?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Williams. He is in another room along the corridor.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the Kennedy Round report.
The Chairman. The morning paper had a very thorough
briefing.
Senator McCarthy. The whole thing is of no consequence
anyway.
Senator Sparkman. Is this what he was going to talk to us
about?
The Chairman. No.
Senator McCarthy. He would rather talk about the Kennedy
Round.
Senator Sparkman. Was there a Kennedy Round discussion this
morning at 9:30?
Senator Hickenlooper. One at 9:30 and one at 10:30.

COMMUNICATION IS SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, for whatever it is worth, I
think the communication between this committee and the
Department of State is seriously impaired and I don't wish the
committee further demeaned. If the Secretary of State has
something which he wishes to communicate to us, let him request
a time when he can appear, at the pleasure of the committee.
The Chairman. Well, of course, I don't like this situation.
I suppose I or others may think it is due to my disagreement
with his policy, but I have tried not to go beyond that, and I
say as politely as Marcy knows how to write a letter for him to
come.
Senator Sparkman. Does that raise a question?
Senator McCarthy. Why don't you try Pat Holt on the next
letter? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. I really have and we have tried to give him
an opportunity and he has accepted it twice.
Senator Hickenlooper. Milrae [Jensen] writes pretty good
letters. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. He himself suggested today, in response to
another proposal that he made, he would be available today. We
said okay, and then he comes up--it disrupts our plans; you
can't schedule something else on it.

FOREIGN AID BILL

I wanted to bring up another question. We don't have much
left on our schedule except foreign aid. We will try to get
some--we hoped, I hoped, that the House would do something
about that bill. There was such a difference between the
House's idea and the administration that we hoped that the
committee, at least, would report a bill to see where we stood.
The staff wasn't a bit pleased with the complete rewrite of
this bill. They preferred the way the House has undertaken to
do it which is simply amending the existing bill.
In any case we will have that before us.

HEARINGS ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Now, about other hearings, if the Secretary isn't coming
what does the committee think about having some other hearings,
general hearings, on particularly the war and its implications,
the economic situation or anything else we would like.
Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, usually I agree with Albert. In
this case I think the issues are far too important for face and
dignity over what our function is, for those of us who disagree
with the Administration have even a greater responsibility to
be brainwashed. I really believe we should stay in
communication with him and ask him to come up as frequently as
he will and for us to say ``you are wrong''. But you have got
to ask him to change our mind if that is incorrect. I think we
should keep pressing the Secretary to show us where we are
wrong.
I would also like to suggest that as a committee, we now,
it seems to me, have become a majority of us where we disagree
with the course of the country, of the administration. Can't we
somehow coalesce this majority around a minimum point
expressing committee disapproval with the resolution, because I
think this would precipitate a real debate and might
precipitate an actual withholding of funds at some point.
Senator Hickenlooper. Which resolution is that?
Senator Pell. To come up with one which meets with the
approval of the majority of the committee expressing our
disapproval of Asia.
Senator Hickenlooper. You may have some difficulty with
that.
Senator Pell. But in the committee we would have a majority
to get it out and I think this would have an effect in holding
down policy. I may sound as if I am talking at odds to the
maximum exposure of the Administration, maximum brainwashing,
but we should in our own responsibility, and I also would like
to see us as a result of our exposure come out with a majority
positions, instead of this business of writing letters, round
robin letters, or taking individual positions. I think this
could have an effect on policy.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reply to that.
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Gore.

AN AFFRONT TO THE COMMITTEE

Senator Gore. I think Senator Pell has taken a view that
has much merit and ordinarily I certainly would agree with
that. But, frankly, it seems that the occurrence of today is an
affront to the committee, and I am not at all sure it isn't
intended to be an affront to the committee.
Senator Hickenlooper. I would have to.
Senator Gore. I beg your pardon?
Senator Hickenlooper. I would have to respectfully
disagree.
Senator Sparkman. So do I.
Senator Hickenlooper. I don't know anything about it. But
this review on the Kennedy Round was suddenly called. I assumed
it was called at the direction of the President who doesn't
brook any interference with his programs, and he has told the
entire cabinet to be there this morning for this review by the
Vice President. I am not supporting the Democratic party, don't
misunderstand me. But I think that probably that is what
happened, and I think Rusk was told to be there this morning as
Secretary of State in connection with the Kennedy Round
explanation to these people in Congress. I would guess that he
didn't have any choice nor did any of the rest of the cabinet
members. That would be my interpretation, Albert.
Senator Gore. I am not sure the President feels any more
kindly toward the committee than Secretary Rusk does.
Senator Hickenlooper. Then we might direct some of this
criticism at the President, too, but personally I just feel
that Rusk should not get the entire blame for this.

RUSK'S BUSY SCHEDULE

Senator Sparkman. I agree with Senator Hickenlooper. I
think we ought to keep this in mind. Secretary Rusk is probably
the busiest man in government. I don't see how the man lives
under the job that he has, and I think he has respect for this
committee. I think he has shown so in the past, and I don't
believe that he would have stayed away if he could have been
here.
The Chairman. It could be coincidence. I don't know why.
Really what puzzles me, Bourke, is the reason for this morning,
I mean this briefing, when everything, I think, that happened
you read in the morning paper. But that is neither here nor
there. I agree with Senator Pell's idea. I don't want to break
off this, if possible. If it is agreeable with the committee,
we will send word he will come on Friday. Will you all come on
Friday if he will come? I don't want to be the only one here.
Senator Hickenlooper. I have something set for Friday.
Senator Williams. I will tell you a simple solution off the
record.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. What do you think about it? You won't be here
Friday?
Senator Gore. I can't; I am sorry.
Senator Hickenlooper. I will be in town, but I have set it
for something else. I think it may be Friday afternoon that I
have set it. I leave the Capitol at 10 o'clock, and I won't be
back here until late in the afternoon.

ATTENDANCE OF SENATORS

Senator Church. I think one thing that Rusk objects to is
not coming to this committee and testifying, but as I have
understood him correctly in the past in conversations I have
had with him, he does resent coming to testify before this
committee and having only three or four Senators, and I can't
blame him. His time is very valuable and he doesn't reach us
because we don't show. I think that if we are going to put an
invitation over until Friday under circumstances which mean
that only four or five Senators are going to be here, we ought
not to do it. We ought to find a time when most of us are here.
The Chairman. He has made this point, and I think with some
justice.
Senator Sparkman. I agree with you and unless we can get a
fair attendance Friday, we ought not to have him.

REHASHING FAMILIAR POSITIONS

Senator McCarthy. I don't think we ought to invite him for
general briefings until he knows what his general position is,
and we know what his is, and he doesn't tell us anything that
he hasn't told the press. If we wait until we get specific
legislative material before us, then he could come up anyway
and give him something to talk about. We don't want to listen
to him and he doesn't want to talk to us.
Senator Church. He is going to rehash his position and is
so familiar with us and we are so familiar with him.
Senator Gore. I don't want to dismiss this situation this
morning quite so lightly. Maybe it is a coincidence, but
certainly with the whole cabinet there, the President must have
been advised that Secretary Rusk had an appointment before this
committee to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia. With war
clouds with China certainly looming, I don't know why a
briefing, why the whole cabinet must be at a briefing with
select members.

KENNEDY ROUND DISCUSSION

Senator Williams. Secretary Rusk was the only member of the
Cabinet at the meeting. Yes, I just left there.
The Chairman. You had been down there?
Senator Williams. He had some undersecretaries.
The Chairman. Was he telling you anything that wasn't in
the paper about the Kennedy Round?
Senator Williams. Yes, he did tell us this. He didn't know
what they had done and the paper indicated that they did.
Senator McCarthy. That is pretty helpful.
The Chairman. That is pretty frank.
Senator Williams. We couldn't get any information as to any
of the statistics----
Senator Gore. Was there any particular reason why this
briefing had to occur this morning on the date that he was
supposed to be at this committee. Was the information given to
you of that urgency?
Senator Williams. I agree with what Gene has just said
here. I think it is just a propaganda movement to have us all
around there and give the idea that they achieved something
great when in reality neither they nor any who attended the
meeting know what they have achieved yet.
The Chairman. This is a very frank statement which I think
is true.
Senator Williams. I was there and if they wanted me to tell
you what they achieved over there, I would know less than I did
before. I read the paper this morning and I think I learned
more than I did there.
Senator Sparkman. What did the corn and wheat people think?
Senator Hickenlooper. They don't know.
Senator Gore. Yet this is given priority over a scheduled
hearing before this committee on the question of war or peace.

VICE PRESIDENT SPONSORED THE MEETING

The Chairman. This is what irritated me, but I still think
there is a lot Mr. Pell has in his favor regardless of his
feelings about it, and I think you are both right in the sense
I don't think there is any justification for this reason that
has just been described that cancels this meeting here after
the long time we have had setting it and at his suggestion.
Senator Williams. Of course, the Vice President was the one
who sponsored the meeting and if he told the Secretary to be
there he would feel obligated to be here.
The Chairman. That is the only thing; they probably
overrode him. They said, ``This propaganda value is too great
and we can't let it not create the impression we did a great
thing.'' They may have overridden him.
Let me put it this way: There is a valid point not asking
him to come to three or four people and it does make him mad.
Shall I ask Mr. Marcy of the staff to poll the Senators and
unless at least 8 or 9 of them promise to be here on Friday, we
not ask him. Or shall we just drop it?
Senator McCarthy. Let it go for this week.
The Chairman. All right. Let it go.
How about some other hearings----

SCHEDULE OF FOREIGN AID BILL

Senator Church. When do we finish our hearings on foreign
aid, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Next week is going to be on Dodd and then
comes the Memorial Day. It will be right after Memorial Day.
Mr. Marcy. The House does not expect to finish the foreign
aid until about the middle of June.
The Chairman. But the committee will finish it.
Senator Church. Do we have to wait until the House
finishes?
The Chairman. No, we are not going to wait that long.
Senator Sparkman. We decided to wait until the committee
reports.
The Chairman. We decided to wait until the committee acted
because there was such a divergence between what the committee
over there had in mind and what the administration wanted.
Senator Church. My only question is because we usually
start too late and it goes too long.
The Chairman. It hasn't been because of our hearing, but it
has been over the controversy over our bill.
Senator Church. It has gotten to be quite late.
The Chairman. We have reported it far in advance of the
action on the floor, isn't that right, Mr. Marcy, practically
every year. We haven't been late on the completion of our
hearings and reporting it.
Then we will have those probably scheduled as soon as we
get back from Memorial Day, that is about the earliest time.
Next week is practically out because you know what the
situation is on the floor next week.
That is the only major legislation.

FURTHER HEARINGS ON VIETNAM

Is the committee interested in hearings with outsiders, any
further hearings particularly on Vietnam and also on the
economic situation and so on?
If we are going to have any more we ought to begin thinking
about them and have the staff contacting people. I personally
would like to have some further hearings. I would like to keep
some kind of discussion going. I am not at all satisfied with
what I read about the Administration's views about the war and
the statement that somebody just related if the Chinese
continue to be hard-nosed why we can't avoid confrontation. I
don't know what this means. It is in the nature of a threat, it
strikes me, and if the Secretary doesn't wish to come, I think
we ought to explore it with other people.
Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.

TAKING A POSITION ON ESCALATION

Senator Pell. I wondered what you would think or would it
have merit to have a couple of sessions in Executive Session
where we could coalesce. I realize it would not, as Senator
Hickenlooper suggested, it might well not go through. But
whether we could arrive at a committee majority position
obviously without regard to party lines, and whether a majority
of the committee really opposes escalation. I think it would
have a good effect on the country if the majority of the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate actually passed out a
resolution of that sort. It may be a rather difficult thing to
get out or it may be rather dangerous to the national interest.
I throw it out as an idea, knowing your views, and wondering
what you thought both in your responsibility as chairman of the
committee with the responsibility of the national interest and,
at the same time, with your own personal views with regard to
what is right.
The Chairman. Well, it is a very difficult matter. I have
thought about it a great deal. A resolution unless there is a
fairly good agreement on it, it strikes me, would not be of
much value, you know, if we just exhibited to be what we know
to be differences of view. If you think there is a formula that
you have in mind or could be developed, I would be glad to
explore it. I think it is our duty and I would like to perform
it as best I could to understand where we are going out there,
and to try to influence it if there is any view in the
committee. I have tried to do it as an individual and I would
also like to do it as a committee if there is any feeling in
the committee that it goes in one direction. If we are split
nine to ten----
Senator Church. That is the split.
The Chairman. It isn't going to be very impressive.
Mr. McCarthy. On what?
The Chairman. On a resolution or a statement.
Senator Pell. I am saying if we could come out with a
majority position opposing escalation. No more than that, but
something that would be a method of blowing a whistle on the
administration.
Senator Hickenlooper. Why don't we wait until Katzenbach
gets back from Africa? I don't know what he is doing over
there. But we had Soapy Williams over there.
Senator Williams. There is an idea if we got Soapy----
Senator McCarthy. That is my continent now, be careful.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hickenlooper. I am on that committee, too.
Senator McCarthy. Yes, but I am the chairman.
Senator Sparkman. I don't believe that this committee can
very well claim for itself the right to determination on the
power to determine the conduct of the war, and that is what it
amounts to. Furthermore, there are all kinds of definitions on
escalation, whether or not there should be more manpower,
whether there should be stepped up activities or not. Those are
military questions that I don't think we are qualified to pass
on. I can have my own individual opinion, but I certainly would
not want to feel that I was called on to set policy.

REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I wish to promote another great
debate, so I move that we adopt the Republican Policy Committee
statement as a policy statement of this committee.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On May 1, 1967 the Senate Republican Policy Committee staff
released a white paper on Vietnam that urged Republican senators,
before deciding to support or differ with the President's policies, to
question ``what precisely is our national interest in Thailand,
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos and to what further lengths are we prepared
to go in support of this interest?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chairman. Well now----
Senator Pell. I second that motion.
Senator McCarthy. Bourke, do you want to make a statement?
Senator Gore. I will write ``be it resolved'' at the
beginning.
Senator Williams. I will second that motion and I think it
is wonderful.
The Chairman. You second the motion that we adopt that as
the policy of this committee.
Senator Hickenlooper. There are no more copies available.
Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent
that the document be inserted in the record at this point.
Senator Hickenlooper. It is already in the Congressional
Record twice, once in the House and once in the Senate.
Senator Pell. I withdraw my request.
Senator McCarthy. I think it ought to be printed every week
so that people read it. Why take official action, maybe some
kind of a commendation.
The Chairman. Maybe you ought to put that as a motion of
commendation to be voted.
Senator McCarthy. To the authors.
Senator Gore. I will not press for a vote this morning.
Let's wait until the Secretary appears. May we have that the
pending business and let him testify.
Senator Church. Make that the pending business and he will
be up here very quickly.

EDUCATIONAL HEARINGS

The Chairman. Let me come back to this other question. I
think maybe what you have in mind may be premature. What I
would like, my own idea, would be to have some further
hearings. I have found them very educational both last year and
this year because we brought people that have spent their
lifetime studying these things, some of them did and others had
experience. At least it was educational for me. I would like to
put some others in along with the other hearings that we have.
About the only serious hearings on legislation are on foreign
aid and I would like to have some other hearings. What is the
feeling of the rest of the committee? Then after that, maybe,
if there is any coalescing of any views at all you might offer
some kind of a motion. That would be the idea of having the
hearings. If there is anything to come out of it it would be an
expression of opinion if the people succeeded in creating an
opinion.

A CHANGE IN OBJECTIVES

Senator Sparkman. Is there anything new and fresh available
or are we going to have just a rehash of the same thing? Won't
it be cumulative?
The Chairman. The developments there, I would say, are
fresh. I mean they are going on every day. The significance of
these statements of the executive, I think, ought to be
considered. I read them here and there and one reason I wanted
to have the Secretary here, I don't know that he would tell us,
was to find out if there is a change in their ultimate
objective there.
Senator Hickenlooper. Did you see that statement in the
speech in New York yesterday?
The Chairman. About the confrontation with China and we are
going to be there a very long time.
Senator Sparkman. Whose speech?
Senator Hickenlooper. Until the end of this century.
Wheeler and Rusk.
Senator Gore. I suggest we start with General Wheeler on a
matter of his own statement of what the policy is about.
The Chairman. John, it seems to me this thing is going
through a change in objectives. I don't think there is any
more----
Senator Sparkman. I think it is perfectly all right to
explore those, but I would hate to see a list of witnesses
brought in that would just say what the others said before, why
we are in there, how we happen to be in there. It would be a
mistake to be in there and we had to be in there and so on and
so forth. To discuss these things, fine.
The Chairman. Well, I think these demonstrations are
perfectly legal, except for those burnings and all that. The
demonstrations are a form of a substitute for the discussions
that ought to be going on before the committee and in the
Senate.
Now, the discussion yesterday, I thought, was useful. The
Senator from Kentucky raised a question and several chimed in
and I think this is all a good thing in our kind of government
to have a discussion going on about a matter which is as
dangerous as this is.
You say there is nothing fresh----
Senator Sparkman. No, I asked a question.
The Chairman. Another thing, you saw this morning, I think
it was this morning, they are now prophesying a $20,000,000,000
deficit.
Senator Gore. $24,000,000,000.
The Chairman. It wasn't, but a few weeks ago, two or three,
that Senator Stennis said he thought they had underestimated it
by $4 to $6,000,000,000,000, I believe, wasn't it, but this
thing, I don't know where I am. I think it is worthwhile giving
that some discussion.

MILITARIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Senator McCarthy. I think there are two things that are new
that we could get some testimony on. One is the militarization
of our foreign policy. This Wheeler thing, this is putting
everything in Vietnam under Westmoreland. There is the Kuss,
the arms sale philosophy going on saying if you don't have our
arms there and if you don't have us supplying the people who
are using our arms we lose our position in influence on the
policy of the country. I think this is an issue that ought to
be talked about publicly. It goes back to Eisenhower warning of
an industrial-military complex.
Senator Hickenlooper. I thought he was responsible for all
this.
Senator McCarthy. No, he warned us. And the only thing is,
I think we could hold some hearings and help educate ourselves
and the public.
The Chairman. I think such hearings along this line, while
they are not directly on foreign aid, they are related to it.
Senator McCarthy. That is right.
The Chairman. And they wouldn't be irrelevant to that even
though we wouldn't bill them as being just foreign aid. In
other words, the kind of policy you are talking about does have
a barge upon the size of the foreign aid program, particularly
in military assistance or support assistance.

CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SENATE

Senator McCarthy. The other thing is this whole conception,
even Senator Mansfield said it yesterday, the sole burden for
foreign policy is the President's. This is not true. I think we
ought to get somebody in talking about the constitutional
responsibility of the Senate, and the way in which you change
the procedure so this can have some influence on policy, not
after the Act, but in the process of policy formation. Get in
some of the constitutional experts, Richard Neustadt and these
people, and let's talk about it.
The Chairman. I think that is a good idea. I would like to.
I noticed that myself when he said it was the sole
responsibility.
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
The Chairman. Well, the Constitution doesn't quite read
that way.
Senator Hickenlooper. Who said that?
The Chairman. Mansfield on the floor yesterday.
Senator Sparkman. It is primarily his responsibility.
The Chairman. Mansfield said it was sole.

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY RUSK AND GENERAL WHEELER

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, in line with Gene's suggestion
I would like to read here what the Secretary is quoted as
having said. I do not know whether this is an accurate
quotation. If so, it would seem to be--to confirm the charges
of the enemies of this country that we are bent upon
imperialism. Let me read you: ``Rusk said it will be useful for
some time to come for American power to be able to control
every wave of the Pacific if necessary. If Communist China
stays militant and hard-nosed, he added, it is difficult to see
how a confrontation can be forever avoided.''
Wheeler was quoted as saying he finds the present situation
in Thailand which the United States is committed to defend
highly reminiscent of South Vietnam in 1960 and 61.
Here is another quote from Wheeler: ``We will be involved
out there to the end of this century.''

REQUIRE SECRETARY RUSK TO TESTIFY

When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of State make these kinds of statements publicly, it
is time for the committee to examine the policy. If the
Secretary wishes to appear then fine; if not, maybe we should
require his appearance.
The Chairman. We can't require it. However, if we started
to discuss these things in hearings, just along the line you
are saying, I think, are the only things that will cause them
to want to testify to give their views about it.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, I don't really understand the
question of protocol. If we really want the Secretary, why
don't we send for him. Don't we have that constitutional right?
Senator McCarthy. He doesn't have to come.
Senator Hickenlooper. I am not so sure about that.
Senator McCarthy. He has every right to say ``no,'' as the
President has.
Senator Pell. Certainly otherwise he has to come.
The Chairman. If that is what you mean, but ultimately he
can say, ``no.'' When you say can you compel him to go, that is
what I thought you said.
But I think those statements are ominous, they strike me as
being so. He makes those publicly, and this is what bothers me:
Why wouldn't he come before this committee and make them
publicly and explain just what he has in mind. He does it in
public in New York or he writes it in an article. But he does
not wish to come before this committee, as I read you the
letter he said, he wrote, because it involves specific
countries. Well, he talks about specific countries here in a
rather threatening way, I would say.

TESTIMONY ON THE ROLE OF THE SENATE

Before we get away from it, I think that question you
raised is extremely interesting and I would like to have two or
three experts on the question of the role of the Senate and
this committee in this area because I think it is confusing to
many people. Some people think we have a lot of authority, and
others think we don't have any at all, and I am not so sure
just how much we do have. I think it is primarily educational,
and on certain specific cases of treaties where you have a
specific thing, we have a power of obstruction which has been
demonstrated many times.
But to play a role in the formulation of policy is another
matter. I don't know how you can do it other than through
educating the public. That is, you can't make the President do
anything you want him to do.
Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, do you think we should be as
reluctant as we are, I probably sound naive in this thought,
but shouldn't we be more forthcoming in our own advice? It can
be taken or not. The function, our constitutional function is
advice, and yet as we know the other day in the question we
discussed about Hungary, the administration said ``don't give
us advice because the President will do just the opposite,''
and therefore we don't do it as a committee action. Shouldn't
we do this as a function?
The Chairman. What was that?
Senator Pell. It was whether we were trying to get a really
good man to go to Budapest, and they said if we do it as a body
that will make the President send somebody absolutely the
opposite.
Senator McCarthy. Get another lawyer from Dallas.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, we couldn't get many worse than
a lot we have got already in many places in the world.
The Chairman. Well now, let me bring this down, that what
you had in mind.
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
The Chairman. Some hearings on that. Does everybody agree
they would be interesting or at least a majority?
Senator Gore. I would.

COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

The Chairman. So we can give some guidance to the staff.
This will be over a considerable period, but they have to have
some guidance and I want some guidance myself.
In response to what you say, Senator Pell, I think it is
our duty, and that is why I make speeches and public
statements. The only reason I hesitate is because the committee
is so split. I am perfectly willing if the committee is
willing, if it can develop any statement that the committee
wishes to make, why, of course. I am assuming we agree, have to
agree with it if I am going to join in it and everybody else
has to. I am perfectly willing, there never has been a case, at
least on the part of the chairman, that I didn't think it was a
proper role. It simply was we couldn't play that role under
existing conditions because the committee is split wide open
and is unable to agree upon any statement I can think of.
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be
careful about not setting up a Committee for the Conduct of the
Civil War.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The controversial Joint Committee on Conduct of the War (1861-
1866) that scrutinized the Union army's tactics and second-guessed the
Lincoln administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chairman. I don't want to conduct the war. I think the
distinction is between conduct of the war and broad policy,
while it is hard to draw sometimes.
Senator Hickenlooper. I say we must be careful not to do
that.
The Chairman. I agree with that. The thing about the
conduct of the war, if he has got to have more men, I am not
about to say he shouldn't have more men. But I certainly think
it is my duty and opportunity to say I don't wish to be there
until the year 2,000, or that I don't think it ought to be
escalated, that I don't believe we ought to have a
confrontation with China. These are policy matters, I think. I
don't think we should press this to a point----

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

Senator Pell. Even more to the point, isn't it up to us
determine whether we have a true national interest
responsibility in Southeast Asia. I think we all would agree
probably on that.
The Chairman. Exactly.
The question raised in the report of the Policy Committee
is a darned good question. What is our national interest in
what we are doing?
Senator Sparkman. I think the first thing that I would like
to know, I don't like Wheeler's statement as it appears in the
press. I don't know what might have been wrapped around it. I
would like to know what his definition of involvement would be.
Certainly we shall continue to have an interest there, but I
would like to know what he meant by involvement.
Senator Gore. I agree, John, and you know I said I didn't
know whether they were quoted out of context or not, but these
are ominous statements.
Senator Sparkman. Standing alone.
The Chairman. Yes.
I think coming back to the Policy Committee report. I think
they really asked the crux of the matter: What is the national
interest of the United States in Vietnam?
Senator Gore. Maybe we should have a hearing on that.
The Chairman. I think we should. I thought of that when I
first read that. What is the national interest there?
Senator McCarthy. I think we ought to find out what it is
because if you are going to pledge the national interest that
is pretty serious, and the national honor.
The Chairman. And the national honor in support of it.
Well, the next two questions asked there are what is it and how
far are we prepared to go defending it?
Senator McCarthy. Once you put the national honor on the
scales you have to declare war to preserve it.

A HEALTHY NATIONAL DEBATE

The Chairman. I think it would be healthy to have a
discussion and a public debate about it. I think it might even
help some of the people demonstrating. If we had a discussion
it might clarify it.
Senator Hickenlooper. You can't help some of the people
demonstrating.
The Chairman. Well, some of them.
Senator Pell. Why couldn't we have a discussion in the
committee where we might find some would go one way or some
another.
The Chairman. Absolutely you could have it.
Senator Pell. But a committee with 16 of us you would be
sure that Senator Hickenlooper's ideas are not different from
some of my own.
The Chairman. He says he is bothered about Wheeler's
statement. Supposing we have Wheeler and he says, he backs up
along the line that we think he may have in mind, that he is
staying there, this is going to be a colony and so on. That
might influence a lot of people.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think we ought to ask Wheeler about
it, but I don't think we ought to put television cameras and
everything else and have a three ring circus about it and
confuse the public all over the place.
Senator Pell. What I am thinking about is 16 or 18 men on
problems we could take privately. Could we not come out with a
sensible point of view since we are all starting with the same
facts and have the national interest in mind?
Senator Hickenlooper. I think we ought to have them in
Executive Sessions.
The Chairman. I would be perfectly willing to make it in
executive. But he makes this statement publicly. It seems to me
if after having him in executive, well whatever your
understanding is, it ought to be publicly ceased because that
is one of the functions of the committee.
Senator Pell. These are two different thing. Wheeler's
statement is a public statement that should be answered
publicly. But what I am talking about is a private discussion
except the Senators arguing back and forth trying to convert
each other.
The Chairman. I would be delighted to have those exchanges
particularly when we have a full meeting here and they are very
useful and they can take place at any time the committee is
ready, willing and wants to.
Senator Pell. And we can get bodies.
The Chairman. If you get the bodies here. But I think those
questions raised are very important.

WAR HAS GROWN GRADUALLY

John, I think what has happened, at least from my point of
view, is this thing has grown so gradually that we never have
been able quite to get the full impact of where we are going.
Generally speaking, you don't oppose the hearings.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, if you are going to have some
Executive hearings first and then decide.
The Chairman. I didn't mean Wheeler. I mean on the matters
that Senator McCarthy suggested, on what our role is, and also
the broad policy with Wheeler. I am not insisting that Wheeler
be open, but I think at some point he ought to explain.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think Wheeler made the statement
and we ought to have him in Executive Session and see what he
meant by it.
Senator Sparkman. You said a while ago that you couldn't do
anything for these demonstrators and so forth. Chuck Percy told
me he was out in Berkeley last night and spoke to 5,000
students and he said they booed him time after time. Regardless
of what he said they booed him.
Senator McCarthy. I spoke at Berkeley six weeks ago and
didn't get booed. [Laughter.]
Senator Sparkman. You must be labeled; you had better look
out.
Senator Williams. They thought you were one of them.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sparkman. I go along with any hearings you want to
set up. I always believe in hearings.
The Chairman. I think discussion is healthy. Very often if
the people who are not in the Senate, if somebody is saying
what they think ought to be said, it is a safety valve. It is
part of our system.
Senator Sparkman. I think it would be well to start off
with Wheeler and in Executive Session.
The Chairman. That is the new one.
Senator Sparkman. And, of course, we could talk with him
about escalation of the war.
The Chairman. I am embarrassed, not only with the
Secretary, I am embarrassed when we insist on someone coming
and then we only have four or five. It looks bad.
Anything else?
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon at 11:20 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, and Case.
Also present: Senator McGee.
The committee heard from Eugene Groves, president of the
National Student Association, and Richard Stearns,
International Affairs vice president, concerning National
Student Association ties with the Central Intelligence Agency.
[The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:35 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse, Aiken, Carlson, and Copper.
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs; accompanied by Charles R. Burrows, Country
Director, Central America; and Richard A. Frank, Assistant
Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs; testified on the
subject of the Swan Islands.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:05 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON DEPLOYMENT OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES AND NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY

----------

Thursday, May 18, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament of the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 8-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore and Cooper.
Also present: Mel Christopher, ACDA, Congressional Liaison,
and Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director, Science &
Technology Bureau.
Mr. Marcy of the committee staff.
Senator Gore. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Fisher, would you give us a report or bring us up to
date on two things: One, the status of communication in our
negotiation, if there has been some, with respect to the
deployment of antiballistic missiles; and second, the
nonproliferation conference that is underway.

STATEMENT OF ADRIAN S. FISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Fisher. Well, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the first,
the problem of the antiballistic missiles discussions,
following some presidential discussions Ambassador Thompson
presented, whether it was in the form of a working paper or
talking points I am not clear, but presented to the Soviet
Union at the end of March of this year, a suggestion that we
might want to begin talks dealing with the limitation on the
deployment of fixed ballistic missiles, offensive character,
and defensive missiles that had a substantial anti-ballistic
missile capability.
He indicated in this communication that what we were
thinking of was something that could be verified primarily by
unilateral intelligence. He indicated further that while we
were prepared to consider the mobile offensive missiles, that
raised verification problems that would have to be the subject
of the exploration.
He indicated further that whether what came out of this was
a formal treaty, a modus vivendi, just each taking action based
on what the other was doing, would depend on what discussions
took place, but at the moment it was purely exploratory.
In an explanatory instruction to Ambassador Thompson, it
was indicated that we thought it unlikely that the Soviets
would agree to the dismantling of their present system and that
he, Ambassador Thompson, should know that we maintained
flexibility as to whether we would want to have a limited
deployment.
Senator Gore. Was this said to the Soviets?
Mr. Fisher. It was not. This was just Ambassador Thompson--
what he had in the preliminary discussions, what he had in the
back of his own mind, whether we wanted to retain flexibility.

EMPHASIS ON LAUNCHERS RATHER THAN MISSILES

There was extensive consideration but no resolution going
into the problem as to what the various counters might be, as
to how you would deal with the problem of what we call MIRV,
the multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles, whether we
would or would not deal with maintaining an option to have a
light ABM system and a variety of things we have discussed
within the executive branch and reached no resolution on.
This was merely a request that talks take place on the
limitation of deployment of the offensive, fixed offensive,
missiles and defensive missiles with a substantial ABM
capability, relying on unilateral intelligence with an
indication that if some other way could be worked out to verify
it, we would be prepared to consider the mobile offensive as
well.
Would you care to--am I correct on it?
Mr. Scoville. The only point I might make, it was launchers
we were talking about rather than missiles.
Mr. Fisher. That is right. We emphasized launchers rather
than missiles because when one speaks of deployment, what you
are really aware of by our unilateral intelligence is the
launcher which is a rather complicated thing. The missile might
be in a warehouse or something else, and I stand corrected on
that.

SOVIETS STUDYING THE PROPOSAL

Now, there has been no answer to that. Once or twice,
Ambassador Thompson has said, ``What about it? When are you
going to answer this communication?''
The response has been, ``This is a very serious matter, and
we are studying it.''
One does not know--one cannot continue this, obviously,
forever, but this has been approximately two months since the
suggestion was made. It does seem at first blush like a fairly
longer period of time, but when I consider the amount of time
occasionally in the executive branch that people spend making
up their mind whether to make a proposition like this, two
months assumes a somewhat shorter look in that perspective.
Senator Gore. Have there been any questions for
clarification?
Mr. Fisher. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
Senator Gore. In other words, nothing has been said except,
``Thank you. We have received it.''
Mr. Fisher. Well, a little bit more: ``We are looking at
it, and we are studying it.''
Senator Gore. Well, tell us exactly what has been said in
regard to that?
Mr. Fisher. Just that, ``When can we expect an answer.'' I
cannot give you the precise date, it was three, four weeks ago,
and the reply was, ``This is a very serious matter, and we are
giving it very deep and intensive study.''
Senator Gore. You do not have the impression it is being
thrown down, shelved.
Mr. Fisher. No, sir. In the context of the way the Soviets
move, I think we ought to give them a little more time before
we decide that they are stalling because from their point of
view this is a very serious thing to undertake discussions of
this kind, and I think they might want to study it pretty
heavily.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TERMS

Senator Gore. Would you have anticipated that in the
ordinary course of consideration that by now there may have
been some questions as to meaning of certain terms?
Mr. Fisher. I would think the questions, since this was
very exploratory and merely suggested we start talking, if
there were to be questions, I think the questions would be,
``Send over your delegation and let's talk.''
I am frank to say, Mr. Chairman, that the initial
suggestion was for a discussion to begin sometime in April, I
forget the precise date. I think it was somewhere around the
middle of April. A date was given. That date has obviously
passed and the talks have not begun.
I would have expected about around now that they would have
said, ``If you want to talk about it, let's talk.''

FORMAL AGREEMENTS AND UNILATERAL DECISIONS

These talks are conceived of as leading to a variety of
possibilities. At one end of the spectrum would be some kind of
a formal agreement limiting deployment not just of ABM, but we
have never considered it except offensive and defensive linked
together and so have they. They have always made it clear that
any limitation on defense would have to be offered by a
limitation of defense.
On the other end of the spectrum would be each making its
own unilateral decisions with hopefully a somewhat better
understanding of what the other fellow was up to.
One of the things we would hope to discover in these talks
would be to persuade them that it is not in their national
interests to keep us in the dark as to what is the capability
of the so-called TALLIN System. If there is substantial doubt
as to whether or not it really is an ABM system, they should
know that we will probably have to react on the assumption that
it is.
Now, precisely how we would assume we could clarify our own
minds on this without having them think this is purely a
fishing expedition--as they would say, ``This is espionage''--
is one of the problems that will face the delegation if at some
unexpected date the reply comes: ``Send them over.''

NOT HEARTENED BY DEVELOPMENTS

Senator Gore. I know it is difficult and at best inexact to
use terms like ``encouragement'' and ``discouragement,'' and I
do not wish to have you take a hard and fast estimate one way
or the other. But I gather from what you say at least you are
not overly heartened by developments.
Mr. Fisher. Well, put it this way, Mr. Chairman, since the
middle of April has come and gone, I have not felt it necessary
to keep my suitcase packed. I would have hoped for some
reaction prior to this of a more definite nature, and we have
not gotten it.
Senator Gore. I guess the fact that it has not been thrown
down would lead to the conclusion that the door is open and
possibly that the matter is being considered. But there is not
much upon which we can base encouragement.
Mr. Fisher. Well, I find it hard to disagree with that,
sir, and my estimate of time has to be tempered by the fact
that the communication in March was not the first this has been
discussed. There had been some quite generalized discussions,
``should we talk about this general problem on a one-level
higher communication,'' that is a head of state communication
earlier. So this was not the first time they had thought about
it as the bolt out of the blue when Mr. Thompson talked with
them in March.
So it is hard to say whether you are encouraged or
discouraged, as you have indicated, sir. I would have hoped for
a response prior to this time.
Senator Gore. Senator Cooper.

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH SOVIETS

Senator Cooper. Have you had any experience in a similar
situation where proposals in this field have been made to the
Russians and you got no discussion at all?
Mr. Fisher. No, sir. The only similar proposal was the
limited test ban when it was proposed in August of '62.
Formerly, it was one of two alternates. Kuznetzev said, ``No,
absolutely no.'' He did not give it the silent treatment. He
just said, ``No, never, never, never.''
And then, well this was in August of '62, and in July of
'63 we were all sitting around in Moscow initialing just almost
the same document.
But usually their ability to turn quickly is not--if they
can turn quickly when they have said ``never.''
Senator Cooper. In that case, how long was it before the
Soviets indicated their willingness to talk?
Mr. Fisher. To talk on this subject?
Senator Cooper. Yes, the test ban.
Mr. Fisher. It was either late May or early June, 1963.
There had been active discussions of a comprehensive test ban
in the meantime and they had come to nothing.
There had been considerable senatorial discussion of the
test ban on a rather, not terribly--encouraging in the
comprehensive, but there had been an introduction of a
resolution dealing with the atmospheric test ban, and I think
they interpreted that perhaps as a signal.
Senator Cooper. The reason I ask this, it is not entirely
strange that you would not get an earlier answer.
Mr. Fisher. No, sir, it is not.

CONSIDERATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

Senator Cooper. Was it Kosygin who made a statement in
England or some place earlier in which he said he did not
consider a defensive system one which should be limited or
controlled?
Mr. Fisher. I am not sure whether Kosygin had said that.
Many Soviet political and military people have said that, and
in this context, in one of the previous exchanges, they have
said defensive systems should not be controlled alone--they
should be controlled only in connection with the control of
offensive systems. They hinted with something that was not in a
letter, but was accompanied by a personal statement of the
foreign minister when delivering a head of state letter, that
what they really meant was the abolition of all offensive
systems, but if we wanted to settle in the meantime for a
Gromyko umbrella, that might be all right too, and in that case
the defensive problem would cease to exist.
But they are traditionally--Dr. Scoville has followed this
longer than I have--but traditionally they have been defense
minded, and many of the intelligence community have many
statements of them of what is wrong with defense.
Senator Cooper. Senator Gore, do you remember that? I think
it was----
Senator Gore. Kosygin was quoted in London.
Mr. Scoville. Kosygin did say----
Senator Gore. Kosygin in London.
Mr. Scoville. I think the context was that he was defending
defensive systems and they wanted things to be planned by the
offensive.
Senator Gore. And he was drawing a distinction between
defensive and offensive.
Senator Cooper. Yes.

TWO INCREASINGLY NERVOUS SYSTEMS

Mr. Fisher. I am not sure that part of the discussion which
we had hoped take place--it is hard for me to see--I have not
explained it fully to my family yet--that defensive systems per
se are bad. It is what follows from them, that a decision to
deploy might lead to both sides reacting against that decision
to deploy and would end up with two increasingly nervous
systems, so to speak, against each other. Neither of us having
the defense but just all of us in a jumpier frame of mind and
another trigger of the arms race with all that would involve,
with the Europeans saying what about our ABM system. One would
hope that if the discussion ever were to get going, the full
implications of this kind would be explored.
I do not think you would ever get a Soviet to say there is
anything wrong with defense per se. In fact, I do not think
there is myself. It is what it leads to that is bad and also
the other things that might have to accompany it. You might
have a shield that you think is a shield but has got an awfully
lot of holes in it in the sort of sense of false security that
might be involved.

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Senator Gore. Will you go to the question of the
nonproliferation conference?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir, I can be quite brief on that.
You have a text in front of you, a text of a
nonproliferation treaty given the Soviets on April 25, 1967.
The Soviets have also given us a text that they gave to us in
Russian which is quite fair as we gave ours to them in English.
We just got our own translation of it a few days ago and we can
make that available to you.
[The documents referred to follow.]

Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the
Parties to the Treaty,
1. Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort
to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the
security of peoples,
2. Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would
seriously increase the danger of nuclear war,
3. In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention
of further dissemination of nuclear weapons,
4. Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear
activities,
5. Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-
products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the
development of nuclear-explosive devices, shall be available for
peaceful purposes to all States Parties to this Treaty, whether
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
6. Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties
are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation
with other States to, the further development of the application of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
7. Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions shall be available through
appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon Parties to
this Treaty, on a non-discriminatory basis,
8. Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,
9. Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this
objective,
10. Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the
strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the
elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of
their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control,
11. Noting that nothing in this treaty affects the right of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the
total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, Have
agreed as follows:
article i
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices,
either directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage,
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to produce or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.
article ii
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not
to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to
produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
article iii
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to
accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all
its peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party to this Treaty
further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or
specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use
of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable
material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless
such material and equipment are subject to such safeguards.
article iv
1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty.
The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository
Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty.
Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to
the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to
which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such
an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of
the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all
nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter
into force for all parties to the Treaty upon the deposit of
instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties to the
Treaty, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon
States Parties to this Treaty.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a
conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva,
Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a
view of ensuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are
being carried out.
article v
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State
that does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any
time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall
be deposited with the Governments of ___, which are hereby designated
the Depository Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all
nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty, and ___ Parties to this
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.
For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one
which has produced and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to the date this Treaty became open for
signature.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or accession.
5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit
of each instrument of ratification and instrument of accession, the
date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of
any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
article vi
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party to this Treaty shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides
that extra-ordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall
give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and
to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
article vii
This Treaty, the Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese
texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the
archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this
Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the
Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
In witness whereof, the undersigned duly appointed
Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done in ___ copies, at ___. on the ___ day of ___, 1967.

Text of Non Proliferation Treaty Given Soviets on April 25, 1967

(Revised Provisions Have Been Underscored)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to
as the Parties to the Treaty,
(1) Considering the devastation that would be visited upon
all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make
every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take
measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
(2) Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
(3) In conformity with resolutions of an agreement on the
prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
(4) Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the
application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on
peaceful nuclear activities,
(5) Expressing their support for research, development and
other efforts to further the application of the principle of
safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special
fissionable materials by use of instruments and other
techniques at certain strategic points,
(6) Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,
(7) Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment
of this objective,
(8) Desiring to further the easing of international tension
and the strengthening of trust between States, thus
facilitating the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear
weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
(9) Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of
any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to
assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories,
(10) Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear technology, including any technological
by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from
the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be
available for peaceful purposes to all Parties, whether
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
(11) Declaring their intention that potential benefits from
any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be
available through appropriate international procedures to non-
nuclear-weapon Parties on a non-discriminatory basis, and that
the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used
should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for
research and development,
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and
not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of providing assurance that source or
special fissionable material covered by this Article is not
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices:
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty
undertakes to have international safeguards meeting the
requirements of this Article on all source or special
fissionable materials for peaceful purposes within its
territory or under its jurisdiction. In cooperating with any
non-nuclear-weapon State with respect to peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction of
such State, each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide
(a) source or special fissionable material unless the
material shall be subject to such safeguards; or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material unless the special fissionable material shall be
subject to such safeguards;
2. After the original entry into force of this Treaty, each
non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has source
or special fissionable material subject to any international
safeguards system other than that of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and each other Party to the Treaty which is a
member of that Agency, undertakes to facilitate agreement, as
provided for in this Article, on verification by that Agency of
the effectiveness of the international safeguards system
applied to such material;
3. To meet the requirements of this Article, international
safeguards (a) shall be either those of the IAEA or such other
international safeguards generally consistent therewith as are
accepted by the IAEA under verification procedures mutually
agreed by the authorities of the IAEA and the authorities of
the other international safeguards system concerned, and (b)
shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three
years from the date of the original entry into force of this
Treaty;
4. Agreement on the implementation of IAEA verification of
another international safeguards system, as provided for in
this Article, shall be reached as soon as practicable but no
later than three years from the date of the original entry into
force of this Treaty; and
5. The international safeguards required by this Article
shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering
the economic or technological development of the Parties having
them. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the
Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, (i) to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic
development and social progress, (ii) to participate in the
safeguarded international exchange of nuclear material and
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear
material for peaceful purposes, and (iii) to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to
contribute alone or in cooperation with other states or
international organizations to, the further development of the
applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE IV

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this
Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted
to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one
third or more of the Parties, the Depository Governments shall
convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the
Parties, to consider such an amendment.
2. Amendments shall enter into force for each Party to the
Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each
remaining Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a
conference of Parties shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in
order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to
assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are
being realized.

ARTICLE V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature.
Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into
force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede
to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ____,
which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its
ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this
Treaty, and ____ other signatories to this Treaty, and the
deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes
of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of
this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature,
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and
the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference
or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party
shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give
notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the
Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and
acceding States.

MIRRORING CHANGES BY CONGRESS

Mr. Fisher. There are a series of standard conforming
changes and some things are in the preamble in one that are in
the articles in the other, but reduced to its essentials, they
are different in only two particulars. These two texts
represent--for their difference, what their similarity is. They
represent vast changes from the texts that were on the table at
Geneva when the Geneva Conference resumed, broke up, in August
of last year. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic
articles, 1 and 2, really mirror U.S. domestic legislation
under which the executive branch is committed by the Congress
not to give U.S. weapons to anybody or transfer control of them
to anybody, but keep them in our own hands. The Soviet language
on that is the same. We and the Soviets are not apart on the
basic obligations of the nuclear weapons states or--and this is
not in our full power to control--what we think the reciprocal
obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states ought to be.

VERSIONS OF EURATOM

Where we are apart are in two particulars, and I will deal
with the important one first. That is the article dealing with
safeguards, and you will find that on page 4 of the document in
front of you, going over to the top of page 7. We have a
provision under which we would propose that basically the
peaceful activities of the nonnuclear weapons states, and that
would include exports to them by the nuclear states, would be
safeguarded either by the IAEA or any other international
organization under arrangements agreed to with the IAEA as
being adequate verification.
Now stripped of diplomatic gobbledygook, this really means
Euratom, and it means also the possibility--it recognizes the
possibility that there might be mirror images of Euratom among
the Warsaw Pact countries who would play a role in----
Senator Gore. What do you mean, ``mirror images''?
Mr. Fisher. Well, the Warsaw Pact countries if they desired
would be able to create versions of Euratom.
Senator Gore. And it would be assigned----
Mr. Fisher. It would be assigned a role of verification
only if it could come to an agreement with the IAEA, the truly
international body, under which the IAEA with such inspection
as it felt was necessary and agreed to, which the organization
could accept as involving adequate verification.
Senator Gore. Would this contain assurances of safeguards
that the Iron Curtain counterpart to Euratom would have a
comparable competency and reliability?
Mr. Fisher. We would assume that the IAEA would not give it
its seal of approval, so to speak, unless it were satisfied
that it did.

A RECIPROCAL TYPE OF TREATY

Now, the reason I raise this mirror image point is not to
poke holes at a U.S. proposal, but this is a reciprocal type of
treaty in which we and the Soviets are jointly sponsoring it,
and we cannot say our regional organizations are good per se
and theirs are bad per se. We have to say that both of them
would, if they--we do not know that they would create one, but
if they were to--it would have to stand the test of acceptable
procedures agreed to by the IAEA, and three years to work those
out.
This is not as complicated as it sounds because the IAEA
does not verify any country without entering into a bilateral
arrangement with that country, and that would be the same even
say in the case of India or in the case of Peru or anybody
else. The IAEA does not have extraterritorial power to come in
Peru and say, ``Let's take a look at your reactors.''
Now, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a provision
that provides for IAEA safeguards on all the peaceful
activities of the non-nuclear weapons countries and on all
things exported by the nuclear weapons countries to any non-
nuclear weapons country whether or not party to the treaty.
But the only difference between us and the Soviets really
is that we have a provision under which the other international
organizations can play a role in the verification process if
they do so in a way which is satisfactory to the supervisory
body. This is not unrelated, although the responsibility for
this is on the executive branch. This is not unrelated to the
type of safeguards outlined in the speech by the chairman of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Pastore, a few
months ago.
Now, this is one difference.

MANNER OF AMENDING THE TREATY

There is one other difference, and this represents the
Soviet concept of the way the treaty is amended. The Soviet
treaty, and we initially concurred in this and we changed our
minds, we concurred in this on an ad referendum basis and
indicated second thoughts on it, as we reserved the right to do
since the negotiations are exploratory. It is based on the
Limited Test Ban Treaty which says if the three principal
powers--U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.--decide to amend the treaty,
and a majority of the parties, including those three, in
counting of a majority agree, the amendment is effective, bang,
that is all there is to it. No ands, ifs and buts.
Now, I would, Mr. Chairman, not be critical of that clause
in the Limited Test Ban Treaty for two reasons: One is, at the
risk of sounding vain, I helped negotiate it. But, secondly, it
fit the problem of the Test Ban Treaty which was primarily an
inhibition on the nuclear powers, and it made it possible for
those powers either to extend the treaty in some way or to
relax it as had been suggested in covering the peaceful
explorations if they agreed and could persuade enough countries
making up a total majority to go along. It is quite a different
problem when you are dealing with a treaty whose preliminary
impact is upon the non-nuclear weapons powers.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Mr. Fisher. And the non-nuclear weapons powers,
particularly those concerned that this treaty might in some way
affect their peaceful activity, say, ``Look, you can't possibly
expect us to sign a treaty in which the prime article affects
us. Then you, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom get
together and get a majority, and the nature of our obligations
has changed.''
And that seemed to us in the consultative process to be a
good, sensible approach.

MODELED ON OUTER SPACE TREATY

So we then are suggesting to the Soviets, and I think we
can work this one out--this should not be too hard--a treaty
language based on the outer space treaty which you will find on
page 7 of the material before you which says that amendments
enter into force on the basis of a majority, but are only
effective as to those who accept them.
So you cannot ram an amendment down anyone else's throat,
so to speak.
The Soviets have agreed to that in the outer space treaty.
The language is taken from the outer space treaty.
Now, so much for the areas of disagreement.
We have suggested, and have been over the last couple of
weeks on an exploratory basis and firmly recently, to the
Soviet Union that ``Let us table the articles on which we have
agreed and say that there are sections where we have not
agreed, and the two co-chairmen, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., are
negotiating out their differences.''

SOVIETS PREPARED TO REJECT LOOPHOLE

This morning at 10 o'clock Geneva time--which I regret to
report is 5 o'clock Washington time--and I am afraid I am
sufficiently far away from Shelby County so I am not used to
getting up at that time any more--the Soviets said that they
had no instructions authorizing them to proceed along this
line. So when the conference opened this afternoon at 3 o'clock
Geneva time, both the statements made by both parties were,
shall we say, somewhat general indicating that we are still
working on trying to get an acceptable treaty, and in a sense
stick with it. At 10 today we had to knock down, with a little
assistance from the Mexicans, a Brazilian proposal that they
should in no way be prevented from developing explosive devices
so long as they were solely peaceful, and the Soviets are with
us on this. They are prepared to say no.
Senator Gore. Good.
Mr. Fisher. For a long period they took the position that
since--they agreed with us that this would be a loophole, but
they were prepared to have us carrying the laboring oar in
saying so. Now they will say so in partnership, so to speak.
Their statement today was surprisingly mild. The usual
complimentary references to the Federal Republic of Germany--
surprisingly mild, sir, and although I think the general press
reports may be a disappointment, if one analyzes the problems
we are really very close to an agreement with the Soviets on
this.

PROBLEM OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS

Now, this does not mean that we have a generally acceptable
worldwide nonproliferation agreement since the agreement with
the Soviets on a joint table is merely another one of a series
of rivers that have to be crossed. The whole problem of dealing
with potential nuclear powers such as the Indians talking about
the peaceful nuclear explosions with the Brazilians, all those
have to be crossed still.
Senator Gore. As a matter of fact, they are the important
ones.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. After all, there is nothing to be signed
really from a purely bilateral treaty between the United States
and the U.S.S.R. We have got to get these. If nonproliferation
is effective, it must include these others.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Because it is they we wish not to
proliferate.
Mr. Fisher. That is correct, sir. So there still remains a
river to cross but I think we are very close to having crossed
this one, that is the one of a joint recommendation with the
Soviet Union. The differences between us are amazingly small.

FORESEEABLE DIFFICULTIES

There are two things: The role which regional organizations
have to play with respect to the Euratom--should they play any
role, even though Euratom has to be satisfied with what that
role may be? The Soviets say no; we say why should they not
play a role just like national systems play a role.
The second is what seems to me to be a cultural lag so far
as the mechanics for an amendment. I cannot imagine the latter
of any extended difficulty if we are this close. I can imagine
some problems with the former and we will have to see whether
we can reach a compromise, persuade the Soviets to accept IAEA
inspection or drop safeguards. Those are the alternatives we
have, and then we will have the problem of addressing the non-
nuclear countries. As you say, Mr. Chairman, that is by far the
most important of this task, but it is the earliest one to deal
with if you do it with the more or less united U.S.--U.S.S.R.
approach, particularly where the countries you are dealing with
are countries that maintain a policy of nonalignment and would
find it difficult to enter into any particular arrangements
with us that they would not enter into with the Soviets at the
present time. That is the present status, sir.
There are those who think that the failure of the Soviets
to have an answer to this problem may be due to broader based
differences with us. They may perhaps be assessing the whole
relationship with us or trying to give us that impression.

REFERENCE TO VIETNAM

Now, I cannot look into their minds, but I could only say
if that is the case, they have not advised Ambassador Roschin
to act that way because his statement today was within the four
walls of the treaty itself. There was a reference to Vietnam,
but a one-sentence statement that regrets that Vietnam might
have a harmful effect on this type of negotiation.
Compared to what is usually said on this subject, if they
are trying to give us any signal of broader basis there, they
have changed their method of signaling, because they are not
usually understaters on this sort of thing.

A RELAXED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

Senator Gore. How long do you think this conference will be
underway?
Mr. Fisher. Well, it is hard to say, sir. I would hope,
even though it may be frustrating, that we could stay with it
until August, until the end of August, and----
Senator Gore. Are meetings being held almost daily now?
Mr. Fisher. No, sir. It is now a somewhat more relaxed
schedule, and I say this with a modest amount of shame in the
face of one who used to write a speech a day. They are
primarily Tuesdays and Thursdays, with co-chairmen meetings in
between. But they are not being held almost daily. They are
held twice a week, and I think the prime subject is going to be
this: I would hope that the Soviets would agree to tabling the
treaty with the two disagreed sections left blank because we
have a great deal of work to do with respect to the non-nuclear
weapons states that are not related to those two sections. The
notion that we keep our tentative agreement purely a U.S.-
U.S.S.R., NATO-Warsaw Pact matter, and keep it secret--of
course it is not possible first--I mean this entire treaty has
been discussed in the North Atlantic Council. That means sooner
or later its contents are going to get out, and I would hope
that the Soviets would agree, we could persuade them, that it
was in the interests of getting on with it to table what we
have agreed to and continue private discussions on the two
unagreed articles. I think we should be able to settle the
amendments one on a fair basis. They have incidentally
indicated some give on the amendments clause, not in terms of
giving up their veto, but they say, ``Look, we do not mind
giving other people vetoes as long as we have got one ourselves
on amendments,'' and that might indicate they are going to come
off the test ban clause and come to some formulation that
amendments not affecting people that do not agree or some other
thing of that kind which I think should be negotiable.
Somehow with all the treaty technicians that this
government has got if we cannot tie up a decent amendment
clause, we ought to go back to the showers, so to speak; that
is, turn in our uniforms.
Now the question of IAEA, Euratom arrangements, is a little
bit different for one reason because of the deeply-held views
of some of our NATO allies.

NATO SUPPORT FOR TREATY

One final thing, Mr. Chairman, at least on this subject,
outside of any other questions you might have, there has been a
good deal of discussion about support of NATO for the treaty,
and I would like to say this proposal that we put to the
Soviets has been discussed exhaustively with our North Atlantic
Treaty allies, and a consensus that we should go ahead on this
basis was obtained quite freely as a result of these
discussions.
Now, there are varying degrees of enthusiasm. Strangely
enough, the one that is making--in NATO the one that seems to
be making the most ``why do you do this'' type noises is Italy,
and not the Federal Republic of Germany. We received a message
from the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany a
couple of days ago saying as far as he was concerned he was
satisfied with the method we were proceeding by, and he thought
we were taking his considerations adequately into account.
But we still have the nut we have to crack before a
complete treaty is arrived at: the IAEA regional arrangements.
But again--I am afraid I am repeating myself--we hope we
can persuade them to solve that by tabling the treaty without
that, while we work on it and then work with the Indians, the
Brazilians and others on these other large treaty issues at the
same time we and the Soviets work on their other.
Senator Gore. You have to cross this stream first and then
get to the more difficult one.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Thank you very much, Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND
VIETNAM

[Editor's Note.--In June, 1967 Israel won a six-day war against its
Arab neighbors, seizing the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the
Jordan River, and Syria's Golan Heights. The crisis started on May 5,
when El Fateh terrorist raids into its territory caused Israel to
threaten military retaliation against Syria, where the terrorists were
based. On May 14, Egyptian and Syrian troops began amassing on Israel's
borders. On May 19, the U.N. Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip withdrew
at Egypt's request, a move that Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
protested as increasing the danger of war. The U.N. Security Council
met in emergency session from May 24 to 30, but reached no decision
other than appealing to all sides for peace.
On June 5, Egypt, Jordan and Syria simultaneously launched military
attacks on Israel. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that
they fought to ``eliminate the shadow of Zionism from Palestine and
restore it to Arabism.'' However, Israel's ability to destroy the Arab
states' air forces permitted Israeli troops to win swift and sweeping
victories on the ground. Israel took the Gaza Strip and then the entire
Sinai Peninsula, the Jordanian portions of Jerusalem and other
territories on the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the high grounds
from which Syria had bombarded Israeli territory. Although the major
powers stayed out of the conflict, the United States supported Israel
while the Soviet Union sided with the Arab nations.]
----------

TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell,
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.
Also present: Senator Javits.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, and Mr.
Jones of the committee staff.
Mr. Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We will try to move along because the Secretary has a
luncheon with the President, and there are so many things
happening.
Mr. Secretary, I am very glad to have you with us this
morning. I want to, just for the record, put in the record an
exchange of letters with the Secretary regarding open hearings.
I still wish to urge once more on the Secretary that he try to
arrange for some open hearings on both what we are speaking
about today which, I assume, will be the Middle East primarily,
and Vietnam, not so much for the benefit of myself or the
committee, but to try to allay the difficulties and the
dissention or misunderstanding of the public, because I have to
spend lots of time trying to enlighten them, as I am sure you
do. But in any case I will put in the record, Mr. Reporter, an
exchange of letters with the Secretary.
Mr. Chairman. I will say the Secretary has said he has to
go to see the President. What time do you have to leave, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Rusk. Perhaps twenty minutes to one, that sort of
thing.
Mr. Chairman. Then at 12:30 we will want to adjourn, at
least 12:30.
Secretary Rusk. That will be fine.
Mr. Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. We have plenty to
talk about.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK SECRETARY OF STATE;
ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Secretary Rusk. Yes, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we do.
I would like to take up immediately the Near East situation
because that is in a very dangerous position, and I should go
into considerable detail here in executive session.
The present chapter really starts with a stepped-up series
of raids along the Israeli frontier primarily by the Fatah
organization, a terrorist group organized basically in Syria,
but these raids were also delivered across the Lebanese
territory into Jordanian boundary.
I might say that our information is that both Jordan and
Lebanon have taken very severe measures in an attempt to stop
these Fatah raids, but we cannot say the same thing about
Syria.
These raids themselves led Israel, the Israeli government,
to make a statement that if they continued Israel would take
action against Syria. That, in turn, stimulated the Syrians to
a high state of excitement and caused Nasser or, at least, was
the occasion for Nasser to move additional forces into the
Sinai Peninsula.
Normally he has about 30,000 troops in the Sinai area. At
the present time he probably has about 50,000 there, so he has
reinforced his troops and moved them forward up toward the
Israeli frontier.
That itself created a situation of tension because Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon called up their forces and alerted their
armed forces, and seemed to indicate that the Arabs would act
together if Israel attacked anyone of them.

NASSER DEMANDS WITHDRAWAL OF U.N. FORCES

The next step in the episode was Nasser's demand that the
United Nations Emergency Force withdraw from the Egyptian-
Israeli border. That force had been established, you will
recall, by action of the General Assembly. We ourselves have
supported it for a period of about ten years. Nasser based his
position on the notion that a sovereign country has the right
to require that foreign forces leave and that the United
Nations forces could not remain there without his consent, and
he was withdrawing his consent.
U Thant, acting on which he considered to be the authority
of the Secretary General, precipitately accepted this demand
from Nasser.
Senator Symington. What was that demand? I did not catch
that.
Secretary Rusk. That the United Nations Emergency Force
withdraw from Egyptian territory.
Now, we took strong exception to that. We did not think
that was a wise thing to do under those circumstances. We did
not think it was necessary for U Thant to move that rapidly.
We felt that he should have instead gone to the General
Assembly and, if not to the General Assembly, then at least to
the Security Council to refer that question to the Assembly or
the Council before he issued instructions to the United Nations
force to withdraw, and the situation on the ground was delicate
in the sense that the United Nations force was not capable of
fighting. It could not defend itself; it was lightly armed. It
did not have a mission of waging hostilities, so that there was
no question they could have been pushed out if Nasser decided
he was going to use his own armed forces to push them out or to
force them to concentrate in a particular area pending
evacuation.
Nevertheless, we thought that the General Assembly, at
least, could bring pressures to bear on the situation, could
use procedures such as sending a commission into the area which
would tend to put a poultice on the fever, and try to resolve
the matter without further inflammation.
Israel was, of course, very much disturbed by the action
taken by U Thant, and by the removal of the U.N. forces.

ISRAEL PROHIBITED U.N. FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY

You will recall that Israel has never permitted U.N. forces
on its own territory. It took that view back after Suez on the
ground that Israel was a sovereign state and that foreign
forces should not be permitted to locate themselves there. That
original position of Israel tended to strengthen Nasser's
argument that as a sovereign state he had the right to require
them to withdraw.
But we felt that U Thant's handling of it was much too
quick and inept, and that he would have been better advised to
take the matter up with one of the two constituted bodies of
the U.N. dealing with such questions.
The most recent development----
The Chairman. Were they there at the invitation of the
U.A.R.?
Secretary Rusk. By agreement with U.A.R., Hammarskjold-
Nasser agreement, in fact, worked out on the basis of a General
Assembly resolution.

A HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE STEP

Then yesterday, President Nasser was up in the Sinai making
a speech to his troops, and in his speech he declared that the
Strait of Tiran was being closed to ships carrying the Israeli
flag.
This is a highly provocative step because the support of
Aquaba is a major port for Israel; it is a principal supply
port. It is their principal contact with Africa and Asia.
It is a thriving city. Several hundred ships a year come in
there from all over the world, and Israel has made it known
privately that this was, and indeed in the Knesset just two
days ago, that this is a Casus Belli, that Israel would have to
resist this by force.
We are not completely sure that Nasser's speech to his
troops was a considered judgment of the Egyptian government as
such. It might have been, he might have been moved by the
occasion to go beyond what he might have done had he given it
more considered thought. But nonetheless he has done it, he has
said it, and this precipitates the issue in a very important
way.
Looking at the general situation there, it is our view that
no one of the governments involved there, with the possible
exception of Syria, seems to want a major military engagement.
We are not at all that certain today about Nasser because of
his action on the Strait which is, as I said, a very
provocative matter.
We are quite sure that Lebanon and Jordan do not want any
part of an engagement here, and it has been our view up until
last night that, on the whole, this situation could be kept
under control unless some major incident by irresponsible
elements triggered something which the governments could not
feel they could take or accept without some sort of counter
action. In other words, the situation was subject to action by
the Fatah organization or by elements of the Palestine
Liberation Army, who are present in such places as the Gaza
Strip.

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY

Shukairy, the head of the Palestine Liberation Army, has
been making very inflammatory speeches lately, and on one
occasion he had the Chinese Communist Ambassador with him, and
referred to him as being his companion.
Now, we have been in close touch with----
Senator Hickenlooper. Excuse me, where does the Palestine
Liberation Army get its supplies?
Senator Lausche. I did not hear your question, Bourke.
Senator Hickenlooper. I said where does the Palestinian
Army get its supplies and equipment?
Secretary Rusk. I would suppose primarily from Egypt.
Senator Mansfield. He said from China. How he gets it I do
not know.
Secretary Rusk. It may get it from China, but I would think
the small arms come from Egypt. They are not a heavily armed
group, but they could be a nuisance.
Senator Symington. Where are they located?
Secretary Rusk. Chiefly in the Gaza Strip. They are spread
among the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, Jordan and
Lebanon. We estimate there are about 8,000. But we have been in
touch with all of the governments concerned, including the
Soviet Union, Britain, France, the other members of the
Security Council, the states with troops in UNEF and, of
course, with Israel and Arab capitals in the area.

SOVIETS ARE TAKING A MODERATE VIEW

The Chairman. What response did you get from the Soviet
Union?
Secretary Rusk. There is a very great interest to us as to
the attitude of the Soviet Union.
The Chairman. What response did you get?
Secretary Rusk. I would have to say, Mr. Chairman, that in
their discussions with us they seemed to take a moderate view.
But two of the Arab states, Syria and Egypt, are saying that
they have been told by the Soviets that the Soviets would
support them against the imperialists. So now we are talking
with them further to date.
By the way, I hope we can keep some of these procedural
steps private because it could affect what happens on the other
end.
We are seeing the Russians again, both in New York and in
Moscow today. At the moment, the members of the Security
Council are meeting informally at the Danish Mission in New
York to consider the situation and the possibility of a
Security Council meeting perhaps later today or in the morning.
I think U Thant would prefer that the Security Council not
meet until he has had a chance to talk with Nasser. But the
situation is so inflammatory that it may be that the members of
the Security Council would feel that they ought to begin to
meet before U Thant gets back or before they hear from U Thant.
That is our own view, by the way, and I think the British and
Canadians feel that way, and I think some of the others are of
that inclination.

ISRAEL COULD TAKE CARE OF ITSELF

Senator Lausche. What is our government's appraisal of
Nasser's honest judgment in the matter?
Secretary Rusk. We have thought that he would realize,
unless he has some major secret weapon or military capacity of
which we are uninformed, that he would be in deep trouble at
least in the short run in an all-out engagement with Israel.
Our own estimate is that in a short engagement the Israelis
would take care of themselves very handily against the forces
that are now opposed to them, but we are not sure that Nasser
thinks that.
Senator Lausche. Up until now Nasser has been pictured as
not wanting to become involved, but probably being coerced by
the Syrians.
Secretary Rusk. I think there is a good deal to that,
Senator. I think that in terms of the Israel-Arab issue as such
over a period of time he has been one of the more moderate in
terms of wanting a military engagement. But, of course, he
probably also feels that with the challenge to Syria, which is
the way they interpret the Israeli statement that Israel would
attack Syria if these terrorist raids continued, he may feel
that his position as head of the Arab world, as he sees it, is
at stake here and that he would have to demonstrate that he is
prepared to make good on that Syria-Egyptian alliance.
The most immediate question, of course, is the Strait. My
guess is that Israel would use force to keep that Strait open,
and the international maritime countries will have to consider
among themselves what their attitude is toward it.
Our view has been all along, and this has been true since
the settlement of the Suez affair, that that Strait is
international waters, and that it should be opened to shipping
of all countries.

CONTACTS WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE

Senator Lausche. Secretary Rusk, I interrupted you. You
were talking about your contacts with the different nations at
this time.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. I do not think you finished your thought.
Secretary Rusk. I think that the British, for example, are
very much concerned about the use of force to close that
international waterway and, further, they feel themselves
committed to the support of Israel if there is a clear
aggression against Israel, working primarily, in the first
instance, through the United Nations.
France follows the same general policy, reflected in the
tripartite statement, although they prefer to deal with this
question not on a tripartite basis, hopefully on a
quadripartite basis, including the Soviet Union and the
Security Council. But in any event not restoring the tripartite
declaration of 1950.
I think at this point----
The Chairman. I did not get that last. What did you say?
Secretary Rusk. Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman, of what
the tripartite declaration of 1950 said:

The three governments, the United States, the U.K. and
France, take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest
and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance
of peace and stability in the area, and their unalterable
opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any
of the states in that area. The three governments, should they
find that any of these states, was preparing to violate
frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their
obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take
action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent
such violation.

MACMILLAN AND KENNEDY STATEMENTS

Now, just yesterday, George Brown said on television in
Britain that he felt that the tripartite declaration had been
substituted for by----
The Chairman. Substituted for by--what do you mean?
Secretary Rusk. By Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of
1963. In other words, that it had been replaced by Prime
Minister Macmillan's statement in 1963.
Senator Mansfield. Applicable just to the U.K. or to the
tripartite group?
Secretary Rusk. The U.K.'s participation in the tripartite
declaration had been overtaken by Prime Minister Macmillan's
declaration of 1963.
Senator McCarthy. Which said what, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rusk. That was based upon a May 8 statement by
President Kennedy. The question was:

Mr. President, do you consider the situation in the Middle
East, the balance of power there, to have been changed as a
result of recent developments, and what is the U.S. policy
towards the security of Israel and Jordan in case they are
threatened?

President Kennedy said:

I don't think that the balance of military power has been
changed in the Middle East in recent days. Obviously there are
political changes in the Middle East which still do not show a
precise pattern and on which we are unable to make any final
judgments. The United States supports social and economic and
political progress in the Middle East. We support the security
of both Israel and her neighbors. We seek to limit the Near
East arms race which obviously takes resources from an area
already poor, and puts them into an increasing race which does
not really bring any great security.

And this is his conclusion on that:

We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force
in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of
communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy
the independence of the people. This government has been and
remains strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of
force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or
preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we
would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt
other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop
to such aggression which, of course, has been the policy which
the United States has followed for some time.

Now, that was on the 8th of May. On the 14th of May Prime
Minister Macmillan was asked----
Senator Aiken. What year?
Secretary Rusk. 1963.
Prime Minister Macmillan was asked whether he will publicly
associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent officially
declared United States policy to the effect that, should Israel
or any of the Arab States appear to violate frontiers or
armistice lines, the United States of America would take
immediate action both within and outside the United States to
prevent such violation.
And the Prime Minister said:

Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the President's statement.
Her Majesty's Government is deeply interested in peace and
stability in this area, and is opposed to the use of force or
the threat of force there as elsewhere in the world. We are
equally opposed to the interference by any country in the
internal affairs of another whether by the encouragement of
subversion or by hostile propaganda. I cannot say in advance
what action we would take in a crisis since it is difficult to
foresee the exact circumstances which might arise. We regard
the United Nations as being primarily responsible for the
maintenance of peace in the area. If any threat to peace
arises, we will consult immediately with the United Nations,
and will take whatever action we feel may be required.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT NOT AN OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENT

Senator Lausche. How does that differ from the tripartite
agreement?
Secretary Rusk. In the first place, it would mean that
Britain and France do not look upon the tripartite declaration
as an organic three-power operational instrument at the present
time. After all, that came before the Suez, and there have been
some complications.
Senator Aiken. Do we?
Secretary Rusk. I beg your pardon?
Senator Aiken. Do we?
Secretary Rusk. I think again the policy which President
Kennedy announced or reaffirmed in May 1963 is, for all
practical purposes, identical with the policy of the tripartite
declaration:

In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression,
whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate
measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action
on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression
which, of course, has been the policy which the United States
has followed for some time.

A DECLARATION RATHER THAN A COMMITMENT

Senator Aiken. If one party of a tripartite understanding
disagrees with the other two, the one party goes ahead
representing the whole?
Secretary Rusk. I think the policy situation is that
France, Britain, and the United States have since the
tripartite declaration or since Suez reaffirmed the underlying
policy of the declaration. But I do not think that the British
and the French are prepared to operate on this policy simply as
a tripartite matter.
The Chairman. This morning's paper----
Senator Mansfield. It appears to me that a declaration is
quite different from a commitment, very different. I see no
commitment there. It is just a declaration of what might be
done.
Secretary Rusk. I think it was a declaration of policy, and
I think that is what I called it.
Secretary Mansfield. But no commitment.
Secretary Rusk. There was no treaty commitment.
Senator Clark. But you do not foresee the British or French
troops going in there, do you, under any circumstances? Maybe
U.N. That is pretty remote.
Secretary Rusk. This is a problem which everybody has got
to think hard about. It depends, of course, on the
circumstances and who does what to whom and how the matter
develops.

AN AGREEMENT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT

Senator Clark. Do you think there is any possibility of
persuading Israel not to attack Syria and to permit a U.N.
force to go back in the Gaza Strip, perhaps half on their side
or half--let me finish----
Secretary Rusk. Excuse me, Senator.
Senator Clark [continuing]. If Egypt would agree to leave
the Straits open? What, in your judgment, would be the Russian
reaction to something like that?
Secretary Rusk. I think if Egypt were to agree to leave the
Straits open, and Israel were to agree to accept U.N. or
international forces in Egypt, I think the Russians would
probably accept it.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, we have a meeting of the
Central Intelligence Agency committee, as you and Senator
Mansfield know, and I would like to get over there before the
meeting is over. I have questions I would like to ask as
chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over that area,
and I would like to request the regular order until the
Secretary finishes.
The Chairman. Maybe we had better. If the Secretary would
wind up his preliminary statement on this subject. Should we
proceed to questions after the Middle East and leave Vietnam
for later?
Senator Symington. I would hope so.

POSITIONS TAKEN BY AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

The Chairman. Do you have anything more to volunteer before
we have questions on the Middle East?
Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, I might say on what
has been said as a matter of policy since President Kennedy's
press conference of May 8, 1963, that President Johnson said in
a joint communique with Prime Minister Eshkol:

He (President Johnson) reiterated to Prime Minister Eshkol
U.S. support for the territorial integrity and political
independence for all countries in the Near East and emphasized
the firm opposition of the U.S. to aggression and the use of
force or the threat of force against any country.

Again, on August 2, 1966, he said:

As our beloved, great, late President John F. Kennedy said
on May 8, 1963, as a declaration of the leader of this country
and as spokesman for this land: `We support the security of
both Israel and her neighbors * * * We strongly oppose the use
of force or the threat of force in the Near East * * *
We subscribe to that policy.

So what I have read to you this morning has been the
essence of what the different Presidents have said.
I have some statements here that I could put into the
record, including President Truman's, President Eisenhower's,
during that period. But the most recent ones are the statements
by President Kennedy which President Johnson reaffirmed.

THE SITUATION COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL

I think the key question here for us to be thinking about,
and I do not come here today with recommendations on it but in
hopes that we can get some expressions of opinion in the
committee, as to what the attitude of the U.S. and other
countries in the West ought to be if there is a major onslaught
by the Arab countries against Israel. I mean, that is the most
serious contingency and one which we cannot completely brush
aside although, as I said earlier, some of you were not here
when I said it, I do not think that the governments of the
area, as governments, are particularly hankering for large-
scale military operations.
I have the impression they are prepared to have their
coattails pulled and held in position. But they are the victims
of possible incidents and emotions, and the situations could
move out of control.
I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to stop at this point because
I know members have comments or questions they might wish to
ask.
The Chairman. I think maybe we will move along on that. I
only have two or three questions.

GOING IT ALONE

I want to make it, I want to try to be very precise about
our policy with regard to this tripartite agreement. Would we
today enforce that if the British and the French are not
willing to, by our own forces? I want to ask later about the
U.N., but first on that subject, is this our policy?
Secretary Rusk. I would not be able to tell you what the
President's decision on that would be. You see, our policy has
been stated on the public record. We have spent all of our time
thus far urging calm upon everybody, Israel, the Arab States,
the Soviet Union, and have been working very strongly in the
Security Council--they are meeting now, as I told some of you
who were here earlier--in an informal meeting to take up this
question.
That is a question on which I am sure the President will be
in touch with the leadership if any decision had to be made on
that point. We are hoping to avoid that question if we possibly
can by holding the situation under control in the Near East.
The Chairman. Well, just as a comment, if we should
undertake to do that we would be hard put to find forces to go
it alone in this area at the present time, wouldn't we?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think the question of going it
alone would come up. My guess is that----
The Chairman. If it did.
Secretary Rusk. This would have to be a matter of general
action by a considerable number of countries, not ourselves.

THE NEED FOR INVOLVING THE U.N.

The Chairman. I do not want to take much time--I would like
to urge that here is a case that if ever the U.N. should be
brought in, this is it. It does not directly involve the major
countries. You intimated you would like some advice or at least
you would not resent any advice from this committee--that this
is an example of where you should go the limit in involving the
U.N. as far as you can.
Secretary Rusk. We would agree to that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All the way.
Secretary Rusk. I would say we do not know how much of a
need we have to lean on as far as the Secretary General is
concerned because he has not been very staunch in supporting
the position and the action of the U.N. in a number of these
situations.
The Chairman. Much more important, I think, are the
Russians, what their attitude would be.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
The Chairman. And I do not know what they replied to you
either. I imagine they would be willing if they get any kind of
consensus.
Secretary Rusk. Could I leave this off the tape, Mr.
Chairman?
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. Senator Mansfield?

AVOID UNILATERAL ACTION

Senator Mansfield. I am pleased with the reaction, Mr.
Secretary. I certainly hope that this country does not act
unilaterally in the Middle East. We have enough troubles in
Vietnam now, more than enough.
Is there an agreement between, a security arrangement
between France and Britain with Israel in addition to anything
you have mentioned so far?
Secretary Rusk. We do not know of any specific and direct
tripartite agreement between Britain, France, and Israel. It
might have come after the Suez affair. We just do not know of
one, if one exists. I would doubt it.
Senator Mansfield. I am pleased to note that you place the
emphasis on the U.N., and the U.N. is taking it up; that you
are carrying on conversations with the Soviet Union, and I
would place more credence in what you have been told than what
the Egyptian newspapers carried.

MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

What is the status of the Middle East resolution of 1961?
Secretary Rusk. That is so far as I know still law, but its
applicability here, I may have to say something different later
if we examine it further, but on the face of it, it would seem
that its applicability here is somewhat fuzzy because that
resolution was applied to countries under Communist domination.
Senator McCarthy. When you went into Lebanon there was no
Communist domination in there.
Secretary Rusk. That is right; in Lebanon and Jordan.
Senator Hickenlooper. Which Middle East resolution?
Senator McCarthy. The Eisenhower doctrine.
Senator Mansfield. 1961. The Middle East resolution.
Secretary Rusk. The Middle East resolution was under
President Eisenhower. That was the resolution on the basis of
the----
Senator Mansfield. I mean 1957.
Secretary Rusk. That was the resolution on the basis of
which we put some forces into Lebanon.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, if I can go on, and I am
just going to be brief. I would express the strong personal
feeling, and that is all I can express, that the President does
not act unilaterally in this area. Pressure is exerted on the
U.K. and the French, who have vital interests there in one form
or another, to take the lead outside the United Nations. We
should do all that we can to simmer this down because I think
that basically the statements made by Colonel Nasser are
provocative and inflammatory. Morally he is in the wrong, that
he made a mistake in requesting that the United Nations
Emergency Force be withdrawn from the Gaza Strip, and I would
hope that something could be done to bring about an accord on
the suggestion made by Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel to the
effect that they both withdraw their forces back----
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I cannot hear the Senator.
Senator Mansfield [continuing]. From a certain area from
the border.
The Chairman. Let us have order, please.
Senator Mansfield. The one thing I want to emphasize,
speaking personally, is I hope we do not become involved
unilaterally.
The Chairman. I want to associate myself with those
remarks.
Senator Morse. So do I.
The Chairman. Are you through?
Senator Mansfield. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Aiken?
Bourke, do you want to ask a question before you leave?
Senator Hickenlooper. I have to go to this other meeting.
The Chairman. Do you have any questions?

NO COURSE OF ACTION PRESENTED

Senator Aiken. What you have been suggesting, Mr.
Secretary, is a suggestion for unilateral action if it is
desirable?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir; I have not presented anything.
Senator Aiken. I missed the first ten minutes.
Secretary Rusk. I have not presented any course of action
this morning. I am consulting with the committee; trying to
bring the committee up to date on the situation; to give you a
feel of the various governments we are in touch with; to tell
you that this is being discussed right at the moment by the
members of the Security Council at an informal meeting; and
also to let you know that about an hour ago U Thant was
supposed to have arrived in Cairo to talk to Nasser, and we
feel that it would be useful to spread the situation out in as
much detail as possible and get the reactions of members of the
committee to it.

DISMAY OVER REMOVAL OF U.N. FORCES

Senator Aiken. Why was U Thant in such a hurry to get the
U.N. forces out of the area?
Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, we do not know. I think that
he was advised that as a legal matter----
Senator Gore. What was the question? I could not get that
question.
Secretary Rusk. The question was why was U Thant in such a
hurry to get the forces out.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. I expressed earlier our dismay that he did
act with such speed here. But I think he was advised as a legal
matter if Egypt wanted those forces out of Egypt they had a
right to request that they go out. They were the host country,
a sovereign country, and that these forces could be there only
with Egypt's consent.
Our view was this was action that should be taken by the
General Assembly. It was just not a unilateral action by Egypt.
Those forces are there by agreement with Egypt, and this
agreement should not be broken unilaterally by the country, the
host country, without full opportunity for the United Nations
to act on its side of the agreement.
Senator Aiken. It almost looks as if he had advance
information that this demand was going to be made.
Secretary Rusk. I would be inclined to doubt that, but I
cannot be sure of it; I could not be sure of it.
Senator Aiken. Or else he was a very fast thinker.
Secretary Rusk. I have the impression that his Soviet
Deputy strongly urged him to accede to Nasser's request
immediately.
Senator Aiken. The Soviets never did approve this
peacekeeping force there.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct. This is the only peace-
keeping force established by the Assembly. As you know, the
Soviets have taken a strong view in any event they should not
do this.
Senator Aiken. Yes, and Yugoslavia took the lead in asking
to have the force maintained.
Secretary Rusk. So did Canada.
Senator Aiken. Against the opposition of Russia.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Aiken. Yugoslavia and Canada.
Secretary Rusk. And Yugoslavia has some troops there as
part of the force.

IF ISRAEL SHOULD FALL

Senator Aiken. However, if Israel should fall, her entire
interests in the Middle East would be jeopardized, wouldn't
they, sir?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that the picture of the
Israelis being driven into the sea is a picture that I just
think people just cannot contemplate.
Senator Aiken. No.
Secretary Rusk. The whole world cannot contemplate that.
I agree with Senator Mansfield on the unilateral aspect of
this. But this is not a phenomenon that the world can sit for,
it seems to me.
Senator Aiken. You get any indication that France and
England would consider it their problem?
Secretary Rusk. We are in touch with them now. I can tell
you that their own views are pretty strong at the present time
on this matter. But I would not want to try to be precise about
it because we are talking further with them today, this
morning. There is a cabinet meeting in Britain going on, I
think, at the present time.
Senator Aiken. Strong in what direction, that they want to
put their own forces in there or they want the United States to
do that for them?
Secretary Rusk. No, this is a matter that everybody has to
be interested in.
Senator Aiken. You think they would be----
Secretary Rusk. I think the chances are that they would be,
but I do not want to speak for them on that point because our
own President has not fully been informed, and does not himself
have a conclusion to recommend to you at this time. This is an
opportunity for me to be able to reflect to the President at
lunch today the views expressed at this table by this
distinguished committee, and I would be very glad to have any
views anyone would wish to offer on this because this is on a
day-to-day basis, maybe even an hour-to-hour basis.
The Chairman. Senator Morse?

U THANT'S ACTIONS

Senator Morse. I will be very brief. I have three or four
very brief questions I want to get your comment on.
George's question covers the first one, as I was going to
bring up, but I wanted to expand a bit, and that deals with U
Thant's action.
I am at a complete loss to understand why he acted so
parentally. It is true it is a United Nations matter, but being
Secretary General does not relieve him of the responsibility on
this General assembly. Being Secretary General does not relieve
him of the responsibility and the obligation to move through
the General Assembly and seek advice from the General Assembly.
Furthermore, under the charter there not only is there
anything to prevent him, but I think clearly it was his
obligation when you have got a matter of war or peace at stake
to have sought advice from the Security Council, too.
I am at a loss to understand why he acted so parentorally.
Had he not done it, that would have given us more time, too,
and time is so important. Therefore, I think he has got to take
a long, hard look at the jurisdiction prerogatives of the
Secretary General because this is not the only time that U
Thant, in my judgment, has gone off, may I say politely, giving
the image he is the United Nations, when he is only, after all,
but a servant of the United Nations in this procedure.
Senator Lausche. I concur.
Senator Morse. And, therefore, I shall not be at all
surprised if you have got here a considerable amount of
influence from that Communist Deputy of his. I am not going to
take the time now, but I think you also have some of the same
influences involved in his attitude in Southeast Asia. I have
not shared the view that this man is impartial.

MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION AND SOVIET INTERVENTION

Now I come to the 1957 resolution which has been mentioned
here which says:
``Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the
national interest and world peace the preservation of the
independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.
To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof,
the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any
nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against
armed aggression from any country controlled by international
communism,'' as you pointed out, Mr. Secretary, ``Provided,
that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty
obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of
the United States.''
I think it takes that resolution out of the applicability
to the instant case, because you are not involved here, unless
Russia gets in, you are not involved here, in my judgment, with
the Communist aspect of the resolution.
Senator McCarthy. Will the Senator yield at this point? But
this was used for the Lebanon intervention, and there was no
threat of intervention of international communism there.
Senator Morse. I know. But I am only citing what the other
countries will say what the purpose was and what it was other
countries particularly approved of there.
But now I come, and you may have talked on it before I got
here, and if you did I am sorry to be redundant. You do not
know it, but I am in this very serious railroad emergency here
that somehow we still have got to face up to a lot faster than
we are facing up to it here on the Hill. That is why I was
late.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT INOPERATIVE

But am I correct in my recollection that Great Britain and
France and the United States have not a security pact but we
have an agreement among the three of us in which if there is a
threat of war in the Middle East we will act in concert against
the aggressor. Is there such a thing?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it would be saying too
much to say that Britain and France look upon the tripartite
declaration of 1950 as still being operative. As a matter of
fact, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain said on television
just last night that he thought that the tripartite declaration
had been supplanted by Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of
1963 which I read to the committee.
Senator Morse. Which I missed.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. May I see that?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Morse. There is no obligation on the part of France
or Great Britain to act in concert with us in case----
Secretary Rusk. Senator, let me say that the tripartite
declaration was a joint declaration of policy, as Senator
Mansfield pointed out.
Now, the question is does their policy remain approximately
the same. I think it is very important that matters of this
sort not be commented upon or quoted outside by anybody because
we are in a very delicate situation, and I do not want to speak
for other governments.
It is my present view that the policies of Britain and
France are in accord with the tripartite declaration of 1950;
that is, they consider this is a very serious matter.
As you know, France and Israel have had very close ties,
and Britain has given their support to Israel and is very much
concerned as a maritime power about the attempt to close the
Strait of Tiran leading to the Port of Aqaba. So I would have
to shade it a little because I cannot speak for either one of
those governments.
My impression is today, after a week of intensive
consultation, as a matter of policy they still are in the
framework of that policy which was announced in the tripartite
declaration.

NOT A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

Senator Morse. Do we consider we are under any
international understanding, obligation other than the
tripartite understanding of 1950 to help Israel or any Arab
state that might be attacked?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, if you could borrow from
Senator Lausche at some stage the statement in the press
conference made by President Kennedy in May 1963, he, as late
as 1963 reaffirmed the underlying policy of the tripartite
declaration, and President Johnson later referred to the May
press conference and said that he supports that policy.
Senator Morse. That was my understanding.
Secretary Rusk. For this is a matter of policy. It is not a
matter of treaty commitment. It is not a matter of contractual
obligation.
Senator Morse. It is not a treaty. It is really not a
matter of signed agreement either, going back to 1950, but it
was a restatement of a commitment there that linked with France
and Britain at that time.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. Wayne, would you yield so that I could
read into the record what the operative words are of the 1950
declaration?
Senator Morse. Yes.

Senator Lausche. The three governments, should they find
that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or
armistice lines, would consistently with their obligations as
members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both
within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such
violation.

What those words mean I will not try to interpret at this
time.
Senator Morse. That is what I am talking about, around this
question that I am asking, and I have got my answer that France
and Great Britain as of now apparently will not consider
themselves bound by the 1950 agreement, but we do not know.
Secretary Rusk. But seem to be pursuing the same attitude
or policy reflected in that agreement.
Senator Morse. That is right.
But as far as we are concerned, based upon the Kennedy
statement of 1963 and the subsequent Johnson statement, we
still consider that we have some obligation to try to get a war
stopped by some joint action on the part of England and France
if they would join us.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think it might be worth, since we
are putting certain things in the record--this is the mid-
fifties--President Eisenhower stated in a press conference:

I would recommend that the U.S. join in formal treaty
engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to
alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab
neighbors.

That is November 1955.
Then in January 1957 he said in a speech to Congress, in a
State of the Union Message:

We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to
the principle that force shall not be used internationally for
any aggressive purposes and that the integrity and independence
of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate.

A MORAL OBLIGATION

Senator McCarthy. Will the Senator yield at this one point?
I accept that we have a moral obligation and we have four or
five statements by a series of Presidents. But the only formal
obligation that you still think is our obligation is within the
United Nations.
Secretary Rusk. The general treaty obligations of the
United Nations Charter.
Senator McCarthy. No other treaties.
Secretary Rusk. Of course, they apply here, but no other
treaties apply to this problem.
Senator McCarthy. Just Presidential statements and the
Eisenhower doctrine which is our unilateral obligation, and
there is nothing left of the tripartite agreement except our
statement we would support it.
Secretary Rusk. And the enunciations of policies by what
amount to four Presidents.
Senator McCarthy. Yes.

CONVERSATIONS WITH GOLDA MEIR

Senator Morse. I will ask, Mr. Secretary, to be permitted
to make this statement. The last official contact I had with
the tripartite agreement was in December 1965 when, under the
President's request, I took my delegation home by way of
Israel. We had a series of conferences over there, and two of
those conferences were with Golda Meir. Frank will recall that
in our conference with Golda Meir, a very long conference, both
of them long conferences, we were talking about the criticisms
we were getting from Israel concerning military aid in the
Middle East.
She expressed quite a bit of concern, as I remember. It is
my recollection, I remember Frank Lausche said to her very
frankly--these were not his exact words, but I paraphrase him,
and I think he will agree, accurately, he said, ``Mrs. Meir, I
am at a little loss to understand your concern because you know
that you have our pledge that we will come to your assistance
if you are attacked.''
She said, ``Yes, Mr. Senator, I know.'' This, of course was
in reference to the tripartite agreement. She said, ``Yes, I
know,'' but, she said, ``I am not so sure that there would be
any Israel left by the time you came to our assistance.''
What Frank was talking about was we have taken this
position in the Middle East. We are not going to stand by if
either the Arab countries or Israel is attacked. Is that a fair
recollection of the conversation?
Senator Lausche. No. I think my point was, I said ``Why are
you complaining because our government has fully informed you
about the aid that we were then sending into Jordan at Eilat,
Aqaba, we were there, and it was said, `Look across the bay and
you will see ships unloading equipment.' ''
Well, I had been previously told that our government told
Israel that we were giving this aid and that Israel knew about
it, and the excuse for giving it was that unless we gave it
Russia would. I cannot confirm----
Senator Morse. I do not want to take the Secretary's time
other than in that conversation you were also--and I thought
you made a very good point--you also told her that you did not
see why she was so concerned because she knew that if a war did
break out that under existing international understandings that
we would come to her assistance in case they were attacked.
Senator Lausche. I do not think I went that far.
Senator Morse. She said, ``My concern there wouldn't be an
Israel left by the time the attack took place.''
Anyway, I will exonerate my friend from Ohio from being the
one that raised the point. I know the point was raised in the
discussion.
But my point is at that time she was then still foreign
minister. At that time she recognized, she thought they had an
understanding with us, and I think with Great Britain and
France, too, that we were not going to be letting her be
attacked, aggressed upon, but she was concerned with whether or
not we would get to their assistance fast enough. I just cite
that point.
The last point I wanted to ask you is, you know, that this
matter will be a matter of discussion all over the entire
Senate. Have you any advice to us as to how we can be of
greatest help to the State Department and to the White House in
any public discussions that may break out on the floor of the
Senate this afternoon?

U THANT NEEDS STIFFENING

Secretary Rusk. There is one point that occurs to me,
Senator, and that is to emphasize the responsibilities of the
United Nations for peacekeeping in this area, because U Thant
may need some stiffening on this point, and I may know before
the meeting is over whether they agreed to actually call a
formal meeting of the Security Council.
Mr. Macomber, would you be in touch with the office when
Ambassador Goldberg calls back?
So I would think that would be one point that could be very
helpful.
Secondly, general advice to all hands to keep calm in this
situation. You see, Israel is in a very, very difficult
geographic position, and Mrs. Meir's comment to you in that
conversation is relevant here. They are surrounded by Arab
States who declare periodically or publicly their hostility
towards Israel.
They have not got much wriggle room in there. Therefore,
they feel that they have got to bristle like a porcupine to
fend off these neighbors if anything ever starts, so they tend
to be a little jumpy. This is partly because of the military
problem of space.
We have urged them to be extremely cautious and patient
here in regard to these boundary incidents in this situation,
and that Israel make it quite clear that if anything happens
here it is not Israel's responsibility; that this is a clear
aggression from the outside.
Just yesterday the Prime Minister proposed that there be a
neutral withdrawal of forces between the Israel-Egyptian
frontier. That was a most sensible and sober suggestion to
make.

CLOSING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN

But again I am concerned about this morning, about the
effect on Israel by the announcement by Nasser that he was
closing the Straits of Tiran. That is an extremely serious
thing.
Senator Symington. Doing what?
Secretary Rusk. Closing the Straits of Tiran that lead up
to Aqaba. That is a very serious step, and we are concerned
about that.
Senator Morse. We have never said at any time that we
considered those international waters the closing of which
would involve our rights?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, we have said we consider them
international wars and that is our view on that. There are four
countries that were served by that Gulf of Aqaba.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I have two or three
questions.
Secretary Rusk. Excuse me, Senator, may I just read into
the record here a portion of an aide memoire handed by Mr.
Dulles to Prime Minister Eban:

With respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto--the
United States believes that the gulf comprehends international
waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and
innocent passage in the gulf and through the Straits giving
access thereto. We have in mind not only commercial uses but
the passage of the pilgrims on religious missions, which should
be fully respected.

So our view has been that the Gulf of Aqaba is
international waters and the passage through the Straits is an
international right.
Senator Symington. Do you want to read the next paragraph
in that statement?
Secretary Rusk. I do not have it with me.
Senator Symington. I will give it to you.

The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States
that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and
Senafir at the entrance at the Gulf of Aqaba was only to
protect the islands themselves against possible damage or
violation and that `this occupation being in no way conceived
in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through
the stretch of water separating these two islands from the
Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only
practical one, will remain free.
In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary
as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on
behalf of vessels of the United States registry, is prepared to
exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join
with others to secure general recognition of this right.

That sounds like a pretty firm commitment at that time----
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Symington [continuing]. By Mr. Dulles.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
Senator Symington. This is dated February 11, 1957.

NASSER'S THREATS TO THE U.N.

Senator Carlson. I have just two questions. The press
dispatches have carried the story that U Thant, the Secretary
General, was advised by Mr. Nasser that if he did not withdraw
the troops they were going to be disarmed. Does the State
Department have any views on that?
Secretary Rusk. We do not have the text of what Nasser
might have said to U Thant. At least, if so, they might have
escaped my attention. I think I probably would have seen them.
It would not surprise me if Nasser did say that.
Senator Carlson. I was going to ask if you do not think he
might have done that.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think it is possible.

BRITISH POSITION

Senator Carlson. Second, the last official statement we
have from Great Britain, outside of the statement by Mr. Brown
\1\ yesterday in London, would be the Macmillan statement of
1963 which you read into the record. I gathered from your
reading of that statement that they pretty much withdrew and
left it to ourselves, at least they were in position where they
could move either way based on the statement. What is your view
of that?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ British Foreign Secretary George Brown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, that it depends on what
weight you give to the opening words of Prime Minister
Macmillan's statement because it was based upon President
Kennedy's press conference statement. Senator Lausche, I
believe, has that exchange.
Senator Lausche. Yes, right here.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, sir. The Prime Minister began
his statement by saying--remember the question was ``Would you
publicly associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent
officially declared United States policy?'' That was referring
to President Kennedy's press conference statement. He said:
``Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the President's
statement.'' Then he goes on to put heavy emphasis on the
United Nations aspect on it. Then, of course, he said as far as
specific action was concerned that would require examination of
the situation at the time.

REASONABLE RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND ISRAEL

Senator Carlson. Are you implying this morning that our
nation does not have any formal obligation or commitment, but
merely implies these commitments are tripartite treaties we
have been into?
Secretary Rusk. We do not have a treaty obligation directly
except to the extent the United Nations Charter is applicable.
We do not have a specific treaty obligation.
Over the years I think that question has been raised from
time to time, but it was concluded that such a treaty would not
be in the interests of peace in the general area nor in our
interests because it was important for the West to be able to
have reasonable relations with both the Arabs and with Israel,
if possible.
Now, this is a policy question which was posed to four
Presidents, and it goes back to the day when the United States
played a major role in the creation of the State of Israel.

OPERATING FROM DAY TO DAY

Senator Carlson. Then we get to a place--and I think
everyone must be concerned about the unilateral agreements--
would you say that we do not have any unilateral agreements in
this field?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have some unilateral declarations
of policy by the Presidents.
Senator Carlson. And these policies imply a great deal more
than just what is in the written word.
Secretary Rusk. I think the statements stand by themselves.
I think they should not be looked upon as empty statements. I
think they do have some content. But how and when and in what
way we give effect to such a policy is something to be
considered in the circumstances.
Senator Carlson. In other words, we are operating right now
from day to day. Do you, as the State Department, have any
contingency plans? In other words, this situation to me based
on your statement this morning, is very critical. What are your
plans? Do you have plans that you could divulge as to what you
are going to do tomorrow?
Secretary Rusk. At present, quite frankly, no decisions
have been made about actions to be taken by, say U.S. forces.
But we have been consulting with all of the governments
involved in the area, in the Security Council, those with the
United Nations Emergency Force troops, the Soviet Union, and
specifically with the British and the French on the situation
and, of course, one has to think about various contingencies,
but no decisions have been made.
Senator Carlson. In other words, you are looking forward to
if one thing happens tomorrow, that you have something serious,
you would at least have in mind something you might be trying
to do?
Secretary Rusk. Well, yes, sir. But that depends upon what
happens tomorrow and what the President's judgment in
consultation with the leaders and others will be.

CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator Carlson. You mentioned consultation with the Soviet
Union. I think we all agree around the table that they, no
doubt, are deeply involved. They are practical international
politicians.
Have you analyzed what their stake would be, whether they
should be with us as a nation; whether they should stay with us
or go with the Far East internationally. Have you got any
thoughts on that?
Secretary Rusk. As to the Soviet Union?
Senator Carlson. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. I think before you came in, Senator, I said
that in our own consultations with them we get the impression
that they would like to moderate the situation, but we get a
different impression from Syria and from Cairo as to what the
Soviet attitude is.
Senator Carlson. They play both sides against the middle.
Secretary Rusk. So either the Arabs are overstating what
the Soviets have said or the Soviets are saying something
rather different to them than they are to us. But we are
talking further with them and we will try to clarify that
point.
Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Gore?
Senator Lausche?
Senator Lausche. Here is Senator Gore.
The Chairman. I thought you had gone.
Senator Gore. I changed my seat the better to hear what the
chairman was saying.
The Chairman. I looked down and I thought you were gone.

SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I share many of the feelings
expressed by members, but I would suggest there would be danger
in any equivocation on our part. I do not wish to elaborate
upon it except to say that because of the tripartite agreement,
because of the statements of the President, because of the
domestic political pressures in this country, the chances are
overwhelming that this country would not see Israel destroyed.
I doubt if it would be in the interests of our Executive to
leave any question about that open to conjecture. That is all I
wish to suggest.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Williams?

UNILATERAL ACTION

Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, in the event the worse
developed, and they did invade Israel, would we act
unilaterally or would we wait for the United Nations, insist
upon France and Great Britain joining us?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, you understand that this is the
most serious of all questions in this situation, and I am a
little reluctant to try to anticipate what the President would
feel we ought to do in a particular situation of that sort.
One thing that I can assure you of and that is that every
possible effort will be made to see that any action that is
taken or becomes necessary will be taken by a maximum number of
countries, and we fully supported what Senator Mansfield said
earlier about the very serious disabilities and difficulties of
unilateral action by us in this situation.
Senator Williams. That is all.
Secretary Rusk. There are a considerable number of--just to
illustrate the point, Senator, there are a considerable number
of maritime nations who have tremendous interests in the
principle of the international character of the Straits there,
the Straits of Tiran, and they certainly ought to be interested
in that if anybody is going to have to do anything about it.
Senator Williams. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche?

CREATION OF ISRAEL

Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I would like to set down in
chronological order the statements made by the Presidents and
Secretary Dulles, the resolution of 1957, so that the record
will show what has been done in the past with respect to this
problem.
It looks to me that the material that was discussed today,
attempting to show what our obligations are, begin with the
tripartite declaration regarding security in the Near East
dated May 25, 1950. Am I correct in that understanding?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, in order to complete
the record one would need to refer back to President Truman's
very strong role in assisting in the creation of the State of
Israel and certain things that he said at that time.
For example, in a speech at Madison Square Garden on
October 28, 1948----
Senator Lausche. October 28, 1948?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. What did Truman say?
Secretary Rusk.

I wish to speak now upon a subject that has been of great
interest to me as your President. It is the subject of Israel.
Now, this is a most important subject and must not be resolved
as a matter of politics during a political campaign. I have
refused consistently to play politics with that question. I
have refused--as a matter of fact, there was at that time
campaign sort of an agreement between the two sides to try to
keep this out. I have the impression it sort of broke out into
the campaign in the last few days, but I remember that very
well because Mr. Foster Dulles who was also involved in it on
the other side. But to resume:
I have refused, first, because it is my responsibility to
see that our policy in Israel fits in with our foreign policy
throughout the world; second, it is my desire to help build in
Palestine a strong, prosperous, free, and independent
democratic state. It must be large enough, free enough, and
strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure.

Now, there may have been other statements, but I think we
should refer to the Truman administration's role.
Senator Lausche. What is that date?
Secretary Rusk. October 28, 1948.

HIGH STATE OF TENSION

Senator Lausche. Well, then follows the tripartite
declaration of May 25, 1950, and at this point I want to read
into the record the substantive language embracing the
declaration of the three countries:

The three governments take this opportunity of declaring
their deep interest in and their desire to promote the
establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the
area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or
threat of force between any of the states in that area. The
three governments, should they find that any of the states was
preparing to violate the frontiers or armistice lines, would,
consistently with their obligations as members of the United
Nations, immediately take action, but within and outside the
United Nations, to prevent such violations.

What was the background with respect to which this
declaration was made?
Secretary Rusk. That had to do with the high state of
tension that existed with the state of Israel in relation to
its frontiers and the attempts by the Arabs to upset the de
facto frontiers that had been established at the time of the
creation of Israel.
Senator Lausche. I now go to the next item that has been
mentioned here this morning, and this is dated February 11,
1957. It is an aide memoire handed to Israel's Ambassador Abba
Eban by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
Secretrary Rusk. I think, sir, if you are establishing a
little chronology it might be useful to insert here a section
from a radio address by Secretary of State Dulles on June 1,
1953, in which he reaffirmed the tripartite declaration of
1950.
Senator Lausche. All right.

OCCUPATION OF TIRAN AND SENAFIR

I want to read here what material was already read:

The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States
that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and
Senafir at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba was only to
protect the islands themselves against possible damage or
violation and that this occupation being in no way conceived in
a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the
stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian
coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only
practical one, will remain free as in the past, in conformity
with international practice and recognized principles of the
law of nations.
In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary,
as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on
behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to
exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join
with others to secure general recognition of its right.

Are these two islands the ones that are now occupied by
Nasser to block ingress and egress?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. But, you see, the United Nations force
had a contingent of Swedes on the mainland just opposite the
straits in order to prevent the possibility that the Egyptians
might emplace artillery there and try to stop passage through
the Straits. That United Nations force has now been withdrawn.
Senator Lausche. Yes. All right.

THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

Now I get down to the Middle East resolution as amended,
which was passed on March 9, 1957. Am I correct that this
resolution, under date of March 9, 1957, follows all of the
other declarations and resolutions which we, you and I, have
thus far discussed?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. This particular one----
Senator Lausche. I think it does.
Secretary Rusk. This particular resolution was aimed at
aggression by countries under Communist domination.
Senator Lausche. That is correct.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. After the statements by Dulles, after the
tripartite declaration, after the statement by Truman, this
resolution was passed by the Congress of the United States.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And in this resolution of March 9, 1957 it
was stated, among other things:
``To this end, if the President determines the necessity
thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to
assist any nation or group of such nations requesting
assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled
by international communism,'' and the important aspect is to
assist against aggression by any country controlled by
international communism.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, Senator. But I think also
the introduction to what you have just read does contain a
declaration of a vital interest to the United States.
Senator Lausche. All right; okay. Let me put the whole
section in there.
Has there been any other action taken by the Congress of
the United States on this Middle East subject subsequent to
this resolution of March 9, 1957?
Secretary Rusk. Nothing comparable in terms of a specific
resolution that I am aware of, Senator.
Senator Lausche. So the last congressional declaration with
respect to the Middle East is this resolution of March 9, 1957?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. I would not want to overlook the
possibility that there is a good deal of preambular material in
other legislation that has a bearing on the issues that could
arise in the Near East, declarations----
Senator Lausche. All right.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S POSITION

Subsequent to March 9, 1957 we have had statements by
Eisenhower and by Kennedy and Johnson.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. Now, the pertinent one discussed here
today was the statement made by President Kennedy in----
Secretary Rusk. May 8, 1963.
Senator Lausche. As a consequence of Kennedy's statement
dealing with Israel and the Arab Republic, and the tripartite
declaration, Prime Minister Macmillan was asked in the
Parliament a certain question, and I will read:

To ask the Prime Minister whether he will publicly
associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent officially
declared United States policy to the effect that, should Israel
or any of the Arab States appear to violate frontiers of
armistice lines, the United States of America will take
immediate action both within and outside the United Nations to
prevent such violation.

That, in substance, what I have just read, is Kennedy's
statement?
Secretary Rusk. It was a summation. There is a slight
difference in wording, but in substance, yes.
Senator Lausche. Summation.
Now, the United States Government received the following
written reply from the Prime Minister.
Secretary Rusk. No. This was an answer to a question--this
is a question in the House of Commons.
Senator Lausche. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. And the Prime Minister answered the
question in the House of Commons.
Senator Lausche. And this is how he answered.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the
President's statement. Her Majesty's Government are deeply
interested in peace and stability in this area, and are opposed
to the use of force or the threat of force there as elsewhere
in the world. We are equally opposed to the interference by any
country in the internal affairs of another whether by the
encouragement of subversion or by hostile propaganda.

Now:

I cannot say in advance what action we would take in a
crisis since it is difficult to foresee the exact circumstances
which might arise.

A STATE OF UNCERTAINTY

My question is: Doesn't this last sentence leave the matter
in a state of uncertainty because Macmillan says that he cannot
say in advance what action ``we would take in a crisis since it
is difficult to foresee the exact circumstances which might
arise.''
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would not attach too much policy
importance to that. I think any chief of government would be
very reluctant to say in advance exactly what steps he might
take.
For example, in a NATO crisis, I think the President would
be very reluctant to pin himself to a particular action even
though the commitments of the treaty are to treat an attack on
one as an attack on all.
Senator Lausche. Is it correct to conclude that there is
only one piece of direct legislation dealing with the subject,
and that is the Middle East resolution of 1957? There may be,
however, some preliminary statements in other official
documents that may have a bearing upon it.
Secretary Rusk. I will have this examined to see whether
there are any direct references to the Middle East in other
legislation which would have a bearing on the present
situation.

HAVE THE UNITED NATIONS TAKE CONTROL

Senator Lausche. Now, then, I want to conclude. In my
opinion, every effort imaginable should be made to have the
United Nations take control of this subject. No efforts should
be spared toward the achievement of this end. This item is one
peculiarly fitted for disposition by the United Nations.
Two, our government should not, under any circumstances,
take unilateral action in the matter.
Three, we have to explore the ability to become involved
beyond our already existing involvement in South Vietnam where
we now have 425,000 men, I believe.
Secretary Rusk. Somewhat more than that.
Senator Lausche. 450,000.
Senator Gore. Will the Senator yield; with a much less
specific commitment than we have in Israel. I do not know how
we can act unilaterally in one case and then say we will not
act otherwise.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, would you repeat what you said? We
ought to explore----
[The statement of Senator Lausche was read by the reporter,
as requested.]
Senator Lausche. Four, I cannot approve the speed of U
Thant and his failure to consult with the principal agencies of
the United Nations in his action in withdrawing the United
Nations troops from the area.
I think that concludes it.
The Chairman. Are you through?
Senator Lausche. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt?

U THANT'S ABILITY TO ACT UNILATERALLY

Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, I am glad that you came here
to discuss our problems with us in advance of action being
taken. I hope this becomes a precedent.
I recall what happened in Vietnam. I was not here when you
came before the committee, but I think this is a proper
function of the advise and consent constitutional
responsibility which we have.
We are in a war now, and all foreign wars are bad. A two-
front war is always bad no matter where you fight it, and it
seems to me a two-continent war at the same time is almost
beyond the power of the mind of man to comprehend as to the
status of his country. So I share Senator Lausche's conviction
that you should proceed with all force and vigor to put before
the United Nations the moment of truth. If there ever was a
controversy which it can solve, this ought to be it.
Up to now they have done a very commendable job, I think,
in maintaining this peace force. I do not know enough about the
Constitution of the U.N. to know whether U Thant can, by a
simple statement of one man, pull out this peacekeeping group
properly as he did or whether it was actually beyond his
authority. It seems to me there must be some authority in the
U.N. greater than U Thant that could put it back into being by
some kind of action.
Am I right or am I wrong?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have had a very sharp discussion
with him on just this point. He claimed, on the advice of his
lawyers, that he had both a duty and a responsibility to act as
he did. We felt he had an obligation to bring this to the
General Assembly or the Security Council before he answered.
Senator Mundt. Assuming he is right--I doubt that he was
right--but assuming that he was right, isn't there some plenary
power in the U.N. that is stronger than his that can put them
in by a United Nations act?
Secretary Rusk. I think there is undoubtedly power under
the charter. The Security Council clearly has such authority of
action. That is vulnerable to the Soviet veto.
It is our view, as you know the Soviets disagree with this,
that the General Assembly also has such power if the Security
Council is unable to act. That could bring a direct clash
between the U.N., as such, and Egypt as such if Egypt said,
``No, you are not going to have your troops on our territory,''
so they are going to have to fight for themselves if Egypt
should resist.
But all things exist in between, and did not give U Thant a
chance to search for it, and this is our strong complaint.
There are things in between.

IS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE POSSIBLE

Senator Mundt. I would assume correctly that there was some
claim, a valid claim by the U.N., that it should not be on one
side of the border. Is it possible to have a demilitarized
zone, so to speak, to include part of the Israeli border and
part of the Egyptian border and part of all neighboring
borders?
Secretary Rusk. Prime Minister Eshkol proposed just
yesterday that the two armies withdraw from the border, and I
would suppose he would have no objection if U.N. observers and
inspectors were able to insure that this, in fact, occurred.
Senator Mundt. Why was this curious arrangement made in the
first place that the peace force should be on one side of the
border?
Secretary Rusk. This was part of the settlement of the so-
called Suez affair, and this was worked out that way because,
as a part of the settlement, Israel withdrew its very
substantial forces from many places deep in the Sinai
Peninsula. So this was part of the settlement at the time, and
if there was any inequity about it in a theoretical sense, the
fact is it was a part of a settlement of the Suez business.
Senator Mundt. Were we in on the settlement?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, as a member of the U.N., and
worked out in the U.N., as you will recall.
Senator Mundt. Wouldn't it have been better, looking
forward and learning from mistakes in the past, if we are going
to have a peace patrol, is it not better to have it on both
sides of the border so that one cantankerous fellow cannot
throw them out, just throw out the part on his side and have a
shield there?
Secretary Rusk. I think as a general proposition there is
some merit in that idea.

AMERICAN OPTIONS

Senator Mundt. What are our options in this? Are we
committed, obligated, by specific treaties to go in and handle
this thing alone if the worst comes to worse?
Secretary Rusk. No, there is no treaty.
Senator Mundt. Are we obligated by any other----
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would say this, that the United
Nations Charter, Article 51, clearly says that ``Nothing in
this charter prevents the exercise of individual and collective
self-defense,'' and that would give any nation the right to
exercise its self-defense and to call upon others who are
willing to help in that self-defense.
Senator Mundt. I understand that. But do we have any moral,
specific or legal commitment by treaty or any other device,
administrative or legislative, which obligates us to go in
alone if worst comes to worst?
Secretary Rusk. That is a matter of how this nation would
respond to the policy declaration made by four Presidents
pointing to our interest in the security of the states of the
Near East, both the Arab States and Israel, and we have said
these things rather specifically about Israel.
Senator Mundt. Have we ever said if trouble breaks out and
nobody else comes to the rescue, the United States will get up
an expeditionary force and send them in alone?
Secretary Rusk. No, we have not.
Senator Mundt. Then the answer is negative.
Secretary Rusk. The answer was read by Senator Lausche. We
would take action within and outside the U.N.
Senator Mundt. Which we certainly are prepared to do.

IF WORST COMES TO WORST

This committee would be prepared to support with the U.N.,
or with the British and the French, and a reasonable number of
associate members of the U.N. But the question we confront, it
seems to me, the only place where we have got a real problem to
solve, is what do we do if worst comes to worst? That is the
question; that is where we are--you, the President, and us. We
have not had much success with the British and French fighting
communism in Asia.
Secretary Rusk. I hope the gentlemen of this committee will
be thinking and worrying about that question because that
contingency could arise. We are doing everything we can to
prevent that question from arising. But that question could
arise, and so everyone ought to be thinking about it, certainly
everyone in the Executive Branch is.
Senator Mundt. You ought to be thinking about it now
because it is happening awfully fast. You pick up the newspaper
and see that Egypt has gone into this area, or Syria, which
seems to be even more irresponsible than Egypt, might go in, so
there you are confronted with a snap judgment.
Is there something we are going to read about in the
newspaper that the President has decided that troops are on
their way, or are you coming back to Congress, or what are our
obligations? As I understand your answer, and I want to be sure
I am right, we have not any moral, legal obligation to go on
our own.
Secretary Rusk. I am not sure----
Senator Mundt. We have an option to make.
Secretary Rusk. I said we do not have a precise treaty
commitment on this situation other than, say, in the United
Nations Charter. I would not be prepared this morning to say we
do not have a moral obligation or we might not have other kinds
of obligations in view of the role played in the establishment
of Israel and the statement made by four Presidents. Those are
things you will have to weigh. I would not say we do not have a
moral right.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

Senator Mundt. What I am trying to get at, are we having a
discussion for the fun of it because we already have some
obligations that you are going to act on as an administration
regardless of what the attitude is, or are you really
consulting?
Secretary Rusk. My understanding of the President's view is
that he would, of course, be in touch with the leadership if
any action were required in the situation, and he and the
leadership would then discuss this problem as far as the
Congress was concerned. But since I had the privilege of being
before this committee today, I am sure the President is going
to be extremely interested in knowing what the reaction of the
members of the committee is.
I would not look upon this as the President's formal
consultation with the Congress.
This is a fast-moving situation, and we have to move fast
and do whatever such consultation suggested we ought to do. But
this is not the last chance of the Congress to consult.
Senator Mundt. This is not the last incident to break out.
We may find the same kind of thing coming up with Rhodesia, and
there are other troubled areas. I think it is kind of
interesting to sort of hammer out the rules of the game now.
There are a lot of people around the Senate who have been
arguing about the rules of the game surrounding Vietnam. That
is five years old. I happened to have participated.

THE USE OF FORCE

But here now we are looking ahead, and we ought to have the
rules of the game, in my opinion, clearly understood between
the Congress and the administration. That is why I am pressing
to see whether or not the door is already closed. Certain
contingencies trigger off certain actions initiated by the
President, and then we are told about it in a message 24 hours
after the troops are in a war.
Secretary Rusk. I think perhaps that occurred in the
Dominican Republic affair because of the time period. But I
think in these other matters we have had a lot of consultation.
Senator Mundt. Do you and your studies----
The Chairman. I wonder if the Senator will allow, before he
leaves that, if the Secretary would be willing to give us what
his recommendation was on this point.
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. You mean on the question of consultation?
The Chairman. No, on the question of the use of force. You
said, and I am only trying to clarify what you do, you are
making a very important point, just what is our obligation. You
finally said a moral obligation, you believed, and not a treaty
obligation. Is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. I said I did not want to say today we did
not have a moral obligation.
The Chairman. I assume it may be said that we have a moral
obligation; is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What your own recommendation will be if it
comes, as he says, would you be willing to go that far?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I really think I owe that to the
President in the first instance. I really do not think I ought
to go into that at this point.
The Chairman. I only wanted to go as far as we could. Okay.
Secretary Rusk. I understand.

CONSULTATION WITH BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP

Senator Mundt. When you say the President would consult
with the leadership, are you talking about the Foreign
Relations Com-
Secretary Rusk. We have not, the President has not told me
what his own thoughts would be. He is----
Senator Mundt. You could tell us what your thoughts would
be.
Secretary Rusk. I would think that the consultation with
the bipartisan leadership, the question of what action, if any,
what kind of further consultation with members of Congress, the
House and the Senate, would be indicated in a situation of this
sort. The leadership would want to take into account the prime
factors, the nature of the action.
I could imagine, for example, if a large number of maritime
nations said that ``We are not going to accept closing of the
Straits of Tiran,'' the likelihood would be or the possibility
would be that that particular situation would be isolated from
the rest of the area, and that would be one thing.
But if the situation looked as if it was moving into
general hostilities that would be quite another thing. So I
think this is a matter on which the President would be in touch
with the leadership, and in that consultation would be the
question of how to consult with the Congress in an appropriate
way as the situation develops.

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Senator Mundt. Do you in your rationale see any connection
between this action inspired, I believe it is, by Russia, a
Communist complex in the Middle East, and the situation in
which we are involved in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, I do not see any connection
myself. We do not have any evidence that the Russians were at
the bottom of this. There are enough obvious and good reasons
in the area to----
Senator Mundt. Then they should not veto Security Council
action.
Secretary Rusk. What is important here--Mr. Chairman, may
Mr. Macomber tell the committee what he just told me about the
informal meeting of the Security Council members?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Mr. Macomber. This informal meeting was attended by all
members of the Security Council except the Communist members.
Senator Mundt. This morning.
Mr. Macomber. This morning, an informal meeting, and
Ambassador Goldberg has just called Secretary Rusk's office to
report. The non-permanent members, the non-Communist members
that were present urged that a meeting take place attended by
the U.S., U.K., France, and the Soviet Union. Ambassador
Goldberg said we were prepared to attend such a meeting and the
British said they would be prepared to attend such a meeting.
The French representative said he would be prepared in
principle to attend such a meeting. He is checking with Paris,
but he assumed he could come.
At that point the non-permanent members of the Security
Council took off to go consult with the Russians to urge that
they come and they are hoping to set up this quadripartite
meeting at 12 noon today.
We have not got final word back from the French or word
back from the Soviets yet, but they are hoping to have a
meeting at 12 o'clock up there of the Soviet Union, France,
U.K., and United States to discuss this situation.

WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE SAYING TO THE SOVIETS

Secretary Rusk. It is my impression from Paris, the talk we
had in Paris, they would welcome a quadripartite discussion.
Senator Mundt. If by noon, if the Soviets come into the
meeting, you might be correct there is no relationship. If they
do not, I think it could be.
Secretary Rusk. They may not come for a variety of reasons.
In the first place they may not be able to get instructions by
noon. So he may not wish to do anything without instructions.
Senator Mundt. Allowing for time.
Secretary Rusk. But the real answer to your question will
come from what the Russians are really saying to the Syrians
and the Egyptians. For example, both Syria and Egypt have sort
of indicated the Russians have said that they would support
them. But it would be very important to know whether that would
be in the event of an Israeli attack, or would support them for
the so-called ``Holy War'' against Israel.
There is a tremendous difference between those two
situations and we may have something more during the course of
the day on what the Russians are saying to us directly on this
subject.
Senator Mundt. I do not want to take any more time. Let me
just cap it off by saying, as far as I am concerned, I think
this is a multilateral challenge.
The Chairman. Speak the least bit louder, please.
Senator Mundt. This is a multilateral challenge which
should be met multilaterally and we should not move in on our
own precipitously getting ourselves committed and then come in
with a fait accompli without a chance to look at the whole
picture.

THE ROLE OF FRANCE

Senator Aiken. You do not believe France would desert
Israel completely, do you Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rusk. Beg pardon, sir?
Senator Aiken. France would not desert Israel at this
stage, would they?
Secretary Rusk. If I were speaking for the corporate body
called France, I would think, I would say, that I cannot
imagine that France would. But when you ask me precisely about
what President de Gaulle as an individual would do, which is
France now for all practical purposes, I cannot be all that
sure, Senator, quite frankly at that point.
Senator Williams. He would have no objections to our taking
the burden alone if we were foolish enough to do it.
Secretary Rusk. I would have serious objections?
Senator Williams. No, de Gaulle.
Secretary Rusk. France. I am not sure of this in this case.
France and Israel have been very close to each other in a
variety of ways. Some of you on the Joint Committee will
understand some of the ways in which they have been close to
each other. So I am not at all sure of that.
Senator Aiken. Yes.

NASSER'S INTENTIONS

The Chairman. Could I ask one following question? You said
you did not see any connection with Vietnam. Do you think
really Nasser would have acted as he has if we were not pre-
occupied with Vietnam? Would he have dared do it?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, I think--in the first place I am not
sure what he has in mind doing. If he is moving his troops up
to the frontier and this is a rather exaggerated and pretty
dangerous game of bluff, that is one thing. If he is talking
about real hostilities, he has got plenty of problems with the
forces facing him right there in Israel, quite apart from what
we do.
I do not believe Nasser--well, I will be surprised if
Nasser underestimates what Israel could do, say in the first 30
days in this situation. I just do not believe this is a major
part of it, Senator, quite frankly.
The Chairman. Senator Symington.
Secretary Rusk. I can be wrong, of course. I have been
wrong before.

UNITED STATES IS OVEREXTENDED

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, first I want to thank you
for your assistance and your courtesy and constant method of
keeping us informed on this rapidly developing situation. I, in
turn, have been very grateful for it.
Naturally I am more interested in this part of the world
inasmuch as I am chairman of the subcommittee, and I would just
like to report that after coming back from Europe a year ago I
said as a result of this more recent trip to Europe these
observations and conclusions I reached last January appear at
least as sound today.
It may be difficult to decide whether or not the United
States is overcommitted politically or overextended from a
fiscal standpoint. But if military commitments are an important
part of political and economic commitments, then this nation is
overextended in all three categories.
Rich and powerful though we are, the U.S. cannot continue
indefinitely to both finance and defend the so-called free
world with such little support from our friends and allies.
They should live up to their commitments as we have to ours.
In addition, unless we change the normalcy approach now
characteristic of our policies and programs incident to
handling these worldwide commitments, there should be a
reduction in the nature and scope of these commitments, and
even some reductions would be desirable.
Under current plans and programs there is little chance of
maintaining adequately trained personnel, military personnel,
to handle our present world commitments even if those
commitments do not involve us in further trouble in some other
parts of the world.
That was a letter that I sent to Chairman Fulbright and
Chairman Russell upon returning from Europe about a year ago.
I would like to ask just a couple of questions here. I
would just like to make this statement: Based on the recent
activities of Mr. U Thant, I am somewhat surprised at the
tremendous effort that we joined in in keeping him in as
Secretary General of the United Nations. For what it is worth,
I would like to just present that observation.

U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH IN MIDDLE EAST

Now, do you know, is any of the Seventh Fleet south of the
Suez Canal?
Secretary Rusk. The Sixth Fleet.
Senator Symington. Sixth Fleet, I mean.
Secretary Rusk. We have----
Senator Symington. The Seventh is in Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. We have some destroyers in the Red Sea
area.
Senator Symington. In the Red Sea area.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Symington. How many have we got?
Secretary Rusk. I would have to double check that. I think
three.
Senator Symington. Any submarines?
Secretary Rusk. I would have to look. But our principal
forces are the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Senator Symington. We have cannibalized some of our
equipment of the Sixth Fleet because of Vietnam. Has that been
taken into consideration? Presumably it would be.
Secretary Rusk. I am sure it would be. I am not familiar
with the facts on that, Senator.

ANTICIPATION OF A BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG HARBOR

Senator Symington. Do you feel that there might be,
inasmuch as we have been kicking around the question of
blockading the Haiphong harbor, where some people feel we
should, other people believe we should not. It is now on the
record publicly the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe we should
take the harbor out on some basis--blockade it, bomb it, mine
it--and the Administration does not. Do you think there is any
chance that the Russians have got a ploy going on with Nasser
so that a position we take in what we do with respect to this
port they can put back on us with respect to Haiphong?
Secretary Rusk. We see no evidence of it, Senator, but
since we do not see any evidence one way or the other, I just
do not know. This is a matter of what maybe a half dozen people
in the Kremlin say to themselves, and that is the crucial
information which is so difficult for us to get. No one has
mentioned this to us. There has been no indication by the
Soviets they are linking this in any way with Vietnam, so I
just cannot answer your question, quite frankly, sir.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM AND ISRAEL

Senator Symington. Well, now my final question, which I
might want to expand on: We know that we have a limited number
of trained military personnel, at least in some categories,
that comes up time and again before the Armed Services
Committee and the Preparedness Subcommittee. If you had to make
a choice as to which country, from the standpoint of the
interests of the United States, is more important to defend,
Vietnam or Israel, which country would you say was the more
important?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would not want to assign a
priority between those at this point. I do feel we have a great
interest--the Congress has declared our vital interest in both
the Near East and in Southeast Asia. I think that priority
between the two would not be for me to assess at this point.

HAWKS VS. DOVES

Senator Symington. The question behind the question is if
there was a boat that was going to be built, or a ship I should
say if there are any Navy people present, Senator Pell, and it
was going to sort of be a boat, a ship, that we could put
around the world and tanks and Marines would pour over
anywhere, a police action, and it was recommended by the
Defense Department.
In this case, both the so-called Hawks and their leaders
and so-called Doves and their leaders united and said, ``The
hell with this. We have had enough with this. No such ship
shall be built because, in effect, it guarantees that the
United States wants to police the world,'' and that was the
position taken by the Senate and it was stricken out of the
bill, and there was surprisingly little support for it on the
part of the House when it came up in conference.
So that to me is the first time that I have seen, you might
say the Hawks and the Doves or the various grades of those two
birds together as saying, ``In any case, let's not go any
further in this concept of unilateral policing of the world by
the United States,'' because probably one reason is we have not
got enough trained people.
Another might be we have not got enough money. In that
case, let me put the question to you in a different way: Is
there not an excellent possibility that even though you would
not want to make that choice because of the nature of our
commitments, no reserve call-ups, no guard call-ups, no
arbitrary limitations of wages or prices, no recognition of the
fact that we are in a major war, whether we like it or not?
The Senator from Ohio brought out we have 450,000 troops or
thereabouts in Vietnam; we have killed over 10,000 Americans;
over 60,000 have been wounded. This is a major war, in addition
to which we are very badly short--this is an executive hearing,
I am sure--of certain types and character of trained military
personnel that are essential to the successful prosecution of
any war anywhere regardless of terrain. So might it not be
necessary for you to make this choice, unless you want to get
into a nuclear war which, of course, would bring up other
problems?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not believe that it is
important for the United States to be the world's policeman and
I have tried to emphasize that on a number of occasions. We do
have some specific commitments and any president or future
president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, and the
future congresses may be faced from time to time with
situations in different parts of the world in which simply as a
matter of prudence and national interest we will do one thing
rather than another.
I think this pre-disposes any secretary of state to hope
that we could have maximum mobility in our Armed Forces in
order to give the United States in the future some choices,
some options.

VIETNAM RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. POWER

Senator Symington. I understand that, but this LDL ship,
nobody could see why it was being built at very heavy cost
unless it was to police the world or the concept of it. And,
secondly, you yourself have been very frank with the committee.
You have told us that we have got, I think your figure was, 40
military commitments around the world.
For many months now I have been saying look out about
Vietnam. I am not one of these playboys and never have been--
either we should shove this war ahead or get out of it. As long
as we are in the ring with 200 million people, a $750 billion
year gross national product, spending $2.5 billion a month
chasing these little people around the woods, the longer we are
in this ring, the audience, which in this case is the world, is
beginning to doubt we have any real power. Therefore, when the
question is asked, as I believe it was, do you think that
Vietnam is the reason for Nasser--I know that you have little
respect for my opinion just as you know I have great respect
for yours--I would think it is a very pertinent question.
It is my personal impression after having spent a
considerable time in Jordan, Israel, Greece and Egypt, in South
Vietnam, the question is pertinent and true. I happen to think
it is, because of the way we control our power in this war, and
I am not talking about any bombing of civilians or nuclear
weapons. I am just talking about trying to obtain success by a
full application of our power. A lot of the countries in the
world, I hate to say this about my own country, they are the
audience with ringside seats, and they said, ``We thought this
was a great powerful country. Throw the bum out. He has been in
the ring now for years and he is not getting anywhere.'' The
result is that you have got this simmering all over Europe and
all over the Middle East. You have got the Iranian situation.
We have had some very interesting testimony on that in this
subcommittee.

NATO SHOULD PLAY MORE OF A ROLE

So I ask with great sincerity: First, do you not think we
have got to make a choice between Israel and Vietnam, unless we
have very hearty support from the other members of the
tripartite agreement? Secondly, which one is the most important
to the security of the United States, because I know we will
both agree you should not send American boys now especially
when we draft them and they fight and die, unless you believe
in your heart, as I believe you do, that it does involve the
security of the United States?
Secretary Rusk. As I indicated, Senator, I would not want
to try to make a choice between the two, but I would add one
postscript to what you said, because it also fits some comments
made here this morning.
We feel that the NATO countries on the other side of the
Atlantic ought to take a much more serious interest in these
places that are 20 minutes jet flying time away from NATO
Europe, and a good many of them are now doing so. I pressed
this very hard at the last ministerial meeting of NATO and
still there is some reluctance in NATO to get concerned about
the Near East and even Africa, this huge continent, just across
the water there from NATO, Europe.
Senator Symington. Is that not because they feel it is
better to not let George do it but let Uncle Sam do it, based
on the record?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have been trying to disabuse them
of that in those places where one or more of the western
countries are pulling out.
Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Symington. I will be glad to yield.

IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT

Senator Mundt. The Senator from Missouri brought up a point
which has been troubling me increasingly in the last several
months. I think he expresses a concern which I have when he
implied that since we have made the decisions as a country that
we are not going to accept defeat in Vietnam, and I have
supported that fully, are we not reaching a stage in five years
of indecisive fighting where the longer we delay defeating the
enemy the less significant our victory is going to be in terms
of the world. That is what concerns me.
If finally we, as the greatest country in the world, cannot
succeed in stopping the fighting in half a country which is
completely non-industrialized, are we going to win any credits
from the world if we delay this victory interminably?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, we have tried in all
administrations since 1945 to deal with crises in such a way
that it would result in a peace and not lead into a general
conflagration. There was restraint at the time of the Greek
guerrillas, the Berlin airlift, Korea, Lebanon, an attempt to
get the Suez matter under control very quickly.
We kept the doors wide open for the peaceful removal of
missiles in Cuba.
It is true in Southeast Asia we waited five years before we
bombed North Vietnam. It is not entirely clear that enlarging
in any significant way the level of violence would bring it to
an end sooner.
You might have a much larger conflagration on your hands,
and this is something on which a judgment has to be made and
the greatest issues ride on it, of course.

ECONOMIC ISSUES IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be on the
floor to say something. But I would like to make one more
observation on this, if I may: As I see it, the security of the
United States and its well being has three legs to that
platform--one is military, one is political, and one is
economic. The economic is not talked about much. It is
dismissed quite casually by the Defense Department. However, at
Bretton Woods we tied the pound in just as tight with gold as
we did the dollar.
Whether it was right or wrong, it was done. Based on my
knowledge of it, I do not see how the British economy could
survive without its Mid East oil income and, therefore, it is
very difficult for me to think that you all in the State
Department in our relationship with Great Britain and with all
that is involved in Europe today incident to the Common Market
and EFTA, it is very difficult for me not to think that the
Middle East is not considerably more important than Vietnam as
far as the basic security involving the United States is
concerned.
However, I would like to associate myself with the chairman
of this committee and other members who are anxious not to
pursue this one unilaterally. I think we have a choice to make.
Secretary Rusk. I see. Thank you.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
patience.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Clark.

RUSSIA IS THE KEY TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, you have been kind enough to
ask us for our advice and our consent in this difficult matter,
and I would like to make the following comments which I have
incidentally written out and given to Bill Macomber.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Clark. In the first place, I concur with the views
of the chairman and Senator Mansfield, Senator Lausche and
Senator Mundt, and, perhaps, a number of others, that by all
means we should take this to the United Nations and not act
unilaterally.
In the second place, while I do agree that U Thant acted
precipitously and possibly even unwisely in pulling the U.N.
peace force out of Egypt, I do not share your possible
disillusionment with him. I think he is our one peace force in
this situation if we are going to rely on the United Nations at
this time.
In the third place, in my opinion, Russia is the key to
peace in the Middle East, and I would hope that all the force
of our most skillful counseling can be brought to bear not only
at the United Nations but Moscow and Washington to persuade
Russia, with almost the same urgency we did at the time of the
missile crisis, that they should cooperate with us in
stabilizing the situation to bring about peace.
In my opinion, France and England, noble allies though they
are, are going to be weak reeds in this situation. Their
military power is pretty eroded, and their zeal and interest in
this area may be keen enough, although I do not believe it will
be effective. While I am sure we need their votes in the
Security Council, I would not feel that they were reeds that we
could rely on with much hope of having anything very successful
come out of it.

LEGALITIES ARE UNIMPORTANT

Next, in my opinion the legalities are relatively
unimportant. I do not think it is the kind of a situation where
you make a good legal case before the International Court of
Justice or anywhere else. Having been a lawyer myself, I say
that with some hesitation, but I think pragmatically the
legalities are relatively unimportant.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, would you illustrate that last
point a little bit as to an example or two?
Senator Clark. Well, some have gone back to the 1950
agreements.
Secretary Rusk. I see.
Senator Clark. Some have talked about the tripartite
agreement.
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Clark. Sure, I know if you are going to make a case
for posterity that is important. But pragmatically it seems to
me it would be mildly ineffectual.
Secretary Rusk. I see.
Senator Clark. Next, it seems to me that the American
people will not permit the Israelis, to use the old cliche, and
I know it is a cliche, to be driven into the sea. This is a
pragmatic political fact we have to take into account, whether
we agree with it or not, and I happen to agree with it.
Next, I would think that our objectives, which in a
situation where obviously our reach may exceed our grasp, but
our objective should be, first, to get the U.N. force back into
the Gaza Strip, if possible, on both sides of the frontier. I
have no patience with Israel for having refused to let the
forces on their side of the frontier.
Secondly, we should try to persuade the Israelis not to
engage in any reprisals against Syria in return for the
Egyptians reopening the straits.
Then I would work very hard to create an effective U.N.
peace force of the same magnitude as the force that is in the
Gaza Strip to move between Israel and Jordan and between Israel
and Syria in the hope that its presence there, considerably
more force than what has been there before, would be in a
position to seal the border against these raids, full well
realizing they could not seal it a hundred percent, but maybe
they could seal it 85 percent.
Then, I would hope, and there is----
Secretary Rusk. This is on the Syrian, Jordan and Lebanese
borders as well as Egypt.
Senator Clark. I do not know about Lebanon, but certainly
Syria and Jordan and I would hope--and maybe this is just a
pious hope--that we could maybe persuade the Russians to
guarantee maybe with us, hopefully through the Security Council
and the U.S., the existing Israeli borders.
I know that Bill Macomber has read and perhaps you have
seen my report on war or peace in the Middle East. I remain
convinced that the long-range objective must be, first, to get
rid of Nasser and try to refurbish the Egyptian economy with an
international consortium which hopefully could rely on some
less belligerent Egyptian. Whether they will or not I do not
know.
My own view is that the Egyptian economy is on its way to
disaster.

STOP THE ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

And finally, in order to do any of this, we have got to
persuade the Russians to stop the arms race in the Middle East,
which I imagine they are very reluctant to do. But it does seem
to me we ought to make it clear to them that they are playing
with fire.
Thank you.
Secretary Rusk. We have taken up that last point with them
on a number of occasions. They have shown no interest in
discussing the conventional arms race. They would be interested
in a denuclearization of the area. But we have gone at them
many times on that and it is a great shame they have not been
willing to join. I agree with you.
Senator Clark. We just have to keep trying, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Lausche. Will you yield to a question?
Senator Clark. I am all through.

U.N. FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE

Senator Lausche. Does your statement suggest that U.N.
forces be placed on both sides of the line?
Senator Clark. Yes.
Senator Lausche. In Israel, in Syria, and in Jordan and the
Gaza Strip.
Senator Clark. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Senator Clark.
The Chairman. Senator Pell.
Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

NAVAL RIGHTS IN THE STRAIT

I find myself in agreement very much with Senator Lausche
and Senator Clark and others that we should not get ourselves
in a unilateral position, whereas we recognize the special
relationship of the United States with Israel and this is on
the horns of a dilemma on which we are, and there is nothing
much we can do about it except do as much as possible to push
it towards the U.N.
One question here in connection with the closing of the
strait, international law does come into this, and I believe
that the width of that strait is more than the six nautical
miles. I do not see how we can possibly accept the fact that
the Egyptians say they can close the strait, because then many
other waterways around the world could then be closed. I would
think this in itself would be action to put ships in there.
Secretary Rusk. I have asked for a further report on that
factual matter, and my first report was that the territorial
waters of Saudi Arabia and Egypt converge at the point where
ships have to go through. It is somewhat a little bit like one
part of the Strait of Malacca. You do have to go through waters
as an international passageway which otherwise would be
territorial waters, but I cannot confirm that at the moment.
It may have to do with those islands and extension of
territorial waters beyond the islands.
Senator Pell. This is a point that can open up in many
other parts of the globe if you once permit any nation to do
that which has a strong naval power.
Secretary Rusk. This would be a strong power
internationally if Egypt would be able to establish this was
not an international waterway.
Senator Pell. We would have to close up some waters in
Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula. We would justify sending our
own ships into it.

