[Senate Prints 111-27]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 111-27
_______________________________________________________________________
MILESTONE OR MILLSTONE:
SETTING THE BAR TO PROMOTE
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE
__________
A REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
First Session
August 13, 2009
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
51-207 WASHINGTON : 2009
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Background....................................................... 1
Legislative History.............................................. 3
Transition to What?.............................................. 4
Financial Sector........................................... 5
Rule of Law................................................ 5
Humanitarian Crisis........................................ 6
Capacity................................................... 7
Analysis and Recommendations for U.S. Policy..................... 7
Objectives................................................. 7
Means of Assistance........................................ 9
Conclusions...................................................... 11
Appendix I--Correspondence Between Senator John F. Kerry and the
Department of State............................................ 13
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, August 13, 2009.
Dear colleague: From April 5 to April 11, 2009, I directed
my senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff
member for Africa, Shannon Smith, to visit Zimbabwe to assess
progress made by the transitional government in order to
develop policy recommendations for the Committee.
On February 11, 2009, opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai
was sworn in as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe as part of a
coalition government in which Robert Mugabe remained president
and head of state. In the months since then, Prime Minister
Tsvangirai, Finance Minister Tendai Biti, and other members of
the Movement for Democratic Change have made measurable
progress in some areas, particularly in corralling runaway
hyper-inflation, establishing some government services, and
imposing certain checks on the corruption that has so long
characterized the Mugabe regime. Much remains to be done, but
this outpost of tyranny has at least been breached.
For U.S. policymakers, the fundamental questions revolve
around how best to help the people of Zimbabwe achieve
peaceful, democratic change; regain economic stability and
agricultural productivity; address the ongoing health crisis;
and restore the rule of law. Current policy is shaped both by
law, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001
and other measures, and by approach. The crux of the issue for
many is how to promote the changes that we seek without aiding
and abetting the architects of Zimbabwe's destruction.
Dr. Smith's report explores these questions by examining
the transitional government's progress and shortcomings and by
offering recommendations on possible steps forward. I hope you
find the report helpful as the U.S. Congress considers how to
advance U.S. interests and those of the people of Zimbabwe.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
MILESTONE OR MILLSTONE:
SETTING THE BAR TO PROMOTE
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE
----------
Background
In 1980, when Robert Mugabe came to power in Zimbabwe, many
hailed him as a liberator. In the decades since, he has helped
transform his country into an economic basket case, public
health disaster, and political dictatorship. Violence,
political oppression, and corruption have increased over the
years as tools to maintain power for Mugabe and the Zimbabwean
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Currency
denominated in the trillions and still virtually worthless; an
exodus of teachers, healthcare workers, and other
professionals; and a raging cholera epidemic all symbolized an
economy and social system in a state of collapse by 2008.
In March of last year, Zimbabweans dared to vote for
change, clearly catching the regime off guard with both their
courage and their level of discontent. In addition to
opposition victories at the parliamentary level, after much
delay, official results for the presidential elections awarded
Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC), 47.9 percent of the vote and Mugabe 43.2 percent, thus
requiring a runoff. Careful not to allow a repeat performance
of this exercise in democracy, Mugabe, his allies in the
security sector, and other ZANU-PF leaders launched a campaign
of violence and intimidation against opposition leaders,
potential MDC supporters, journalists, human rights advocates,
and others, especially in rural areas. Tsvangirai, as a result
of massive violence against his supporters and his own
detention, was forced to withdraw from the runoff, leaving
Mugabe to claim 85 percent of the official vote and a hollow
triumph.
After the election, politically motivated violence by the
security forces, so-called ``war veterans,'' and other youth
and militia groups escalated even further; dozens of MDC
supporters were reportedly killed after the election, raising
the death toll still higher, and Human Rights Watch reported
that over 5000 people were beaten and tortured.\1\ Zimbabweans
continued to flee their country's economic crisis and political
violence by crossing the border, but some also faced attacks of
xenophobic violence in South Africa.
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\1\ Human Rights Watch, `` `They Beat Me like a Dog': Political
Persecution of Opposition Activists and Supporters in Zimbabwe,''
August 2008. Groups of ``war veterans'' in Zimbabwe are government-
financed militias associated with land invasions and other attacks;
their ranks often include large numbers of individuals too young to
have fought in the struggle for liberation.
