[JPRT, 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2011
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
2011 ANNUAL REPORT
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2011
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JAMES RISCH, Idaho
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
MARIA OTERO, Department of State
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Executive Summary............................................. 1
Introduction................................................. 1
Overview..................................................... 3
Specific Findings and Recommendations........................ 10
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 52
II. Human Rights................................................. 55
Freedom of Expression........................................ 55
Worker Rights................................................ 67
Criminal Justice............................................. 80
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 94
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 107
Population Planning.......................................... 110
Freedom of Residence and Movement............................ 117
Status of Women.............................................. 121
Human Trafficking............................................ 126
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 131
Public Health................................................ 135
The Environment.............................................. 139
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 150
Civil Society................................................ 150
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 158
Commercial Rule of Law....................................... 170
Access to Justice............................................ 182
Property..................................................... 191
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 194
V. Tibet......................................................... 207
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 221
VII. Endnotes.................................................... 226
Political Prisoner Database................................ 226
Freedom of Expression...................................... 227
Worker Rights.............................................. 234
Criminal Justice........................................... 240
Freedom of Religion........................................ 247
Ethnic Minority Rights..................................... 259
Population Planning........................................ 261
Freedom of Residence and Movement.......................... 267
Status of Women............................................ 269
Human Trafficking.......................................... 273
North Korean Refugees in China............................. 277
Public Health.............................................. 279
The Environment............................................ 282
Civil Society.............................................. 290
Institutions of Democratic Governance...................... 293
Commercial Rule of Law..................................... 303
Access to Justice.......................................... 312
Property................................................... 316
Xinjiang................................................... 318
Tibet...................................................... 328
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau........................ 343
I. Executive Summary
Introduction
The China of today is vastly different from that of 30
years ago, when major economic reforms began, and even 10 years
ago, when China acceded to the World Trade Organization. More
people in today's China enjoy an improved quality of life,
economic freedoms, and greater access to information via the
Internet and other communication technologies. But economic and
technological progress has not led to commensurate gains in
China's human rights and rule of law record.
In the areas of human rights and rule of law this year,
China's leaders have grown more assertive in their violation of
rights, disregarding the very laws and international standards
that they claim to uphold and tightening their grip on Chinese
society. China's leaders have done this while confidently
touting their own human rights and rule of law record. This
year, officials declared that China had reached a ``major
milestone'' in its legal system and made ``remarkable
achievements'' in carrying out its 2009-2010 National Human
Rights Action Plan, asserting that ``civil and political rights
have been effectively protected.'' China's leaders no longer
respond to criticism by simply denying that rights have been
abused. Rather, they increasingly use the language of
international law to defend their actions. According to China's
leaders, today's China is strong and moving forward on human
rights and rule of law.
Official rhetoric notwithstanding, China's human rights and
rule of law record has not improved. Indeed, as this year's
Annual Report indicates, it appears to be worsening in some
areas. A troubling trend is officials' increased willingness to
disregard the law when it suits them, particularly to silence
dissent. Beginning in February 2011, Chinese police took the
unusual step of ``disappearing'' numerous lawyers and activists
in one of the harshest crackdowns in recent memory. It was no
surprise, then, that in sensitive issue areas such as China's
population planning policy, local government officials
demonstrated little restraint in turning to illegal measures,
including violence, to coerce compliance with a policy that
itself violates international human rights standards. Lack of
respect for the rule of law extended into the international
arena, where China pursued domestic subsidies and industrial
policies inconsistent with China's commitments as a member of
the World Trade Organization.
The Chinese government's misuse of the law to violate
fundamental human rights continued. The Commission observed
officials citing the ``law'' as a basis to crack down on
peaceful protests; to prevent Buddhists, Catholics, Falun Gong
practitioners, Muslims, Protestants, and Taoists from freely
practicing their beliefs; to prevent Tibetans, Uyghurs, and
other ethnic minorities from exercising autonomy despite
guarantees in Chinese law; to prevent workers from
independently organizing; and to clamp down on civil society
organizations. The Communist Party tightened its grip at all
levels of society, stepping up monitoring of citizens and
social groups and stifling attempts at independent political
participation and advocacy for democracy.
Along with negative developments, there have been some
hopeful signs, notably at the grassroots level. The Commission
observed the courage of citizens calling for justice, as when
daring journalists and millions of Internet users outmaneuvered
censors to raise questions about the government's response to a
high-speed rail crash, or when members of the Shouwang Church
openly defied the government to hold outdoor worship services
in Beijing. The Commission also continued to observe well-
intentioned officials and individuals seeking to bring about
positive changes within the system. Such actions testify to the
Chinese people's desire for a just society and their
willingness to be productive partners in pursuit of that aim.
Human rights and rule of law developments in China are
important to the rest of the world. The rights to freedom of
expression, association, and religion are universal and
transcend borders. These rights are provided for in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, two documents that
China has publicly supported. When the Chinese government and
Communist Party deny these rights, as when they censor the
press and Internet and restrict access to courts, citizens
worldwide--not just in China--know less about issues such as
poisoned food, unsafe products, natural and man-made disasters,
and infectious disease, and have less recourse to hold
officials accountable. Moreover, the Chinese government's
respect for human rights and rule of law domestically serves as
an important barometer for China's compliance and cooperation
internationally, from trade agreements to issues of common
global concern. Finally, as recent years have shown, China's
increasing confidence in and defense of its human rights record
risk setting negative precedents for other countries and
reshaping international human rights standards to allow for
China's abuses. China's strident justification this past year
of its imprisonment of the Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo,
and the refusal of some governments to send representatives to
the Nobel ceremony, exemplify this trend.
This is the Commission's 10th Annual Report on China's
human rights and rule of law developments. As in the past, the
Commission has assessed the Chinese government's record on the
basis of China's own Constitution and laws and international
human rights standards, relying on research based in large part
on reports and articles published in China. As Commission
research has shown this past year, Chinese officials continue
to deny Chinese citizens their rights in order to preserve the
Communist Party's notion of political stability and harmony.
China's stability is in the United States' best interest, but
the Commission believes that stability will not result from
repressing rights for perceived short-term gain, but only by
ensuring and protecting the rights of all Chinese citizens.
Overview
Below is a discussion of the major trends that the
Commission observed during the 2011 reporting year, covering
the period from fall 2010 to fall 2011.
disregard for the law
The Commission observed Chinese officials disregarding the
law to deny Chinese citizens the freedoms of speech,
association, and religion, and the right to be free from
arbitrary detention, as well as Chinese officials refusing to
abide by international commitments:
Disappearance of Human Rights Lawyers and
Activists. In the first half of 2011, authorities
reportedly ``disappeared'' numerous lawyers and rights
activists known for criticizing the Communist Party and
for advocating on behalf of politically sensitive
causes and groups. The ``disappearances,'' in which
persons went missing with little or no word of their
whereabouts or the charges against them, violated the
limited procedural protections provided under Chinese
law and drew the criticism of the UN Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and of the
international community. The missing included the well-
known artist and public advocate Ai Weiwei, who was
kept at a secret location for 81 days before being
released on bail on the condition that he not grant
interviews or send Twitter messages. Following the
crackdown, the Chinese government announced a draft
revision to its Criminal Procedure Law that would
legalize such disappearances.
Population Planning. Although Chinese law
prohibits officials from infringing on the rights and
interests of citizens when promoting compliance with
population planning policies, the Commission noted
reports of official campaigns, as well as numerous
individual cases in which officials used violent
methods to coerce citizens to undergo sterilizations or
abortions or pay heavy fines for having ``out-of-plan''
children. In one such example, in October 2010, local
family planning officials in Xiamen city, Fujian
province, reportedly kidnapped a woman who was eight
months pregnant with her second child and detained her
for 40 hours. They then forcibly injected her with a
substance that caused the fetus to be aborted. During
this time, the woman's husband reportedly was not
permitted to see her.
Worker Rights. China's Constitution and
international human rights standards provide for
freedom of association, but workers in China are still
denied their fundamental right to organize independent
unions, despite some potentially positive but limited
developments this past year (see below). Instead,
workers must rely on a Party-controlled union to
represent them. Without genuine labor representation,
Chinese workers continue to face poor working
conditions and harassment when they seek to advocate
independently for their rights. Worker safety issues,
especially among miners, and child labor remained
serious problems.
Extralegal Confinement of Released Activists,
Petitioners. Hu Jia, a human rights and environmental
advocate, and Chen Guangcheng, a self-trained legal
advocate who publicized population planning abuses,
were released from prison this year only to face, along
with their families, onerous conditions of detention
and abuse with little or no basis in Chinese law. In
Chen's case, authorities kept him and his wife under
extralegal house arrest and allegedly beat them after
video footage of their conditions was smuggled out of
the house and released on an overseas Web site. In
addition, officials continued to hold Mongol rights
advocate Hada after completion of his prison sentence
in December 2010. The legal basis under Chinese law, if
any, for his continued custody is unclear. Chinese and
international media also reported on the ongoing
problem of ``black jails,'' which are extralegal
detention facilities used to house and abuse citizens
who persistently petition the government about their
grievances.
Commercial Rule of Law. China continued to
implement policies that are inconsistent with its
commitments as a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and are incompatible with the rule of law.
Industrial policies limit market access for non-Chinese
companies and in some cases violate the core WTO
principle of national treatment; state-owned
enterprises enjoy direct and indirect subsidies,
including land and regulatory protection, which is
contrary to China's WTO commitments. Favoring state-
owned enterprises has implications for human rights,
including the taking of land to subsidize production
and the use of the state secrets law to protect
information in the state-owned sector. WTO cases this
past year addressed the impact of China's policies on
its trading partners in industries ranging from tires
to wind energy. These cases highlight Chinese support
of its domestic industry, China's use of quotas and
subsidies, the lack of transparency, and the fear of
retaliation against foreign companies that speak up.
China continued to control its currency, which many
economists and the International Monetary Fund consider
to be undervalued.
Ethnic Minority Language and Culture. In
Tibetan autonomous areas of China, the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, and other minority areas, the government
continued to promote policies threatening the viability
of the language and culture of Tibetans, Uyghurs,
Mongols, and other groups, in contravention of China's
Constitution and law providing autonomy to ethnic
minorities. These policies included the imposition of
Mandarin Chinese language in schools at the expense of
other languages, the compulsory resettlement of large
numbers of nomads, tight curbs over religious practice,
and economic development projects that threatened
livelihoods and sacred sites.
misapplication of the law as a tool for repression
The Commission also noted the continuance of Chinese
officials abusing and strengthening laws as a tool for
repression and to deny citizens the basic freedoms of speech,
association, and religion, and the right to be free from
arbitrary detention.
Criminal and Administrative Law. Official
abuse of Chinese criminal law and administrative
provisions prohibiting ``subversion,'' ``splittism,''
and ``disrupting social order'' remained a significant
concern this reporting year. Chinese officials used
these provisions to imprison labor advocates, writers,
Internet essayists, democracy advocates, and Tibetan
and Uyghur writers and journalists who engaged in
peaceful expression and assembly. These included labor
lawyer and advocate Zhao Dongmin, three Tibetans--
Buddha (pen name), Jangtse, and Kalsang Jinpa--
democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, Uyghur journalist
Memetjan Abdulla, and numerous other advocates swept up
in the domestic crackdown that followed protests in the
Middle East and North Africa and the calls for
``Jasmine'' protests in China. In August, China's top
legislature reviewed a draft amendment of the Criminal
Procedure Law that would legalize the current practice
of forcibly ``disappearing'' rights advocates in
violation of international standards.
Internet Regulation. The Chinese government
sought to tighten its supervision of Internet
activities, establishing in May 2011 a State Internet
Information Office to ``strengthen [the state's]
supervision of online content.'' Reports indicated that
officials also stepped up measures to monitor Internet
use in public places. The total number of Web sites in
China reportedly decreased dramatically as a result of
greater state intervention.
Religious Regulation. The Chinese government
continued to formally recognize only five religions and
to require groups belonging to these religions to
register with the government and submit to ongoing
state control. Unregistered worshippers and those
practicing unrecognized beliefs continued to face
harassment.
Buddhists and Taoists. Authorities
maintained a restrictive framework for
controlling Buddhist and Taoist doctrines,
practices, worship sites, and religious
personnel.
Catholics. Authorities continued to
harass and detain Catholics who worshipped
outside state-controlled parameters. The state-
controlled church forced some bishops to attend
the ordination ceremonies of two bishops
ordained without Holy See approval--the first
such ordinations since late 2006--as well as a
December 2010 state-controlled church
conference.
Falun Gong. Officials continued to carry
out a campaign--lasting more than a decade--of
extensive, systematic, and in some cases
violent efforts to pressure Falun Gong
practitioners to renounce their beliefs. This
year, officials were in the second year of a
three-year campaign that included greater
funding and government measures to achieve
these goals.
Protestants. Officials took into custody
or confined to their homes hundreds of members
of unregistered Protestant congregations who
assembled into large groups or across
congregations. These included members of the
Shouwang Church, which had not registered with
the authorities, after they attempted to hold
large-scale outdoor services in Beijing.
Regulations in Ethnic Minority Regions.
Tibetans. Governments at prefecture
levels or above issued or drafted a series of
regulations to tighten state control over
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, monks,
and nuns.
Uyghurs. Following demonstrations and
riots in the Xinjiang region in 2009,
authorities there maintained repressive
security policies that targeted peaceful
dissent, human rights advocacy, and expressions
of cultural and religious identity, especially
among Uyghurs.
tightening party control over society
The Commission observed the Communist Party's attempts to
strengthen control over many aspects of society in ways that
threatened basic human rights of freedom of expression,
association, and religion. Authorities created new institutions
and stepped up monitoring of citizens and groups in the name of
``comprehensive management of public security'' and
``safeguarding social stability.'' In some cities, Party
monitoring was extended into commercial buildings and local
officials packaged ``social management'' tasks with government
service delivery in expanded monitoring of neighborhoods. Party
wariness of the formation of independent networks, whether
among Chinese citizens or between Chinese citizens and foreign
groups, remained a prominent feature in many policies.
Democratic Governance and Political
Participation. Top officials continued to insist that
there would be no multiparty elections or separation of
powers and that the goal of any political reform--
whether it is of the political system or of the media--
must be to strengthen, not weaken, the Party's
leadership. The use of the Internet by independent
candidates running in local people's congress elections
emerged as a hopeful sign for grassroots attempts at
democracy, but the Party discouraged such candidates,
and local officials took repressive measures to stop
them. The Party sought to monopolize village leadership
positions. Authorities continued to have no tolerance
for certain democracy advocates, for example
restricting the freedom of movement of elections expert
Yao Lifa.
Media and Internet. Party officials maintained
heavy censorship of the Internet, media, and
publishing, including limiting coverage of public
disasters and health emergencies, and silencing well-
known journalists such as Chang Ping. Repression of
foreign journalists peaked after they attempted to
cover the calls for ``Jasmine'' protests.
Negotiations With the Dalai Lama. Regarding
the status of negotiations between Chinese officials
and the Dalai Lama or his representatives, no formal
dialogue between the two sides took place this past
year, the longest break since dialogue resumed in 2002.
Officials continued their campaign to discredit the
Dalai Lama as a religious leader. For his part, the
Dalai Lama renounced an official role in exiled Tibetan
governance, a move that could alter the dialogue
dynamics by making it more difficult for officials to
characterize him as a ``political'' figure.
progress claimed; impact unclear
This past year, the Chinese government announced new
measures related to human rights and the rule of law, but the
actual impact was unclear or negative.
Civil Society. Beijing and Shanghai reportedly
conducted limited reforms to potentially make it easier
for certain types of civil society organizations to
register with the government, but some experts argued
that the moves could solidify the government's already
tight control over which types of civil society
organizations are allowed to operate in China.
Death Penalty Reform. In order to limit
application of the death penalty, for which statistics
remain a state secret, authorities amended the PRC
Criminal Law to reduce the number of crimes punishable
by death from 68 to 55. In practice authorities rarely,
if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13
reclassified crimes.
Access to Justice. Officials promoted a new
mediation law, effective in January 2011, as the
preferred method of resolving disputes and maintaining
social stability. While mediation may be effective in
some cases, the courts' emphasis on this form of
dispute resolution raised questions about denying
access to courts, increasing pressure on courts and
parties to mediate cases, and weakening the rule of
law.
Village Governance. Local authorities
continued to implement pilot projects in villages to
reduce corruption, maintain ``social stability,''
improve budget transparency, and promote ``democratic''
public participation, but the sustainability and impact
of these projects are unclear.
Environment. Some central-level authorities
continued to state their support for public
participation and took steps to improve environmental
information disclosure. An administrative provision
limiting the disclosure of basic pollution information,
however, appeared to remain in effect, and local
environmental authorities continued to be reluctant to
disclose information, especially in relation to
polluting industries. In addition, central-level
environmental officials issued a measure that states
support for social organizations and encourages closer
cooperation between government officials and
environmental groups, but also stipulates strengthening
``guidance'' of and ``political thought'' work for
environmental groups.
potential for progress
In a few areas, the Commission observed developments that
could bring about positive change in human rights and the rule
of law in China depending on implementation and other factors.
Mental Health. After decades of preparation,
officials released a draft national mental health law
in June 2011 that could curb abuse of the diagnosis of
mental illness to detain in psychiatric institutions
persons who voice dissent.
Government Transparency. Officials continued
to state their support for open government information
initiatives, and the number of government agencies
publicly disclosing general information about their
budgets reportedly increased. However, a number of
fundamental obstacles to transparency remained in
place, including China's state secrets laws, lack of a
free press and independent judiciary, and policies
requiring government approvals of investments through a
non-transparent process.
Worker Rights. Faced in part with the demands
of a younger, more assertive workforce and pressure to
maintain social stability, Chinese officials introduced
limited steps that could improve conditions for
workers. A law on social insurance took effect that
deals with work-related injury insurance, and
authorities reportedly continued to consider a draft
national wage regulation. It remains unclear whether
such measures will help address unequal wealth
distribution and streamline worker compensation
procedures.
Citizen Participation on the Internet.
Government initiatives to expand access to the
Internet, including access among rural residents, have
contributed to creating an online space that Chinese
citizens have utilized to express concern over human
rights and government policies. The government and
Party, however, continued to heavily censor the
Internet and to promote its use for economic
development and propaganda.
Anticorruption. The government continued
limited anti-corruption measures, including steps to
prevent corruption at the grassroots level, to curb
judicial corruption, and to criminalize bribery of
foreign officials by Chinese companies operating
overseas. Officials issued provisions calling for the
promotion of an ``honest'' Party and a ``clean''
government. Despite some new regulatory language,
protections for whistleblowers remain inadequate.
Access to Justice. Chinese officials
reportedly took some steps to expand legal aid and to
promote administrative law reforms that seek to provide
greater oversight of state agencies and government
employees and to protect citizens' interests.
Property Rights. Regulations covering
expropriation of urban housing came into effect in
January 2011. If fully implemented, the regulations
could offer greater protection for urban homeowners.
Rural landowners, however, lack equivalent protection.