A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Another question of the Security Council, has any request
been made to hold a session of it and be seized of the problem?
Secretary Rusk. Did you hear the report of Mr. Macomber
just a few minutes ago?
Senator Pell. No, I did not.
Secretary Rusk. The non-Communist members of the Security
Council met informally this morning, and the non-permanent
members strongly urged the Big Four to meet. We agreed, the
British agreed, the French agreed in principle, they are
getting instructions, and then the non-permanent members left
the meeting to go off and talk to the Russians to see if they
would agree.
They were hoping to have a meeting by 12 o'clock. My guess
is the Russians would not get instructions by then.
Senator Pell. One thought is if we do not get Security
Council action, would you be inclined to the view to get it
under articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Charter, the Military
Staff Committee, where these forces should be rather than as a
special separate force?
This would be true particularly if the Soviet Union were
willing to bear with us.
Secretary Rusk. The articles you refer to, Senator, I
believe anticipate that there already would have been worked
out formal agreements bringing forces under the jurisdiction of
the Security Council and, as you and I can remember from the
old days, our negotiations on that in 1946 and 1947 failed to
produce any result.
I think the Security Council could ask U.N. members to
contribute forces within a framework that is different than
articles 42, 43, and 44 if it chose to do so. It is not
restricted to those particular articles.
So that I think if we were to lean on the concept of a
formally established United Nations force the Military Staff
Committee and so forth, we would probably find that was
impossible in the timeframe we are talking about.

VIETNAM AND THE PACEM EN TERRIS MEETINGS

Senator Pell. Then finally, speaking for myself, and there
are others of us who will be abroad next week at this Pacem En
Terris meeting; this will undoubtedly come up. Vietnam will
come up.
I for one certainly do not intend to be critical publicly
of our foreign policy outside the United States in Vietnam, but
I would hope that the Administration would have somebody, not
relying on us, to defend those aspects of it with which we may
disagree in this environment because there may be people from
all shades of opinion, right and left and center, in Geneva.
My understanding is Arthur Goldberg is not going now, and I
would hope somebody was.
Secretary Rusk. We are trying to send a substitute for him
now.
Senator Pell. You are?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Pell. I think it is terribly important. It is too
much to ask us to defend it.
Senator Clark. I would support Senator Pell. Those of us
who are going tend to be critical of our position in Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. I understand that.
Senator Clark. It seems to me we should not be put under
the burden of defending it over there within the limits of our
obvious national loyalty.
Secretary Rusk. There will be, quite apart from Americans
who might be present, Thanat Khoman of Thailand and the foreign
minister, Tran Van Huong. But there will other voices present
at Pacem En Terris.

REEMPHASIZE THE MULTINATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Senator Pell. Is there anything we can do to be of help in
this Near Eastern problem, because this again will take the
focus of attention which is probably good from the viewpoint of
American interests, will center toward the near East for a
change?
Secretary Rusk. I would think if the U.N. responsibility
could be emphasized and re-emphasized, if the multilateral
responsibility should be re-emphasized, and the necessity for
calm in all the capitals of the area--I mean those are the
three things that are most important at this point it seems to
me.
Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Pell. Certainly.

BRITISH INITIATIVE

Senator Mundt. Now that Bill is back in the room, I would
like to inquire about the genesis of this meeting this morning
of the non-Communist members of the Security Council. My
question is: One, who called this morning's meeting? Secondly,
why were not the Communist nations represented? Did they refuse
to come or were they not invited?
Secretary Rusk. I think this was an informal consultation
in which happily the British took the initiative. They had a
cabinet meeting this morning before we got up. They asked Lord
Caradon to meet us at the crack of dawn to see if we would join
in getting such a meeting together, and so I was encouraged by
the fact that the British were taking some initiative on this.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Mundt. I think it is important to establish whether
the Communist countries were invited, otherwise it would look
like a de facto recognition of the fact that Communists are in
this thing on the Egyptian side which makes it more difficult
to get to go later.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. Until Mr. Macomber reported to
us, Senator, I did not have any information on that point.
Senator Mundt. I think it is very important.
Secretary Rusk. Do you know whether they were invited or
not, Bill? I just do not know.
Senator Mundt. I think it is important for the purpose of
having it for the record.
The Chairman The Secretary can supply it for the record.
Secretary Rusk. We can supply it for the record.
The Chairman. Are you through?
Senator Pell. I have no more questions.

U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MIDDLE EAST

Senator Morse. When we talk about the refusal of Russia to
engage in talks, we are talking about a nuclear engagement in
the Middle East, not with regard to conventional arms. Have we
not shipped about as much conventional arms into the Middle
East under sales as the Russians have?
Secretary Rusk. I would not think so, sir.
Senator Morse. You would not think so.
Secretary Rusk. No, sir. If you put Egypt and Syria and
Algeria together, those have been very large shipments, and we
have tried to become, tried to be, a very junior supplier of
arms. As a matter of fact, we have helped Jordan, as you know,
over the years. Israel has had most of its supplies from
Western Europe rather than from this country, and the problem
for us arose when these very large shipments of arms to Egypt
created a great imbalance between them and their Arab neighbors
quite apart from Israel. We are interested that Saudi Arabia
and Jordan not be completely overwhelmed by fear and we have
tried to keep a delicate balance there by some assistance to
Jordan and some assistance to Israel.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. So I think Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia
are elements of certain calm and stability in this situation.
Syria is just as jittery as it can be, and Nasser is playing a
game that he may not have fully disclosed as yet.
Senator Morse. How about Iraq and Iran, have we supplied
some there?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think Iran has; yes.

DANGER IN VACILLATION

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, since I asked no questions--I
confined myself to a very brief statement--I would like to take
the time to express appreciation to the Secretary for this
hearing and consultation. I particularly do so because at the
last meeting I expressed some impatience, if not criticism, of
what I interpreted, perhaps erroneously, as reluctance on the
part of the Secretary to keep the committee currently and fully
informed. So with a background of that, I particularly want to
express appreciation.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Gore. And I want to add this, Mr. Secretary.
Although I share the sentiment that has been so generally
expressed around the table as to the inadvisability of
unilateral action, I know that one error does not justify
another, this being one of the possible consequences that I
have envisioned of our deep involvement in Vietnam.
Nevertheless, the practicalities are such that I think and wish
not to reiterate, after all I have heard, that there would be
very grave danger in vacillation. The United States in my view
must take the firmest possible leadership here to possibly
avoid a conflict in which we would inevitably be involved if it
occurred.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, that is a very important and very
strong point. We have tried to be very clear privately with
governments that we consider this a most serious situation, and
the problem is how far do you go publicly in the absence of a
particular factual situation to work on, and how far do you go
in raising such questions of prestige. The prestige factor
makes it more difficult to keep the thing under control, which
in effect is deterrence, is a very powerful one and we are
giving that a deal of attention.

A MORAL OBLIGATION TO ISRAEL

Senator Morse. That is what I want to stress, Mr. Chairman,
and I will stop with this. I share Albert Gore's comment just
now, and the Secretary's too. We know what we are skirting,
what we have to face up to.
As far as I am concerned, I want the record to show if you
get to a point where these Arab states really do make war on
Israel, and start trying to demolish Israel, let us face it, we
do have a moral obligation and a very important moral
obligation to come to her assistance. We can give her
assistance under those circumstances, but I pray it is not
going to be on a unilateral basis. We have to make the other
free nations understand the relation of freedom in this matter
because if they do get into a war, then you have got
totalitarianism seeking to drive this country into oblivion.
If they get by with it there, and other free nations do not
join through United Nations action, we are going to force the
withdrawal ourselves, because they are going to attack freedom
elsewhere in the world, and we cannot do that unilaterally. But
I think here we were more responsible than any other nation in
the world in creating a climate that permitted the
establishment of Israel in 1948. This is pretty much a United
States move; we got other nations to come along, but we took
the initiative.
We are dealing here with totalitarian nations, and if
they--I am inclined to think they are closer linked to Russia
than they may surmise at the present time.
If we get to that precipice where it is these totalitarian
nations against Israel, I think there are various forms of aid
we are going to have to supply Israel to keep her in a position
to do most of the fighting, but give her whatever she has to
have in order to fight back.
The Chairman. Senator Pell.
Senator Pell. One further request of the Secretary. I gave
to Bill Macomber a little speech and some suggestions with
regard to Vietnam. I would like very much when I am over there
to try them out either on Mai Van Bo in Paris or whoever is
amongst our adversaries in Geneva. I would like to have you
give me a reading and tell me whether they are all wet or will
be acceptable. I do not think they will be acceptable from the
other side's view, but I thought it would be interesting to
have your reaction.
The Chairman. Senator McCarthy, do you have any questions?
Senator McCarthy. No.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. I want to say one word

THE KENNEDY ROUND

Secretary Rusk. Before other senators leave, I might just
tell you, I do not know whether Ambassador Roth has been in
touch with you.
Senator Pell. Who?
Secretary Rusk. Ambassador Roth, ambassador at the Kennedy
Round. He will be in touch with you and he is available before
the committee if you want to hear about the Kennedy Round.

NOTIFICATION OF THE COMMITTEE

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could have an
understanding that you would notify the committee and come to
see the committee before any really serious step is taken. I
think you have seen the interest this committee has in this
matter, and I hope we can have at least an informal
understanding to try to keep the committee as such advised of
developments because the committee is deeply interested in this
matter.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I would do my best to do so, Senator.
The Chairman. That is all I want.
Secretary Rusk. It may be necessary to have a meeting at
some odd hours in order to permit that consultation.
Senator Gore. He will be ready.
The Chairman. One thing purely on my own, I have already
said I hope you get to the U.N. I would entreat you to perhaps
reappraise our Vietnam situation because I join the Senator
from Missouri and some others here in believing that this is
all part of an overall ball of wax, as they say. It may not be
directly and specifically the cause of this, but I am quite
sure it contributes to the attitude of those involved as to the
effectiveness of this country.
I think everybody, because of this historical basis that
you discussed at length here, everybody knows that, the
countries know it, and they know about this moral commitment.
They feel fairly sure in their bones that we will react. I
believe they do. We do not have to talk too much about that.
That is a matter that has been said time and again.

THE MIDDLE EAST IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN VIETNAM

But they feel if we are preoccupied elsewhere, it puts us
in a terrible bind, makes it very embarrassing to us, and it is
embarrassing to me, I know, and I think it is embarrassing to
the country, to be caught now, preoccupied as we are, in a
place which at least I do not hesitate to make a decision that
the Middle East is far more important to the security of this
country than Vietnam. I do not think there is any comparison,
not only because of strategic bases, but because of our own
investments if for no other reason. That is one of the reasons;
but because of our cultural relationship, political
relationship, all these relationships that have been mentioned
this morning, speeches by Truman and others and so on, and
various tripartite agreements. To me they are far more
persuasive than anything that has ever been revealed with
regard to Vietnam.
All I am trying to say is I do hope the administration will
perhaps reconsider its attitude toward stopping of the bombings
and effort toward bringing Vietnam to a close.
I agree with what the Secretary said about enlarging that
war. I do not go along with the idea that you can bring it to a
quick conclusion by destroying North Vietnam. I believe that is
the way you will have a third world war. That is one part of
your policy I agree with, and I am not for a third world war
over that or any of these other places if we can possibly avoid
it.
So I would like to recommend at least, for whatever it is
worth, that this is an example of what we are going to be
confronted with, we are now and may otherwise, if we do not
liquidate that war in some reasonable way, and within the
reasonable future.
The only way I can see is a compromise. We cannot expect to
get a victory. I know you know what I think, and I will not
burden you with a reiteration of my attitude toward that
situation. I do not think it is too late to still perhaps
consider this proposal about stopping the bombing without
making any agreement. Just stop it and see what happens. Put it
to a test without any announcement or anything else, the theory
that Kosygin and, well, others, members of this committee and
others, have had--U Thant--that possibly it would create a
condition for negotiation.
I realize that at this particular moment it might look as
if we are scared to death if you did it precipitately, but you
would have to do it with some reason in spacing. I do not know
what will happen in the next few days. I only urge that.
You seem to give us the feeling this morning that you
welcome some suggestions. So I come back to that one. I am
feeling very sad about things.
Senator Carlson--this is nothing directed to that, but he
just whispered in my ear as he was leaving, early this morning,
one of his secretaries was murdered in her apartment. It just
sort of highlights how we have neglected the conditions here at
home that this can happen right here in the capital of the
country, of our country, and we know how this has gone on. It
does not have any direct relation to this, but underneath all
of my concern, all of this, is that our preoccupation with
Vietnam and others has caused us to neglect things that
absolutely must be done here in the United States.
That is a little lecture, but anyway I do hope you will
consider possibly a reappraisement of this policy of continued
bombing.

SHIFT OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS TO MILITARY CONTROL

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, since we are
on Vietnam, I would like to ask a question about the
pacification because today you were supposed to come and talk
about that, and you were to have talked about the Kennedy
Round. You may have explained this to the satisfaction of all
other members of the committee. At the time it was made I
wanted to reserve my judgment until I got more information. I
have not got any more information and I really have--am going
this week to say something about it. I wish you would tell us,
for me and perhaps the rest of the committee, specifically what
were the reasons why you felt the pacification program had
failed under civilian control and you moved it under the
military control and what the indications are.
Secretary Rusk. I think, first of all, Senator, it is
important to keep in mind that this reorganization of
pacification is solely a reorganization of the U.S.
participation in pacification. It is not a substitute of the
U.S. pacification operations for the South Vietnamese.
The change was made for two or three purposes: One, the key
necessity for pacification is local security, and the
coordination of the security operations in the military forces
on the one side and the pacification teams on the other are a
very high priority and we thought it had better be done after
experimenting with the other and if both were the
responsibility of the military commander.
Secondly, there was a very important logistic reason why
the military--that this was a direct responsibility engaging
their serious attention, would be able to remove supplies, move
people at the right place, at the right time to give maximum
momentum to the program.
And, third, in a good many of the outlying districts our
own little AID teams and other support operations were running
short of personnel, civilians recruited on a civilian basis,
and the Army can assign its people to do some of their jobs for
which no civilians were available and it makes it possible to
expand somewhat in that direction.
But this is basically a reorganization solely within the
U.S. structure. It is not in any sense a taking over by us of
the pacification effort of the entire country.

ROLE OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER

Senator Mundt. Does this mean that the Vietnamese aid
program appropriation will come to us now as a part of the
military budget?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir; no, sir. The support from here
through the normal civilian agencies, AID, P.L. 480, things of
that sort, would be as here, and a civilian office out there
was put directly under General Westmoreland. That is a civilian
office with Mr. Komer as General Westmoreland's deputy for
pacification.
Senator Morse. Also the Ambassador over all.
Secretary Rusk. Also the Ambassador over all.
Senator Mundt. Over Westmoreland you mean.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. Ambassador Bunker is the No. 1
man in the country for all.
Senator Mundt. He is determining the military maneuvers.
Secretary Rusk. Oh, no, he does not determine the direct
military moves, but if there are military operations on which
he has any problem from his general responsibilities, he is not
only free to comment but he frequently is invited to comment so
that his judgment can be taken into account along with the
President's, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
Senator Mundt. In case of a military maneuver like the
recent entry into the demilitarized zone----
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Mundt [continuing]. Does that mean that Ambassador
Bunker, had he thought it unwise.
Secretary Rusk. He could have said so.
Senator Mundt. He could have. He would have been the top
man.
Secretary Rusk. That is right. On a matter of that sort,
the Commander-in-Chief has the full responsibility, and----
Senator Mundt. Somebody has to be the top man. Who finally
has the veto? In this country, the Ambassador has?
Secretary Rusk. No, I did not say he had a veto on a matter
for the President to decide.
Senator Mundt. If he thought General Westmoreland should
not go into the demilitarized zone, would the ambassador--would
the General not have gone?
Secretary Rusk. I need a little better example on this
matter.
Senator Mundt. Well, I mean, supposing----
Secretary Rusk. If Ambassador Bunker, for example, felt
that it would not be a good thing to put an American battalion
down in the Cao Dai sect's area in a given circumstance he
could advise General Westmoreland of that and advise us of
that. If General Westmoreland wanted to refer that back to
Washington, he could do so and we would look at it with the
judgment of both brought to bear. But the Joint Chiefs--the
Commander-in-Chief sends his military orders through the Joint
Chiefs to General Westmoreland, but Ambassador Bunker is
expected and required to keep us alerted at all times to any
factors in the military operations that affect his
responsibilities for the country as a whole and particularly
the political side of it and those have to be continually
matched. This is no different from World War II or Korea or
anything else in that respect.

THE GENERAL AND THE AMBASSADOR

Senator Mundt. World War II? What ambassador could have
told Eisenhower what he could do?
Secretary Rusk. Beg pardon?
Senator Mundt. In World War II what ambassador could have
told Eisenhower what to do with troops at the time of the
battle?
Secretary Rusk. The Government of the United States said a
good many things to General Eisenhower about what he would do
with his troops and alternatives.
Senator Mundt. The President of the United States.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
Senator Mundt. But you said the ambassador had the same
position. I cannot think of who he will be.
Secretary Rusk. Maybe I am not being very clear about
something on which I do not feel confused, Senator; if I
confuse you, I apologize.
Ambassador Bunker is the top representative in Vietnam of
the President of the United States. Obviously he is not a
military man and does not have the responsibility for the
deployment of forces as a military matter, whether we have this
particular operation today or that particular operation
tomorrow.
But his judgment is regularly consulted on everything
affecting Vietnam including the character and the general shape
of military operations. The ambassador and General Westmoreland
work very closely together as a team. They are constantly
talking about these things with each other locally, and we have
not had friction or difficulties arising from this.
But take, for example, on a mission such as how you deal
with these Vietnam forces just across the Cambodian border.
Naturally the American ambassador is a major, major factor.
Senator Mundt. Because that goes into international things.
Secretary Rusk. I do not want to leave the impression that
Ambassador Bunker is trying to be a military man running the
military part of the war. But also it is just as equally true
that the military forces in Vietnam are there for a political
purpose to protect Vietnam from this thing, from going to the
north and to assist in the political reconstruction of the
country in a period of elections and things of that sort. So
that we need both judgments brought to bear at both times.

TRANSFERRING PACIFICATION

Senator Mundt. Back to the question that generated this:
Specifically can you tell us whether it was Ambassador Bunker's
original recommendation that we switch the pacification
responsibility or was that suggested by Westmoreland?
Secretary Rusk. This was discussed for some time before
Ambassador Bunker got there. We thought that the decision on it
ought not be made until he got there and that he would
recommend on what seemed to him to make the most sense after he
saw the situation. He recommended that this transfer be made.
General Westmoreland was just a little reluctant because it was
an additional considerable responsibility, but he accepted it
in good heart and is proceeding to go ahead with the operation.
The Chairman. Is the Senator through?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I see you just a moment?
The Chairman. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the committee recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

Department of State,
Washington,
May 30, 1967.
Hon. J. William Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: During his testimony before the
Committee on May 23, Secretary Rusk was asked to obtain further
information in response to questions from several Members. I am
pleased to submit the requested information below. For
convenience, the inquirer and the question are also shown.
1. Senator Carlson: Did Nasser threaten to disarm the
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) if the Secretary General
of the United Nations did not agree to remove them?
Reply: (Confidential) Nasser said in his speech on May 22
that, had the UNEF not been withdrawn, they would have been
forcibly disarmed. However, we have no evidence that the United
Arab Republic made this threat directly to the United Nations,
or indeed that it was even necessary to do so.
2. Senator Symington: Are there any United States
submarines in the area east of Suez?
Reply: (Confidential) As of May 29, there were no United
States submarines in that area.
3. Senator Lausche: Asked the Secretary to see if there
were a preambular or other statements in existing legislation
which might have a bearing on our commitment to Israel other
than the Middle East Resolution of March 9, 1957.
Reply: (Unclassified) There are no such preambular or other
statements known.
4. Senator Hickenlooper: Who is supplying equipment to the
Arab (i.e., Palestine) Liberation Army (PLA)?
Reply: (Unclassified) Most of the PLA's equipment is of
Soviet bloc manufacture, and has been supplied by the UAR,
Syria, and Iraq, from stocks received by these countries from
the bloc. There have been reports of weapons supplied by
Communist China (though not necessarily of Chinese
manufacture); but we have no solid information to confirm such
reports.
I hope the foregoing information will be of use to the
Committee, and invite you to call upon me any time you believe
we can be of service to you.
Sincerely,
William B. Macomber, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

----------

Thursday, June 1, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
Room S-116, The Capitol, Senator John Sparkman presiding.
Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Mansfield, Gore,
Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Mundt, Case,
and Cooper.
Also present: Vice President Humphrey.
Senators Hayden, Russell, Stennis, McClellan, Byrd of West
Virginia, Dirksen, Kuchel, Smith, Javits, and Thurmond.
William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations; Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Kathryn N. Folger,
Legislative Management Officer; and John Reilly, Assistant to
the Vice President.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the
committee staff.
Senator Sparkman. Let the committee come to order, please.
We are very glad to have the two Secretaries with us this
morning and, Secretary Rusk, I understand you are to lead off.
We will be glad to hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE;
ACCOMPANIED BY HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE; AND LEONARD C. MEEKER, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished Senators.
Let me make two preliminary remarks. One is that I would
hope that this could be considered a secret consultation. There
is a tinderbox in the Near East. We have, on the one side, a
Holy War psychology. We have, on the other side, an apocalyptic
psychology, and it is particularly important that discussions
with an official like the Secretary of State be held very
private in this situation.
Secondly, I would like to express the President's and my
own very deep appreciation for the restraint which has been
shown in the discussion of this matter here at this end of
Pennsylvania Avenue. It is a highly dangerous matter, and we
very much appreciate the soberness of the discussion thus far.
One of the problems about the Near East is to know where to
begin when one discusses it. The Arabs would like to begin with
the birth of Israel.

U.S. SUPPORT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Let me make an introduction by calling your attention to a
simple proposition that President Johnson had in his statement
of May 23, in which he quoted other American Presidents that
the United States is firmly committed to the support of the
political independence and territorial integrity of all the
nations of that era.
When we look at the history of this post-war period, it is
interesting to note that in 1956 and 1957 President Eisenhower
strongly objected to the attack by Israel, Britain, and France
on Egypt. In 1958 he put troops into Lebanon to protect Lebanon
against threats from Syria and Iraq.
President Kennedy has continued the support of Jordan whose
principal threat came from Egypt. President Kennedy put a
squadron of fighter planes into Saudi Arabia at one point as a
demonstration of solidarity against a threat from Egypt.
We intervened very heavily in Cairo diplomatically to try
to bring about a cessation of subversive and propaganda attacks
by Egypt against Libya and, at that time, were reasonably
successful in that effort.
We have tried to encourage and support Tunisia and Morocco
against a buildup of threat, as they saw it, from Algeria.
In other words, our policy in that area has not been simply
a pro-Israel, anti-Arab policy. It has been a balanced attempt
to assure the territorial integrity and the independence of the
states of that area.
When Israel has been subjected to terror raids from across
its borders, we have again intervened in capitals and expressed
our strong view of that in the Security Council of the United
Nations.
When Israel, on the other hand, delivered what we
considered to be a much heavier than necessary retaliatory
attack on the Jordanian village of Samu in November of last
year, we criticized Israel severely for that in the U.N. So we
have tried to make good on that simple declaration policy in an
even-handed way.

THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS

Now, the present chapter I think opens with the increase of
terrorism along the Israeli frontiers with Jordan, Syria, and
Lebanon.
We suppose--we have ourselves known that these terrorist
attacks were organized by an organization called the Fatah. We
know that the Lebanese and Jordanian governments have been
acting vigorously within their means to try to eliminate such
attacks from their territory, although we know the Syrian
government has not acted with similar restraint. In any event,
there was a buildup of those terrorist raids into Israel in
March and April. In early May certain Israeli statements were
made by the Air Force Commander, and news accounts appeared of
statements by high Israeli sources the first ten days of May,
that if these raids continued Israel would have to take action
against Syria.
That, in turn, prompted Syria to call upon their defense
agreement with Nasser. Nasser started moving forces into the
Sinai Peninsula, and on May 17 requested the United Nations
forces to withdraw from Egyptian territory.
As you know, the Secretary General, we think much too
precipitously, agreed to that withdrawal.
Secretary General Hammarskjold said that it would be for
the General Assembly or the Security Council to take up the
matter of, whether they should take up the question of their
withdrawal.
The Secretary General agreed to the withdrawal and,
perhaps, agreed in broader terms than the requests,
particularly with regard to the Gaza Strip.
In any event, within the next few days, on May 22, while
the Secretary General was on his way to Cairo, Nasser announced
the closing of the Strait of Tiran.
That is the present shape of the immediate crisis.

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The role of the Soviet Union: We know that the Soviet Union
has been supporting and encouraging what the Soviets call and
the Arabs call the progressive states--Egypt, Syria, Algeria--
over against the more moderate and conservative Arab states.
We think that the Soviet Union would encourage the
political response to the Syrian-Egyptian reaction to the
Israeli threat.
We suppose that they might have also agreed to the request
for the removal of United Nations forces. As a matter of
general policy, the Soviet Union has always strongly objected
to the creation of U.N. forces by the General Assembly, saying
that that is a monopoly of the Security Council, where they
have a veto.
We have reason to believe that they were not informed in
advance of Nasser's announcement of the closing of the Strait
of Tiran.
I would state that much more categorically except for
always the possibility of some misinformation or error on a
point of that sort, but it is our strong impression that the
Soviets were not consulted by Egypt on the closing of the
Strait of Tiran.

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. USING INFLUENCE FOR MODERATION

I would like to tell you in the utmost secrecy, and I am
relying very heavily on you on this, that we ourselves, in a
very short message to the Soviet Union, suggested to them that
they would use restraint in this situation. Their reply to that
was a longer reply, pleading with us to use our influence in
Israel, and promising that they themselves would use their
influence in Syria and in Cairo for mutual restraint, so that
neither side would start the shooting.
We have----
Senator Gore. I did not get that last remark.
Secretary Rusk. Both would use their influence in the area,
we in Israel and they in Syria and in Egypt, to insist that
neither side start the shooting.
We have ourselves advised moderation in Israel----
Senator Hickenlooper. Excuse me, did the Kremlin agree in
that?
Secretary Rusk. Well, now, they came back and proposed to
us----
Senator Hickenlooper. I see.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. That we undertake this
diversion of labor in terms of counseling moderation.
We have done so on our side and have kept the Israelis
fully informed about our conversations with the Russians, and
we have good intelligence reasons to believe that the Soviets
have, in fact, counseled moderation upon Egypt and Syria.
Senator Dirksen. When was that reply received?
Secretary Rusk. That has been in the last eight days.
I am going far beyond my brief in telling you the Soviet
exchange, but I believe it is highly relevant in this
situation.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

Now, we think that there may be the possibility for a
breathing space here as far as major hostilities are concerned,
subject to one very specific problem, and that is the Strait of
Tiran.
A breathing space raises a problem of what the status quo
is during the breathing space, and if Nasser insists that the
status quo involves the closure of the Strait of Tiran, then we
have a major crisis indeed. If he would agree that the status
quo should be that prior to his statement about the closing of
the strait, then more time is available and people can litigate
the problem and discuss differences and perhaps, keep the
boundaries of the Israeli-Arab states under some control.
This is a major issue of principle with Israel, and is one
which they take with the utmost seriousness.
The strait itself has been open to international shipping,
as a matter of general principle, since 1957.
About 120 ships a year go through that strait, about half
of them tankers, about half of them dry cargo ships.
Practically all of Israel's import of oil comes through the
strait from Iran. What comes in and out of their port of Eilat
on the Gulf of Aqaba represents three to four percent of their
exports and imports, but it is their principal contact, their
only contact with the Afro-Asian world looking toward both the
present and the future, and in a trade which has been growing
and is particularly important to them because the Suez Canal
has been closed to them during all this period.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the right has been
there since 1957, the Israelis have not utilized it very fully
with regard to their own flag ships.
For example, since 1955 only one Israeli flag merchant
vessel has gone through, and there are four or five Israeli
fishing trawlers that go in and out, have gone in and out,
fishing in the Red Sea, and returning to Eilat for supplies,
water and things of that sort.

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Senator Lausche. What was the status prior to 1955 and
1957?
Secretary Rusk. As far as Israel was concerned, there was
no access through the gulf.
Mr Meeker, what about international shipping prior to that
period. Do we have much information on that?
Mr. Meeker. There was a small amount of cargo going to the
Jordanian port of Aqaba in that early period. Israel had not
yet developed the port of Eilat, and that development really
came after 1956.
Secretary Rusk. Now, in terms of where we are in this
situation, I think it is of some significance that the Soviet
Union has not stated a categorical position on the Strait of
Tiran.
I say that with some caution because when we leave this
room we may hear one. We cannot guarantee it, but they, as a
maritime power, have some interest in the general principles
involved here.
The territorial waters, the combined territorial seas, of
Saudi Arabia and of Egypt across that strait meet in the middle
of the strait.
The combined territorial waters of Malaya and Indonesia
similarly would cut off the Strait of Malacca, of Denmark and
Sweden access to the Baltic Sea.
We believe that it is a firmly established principle of
international law, confirmed by the Convention of the Law of
the Sea in 1958, that where two bodies of international waters
are joined by narrow waters of this sort, there is an
international right of passage through that strait.
Mr. Len Meeker, the Legal Advisor to the State Department
is here and can develop that in some detail for you if you
would wish to go into that.
So we feel that it is important that Nasser acknowledge
whatever the territorial water situation is, that there is an
international right of passage for shipping through that
strait.
We do not accept the view that Nasser or, for that matter,
Israel, is entitled to call upon rights of belligerency in
order to refuse such rights of passage.
Secretary General Hammarskjold made it quite clear that
those rights ought not to be available. We have not accepted
the exercise of rights of belligerency between Arab states and
Israel since the armistice agreements were entered into.
Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt you.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, please.

BASIS OF EGYPTIAN CLAIM

Senator Symington. That language is a little too hightone
to me. Does that mean that we do not believe the Israelis
should go to war if they are stopped from using the Port of
Eilat?
Secretary Rusk. No sir; I am not commenting on that
particular point at the moment. I am saying we do not believe
in this instance, for example, that Egypt can rely upon the
fact that it is in a technical state of war with Israel to
close the strait to international shipping going through there.
Now, there are certain obscurities----
Senator Sparkman. While you are talking about that----
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Sparkman [continuing]. Does Egypt claim--there is
an island out six miles from the coastline--this map does not
show it.
Secretary Rusk. We will have a large-scale chart down here,
hopefully before our discussion is over. I tried to bring one
with me, and we lost it in the corridors of the department on
my way down here.

EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION OF ISLAND OF TIRAN

Senator Sparkman. There is an island about----
Secretary Rusk. The island which is offshore from Egyptian
territory is actually owned by Saudi Arabia.
Senator Sparkman. It is?
Secretary Rusk. The Egyptians occupied it for the time, but
told us in 1950 at the time that they occupied it, that they
were occupying the island solely for the protection of the
island, and that their occupancy would not interfere in any way
with international rights of passage through the strait. But
those islands are Saudi Arabian islands, and we understand at
the moment they are not occupied, although it is possible that
the Saudis may put somebody ashore.
Senator Sparkman. The large Island of Tiran.
Secretary Rusk. The nearest one is Tiran.
Senator Sparkman. Is there no passage between Tiran and
Sanafir?
Secretary Rusk. No. The waters are too shallow, and it is a
very widening and dangerous passage.
Senator Sparkman. In other words, this is the only passage?
Secretary Rusk. There are two passages between Egypt and
the Island of Tiran. One is the Enterprise Passage, which is
about a mile off-shore from Egypt, and it is very deep and is
one customarily used.
The second is Grafton Passage which is adjacent to the
Island of Tiran, which also is some 260 feet deep, but it is
somewhat more hazardous because of certain rocks, and it is
much narrower. But there are two passages there, one wholly
within Egyptian territorial waters; the other, its state is
somewhat obscure because of its location, probably in Saudi
Arabian territorial waters.
Senator Clark. Didn't Egypt lease the island from Saudi
Arabia?
Secretary Rusk. Not so far as we know.
Mr. Meeker. Not so far as we know.
Secretary Rusk. I think they occupied it, even though it
wasn't Saudi, did not claim it to be Egyptian territory at the
time they occupied it.

WHAT NASSER MEANS

Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, is Nasser claiming two
things or one only? One, that is, this is an inland waterway,
and it is within the jurisdiction--it is within their
jurisdiction and, two, that a state of war exists, and even
though it is an international seaway, in a state of war he has
the right to blockade it?
Secretary Rusk. Well, yes, Senator, in general.
But I would like to call your attention to the fact that
there are certain points that are still obscure, and there may
be some advantages in obscurity pending further clarification
and negotiation.
In the first place, we do not know exactly what it is he is
saying he is going to do in closing the strait. He has talked
about barring Israeli flag ships and ships carrying strategic
goods, for example.
Now, the only material that goes through that strait that
comes close to being a strategic good is crude oil.
The Egyptians have referred to application of the items
under our Battle Act.
Our Battle Act does not include crude oil. So, query: Is he
saying that he will blockade only Israeli flag ships for all
practical purposes or is he saying that he would blockade it
with respect to all other ships including tankers, and what
kind of material is he prepared to let go through?
I want to distinguish this de facto situation from the
issue of principle, which is very, very important indeed, and
is of greatest possible importance to Israel in this situation.
We are not completely sure that he is talking about both
channels that I mentioned. In their public statements they have
concentrated on the Enterprise Channel, the one that is a mile
off Egyptian territory. We are not completely sure that they
are also talking about the Grafton Channel, which, perhaps, in
a technical sense, is outside of Egypt's territorial waters,
but where joint action by Saudi Arabia and Egypt might bring
about the same result.

NASSER'S CALL FOR A HOLY WAR

I would like to point out that Nasser has called upon the
only issue on which all Arabs can be united. This has cut
through some of the major differences between him and the more
moderate and conservative Arab states. But, at the same time,
he has mounted a tiger.
The man in the street in the Arab world is inclined to
think that the Holy War is here and, secondly, the man in the
street has heard nothing but that he has closed the Strait of
Tiran.
That has given Nasser a great boost of prestige within the
Arab world at this point.
Now if, in fact, the Tiran Strait can be opened, and it
becomes apparent that the Holy War is not on, then he faces the
possibility of very serious disillusionment among the men in
the street in the Arab world, and he perhaps knows that. So
this is one of the elements that makes it a more difficult
situation to handle.

MODERATING PRESSURES

We ourselves have tried to engage the Soviet Union in a
specific discussion of the Strait of Tiran. Thus far they have
not replied on that particular point, because some of us feel
if the strait issue can be resolved, that the other aspects of
the problem can be brought under some control; that is, some
sort of U.N. presence along the borders, some possibility of
demobilization of some of the forces that have been called up.
We know that there have been moderating pressures put in on
Syria to do a better job in cutting down on these terrorist
raids coming out of Syria either directly into Israel or
through Jordan and Lebanon into Israel.
We do not believe that most of the Arabs want a war in this
situation; in fact, it may well be that none of them want a
war. We believe that Israel would prefer not to have war if its
vital interests are properly protected.
I would like to emphasize that I am not here this morning
to talk about the problems that might lie at the end of the
road. I assure you that the President will be in fullest touch
with Senators and the Congress along the way.
We are not here contemplating, that is, we are not here
deciding to take the particular step of action involving the
use of armed force.

DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE

As you know, the President's view would be that the
Executive and Congress move together on a matter of that sort.
But I would like to consult with you about a step which
reflects the attitude of the maritime powers back in the late
fifties with respect to the right of international passage, and
if Mr. Macomber would pass out to you a copy of a brief
declaration we would contemplate consulting among governments
to get the maximum number of governments to join in issuing
such a declaration with respect to the right of passage.

Limited Distribution Declaration

The Governments of maritime nations subscribing to this Declaration
express their grave concern at recent developments in the Middle East
which are currently under consideration in the United Nations Security
Council. Our countries, as Members of the United Nations committed to
the Purposes and Principles set forth in the Charter, are convinced
that scrupulous respect for the principles of international law
regarding freedom of navigation on international waterways is
indispensable.
In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve ports on the
Gulf of Aqaba, our Governments reaffirm the view that the Gulf is an
international waterway into and through which the vessels of all
nations have a right of passage. Our Governments will assert this right
on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our
Governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with
others in seeking general recognition of this right.
The views we express in this Declaration formed the basis on which
a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early 1957--a
settlement that has governed the actions of nations for more than ten
years.
These views will guide our policies and action in seeking to assure
peace and security in the Near East.
This declaration itself does not commit anyone as to the
means by which they individually or collectively assert the
right of international passage.
When one asserts a right one can use diplomacy, one can
assert it in the U.N., or one can do it through protest; one
can do it through various retaliatory economic measures or, as
a possibility, through the use of armed force.
But the issue of the use of armed force does not itself
pose specifically in this declaration.
We want very much to go over this declaration with you and
get any observations or comments which any of you might have.
Perhaps Mr. Len Meeker could just comment on the two
principal paragraphs here from a legal point of view. Mr.
Meeker?
Senator Symington. Before you do that, Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Rusk. Yes, Senator.

MARITIME NATIONS

Senator Symington [continuing]. Just so we can get it in
context, what governments are we referring to when you say
``the governments of maritime nations?''
Secretary Rusk. We would hope to have as many governments
as possible on this. I think there are twelve, for example, who
made a similar statement in 1957, was it?
Mr. Meeker. 1957.
Secretary Rusk. At that time there were individual
statements in the General Assembly and elsewhere.
If there were fifteen to twenty nations that might be
included in such a group, we feel that this would, could make a
very useful contribution and give some of those who are trying
to work between the parties something to work on in terms of
leverage, and the attitude of the maritime countries.
Now, on the issue of force, I remind you we would hope very
much that Liberia and Panama would sign this declaration. It is
obvious that they are not in any event going to use any force
to assert the rights exerted here.
But, and it may well be, you see, that the issue here is
one which could be subject to negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, litigation, provided there is a satisfactory
status quo established pending such litigation or diplomatic
action.
I want to again remind you that the key question here is
what is the status quo in the strait pending or during further
discussion of the direct international issue involved, and that
is the most sensitive, the most dangerous, and most serious
question which we are not now discussing with you in terms of
practical action other than diplomatic and political at this
point, but one which you should be fully aware of as the really
explosive element in this situation.

PUTTING THE DECLARATION TO THE BRITISH

Senator Sparkman. This is now just a proposal, is it not,
sir?
Secretary Rusk. Well, this is a declaration which, I think
I should tell you, we have discussed this declaration with the
British as one of the alternatives.
We have in mind putting this to a good many other
governments--the British, the Dutch and others--and there may
be some counter proposals from some of them about particular
wording. We do not know.
But we want you to know that we have in mind the issuance
of a declaration by the maritime powers on this international
right that is involved in this situation.
Mr. Meeker, would you comment on the underlying--by the
way, may I say because of the sensitive nature at this point,
that this is a secret paper. I would appreciate having these
papers back. There will be copies here in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for you to consult, but it is very
important that this be considered secret at this point.
Senator Sparkman. Is this in line with what Prime Minister
Harold Wilson said to the House of Commons yesterday?
Secretary Rusk. As far as the declaration is concerned, he
pointed further toward the future as far as some armed action
than we are prepared to go today in terms of consultations with
the Congress.
He hinted at it and, of course, we are looking at all
contingencies here. But the President himself would want very
much to explore fully the possibilities of the U.N. Security
Council as well as some private diplomacy that is going on to
see whether those alternatives are necessary or whether we have
to get to that point at all. We just do not know yet, quite
frankly.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Secretary, is your assistant now
going to discuss this?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.

ORIGINS OF THE WORDING

Senator McClellan. May I ask, I would like to have some
emphasis on this aspect of it--I note, and I quote: ``Our
governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping
sailing under their flags.'' I would like an interpretation of
what you mean by that.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker?
Mr. Meeker. The essence of this declaration is contained in
the second paragraph. The first statement there says:

In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve
ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our governments reaffirm the view
that the gulf is an international waterway into and through
which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage.

I would like to say just a word about the origin of that.
This statement, in content, is based directly on what the
representatives of some fourteen United Nations members stated
in the General Assembly on March 1, 1957.
Now, those countries included, besides the United States,
Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland
and Costa Rica.
That first sentence is a statement about the view of the
declaring governments as to the legal status of the strait;
namely, that it is an international waterway, and there is a
right of passage throughout for the vessels of all nations.
The second statement in the paragraph is the one to which
you just referred, Senator:

Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all
shipping sailing under their flags, and our governments are
prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others
in seeking general recognition of this right.

I would like to say a word about the origin of that
language as well.
This is based almost word for word on the statements which
were made by Ambassador Lodge and by the representative of the
United Kingdom in the General Assembly at that time.

ASSERTING THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE FOR ALL

The statement that we would assert the right of passage on
behalf of all shipping sailing under flags of the two
countries, that statement was made both by Britain and the
United States to the United Nations General Assembly in March
of 1957.
What it meant was that in regard to both British vessels
registered in Britain, and in regard to United States vessels
flying the United States flag, we would assert that those ships
of our own would have the right to go through the strait and
the gulf to ports at the head of the gulf.
Now, the second paragraph goes on in that sentence to make
one further statement, which is that the declaring governments,
in addition to making this assertion of a right for their own
ships, would cooperate among themselves and also join with
other states who might not be signatories to this declaration,
in order to seek a general recognition of the right.
This declaration, as the Secretary has already stated, does
not indicate what particular means would be employed. Indeed,
that question is one which lies in the future. It has to be
considered as the governments go along.
The purpose of this declaration is to set forth, first, a
legal view as to the status of the strait and the gulf and,
secondly, to make the general declaration that we would assert
that right of passage for ships of our own flag and would join
with others in trying to secure a general recognition of the
right.
Senator McClellan. Then the word ``assert'' does not carry
with it any implication of enforcement of the right, just
merely to say it is our right?
Mr. Meeker. It carries no implication at all. It is neither
a commitment to use force nor does it exclude it. This is a
subject that simply is not covered, not dealt with, by the
declaration.

CLARIFY MEANING BEFORE OTHER COUNTRIES SIGN

Senator McClellan. Now, the thing that strikes me--and I do
not know much about diplomacy--but you get fifteen or twenty
countries to sign this, and then they disagree on what is
meant. That is why I think these things should be settled
before we sign them.
Senator Stennis. Spelled out.
Senator McClellan. We are going to sign something here that
I would interpret one way and fifteen other countries,
governments, interpret another.
Secretary Rusk. I would assume, Senator, that that matter
would be clarified in discussions among governments because
they will be asking the same questions which you have and, as
Mr. Meeker has pointed out, it is our view that the assertion
of a right does not itself prescribe the means.
There are many means. It does not require the use of force,
but it does not exclude the use of force. There are many ways
in which one can assert a right.
Yes, sir, Senator?

FUTURE TENSE

Senator Case. Mr. Secretary, why do you use the word
``will''? Why don't you just assert it if that is what you are
doing, assert it now and not say threaten to do something in
the future? I think that would clarify somewhat the Senator's
point about it.
Senator McClellan. Then I have another question.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
Senator McClellan. What about that?
Secretary Rusk. That is an interesting point, Senator. This
was based on the language used in 1957. From a legal point of
view it probably does not make any difference. But we will
certainly take that under advisement as a suggestion.

OTHER NATIONS DRAG THEIR HEELS

Senator McClellan. Now, one other question. This is what
concerns me about these international agreements. We are over
here fighting a war now, where some other folks ought to be
there with us, if we should be there at all. I do not want to
get ourselves in a position in this where again we are going
out and taking the lead and the others drag their heels and let
us do all the fighting. That is what concerns me. And before I
subscribe to something, I want to know what the others are
going to do, and not leave it up in the air as this does.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, this does not get to the question
of who would join in using force to assert this right.
I had a long and very useful discussion with the Foreign
Relations Committee a few days ago, and reported back to the
President the practically unanimous view of the Foreign
Relations Committee and, I gather this has been held very
widely in the Congress outside the committee, that we should
give maximum weight to the effort in the United Nations; that
we should in any event emphasize the multilateral character of
this problem; and that we should do our very best to avoid the
unilateral action by the United States in this situation.
The President is very much concerned with that, and very
much persuaded that that is the right course. Before any
forceful action would be seriously contemplated, he would be
back here consulting with the Congress on that issue.
He has made it very clear that our action in this is within
our constitutional processes, and there is no question about
the fact that on that point there would be further, most
serious consultation with the Congress.
Senator McClellan. I am not in disagreement about that at
all.
Senator Rusk. I understand.

DOES ASSERTION MEAN ENFORCEMENT?

Senator McClellan. What concerns me is that sixteen nations
or fifteen nations join in this phrase ``We will assert,'' and
does it mean to them or does it mean to the world, does it give
the impression that when we say we assert we mean to enforce
it? In asserting a right do we mean to enforce it, and that is
one of the troubles with diplomacy in my book today, it leaves
so much uncertainty.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think one would not want at this
point to, quite frankly, clarify that point, because to make a
declaration now saying that we are going to assert this right
by force if necessary would greatly impede the possibilities of
settling it by other means.
Senator McClellan. I am not arguing that this is not right.
I just point out to you----
Secretary Rusk. I understand, sir.
Senator McClellan. What gives me concern, because I think
in the past we find ourselves today in positions where we have
gotten into situations without the assistance and cooperation
that we had a right to anticipate from agreements of the past,
and I do not want to find ourselves in that situation in this
crisis.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I can assure you that I certainly
would not want to find ourselves in that situation.

NATIONS WITH MAXIMUM INTEREST IN MARITIME RIGHTS

Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, why was it that you only had
fourteen signers at the time this was originally brought up?
This is a pretty small minority of the rest of the nations of
the world. Did the rest of them refuse to sign it or say they
were going to go it alone?
Secretary Rusk. It was my understanding those were the ones
who had the maximum interest in maritime rights.
Mr. Meeker, would you comment on the relevant article of
the Convention of the Law of the Sea?

FLAGS FLOWN IN THE GULF

Senator Clark. In that connection, could I ask, while he is
answering, how many flags were flown on those 120 ships? How
many flags were there?
Secretary Rusk. I have it here.
Mr. Meeker. I do.
Secretary Rusk. There has been almost a total absence of
Israeli flags, except Israeli trawlers. One Israeli merchant
ship visited Eilat during the period from January 1965 up to
the present. Four or five visits a year are made to Eilat by
Israeli flag fishing trawlers which operate in the Red Sea.
Secondly, we do not have any Communist shipping going in
there.
Third, dry cargo shipping accounts for something less than
fifty percent of all calls made since January 1965. Nine
countries, Greece, Liberia, the U.S., the Netherlands, Panama,
the Philippines, Sweden, Norway, and Italy. There have been
very, very few U.S. flag ships going there.
Senator Clark. Are those the tankers?
Secretary Rusk. No. The tankers are primarily under
Panamanian and Liberian flags. They account for between 60 and
70 percent--I am sorry, they account for practically all of the
tanker tonnage going in there.
As a matter of fact, tankage has now been pretty well
concentrated in five or six large tankers operating under
Liberian and Panamanian flags.
Senator Clark. They get the oil from Iran?
Secretary Rusk. They get the oil from Iran. By the way,
this is not something that is generally publicized because Iran
claims that it is the consortium that sells the oil, and Iran
does not acknowledge that it is selling oil to Israel. There is
a little fuss going on now between Egypt and Iran on just that
point.
But these are large tankers, 20,000 to 30,000 gross tons,
and about a half dozen tankers are involved in that trade.
Then there are some Israeli-owned vessels flying under
foreign flags that are encompassed in the numbers I have
already given you.
Senator Clark. Well, from that it would appear that very
few of the maritime nations that you are asking to sign this
declaration have ships under their flags that use the gulf.
Secretary Rusk. There are about nine or ten of them which
are directly involved to one degree or another.
Senator Clark. One or two ships each.
Secretary Rusk. But then there are other, there are
maritime nations which have a great stake in the principle
involved here.
For instance, Japan brings huge tankers to the Straits of
Malacca that have a draft of one foot less than the draft of
the strait, and they get all of their oil from Iran,
practically all of it.
Senator Clark. Okay. Just one more question and then I will
subside. Are there any British or French registered vessels
using the gulf or the strait?
Secretary Rusk. The U.K.--I do not see France on the list.
The United Kingdom certainly.
Senator Lausche. Will you again identify----
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I did not come anywhere near
getting an answer to my question when I got diverted.
Secretary Rusk. I am sorry.

AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB

Senator Mundt. My question is why, back in 1950-something,
fourteen nations signed this declaration, such a small minority
even of the maritime nations signed it? Did a group of fourteen
get together and were doing this as an exclusive club. Did they
ask the others and did they reject it?
Secretary Rusk. I would think those that signed it,
excluding the Communist countries, would represent a very, very
high percentage of the maritime shipping.
Now, Japan--Japan was not----
Mr. Meeker. Japan was not a member.
Secretary Rusk. Japan was not a member of the U.N.
Senator Mundt. Read those fourteen again.
Mr. Meeker. Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Costa Rica,
the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.
I might just say a word about the origin of those
statements made to the General Assembly which will, perhaps, in
part, answer your question, Senator.
Senator Lausche. May I interrupt at this point? Was that a
written declaration signed by people or were they oral
statements made----
Mr. Meeker. Individual oral statements made on the floor of
the General Assembly.
Secretary Rusk. But parallel statements.

NEGOTIATIONS AT END OF SUEZ CRISIS

Mr. Meeker. There have been in the preceding few days, and
concluding on February 28, very active consultations between
the U.S. government, the government of Israel, and others as to
exactly how the peace settlement and armistice would be
arranged at the end of the Suez conflict.
At that time it was agreed that there should be a series of
statements to this effect concerning the Strait or Tiran and
the Gulf of Aqaba as part of the overall set of arrangements
under which forces would be withdrawn and under which the
United Nations Emergency Force would be put in its positions,
both in the Gaza Strip and also at the entrance of the Strait
of Tiran.
The United States made a statement on that day--Ambassador
Lodge was our representative in the Assembly--and we, and I
think also the government of Israel, spoke with a number of
other countries asking them whether they would be prepared to
make parallel statements.
I am not aware that we approached any countries who said
they disagreed with this point of view and, therefore, declined
to make a statement.
I think the shortness of time may be responsible for the
fact that there were not more than fourteen. But I think that
it is noteworthy that among this group are some of the
principal shipping nations of the world.
Senator Sparkman. May I ask this question?

HOW WILL RIGHTS BE ASSERTED?

Senator McClellan. If I may have this one other question,
and then I am going to quit. I just want to satisfy myself.
When you say that these governments will assert a right,
the right is presumed to make that claim without any
reservation. Now you propose to assert it. That means we are
going to take some action; assert means to act. How are we
going to assert it except for the ships to go up there and
demand to pass through? How do you assert it?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, there are many--I am not a
lawyer, and I will ask Mr. Meeker to comment on this. But my
understanding is that there are many ways to assert a right. If
a trespasser comes on your land----
Senator McClellan. I know there are other things, but when
you----
Secretary Rusk. If a trespasser comes on your land you try
to talk him off it; you can call a cop in certain
circumstances; you might even shoot him. But there are many
ways to assert a right, and there are a good many possibilities
open here as to how the right can be most effectively asserted.
This is silent on the question of how.

DECLARATION DOES NOT EMBODY A COMMITMENT

Senator McClellan. I know it is. That is the point. Is it
going to be interpreted by Israel that we are going to assert
it, we are going to see that these ships get through, or are we
leaving her open to that hope or expectation?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker, would you read the Senator that
sentence of interpretation which we would propose to use if
other governments--some of them undoubtedly will ask us the
same question that you just asked.
Senator McClellan. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Do you have that sentence there with you?
Mr. Meeker. Yes, I do.
What we would say in answer to this very question from
other governments is roughly the following: That the language
of the declaration in itself does not embody a commitment as to
the particular means by which the right would be asserted in
order to give effect to the purposes of the declaration.
The declaration starts with two things. First, an assertion
of international status in the waterway and, second, a
statement that the governments participating in the declaration
will assert this right and will seek to gain general
recognition for it.
Now, the question of how these purposes are going to be
effectuated, that is simply not covered in this declaration,
and it is a question which the governments themselves are going
to have to continue to consider as they proceed.
As the Secretary has said, there are many different ways of
proceeding: in the United Nations; through diplomacy; by indeed
sending one or more ships through the strait for the purpose of
entering the Gulf of Aqaba. There are many different ways, and
those will all have to be considered.

USE OF FORCE IS A SEPARATE QUESTION

Secretary Rusk. Senator, may I just add one word of
clarification on this?
Senator McClellan. I am going to quit.
Secretary Rusk. We ought to be clear around this table on
this point.
The Executive Branch is not going to come back to you
gentlemen at any time in the future to say that this word, this
declaration commits us to the use of force. That is a separate
question which the President and you would have to talk out
among yourselves and make a decision on it.
Senator McClellan. That ought to be made very clear. I
appreciate your saying that.
Now, one other thing. You said there are different ways to
assert it. Is not the most direct way to assert this right to
move your ships out there and demand passage through?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that might be the most direct way.
Senator McClellan. I said direct.
Secretary Rusk. It might be the most direct way.
Senator McClellan. And if shooting starts over there would
we not expect a direct effort made?
Secretary Rusk. Well, this, it might be the most direct
way. It may not be the most effective way or the wisest way
under certain circumstances.
Senator McClellan. I apologize, and I thank you. I am
through.
Secretary Rusk. I understand.

STRAITS AROUND THE WORLD

Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, will you reidentify the
straits around the world where this principle becomes involved.
You mentioned the Malacca Straits. Which are the places? I do
not have--in the Baltic?
Secretary Rusk. I do not have it. Perhaps Mr. Meeker has
it, sir.
Senator Lausche. I want it for information.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. Here is a list that I will be glad
to----
Senator Lausche. Is it a large list?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. It involves two pages with two or
three lines each.
Senator Lausche. It ought to be placed in the record.
Secretary Rusk. We will put it in the record of the Foreign
Relations Committee. But the Strait of Dover, the Strait of
Gibraltar, the Magellan Straits, the Straits of Malacca, the
Martinique Channel. The two most dramatic ones, I would
suppose, would be the Straits of Malacca, the Singapore
Straits, and what do you call this between Denmark and--the
Sound between Denmark and Sweden where territorial waters come
right up and occupy the entire passage.
Senator Clark. You have the case in Corfu.
Secretary Rusk. The Corfu case in the World Court is very
opposite here with respect to the principle involved.

SOVIET INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM

So we feel--and, by the way, the Soviet Union might have
some real interest in this problem. The Bosporus is covered by
the special convention, Montreux Convention, but the Soviet
Union, as a maritime nation, has got a tremendous interest in
this. This may be one of the reasons why they are just being a
little careful about this issue of the Strait of Tiran.
Secretary Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, why didn't Russia have
to ask Turkey for permission to go through the Dardanelles?
Secretary Rusk. That is under the regulations of the
Montreux Convention. By the way, on that point, Secretary
McNamara might wish to comment, but the movement of these
vessels into the Mediterranean brings their forces about where
they were--about two or three ships more--about June a year
ago. This may or may not be connected with the Middle East
crisis, but it is not a major naval movement.
Bob, do you want to comment on it?
Secretary McNamara. I think they are trying to make it
appear that it is connected with the Middle East crisis and to
give the peoples of the world the impression they are moving
forcefully to support the Arab position. But the fact is that
the movement was planned separate and apart from the Middle
East crisis and, as Secretary Rusk pointed out, brings their
total fleet in the Mediterranean to slightly more than the
strength that it had a year ago.

ISRAEL'S OIL RESERVES

Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on how much
time, in your opinion, we have got in this area. I have
particular reference to how much reserve oil Israel has got,
and how long can we reasonably expect them to cool it.
Secretary Rusk. Well, there is not a lot of time here,
because this is a major issue for Israel, and Israel has made
it clear, both in 1957 and since, that they would protect their
own rights of access through the Strait of Tiran.
Senator Clark. As long as they have got some oil you can
probably cool them. But if they are running out of oil they are
going to act. Is this not a fair assumption?
Secretary Rusk. I would hesitate to ask Israel to give, to
specify the number of days. But their patience is going to run
out pretty fast.
Senator Clark. I would ask then how much oil they have got.
Secretary Rusk. I do not know what their stocks are. If we
have that information----
Mr. Battle. We do not have it.

ESTABLISHING THE STATUS QUO

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to infringe
on the rights of any Senator, but we have the Secretary of
State here and the Secretary of Defense, and I would hope that
we would make a reasonable effort to preserve the regular
order. There are many questions I would like to ask.
Senator Sparkman. Well, Senator Symington, I appreciate
that. I have been trying for some time to get in a question
myself.
If I may ask it now, and ask Mr. Meeker to explain--no, to
ask this general question about page two of this proposal: The
views we express in this declaration formed the basis on which
a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early
1957--a settlement that has governed the actions of nations for
more than ten years.
Now, is that borne out by facts and documents and
historical records or is that just a statement of opinion?
Mr. Meeker. No, I think that is borne out by the record
very clearly.
In 1957, at the end of the Suez conflict, one of the things
that was done to resolve the conflict and to deal with this
issue about navigation through the Strait of Tiran, was to
station an element of the United Nations Emergency Force at a
place called Sharm el-Sheikh in Egyptian territory at the
southern-most tip of the Sinai Peninsula.
The stationing of that force was for the very purpose of
seeing to it that navigation through the strait and into the
gulf would be unimpeded. This was agreed to by Egypt and it was
also accepted by Israel as a satisfactory set of arrangements
under which they would withdraw their forces from certain
territory which they had occupied.
Now, in fact, for the next ten years from that time until
very recent days when Egypt again occupied Sharm el-Sheikh,
there was no interference with navigation through the waterway.
We thought that it would be useful in this declaration to
point out that there had been a status quo undisturbed for ten
years, and that any effort to block navigation through the
strait and gulf now was an effort to upset something, upset a
set of arrangements, which have lasted for more than ten years.
Secretary Rusk. And a status quo based upon an agreement of
ten years ago.

REMOVAL OF THE PEACE FORCE

Senator Sparkman. What effect did the removal of the peace
force from there have upon this agreement?
Mr. Meeker. We do not think that it has any legal effect
whatever because the right of passage was one which we asserted
and believed to exist quite independently of the stationing of
an element of UNEF at Sharm el-Sheikh.

1958 AGREEMENT ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

I should mention that one year after the settlement of the
Suez conflict, there convened at Geneva a conference on the Law
of the Sea in the spring of 1958, and this very issue was
addressed by the conference. The Netherlands made a proposal
for a provision to be inserted in the treaty and, in fact, it
was inserted in the treaty. It reads as follows--this is
Article 16, paragraph 4 of the Treaty on the Territorial Sea:

There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of
foreign ships through straits which are used for international
navigation between one part of the high seas and another part
of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.

Now, that fits just perfectly the situation on the Strait
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.
Secretary Rusk. And the Soviet Union acceded to this
convention without entering a reservation on this particular
article.
Senator Kuchel. Have we approved this treaty?
Secretary Rusk. We have, and Egypt has not.
Senator Lausche. When was that approved?
Secretary Rusk. 1958.
Senator McCarthy. 1958.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

Senator Sparkman. I think here is something that might be
well to put into the record. This is General Assembly
Resolution 1125 of February 2, 1957, operative paragraph number
three:

Considers that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the
Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas the scrupulous maintenance of
the armistice agreement requires the placing of the United
Nations Emergency Forces on the Egypt-Israel armistice
demarcation line.

It seems to me that would be well to put in the record at
this point.

ATMOSPHERICS OF THE U.N. DEBATE

Secretary Rusk. By the way, just to comment a little bit on
some of the atmospherics in the U.N. debate, the Arabs in New
York have called for complete compliance with the armistice
arrangements. One of the problems about this is that they want
to be selective about it.
Under the armistice arrangements Israel could use the Suez
Canal, but they do not mean that. So they are trying to be
quite selective about which arrangements it is that they want
to have maintained.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Hickenlooper?

EGYPTIAN FOOD SUPPLIES

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, as a corollary to the
question about the amount of oil in Israel, how much food does
Egypt have for the future? How long can Egypt feed itself?
Secretary Rusk. We believe they usually run from six weeks
to two months' stocks in the country. As you know, they have
not been receiving food from us for some time.
We understand they have made arrangements with the Soviet
Union that will probably take them to the first of the year.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Hayden, do you have any questions
of the Secretary?
Senator Hayden. No.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Stennis?
Senator Stennis. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I feel
like I ought to pass in favor of members of your own committee.
Thanks very much.
Senator Sparkman. We are all meeting together.
Senator Stennis. I pass for the time being.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Kuchel?
Senator Kuchel. No questions.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Mundt?

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, if I understand your opening
statement, the nature of this document is something which you
propose to circulate among maritime countries----
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Mundt [continuing]. Without handling it through the
United Nations.
Secretary Rusk. Well, let me say----
Senator Mundt. That is within your program.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. This is a very early
consultation with the Senators on this particular document.
We undoubtedly will have from some governments some
suggestions for amendments or some additions or something of
that sort. Nor has there been a final decision as to just when
and how to use it. In any event, if it is used it would
presumably be referred in the first instance as a declaration
to the United Nations.
But there is a great deal of discussion going on in the
corridors. We have a new President of the Security Council for
the month of June, a Dane, who is not under the same
limitations that the representative of China was under there
because he was not--he has no contact with a good many members
of the Security Council, and so we do not--I cannot tell you
today exactly who would adhere to this declaration, nor when
and how it would be used.
But we feel that this is a matter of some urgency to pull
together a maximum group of countries who have an interest in
this maritime right we are talking about here.

NEED FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION

Senator Mundt. If I might follow up what I have in mind. I
am a little bit dubious about going around the United Nations
to contact these countries and get them to sign it, because
historically every time we have proceeded in some area of the
world without the sanction of the U.N., it has gotten to be an
American task, an American job.
Korea, while we did it legally, we went around the Russians
because they were not there, and it was our war. In Vietnam, we
edged into it without the U.N., and it has become our war.
It seems to me in this kind of thing, if we do agree upon
it, it should in the first instance be submitted for U.N.
action instead of something that is promoted outside. That was
the purport of my original question about the fourteen
countries, because that does not even represent a fraction of
the U.N. support.
Secretary Rusk. That issue is right now before the Security
Council because yesterday Ambassador Goldberg put in a
resolution calling on the parties concerned to comply with the
Secretary General's appeal. The Secretary General's appeal was
to urge all the parties concerned to exercise special
restraint, to forego belligerence; that is, the exercise,
attempted exercise of belligerent rights; and to avoid all
other action to increase tension, to allow the Council to deal
with the underlying causes of the present crisis and seek
solutions.
Now, that resolution, which involves the same principle as
this declaration, is right now before the Security Council.
There is also an Arab resolution which takes another view.
So this issue is before the Security Council now.
Senator Mundt. Then where does this fit in? Is this
proposed to be done if the Security Council does not act? I am
just not clear. You started out by saying you would circulate
this to as many countries as would be willing to sign it.
Secretary Rusk. It would be a multilateral support of the
assertion of this right which we are now asserting in the
Security Council.
Senator Mundt. Well, I do not want to take any more time,
but I want to reiterate my skepticism about the United Nations
by running around it.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Mansfield?

FRANCE'S DETACHED ROLE

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, I note that France is
hardly even mentioned. What is its position vis-a-vis the
situation in the Middle East.
Secretary Rusk. France has been trying to play a detached
role. It has taken two steps which are relevant. We are
consulting with them now and, as you know, consulting with
France is rather difficult until other Frenchmen know exactly
what one man has in mind, and that is sometimes hard to
ascertain.
France has been giving, expediting its arms assistance to
Israel. France has been the principal supplier of Israeli arms.
Senator Mansfield. Still?
Secretary Rusk. Still, And they have been expediting those
shipments. We should keep that very quiet.
Secondly, they publicly as well as privately called upon
the Soviet Union, ourselves, and the United Kingdom to join in
quadripartite consultations on this matter.
The Soviet Union has turned that down, although we just
hear this morning that the Soviet Union is apparently prepared
now for the first time to discuss these matters within the
framework of the Security Council. So that there will be
discussions with Fedorenko and Seydoux and Caradon at the
Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg is pursuing that today.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT MEETING

Senator Mansfield. One more question. Referring to the
French suggestion, could the United States and the U.S.S.R.
issue a call for a summit meeting of the maritime states to
include, one, consideration of the declaration which has been
laid before us today for an immediate decision and, secondly,
consider an agreement based on the Montreux Convention to
illustrate indirectly the situation which the U.S.S.R. finds
itself in in the Bosporus?
Secretary Rusk. That is a possibility, Senator. I would
think that that would be a little premature at this time until
we explore further with the Soviets what their view is on the
strait.
I think if we came to a summit where the court of last
resort is in session, only to break up in severe disagreement,
that would set everything back.
We would hope very much that the Soviets will show some
flexibility on this question of the strait insofar as their
support of the Arabs is concerned. However, that is something
we will keep very much in mind as a possibility.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Dirksen?

SHIPS UNDER FOREIGN REGISTRY

Senator Dirksen. I would like to ask Mr. Meeker a question.
I notice on the last part of page one where you say:
``Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all
shipping sailing under their flags.'' What about governments
whose vessels are under foreign registry, Israeli vessels, for
instance, flying the Liberian flag or the Panamanian flag?
Secretary Rusk. If I may comment first on that, Senator, on
these matters the government of the flag has the overwhelming
predominant role.
Now, I do not know whether this has been made public or
not, but President Tubman, for example, of Liberia, has asked
his flag ships to come around Africa into Haifa rather than run
through the strait and have them sunk before this question is
clarified.
But you have two different authorities operating in a
matter of this sort: The government of the flag in the first
instance and, secondly, the owners.
Now comes Lloyds of London. They have cancelled insurance
on ships going through the strait, and so owners simply as a
matter of ownership prudence are reluctant to challenge the
situation until it is clarified further. That is the principal
reason why, perhaps, there have not been actual ships going
through there in the last few days, that is, to Eilat.
Senator Dirksen. Using the word ``their'' you really limit
this, don't you, to their flags?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, in that particular phrase. But the
second phrase ``to cooperate among themselves and to join with
others in seeking general recognition of this right'' broadens
it somewhat.
Senator Dirksen. That is all.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Gore?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Meeker. No.

PARALLEL WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, well, I shall confine myself to
a very brief statement.
I wish to commend the administration for its prudence and
caution in this matter, but also its firmness, and to express
appreciation for the close consultation with the Senate.
I would add one word of caution with respect to the use of
the present tense which Senator Case suggested. If you speak in
the future, you reserve the right to future assertion, you
leave more options, more choices open.
The most encouraging thing you bring is, however secret it
is, that there is close communication, mutual effort, on the
part of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would like to emphasize the
secrecy of that because that would disappear----
Senator Gore. Yes.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. If from our sources this got
to be known.
Senator Gore. I accept.
Now, my one question is: Since there is a possibility of a
parallelism with respect to this gulf and this port and
Haiphong, and since you report to us this does encompass a
matter of major importance, a mutuality of effort to cool a
dangerous situation in the Middle East, if that in any way
could be coupled with a mutuality of effort in Southeast Asia.
I do not wish to divert you particularly into that, but it
seems to me that this might be a major break in cooperation
between the two great powers. I would hope that we would not
lose the opportunity, if such existed, in extending this
cooperation to an effort of deescalation in the Far East.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, there is nothing we would like
better.
I would doubt the wisdom of trying these two questions
together organically, because it is hard enough to sort out
conflicting interests in each question standing alone.
However, we are in pretty regular contact with the Soviet
Union on Vietnam. I think the big problem there is that their
influence in Hanoi does not put them in a position to negotiate
seriously about it.
I do not believe Vietnam at this stage can be settled
between Washington and Moscow because Moscow cannot deliver
Hanoi. I think myself there is a basis for agreement between us
and the Soviet Union on Vietnam, based upon our recognition of
their stake in North Vietnam and their recognition of our stake
in South Vietnam.
We have had many, many long discussions with the Soviet
Union along these lines.
I would hope that given the parallel action that we and
they showed during the India-Pakistan fighting and, indeed, at
the Tashkent Conference, where we encouraged all three of them
to go ahead with the Tashkent Conference, that if there could
be some parallel action here this might encourage a little more
parallel action on some other problem.
Senator Gore. The whole purpose of my question was to
entertain such a hope.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Smith?
Senator Smith. Yes Mr. Chairman.

MINING OF THE STRAIT

Mr. Secretary, Nasser has been quoted as saying that the
strait, the entrance of the strait or the gulf, I do not recall
which, was mined. You referred to continuing shipping. How can
shipping be continued if the mining has taken place without a
lot of trouble?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we doubt very much--and the Secretary
might wish to comment on this--would you comment and take that
one, Bob?
Secretary McNamara. Yes. We have no indication that they
have mined the strait itself. As a matter of fact, we have some
indication that they have not. They may have mined in a
defensive way the entrances to their own naval facilities near
the strait. We think that is what he might have alluded to.
But the mining of the strait itself would be extremely
difficult because it is very deep, some 900 feet deep, and the
current passing through it is quite swift. We doubt that he has
the capability to mine waters of that kind.
We have no evidence he has. There have been a number of
ships that have passed through since he was alleged to have
made that statement, and it is our firm conclusion that the
strait is not mined as of today.
Secretary Rusk. Apparently shipping goes through normally
to the Jordanian port of Aqaba through the strait, so it is
unlikely that the strait itself is mined in a way that would
close it.

AUTHORITY FOR WITHDRAWING U.N. TROOPS

Senator Smith. One other question, Mr. Secretary. On what
authority were the U.N. troops or forces withdrawn?
Secretary Rusk. The Secretary General felt on the basis of
legal advice he had from his own Secretariat that he, as
Secretary General, had authority to withdraw those forces
basically on the ground; that the forces were there with the
consent of Egypt, and if Egypt, as a sovereign country,
withdrew that consent, the forces had no right to be there.
Now, we might not have contested the right which might have
existed at the end of the day, but we did think that the
Secretary General would have been much wiser, indeed had an
obligation, to consult the General Assembly or the Security
Council before taking that action, because the force was
established by the General Assembly.
But he used that. He exercised what he considered to be the
executive and the legal power of the Secretary General as sort
of the commander-in-chief of the U.N. forces.
Senator Smith. Have we protested?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, indeed we have, very strongly, both
publicly and privately. The President's statement on May 23
said that we were dismayed about that action.
Senator Smith. Could he return the U.N. to that area then
without action by Colonel Nasser?
Secretary Rusk. He probably could if he and the parties
were willing to as a matter of law. My guess is that he would
not make the attempt, and also my guess is that Egypt would not
accept it. But it is not completely outside the possibilities
that some sort of U.N. presence, less than the United Nations
force, more than just a handful of commissioners, might be put
along that border before this matter is finished.
Senator Kuchel. On what side?
Secretary Rusk. On both sides, perhaps.
Senator Smith. Such action then makes the United Nations
rather useless, does it not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator Smith, this is a personal
view. I do not want to speak for the entire administration on
this, but I have felt that the Secretary General has on three
occasions, on three issues, not supported the U.N. and
supported the charter in a way that one would expect the
Secretary General to do so: On the article 19 issue; on his
great resistance to consideration of the Vietnam situation by
the United Nations; and now on this particular matter of the
U.N. forces in the Middle East. We have been disappointed in
all three of those.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Lausche?
Senator Lausche. Yes.

COMPARISON TO BOSPORUS STRAIT

Are France and Great Britain signatories to the convention
defining international waters?
Mr. Meeker. The United Kingdom is a party to the 1958
convention; France is not.
Senator Lausche. Why didn't France subscribe to it?
Secretary Rusk. They have never indicated any reasons.
Senator Lausche. Did either France or England make
statements on the floor of the United Nations comparable to the
ones that were made by the nations that you identified a moment
ago?
Mr. Meeker. Both of them did, and those statements were
along the lines of this very draft declaration.
Senator Lausche. Why is the Bosporus Strait considered
different than all other straits which are mentioned as being
parts of the high seas in the convention?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker?
Mr. Meeker. There is this difference, what a treaty has
been concluded among a number of countries, the Montreux
Convention governing passage through the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles.
Now, there is not any comparable treaty addressed
specifically to this strait.
Senator Lausche. Well, was the treaty on the Bosporus
Strait executed before the convention?
Mr. Meeker. Long before, yes.
Senator Lausche. I see.
Secretary Rusk. The 19th Century at first, wasn't it?
Mr. Meeker. I think it was 1924.
Senator Lausche. Looking at the map it would seem that the
body of water that is connected by the Bosporus Strait with the
Mediterranean has more of the attributes of an inland body of
water.
Is there any rationalization for keeping the Bosporus
Strait out of the general principle declared in the convention?
Secretary Rusk. It is subject to a special regime of
international law based upon a treaty. The same issues might
arise if there were no special treaty governing it.
Senator Clark. You still have the Dardanelles.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, both together.
Senator Clark. Both under one?
Mr. Meeker. Yes.

REACHING AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION ON VIETNAM

Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, you stated that Russia
recognizes our interest in South Vietnam as well as we
recognize their interest in North Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. No, Senator, excuse me, I did not go quite
that far.
I said there ought to be the makings of an agreement
between us on Vietnam based upon our willingness to recognize
their interest in the security, and so forth, of North Vietnam,
and their recognition of our interest in South Vietnam.
Senator Lausche. What is the basis of that interest? How do
we conclude that it is in their interest to have North Vietnam
and in our interest to have South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, they have very close relations with
other socialist countries, and we have a treaty involving South
Vietnam. It is a protocol state to the SEATO Treaty.

LANGUAGE USAGE

Senator Lausche. Now, you recognize the importance of the
words ``will assert'' as indicated by the memorandum which you
have already prepared containing your explanation of those
words. Did you give consideration to the use of some other word
than ``assert'' in preparing this declaration?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker?
Mr. Meeker. The reason that we chose that particular
language was that it is the very language used by both the
United States and the United Kingdom in their statements to the
General Assembly in 1957. We felt that the wording was
expressive of what we meant to say.
It is also the same wording that was used in the aide
memoire given to the government of Israel explaining our
position. Secretary Dulles a few days before in February had
given to Israel, the Israeli Embassy in Washington, an aide
memoire which contained these very words as expressing a part
of our attitude toward the Strait of Tiran. It has a good deal
of history, and we thought we would probably maximize the
support for this declaration by expressing a declaration in
terms that are familiar, that would be recognized by other
governments as something that they had already subscribed to
earlier.
Senator Lausche. Now, I observe in the declaration, you say
that we affirm--``In regard to shipping through the waterways
that serve ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our governments reaffirm
the view that the gulf is an international waterway into and
through which the vessels of all nations have a right of
passage.''
Did you think. of using the word ``reaffirm'' instead of
the word ``assert'' in the second sentence of the second
paragraph: ``our governments reaffirm this right on behalf of
all shipping.'' Did you give any consideration to that? You use
``reaffirm'' in one instance and ``assert'' in the other, and
my question is why.
Mr. Meeker. I think perhaps the two words are used in a
slightly different context. In the first case, the governments
are stating, and in some cases restating, a view that they have
expressed before; and in the second sentence what the
governments would be doing would not be stating a view but
saying that they would pursue, they would assert, they would
maintain, they would do things to make effective their right of
passage.
I think the two words are used in a slightly different
sense, and that is why we used ``reaffirm'' in one case and
``assert'' in the other.
Senator Lausche. Was the word ``will'' instead of ``shall''
used advisedly?
Mr. Meeker. ``Will'' is exactly the language that was used
in 1957; ``will assert.''
Senator Lausche. Well, ``shall'' in this context would mean
a determination and a purpose. ``Will'' has a different
connotation when used in connection with the third person.
Now, my question is was the word ``will'' instead of
``shall'' used advisedly?
Mr. Meeker. It was used because it was the exact same
expression which governments have used before, ten years ago.
Senator Lausche. Now, then----

MANY WAYS TO ASSERT RIGHTS

Secretary Rusk. Senator, may I just intrude for a second
here? I am sorry Senator McClellan left--oh, Senator McClellan,
you are here. I made the point that this language neither
commits us to nor prohibits the use of force here, and that I
told you that the Executive would be back with you later if
that situation should arise.
But I want to be completely frank on this. The language
``will assert'' does not mean that we will do absolutely
nothing. There are many ways to assert rights, and so that if
there is anyone who feels that we ought to pay no attention to
this right in the Gulf of Aqaba or the Strait of Tiran, we
ought to treat it with indifference, we ought not to lift a
finger on that, then this language goes beyond that.
Senator McClellan. Will you yield?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, Senator.
Senator McClellan. You mean by ``assert'' you will assert
it in one instance and if you are not successful in achieving
your objective you will assert it another way. Does it not
imply, I get the implication from it, that when you say
``assert it'' you mean to assert it to the point of gaining the
objective?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the assertion of the right itself is
not a final obligation to go all the way, but it is not trivial
language, Senator. I do not want to be----
Senator McClellan. I know it. I just wanted everybody else
to be----
Secretary Rusk. And you are quite right to want to know
what it means.
What I am saying is we will assert it in every way we can--
in the first instance without the use of force, but on the
question of the use of force, it is not a commitment here. The
President will surely be in consultation with the Congress
before we get to that point.
Senator McClellan. What I was concerned about, Mr.
Secretary, was that we all agree to ``assert.'' We give one
interpretation to what we mean by ``assert.''
Someone else signing it, some other government, gives
another. Therefore, when we say ``assert'' we mean we are going
in there to gain this right; to make it secure and to exercise
this right. The other government might say, ``Well, we didn't
mean that. If that is what you meant, go ahead.'' We will get
out again on a limb with nobody supporting us. That is what
concerns me, because I think we are there in Vietnam now,
assuming we are there, and have a right to be and it is our
place to be there, we have an obligation to be there, I think
there are many others who have a greater obligation to be there
than we have who are not there.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS

Senator Lausche. I want to conclude. Based upon my own
observation of the high seas and supported by the convention
which has been described, to me it appears clear that these
waters, this strait leading into the Gulf of Aqaba, connects
two bodies of international waterways. I subscribe fully to the
rationalization given by Senator Rusk. [Laughter.] Secretary
Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lausche. Yes, by Secretary Rusk.
Demonstrating that a principle is involved there dealing
with many straits throughout the world.
I have no hesitation about declaring by myself as a member
of this committee that these straits are international waters.
That is my view at the present, and I now conclude my
questioning.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Cooper?

INTENTION TO ENFORCE PASSAGE

Senator Cooper. Some of the questions I have perhaps have
been asked. But I think it is important that we consider every
facet of the declaration. I think it is important to say that,
if these straits are not opened, it is our intention to enforce
the passage. I think that is the position.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
Senator Cooper. From your information and knowledge, would
this declaration inhibit or prevent Israel from attempting to
force a passage because if they attempt, I think we all have to
think there is going to be a war.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think there is nothing in this
declaration which in itself would prevent that, particularly
action by Israel to protect or defend the passage of its own
vessels through a strait of this sort.
I do believe, if there are a substantial number of maritime
powers that assert this principle, this might have a delaying
effect upon a cataclysmic decision which the Israeli government
may feel it has to make because of the vital importance of this
strait to it. In that sense, I think this declaration provides
a little more moderation because there is a sense that the
international community is interested in it and is trying to
make good on the rights which are so vital to Israel and, for
that matter, to Jordan, if the Nasser-King Hussein affair were
to flare up in a hostile way at some point.

AN ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL

Senator Cooper. I can understand that. It might for the
time being inhibit Israel from taking action to open the
strait. But if Israel accepted that, it goes along that Israel
would expect the governments who might sign this declaration at
some point to open the strait, isn't this an assurance to
Israel that if the strait is not opened by action of the United
Nations or some diplomatic means that these governments who
then signed the declaration will take action to open the
strait?
Secretary Rusk. In that sense, sir, the situation is no
different from what it was ten years ago in 1957 when the basic
agreement was made on these arrangements. Israel at that time
understood that it had the right, just as other countries did,
with respect to their own ships going through these waters. I
do not think that situation has changed, although at the moment
it is more enflamed.
Senator Cooper. My point is that I think the key to
Israel's position now is that the strait would be opened. If it
does not take action to open the strait itself, then it will
assume that those who signed this declaration have implied, if
not promised, to open the strait.
Secretary Rusk. I think Israel will be prepared to see a
maximum effort made by the maritime nations on this issue
before they made a final decision with respect to self-help on
a unilateral basis.
Senator Cooper. I notice in the second paragraph, the
second sentence: ``Our governments will assert this right on
behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our
governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to
join with others in seeking general recognition of this
right.''
Would Israel be asked to sign this declaration?
Secretary Rusk. That matter has not been finally decided.
There are some pluses and minuses on that. At the present time,
I cannot give you a final answer on that, Senator.

CONSULTING CONGRESS

Senator Cooper. I went through those documents in 1957, and
I noticed the Secretary of State at that time said that the
United States, of course, considering this to be international
waters, would assert its own right to put ships of our registry
through the strait, but it would not assert them in favor of
other ships except by resolution of the Congress.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Cooper. Now, this declaration would go farther.
That would say there that we assert this right not only on
behalf of the United States, but we are prepared to cooperate
among themselves and to join with others in seeking general
recognition of this right.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think if a matter of the use of
force arose, the President would be in full consultation with
the Congress, and we have very much in mind the constitutional
processes here throughout this situation.

SENDING A TEST SHIP

Senator Cooper. One other question. Of course, the best way
to test it would be to send a ship up there, and if that ship
passed without any difficulty, why, at least it has been
asserted as to that particular country and ship.
But suppose the United States sends a ship up and it is
stopped; it is fired upon. The United States would then have to
make a determination to go through against hostile action or
withdraw. It would be a pretty difficult question.
Now, it was said that the President would consult, you have
said that the President would consult with the Congress before
using force. Well, under the situation I have indicated, you
might be using force simply--you would have to use force or
back off if the ship is up there. Would the government consult
with the Congress before sending a ship up to test such a
situation?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I will certainly----
Senator Cooper. Because you would be----
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Take that question under
advisement.
I think I am not able today to give a final categorical
answer, because we are talking here about giving merchant
vessels which are at the disposition of their owners, and the
movements of which are not necessarily under our control; quite
frankly I do not anticipate, we do not know of a U.S. flag ship
at the present time that is planning to go into that strait, do
we, Bob?
Secretary McNamara. No, we do not.
Secretary Rusk. We do not have many in there because I do
not think this contingency is likely to arise. I do not think
this will be the first contingency to arise in this situation.
Senator McClellan. Would you yield?
Senator Cooper. Yes.

CLARIFY MATTERS IN ADVANCE

Senator McClellan. Would you not think generally, there
might be exceptions, that you would make your determination
about what you intended to do before you sent the ship up
there?
Secretary Rusk. What we are intending to do, Senator, in
connection with U.N. business is to get these things clarified
well ahead of time and avoid the problem because some of the
statements President Nasser has made have indicated that,
except for Israeli flag ships, he may not change what has been
happening here over the past years.
Now, the principle involved----
Senator Hickenlooper. Does he assert the right to do it,
however?
Secretary Rusk. Well, he has talked about closing the
strait to foreign flag vessels carrying strategic goods. Now,
in fact, strategic goods have not been going through that
strait other than the possibility of considering crude oil. But
in doing so he has also referred to the Battle Act list of
strategic goods, and crude oil is not on the Battle Act list.
So these are elements of obscurity here which need to be
clarified, and we are trying to find out exactly what it is
that Nasser says he will and will not do, so we will know
what--how we proceed from there.
Senator McClellan. I was not pressing the thing except----
Secretary Rusk. I understand.
Senator McClellan [continuing]. Except before we send a
ship up there we ought to know what we intend to do----
Secretary Rusk. I agree with you.
Senator McClellan [continuing]. Before we send it up there.
We might agree to send it up there and to do nothing. I do not
know. But I do not think that a decision should be made
generally--at least there might be an exception--before we send
a ship up there, as to what we intend to do.
Senator Sparkman. Any more, Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. One more question.

DANGER OF EXACERBATING THE SITUATION

As I understand it, the U.S., through its resolution in the
Security Council, is proposing a dampening down of the
situation.
In your judgment, would this declaration, if issued, have
any effect upon exacerbating the situation, knowing Nasser's
disposition, in view of his declaration that he would not let
any of the ships through?
Secretary Rusk. I think, Senator, in terms of the timing of
the declaration, we want to take into account the then state of
discussion at the Security Council and through private
diplomacy.
Certainly the Arabs will not like this, but if you have
twelve to twenty countries signing it, it has considerable
weight, and in those, such as the President of the Security
Council or, perhaps, the Secretary General, would have more
muscle in their talks with the other side, with the Arabs, to
try to get an answer to this question of the strait, because
this will have, I think, very considerable weight in any such
discussions.

POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator Cooper. I will ask one more that goes beyond this.
Do you anticipate in any way or believe that this situation
there could bring the United States into a confrontation with
the Soviet Union?
Secretary Rusk. I think it is possible, sir.
I did indicate to the Senators earlier, I think you were
here when I said that we had had certain exchanges with the
Soviet Union.
One cannot reply upon anything absolutely in matters of
this sort, but it is our impression that they are not
themselves now reaching out for a military confrontation; that
they do not want major hostilities in the area. Although we
should be under no illusion about it, they would like to make
as many Brownie points as possible in supporting the so-called
progressive states, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, against the more
moderate Arab states, against Israel, and undoubtedly they hope
to pick up prestige in the Arab world.
Now, let me say on that, sir, I mentioned earlier that
President Nasser has climbed on the back of a tiger here. If
when we get through with this thing the strait is opened, and
the Holy war has not occurred, then there is going to be a
rebound from there as far as the Arab man in the street is
concerned.
Senator Cooper. I do not think he can back down. That is
the problem.

CLOSING OF STRAITS MAY BE SELECTIVE

Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield for one
question? Going to a very important part of this, has it been
determined that Nasser asserts the right in his complete
discretion to close the strait to anyone, any shipping, all
shipping?
Secretary Rusk. He has not yet said that categorically.
Senator Hickenlooper. Or selectively closing it.
Secretary Rusk. I think that the Arab answer to that would
be selectively; that is, it seems that their attitude--and Mr.
Meeker, will you check on this--it seems to me they are talking
about closing it to Israeli flag ships and the flags of other
nations carrying strategic goods.
Senator Hickenlooper. If he can close it selectively, then
he asserts complete sovereignty over the strait.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Hickenlooper. How does that affect Jordan's rights?
Jordan's only outlet to the sea is by way of Aqaba.
Secretary Rusk. It could affect Jordan's rights if Cairo
wished to exercise themselves against Jordan.
Senator Hickenlooper. And Saudi Arabia fronts on the sea.
Secretary Rusk. That is right. There are four riparian
countries involved in this Gulf of Aqaba thing, plus the
general international rights of maritime nations.
Now, three of those riparian countries are together because
the issue is Israel, but they may not be together next time
when this question comes up.

VALIDITY OF THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

Senator Kuchel. Senator, may I ask one quick question,
please? Senator Sparkman. Bearing on this? Because I wanted to
call on Secretary McNamara.
Senator Kuchel. Just one quick question.
Mr. Secretary, does the department consider that there is
any validity in the old tripartite agreement? Is there any
obligation to the three signatory countries?
Secretary Rusk. The principle under the tripartite
agreement has been restated by American Presidents, and was
essentially the language used by the President in his statement
of May 23.
As far as Britain is concerned, and there are--you should
look over the record of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in my last appearance, Senator Kuchel----
Senator Kuchel. Okay.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. As far as the British are
concerned, they consider the tripartite declaration has been
overtaken by a press conference statement by President Kennedy,
reaffirmed by the British Prime Minister in the House of
Commons in 1963.
The French are very uncertain on this point. I would think
we would have to assume, though, as far as the organic
tripartite character of that declaration is concerned that
Britain and France would think that was overtaken by the Suez
affair.
Senator Kuchel. Thank you.
Secretary Rusk. Although the policy may be continued by all
three.

LANGUAGE OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE

Senator Sparkman. I want to ask Secretary McNamara to make
some comments.
Senator McNamara. I only wanted to comment on one question
raised by Senator Cooper, Mr. Chairman.
He asked: Does the proposed declaration go beyond the
statement of 1957, specifically with respect to stating that
the U.S. government is prepared to join with others in seeking
general recognition of this right. I think the answer is, no,
it does not, Senator Cooper.
The specific language of the aide memoire delivered by our
government to Israel on February 11, 1957 is, and I am going to
leave out one or two clauses, but the essence of it is, ``The
U.S. is prepared to join with others to secure general
recognition of this right.'' I think, therefore, the language
of the declaration parallels that of the U.S. government's
statement to Israel in February of 1957.
Senator Cooper. I do not want to get legalistic, but I
think this ought to go in the record. Later on February 19,
1957, the Secretary of State, commenting on that aide memoire,
said, as I read it, that it only applied to the United States,
that it would assert that right for vessels under its own
registry, but it had no right to assert it for any other
country.
Senator McNamara. I think this specific language was that--
this was on the 19th of February:

The President has inherent power to use the forces of the United
States to protect American ships and their rights all over the world,
but he has no power, in my opinion, to use the forces of the United
States on behalf of vessels of another flag unless he is given that
authority by some congressional resolution or by a treaty.

The distinction between the----
Senator Lausche. Whom are you quoting?
Senator McNamara. I am quoting Secretary Dulles speaking to
a news conference on February 19, 1957.
I think this is the language that Senator Cooper was
alluding to, and the distinction between that language and the
aide memoire language of February 11, 1957 related to the use
of force in support of the recognition of the right as opposed
to joining with others in seeking general recognition.
I only wanted to point out the language of the declaration
parallels that of the statement to Israel on February 11.
Senator Cooper. I think that is a correct interpretation.
Senator Sparkman. Secretary Rusk is going to have to leave
within a few minutes.
Senator Case?

IN CASE ISRAEL TAKES ACTION

Senator Case. I have one question.
Senator Sparkman. I am sorry, I thought you were still out
of the room when I called on Senator Cooper.
Senator Case. Mr. Secretary, what will the United States do
if Israel moves by land or sea or by air? Have we got a
contingent plan?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, quite frankly we are trying
to look at all of the contingencies in the situation. But I
think it would be quite irresponsible for me to try to come up
with an answer to that question. It would be for the President
to make a determination in that situation and to discuss the
situation with the leadership to decide what the attitude of
the Congress will be.
I just think that is much too far-reaching and serious a
question for me to try to answer casually, quite frankly.
Senator Case. It is a serious question, very serious.
Secretary Rusk. And it is a question we have very much in
mind, of course.
You might want to review, if you have not done so, a good
deal of the record here that is in the Foreign Relations
Committee on the occasion of my last appearance in executive
session on what has been done and said in the past on this
point.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Thurmond?

SOVIET GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator Thurmond. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask if you are
of the opinion or partially of the opinion that I am, that one
of the causes of this trouble in the Middle East is the desire
of the Soviets to possibly cause us to lose our contacts with
the Arabs. I just started to say, knowing that the Soviets
desire to stir up trouble over the world, and their goal is
still to dominate and take over the world, if they can create
an incident there and get the Arabs all together, it seems they
have been very successful from what has happened with King
Hussein and Nasser have been at odds and now are joined
together. All the Arab countries it seems are consolidating and
working together now, and if they do, and throw Israel on the
other side, then they may feel we will defend Israel. That will
cause the Arabs to go against us, causing them to cancel our
oil contracts with them. I just wonder if you have any
information on that.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think there is no question but
that the Soviet Union has been working for some time to
increase its own position in the Arab world by supporting
these, particularly these four progressive states, and that the
confrontation between Nasser and the more moderate and
conservative states has been a part of that controversy.
This has been enhanced because Nasser has now been able to
pose an issue with Israel on which all Arabs apparently have to
speak together. This is a matter for internal survival for most
of them on this particular issue.
But I would point out that this is the only issue on which
they can speak together, and although the Arabs publicly are
saying a good many things these days in terms of unity on this
point, I do not believe the moderate and conservative Arabs are
under any illusion about some of the other elements involved in
this situation.
I think that is true of Hussein. I think it is true of King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and I think it is true of Tunisia,
Lebanon, Morocco.
So I would not take too tragically a view at this point of
the possibility that the entire Arab world suddenly is going to
move into the arms of the Soviet Union over this particular
issue.
It is very important for us to get this straight, this
situation straightened out, so that the other issues in the
Arab world will come to the surface again.

DENYING THE WEST ARAB OIL

I think the Soviet Union is more interested in perhaps
denying the West the Arab oil than it is in getting the oil for
themselves. But that is very much a two-edge sword. It would
cause some major disruption in the free world if Arab oil were
denied, say, to Western Europe. But it also means that the Arab
countries themselves would lose their basic resource. They
cannot drink the oil. They cannot do anything else with it but
sell it, and the Communist Bloc is not--does not need it in
terms of oil supply.
It would cause great disarrangement for all the rest of us,
but it certainly would have a large effect on the Arab world if
they lose world markets in the sale of their oil.
Senator Thurmond. If they can deny the West that oil they
would certainly accomplish a big objective they have in mind.
Secretary Rusk. I suppose perhaps in the short run. I do
not quite see reducing the Middle East, even from their point
of view, to subsistence and complete dependence upon their
support in lieu of Arab sales of oil to the entire world. I
think there are some limitations on their side as well as on
ours in that situation.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, on account of the shortness
of time I will not ask any further questions.
Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman, may I have one minute?
Senator Sparkman. Okay, Senator Stennis.
Senator Stennis. I was going to take but one minute.

U.S. PEOPLE WILL NOT SUPPORT UNILATERAL ACTION

I want to thank you for being among those invited here. Mr.
Secretary, I want to commend you for trying to get some kind of
agreement and committal from other nations.
I judge you think that nothing effective is going to come
out of the U.N. on it. So I think we ought to reach someone
else. I do not believe our people--I want you to remember, at
least one Senator thinks our people are not going to support
another undeclared war, a shooting war, alone, of us going in
alone. I just do not believe that it can be over.
I think, therefore, you ought to tell England and France
and others that is the situation. That they need not think that
they can stand by and wait for us to go in alone. I believe,
though, that is in the back of a lot of their minds, at least,
that they will hold back until they are convinced of that fact.
Senator McClellan. Exactly what I was trying to determine
about this word ``assert.''
Senator Stennis. Yes. I think I ought to say that here.
I do not want to say it on the floor, not yet, because I
think you are working hard and making some headway. I was glad
to see you are trying to get these other nations.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word about
the U.N. security aspect of this.
Senator Stennis. I was not trying to discredit them. I
think you----
Secretary Rusk. I think it is unlikely that this matter is
going to be settled by a resolution of the Security Council,
that is, a formal resolution, because there are vetoes and
there are voting problems and things of that sort.
But if you will remember the Cuban missile crisis, it
proved to be very important that that question was officially
before the U.N. because that helped to take certain of the
prestige factors into custody, to the ice box, for a period,
while other processes reached a solution.
Now, the same thing may well be true here, the fact that it
is before the Security Council gives other processes of
discussion a somewhat better chance to operate. So we just do
not know.
Senator Stennis. I was not suggesting that you abandon
them.
I am just glad you are going another route.
Secretary Rusk. I understand.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, when Israel----
Senator Sparkman. Wait a minute.
Senator Stennis. Thank you.
That is all, Mr. Chairman. I just want to make that
statement.

IF ISRAEL QUESTIONS THE MEANING

Senator Lausche. If and when Israel asks what is the
meaning of the words ``will assert'' what answer will be given
to them?
Secretary Rusk. As far as this declaration is concerned,
the same answer Mr. Meeker read that we will give to all other
governments.
Senator Lausche. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Javits?

ASSESSMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, I am a guest of the
committee. I appreciate it very greatly. If the chair allows me
to ask one question I will, but only because it has not been
covered. It is essentially a question of Secretary McNamara,
and the question is this. Is there any reason to revise the
U.S. appraisal of either the valor, the capacity or the
fidelity of the forces of Israel in this situation?
Secretary McNamara. No, sir; there is not. We believe they
are well-equipped, well-trained, well-led and highly motivated.
Senator Javits. Thank you.

ATTACKS ON U.S. FLAG SHIPS

Senator Lausche. This further question, and I wish it would
be put following the last one. Do I understand that before any
affirmative action having the relationship to actual shooting,
the administration will come before this committee or before
the Congress?
Secretary Rusk. That is my clear understanding, sir.
Senator Lausche. Yes.
Now, then, what would the attitude be of the administration
about sending a ship up there and not knowing what is going to
happen and if it is shot at?
Secretary Rusk. A U.S. flag ship?
Senator Lausche. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. We do not have a U.S. flag merchant vessel
scheduled there for the indefinite future.
We would like to avoid that situation again by getting the
question settled before we get there. But I cannot give you a
precise answer to that question at the moment, Senator.
Senator Lausche. Well, I would assume that you would not
undertake to do that while you are aiming toward negotiations
and some amicable way----
Secretary Rusk. A similar incident may arise by some other
flag ship going through there. The owners have been rather
skittish in the present state because they do not see clearly
what would happen to their ships, and Lloyds has taken the
insurance away.
Mr. Chairman, if I may say so, I greatly appreciated the
invitation of the Foreign Relations Committee on my last
appearance here to feel entitled to call upon the committee at
any time of the day or night for further consultation. I hope,
perhaps, that invitation can remain because we may need to
consult with you very promptly on very short notice.
Senator Sparkman. It certainly does remain.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ABBA EBAN

Senator Lausche. Are you able to tell us what the President
said to Eban in the meeting the other day? If you are not, just
say so.
Secretary Rusk. May I just have a word with the Vice
President?
[Discussion off the record.]

IN THE HIGHEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION

Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one word with
reference to the administration. I think what they have done so
far has been in the highest interests of our nation, and for
one senator I would like to say so privately and publicly.
Senator Sparkman. Thank you, Senator Javits. Secretary
McNamara? [Laughter.]
Secretary McNamara. I feel privileged and complimented.
Senator Sparkman. That is the result of what somebody else
did.
Senator Lausche, I believe.
Well, we appreciate the attendance of both of you
gentlemen. May I say this, that speaking on behalf of the
committee, and I am sure for the Chairman, we stand ready at
any time--I am sure Secretary Rusk remembers back during 1950
and 1951 when we were trying to work up the Japanese peace
treaty, our Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs was ready, and
we held meetings, morning, noon, and night.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, at the risk of being boring,
I want to emphasize that I am trying to be frank today, and
that we have to exercise discretion in what we say.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Ad Hoc Human Rights Subcommittee
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The ad hoc subcommittee met in executive session at 10:55
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper and Cooper.
Executives J, K, and L, 88th Congress, 1st session, the
Human Rights Conventions, were ordered reported to the full
committee.
[The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Symington
(presiding), Morse, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper,
Carlson, Williams and Cooper.
Also present: Senators Allott, Anderson, Baker, Bennett,
Boggs, Brooke, Byrd of Virginia, Byrd of West Virginia, Cotton,
Dirksen, Dominick, Fannin, Griffin, Harris, Hatfield, Holland,
Hollings, Hruska, Javits, Jordan of Idaho, Kennedy of
Massachusetts, Long of Louisiana, McClellan, McGee, McIntyre,
Metcalf, Miller, Monroney, Montoya, Morton, Moss, Murphy,
Muskie, Pastore, Pearson, Prouty, Proxmire, Scott, Smith,
Spong, Thurmond, Tydings, Williams of New Jersey, Yarborough,
and Young of North Dakota.
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs; accompanied by William B. Macomber, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of
State, briefed the group on the Middle East situation. All
members of the Senate were invited.
[The committee adjourned at 6:30 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

----------

Wednesday, June 7, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:10 p.m., in
room S-207, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams,
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Senators Allott, Baker, Bennett, Boggs, Byrd
of Virginia, Byrd of West Virginia, Cannon, Cotton, Dirksen,
Dominick, Fannin, Fong, Griffin, Hansen, Harris, Hatfield,
Hayden, Hruska, Javits, Jordan of Idaho, Kennedy of New York,
Kuchel, Magnuson, McGee, Miller, Mondale, Monroney, Montoya,
Morton, Moss, Murphy, Muskie, Pastore, Percy, Prouty, Randolph,
Ribicoff, Russell, Scott, Smith, Spong, Stennis, Thurmond,
Tydings, Yarborough, and Young of North Dakota.
William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations, Department of State.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the
committee staff.
The Chairman. We will come to order. The Secretary has
another meeting at 6:30, and we have to start on time. Close
the doors, Mr. Kuhl.
The briefing this afternoon on the situation in the Middle
East for all members of the Senate was arranged at the request
of the administration. In view of the widespread interest of
members of the Senate in developments there, the administration
thought it would be helpful for this briefing to take place at
this time.
For those members of the Foreign Relations Committee who
are present, I want them to know that I am seeking to arrange
for the Secretary to meet with us tomorrow or Friday for
consultation and an examination in greater depth of our
policies in the Middle East. I am sure all members of the
Senate appreciate the fact that a briefing of the kind we have
arranged for today does not permit the free exchange of ideas
and the examination of policy in depth which is essential if
the Senate as an institution is to handle its business in such
a way as to discharge its constitutional responsibilities in
the field of foreign policy.
Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you. I hope you
will proceed as you wish.
If you are willing and have time to entertain questions
after your statement, I shall do my best to recognize members
of the Senate in order of their seniority of that body.
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished Senators.
I do not come today with a prepared statement, but rather
notes on the basis of which I want to bring you up to date on
where we are at the moment, and to invite your questions and
comments on the situation as it may unfold.
The Security Council of the United Nations has just held
its meeting, called for by the Soviet Union today, and it has
passed a second resolution on the cease-fire designating 4
o'clock today Eastern Standard Time as the time for cessation
of firing and all military activities.
Upon the cease-fire, the situation as we understand it is
that Israel has said it would welcome a cease-fire, but for
that, with the exception of Jordan, we do not have a clear
expression from the other Arab governments as to whether they
are willing to accept it.
We do have resistance, publicly expressed by countries like
Iraq, who are not in direct touch with Israeli forces. But the
situation is somewhat obscure on the Arab side.
That itself is of some interest because the Soviet Union,
beginning yesterday, has been pressing for an immediate cease-
fire, and has not been able to produce Arab agreement to the
cease-fire. Indeed, the general Arab view, expressed in the
corridors last evening at the end of that long evening session,
was that the unanimous resolution of the Security Council was a
sellout to Israel, and that the Soviet Union's support for that
resolution was a betrayal of their support for the Arabs.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

As far as the military situation is concerned, for all
practical purposes I think we can assume that Israel has
established military superiority throughout the Sinai
Peninsula, that it has gained complete air supremacy, and that
it is on the verge of having full military control of the West
Bank of the Jordan river as far as that portion of Jordan is
concerned.
We have heard reports during the day that Eastern European
countries are rushing equipment to Egypt. We do not see mass
movements of equipment. We doubt very much that such equipment
will make much difference in the present military situation.
The report of flights of aircraft from Algeria to Egypt are
not likely to change the military situation substantially. So,
in terms of assessing the situation, I think it is a reasonable
assumption as a factual matter that the Israeli forces have
succeeded up to practically the canal itself, have seized Sharm
el-Sheikh at the Straits of Tiran, and are in command of the
West Bank.
I would like to comment briefly on the costs to us thus far
in terms of our situation in the Near East.
We have now had breaches of relations from nine countries.
Those are Egypt, Algeria, Syria, the Yemen, the Sudan, Iraq,
Mauritania, Lebanon and, I believe, Burundi down in Central
Africa.
I think we need not at the moment try to speculate as to
how far this diplomatic action goes and how long it is likely
to last because the situation in the different capitals seems
to be somewhat obscure.

LIMITING THE BREACH

On the assumption that this is a very private meeting, Mr.
Chairman, and what I am saying here will not be quoted outside,
a number of these governments which are breaking relations have
discussed ways and means of limiting the breach.
For example, Egypt has talked about our leaving behind a
number of diplomatic and administrative officers to carry on
functions under the technical supervision of a protecting
power.
The Sudan has talked about finding arrangements to continue
economic, cultural and business relationships, and we think
that there are other ways in which they can translate this into
what has now come to be called a soft break rather than a hard
break in diplomatic relations, somewhat the way they did in
Germany over the recognition in Israel, somewhat in terms of
the break, breach, where Great Britain holds Rhodesia.
Nevertheless it is true that we are suffering at the
present time significantly as far as Arab public opinion is
concerned.
This is related to the general view that Israel committed
aggression in this situation, and that the United States is in
sympathetic support of Israel. More specifically, it has been
radically inflamed by the direct charges which have been widely
circulated throughout the Arab world that U.S. aircraft
participated in the attacks on Egypt, and from Damascus that
U.S. infantry forces are involved in the operations.
We do not know anyone who believes it except--that is as
far as governments are concerned. We know the Soviets know
better. They have their own vessels alongside practically our
own carriers, and they know perfectly well that our aircraft
have not taken part in these operations.
The Libyans know we have not used Wheelus Airfield for any
such purposes. But as Arabs have explained it to me in the last
24 hours, President Nasser has felt that it was necessary for
him to make a case that he was defeated not by Israel but by a
combination of Israel and two great powers, the U.S. and the
U.K.
But the cost to us in Arab public opinion in the short run
is, of course, substantial.

THE OIL PROBLEM

As far as oil is concerned, the situation at the present
time is fluid. Some of the production has been stopped as a
means of protecting the actual production facilities
themselves.
For example, at Bahrain, the facilities are closed for
protective purposes.
ESSO Libya has stopped production in exports.
Saudi Arabia has joined those who stopped exporting to the
U.S. and the U.K.
Oil sanctions applied just to the U.S. and U.K. are not
likely to have very far-reaching effects because if they
continue to send oil into Western Europe generally we and the
U.K. can get along reasonably well with other arrangements and
shifting sources.
But, nevertheless, the oil problem remains touchy, and we
have a full-time team working on that with the oil industry,
both our own and international oil industries, in order to keep
the situation under review and take the protective steps that
may be necessary.
The closing of the Suez Canal, of course, affects the
shipment of oil into Europe, adds about 16 days to the passage
of oil tankers. But the fact that in recent years tankers have
gotten to be very large has reduced the impact of that problem
upon supplying Western Europe.

A STUNNING SETBACK TO NASSER

The costs to others also are high. Nasser has had a
stunning setback. We already see signs of considerable
disillusionment in the Arab world about the predicament into
which Nasser has led them.
Quite apart from the question of who might have started
this affair, the Arabs, including many in Cairo, now apparently
are saying, ``Well, in any event, he should have own better in
terms of the military situation or should have known more about
the attitude of the Soviet Union or more about the dangers
which might have been created by action taken over against
Israel.''
We have nothing to confirm the newspaper report out of
London this morning that the general of the forces in Sinai has
taken over command of the armed forces, and that Nasser is
expected to be finished.
We just have nothing pointing in that direction at all, and
it is the kind of newspaper story that could be written out of
an armchair in London without any special information to go on.

SOVIET INEFFECTIVENESS

The Soviet Union has, I think, in the longer run suffered a
considerable setback here. There has been a considerable Arab
reaction against the, what they consider to be, support,
encouragement and pledges from the Soviet Union which, in the
showdown, did not prove to be effective.
I might say to you very privately that we do not see
indications thus far from our Watch Committee that the Soviet
Union is engaging in any military moves that might indicate a
military intervention in the situation. Of course, we would be
extremely interested in that if any such indications came
along.
But, in looking at the situation, we are puzzled as to
whether the Soviet Union had quite a different military
estimate of the situation than we and other governments in the
West have had for some time about the relative capacity of the
armed forces as between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Indeed, I think the speed with which the Israeli forces
prevailed surprised their own estimators, as well as our own.
But we are puzzled about whether the Soviets really thought
that in this kind of a clash the Arab forces would be able to
prevail.
You would suppose that they felt that they knew a good deal
about the Arab forces since they had equipped many of them with
a lot of their equipment, and had trained a lot of them to fly
in airplanes and run their tanks.
But if this did arise out of a miscalculation, then I
suppose that somebody in Moscow is in some difficulty at the
present time.

PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET UNION

We also are somewhat puzzled by the fact that the tenor of
the private exchanges which we have had from the Soviet Union
over the past 10 days or so are quite different from the public
attitude of the Soviet Union as reflected in their broadcasts
and their statements even in the United Nations.
Their private exchanges have shown a much better, a much
greater, degree of moderation in terms of an interest in
restraining the two sides, in terms of bringing the fighting to
a conclusion when it started than one would read from their
public broadcasts.
So we cannot ourselves yet make a very good judgment about
just what the Soviet Union considers its gain to be.
We do know they are giving advice to the Arabs at the
present time which the Arabs are not yet prepared to accept in
terms of how to bring the situation to a close.

ISRAEL'S STUNNING SUCCESS

As, far as Israel is concerned, if Nasser has had a
stunning setback, the Israelis have had a stunning military
success.
We, I think, can expect Israel to take a very strong
position on a very simple notion put forward by Foreign
Minister Eban when he said that Israel will not withdraw to a
state of belligerence, but will withdraw to a state of peace.
I think we can expect Israel to insist very hard that just
the restoration of some temporary arrangements, supervised by
the U.N., is not good enough.
I think we can expect them to take the position that they,
too, are one of the 122 members of the United Nations; that
they are a sovereign state; that their existence will have to
be acknowledged; and they will have the prerequisites of any
other sovereign state. I think we will find that they may be
very resistant to any kind of U.N. supervisory machinery, as
indicating some discrimination against Israel among the 122
members of the U.N.
I think we can be very sure the Israelis will insist upon a
permanent solution to the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of
Aqaba situation.
I think they very well might insist upon an opening of the
Suez Canal, in other words, the attributes of everybody in this
situation.
Of course, what Israel has in mind is going to be extremely
difficult for the Arab side to take, at least under the present
governments of the Arab countries.
Now, whether there will be changes among some of these
governments we cannot at the present time know for certain. But
you all know the deep feelings on both sides in the situation,
and the problems which the Arab governments have had in making
sense in certain occasions, given the attitude of the mobs in
the street and the ease with which high passions can be whipped
up in connection with the relationships with Israel.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING

Now, we hope very much that out of this crisis, which we
tried to prevent, that there can come an opportunity for some
much more far-reaching solutions to some of these problems than
have thus been achieved.
It may well be that this is a time to make some real
headway on the Arab refugee problem. It certainly is the time
when this question of standing people apart with rights of
belligerence will have to be dealt with.
The claim of the Egyptians that they could close Straits of
Tiran because they were in a state of war with Israel and can
exercise rights of belligerence is the sort of claim that just
cannot endure in the future if there is to be peace in that
area.
We would hope that out of this could come a more solid,
regional approach to economic and social development in the
area, and under such cooperative ventures, such as
transportation and water developments, things such as that.
We would hope at long last the Soviet Union might be
willing to talk some sense about getting the arms suppliers
together in getting some limitations on the race in
conventional weapons.
As I have told some of you before, we have had occasional
contacts with the Soviets on that subject. They have been
willing to cooperate with respect to nuclear weapons, but have
never been willing to talk seriously about finding some
limitations on a level of conventional arms. It may be that
rather than spend an additional billion dollars to try to
restore what has been lost in the fighting in the last three
days, in reequipping, say, Egypt, that they might be willing to
let the Geneva Conference, for example, get together a group to
talk seriously about some sort of arms limitations in the area
as a whole.

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

The most immediate next question for the Security Council,
if the Arabs do come in and accept the cease-fire, will be to
work on the problems of withdrawal, and that will immediately
involve us in the nature of a permanent settlement.
I would not want to predict that it is going to be easy to
get a quick withdrawal of Israeli forces unless they see more
clearly than they do now the picture of the eventual settlement
which will come out of this present situation.
We can expect considerable instability and fluidity in the
area. I would hesitate to try to predict today how many of the
Arab governments can survive this situation.
I do want you to know that behind the scenes there is a
good deal more moderation in the Arab world and among Arab
governments than would appear on some of the broadcasts, and
that very much behind the scenes there is a considerable
satisfaction that President Nasser, who has caused so much
trouble among the Arabs themselves, has had a very significant
setback in this situation.
Mr. Chairman, that is a very brief summary of where we are
at the moment. I will be glad to take questions and try to
elaborate any particular points that might come up.
Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
If it is agreeable, I would like to call on members in
order of seniority.
Senator Hayden, do you have any questions?
Senator Hayden. No.
Mr. Chairman. Senator Russell?
Senator Russell. Yes, I have one or two.

IMPACT OF OIL SANCTIONS

Mr. Secretary, I happen to have been in France in 1956 when
they closed the canal, and it was very disagreeable with the
French. Even the hotels broke down in cooking and heating.
Do the French have adequate oil from Algeria and other
places without coming through the canal now?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the French are at the present time
not being specifically subject to oil sanctions by the Arab
countries.
Senator Russell. I know. But how about the canal, is it
closed?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the canal is closed. They have
important oil resources in both Algeria and in Libya.
Senator Russell. And they are adequate?
Secretary Rusk. So we think as far as France is concerned
they will be in reasonably good shape.
There will have to be some readjustment involving ourselves
and the United Kingdom.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have been getting certain of
our Far Eastern oil out of there, out of some of those
countries. But we think that adjustments can be made without
causing us any trouble.

U.S. AID TO THOSE WHO BREAK RELATIONS

Senator Russell. You are talking about this soft breaking
of relations. If they break relations and withdraw their
ambassadors and, I assume, make ours come home, and yet they
still want to stay on the dole and the aid program and all
that, it would seem to me to be a rather gentle way to run a
breach of relations.
Secretary Rusk. No. I would think, Senator, in the case of
those who break relations with us that the U.S. Government aid
programs would not go forward under the rug. But I do bring to
your attention the fact that we do participate, for example, in
the FAO's world food program, and I think there might be some
very serious difficulties if we were to drop out of the FAO's
world food program, which is somewhat limited in scope, because
a particular country has broken relations with us.
There is a more--there is a second problem we will have to
think about, and I do not want to--we do not have a final
decision on this, and that is in those countries where there is
a breach of relations but where American private citizens are
welcome to remain, and where some of our voluntary agencies
such as Church World Services or missionary groups, and things
of that sort, remain behind, whether they should be permitted
to go ahead with their own relief work based on Title III of
P.L. 480. That is a rather complicated problem in relation to
our longer range interests in those countries.
Senator Russell. We stopped it in Egypt without any
difficulty.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. I am not now suggesting an answer. I
am just saying----
Senator Russell. Frankly, I do not think if a nation severs
relations with us that we ought to go out of our way to ship
them anything.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Russell. I do not think that should be just
considered a kind of subject that does not really mean
anything, because that is one of the things that gets the world
into too many troubles, because we gloss over these things.
Secretary Rusk. I want you gentlemen to know that this is a
problem we will have very shortly, and that is what we do about
our church charitable groups which have been operating
privately in these countries and have used relatively limited
amounts of food in connection with our work in these countries.
I do not disagree with the feelings you express, Senator,
but I am just saying it is somewhat complicated.

U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR A CEASE-FIRE

Senator Russell. Apparently we have put a good deal of
pressure on Israel with respect to the cease-fire. Why do we do
that when they were gaining a great victory over people like
Nasser, to whom we say we do not owe any obligations at all?
Did the Israelis ask us to intercede?
Secretary Rusk. I think the Israelis were very pleased with
the resolutions passed by the Security Council, and you will
notice also that the Arabs called the resolution of the
Security Council a sellout to Israel.
Senator Russell. Yes, I am aware of that. But I cannot
believe that Russia would have gone so far if they had not had
some intimation from Nasser that he was about to call it quits.
Secretary Rusk. What we were not able to agree upon in the
Security Council was the idea that the Security Council would
order a withdrawal on the basis of a status quo of June 5 that
would have been----
Senator Russell. The Israelis have not indicated any
willingness to do that. If they do, they ought to have their
heads examined.
Secretary Rusk. Nor do we because we have, as a maritime
nation, an interest in the straits of Tiran, and some of the
other countries----
Senator Russell. And so with the Suez Canal.
Secretary Rusk. The withdrawal of the forces is necessarily
going to get caught up in the nature of the settlement. It is
going to take some time, and I hope----
Senator Russell. If the Israelis gained a more complete
victory, it would be more simple, would it not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, they have a complete victory now
unless they crossed the canal. I do not know whether they want
to try that or not.
Senator Russell. They may not want to over-extend
themselves.

PROTECT ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENCE

The Chairman. I may overlook somebody, but according to my
estimates, next is Senator Magnuson.
Senator Magnuson. I wanted to ask the Secretary this.
Naturally a lot of us have been contacted by many people
interested in this whole matter since this happened,
particularly the Jewish people in America, who have done so
much to help Israel become what it is, which you and I know so
well, and I would hope that we would not be a party to any kind
of withdrawal, number one, to the status quo.
Number two, I would hope we would not become a party to
withdrawal and leave something hanging, but we ought to now
make as much permanence as we can for the independence of
Israel for a long, long time, and get all maritime nations in
concert on this old, real serious problem, leaving out the
political, ideological problem of freedom of the seas.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. I think that----
Senator Magnuson. I hope--I was going to ask you--are we
pretty much not formally, but are we pretty much committed to
that generally?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we ourselves have got an
interest, as we have explained in earlier briefings down here,
in this problem of the Straits of Tiran, and I myself have no
doubt that that question is going to get settled in connection
with the present situation.
Senator Magnuson. Yes. I think the Israeli people have got
to know there is some kind of permanency of Israel.
Secretary Rusk. But I think, sir----
Senator Magnuson. In other words, I would go right on to
Cairo if I were the Israelis.

ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk. There would be some advantage in letting
the President of the Security Council, a Dane, Mr. Tabor, and
the Secretary General, have the first whack at negotiations
between the two sides on the basis of a final settlement.
There are some reasons why it is better for us not to
ourselves take on that job as a volunteer.
Senator Magnuson. I understand that.
Secretary Rusk. Although we have vital interests in many of
the questions concerned, and we would be following it very
closely with the Security Council. But we are not a very good
party now to talk to the Arabs.
Senator Magnuson. No.
Secretary Rusk. And Mr. Tabor, President of the Security
Council, probably is in a better position to do so.
Senator Magnuson. Yes.
Senator Russell. How long will he be there?
Secretary Rusk. I beg pardon?
Senator Russell. How long will Tabor be there?
Secretary Rusk. Throughout the month of June.
Senator Russell. That is what I thought. Who succeeds him?
Secretary Rusk. Then Ethiopia, and I think in the case of
Ethiopia they have interests very close to ours. They have
relations with both Israel and the Arabs, and again, very
privately, the Ethiopians have let it be known to us if this
Straits of Tiran issue was not settled, Ethiopia was finished
as a Red Sea owner, and they have a vital stake in this
question of freedom of navigation in there.
Senator Magnuson. I just want to say it seems to me a
meeting point for a great number of people in the world would
be this maritime problem, the freedom of the seas.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. I think there is no question about
that.
Senator Magnuson. Bring them in.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM TO ISRAEL

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, reports have come over
the air since the 4:00 o'clock meeting this afternoon
indicating that Russia has sent some kind of a notice in the
nature of an ultimatum that if Israel or if the Israelis do not
stop shooting, Russia will withdraw recognition, with no
mention of the fact that the Egyptians should stop shooting,
too.
Now, can you verify that or give us any details on that?
Secretary Rusk. I saw a press ticker, Senator, that the
Russians said to Israel if they did not cease fire immediately
that Russia would break relations.
Well, in this day and age that is not a very severe
sanction, and I do not believe that Israel is going to be too
upset about that particular kind of threat.
We have not seen thus far signs of any action that the
Soviet Union might take on the ground in this situation, with
the possible exception of sending in some additional supplies,
military supplies, if they can find anybody to give them to
when they get there.
I should think that sending in more military supplies in
this situation would be a rather unattractive project right
now.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is interesting.

A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO ISRAEL

Well, I do not know, I would not dispute your view on this,
but I think we have a great opportunity to do something with
the Arab world now, and I do not agree that we have a special
obligation to serve Israel. But I think we have a special
obligation to serve the integrity of Israel, along with every
other country over there. I would not single Israel out against
any other country, if we can save the peace of the world there.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, in that connection, if you
look back over the last decade, the U.S. in a variety of ways
has taken action on behalf of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in pursuance of
this notion that we are committed to the independence and the
territorial integrity of all the states in this area.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I think that is our proposition,
and I think we make a tragic mistake if we choose up sides for
any one country unless our own vital interests later indicate
that we have to do it of necessity. I do not think we have come
to that point yet.
Secretary Rusk. We are inclined--and I think I ought to
mention this because if there are those who have a strongly
different view it would be helpful to know it--we are inclined
in this matter of the breach of relations to let these other
countries determine the extent of the breach in the sense that
if they want to maintain consular, cultural relations, we will
do it. Let us exclude aid from that, because breaking
diplomatic relations and maintaining aid programs--but consular
relations or cultural relations or those who say in the case of
Egypt ``We want your officials and people running the oil
companies to stay,'' we are inclined to do so on that basis.
But we are inclined to let them set the level of the breach
and proceed on that basis in order to make it easier to restore
the situation exactly.
Senator Russell. As long as there is any quid pro quo, that
is all right. But if it is one-sided----
Secretary Rusk. No, they would have the same type of
relationship that we would have there.

CHANGE OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

Senator Hickenlooper. Just one question in the nature of an
observation. I think it is entirely possible in the settlement
of this situation that there may have to be certain territorial
rearrangements, at least so far as claims are concerned,
involving the freedom of the seas in the Gulf of Aqaba, and the
freedom of the use of the canal, and things of that kind, which
might be considered to be territorial alterations.
But I, what I meant was a massive or substantial change of
territorial sovereignty.
Secretary Rusk. At the beginning of this recent fighting,
Prime Minister Eshkol and General Dayan both said Israel did
not have territorial ambitions.
My guess is that they are going to want to have some pretty
hard guarantees on the Straits of Tiran, and that this is not
necessarily their last word on this particular point.
But if they were to go for larger territorial changes in
that area, the problem would be there that they probably would
be sowing the seeds for another conflagration at that point.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Young?

ISRAELI CONTROL OF WATERWAYS

Senator Young of North Dakota. Is Israel in about a
position to take over the Tiran Straits or to control the Suez
Canal? I would think after having gone this far it would be
possible for them to do so, and in their own interest they
would go to take control of the Tiran Straits, and then they
could dictate----
Secretary Rusk. Well, they have occupied Sharm El Sheikh,
which is the position opposite the Straits of Tiran on the
southeastern corner of the Sinai Peninsula. So as far as the
Gulf of Aqaba is concerned, they control it at the present
time.
Senator Young of North Dakota. And they are pretty secure
and would be hard to dislodge?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes. I think they are very secure from
a military point of view.
Senator Young of North Dakota. I mean, the Arabs do not
have any sizable force?
Secretary Rusk. No. The truth seems to be, gentlemen, that
the Arab Air Forces have been, for all practical purposes,
destroyed, and that for the last twenty-four hours, the Israel
Air Force has been able to operate not against Arab air, but
against Arab ground forces, tanks and things of that sort.
Senator Young of North Dakota. How near are they to
controlling the Suez Canal?
Secretary Rusk. Well, they are on the east bank of the
canal. They probably could deny the use of the canal. But in
terms of seizing it and operating it, that is quite another
matter.

SEEKING A CEASE-FIRE

Senator Young of North Dakota. How would you get a nation
like Israel to stop now, to get them to have a cease-fire when
there is such bitter hatred?
Secretary Rusk. They are prepared to cease fire if the
Arabs will. But the question of cleaning up afterwards in terms
of a final settlement is another question.
Senator Young of North Dakota. They could agree to it.
Whether they would do it or not----
Secretary Rusk. No. We are a long ways away from a final
settlement of this yet, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. I do not believe I will ask any
questions.
The Chairman. Senator Williams of Delaware?
Senator Williams. I will skip.
The Chairman. Senator Stennis?
Senator Stennis. Mr. Secretary, you said that Israel was
ready to cease fire. But to what extent are they continuing to
advance militarily, territorially?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, they are continuing right
straight along in the absence of a cease-fire with the Arabs.
Senator Stennis. I see.
Secretary Rusk. Now again, I can tell you that we have for
48 hours had some part in contacts between Israel and Jordan
with respect to a cease-fire, because both sides apparently
would like to have one. But it has broken down because local
commanders, probably local Jordanian commanders, have not, in
fact, stopped shooting, and the question was whether the
Jordanian command had control of all of its own forces.
But while the other side is still shooting the Israelis are
going ahead. Now they are prepared to cease fire if the Arabs
will.

ISRAEL'S MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Senator Stennis. Do you expect them to physically take the
Canal, all of it? You say they have a negative on it now. But
do you expect them to----
Secretary Rusk. I do not have any information on what the
Israeli military objectives are. They have been pretty close-
mouthed on this situation. The situation is quite different
than in Vietnam where everybody is able to report anything they
want to report out of there, and put it all on television. Both
sides in this situation put a censorship on it immediately, and
both sides have been rather close-mouthed in talking to other
governments about their military plans and purposes.

MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Senator Stennis. Quite briefly, what was that you said
about the equipment coming out of Eastern Europe, the military
equipment or supplies? You said that that was vague and
uncertain.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have heard some reports that
additional military supplies were being sent from Eastern
Europe to Egypt. But whether they, in fact, unload or will
arrive, I should think is qualified somewhat by the very fast-
moving situation on the ground.
Senator Stennis. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

COMPELLING A CEASE-FIRE

Senator Mundt. I think you said, Mr. Secretary, that the
cease-fire is to begin at 4 o'clock today.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. But that turns upon the willingness of
both sides to take it.
Senator Mundt. Right.
Secretary Rusk. And they do not have anything very hard
from the Arab side on this point, with the exception of Jordan.
Senator Mundt. My question is, assuming the possibility of
no cease-fire today or tomorrow at 4 o'clock, have we any other
suggestions to propose to the Security Council such as,
perhaps, economic sanctions against Egypt to compel them to
cease fire and, if so, would the Russians join us?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, quite frankly we have not
gotten to that point yet. We think the President of the
Security Council and the Secretary General ought to be in touch
with both sides to try to work out a cease-fire.
We think if they did that they would have the cooperation
of the Russians in the present situation, but query whether
some of the Arab governments could feel they could accept a
cease-fire and survive.
I am not sure what the situation is in Cairo at the present
time, for example. I just do not know.
Senator Mundt. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Smith?
Senator Smith. No questions. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
Senator Carlson. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, in relation to the remark you
made about the Foreign Relations Committee, I will be very
happy to come tomorrow at a time, a mutually convenient time,
so we will try to get a further briefing tomorrow.
The Chairman. Fine.
Senator Monroney.

REESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ARAB NATIONS

Senator Monroney. Mr. Secretary, what gain would we have to
make any hastening or rushing the re-recognition of the Arab
countries that broke off relations to justify apparently their
story that our planes were attacking them?
Secretary Rusk. It is not a question of our rushing, but
the question is simply not pressing the gap any further than
they themselves insist upon pressing it at this time.
We do have important interests in these countries. We would
like to have a presence, if one is feasible, and representation
there.
My own guess, Senator, is that there is going to be a
considerable revulsion against the Soviet Union in the Arab
world here during the next several months, and if we have a
presence there it would come in rather handy for us to be
there.
Senator Monroney. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Pastore?

ISRAEL AND THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator Pastore. I am a little concerned with the
possibilities of our involvement in that part of the world. You
have already said that there may be a cease-fire.
I would assume if that did happen the Israelis would stay
pretty much in Egyptian territory that they now occupy, is that
correct?
Secretary Rusk. Until there is the shape of a final
settlement which is known.
Senator Pastore. Then you went on to say that you would
suppose that the Israeli government would want to assert itself
as a sovereign state like all the other nations of the world,
and that they would want free and innocent passage in the
Straits of Tiran and, at the same time, would want the same
concession made with regard to the Suez Canal.
Now, my question is this: Let us assume, as you have said,
that the present rulers of the Arabic world will not agree to
this for political reasons. What is the possibility of Russia
beginning to assert itself, and then what would be our position
in that respect, and what are our commitments with regard to
that?
I would assume, before you begin answering, I would assume
that Israel would be a darned fool at this time if it did not
assert its rights to go through the Suez Canal like other
nations of the world. They are there now.
Secretary Rusk. That was a part of the armistice
arrangements which they were never able to collect on.
Senator Pastore. That is right. And now they are there.
Secretary Rusk. They are the Canal, that is right.
Senator Pastore. They are the Canal, and I would assume
that they would insist upon that.
Now, let us assume they do insist, and the Arabic world
won't agree. What is the possibility of any further assertion
on the part of Russia and what does that mean to us?
Secretary Rusk. There is that possibility, Senator, that
the Russians may take much more action practically than they
have thus far. We do not see signs of it, and we do not believe
they intended to back the present play by force in this
situation.
I think the principal problem there would be between the
mediators for Israel and the Arabs to try to find an answer
that both Israel and the Arabs would be willing to accept. It
is going to be tough because at the present time it is hard to
see exactly where this point is going to be reached and when.
But I think you would expect Israel to be pretty forthright
in demanding its full rights as a power to access to these
passages.
Senator Pastore. In your secret diplomacy, has Russia
indicated any inclination as to the right of Israel to go
through the Suez Canal?
Secretary Rusk. We have not, quite frankly, talked about
the Suez Canal. We do believe----
Senator Pastore. I mean in the past.
Secretary Rusk. I think they would recognize an
international right in the Straits of Tiran. But, for heaven's
sake, gentlemen, please no one say anything about this kind of
question because it would be just murder. But I do not think
the Straits of Tiran are going to be a problem when this thing
is wound up.
Senator Pastore. I would not suppose that, but I am worried
a little bit about the Suez Canal.

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

Now, another question: Have you been approached at all by
the Jewish-American community?
Secretary Rusk. I have not myself, but I gather there are a
good many letters. But no one has asked to see me.
Senator Pastore. Well, groups are coming to see us, and
they are insisting that America live up to its commitment. If
you were in our position what would be your answer to that?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we have to talk about which
commitments and what it is we are talking about.
I do think--quite frankly, if you go back over this record
since 1947, there is a whole basketful of understandings and
U.N. resolutions. You find, generally speaking, that each side
has tended to pick and choose out of those resolutions those
things which they wanted at one time or another, and that there
are a good many things on both sides which have been rejected
out of these U.N. resolutions.
Now, at the time of the original resolution creating the
State of Israel or on the settlement of Palestine, the Arabs
bitterly rejected that resolution and fought against it, in
fact.
Their present position is there is nothing they want more
than that original U.N. resolution. There was a resolution from
which the Arabs got certain benefits, which gave the Israelis
passage through the Suez Canal, but they have never gotten
passage through the Suez Canal.
President Eisenhower made a specific commitment in the
General Assembly at the time of the 1957 settlement about the
Straits of Tiran being international waters. That was done at a
time when he was acting on behalf of Egypt to get Israeli
troops out of the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt did not formally
accept that at the time as a matter of legal doctrine, but they
got the benefits of the arrangements; namely, the withdrawal of
Israeli troops.
So the past here is a jungle of resolutions which have in
them many elements which each side along the way has refused to
comply with.

NO OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENTS

Senator Pastore. Well, they are having a big rally here at
Lafayette Square, and I am wondering what it is all about, and
what we, as elected officials, say to these constituents of
ours on the enforcement of these commitments.
Secretary Rusk. Well, again, I think one ought to be
precise about the commitments. The President's statement of May
23 is a pretty comprehensive statement of our commitments in
this situation. There he reaffirmed the general commitment to
the political independence and territorial integrity of all the
states in the area, and the specific commitment on the Straits
of Tiran.
But we do not have vague, unorganized, open-ended
commitments to either side in this situation. We do not have a
treaty commitment, for example, that spells these things out.
Now, we have a major involvement stemming from the role we
played in the creation of Israel, and our support for various
types of United Nations action and settlement, and some
specific commitments on the Gulf of Aqaba.
But I think we need to be fairly precise, at least people
in my position, in talking about what commitment it is we are
talking about.
Mr. Chairman. Senator Bennett?

RESTORATION OF RELATIONS

Senator Bennett. I have just one question. Now that these
Arab countries have taken the lead in breaking diplomatic
relations, are we going to wait for them to take the lead in
restoring them?
Secretary Rusk. Well, it would be normal for the country
that took the original initiative to take the initiative to
restore them. But I think our general attitude ought to be that
we are relaxed about having relationships with those countries
that want relationships and are prepared to guarantee rights of
legation, because we have relations with a good many countries
with whom we are not in agreement on every point. I would think
we would be relatively relaxed about that in the future, and
some of this restoration of relations, I think, might come in a
matter of weeks rather than in a matter of months.
Some of the local officials in certain of these countries
have said to our people, ``Well, we will see you in about 2 or
3 weeks' time,'' that kind of thing. So we do not know exactly
what this means yet.
Senator Bennett. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman. Senator Gore?
Senator Gore. I will defer until tomorrow.
The Chairman. Senator Symington?

COMPARISON TO VIETNAM

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, I have a few questions.
When I came back from Vietnam in early January this year, I
reported that scores of our pilots were pleading that they be
allowed to do what apparently Defense Minister Dayan instructed
General Weitzman and his pilots to do.
One pilot said that four out of the last five missions he
had flown over the airport at Fukien were to hit much less
important targets closer to Hanoi and, therefore, I carried
their plea, and I find out that last week the military airfield
at Fukien has never been put on the target list, let alone
struck.
In the last 12 hours, in 12 hours, I think it is fair to
say, that against much heavier opposition, although under
different circumstances, General Dayan has really accomplished
more against three or four countries, and in one sense more
than that, than we have in two years in Vietnam, and I see it.
My question would be, as a result of staving off this, to
me and a number of my growing number of my colleagues,
denigration of airpower, and this almost unbelievable success
that they have had through the right use of airpower, the
saving of lives and treasure. Do you think this is going to
have any effect on the way we are handling the situation in
Vietnam or do you think we will continue to make it a major
land war without the use of our naval air, our seapower, I mean
of Air Force air and our seapower? We are just going to go
ahead to the tune of $2 billion a month or whatever it is, a
very heavy cost, or will this perhaps almost unprecedented
military success in modern times affect the way we are handling
the Vietnamese War?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, if we were fighting
primarily tanks and aircraft in open desert, the pattern of war
would, of course, be different.
It is not quite the same problem in Vietnam. I can talk
about that further. I think you know some of the problems we
feel we are involved with there. But I think the situation is
quite different from a military point of view, and I would
doubt that any of these airfields in Egypt are as heavily
defended as this particular airfield is up in Hanoi.
Senator Symington. Well, airpower is airpower regardless of
the nature of the terrain underneath it, and it seems to me
unfortunate that if we are going to use it at all, we do not
use it properly.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman. Senator Ervin has gone.
Senator Kuchel, you just came in?
Senator Kuchel. No, I have been here, but that is all
right.

USE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Secretary, I watched the Security Council last night,
and I think everyone is most proud of the fact, even at the
last minute, the Security Council passed a resolution.
Apparently it passed another one today, and I assume,
therefore, that our policy has been to use the machinery of the
United Nations to a maximum extent possible.
Now, if there is going to be a cease-fire, which I assume
there will be, if not this afternoon, tomorrow afternoon or the
next, there is no victor and no vanquished, so the problem of
territory, of free access to any waters of egress and ingress
along any land is going to have to be the result of an
agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis which, I guess, is
not going to take place or there are going to have to be
additional decisions made in the Security Council.
Will it be our policy to bring to the Security Council such
resolutions as clothing the President or U Thant with the
responsibility of asking, of making decisions to bring about a
peace rather than a truce?
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe that the matter of
decisions on these matters will be turned over to the Secretary
General, and I doubt very much that a resolution could pass the
Security Council that has not already been agreed to by the two
sides.
The situation in the Security Council is such that unless
you got agreement on the two sides, there is not a majority
vote. That sounds contradictory to what has happened in the
Security Council last night when the Security Council was
unanimous on a ceasefire, even though the Arabs were not
prepared to step up and say, ``We accept it.''
But in the terms of the long-range settlement, I do not
believe that the Security Council can legislate and impose upon
the parties a settlement which has not been worked out by
negotiation.
Senator Kuchel. So what would our policy be with respect to
negotiating a peace? Would our policy be to participate in the
negotiation unilaterally, in concert with other nations? I
mean, if you could help us on that point, I think it would be
most valuable.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we would very much hope that the
Security Council would be the principal forum in which these
things are dealt with.
Now, quite obviously there are going to be a lot of
consultations in capitals behind the scenes, as there was all
day yesterday and the day before.
But we think there would be great advantage in keeping this
matter in the framework of the Security Council just as much as
possible.
In our earlier consultations down here it was my strong
impression that that was almost the unanimous view of the
people at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

U.S. WAS NOT MILITARILY INVOLVED

Senator Kuchel. One more question. Are we going to pursue
what Arthur Goldberg raised last night, and nail the Arabs to
the cross on that falsehood of our military participation?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have been trying to do that with
all the means at our command.
The Arabs, however, continue to circulate this story 8, 10
hours a day.
As you know, we invited U.N. observers aboard our carriers,
and urged them to investigate the whole thing and look at our
logs and talk to pilots.
The Syrians added an item to that today and they charged
U.S. infantry were involved in these operations.
Senator Russell. I thought you said the Jordanians.
Secretary Rusk. No, sir. It was Damascus, Syrian radio.
Damascus had charged us with having infantry.
Senator Kuchel. Will we follow through, however, and
request the President of the Security Council to appoint an
impartial board?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we would like to see them do it, but
the trouble is that nobody believes these stories and,
therefore, they think it is undignified to accept our
invitation.
You see, it is almost humiliating for the Security Council
to send observers in the face of such outrageous lies.
Senator Russell. I thought you did a good job, Mr.
Secretary, on television.
The Chairman. Senator Morse?
Senator Morse. I have a couple of questions.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.

SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

Senator Morse. The first one relates to the reference you
made twice in response to a question about some information
that supplies were being sent into the Arab countries.
Let us assume that they are not, but there is a probability
they will be, say, from Russia or from Eastern European
countries and others. What is our position with regard to
supplies to Israel? We already have some outstanding
commitments in regard to the sale of airplanes, and we are not
talking here about commitments, but there is no question about
what the understanding of Israel has been for quite some years
that they can rely on the United States to come to their
assistance in protection if they tried to drive her into the
sea. There is no question, but this was a movement to do that.
Are we going to stand by while Arab countries get their
supplies replenished from Russia and other countries, and not
proceed to provide Israel with supplies? Because if we do not
supply her, she is not allowed to get supplies; she cannot hold
out against a replenished supply if you are going to give the
opposition breathing time, and I happen to disagree with some
of what I think are the connotations brought in this
conversation this afternoon in regard to our obligations.
I think we have very definite obligations, and we have
assumed them, and restated them over and over again, including
not only moral obligations but statements of our public
officials to Israel that we are not going to stand by and have
her driven into the sea.
My question is what are we going to do if the Arab
countries are resupplied? Are we going to wait for further
negotiations and further talk, or are we going to deliver some
supplies?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have not interrupted our own
shipments to Israel.
As far as Soviet shipments to the Arab countries are
concerned, we have not ourselves taken action to interrupt
them.
Now, my guess is that if there is not a cease-fire, that
any aircraft, for example, coming into any Arab countries will
be subject to Israel air attack.
The situation after a cease-fire is, of course, different.
We, at the present time, are not considering using military
action to stop arms from going from Eastern Europe into the
Arab countries, to answer your question directly, Senator.
Senator Morse. Well, it is an answer, but I still do not
know what the supplies are that we are going to send in to meet
the needs that are created by this war.
She lost a lot of equipment. She lost a lot of planes. What
I want to know is, is it going to be the policy of my
government that we are going to stand by and see the Arab
countries replenished and we are not going to proceed to supply
Israel with supplies that she is going to need for
replenishment to keep her military force going?
Secretary Rusk. All I said thus far, Senator, is we have
not stopped our shipments to Israel, and the question of
further aid or resupplies has not come up yet. It has not been
brought up to us yet by Israel.

OPPOSE TERRITORIAL ENLARGEMENT

Senator Morse. I quite agree, and this will be my last
point. I quite agree that we should not be involved in
participating in territorial enlargement or encouraging
territorial enlargement by Israel.
I understand they themselves do not seek manpower, that
they may seek support. But certainly I think we have a clear
duty now to get established once and for all these questions in
regard to international waters, including the Straits of Tiran,
and certainly made perfectly clear we are going to be on the
side of those that recognize that this Suez Canal ought to be
operated without discrimination against any country, including
Israel, and these are some of the troublesome problems that are
involved in the settlement of peace.
But, Mr. Secretary, I think it would be very unfortunate
for us if we did not make clear at all times that now we are
going to insist on a peace settlement, not on a truce
settlement, because the truce settlement simply means we are
going to postpone another war for two or three or four years. I
think it is very important, for whatever it is worth, and I
speak most respectfully, as you know, but I think the State
Department has got to make much clearer statements than have
been made yet in regard to what we are going to do in insisting
that the existing procedures of international law be used to
bring about peace over there and not a truce.
Secretary Rusk. I had the impression we had done that in
the Security Council, Senator, but we will go from there.
Senator Morse. I listened to it, and I do not form that
impression.
Secretary Rusk. But in terms of detailed desiderata, the
parties have not come in with theirs at the present time.
Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, this is a question where we
have got to exercise clear leadership in giving news to the
world as to exactly where we stand in regard to negotiating a
peace.
Mr. Chairman. Senator Cotton?

ISRAELIS MAY REQUEST A DECLARATION OF U.S. INTENT

Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, as you have said, our own
unilateral commitments to Israel are of a rather informal
nature, statements of the President and of his predecessors.
Certainly there is a basketful of declarations, but no formal
treaty.
If Israel, victorious, is going to be insistent on some
safety and security of her rights in the future and does not
feel disposed to accept, to rely on the U.N. for safety, and
regards us with some satisfaction as, in a sense, a patron,
isn't it likely that before the Israelis relinquish the ground
they have won, that they may expect from us, by formal treaty,
a real declaration of just exactly what our commitments are to
them so that it will no longer be nebulous or vague? I am not
asking what we would do.
Secretary Rusk. It is possible that they might raise that
question. They have not put that to us in connection with the
present crisis. That has come up from time to time over the
years, but it has not been a part of the conversation during
this present--during this year.
Senator Cotton. But if we were sitting where they are
sitting before we withdrew, it would not be unlikely, would it,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rusk. We have acted at various times in a variety
of ways to support the security and the territorial integrity
of a number of these states in the area.
Our general statement of policy there has applied for all
of the countries in that area, including Israel and, of course,
we have had a very close tie with Israel.
I would suppose that the attitudes and statements of four
Presidents in this matter have been pretty well supported in
the country, and whether you want to get into an additional
alliance, treaty or alliance, at this point is something on
which your views would be of interest. But I rather had the
impression that alliances were not particularly popular these
days.
Senator Cotton. The only reason I presume to raise the
question, Mr. Secretary, was that at the last briefing I tried
to find out what our actual commitments, either legal or moral,
unilaterally were with Israel.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. I would be very glad to----
Senator Cotton. And I had some difficulty in finding out
what they were.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, we had a meeting of the Foreign
Relations Committee in which I tried to review those, and
Senator Morse and Senator Lausche and others helped prepare a
record on that. I do not know whether you had a chance to look
at the transcript of that executive session, but you might ask
Mr. Marcy to make that available, because we tried to spell
those out in some detail.\1\ If not, I would be very glad to
see that you get a special briefing on that point, sir.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See transcript of May 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman. Senator Hruska?
Senator Bible?
Senator Allott?

ACHIEVING A PERMANENT PEACE

Senator Allott. Mr. Secretary, what I have to say I say
with all respect. But the situation in the Near East, as all of
us know, has been coming to a boil for approximately two years.
Secretary Rusk. Excuse me, Senator Allott.
Senator Allott. Has been coming to a boil for approximately
two years, and I have attended what briefings we were able to,
and it appears that the United States was completely surprised.
We found ourselves in an absolutely untenable position when
the UAR closed the Straits of Tiran.
Now, fortunately for the United States, a courageous
people, with guts and foresight, have saved our bacon, and I
might say also Great Britain's, in the eyes of the world.
I am very interested that in these next few weeks we do
whatever is necessary to get a permanent peace there, and in my
present thinking it amounts to three things: Suez, Tiran, and
borders, and in this same connection with the remarks that
Senator Monroney made, it would seem to me that there would be
a definite advantage since the Arabs are distinctly
disenchanted with the Russians, in being a little reluctant and
in just going back into complete diplomatic relations with
these people.
The situation of their thinking at the moment, because of
the Russian vote last night, is not going to change their
feelings toward the Russians overnight. It seems to me that at
this time we should show some reluctance and not go back in
there and say, ``All right, boys, this was fun while it lasted,
but now let us go back to where we were before.''
That is a comment. You may have a comment to make to both
of them, but I think that we have to take somewhere down the
line a much firmer and definite position than we have with the
Israelis, and I would hope that we would make the resumption of
diplomatic relationships a little bit difficult to procure, not
that I say we should refuse, but we should make them a little
more difficult.
Secretary Rusk. Well, our attitude in certain other
situations like Cambodia and the Congo Brazzaville, where they
have broken relations in the past, has been not to resume
unless there is a full and bonafide resumption, and we have no
intention of begging for restoration.
But, on the other hand, if there is an opportunity to
restore them on a full and reasonable basis, with full rights
of legation, it has been our tradition to do so. But I
certainly will keep your remarks in mind, Senator.
Senator Allott. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Case?
Senator Case. Not today.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Morton?
Senator Javits?

PUTTING THE CHIPS ON THE TABLE

Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, I will make two statements
of fact and then ask you a question based upon them.
The first statement is that I detect a certain satisfaction
and, perhaps, even elation in the President and the Secretary
of State that the Israelis have done as they have.
The second point is that unlike Vietnam, here is a tough
army, well able to look after itself.
Now, I think the question that is troubling many of us is
what is the United States prepared to do to back it up? What
risks is it prepared to take?
Now, we know the Russians have said they will give the
Arabs all-out support, and we know that the United States has
fuzzed around with the words ``neutral in thought, word and
deed'' which you have done your best to explain, and bless you,
and the President has, and I am not even complaining about what
you say. But what are you going to do? Are we prepared to match
the Russians, in fact, if they begin to put their chips on the
table, notwithstanding what they have said or done in the U.N.,
or are we not?
Are we going to pussy-foot around with this one, too?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, on that question, putting
the chips on the table is something that involves a
consultation with the Congress and the President and the
Congress acting together. That is the point I told you we were
not here to discuss in our earlier consultations, but that
would be a matter of the Congress and the President acting
together in a situation of that sort.
Secondly, I would say that I would not value the chips that
the Russians have put on the table very highly at this point.
Senator Javits. May I just ask one follow-up question?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.

ISRAEL'S LINES ARE VERY EXTENDED

Senator Javits. I agree with you thoroughly. I think you
have every reason for satisfaction, and I am all with you. I am
only asking for the future, because if we are going to play
this very cozy and very safe, then we are going to go one way.
I think we are going to get the pants trimmed off of us. But if
we are going to take a few risks here, where we have a great
army, and when we are taking enormous risks in Vietnam where we
have a very, very weak reed to lean on----
Secretary Rusk. Senator, you do not have any indication
that the Russians are preparing to intervene in this, do you?
Senator Javits. No, sir. I am not saying this, but you have
got enormous problems of supply which Senator Morse has raised,
and that is a big thing for the Israelis. The Secretary knows
they are immobilized, which means their country can get very
poor very fast. All the fellows who work are away, and so these
are going to be very real problems. Their lines are very
extended. This knifing through is by no means the whole ball
game. The Secretary knows that at least as well as I do, and
that is the point of my question.
We are going to be called upon to evidence some
implementation of our statement about the presentation of the
territorial integrity and political independence of the only
state who is being threatened really on that score, and that is
when performance will really count.
Now, the will to perform is going to be just as important
as the deed.
Secretary Rusk. I am supposed to be at a meeting at 6:30 at
which some of these questions will be discussed.
Senator Javits. I thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Yarborough?

ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK

Senator Yarborough. Mr. Secretary, this is a question of to
what extent has the Jordan territory west of the Jordan River
been occupied by the Israelis?
Secretary Rusk. They have for all practical purposes
military control of the West Bank. They are not completely
occupied--they have not yet completely occupied every
neighborhood in it.
The Jordanian army is in complete disarray on the West
Bank.
There are a million inhabitants on the West Bank, a good
many of them refugees from the other part of--from the
territory that is now Israel. So it is a very large population
which the Israelis now have, for which they now have
administrative responsibility.

REESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

Senator Yarborough. My other question was properly a
statement as much as a question. I want to approach what the
Secretary said about the reestablishment of relations with the
Arab states if they ask for it. I am very sympathetic to
Israel, as I think nearly all Americans are. Most of us are
either of the Jewish or Christian faith, and we feel very close
ties, and we have sympathy with Israel.
But these Arabs have been so completely defeated and are so
down, that my experience is that when a person is down
psychologically, and the whole world is looking down at them,
that we ought to pat them on the back, and not pull them down
further. I do not think it is any time to kick them when they
are down.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, despite all the problems
that Nasser has caused, and perhaps some others have caused,
looking ahead here for the next twenty-five years, there are
going to be 200 million Arabs in this part of the world. This
area is adjacent to NATO. It is a vitally important area, and I
think that we have a great interest in the prosperity and the
safety of Israel. But we cannot neglect this vast area that is
inhabited by the Arabs, and be consistent with the long-range
interests of our own country.
So we are interested in having a settlement here with which
both sides can live permanently. That is the important thing.
To put it into Mr. Eban's own words, you do not withdraw to
a state of belligerence, you withdraw to a state of peace.
Senator Yarborough. I agree, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. So we have no problem with that.
The Chairman. Senator Prouty?

ARAB REFUGEES

Senator Prouty. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that
this might be an opportunity for us to do something with
respect to the Arab refugees, which has been a great irritant,
of course, to the Arab nations, even though they have done
nothing to help.
Were you suggesting that there be the possibility of a
financial confrontation for property loss?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, if we could get a settlement of
that problem between the parties at the expense of paying a
substantial amount of money for winding it up we would be down
here very fast asking for it.
I personally believe that there is a basis for settling the
question on the basis of the individual secret choices of the
individual refugee as to where he wants to live, and if a way
could be found to give them that secret choice, the practical
result would be one with which Israel could live.
I doubt very much that many of these refugees are going to
say they want to live in Israel. There will be a fraction of
them who would, and Israel will take a fraction of them. But
the theory is such that the Arabs won't accede to the fact that
anything less than a million of them must have the right to
live in Israel, you see. So the theory has complicated the
practical arrangements.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND VIETNAM

Senator Prouty. I won't ask you to comment on this, but I
think it is something you should be thinking about. The rumor
is becoming somewhat widespread, I think it was even reported
on a broadcast or TV from Vietnam, that Russia's cooperation
and the buildup by this action in the Security Council might be
attributable to the fact that we are trying to work out some
arrangement with them vis-a-vis Vietnam and the situation
there.
Secretary Rusk. No. These two situations have not been
linked at all in our discussions with the Russians.
Senator Prouty. Thank you.
Secretary Rusk. Those rumors were just sheer speculation
with no basis.
The Chairman. Senator Cannon?

SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN ARAB NATIONS

Senator Cannon. Mr. Secretary, do we have reports of any
assaults on American citizens in the Arab world other than the
two men who were hospitalized in Libya yesterday?
Secretary Rusk. There have been a good many stonings of
embassies and consulates. In one place in Benghazi, our embassy
personnel locked themselves in their own vault overnight until
a company of British troops came in and got them out.
We have not had, I think, deaths to report other than those
that you have seen reported publicly about people who got
caught actually in the cross-fire.
We have a very large-scale evacuation of Americans going
on, and our principal problem at the moment is in Amman because
of communications. Elsewhere it seems to be going reasonably
well.
Senator Cannon. Have you recommended that Americans who
were in those areas evacuate?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, we have.
Senator Cannon. Is that true in Libya?
Secretary Rusk. Libya is--well, we have about 8,500 people
at the Wheelus Base, and they will be taken out by the Air
Force if required. But we are not making an emergency
evacuation of those people at the present time, at the present
moment.
Senator Cannon. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Muskie?
Senator Muskie. No question.
The Chairman. Senator Fong?
Senator Fong. Yes.

THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN FRONTS

Mr. Secretary, do you have any intelligence on the material
and personnel at the various fronts?
Secretary Rusk. On the what?
Senator Fong. The various fronts. It seems in just the
Egyptian sector and the Jordanian sector there is fighting, and
the Syrian and Iraq sectors have been quiet.
Secretary Rusk. There has been very little shooting along
the Lebanese front. There has been some cross-frontier shooting
along the Syrian frontier that has not amounted to very much.
There has been a good deal of fighting between the Israeli
and the Jordanian forces, the Jordanians being under the
command of an Egyptian general or until very, very recently,
and major fighting with the Egyptians.
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan have not been the prime problem.
The prime problem has been between Israel and Egypt.
Senator Fong. Have you any intelligence as to the amount of
material and personnel involved on the Egyptian front and the
Jordanian front?
Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, I do not have it with me. I
can get that information to you if you would like, Senator, but
I just do not happen to have it with me.
Senator Fong. Another question: The question of volunteers.
I notice there are 3,000 people already ready to go to Israel.
What is the State Department's policy on that?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have barred travel of citizens
into that area unless they get special permission with a valid
passport. That applies to all the countries in the area, right?
Mr. Macomber. Except the newsmen.
Secretary Rusk. Except newsmen and certain special
categories.
Senator Fong. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Pell?

IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator Pell. Mr. Secretary, the world is a pretty small
place. The Soviet Union is in a position now of seeing its
friends and allies in the Near East getting defeated, and it
also involves North Vietnam, seeing its friends and allies
taking a bit of a pasting.
Has any thought been given to, one, following up the cease-
fire with sort of a degree of good feelings if we work with the
Soviet Union in this part of the world and settle our problems
in other parts of the world, and, two, has any thought been
given as to how we can avoid pushing the Soviet Union into a
corner where it can lash back, such as in Berlin and in other
places?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the second point, there is not much
we can do about that in this situation.
We did not encourage the Arabs to create this critically
dangerous situation or make some rather extragavant public
promises to the Arabs about support.
We have not been out of contact with the Soviets on Vietnam
at any point during this period.
But whether this situation in the Middle East will have an
effect on the possibilities of a settlement in the Far East we
just do not know yet. My guess is that they still are looking
at these two things rather separately.
The Chairman. Senator Miller?

DANGEROUS EUPHORIA OVER ISRAELI VICTORY

Senator Miller. Just a couple of comments, Mr. Secretary.
I would hope that diplomatic relations would be preceded by
some kind of a revocation of these false charges.
Looking down the road and thinking of our relations with
the Arab people, unless those charges are eventually revoked, I
think we are going to have a difficult time of it. So I would
hope that that would be a sine qua non in these diplomatic
relations.
The second point is that--I may be wrong--but I detect a
sort of a euphoria going around Washington with respect to the
success of the Israeli army.
Now, I think that we had better be pretty careful that we
do not count our chickens before they are hatched. Senator
Morse has raised a very valid point.
I would hope that we would be very careful that we not
assume that everything is all over right now.
Thank you very much for coming down.
Secretary Rusk. Right, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Dominick?

U.S. COMMITMENT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Senator Dominick. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding
that we have a commitment to support the territorial integrity
of the countries in that area.
Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.
Senator Dominick. Now, Israel at the present time is on
Egyptian-Jordanian territory. Suppose Israel says that in order
to withdraw to a peace--this means the West Bank of Jordan or
it means Gaza Strip--what do we do then?
Secretary Rusk. Well, they have not said that yet, and I
would have to reserve on that, if that situation comes up.
They announced when the fighting started that they would
not--they did not have territorial ambitions. But I would not
want to answer that one in advance, Senator.
Senator Dominick. Let me put it another way. Is that
commitment that we have so binding that this administration
would feel it would have to honor it if Israel took that
position or can't you--you obviously do not want to answer that
at the moment either.
Secretary Rusk. That would be a very serious question,
Senator. I think I will not try to answer that one off the
cuff.
We have supported the existing territorial arrangements in
that area for a long time. That would create some very, very
serious problems for the future and would almost guarantee
there would be another round of conflict at some point, I would
think. I do not know. But I am not trying--I would not want to
try--to give you an answer on that one today, sir.
Senator Dominick. My difficulty on this is to see how the
Israelis can legitimately feel that they are going to withdraw
to a peace unless they do make some substantive changes in
their strategic and tactical decisions.
Secretary Rusk. Well, looking ahead they have got the
problem to live with 200 million Arabs in 25 years, so they
have got to think about a lot of things. Reconciliation with
the Arab world is a vital matter for them at some stage, and
they have been ready for it during all this period when the
Arabs would not even sit down with them at a table.
But I think we should not suppose that they would think
that their answers are going to be found by simply boundary
adjustments in a major way that would guarantee the lasting
enmity of the Arab world.
The Chairman. Senator Robert Kennedy?

REPLENISHING ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Secretary, assuming that the cease-
fire does not come immediately, or assuming that we have a
cease-fire in the period of the next 2 or 3 days, and during
that period of cease-fire time goes by, a week goes by, two
weeks, or three weeks go by, and we still have not reached a
permanent peace, what will we be doing during that period of
time to replenish the arms and the materiel of Israel, for
instance, which, I suppose, would be in desperate need.
The second part of that is if the Soviets really sent in
some of these arms and goods at the present time--if there is a
cease-fire, of course, the situation changes in the matter--at
that period of time they might decide they wanted to replenish
at least some of the arms that have been lost by some of the
Arab countries, and perhaps regain some of the stature which
they lost over the period of the last 2 or 3 days. What would
we do?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, in the first case, we do
expect to have some requests from Israel in the direction of
replenishment, and we will certainly take a look at those when
they come in, yes.
Senator Kennedy. Could I just ask what that means exactly?
Secretary Rusk. Well, you are familiar with the way these
things go, where is the money, what sort of things is it that
they want, have we got them, how----
Senator Percy. Can we just assume we will have everything
they ask for?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I do not know, Senator. I do not know
anything--I do not know any government that is in that
position.
Senator Kennedy. I just think that question is going to
arise for everybody.
Secretary Rusk. We expect to see them reasonably soon.

SYMPATHETIC VIEW OF ISRAELI ARMS NEEDS

Senator Kennedy. All of us would like to make a responsible
decision on it in the Senate. Where would we be on that?
Secretary Rusk. You mean on the first one?
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. I think we would take a pretty sympathetic
view toward their essential requirements.
Now, we have not been their major arms supplier, and this
problem may be complicated by President de Gaulle's attitude.
The French have given them most of their sophisticated weapons
or sold them, and cut off spare parts or things of that sort
right in the middle of this situation. But we will just have a
look at it and see what is required.
Their losses, quite frankly, have not been heavy. They have
used a good many consumables and ammunition, but their actual
loss of equipment has not been all that heavy.
Senator Kennedy. But I suppose even they will have
shortages of ammunition if the fighting continues for another
ten days.
Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes, yes, and we have already taken
that into account in our own arrangements, that possibility if
this thing should go on.
On the other matter, on the Russian side----
Senator Muskie. On that question, Mr. Secretary, does that
mean you are going to try to work out assistance for them?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.

RUSSIAN AID TO ARAB NATIONS

On the other side, what the Russians will do, I do not know
that we will get into military prevention of some supplies
going from the Russians to those countries. But my guess is
that they would have to supply a lot more than equipment at
this time to recoup the situation in certain of these Arab
countries.
Senator Kennedy. If they did take that kind of a step, if
they decided they were going to furnish more planes or whatever
it might be, if they decided that they were going to furnish
some kind of equipment, would we be in opposition to that?
Would we be prepared to offset whatever they do?
Secretary Rusk. You mean in Israel?
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. I thought--do you mean we would interrupt
the Russian supply?
Senator Kennedy. No.
Secretary Rusk. We would take that into account, and what
we would do so far as Israel is concerned, we have tried to
strike that balance all along. There have been a good many who
felt we were underestimating Israeli requirements. Our feeling
has been that Israel was in pretty good shape in relation to
its neighbors, and I do not believe the events in the last few
days have disproved that.
So that we feel we have an interest in the security of the
countries out there in relation to each other, and we won't be
at all indifferent to the Israeli needs in this situation.
Senator Javits. The Secretary said he is going to a meeting
at 6:30 on this very subject. Is that going to be discussed?
Mr. Chairman. I wonder, Senator Percy is the only one who
has not asked a question. Do you have a question?

ISRAEL'S ACCESS TO THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator Percy. You have indicated it would be dangerous in
speaking about negotiating terms with Israel. I have already
taken a position with some of my constituents that it would be
reasonable for Israel not only to insist on access to the
Straits of Tiran but also access to the Suez Canal.
Secretary Rusk. I did not mean by that that I was
suggesting that any of you are limited to expressing your own
views on this matter.
Senator Percy. I see.
Secretary Rusk. It would be very difficult to quote me on
the subject or attribute news to me at this point.
Senator Percy. I think the question also as to whether
there is any change in the State Department's attitude on
bridge-building and East-West trade, and things of that type,
will come out before us very quickly, whether you are going to
continue, if it is proven the Soviets have been a little
mischievous in this area, whether you will have the same
attitude or not. Perhaps we need not talk about it now, but at
some time it would be helpful to discuss that phase of it.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I would say my own present view on
that, sir, is we ought to continue to try, and I would also add
that the Soviets were more--have been more--restrained in this
situation than we thought they might be.
Senator Kennedy. Can I just finish the last question? Is
our policy in the Middle East still to maintain the territorial
integrity of the countries?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. How you do it depends on the
circumstances.
[Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:35 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt,
Case, and Cooper.
The following nominations were ordered reported favorably:
Covey T. Oliver, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
American Affairs; William J. Porter, to be Ambassador to the
Republic of Korea; Benigno C. Hernandez, to be Ambassador to
Paraguay; and the Routine Foreign Service List of May 24, 1967.
S. 1577, a bill to complement the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, was ordered reported, with an amendment.
S. 624, to provide certain increases in annuities payable
from the Foreign Service retirement, and S. 1688, the Inter-
American Development Bank Act amendment, were carried over.
The Human Rights Conventions: Executives J, K, and L, 88th
Congress, 1st session, were discussed and carried over. S. 990,
a bill to establish a United States Committee on Human Rights,
was ordered reported with an amendment.
[The committee adjourned at 11 a.m.]

BRIEFING ON VIETNAM

----------

Thursday, June 8, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:35 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Gore,
Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and
Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Tillman, and Mr.
Jones of the committee staff.
The Chairman. If the committee will come to order.
Mr. Ambassador, we will take up where we left off before,
which I suppose is a good enough place to start, because you
already have noticed that it is a repetition of the question
that I gave you which you deferred.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PORTER, AMBASSADOR TO KOREA

Mr. Porter. I hope I have the article.
The Chairman. Do you remember it?
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; I think so.
It was the paragraph----
The Chairman. I will read the paragraph if you would like.
Mr. Porter. If as much effort and money were put into the
training of ARVN, etcetera, reforming the bureaucracy, forcing
the generals to prosecute corrupt colleagues as are put into
dropping bombs in the country, there is more than a fair chance
that the Americans could pull it off. But in Vietnam the
Americans have a leadership problem.
I agree with the statement.
The Chairman. You do agree?
Mr. Porter. There is a very pronounced pervasive leadership
problem, principally because we must rely on Army officers, or
we have had to rely on Army officers, to provide leadership
since the fall of Diem, and those officers----

WHAT AID OFFICIALS ARE DOING IN VIETNAM

Senator Hickenlooper. What are we doing with the thousand
or so AID people we have got out there?
Mr. Porter. The AID people, of course, are not dealing
primarily with the Army officers, Senator. They are dealing
with the civil administration, and while there are Army
officers in that, too----
Senator Hickenlooper. What do you mean by leadership?
Mr. Porter. I mean the Army officers who compose the top
elements of the government, the national leadership council, is
composed almost entirely of Army officers, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. I thought you meant out in the
people.
Mr. Porter. No, sir. I refer to all Army officers, both
those at the head of the government and those in the field.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
Mr. Porter. At the head of their units.
Senator Hickenlooper. They are all bad, are they?
Mr. Porter. They are not all bad. There are some brave and
dedicated men among them.
But the problem with the Army and the officer class there
is that a man becomes an officer or at least eligible for the
officer training school simply by going to a university.
The enemy does not worry about that. They take boys, train
them, size them up, see if they have leadership qualities. The
man who has what it takes, who will lead his soldiers well on
his side, any time of day, follow his orders, is the man who
will rise in their ranks. There is no question of having a
diploma. In fact, in my view, on the enemy side it is a
disadvantage to have one in Vietnam.
We have not done a great deal about this system. We have
accepted it. We have tried to train, through these officers, an
Army in the image and likeness of ours and of Korea days, and
we have not sufficiently struggled against a set of habits as
well as attitudes.
Senator Hickenlooper. What are we doing with all the AID
people out there? The woods are full of them out there.
Mr. Porter. The AID people, in my opinion, there are lots
of them, of course, are extended. Their numbers are great.
Senator Hickenlooper. I agree something is wrong out there,
don't misunderstand me.
Mr. Porter. No, sir; I do not misunderstand you. But the
AID people and the civil element in that country represent
possibly one half of one percent of the total Americans. They
are scattered throughout, doing their best to further various
programs of pacification and reconstruction in 236 districts
and 44 province capitals.
They are dedicated men, many of them living in isolated
areas, with considerable danger to themselves, and I really
think, sir, that there is very little need to defend the effort
on that side.
Certainly there has been slippage, certainly AID has
encountered problems both with individuals and problems of
substance.
But in my view, those men, all of them practically
volunteers, are exposing themselves to great dangers and doing
good work.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. I did not mean to
interpose.
Senator Case. I am sorry, you were just commenting on what?
What was the comment on?
Mr. Porter. The Senator inquired what were the AID people
doing in Vietnam.
Senator Case. I see.
Mr. Porter. There are a great many of them I pointed out,
and I explained how widely dispersed they are, and my view of
their performance.

VIETNAMESE OFFICER CORPS

Senator Gore. Could I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, about
the officer corps?
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.
Senator Gore. You say that the officers, one becomes
eligible to be an officer or a member of the officer corps, in
the South Korean Army----
Mr. Porter. South Vietnamese.
Senator Gore. South Vietnamese, I see, merely by attendance
at the university.
Now, is attendance at the university open to all or is this
an aristocratic sort of privilege?
Mr. Porter. It tends to be aristocratic and urban. It is
not everybody who can get to the university regardless of his
brains.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Mr. Porter. Position is required, family position, in many
Cases.
Now, in recent years, the last two or three years, an
effort has been made to create officers through field
promotions of enlisted personnel and from the ranks of the
noncoms.
But while some lip service has been, or there has been some
performance in that connection, I think that the scale is
unsatisfactory. I do not believe that the rural elements, the
families, the peasant boys, have the possibility of getting to
the armed forces and into responsible positions on our side to
the same degree or anything like it that they have on the VC
side.
Senator Gore. Thank you.

THE WAR CAN ONLY BE WON BY THE VIETNAMESE

The Chairman. Mr. Porter, he goes on--I may say to those
who came in late, these are a few paragraphs, a couple of
paragraphs, taken from Ward Just's article on Sunday. Most of
you, I expect, read that. I was just asking his comment on it.
Senator Case. I think it is very important.
The Chairman. That was the first one.
The next one, he says:

In the final analysis the war can only be won by the
Vietnamese, but it is still the Americans' to lose by
misapplication of power or by impatience or sheer unwillingness
to do what needs to be done.

Do you think that is an accurate statement?
Mr. Porter. Yes. The Vietnamese have to win the war. The
great struggle on our side and on the military side--when I say
our side I meant the civil side, the civilian side--is to get
the Vietnamese to do for the Vietnamese the things that have to
be done if the war is to be won. This is one reason why, in
developing the present concept of pacification, I refused to
let any Americans go into the villages with the teams.
The Vietnamese must perform the service required for their
fellow countrymen in the villages, and the Vietnamese must
protect the villagers while the pacification process is under
way.
Now, some people, and some of the civilians, too, involved
in the program, point with pride to the fact that in a certain
province in Vietnam pacification has proceeded very well. That
is the province of Binh Dinh. This is not an acceptable concept
to me because pacification has proceeded there under the
protection of foreign troops, principally those of the Korean
Republic and our own.
Were we to take those troops out of there, the process
would certainly slow down, and we might have retrogression,
probably would have retrogression.
I am convinced that certain things of that kind must be
done by the Vietnamese, and should not be done by the
Americans.
Senator Cooper. May I interject there?
The Chairman. Let me finish, and then I will go around. Let
me finish this one.
Do you believe that a military victory is possible or would
that achieve our real purposes?
Mr. Porter. May I preface my final sentence on the subject
by recounting a little bit of my own experience. I have been
with guerrillas, close to them, sometimes with them physically,
over many, many years in various countries.
I have never seen a guerrilla movement beaten if it had
national support. I do not believe that we, on our side, have
the training, brave as our people are, to cope with the kind of
guerrilla movement on the scale that it exists in Vietnam, even
though I do not believe that movement on the guerrilla side,
the VC, have support on the scale which the nationalist
movements of North Africa and the Near East enjoyed in their
struggle against the French and the British.
I therefore believe that we cannot win the war by military
means alone. That is the answer, Senator.
But I would like to go on for just one moment.
The Chairman. Certainly.

COMPONENTS OF U.S. EFFORTS IN VIETNAM

Mr. Porter. As I see our effort in Vietnam today, it is
composed of five elements:
The bombing of the North, which I consider necessary if
done with restraint and care because for morale and for reasons
of interdicting the flow of supplies connected with that, it is
necessary to undertake such action. Additionally, the North
Vietnamese are delivering very large weapons, powerful weapons,
to the South by means at their disposal.
The second element of our effort is, of course, the
military campaign in South Vietnam itself.
The third element is the pacification effort which is
designed to meet the VC where he was strongest, and that is in
the villages of South Vietnam. They were never an urban
movement.
The fourth element is the psychological warfare effort,
which is producing results and brings in at times as many as a
thousand or more VC a week, at least since the beginning of
this year after the application----
Senator Case. That is to create defectors on their side.
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
And the fifth element which I consider to be the most
promising of all in this array, is the return to constitutional
government, although that is at the moment beset with
difficulties and dangers.

MILITARY EFFORT IS NOT THE DECISIVE ASPECT

The military effort is a necessary part of the overall
effort. But it is not the decisive aspect, because I have
always felt since I went to Vietnam that we could win by
acquiring their minds, by bringing them over to us, but that we
could not win simply by killing them.
I have seen massive power applied to other guerrilla
movements. It won't do by itself, careful as we are to try to
hit the enemy only. The French had 600,000 men applied to a
much smaller movement when I was in Algeria. It did not work.
Of course, the French were facing a totally hostile
population, and we are not in Vietnam by any means.
But those are the elements of the struggle, as I see them.
The military element would not be sufficient by itself, and
I personally place more reliance on the last three: the
returning to constitutional government, provided we can emerge
with a useful and representative government; pacification, to
give the villagers something worth living for, to get them
security, which is what they want more than any other ideology;
and psychological warfare to reach the minds of these boys in
VC units.
Military, yes it is very necessary. It won't win by itself.

WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE

The Chairman. I find it difficult to believe that any
white, rich, powerful Western country can ever be very
sympathetic to these people and winning their minds and their
feeling that we really are their friends and their benefactors.
Not only here--it is not peculiarly Americans, I mean it was
the same with the French or the British or the Germans.
The whole picture seems to me utterly unfeasible, not
because of any defect or inefficiency or any kind of thing on
our part, it is just in the nature of things.
Mr. Porter. May I comment on that?
Mr. Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Porter. I, perhaps, used a phrase inadvisedly if I
talked about their minds, bringing them over to us.
I never sent a team into a village with that thought in
mind.
Mr. Chairman. You said that.
Mr. Porter. To reach their minds you first begin with their
security and their family well-being, and you create
conditions.
Eventually, certainly not immediately, they would not know
what you are talking about. The target eventually is their
minds, so that if you get something that is representative of
them in Saigon, you can begin the work of educating them about
values.
Now, you hear lots of phrases such as ``winning the hearts
and the minds of the people.'' The hearts and the minds of the
people are won initially, at least, if you provide them
security and some degree of well being; their minds to the
extent that they are with you, and their hearts, and their
minds also, because they understand you are doing something for
them.

FRENCH EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM AND ALGERIA

Mr. Chairman. You have mentioned you have had long
experience in Algeria and now in Vietnam. Before the revolution
started, and for many years, at least since about 1885, the
French gave them, I would think, a high degree of security.
They were not being slaughtered and murdered, and so on, but
still they wanted to get rid of those French, and they did get
rid of the French, both in Algeria and there.
The French are civilized people. Maybe they are not as good
as Americans--nobody is--but next to us they are civilized
people, we thought.
Why is it that these people do not accept them?
Mr. Porter. The French gave them very little security----
Mr. Chairman. Really?
Mr. Porter [continuing]. In the rural areas, and certainly
security against the kind of movement which had its origins and
its birth out there in the rural areas, and they gave them
practically no social justice. That is the answer there.
These people crave, and even those boys to whom I talked--
--
Mr. Chairman. How about Algeria? There was no security
there? I had read prior to the revolution there was some degree
of prosperity and normalcy, and so on in Algeria, but they
still wanted to get rid of the French.
Mr. Porter. Here again it is a question of time. The French
gave them security as long as they were willing to accept
French protection----
Mr. Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Porter [continuing]. Or as long as they were forced to
accept it. But they gave them very little social justice.
Senator Symington. Will the Chairman yield?
Mr. Porter. If I may say, sir, the term ``an Algerian
election'' was coined in French days as the proverbial
something crooked. It is the measure of something crooked, and
the Algerians knew it. So you had a kind of security imposed
which people did not want, but you had no social justice
alongside it, which might have brought people, perhaps
eventually, to accept this system. But in the meantime it would
have, of course, forced the French to evacuate the country.
Senator Hickenlooper. They had two classes of citizens in
Algeria.
Mr. Porter. Yes.
Mr. Chairman. In all this colonial era, the British are
said to have had some degree of social justice in places like
India and some of their other colonies, and yet they wanted to
get rid of the British. This does not add up to me.
Mr. Porter. There are degrees of this.
Mr. Chairman. Unless you think Americans have some special
quality of kindness and consideration and empathy which no
great powerful nation in the history of the world ever
exhibited, I do not see how you think we are going to have a
different response.

WHITES CANNOT INFLUENCE VILLAGE ELECTIONS

Senator Symington. Before you answer that, I want to ask
you this question. I had a talk with Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv,
who had just come back from Vietnam, and I know you saw him out
there----
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And, based on my experiences out there--
I met him coming back from Vietnam--he said not less than three
times in a couple of hours that we talked: ``Remember this.
Don't ever forget it.'' He talked as a man experienced in
guerrilla fighting.
He said, ``No white man is ever going to sell their
candidate for village chief to the villagers in Vietnam or
anywhere else.''
This he said after he had been there and, of course,
naturally, it worried me because since I last had the privilege
of seeing you, the whole pacification program has been turned
over to the military.
What do you think--everybody knows of his vast experience
in this field, and what would be your reaction to that comment?
He emphasized it and re-emphasized my words.
Mr. Porter. He is absolutely right; he is absolutely right.
But, may I say that, Senator, the pacification program has
been turned over to the military primarily because of the
feeling here of course, I do not mean in the committee but in
Washington--that our military would not or could not or did not
make the effort to invoke the necessary effort by the Army of
Vietnam on the protection side of pacification, and would not
do so until our military were totally responsible for the
pacification program.
Now, last September this was about to happen, and I came
home and argued against it, but the ground, the approach, then
was different. It was claimed it would be more efficient to put
it under the military.
This time when the change was made it was done so, as I
understand it, on the ground that with complete responsibility
our military would put their shoulders a little more heavily
against the wheel, and get the necessary performance out of the
people they had trained. Those people, of course, are the Army
of Vietnam who must, as I was saying a while back, protect
their people in the villages and the pacification teams while
the process is going on.
Now, let us hope for everybody's sake that this is going to
work out. I hope so. Many of my civilian colleagues did not
think it would, but they have to keep trying and accept the new
state of things.
Senator Symington. Thank you.

USE OF MARINES IN AID PACIFICATION EFFORTS

Senator Case. What do you think, if I may just interject
there, of the effort they have been making around Danang, that
is, the Marine idea of having a detachment of perhaps 12 of our
soldiers join the team?
Mr. Porter. I like that. The marines, in fact, in my view--
the Senator has been out there and perhaps has his own view of
things which are perhaps different than mine--the Marines have
shown a great deal of imagination in trying to cope with this
problem. They have unfortunately been drawn off by the influx
of North Vietnamese across the demilitarized zone and, as a
result, the effort by these combined companies, those to which
you referred, sir, have suffered--but it is a good idea.
Senator Carlson. May I say they have been under the command
of a great Kansan, General Lewis W. Walt.
Mr. Porter. Walt, and, in fact, I obtained the services of
several of the Marine officers, and brought them into my
organization wearing civilian clothing, because they do have
that sensitivity and feel, which is not to say the other
services do not. But the Marines did show a particular talent,
I think.

GREATER USE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY

Senator Case. In this connection, can we use more of the
Vietnamese Army more effectively not only in pacification
protection programs, but also on a larger scale fighting? May I
just throw this on the table? I do not think it is much of an
idea to put another 150,000 Americans in an overloaded country
already. This I just do not believe. Have you got a comment on
that, too, in connection with this whole thing?
Mr. Porter. I have an opinion.
The Chairman. Well, go ahead and express it.
Senator Case. Well, bless your heart. You know----
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; I have an opinion.
I would have to be shown before I would put more troops in
there just what they are supposed to achieve.
There are about 1.1 million men under arms. Another
100,000, ten percent, does that mean we are within ten percent
of victory? Of what? This is what worries me. I worry about
this, and I do not want to criticize the generals with whom and
alongside of whom I worked. But what is not needed--I do not
believe it is needed there--are more troops.
I would like to see a good deal of retraining. What is
basically needed in that country to alter the situation
dramatically is a night fighting force. The night fighting
force is what is needed. We have not trained the Vietnamese to
do this job. Maybe we cannot, maybe we are not trained
ourselves for it.
But after sundown, as the Senator knows, there is a
different state of affairs there. In the daytime we can go
anywhere, and our victories are real when we can detect the
enemy or when he attacks us. But when night must fall, if you
have the tanks out or you have the choppers out, you have to
pull them back. Why? Because there is a different state of
affairs, and you have an enemy who knows every inch of his
terrain and who works best at night.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WILL FIGHT

Senator Symington. Can I ask you a question right there?
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. How many more men do you think we need
to put into Vietnam to get a really tight hold, a really tight
handle, on the guerrilla problem?
Mr. Porter. I do not know that we need to put any in.
Senator Case. Americans?
Mr. Porter. Senator, I do not know that we need to put any
in. I would like to see--perhaps it would require a miracle--
something done to retrain, say, 50 percent of ARVN to move out,
say at 5:30 at night instead of everybody moving in and holding
up.
We know they will fight at night if they have proper
officers. We have some units on the civilian side which react
to specific intelligence. There are men who know the terrain as
well as the VC. But we have only a few of them because we
cannot set up an army in competition with the Ministry of
Defense in Saigon.
But they are good boys. They are just as good as the VC if
they are properly led.
Senator Cooper. Who are you talking about, the South
Koreans?
Mr. Porter. No, sir. I am talking about the Vietnamese, the
Vietnamese elements.
Senator Cooper. I mean the South Vietnamese.
Mr. Porter. We know they will fight.
Senator Gore. Didn't you say a moment ago there were one
million men under arms?
Mr. Porter. There are 1.1, I should think, which is a
nearer estimate, sir.
Senator Gore. With only 15 million South Vietnamese, it
seems that is one soldier, more than one soldier, to every 15
men, women and children.
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Gosh.
Senator Case. There are different kinds of soldiers. There
are daytime soldiers and part-time soldiers.
Mr. Porter. Yes. There are approximately, I think if I
recall the figures of the Army of Vietnam in its three
categories of the Regular Army, the Regional Force and the
Popular Forces, they number 630-odd thousand, and we have
pretty close to a half million ourselves. Then there are 30
ROK's, and smaller units, of course, from the other troop
contributors; yes, sir.

THE WAR IS NOT HOPELESS

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper, do you want to ask a
question?
Senator Hickenlooper. I do not know whether I get the right
impression or not, but I take it you think we ought to get out
of there. It is a hopeless thing; we cannot win?
Mr. Porter. No, sir. I do not think it is hopeless if we do
the right thing. But I do not agree with Ward Just, my friend
here, who says it is probably unwinnable or some such phrase. I
think we are doing--we have a program, and if we persevere and
do the things which have to be done on our side and, more
important, induce the Vietnamese and especially the Vietnamese
Army, to do the things which must be done by them, and should
only be done by them--protection of the villages, the work in
the villages, and the various other things I have mentioned--we
have got a pattern here which will win for us.
Senator Clark. What do you mean by win?
Mr. Porter. I mean it will achieve at least temporarily,
and I will explain the use of that word in a moment, sir, it
will bring about a cessation of hostilities.
Now I say temporarily because it will only be temporary
unless there is a very great deal done on the side of social
justice, and if it is permanent, if institutions are built to
take advantage of what might otherwise be a temporary cessation
of enemy activity. There has to be--institutions have to be
developed in that country.

RIVALRY BETWEEN THIEU AND KY

One of the most worrisome things at the present time is the
fact that the two men, Thieu and Ky, are now vying for the
presidency. This could split the army which, after all, is a
relatively stable institution. It would endanger the stability
that we have had for the past two years instead of moving us
toward the kind of situation we want to see exist there, a
constitutional government, representative government.
We knew about the risks when we urged them to do this. We
thought there might be rivalry. Well, it is developing and it
is very serious.
If, however, the process goes well, and we get a
representative government, preferably civilian in nature, which
the military are willing to serve as protectors of the
constitution and the country, then we could really move forward
because such a government resulting or emerging from an honest
election, observed by newspapermen and officials from all over
the world, who are supposed to be invited to this next one,
will effectively deal with the VC claim which the Communists
push night and day, to be the sole representatives of the
people of South Vietnam.

CHANCES OF AN HONEST ELECTION

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you think there is any chance of
getting a satisfactory election according to what we call
honest standards or reasonably honest standards down there in
the next two decades?
Mr. Porter. We did it last September in the elections for
the Constituent Assembly.
Senator Hickenlooper. There are a lot of claims----
Senator Case. There was a selected group of candidates, but
the election itself was----
Mr. Porter. The election itself was honest and above board
between candidates.
Of course, you go into this kind of thing----
Senator Hickenlooper. Didn't somebody sort of ride herd on
that election down there, hold them within the fence in some
way?
Mr. Porter. Mainly by insuring the presence of a great many
observers, press and others, sir.
Senator Clark. How about the franchise though, isn't that a
real problem? How about who is being allowed to vote?
Senator Gore. To seek office.
Senator Clark. No, to vote.
Senator Gore. And vote. A man who is neutral is not allowed
to run.
Senator Clark. Or allowed to run, isn't that right?
Mr. Porter. They have progressed beyond the neutrality
aspects. They have under our encouragement adopted a program of
what they call national reconciliation.
Senator Gore. I saw Marshal Ky this morning, Mr. Porter, on
television in a U.S. helicopter out shaking hands with the
children, campaigning. I wonder if anyone can come to any
conclusion except that he is our candidate?
Senator Case. He has got a helicopter. I think it is a good
idea he is campaigning. He now is beginning to realize you have
to pay enough money for the soldiers----
Senator Gore. Are we going to provide a helicopter for his
opposition?
Senator Case. Look, the President of the United States
takes the presidential plane and goes campaigning. [Laughter.]

NORTH VIETNAM COMMANDS OBEDIENCE

Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this question--I have
to go. I cannot stay much longer and I would like to finish a
couple of questions I have. But why is it that the North
Vietnamese fight like the devil, and the South Vietnamese seem
to run around at loose ends like chickens when a thunderstorm
comes along? I know they will fight on occasions. I do not say
they are not brave when properly stimulated. But what
stimulates the North Vietnamese to keep coming in in waves and
waves and waves? Ho cannot line them all up on the chopping
block.
Mr. Porter. I can only guess at it, Senator. In the North
there is a system which commands obedience and punishes
severely if it is not given.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is very true.
Mr. Porter. And in the South it is not as rigid nor as
compelling a system.
Senator Hickenlooper. If people love liberty so much, I do
not mean to say people do not love liberty, but if people love
liberty so much, and these people get a chance, why don't they
go into a system that is not so rigorous? A million of them did
come down at the time of the French.
Mr. Porter. And, in my opinion, would do so again if that
frontier were open.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, they are down in South Vietnam.
Mr. Porter. When you have the kind----
Senator Hickenlooper. Are they there for loot?
Mr. Porter. No, they are down there, I think, because the
southern elements, the VC, NLF, the military arm, at least, is
now in considerable trouble because of pressure. Things are not
the way they were, and while they are holding on, and they are
punishing us at night, they have suffered heavy losses. I think
that is the reason the northerners came down in such force or
at least are turning on the pressure up in the northern
provinces of South Vietnam. This is purely a personal guess.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, thank you. I have to go. I
appreciate your coming here. I wish you well.
The Chairman. I am glad you have gotten so much
encouragement that you are glad about it.
Senator Hickenlooper. I did not get any encouragement. I do
not feel any better, but I thank the Ambassador for coming.
Senator Case. I think this has been the most useful session
I have had since I have been a member of the committee.
The Chairman. Senator Symington, do you have any further
questions?
Senator Symington. I have some.

THE SPIRIT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

First, let me say what a privilege it was talking with you
in Vietnam. I left my discussions with you feeling I understood
a lot of things I had not understood before.
I do not believe, I want to tell you this and just present
it to you. After thinking over all the discussions I had with
all the people there, I do not think that Premier Ky represents
a majority of the people of South Vietnam, if you add the Viet
Cong to the non-Ky South Vietnamese.
It seems to me we have learned a lesson in the last few
days in what people with a heart as well as a head can do in
two and a half million people making this fantastically
successful operation in that part of the world in which you are
a true expert, against 80 million, take on everybody, and the
next thing you know obliterate their military power to the
point that they have done to date.
With a premise of that type and character of thinking, do
you remember when I was out there, two weeks before I got
there. They assassinated perhaps the leading civilian opponent
to Premier Ky. I remember I called you up to confirm our first
date, and you said they have just nearly killed the second
leading opponent. Do you remember?
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Now, also when those 30 people hit the
TonSonNhut Air Base there right in town, they knew they were
dead. Whether they were successful or not or worse than dead,
they would be tortured if they were caught. We would turn them
over to the South Vietnamese. Isn't it true that the spirit of
South Vietnam is more truly represented in the Viet Cong than
it is in the majority of the South Vietnamese? That is my
question.

ZEALOUSNESS OF THE VIET CONG

Mr. Porter. You mean are the VC more representative of the
people of South Vietnam than----
Senator Symington. Well, I will put it to you this way:
Aren't the Viet Cong, looking back to what has happened in the
Middle East in the last few days, aren't they the people of
dedicated courage as against the South Vietnamese?
Mr. Porter. There is no question about the courage of
certain of their units.
Senator Symington. Zealous, aren't they more willing to die
for a cause, let us put it that way?
Mr. Porter. Yes, Senator, some of them. But if they were
solid in that respect we could not peel off a thousand a week
as we are doing now from their units. It is not a solid
organization.
My own opinion is, and here again I am giving opinions, I
am not----
Senator Symington. Do you think a thousand a week is worth
$2 billion a month?
Mr. Porter. I paid for each of those 1,000 the sum of $125.
That was my overall cost per head for these people as I walked
them out. That is all I can say.
Senator Symington. I am not going to pursue it any more.
Mr. Porter. It is not a very expensive thing.

FACELESSNESS OF THE VIETCONG

Senator Case. What you really mean is there is not in South
Vietnam, except for certain highly organized units and
disciplined and trained people, there is not any great passion
for the Viet Cong or for the Communists.
Mr. Porter. I was about to say in an open election today,
if it could be controlled, that is to say, in the sense of
being protected from pressure, armed pressure, my own judgment
would be that the VC might get 15 percent of the vote. I have
tried to reach out to this movement.
Senator Mundt. Is that all of Vietnam or South Vietnam?
Mr. Porter. South Vietnam.
I have tried to reach out to this movement, as I have to
others in other places, to see who is what, and what astonishes
me about them is their facelessness. There is nobody who stands
out there who amounts to anything in the community. They are
not led by the respected elements of the community as were the
nationalist movements of North Africa and the Middle East that
I knew.
It is a very odd business. They do not seem to have any
control over the workers. We could be harassed in North Africa
building the bases in Morocco by a single order from the
underground movement.
The VC have tried a general strike. They would obviously
like to hamstring our effort there in construction of the base,
and so forth.
They tried that tactic twice, a complete failure, zero.
Nobody responds. I have not ever encountered a movement quite
like this before.''

VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE

Senator Case. They talk about the Viet Cong infrastructure,
and then they do not mean a head man and the village chief and
all the rest of it sitting down somewhere behind the screen
somewhere, and if they do not, what do they mean?
Mr. Porter. They mean the chap who is with them. He might
be a member of a village council. There might be two members.
There might be another man in the village, a regular farmer,
carrying on intelligence functions, notifying them of this.
This is what they mean by the infrastructure. This is what we
have to try to get at after we start the pacification of the
village.

FAILURE OF STRATEGIC VILLAGES

Senator Gore. When I was out there ten years ago we were
spending vast sums of money on the strategic villages. This was
going to be the salvation for pacification.
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. They were utter and complete failures.
Mr. Porter. That is correct.
Senator Gore. Ten years later we have other innovations.
What will it be ten years from now, in your view?
Mr. Porter. When I was told to take over pacification,
Senator, I found no precedents except those of failure, the
kind of thing you mentioned, the strategic hamlet program and
others.
Senator Mundt. Is that what Roger Hilsman told us about at
that time?
Mr. Porter. Possibly. I am not sure what Hilsman said.
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Mr. Porter. But the strategic hamlet, we found the error.
People were coerced into living in it. They were taken out of
their villages and they were given arms to defend what?
Nothing. And even if they were inclined to, say it was a
Catholic village and they wanted to oppose the VC or the Viet
Minh, it was a principle or a religion or what have you. First,
in the case of those who did wish to oppose them, the reaction
was, the protective reaction by the government was often
delayed, and frequently non-existent; the reaction force too
far away, no choppers in those days, no planes, no guns or what
have you that could be brought to bear.
The VC set up their sand table. They figured how far away
the reaction force was, how many people were in this resisting
hamlet. They devoted the force, they applied the force,
required to reduce the hamlet. They posted, as they still do,
their ambush force between the objective and the reaction
element, and simply cut it down.
As you said, sir, you are quite right. The ruins of these
hamlets are strewn all over the place. We decided that we would
expand only from secure areas, already secured; that nobody
would be forced to leave his village and live in a barbed wire
entanglement. We tried to take advantage of those errors.

A WINNING CONCEPT OF PACIFICATION

I am convinced that we have emerged with a concept of
pacification which will work if all of the elements, the
ingredients, are in the package, and those ingredients can be
simply stated.
You must first have a well-trained team which knows what it
is about, and which must be from that village or district area.
They must be known in there to help the economic
improvement, security and general training, and reparation of
civil functions in the village itself.
You must then have the understanding of the province and
district officials' support. Without that the things that are
needed from on top won't come down to the village, the lumber
for the bridge or the pigs or whatever is needed to start up
life again.
You must then have your economic wherewithal in position to
insert into the area once you go in to support the team.
Then you have got two things that are intangibles. You must
have your prospective force of the Vietnamese Army somewhere in
the neighborhood on a 24-hour basis, not holing up at half past
five, and not waiting until eight o'clock in the morning when
the village is struck at midnight.
And, finally, if you get your protective force acting
properly in that sense, they must have the right attitude with
the villagers. They can be a good protective force, but if they
go in there and grab the girls and steal the chickens and do
all this other stuff, which has been all too common, the people
say to their friends, us and others, ``Take them away. We would
rather have the VC.''
But when you have got all those things going on in a
village area, we know from experience it can be done, but you
must expand from secure areas. You cannot pick and you must not
force people into so-called strategic hamlets.

CURRENT STATUS OF VILLAGES

Senator Mundt. What percentage of the villages do we have
with all these ingredients operating now?
Senator Case. Ten percent?
Mr. Porter. I would say--no, sir; more than that. We have a
goal of taking 1,100 hamlets, not villages but hamlets, this
year with 1.3 million people in them.
We have not yet applied teams and the other elements to all
of the 1,100, but I would say that in possibly 40 to 50 percent
of the villages or the hamlets where we are, where pacification
is underway, the ingredients are there in sufficient quality to
further the process.
It shifts. You know, some time or other a province chief or
district chief is on his good behavior, and he puts up quite a
show for a few weeks. But you have to keep watching or there
will be some backsliding. This is a fluctuating process. The
movement is forward.
In 1966, if I may continue for a minute, sir, in 1966,
which was really a year of organization, we were putting this
concept together. We took over about 500 hamlets, and we are
now moving, as I say, up.
The teams are being refined, the leadership improved,
etcetera. It will go. But what has been lacking up to now is
that required around-the-clock protection. Too many teams in
villages cooperating with us have been struck at midnight with
no reaction until eight a.m. A team or village cannot stand up
against a company of VC.
This is what is missing, and this is what the new team in
Saigon is supposed to try to evoke from the Army of Vietnam.
We have been trying, of course. Being aware of the problem,
we managed to get 60 battalions of their 120 battalions of the
Army of Vietnam allocated to the job of protecting those
villages.
Senator Gore. But they are still a daytime Army.
Mr. Porter. They are still a daytime Army all too often. We
were hit 25 times, last year. Villages in which teams were
working were hit 25 times by the VC last year.
But by the end of this year the pacification threat became
so great, the enemy, that is the VC, raised it to top priority.
Up to the time I left Saigon in May we had been hit this year
about 400 times, and there are special decorations now
announced by the VC. They fear this process, and I am glad they
do, in a sense, because it tends to prove that we now have
something that might work.
But we are still evolving. Nobody has got all the answers,
and I can only hope that the new team----

INSPIRING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

Senator Carlson. What you are saying, Mr. Ambassador, is
that for some reason we cannot inspire the Vietnamese Army, the
Southern people, who should be doing it. Why aren't they
inspired? They just serve in the Army and draw their salaries,
and don't we try to encourage and try to help the people? Is
that the idea?
Mr. Porter. Well, sir, the officer class is the key to it
all. Now, General Westmoreland, for whom I have great respect,
has a different opinion of them than I.
Senator Carlson. I see.
Mr. Porter. He thinks they are good. He came back here and
made a speech and devoted part of it to praising the Vietnamese
Army, and there are good men in it.
But as far as I am concerned, in this pacification thing
there have been some glaring deficiencies.
Now, everybody is trying to get this thing changed.
Why we cannot inspire them, why we have not been able to,
is because there is an officer class which has acquired bad
habits. The war is over at 5:30. There is no war on Sunday, you
know, that kind of thing.
It is just not applicable to this kind of situation. Now
maybe if you had a fixed line with a lot of trenches and great
defenses there would be no problem except the enemy coming at
you from one direction, and you could maybe take a little time
off to do this. But you cannot. You have to fight right around
the clock in Vietnam, and nobody can fight at night.
Senator Gore. Senator Cooper.
Senator Case. Are we getting anywhere in correcting this;
are we starting?
Mr. Porter. We are trying. Our military and everybody out
there are doing their damndest to get it. Please don't feel
from what I have said that there are not good units and not
good Vietnamese. The Vietnamese trooper on our side is just as
good as the VC, but he is not operating in his own territory
very frequently. He cannot get out at night. He is not setting
booby traps for the enemy at night or ambushes, and he has got
a different kind of training. He is a conventional trooper,
brave as they come, when the enemy is coming across the field
at him perhaps. But at night it is a different business.
Senator Carlson. Is this a fixed bad habit or is it bad
morale on the part of these people? What do you think?
Mr. Porter. I think it is just a bad habit. I do not think
it is anything that is unchangeable, except that it is going to
take time, Senator, to do it.
Senator Carlson. I am through.
Senator Cooper. Might I ask a couple of questions, Senator
Gore?
Senator Gore. Go ahead.

IMPLAUSIBILITY OF MAKING OVER SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Cooper. I certainly appreciated hearing you,
Ambassador Porter. But it seems to me in a way what you have
said, one could say that it brings into question the very
premise upon which we are operating in South Vietnam.
We would say we are there to help the people fight for
their freedom and help them resist aggression. But from what
you said they do not seem to be doing very much, and if you
extend your suggestion, it seems to me, what we are saying, we
have to make over the whole country. We have to make over the
military forces. You have to, the people themselves have got to
believe there is social justice. You say you have got to get
the government in the attitude of providing social justice. It
seems that the Americans are stimulating or trying to inspire
the making over of a country economically, militarily. I just
wonder if a country can do that to another country? No colonial
country has ever been able to do it. The British did very well
in India and did very well in other places, but they could not
do it.
I think it questions the very premises which we are there
for. I want to ask you two or three very specific questions.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY'S LACK OF MOTIVATION

Take the Army, I read this--of course you have made it
clear--they do not fight at night.
I can remember four or five years ago when we heard one of
the purposes of our advisers out there, as stated on the floor
a number of times, was to train these South Vietnamese in
night-time fighting and guerrilla fighting. Apparently we never
did.
Then you say they cannot even protect the security of the
hamlet; they are driven off.
Well, it does go back to what is the reason--part of it may
be training--but isn't it also the fact that it is lack of
motivation?
Mr. Porter. Motivation in many cases, yes.
I did not say, I do not think I said, Senator, that they
won't protect a hamlet. What I said is that the reaction is
delayed beyond reason. That a hamlet, after a signal goes in,
should not be expected to wait eight hours before the local
force or the force in the vicinity reacts.

GET THE VIETNAMESE TO DO THINGS FOR THEMSELVES

Senator Cooper. You changed your system now to put
Americans in there or with Americans and South Vietnamese to
provide the security. It is evident that they would not secure
the hamlet at night; is that correct?
Mr. Porter. To put Americans in to react instead of South
Vietnamese?
Senator Cooper. Yes.
Mr. Porter. But then we would be changing our basic
philosophy. You mentioned the British and what they tried to
do, and so on. But they tried to do it directly to these people
or for these people; make them do things. We are trying to get
the Vietnamese to do things for Vietnamese.
Senator Cooper. The fact is we have not been able to get
them to do it. We have not been able to get them to do the
fighting that they ought to do.
Mr. Porter. That is right.
Senator Cooper. It is their country, to protect the
villagers, to engage in night fighting. The Viet Cong engage in
night fighting, but these people have not, and part of it must
be because they will not. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Porter. Yes.

ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Senator Cooper. Then I think it is a question that they are
not fighting for something in which they believe.
Now, what about the people themselves? You said, first they
must have a feeling of security, and that has been answered by
your statements about the failure of their own people to
protect them, the Army people.
Second, they must have a belief that this social justice
will be accorded them. Then that goes for their government. It
would follow then their government has not taken any large
steps to accord them what you call and what we generally
understand are the elements of social justice. Is that correct?
Mr. Porter. They have taken some steps, but there is a very
great deal to do in that field. It is hoped that many things
will be done under a constitutional form of government which
would be representative and would give the people a chance to
raise their voices against injustice.
Senator Cooper. I am going to quit. But if I may pursue my
line for just a moment, following Senator Gore's observation, I
have seen time after time long lists of things that have been
provided to the people of South Vietnam through our money and
our effort. Only this year the President, in one of his
speeches, one of his messages to Congress, had a tremendous
list of things that have been done because of our aid and our
money--schools, roads. I just cannot name all of them. But that
has not accomplished very much, has it?
Mr. Porter. I think it has in the areas that are secure.
Senator Cooper. It has?
Mr. Porter. Yes, I think it has. The program has produced
in the secure areas a feeling on the part of the Vietnamese
generally that they would like--outside those areas, too--that
they would like to have the same benefits and security.
Security brings with it tangible benefits.
Yes, I do believe there has been a definite and good
reaction to these programs.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOYALTY

Senator Cooper. Is there any feeling of loyalty or
attachment on the part of the people in South Vietnam toward
the government?
Mr. Porter. Yes, in many cases, there is.
What we have noted is the willingness of the people
throughout South Vietnam to cooperate with the government
provided the security is not transient.
Too many times in the past the VC have been swept from a
village area, and then the military unit went off to do
something else, and the VC came back to punish the village for
cooperating during the brief period when it was secured. They
have learned. They have had many bitter lessons in that
connection.
Now, we find they want to be sure that that security is in
as a basic ingredient of the program. It must be there; must
stay there. Once they are sure of that, it takes about two or
three months to calm their fears. Then the intelligence about
the VC begins to come in, not quickly, because of the history
of it, but they do cooperate. In that sense they are loyal.
They will respond despite VC threats to participate in the
election appeal. We have seen that definitely on several
occasions, now, and there is no particular loyalty to a
government in a party sense. But there is a feeling that there
are great advantages to be derived if only peace and security
could be achieved, can be achieved.

DISLIKE BETWEEN SOUTHERNERS AND NORTHERNERS

Senator Cooper. One other question: What is the attitude of
the people toward North Vietnam? When I was there I was told
that there was a great feeling toward Ho Chi Minh, but they did
not like the North, and it was chiefly the basis for being
willing to continue to make such efforts as they could
fighting.
Mr. Porter. There is a disease called regionalism in that
country. The southerners and the northerners do not like each
other, and the Centrists do not like either.
Senator Case. It goes back for centuries.
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; and that is one cause of the
friction.
There is then, of course, a big Catholic element which
dislikes the North for other reasons, although many of them,
Catholics in the South are foreign, are of northern origin.
On the other hand, many officers came down from the North
because they were afraid of Communists and did not like them,
or their families had suffered, people like Ky himself. That is
his weakness in this forthcoming election as a northerner. He
will run, and will have great difficulty unless he finds a
strong southerner to go with him.
Senator Cooper. I thank you.

IF THE ELECTION SPLITS THE ARMED FORCES

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, you said earlier that if--
there are a lot of ifs--if the election went over well, if they
got a civilian who did a good job for social justice, and then
maybe a constitutional government and election which was to be
held in September, it would alleviate the situation.
You did not discuss the other contingency, except to say
there is a rivalry between the two popular military leaders
that might split the Army.
Mr. Porter. Yes.
Senator Mundt. So if that happens where are we? If that is
in the realm of possibility, and I gather it could be, what
happens?
Mr. Porter. There could be considerable dissension. There
is a feeling by many of us that what is required at this point
is a civilian government with the support, loyal support, of
the Army.
Ky and Thieu, young men, have been in power now for a
couple of years, and have gotten to like it. Neither wishes to
yield to the other, and both will be candidates apparently.
If this splits the armed forces, we may have a tendency to
revert to the business of a coup d'etat, which were frequent
before Lodge and I went in there.
Somebody is going to have to be pretty firm somewhere, it
seems to me, because the coup d'etat was bad enough in the old
days. But now with 500,000 Americans in the country, the rules
of the game have got to be changed accordingly, and I think
somebody is going to have to tell them.

PERILS OF AN ELECTION IN WARTIME

Senator Mundt. Is this a contingency? Is it going to
provide any loyal support on behalf of the South Vietnamese if
we superimpose on them an American-made selected government?
Wouldn't that antagonize them right off the bat?
Mr. Porter. Senator, we have been backing away from doing
just that despite everybody, all kinds of people, approaching
us saying, ``You have to say what you want and then people will
know.'' That is a very dangerous position to get into.
Senator Mundt. I was a little concerned in my own mind when
I first heard we were going in there in the middle of a war and
holding an election. We might be creating a fracas. We might go
from bad to worse, because it is a little unprecedented in our
American wartime history to have elections and wars going on at
the same time and at the same place, and we having instigated
it. We have got to assume some responsibility for the results.
And what could happen, seems likely to happen, to me, and I am
not an authority on Vietnam because I have not been there, but
it seems to me what could very well happen is that the split
that you mention between these two charming and rather
successful military figures who have a loyal following in their
sub-officers, if they split up, and the one who loses is not
going to support the one who wins, there is no alternative but
just to superimpose a ``made in Washington'' government. I
think that is the worst of all eventualities.
Mr. Porter. Yes, or to act in time and reason firmly with
them.
My own tendency would be not to wait, to get at this thing
sooner rather than later, because the effect in the country
will be very bad.
We have a lot to gain by a good election, and a respected
figure, preferably civilian, emerging. The whole image of
Vietnam throughout the world will change, and we will feel
easier with them, I think, as a result.

THE AMERICAN CANDIDATE

Senator Gore. It seems to me from all that you have said,
particularly with respect to Senator Cooper's observation, that
Ky here is a key to success, which must be motivation. The
French were unable to motivate these people to defend
themselves. We have been trying, since 1954, and we have not
been very successful.
You agree with the observation of General Dayan that no
white man's candidate will succeed as village chief. What
reason do we have to believe that the white man's candidate
would be accepted? How much is this yellow man against white
man's exploitation?
Mr. Porter. Sir, I would never propose a candidate as such.
Senator Gore. Well, this man is our candidate. He comes to
Honolulu; he comes to the Philippines. He campaigns in an
American helicopter. He has a plane with a bar in it. He wears
a baseball cap he got over here. How can he be more a white
man's candidate than he is?
Mr. Porter. Well, I tend to think that the trip to Honolulu
and the plane, etcetera, are the perquisites and trappings of
office. I do not know----
Senator Gore. They are our trappings though. We provided
the trappings.
Mr. Porter. I know. But any soldier--we had them there, Big
Minh had them, and others had them before Ky showed up, because
we were supplying these kinds of items.
But the mission has been extremely careful to make it clear
to everybody in Saigon that there is no American candidate.
This has been said to Ky himself; it has been said to all the
others.
Now, in exerting our influence in the place, I think it
should be in the direction of getting them, as we have done on
sort of a minor scale from time to time, to pull together; to
get together again, and pull together, and make up their minds
on a course of action that will not split the country or split
the armed forces.
Maybe they could compromise now that both are candidates or
have announced their candidacy in favor of a civilian.
You know in Vietnam there is no foregone conclusion that Ky
can win. Ky is a northerner; he is a young fellow. He has not
got any southerner of prominence to run with him that I know of
yet. He is opposed by a couple of respected but not outstanding
personalities, and it is just barely possible that he and/or
Thieu would be beaten, despite the advantages which accrue from
being in office.
Senator Gore. Let me make this observation. If I were his
public relations officer, the first thing I would do is to take
the American baseball cap off him and give him one of these
little round hats that goes up to a peak.

THE SITUATION IS INTOLERABLE

Senator Case. Tell me how do we exercise influence? We
ought to influence them to eliminate corruption or cut it down.
We ought to influence them to pay the civil servants and the
army more. We ought to do a thousand things. How is this done?
Do we go in and say, ``Ky, you little jerk, will you get some
sense in your head or else we will get the hell out of here''?
Now, how can you--I understand, I have seen papers from
downtown or to each other downtown, that we have such a great
stake in this place, and we are absolutely at the mercy of the
Vietnamese because we know we cannot pull out.
Well, I say we can pull out, although I am against it. I
think that the effect, except on the basis of the South
Vietnamese demonstrating to the world that they are not worth
saving, I think it would be a disaster if we pulled out as far
as the periphery goes and as far as many of the people in South
Vietnam who have come along with us and all that.
But this is intolerable, to have American boys killed while
people get rich, etcetera, etcetera, for very much longer.
Tell us how it works. Do you talk to Ky? Did Cabot talk to
Ky?
Mr. Porter. Oh, yes; yes, sir. We do not have any
hesitation about taking up delicate matters or problems that
might be delicate in other countries with people like Ky.
In the matter of corruption, we had some frank discussions
and conversations with him. He did manage to remove two of the
highest ranking generals in the country from office as a
result.
Senator Case. One guy is still in there though.
Mr. Porter. Well, there are several other characters
around, but at least the Minister of Defense was taken out, and
the commander of the Fourth Region, the Delta.
In matters pertaining to an army raise or pay raise or
civil servants, much the same process goes on. Ky is not
difficult about that kind of thing.

ELIMINATING KY AS A CANDIDATE

Senator Case. Well, what I mean to say specifically now,
you were just talking with Senator Gore and Senator Mundt about
the matter of the desirability of eliminating Ky as a
candidate. Can you talk to him about this kind of thing? You do
not select a candidate, but can you persuade Ky and the
military to put in a responsible civilian figure who will
himself add a little legitimacy to the government, which is the
main thing that Ky lacked because he is regarded by most people
still, as I understand it, as one of a bunch of thugs who have
come down from the North and except for Big Minh, who had a
little standing because he was the instrument to overturn a
dictator and a tyrant, the rest of these people have had no--
they inspire no loyalty or no affection. They are in no way a
force to draw a country together, this kind of thing.
Mr. Porter. That is why I said, sir, a civilian candidate
might well win.
Senator Case. What can you do to help this?
Mr. Porter. But in the matter of what do you say to Ky, and
so on, I do not know what is being said at the moment. I have
been out of touch.
The pitch when I left was for Ky and Thieu to settle
between them, and this was being made directly to them, to
settle between them which of them would be the candidate, since
they seemed to be both talking about running if a split in the
armed forces was to be avoided.
They gave assurances that no split in the armed forces was
going to happen, but no more than that. Since they have
announced their candidacy, this has weakened both.
The conversations are straightforward and frank when we
have reason to talk to them.
Senator Mundt. Have you ever tried to talk an American
politician out of running for office? It is not easy.

POSSIBILITY THAT A CIVILIAN MIGHT WIN

Mr. Porter. There is something in that sense, Senator. But
they will split their support, and I would not be unhappy to
see a civilian emerge, provided he has some kind of a working
arrangement with the military. The military make a hell of a
lot of difference.
Senator Case. Of course, of course. But it might happen
that way.
Mr. Porter. Ky, I sense in Vietnam, naturally perhaps on
the part of the people, some hesitation about backing military
candidates, and I don't--he is too young, he is northerner, and
he has not got a good southerner to run with him so far, and
there are great weaknesses.
If a respected southern figure emerges from the Delta, the
Delta will vote southern, and that great conglomeration outside
Saigon is unmanageable but probably would not vote military.
Senator Mundt. Let me ask you this. You were in such a
position, you and Cabot who were there, and your successors who
are there. Couldn't you call in Ky and this other fellow in the
same room and say, ``Look, fellows, we are trying to win this
war. Will you agree on a civilian?'', That kind of thing, might
conceivably be withdrawn, you might get either to withdraw for
the other. It is my inclination to believe in a war-time
situation that one or the other is more likely to win than a
civilian.
The Chairman. That is the way you are going to do it in the
Republican convention in the back room. [Laughter.]
Senator Mundt. Yes. ``Look, agree on some civilian and
everybody will pitch in and help.''

NEED FOR A RUN-OFF

Senator Case. Up to now it does not look too good. When you
left, the assembly had just defeated the effort some of the
civilians had been making to provide for a minimum vote in
order to win on the first election, and----
Mr. Porter. This was at the behest of the Ky elements. This
is a very troublesome aspect.
Senator Case. That is right.
Mr. Porter. Very troublesome. Because, we have pointed out
to Ky, if there is no run-off and there are four or five
candidates, and a man emerges with 15, 20, or 25 percent of the
vote, where will be his prestige domestically or
internationally? We are hoping for something here that will
look like a national mandate, whoever is put into office.
Senator Case. They turned this down.
Mr. Porter. They turned this down, and Ky later said--well,
we took this up with him again, and it seemed to us to be a
good procedure. But he said he thought that he probably would
get, or that the winner would probably get 40 percent of the
vote, which would not be bad, of course, in a field of five
candidates or so. But it is not a healthy business that way.
The Chairman. Senator Clark, have you posed any questions?

VIETNAM CLOSE TO A STALEMATE

Senator Clark. I would like to ask a couple.
Mr. Ambassador, I came in late, and I hope I won't be going
over ground that has already been covered. But I understand you
did not have any serious quarrel with Ward Just's article in
The Washington Post on Sunday. Am I wrong about that?
Mr. Porter. No. Ward reflects, or the article reflects a
number of incidents primarily. He is a very sensitive man, and
in certain respects I can agree fully. I am not sure--I do not
go along with him when he says the war is probably unwinnable.
This was printed in the paper, and this was not my thought. I
think it is winnable if, and then, of course, the ifs come into
the picture.
Senator Clark. Yes. But I get the impression at the present
moment we are pretty close to a stalemate. Is that wrong?
Mr. Porter. Well, you are right in the sense that we can do
what we like in the daytime and damned little at night.
Senator Clark. Yes. But I mean if we are close to the
stalemate we finally got in Korea, maybe it is a good time to
start talking.
Mr. Porter. No, because there is no line, you see. It is
not like Korea. It is quite different, sir. If there were a
line you got stalemate on that would be great.
Senator Clark. I understand that, but it does not seem to
us it makes sense. So many die. We kill so many of them and
they kill so many of us. This goes on and on. We do not take
any more territory; they do not win. I do not want to argue
with you, but it seems to me whether there is a line or not is
not important.

VICTORY BY ATTRITION

Mr. Porter. Westmoreland is counting on pure attrition. You
kill enough of them and it eventually will quiet down. I have a
different approach.
Senator Clark. He also says five or six years.
Mr. Porter. I do not know. The military do their own
figuring.
The Chairman. How many years do you say?
Mr. Porter. Well, I could not say. At the present time I
would want to see how this election turns out, because I think,
sir, after this election, if we get something reasonable with a
good image, world image, as a result of a popular mandate and
all that, I think they ought to be pushed to open negotiations
with the other side. They are Vietnamese. We are locked in.
We have said we won't negotiate with the VC. We cannot stop
the bombing unless we get a gesture, all these other gestures.
They are not locked in by anything. They can and should, it
seems to me, after the election, say to the VC. ``Now, look,
there is no question this has been a decent election. Everybody
in world opinion says so. Now, what do you want to do? Do you
want to talk or not?''
I also believe that this is what we are very likely to see
because the spirit in the constituent assembly tends to reflect
or indicates this possibility. This may be the way to go.
The Chairman. That is providing Ky is not elected.
Mr. Porter. Well, if a soldier is elected----
Senator Case. You are going to have a congress; you are
going to have a legislature, which is going to be a factor.
Mr. Porter. If a soldier is elected it would take rather
more urging on our part to make this direct contact. But I
would not want to give up.

FAILURE TO PRODUCE A STRONG MILITARY FORCE

Senator Clark. Do you know a Japanese reporter from the
Christian Science Monitor whose name is Takashi Oka?
Mr. Porter. Yes, I have met him.
Senator Clark. So far as you know, is he fairly reliable?
Mr. Porter. Yes. He is an interesting reporter. Sometimes
he tends to write things without checking them.
Senator Clark. This letter which Carl Marcy has handed me,
written on May 20, has some interesting observations in it. I
would like your comment on one. One of them is:

It is pertinent to ask why, with all the material help
provided by the Americans, the non-Communist Vietnamese so far
have not been able to create a military force half as good as
that of their Communist compatriots.

Is that a fair comment? Is that a fair question?
Mr. Porter. Yes, it is a fair question, but it is not
entirely a Vietnamese fault. We have been training them for ten
years.
Senator Clark. He comes to the conclusion it is the fault
of their officers.
Mr. Porter. That what, sir?
Senator Clark. He comes to the conclusion that it is the
fault of their officers, which bears out something which you
said earlier about the nine-to-five hours, and also something I
saw in the paper that in three years there has only been one
field grade officer in the South Vietnamese army wounded in
combat.
Mr. Porter. I am seriously concerned about the officer
corps for a number of reasons. But I think there have probably
been a few wounded.
I must say the civilian elements in Saigon seem to be much
more the object of--the police particularly whom we on our side
trained--much more the object of VC attack than the officers of
the army.
Senator Clark. Which would seem to indicate they are happy
with the officers of the army.
Mr. Porter. Well, there is something there.
Senator Case. They do not expose themselves.
Mr. Porter. We get hit much harder, our officers.

A CORRUPT ARMY LED BY POLITICAL GENERALS

Senator Clark. I won't detain you much longer. But here is
another one that Takashi Oka says:

Promotion in the Vietnamese army still depends on a complex
of personal family, regional, religious and educational ties on
the generals and wives an officer knows, on his behavior during
the innumerable coups and purges that have shaken the army
during the past several years. The result is an army led by
political generals willing to accept American advice only at
the most technical level of logistics, new weapons, and
sometimes of strategy. The corrupt and creaky, clubby structure
of the Vietnamese army itself remains a sacred cow. Foreigners
fiddle with it at their peril. Even the well-intentioned
members of the Vietnamese military fraternity hesitate to touch
it, and so the Americans fight the war.

Is that unfair?
Mr. Porter. It is harsh, but it is not unfair. The first
part of it, yes, the list of factors.

REORGANIZATION OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Senator Clark. Now, Joe Kraft, who is a pretty
controversial figure, I happen to like him and respect him, but
others do not, had an article in the Post--and this is my last
question, Mr. Chairman--on the 12th of May, in which he is
talking about the reorganization under which the American army
took over the pacification thing, and he says:

Reorganization is bound to work a subtle change in mood of
the pacification effort. Originally the program was conceived
as a means for winning over people in the villages, including
people on the other side, by meeting their needs. As an adjunct
to the military, however, pacification will be inextricably
intertwined with the goal that comes so naturally to soldiers,
victory. The dominant theme will shift from winning over those
on the other side to killing them.

That is a little rough. Do you think the army can do a
better job than the civilians in pacifying the Vietnamese, whom
I would be afraid are not going to permit themselves to be
pacified by white men?
Mr. Porter. Well, I assume you were speaking of our army.
Could our army do it?
Senator Clark. Yes, I was speaking of our army.
Mr. Porter. I happen to feel and believe strongly that this
must be done by civilians.
First of all, to begin with, the technical aspect, the army
tour of duty, is too short. The civilian, the American civilian
will live in and observe the village and its environs for two,
three, or four or more years. The army man is in there perhaps
for six months, because the feeling is that this is sort of
secondary, the advisory work is of a secondary character, and
he wants to be, for his own good if he is a career man, even if
not an officer, he wants to be in a battle unit.
This is a question of sensitivity. I have--I think that the
army boys would have as much as civilians if they were devoted
entirely to that kind of work for the same length of time.
Senator Clark. Well, I spent----
Mr. Porter. Then, of course, there are problems of command.
Senator Clark. Sure.
Mr. Porter. The civilian is given, at least was, a great
deal of flexibility, and he can use his own judgment as to what
is needed, and a civilian is generally convinced of the need to
keep an American presence out of those villages. I am not sure
that that is the case with the army.
Senator Clark. Well, I was in the Air Force for four years
many years ago, during World War II, and I had the most
enormous high regard for the West Pointers and the
professionals that I worked for. They were really magnificent
military men.
But, boy, when they got to military government, they did
not know which end was up.

RATIONALE FOR THE SWITCH

Senator Case. I guess, Joe, perhaps, you were here, perhaps
you were not here, when the Ambassador was saying that he
understood the rationale for this switch, which I have very
great doubts about, was primarily the providing of security for
the program in the hamlets.
Senator Clark. I am sure it was.
Mr. Porter. The rationale at the time the switch was made,
if our army, if it had complete responsibility for the
pacification army as carried on under me previously, would then
feel the compulsion or greater compulsion to evoke the
necessary protective attitudes and actions out of the army of
Vietnam.
Senator Case. By the Vietnam, and we would see that this
was done.
Mr. Porter. And now we have people in there who are charged
with evoking that Vietnamese action.

THE LINE COMMAND

Senator Case. When I was over there they had not worked out
this line of command really, the integration side of it.
Mr. Porter. No sir.
Senator Case. We have, what is his name, Bob Komer, who is
Deputy for Westmoreland for this purpose, a civilian.
Mr. Porter. Yes.
Senator Case. But it has not really been very clear as to
what the chain of command was going to be.
Mr. Porter. Komer was in effect to take over that part of
my job which was concerned with the structure and operation of
pacification, the training of teams, the choice of the villages
to be pacified, etcetera.
No, General Abrams, as I understand it, is to be the one
who evokes from the army of Vietnam, as Westmoreland's other
deputy, the proper protective action and the right attitudes,
etcetera, toward this process.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, could I go off the record for
just half a minute?
The Chairman. Yes.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. On the record.

FIGHT INDEFINITELY OR NEGOTIATE

Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if I can ask you one or two
questions.
Probably in the interest of time I will over-simplify them.
It seems to me in a very broad way we have two
possibilities.
One is to continue the fight indefinitely, some say six
years, some say ten, some say twenty, however that may be.
The other is to negotiate.
Why is it impracticable to seek negotiation? At one time,
our own government, and certainly others, have said a return to
the essentials of the Geneva Accords could be an acceptable
starting place to see if some basis for a non-military solution
can be found.
Would you care to comment on that?
Mr. Porter. I think there will be a more propitious moment
during which we can move toward negotiations if these elections
come off properly.
Now, there are problems, and I suppose this government, in
moving toward a direct contact with the MLF-VC, in view of the
things we have said, would not do this. Those problems do not
apply to the upcoming new government of Vietnam next September.
Mr. Chairman. The reason I raise that question----
Mr. Porter. It seems to me they have more liberty of
action, Mr. Chairman. Excuse me.

ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE SEEN AS FAIR

The Chairman. I hope I am wrong about it, but this
election, it cannot possibly be considered by the world as a
fair election because everyone won't be out voting.
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; everyone who is not bearing arms will
be allowed to vote; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Who is going to supervise it?
Mr. Porter. There will be, of course there will be great
dependence on the presence of the world press, and they are
inviting official observers from many countries, as I
understand it, to observe, not to supervise, but everyone can
vote provided he has not got a gun in his hands.
We have managed to get to the VC to come into the VC
center, and within two months he will be integrated if he
wishes into the Vietnamese society, and he may vote. More
recently they have accepted the thought that the higher-ups in
the VC may also reenter society, resume their professions and
take part as individuals in the political process.
What they have not accepted is the thought of VC-MLF
participating as a party nor, of course, have they accepted the
idea that armed units of the enemy side may come in to vote.
That, of course, would not happen anyway. But they may vote.
They have done so.

CHANCES OF THE COMMUNISTS WINNING AN ELECTION

The Chairman. Then you do not think it is feasible to
return to the Geneva Accords--just supposing, just for
speculation, to try to make the point I am trying to make, if
you did have a cease-fire and you had an election supervised by
the ICC instead of the American army, whoever the officials
are, that this would make--do you think that the Communists are
bound to win such an election?
Mr. Porter. I think not.
The Chairman. If not, why don't we take that route and make
it more in accord with the concept of the Geneva Accords?
Mr. Porter. Elections supervised by the ICC would require,
of course, the agreement of the Communist element.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Porter. And I think there is good reason to believe
that they would themselves not agree, and that on the
Vietnamese side the Ky government might not agree.
We would not know about the latter point until we exerted
our influence and pressure. But it is not an easy route to take
by any means. It is not easy.

FACED WITH A SECOND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Chairman. What I am leading up to, I suppose, now we
are faced with this second war in the Middle East which God
willing is coming to an end as far as the violence goes. But
the end is a long ways off as far as a real settlement is
concerned.
You could tell in this body itself this last week there was
a much higher degree of apprehension as a result of this war in
the Middle East breaking out on top of another war which is a
very major war. Some are considering the proposition that it
may, time may be here that we ought to consider trying to bring
about a settlement involving, of course, the Russians and the
other interested parties, of both the Middle East and Vietnam;
that if we cannot settle Vietnam the Russians are not going to
be satisfied to just sit by and be good and play ball in the
Middle East while we are continuing to escalate and pursue the
war in Vietnam.
I think there is some logic in that, a matter of
psychology. I know the administration insists that there is no
connection between these two.
I think, I sense, a great many of my colleagues believe
there is a connection, particularly from the attitude of the
Russians. They are still a pretty important element in the
overall picture.
Now, you say it is not a propitious time. It may not be
with looking only at Vietnam. But it seems to me, looking at
the whole world situation and, particularly, our relations with
the Russians, they have received a very serious setback now in
their prestige and their allies in the Middle East, and
possibly they could be disposed to consider a package
agreement.
The reason I mention the Geneva Accords is simply because
these governments--one common thread, I think, has been in the
various pronouncements by Communists as well as our own
government in the past, that this would be a reasonable place
to begin. I am much more interested really in settling Vietnam
than I am in the Middle East, not that we are not interested in
both, but the one that is really hurting this country at the
moment is Vietnam. I mean financially we are getting into very
serious trouble. You saw where the House refused to up the
limit. You know what that is. It is resentment against the
distortion of our economy rising from the Vietnamese war.

CONSIDER A BROADER FRAMEWORK THAN VIETNAM

We had the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee saying
in a speech the other day he anticipated there could be a
deficit, on top of what we already have scheduled, of $29
billion this coming year. That was from Wilbur Mills, the
chairman of Ways and Means.
We are getting into very serious difficulties, I think,
economically, domestically. We have the distortion of our
domestic programs.
You read in today's paper about a riot, a racial riot, in
Boston, which has not heretofore been particularly subject to
that. Seventy people were injured, and so on.
Everyone feels that this summer we are going to be plagued
with many more domestic difficulties in this area, all of
which, I think, reflect the Vietnamese war, not just the
monetary part, but the distraction of the attention of most of
our political leaders. They are thinking the war. They are not
thinking about the poverty program or the urban program, and so
on. You know they cannot possibly be.
I was wondering if those of you, and particularly you, who
have been so close to this out there, feel whether this should
not be considered in a little broader framework than just
Vietnam. Because if we are going to get anywhere with peace
with the Russians or detente, I think we have to consider our
doing something about Vietnam if they are going to be
reasonable about other parts of the world.
This thing has blown up in their face in the Middle East.
If we do not make any movement towards some kind of
reconciliation, they can also make it difficult in Berlin or a
number of other places.
Is this unreasonable to try to bring these two in focus,
whether or not, in the words of the Secretary, there is an
organic connection. I think there is certainly a psychological
connection between the two in the minds of the Russians.
Mr. Porter. The package, Vietnam----
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Porter. [continuing]. And in the Middle East?
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Porter. And, of course, the matter of the people who
will eventually have to give, not only to us in Vietnam, but
perhaps we could find some means of doing that, but some very
tough people I was associated with for many years, meaning the
Israelis.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Porter. I do not know.
In general appearance, of course, it seems attractive. The
work seems very complicated.
The Chairman. It is complicated.

VIETNAM IS A PERIPHERAL AREA

What bothers me really, I know when you were there, and I
know what I call good technicians and people, they are
interested in accomplishing their particular job. But,
honestly, I do not see in the overall picture if we spend five
or ten years bringing about a democratic regime there, in the
first place, it would be a very tenuous regime if we impose it
or if we manage it, if it does not develop of its own roots
there. It is not to me the kind of position that is nearly as
dangerous to the peace of the world over a long period as the
Middle East can be because of the juxtaposition of so many
different interests.
I have always been impressed by [General John] Gavin's idea
that while it is important, it is not the most important or
most strategic area, and so on. It is a reasonably peripheral
area.
I wonder, we pursue it with all this money and effort and
manpower and the attention of our people, and the neglect-we
are neglecting Latin America; we are neglecting our domestic
programs; we are neglecting Africa because we do not have but
one mind, and the President can think of only one thing at a
time.
I do not know. I think we are riding for a very serious
problem if we do not bring these two together in some focus,
and get some kind of a detente and stop this slaughter. That
endless slaughter, it seems to me, is very dangerous.
I was struck today, the Secretary was here this morning,
and he left--there had been word that one of our ships had been
torpedoed. Well, you know how it turned out.
Supposing by mistake they had torpedoed a Russian ship.
Would they have accepted the excuse that it was a mistake? I do
not know whether they would have or not. They are mad as hell
about our bombing their ship in the harbor.
The Ambassador to Czechoslovakia came to see me and he said
good-by, and he said the Russians were furious about our
bombing their ship, and they do not begin to buy that we did
not do it. They know we did, he said. These mistakes are very
dangerous.

GIVING THE VIETNAMESE A CHANCE TO MAKE A CHOICE

Senator Case. This is a very important question in our line
of questioning. We all know you have concerns and have
expressed them, and we all hold, and I think this is a real
hard question, what would happen if we made the kind of a deal
that we can make now? First of all, can we make a deal that
does not involve turning over South Vietnam to the Communists,
except by immediately or short steps? If that is desirable then
we should do it. If because of all the things that have
concerned----
The Chairman. I am not proposing we just turn it over to
them.
He is saying if they had a fair election he does not think
they would vote for it. But I am saying it is up to them if we
give them a fair opportunity that they make the decision.
Senator Case. I think we are hoping that this will be
regarded by the civilized world as, broadly speaking, a fair
election.
The Chairman. I do not believe they will when it is under
our control. I think you have to have more participation by
outsiders.
Mr. Porter. You mean, sir, the country, our control of the
country, or the election?
The Chairman. Well, I mean the means of communications. The
fact of the availability of transport, and all of this. The
part that is going to function in this election is bound to be
attributed to our control.
Mr. Porter. Well, whatever the case may be, communications
or transport, we have made it perfectly clear to them that we
will not permit our transport to be involved in any of their
election.
The Chairman. You or somebody said Mr. Ky campaigns in his
helicopter. Where did he get the helicopter?
Mr. Porter. Well, there are helicopters there, and there
are machines which belong to the Vietnamese government.
The Chairman. We made it available. We made available
everything they have.
Mr. Porter. Yes.

A PHONY ELECTION

The Chairman. Nobody is going to buy this kind of phony
business. We are really running the show and Ky is our man. I
do not think you can ever convince anybody he is not our man.
Senator Case. I think it is really a hard problem for any
civilian to campaign against him, don't you, with all the
censorship and everything going on? We are constantly trying to
help this out, but I think to get a civilian man in we probably
would have to persuade Ky and his colleagues in the military
that it is desirable in the long run. That is the only way we
can get him out.
The Chairman. I did not mean to put you on the spot to
answer this question or not.
Senator Case. I am going to put him on a spot by sharpening
it.

POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

The Chairman. What I meant to do is this: You have the
confidence of the administration, I know. Would it be
feasible--I won't even put it in the form of a question, I
would rather put it this way--I would appeal to you and plead
with you, without your answering yes or no, to inspire them to
think about it, at least the possibility of private
negotiations with the Russians and then with the French and
British, before major powers, at least, who have an interest in
this area, to consider under these present circumstances in
which the Russians and the Arabs are humiliated, and it could
be dangerous if we pushed this.
There is too much bragging. I regretted the statements made
yesterday that this was a great victory for the West. This is
the most infuriating way you can put this thing in the Middle
East, but this was published as attributed to the Secretary.
I do not really think he ever said it, or certainly
intended to say it that way, but these things happen.
I think during this interim if the Russians could be
approached, if our government, and I certainly cannot do it,
and it will have to be the administration, along this line, and
they could see some prospect of a settlement in Vietnam, they
would be greatly--their feelings would be helped a lot to go
along in the Middle East and elsewhere if they thought they
could get that off their back, because it is a burden to them,
too. It is a burden and it is a dangerous one because of their
relations with the Chinese.
All I am doing is appealing to you to inspire them to think
about it along this way and not be too frozen in their attitude
that this has nothing to do with the Middle East, and we do not
want to consider it at all.
I think it is one of the things that might appeal to the
Russians to consider seriously this approach.

COMMUNIST FEARS OF AN ESCALATING WAR

I had a conversation with some of the Europeans at Geneva
last week, and this sort of thing came up, and by and large
those people--some were Communists, some were non-Communists--
felt that the time has come where something ought to break
about the continuation of the escalation in Vietnam.
They are all very apprehensive about it, you know all the
Europeans are, for fear that it will escalate into a war that
involves them. They are genuinely fearful.
Everybody is worried about it is what comes out of this
thing. Are we going to get into a war with the Russians, the
Chinese and/or the Russians? It is always simple to say oh, no,
that cannot happen. It is exactly what they said about Korea.
We do not know obviously, but it is possible. Anytime you
are slaughtering people wholesale there is always a danger.
I was hoping you would, at least, plan to see that they
consider it, whatever they do. I would hate for them to miss an
opportunity if it is here. I do not know whether it is here or
not, but it is worth looking into.

PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator Case. Bill, do I understand you really--because I
do not see as a matter of logic how the Middle East thing is in
conjunction with Southeast Asia. How it makes it any more easy
to make an agreement, unless what you have in mind in a way is
that you get the Russians to ease off and to use their
influence, whatever it may be, on the Arabs to ease off on
Israel; settle that in a fair way, on a fair basis for the long
term which, you know, I am all for in connection with our
agreeing to withdraw somewhat our support or put pressure on
the South Vietnamese. Is this what you have in mind?
The Chairman. It is awfully late to try to do it.
Senator Case. I just want to get some idea.

DAMPEN THE FIRES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Chairman. Maybe in a few words I will try to do it this
way.
What I would propose to do, and this is, of course, very
over-simplified. We are now engaged in the Security Council
with the Russians.
They have agreed for the first time in a long time on this
cease-fire. They supported it, all the Security Council did.
We are doing business for the first time in a long time in
the Security Council.
Just to illustrate what I mean, I would propose to do with
the Russians--they have joined now in this, and we welcome that
assistance. This business in the Middle East has been very
troublesome; it still is. The emotions are high, the resentment
is bound to be terrible, and two or three things should be
done.
Let us not first engage in rebuilding the armaments. Let us
come to some understanding on conventional arms in this area
and see if we cannot dampen down the fires.

REFER THE WAR TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

In addition to that, we have this other war over here that
is very dangerous. Why can't the Security Council, with all of
its prestige, unanimously recommend that the war in Vietnam be
referred back to the Geneva Conference. That is where most of
the parties, I think all of them, at one time or another have
said it should go for reevaluation of the Accords of 1954 and
see if they cannot find a basis upon which this matter can be
brought to a negotiation.
This is the forum in which the North Vietnamese, China, the
United States, de Gaulle and others have said is the only
forum, not the United Nations. The Security Council does not
attempt to deal with it, but they recommend that this be done
with the prestige of that agency, with the participation of the
Russians, and that the bombing in the North should be stopped,
and we, of course, agree with this; pending this we will just
agree to do this, to get some movement in this thing.
We are absolutely at a stalemate on this negotiation. After
the last exchange of letters with Ho Chi Minh, everybody said,
``Well, let's out. We are just going to fight it to the end
now.'' That is the general attitude.
I do not think there is the slightest hope until the moment
there are going to be any negotiations at all. It is going to
be a military solution. Yet, at the same time, many of the most
knowledgeable authorities say it is not subject to a military
solution. You virtually said that yourself. You do not think
the military can do the job. It requires a very complicated,
long, drawn-out system of pacification.
The point would be to get some movement in it, a new
approach, and a feeling that we are dampening down the fires of
war instead of escalating them.
This is largely, I think, a psychological point that I am
trying to make, that we get a movement into this terrible
confrontation that seems to be building up.

USE THE UNITED NATIONS

The obverse of that, if we do not do it, it seems to me,
the resentment of the Arabs is going to be very great. The
Russians, after they lick their wounds, will say, ``Well we
can't be pushed around like this forever.'' They can think of
other things to do to cause us trouble and to stir up trouble.
They are quite capable of it, if they do not change their
attitude that we want to cooperate. You either go one way or
the other. They never stand still.
So this is a proposal, to use the U.N. to get it off dead
center, and the U.N. would continue as the forum for the
various details of the Middle East, such as what to do with
Aqaba, the opening of the Suez, whatever readjustments of the
withdrawal, and all the details of implementing a cease-fire,
and bringing about a peace and, hopefully, a genuine treaty of
peace rather than a truce.
This is all I am trying to explore. I think that it makes
sense to bring the two together, because then it is a really
important matter, if it could be done, and if the Russians were
encouraged to take a part in this.
They reacted very favorably to their little experience in
Tashkent, which was a minor matter compared to this.
You never know, it might appeal to their sense of history.
They have been fairly restrained on the whole up to recently.
They have been getting pretty tough recently, to me exhibiting
a kind of impatience of, well, there is no hope of a
negotiation with the Americans. I must say I felt that
publication of the matter of Ho Chi Minh that his government
had just given up all hope of any negotiations, that there has
got to be a military victory, and I honestly do not think it is
feasible.

POSSIBILITY OF CHINA ENTERING THE WAR

Before you get that I think the Chinese will come in, just
as a matter of human knowledge, without any more knowledge than
anyone else. I think it is a matter of human nature that before
they surrender and give in they will come to the aid of these
people, just as they did.
Senator Case. I understand--I know it is late, but I have
been waiting a few hours to say a few words myself, and I want
to be sure I understand what you mean there.
Do you mean if we are at the point or it seems as though
there is a real chance that the momentum in the South Vietnam
war is going to carry us through to our objective, that of
establishing a government and a society there that are
independent and non-Communist, that then inevitably the Chinese
will come in or do you mean if we attempt to defeat Ho Chi Minh
in the North?
The Chairman. Oh, yes. Ho Chi Minh, if we continue to where
we make him surrender.
Senator Case. I do not mean surrender. I am talking about
winning the war in the South. Do you think that will produce
Chinese intervention so that we are just hitting ourselves, we
are chasing our tail, because if we lose we lose, and if we win
we lose?

AN UTTERLY UNFEASIBLE OBJECTIVE

The Chairman. I do not think we will win the war in the
South as long as the North continues to support them. I do not
see any change. I do not gather from this change there is any
substantial difference in the military situation. We control it
during the day and not at night.
Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. This is because of the fact that we have not
been very intelligent about it. Is this correct or maybe I
misunderstood?
The Chairman. Of course, I questioned that further. I
indicated further I do not believe it is possible for a rich,
white, American country to go over and give, manufacture a
nice, democratic system for anybody, for these people. I do not
think they are going to accept it at all. I think it is an
utterly unfeasible objective. But I was not trying to argue
that now. There is a difference of opinion on that.
Senator Case. I would think this is the whole point, Bill.
If we are engaged in something that is impossible----
The Chairman. I think we clearly are; absolutely clearly
are. There is no doubt about it.
Senator Case. Ambassador Porter does not agree with that.
The Chairman. Mr. Porter cannot possibly agree with that in
his position. It would be utterly impossible for him to.
Senator Case. He is a man who has got to the point in life
where his only desire is to be true and honest, and even if
that means his losing his career he will do it.
Mr. Porter. Right.
The Chairman. I would not for a moment question his
truthfulness and honesty.
Senator Case. The way he has talked today he has been the
most refreshing thing we have had this year, and it makes
sense.

HOW ASIANS VIEW THE WAR

May I say this, Bill. You are a little bit arguing a
priori, that is, you take an assumption that, you know, this is
a war of the Americans, the white race against the yellow. I do
not think this is the way in this context the thing is going.
The Chairman. You do not think that is the way they look at
it?
Senator Case. I really do not. What do you think about it?
Mr. Porter. I do not think they look at it that way at all.
I believe the presence of other Asiatics in Vietnam----
Senator Case. They hate the Chinese and Koreans much worse.
Mr. Porter. One aspect----
The Chairman. How do you explain the constant repetition in
people like Bernard Fall and De Villiers----
Senator Case. He is a pro-French fanatic. Fall is
absolutely----
The Chairman. You dismiss these people as of no
consequence. I cannot argue with you.
Senator Case. I know. But he suffered a trauma when the
French were beaten, and he could not possibly be anything but
anti-American. I think this is true. I am trying to be----
The Chairman. You cannot do anything but possibly be pro-
American either, neither can I. But I do not happen to think
Americans are God and able to do things no white man has been
able to do in the history of the world.
Senator Case. The last best hope of freedom is the United
States. I happen to believe that, and I think it is, and it
applies.
The Chairman.. That is in the United States.
Senator Case. Abraham Lincoln was talking about the world.
The Chairman. What did Abraham Lincoln have to say about
this kind of a war?
Senator Case. Abraham Lincoln had plenty to think about.
But, seriously, I do not think this racial thing is the
problem, that is one point.
The Chairman. What I mean, these people--I do not know
whether you call it racial, maybe cultural is the better word--
but I do not think they are sympathetic to the American concept
of how to organize a society or of our sense of values. I do
not know why they should. If they did they would be most
unusual.
The Japanese and Chinese are not very sympathetic to that,
and rightly so, in my opinion.
Senator Case. Well, now, may I just start another----
The Chairman. I think you and I had better argue this some
other time. It is 6:30, and the Ambassador has other things to
do. You can do whatever you like.

PLAY THE HAND IN A SENSIBLE WAY

Senator Case. Give me five minutes, or three minutes. I
seem to sense not only in Vietnam but briefly in some of these
other countries a very strong feeling that our presence in
Vietnam had first come to be accepted as for real and for
permanent.
The Chairman. Permanent?
Senator Case. Not our presence but our resistance to the
Communist take-over, that we meant it and that, as a result, a
whole new tone in this whole area was going to be established,
beginning to be established, of hope that it was possible to
develop the area, to reconstruct nations in more modern fashion
and what-not without falling into the Communist system.
Now, and that if we backed out now, whether we should have
gotten into it in the first place or not, there was very grave
danger that this whole thing would fall down, and that the
consequences would be probably more serious. This is a kind of,
I suppose, belief in the domino theory. And if we stay and
attempt at least to play the hand out along the sensible way,
that we are now refining and coming to do it, that that would
be the better way. Do you feel that this is--is this your
general feeling?
Mr. Porter. That is certainly the sentiment in East Asia
today.
Senator Case. Do you think it makes sense? Do you think--
well----
Mr. Porter. Yes, I do. I think it makes sense. I believe
that our departure from Vietnam in a humiliating or
dishonorable circumstance would have a disastrous effect on
those countries.

A DISASTER TO PULL OUT OF THE WAR

Senator Case. Reischauer agreed with this, and he did not
agree with our going in. He said that in an article. He would
not have gone in. He would not have taken this on this way. He
thinks it was a mistake that we did. But having done it, it
would be a disaster if we pulled out on any basis except, in
effect, attempting to win the war in the South.
This, Bill, I just wanted to get down--this was confirmed
by such observations as I made, and I did not just let myself
listen to our military or even our ambassadors or whatnot. I
made a point before, during or after the trip to talk to Ward
Just, and to talk to Dave Halberstam up in New York or Moore,
now in----
Mr. Porter. Charley Moore.
Senator Case [continuing]. In Hong Kong, but who was so
long in Saigon.
I found only one of the whole bunch of them, and that was
Stan, who thought we ought to get out. He had been out there
for years, and he had seen frustration after frustration. But
the great majority of all these people say----
The Chairman. They want us to stay there.
Senator Case. They want us to try.
The Chairman. In other words, have another colony on our
hands.
Senator Case. Again I would think myself once this gets
started that it will have an accelerated effect, a cumulative
effect. I would say I do not feel we should stay, if these guys
are not going to do the right thing, make sense and work at
corruption and work at building a government and whatnot. I
would say no matter what happened, we ought to get out, and we
have good reason to do it. I do not think there is any chance
of a deal until after the next presidential election. That is
my honest view.
Thanks a lot for coming up here.
Mr. Porter. It is my pleasure.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

----------

Thursday, June 8, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt,
Case, and Cooper.
Also present: William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations, Department of State.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Bader of
the committee staff.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have
you this morning.
There are a number here who say they will be late, but I
hope we will get a much better representation. They did not
know, of course, until late, that you would come this morning.
Do you have anything you would like to add before we have
questions, anything more to add to our briefing yesterday,
anything new or different? We all heard what you had yesterday.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I want to add
very much to what was said yesterday.
I would like to have a good discussion this morning. If I
could make one remark off the record.
The Chairman. Off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]

PROBLEMS WITH ACHIEVING A CEASE-FIRE

Secretary Rusk. Well, on the matter we discussed yesterday,
the situation today still remains that Israel has announced
that it would accept the cease-fire if the other side would.
Egypt, Syria and Iraq have announced that they are not
accepting the cease-fire, and it is our impression out of Cairo
that they do not intend to.
We think this is going to complicate the situation a great
deal because the Russians have been pressing us very hard to
get the Israelis to accept the cease-fire, and they are not
able to deliver the other side. So it does not look as though
this thing is going to clarify very quickly except on a purely
military basis along the Canal and the West Bank of the Jordan.
I did not yesterday, in view of the large attendance, I did
not get into some possibilities that ought to dampen down any
sense of general elation here in this situation.
We do not yet know what the effect of this situation will
be on the governments concerned. It is hard to see how Nasser
can survive this situation. We are not at all sure that King
Hussein can survive it.
If there are changes in these governments, the
possibilities of getting an enduring settlement would turn a
great deal on the nature of the leadership that might come to
power. The political situation itself is very flexible, fluid
at this present time.

WATCHING SOVIET UNION ELSEWHERE

Further, we cannot assure that the Soviet Union is just
going to cut its losses and take its lumps here in this
situation. It may feel----
Senator Mundt. You said what?
Secretary Rusk. I say we cannot assume that they will.
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. On the present basis they face a very
serious setback, and they may feel that it is necessary for
them to do something to try to recoup their position.
We are watching it very carefully, and we have not seen
specific moves which they might possibly make. We are watching
all situations, such as the Berlin corridor, to see whether
there is any indication that the Soviets are likely to stir
something up somewhere in order to take some of the pressure
off of them on this particular situation.
There have been, so far as we know, no more breaches of
diplomatic relations since the meeting yesterday afternoon. But
the reiteration by Cairo of the charges that our forces have
participated continues to inflame the mob in a number of
places.
Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, might I interrupt?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, please, Senator.

JORDANIANS FIND NO EVIDENCE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION

Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, I heard over the radio
this morning a report, this is a radio report, that at a
conference in Amman, either last night or this morning--
afternoon their time, whatever time it is--that their military
people said they agreed there was no evidence of any
participation by American or British forces in this military
action.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, that is quite right. Without prodding
from us, the Chief of Military Intelligence in Jordan announced
they had no information that any U.S. military aircraft were
operating over Jordan. That will go a long way, because some of
the Arab countries attributed this evidence from hard evidence
they had from Jordan, and Jordan's denial will go a long way, I
think, towards helping us at least on the propaganda side.
Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask a
question?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, please.
[Discussion off the record.]

THE SHAPE OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT

Secretary Rusk. Because we are all thinking about the shape
of a general settlement. But I want to emphasize the point that
this is not something that can be ground out in Washington and
imposed upon the other capitals. We certainly are not in a
position to command Israel about a settlement, and it has
become apparent to us that the Soviet Union is not in a
position to command the Arab countries.
So naturally we ought to have some ideas of our own, and
that is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, why I welcome this
chance to be with the committee this morning.
We had a very good discussion here about ten days ago which
was, I thought, extremely helpful to me because we had a
general discussion in the committee about some of the policy
issues involved.

STRAITS OF TIRAN MUST BE OPEN

Senator Mundt. I take it that issue is no longer with us.
Secretary Rusk. The particular issue of the Straits, I
think, is pretty well behind us.
We understand that the Soviets have told the Egyptians we
have got to accept a cease-fire with the Straits of Tiran open.
Now, the Soviets, as I told you before, had not committed
themselves on the Straits of Tiran, and we were very sure that
the Egyptians had not consulted the Soviet Union before Nasser
made his speech closing the Straits.
The Chairman. Had not consulted.
Secretary Rusk. Had not been consulted. As a matter of
fact, Nasser probably did not consult anybody. I have seen a
number of Arab foreign ministers in the last two weeks, and I
have not found anybody that he consulted on that subject.

BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS

The Chairman. Could I ask in that connection----
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are the Soviets willing to talk to you
frankly about this and other matters now? Are they being as
standoffish or not? What are our relations?
Secretary Rusk. They are willing to talk to us bilaterally
very frankly.
The Chairman. That is what I mean.
Secretary Rusk. They are unwilling to go into that four-
power discussion even at the U.N. that President de Gaulle
asked for.
The Chairman. When you said they cannot command the Arabs
and we cannot command Israel, I mean I can appreciate that. But
if we could together, agree upon any line of action of things
to get, I would think it would be pretty difficult to stand out
against over a period, if we can agree with the Soviets.
Secretary Rusk. I think that would be true, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Individually they play each other off and all
that.
Secretary Rusk. The difficulty is that at the moment
everybody's nerves are very raw, the Arab nerves and the Soviet
nerves.
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. And so it is going to take a little time, I
think, to get this back to a point where we and they can talk
about a final solution.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIPLOMACY

The Chairman. Would it be consistent with your policy to
approach the Soviets that we are perfectly willing to be very
reasonable in this area, to try to achieve our ultimate
objective of the integrity of Israel--I think that is clear;
they ought to know that is clear and combine it with some
movement in Asia?
It seems to me it was a great shock that this has brought
on everybody. It obviously shocked this country worse than
Vietnam, that it would be an opportunity for diplomacy, quiet
diplomacy, certainly between us and the Russians, to combine
these two? They surely are interested in Vietnam, and we are
interested in the Middle East. It seems to me the evidence is
clear that this country emotionally and politically is more
interested in Israel, the Middle East, than they are in
Vietnam. I mean you watch the turnout here in the Senate, the
great furor that has resulted.
I wondered if it is beyond reason to expect that there
might be an opportunity for a general agreement in which you
could work it with the Soviets privately, and if you could
agree, I do not know why with a little patience this could not
be made acceptable to both sides.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, we have talked to--and I
would like to emphasize the top secret character of this tape.
The Chairman. Well, you can take this particular thing off
the record. It will be top secret.
[Discussion off the record.]

TIME FOR AN UNCONVENTIONAL DIPLOMATIC APPROACH

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up what you
said in this very brief colloquy with the Secretary, and I want
to preface it, Mr. Secretary, by saying that we are all in this
problem together. You and I have had differences on policy, but
we have not had differences on a personal level. I want you to
know that I not only have a very high regard for you, but the
suggestion I am going to make is just not expecting acceptance
of it necessarily, but I hope consideration of it bears out the
feeling I have towards you personally.
I think we have got to get out of our stereotype channels
of diplomacy in regard to this matter. I do not think they will
resolve it because there are a good many things you yourself
have said about this spot that Russia is in.
I do not think face should mean much to us if we are
willing to go not half a mile or three-quarters of a mile, but
all the way.
I think that now is the time with Russia in the position
that she is in for us to resort to quite an unconventional
diplomatic approach in regard to this matter.
You talk about bringing our ambassador back to Washington.
My suggestion is that careful consideration be given by the
President and by you and others and that you proceed without
delay to Moscow yourself; that you announce to Moscow, our
government announces to Moscow, that because of the problems
that both great powers have, and the responsibility of both
great powers more than all the others combined to maintain
peace in the world, you are going to Moscow for conversations
with the Russian leaders, if they want to receive you.
You can say right away suppose they slap us in the face and
tell us to stay home. All right. That is not going to hurt us.
Those slaps do not hurt. The world will know what we are trying
to do, and my confidence in you is such that I believe if you
could sit down there, first with our ambassador for his
briefing in Moscow, and then put these Russians really on the
spot by demonstrating our good faith, and have that top level
conference in Russia--we do not know what the result might be--
but I cannot see any loss in trying it.
I just think we are going to make a mistake if we just wait
for the passage of time that it is going to take--you yourself
pointed out that we probably have got two weeks ahead of us. I
do not think we can wait. I think we have the right and the
duty for us to try to have some diplomatic intercourse directly
with the Russians.

A CASE OF DIPLOMATIC AGGRESSION

You know the attitude of the Russians. If we go to Moscow,
they will think that is some great concession on our part. It
is no concession, in fact, because that leads me to the second
point, and then I will be through--I raised it briefly in our
colloquy yesterday upstairs. I may not understand it, but I am
not too happy about what you said yesterday concerning our
attitude in regard to reestablishing diplomatic relations with
these countries that have broken diplomatic relations with us
while they destroy our embassies and threaten our people and
seek to coerce us.
I think we have to put handcuffs on them. I want to
reestablish relations with them, but not on their terms but on
ours, because here is a case of diplomatic aggression, at least
on their part.
I think they have got to understand we are not going to
stand by and have our ships sunk. We are not going to stand by
and have them continue to threaten peace in the Middle East.

NEED FOR A PEACE TREATY

That brings me to the last point I made upstairs. I think
we ought to make perfectly clear in this situation now, Russia
has got to understand it, and one of the things you can talk
about in Moscow is we are not going to let Israel have to
survive from now on without a peace. We have to have a peace
treaty and we have got to have an understanding that there is
not going to be a repetition of this, and that our future
relations by way of aid to them is dependent upon their working
out a peace settlement.
I know the government does not like to hear me say it, but
in my judgment if we had not given the aid to the Arabs or go
along with aid to the Arabs while they were continuing to
threaten the survival of Israel, I do not think we would be in
the position we are today.
I never have bought the argument, if we do not do this,
they would have gone to Russia. I think they realize now what
it cost them to go to Russia.
It may be just a completely unacceptable idea, but I want
to link it to what the chairman says. I made a very short
statement on the floor of the Senate yesterday about Vietnam. I
am sure the State Department won't like it, as they do not like
much of what I say on Vietnam, but you cannot separate Vietnam
from the settlement over here in the Middle East. The Russians
are not going to let us, for one thing. I do not think it is in
the cards. I think we have got to hitch them together, but not
directly at first.

SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD GO TO MOSCOW

I think we need some dramatic and, you may not like the
word ``dramatic'' but, after all, it is important, too, in
times of crisis, some dramatic change in the format of our
diplomacy.
I think, six, there is no one better qualified to do it
than you. I hope you will understand that it illustrates my
feeling toward you personally. I think you are the one to do
it. I think you can do it. I think the President ought to send
you to do it.
If you wait for two weeks, God knows what we are going to
be faced with in two weeks.
I would like to see you go on to Moscow on a basis you can
set it up, and put them on the spot. We cannot lose anything by
it.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not in any sense rule out the
possibility of my going to Moscow, and I certainly will give
that further thought.
We are in very close touch with the Russians. The problem
with the Russians is not, you know, lack of communication at
very serious levels. But, nevertheless, if a trip of this sort
would appear to be promising, I do not rule it out at all.
Senator Morse. It may be something to their prestige. We do
not have to worry about our prestige.
Secretary Rusk. They may be very sensitive at the moment
about a thing of this sort. However, let me say, I think what I
would like to do is to have a very long talk with Dobrynin when
he gets back this week, and try to get some feel for it.
Ambassador Thompson is here now, our Ambassador to Moscow,
and when their Ambassador gets back, Thompson and I will sit
down with him and go over these things.
We are, I am, in touch with Mr. Gromyko very frequently,
and we are in touch through other channels.

A COMMISSION TO GO TO HANOI

Senator Morse. One more thing. I am not only thinking about
the relationship of the U.S. and Russia, but I am thinking of
the image that that would create with the rest of the world.
That is important, that the rest of the world know that the two
great powers, both great powers, recognize the seriousness of
the crisis, and we are trying to find a basis on which we can
reach an understanding.
I think it would have a terrific psychological offensive
around the world.
I have another wild idea if you want it, if anybody wants
to call it a wild idea. I think we ought to follow that also
with an offer for an extraordinary commission of some kind to
go to Hanoi, call their bluff, to go to Hanoi, to send an
extraordinary commission under the auspices of our government
to Hanoi.
If they want to sit down, not with any authority to make
any commitments at all, but to talk--and I think you would be
applauded around the world.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, the contingency I have
predicted has come, and they have asked me to come straightaway
on this other matter, so if the committee will forgive me I
will have to withdraw. Perhaps we can do it in the morning or
some other time.
The Chairman. All right. We will consult, and the staff
will be in touch with your office.
Secretary Rusk. I want you to understand the confidential
character of what I said.
The Chairman. What are we going to say about why you had to
go, just an emergency meeting?
Secretary Rusk. I think you had better say that I was
called back to my office.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a good idea
that we restore the program, that once in a while the Secretary
comes and talks to us as a committee. I think it is all right
to have a certain sponsoring group for the whole Senate now and
then. I think that is good.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee adjourned to
proceed to other business.]

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

----------

Friday, June 9, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy,
Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations, Department of State.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the
committee staff.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We are resuming our discussion with the Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, just as I came in the press asked if I have
heard there has been a renewed outbreak of fighting. Is that
correct; have you heard anything?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE--
RESUMED

Secretary Rusk. The information we have this morning is
that along the Syrian frontier there is fighting. Each side has
charged the other one with violations, and the Syrians have
asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council.
We do not have the facts in detail.
One of the complications might have been there is an Iraqi
brigade on the Syrian-Jordan frontier, and Iraq has refused to
accept a cease-fire.
We do believe that the Syrians have been throwing artillery
shells across from the high ground to their side of the border
into the valley of Israel territory and shelling some of those
villages there.
But, quite frankly, we just do not know enough to give me a
chance to take an official position on just what has occurred.
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, on the boat incident
yesterday, which brought our meeting to a conclusion, I may say
that as soon as I found out the real facts, I came on back
down, but the committee had adjourned.
The situation--the incident was extremely distressing, not
only because of the dead and the wounded which were involved,
but because it was a very reckless act.
Senator Hickenlooper. It seems to me it was completely
inexcusable.
Secretary Rusk. It was a vessel configured as a merchant
vessel. It was a U.S. Navy ship flying the U.S. flag,
relatively unarmed with 450 caliber machine guns. It was ninety
miles off Port Said, 14 miles off of the Gaza Strip territory,
and was attacked by six strafing runs by aircraft and by motor
torpedo boats.
Now, when I left here, I thought that it might well be an
Egyptian attack. You can imagine that would have raised the
most serious problems. But suppose it had been an Israeli
attack on a Russian ship.
The Chairman. Yes.

ISRAELI APOLOGY

Secretary Rusk. I called in the Israeli ambassador and
protested in the strongest possible terms and pointed out to
him the dangers that were involved in this kind of an operation
in that area. He had no explanation. We have had nothing but an
apology from the Israeli Government. But there it is, and we
will be in touch with Israelis further about it.
After all, there are some damages and there are dead and
wounded, and we will follow up on that with them.
Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, on that very point, one of
the families in our state is affected, and, of course, that
will be true of many others because of the dead and injuries.
They are not happy with just an apology. They are really
complaining. Is there anything more that can be done on this?
Secretary Rusk. I understand.
Senator Carlson. It was, I imagine, as I understand,
surface PT boats.
Secretary Rusk. Plus six strafing runs by aircraft.
Senator Carlson. I cannot understand it.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think we should file for
reparations. We should press for them, for the families, the
people that were killed, and I am not sure but what I am
impressed with the cavalier attitude of--it looks like a
cavalier attitude--of Israel on this thing. They can do that
with impunity.
Secretary Rusk. Well, the next move is at the moment up to
them to come back with a better statement of fact than they
have given us thus far. I will say this. We were very pleased
that Israel immediately notified us that they had done it, and
here in this room I can say that we did use the ``Hot Line''
for the purpose for which it was invented on this one, to flash
a message to Moscow to inform Cairo, because at that moment we
thought that the probabilities were it was an Egyptian attack
and we would take the steps necessary to defend the ship. We
were able to use the ``Hot Line'' to cancel that, and inform
the Soviets immediately that it was an Israeli attack, and
that--but in any event, as far as the international side of it
is concerned, it proved not to be the kind of crisis that could
have caused far greater trouble, either Egyptian attack or a
Russian victim.
Senator Hickenlooper. Has the Israeli Government indicated
any real sorrow about this thing, or is it a perfunctory
apology?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes, they have been profuse.
Senator Hickenlooper. Have they said whether any
disciplinary action will be taken against the stupidity of this
crew or----
Secretary Rusk. I asked for that yesterday.
Senator Hickenlooper [continuing]. Or the commanding
officers of the area or anything?
Secretary Rusk. We have not heard any more except what I
have told you.

OUTSIDE POWERS CANNOT GIVE ORDERS

Mr. Chairman, when we were breaking up yesterday, we had
gotten to the point of trying to look ahead a little bit as to
the general structure and shape of a settlement in this
situation. With feelings inflamed as they are, settlement is
going to be extremely difficult and may take considerable time,
and I want to emphasize the point I made yesterday that outside
powers are not in a position to give orders in this situation.
We cannot give final commands to Israel and be sure they will
take our advice. The Soviet Union cannot give commands to the
Arabs, and so the heart of the problem is to bring the two
sides to a situation with which they are willing to live and
that is going to be extremely difficult.
However, the general shape of settlement that emerges, I
think, drawing both from the problems in the past, which have
inflamed the situation, and from the prospect for the future--I
emphasize this prospect for the future because Israel has a
vital national interest in finding some way to live at peace
with what are going to be 200 million Arabs in the next 25
years--so that their willingness to make their contribution to
a reconciliation with the Arabs is going to be a very, very
important element here.
Now, with the bitterness of the psychology of shocking
defeat among the Arabs, and the exuberance of a stunning
victory in Israel, it is going to take a little time, I
suspect, to bring about a lasting settlement.
We feel that it is very important that the state of
belligerence be removed. Now, whether one does that formally
through peace treaties or in some other way, I would still
leave open, a little flexible at this point. There is not much
of a way to force people to come to a table and put their
signatures on a piece of paper that will be enduring, and it
may be that some of these governments simply will refuse to do
that even though they may accept the situation contained in
such document.
So I would concentrate on the policy point of eliminating a
state of belligerency without at the moment emphasizing how
that is done.
I noticed there is a good deal of speculation about putting
emphasis on peace treaties as such. I do not think it is a
treaty that is important. Look at Japan and the Soviet Union.
They do not have a peace treaty, but they exchange ambassadors.
They have normal relations. They have considerable trade
between the two of them, and they are not challenging each
other's territory.
I just mention that as a first point.

ISRAEL WILL INSIST ON USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

Secondly, Israel is going to insist upon being treated like
any other sovereign country without special derogations of that
sovereignty. My guess is that they will insist upon right of
passage of the Strait of Tiran. My guess is that that question
is already accepted as far as the other side is concerned. It
certainly is accepted as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.
I am telling you this very privately. I think Israel will
insist upon its normal right to put peaceful traffic through
the Suez Canal. That will be more difficult for Egypt to
accept, but that is a point that has already been covered in
earlier United Nations resolutions.
Senator Hickenlooper. Was that not covered in the armistice
agreement?
Secretary. Rusk. Yes, that is right; that is right.
The territorial question could become a little tricky.
Prime Minister Eshkol and General Dayan both stated at the
beginning of this affair that they had no territorial
ambitions. Generally we have supported the boundaries, the
existing boundaries, in that area. If Israel raises far-
reaching boundary claims, then that is going to be a very, very
difficult element in any solution. I think Israel is entitled
to some assurance that whatever rights are established in this
settlement be a fact accorded to them and not be subject to
unilateral action by the Arabs.
One of the things we will have to expect is that somewhere
along the way there are going to be some demands for
international guarantees of some sort. Whether the four
principal permanent members of the Security Council can agree
among themselves that the Security Council will guarantee X, Y,
and Z in a way that is not subject to a veto remains to be
seen. But in a settlement which, against the background of this
particular history, and with a small country surrounded by
potentially hostile countries, with all of the possibilities of
pre-emptive attacks and all that sort of thing hovering over
everybody, this question of how you stabilize the situation is
a very important one.

LIMIT ARMS RACE IN MIDDLE EAST

Next, I do believe that there is a major opportunity here
for the principal powers to get together on some sort of
understanding about the levels of arms in this area. I have
told the committee before that we have tried from time to time
to open this question with the Soviet Union and although they
are willing to work on it in the nuclear field, they have been
unwilling to work on it in the conventional arms field.
Perhaps psychologically this is not the very best moment in
terms of Soviet dismay at some of the things that have
happened. But nevertheless they put very large quantities of
arms into Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and we have some little reason
to believe that they might have a new interest in this subject.
If so, that could be very important.
But, you see, this arms race sort of took the form of large
Soviet arms supplies to Egypt, Algeria, Syria. Hostility
between Egypt on the one side, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the
other; hostility between Syria and Jordan, some necessity on
the part of other suppliers, Britain, ourselves, to assist
Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the extent necessary to give them
some assurance against their own Arab neighbors; the
combination of Arab arms causing problems with respect to
Israel's security----

SOURCES OF ISRAELI ARMS

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, may I just say----
Secretary Rusk. Yes?
Senator Symington [continuing]. We have been running
hearings for a good many weeks, and we would have had one
yesterday with Mr. Kitchen except for this.
It is a fact, is it not, that neither Soviet Russia nor the
United States has given any material amounts of arms to Israel,
and, if that is true, are they not relatively independent in
their thinking at this point?
Secretary Rusk. No, we have provided tanks and Hawk
missiles and certain other kinds of equipment to Israel, but
their principal arms supplier has been France. And I am
assuming that France, Britain, the Soviet Union, ourselves,
would have to be involved in any discussion on this subject.
The Israeli air force is almost all French supplied.
Well, there is another element, if we could inject
something on that into a final settlement it would be helpful.

TRAGEDY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

Then, there is the problem of the refugees, this
intractable issue which has resisted settlement despite many,
many efforts to do so.
The tragedy of the refugee problem is that some of us are
convinced that there is a practical solution which would be
acceptable to both sides, but which in theory is unacceptable
to both sides. What I mean by that is that if you could get
each refugee into the privacy of a confessional booth and let
him make a personal and secret judgment as to where he wants to
live, many of us believe, are convinced, that their own
personal and secret choices would produce a practical result
which Israel could accept.
I mean if the gentlemen around this table were Palestine
refugees, would you all want to live in Israel? I doubt you
would. But if one out of ten wanted to live in Israel, we could
persuade Israel, I think, to accept that number, and we could
find compensation and resettlement for those who are wanting to
live in other places.
What has stood in the way of that, and we have tried this
several times, is the political fact that if you have a
machinery which is known, the Arabs pass the word among the
Palestinians, ``Now you go in there and tell them you want to
go in Israel or you are going to get your throat cut,'' and the
Arabs insist as a matter of principle Israel would have to
accept how many would opt to go to Israel.
Israel can take 150,000, 200,000, but they are not going to
take a million.
But Arabs insist as a matter of principle a million must
have a chance to opt to go to Israel.
Now, it may be out of this will come some settlement of
that problem.
I heard one report out of Tel Aviv that the Israelis are
thinking about insisting that the West Bank of the Jordan be an
autonomous province of Jordan and the home for the refugees.
Well, that will not settle the problem politically entirely,
but some fresh thought can be----
Senator Hickenlooper. It would be another Gaza Strip, would
it not?
Secretary Rusk. It would tend to be if they go there simply
as a way station on the way back to Israel, rather than accept
it genuinely as a final solution.
Senator Symington. Could I ask one question here?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, Senator.

U.S. HAS LIMITED LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL

Senator Symington. When the Israelis, as you know, were
anxious to have declarations that we should go in with Israel
unilaterally, Mr. Secretary, that we should support them
unilaterally, I did not think we could do it because we were so
heavily committed in Vietnam. I did not see where the trained
people come from, especially if we are going to accede to more
people in Vietnam, and, thereafter, after waiting to find out
whether anybody would help them, in effect they have struck by
themselves and have been markedly successful. Does it not mean
we have relatively little leverage on what they want to do now
that they have physically occupied these countries by utilizing
their military equipment intelligently?
Secretary Rusk. We have some limited leverage on them. I
told the committee earlier that we felt we had a commitment
from them that they would not move during this time period in
which they did move.
Now, the situation on the Egyptian side built up in such a
way that it put great pressure upon the Israeli Government, and
I have no doubt that on the day they decided to shoot the works
that they felt that they were in danger of an imminent attack,
based upon information that they thought they had in front of
them.
But I think the real pressures on them, Senator, are going
to be the necessity for their finding some way to live with
these now hundred million, soon to be 200 million, Arabs,
because if they try to remain a little armed camp there forever
in a sea of bitter hostility, they have got some major problems
for their own long-term survival.

SUBSIDIZING THE REFUGEE CAMPS

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I realize that we do not have
power, as Senator Symington has punctuated, to give
instructions and directions there.
There is one problem, it seems to me, about which we can
have a say, and that is continued subsidization of this refugee
camp. I went there ten years ago and found it an impossible
situation in which they have continued all the while to feed
and clothe, support those people, and there are some 200,000
more than when they went into the camp. So surely we can have
something to say about no longer continuing to subsidize this.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that constitutes some pressure on the
Arabs. It does not constitute any pressure on Israel.
Senator Gore. Well, Israel has taken over some of them, in
the Gaza Strip and also in Jordan. They are now claiming
sovereignty. So it seems to me it might be a pressure on both.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I do think that the refugee matter
should be raised and looked at wholly anew in connection with a
settlement of this present situation.
Senator Gore. The point I am trying to make is this is one
subject on which we can have a say, and that is how long we are
going to continue to pay a very heavy cost of these refugees if
they are not dispersed into the countryside.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I do not want to underestimate
influence in this situation, but I just want to point out that
it is not necessarily decisive when you are talking with
countries about what they consider the life and death issues
for them.

TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR DONATIONS TO ISRAEL

Senator Hickenlooper. Do we not give tax forgiveness for
moneys contributed to Israel, which is rather unusual? We could
stop that.
Secretary Rusk. I believe contributions to the UJA are tax
exempt, yes.
The Chairman. That is right.
The only country. Do you think you have the votes in the
Senate to revoke that?
Senator Case. Are you in favor yourself?
Senator Hickenlooper. I think we ought to treat all nations
alike.
Senator Case. That is correct. But are you in favor of it?
Senator Hickenlooper. As long as we do not give it to other
nations, I do not----
The Chairman. The trouble is they think they have control
of the Senate and they can do as they please.
Senator Symington. What was that?
The Chairman. I said they know they have control of the
Senate politically, and therefore whatever the Secretary tells
them, they can laugh at him. They say, ``Yes, but you don't
control the Senate.''
Senator Symington. They were very anxious to get every
Senator they could to come out and say we ought to act
unilaterally, and they got two, three.
The Chairman. They know when the chips are down you can no
more reverse this tax exemption than you can fly. You could not
pass a bill through the Senate.
Senator Hickenlooper. I do not think you could.
The Chairman. Changing that tax exemption contribution to
the UJA. I would bet you ten to one you could not begin to pass
a bill You do not believe they could under any circumstances.
Senator Symington. A bill to do what?
The Chairman. To revoke the tax exemption of gifts to the
UJA. That is one of their major sources of income. You yourself
have pointed out the money they paid for the French arms they
got from the U.S.
Senator Symington. Each year the money we give annually for
this is less than 1 percent of the cost of Vietnam.
The Chairman. I agree with that.
Senator Hickenlooper. There you go.

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS PAY THE ISRAELI ARMS

The Chairman. But you know very well, you said yourself,
that the arms they buy from France are largely paid for by
contributions that come from this country.
Senator Symington. Because we would not sell it to them, so
instead of selling them the arms----
Senator Gore. Has the President recommended that this be
repealed?
The Chairman. No, he has not. I do not wish to make the
point except the Secretary is quite correct when he says his
leverage on Israel is very limited because of the political
situation.
Senator Hickenlooper. I am sorry I brought it up.
Secretary Rusk. I did not say it.
The Chairman. If you did not say it, you do not disagree
with it anyway.
Secretary Rusk. I think it should be pointed out though on
this tax exempt matter that there are many other organizations,
institutions, that would fall into the same principle, private
foundations in their expenditures abroad, churches, the
voluntary agencies; there are very large sums of money going to
foreign countries that are tax exempt in this country as the
origin.
Senator Hickenlooper. I do not think it is analogous.
Senator Gore. It is tax deductible; you said tax exempt.
Secretary Rusk. Except the organizations are exempt.
Contributions to them are tax deductible.
Senator Cooper. I suggest--it is possible after this that
Israel may ask that this be removed as a sign of showing they
are not absolutely dependent on the U.S.

IF ISRAEL KEEPS THE TERRITORY IT CONQUERED

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, I have just one other
question I wish to ask. They have been hating the Jews ever
since there was a country, and they are hating them, and they
kept on saying they are going to drive them into the sea.
Finally, when nobody else would come in, the Israelis said,
``Well, we had better not let them drive us into the sea,'' so
they hit them and knocked their brains out and they got a
tremendous amount of additional territory.
Why on the basis of the way things are going, inasmuch as
the Arabs still say that they are going to drive them into the
sea and that they hate them, why should they not keep what they
have taken, which will at least make it easier for them to
support the refugees, etcetera, etcetera, and make their
position as a nation more viable? Why should they not just keep
what they have taken? Who has any right to tell them? They have
done it by themselves against this steady hate that has been
growing, and certainly we have not in any way done anything
effective to block it or stop it. Why have we any right to tell
them to give up anything unless they are getting something for
what they give up?
Secretary Rusk. The point there, Senator, is that they can
play that game on a geopolitics basis and prepare for
themselves fantastic problems for the future.
Senator Symington. Have they not got them anyway? That is
my only point. They have them.
Secretary Rusk. The alternative may be, and I would think
that it would be, in Israel's vital national interest to try
the other alternative. The alternative may be a reconciliation
on the basis of Arab acceptance that Israel is there to stay
and a condition of hostility need not exist between Israel and
its Arab neighbors.
When you look ahead to 200 million Arabs, with the vast
resources that are coming rapidly into that area, the oil and
all the rest of it, the possibility that Eastern Europe may
then wholly align themselves with all these people, and pour in
stuff in a position there, over time, five years, ten years, 15
years, Israel will have to do it all over again, and under
conditions that may be much more difficult next time because
next time the Arabs will probably strike first.
The Chairman. I think you are quite right.
Senator Hickenlooper. I agree with that thoroughly.
The Chairman. The only hope for Israel for the long term.
Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact, we have a very
difficult problem facing us right now, Senator.
[Discussion off the record.]

INDEMNIFICATION BY ISRAEL

Senator Mundt. I would like to ask a question deriving out
of phone calls as I was coming over this morning.
A friend of mine who believes that he had a son on this
ship that was shot at, torpedoed or whatever happened, to the
best of the information that we can get, he may be wrong, but
he thinks he has, but he is pretty bitter. He said to me, and I
say to you, What happened? What is the position of the United
States when somebody shoots one of these ships down on the high
seas? Do we just say, ``Well, you are sorry, it's all right
with us,'' or is there some indemnification?
Secretary Rusk. No problems of damage and indemnification
have been raised. We do not have a report of the condition of
the ship itself or the damage, but we have laid the basis for a
very strong protest for going back to them on that kind of
thing. We have not had anything by way of explanation from
Israel, communications, that could explain that within 24
hours. They, too, I am sure, are investigating, but the only
thing we have had from them is a flash report that it occurred.
We are very glad they told us right away because if they just
laid low on this situation and we did not know who did it,
there would have been a strong inclination here to believe the
Egyptians did it, you see. But we will be going back to that
question when we get more facts.
Senator Mundt. We just do not settle it at this point.
Secretary Rusk. No, it is not settled at this point.

U.S. INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL

Senator Mundt. I was a little bit disturbed when I heard
all this discussion around the table this morning that we do
not control Israel, and Israel controls the U.S. Government and
the Senate. I kind of hate to accept this philosophy. I do not
believe it. I think we have a lot of influence over Israel if
we decided to exercise it in the present circumstances.
Put yourself in the Israeli's position. They found out that
the Russians are not their friends; that is sure. They found
out France would not even sign their little maritime
declaration as I understand it. Where would they be next week
if the U.S. took the same kind of attitude, and this trouble is
not going to be resolved, the bitterness eliminated, no matter
what kind of settlement.
So I think we are in a strong position to reason with them
and to talk with them if in fact they are not running the
United States, and I do not think they are. I would deny we
have no influence with them. I think we can lead from strength
in discussing the various settlements proposed. I am very
fearful if we are going to support a guarantee of international
borders of a whole new country of Israel spread out with all
the lands picked up in the war, that we have sown the seeds of
another conflict, like Alsace Lorraine and what is this little
place in between India and Pakistan, Kashmir. So far as I know,
they never settled the situation between Turkey and Syria.
Secretary Rusk. This is where I came in 20 years ago. I was
Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs when the Palestine problem
was before the U.N., and I would emphasize the importance, as
this matter moves ahead, of developing a very strong bipartisan
U.S. position on this problem.
Senator Mundt. I think it is important.
Secretary Rusk. Because it is only on that basis that we
can proceed with major influence in this situation.
Senator Hickenlooper. Karl, I merely suggest that you take
up the hearings on the Foreign Agents Registration Act if you
want to find the 19 ramified, concealed and camouflaged Jewish
organizations in this country that have their tentacles all
through this whole situation. It is in there; it is in the
record.
Senator Mundt. That must have happened before I became a
member.
Senator Hickenlooper. I sat through these hearings.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ABM DEPLOYMENT

Mr. Secretary, first I want to congratulate you, and
through you the President, upon the handling of a very
difficult and delicate situation in a commendable manner.
Next, it seems to me that the most encouraging thing that
has come out of this tragedy is the equation between perhaps
the maturing use of the equation between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Perhaps it has some hopeful elements, both
with respect to the Middle East and other places.
As a preface to my question, I would like to say that I
have been shocked, and I believe the world was shocked, at the
quick, dramatic results of the first strike. If that be true
with conventional arms, then the subject on which the
Disarmament Subcommittee held a hearing, the question of
deployment of ABM, is certainly a very pertinent question now.
As you know, our committee held an extensive hearing. There
were no leaks from the committee. In fact the subcommittee did
not even attempt to reach any conclusion yet.
I wish now by question to reopen with you the question of
negotiation with the Soviets on ABM deployment. It becomes a
pressing matter in view of this demonstration of blitzkrieg
warfare. Can you give us a report on the status of that?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. I think there is a very big difference
between a first strike which has a reasonable chance of
paralyzing the other side's armed forces and a first strike
which cannot do so, and this is particularly applicable to the
missile field. To the extent that the Israelis got the first
strike against the Arab forces, they did succeed in
establishing air superiority apparently in a matter of four
hours because they caught most of the Arab air forces on the
ground.
Now, with missiles we do not see any way in which a first
strike by either side can deny to the other side a devastating
second strike.
I think the ABM problem therefore is not necessarily
affected by this particular situation in the Near East,
although it raises the issue in general.