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Prodded by international pressure, including the mediation
efforts of Southern African Development Community (SADC) leader
Thabo Mbeki, on September 15, 2008, Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and
Arthur Mutambara (leader of the opposition faction known as
MDC-M), signed a Global Political Agreement (GPA). This power-
sharing arrangement named Mugabe as president and head of state
and Tsvangirai as prime minister within a unity government in
which cabinet ministries would be divided among the parties.\2\
The GPA prioritized the restoration of economic stability and
growth, mandated a constitutional drafting process, referendum,
and time frame, and affirmed political freedoms and adherence
to the rule of law. Significantly, it did not designate control
of the security sector, which has remained in the hands of
ZANU-PF.
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\2\ Under the GPA, ZANU-PF would nominate 15 ministers and MDC
would name 16 (13 for MDC-Tsvangirai or MDC-T and 3 for MDC-M). The
text of the agreement is available online at [http://www.nimd.org/
document/807/zimbabwe-agreement].
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The signing of this accord did not lead to the immediate
formation of a unified government. Rather, it was followed by a
renewed campaign of arrests and harassment of MDC members and
other activists and accelerated economic decline. On January
31, 2009, Tsvangirai announced that he would indeed join a
transitional coalition government. On February 11, 2009, he was
sworn in as prime minister. The MDC assumed control (although
often with few resources) of important ministries including
Finance, Health, Education, Commerce and State Enterprises, and
Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs.
Given the history of violence that has marked relations
between the parties, it is worth asking what their motivations
were in joining a coalition government. For Mugabe, joint
government--however protracted and limited--does represent a
significant concession in power. His tyranny is definitely
somewhat diluted, although continued ZANU-PF control over the
security apparatus tempers the impact of this power-sharing.
While much international attention has focused on Mugabe, ZANU-
PF is larger than its president, and other members of the old
guard are at risk of losing the wealth, privileges, and
protection that the regime has brought them if the GPA is
ultimately fulfilled. Zimbabwe's utter economic crisis (with
inflation early in the year measured in percentage points in
the hundreds of millions) had to be one driver behind Mugabe's
decision.\3\ Moreover, the 85-year old Mugabe ultimately may
have concluded that he could win either way: if the MDC is able
to restore economic progress and perhaps get international
sanctions lifted, he may prosper in the transition. And if the
MDC fails at this task or the arrangement itself falls apart,
he and ZANU-PF will in all likelihood remain, perhaps in an
even stronger position.
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\3\ Economist Steve Hanke captured the mind-numbing statistics
this way: ``In the absence of good official numbers, I've developed my
own hyperinflation index for Zimbabwe. I derive it from market-based
price data starting in January 2007. The index tells us that Zimbabwe's
inflation rate recently peaked at 80 billion percent a month. That
means around 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion percent a year--or 65
followed by 107 zeros. To get a handle on it, realize that it's
equivalent to inflation of 98% a day. Prices double every 24.7 hours.''
Hanke, ``The Printing Press,'' Forbes Magazine (December 22, 2008).
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When he announced he was joining the government on January
30, 2008, Morgan Tsvangirai stated that since the party had
been forced by ZANU-PF's campaign of violence to abandon the
polling booth as the mechanism for change, the MDC now saw
``the negotiating table as the new front line in our quest for
a democratic Zimbabwe'' and the GPA as the means to advance
this cause. ZANU-PF's continued obstruction had blocked
progress, but ultimately, Tsvangirai said, the MDC National
Council had asked itself two questions: what would allow the
party to continue to pursue its goal of achieving a free,
democratic Zimbabwe and what was ``the best way of alleviating
the suffering of the Zimbabwean people, stabilizing the economy
and restoring and retaining some semblance of a normal
society?'' The answers, he concluded, led him and his
colleagues to the decision to join the inclusive government.\4\
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\4\ Statement by Morgan Tsvangirai, January 30, 2009, printed in
http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/tsvangiraistatement_300109.
