[Senate Prints 111-36]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 111-36
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SRI LANKA: RECHARTING U.S. STRATEGY AFTER THE WAR
__________
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
First Session
December 7, 2009
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Since the War Ended on May 19.................................... 3
Status of IDPs................................................... 4
Progress on Political Reconciliation............................. 7
An Intimidated Media............................................. 8
Child Soldiers................................................... 9
Economic Challenges.............................................. 10
Strategic Interests in Sri Lanka................................. 12
U.S. Engagement with Sri Lanka................................... 13
Recommendations on Sri Lanka..................................... 16
(iii)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, December 7, 2009.
Dear Colleagues: The administration is currently evaluating
U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka in the wake of the military defeat
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the
world's deadliest terrorist groups.
It has been six months since the end of the war, and the
Sri Lankan Government is dealing with a humanitarian crisis in
the North where hundreds of thousands are still displaced and
homes and infrastructure are destroyed. The Government faces
many challenges in transitioning to peace, and the
international community can help.
Sri Lanka is an important partner and friend to the United
States, so we asked two of our Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) staff members, Fatema Z. Sumar and Nilmini
Gunaratne Rubin, to evaluate U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka. Ms.
Sumar and Ms. Rubin traveled to Sri Lanka with the extensive
support of the American Embassy in Colombo and the Sri Lankan
Embassy in Washington, DC, to conduct a week-long fact finding
mission November 2-7, 2009, to see firsthand how the country
was transitioning after the war. They met dozens of government
officials, opposition party leaders, non-governmental
organizations, journalists, international donors, foreign
diplomats, academics, civil society leaders, business people,
internally displaced persons (IDPs), and Sri Lankan citizens in
a variety of settings. In addition to Colombo, they traveled
throughout the country, including visiting the IDP camps in the
North, viewing demining activities in the Northwest, seeing
areas rebuilt after the December 2004 tsunami and fighting in
the East, and meeting local government officials in the South.
Their report provides significant insight and a number of
important recommendations to advance U.S. policy in Sri Lanka.
We hope it will help stimulate debate on the nature of the
U.S.-Sri Lanka relationship and American interests in South
Asia.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member.
(v)
SRI LANKA: RECHARTING U.S. STRATEGY
AFTER THE WAR
Executive Summary
Sri Lanka stands at a critical juncture in its efforts to
secure a lasting peace. After almost three decades of
separatist war, on May 17, 2009, the terrorist Liberation Tamil
Tigers of Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) officially conceded
defeat. Two days later, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa
declared total victory after government soldiers killed the
Tamil Tigers' leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, and took control
of the entire country for the first time since 1983. With an
estimated 70,000 casualties over the years, it was a bitter and
hard-fought victory, one of the few instances in modern history
in which a terrorist group had been defeated militarily.
President Rajapaksa framed the victory as part of the global
fight against terrorism, declaring in a May 19 speech before
Parliament, ``Ending terrorism in Sri Lanka means a victory for
democracy in the world. Sri Lanka has now given a beginning to
the ending of terrorism in the world.''
The war in Sri Lanka may be over, but the underlying
conflict still simmers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Sri
Lanka is not a post-conflict environment. While the fighting
between the Government and the LTTE may have ended, the reasons
for the political and social conflict (that also gave rise to
youth militancy and armed clash in the 1970s and 1980s) will
take time to address. Those root causes must be tackled soon
and with a sense of urgency to prevent the country from
backsliding. Thirty years of violence have taken a toll on the
majority Sinhalese population, giving rise to a siege mentality
toward the ethnic Tamil minority.
For their part, Tamil leaders have not yet made anticipated
conciliatory gestures that might ease government concerns and
foster a genuine dialogue. Some Tamils are wary about the long-
term significance of post-war Sinhalese ``triumphalism'' and
fear that they may be marginalized in the unified country of
Sri Lanka. The Tamil middle class has been devastated, many
having emigrated years ago, leaving behind few mainstream
leaders to represent more moderate views. The situation is
particularly dire for Tamils in the North, who are trapped
between living in government-run camps and returning to homes
destroyed in the war.
Real peace will not come overnight to Sri Lanka and cannot
be imposed from the outside. The country has endured decades of
trauma, and a generation of politicians and laymen know little
aside fromwar and conflict as the norm. It will take time for
the country to make the transition to a post-conflict
environment amid ongoing political and economic challenges. The
country's economy remains fragile, requiring the International
Monetary Fund to provide a $2.6 billion loan to bolster Sri
Lanka's reserves. Government officials have been under
additional pressure as a result of the European Union's
deliberations to suspend special trade preferences with Sri
Lanka, known as ``GSP Plus,'' unless progress is made on human
rights and political freedoms.
The political environment in Sri Lanka is not as black and
white as many outside observers believe. Despite ongoing
allegations of war crimes and human rights abuses, the
Rajapaksa Goverment has taken some positive steps to ease the
humanitarian crisis in the North, develop the East, and reduce
the number of child soldiers. Its recent announcement to allow
increased freedom of movement in the government-run camps for
internally displaced persons (IDPs) starting December 1, 2009,
and shut down the camps by January 31, 2010, is positive and
welcome. The Government still faces many legitimate obstacles
in the North--such as removing the extensive mines left by
years of warfare--where the international community can be an
active partner in promoting faster resettlement.
Serious questions remain about the Sri Lankan Goverment's
ability to address pressing reconstruction and development
needs for Tamils and Muslims. The Government's prolonged
application of emergency laws, lack of transparency in
developing a strategy for reconstruction and resettlement,
questionable conduct during the war, and clampdown on press
freedom have undermined trust and the prospects for greater
partnership with international donors. Though the war is over,
a culture of fear and paranoia permeates society, especially
for journalists, which further erodes Sri Lanka's standing in
the international community and hampers its prospects for
genuine peace.