SOVIETS STILL DETERMINING THEIR POSITION

I might tell you, Senator, that we have been waiting for
the Soviets to respond to our latest suggestion for serious
talks on these matters. We have the impression that the Soviet
Union is still in the process of determining its own position.
Now this may be because it is a highly complicated matter and
they may not have done the kind of depth studies that we have
been doing over a period of a year. It may be that there are
serious differences of view within their leadership. I have no
doubt their military, for example, want to go for ABMs, and in
that sense they are not much different from other military.
Now, we hope that they will come back and get into serious
talks with us on this. They have not said no, but they have not
yet announced a time. We have said, ``We have our fellows who
are ready to sit down with you at any time either in Moscow or
Washington to go into this further,'' and they said, ``Well, we
are ready to talk about it, but we will let you know.''
Our own impression is they are still trying to decide what
it is they would say in these discussions, but we are trying to
follow through on that.
Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit, in view
of Karl Mundt's statement----
Secretary Rusk. Yes?
The Chairman. Are you finished with that?
Senator Carlson. I did want to get back to this ship again
because of Karl Mundt's statement.
The Chairman. Had you finished with this?
Senator Gore. If you will wait just a moment until I
finish.
Senator Carlson. Yes.

DEVASTATING EFFECT OF A FIRST STRIKE

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, is there any way at your
command or the President's to reach some conclusion or ask the
Soviets if they either will talk or not talk before this
session comes to an end.
I have said nothing publicly on this subject except that I
did not think we ought to be strung along on this, and I am
greatly impressed with this devastating effect of a first
strike. I am not ready to accept that it will not be equally
devastating, even more so, with missiles. I have the feeling
that this Congress ought to know before it adjourns whether or
not there are going to be serious negotiations on this subject.
If not, I venture the guess that the Congress will want to make
an appropriation to initiate deployment.
I only urge you to convey to the President, at least, my
view, which I believe is concurred in unanimously by members of
the subcommittee--although I am not sure unanimously, but
mostly to--that we should either come to serious negotiation on
this or proceed with our own deployment.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I will be glad to see that those views
are given to the President and to Secretary McNamara.
Senator Gore. Now, in response to the question, do you see
any way to elicit a more definite answer from the Soviets? Will
they be impressed with the blitzkrieg character of this war
over there?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that the world-wide strategic
issue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is so very large in
size and so much more devastating in the stakes that I just
doubt that the Soviets will draw any conclusions from this Near
East situation on that particular point. I just doubt they
will.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson.

LOCATION OF THE LIBERTY

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, just in view of what
Senator Mundt has raised again--and I raised it at the
beginning of this session because most every member of the
Senate and many of Congress are going to have families involved
as a result of the deaths and the casualties in this
unfortunate situation about this ship. We are going to have to
answer some questions.
I believe you stated it was 15 miles off the coast of
Israel. Is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. And 90 miles north of Port Said.
Senator Carlson. Was it there on the orders of the Defense
Department?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Carlson. Did the State Department know about it,
and were they familiar with its location?
Secretary Rusk. I am not clear, but I would not draw any
distinction on that. This was a communication ship, and during
the period in which our embassies and consulates were being
closed down and we were having to resort to all sorts of
improvised communications, it was there to help in the relay
process of messages that our people wanted to go back and
forth.
Senator Carlson. Had it been there for a great length of
time?
Secretary Rusk. No, it had moved in just very shortly
before that.
Senator Carlson. Were we intercepting or receiving messages
for Israel on this ship?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think so.
Senator Carlson. These are questions that have come to me
from families----

TYPE AND CHARACTER OF THE SHIP

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, I would think pretty soon
somebody had better talk about what type and character of ship
this was. I think this is a rather important situation as far
as----
Secretary Rusk. It has the capacity to listen, but we were
not involved in transmitting messages from one side to the
other, if that is what you have in mind.
Senator Carlson. Well, the people out in the country are
asking questions, and we are going to have to answer whether--
this can all be off the record as far as I am concerned now--
but we are going to have to have answers to those questions
from the parents of those boys.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think you should understand on
the question of what it was doing there, it was there under
proper orders, on behalf of the United States Government, in
the high seas.
Senator Mundt. International waters.
Secretary Rusk. And therefore, from our point of view, was
not subject to attack by anybody.

U.S. CASUALTIES

Senator Hickenlooper. Has the casualty list been published?
Secretary Rusk. The last I saw was ten dead.
Senator Hickenlooper. No, I say has the list of names been
published?
Secretary Rusk. No; I am not sure.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper.
Senator Cooper. Yes, I would like to--I have been wanting
to ask a question. I have been waiting my turn.
The Chairman. All right, he is ready.

EASTERN EUROPEAN ARMS TO EGYPT

Senator Cooper. First, I would like to thank the Secretary
for all the information he has given us, and I think it is very
valuable.
Also I appreciate very much what you said, we are not out
of the woods yet even as far as hostilities may be concerned.
We talk about the possibility of replenishing Egypt by Eastern
European countries. I read in the paper either last night or
this morning, it said there was a rumor, but nevertheless there
was a story that prior to yesterday----
The Chairman. Will the Senator speak up a little. I cannot
hear.
Senator Cooper. I will do the best I can. I have difficulty
with my throat.
The Chairman. Do the best you can. The Senators down at the
end cannot hear.
Senator Cooper. What I was saying, there were stories in
the papers yesterday and this morning that Egypt was being
replenished by arms from Eastern Europe. Does the Department
have any information on that subject at all?
Secretary Rusk. We have heard reports and rumors. We do not
have anything very hard about significant replenishment
actually arriving in Egypt.
Senator Cooper. There were also stories that Russia had
flown in some supplies.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I was thinking about replenishment
from Russia. I do not know of any arms. Well, Algeria may be
sending some planes to Egypt and some of the others may be.
Iraq may be sending some planes to Syria. But we have heard the
reports. We do not have very hard information at the moment as
to what has arrived on the scene.
Senator Cooper. Is there any indication that Egypt was able
to pull back and save a good deal, a good many, of its tanks?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. They will have undoubtedly several
hundred tanks left. But they lost several hundred in the Sinai.

MANEUVER OF RUSSIAN VESSELS

Senator Cooper. One other question: On this possibility of
some incident which might cause great trouble, particularly
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, is it a fact that--you
said it has been--very difficult for Egypt to hit this vessel.
What do you make out of this maneuver of the Russian naval
vessels against which naval commanders there protested,
according to the papers.
Secretary Rusk. The Soviet forces there at the present time
in the eastern Mediterranean are about what they were in June
of last year. They usually send out a few more ships in June.
Senator Cooper. I do not mean this ship, I mean the report
that they have been moving in and out of our naval formation
against which a protest was made by a naval commander.
Secretary Rusk. I have seen that. I have not had operation
reports on just what they have been doing. This is something we
would like to sort out sometime with the Soviet Union because
that happens on both sides, quite frankly, and we are not in a
very good position to be all that indignant about their having
naval vessels in the vicinity of our naval vessels because we
do that both ways. I can assure you, when Soviet ships go into
the Gulf of Tonkin, they think they are being harassed pretty
badly by our vessels nearby and planes buzzing them and taking
pictures and things of that sort, so I would hope we would not
get too excited over this particular kind of problem. We ought
to sort it out some day with them, but it is a bilateral kind
of problem.
Senator Cooper. You think our ships would be moving as
close to this area as they seem to be, like 14 miles off this
vessel, and the fleet is not too far away.
Secretary Rusk. Well, our fleet has been up south of
Cyprus, at least portions of it, and other portions further to
the west. Actually our carriers have been some distance away.
But it is not abnormal at all for us to have this type of
vessel in that kind of a situation.
Senator Cooper. Well, that is all I have.
I would like to say this for the record. I thank you, Mr.
Secretary, and your associates, and I thank the President, in
the restraint and patience with which you have worked in this
situation, for which you deserve tremendous credit.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.

RESCUING AMERICANS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask the Secretary--our
nationals were practically ordered out of several of these Arab
countries.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. Egypt, and is it not perfectly
natural that our ships would be in there, airplanes or
something, to see if we could aid or to prevent undue damage to
our nationals as they are being moved out?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, we have had an extremely dangerous
and difficult problem with regard to our nationals out there in
this situation, some 25,000 in the area, and we could not be at
all sure that normal rights of legation would apply against all
these problems.
Our contingency plans for rescuing Americans who might be
caught, even against the wishes of the local governments, had
to be very extensive and it was very important for us to have
the most immediately available information. Some of our
communications equipment could not reach very far from the
fellow who had a little pack on his back. So it was perfectly
normal for us to have a ship of this sort in there.
Now, we still are not out of the woods yet on this question
of taking care of American nationals in the area.
Senator Case. Could you give us a little rundown on that?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. The most difficult problem has been in
Amman because of the lack of easy communications to safe haven,
but we think the situation is now under reasonable control with
the other governments.
In the case of those who have broken relations with us,
they are taking governmental steps to protect American
personnel. We made it very clear to them on this matter we
would apply the principles of reciprocity. We would expect to
treat their people there with the same consideration we
expected from them, and I think that that situation is
clarifying.
But we still are not over the dangers of possible mob
action.
Wheelus Airbase could be a little sticky. We have about
8,000 Americans that have been collected to the Wheelus base.
The Chairman. Civilians?
Secretary Rusk. And military and dependents.
Now, we think we can take care of that because we have a
fair amount of local force of our own if the Libyan Government
does not have enough force to do it itself. The Libyan
Government has been trying, but it has limited capabilities
against mobs. But in general, I am somewhat encouraged about
the threat to American citizens in the area this morning.

TRANSCRIPT OF NASSER CONVERSATION

Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, have you been able to prove
or disprove that curious story in the Star last night,
allegedly a transcript between Nasser and the king, about
``Come on, get behind us and prove the British and
Americans''--
Secretary Rusk. We are analyzing that recording and
comparing it with earlier recordings of these two gentlemen to
see how authentic it was. I have no reason at the moment to
doubt the authenticity of it.
The Chairman. Senator Pell, do you have any questions?
Senator Pell. One.
The Chairman. Senator Pell.

SLOWDOWN IN FIGHTING IN VIETNAM

Senator Pell. Mr. Secretary, I would like also to say how
much I admire the restraint which you and the administration
have shown.
Secretary Rusk. Thanks.
Senator Pell. And also again advert to the point I
mentioned before, and that is the slowdown in the fighting in
Vietnam. You may not wish to enlarge on this, but it would seem
to me there might be a relationship between the slowdown there
and the improved relations, improvement of communications with
the Soviet Union.
Is there any way, now that the Soviet Union has suffered a
rebuff in the Near East, that we might be able to relate that
to some part of de-escalation on our part in Vietnam and reach
some kind of a solution there, too?
I am sure you were thinking about the whole picture, and I
was wondering if you could tell us about your thoughts in that
regard.
Secretary Rusk. We are in touch frequently with the Soviet
Union on Vietnam. Their problem and ours is still with Hanoi.
We keep a very close check on what happens on the ground in
Vietnam to see whether any slowdown has a political
significance.
Actually, in terms of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
initiative, there has not been a significant slowdown in the
last week or ten days as sort of reflected in the press.
There has been some information indicating that they are--
they continue to build up for that offensive, the June
offensive, that we are expecting in the DMZ.
I think there is a slowdown. At the moment it is for some
regrouping on the part of our own side and the absence of
large-scale fighting, but not a slowdown in the rate of Viet
Cong or North Vietnamese incidents or attacks in the
countryside.
So we cannot draw political conclusions from it. But we
are, and continue to be, in touch with the Russians, and will
follow up on Vietnam with them. But their problem is that it is
still with Hanoi.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator McCarthy, do you have a contribution?
Senator McCarthy. Not right now.

RUSSIAN ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE ARABS

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go on and
explore a little further this same question.
There was an interesting article this morning in the
Washington Post. I do not know whether you had time to read it
or not. I would like to read just a couple of paragraphs. It
says:

In the early stages of the Middle Eastern crisis, the
suspicion was freely voiced that Russia had encouraged the
Arabs in order to get back at the United States for Cuba,
Vietnam and other failures of Soviet policy.

Senator Mundt. We cannot hear you.
Senator Cooper. I want to lodge a protest.
The Chairman. ``But it is now clear that the Kremlin had no
such intention. It has worked with the Western powers''--and I
presume that means us--``behind the scenes to mitigate the
conflict, at the cost of appearing to forsake its Arab allies,
instead of issuing the kind of vociferous and saber-rattling
promises of support which it gave so readily in the past.''

As a sign of political maturity, this is much more
convincing than the ``Tashkent spirit'' following the India-
Pakistan war in the fall of 1965.

Then I skip over to another paragraph.

Support for the Arabs has been expressed in the most
generalized and vague assurances. The Soviet Union has been
aware of the dangers of the situation, and has not wished to
encourage Arab recklessness by promises of support.

It is a rather long article. But that again leads me to ask
you and again hopefully to suggest that the Department give
very serious consideration to trying to use this occasion,
which I am sure is a great shock to the prestige, the ego, of
the Soviet Union, to enlist their assistance through the
Security Council, where they have cooperated apparently in
recent days, to open up Vietnam. If we are to get anything of
any value out of this, it seems to me it could be to get a
negotiation on Vietnam.
I cannot help but think there is a possibility of utilizing
this. I think the Soviets have been extremely restrained in
their promises.
You remember how Krushchev threatened everybody at the time
of the '56--well, in nearly every occasion he was always
threatening that he would not stand idly by. This calls
attention to it, how Khrushchev said, ``We won't stand idly
by,'' and so on, which was absent in this particular instance.
But I would feel there is some parallel interest, and these
present people, Kosygin in particular, being an engineer and a
technician, I do not believe is nearly as interested in big
political gestures as his predecessor was.
I would like very much to urge that this be explored,
utilizing their present presence and interest in the Security
Council, to see if the Security Council might not make
recommendations.
I am not suggesting they can handle Vietnam because the
other side has insisted, and I suppose still will, it has no
jurisdiction, but to use it to perhaps reopen and reconvene the
Geneva Conference, which the other side and ourselves have in
times past said would be a proper forum for a negotiation.
You say the trouble is Hanoi. It has been the trouble has
been Hanoi. But if that could be coupled with a recommendation
to stop the bombing, that would ease our own political
situation and might open it up.

BRINGING VIETNAM WAR TO A CLOSE

I just offer that as a suggestion, because I am very
anxious and very interested in bringing the Vietnam thing to a
close, because of the effect it is having on our domestic
economy, our political situation. I think this is going to be
most serious if this war continues through to the next
election, and that is about the only benefit, affirmative
benefit, I can see we can get out of this.
We have all the troubles here, and we will do what we can,
and I join the others about what we have done so far in the
Middle East.
Of course our problem has been made rather easy by the way
the military thing went, up to this point. We still have some
terrible problems. But do you not think there is a possibility
that this might shake loose the frozen attitude that has grown
up?

SOVIET ROLE EXAGGERATED

Secretary Rusk. Senator, first let me make a few comments
on my own personal impressions of the role of the Soviet in
this Middle East situation because I think that story you read
from exaggerated it from both directions.
I do not believe that the Soviet Union was strongly
encouraging what they called the progressive Arab states--
Cairo, Syria, Algeria particularly--to move against the
moderate and conservative Arab states, and to work against U.S.
influence in the Middle East, and to support the U.S.S.R.'s
influence there.
I think they encouraged the Arabs up to the request for the
removal of UNEF.
Then I think Nasser jumped out ahead of the Soviet Union
considerably when he announced the closing of the Straits of
Tiran.
Now----
The Chairman. You think that was done without their
approval.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
The Chairman. I see.
Secretary Rusk. And we have very good reason to believe
that Nasser did not consult the Soviet Union or indeed anybody
else when he closed the strait.
Senator Symington. How about U Thant, did he consult him?
Secretary Rusk. No, he did not on the closing of the
straits.
Now, I think what has happened, this sort of parallel
action by us and the Soviet Union in the Security Council, from
their point of view was an attempt to stabilize the situation
as quickly as possible in the face of a prospective stunning
defeat of Arab forces by Israel.

ARAB FAILURES IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

One of the curious things about this situation over the
last 20 years has been that the Arabs seemed to have a genius
for just being too late to take care of their own interests. I
will give the earliest example and the latest example.
At the instruction of President Truman and General Marshall
during the mandate of Palestine, I was negotiating with the
then Zionists and the Arabs about a military and political
standstill so there could be at the termination of the mandate
a further period in which a genuinely agreed solution could be
found.
The Chairman. What year was that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rusk. That was 1947. I was up in the Savoy Plaza
Hotel. I had the Arab delegation down one end of the hall and
the Zionist delegation at the other end of the hall, and we got
practically everything put together except the question of the
number of Jewish immigrants that would be admitted into
Palestine during the standstill.
We got the Jewish side to accept 3,000 a month, which was
very small compared to the numbers that they thought and hoped
would want to come in. It is 36,000 a year.
Then Prince Faisal, now King Faisal, who was the spokesman
for the Arab side, refused to accept that 3,000 figure on the
grounds that if you accepted 3,000 they would send in 3,000
pregnant women and that would make it 6,000.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is one way to do it.
Secretary Rusk. Now, you see, had they accepted that figure
of 3,000, this whole thing might have taken a different shape
over a period of time, you see. That is an early example of
being too late.
Now, the big example is that they fought on the ground to
oppose the basic U.N. resolution establishing Israel whereas
now there is nothing they want more than the original
resolution.
Senator Hickenlooper. Who?
Secretary Rusk. The Arabs.
The Chairman. The Arabs.
Secretary Rusk. You see, they want that original resolution
which provides much less Israel territory than Israel has since
then obtained.
Now, here in this, since the fighting broke out----
Senator Hickenlooper. I thought they were unalterably
opposed to the recognition of sovereignty of Israel.
Secretary Rusk. But they are now demanding the application
of the original U.N. resolution too late. Had they taken it at
the time, they would have had it.
Now, when the fighting broke out, had they taken
immediately the first Security Council resolution on a cease-
fire, they would have been far better off than they are today.
I think the Soviet Union understood that and tried to press
them to take the ceasefire two days ago. Now, with 48 hours of
fighting, they have lost the Sinai and the west bank of the
Jordan, so I think that the Soviets were taking a practical
view.
Now, from here on out, I think you can expect the Soviets
to do everything they can to stimulate the most radical among
the Arabs, through propaganda and otherwise, perhaps to try to
find some basis on which they can recoup the situation.
So I am not sure we will not find that the Soviets and we
are going to have real difficulties in the Security Council
about a final settlement here. I think for very practical
reasons----
[Discussion off the record.]

U.S. BALANCING ACT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Symington. In 1953 when I first came to the Senate,
Mr. Herzog was military attache, brother-in-law of Abba Eban,
and he said to me, ``If you give arms to Yugoslavia, who you
know won't fight for you, why don't you sell them to us, who
you know would fight for you?''
Nobody answered that question, and I have been following
closely for 15 years this whole situation even before I came on
this committee.
I would like to ask this question: You have this balancing
of arms in this government. There are not many Americans who
know, realize, that we not only had F-I04s in Jordan but we had
American pilots in Jordan when this business began to flare up.
We have done a balancing act. I say this with great respect,
but I would not say it if I did not think it was fair. But we
have been very unfair to the Israelis the way we handled
economic aid to Egypt, and at the same time, while they have
gotten a lot of money from this country, it has gone to buy
this air force from France.
Under all these circumstances, it seems to me that foreign
policy, and Senator McCarthy and I have been very interested in
this in hearings and we have got the chairman interested, and I
think we ought to wrap the hearings up. It seems to me we have
been setting foreign policy, at least as far as the Middle East
is concerned, in the Department of Defense in a fairly low
echelon.

INCREASE THE SALE OF ARMS

We have increased the sale of arms in the last five years
from $300 million a year to $1.7 billion a year. We do this
with a fellow who, to be honest, a few months ago I never knew
existed. I never heard of him. He seems to be the biggest shot
around these parts, and so forth and so on, and I think it is
better if we are going to start talking about working out with
the Soviets some arrangements. I think we just, Mr. Secretary,
and I say this with great respect, to me it is just as clear as
light the Defense Department at low levels has been setting
foreign policy in this field.
I know and you know General Weitzman, who could not be more
interesting and obviously a very able man, runs their air
force. He has been promoted to deputy. He was over here
pleading for the type and character of arms that we refused to
give him and did give some of his enemies. Under these
circumstances again, I say, I can see the hate angle and I can
see the oil angle, and the future Soviet angle, but it looks to
me like they have a country that they pretty well got this part
of Jordan stuck in there. They have got the Sinai Peninsula and
I do not see why we should be so anxious to see them give up a
lot because they gave up an awful lot when we agreed and Nasser
agreed to let them use the canal and the Gulf.
So we have been knee deep in this arms thing, and I think
our record on the way we have handled it would be open to a lot
of world criticism if it is to be opened.
But for what it is worth, I would appreciate your giving me
your comments on these observations.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, first I think it is only in NATO
that Mr. Kuss has practically a blank check to sell arms to
help with the offset problems in NATO, within the general
structure of NATO limits.
As far as other parts of the world are concerned, those
come up to Cabinet level, and I will have to take the lumps.

ARMS SALES THROUGH IRAN

Senator Symington. Is Iran part of NATO?
Secretary Rusk. No, but those matters come up to Cabinet
level.
Senator Symington. Did you know about the sale of F-86s to
Pakistan through Iran and the German private corporation?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, and we have tried to pull a string on
that.
Senator Symington. I do not say----
Secretary Rusk. No, but we have to follow this pretty
closely.
In the case of the Near East, we have tried for years not
to become a principal arms supplier in the Near East. But here
with these massive Soviet buildups in Syria and Egypt, we knew
that Nasser was out to get King Hussein. We knew Hussein had to
have some sort of protection against Nasser. Now, that ramifies
into a problem with Israel.
We have----

U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL

Senator Symington. If Nasser was out to get Israel, we
never would give any sophisticated war material to Israel. That
is what I have never been able to understand.
Secretary Rusk. I think some of the stuff we have given to
Israel has been very sophisticated. Our view was that Israel's
defense establishment was in pretty good shape against the
Arabs. They came in for some requests from time to time, they
went far beyond some things we generally supplied them, but our
general estimate was they were pretty reasonably balanced and
this was far in excess of their requirements, and the last few
days have not proved us wrong.
Senator Symington. They have a secretary of defense over
there who happens to be a military man and listens to his
chiefs of staff, so they did pretty well when they got rolling.
They did more in four days than we have done with our air power
and sea power in Vietnam. That is another matter. I did not
want to get away from their capacity to handle a war
brilliantly. All I am getting back to is the first premise,
considering the way we have acted with them, I do not see where
we have the leverage to tell the to go back from what they have
conquered in order to protect themselves.
They are going to get the hate from the Arabs whether they
do or do not. That is my only point.

USE OF U.S. ARMS AGAINST ISRAEL

Senator McCarthy. Will the Senator yield?
Is it not true that more of our arms, if they had been put
into use, would have been used against Israel than would have
been used against the Arabs, Saudi Arabia and Jordan?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, I would think not.
Senator McCarthy. We have not given much to Israel. We may
have helped them buy French arms.
Secretary Rusk. They had tanks from us, and I do not want,
you know, to brag about how much we gave to everybody, but the
Saudi Arabian arms have not been involved in this situation.
Senator McCarthy. They did not get organized.
Secretary Rusk. Beg pardon?
Senator McCarthy. They were not ready.
Secretary Rusk. And for other reasons.
Senator McCarthy. If they had gotten those Hawk missiles
in.
Secretary Rusk. And for other reasons I think Saudi Arabia
was taking their time because of their relations with Nasser.
Senator McCarthy. I wanted to ask what does this mean in
the general re-evaluation of the arms sale with Saudi Arabia?

FINDING A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Secretary Rusk. Before you came in, I was trying to
indicate some of the elements we feel ought to go into a final
solution here. One would be some agreement among the principal
arms supplying countries including the Soviet Union about the
level of arms in the area, and, if we could achieve something
of this sort, it would be very important.
Senator McCarthy. Does this open a way to doing something
real about the Arab refugees or does not a disturbance of this
magnitude make a difference?
Secretary Rusk. We would hope so. I indicated earlier that
if the Arab refugees could be given a chance to go into the
privacy of a confessional booth and make a personal decision
about where he wants to live ten years from now, that the
practical effect of that secret consultation with the refugees
would probably be something that Israel could accept because
perhaps only one in ten would elect to live in Israel.

FUTURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator McCarthy. What about the canal? Are you going to
let the Egyptians take it over again and give them a chance to
shut it off any time they want to as they have done twice in
ten years. Or is this the time to move in a way that President
Truman indicated back in '45 about the Panama Canal, the Suez
and all these things?
Secretary Rusk. I have no doubt that the opening of the
Suez will be a major issue in the settlement of this affair.
Senator McCarthy. Continued opening, the question of how it
would be kept open.
Secretary Rusk. It may be on this, you see, that some--
instead of relying upon general rules of international law--it
may be possible to work out a special regime of international
law for these two waterways, roughly similar to the Montreux
Convention affecting the Bosporous. Yes, we are working on that
pretty hard.
The Chairman. Senator Clark has not had a chance. I wonder
if he could be recognized.
Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE NEED FOR DISARMAMENT

Mr. Secretary, I would like particularly to have Senator
Gore and Senator Symington listen to this. Mr. Secretary, it
seems to me that our government has an opportunity to do
something which comes once in a lifetime, to do something
effective about the disarmament, and I use the word
``disarmament'' instead of arms control advisedly, as a result
of what has happened in the Middle East.
The Russians, as I understand it, have poured over the
years something in the neighborhood of $2 billion in armaments
into the Middle East about which around $1 billion, Mr. Bader
tells me, went to Egypt.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Clark. An awful lot of that has gone down the
drain.
I would not think that a hard-boiled people like the
Russians would be deeply interested in making the same mistake
again.
Secretary Rusk. Add $1 billion to Indonesia.
Senator Clark. Yes, sure.
Now, the Israelis have always proudly boasted that they
were very much in favor of disarmament in the Middle East, but
they could not do anything about it because the Arabs would not
go along.
Well, now, maybe with the Arabs significantly, although not
certainly totally disarmed, with Russia disillusioned, this is
a time when our government would move pretty rapidly in that
direction. I am sure that Senator Gore, the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Disarmament, and Senator Symington, as chairman
of the Subcommittee on the Middle East, might look with favor
on this suggestion.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Now, yesterday I think it was announced that you were the
chairman of a special committee on the Middle East, and McBundy
has been brought back out of the mothballs to be the executive
director. I, frankly, am a little bit disappointed. In fact, I
go further and say I am quite disappointed that there is nobody
from the agency which has the statutory responsibility for
dealing with arms control and disarmament, mainly the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, under that subcommittee.
I talked to my good friend and yours, Joe Sisco, at the
White House yesterday at a luncheon, and he said, ``You don't
need anybody from that outfit on that committee. I am on it.''
He said there is nobody from AID on it either. Well, I
respectfully suggest to you that it may be that that point of
view does deserve some upgrading. They should not be treated
exactly like lackeys who are sent over to Geneva from time to
time and gotten rid of, but that Bill Foster ought to be on
that committee.
I was going to make another suggestion, which is one that I
wrote for this committee not too long ago, that we ought to
give this whole disarmament effort, or if you are going to
downgrade it to arms control, a much higher priority in the
Middle East than you have done. I would recommend to you, sir,
that you ask the President to turn the Vice President loose on
this. He used to be chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee
down here. This has been one of his babies for many a long
year. I do not need to tell you the energy that he has got, the
zeal with which he can approach this task, and I would suggest
unhampered by some of your restrictions which might impede some
of the rest of them.
I guess that is a question, isn't it?
Secretary Rusk. I will report back your views, Senator. I
am not sure about the Vice President in this particular role.
Senator Clark. He might get us disarmament.
Secretary Rusk. The functions of a Vice President are
beyond my level.
It is true that this committee does not have on it the
Director of ACDA, the Director of AID, the Secretary of
Interior and a number of others who have a major stake in what
happens here, and we expect to draft them when questions come
up.
But ACDA has been working for some time on the possibility
of conventional arms limitation in the Near East.
In the opening statement of the Geneva Conference I myself
will be a recognition by the NATO countries that they have an
important interest in the Near East, and will help out a little
bit more.
I am going to have to go at least for a day or two to the
NATO Ministers Meeting in the middle of next week, and for the
first time in a long time the NATO countries are beginning to
get interested in something outside of NATO.

LET THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLE ITS OWN PROBLEMS

The Chairman. Yesterday, some people called on me, and they
thought that now--they did not put it that way--now that Israel
has prevailed, that we ought to let them alone to settle this
among themselves.
What should I say to them when they say that to me?
Secretary Rusk. I would think the best way to deal with
that one at the present time would be to say that this is in
the Security Council and it ought to stay there for a while.
The Chairman. The U.N. can do it. I said if they can do it,
I am all for it.
Secretary Rusk. By the way, may I make just one brief
remark. We have had some indication in the last three days,
Senator Gore, that we are making some more progress on the
nonproliferation treaty.
Senator Gore. Wonderful.
Secretary Rusk. So we may be able to table a joint draft in
Geneva shortly.
Senator Gore. Good.
Secretary Rusk. But that is just--I cannot guarantee that
yet, but we have been encouraged by what has happened in the
last three days.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock p.m., the committee was
adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse (presiding), McCarthy and Carlson.
Fulton Freeman, Ambassador to Mexico, accompanied by
Terence Leonhardy, Director, Office of Mexican Affairs,
Department of State, briefed the group on the Dykes Simmons
case.
(Reporter present at request of Senator Morse.)
[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:40 p.m.]

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

----------

THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:15 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Symington, Lausche, Pell, McCarthy,
Hickenlooper, and Aiken.
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY C. KITCHEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH WOLF, DIRECTOR
OF OPERATIONS, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS; AND H.G. TORBERT,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

* * * * * * *

SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN [P. 85]

Senator Symington. Speaking of Pakistan, the subcommittee
has been told by the Defense Intelligence Agency that there was
no doubt within the intelligence community that the F-86's in
question were going to Pakistan, and reports to this effect
were circulated before the aircraft left Germany.
Did you see those reports?
Mr. Kitchen. I saw some intelligence reports after the
aircraft arrived in Iran. I did not see intelligence reports
prior to their departure from Germany.

* * * * * * *

Senator Symington. Well, may I repeat that the Defense
Intelligence Agency said that it was clear to them that they
were going to Pakistan. Without in any sense getting into
controversy as to whether we did or didn't know about it, when
we found out they had gone, did we make any protest to Iran, or
to Pakistan?
Mr. Kitchen. Well, as far as Iran is concerned, the degree
of protest centered around inquiries as to whether when they
gave the certification that the aircraft were to be used in
Iran, whether or not this really constituted Iranian Government
policy.
There was never, to my knowledge, an approach to the Shah,
who really determines Iranian policy, and no point-blank
question to him as to whether or not they had in fact been
turned over to Pakistani control.

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF SALES AGREEMENT BY IRAN

Senator Symington. I am a great admirer of Iran, but
wouldn't it be logical to ask them if they were violating the
agreement that the U.S. Government had told the people of the
United States they intended to carry out with Pakistan and
India?
Mr. Kitchen. Well, we did discuss this in the sense,
Senator, that when we announced the new policy in April for
Pakistan and India, we laid that before the Shah and made very
plain what our policy objectives were and that included the
element of control and our sincere desire that he cooperate in
making a contribution to our policy in the sense of maintaining
that control.
Senator Symington. Was it made clear to us that there was
no intention to abide by our suggestion or without our
knowledge until we found it out?
Mr. Kitchen. Well, I think in reverting to what I
immediately said with regard to our new policy, he indicated
that he thought that our approach was not unrealistic, that it
was a fairly good approach. He felt that if we, in fact,
monitored it in terms of balance between India and Pakistan,
that this was a reasonable proposition.
I personally believe that his action in permitting the
aircraft to go on to Pakistan really centered around his
personal persuasion that in effecting the cut-off at the time
of hostilities we were in fact penalizing Pakistan.
He had certain relationships with Pakistan which allowed
him to draw the conclusion that this was an unfair proposition
at that stage.
I think he regards our policy now as a fair policy, and I
think he would give it his general support.

* * * * * * *

IRANIAN PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION [P. 86]

Senator Symington. The testimony that we have had, to the
best of my recollection, to justify this policy is their fear
of the United Arab Republic. Do you think Iran will continue to
buy arms from the Soviet Union now that Nasser has been given
his comeuppance, you might say, by the Israelis?
Mr. Kitchen. My personal estimate would be, Senator, that
he will continue to buy non-lethal equipment, generally non-
lethal, and what I would call common user equipment from the
Soviet Union.
It is my view that he saw that in our policy of cutting off
aid to India and Pakistan in the event of hostilities, the
dangers, as he sees them, of being dependent on a single source
of supply.
I think that that was one of his strongest motivations for
this purchase, as well as the fact that he was able to take a
wasting economic asset, the gas which he was flaring, and trade
it for this basic equipment.

* * * * * * *

U.S. POLICIES REGARDING ARMS SALES ABROAD [P. 87]

Senator Symington. Do we consider there are any developed
countries in the Middle East?
Mr. Kitchen. The criteria here might go again back to the
problem of Iran. Iran now has a surplus of income from oil.
When I use the word surplus I mean it has a substantial income
from oil that gives the government certainly a wider range of
choice than it had up to the last three or four years. It has
been our policy to try to persuade the Government of Iran to
hold its defense spending down. We have, in fact, approved
sales to Iran only about a quarter of what the Shan has
requested. We work not only with the budgetary authorities in
the Ministry of Defense but actually with the Central Bank and
other experts to develop what we believe is a real economic
picture of Iran and we have done our best to persuade the Shah
that he should not go over certain levels in his defense
spending.

* * * * * * *

U.S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE [P. 89]

Senator Symington. What do you now plan to do about Greece?
Mr. Kitchen. Well, Greece is still fulfilling a NATO
commitment. Her military establishment is committed to NATO
objectives. That basis commitment hasn't in any way been
changed by the new regime.
The question is whether we should continue to provide
certain heavy equipment to Greece more as a measure of our
concern about the political nature of that establishment rather
than any doubts about its military problems.
Senator Symington. I understand.
What do you mean by heavy equipment?
Mr. Kitchen. Well, at the present time certain artillery
and, I believe, aircraft.
Senator Symington. What type of aircraft? F-5's, perhaps?
Mr. Kitchen. Well, I believe it is F-5's.
Senator Symington. F-5's. What size artillery?
Mr. Kitchen. I would have to check again. I think it is
howitzers.
Tanks, as well?
Well, all right, tanks.
Senator Symington. What type of tanks?
Mr. Kitchen. 47's or 48's.
Mr. Wolf. I believe it is 48 or modernization of their
present holdings.
Senator Symington. Are we continuing to ship that to Greece
now?
Mr. Kitchen. Not those heavy items.
Senator Symington. And when did we stop?
Mr. Kitchen. We stopped a few days after the coup.
Senator Symington. And we have not yet decided whether or
not we will continue?
Mr. Kitchen. We have not yet decided.
Senator Symington. I see. That clears that up.
Does this involve in any way our relationship with our
other NATO partner, the Turks?
Let me put the question to you this way: Would we discuss
this with the Turks, recognizing the Cyprus problem before we
made the decision?
Mr. Kitchen. To resume?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Kitchen. I don't believe we would. I think this, again,
is a unilateral policy question with regard to the political
nature of that government and not about the basic military
situation.

AMERICAN CONTROL OVER RESALE OF SURPLUS MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Senator Symington. Mr. Kitchen, you mentioned the fact that
you worked with Mr. McNaughton as well as Mr. Kuss and Mr.
Hoopes in the Department of Defense.
Mr. McNaughton told this committee that the United States
had complete control over the resale or other transfer of
military equipment of United States origin. But when the
subcommittee asked the Defense Department for a list of sales
and commitments that the German firm, Merex, has made in
reselling U.S. equipment, Mr. McNaughton replied, ``This
specific information is not available within the Executive
Branch.''
Can you explain this apparent contradiction?
Mr. Kitchen. We are aware of some of the Merex transactions
through intelligence sources. Merex has not been the only sales
agent which the German government has employed once we
indicated that we did not wish to recapture certain equipment.
We have some knowledge through, as I say, intelligence sources
of what the Merex transactions have been.

* * * * * * *

CANADIAN SALES DESTINED FOR PAKISTAN [P. 91]

Senator Symington. And they were not going to send them to
the Pakistanis?
Mr. Kitchen. There was no such statement that they might
send them, but the point was they were to be used properly by
Iran.
May I go on and say, sir, when I was in Munich a month ago,
I had a very full and frank discussion with representatives of
both the German ministry of defense and foreign ministry, made
very clear to them without citing specifics because most of our
specifics came through intelligence channels that we were quite
aware that there had been irregularities in their handling of
American surplus disposal and we did not wish to run into those
irregularities again.
Senator Symington. Why did the German Government throw over
Merex and take over the new company whose name is so long I
can't pronounce it?
Mr. Kitchen. I don't know the real answer to that. It may
be partly their recognition that we were quite aware of this
and had had knowledge of it, did not want to see it repeated.

* * * * * * *

FOREIGN FIRMS ENGAGED IN ARMS SALES [P. 96]

Senator Lausche. Obviously, this Levy Company is of the
belief that it can in some way get military surplus equipment,
and it is telling its clients that it will get it for them
through some manipulation. Is that correct?
Senator Symington. Mr. Kitchen would agree to that.
Mr. Kitchen. I agree to that.
Senator Lausche. It is a dangerous thing.
Mr. Kitchen. Before you came in, sir, I said I had
conversations with the German Government. Recently it was made
very plain that we were aware of the irregularities that
occurred in that transaction with Iran, and, as a matter of
fact, I understand that Merex, as the Chairman has suggested,
has been dropped by the German Government.

* * * * * * *

JUSTIFICATION FOR SALES TO IRAN [P. 98]

Senator Symington. The nature of the job the man has does
not make any difference. He can be a dentist, and then he
begins to operate.
In any case, after they did buy it, after they did say they
were going to buy this what-you-call unsophisticated equipment
from the Soviets, we agreed to sell our most sophisticated
airplane, minus some parts and so forth, but the frame was the
F-4. Why would they not buy any military equipment from the
Soviets unless we apply pressure to them to cut it out; and how
can we apply pressure if we are selling them sophisticated
equipment at the same time they are buying other military
equipment from the Soviet Union?
Mr. Kitchen. Well, sir, I would like to respond on the
first part of this with regard to the explanation. They did not
let Soviet technicians in. This was their own description of
this and so far as I am concerned, I for one would not use this
in justification of their move. I merely wanted to describe
what they said.
I think there have been thousands of Soviets in Iran since
the end of World War II, and I quite agree with your point of
their being in there in connection with their other industry
and so on.
The point is I think the Shah felt there was a real
difference between having that and having them as technicians
within his military establishment, to where he developed some
dependency on Soviet technicians in terms of his ability to use
his military establishment, and I think that that is of some
consequence.

* * * * * * *

Senator McCarthy. Did you people at the time you approved
the A-4 transfer know that the Iranians were going to buy the
Russian equipment, or did that come to you as a surprise after
you approved the airplane transfer?
Mr. Kitchen. I do not quite recall the sequence on that. I
would have to check the record, Senator.
I would put it this way. I thought the knowledge of the
Russian transaction actually preceded our decision to supply
the F-4.

KNOWLEDGE OF IRANIAN-SOVIET ARMS DEAL [P. 100]

Senator McCarthy. I do not say McNaughton made any denial.
As I remember, he made a general statement about our selling it
from keeping the Russians from putting military equipment in
Iran. There was no indication, as I remember his testimony,
that this--because the public announcement of the sale of
trucks and so on came after the hearing we held on this matter.
Mr. Kitchen. I want to say that we felt the sale of the F-
4's to Iran was less in a sense related to the provision on the
Soviet equipment, the type of Soviet equipment that the Shah
bought and the amounts, as it was to the fact that we had
successfully held the Shah to a program of about $50 million a
year when he wanted about four times that.
The Shah came to us and said that he was rapidly,
increasingly, concerned by the range of the MIG-21 operating
out of Iraq. The equipment which we provided did not have the
range of the F-5 and was not suitable to take off from his
interior fields and engage them approximately at his national
border. He wanted an aircraft that was capable of doing that.
Because of the $50 million figure and because of the
expense of this aircraft, we reluctantly concluded that this
was not, in his terms, an unreal requirement or an unreal
request. We made the sale in a sense on its own merits, and
less connected with the Soviet transaction.
Senator McCarthy. The Soviets are being paid pretty much in
oil, are they not?
Mr. Kitchen. Gas, sir.
Senator McCarthy. How are we being paid?
Mr. Kitchen. It is a transaction where we will be repaid--
it is a credit arrangement.
Senator McCarthy. It is a credit arrangement.
Mr. Kitchen. Yes, because of his royalties when they fall
due and so on.
Senator McCarthy. It is not a direct sort of barter
arrangement such as the Russians have.
Mr. Kitchen. No, sir.
Senator McCarthy. What would have happened if the $400
million worth of arms that we and the British are supplying to
Saudi Arabia, in addition to what we were supplying to Jordan,
had been operational, and used by the Jordanians and the Saudi
Arabians in the recent Mideast crisis?
Mr. Kitchen. You would like to have our views on how it
might have been applied?
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Mr. Kitchen. Of course we are in an executive session. I
think the Saudi equipment was and is being bought for
protection against Nasser and had little to do with its
relationships to Israel.
Senator McCarthy. It would not have been used.
Mr. Kitchen. I doubt very much that it would have been
used. A lot of that money for instance is in the Hawk system
which is defensive. I think it has come largely out of the
irritations and genuine concerns of the Yemeni conflict, the
presence of the Egyptians in the Yemen.
As far as Jordan was concerned, sir, a dozen F-104's
against what we say the Israelis dispose of, I think they would
have tried to take the air. I think that would have been about
it.
Senator McCarthy. What was the status of the agreement to
sell F-104's?
Mr. Kitchen. My understanding is, and I am subject to
checking the record, that approximately only a third of them
were there--four aircraft, some transitional training was being
accomplished. The aircraft were removed from Jordan several
days before hostilities, moved out at the request of the King.
Senator McCarthy. Where did the King put them?
Mr. Kitchen. He simply turned them back to us and we moved
them out. I do not know where they went.
Mr. Wolf. They were, as I recall, our aircraft on loan at
that time.
Senator McCarthy. He did not have title to them. We got
them out?
Mr. Wolf. We got them out. Where they are now, I do not
know.
Senator McCarthy. I see.

* * * * * * *

HEAVY ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AMERICAN POLICY [P. 101]

Senator McCarthy. Well, I think that is the danger, and I
see principally it is coming in Europe.
Do you have any reasonable discussions or communications
with the Russians now with reference to possible limitation on
their arms sales in North Africa and the Middle East?
Mr. Kitchen. We are attempting such communication right
now. We are concerned that the Russians not be recommitted to
programs of the size they were committed to. We feel that the
amount of material which has been supplied quickly on a fill-in
basis does not constitute any indication of such a deep
commitment.
Senator McCarthy. You mean what they are doing right now.
Mr. Kitchen. Yes. It is to keep some leverage with the
Arabs during the U.N. phase and to perhaps fill the losses and
we are very concerned that we get that communication.
Senator McCarthy. They have a problem as to what to do with
their semi-obsolete equipment.
[Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
S. 1688, the Inter-American Development Bank bill, was
discussed and it was decided to take an overall view of the AID
bill, plus S. 1688, before making a decision.
S. 624, to provide certain increases in annuities payable
from the Foreign Service retirement and disability fund, was
ordered reported without the Pell amendment.
The committee heard James Pineo Grant, nominee to be
Assistant Administrator, AID (Vietnam) and then ordered him
reported favorably by a voice vote.
Short discussion on the Human Rights Conventions, before
agreeing to begin markup on the AID bill on Tuesday, June 27.
[The committee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche,
Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt,
Case, and Cooper.
The committee began markup of S. 1872, the Foreign Aid
bill. Roll call votes were taken on Senator Cooper's substitute
(to limit development loans to 15 countries, with Presidential
discretion to extend to an additional 8 countries if President
reports to the Congress) to Symington motion to limit
development loans to 15 countries, with authority to extend to
additional countries only after passage of concurrent
resolution. The Cooper substitute was defeated by a vote of 10
to 3, and the Symington motion was approved by a vote of 11 to
2.
[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON GLASSBORO TALKS

----------

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore, Lausche,
Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Williams, Mundt, Case and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader
of the committee staff.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We had originally scheduled a hearing on foreign aid, but
in view of the very interesting activities that have been going
on in recent days the Secretary thought he would like to brief
us some on those activities first.
Of course if someone wants to ask foreign aid questions
later on, he wouldn't mind, although he informs me he has a
Cabinet meeting and has to leave at 20 minutes to 12.
Is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Secretary. I hope you will
give us a little statement before we interrogate you.
Senator Aiken. Where was he at 8:30 last night?
The Chairman. Talking with Gromyko.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thought I might try to draw together a good many threads
here of the last two weeks to include what is going on in New
York, the summit discussions, and to bring you up to date on my
talk with Mr. Gromyko last evening which was the most recent of
our exchanges with the Soviet Union.
Much of our time was spent on the Middle East, and I think
we ought to keep in mind that there are three sets of issues in
the Middle East which tend to merge, overlap, which tend to
break up the notion that there is a solid community called
``The Arabs,'' in which our interests vary from issue to issue.
There is the Israel-Arab issue, which involves very deep-
seated emotions on both sides, emotions which were inflamed 20
years ago with the creation of the State of Israel, and which
have not really subsided--issues on which almost all Arabs
speak with a single voice.
Then there is a very serious contest going on between the
self-styled progressive Arab states, countries like Egypt,
Syria, Algeria, and the moderate or conservative Arab states
which comprise almost all the rest.
The third is a serious effort by the Soviet Union to
penetrate the Middle East to establish an effective presence
there at the expense of the West, which carries with it very
heavy overtones affecting the total world situation.
At the fringe is a minor Chinese Communist effort in the
area, but I haven't found anyone among the Arabs particularly
that I have talked to in recent weeks who take the Chinese
activity very seriously, although they have been busy with the
Palestine Liberation Army and a few minor groups here and
there.

MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL

I think the committee was briefed in great detail up to the
point where the Middle Eastern question moved from the Security
Council to the General Assembly. We had no enthusiasm for that
transfer of the forum because in the first instance we felt
that in the Security Council the voting situation was such that
it required that any result be a negotiated result. It was not
possible for the Security Council to pass a wholly one-sided
resolution or a resolution which had not been at least in part
negotiated between the two sides, and the Security Council had
succeeded in passing four unanimous resolutions and had been
able to bring about a cease-fire when the hostilities actually
began.
Further, we anticipated that the Soviet Union would use the
General Assembly for a major propaganda effort to reaffirm its
support of the Arabs and cast the United States in the role of
the enemy of the Arabs, partly as a part of its long range
strategy and partly to recover from the very serious setback
which the Soviet Union itself had suffered when, in the face of
a striking Arab defeat, the Soviet Union was considered by many
Arabs to have let them down.

KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO THE U.N.

It was against this background that we heard that Mr.
Kosygin was coming.
Despite the fact that we were in regular touch with him on
the ``Hot Line'' there for several days, he did not give us any
private information that he was coming. It was simply announced
he was coming to the General Assembly.
When we heard that, Mr. Christian, the Press Secretary for
the White House, made a short statement indicating that he
would be welcome and that we hoped that he would enjoy his
visit to this country and that the President and he might meet
while he was here.
After his arrival, we let it be known to him that the
President would be glad to extend him hospitality in Washington
or Camp David with whatever degree of formality or informality
he might be able or willing to accept.
But he took the view that he was coming to the United
Nations and not to the United States, that he could not visit
the United States as such and, therefore, he did not believe it
would be appropriate for him to come to Washington.
Well, that led to consideration of other places, and we
finally decided upon Glassboro on the recommendation of the
Governor of New Jersey.
Just before the announcement of the Glassboro meeting was
made, I had gone to see Mr. Kosygin and told him there were a
number of points which the President would be ready and glad to
have a chance to discuss and if he, Mr. Kosygin, thought such a
talk would be worthwhile the President would be glad to meet
him in New York, in New York State or in New Jersey.
Those four points were: Non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, the ABM problem, the Middle East, and Vietnam.

KOSYGIN'S MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

Now, as far as the Assembly is concerned, on the opening
day, Mr. Kosygin not only made his speech but also put in a
resolution which had in it three key points: One, a
condemnation of Israel; secondly, a demand for the withdrawal
of Israeli forces immediately and unconditionally; and, third,
reparation or compensation by Israel to the Arabs for the
damage inflicted and a return of captured property including
captured arms.
I think it is worth noting that in recent days discussion
of a condemnation of Israel and the matter of reparations has
pretty well dropped out of the picture and the Soviet Union is
concentrating now on an immediate and unconditional withdrawal
of Israeli forces back to the so-called armistice lines.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE POINTS

The following day, Ambassador Goldberg put in a United
States resolution built around the five points in the
President's speech of June 19: The recognized right of national
life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage,
limits on the arms race, and political and territorial
integrity for all the states in the area.
We did that partly to broaden the agenda of the Assembly
itself because up until that point the item on the agenda was
Israeli aggression. But when we put in our resolution calling
for steps to stabilize a general and more permanent peace in
the area, then that was by arrangement with the Secretariat
included on the agenda of the General Assembly.
The situation at the present time is that neither the
Soviet resolution nor the U.S. resolution is likely to pass
with the necessary two-thirds vote. What is likely to happen is
that there will be some third resolution, still unsurfaced,
around which some sort of consensus might build, combining the
idea of withdrawal with some of these broader principles of
stabilizing a permanent peace.
In our talks with Mr. Kosygin and two additional talks
which I had with Mr. Gromyko, we took up the Middle East
situation in great detail. I suppose 80 percent of the
President's time with Kosygin was spent on the Middle East.
Kosygin's very tough press conference on the subject is a
pretty accurate reflection of what he said in private. He is
pressing very hard for a simple and unconditional withdrawal of
Israeli forces to the armistice line, and is unwilling to talk
seriously about other issues until that question of withdrawal
has been resolved.

AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY

Having said that, it is, I think, correct to say that there
are important, indeed major points of agreement between
ourselves and the Soviet Union on the Middle East.
For example, the Soviet Union accepts Israel as an
independent national state. It voted for its creation, and Mr.
Kosygin reaffirmed that in his speech to the General Assembly.
The Soviet Union, I think, would support the idea of an
elimination of the state of belligerence.
Now, this is a very important, indeed a fundamental point
involved in this present situation, because the Arab states,
particularly those immediately neighboring Israel, have
proceeded on the basis that they are in a state of war with
Israel and have the right to exercise the so-called rights of
belligerence in their dealings about or with Israel.
When President Nasser, for example, closed the Strait of
Tiran, we were immediately in touch with him, and he based the
closing of the Strait of Tiran on rights of belligerence
stemming from the state of war with Israel. That raises some
interesting points of a reciprocal character because the
Egyptians tend to overlook the fact that if Egypt is in a state
of war with Israel, Israel is in a state of war with Egypt. The
Latin Americans have pointed out from a legal point of view,
around New York, that if Egypt is in a state of war with
Israel, Israel cannot commit aggression against Egypt, and that
the question of withdrawal takes on a special and less
insistent role if a state of war is insisted upon.
But I think the Soviet Union would agree to find some way
to remove the rights of belligerence at some stage, after
withdrawal has been accomplished.

END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCE

Mr. Gromyko volunteered the interesting remark that whereas
Japan and the Soviet Union do not have a peace treaty with each
other, they did join 10 years ago to remove the state of
belligerence between the two countries, and that is an
interesting precedent for this kind of problem here in the
Middle East.
I think also that the United States would have no
particular problem with the Soviet Union on rights of maritime
passage.
Senator Aiken. Is that public knowledge, the state of
belligerency?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, it is. Would you like to have the
documentation on that?
Senator Aiken. No, I just want to know whether it is safe
to refer to it.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Aiken. It would be helpful.
Senator Clark. It would be safer to refer to the fact that
the Russians would approve ending the state of belligerence.
Secretary Rusk. No, I don't think you had better put words
in their mouths on it. I think you can point out that Russia
and Japan removed the state of belligerence between them 10
years ago even though there is not a peace treaty between them,
and I would urge out of this no one put words in the Russians'
mouths because I would like to talk rather freely about the
Russians' views on some of these things.
I don't think we will have much problem with the Russians
on the question of maritime passage.

OPENING THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

I can tell the committee that Egypt has let it be known
that the Strait of Tiran problem can be resolved; that the
Strait can be opened. The sticking point is that they want to
do it informally and as secretly as possible. In other words,
it is not the kind of thing that you can handle secretly. Ships
pass through, and unless there is some real assurance, an
assurance would have to be public, it is very hard to see how
this could be managed.
But I think we can assume that in all of this business the
Strait of Tiran will be opened.
I don't believe the Soviets would object to Israeli ships
going through the Suez, but we are a long way from having the
consent of Cairo for the passage of Israeli flag ships through
Suez.
Senator Hickenlooper. Have they started clearing the
channel yet?
Secretary Rusk. I haven't had information that they have. I
understand that there is about a 30 day job to clear the
channel with three or four ships that have been in trouble
there.
Senator Aiken. Who sunk the ships?
Secretary Rusk. There was one with cement in it that I
understand the Egyptians sunk. There is another one that ran
aground, whether it was trying to dodge or something. I just
don't know of individual ships, but at least one with cement in
it was sunk by Egyptians.

ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

We went into the question of the arms race with the Soviet
Union, and I must say that I think I detect more interest among
the Arabs in finding some limitation to the arms race than I do
on the part of the Soviet Union. I think we ought to bear in
mind that this question of arms in the Near East is not
something which we are likely to be able to manage by our own
unilateral efforts, particularly so long as the Soviet Union
continues to send very large supplies of weapons in there,
because it is a three-cornered problem.
With the massive Soviet arms build-up in Egypt, Syria, and
Algeria, that creates problems in the first instance for their
own Arab neighbors, the moderate or conservative regimes who
feel under pressure from Cairo or in the case of Algeria,
Tunisia and Morocco. So that we have in the past tried to make
moderate amounts of arms available to Jordan, for example.
We have sold some arms to Saudi Arabia although the British
are their principal supplier, and we have given some very
modest assistance to countries like Tunisia and Morocco.
But that, in turn, creates a problem with Israel. We did
have some well understood balanced arms supplies both to Jordan
and to Israel to the knowledge of both in a situation in which
they were reasonably content on both sides with what was being
done.

KEEPING AN HONEST CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES

Senator Lausche. At this point, Mr. Secretary,----
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche.--May I state that when a delegation was in
Tel Aviv, we were told by Mrs. Meir that they knew from the
State Department that U.S. military equipment was going in
there. That is, she corroborates what you have just said that
Israel was fully familiar with what you were doing.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have tried to keep in honest
contact with both Jordan and Israel on this question, because I
think each one of them knew that such arms as we were putting
in there were not aimed at the country across the border, but
in each case had a different purpose.
So that I think we should have in our minds if we withdraw
completely from the area and leave the area completely to
Soviet supplied arms to Egypt and Syria, then we expose a good
many of these countries, Arab as well as Israel, to a build-up
and dangers and threats which could work very much against our
interests and those of the western world.
I don't want to get into that in any more detail than the
committee wishes to, but I just wanted to mention it in
passing.
The Soviets did not give us much encouragement, however, on
the question of limitation of arms to the Near East. Our
present information, and I think perhaps we could leave this
off the tape at the moment----
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have got to go to
another hearing at 10:30 and I wonder as long as this subject
has been brought up if I can ask the Secretary one or two
questions.
Senator Lausche. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I have another
meeting to go to, too.
All right.
Senator Clark. I have another meeting at 10:30.
Senator Lausche. Go ahead. I have no objection.
The Chairman. You take two or three minutes, whatever you
want.

THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE

Senator Symington. There is just one question I have to
ask. I have heard that the build-up is considerably more from
another branch of the government than what you have stated, and
my only single question is what will be our position if the
Israelis decide that the best defense is a good offense again?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I was just given this information
this morning. My information is that this is an all-department
judgment at the present time.
Senator Symington. In any case, my question is, if they
decide the best defense is the best offense again, what would
be the position of the United States?
Secretary Rusk. I think we would advise strongly both sides
here not to initiate another round of hostilities just as we
did before this last round started.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. All right, continue, Mr. Secretary.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Secretary Rusk. Well, I have tried to summarize briefly the
general attitude of the Soviet Union on the Middle East. As I
say, that took up about 80 percent of the time in the
discussions between the Chairman and the President.
On the question of non-proliferation, I think we did make
some significant headway. On June 7, our two representatives in
Geneva, the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, put their
heads together and recommended to their governments ad
referendum a joint draft which, if it were to be approved by
the two governments, would be submitted to the Geneva
Conference without Article III on safeguards.
We looked over that and were satisfied with it as a basis
for further negotiation with the other members of the
conference, and with governments not members of the conference,
and authorized our man to proceed.
The Soviets have not yet authorized their man to join in
tabling that resolution, that draft treaty.
We talked about that in some detail with Mr. Kosygin and
Mr. Gromyko, and it is my impression, I cannot guarantee this,
but it is my impression that within a very few days the Soviet
Union will agree in Geneva to table the draft that has now been
prepared, minus Article III on safeguards, leaving Article III
blank for further negotiation between the two co-chairmen.
I think that represents some significant headway, and we
can be, I think, reasonably pleased that that step may be in
sight.

PROBLEMS IN ESTABLISHING SAFEGUARDS

On safeguards, the issue continues to be one not between
the United States and the Soviet Union, but between EURATOM and
practically everybody else on the issue as to whether EURATOM
safeguards are to be accepted as a substitute for IAEA
safeguards, the Vienna safeguards in effect, or whether all
nations, including the EURATOM members, would accept a single
set of safeguards under the IAEA system.
Our information on this point has been that France,
particularly, was objecting to the acceptance of IAEA
safeguards in EURATOM.
Mr. Gromyko tells me that is not what Couve de Murville
said to him, so we are trying to clarify that particular point.
I think it is possible that the safeguards question can be
resolved.

DISCUSSIONS ON ABM

On the ABM question, the President pressed Mr. Kosygin very
hard on that to set a time and a place for discussions, this
week, next week, because this matter has been pending now for
three months since the Soviet Union said they would be prepared
to discuss offensive and defensive missiles with us.
Mr. Kosygin was not willing to set a time, although he
indicated that they would be prepared to discuss the matter
further at some stage. He rather indicated before too long,
whatever that means.
He pretended to believe that one of the problems was that
we were willing to discuss only defensive missiles, and he made
a pretty strong case against that. But in fact for a very long
time we have told him that we do want to talk about both
offensive and defensive missiles, and I don't quite understand
why even in his press conference after all of our talk he left
the impression that somehow we were prepared to talk about only
defensive missiles. He knows better in terms of the most direct
statements by us over a period of the last several months, and
by what the President said at Glassboro.
My guess is that there will be some further talks on that
subject. I think it is entirely possible that the Soviet Union
has not completed its own staff work, its own preparations. It
is a very complex matter.
We had spent perhaps a year working on this matter among
our departments before the proposals were made to the Soviet
Union, so that we were pretty well along the way before we
raised it with them.
If they have not gone through the same exercise, the more
they get into it the more complicated they undoubtedly have
found it, so I think there is a reasonable possibility that
they simply have not completed their work and they may have
some military views to take into account as the gentlemen
around this table know we have had to do.

SOVIET UNION WILL NOT SPEAK FOR HANOI

On Vietnam, the principal problem there is the one we have
long been familiar with. The Soviet Union either is unwilling
or unable to try to speak for Hanoi and, therefore, is not able
to sit down with us to do business on Vietnam. They are
unwilling to commit themselves as to what they might do if by
that it means going out beyond what they understand to be the
position of Hanoi.
I think the discussion on that, however, was extremely
useful in terms of clarifying the situation, and to make
apparent to Mr. Kosygin a wide range, a very wide range, of
possibilities for moving this matter toward peace if there is
any way to get Hanoi to pick up any one of the possibilities
and the alternatives and begin to move.
I don't know whether we will hear more from them on that
subject or not. We would hope so.

CLOSING THE GAP ON IMPORTANT ISSUES

I would think that on the whole the talks were very much
worthwhile on the simple point that the difference between
having the talks and not having the talks was a very
substantial difference. I think there would have been general
disappointment if these two men had been that close to each
other geographically and not been able to sit down and exchange
views.
I also think that the talks helped to improve
understanding, in the original sense of the word understanding;
that is, it helped each side to get a fuller, more detailed
understanding of each other's points of view.
I can't say that I think that the talks brought about an
understanding in terms of closing the gap on some of the
important issues which we have before us. But I must say that I
think it also improved considerably the sense of contact
between these two individuals, and may make it somewhat easier
for them to be in direct touch with each other again when it
becomes desirable and necessary to do so.

SOVIETS WARN OF RENEWED FIGHTING IN MIDDLE EAST

There were no polemics on either side. There were no
threats. There was an indication by the Soviet Union that they
thought fighting would break out again in the Middle East if
there was not a prompt withdrawal of Israeli forces. But that
was about as close as discussion came----
Senator Case. Would you say that again?
Secretary Rusk. I said the Chairman, Mr. Kosygin, indicated
that he thought there was a very high prospect of fighting in
the Middle East if the Israeli forces did not withdraw promptly
and unconditionally, but that was as close as the conversation
got to a threat, and the meaning of that is a little hard to
understand.
I think it was made quite clear if they got into it
themselves that would be a very serious matter indeed. We would
ourselves be much concerned about that, and we fully expected
that they would not themselves get involved in the situation. I
didn't get the impression that they were saying they were just
about to.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ARAB SIDE

Whether the Arabs themselves are able to contemplate a
further round at this point, I think is very doubtful. But
there are additional aircraft that have been brought back in
there lately. The Arabs have seen the value of a tactical first
strike so one can't be sure as to exactly what would happen.
More generally in the area, we are not completely sure just
what is happening in Cairo; who is really in charge; who is
giving instructions.
I had two long talks with Dr. Fawzi myself in New York,
preceded by a talk which Averell Harriman had with him. I did
not get too much impression that he was acting under any clear
instructions from his own government, and the talks proved to
be rather tentative in character.
The government in Syria is very fragile at the moment and
there could be political changes in Syria at almost any minute.
King Hussein of Jordan has increased his stature
considerably during this period within the Arab world because,
of all the Arabs, the Jordanians at least fought with
considerable courage. The King himself was there and lost five
members of his family. He gained additional respect among the
Arabs for having, in effect, as they saw it, acted like a man
compared to the way some of the others acted.
We are going to have a great deal of trouble in trying to
bring together the various principles on which a permanent
peace can be established there.
The Arabs are going to be extremely sensitive about making
major concessions which appear to be made under the impact of a
dramatic Israeli military success.

ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM

On the Israeli side, it is going to take them a little
while longer, I think, for the second thoughts to take hold,
and get them focusing on what is necessary to effect some sort
of reconciliation with the Arabs for the long run.
I have to say that, from the national point of view, I
think the action they seemed to be taking yesterday and today
to annex the old city of Jerusalem is going to be deeply
resented by many members of the United Nations who look upon
that as presenting them with a fait accompli. I think that is
going to cost the Israeli a good many votes up there before
this present session is over.
We strongly urged the Israelis not to take any action of
that sort that would present everybody else with a fait
accompli, because the problems are difficult enough at best,
but apparently they have gone ahead at least to the extent of
electing a government for the old city.
On how permanent a basis, I am not quite sure. I haven't
actually seen the details. But that action, I think, is going
to cost them considerably in the General Assembly.
Mr. Chairman, I have wandered, rambled around quite a bit
in order to open up a number of points that the members of the
committee might wish to get into. I am at your disposal to
pursue these matters in more detail.
The Chairman. Well, fine.

SUSPENSION OF BOMBING IN VIETNAM

Could I ask a little more about the Vietnam situation? Was
there anything said by them about a suspension of the bombing
or a standstill for any period of time? Did they encourage you
to believe that if this could be done there might be a
negotiation?
Secretary Rusk. They repeated, in effect, what Kosygin had
said publicly in London, that a stoppage of the bombing could
lead to a negotiation. But they were not able to say anything
at all about what action would occur; what the effect would be
on the ground; what would result in fact as distinct from what
might be happening at the conference table.
The Chairman. They couldn't give us any assurance, I
suppose, about what Hanoi would do?
Secretary Rusk. That is the problem. He was not able to
speak for Hanoi.
For example, he was not able to say whether or not those
three or four divisions in and near the demilitarized zone
would attack our marines up there while such talks were going
on.

POSSIBILITY OF A CONFERENCE

The Chairman. Did he express the belief that if we did have
a standstill that they would have a conference?
Secretary Rusk. No, he didn't--well, he indicated if we
stopped the bombing that there could be negotiations. He did
repeat what he said in London on that matter.
The Chairman. It was my understanding that at one point he
indicated that if we could get a conference, stop the war in
Vietnam, everything else would fall in place. Is that an
accurate statement of his attitude?
Secretary Rusk. I don't have that. I don't--I would have to
review the transcript.
The Chairman. The morning paper.
Senator Lausche. In connection with this, he said that we
should stop the bombing and pull our troops out of South
Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think that is the standard public
position.
Senator Lausche. But that is not what he said----
The Chairman. That is the public position?
Secretary Rusk. That would be a retreat in fact from what
he said in London on the subject, because in London he didn't
say anything about pulling our troops out.

A MAJOR ESCALATION OF THE WAR

The Chairman. I understand we may be on the verge of
sending one or two more divisions to Vietnam. Would this not be
considered a major escalation of the war in a long term sense
of a further determination, or sign of determination, to remain
for a longer period. To put it another way, an indication we
have given up any hope whatever of any kind of negotiation?
Secretary Rusk. I am not familiar with----
The Chairman. Well, the rumor is in the paper that we are
about to send either one or two more divisions; a hundred
thousand men have been mentioned in some cases. Ky requested
140,000 men. So it is true that publicly at least we have
variations of the amount.
Secretary Rusk. I haven't been in the discussions myself
involved in that problem. It is my understanding that such
questions in any event will not arise until Secretary McNamara
has been out and talked over the situation.
The Chairman. These are figures that have been in the
paper. What I was wondering is, I think this comment about if
the war could be stopped, if we could get a negotiation, came
from the briefing of the President to the leadership. He
indicated he thought--of course, this is a theoretical way to
put it, I don't think it was pinned down to something very
specific--but that the real major problem was the war in
Vietnam. Many other outstanding problems which you have
mentioned, proliferation, arms control, etcetera, are
influenced by this. Even the question which caused a little
concern in the paper about whether or not there was arrangement
for a further meeting is influenced by this, and it is
obviously there.
I just wondered if you felt that this man has any
inclination to go further.

KOSYGIN'S STATUS IN SOVIET GOVERNMENT

One thing I particularly wanted to know, what is your
feeling about Kosygin's responsibility in this government? I
mean compared to Brezhnev and Podgorny and as a triumverate, do
they have any independence of action as a trio comparable to
our President, for example? I mean was this man really free to
take any initiative or was he just strictly following orders
from the trio, and they were following orders from the Central
Committee? Could you explain this a little bit?
Secretary Rusk. I have the impression that the three
together make up the authoritative leadership of the Soviet
government but that you have to take the three together, and I
have the impression that the views which Mr. Kosygin presented
here were the views which the three of them had agreed on.
The Chairman. He had really no discretion to depart from
them, is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. No discretion to depart from them without
consultation with the other two.
The Chairman. That is what I mean.
Secretary Rusk. But I don't think that means Mr. Kosygin
himself is just a mouthpiece. He is one-third of the
leadership.
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Rusk. So he is just not repeating something that
somebody else tells him.
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Secretary Rusk. These are positions which he and Mr.
Brezhnev and Podgorny reached as a collective, as a committee.
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Now, to what extent he was in touch back
home while he was there, I have no way of knowing, but I have
no doubt that there was a lot of telegraphic traffic going back
and forth while he was in this country getting ready for the
meeting and also perhaps in between the two meetings.
The Chairman. Sure.

SHARING THE TOP RESPONSIBILITY

Secretary Rusk. But I would think that Kosygin is a man who
does share the top responsibility, but he only shares it. He is
not like Khrushchev who would go off on his own.
The Chairman. Nor like our President.
Secretary Rusk. Not quite in the same constitutional
position as our President.
The Chairman. That is what I mean and he could be removed
tomorrow if the Central Committee desired it; all three of them
could.
Secretary Rusk. They could, although I think three of them
together pretty well control the Central Committee.
The Chairman. But if they did something that fell out of
sympathy with the Central Committee.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
The Chairman. They can fire them, just like a parliamentary
body can kick out a prime minister at a moment's notice.
Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, I had the impression the
tone of his press conference was for home consumption.
The Chairman. That is--I had it, too, and that is why I
asked the question.
Secretary Rusk. The tone was more rigid in its formulation.
The tone in the press conference was more rigid in its
formulation than the press talks.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche?
I have a lot of other things, but I don't want to take up
all the time.

HANOI'S DEMANDS FOR UNCONDITIONAL HALT TO BOMBING

Senator Lausche. Why can't we accede to Kosygin's demands
that we stop the bombing in the north?
Secretary Rusk. Well, so far as we know, we have not heard
to the contrary from Hanoi. They are insisting that it be
unconditional and definitive.
Now, there are various explorations going on to find out
whether in fact that is their view. We have tried, as you know,
on a number of occasions, short pauses, but on each of those
occasions they come back and say the pause is an ultimatum.
``You have to have a commitment this is unconditional.''
We are not going to say now talk and we will start the
bombing again if we are not satisfied.
These are matters that can change from time to time. We
have not yet seen clear signs of any change as far as Hanoi is
concerned. Undoubtedly, they are thinking about these problems
just as we are. But whether Mr. Kosygin will make any effort to
ascertain whether Hanoi's position on any of these points has
changed, I just have no way of knowing at the present time.

THE PERILS OF NEGOTIATING

Senator Lausche. What are the dangers if we stopped the
bombing of the North and went to the negotiating table. What
perils are there in that course?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the principal problem on that is the
practical problem that if they are relieved of bombing, they
can rest there in safety and relative comfort and continue to
supply men and arms into the South to carry on the war on their
side full scale without any interference by us north of the
17th Parallel, and without any major incentive toward peace.
Senator Lausche. Did Kosygin's statement imply that if we
did stop the bombing and did go to the negotiating table that
the war would still go on in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have no indication to the
contrary. In other words, no one thus far has been able to tell
us what, in fact, would happen on the ground during a period of
discussion. You see, we can't completely forget the experience
at Panmunjom when we took more casualties after the talks
started than before the talks started. There can be prolonged
talks during that period, and we could not hit anything north
of the 17th Parallel, and they could reinforce and supply and
continue to infiltrate without interruption or even discomfort.
I think the possibilities of peace would be postponed
considerably.

OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator Lausche. I have no further questions--by the way,
has there been any talk about setting up some plan that would
make the Suez Canal permanently open to all peaceful sea-moving
vessels?
Secretary Rusk. Egypt thus far has been very resistant to
the idea of opening up the canal to the flags of all nations,
including Israel. However, if one could remove this state of
belligerence, this state of war between Egypt and Israel, it is
possible that in time, and perhaps not too long in the future
as a practical matter, Israeli flag ships might go through the
canal because the legal basis for keeping them out of the canal
is the state of war.
Senator Lausche. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator Hickenlooper. I have no questions on this
particular phase of this at the moment.

ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY

I did want to ask you if you are prepared to make any
statement on it at the moment, it may be out of your bailiwick,
about the assault on the Liberty Ship in the eastern
Mediterranean killing the Americans.
The Chairman. Here is a letter about it.
Senator Hickenlooper. I didn't know about this letter.
The Chairman. This man wrote a letter----
Senator Lausche. Are you two having a private conversation?
The Chairman. No, it is about a Liberty Ship. He started to
ask and I thought maybe he would like to see it.
Senator Hickenlooper. He told me I had bad breath.
[Laughter]
Secretary Rusk. I was just informed, Mr. Chairman, after my
arrival back in Washington this morning, that the report of the
Naval Court of Inquiry has now been received, and that the
Department of Defense will make public this afternoon a summary
of that report.
I have not had a chance, myself, to see it or to study it,
but the two opening paragraphs of the summary are as follows:

A Navy Court of Inquiry has determined that USS Liberty was
in international waters, properly marked as to her identity and
nationality, and in calm, clear weather when she suffered an
unprovoked attack by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats
June 8, in the eastern Mediterranean. The court produced
evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to
identify Liberty correctly. The Court had insufficient
information before it to make a judgment on the response for
the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to
attack.

Now, we have given the Israelis a very stiff note on this
subject. When we get the results of the inquiry and some
estimates of the damage and the compensation required, we
expect to be filing for full compensation as is customary in
such cases.
It is my understanding that it is considered to be an
accidental attack insofar as the intent of the Israeli
government is concerned.
The Chairman. The government, as distinguished from----

ISRAELI INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT

Senator Hickenlooper. How about the people who ran the
attacking ships?
Secretary Rusk. They are themselves conducting a companion
inquiry into it, and the Israeli military advocate general is
holding a preliminary judicial inquiry by a legally qualified
judge who is empowered by law to decide on the committal for
trial of any person.
So it looks as though that indicates that they think there
may be some culpability on the part of individuals who might
have been involved in this attack.
Senator Hickenlooper. What does the investigation show? The
rumor, and statements we have had thus far, indicate that
Israeli planes made two or three passes over the ship as much
as at least 30 minutes or more before the attack occurred at a
low altitude apparently for the purpose of identification of
the ship. Also that at least one torpedo boat of the Israelis
came up very close to the ship before the attack was made, and
then backed away, and then fired at the ship.
Secretary Rusk. Again, I don't consider myself a very
expert witness on this point at the moment, Senator, but I do
see here on the summary that I have in front of me: ``The Court
heard witnesses testify to significant surveillance of the
Liberty on three separate occasions from the air at various
times prior to the attack, five hours and 13 minutes before the
attack, three hours and 7 minutes before the attack and two
hours and 37 minutes before the attack. Inasmuch as this,''
that is the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry, ``was not an
international investigation, no evidence was presented on
whether any of these aircraft had identified Liberty or whether
they had passed any information on Liberty to their own higher
headquarters.''
You see, we do not have in front of our own Naval Court of
Inquiry Israeli personnel or officers or anything of that sort
so the Court of Inquiry under those circumstances could not, I
suppose, properly make a finding on that point.

SURVEILLANCE OF SHIP PRIOR TO ATTACK

Senator Hickenlooper. Anyway, they did establish from
whatever testimony they had, they established the fact that the
passes had been made over this ship?
Secretary Rusk. That there was significant surveillance of
the Liberty on three separate occasions.
Senator Hickenlooper. Three separate occasions as much as
two hours before?
Senator Williams. Five hours.
Senator Hickenlooper. Five hours; two hours.
Secretary Rusk. Five hours, three and two and a-half.
Senator Hickenlooper. Over this ship, five, three and two
and a-half over this ship.
Incidentally, this lad who gave this interview in the New
York Post is from my home country, Palo, Iowa.
The Chairman. Is he bound to be a straightforward, honest
virtuous fellow?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yeoman Brownfield is his name.
This is the first I have seen of this story.
Senator Lausche. Was he a man on the ship?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, he is a yeoman on the ship.
Secretary Rusk. I think I should add here, I see also in
this same paragraph this statement by the Court, our own Court:
``It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the
culpability of the attackers and no evidence was heard from the
attacking nation. Witnesses suggested that the flag,'' that is
the U.S. flag, ``may have been difficult for the attackers to
see, both because of the slow speed of the ship and because
after five or six separate air attacks by at least two planes
each, smoke and flames may have helped obscure the view from
the motor torpedo boats.''
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, the time to identify the flag
was before they shot.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. Whether the flag was out or limp on
its mast, that is part of the point they were talking about
here.
But I haven't had a chance to study it, Senator, and I
wouldn't want to----
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I hope we get a full report on
this, because I can't help but draw the conclusion at this
moment, subject to such evidence as may develop later, that all
of the known facts, at least to me, indicate that they were
either blind or utterly stupid, or they deliberately identified
this ship and deliberately attacked it with the purpose of
sinking it, and I think in any event, it is very bad.

DEFINING INDEMNIFICATION

Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
Senator Mundt. When you say you sent them a stiff note to
ask for indemnification, in international parlance is that just
asking them to restore the ship or pay some kind of indemnity
to the families of the people killed?
Secretary Rusk. My understanding is it is indemnity of
personnel as well.
Senator Hickenlooper. You have not gone through that so I
will not attempt to have you do it piecemeal on that.
Secretary Rusk. There will be a statement made by the
Department of Defense today, and I have no doubt full
information can be made available to this committee.
The Chairman. Senator Pell, do you have a question?
Senator Pell. Yes.

TAKING THE INCIDENT TO THE WORLD COURT

Following up Senator Mundt's question there, you have no
idea as to the amount of indemnity of people killed? I have a
constituent killed there.
Secretary Rusk. No. I do not have any information on that
at the present time. There is considerable practice on that
point. I just do not know what it is. I am not sufficiently
informed at the present moment.
Senator Pell. Another question in connection with the
Israeli crisis: Would there be any possibility or any merit to
the idea of advocating a position of referring these points of
issue between Israel and the Arab nations to--some of them at
least--to the World Court for an advisory opinion, to put it on
ice for a little bit? It would give each side an opportunity to
make its arguments and give each side a face-saving excuse to
accept retrenching to a degree.
Secretary Rusk. The possibility of referring the Strait of
Tiran to the World Court was considered and discussed
internationally before the fighting started, and the great
difficulty there was that we could not get an agreement on the
status quo during the appeal to the World Court. Would the
strait be open or not while the matter was before the Court?
There is a second aspect to it and that is from a purely
legal point of view, if Egypt went to the Court and said, ``We
are in a state of war with Israel, and the closing of the
strait'' is an exercise of our rights of belligerence,'' that
would have been a very strong position in the Court as a matter
of law.
So I think that on that particular point we are better off
today than we would have been in referring it to the Court
because I think we are going to get the strait open.
Senator Pell. Right.
Actually, from a conversation with the Department of
Justice, I understand even if it is not a state of belligerency
we are on thin ice so far as the straits.
Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, our own estimate on that,
given the composition of the Court, our own estimate on that is
that a decision either way might be an 8 to 7 decision and that
is not a very encouraging prospect in order to resolve a
problem that is a cassus belli to one side and a very
inflammable issue to the other.
Senator Mundt. We have that every week.
The Chairman. Every Monday morning.

THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

Senator Pell. From the viewpoint of the United States now,
though, might it not be of merit to advocate this? Maybe it
cannot be achieved, but it would be a position to advance, not
just for the straits but for the question of the Jordanian land
west of the Jordan or the status of the Gaza Strip, or the
status of Jerusalem. Would this not have merit?
Secretary Rusk. I doubt the parties would permit such
political questions to be settled by the Court.
Senator Pell. I would agree with you. But from the U.S.
viewpoint, might it not have merit to advance it as a public
position?
Secretary Rusk. The status of Jerusalem, under the original
U.N. resolution, the entire city was supposed to have been
internationalized, you will recall, and indeed we have not
recognized the occupation of the new city of Jerusalem by
Israel. We keep our embassy in Tel Aviv. But I am not at all
sure that the issue would be considered by the Court to be
justifiable as opposed to being a political question. I do not
know. I would have to think more about that, Senator.
Senator Pell. I was just thinking under article 65 of the
Court's mandate if we could advocate that an advisory opinion
be given and secure acceptance of it, at least it would give us
a good propaganda position in the world as advocating a
juridical position.
Secretary Rusk. As I have talked to different sides in New
York, I have the impression that the old city of Jerusalem is
going to be the most difficult of the questions involved here
and it is possible that there could be some way to have some
aspects of that considered in the Court at some stage. I do not
believe that Israel has major territorial claims other than the
old city of Jerusalem.
Senator Pell. And also it divides in the hills where they
can throw the rocks down.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. But the U.N. truce machinery is now
working on that, and we have had some encouragement to think
they are getting somewhere with both sides on the Syrian hills
on the border between Israel and Syria.
Senator Lausche. Senator Pell, will you allow me to put a
question?
What do you envision as involving the old area of
Jerusalem? Is it the whole bulge that pushes itself into the
main body of Israel?
Secretary Rusk. No, not the west bank as a whole. Simply
the old walled city of Jerusalem.
Senator Lausche. All right.

DEFINING THE BOMBING PAUSE

Senator Pell. One final point on Vietnam: As I read the
press reports of Kosygin's statement, he emphasized publicly
that a bombing pause need be unconditional and definitive.
Unconditional, I think, was the word that was used. But never
did he say it need be permanent. In other words, if in the
course of some weeks nothing happened, and the fighting
continued, we would be at perfect liberty to resuming it. Was
this reflected in his private conversations, too, or not?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I hope I can be forgiven for not
getting into that aspect of the conversation in detail. We
noted that, and we would be interested in knowing whether there
are any consequences. We will have to wait and see.
Senator Pell. Thanks.
Secretary Rusk. It is potentially an important point.
Senator Pell. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Williams.

ABM SYSTEM DEPLOYED NEAR MOSCOW

Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the fact
that they were willing to talk about the ABM programs, willing
to postpone it. In the meantime, are they developing their own
antiballistic missile program and rushing full steam ahead?
Secretary Rusk. I would have to get an up-to-date briefing
as to what has happened in the last, say, 30 to 60 days on
that. We know they have been deploying an ABM system in the
general vicinity of Moscow. There has been some argument in our
own intelligence community about whether there might be some
additional ABM sites along the northern part of the country.
But I think we have to assume that they are proceeding with
whatever it was they had planned to build, particularly in the
Moscow area.
Senator Williams. Do you think it is possible they are
going to just keep postponing these talks until they get theirs
done and then agree that we will all stop it, or would they
include dismantling their own then as a part of it?
Secretary Rusk. They have rejected--if you put together
offensive and defensive missiles, I think they would not agree
to a freeze. On several occasions we proposed a freeze. It
would be in our advantage to have things frozen as they were,
say, six months ago or even today. But they have rejected the
idea of a freeze because of the considerable margins we have in
the offensive weapons field, so I would be a little surprised
if they came in and said,--``Let's freeze them where they
are.''
Senator Williams. How about freezing this particular
program?
Secretary Rusk. I would be frankly surprised if they would
dismantle whatever ABMs they might have put up around Moscow.
So I think we have to give some thought as to what that means
in terms of what we do.

DELAY IN U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF ABM

Senator Williams. Well, the question in my mind was whether
or not we are, by delaying, we are getting caught in a box
here. If we agree not to advance the program, they would be
fully protected.
Senator Case. It all depends on what kind of a system it
is.
Senator Williams. That is right.
Senator Case. I think that is the question.
Secretary Rusk. I do not feel fully qualified to go into
this, but my understanding from Secretary McNamara is that we
now have in our budget funds for what we in any event would be
doing this next year in this field. In other words, somebody on
the Armed Services Committee may have more details on this than
I. Is there anybody here?
Senator Case. Stuart is our expert.
Senator Gore. Stuart is not here.
Secretary Rusk. But it is my understanding if there was no
agreement, Senator Williams--you see, it is my understanding if
there were no agreement of any sort, or no prospects of any
agreement and we were going to make certain deployments that we
are doing in this next year's budget, whatever it is that we
would be doing under those circumstances. So we are not
deliberately holding our own program back on the prospect that
somehow we will have an agreement with the Soviet Union, as far
as this year is concerned.

RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO A BOMBING HALT IN VIETNAM

Senator Williams. In return for us, if we would stop
bombing North Vietnam, would Russia hold up some of her
supplies, or was there any mention made about what we would do
about the Port of Haiphong? Could we stop bombing and blockade
that later?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the question of stopping and then
resuming is, of course, at the heart of the matter. It would be
extremely difficult for us to give up our freedom of action to
do what is necessary in relation to what they are doing
militarily on the other side, the North Vietnamese.
I think the question would be whether, if there were some
talks, you could move promptly toward a settlement or whether
it becomes clear at the early stages of talk that no settlement
is possible, and we do not have information from the Soviet
Union as to what they would do if we stopped the bombing. We
have asked them that question several times. We have said,
``Now we understand that perhaps you can't speak for Hanoi, you
can't say what Hanoi will do, but you can at least say what
you, the Soviet Union, would do if we stop the bombing. Tell us
what that is.'' They have never answered that.
Senator Cooper. About supplies or Geneva Conference?
Secretary Rusk. Supplies, or calling a conference, but they
have not been willing to tell us what they would do, quite
apart from what Hanoi would do if we stopped the bombing.
Senator Williams. That is all.
Secretary Rusk. We put that to them several times very hard
over the period of the last year.
The Chairman. Senator Gore.

CHINESE EXPLOSION OF HYDROGEN BOMB

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, in the discussion between the
President and Mr. Kosygin or between yourself and Mr. Gromyko,
or as a group, on the deployment of antiballistic missiles, was
reference made to the Chinese detonation of a hydrogen bomb and
the bearing this would have on the Soviet position and on ours?
Secretary Rusk.. There was relatively little discussion,
direct discussion, about China. I think broadly speaking it is
still true, as I have told the committee before, the Russians
in general are pretty reluctant to discuss China with us.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

I was interested, Senator--this is not quite an answer to
your question, but it is related--in talking about the non-
proliferation problem. Mr. Gromyko raised the desire of the
Indians to have some sort of assurance in the event of a
nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail directed against them if
India signed the nonproliferation treaty.
The Soviets produced a draft which would anticipate that
the Security Council would say, ``We, the Security Council,
will take action in the event that a nuclear power either
attacks or uses nuclear blackmail against a non-nuclear
country.''
I pressed Mr. Gromyko pretty hard on whether he meant that
the permanent members of the Security Council would act
together if such a statement by the Security Council ever had
to be faced and had to be acted upon, and he used some pretty
categorical language on that point, which was the closest he
came to saying that we----
Senator Gore. I think the chairman ought to hear it. If you
do not mind repeating it.
Secretary Rusk. The question is to what extent we and the
Soviets have talked about China in this exchange, and I
indicated they are still reluctant to talk to us specifically
and directly about China.

RETAINING A VETO THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator Gore. But in the case of our discussion about the
nonproliferation treaty and India's request for assurances in
the event of a nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail which I
believe you said Mr. Gromyko initiated.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, he brought this subject up, and
referred to a recent talk he had had with Mr. Chagla, the
Foreign Minister of India. The Soviets have a draft statement
which they would contemplate making in the Security Council at
the time of the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty in which
the Security Council would commit itself to act as a Security
Council in the event of a nuclear attack, nuclear blackmail
against a non-nuclear country. I pressed him very hard about
whether they were serious in supposing that the permanent
members of the Security Council, particularly the four who have
nuclear weapons, could or would, in fact, act together in that
situation. For what it is worth, he was pretty categorical in
his contemplation that they would act together.
Now that could only mean that China would be the problem.
Senator Gore. Well, this seems to me quite significant.
Did he propose--this statement which he drafted, which he
submitted, was this merely a statement on the part of the
Soviet Union or did he propose it be a statement of the
Security Council?
Secretary Rusk. Well, he first--the Indians began by hoping
that we and the Soviet Union would make separate but parallel
statements, in effect of assurances. We have explained both to
the Soviet Union and to India that assurances that have any
substance in them are for us a treaty problem, and that we
could not casually make a declaration of that sort without
going through the treaty procedure.
We do have a legislative base for the Security Council to
say as a Security Council, where we would retain a veto, along
with the other permanent members, that the Security Council
would act to support a country that is being attacked by
nuclear weapons or subject to nuclear blackmail, you see. But
none of this is going to happen without complete, full
consultation down here. I am not--has your subcommittee seen
this draft Soviet statement?
Senator Gore. No, we have not.
Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, the committee might
want to have a look at that because we have not yet ourselves
been prepared to go that far.
Senator Gore. This is the first we had heard of it.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
We have been told indeed by the Indians a few months ago
that they were going to separate the question of assurances
from the question of the nonproliferation treaty. But Mr.
Gromyko told me last evening that the Indians have apparently
now come back to this question of assurances for the non-
nuclear powers in the event they signed the non-proliferation
treaty. But it is an important point, and it is a very
difficult point.
[Discussion off the record.]

PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEM REGARDING MISSILES

Senator Gore. Coming back to the ABM question, as you know
the Disarmament Subcommittee had extensive hearings. We have
delayed making a report, in fact delayed trying to reach a
decision as to what the subcommittee would recommend, in the
hope that somewhere, sometime, the Soviets would agree to
initiate actual talks and discussions. I understand that before
I arrived you expressed the hope that discussion would begin.
Could you be--would you mind repeating that and upon what you
base your hope?
Secretary Rusk. Well, first, I think it is entirely
possible that the Soviet Union simply has not completed its own
interdepartmental work, if you like, its own staff work on the
positions which they would take in these discussions. As you
know, this is a very, very complicated business and we had at
least had the benefit of more than a year of staff work behind
us when we led off on this subject.
Secondly, I think that they run into the same problem that
we run into in this country, and that is a kind of public
opinion problem that it is hard for people to understand why
you do not build a defensive missile if there is any
possibility that that defensive missile can do any good
whatever, and the notion that defensive weapons would simply
produce a multiplication of offensive weapons to put you in a
position to saturate the defense is a little sophisticated for
the man in the street in their countries as well as in ours.
One of the Russians said to me, ``It will be very hard for
us to persuade our people that we should not have defensive
missiles if there is any possibility that the defensive missile
will hit an incoming missile.'' That is an understandable
reaction, you see.
[Discussion off the record.]

RUSSIANS ARE TENDER FOOTED REGARDING CHINA

Senator Gore. In the exchanges between the President and
the chairman on the ABM, I think it would be very significant
if he recognized that they had a threat from both sides, a
nuclear threat from both sides; if there was reference to
China, they are bound to be aware of it, and I know you have
told us several times that they are very tender footed to
referring to China in any respect. But this reference to
assurances to India is certainly an indirect reference to it,
and I just wondered if there was any reference at all to the
fact that China had now unexpectedly soon achieved a hydrogen
weapon and a large one.
Secretary Rusk. No, that came up only in my own talk with
Gromyko about the nonproliferation treaty and the Indian
problem of assurances.
Senator Gore. What impression did you have of Gromyko's
reference to it?
Secretary Rusk. That India's request for assurances----
Senator Gore. No, the Chinese achievement of a hydrogen
weapon.
Secretary Rusk. That was not specifically discussed as
such; the fact that they had exploded a hydrogen weapon was not
discussed as much.
Senator Gore. Did Gromyko give you an indication more
specific than Mr. Kosygin's to the President that they would be
back in touch?
Secretary Rusk. No, this was Kosygin to the President.
Senator Gore. Gromyko did not add to it.
Secretary Rusk. No, because the President and Mr. Kosygin
had talked at such length and in such detail about the ABM
problem, I spent my time with Gromyko on the nonproliferation
problem.
Senator Gore. Well, our Disarmament Subcommittee met this
morning and we again agreed to defer coming to any report or
conclusion until we had your report, and maybe we should wait
some further. This is so important----
Secretary Rusk. I would suggest, Senator, that we might see
whether in the next two weeks we get something further with
them, and we can be in touch with you about that.
Senator Gore. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We have about 20 minutes. Can we divide it
up?
Senator Mundt.

MEANING OF AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT

Senator Mundt. Many, many times, Mr. Secretary, we have
talked about stopping the bombing in the north and you used a
phrase that I cannot understand. Hanoi says that bombing has to
be unconditional and definitive. The way I understand those
terms they are self-contradictory. Will you tell us what you
mean? You obviously do not mean that.
Secretary Rusk. Our understanding of what that means is:
Unconditional is we would not require as a condition for
stopping of the bombing that they take corresponding military
moves on their side. For example, that those divisions at the
DMZ would not attack our Marines while the bombing would stop.
That is what I think they mean by unconditional.
Senator Mundt. I can understand that. But when you say
unconditional and definitive, definitive makes it some
conditions apparently.
Secretary Rusk. They have used three different expressions
having to do with the duration of the stopping. They have said
definitively, they have said for good, and they have said
permanently.
Senator Mundt. Those are conditions.
Secretary Rusk. Well, but have to do with duration, you
see. I am not sure that I get your point, Senator.
Senator Mundt. Because when you say unconditional, that
means open sesame, stop, sit down and talk. But if along with
unconditional you say they are going to stop for two years or
forever, for 15 minutes, that is a condition. It seems to me
the two terms contradict each other. I do not see how you can
have an unconditional arrangement which is definitive. As soon
as you crank in definitive you put in a condition.
Secretary Rusk. I see. I suppose you could look upon the
item of permanency itself as a condition which they put on it.
Senator Mundt. Is it your phrase or their phrase?
Secretary Rusk. No, it is their phrase.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, that is a vote, and maybe someone
can continue and can come back, but that is a vote.
Secretary Rusk. I will be here until 20 minutes to 12.

CASTRO'S CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION

Senator Mundt. To me, the most discouraging part of the
whole summit was the fact that my reaction was that either
side--he was going to thumb his nose deliberately by visiting
Cuba unless he tried to figure out some way to insult us as it
were, to have an affront. He knows this is our tender spot.
This is our neighbor. Did you get that reaction, or would you
say that is another friendly gesture?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would not quite interpret it
that way because of a good deal of intelligence information we
have which throws another different cast on it.
Senator Mundt. I would like to hear the different cast.
Secretary Rusk. Castro has been publicly criticizing Moscow
for not being vigorous enough about supporting revolutions in
Latin America. Castro's public position is somewhere between
Moscow and Peking. Castro has publicly acknowledged that Cubans
were involved in that landing on the Venezuela coast 90 miles
east of Caracas, and we also note that the Soviets are not very
happy about the cost of this Cuban business and the relative
nonperformance of the Cubans in their own economy.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. We do know the reception in Havana was
modest. I think he was anticipating at least some difficulties
in Havana. I do not look upon it as an attempt to affront us as
much as their having serious problems they wanted to discuss in
Cuba. What they were I do not know.
On our side we pressed them very, very hard on this
business of Cubans sending arms and men into other countries as
in the Venezuela case.
Senator Mundt. He gives you the old business that you give
them on Hanoi.
Secretary Rusk. They say, ``We don't have the same
information that you have.''

SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Mundt. Which leads me to my most important question
and the part I cannot buy at all, and you seem to accept it as
holy writ. ``We are sorry; we have no control over Vietnam. We
would like to help; we are not interested in continuing the
war. We would kind of like to shorten it, but we have no
influence.''
Now, realistically you and I know and they know if they
shut off the supply of arms the war is over because they have a
lot of influence if they want to exercise it. I cannot get away
from the facts of life on that.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not think that we are under
that much of an illusion. We would not--you and I would not be
that far apart on this point.
They do not have enough influence in Hanoi to deliver Hanoi
to whatever it is that we and they would agree to.
Senator Mundt. Unless they use their muscle in shutting off
their supply.
Secretary Rusk. But using their muscle would simply mean
Hanoi would squirt fully into the arms of Peking, and it is
Peking that is furnishing the kinds of material that are
actually being used in South Vietnam.
Senator Mundt. Not the petroleum.
Secretary Rusk. But they do not use petroleum in South
Vietnam in the sense of----
Senator Mundt. They use it to get there.
Secretary Rusk. Sure, they use it in North Vietnam and in
the line of communication, but that means more bicycles and
more piggyback and that sort of thing.
I do not believe that the North Vietnamese would stop the
war if they, the Soviets, cut off supplies. I may be wrong.

MOSCOW CANNOT GIVE ORDERS TO HANOI

Senator Mundt. I just hope that in your talks with them you
do not give them the impression that you give me, to say,
``Well, that is certainly a valid argument. We realize you
haven't got influence on Cuba although you are financing them
and giving them the supplies that they need.''
Secretary Rusk. I did not say that about Cuba.
Senator Mundt. ``The same way about Hanoi, they are a good
friend of yours, they are doing well, you have given them
antiaircraft weapons,'' and you have to press them on this. I
think in talking with them you have to assume my position.
Secretary Rusk. But that is not the way the talks go. On
Laos, for example, we press them very, very hard on their
commitment to us about Laos in 1961 and 1962, and that it is
their problem to find a way to make Hanoi comply with that
agreement. But I think that we would somewhat misunderstand the
situation if we think that Moscow can give an order to Hanoi
and Hanoi will obey it. That is not the situation.
Now, we have raised the point that you have just raisd in
terms of, ``Well, if we stop the bombing what will you do? You
can't tell us what Hanoi will do perhaps, but what will you do?
Will you take some of these steps,'' such as you mentioned, and
they do not answer.
Senator Mundt. I have to go vote.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. NAVAL INCIDENTS

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there are two things that are
not directly here, but I would like to have either your comment
or some memorandum about it. Senator Church received a letter
from a member of the S.S. Walker's crew indicating in his
opinion that the--our destroyer deliberately bumped the Russian
ship in the Sea of Japan. He is not here. I hoped he would be
here, and I may be going further than he anticipated, but
anyway he showed it to me, and I would like very much to have
you, if you are not prepared to make a positive statement about
it, to have a report on it.
The other was a report on the U.S. bombing of the Russian
ship Turkestan in the Harbor of Cam Pha, whether that was
deliberate. I think it is significant in trying to get a
picture about how these either accidental or intentional acts
take place in trying to reach an impartial or objective
judgment as to just what our relations are.
Could you do that if you do not want to take the time now?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I will do that.
The Chairman. I think we ought to have it in committee. I
was going to bring it up anyway at some other time.
Secretary Rusk. Does the committee have the letter that was
referred to?
The Chairman. Senator Church has it. It came to him. It was
like this man from Iowa on the Liberty. This fellow who wrote,
it was a constituent and a member of the crew, and it is a very
persuasive letter. I read it. I cannot imagine that it was a
fabrication. In fact, it has a tone of great validity.
Secretary Rusk. I do know----
The Chairman. He is a little nervous about revealing the
boy's name for the fear of retaliation from the services, you
can understand that.
Secretary Rusk. Let me have a couple of the paragraphs out
of the letter.
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. But on that I do not have details in mind.
I think what was happening there was that our vessels were in
normal training exercises.
The Chairman. I understand that.
Secretary Rusk. And the Soviet vessels came in very close,
and, as a matter of fact, I gather that on one of the bumpings
our people thought that the Soviets had not intended to bump,
but that winds and waves and so forth caused them to bump.
Well, that is getting awfully close just as a matter of----
The Chairman. Well, this letter is to the contrary, and
that is why I wonder if you have a report because it is very
clear that this fellow believed that we deliberately did it and
prepared for it before it occurred.
Secretary Rusk. There was an argument about rules of the
sea, rules of the road and things of that sort, and I will be
glad to have an answer.
The Chairman. I do not want to delay the committee because
Senator Cooper has not had an opportunity.

POTENTIAL OF RENEWED WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator Cooper. I would appreciate it if I can. I have
about three or four questions.
The first I would go to is this question of any possibility
of resumption of war in the Middle East. You said that Kosygin
suggested war might break out again in two or three situations.
If the Soviet Union is rearming Egypt and Algeria and Syria, do
you think that carries with it any suggestion that at any time
in the near future Egypt and Syria might start aggressive
action and be supported by the Soviet Union other than just by
the supply of arms? Is there any possibility?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is a possibility one cannot
fully discount.
My own hunch is that they have had it for a while, and it
would be very difficult for them to. We do not at the present
time have information indicating that the Soviets contemplate a
direct military intervention on their side.

ISRAELI COMPLIANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

Senator Cooper. I know it is speculative. But the second
point is growing out of any action in the U.N. Now in the event
that the General Assembly called upon Israel to withdraw, would
it refer this to the Security Council or would the General
Assembly try to establish its own enforcement procedures?
Secretary Rusk. The basic constitutional position is that
the General Assembly recommends.
Senator Cooper. To the Security Council.
Secretary Rusk. To the parties or to the members or to the
Security Council. My guess is if the General Assembly
recommends a general withdrawal by Israel, Israel would not
comply and it would go to the Security Council.
Mr. Kosygin indicated in his press conference he thought
the recommendations of the Assembly would go back to the
Security Council for implementation.
Senator Cooper. Russia does not accept the Uniting for
Peace Resolution.
Secretary Rusk. Only for the purpose of bringing this
matter to the General Assembly because they did use that
procedure to get it to the General Assembly. But I would think
that the recommendations of the General Assembly would wind up
again in the Security Council.
Senator Cooper. Then if the Security Council agreed upon
some method of, I would say, enforcement, to try to secure
consent on the part of Israel, would there then be any
possibility that Russia would say, ``Well, the Security Council
will not act. Then we are going to act. We are going to support
the resolution.'' It has been indicated in statements they said
if you construe them very liberally. This is a lot of
speculation but everybody felt so fine a couple of weeks ago,
the war, the possibility of war had ended, and in considering
Kosygin's very strict position, I wonder if it has any holding
of possibility of war.
Secretary Rusk. I think the dangers are not by any means
completely ended. I think perhaps the guerrilla technique is a
real possibility, and that might, in turn, start more normal
operations by Israel, for example, if they ran into more
guerrilla action.
But, quite frankly, we just have no way of being sure.

QUIET HARD NEGOTIATION

Senator Lausche. John, what is our government to do if it
goes back to the Security Council with the recommendation?
Senator Cooper. I suppose we will have to wait and see what
it was. That would be the answer.
Secretary Rusk. My guess is, Senator, that what would come
out of the Security Council would be based upon a lot of quiet,
hard negotiation among the different sides, otherwise you could
not get a resolution passed by the Security Council.
Senator Case. May I just interrupt on this point?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, Senator.

CHANCES OF A RUSSIAN MILITARY OPERATION

Senator Case. On this question that Senator Cooper asked,
the chance of Russia taking it upon itself or the application
of sanctions for the violation of the Security Council
recommendation, have we made clear, or is it or would we make
clear, that we would oppose, interpose ourselves in such a case
so as to check Russia from any such adventures?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think the Soviets are in any doubt
about that.
Senator Case. That is all I wanted to be sure of.
Secretary Rusk. Let me point out, Senator Case----
Senator Case. I am not talking about public posture.
Secretary Rusk. I understand. Let me point out that this is
not a case where the Russians could put in a battalion or two.
This is a major military effort if they made a military effort.
In the first place, the support they would have from Arab
assistance would be rather flimsy. That has already been
demonstrated. This is a long way for them to operate in a major
military operation with their communications as they are, their
sea routes as they are.
So this is not a very attractive military expedition from
their point of view.
Senator Cooper. I did want to raise a question----
Secretary Rusk. The more serious question would be some
Russian pilots.
Senator Gore. Would be what?
Secretary Rusk. Russian pilots.
Senator Cooper. If the Security Council called upon
Israel's withdrawal and perhaps they had some trouble in
establishing some kind of enforcing agency, and Russia could
say we support the U.N. under certain of those sections and we
will take whatever action we think is necessary to support the
U.N., of course that could lead to war with us.

RESTRICT BOMBINGS TO INFILTRATION ROUTES

There is one other question. We were talking about this
question of bombing, and what you meant by unconditional and
they definitive and whatnot. I did propose and have thought and
still think that it would be worthwhile to restrict bombing to
the infiltration route as they enter South Vietnam, and that
unconditional to my mind would simply mean that we did it
without requiring in advance any action on the part of North
Vietnam, but always with the recognition that if nothing came
out of it, of course our country, like any other country, has
the right and duty to protect its people. But my point was, and
has been, that I have thought that unconditional should mean
that we do not exact or require any prerequisite, any prior
requirement, and that has been my thought and I still believe
it is worth a chance with all the things we have.
Secretary Rusk. We tried, Senator. I do not want to exclude
any possibility or combination in the future, but you will
recall we tried to do this by infiltration at one point. Last
December we told the other side that we would hold our hand in
a ten nautical mile area around Hanoi, 300 some square miles.
We said, ``We are not asking you directly for a quid pro quo.
We will be impressed if you did something comparable in the
south, Saigon or DMZ or somewhere else, that if this turns out
to be a good idea we can expand this concept, we can build on
it, let it grow.'' But we did not get any response, and waited
for four months to see if we could get something back.
The Chairman. I wonder if Senator Case can be allowed to
ask a question.
Senator Case. I am interested in this.
The Chairman. All right, you will have a chance.
Secretary Rusk. When we look to the future, I do not want
to be categorical about what can or cannot be done. I think we
need to hear more than we have heard thus far about what the
possibilities are, but we continue to explore these
possibilities.

CHANGE EMPHASIS TO TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator Case. I would like to add my voice to Senator
Cooper's and some others. I do not know what we have to define
exactly the same limitation we think it is desirable to put on
ours, but very close to it, not for the sake we get
negotiations but because it is the wise and right thing to do.
I am not one of those who thinks we have failed to
negotiate any possible chance, that we were not smart enough to
catch a glint in somebody's eye of what was there, but because
it makes sense to limit the war and give evidence of some
limitation.
I think there are other things we want to consider limiting
and one is a very serious question of whether we should put any
more armed forces of our own in.
The Chairman. That is an immediate question.
Senator Case. I think we ought to do a lot better in
training the ARVN and insist upon things that they are going to
have to do and not be so timid about throwing our weight
around, because, after all, we are killing American boys. This
is not going to go on very much longer, I would think, with
impunity, and well, bless your heart, this the kind of thing I
am going to be talking about these days.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Senator Case. That is all.

WITHDRAWAL TO NATIONAL TERRITORIES

The Chairman. I have one other question before you leave.
Do we have a position on the resolution requiring withdrawal to
the armistice line? The reason I have asked that, the President
has stated he believes in the territorial integrity of all
states in the Middle East. What is our position on that in a
resolution where you have to vote on whether or not they
withdraw?
Secretary Rusk. We have taken a position that a single
unconditional withdrawal to a state of war is not good enough.
For example, it will make a difference if they would say
withdrawal to national territories.
Senator Case. What would that mean?
Secretary Rusk. Well, it would mean Israel exists and has
some national territory. These are not just boundaries or
armistice lines and a state of war, do you see?
Senator Case. I see.
Secretary Rusk. Or if you could hook it on to a state of
belligerence. But just to go back to armistice lines where
Egypt considers itself at war with Israel, but Israel must not
lift a finger because it is at war with Egypt is not going to
bring peace.
Senator Case. If you couple conditions with it you would
support it, similar----
Secretary Rusk. We are not objecting to withdrawal. But
what we are saying is you ought to withdraw to peace and not a
state of war.
Senator Mundt. Territorial is that difference.
Secretary Rusk. The territorial problem is going to be--the
most difficult one is the city of Jerusalem.
Senator Case. How about Syria?
Secretary Rusk. I think they are working on that in the
U.N. machinery. Israel has no interests in Syrian territory.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM

Senator Gore. You will bear in mind, too, if you withdraw
to conditions one of the conditions might be implementation of
the U.N. resolution about internationalization of the old city
of Jerusalem.
Secretary Rusk. This is a very, very serious problem
because members of the Jewish faith feel very, very strongly
about the city of David and Solomon; so do the Moslems for
reasons stemming from their religion; so do the Christians, and
feelings run very high on it.
I think this is going to be the most troublesome,
inflammatory and difficult part to resolve of the whole
business here--what happens in the old city of Jerusalem.
Senator Lausche. What about the other part of the area west
of the Jordan?
Secretary Rusk. I cannot speak for Israel and I am not
trying to. My impression is that Israel is not too happy about
the prospect of trying to annex the West Bank with a million
Arabs in it. And I think they might well be ready for that not
to be a part of Israel.

ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Mundt. I would like to ask one question about South
Vietnam. I am very much disturbed by what I read and hear on
television about the way this election campaign is going. Can
you tell us anything about what is happening?
The Chairman. Mr. Ky you mean.
Senator Mundt. Well, Ky and the whole business. It seems to
me we may come up with a pretty sour kettle of fish.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we were----
Senator Mundt. This is our idea so we have got to try to
make it work.
Secretary Rusk. We were very much disappointed that Thieu
and Ky both elected to run.
Senator Mundt. We read where Big Minh is coming in, too.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Big Minh is a further complication.
Ambassador Bunker is working very hard on the question of free
and fair elections and trying to insure that this does not
involve a split within the military as such as far as the corps
commanders and the organized divisions and things of that sort
are concerned. But we are troubled, too.
Senator Mundt. It is a real situation. Here you have
500,000 men who may come up with a government which is not with
us.
Secretary Rusk. I think that is not so much the problem as
the disorder and disarray among themselves and the turbulence
of this electoral period. I do not believe there will be a
government that wants to throw us out or wants to accept Hanoi.
Senator Mundt. Could they defer that until next year?
Secretary Rusk. I beg pardon?
Senator Mundt. Could they defer that until next year?
Senator Case. They are not supposed to campaign except for
30 days.
The Chairman. Ky is ignoring all the rules.
Senator Case. Using the press, censorship.
The Chairman. Censored the press.
Senator Case. This is another case where I think our
influence ought to be very heavily used.
The Chairman. I was going to say Karl thinks the Russians
ought to control Hanoi. Can we control Saigon any better? He
does not seem to do anything we want him to do.
Secretary Rusk. Well, this is something we are working very
hard on down there and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Katzenbach will get
fully into that when they are there.
I am not going to say everything is fine on this one.
Senator Mundt. Okay.
Secretary Rusk. We have got some problems.

U.S. FUNDS FOR MIDDLE EASTERN REFUGEES

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?
The Chairman. One last question while he is getting his
papers together.
Senator Gore. I notice the President has made, according to
the press, $5 million available for refugees. Is this available
to the United--UNEF--or available to Jordan, or to whom is it
made available?
Secretary Rusk. It would be made available to the UNRWA
organization or to the relief agencies working in the
governments. One of the serious things that has happened here
is that a new refugee problem is being created across the
Jordan. Lots of the refugees from the West Bank have been
pouring out of there. We have tried to get both Jordan and
Israel to keep the people in place so that we do not create
this new problem. But large numbers have been moving. I think
perhaps as many as 100,000 have left the West Bank across the
Jordan. So we thought that on the basis of humanitarian grounds
we ought to chip in something on that.
Senator Gore. We already chipped in about $400 million over
a period of time.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
Senator Gore. And we are paying 60 percent. Will our $5
million be matched by any other member of the United Nations?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that you will find that that
$5 million will be more than matched by the time the other
contributions that we know are underway get there. I mean a lot
of people are sending in things. It is urgent. As a matter of
fact, some of the Arab governments have more than matched the
$5 million and help to Jordan in this situation, but I have to
get the details. I am not familiar with the details.

ISRAELI RELIEF EFFORTS

Senator Lausche. Are there any more of the Arab troops in
Gaza or out in the desert who have not been brought in?
Secretary Rusk. You mean from the point of view of relief
suffering and that sort of thing?
Senator Lausche. Yes, out there without food and in the
sunshine and nobody seemed to be concerned about them.
Secretary Rusk. The Israeli armed forces--we went into that
very hard because we had planes standing by that could drop
food and water to these people. We got them as far as Athens
ready to go. The Israeli armed forces and the Egyptian Red
Cross put together joint teams, too, and used a lot of
helicopters and things of that sort to scour over the desert.
The problem turned out to be not half as large as it was
feared, and when Nasser opened up the water under the canal to
make water available in that part of the Sinai, it went a long
way toward relieving that problem, so I would think that is
reasonably under control.
Senator Lausche. All right.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I have to run.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, in view of the situation on the
floor, I do not think we can have a meeting this afternoon.
There will be a meeting in the morning now on the Panama Canal.
Everybody knows that.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM

Secretary Rusk. You might wish Mr. Macomber to inform you
of a statement the President just made on Jerusalem.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Macomber. It was just put out. There are two key
sentences in it. First of all, he talks about the importance of
this city to the three great religions. But the two operative
statements just released from the White House, the two key
sentences are, one, ``First of all we assume that before any
unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there
will be appropriate consultations with religious leaders and
others who are deeply concerned.''
And then later in the statement the President in talking
about the need for a fair solution says, ``That,'' meaning the
fair solution, ``could not be achieved by hasty unilateral
action, and the President is confident that the wisdom of good
judgment on the part of those who are immediately involved will
prevent this.''
This is a statement which the press secretary put out in
the White House on behalf of the President just about five
minutes ago.
[Whereupon, at 11:55, the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Thursday, June 29, 1967.]
Department of State,
Washington,
July 13, 1967.
The Honorable J.W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate,
Washington, DC
Dear Senator Fulbright:
Secretary Rusk has asked me to reply to your request to him during
his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June
28, 1967 for a complete report on the bombing of the Soviet Ship
TURKESTAN in Cam Pha Harbor, North Viet-Nam.
On June 2, 1967, a flight of US Air Force F-105 aircraft passing
over the area of Cam Pha directed suppressive 20 mm fire against a
North Vietnamese anti-aircraft site near Cam Pha. It appears that some
of this fire may have struck the TURKESTAN. According to the Soviet
Government, several crew members were wounded, one of whom subsequently
died, and the ship was damaged.
A Soviet note dated June 2, 1967 protested the incident. Our
investigation at that time revealed that two flights of US Air Force
aircraft had operated over the Cam Pha area at the time and date of the
allegation but pilots reported all ordnance delivered was on legitimate
military targets. Thus, at this time, it appeared that fallout from
intense North Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire was probably responsible.
Our reply of June 3 to the note rejected the Soviet version and while
expressing regret for casualties and damage also expressed regret for
the hundreds of Vietnamese, Americans, and citizens of allied countries
who die each week as a consequence of the aggression of North Viet-Nam
against the Republic of Viet-Nam. We also pointed out that all possible
efforts are taken to prevent damage to international shipping but that
accidental damage is an unfortunate possibility wherever hostilities
are conducted and that the Soviet Government must recognize that
shipping operations in these waters under present circumstances entail
risks of such accidents.
Subsequently, we received the information that a third flight of US
Air Force aircraft possibly struck the TURKESTAN while delivering
suppressive fire against nearby North Vietnamese anti-aircraft
positions. By note delivered June 20, 1967 to the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, we acknowledged this possibility and reiterated in the note
the instructions to our pilots to avoid engagement with vessels which
are not identified as hostile and assured the Soviet Government that we
will make every effort to insure that such incidents do not occur. On
June 26 Soviet Counselor Chernyakov made an oral statement to Assistant
Secretary Leddy in which he stated that the Soviet Government reserved
the right to return to the question of compensation in connection with
the incident and repeated the Soviet demand for punishment of the
guilty parties. Mr. Leddy took note of the Soviet points but expressed
the view that it would be very difficult for the US Government to
accept legal liability for any damage. On June 28 the Department
spokesman stated that the US Government considered that its position on
the incident was fully expressed in its note of June 20 to the Soviet
Government and saw no merit in further exchanges on the matter.
A later Soviet assertion that United States aircraft damaged the
MIKHAIL FRUNZE and other Soviet vessels in the vicinity of Haiphong on
June 29, 1967 has also been examined. A Defense Department statement on
June 30 noted the possibility that certain ordnance from two United
States aircraft may have fallen on the MIKHAIL FRUNZE. These aircraft,
which were assigned to protect bombing planes, attacked an actively
firing air defense site approximately 500 yards from the location of
the ships. Other reports indicate that damage may have been done to a
British ship, the KING FORD, at the same time. All of these incidents
are still under investigation.
I hope the above provides you with the information you desire.
Sincerely,
William B. Macomber, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
Department of State,
Washington,
July 19, 1967.
Honorable J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Fulbright:
The Secretary has asked me to send you a report on the recent
collisions of the USS WALKER with two Soviet ships in the Sea of Japan,
which you requested during his recent appearance before the Foreign
Relations Committee. I delayed my report to you until we had an
opportunity to see an excerpt from a constituent's letter to Senator
Church which you mentioned to the Secretary. The constituent states
that he was aboard the USS WALKER at the time of the collisions and
considers that broadcast accounts of the incidents were inaccurate.
The two collisions in which the USS WALKER was involved were
obviously a matter of immediate and deep concern to the Department, and
we requested at once full details from the Navy. The summary of the
facts given below is drawn from information provided by the Navy
concerning the circumstances in which the collisions occurred.
According to the Navy's report, the fundamental cause of the
collisions was the persistent and close harassing surveillance by
Soviet naval and air forces of a U.S. anti-submarine task group. This
task group of which the USS WALKER was a member was at the time of the
collisions conducting routine training exercises in the Sea of Japan,
more than 100 miles from the Soviet coast. While engaged in this
activity the group was subjected for several days to continuous close
surveillance by Soviet destroyers and aircraft, which on a number of
occasions approached dangerously close to the U.S. ships and interfered
with the exercises. On May 10 and 11 two different Soviet destroyers
struck the USS WALKER glancing blows doing very minor damage and
injuring no one.
The May 10 incident occurred when the Soviet destroyer 022, having
come dangerously close to the USS WALKER a number of times earlier,
approached her from astern and brushed her starboard side in passing.
Under Article 24 of the International Regulations for preventing
Collision at Sea, a vessel overtaking is obliged to keep clear. In this
case the Soviet ship did not do so. On May 11 the Soviet destroyer 025,
continuing the tactics of the 022 in repeatedly approaching too close
for safety, suddenly turned across the WALKER's bow and slowed down
while being overtaken, rather than maintaining course and speed as
required by the rules of the road. A glancing collision resulted.
Shortly after information about these events was relayed to the
Department of State, Assistant Secretary Leddy made oral protests to
the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Washington; these were followed by
diplomatic notes calling attention to the serious consequence which
could result if such activities by Soviet vessels are not stopped.
Ambassador Thompson made a parallel protest on May 13 to the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, and the Soviet Government
simultaneously delivered a note of protest to him, maintaining that the
U.S. vessels had violated the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea. Ambassador Thompson made it clear that he could not
accept the Soviet allegations.
You will note that the above account differs significantly from the
views expressed by Senator Church's constituent. We in the Department
of State are unable to judge the accuracy of his observations or the
degree of his understanding of all that was happening during the
exercises. There is nothing, however, in the Navy's report to support
the opinion that the USS WALKER deliberately collided with either
Soviet destroyer. On the contrary, the report indicates that the Soviet
ships were at fault in both cases, and that in the second case the
Soviet destroyer may have acted deliberately.
The issue raised by these events goes beyond the question of
technical violations of the rules of the road. Judging from the
information at our disposal, the incidents resulted from Soviet efforts
not merely to observe but also to interfere with routine U.S. Navy
exercises on the high seas well distant from Soviet waters. The dangers
inherent in this sort of situation are obvious, and it is for this
reason that we have emphasized to the Soviet Government the serious
consequences which would flow from operations of this type. We hope
that the diplomatic steps we took upon this occasion will help reduce
the likelihood of such incidents in the future. At the same time we are
fully cognizant of the need for mutual restraint in encounters between
U.S. and Soviet naval ships at sea, and we are informed that our naval
commanders are under strict orders to observe the international
regulations involved and to exercise forbearance on such occasions.
If you need further details about the actions of our ships during
these episodes you may wish to get in touch with the Department of the
Navy. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this
matter.
Sincerely yours,
William B. Macomber, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche,
Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Cooper.
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special United States
Representative for U.S.-Panamanian Relations, accompanied by
Ambassador John N. Irwin, II, Special U.S. Representative for
Interoceanic Canal negotiations, briefed the group on three
proposed Panama Canal treaties.
[The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, JULY 10, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee and other members of the Senate met in
executive session at 11:30 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Carlson, and
Mundt. Also Senators Allott, Dominick, Holland, Miller, Murphy,
Pearson, Percy, and Young of North Dakota.
Ambassador John N. Irwin, II, Special United States
Representative for Interoceanic Canal negotiations, accompanied
by Edward W. Clark, Country Director for Panama, Department of
State, returned to brief the members who were not present at
the June 29 briefing, and other senators, on the three proposed
Panama Canal treaties.
[The committee adjourned at 1:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 11, 1967

BRIEFING ON THE CONGO SITUATION

[Editor's note.--On June 30, 1967, a plane carrying former
Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe was hijacked over the
Mediterranean. Taken to Algeria, Tshombe remained there under arrest
until his death two years later. Tshombe's capture triggered a revolt
by the mercenary soldiers and gendarmes he had once employed in the
Congo's Katanga Province. The Congolese government under President
Joseph Mobutu eventually crushed the rebellion.
Expressing support for Mobutu's government, the United States sent
three cargo planes for logistical aid and to be ready in case American
citizens had to be evacuated. In response to congressional protests
over American involvement in the Congo, the United States removed one
of the planes on July 26 and another on August 3. The third plane was
used to transport government troops.]
----------

TUESDAY, JULY 11, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:00 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Church, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Senators Russell, Stennis, Jackson, Cannon,
Young of Ohio, McIntyre, Byrd of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond,
Miller, and Dominick.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, of the
committee staff.
Mr. Darden and Mr. Kirbow of the Senate Armed Services
committee staff.
The committee will come to order.
We are very pleased to have the Secretary of State this
afternoon to talk to us a bit about the recent activities in
the Congo. He will give us a short statement of the factual
background and then be prepared to answer questions.
Mr. Secretary, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE;
ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH PALMER, II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. It
is a privilege to be here.
I think it might be worth bearing in mind at the very
beginning we are talking about a country in the part of Africa
which is as large as the U.S. east of the Mississippi, because
the size of the country and its primitive communications have
something to do with the questions before us today.
About July 4 we had information that a group of
mercenaries, French, Belgian and Spanish, had seized positions
in the Eastern Congo, particularly Bukavu and Kisangani which
used to be called Stanleyville.
We might pause at this moment and speculate as to what was
behind these mercenary movements, perhaps a total of 150 or 180
of them; we have no effective contact with them at the present
time, and no real basis for making much of a judgment as to
what their motivations might have been.

MERCENARIES' MOTIVATIONS

We have heard rumors that there were differences among the
mercenaries themselves, and this caused certain groups to move
contrary to the wishes or the views of other foreign
mercenaries working with the Congolese forces.
We have heard rumors that they felt they were going to lose
their jobs by the beginning of September and wanted to impress
upon the central government for whom they had been working that
they were needed, and that the arrangements should continue.
There have been reports that their motivation was primarily
loot, that they had estimated that the safes and the cash
registers had filled up again after the violence of a year or
so ago, and that they might come in and make a haul.
We had not been able to confirm any political arrangement
between them and Mr. Tshombe who was kidnapped on June 30, nor
do we have any confirmed information that they were working
specifically on behalf of any foreign governments.
But the seizure of these positions with some casualties,
the number and the nature of which we have not been able to
confirm, set off a very large wave of feeling throughout the
Congo, and indeed among most of the officials of the Congolese
government--public charges that they were trying to bring down
the government of the Congo; that they were being backed by
international high finance; that this represented a conspiracy
on the part of quite a few governments to undermine the Congo.
I think the most immediate result of the operation was to set
off a wave of anti-white feeling throughout the Congo.

CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

Now, we had a very serious interest in this because we have
something over 3,000 personnel there scattered all over the
country. More than half of them are in the general neighborhood
of the capital, Kinshasa, plus several hundred others are
scattered throughout the rest of the country on business
activities, or as missionaries or teachers, or providing
medical services, or in some posts representing the Government.
There are a few Americans, I believe, in the U.N. organizations
scattered around the country.
About the sixth and seventh of the month, our Ambassador
there, Ambassador McBride, who is a very able and experienced
professional officer----
Senator Symington. Where does he live, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rusk. I beg pardon?
Senator Symington. Where does he live, his residence there?
Secretary Rusk. He is in the capital, in Kinshasa.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Secretary Rusk. He began to take up with us very urgently
the great danger to the Americans in the country arising from
the antiwhite sentiment that was rapidly building up.
There were reports that anti-white rallies would be held in
what used to be called Elizabethville down in the Katanga; that
there were some white killings by enraged Congolese.

PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE

The situation looked very murky indeed, and he strongly
recommended that we take some action pending President Mobutu's
appeal to other governments, including African governments, for
assistance; that we take action to demonstrate publicly that
this was not a conspiracy by white governments aimed at
bringing down the Congo, but would tend to reinforce the
efforts being made by the government to calm this kind of
racial outburst.
The telegrams were very strong on the subject. He pointed
out for all practical purposes all Americans in the country
were hostages to the situation of rage, and that the morale
among the American community there was very weak indeed; that
they were terror-stricken and nervous and fearful of their own
position.
We went back to him and pointed out that that was not a
simple or easy thing to do; that this is not a matter that one
can do lightly or for a temporary or transient reason, and we
urged him to give the most serious consideration to the need
before he pressed us for moving forward on the three C-130s.
He did come back on Saturday and pressed again very hard.
He said that it was very important for purposes of reassuring
the American population, and very important for the morale of
the government of the Congo and its ability to go to its own
people and reassure them that this is not an anti-white
conspiracy against the Congo, and to reinforce a television and
radio campaign throughout the country calling for decent and
careful treatment of all foreigners.
There was scheduled for Sunday morning in what used to be
Elizabethville in the Katanga a mass rally of local people
aimed at--it was considered--the extermination of the whites,
and a very, very dangerous and explosive situation developed.
He also pointed out that the problem was not purely
psychological, and this gets us into one problem on which there
is a conflict of interest between our requirements here in
Washington and our requirements in the Congo, and that is that
if it became necessary to evacuate the Americans from the Congo
it was important to have some lift of this type immediately
available.
Now, it is readily understandable here that the protection
of American citizens abroad is an ancient, indeed one of the
first obligations of the Department of State, and has been
since Benjamin Franklin first went abroad to represent the
Colonies of the United States, the American Colonies.
But he cautioned us and urged us not to make any particular
point here about the possibility of evacuating Americans
because he said if that became known to the Congo, or it was
made a point of in the Congo, that it would inflame and make
more difficult the very problem we were trying to avoid.
So we felt that we ought to provide three C-130's to carry
out certain non-combat operations in support of the central
government in a large country which has primitive
communications.

U.S. WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN COMBAT

We did make it very clear that we were not involving
ourselves in combat; that we were not going to provide combat
forces. We sent these three planes with 126 personnel on board.
Forty of those were members of the air crews themselves;
another 45 were an Army platoon to guard the planes themselves
on the airfield; three planes, 45 men, 15 men to a plane, five
men for three shifts of eight hours each.
Then, 33 men in general support, such as communications and
medical aid personnel, and a few people of that sort, and a
little headquarters group for these three planes made up of
eight officers and men, a total of 126 men.
These planes seemed to us to be a continuation of a type of
support which we have given the Congo over a period of many
years. We gave very large transport support to the United
Nations Forces when they were in there. In 1964-1965 we had, I
think, four C-130's in the Congo for a year supporting the
efforts of the central government to deal with the extreme left
revolt over in this same area, where the Simbas, so-called,
were armed.
You will recall the difficulties we had in Stanleyville at
that time, and it did not appear to us that the return of the
three C-130's to the Congo would be a major problem insofar as
our major attitude and our major policies were concerned.
I would like to add that requests have gone to other
governments. We think that in the next day or two there will be
public announcements of certain assistance provided by other
governments in the situation, including certain African
governments, and we think that will be for the advantage of the
total situation.
We are inclined to believe that this mercenary effort will
be circumscribed. Our latest reports from Bukavu today have
been that the situation there is relatively quiet. There is a
very mean situation still existing at Kisangani, formerly
Stanleyville, where the government forces are in command
generally of the city, and the mercenaries, with a large number
of hostages, both Africans and whites, are holding the air
strip. An effort has been made to obtain a cease-fire to
arrange evacuation of those not involved, particularly the
women and children and the wounded.
The Red Cross is working on that and has sent their man
from Rhodesia up to the Congo to try to make effective Red
Cross contact with the mercenaries to work out the evacuation.

MERCENARIES HAD BEEN IN THE MILITARY

The Chairman. Could you describe who the mercenaries are?
What is their origin? I am not clear who they are?
Secretary Rusk. These particular ones are Belgian, French,
and Spanish nationals who have been employed from time to time
by different elements in the Congo, but in more recent months
these mercenaries were in the employ of the central government,
President Mobutu's government.
The Chairman. They were part of the government's armed
forces?
Secretary Rusk. Part of the government's armed forces, and
then they apparently went off on this escapade of their own.
The Chairman. They are white people?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct; that is correct.
Senator Mundt. Paid by whom?
Secretary Rusk. Up until recently paid by the government of
President Mobutu. Unless there is some connection with outside
forces that we do not yet know about, they appear to be acting
pretty much on their own.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT U.S. MISSION

Now we are concerned about some misunderstandings which
apparently occurred as to what this was all about. It was a
favorable response to President Mobutu's request for long-range
logistical support in a country that is very short of
communications and transport capability.
It was not the supplying of combat forces, and everybody
over there, as well as back here, at least among those
officials who are responsible, are thoroughly aware of the fact
that we do not intend to supply combat troops. We were not
asked to supply combat troops, and the only combat elements
involved are this platoon of security men for the planes
themselves.
It is not the first step in a growing U.S. military
commitment. My guess is that President Mobutu will not seek
significant outside military assistance. If he were to go for
any additional ground troops, he has about 30,000 already, he
almost certainly would go to neighboring African countries for
any additional ground troops that he would need. He may get
countries like Ethiopia and Ghana to assist him in some fighter
planes if the situation continues.
It is not an indication that the United States intends to
leap into every problem that develops anywhere. We did not get
into Indonesia or the Hong Kong or Burma or the India-Pakistan
fighting or the Middle East, or a great many other situations
with our own troops or by direct involvement of our own
personnel.
This a continuation of a general policy which we have
followed since 1960 when President Eisenhower first urged that
this matter of the Congo be taken into the United Nations, and
supporting the territorial integrity of the Congo.
It continues an effort which we have exercised in a variety
of ways, both through economic assistance and by providing
aircraft on different occasions, first, in support of the U.N.,
and then in support of the government of the Congo during the
left-wing revolt of 1964, 1965.
We felt that it was a very important action for us to take.
I would say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that again we are
faced with a situation where the alternatives do not unfold
themselves and what might have been is not readily apparent. We
are not yet out of the woods. We ought to be rubbing our
rabbits' feet about the situation in Kisangani, and whether the
people there can be extracted without serious loss of life,
because the fighting gets pretty bitter on both sides in these
clashes in that part of the world. But I must say that if the
anti-white wave had swept the Congo, and there were large
numbers of white people, including the Americans, killed off in
that wave of high feeling, I think I would have found it much
more difficult to come down here and answer the questions in
that situation than I feel today in answering questions about
why we did what we did.
So I will pause at this point, Mr. Chairman, for your
questions and comments on the committee.

AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

The Chairman. Just a few points. The mercenaries, did you
say about 150 rebelled?
Secretary Rusk. 150 to 180 so far as we can determine.
The Chairman. And they were troops of the government?
Secretary Rusk. They were employees of the government.
The Chairman. Did you say there were 3,000 Americans there?
Secretary Rusk. My figures are----
The Chairman. I heard 500.
Secretary Rusk.--about 3,230; roughly 1,734 in the area of
the capital, the general area of the capital, Kinshasa, which
used to be Leopoldville.
The Chairman. How about Bukavu?
Secretary Rusk. 1,284 in Kisangani, that is Stanleyville.
These are the areas surrounding these towns.
The Chairman. These are government employees?
Secretary Rusk. No. These are all missionaries, teachers,
medical people, tourists, some alien residents, a number of
press men apparently were caught in there as tourists; about
188 down in Elizabethville in the Katanga, and about 124 in
Bukavu.
The Chairman. How many Americans have been killed?
Secretary Rusk. We have not yet had any report of Americans
being killed.
The Chairman. Have any been molested?
Secretary Rusk. We think some have been caught in the
struggle. We had one report that one sergeant who has been on a
training mission on truck transport training in the Congo might
have been wounded in the leg and might have been in a hospital,
but we have not been able to confirm any numbers of that sort.
We think there have been perhaps up to 20 or so whites
killed so far in different parts of the country during this
particular episode.
The Chairman. But no Americans?
Secretary Rusk. No Americans that we know of.

CONSULTING THE UNITED NATIONS

The Chairman. Was the United Nations consulted about this
move?
Secretary Rusk. This was before the United Nations, the
Security Council, on Saturday. They had adjourned to Monday.
Ambassador Buffum reported to the Security Council yesterday
afternoon on the provisions of these transports, and there was
no question raised, no criticism or no adverse comment from any
quarter when he reported.

POLICIES OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

The Chairman. Did I understand you correctly that you feel
this is a continuation of a commitment made by President
Eisenhower to protect the territorial integrity of the Congo?
Secretary Rusk. No, it is not in that sense a commitment,
Senator.
The Chairman. What is the significance of the Eisenhower
action?
Secretary Rusk. When the Congo situation descended into
complete anarchy in 1960, this Government was asked for
assistance, along with other governments, and President
Eisenhower urged that the matter go before the United Nations.
Then for a period of about 4 years this matter was in the
operational hands of the United Nations, and you will remember
the substantial amount of assistance, both in transport and in
funds, which we provided to that United Nations effort.
That was phased out partly because of a great difficulty
that had arisen in financing the United Nations efforts, except
on economic and technical assistance, except on that side,
where several hundred technical assistance people have been
working up until the present in the Congo on behalf of the
United Nations.
The Chairman. In that connection, I wanted this Eisenhower
aspect because in your testimony before the Committee in 1962,
this is a quote to our Subcommittee on African Affairs, you
said:

President Eisenhower rejected from the start any direct
intervention by the major powers. In reply to the Congo
government's request for United States forces, the United
States stated that any assistance should be through the United
Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country,
the United States included.

Secretary Rusk. That is correct as far as combat forces are
concerned. And during the Congo affair you will recall that the
five so-called great powers, the five----
The Chairman. It does not say combat forces. Is this a
change in our policy, or isn't it?
Secretary Rusk. It is not a change over the last six years,
Mr. Chairman. We put in transport capabilities in support of
the United Nations, and then after the United Nations withdrew
its forces, we put them in in support of the central government
of the Congo in the face of that extreme left revolt and
rebellion in 1964-1965. We had four C-130's there for a period
of a full year in 1964-1965.
The Chairman. Well, I do not wish to take too much time.
Senator Russell brought this matter up, and I wish Senator
Russell would ask questions.
Senator Russell. I do not have many questions.

THE SPREAD OF RUMORS

What has happened to the plane that Mobutu sent up there to
Stanleyville to see if he could get those newspaper men out?
Secretary Rusk. We have not been able to establish any
contact with the mercenaries. The mercenaries have not been
responding. What they are trying to do is to establish contact
through the Red Cross. But unless there is some sort of
response from the mercenaries on the ground it is extremely
hazardous for any kind of a plane to land there in the hopes
that they can take people out rather than have the plane itself
hijacked by the mercenaries.
Senator Russell. Who spread this rumor that the white, some
white power was going to take over down there? Did they
designate what power it was, the United States, or what?
Secretary Rusk. There was very bitter criticism of the
Belgians particularly, and of the French. I think this stems
from the natural kind of reports that would come based upon the
nationality of the mercenaries themselves, and also, as you
know, the fair amount of tension that has existed from time to
time between the Congolese and some of the Belgian economic
interests in the Congo.
Senator Russell. Of course, you never know about what you
read in the papers. I am reading now from a newspaper article,
the Associated Press, which says that the Katangese or the
Congolese, I assume, mutinied against the regime of Mobutu, and
the mercenary officers, heavily outnumbered, apparently had no
choice but to join the movement. This is according to informed
sources, it says.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is true that there were some
Katangese elements with these mercenaries. But I would not
myself think that the mercenaries had no choice in the matter.
I would think that they had freedom of action on their own and
could have made their own decisions in that situation.

GOALS OF THE MERCENARIES

Senator Russell. Just as a matter of curiosity, Mr.
Secretary, what is your theory as to what these mercenaries
could gain, 150 to 180 of them there in a country as vast as
you say, as this country east of the Mississippi River, and in
a nation of 15, 18 million population? You do not suppose they
thought they were going to conquer the whole thing, do you?
Secretary Rusk. This is something that, as I indicated in
the beginning, we can only speculate about because we do not
have any firm information about what was in their minds.
Now, some of them did borrow a plane and go down to
Rhodesia. What they took with them in terms of funds or
anything of that sort, we do not know. Whether they were out to
see what they could pick up by way of cash or valuables or
whether they had some more far-ranging political purpose, we
just cannot say at this point.
There were some indications that they wanted to put on a
demonstration that would cause them to be employed by the
Mobutu government for a longer period under more favorable
circumstances, in other words, a little bit of collective
bargaining they were putting on in this situation.
Senator Russell. Pretty tough goon squads though from what
you said.
Secretary Rusk. Pretty rough; pretty rough.

WHAT FIGHTING TOOK PLACE

Senator Russell. But even at that the press accounts say,
and I read again from the press, ``The mutineers and
mercenaries took over the town,'' that is Bukavu, ``without
firing more than a few shots and the Congolese garrison fled
into the bush.''
So there was not very bitter fighting there as you said
took place.
``Thursday afternoon, a little more than 24 hours later,
the mutineers left Bukavu as suddenly as they arrived.
Witnesses said the city was then calm and there was little
damage.'' Then it goes on to recount that the Congolese
soldiers in the bush heard that these mercenaries had left, and
they came into town and proceeded to tear the town up and shoot
people right and left, including women and children, and they
are the people we are going down there to help. It is a little
confusing to me.
Secretary Rusk. We have had reports of casualties on both
sides. We have not been able to confirm them because, as I say,
we do not have people on the spot who can give us reporting.
It is true, I think, that when the Congolese forces,
particularly in the Kisangani area, engaged in heavy fighting
there, that they themselves were pretty brutal. I think both
sides have acted with considerable brutality here.
One of our concerns, quite frankly, is that if the fighting
goes on and the mercenaries, who are now surrounded, are
gradually sort of hemmed in and worn down, that the hostages,
both black and white, which the mercenaries are holding, will
be in very severe danger indeed from the Congolese armed forces
as they move in, as well as from anything the mercenaries might
do.
Senator Russell. So the Congolese would kill the
mercenaries and the hostages that we are fighting to recapture.
Secretary Rusk. That is one of the dangers we have to worry
about, Senator.
Senator Russell. I do not see how you ever possibly can
hope to deal with a country of that kind. It is impossible for
you to do anything about it, if it is that kind of a paradox.
Secretary Rusk. It is true that a cease-fire was arranged
for a period of a couple of days in this Kisangani area in
order to try to establish some sort of contact with the
mercenaries in order to relieve these hostages. But how long
that cease-fire can be maintained I am not sure.