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When he heard the news, MDC Secretary-General (and now
Finance Minister) Tendai Biti wept, according to his own
account, heartbroken that the MDC had joined forces with the
regime that had tortured opposition members, stolen their
electoral victory, and run their country into the ground. But
for Tsvangirai, and subsequently for the even more skeptical
Biti, coalition had become the only alternative to the complete
collapse of the economy and a worsening in the suffering of
Zimbabwe's people, despite the obvious flaws in the coalition
agreement and despite their lack of trust in their new partners
in government.
Legislative History
The United States has imposed a ban on the transfers of
defense items and services to Zimbabwe since 2003 and targeted
sanctions against over 250 individuals and entities, as well.
U.S. policy has also prohibited non-humanitarian aid, and other
sanctions are required under the Brooke Amendment. At the same
time, the United States has led the world in the provision of
life-saving assistance to the people of Zimbabwe, supplying an
estimated $1 billion in aid since 2002.\5\ The Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-99)
specifically addressed debt relief and restricted U.S. voting
regarding Zimbabwe through international financial
institutions. More broadly, it laid out a framework for U.S.
relations with the country. The Act, often referred to as
ZDERA, states that ``It is the policy of the United States to
support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect
peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable
economic growth, and restore the rule of law.'' It also
requires presidential certification of the achievement of
certain conditions as a requirement for the extension of debt
relief or other financial assistance to the government. These
benchmarks, which may be waived by the President if it is in
the national interest to do so, include the restoration of the
rule of law; the conduct of a free and fair presidential
election or the creation of conditions necessary for such an
occurrence; the commitment to equitable, legal, and transparent
land reform; fulfillment of agreements to end the war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo; and the subordination of military
and national police forces to civilian government. The Act also
authorized assistance to support the establishment of
democratic institutions, a free press and the media, and the
rule of law.
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\5\ Lauren, ``Zimbabwe,'' Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress RL32723, (May 19, 2009).
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In April 2008, the Senate passed S. Res. 533, offered by
Senators John Kerry and Norm Coleman, which detailed the
violence and fraud that characterized the elections and called
for a cessation of violence by Zimbabwean security forces and
militias, a timely and peaceful democratic transition, and
international cooperation to prepare a comprehensive economic
and political recovery package for Zimbabwe in the event a
democratic government is formed and commits to key reforms. The
events of 2008 were also the subject of substantial
correspondence between members of Congress and the
administration.\6\
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\6\ See, for example, correspondence between Senator John Kerry and
the Department of State in Appendix 1.
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In recent years, appropriations measures have expanded
these restrictions and Section 7070(e) of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 (P.L. 111-8)
further stated that ``none of the funds appropriated by this
Act shall be made available for assistance for the central
government of Zimbabwe'' unless the Secretary of State
determines that ``the rule of law has been restored in
Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to
property, freedom of speech and association, and a transitional
government has been established that reflects the will of the
people as they voted in the March 2008 elections.'' The FY 2009
Supplemental Appropriations request from the President included
$45 million for Zimbabwe to re-establish and strengthen
democratic institutions, provide social safety nets, ensure
critical health interventions and support economic
revitalization in the wake of contentious national elections
and sought targeted relief from the limitation on assistance to
the central government imposed by P.L. 111-8. The bill as
passed by Congress, provided relief from section 7070(e) of
P.L. 111-8 for ``macroeconomic growth assistance to Zimbabwe.''
It also authorized $40 million in Economic Support Fund
assistance (the House bill had included $28 million while the
Senate bill had included the President's full request).
Transition to What?
MDC ministers and other supporters of the attempt to enter
into the government with ZANU-PF frequently employ the term
``inclusive government'' to describe the arrangement.
Ambassador James D. McGee and staff of the U.S. Embassy in
Harare generally referred to the enterprise as the
``transitional government,'' emphasizing the need to move
forward through a constitutional process to new free and fair
elections. It has also been described as ``an unholy marriage
of contradicting interests'' \7\ and is at best a fragile
coalition of perceived necessity of two competing and often
antagonistic parties, each seeking a new election in which it
can prevail--which for the MDC would require a fair playing
field, international observers and other protections,
conditions which by their very nature would imperil ZANU-PF's
hold on power.