Criminal Procedure Reforms. In August, China's
top legislature reviewed a draft amendment to the
Criminal Procedure Law, which includes revisions that
aim to prohibit forced self-incrimination, bar the use
of evidence obtained through torture, and permit
Chinese criminal defense attorneys to meet criminal
defendants in custody without being monitored.
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated in
and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this
Annual Report, including its findings, views, and
recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of
individual Executive Branch members or the policies of the
Administration.
Specific Findings and Recommendations
A summary of specific findings follows below for each
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.
Freedom of Expression
Findings
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year,
Chinese officials continued to maintain a broad range
of restrictions on free expression that do not comply
with international human rights standards, including
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such
standards permit states in limited circumstances to
restrict expression to protect interests such as
national security and public order, Chinese
restrictions covered a much broader range of activity,
including expression critical of the Communist Party
and peaceful dissent. Despite this, Chinese officials
continue to point to Internet development in China as
proof of freedom of expression and to argue that
Chinese restrictions comply with international law,
including in the case of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize
winner Liu Xiaobo.
This past year was marked by a major crackdown
on Internet and press freedom that exemplified the
range of tools officials can use to restrict the free
flow of information. The crackdown began in mid-
February following protests in the Middle East and
North Africa and the appearance of online calls for
``Jasmine'' protests in China.
While international and domestic observers
continued to note the vibrancy of Internet and cell
phone use in China, government and Party officials
showed little sign of loosening political control. Top
leaders, including President Hu Jintao, called for
``strengthening'' the Party's guidance of online public
opinion, as well as the Party's leadership over the
Internet. Officials established a central-level agency
to tighten supervision of the Internet and issued
regulations to increase monitoring of Internet use in
public places. Censors continued to block the sharing
of online information that officials deemed to be
politically sensitive, including news of the Nobel
Peace Prize award to imprisoned intellectual and reform
advocate Liu Xiaobo, the calls for ``Jasmine''
protests, and words such as ``human rights'' and
``democracy.'' At times, citizen expression on China's
microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following the
Wenzhou high-speed train accident in July 2011.
Officials insisted that any reform of the
media industry would result in ``no change in the
Party's control over the media.'' Officials continued
to issue broad guidance, such as telling the media it
was their ``common responsibility'' to promote the 90th
anniversary of the Party's founding. Officials also
continued to issue specific directives, such as how to
cover the protests in the Middle East and North Africa
and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo.
Harassment of foreign journalists reached a new height
this past year, including beatings and threats of
expulsion of journalists who attempted to report on the
``Jasmine'' protest strolls.
Officials continued to arbitrarily restrict
expression by abusing vague criminal law provisions and
abusing broad regulations and registration requirements
applicable to journalists, publishers, news media, and
the Internet. Citizens who criticized the government
were charged with national security crimes such as
``subversion.'' Official campaigns to train and
supervise journalists conducted in the name of
combating corruption continued to be heavily imbued
with political indoctrination. Officials continued to
use campaigns they described as intended to enforce the
law to instead target ``illegal'' political and
religious publications. Such publications included ones
that ``defame the Party and state leaders'' or
``contain political rumors that create ideological
confusion.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Raise concerns over and draw enhanced
international attention to the Chinese government's
continued insistence that its restrictions on freedom
of expression are consistent with international
standards. Chinese officials assert that such measures
are taken to protect national security or public order
when available information indicates that many measures
are aimed at silencing opposition to the Party or
blocking the free flow of information on politically
sensitive topics. Emphasize that the Chinese
government's position undermines international human
rights standards for free expression, particularly
those contained in Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19
and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Emphasize to Chinese officials that Communist Party and
government censorship of the Internet and the press can
lead to instability by eroding public faith in the
media and government.
Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese
officials on the issue of how governments can best
ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are
not abused and do not exceed the scope necessary to
protect national security, minors, and public order.
Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such
as public participation in formulation of restrictions
on free expression, transparency regarding
implementation of such restrictions, and independent
review of such restrictions. Reiterate Chinese
officials' own calls for greater transparency and
public participation in lawmaking. Such discussions may
be part of a broader discussion on how both the U.S.
and Chinese governments can work together to ensure the
protection of common interests on the Internet,
including protecting minors, computer security, and
privacy.
Acknowledge the Chinese government's efforts to
expand access to the Internet and cell phones,
especially in rural areas, while continuing to press
officials to comply with international standards.
Support the research and development of technologies
that enable Chinese citizens to access and share
political and religious content that they are entitled
to access and share under international human rights
standards. Support practices and Chinese-language tools
and training materials that enable Chinese citizens to
access and share content in a way that ensures their
security and privacy. Support the dissemination of
online Chinese-language information on the Internet,
especially popular Chinese social media sites, that
discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese
citizens are entitled under international standards.
Raise concerns regarding Chinese officials'
instrumental use of the law, including vague national
security charges, as a tool to suppress citizens'
rights to freedom of expression, and question whether
such actions are in keeping with the spirit of the
``rule of law.''
Elevate concern over the increased harassment of
foreign journalists, who this past year have been
beaten and threatened with expulsion for attempting to
report on events of public concern. Emphasize that such
treatment is not in keeping with regulations issued for
the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games in which Chinese
officials promised greater freedoms for foreign
journalists, and is not in keeping with the treatment
Chinese journalists are afforded when reporting on
events in the United States.
Call for the release of Liu Xiaobo and other
political prisoners imprisoned for allegedly committing
crimes of endangering state security and other crimes
but whose only offense was to peacefully express
support for political reform or criticism of government
policies, including Tan Zuoren (sentenced in February
2010 to five years in prison after using the Internet
to organize an independent investigation into school
collapses in an earthquake).
Worker Rights
Findings
Workers in China still are not guaranteed,
either by law or in practice, full worker rights in
accordance with international standards, including the
right to organize into independent unions. The All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official
union under the direction of the Communist Party, is
the only legal trade union organization in China. All
lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU.
The Commission continues to note the lack of
genuine labor representation in China. ACFTU officials
continue to state that it is their goal to develop
stronger representation for workers. In January 2011,
for example, the ACFTU announced its plan to establish
a system of electing worker representatives in 80
percent of unionized public enterprises and 70 percent
of unionized non-public enterprises in 2011. In March
2011, Zhang Mingqi, the vice chairman of the ACFTU,
acknowledged that an increase in worker actions was due
to enterprises having ``neglected the legal rights and
benefits of workers'' for many years. Multiple
localities in China also announced plans to establish
collective wage consultation systems in coming years,
including Qingdao, Changde, Rizhao, Qinhuangdao, and
Shenzhen.
At the same time, advocates for worker rights
in China continue to be subjected to harassment and
abuse. In particular, officials appear to target
advocates who have the ability to organize and mobilize
large groups of workers. For example, in October 2010,
a Xi'an court sentenced labor lawyer and advocate Zhao
Dongmin to three years in prison for organizing workers
at state-owned enterprises. Authorities charged him
with ``mobilizing the masses to disrupt social order.''
Authorities continue to detain Yang Huanqing for
organizing teachers in fall 2010 to petition against
social insurance policies they alleged to be unfair.
As the Commission found in 2010, Chinese
authorities continue to face the challenge of
accommodating a younger, more educated, and rights-
conscious workforce. In February 2011, the ACFTU
released a set of policy recommendations intended to
better address the demands of these young workers.
Younger workers, born in the 1980s and 1990s, continue
to be at the forefront of worker actions in China this
year, including large-scale street protests in southern
China in June 2011. These young workers also make up
about 100 million of China's 160 million migrant
workers, and compared to their parents, have higher
expectations regarding wages and labor rights. China's
Minister of Agriculture Han Changfu has pointed out
that many of these young workers have never laid down
roots, are better educated, are the only child in the
family, and are more likely to ``demand, like their
urban peers, equal employment, equal access to social
services, and even the obtainment of equal political
rights.''
With Chinese officials charged with preserving
``social stability,'' the extent to which they will
allow workers to bargain for higher wages and genuine
representation remains unclear. In part to address
official concern over the unequal distribution of
wealth across China and its potential effects on
``social unrest,'' the government reportedly is
considering a national regulation on wages. Chinese
media in the past year reported that the draft
regulation includes provisions creating a ``normal
increase mechanism'' for wages, defining a set of
standards to calculate overtime pay, and requiring the
management of certain ``monopolized industries''
(longduan qiye) to disclose to the government and the
public the salary levels of their senior employees.
The Commission continued to monitor the
progress of Guangdong province's draft Regulations on
Democratic Management of Enterprises, which reportedly
would extend to workers the right to ask for collective
wage consultations and allow worker members to sit on
the enterprise's board of directors and board of
supervisors, represent worker interests in the boards'
meetings, and take part in the enterprise's
decisionmaking processes. In September 2010, the
Standing Committee of the Guangdong People's Congress
reportedly withdrew the draft from further
consideration due to heavy opposition from industry.
During this reporting year, a major Hong Kong media
source reported that Guangdong authorities would
approve the draft in January 2011. However, no such
action has been observed.
Chinese workers, especially miners, continued
to face persistent occupational safety issues. In
November 2010, the ACFTU released figures showing a 32
percent increase in occupational illnesses in 2009, of
which the vast majority involved lung disease.
Officials took some efforts to close some mines and
promote safety, and fatalities have been consistently
reduced over the past few years, but uneven enforcement
reportedly continued to hinder such efforts. Collusion
between mine operators and local officials reportedly
remains widespread.
In January 2011, revisions to the Regulations
on Work-Related Injury Insurance became effective. The
changes include requiring officials to respond more
quickly to worker injury claims, but the effectiveness
of the changes is unclear. As the Commission reported
last year, the claims process may last for more than a
decade. The process is further complicated for migrant
workers who may already have left their jobs and moved
to another location by the time clinical symptoms
surface.
The extent of child labor in China is unclear
in part because the government does not release data on
child labor despite frequent requests by the U.S.
Government, other countries' governments, and
international organizations. While a national legal
framework exists to address the issue, systemic
problems in enforcement have dulled the effects of
these legal measures. Reports of child labor continued
to surface this past year. As an example, in March
2011, Shenzhen authorities reportedly found 40 children
working at an electronics factory.
The National People's Congress Standing
Committee passed the PRC Social Insurance Law in
October 2010, and it became effective on July 1, 2011.
The law specifies that workers may transfer their
insurance from one region to another and discusses five
major types of insurance: Old-age pension, medical,
unemployment, work-related injury, and maternity. No
implementing guidelines have been released and some
critics have said the law is too broad to be
implemented effectively. In addition, the extent to
which the law will enable a greater number of migrant
workers to obtain social insurance remains unclear. At
the same time, migrant workers continued to face
discrimination in urban areas, and their children still
faced difficulties accessing city schools. Employment
discrimination more generally continued to be a serious
problem, especially for workers without urban household
registration status.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support projects promoting reform of Chinese
labor laws and regulations to reflect internationally
recognized labor principles. Prioritize projects that
not only focus on legislative drafting and regulatory
development, but also analyze implementation and
measure progress in terms of compliance with
internationally recognized labor principles at the
shop-floor level.
Support multi-year pilot projects that showcase
the experience of collective bargaining in action for
both Chinese workers and trade union officials;
identify local trade union offices found to be more
open to collective bargaining; and focus pilot projects
in those locales. Where possible, prioritize programs
that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective
bargaining pilot projects even in factories that do not
have an official union presence. Encourage the
expansion of exchanges between Chinese labor rights
advocates in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the
bar, academia, the official trade union, and U.S.
collective bargaining practitioners. Prioritize
exchanges that emphasize face-to-face meetings with
hands-on practitioners and trainers.
Encourage research that identifies factors
underlying inconsistency in enforcement of labor laws
and regulations. This includes projects that prioritize
the large-scale compilation and analysis of Chinese
labor dispute litigation and arbitration cases and
guidance documents issued by, and to, courts at the
provincial level and below, leading ultimately to the
publication and dissemination of Chinese language
casebooks that may be used as a common reference
resource by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers,
employers, union officials, and law schools in China.
Support capacity-building programs to strengthen
Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in
defending the rights of workers. Encourage Chinese
officials at local levels to develop, maintain, and
deepen relationships with labor organizations inside
and outside of China and to invite these groups to
increase the number of training programs in mainland
China. Support programs that train workers in ways to
identify problems at the factory-floor level, equipping
them with skills and problem-solving training so they
can relate their concerns to employers effectively.
Where appropriate, share the United States'
ongoing experience and efforts in protecting worker
rights--through legal, regulatory, or non-governmental
means--with Chinese officials. Expand site visits and
other exchanges for Chinese officials to observe and
share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, lawyers, the
U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and other regulatory
agencies at all levels of U.S. Government that work on
labor issues.
Support USDOL's exchange with China's Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) regarding
setting and enforcing minimum wage standards;
strengthening social insurance; improving employment
statistics; and promoting social dialogue and exchanges
with China's State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS)
regarding improving workplace safety and health.
Support the annual labor dialogue with China that USDOL
started in 2010 and its plan for the establishment of a
safety dialogue. Encourage discussion on the value of
constructive interactions among labor NGOs, workers,
employers, and government agencies. Encourage exchanges
that emphasize the importance of government
transparency in developing stable labor relations and
in ensuring full and fair enforcement of labor laws.
Criminal Justice
Findings
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year,
the Chinese government waged a broad-scale crackdown on
human rights advocates, lawyers, bloggers, writers, and
democracy activists. In early 2011, Chinese public
security officials detained more than 200 advocates in
a campaign that appeared related to official
sensitivity over recent protests in the Middle East and
North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-
called ``Jasmine'' protests within China.
Harassment and intimidation of human rights
advocates and their families by Chinese government
officials continued during this reporting year. Public
security authorities and unofficial personnel illegally
monitored and subjected to periodic illegal home
confinement human rights defenders, petitioners,
religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their
family members. Such mistreatment and abuse were
evident particularly in the leadup to sensitive dates
and events, such as the Nobel Peace Prize award
ceremony in December 2010 and the ``Jasmine'' protests
of early 2011.
Chinese officials continued to use various
forms of extralegal detention against Chinese citizens,
including human rights advocates, petitioners, and
peaceful protesters. Those arbitrarily detained were
often held in psychiatric hospitals or extralegal
detention facilities and subjected to treatment
inconsistent with international standards and
protections found in China's Constitution and the PRC
Criminal Procedure Law.
Chinese criminal defense lawyers continue to
confront obstacles to practicing law without judicial
interference or fear of prosecution. In cases that
officials deemed ``politically sensitive,'' criminal
defense attorneys routinely faced harassment and abuse.
Some suspects and defendants in sensitive cases were
not able to have counsel of their own choosing and some
were compelled to accept government-appointed defense
counsel. Abuses of Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law,
which prescribes criminal liability to lawyers who
force or induce a witness to change his or her
testimony or falsify evidence, continue to hinder
effective criminal defense.
In February 2011, the National People's
Congress Standing Committee reviewed and passed the
eighth amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which reduced
the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty to
55 crimes. The reduction signaled the first time the
Chinese government has reduced the number of crimes
punishable by capital punishment since the PRC Criminal
Law was enacted in 1979. International organizations
and the state-run media pointed out that courts rarely,
if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 crimes no
longer eligible for capital punishment.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Press the Chinese government to release
immediately advocates who are in prison or detention
and to adhere to fair trial standards and ensure
procedural protections for the approximately 40 human
rights advocates in cases that have already gone to
trial.
Support the establishment of exchanges between
Chinese provincial law enforcement agencies and U.S.
state law enforcement agencies to study policing,
evidence collection, inmate rights, and other criminal
justice reforms currently underway in China.
Press the Chinese government to adopt the
recommendation of the United Nations (UN) Committee
against Torture to investigate and disclose the
existence of ``black jails'' and other secret detention
facilities as a first step toward abolishing such forms
of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese government to
extend an invitation to the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention to visit China.
Call on the Chinese government to commit publicly
to a specific timetable for its ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which the Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not
yet ratified. Press the Chinese government to implement
the principles asserted in its 2009-2010 National Human
Rights Action Plan, and request that the Chinese
government implement additional plans to advance human
rights and the rule of law.
Urge the Chinese government to amend the PRC
Criminal Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced rights
and protections for lawyers and detained suspects
contained in the 2008 revision of the PRC Lawyers Law.
Encourage Chinese officials to commit to a specific
timetable for revision and implementation of the
revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law.
Freedom of Religion
Findings
The Chinese government continued in the past
reporting year to restrict Chinese citizens' freedom of
religion. China's Constitution guarantees freedom of
religious belief but limits protections for religious
practice to ``normal religious activities,'' a term
applied in a manner that falls short of international
human rights protections for freedom of religion. The
government continued to recognize only five religions--
Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and
Taoism--and required groups belonging to these
religions to register with the government. Registered
groups received some legal protection for their
religious activities but remained subject to ongoing
state controls. Members of both unregistered and
registered groups deemed to run afoul of state-set
parameters for religion faced risk of harassment,
detention, and other abuses. Some unregistered groups
had space to practice their religions, but this limited
tolerance did not amount to official recognition of
these groups' rights. Authorities also shut down the
activities of some unregistered groups and maintained
bans on other religious or spiritual communities,
including Falun Gong.
The government continued to use law to control
religious practice in China rather than protect the
religious freedom of all Chinese citizens, accelerating
efforts in the past reporting year to revise or pass
new legal measures. Planned legal measures, like others
passed in recent years, build on provisions contained
in the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA).
Recent legal measures have added more clarity to
ambiguous provisions in the RRA but also have
articulated more detailed levels of control.
Authorities continued to control Buddhist
institutions and practices and take steps to curb
``unauthorized'' Buddhist temples. As of August 2011,
the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan autonomous
prefectural governments issued or drafted regulatory
measures that increase substantially state infringement
on freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries
and nunneries.
Authorities continued to deny Catholics the
freedom to recognize the authority of the Holy See in
matters relating to the practice of their faith,
including selecting Chinese bishops. Authorities
continued to harass, detain, and place under
surveillance some unregistered priests and bishops, as
well as forced some bishops to attend what the Holy See
considers illegitimate state-controlled church events
against their will.
Local governments across China continued to
prohibit Muslims from engaging in religious outreach
and preaching activities independent of state-set
parameters. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
officials integrated curbs over Islam into security
campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on
the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued
campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and
women from wearing veils, and targeted ``illegal''
religious materials in censorship campaigns.
Cases of harassment and detention of
Protestants since late 2010 suggest that authorities'
sensitivities have intensified toward Protestants who
organize into large groups or across congregations, or
who have contact with foreign individuals or
organizations. This past year, the government also
called for ``guiding'' members of unregistered
Protestant groups to worship at registered sites.
Authorities maintained controls over Taoist
activities and took steps to curb ``feudal
superstitious activities.''