ESTABLISHING A STRIKE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Senator Russell. Mr. Secretary, you are not only
distinguished in the field of state craft, you have an enviable
military record. What was the significance of establishing a
headquarters of the STRIKE Command there in the Congo? This
press account here is referring to a STRIKE Command and says
the command is comprised of Army and Air Force elements capable
of rapid deployment, especially in Africa and Southern Asia.
Is the purpose of that statement to intimidate and frighten
these mercenaries into surrender or are you ready to send
people down there to support it?
Secretary Rusk. I think it is a case of misreporting or
misinterpretation. The only people I know about are these eight
members of a command group that went with these C-130's as the
command group for the C-130s.
Now, they came, I suppose, from the STRIKE Command, because
STRIKE Command is the general headquarters that would have
responsibility for this kind of a military movement.
Senator Russell. Primarily an Army organization.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Russell. Whereas you sent the Air Force down there.
Secretary Rusk. But this in no sense is a first echelon of
a deployment of combat forces to the Congo. I think that point
ought to be made very clear because it has never been
contemplated, and that is not involved in this situation at
all, Senator.
Senator Russell. This was certainly calculated to leave a
different impression on the minds of anybody who knew anything
about the Army.
Secretary Rusk. I think I should say that because again
some misinterpretation might arise, that this force will be
supplied, we expect it to be there, perhaps, between two weeks
and a month. By that time, we expect the situation to have
shaken down. It will be supplied for its special requirements
by air while it is there.
For example, I believe that a C-130 is on its way now with
certain propellers and other special equipment, but it will
unload those in Kinshasa and come back. The force will be
supplied by air. But I hope the people won't get excited that
the three are becoming six or eight or ten.
There is a fourth C-130 on the way that carries supplies
for these three, and it will come home when it delivers its
supplies.

A VERY MEAN KIND OF A FIGHT

Senator Russell. Frankly, I am concerned about any of them
being there under these conditions with the implications of the
composition of this unit, small though it may be. I am even
more confused that we are concerned--those that we have gone
there to help are going to kill the hostages, and are those we
are going to try to eliminate. Apparently they are in no danger
from people who have them as hostages, but the people we are
going to help are going to kill them unless we do something
about it. That is what confuses me.
Secretary Rusk. Well, this is a very mean kind of a fight
there in the Stanleyville area. Whether there will be enough
discrimination on both sides, or whether the mercenaries will
take vengeance on some of the hostages they are holding, or
whether the Congolese soldiers will be sufficiently disciplined
to draw distinctions if they do close in on the mercenaries,
these are the problems we just have to keep our fingers crossed
on. It is a very tough situation.
Senator Russell. You do not really believe these
mercenaries, with all the vile implications that go with these
words, are going to turn off and kill these civilians that they
are holding as hostages, do you, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rusk. They have been very rough, and they are
holding a good many Congolese hostages as well. So I do not
know what they are going to do, Senator.
Senator Russell. You do not know what the Congolese are
going to do either.
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.

U.S. TRYING TO CALM THE SITUATION

Senator Russell. Are we just intervening in that kind of a
position--we have no idea what is going to happen or who is
going to kill who or why, but we have gone in here
nevertheless?
Secretary Rusk. What we are trying to do is calm down the
situation so you do not have an entire population aroused to do
violence to all whites in the country, including 3,000
Americans.
Senator Russell. If this country, as remote and as bad as
communications are as you say they are, how are you going to
get the word around if you are not going in to capture the
country?
Secretary Rusk. They are going systematically on the radio
and such television as they have. Sunday morning the Governor
of Katanga----
Senator Russell. How much television do they have?
Secretary Rusk. I think they have three systems altogether.
Senator Russell. Do you know how many sets there are?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
Senator Russell. Receiving sets.
Secretary Rusk. But Sunday morning they got the Governor of
Katanga, personally at our urging, he went out in a sound truck
around the city calling on everybody to be quiet; cancelled a
rally the object of which was clearly anti-white in character;
and did a good deal to calm the situation. This kind of thing
was possible on the basis of some tangible evidence of support
from us to get over the idea that somehow all the blacks were
on one side and all the whites were on the other.
Senator Russell. Well, it will take some time to try to
unravel this situation as to who is killing who and why we are
on the side we are on when that is apparently where the danger
comes from.

U.S. POSITION IN NIGERIA

I do want to ask you some questions about another matter.
Yesterday, I happened to be looking at the ticker and I saw
where the press representative of your department had said that
we had the same interest in Nigeria and would do the same thing
there.
In a few minutes another statement came in saying that it
was a different situation in Nigeria; that this was purely an
internal war. Finally, at a much later hour, he said that we
had refused to go into Nigeria. Just what is our position with
respect to Nigeria?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think the first report to which you
referred was a press interpretation of his effort to say as
little as possible about Nigeria, and that was because he did
not close the doors at that point, and speculation went off in
the other direction.
We have not been asked for troops or assistance of this
type by Nigeria. We would not be furnishing any if they did.
Nigeria has not been before the United Nations as an
international matter. We do not have the same lines of policy
with respect to Nigeria we have with respect to the Congo.
Quite frankly, as far as the United States is concerned, we
feel that if anyone else is to take any part there at all by
way of assistance, this is clearly a British responsibility,
and we are leaving this pretty much in the hands of the
British. We are not getting mixed up in it.

LEAVING THE CONGO TO THE BELGIANS

Senator Russell. We should leave this in the hands of the
Belgians in the Congo. They have plenty of people to be able to
handle it, and have shown beyond peradventure when they had the
first terrible massacres there.
Secretary Rusk. Well, the Belgians are not able to handle
this one, Senator. They are not able to take care of their own
people, let alone these 3,000 Americans who are in the country.
I do want to emphasize again our real concern and our
responsibility for what happens to these 3,000 American
citizens in the Congo.

HEATED SITUATION IN NIGERIA

There is another reason for saying as little as possible
about Nigeria, because they are also in a heated situation.
We have got 6,000 Americans there; about 5,000 in the
federal areas of Nigeria, and about 1,000 in Biafra. We are
trying now to evacuate a number of these Americans, and
anything that is said here about Nigeria could seriously
endanger some of those people.
Senator Russell. Did somebody tell them the white people
are getting ready to take over Nigeria?
Secretary Rusk. That has not been the issue in Nigeria.
That has not been the issue there.

MOBUTU'S EFFORTS TO DE-RECRUIT MERCENARIES

Senator Russell. Well, have you got any agreement with Mr.
Mobutu that he is not going to recruit any more of these
mercenaries that caused this trouble and having you send some
more Air Force people down there, paratroopers and
headquarters? We did not put these mercenaries on him. He hired
them himself.
Secretary Rusk. We have no agreement with him at all about
putting more people, or planes, or anything of that sort in. We
understand that his own plans were to steadily de-recruit these
mercenaries, and as the training of the Congolese forces
improved, as there has been improvement under Belgian, Israeli
and Italian training teams, that he would steadily get rid of,
cut down the mercenary involvement of his own forces. This may
be one of the things that caused some of these mercenaries to
take things in their own hands the other day.
Senator Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

PREVIOUS POLICY OF HIRING MERCENARIES

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rusk. Was Tshombe the first head of government in
the Congo that hired a substantial number of mercenaries to put
down the insurgents? Mobutu was not the first, was he?
Secretary Rusk. No, that is quite right. Before him,
Tshombe had hired a considerable number drawn from a variety of
countries. But before that the Belgians had provided a
considerable number of officers for the Congolese armed forces.
So there have been outsiders present with the Congolese armed
forces almost continuously throughout this period.
Senator Hickenlooper. Now, what do you sense to be the
connection between the abduction of Tshombe, who is now in
Algeria in jail, and the situation in the Congo under Mobutu?
Secretary Rusk. We have not been able to thus far establish
any connection between these events. It is possible that there
are--that the kidnapping of Tshombe led to some reaction on the
part of these mercenaries, but we have nothing at all to
indicate that.
We have been very interested in press reports from Algeria
today that the Algerian press is severely criticizing those,
what they call, adventurers who were with Tshombe on the plane,
and this tends to point in the direction that the Algerians may
be reluctant to turn Tshombe over to the Congolese.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, what basis would they have, if
they are reluctant to turn him over, what basis would they have
for holding him? Has he committed any crime in Algeria?
Secretary Rusk. No. We do not know what the interaction on
that will be. Other governments are working on that. As you
know, we have no relations with Algeria at the present time.
They do not have an extradition treaty with the Congo, and we
just have no information today as to what the final disposition
of him was.
I do not think they expected him there. This was a surprise
to them. But when he got there, there he was; what to do with
him.
We have all had problems of that sort.
Senator Hickenlooper. They have got a bear by the tail.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.

NO THREATS AGAINST U.S.

Senator Hickenlooper. Has the Mobutu government threatened
to prevent overflights of commercial and military aircraft if
our assistance were not provided in this instance?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir. I think there were some
regulations placed generally throughout the Congo on such
things as border closings and things of that sort, applied to
everybody including our own people. I am not aware of any
threats to take any action against us, Senator, if we did not
provide these planes.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aside from----
Secretary Rusk. May I just check that with Mr. Palmer? Do
you know of any?
Mr. Palmer. No, I am not aware of it.
Secretary Rusk. No, I have had no impression of any threats
on this.
Senator Hickenlooper. Were there any conditions demanded
either way by us or by the Mobutu government involved in the
supplying of these planes down there?
Secretary Rusk. The principal thing that we----
Senator Hickenlooper. I mean substantial conditions.
Secretary Rusk. No. The principal thing we insisted upon
was that the government and all of its component agencies
around the country would make a maximum effort to calm down
this wave of anti-foreign and anti-white feeling that was going
on, because this was a very important part of the whole purpose
of putting these planes in there, and they have been performing
on that, I think with some success. But this was the principal
thing that we linked with the furnishing of these C-130's.

SPECIAL MEANING OF ``LIBERATION''

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, doesn't it seem to have been the
history of this situation in the last several years that
looting and periodic murder and other crimes even worse have
been characteristic of both sides in this matter when they
happen to win a village or take over an area?
Secretary Rusk. I think on the whole that is a fair
statement; yes, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. So that----
Secretary Rusk. Of course, that is not unknown on the part
of other armed forces in other wars. This term ``liberation''
has gotten to have a special meaning.
Senator Hickenlooper. The poor people caught in the middle
are between the devil and the deep blue sea when this happens.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONGO

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you have any evidence of any pro
or anti-Castro Cubans involved in this fighting in the Congo
now or in this disturbance there?
Secretary Rusk. None at the present time. There have been
some Cubans from time to time flying for Air Congo and under
contract with the Congolese government.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are those military planes?
Secretary Rusk. I think both civilian and military. The
Congolese civilian and military planes. They had some T-28's,
and then they also had the civilian planes of Air Congo, C-
47's, and things of that kind.
One of them was reported to have escaped over into Rwanda,
an adjoining country, out of the Kinshasa area--the Kisangani
area, the old Stanleyville area, just recently. But we have
very little on just what happened to those Cubans.

WHY AMERICANS RETURN TO THE CONGO

Senator Hickenlooper. Why do these people go back into the
Congo, 3,000 of them, after a bloody situation and history of
murder and everything else in there? Americans and others rush
back in there literally by the thousands.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I suppose there must be 35 or 40
thousand Europeans altogether, Europeans and Americans,
outsiders, in the Congo of 15 or 20 nationalities. Many of our
Americans are missionaries, and missionaries are very
persistent about getting back into areas where they have been
active. As a matter of fact, they are usually rather slow to
take our advice about getting out of most places in the world.
So they went back in. Then we have business people in there and
many European origin personnel are there for the various
investment companies.
A good many of them are actually working for the Congolese
government, a great many technical assistance people in there,
several hundred. They are there for the purpose of furnishing
technical assistance, so they go back in.
Senator Hickenlooper. I know they did.
Secretary Rusk. Just as people go back after a volcano has
destroyed a place. They will go back and build.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. But normally people who put
their hands on a hot stove once, they do not put it on there
for a while. But others seem to rush back in.
Secretary Rusk. Most of these Americans who have gone into
these outlying places away from the capital apparently are
American missionaries.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think I will desist. Thank you very
much.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you.

U.S. TROOPS ON ALERT FOR CONGO SERVICE

The Chairman. If Senator Sparkman will pardon me, I had a
question here, a very brief one. I was informed last night by
the aunt of a member of the Armed Forces, who has been in
Vietnam and is now at Fort Bragg, that he had been put on alert
to go to the Congo at a moment's notice. Is that true?
Secretary Rusk. I have no way--if you want me to find out--
--
The Chairman. You do not know whether our troops, any
troops in the Special Forces, in Fort Bragg----
Secretary Rusk. You mean after the dispatch of these? I do
not know of any troops that are on alert to go to the Congo.
The Chairman. That is what she said. He was upset about
that because he had already served his term in Vietnam and
thought he was going to get out, and they put him on alert to
go to the Congo. He was not very pleased.
Secretary Rusk. On Saturday, we alerted people in
connection with the C-130's, but I do not know of any other
alert.
The Chairman. Senator Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. I will pass.
The Chairman. Mrs. Smith.
Senator Smith. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Senator Stennis.
Senator Mansfield.
Senator Symington.

U.S. PLANES DISPATCHED TO THE CONGO

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, how many planes were
sent?
Secretary Rusk. Three C-130's.
Senator Symington. Where did they land?
Secretary Rusk. They went through South America over
Ascension Island, and landed in Kinshasa, the capital. There is
a huge, very large, international airport there in the capital
of the Congo.
Senator Symington. Are they still there?
Secretary Rusk. So far as we know, yes, sir. That is, as of
when I left the office. I believe they might have flown one
mission to try to establish radio communication with these
people at the airfield in Kisangani, although that might not
have been a C-130. I think it might have been one ammunition
drop about 500 miles away from Kisangani, but they are based in
Kinshasa.
Senator Symington. Were there any other white countries
that put in any planes besides ours that we know of?
Secretary Rusk. Not as yet. We know that some requests have
been made, and that this is being now worked out with the
Congolese government. We do not know what the result of that
will be.

U.S. CITIZENS' RIGHT OF PROTECTION

Senator Symington. Based on the question that somebody
asked, don't Americans in the Congo, with all this tribal
unsettlement and instability, don't they realize that they are
there at their own risk?
Secretary Rusk. I think they realize that there are some
risks there, Senator. But we have over the last 190 years
experimented from time to time with the idea of getting
citizens to waive any claims to our protection. It does not
work. I mean a sovereign government cannot waive its
responsibilities for its own citizens, and once in a while over
many years when somebody purports to waive our responsibility,
and then he goes abroad anyhow and gets in trouble, that waiver
does not amount to anything. He can still ask for help.
Senator Symington. Are the three United States aircraft
there under our command?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. From Washington or from a commander in
the field?
Secretary Rusk. The local operational command is with a
command of the group itself. But they are under the Ambassador,
and the Ambassador has very strict instructions about the kind
of missions that they may or may not engage in. Any question on
that would be referred back to Washington.

SENDING OF U.S. PARATROOPERS

Senator Symington. If the United States trusts General
Mobutu enough to place three aircraft at his disposal, along
with a presumed requirement that they not land in the areas of
the fighting, why do we send 150 American paratroopers to
protect the planes?
Secretary Rusk. These paratroopers are to provide guards
for the planes themselves while they are, among other places,
in the capital city.
When I take a plane abroad I take along guards with me and
they keep a guard on the plane at all times. So this will be
five guards per plane on three eight-hour shifts roughly. It
seems to be minimum under those circumstances.
Senator Symington. I would like to just make one
observation, Mr. Chairman, if I may, because it will come up
later. It does not have to do with this particular subject.

U.S. ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL

But, getting back from the Middle East, I reported to
Chairman Russell and Chairman Fulbright that I thought, based
on the quality of the Egyptian Air Force, it was only a
question of time before there would be a blow-up out there.
The Israelis saved themselves by hitting first. Their air
force is 95 percent French. The French have refused immediately
to sell them anything or work with them, just like they have
done to us in the past, and the Russians apparently are
rebuilding rapidly the Egyptian Air Force, and whoever hits
first out there generally wins because of the nature of the
terrain, et cetera.
I would hope that you would be considering what we would do
if the French continue to refuse to send any military
assistance to Israel or, perhaps, if there are any friendly
Arab countries left--sell planes would be better--and give what
our policy will be towards Israel, if they have the ability to
buy defenses from us if the French continue to run out on them.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, this is a question that is very,
very much on our minds with the renewal by the Soviet Union of
their substantial arms shipments to Egypt, Syria, and Algeria
because--and I know the committee does not want to get into
this in detail today--but we do have once again the problem
which that posed for us before, because these three so-called
progressive states heavily furnished with arms by the Soviet
Union create threats not only to Israel as a possibility, but
their own Arab neighbors--Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia,
and Morocco.
We have tried in the past reluctantly because we have not
wanted to become a major arms supplier in that part of the
world, we have tried, with the help of some other governments,
such as particularly France and Britain, to do a certain
balancing there between the moderate Arab states and these
three so-called progressive states, and then, in turn, to have
some balance between the forces on the Arab side and Israel
itself.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Aiken.

FRENCH AND BELGIAN POLICY TOWARD THE CONGO

Senator Aiken. What action have France and Belgium taken
with regard to the Congo?
Secretary Rusk. The Belgians have made certain offers of
assistance which are now being worked on in the Congo. There
are some Belgians in the Congo who are being withdrawn from the
country because they are considered to be potential trouble-
makers and might be too much connected with the mercenary kind
of interest.
However, I am not able to get into specifics today because
this is a matter that is still under discussion between the
governments concerned.
Senator Aiken. So far as you know, neither France nor
Belgium have sent any military assistance in there to help
maintain order?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Belgium has had a substantial
training force with the Congolese forces all along,
particularly with their ground forces.
Senator Aiken. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Israel is training their paratroopers, and
Italy is giving some help with their small naval forces, and
things of that sort.
Senator Aiken. France and Belgium, either or both, do they
have material investments in the Congo now?
Secretary Rusk. Yes. Belgian investments are very
substantial. Ours, by the way, are relatively minuscule.
French investments, Mr. Palmer, do you know about that?
Mr. Palmer. No, I do not think they have very much.
Secretary Rusk. I do not have the impression that the
French investments there are very substantial.
Senator Aiken. Well, do we, in effect undertake--have we,
in effect, undertaken to protect the Belgian investments?
Secretary Rusk. That is not the purpose of the exercise
here, Senator. We are primarily concerned about what would
happen in that country if the country itself, with this
government and its people, felt that the white world was
opposed to it and trying to break it up, which would lead them
to provide all sorts of elements into the situation; and,
secondly, to make a reasonable response to the threat to our
own people in the Congo and find ways and means of allaying the
dangers which they face with this wave of anti-white feelings
sweeping the country.

LENGTH OF STAY OF U.S. PERSONNEL

Senator Aiken. How long do you expect to keep our 150
people there, the troops in there?
Secretary Rusk. The present thinking is somewhere between
two weeks and a month.
Senator Aiken. You had them in there once before to bring
out refugees that were threatened with the----
Secretary Rusk. The Simbas.
Senator Aiken. --cooking pot.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
We had four C-130's there for a period of about a year in
1964-1965.
Senator Aiken. Yes. It will take somewhere between two and
four weeks?
Secretary Rusk. That is the present situation. We think the
prospect is that the Congolese army is better trained and in
better shape than it was three or four years ago. We think the
prospect is that this mercenary affair will be wound up before
too long.
Senator Aiken. But if real trouble should develop, our
forty-odd combat troops would hardly be sufficient, would they,
sir?
Secretary Rusk. Well, these forty-odd combat troops are
there just to guard the planes and the airfield. They are not
there to fight.
Senator Aiken. I thought you said there were some forty
others besides the ones you designated.
Secretary Rusk. Well, forty Air Force crews and forty-five
Army personnel to guard the planes.

U.S. INVESTMENTS IN THE CONGO

Senator Aiken. How much investment do we have in the Congo?
Secretary Rusk. Relatively small, very small indeed.
Senator Aiken. Do we have----
Secretary Rusk. In terms of economic investment.
Senator Aiken. Is the Union Miniere, I believe that is what
it was called, something like that, is that the big investment
in the Congo?
Secretary Rusk. That is the, I suppose, largest single
investment. They have reorganized that whole operation in
recent months. But that is the copper operation.
Senator Aiken. Are Americans heavy stockholders?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think so.
Mr. Palmer. No, not particularly.
Senator Aiken. Then we are in there protecting our
missionaries, and you would say what, about 40,000 other white
people?
Secretary Rusk. How many Belgians would you estimate are
there, Mr. Palmer?
Mr. Palmer. About 30,000.
Senator Aiken. Why aren't they interested in protecting
their people?
Secretary Rusk. About 30,000.
They have personnel with the Congolese armed forces.
Senator Aiken. I see.
Secretary Rusk. And they----
Senator Aiken. They do not apparently think it is wise to
have a number of white Belgians in excess of the number of
native troops then.
Secretary Rusk. I do not know that they relate these two,
Senator.
Senator Aiken. I think you get the idea. [Laughter.]
All right.
The Chairman. Senator Morse. He is not here.
Senator Jackson.

THE MISSION OF AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

Senator Jackson. Mr. Secretary, under what instructions is
the commander of the three planes operating under?
Secretary Rusk. He is operating under the direction of the
Ambassador, who is under the direction of Washington, and
basically those instructions are that these planes are to be
used for logistics purposes, and not for combat purposes; not
to get into situations where combat is likely or to attempt to
involve themselves in situations of violence.
Senator Jackson. Is it clear, because I think it is
important that we get this thing straightened out, that his
overall mission is to protect American lives, or could that
mission include the moving of Congolese troops?
Secretary Rusk. It could include the moving of Congolese
troops from, say, the capital area where some of the better
trained troops are over into the eastern part of the Congo,
including into the country of Rwanda. Rwanda has made its air
base available to receive troops. So that the movement of
military supplies and, perhaps, even the movement of troops
would be----
Senator Jackson. For what purpose?
Secretary Rusk. For the Congolese forces.
Senator Jackson. Yes. But to utilize Congolese forces
limited to protecting American lives?
Secretary Rusk. No, for the general reestablishment of the
authority of the Congolese government throughout the country.
Senator Jackson. This is, you now, what seems to me to sort
of contradict what was said at the outset; namely, I understood
we were there to protect American lives. Now maybe you cannot
say this publicly because that might offend the government.
Secretary Rusk. It is protecting American lives that we
ought not to say much about publicly, Senator.
Senator Jackson. I understand that.
Secretary Rusk. That is the difficulty.

AN AMBIGUOUS ROLE

Senator Jackson. But now what they are doing here, as I
understand it, it goes beyond that. The planes can be used in
supporting the effectiveness of the government of the Congo.
Secretary Rusk. I wonder----
Senator Jackson. I wonder if we can get this. This is the
crux of this problem.
Secretary Rusk. Do you have the text of the announcement we
made, Mr. Palmer? The announcement was made in terms of
logistics support to the Congolese government.
Senator Jackson. I think what the American people are
disturbed about is that it is sufficiently ambiguous so that it
can include our military involvement in the Congo without
relation to the protection of American lives and property.
Now, I had the impression at the outset of your remarks
that we were simply following the tradition established in
Benjamin Franklin's time on up to protect American lives.
Secretary Rusk. We should have here--I am sorry I do not--
the text of the announcement that was made at the Department of
State. The announcement said that in response to a request from
President Mobutu, the United States Government has dispatched
three C-130 aircraft to Kinshasa, and that they will be in a
noncombatant status.
Senator Jackson. Yes. But if you move troops and you get
shot at you are suddenly combatant.
Secretary Rusk. Well, the orders are that they not put
themselves into combat situations, Senator.
The other side does not have--that is, these mercenaries do
not have--means of going after this airfield in Rwanda, for
example, and they do not have means of dominating the entire
Eastern Congo. There are many things these planes can do that
would not get them into a combat situation.
Senator Jackson. Except we cannot get to Stanleyville where
they have got the hostages.
Secretary Rusk. That is right, and they are not going
there.

PUTTING DOWN A REVOLT

Senator Jackson. Well, Mr. Secretary, I realize you have a
problem here. But I think it is unfortunate that the American
people cannot be told that the primary mission is to protect
American lives. Now, the American people understand that, and I
think this can be explained.
As you say, if you had not done that, why then, there would
have been a disaster down there. They would be crawling all
over you in the State Department for not having lived up to one
of the No. 1 responsibilities of the State Department, to
protect American lives and property.
But now I gather that actually the mission is beyond that.
It goes to the support of the Congolese government and their
ability to maintain law and order generally. Law and order
meaning, of course, to put down a revolt.
Secretary Rusk. I think it would have been very hard to
make full contribution to the first point had they not been
available to support the government on the second point because
this was tied into a nationwide effort in the Congo to
demonstrate that rumors were not correct that white governments
in different parts of the world were in some conspiracy against
the Congo to bring down the government. The fact that we had
tangible support there in the shape of these planes made it
possible, with considerable credibility, for the government to
go to the people and say, ``Look here, you see what has
happened here, this is not the case. Let us take care of all of
these foreigners. This is not an international conspiracy aimed
at the Congo.''
So that one purpose meshes into the other.

WHAT MOBUTU EXPECTS

Senator Jackson. What is our understanding with Mobutu?
Secretary Rusk. Well, those planes are not under his
command.
Senator Jackson. No, sir; I understand that. But what is
our diplomatic understanding with him? All orders, I gather,
that are beyond what the commander in the field has been given
emanate directly from the President.
Secretary Rusk. Presumably his people would request
assistance from the C-130's, and our people would look at it
and see whether it was within the terms of reference or the
purpose for which the planes were put there and, if they are,
grant or deny the request.
Senator Jackson. Does he understand we are not, our forces
are not to be involved in any combat type of situation?
Secretary Rusk. Absolutely, no type of combat situation; no
question about that.
Senator Jackson. What does he really expect from us?
Secretary Rusk. I think he wanted, in the first instance, a
tangible representation of political support as far as his own
people were concerned.
Senator Jackson. It is more symbolic maybe?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Jackson. Somehow the powerful United States of
America is with them as indicated by three planes that are out
there.
Secretary Rusk. I mentioned earlier the matter of getting
on radio and trying to settle down this racial feeling. This
was a second requirement that I forgot, in answer to, I think
it was, Senator Russell's question. That was that they continue
to make maximum use of their own aircraft. They have some
aircraft in the air in the Congo and in other resources, and we
want them to take as much of this job, of course, as they can.

EVACUATION PLANS FOR NIGERIA

Senator Jackson. How can we avoid, if the situation becomes
as serious in Nigeria as it is in the Congo, coming to the
assistance of Americans in Nigeria?
Secretary Rusk. Well, in all countries, in practically
every country, outside of a few of the most stable, we have
over time worked out contingency evacuation plans.
We are now trying to move, and we should not say anything
about this outside because these things are awfully dangerous
locally. We are moving some Americans out of Nigeria now. We
have had a major movement of Americans out of the Middle East
here in recent weeks, and it went with remarkable efficiency,
on the whole, including the use of American military aircraft
to go in and get these people out.

AVOID BEING ACCUSED OF INTERVENTION

Senator Jackson. It seems to me that if one of the, from
our standpoint, at least, I take it--the primary mission is to
protect American lives. If we are confronted with a political
problem with the Congolese government in that you have to allow
Mobutu to use the color of, at least, military strength as a
psychological device to hold his government together in this
crisis, that is about what it boils down to, is it not?
Secretary Rusk. I think on the matter of concern about
Americans who might face a very dangerous situation, it is not
unusual in these situations for us to have to be quiet for a
period of time in order to think, in the first instance, about
the safety of the people in some remote and difficult part of
the world. I suppose that maybe on this point we simply have to
wait for a period and let the American people understand it was
involved at the end of the story rather than at the beginning
of the story.
Senator Jackson. Well, I can appreciate the need to avoid
being accused of intervention, that is in a Yankee
imperialistic way, just coming in to pull Americans out.
I think this creates some real political problems. But I am
concerned especially with our problems in Vietnam and
elsewhere, that we cannot tell the American people that,
``Look, we are not about to follow the business of trying to be
the gendarme for the world, but that we are carrying out a
traditional policy of the United States to support its
citizens.''
This complicates our problem at home in order to save the
face of the head of the government, General Mobutu, in the
Congo; isn't that about it?
Secretary Rusk. And, perhaps, to save the lives of American
citizens in the Congo.

BELGIANS OUGHT TO TAKE ACTION

Senator Jackson. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. How
many whites are there in the Congo? You said there were
approximately 3,230 Americans.
Secretary Rusk. About 30,000 Belgians. What others, Mr.
Palmer, would you suggest?
Senator Jackson. 30,000 Belgians?
Secretary Rusk. About 30,000 Belgians; I would think,
perhaps, 10,000 or so of other nationalities.
Mr. Palmer. I would imagine there are quite a number of
Greeks, 3,000 or 4,000 Greeks.
Secretary Rusk. Greeks, French, a few British.
Senator Jackson. Why aren't they doing something? It is the
old, old question that we get asked.
Secretary Rusk. As I say, the Belgian response on this is
now being worked on in Kinshasa with the Congolese government.
Senator Jackson. Certainly the Belgians ought to. I realize
they may have special political problems because of the Tshombe
situation. But, goodness gracious, with that many whites there,
we only have ten percent of what the Belgians have. They ought
to be doing something. This is one place where they could
certainly come in and help without having to get involved maybe
directly in the kind of fighting that we are engaged in in
Vietnam.
That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Thurmond.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PLANES HAD NON-COMBAT STATUS

Mr. Secretary, let me clarify just a moment. Is the main
purpose we went in there to protect American lives or to
bolster the existing government there by sending in
paratroopers in uniform. I guess they were in uniform, were
they? Or were they wearing civilian clothes?
Secretary Rusk. I think they are in uniform, uniformed.
Senator Thurmond. Sending in paratroopers in uniform in
planes which might indicate that we are going to give further
aid, if necessary. In other words, was the real purpose to
protect the Americans, to bolster the existing government or
was it to play politics, give the impression to the world that
we are going in to save this colored government from being
taken over by white people?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the two purposes cannot be totally
separated. Both were very much in our minds at the time that
the decision was made. The position of the Americans there was
very high in our minds. But there was no effort made to create
the impression that this was just the impression of a first
flight of American military who were on their way to the Congo
to engage in combat operations in the Congo.
As a matter of fact, the announcement emphasized that these
three planes were in a non-combatant status. These paratroopers
that you referred to are guards for the planes on the airfield,
nothing more than that.
Senator Thurmond. Couldn't the guards have worn civilian
clothes and not given the impression that America was sending
uniformed people over there, especially paratroopers?
Secretary Rusk. I would think that guards in uniform would
be more suitable under the circumstances with the military
aircraft on the field.

NO POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED

Senator Thurmond. As a matter of fact, wasn't the real
purpose of sending these people over there either one of two
things: To let the world know that we are bolstering that
government and we are sending a contingent of troops, the
implication being that we will send others if necessary?
Secretary Rusk. I would accept the first part of it but not
the second. There is no implication we would send others.
Senator Thurmond. Or was it the fact, in view of our
attitude toward the Ian Smith government, was it the fact that
we are making a play for the colored vote here and we are
sending troops and continuing over there to protect the colored
government after being taken over by white mercenaries?
Secretary Rusk. I do not know about any political factor
here. I do know that there is a broad political factor in the
Continent of Africa here in this situation, and if Mobutu
should turn to the most radical and the wildest leaders in the
African Continent for help on the grounds he could not get any
help of any sort from anybody else, I think that would be very
adverse to our interests here.
Mobutu has been one of the more moderate of the African
leaders. He has worked with the moderates rather than the
extremists. The Chinese in the Congo, for example, are Chinese
Nationalists rather than Chinese Reds.
We have some stake, of course, in his general orientation
toward the West rather than towards the more extreme Arabs or
off to Eastern Europe.
Senator Thurmond. The general impression has been
expressed, I might as well tell you in my State, and some of it
around here, too, that we are intervening where we have no
business, and either we are playing politics in this matter to
make it appear to the colored people that we are going to
defend a colored government against white mercenaries. Now, it
turns out the white mercenaries were part of the colored
government. They were soldiers under the colored government. I
mean, after thinking this thing through well, if you had to do
it again would you do it again?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, I think, I would indeed, sir, because
of the very urgent considerations that were in front of us by
one of our ablest and most experienced ambassadors on the
ground, concerned about what was, what could happen in that
country if it set off on a wave of anti-white feeling; if the
Americans themselves were in jeopardy; if there was a total
breakdown of confidence in the government; and creating a
situation in which all sorts of people might come in and fish
in troubled waters. I would have no hesitancy at all about the
decision that was taken.

TREATMENT ON MOISE TSHOMBE

Senator Thurmond. Now, Moise Tshombe has been a friend to
the United States. He is one of the most literate and best
educated men in Africa, and we are treating him rather
shabbily.
Was there any understanding with Mobutu or the Congolese
government that by doing what we did they would not harm
Tshombe, or was he discussed?
Secretary Rusk. We hope that situation will not arise
because we hope that the Algerians will not go further with
this kidnapping business.
I do not know that we have treated Tshombe shabbily. When
he was the government of the Congo we gave him full support at
a time when many African countries were rather critical of us
for doing so. Our view was that his government was the
government of the Congo and we supported the government of the
Congo.
Mobutu became the government of the Congo, and we support
this government of the Congo.
Senator Thurmond. What we did is a long story. But we did
not have any understanding with the Congolese government that
they would protect Tshombe or would not harm him?
Secretary Rusk. We have no understanding in connection with
the C-130's; no, sir.
Senator Thurmond. In other words, Tshombe did not come into
this picture at all?
Secretary Rusk. Not in our discussions with the Congolese
government; no, sir.
Senator Thurmond. His name was not mentioned at all?
Secretary Rusk. So far as I know he was not.
Senator Thurmond. Although you know he is under sentence of
death in the Congo if he returns there, and you know it is
possible that he maybe turned over by the country where he is
now.
Secretary Rusk. Well, if that happens, sir, we will try to
get to that when it happens.
Senator Thurmond. Would you take steps to try to save his
life?
Secretary Rusk. I think it would be important for the
present government of the Congo not to take action against
Tshombe and not to execute him because this business of regular
and frequent killing off of political opponents is not a very
profitable undertaking. It just keeps a country all stirred up.
Senator Thurmond. I am glad you feel that way. Will you
express that to the Congolese government?
Secretary Rusk. If the occasion arises; yes, sir.
Senator Thurmond. If the occasion arises?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
Senator. Thurmond. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Church. He was here a minute ago.
Senator Church.
Senator Church. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. AID PROGRAM IN THE CONGO

With respect to these three thousand Americans who are
presently in the Congo, how many of these are there as our
cadre to carry out our various AID programs?
Secretary Rusk. There are 303--1 think these figures are
correct--303 U.S. official personnel; 276 dependents of
American officials. The rest of them are residents, mostly
missionaries, and some 117 or so tourists and alien residents
and miscellaneous groups.
Senator Church. Well, about 20 percent of them then,
considering dependents, are there in connection with either the
American Embassy or in connection with the American AID
programs. The balance are not.
Secretary Rusk. I think that is correct, sir.
Senator Church. How do these planes protect these
Americans? I mean----
Secretary Rusk. I think the two principal things would be
first, that their being there was of great assistance in
calming down public opinion and the building up of a racist
public opinion aimed at white people.
Senator Church. I understand that part.
Secretary Rusk. That is the political factor.
Secondly, they are there, they could be used for prompt
evacuation if evacuation should be called for. They have no
combat capability in the event of any struggle occurring.

ESTABLISHING A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Senator Church. Well, the reason I ask this question is
because it occurred to me that we may be talking about a
doctrine that I am not familiar with regarding the
responsibility of the American Government to confer or extend
protection to American citizens abroad.
I have understood the practice in the past to move in and
to evacuate American citizens in a situation of danger abroad.
But to move in and establish an American presence in a foreign
country under the color of this doctrine seems to me to be at
least an extension of the doctrine, a form of the doctrine with
which I have not previously been familiar.
Secretary Rusk. I think the presence has been there with
these 3,000 Americans we are talking about.
Senator Church. What I mean is--no, no--what I mean is they
are the citizens we have gone in to protect. In the past the
United States and other countries have sought to protect their
citizens abroad by moving in and evacuating them from dangerous
situations.
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Church. But here we have gone in and established a
kind of military presence which may last two weeks or a month,
or if a problem is not settled in that length of time, may last
much longer, and that military presence in the Congo is
justified on the theory that it is but an application of the
doctrine of protecting American citizens abroad.
Secretary Rusk. It has more than one justification.
Senator Church. I do not follow this.
Secretary Rusk. It has more than one justification in our
minds. But we, on many occasions, put American aircraft or
American ships into situations where evacuation of American
citizens is called for, and sometimes we take precautionary
dispositions in the event of possible crisis or possible danger
to American citizens. We move aircraft or ships around.
We sometimes--we have done that on many occasions where
evacuation did not become necessary, but we just got through,
as I said, with a very large scale evacuation of personnel out
of the Middle East, and in some of those situations in the Arab
countries we used American military aircraft on a substantial
scale.
Senator Church. Well, I can see that aircraft of this kind
can be used for the purpose of evacuating American citizens
from a situation of extreme danger, and that we may be on the
brink of that in the Congo. We have them there for that
purpose.
But we could not just keep them there in the Congo
indefinitely on the ground that American citizens might be in
danger.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Church. And not have that an extreme distortion of
the doctrine.

AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN THE CONGO WAS FRIGHTENED

Secretary Rusk. No. But, you see, our Ambassador reported,
Senator, that the American community was in an acute morale
situation. They were frightened; they were expecting anti-white
demonstrations; they were expecting the possibility of
massacre. There had been about 20 white people killed in this
kind of situation already, roughly 20. They were expecting a
big demonstration down in Katanga, for example, where they were
calling for people to assemble, bringing their bows and arrows
and machetes and things of that sort to go after the white
people. There is a very large white community down there,
including a good number of Americans. It was to try to get that
sort of a situation under control, that was one of the
principal reasons why we put these three C-130's in there. The
government, on the basis of knowing that this kind of political
as well as practical help was coming, was able to get out and
make a convincing case apparently to most of the population
that these mercenaries did not represent a big white
international conspiracy to do in the government of the Congo,
and that had a good deal to do with settling down the
atmosphere in the country.
Now we are not out of it yet, gentlemen. I want to make it
very clear that the situation is still pretty touchy. It is
touchy in Kisangani. It is touchy still in the Katanga to some
degree, although that is pretty well under control now. There
may be outlying areas where we can still run into--and if we
run into this period without significant loss of American life
we will be fortunate, and we are working on it day and night.

A POTENTIALLY LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

Senator Church. With respect to the other aspect of the
Americans, that is, to give logistical support to the Congolese
government, suppose that your anticipations do not materialize
and the situation does not grow better in two weeks or a month,
but grows worse. Having made a commitment to give logistical
support to the Mobutu government, if the Mobutu government
calls upon us to extend that support and triple the number of
planes in order to expedite the movement of Congolese troops,
aren't we then in a position where it becomes quite difficult
not to proceed with the commitment on the ground that we always
keep our pledges?
Secretary Rusk. No, I think a request to other governments
including other African governments, will begin to take effect
here in some of these matters. In the case of troops, I would
myself think that under the general practice which has been--we
have seen examples of in the last six years in the Congo--they
would certainly call on other African states for additional
troops for assistance.
I do not anticipate that we will be getting requests for
any significant buildup of our effort.
There was a very clear understanding there was a precise
request for three aircraft. These have a very special
capability in terms of logistics support. They have no combat
capability.
Therefore, we certainly would not expect to commit them
into any combat situation. But they are long range. They have
short landing capability. They have large tonnage capacity.
They can take large numbers of people. So they are very well
adapted to this particular kind of thing.
Senator Church. We have made no commitment, and you feel no
obligation nor anticipation that we are going to enlarge the
number of planes we have sent?
Secretary Rusk. Our expectation, Senator, is that this
effort, which is primarily an effort of about 150 to about 180
mercenaries, is going to peter out either through a combination
of its own lack of momentum and pressures from the government
forces. If you think of a country as large as the U.S. east of
the Mississippi, if you think of a raiding party of 150 people
moving into, say, the outskirts of Louisville one day, and then
in two or three days getting on to Chattanooga, they are not
going to take over the Congo. They are not going to take over
the Congo.
Senator Church. No. But in that situation one also wonders
about the need of the Congolese government to rely upon us to
effectively take care of a threat of that proportion.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, these are matters of
judgment. We had a very severe situation portrayed to us by our
Ambassador reflecting the views of the general American
community there.
If we had waited two or three days, and these massacres had
developed, substantial numbers of Americans had been killed, I
would be down here answering another set of questions. I would
prefer to answer the ones I am answering now rather than that
other set which I would be answering in that circumstance,
quite frankly.
Senator Church. I think your answer to these questions is
very able, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you.
Senator Church. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson.

THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, in view of this discussion
this afternoon, of course, everyone is obligated to protect our
own citizens. But when it gets to dealing with another
government, sending troops and planes to protect or preserve a
government, I just ask this one question: If it is the position
of the administration that the President can order U.S. forces
to give logistics support to a government or to rebels, for
that matter, without a treaty, legislation, or a commitment?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, from the internal
constitutional point of view, the Commander-in-chief does have
authority to use the armed forces of the United States within
broad limits, and he has exercised that a hundred times.
I might tell you that the protection of the territorial
integrity of the Congo has been of major concern to the United
Nations. There continue to be outstanding resolutions in the
United Nations calling upon all nations not only to refrain
from interfering with the Congo, but also to give it assistance
in maintaining its territorial integrity.
Those resolutions are still in force, and were the
background for the meeting of the Security Council on the Congo
Saturday, and again yesterday.
We reported these planes to the Security Council, and no
one, including the Russians, raised any problems or objections
to the dispatch of these planes there.
So I think that the Congo has been a matter of
international concern for many years, and I think there is no
question in my mind about both the international environment in
which these planes went in there and the internal
constitutional situation.
Senator Carlson. Admitting that is correct from a U.N.
standpoint, we still get back to the question of whether our
Nation, whether the President of the United States and the
administration can, without a treaty or legislation or
commitment, go out and take over the United Nation's
obligations.
Secretary Rusk. It has not taken over the United Nations'
obligations. All we did was to put in three planes.
Senator Carlson. I know.
Secretary Rusk. And these questions did not come up two
years ago when we put in four planes. They did not come up
earlier in the same form when we were putting transport to
support the U.N. efforts there at the earlier stage.
Senator Case. Times have changed, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. So I gather.
Senator Carlson. That is all.

NO RUSSIANS IN THE CONGO

Secretary Rusk. Any Russians in the Congo?
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. The Congo does not have relations with the
Soviet Union. There are three or four countries of Eastern
Europe that have embassies in the Congo.
The Chairman. Senator Stennis.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I came in so late
that I have hardly warmed up to the subject.
Senator Case. See what you can do.
The Chairman. Do you want a little time?
Senator Stennis. I am going to have to go, that is the
trouble.

COMPARISON TO VIETNAM

I am concerned, you are talking about two years ago, Mr.
Secretary--first, I want to commend you again, though, for your
Middle East handling--the way you handled yourself.
Two years ago the war was not going like it is in Vietnam.
We did not have all these men over there. We are supposed to be
a little wiser than we were two years ago.
I do not object to going in there to bring out our people.
But Senator Church brought out that we are going in there and
we set up in a way. I do not know. You said, as I understood,
there is no obligation, though, or any promise or anything to
stay or to augment under conditions----
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Stennis. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. No commitment with respect to----
Senator Stennis. Have you made any statement about your
expectation of pulling out to the committee this afternoon,
sir?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. I indicated to the committee, and
we have indicated to the Congolese government, we expect these
planes to be there for a period of from two weeks to a month.
Senator Stennis. Well, I don't want to go over what you
have already told. I thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Miller.

CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Senator Miller. Mr. Secretary, how many paratroopers went
on board the planes?
Secretary Rusk. Forty-five. Three planes; 15 men to a
plane; five men to a ship on guard.
Senator Miller. Now, when did Mobutu make the request?
Secretary Rusk. The request for these C-130's came up on
the 6th of July.
Senator Miller. Did he make the request of our ambassador?
Secretary Rusk. Of our ambassador which was referred back
to Washington.
Senator Miller. When was the decision made to dispatch the
three aircraft?
Secretary Rusk. On late Saturday night. They had been
alerted and displaced forward, but the decision was made late
Saturday night.
Senator Miller. And I presume by the President?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Miller. Was there any consultation with any member
of Congress before that decision was made?
Secretary Rusk. We discussed it with some members of the
Congress at the time that we displaced the planes forward to
Ascension Island, and we notified a good many more at the time
that they were ordered on in from Ascension Island to the
Congo.

COMPARISON WITH NIGERIA

Senator Miller. I note that you said that we would not have
sent these planes to Nigeria. I believe you said something to
that effect?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Miller. I cannot understand why we would not if we
had 6,000 Americans in Nigeria, and there was a need to protect
them, and we only have 3,000 in the Congo, why wouldn't we send
three planes to Nigeria if the President of Nigeria asked us
for them.
Secretary Rusk. He did not ask us.
Senator Miller. But if he had.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is--I do not want to confuse two
circumstances. If a full-scale evacuation program from Nigeria
had to be undertaken, it is entirely possible that we would use
such aircraft and such ships as might be available to move out
these 6,000 Americans over there.
Senator Miller. But suppose there is not a full-scale
evacuation, but just a comparable situation of some mercenaries
and the President of Nigeria contacts our ambassador and says
he would like to have three aircraft with guards. I understood
that you indicated we would not furnish those aircraft.
Secretary Rusk. I am not sure that you were here at the
beginning, Senator----
Senator Miller. I was, yes.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I tried to distinguish between the
two cases, first, on the basis of a very large international
interest in and expressed interest in the situation in the
Congo and, secondly, I indicated that we look upon Britain as
having the primary role in any requirements of Nigeria in this
situation.

NATURE OF THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THE CONGO

Senator Miller. Well then, does that mean that we have a
primary role--that Britain can look to the United States as
having the primary role for the Congo?
Secretary Rusk. I think the problem is more generalized. I
think there will be other countries giving assistance there. I
suppose there must be 15 to 20 countries involved in the Congo
at the present time giving assistance one way or the other. The
Israelis have been training their paratroopers; the Belgians
their ground forces; and the Italians some of their naval
units. There are very substantial numbers of economic and
technical assistance missions from various countries.
I think you will see in the next day or two some
announcements will be made about other countries giving
particular assistance in this situation that we are talking
about today.
Senator Miller. Well, we did not apparently think that it
was prudent to wait until these other countries joined with us
in this assistance.
Secretary Rusk. No. Our ambassador made it very clear
during the day that there was a most urgent situation, based
upon this rapidly growing racial feeling throughout the Congo
and the real threat that that would get out of hand to the
jeopardy of, among others, the American community there.
Senator Miller. Well then, it gets down to where the timing
of it, if not the act itself, the timing of it revolved around,
the protection of Americans.
Secretary Rusk. I think the urgency and timing are very
closely related to that; yes, sir.

SAYING AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT NIGERIA

Senator Miller. If there was a similar timing and urgency
with respect to Nigeria we still would not do it. Is that
correct? Do I understand you correctly?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, if we get into Nigeria--and
again I am not going to try to foreclose whatever might have to
be done in an evacuation situation in Nigeria--we have those
evacuation plans for many countries in different parts of the
world. I do not want to inhibit those in any way.
But I do point out that Nigeria is in a very delicate
situation, and anything that we say from here about Nigeria one
way or the other could endanger one or another group of
Americans, and possibly both----
Senator Miller. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. --who are in Nigeria. So we have tried to
say as little as possible about Nigeria. We do not think
Nigeria is in the same situation as the Congo, among other
things because the territorial integrity of the Congo has been
a major international interest in the last seven years.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NIGERIA AND THE CONGO

Senator Miller. What I am trying to do is get the precise
essential difference here, and I believe I would gather from
what has been said this afternoon that the establishment or the
reinforcement of the Congolese government would tip the scales
as distinguished from reinforcement of the Nigerian government.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, and there are other things that work
in the Nigerian problem. The situation of the two sides is
rather different than the situation in the Congo, to start
with.
Secondly, there are those, including heads of African
states, who are working with the Nigerian government and the
head of the government in Biafra to see if they can get some
palaver started to resolve this problem by peaceful means. You
have got quite a different situation in Nigeria than you have
in the Congo.
Senator Miller. And a different situation with respect to
our continuing commitment to reinforce that government.
Secretary Rusk. Well, there is another major difference,
and that is that in Nigeria, although it is split into two
parts at the present time, in both parts there is a responsible
government which has general control of all elements of the
areas within each part, whether in Biafra or in the rest of the
Federation.
Here in the Congo you have a situation where there are two
or three spots at the present time that are not under the
control of the government, where nobody exercises control. This
was one of our problems in the rescue operations in
Stanleyville two years ago. There were wholly irresponsible
elements there in Stanleyville holding a large number of
hostages who were not responsive to any authority. No one could
take responsibility in that situation. It was simply almost
wild terrain in those circumstances.
You do not have that. You have responsible authorities in
both parts of Nigeria to whom you can look to such things as
protection of your Americans under present circumstances.
Senator Miller. Did Mobutu request just three aircraft
originally or did he ask for more?
Secretary Rusk. His specific request was for three
aircraft.
Senator Miller. One last question.
Secretary Rusk. You see, he had had--there were four back
there in 1964-1965. This time he asked for three.

WHY THE U.N. DID NOT TAKE JURISDICTION

Senator Miller. One last question: Senator Fulbright asked
you if the U.N. had been contacted on this, and I believe that
you answered that they had been notified and there was no stir
about it.
But the question I would have would be why was not the
United Nations asked to take jurisdiction over this?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the Security Council met on Saturday
on the Congo situation, and put it over--was it Saturday or
Friday? I think it was Saturday.
Mr. Palmer. I think it was Saturday.
Secretary Rusk. And put it over to Monday for a second
meeting. I think it is just primarily a question of time,
Senator.
Senator Miller. You do not think the Secretary General
could have undertaken to authorize the dispatch of three
aircraft----
Secretary Rusk. No. This would have gotten into a great
wrangle in the Security Council on the whole issue of peace-
keeping and the question of financing and the question of
whether the Soviet Union would insist upon its special view of
the peace-keeping operations. I think this would have, by that
time, meant the events in the Congo could well have been
completely out of hand from our point of view, from the point
of view of the racial feelings that were building up.
Senator Miller. This is a case where you, I presume, have
preferred to go through the U.N. machinery, but because of the
situation you really felt that you could not do it and meet the
requirements.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we did feel that we could go through
that process and meet the requirements.
Now, when you----
Senator Miller. I mean in time.
Secretary Rusk. If there got to be a requirement, for
example, on the part of the Congo for additional, say, ground
troops, I think they would go direct to neighboring African
countries for that assistance rather than go through the United
Nations machinery, because the United Nations operations pretty
well closed out, because of the almost impossible problems of
financing and the problems of legislation in the U.N. I think
they would do that bilaterally with their neighbors under the
general rubric of the resolutions that are still standing on
the U.N. books, and I think we will probably see certain
African countries giving the Congo some help in the next few
days on that very basis.

MOBUTU'S APPEALS TO OTHER NATIONS

Senator Miller. Do you know whether or not Mobutu had
requested such assistance from any other country before he came
to our Ambassador?
Secretary Rusk. He addressed an appeal to the members of
the Organization of African Unity, that is, all the African
states. He also sent an appeal to the Security Council to try
to get the Security Council to hold the line around the Congo
and not have others taking part in a conspiracy against the
Congo. That resolution was passed yesterday, so he has been
asking other governments for that help.
Senator Miller. Thank you Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Senator Pell?
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GREAT DANGER FOR ALL

Mr. Secretary, you certainly are getting more than your
share of crises. My own views are pretty well expressed, my own
concern has been expressed by Senator Stennis in his own words.
One query though. If there are 30,000 Belgians and 3,000
Americans, why aren't they in just as great a danger, and why
was there not concern for all the white people there and not
just our own people?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, there was great danger for all of them.
As a matter of fact, the fact that the mercenaries were
Belgian, French, and Spanish nationals created great dangers
for all the whites, but perhaps especially for the Belgians.
Senator Pell. Then why should not the Belgians, who I am
informed have similar type airplanes, why should they not also
get involved and help us with these planes there, be ready to
evacuate them?
Secretary Rusk. This was discussed immediately with them at
the same time the questions came up with us, that the Belgians
have offered certain help in the Congo in this situation, but
it has not yet been worked out with the Congo government. This
has to do with crews and things of that sort.
You see, there are a good many Belgian crews working in the
Congo up to a point, and there is a question of sorting out
which of these crews are thoroughly reliable and which of them
might not do the job.
Senator Pell. I was struck by one point you mentioned which
seemed to me to be of some use to the administration from the
domestic side, and that is the fact that by having white people
supporting Mobutu's government, it takes a little of the sting
away from the fact that he is opposed by white mercenaries. I
am wondering why this point has not been emphasized more by the
Department? It seems a pretty valid point.
Secretary Rusk. I am not quite sure, Senator--you mean more
emphasis ought to be put on the white mercenaries?
Senator Pell. What I was driving at, you said one of the
reasons for sending our planes in there was to show that some
people in the white world were supporting the legitimate
government of Mobutu, and this was not part of a white plot to
throw them out.
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Pell. This makes a great deal of sense from the
world's viewpoint, and I was wondering why we had not made it
harder.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think this came out in the Security
Council's discussions yesterday. Perhaps we ought to say more
about it.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

MOBUTU'S RELATIONS WITH TSHOMBE

Senator Mundt. Where was Mobutu when Tshombe was at one
time a revolutionary and then head of the Congo government? Was
he pro-Tshombe or anti-Tshombe?
Secretary Rusk. I think Mobutu was a part of the coup that
unseated Tshombe. But what was his job during the Tshombe
period?
Mr. Palmer. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese
forces.
Senator Mundt. I thought they were on the same side.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, they were.
Secretary Rusk. They were during a period of two years
during the Simba affair in the East. They were working
together.
Senator Mundt. What has Mobutu's record of friendship been
in the U.N. and other places? Has he been a steadfast friend of
ours?
Secretary Rusk. He has been very helpful internationally
toward us. More importantly, he has worked with the moderate
leaders of Africa in competition with the more extreme leaders
of Africa, and has helped to increase the voice of the
moderates in African affairs as well as in U.N. affairs.
Senator Mundt. Where does he line up in the U.N.? Is he
part of the Asian-African anti-American bloc or is he on our
side?
Secretary Rusk. Well, he is a part of the Asian-African
community. I do not think one talks about its being a bloc much
more because they divide up on most issues now.
I would not call him, put him in an anti-American bloc; no,
sir.
Senator Mundt. You think he is a pro-American?
Secretary Rusk. He is pro-Western in his general
orientation.

IF HOSTAGES ARE TAKEN

Senator Mundt. I would like to take the question Jack
Miller was asking and put it before you straight.
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Mundt. Assuming, as the ticker tape upstairs
indicates, that the rebels are losing out in this contest--I do
not know which side is right--but assuming they are losing out
in accordance with the tape, and as they get squeezed into a
narrower corner they get desperate, and seeing what we are
doing over here, and they would pick up American hostages. What
do we do on that? I am putting it on all fours.
Secretary Rusk. They got to that point before there was any
whisper of C-130's to get out there. They have occupied an
airfield at Kisangani which is old Stanleyville, and they have
a large number of non-combatants there under their control,
Congolese, Europeans. We do not have very good information
about exactly who is there, particularly about how many
Americans are there, if any.
We think there may be some. We think there may be some
American news reporters who were out there on a tour when these
things broke.
There may be a member of, a sergeant member of our ground
transport training team that was there to show them how to run
trucks and maintain trucks, things of that sort. We just do not
have much information because we are not----
Senator Mundt. All right. We have some. They get desperate
and they get pushed into a corner and they announce to us and
the world, ``Either you come out there and pull the federal
troops out of here and come to our assistance or we are going
to blow the brains out of the Americans.''
Then you have it squarely before you as to what you had in
the Congo.
Secretary Rusk. Could I comment briefly on this off the
record?
[Discussion off the record.]

SUPPORT FOR THE MERCENARIES

Senator Mundt. You have got a lot of irritation left in the
Congo other than that between Mobutu and the mercenaries. It
would seem to me incredible that a couple of hundred harum-
scarum soldiers of fortune gathered together as mercenaries
from four or five different countries could aspire to take over
a country which is engaged in this kind of a venture unless
they had some kind of support in the Congo. You said nothing
about that. How about that? There must be some natives
supporting them.
Secretary Rusk. There were some Katangese forces with two
or three of these mercenary groups. I do not believe those are
going to amount to very much. But again out there in that part
of the world, and particularly in the eastern Congo, a handful
of mercenaries can go a long way from a military point of view,
in the first instance.
Now, relatively few mercenaries succeeded in breaking the
back of that extremely leftist revolt in the eastern Congo two
years ago when the Simbas and others were at war there, getting
help from Sudan.
Senator Mundt. They were on the side of the government?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Mundt. Now they are on the other side. They have to
have some native support, some indigenous support.
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are at the present time--we are
not even sure that some sort of palaver might not solve the
problem.
As I said earlier, I am not sure whether you were here,
there were reports that this whole exercise was an exercise in
collective bargaining for better pay for mercenaries, and we
just do not know what their motives are, very frankly.
Senator Mundt. What thought have you given though to the
possibility that they are recruiting dissident indigenous
people who do not like Mobutu for one reason or another or who
may have been sympathetic to Tshombe or somebody else, so they
have gotten together now, 500, and then 5,000, and then 50,000
supporters, and are we going to get into this war to put down
that kind of revolution?
Secretary Rusk. I have not seen very much on that. My
impression is that these people at Kisangani are surrounded by
government forces. They do not have access to the countryside
to do a lot of recruiting.
Do you have anything, Mr. Palmer, on this question?
Mr. Palmer. No. I think your impression is correct, Mr.
Secretary. Most of them are in Kisangani and surrounded.
Secretary Rusk. This does not appear to be any major
political move with any roots in the country or that sort of
thing.
Senator Mundt. Granted that is so, surrounded by government
forces and only 200 of them, why doesn't the government go in
and push them out? 200 people in an enclave cannot hold up an
army very long.
Secretary Rusk. I suppose if nothing breaks on this shortly
that is what will happen. But they have gone through a period
of a couple of days of cease-fire trying to find a better
answer because they are holding large numbers of people there
at the airport as hostages, and that could be very rough on
those people.
Senator Mundt. Have they issued statements in the nature of
a threat that ``Either you come to terms with us or we are
going to cut the heads off the hostages?''
Secretary Rusk. No, but they have not responded to a good
many appeals being made to them to permit, say, aircraft to
take out the hostages; take out the women and children and
noncombatants who are there. So we literally do not know what
their attitude is because they have not been responsible to
efforts to communicate with them.
Senator Mundt. But you do not think there is any
possibility that they may be in charge of a developing
revolution that can become a civil war?
Secretary Rusk. I cannot preclude any possibilities in that
situation, but it does not look that way now.
Senator Mundt. Okay.
The Chairman. Senator Byrd.

NOT WHOLLY A UNILATERAL ACTION

Senator Byrd of Virginia. Thank you, Senator Fulbright.
Mr. Secretary, one question principally for clarification.
A primary mission or, if not, the primary mission of the planes
is to support the government of the Congo, including the
movement of military supplies, the movement of troops, and even
the movement of troops to a third country--Rwanda, I believe
you mentioned.
Secretary Rusk. Rwanda as a part of its response to aid to
the Congo has made its principal airfield available to the
government of the Congo for transport purposes.
Senator Byrd of Virginia. No, my question is this: Is it
your judgment that this Congo operation should be unilateral
action by the United States rather than by United Nations
action?
Secretary Rusk. I think that we will find that it is not
wholly unilateral because there will be others who will be
assisting in one way or another.
I think it is within the framework of United Nations policy
and resolutions which, among other things, include requests to
all members to be of assistance to the Congo in maintaining its
territorial integrity. But in terms of administering an
operation of this particular sort and providing three aircraft
in a hurry for the purposes for which I have stated here today,
I just do not think the U.N. was in a position to do it.
Senator Byrd of Virginia. Our government did not seek the
approval of the United Nations?
Secretary Rusk. Not prior approval before the planes were
put in there. We did report it to the Security Council
yesterday and there was no objection by anybody.
Senator Byrd of Virginia. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Case.

A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senator Case. Mr. Secretary, I have been trying to--every
one here has, as the colloquy on the floor indicated--has been
trying to assert some ideas on the problem of arriving at some
sort of working arrangement or understanding about a working
relationship between the President, the Secretary of State, on
the one hand, and the Congress, on the other, in matters of
this kind.
What is your conception about the way this ought to be? You
mentioned here, and you mentioned before a number of times,
that the President has moved troops in without asking for
Congress' agreement to a declaration of war.
What is your conception about that?
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is not easy to generalize on a
matter of this sort.
But, in the first place, the Congress was not here when the
decision had to be made. The committee was not available.
I had hoped--I had taken up the possibility of meeting with
the committee yesterday on another subject, and the
understanding was there would not be enough members to make it
possible; there would not be enough members present to make it
possible--to schedule it that way.
Now, we, I think, probably what we did here, was to under-
estimate what you refer to as changed conditions with regard to
an action which seemed to us to be a repetition of an action we
had taken several times before with respect to the Congo.
Senator Case. I am not criticizing that.
Secretary Rusk. I understand, but we did not have a
resolution of Congress, for example, when we put the four C-
130's into the Congo in 1964-1965.
Senator Mundt. You had a U.N. resolution.
Secretary Rusk. Well, this was after the U.N. period. Of
course, we have the same U.N. resolution today, for that
matter.

STATING AMERICAN POLICY PUBLICLY

Senator Case. I think what I am groping at, if we can just
have an informal back and forth here, you know, trying to get--
I am not trying to write a doctoral thesis about it--but I
think it is important. In all of these things, there is the
insipient danger to American lives, the background of the
United Nations interest and actions, the nature of the threat
against a country. It seems to me that all of these things are
things--and I put this to you--that could be said out loud and
to the public and, at the time and in a way that--and again you
have your own ideas as to what you can do without raising
difficulties and that sort of thing--but it seems to me the
American people would accept this. I accept what you did here.
I think it makes sense for the reasons that you have given. Why
can't most of these be stated publicly?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, the principal reason why our
announcement on this was so terse and couched in the phrase in
which it was couched, was that there was an extremely volatile
and dangerous situation in the Congo. I hope the senators
present and who have already left did not go before television
out there and talk about these planes to evacuate Americans,
because that is a very, very delicate situation in the Congo at
the present time.
We had to act promptly but in low key, and without
disclosing all of the elements in the situation. To disclose
all of the elements would have contributed to the very problem
we were trying to avoid and prevent. So it is that kind of a
problem we were faced with.
Senator Case. I think it is a question though as to how
much people think information broadcasted generally is good or
bad. I cannot think of anything much that you have said that
would be strange or surprising to anybody. Isn't this the
reason for an understanding of this by the members of the
United Nations, the government themselves?
Secretary Rusk. I think the principal point that I had
reference to was the relation to the possible evacuation of
Americans. This is one of the greatest dangers and of great
sensitivity.
Senator Case. But the danger of a racial eruption.
Secretary Rusk. I think that can be mentioned, yes.
Senator Case. Yes.

A STATE OF NEAR PANIC

Senator Mundt. Tell us why. I accept your word, but why
would it be dangerous to say that we are going to evacuate
Americans to protect their lives if that is necessary?
Secretary Rusk. The judgment of our ambassador on the scene
there was that the American community was in a state of near
panic. If we had launched evacuation moves prematurely, this
would have added to the panic and would have left the
impression in the Congo that we were abandoning the Congo to
whatever conspiracies of other white people they thought they
were being subject to, whereas if we created the impression of
calm, we were going to give the Congo government this tangible
demonstration of our support and settle down the nerves of our
own people. That, in turn, would help settle down the general
situation and public opinion. It also gave the Congolese
government and their officials something to lean on when they
went to their own people and said, ``Well, now, you see it is
not what many people have said. This is not a general white
conspiracy against the Congo and its government. Treat the
foreigners well. We do not think the governments of the world
are in support of these mercenaries. Go home and get your work
done and treat foreigners correctly.''
The Chairman. Wasn't the origin of this so-called panic the
government broadcasts?
Secretary Rusk. At the very beginning.
The Chairman. They are the ones who stirred it up and
created the atmosphere of panic.
Secretary Rusk. At the very beginning the government
contributed to this because at that time they did not know what
was behind this. They did not know whether a lot of people were
waiting outside the country, waiting to come in behind these
fellows, and they got very much disturbed about it when the
affair first occurred.
They have calmed down considerably since and have gone the
other way in trying to calm down the other people. You are
quite right, Mr. Chairman. The government's original broadcasts
did help stir this up.
Senator Case. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Morse.

PRESIDENTIAL USE OF ARMED FORCES

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, first I want to express my
regrets in not being here all afternoon, but I was one of the
conferees in a conference with the House on the railway case
and, therefore, I missed the benefit of hearing your full
discourse. Therefore I shall limit myself to the parts that I
have heard.
My questions will be few. Do you believe that the President
has the power, acting alone in his Executive capacity, to order
five, ten, fifteen, twenty more C-130's to the Congo if he is
requested to do so?
Secretary Rusk. I think if one looks back to these hundred
instances in which Presidents have used the armed forces of the
United States for a great variety of purposes, as a
constitutional matter, I think he would have.
I think now that the Congress is here, he would keep in
touch as this situation developed. But I think, as a
constitutional matter, he would have.
The Chairman. If the Senator will yield on that----
Senator Morse. I want to say good naturedly I do not think
bad precedents ever make a good law. It would be bad precedent
to give a constitutional right, nor does the practice of an
unconstitutional course of action create a constitutional
right.
Secretary Rusk. I do not pretend, Senator, to be a real
expert on this particular point.
Senator Morse. I am not either. I am just seeking
information and enlightenment on it.
Secretary Rusk. I suppose that it varies greatly with the
situation. We moved more planes than that into the Middle East
to evacuate American citizens in the recent crisis, far more
planes than that on the authority of the American President.
Senator Morse. So far as I can read the record, although I
hope we are going to have it, and you are quite right, we are
entitled to make ourselves available to you for discussion of
the Middle East. I hope we are going to have a detailed
briefing on some of the aftermaths of that, which raises this
very point. It is one thing to evacuate and it is another thing
to say what we are going to do about the government.
Senator Fulbright, you asked me to yield.

AMERICAN FORCES ON STAND-BY ALERT

The Chairman. Before you came in, I had information that a
number of Special Service troops at Fort Bragg had been put on
the alert to be taken to the Congo in case of need.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, is your information--this is after
the C-130's went there?
The Chairman. Well, this call was yesterday, and this
person said one of her relatives had called them and said he
had come back from Vietnam and hoped to be getting out, and now
had been put on the alert to go to the Congo, stand-by alert to
go to the Congo, at a moment's notice.
Just for your interest, that is put out by the State
Department. That is an expression of their policy as of that
moment.
Secretary Rusk. I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to look into
that point you raised. I think it is possible since we have----

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH VIETNAM

The Chairman. The only reason I raise it is that clearly
the government does believe it has authority to send any amount
of troops it wishes to the Congo if it so desires.
Secretary Rusk. No, not at all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Why not?
Secretary Rusk. Any amount of troops to the Congo?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Secretary Rusk. I do not understand that.
The Chairman. I do not see that it would be entirely
inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place. How many did you
send to the Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have
sent 100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not
send 100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it
desirable.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it was not until seven months after
the Tonkin Bay resolution that the number of troops in Vietnam
were substantially above what President Kennedy had authorized
to go in there.
We have had long discussions on that point before, but that
was not, in my judgment, without authority.
The Chairman. I did not say it was without authority. You
say you have authority. I do not know where you draw the line
here. I do not want to interfere and take your time here.

A RULE OF REASONABLENESS

Senator Case. If the Chairman would permit me to inject
what I was trying to develop was a kind of rule of
reasonableness or suitability that involves, among other
things, close consultation with the Congress.
Senator Morse. Might I suggest to my friend from New Jersey
that if you have authority to pass the Tonkin Bay resolution
granting power, you have the authority to pass a resolution
restricting the power.
Senator Case. Your last clause I did not hear.
The Chairman. Restricting the power.
Senator Morse. Now, Mr. Secretary, I am going to limit
myself to what I heard in the discussion.
I will ask you to co-sponsor my resolution, Senator.
Senator Case. I am greatly honored to be asked. [Laughter.]
Senator Morse. It would be a great honor to have you
accept. [Laughter.]

CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Secretary, I heard you talk about Nigeria. Suppose the
President, instead of following the course of action that he
apparently followed in regard to Nigeria, had taken the other
route and decided to send some reinforcement into Nigeria.
If I understand you correctly you think he has the
authority to do that. He would have had the authority to do
that.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not feel that I am here to
dispose of the constitutional prerogatives of the President
without full consultation of the President and the Attorney
General.
Now, I would suppose----
Senator Morse. I made my point.
Secretary Rusk. To try to make it as precise as possible on
one feature of it, I would suppose that if a situation in
Nigeria got to a point where our evacuation plan, standing
contingency plan for evacuation of American citizens become
operative, that the President would, as he has done on many,
many occasions before, all Presidents would have the authority
to activate that evacuation plan.
Senator Morse. Well, that raises the very point I want to
raise. It is one thing for a President of the United States as
Commander-in-Chief meeting an emergency that involves the
protection of American lives to proceed, limiting his operation
to the protection of those lives and the evacuation of the
people, that is one thing. It is quite another thing for the
President to assume that he has the power to send American
troops abroad to bolster a foreign government, without
Congressional authority, and I think that is one of the great
constitutional issues that is before the American people at the
present time. It disturbs me because I really think it is so
unnecessary to create the split that the President is creating
in this Republic at the present time.

MOVING AWAY FROM CO-EQUAL BRANCHES

When Senator Stennis says things have changed in two years,
they sure have, in regard to this split of opinion in our
country as to whether or not we are moving in the direction not
of three coordinate and co-equal branches of government, but
one in which the Executive is step by step, and rather rapidly,
taking on some of the characteristics of what, for want of a
better descriptive term, we call government by executive
supremacy.
I do not think it is necessary. I never have thought it was
necessary, for us to get into this kind of a conflict. We
cannot listen to the discussions around this body without
knowing it is a very serious matter, and that is why I was not
engaging in any jocularity when I said to the Senator from New
Jersey that we have to start thinking of different types of
resolutions than the Tonkin Bay Resolution because I think a
case can be made for the power of the Congress to restrict the
President by way of resolutions.
I do not think we ought to get into that kind of a hassle
with the executive branch of government. I think you know me
well enough to know that no matter what differences exist
between me and the executive branch of government they are
completely professional and derive only from my very sincere
beliefs about what I think is a veering away from the true
meaning of the separation-of-powers doctrine in this Republic.
I think we are dealing here with an administration, many
emergency situations have given rise to it, I realize that, but
I think we are dealing with an administration that has gone
further than any administration in our history in the exercise
of what I think is pretty much arbitrary power on the part of
the White House.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I have the impression that this
administration has tried to consult the Congress, not always
successfully, more frequently than any administration I know
about.
The last time I was involved in a colloquy of this
particular subject, the issue was that some Members of the
Congress felt we were trying to consult them too much. So it
may be we need a little philosophy on both sides on this
particular point. I can recall, too----

BRIEFINGS ARE NOT CONSULTATION

The Chairman. May I say at this point, since I think I am
involved in that, that I do not consider briefings in which the
committee, such as you have had this afternoon, briefings in
which we have had no opportunity to talk is consultation. That
is lecturing under circumstances where examination and
discussion are not appropriate. That is what I had in mind.
I think you have reference to this kind of consultation
which I consider to be the kind that was intended. I do not
think there has been any undue amount of that. But we have had
an awful lot of briefings at the White House which I do not
consider to be the equivalent of that at all.
Secretary Rusk. No. Frankly, I was referring to the
discussion we had at the time of the Punta del Este Resolution.
The Chairman.Well, that was all right. It was very good.
Secretary Rusk. I can remember when Mr. Truman consulted
the leadership at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War.
He was advised to proceed on the basis of the power of the
President, and then shortly after that, one of the leaders said
he supported what he did but he did not support the way he did
it. He should have come for a resolution. These are things that
need sorting out, further discussion.
Senator Morse. I agree.
The only purpose of my comment here is to raise a situation
that I know exists up here. I am not alone in this point of
view. That is why you are getting, I think, the kind of
critical reaction up here, because we have, I think, not
established the relationships that are necessary.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BOLIVIA

I will ask you one question dealing with this indirectly,
and I think I owe it to you to ask it, and I owe it to myself
to get the information. Can you tell the committee what
military personnel the United States has, United States
military personnel in any capacity, as advisers or in any other
capacity, in Bolivia?
Secretary Rusk. I will have to get the exact information.
We have a small group there training, particularly a new
battalion that is being organized for counter-guerrilla
operations.
Senator Morse. Guerrilla operations?
Secretary Rusk. That is right.

PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE UNLIMITED POWER

Senator Morse. That gives concern to some--whether or not
that should be done by executive action, or whether there ought
to be not only consultation but advice and consent before we
start sending American troops for any kind of military action
into another country, be it Bolivia, the Congo or anywhere
else. I think that what is developing here in this discussion
this afternoon, and we are indebted to you for doing it, is the
outlining of a framework of what I think is bound in the weeks
ahead to open very important constitutional debate in the
Congress as to how far the President should be allowed to go in
exercising this discretionary power without a resolution passed
by Congress approving it or without the Congress passing a
resolution rejecting it if he attempts it.
Even in the Tonkin Bay Resolution we had the rescission
clause in Vietnam in which he was to be granted the power only
as long as the Congress continued it, subject to rescission.
Now, that seems to involve recognition on the part of both
the Executive Branch and the Congress that this was not an
unlimited power on the part of the President. That is all I
wanted to raise, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, this is a very interesting
point. I felt myself that President Johnson had wanted to
consult the Congress more frequently on major matters that most
Presidents have done outside the framework of, say, normal
legislation.
Now, in the case of the Food for India business, the
President had authority under existing law, but because it was
of a substantial size he said, ``I want to be sure the Congress
and we move together on this before we move, even though I have
the legal authority under the law,'' and so he came down and
asked for the Food for India consideration.
In the case of the Middle East, as you know, we were
consulting pretty intensively on that situation as the matter
developed, particularly prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

EXAMPLE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

I would be interested in knowing whether you felt that if
the President sent a ship through the Strait of Tiran--I
believe you were in favor of that at the time--whether that
should have been preceded by a resolution of the Congress?
Senator Morse. I am very glad you raised it.
Secretary Rusk. You see, these are things which, by the
time--this could make it very complicated, because if we were
to expose that action ahead of time, there might be other ships
waiting there and greatly complicate the issue on the ground.
Senator Morse. I am very glad you raised the point. First,
let me say that I do not know of anybody on this committee who,
on the record, has praised President Johnson more than I have
for the consultations that he has engaged in. I can give you
Congressional Record citation after citation, as well as the
records of this committee.
My high approval of consultation, Punta del Este was an
example of it, the Middle East was an example of it, I have
said many times that the President, based upon his experience
up here as Majority Leader and his other senatorial capacities,
always recognized what I think is the true meaning of the
advice and consent clause of the Constitution. But it is advice
and consent before the fact, not after the fact.
In regard to the Strait of Tiran, if you will read the
entire speech I made on the floor of the Senate after a 3-hour
briefing by you, and I take responsibility for the speech, but
I want to say that as I listened to you, I thought the best
service I could render was to make that speech on my own.
Secretary Rusk. I am not criticizing the speech. I am just
thinking of the procedures involved.
Senator Morse. I went up and made it. Part of the speech
would have to be read in light of what I said about the Strait
of Tiran. I said this was a violation of international law
rights of maritime nations, including our own. We cannot let
Nasser get by with a violation of our rights to the high seas.
He should be notified that we are going to send a commercial
ship in there, and if he seeks to block the commercial ship
and, of course, we have to exercise our naval rights by sending
a naval vessel through or attempt to send it through, I would
take the same position now.

JOINT ACTION WITH CONGRESS

My direct answer to you is if the President had decided
following that course of action, of course I think he ought to
have consulted with the Congress, and given advance notice as
to his plans to do that. You say there might be other ships
waiting. I think just his announcement to the Congress of the
United States that he was planning to do that if this blockade
continued would have caused Mr. Nasser to stop blocking the
Strait of Tiran. At least we ought to have tried it.
But my point is that would have been in joint action with
the Congress and not on the basis of what I think is a too
extensive exercise of the Commander-in-Chief's power of the
President doing it at his own discretion.
I do not think he has the right to make war at his own
discretion, and that could have led to making war.
I think the Congress has to be consulted in that matter so
that they know the course of action.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Well, in any event these three transport aircraft in the
Congo do not involve the business of making war.
Senator Morse. Well, not yet, not yet. But if we go on,
anybody can build up a hypothetical. If you go on to the point
of supporting a government, and the government should be
subject to attack, and you have to move in to defend the
government, you are at war and American soldiers start dying.
I just happen to think that there is growing concern in
this country about American soldiers dying abroad in carrying
out the exercise of the Executive discretion. I think that is
part of this issue.
This is all I have.
Secretary Rusk. I would not myself include Vietnam in that
category.
Senator Morse. I know you would not. But, of course----
Secretary Rusk. There is great concern about Vietnam.
Senator Morse. I know you would not, but you know I would.
Secretary Rusk. I know.

AID TO ISRAEL

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there was one other matter
that the committee discussed this morning, but since most of
them have gone, I would think it is inappropriate maybe to
raise it. This morning in the discussion of foreign aid they
did send word or authorized the Secretary to give us a full
report on the Israeli sinking of our ship. The matter of aid to
Israel arose and, perhaps, we will just say now that at a later
date, particularly on Friday, I am sure some of the members
will want to raise that question.
Secretary Rusk. All right, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Because they raised the question what about
the aid in view of the attack on the Liberty ship.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I will be glad to discuss that.
I might just say at the moment that all the facts we are
going to get, I think, are pretty well in, and we still have no
satisfactory explanation of how it occurred.
We will be putting a bill in to the Israeli government for
reparations and damages for both personnel and for damage to
the ship, and that will be coming along as soon as we get all
the data together. That will be a very substantial bill.
The Chairman. Well, I just wanted you to know it was raised
this morning.
Well, thank you very much.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Lausche,
Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, and
Cooper.
To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. The
Church motion to reduce Supporting Assistance from $720 million
to $600 million and one year was approved by a roll call vote,
9-2. Mundt motion to cut the Contingency Fund from $100 million
to $50 million and one year was approved by a roll call vote,
11-0.
[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 13, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams,
Mundt, and Cooper.
To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill.
[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 25, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore,
Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and
Cooper.
The nominations of Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr., to be
Ambassador to Pakistan, and Kennedy M. Crockett, to be
Ambassador to Nicaragua, were ordered reported favorably.
Ex. H, 90-1, Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations, was
ordered reported favorably, and the Committee continued markup
of S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. Senator Jack Miller testified
on an amendment to the Aid bill.
[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967

----------

Wednesday, July 26, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche,
Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson,
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

* * * * * * *

BASE RIGHTS [P. 244]

Now, the total on the first page of $596 million for
military aid for 1968 is broken down into the six categories
that you see there. The first category is base rights. For all
practical purposes, these are rental payments. $45 million for
rent. These bases are important to us. We believe we should
continue to occupy them. If you feel otherwise, we can cancel
the rent. If not, we must pay that.
We think we have negotiated agreements that are as
economical as practicable under the circumstances. Any
significant change would, I think, lead to removal of our
facilities from those particular base areas.

* * * * * * *

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES [P. 244]

The next, category three, summarizes the military aid
program for 18 Latin American countries--$13 million of
training and $32.5 million of equipment. A total of $45.5
million in grant aid for 18 countries in Latin America. That,
too, is down from the average for '61 and '62 of $63 million.
We hope by 1971 to further reduce that $45 million to about
$15 million, and, at that time, we hope to have eliminated all
materiel aid and to be providing training only.

* * * * * * *

POSSIBLE DEACTIVATION OF OUR BASE FACILITIES [P. 254]

Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question on
category 1? Have we been requested by any of these countries
who are in category 1 to disband or deactivate or move out?
Secretary McNamara. Libya has asked that we enter into
discussions possibly leading to removal of some or all of our
activities from our Libyan base.
We believe that this was a move made for domestic, ie.,
Libyan political purposes. Since we received the request, we
have entered into negotiations. We have been told privately
that it is hoped we will move out of our facilities. I cannot
tell you how these negotiations will conclude.
In the case of Portugal, they have expressed considerable
resentment over the restrictions we have imposed on the use of
military aid equipment in Angola, and at various times----
Senator Hickenlooper. Why did we oppose that?
Secretary McNamara. Because we felt the military aid
equipment has been distributed to Portugal for use in the
common defense under NATO auspices, and NATO command, and it
would be a diversion from the intended purpose for it to be
used in Angola.
Senator Hickenlooper. France used a lot of it in Algeria
before de Gaulle got--went up in the luminous cloud in heaven.
Secretary McNamara. Senator Hickenlooper, I am not familiar
in detail with the use of French equipment in Algeria, and I do
not want to comment on it, but I do know that we prohibited the
use of military aid equipment in Angola by Portugal, and that
this has raised some questions about the formal removal of our
base rights in Portugal. This is in answer to Senator Carlson's
question.
Senator Hickenlooper. We seem to look with indifference on
the use of Congolese equipment against Angola, as I read the
papers, and that is about the only place I can get information.
Secretary McNamara. I do not believe so, Senator
Hickenlooper. I am not familiar with any failure on our part to
restrict the use of Congolese equipment in Angola. I will be
happy to look into it.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think the equipment is used. I do
not know about our restricting it. I do not know what we can do
about it.
Secretary McNamara. If it is furnished under military----
Senator Hickenlooper. I just wonder whose ox is being gored
over there is all. It is strange political----
Secretary McNamara. We believe our ox will be gored if we
furnish equipment to Portugal under a military aid program for
use in NATO operations and it is diverted to use against
Angola. In any case, I am answering Senator Carlson's question
as to whether any of these countries asked us to restrict our
occupancy rights. The answer is that, although the Portuguese
were irritated by our position on military equipment in Angola,
they have not asked us to deactivate our bases.
Senator Carlson. How about the Philippines?
Secretary McNamara. The Philippines have not asked that we
restrict our occupancy but that we provide joint occupancy of
one base, providing on the base for Philippines military
headquarters, for example, and other activities. We have
resisted this because the base does not permit joint occupancy.
Senator Carlson. Thank you very much.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE PHILIPPINES

The Chairman. With regard to the Philippines, is not $22
million all the aid we give them?
Secretary McNamara. The $22 million is all of the aid
programmed for the Philippines, Mr. Chairman, excepting the
assistance to Philippine forces in Vietnam which is not
provided for under the military aid bill but under the
legislation passed by the Congress and funded by the defense
budget. I can give you that amount.
The Chairman. How much is it?
Secretary McNamara. For fiscal '66 it was $6 million. In
fiscal '67, $17 million, and in fiscal '68, $4 million.

* * * * * * *

BASE RIGHTS [P. 256]

Senator Cooper. The total of your category one shows $45.3
million.
Secretary McNamara. Yes.
Senator Cooper. I have added the figures for 1967 and they
indicate $62.9 million. There is a reduction then in category
one for fiscal year 1968?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, there is a $2.5 million reduction
in Ethiopia, and I think Libya is down.
Let me just check very quickly. Libya is down. Portugal is
not. Spain is the big item which is down. It is really not a
fair comparison, and that is why I did not show the '67 figure.
It is true that the total is down, but the Spanish figure
for '67 in a sense paid part of '68, so you would have to
average the two, I think, Senator Cooper, but you are quite
correct in pointing out that the payments are down.

PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS

The Chairman. I understand that in June of this year, Mr.
Bundy telephoned and said that when President Marcos was here
last spring the President committed the United States to equip
engineering construction battalions for domestic Philippine
use. The President also said in due course we would consider
whether to equip an additional five battalions. The first
operation has gone so well that the President now plans to go
ahead with his second five battalions at a cost of about $9
million. He says he needs no new money as the administration is
counting on saving from deobligations in the Middle East.
Is that your understanding of the situation?
Secretary McNamara. The first three battalions have been
MAP-supported for a number of years. When the Philippines sent
their engineering unit to Vietnam, we agreed to fill out the
equipment of these three construction battalions to help
compensate for the loss of the engineers in the Philippines.
The equipment was funded by the services as a Vietnam related
cost. The fourth and fifth battalions were then squeezed into
the FY 67 MAP by eliminating other items previously scheduled
for Philippine military aid. Mr. Bundy's call referred to the
President's decision to go ahead with the second ECBs. We
recently increased the FY 67 Philippine MAP to $26.6 million to
begin financing this decision.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Senator Gore. If this is strictly for internal security,
internal use, why is it not properly characterized as economic
assistance? Is it not purely economic assistance?
The Chairman. I assume that this is part of the
consideration for sending those 2,000 troops to Vietnam, but I
do not know. I cannot prove it.
Secretary McNamara. Strictly speaking, not, Mr. Chairman.
Let me give you my recollection. If it proves in error after I
check the details, I will correct the record.
My recollection is that the Philippine president was very
much concerned by the Huk threat--Communist guerrilla groups
beginning to become active in the rural areas. He wanted to
build roads into those areas using military construction
battalions in order to open them up, both to advance the
economic welfare of the people and also to permit security
forces to operate in such areas more effectively.
He wanted the military aid program to be expanded by the
amount necessary to establish the construction battalions, and
when he came over here to discuss a number of items, including
the movement of forces to Southeast Asia, he raised these
issues. We were very reluctant either to add to his military
aid program or to finance these construction battalions through
any other source of funds. We had earlier agreed to fill out
the TO and Es of the existing three ECBs using service
``Vietnam related'' to compensate for the loss of the
Philippine engineering folks going to Vietnam. During his
visit, we did agree that, from a purely security point of view
and without any consideration of forces going to Southeast
Asia, it was wise for him to activate two additional
construction battalions and use them for the purpose for which
they were planned.
We financed the 3rd and 4th ECBs from within the limits of
the then-approved FY 67 Philippine military aid program of $22
million.
We have planned the financing of battalions 6 through 10,
for which we made only a contingent commitment, by raising the
FY 67 Philippine MAP to $26.6 million and by using 1968 funds.
I will want to check all this, but that is my recollection.
Senator Gore. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, I do not raise in this connection the
advisability of the aid or inadvisability of it. It just seems
to me from all the Secretary has said that it is almost purely
economic aid, unless it was a quid pro quo for sending the
troops to Vietnam. Whether good or bad, it seems to me that it
ought to be characterized as economic aid. This provides no
military assistance to the western defense, it seems to me.

TOTAL U.S. AID IN FISCAL YEAR 1967 TO THE PHILIPPINES

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I do not know how to phrase
these questions precisely, because I do not know as much about
the program as you do. Is it feasible for you to give us a
figure of the total amount of money that either you or that the
United States government gave to the Philippines in fiscal
1967?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, surely, this goes far beyond my
responsibility, Mr. Chairman, because it involves economic aid
and distribution under P.L. 480.
The Chairman. It is very difficult for us to get the
information. We have had a long experience with the
Philippines, and my impression is that we have continued to
support a very corrupt regime there. The wisdom of our program
bothers me in the Philippines, because they have from time to
time been able to milk us of many millions of dollars, hundreds
of millions of dollars, and I am a little bit impatient about
them continuing to get it in this fashion.
You are familiar with some of those past examples, are you
not?
Secretary McNamara. Well, I am familiar with the military
aid portion of it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You are familiar with it.
Secretary McNamara. I would be very happy, if you wished to
ask me to do so, to collect from the other agencies of the
government the data on economic assistance and other assistance
to the Philippines to add to the $22 million of military aid
that we are proposing.

* * * * * * *

CRITERIA APPLIED IN TRANSFERRING PROGRAMS [P. 258]

Senator Gore. I can see where you anticipate an expansion
in Thailand because you now have got them almost directly
involved in the Vietnam war, but I do not see that has any
application in Laos.
Secretary McNamara. It is even worse in Laos.
Senator Gore. They are not involved in the action.
Secretary McNamara. They are involved.
Senator Gore. In Vietnam?
Secretary McNamara. They are involved.
Senator Gore. Not in Vietnam, however.
Secretary McNamara. But they are involved in very
substantial combat operations.
Senator Gore. Largely internal. It seems to me--I do not
quite see that it would be directly related to the Vietnamese
war and I can see the prospect of the expanding of it.
Secretary McNamara. It is very directly related to the
Vietnamese war.
Senator Gore. They will have trouble anyway.
Secretary McNamara. The combat in Laos is affected by the
volume of movement from North Vietnam to South Vietnam of men
and materiel through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The amount of
ammunition expended, for example, and the number of combat
engagements is very directly related to the infiltration by
North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and we found it almost
impossible to predict accurately 18 months in advance the
expenditures of ammunition in Loas. They became very, very
heavy.
As you can see, expenditures of ammunition and equipment
almost are running $100 million in a year now. It was to take
account of this unpredictable character of the Laotian
expenditures that we suggested Loas be removed from the
military aid program.

* * * * * * *

F-111 SALE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM [P. 264]

Out of our $11 billion of foreign sales and commitments
between '62 and '67, the total involved in that single sale is
on the order of $800 million. I have forgotten whether it is
$800 million or $1 billion, but it is in that area. And quite
frankly, I recommended against it to the Prime Minister. He had
Defense Minister Healy, Foreign Secretary Brown, as I recall,
and the British ambassador at the meeting with me on the
subject. It was a very delicate issue involving all of the
British Cabinet and the British Cabinet which met on it several
different times. The reason it was delicate was that it
involved the potential cancellation of the TSR-2 aircraft on
which they had already spent over $400 million of development
costs and on which, at that time, they had employed some 24,000
British citizens. The question was whether they should
terminate that operation--the TSR-2--disemploy the 24,000
British citizens, and buy the F-111, or whether they should
not.

* * * * * * *

POSSIBILE FURNISHING OF ARMS TO JORDAN [P. 265]

Secretary McNamara. Yes. May I comment on three points. Who
will approve it? What has been the past action? Where do we
stand today?
First, there will be no military assistance, grant or
sales, to Jordan that is not personally approved by the
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. That has been the
practice in the years that I have been associated with it, and
it will be the practice in the future.
Secondly, what was the past policy? I want to speak on a
very delicate matter and ask your cooperation in withholding
this information from public forums.
The fact of the matter is that the recent agreements with
Jordan--and when I say recent, I mean extending back, say, two
or three years during which time agreements were made that
totaled something on the order of 60 odd million dollars worth
of supplies for an extended period of delivery--have, generally
speaking, been made pursuant to the decision of the Israeli
government. I want this clearly understood. There are some
qualifications to this, and I do not mean to say that they
approved every single transaction. But on the more important
transactions, they were asked to make the decision. I
personally negotiated with Eban and, as a matter of fact, I
insisted that the Israeli government sign a statement
indicating their approval of the supply of arms to Jordan.
Now, why did we do this?
Because we didn't want to feed the fires of an arms race in
the Middle East. Our policy is quite the contrary. Nor did we
want one of the parties publicly objecting to the supply to the
other party.
Beyond that, we felt that the independence of Jordan and
the character of its political life was a matter of primary
concern to the Israelis, not to us.
As you pointed out a moment ago, we do have interests in
the Middle East. Our private corporations have oil interests
there and financial interests. The Western European nations
depend on Middle Eastern oil to a considerable degree.
But, nonetheless, we felt that the primary interest was
Israeli interest, and the primary responsibility must be that
of Israelis.
So we said in effect to Israel, ``You decide''----
Senator Gore. What do you mean by primary?
Secretary McNamara. The primary responsibility for the
decision as to whether we would or would not supply arms to
Jordan must be Israel's and we said to them in effect, ``You
decide. We have been requested to supply arms to Jordan. Those
arms might be used against you. If the arms are not supplied,
almost surely the current government will be overthrown. It
will be replaced by another government. The Soviet Union will
be the arms supplier to Jordan and may have important influence
in this country that is on your border.''
And a very extended border indeed.
``But this matter is of so much greater importance to you
than it is to us we are not going to act unless you certify we
should act in a certain way. We want to tell you also that you
must bear the responsibility for your decision. And if you
decide we should not supply arms to Jordan, and King Hussein is
overthrown, and the Soviets do become the primary supplier, and
they do introduce military personnel or otherwise affect the
security of your border, that is your decision and we don't
want afterwards to have you claiming it is ours.''
Quite frankly, we put it just that directly, and after it
was all over I said, ``Sign here.'' I don't want this
discussed; and if it is to be discussed, I will deny it,
because the very life of some of these people is involved.
Senator Symington. If the Senator will yield, you don't
have to deny it. I want to completely confirm it with the
gentleman in the room who was Ambassador to Jordan. I had asked
the Israeli representative if he had any objection to selling
the F-104's to Jordan and he said none whatsoever.
Mr. Macomber was in the room.
Secretary McNamara. These are delicate matters and, as I
say, I would have to deny it. These are extremely delicate and
obviously cannot be carried out without the Secretary of State
and Secretary of Defense.
Senator Mundt. The same with Saudi Arabia?
Secretary McNamara. That instance is different. And I don't
recall that we asked Israel to pass on Saudi Arabian matters;
but I do know Israel is interested in, I will say, driving a
wedge between the moderate Arabs among whom one would sometimes
classify Saudi Arabia, and the radical Arabian nations, which I
would say are Syria and Iraq and Egypt. So that I believe that
Israel would favor the Saudi Arabian policy we followed,
although I personally have not discussed it with any
representatives of that government.

* * * * * * *

ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY [P. 266]

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman--I hope from--the Secretary has
misspoken himself a bit.
Secretary McNamara. I hope not, but I may have.
Senator Gore. Because I can understand why in such delicate
matters we would obtain the advice of the Israeli government. I
don't really think we ought to relegate to them the decision-
making on a matter of this delicacy, but I have used my time
and Senator Symington is chairman of the Middle Eastern
subcommittee, and I want to defer.

* * * * * * *

ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY [P. 268]

Secretary McNamara. Yes, there is no question but what we
have more evidence here of lack of intent to consciously attack
a U.S. vessel than we had there.
May I finish by taking just one second to say I would like
to go back and examine the record of the Tonkin Gulf incident
which occurred three years ago, and on which my memory is a
little hazy, to determine the evidence of conscious intent of
attack. I think it is very clear. I think the evidence is that
our communications intelligence intercepted orders that
indicated intent to attack.
There was no evidence of that in the case of the Liberty.

* * * * * * *

U.S. MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR [P. 270]

Senator Hickenlooper. I think this comes under the heading
of a little international humor maybe, or military humor. In
the period of 1950-1967, El Salvador, which has a total of
4,300 men in its armed forces, received $5.3 million in
military assistance, considerably more than a thousand dollars
per man.
A research memorandum of the Department of State on the
recent border hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras
includes this statement:

The Salvadoran government displayed considerable
understanding and tolerance of Honduran domestic problems,
although it is somewhat red-faced by the performance of its
army which, according to our Ambassador, would surely
annihilate itself by starvation if it attempted to camp out for
more than a week.

Has our military aid to El Salvador gone down the drain or
what?
Secretary McNamara. Senator Hickenlooper, the military
assistance proposed for El Salvador in Fiscal 68 totals
$700,000. It would provide two light helicopters, certain
training ammunition and miscellaneous minor supplies. Beyond
that, I can't tell you what the $700,000 is for.
Senator Hickenlooper. I am not going to make an issue out
of it. Apparently they tried to get a quick battle and get back
to the kitchen for meals. [Laughter]
Senator Hickenlooper Well, I think that is all. I will not
take any more time.

* * * * * * *

DEFENSE DECISION ON IMPORTANT ARMS SALES [P. 274]

Secretary McNamara. I, myself, had serious questions about
each of them. I believe I am correct in saying that, in every
instance, we substantially modified the request, and these were
requests from foreign governments for these sales. I know that
in the case of Iran, I personally cut the Iranian request back
to the level at which it was ultimately settled contrary to the
advice of our ambassador, who by the way was personally
involved in this, and contrary to the advice of some other
representatives of the government, but with the clear support
of the Secretary of State.
In the case of F-5's to Morocco, my recollection is that we
substantially reduced the number, again with the support of the
Secretary of State.
In the case of A-4's to Argentina, there was a long,
extensive negotiation and, I think, a very controversial one.
The Secretary of State and Defense participated directly in
that negotiation.
The sale of F-104's to Jordan, I alluded to earlier.
I personally handled this with the foreign minister of
Israel, as well as with the King of Jordan and the official who
serves him as both defense minister and chairman of the joint
chiefs. I did so with the full knowledge and support of the
Secretary of State.
These are typical sales agreements, every one of which, if
it is of any importance, comes to my direct personal attention.

* * * * * * *

SENDING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO GREECE [P. 276]

Senator Symington. Did the Defense Department decide to
keep sending light equipment to Greece after the coup?
Secretary McNamara. The Secretaries of State and Defense
discussed the flow of military aid equipment to Greece after
the coup, and agreed that it should be substantially reduced.
We have since that time withheld deliveries of such items of
equipment as tanks, combat aircraft, combat naval vessels, and
other major items. We are continuing to deliver such things as
spare parts and some items of light equipment such as radios
and rifles.
I know that all the major items have been held up, but I am
not entirely confident of what is moving in the way of light
equipment other than spare parts.
Senator Symington. Well, my memory is not too good, but I
think that at one time Secretary Battle, for whom we have great
respect down here, told us there had not been any tanks
delivered, but then we found out or he found out, I forget
which came first, the chicken or the egg, that some did. He was
quite upset about it, but based on the previous testimony, I
think we straightened it out. Did you know that heavy tanks
were delivered after the coup, even though they had been loaded
before the coup?
Secretary McNamara. I do not believe I knew it, Senator
Symington, and I am not absolutely positive of it even now.
My understanding was that we stopped all deliveries that we
could. I happened to be in Paris a few days after the coup--I
would say within four or five days afterward--at a NATO meeting
attended by the new Defense Minister of the Greek government. I
told him that we could not continue the military aid program as
we had initially planned it, and as we had agreed to, unless we
had assurances that the constitutional processes would be
reestablished and the constitutional guarantees reaffirmed.
This was the initiation of the program to restrict deliveries
of what I will call heavy equipment or sophisticated equipment
to Greece.
I believe that we took every action that was within our
power to stop such deliveries. Whether or not a vessel that had
been loaded was in transit, or then being unloaded, or about to
go into dock to be unloaded, I frankly do not know.
Senator Symington. Could you have somebody on your staff
give us the story?
Secretary McNamara. I will check it and let you know. I do
know we diverted vessels that were on the water already loaded
and moving to Greece. I do not know that we diverted all, and I
do not know whether there were some being unloaded at the time.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

MILITARY SALES AND AID TO LATIN AMERICA

Secretary McNamara. There is one point not related
specifically to the basic issues of the Export-Import Bank that
I hope we can discuss later because I would like to comment on
it, and that is sales and aid to Latin America.
As the committee knows, these are governed by a maximum
limit established by the Congress which requires that we not
deliver either through grant aid or sales, a total of more than
$85 million worth of equipment to the twenty countries of Latin
America. That is a well-established limit that we, of course,
adhere to.
Senator Symington. A question has been handed me by Senator
Gore, presumably from the staff. It is understood that the
Senior Interdepartmental Group has recommended to the President
the present embargo on all shipments to Greece be lifted. Is
that a matter of Executive privilege or----
Secretary McNamara. Well, I guess it is a matter of
executive privilege, but I won't stand on that, Senator
Symington.
One of the problems involved in understanding the
authorities for grant aid and sales was in the interpretation
given in the testimony on the role of the senior
Interdepartmental group. The senior Interdepartmental Group
does not act independently of the Secretaries of State and
Defense and the recommendation, if they made one, has not yet
come to me. I will be quite frank to tell you that we have had
continued resistance from the Greek government to our policy,
and very recently some suggestion that we reconsider it by our
Ambassador to Greece. But we have not made any decision on it
yet.
I think it was Secretary Rusk's feeling, as it is mine,
that we should use this as a lever to move them toward some
program of developing a constitution and putting it before the
people to be voted upon, and some program for moving back
toward constitutional government.
They are beginning to move in that direction. They have
developed some tentative plans for preparing a constitution and
submitting it to the people. Whether this should be sufficient
basis for reexamination of our policy, I do not know. I will
have to examine it some time in the next few weeks when these
papers come to my attention.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * * * *

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS IN VIETNAM [P. 278]

Senator Aiken. Would you say that military assistance
programs in these other countries attest to the failure of the
programs as South Korea attests to the success of it?
Secretary McNamara. Senator Aiken, I think that is a
reasonable question. In the case of the Taiwanese, the South
Vietnamese have not asked the Taiwanese to provide military
forces, because if they were provided, it would enlarge the
conflict between Taiwan and Red China. It is that kind of
action which has differentiated Taiwan from South Korea.

* * * * * * *

CATEGORY 1 ASSISTANCE [P. 279]

Senator Carlson. But I did want to mention one other thing.
You brought up this morning this category one, and I would like
to ask, because of these countries you mentioned, for instance,
Libya. I heard reports that they would be very happy if we
removed our operations in that country, and you stated that
there had been some discussions which you thought were maybe
political rather than actually their desire. But there is
another problem there that enters into that, as I see it, and
this is an executive session here, and I have a classified
paper in which we are supplying them or selling them or through
grants a substantial amount of military equipment this year; is
that correct?
Secretary McNamara. The grant program is $3.6 million and
the FY '68 credit sales program is on the order of $12 million,
Senator Carlson. I am giving you this from memory, and I may be
somewhat off.
Senator Carlson. My point was this----
Secretary McNamara. I may have overstated it.
Senator Carlson. I am going to read the first paragraph.
This is an executive session. This is a letter dated April 6,
1967, signed by Mr. Gaud:

I recommend that you make the determination necessary to
permit the furnishing to Libya of certain defense services on a
grant basis. The defense services to be so provided are a
portion of the maintenance services element of a proposed $5.1
million sales transaction under which Libya, at a cost to it of
$43.1 million, would purchase on a cash basis ten F-5 aircraft,
spares, training and parts of the maintenance services not
covered by the grants.

I raise this question because here we have $3.6 million for
an air base and for gunnery training, and just looking at it
from a country boy's standpoint, you get the impression we are
maintaining that base in order to sell aircraft.
Secretary McNamara. No, sir; quite the contrary.
On the Libyan transaction, I said this was $3.6 million in
grant aid and $12 million in sales in 1967. I think it may be
$14 million in sales in 1968. There is strong opposition to
selling aircraft.
Secretary Rusk and I struggled with this for weeks before
we approved the transaction. Not only do we have a question
about the $14 million, but we would like to hold it much lower.
There is no feeling among any of us that we would maintain a
base there to sell aircraft.
I would be absolutely frank with you. To turn it around, I
would like to get rid of the base so we would not have to sell
supplies to them.
Senator Carlson. You did sell them, did you not, if you
follow through----
Secretary McNamara. The $51 million does not strike a
responsible chord. I do not mean to say it is in error, but I
just do not remember that particular amount. The amounts I do
have here are for 1967 and 1968. There was no credit sale in
1967, and a $14 million credit sale is planned for 1968. It is
possible, in fact I am sure, it extends beyond 1968.
I will be absolutely frank with you, if I knew any way to
get rid of that base and operate without it, I would propose to
do so and avoid the pressure that they put on us for either
grants or sales aid.
There is, however, one other matter to consider in
determining whether we should make sales to them, and that is
the relationship of Libya to Egypt. At times Egypt has been
quite hostile to Libya, and there has been indication that she
was seeking to lay groundwork for military action against
Libya, which would be, I think, contrary to our interests.
Therefore, under certain circumstances it might, in the opinion
of the Secretary of State, be desirable to provide either grant
or sales assistance to Libya to allow her to protect herself
against her neighbors. But short of that, I would like to see
us try to work out of that base and avoid these pressures on us
for both grants and sales assistance to Libya. I do not know
when we can do that.
Senator Carlson. Well, this paragraph I just read was dated
April 6 and signed by Mr. Gaud to the President.
Secretary McNamara. I am sure it is correct. I just do not
happen to recall beyond 1968.
Senator Carlson. On April 8, here is a Presidential
determination, so this went to the very top, and the President
recommends that this sale be made, and on that basis, as I
understand it, this is a cash sale.
Secretary McNamara. I believe it is a credit sale, Senator
Carlson. I would be----
Senator Carlson. Would that be through the Export-Import
Bank?
Secretary McNamara. Let me see if I can tell you--no, it is
a cash sale.
Senator Carlson. I bring this up for the very reason that
here we have $3.6 million to maintain the base and, at the same
time, following through on this letter and the President's
recommendation of it--the President recommends it--it is signed
here, that we sell them a total of $51 million.
Secretary McNamara. We have a clear policy of shifting from
grant aid to sales where we can do so.
If it is decided that a country must have military
equipment, and it is decided that it can afford it, to the
maximum extent possible we shift from grant aid to sales. But,
at the same time, we hold the total to the absolute minimum
consistent with our other objectives.
In this instance, our other objectives are: one, to
maintain occupancy of the base in the short-run; and, two, in
certain circumstances to permit Libya to deter aggression by
her neighbors.
Senator Carlson. Just one question. You said there were
great objections to the sale. Was that from the departments?
Who were the objectors to the sale?
Secretary McNamara. I would rather not comment on it.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. Back on the record.
Senator Gore. I just have a quick question. I understand
you to say a few moments ago that you would like very much to
be rid of the Wheelus Air Base.
Secretary McNamara. Yes, I would, Senator Gore.
Senator Gore. Then why do we stay there?
Secretary McNamara. Well, it is a gunnery range, plus a
communications facility, plus----
Senator Gore. Whatever it is we would like to get out; they
have asked us to get out.
Secretary McNamara. We have not been able to develop a
satisfactory substitute gunnery range. Possibly, as the years
go by and we change our equipment in Europe, we can exercise
those planes elsewhere than in Africa. But we have not had
planes, for example, that can fly from bases in Europe back to
U.S. gunnery ranges, and the North African gunnery range has
been of inestimable value in carrying out our training there.
This is one of the major reasons why the Libyan base has been
essential.
Quite frankly, I keep hoping that, if and when we replace
the European equipment with F-4's and F-111's, we can find
other gunnery ranges than the Libyan one. I must confess that
the consensus of the experts in the department is against me on
this, but I continue to hope that it may be possible; and I
will guarantee you it will be in three to five years.
Senator Gore. Thank you, Senator Carlson.
Senator Carlson. Would you put in the record, if it is not
too classified, what this $51 million is?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, I would be delighted to. I think
an important element of it is F-5 aircraft. I have forgotten
the number, something like twelve or twenty, some such number
as that.
The Chairman. Are you through?
Senator Carlson. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt?
Senator Mundt. Will you give us a little more information
of what you were alluding to on page two when you said that the
Laotian forces are now constantly engaged in combat operations
mostly associated with the free world effort in Vietnam.
How sizable is the Laotian force fighting on our side?
Secretary McNamara. May I ask General Wheeler to comment on
that?
General Wheeler. What the Secretary was referring to,
Senator Mundt, is the fact that the North Vietnamese, in order
to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex that leads from North
Vietnam to the Panhandle of Laos, have introduced combat troops
there to protect these lines.
Furthermore, over a period of a number of years, they have
been conducting an annual dry season campaign to take over the
plain area contiguous to Luang Prabang, which would eventually
lead them down to the Mekong. So, really, you have two
activities going on. You have a defensive action by Laotian
forces in the North--that is in the Plains area--where they are
protecting their own territory. In the South, in the Panhandle
area, they continue to hold under Laotian control about one-
half of the Panhandle area--the western portion of it--and they
are resisting the efforts of the North Vietnamese to expand
that area.
Now, as to the number of Laotians that might be involved at
any given time in actions directly related to the Vietnamese
effort, this would be hard to say. I would say that probably
today there are on the order of 6,000 or 7,000 Laotians who are
engaged in the Panhandle area in hanging on to what they have.
Further to the North----
Senator Mundt. Friendly Laotians now?
General Wheeler. These are friendly Laotians.
As I am sure you know, you have a combination of hostile
forces, particularly in the North. You have what they call the
Pathet Lao. These are the Communist-oriented Lao who are
stiffened up by a sizable infusion of North Vietnamese
battalions.
In the North, there must be something on the order of
20,000 troops involved at all times.

U.S. POLICY IN THE CONGO

Senator Mundt. Tell us why the Congo, Mr. Secretary, is so
important to our national security, our overall posture in the
world. We have a little sizable contribution here, we have some
planes over there, which are almost engaged in military
activities now, and I guess you were not here when we had our
colloquy with Secretary Rusk, manifesting some committee
disenchantment over this idea of playing at war over there in
the Congo.
Secretary McNamara. I think this is a matter of judgment,
Senator Mundt. Perhaps we have a difference of judgment on it.
There were three transport aircraft, C-130's, moved to the
Congo. The danger----
Senator Mundt. We were told they would be out in two weeks.
Are they out?
Secretary McNamara. I cannot speak for what you were told.
I never made that statement.
Senator Mundt. Secretary Rusk said they would be out in two
weeks.
Secretary McNamara. One is out, and the other two are
scheduled for removal in the near future.
In any case, there may be a difference of judgment, as
there may be with respect to many matters of foreign and
defense policy, and my judgment is very clear on this.
In retrospect, it was an excellent move. Our ambassador
there believes it was the introduction of these three transport
aircraft that deterred the murder of large numbers of Western
Europeans and U.S. citizens. I believe there were ten to twenty
individuals murdered as it was. There were large numbers of
Americans whose lives were at risk.
It is said today that it was the introduction of the three
transport aircraft that changed the plans of the opponents of
the government and, particularly, the mercenaries. I can only
repeat to you what I received through the intelligence services
and through the diplomatic channels. My judgment today is that
it was a very wise move indeed.
Senator Mundt. I was not trying too much to interrogate you
about the planes as to inquire as to what we are going to do
with the $3.5 million or $3.6 million, whatever it is, that you
plan to put into the Congo in this bill, because it looks to me
like Mobutu is not the kind of fellow we would be supporting if
he were the head of the government of Greece. You have got some
pretty good criteria about that, but we do not seem to have any
criteria about supporting him.
Secretary McNamara. We are trying to provide a minimum of
support to introduce some stability into that government. $3.5
million, as you point out, is the amount involved. It provides
vehicles and communication equipment, certain spare parts for
the units that he has.
Senator Mundt. Any weapons?
Secretary McNamara. I think there are some weapons, but it
is primarily vehicles and communications equipment and spare
parts.
I will be happy, if you wish, to examine the details and
let you know whether there are any weapons involved.
Senator Mundt. Are we going to look pretty bad before the
world if we are supporting that kind of an administration,
which then results in murdering Tshombe when he gets over
there, without a fair trial?
Secretary McNamara.Yes, I think so. But I am not at all
sure I know what the better policy is. I myself believe we have
saved American lives by this policy.
Senator Mundt. By the three planes.
Secretary McNamara. By the three planes.
Senator Mundt. There is no use arguing it. It is pure
speculation.
Secretary McNamara. By the three planes and past actions. I
think we also prevent a coup from developing by our $3.5
million program. But I am prepared to admit that the government
of the Congo is in many respects an irresponsible government.
Obviously, I would deny it, if it were stated in a public forum
that I said so. I do not, however, know personally of a better
policy to follow than the one we are following.
Senator Mundt. No, but I would insist, as far as we
possibly can, that Tshombe, if he goes back there, should have
a fair trial--a man, as I understand it, who was a friend of
the United States.
Secretary McNamara. I can tell you that we certainly will
insist as far as we can. But we do not control the government,
and I do not want to predict what will happen to him.
Senator Lausche. I concur with what you have said, Senator.
It would be tragic to have Tshombe, who has definitely been our
friend, deemed guilty.
Senator Mundt. I feel like an accessory to the crime.
Senator Lausche. Without a trial, tried in absentia.
Secretary McNamara. I can only tell you that we will use
every influence we have at our command to prevent it. But I
cannot predict that we will succeed.

* * * * * * *

PROPOSED FLAT LOAN FOR AUTOMOBILE PLANT [P. 289]

Senator Mundt. I do not totally disagree with you. But it
seems to me you have a great gap when you say an automobile
complex like that has no military significance to Russia.
Secretary McNamara. I do not believe it does, sir.
Senator Mundt. That has not been our experience in this
country.
Secretary McNamara. It has in the sense that you cannot
convert an auto factory to produce military equipment. You can
stop production of the automobiles, with great resistance from
the public, and take the people who produce the automobiles,
and after a long time convert them to producing something else;
but it is a long time indeed, as all of you know who have
watched Ford Motor Company convert to B-24 production in World
War II.
General Wheeler. May I add something?
Secretary McNamara. General Wheeler asked if he might add
something.
General Wheeler. Senator Mundt, this was a question
discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because we wanted to
determine to what degree this might improve the Soviet
capability. We came down to the view that the accretion of
strength was not appreciable, and the reason is that the
Soviets have plenty of industrial resources today to turn out
all of the military equipment that they need.
In other words, they have no shortage, so far as we can
determine, of a capability to produce tractors, and that means
they can produce tanks because they have treads. They turn out
all the artillery and all the trucks they need for military
purposes, so our corporate judgment was that probably this
would, as the Secretary said, in the long term, divert
resources that would be available for military programs into
domestic civilian programs.

* * * * * * *

FUTURE TROOP LEVELS [P. 297]

Secretary McNamara. Let me put this aside and comment on
the more specific questions you have asked, as to what
decisions have been made regard to future troop levels.
No final decisions have been made. General Wheeler, General
Westmoreland and I have discussed possible troop levels with
the President. I think it is clear that they will have to be
increased above the levels that had been considered this
spring. Exactly how much is not clear. Part of it depends on
the actions of the South Vietnamese government and other allied
nations.
Since we had these discussions with the President, you may
have noticed that the South Vietnamese government has stated
publicly that it plans to increase the size of its forces.
Senator Case. It has made that announcement. The question
of the adequacy, 600,000, and so forth.
Secretary McNamara. Yes. I think that should be addressed.
But I want to point out, first, that one of the reasons no
final decision has been made by the President is that the South
Vietnamese government had not made a final decision. He felt,
and I think rightly so--and certainly I recommended to him--
that any final decision on U.S. troop strength should depend,
in part, on what the South Vietnamese government was prepared
to do.
They have since indicated they are prepared to raise their
troop strength by about 65,000 men. This will require that they
modify their draft, extend the terms of service, and that they
take certain other actions.

* * * * * * *

EFFECTIVENESS OF VIETNAMESE FORCES [P. 300]

The Chairman. I do not know what the truth is, but these
private reporters certainly do not agree with you. That is not
the only article I have read to the same effect, many of them.
Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I do not know any private
reporter that I have ever talked to who believes the South
Vietnamese won't fight--none.
The Chairman. I think Ambassador Porter made a statement
not so long ago that they are eight-hour soldiers. They won't
fight at night.
Secretary McNamara. I have never seen a statement such as
that attributed to Ambassador Porter. He never made such a
statement to me.
I want to distinguish between----
Senator Case. Excuse me, I did not understand that.
Senator Gore. Daylight.
The Chairman. They are only daylight soldiers, and the
implication of his statement was they are not very effective
soldiers.

* * * * * * *

EFFORTS TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF VIETNAM TROOPS [P. 301]

Senator Case. What are the desertion rates?
Secretary McNamara. It was on the order of 125,000 annually
a year ago, and at the present rate will reach about 74,000
this year.
The desertion rate is down almost 50 percent in the year
and, in part, this reflects the improved compensations.

* * * * * * *

[P. 302]

Secretary McNamara. While we have not determined finally
how many additional U.S. troops we will send, we know we will
send additional U.S. advisors. I would say something on the
order of 1,500 to 2,500.
General Wheeler. Between 1,500 and 2,500, and they are
working on the exact details and the number of men.
Secretary McNamara. These men will advise the popular force
and the regional force, as well as the ARVN, but particularly
the popular and regional forces.
I tried to say publicly, gentlemen, that I feel there is
much room for increasing the effectiveness of those forces,
that our action should be contingent upon the action taken to
increase the forces. So I do not want in any way to mislead you
on this, or deny the validity of your question or the
implication that the forces are not fully effective at the
present time.
But let me ask General Wheeler to comment further on this.
General Wheeler. The problem within the Vietnamese forces
is primarily leadership, and it has been for several years.

* * * * * * *

[P. 303]

General Wheeler. I visited with this one division when I
was out there recently with the Secretary. I talked to the
division commander; also, I got the report of Colonel Kelley,
U.S. senior advisor, and Kelley says they are first class
troops.
Now, they are under strength. Why are they under strength?
Because they have lost people fighting the North Vietnamese.
These are the reasons.
There are three divisions in the Delta, three South
Vietnamese divisions. All three are well led, and all three are
performing effectively against a pretty high level of Viet Cong
strength down there.
The ratio of strength of government forces versus the Viet
Cong in that area is just a little above the 2.5 to 1 ratio,
and this is about as low as you can get and operate
effectively.
There are other units, and I could name several of them by
number, that are recognized by our U.S. personnel, General
Westmoreland and his people, and by the South Vietnamese as not
being fully effective, and General Westmoreland has means of
improving their performance.
The first thing he does, of course, is advocate the removal
of less than effective leadership and their replacement by good
officers, and I might add that he constantly reviews the
performance of units and makes recommendations to General Vien,
who is both Minister of Defense and Chief of the Joint General
Staff, to get better leadership in these marginal units.
The second way that he exerts an influence is that if a
unit is rated by the U.S. advisors as being less than
effective, he takes them off military assistance support. He
writes a formal letter to General Vien and says that at such
and such a date, such and such a battalion is no longer
eligible for military assistance support and will not be placed
back on, its eligibility will not be renewed, until such time
as their performance is improved.
The Secretary has already mentioned these numerous actions
to improve leadership. One course of action is to place combat
tried veterans from the enlisted ranks into the junior ranks of
the officer corps.
The program is progressing and they are getting a better
infusion of experienced leadership at that level.
Another means to improve the quality of the output of their
military academy is to make sure that these young officers,
instead of being sent to some headquarters staff in one of the
big cities, must go to a combat unit and perform combat service
as their first assignment, very much the same thing as we do.
They have a half dozen other programs along the same line.
General Westmoreland, when he was here, said that South
Vietnamese leadership was so thin that he did not feel that
they could expand and still retain their effectiveness.
During the past year, with this improvement in output of
leaders, he now considers that a modest expansion of the South
Vietnamese forces is possible, and he has so recommended, and
his recommendations and proposals to the South Vietnamese are
embodied in a recent announcement, Senator Case, regarding
their upcoming action to expand their forces.

U.S. INFLUENCE WITH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT

Senator Case. I do not think I have to tell you. You know
pretty much my feeling with respect to this war. I have not
opposed it on moral grounds.
I do think there is a very grave question as to the
achievability, and I am sure that to withdraw now might result
in disaster. But this is still an open question. I am only
trying to find out whether this is an interval or whether we
are engaged in something that ought to be stopped, and this
relates to that question that is uppermost in my mind.
One of the things that troubled me more than anything that
happened in the last year was that we get a government report
which says, in substance, that we had no leverage on the South
Vietnamese. Our prestige was so deeply involved that we could
not tell them what to do, and that is, if they do not perform,
that we are through, because there is no point in killing
American boys in a hopeless cause. That is the only way to do
it.
Secretary McNamara. Senator Case, I think if the report
said that, it was in error.
Senator Case. The report that I am talking about was given
to Dave Lilienthal for his planning purposes, and this is a
high-level report.
Secretary McNamara. I do not think I have seen the
document.
But in any event, I strongly disagree with the statement if
that is the statement.
Senator Case. But, Mr. Secretary, it has to be true not
only in your mind and General Wheeler's mind, but it has to be
true in the minds of everybody who deals with this matter.
Secretary McNamara. I know General Westmoreland feels he
has strong influence with the South Vietnamese, and I know
Ambassador Bunker feels that way. That does not mean we can
lead them to do everything that we ask. Many of the things that
we ask are probably in error. They may be beyond their
capability. But in any event with respect to things that they
are capable of doing, we have power of persuasion.
General Wheeler. The Port of Saigon is an example.
Secretary McNamara. The Port of Saigon.
Senator Case. There is a great improvement there.
Secretary McNamara. It is now as good as the Port of New
York.
Senator Case. But it took a long time.
Secretary McNamara. We met with Premier Ky, and we said to
him, ``You make up your mind to clean it up, or help us to
clean it up, or the shipments are going to stop.''
We have leverage, and General Wheeler and I personally did
this last July or last September. It is one minor indication of
our leverage.
Senator Case. This is one issue of what I am talking about.
This is again not--I am only critical in the sense that I am
trying to get at the truth.
Secretary McNamara. Surely. I understand your concern, and
I think it is an appropriate concern. But I do emphasize that
we have this leverage, and we exercise it. Maybe we have not
exercised it enough at times; but we have it, and it is
available in a number of subtle forms.
There are individuals there over whom we have the power of
life and death and, occasionally, we choose to exercise that
power, just by the degree of our association or our support. We
make it perfectly clear we are not going to support----
Senator Case. You more than anybody else know the answers
to these questions.
Secretary McNamara. I know the answers to some. Some of the
others----
Senator Case. I mean more than anybody else. Nobody knows
them all.
Secretary McNamara. The question of how this will develop,
how long this will take, I cannot answer. I have nothing that I
think I could add to your own judgment on the matter.
The Chairman. How do you exercise the power of life or
death?
Secretary McNamara. We won't support certain individuals
under certain circumstances, and they know if we do not----
Senator Case. They would be assassinated.
Secretary McNamara. --they will be assassinated.
Senator Gore. Ky, for instance?
Secretary McNamara. I am not speaking of particular
individuals, and I would want to take this out of any published
record, as I am sure you would want me to. I simply want to
emphasize that the U.S. government should have power to
influence the South Vietnamese government. We do have the
power, and we do exercise it.

VIEWS OF OTHERS ON VIETNAM

The Chairman. I do not want to take the time of the Senator
from New Jersey, but I would interpret Ambassador Porter, who
testified here only a few weeks ago--June 8--as not being very
much in agreement with this view about the effectiveness of the
South Vietnamese. I will put it in the record.
Senator Case. I think so. Would you disagree with anything
that he said? This is my impression; this is what I am----
The Chairman. Do you want me to read it?
Senator Case. If you would.
The Chairman. I will not read it all, but I will have it
put in here.

There are about 1.1 million men under arms. Another
100,000, ten percent, does that mean we are within ten percent
of victory? Of what? This is what worries me. I worry about
this, and I do not want to criticize the generals with whom and
alongside of whom I worked. But what is not needed is--I do not
believe it is needed there--are more troops.

Are you familiar with that sentiment on his part?
Secretary McNamara. I do not recall having seen that.
The Chairman. This is page 17 of our hearings here.
Secretary McNamara. I have not seen that particular one.
The Chairman.

It would like to see a good deal of retraining. What is
basically needed in that country to alter the situation
dramatically is a night fighting force. The night fighting
force is what is needed. We have not trained the Vietnamese to
do this job. Maybe we cannot; maybe we are not trained
ourselves for it.
But after sundown, as the Senator knows, there is a
different state affairs there. In the daytime we can go
anywhere, and our victories are real when we can detect the
enemy or when he attacks us. But when night must fall, if you
have the tanks out or you have the choppers out, you have to
pull them back. Why? Because there is a different state of
affairs, and you have an enemy who knows every inch of his
terrain and who works best at night.

Then Senator Clark was asking questions and he was reading
to him a statement, and I am going to skip down to where Clark
says:
He comes to the conclusion--he was quoting from a Japanese,
I think Oka, the Oka Report--he comes to the conclusion that it
is the fault of their officers, which bears out something which
you said earlier about the nine-to-five hours, and also
something I saw in the paper that in three years there has only
been one field grade officer in the South Vietnamese army
wounded in combat.

Mr. Porter: I am seriously concerned about the officer
corps for a number of reasons. But I think there has probably
been-there have been a few wounded.--

And he goes down--I am going to skip, but I would like the
Reporter to put this all in, I do not want to take the time. He
reads, Senator Clark reads, as a basis for a comment that I
think is very significant. This is Mr. Oka's statement:

Promotion in the Vietnamese army still depends on a complex
of personal family, regional, religious and educational ties
and the generals and wives an officer knows, on his behavior
during the innumerable coups and purges that have shaken the
army during the past several years. The result is an army led
by political generals willing to accept American advice only at
the most technical level of logistics, new weapons and
sometimes of strategy. The corrupt and creaky, clubby structure
of the Vietnamese army itself remains a scared cow. Foreigners
fiddle with it at their peril. Even the well-intentioned
members of the Vietnamese military fraternity hesitate to touch
it, and so the Americans fight the war.

That is the statement. Clark asks, ``Is that unfair?''
Mr. Porter says, ``It is harsh, but it is not unfair.''
Secretary McNamara. He is absolutely wrong.
The Chairman. The first part of it, yes, the list of
factors.
Nearly every single non-administration witness, such as
this Taylor and others, concur in Mr. Porter's view. This is
what bothers us.
Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that
every non-administration witness will concur in that view.
The Chairman. Well, the reporters who write about it--I do
not know Frederick Taylor.
Secretary McNamara. I just want to address myself to the
statements made. I do not believe every non-administration
witness will concur in that view. I know Ambassador Lodge and
General Taylor won't. I know Ambassador Bunker won't.
May I disagree for just one second in order to comment
fully on all the material put in the record, which I have not
read?
The Chairman. I think so.
Secretary McNamara. I want----
Senator Case. This is in substantial accord with what I got
from practically everybody except from the military, and the
military briefing was correct but very formal.
Senator Gore. Did you get it from our own soldiers?
Senator Case. Individuals.
The Chairman. I have had letters.
Secretary McNamara. I think we need to address ourselves
specifically to what has been said. I do not have it in front
of me, but I jotted down some language which said that the
South Vietnamese are only willing to accept advice at the
technical, logistical level. Now, this is just absolutely
untrue, and I will tell us why. They actually function under
our command in many, many circumstances. I do not know what you
call it. I call it more than advice when they are taking
commands from us.
Beyond that, General Westmoreland advises with their
Defense Minister, advises on matters at more than the technical
or logistical level--strategy, tactics, whatever you want to
call it, but it is far more than the technical or logistical
level.
This was about all I could write down, Mr. Chairman, but it
just is not true.
The Chairman. I would have thought Mr. Porter is a
competent witness, and he certainly is part of the team, so to
speak. He has been recommended----
Secretary McNamara. I do not know what part he was
commenting on, and I say it is not true. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is here. Let him comment on it.

NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS KILLED

General Wheeler. In the first place, that is a
generalization. Whoever wrote this article takes the worst
elements in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, and lumps them
with the best, and assesses them as being equal to the worst.

* * * * * * *

ESTIMATED SALES [P. 309]

Senator Cooper. The chief volume of those sales would be to
India and Pakistan.
Secretary McNamara. No, sir, although India and Pakistan
might buy some, the chief volume in fiscal 1968 will be to
Iran, to Saudi Arabia, and to Israel.

* * * * * * *

NATURE OF DOD GUARANTEE [P. 312]

Senator Cooper. If these countries cannot pay, why don't
you just list them in grants. Is it because you believe they
can pay in time?
Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir. They very definitely can pay
it back in time. Iran, for example, is one of the major
countries which would receive this kind of guaranteed loan.
Israel is another. I think it is very clear that both Israel
and Iran can pay over a reasonable period--five, seven or ten
years.

* * * * * * *

EFFECT OF CANCELLATION OF REVOLVING FUND ON U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS [P.
312]

Secretary McNamara. In most instances, we have no treaty
commitments to the underdeveloped countries. The amount of
military equipment we are supplying them under sales agreements
does not give them a capability to fight along with our side in
any significant fashion. Here, the objective is quite
different. The objective is in many cases to hold down an arms
race, to avoid destabilizing relationships among nations such
as would occur were we to deny military sales to Israel. I
think that Israel represents, perhaps, a good example of the
problem we would face if the revolving fund authority were
cancelled, or if our use of Export-Import Bank credit for
undeveloped countries is cancelled.
If that be the case, we cannot make military credit sales
to Israel. If we cannot make military sales to Israel, the
power balance between Israel and particularly the radical Arab
countries will shift. This is a matter of concern particularly
to our State Department and indirectly to the Defense
Department.

* * * * * * *

EFFECT OF ARMS SALES ON PURPOSES OF FOREIGN AID [P. 313]

Secretary McNamara. We have very rigid standards that we
apply to determine the extent to which the resources of a
country may be diverted from its economic development to its
military equipment.
In the cases of India, I personally have put limits on the
amount that we would accept from India in the way of diversion
of resources from economic development to military sales.
The same thing is true of Iran, and of several other
nations.

POSSIBILITY OF PROMOTING AN ARMS RACE

Senator Cooper. I will just make an observation on the sale
of arms to Pakistan and India. If you provide arms to one
country, the other will secure additional arms from another
country, and the arms race goes on.
The Chairman. There is $90 million in sales for that.
Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I think that when that
was put in it may have been a proper estimate, but my personal
estimate is that the sales will not, need not, and probably
should not exceed about $15 million to the two countries for
fiscal 1968.
The Chairman. I do not know where this came from.
Secretary McNamara. I think the schedule you have shows
perhaps $75 million.
The Chairman. It says $90 million. I have it before me, for
the two, India and Pakistan.

* * * * * * *

P. 314

Secretary McNamara. I have tried over the years to hold
down diversions, and we have consistently urged the Indians to
reduce their defense budget. I think it is too high at the
present time.

* * * * * * *

BASE RIGHTS [P. 314]

Senator Cooper. The money is provided by a MAP program.
Does the United States have to contract for a term of years
beyond the fiscal year 1968?
Secretary McNamara. We do. Of course----
Senator Cooper. For the payment of these sums to these
countries for the base rights?
Secretary McNamara. We have a treaty with the countries
giving us occupancy rights beyond fiscal 1968. But we do not
have commitments to them for payments of this kind other than
commitments made subject to action by the Congress. No
commitment beyond fiscal 1968 is made for any purpose
associated with military aid other than with this
qualification--subject to action by the Congress.
Senator Cooper. This morning there has been discussion
about the base in Libya, and some discussion about Portugal.
Can you supply to the committee some statement about
Ethiopia, the Philippines, Spain, and your judgment about their
importance to the security of the United States?

* * * * * * *

Senator Cooper. And three Latin American countries.
Secretary McNamara. Yes.
Senator Cooper. Military assistance and sales to Latin
American countries.
It is always stated that our purpose is to provide funds
for internal security. Would you say that this is correct with
respect to all of the countries, that it only provides internal
security or in some cases it would provide offensive capacity.

MILITARY SALES AND AID TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES [P. 317]

Secretary McNamara. I think it provides an offensive
capacity in some cases, Senator Cooper. May I supply for the
record, because I do not want to take your time now, every
major item of offensive equipment we have supplied in the last
five years, and the number proposed for 1968--which is almost
zero. I would also like to include both the military aid and
military sales, because the Latin American military aid program
and sales program is, I think, a program that acts as a
dampener on offensive weapons rather than as a supplier. I
would like to lay that out for you.

* * * * * * *

MILITARY SALES TO FRANCE [P. 318]

Senator Cooper. I see a notation of $25 million of military
sales to France. Is that a correct item?
Secretary McNamara. I do not recall it. It may well be. Our
sales to France were running a little under $100 million a
year, and I think they have recently declined to about $25
million a year.

* * * * * * *

ALLEGED RESALE OF TANKS BY WEST GERMANY [P. 319]

Secretary McNamara. Except for one intra-NATO case, and a
U.S. approved delivery in 1964 of tanks to Israel, we have not
given our approval and no other transactions have been
consummated. These were government to government transactions
and no private firms were involved.

* * * * * * *

[Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. The
Church motion to repeal the military credit sales authority
(including elimination of revolving fund) was approved, 12-6,
after the Cooper motion to provide $75 million to guaranty
total sales of $150 million was defeated, 8-10. Church motion
to cut military assistance from $596 million to $475 million
was approved, 7-6. Morse motion to reduce military aid (sales
and grants) to Latin America to $50 million was approved, 10-5.
Morse motion to limit military assistance (sales and grants) to
Africa to $25 million was approved, 8-7. Morse motion to add
subsection on Central American Defense Council (requiring that
all except $1.5 million of the military aid funds for Central
America be used for regional integration of military forces)
was approved, 8-6. Morse motion to cut off assistance to any
country following a military coup was defeated, 6-10. Sparkman
motion to reconsider earlier action, cutting Vietnam
administrative expenses ($7 million out of Supporting
Assistance) was defeated 7-7.
Sparkman motion to reconsider earlier action (reducing to
50% the coverage on extended risk guarantees) was defeated 6-7.
Sparkman motion to report the bill as amended passed 10-2,
after Church substitute to report without recommendation was
defeated, 7-7.
[The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, and Cooper.
Leonard Unger, nominee to be Ambassador to Thailand and
Sheldon B. Vance, nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Chad, were heard and ordered reported favorably.
S. 1688, the Inter-American Development Bank Bill, was
ordered reported with an amendment on motion by Senator
Sparkman, 14-2. Other votes taken were: Gore motion to postpone
action lost 2-14; Lausche motion to cut to $200 million per
year lost 5-11; Symington motion for no loans for arms was
approved 16-0; Lausche motion to cut to $250 million per year
lost 4-12.
[The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
Edward M. Korry, nominee to be Ambassador to Chile appeared
before the committee and was ordered reported favorably. Short
discussion on Ex. I, 90/1. The Human Rights conventions Ex. J,
K, L, 88/1, were discussed and decision made to hold a hearing
with the American Bar Association before proceeding.
The following nominees were ordered reported favorably:
William B. Dale, as Executive Director for the United States,
IMF; Livingston Tallmadge Merchant, as U.S. Executive Director
of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Homer
Daniels Babbidge, Jr., Abram Leon Sachar, and Robert Anthony
Scalapino, as Members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and Cultural Affairs for a term
expiring May 11, 1970.
It was decided to hear Brent Ashabranner as Deputy Director
of the Peace Corps before taking action.
Ex. P, 89/2, Treaty with Thailand was ordered reported.
H.R. 3399, to extend the termination date for the
Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission was also considered.
[The committee adjourned at 12:00 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:30 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Church, Aiken,
Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to Council of OAS;
accompanied by Ward P. Allen, Director of Office of Inter-
American Political Affairs and Richard A. Poole, Political
Advisor, Office of InterAmerican Political Affairs, briefed the
group on the Foreign Ministers' Conference and the current
situation in Latin America.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Church,
Dodd, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
The committee approved the following nominees as United
States Representatives to the Twenty-second Session of the
United Nations--General Assembly: Arthur J. Goldberg, William
B. Buffum, Lawrence H. Fountain, William S. Broomfield, and
Adrian S. Fisher; with I.W. Abel, Robert S. Benjamin, Hector P.
Garcia, Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris and Herbert R. O'Conor,
Jr., as alternates.
S. Res. 151, Relative to U.S. Commitments to Foreign
Powers, was discussed as to procedure.
[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:45 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright and
Church.
Discussion of Military Assistance to Middle East and Greece
with Townsend Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force;
accompanied by Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Logistics Negotiations (ISA), Harry
Schwartz, Peter R. Knaur, and Lt. Col. T.H. Tackaberry, USA.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 3:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1967

U.S. Senate,
AD Hoc Subcommittee on USIA Personnel
Legislation, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The ad hoc subcommittee met in executive session at 10:10
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Pell (presiding), Mansfield,
Hickenlooper, and Cooper.
Without objection, S. 633, a bill to create a career
personnel system for the USIA, was considered and ordered
reported with amendments to the full committee.
[The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 10:40 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:35 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman,
Lausche, Church, Clark, and Hickenlooper.
Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs, accompanied by Wymberly De R. Coerr, Ambassador to
Ecuador, appeared to brief the group on the recall of
Ambassador Coerr and a briefing on the sale of arms to Latin
America.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 6:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy,
Hickenlooper, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
Ex. L, 88/1, Supplementary Convention on Abolition of
Slavery, was ordered reported favorably by a roll call vote,
19-0.
Ex. K, 88/1, Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor,
with a suggested understanding, was tabled by a vote of 13-4.
Ex. J, 88/1, Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
together with an offered understanding, was tabled by a vote of

12-4.
S. Res. 151, Relative to U.S. Commitments to Foreign
Powers, was discussed and no action taken.
[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Pell,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.
Idar Rimstad, Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Administration, Ambassador John M. Steeves, Director General of
the Foreign Service, and James Hoffnagle, Deputy Director,
appeared to discuss the lateral entries in the two Routine
Foreign Service lists dated September 20, 1967. The two lists
were then ordered reported without objection, Ex, B, 90/1,
Supplementary Tax Convention with Canada, and Ex. F, 90/1, Tax
Convention with Trinidad and Tobago, were considered and no
action taken.
[No transcript of the session was made.]

MINUTES

----------

MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Easter and South
Asian Affiars, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Church, Pell, and
Hickenlooper.
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, accompanied by John F. Root,
Country Directors, North Africa, Department of State, discussed
with the group Military Assistance to the Middle East and
Greece.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 3:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
Ex. F, 90/1, Tax Convention with Trinidad and Tobago, and
Ex. B, 90/1, Supplementary Tax Convention with Canada, were
ordered reported by a voice vote. S. 633, a bill to establish a
USIA Foreign Service Personnel System, was reported by a voice
vote. The group discussed an appearance of Dean Rusk in open
session. Ex. J,
90/1, Tax Convention with Brazil, was discussed and carried
over. S. Con. Res. 49, commemorating the 50th Anniversary of
Finland, was ordered reported by a voice vote.
[The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in
room
S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
William M. Roth, Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, accompanied by John A. Schnittker, Under
Secretary of Agriculture, and William Starkie, Foreign
Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture, briefed the
group on the proposed International Grains Agreement.
[The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and
Cooper.
S. Res. 151, Relating to National Commitments, was
discussed and no action taken.
[The committee adjourned at 12:25 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 9:35 a.m., in
room 4219, New Senate Office Building.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, and
Aiken.
The group met early to have a preliminary conversation with
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative, United
Nations, before he testified in public session on S. Con. Res.
44 and S. Res. 180, expressing the sense of the Congress that
the Vietnam conflict should be submitted to the United Nations.
He was accompanied in open session by Joseph J. Sisco,
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs.
[The committee adjourned at 10:00 a.m. to go into public
session.]