The final stages of the war captured the attention of
governments around the world, particularly the United States.
The Obama administration has been focusing on the humanitarian
crisis in the North and pressing the Sri Lankan Government to
take meaningful steps toward political reconciliation and press
freedom. The United States is one of the largest donors of
humanitarian aid to Sri Lanka, including food aid and de-mining
assistance.
Yet, in Colombo, the Goverment considers the bilateral
relationship with Washington to be on a downward trajectory.
Most U.S. criticisms of Sri Lankan actions at the end of the
war and treatment of IDPs have fallen on deaf ears, with Sri
Lankan authorities dismissing the U.S. posture as ``no carrots
and all sticks.'' U.S. assistance to Sri Lanka, although
delivered in grants and not loans, has attracted criticism from
the Rajapaksa Goverment for its emphasis on political reform.
This growing rift in U.S.-Sri Lanka relations can be seen in
Colombo's realignment toward non-Western countries, who offer
an alternative model of development that places greater value
on security over freedoms.
Indeed, Sri Lanka's geopolitical position has evolved
considerably. As Western countries became increasingly critical
of the Sri Lankan Government's handling of the war and human
rights record, the Rajapaksa leadership cultivated ties with
such countries as Burma, China, Iran, and Libya. The Chinese
have invested billions of dollars in Sri Lanka through military
loans, infrastructure loans, and port development, with none of
the strings attached by Western nations. While the United
States shares with the Indians and the Chinese a common
interest in securing maritime trade routes through the Indian
Ocean, the U.S. Government has invested relatively little in
the economy or the security sector in Sri Lanka, instead
focusing more on IDPs and civil society. As a result, Sri Lanka
has grown politically and economically isolated from the West.
This strategic drift will have consequences for U.S.
interests in the region. Along with our legitimate humanitarian
and political concerns, U.S. policymakers have tended to
underestimate Sri Lanka's geostrategic importance for American
interests. Sri Lanka is located at the nexus of crucial
maritime trading routes in the Indian Ocean connecting Europe
and the Middle East to China and the rest of Asia. The United
States, India, and China all share an interest in deterring
terrorist activity and curbing piracy that could disrupt
maritime trade. Security considerations extend beyond sea-lanes
to the stability of India, the world's largest democracy.
Communal tensions in Sri Lanka have the potential to undermine
stability in India, particularly in the Indian state of Tamil
Nadu, home to 60 million Tamils. All of these concerns should
be part of our bilateral relationship.
The United States cannot afford to ``lose'' Sri Lanka. This
does not mean changing the relationship overnight or ignoring
the real concerns about Sri Lanka's political and humanitarian
record. It does mean, however, considering a new approach that
increases U.S. leverage vis-a-vis Sri Lanka by expanding the
number of tools at our disposal. A more multifaceted U.S.
strategy would capitalize on the economic, trade, and security
aspects of the relationship. This approach in turn could
catalyze much-needed political reforms that will ultimately
help secure longer term U.S. strategic interests in the Indian
Ocean. U.S. strategy should also invest in Sinhalese parts of
the country, instead of just focusing aid on the Tamil-
dominated North and East.
The Obama administration is currently weighing a new
strategy for relations with Sri Lanka. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has closely followed events on the ground
this year, including a hearing in February and a staff trip to
Sri Lanka in November. In an effort to stimulate a larger
debate on U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka, the committee staff
prepared this bipartisan report examining recent developments
and proposing recommendations for U.S. policy towards Sri
Lanka. The recommendations include a broader and more robust
U.S. approach to Sri Lanka that appreciates new political and
economic realities in Sri Lanka and U.S. geostrategic
interests; continuation of de-mining efforts in the North; and
promotion of people-to-people reconciliation programs
throughout the country.
Since the War Ended on May 19
Over six months have passed since the Sri Lankan military
defeated the LTTE on May 19, 2009. President Mahinda Rajapaksa,
a hardliner who came to power in 2005, has enjoyed enormous
popularity among Sinhalese since the end of the war because he
is seen as the political architect who won what many thought
was an unwinnable war. Some, like Minister of Justice Malinda
Moragoda, have called this a ``golden moment'' for rebuilding
national reconciliation.
Indeed, the end of Sri Lanka's long-running separatist war
opens up enormous opportunities to move the country forward on
multiple fronts: political reform, economic renewal, and
international re-engagement. For the country to make the
transition from a post-war to a post-conflict environment, Sri
Lankan leaders must be prepared to take difficult steps to
bring the country together and resolve underlying political and
socio-economic tensions that led to the conflict. While there
have been some success stories such as reducing the number of
child soldiers and rebuilding the East, it is not clear that
the current leadership understands exactly how to shift from a
mindset of conflict and suspicion to a peacetime approach.
Moreover, the Goverment's paranoia about criticism and the way
some government officials equate criticism with support for the
LTTE complicates efforts to move forward. Strikingly, the whole
Rajapaksa Goverment strategy seems to be still driven by
security concerns.
For instance, the Goverment still fears LTTE sleeper cells,
both in Sri Lanka and abroad, and screened all Tamils in
government-run camps for potential links to terrorism. ``Guilty
until proven innocent'' remains the basis for operations, and
the recent discovery of massive caches of weapons in the north
of the country, the former base of the Tigers, only deepens the
Goverment's suspicions. Still, there are fewer checkpoints in
the country and people do feel a greater sense of freedom of
movement, even in parts of the North.
It will take time for the country to transition to a post-
conflict phase. Sinhalese and Tamils remain politically very
far apart with few moderate political leaders emerging to
bridge the gap. The country has immediate issues to address,
such as the status of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
the North. At the same time, longer term political questions on
the nature of the state must be tackled. In the meantime, basic
democratic rights and freedoms, such as freedom of the press,
continue to deteriorate, raising concerns about the health of
Sri Lanka's democracy.
