[Senate Prints 111-40]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 111-40
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AL QAEDA IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA:
A TICKING TIME BOMB
__________
A REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
JANUARY 21, 2010
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
1. Al Qaeda Reconstituted........................................ 4
Background................................................... 5
A Continuing Threat in Pakistan.............................. 7
2. Yemen: Exploiting Weaknesses.................................. 8
A Multifaceted Threat to U.S. Interests...................... 9
Al Qaeda Transformation Underway in Yemen.................... 9
A History of Violence and Extremism.......................... 11
3. Somalia: Failure Breeds Extremism............................. 13
Alliance or Not, a Specific Threat to Americans Exists....... 15
State Failure Offers Further Opportunities for Terrorists.... 16
4. Conclusion.................................................... 16
No Direct Connection Between al-Shabab and Somali Pirates........ 18
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, January 21, 2010.
Dear colleague: This report by the committee majority staff
is part of our ongoing examination of Al Qaeda's role in
international terrorism. U.S. and allied operations over the
past several years have largely pushed Al Qaeda out of
Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of those fighters traveled to the
tribal region on the Pakistani side of the border with
Afghanistan. But ongoing U.S. and Pakistani military and
intelligence operations there have made it an increasingly
inhospitable place for Al Qaeda. Consequently, hundreds-or
perhaps even thousands-of fighters have gone elsewhere. New Al
Qaeda cells or allied groups have sprung up in North Africa,
Southeast Asia, and perhaps most importantly in Yemen and
Somalia. These groups may have only an informal connection with
Al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan, but they often share common
goals. Al Qaeda's recruitment tactics also have changed. The
group seeks to recruit American citizens to carry out terrorist
attacks in the United States. These Americans are not
necessarily of Arab or South Asian descent; they include
individuals who converted to Islam in prison or elsewhere and
were radicalized. This report relies on new and existing
information to explore the current and changing threat posed by
Al Qaeda, not just abroad, but here at home.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
AL QAEDA IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA:
A TICKING TIME BOMB
----------
Executive Summary
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the offshoot of Osama
bin Laden's terrorist network operating in Yemen and Saudi
Arabia, has evolved into an ambitious organization capable of
using non-traditional recruits to launch attacks against
American targets within the Middle East and beyond. Evidence of
its potential became front-page news after a young Nigerian
trained at one of its camps in Yemen tried to blow up a
passenger aircraft bound for Detroit on Christmas Day.
For American counter-terrorism experts in the region, the
Christmas Day plot was a nearly catastrophic illustration of a
significant new threat from a network previously regarded as a
regional danger, rather than an international one. The concern
now is that the group has grown more dangerous by taking
advantage of the weakened central government in Yemen, which is
struggling with civil conflicts and declining natural
resources. These experts have said they are worried that
training camps established in remote parts of Yemen by Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are being run by former
detainees and veteran fighters from Afghanistan and Iraq and
used to instruct U.S. citizens who have immigrated to Yemen to
marry local women or after converting to Islam in American
prisons.
Law enforcement and intelligence officials told the
Committee staff in interviews in December in Yemen and other
countries in the region that as many as 36 American ex-convicts
arrived in Yemen in the past year, ostensibly to study Arabic.
The officials said there are legitimate reasons for Americans
and others to study and live in Yemen, but they said some of
the Americans had disappeared and are suspected of having gone
to Al Qaeda training camps in ungoverned portions of the
impoverished country. Similar concerns were expressed about a
smaller group of Americans who moved to Yemen, adopted a
radical form of Islam, and married local women. So far, the
officials said they have no evidence that any of these
Americans have undergone training. But they said they are on
heightened alert because of the potential threat from
extremists carrying American passports and the related
challenges involved in detecting and stopping homegrown
operatives.
The staff interviews were conducted just before the failed
Christmas Day plot. The ability of Al Qaeda to expand beyond
its core members by recruiting non-traditional adherents was
one of the lessons drawn by counter-terrorism experts from the
failed attempt to blow up the aircraft. The suspected bomber
was a Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 23, who had
overstayed an education visa in Yemen by several months and had
undergone explosives training at one of the remote Al Qaeda
camps. His father, a respected retired banker and former
Nigerian government official, had warned the U.S. embassy in
Nigeria about his son's growing radicalism and disappearance
while in Yemen, but Abdalmuttallab was able to use a U.S. visa
to board the flight in Amsterdam with a bomb sewn into his
underwear. He was overcome by passengers and crew members as he
tried to detonate the device and has been indicted by a federal
grand jury in Michigan on charges of attempted murder and
attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.
The Yemeni origins of the bomb plot, the Nigerian homeland
of the accused bomber, and the flight path from the Netherlands
underscored the fact that American counter-terrorism efforts
cannot focus exclusively on a single country or region and that
an attack could come from anywhere. These concerns are deepened
by growing evidence of attempts by Al Qaeda to recruit American
residents and citizens in Yemen, Somalia and within the United
States. What is required is a measured, strategic assessment of
the threats that exist today, wherever they originate.
In important ways, the United States is safer than it was
before the attacks of September 11, 2001. Our intelligence and
law enforcement agencies have worked effectively at home and
abroad to disrupt threats and heighten vigilance. U.S.
intelligence and military officials agree that Al Qaeda's
capacity to carry out large-scale terrorist operations has been
significantly degraded. Its financial and popular support is
declining and U.S. and allied operations have killed or
captured much of Al Qaeda's leadership, with the notable
exceptions of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Polls show
that support for the organization has weakened among Muslims
because of its harsh tactics, including repeated suicide
attacks that have killed thousands of innocent civilians in
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries.
The U.S. military has largely pushed Al Qaeda out of
Afghanistan and Iraq. While the military efforts should be
praised, they have not eliminated the threat. Many fighters
affiliated with Al Qaeda and other militant groups have taken
refuge across the Afghan border in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Authority, which remains a major safe
haven. At the same time, intelligence and counter-terrorism
officials said hundreds and perhaps thousands of veterans of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have relocated to other
places, primarily Yemen and Somalia.