Authorities are currently in the second year
of a three-year campaign to increase efforts to
pressure Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their
belief in and practice of Falun Gong. This campaign is
part of a broader campaign--lasting more than a
decade--that reportedly has been extensive, systematic,
and in some cases violent. Local authorities in
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, took measures to
restrict the freedom of Falun Gong practitioners during
the November 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou, including
detaining Falun Gong practitioners on suspicion of
``cult''-related activity.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to
all citizens freedom of religion in accordance with
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and to remove the government's framework for
recognizing only select religious communities for
limited state protections. Stress to Chinese
authorities that freedom of religion includes the right
to practice a religion, as well as the right to hold
religious beliefs, and that China's limited protections
for ``normal religious activities'' do not meet
protections for freedom of religion as defined by
international human rights standards. Call on officials
to integrate steps to protect freedom of religion into
initiatives to improve human rights in China. Stress to
the Chinese government that the right to freedom of
religion includes: The right of Buddhists to carry out
activities in temples independent of state controls
over religion, and the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
express openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan
Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right
of Catholics to recognize the authority of the Holy See
in matters relating to the practice of their faith,
including to make bishop appointments; the right of
Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong
inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in
religious outreach and preaching activities independent
of state-set parameters and not face curbs on their
internationally protected right to freedom of religion
in the name of upholding ``stability''; the right of
Protestants to worship free from state controls over
doctrine and to worship in unregistered house churches,
free from harassment, detention, and other abuses; and
the right of Taoists to interpret their faith free from
state efforts to ban practices deemed as ``feudal
superstitions.''
Call for the release of Chinese citizens
confined, detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for
pursuing their right to freedom of religion (including
the right to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such
prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (Tibetan Buddhist nun
sentenced in 2009 to 10 years' imprisonment after she
and other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan
independence and the Dalai Lama's long life and return
to Tibet); Su Zhimin (an unregistered Catholic bishop
who disappeared after being taken into police custody
in 1996); Wang Zhiwen (Falun Gong practitioner serving
a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful protests by
Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); Nurtay Memet (Muslim
man sentenced to five years' imprisonment for a
``superstition''-related activity connected to his
religion); Fan Yafeng (a legal scholar, religious
freedom advocate, and house church leader kept under
home confinement since November 2010 in connection with
his advocacy for unregistered Protestant communities
and coinciding with a broader crackdown on rights
advocates), as well as other prisoners mentioned in
this report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Call for officials to eliminate criminal and
administrative penalties that target religion and
spiritual movements and have been used to punish
Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom
of religion. Specifically, call for officials to
eliminate Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which
criminalizes using a ``cult'' to undermine
implementation of state laws) and Article 27 of the PRC
Public Security Administration Punishment Law (which
stipulates detention or fines for organizing or
inciting others to engage in ``cult'' activities and
for using cults or the ``guise of religion'' to disturb
social order or to harm others' health).
Support initiatives to provide technical
assistance to the Chinese government in drafting legal
provisions that protect, rather than restrain, freedom
of religion for all Chinese citizens. Promote exchanges
to bring experts on religious freedom to China and
support training classes for Chinese officials on
international human rights standards for the protection
of freedom of religion. Promote dialogue on religious
freedom, including information on protecting the rights
of the range of religious communities and
organizations, including faith-based groups that carry
out social welfare activities.
Support non-governmental organizations that
collect information on conditions for religious freedom
in China and that inform Chinese citizens of how to
defend their right to freedom of religion against
Chinese government abuses. Support organizations that
help religious practitioners to appeal prisoners'
sentences and orders to serve reeducation through labor
stemming from citizens' exercise of freedom of
religion; to challenge government seizure of property;
and to challenge job discrimination based on religion.
Ethnic Minority Rights
Findings
In the past reporting year, ethnic minorities
in China continued to face unique challenges in
upholding their rights, as defined in both Chinese and
international law. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights stipulates that ethnic, religious,
and linguistic minorities within a state ``shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language.'' The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
stipulates some protections for minority rights and
provides for a system of regional autonomy in
designated areas. Limits in the substance and
implementation of state laws and policies, however,
prevented minorities from fully enjoying their rights
in line with international standards and from
exercising meaningful autonomy in practice.
The government continued to recognize 55
groups as minority ``nationalities'' or ``ethnicities''
(shaoshu minzu) and exerted tightest control over
groups deemed to challenge state authority, especially
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet
Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas,
and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See separate
findings and recommendations on Xinjiang and Tibet
within this section.] Government authorities continued
to punish ethnic Mongols perceived to challenge state
power or who attempted to promote their rights. In the
past year, authorities detained, sentenced to prison,
or appeared to hold in extralegal detention a number of
Mongols who aimed to protect their rights or preserve
Mongol culture. Those detained included Mongols who
held demonstrations in May 2011 to protest government
policy toward grasslands use and curbs on Mongol
culture.
Government steps to address ethnic minorities'
grievances remained limited in the past year. The State
Ethnic Affairs Commission reported in December 2010 on
exploring and ``perfecting'' ``new mechanisms and
forms'' for improving the state's regional ethnic
autonomy system, but also affirmed the basic parameters
of the state's minority policies. The Chinese
government's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action
Plan pledged support for some aspects of ethnic
minority rights, but appeared to have limited impact,
especially in the areas of civil and political rights.
The Chinese government continued to implement
top-down development policies that have undercut the
promotion of regional autonomy and limited the rights
of ethnic minorities to maintain their unique cultures,
languages, and livelihoods, while bringing a degree of
economic improvements to minority areas. The government
bolstered longstanding grasslands policies that have
imposed grazing bans and required some herders to
resettle from grasslands and abandon pastoral
livelihoods, a development that affects Mongols,
Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority groups in China.
Mongols protested grasslands policies during a series
of demonstrations in May.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support rule of law programs and exchange
programs that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of
different models for governance that protect ethnic
minorities' rights and allow them to exercise
meaningful autonomy over their affairs, in line with
both domestic Chinese law and international human
rights standards. Following the expiration of the 2009-
2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, call on Chinese
authorities to continue to include attention to
minority rights in subsequent human rights initiatives
and issue concrete plans for implementation and
assessment in line with international standards.
Support programs that promote models for economic
development in China that include participatory
decisionmaking from ethnic minority communities. Call
on the Chinese government to examine the efficacy of
existing grasslands policies in ameliorating
environmental degradation and to take steps to ensure
that the rights of herders are protected in the process
of promoting environmental policies.
Support non-governmental organizations that
address human rights conditions for ethnic minorities
in China to enable them to continue their research and
develop programs to help ethnic minorities increase
their capacity to protect their rights. Encourage such
organizations to develop training programs on promoting
economic development that includes participatory
decisionmaking from ethnic minority communities;
programs to protect ethnic minority languages,
cultures, and livelihoods; and programs that document
conditions and research rights abuses in the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region. Encourage broader human
rights and rule of law programs that operate in China
to develop projects that address issues affecting
ethnic minorities in China.
Call on the Chinese government to release people
detained, imprisoned, or otherwise held in custody for
advocating for the rights of ethnic minority citizens,
including Mongol rights advocate Hada (who remains in
custody despite the expiration of his 15-year sentence
in December 2010), his wife Xinna and son Uiles
(detained in advance of Hada's scheduled release and
later formally arrested), and other prisoners mentioned
in this report and in the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database.
Population Planning
Findings
Chinese government officials continued to
implement population planning policies that interfere
with and control the reproductive lives of its
citizens, especially women, employing various methods
including fines, withholding of state benefits and
permits, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and
arbitrary detention to punish policy violations.
The Commission observed in 2011 the continued
practice by local governments of specifically targeting
migrant workers for coercive implementation of family
planning policies.
The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is
not consistent with the standards set by the 1995
Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of
the Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development. Controls imposed on Chinese women and
their families and additional abuses engendered by the
system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies
against ``out-of-plan'' children, also violate
standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. China
is a state party to these treaties and is bound to
uphold their terms.
The Chinese government does not consistently
implement provisions in the PRC Population and Family
Planning Law (PFPL) that prohibit and provide
punishment for abuses in the implementation of
population planning policies. Article 4 of the PFPL
states that officials shall ``enforce the law in a
civil manner, and they may not infringe upon the
legitimate rights and interests of citizens.'' Under
Article 39, an official is subject to criminal or
administrative punishment if, in the implementation of
population planning policies, the official ``infringes
on a citizen's personal rights, property rights, or
other legitimate rights and interests'' or ``abuses his
power, neglects his duty, or engages in malpractices
for personal gain . . . .''
September 2010 marked the 30th anniversary of
the beginning of China's current family planning
efforts, and following this anniversary, the Commission
observed increased public discussion of the prospects
for family planning policy reform. Top Communist Party
and government leaders continue to publicly defend the
policy and rule out its cancellation in the near-term.
The Chinese government's population planning
policies continue to exacerbate the country's
demographic challenges, including a severely imbalanced
sex ratio--the highest in the world--an aging
population, and a decline in the working age
population.
Authorities released Chen Guangcheng, a self-
trained legal advocate who publicized population
planning abuses, from prison after he had completed his
full sentence on September 9, 2010. Following his
release, however, authorities have kept Chen and his
family under ``soft detention,'' or home confinement,
and continued to subject them to abuse and restrictive
control.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge Chinese government officials to cease
coercive methods of enforcing family planning policies.
Urge the Chinese government to dismantle coercive
population controls and provide greater reproductive
freedom and privacy for women.
Urge the Chinese government to reevaluate the PRC
Population and Family Planning Law and bring it into
conformance with international standards set forth in
the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of
Action of the Cairo International Conference on
Population and Development, as well as the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
Urge China's central and local governments to
enforce vigorously provisions under Chinese law that
provide for punishments of officials and other
individuals who violate the rights of citizens when
implementing population planning policies. Urge the
Chinese government to establish penalties, including
specific criminal and financial penalties, for
officials and individuals found to commit abuses such
as coercive abortion and coercive sterilization--
practices that continue in China despite provisions
under existing laws and regulations intended to
prohibit them. Urge the Chinese government to delink
material and financial incentives for officials from
their performance in implementing family planning
policies and thereby reduce or remove the impetus for
unlawful practices.
Support the development of programs and
international cooperation on legal aid and training
programs that help citizens pursue compensation under
the PRC State Compensation Law and that help citizens
pursue other remedies against the state for injury
suffered as a result of official abuse related to
China's population planning policies.
Call on the Chinese government to release Chen
Guangcheng and his family from extralegal detention and
to permit them to enjoy the freedoms of movement,
expression, and association, as provided under Chinese
law and international standards to which the Chinese
government has committed.
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Findings
During the Commission's reporting year, the
Chinese government continued to relax some household
registration (hukou) restrictions consistent with
earlier efforts. The system, first implemented in the
1950s, continues to limit the right of Chinese citizens
to establish formally their permanent place of
residence.
The Chinese government implemented several
pilot hukou reform projects in several municipalities,
aimed to bring all residents who already hold a local
hukou under a unified registration system. The
ramifications of the latest hukou reforms remain
unclear. The Chinese media have praised the latest
reforms as an important step toward true equality
between urban and rural Chinese citizens. However,
potential problems include the possibility of forced
relocation of rural residents, inadequate compensation,
and rural residents' ability to adjust to urban life
after relocation.
The Chinese government continued to impose
restrictions on Chinese citizens' right to travel in a
manner that is inconsistent with international human
rights standards. During the past year, authorities
increasingly used various legal pretexts to prevent
rights defenders, advocates, and critics from leaving
China. Officials often cited the PRC Law on the Control
of the Exit and Entry of Citizens as justification for
preventing rights defenders from traveling.
The Chinese government continued to place
restrictions on liberty of movement to punish and
control political dissidents and human rights
advocates. Restrictions on liberty of movement within
China were especially harsh during this reporting
period. Authorities employed a spectrum of measures
including stationing police to monitor the homes of
rights defenders, taking rights defenders to remote
areas, inviting them to meetings to ``drink tea'' with
security personnel, and imprisonment.
Chinese authorities used forceful efforts to
intimidate and control human rights advocates and their
family members during this reporting period. The
Chinese government appears to have intensified efforts
to crack down on human rights advocates after the
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to prominent Chinese
writer and democracy activist Liu Xiaobo and an
anonymous online call for ``Jasmine Revolution''
protests within China.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support programs, organizations, and exchanges
with Chinese policymakers and academic institutions
engaged in research and outreach to migrant workers
that provide legal assistance to migrant workers, and
encourage policy debates on the hukou system.
Call on U.S. academic and public policy
institutions and experts to consult with the Commission
on avenues for outreach to Chinese academic and public
policy figures engaged in policy debates on reform of
the hukou system.
Stress to Chinese government officials that the
Chinese government's non-compliance with international
standards regarding freedom of movement inside China
negatively impacts confidence outside China in the
Chinese government's commitment to international
standards more generally.
Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC
Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so
that the meaning and parameter of ``harmful to state
security,'' and ``cause a major loss to national
interests'' under Article 8(5) are more clear.
Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC
Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so
that those who are detained can appeal the decision or
seek other remedies.
Raise specifically Chinese government
authorities' restriction on liberty of movement of
rights defenders, advocates, and critics including
writer Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu
Xiaobo, and human rights activist Chen Guangcheng and
his family.
Status of Women
Findings
Chinese officials continue to promote existing
laws that aim to protect women's rights, including the
amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and
Interests and the amended PRC Marriage Law; however,
ambiguity and lack of clearly outlined responsibilities
in China's national-level legislation, in addition to
selective implementation and selective enforcement of
this legislation across localities, limit progress on
concrete protections of women's rights.
In its domestic laws and policy initiatives
and through its ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), the Chinese government has committed to
ensuring female representation in government. However,
female representation at all levels of government
appears to have made little significant progress in the
2011 reporting year.
The National People's Congress Standing
Committee passed the revised PRC Organic Law of the
Villagers' Committees in October 2010, revising the
language stating that there should be ``an appropriate
number of women'' in village committees to language
that states village committees ``should have female
members.'' The revised law also includes a stipulation
that women should hold one-third of positions in
village representative assemblies. The impact these
revisions will have on female representation at the
village level in the future is unclear, but some
domestic observers have hailed them as a positive step.
An increase in women's decisionmaking power at the
village level may lead to greater protection of women's
property rights in rural areas.
China has committed under CEDAW to take ``all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of employment.'' Women
continue to experience widespread discrimination in
areas including recruitment, wages, and retirement
despite the fact that the Chinese government has
committed under Article 7 of the International Covenant
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 11
of CEDAW to ensuring gender equality in employment.
While China's existing laws such as the PRC Labor Law,
amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and
Interests (LPWRI), and PRC Employment Promotion Law
prohibit gender discrimination, they lack clear
definitions and enforcement mechanisms, which weakens
their effectiveness.
The amended LPWRI and amended PRC Marriage Law
prohibit domestic violence, and individuals charged
with the crime of domestic violence are punishable
under the PRC Criminal Law. These national legal
provisions leave many who encounter domestic violence
unprotected, however, as they do not define domestic
violence or outline specific responsibilities of
government departments in prevention, punishment, and
treatment. Officials reportedly completed draft
national-level legislation that clarifies the
definition and distribution of government
responsibilities. Domestic violence reportedly remains
pervasive, affecting nearly one-third of families in
China. China's amended LPWRI also prohibits sexual
harassment and provides an avenue of recourse for
victims. The LPWRI does not, however, provide a clear
definition of sexual harassment or specific standards
and procedures for prevention and punishment,
presenting challenges for victims in protecting their
rights. Sexual harassment reportedly remains prevalent
in China.
Statistics and analysis from studies published
in 2008, 2009, and 2010 regarding China's skewed sex
ratio suggest that sex-selective abortion remains
widespread, especially in rural areas, despite the
government's legislative efforts to deter the practice.
Some observers, including Chinese state-run media, have
linked China's increasingly skewed sex ratio with an
increase in forced prostitution, forced marriages, and
other forms of human trafficking.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support programs in China that increase women's
leadership training through U.S.-China exchanges and
international conferences. Support legal programs that
promote women's land rights, especially in rural areas,
and urge that steps be taken to ensure that village
rules and regulations are in accordance with national-
level laws and policies and to ensure adequate
protection of women's rights and interests.
Urge the Chinese government to strengthen
enforcement mechanisms for implementation of provisions
in the PRC Labor Law, the amended PRC Law on the
Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (LPWRI), and
the PRC Employment Promotion Law that prohibit gender
discrimination. Urge Chinese officials to address
specifically gender discrimination in recruitment,
wages, and retirement.
Urge the Chinese government to enact
comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly
defines domestic violence, assigns responsibilities to
government and civil society organizations in
addressing it, and outlines punishments for offenders.
Inquire whether officials will release such legislation
for public comment and, if so, how long the public
comment period will be and to whom it will be made
available. Urge the Chinese government to further
revise the LPWRI or enact new comprehensive national-
level legislation to provide a clear definition of
sexual harassment and specific standards and procedures
for prevention and punishment. Support training
programs that increase awareness of domestic violence
and sexual harassment issues among judicial and law
enforcement personnel.
Human Trafficking
Findings
China remains a country of origin, transit,
and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and
children. The majority of human trafficking cases are
domestic and involve trafficking for sexual
exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage.
The Chinese government acceded to the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo
Protocol) in December 2009. To date, the Chinese
government has revised some, but not all, of its
legislation to conform to the Palermo Protocol. For
example, the Chinese government issued an amendment to
the PRC Criminal Law, which included revisions that
broaden the scope of prosecutable offenses for forced
labor and increase penalties, but do not clearly define
forced labor. The Chinese government's legal definition
of trafficking does not conform to international
standards.
Using the definition of human trafficking
under Chinese law--which conflates human smuggling,
child abduction, and illegal adoption with human
trafficking--the Supreme People's Court reportedly
convicted 3,138 defendants in trafficking cases in
2010, up from 2,413 in 2009. Of these, courts
reportedly handed down 2,216 prison sentences of five
years or more. In addition, the Supreme People's
Procuratorate reportedly convicted 4,422 individuals on
trafficking-related crimes in 2010. In cooperation with
non-governmental organizations and international
organizations, Chinese authorities took steps to
improve protection, services, and care for victims of
trafficking but continued to focus efforts on women and
children.
The Chinese government does not offer legal
alternatives to deportation for identified foreign
victims of trafficking, and continues to deport North
Korean refugees under the classification of ``economic
migrants,'' regardless of whether or not they are
victims of trafficking.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
commitments under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children; continue to revise the government's
definition of trafficking; and enact comprehensive
anti-trafficking legislation to align with
international standards.
Call on the Chinese government to provide more
services for trafficking victims. Support expanding
training programs for law enforcement personnel and
shelter managers that help raise awareness and improve
processes for identifying, protecting, and assisting
trafficking victims. Support legal assistance programs
that advocate on behalf of both foreign and Chinese
trafficking victims.
Object to the continued deportation of North
Korean trafficking victims as ``economic migrants.''
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
international obligations with regard to North Korean
trafficking victims and provide legal alternatives to
repatriation.
North Korean Refugees in China
Findings
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year,
central and local authorities continued policies of
classifying all North Koreans in China as ``illegal''
economic migrants and repatriating North Korean
refugees in China, amid rising concerns over
humanitarian crises and political instability in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 2011,
the Chinese government reportedly increased the
presence of public security officials in northeastern
China and erected new barricades along the Chinese-
North Korean border.