NEED FOR OPEN HEARING WITH SECRETARY RUSK ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD
SOUTHEAST ASIA

----------

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room
S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Williams, Mundt, and Case.
Also present: Senator McGee.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and Mr.
Lowenstein of the committee staff.
The Chairman. For the record, I will start out with a very
brief statement to start the matter off. We might as well come
forward. They will come in.
The committee this morning is pleased to have the Secretary
of State, who is appearing in executive session in response to
our letter of October 31st as well as earlier exchanges.
Committee members are aware that this session--as described in
the letter--is ``designed primarily to elicit and consider''
the Secretary's reasons for preferring not to accept the
opportunity to meet with us in public on the subject of United
States policy toward Southeast Asia.
Both in his letters to the committee, and specifically in
his press conference of October 12th, Secretary Rusk has
indicated his preference for what he terms ``close consultation
behind closed doors.'' In the letters, he has roughly outlined
the factors which influence his position. We welcome today a
more detailed and profound explanation of the Secretary's
attitude.
I wish at the outset to express my personal belief that the
issue we are considering together is of the highest importance
to our representative form of government. Indeed, the question
of whether or not a Cabinet officer in general should publicly
respond to committee inquiries is a matter of constitutional
significance. In this sense, the committee has a duty to uphold
a legislative prerogative. For if it is not maintained and
exercised, this power will be diminished and gradually
eliminated, as have been so many functions of the legislature
in this century.
At this juncture, I do not wish to take the time from the
committee and the Secretary to elaborate my personal views
beyond stating a few brief points.

THE COMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION

First, I believe the historical record fully supports the
thesis that the senatorial powers of Advice and Consent to
ratification of treaties and to presidential appointments have
consistently been exercised in public as well as in closed
session. These practices are so firmly established that I doubt
that the Executive Branch would insist that this committee
should consider an important treaty or examine a nominee for
Secretary of State without an open hearing. I should think that
the most important foreign policy issue facing us today would
fall into that same category.
Secondly, I believe that the committee's actions must be
consonant with the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946. Not only does the Act enjoin the function of
legislative oversight, which necessitates committee hearings,
it also expressly provides that:

All hearings conducted by standing committees or their
subcommittees shall be open to the public except executive
sessions for marking up bills or for voting or where the
committee by a majority vote orders an executive session.

Finally, I believe that the Secretary's press conference of
October 12th has resulted in a change in the environment in
which the public heretofore has considered the Vietnam War.
While I recognize that the aim of the press conference was to
clarify the arguments supporting United States involvement in
Vietnam, the result would seem to have raised serious questions
about priorities and the national interest.
The factor of China is not a new one, but the emphasis
given to that factor by the Secretary appears to have changed
our policy approach to Asian affairs. And it seems to me that
the Administration would wish to test this revised approach
before the electorate as a matter of sound public policy.
With these brief introductory remarks, Mr. Secretary, I
invite you to give us your views about this issue as well as
about the subject of public hearings.
We are very pleased to have you, and will you proceed, if
you have an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. I have a very short statement, Mr.
Chairman, on this particular point.
I am glad to discuss with the committee this morning the
question of whether I should appear in public session for a
discussion of Vietnam or whether such matters are better
pursued in executive session.
Let me say at the outset that I am not today discussing
this matter as a matter of constitutional principle in the
first instance, but rather from a practical and pragmatic point
of view and from the point of view of wisdom.
I think we all fully understand that the Congress as a
whole plays an important and indispensable role in the
determination of foreign policy in carrying out its
constitutional functions, and this committee plays a very
special role.
I regard it as particularly important that in discussions
with this committee I have the opportunity to be completely
candid so that the views of the committee and its individual
members can be based on a full understanding of how the
Administration sees the facts and the Administration's point of
view.
I do not of course assume that such candor will necessarily
result in agreement either between members of this committee
and the Administration or among the members of the committee
themselves.
But it does seem to me important that whatever disagreement
there may be is based upon as full a knowledge as possible of
the position of the Administration and the reasons for that
position.
I do think that you will all agree that there are things
the Secretary of State can say in private that he ought not to
say in public, and that the more delicate the international
situation involved, the greater the area of discretion. When
the situation actually involves hostilities, the need for
discretion is underlined.

PRECEDENTS FOR CLOSED HEARINGS

I think the general practice of the past is illustrative
particularly in these recent decades.
Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull discussed problems of
World War II in open session prior to Pearl Harbor. He did so
in connection with Lend Lease and the arming of American
flagships. But my information is that he did not discuss in
public hearings the issues of World War II after Pearl Harbor.
He did address a Joint Session of Congress on November 18,
1943, on the results of the Moscow Conference of Foreign
Secretaries.
During the Korean conflict, my recollection is that the
Secretary of State did not testify in open hearings about the
conduct of the war. Some of you will recall that there were
extensive hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive
session and that agreed-to transcripts were released as the
hearings proceeded. It was this precedent which led me to
suggest that we have as searching and as far-reaching
discussion as the committee might wish in executive session and
the release therefrom of a transcript on the basis of an
agreement as to what would be consistent with the national
interest.
Precedents also suggest that where Vietnam is involved in
legislation before the Congress, such as the Foreign Aid
Program these matters are touched upon in the course of public
hearings of such legislation. I have appeared publicly eight
times before the committees of the Congress during its present
session. Questions involving Vietnam arose in some of these
hearings. I recall, of course, I did appear with this committee
in a public discussion on Vietnam on February 18, 1966.

CONSIDERATIONS OF WAR AND NEGOTIATIONS

There are some important practical considerations involved.
We have substantial combat forces in the field engaged in a
struggle with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. They are
there for reasons which are familiar to you even though some of
you may not now agree with these reasons. A public discussion
of the conduct of military operations, involving the Secretary
of State, cannot help but be of some advantage to our
adversaries. This would be particularly true with respect to
intentions, future plans, estimates of the military situation
and other matters bearing upon the conflict itself.
I am concerned lest such discussions hamper the Commander-
in-Chief.
Second, It is not advantageous for the Secretary of State
to be pressed publicly for details of positions which the
United States might take in intergovernmental discussions or in
negotiations to bring this situation to a peaceful conclusion.
We need to be in a position to negotiate with those who can
stop the shooting. It would seriously hamper such negotiations
for us to be asked to disclose in advance many details which
ought to be part of negotiation itself.
As the committee knows, North Vietnam has been unwilling to
engage in negotiations in any forum, public or private. I will
be glad to go into that in as much detail as you wish in an
executive session.
Third, the Secretary of State faces a somewhat different
problem than does a senator in discussing the policies, the
performance and the deficiencies of other countries. Senators
are free to say anything that is on their minds about other
countries--and do so frequently on the floor of the Senate and
in public speeches. But when this is done in the presence of
the Secretary of State, then I am in a most difficult position.
I cannot, at one and the same time, be completely candid with
my colleagues in the Senate and carry out my public
responsibilities as Secretary of State in discussing either the
policies or the actions of other governments.
It may well be that I would agree with some of the sharp
criticisms which could be leveled at other governments. But for
me to engage publicly in such criticisms would greatly hamper
the ability of the United States to work effectively and
quietly to remedy the situations which are of concern both to
you and to me.
It does not seem to me that the absence of a public
discussion between the committee and myself represents any
impairment of public discussion of the issues. Senators are
free to discuss these matters on the floor of the Senate, on
platforms throughout the country, in press conferences and on
television. I myself take part in this public discussion in the
press conferences which are expected of a Secretary of State,
and in a limited number of visits to different parts of the
country.

PRIVATELY EXPRESSED VIEWS OF MEMBERS

Finally, Mr. Chairman, one of the values of discussion in
this committee derives from the considered views of the members
of the committee. I have been told by members from time to time
that they do not wish to have privately expressed views made
public or given dissemination in the Executive Branch of the
Government.
As you know, the committee has been very careful to keep to
itself the transcripts of executive sessions. I wonder whether
such consultations, in the best sense of the word, can occur in
public session.
These are the considerations which have led me to suggest
to the committee that we have a thorough examination of the
Vietnam situation in executive session and that we release to
the public the transcript of those things which can be released
consistent with the public interest.

SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT CHINA

I might add one brief comment, Mr. Chairman, one point to
which you adverted in your opening remarks, and that is the
reference to China in connection with my last press conference.
I will point out as a procedural matter that this press
conference lasted for an hour rather than a half-hour. Had John
Hightower closed the press conference at the usual half-hour,
the question would not have arisen. It came up at the end of my
press conference, but I said basically four things about China.
One was that there would be a billion people there and I do
not know anyone who disputes that;
Secondly, that they will have nuclear weapons, and I have
no doubt that that is true;
Third, that no one knows what their directions of policy
are going to be in the next ten or 20 years, and I do not know
anyone who does know;
And, fourth, that the other nations of Asia are concerned
about this.
Now, I did call attention to the fact that we have
alliances with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of
China, Southeast Asia, Anzus, and that these alliances are
concerned with organizing peace in the Pacific and that
undoubtedly China played a very large part in the formulation
and negotiation and the conclusion of those alliances.
Now, I was startled and a little shocked, quite frankly, to
have these remarks at my press conference picked up as though I
were raising the question of a yellow peril. There is nothing
to that at all. I did not discuss it in those terms, and this
it seems to me, was a return to yellow journalism.
In any event, these are the reasons why it seems to me that
with the precedents established during the Korean War, in the
so-called (Douglas] MacArthur hearings, there would be a sound
basis on which we can have an exhaustive and complete
discussion in executive session and release the transcript
except for those portions which we might agree are not in the
public interest to release.
So basically, those are my thoughts on that subject, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

A PROFOUND DIVISION OF OPINION

Of course, I do not recall either personally or even from
reading about former circumstances in our history outside of
our own Civil War and Reconstruction period in which there has
been such a profound division of opinion about the correctness
of our policy, that is as to international interest, as there
is now, which is one of the reasons that contribute to this.
Do you not think that is true?
Secretary Rusk. I do not know to what extent that would be
true, Mr. Chairman.
I recall, I would have to look it up and furnish it to you,
but I recall that in about February of 1951, a Gallup Poll
showed that 66 percent of those polled wanted to pull out of
Korea. We do not have policy like that today wanting to pull
out of Vietnam. So I do not know.
I was in the Department of State during the Korean affair
and I know it was a matter of considerable controversy around
the country and I have no way of comparing it, but I think this
phenomenon is not new.
The Chairman. You do not think that the present conditions
in the country are unprecedented?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think they are unprecedented, sir.
I think there is wide division. There are very sharp
differences of view about this situation.

PUBLIC CONCERN AND CONFUSION

The Chairman. I was under the impression there was a
sharper division of view under present conditions than
formerly, and I think the public is confused, I believe my own
constituents are, as to the justification for the rising cost
of the war in both lives and in money. I think that is being
reflected in the situation in the Congress.
Maybe my memory is bad, but I have been here 25 years, and
I have never seen such difficulties as have arisen presently
over such things as the tax bill, the poverty program, you can
almost name anything. There is a great difficulty and it is bad
for the country and it is bad for the Congress. We are
criticized, the Congress as such, almost daily.
I may be wrong about it, but it strikes me that we are in a
considerable disarray within the country and the Congress, and
it would seem to me that under such conditions public
discussions would go a considerable way or help to resolve
these differences and, hopefully, to allay the strife that is
afflicting us both in the Congress and in the country. I may be
wrong about it.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether in executive
session it would not be possible to take up these sources of
confusion and these points of confusion, and discuss them out
thoroughly in the committee. I am not sure that it would be
possible to remove this confusion in public discussion unless
there can be a greater consensus here in the committee itself,
and it may be that the range of disagreement can be narrowed
and that there could be a wider range of agreement on some of
the essential facts of the situation which itself might form
the basis for a broader public understanding of what the issues
are and where the differences properly lie.

GREAT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

The Chairman. Of course, I agree that executive sessions
serve a purpose, but so do public.
It was only whether or not we should have public ones.
There is no one, I think, who feels we should not have
executive sessions, which we do have and are willing to have at
almost any time. But yesterday's was sort of an odd
circumstance.
We asked one of the professional career men who was being
examined, Mr. Miner, how many countries in Africa, I forget why
it came up, have a parliamentary system and he could think of
only three. The democratic system, it seems to me, all over the
world is having great difficulty, and I would regret to see us
have too many difficulties. We are considered the leading
democratic country of the world, and it distresses me very much
to see that continued friction that exists within our country.
I do not have to remind you of the difficulties in the
House at the present time. There is much more in the House at
the moment than there is here over domestic programs as well as
foreign aid. We have struggled with foreign aid, finally
reached an agreement with a conference, and the House has
already taken action very drastically different from what we
reached.
I only mention it, not for the substantive point of view,
but as evidence that I think we are in great difficulties
politically, and I thought public discussions of the source of
these difficulties would be helpful, both to the Congress and
to the public generally, because ultimately they do have some
influence upon the course of our policies.
So that was really behind my own feeling that we should
have it. But I do not wish to occupy all the time.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman I would be very glad----
The Chairman. Do you wish to respond?
Secretary Rusk. I would be very glad to hear the views of
the members of the committee on this point. It is important.
Senator Sparkman. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AN AURA OF CONFUSION

Secretary Rusk, I will say at the outset that I think it is
very dangerous to have you appear in public session before this
committee and I think past experience has shown it.
I think the questions that have been asked you, the
statements that have been made, create an aura of confusion
that contributes to the confusion of this country. While I
think periodically you ought to appear before this committee on
broad subject matters of policy, some of these meetings have
been the occasion for some very confusing and rather caustic
interrogations and statements with regard to your conduct of
affairs, not by all members, I do not mean that, but those have
not been of service to our country. I have been increasingly
feeling that way.
Now, so far as this ``yellow peril'' business is concerned,
I can see nothing in your statement that would give rise to any
thought, that you raised the so-called yellow peril idea at
all.
Certainly the Chinese are there and that is a fact of life.
The Russians are there and we have talked about the Russians.
But that did not raise any Oriental peril so far as I know, and
with the Red Chinese having atomic weapons, of course it is a
potential threat in the future, something we have to keep
account of.
I saw nothing that would raise that old bugaboo for the so-
called yellow peril which was not quite the yellow peril that
was intended to be talked about in this context.
I feel very sorry that our country is being subjected to
this kind of emotional and socio-political conflict in the very
area where we ought to be a little more cohesive and so on.
I would be the last person in the world to say that people
should not have their own ideas, they should not accept them,
and should not discharge them, the responsibilities of their
own; of course they should, and they do, and I respect those
ideas. I may not agree with them, but I respect them. I may
agree with some; I may disagree with others.

OPPOSED TO TELEVISED HEARINGS

But I can see nothing but difficulty for our country,
increasing difficulty in a public television demonstration for
any appearance of yourself in connection with any inquiries and
intimate discussion of what our plans are in the future. I can
see nothing but a hampering of future negotiations which are
without doubt very delicate and very unsatisfactory, not only
to you, but to everybody else from time to time because of the
intransigence of the other side on these matters. I just want
to make that very clear.
I think it is very helpful for you to appear here, and I
would feel the same way about Secretary McNamara as head of the
military. I do not always agree with everything that McNamara
does. I do not always agree with everything that he says, but I
do not think he ought to be put up in public and asked about
the war plans of this government. While it is not couched in
that term, nevertheless that is the effect on the public, and a
denial of an answer and many things that can--the avoidance of
an answer, or the statement, ``Well, I would rather discuss
those things in secret,'' that gives a lot of answers to a lot
of questions lots of times that the other folks would like to
know. I just think it is a dangerous situation and I think we
are treading on very dangerous ground.
There are many areas where I think the Secretary of State
is obligated to come in public session and discuss broad fields
of operation, but in the past the tendency to put the Secretary
of State, and put the Secretary of Defense, in positions where
they have to rather back and file in public, where they know
they cannot say certain things that might be categoric answers
to questions, I think is not serviceable to our country.
I do not have any questions to ask you at this moment. But
I do want to make myself as reasonably clear as my limited
ability will permit me. I do not want to furnish an excuse for
a public official not appearing in public at all, but I think
there are times and places and subject matters and conditions
and circumstances. I think we are in difficulty at this time.
So far as I know, the sentiment I get in my area is that the
people are overwhelmingly for winning this war and they
understand, they think, why we are in there.
There are a lot of people who feel we are not running the
show quite like it ought to be run. That is very true. But I
just got back yesterday, and the sentiment I get is that ``For
God's sake, let us win this thing.'' There are reasons why
perhaps we cannot win it immediately, but the people want to
win it rather than be defeated.
Be that as it may, I just wanted to express myself on that
score.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Can I make one comment before I call on you,
Senator?

APPREHENSIVE OF A WAR WITH CHINA

On this, we agree about the confusion, but I submit that
since there has been no public session of this committee for
some 18 months, February 18, 1966, that this difficulty or
these conditions certainly do not arise from any public
hearings the committee has had. The committee has not had any
hearings in public. Whatever the reason may be, it is not
attributable to any public hearings we have had for 18 months.
Your bringing up China reminds me of a situation which I--
which is perhaps far-reached, but I know the original war that
started the decline of China and I think contributes to the
present difficulty with China grew out of the opium war in
which Palmerston deceived the House of Commons for some eight
months while he was preparing an attack on China. The House of
Commons I doubt would have authorized it but it took place, and
when he was asked about it in their question period in public
he lied about it. I do not mean to say you are lying about it
because you have not said anything to the committee for 18
months in public.
But many of us are very apprehensive, and I am one of them,
that we may drift into a war with China just as they did and I
think it led to circumstances of which we are reaping part of
the benefit today. I think that if we are going to have a war
with China the American people ought to know about it in
advance before we get into it.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am sure, I hope you will
agree that although I can be wrong before this committee, I
have not attempted to deceive this committee.
The Chairman. Well, I am not--I did not so state.
It is quite clear that Palmerston deceived the House of
Commons. That is a matter of history. He lied to them in answer
to public questions. He refused to answer and all the time he
was preparing an attack on China which he brought about and
which led to the Opium War and which I think led to the attacks
of the West, including--we played a minor part but the British,
the French--the French as a result of that really got into
Vietnam later on, and the whole world is paying the penalty of
a very unwise policy at that time.
Senator Morse.
Senator Aiken. That is where my credibility got strained. I
do not think you can withdraw either politically or physically
within six months, but it may be a worthy objective.
Secretary Rusk. It would depend upon whether these
conditions had been achieved, I think, Senator. At any rate,
that is what the chiefs of government at Manila said on the
subject.
Senator, on the constitutional point, as I indicated
earlier, I would hope that we could consult about this matter
before we reached the constitutional issue as such.
Senator Gore. I agree; I agree.
Secretary Rusk. This is why I did not reply directly to the
two questions asked by Senator Morse.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

No one is more respectful for the Constitution than I am.
But no one is more reluctant to reach the impasses of the
Constitution. So I would hope that the committee would think
carefully about the considerations I have advanced this morning
and we certainly, I shall certainly think about what has been
said in the committee. But I would, if we get to constitutional
points I would need further counsel on that before I could, I
would, attempt to make a statement with respect to the
Constitution.
Senator Gore. But you agree it is a matter not solely for
the determination of the executive?
Secretary Rusk. I think the constitutional problems are for
all of the branches of the government whose prerogatives are
involved in the Constitution.
Senator Gore. Thank you.

A CONTINUOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would hope if this
committee decides that it would request your attendance in
public session that you would see fit to accept because I think
that rejection would be misunderstood by a lot of people.
However, I think that it is important that a continuous
exchange of views between the Executive and the Legislative
Branch continues and I am not so concerned whether that is to
be in executive session or in public session.
I do have a question in my mind that at a time when we are
at war, and we are at war, whether or not any constructive
purpose would be served by having a public session even though
I recognize your right to refuse to suggest answering the
question in executive session, which we would respect and which
you have done. But I can picture a situation where I or some
member of the committee unintentionally may ask a question
which by the mere asking of the question itself would carry an
inference which would be misunderstood by not so much the
American people or by Congress but perhaps by the other side,
and there is a question in my mind as to the wisdom of holding
a public session at this time to explore all these factors.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you.
The Chairman. Do you wish to comment?
Secretary Rusk. I think not, sir; I think I have the
Senator's view.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

OPEN HEARINGS WILL NOT FOSTER UNIFICATION

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, it has
been my belief that while our country and our people are so
deeply divided on the course that we should follow in Vietnam,
our primary objective ought to be to bring about a unification
of thinking.
With divided thinking known by Ho Chi Minh, the ability to
get him to go to the negotiating table is nil.
I have been turning over in my mind ways and means of
analyzing the thinking of the people and, if possible, bringing
them to a common judgment.
The achievement of a common judgment I suppose is
impossible. But you cannot win a war with a division that we
are suffering.
My judgment is that open hearings of the character
suggested here will not tend towards a unification of judgment
but will aggravate the disagreement that already exists.
We talk about a hearing. Now I put this question: What is a
public hearing at which the Secretary of State appears as a
witness? Is it a public debate? Is it a genuine public hearing
where you are soliciting information from the Secretary on a
specific issue?
If we are to assemble and generally debate, and the
Secretary of State is silenced because there are matters which,
if revealed, he believes will be hostile to the security of the
country, can it even be called a debate?
My own judgment is that we have not had genuine public
hearings. A public hearing would be one in which there was a
specific issue, and the Secretary was asked questions what
shall we do about this issue. Should we not differentiate what
is a genuine public hearing from what has turned into a public
debate, and I submit to you that public debates are not in the
interest of our country if they are conducted in the manner in
which our hearings have been conducted in the past.
If the so-called public hearing turns into a debate, and
the Secretary is obliged to remain silent because the item
discussed, if fully revealed, would not be in the best
interests of the security of the United States, does the
proceeding even fail to meet the true definition of a true
debate?

A LONG DEBATE OVER VIETNAM

The debate about what our course in Vietnam should be has
now been in progress since the Tonkin Bay resolution. When was
that, August 1964?
Senator Morse. Long before that.
Senator Gore. Long before that.
The Chairman. Oh, yes, but that was the Tonkin Bay.
Senator Lausche. For three years we have been arguing it,
arguing for what purpose?
Has it been to repeal the Tonkin Bay resolution? Has it
been to establish justification for pulling out?
In the three years, how many times has the Secretary
appeared before us?
Those hearings, those debates, in my opinion, have fully
explored all of the aspects that you are speaking about without
dealing with any particular issue.

A RESOLUTION TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM

Now, this is rather rash, I suppose: If our presence in
Vietnam is wrong, it is believed that we should pull out,
should not some one of us present a resolution to the Senate
that we should pull out, and if that resolution is presented,
the Secretary is called to a hearing and asked to give his
views on whether we should pull out. But then if that were one,
we would have a specific issue. We would not be just sprawled
all over the field, as we have been in the last three years.
Let us look to what we are coming. I do not know whether
this is true or not, Mr. Secretary, but I have the Washington
Post of November 6. Here is what it states:

Detailed instructions helped hecklers give Secretary of
State Dean Rusk one of his roughest receptions at Indiana
University last week. Order of battle instructions bearing the
name of the Committee to End the War in Vietnam advised
demonstrators that Rusk should be allowed to make his speech
but with suitable heckling in the great American tradition.

The leaflet giving instructions to these college students
contained this statement further:

At appropriate moments when Rusk says something
objectionable to you shout ``Lie'' or ``Booh''. The shout of
``Lie'' or ``Booh'' will be effective. At the conclusion of
Rusk's speech yell ``Hell, no, we won't go''.

I say to you that we are partly responsible for that type
of conduct among the American students.
Senator Morse. There are rightist groups who do the same
thing. I can testify as to what they do.
Senator Lausche. I think it is just beyond my understanding
of what true Americanism is.
Senator Gore. Would the Senator yield?
Senator Lausche. And, Mr. Secretary, I have the deepest
compassion for you. You have the toughest job in the United
States except that of the President, and I say do not yield.
Hold your post. When history is written you will go down as a
man who stood true to your word, fearless in the expression of
your judgment, devoted to the cause of the United States.
Senator Gore. Will the Senator yield to me now?
Senator Lausche. Yes, I yield.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

Senator Gore. Senator, before your peroration, it seemed
to me that you had somewhat arrived at a conclusion not greatly
dissimilar to mine, and that is that it might be possible to
refine the subject matter and rules of procedure to fulfill the
function of public education and public exchanges between the
Executive and the Legislative. Am I correct in that?
Senator Lausche. I think there is one way of bringing the
issue before the public. I am prepared to join with any one of
you to offer a resolution to withdraw from Vietnam. Then he
will come in and testify.
Senator Case. Would the Senator yield?
Senator Lausche. Yes, I yield.

PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

Senator Case. I think you have, in another way, you have
helped to point the way to what I think is desirable. I am not
at all sure it is an excuse or desirable for the Secretary or
the President or any public figure except a Member of Congress
who is supposed to take a beating of this sort to go into
certain situations in which this kind of organized, not debate,
but organized protest and demonstration is possible and is
getting to be more normal.
I would keep out of that kind of thing. It does nothing
help public understanding or anything else and it certainly
does not help the country to have our Executive Branch upset by
this kind of thinking and its strength and energy wasted.
But it is still necessary to have a place in which this
debate can take place, and where is it more suitable than in
the Senate of the United States. Under circumstances such as
Senator Gore has suggested and in which it is properly
controlled, not necessarily, we can decide whether we should
have television cameras or not.

A BRIDGE OF UNDERSTANDING

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I want you to know that I am
very pleased that you are here this morning, and I am pleased
we are in executive session on this matter. This is the kind of
subject matter that ought to be discussed----
Senator Mundt. Wayne, we can't hear you.
Senator Morse. I said I am very pleased the Secretary is
here, and I am pleased we are in executive session, because I
think this is the type of subject matter that ought to be
discussed in executive session. I shall be just as brief as I
can, but being one of those who has been a public critic of the
Secretary because he hasn't appeared in public hearing, I think
I owe it to him and I owe it to the committee to briefly
express my point of view because what I seek is a bridge of
understanding between this committee and this Administration. I
don't think it is only between this committee and Secretary
Rusk.
I think we need to do everything we can to build a better
understanding between this committee and Administration.
As the Secretary knows, divisions of opinion exist within
the committee. For example, I do not share many of the points
of view expressed by my good friend, Senator Hickenlooper, this
morning, probably more a difference in the emphasis that he
places on this point of view than anything else. But, and I
don't expect, don't ask you, Mr. Secretary, to agree to my
point of view. I only hope that this kind of an exchange will
give each a better understanding of the other man's point of
view.
So I am going to say these things about why I think we
should have both executive and public hearings. I think it is
very important that in a democracy that the Cabinet officers
appear in public hearings before a legislative committee. As I
have said on the Senate floor, I think it is part of our
checking system. I don't fear the people. They can judge if a
Senator abuses a privilege in a public hearing. But we all know
that any time you or any other Cabinet member are asked a
question that you think involves the security of the Republic
that you think should be better asked in executive session, it
happens all the time, the Administration witness says, ``Well,
Mr. Senator, I would prefer to answer that question in an
executive session.''

PROTECTED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

If a Senator at any time, and I take you back to the
record, because it is replete with proof of what I now say, if
a Senator pressed for an answer in a question that the Cabinet
officer says he would like to answer in executive session, he
is protected by executive privilege.
I remember very well the MacArthur hearings where the
Senator from Oregon several times on that occasion, as the
record will show, when a Senator was insisting that the
representative of, at that time of General [George C.] Marshall
and General [Omar] Bradley, pressed for answers and they said
they would prefer to answer in private, I arose and defended
their right as a matter of executive privilege to answer in
executive session.
I think that right will always be guaranteed, and I think
that is good for the public, too. I think it is part of their
education. I think these public hearings are of great
educational value, not only for the committee but for the
public.
You have never appeared in a public hearing, may I say, Mr.
Secretary, in which in my judgment you didn't make a very
constructive record; you came out of the hearing stronger than
you went in, in my mind. I think you always will. I think a
public hearing is a bridge between the committee and the
Administration and the public.
You can't understand my position in regard to public
hearings unless you also understand that I feel that the
American people are entitled to have the two branches of our
Government, the Legislative and the Executive, meet in common
meeting before the public for a discussion of those things that
appropriately can be discussed in public. I say, too, the third
branch, the Judiciary, of course, is not involved in this phase
of the checks and balances system.
I think the Administration has a clear duty to meet with a
Foreign Relations Committee or an Armed Services Committee, or
any other committee that has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and to discuss those things that can appropriately be
discussed in public. I don't think the Administration is hurt
by it.

ONE DEDICATED PURPOSE

I come to the point the chairman raises--it represents some
difference that I have with Senator Hickenlooper. There is no
question our being a divided nation. I don't think that
executive sessions are going to promote unity if they are all
executive sessions. I think you should welcome an opportunity
to appear before this Committee in public and respect our
judgment as we will respect yours as to what is appropriate.
But now let's take the negative side of it. Suppose you get
into a session someday and members of this committee suffer
lapses of good judgment, and violate what we can all agree is a
reasonable course of conduct. How many members of this
committee do you think will come to their defense? Almost all
of them if there is any inappropriate course of conduct on the
part of any member of this committee. This is not a case of a
contest. This is not a case of two opposing teams fighting
across the table. This is a case of where every man around the
table, including yourself, on such an occasion has one
dedicated purpose. We may have different sights as to how best
to reach that purpose, but we have one dedicated purpose and
that is to serve our country. There isn't any question about
that being the purpose of any member of this committee or of
yours.

A CREDIBILITY GAP

I think it is a great mistake for us to let this notion
spread that for some reason this Administration, with you as
its spokesman, isn't willing to come before this committee for
a public hearing. I don't think your offer by way of a
substitute is satisfactory; namely, that we have executive
sessions and then we release a censored transcript of what took
place.
I think the American people are entitled to see and hear
with their own eyes and ears and make their judgments with
regard to what is going on in the field of foreign policy to
the extent that they can be apprised.
Furthermore, Mr. Secretary, it happens to be my view, you
may not agree, you probably don't agree, some of my colleagues
don't, but it is true that there is a feeling on the part of
many that they are not, of the public, they are not being told,
that there is a credibility gap. I think a public hearing will
help bridge that.
I think what we need is an increased confidence in the
public at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue; an increased
confidence of the public in their Congress, and they have got
good reason to have some questions about the Congress; an
increased confidence of the public in the Executive Branch, and
I am sorry to say but it is my belief they have some reason to
have a lack of confidence there, too. But we all have a common
interest in eliminating that lack of confidence in respect to
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.
In a nutshell, this is my point of view. I think you are
throwing away, if I may speak humbly and very respectfully, I
think you are throwing away a great source of power that the
Administration has in helping inform the public.
You have got nothing to fear in a public hearing before
this committee, because of the safeguards that the record shows
always are available to you.
I have heard you in some of our public hearings on many
occasions say ``Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to answer that''--
I don't quote you but paraphrase you--``I prefer to answer that
in executive session.'' And the chairman has always said, or
the man who asked the question has always said, ``Very well.
That is perfectly satisfactory.'' That is what he should say.
You have the discretion. It will be in public and the
disclosure of information to the degree that you think is
proper to disclose it. I think it is a healthy thing in a
democracy.

THE RISKS OF DEMOCRACY

The last point I make is after all don't forget democracy
has its risks. Its price is high, but it is worth both the
risks and the price.
I just am greatly worried about this trend that is
developing in this country on the part of the opposition. I
happen to think it is much more serious than the Administration
recognizes. Sunday night I lectured at Purdue University. Part
of my thesis was to defend my position in opposition to conduct
on the part of the college students and non-college students in
exceeding the limits of the law in their manifestations of
protests against the war. They know that I have great
reservations about this war. They also know that I never have
countenanced and I never will violation of the law in respect
to protests.
It is very interesting to see what happened; I didn't know
what was going to happen. But I thought here was a place to
again--I have done it many times on campuses--draw the line on
this. Sure, I had some questions in opposition to my position
but, on the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the
students as well as the town people made very clear they agreed
with that major premise.
Now I think we are throwing away, if we follow what I
understand to be your position of not appearing in public
hearings, a great educational force that the Administration
can't justify.

A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

So, I close with these questions. I ask them, Mr.
Secretary, in the greatest of respect, but I think the record
should show and I will state all three, one after the other,
and then you can comment now or later. I would like to have you
state for the record whether we are to understand that you are
refusing to testify before this committee in a public hearing
in regard to not only Vietnam but other foreign policy matters.
For example, I think the Congo matter, which Mr. Macomber
called me about the other day in Lafayette, ought to be
discussed before the committee. Here is one that I think could
be very appropriately discussed in executive session first and
then maybe at a subsequent meeting make any public statement
that ought to be made. But I would like to have the record show
that you are refusing to testify before the committee in public
hearings with regard to foreign policy, with particular
reference to Vietnam.
Second, I would like to know whether or not this is a
presidential decision.
And lastly, I would like to know if, for example, if you
would object to making this transcript public, because there is
going to be a great deal of interest as to what happened here
this morning in regard to our discussion of public hearings. It
may very well be that the committee decides that it shouldn't
be made public, but nevertheless I would like to know whether
or not the Administration through you would have objections to
making it public.

RELEASE THE TRANSCRIPT

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I can answer your first two
questions together, I think. One is that I am not--I have not
taken a constitutional position here of refusing.
What I thought I had been doing was consulting with the
committee on this question. I had an invitation from the
committee. I came back with another recommendation that we do
it in another way. I understood we were going to talk about
that in the committee here this morning, so, as I indicated at
the very beginning of my remarks this morning, I do not feel
that I am today involved in the underlying, or the possibly
underlying constitutional point.
It seems to me that we ought, first, if the committee would
wish it, to talk about the question of what is wise to do in
this circumstance, in this situation. So the first two
questions I would not accept as the framing of the issue that
is in front of us now as I see it.
On the third question, I would be glad to look at the
transcript and certainly I don't think there is anything that
has been said thus far that I would object to being released.

NOT A DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY AS A WHOLE

Senator Morse. I do hope, and I finish with this, but I do
hope, I agree with you that the subject matter is the broad
subject matter. But I do hope at the conclusion of the meeting
this morning that we can find out what your position would be
in answer to my two specific questions as to whether or not you
are standing on what you think, which I disagree with, but that
is all right, you are refusing to testify as Secretary of State
before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate at a
public hearing on foreign policy, including Vietnam.
Second, I think we ought to know whether or not the
position that you take is the position that is based upon a
Presidential decision.
Secretary Rusk. I would like to have one further comment to
your first question. I had not looked upon this discussion as
involving foreign policy as a whole. I have been, as I
indicated in my remarks, I have been in public session, what is
it, six or eight times--several times this session, and I
have--I thought the issue had arisen rather specifically with
regard to Vietnam.
Senator Morse. Of course, if we use Vietnam as a precedent,
and we accede to your refusal, you extend it to any other
foreign policy matter any time you want to extend it to,
whether it is the Congo----
Secretary Rusk. Of course, in some of these other foreign
policy matters, some of these same considerations would apply
as you adverted to and as I did in my own remarks.
For example, you and I might--I might want to have to look
at the transcript on this if we release this testimony, you and
I might agree on the tragedy of recent events in Greece.
But my problem is not just to criticize but to find a way
to help get Greece back on the track that other members of NATO
would like to see them on. I can't do that by saying some of
the things publicly that I may have in my own mind, that you
may have in yours, in my particular job as Secretary of State.
This is a real dilemma, not only for the Secretary of State in
this country, but for foreign ministers in other democracies.

COMPARISON TO BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS

In the case of the House of Commons, they give notice of
questions so that the answers can be carefully thought about
and they can be, I think, taken to account, the
responsibilities of the foreign minister. Of course, there are
supplementary questions so they can be elaborated, but we don't
have the custom here of giving notice of questions. So that
sometimes it isn't easy for a Secretary of State on the spur of
the moment, particularly before a great committee of the
Congress, to respond. At a press conference you can brush the
question aside or just give a platitude and that is the end of
it. But one doesn't do that with the committees of the
Congress, not very readily.
The Chairman. Are you through?
Senator Aiken.

A UNITED NATION

Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I didn't understand that the
scope of this meeting this morning was limited to the question
of whether the Secretary should appear in executive or public
sessions. So far as I am concerned, I think he should appear
for the purpose of giving us information as to the thinking and
the operations and objectives of our government in the fields
of foreign affairs, and it is immaterial to me how I get that
information.
In the last few months we have been getting it largely
from, as it relates to Southeast Asia, from people who have
been there, from the armed services or otherwise and they come
back and tell us what they know about it.
I can well understand the President's disappointment that
he doesn't have a united nation back of him. I don't know what
the percentages are. In fact, the way questions are put, they
are very difficult to answer anyway, like that referendum
taking place in San Francisco today; I believe it is worded,
``Do you want an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam?'' Well that
word ``immediate'' would certainly kill it for me, because it
is out of the question. You can't withdraw immediately.
But if the President wants unity in this country, he
certainly would have it if the Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, or
Cuba or France or Russia or anybody else started dropping bombs
on Front Royal or Silver Spring, we would have unity in this
country very, very fast and there is no question about it.
But, I regret that some speakers have by inference
indicated they thought those who criticized their judgment in
carrying the war 10,000 miles from home were not wholly loyal
to the country. I don't go along with that. I agree, probably
some of them have not, but the others you always have some of
them, but I do think you can criticize the President's judgment
and not oppose his policies.
As I said, I want to get the information and it is
immaterial how I get it, whether it is a private or executive
or public hearing.
I would say there are some things that ought not to be told
in public hearings. But the question of China, and I think the
public got the inference that perhaps our objective was to
contain China and protect, certainly protect Southeast Asia
from China. My own knowledge, I realize that every country in
Southeastern Asia, including Cambodia and all the rest of them,
are scared to death of being overrun by the Chinese.

WHEN THE U.S. WITHDRAWS FROM VIETNAM

But that leads me to question the statement which the
Administration has made that when we defeat the Viet Cong and
North Vietnam in no uncertain manner, we will promptly withdraw
from Southeast Asia. I believe the term six months has been
given.
The question I would like to ask is, if we withdraw
immediately from Southeast Asia with our forces, how are we
going to protect those countries from a billion Chinese Reds,
assuming they are Red by that time. We can't withdraw, can we?
As long as we remain a strong military nation, how can we
withdraw?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, it has not been in our thought
that we would withdraw from positions that we have been holding
for some time in the Pacific. We have bases in the Philippines,
in Okinawa, Guam. We have forces in Korea. We have not
contemplated from the very beginning of SEATO we would maintain
standing armies in Southeast Asia in the SEATO area.
I think this would depend upon the solidity of the
settlement there. We do have considerable mobility. I would
think it would not be, at least the seven governments who have
been carrying the battle there in Southeast Asia, felt that it
was not necessary to maintain standing forces of other
countries in South Vietnam, once certain conditions have been
achieved.
Now, there is no contradiction, I think, between that and
the maintenance of alliance arrangements and guarantees.
We have alliances in this hemisphere but we don't have
standing forces in the countries that are protected by that
alliance.
I think that the answer to that would be that we do not
anticipate that we would maintain a standing force in Vietnam
beyond the time that the governments indicated they would do so
following a statement of settlement, but we would have in the
background forces in the Pacific and a high degree of mobility
in case they were required again.
Senator Aiken. And arrangements for naval bases.
Secretary Rusk. No. We are not----
Senator Aiken. None at all?
Secretary Rusk. We are not planning bases in South Vietnam
itself.

ENDING THE WAR WITHOUT A FORMAL AGREEMENT

Senator Aiken. Do you think it is impossible to end the war
without the signed agreement between North Vietnam and the
United States?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I do, Senator. That is one of the
major alternatives which we not only have thought as a
possibility, but we have experimented with it somewhat.
Senator Aiken. As a probability?
Secretary Rusk. That is, it may be that this situation may
terminate more like the Greek guerrilla situation terminated
rather than a formal agreement.
Senator Hickenlooper. Did you say it is impossible?
Senator Aiken. Impossible to end a war, it is impossible to
end a war without a formal signed agreement?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes, it is possible to end it without--
--
Senator Aiken. It is possible, that is what I thought you
said.
Secretary Rusk. It is possible without a formal signed
agreement.
Senator Aiken. Yes.

A PROCESS OF DE-ESCALATION

Secretary Rusk. We have tried on a number of occasions to
start a process of de-escalation. For example, in the first
part of this year we did not bomb for a period of almost four
months on a ten-nautical mile radius of the center of the City
of Hanoi, that is 300-something square miles. We said to the
other side, ``Now we are not asking you for an exact quid pro
quo. We are going to do this. We will be impressed if you would
do something comparable in the Saigon area or in the
Demilitarized Zone or any other place where we could take
notice of it, and if you think this is a good idea we can build
upon that and increase the areas on both sides.'' But we didn't
get any response from that.
And there have been other efforts to try to start the
process of de facto de-escalation to see if that would be
possible even though it might be difficult on all sides to have
a formal agreement to that effect.
Senator Aiken. Would you be surprised if along in the
Spring you saw indications that the Viet Cong, the North
Vietnamese reached a point where it might be possible to de-
escalate? Would you be surprised?
Secretary Rusk. We don't see indications of that at the
present time but that is one of the things to which we are
completely alerted at all times. We watch the incident rates.
We watch the number of attacks. We watch the location of the
attacks to see if there is any trend that has a political
connotation to it.

VIET CONG DEFECTORS

Senator Aiken. I notice you make a point of the increased
number of defectors from the Viet Cong now. When did we stop
calling them refugees?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, the refugees are rather a different
group. The so-called defectors, the Chu Hoi people, are people
who were former Viet Cong and who come in and say, ``I was a
Viet Cong. Here I am and I want to rejoin the body politic, the
society.'' Then they are given some schooling, they are put
back into jobs.
I can tell the committee very privately that on Thursday
the Saigon Government expects to announce a Cabinet and I think
there is--I am told there may be an ex-Viet Cong member of that
Cabinet in one of the Cabinet posts.
Senator Aiken. Yes.

A WAR AGAINST IDEOLOGY

I don't want to use too much time and quite refer to your
press conference because I think people have referred to that
frequently to soothe their own thinking, but in the press
conference you referred a number of times to Asian Communism,
implying what this was all about, and the rhetoric of the
Administration is replete with the words ``communism'' and
``communist.'' Yet the Administration tries to convince the
other side it is not fighting a war against the ideology. And
here is the question:
Do you think the American people would support this war if
Hanoi was not governed by a Communist regime. Would it make any
difference to you if the North Vietnamese had a monarchy? Would
we still be fighting them? That is more or less hypothetical.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think if under the SEATO Treaty we
had a commitment which covered South Vietnam and required us to
take steps to meet the common danger in the events of
aggression by armed attack that would apply regardless of the
ideology of the country delivering the attack.
Senator Aiken. These questions I am asking are more or less
in a sense spot-checking.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I understand, sir.

SOVIET ORBITAL MISSILES

Senator Aiken. For the last one I would say: In your
opinion, does the Soviet orbital missile violate the spirit if
not the letter, of the existing agreement pertaining to control
of nuclear weapons?
Secretary Rusk. Well, if the missile itself went into orbit
and contained a nuclear warhead, this would be a clear
violation of the treaty.
Senator Aiken. But you would never know.
Secretary Rusk. But we would have a pretty good idea if
they orbited such missiles as to whether the pattern of them
indicated there might be missiles involved. But these
suborbital missiles are not strictly in orbit in the sense of
the space treaty.
Senator Aiken. No, they are not.
Secretary Rusk. But I don't want to leave the impression
that we are clapping hands about it or are thinking this is a
good development.
Senator Aiken. Well, as I remember----
Secretary Rusk. But thus far, our examination of it
indicates there is not a violation of the space treaty.
Senator Aiken. I think it would be far less dangerous to an
enemy than our underwater nuclear fleet.
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are many technical problems
that seem to me to impose some limits on such a capability.
Orbiting nuclear weapons in space would open up the
possibilities of technical malfunctions and all sorts of things
that would add a new element of danger even from the point of
view of the government that puts them there, and I would
suppose that that would not be very far.

ASIAN COMMUNISM

If I might make a very brief comment on your reference to
Asian Communism, there has been a rather sharp difference since
about 1960-61 between Communists in Asia and Communists in
Eastern Europe on the question of the strategy for pursuing
world revolution.
In the case of China they have pressed a doctrine of
militancy to the point where they are relatively isolated in
the Communist world, and they have been doing something about
it in a good many countries. It is this brand of militant
Communism that we have sometimes referred to as Asian Communism
in order to distinguish it from the peaceful co-existence
doctrine with all its imperfections and qualifications that is
being discussed in Eastern Europe.
We don't, for example, at least I don't, see anything in
Hanoi that points toward Titoism. It is true that the North
Vietnamese themselves would not like to be swarmed over by the
Chinese. But, on the other hand, Tito's relations with Hanoi
are just abut as bad as between any two countries in the
capitalist world, not quite as bad as between Moscow and
Peking.
Hanoi is moving on Laos and as been sending infiltrators
into Thailand, so that to draw a closer analogy you would have
to suppose that Yugoslavia was going after Austria and Greece
before you could draw a parallel as to whether Hanoi might be
another Tito.
So we don't see any connection, except for the point that
the Vietnamese, they clearly do not appear to be ready to be
absorbed by the Chinese.

CUBAN COMMUNISM

Senator Aiken. The morning papers report that at a party in
Moscow yesterday, the American ambassador attended and the
Cuban ambassador refused to attend. Where does that leave that
situation? Do you know why Cuba would not go? Is she joining
the Chinese or the Albanians or who?
Secretary Rusk. There has been, we know, some argument
between Moscow and Havana about the tactics to be pursued by
Communist parties in Latin America, and there again the issue
seems to be between militancy on the one side and a popular
front technique which the Soviets rather supported in Latin
America.
There are important differences between some of the Latin
American Communist parties and Castro and this has given rise
to some frictions. The Cubans were not invited to make a speech
along with others in Moscow. This led the Cubans to stay away
from the party, and we hope this will develop somewhat further.
Senator Aiken. It might be that some of the delicate
arrangements which I believe you referred to in your press
conference are working here or there.
That is all; I have used my time.
The Chairman. Senator Gore.

A MISTAKEN POLICY IN VIETNAM

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, you are not here to discuss
Vietnam policy this morning and I shall not proceed upon that
basis. Suffice it to say as a preface to my exchange with you
on the subject of your appearance this morning, you are aware,
I am sure, that throughout your incumbency and before, I have
thought my country was involved in a mistaken policy in
Vietnam. That policy has undergone a number of changes. I
submit that your reply to Senator Aiken just a few moments ago
about the retention of bases, of the removal of troops, appears
to be considerably different from the statement from the
Philippine conference in which the President referred to the
removal of troops within six months. I won't go into detail but
I just use that as a possible illustration of the fact, I
believe, our policies there have undergone an enlargement,
particularly since your last appearance before the committee in
public session.
Now, I would like to come to that particular question for
which you are here, about which you are here.
For your information, when we considered this in executive
session alone a few days ago, I moved that the chairman be
instructed to communicate to President Johnson the deep concern
of this committee about the threat to public communication
between the Executive and Legislative Branches on a subject so
vital as war and peace, on a subject the cause for which
American boys are sent to fight and die.
When Senator Mansfield suggested the meeting which we now
have, I promptly withdrew the motion because I thought it was
much better that you come, as you have done today--if you are
looking for the Philippine statement, I have it here, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I am looking for the Manila, I am
listening to you, Senator.
Senator Gore. Just to save you looking for it; I have it.
Will you hand it to him over there?
I really didn't wish to make a point except it illustrated,
I think, our whole program has been undergoing changes there.
With each step of escalation there has been the broadening of
the conflict and your recent statement about vital American
interests being involved in Vietnam, it seems to me, is an
enlargement of the policy and certainly enlargement of the
issue.

A CONSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIP

But to come now to the question, if I may have your
attention: You said right in the beginning that you were not
dealing with this as a constitutional matter in your appearance
this morning. The constitutional question is involved, and I
wondered if the Executive Branch alone should arrogate to
itself the determination of that question. It seems to me that
both branches of government have constitutional
responsibilities and rights.
The Senate has a limited constitutional partnership with
the Executive, the President, with respect to the Nation's
foreign policy. I am sure you concur in that.
Now, in pursuance of our responsibility of advice and
consent, we have, this branch of the government has
responsibility and particularly this Committee, and then
Section Five of the Constitution, it is for the Congress to
determine what sessions of its committees will be made public.
There is not only a constitutional question involved here but
also a statutory one to which the Chairman has already
referred.
Then, Mr. Secretary, there is a third point I would like to
make and that is our joint obligation in a democracy to public
opinion, to public education, to public enlightenment. It is,
after all, a government, as Abraham Lincoln described it, of,
by and for the people.
Now, I wish to suggest that it might be wise for you to
consider a public appearance and particularly if this
committee, after this consultation, should determine that in
its view its constitutional responsibilities required a public
session. I submit this is a question on which both of us have
the duty and right of position.
Now, if it be determined between the Executive and the
Legislative that a public session is in the public interest,
then I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that this committee, in my view,
will be very reasonable, extremely reasonable, not only as
Senator Morse has suggested, with every member refraining from
pressing the point which you would prefer to answer in
executive session but I think, and this is only an opinion of
mine, the committee has taken no position so far as I know, I
think it would be possible for your staff and the committee
staff, subject to your approval and the committee's approval,
to work out areas of sensitivity, to work out methods of
procedure, to work out the modus vivendi of a public appearance
which would safeguard the interests which you rightly consider
relevant and difficult if not dangerous.
Senator Lausche. Al, would you yield for a question?
Senator Gore. I have finished.

ISSUES FOR HEARINGS

Senator Lausche. On what issue would you hold the hearing?
Would it be on pulling out of Vietnam? Would it be on stopping
the bombing? On what issue would we hold the hearing?
Senator Gore. Well, I would think the involvement of the
national interest and the policy with respect thereto. I would
not want to confine it to particular issues such as pulling out
or bombing. So far as I am concerned I have never had a word to
say about bombing. I considered that a tactical matter. Not one
time have I referred to that, ever. So I would think, to answer
your question, if we are to have a review of policy in Asia, it
ought to include the whole question--China, Russia, future
equation between the major powers, Southeast Asia, the smaller
nations and the bigger nations. I would not want to be
restrictive in it.
I had concluded, Mr. Secretary. I just pass these views
along for you to consider, and I think it is good that you come
and I am delighted Senator Mansfield made the suggestion,
because I consider it is a threat if you should finally, if
this Committee should insist upon your appearance and you
finally declined and the President supported you in that, then
indeed, it would be a serious matter.

TROOP WITHDRAWALS

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, just one or two comments, if
I may, on what Senator Gore has said.
In the Manila Communique the statement was made with regard
to troop withdrawals that--and allied force troop withdrawals:
They shall be withdrawn after close consultation as the
other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases
infiltration and the level of violence there subsided. Those
forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than
six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.
I don't recall anything that I said to Senator Aiken that
seemed to cut across that in any way. It seems to me those two
are quite consistent. I will be glad to review the record to
see if by any chance what I said to Senator Aiken was ambiguous
on that.
Senator Aiken. No cameras.
Senator Case. I think, however, it is a matter for us and a
very serious matter to keep this debate to put it in the high
level and to have it because the public has to have these
things discussed. And they are not being discussed at the
Pentagon, and they are not being discussed at Indiana
University in circumstances like this, but let us provide the
forum.

A HEARING WITH A GOAL

Senator Lausche. I will yield after I make this statement.
In my type of a hearing where you are wanting to reach
decisions, it is essential at the very beginning to determine
what the issue is. Then you have a hearing of affirmative or
negative proof on the issue.
But these hearings that we have been conducting have been
an exchange of arguments with no goal sought.
Now I yield to you.
Senator Case. If the Senator would just yield once more, we
could meet this point by having a series of questions presented
ahead of time and I would not agree with your formulation of
the issue; I think it is much too broad and provocative and
what not. I do not think you meant it to be a final choice.
Senator Lausche. What would the hearing be on?
Senator Case. You can have your voice and I can have my
voice. I have questions I would like to ask.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest the Senator
from Ohio has had far more than his fair time.
Senator Lausche. I am just going to conclude in half a
minute.

A HORRIBLY UNJUST ATTACK

Now the matter of yellow peril, it was a horribly unjust
attack made on you, and if the charge of yellow peril is to be
made, is it not also to be directed at Truman, at Eisenhower
and Kennedy?
Truman felt that the Communists should not be permitted to
move into South Vietnam. Eisenhower succeeded in achieving a
peace. But after the peace was achieved, huge numbers of troops
were kept in Korea to stop the Communists from moving
southward.
When Kennedy became President, there were 500 troops in
Vietnam. When he died there were 19,000.
Senator Clark. It is absolutely wrong.
Senator Lausche. It is absolutely correct.
Do you challenge the number I have given?
Senator Clark. I certainly do.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, let's get the figure and put
it in the record.
Do not squirm, Joe. I have the right to speak. If I am
wrong in the figures, we will put them in and correct them.
That is all I wanted to say. I am for a public hearing but
not a public harangue and a public debate where one man is
before us and 19 of us are shooting at him.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, if I might have a brief
comment.
The Chairman. Yes.

REGRETS FROM INDIANA STUDENTS

Secretary Rusk. I thank Senator Lausche for his generous
personal remark, but I think I owe it to the students of
Indiana to put a postscript on what he read from.
It is true that an instruction of that type was circulated.
In the audience of about 4,000, there were about 150 who felt
themselves subject to this instruction, and they did create, as
some of you may have noticed on television, a considerable
amount of disturbance in the course of my remarks. I am
receiving a delegation of Indiana students on Thursday who have
circulated a petition throughout the student body to express
the regrets of the students of Indiana University over this
episode.
I think that ought to be in the record, because I do not
think that this in any sense----
Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I do not think any type of
apology is necessary. I saw you on television and you had my
deepest sympathy. When you were finished with a sentence, they
yelled, ``Lie, lie''.
Senator Morse. I think the Secretary came out of it very
well. Always that is the case when you deal with these
extremists. Frank talks about this group of extremists. I have
time and time again, I have been at least a dozen times in the
three and a half years with this rightist student group
parading through the auditorium while I was speaking, picketing
outside, making all of these things; I came out stronger each
time, stronger than I went in because the whole mass of the
student body leaves them just as they did in Indiana. This is
part of the price of freedom I talked about earlier today. That
does not bother me.
Senator Lausche. Will Carl get for the record the correct
figures on the number of troops?
The Chairman. Yes, he will get it.

STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT ON CHINA

Secretary Rusk. And finally, Mr. Chairman, I might just
pass along for the convenience of the committee and its staff,
not necessarily to be put in the record, a compilation of
statements made by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson and their Secretaries of State on the problems of peace
in Asia, including many references to China along the way.
Senator Morse. They ought to be in the record.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

SECRETARY'S VISITS TO COLLEGE CAMPUSES

Senator Mundt. I think Senator Lausche made a very special
point which may move us in the direction he suggested if we had
a series of hearings on a very special point about the
responsibilities of the Foreign Relations Committee and the
Senate in world affairs, which I thought were very fruitful.
We had one dealing with the Chinese situation which I
thought proved very fruitful and in which I think you made your
best presentation that could ever have been made.
I am not convinced that just a public hearing on the war
after we have been fighting it for five years would serve any
public interest, although I must say that if it is going to be
part of a package, to go to college campuses to subject
yourself to a kind of dissention we have heard and get thrown
at you questions which would be rougher to answer than the ones
we would ask, I do not see how you figure out that the only
place you can appear to answer questions would be the Foreign
Relations Committee if you are going to do it publicly with
them.
I think it is a mistake to go and get into that situation,
not because of the impact on the student body--I am prepared to
accept that you did some modicum of good at Indiana University,
but I think you created a great wave of dissention across the
country as a whole, as a consequence of that, and I think you
have to examine your whole card a little more carefully.
If you feel part of the job of informing the public is to
get into these debates with college students, I do not think
you have very strong grounds to say, ``I do not want to do this
with the Foreign Relations Committee.''
I think perhaps you ought to get a new pattern of
performance to carry this message that you should carry to
convince conventions of people at formal meetings, of
responsible people where you are going to get a tentative
hearing, if the question is going to be asked would it be more
circumspect than if you just subject yourself to what you know
is a plant of a purposeful effort in order to create dissention
across the country as a whole.
It is not just what happened on the campus, but
ramifications all over the place. So I am not convinced that,
one, public hearings of a general nature even before our
Committee will be in the public good, but I see no reason why
we should be blackballed if we are going to have them all over
the country in front of college campuses.
I would like to say a word or two about this press
conference which has been the subject of discussion before our
Committee.
I sympathize with you. I think this was a shameful
distortion of what you said, but as one who earned a
considerable proportion of his living on the public platform a
decade and a half before he came to Congress and has watched
what happens when we give talks and hold press conferences
since I have been here, I can realize what happened because I
think you did leave a vulnerable point.

PAST EXPERIENCES WITH THE PRESS

I can appreciate the great difficulty. I had an experience
in public life when I was acting chairman of the House
[UnAmerican Activities] committee that was handling the Alger
Hiss case, and one night the son of a dear friend of yourself
and a good friend of mine, Larry Duggan, jumped or was thrown
out of a high rise in New York City. I got called out of bed
about 2:00 a.m. to come down to a meeting with detectives and
policemen and FBI men and reporters at headquarters to see
whether or not we had anything in the files about Laurence
Duggan, which we did. He was on the list of five people we were
expecting to call.
So I told them that, and the thing dragged on into the
middle of the morning, in the wee hours of the morning, and
some reporter said, ``Give us the names of the other ones'',
and I said ``I do not want to do that.''
``When will you give them to us?''
I said, ``When they jump out of the window.''
Well, all hell broke out; I was pilloried in all the
papers. A man wrote a book against me. Frankly, I should have
said, ``When we call them.''
I suffered for a long time, not without embarrassment and
not without criticism, but I survived and I am still here.
But I think you made an error. If that happened in a press
conference, I do not criticize you for it, but you should have
said in your opinion, in my opinion, not something which would
let a purposeful fellow distort what you said into yellow
peril, but what you said this morning, as you said many other
times, there are a billion Chinese under Communist control over
there. You would have been a target, in my opinion, instead of
letting the door open.
I do not say this in criticism, but I think we all learn
from our mistakes and I think you would have been better
advised to tell the story more precisely and certainly could
have eliminated that particular problem.

A FIELD DAY FOR PROPAGANDA

I would like to say this, that I think our communication
with the Administration is suffering not from public exchange,
you are talking all the time and the President is talking all
the time and we are talking all the time. This is part of the
public exchange.
I think we are suffering from not having enough meetings of
this type, executive sessions, in which we can get into the
matters which need to be discussed.
I am not so much concerned about the fact that a public
hearing might be divisive to the American public. I think it
might or might not, but I do think that a public hearing might
be very disturbing to the rest of the world. I think if we ask
you a question and you have to duck it because it is not
diplomatic to answer it, the mere fact that you cannot answer
it conjures up for the propagandists to draw a whole
opportunity to have a field day and make their own
interpretation of what the situation happened to be.
I think this dialogue is useful.

SELLING THE PACKAGE

About 15 hours ago I was addressing a state meeting of
bankers out in California which was also addressed by members
of the panel, by three good friends of yours, so they said, and
you would know better than I. The one was Mr. Foster, one was
Mr. Prager, and one was Mr. Barnett; they did a tremendous job
with these bankers of selling the administration position, and
the national position, as to why I think we are in Vietnam, and
why I think we cannot pull out of Vietnam. They put it not on
the basis that we had some kind of commitment there, SEATO, or
we had some kind of moral obligation. They did not get into
that aspect. They did not get into the aspect that we were
particularly concerned about trying to raise the standard of
living by sacrificing tens of thousands of American lives over
there or to have an election in which it would be appropriate
to have the mayor of Saigon selected by American electoral
standards.
They said this is basic to our security and they did a
wonderful job of selling their package on that.
Senator Morse. Karl, could I interrupt for a moment? Joe
Clark has to rush to Philadelphia to vote. Would you permit him
to intervene for just a moment and then you resume when he
goes?
Senator Mundt. We can establish rules of the game as to how
long it will take as to whether it takes away from my time.
Senator Morse. I just thought he ought to say what he wants
to say.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY

Senator Clark. I appreciate what the Senator from Oregon
has just said and the usual courtesy of my friend from South
Dakota. I do have to go to vote for an important election in
Philadelphia and I have appointments up there. I would like to
say a couple of words and then I will be free.
Mr. Secretary, in your opening comments you referred to the
fact that the conduct of the war was not discussed either in
World War II or in Korea, and I have no doubt you are correct.
Personally, I do not want to hear about the conduct of the war
for I can get that from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and if necessary from the newspapers. What I do
want to hear about is our foreign policy: What it is; why it is
that way; what is its justification; why has it changed so
drastically since the election of 1964; what further changes
can we expect almost week by week.
I believe that we have almost reached the state in this
country where the influences of the military are slowly but
surely becoming a danger to our democratic values.
One of the principal weapons of the military is secrecy. I
do not like to see the Secretary of State contributing to what
is essentially a totalitarian technique by refusing to appear
in public session before this committee.

PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

Among the questions I should think should be asked you in a
public session would be some reference to the condition of
pacification in the country. A very reputable reporter whose
views I have a high regard for told me the other day that in
his judgment the pacification was a mess. A group which I
chaired had the opportunity to hear Mr. Luce discuss the
problems of pacification and peace in Vietnam. What he had to
say was disturbing to me and other senators who heard him.
Ambassador Reischauer has just written a book about the
Asian policy.\1\ I would like to hear the Secretary of State
say what is his difference of points of view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Edwin O. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam (N.Y., 1967).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in my judgment there can be no unification of
thinking about Vietnam nor is there any relevance to a
discussion about a debate. We are not interested in debate. We
seek information. We do not want to conduct a debate upon the
forum of a public hearing. Nobody is suggesting that.
Senator Lausche. That is not suggested.
Senator Clark. I am not yielding. Nobody is suggesting we
should pull out of Vietnam. This is a straw man only put up to
be knocked down.
I would hope we could discuss these matters with some
maturity and with a minimum of emotion.
Mr. Secretary, you know the high regard in which I hold
you. I do hope you will decide to come down here in public
session under the appropriate safeguards which we are prepared
to set up.
Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Senator Mundt.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BEYOND VIETNAM

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, if there is a moment and I
realize the Senator would not be able to stay, but I would like
to make a very brief comment.
As to the matter of what is our foreign policy and what it
is all about, I think it is interesting to take note of what is
happening in 1967 despite the pain and difficulty of Vietnam.
The Kennedy Round was completed, the Monetary Funds
agreement on liquidity was achieved, the Space Treaty was
ratified unanimously by the Senate. The Consular Treaty was
ratified with some difficulty, but nevertheless with a very
strong vote. The Latin American presidents did decide to move
to a Common Market in the next decade. The Asian Development
Bank, thanks to the help of this committee----
Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I know you make a darn good
case but I have to go.
Senator Case. You should do it in public before the
committee.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, do you happen to know
the military personnel in Vietnam when Eisenhower went out; it
was around 700 instead of 900.
Secretary Rusk. Just over 600.
Senator Clark. At the time of the assassination it was
12,000.
Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy made the decision to
increase those forces to the level of about 17,000.
Senator Morse. That is 17,000?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
Senator Morse. Were they there at the time of his death or
on their way?
Secretary Rusk. That is true.
Senator Morse. They were there?
Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact----
Senator Morse. I am sorry, I apologize.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt really has the floor and he
yielded it only for a limited time.
Senator Case. He is not going to talk for an unlimited
time?
Senator Mundt. No.

THE U.S. AS A PACIFIC POWER

It would seem to me, Mr. Secretary, if you are going to
appear before our committee in public that you ought to
concentrate on the basic objectives which we have. I do not
know how you are going to eliminate this kind of debate to
include that, but we are either there or we are not there
because of the security interests of the United States. I think
we are there for that reason. If we are not, you lose another
supporter this morning.
But I have heard you say you are there for that reason and
that to me is a prevailing argument if it is true.
I think we are there because, not, I do not care if there
are a billion or ten billion people in China, if, they are
under the Chinese Communist domination, and part of this whole
movement of the Communists to take in their neighbors, move out
by encroachment on territory, we have a legitimate interest.
I think we are there because we have to maintain our
position as a Pacific power and if we do I do not think you can
isolate Southeast Asia.
I think you emphasized altogether too much the fact that we
have an interest in Southeast Asia. I think we have an interest
in the Pacific. Our 50th state sticks out there quite a way in
the Pacific. I think if we do not maintain the right area of
accommodation, friendship with Japan, and Japan goes in either
with China or Russia, we are in one hell of a fix in that
situation and that is in our interest.
We have a firm treaty obligation with Formosa in the
Pacific. The greatest job of colonization in the world was done
under the aegis of the U.S. in the Philippines, it is in the
Pacific, and I think you should sell your argument that this is
part of our responsibility as a Pacific power, and this is one
of the areas but not the whole business, and not the whole
thing to be concerned with. But if it is related to our being
able to maintain ourselves as a Pacific power, that is my main
point.

TRADE WITH THE ENEMY

Have two basic criticisms and I am not going to close
without saying them because I deplore the way there have been
so many civilian injections into the military decisions in
Vietnam, and you are immunized from that.
I deplore even more completely the indefensible trade
polices of supplying material to the enemy which is shoring up
the capacity of Ho Chi Minh to fight, and I do not know whether
it is your policy which you sold Johnson or Johnson's policy
which you enunciate, but I think it is something we have and I
have two questions.

CHINESE SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

In the Pacific papers yesterday, the West Coast papers, and
on the radio and television, I heard a lot of discussion in the
last few hours that just recently they had found, some Chinese
soldiers among the people who were killed in this last big,
battle in Vietnam. I think if that is true we should know about
it. If it is not true, we should be told it is not true.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, we have asked for clarification of
any information they have out there locally. I heard those
press reports. We do not have anything back officially. There
are a good many ethnic Chinese, both in South Vietnam and in
North Vietnam, and some of those are in the armed forces. We
have never had any information that any personnel of the
Chinese armies in China have been, in South Vietnam, but quite
frankly, we do not have anything further on that.
Senator Mundt. I know you have told us that before.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. We do not have information on
that.

PROPOSALS TO NEGOTIATE

Senator Mundt. Secondly, how many times have we indirectly
or directly requested to negotiate? I heard the figures 28.
Secretary Rusk. Earlier this year, just as a matter of
reminder, I put together a list of some 28 proposals that have
been made by ourselves or the other governments or groups of
governments or other personalities to which we had given what
we thought was an affirmative response, to which Hanoi--which
Hanoi turned down. That does not include large number of
private contacts.
So that the answer would be many dozens. I would have to
count to be more precise. But the 28 are those that are on the
public record.
Senator Mundt. That is good enough for my final question. I
want to ask that one based on my own experience based on a
little I know about human psychology. I do not know very much
about human psychology, but I know most of the fellow around
this table have been in many political campaigns, some of them
tough, some of them easy, usually in the process we have a
series of debates. On some occasions my opponent halfway
through the campaign has suggested to me directly or indirectly
we call off the debates. He does not like the way they have
gone.
What has been my reaction? To try to schedule more of them
because when my opponent wants to call them off, I figure he
does not think they are going well.
Is there a danger? I feel there is. A danger of going too
frequently with cap in hand to Hanoi and saying, ``Let's
negotiate''. Where the other fellow begins to feel, either
because of a division of support at home or some other thing,
he figures the tides of faith are going against us.

KEEP ALL CONTACTS OPEN

Are we defeating our position by going there too
frequently?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, that is one of the factors that
has to be taken into account by making judgment about these
matters. We have felt that there are other considerations that
would override that particular point. I would not deny that
that is a point that has to be weighed, but we do believe that
it is important to keep all the contacts open, to keep all
forums open, to keep all channels open so that it will be easy
and simple for us to hear the important signals when the
signals are there to be heard.
I think we also owe it to our own people and to our own
troops in the field and to our allies not to have inadvertence
or inattention delay stand in the way of a peaceful settlement
when the times comes.
This is a complex matter. The point you make is one that we
have discussed. It is one that was expressed to me by a neutral
Asian leader at one point in terms of the psychology of Asia.
But I think these other considerations on balance point the
other way.
Senator Mundt. Well, I wanted to be sure you were giving it
concern. The collateral thing is, even though you decide it is
wise to continue it, there is some thought that should be given
as to how wise it is to keep telling the world about it if we
have a lot of uncommitted guys not on either side who also
react with the psychology of human beings. I shudder to have
you get up sometimes in front of Indiana University and say 45
times we have it or 50 times, but I think this is something you
have to keep uppermost in your mind as far as the neutrals and
the uncommitted and the enemies that do not like us who are in
the field against us. I think there is a danger that this will
be interpreted as a weakness.
I am certainly in favor of keeping the lines or
communications open, but I just utter a note or caution in that
connection.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE WAR

Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, it might be worth
noting that the President made a very important statement in
his San Antonio speech at the end of September in which he
said----
Senator Mundt. The best speech he has given on the war, by
the way.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. That the bombing could stop
when it would lead promptly to productive discussions, and we
assumed during such discussions North Vietnam would not take
military advantage of the cessation of or limitation.
Now, there is a public statement of an attitude which Hanoi
knows about, knew about. Hanoi did not come back and say,
``Well, now let's look at this. What does promptly and
productive mean.'' They did not come back and say, ``What do
you mean by not taking advantage?'' They simply rejected any
such formulation out of hand because it was a condition on
their condition, their condition being that we must stop the
bombing permanently and unconditionally.
But I think this formulation, it seems to me, to be just as
reasonable and fair as one could be expected to go in any
situation in order to get talks started, and these were
rejected both publicly and privately.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the patient Mr.
Pell.

U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I have a note delivered to
me from the Department of Defense.
December 31, 1960, personnel in Vietnam, 900. December 31,
1963, 16,300, and I ask that this discussion about the troops
that just took place, Senator Hickenlooper's questions, be put
in the record at the point where I was discussing the subject.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Senator Pell.
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Mundt.

SUBORDINATING U.S. INTERESTS

The Chair opened up with some references to Palmerston who
is a great pragmatist, and I must say one of the quotations
alluded to is when he said:

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those
interests it is our duty to follow.

When you read English history, you will find his objective
was to follow the interests of the British, and as those
interests changed he changed policies.
The reason why this question has come up and the Secretary
coming down here is that some of us believe that we are
subordinating our interests to pre-established policies, and if
we are wrong we want to find out why we are wrong and where we
are wrong and see why the interests may change; why the
policies do not change with those interests.
Another historical point here that the Secretary raised was
in connection with the question hour. Actually, as we all know,
the real guts of the exchange in the Commons is not through the
scheduled question that is submitted a week in advance, but the
supplementary questions that come and everybody knows.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I referred to the supplementaries.
Senator Pell. I know you did and that is really the whole
meat of the exchange here.

ADVANCES IN TELEVISED PROCEEDINGS

Another point to make it more pleasant, since you televise
hearings for everybody, the Secretary and us, I have often
wondered why we are not aware of the fact you do not have to
have bright lights. Television equipment is such today that
they can do it with this kind of lighting and they just need a
little nudge from the appropriate committee chairman in order
to avoid those bright lights that bore into the witness's eyes.
He does not have the same privilege that the other men in the
committee do have, being able to leave, at more frequent times.
I would hope if we did have televised hearings, this
thought would be borne in mind.

RUNNING AGAINST HISTORY

The questions that I would like to see raised in such a
hearing if it were held would be, one, the question of what are
our real interests, and then, too, the thing that buffalos me
completely is how it is that with the Soviet Union putting in
two and a half percent of what we are in Vietnam, and China
putting in .6 percent, basically this is a battle of Vietnamese
versus Vietnamese and we have to overwhelm the opposition to
the extent that we do. It would indicate that there is a
certain lack of spirit on our side or lack of belief or
dynamism, or whatever the word is.
In the long run when you run against dynamism, you are
running against history, I think, and I would like to see why
we cannot either instill the same dynamism on our side or if we
will not have to eventually accept a working out of the two and
live with it.
These are rather random thoughts. On balance, I had no
closed view when I came into this meeting. I still think it is
a close question. I would be inclined if it were put to a vote,
I would support the idea there should be some kind of hearings
with all the safeguards that can be set up.
The Chairman. Do you wish to comment on that?
Secretary Rusk. I wish to make a general comment before the
committee concludes, Mr. Chairman. But I leave the timing of
that to you, sir.
The Chairman. WeIl, Senator Case had to go make a quorum
and he said he would be right back. In the meantime, I will ask
quite a few questions.

A GENUINE CONSULTATION

I am not quite clear what your attitude is about appearing
in public, whether it is on a constitutional or pragmatic
basis.
Just what is your attitude?
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I think the members of the
committee know my great regard for this committee, and I would
hope that the committee would allow me to think further about
what has been said at the committee this morning.
I am not--I did not come down here with a dictate. I did
not come down here with a closed mind, and I wanted a genuine
consultation with the committee on this problem. I think the
nature of the problem has been thoughtfully and well explored
here this morning from different points of view.
If I could express one point that I think is important. It
seems to me there are a good many elements in this problem that
could be clarified and that the range of differences could be
narrowed if we had a quiet, thoughtful give-and-take around
this table about some of those points which have contributed to
confusion, and also some of these far-reaching questions such
as Senator Pell and others have raised.

``NEGOTIATE NOW''

Now, I have not heard in this committee anyone who says
that we ought to pull out of Vietnam. There may be such a view
but it has not been expressed this morning, and I recall a
letter written by a group of senators, including some members
of this committee, that, or a statement that made the point
that they did not wish to pull out of Vietnam.
Now, that is a very important point, and it causes some
implications. We ought to examine, it seems to me, those
implications and see where that brings us, where that leads us.
There is a widespread slogan around the country,
``Negotiate now.''
Now that is something, it seems to me, that would be
advantageous for the committee and the Secretary of State to
examine in great detail on the basis of everything that has
happened up to this point on the possibilities of negotiation
and the attitude expressed by Hanoi and Peking and Moscow, and
these are different--as we know them to be, or think them to
be.
There are such questions as the chain reactions which might
exist among treaties. What is the effect upon other countries
of our conduct under one treaty?
This seems to me to be a very far-reaching question, and I
would think that quite apart from this matter of a public
session, and I would like to have a chance to reflect upon what
was said and be in touch with the committee further about that,
that there would be great advantage in a serious discussion,
not just asking questions of me and listening to me, but
genuine discussion around the table on some of these issues and
see whether or not the matters can be pinpointed a little more
specifically and some elements of misunderstanding eliminated.
I would hope we could have that kind of discussion.
We spent most of the time this morning on the problem of a
public hearing rather than on Vietnam, and I would be glad to
continue this discussion with the committee at the committee's
convenience if it wishes to do so, or I will advise the
Committee later as to reactions to what has been said here this
morning about a session.

CONCERNS ABOUT THE REST OF THE WORLD

Senator Morse. May I make a one-minute comment. I think the
Secretary's suggestion that he needs further consultation with
the Administration is very important. There are other things
that I hope we can get into. I am very much concerned about the
Congo. I think we need to be brought up to date. We talked to
Bill Macomber over the telephone but we need an up-to-date
briefing on that. But I want to say this, Mr. Secretary, again
not asking for agreement but I am thinking about the President.
I happen to think the President is in very serious difficulty
in this country in many places over the very issue we are
talking about this morning, whether or not this Administration
is going to take the position that it is not going to have its
chief spokesman, the Secretary of State, testify before the
committee in some public hearing. We are not asking that all
these hearings be public. I think the great majority of them
will be executive. But I think that it is so important that we
have some public hearings, and I do not think they should be
straitjacketed hearings.
Going back to my earlier statement, I think after all, as
senators from our respective states we have to be judged by
what we ask, and you can handle the questions. You have never,
as I said, come out of a hearing but what you came out stronger
than when you went in, in my judgment. But I do think it is
proper for you to have notice in advance that certain questions
are going to be raised, but that should not limit anybody from
asking any question that he thinks ought to be asked.
But I think we will make a great mistake from the
standpoint of the President himself if we establish a policy
here of no public hearings. That leaves, and you yourself have
pointed out, I think, three or four times this morning, there
is a basic constitutional question. If we cannot resolve it
without getting into the constitutional question, the
constitutional question is going to be raised, and raising the
constitutional question on this point for whatever my judgment
may be worth, I think will do the President further irreparable
damage.
I do not think that millions of people in this country are
willing to go along with what they will interpret, no matter
how much you deny them by saying we can discuss it in executive
session, what they consider to be a serious trend toward
government by secrecy in time of crisis.
Senator Mundt. Will the chairman yield at that point?
Senator Morse. I am all through.

PRECEDENTS IN PREVIOUS WARS

Senator Mundt. Let me raise this question. We are not
exactly a new country, and this is not our first war. There
must be some precedents, maybe you know them, maybe a study has
been made of the relationship of the executive to the Foreign
Relations Committee in previous wars. Have we held public
hearings?
Secretary Rusk. In my opening statement I pointed out that
after Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull had not appeared in public
session.
Senator Mundt. I remember that incident, but I am talking
about the long precedent. What did we do in the Korean war? How
about World War II?
Secretary Rusk. Secretary [Dean] Acheson did not discuss
the war in public session during the Korean war.
Senator Mundt. I quite agree with you when you say it is
essential to understand that division in the country on the
Korean war probably was as great or greater than it is now, and
they are pretty much compatible, both of them we got into
without a declaration of war. I think there would be some
interest in precedents available as to what kind of
disagreements the State Department had with the Foreign
Relations Committee.
Senator Morse. I might say precedents of violating a
constitutional right do not create lawful precedents.
The Chairman. I wonder if we could allow Senator Case--I
will return to this briefly. I will desist for a moment, but
Senator Case has not had an opportunity.
Senator Case. You are most thoughtful and I shall be very
brief.

OPPOSED TO SECRECY

Most of the points I wanted to make have been made. But
there is one thing I would suggest and that is there is a very
great difference, in my judgment, that ought to be recognized
by all of us between short-term operating matters and long-term
policy. I think there is a tendency on the part of the
Executive Branch to want to have secrecy for both, and I think
we ought to insist that that not be done, not in our interest
but in the interests of the country.
There is no way, in my judgment, that we can clear up the
unhappiness in this country except by a full and free
discussion of many things about South Vietnam. The people do
not understand, I myself do not understand, the constant
repetition of optimistic statements from downtown in contrast
to the almost unanimous somber reports that come back from the
reporters on the scene. Now this is just the plain fact.
They do not understand why a group like for instance the
Ripon Society says that our present course can only be
successful if we wipe South Vietnam from the map and create a
nation of refugees, the scorched earth operation.
These things have to be discussed and they are not short-
term, they are long-term.
[Adam] Yarmolinsky had a piece in the Post the other day on
the anniversary of the Cuban missile business and he said he
shuddered to think, I will get it right here, one shudders to
imagine the cost of any national debate at that time, that is
to say about decisions, about that immediate crisis ``being
carried on against a rising volume of bird calls from the
assorted hawks and doves.''
This makes a distinction. This is a short-term operating
matter as to which secrecy is absolutely essential and I would
defend it, but not long-term policy and not long-term
operations, not the facts, basic facts, as to how things are
going, how we expect to win, what our broad policy is in
Southeast Asia. I think that unless we do get in this committee
the kind of discussion about this thing, there is likely to be
no place where we can get it. We are not going to get it in
public meeting.
Senator Pell. Will the Senator yield?

DEFINE OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS

I would like to support very much what you are saying
because, when you were out of the room, that is what I was
saying. What we are trying to define here; what are our long-
term interests. If we do not have a long-term interest
remaining on the mainland of Asia, then are we right in
maintaining the efforts we are at this point to make sure that
the area does not go against us. I think these are the things
that could be properly explored without getting into short-term
numbers games or what is going to happen next December.
Senator Case. I do think this is true, and I see no way of
drawing the country together except by talking out these
differences and these conflicts which I am not surprised the
country is confused about. I am confused as to whether we are
making any progress or whether we are not, and the way our
arguments from downtown and from other places do not meet but
go off on tangents from each other. I do think, Mr. Secretary,
if there is some way we can work this thing out, the discussion
of ground rules is absolutely in order. I think we ought to do
it. It does not answer the kind of questions that I have had
for months and years now to say we are in a good cause; that it
is desirable to maintain a balance of power in Southeast Asia;
that our friend Premier what is his name in Singapore, his life
is in danger if we get out or as he says, we are going to have
communism from the tip end of Indonesia through India up
through the Middle East if we pull out. We are not arguing
about that. Well, we just need a discussion of the facts as to
what is going on on the long-term basis. The only other thing I
would say is that there is a little bit of feeling that I have
had that some people are trying to stir up opposition in order
to get sympathy for the policies of the Administration. This is
not a hard thing to do because you have got a bunch of jerks
around who will come right up to the bait every time you tackle
it there, and you will make them ridiculous and you will get
sympathy. I do not mean you have done this, sir, but I think it
is quite possible that unless we provide a dignified forum for
thoughtful discussion, the thing is going to deteriorate into
something which is going to lead to very bad trouble and
greater division in this country.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.

NEED FOR A SERIOUS DISCUSSION

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not know what might be
involved in the suggestion that some people are trying to stir
up opposition in order to create sympathy.
Senator Case. I do not say it as a matter of intention,
that may be the wrong way to put it, and you are right to
correct it. I say the effect is this and the effect is to
remove from serious discussion the matters that I think must be
seriously discussed. It is possible that the Administration is
in error in certain matters, and I think it ought to meet
serious criticism and discussion.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, yes, we are involved in questions
here that we all ought to approach on our knees from time to
time.
Senator Case. That is correct.
Secretary Rusk. Questions that test the human capability to
their limits, and that is why I made that suggestion that we
have a quiet and thorough and sober discussion.

DELAYED RELEASE OF HEARINGS

Senator Case. May I say one thing about the matter of
executive hearings. I would be happy to come any time for any
kind of hearings that anyone else wants, but I have felt in a
sense this has added to confusion. We get Senate subcommittee
hearings for instance on the bombing of North Vietnam. They
buzz around each day about what was said. Then the matter goes
into limbo for about two months and then the hearings come out
as if it were said today, a lot of statements that have no
bearing on current matters at all come in and further screw up
the picture. This I think happens again and again when you have
delayed release of executive committee hearings, and it is not
your fault--it is not anybody's fault, but it does tend rather
to confuse than to help clarify in the public mind facts that
they should have.

CONTRADICTORY POLICIES

The Chairman. You remind me or you raise a very important
question about what the purpose of this is. Senator Mundt said
he attended a meeting and representatives of the
Administration--I understood he said to be your men; I guess
they were from the Department--did not sell the war, the
justification, on any of the bases of treaties or commitments
but it was vital to our security that we stay there, as I
understood him, and to control this area. Yet only last week we
had a hearing with Mr. [Arthur] Goldberg, speaking also for the
Administration, that we were willing to go to Geneva and to
urging--in fact recommend by the Security Council to go to
Geneva to return the Geneva Accords and have an election, and
if and whenever that election is held, it of course would mean
the withdrawal of our troops and our manpower from the area,
and I believe he suggested a neutralization.
Well it seems to me this is directly contradictory. You
cannot both be there to restrain China and get out under the
Geneva Accords. The Geneva Accords were designed to liquidate
the war with the French and to remove the French and if we
return, and if we should, and if he means what he says, and I
assume he did, it seems to me you would have a direct
contradiction of spokesmen of the Administration.
I do not know how you resolve these. Of course another
basic question to me is about this matter of national interest.
You raised, or someone did, the question of we are spending $30
billion a year roughly. We are losing--and we all know how many
men in casualties compared to what the Russians and the Chinese
are doing, the major Communist powers. If this goes on very
long it strikes me we are weakening ourselves very
substantially and we are not promoting our national interests.
On the contrary we are weakening the United States relative to
the Communists and that this role, if pursued long enough,
would mean the demise of the United States as a great power.
These are basic questions as to the wisdom of the course we
are pursuing, and I had always assumed that the function of the
Senate and the Congress generally was to participate in the
discussions to resolve which is in the national interest.

AN ASSUMPTION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The assumption that it is in our national interest in the
war is an assumption, that is just an assumption. And I cannot
help believe that out of the 19 members of this committee or
the hundred members of the Senate there could not be distilled
a certain amount of wisdom.
I agree with you that all the wisdom and infallibility does
not exist in the executive in this or in any other executive. I
thought the distinguishing characteristics of our system was
that the participation of representatives elected by the people
with the Administration would reach a, more likely reach, a
wise policy than just leaving it up to them directly.
If the Senate wishes to leave it up to the President, it
can. Most of the countries in the world do that. The great
majority today leave it up to what is the equivalent of the
President.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, but the President is also a member
of the parliament in many parliamentary systems.
The Chairman. That is the general basis, if we leave it up
to the President, do we have a function to play or not? If we
do not, all right. I think we do. But if the majority thinks we
do not and we leave it up to the wisdom of the President, that
is their privilege. Congress can abdicate its responsibilities
if it likes.
Secretary Rusk. Senator----
The Chairman. There is this basic question of what is the
national interest. Is it to pursue a war that is costing us
roughly 30 times--leaving out the money, it is hard to
calculate lives--or not, and the disruption that grows out of
this--we all know what is happening here domestically, the
conflicts that are going on right now in the Congress over
domestic programs, some of which all of us or most of us only
two or three years ago were supporting, are going down the
drain.
My view is that it is not in our national interest.
Here is a little country, if you take Vietnam itself, we
said originally at some time it was for self-determination and
so on. My commitment is not to the people or South Vietnam, it
is the people of Arkansas and the United States. That
commitment overrides all the others. If I think it is against
their interest I cannot see how I have a right not to say so. I
think if we are doing something to the long-term detriment and
safety of this country and of my own constitutents, I think it
is my duty, if I am the only one to speak out, I think it is my
duty to say that I think you are undermining the long-term
strength of the greatest democracy in the world and one of the
few democracies left. That is the way I look at it.

THE SENATE'S ROLE IN SENDING TROOPS

Senator Case. If the chairman will just yield here for one
final observation, I have to go to the Appropriations
Committee. I think this is a matter of the utmost importance
and utmost seriousness.
The Chairman. I do, too.
Senator Case. One of the reasons we are now told by a great
many people who have doubts about whether you should have
gotten into this in the first place is having committed so many
people there, having put--strike that word ``commit,'' it is a
terrible word--having put all the strength we have there, we
have laid on the line the question of our prestige to the point
where we cannot withdraw.
Now, who put them there in those numbers, and why did the
Senate not have something to say about it. It is said, I have
heard it said--I am not asking for comment, if it is wrong,
fine--that the Security Council met on this question years ago
and decided to go in with force in great numbers up to more
than we have there now already. We were constantly told all
during the period from then to now that something of this sort
was never contemplated.
This is the kind of thing which is involved here, the long-
term policies of the United States of America, not short-term
military operations, are we going to bomb up there tomorrow and
talking about it is going to endanger pilots' lives. I am
against this entirely. But somewhere along the line we have got
to call a halt to this kind of thing by which the executive
branch, by itself, without reference to and in fact denying
that it is doing so, is putting this country into the sort of
position that we are in today, and this is all part of the
background.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. First, there was no such meeting of the
National Security Council.
Senator Case. I am glad there was not.
The Chairman. Did you mean recently?
Senator Case. Years ago.

CONSIDERATIONS OF TROOP STRENGTH

Secretary Rusk. No, the question of troop strength required
has been considered in relation to what the other side does,
and those questions have been decided as the decisions--as
decisions to send particular troops out there. There never has
been any overall projection in the future.
Senator Case. There must have been some thoughts as to how
far you would go before you put U.S. military on the ground.
Secretary Rusk. Of course, President Kennedy faced that
very directly, and he was the one who made the basic decision
if we had to use military power in Southeast Asia we would do
it in South Vietnam and not in Laos, Laos being a landlocked
and difficult country, and this was a basic decision.
Senator Case. I think it was, that was my impression.
Secretary Rusk. It was not until seven months after the
Tonkin Gulf resolution that the level of U.S. forces in Vietnam
increased substantially beyond the level established by
President Kennedy, and that was a very long time after the
present President Johnson became President.

THE SENATE HAS EXERCISED ITS FUNCTIONS

Mr. Chairman, on your comment it seems to me that these are
not questions that just arose afresh in the last weeks or last
months. Surely the Congress, and particularly the Senate, has
addressed itself to these questions in the past, all along the
way, and has exercised its function. The Senate has approved
with overwhelming votes these various treaties that we made in
the Pacific Ocean area. It did so because these treaties were
considered to be in the vital interests of the United States.
As far as the Secretary of State is concerned he must
proceed on the basis that the security of Southeast Asia is
vital to the national interests of the United States and to
world peace because the Congress in 1964 declared that to be
the case with two dissenting votes.
I have no other guide from the Congress as a corporate
body. That is the Congress' view.
The Chairman. Are you speaking now of the Tonkin Gulf
resolution?
Secretary Rusk. I am speaking now about the second
paragraph of it which was not Tonkin Gulf but Southeast Asia.
Senator Morse voted against it so I cannot direct my statement
to him on this, but this idea is not a new idea. It underlay
the making of these treaties in the Pacific. President Kennedy
and President Johnson and their Secretary of State have not
come down here to the Senate with new alliances. What we have
been trying to do is work things out like the nuclear test ban,
the space treaty, the consular treaty, and the East-West trade
and questions of that sort, if you will give us a chance. We
are not trying to promote the U.S. into being some policeman of
the world under some dogma and far-reaching for power's sake,
but we do have a very serious question on our hands if we let
the word get around that our treaty commitments may not mean
what they say.

KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNDY IN VIENNA

I must tell you in all seriousness that I have in mind an
exchange which eats on my soul.
Senator Symington. I beg pardon.
Secretary Rusk. Which eats on my soul. In Vienna in June in
1961 when Chairman Nikita Khrushchev said to President Kennedy
in effect, ``Get your troops out of Berlin or there will be
war,'' it was necessary for President Kennedy to say to him
then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war and it is going to be a
very cold winter.'' and with that expression the two shook
hands and took their departure.
Now if Chairman Khrushchev had said to him, ``Don't kid me,
Mr. President, because I know your people won't stand up to it
if I put the pressure on,'' there would have been war.
Now the possibility of deterrence, the possibility of
avoiding this notion of the credibility of the United States,
it is true that we did not, and we perhaps ought to look back
at the whole record in history of this. The alliance itself did
not deter the efforts of North Vietnam to move into South
Vietnam and into Laos. But this is not the only place where
this question of credibility is very important.
So these are things we ought to discuss around this table,
it seems to me, as thoughtfully and as soberly as we can, to
see where we are in terms of those underlying interests that
Senator Pell mentioned and some of the other factors that are
involved. But this is not a matter on which the Congress has
not performed its function. It has performed its function in
the key--when the key decisions were made, the key decisions
were made along the way.

GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION WAS A MISTAKE

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, I regret you brought up
Tonkin Gulf because I publicly apologized and stated I was
mistaken. I think it is a great--Senator Case has also
discussed this at length and I do not know that we have time to
raise it again, but when I reviewed the record of the briefing
we were given by the Secretary of Defense, in particular, and
we spent, the combined committee spent an hour and 40 minutes
considering it under an urgency that it had to be done
immediately to have any effect, it is hard for me to believe,
as the Senator from New Jersey has said in extenso, and I do
not want to go over it all now, we do not have time, that that
constitutes a deliberate judgment on the part of this committee
and the Congress on the fundamental questions.
Just frankly between you and me, I think we were had, we
were put under pressure of an immediate action. We spent an
hour and 40 minutes with almost no questions about that matter,
and we voted it out under the impression that this was an
emergency, and that if we expressed the degree of unity
immediately this would have some mysterious effect of
restraining the North Vietnamese. I have already gone into it
in great extent.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
The Chairman. I do not want to burden the record of why I
did it. I am convinced I made a serious mistake not to oppose
immediate action, to have had hearings at that time, to have
gone through the kind of procedure that I have tried to follow
and urged this committee to follow since that time, so that we
do not take precipitate action under conditions that are
represented to us to be of a great crisis nature by the leading
spokesmen for the Administration.
I regret that this kind of question as to the vital
interests of the United States is based upon that particular
action which under any, it seems to me, common sense
consideration, would not be considered a deliberate,
thoughtful, serious consideration of what our interests were.
The debate on the floor only took place, I mean did not
occupy but just a few hours. The Senator from Oregon, who, as
you all have rightly said, has the clear record of being right
on that occasion, was allotted almost all the time the second
day. We had one day of debate in the afternoon. It did not
last, I do not think, over three or four hours, and it was by
unanimous consent the next day because of his position he was
given, I think, two or three hours. He was entitled to it. That
is all the debate was, if that is a deliberate decision of this
body to judge the vital interests of the United States' staying
in Southeast Asia, of controlling it, well, I think is a
distortion of its meaning, I do not consider we have had that
kind of deliberation.
Yes, I will yield.

RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

Senator Lausche. If you were wrong in August of 1964 and
you believe you are right now, what do you propose
affirmatively we should do to remedy the wrong?
The Chairman. I have proposed this in long written
statements and in innumberable oral statements. Briefly what
was proposed, as I had understood it the other day, and in the
discussion by Mr. Goldberg, let us assume we are successful,
just to illustrate what I would like to see happen, is that the
Security Council would take affirmative action, as I would
assume we have some influence with these people, and we would
have to establish in their minds that we mean it, that they
reconvene the Geneva Conference after recommendations of the
Security Council because that would give it a prestige and an
importance beyond anything we could do bilaterally. They would
return to that. The President himself on past occasions has
made statements that led me to believe he would be satisfied by
returning to the Geneva Conference, and following the basic
principles of that conference as to how to resolve our
questions that have arisen in Vietnam and in which we in a
sense have taken the position of the French, and that is the
way--that is the procedure I would follow.
But basic to that, Frank, is the decision in the mind of
our own government on this vital one. Is it vital to our
interests to remain in Vietnam to protect Southeast Asia and
India and so on from the possibility of Chinese expansion in
the future? That is a very--it seems to me, the guts of the
question.
Senator Lausche. Do you propose pulling out?
The Chairman. If it is, then of course we should not go to
Geneva. We should do what we are doing. If it is not vital that
we remain and maintain a physical military presence in the
area, then we ought to follow Geneva, it seems to me. It is an
oversimplification. You said pull out. To pull out has the
implication that we just drop our arms and walk out.

AN ORDERLY WAY TO NEGOTIATE

What I am saying is that in an orderly way we negotiate
through return to Geneva and accept the basic principles there
of how to resolve it. In that sense we do get out of a physical
presence on the mainland. This is by no means giving up any of
your seapower or our airpower, the bases we have and and so on.
This is, as I see it, the crux of the matter.
Personally it does not at this moment seem to me a physical
domination of Southeast Asia or any part of it or South Vietnam
is in our national interests because the cost of this is way
out of proporation to what we get for it.
The Senator from Missouri has made the point time and time
again that by our involvement there and by tying down our
troops and the vast expenditures of funds and lives and money
and especially attention, we are endangering other areas in the
world of far greater importance to us. These are all matters
you have to weigh to balance one against the other, and the
Senator from Missouri made that point on several occasions and
I thoroughly agree with him. I think it is very pertinent to
this kind of issue. You balance off what is the most important
to the long-term strength and security of our country, and to
assume that it is in the national interest to stay there you
are assuming the very question at issue. I do not accept that
as it is yet. It has not been proven.
Senator Symington. If I may----
The Chairman. The Senator from Missouri really came in
late. He is entitled to the next if he wishes. I yield.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE VIET CONG

Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, believe me, I have the
most complete sympathy with your problem in every way. I do
think that you have a problem yourself, if I may say so
respectfully, as to how you cut the pie of our limited
resources.
With that premise, there is just one question I would like
to ask at this time. My impression from Ambassador Goldberg was
that if we got to the Geneva Conference through the Security
Council, which I would most earnestly hope we do with this
continued unfortunate business, the U.S. Government would be
willing to have the Viet Cong, which therefore would mean the
National Liberation Front or vice versa, participate as a full
negotiating member at that Geneva Conference. Is that the
position of the Administration?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is something to be negotiated in
connection with the possibility of such a session because----
Senator Symington. But you see here is the point, if I may
go on. If that is subject to negotiation--I came in on a plane;
I apologize for coming late. I read in Time or Newsweek that
this is the position of the United States based on the
testimony of Ambassador Goldberg before our committee in open
hearing. Now if it is, to my mind it is a long step forward.
The little plan that I advocated has been conspicuous by lack
of comment on the part of the Administration no doubt because
it was premature. But I did suggest that we have the South
Vietnam Government, which is a little inclining forward, agree
to negotiate with the Viet Cong or National Liberation Front.
Now, the press through a weekly newspaper, not a morning
report or the day after a hearing, feels, I read it this
morning, that Ambassador Goldberg said that if we could get to
Geneva that he would be willing that the United States, as our
representative, would be willing to have the Viet Cong
participate in the negotiations as a full participating member.
One of the reasons why under the proper controls I think that
an open hearing is now necessary because of the growing unrest
in the country, is that if this is a matter for negotiation it
certainly was not left that way with the Committee the other
day by Ambassador Goldberg.

DIFFERENT WAYS OF NEGOTIATING

Secretary Rusk. Well, I would have to look at the exact
language he used because as a full participating member is the
point I would raise because no one----
Senator Symington. I just raise the point.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Not even on the Communist side
recognizes them as a government. If they sit at the table as a
government with a veto on the result, then I query whether this
advances us toward a solution better than to find ways to have
them suitably represented and heard.
Now, there are many ways of doing this. Remember the two
Germanys sat at a Foreign Ministers meeting with their table
six inches behind or something of that sort. Now these are
things we are prepared to talk about with those who can stop
the shooting but we have not gotten Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking
to that table yet. They have not raised this as a condition for
coming to the table, and indeed the noises from the other side,
and I may not be able to leave this if this record is to be--
the part that might be released at some stage, there seem to be
some indications that they believe there are two kinds of
discussions that ought to take place, one between us and Hanoi
with respect to the issues between us and Hanoi, because it is
Hanoi that is responsible----

GIVING AWAY NEGOTIATING POINTS

Senator Symington. I have been in a good many negotiations
in my day and a good many business trades. Why do we always
hedge it? Why do we not first try to sell it and then hedge it
if necessary in the trade?
What good is it for Ambassador Goldberg to tell the
committee something in an open session that you have to say we
have to negotiate.
I will carry it a little further than that. One thing that
disturbs me a great deal was that there was an editorial in the
New York Times last January 26 and it said one of the worst
kept secrets in the country was the difference of opinion on
the one hand between the Secretary of Defense and on the other
hand the President, the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of
Staff.
To me that was the most unfortunate comment. I think it is
the type and character, as much as I believe the war has been
badly plumbered from a military standpoint from the beginning,
I believe this is the type and character of problem that shows,
some way has to get before the people, under whatever rules
would be advisable for a hearing. I have changed on that
because I think the people are totally restless and have a
great lack of understanding, and at least to some extent, I
know this is not true of you. They are beginning to feel they
are being misled.
Perhaps it is fair to say they feel they have only been
given part of the truth and, as the lawyers say, partial truth
is an evasion of truth. This disturbed me because I got the
very definite impression from Ambassador Goldberg if we could
fight this very difficult thing to do, which for me looks about
impossible with the Russians having a veto on the Security
Council, nevertheless if we could get it through the Security
Council to the point where we did get to Geneva that we would
let the Viet Cong come there. Yet you as the Secretary of State
and a more important person in the Administration said this
morning this would be one of the things to negotiate. So we get
mixed up is my point.

WHAT AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG SAID

Secretary Rusk. May I make two points on that. My
understanding of what Ambassador Goldberg said, the members of
that conference could and would make the necessary decisions as
to participation of the National Liberation Front and the form
that that participation might take. He indicated----
Senator Symington. Somebody has given you some notes can
you read them. All I know is my impression was we can do it and
I know it is confirmed in the press. It is just an illustration
of the general misunderstanding of what is going on between the
various countries.
Senator Sparkman. Will the Senator yield to me very
briefly?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. I want to say this: the record requires
very careful reading.
Senator Gore is the one who put these questions, followed
them up very carefully. Ambassador Goldberg gave a peculiar
sort of an answer. He first said we will not stand in the way.
He said it in a more or less negative way, and he never said
anything more than, I believe, if it gets to the point that our
vote is required, it will be available.
I believe those are almost the exact words that he used. I
thought at the time that he was using rather peculiar language
in answering, and I did not construe it as being our inviting,
but if we are put up to it, put up against it, we would not
refuse.

PUTTING YOUR CARDS ON THE TABLE

Secretary Rusk. Well, the President said two years ago that
the presence and the voice of the Liberation Front is not an
insuperable obstacle, but, Senator, surely in a negotiation in
the business field you do not start a negotiation by putting
all your cards on the table.
Senator Symington. You have not put any on in a couple of
years. You have had a rigid position.
Secretary Rusk. There have been 14 points, elements of a
peaceful solution There have been 28 proposals made to get
something started. There have been points by the dozens and
dozens and dozens put forward on which we get no response from
these fellows in Hanoi.
Senator Symington. My statement is overstated. But I know
they gave had four positions in there--and stop the bombing was
only one of the four.
But I also know we have had a very rigid position against
negotiation with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, and
the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front as a separate
entity. After my fourth trip there in recent months I am
convinced we are not going to get anywhere unless we just
pulverize this group, and then you are not sure what is left
unless we do negotiate with the National Liberation Front and
the Viet Cong.
Based on the questioning of the Senator from Tennessee my
impression was just what the Senator from Alabama's impression
was, that there was some give here and it is grabbed for by the
people like thirsty people in the desert, as maybe there is
some relaxation. I do not think we are going to get anywhere
unless we did and that is why I put it in the suggestion that I
made, and why I was so impressed with Ambassador Goldberg's
remarks. If it was deliberately cryptic, I am sorry because I
thought, he was being positive about it at least to some
extent. But it is the type and character of the thing that I
believe we have to clear up with the people if we are going to
do anything about this increasing unrest.

PRESS HANOI ON NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary Rusk. I would offer one brief comment in regard
to the comments last made by the chairman as well as by Senator
Symington here.
It would be important for this committee to know, and I
think we can go into that in great detail, whether the
chairman's argument, for example, is with us or is with Hanoi.
It will be very helpful for the chairman to say to Hanoi, here
is what I think you ought to do in terms of coming to a Geneva
Conference and trying to take some of these processes of
peaceful settlement.
I think the letter which you signed at one stage did in
fact press Hanoi on that point, but we do not object to a
Geneva Conference or the Security Council's dealing with this
or any of these things. But there is no chair there for Hanoi.
Hanoi says they are not going to do it.
So we are still left with a problem.

THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS

The Chairman. I cannot read Hanoi's mind but my impression
is the uncertainty, it is in my mind, and I think in the minds
of certain members of this committee who have already spoken,
to what our real purpose is is one of the obstacles to a
conference. They have had conferences before. They went to
Geneva and they believe, and I think with some reason, that the
conference, that they agreed to a settlement which was, it was,
run out on, that was not carried out. That is ancient history.
They also had an agreement with the French in 1946 which
clearly the French backed out on. I think if it is uncertain as
to what our purpose is, I can see where they would not wish to
go to Geneva or anywhere else. He would just have to fight it
out, if our purpose is that our control, military control of
South Vietnam is in our vital interests, therefore we are going
to stay there, then there is nothing to negotiate about.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I read, just to make
my point on this?
Secretary Rusk. But we have not said that.
The Chairman. I do not know. I am uncertain about what this
is.
Senator Mundt a while ago said some of your spokesmen
convinced him that, leaving out all the resolutions and
treaties and everything else, it is in our national interest to
stay there and he sold the bankers in California on this, and
they all approved of it.
Secretary Rusk. Well, to stay there while there is a fight,
there is a question of security with the people coming in from
the North, but that does not mean to stay there.
The Chairman. That is not what I understood him to mean.
As long as China is there and not in a friendly mood, which
could be a very long time, depending upon how we treat China. I
thought that is what he meant, not just during this fight.

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S POSITION

Senator Symington. Let me just read this for the record,
Mr. Chairman, the last two paragraphs in Time magazine of
November 10. Under the heading ``The War'', ``The Real
Stalemate'', is the heading:

On the Senate side, talk of turning the Vietnam question
over to the United Nation rumbled on, with Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield and Minority Leader Everett Dirksen both supporting
such a move. The Foreign Relations Committee also heard UN
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg clarify for the first time in public
the Administration's willingness to allow the Viet Cong to
participate in Security Council peace talks.
While the UN to date has shown no interest in tackling the
Vietnam dilemma, Goldberg said also that if the Geneva
Conference is reconvened, the U.S. will not argue with the
Conference Co-Chairmen, Russia and Britain, about invitations
or agenda. Thus, the Viet Cong could participate in Geneva
talks with no American objection--a significant softening of
the U.S. position to date.

Reading that, I was pleased. If it is not right, then the
people have been misled either by Time magazine or by Arthur
Goldberg or by both, or by somebody, or they just made a
mistake. It is hard to figure. But if this is not right, I
think that ought to be corrected fairly promptly.
Secretary Rusk. I think the transcript of the Goldberg
hearing is here, it is in front of you; in connection with the
Security Council he referred specifically to Rule 39 of the
Security Council under which they have in the past invited
representatives of the Jewish Agency and representatives of the
Arab Committee, and people of that sort. He was not specific in
terms of the status either at Geneva or at the Security
Council. That is something to be determined when we, if we, get
that far. This has not been raised by the other side as the key
that unlocks the door to a meeting of the Geneva Conference or
to negotiations.
We are, you would be interested, we are listening now to
see whether Hanoi is going to make any comment on what
Ambassador Goldberg said. As of this morning they made no
comment.

LOOK AT THE TRANSCRIPT

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a couple of
questions and I want to raise a couple of points of procedure
here. I think the Secretary is right. Let's reread what
Ambassador Goldberg said in the transcript. That speaks for
itself.
I remember he made clear several times talking about nine
votes needed to make a majority and what he said was if our
vote--we are not going to initiate it. We are not going to
compose it. If we get to a point where our vote is required for
the ninth vote, we will not stand in the way.
I think I quote him exactly when I say, ``We will not stand
in the way'', and that was brought out several times. So I know
what it is to be quoted incorrectly by Time magazine as well as
most of the other press of the country.
Senator Case. Most of the people would give their right arm
to be quoted at all.
Senator Morse. I want to say first with Arthur Goldberg, we
ought to look at the transcript.

PRESS THE UNITED NATIONS TO INTERVENE

I have two other points I want to make. I want to associate
myself with the chairman, with your general thesis that you
expressed here just a very few moments ago, although as I said
at the hearings the other day and the Ambassador said he wanted
to limit himself to discussion of the Security Council and not
the General Assembly, I want to add for this record, of course
I do not think you are going to get it through the Security
Council.
You might, as I said in the hearing the other day, get them
to refer it to the General Assembly, but suppose they do not
even do that.
I still would press for General Assembly intervention and
have them lead us into the reconvened Geneva Conference. But
all I have ever been insisting on or you have been insisting on
is we tried this approach which leads me to the last point I
want to make before I bring up the procedural matter.
I am glad to have my memory refreshed again because I had
heard it before, and I know it is a fact of that famous
conference between Khrushchev and President Kennedy, and I
think President Kennedy was exactly right. I think he made the
correct reply to Khrushchev, because of the vital interests of
the United States and because of what would be involved in
connection with our position with Russia. But I do not think to
argue analogously from that that the same situation is involved
in Asia has any relevancy at all. That is where I leave the
Secretary and the President.
I do not think we have ever had any right to take the
position that we were going to unilaterally as a military
policeman set up our military posture in Asia, and say, ``We
are going to enforce what we think ought to be the
international policy in Asia.'' That is where I leave the
Secretary.
It is why I think we need the kind of discussion we are
having here this morning.

A CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER

I think in broad outlines there is a need for the
Administration to explain to the American people its position
in a public hearing. I just do not think you can possibly
justify a continuation of the Secretary, and I think that is
why I asked the question when I got up here, expressing a
Presidential point of view, because I think, I do not know, I
probably should strike the word ``think'' and substitute the
word ``suspect'', that the Secretary's position that he has
taken on public hearings is also the President's.
So that does raise the constitutional issue. We will have
to fight that one out on constitutional grounds. It is not
going to promote the kind of bridge-building that I talked
about in my opening statement this morning. But I certainly
think that we should not draw that line now.
The Secretary is absolutely right in saying that he does
not want to get into the constitutional matter now. I do not
think we should until there has been further consultation
between the Secretary and the President and further executive
conversation with the Secretary and this committee.
I am not precipitous in these matters. I think you ought to
do everything you can to find out if you can find a common
ground of agreement and work from that ground if you can. I
want to say very definitely, however, as a United States
Senator, I will not stand by and not raise the constitutional
issue in regard to a matter that I think is of vital concern to
the welfare of the people of my country.
I do not think that the advise and consent clause,
according to my sights, can be emasculated the way it will be
emasculated, the constitutional rights of the committee, the
rights of the committee to determine what kind of hearings it
is going to have under the Constitution, I am not going to
stand by and permit this Administration or any other to
emasculate it.
I have already said to Clifford, he can cite all the
precedents you want about Secretary of State Hull or Acheson or
anybody else, that does not create a constitutional right. If
it is a wrong precedent it continues to be wrong no matter what
other Administration wants to make the same wrong.
But I think the Secretary is entitled to have an
understanding with us now. He is going to have to go out and
face the press and I think we ought to try to reach a
procedural agreement in the closing moments of this session
this morning. We owe it to him not only as a matter of courtesy
and decency, but we owe it to him because he is Secretary of
State and through him owe it to the country, that we have an
understanding that he will announce, I hope that we can reach
an understanding, that he is going to further pursue this
matter with the full understanding of the committee at some
appropriate time next week.

CANNOT LET MATTERS DRIFT

There is just one of these things that you cannot let
drift. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you can obtain from the
Secretary, it was my suggestion to the Chairman and members of
the committee that we agree when we break up this morning to
meet again at a time convenient to him, but in the reasonably
near future, for discussion of this and resolution of it where
we can agree to public hearings; that he be given our assurance
that we respect his problems in those public hearings and will
continue to respect them, but they are going to be public
hearings unless the President, who is his boss, says no. If the
President says no, then it removes the conflict from the
committee with the Secretary as far as I am concerned, with the
individual senators, the committee does not want to do it in
conflict with the President of the United States.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say a very
brief word.

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Mr. Secretary, first I want to comment on Ambassador
Goldberg's appearance before the committee last week. I think
every member of the committee felt that it was a very fine
appearance. I think it did more good to the morale of the
committee than anything we have had happen in a long time. I
felt it was like a breath of fresh air.
Senator Pell. Amen.
Senator Morse. Right.
Senator Sparkman. I believe that it met with approval
throughout the country from various press reports I have seen,
and so forth.

THE MAKE-UP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

There is one thing that disturbs me and that is the
difficulty of getting as many as nine votes. It appears we will
be able to get eight, but there is difficulty about the ninth.
When we look at the make-up of the Security Council and whether
we consider some of them who ought to be some of our staunchest
friends, it seems to me without arm-twisting but just with good
moral suasion, we ought to be able to get that ninth vote which
I think would have a terrific impact upon this whole situation.
I hope that every consideration will be given toward an effort
to get that ninth vote in the Security Council, and that this
matter be pushed seriously and conscientiously in the Security
Council. I think it would mean much, if we could get that
resolution through.
The Chairman. If I might add to that, I think one of the
reasons that would bar maybe a country like Ethiopia is the
uncertainty as to what our real long-term purpose is there, it
would be in my view.
But anyway, I think this is a matter that was helped if we
really mean it. If we want Geneva, we have to clarify for their
benefit, the members whose vote you are solicitating.

SOVIET EFFORTS TO BRING HANOI TO NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, under conditions of very
great privacy, I would like to put my finger on what I think is
the most difficult problem about this matter. We know that this
year the Soviet Union has made at least two efforts in Hanoi to
bring them into some sort of negotiation. We know they were
rebuffed both times.
At the present time the Soviet Union is rather quiescent on
this matter, presumably waiting to see whether some other
situation will develop. You will have noted when President
Johnson and I speak about Vietnam, we do not unlimber our blast
on Mosow; this is for a reason.
The Soviets tell us that they hope very, very much that we
will not press this in the Security Council and have a public
eye-gouging debate there against this background. Now this is
to me a troublesome point.
Now the President, I, Ambassador Goldberg are going to try
to do what we can on this U.N. consideration of this, but I
think it is important for the committee to know that this is a
very troublesome point.

PRESSING THE SOVIETS TO CALL A CONFERENCE

The Chairman. What reason do they give for not wishing,
because they have publicly announced they thought the Geneva
Conference provisions were the proper way to do it?
Secretary Rusk. Their public problem is that Hanoi says
this is not the business of the U.N., and the Soviet Union is
very reluctant to go out publicly in advance of the position of
Hanoi even though privately they may try to do a little
something about it from time to time.
Senator Morse. Does Hanoi say it is not the business of the
Geneva Conference?
Secretary Rusk. No, but they will not come to a Geneva
Conference. Hanoi continues to say as between the U.N. and the
Geneva Conference, this is the business of the Geneva
machinery.
Senator Morse. But, Mr. Secretary, we cannot stand by
though and let Russia control us with her so-called unofficial
veto power.
Secretary Rusk. I understand.
Senator Morse. We ought to get the Geneva Conference to go
and she is co-chairman. She does not even join with Great
Britain in calling for a Geneva Conference.
Secretary Rusk. We have pressed them over and over and over
again to call a Geneva Conference, either on the whole problem
of Southeast Asia or any part of it. We tried it on Cambodia,
on Laos, on Vietnam, on the DMZ, on any part of it or all of
it, and they have been unwilling to join in calling them.
The Chairman. I understand you to say that Hanoi has
positively said she would not attend a Geneva Conference?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
The Chairman. At all?
Senator Morse. You mean Geneva or U.N.?
Secretary Rusk. Geneva.
The Chairman. It is the first time I heard that.
Senator Sparkman. Can not Russia influence them?

THE SOVIET UNION'S CHINA PROBLEM

Secretary Rusk. Of course, there is another matter while we
are in a very private conversation here. There is some
indication that the Soviets do not want a Geneva Conference as
a machinery because Peking is there. Now this is not our
problem, that is their problem, it is Peking's problem, but I
think it weighs in the balance here as to their attitude on
this situation.
Senator Sparkman. Why do they not work up some other
conference such as France suggested?
Secretary Rusk. We have suggested that the two co-chairmen
and the three members of ICC meet, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bebler,
the head of the World United National Association made that
proposal. We would be glad to see these five countries. That
gives them a machinery which does not have to include Peking,
you see, or us, or Hanoi, see what they can do. We supported
the idea that a group of Asian countries get together without
us, without the Soviet Union, neutral Asian countries, to see
if they could be in touch. We would be glad to see if these
Nobel Peace Prize people could establish any contact that would
lead to anything, but their initial contacts were, in Moscow,
the group that went there, without our Mr. Kink, was very
discouraging indeed, were very discouraging indeed.
So we will fully explore this situation in the Security
Council further.
Ambassador Goldberg has discussed that several times this
year at different occasions with different members of the
Security Council, so we are not going to cheat on the
resolution that is before it, that the committee has in front
of it at all. But there are some very complex problems
connected with it.

HANOI'S UNWILLINGNESS TO GO TO GENEVA

The Chairman. Has Hanoi ever publicly stated she would not
attend a Geneva Conference if it was reconvened?
Secretary Rusk. Well, she is unwilling to give a go sign to
Moscow to convene it, and presumably also to Poland.
One intriguing--we reached one interesting point here
about, when was it, two and a half years ago when a Hanoi
delegation was visiting in Moscow, and in their joint
communique they seemed to look with approval on a Geneva
Conference on Cambodia and Laos. We said we thought this would
be a very good idea. We understand that at that time Peking
moved in in Hanoi and in Cambodia and broke up the
possibilities of such a conference. So I suppose that Hanoi is
also looking over its shoulder at Peking to a degree, although
I would think Hanoi is now in a position to come to some sort
of a conference without Peking's presence if Hanoi wanted to. I
think they have that much independence at the present time.

A VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Chairman. What would be wrong, however, with this being
made public through a vote in the Security Council?
It seems to me it would clear the air a bit if we made a
genuine effort and they refused, all of the Russians and
their--others simply refused to do it, it would improve our
position in the public mind if we made a genuine effort to do
it.
Secretary Rusk. We sometimes have a dilemma as between
those things which would strengthen our public position from
the point of view of public opinion, and keeping certain things
open as a means of solving the problem.
There are a good many private exchanges which have taken
place, which, if we made public, would reinforce the view that
we have made extraordinary efforts to try to find a way to
bring this to a conclusion. But to do so would mean to let
Hanoi know that any contact they have with us is likely to be
made public and scare them away from some of the contacts that
could be very important
It is a dilemma we have had, one has in diplomacy, and it
is not the first time it has arisen.
Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.

A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS

Senator Pell. A couple of comments, just to clear the
record on the colloquy between the Ambassador and Senator Gore
when Senator Gore very sagely brought out a shift in emphasis
in my view, what the statements were, ``We would not stand in
the way, we would not prevent it from happening'', which would
bear out the Symington reference from Time magazine, but it was
never stated in an affirmative way and would support the
position of the Secretary of it being no, from the viewpoint of
the record there has been no change. There has been a change in
emphasis.
The second point I wanted to make was that in connection
with going to the United Nations, I was struck by the fact that
all the witnesses except Ambassador Goldberg, and this includes
those who had submitted written statements as well as those who
came verbally, said there was no chance of the United Nations
Security Council, General Assembly or anybody else taking up
this resolution unless the bombing had ceased first. They were
unanimous in that regard.
This, Ambassador Goldberg did not agree with in that
respect and he thought it would have no effect upon the
permanent members of the UN.

A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING

The question I wanted to ask the Secretary was whether he
thought, and he is aware there have been exchanges on this
subject, and I am struck by the strength with which the North
Vietnamese predicate any move on a cessation of the bombing,
and I was wondering if it is his view that Hanoi would not
come, the answer that Hanoi would not come to the Geneva
Conference was predicated in no change in our posture in this
regard or upon a cessation of the bombing?
Secretary Rusk. Well, these are matters that we ought to go
into great detail on, Mr. Chairman, in executive session when
there is more time. But let me summarize a great deal of recent
business on this.
Hanoi, in the first place, refuses to negotiate without
conditions, that is just start talking as has happened in most
of the crises since 1945 where the two sides made contact and
talked about things to resolve the crisis. They have raised a
condition of a permanent and unconditional stop of the bombing.
They varied this word ``permanent'' a number of ways, sometimes
they call it ``definitively'', sometimes they said ``for
good'', sometimes they said ``once and for all'', sometimes
they said ``permanent''.
No one has been able to get for us from Hanoi any interest
in the stoppage of the bombing that is not permanent.
Now, it has been suggested that what we ought to do is stop
the bombing without answering that question. But the trouble is
that question will be put to us the next morning, and they will
say, ``Is this permanent or not?'', and if we fail to say that
it is permanent then we have the same problem.
Yes, please.
Senator Pell. Excuse me. I will not interfere.
Secretary Rusk. Let me continue just a minute further.
But even so, the President in San Antonio said we will stop
the bombing when it will lead promptly to productive
discussions and then we stated an assumption that during the
discussions the North Vietnamese would not take military
advantage of it.
We thought that might at least elicit some repartee, some
examination, a counterproposal or some discussion as to what
these words meant. This was not a condition on our side with
respect to negotiations. It was a qualification of their
condition.
Now, no one has been able to tell us, including--well Hanoi
will not, therefore no one else can. Hanoi has not even said if
we stop the bombing they will come to negotiations.

CREATING A SANCTUARY

Senator Pell. May I make one point here, Mr. Chairman?
I believe the Secretary would be inclined to agree with me
that the point has been made to a representative of North
Vietnam to the effect that if the cessation did not produce
good results in a reasonable period of time, the bombing would
be resumed and there was no denial of that fact, and that is
accepted in their thinking. Would that not be a correct
statement?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we tried to leave them the freedom of
action of not addressing themselves to that question that they
wanted to on the San Antonio formula, you see. Because we
stated lead promptly to productive talks.
Now, the ``promptly'' is fairly important because we have a
good deal of evidence, including documents and otherwise, they
have been discussing among themselves what they call a fight
and negotiate strategy. Obviously that creates very great
problems if they sit there in a sanctuary safe and secure
indefinitely into the future while they send their men and arms
into South Vietnam while there is meaningless talk, but they
did not come back to explore those expressions.
We were ready to talk about those things with them.
Secondly, when we stated the assumption we were prepared
for them to ask us what this meant, we could have told them.
Now let me say, could I leave this off the record, Mr.
Chairman?
[Off the record.]

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, the time is going on. I am
still puzzled about what to say. We have to say something to
the press. Shall I say that the decision about public hearings
will be a presidential decision; it has not yet been resolved?
We will have a further meeting and at that time we will get an
answer; is that it?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that you would
not at this point point to the President on this matter. We
have had, I thought, a very thoughtful and thorough discussion
here this morning. There are different views on the committee.
I have asked for the chance to reflect upon what has been said
here in the committee. I wonder if we could not say we had a
thorough discussion of the matter; that no final conclusion was
reached; that the Secretary indicated that he wanted to reflect
upon what had been said here, and the members of the committee
will want to reflect upon the discussion; and that the
committee and the Secretary will be in touch again.

FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

The Chairman. Then there is no conclusion was arrived at.
We had a discussion of the matter but that resolution of
whether or not there would be public hearings on Vietnam is
left for further consultation?
Secretary Rusk. For further consultation.
Senator Morse. I was going to say they will ask the
chairman when and I do think we ought to have a time bracket.
The Chairman. We can say as soon as convenient, and
probably if they press me I would say next week; is that too
soon?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we hope promptly. But we do have----
Senator Gore. That is good.
The Chairman. Can I say this? They will ask me. I have to
say something--whose next move is it. Will we hear from you?
Will you notify us as to whether or not--what the decision is
or shall we contact you?
Secretary Rusk. I think on that you can say the Secretary
indicated he will be in further touch with the committee.
Senator Morse. Promptly?
Senator Rusk. Promptly.
Senator Pell, I wonder if it would be useful to say there
is a difference between short and long term and if the
Secretary did come up it would be on long term.
The Chairman. I might get mixed up.
The main thing this was announced for was whether there
would be public hearings, and the whole point is I have to say
something.
I will say this: We discussed the matter and the Secretary
wishes further time to consider the matter and the Committee
will of course consider the matter further and no action was
taken of any kind this morning. We had a discussion, and in the
future we hope promptly.
If they pin me down, I will say sometime next week; is that
about right?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Morse. Fine.
Senator Gore. I think it has been very helpful, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. I have enjoyed it very much this morning.
[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in
room
S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson,
Mundt, and Case.
S. Res. 180, expressing the sense of the Senate that the
Vietnam conflict be brought before the United Nations, was
ordered reported by a vote of 19-0.
S. Res. 151, relating to National Commitments, was
considered and an original resolution was ordered reported by a
vote of 17-0, Senators Dodd and McCarthy not voting.
S. Res. 1418, the passport bill, was considered and no
action taken.
[The committee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION

----------

Thursday, November 16, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, the Honorable J. William Fulbright
(Chairman) presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson,
Mundt, and Case.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and
Mr. Lowenstein, of the committee staff.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The committee is very pleased to have with us this
afternoon Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who is in Washington for
consultation.
I know I speak for all the committee in expressing our
thanks to you for coming here today. I know your time is short
and the demands on you are very great and very heavy. We will
be glad to have any observations you wish to make, Mr.
Ambassador.
I believe you are accompanied by Mr. Robert Komer, your
Deputy for Civil Operations.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
The Chairman. And you have others, Mr. Philip Habib, a
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, and John
Negroponte, Executive Assistant to Ambassador Bunker.
Proceed sir.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLSWORTH BUNKER, UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, ACCOMPANIED BY: ROBERT W. KOMER,
AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S DEPUTY FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT; PHILIP C. HABIB, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS; JOHN NEGROPONTE,
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER; AND WILLIAM B.
MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL
RELATIONS

Ambassador Bunker. Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be
useful if I should give first just a brief summary of the
present situation, as I see it, in Vietnam.
Casting up the balance sheet is, obviously, a rather
difficult, complicated undertaking involving as it does many
factors, questions of judgment, some imponderables. I think in
looking back no one would deny that we had come a long way in
the last two years. Certainly that is the opinion of my
colleagues in the diplomatic corps who are there and have been
there for much longer periods than I.

MILITARY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED

In the first place, the military situation has greatly
improved. The North Vietnamese Army has not won a single major
victory in the South. On the contrary, it has suffered heavy
losses on the battlefield. At home, much of the infrastructure
has been damaged or destroyed: An estimated half million people
diverted to the repair of war damage; the movement of men and
supplies made infinitely more difficult; food shortages have
developed. It seems apparent that physically and materially the
country has been badly hurt.
At the same time, Viet Cong recruitment has declined since
early 1966 by perhaps more than half. Our estimates were at
that time the recruitment was some 6500 to 7,000 a month, and
now our intelligence estimates are that it is between three and
four thousand a month.
The age of the draftees has declined. As an example, I
visited a little while ago a hamlet in the delta which was
attacked later by a battalion of Viet Cong who were beaten off
by the popular forces. The Vietnamese Regulars responded
quickly, caught up with them, killed 51 and captured 10
prisoners and weapons; three of the prisoners were 12 years
old, two of them were 14, and five were 17. This is being
repeated, constantly, as we are taking prisoners.
At the same time, the Viet Cong have progressively denied
access to food, with the result that in areas they control they
have extorted higher and higher taxes and thus are alienating
the population.

PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

By contrast, I think it is fair to say that South Vietnam
has made substantial progress in a good many ways.
On the political front, there has been a stable government
for two years; the constituent assembly elected; a constitution
drafted and promulgated; village and hamlet elections held last
spring and summer; some 14,000 village and hamlet officials
elected. Presidential and congressional elections took place,
as you know, in September and October of this year.
Thus, within a space of 14 months and under wartime
conditions, five elections have been held.
A new government has been inaugurated.
From a statement made a few days ago by the Prime Minister,
and by the president previously, vigorous action was in calling
on the people for greater efforts and greater sacrifices.
It has already taken two important steps. A decree
providing for partial mobilization, expanding the draft ages
from 18 to 33, requisitions of specialists and technicians from
34 to 45 years of age and recalling to service men within the
draft groups who have previously been demobilized and extending
the service of those already in the service.
Secondly, and I think a very important step, was a decree,
law, to become effective January 1st providing that all land
and property taxes will be administered by, and all the
revenues collected for local governments, namely the villages,
provinces and the municipalities and the prefectures.
Transferring, as the decree does, virtually all land tax
authority to the local units of government, I think this
represents really a giant step forward.
Inflationary pressures are severe, but have been kept under
reasonably good control while prices have gone up; food
supplies are ample.
The Vietnamese Armed Forces are being steadily improved and
in many instances have turned in excellent performances.
Pressure on the enemy has been stepped up by both the United
States and the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

PACIFICATION GAINING MOMENTUM

Pacification has gained momentum.
As Ambassador Komer can tell you, it was somewhat slow in
getting started. A vast amount of planning, organization,
training was involved in it. The reorientation and re-training
of the Vietnamese Armed Forces; part of the Regular Forces
being diverted to pacification; and most of the regional and
popular forces having responsibility, also, for it. The
revolutionary development forces had to be trained. More than
30,000 individuals or cadres, as they call them, have been
trained.
I think as of the end of August, there were some 611 teams
then operating, and we expect to have 700 by the end of this
year.
The roads and waterways are being opened up to traffic,
another contribution to pacification. For example, in the Third
Corps area, which includes Saigon, twice the mileage can be
traveled during the day without military escort as could a year
ago, and four times the mileage of two years ago.
Defections under the open arms program or Chu Hoi program,
as they call it, are running maybe 50 to 75 percent ahead of
last year, I think.
The population under the government of Vietnam has
increased from January of '66 to date by approximately 13
percent, according to the Vietnamese government figures, to 70,
with 14 percent under Viet Cong control and the balance, 16
percent, being contested. Our figures are a little more
conservative. We estimate 68 percent under government control,
17 percent under Viet control, and 15 percent are being
contested.

ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I think one benchmark of progress are the elections which
took place in September '66 for the Constituent Assembly, and
those which took place September this year for the president
and vice president and the senate.
Registration increased by 5,250,000 in 1966 to 5,850,000 in
1967.
Of those registered in 1966, a little over 80 percent
voted, and in '67, 83 percent of the registered voters voted.
If you take the figure for the number of registrations in
the September election this year, it represents about 75
percent of the total population, indicating that that many,
that portion of the population felt self-secure to vote in
spite of massive efforts by the Viet Cong to disrupt it.
Senator Hickenlooper would tell you, as he was there as an
observer. The elections, I think, in the opinion of not only
our observers but of observers from some 23 other countries,
were carried out fairly, carried out extremely well organized,
and, as I say, carried through in spite of efforts by the Viet
Cong to disrupt them.
One interesting incident occurred. Senator Murphy of
California and Governor Guy, of North Dakota, were halfway up
the coast at Tuy Hoa on election day, and someone threw a
grenade into a polling booth and killed three people, wounding
41. Someone said, ``We are now going to vote,'' and many of
those wounded came back to vote, an indication, I think, of the
great interest on the part of the people in the democratic
processes.
Perhaps another indication is the number of candidates. We
had 11 presidential tickets. There were 480 candidates for 60
senate seats, and there were 1,075 candidates for 137 seats of
the lower house.

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

There is full employment today and in some cases a labor
shortage.
While this does make the economy prone to inflationary
pressures, it also means a fundamental change in the conditions
of life for many millions of Vietnamese workers and peasants.
Prosperity is coming, too, to rural Vietnam. In the
pacified areas and even in some that are contested, the
standard of living is even higher now than it has ever been.
Means by which prosperity is coming are quite clear. There
is an urban demand generated, of course, by the full
employment. The roads and canals have been secured, making it
possible to move products to market. Jobs are available in the
local towns and cities for all who want them, and this
combination in many sections has produced something really akin
to a rural boom.

HANOI'S DETERMINATION

There are aspects, however, of the problem that one must
consider.
As I have said, the enemy offensive has been blunted, but
it has not been eliminated. The infiltration continues from the
North at an estimated rate of about 6,500 a month. Because of
the decline in Viet Cong recruitment, which I mentioned, and
general morale, more and more of the war effort has been taken
over by Hanoi.
Hanoi's determination does not seem to be affected by the
severe punishment that it has taken. We have seen no apparent
indication of its desire to enter into negotiations, and it
seems apparent that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are
still willing to keep North Vietnam supplied with weapons and
with materiel.
While the enemy, as I said, has been badly hurt, and the
Viet Cong encounters increasing difficulties on the South
Vietnam side, there are also problems. The first is the task of
organizing the new government; setting up the organs of
democratic representative government; the organization of both
houses of the Assembly; establishment of a supreme court;
inspectorate; security council; passage of press laws; the law
establishing--the law for political parties, all of which have
to be undertaken now.

GETTING THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM UNDERWAY

The second task is getting the government's program
underway, especially pushing ahead on the shorter phase
priority objectives.
As both Thieu and Ky have said to me, it is highly
important that the new government should progress in the next
six months to gain the support and enthusiasm of the people.
Although the Vietnamese armed forces, I have said, have been
greatly improved, there is still much to do. Leadership and
ability to cope with the guerrilla warfare and security are
areas where there are still deficiencies. Training is going
ahead in many ways. New methods are being devised, particularly
those of joint combat units where the United States and
Vietnamese units are working together.
General Westmoreland will tell you it often makes a better
operating unit than each one operating separately.
There still needs to be improvement in Vietnamese
motivation, involvement, pacification, because in the last
analysis this has to be done by the Vietnamese themselves. They
must carry the main burden of the program.
In this connection, I think the village and hamlet
elections are really just as significant as those for president
and vice president, and the assembly, because it marks the
beginning of the initiation of local government which was
largely destroyed by the French occupation and Diem regime,
involving the people in their own developments and their own
well being and their own government.
As I mentioned, this first step of turning over the
collection and administration of the land and property taxes is
an important step in that process.
These 14,000 officials who were elected are being trained
now, too, in local government and the process is getting
underway. But the aspirations of the people for security, for
social justice, for the elimination of corruption, for economic
and social development and improvement in their standard of
living, especially in the rural areas, are only beginning to be
fulfilled.
There is obviously work to be done on many counts. There
are many obstacles to overcome, but balancing out the pluses
and minuses, I think none of the latter are insuperable.
The Vietnamese are intelligent and hard-working people, and
properly guided, encouraged and well led, they have
demonstrated that they can perform effectively.

GRADUALLY ACHIEVING OUR AIMS

It is my opinion that we have had a good measure of
success, that we are making steady, not spectacular but steady
progress, and that we are gradually achieving our aims in
Vietnam.
I believe that we are also at the point where the steady
progress I have referred to can be accelerated in all of these
fields, in the military aspect of it and the evolution of the
constitutional process, in pacification, a word which, I
confess, I don't like because I think it has connotations of
the French. What is really a better term for it, and a term
which both Thieu and Ky prefer to use, is nation-building or
rural reconstruction. I think it much more accurately describes
what the process is.
In my view, the political aspect of the problem, the
evolution of the constitutional process, the nation-building,
rural reconstruction, revolutionary development aspects are
just as important as winning the war, in solving the problems
of Vietnam as the military aspect.
In fact, I don't know that the war can be won militarily
without success in either of these areas, and if it were, it
might be meaningless.
But I believe that, because of what has been accomplished
today, we are now at the point of being able to not only
maintain the rate of progress, but accelerate it.
So I am convinced that if we stick with this problem and it
is not a short-range proposition, we shall have success in
achieving our objectives.
Mr. Chairman, this is a very brief summary of the situation
as I see it at the present time.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Perhaps it would be useful to ask a few questions.

A RURAL BOOM

You indicate they are really having, if I understood you
correctly, a rural boom.
Ambassador Bunker. In some areas.
The Chairman. In some areas.
Ambassador Bunker. Not generally.
The Chairman. Could you tell us how much rice you expect
for us to supply to Vietnam this year?
Ambassador Bunker. About 800,000 tons.
The Chairman. Is that expected to come from this country?
Ambassador Bunker. Well----
The Chairman. Or purchased elsewhere?
Ambassador Bunker. Most of it from this country.

U.S. SPENDING IN VIETNAM

The Chairman. Do you know how much we are spending in
Vietnam this year?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, on the economic assistance and the
aid side, or overall?
The Chairman. Overall.
Ambassador Bunker. I do not know. I have not got that
figure.
The Chairman. Do you have an estimate to make?
Ambassador Bunker. I would guess it is somewhere around $21
billion, $22 billion, including the military.
The Chairman. Including the military.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
The Chairman. And the economic, overall.
Ambassador Bunker. Overall.

THE OPEN-ARMS PROGRAM

The Chairman. Would you describe very briefly what you mean
by the Chu Hoi program?
Ambassador Bunker. It is what is known as the open-arms
program, and that is the inducement to the Viet Cong to leave
the Viet Cong and come in to the Vietnamese Government.
The Chairman. There is 75 percent more than last year.
Ambassador Bunker. I think it will come out about that.
Last year the total was 20,000. At the end of September, we had
25,000.
Mr. Komer. 25,000. It is running about double last year.
Ambassador Bunker. Roughly double last year.
The Chairman. Does this include refugees?
Ambassador Bunker. No.
The Chairman. In neither year?
Ambassador Bunker. No, neither year.
The Chairman. In this last election, I have forgotten, what
was the percentage of the total vote that the present
government received?
Ambassador Bunker. Thirty-five percent.

A LONG-RANGE PROBLEM

The Chairman. You stated right at the end of your statement
that this is not a short-range problem. Could you estimate how
long-range problem you think it is?
Ambassador Bunker. No, I could not, Senator. I do not like
to put it in a time frame. I do not know. My own feeling is
that we have been the victim in a way of over-optimism in years
gone by. It is not a short-range program. I think that we are
at the point now where in all of these phases which I have
mentioned--military, political, constitutional, nation-
building--we are at the point where we can accelerate these
programs. I think that we may begin to show more rapid
progress.
Certainly the situation with the Viet Cong has
deteriorated. One never knows in these situations how close you
may be to success.

DEFINING U.S. AIMS

The Chairman. Well, lastly, you said you thought we were
gradually achieving our aims in Vietnam. I wonder if you would
clarify for the record as much as you can what our aims are in
Vietnam.
Ambassador Bunker. First, they are a political settlement
through a just achievement of a just and endurable and
honorable peace through negotiations. Negotiations leading to a
political settlement, acceptable to the Vietnamese, to
ourselves, to North Vietnam, the Front.
Secondly, a chance for the Vietnamese people to choose
freely the form of government under which they wish to live.
Third, to help them build their own political institutions
and a viable economy, and to make credible our obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations and SEATO to resist
aggression.
Eventually when peace is secured, to develop regional
organizations through which the Southeast Asian countries can
carry on joint undertakings in economic development and mutual
cooperation.
The Chairman. Senator Mansfield, do you have any questions?
Senator Mansfield. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

WRITING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION

Senator Hickenlooper. I think Ambassador Bunker certainly
has covered any questions that I might have. I was very much
impressed with the fact that there does seem to be an
increasing amount of stability in South Vietnam. Certainly I
can testify as to what he said about the elections. We told
some of them over there if they wanted some tips on how to rig
an election, come over and we will take you over to Chicago and
a few other places in this country to give you some tips on how
to rig an election, because we know how to do it. [Laughter.]
But there was one significant thing they told me while I
was there going through the legislative building in Saigon. The
man who was with me, who was there when they were hammering out
this constitution that they have now, said if anyone tells you
that that constitution was a cold deck affair, he said, ``You
should have passed this building every day for two or three
months and heard them quarreling and shouting and yelling in
their various attitudes, and everyone expressing his own
opinion.'' He said, ``They expressed their opinion, and they
hammered out a constitution in which everyone had a right to
express themselves,'' He said, ``It was probably about as
nearly a fair and equitable approach as anyone he had known.''
I do not think it is perfect. Perhaps there might have been
some places where there was some influence, but certainly when
you go to almost any election booth or precinct voting place in
the United States and see people out there importuning the
voters, usually at a legal distance from a poll but
nevertheless trying to put the pressure on them to vote their
way, we did not see any of that in Vietnam. They might have
been indoctrinated beforehand, but if they were it was very
well concealed. It was not that evident.
Just one thing I wanted to ask you, Mr. Ambassador.
Incidentally, I want to testify publicly to your great courtesy
to all of us while we were there.
Ambassador Bunker. It was a great pleasure, Senator, to
have you all there and have a chance to see what was going on.
Senator Hickenlooper. You were very nice to us.