Status of IDPs
The conflict between the Sri Lankan military and Tamil
Tigers caused an estimated 300,000 Tamils to flee from their
homes in the North earlier this year. Many of these Tamils were
taken to Army-run government welfare centers where they were
screened for potential terrorist links and until recently
detained until the Goverment decided conditions for return had
improved. This sparked an outcry within the international
community, particularly in the West and India, and led to
pressure on the Sri Lankan Government to move faster on rates
of return, freedom of movement, access to the camps, and
compliance with international standards set forth by the United
Nations, which were endorsed by the Goverment. Sri Lankan
officials told committee staff that they are eager to resettle
all the IDPs, who are costing about 1 million U.S. dollars a
day. But from the Goverment's perspective, the security
challenges of LTTE cadres hiding among IDPs and the risks of
allowing people to return freely to war-torn areas filled with
mines trumped other short-term considerations.
Due to the onset of the monsoons and ongoing pressure from
the international community, on October 15, the Sri Lankan
Goverment accelerated its resettlement program for IDPs. The
goal was to release about 4,000 people a day from the camps so
that the majority would be resettled before the end of the
year. As of December 3, 2009, some 120,740 people remain in the
camps, according to Sri Lankan Goverment figures, and 139,803
people have already been resettled in Ampara, Batticaloa,
Jaffna, Mannar, Trincolmaee, Kilinochchi, and Mullaithivu
districts, the latter two being former LTTE strongholds. At the
end of November 2009, the Goverment announced plans to close
the controversial camps by January 31, 2010, and all IDPs were
granted freedom of movement starting on December 1, 2009. This
was a significant and welcome step forward by the Goverment.
According to the Sri Lankan Goverment figures, the
Goverment provides families selected for resettlement with a
basic package: nonfood items, kitchen utensils, agricultural
tool kits, 6 months of dry rations, an initial payment of Rs.
5,000 Sri Lankan rupees (about $44), a shelter grant of Rs.
25,000 rupees (about $219), roofing sheets, land preparation
cost of Rs. 4,000 rupees per acre (about $35), provision of
rice seed (paddy), fertilizer allocation, and transportation.
Effective December 15, 2009, the Sri Lankan Goverment plans to
increase the shelter grant to 50,000 rupees ($450) to each
returning family. $450 is about 25 percent of the average per
capita income in Sri Lanka. While this amount is insufficient
for fully repairing a damaged home, these funds provide a
starting point to make a damaged home livable on a temporary
basis until additional aid or funds can be accessed. Some
families are directly resettled in their places of origin,
either returning home or staying with host families, while
others are taken to government-run transition centers where
they are free to come and go but which lack robust services.
In early November 2009, committee staff traveled to Manik
Farms, the largest of the IDP camps, and Mannar district in the
northwest, as part of a trip arranged by Defense Secretary
Gotabaya Rajapaksa. During the visit to Zones 2 and 3 at Manik
Farms, areas selected by staff without advance notice to the
Goverment, staff met with IDPs and observed living conditions,
hygiene facilities, educational facilities, banking centers,
food distribution, and the release of IDPs. Basic shelter,
food, and hygiene needs were being met, and U.N. agencies had
reliable access. The monsoons pose an enormous challenge to
operations because of possible flooding and difficulty of
moving equipment in the mud. IDPs told staff they were looking
forward to returning home, but remain nervous about what they
would find in these war-damaged areas.
Army officials running the camps were complimentary about
the support they received from U.N. organizations such as the
World Food Programme (WFP) and the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). But the officers seemed unaware of specific
donor support for these programs, such as the $28.3 million the
United States had given WFP for food aid in the camps. They
remain broadly suspicious of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) because of negative experiences in the aftermath of the
deadly tsunami in 2004. In the chaos of the devastation, some
town and provincial representatives reported that some
international NGOs that had not worked in Sri Lanka prior to
the tsunami wasted funds, implemented inappropriate projects,
and failed to consult with local communities.
Basic problems still exist. Access to the IDP camps
generally has been heavily restricted and monitored. Tamil and
Muslim political leaders, journalists, and various NGOs, as
well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
had been denied entry into the IDP centers and, as a result,
there was no free flow of credible information coming from the
camps. The Goverment has begun to ease some of these
restrictions. People are still unable to locate their
relatives, and some potential host families have been dissuaded
by intrusive government screening procedures. There was no
legal basis for the Goverment detention of Tamils in the camps,
according to Minister of Justice Malinda Moragoda. The IDPs'
relief that the war was over is tempered by disappointment with
the continued security checks and government control over their
lives.
Conditions in the North remain dire. Heavy fighting during
the last phases of the war essentially destroyed much of the
North, and it will take time and money to rebuild the shattered
infrastructure and remove the many mines. The Goverment says it
has ambitious reconstruction plans to improve Tamils' lives in
the North, but since these plans are not yet public, there is
no way to verify these claims. In Mannar district, for example,
homes, schools, and shops were destroyed by fighting and
returnees must rely on UNHCR roofing sheets for basic shelter.
There are reports that the Army and LTTE placed at least
1\1/2\ million mines in the Northern Province, an area of 3,340
square miles, and de-mining remains--by its nature--very slow
going and manually tedious. Although the Army has augmented its
de-mining equipment (flails) to more than twenty, the rate of
de-mining is determined by weather, terrain, and the need to
follow machines with manual de-miners. The Army is using six
newly purchased de-mining machines from Croatia and Slovakia.
The Goverment repeatedly has asked the international community
to increase its funding for de-mining by providing support
directly to the Army. The United States has provided $6.6
million of de-mining funding this year to four mine action
NGOs. Additionally, a November 2009 assessment of the Army's
needs by U.S. experts may result in recommendations to provide
additional U.S. training and equipment, totaling up to $2.7
million, according to the U.S. Embassy in Colombo.