While Al Qaeda's short-term goals remain the same-to bring
down a U.S. airliner, to push U.S. and NATO troops out of
Afghanistan, and to attack a broad range of targets worldwide-
its methods have changed in response to American successes
against the core organization. Many groups acting under Al
Qaeda's banner are only loosely affiliated with the leadership.
More often, they raise their own money and plan and execute
attacks independently. Operational decisions are routinely made
at the local level, rather than by bin Laden or Zawahiri.
Despite these changes, there are common elements that serve
as warning signals to U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism
officials. For example, Yemen and Somalia have a core of
trained militants who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both
Yemen and Somalia have weak central governments that exercise
little or no control over vast swaths of their own territory
and forbidding, harsh terrains that would make it virtually
impossible for U.S. forces to operate freely. They have
abundant weapons and experience using them on the battlefield.
Government cooperation with American counter-terrorism efforts
has historically been spotty and portions of both populations
are hostile to the United States.
In Yemen, the limited reach of the central government and
changes in the country's demographics have permitted extremists
to thrive. In addition to AQAP, Yemen confronts a tribal revolt
in the north of the country, a secessionist movement in the
south, and rising poverty rates. The country's foreign
minister, Abu Bakr al-Qiribi, recently acknowledged that the
rebellion and secessionist movement had distracted the
government from going after Al Qaeda in the last year.
AQAP, the primary terrorist group in the country, is
closely linked to Al Qaeda. The local affiliate is led by a
Yemeni militant who was involved in the 2000 attack on the USS
Cole in which 17 American sailors were killed. He was among 23
Al Qaeda fighters who escaped from a Yemeni prison in February
2006, reportedly with help from security officials. The group's
deputy is a Saudi citizen who was released from Guantanamo in
November 2007. After completing a Saudi government-sponsored
rehabilitation program, he slipped south into Yemen and
returned to militancy.
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih has promised that his
security services will track down members of Al Qaeda and there
has been considerable cooperation between U.S. intelligence and
military units and their Yemeni counterparts. But Salih's
government angered Washington by releasing militants who claim
to have renounced violence, including some former Guantanamo
detainees and one of the masterminds of the Cole bombing. In
early January, President Obama reflected these concerns when he
suspended the release of further Yemeni detainees from
Guantanamo, where they comprise about half the remaining
population.
Al Qaeda also is expanding its presence across the Gulf of
Aden in Somalia. U.S. counter-terrorism officials told the
Committee staff they fear American citizens are being recruited
in Somalia for terrorist operations. They pointed to several
Somali-Americans arrested in Minnesota in early 2009 after
returning from fighting alongside al-Shabab, which is the
dominant militant group in Somalia and has close ties to Al
Qaeda. Officials also expressed concern about two dozen
Americans of Somali origin who disappeared in recent months
from St. Paul, Minnesota; similar disappearances have been
reported in Ohio and Oregon. The vast majority of Somali-
Americans has been alarmed by these developments and cooperated
in investigations.
While most of our counter-terrorism resources are rightly
focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the potential threats from
Yemen and Somalia pose new challenges for the United States and
other countries fighting extremism worldwide. The prospect that
U.S. citizens are being trained at Al Qaeda camps in both
countries deepens our concern and emphasizes the need to
understand the nature of the evolving dangers. President Obama
has pledged to strengthen our relationship with the Yemeni
government through increased military and intelligence
cooperation. Addressing emerging dangers in Yemen and elsewhere
in the region constitutes a vital national security interest,
and this report is intended to provide information that will
help guide us in that mission.
1. Al Qaeda Reconstituted
Al Qaeda has been battered around the world since its
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The group
is facing dwindling financial and popular support and
difficulty working with other extremists around the world. U.S.
and allied operations against Al Qaeda have killed or captured
many of the organization's leaders, while the majority of
Muslims around the world are repulsed by its methods.
The U.S. military has pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan.
Similar U.S. success in Iraq has forced hundreds of fighters
out of that country. As a result, the bulk of Al Qaeda fighters
have relocated to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal
Authority, along its border with Afghanistan. Large numbers
have relocated to other parts of the world, including Yemen and
Somalia.
Despite setbacks, Al Qaeda is not on the run. The group has
expanded its recruitment efforts to attract non-traditional
followers and adapted its operations. U.S. law enforcement
authorities told Committee staff they believe that as many as
three dozen U.S. citizens who converted to Islam while in
prison have traveled to Yemen, possibly for Al Qaeda training.
As many as a dozen U.S. citizens who married Muslim women and
converted to Islam also have made their way to Yemen. In some
cases, Al Qaeda recruits have come from moderate backgrounds,
like would-be Christmas bomber Omar Faruq Abdulmutallab, whose
father is one of Nigeria's most highly-respected bankers and a
former government minister.
While goals have remained unchanged, the methods with which
Al Qaeda tries to accomplish those goals have changed. Many
groups linked to Al Qaeda are only loosely affiliated and act
on their own.
That said, recent history demonstrates that several factors
bind Al Qaeda members together. The first is friendship forged
on the battlefield. Arabs who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan
call themselves ``Afghan alumni.'' Thousands went to Yemen
after the Soviets' defeat and were welcomed as heroes. Many of
them fought again side-by-side in southern Yemen during that
country's civil war in 1994. The second is discipleship. Most
young Yemeni Al Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan and
Pakistan after the September 11 attacks said they had decided
to make jihad against the United States only after being
prodded into doing so by the imams in their villages. Third are
family and tribal ties, although this same dynamic can work
against it in Somalia. Arabs have historically married across
tribes-and even nationalities-to cement alliances and power,
and Al Qaeda benefits from this trend. Somalis, however, have
tended to be a more insular society.\1\
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\1\ ``To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East,'' by Scott Atran, New
York Times, December 13, 2009.
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Background
Over the past eight years, Al Qaeda has evolved into a
significantly different terrorist organization than the one
that perpetrated the September 11 attacks. At the time, Al
Qaeda was composed mostly of a core of veterans of the Afghan
insurgency against the Soviets, with a leadership structure
made up mostly of Egyptians and bin Laden, a Saudi of Yemeni
descent. Most of the organization's plots either emanated
from--or were approved by--the leadership.
The Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Due to
pressures from U.S. and international intelligence and security
organizations, it has transformed into a diffuse global network
and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with
varying degrees of independence. The leadership, headed by bin
Laden and Zawahiri, is thought to be in the mountainous border
region of northwest Pakistan, where it continues to train
operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda.\2\ But Al
Qaeda cells or affiliated groups in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, North
Africa, and Southeast Asia now represent critical players in
the larger movement. Some cells receive money, training, and
weapons; others look to the leadership in Pakistan for
strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger
narrative of global struggle. Michael E. Leiter, Director of
the National Counter Terrorism Center, said in an April 2009
speech that the trajectory of Al Qaeda is ``less centralized
command and control, no clear center of gravity, and likely
rising and falling centers of gravity, depending on where the
U.S. and the international focus is for that period.'' \3\
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\2\ See Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl, and Seth Rosen, ``Beyond
Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism,''
Center for a New American Security, June 2009, p.10.
\3\ ``Remarks by Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National
Counter Terrorism Center,'' at The Aspen Institute, April 9, 2009.
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The Al Qaeda network today also is made up of semi-
autonomous cells which often have only peripheral ties to
either the leadership in Pakistan or affiliated groups
elsewhere. Sometimes these individuals never leave their home
country but are radicalized with the assistance of others who
have traveled abroad for training and indoctrination. The July
2005 London bombers are an example of semi-autonomous actors in
the Al Qaeda universe, as is Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan living
in Denver who was charged in September 2009 with conspiring to
carry out bombings in the United States. The London bombers,
radicalized in the UK, sought training in Pakistan before
returning home to carry out their attacks. Similarly, Zazi
reportedly was radicalized in the United States before
traveling to Pakistan for training.
Another category of today's Al Qaeda movement is self-
radicalized individuals, who lack any connection to the larger
network but accept Al Qaeda's theological arguments and
strategic aspirations. One example is Michael C. Finton,
arrested in September 2009 in Illinois on charges of attempting
to use a weapon of mass destruction.\4\ Finton, 29, converted
to Islam while serving in an Illinois prison from 1999 to 2005
for robbery and battery charges. According to a court
affidavit, he traveled to Saudi Arabia in March 2008. An
undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation agent posing as a
low-level Al Qaeda operative met with Finton in the months
leading up to his September arrest. The officer provided him
with a van containing materials he said were explosives. Finton
then parked the van outside a federal courthouse in
Springfield, Illinois, where he was arrested. There is no
evidence that Finton underwent Al Qaeda training or conspired
with others, like Zazi and the London bombers did.
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\4\ For more, see ``Men Accused of Unrelated Bomb Plots in Ill.,
Texas,'' Associated Press, September 24, 2009.
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Despite Al Qaeda's transformation in recent years, its
strategic objectives remain the same: to attack the United
States and governments seen as supporting the Americans. John
O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism, told the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in an August 2009 speech that ``Al Qaeda
has proven to be adaptive and highly resilient and remains the
most serious terrorist threat we face as a nation.'' \5\ The
U.S. intelligence community assesses that Al Qaeda is
``actively engaged in operational plotting and continues
recruiting, training, and transporting operatives, to include
individuals from Western Europe and North America,'' according
to Leiter's testimony in September 2009 before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.\6\
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\5\ ``Remarks by John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,'' at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, August 6, 2009.
\6\ ``Testimony of Michael Leiter at hearing `Eight Years After 9/
11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,' '' before the
U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
September 30, 2009.
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Thanks in large part to the actions of the U.S. government,
Al Qaeda and its leadership in Pakistan are under tremendous
pressure. U.S. military and intelligence operations have
reportedly degraded the leadership's capacity for conducting
external operations and raising funds.\7\ Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, told the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in February 2009 that Al Qaeda
``today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago.''
\8\
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\7\ ``Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau
of Investigation,'' before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, September 30, 2009.
\8\ ``Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,'' Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
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Though Al Qaeda affiliated groups have carried out numerous
deadly terrorist attacks over the past two years, the
leadership in Pakistan has demonstrated limited operational
effectiveness during that same time span. In part because of
the loss of top commanders and continued pressure from U.S.
intelligence activities and those of foreign partners, Al Qaeda
has been unable to orchestrate successful large-scale attacks.
There is also some evidence that Al Qaeda is struggling to
retain recruits and raise funds. In June 2009, the group's
leader in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, released an audio
message asking for money because Al Qaeda members were short of
food, weapons, and other supplies. \9\
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\9\ William Maclean, ``Al-Qaida's Money Trouble,'' Reuters, June
15, 2009.
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The Al Qaeda movement faces perhaps an even larger
challenge in the form of a legitimacy crisis within Muslim
communities. According to Blair, the United States has ``seen
notable progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist
groups like Al Qaeda.'' \10\ Muslim populations worldwide, some
of which approved of Al Qaeda's actions in the wake of the
invasion of Iraq, appear to have turned against the movement.
The killing of innocent Muslims in Iraq and Pakistan, as well
as the bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan in November
2005, produced a significant backlash. For example, a poll
conducted by Jordan University's Center for Strategic Studies a
month after the Amman bombings showed that only 20 percent of
the population viewed Al Qaeda as a ``legitimate resistance
group,'' down from 67 percent in 2004.\11\ Over the past two
years, several prominent religious scholars and former Al Qaeda
associates-including Saudi fundamentalists Sheikh Salman al-
Awda and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, one of Al Qaeda's original
spiritual leaders--have spoken out against the indiscriminate
tactics and ideology.
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\10\ ``Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,'' Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
\11\ Murad Batal Al-Shishani, ``Jordanian Poll Indicates Erosion of
Public Support for Al Qaeda,'' Terrorism Focus, Vol. 3, No. 6, February
14, 2006.