RELEASE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Do you have any views as to the reason or the propaganda
value or what may be behind the release of these three military
people through this pacifist representative in Cambodia?
Ambassador Bunker. No, we have not.
Senator Hickenlooper. Who came back with them? I wonder why
some of the rest of them were not released.
Ambassador Bunker. We have not really.
Senator Hickenlooper. I know it is outside your bailiwick.
Ambassador Bunker. No, it is not. But I just do not know. I
do not think we formed an opinion about it. This happened just
after I left.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I know.
Ambassador Bunker. So far the embassy has not really, I
think, come to any opinion unless Mr. Habib knows something
about it. Do you?
Well, Mr. Habib says that what speculation there is is to
the effect that there may have been, perhaps because of the
death of Gustav Hertz, to----
Senator Hickenlooper. Because of the death of who?
Ambassador Bunker. Gustav Hertz. He was the AID man who was
kidnapped, you know. They said he had died of natural causes
and perhaps also to induce reciprocal action, the release of
some of their own people on our side.
Senator Hickenlooper. Have we not made offers for some
reciprocal exchange of prisoners?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, we have.
Mr. Habib. We have indicated willingness to exchange.
Senator Hickenlooper. And they have not shown any
willingness.
Ambassador Bunker. So far.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, this is all speculative, but
one wonders whether or not they might have released these three
people to this particular individual, this American that they
released them to, in order to encourage the coterie of dissent
in the United States which he represents, that is.
Ambassador Bunker. It might be possible.
Senator Hickenlooper. I say it is all highly speculative.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Bunker. We naturally hope this will lead to
further exchanges.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, indeed.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Morse.

SEEDS OF HATRED IN ASIA

Senator Morse. Mr. Ambassador, I was very interested in
some of your statistics. I would waggishly say that apparently
in some of the areas where the militant intend to fight down to
the bitter end they are apparently willing to fight down to the
last child if you are capturing 12 and 14 year olds. But, you
see, the interesting thing about all your discussion is the
assumption we are right. Of course there are many of us in this
country who do not think we are right. You speak to Senator
Hickenlooper about elections. We are having some in this
country, too. We had one the other day in a very conservative
Republican area of California, a very interesting election,
having some polls, too. I do not see how anyone can take any
Administration--could take any great enthusiasm out of the
results of those polls, and so I must say quite frankly and
respectfully I am not all impressed with your statistics nor
with your rationalizations as to what we are doing in Vietnam.
I think you despoil it when you point out that, in spite of all
the very favorable accounts you give in the first part of your
statement, you end up by bringing out about the problems, and
we have no indication when it is going to be over.
I am talking now about the Viet Cong having a hard time
recruiting--I am going to come to statistics on that in a
moment--and that the North Vietnamese are continuing
infiltrating about 6,500 a month. I noticed in your answer to
Senator Fulbright bearing upon the last point I made, no
reference to Secretary Rusk, unfortunately, in my opinion,
press comments that we may be in there to contain China. Do you
have any concern as to whether or not if we were to get through
slaughtering the infiltration from the north there would be
further seeds of hatred in Asia because of this course of
conduct? We might then be confronted with Chinese infiltration.
Does that concern you at all?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, Senator Morse, my feeling is that
if the Chinese, while they would probably like to see Hanoi
keep on fighting as long as possible, I don't believe the
Chinese themselves will intervene in the war unless we went to
the extent of attempting to overthrow the Hanoi government. I
think then they might come in, but we have made it clear that
we have no designs against the Hanoi government. We are not
invading North Vietnam and my feeling is that this will--we are
fighting a limited war, and keeping the war limited, toward
limited objectives. My feeling is also, quite strongly, that
with the possible exception of Cambodia--and I am not even so
sure of that--that if you talk with all of the countries
surrounding the mainland of China, beginning with South Korea,
Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia, New
Zealand, South Vietnam, I say with the possible exception of
Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, yes, India, too, they have a very
real interest in seeing our efforts there succeed and, as I
say, an honorable, just and durable peace secured.

WHAT IS SO LIMITED ABOUT THE WAR?

Senator Morse. I am always interested in the use of the
phrase ``limited war'' by you and other spokesmen for the
Administration.
What is so limited about it? With the devastating bombing
record that we have made in North Vietnam, with thousands and
thousands of refugees we have created, at a great loss of
civilian life in this area, what do you mean limited? You mean
limited only to direct bombing of China?
When you speak about invasion, limited vis-a-vis Vietnam,
is what you mean we haven't sent any troops in yet, a manpower
operation in there yet? But how could you do more damage to
North Vietnam than we are doing with this unbelievable bombing
program?
Ambassador Bunker. I think we could do a great deal more
damage, Senator. We are bombing military targets in North
Vietnam. We are not bombing cities.
Senator Morse. Too bad that graves can't come to life and
tell the American people how much damage you have done that
isn't military damage in North Vietnam. Of course when you say
that you believe China isn't going to come in, that is what
creates the great disagreement among us. I think there is a
great danger that China will come in. If you force a surrender,
what else can she do but come in? I don't see how Russia and
China can stand by and permit us to force a surrender, and that
is the kind of risk that I think is so unconscionable on our
part in our conducting of this war, and that is what this great
debate in part is about over here, and the kind of
rationalization we are getting here this afternoon, I think
when it becomes public is going to intensify the debate and the
determination on the part of those of us who do not share the
views of this Administration, that can be justified morally or
any other way.
I don't intend to be silenced in carrying on this fight
because I think you have got the public so split by this course
of action that your killings over there are not going to unite
us.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL

But the staff has prepared a memorandum here, and then I
will be through, Mr. Ambassador. It is all right to talk here
in closed session about a confidential report that the
committee has received from the Department of Defense in reply
to an inquiry that the committee made concerning handling the
evaluation system. They set out the various categories,
population control and hamlet control.
Let me read a portion to you from the staff memorandum. It
points out, we made this inquiry on October 31, got a reply on
November 1st. The staff points out that in a San Antonio speech
in September, President Johnson said the proportion of
population living under communist control has been reduced to
well below 20 percent. Ambassador Bunker is quoted in today's
New York Times as having said yesterday that the proportion is
now 17 percent. Both statements are generally correct.
According to the Defense letter, the percentage of the
population which was VC controlled as of August was 16.5
percent, and the additional 2.2 percent of the population was
found in Category E, which are hamlets in which Viet Cong
military activities are affected, in which attacks and ambushes
occur, and in which South Vietnamese administrative and
political activities are freer and effective and present only
in the daytime.
Then the staff adds:

However, it should be noted that the population control
figure specifically, except the 20.8 percent of the population
which does not live in hamlets, the claim that less than 20
percent of the population is under communist control, assumes
that none of the population living outside hamlets is under
communist control.

Do you think any of that 20 percent is under communist
control?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, 20 percent, of the city
population, which is under government control.
Senator Morse. Well, the figures that you have given make
no reference to the 20 percent.
Ambassador Bunker. The figure that I gave for government
control includes the cities, Senator Morse, as well as the
rural areas, you see. It is the city population. I mean Saigon,
Da Nang, Hue and the cities, provincial capitals, and so forth,
which are under government control.

HAMLETS UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL

Senator Morse. Isn't it true that the extent of Vietnam
control is quite different if the figures on hamlet control as
distinct from population control are examined?
Ambassador Bunker. If you exclude the city population, and
you take the population outside of the cities, the percentage
changes, of course, but I am giving the figures for the total
population.
Senator Morse. I know. But the Defense Department figures
show that 32 percent of the hamlets are VC controlled and an
additional 3.8 percent are in Category E.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, that is true.
Senator Morse. Thus the percentage of hamlets under hamlet
control is about twice the percentage of population control
under communist control.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes. Ambassador Komer can answer that
because he is in charge of this hamlet evaluation survey.
Senator Morse. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Komer. Senator, it is almost impossible to compare
numbers of hamlets with amounts of population because the size
of hamlets varies so considerably. There are some hamlets with
only 75 percent in them. We found that there is another hamlet
that has 13,000 people in it. So if you are talking about
security of the people, we find that the population figures are
much more useful than the hamlet figures because the hamlet
figures sort of imply this is a symmetrical hamlet.
Now, the reason for the difference in those percentages
which you have cited, sir, is because the President was using
figures, I believe, as of 30 June, 1967. The Defense Department
answer to you has included the figure as of 30 August.
Ambassador Bunker was using the latest figures we got. We try
to put them together each month to see what the trend line
figures are, figures as of the end of September.

DIFFICULTY IN MAKING CALCULATIONS

Senator Morse. We need to make clear, don't we, Mr. Komer,
that the Ambassador's figure and yours, too, apparently really
cover a very limited part of the country?
Mr. Komer. No, sir, they cover the total population of the
country, hamlet and non-hamlet.
Senator Morse. Then I get back to my premise. How do you
know that in the hamlets that the Defense Department is talking
about the government controls the cities apparently but the
Viet Cong controls what--a third of the area? How much of the
land area of Vietnam, South Vietnam at the present time, is
Viet Cong controlled and how much is controlled by the junta?
Mr. Komer. We don't have very good figures on area control
because that is pretty hard to calculate. You know, what
percentage of the fields of a hamlet are tilled by people who
are Viet Cong, and what percentage are tilled by people who are
loyal to the government. Besides which about 40 percent of
Vietnam is mountain, swamp and jungle, which is basically
uninhabited. There aren't any hamlets there. So it is very hard
to come up with a sensible figure on the amount of territory
that is controlled by one side or the other.
So we decided we would stick with what is important in this
war and that is the people.

PROBLEM OF REFUGEES

Senator Morse. Of course my next one, I am through with
this, but my next one is a hypothetical. It will probably never
come to pass in the foreseeable future. I think it is perfectly
obvious that the State Department and the Pentagon Building and
the White House intend to maintain a military presence for many
years until repudiated by the American people, which may not be
so many years. But what do you suppose would happen if we did
remove ourselves as far as the refugees are concerned? Do you
include the refugees within your figures?
Mr. Komer. Yes.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, those are included.
Senator Morse. I suppose they are controlled, all right.
But are you of the impression that they are enthusiastic about
their being refugees and enthusiastic about the support that--
about the course of action we follow? The reason I raise this
is that some of us around this table were briefed not so long
ago by Mr. Luce and some others, and I understand that Mr.
Bunker thinks that this organization ought to continue over
there. We didn't get such a rosy picture, Mr. Ambassador, from
Mr. Luce and his associates.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, Senator, I may say that most of
Mr. Luce's associates in Vietnam don't agree with them because
most of them are there and are working there. He and 65 others
resigned, but there are some 150 there now who have elected to
stay.
Senator Morse. It has always been true of the difference
between leaders and followers.
Ambassador Bunker. I talked to Mr. Luce in Vietnam. I think
he felt very emotionally disturbed by the situation, that war
is a tragedy as it is, obviously, and that the innocent suffer,
too, along with the participants. And he felt so strongly about
it that he felt he had to resign.
He did, unfortunately, give his letter to the President to
the press, before he delivered it to me. I simply said to him,
he is certainly entitled to his opinion. If he felt as strongly
as he did, then he ought not to stay there. But the IVS has
quite a large contingent there who are doing splendid work and
who are determined to stay and to continue to do that sort of
work, which is extremely valuable, in agriculture, among the
refugees, and in education.
Senator Morse. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the ambassador
knows that it pains me to find myself in disagreement with him
because for so many years we were in agreement on so many
things.
But, on the other hand, I would be flying under false
colors if I didn't say enough here this afternoon to leave no
room for doubt in the mind of the ambassador, I happen to think
that we are writing such a sordid record in Vietnam that it
will go down to the everlasting discredit of American history.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Aiken?
Senator Aiken. Yes, not much.

A NEGOTIATED PEACE

Assuming that the war does end some day, is it your opinion
that the war will be ended and the conditions of peace
determined at the conference table?
Ambassador Bunker. If it comes to negotiations, Senator, I
would hope so.
Senator Aiken. No. The question was will it come to
negotiations. Will the war be ended and peace terms written at
the conference table?
Ambassador Bunker. Oh, well----
Senator Aiken. What is your own opinion?
Ambassador Bunker. I would----
Senator Aiken. I have got your predecessor's opinion.
Ambassador Bunker. I would say that as of now Hanoi has
shown no inclination to come to negotiations. I think that is
the present situation.
Senator Aiken. I think you are right there. But if it does
not come to the point of negotiations and the arriving at peace
that way, how will the war be ended?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think it can be ended in a
number of ways. I think the development of the nation-building
process and the constitutional process, of the continuation,
and I believe acceleration, as the last for each year of the
open arms process, will gradually, I think, wean away the Viet
Cong from the other side.
If Hanoi withdraws its troops, as it may, the war can come
to an end.
Another alternative would be the fact that, as my
predecessor Cabot Lodge, said, ``If they are played out, they
may decide they have had enough and gradually withdraw.''

THE SCALE OF HOSTILITIES

Senator Aiken. How will we know when such conditions have
been reached?
Ambassador Bunker. I think we know by the scale of
hostilities. As a matter of fact, I would say that now in three
quarters of the country except in the north--and there are
certainly some indications that the enemy has resorted to what
they call phase 2 of warfare, which is a guerrilla type way,
small unit warfare, and there has been no--our indication
indicated quite clearly that they intended to start the monsoon
offensive at the end of May this year. It has never gotten off
the ground. It never got started, and consequently it may be
that as pressure accelerates, as I think it will, militarily--
--
Senator Aiken. With more forces.
Ambassador Bunker. With the forces which are programmed--
two things, I think: In the first place I think we ought to
make a distinction between what happened before 1965 and from
1965 on. Before 1965 we were there only in an advisory
capacity. It was in 1965 that we decided to send troops there
in force.
Senator Aiken. Well, we had 17,000 troops there before
1965.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, but they were not combatant troops,
then, but in a training and advisory capacity.
Senator Aiken. We didn't have them at Da Nang.
Ambassador Bunker. We were not fighting.
When we came there in force we discovered the fact that
there was no logistical base, and we had to spend more than a
year building a logistical base. We had relatively few combat
troops. About three out of four troops were support troops,
construction battalions, engineer battalions.
The base took more than a year to build and it is only
within the last year that I have been able to do more, and now
the ratio is reversed and the ratio of combat troops to support
troops is in balance. We are now not only maintaining pressure
but to increase the pressure on the enemy, at the same time the
performance of the Vietnamese troops is steadily improving in
spite of what one reads in the press here, which I think is not
fairly reporting the performance of the Vietnamese troops, and
the combination, I think, is an indication that on the military
side that progress certainly should accelerate.

FAILURE TO STOP INFILTRATION

Senator Aiken. Well, we started bombing North Vietnam
February 1965, as I recall it.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
Senator Aiken. The purpose being to stop infiltration of
men and materiel from the North.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
Senator Aiken. Yet I think you just said that infiltration
was running about 5500 a month now.
Ambassador Bunker. I said about 6500 a month.
Senator Aiken. Which is the highest it has been.
Ambassador Bunker. No, sir.
Senator Aiken. How high has it been before that?
Ambassador Bunker. It was up to 7,000, 7500.
Senator Aiken. Well, that is the highest I have heard.
Ambassador Bunker. No, no.
Well, Mr. Habib said some months it has gone over 10,000.
Senator Aiken. Well, yes, that could be.
Ambassador Bunker. Well anyway----
Senator Aiken. But it hasn't been----
Ambassador Bunker. It fluctuates, too.
Senator Aiken. Sure.
Well, if there is no conference, no negotiation, if the
North Vietnamese firmly are determined not to yield at any
price, but are sending their 12-year-olds and even their 10-
year-olds into action, who will determine when the war should
end, if they don't give up, or will it never end?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, my view is, Senator Aiken, that
even if they do not come to negotiations the war will end. My
belief is that if we continue on the course we are continuing
now, as I said before, I think that, militarily, operations
will become increasingly effective. I think on the political
side this new government which has come in should be given a
chance to show what it can do. Come in with, I think, a new
feeling of confidence and determination and self-reliance. The
government which preceded it for two years was in power for two
years. The first year was spent in restoring order and
stability. It has only been in the last year they were able to
start any programs.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLICYMAKERS

Now, the new government has come in with, I think, a very
excellent platform and program on what they want to try to do.
I think we will see the country starting to change.
Senator Aiken. Has there been a great change in the key
personnel of the government?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, there has been a considerable
change. A considerable change.
Senator Aiken. Well, who are the policymakers?
Ambassador Bunker. There are only three military people in
the government today.
Senator Aiken. Thieu, Ky,--who are the others?
Ambassador Bunker. No, I say in the cabinet. Thieu and Ky,
who are president and vice president, but in the cabinet the
minister of defense, the minister of revolutionary development,
and the minister of the interior.
Senator Aiken. Is Tran Van Do still in the cabinet?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.

BENCHMARKS OF SUCCESS

Senator Aiken. Well, I don't want to take up too much time.
I don't see that in your statement you indicated any
improvement indicators or benchmarks or whatever you call them.
Have you got any indicators that show there has been
improvement? Aren't there any minus figures anywhere, or have
we improved in every single phase of the war?
Ambassador Bunker. No, I don't pretend, obviously, that we
don't have setbacks. The Vietnamese Armed Forces, they are not
always successful; neither are we for that matter. We can get
ambushed and so do they.
I made up a list, however, at the time the Vice President
came out, of performance of the Vietnamese Armed Forces simply
because I felt that the record that came back here was entirely
unfair and inaccurate.
Between October 20th and November 6th, there were some 43
engagements, some of them quite sizable, and in 35 of which
they had a very great success. They had about three defeats and
about five stand-offs.

MARINES' RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAMESE

Senator Aiken. We get a good deal of unofficial information
from many people who come back from Vietnam, and the reports I
get are that the relationships between the American servicemen
and the native population is much better in the territory
occupied by the Marines than in other parts of the country.
Do you get any such reports as that?
Ambassador Bunker. No, I don't think so.
Senator Aiken. You don't.
Well, then----
Senator Case. What was the point, George--I am sorry.
Senator Aiken. That the relationship between the native
population and our armed forces is better in the north than in
other parts of the country.
Senator Case. You mean where the Marines were?
Senator Aiken. Didn't General Walt move the Marines out of
the cities and Da Nang to a considerable extent, and aren't our
forces concentrated in the other cities?
Ambassador Bunker. No, it is our general policy to move
them out of the cities everywhere.
Senator Aiken. Everywhere?
Ambassador Bunker. They are not all out of Saigon, no, but
a great many of them are.
Senator Aiken. I guess that is it.
Well, do you have any trouble getting volunteers for aid
work?
Ambassador Bunker. I don't know of any. I think they are
recruiting all the time.
Senator Aiken. Yes. Do you get enough?
Ambassador Bunker. Get enough? Yes.

MARINES DOING AID WORK

Senator Aiken. You do. You don't ever call on the Marines
to furnish personnel for aid work?
Mr. Komer. Can I answer it?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Komer. As a matter of fact, in the aid recruiting
drives in the major cities, the number of recruits held up. The
number of volunteers held up very well.
The Marines do try to help out on local security----
Senator Aiken. They try, or they are told?
Mr. KOMER. No, they are not told.
Senator Aiken. Yes, they are. They are told and you know
it.
Mr. KOMER. I think----
Senator Aiken. They are told, and you know it, to furnish
men for aid work and do the work that you are supposed to do
there.
I had not intended to say this, but I am saying it now, and
you know it and I know it and the Marines know it. That they
have to take their men right out of the ranks and put into the
aid work.
Well, I shouldn't say it, anyway, but I have.
Ambassador Bunker. Senator Aiken, if you mean they are
engaged in some civic action activities, yes.
Senator Aiken. Engaged in agricultural work to a
considerable extent.
Ambassador Bunker. It is news to me.
Senator Aiken. If you get out on the farm and look around,
you will find some of them there. I am not kidding; I know.
That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Gore?

HIGH LEVEL POLICY REASSESSMENT

Senator Gore. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you are at
liberty to convey to the committee an assessment of the so-
called high level review of policy and program which, according
to the press, has been underway with you here, with General
Westmoreland and the President and the Secretary of State, et
cetera.
Are we to have another escalation which has followed all
previous and reassessments----
Ambassador Bunker. No, Senator Gore. In the first place, I
may say that I have talked to the President, had two talks with
the President since I returned, and Westmoreland has once. What
we have reported on the situation as we see it today in
Vietnam. That was the purpose of our coming back for normal
consultation. I have been there six months and I felt it was
time to come back and to report on what I had seen; what I felt
the situation to be; what progress we had made.
I think out of these consultations, and out of our mutual
discussions and talks, we may then come to some conclusions,
but we have not as yet.
Senator Gore. So far as you know, no conclusion different
from continuation of present policy has been reached?
Ambassador Bunker. No, sir.

MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

Senator Gore. Mr. Ambassador, in your statement to Senator
Aiken a few moments ago you said, ``If Hanoi withdraws its
troops, the war can end.''
I find that extremely important, extremely interesting. It
is somewhat akin to the statement that Secretary Rusk made in
his press conference recently in which he said, ``We put our
combat forces in there because North Vietnamese forces moved
into South Vietnam.''
Now, my question is: If North Vietnam did, in fact,
withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, would the United States
be willing to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and permit
self-determination by the people in South Vietnam?
Ambassador Bunker. We have said at the Manila Conference,
there is the exact wording in here somewhere. I might read, in
particular, paragraph 29. They declared that all allied forces
are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the
object of aggression, and its government requested support in
the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be
withdrawn after close consultation as the other side withdraws
its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the levels of
violence subside.
Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not
later than six months after the above conditions have been
fulfilled.
Senator Gore. Well, this, if you will pardon me, this is
not exactly clear. Throughout, our policy seems to have been
based upon the fact or fancy that we are resisting aggression.
I asked Secretary Rusk a few days ago about this six months
proposition, and I will have his answer in a few moments. His
answer, it seems to me, adds up that that didn't mean anything
except it was a good propaganda phrase. What I am asking you
now, if you know whether or not the United States would, in
fact, be willing to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam
within six months, if North Vietnam would withdraw her troops
from South Vietnam.
Ambassador Bunker. Senator Gore, I am not in a position to
make that decision, obviously, and as far as I know the policy
of the United States is still the policy based on the Manila
Conference. I have not been informed of any other change.
Senator Gore. All right. I don't wish to press you at all.
I just asked you if you know.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.

NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Gore. I would like to ask a question about this
which you may know. What is the present numerical strength of
North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam?
Senator Pell. Excuse me, may I ask, interpolate here, do
you mean North Vietnamese troops mean more than in North
Vietnam?
Senator Gore. No, in units, North Vietnamese, military
units now in combat in Vietnam.
Ambassador Bunker. Our estimate is, Senator Gore, that
there are 55,000 to 60,000 regular North Vietnamese Army troops
in South Vietnam at the present time.
Senator Gore. Now, does that then--then we have some
500,000. What was the conclusion of the conference?
Mr. Komer. I was just pointing out to the Ambassador the
way we keep order of battle figures tends to understate the
number of North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam
because we have been including in the figures only those North
Vietnamese troops that are in North Vietnamese units.
Increasingly, North Vietnamese replacements have been going
into South Vietnamese units, so that the Ninth Viet Cong
Division up in Phuoc Long and Binh Duong provinces, while it is
carried in military order of battle as a Viet Cong Division is,
we believe, now about 50 percent or over North Vietnamese
regular troops, you see. So this is a matter of the way order
of battle people keep the books. We think there is an
increasing proportion, no question, that an increasing
proportion of the South Vietnamese, of the Viet Cong main and
local forces are being filled up with North Vietnamese
replacements because the Viet Cong recruiting rate is down so
much. We are doing a survey of this now, and the figures will
not be available, although it is simply a matter of adding them
all up, for another couple of weeks. But it is possible that as
many as two thirds or even three quarters of the total enemy
organized units, now I would emphasize organized units, are now
North Vietnamese.
Senator Gore. How many would that be in your estimate?
Mr. Komer. Instead of the figures that we are carrying now
of 50,000 to 60,000, it might be as many as 65,000 to 75,000.
Senator Gore. Sixty-five thousand to seventy-five thousand?
Mr. Komer. Yes. My own personal judgment would be, and I
have tried to study this very carefully, that the higher
figures are much more accurate because we simply haven't been
taking into account these replacements that have been coming
down.
Senator Gore. Then, to combat this 65,000 or 75,000, we
have approximately 500,000.

SHUTTING OFF INFILTRATION COULD END THE WAR

If they would withdraw 65,000 or 70,000 or 55,000,
whichever it is, all of them, what portion of our 500,000 would
the United States withdraw, if you know the answer to the
question. You have just said, Mr. Ambassador, that if Hanoi
would withdraw its troops, the war can end. How can it end?
Ambassador Bunker. I think it can end because I think the
problem will be completely manageable if the infiltration----
Senator Gore. Manageable by whom?
Ambassador Bunker. By the Vietnamese and ourselves. I think
we can end the war quite rapidly, because, as I have said
previously, the Viet Cong itself is having more and more
difficulty recruiting. Its morale is deteriorating. The
population, the desertions, are increasing steadily. As
Ambassador Kohmer says, it will be close to double this year
what they were coming over to the government side.
If the infiltration is closed off, or choked off, or
withdrawn or stopped, my opinion is that the situation becomes
readily manageable.
Senator Gore. You say readily manageable by ourselves and
the South Vietnamese. I am trying to draw your attention to a
point of reciprocal action, reciprocal withdrawal.

AN AMERICAN COLONY

Now, of course, if the North Vietnamese give up the
struggle, if they call all their men home, and we keep 500,000
there to, as you say, one of your objectives is to build
political institutions, I take it, in our own image, then we
are in fact really seeking to establish an American colony
there.
What I am asking you is, will the United States be willing
to withdraw from South Vietnam if North Vietnam will withdraw
from South Vietnam?
Ambassador Bunker. We have said so in the Manila
Declaration which I have just read.
Senator Gore. Well, I would like to read you what Secretary
Rusk said about that a few days ago before this committee.

In the Manila communique the statement was made with regard
to troop withdrawals that allied force troop withdrawals. They
shall be withdrawn after close consultation as the other side
withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration and the
level of violence there subsides. These forces will be
withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months
after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

He continues, but not reading from the Manila statement:

I don't recall anything that I said to Senator Aiken that
seemed to cut across that in any way.

It seems to me those two are quite consistent. I want to
find now what he said to Senator Aiken.
Senator Aiken. I told him he was nuts in saying they would
get out of there in six months, or words to that effect. It
would be physically and politically impossible.
Senator Case. Well, if the level of violence subsides.
Senator Aiken. That is what I told him. Maybe I will help
him find it.
Senator Gore. Well the point is--I will go to another
point, if I may, lest I overstep my time.

DEFINING SELF-DETERMINATION

Another one of the objectives you outlined to the chairman
of our policy there, was self-determination on the part of the
Vietnamese people.
Do you mean self-determination on the part of the
Vietnamese people, or South Vietnamese people?
Ambassador Bunker. I am referring to South Vietnam. I
imagine that the North Vietnamese haven't much chance at self-
determination as a tightly controlled communist state to
expressing their views very freely. I do not know. I am not
concerned with the political system in North Vietnam. Neither
are we; we are not trying to upset it. That is their business.
What I am referring to is the situation in South Vietnam.
Senator Gore. Then would it logically follow that our aim
is to establish another country in South Vietnam, another
nationality, another nation, fully independent of and
politically unrelated to North Vietnam?
Ambassador Bunker. I would say that our objective is to
enable or help the South Vietnamese to determine the kind of
government under which they wish to live.
Senator Gore. You mean, then, by self-determination
exclusively of South Vietnam?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.

UNIFICATION THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS

Senator Gore. Then, Mr. Ambassador, what is the meaning of
the President's statement and the Secretary of State's
statement that the Geneva Accord is an adequate basis for peace
in Vietnam?
Ambassador Bunker. I think the meaning is, Senator, that
the Geneva Accords which provide for eventual determination of
the status of both North and South Vietnam under free elections
and under conditions which will permit free elections, it is my
understanding--although I don't profess to be an expert on what
happened at the Geneva Accords--is that the reason the South
Vietnamese were not willing to enter into elections at that
time was the obvious one that there were no provisions for free
elections. That in a communist controlled state, where the vote
is 99 percent, and where it is quite obvious that as Viet Minh
had been left behind in South Vietnam, there was no question
about free determination or how it would come out.
I think that is the reason why the provisions for voting on
the question of unification didn't take place and neither----
Senator Gore. In other words, to put it another way,
elections were not permitted because our side was going to
lose?
Ambassador Bunker. Because the conditions--well, the
conditions didn't exist for free elections.
Senator Gore. Well, that is the way you state it.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir, I think so.
Senator Gore. But I wish to point out to you that the
Geneva Accord is quite contrary to the description of self-
determination you have given us. I don't, I certainly have no
desire to belabor you with policy because, as you say, you are
there as a representative of the President. But I thought it
might be enlightening to you a wee bit to know that there are
some of us who recognize a great many inconsistencies and
uncertainties of policy. The Geneva Accord specifically
proclaims against two political entities in Vietnam, the 17th
Parallel is but a truce boundary, not in any sense to be a
political boundary. There is no reference whatsoever, as you
indicated, there might be much self-determination in South
Vietnam. There is no reference to two countries; it is all one
country.
Ambassador Bunker. That is correct, Senator, but I think it
also provides, if I am not mistaken here, I haven't got the
words here, that the question of unification shall be carried
out through elections under proper safeguards and under proper
machinery, and certainly it is the view of the South Vietnamese
government, and I think it was ours at the time, that that
machinery did not exist and it was not possible to create it
under these conditions.
I might give you a little sidelight on this off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]

THE SPIRIT OF THE ALAMO

Senator Gore. The reason I press the point is it appears to
me that where the United States got off track was in going
contrary to the Geneva Accords, and instead of trying to pursue
a self-determination, whatever it may have turned out to be, by
the Vietnamese people, set out on a course to establish
something in our own image, a separate country in South
Vietnam. We sought and now seek, from your information, to
sever the country into two, not to accept neutrality of the
country under some genuine self-determination, again whatever
it may be. I doubt very much if we are going to get a quick
peace there.
You might just find under those circumstances that the
Vietnamese would have the same spirit that the men in the Alamo
had, to fight to the last man. This is going to be a long time,
maybe the last child.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, Senator, let me make it clear, I
do not pretend to set policy for the United States government.
I am there to carry it out. But I do not mean to say, as we
have said, we were willing to use the Geneva Accord as a basis,
that we would take a position that there could not be a
provision for unification and for a vote on unification in any
settlement.
Senator Gore. But you are unable to say whether the United
States would, in fact, be willing to withdraw her troops in
South Vietnam if North Vietnam would withdraw all of her troops
from South Vietnam.
Ambassador Bunker. All I can say is I cite you the Manila
declaration and that is as far as I can go.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?

RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

Senator Carlson. Mr. Ambassador, this gives me an
opportunity to again thank you for the splendid help I received
and many courtesies extended when I was over there in July. I
want you to know it was greatly appreciated and it was very
helpful to me.
Ambassador Bunker. I hope you will return again.
Senator Carlson. I may do so. I want to ask you one or two
questions about our refugee problem.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
Senator Carlson. As I gather, when I was over there we had
hundreds of thousands of refugees who were refugees no doubt as
a result of our military operations and our defoliating
program. How many do we have at the present time? You may have
discussed this before I came in. If you have----
Ambassador Bunker. No, I did not. I have the figures right
here, Senator. Temporary refugees: 786,532 as of September 30.
Senator Case. What was the figure; what did you say?
Ambassador Bunker. Temporary.
Senator Carlson. Temporary.
Ambassador Bunker. 638,428 had been resettled, and another
638,000 returned to their original villages.
Senator Carlson. In other words we have handled----
Ambassador Bunker. Two million roughly.
Senator Carlson. Yes, roughly 2 million refugees; 700 and
some thousand presently.
Ambassador Bunker. Presently.
Senator Carlson. And----
Ambassador Bunker. 786,000.
Senator Carlson. What is the possibility of getting these
people back into areas where they can become self-sustaining?
Ambassador Bunker. That is exactly what we have been trying
to do. Those who have returned to their original villages, for
example, or those who have been permanently resettled--in each
case 638,000-now this is what the objective is for all of them,
the temporary ones as well. I think I would like Ambassador
Komer to discuss that a little because he has been following it
very closely and it is part of his----
Senator Case. I wonder if you will, Mr. Bunker, indicate in
the case of these resettled and returned people just where they
come from and any broad categories so we will know just what
the situation has been.

RESULT OF DEFOLIATION PROGRAMS

Senator Carlson. While you are discussing that, Mr.
Ambassador, tell us how many are refugees as the result of our
own military operations and they are there for other reasons.
Mr. Komer. That is very hard to say, Senator, but I think
it is indisputable that most of the refugees have fled from
areas of Viet Cong control. They have not been generated
deliberately by us. This is not our policy, except in a few
exceptional cases which are a very, very small fraction of this
total number of refugees.
Senator Carlson. Of course we defoliated great areas.
Mr. Komer. But defoliation takes place, sir, in jungle
areas; the whole purpose of defoliation, as I understand it, is
to remove jungle cover.
Senator Carlson. It does include hamlets, however, does it
not, and probably some cities?
Mr. Komer. No, sir, in no cities, and in very few populated
areas. The purpose of defoliation is to get at the jungle areas
where the Viet Cong had their bases and where they operate. So
more and more defoliation operations are taking place. In fact
we are reviewing that right now. Defoliation is taking place in
the back country where people are not----
Ambassador Bunker. I may state, Senator Carlson, that in
each case of defoliation, that has to come to me to be
approved. We look into it very carefully to see the least
possible damage is done. As Ambassador Komer says, it is almost
entirely in jungle areas, areas of heavy cover; that is the
purpose.
Senator Carlson. It was called to my attention when I was
over there flying out to the 9th Division Headquarters that you
did defoliate an area not far outside of Saigon which must have
had population.
Mr. Komer. This was probably the Hobo Woods, but if it was
in the 9th Division, it was the Hop Sac Base area and that was
all jungle; very few farming.
Ambassador Bunker. The jungle comes very close to Saigon
and very close to the seacoast actually.
Senator Carlson. I see.
How much are we----
Mr. Komer. Could I say something----

BULK OF REFUGEES IN THE NORTH

Senator Carlson. Yes, I wish you would, sir, because it
greatly disturbs me. First, how are we going to get these
people back where they belong, and, secondly, how can we win
the hearts and minds of people there when we have a program
that creates two million refugees?
Mr. Komer. That is since 1961.
Senator Carlson. Yes.
Mr. Komer. But as to the locale, Senator Case asked, the
great bulk of the refugee problem is in the I Corps where the
North Viet Cong are strongest and the operations are the
heaviest against the Marines. Of these, only 500,000 are in I
Corps. Most of the new refugees come in the northern I Corps
and northern provinces. This is during--all during 1967, and
really during the last six months of 1966, too.
It used to be that the bulk of the refugees came from down
around Saigon and in the delta because then it was a VC war
rather than a North Vietnamese war. But the trend in the delta,
for example, in 1967 has been the other way. More refugees are
being resettled or are returning to their original homes than
coming in new, so the trend is the opposite down in IV Corps
and III Corps and much more under control.
The Vietnamese government quite candidly did not pay too
much attention to its refugee problem until about 1966, and, in
regard to this, the refugees, as casualties of war. Since 1966
they established a refugee commissariat with a very able and
energetic doctor at the head, and he is just now beginning to
get on top of the problem. He still is not on top of the
problem in I Corps, but he is trying awfully hard.
My own personal view is that there will be fewer refugees
in 1968, substantially fewer, than we had in 1967, and the
direction we are giving to our people who are in an advisory
role is to give much greater emphasis to resettlement and to
return to their villages because as the security extends to the
countryside it is possible that more of the refugees go home.

U.S. SPENDING IN VIETNAM

Senator Carlson. How much are we spending at the present
time, this government?
Mr. Komer. The figures are very hard to come by, sir,
because what AID is spending on direct account is available,
but then you have to add in P.L. 480, Title II. Then you have
to add in what our own military is providing in the way of
refugee help through civic action. I have asked for the figures
and they are being assembled now. They are substantially higher
than I think the 25 million dollars that AID is directly
spending.
Senator Carlson. Did we not have about $87 million in our
AID program for refugee work last year?
Mr. Komer. No sir; I do not think it was that high.
Ambassador Bunker. No, not that much.
Senator Carlson. Maybe my figures are higher.
Ambassador Bunker. Medical plus refugees. Also, Senator
Carlson, I might say that the Vietnamese budget has also been
very largely increased for refugees from $2 million to $5
million for the coming year.
Senator Carlson. I was hoping we could take care of them,
and I was hoping it would not increase.
Mr. Komer. I think they will be. This is just my view. I
think it will diminish substantially as we emphasize
resettlement or repatriation in 1968. I might add that on top
of what the U.S. government does there are about 30 voluntary
agencies and their work is largely oriented toward helping
refugees. You see there are so many people involved in the
refugee assistance program and it is pretty hard to break down
what the total cost is because they do not break it down.
Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE COST OF THE WAR

Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure seeing you again,
sir. I want to thank you again for all your kindness and
frankness with me when I was in Saigon a few weeks ago.
Ambassador Bunker. A very great pleasure.
Senator Symington. As you can tell by some of the questions
asked you by some of the members here, the Foreign Relations
Committee is not in complete agreement with the policies and
programs laid down in Washington that you are working on out
there.
Senator Morse. Did you say some?
Senator Symington. I am glad you mentioned the point to the
committee that you are carrying out the policies and not
creating them, and I do not mean by that any implied criticism
on your part of that.
I was very glad this morning to have General Westmoreland
tell us before the Armed Services Committee that he had not
really started putting the pressure on militarily until this
year. I only regret a good many billion dollars we lost when
people thought we were putting pressure on. At least it did in
this country, although those of us who went out there did not
feel that way in 1965, 1966. My worries have to do with the
political situation, sir, and above all with the cost,
especially considering what is going on in the rest of the
world.
I was glad to get your observations about the bombing
because, one day after I left you, I went out on the Coral Sea.
The weather was very bad so they were not flying. One of the
pilots asked me why some of my colleagues were more interested
in preventing casualties in North Vietnam than they were in his
life, or in that of Americans in South Vietnam. I thought that
was a very good question based on the testimony of the ground
general of the Marine Corps and the Army who pointed to us and
to the pictures of how many additional casualties we had as a
result of the bombing cessation, especially the one during the
Tet holiday which resulted in the heavy mortars coming down.
So I hope you do continue, if we are going to continue
fighting out there at all--about which I have doubt from a
political and economic standpoint--I hope we do continue to
realize that it is at least as important to save American lives
as it is to worry about North Vietnamese lives. I resent
bitterly some of the intellectuals who have never run for
sheriff who criticize people who bring up that point as a
criticism of those who make it.
I have been around this government one way or another, Mr.
Chairman, for a good many years, and I have never seen anybody
handling a situation, a delicate situation, with more courage
and ability than Ambassador Bunker. It makes me very proud to
be an American.
I want to thank you for all you have done for your country.
Ambassador Bunker. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt?

TRAINING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

Senator Mundt. Some time ago in your statement you said
there were 14,000 local officials who had been elected and are
now being trained in their jobs. Being trained how, where and
by whom?
Ambassador Bunker. Being trained by the Vietnamese
government in the various parts of the country, provinces where
they are elected and being trained in the duties of carrying on
the work as councils. There are councils that run from
villages, 5 to 11, depending on the size of a village. They, in
turn, elect the council chief, which would be in effect the
mayor of the village. They then set up the various
subcommittees for various functions of government--education,
for example, public health and agriculture--all of the local
governmental functions and duties.
The reason I say I think it is significant really in a way
is that the elections for president and vice president and
assembly, because I think the involvement of the people in
their own government and subsequent political organization of
the countryside is perhaps one of the best defenses against the
Viet Cong that could possibly develop.
Senator Mundt. I agree entirely with that point. I was
curious to know whether they have the experience and competence
in the business of local government to go out and give these
people on-the-job training or call them in at some central
place.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, actually the Vietnamese government
does come to us for advice on this and other administrative
functions of government.
Senator Mundt. We do not have the personnel.
Ambassador Bunker. No, we do not.
Senator Mundt. Either in numbers or experience to train
them.
Ambassador Bunker. No, but we can give overall advice as to
procedures, policies. We are working with them on the community
development projects which are going to start now in ten of the
provinces. I think we are making very substantial headway.

A WEAK POINT IN THE OPERATION

Senator Mundt. Well, it seems to me as I hear you, and
Lodge before you, this is one of the weak points in our
operation and that is somehow or another either we are going to
step in and select the right people, which I would be inclined
to doubt, but it seems to me that if we do not get them
trained, we have to do it, and I do not know how you can do the
job without training them.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think, Senator, as I said, one
has to remember that the government which has just been
superceded, which was in power for only two years--the first
year was occupied in restoring order really--it was only in the
second year that we began these projects.
Now, and considering those, I think they accomplished a
good deal.
As I say, the fact that five elections were held in the
midst of a bitter war, it is quite a remarkable performance,
and the fact----
Senator Mundt. I agree with all that. That is not the point
I am trying to make. The point I am trying to make, the result
indicates that our military advisers have had pretty good
success in operating the fighting of the South Vietnamese. They
have performed rather creditably. I am just wondering whether
we have put the intensive effort required in training these
people who have had inexperience in the business of government
to do the job.
Ambassador Bunker. I think we are doing a pretty good job.
I think we have to be careful not to overdo it because they are
as a rule feeling now that they are a sovereign government and
they want to do as much as they can of their own, too. But I
think they are making good headway.
Senator Mundt. 14,000 of them scattered in how many local
governmental units?
Ambassador Bunker. About, let us see, the elections took
place in about a thousand villages and 2,500 hamlets.
Senator Mundt. So you have 3,500 little local governments.
Ambassador Bunker. That is right.
Senator Mundt. Am I right in my assumption that most of the
people elected are new to the business of government?
Ambassador Bunker. No, not all of them. Some of them are;
some were previously appointed officials.

PROVIDING EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL

Senator Mundt. It would seem to me that the strength of our
effort could be increased by providing you with the kind of
experienced personnel who would be available upon request, not
impose it upon them.
Ambassador Bunker. We actually have experienced personnel
who actually are working with them, not only in that but also
in another phase of what we are proposing to do, which is
reorganization of the civil administration. There we are
working with them by giving them a great deal of advice which
they are asking for.
Senator Mundt. The central government.
Ambassador Bunker. That is the central and provincial
government.
Senator Mundt. Can you give it in terms of figures how many
people you have assigned to you that is your responsibility
with it--maybe it is not--maybe it is the responsibility of the
other ambassador--who handles the pacification program--that
would include having stable, sensible, competent local
government? 3,500 different locations. How many people do you
have assigned to you who, if you got a request tomorrow for 500
people to 500 localities, would you have more than enough
manpower or not?
Ambassador Bunker. 500 of our people?
Senator Mundt. Yes, trained in the field.
Ambassador Bunker. No.
Senator Mundt. If you had 100 requests.
Ambassador Bunker. What about the corps situation?
Mr. Komer. We have about 3,000 advisers in all in the
pacification end of things, but of whom about a thousand are
civilian and the other 2,000 are military.

VIETNAMESE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Senator Mundt. Of those 1,000, how many have the expertise
and the experience to give them competence in training?
Mr. Komer. That would be very hard to say, sir. One of the
big problems in giving advice on local administration down at
the grassroots to the Vietnamese is the problem of
communication. Actually the Vietnamese have had a pretty good
civil administration. Their special commissariat for
administration, which is the key part of the interior ministry,
is again under the interior ministry. It has some very good
people in it. They have a tradition of local autonomy. The
village used to have a great deal of autonomy. I believe half
of the officials Ambassador Bunker said were elected have been
elected officials previously--village chiefs, village council
members.
The big problem is to get the authority back to them
because the problems dealt with at the hamlet and village are
pretty hardheaded problems of the town meeting kind.
I was very encouraged by this new decree which was just
passed which provides that local taxes will go to the local
administration, either to the municipality or to the village in
rural areas. This is very encouraging.
When you have money to spend which you collect for your own
constituents, then you have not only authority, but you have
the ability to do something. This is going to be quite a
desirable thing.
Ambassador Bunker. Then in addition to that, Senator, as I
described the organization, the village councils, subcommittees
on agriculture, for example, if they want advice we have
agricultural advisers; on health, public health advisers; on
security and police, police advisers--so that we can supply
assistance on these various aspects of local government.
Senator Mundt. You feel then we are doing the very best job
we are capable of doing.
Ambassador Bunker. I do not say we cannot improve on
anything we are doing.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator Mundt. Among the critics of the Vietnamese war are
some who say--and I keep reading it in papers; I do not know
whether it is true or not--that the Vietnamese armed forces do
not represent an adequate percentage of the Vietnamese
population vis-a-vis the United States. I have a hunch it is
not true, but I have not any facts and figures with which to
answer it. I would like to have something.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I will give you the figures,
Senator, of the Vietnamese armed forces. The strength of the
armed units is 757,000.
Senator Mundt. You are talking now about soldiers, not
village home guard people.
Ambassador Bunker. Not the home guard, no. Including the
national police.
Senator Mundt. 750,000.
Ambassador Bunker. 757,000 to which they will propose to
add 65,000 this year, this coming year.
Senator Mundt. Of the 750,000, how many would you say are
really----
Ambassador Bunker. How many what?
Senator Mundt. Units would be fighting as contrasted with
the policemen. You said that included the police.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, the police are 66,000.
Senator Mundt. So there are over 650,000 actually
Vietnamese military people.
Ambassador Bunker. That is right.
Senator Mundt. The population is roughly 18 million.
Ambassador Bunker. 17 million.
Senator Case. Does that include popular, regional, and
regular forces?
Ambassador Bunker. The regular army is 290,300; the air
force, 15,444; the navy, 16,000; marine corps, 8,100; regional
forces, 143,000.
Senator Mundt. Explain what is the marine corps.
Ambassador Bunker. Those are forces largely used for
defense and security of the----
Senator Mundt. They are trained combat units.
Ambassador Bunker. Oh, yes.
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Ambassador Bunker. The popular forces----
Senator Mundt. That is what I mean.
Ambassador Bunker [continuing]. 140,500.
Senator Mundt. These are not----
Ambassador Bunker. They defend the hamlets and the
villages, and they are just as subject to attack as any regular
force. And also do very good work, I may say.
Senator Mundt. They are purely usable for defensive
purposes.
Ambassador Bunker. They are used for defensive purposes,
yes.

ROLE OF THE REGIONAL FORCES

Senator Mundt. So that what I call a fighting unit is used
in defense in the case of attack and they are used in offense
when attacked by others. That would add up to how many now,
500,000?
Ambassador Bunker. Do what?
Senator Mundt. Would there be 500,000 of those?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, all these that I have mentioned
except the police, the national police, are used in fighting
one way or another.
Senator Mundt. I know that. But the popular forces that
surround the village and protect them, are they the kind of
forces that are subject to fluid control? If you send them out
on an offensive mission, they would be in the same category as
our Americans to fight offensively and defensively depending
upon the exigencies of the situation?
Ambassador Bunker. That is right, yes. But I may say, too,
you are quite right, the regional forces, the popular forces,
perform an indispensable role because unless you have not only
security, but a continuous security, you do not have
pacification.
Senator Mundt. I think this is right. But this does not
give me what I need to answer somebody who asks how many troops
have they supplied in the same category as Americans who fight
in accordance with the needs of the occasion offensively and
defensively. You have to take the popular forces out of that,
whether you take the police out of it.
Ambassador Bunker. Take the popular forces out of it, and
the police. Popular forces are 140,000; the police are 66,000.
Senator Mundt. You still come up with over 500,000 who are
there for the same purpose that our people are. And they are
brought in by draft, are they, by volunteers, conscription?
Ambassador Bunker. Both, conscription, but everybody now
aged 18 to 33 is subject to the draft.

UNFAIR CHARGES AGAINST VIETNAMESE

Senator Mundt. The same people in the field of journalism
say they go around Saigon and they see all kinds of able-bodied
Saigonese, Vietnamese, who run around on motor vehicles.
Senator Case. You can buy your way out, can you not? What
is the volume. You cannot?
Ambassador Bunker. Certainly there is no way of buying
yourselves out; no legal way.
Mr. Komer. There is a tough law.
Ambassador Bunker. The law is tough.
Senator Mundt. I really have to say from what you have
indicated, I would think that this is a false charge that the
Vietnamese are not supplying their fair share of the people.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I think it is an unfair charge just
as I think a great deal of the reporting that comes back here
is not accurate. I feel very strongly about it.

AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS

Senator Mundt. Two other questions. I share with Senator
Symington the feeling that this idea of having a bombing pause
longer than it can be for Christmas day, but a bombing pause
that certainly will be paid for by the American troops, I
think, certainly had been demonstrated on the record. What
would you think if instead of a bombing pause we made a
suggestion we would make an exchange of X number of prisoners?
Would that be conducive to the interests of this country in
terms of saving American lives and putting the other fellow
under an obligation to say yes or no? Would it be more helpful
than just asking them to extend the cessation of bombing for 24
hours, or 48 hours?
Ambassador Bunker. I think the exchange of prisoners would
be highly desirable.
Senator Mundt. You said we have offered it several times.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
Senator Mundt. It certainly has not been as well publicized
as the offers to stop bombing.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think the bombing cessation has
had more publicity.
Senator Mundt. Have we ever offered it in a public
proclamation, certain terms?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, we have tried to do this through
the International Red Cross and through other offers. Of course
one problem is that the North Vietnamese do not deal with the
International Red Cross. They do not accept the fact that our
prisoners are really prisoners of war.
Senator Mundt. I mention that because when I was home last
week I was visited at the hotel by the wife of a prisoner who
is someplace in Vietnam. She says, ``Why doesn't our government
make an offer to exchange prisoners?'' I made a curbside guess
and said we have.
Ambassador Bunker. We have.
Senator Mundt. She has not heard about it. It seems to me
we should publish it and pick out a certain date. Christmas day
would be a good day. If it is a bad day for the pagans, pick
out some other day, but I think we ought to make it over even
if for the propaganda effect.
Tell me, what is your estimate of how many American
prisoners we have up there?
Ambassador Bunker. We have about 400, is it not?
Mr. Habib. We do not know exactly because they will not
give us any lists.
Senator Mundt. Have we got an estimate?
Mr. Habib. We have estimate of several hundred.
Senator Mundt. Well, tell them we will exchange 500 or
something. I think it would be much wiser.

THE FATE OF THAILAND

My final question is, if we pull out or fail or lose this
war, knowing the Oriental mind in that part of the world as you
do, what do you think would be the fate of Thailand?
Ambassador Bunker. It would be in an extremely difficult
position. I think all of the countries in the area would be.
Senator Mundt. Would Thailand not come in for special
attack because she has given her all to be on our side?
Ambassador Bunker. I would think so.
Senator Mundt. We have occupied her territory and it would
seem to me they are going to say here is a fellow who was a
country that was a traitor to the cause, and the area, and
color, and all the rest. I assume there would be tremendous
vengeance to invade her country.
Ambassador Bunker. Thailand already has her problems in the
northeast.
Senator Mundt. They would feel that in that part of the
world that she had bet on the wrong horse.
Ambassador Bunker. We are not going to lose the war.
Senator Mundt. What?
Ambassador Bunker. We are not going to lose the war.
Senator Mundt. Not while we stay there, but if we pull out.
That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Clark.

TESTIMONY AT VARIANCE WITH THE NEWSPAPERS

Senator Clark. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to make a few
observations and then ask you to comment on them. I am sorry
Ambassador Komer had to leave. I do not know----
Ambassador Bunker. He can return again any time.
Senator Clark. We do not want to harass you.
The Chairman. He had to go to the White House.
Senator Clark. Yes.
I do not know of any two men in the service of our country
for whom I have a higher regard than you and Ambassador Komer.
Yet I find myself in a state of almost complete frustration.
Ever since I came to the Senate almost 11 years ago, we have
been told by our ambassadors in Saigon that we are winning this
war. First it was General Taylor who was ambassador. Then it
was Ambassador Lodge. And now it is you. I suppose they could
not be wrong all the time, and maybe you are right this time. I
hope to goodness you are.
Ambassador Bunker. I hope so.
Senator Clark. But what you tell us is at complete variance
with what we read in the newspapers.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, quite so. I agree with you.
Senator Clark. What we are told by people coming back here.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I agree with you, Senator. I can
give you a most recent example. What was said about the
performance of the Vietnamese armed forces is to my mind
inaccurately reported. There was a very substantial battle up
about 80 miles near the Cambodian border, 80 miles north of
Saigon, beginning October 27. I think the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese were trying to have a propaganda victory at
the time of inauguration. The first attack came at 1 o'clock in
the morning on the Vietnamese forces who repulsed the attack
and did a tremendous job. Our forces did not show up until 7 in
the morning. Attacks recurred four successive nights and the
Vietnamese took their full part in it and did a splendid job
according to our officers and generals. An article appeared in
Newsweek about it and you would never know there was a
Vietnamese soldier present.
Senator Clark. Well, that is the sort of thing that bothers
me. You tell us the morale of the South Vietnamese troops is
good; they are fighting better all the time. You just told us
of an incident in which apparently they performed with some
gallantry. Yet we are told they will not fight at night; they
work a five-day week; the officer corps is poor and corrupt;
most of the officers fought with the French against their own
people; the AWOL rate is extraordinarily high; corruption is
rampant and they do not have an effective conviction.
Who is right? You would have to say you are right and I
would want very much to believe you, but can you explain----
Ambassador Bunker. I will tell you, Senator. We had 22
observers out there, a broad cross section, very representative
group of people who came out for the elections.
Senator Clark. I am not talking about the elections.
Ambassador Bunker. No, no, but I want to tell you about
this reaction, talk about this reporting. Many of them said to
the press, ``We really don't understand the kind of reporting
you are sending back here after what we have seen.''

BRAINWASHING

Senator Clark. Governor Romney says he has been
brainwashed. I do not know who to believe.
Senator Case. Leave that; strike that out; be serious about
it.
Senator Clark. I am being serious about it. He said it
seriously, too. If I can just----
Senator Case. This is the most crucial point I think we
have been discussing all afternoon.

EVALUATING PACIFICATION

Senator Clark. If I could make one or two more comments and
I would be happy for you to reply. I would like to kind of get
it off my mind, and I will be quite brief.
Mr. Komer told us that pacification was going reasonably
well. It was largely handled by civilians. I talked to a very
knowledgeable reporter and TV commentator who came back from
there recently and he said pacification is a joke. We had lunch
with Mr. Luce, who said he considered it a failure.
You say, Mr. Komer says, it is largely being done by well
trained civilians. We had General Walt of the Marine Corps in
for lunch the other day, and he was a marvelous man, and he was
justifiably proud of the pacification I Corps. He told us it
was all done by the Marines, such as Senator Aiken indicated a
while ago.
Ambassador Bunker. I think that is probably maybe slightly
excess pride on the part of the Marines. I think they should be
proud of their performance, and General Walt is very
enthusiastic, of course.
Senator Clark. He is a very great guy, but didn't they do a
lot of pacification up in I Corps, the Marines, just the
soldiers going out and pacifying these villages? That is what
he told us.
Ambassador Bunker. They did quite a little work there, yes,
but they didn't do the major share of it, and the----

REPORTERS WITH PRECONCEIVED NOTIONS

Senator Clark. I am going to cut this short because I don't
want to harass you and I don't want to detain you.
Ambassador Bunker. I am not harassed at all, and I will
answer any questions. My own view is, and I will say to you
very frankly, I had the same problem in the Dominican
situation. We had reporters who came there with a preconceived
idea. There wasn't anything I or anybody could say to change
their mind, but only the facts changed their minds.
Senator Clark. But they were wrong.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, they were wrong.
Senator Clark. In my view.

VIET CONG STRENGTH

Senator Clark. Finally, the Defense Department has just
told this committee that there are 241,300 Viet Cong under
arms, which is down 2,000 since the first of the year. Yet we
hear about high diversion rates and people going AWOL. As far
as one can read from the newspapers, the Viet Cong is going
just as strong now as it was five, ten years ago. We hear, the
Defense Department tells us, that there are only 50,000 North
Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Now, you tell us there are
a lot more because replacements are going into Viet Cong
regiments. But in the end, if the Defense Department is right,
there is a total Viet Cong and Hanoi strength of 291,300,
whereas the total strength of our forces and of the South
Vietnamese is in the neighborhood of 1.2 million, and from the
newspapers we are not doing any better from a military point of
view than we were 10 years ago.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, ----
Senator Clark. You don't agree with that?
Ambassador Bunker. I certainly don't agree with it.
Senator Clark. The New York Times, this is one of the most
frustrating things, and I am through with it, the New York
Times on Sunday had a front page account which quoted the
dispatches from Saigon of our military people and the embassy,
too, which is just about what you told us this afternoon. On
the front page of ``The Week in Review'' section was a headline
saying, ``Tough enemy takes the offensive in Vietnam.'' The
account was all about how our boys at Dak To were being blown
up and ammunition dumps exploding and the siege at Con Thien.
It looks as though the whole offensive was there on their side.
I am not for search and destroy, but one gets from reading
the newspapers we are pretty much having our backs against the
wall and I can't understand it.
Ambassador Bunker. I can't, either. It is just in my view a
very inaccurate picture of what the situation is.
Senator Clark. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Case?
Senator Case. Thank you very much.

TALKING AT CROSS PURPOSES

Mr. Ambassador, I repeat for myself what has been said by
many others, thank you for your hospitality and for your
courtesy in Vietnam. I was there very shortly after you
arrived.
The questions I have I am afraid are mostly repetitious of
those which have been asked before. I am sure they are nothing
new. You have heard them, and you have read them, and you know
the newspaper fellows who say they doubt the war is winnable;
it is not being won.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
Senator Case. And Ward Just says, ``Don't believe anything
you hear about Vietnam,'' not because people mean to be
deceitful, but because they are generally talking at cross
purposes and there isn't much of a definition of what words
mean.
I wish there were some way that you could try to help us in
bringing the discussion of Vietnam down to the point where we
talk to each other in the same terms and understand what the
facts are.
I know the problem of doing that is just about as difficult
a problem as winning the war.
The Ripon Society presents a diagnosis which was not
accepted by the administration the core of which I gather is we
are really only successful in pacification where it isn't
necessary. Where the Catholic population is Catholic, they are
pacified. Where the population or one of these various sects
who formerly were not recognized by the Vietnamese regime but
now are, who are anti-communists, who are now recognized just
by an act of ours and using different words to describe them,
but our general program, I don't mean ours but the South
Vietnamese program of bringing new groups into the support of
this government, a trite old phrase, winning the hearts and
minds of the people, is not happening. I know it is hard to be
specific. You have given us figures about the number of people
under government control, and under Viet Cong control, and
under mixed control, but without some definition or some
description of what we mean by control, these statistics are
not very meaningful.
When I was out there, I talked to one fellow who had been
working in pacification for many years. He was asked by a group
of newspaper people how long would it take and he said maybe 10
years at the present rate. But he said this would accelerate if
it was going well, if it went well at all.
Then we get some of the generals come back here saying in a
year and a-half, still saying within a year we are going to
begin to withdraw our troops.
I didn't mean to make a speech. I want to get you talking
about these things, but you probably said all your answers. You
just disagree with the newspaper guys.

GOVERNMENT OPTIMISM VS. PRESS PESSIMISM

How in the world does this disagreement exist? These are
not people, I am sure I would not think so, you know them--for
the most part they are certainly not anxious to be proven to be
correct that we are not getting anywhere out there. I should
think most of them would be wanting to be getting home and we
would want to be winning this war. But I have never seen a
situation in which there was almost a unanimous impression on
the part of the newspaper reporters in the face of what has
been more or less continuous, general optimistic reports by our
agencies of government. This is something that people cannot
understand and is the main cause of our difficulty.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I am inclined to agree with you
that one of the main causes of our difficulties is this kind of
reporting that we get out of Vietnam, frankly.
There is a very big press corps there, as you know. Many of
them are young and inexperienced people.
Senator Case. Not all.
Ambassador Bunker. No, not all, and I find the more mature
people take a far more objective view of the situation than
many of the people who are there.
I can answer that some of the people have been there so
long that they seem to be--I get the newspaper people,
journalists and reporters in. I have tried to make a point of
getting in half a dozen of them every week. Tell them we will
have dinner; sport shirt; informal talks; get everything off
their chest and everything they want to say.
Senator Case. I have never heard any criticism of the way
they were treated or the fact----
Ambassador Bunker. Because I want to find out what the
problem is; how they see it. I want to try to be objective and
realistic about the situation. As I said to my staff when I
first went there, if all I hear are success stories I will be
suspicious. I know it is not all going to be successful. I know
we are going to have setbacks, and I know we are going to have
problems.

A DISENCHANTED REPORTER

But, for example, when you get an article as we had once in
Newsweek about the Vietnamese Armed Forces which began saying
that one regiment had opted out of the war and supplied
prostitutes to the American forces--I had Westmoreland run this
down, and there was not one shred of truth in it. I mean, how
do you account for this?
Senator Case. I should be interested to know myself. What
did the magazine say about it?
Ambassador Bunker. This man, this fellow, I have had him
for dinner at my house. He has been there a long time. He was
completely disenchanted with the whole scene; it was a sick
society and there is nothing you can do about it. That was the
whole attitude.
Senator Case. That wouldn't make it a lie.
Ambassador Bunker. I don't know any more than you do,
Senator, how we get what we do. But certainly as far as my
objective view, as far as I can be objective, and I try to be,
I just think the general impression that is created here about
the Vietnamese Armed Forces, about pacification, gives a very
distorted view.
Pacification, as I said, was slow getting underway because,
in the first place, the first year the government was taking
over, trying to restore order and create some degree of
stability. The program got underway the second year of the
administration. It required a lot of planning, a lot of
organization, a lot of training and the involvement of large
numbers of people. It was slow.
Now, the program this year was the pacification of 1100
hamlets and we won't reach it because it was slow. We may get
900 to a thousand.
Next year we expect to do 1500 to 2000. So, as I say, in
all these areas we are trying to be able to accelerate the rate
of progress.
Senator Case. Well, just on the question of pacification,
again Komer would be the man we really should be asking the
questions of, and I hope we will ask Mr. Komer to come up again
when we can have some time, and especially the young fellows at
the tail end of this performance----
The Chairman. I would strongly recommend for your
convenience and his that you have a subcommittee meeting any
time.
Senator Case. I would like to because we are only trying to
get the facts.
Senator Clark. I think you ought to say junior instead of
young.
Senator Case. Did I say young?
Senator Clark. Yes, you did.
Senator Case. That is the way you feel. Ambassador Bunker
and I are the two oldest men here, and Clark.
I do have questions about this matter, just a couple more,
and then I will be finished with it.

HAMLETS PERMANENTLY PACIFIED

Apart from those areas where you have sectarian groups of
one kind or another, or the Catholics, the mountain people,
whatnot, is there any situation in which we have taken a hamlet
or a number of them and permanently pacified them? Or is the
situation during the time we have all the places saturated with
troops they are going to be amenable, but when the troops get
out, our troops get out, as they must to go on to the next one,
then we have lost them?
I really would like to know about it.
Ambassador Bunker. Where there is pacification, where there
aren't these sects, you see, yes, there is, in Binh Dinh
Province, for example, where there were no Catholics at all.
And no Hao Hoa and mostly Buddhists, as far as I know.
Senator Case. How many people are involved in this
pacification; how many hamlets?
Ambassador Bunker. I don't know how many of the hamlets. It
is the second largest province. I think about 65,000-900,000
population.
Senator Case. How many hamlets?
Ambassador Bunker. I don't know how many hamlets, one of
the priority areas.
Senator Case. I wonder if we could have for the record the
number of hamlets and the number of population in the pacified
areas.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Habib. We will get that for the record, Senator.
Senator Case. Thank you.

STOP INCREASING AMERICAN PERSONNEL

Senator Case. It is not fair to ask you and, therefore, I
won't, but I will just throw out a suggestion which has been
made by a great many people that, if we had put as many people
as we usefully should put into South Vietnam, then it is time
to stop increasing the number of American personnel.
Is this your general opinion?
Ambassador Bunker. I think we are pretty well there, yes. I
think we need some more advisers with the regional popular
forces. We haven't very many with them because they are doing a
very vital job and doing it increasingly well. I think we can
help there, but, no, I think we are at about the limit.

SLOWNESS IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY

Senator Case. This one last broader question, and this is
not critical of you because I have sensed you are as tough a
guy as has been operating for us out there, and I really mean
this in the right sense, but a criticism of our slowness in
putting pressure on the South Vietnamese military and the junta
to do what they must do themselves in order to build an
effective military force and a society and to develop a feeling
for nationhood among the people and loyalty to the government.
Have you been able to put as much heat on as you personally
felt you would like to do?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I have. Sometimes I think I may
have overdone it, because it sometimes becomes
counterproductive, as you know.
Senator Case. Would you just explain why and in what way it
becomes counterproductive?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes. I think the outstanding
characteristic perhaps of all of the Asian--this is not just
confined to the Asian countries but the under-developed
countries--is the question of pride, and I think that you can
put pressure on to the degree where you get simply no results
at all. There are many ways of putting pressure on: persuasion,
urging, withholding of funds, and all kinds of things. All
these methods have been used, and I think that I have put all
that the traffic will bear on Thieu, Ky, and on the government.
I think they have responded very well, frankly.

VIETNAMESE SHOULD NOT TAKE U.S. FOR GRANTED

Senator Case. Is it your judgment that they, and by
``they'' this is a little imprecise, but I am trying to be
provocative rather than precise, that they have a feeling that
no matter how little they respond to our suggestion that we
have no option but to support them?
Ambassador Bunker. I don't think so. I made it very clear
to them they can't take us for granted.
Senator Case. And do you think that they have a fairly
clear idea it is not inconceivable that in the event of their
failure to do what we believe is necessary we could pull out
entirely?
Ambassador Bunker. I think they may have, yes, and I think
they----
Senator Case. You say may.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, I can't answer this categorically,
obviously, Senator.
Senator Case. But I mean it is terribly important that we
should know this, for some people in our government have said
to me, and I guess I said to you out there, that we have no
option and in effect that the people out there know we have
none and, therefore, they can go their merry way----
Ambassador Bunker. I made it very clear to them they cannot
take our assistance for granted; they can't expect the American
public to support their efforts if they are not pulling their
own weight behind them. I think the measures which they have
adopted and are adopting in this new government are an
indication of their responsibilities--the attack on corruption,
the extension of the draft, the insistence on austerity, the
reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces, the organization
of the civil administration--all of these things. Here is a new
government, the former government having been in only for two
years, and, as I said, only able to perform in the last year. I
think they ought to have a chance of showing what they can do.

U.S. RICE SUPPLIES TO VIETNAM

Senator Case. Just one factual question to be sure I
understood you correctly. Did you say we were putting in
800,000 tons of rice this year?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes; I think 800,000 tons. That is the
estimate we will need.
Senator Case. Unless I am crazy, it is a billion--no, a
million--1,600,000,000 pounds, which is a hundred pounds per
person. Is that right?
Mr. Habib. Eight hundred thousand tons of grain; it is not
all rice.
Senator Case. But edible grain for human consumption.
Mr. Habib. Yes.
Senator Case. It is a tremendous amount of their food
supply, isn't it? A tremendous proportion of their food supply?
Ambassador Bunker. It is a big staple. Rice is the
principal staple, of their food.
Senator Case. What is their own production of grains and
rice normally?
Ambassador Bunker. What would it be?
Mr. Habib. We would have to get the figure. I don't have
the precise figure.
Senator Case. Thank you. And we sell their for----
The Chairman. We give it to them.
Ambassador Bunker. Piastres.
Mr. Habib. P. L. 480.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Food for Peace Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Case. We are not able to pay on the market for our
expenses.
Mr. Habib. We do a portion of it.
Senator Case. How much?
Mr. Habib. I think we are up to 20 percent.
The Chairman. Before they used to export a large quantity
of rice. This was an exporting nation until we occupied it.
Senator Case. I just want to get roughly how much of the--
Mr. Habib. I think we are up to 20 percent, but we will
correct it for the record. We keep a certain portion for our
own use and the proportion they use is, of course, used in
their own budget.
Ambassador Bunker. The last contract was 20 percent for our
uses.
Mr. Habib. Twenty percent.
Senator Case. What do you mean by their own?
Ambassador Bunker. For example, under P.L. 480, 15 to 20
percent.
Senator Case. Yes, but we weren't in Indian spending
hundreds of millions of dollars on the local market for our own
military.
Ambassador Bunker. It is quite true.
Senator Case. We are not permitted to use that for any of
our expenses except for this 20 percent.
Ambassador Bunker. This last contract was 20 percent, I
think.
We have had some contracts, the one before was, I think a
hundred percent, if I am not mistaken. We can give that to you.
Senator Case. Broadly speaking, they built up through these
operations in South Vietnam something around $350 million
surplus in American dollars; isn't that right?
Ambassador Bunker. We have an agreement with them. It is to
be held to $250 million.
Senator Case. To be cut down?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
Senator Case. It is still above that.
Ambassador Bunker. Presently it is about $300 million.
Senator Case. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Pell?
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM

I share the general admiration for you and your work and,
obviously, my views on this are not intended as any criticism
of you, but of our policy.
I was just wondering in your own mind if you would feel
that a land invasion of North Vietnam, or the bombing of the
population centers, or the dikes, would be quite likely taken
by China as a threat to its own security, from your diplomatic
experience, your own view.
Ambassador Bunker. I would guess that an invasion would
depend on where the invasion took place and how near it was to
China or Hanoi itself. I would guess that if we went into north
of the demilitarized zone, for example, I don't think----
Senator Pell. That is what I meant.
Ambassador Bunker. I don't think it would draw in the
Chinese. But if you went in near Hanoi I think it might be a
different story.
Senator Pell. Would you be opposed to either of these two
actions, as ambassador?
Ambassador Bunker. I would be opposed to going in Hanoi;
yes, yes.
Senator Pell. Or to the bombing of civilian centers, and
the bombing of the dikes?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, I don't think--I would be opposed
to the bombing of civilian centers, yes.
Senator Pell. You would or would not?
Ambassador Bunker. I would.
Senator Pell. The reason I am asking this question, we have
pretty well exhausted in the north the targets of military
opportunity. You read the hearings with Secretary McNamara and
there are not too many targets that are important, and the
Administration is going to be faced with the choice next. I am
wondering what your recommendation would be.
Ambassador Bunker. My recommendation would be the bombing
of military targets, interdiction bombing, which we are doing.

AMBASSADORS ARE ALWAYS OPTIMISTIC

Senator Pell. One viewpoint, and I don't mean to press you
too hard on this, but I would like to know, and it would be of
great satisfaction to some of us, if civilian bombing were
seriously contemplated as a means of additional pressure or the
bombing of the dikes, or invasion considerably north of the
demilitarized zone, would you feel strongly enough opposed to
submit your resignation?
Ambassador Bunker. I don't know, Senator.
The Chairman. That is a personal question.
Ambassador Bunker. It is a hypothetical question.
Senator Pell. Very hypothetical. But this is what is in the
back of the minds of myself, certainly, what happens at the end
of a year or two, because I, as you can see from my position on
the totem pole, is the last question to you, I have only been
in this committee three years. I have never heard an ambassador
who is not optimistic, and yet the problem remains that the
course we are presently following, we will have followed that
course, and what happens after it. This is why I am wondering
what your views are. Or do you feel we will have victory, not
victory, but peace before we reach the end of this present
course?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, my own view is that this present
course can be successful and will be successful. I say I don't
put it, I haven't put it in any timeframe. People have asked me
how long, and I am not willing to say, because I don't know.

POSSIBILITY OF DE-ESCALATION

Senator Pell. I think there are very good views that could
be advanced that we could have a 10 or 15 year operation there
if we could lower the stakes, if we ceased the bombing in the
north, if we adopted some of the de-escalation in the south. It
would be to their advantage to negotiate us out.
The problem is where we are passing a bearable limit for an
indefinite period. I was wondering what your views were.
Do you think that the de-escalating school would be a great
mistake or not?
Ambassador Bunker. I don't know how you get the other side
to de-escalate, frankly.
I have heard----
Senator Pell. You just leave them alone in the areas where
they are in South Vietnam.
Ambassador Bunker. I certainly would be opposed to that.
Senator Case. Would the Senator yield, because this is a
question I would have liked to have developed just for a point.
Senator Pell. Certainly.
Senator Case. Would you distinguish between de-escalation
of the war which would be desirable, but I am more worried
about de-escalation of American participation, and I think we
could perhaps separate those two matters. I see no reason to
think that the American public is going to stand still for a
much longer indefinite prospect of the continuance, the present
rate of casualties and expenditures, casualties mostly. I think
this is going to have to be reduced if it is to go on or to be
regarded as an indefinite prospect, and I wonder, therefore,
whether there is any prospect, in your judgment, of reducing
the extent of the American involvement, the casualties and
expenditures as opposed to the overall de-escalation.
Ambassador Bunker. Of course I think this is a question of
time, Senator. As I say, if we are successful, as I think we
shall be and will be, obviously this will involve a reduction
in American casualties and American presence, of course. When
and just how long it is going to take, I am not prepared to
say.
Senator Case. You don't think we should increase the size
of the American personnel there?
Ambassador Bunker. I think we have sufficient, myself.
The Chairman. Are you through, Senator?
Senator Pell. I am not through.
Senator Case. Thank you very much.
Senator Pell. Thank you.

THE WAR SEEMS OUT OF PROPORTION

Another question where you, I am sure, have some thoughts,
is this question of the drive. How is it that when what we
contribute taking it as a total to be a hundred percent, the
Soviets are putting in about two and a-half percent of what we
are in weapons and money, nothing in men, and the Chinese are
putting in about .6 percent. How do you account for the
apparently increased momentum, the drive, urgency of the Viet
Cong and the North Vietnamese over the South Vietnamese where
the balance to keep it even has to involve this huge American
contribution far outweighing that from outside Vietnam and the
other side?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think the nature of the war,
Senator. I mean a guerrilla type warfare obviously takes a
great many more. I think the British discovered that in Malaya.
If you are fighting, opposing a guerrilla type war, it takes a
great many more men, a great many more troops.
Senator Pell. Doesn't that seem a little out of proportion
to you?
Ambassador Bunker. I don't believe it is, compared to, as I
understand, the ratio in Malaya. It is about the same as this,
if not higher; higher, I think.
Senator Pell. What are the number of North Vietnamese
divisions presently not committed; number of men in them. Do
you have any idea of that?
We have heard the figure something like 15.
Mr. Habib. About 350,000 men under arms, regulars under
arms and, of course, they have a large militia they can draw on
and they have a conscription system they can draw on.
Senator Pell. But it is still another 300,000 not
committed.
Mr. Habib. At least under arms.

PROMOTE SELF-GOVERNMENT OR RESIST AGGRESSION

Senator Pell. I was a little concerned earlier when you
mentioned that the villages and the towns in South Vietnam had
not had self-government since the French occupation, which is
really more than, I guess more than a hundred years. Do you
really believe it is this important that we should be fighting
this hard to give these people who haven't had self-government
for more than a century, to be giving them self-government?
Ambassador Bunker. I think yes. I think they have to govern
themselves if they are not governed by a colonial power.
Senator Pell. But isn't this a pretty large order to say
that all areas that were under colonial domination before will
be underwritten in their right to self-government by the United
States?
I think it is a dangerous precedent we would be getting
into.
Ambassador Bunker. We are committed, aren't we, to the
right to self-determination and if people have that they have
got to learn to govern themselves somehow.
Senator Pell. I would question that. I think there are many
countries in the world where the right of self-determination
does not exist, and I would hope we would not go to war to
bring it about.
Ambassador Bunker. I don't think we are going to war for
that reason.
Essentially, we are going to war to resist aggression.
Senator Pell. That is a different reason.
Ambassador Bunker. I know, but in the process of building
up the country and of helping it to become viable politically
and economically, I think that--and the Vietnamese are doing
this themselves. This is not our motivation. I mean this is
their own motivation, and this is what they want to do in the
way of developing a government.
Senator Pell. I know.
Incidentally----
Ambassador Bunker. Because if there was traditionally in
the country--there is an old Vietnamese saying, the law of the
emperor stops at the village gate. They used to run their own
affairs and it is a tradition of the country.
Senator Pell. I know that just as the Viet Cong had
released three of our prisoners there that the South Vietnamese
government is about to execute three of the VC. Doesn't that
seem a little anomalous?
Ambassador Bunker. They are not going to do it.
Senator Pell. Good. I am delighted to hear that and very
glad indeed.
I think I will terminate my time on this happy note.

OTHER TROOPS IN VIETNAM

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you have been very
patient. I regret we have taken so much of your time.
One or two questions that have occurred to me during the
course of this: Are you aware of the terms on which Korean
troops have been supplied to the war in Vietnam? Is that within
your jurisdiction?
Ambassador Bunker. Well, I am not completely, I think,
aware of it.
Have you got any information?
The Chairman. Have you seen what is called the Brown letter
setting out these terms?
Mr. Habib. March 14th of last year.
Ambassador Bunker. No, I have not.
Mr. Habib. There is such a letter.
The Chairman. Do you have a copy of it?
Mr. Habib. No, sir.
The Chairman. Could it be made available to the committee?
Mr. Macomber. Let me look into it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The same on the Philippines, if you can give
that to us.
The paper reported a few days ago that the Thai government
has offered to send 10,000 troops.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
The Chairman. Is that correct?
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, that is correct.
In addition----
The Chairman. To what they now have.
Ambassador Bunker. To what they now have, yes.
The Chairman. What did they request in return for that? Do
you know?
Ambassador Bunker. No, I don't know. I know they did
request something, but how much or what, I don't know.
Mr. Habib. The terms are under discussion.
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, still under discussion.
The Chairman. Could you supply to us, Mr. Secretary, what
the proposal is?
Mr. Macomber. Yes, sir, I will try to bring up to date that
information that we supplied earlier.

AGREEMENT AMONG EMBASSY STAFF

The Chairman. Is it accurate, Mr. Ambassador, to assume
there is no difference of views about this matter within the
embassy staff, or is that a proper question to ask you?
Ambassador Bunker. About what matter, Senator?
The Chairman. About the progress of the war and the
prospect----
Ambassador Bunker. No, I know of no difference.
The Chairman. They all agree as to--there is no real
serious difference of views in your advisers?
Ambassador Bunker. I know of none.
The Chairman. I know you said there is great pride in the
underdeveloped countries. Am I to assume you don't think there
is in the developed countries?
Ambassador Bunker. No.
The Chairman. It is the same; it affects everybody.
Ambassador Bunker. I think there is a very interesting
book, Eric Hoffer's Ordeal of Change. I think it is very
worthwhile reading, it is not a very long book, about the
attitude and sense of values of some of the developing
countries.

THE NATURE OF THE U.S. OBJECTIVE

The Chairman. One last question: You said they could not
take us for granted, and that it is very clear to the
Vietnamese officials that they have to perform, I take it, a
moment ago in response to a question----
Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. If it should turn out to be the objective of
this country to contain China rather than to just give self-
determination, it seems to me they can take us for granted. It
depends a little upon what our objective is, doesn't it?
Ambassador Bunker. Perhaps so.
The Chairman. In other words, if we are there to contain
China it doesn't really matter whether they perform or not. We
cannot leave until we have contained China for an indefinite
period.
Ambassador Bunker. Well, that may be, Senator. But I say
that is a matter of policy that is beyond my competence.
The Chairman. That is right; you made that clear.
Ambassador Bunker. And I simply report what I have
indicated to them.
The Chairman. I understand, and I didn't wish to raise it
again.
It has already been raised, but the answer to that question
really does depend upon what our real objective is in this
area, doesn't it?
Ambassador Bunker. It goes beyond the situation in
Southeast Asia.
The Chairman. It would be a different answer.
Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate
your coming here and giving us the advantage of your knowledge.
Ambassador Bunker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am always
happy to come before the committee, as I indicated when I came
up before I went to Vietnam, and I hope to come back
periodically because I think it is important to report on what
the situation is, at least as I see it.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
That is a vote, I may say, for those present.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee recessed, subject
to call of the chair.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Clark, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
George R. Jacobs, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Resources and Food Policy, Department of State,
accompanied by Tom O. Murphy, Director, Sugar Policy Staff,
A.S.C.S., International Sugar Agreement.
Robert F. Woodward, Interim Director of the Office of Water
for Peace, Department of State, accompanied by Rodger P.
Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, testified on S. Res. 155, relating to
Desalting Plants in the Middle East.
[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MOTIONS REGARDING TESTIMONY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

----------

Thursday, November 30, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met pursuant to notice, at 10:22 A.M., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson,
Williams, Mundt, and Case.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Holt of the
committee staff.
[Ex. K, 90/1, International Sugar Agreement, was ordered
reported unanimously.
H.R. 9063, to amend the International Claims Settlement
Act, was ordered reported with an amendment, after receiving
testimony from Dr. Edward D. Re, Chairman, Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, accompanied by Andrew T. McGuire,
General Counsel]

BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I have a motion I would like to
submit.
The Chairman. All right, the Senator from Tennessee.
Senator Gore. I would like the staff to distribute some
copies if they would. This is on Gore's motion. I believe I
gave Carl the last copy I had. Will you bring me one?
Mr. Chairman, I move that the chairman of the committee be
instructed to communicate to the President of the United States
the concern of the committee about the breakdown in public
communication between the executive and the Senate which arises
from the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify before
the committee in public session on United States policy in
Southeast Asia. I would like to be recognized.
The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee.
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, may I make my position
clear? I anticipate making a motion to table this motion at a
later date, but I do not want to make it now. I do not want to
cut off any debate on this, but at the proper time I will make
a motion to table. I only want to state that for information.
The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a mild motion--
--
[Discussion off the record.]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE PRESIDENT

The Chairman. Could we have order? I want to hear what the
Senator from Tennessee has to say.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I hope this motion, which I
consider a very mild one, can be considered in the light of the
relationship between the Senate and the President, rather than
in terms of Vietnam or anti-Vietnam. A precedent is about to be
established with the adjournment of this session which I think
would be extremely damaging and of historic proportion.
The Constitution, it seems to me, places the Senate and the
President in the position of limited partnership with respect
to foreign policy, both concerning formulation and conduct.
What other meaning can be attached to the provisions of
advise and consent, the provision relating to the raising and
disposition of armed forces, ratification, confirmation, and so
on? I will not get into a constitutional argument, except to
conclude with that particular portion of my remarks by saying
that, it seems to me, the Senate, this committee being the
agent of the Senate, has a constitutional duty, right, and
responsibility to the public and to itself to explore, and
insofar as is consistent with the national interest, explore,
in public, foreign policy issues, particularly those so
important as war or peace.
For almost two years now, the committee has requested--I
put in the Record a few days ago the series of letters
exchanged between the chairman and the Secretary of State--the
public appearance of the Secretary of State--on the general
subject of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN PATIENT

I have suggested that the committee has been extremely
patient. It is more than three weeks now since the Secretary
met here with us and told us he would promptly give us an
answer on the request, which was further pressed at the
committee meeting, regarding his public appearance.
It seems to me that such treatment, without being
personally critical of the Secretary, which I don't intend at
all, is nevertheless contemptuous treatment of this committee.
Further, if we do not press our point in this regard, I
think it will further deny this committee and further establish
the privacy of the executive in the formulation and the
execution of the foreign policy of our nation.
Of course, this motion would not undertake to require his
appearance. It has no such connotation. It merely asks, directs
the chairman to communicate to the President of the United
States, not just to the Secretary of State, who is the
President's agent, but directly to the President, the concern
of this committee over this breakdown in public communications
between the executive and the Senate.
I hope that it has no partisan connotations, no political
connotations. I certainly do not intend this. This is addressed
purely to the subject of the equation which our constitutional
forefathers undertook to provide between the executive and the
legislative, specifically the Senate and the President, in this
vital field. I do not wish, Mr. Chairman, to make an extended
argument. That is in brief my views and my purpose in
presenting this motion.

THE PRESS CREATES INCIDENTS

The Chairman. If I may say one word, I have been, as you
all know, in Arkansas quite a bit in the last two months, and I
am very often asked why we do not have such discussions in
public. This incident at the Bruton Parish Church which was
widely publicized particularly attracted the attention of my
constituents because that particular minister at one time was
dean of the Trinity Cathedral in Little Rock, Arkansas. A lot
of people know him down there, and so they asked me about it.
I wrote to the minister and got a full statement, which
maybe I should have brought over in connection with this, I
didn't think about it, of his whole sermon, and I must confess
it is a good example of the press picking out of a very
moderate sermon, as a matter of fact, much of it was most
sympathetic to the difficulties of the President and the
country. It was a very moderate statement, but there was that
one sentence in it which they picked out which suggested that
in effect he was saying that he thinks it would be good for the
country, for the President, and for everybody, if there was a
clarification of our purposes. I think he meant it to be
helpful, however it was. He was very embarrassed about it. The
letter he sent to me, in the first paragraph, there was a
paragraph that was written in, but the rest of it was obviously
a form letter he had prepared to send to everybody who had
criticized him. He was greatly disturbed because I think he
genuinely did not intend to embarrass the President.
He thought he was giving him good advice; that it would be
very helpful to him and to everybody if he would clarify what
our purposes are. They have asked me about it in Arkansas. Why
doesn't the committee have the Secretary? I tried to explain as
best I could just what have been the circumstances.

SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD COME VOLUNTARILY

I wish he would come on down voluntarily, of course,
without such a letter. The only thing that bothers me about it,
I am thoroughly in accord with what the Senator seeks to obtain
here, is whether or not this would be the way to do it. It
might be, if the judgment of the committee is, and I think I
would certainly support it if the clear majority of the Senate
wished to do it. I would hate to have this kind of a matter
just a very narrow decision after there having been very
vigorous dissent against it. This may not be the best way to
bring it about.
I would think it would be kind of embarrassing if we sent a
letter and then a complete rejection and denunciation. It would
only make matters worse. I am puzzled in my own mind as to how
we can persuade the Secretary to come. He obviously now is in
the position of awaiting the President's decision. We gathered
from our liaison officer that this is a matter at the White
House level now.
It is not just the Secretary personally any longer who is
making the decision. It is a presidential decision. It has been
discussed at the White House level; we were informed.
I do think it would be good for him. I agree with the
minister that it would be very helpful, if it is possible, at
least to precisely state what the objective of the present
policy is, but I don't know how to go about it. This is one way
to raise the question.
I would support it if the committee wishes to support it. I
would like to hear the views of all the members as to what they
think about it, because it is embarrassing to be told, ``Well,
why can't you get him'' and so on. It looks as if the chairman
is delinquent in not getting him. It is hard for the people
down home to understand why I can't get the Secretary of State.

STILL WAITING FOR A REPLY

Senator Gore. Could I add one other thing that I had failed
to call to the attention of the committee? I offered this
motion more than a month ago, and it was at that time, you will
recall, that Sentor Mansfield suggested that the committee
invite Secretary Rusk to appear in executive session to discuss
the question of his appearance at a public session. Thereupon,
I withdrew the motion. The Secretary came, and as I related a
moment ago, told us some three and a half weeks ago that he
would give a prompt reply.
Now, it was not specifically interpreted to mean the next
week, but there was a discussion about the following week. But
here it is now, the 30th day of November, the session nearing
an end. So it just seems to me that either the committee is
going to communicate to the man who is responsible or not. Now,
if there is some better way to bring it about, my objective is
to preserve and promote the equation of mutual responsibility
in this field. I will desist from further remarks, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

NOT A QUESTION OF COMMUNICATIONS

Senator Hickenlooper. I don't like to be in a position of
disagreeing with my good friend, Albert Gore. He advises my son
on how to raise black cattle and sell them for a good price,
and I am sympathetic with him. It is better than I can do. We
agree on a lot of things.
But I cannot agree that this is an advisable thing to do,
and I so told him.
In the first place, this is not a question of communication
in my judgment.
Senator Gore. I said public communication.
Senator Hickenlooper. This is a question of public
appearance.
We have no trouble getting the Secretary up here. He has
quite a few things to do. How many countries are there in the
world, 117 and 120 in the United Nations?
Senator Case. Over 120 now.
Senator Hickenlooper. You know, it is really quite a little
job to keep track of those things. He has something to do. But
I don't know of any occasion where he has failed or refused to
come up here in executive session and talk these things over
with us, frankly.
Now, there have been a number of occasions when he has come
up here and talked in executive session, and for some reason
what he said here has got in the papers the next evening or the
next day, to the disappointment of all the members who are
here. I am sure that they regretted it very much. But
nevertheless he has come. So it isn't a question of
information.
We are informed any time we want to be informed about any
questions we want to ask him; he comes. The Lord knows, I
disagree with Lyndon Johnson. I am not defending Lyndon Johnson
particularly one way or the other. I expect to vote against him
in the next election. And I suppose everybody knows that.
I don't defend everything Dean Rusk does. I am just not a
follower of this thing at all. But I do feel that this would
tend to create an emotional, psychological situation in this
country that would add to the confusion that already is
bedeviling us in the world and especially within this country.
Now, I feel strongly that it would.

RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH THE PRESIDENT

Getting down to the thrust of this motion, which I am sure
Senator Gore doesn't mean it this way, I probably have
misinterpreted it, but this is a thrust right at the heart of
Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State. I don't think that is where
the responsibility lies. I think it lies with the President of
the United States.
The Chairman. I think it does, too.
Senator Gore. This is addressed to the President, not Rusk.
Senator Hickenlooper. I know, but this is what I am getting
at, Albert. I want to explain what I mean by what I said.
I have no word from the horse's mouth. I have no direct or
indirect second-hand communication one way or the other on this
thing, but I put a few things together, over a long period of
time. I don't think there is any question at all that if the
President said for Rusk to come up here, he would come. But I
think he is not coming, and, frankly, I am talking within this
committee, I think he is not coming because the President tells
him not to come.
Now, Senator Fulbright talked about this minister down at
Williamsburg. Personally, I think that was a rather arrogant
and illadvised thing.
The Chairman. Have you read the whole speech?
Senator Hickenlooper. No, but----
The Chairman. I would like for you to read it.
Senator Hickenlooper. I don't think that a person who
singles out the President of the United States who comes there
for worship should get into a political manipulation.
The Chairman. Will you get that and bring it over here?
Senator Hickenlooper. I may be wrong, but, anyway, that is
the way I feel about it. But if the press will pick out, out of
context, something like that, what will the press do, out of
context, on some kind of a public statement and a give-and-take
question-and-answer business from the Secretary of State in a
delicate situation such as we have in the world today?
And I think the same thing would apply there.

A DIRECT THRUST AT RUSK

I get back to the question of why I think that this could
well be interpreted as a direct thrust at Rusk. It is directed
to the President of the United States; that is, it says he
should communicate to the President the concern of the
committee about the breakdown in public communication between
the executive and the Senate. Now here it is, ``which arises
from the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify.''
Now, that is a direct dagger at the heart of the Secretary
of State, I believe, as it will be interpreted in the papers,
and I feel that it is not quite fair to him. He is a man of
great capacity. I repeat again, there are a lot of things that
he has done and said and positions that he has taken that I
don't agree with at all.
I have had my disputes with him.
Senator Gore. What about failure instead of refusal?
The Chairman. Or you could say the administration's
spokesman.
Senator Gore. I don't wish to aim anything at the Secretary
of State.
Senator Lausche. What if you would say his refusal to come
before the committee in public to listen to the public
diatribes of the committee members while few or no questions
are asked of him on direct issues?
Senator Case. Except by Mr. Lausche of Ohio.
Senator Case. I had an important point to make and you took
it right out of my hand here.
Senator Lausche. Well, okay.
Senator Hickenlooper. I was going to say this, Albert. The
reason I said at the outset that I propose, whenever we are
through talking, my plan is to make a motion to table this. I
personally would prefer to do that rather than to make a motion
just in diametric opposition. I think we are better off, the
way I view it, we would be better off to table it, which means
that we just don't act on it, rather than to vote it down, a
negative vote. That is the reasoning behind my thought on
tabling this thing.
Senator Gore. Could I ask a question?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

PRESIDENTS HAVE USURPED POWER

Senator Gore. Do you share my concern with the continued
diminution of the power and influence of the legislative branch
of the Government? Don't you think we should do something to
assert the rights and responsibilities of this committee?
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I think so, but there are ways
of asserting it and ways of asserting it. Now, I have a fairly
substantial history--I have talked a little bit too much about
it in this committee, I guess--but I have a fairly substantial
history of expressing my view on that subject that I think the
President has usurped his power, beginning back when I first
came down here, and that was with the NATO troops. I have been
quite consistent on that since then. I don't think the
President has any right to send NATO troops over there without
congressional approval.
We later got around and approved it, and I will again
repeat to ad nauseum, I think, but I will again repeat my
question to Dean Acheson at that time, that were we expected
to, or would we send any substantial number of troops over to
implement the NATO program in Europe. We have been told that we
would take care of the sea and the air and all that. I asked
him that specific question, and his answer to that was, ``The
answer to that, Senator, is a clear and emphatic no.''
Now those were the exact words that he used. Within three
months, we had four divisions going to Europe without any
further authority of the Congress, and I have been on that
little kick ever since. I mean, I think the President
constantly goes under what he claims to be his Commander-in-
Chief powers, which this Supreme Court may say he has, I don't
know. They will say anything over there.
Senator Gore. Inherent powers.
Senator Hickenlooper. But I don't think they are inherent
powers. I don't think the Constitution conveys those powers. We
do go ahead and we okay them afterwards many times, after he
has done something. You go back into history, Franklin D.
Roosevelt's fifty destroyers business. I think that was an
utter giveaway of American property without any authority at
all, but Congress went ahead and authorized it by implementing
it at a later date. So that became a moot question. That is the
way it usually happens.
But we are building up in this country, we are building up
through the Meet the Press and these people that get on radio
and say, ``Oh, but the President has the inherent right under
the Constitution to do these things.'' I don't think he has any
such a damn thing. I don't think he has that right at all. His
constitutional powers are very limited in the Constitution, and
many of his powers that go for international affairs have to be
cooperatively exercised, such as confirmation, or that is
advice and consent of the Senate.
I agree with you. I don't go on the other side of the
question. But I do think we are in a situation of tension at
this present time. The question is whom do you believe? Do you
believe Westmoreland, or do you believe some of these other
fellows, or do you believe----

SECRETARY DECLINES TO TESTIFY IN PUBLIC

The Chairman. That isn't the question. These people who
talk about their being busy. The Secretary makes speeches all
over the country. He gives interviews in U.S. News and World
Report. He prepares them or goes over them. He does it
everywhere, except he doesn't want to come to this committee.
Senator Hickenlooper. He comes here.
The Chairman. He doesn't want to come in public. These are
all public appearances. He appears in public, in statements. He
makes speeches; he goes out to Indiana. You know as well as I
how often he goes. He takes plenty of time to talk to everybody
but this committee.
Senator Hickenlooper. So does the President.

CALL FOR QUESTIONING

The Chairman. I think Frank, in a very subtle way, Frank's
suggestion that this committee asks questions which he doesn't
like, do you agree?
Senator Lausche. No; may I state my position?
The Chairman. I think that is true.
Senator Lausche. In my opinion, we have not conducted
genuine hearings in which a witness is called to testify. This
resolution says that he refuses to testify.
In the British Parliament, Cabinet members are called for
questioning.
The Chairman. In public.
Senator Lausche. Not to listen to speeches of twenty and
thirty and forty minutes in length. Now, I would suggest that
we clean our own house first, lay down rules of procedure. You
call him to testify on a specific issue.
Issue: Shall we pull out of Vietnam?
Issue: Shall we stop the bombing?
Issue: Shall we increase the bombing?
We call him and we ask him to testify, and the members of
the committee shall be permitted to ask questions and not to
have Rusk as the public attraction for the committee members to
make speeches on television and radio, and only for that
purpose, while the poor Secretary has to listen, sit there and
listen docilely to what is being said.

LIMITING TIME FOR QUESTIONS

The Chairman. Of course, I don't agree with that at all.
The secretary usually starts out, and with the limited time, he
often takes up so much time with the initial statement that
almost invariably it is at least thirty minutes, sometimes
forty-five minutes; that has been the usual practice in all
public sessions.
It is occasionally true that one or two members may say,
``I don't wish to ask a question,'' and make a statement, but I
don't know how we are going to vary that. It would be a very
drastic change to say members of the committee are not able to
make a statement. I don't believe any of you are willing to do
that.
Senator Mundt. We can solve that problem by giving each
member so much time.
The Chairman. That is a very difficult problem. With the
Secretary, with any Secretary or any witness who is at all
astute, he knows you haven't much time. He knows it is very
easy to make a long answer that takes all your time, and he
gets absolutely nowhere. He knows if you are operating under a
five- or ten-minute rule. We have tried that, and I think those
meetings don't get you anywhere because no one person is able
to pursue any question to its conclusion because of the time.
I have asked the staff in the last several meetings we have
had, not with him, but with other people, the average of
everybody has run not over ten minutes, because there will be
some people who won't ask any questions; they will skip by, but
there are always two or three people who are interested in the
subject particularly and pursue it for a longer time. But I
think the staff will say this. I asked them to do that. I
wanted to see the average time of so many members during a
certain limit; how long it went. It worked out to just about
ten minutes or a little less, although some would take as much
as twenty; some would take only one or two minutes. Some would
pass altogether. But I don't know how you make these hearings
effective.

REFINING THE VALIDITY OF THEIR POLICIES

I have just been handed this which you may have seen, dated
November 27. Here is a long interview that he gives to the
Reader's Digest in the form of an interview. Well, of course,
these are all created not to elicit what I think is the crux of
the matter, but as a vehicle for the expression of his views
without examination.
It may be that the Congress doesn't have any role to play,
but I think it does. I think that the participation of this
committee, with all its faults, could be very helpful to this
or any other administration in refining the validity of their
policies.
I agree with the minister. I think there is a great
question in the minds of certainly my constituents as to what
in the hell are we doing in Vietnam that justifies the cost.
They are not all against it. They don't know. Some of them,
they are divided like everybody else, but most of it is more
confusion as to what it is rather than a positive view that it
is right or it is wrong. They just don't know.
I want to put in the record for everybody, I wish I had
copies----
Mr. Marcy. We will make some copies.
The Chairman. This sermon, I think it is a very innocuous
sermon, in which there was only this one sentence that was
picked out that appeared and it was presented as if it was
critical.
It is a very moderate and nonpolitical approach based upon,
I thought, one of the President's favorite prophets, Isaiah. I
don't want to take your time to read it all, but I want to put
it in the record, Mr. Reporter.
Senator Mundt. Why don't you Xerox it and distribute it?
The Chairman. I think it is interesting to show how a
distorted version can be made of a very moderate statement.

TEXT OF SERMON

The Chairman. This preacher starts out, he says, his theme,
his text is, ``The people who sat in darkness have seen a great
light. They that dwell in the land of the shadow of death upon
them hath the light shone. Isaiah 9.2. Moses explores,
``Leading the children of Israel'' and so on, and it goes on.
It is a normal, what I call orthodox thing, except it gets down
to this point. He talks about--I will read it, if you would
like, one or two paragraphs.

Today we seem surrounded by insoluble problems.
Irresistible forces appear to be approaching collision with
immovable objects. The most immediate and demanding conflict
arises from the insistence of racial minorities to be given all
the rights and privileges that the majority have achieved. The
race problem can no longer be evaded either in this country or
abroad.
Seemingly impossible questions will require even more good
will than brains. Probably the only effective way out will be
to provide better schools for everybody and develop a more
inclusive type of community life. The end result will benefit
everybody. Our lives will be far richer as our society becomes
more inclusive. Isn't this what our Lord Christ prescribed,
love thy brethren, bear one another's burdens, to whom much is
given.
Now we are seeing the pragmatic necessity of what we once
thought impractical idealism fortifying us as it did Moses;
getting Catholic and Protestant together appeared ten years ago
as wild idealism. Today the Holy Spirit is leading us into an
increasing number of intimate contacts and a united force for
good is becoming a possibility.
Some deeply loved prejudices may have to be put aside, but
God is working his purpose out, invalidating what seemed a
stalemate.
The overshadowing problem before us is the international
realm. The political complexities of our involvement in an
undeclared war in Vietnam are so baffling that I feel
presumptuous even in asking questions. But since there is
rather general consensus that what we are doing in Vietnam is
wrong, a conviction voiced by leaders of nations traditionally
our friends, leading military experts, and the rank and file of
American citizens, we wonder if some logical, straight-forward
explanation might be given without endangering whatever
military or political advantage we hold. Relatively few of us
plan even the mildest form of disloyal action against
constituted authority. United we stand; divided we fall. We
know the necessity of supporting our leader, but we cannot
close our Christian consciences to consideration of rightness
of actions as they are reported to us, perhaps erroneously,
perhaps for good cause of which we have not been apprised.
We are appalled that apparently this is the only war in our
history which has had three times as many civilian as military
casualties. It is particularly regrettable that to so many
nations the purpose appears as neocolonialism. We are mystified
by news accounts suggesting that our brave fighting units are
inhibited by directives and inadequate equipment from using
their capacities to terminate the conflict successfully.
While pledging our loyalty, we ask humbly, why? And so on.

I won't read it all. But I think it is a very moderate one.
Here is what he says in his letter. As I say, you can see there
is one paragraph--here is what he says:

Perhaps some day it will be understood that my remarks in
Bruton Parish Church November 12 were intended to give strength
to the heart and the hands of the President. I felt the analogy
of light shining in darkness, Isaiah 2.9 illustrated by ancient
Moses and medieval Luther would be helpful. Religious and
racial dilemmas apparently hopeless until recently are rapidly
approaching solution because intelligent good will is being
acted upon by God. All these seem to provide reasonable hope
that when people are adequately informed as to rightness of our
purpose and procedure in Vietnam, God will again resolve the
impasse rapidly and honorably. The sermon was neither
derogatory nor critical of Mr. Johnson, as many of those
attending in a spirit of worship agree.

He is assuming, referring, I suppose, to the people
actually there.

Deplorable misconstructions have been drawn from the
occasion by lifting portions out of context, by impugning
motives, and by imagining ideas which were never stated or
inferred. My outline and intent was simple, kindly, and
religious.
One, when things seem hopeless and man does his righteous
best, God gives victory. Since I was incapable of making
specific recommendations, I sought by example from Scripture
and history to give encouragement. A clear reading of the
entire address will, I believe, bear out my motives as those of
a constructive Christian gentleman speaking appropriately from
an intelligent pulpit.
Sincerely yours.

I think the fellow is correct, if you read the whole thing.
I don't see how you can take offense to it except just by
picking that sentence and saying this is what the whole sermon
is about.

A FALSE PREMISE

Senator Mundt. I think what he forgot, Bill, is that a
preacher is not supposed to prevaricate from the pulpit. I
think he started his whole discourse on a false premise when he
said there was a dominant point of view in this country that
the thing was wrong. After that, I don't see what is wrong with
it, except for the misstatement of fact, if you are going to
accept the Gallup poll and various polls I have seen on the
subject.
The Chairman. He raises the question there in that
connection.
Senator Mundt. I thought he made a flat statement.
Senator Case. I think he talks about the consensus being
the consensus of nations rather than the consensus in this
country.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think it goes beyond that.

COMMUNICATE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, in the light of the very able
remarks of Senator Hickenlooper, I would like to modify my
motion so as to avoid any thought of any personal thrust.

I move that the chairman of the committee be instructed to
communicate to the President of the United States the concern
of the committee about the breakdown in public communication
between the executive and the Senate, and that the committee
respectfully suggest to the President the advisability of
administration officials testifying before the committee in
public session on United States policy in Southeast Asia.

The Chairman. Would you mind reading that over?
Senator Sparkman. Mine, too.
Senator Gore. I strike out these words ``which arise from
the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify,'' and
substitute therefor ``and that the committee respectfully
suggests to the President the advisability of administration
officials testifying before the committee in public session on
United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia.''
I think that avoids anything except communication to the
President whose responsibility it is, the advisability of
continuing this mutuality of responsibility and also exercising
our constitutional duty.
Senator Hickenlooper. Would you give that last part again?
The Chairman. Read the whole thing slowly, will you?
Senator Gore. AIl right.

In what less offensive manner can it be put?
I wanted to make it as broad as possible.

MAKING THE ACTION PUBLIC

Senator Case. Would this action be made public?
Senator Gore. If the chairman writes a letter; it would be
up to him.
Senator Sparkman. Go outside there and look.
The Chairman. There is no practical way to keep it from
being public.
Senator Case. What I was thinking of, Al, I agree with this
one thousand percent. I have made speeches about it myself on
the floor and will continue to do it, whether it is wise for us
to take any action, or whether we will be put in kind of a box
in spite of the very, I think temperate, changes that were made
in your resolution, Bill. The average newspaper editorial,
whether it be the Times or the Post or hawks or doves or what,
they all climb down on us, and we got nowhere.
The Chairman. Not all of them. The Post is the worst one,
but some of them were very favorable.
Senator Case. I know, but in general, everybody rushes to
protect the President from being hurt by usurpers in the way of
Congressmen and what-not. I just don't think that it is going
to do any good to squawk publicly, as a committee.
Now, I think individually, and I am going to continue more
strongly myself to do it, Albert.
Senator Gore. Will you yield there?
Senator Case. Yes.

A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY

Senator Gore. I have no desire to be precipitous about it.
If the committee would rather wait, I have no desire to press
for action. It seems to me, though, Senator Case, that we
simply cannot take this by doing nothing. We have been snubbed
for nearly two years, and it is the constitutional duty of this
committee, as I see it.
Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. Senator Carlson.

COMMITTEE COULD DAMAGE ITSELF

Senator Carlson. I want to say this. I rather concur in
what Cliff Case has just stated. I don't like to vote for
Albert's motion or for Hickenlooper's proposed motion. I think
we damage ourselves if we come to a vote here today no matter
what the outcome is. I regret this as much as any member of the
committee.
I would hope that the Secretary of State would come up here
and testify, and I agree with Bourke Hickenlooper. I think he
is not coming up here, because the President is the one man
that tells him not to come.
The Chairman. I think that is true.
Senator Carlson. And I regret it.
Senator Sparkman. Will the Senator yield there just for a
comment?
Senator Carlson. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. And the President will do that regardless
of whether we adopt this or not.
Senator Carlson. Yes, he probably will do it. I sympathize
with the Secretary of State, and while I disagree violently
with the President and have on many occasions, and the
Secretary of State, they have gotten themselves into a position
in this emotional period in our country where they can hardly
appear in public without some emotional situation developing,
such as developed with the Secretary at this school.
You mentioned the Reader's Digest and the United States
News and World Report. I think the Secretary has got himself in
such a position that that is about the only way he can
communicate with the people now. He can't get out in these
public meetings.
On this last tour of the country, the President went to
military establishments. He would have been embarrassed even in
Kansas had he not done so, and I think it is regrettable.
The Chairman. I think it is.
Senator Carlson. I think this situation will inflame it
further. I would hope we take no action today, and if we get to
a vote, I shall, of course, support tabling, but I don't think
that is good. I just don't like it.
Senator Hickenlooper. If it is the consensus to continue
this thing, I will not press the tabling motion. I would rather
dispose of it.
Senator Aiken. Hold it over for further consideration.
Senator Hickenlooper. If it were for final consideration,
then I would vote to table.

SETTING A HISTORIC PRECEDENT

Senator Gore. I see the majority will of the committee. It
just seems to me, though, gentlemen, that we are setting
historic precedent here or allowing one to be set that will
plague us throughout history, not us, but others.
Senator Lausche. Will someone answer my question----
Senator Sparkman. May I offer just this suggestion, Albert?
I had to leave the room for a little while. Perhaps this has
been suggested. Can we say that there is a failure of
communication between the Secretary of State and the committee
simply because he will not testify in public? Have we the right
to insist that he testify in public? I personally--now you take
on that series of hearings that we had last year that were
televised. I thought they were good, and I endorsed them. But
that was a general survey of the situation, including many
outsiders that came in.
I don't think we have got the right to tell the Secretary
of State that he must testify in public.
Senator Gore. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Sparkman. I broke in on somebody.
Senator Gore. The Constitution makes it very plain that it
is for the Congress to decide which of its sessions shall be
public and which shall be executive.
Senator Sparkman. And I want to go further and say that the
President has the right to say whether he will testify at all
or not.
Senator Gore. I think that is a dual responsibility.

COMMITTEE SHOULD INVESTIGATE THE WAR

Senator Case. If I might just say this. I have been deeply
concerned that we haven't as a committee been pursuing this as
hard as we could. I have been trying to explore some way in
which we could have our own investigation as to how the damn
thing is going out there. The staff has not been favorable to
this, as to whether it was feasible. But I am not happy about
this. I think maybe what we ought to do is have a series of
public hearings, have another series of public hearings on this
and let anybody come who wants, and with our own careful
selection of people. If the administration doesn't want to
testify at those proceedings, then they will have to take their
chances. I would like to go at it that way, Albert, rather than
try to squeeze the President. We will not get anywhere, never
will, trying to force the President into doing something.
The Chairman. If we did that, it might be that they would
voluntarily come.
Senator Case. I think they would.
Senator Lausche. I am of the belief that if you lay down
ground rules as I have suggested, that you would have no
difficulty in getting the man to come before this committee.
But if I were in his place, and were subjected to the imbalance
of the ability to present the picture, I would say to myself
that the hearing is not conducive to the interests of the
country.

PROCEDURES OF BRITISH PARLIAMENT

Am I correct that in the English Parliament, cabinet
members are called, and that the members of Parliament are
limited to questions and not to the right to make speeches?
Senator Aiken. No.
Senator Mundt. It didn't work. They liquidated the Empire.
Senator Lausche. I didn't hear you.
The Chairman. They submit written questions, but in answer
to the question, if it is not satisfactory or something, the
member who submitted it has the right to make comment upon it
at the time. They do submit, however, in advance, I think,
written questions, and it is only if the question isn't
satisfactory or for any reason, that is what happens, I think.
Senator Case. They get a good heckling.
The Chairman. They can be heckled. You talk about being
unruly; you have never seen such an unruly place. They shout at
them and boo them and everything else in a way that I have
never seen take place either in committee or on the floor. It
is the most unruly body I have ever seen on occasion.
Senator Lausche. We talk about acquiring information that
is sound, but do I go to the committee hearings to listen to my
colleagues make speeches, or do I go there to get information
from the witness?
The Chairman. What do you go to the Senate floor for?
Senator Lausche. That is why I go to the Senate floor, to
hear my colleagues make speeches. But when a witness is called,
I go to the meeting to hear the witness.
The Chairman. You don't mean to say just hearing without
any cross-examination.

INFLUENCE OF RADIO AND TELEVISION

Senator Lausche. But I mean all I listen to is speeches,
and especially when the television is there and the radio.
Senator Gore. Senator, I don't think you are quite fair in
that.
Senator Lausche. Well, that is my judgment.
Senator Gore. There has been some of that, perhaps too much
of it. But I don't believe you can characterize all of our
hearings in that manner.
Senator Lausche. Well, they become especially so when you
have the television there and the radio. The meetings are
attended with far greater representation when the television is
there than when it is not.
Senator Gore. Including the Senator from Ohio.
Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, this is all speculation that
can be decided by fact. Just look at the abstract of the last
hearings and you will see that the witnesses have more inches
than do the senators.
Senator Lausche. Well, of course, on the initial
presentation. Pardon me.
The Chairman. They take more time than any one senator.
Senator Hickenlooper. You are talking about total.
Senator Pell. I am saying that the witnesses take more time
than the total Senators.
Senator Hickenlooper. There have been some abuses of this
in the committee.
The Chairman. Well, there is no doubt but that is our
system. I don't know how to control it. If you want to submit
some guidelines, I would be interested to see what they were.
Senator Case. Bill, we could start out with the bottom of
the list instead of the top.
The Chairman. As far as I am concerned, if the committee
wishes it that way, we will try it. I think that ought to be
submitted to a vote of the committee.

NOT AN ANTI-WAR RESOLUTION

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a
course of action.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.
Senator Mundt. I must say that I think Albert has made a
great case. While I am not quite prepared to vote for his new
resolution, if he could just change the end of it a little bit
so that those who would deliberately try to misinterpret it as
an anti-Vietnam war resolution couldn't do it, I don't think it
is intended to be that. It is an honest search for information.
I must say that I am also distressed by the fact that the
Secretary goes before universities and magazines and talks and
answers questions, and the only group he blackballs is this
committee.
Senator Hickenlooper. No, he doesn't.
Senator Mundt. Yes, he does.
Senator Hickenlooper. He appears here.
Senator Mundt. In public he goes to every place except
here.
Senator Case. He goes before labor unions.
Senator Mundt. I don't think he should have the unlimited
opportunity to make statements which never are challenged and
which are never examined in the penetrating way that we can do
it. I think that is part of our function, and I think we are
falling down on it through no fault of our own.
On the other hand, I don't want to get involved in passing
a resolution which the press is going to pick up and say the
Foreign Relations Committee has resolved to make a critical
approach to the war in Vietnam, let the facts come where they
will. I would like to see that last part somehow broadened so
it isn't just targeted on Southeast Asia.

TRY TO REACH CONSENSUS

But I would say just this, Mr. Chairman, as a means of
procedure. I agree with what you said earlier. It would be too
bad to divide this up by a 7-to-5 vote, or however it goes. To
try to bring about a consensus of the meeting, why don't we ask
the chairman, let him do it on his own, to write a letter to
Secretary Rusk, quoting what he said when he was here, when he
pretty clearly indicated he would let us know very soon whether
he would come or not. Just reminding him of that. Say we are
running out of time; we are going to adjourn. The committee
renews its invitation and hopes he will come in a public
hearing, and would like a reply. He will get that in a few
days, and then let's reexplore it to see whether some
resolution might be necessary.
I think possibly he might come. We have got a different
ball game now. He can't avoid a public debate on foreign policy
if what George Aiken says is correct, if one of our colleagues
is going to run on the issue of Vietnam. It is going to be
debated all over the country. Why should we just as the Foreign
Relations Committee sit on the sidelines and not participate in
the discussion?
I do sense in my mail a feeling that while it is true they
have told us time after time what the objectives are, it is a
kind of varying presentation. It isn't always the same. I wish
they would make up their minds some place along the line and
stick to it.
The Chairman. That is right.
Senator Mundt. It would be a lot easier to defend or oppose
it, but you have got a moving target. I would like to have him
come before I go home and answer some questions. I don't
object, Frank, except I get impatient, like you do, Frank, when
the other fellow does it. But I think it is something to be
said, to talk to the Secretary of State and say now here is
what I think, present your viewpoint, and what is your reaction
to it. That is one way of asking questions and getting
information. I think, if Bill is right, if he just kind of
keeps any of us from taking too much time, maybe we don't have
to have a ten-minute limitation. I think a letter like that,
without any publicity by the----

PRIOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senator Gore. I think I agree with everything you have
said, but I want to hear from Senator Aiken.
Senator Aiken. I was just wondering how many members of
this committee had communicated with the President about this
matter.
Senator Pell. You mean about Vietnam or about Rusk?
Senator Aiken. About the matter under discussion. He may
just be waiting to hear from us.
Senator Pell. You mean about Rusk appearing?
Senator Aiken. Aiken. Yes.
Senator Pell. Or about disapproval in Vietnam?
Senator Aiken. Yes.
The Chairman. Which, George? I am not clear.
Senator Aiken. The only man that can unite the sentiment of
this country is DeGaulle. He has united it beautifully. We
expect to have different opinions, but I was wondering, has
anybody spoken to the President?
Senator Case. About Secretary Rusk?
Senator Aiken. About the situation.
Senator Sparkman. He said, ``The matter under discussion.''
That is the Rusk matter.
Senator Aiken. I don't think anybody has communicated with
him. I don't think he communicates with anybody on the Hill.
The Chairman. I don't know that anybody has.
Senator Aiken. Perhaps he is waiting for us to call first.
Senator Sparkman. I have not.

A SIMPLE FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Mr. Chairman, if we are not going to have a vote on it, I
need to go.
The Chairman. I have got to make a statement on the floor.
What do you think, Albert, about Karl's suggestion, just a
simple follow-up letter?
Senator Lausche. That is just as bad as passing on the
other thing.
Senator Pell. Let it simmer.
Senator Gore. I am willing. There is nothing partisan in my
view here. We have a duty, I think.
The Chairman. Was there anything else on the agenda, Mr.
Marcy?
Mr. Marcy. We would like to get these two nominations
passed.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, are you willing to pass on this
routine service list of November 20?
Senator Mundt. I haven't heard your decision that you made
on the other thing.
The Chairman. We are going to hold it in abeyance and do
nothing.
Senator Mundt. Are you going to write a letter?
The Chairman. I understood not.
Senator Gore. I understood that you were accepting his
suggestion and that this be held in abeyance.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper and others said let us
do nothing for the moment.
Senator Hickenlooper. Personally, I wish we would postpone
it.
Senator Mundt. You don't have to publicize it. Write him a
letter.
Senator Gore. The chairman can do that.
Senator Mundt. The chairman has a right to write a letter.
The Chairman. Without a motion or anything.

DEFER CONSIDERATION

Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, since the Christmas season is
approaching, and it is an era of good will, supposedly, I move
that we defer consideration at this time.
The Chairman. Of the routine nominations?
Senator Aiken. No, no.
The Chairman. On the other?
Senator Aiken. On Albert's resolution.
The Chairman. The committee takes no action on this matter.
Senator Aiken. I don't think this is the time. Let us have
a truce for the next--what, 37 days?
Senator Hickenlooper. A bombing pause?
Senator Aiken. A bombing pause for about 37 days.
Senator Sparkman. How about over Tet.

* * * * * * *

[The Routine Foreign Service list dated November 20, 1967
was approved by voice vote.
Paul G. Clark, nominee to be an Assistant Administrator of
the Agency for International Development, was ordered reported
favorably.
H.R. 3399, to extend the termination date for the
Corregidor
Bataan Memorial Commission was ordered reported with an
amendment.
The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

----------

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Clark,
Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Case.
Donald L. McKernan, Special Adviser to the Secretary of
State for Fisheries and Wildlife, accompanied by Carl F.
Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser, and Ernest Kerley, Assistant
Legal Adviser for International Claims, testified on S. 2269,
relative to the unlawful seizure of fishing vessels of the U.S.
by foreign countries. No action taken.
S. 1418, to make changes in the passport laws, was
discussed and put over until the next day.
William K. Miller, Director of the Office of Maritime
Affairs, accompanied by Knute Malmbourg, Office of the Legal
Adviser of the Department of State, testified on Executive M,
90/1, Amendment to article 28 of the Convention of the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. No action
taken.
[The committee adjourned at 11:50 a.m.]

MINUTES

----------

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room
S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Ex. M, 90/1, Amendment to article 28 of the Convention of
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, was
ordered reported favorably without objection.
S. 2269, relative to the unlawful seizure of fishing
vessels of the U.S. by foreign countries, was ordered reported
adversely by a
13-5 vote.
S. 1418, to make changes in the passport laws, was ordered
reported favorably by a 16-2 vote, after rejecting Clark
amendment by a vote of 7-11.
S. Res. 155, relating to the construction and operation of
nuclear desalting plants in the Middle East, was ordered
reported.
[The committee adjourned at noon.]

MINUTES

----------

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in
room
S-116, the Capitol.
To consider the University of Wisconsin study on problems
of
agriculture.
[No transcript was made of the session.]

BRIEFING ON GREECE AND MIDDLE EAST

----------

Thursday, December 14, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (Chairman of
the Subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright,
Sparkman, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Sidney Sober, Director, Regional Affairs
Bureau, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of
State.
Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.
Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, we know you are very
busy, and, gentlemen, we will call the meeting to order.
Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your coming down to talk to us
about problems incident to the Middle East, and may I suggest
that you start off by running through the situation of recent
developments in Greece, and then perhaps there are other parts
of the world that you would want to talk about. But in the
meantime, after you give the position as you have it on Greece,
perhaps other members of the committee would like to ask you
questions.

STATEMENT OF LUCIUS D. BATTLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR
EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Battle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy to
have a chance to be here with you today.
The situation in Greece at the moment is far from clear.
There are many of the actual facts of the events of the past
two days that are not known to us. I will tell you them as best
I know them based on evidence as it stands at the moment.
The King has for some time been deeply concerned about his
relations with the junta crowd. He has said in the past that he
thought one of these days a confrontation between himself and
the junta was probably inevitable. Our advice to him has never
encouraged a confrontation. We have always said we felt that
perhaps his leverage could best be used in trying to make this
crowd move in the direction that he wanted, but we have added
in various conversations with him that, if there should be a
confrontation, there must be very careful preparation so he
must know exactly what was to happen.

THE KING ACTED ON IMPULSE

Unfortunately, the confrontation occurred. It occurred, I
think, without a plan and in a moment of emotion. If I can read
a phrase that came in by telegram from the embassy today that
their preliminary assessment is that the King acted on impulse
rather than on a concrete plan, apparently with the full
confidence that his mere presence in the north would rally
support for his revolt.
He moved forward, he apparently had--if he had contact with
the military leaders in the area, it was obviously inadequate
to assure they were with him. He appears to have had the
support of a large part of the air force, some of the navy, but
very, very little else.
Even that support fell apart very quickly. It never came to
any real meaningful group of meaningful support behind him.
We are not sure during the course of yesterday even where
he was. He went originally to Larissa, and then was reported as
seen in Kavalla and elsewhere in the area, but we were not sure
where he was or what he was in fact doing.
He had issued this appeal. It was carried over the radio in
Greece several times during the course of the day, but
apparently brought little popular support and very little
attention.
He had with him Kollias, who is the prime minister of the
present government in the government in Greece, and Kollias has
continued on with him to Rome to which he went last night, less
than 24 hours after he started.
It is, I think, deeply regrettable that this came at the
moment it did. I think we could attribute it perhaps to several
things, although this is a guess. This is not based on any
knowledge. I think that his relations with the junta had been
strained. I might tell you very--since this is an executive
session, I would not want this to leave the room--I talked to
Fred Reinhardt in Rome just about an hour and a half ago. He
said that the King had called him on the telephone. The King
intended to have a press conference during the course of the
day and to explain his actions.

A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

As stated to Freddy on the telephone by the King, he became
convinced that there was no intention to return to
constitutional government. He also was pressed to take actions
that he found impossible to take, and that he had no intention
of returning. This is a telephone conversation, and I might
point out a rather bad connection.
He said he would not return until there was a clear date
for a constitutional government, and a date for elections. He
also made the statement that the swearing in of a regent was
illegal in several respects. First, that it occurred while he
was still on the soil of Greece and, secondly, that the oath
was illegal. That was not explained, nor were the acts that he
was allegedly asked to take explained.
I am not aware that the press conference has occurred, but
there may be one during the course of the afternoon.
In Athens itself, the coup crowd has formed a new
government; Papadopoulos is now the new prime minister. They
have sworn in this little known agent whose name is Zoitakis,
or that is as close as I can come. The exact legal position of
the government is not yet clear. We are not in possession of
full facts. Whether, for example, there is a new act of
recognition necessary is not absolutely certain. We
undoubtedly, I think, have ahead of us a very difficult period
in terms of our relations with the junta. We have had not an
easy time prior to this, but I think we have a most difficult
period ahead of us.
We have not decided what we will do with respect to
relations with them.
In the middle of the night, I received a message from Phil
Talbot saying that he and several other ambassadors had been
summoned to a meeting and he wondered whether he should attend
this meeting with Papadopoulos. My advice was that he not
attend; that we have pause for a day or two; reassess what our
requirements were here. This would have constituted or could
have been interpreted to constitute recognition. Whether a new
act of recognition is required depends upon the ruling of the
legal adviser of the Department of State, but it was my advice
to him not to attend, and he joined with several others--the
British, the French, the Germans--in staying away from that
particular meeting.
We have instructed him not to have any--to have a minimum
of official relationships with the new government, until we can
sort out what the legal position is and what we should do in
this instance.

U.S. LONG-TERM RELATIONS WITH GREECE

We still have before us the very searching questions we
have had all the time. Our relations with Greece go back a long
way. They are a member of NATO. We have important installations
in Greece itself. I think the importance of Greece in the
entire Middle East is very great, and we must not take lightly
our own relations there. We must look upon it as a long-term
thing and a problem as far as the Greek people are concerned,
and I think that we must assess our interest in that light.
I know some of the members of this committee have been
deeply concerned about the political prisoners there. One of
the first things we did was to send a telegram saying that we
hoped that the embassy would bring to the attention of the new
government--the new, new government as we are now calling it--
our deep concern about these political prisoners, our hope that
they would not be pawns in this particular situation, and that
nothing would happen to them.
We have had no response to that, but a message has gone
forward to that effect from us.
I think we must look with real concern upon it, this new
group in power. It is essentially the same elements of strength
that were there before.
I think there is no doubt that they have very firm control
over the country. As best we know it now, and it was perfectly
evident in the course of yesterday and particularly into the
night last night that the King had very little support, and, as
I said, that this was an unplanned, an unarranged effort that
he had made. It is very unfortunate, but I think we have got
simply at the moment to sit tight for a couple of days to
decide what we can do, to do it in concert with our other NATO
allies. I have been in touch with the British, for example,
today. They have about the same attitude that we have. They are
examining their legal situation, and I will be back in touch
with them before the day is over.
I think we must go very slowly here. I do not believe that
any rash effort to end our relations in Greece--I think that
would be most ill-advised. I think we have got to be pretty
calm about it. There is no doubt about it, this is an
unfortunate development and one that I deeply regret.

FOLLOWING A MIDDLE COURSE

As you know, we have attempted over the past months to
follow a middle course in terms of our relations with Greece,
not to let our relations go completely sour with them, but
neither in any way to give evidence that we approved of the
junta crowd, which we most definitely have not. That problem is
still with us and I suspect that this group will be with us for
some time to come, and that we have to prepare for that
eventuality.
The situation within Greece itself is calm. I have many
details on it. I have just messages coming in very steadily to
me. The last one that I received just before I left says that
calm prevails in Athens with the public proceeding about their
business in a normal manner. That is substantially what those
many paragraphs say.
The people did not respond to the King's call. There has
been a kind of apathy about the situation, and I think that is
reflected in the total problem.
That, sir, I think, sums up where we are with respect to
Greece. I will be happy to talk about--I have several other
crises I hope very much to touch upon this afternoon, this
being probably the last chance I will have to talk with you for
some time.

AMERICANS IN GREECE

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, what do you think? Shall
we ask him about Greece and then go to the others?
Senator Fulbright. I would think so. It is much the most
critical one.
Senator Symington. Well, will you please go on.
Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, how many civilians and
military Americans are in Greece?
Mr. Battle. It is around 20,000, Mr. Chairman. I have got
it specifically.
Senator Fulbright. How are they broken down?
Mr. Battle. As of the end of 1966, there were 7,167
military-connected U.S. personnel. That word I would have to
define. 2,800 military personnel of which 2,150 are air force.
Senator Fulbright. I lost you. 7,000, what is that?
Mr. Battle. 7,000 military-connected personnel. That would
be military plus dependents, or civilian employees.
Senator Fulbright. Military plus dependents.
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, military-connected persons.
Senator Fulbright. I see. How many civilians? I only want
to get an idea of our people.
Mr. Battle. In my mind, sir, it is a total of around 20,000
Americans, business and everything, within Greece itself.
Senator Fulbright. I see.
Senator Gore. It is a lot of people.
Mr. Battle. It is a lot of people.
Senator Fulbright. You would not want to venture how many
of those were governmental, aside from the military. You do not
know how many CIA agents we have there. Is that a secret?
Mr. Battle. It would be a secret. I do not have the figure,
Mr. Chairman. I would be glad----
Senator Fulbright. 20,000?
Mr. Battle. Sir----
Senator Fulbright. All right. I will not press that.

U.S. DID NOT ANTICIPATE GREEK COUP

Were you aware of the first coup last year before it took
place?
Mr. Battle. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, I was not.
Senator Fulbright. You mean our CIA did not know it either?
Mr. Battle. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. There were at the time--
the first coup occurred the week I took office. There had been
recurring rumors that coups would occur in Greece for some time
preceding that.
Senator Fulbright. Well----
Mr. Battle. But this particular coup came as a surprise to
everybody.
Senator Fulbright. That is what I was getting at. This
particular coup was a surprise to you, but you knew that
another coup involving the senior officers was underway, did
you not?
Mr. Battle. No, sir, I did not. I knew there had been many
rumors of coups, rumors that coups had occurred, but not of any
specific, to my knowledge, any specific coup or any specific
group.
Senator Fulbright. I see.

Allegations of CIA Involvement in Coup

Do you know a man named Rousseas who has written a book
just published? \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Stephen W. Rousseas, The Death of Democracy: Greece and The
American Conscience (New York: Grove Press 1967).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Battle. I know he has written a book, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Fulbright. A book on Greece. He is an American. He
alleges that particularly our people, CIA, were cooperating
with the senior officers in anticipation of a coup. What
happened was that three weeks before that coup was to take
place, the objective of which was to prevent the election, the
junior officers got wind of it and, anticipating the senior
officers, they had their own coup and took over. That is what
he said.
Mr. Battle. I think, Mr. Chairman, that there was a plan
for a coup, as I understand it, that had existed for some time.
I assure you, sir, I was unaware totally of any plan----
Senator Fulbright. You mean you personally.
Mr. Battle. As far as I know, our government.
Senator Fulbright. But you would not necessarily know if
the CIA was sponsoring it, would you?
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I make every effort to know what
goes on in the countries of my----
Senator Fulbright. I said you would not necessarily know,
would you?
Mr. Battle. I believe I would, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Fulbright. Well, this man makes it very positively;
of course I do not know. He documents it. I have not talked to
him; I am just asking you. This is his theory, and he lived
there for a long time. He cites dates of meetings between
people, names names, all of this. Of course, it may not be
accurate. I was just asking you, but you are stating
unequivocally that our government did not have anything to do
with the design of trying to thwart the holding of the election
on May 28.
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I assure you that I checked
immediately after I was awakened in the middle--I was called in
the middle of the evening on the coup, the first coup, and I
checked very carefully and I was assured at very high levels
that we had absolutely nothing to do with it.
Senator Fulbright. He says that. He confirms that, that you
did not know about the first coup, that nobody did much because
these youngsters, these colonels, anticipated that the old boys
would take over and they would be left out.
But his story is that a coup--and he alleges, I would say,
that this government did not want the election to take place in
May, I think it was May 28, because they thought Andreas
Papandreou would be elected.

U.S. WANTED ELECTIONS HELD

Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I would like on that point--you
have to know about this one. I have not re-read this particular
file. I have not had time the last few days. There was a
discussion between our ambassador in Athens and the King some
days before the coup in which we most emphatically said that we
felt that the holding of elections was part of our--it was
essential there, and most clearly, in our judgment, was an
essential part of the----
Senator Fulbright. That is what I want on the record.
Mr. Battle. That point was made.
Senator Fulbright. That point was that the elections should
be held regardless of who was elected.
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. That is all I wanted to find out.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD GREEK JUNTA

Well, what is our attitude now toward this junta? Are we
going to continue to give them aid? Are we going to continue
the supply of ammunition or what else, or are we going to quit?
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, we have not really reached any
basic decisions in these few hours since this current new
development. I think we are faced with a very new situation. I
think it is one that we have to examine very, very carefully.
Senator Fulbright. May I say--go ahead. I want you to
finish.
Mr. Battle. We have not had, as you know, any economic aid
in there for some time, and immediately after the coup of April
21, we cut off all major equipment that was going in at that
time. We got up to the supplies of tanks and planes that were
going in there.
Senator Fulbright. Distinguish between ``major'' and
``minor.'' What have we given this coup since that time?
Mr. Battle. A large part has been spare parts. There have
been ammunition and other specifics, small arms, but it is
not----
Senator Fulbright. How much in value?
Mr. Battle. Thirty odd million dollars.
Senator Fulbright. Since they took over. Is that about
right?
Mr. Battle. It is about half what it would have been, if I
am not mistaken.
Senator Fulbright. I thought our total program----
Mr. Battle. The annual level has been $65 million
approximately, and it has been cut, was cut about in half. I
can supply the exact figures for you, sir, if you would like to
have them.

DANGER OF CIVIL WAR IN GREECE

Senator Fulbright. Well, not exactly, but what I am really
getting at is not the precise figures, but our policy. But I
would gather from this we were not taking a position that we
disagreed with the coup.
Mr. Battle. In their opinion, we took a position and they
found it very hard to understand because it was so disapproving
of it. This is one of the peculiar dilemmas of this thing.
Senator Fulbright. They took the position they could not
understand it.
Mr. Battle. They felt they had come in--they repeatedly
stated in their earlier, the first days, that they were pro-
American; they were pro-King; they were pro-NATO. They were
going to straighten out Greece. Why did we not like them? The
answer was that we did not like them because they had not come
into power in a legal and constitutional manner, and we found
this highly objectionable in that situation. We were deeply
worried in the very beginning. The same worries that I have had
over the last couple of days--the danger of civil war in
Greece--and it was our belief at that stage that rather than
have a total break with them that a middle course was a proper
course.
I met with this committee about that time, and I remember
saying I do not guarantee it is going to work, but I think we
are better off trying to go the middle course than to let the
totality of our relations really go downhill rapidly. We must
try to see if we can bring this crowd around.
The alternative at that stage seemed to us very likely to
be, and it was the view of almost every observer, that it could
well have been a civil war in Greece and that we felt we had to
try to avoid it if we possibly could.
Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Senator Hickenlooper?

WHAT TRIGGERED THE KING'S ACTION

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you have any idea as to what
triggered this operation, I mean of the immediate moment? I
understand he was dissatisfied and fearful of the military
group.
Mr. Battle. I imagine, Senator Hickenlooper, and this is
partly guess, we were very alert to this while he and the junta
were signed on to the arrangement on Cyprus, they were both
committed to it, that this represented a moment in which the
King probably believed that the junta had less political
support growing out of what the Greeks could well have
considered a retreat on Cyprus and a defeat for them.
Senator Hickenlooper. How much did his mother have to do
with this?
Mr. Battle. I suspect she was advising him. That is sheer
guess; I have no basis for that statement.
One other element is that Karamanlis, who is the former
prime minister, made a statement in the middle of the Cyprus
crisis in which he called for the overthrow of the junta crowd.
That statement, I am sure, we are fairly certain that he and
Karamanlis were not in touch with each other, still it was
perhaps a political advantage that he thought flowed from that
statement that he wanted to take advantage of it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, the point of my question is not
so much suspicion on each side over there but as to why it
occurred yesterday, if there was anything that triggered the
thing yesterday that you knew about.
Mr. Battle. I am not aware of anything.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. I gathered from reading what we have read
in the papers the same thing that you brought out, that it
probably was an act of impulse, strengthened, perhaps, by his
mother. However, when he appeared before our Foreign Relations
Committee sometime back, I think we could get the same
reaction. I felt he was impatient. I thought he was rather bold
in some of the things that he said. I think it is a rather
tragic thing that he acted so soon, but at the same time I
think you are exactly right. We must be careful. We must choose
our steps very carefully.

U.S. NAVAL VESSELS LOANED TO GREECE

What about our naval vessels that we just re-loaned to them
the other day?
Mr. Battle. Well, those vessels, Senator Sparkman, were--as
you know, they were there. This was just an extension of the
loan.
Senator Sparkman. I know it.
Mr. Battle. To have recalled them would have raised a lot
of problems including a financial one. I think we have got to
remember, and this has been one of our dilemmas, that we have
an overall commitment to NATO, to NATO force goals, and we are
working within an overall pattern of the military supply of
Europe. You cannot separate one country out of it.
I think we are in a dangerous situation here now. I do not
wish to be optimistic or in any way to lead this committee to
think I know what the answers are. I do not know what they are.
I think we have got to proceed very carefully, and I think we
have to remember that NATO and the military commitment and the
military structure is still a very basic part of our foreign
policy. While I deeply regret what has happened in Greece, I do
not think at this stage that we must be cavalier about our
total relationships here. I think we have got to be very
conscious of it.

THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

Senator Sparkman. You mentioned the Cyprus settlement. Did
you intend to leave the impression that he was unhappy over
that, or did he just say it was an opportune time?
Mr. Battle. Senator Sparkman, I do not think he was happy
at all. He endorsed what he was most eager to bring about. I
think what he endorsed was that the junta had been blamed for
the retreat on Cyprus and there was considerable speculation.
While we had no reason to suspect this thing would occur
yesterday, we had thought there could be a political result
from this Cyprus decision; that there could be a weakening of
the junta's political position in Greece and I suspect the King
felt exactly the same thing.
Senator Sparkman. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Senator Cooper?

STATUS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

Senator Cooper. You said you wondered what our relationship
would be to what you termed the new, new government. Is this
not just another shake-up in the existing government? Why is it
a new government?
Mr. Battle. This raises, Senator Cooper, two or three
questions we did not have before.
Senator Cooper. Give us that.
Mr. Battle. I am speaking without a final legal opinion in
our own department, but let me tell you sort of the range of
it, if I may, Sir.
When the coup took power April 21, the King was still
there. Our ambassador is accredited to the King, not to a
government. Therefore, there was no question of recognition at
all.
The question now is whether that has changed and whether we
have a new requirement for an act of recognition. There is not
a final legal view on it. But if the regent had been legally
appointed, which, as I understand it, under the Greek
constitution requires the act of a parliament, there would have
been a continuity of accreditation of ambassadors to the person
of the regent rather than to the person of the King.
The question now is whether the regent is legally
appointed; whether the ambassadors are accredited to the
regent; what the status of the King is. He has not legally
abdicated. There are many legal uncertainties at the moment,
but the best guess is it would take some sort of act.
Senator Cooper. The King has conferred certain legitimacy
on the conduct.
Mr. Battle. That is right, sir.
Senator Cooper. It seems to me it may be a technical legal
question. But practically it is the same group of people.
Mr. Battle. It is the same group of people substantially.
Senator Cooper. Following what Senator Fulbright was
talking about a while ago, I do not know whether I heard it or
read it, but I had heard, too, that this group of senior
officers, supported by the King, had planned to have a coup
which was to take place later and which the young officers just
anticipated, came into power.