The international community has been pushing hard for open
camps and resettlement based on international humanitarian
principles. In many ways, however, counting the number of IDPs
released from the camps is an incomplete metric because it
belies the grim conditions facing returnees. It also discounts
the enormous challenges of keeping returnees safe from the
minefields, although urgent de-mining needs are not a
justification for restricting freedom of movement.
Numerous government officials shared with committee staff
their frustrations over international pressure for faster
release of IDPs given the challenging conditions for
resettlement. They have legitimate fears that if IDPs are
allowed to move freely in the North, there will be numerous
casualties from active mines for which they will be held
accountable. They are also reasonably hesitant to permit IDPs
to return to areas where there are no services and where
frustrations could breed resentment and security threats
against the Goverment. While these concerns are valid,
government officials did not seem to understand the benefit of
greater transparency and partnership with international donors
to combat these challenges together in a robust and
constructive way.
Finally, although they are forgotten by most, more than
100,000 Muslims are being housed in IDP camps in the Northwest,
mostly in Puttalam. The LTTE forcibly removed Sri Lanka's
Muslim population in the North from their homes in 1990, and
they have been living in the camps ever since. Many now want to
return home, and local Muslim leaders have been seeking
government assistance in tracing properties back to original
owners because many people were unable to take their land
documents when they fled. Issues of land registration and
ownership between Tamils and Muslims in the North could
complicate repatriation efforts unless serious attention is
paid to these issues.
Progress on Political Reconciliation
Early Presidential elections are now scheduled for late
January 2010, preceding the parliamentary elections scheduled
to be held before April 2010. President Rajapaksa enjoyed
immense popularity among the Sinhalese electorate at the end of
the war. He was seen as the political architect of victory in
what many thought was an unwinnable war, and early elections
would be a way for him to expand his power base in Parliament.
While he initially appeared invincible at the ballot box,
mounting economic concerns and the opposition announcement that
it would put forward former Army commander Gen. Sarath Fonseka
as a candidate leave more uncertainty about the outcome and
prospects for political reconciliation.
The big challenge is the unresolved questions around the
ethnic tensions that were at the core of the conflict. The
hierarchy of the LTTE appears to have been destroyed. While few
Tamils in Sri Lanka express any desire to resume violent
conflict, some Tamil political leaders still talk about
controlling the North and East. Rumors abound of plans for
Sinhalese colonization of Tamil towns in the North, such as
Kilonochchi, the former administrative center of the LTTE-
controlled ``Vanni.'' Further, many Sinhalese feel Tamils do
not appreciate the trauma they suffered under the Tamil Tigers,
a group the FBI listed as ``among the most dangerous and deadly
extremists in the world'' and credited for pioneering the use
of suicide bombers.
There are different options available for political
reconciliation between ethnic groups. Since 1983, there have
been several attempts to find a constitutional accommodation
between successive Sri Lankan Goverments and the advocates of
Tamil nationalism that would lead to greater power-sharing and
devolution. For instance, the 13th and 17th amendments to the
Constitution established provincial councils and sought to
decentralize power to them. These initiatives have not resolved
core tensions, and some view them as out of touch with
prevailing political and military realities. In addition, Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress Member of Parliament M.T. Hasen Ali noted
that there is a need for a power-sharing arrangement that
includes the Muslim minority. To date, a definitive solution to
the ethnic problems remains elusive.
A report was recently completed by the All Parties
Representative Committee (APRC), a panel of experts and
political leaders from varied backgrounds appointed by the
President to develop a political proposal for power-sharing and
reconstructing political institutions. These could include
devolution of power from the central government to the
provinces, a second house in the Parliament modeled somewhat
after the U.S. Senate, and independent oversight bodies meant
to serve as a check on powerful state institutions. President
Rajapaksa has not shown a preference yet. He has said he will
not tackle any political reform until after Presidential and
parliamentary elections take place in 2010. A political
solution that is broadly acceptable to could also provide the
basis for reconciliation between the embittered ethnic
communities.
Many are concerned that Sri Lanka's Emergency Regulations,
enacted in 1989, are still in place despite the end of the war.
Among many things, the regulations allow for a concentration of
power by moving the head of state function from the Prime
Minister to the President and permit the detention of
individuals for up to 1 year without charge.
Discussions about reconciliation have not fully begun in
Sri Lanka. While the international community is promoting
independent inquiries into what happened in the last moments of
the war, there is little such call in Sri Lanka--yet. There
still needs to be a debate on what reconciliation model to
follow or create and how to link any fact-finding into the
reconciliation process.
An Intimidated Media
Though the war is over, press freedom remains troubling in
Sri Lanka, raising serious concerns about the vitality of its
democratic institutions. According to the 2009 Press Freedom
Index of Reporters Without Borders, Sri Lanka was ranked 162nd
out of 175 countries, alongside countries like Uzbekistan,
Somalia, and Burma. In 2009 alone, two journalists were
killed--Lasantha Wickramatunga, editor of The Sunday Leader and
freelance writer Puniyamoorthy Sathiyamoorthy--according to the
Committee to Protect Journalists. There have been numerous
documented attacks on journalists in Sri Lanka, prompting at
least thirty journalists to flee the country. A few journalists
remain imprisoned, notably J. S. Tissainayagam, who was
convicted under Sri Lanka's Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)
for writing two articles critical of the Sri Lankan Army's
conduct against the LTTE in a case the U.S. State Department
says ``appeared to be politically motivated.''
Committee staff members noted a palpable fear among
journalists and civil society during their recent trip to Sri
Lanka. While some journalists cancelled scheduled meetings with
staff for fear of persecution from the Goverment, committee
staff did meet with select newspaper, magazine, and television
journalists, including bloggers. Although most of the
journalists said they are able to function as independent
media, the consensus was that the press is not truly free.