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\7\ Lorne Craner, President, International Republican Institute,
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Hearing,
``Zimbabwe: Opportunities for a New Way Forward,'' May 7, 2009.
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Despite the contradictions inherent in this unsteady
coalition, the MDC, joined at times by reform-minded elements
in the other party, has managed to make more progress than may
be readily recognized from news stories about Zimbabwe. There
are major hurdles still to be overcome--notably including the
continued presence of Gideon Gono as Reserve Bank Director and
Johannes Tomana as Attorney General; ongoing farm invasions and
disruptions; recurrent arrests of human rights activists, MDC
members, and others; and delays in fulfilling other commitments
of the GPA. Nonetheless, it is worth examining sector by
sector, incremental advances and setbacks or obstacles to
reform and thus, ultimately, to fundamental change.
Financial Sector
In terms of the economy and governance, Finance Minister
Tendai Biti has managed to make notable strides forward. His
abandonment of Zimbabwean currency in favor of a combination of
U.S. dollars and South African rand helped bring to a halt the
rampaging hyper-inflation that had ravaged the Zimbabwean
economy, and goods have again begun to line store shelves. In a
country with an estimated 90 percent unemployment rate in the
formal economy, however, the ability to purchase food supplies
and other products remains limited. Thanks largely to Biti's
success in capturing revenues formerly lost to the corrupt
machinations of Gono and others, the government has initiated
monthly allowances of $100 for civil servants, teachers, and
other government employees. Cutting off many of their funding
sources and instituting ``dollarization'' also reduces the
ability of Gono and Mugabe to continue to buy the support of
their cronies through the largesse of purloined revenue and the
vehicle of the printing press. Gono remains in office but he
appears to have been marginalized.
Biti's Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP)
offers an attempt to provide a roadmap to stabilize the economy
and promote investment and growth; advance political reforms;
uphold the rule of law and fulfill the tenets of the GPA
including the drafting of a constitution; and restore the
provision of social services and protections. The STERP, like
the GPA, calls for the abolition of international sanctions and
the repeal of ZDERA ``in order to facilitate a sustainable
solution to the challenges that are currently facing the
country,'' arguing that measures limiting access to credit, for
example, hinder the inclusive government's chances of
resuscitating the economy. The ambitious document depends both
on the will of the government to carry out its provisions and
the eventual availability of billions of dollars in
international assistance and private investment to reverse the
enormous economic and structural damage of the past decade and
more.
Rule of Law
One sees far less progress in the judicial and security
sectors, which remain largely in the hands of ZANU-PF through
the office of the Attorney General and the larger bureaucracy
of the ``securocrats''--Zimbabwe's service chiefs, police,
colleagues at the Ministries of Defense and Justice, and their
network of spies and henchmen. Human rights advocates who have
suffered previous arrests, detention, and torture, have been
re-arrested in recent weeks, and farm invasions against
Zimbabwe's few remaining white farmers and their black
associates and employees have continued, as have additional
land invasions of conservation areas. These actions fly in the
face of the promises made in the GPA and elsewhere, but may
also demonstrate the efforts of hardliners within ZANU-PF to
assert their authority or to sabotage the inclusive government.
The role of Mugabe himself is not always precisely clear; some
MDC reformers and other activists have argued that he has
actually at times played a constructive role in the process by
keeping some of the other extremists at bay. Certainly, though,
he appears to remain at the center of his party and of its
machinations to remain in power. At the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee members' coffee on June 11, 2009, Prime
Minister Tsvangirai stated that Mugabe remains in full control
of the institutions that he manages, but also asserted that the
aging Mugabe may be searching for an exit from the political
stage.
The GPA calls for the drafting of a new people-driven
constitution to replace the original document, which was
written at Lancaster House, London in 1979, with a referendum
to be held within 18 months; the initial phases of this process
are underway. A number of civil society activists have charged
that the process is insufficiently inclusive, and consultations
are becoming increasingly contentious. Tensions over public
input are in part a product of the strain between a people-
driven process and the drafting of an actual document. They may
also reflect differing priorities. At the same time, civil
society actors emphasize the importance of creating and living
up to a clear timeline for elections, which is not established
in the GPA. Establishing an environment in which future
elections can be held without the intimidation and violence
that has characterized previous campaigns and balloting will be
critical to achieving an outcome that reflects the will of the
people.