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A Continuing Threat in Pakistan
U.S. officials remain concerned that Al Qaeda terrorists
maintain bases and training camps in Pakistan and that the
group appears to have increased its influence among the myriad
Islamist militant groups operating along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. Bin Laden and Zawahiri are believed to be
hiding in northwestern Pakistan, along with most other senior
operatives.\12\ Al Qaeda leaders have issued statements
encouraging Pakistani Muslims to ``resist'' the American
``occupiers'' in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to fight against
Pakistan's ``U.S.-allied politicians and officers.'' \13\ A
2007 National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the
United States concluded that Al Qaeda ``has protected or
regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability,
including a safe haven in [Pakistan's Federally Administered
Tribal Areas], operational lieutenants, and its top
leadership.'' \14\
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\12\ ``CIA Chief Says Bin Laden in Pakistan,'' Reuters, June 11,
2009; ``Al Qaeda's Global Base is Pakistan, Says Petraeus,'' Wall
Street Journal, May 9, 2009.
\13\ See, for example, ``Qaeda's Zawahiri Urges Pakistanis to Join
Jihad,'' Reuters, July 15, 2009.
\14\ See http://www.dni.gov/press--releases/20070717--release.pdf.
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Islamabad reportedly has remanded to U.S. custody roughly
500 Al Qaeda fighters since 2001, including several senior
operatives. U.S. officials say that drone-launched U.S. missile
attacks and Pakistan's pressing of military offensives against
extremist groups in the border areas have meaningfully
disrupted Al Qaeda activities there while inflicting heavy
human losses.\15\ The August death of Al Qaeda-allied Pakistani
Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, reportedly caused by a U.S.-
launched missile, may have thrown Islamist militants in western
Pakistan into disarray. Some analysts worry, however, that
successful military operations are driving Al Qaeda fighters
into Pakistani cities where they will be harder to target and,
fueling already significant anti-American sentiments among the
Pakistani people. The Pakistani military has conducted
successful counter-insurgency campaigns to wrest two parts of
the country from Pakistani Taliban control, the Swat Valley and
South Waziristan. Still militants continue to use some of the
rugged tribal areas as bases of operations.
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\15\ ``U.S. Missile Strikes Take Heavy Toll on Al Qaeda, Officials
Say,'' Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2009; ``Al Qaeda Seen as Shaken in
Pakistan,'' Washington Post, June 1, 2009; ``Al Qaeda Weakened as Key
Leaders are Slain in Recent Attacks,'' Associated Press, September 19,
2009.
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It is clear that there is a significant Al Qaeda threat in
Pakistan. But there are significant Al Qaeda populations in
Yemen and Somalia, too. As Al Qaeda members continue to resist
U.S. and Pakistani forces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border, some of their comrades appear to be moving to Yemen and
Somalia, where the political climate allows them to seek safe
haven, recruit new members, and train for future operations.
2. Yemen: Exploiting Weaknesses
There are parallels between Pakistan and Yemen, according
to U.S. counter-terrorism officials, military leaders, and
policymakers. Both have become havens for significant numbers
of Al Qaeda fighters formerly active in Afghanistan. Both have
weak central governments that have difficulty controlling vast
swaths of their own territory and populations that are often
hostile to the United States.
The weak central government and alarming socioeconomic
changes in Yemen have provided opportunities for terrorist
groups to build and maintain a presence. The government's
counter-terrorism efforts are further hobbled by the conflicts
in the northern and southern parts of the country.
Overall, Islamic extremist groups are not strong enough to
topple President Salih's regime-he has co-opted several
already-but they are capable of successfully striking a high
value target, such as a foreign compound or an oil
installation. On September 17, 2008, the Al Qaeda affiliate
attacked the entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, killing 11
people. Six of the attackers also died. Observers note that
despite such a brazen attack, Yemeni militants failed to breach
the U.S. Embassy's outer layer of security and killed mostly
Yemeni civilians rather than U.S. Embassy personnel.
Nevertheless, media coverage may have been enough to satisfy
the perpetrators, as the U.S. State Department soon after the
attack announced that it would, for the second time in a year,
authorize the departure of all nonessential personnel from
Sana'a.\16\
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\16\ ``Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,'' by Jeremy Sharp,
Congressional Research Service, page 8.
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Yemen exhibits several traits that worry counter-terrorism
and intelligence officials. Worsening socioeconomic trends have
the potential to overwhelm the Yemeni government, further
jeopardizing domestic stability and security across the region.
Yemen's oil-the source of over 75 percent of its income-will
run out by 2017, and the country has no apparent way to
transition to a post-oil economy.\17\ More worrisome is the
rapidly depleting water supply. Shortages are acute throughout
the country, and Sana'a may become the first capital city in
the world to run out of water.\18\ The country's water is being
consumed much faster than it is being replenished. A large
amount of Yemen's water consumption is devoted to the
irrigation of qat, a semi-narcotic plant habitually chewed by
an estimated 75 percent of Yemeni men. Qat is blamed for
decreasing productivity, depleting resources, and contributing
to the poverty that leaves nearly half the population earning
less than $2 per day.\19\ The country also faces one of the
world's highest population growth rates, 3.4 percent a year,
which strains the government's ability to provide services and
contributes to an illiteracy rate of more than 50 percent.\20\
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\17\ ``Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,'' by Christopher Boucek,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number
102, September 2009.
\18\ Ibid.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/rankorder/
2002rank.html?countryName=Yemen&countryCode=ym®ionCode=me&rank=4#ym,
January 12, 2009.
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A Multifaceted Threat to U.S. Interests
U.S. diplomats and law enforcement officials say that a
significant threat to U.S. interests could come from American
citizens based in Yemen. Most worrisome is a group of as many
as three dozen former criminals who converted to Islam in
prison, were released at the end of their sentences, and moved
to Yemen, ostensibly to study Arabic. U.S. officials told
Committee staff that they fear that these Americans were
radicalized in prison and traveled to Yemen for training.
Although there is no public evidence of any terrorist action by
these individuals, law enforcement officials told Committee
staff members that several have ``dropped off the radar'' for
weeks at a time. U.S. law enforcement officials said they are
on heightened alert because of the potential threat from
extremists carrying American passports and the related
challenges involved in detecting and stopping homegrown
operatives.