Media representatives noted that the Goverment did not exercise
its control of the press through direct censorship or a
dominant state-run propaganda machine. Since acts of violence
against journalists and cases brought against them varied
greatly and the perpetrators remain at large, reporters and
editors could not predict future actions against them. To avoid
violence, many journalists engage in self-censorship, and many
sources were unwilling to be quoted. For example, journalists
pointed to a recent Ministry of Defense press release that
discouraged reporting on the political ambitions of active duty
military, forcing nearly all media outlets to drop coverage of
military members, including former Army Chief General Fonseka,
who is now a Presidential candidate. Some media representatives
insisted the situation was ``not that bad'' and most accepted
that certain restrictions on the press were necessary for the
Goverment to win the war against the LTTE. In addition, nearly
all of them criticized some aspect of U.S. policy as
interference in domestic issues.
Journalists and political and civil society actors continue
to face difficulties accessing parts of the country, such as
the IDP camps in the North, because of government fears that
negative publicity will fuel the ``LTTE propaganda machine.''
These fears have blinded the Sri Lankan authorities to the
benefits of having a free media that could report favorably on
the constructive steps the Goverment has taken since the war's
end. Basil Rajapaksa, President Rajapaksa's brother and lead
advisor on resettlement in the North, told committee staff that
such restrictions are designed to protect the privacy of the
IDPs. He observed, ``IDPs don't like media and the cameras,
because they don't want to be portrayed in those conditions''
and that free access would only be granted to those ``genuinely
interested'' and only those ``that could be truly trusted.''
Mr. Rajapaksa also argued that journalists were not singled
out--high ranking police and army officials and members of the
business community have also been imprisoned on terrorism
charges.
Child Soldiers
The Goverment of Sri Lanka has made good progress toward
eliminating the problem of child soldiers, with expectation
that the cases of the 15 children remaining in the ranks of the
Goverment will be resolved by the end of this year. Many
heralded the Goverment's effort to address the child soldier
issue during staff's visit and noted the police investigations
on child recruitment. The Goverment is a state party to the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which requires it to take all feasible measures to prevent
recruitment and use of those under 18 by armed groups that are
distinct from armed forces of a state, including the adoption
of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such
practices.
As noted in the State Department's Incident Report, the
LTTE allegedly forcibly recruited thousands of male and female
children, some as young as 12, into its cadres. Reportedly, in
some cases, parents or children who resisted were beaten or
killed. The LTTE trained the children to use weapons and sent
them to the front lines, according to reports. In close
collaboration with UNICEF, the Goverment has established
centers where roughly 500 former LTTE child soldiers are
receiving vocational and other training opportunities. The
expectation is that the children will be reunified with their
families (if they can be found) or released to host families
and then reintegrated into society.
Economic Challenges
The Goverment's budget suffered from the high cost of
fighting the war. Expensive purchases of war-related equipment
and ammunition, often on longer term contracts and using up
valuable foreign reserves, coupled with a drop in exports due
to the global economic downturn, pushed Sri Lanka to request a
$2.6 billion stand-by arrangement from the IMF in early 2009
which was approved in July. Sri Lankans are optimistic that the
economy will improve, but it has been harder to lure foreign
investment into the private sector. The overall defense budget
has yet to see any sort of ``peace dividend.'' Longer term
contracts with foreign suppliers of military equipment,
particularly China, continue to weigh heavily on the budget,
and the military has pushed for an expansion of bases and
personnel in the North. Some contend that a continued high
level of troops is required in the formerly LTTE-held areas to
hunt down remaining LTTE forces, seize hidden caches of
weapons, and prevent any resurgence of violence. At the same
time, military and civilian officials stressed to staff that
the bulk of the requested increase of about 15 percent in the
defense budget is due primarily to the Goverment's need to pay
down military debts incurred during the final stages of the
war.
Sri Lanka's economy grew relatively well throughout the war
years, and Sri Lankans hope the end of the war will trigger an
economic boom. Sri Lanka averaged 5 percent annual growth in
gross domestic product (GDP) over the last 20 years, and it has
a per capita income of $2,000, the highest in South Asia after
the Maldives. Sri Lanka has developed a strong garment
industry, which constitutes 43 percent of total exports, and
still has significant tea exports. But economic opportunities
are distributed unevenly. The Western Province, where Colombo
is located, contributes almost 50 percent of Sri Lanka's GDP,
while there are fewer opportunities in other areas, especially
the former conflict regions. The war between the Government of
Sri Lanka and LTTE, which claimed over 70,000 lives since 1983,
had an economic component as many LTTE leaders were from poorer
communities. For instance, leaders in the two brutal Marxist
uprisings in the southern part of Sri Lanka, known as the
Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP) insurrections, which killed
15,000 in 1971 and 50,000 people in 1988-89, were driven by
economic discontent. Clearly, long-term stability in Sri Lanka
will be dependent on solid and distributed economic growth.
Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, brother of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, repeatedly used the Eastern Province as an
example of the Goverment's demonstrated performance record and
as a model for plans in the North in discussion with the
committee staff. He said he regretted that Sri Lanka was ``poor
at propaganda'' and had failed to explain its actions and
intentions to the international community, especially to the
U.S. and the West. Rajapaksa said the military victory would
lead to lasting peace only if accompanied by economic
development in the areas formerly occupied by the LTTE.
Donors have responded to the war's end by shifting their
portfolios to the North and East of Sri Lanka. However, there
is a chance that this could breed resentment in the South where
there is still much poverty. While some international donors
seemed to be artfully calibrating their operations in Sri Lanka
so as not to exacerbate underlying tensions, others chose to
ignore the conflict outright. U.S. Goverment assistance has
focused on conflict sensitivity and economic equity among all
ethnic groups--Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim--and on addressing
the regional economic imbalances in conflict-affected areas
that have been amplified by the conflict.