The Chinese government continued to deny the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to the
Chinese-North Korean border and to North Korean
refugees in northeast China. The inability of the UNHCR
to access North Koreans seeking asylum in China makes
it difficult for the UNHCR and human rights
organizations to obtain accurate information on the
number of North Korean refugees, the reasons behind the
North Korean defections, and the concerns of North
Korean refugees over forced repatriation.
Chinese security authorities reportedly
cooperated with North Korean police officials to
repatriate North Korean refugees in reported
``manhunts'' throughout China, including remote areas
within Yunnan province and the Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region. Chinese law enforcement agencies
have deployed hundreds of officials to locate and
forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees.
North Korean women in China continue to be
trafficked into forced marriage and commercial sexual
exploitation. The Chinese government's repatriation of
trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol), as well
as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (Palermo Protocol). The government's failure
to take adequate measures to prevent North Korean women
from being trafficked and to protect North Korean
victims of trafficking contravenes its obligations
under Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol and Article 6
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
Chinese local authorities near the border with
the DPRK continued to deny household registration
(hukou) to the children of North Korean women married
to Chinese citizens. Without household registration,
these children live in a stateless limbo and cannot
access education and other social benefits.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support the efforts of the UNHCR to gain
unfettered access to North Korean refugees in China,
beginning with children born to a North Korean parent
in China, and encourage the Chinese government to work
with the UNHCR in enacting and implementing national
asylum legislation that conforms with China's
obligations under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol
and to immediately cease detaining and repatriating
North Koreans in China.
Urge central and local Chinese government
officials to abide by their obligations under the
Palermo Protocol (Article 9) and CEDAW (Article 6) to
prosecute human traffickers in northeastern China and
along the border with the DPRK.
Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status
and related social benefits to North Korean women
married to Chinese citizens and grant the same to their
children. In particular, urge local Chinese officials
to allow these children to receive an education in
accordance with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) and
the PRC Compulsory Education Law (Article 5). Urge the
Chinese government to allow greater numbers of North
Korean defectors to have safe haven and secure transit
until they reach third countries.
Public Health
Findings
The Chinese government's domestic legislation
explicitly forbids discriminatory practices in
employment, and as a State Party to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
Chinese government has committed to eliminate
discrimination in employment and education against
persons with disability or infectious diseases.
Discrimination against people living with medical
conditions such as infectious diseases and mental
illness remains commonplace, and those who experience
discrimination face challenges in seeking legal
recourse.
Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and individual advocates continue to play a positive
role in raising awareness about health concerns;
however, Chinese officials continue to harass some
public health advocates and monitor and control the
activities of NGOs through restrictions on registration
and funding.
The burden that cases of mental illness place
on the country's under-resourced mental healthcare
system is significant. Officials reportedly continue to
abuse their power over psychiatric institutions and
medical professionals by using them as ``tools for
detaining people deemed a threat to social stability.''
In June 2011, the Chinese government released for
public comment the draft Mental Health Law, which
generated vibrant discussion among individuals and
organizations across civil society sectors. Officials
announced plans to enact the Mental Health Law by the
end of 2011.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to stop repression
of public health advocates and provide more support to
U.S. organizations that address public health issues in
China.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on
effective implementation of the PRC Employment
Promotion Law and related regulations that prohibit
discrimination in hiring and in the workplace against
persons living with HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B virus, and
other illnesses. Support programs that raise rights
awareness among individuals living with infectious
disease, disability, or mental illness.
Urge the Chinese government to address concerns
that individuals and NGOs raised during the public
comment period for the draft Mental Health Law. Urge
Chinese officials to accomplish their stated goal of
enacting the Mental Health Law by the end of 2011. Urge
officials to then ensure implementation of the law
across localities.
The Environment
Findings
China's environmental problems remain serious.
This year's report highlights heavy metal and growing
rural pollution problems. Citizens continued to express
their environmental grievances and sometimes protested
in the streets, including at a protest against a
chemical plant in Dalian city, Liaoning province,
involving over 10,000 citizens who ``took a walk'' in
front of government and Communist Party buildings. In
some cases, officials suppressed demands for a cleaner
environment. Local authorities detained, harassed, or
threatened people including parents of children
affected by lead poisoning in several provinces who
raised grievances or sought redress; citizens
demonstrating or complaining about landfill operations
in Fujian province; citizens protesting operations of a
waste incinerator in Jiangsu province; and citizens
protesting expanded mining operations in the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region and Tibetan autonomous
areas.
Corruption, noncompliance with and uneven
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws
and regulations, and the lack of legal recourse, remain
significant challenges for China in managing its
environmental problems. Sometimes environmental
protection authorities do not take enforcement actions
as required by law, and at times courts refuse to
accept lawsuits because of concerns over ``social
stability.'' Environmental protection was among the
areas to have the highest levels of bribery and
corruption in the first six months of 2010.
Central and some local Chinese environmental
protection officials have taken steps to improve
information disclosure. Yet, efforts to implement
disclosure measures remain underdeveloped. Some
citizens have been proactive in requesting information;
however, several challenges to accessing information
remain, including administrative provisions that limit
the scope of information that environmental authorities
can disclose. The most difficult type of information to
obtain in some cases is that related to polluting
enterprises, which has potential implications for
citizen health. Chinese citizens and experts have
expressed concern over the speed and lack of
transparency of developing hydroelectric and nuclear
power projects. The nuclear power plant disaster in
Japan in March 2011 appeared to embolden Chinese
citizens and experts to speak out about safety
concerns, and prompted Chinese officials to conduct a
safety review and consider new legislation that could
improve the transparency of China's nuclear industry.
Environmental protection remains a sector in
which public participation is somewhat encouraged, yet
officials also continue to seek to ``guide'' or manage
participation. A new national-level official guiding
opinion requires environmental groups to report on
their international cooperative projects with foreign
non-governmental entities for ``examination and
approval.'' The opinion also calls for the further
strengthening of relations and cooperation between the
government and social organizations, as well as greater
political indoctrination of environmental groups by
relevant authorities.
Top Chinese authorities reportedly consider
China to be vulnerable to the impacts of climate change
and have taken steps to mitigate and adapt to climate
change. Chinese leaders plan to voluntarily reduce
carbon dioxide intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of
GDP) by 17 percent by 2015. While non-governmental
organizations continue some activities to address
climate change, public participation in climate change
policy processes is minimal. Chinese leaders stated
they would improve data reliability and transparency in
relation to energy and climate change; however, Chinese
leaders face significant challenges in these areas.
Official Chinese measures to address climate change, as
well as their implementation, could place the rights of
citizens at risk without sufficient procedural and
safety protections.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call upon the Chinese government to cease
punishing citizens for their grassroots environmental
activism or for utilizing official and
institutionalized channels to voice their environmental
grievances or to protect their rights. Support efforts
by Chinese and U.S. groups working in China to expand
awareness of citizens' environmental rights and to
promote the protection of those rights. Projects might
include supporting U.S.-China discussions about
complaint resolution mechanisms and strengthening U.S.-
China cooperation regarding researching and addressing
environmental health problems. Include environmental
law issues in the bilateral human rights and legal
expert dialogues.
Support multilateral exchanges regarding
environmental enforcement and compliance tools,
including environmental insurance, market mechanisms,
criminal prosecution of serious environmental
infringements, and public interest litigation
mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen
environmental impact assessment processes and citizen
participation in those processes. Engage Chinese
officials and others who seek to devise a realistic and
fair compensation system for people harmed by pollution
in China that could aid enforcement efforts.
Support continued expansion of environmental
information disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government
experiences with the Toxics Release Inventory Program
and other U.S. programs that seek to provide more
environmental transparency. Support programs that
educate Chinese citizens about China's system of open
government information. Encourage Chinese officials to
make government and expert research reports regarding
climate change and its impacts in China public and
easily accessible. In addition, continue U.S.
Government engagement with relevant ministries,
academic institutions, experts, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in developing China's capacity to
measure, report, publicize, and verify emissions
reduction strategies and techniques reliably.
Encourage the development of environmental NGOs
in China, including incorporating joint non-
governmental participation in bilateral projects.
Support efforts to raise the technical and operational
capacity of Chinese environmental NGOs.
Engage local Chinese leaders in their efforts to
reconcile development and environmental protection
goals. Call upon U.S. cities with sister-city
relationships in China to incorporate environmental
rights awareness, environmental protection, and climate
change components into their sister-city programs. When
making arrangements for travel to China, request
meetings with officials from central and local levels
of the Chinese government to discuss environmental
governance and best practices. Invite Chinese local-
level leaders, including those from counties,
townships, and villages, to the United States to
observe U.S. public policy practices and approaches to
environmental problem-solving.
Civil Society
Findings
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year,
the number of civil society organizations (CSOs)--
including organizational forms that most nearly
correspond to the Western concept of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs)--participating in legal and
policymaking activities in areas that are not
politically sensitive continued to increase gradually.
At the same time, organizations and individuals who
worked on politically sensitive issues continued to
face challenges.
NGOs continued to face challenges fulfilling
complicated and cumbersome registration requirements.
In order to operate legally, an organization is
required to obtain a sponsorship agreement from a
public administration department in a relevant ``trade,
scientific or other professional area'' at the
appropriate level of government before registering with
the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). Sponsorship
agreements are sometimes difficult to obtain because
local sponsors are at times reluctant to take on the
burdens of supervisory responsibilities. NGOs that do
not fulfill these ``dual management'' requirements are
not protected under the law and are prohibited from
receiving outside donations. Some NGOs opt to register
as commercial entities, in part to circumvent the
burdens of fulfilling dual management requirements,
though such actions could also subject them to targeted
or selective oversight from the government as well as
higher tax rates.
The Commission observed in this reporting year
that ``private'' foundations (fei gongmu jijin hui),
which are not permitted to solicit donations through
public fundraising activities, reportedly continued to
face operational hardships. ``Private'' foundations may
apply to become ``public'' foundations (gongmu jijin
hui), which are permitted to solicit donations through
public fundraising activities, only if they can find
government department sponsors and meet other required
criteria. The Chinese government reportedly is
considering revisions to the 2004 PRC Regulations on
the Management of Foundations and is drafting the PRC
Charities Law. Nevertheless, because draft language
does not appear to have been widely circulated, it
remains unclear what the proposed revisions and the new
law will entail or how proposed regulatory changes will
create room for private foundations to operate and
grow.
Some Chinese citizens who sought to establish
and operate NGOs that focus on issues officials deem to
be sensitive faced intimidation, harassment, and
punishment from government authorities. During this
reporting year, for example, Chinese authorities
continued to repeatedly harass and interfere with the
operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education,
a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization
founded in 1994 by Wan Yanhai, a public health
researcher. Authorities reportedly visited Aizhixing's
office where they confiscated documents, warned Wan--
who had left China for the United States in May 2010
over concerns for his personal safety--not to attend
the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Norway honoring Liu
Xiaobo, and shut down the organization's Web site for
posting a letter that officials found objectionable.
Some localities are following efforts in
Shenzhen to simplify the registration process for
certain types of service-oriented NGOs, and two other
localities are among those considering changes to
current regulations. Authorities in Beijing, for
example, may extend to the entire city a current pilot
project in one district that ``opens up'' the
registration process for four types of social
organizations, including the types of organizations
that provide ``social benefits'' (shehui fuli) and
``social services'' (shehui fuwu). Officials in
Shanghai city reportedly signed a ``cooperative
agreement'' with the Ministry of Civil Affairs to
``create new models for the development of social
organizations.'' The extent to which these reform
efforts will create space for civil society
organizations to grow remains unclear, as civil society
advocates remain under tight scrutiny, and some were
subjected to harassment, detention, and other abuses.
Moreover, some experts on Chinese civil society both in
China and abroad have cautioned that the latest reform
efforts, while helpful to many grassroots organizations
providing various kinds of social services, could also
solidify the government's ability to control such
groups by forcing them to follow ``government
leadership'' as a condition to operate.
During this reporting year, Chinese officials
have continued to emphasize efforts to ``guide''
developments in civil society. Zhou Yongkang, the
Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee
Political and Legal Affairs Commission, said that ``in
fostering comprehensive social organizations, we must
work hard to integrate various types of social
organizations into a social organization system led by
the Party Committee and the government . . . in the
management of social organizations, we must establish a
system of separate development and separate management
to promote the healthy and orderly development of
social organizations . . . in the management of foreign
non-governmental organizations working in China, we
must establish a joint management mechanism to protect
legitimate exchanges and cooperation and strengthen
management according to the law.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Ask Chinese officials for updates on recent
reforms at the local level relating to registration of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other aspects
of civil affairs. Encourage these officials to broaden
the reform efforts that relax constraints on NGOs and
to make them applicable to other parts of the country
through national legislation and regulatory
development.
Ask the Chinese government to refrain from
applying uneven or selective enforcement of regulations
to intimidate groups that they consider to be handling
sensitive work. Request the Chinese government to
revisit the recently issued State Administration of
Foreign Exchange circular concerning overseas donations
to Chinese organizations. Emphasize that NGOs, both
domestic and international, are outlets for citizens to
channel their grievances and find redress, and in turn
contribute to the maintenance of a stable society.
Conversely, point out that stricter controls over civil
society organizations could remove a potentially useful
social ``safety valve,'' thereby increasing the sources
of instability. During discussions with Chinese
officials, mention the Tsinghua University report which
found that even as the government increased spending on
public security and tightened its control over civil
society, social conflicts are happening with greater
regularity.
Take measures to facilitate the participation of
Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in relevant
international conferences and forums, and support
training opportunities in the United States to build
their leadership capacity in nonprofit management,
public policy advocacy, strategic planning, and media
relations.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Findings
The Communist Party exercises control over
political affairs, government, and society through
networks of Party committees or branches that exist at
all levels in government, legislative, and judicial
agencies, as well as in businesses, major social groups
(including unions), the military, and most residential
communities. During the 2011 reporting year, Communist
Party leaders reiterated Party dominance and
accelerated efforts to build or revitalize Party
organizations, especially focusing on Party branches in
commercial buildings, urban neighborhoods, academic
institutions, and law firms.
China's political institutions do not comply
with the standards defined in Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which Chinese leaders have signed and declared an
intention to ratify. Nor do China's political
institutions comply with the standards outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While central-
level Chinese leaders continued to issue measures meant
to improve the efficiency of bureaucratic governance
and to bolster trust in the Party, news reports did not
indicate any major forthcoming political reforms.
Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the need for political
reforms; however, some of his remarks were censored in
the Chinese domestic news. Other top leaders appeared
to criticize ideological pluralism and to emphasize the
impossibility of implementing ``Western-style''
democracy with its separation of powers and competing
political parties.
During this reporting year, Chinese
authorities expanded social controls under the banner
of strengthening ``comprehensive management of public
security'' and ``safeguarding social stability.''
Officials engaged in a largely preemptive crackdown
affecting hundreds of people, apparently disregarding
their constitutional right to freedom of assembly and
preventing them from gathering peacefully in so-called
``Jasmine Revolution'' rallies, with the purpose of
advocating for democratic reforms, among other issues.
In addition, authorities continued to detain, sentence,
and demonstrate little tolerance for those individuals
involved in political parties not sanctioned by the
Communist Party. For example, authorities handed down a
harsh sentence to Liu Xianbin for his democracy
advocacy activities and arrested Li Tie for posting
writings advocating for democracy on the Internet.
Direct elections for local people's congress
representatives are held only at the county level.
Authorities appeared to discourage ``independent
candidates'' who utilized online resources to campaign
in the latest round of local people's congress
elections, and news stories reported harassment of
``independent candidates'' and their families. At least
100 ``independent candidates'' announced via microblog
their intention to run.
Chinese leaders continued to voice support for
village autonomy with the Party as the leading core.
While village committee elections have spread across
most of China, they continue to be plagued by official
interference and corruption. Major revisions to the law
governing village committee elections are likely to
alter the balance of authority in village-governing
organizations, partially because the law mandates
establishment of a new ``supervisory committee'' or
equivalent in every village. The revisions also clarify
election and recall procedures. The supervisory
committees may help to reduce village corruption, but
they may also act to ``maintain social stability'' by
stifling critical voices. Central-level officials
continued a survey of outstanding governance problems
at the grassroots level, and authorities in numerous
localities reported that they instituted a variety of
``democratic management'' projects to improve relations
between village leaders and rural residents, to reduce
corruption, to improve information disclosure, and to
promote ``democratic'' public participation. The
Commission has not observed news media reports
containing details on the implementation and
sustainability of these pilot projects.
Authorities continued to express support for
government information disclosure and expanding the
transparency of Party affairs. In addition, the State
Council released the Opinion Regarding Strengthening
Construction of a Government That Rules by Law in
November 2010, which emphasizes enhancing government
information disclosure, with a focus on budgets,
allocation of public resources, approval and
implementation of major construction projects, and
nonprofit social causes. Beijing municipality issued a
measure that reportedly will, for the first time,
include Party leaders within the ``scope of
accountability.''
The Chinese government and Communist Party
reportedly sought to improve governance accountability,
and at the same time improve ``social management.'' The
government reportedly took limited steps to combat
corruption, which remains a significant problem. In the
2011 reporting year, the Chinese government issued
China's first white paper on corruption as well as
other measures to subject officials to financial
audits, encourage reporting of corruption, and protect
whistleblowers. Chinese government authorities revised
official evaluation models that could lead to greater
accountability, relieving pressure on officials to
falsify data in order to be promoted. Authorities
issued a major economic and social development plan for
the next five years (the 12th Five-Year Plan), which
notes that authorities will ``establish a community
management and service platform,'' linking service
provision and social management.
Citizens and groups in China have little
direct access to political decisionmaking processes;
however, they are increasingly able to use various
channels to express opinions regarding proposed
policies and regulatory instruments. New measures
stipulate that ``major'' policy decisionmaking
processes should include public participation, expert
argumentation, risk assessment, legal review, and group
discussions. The measures also stipulate that
authorities should track how their decisions are being
implemented.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to release people
detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to
call for political reform within China--including
democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, who was sentenced to 10
years in prison in March 2011 for ``inciting subversion
of state power''; the people detained for mentioning
the protests in the Middle East and North Africa or
calls for ``Jasmine'' protests in personal
communications or in Internet postings; and other
prisoners of conscience mentioned in this report and in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Support research programs for U.S. citizens to
study political and social developments at the
grassroots level in China and expand the number of U.S.
consulates throughout the country.
Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in
local people's congress and village committee
elections, including expansion of domestic election
monitoring systems, training of Chinese domestic
election monitors, and joint U.S.-Chinese election
monitoring activities.
Support continued substantive exchanges between
Members of the U.S. Congress and members of the
National People's Congress and the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, especially in
relation to Congressional oversight processes and
budgetary matters.
Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations
that seek to work with local Chinese governments in
their efforts to improve transparency and
accountability, especially efforts to expand and
improve China's government information disclosure
initiatives. Such projects might include training in
the U.S. Freedom of Information system for Chinese
officials, joint efforts to better publicize the Open
Government Information (OGI) Regulations at local
levels, and citizen and group training about how to
submit OGI requests.