NATO CONCERNS ABOUT GREECE

I would say this. You are talking about our difficulties
with them and the necessity of being careful because of the
NATO situation.
I just came back from this parliamentary group of NATO, and
I admit they are just members of the different parliaments, I
do not know how influential they are in their own parliament
any more than I am in this one, but nevertheless they speak of
the concern in their parliaments about Greece, and I would----
Senator Sparkman. By the way, Greece did not have a
delegation.
Senator Cooper. No, they did not have any because they have
no parliamentary representatives. I would say most of the
people on the committee I was serving on were military people
and are most conservative. They support NATO fully and want to
keep it strong. But there is great distaste for this government
in all these countries in Europe, and their concern was that if
this government hangs on and does not take some steps toward
elections and a parliament, they think it is going to shake
NATO to the foundation on the southern flank and hurt NATO as a
whole. It is very distasteful to them.
Not only that, I talked to officials of the government in
England and in Italy. They are very concerned about that,
Fanfani and others, so I take another--I think we ought to look
at it from another viewpoint as to whether this--if the United
States does not use some influence for a democratic
development, you are going to have NATO weakened perhaps rather
than strengthened.
Mr. Battle. Senator Cooper, I agree with that concern
completely. The question is what leverage we have and how you
can exercise it. I had hoped to go to Greece over the next
weeks myself. I think the situation has now changed. I planned
a trip there with a hope of having some really very firm talk
with them about the need--they have a constitutional report due
on the 15th of this month. This has been done by a
distinguished group of jurists. I think what they do with that
is going to be important. Whether this is the time framework
which they have tentatively committed themselves to, to get
back to constitutional government, whether they will adhere to
this now remains to be seen.
I might point out to you, sir, that I talked with Secretary
Rusk two or three times during the course of yesterday when he
was in Brussels, and he was reflecting the same concern in
NATO. He was at the NATO meeting that you just expressed. He
called me a couple of times and he said most of the NATO
countries were highly sympathetic to the position of the King
and would like to know what to do to help him, but, of course,
in the first hours we did not know what support he had or who
was behind him. But he said it was rather difficult to support
someone when you really do not know where he was or what he was
doing.
There were rumors he left the country, all kinds of rumors
in the course of yesterday afternoon, but the concern
particularly on the part of the Scandinavians, the Dutch, have
been evident for some time. It was discussed at great length
with them.
Senator Symington. Are you finished, Senator?
Senator Gore?
Senator Gore. I am satisfied with the report. No questions.
Senator Symington. Senator Case?

NATO'S COOL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COUP

Mr. Case. Would you just tell us what actions the other
countries in NATO took in regard to recognition, the
relationships with the junta up to now?
Mr. Battle. The relations, sir, of I think all the NATO
countries since April have been about the same. It has been--
while you say we may not have been as disapproving as you would
have liked, most of us had had very cold, very cool relations
with them since the coup crowd took over. There were political
problems within the Scandinavian countries that I think made
them particularly concerned, but they did not change anything
until fairly recently and, over another issue of a month or two
ago, they withdrew their ambassador.
At this stage I think the British, the French, the Germans
and ourselves, we have approximately the same difficulty about
the future.
My own view is we should not take any act of recognition.
We must have a minimum of contact for a few days and see what
happens, but I do not again think we ought to lightly break
relations here. I think there may be a way we can stay there
legally without an act of recognizing as long as they permit us
to do so even if a new act of recognition is required.
Senator Case. But we will keep in touch, I take it, with
other countries in NATO.
Mr. Battle. Absolutely, sir. This is basic to what I think
we have got to do.
Senator Case. Thank you.
Senator Symington. Senator Clark.
Senator Clark. No questions. Thank you.
Senator Symington. Senator Pell.
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NO QUID PRO QUO ON CYPRUS

Mr. Secretary, just to get on the record a point that I
know we talked about privately, would I not be correct in my
statement that no quid pro quo was made by Mr. Vance in return
for the acquiescence of the Greeks to their withdrawal from
Cyprus?
Mr. Battle. You are absolutely correct, Senator.
Senator Pell. In any way or form.
Mr. Battle. No manner of any kind.
Senator Pell. Right.

SAFETY OF TRAVEL IN GREECE

Another question, I have a constituent who is in the travel
business and he represents a travel association and they wanted
to know what the attitude was of the U.S. Government in regard
to travel to Greece. Is there any particular view on it or not?
Mr. Battle. During the Cyprus crisis?
Senator Pell. No, I mean as of now.
Mr. Battle. Now?
Senator Pell. Yes.
Mr. Battle. We have not taken a position on it. I do not
think there is any at the moment. It does not appear there is
any danger of civil war.
Well, I will get the advice of our embassy steadily on this
particular point. I do not think at the moment there is any
particular reason for discouraging it.
Senator Pell. Right.

BACKING A LOSING CAUSE

I must say I would agree with you about the importance of
not moving hastily and not breaking relations even if one
disapproves. In the end, you are cutting off your nose so often
to spite your face.
As you know, we again talked a couple of times yesterday--I
am still concerned that even though we recognized the fact that
the King was on the ropes and did not know what he was doing,
it seems to me we knew the King was doing the right thing, was
doing what many of us had urged him to do, at least I as one
individual had, and we had a certain responsibility here even
if we came out backing a loser. To my mind there is a certain
moral, I will not say bankruptcy, but a moral breakdown in that
we who lecture the world so freely and easily many times came
out with no statement of encouragement to the King for doing
what we all wanted him to do.
Without going into your own personal position on this
matter, how do you account for this, recognizing we might have
been backing a losing cause?
Mr. Battle. The decision that was taken, Senator Pell, was
based on the very great uncertainty of events yesterday. If it
had appeared that there was a chance of the King having any
support, or if we had even known he was going to remain in
Greece and tried this, I think our attitude might have
developed in a different way. But the attitude we took was the
same attitude that Secretary Rusk reported the other NATO
countries took. As he said, it is awfully hard to back
something when you have not got anything to back. We could not
find the King. We did not know where he was. We did not know
who was supporting him. We were not even sure whether he
remained in Greece. Therefore, it would have been a hollow
gesture and we waited to find this out and it was all over.
That is exactly what happened.

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE KING

Senator Pell. Has anybody from the American side talked
with the King since this thing started?
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, I told--I guess before you came in--
this. I hope very much this will not leave this room.
Ambassador Reinhardt called me a couple of hours ago, and he
had had a telephone conversation with the King, and he is
having a meeting with him perhaps now. He told me that he had
had a telephone call from the King and the King had indicated
he was having a press conference and would explain his own
actions.
What has come out of the meeting with him I do not know,
but I see no reason for us not to have--I do not think this
ought to be publicized because I do not--for a lot of reasons,
but I would assume we would continue to have contacts with the
King, and I see no early reason for us not to do so.
Senator Pell. Do you feel the King feels let down by us in
any way?
Mr. Battle. Well, I would imagine he may very well, Senator
Pell. I think he may very well. But I think the King in many
ways let himself down. I must say there was no preparation;
there was no plan. He just did this on an emotional impulse as
we understand it. Again I do not know all the facts, but from
everything we have, this is what it appears to be.
Therefore, we have never encouraged him in taking on this
kind of thing. Obviously, it is his own decision. We have
believed that his own leverage in the country was of distinct
advantage. There was a period when I think he considered once
leaving. Our own view at that stage was it would have been bad
if he had departed. This was many months ago.
I regret what has happened very deeply, but it was his own
decision and not one that we wished to enter into in any way,
shape, or form.
Senator Pell. Just to pursue this a little further, I
realize we did not push him in it, but do you think he felt it
implicit in the conversations he had with the Executive Branch
while he was here that he might have received more
encouragement and support than he received in fact?
Mr. Battle. That is conceivable. I do not think there is
any basis for it because he did refer, as I said earlier, to
the fact that there would one day be a confrontation. We always
said, ``You must be very careful to be sure your own plans are
carefully laid if this is the case,'' and we had urged him, I
did myself, because I felt his own leverage in the situation
was very important in terms of keeping the group in power
moving toward a constitutional government that he and we both
felt and still feel important in the situation.
Senator Pell. Right.
But you say we were not forewarned of it.
Mr. Battle. I believe, sir, it was the spur of the moment.
Perfectly clear there was no plan or at least if it was a plan
it was a very bad one. Nobody joined. I just do not think the
evidence that he had any plan in being is very great. I could
be wrong and it may be as we learn more about it. But based on
what we know now, it appears to be a formless decision on his
part.
Senator Pell. Have you had a peak at the constitution or
not?
Mr. Battle. No, sir.
Senator Pell. Thanks; that is all.

SYMPATHIES FOR THE KING

Senator Symington. I talked at length with the King, for
several hours with the ambassador, and then had breakfast with
Papadopoulos seemed to me it was just a case of playing chess
with each other and which one moved. If he moved first, if the
yellow moved before black, why then--white before black--then
the question was would white move successfully or if black
moved if you call that, and apparently he moved too fast.
Based on what I learned from Ambassador Talbot and just in
the room, my impression was that his sympathies were completely
with the King as well as his hopes.
Mr. Battle. I think there is no doubt of this, Senator
Symington.

INFLUENCE ON GREEK-TURKISH SITUATION

Senator Symington. There are just two questions I would
like to ask: First, how, if in any way, will this affect the
Cyprus and Turkish situation, and, secondly, what our future
plans would be with respect to any form of aid including
military aid.
Mr. Battle. The first question with respect to Cyprus, the
Turks have told us since the events of yesterday that they
still stand on the agreements. Our first act when we heard this
had happened, I got in touch with the Secretary by phone
immediately saying I thought it was very important that he tell
the Turks to in fact keep their shirts on, not to take any
action that would seize upon what appeared to be an
opportunity. They appeared to go completely along with this and
have reconfirmed their support of the Cyprus agreements.
Secondly, on the second point you made, Senator Symington,
we have not addressed ourselves, having reviewed now everything
that is in the pipeline, there is no thought of economic
assistance. There has not been for a long time. We have got the
very difficult problem of NATO. I still have some hope that
this crowd will turn itself around, and I think there may be
new pressures on them.
We were told in a telegram from Talbot that they appear to
have considered instead of appointing a regent, announcing that
they were now a democracy. This is the nature of the
government. It shows the careful planning and the great
experience that is brought to bear by this crowd. They are not
a very good group, let us be honest about it.
I think there might be some international pressures on them
to go on with the constitutional reforms they have stated. I
think at the moment--again I see nothing ahead but difficulty
for us. I do not think we ought to rush in the next 24 hours or
so on a decision on it. I am rather bearish on any prospect of
aid there, but I do not wish to say at this stage that is my
final attitude and there has been no decision by the
administration at the moment.
Senator Symington. Would you when you get a full report,
even though we will probably be out of session, in case of that
will you give to Mr. Marcy or anybody who is in charge of the
staff here what you consider as much information as possible so
if he wants to know what the information is he can be supplied
unilaterally on a proper basis?
Mr. Battle. Yes.

JAILING OF PAPANDREOU

Senator Fulbright. One more question. What is the status of
Andreas Papandreou. Is he in jail?
Mr. Battle. He is in jail. We had one report which came in
yesterday which was based with his wife who had talked either
with Phil or an embassy officer, I forgot which. She was very
upset that this present situation could work to his detriment.
She had taken him supper and had seen him at a distance. Many
people have seen him over recent months. His health appears to
be all right.
We have repeatedly----
Senator Fulbright. He is alleged to have TB.
Mr. Battle. That is right, but there were reports he was in
very serious health and was about to die several months ago,
but that is not the case. I believe he has had TB in the past.
How active is it, I do not know. As I said, one of the first
things--I think I brought the telegram, no I did not--that we
did was to inform the coup group we would view with very deep
alarm any action on the political prisoners.
What is the future of Andreas Papandreou, Mr. Chairman, I
could not tell you, but this is one we have acted on behalf of
the political prisoners repeatedly, and we will continue to do
so within the limits of leverage we have in the situation.
Senator Fulbright. His father is also under house arrest.
Mr. Battle. His father was freed from jail, is under semi-
house arrest. This may have changed over the last day.
Senator Fulbright. That is all.

EFFECT OF CUTTING OFF U.S. AID

Senator Symington. Anybody else have any questions on
Greece?
One more question. If we did not furnish military aid and
we did not furnish economic aid of any kind, and if the King is
over there saying he wants a constitutional government in
Italy, would there be any chance, as you see it now, of that
operating in favor of the fall of the junta or do you think
that----
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I doubt it.
Senator Symington. You see the thrust of my question.
Mr. Battle. I think it has been pretty evident that the
King has not any basic popularity with the people. This is one
of the weaknesses. I think our denial of the military, a
complete break on military, I do not think it will bring the
junta down. I was awfully glad during the Cyprus crisis we had
a reasonable relationship with him. If we had totally cut off
every relationship in April, we would have had a war over
Cyprus a couple of weeks ago, and, therefore, I think we need a
certain leverage. We need a certain influence.
I do not like this crowd any better than anyone in this
room does, but neither can I take my responsibilities lightly
of ending this relationship as important as this one is.

AVERTING A WAR

Senator Symington. What next would you like to talk about?
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I have a whole chamber of horrors
here--if the committee would like to hear it. I am just afraid
I will not have another chance.
Senator Symington. Let us ask the chairman.
Senator Fulbright. Have you got any good news?
Mr. Battle. I have a little in the sense we do not have a
war in Cyprus.
Senator Fulbright. O.K.
Senator Symington. If we passed that one, we all know that,
and we will hear about that.
Mr. Battle. Just one word on Cyprus. I would only like to
say while we have averted a war I do not think we have solved
the problem. There is a lot more to be done. The issue is not
removed and it will be before us again. That is the end of my
comment on Cyprus if you followed it in the paper.
Senator Clark. May I ask one? What was the relationship of
Brosio Vance in the working out of the agreement which
apparently has averted war?
Mr. Battle. On Wednesday before Thanksgiving, Senator
Clark, we had very clear intelligence that the next morning the
Turks were going to move. This seems absolutely certain. We
felt that at that moment we had attempted to interest NATO and
the U.N. in taking an action. At the same time we felt that
NATO could not operate with respect to Cyprus because Cyprus is
not a member of the organization.
We felt that NATO had a certain leverage with the Greeks
and Turks over the NATO relationship.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN YEMEN

Senator Symington. Before we lose too many people, I want
to ask about the Soviet Union going into Yemen and Aden.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I want to know about that. I
think that is the most important thing before us right now.
Mr. Battle. This is what I wanted to particularly talk
about this afternoon. First, let me review the situation with
respect to Yemen and a few of the things you have said at a
couple of these hearings before.
For a long time, the Soviets have had a role in Yemen, but
an indirect role. Their role in Yemen has been expressed
through the Egyptians. They have been supplying military
equipment there for a very long time. It has been going on
indirectly.
While I was still ambassador to Cairo on several occasions,
I got little indications, I mentioned this in one of our
discussions down here, I had indications that the Egyptians
were a little nervous about the Russians making a direct effort
to get into Yemen without going through them and supplying
military equipment.

EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM YEMEN

After the Arab-Israeli war and after the Khartoum
Conference in which the moderate Arabs agreed--the oil rich
countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya--agreed to pay part of
the cost of the closure of the canal and the cost of the war to
the Jordanians and Egyptians, King Faisal really had three
purposes by that agreement, and he is paying a very large
amount of money. He wanted three things: He wanted the
Egyptians out of the Yemen; he wanted to get Radio Cairo off
his back; and he wanted to establish himself as a good Arab
because he had not fought in the Israeli war and he had no
intention of fighting in the Israeli war, and he had no
intention----
Senator Symington. Who is this?
Mr. Battle. Faisal. He did want to identify himself for
political reasons as a member of the Arab club and he wanted to
get Nasser out of Yemen which is a problem for him because it
is so close to him.
The Egyptians needed to withdraw from Yemen. They had had
70,000 troops in there just before the Arab-Israeli war. They
had about 25,000 reduced from a high of 70,000, had economic
reasons for wanting to get out, and they began to withdraw and
they are now out.
As they pulled out and lessened their own numbers in Yemen,
they also found themselves being supplanted directly by
Russians.
Now, as the Egyptians withdrew, and they had been steadily
withdrawing since the Khartoum arrangement, they have been
getting their money. Faisal has handled it very well. He has
been handing it out to Nasser a little bit at a time and, as I
might say, the Battle view of how to aid Nasser, he holds him--
--
Senator Fulbright. So much a soldier. [Laughter.]
Mr. Battle. Just about, sir.

INVITATION TO THE RUSSIANS

So that the troops have withdrawn, and the last ones are
now out. But at the same time the Russians have reinstituted
their own interest in a direct involvement there.
They had an invitation from the Yemen about two months ago.
The Yemens said they would like to pay a military--send a
military mission to Moscow, and the Russians said, ``Don't you
come to us, we will come to you.''
They sent several people down. They stayed for some days,
and we have begun to see the results of this very clearly.
Now, in the last weeks as the Egyptians have withdrawn, the
royalists have also kicked up their heels. With some assistance
from Faisal that they have had over the years, and from a few
other assorted people including Iran, they have made it more
difficult for the remaining Republican troops there. The
Russians have responded to this very quickly. In the past
month, the USSR has airlifted a number of MIG 15, 17 fighters
as well as training aircraft in knock-down form into Yemen.
These were being assembled by 40 Soviet technicians at Sana
Airport, but the planes may have been moved to Hodeida to get
away from this royalist shelling I mentioned a moment ago.
There has been a crash program of small stuff going in NAN-12
for some days now; it is hard to move any vast amount of
equipment that way, but is does not take a lot to have an
impact in this situation.

SOVIET PILOT SHOT DOWN

What is disturbing is that a Soviet pilot was shot down
there some days ago. We have gotten this pretty clearly
established. There is no doubt, virtually no doubt, that this
is accurate. This is the first time we had been aware of direct
Soviet pilots in there.
Senator Symington. Excuse me. This is the first time that a
Soviet military person has been known to have been fighting or
working in that part of the world, is that not correct?
Mr. Battle. I think in direct fighting, yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Advisers in Syria but indirect fighting.
Mr. Battle. There were some reports of Russian officers
captured during the Arab-Israeli war who were serving
apparently as advisers. We have never had a complete
confirmation of this, Mr. Chairman.
There is no doubt that the Soviets are putting equipment
in. They have put in about 30 military people which would
support roughly six or eight pilots. The planes that they put
down there, I do not think the Yemenis are capable of flying
them, so I think we must assume that this is more than a one-
pilot thing.
They have also been pouring in technicians, pouring them
in; they have got several hundred in there.

COMPETITION BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND CHINESE

I think the Soviet interest in this area is several--I have
been over this with the committee before, but I would like to
repeat it. The Chinese have been active in Yemen for some time.
I think there is a competition between the Chinese
Communists and the Soviets over influence in that miserable
place. There is only one reason for wanting to be there, and
that is its location.
Another interest is, as the British withdraw from the area,
and I think this is deeply regrettable from our point of view,
and I have urged them officially and unofficially for two years
to reconsider their decision, but they are withdrawing. As they
have withdrawn their power from Aden, this entire area looks
more attractive to the Soviets than it has in the past. I think
they see a vacuum there into which they are willing to make a
commitment.
I think the situation that exists with the new People's
Republic of South Yemen, the Aden area and the immediate
surroundings, is a very dangerous one.
I think there are a couple of somewhat brighter spots than
we thought possible a few months ago. The group that is in
power there, the national liberation force, it is a far, far
left organization, but it is not the Egyptian FFLOSY so-called,
the Federation For the Liberation of South Yemen, which, I
think, was even more radical in some respects and totally loyal
to Egypt and would have created an Egyptian presence in that
particular place.
I think we have a momentary calm in Aden. It is not going
to last. This is going to be a pressure point for some time.

TRYING TO INVOLVE NATO

Now, your obvious question, I am sure, sir, is what are we
able to do about it. The answer, sir, is not a great deal. We
have tried repeatedly to involve NATO in this entire problem.
The Mediterranean area and all this area seems to me a
legitimate area for NATO to be concerned about. I went over to
NATO in July and briefed the Council on our concern about this.
Secretary Rusk has just been appearing before the Council this
week. I have not had a full report on his talks, but we have
been attempting to make them aware of the Soviet thrust in this
area which I think is quite large, not just Yemen but
throughout the Arab world.
Senator Symington. Could I ask one question there?
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.

HOLD DOWN AN ARMS RACE

Senator Symington. Do you think that with the Russians
warning us about going into Cambodia, that they would pay much
attention to what we wanted them to do in Yemen or Aden?
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to try it. I do
not know how much attention they will pay to us, but we are now
talking about another possible effort with the Soviets. We have
tried several times over the last several years to reach some
kind of understanding on arms limits in the area which is badly
needed. So far it has had no effect, but I do not think we
should give up on it. I think we have to keep on trying to hold
down the arms race in that area. It is not easily done. I do
not think they are going to--they may restrain themselves in
Yemen, but I doubt if anything we say is going to make them
reverse their course if you want an honest answer.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Fulbright. I do not think I have any questions.
Senator Symington. Senator Hickenlooper?

COMMUNIST ENCIRCLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST

Senator Hickenlooper. Is there any question in your mind,
Mr. Secretary, but that this is only the continuation of a
farfetched and long-planned program to encircle the whole oil
of the Middle East there and take over the Arabian peninsula?
It seems to me it is so evident there is not any argument about
it. When they get that, then Persia is gone. It is the
encirclement puzzle and they will control the Red Sea, and all
the approaches to that area, and in the meanwhile I do not know
what we are doing about it.
Mr. Battle. Senator, we have just had a study made of this
called a--Julius Holmes did a study on the whole Russian thrust
in the area. It comes up pretty much with the same conclusion
you just enunciated.
Senator Hickenlooper. I never read Julius Holmes' study,
but it seems apparent on the face of it.
Mr. Battle. You got the point without reading it, and I
think it is quite true. I think their interests are several. I
think it is oil; I think it is strategic location; I think it
is political pressure.
Let us never forget that there are three wars in this
Middle East that we are fighting now, that the Arab-Israeli one
goes on and on, the cold war goes on, and the struggle between
the moderate and the radical Arabs goes on.

TAKING SIDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator Hickenlooper. Of course we must be, I suppose, very
careful about not taking too many sides but we have taken sides
in the Middle East. We are supporting Israel a thousand
percent, and we are kicking Faisal in the teeth. In that great
area there is a chance that he, I think, would gravitate more
and more toward a western orientation.
I am not for him or against him one way or the other. That
is not it. But I think we are making a terrible mistake there
that is going to rise up to haunt us and cause us trouble.
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about U.S.
influence in the modern Arab states, particularly Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan. I think those are states in
which we must not let our influence go.
Senator Hickenlooper. We are rolling them over just as fast
as they stick their heads up, I think.
Mr. Battle. Well, sir, I assure you----
Senator Hickenlooper. It looks to me that way.
Mr. Battle. There is nothing I am more concerned about. We
have had problems growing out of the Arab-Israeli war in terms
of our relations with the moderate Arabs, but I think we have a
great stake here and we simply must not ignore the importance
to us economically and politically of those countries.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I could not agree with you
more.
Mr. Battle. Iran--I know the Shah of Iran has been very
much concerned. He has been worried to death about Nasser and
he is worried about the same line you are, Senator
Hickenlooper, in terms of the thrust into the area.
Senator Hickenlooper. It is not without its problems. I do
not mean to say it is an easy solution, but there are too many
influences pushing us just one way in that thing and that is
going to rise up to smite you.

PROTECTING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Senator Fulbright. Do these Arabs ever remind you of our
pledge to protect their territorial integrity of all the
countries in the Middle East?
Mr. Battle. Senator, I could not tell you how many
discussions I have had with them. I try very hard to keep in
touch with all the Arabs, even those countries we broke
relations with. I might tell the committee after they had
broken relations and during the General Assembly meeting I had
the word passed in New York. We had several official and
unofficial points of contact; we did not want to lose touch
with them. I got Bob Anderson, Jack McCloy, several others,
businessmen who have been very active in the Arab world, and I
put two of our people in New York and sent word they were
available to talk at any time. We have talked about every
aspect of it including the question of territorial integrity.
The general opinion of territorial integrity when defined
in detail gets very complicated.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, they are hysterically emotional
about this thing, and emotionally unreasonable in terms of our
rights. It complicates the problem, no question about that.
Mr. Battle. I think this mission that is out in the area
now, Ambassador Goring is out there on behalf of the Secretary
General of the U.N., and I am hopeful that not only will that
mission be successful but that we can exercise such leverage as
we have in two ways, well, both Arabs and Israelis, to bring
about in time a settlement on this thing.
I am not optimistic that it is coming quickly, but I think
we have got to keep on trying and looking towards a permanent
one and not a temporary cease-fire.
Senator Symington. Senator Clark?

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA

Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, what evidence do you have of
Russian penetration on the other side of the Red Sea either in
French Somaliland or the Somalia Republic?
Mr. Battle. Senator Clark, those are out of my area
completely. The Chinese made a real effort in there for a time.
I know the Russians have tried, but how broad it is or how
effective it is, sir, I will have to refer you to my AF
colleague. I have only the UAR on the African Continent.
Senator Clark. Is it not important in terms of the
administration of the State Department handling this thing that
you are as concerned as you appear to be, and I share your
concern, as to what the Russians are doing on the northeast
shore of the Red Sea if there has been some----
Mr. Battle. Well, I know a little bit about that. I am not
quite as ignorant as I sounded. They have been active. I think
the Chinese have not done awfully well in there, and the
Russians continue to supplant them. They have tried to put in
both aid and military assistance in there. I am not aware of
any program at the moment that is active.
Senator Clark. How about De Gaulle in Djibouti. I mean is
he not in on the act?
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.
Senator Clark. That seems too bad.
One further question, Mr. Chairman.

ISRAELI REFUGEE PLAN

Have you had a look at the five-year Israeli refugee plan
which was in the paper this morning?
Mr. Battle. I have discussed it generally. I have not seen
that specific plan, but I had a long meeting with Comay,
Ambassador Coman, last week on their attitude. I am generally
familiar with what they have in mind, Senator Clark. I have not
looked at that specific piece of paper.
Senator Clark. Do you think it holds some hope for a basis
for negotiation?
Mr. Battle. I think you have got to cope with some of the
political realities on this scene before you get very far on
the refugees.
There are some very deep-seated emotional problems that
bring political problems. I think that unless you can get a
basic understanding on a political settlement, it is going to
be difficult indeed to get a real plan working on the refugees.
Senator Clark. Is not the refugee problem one of the things
that has to be solved as part of any political settlement?
Mr. Battle. I think it has to be and my own view is that we
ought to be whacking away at it as opportunity permits without
ever saying we are solving it.
This sounds like a non sequitur, but let me tell you
specifically what I mean. If you talk about liquidating the
problem of refugees, the Arabs get their backs up immediately
because they have used it as a political weapon. They say there
is only one solution and that is repatriation or compensation.
However, many of those people could be placed, and I think
capital projects--I talked with Jim Linen of Time Magazine who
has been the leader in this project for Near East Emergency
Donations--it is called NEED--and it has been suggested that
while he never said he is trying to liquidate the problem that
such funds they could put into it for capital projects that
gave employment that gave permanence ought to be instituted
without ever saying we are trying to liquidate or removing it,
but simply do it.
They have tried a certain amount of that. I hope the world
can do a certain amount of this, but if you say we have a plan
that is going to liquidate the problem, there is an immediate
political difficulty, but you can go ahead with some projects.
Senator Symington. Senator Case.

KEEPING THE BRITISH IN ADEN

Senator Case. Back to Aden. That is over the hill now, but
I wonder was there ever any discussion of the possibility of
the British staying there if we helped pay the bill?
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, there was. I cannot tell you--the
Secretary had one or two conversations with the Foreign
Minister that I am not completely informed about. They had a
combination of a political problem and an economic one. The
British--I do not quite know why, but the problem of
colonialism has become a problem internally for them, and the
pressure somehow this became a kind of symbol in Great Britain
of colonialist policy, and the government wished to withdraw,
so they told me, in London, for political reasons as well as
economic ones.
Moreover the cost was pretty heavy, and that was the main
thing.
We did indicate, I think they would have stayed if we
picked up the bill. We explored it, but it did not get very
far.
Senator Case. I ask because there are other places, as in
Singapore, where this same thing may come up again and you run
into the same British political problem and we have to think
about something else.
Mr. Battle. Yes.
Senator Case. I have no further questions.
Senator Symington. Senator Pell.
Senator Pell. No questions.
Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask along that line here. Has
it not been pretty well bandied about that Britain has adopted
a firm policy of getting out of everything east of Suez?
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, or getting out bit by bit.
Senator Hickenlooper. But that is their policy--
disassociate themselves politically from everything east of
Suez.

CONNECTION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Senator Fulbright. Just a general question. I am just
curious what the Secretary's view would be, if there is any
connection between the war in Vietnam and the Russian movement
in this and other places.
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I do not think so. I think the
Russian movement in this area is not a new thing. This has been
underway for quite a long time.
Senator Symington. Yes, but if I may interject there and in
context, it is known that we are short of people. It is known
we are terribly short of engineers. It is known we are terribly
short of helicopters in the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
It is known we have 475,000 people today, and tomorrow we will
have 500,000 in Vietnam. We have got the Seventh Fleet out
there; the head of NATO and CincPac in Naples; SHAPE in the
south--they call it CincPac South; the southern part of NATO is
worried sick about Mers-El-Kebir and the growing axis between
France, Algeria, and the Soviet Union.
On the western side of the Mediterranean they have got the
best naval base in Alexandria. They are going to get maybe soon
the best naval base in the western Mediterranean. Do you think
they would be doing this if they did not know we were so deeply
bogged down in the Far East? That is the gist of the chairman's
question?
Mr. Battle. They have had pressure on the UAR and Syria and
Algeria for quite a number of years now.

BABYSITTING THE WORLD

Senator Symington. But for 200 years, as the Senator from
Iowa said, this is--I have not read the Holmes' report, but we
have known for 200 years the czars have wanted the warm water,
that has been tremendously increased as a prize as the result
of the development of oil.
Eighty percent of the oil for Europe comes from this part
of the world. The British economy in my opinion is washed up,
finished and done if they lose the Mideast oil based on what I
have tried to find out about it, and therefore they certainly--
you remember how fast they dropped paratroopers into Kuwait,
and yet now they are getting out of Aden, and here we are
loaded down in Korea, loaded down in effect in Japan, Formosa.
Senator Fulbright. Vietnam.
Senator Symington. Above all in Vietnam.
Mr. Battle. Loaded down in Europe, and we are babysitting
the world.
The question, as I see it, they wanted to do it for a long
time; I think everybody would agree to that. But is it not the
fact that we steadily get deeper and deeper mired down in
Vietnam, in your opinion, the question is asked you, is that
not one of the reasons why, when, what is it, when the cat's
away, the mice will play or something. We think we are a pretty
big cat apparently, and is there not a little more playing
going on because we are down----
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, you can never entirely divorce
one part of the world from another. The issue in one part of
the world has an effect elsewhere. There is no doubt about
that. I only was trying to say I think the Russians have been
at this for some time and whether we had gotten involved in
Vietnam or not, I think they would be going in in one degree or
another.

DISASSOCIATING PROBLEMS FROM VIETNAM

Senator Fulbright. Of course, I am afraid the chairman
might have influenced your answer. I wanted to see what you
would say. But because you do take the position these are
disassociated--that is the official line, that these are quite
disassociated, not only that it is disassociated from Vietnam
but all of our domestic problems have nothing to do with
Vietnam. That is the Administration policy line, is it not?
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, more or less. I am not
responsible for Vietnam. I have got enough problems in my own
area.
Senator Fulbright. I know that. I was just speculating on
what you would say.
Mr. Battle. I am not going to engage with you in debate on
this.
Senator Fulbright. I do not want a debate. I wanted you to
put on the record what the administration's attitude is.
Senator Pell. Would the Senator yield there?
I thought the Administration's view was it was not
disassociated but one vast Communist plot, and that what went
on in any part of the world had its effect in any other part of
the world because the strings are all being pulled from one
place.
[Discussion off the record.]

ARMS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, again because I may not be here,
I would like to inform the committee of one other small problem
because I do not want there to be any danger of the committee
not feeling I did not tell them something.
As you know we enunciated a new arms policy for Pakistan
and India some time ago. We have been trying very hard to
adhere to that policy. The policy very basically is to supply
spare parts. We closed the MAAG in both countries, and we have
not put in any major tanks, planes, etcetera, in either
country. We have been trying--we have been urging them to cut
down their own defense expenditures. The only way in which we
had any involvement with major equipment was through third
country sales. I only want to inform the committee that the
Pakistanis have been shopping around for some time for tanks.
They have approached it, several other countries including the
Italians who have been to us about selling, they wanted 200 M-
47 tanks. In line with the policy that this committee has been
informed of, we have said that major equipment would be
supplied even in a third country situation with our approval
only if it replaced obsolescent material. We have told them 200
tanks we felt were excessive. We would consider 100 provided
several criteria were met. We had no intention of purchasing
additional ones from China, and that they agreed these were
replacements on a one for one basis. This deal has not gone
through. It is still--they are talking not only--the Paks are
talking with the Italians and with the Belgians, but I wanted
you to know that this possibility is before us. We have made no
decision that will be in line with that general policy and I
was afraid if it happened while you were away you would wonder
why I had not told you about it. I wanted you to know.

IRANIAN ARMS PURCHASES FROM SOVIET UNION

Senator Symington. Will you tell us now about the $40
million in purchases by the Iranians from the Soviet Union?
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir. This is an extension of the earlier
deal that you are completely familiar with.
Senator Pell. May I interrupt. As just one member of the
committee, I would hope you would not even approve 100. I
realize that would just be maintaining the status quo. I would
hope gradually there would be an attenuation of the military
equipment both countries have, and I realize that is not a
majority view, but I wanted to express my view.
Mr. Battle. Senator Pell, we have tried to cut down their
defense expenditures, and I can report that they reduced their
budget by 3 percent since we instituted this policy. I have
been talking with both of them about it. The Indians told me
the Paks are cheating. They have not really reduced it, but
based on what they submitted to us and showed us. I assure you
we have been over this step by step by step. There is no
opening of all the arms arsenals of this country or any other
country that we have control of. We are simply trying to hold
down the arms race on a realistic basis.
Now, sir, on the question about the Iranians, in November
of '67 we were informed of a $44 million extension of the
earlier arms deal with similar payment terms. Those terms are
ten years at 2\1/2\ percent interest whereby the USSR would
supply 500 armored personnel carriers, 40 tank transports,
2,200 trucks and jeeps, and six mobile maintenance shops. This
is still not public knowledge. It is exactly the relationship
to the original agreement we are not sure.
I would like to point out that as soon as we heard about
this we informed the chairman--and I do hope to have an
opportunity to be meeting with you soon so the committee would
know it. We have tried to discourage this.
I would like to point out the Iranians have been very
restrained in their acceptance of personnel which I think is
the very great danger, and, from their point of view, this deal
makes economic sense.
I also must point out to you that the Shah is deeply
concerned about the same thing that we were talking about this
afternoon, which is the Russian thrust in the area. I suspect
we are going to have further appeals from him for additional
military equipment over the next few years.
Senator Symington. If I may finally ask one question,
please----
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.

FRENCH REFUSAL TO SELL ARMS TO ISRAEL

Senator Symington. Senator Javits made a speech on the
floor the day before yesterday about arms. Apparently General
de Gaulle has refused to give, or sell rather, to the Israelis,
at least to this point, arms that they have already paid for,
tens of millions of dollars, $42 million that France has taken.
I read that he said that they disobeyed him. ``Israel disobeyed
me,'' is a quote.
There are only three countries making this kind of
weaponry: one is the Soviet Union that is rearming the Arabs;
one is General de Gaulle who is now rumored--and Senator Javits
mentioned in his speech--to be sending to Iraq the planes he
was going to sell to Israel; and the third ourselves. Nobody
else, to the best of my knowledge, in production makes the type
and character of sophisticated weaponry that the Israelis need.
For the record, and before we leave, I have seen figures
which show that the total number of modern Israeli planes
today, combat planes, is 75. I have checked it and rechecked
it, and I believe that is about right, and they have no
bombers. The total number already of Arab planes, fighters, is
around 580. Bombers, the figures are not important--the bombers
they have considerable of including new bombers they have given
Iraq which are beyond the two-way range of Israeli fighters.
Their situation, therefore, according to Senator Javits,
and I must say I have heard the same, I did not know he was
going to make the speech and I was not in town when he made it.
But their situation, therefore, means that Israel could be
subject any time now, especially with borrowed pilots, and the
Algerians put 40 pilots into Egypt in the last episode in June,
they could be subject any time to an attack from the air, which
would be dangerous because of the size of the distances
involved.
With the premise that these figures are reasonably accurate
and the condition is reasonably stated, which was in the talk
that I read that he made, what is our policy going to be about
letting them buy military equipment from us?
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, let me make several comments on
it.

THE CHURCH AMENDMENT

Senator Symington. Before you do it, I want to say this:
People high in the Administration have been telling other
people that because we passed the Church amendment that we made
it impossible to help Israel with arms. I want to say for the
record that is not true. I have investigated it very carefully.
The Church amendment had primarily to do with undeveloped
countries that were being sold arms in South America that we
did not know about, despite the fact when they came up for
economic aid they assured us that the military aid was not
going to go. Perhaps that is one of the reasons that the
Defense Department tried so hard to keep the names of the
country involved in the country X deal from being known. Mr.
Bader knows this story backwards and forwards because the
Chairman let him work with me on it.
Now, the story has gotten around that because of what the
Senate did, it is not possible for this country to supply arms
to Israel.
We know, you and I know, that that is false. What I would
like to do would be to find out why. What is the reason for not
supplying these arms quickly in the interest of the United
States?
So far as I know, with the possible exception of a few
Australians, the Israelis are the only people who are doing any
fighting at any place in the entire world for us unless they
are paid--that is, against Soviet aggression, and if that is
important.

ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL

Now, that is just a premise which is really not pertinent
to the thrust of my question. What are we going to do if these
people come and ask us to purchase arms from us? You have told
us about Pakistan. We know about Iran. We know about the five
countries in South America. What is going to be our policy with
respect to Israel if they put up the money?
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make several
comments.
As you said, the figures are less important than the basic
issue.
I think the question of the accuracy of the figures depends
upon your definition of ``modern,'' but let us not argue that.
Senator Symington. I will say 155 fighters all told for
Israel, and 75 of those I would consider, namely the Super
Mystere and the Mirage, modern fighters against MIG 21's or SU-
7's.
Mr. Battle. I would like to say, sir, we are following this
issue. I spent a great deal of time on this in recent days. I
expect to spend a great deal more time on it in the days ahead.
I was authorized to say this afternoon only that no decision
has been made with respect to the future, but I would like to
comment on two or three of the points made.
First, as far as the French deal, the Israelis bought 50
Mirages. Their traditional supplier of planes, from the French
pre-war, you are quite right. They paid not for all but a good
portion of it, and the Israelis prefer the Mirage and wanted
it. We also over the years have preferred not to be the only
supplier, and the Israelis concur with that view, and therefore
we hoped that they would continue to supply it.
Senator Symington. May I just in context--we preferred to
be not a supplier. There are no modern American combat
airplanes in Israel.
Mr. Battle. No, sir, I meant all kinds of military
equipment. There are other kinds of equipment, too, so we have
supplied military equipment.

SPECULATION ABOUT FRENCH MOTIVES

So far as the status of this order is concerned, it has
been rather interesting to watch over the last few days. I
talked with Mr. Eban in September when he was here. He told me
then that he felt that the French would live up to the
contract, having gone as far as it had including the money.
Since that time, the Israelis have told us they had serious
doubts that the French were going to live up to that
arrangement.
A few days ago there was a statement made and a good deal
of speculation that the French were playing around in Iraqi oil
and were going to commit military equipment to the Iraqis. At
that same time that story came out, there were two other
stories that accompanied it. One was an intelligence report
that there were a hundred Mirages about to be sold to Belgium
and that those included the 50 for Israel, the destination of
them after that not identified.
Second, the story was that 50 Mirages would go to Iraq of
the group, of the ones that had been planned for Israel.
A debate then began in France and after the first--heavily
involving the question of anti-Semitism and following that the
French were forced to a rather strange and hard-to-understand
statement. That statement said that they had not diverted 50
planes from Israel to Iraq. They did not say they were going on
with the sale, however, but they made it very clear they had
not diverted them.
Now, in checking into the matter, I found that we had
authorized export licenses for Sperry gyroscopes for those
planes. On the basis that it was a contract for the sale of
those 50 gyroscopes to Israel through commercial channels
rather than governmental ones, which I will explain in a
moment, I sent a message that those had been authorized on the
basis those planes were being delivered to Israel, and that if
they were not sent there we would consider this a violation on
the terms of the original arrangement.
At the moment our embassy in Paris believes--I am not sure
this is not an overstatement--that probably the French will go
through, after dragging their feet for a while, with their
contract. The Israelis do not believe so. It is an open
question. It is at least a possibility that has changed in the
last two or three days.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IMBALANCE

Now, we are concerned about the Israeli, the possibility of
an imbalance. The military authorities in our country do not
think there is an immediate threat. There is, however, a
potential problem there.
Senator Symington. They are the same ones who have been
giving us information on the other war.
Mr. Battle. I suspect pretty much the same, Mr. Chairman.
We have made no decision on this, but we are watching this
very, very closely and including the possibility of the French
and their arrangement.
We have talked in general terms with the French about arms
policies, but they have not been very forthcoming so far. We
are considering another demarche to them in the very near
future.
As you know, I reported to the committee some weeks ago we
were providing 48 A-4s to--that number is not public knowledge
and I hope it will be handled with care--to the Israelis,
deliveries to start this month. It would be at about the rate
of four a month and would be completed at the end of the year.
All I can say to you is we are watching this most carefully,
and I assure you it will get very, very careful attention. I
will be very happy during the next weeks to keep in touch with
you about it, Mr. Chairman, if that is the wish of the
committee, or with Mr. Marcy or with anyone you designate
because I think this is an area in which you have a very
legitimate interest and I would hope I would keep you informed.

U.S. ARMS POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

Senator Symington. First, because my senior colleagues are
interested in this, I wish any information you do get, you
would give to Mr. Marcy so he could give it to the chairman,
Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Gore, or any members of the
committee.
As I understand it, what you are saying is (a) we are going
to deliver the planes to Israel that we had already agreed to
deliver to them.
Mr. Battle. That is right, which were held up after the war
when all arms sales were suspended.
Senator Symington. And (b), despite the development in
France or anywhere else, we have not yet reached a decision to
sell them any additional arms. In both cases I should use the
word ``sale.'' We have not reached any decision to sell them
any additional arms beyond what we agreed before the June war.
Mr. Battle. That is substantially accurate. That is
certainly accurate on planes. I think there is additional small
stuff, spares, things of that sort.
Senator Symington. But you know their problem----
Mr. Battle. Your concern, sir, is entirely legitimate. All
I can do at this moment, I tried to see whether a decision
could be made before I had this hearing. I did not obtain
clearance for one. I assure you we are watching this most
carefully, and I will be in touch with you.

THE PROBLEM OF JORDAN

I would also like to mention the problem of Jordan in
passing. We have, I think, a very serious political problem
there as well as a military one. Jordan is the only country
that has had no additional equipment. While we had contracted
for planes before the Arab-Israeli war, there is no thought at
the moment of putting in planes. We do have before us a request
for $6.5 million in miscellaneous spare parts, some ammunition,
some recoilless rifles that we will have to consider. The main
issue here is whether we are going to be a supplier or going to
have the Soviets be a supplier of Jordan.
Senator Symington. You decided, as I understand it, that
you should give aid to other Arab countries if you gave the aid
to Israel or rather sold-we should sell aid or give aid to
other Arab countries if we sold to Israel what we agreed to
sell to them before.

SALES TO ARAB COUNTRIES

So that has been done. What are the Arab countries that we
are now selling arms or giving arms to?
Mr. Battle. Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, something for Lebanon,
very little, but a little bit, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, but that
is so small----
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman?

SALE OF TANKS TO PAKISTAN

Senator Fulbright. I wanted to clear up about these tanks
because this was a matter that Senator Symington had a good
deal of hearings about. In this last hearing with Mr. Cummings,
I read from it on page 40 in that Mr. Bader said, ``There is a
minimum of 5,000 tanks,'' Western Europe.
Mr. Cummings said, ``Available----''.
Mr. Bader said, ``For resale around the world.''
And Mr. Cummings said, ``Right, and that ignores MAP
material. In Belgium there are tremendous quantities of tanks.
The exact number is classified and not really known to me, but
Italy the same way. Italy is the largest holder of M-47s. Mr.
Kuss is presently discussing giving these German tanks to
Italy. If that happens, I guarantee you Pakistan will meet
their requirements.''
And Mr. Bader informs me that presently Mr. Kuss is in
Italy making arrangements to handle these M-47 tanks for
Pakistan. Is that correct?
Mr. Battle. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
Senator Fulbright. Would you know?
Mr. Battle. Well, this could not be done without my
approval.
Senator Fulbright. Without your knowledge.
Mr. Battle. Yes, sir. I will tell you exactly where he is,
Mr. Chairman. The Italian ambassador came in to me about a week
or ten days ago asking what our attitude would be. I told him--
on this sale he said they wanted 200 tanks. I said that we
would consider that an unnecessarily large figure, that we
would entertain a request for 100. We would have to know a lot
of specific things. For example, the origins of the tanks, the
state, condition of them, the cost of them, the financing of
them, and we would have to--we also have had talks in Pakistan.
They have been on the trail of tanks for some time.
We would also have to have assurances that for each tank
they bought that it was a replacement from one they had on
hand, and it would have to be shown.
Senator Fulbright. Would Mr. Kuss handle these tanks
without your approving or knowing?
Mr. Battle. Sir, I do not see how it is possible. I have
tried very hard to make sense out of this arms policy. It is
difficult to do.
Senator Fulbright. It sure is.
Mr. Battle. But we are watching it on a point-by-point
basis, Mr. Chairman, and I am trying--I hope to keep this
committee informed and I am making a very honest effort to do
so. This is why I wanted you to know this deal was around
before because, if something should happen on it, this is
within the lines of the policy we described to you. But I do
think that we should keep you informed on these matters.
Senator Pell. As a question of geography, Mr. Chairman,
would it not be correct to say that tanks could only be used by
Pakistan against India? They could not possibly be used against
China because of the mountains.
Mr. Battle. Senator Pell, I do not know my geography that
well.
Senator Pell. I think geography will show----
Senator Hickenlooper. Because of the terrain.
Senator Pell. You cannot get the tanks over the mountains.
I think geography will show these tanks are intended for India.
Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, before the chairman
leaves, I want to say to you that this committee has complete
confidence in you.
Senator Pell. Amen.
Mr. Battle. I appreciate that.

THE PENTAGON AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator Symington. We get more information from you in less
time, in my opinion, than anybody around.
Now, what the chairman of this committee says is pretty
fundamentally serious to me. Either Mr. Kuss is in Italy
working on this deal and you do not know about it, or he is not
in Italy, so then you should not know about it. If he is in
Italy, without your permission or approval or knowledge, then I
think that you have got a problem. There are going to be some
changes, we understand, over in the Pentagon, and maybe this is
the time--you know, this is a time you might move in there and
say, ``By the way, if it is all right with you, the State
Department would like to have something to do with foreign
policy being set through the sale of purchase or renting of
arms.''
For what it is worth, it is just something to think about.
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, he might be in Italy without my
knowledge, but, so help me, if there is any arrangement made
without my knowledge of these hundred tanks, there is really
going to be an explosion.
There are other countries with whom the Paks have been
talking, the Belgians among them. They mentioned Iran, which we
tended to rather discourage, and the only one I have had any
direct talk with has been Italy along the lines.

FRENCH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you about this: What
caused the change in the relationship between France and
Israel? France was supplying Israel before the war. France
worked with Israel on the secret atomic plant that Israel had,
and so on, and now they seem to not be buddies so much.
Mr. Battle. Well, I think there are two or three factors in
this. One, I think the French are playing the oil game here in
several respects. Secondly, I think they have watched our own
relationship with Egypt and others go into periods of decline
and they would like to replace us as a major western influence.
Third, their relations with the Soviets in this area, I
think, are at least interesting to speculate about. They
continue to talk in terms of a Big Four arrangement, for
example, on peace in the area that sort of thing. But basically
I think they are trying to increase their own influence with a
minimum of outlay and with the oil in mind.
As far as Israel is concerned, I strongly suspect that they
have continued, at the same time they have denied it, the
supply of small spare parts to them even though they publicly
profess to have an embargo.
Senator Hickenlooper. You mean at the same time the
Israelis deny it also.
Mr. Battle. The Israelis have not denied it to me, not the
small spares. I think they have not denied it. I suspect that
the French have gone on.
I suspect the dollar or the Israeli pound has a good deal
of influence in France, and I would not rule out the
possibility they will find out a way to make--at the same time
they profess in an effort to establish a very warm relationship
with the Arabs, they may still work out some third country
deal. I would not rule it out.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, we are always rewarded by
the privilege and pleasure of listening to your mellifluous
words and sound logic.
Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think you have fully explained and
clarified everything.
Mr. Battle. I have not solved any of them. It is good to
see you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON NEWS STORIES ON THE NLF IN SAIGON & THE U.N.

----------

Thursday, December 14, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 o'clock
a.m. in Room S-116, The Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright
(Chairman) presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators, Sparkman,
Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper,
Carlson, Mundt, Case and Cooper.
Also present: Senator Young of North Dakota.
William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations; Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary,
State Department.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Jones, Mr. Henderson, and Mr.
Bader of the committee staff.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
There have been a number of news reports recently
concerning an initiative made by the National Liberation Front
to send representatives to the United Nations and of the arrest
in Saigon of a Viet Cong agent alleged to be on his way to a
meeting with American officials.
This committee would like to have an explanation of what
actually happened in these two incidents, and obtain
information on our general policy about contacts with the
National Liberation Front.
We are very pleased to have this morning the Under
Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to give us any
enlightenment you can.
Will you proceed, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS DeB. KATZENBACH, THE ACTING
SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Katzenbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Much of the information that I am giving both in this brief
statement and in answering questions is quite sensitive and is
classified Top Secret.
You have asked for information with respect to recent news
stories. The first of these has to do with the fact that it has
been reported that the NLF has sought to send representatives
to the U.N. The second with the fact that a representative of
the NLF was arrested recently while he was on his way to a
meeting at the United States Embassy in Saigon.
Let me say at the outset that while news stories on these
two matters broke at approximately the same time, there is
absolutely no connection between them. With respect to the
first, I think Ambassador Goldberg has already clarified the
essential facts for the press, but I will give you what
supplementary information we possess. With respect to the
second, I will give you the essential facts, but I would like
to caution you now and later that this matter still involves a
possibility for the exchange of prisoners and for that reason
should be treated with complete secrecy.

THE NLF AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The facts with respect to the NLF and the U.N. are simply
as follows:
On September 22, 1967, a high-ranking member of the U.N.
Secretariat gave Ambassador Goldberg the following personal
oral message----
The Chairman. What was that date?
Secretary Katzenbach. September 22, 1967. High-ranking
member of the U.N. Secretariat gave Ambassador Goldberg the
following personal oral message from the Secretary General. He
said the Secretary General had received from an unnamed person
an inquiry as to whether or not the United States would be
agreeable to having ``two or three NLF representatives come to
the U.N. in a private capacity to attend the present session of
the General Assembly.'' Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N.
official that without further information as to the purpose of
the trip it would be difficult to give even a personal
reaction.
On September 26, the same official gave Ambassador Goldberg
some additional information provided by the Secretary General.
He said the NLF individuals had indicated they would need to
know Washington's reaction to granting them visas, and if
Washington would be receptive if the request were made through
another government having relations with the United States. If
Washington was negative, the NLF would wish the whole matter
dropped without publicity.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

The next day Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N. official
that before the United States could reach a final judgment in
the matter we would wish to know (1) who the intermediary is
and how reliable the Secretary General feels him to be; (2)
what kind of passports would be used and what kind of visas
would be requested and for what duration; (3) who the NLF
individuals were; and (4) what is the exact purpose of their
visit and does it embrace conversations with the United States
Government? With respect to the last point Ambassador Goldberg
observed to the U.N. official that if there was any serious
desire on the part of the NLF to have conversations with the
United States it was his view that coming to the U.N. would
probably be the least desirable way of guaranteeing the
security and secrecy of such discussions. Nothing further was
heard until November 3, 1967 when the U.N. official provided
Ambassador Goldberg with the following answers to the last
three questions posed:
``1. Number two: One leading Central Committee member and
an aide. (Names to be provided when agreement is forthcoming in
principle.)
``2. Passport: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North
Vietnam) preferred. Diplomatic passport--''
Senator Gore. I didn't understand that word.
Secretary Katzenbach. Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North
Vietnam) preferred.''
The Chairman. What does that mean?
Secretary Katzenbach. As to what kind of passport they
would prefer, they would prefer to travel on a North Vietnam
diplomatic passport (must). If it is not acceptable, will get a
passport from a U.N. member state.
``3. Duration. One year but may consider six months stay.
Would like some assurances for possibly two years.
``4. Purpose: Work principally at U.N. but would not refuse
radio/TV/press interviews.''
The U.N. intermediary added that the SYG now assumed that
the North Vietnamese were in fact aware of the request.
Senator Lausche. What you are reading now, is that all in
writing taken from documents or are these oral?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, the four points I gave you were a
piece of paper that was handed on behalf of the Secretary-
General by a member of the Secretariat to Ambassador Goldberg
as the response given to the questions that he had asked.
Senator Gore. May I ask----
Senator Lausche. Were Goldberg's questions in writing?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, Goldberg's questions were given--
presented them orally. He may have put the four questions in
writing. I would have to check whether he put them in writing--
they were oral only.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman?

ROLE OF RALPH BUNCHE

Is there any particular reason, Mr. Secretary, why you do
not identify the representative of the Secretary General?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, it was Mr. Ralph Bunche.
Senator Gore. The reason I asked----
Secretary Katzenbach. Simply because his name has not been
entered.
Senator Gore. He is, the reason I ask, Bunche is extremely
close to U Thant.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes. There was never, may I say,
Senator, there was never any questions in my mind that he was
actively representing the Secretary General's views.
Senator Gore. That is all I wish to clear up.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes.
The U.N. intermediary added that the Secretary General now
assumed that the North Vietnamese were in fact aware of the
request.

THE U.S. WOULD NOT OBJECT TO VISAS FOR NLF

On November 15 Ambassador Goldberg gave to the U.N.
official the following response: This is in quotes and this was
given in writing:

As the Secretary General is aware, Ambassador Goldberg has
stated publicly that the United States would not object or
stand in the way of NLF representatives Security Council
discussion of Vietnam. We would be prepared to grant visas in
connection with such Security Council proceedings.
We note that North Vietnam passport preferred. This would
be acceptable to us under the circumstances noted above.

There are two footnotes to this story. On December 9 the
Hanoi official radio stated that it had monitored the following
statement from the NLF refuting a new lie of U.S. propaganda:

The U.S. propaganda machine recently spread rumors that the
NLFSV had expressed the desire to send its representative to
the United Nations to give its views on the Vietnam question.
Liberation Press Agency is authorized to declare that this is
sheer fabrication.

The NLF liberation radio finally broadcast the above
statement forty-four hours after Radio Hanoi had supposedly
``monitored'' it. Second, yesterday at the U.N. a document was
circulated by the Roumanian Government purporting to give the
NLF case for its activities in South Vietnam.
And I will be happy to provide the committee copies of that
document when I get it.
Senator Cooper. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes.

HANOI RADIO REPORTS

Senator Cooper. Did the Hanoi radio report that the NLF had
rejected this story?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, it reported it had
monitored the NLF radio on this and it was quoting from what
the NLF had said, only the NLF didn't get around to saying it
until 44 hours later.
Senator Cooper. Then the NLF finally did make a statement?
Secretary Katzenbach. The NLF made the identical statement
44 hours after Radio Hanoi had monitored it.
I go on, Mr. Chairman, either I can answer questions on
that aspect of it now or I can go on with the Saigon matter, as
you please.
The Chairman. Maybe you should proceed. The real point is
on this matter as you go along.
Secretary Katzenbach. Okay.

RELUCTANCE TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE

Senator Gore. One clarifying question, not that it is
particularly important, but I just wondered if our government
knows, and if it knows, if there is any reluctance to
identifying the source of the communication to the Secretary
General. That may have a bearing, if you know it.
Secretary Katzenbach. We do not know it. I put my second
footnote to this as a possible inference.
Senator Gore. Fine, thank you very much.
Secretary Katzenbach. But I don't know it.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Senator Lausche. Did you draw any conclusion as to the
genuineness of the purpose of the communists of South Vietnam
based upon these different things that transpired? Was there a
conclusion reached that this had no relationship to a purpose
to discuss peace or that it was only intended to use the United
Nations as a platform for its propaganda?
The Chairman. That ought to come at the end when he
finishes, if I may suggest. He hasn't finished yet.
Secretary Katzenbach. I finished on that particular one.
The Chairman. What?
Secretary Katzenbach. I finished on the U.N. contact but I
will go on with the other and I will take your question, then,
Senator Lausche, or whatever procedure you wish to follow.
Senator Lausche. All right.

U.S.-NLF CONTACTS

Secretary Katzenbach. I would like now to give you the
basic facts of the so-called U.S.-NLF contacts in Saigon about
which there has been so much speculation in the press. I would
like to re-emphasize that this is a very delicate matter, not
because it involves as has been said, important U.S.-NLF
contacts, but because it involves a possible exchange of
prisoners and therefore could be the means to securing the
release of some of our sick and wounded in the hands of the VC.
In my judgment, the unfortunate publicity already given to
this matter, has seriously jeopardized its success, but it is
still an ongoing possibility.
The simple facts are these. Some time ago as a part of a
routine police operation, a VC agent was arrested. On his
person this agent had a message addressed to Ambassador Bunker.
It suggested the possibility of U.S.-VC prisoner exchange,
including the possibility of U.S. pilots held by Hanoi.
This message was promptly turned over to our Embassy by
Vietnamese authorities [deleted].
In consultation and agreement with the high South
Vietnamese officials we have made efforts to follow up this
possibility [deleted].
As you can imagine, this process is not only a delicate
one, but a slow one. The NLF now wishes the South Vietnamese
Government to release its so-called ``emissary'' and a number
of VC cadre of ranging importance as a necessary preliminary to
an exchange of prisoners. Such a unilateral release--at least
in the first instance--raises difficulties for the South
Vietnamese Government since it would have to explain to its own
knowledgeable officials, and perhaps to the public, why it
released known VC prisoners. Unfortunately the present
publicity, which includes wild rumors now floating around
Saigon, have greatly aggravated this problem. Any release,
unless in the format of an exchange such as the Rudolph Abel-
Gary Powers exchange, would have to be kept secret. This has
become harder to do since public revelation and speculation.
Despite these difficulties, we are still hopeful that this
operation will become possible and lead to the release of some
American prisoners.
This is our objective and it can only be prejudiced by
further public speculation.
Let me add that no high-ranking American official has at
any time during this operation had any direct contact or
discussion with representatives of the NLF; that Ambassador
Bunker has, of course, been in full charge on the U.S. side of
the efforts towards a prisoner exchange; that throughout this
operation high officials of the South Vietnamese Government
have acted with us in seeking to forward the objective. The
United States has not taken--and was not in a position to
take--any action without the full cooperation and consent of
the South Vietnamese Government.

IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE CUSTODY

The Chairman. Is this last statement to be taken that we
have no influence with them? I mean, they have complete control
of the situation?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, I don't mean we have no influence
with them. I mean they are their prisoners. They are in the
custody of the people----
The Chairman. Did they take these prisoners or did we take
them?
Secretary Katzenbach. They took them. And as far as the
people they now want released and some other people that they
would have an interest in, these are VC cadre that have been
picked up in one place or another and they are in the custody
of the South Vietnamese authorities.

PRISONER RELEASES NOT RECIPROCATED

The Chairman. I have not followed this as closely, of
course, as I should have. I am told Newsweek said that these
representatives of the NLF have been contacting us several
times, frequently. Is that true or not, or is this the first
instance?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, this is the first instance.
The Chairman. We have never had one of this kind for
exchange of prisoners or anything else?
Secretary Katzenbach. We have made efforts in various
places around the world to find out if there was any interest
through the use of intermediaries in having any discussions
with respect to prisoner exchange and we have always been
turned down flatly. This is the first time there has been
anything which indicated the possibility of prisoner exchange
through any kind of work. There have been prisoners released,
as you know.
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Katzenbach. In the Christmas period, the Tet
period, and this has been reciprocated by our releases.
The Chairman. Without any negotiations.
Secretary Katzenbach. Without any negotiations or
discussion or understandings or direct or indirect or anything
like that.
The Chairman. Senator Gore, do you have any questions?

ROLE OF THE CIA

Senator Gore. Yes. Pursuing the questions of contacts I
notice you say--no high-ranking U.S. officials. Would you be a
little more explicit about this? Please understand my questions
are not critical. I would be inclined to be critical if I did
not think or if you did not have [deleted] as much contact as
possible with the dissident elements within South Vietnam. So I
preface this just to say I am not asking critical questions but
I am asking for information. To what extent do we have contacts
with NLF?
Secretary Katzenbach. On the basis where we have knowledge
of the fact that they are NLF members almost nothing.
Senator Gore. [deleted]
Secretary Katzenbach. No, that is correct. I made the
statement that I made here simply because obviously [deleted]
we are not in position to say no, we have not had any contact
with members of the NLF because we do have contacts with these
people when they are picked up by Vietnamese authorities or as
part of any kind of a joint operation or that kind of thing we
have contact with. Beyond that, we simply do not.
The stories that Saigon had said this fellow was on his way
to meet Ambassador Bunker and they were meeting at the American
Embassy and so forth. So I emphasize that point because the
truth of the matter is [deleted]
Ambassador Bunker and no other member of the Embassy staff
has even talked with the fellow or seen him.

SECRET OPERATIVES WITHIN THE NLF

Senator Gore. Do we not have secret operatives within the
NLF apparatus itself? [Deleted.]
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. Do you know whether it is true?
Secretary Katzenbach. To the best of my knowledge, it is
not true. We get information, we get information from third
parties who have contact. We don't have any direct.
Senator Gore. Well, this is information which we can get
from Mr. Helms.

ROLE OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

I notice you did not relate any answer to one of the
questions of Ambassador Goldberg, to wit, did the proposed
visit entail or involve, or I don't remember your exact words,
discussions or attempts to have discussions with the United
States Government.
Did they ever answer that question?
Secretary Katzenbach. They did not respond to that
question.
Senator Gore. What significance did you read into this, if
any?
Secretary Katzenbach. To the fact they did not respond to
it?
Senator Gore. Yes, if any.
Secretary Katzenbach. That that was not one of the purposes
of their coming. If it was a matter of their seeking contact,
Senator, as Ambassador Goldberg did point out to them, there
are many places this could be done which could be more secure
and less exposed to the glare of publicity than New York but he
nevertheless asked, he expressed that observation, asked the
question, got no response to the question or to the
observation.
Senator Gore. Well, I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have the
impression that you have given us, told us fully, as you have
it. If there is something else, would you volunteer it?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir. I have not given you
operational details of this, but I have given you essential
facts as honestly and as candidly as I can.
Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

AUTHENTICITY OF A RUMOR

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Katzenbach, I think Senator Gore
raised this question a moment ago, he didn't pursue it in his
question and if I may go ahead with it, what convincing proof
is there of the authenticity of this rumor that has come
through Bunche or something else have or is it like some of
these other, just somebody in a drawing room making a lot of
statements such as happened in Italy and so on? Apparently it
was just somebody trying to be a busy-body.
Secretary Katzenbach. We have no evidence of any
authenticity on it. This was transmitted through the channels I
indicated. We don't know who the person who spoke to the
Secretary General was. I would have no reason to believe the
Secretary General made this up out of the whole cloth.
Senator Hickenlooper. I was not even suggesting that, no,
no.
Secretary Katzenbach. Whether that person was speaking on
behalf of the NLF or not we have no----
Senator Hickenlooper. The authenticity of the person who
allegedly carried this message and spoke to the Secretary
General?
Secretary Katzenbach. Are you talking about the New York
incident?
Senator Hickenlooper. No.
Secretary Katzenbach. Or the other one?
Senator Hickenlooper. I am talking about the first report
that the Secretary General gave that somebody approached him or
that he had been approached on this proposition. I would hope
we would have some idea as to whether or not the person who
approached the Secretary General was speaking with some
authentic background.
Secretary Katzenbach. We would not be in position to answer
that since he has never said who it was.
The Chairman. Did you ask him?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What did he say?
Secretary Katzenbach. We got no answer. Originally
Ambassador Goldberg asked what the Secretary General's views
were as to the reliability of this, and we got no answer to
that question, but by the fact that he pursued it, assumed that
the Secretary General believed that the person he was talking
to was a responsible and reliable intermediary on this. I think
we assumed, without any facts to back it up, that it was a
representative of an eastern European Government, but it might
not have been.

UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION

Senator Hickenlooper. Then, of course, the NLF just comes
and disclaims this and says it is nothing but trickery on our
part. The North Vietnamese come out and say it is nothing but
trickery on our part, propaganda.
Unfortunately, with our publicity media, we grasp at straws
that apparently, and get everybody all excited about something,
and we don't have any real proof about it, so far as the
genesis of the matter is concerned.
Secretary Katzenbach. That is correct. Of course, they did
say in the initial message, Senator, if there was any publicity
given to this, they would deny it.
Now, that is a two-edged sword.
Senator Hickenlooper. It all gets back to the point, I
guess we are supposed to be righteous and the other fellow
isn't. But I think there may be some exceptions to that rule. I
think we are walking with a very thin reed here. I don't think
you have gone overboard on this at all, but we don't know with
whom we are dealing. It is sort of a domino operation down the
lines some place. Maybe that is the path we have to take with
these people, I don't know. It is a tribute, of course, to the
uncertainty and confusion that is going on. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche?

THE UNITED NATIONS EPISODE

Senator Lausche. Referring to the United Nations episode,
was there anything whatsoever in the exchange of communications
between Goldberg and the intermediary indicating that the
National Liberation Front wanted to use the United Nations as a
middle agency to discuss the war problem with the United
States?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, there wasn't. Both the NLF
and Hanoi have repeatedly denounced the competence of the U.N.
to deal with any of these problems, but, at the same time, they
stated their own purposes on this as----
Senator Lausche. Will you repeat them?
Secretary Katzenbach. As work principally at the U.N. but
would not refuse radio, TV, press interviews.
Senator Lausche. From what you have said, it would seem
that the National Liberation Front wanted to get to the United
Nations not to discuss the war problem but to use that agency
and the facilities that might become available to propagandize
in the United States.
Secretary Katzenbach. I would think that was their
principal purpose. They may, as the press have speculated,
wanted to do something on the line which the Algerian
Liberation Movement did some years ago, which was essentially
that purpose.

THE SAIGON INCIDENT

Senator Lausche. Now, getting to the Saigon incident: Did
our Ambassador, on the basis of what had previously happened,
anticipate a visit from a Viet Cong representative about the
exchange of prisoners?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir. Absolutely the first
indication, knowledge, glimpse, glimmer, flicker or light,
anything else was when the South Vietnamese police authorities
came to the Embassy and said, ``We found this piece of paper on
the fellow we picked up and it is addressed to Ambassador
Bunker.''
We had no prior indication, knowledge of anything, and in
Saigon or elsewhere. And it was at that point we went back and
they gave us permission to question the person with respect to
this piece of paper and decided whether it had any authenticity
or what it was and who he was and so forth.
Senator Lausche. Can you say whether or not in the
relationship with Saigon there has been a policy on the part of
the United States of complete disclosure of what we are doing
and in anticipation of a complete disclosure on the part of the
Saigon Government of what it is doing?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, in terms of anything having to
do with NLF that would be true, yes, sir.

NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MISSION

Senator Lausche. Some inferences are drawn that there was
an expectation on the part of our government of a visit to be
made by the representative of the National Liberation Front,
but that the Saigon Government was not informed and then by
accident arrested this man not having knowledge of an
understanding of that visit between him and the Government.
What about that?
Secretary Katzenbach. There is no truth to that,
absolutely, Senator. We had no prior knowledge of this
individual, his mission or purpose or anything of that kind,
and as far as we have been able to ascertain the operation on
which he was arrested was a perfectly routine police operation,
and that is really the whole story. We had no prior knowledge
of it.
He was arrested, there was no reason not to believe he was
arrested just as they said he was arrested.
If I can make an editorial comment, he seemed to be rather
clumsy about the way he was going about things, but that is the
way it happened.
Senator Lausche. [Deleted] was there any--were there any
statements made by him indicating that he had any other purpose
than to talk exchange of prisoners?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir. In the discussions they had
with him he said this was the reason that he had come to Saigon
was to deliver this message to the American Embassy. He said
that was his purpose.
Senator Lausche. I think that is all.

OBJECTIONS TO NLF EMISSARIES

The Chairman. With regard to his questions, I don't quite
understand why you think it would be so dangerous if these two
NLF people came to New York. How would that hurt us? Why would
you object to it?
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, I think the question is what
their purposes are. We have taken the position, Mr. Chairman,
that if they come in connection with anything, any U.N.
activity, at the invitation of the U.N. or any of its agencies
under the headquarters agreement, of course, they are entitled
to visas or anything else.
We have not taken the position that if they are not coming
in any connection with that kind this country should under the
present statutes and visa and passport laws admit people on
passports of, whatever passports it may be, and I guess they
would tend to make them phony passports, with visas to engage
in any propaganda exercise that they want to engage in. We
would have to make a finding in point of fact of people of this
kind, that the Secretary of State and Attorney General would
have to make a finding, that their admission was in the
national interest and I think in the absence of some sincere
purpose on their part other than what they have indicated, that
it is not a question of danger but just a question of why
should we let them.

EMISSARIES DID NOT WANT TO TALK

The Chairman. I understand the technicalities, you don't
have to let them in. But we have made, and the President has
made, very repeated statements: just give us a warm body and we
will confer with them and we will talk with them anywhere, on a
neutral ship or anywhere.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And here apparently two of them want to come
to New York and we say, ``No, we don't want you to come to New
York.''
Secretary Katzenbach. They didn't want to come to talk,
Senator.
The Chairman. How do you know they didn't want to come?
Secretary Katzenbach. Because that question was asked them
and it was quite, it seems to me, ostentatiously not answered,
because they started off with our four questions and they said
in their answer, One, and then Number Two, ignoring the first
question.
The Chairman. Of course, I don't know. I have no knowledge
at all of it.
Do you know who the leaders of the NLF are?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You don't know whether they were coming or
not?
Secretary Katzenbach. They didn't give us any names.

THE PROPAGANDA VALUE

The Chairman. I don't know, but the propaganda of refusing
them seems to me maybe to be as important as having them come,
because we look as if we don't want to have any contacts with
them.
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, might I say as far as the
propaganda value of it is concerned, Mr. Chairman, I would at
least quote the Hanoi Radio and NLF Radio that says the whole
thing was a plot on our part and a figment of our imagination
which, it seems to me, says something about the propaganda
value of it.
The Chairman. Well propaganda is a very difficult thing to
judge.
But, anyway, Senator Carlson?

ROLE OF ROUMANIA

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I believe it was a part of
your prepared text or else you orally stated that the last word
on this was as of yesterday from Roumania, was that right?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, I said--I put it as a footnote.
Whether it is connected or not, Roumania yesterday circulated
in the United Nations as a UN document the NLF position with
respect to the war in South Vietnam and with respect to the
future which is--I have not read the document myself. I
understand that this is essentially their September 1 platform
which has just been reproduced in the United Nations.
Senator Carlson. In other words, it is not something
current. It is something that goes back to September 1, that
they yesterday called attention to the United Nations?
Secretary Katzenbach. The Roumanian government called
attention.
Senator Carlson. I mean they did?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes.
Senator Carlson. Is it reasonable to assume it might well
have been Roumania that had the original contact with the
Secretary General in view of the fact the first information you
had on this was September 22nd?
Secretary Katzenbach. I think that is certainly a possible
inference. I would guess it was an eastern European Government.
Senator Carlson. Do you have any evidence it was Roumania?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.

unable to follow through

Senator Carlson. It seems to me that there is some
undercurrent there that we don't seem to be able to ferret out,
or maybe we do and we don't seem to get the information here as
to who is or who is not trying to contact either a
representative of the U.N. through the Secretary General or
possibly our own government, there is a great deal of confusion
and concern in this nation, that is all I can say. People are
writing and they ask, ''Why don't we make some contact? Why
don't we have contacts?''
It looks like maybe the Roumanian government may have come
in to the Secretary General and we haven't been able or he
hasn't been able, or Ambassador Goldberg hasn't been able to
follow through.
I don't know. I am at a loss.
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, Ambassador Goldberg, as I said,
asked explicitly was it their purpose to have a discussion with
the U.S. government officials, and then volunteered if that was
their purpose there would have been better places than in New
York with all the publicity with somebody coming with North
Vietnamese passports and so on and so forth.
But that question just floated out on the water, and it was
never responded to.
Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator McCarthy?

ROLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I think this question may
have been asked.
The last sentence in your statement, ``The United States is
not in position to take any action without the full cooperation
of the South Vietnamese government,'' I understand your answer
was that the prisoner you are talking about was taken prisoner
by the Vietnamese.
Secretary Katzenbach. In their control and custody.
Senator McCarthy. Do we capture and turn them over to them
and lose any right----
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, those were cadre.
Senator McCarthy. What about prisoners we negotiate about,
can we negotiate without reference to them or do we have to get
clearance from the Vietnamese government?
Secretary Katzenbach. We don't need clearance from the
Vietnamese government. We would be in position to release any
prisoners we had captured in exchange for release of our
people.
Senator McCarthy. To the NLF?
Secretary Katzenbach. If this involved contact with the NLF
or discussions with the NLF we would tell the South Vietnamese
Government about it and discuss that with them.
Senator McCarthy. What if they said no?
Secretary Katzenbach. I don't suppose that they would say
no, Senator.

GETTING CLEARANCE FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator McCarthy. The Vice President recently said it was
high-handed of me to suggest for us to talk to the NLF without
getting clearance from the Vietnamese government.
Secretary Katzenbach. Certainly without consulting----
Senator McCarthy. He didn't say consult; he said clearance.
Do you think we can negotiate with the NLF over there even
though the South Vietnamese government said no to it?
Secretary Katzenbach. On a prisoner exchange, with respect
to our prisoners and prisoners of them that we held, I think--
--
Senator McCarthy. We have never done it, have we?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, we have never been able to
do it.
Senator McCarthy. Have we tried?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, we have tried.
Senator McCarthy. Independently?
Secretary Katzenbach. We tried to make contact in many
places for the purposes of prisoner exchange with the NLF and
have been turned down absolutely flat on each occasion we have
attempted to do it. The current one I am talking about is the
first time that they have shown the slightest interest in
proceeding along these lines. That is why we were hopeful we
could somehow or other keep that alive despite the difficulties
we run into.

NLF SEEKING PUBLICITY

Senator McCarthy. What about other contacts? Why would the
NLF have had to come to the U.N. through this very involved and
roundabout sort of way to get its request to the United States
with reference to the approval of visas?
Secretary Katzenbach. Why would it do it?
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Secretary Katzenbach. First of all, I think you have to
make the assumption on that which I am perfectly willing to
make with you although I don't know the fact, that the NLF did
in fact want to do this, and this was not an intermediary going
to the Secretary General and then proceeding in this way, but
making that assumption, it would seem to me that their reason
for coming there was that they thought, in view of some of the
current opinion in the United States and in the U.N. that they
could do some lobbying and perhaps get some publicity. There is
no reason that I can see in that record, Senator, to indicate,
one, that they wanted to have any serious talks about anything
political, or secondly, that they had anything to do with
prisoner exchange whatsoever.
Senator McCarthy. Well, I think that is probably right. I
just am concerned about the process they followed. It would
seem to me that unless they thought they would get more
publicity this way than if they checked with the U.S.
Ambassador in Saigon to see whether the United States would
approve instead of going through three or four exchanges before
getting to the State Department, on the question of whether the
visa would be granted or not.
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, I think at least one
explanation of that, senator, is the one they gave from the
outset, saying if this was not going to be done they wanted to
deny it, that anything had occurred.
If you want to deny something, you usually do it through a
channel which makes it deniable.
Senator McCarthy. It would seem to me it would have been
easier to just stop it earlier, if they had gone through our
Ambassador and gotten a turndown at that point instead of
putting it through three or four exchanges. Maybe they didn't
want it to go by that way.
Thanks very much.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

THE PRISONER'S MESSAGE

Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, I read your statement, and I
read it fast and I may have read it wrong, but I think I read
it that the man arrested in Saigon was a Viet Cong heading for
Bunker's office, is that right?
Secretary Katzenbach. They do not know where he was.
Senator Mundt. With a message.
Secretary Katzenbach. He had a message on him at the time
he was taken prisoner. How he proposed to have that message
delivered or, I suppose even whether he proposed to deliver it
is----
Senator Mundt. In all events he was seeking, from the
evidence, to convey a message to Bunker.
Secretary Katzenbach. He was seeking to convey a message to
Bunker.
Senator Mundt. My question, this kind of disturbs me, if
there are no ways in which we can get in communication with the
government of Vietnam whether it is on peace--this was not, but
on exchanges of prisoners which is also very important--if the
Saigon government goes through an intermediary there and makes
up that communication, I think that disturbs you if it----
Secretary Katzenbach. I think the Saigon government behaved
perfectly correctly in the situation. They had no knowledge as
far----
Senator Mundt. Arresting him, I agree.
Secretary Katzenbach. As soon as they arrested him and
searched him and found this communication, it was promptly
turned over to the United States, and they then permitted us to
question this man.
Senator Mundt. They did?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
Senator Mundt. Well, that was my question. I understood
they did not.
Secretary Katzenbach. No, they did.
Senator Mundt. They did allow us to question the man.
Secretary Katzenbach. [Deleted.]

FURTHER COMMUNICATION

Senator Mundt. Who now will make the decision whether the
man can go back to wherever he came from with our reactions to
the message?
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, we have had further
communication through another person, which I said in here,
through another intermediary on this, and this is the
question--so far as the decision what to do with this
particular fellow this is a decision we have to arrive at in
agreement with the South Vietnamese for the simple reason that
they have custody of him. The great difficulty of releasing him
is that this is known to any number of people in Saigon, it is
known to all the prison authorities and police who had
something to do with it, and he is an identified medium level
sort of GS-14 VC type, and with the publicity that has been
given to it, Senator, they have got a problem in suddenly
releasing this man, and that will be all over the place when
they do it.

RUMORS AND SPECULATION IN SAIGON

Senator Mundt. What does the publicity in Saigon say, say
we have arrested a Viet Cong spy? Does it say we have arrested
a Viet Cong agent who is over here talking about release of
prisoners? Do they tell the whole story?
Secretary Katzenbach. It tells that also but there are also
all kinds of rumors and speculations that the Americans have
been dealing behind the government's back, this fellow was
going to a meeting with Ambassador Bunker, and this kind of
thing. So that with certain elements in South Vietnam who are
mistrustful of the Americans, that has been used to expose that
part of it.
Now, if this fellow were released I think it would be
immediately known because there are so many people who know who
he is and so forth. I am not putting that, Senator, I am not
putting that out of the ball park and saying it cannot be done.
It is just difficult to do while everybody's attention is
focused on what is happening to this fellow.

RELEASING PRISONERS

Senator Mundt. Were the prisoners involved in the message
described as Vietnamese or Americans or not described at all?
Secretary Katzenbach. The prisoners that they would release
were described as Americans.
Senator Mundt. That being the case----
Secretary Katzenbach. The prisoners they wanted were
political prisoners.
Senator Mundt. Sure, we being partners in the war this is
something we ought to pursue as diligently as possible.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
Senator Mundt. This business of releasing prisoners is
vital to us, I suppose more vital to us because we place a
greater premium on human life.
Secretary Katzenbach. I could not agree with you more. But
the reason I said the publicity which has been given to the
matter has made it difficult and slowed it down--it is still
alive and I am still hopeful we can work out a way to do it and
certainly this is a matter which Ambassador Bunker has been
personally concerned as a very high priority business, and it
seems every time he tries to do something there are more
stories in the Saigon press.

PRE-CONDITION TO PRISONER RELEASE

Senator Mundt. We should stay in there, it seems to me, and
not be pushed out. I do feel in a case like this we should
exercise all the persuasion we can to call their bluff on this,
if that is what it is, and let him go back, it is just one more
Viet Cong, and go back and tell them, ``Yes, we would be
willing to exchange prisoners,'' and get the word out to the
home folks, as I got a call from a wife of a fellow who has
been established as being a prisoner over there, and I have
been telling them, which I think is right, we have been doing
everything we can.
Secretary Katzenbach. We have.
Senator Mundt. And we are going to do everything we can,
but she could not quite understand the stories, after she heard
the stories.
Secretary Katzenbach. But the difficulties that appear in
the statement there they have now set as a pre-condition to
having any communications of the release of prisoners that
there would be a unilateral prior release of a number of VC
cadre, it is not of tremendous importance, but all identified
as such, known to be held by the South Vietnamese, and this
raises an additional problem as to whether you are going to
release half a dozen people for the possibility of getting on
with some discussions, and it does raise a political problem
for the South Vietnamese to do it. But again I am hopeful we
can work this out and we are working on it.
Senator Mundt. Well, I hope we will lean over backward even
if it involves releasing a couple of Viet Cong prisoners, not
too many of them, but a couple of them and say, ``Now what are
you going to do next?''
It is no great loss to us if a couple more Viet Cong go
home if there is a chance to open up the prisoner exchange
because this is pretty serious, and I wish you could go out--I
realize you cannot tell the whole story probably, but I wish
you would get out something a little more reassuring from the
Department of State than they have read thus far because they
do not seem to understand and there is nothing we can tell them
on the basis of secret testimony that helps them.
Secretary Katzenbach. Senator, the importance of it and our
efforts on it we could not be more in agreement with you. Of
course what we say, we would love to be able to say more than
we can, and I simply say if we do it is going to make more
difficult what we are trying to do. We would rather sit and if
we can achieve the end objective----

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Senator Mundt. Our overall prevailing relationships with
the new government in Saigon, are they so sticky and are we so
suspicious of each other that we cannot sit down with them
across a cup of tea and talk like we are talking here?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir. We talk with them this way:
We have had good cooperation from them on this on the highest
level. It does make it more difficult, just the mechanics of
how you do this and how you explain it, and Thieu has the
additional problem on there that he is getting a good deal of
static in the press in Saigon right now that he is just a
puppet of the Americans. If the Americans say release somebody
and he releases them and if the Americans say jump and he jumps
there.

PARENTS OF PRISONERS

Senator Case. It is on this--I think you have already
answered this, Mr. Katzenbach--on the question of how much we
can say on what you are talking about because I as well as the
Senator from South Dakota have received a letter from the
parents of a boy who is presumably a prisoner of war and they
write and are very exigent about this thing.
I feel as the Senator from South Dakota does we are not
doing very much to help him and I just want to know whether
there is anything you have said that we could pass along or
not, frankly, to be specific.
Secretary Katzenbach. Senator, I feel that we are doing
everything we are able to. I can tell you as a fellow who spent
a couple of years as a prisoner you could not get anybody more
sympathetic to getting those guys out, wanting to do it, than I
am. I see no reason why you should not say there are efforts
being made--these things take time but they are being made--to
try to get some sort of prisoner exchange.
Senator Case. Thank you.
The Chairman. Are you through?
Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

MILITARY MISSIONS INTO CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I will ask
any questions because I am sure it would be repetitive. I have
here a number of questions the staff has prepared. Have these,
most of these been asked?
The Chairman. No.
Senator Sparkman. There are one or two I think that I would
like to ask. One of them is this: Currently the policy on ``hot
pursuit'' of Viet Cong units into Cambodia is to be revised.
Does this mean that search and destroy military operations will
be carried out in Cambodia and Laos? And if it is a new policy,
would you explain it?
Secretary Katzenbach. I do not think it is any new policy
on it. There is nothing of that kind that goes on now.
Senator Sparkman. I heard over the radio this morning that
you came within two and a half miles of the Cambodian border in
bombing raids today.
Secretary Katzenbach. We have gone--yes, sir.
Senator Sparkman. Very close.
Secretary Katzenbach. I do not know, that may well be true.
Senator Sparkman. And it was speculated by this commentator
that that might urge a hot pursuit permission.

SPEECH BY SIHANOUK

Secretary Katzenbach. The problem of sanctuaries in
Cambodia is a perfectly real problem. We have made efforts, are
making efforts, to see if that can be dealt with
diplomatically. We have provided a good deal of evidence as to
the use of sanctuaries to Sihanouk in the hope that either he
will take some steps to the extent he is able to or, as you
perhaps read in the paper yesterday in recent speech, to see if
he can bolster up the ICC to do something to preserve that
border and deny sanctuaries there.
Senator Sparkman. Let me get that straight. You mean he
said----
Secretary Katzenbach. He was quoted yesterday in the press,
and that is really the source of the first part that I gave you
was in fact true although there has been no publicity given to
it. We would not want any given to it because he can be a
fairly erratic fellow and he may react exactly the wrong way.
We provided a good deal of evidence to him as to where bases
are located, where we think they are located, and so forth in
the hope he would do something about it. I took his speech----
Senator Hickenlooper. What can he do?
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, he could, for example, ask the
ICC to come in and he could expose this. He could do that kind
of thing. I think that would make life a lot more difficult.
They did get the heck out of the base that the newspaper
reporters discovered in there, so it may be possible to do
something.
Senator Hickenlooper. His army does not amount to much.
Secretary Katzenbach. Not much, but something. I think if
he could put some of his fellows in the right place I think it
would cause some difficulties.
Senator Mundt. John, will you yield?
Senator Sparkman. Let me make this comment. Certainly it
would help things if he had a change in attitude.
Secretary Katzenbach. Certainly it would.

NEED FOR HELICOPTERS

Senator Mundt. But he is supposed to have said in a press
conference that he would let the ICC look around if we would
send him some helicopters to carry them.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir. That is what he is reported
to have said, and I think that is something which we are now
exploring to see how it is possible to do this.
Senator Mundt. Would that not be worth the helicopters to
us?
Secretary Katzenbach. Oh, yes, sir, I personally think it
would.
We now have to find where and how we could provide
helicopters and whether or not the ICC is going to do it.
Senator Case. You can take Senator Percy's.
Secretary Katzenbach. What?
Senator Case. You can take the one Senator Percy used.
[Laughter.]
Senator Mundt. The Canadians want to do it.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, it is a question of whether
the Indians and Poles would do it.
Senator Sparkman. I will not ask any more. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper--Senator Case.

AMERICAN PRISONERS HELD BY NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Cooper. Do you know how many American prisoners are
held by North Vietnam, the Viet Cong?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir. I can give you those
figures as of December 1. By the NLF, 20 confirmed. Missing,
possibly prisoners, 209. So there is a total of possible
prisoners of 229, but only 20 we have confirmed.
Senator Cooper. Are any of them held in North Vietnam that
you know about?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes. I was going to give the North
Vietnamese figures. Those are the figures. I do not know
whether those people remain in South Vietnam or whether they
are in North Vietnam. But the 20 we believe to be in South
Vietnam.
As far as North Vietnam is concerned we know of 203, and
missing and perhaps prisoners 435.
Senator Cooper. You said that the United States is making
all possible efforts for an exchange of prisoners. I do not
doubt that at all, but what means and pressures do you use to
propose such exchanges? How do you go about it?
Secretary Katzenbach. We go about it in different ways, try
different ways of going about it, try to make direct contacts.
We have made on one occasion a direct contact with Hanoi by a
simple statement we would like to engage in this any way they
want to do it.
We have also explored indirectly with both Hanoi and with
the NLF in various places through third parties who inquired of
us whether there was any arrangement in any way that they would
be willing to go about arrangements, discussions, or other
means of exchange of prisoners. This has been done on a number
of occasions and we have gotten a flat rejection everywhere. It
is--the only means we have that has been affirmative is the
incident that is under discussion.
Senator Cooper. Is the Red Cross able to get into North
Vietnam?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, they would not permit them. We
have used, as an example of--whenever any person goes there,
even if they are not a person you are very dearly in love with,
we ask them to take this up and to discuss this and to try to
check on the prisoners and to state our interest in doing this,
any way whatsoever.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE HELD AS PRISONERS

Senator Mundt. Do you have a reading in response to Senator
Cooper's question about the American prisoners? Do you have any
idea how many South Vietnamese prisoners are held up there?
Secretary Katzenbach. I do not have any figures on that. We
do not have any.
Senator Mundt. This would have some bearing as to whether
the Saigon government would be willing to exchange prisoners if
they have got them up there.
Secretary Katzenbach. They have some prisoners. There are
not nearly as many in North Vietnam as our prisoners for the
reason most of our prisoners in North Vietnam are air crews. So
that----
Senator Cooper. How many prisoners----
Secretary Katzenbach. In North Vietnam we have confirmed
105 Navy which is all off carriers, 93 Air Force, and 5 Marines
which gives you an idea of where the prisoners are coming from.
Senator Cooper. How many prisoners does the United States
hold?
Secretary Katzenbach. I do not have those figures.
Senator Cooper. We do hold prisoners of war.
Secretary Katzenbach. We hold prisoners of war, some we
turned over and some we hold, is that right?
Mr. Read. Yes, we have a few.
Senator Cooper. About how many?
Mr. Read. We could supply that for the record.
Secretary Katzenbach. I would have to get the information.

THE LEVERAGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

Senator Cooper. The reason I ask this is we would have to
have some leverage talking about an exchange, we would have to
hold some prisoners and if we turn them all over to South
Vietnam we would have to hold some.
Secretary Katzenbach. Can I give at least a personal view
on that? I think there is a difference of attitude and
philosophy between the Americans and Vietnamese as to
prisoners, as to the value and worth of human life and so
forth. I think as far as the value to either Hanoi or the NLF
of people held, the people that they are interested in are not
soldiers, even to some extent officers that have been captured
because we have not captured all that many. I think their
interest is in the political infrastructure where these people
have been taken prisoner.
The Chairman. Have we captured any P.T. crews?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, I do not think so.
The Chairman. Those crews of the P.T. boats, we sank some,
did we not capture the crews or we reportedly sank some?
Secretary Katzenbach. I do not know the answer to that, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. You do not know. Go ahead.
Secretary Katzenbach. I have no recollection of having any
knowledge of it.
Senator Cooper. You were talking about political prisoners.
Secretary Katzenbach. In terms of leverage they always
indicate much more interest in the political people.
Senator Gore. I did not understand in terms of leverage.
Secretary Katzenbach. They are much more interested in the
political people, the VC infrastructure than in terms of the
soldiers.
We captured very few officers who had any significance to
them at all.
Senator Case. But the cadre.
Secretary Katzenbach. But the cadre is what they are
interested in.
Senator Gore. Senator Cooper, would you yield at this
point?
Senator Cooper. Yes.

NLF'S PRELIMINARY REQUESTS

Senator Gore. I think Senator Cooper has put his finger on
a sensitive item. You told us earlier that the NLF wished as a
preliminary for further discussion of exchange of prisoners the
release of the NLF man who was apprehended with a note to
Ambassador Bunker. Now if they make this as a preliminary----
Secretary Katzenbach. And more. They asked for more than
that.
Senator Gore. Even more, and the Saigon government refuses
to grant that then we are up against--face to face with the
question that Senator Cooper proposes that we are without
leverage to go further.
Excuse me, Senator Cooper, we are right at that.
Senator Cooper. That is the point I raised.
Senator Gore. Will you define the ``release of this
prisoner and more''? I know what you said earlier, define ``and
more.''
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, they want----
Senator Sparkman. Twenty, was it not?
Secretary Katzenbach. Well--no, sir. It is very hard to say
precisely what they want because they did not name the people
that they wanted.
Senator Sparkman. You did have a number in your paper
though, did you not?
Secretary Katzenbach. I do not believe there is a number in
there.
Senator Pell. There is nothing specific.
Senator Sparkman. I thought you said ``wanted him and 20
others.''
Secretary Katzenbach. No, the only figure I raised was the
20 U.S. identified prisoners.
Senator Gore. I did not understand, I am sorry. In your
answer to him I did not quite get it. You say you referred to
20.
The Chairman. No, he said no.
Senator Sparkman. He did not. That was 20 prisoners held.
Secretary Katzenbach. I would like to make it clear that
the Saigon government has not refused to do it. It is just that
the current publicity is giving us some headaches on just how
to go about not refusing to do it.

FEW PRISONERS FROM BATTLES

Senator Mundt. While we are still on prisoners, the
prisoners you have listed held by Hanoi, it would appear to me
to be almost all some pilots who have been shot down or
navigators or people picked up at sea.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
Senator Mundt. I cannot quite conceive how we fought these
big battles along the DMZ and kill and wound a lot of people
and nobody gets caught on either side as being a prisoner.
Secretary Katzenbach. We take some prisoners, they do not
take very many. They are a hit and run operation, and they
simply do not take----
Senator Mundt. No prisoners from all these battles that
have been fought?
Secretary Katzenbach. Very, very few, sir. We have five
Marines listed as prisoners in North Vietnam that are
confirmed. We have 11 Marines missing that might be prisoners.
The rest are Air Force and Navy.
Senator Sparkman. Navy. How many Navy?
Secretary Katzenbach. Navy pilots.
Senator Sparkman. Navy pilots.
Senator Cooper. May I just finish on that?
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Cooper.

U THANT'S INTERPRETATION OF NLF INTENTIONS

Senator Cooper. To return to the U.N., I think you said
Ambassador Goldberg asked one whether they wanted to talk to
the United States, whether they wanted to appear before any
organs of the U.N. Did they respond specifically to that
question?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, they did not to the question
as to whether they wanted to have any relations, any talks with
the United States. Their only response on that is what I quoted
before, where it said purpose: ``Work principally U.N. but
would not refuse radio, TV, press interviews.''
Senator Cooper. This message, I understand, came from U
Thant. Was he in a position to elucidate any more on this
issue?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
Senator Cooper. That is all he knows.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
Senator Cooper. Have there ever been any other efforts,
similar efforts made, by the NLF to come to the U.N.?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.

NLF REPRESENTATIVES IN WORLD CAPITALS

Senator Cooper. The NLF has representatives throughout
Europe, has it not, in different capitals?
Secretary Katzenbach. In some countries, yes, sir.
Senator Cooper. We read about some of them like Paris,
Poland.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, Paris.
Senator Cooper. Algeria.
Secretary Katzenbach. Algeria.
Senator Cooper. Romania.
Secretary Katzenbach. Cairo, two or three other places;
Prague, New Delhi.
Senator Cooper. Has the United States any contacts with
these representatives?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
Senator Cooper. Never?
Secretary Katzenbach. Never been able to.
Senator Cooper. So far as you know have any of these
representatives of the NLF ever made any proposition through an
intermediary to the United States toward negotiations?
Secretary Katzenbach. They have not, sir, no.
Senator Cooper. Has the United States tried to make
contacts with their representatives in any way?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, we have tried from time to
time on the question of prisoner exchange. It has been our
thought that that was the easiest thing to make some contacts
on and if we had been able to make any contacts on it we would
have, as I said before----

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S VISITS

Senator Cooper. Now in the newspapers over the year stories
about ambassador Harriman visiting countries rumored that they
may have contact with the NLF----
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
Senator Cooper [continuing]. North Vietnam, is that all
barren, there has been no contact?
Secretary Katzenbach. That is right.
Senator Cooper. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Katzenbach. And whenever any approaches have been
made in most really very indirect kinds of ways they have been
very flat about an unwillingness to do anything.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS

The Chairman. Is it our policy not to negotiate with the
NLF or is it to negotiate with them or try to in order to
possibly divide in some way at least temporarily from the Hanoi
regime, divide NLF from the Hanoi regime?
Secretary Katzenbach. I think we have felt that
negotiations would have to be with somebody that as far as we
were concerned, somebody that was speaking in some sense for
Hanoi, and the President has made clear on a number of
occasions that if such negotiations took place the NLF would
have no difficulty having its views presented.
The Chairman. I understand. Then it is we do not wish to
negotiate with the NLF.
Secretary Katzenbach. I think that the question of
negotiations with the NLF is two-fold: In the first place we
believe, with a good deal of reason to believe it, that the NLF
is an instrumentality of Hanoi. We do not think that it is
possible, even if one determined that it was wise policy, to do
so, to negotiate with the NLF unless in fact they are capable
of representing Hanoi and are doing so with the full authority
of Hanoi in this.
Secondly, the NLF wants to be--inisted publicly and every
other way in any negotiations with it, have to recognize it as
a government, and that is something that the government of
South Vietnam is quite unprepared to do. I do not think that
all of this means that in terms of trying to get the
negotiations and so forth that it means that the NLF cannot be
a party to this.
The Chairman. I understand that.
Secretary Katzenbach. But it largely, it seems to me,
depends on attitudes towards this that the Hanoi government
would have as to those negotiations and also as to time and
circumstances and so forth as far as the South Vietnamese
Government is concerned. It seems to me obvious, Senator, at
some time, in some way, the government of South Vietnam has to
find ways of settling its differences with those South
Vietnamese who are fighting against it, who are part of the
war, and I think that has been recognized by General Thieu and
General Ky.

ROLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman. Is it fair to say that our policy is not to
negotiate or accept representatives for negotiations from the
NLF?
Secretary Katzenbach. Not without discussion with the South
Vietnamese government and with working with them on this
problem.
The Chairman. Well, they have made it very clear that they
will not, they stated that publicly. They will not.
Secretary Katzenbach. They stated they would negotiate with
Hanoi. They have not quarreled with the fact that Hanoi would
have ways of having the NLF represented in that.
The Chairman. But haven't they said publicly and being
printed time and again, they will not negotiate with the NLF,
is that true or not?
Secretary Katzenbach. General Thieu has made a number of
statements on that. I think I can probably quote them to you.
The Chairman. Well, I think I have read them. I think that
is true. As far as you know, it is true, isn't it?
Secretary Katzenbach. In general terms. It seems to me he
has been forthcoming as far as negotiations are concerned, as
far as a willingness to negotiate. He has pointed out that
negotiating with the NLF which is an instrumentality of Hanoi
would raise difficulties for him as such if it were done that
way.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The Chairman. Well, I haven't got an answer yet. Is it fair
to say, for me to say, for example, that if I were asked that
it is the policy of our government not to negotiate with the
representatives of the NLF, is that a fair statement?
Secretary Katzenbach. If they are representing the NLF as
the legitimate Government of South Vietnam and so forth, we
don't recognize them as that.
It is not fair, Senator, to say that we would refuse to
negotiate with the NLF when the President has said repeatedly
that in negotiations with Hanoi, the NLF could be represented,
and I don't think it is fair to make the flat statement on
this.
And you are talking here, I suppose, peace negotiations,
you are not talking about trying to work out some way of
prisoner exchange.
The Chairman. Talking about some possible way to settle the
war.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD SETTLE MATTERS THEMSELVES

Mr. Chairman. For example, this is a statement the staff
just handed me. This is from the December 6 Washington Post,
Chalmers Roberts:

The statement went on to say that ``Our position toward
peace talks is that one should talk to the aggressors, that is
the North Vietnamese and not the Viet Cong. It is a matter, of
course, that we should object to the Viet Cong going to the
United Nations.''

And does that mean, that is the attitude of the South
Vietnamese Government, is that our attitude, too, on this
matter?
Secretary Katzenbach. I think with respect to negotiations
among the South Vietnamese, our position has been that they
should settle these matters themselves.

PRESIDENT THIEU'S PRESS CONFERENCE

Let me quote from Thieu's press conference so that it will
be accurate in terms of what is said. This is from General
Thieu's press conference of August 25:
``In what way might the future government open talks with
the NLF?''
Thieu replied that ``The position of the GVN is that there
can be no talks with the NLF if they insist on terming
themselves representatives of the people of South Vietnam. We
cannot accept that,'' he said.
``Would they hold informal talks with the NLF?''
Thieu said, ``If they come to Saigon, I will talk to them.
Such talks could bring good results.''
``Would he guarantee NLF members safe passage to Saigon?''
Thieu said, ``Sure.''
Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield?
The Chairman. Yes.

DEALING WITH HANOI AND THE NLF

Senator Mundt. What is hard for me to understand, Mr.
Secretary, is what kind of fruitful result might come of it. I
can't just see how it is going to benefit the United States
much to have a peace treaty with the NLF and a war with Hanoi,
because you have got behind somebody you can't trust. It seems
to me you have to bring Hanoi and NLF in together.
Senator Gore. Will you include Saigon in that?
Senator Mundt. Yes, I will include Saigon, I don't see how
Saigon is benefitted if you stop the NLF and you still have a
war going on with Hanoi. It seems to me you have a greater
advantage in negotiating with Hanoi and the NLF than just with
the NLF alone.
Secretary Katzenbach. I think there is. You can fudge up
the situation. I mean just talking the U.N. instance, here are
two particular people traveling with passports from Hanoi and
saying they are prepared to speak and negotiate, they may be
NLF members and presumably they will represent Hanoi, I suppose
you will get mixed up in that kind of situation.
The basis point I would make on this is that the NLF is in
our judgment not a truly separate entity from the Hanoi
Government. It is their instrumentality in the south. It was
created to, if you go into the history of this it was created
to be the instrumentality of this.

RELATIONSHIP OF VIET CONG AND HANOI

The Chairman. That is a question upon which there is a
difference of opinion. Many people have said the NLF while it
is allied with, supported primarily by them, that there are
many more people, fighting people, in South Vietnam, who, that
are members of the Viet Cong that are regular soldiers from
Hanoi, are there not?
The figures we have seen would indicate there are far more
members of the 200 or whatever it is thousands of communists in
South Vietnam. As I remember, it was about 290,000, only about
50,000 are North Vietnamese, the rest are NLF people or Viet
Cong, is that about correct?
Secretary Katzenbach. I think that is about correct. Some
of those people are people who came down from the north.
The Chairman. Well, suppose, just for a hypothetical
supposing they had had enough of it and wanted a cease fire and
we would refuse to meet with them, if I understand you
correctly, unless Hanoi joins and is the negotiating party, is
that correct? Supposing they said, ``We would like a cease
fire,'' and you said, ``No, we don't want it unless Hanoi
joins.''
Secretary Katzenbach. The NLF can speak for Hanoi in this
situation and I don't suppose that there is any great problem.
The Chairman. What if they just speak for themselves. They
are the dominant people there in numbers.
Secretary Katzenbach. There is, as you say, a difference of
opinion on this. I am very clear in my mind as to who controls
the NLF.
The Chairman. I know you are.
Secretary Katzenbach. I think if you negotiated with one of
these fellows on the NLF who came over under your hypothesis he
would bring nobody with him. You would have another Chu Hoi.

A GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE

The Chairman. If he was a genuine representative of the
NLF, he represents a major number of the fighting men in South
Vietnam who fight our soldiers.
Secretary Katzenbach. That is correct. Maybe he would end
up being a genuine representative, in that--self designated in
that capacity like some of these other people who then end up
in exile. I mean I don't think it is possible, Senator.

A CIVIL WAR

The Chairman. I know you think that, but here they are
taking the punishment, I mean they are getting killed lots more
than the North Vietnamese, and it is possible that they have
had enough of it and they would like to settle the matter
regardless of Hanoi. It is possible, I know you don't agree
with this because this doesn't fit your theory of the war, but
not everybody agrees with your theory of the war, I guess you
know that, as to how it started and what it is about.
There are people who think this was a civil war and before
we intervened, and that these are the major fighting units and
they have had enough of it, they have lost enough people and
would like to stop it.
Assuming that, it seems to me what would be the
disadvantage to us of meeting with them if you could get a
cease fire.
Secretary Katzenbach. I think if that were the situation
and you were correct in that, that the government of South
Vietnam would have no difficulty trying to settle matters of
that sort.

WHAT IS THE U.S. ATTITUDE

The Chairman. I am talking about the United States, you are
always shifting over. What is the U.S. attitude? We are doing
most of the fighting.
Secretary Katzenbach. To make that very simple: I don't
think that the United States is in a position to or should be
in a position to tell the South Vietnamese just exactly, ``By
god, you are going to settle this war in this way, whether you
like it or not.''
The Chairman. You don't think so?
Secretary Katzenbach. I don't think--if that is true, then
we could turn the whole thing over to the NLF and say, ``That
is the way it is and we now insist on that.'' We have gone
through the process, it seems to me, of trying to create a
government there that can speak for South Vietnam, it
represents many more people in South Vietnam than the so-called
government of the NLF and it just seems to me that in terms of
the solution there, as I said before, they are going to have to
work out their differences at some period of time, but I don't
know what right we have to say, ``We are imposing this
political system on you,'' that is what we are fighting for.

THE COST FOR THE UNITED STATES

The Chairman. The reason, we are paying the costs and we
are losing the men, is a very practical reason. The cost is on
the United States and that government wouldn't last very long;
if it isn't a puppet government, I never saw one.
Secretary Katzenbach. Let me say, Senator, that the bridge
you want to know whether or not we want to cross has not yet
been constructed, because every single indication from the NLF
has been just as flat and negative as any indication from
Hanoi.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman----
Secretary Katzenbach. I say if that situation you talk
about comes into being in fact then let's see what we would do
if that situation comes into being.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask----
The Chairman. Let me say you continue. I have another
appointment.
Senator Mundt. May I ask a question before you go?

NEGOTIATE WITH THE VIET CONG

Senator Sparkman. I wanted to ask a question right on
there, but I wanted to ask the same question a little
differently, but on a different premise.
The different premise is this. I agree, Mr. Secretary, as
to the nature of the war. I don't agree with the chairman, as
is well known, I presume. But it seems to me that the Viet Cong
are in South Vietnam, and they are conducting the fighting
there and, as a practical matter, if they ceased fighting North
Vietnam, it seems to me, would have a pretty difficult time
carrying on.
Secretary Katzenbach. Right.
Senator Sparkman. So it seems to me that we probably ought
to have a kind of a receptive attitude to any proposal on their
part, to negotiate, and if the opportunity ever presents
itself, I think we ought to be in an attitude to be willing to
negotiate with them without asking. Let them ask permission of
Hanoi, if permission has to be given, but don't let us
predicate our proceedings on what Hanoi says to them.
Secretary Katzenbach. I don't disagree with that. One of
the great difficulties with this is that the NLF has constantly
claimed to be the legitimate government, and so forth, and so
on. And one of the problems that obviously Thieu has or that we
have on this, is when asked these kinds of questions to say,
``Oh, yes, we will negotiate with the NLF'' assuming that were
our position, is to build the NLF up and to build up the
mythology of the independent NLF into a government and so forth
so it becomes a political factor. They want to push for that
kind of a statement not because they want to negotiate, but
because they want that kind of public recognition. This is what
makes life difficult for the government in Saigon.
So I would say if the facts that the chairman says are
true, here are people who can speak for 200,000, 150,000
troops, who claim to do that, there is reason to believe that,
they say, ``We want to make peace,'' at that point, let's cross
that bridge when we have that sincerity in those circumstances.
I don't think we have it now and I think it is very
hypothetical and dangerous to try to answer it.

A SENSIBLE FORMULA

Senator Mundt. You laid down in response to the chairman's
question a sort of formula which to me sounds sensible, and
that is that the United States against the opposition of the
Saigon government could not very well negotiate with the NLF.
If they said okay, yes, but if they said, no, no.
Now, it seems to me to be consistent you have got to apply
that same formula to Hanoi. I don't see how the United States
can very well go in and negotiate a peace with Hanoi over the
opposition of the government of Saigon without first shooting
the Saigonese government out of the saddle.
Would you apply the same formula as well as the formula for
the NLF and a different formula for Hanoi?
Senator Case. Saigon doesn't object to that so much, is
that the point?
Secretary Katzenbach. I think all of our allies including
Saigon we would want to consult before any negotiations occur.
The basic reason we are in there is aggression by North Vietnam
against South Vietnam. If that matter would be resolved then it
would be possible to resolve our differences. We have
differences with Hanoi which would be capable of resolution in
terms of how we got in there.
The government of South Vietnam has differences with the
government of North Vietnam and with the insurgents that are in
the south. These are going to have to be resolved sometime, by
some mechanism, by some method.
I don't think we would in either instance negotiate behind
the backs of the South Vietnamese government.
Senator Mundt. Any more than we would expect them to
negotiate behind our backs to set up the conditions.
Secretary Katzenbach. That is correct.

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

Senator Case. Karl, may I make just a little comment here?
It seems to me this point which has itched and irritated and
annoyed me a year ago, and a year and a-half ago by someone who
thought he had said something when he said we ought to
negotiate directly with the NLF, it was just a matter of bad
handling.
If we said from the beginning we haven't tried to
negotiate, we will cross that bridge when we come to it, we
would have been much better off.
And this business now we have a thousand people who are
thinking they are saying something and thinking we are
intransigent.
Senator Mundt. Think of your impact of that on your elected
government of Saigon.
Secretary Katzenbach. This is the problem even with that
kind of statement.
Senator Case. There is something, you know, I am not happy
about the way this war is going, as I have said, and the way we
are conducting ourselves, but this kind of thing always seems
to me like making much ado about absolutely nothing at all, and
I would be glad to say so again and again.
Senator Cooper. May I say something?

A VERY GLOOMY REACTION

It seems to me one problem about all this is, as you say,
there has been no indication of any attitude on the NLF
negotiating, I assume that is correct--is that correct?
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, they have talked about
negotiating on their terms.
Senator McCarthy. So have we, that is not a real fault.
Senator Cooper. Your attitude ought to have some weight as
to whether or not they ever negotiate.
All I can say after listening to you, it is a very gloomy
reaction. I don't see any, any hope of any kind except to crush
them with military force, that is about it.
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, I think--I am not hopeful
that there will be any negotiation in the immediate future on
this. It doesn't seem to me it looks as though there will be.
But it is not--we have indicated we would be willing to
negotiate with Hanoi on an open agenda, that is anybody could
raise anything they wanted to raise. Neither Hanoi nor the NLF
has ever indicated any interest in negotiations except after
certain pre-conditions had been accomplished. That is the
difference between the two positions. Hanoi has put
preconditions of bombing on it. It has varied from time to
time, at least in the public statements as to whether you have
to negotiate on the premise that the NLF was a legitimate
government of South Vietnam, on the four points, the NLF five
points.
If the position which the chairman indicated somebody wants
to speak for the NLF, I don't believe we are separated in that
kind of a way, if this came to pass, and said they could do it,
I would assume under these circumstances that they were doing
it with the authority of Hanoi, and I can see many different
scenarios so far as negotiations were concerned if people
wanted to negotiate.
The difficulty, as I emphasized a moment ago, and I think
Senator Case, to some extent, the difficulty is what you are
talking about, the very statements you make get into it, create
political difficulties and it is very difficult to find a
formula that doesn't serve the other fellow's political
purposes when--I think you can appreciate the difficulty of
that. Maybe bad handling or maybe it is just a tough problem to
handle in a tough society.
Senator Sparkman. Senator, Senator Pell has been sitting
here rather patiently and hasn't engaged in any questioning.
Let's recognize him.
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am very glad I followed your advice last night and didn't
go to Athens.
Secretary Katzenbach. Tragic.

CLOSING THE CAMBODIAN BORDER

Senator Pell. Just going back to Cambodia for a moment,
isn't it, my recollection is that once Sihanouk offered to
maintain a tight border if we would pay for it. My recollection
is not exact. I don't think he brought in the ICC. I think it
was more a question if we would provide American soldiers,
underwrite it, he would permit us to close the borders.
As you know, in international law a blockade to be legal
must be effective and he is willing for the border to be closed
if we provide the means.
Was that so, and if it was, what was our response, do you
happen to recall?
Secretary Katzenbach. I don't think--they were not talking
about American soldiers, providing American soldiers to keep
his border closed. He doesn't want that.
Senator Pell. What was his proposal, do you know?
Secretary Katzenbach. The only proposal that I can recall
that Sihanouk has ever made outside of negotiating the problem
as he frequently does, was the one that appeared in the press
yesterday where he talked about giving the ICC some equipment
to do it. Have there been any others?
Senator Pell. I am sure there were. A couple of years ago,
you could not recall it, but it was when you were still in
Justice.
Secretary Katzenbach. I don't recall any other offer.
Mr. Read. Nothing recent now.
Senator Pell. It was two or three years ago.
Maybe for the record it could be submitted, the proposal he
made and our response at that time.

GIVING THE CAMBODIANS HELICOPTERS

Senator Sparkman. I am not sure your question embodied
this. If we gave them those helicopters would they be piloted
by their own pilots, Cambodian pilots?
Secretary Katzenbach. I think we would have a problem
finding compatible types and so forth. I think this is one of
the things being looked at in view of his statement, we don't
know what the ICC will do, we have to again, if we were going
to give them helicopters we would have to find compatible
types, for example, to be piloted by Canadians, Indians, or by
Poles, and this is not easy to do, you know, before this time
tomorrow. It gets complicated. Also, there are even some legal
complications as to just how we provide, on what kind of a
basis, you know, equipment to the ICC.
Senator Sparkman. You could lend lease it to them.
Secretary Katzenbach. I am not sure the legislative
authority, but how you go about doing this even as it now sits.

NLF COULD ATTEND SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, returning to the question of
the NLF going to the United Nations, as I read the paper and as
I understand it, we have never denied them and said they could
not come.
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
Senator Pell. For the purposes, for any reason whatsoever.
We said the reason they could come is still being left open, is
that correct?
Secretary Katzenbach. We have gone further than that. We
have really said they could come in connection with any debate
in the Security Council and if you read the headquarters
agreement, or for any other purpose that--the United Nation's
purpose. They have to have passports and so forth to come, but
we have not tried to deny their coming if the U.N. wants them
to come. That is a simple statement of it.
But if they just want to come on their own and nobody in
the U.N. is asking them to come, we have taken the position
that, I suppose, we haven't denied that.
They haven't applied for visas. I don't mean to mislead the
Committee. I would think unless we found some legitimate reason
for that we wouldn't have a great deal much reason to give them
visas to appear on a national network and do this, that, or the
other thing.
Senator Sparkman. I know they said they were willing to do
that.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, yes.

COMPARISON TO ALGERIA

Senator Pell. What is the difference in handling, or has
there been any difference in handling of the NLF delegates from
Algeria or whenever it was '58 or '59, and the handling of
these NLF ones from Vietnam?
Secretary Katzenbach. Sure, some Algerians came into this
country on passports. I think they were on Pakistani passports,
I have forgotten, they may have been on other passports. But
they came in, they got visas to visit. I don't think there was
any diplomatic status at all. They hung around New York and it
was an Algerian freedom movement there and so forth. I think
there is a slight distinction between Algeria's fight against
France and what is presently going on in South Vietnam. I think
that is a difficult case to make.

WHO CAN SPEAK TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, I can't quite get through my
mind, if you let the NLF come, Number One, who do they
represent, how do they obtain membership in the U.N.? Is the
U.N. open to any rump group that wants to participate in
debate, whether they represent anybody or not?
Could Stokley Carmichael go up there and say, ``I represent
Black Power,'' and make a speech?
Unless you recognize them as a government, how do they
come?
Secretary Katzenbach. That is my point. Under Rule 39 it
does provide that the Security Council can hear persons----
Senator McCarthy. They could hear him if they wanted to.
Senator Mundt. They could even invite him in.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, that could be.
Senator Mundt. Not in the plenary session of the General
Assembly.
Secretary Katzenbach. No, he doesn't have a vote and in
that kind of situation and doesn't involve recognizing him as a
government of any kind because I think the language is
representative of persons or groups, persons.
Mr. Read. The interested persons or groups.
Secretary Katzenbach. Interested persons or groups.
Senator Mundt. In other words, the only way the NLF could
be would be by invitation by the Security Council, and then to
appear only before the Security Council. Could they also appear
before the General Assembly?
Secretary Katzenbach. That would be true only under Rule
39.
Now, it is possible that other agencies of the U.N. could
invite persons to appear before them, any of the specialized
agencies, this is under the Headquarters Agreement. If they
were invited that way, I think we would be obligated to invite
them for that purpose, under the Headquarters Agreement which
we do appear to have in effect.

A RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator Mundt. Suppose the Asia-Africa bloc which is not
favorable to our war should introduce a resolution in the
General Assembly inviting the NLF and it passes. Does it mean
they could participate in the speeches?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, I think if the General Assembly
did it, I think it would be this kind of a fashion: The General
Assembly would be similar to either one of its activities or
committees or pursuant to a resolution there which said it
wanted to hear from a representative of this group, and I think
if the General Assembly said, although there is no explicit
article of that kind, if they wanted to do it, they haven't
crossed this bridge, I would be inclined to believe if the
General Assembly voted it, they wanted to hear a representative
of this group and he wanted to make a speech and that was the
view of the General Assembly, that the United States qua the
United States under the Headquarters Agreement would be
obligated to admit that person for that purpose whether they
like him or not.
We wouldn't have to admit them to go on CBS or NBC or this
or the other thing.
Senator Katzenbach. We did that with Cuba.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, but Cuba is a member.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, but if the U.N. votes to ask
these people here.
Secretary Katzenbach. We gave them a passport visa to come
in for that purpose.
Senator Hickenlooper. For that purpose in the U.N.

AN OPEN SNOOKER GAME

Senator Mundt. For that purpose, and if in the General
Assembly the African-Asian bloc introduced a resolution
tomorrow morning to have a representative of Red China come and
give an address to the General Assembly, would it be covered by
NBC and CBS? This is kind of an open snooker game, anybody can
come in who gets invited and makes speeches.
Senator Hickenlooper. They did at one time, they had the
Red Chinese.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, he came there on the question of
seating Red China in the U.N.
Senator Mundt. Gave a speech on the podium.
Senator Sparkman. He was there and spoke.
Senator Mundt. Being in New York is one thing, but being on
the Floor of the Senate giving a speech or something is
different.

U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER U.N. AGREEMENT

Senator Gore. Ambassador Goldberg answered that question at
the same time he answered the question about the NLF. He said
we would not interpose objection if they were invited.
Secretary Katzenbach. We have obligations under our
Headquarters Agreement for U.N. purposes.
Senator Sparkman. I think it might be well to cite that in
the record right at this point, if I may. Article IV, Section
11, reads, I won't read the whole thing but it reads to this
effect: ``The Federal, State or local authorities of the United
States shall not impose any impediment to transit to or from
the Headquarters District of'' five different classifications,
the fifth of which is, ``other persons invited to the
Headquarters District by the United Nations or by such
specialized agency on official business. The appropriate
American authorities shall afford any necessary protection to
such persons while in transit to or from the Headquarters
District,'' and so forth.
And then the first sentence in Section 12 is the ``The
provisions of Section 11 shall be applicable irrespective of
the relations existing between the governments of the persons
referred to in that section and the Government of the United
States.''
Senator Mundt. John, my question is, I recognize we have to
let them come.----
Senator Sparkman. I recognize that but I thought we ought
to have this in.
Senator Mundt. Do they have the right to stand up on the
podium of the General Assembly with the satellites covering for
TV if they don't belong?
Secretary Katzenbach. If the General Assembly so provides,
I assume they would.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Pell hasn't finished his
questioning yet.
Senator Pell. Let me finish up here, if I may.

NLF VIEW OF U.N. JURISDICTION

Why in your view did the NLF delegates who made the
demarche or presumably made the demarche originally withdraw
and not follow up and try to either press us in this and get us
to specifically deny them entry or come, why did they back
away, in your view?
Secretary Katzenbach. I would suggest as one reason for
this they have never admitted and have always denied that the
United Nations had any competence whatsoever with respect to
what they were doing. And, therefore, I think they did not want
to be in the position of having their finger in this particular
pie.
Senator Pell. You don't feel----
Secretary Katzenbach. And, of course, the other thing,
Senator, is that we don't, as I said earlier, we don't know
whether this was somebody else's idea or theirs. We have got
the three steps removed.
Senator Pell. Right.
Going to the man who was caught in Vietnam, the VC--NLF
man, do we take any precautions with people in that position,
political prisoners, trying to make sure they are not
susceptible to the maltreatment, which is pretty customary
there, or do we just presume that once we turn them over to the
South Vietnamese, South Vietnamese rules apply?
Secretary Katzenbach. One, we didn't turn them over to the
South Vietnamese; they caught them.
Senator Pell. I mean prisoners of war.
Secretary Katzenbach. But I will say in this instance, at
least this fellow is not--he was interviewed by him, we didn't
beat him and he had not been beaten up, maltreated in that way.
But I don't want to give a clean bill of health to any
government's treatment to all prisoners. I don't think it is
something that we would be in a position to control certainly,
or even to influence in all instances.
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Gore has some questions.

INTERPRETATIONS OF NLF ACTIONS

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I find it intriguing that an
answer was not provided to Ambassador Goldberg's interrogatory
as to whether they wished to contact the United States
government. One can read into that different things, an
admission or a statement on their part that they did wish to
contact and have a talk with the United States government might
subject them to the interpretation that they wished to
surrender.
There are various interpretations that can be put upon it.
I don't think we can rush to the conclusion that because
they didn't answer the question that that operates as a denial.
I would be inclined to think that their omission of an answer
to that question might very well indicate that this was one of
the purposes.
Secretary Katzenbach. Senator, most respectfully, I think
you have to put that together with their refusal in many other
instances even to talk about such things as prisoners, to have
any contact with any official of the United States Government
or indeed any other person that they might possibly be speaking
for the United States Government, and I think taken against
that background in other places and against the observations of
Ambassador Goldberg if this indeed was their purpose it would
not be difficult to accomplish in a number of other places and
with a greater deal of secrecy and security I would say
certainly they had not affirmed it and they did answer it in a
way to the extent they answered it by saying they wanted to
lobby in the U.N. and not refusing invitations to appear on
various communications media, and I think putting that
altogether it is pretty hard to make an affirmative out of it.
Senator Gore. I would not attempt to make an affirmative
but I don't think we can dismiss the possibility that an
omission of an answer would indicate an interest in an
affirmative. At least it is an unresolved question.

NOT ACTING BEHIND SOUTH VIETNAM'S BACK

Is there any way, has the United States sought any other
way, to bring and find a resolution of that question?
Secretary Katzenbach. In this particular context, no, sir,
we have not pushed it beyond that. In other contexts we have
gotten projections of this. My own view is that if there is any
interest--let me put it differently. My own personal view, if
you can't discuss directly or indirectly such a subject as
prisoner exchange that it does not bode very well for
discussing more important matters than that.
If it were possible to actually discuss prisoner exchanges
there would have always been the possibility of discussing
other matters on that, and let me be quick to say this is
something we would do with the full knowledge of South
Vietnamese Government and not behind their backs.
I keep repeating that because it is a matter on which they
quite understandably are very sensitive and those who would
like to divide allies constantly give rumors to the effect that
the United States is selling them out from behind their back,
and this is what is happening in the Hanoi newspapers, and I
want to be very clear on that point.
Senator Gore. I am willing to leave it as an unresolved
question, but I did wish to suggest that their omission of an
answer cannot, in my view, be interpreted as a negative answer.
It might mean the other.

NOT A HIGH-RANKING REPRESENTATIVE

But, now, coming to the contact or attempted contact or
alleged purported attempted contact in Saigon, can you give us
some indication of the nature of the NLF official who was
apprehended, was he lowly, was he a man of stature within their
infrastructure?
Secretary Katzenbach. I would say, if I wanted a rough
equivalent, he was about a GS-14.
Senator Gore. Well, that really doesn't mean much to me.
Could you give us----
Secretary Katzenbach. I was trying to find an analogy. He
is the kind of fellow that we would have----
Senator Pell. He is a lieutenant colonel.
Senator Sparkman. I started to say full colonel.
Secretary Katzenbach. Well, lieutenant colonel, full
colonel. He is the kind of fellow we would have over there, for
example, as an assistant district representative. I have no
question, let me be clear on this, we were satisfied, [deleted]
as to his genuineness and that he had contact with people who
were more important than that but he himself was not a person
of great stature.
Senator Gore. He was not a high official?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
Senator Gore. But [deleted] a genuine emissary?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.

THE NATURE OF HIS APPREHENSION

Senator Gore. Now, can you give us something of the nature
of his apprehension? Was he near the embassy?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, he was in Saigon, and he was
picked up as part of a raid on some various people suspected of
being VC members and he was one of them. It was an ordinary
police raid. In fact, of a type that goes on very frequently.
Senator Gore. Any indication of how long he had been in
Saigon?
Secretary Katzenbach. He had been in Saigon a few days. He
said he had been there before and had been unable to make any
contact. That is only his word on this.
I don't know whether it happened to him or not.
Senator Gore. According to him, he had sought to previously
make contact.
Secretary Katzenbach. According to him, he sought
previously to deliver the message. I don't know why it can't be
dropped in the mail.
Senator Gore. But was the message dated?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, I believe the message was not
dated.
Am I correct in that?
I am fairly sure it was not dated.

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE

Senator Gore. Do you have the text of the message?
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Could you read it to us, or have your
assistant?
Secretary Katzenbach. I have been awfully hesitant in
getting into operational details.
Senator Gore. Well, we will take this off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. You are very cooperative, Mr. Secretary, and
this, of course, you understand, is for the information of the
committee. I have but a very few other questions to try to get
really at the mechanics and in order to reach my own conclusion
as to the importance of this.

FURTHER CONTACTS WITH NLF

You say that we have had further contacts via an emissary
whom we regard as possessing sufficient contacts with the Viet
Cong.
Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Would you give us some indication of his
stature, [deleted].
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. I have no further questions.
I want to thank the Secretary for being forthright with
this committee in the matter.
Senator Sparkman. All of us.

UNWISE FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO MEET EMISSARY

Senator Cooper. May I ask this: Would there have been any
value, in your judgment, for this man actually to continue his
mission and talk to Ambassador Bunker? Because the papers have
said they gave----
Secretary Katzenbach. It would have played actual hell with
the raised hell with the South Vietnamese Government. Because
there are people there who want to separate us, who are not all
on the left, Vietnamese strong nationalists who would say he
would just do what the Americans say. It would be most unwise
for Ambassador Bunker himself to do that kind of thing.

VISITS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO U.S.

Could I make one point?
There are, I think--as you gentlemen know, in January and
February a number of members of the Vietnamese Senate recently
elected who will be visiting this country, and I think you will
find this of considerable interest, and I wonder if I could be
so bold as to hope that to some extent some of these people
might be given some of the sort of courtesies that are given in
view of the number of American senators and representatives who
travel over there, I think it would be a helpful thing in terms
of relationships between the two if this could be done and some
of these people, I think you will find very interesting.
Senator Sparkman. I am sure it can be done.
Senator Gore. I am sure some of us will invite them.
Let me ask, are any of them permitted to come or are they a
delegation chosen by the junta?
Secretary Katzenbach. No, any of them will be permitted to
come. I think you will find that the senators and
representatives over there, particularly as things go along,
are going to have their own views on how things are going to be
done. That is a part of democracy and it will be helpful in
some instances and it will not be helpful in others.

A BROADER VIEW OF THE SITUATION

Senator Case. Just one point, Mr. Chairman. I don't say
this is a call for that purpose, but I would like to suggest at
some time the committee ask the Secretary or anyone the
Department says is competent to talk with us about some of
these broader matters, such as the memorandum that was
circulated out there in the Embassy on discouragement and
pessimism and whatnot; the differences between Thieu and Ky,
the problems with the press out there, which may reflect in
part those differences, and all the rest, and a broader view of
the situation, perhaps, early in the term.
Senator Sparkman. Fine.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
You have got some people waiting to receive you outside.
I request that there be inserted in the record a newspaper
article from the New York Times, dated Wednesday, December 6,
1967, and an item entitled, ``Limited Distribution for Internal
U.S. Mission Use Only, Provincial Attitudes, dated November 26-
2 December 1967.''
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, subject
to call of the chair.]

MINUTES

----------

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1967

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, Carlson, Case, and
Cooper.
Charles E. Bohlen, nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, was heard and then ordered
approved by voice vote.
Discussion followed on miscellaneous committee business
(making excerpt public of 1966 Bundy appearance; Secretary Rusk
appearances, etc.)
[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

APPENDIX A

----------

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

PUBLICATIONS FOR 1967:

HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS, AND REPORTS
HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1967

Jan. 23, Feb. 3 and 8, 1967............... Consular Convention with the
Soviet Union.
Jan. 30, 1967............................. The Communist World in 1967
(Kennan).
Jan. 31, 1967............................. Asia, the Pacific, and the
United States (Reischauer).
Feb. 2, 1967.............................. Harrison E. Salisbury's trip
to North Vietnam.
Feb. 3, 6, 7, 28, and Mar. 1, 2 and 3, United States Armament and
1967. Disarmament Programs.
Feb. 20, 1967............................. Changing American Attitudes
Toward Foreign Policy
(Commager).
Feb. 23 and Mar. 8, 1967.................. Human Rights Conventions.
Feb. 27, 1967............................. Nomination of William M.
Roth, Special
Representative for Trade
Negotiations.
Mar. 7, 13 and April 12, 1967............. Treaty on Outer Space.
Mar. 14, April 13, 20, 25 and June 22, Arms sales to Near East and
1967. South Asian countries.
Mar. 17 and 21, 1967...................... Latin American Summit
Conference.
Mar. 21 and Apr. 25, 1967................. U.S. Informational Media
Guaranty Program.
Apr. 10, 1967............................. Nomination of Rutherford
Poats.
Apr. 26 and May 3, 1967................... U.S. troops in Europe.
May 4, 1967............................... Peace Corps Act Amendment of
1967.
May 9, 1967............................... Diplomatic Relations Act.
May 18, 1967.............................. Inter-American Development
Bank Act Amendment.
June 12, July 14 and 26, 1967............. Foreign Assistance, 1967.
Aug. 16, 17, 21, 23 and Sept. 19, 1967.... U.S. Commitments to Foreign
Powers.
Sept. 13, 1967............................ Human Rights Convention,
Part 2.
Sept. 28, 1967............................ USIA Foreign Service
Personnel System.
Oct. 3, 1967.............................. Asian Development Bank
Special Funds.
Oct. 5, 1967.............................. Tax Conventions with Brazil,
Canada, and Trinidad and
Tobago.
Oct. 19, 20 and Nov. 17, 1967............. Construction of nuclear
desalting plants in the
Middle East.
Oct. 26, 27 and Nov. 2, 1967.............. Submission of the Vietnam
conflict to the United
Nations.
Nov. 29, 1967............................. Governing the use of ocean
space.

COMMITTEE PRINTS

Jan. 23, 1967............................. East of the Elbe: Report by
Senator Clark.
Jan. 25, 1967............................. Arms Sales and Foreign
Policy: Staff Study.
January 1967.............................. Legislation on Foreign
Relations: Joint Committee
Print.
Feb. 16, 1967............................. Status of the Development of
the Anti-ballistic Missile
Systems in the United
States: Statement of Dr.
John S. Foster, Jr.,
Director of Defense
Research and Engineering.
Feb. 23, 1967............................. Study Mission to East
Berlin, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia: Report by
Senator Pell.
February 1967............................. The United Nations at Twenty-
one: Report by Senator
Church.
March 1967................................ Consultative Subcommittees.
Mar. 31, 1967............................. Twelfth NATO
Parliamentarians'
Conference.
Apr. 10, 1967............................. War or Peace in the Middle
East: Report by Senator
Clark.
April 1967................................ The United Nations
Peacekeeping Dilemma:
Report by Senator Case.
May 15, 1967.............................. Mexico-United States
Interparliamentary Group:
Report on 7th Meeting.
June 6, 1967.............................. A Select Chronology and
Background Documents
relating to the Middle
East.
July 27, 1967............................. Background Information
Relating to Southeast Asia
and Vietnam (3d revised
edition).
Aug. 10, 1967............................. The Charter of the
Organization of American
States, as proposed to be
amended by the Protocol of
Buenos Aires (Ex. L., 90th
Cong., 1st sess.).
Sept. 18, 1967............................ Survey of the Alliance for
Progress: The Political
Aspects.
Sept. 25, 1967............................ Survey of the Alliance for
Progress: Inflation in
Latin America.
September 1967............................ The Rim of Asia: Report by
Senator Mansfield.
Oct. 9, 1967.............................. Survey of the Alliance for
Progress: The Latin
American Military.
Oct. 30, 1967............................. Survey of the Alliance for
Progress: Foreign Trade
Policies.
Dec. 22, 1967............................. Survey of the Alliance for
Progress: Insurgency in
Latin America.

SENATE DOCUMENTS

S. Doc. 42, Aug. 7, 1967.................. Canada-U.S.
Interparliamentary Group:
Report on 10th Meeting.
SENATE REPORTS

S. Rept. 77 (S. Con. Res. 16) Mar. 20, The Centennial of the
1967. Confederation of Canada.
S. Rept. 80 (S. 623) Mar. 23, 1967........ The International Bridge Act
of 1967.
S. Rept. 83 (S.J. Res. 60) Apr. 3, 1967... Latin American Summit
Conference.
S. Rept. 190 (S. 1029) Apr. 20, 1967...... Benefits for employees in
high-risk situations.
S. Rept. 207 (H.R. 3399) May 3, 1967...... Corregidor-Bataan Memorial
Commission.
S. Rept. 223 (S. 1031) May 11, 1967....... Amendment to the Peace Corps
Act.
S. Rept. 234 (S. 1030) May 16, 1967....... Informational Media Guaranty
Program.
S. Rept. 235 (S. 1785) May 16, 1967....... Benefits for employees in
high-risk situations.
S. Rept. 344 (S. 990) June 13, 1967....... U.S. Committee for the
International Human Rights
Year.
S. Rept. 346 (S. 1577) June 14, 1967...... The Diplomatic Relations Act
of 1967.
S. Rept. 352 (S. 2003) June 23, 1967...... Foreign Service Retirement
and Disability Fund.
S. Rept. 499 (S. 1872) Aug. 9, 1967....... Foreign Assistance Act of
1967.
S. Rept. 501 (S. 1688) Aug. 11, 1967...... Inter-American Development
Bank Act Amendments of
1967.
S. Rept. 715 (S. 633) Nov. 1, 1967........ USIA Foreign Service
Personnel System.
S. Rept. 734 (H.R. 6167) Nov. 7, 1967..... Extension of Naval Vessel
Loans.
S. Rept. 797 (S. Res. 187) Nov. 20, 1967.. National Commitments.
S. Rept. 798 (S. Res. 180) Nov. 21, 1967.. Submission of the Vietnam
conflict to the United
Nations.
S. Rept. 832 (H.R. 3399) Dec. 4, 1967..... Transferring to the American
Battle Monuments Commission
all authority of the
Corregidor-Bataan Memorial
Commission.
S. Rept. 836 (H.R. 9063) Dec. 4, 1967..... International claims.
S. Rept. 919 (S. 2269) Dec. 11, 1967...... Unlawful seizure of U.S.
fishing vessel.
S. Rept. 920 (S. Res. 155) Dec. 11, 1967.. Construction of nuclear
desalting plants in the
Middle East.
S. Rept. 926 (S. 1418) Dec. 12, 1967...... Changes in passport laws.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS

Ex. Rept. 1 (Ex. H, T and U, 89-2) Feb. Fisheries conventions.
27, 1967.
Ex. Rept. 2 (Ex. Q and R, 89-2) Feb. 27, Maritime Facilitation
1967. Conventions.
Ex. Rept. 3 (Ex. K, L, M, J and N, 89-2) Customs Conventions.
Feb. 27, 1967.
Ex. Rept. 4 (Ex. D, 88-2) Mar. 3, 1967.... Consular Convention with the
Soviet Union (with
individual views).
Ex. Rept. 5 (Ex. E, 90-1) Mar. 30, 1967... Amendments to the
International Convention on
the Safety of Life at Sea.
Ex. Rept. 6 (Ex. C, 90-1) Apr. 12, 1967... Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents.
Ex. Rept. 7 (Ex. O, 89-2) Apr. 17, 1967... International
Telecommunication
Convention.
Ex. Rept. 8 (Ex. D, 90-1) Apr. 18, 1967... Treaty on Outer Space.
Ex. Rept. 9 (Ex. G, 88-1) May 3, 1967..... Conventions on the
International Exchange of
Publications and Documents.
Ex. Rept. 10 (Ex. A, 90-1) May 3, 1967.... Amendment to Article 109 of
the United Nations Charter.
Ex. Rept. 11 (Ex. G, 90-1) May 3, 1967.... Convention on Narcotic
Drugs.
Ex. Rept. 12 (Ex. H, 90-1) July 27, 1967.. Partial revision of radio
regulations.
Ex. Rept. 14 (Ex. P, 89-2) Aug. 25, 1967.. Commercial Treaty with
Thailand.
Ex. Rept. 15 (Ex. I, 90-1) Sept. 13, 1967. Consular Convention with
France.
Ex. Rept. 16 (S. Ex. Res. 1) Sept. 14, Withdrawal of certain
1967. treaties.
Ex. Rept. 17 (Ex. L, 88-1) Oct. 31, 1967.. Supplementary Slavery
Convention.
Ex. Rept. 18 (Ex. B and F, 90-1) Nov. 1, Tax conventions with Canada,
1967. Trinidad and Tobago.
Ex. Rept. 19 (Ex. K, 90-1) Dec. 4, 1967... Further Prolongation of the
International Sugar
Agreement.
Ex. Rept. 20 (Ex. M, 90-1) Dec. 8, 1967... Amendment to Article 28 of
the Convention of the
Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization.

APPENDIX B

----------

Volumes Published to Date in the Historical Series

Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine.
Foreign Relief Act: 1947.
Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948.
The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Military Assistance Program: 1949.
Extension of European Recovery Program: 1949.
Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949-50.
Reviews of the World Situation: 1949-50.
Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee:
Volume I, Eightieth Congress, First and Second
Sessions, 1947-48.
Volume II, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second
Sessions, 1949-50.
Volume III, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-second Congress,
First Session, 1951.
Volume IV, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session,
1952.
Volume V, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, 1953.
Volume VI, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session,
1954.
Volume VII, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session,
1955.
Volume VIII, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session,
1956.
Volume IX, Eighty-fifth Congress, First Session,
1957.
Volume X, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session,
1958.
Volume XI, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session,
1959.
Volume XII, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session,
1960.
Volume XIII, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-seventh Congress,
First Session, 1961.
Volume XIV, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session,
1962.
Volume XV, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session,
1963.
Volume XVI, Eighty-eighth Congress, Second Session,
1964.
Volume XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session,
1965.
Volume XVIII, Eighty-ninth Congress, Second Session,
1966.
Volume XVIX, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 1967.