World Bank staff in Sri Lanka, including Country Director
Naoko Ishii and Senior Country Economist Claus Pram Astrup,
should be commended on their development of a ``conflict filter
to enhance effectiveness and reduce reputational risks'' at the
concept design and implementation stages of projects. As laid
out in the World Bank Sri Lanka Country Assistance Strategy
Paper 2009-2012, the filter asks:
Have sufficiently broad stakeholder consultations
been conducted?
Have adequate impartial grievance mechanisms been
established?
Are project management and administration adequately
sensitive to inter-ethnic issues?
Are conflict-generated needs adequately identified?
Have opportunities to strengthen reconciliation and
inter-ethnic trust been adequately identified?
World Bank staff noted that the filter had been a useful
engagement tool. The Asian Development Bank as well as other
international donors factor in conflict though in less formal
ways.
However, the IMF does not officially consider conflict
sensitivity at all and almost prides itself on its tunnel focus
on financial indicators, although the IMF's mandate is
macroeconomic stability--and a key factor to economic stability
is resolution of war and conflict. On July 24, 2009, the IMF
approved a $2.6 billion loan to support the Goverment of Sri
Lanka's ``ambitious program . . . to restore fiscal and
external viability and address the significant reconstruction
needs of the conflict-affected areas, thereby laying the basis
for future higher economic growth.'' The IMF did not examine
the possible impact of its program on the conflict in Sri
Lanka. The IMF reportedly did not provide its Executive Board
with a copy of the Goverment's reconstruction program, a
program which had not been shared publicly in Sri Lanka and
received no input from civil society. Though the World Bank
consults IMF assessment letters when it does significant budget
support, the IMF did not reciprocate the consultation and
incorporate the results of the World Bank's conflict filter.
IMF Resident Representative Koshy Mathai argued that
although the Goverment had used the IMF Letter of Intent as a
vehicle to clarify its own reconstruction plans and
humanitarian assistance and despite IMF staff interest in those
issues, it was outside the IMF's mandate to have conditionality
in political and military areas. He suggested that other
international fora were more appropriate for addressing those
concerns. The first of eight tranches (roughly $330 million
each) of the loan was in the reserves at Central Bank as
prescribed and the second tranche was also approved.
One of the biggest threats facing Sri Lanka's economy is
the loss of the European Union's ``GSP Plus'' trade
concessions. Some argue this would cost the country $150
million a year in trade and thousands of jobs, although the Sri
Lankan Central Bank issued a statement asserting it would have
little impact. The GSP Plus program, established in 2005,
allows Sri Lankan goods a reduction in EU tariffs which are
particularly important in the highly internationally
competitive garment sector which employs thousands of Sri
Lankan women. Last year, EU imports from Sri Lanka under the
program neared $2 billion. The GSP Plus benefit is predicated
on Sri Lanka's compliance with internationally recognized labor
and human rights standards, including treatment of the IDPs.
Some assert that the EU's threat of suspension has led to the
Goverment's recent accelerated release of IDPs and granting of
freedom of movement.
Strategic Interests in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has been a friend and democratic partner of the
United States since gaining independence in 1948 and has
supported U.S. military operations overseas such as during the
first Gulf War. Commercial contacts go back to 1787, when New
England sailors first anchored in Sri Lanka's harbors to engage
in trade. Sri Lanka is strategically located at the nexus of
maritime trading routes connecting Europe and the Middle East
to China and the rest of Asia. It is directly in the middle of
the ``Old World,'' where an estimated half of the world's
container ships transit the Indian Ocean.
American interests in the region include securing energy
resources from the Persian Gulf and maintaining the free flow
of trade in the Indian Ocean. These interests are also
important to one of America's strategic partners, Japan, who is
almost totally dependent on energy supplies transiting the
Indian Ocean. The three major threats in the Indian Ocean come
from terrorism, interstate conflict, and piracy. There have
been some reports of pirate activity in the atoll islands near
Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka's geopolitical position has changed in recent
years. The United States has developed closer ties with India
while Sri Lanka moved towards China. India has been very
concerned with instability in Sri Lanka and has worked quietly
behind the scenes to push for faster resettlement for Tamils.
India directly suffered from the spillover from the Sri Lankan
conflict in 1991 when a LTTE female suicide bomber assassinated
Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, reportedly in response to Ghandi's
decision to send an Indian Peace Keeping force to Sri Lanka in
1987. Communal tensions in Sri Lanka have the ability to
undermine stability in India, particularly in the southern
Indian state of Tamil Nadu, home to 60 million Hindu Tamils.
India's large Tamil population just across the Paulk Strait
fuels fears among Sri Lanka's Sinhalese community, who
represent 80 percent of the Sri Lankan population and are
concentrated in the lower two-thirds of the country, that they
could become a minority under siege. While India has no
apparent interest in stoking conflict in Sri Lanka, Indian
officials are reportedly increasingly concerned about their
strategic role in the Indian Ocean and China's growing presence
in Sri Lanka.
Chinese activities in Sri Lanka are largely economic,
focusing billions of dollars on military loans, infrastructure
loans, and port development. While these are loans that will
need to be repaid and do not contribute much towards the local
economy, they come without any political strings, a fact which
makes them attractive to the Sri Lankan Goverment. According to
the Congressional Research Service, ``Chinese activity in the
region appears to be seeking friends like Sri Lanka to secure
its sea lines of communication from the Straits of Hormuz and
the western reaches of the Indian Ocean region to the Strait of
Malacca to facilitate trade and secure China's energy
imports.''