Support projects that assist local governments,
academics, and the nonprofit sector in expanding
transparent public hearings and other channels for
citizens to incorporate their input in the policymaking
process. Such projects might include an exchange
program component, whereby Chinese local government
officials and non-governmental organization
representatives would travel together to the United
States to attend town hall or public meetings that
address significant issues. Such projects might also
include pilot projects in China in which citizens'
suggestions to authorities about draft laws,
regulations, or policies are made available to the
public.
Commercial Rule of Law
Findings
Industrial policy continues to play an
important role in the Chinese economy, guiding
important sectors such as automotive, software, and
``cultural industry.'' These industrial policies are
comprehensive frameworks for development in key sectors
of the Chinese economy, providing for subsidies and
other benefits, plans for restructuring the state-owned
companies in the relevant sector, and export goals. The
use of industrial policies, especially in key sectors,
was supplemented by China's 12th Five-Year Plan, which
sets out certain ``strategic emerging industries'' for
support, including energy conservation, new-generation
information technology (IT), biotechnology, high-end
equipment manufacturing, new energies, new materials,
and new-energy vehicles. Further, the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology and other
government departments have issued sector-specific
plans.
China's state-owned sector enjoys preferential
treatment, crowding out private companies in certain
key sectors. This can act as a barrier to legal
development and the rule of law, as the state controls
the companies, the courts, the legislatures, and
administrative departments. China's industrial policies
encourage the transfer of technology to the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), and their consolidation into
``domestic champions.'' SOEs also enjoy various direct
and indirect subsidies.
Chinese legislation is vague as to whether
information concerning the SOEs falls under China's
rules on commercial secrets or the PRC State Secrets
Law. This was highlighted in the case of Xue Feng, a
U.S. citizen who was arrested in China for helping his
U.S.-based employer purchase a commercial database in
China. The database was not classified as a state
secret at the time of the transaction. Xue was
sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in China for
violating China's state secrets law, and his sentence
was upheld on appeal in February 2011.
China has been a party to several World Trade
Organization (WTO) cases since acceding to the WTO in
December 2001, and there were six active disputes
against China in 2010. The WTO found against China in a
case it brought challenging the United States'
imposition of tariffs on certain auto and truck tires
under the transitional product-specific safeguard
provision in China's Protocol of Accession. The United
States brought a case against China concerning its
provision of subsidies to the domestic wind energy
industry, which is pending. China appealed a WTO
decision that China's restraints of exports of bauxite,
coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide,
silicon metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc are not
consistent with China's obligations under the WTO.
The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be
a subject of concern to policymakers inside and outside
China.
Chinese government departments closely
regulate foreign investment in China and use the
approval process to ensure that foreign investment is
in keeping with government policy. During the
Commission's 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities
issued a revised draft of the Foreign Investment
Guidance Catalogue, which lists industries in which
foreign investment is encouraged, restricted, or
forbidden. The revised catalogue includes provisions
listing as ``encouraged'' the strategic emerging
industries covered in the 12th Five-Year Plan.
Chinese outbound investment has grown, with
much of the growth concentrated in investments in
energy and minerals needed for Chinese manufacturing.
Outbound investment is regulated by the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) and the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC). The State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission issued new
measures regulating offshore financial activities by
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Outbound
investments are financed by loans from China's state-
owned banks, outbound investment funds, and use of
renminbi reserves.
Two of the three Chinese government
departments in charge of implementing the PRC
Antimonopoly Law (AML) issued new AML regulations
during the 2011 reporting year. The State
Administration for Industry and Commerce passed three
sets of regulations on monopoly agreements, abuse of
dominance, and abuse of administrative power, and the
NDRC issued two sets of regulations on price monopoly.
The five sets of regulations became effective on
February 1, 2011.
MOFCOM, which handles AML merger reviews, has
held up approval of mergers of non-Chinese entities
outside China during this reporting year, including
Nokia's purchase of certain of Motorola's network
assets, and the merger of two Russian potash companies.
There have been no reports of MOFCOM not approving, or
giving only conditional approval to, mergers between
Chinese companies; however, the State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission has been
encouraging the consolidation of the SOEs in China, a
process which some industrial policies, such as that
for the auto industry, mandate.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Develop and support a project surveying the role
of China's industrial policies in the Chinese economy
from the perspective of WTO requirements, including how
the development of these policies, and the role they
play in directing China's economy, impact the
development of transparency, rule of law, and China's
compliance with its international legal commitments.
Request through the Open Government Information
office at the Ministry of Commerce, or through
bilateral dialogues between the U.S. Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and their
Chinese counterparts, details on merger applications
reviewed since the PRC Antimonopoly Law came into
effect, including the number of applications involving
non-Chinese companies, the number of applications
involving state-owned enterprises, and the results of
each of the merger reviews.
Through bilateral dialogues between (1) the U.S.
Trade Representative and U.S. Department of Commerce
and (2) China's Ministry of Commerce, National
Development and Reform Commission, and State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission,
obtain details on the amount of Chinese investment
(other than in financial instruments) in the United
States, the criteria Chinese authorities use in making
approval decisions concerning such investment, and how
such investment is financed.
Arrange for Chinese authorities to clarify the
approval procedure applicable to foreign investment in
China, including how the security review procedure
relates to the regular review procedure applicable to
all foreign investment in China under the auspices of
legal exchanges such as the U.S. Legal Exchange under
the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.
Access to Justice
Findings
Chinese citizens' ability to redress perceived
wrongs continued to face significant challenges during
the Commission's 2011 reporting year. Authorities
continued to promote a ``harmonious'' socialist society
with Chinese characteristics. Key policies and
regulations during the past year reflect the Party's
ongoing concern with ``maintaining social stability.''
The courts encouraged the use of mediation
over trials as means to resolve disputes in civil
cases. Critics point out that mediation could lead to
curtailed access to courts for Chinese citizens. In
addition, it remains unclear whether the new PRC
People's Mediation Law can adequately resolve disputes
without coercion, and whether it can provide for
effective enforcement of mediated agreements.
Citizen petitioners seeking to address their
grievances continued to face official reprisals,
harassment, violence, and detention, especially by
local governments due to incentive structures linked to
citizen petitioning.
Officials at various levels of government
continued to discourage, intimidate, and detain human
rights lawyers and defenders who take on issues, cases,
and clients that officials deem to be ``sensitive.''
Officials employed a spectrum of measures including
stationing police to monitor the homes of rights
defenders, forcing rights defenders to travel to
unknown areas or to attend meetings to ``drink tea''
with security personnel, and imprisonment.
The Supreme People's Court announced in May
2011 that it would issue uniform guidelines for some
types of cases. The guiding cases are meant to provide
uniformity in decisionmaking for the public security
apparatus, procuratoracy, and the courts. One of the
key questions that remains unanswered is the degree to
which the guiding cases are binding on lower courts.
The Chinese government continued to promote
administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater
oversight of state agencies and government employees
and to protect citizen interests if they are faithfully
implemented and executed. The amended PRC
Administrative Supervision Law became effective in June
2011. Its key provisions provide some protection for
whistleblowers. The amended PRC State Compensation Law
became effective in December 2010. Its key provisions
expand the scope of the law by allowing negligence as a
cause of action against the government under some
circumstances. In addition, the amended law eliminates
certain procedural loopholes making it easier to
establish a valid claim.
Chinese citizens remained reluctant to bring
cases against government officials utilizing
administrative law provisions. Cases brought against
the government based on administrative law provisions
reportedly accounted on average for very low
percentages of local courts' total workloads.
The government increased funding for the legal
aid system during the 2011 reporting year.
Nevertheless, China faces a systemic shortage of
defense lawyers. In underdeveloped regions, some
criminal defendants may have no access to legal
representation.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support the U.S. State Department's International
Visitor's Leadership Program and other bilateral
exchange programs that bring Chinese human rights
lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the United States
for study and dialogue. Support similar programs in the
non-governmental organization and academic sectors that
partner with China's human rights lawyers and nonprofit
legal organizations.
Continue to monitor the policy of mediation as
the Chinese government's preferred way to resolve
disputes. Achieve a clear understanding of the
implications on Chinese citizens' access to justice and
the Chinese government's compliance with international
standards.
Continue to monitor the anticipated issuance of
the guiding cases by the Supreme People's Court for the
public security apparatus, procuratoracy, and the
courts. Pay particular attention to their effect, if
any, on lower level courts.
Express concern to Chinese authorities over
treatment of petitioners and encourage Chinese leaders
to examine the incentive structures at the local level
that lead to abuse of petitioners who seek to express
their grievances.
Object to the continued harassment of human
rights lawyers and advocates. Call for the release of
lawyers and activists who have been subject to unlawful
home confinement, ``disappearance,'' or harassment by
officials for their activities to defend and promote
the rights of Chinese citizens.
Support exchange, education, and training in
legal aid expertise with Chinese defense lawyers and
law schools.
Property
Findings
Over the past year, there have been numerous
cases of expropriation and abuses by local governments
and property developers, including forced evictions.
Forced evictions are contrary to the General Comments
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which China has ratified. Some
property owners who refuse to leave their homes have
been beaten, harassed, or illegally detained. China's
economic development has led to increased need for
land, and income from land sales has been an important
source of revenue for local governments.
In January 2011, the Regulations on
Expropriation and Compensation for Housing on State-
Owned Land came into effect. The regulations define
``public interest'' in the context of land takings and
set out some procedural protection for urban land
rights owners. Though the 2007 PRC Property Law and the
2004 PRC Law on Administration of Urban Real Property
both provide that local government should only
expropriate land in the ``public interest,'' neither
include a definition of the term. While the new
regulations provide greater clarity and better
protection, their effectiveness will depend on
implementation.
The Regulations on Expropriation and
Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land apply only
to urban land, leaving China's rural residents with a
lower level of protection. Rural land is owned by
collectives, and farmers legally can enter into 30-year
contracts with their collectives for use of
collectively owned land. However, there is little
protection for farmers, and there have been
recommendations that protection from expropriation be
extended to rural residents.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government in meetings and
correspondence to prepare and pass legislation
concerning expropriations that provides protection for
rural land dwellers comparable to that enjoyed by urban
dwellers under the Regulations on Expropriation and
Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land.
Arrange and support a program of technical
assistance for Chinese government departments
responsible for land management concerning U.S.
procedures and standards for taking property by eminent
domain. Such assistance would highlight the meaning
under U.S. law of takings in the ``public interest,''
and could be organized by U.S. municipal governments
working with their sister cities in China.
Urge the Chinese government to put in place
comprehensive legislation to clarify rural land titles
and to provide legal assistance to rural land dwellers
to help them protect their rights to collectively owned
land. Working through U.S.-China dialogues, such as the
Legal Exchange under the Joint Commission on Commerce
and Trade, engage in technical exchanges with China
concerning pro bono programs at law firms, or provision
of other legal services for the poor in the United
States.
Xinjiang
Findings
Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained poor in the
Commission's 2011 reporting year. Following
demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009,
authorities maintained repressive security policies
that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy,
and independent expressions of cultural and religious
identity, especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the
region's stability. Authorities bolstered security in
the region in summer 2011, following incidents they
described as terrorist attacks and in advance of an
expanded trade expo.
The Chinese government continued to obscure
information about people tried in connection to the
July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas
media reported on cases of people imprisoned for
peaceful speech and assembly during that time. The
number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of
endangering state security--a category of criminal
offenses that authorities in China have used to punish
citizen activism and dissent--decreased in 2010
compared to 2009 figures but remained higher than in
years before 2009.
Implementation of a series of central
government-led development initiatives, first announced
at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum,
spurred an intensification of longstanding policies--
including Mandarin-language schooling, herder
resettlement, and urban development projects--that have
undermined the rights of Uyghurs and other non-Han
groups to maintain their cultures, languages, and
livelihoods.
Authorities in the XUAR enforced tight
controls over religion, especially Islam, and
maintained restrictions on religious practice that are
harsher than curbs articulated in national regulations.
Officials integrated curbs over Islam into security
campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on
the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued
campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and
women from wearing veils, and targeted ``illegal''
religious materials in censorship campaigns.
Discriminatory job hiring practices against
Uyghurs and other non-Han groups continued in both the
government and private sectors. Authorities also
continued to send rural non-Han men and women to jobs
elsewhere in China, through programs reportedly marked,
in some cases, by coercion to participate and
exploitative working conditions. Education authorities
in the XUAR continued to require students to pick
cotton and engage in other forms of labor in work-study
programs that exceeded permitted parameters for student
labor under Chinese law and international standards for
worker rights.
National and XUAR government officials
continued to implement projects that have undermined
Uyghurs' ability to protect their cultural heritage.
Authorities continued steps to demolish and
``reconstruct'' the Old City section of Kashgar and
relocate residents, a five-year project launched in
2009 that has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents
and other observers for requiring the resettlement of
residents and for undermining cultural heritage
protection. The Chinese government also continued to
politicize the protection of Uyghurs' intangible
cultural heritage, nominating a Uyghur social and
artistic gathering for increased state and
international protection, but defining this form of
intangible heritage narrowly to exclude variations that
contain religious elements and social activism.
Information remained limited on the status of
asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia
in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the
asylum seekers' refugee status. In May 2011, Chinese
security officials, in cooperation with authorities in
Kazakhstan, forcibly returned a Uyghur man--initially
recognized as a refugee, though the UNHCR later revoked
this status--from Kazakhstan to China. In August,
authorities in Thailand turned over a Uyghur man to
Chinese authorities--who are presumed to have returned
him to China--while authorities in Pakistan and
Malaysia forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in the same
month. The forced returns are among several documented
cases of forced deportation in recent years,
highlighting the ongoing risks of ``refoulement'' and
torture that Uyghur refugees, asylum seekers, and
migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the
sway of China's influence and its disregard for
international law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support legislation that expands U.S. Government
resources for raising awareness of human rights
conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for
increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human
rights.
Raise concern about human rights conditions in
the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of
security campaigns to suppress human rights. Call on
the Chinese government to release people imprisoned for
advocating for their rights or for their personal
connection to rights advocates, including: Gheyret
Niyaz (sentenced in 2010 to 15 years in prison for
``leaking state secrets'' after giving interviews to
foreign media); Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10
years in prison for allegedly ``inciting racial hatred
or discrimination'' or ``inciting separatism'' after
writing a short story); Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim
(adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in
2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively,
for alleged economic and ``separatist'' crimes), as
well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Call on the Chinese government to provide details
about each person detained, charged, tried, or
sentenced in connection to demonstrations and riots in
the XUAR in July 2009, including each person's name,
the charges (if any) against each person, the name and
location of the prosecuting office (i.e.,
procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the
name of each facility where a person is detained or
imprisoned. Call on the Chinese government to encourage
people who have been wrongfully detained to file for
compensation. Call on the Chinese government to ensure
people suspected of crimes in connection to events in
July 2009 are able to hire a lawyer and exercise their
right to employ legal defense in accordance with
Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law
and to ensure suspects can employ legal defense of
their own choosing. Call on the Chinese government to
announce the judgments in all trials connected to
events in July 2009, as required under Article 163 of
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. Call on the government
to allow independent experts to conduct independent
examinations into the demonstrations and riots and to
allow them access to the trials connected to these
events.
Support non-governmental organizations that
address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them
to continue to gather information on conditions in the
region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase
their capacity to preserve their rights and protect
their culture, language, and heritage. Provide support
for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news to the
XUAR and gathering news from the region to expand their
capacity to report on the region and provide uncensored
information to XUAR residents. Provide support for
libraries that hold Uyghur-language collections to
increase their capacity to collect and preserve books
and journals from the XUAR. Support organizations that
can research and take steps to safeguard tangible and
intangible cultural heritage in the XUAR.
Call on the Chinese government to support
development policies in the XUAR that promote the broad
protection of XUAR residents' rights and allow the XUAR
government to exercise its powers of regional autonomy
in making development decisions. Call on central and
XUAR authorities to ensure equitable development that
promotes not only economic growth but also respects the
broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents and
engages these communities in participatory
decisionmaking. Ensure development projects take into
account the particular needs and input of non-Han
ethnic groups, who have faced unique challenges
protecting their rights in the face of top-down
development policies and who have not been full
beneficiaries of economic growth in the region. Call on
authorities to ensure that residents have input into
resettlement initiatives and receive adequate
compensation. Call on authorities to take measures to
safeguard the rights of herders to preserve their
cultures and livelihoods.
Call on the Chinese government to ensure
government and private employers abide by legal
provisions barring discrimination based on ethnicity
and cease job recruiting practices that reserve
positions exclusively for Han Chinese. Call on
authorities to monitor compliance with local directives
promoting job opportunities for non-Han groups, who
continue to face discrimination in the job market.
Support organizations that can provide technical
assistance in monitoring compliance with labor laws and
in bringing suits challenging discriminatory practices,
as provided for under Article 62 of the PRC Employment
Promotion Law. Call on Chinese authorities to
investigate reports of coercion and exploitative
working conditions within labor transfer programs that
send rural non-Han men and women to jobs in the
interior of China. Call on Chinese authorities to
investigate work-study programs within the XUAR and
ensure they do not exceed permitted parameters for
student labor under Chinese law and international
standards for worker rights.
Call on the Chinese government to provide
information on the whereabouts and current legal status
of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned from
Cambodia in December 2009 and Uyghurs forcibly returned
to China from Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, and
Malaysia in 2011. Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees
and asylum seekers with Chinese officials and with
officials from international refugee agencies and from
transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees.
Call on Chinese officials and officials from transit or
destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and
refugee designations of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees and the refugee and citizenship designations
of other countries. Call on transit and destination
countries for Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and
migrants to abide by requirements in the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
Convention against Torture on ``refoulement.''
Tibet
Findings
Expanding Chinese government and Communist
Party use of legal and policy measures to increase
pressure on Tibetan culture--especially on religion and
language--are resulting in consequences that Tibetans
believe threaten the viability of their culture.
Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts with
increases in government-provided statistical measures
on economic development and social services, such as
education. Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval
of government and Party policy on Tibetan affairs are
at increased risk of punishment as the central and
local governments expand the use of legal measures to
safeguard ``social stability'' by criminalizing such
expression.
No formal dialogue took place between the
Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese government and
Party officials during the Commission's 2011 reporting
year. The environment for dialogue deteriorated as the
government pressed forward with implementation of legal
measures and policies that many Tibetans--including the
Dalai Lama--believe threaten the Tibetan culture,
language, religion, heritage, and environment. In 2011,
the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role of a
Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is
commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-
exile. The change has the potential to alter dialogue
dynamics by eliminating the basis for the Party and
government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a
``political'' figure.
The government and Party continued the
campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious
leader and expanded government and Party control over
Tibetan Buddhism to impose what officials describe as
the ``normal order'' of the religion. As of August
2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan
autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted
regulatory measures that increase substantially state
infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries and nunneries. The measures impose closer
monitoring and supervision of each monastery's
Democratic Management Committee--a monastic group
legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and
teachers obey government laws, regulations, and
policies. The measures expand significantly township-
level government authority over monasteries and
nunneries and provide a monitoring, supervisory, and
reporting role to village-level committees.