Another concern is a group of nearly 10 non-Yemeni
Americans who traveled to Yemen, converted to Islam, became
fundamentalists, and married Yemeni women so they could remain
in the country. Described by one American official as ``blond-
haired, blue eyed-types,'' these individuals fit a profile of
Americans whom Al Qaeda has sought to recruit over the past
several years. Most of them reside in Sana'a.
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born imam who reportedly was the
spiritual advisor of Major Nidal Hassan, a U.S. Army officer
accused of murdering 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas in November
2009, currently resides in Yemen. U.S. law enforcement
officials told Committee staff that Awlaki counsels young
Muslim fundamentalists to ``continue jihad'' and to ``fight the
Crusaders.'' Although Awlaki has not yet been accused of a
crime, U.S. intelligence and military officials consider him to
be a direct threat to U.S. interests.
Meanwhile, according to U.S. law enforcement officials, 34
members of Al Qaeda who came to Sana'a from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo and who registered with the
Yemeni government as Al Qaeda members, live in the immediate
vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. These Al Qaeda fighters, upon
registering their affiliation with the Yemeni government,
promised to refrain from all terrorist activities.
Al Qaeda Transformation Underway in Yemen
In January 2009, Al Qaeda militants in Yemen announced that
the group's Saudi and Yemeni ``branches'' were merging under
the banner of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The
Saudi extremists had carried out a wave of terrorist violence
that swept Saudi Arabia from 2003 through 2007, but they were
driven south to Yemen after a crackdown. AQAP is led by a
Yemeni militant\21\ who in 2006 escaped from a Yemeni prison
along with 22 other Al Qaeda fighters, reportedly with help
from Yemeni security officials. One of his deputies is a Saudi
citizen who was repatriated to Saudi Arabia from Guantanamo in
November 2007 and returned to militancy after completing a
rehabilitation course in Saudi Arabia. Some counter-terrorism
experts suggested that the presence of Saudi militants in Yemen
indicates that Al Qaeda's presence in the kingdom has been
significantly hampered by Saudi security forces and that they
have gone to Yemen because of its more permissive
environment.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ According to a number of sources, the leader of Al Qaeda in
Yemen is a 32-year-old former bin Laden secretary named Nasir al
Wuhayshi. Like other well-know operatives, Wuhayshi was a member of the
23-person contingent who escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2006.
Wuhayshi's personal connection to bin Laden has reportedly enhanced his
legitimacy among his followers. After the fall of the Taliban in
Afghanistan in 2001, he escaped through Iran, but was arrested there
and held for two years until he was deported to Yemen in 2003. See,
Gregory D. Johnsen, ``Al Qaeda in Yemen Reorganizes under Nasir al-
Wuhayshi,'' Terrorism Focus, Volume 5, Issue 11, published by the
Jamestown Foundation, March 18, 2008.
\22\ According to one Saudi commander, ``We have killed or captured
all the fighters and the rest have fled to Afghanistan or Yemen. . . .
All that remains here is some ideological apparatus.'' See, ``Saudis
Retool to Root Out Terrorist Risk,'' New York Times, March 22, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recent months, AQAP has threatened to attack Yemeni oil
facilities and the soldiers protecting them, Western interests
in Yemen, and foreign tourists. In March 2009, AQAP suicide
bombers killed four South Korean tourists and their local
Yemeni guide near the city of Shibam. A week later, they
carried out a second attack against a convoy of South Korean
officials who had traveled to Yemen to investigate the murders.
Some analysts suggested that AQAP may have received assistance
from a source inside the security forces in order to carry out
a bombing against a well-guarded foreign delegation on its way
from the country's main airport.
In 2009, several high ranking U.S. intelligence and defense
officials suggested that Yemen was becoming a failed state and
consequently a more important theater for U.S. counterterrorism
operations. In February 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta said he
was ``particularly concerned with Somalia and Yemen. Somalia is
a failed state. Yemen is almost there. And our concern is that
both could become safe havens for Al Qaeda.'' \23\ A few months
later, DNI Director Blair stated that ``Yemen is reemerging as
a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of
operations for Al Qaeda to plan internal and external attacks,
train terrorists, and facilitate the movement of operatives.''
In his April 2009 testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Commander of U.S. Central Command General David H.
Petraeus said, ``The inability of the Yemeni government to
secure and exercise control over all of its territory offers
terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, particularly Al
Qaeda, a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and support
terrorist operations.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Central Intelligence Agency, ``Media Roundtable with CIA
Director Leon E. Panetta,'' press release, February 25, 2009.
\24\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy
on Afghanistan , Pakistan, Statement of David H. Petraeus, Commander,
U.S. Central Command, 111th Congress, April 1, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee in April 2009, Michael Leiter,
director of the National Counterterrorism Center, remarked ``We
have witnessed the reemergence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, with Yemen as a key battleground and potential
regional base of operations from which Al Qaeda can plan
attacks, train recruits, and facilitate the movement of
operatives . . . We are concerned that if AQAP strengthens, Al
Qaeda leaders could use the group and the growing presence of
foreign fighters in the region to supplement its transnational
operations capability.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ``Al Qaeda Focuses on Yemen as Launchpad: U.S.,'' Agence
France Presse, September 30, 2009
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. diplomats and western press reports indicate that Al
Qaeda has grown bolder in Yemen in the past year. In late
December 2009, Al Qaeda militants made a rare public appearance
in southern Yemen, telling an anti-government rally that the
group's war was with the United States, and not with the Yemeni
army. Al-Jazeera television showed footage of the militant
addressing the crowd while an armed comrade stood by as a
bodyguard. Both were unmasked.\26\ Also in late 2009, Yemeni
government officials said that Al Qaeda was responsible for a
daring armored car robbery in Aden, which netted $500,000. No
arrests have been made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Qaeda Makes Rare Public Appearance at Yemen Rally,'' The
Washington Post, December 21, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
American concerns have been reflected in stepped-up
cooperation with the Yemeni military and security services. In
December, the deputy director of the CIA, Stephen Kappes,
visited the capital for consultations. After the Christmas Day
bomb plot, President Obama announced that the United States
would increase its training and equipping of Yemen's security
forces.