For instance, in 2007, China reached a billion dollar deal
with Sri Lanka to develop a deepwater port in the south at the
sleepy fishing village of Hambantota. In 2008, China gave Sri
Lanka nearly $1 billion in economic assistance according to the
Congressional Research Service. In 2009, China was granted an
exclusive investment zone in Mirigama, 34 miles from Colombo's
port. Even for those that dismiss China's ``string of pearls''
strategy as overblown, there is concern about growing Chinese
influence on the Sri Lankan Goverment. During the closing
stages of the separatist war, for example, China blocked
Western-led efforts to impose a truce through the United
Nations Security Council and continued supplying arms to the
Sri Lankan Goverment.
Sri Lanka's strategic importance to the United States,
China, and India is viewed by some as a key piece in a larger
geopolitical dynamic, what has been referred to as a new
``Great Game.'' While all three countries share an interest in
securing maritime trade routes, the United States has invested
relatively few economic and security resources in Sri Lanka,
preferring to focus instead on the political environment. Sri
Lanka's geostrategic importance to American interests has been
neglected as a result.
The Sri Lankan Goverment says American attitudes and
military restrictions led it to build relationships with China,
Burma, Iran, and Libya. The Minister of Science and Technology
and All-Party Representative Committee Chairman Tissa Vitarana
Minister told committee staff, ``We have the United States to
thank for pushing us closer to China.'' According to Vitarana,
President Rajapaksa was forced to reach out to other countries
because the West refused to help Sri Lanka finish the war
against the LTTE. These calculations--if left unchecked--
threaten long-term U.S. strategic interests in the Indian
Ocean.
U.S. Engagement with Sri Lanka
The United States and Sri Lanka have a long history of
cordial relations based in large part on shared democratic
traditions. U.S. assistance programs with Sri Lanka have
covered a broad range, including civil society, economic
development, international visitor exchanges, and humanitarian
assistance training for the military.
Since 1956, USAID has invested more than $1.9 billion in
Sri Lanka according to the USAID Mission in Colombo. In 2008,
the United States successfully completed its $134.5 million
tsunami reconstruction program, and the rehabilitation
infrastructure was handed over to the Sri Lankan Goverment.
Current programs focus on the Eastern Province and adjoining
areas, and USAID plans to extend assistance to the North by
helping war-torn communities return to normalcy as soon as
possible. In 2009, the United States was the leading donor of
food and humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka, with a total
USAID budget of $43.12 million. More than 280,000 IDPs have
been assisted by food rations, water and sanitation facilities,
temporary shelters, emergency medical treatment, and mobility
aids for the disabled.
The congressionally funded Asia Foundation has been in Sri
Lanka since 1954 and has played a quiet but important role in
supporting Sri Lankan Goverment and civil society initiatives
to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law and
human rights.
On the economic front, the United States is by far Sri
Lanka's most important trade partner, accounting for more than
one-quarter of the country's total exports according to the
Congressional Research Service. During Prime Minister
Wickremasinghe's 2002 visit to Washington, the United States
and Sri Lanka signed a new Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) to examine ways to expand bilateral trade and
investment. While the war precluded most major U.S.-Sri Lanka
economic initiatives since 2006, TIFA talks were held in
Colombo this fall to explore new opportunities.
On the security front, the United States and Sri Lanka have
enjoyed friendly military-to-military relations and defense
relations, although the U.S. scaled back security assistance in
recent years. Sri Lanka continues to grant blanket over-flight
and landing clearance to U.S. military aircraft and routinely
grants access to ports by U.S. vessels. U.S. military training
and defense assistance programs have provided basic infantry
supplies, maritime surveillance, and interdiction equipment for
the navy and communications and mobility equipment to improve
the Army's humanitarian effort and U.N. peacekeeping missions,
according to the Congressional Research Service. In 2007, the
United States and Sri Lanka signed an Acquisition and Cross-
Services Agreement, which created a framework for increased
military interoperability.
U.S. engagement with Sri Lanka has continued in the Obama
administration. Just days before the war ended, President Obama
delivered a statement from the Rose Garden urging Sri Lanka to
``seek a peace that is secure and lasting, and grounded in
respect for all of its citizens.'' While economic and security
relations continue on a limited basis, the U.S. approach has
heavily focused on humanitarian issues and political reforms.
The administration has consistently called for an end to
human rights abuses, protection and rapid resettlement of IDPs,
and genuine efforts towards reconciliation in part through
statements from President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton and the Assistant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake. The State Department, under
the leadership of its new U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka,
Patricia Butenis, has demanded progress from the Goverment on
eight benchmarks including improved conditions in the camps,
return of IDPs, political progress, and de-mining. The Treasury
Department abstained on the $2.6 billion IMF loan to Sri Lanka
this summer because of humanitarian concerns. At Congress's
behest, the U.S. Goverment continues to suspend military aid to
Sri Lanka and issued a report on incidents during the war that
may have constituted violations of international humanitarian
law.
In Colombo, the U.S. approach is viewed by many senior
government officials as heavy-handed and ``shrill.'' They no
longer sense a strong partnership with the United States and
view the relationship to be on a downward trajectory. The
President's senior advisor and brother, Basil Rajapaksa,
advised committee staff that the United States should approach
Sri Lanka as ``friends'' and ``give suggestions rather than
make critical remarks.'' The President's other brother and
Defense Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, expressed similar
frustration that the United States and international community
had not recognized the Goverment's progressive transition to
democracy, ethnic reconciliation, disarmament and
demobilization of paramilitary groups, rehabilitation of child
soldiers, and economic development. He said he believed
strongly in the value of repairing Sri Lanka's relations with
the United States and recommended that Washington focus its
attention on the future and not the past, judging the Goverment
on its record of performance in the Eastern Province, and not
on the agendas of its critics. He said he did ``not deny there
have been cases of government abuse,'' but that defeating the
LTTE had been the top priority and trumped other
considerations.