In addition to a new constitution, basic legal reforms are
needed in a number of areas. The Mugabe government has used the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) to
stifle the media in the country, while the Public Order and
Security Act (POSA), the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform)
Act, and the Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA) have together
provided a legal veil over massive opposition arrests and the
broader suppression of freedoms of speech, assembly, and
expression.\8\ These laws persist on the books and represent a
fundamental stumbling block in the transitional government's
attempt to convince human rights champions within Zimbabwe and
critics outside the country that it is moving forward in the
reform process. ZANU-PF control of critical ministries may
impede immediate repeal of these laws, but even introduction of
progressive legislation by MDC parliamentarians could signal
progress.
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\8\ For a fuller discussion of the legal restrictions, see
``Zimbabwe.''
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Humanitarian Crisis
Zimbabwe's humanitarian crisis has fully unfolded over the
last year, as the repercussions of a wide range of past policy
decisions and resulting economic catastrophe have collided. In
Africa's ``bread basket,'' an estimated 9 million people--or
three out of four Zimbabweans--relied upon food assistance in
the past year. Zimbabwe also has the highest proportion of
orphans in the world, and these 1.5 million children are
extremely vulnerable. Once home to the continent's premier
education system, schools are emptying out as teachers have
left the country, parents have been unable to pay school fees,
and classrooms lack the most basic materials or structures. A
threatened teachers' strike, which would have been disastrous
for the MDC-led ministry of education and perhaps the coalition
itself, was averted through negotiations. Agricultural
productivity--already slashed by farm invasions and the
corruption-ridden redistribution of land to ZANU-PF loyalists--
has further declined, leaving millions in need of food
assistance. The cholera epidemic, which has stricken some
100,000 people in the past year, has substantially slowed, as a
result of a combination of treatment efforts funded by the
international community and changing weather conditions.
However, without infrastructural improvements in water and
sanitation and in the country's health system, the epidemic is
almost certain to resurge. A January 2009 report from
Physicians for Human Rights, ``Health in Ruins: A Man-Made
Disaster in Zimbabwe,'' offered a scathing indictment of how
the Mugabe regime's politicization of healthcare, abrogation of
basic government services, and corruption had together created
the health crisis manifested by but hardly limited to the
cholera outbreak.\9\ The MDC now holds the reins at the
Ministry of Health, but the damage wrought to the system and
the exodus of health workers constitute formidable obstacles to
restoring care without a major infusion of additional
assistance from abroad.
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\9\ Physicians for Human Rights, ``Health in Ruins: A Man-Made
Disaster in Zimbabwe,'' (January 2009).
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Capacity
MDC and other members of the government who may be willing
to undertake reforms are handicapped not only by the Mugabe
machine but also by a fundamental lack of capacity. Opposition
members who had never been allowed near government positions
now command ministries, and while many of these individuals are
quite capable, experience levels within the ministries can
quickly run thin. The agencies themselves--and this clearly is
a function of ZANU-PF obstruction--are breathtakingly bare: a
ministry may, for example, possess a single computer. Minister
of Education David Coltart has described coming to work to find
a cadre of women preparing to carry buckets of water up 18
flights of stairs because his ministry lacked both water and
working elevators. Another disturbing sign is that one of the
first acts of Reserve Bank chief Gono after the formation of
the inclusive government was to provide each of the newly named
ministers with his or her own official Mercedes Benz;
reportedly only Coltart rejected the car.
Analysis and Recommendations for U.S. Policy
Objectives
In thinking about U.S. policy, two closely related sets of
guidelines are worth bearing in mind. The first comes from the
statement of policy of the 2001 ZDERA legislation: ``to support
the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful,
democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic
growth, and restore the rule of law.'' The second derives from
the questions Morgan Tsvangirai said he wrestled with earlier
this year in making the decision to join the government:
wherein lies the best chance for achieving a free, democratic
Zimbabwe and ``alleviating the suffering of the Zimbabwean
people, stabilizing the economy and restoring and retaining
some semblance of a normal society?'' These objectives are
broadly shared by policy makers in Washington and activists,
human rights advocates, humanitarian workers, and others
striving for change in Zimbabwe. Differences emerge on tactics
and timing, particularly the question of when and how to
strengthen reform efforts within the government.