Government security and judicial officials
used China's legal system as a means to detain and
imprison Tibetan writers, artists, intellectuals, and
cultural advocates who turned to veiled language to
lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize
government policies toward the Tibetan people and
culture. Examples during the 2011 reporting year
included writer-publishers, a conference organizer, a
singer, and persons who downloaded ``prohibited''
songs. The government seeks to prevent such Tibetans
from influencing other Tibetans by punishing peaceful
expression as a ``crime'' and using imprisonment to
remove them from society.
Events this past year highlighted the
importance Tibetans attribute to the status and
preservation of the Tibetan language and the increased
threat that some Tibetans believe will result from
``reform'' of the ``bilingual education'' system.
Tibetan students in one province led protests against
plans to reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan
language during the period 2010 to 2020. A Party
official characterized ``unity of spoken and written
language'' as essential for ``a unified country'' and
implied that protesting students put national unity at
risk. Retired Tibetan educators submitted to
authorities a petition analyzing what they deemed to be
violations of China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law that result in the infringement of ethnic
minorities' rights.
Rural Tibetans protested against what they
consider to be adverse effects of government and Party
economic development policies--especially mining--that
prioritize government objectives above respecting or
protecting the Tibetan culture and environment. The
value of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) mineral
resources is approximately double the 2001 to 2010
subsidies the central government provided to the TAR,
based on official reports. The TAR government has
completed the compulsory settlement or resettlement of
nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural population.
Officials provided updates on construction of the
railway network that will crisscross the Tibetan
plateau: one link will traverse quake-struck Yushu,
which the government renamed and will make into a
``city'' with a substantial population, economy, and
well-developed infrastructure. Tibetans in Yushu
protested after authorities either sold or expropriated
their property without providing adequate compensation.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to engage in
substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives on protecting the Tibetan culture,
language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous
prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan,
and Yunnan provinces. The Dalai Lama's withdrawal from
exiled Tibetan administrative affairs has the potential
to alter dialogue dynamics by eliminating the basis for
the government and Party to characterize him as a
``political'' figure. As tensions rise in Tibetan
areas, a Chinese government decision to engage in
dialogue can result in a durable and mutually
beneficial outcome for the Chinese government and
Tibetans and improve the outlook for local and regional
security in coming decades.
Convey to the Chinese government the urgent
importance of refraining from expanding the use of
legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan
Buddhists' right to the freedom of religion. Point out
to Chinese officials that the anti-Dalai Lama campaign,
aggressive programs of ``patriotic education,'' and
recent prefectural-level legal measures seeking to
control Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs could promote
social discord, not ``social stability.'' Urge the
government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
identify and educate religious teachers in a manner
consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions.
Request that the Chinese government follow up on
a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government
that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the
Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as
an ``ordinary citizen'' along with his family. Urge the
government to invite a representative of an
international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi
Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can express to the
representative his wishes with respect to privacy;
photograph the international representative and Gedun
Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi
Nyima's statement and the photograph.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance
of respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and
language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant
Tibetan culture by honoring China's Constitution's
reference to the freedoms of speech, association,
assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the
security establishment, courts, and law to infringe
upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights.
Urge officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain
the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in
teaching modern subjects and not to consign Tibetan
language to inferior status by discontinuing its use in
teaching modern subjects.
Encourage the Chinese government to take fully
into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when
the government plans infrastructure, natural resource
development, and resettlement projects in the Tibetan
areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to
engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of
such projects and in advising the government on the
implementation and progress of such projects. Request
the Chinese government to compensate fully, fairly, and
promptly all Tibetans who suffer the loss of property
or property rights as a result of the April 2010 Yushu
earthquake and the government's decision to redevelop
Yushu as a new ``city.''
Increase support for U.S. non-governmental
organizations to develop programs that can assist
Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully
protect and develop their culture, language, and
heritage; that can help to improve education, economic,
health, and environmental conservation conditions of
ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and
that create sustainable benefits for Tibetans without
encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas.
Continue to convey to the Chinese government the
importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan
protesters and rioters; condemn the use of security
campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the
Chinese government to provide complete details about
Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-
related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings and
correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of
Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the
peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative
examples include: Former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now
serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing
leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-
Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub
(sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets);
Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a
reincarnated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years
commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting
splittism''); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8
years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a
public festival).
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Findings
Though the Hong Kong Basic Law states that the
``ultimate aim'' is the selection of the chief
executive and the election of all members of the
Legislative Council (Legco) by universal suffrage,
reforms passed in 2011 fell short of these aims. The
reforms cover the election of Legco members and the
selection of the chief executive in Hong Kong's 2012
elections. Under the reforms, the number of members of
the selection committee that chooses the chief
executive will be increased from 800 to 1,200, and the
number of Legco members will be increased from 60 to
70, with 5 of the additional 10 members elected
directly and the other 5 elected under a newly created
territory-wide District Council functional
constituency. According to a report in an independent
Hong Kong newspaper, the mainland Chinese government
has been ``coordinating'' election strategies behind
the scenes.
The Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and Hong
Kong's Basic Law provide that Hong Kong shall enjoy a
high degree of autonomy. In the past year Hong Kong's
immigration authorities refused to grant visas to two
exiled leaders of the Tiananmen protests, Wu'er Kaixi
and Wang Dan, to attend the funeral of Hong Kong
democracy activist Szeto Wah in January 2011. Hong Kong
controls its own immigration policies under the Basic
Law, and at least one Hong Kong commentator viewed the
immigration department's refusal to issue visas as Hong
Kong deferring to the wishes of the mainland
authorities.
Corruption in Macau is a major and growing
problem, with Macau's ranking on the Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index dropping from
43rd in 2009 to 46th in 2010. The growth of gambling in
Macau, fueled by money from mainland Chinese gamblers
and the growth of U.S.-owned casinos, has been
accompanied by widespread corruption, organized crime,
and money laundering.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to make every effort to visit Hong Kong
when traveling to mainland China. U.S. Government
delegations' meetings in Hong Kong should include
meetings with members of the Hong Kong Legislative
Council, officials with the Hong Kong government
administration, and members of the judiciary. Such
meetings show U.S. support for a high degree of
autonomy in Hong Kong under the system of ``one
country, two systems'' and for rule of law.
In meetings with Chinese government officials,
urge them to allow the people of Hong Kong to enjoy the
high degree of autonomy articulated in the Basic Law
and the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration, especially in
matters concerning elections and immigration, and to
allow the introduction of universal suffrage with ``one
man, one vote,'' if this is the wish of the people of
Hong Kong.
Arrange for regulatory experts from states with
gaming industries, such as Nevada, to provide technical
training and assistance to Macau authorities on how to
control criminal activity, and ensure that U.S. casino
owners and operators in Macau are adhering to the
highest standards for the gaming industry.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 13 to
0.
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD)
(http://ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date
information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners.
Consult a prisoner's database record for more detailed
information about the prisoner's case, including his or
her alleged crime; specific human rights that officials
have violated; stage in the legal process; and location
of detention or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations traveling
to China to present Chinese officials with lists of
political and religious prisoners compiled from
database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and private
citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city
relationships with China to explore the database and to
advocate for the release of political and religious
prisoners in China.
a powerful resource for advocacy
The Commission's 2011 Annual Report provides information
about Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the
context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many
of the abuses result from the Communist Party's and
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its
own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of
the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare
summaries of information about political and religious
prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials.
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific
Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual
Report and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at http:/
/ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available
at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.)
PPD use has increased substantially following the July 2010
PPD upgrade. The PPD received approximately 90,900 online
requests for prisoner information during the 12-month period
ending August 31, 2011, an increase of approximately 164
percent over the 34,400 requests during the 12-month period
ending in August 2010. During the 12-month period ending in
August 2011, the United States was the country of origin of the
largest share of requests for information (approximately 46
percent), followed by China (24 percent), Germany (8 percent),
France (3.5 percent), and Great Britain (3.2 percent).
Approximately 13 percent of the requests originated from U.S.
Government (.gov) Internet domains, 13 percent from worldwide
commercial (.com) domains, 13 percent from worldwide network
(.net) domains, 1.5 percent from U.S. education (.edu) domains,
and 0.8 percent from worldwide nonprofit organization (.org)
domains. Approximately 16 percent of the requests for
information were from numerical Internet addresses that do not
provide information about the name of the registrant or the
type of domain.
political prisoners
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the
staff member's area of expertise. The staff seek to provide
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners
and about events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained information on
6,623 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,451 are cases of political or religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
5,172 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon
after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there
are considerably more than 1,451 cases of current political and
religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on
an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious
imprisonment to the PPD.
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their
extensive experience and data on political and religious
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner
information, as well as on information provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize
in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.
more powerful database technology
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational
institutions, and individuals who research political and
religious imprisonment in China or who advocate on behalf of
such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly
leveraged the capacity of the Commission's information and
technology resources to support such research, reporting, and
advocacy.
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment
in China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These types include violations of the right to
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
and free expression, including the freedom to advocate for
peaceful social or political change and to criticize government
policy or government officials.
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission and
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
Introduction
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, Chinese
officials maintained a broad range of restrictions on free
expression that do not comply with international human rights
standards. While such standards permit states in limited
circumstances to restrict expression to protect interests such
as national security and public order, Chinese restrictions
covered a much broader range of activity, including peaceful
expression critical of the Communist Party. Chinese officials
showed little sign of loosening political control over the
Internet and cell phones. They called for strengthening the
Party's guidance of online opinion and censored politically
sensitive information, including searches for ``human rights''
or ``democracy.'' At times, citizen expression on China's
popular microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following a
high-speed train accident in July. A top official said there
would be ``no change in the Party's control over the media,''
amidst censorship of events such as the Nobel Peace Prize award
to imprisoned Chinese intellectual and reform advocate Liu
Xiaobo and intensified harassment of foreign journalists.
Officials continued to abuse vague criminal charges, including
subversion, to target peaceful speech critical of the Party.
Officials maintained broad regulations and registration
requirements applicable to journalists, publishers, news media,
and the Internet.
International Standards for Free Expression
Many Chinese restrictions on free expression do not comply
with international human rights standards. Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights permit officials to restrict expression so long as it is
(1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of
others or protecting national security, public order, public
health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law;
and (3) necessary and the least restrictive means to achieve
the purported aim.\1\ Regarding the purpose requirement, the UN
Human Rights Council has said restrictions on ``discussion of
government policies and political debate,'' ``peaceful
demonstrations or political activities, including for peace and
democracy,'' and ``expression of dissent,'' are inconsistent
with Article 19 of the ICCPR.\2\ As outlined in this section,
Chinese officials continued to restrict expression on the
Internet and in the media for impermissible purposes, such as
to stifle peaceful criticism of the Communist Party. As to
restrictions clearly set forth in law, Chinese officials this
past year abused vaguely worded criminal law provisions and
resorted to extralegal measures to arbitrarily restrict free
expression. As to the narrowness requirement, as documented in
this section, Chinese restrictions continued to be overly broad
and disproportionate to protecting the stated interest. In May
2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression noted that
restrictions on expression should be applied by an independent
body and include the possibility of remedy against abuse.\3\ As
noted in this section, in China there remained no independent
checks on government abuse.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Official Response to Overseas Protests and Calls for Domestic
``Jasmine'' Protests
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year was marked by a crackdown on free expression in China
in early 2011 that followed protests in the Middle East and North
Africa and the appearance of online calls for ``Jasmine'' protests
domestically. Protests in the Middle East began in Tunisia in December
2010 and soon spread to Egypt, Libya, and other countries in the
region. In February 2011, the ``Jasmine'' calls began circulating
online in China.\4\ They called for weekly non-violent protest strolls
in select cities to demand an end to corruption and to promote issues
such as judicial independence, free expression, and political
reform.\5\
media and internet censorship
Officials reportedly censored Chinese media coverage of the Middle
East and North Africa protests. According to leaked censorship
instructions, officials allegedly ordered Chinese media to use only
stories issued by the central government news agency, Xinhua, and
banned reporting on demands for democracy in the Middle East or drawing
comparisons to China's political system.\6\ Western media observed
Chinese media relying heavily on Xinhua stories and observed one-sided
coverage emphasizing the dangers of democracy for countries not ready
for it.\7\ At the time, online censors reportedly blocked searches of
the words ``Egypt,'' ``Libya,'' ``Jasmine,'' and ``democracy.'' \8\ The
duration and effectiveness of the censorship was unclear. Foreign media
attempting to report on the ``Jasmine'' protests encountered intense
harassment. [See Foreign Journalists below for more information.]
harassment, detentions of chinese citizens
Starting in mid-February 2011, Chinese authorities also targeted large
numbers of writers, artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, and reform
advocates. Many were outspoken critics of the government; some tried to
share information about the ``Jasmine'' protest calls, while the
connection of others, if any, to the calls was unclear.\9\ Officials
detained numerous citizens on national security and public disturbance
charges.\10\ [For information on these and other individual cases in
the crackdown, see Internet and Other Electronic Media, and Abuse of
Criminal Laws To Punish Free Expression in this section.] The UN
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other
international groups noted reports of numerous Chinese citizens having
gone missing or disappearing into official custody with little or no
information about their charges or whereabouts.\11\ [For more
information on the apparent disregard of criminal procedural
protections in connection with the disappearances, see Enforced
Disappearances in Section II--Criminal Justice.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet and Other Electronic Media
blocking and filtering political content
In China, officials are not transparent about the content
that is blocked or why it is blocked,\12\ and they continue to
arbitrarily block content for purposes impermissible under
international standards. Chinese authorities expressed anger
over the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned
prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo in
October 2010, for example, and blocked online searches for
``Nobel Peace Prize'' or ``Liu Xiaobo'' and text messages
containing Liu's name.\13\ In January 2011, authorities
reportedly banned hundreds of words, including ``democracy''
and ``human rights'' from cell phone text messages.\14\
Politically sensitive Web sites continued to be blocked,
including a popular Tibetan culture site, an anticorruption
site, and a public health advocacy Web site.\15\ Officials also
continued to block information in a disproportionate manner
that did not appear necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. For
example, access to overseas sites such as Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube remained completely blocked.\16\ In late May 2011,
officials reportedly imposed broad blocks on Internet and cell
phone access in the northern part of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region following a series of mostly peaceful
protests sparked by the death of a herder.\17\
Officials continued to detain and harass Chinese citizens
who sought to share politically sensitive content online. In
each case, the activity appeared to pose little threat to
national security or public order, or the punishment appeared
disproportionate to the alleged offense. For example, rights
defender Cheng Jianping (who uses the pseudonym Wang Yi) sent a
satirical Twitter message urging anti-Japanese protesters to
converge on the Japanese pavilion at the Shanghai 2010 World
Expo.\18\ The Xinxiang City Reeducation Through Labor (RTL)
Committee in Henan province ordered her to serve one year of
RTL in November 2010.\19\ In April 2011, authorities in
Chongqing municipality ordered a citizen to serve RTL for
posting scatological humor in a critique of the policies of
Chongqing's Party Secretary Bo Xilai.\20\ In November 2010,
Shanghai police interrogated the writer Xia Shang after he
offered to buy flowers for victims of a Shanghai fire in an
Internet post.\21\ Officials treated citizens who sought to
share information about the calls for domestic ``Jasmine''
protests, which appeared to be a non-violent call for political
reform, as threats to the state. The detained included Hua
Chunhui, an insurance company manager and activist who
reportedly sent Twitter messages about the ``Jasmine'' protest
calls and was charged with endangering state security.\22\ In
April 2011, officials in Jiangsu province ordered Hua to serve
18 months of RTL.\23\ In February, police in Harbin city,
Heilongjiang province, detained Internet blogger Liang Haiyi on
suspicion of the crime of ``subversion of state power.'' Police
accused her of posting information about the ``Jasmine''
protests on the popular QQ microblogging site.\24\
The types of content prohibited online in China are not
clearly defined in law, and thus conflict with international
standards. Chinese Internet regulations contain vague and broad
prohibitions on content that, for example, ``harms the honor or
interests of the nation,'' ``spreads rumors,'' or ``disrupts
national policies on religion.'' \25\ Chinese law does not
define these concepts.\26\ In China, the government places the
burden on Internet service and content providers to monitor and
remove content based on these vague standards and to maintain
records of such activity and report it to the government.\27\
In February 2011, a manager at Renren, a major social media
company similar to Facebook, said that the company censored
sensitive content using a staff of 500 and a keyword filtering
system, and that the ``CEO would have to have a coffee with the
government'' for any misstep.\28\ The Party's influence over
the technology sector was evident in June, when more than 60
representatives from top Chinese Internet companies, including
Sina and Baidu, gathered in Shanghai to commemorate the Party's
90th anniversary.\29\ Also in June, Sina announced plans to
launch an English microblog site in the United States, which
could have the effect of exporting Chinese censorship to
overseas markets.\30\ The U.S.-based company Google, which has
operations in China and which in early 2010 challenged Chinese
censorship requirements, reportedly continued to face problems
in China. In March 2011, Google reported that the Chinese
government appeared to be interfering with its email service in
China and making it look like a technical problem.\31\ The
government denied the charge.\32\ In June, Google reported that
an attack on hundreds of personal Gmail accounts, including
those of Chinese political activists, senior U.S. officials,
and journalists, had originated from China.\33\ The Party's
official newspaper rejected the allegation.\34\
prior restraints on the internet
In addition to blocking certain types of content, officials
in China control the Internet by determining who gains access
to the medium through numerous licensing requirements (i.e.,
prior restraints). All Web sites hosted in China are required
either to be licensed by or registered with the government, and
sites providing news content or audio and video services
require an additional license or registration.\35\ In a 2011
report, the UN Special Rapporteur for Free Expression said that
licensing requirements ``cannot be justified in the case of the
Internet, as it can accommodate an unlimited number of points
of entry and an essentially unlimited number of users.'' \36\
In October 2010, Chinese media reported that as of the end of