Many Sri Lankan Government officials seemed surprised by
the barrage of international criticism and intense public
scrutiny they received following the war. They had expected
instead praise for defeating a notorious terrorist group--which
pioneered suicide bombing techniques and assassinated Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President
Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993--and space to make the transition
to a post-conflict environment.
Opposition leaders take a different view. United National
Party and opposition leader Ranil Wikremesinghe said the United
States was on the right track in publishing the ``Incidents
Report'' and should ``keep the pressure on the government.''
Wikremesinghe said Sri Lankans did not want to lose their
relationship with the United States, and the Goverment's
criticism of recent U.S. remarks was ``complete nonsense.''
Among both government and opposition leaders and within
civil society, there is growing consensus on the importance of
the U.S.-Sri Lanka bilateral relationship and the need for it
to be strengthened. There is a common view that American
influence is waning, in part because of the tone of its
messages. As one Western aid official told committee staff:
``Sticks don't work with the Sri Lankan Government. They need
to hear coordinated, constructive messages that give them time
to implement change without losing face.'' There is also
concern that Western donors do not invest in projects that are
government priorities such as big infrastructure projects and
roads, allowing non-traditional donors like the Chinese to fill
the vacuum.
With the end of the war, the United States needs to re-
evaluate its relationship with Sri Lanka to reflect new
political and economic realities. While humanitarian concerns
remain important, U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka cannot be
dominated by a single agenda. It is not effective at delivering
real reform, and it shortchanges U.S. geostrategic interests in
the region.
The challenge for the United States will be to encourage
Sri Lanka to embrace political reform and respect for human
rights without pushing the country towards Burma-like
isolation, while still building a multifaceted bilateral
relationship that reflects geostrategic interests. Engagement
is key, for as Minister of Justice Moragoda said, the United
States ``cannot afford to marginalize the Sri Lankan
Government.'' Serious engagement will require an expansion of
the number of tools in the U.S. toolbox.
The United States does have influence in Sri Lanka. The
challenge today is how to creatively leverage political and
humanitarian reform with economic, trade, and security
incentives so as to link an expanded partnership with better
governance and a strengthened democracy. To be effective, the
United States should better understand what is important to the
Sri Lankan Goverment and people and retool its strategy
accordingly.
Recommendations on Sri Lanka
The Obama administration should:
1. Take a broader and more robust approach to Sri Lanka
that appreciates new political and economic realities in Sri
Lanka and U.S. geostrategic interests. Such an approach should
be multidimensional so that U.S. policy is not driven solely by
short-term humanitarian concerns but rather an integrated
strategy that leverages political, economic, and security tools
for more effective long-term reforms.
2. Continue support de-mining efforts in the North. De-
mining will be a major factor in successful resettlement of the
North.
3. Engage the United Nations (World Food Programme and
other agencies) and the Sri Lankan Goverment in developing a
realistic resettlement strategy for 2010 that reassesses food
and nonfood needs to support returnees' efforts at
reestablishing their livelihoods.
4. Promote people-to-people reconciliation programs to
build bridges between the Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim
communities. A people-to-people approach should be linked to
political reforms and processes that support transitional
justice. Funding for such programs is available on a
competitive basis under section 7065 (``Reconciliation
Programs'') of Public Law 111-8, and additional funding will be
included for such purposes in the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010.
5. Expand U.S. assistance to include all areas of the
country, particularly in the south and central areas so that
Sinhalese and other groups also benefit from U.S. assistance
programs and reap some ``peace dividend.''
6. Tighten visa restrictions and revoke U.S. citizenship
for any persons who are shown to have committed war crimes in
Sri Lanka, whether they acted on behalf of the LTTE or the
Goverment of Sri Lanka.
7. Expand the USAID/Department of Justice police program
and provide judicial advisors to the Sri Lankan Ministry of
Justice in order to support critical police reforms and
implementation of current law.
8. Publicly commit to reinstating Peace Corps operations in
Sri Lanka as soon as the emergency regulations are removed.
Peace Corps volunteers could focus on teaching English and
information technology training.
The U.S. Congress should:
1. Authorize the U.S. military to resume training of Sri
Lankan military officials to help ensure that human rights
concerns are integrated into future operations and to help
build critical relationships.
The international financial institutions should:
1. Encourage all international financial institutions to
systematically factor in the role of conflict, as the World
Bank does through its conflict filter for Sri Lanka, to ensure
that IMF and development bank financing does not inadvertently
exacerbate conflict. Specifically, World Bank staff should be
commended on its development of a conflict filter for Sri
Lanka, and the World Bank should expand its use in other
countries.
2. Proactively review military spending as a component of
its financial programs with conflict countries.
The Sri Lankan Goverment should:
1. Treat all internally displaced persons in accordance
with Sri Lankan and international standards, including by
guaranteeing their freedom of movement, providing access to
war-torn areas and populations by humanitarian organizations
and journalists, and accounting for persons detained in the
conflict.
2. Recognize the importance of a free and fair press, for
both its own democratic traditions and for sharing accurate
information with the international community. In showing its
commitment to freedom of the press, the Goverment should
welcome back journalists that have fled the country; pardon
those such as J.S. Tissainayagam who were indicted under
emergency laws; cease prosecuting cases against journalists
based on emergency law; and actively investigate threats,
abuses and killings of journalists.
3. Take steps to repeal emergency laws that are no longer
applicable now that the war is over. This will send a strong
message that Sri Lanka is ready to transition to a post-
conflict environment.
4. Share its plans for resettlement and reconstruction in
the North with Sri Lankan civil society and international
donors, who are well-positioned to support such efforts if
there is greater transparency and accountability.
5. Commence a program of reconciliation between the diverse
communities in Sri Lanka.
6. Engage in a dialogue on land tenure issues, since they
affect resettlement in the North and East.