On the one hand, the MDC has achieved gains that seemed
impossible last year. MDC members control a majority in
parliament, hold the prime minister's office, have succeeded in
sidelining Gono to a surprising degree, and have been able to
make a difference in people's lives by steps such as halting
the death spiral of inflation and providing $100 allowances to
teachers, healthcare workers, and other civil servants. While
divided and fragile, the coalition government is a reality.
On the other hand, Mugabe and his allies maintain control
over the security apparatus, and farm invasions, arrests, and
other abuses of individuals and of the rule of law persist. For
each step forward, the hardliners often manage to pull the
government another step back, in a deliberate strategy to
sabotage the progress of the MDC and the coalition itself. At
the same time, though, ZANU-PF is beginning to show some
cracks, as other factions within the party perhaps see the
writing on the wall that the balance may be shifting in the
country and look to ensure their own political survival.
The agenda for change that the United States hopes to see
in Zimbabwe includes a legitimate constitutional process, free
and fair elections within a 2 to 3 year timeframe, and
increased productivity within the economy. Benchmarks set in
the ZDERA legislation in 2001 were written for a Mugabe
government. Today we confront a government in which Mugabe
remains in the presidency but joined by the opposition leaders
who have for years fought for change in Zimbabwe, often at
extreme personal risk. The MDC and perhaps their likeminded
reformers in ZANU-PF positions cannot achieve these benchmarks;
ensuring equitable and transparent land reform, for example, is
out of their hands at this time. Are these markers, then, the
appropriate standard to which to hold the transitional
government or are there alternative metrics that may increase
U.S. flexibility to work with agents of change and strengthen
their efforts?
Considering options to move forward does not require the
broad removal of sanctions, travels bans, or frozen assets on
individuals or parastatals that are on the Office of Foreign
Assets (OFAC) lists. In the latter category there are one or
two entities (such as Agribank, discussed further in this
report) for which it may be worth considering revision in the
near term, but the wider lifting of the sanctions as a whole
appears both premature and exceedingly unlikely, despite the
requests of the MDC that the United States do so. Within these
existing structures, however, it is worth exploring other
opportunities to strengthen the chances of success for
Zimbabwe's achieving the fundamental objectives of a
constitution, meaningful elections, and economic growth and
asking if amendments in U.S. law are needed to improve these
odds.
The tension is how to move forward with assistance without
rewarding tyrants and thieves. Potential expanded assistance is
a gamble: the coalition could simply crumble or the MDC could
be forced out by the machinations of the ZANU-PF security
establishment. Some analysts emphasize caution. For example, in
an April 29, 2009 statement, Georgette Gagnon, Africa director
at Human Rights Watch, affirmed that ``donor governments . . .
should not release development aid until there are irreversible
changes on human rights, the rule of law, and accountability.''
\10\ If one waits for irreversible changes, however, the
opportunity to try to create the conditions that could lead to
them may pass us by. A recent statement by the Elders, a group
of global leaders brought together by Nelson Mandela, reflects
this urgency: ``The risks of inaction by donors outweigh the
challenges of delivering increased aid.'' \11\
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\10\ Human Rights Watch, ``Zimbabwe: Donors Should Focus First on
Reform,'' (April 29, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/29/
zimbabwe_donors_should_focus_first_on_reforms.
\11\ The Elders, ``The Elders call for more aid to help stabilise
Zimbabwe,'' May 7, 2009, http://theelders-news.blogspot.com/search/
label/Zimbabwe.
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Means of Assistance
The Supplemental Appropriations Act recently signed into
law includes $40 million in assistance for Zimbabwe and
modifies the restriction from the Omnibus Appropriations Act
for FY2009 on certain forms of assistance to the central
government. This assistance provides more than simply some
flexibility for the Secretary of State down the road if
conditions improve. It offers the opportunity to develop and
begin to act on a phased strategy to seek to enhance the
chances for macroeconomic growth and with it reform and
democracy in Zimbabwe. Following his visit with Prime Minister
Tsvangirai, President Obama announced that the United States
would provide $73 million in new assistance aimed primarily at
strengthening good governance and addressing Zimbabwe's HIV/
AIDS crisis.