September 2010 Chinese Internet companies had inspected nearly
1.8 million Web sites and shut down 3,000 for failing to
register.\37\ In July 2011, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) reported a 41 percent decrease in the number of
Web sites in China in 2010 to 1.91 million sites.\38\ The
report's editor cited government campaigns targeting
``obscene'' sites and the economic downturn as reasons for the
decrease, and said in recent years few sites had been closed
``purely to control speech.'' \39\ Other observers in China,
however, attributed the decrease to the chilling effect of
expanding government control.\40\ The CASS study also claimed
that the United States was using new media, including the Voice
of America, to threaten China's ``ideological safety.'' \41\
expanding overall access, while maintaining control
The government has pledged to expand access to the Internet
and cell phones.\42\ Official statistics indicate that by the
end of 2010, there were 457 million Internet users in China,
including a growing number in rural areas, and by April 2011,
900 million mobile phone accounts.\43\ Officials have sought to
expand the Internet to promote economic development and
government propaganda.\44\ Still, international observers and
Western media continue to note the difficulties officials have
in controlling this emerging and vibrant space for expression,
including expression of criticism of the government and
discussion of some politically sensitive topics.\45\ In July
2011, for example, users on China's two most popular Twitter-
type microblogs posted some 26 million messages after a high-
speed train crash near Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province.\46\
Officials reportedly censored some messages, but a large number
of messages either were allowed through or appeared too quickly
for censors to react.\47\
Official statements and actions continue to emphasize
control rather than freedom on the Internet. The importance of
maintaining official control was reinforced in May 2011, when
officials established a State Internet Information Office to
``supervise and urge relevant departments to strengthen their
supervision of online content, and to be responsible for
approvals for online news services and other related services
as well as day-to-day oversight.'' \48\ In China, the Communist
Party exercises tight control over government agencies that
manage the media and Internet.\49\ This relationship gives the
Party discretion to use government restrictions not just for
the purpose of regulating pornography, intellectual property
violations, and protecting minors--permissible purposes under
international standards--but also to serve the Party's
interests. In February 2011, President Hu Jintao called for
``strengthening the mechanisms for guiding online public
opinion.'' \50\ The practice of authorities paying Chinese
citizens to post comments favorable to the government and Party
on the Internet reportedly continued.\51\ In February,
Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou
Yongkang said authorities should ``coalesce a comprehensive''
structure for managing the Internet ``under the Party
committee's unified leadership.'' \52\ In Beijing, authorities
reportedly issued regulations requiring bars, hotels, and other
public places to purchase and install costly software to
monitor the identities of people using wireless services at
those locations.\53\
Abuse of Criminal Law To Punish Free Expression
Officials continued to use the criminal charges of
``subversion'' and ``inciting subversion'' (Article 105 of the
PRC Criminal Law) this past year, in part in connection with
the crackdown that followed protests in the Middle East and
North Africa and the calls for ``Jasmine'' protests
domestically.\54\ According to the non-governmental
organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights Defenders, out of a
total of 48 individuals detained since mid-February 2011,
officials had charged at least 17 with ``subversion'' or
``inciting subversion.'' \55\ Ran Yunfei, a prolific writer,
blogger, and activist, was arrested in March for ``inciting
subversion.'' \56\ Authorities released him in August but
placed him under ``residential restriction'' for six months,
restricting his movements and ability to write and speak.\57\
In March, police in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, detained
prominent blogger Guo Weidong on suspicion of ``inciting
subversion of state power'' after alleging he had forwarded
information online about the protests.\58\
Officials also charged numerous persons with ``creating
disturbances,'' a crime under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal
Law.\59\ Officials detained the human rights activist Wei Qiang
on the charge of ``creating a disturbance'' in March 2011,
before releasing him on bail to await trial in April.\60\ In
February, Wei was at the site of one of the ``Jasmine'' protest
strolls in Beijing and reported on the scene using his Twitter
account. Amid the broader crackdown, authorities in March 2011
also detained the Beijing-based rights advocate Wang Lihong on
the charge of creating a disturbance, but in connection with
activities stemming from almost a year earlier.\61\ They
alleged that Wang had used the Internet to organize protests
outside a court in support of three bloggers accused of
defamation for helping a woman call on officials to
reinvestigate her daughter's death.\62\ In September, after a
trial reportedly marked by procedural irregularities,\63\ a
Beijing court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison for
creating a disturbance.\64\
In the case of the well-known artist Ai Weiwei, officials
charged him with economic crimes, alleging that his company had
evaded ``a huge amount of tax.'' \65\ Ai had become an
outspoken critic of government policies and had been keeping
track of the lawyers, bloggers, and activists swept up in the
crackdown, when officials detained him in April.\66\
Authorities had refused to notify his family of the charges
against him or his whereabouts and kept him at a secret
location, purportedly under ``residential surveillance.'' \67\
During his 81 days in custody, Ai was reportedly kept in a cell
without windows and was accompanied by two guards.\68\
Authorities released Ai on bail in June on the condition that
he not give interviews or use Twitter.\69\ In August, Ai
resumed his Twitter messages and told a Western newspaper, ``I
can't be alive and not express my feelings.'' \70\
The actual threat these citizens posed to state security
and public order or whether the underlying crime was the actual
motivation for official action is unclear, as details regarding
many of these cases remain limited. Available information
suggests that officials targeted the citizens to stifle
political expression and dissent. Many of the citizens targeted
had track records of criticizing the government and Communist
Party and advocating for democracy and human rights.\71\ As the
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Chinese Human
Rights Defenders have noted in recent years, the vagueness of
Chinese crimes of endangering state security, including
subversion, lends itself to official abuse of freedom of
speech, and Chinese courts make little assessment of whether
the speech in question poses a threat to state security.\72\
There were other cases of alleged subversion or splittism this
past year. In October 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei
province, arrested the prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of
subversion; Li had written numerous essays in support of
democracy.\73\ In November, Beijing authorities detained
activist Bai Dongping on inciting subversion charges after he
posted online a photo of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\74\ In
December, three Tibetan writers, Kalsang Jinpa, Jangtse Donkho,
and Buddha were sentenced to prison terms of three to four
years for inciting splittism after articles they had written
about the 2008 Tibetan protests appeared in a magazine.\75\ In
March 2011, authorities in Suining city, Sichuan province,
sentenced democracy advocate Liu Xianbin to 10 years in prison
for seeking to incite subversion by writing essays advocating
for, among other things, democracy, and posting them on Web
sites outside of China.\76\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities Defend Liu Xiaobo Case on Grounds of International Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
After imprisoned prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, Chinese authorities
sought to defend their handling of his case as consistent with
international law. After the award was announced, China's central
government news agency, Xinhua, issued an analysis of the case based on
the findings of a Chinese criminal law scholar, Gao Mingxuan.\77\ The
analysis noted that international treaties and nearly every country's
laws criminalize some speech, and that Liu's speech had sought to
incite the overthrow of the Chinese government.\78\ Xinhua failed to
note that the essays and activities cited as evidence against Liu, who
was sentenced to 11 years in prison, did not advocate violence and
instead called for nonviolence and gradual political reform.\79\ A May
2011 opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded
that Chinese authorities' handling of Liu's case violated both his
right to fair trial and his right to political free speech as provided
under international law.\80\ Chinese officials responded to the Nobel
announcement by detaining citizens who distributed leaflets and posted
online messages in support of Liu.\81\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extralegal Harassment
Chinese officials continued to physically harm, restrict
the travel of, and otherwise extralegally harass citizens to
punish and stifle expression. Under illegal home confinement
after his release, self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng
and his wife Yuan Weijing recorded video of themselves
describing the round-the-clock surveillance and harassment they
faced.\82\ After the video was smuggled out and posted online
in February 2011, security officials reportedly beat Chen and
Yuan on two occasions.\83\ After the Nobel announcement in
October 2010, authorities confined Liu Xia, the wife of Liu
Xiaobo, to her home in Beijing and cut off her communications
to the outside world.\84\ A May 2011 opinion of the UN Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Liu Xia's house
arrest violates international standards.\85\ After his release
from prison in December, China Democracy Party co-founder Qin
Yongmin was harassed by police in Wuhan city, Hubei province,
who accused him of speaking to reporters.\86\ Officials refused
to allow the noted writer Liao Yiwu to attend the March 2011
PEN World Writers Festival in New York and a literary festival
in Australia in May.\87\ In July, Liao escaped China at the
Vietnam border. He fled to Berlin in anticipation of the
publication of a memoir on the four years he spent in a Chinese
prison for writing a poem on the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\88\
The Buddhist leader Wu Zeheng reportedly has been beaten,
harassed, and prevented from participating in a Buddhist
celebration by authorities in Guangdong province following his
release from prison in February 2010.\89\ Wu previously served
11 years for alleged economic crimes, although reports connect
that imprisonment to his issuance of letters to China's
leadership calling for reforms and an end to corruption.\90\
Freedom of the Press
Chinese government and Communist Party control over the
press continued to violate international standards.
International experts identify media serving ``as government
mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the
public interest'' as a major challenge to free expression.\91\
In China, officials expect the media to serve as the Party and
government's mouthpiece. In a November 2010 speech on political
reform, Liu Binjie, director of the government agency
responsible for regulating the press, the General
Administration on Press and Publication, said any reform must
be ``beneficial to strengthening and improving the Party's
leadership over press and publishing work. . . . From beginning
to end we must insist on . . . no change to the nature of press
and publishing serving as mouthpiece of the Party and the
people, no change in the Party's control over the media.'' \92\
In January 2011, a spokesperson for the State Administration
for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) said officials had
ruled out any moves to commercialize radio and television
stations. ``Radio and television stations are the Party's
important news media and battleground for propagandizing
ideology and culture . . . and propaganda must remain its
focus,'' he said.\93\ In November 2010, the Party's official
journal, Seeking Truth, cited the experience of the former
Soviet Union to argue against any liberalization of China's
press.\94\
Authorities have allowed reporters some room to exercise
``public supervision'' duties over local officials and local
matters, but in recent years have sought to rein in this space.
In the summer of 2010, for example, the Central Propaganda
Department reportedly barred more commercially oriented
``metropolitan'' (dushi) newspapers from publishing
``negative'' stories about incidents in other geographic areas
within China or carrying stories published by newspapers based
in other areas, a practice known as ``outside area
supervision.'' \95\ Rhetorically, officials continue to claim
that the rights of legally recognized journalists should be
protected, although the content of such rights remains
unclear.\96\ Emboldened by official claims that journalists
deserve protection, Chinese journalists protested a series of
incidents during the summer of 2010 in which local officials
and commercial interests had targeted a number of journalists,
including threatening them with charges of criminal
defamation.\97\ Despite such protests, a deputy editor at
Caijing, a Chinese financial magazine known for its
investigative reporting, noted the ``core problem: our police
and judiciary are not independent and there is widespread
collusion between officials and enterprises.'' \98\ In July,
the Party issued an order censoring news coverage of a high-
speed train accident in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province,
forcing newspapers to discard pages containing coverage of the
incident.\99\ The order came after Chinese citizens flooded the
Internet with messages questioning officials' response and
openness following the crash.\100\ A number of Chinese
journalists expressed outrage at the propaganda order on their
blogs, and at least one news weekly appeared to ignore the
order.\101\
political control of media through party directives
This past year, officials continued to publicly issue broad
directives on what China's domestic media should report,
reminding journalists of their duty to ``correctly'' (zhengque)
guide public opinion. On Journalists' Day in China in November
2010, Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, said
that ``a correct public opinion orientation benefits the Party
and the people.'' \102\ He called on the news media to
``propagandize the Party's positions.'' \103\ To prepare for
the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party in July 2011, Central Propaganda Department director Liu
Yunshan said in April that covering the anniversary was the
``common responsibility of media organizations at various
levels.'' \104\ He called on evening and metropolitan
newspapers to ``use vivid stories and inspiring topics to
illustrate the glorious history of our Party's struggle'' and
urged online media to ``help the large numbers of netizens
understand the Party's great historical course by publishing
special postings, background links, and online interviews.''
\105\ In May 2011, an official at SARFT confirmed that
television stations had been verbally ordered not to air
detective and time travel shows during the anniversary
period.\106\
The Party, through its Central Propaganda Department, lower
level propaganda departments, and other government agencies,
also issues more specific directives to the media on what they
can and cannot report on. These directives are considered state
secrets, but their contents continue to be leaked to the public
and reported on by foreign and Hong Kong media and non-
governmental organizations. In an April 2011 Washington Post
story, unnamed Chinese editors and journalists confirmed the
substance of a series of directives issued in March that
appeared to reflect official nervousness over the North Africa
and Middle East protests.\107\ In January 2011, the
International Federation of Journalists released a report
documenting more than 80 censorship orders in 2010.\108\ The
orders reportedly blocked information on ``public health,
disasters, corruption and civil unrest.'' \109\ A virtual news
blackout, including the blacking out of Western stations
broadcast in China, followed the Nobel Peace Prize announcement
in October 2010.\110\ The only news stories were from state-run
media outlets such as Xinhua and Global Times, which reported
on Chinese displeasure with the award.\111\ In January 2011,
the Central Propaganda Department reportedly ordered media not
to use the phrase ``civil society'' in their reports.\112\
punishment of journalists
Journalists and news media who issued news reports that
authorities did not approve of continued to face punishment. In
December 2010, a reporter at Southern Weekend said that the
paper had been ordered to cease publication of an annual media
award.\113\ In January 2011, the outspoken journalist Chang
Ping, who worked for the Southern Daily Group, reported that he
had been dismissed from his job under pressure from
authorities.\114\ That same month, Time Weekly placed one of
its editors, Peng Xiaoyun, on what appeared to be involuntary
leave after the paper ran a story mentioning prominent
activists and several signers of Charter 08.\115\ Titled the
``100 Most Influential People of Our Time'' and published in
mid-December, the list included Zhao Lianhai, the advocate for
victims of tainted milk.\116\ After the story's publication,
copies reportedly were recalled and Peng and another editor
were required to write self-criticisms.\117\ In March 2011,
Peng reported that she had been dismissed.\118\ The publishers
of another Guangzhou-based publication, South Wind Window,
reportedly demoted its president and suspended another
journalist after officials criticized a story they deemed
``anti-government and anti-Communist Party.'' \119\ Following
the Wenzhou train crash, China's central television network
suspended Wang Qinglei after the host of a program he produced
questioned the Railway Ministry's response to the incident, and
removed another program after it criticized the ministry's
spokesman.\120\
political control of media through regulation of editors and
journalists
All news media are subject to an extensive licensing system
and continual government oversight. In order to legally report
the news, domestic newspapers, magazines, and Web sites, as
well as individual journalists, must obtain a license or
accreditation from the government.\121\ Radio and television
broadcast journalists must pass a government-sponsored exam
that tests them on basic knowledge of Marxist views of news and
Communist Party principles.\122\ In the 2010 Annual Report, the
Commission reported that government officials were planning to
require all journalists to pass a similar exam, but it is
unclear whether this exam has been implemented.\123\ Ongoing
training initiatives for journalists continued to be heavily
imbued with political indoctrination. In November,
teleconferences with journalists across China were held in
connection with a new campaign to ``Stop False Reporting,
Strengthen Social Responsibility, and Strengthen Construction
of News Profession Ethics.'' \124\ The campaign sought to
``guide editors and journalists to grasp the basics of Marxist
views of news . . . in order to strengthen the feeling of glory
and mission in doing the Party's news work well.'' \125\
According to an April 2011 article on the China Journalists
Association Web site on 14 newspaper units that carried out
``self-education,'' journalists at one Beijing newspaper were
reminded that ``news media are the mouthpiece of the Party and
people . . . and not simply a commercial activity.'' \126\
International experts have criticized a general licensing
requirement for journalists.\127\ In a 2010 joint declaration
on challenges to free expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression and his international
counterparts identified as challenges ``registration
requirements for print media'' and government rules against
``publishing false news.'' \128\ Chinese officials continue to
exercise their discretion to shut down unlicensed media. In
March 2011, China's main press regulator, the General
Administration on Press and Publication, announced a 100-day
campaign to, among other objectives, shut down ``illegal''
reporting offices.\129\
foreign journalists
This past year the Commission observed a spike in the
intensity and level of harassment against foreign journalists
as they attempted to report on events considered sensitive by
Chinese officials. In February 2011, foreign journalists who
traveled to Linyi city, Shandong province, to report on the
home confinement of self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng
encountered violent groups of men who roughed them up,
threatened them with bricks, and destroyed equipment.\130\ The
journalists contacted local police but received no
assistance.\131\ In late February and early March 2011, Chinese
authorities harassed foreign journalists attempting to cover
the ``Jasmine'' protest strolls at sites in Beijing and other
parts of China.\132\ On February 27, reporters covering the
Wangfujing site in Beijing met rough treatment from officials,
and one journalist was reportedly beaten and later sought
treatment at a hospital.\133\ Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi denied that any foreign journalists had been beaten, and
foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said the journalists had
disrupted ``normal order'' and violated unspecified rules.\134\
Harassment continued in the days that followed, with officials
asking a journalist to sign a pledge promising never to report
on the ``Jasmine'' protests and officials threatening to expel
journalists or revoke their press credentials.\135\ In April,
plainclothes police detained, and in at least one case roughed
up, foreign reporters attempting to cover an outdoor Christian
religious gathering.\136\ In May 2011, the professional
association of international journalists in China, the Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China, said 94 percent of survey
respondents believed reporting conditions in China had
deteriorated, with 70 percent saying they faced interference,
violence, or other harassment during the past year, and 40
percent saying their sources had encountered official
harassment.\137\
restrictions on ``illegal'' publishing and political and religious
publications
The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to
root out unlicensed publications and publications containing
what officials deemed to be ``illegal'' political and religious
content. In China, no one may publish, print, copy, or
distribute a publication without government approval, and
publishers must submit to ongoing government supervision.\138\
To obtain government approval, a publisher must meet minimum
capital requirements, obtain a government-approved sponsor, and
accord with the state's own plans for the publishing
industry.\139\ Once approved, publishers must submit written
reports of their publishing activities to the government and
seek advance approval to publish on matters that involve
``state security'' or ``social stability.'' \140\ In March
2011, the State Council amended the Regulations of the
Administration of Publications, leaving these general
requirements intact and adding new provisions requiring those
who distribute publications over the Internet or information
networks to obtain a license and requiring specialized
personnel to take a state exam to show compliance with state-
imposed qualifications.\141\
Those who ``illegally'' engage in business activities,
including publishing without a license, remain subject to
criminal penalties under Article 225 of the PRC Criminal Law,
and officials continue to use this charge to target political
speech.\142\ In August 2010, authorities in Shaanxi province
detained author and journalist Xie Chaoping on this charge
after he published a book on the relocation of citizens
affected by a hydroelectric dam.\143\ Prosecutors refused to
approve Xie's arrest for insufficient evidence.\144\ In
December 2010, authorities took Mongol writer Erden-uul into
custody in apparent connection to a new book he authored that
reportedly addressed Inner Mongolian independence from China,
saying the writer had engaged in ``illegal publishing.'' \145\
The Chinese government reported in September 2010 that Mongol
rights advocate Sodmongol was being tried in connection to
``counterfeiting book registration numbers and illegally
publishing and selling books.'' \146\ In April 2010 authorities
detained Sodmongol while he was en route to attend the UN
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.\147\
Government agencies police content based on vague and
sweeping prohibitions on content deemed by officials to
``destroy ethnic unity, or infringe upon ethnic customs and
habits,'' ``propagate evil cults or superstition,'' or ``harm
the honor or interests of the nation.'' \148\ Provincial and
local authorities continued to target ``illegal'' political and
religious publications. In March 2011, a Chinese news report
said authorities in Heilongjiang province would ``strictly
confiscate political illegal publications and publications that
defame the Party and state leaders, along with illegal
publications that incite ethnic division.'' \149\ It also said
authorities would emphasize blocking and confiscating ``illegal
political publications'' that ``hostile foreign forces cook
up,'' or that ``domestic lawless persons illegally print or
copy to disseminate political rumors,'' or that ``create
ideological confusion.'' \150\ In April, authorities in Jiangxi
province seized some 632 publications that constituted
``illegal religious propaganda.'' \151\ Also in April,
authorities in Guang'an city, Sichuan province, reportedly
destroyed some 30 items that were ``illegal political
publications, [related to the] Falun Gong cult organization,
and illegal religious propaganda,'' as well as 1,141 ``illegal
newspapers and journals.'' \152\
Worker Rights
Introduction
Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or
in practice, full worker rights in accordance with
international standards, including the right to organize into
independent unions. Advocates for worker rights in China
continued to be subjected to harassment and abuse. The All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union
under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal
trade union organization in China. All lower level unions must
be affiliated with the ACFTU.