A History of Violence and Extremism
Christopher Boucek, a fellow with the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, recently wrote that, ``Islamist
extremism in Yemen is the result of a long and complicated set
of developments. A large number of Yemeni nationals
participated in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the
1980s. After the Soviet occupation ended, the Yemeni government
encouraged its citizens to return and also permitted foreign
veterans to settle in Yemen. Many of these Arabs were
integrated into the state's various security apparatuses. As
early as 1993, the U.S. State Department noted in a now-
declassified intelligence report that Yemen was becoming an
important stop for many fighters leaving Afghanistan. The
report also maintained that the Yemeni government was either
unwilling or unable to curb their activities. Islamist
activists were used by the regime throughout the 1980s and
1990s to suppress domestic opponents, and during the 1994 civil
war Islamists fought against southern forces.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ ``Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,'' by Christopher Boucek,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number
102, September 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al Qaeda's first known attack took place in 1993 in Aden.
After several serious attacks in the early 2000s, including on
the USS Cole and the French oil tanker MV Limburg, Yemen
experienced a brief period of calm. Analysts believe this was
the result of a short-lived ``non-aggression pact'' between the
government and extremists and enhanced U.S.-Yemeni counter-
terrorism cooperation. By 2004, however, a generational split
by younger extremists, radicalized in part by the global Sunni
Islamist revival and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, led to the
emergence of a group not interested in negotiating with what it
viewed as an illegitimate and un-Islamic government in Sana'a.
Several prison escapes of experienced and dangerous operatives
further energized this younger faction, which launched a new
campaign of violent attacks against oil facilities, foreign
residents and tourists, and government security targets.
Western targets in Yemen would make attractive targets for
a resurgent Al Qaeda. Recent counter-terrorism measures in
Saudi Arabia forced extremists to seek refuge elsewhere and
analysts have observed a steady flow relocating to Yemen's
under-governed areas.\28\ Saudi authorities recently released a
list of 85 most-wanted terrorism suspects, 26 of whom are
believed to be in Yemen, including eleven Saudis who had been
detained at Guantanamo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ``Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,'' by Christopher Boucek,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number
102, September 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the central government, the Houthi rebellion in the
north and the secessionist movement in the South represent
threats to the survival of the state. Al Qaeda has attacked
Yemeni government interests in the past, and Al Qaeda figures
in the country have made public statements opposing the
government. Senior Yemeni officials say frequently that their
country is working with allies, including the United States, to
fight terrorism. But U.S. officials complain that the Yemeni
government often does not appear serious about the Al Qaeda
threat because a number of high-profile suspects have either
been released from custody or have escaped from Yemeni prisons.
U.S. government officials describe Yemeni cooperation on
counter-terrorism issues as ``episodic at best.''\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Convicted USS Cole bomber Jamal al-Badawi, for example, was
arrested and convicted on terrorism charges related to the attack, and
sentenced to 15 years in prison. He escaped twice, allegedly with the
help of Yemeni security officials, surrendered twice, and then given
conditional release. Despite protestations from the United States, the
Yemeni government has refused to extradite Badawi to stand trial. He is
currently free in Yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons and explosives from Yemen, where gunrunners operate
with impunity, often find their way to Somalia and have been
traced to attacks in Saudi Arabia, including explosives
employed in a Riyadh bombing and assault rifles used in an
attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah. More recently, a Saudi
national who had been living in Yemen, attempted to assassinate
Prince Muhammad bin Nayif Al Saud, the Saudi Deputy Interior
Minister and Director of Counter-terrorism, by detonating a
bomb concealed in his undergarments. The device was similar to
the bomb used by Omar Faruq Abdulmutallab in his attempt to
blow up a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day.\30\ U.S.
law enforcement officials said both men received their training
in Yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ On August 27, 2009, AQAP operative Abdallah Hassan al-Asiri,
pretending to surrender to Saudi authorities, detonated a bomb hidden
in his undergarments and made of pentaerythritol tetranitrate, or PETN,
while in the presence or Prince Muhammad bin Nayif. Asiri spent weeks
negotiating his false surrender and was invited, as other penitent ex-
militants, to meet the prince during a Ramadan fast-breaking event. He
bypassed some airport inspections because he was flown from southern
Saudi Arabia on the princes own jet and was not required to change
clothes nor thoroughly searched before he met the prince. US officials
meanwhile said that Omar Faruq Abdalmutallab also tried to detonate a
PETN bomb sewn under his undergarments. Abdulmutallab told US law
enforcement authorities that he obtained the materials in Yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. government is aware of Yemen's needs, both in
counter-terrorism and in economic security. The Obama
administration requested-and Congress authorized-more than $50
million in economic and military aid, $35 million in
development assistance, $12.5 million in foreign military
financing, and $5 million in economic support funds. This
represents an increase of more than 200 percent.
3. Somalia: Failure Breeds Extremism
Al Qaeda's tentacles reach deeply into Somalia and
conditions similar to those in Yemen make it possible for the
organization to extend its influence in the archetype of a
failed state just across the Gulf of Aden from Arabian
Peninsula. The threat from Al Qaeda and from its Somali
affiliate, al-Shabab, is increasing. The administration has
worked with the Somali president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed,
and Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton praised him last
summer as the ``best hope'' for his country in many years. The
Obama administration has decided to bolster Sharif's embattled
government by providing money for weapons and helping the
military in neighboring Djibouti train Somali troops. Counter-
terrorism may be our primary reason for increasing cooperation
with Somalia, but the engagement must reach beyond those narrow
goals in order to control the spread of Al Qaeda and its
message. As Senator Russ Feingold told the Senate last August,
U.S. policy should be rooted in a ``serious, high-level
commitment to a sustainable and inclusive peace.''