Enhanced humanitarian assistance or ``Humanitarian Plus''
or even ``Humanitarian Plus Plus'' is one avenue to promote
change. The donor community in Zimbabwe, known locally as the
Fishmongers Group (named after a local restaurant that was long
the site of coordination meetings), is looking at ways to
expand the range of support and to avoid duplication of
efforts. Donors are wrestling with questions of progress and
timing: namely, at what point should the international
community cross the threshold from humanitarian aid to
development work and how clear a line is there between these
approaches? The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) is exploring programs in the health and democracy and
governance sectors, for example, which might be expanded under
such an approach. Other donors are examining areas such as
education. Either the U.S. or other partners should also
closely examine opportunities to boost agricultural
productivity, especially since rainy season cycles are such
that lost plantings may cost Zimbabwe another year of hunger.
Direct budget support is clearly a non-starter for the
United States, but South Africa has offered some assistance,
and others might follow if sufficient progress is made.
Differing policies and approaches underscore the importance of
coordination for both the bilateral and multilateral donors.
Zimbabwe's crisis has had a significant destabilizing
impact on the surrounding region. While the massive migration
from Zimbabwe has fueled xenophobic tensions, the exodus of so
many members of Zimbabwe's talented work force has also
provided some genuine advantages to these neighbors. The
regional context is significant, both for its strategic
implications and for the positive economic and political
influence that partners in SADC could play in Zimbabwe's
future, although countries in Southern Africa have been hard
hit by the global financial crisis. Countries such as South
Africa can and should do more to promote democratic change in
Zimbabwe, along with economic growth; recent statements in this
regard are promising.
There is generally broad support for expanded humanitarian
efforts, and they represent an important element of any broader
U.S. strategy towards Zimbabwe. Flexibility and creativity are
critical. In Zimbabwe, the situation is in many ways more a
matter of the restoration of capabilities and infrastructure
that have been laid waste by the regime and the return of
talented expatriates who have fled in droves, rather than the
creation of new skills. It is in some respects comparable to a
post-conflict situation. Additionally, the direct effects of
Operation Murambatsvina (translated variously as ``Clean Out
the Filth'' or ``Drive Out the Trash''), the massive demolition
of much of the housing and informal economy of the country's
urban poor in 2005, in apparent retaliation for their support
of the MDC in parliamentary elections, continue to be visible.
Increased international support in the humanitarian sector will
also free up resources within the Zimbabwean government to make
its payroll for civil servants and the military and to
undertake other projects.
Economic growth is essential to alleviating suffering and
to the country's prospects for democracy. There has to be a
tangible ``coalition dividend'' for the population in terms of
jobs and economic security, as well as the ability of the
government to deliver basic services, if the reform effort is
to offer a credible distinction from the misrule of Mugabe's
reign.
Agricultural productivity will be critical to economic
recovery. The international community has responded to
Zimbabwe's crisis with life-saving food aid, but additional
agricultural inputs are needed to help restore food security.
The MDC has also emphasized the need for the restoration of
lines of credit and has specifically called for sanctions to be
eased on Agribank, which is primarily government-owned, in
order to help restart food production by communal and small-
scale farmers. Such a step would require careful scrutiny but
should be explored as a possibility.
Local and provincial governments are another target of
opportunity for U.S. and other assistance in this democratic
push, as is civil society, including business associations,
farmers' unions, women's groups, and human rights and legal
advocates among others. Parliament is in need of capacity
building as well, if it is to serve as a check on and balance
to the executive.
The Ministry of Finance has made a start at tackling
financial reforms, revenue enhancement, tax collection, and
other fiscal management issues, but will need support to
overturn decades of misrule. The World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) are repositories of expertise in these
areas, and in May the IMF, with U.S. support, voted to resume
technical assistance, in spite of Zimbabwe's continued arrears.