U.S. diplomats, law enforcement officers and intelligence
officials in the region said that a key concern is Somalia's
open, virtually defenseless border with Djibouti. The only
official border crossing is at the village of Loyada, a dusty
and impoverished outpost in the desert, where as many as 200
refugees per day arrive from Somalia and Ethiopia, most on
their way to Yemen and the Gulf. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees office in Djibouti reports that there
are 10,000 Somali refugees there, with another 80-100
additional refugees processed every week. The Djiboutian
government refuses to allow single men from Somalia into the
country, fearing infiltration by al-Shabab or Al Qaeda.
The United States has provided Djibouti with technical
assistance to help improve the Loyada crossing, but authorities
said more money is needed to secure the facility and to improve
security at other crossings farther out into the desert. The
border is utterly porous and easily breached, and Djibouti
needs cameras and radar for the Coast Guard, as Loyada sits
only a kilometer inland from the Red Sea. Djiboutian officials
told Committee staff that their government has no resources to
patrol either the land or sea border, even though at low tide
refugees can easily walk through the salt marsh undetected.
Furthermore, U.S. diplomats say that a coherent system is
needed to share information on the movement of dangerous people
across the border. A Committee staff member watched at least 50
people cross the border on a recent visit to Loyada, only about
a third of whom had a passport or any other documentation. A
man with an Iraqi passport was turned back by a Djiboutian
immigration official who said that no Iraqi national had any
reason to be in the area in the first place. The Djiboutian
immigration official told a Committee staff member that he had
recently turned away two Somali-Americans with U.S. passports,
fearing that they were al-Shabab. He added that the pair could
easily have walked a kilometer or two into the desert and
crossed into Djibouti without being detected, as many people
do.
Americans attempting to cross from Somalia into Djibouti
apparently is not unusual. The official told Committee staff
that a significant number of Western passport holders,
including Americans, have tried to cross illegally between
Djibouti and Somalia in the past year. Recently, two Somali-
Americans were arrested while trying to transit Djibouti on
their way to Somalia for what the immigration official said was
terrorist training. Both were prosecuted and jailed in Djibouti
for illegal entry. U.S. officials add that Somali-Americans are
taught techniques for avoiding detection by the FBI once they
make their way to al-Shabab training camps.
Officials in the region said that one of their major
worries is that Al Qaeda is trying to take advantage of its
Somali-American recruits by establishing a larger presence in
Somalia and plotting attacks on the United States or American
targets. Bronwyn Bruton, a Somalia expert at the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR), underscored those worries recently in
Foreign Affairs, writing that ``one of Washington's primary
concerns about Somalia is that Al Qaeda may be trying to
develop a base in the country from which to launch attacks
against Western interests. Counter-terrorism officials also
worry that more alienated members of the Somali diaspora might
embrace terrorism. Somali-Americans were arrested in Minnesota
in early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside al-
Shabab, an extremist group associated with Al Qaeda, and in
late August 2009, several Somalis were arrested in Melbourne
for planning a major suicide attack on an Australian army
installation.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ ``In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More,''
by Bronwyn Bruton, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009, pages 79-
96.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. intelligence analysts have argued since the mid-1990s
that Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign jihadist
groups. Al Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous
organization in Africa, but its foothold in Somalia has
probably been facilitated by the involvement of Western powers
and their allies. In fact, according to Bruton, the terrorist
threat posed by Somalia has grown in proportion to the
intrusiveness of international policies toward the country.\32\
Al-Shabab originally emerged as a wing of militant youths
within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the group that
controlled much of Somalia prior to the country's December 2006
occupation by Ethiopian forces in cooperation with Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was struggling
with the ICU for power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the mid-1990s, Islamic courts began to emerge around the
country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. The absence of
central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive
to the proliferation of armed factions and a safe haven for
terrorist groups. The three terrorists suspected of the 1998
attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and
the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, used Somalia to recruit,
train, hide, and smuggle weapons.
CFR's Bruton states that Ethiopia's occupation of Somalia,
which was meant to oust the ICU, had a dangerous, albeit
unintended consequence. ``By then, the ICU had exhausted most
Somalis' patience, and it dissolved, its leaders scattering in
southern Somalia or fleeing to Eritrea. Ethiopia was forced to
occupy Mogadishu to prop up the .TFG, and its presence ignited
a complex insurgency.'' \33\ The U.S.-backed occupation also
fueled anti-Americanism in the country.\34\ Bruton continues
that ``Responding to these developments, jihadists from the
Middle East and as far away as Malaysia arrived to help al-
Shabab. They brought with them suicide bombings and
sophisticated tactics such as remote-controlled detonations. By
the time Ethiopian forces withdrew in early 2009, al-Shabab's
influence had spread.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Ibid.
\34\ Statement of Ken Menkhaus, ``Developing a Coordinated and
Sustainable U.S. Strategy Toward Somalia,'' before the Subcommittee on
African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 20,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alliance or Not, a Specific Threat to Americans Exists
Only two of al-Shabab's leaders have pledged fidelity to
Osama bin Laden, but some young Al Qaeda fighters who trained
in Afghanistan have moved to southern Somalia to train Somalis
in al-Shabab camps there. In return, al-Shabab has provided
these Al Qaeda trainers with bodyguards, according to Ethiopian
government officials.
Estimates of the number of Al Qaeda fighters in Somalia by
American and African officials vary widely, from a low of 20 to
a high of 300. African officials told the Committee staff that
there has been a marked change in al-Shabab's tactics over the
past five years, as the Somalis have adopted Al Qaeda's more
lethal strategies.
Al-Shabab and Al Qaeda appear to be cooperating closely in
their administration of the training camps in southern Somalia,
notes CFR's Bruton. ``Some of these are reserved for imparting
basic ideological precepts and infantry skills to newly
enlisted Somali militia members, while others provide more
advanced training in guerilla warfare, explosives, and
assassination. The latter camps have become a magnet for
foreign fighters coming from the Somali diaspora, other African
countries, or the Middle East.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ ``Peacebuilding Amid Terrorism: Fragile Gains in Somalia,'' by
Andre Le Sage, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policywatch #1594, October 27, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Leiter of the National Counterterrorism Center
argues that al-Shabab's training camps are solely Somalia-
focused, and that the group does not have goals beyond
Somalia's borders.\36\ Al-Shabab certainly has launched
terrorist attacks, but only against domestic opponents in the
Somaliland and Puntland regions of Somalia. The Somali-American
suicide bomber attacked a Somali opponent of al-Shabab, rather
than western interests in Somalia. U.S. law enforcement
officials contend, however, that al-Shabab would hit US or
other Western targets outside of Somalia if it could.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ ``U.S. Mulls Striking Somali Terrorist Training Camps,''
Comments by Michael Leiter, National Public Radio, Morning Edition,
April 20, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leiter recently told Congress that al-Shabab has sent
dozens of Somali Americans and American Muslims through
training conducted by Al Qaeda. At least seven already have
been killed in fighting in Somalia.\37\ Last summer, Al-Shabab
released a video pledging cooperation with Al Qaeda. The video
used an American spokesman and showed footage of a training
camp featuring a former University of South Alabama student.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ ``The Threat from Somalia,'' The Washington Post, November 2,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Western diplomats also expressed concern about a possible
rise in violence against U.S. and other Western interests in
Sweden because of that country's growing Somali population.
Sweden accepts 1,000 Somali refugees per month, according to
western diplomats, and nearly all of those refugees at least
initially settle in Gothenburg, Sweden's second largest city.
The diplomats reported that pro-al-Shabab refugees in 2009
drove moderates out of the city's largest mosque and took
control of its administration. Law enforcement officials
believe that the pro-al-Shabab refugees are heavily involved in
recruiting for the group, and they are encouraging new recruits
to return to Somalia for training. These same officials
estimate that there are currently 40 Swedish citizens in al-
Shabab in Somalia.
State Failure Offers Further Opportunities for Terrorists
One of Somalia's most serious problems is the lack of all
but rudimentary government and civil society. As a result, even
basic services like education are not available for many
Somalis. Consequently, many parents send their children to
Islamic schools or mosques for their education. But madrassas
and mosques offer a very limited curriculum, and they tend to
be fundamentalist in nature because they are financed by al-
Shabab and the Saudi government. Djiboutian authorities
complained that while most Gulf States build schools and
hospitals in east Africa and send food and medicine to the
region, the Saudi government builds mosques and sends Qurans.
Analysts point out that in many areas al-Shabab is the only
organization that can provide basic social services, such as
rudimentary medical facilities, food distribution centers, and
a basic justice system rooted in Islamic law. Western diplomats
fear that al-Shabab will continue to win converts by providing
services similar to the way Hamas found success in the Gaza
Strip.
Experts strongly caution that there is little the United
States can do to weaken al-Shabab. The United States has
launched air strikes to target high-level members of al-Shabab
it believes have links to Al Qaeda. But experts say these air
strikes have only increased popular support for al-Shabab. In
fact, they argue that two of the only actions that could
galvanize al-Shabab and increase its support within Somalia are
additional air strikes by the United States, or a return of
Ethiopian troops.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ ``Al-Shabab,'' by Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign
Relations Backgrounder, February 27, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Conclusion
Terrorism is a tactic that can be defeated, but doing so
represents a challenge of extraordinary proportions and a
commitment to progress that will sometimes be slow. There are
several steps that the United States can take, internally and
in concert with foreign governments, to make terrorist
operations more difficult, particularly in places like Yemen
and Somalia, where the threat appears to be growing.
First, U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic
officials must cooperate closely to discern the terrorist
threat, including that posed by Americans, and to address that
threat. Information sharing is the most important component of
this cooperation. The failed Christmas Day bomb plot
demonstrated what can happen when U.S. government agencies fail
to act on or disseminate information quickly and efficiently.
Second, U.S. government cooperation with foreign partners
must be redoubled across the counter-terrorism spectrum:
Information-sharing, counter-terrorism and law enforcement
training, and border control are all areas where allies will
benefit from cooperation. Foreign partners are often the first
line of defense: Djiboutian border patrol agents turn away
suspect immigrants, Yemeni police raid an Al Qaeda safe house,
or an alert immigration officer stops a suspicious traveler at
an airport in Europe. But as the Christmas Day bombing attempt
proved, one breakdown in the system can be disastrous.
Finally, a viable counter-terrorism strategy must take into
account the fact that terrorism is not created in a vacuum, and
its causes must be addressed. The U.S. government must engage
foreign partners on issues such as literacy, high birth rates,
economic development, and human rights. All countries concerned
must understand the dangers of attempting to solve the complex
problem of terrorism through a one-dimensional military
approach. The solution also lies in steady progress toward
helping governments in conflict zones like Yemen and Somalia
provide a sense of hope and a plausible vision of the future
for their people.
No Direct Connection Between al-Shabab and Somali Pirates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Western diplomats and military officials agree that currently there
is no direct connection between al-Shabab and Somali pirates, due
primarily to clan and tribal differences. The pirates hail almost
exclusively from Somalia's Majourteen clan, Issa Musa subclan, which
are based in Puntland and Somaliland, in the central and northern parts
of the country. Al-Shabab, however, is made up of Somalis of various
clans from Mogadishu and southern Somalia that are not related to the
Majourteen. Ethiopian academics describe al-Shabab as ``an
opportunistic organization. Shabab speaks to southern Somalis by using
nationalist rhetoric and money.'' Most of the raiders and their backers
on land are involved in piracy solely for the money. Al-Shabab, on the
other hand, is ``not as xenophobic as the northerners. They welcome
foreign fighters, who they call `Muslims.' They don't make any
differentiation by nationality. Al-Shabab doesn't even have its own
flag.''
There is, however, an indirect connection. In the past year, the
pirates have begun operating out of southern ports controlled by al-
Shabab. This is a new development in 2009, according to U.S.
diplomats. Pirates simply pay a ``user fee'' to al-Shabab for use of
the ports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------