While it is obviously logical to take advantage of these
institutions' capabilities and unwise to duplicate their
efforts, additional technical assistance from the Department of
Treasury or other U.S. agencies could be of symbolic
significance and concrete help, as well as a source of welcome
additional oversight for policy makers in Washington.
The transitional government, including the Parliament, must
also do more. Laws such as the Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and
Security Act (POSA) that have stifled basic freedoms for years
are still on the books and still in use. Introduction and
passage of legislation to repeal these laws is one benchmark to
measure Parliament's determination to re-write Zimbabwe's
punitive laws and uphold human rights and liberties.
Conclusions
The July/August 2009 ``Failed States Index'' ranked
Zimbabwe as the second most fragile state in the world, behind
only Somalia, based on the events of 2008. As that report
noted, however, the power-sharing agreement, abating inflation,
and improving personal security offer hope.\12\ Zimbabwe now
has a government in a genuine if uncertain transition, with
hyperinflation slowed, a new sense of optimism among the
public, some government ministries delivering services, and at
least partial checks on the corruption and oppression of the
Mugabe regime. This outpost of tyranny has been breached,
though it has not fallen. The coalition government--while
fragile and imperfect--is a reality. And that progress could
come to a screeching halt, either because of internal
weaknesses or a lack of external support.
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\12\ ``The Failed States Index,'' a collaboration of Foreign Policy
and Fund for Peace: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/
2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
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In dealing with this new reality, U.S. policy must be
adaptable without sacrificing basic principles. While
individual sanctions aimed at the architects of Zimbabwe's
destruction are appropriately unlikely to be on the agenda for
revision, benchmarks by which to measure change should be
milestones rather than millstones. Without developmental
assistance that helps the transitional government demonstrate a
tangible difference from its previous years, reform may fail. A
phased approach is needed, and careful monitoring is required.
The international community should be careful, but excessive
caution that paralyzes implementation may undermine U.S.
objectives and Zimbabwean progress.
Specific policy options for the United States to help boost
change include:
increased support for food security (beyond food
assistance) and mechanisms to foster the extension of
agricultural credit, especially for small-scale and
communal farmers;
expanded technical assistance and on-site mentoring for the
Ministry of Finance and other reform agencies;
continued assistance in the health sector, especially to
maintain HIV/AIDS and TB treatment programs and to
begin to rebuild the health system and restore the lost
workforce;
continued support in the areas of democracy and governance
at the local, provincial, and national levels,
particularly to promote parliamentary action and to
strengthen the constitutional drafting process;
close coordination with other regional and international
actors to maximize the positive impact of donor
activity, including efforts to revive Zimbabwe's
economy; and
an approach predicated on U.S. objectives rather than
fears.
Rethinking benchmarks to measure forward progress is
necessary to measure the impact of reformers seeking to move
Zimbabwe toward democracy and to restart its economy.
Zimbabwe's agents of change must also do more. Efforts to
repeal Zimbabwe's repressive legal framework and adherence to
additional safeguards against corruption are important
parliamentary and ministerial steps. Furthermore, for
international assistance to even begin to approach the billions
called for in the STERP and other plans, the coalition
government must make substantially greater headway politically,
economically, and in terms of the rule of law. A graduated but
flexible approach to increasing support and easing constraints
by the United States and others that adapts to these changes on
the ground will boost the prospects for lasting change.
Over-arching U.S. goals for Zimbabwe have been laid out
clearly since 2001: ``to support the people of Zimbabwe in
their struggle to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve
broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the rule
of law.'' The realization of those objectives will require
concrete progress on the ground in the coming months in order
to begin to fulfill the promise of the Global Political
Agreement including measures to create a new constitution;
reinvigorate the economy; restore Zimbabwe's ability to feed
its people and resuscitate its health and education systems;
and create the conditions for free and fair elections. Robert
Mugabe and the larger apparatus of ZANU-PF have run Zimbabwe
into the ground but if they remain the dominant and unyielding
focus of U.S. foreign policy, the chances for reform efforts to
succeed are diminished. And, if these attempts to create a
democracy fail, Mugabe and the hard-liners will be the greatest
beneficiaries.
Appendix I--Correspondence Between Senator John F. Kerry and the
Department of State