During the 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities have
faced the dual challenges of accommodating a younger, more
educated, and rights-conscious workforce and addressing changes
in economic development patterns (including inland growth,
fewer workers migrating to coastal areas, rising wages, and
labor shortages in some locales). Due in part to shifting
labor, economic, and demographic conditions, official and
unofficial reports have indicated that workers appeared to have
gained increased leverage in the relationship between labor and
capital. In recent years, Chinese workers have become more
assertive in securing their rights, higher wages, more genuine
representation, and better protection under China's labor laws.
In some cases during this reporting year, workers continued to
channel their grievances through, and to seek guidance, advice,
and legal aid from, labor lawyers and advocates. At the same
time, authorities have harassed, detained, and sent to prison
labor advocates who attempted to organize workers for
``disrupting social order.'' Some local officials reportedly
beat and kicked striking workers and labor petitioners, and
reports of attacks on migrant workers seeking back pay
continued to surface.
With Chinese officials charged with preserving ``social
stability,'' the extent to which they will allow workers to
bargain for higher wages and genuine representation remains
unclear. Principles and different aspects of collective
bargaining rights have been mentioned in multiple drafts of
local and national regulations during this reporting year,
including the draft Regulation on Wages--proposed in part to
address official concern over the unequal distribution of
wealth across China and its potential effects on ``social
unrest''--as well as trials and measures for collective wage
negotiations in different localities. Some critics, however,
have questioned the lack of specifics in some of these
proposals and, thus, their eventual effectiveness.
Rights Consciousness, Worker Actions, and ``Social Stability''
During this reporting year, Chinese officials have
continued to assess the characteristics of the new generation
of migrant workers as well as their significance on the
shifting labor landscape, public safety, and ``social
stability.'' \1\ Chinese government statistics suggest that
these young workers constitute 61.6 percent of all migrant
workers.\2\ In February 2011, the ACFTU released a study
identifying the characteristics unique to current young migrant
workers. The document also provided several policy
recommendations for ``resolving the problems facing the new
generation of migrant workers in realizing their rights and
interests.'' \3\ The report notes that over half of young
migrant workers are unmarried and that 74.1 percent of them had
``studied in school'' prior to leaving home. By contrast, only
35.4 percent of the ``traditional migrants,'' those born before
1980, had studied in school.\4\ These young migrant workers
also are mostly concentrated in secondary and tertiary
industries and are overwhelmingly employed by private
enterprises (84.3 percent) as opposed to state-owned
enterprises (12.5 percent).\5\ On average, they receive lower
wages (167.27 yuan (US$26) lower than ``traditional
migrants''); are more likely to sign labor contracts that lack
specific provisions detailing minimum pay in line with local
regulations; have less employment stability; face ``relatively
more hidden dangers'' in terms of workplace safety; and are
less likely to join labor unions (44.6 percent of young migrant
workers are union members, versus 56 percent of ``traditional
migrants'').\6\
The ACFTU report provides several recommendations on ways
in which the government may more effectively accommodate
younger workers' unique life experiences and characteristics.
Some of the suggestions include strengthening efforts to tackle
wage disparities, advance social insurance programs, provide
technical training to increase young migrant workers'
competitiveness and ability to adjust to changing
circumstances, encourage localities to explore methods to
reform the household registration system, and organize young
migrant workers into unions and facilitate channels for them to
address their grievances.\7\ These suggestions appear to
reflect the Chinese government's initial ideas to grapple with
the aforementioned generational changes, a generation of
migrant workers who, as one senior Chinese official observed,
have never put down roots, are better educated, are only
children, and are more likely to demand equal access to
employment and social services--and even equal political
rights--in the cities.\8\
Official and unofficial reports indicate that, for the most
part, the young migrant workers described above have been at
the forefront of recent worker actions.\9\ Worker actions have
been common in China in recent years, and that continues to be
the case during the 2011 reporting year. China Strikes, a Web
site dedicated to ``track[ing] strikes, protests and other
collective actions taken by Chinese workers to defend their
rights and interests,'' recorded at least 32 such actions by
workers from October 2010 to May 2011.\10\
As with the spate of worker actions that took place in the
spring and summer of 2010 that garnered international
attention, workers during this reporting year took action to
recover back wages, protest the non-payment of wages, call for
higher pay, and, for some older workers, demand due
compensation in the cases of restructuring at certain
enterprises. Social inequality and the lack of rule of law
reportedly played a role in driving low-paid migrant workers to
participate in a series of riots and protests in southern China
in June 2011.\11\ In April 2011, workers reportedly blocked the
front gate of a liquor factory protesting the compensation
terms during restructuring.\12\ In the same month, more than
1,000 truck drivers in Shanghai municipality, reacting to
rising fuel costs, protested for higher pay. In March 2011,
about 80 sanitation workers in Guangzhou city, Guangdong
province, took part in work stoppages to protest non-payment of
wages, claiming that management owed each worker from 3,000 to
4,000 yuan (US$464 to US$618) for overtime and other
allowances.\13\ In November 2010, an ``entire street'' in
Foshan city, Guangdong province, was reportedly ``filled with
workers,'' perhaps up to 7,000, as management at Foxconn, a
Taiwanese-owned company that produces electronics, allegedly
forced workers to sign contracts with terms that many workers
found unsatisfactory.\14\ Starting in October 2010, about 70
workers at a Japanese-owned factory took part in strikes to
demand that the company comply with China's labor laws,
including the right to sign contracts and to be compensated
with overtime payments.\15\
Chinese authorities during this reporting year continued to
harass, detain, and imprison labor advocates and lawyers whom
officials deemed to be threats to ``social stability.'' For
example, authorities ordered Yang Huanqing, a teacher in
Jingzhou city, Hubei province, to serve one year of reeducation
through labor in March 2011 for ``disrupting work unit order''
when he supposedly organized 22 and 33 dismissed teachers in
October and November 2010, respectively, to petition in
Beijing. Yang reportedly led the teachers to petition against
social insurance policies they alleged were unfair.\16\
In another case that reflects authorities' concern with
labor advocates' and lawyers' ability to organize and mobilize
large groups of workers, the Xincheng District People's Court
in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province, sentenced labor lawyer and
advocate Zhao Dongmin to three years' imprisonment on October
2010 for ``gathering a crowd to disrupt social order.'' \17\
Zhao had allegedly organized workers at state-owned enterprises
in Xi'an in April 2009 to establish the Shaanxi Union Rights
Defense Representative Congress, an organization that,
according to China Labor News Translations, a Web site
dedicated to analyzing developments in China labor relations,
was ``critical of the Chinese [state-run] trade union's failure
to represent the interests of state sector employees in
restructured and/or privatized enterprises.'' \18\ Prior to
Zhao's arrest, Shaanxi authorities had warned that Zhao and
others had:
seriously disrupted the normal workings of Party and
government organs and have become a huge potential
danger to social stability. They have made use of
problems in society, including using old and frail
enterprise retirees as cannon fodder to pressure the
government. They have stirred up extreme delusions and
fanned the flames in an extremely outrageous manner. If
resolute measures are not adopted, they will grow into
a threatening force and are very likely to wreak even
greater havoc to social stability.\19\
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining
The Chinese government prevents workers in China from
exercising their constitutional right to freedom of
association.\20\ Trade union activity in China is organized
under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a
quasi-governmental organization under the direction of the
Communist Party.\21\ Leading trade union officials hold
concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party. The ACFTU
Constitution and the Trade Union Law of 1992 both highlight the
dual nature of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and
interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the
Party and the broader goals and interests of the Chinese
government.\22\ The ACFTU monopolizes many worker rights issues
in China, such as shop-floor organizing and formalistic
collective contract negotiations, but it does not consistently
or uniformly advance the rights of workers.\23\
At the shop-floor level, the ACFTU's unions remain weak and
marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at
lower administrative levels sometimes may play an important
role in legislative and regulatory development, this role is
not matched with power at the enterprise level. Generally
speaking, firm-level union branches are weak, non-democratic,
and subordinate to management.\24\ Despite an increase in
legislation and administrative regulations that grants the
ACFTU more power at the firm level to resolve disputes, the
structural weaknesses of the trade union branches make
improvements in trade union autonomy and worker advocacy
difficult and slow.\25\
collective contracting
Collective contracts and some process of collective
consultation and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor
relations since the 1990s, when state enterprise reform
deepened and labor conflict began to increase rapidly,
especially in the private sector. The ACFTU has championed
collective contracts and collective negotiations as important
foundations for trade union work at the enterprise level. In
recent years, the collective contract system has received more
Chinese government and Communist Party support as part of an
attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of labor
relations at the local level between the government, the ACFTU,
and the employer associations.\26\ Moreover, some Chinese
officials have stated in public that collective consultation--
and, in the process, fostering more genuine representation for
workers--could be an effective way to defuse labor disputes and
develop ``harmonious labor relations.'' \27\
In January 2011, the ACFTU published a set of ``work
objectives'' for the new year, stating the organization's goal
to ``set up trade union organizations according to law to
unionize the vast majority of workers[.]'' \28\ More
specifically, some of the benchmarks that the ACFTU document
provided include the boosting of national unionization rates at
``businesses with corporate capacity to 65 [percent],'' and an
increase in ``the number of union memberships to make up more
than 80 [percent] by the end of 2011'' and ``over 90 [percent]
by the end of 2013.'' \29\ Even as the ACFTU supplied
quantifiable benchmarks, however, it is not clear how these
goals will be implemented in practice. It remains to be seen
whether such goals will facilitate the approval of local and
national regulations with specific implementation and follow-
through directives and measures, as well as the necessary
reforms to make unions more representative of workers'
interests.\30\
During this past year, the Commission continued to follow
developments concerning the Guangdong province draft
Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises
(Regulations). As the Commission reported last year,\31\ the
draft Regulations would extend to workers the right to ask for
collective wage consultations \32\ and allow worker members to
sit on the enterprise's board of directors and board of
supervisors,\33\ represent worker interests in the boards'
meetings,\34\ and take part in the enterprise's decisionmaking
processes.\35\ In September 2010, reportedly under heavy
lobbying by members of the Hong Kong industrial community, many
of whom operate factories in southern China and are concerned
with rising production costs, the Guangdong People's Congress
Standing Committee decided to suspend further deliberation of
the draft Regulations.\36\ In January 2011, a source in the
Hong Kong industrial community who had met with officials in
Guangdong province reported to the South China Morning Post
that the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress would ``very
likely'' approve the draft Regulations later that month.\37\
Other unofficial sources, however, suggest that the approval
process of the draft Regulations seemed to have stalled
indefinitely.\38\
Other localities in China also announced plans to establish
collective wage consultation systems in the coming years. In
Qingdao city, Shandong province, for example, the Qingdao City
Health Bureau announced in March 2011 goals to establish a
system of ``equal collective wage consultation'' for all
contract workers within three years.\39\ In a city with more
than 40,000 medical workers, the health bureau's plan
reportedly will only cover contracted workers, who number
around 5,000.\40\ At medical organizations where unions do not
yet exist, a government document suggests that workers may
choose their own representatives.\41\ This past year, other
cities that reported plans for collective wage consultation
initiatives included Changde city, Hunan province; \42\ Rizhao
city, Shandong province; \43\ Qinhuangdao city, Hebei province;
\44\ and Guanghaiwei city, Zhejiang province.\45\ The Shenzhen
Municipal Trade Union reportedly plans to sign collective wage
contracts at 550 enterprises in the next year.\46\
The extent to which the ACFTU's stated goals, if
materialized, and other local experiments with collective
consultation will expand the space for greater and more genuine
worker representation remains unclear. At present, the
collective contract and consultation system remains weak and
formalistic in many cases because enterprise-level trade union
leaders are not positioned to serve the interests of their
workers. Many collective contracts reportedly solely reflect
the basic legal standards in the locality and often are the
result of concerted government or Party work to encourage the
enterprise to enter into formalistic contracts rather than the
result of genuine bargaining between management and the
enterprise trade union.\47\ Finally, none of the aforementioned
actions taken by different localities and the ACFTU have
changed the fact that freedom of association does not exist in
China.
Migrant Workers
Migrants are generally characterized as rural residents who
have left their place of residence to seek non-agricultural
jobs in Chinese cities, sometimes in the same province and
sometimes far from home. Official Chinese government statistics
break down the total number of migrants into those who spent
less than half the year as migrants, i.e., those who spent less
than six months during the year away from their place of legal
residence (61 million in 2010), and those who spent more than
half the year as migrants (160 million in 2010).\48\ The
government estimates that over the next three decades, about
300 million people are expected to relocate to urban areas.\49\
As a marginalized urban group, migrant workers are often
abused, exploited, or placed in unsafe work conditions by
employers who take advantage of their insecure social position
and lower levels of education.\50\ Persistent discrimination
reportedly continues to adversely affect the social, civil, and
political rights of migrant workers.\51\
In 2011, migrant workers continued to face serious
challenges in the workplace, such as wage arrears and non-
payment of wages.\52\ They also lacked access to reliable
social insurance, specifically payments covering occupational
injuries and diseases.\53\ Many localities have expanded
efforts to provide migrants with social insurance coverage.
Figures from the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security indicated that, by mid-2011, 838 counties in 27
provinces and autonomous regions, as well as the four directly
administered municipalities, had launched what the State
Council has called the ``new-type rural social old-age
insurance pilots,'' covering 24 percent of the population in
these areas.\54\ A 2009 State Council document also provided
details on ways to make social insurance accounts transferable
as migrants move around the country.\55\ There still appear to
be significant problems in terms of participation (for both
employers and employees), coverage, and portability between
rural and urban areas.\56\ Migrant workers generally are able
to withdraw funds only from their individual accounts, losing
the larger percentage of their pensions that is paid by their
employers. With migrant workers facing uncertainty about
whether they will return to the same locale from one year to
the next to look for new work, and with the portability of
pension accounts highly restricted, some have chosen to
withdraw their pensions.\57\
Law on Social Insurance
The National People's Congress approved the PRC Law on
Social Insurance in October 2010, and it went into effect on
July 1, 2011.\58\ The law states that the Chinese government
will establish \59\ a system of basic old-age insurance,\60\
medical insurance,\61\ work-related injury insurance,\62\
unemployment insurance,\63\ and maternity insurance.\64\ It
specifies the respective responsibilities of employees and
employers to fund contributions for different insurance
programs. Under the law, both the employee and the employer,
for example, are required to contribute toward the basic
insurance funds for old-age pensions, medical care, and
unemployment benefits.\65\ For work-related injury and
maternity insurance, however, only the employer is responsible
for the contributions.\66\ The law also requires employers to
register employees with social insurance agencies within 30
days of hire,\67\ delineates the legal penalties for an
employer who fails to contribute the required funds within the
specified time limit,\68\ and grants social insurance agencies
the right to seek help from government administrative units--at
the county level or above--to request the transfer of funds
equal to the amount of missed payments from the appropriate
banking and financial institutions.\69\
One of the law's stated aims is to make social insurance
coverage ``sustainable,'' \70\ and the law specifies that
workers may transfer their accounts as they move from one
region to another. It explicitly states that ``rural residents
entering cities to work may participate in social insurance.''
\71\ In the cases of old-age and medical insurance, the law
seeks to enable their portability by stating that, for an
individual who travels from one region to another for work, his
or her basic old-age and medical insurance records ``will
transfer along with the individual,'' and the calculation of
his or her contributions will be ``cumulative.'' \72\ Once the
individual reaches retirement age, basic old-age insurance
benefits will be calculated by taking into account work
performed in all localities, but payments will be made in a
``unified'' way (i.e., no distinction between work done in
rural and urban areas).\73\ The law, however, states only that
``national coordination'' of old-age insurance pools and
``provincial coordination'' of the other four insurance pools
will be ``gradually implemented,'' leaving the ``specific time
frame [and] steps'' for the State Council to decide.\74\
Moreover, one foreign law firm pointed out that since the law
does not provide ``national united social insurance
contribution rates . . . employers would still need to refer to
the local regulations for contribution rates of the social
insurance schemes.'' \75\ At this point, the law's
effectiveness and ability to standardize and expand China's
social safety net remain unclear and implementation regulations
have yet to be issued.\76\
Wages
By the end of 2010, 30 provinces had reportedly raised
minimum wage levels by an average of 22.8 percent.\77\ Some
localities continued to establish higher levels of increases
thereafter.\78\ On March 1, 2011, Guangdong province announced
a four-tier minimum wage level chart, categorizing minimum wage
levels by region within the province.\79\ Authorities assigned
Guangzhou city, the provincial capital, a level of 1,300 yuan
(US$200) per month. Dongguan city, where many foreign-invested
factories are located, fell into the second category, with a
new minimum wage level of 1,100 yuan (US$170) per month. In
Shenzhen, effective April 1, 2011, the government raised the
minimum wage level by 20 percent, to 1,320 yuan (US$204) per
month, the highest in China.\80\ Other localities, such as
Shanghai municipality and Shandong province, also established
further increases.\81\ Reports indicate that some cities
proceeded to raise minimum wages because they struggled to
attract workers.\82\ Despite rising minimum wage levels,
however, reports also indicate that inflationary pressure
continued: Inflation stood at 5.4 percent in March 2011 \83\
and 5.5 percent in May 2011, with food prices rising by 11.7
percent.\84\
The PRC 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers
and requires local governments to set wage standards for each
region.\85\ The PRC Labor Contract Law improves formal
monitoring requirements by tasking local labor bureaus to
monitor labor practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage
standards.\86\ The law also imposes legal liability on
employers who pay rates below minimum wage.\87\ In addition,
the law guarantees minimum hourly wages for part-time
workers.\88\
Illegal labor practices, however, continue to undermine
minimum wage guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem,
especially for migrant workers.\89\ Subcontracting practices
within industry reportedly also exacerbate the problem of wage
arrearages. When investors and developers default on their
payments to construction companies, workers at the end of the
chain of labor subcontractors may lack the means to recover
wages from the original defaulters. Some subcontractors neglect
their own duties to pay laborers and leave workers without any
direct avenue to demand their salaries.\90\ The Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security, in conjunction with other
government agencies--including the Ministry of Public Security
and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission--reportedly formed a ``united investigative group''
and examined wage arrears problems in provincial-level areas
such as Tianjin, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Zhejiang,
Jiangxi, Liaoning, Guangxi, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.\91\
draft regulation on wages
In part to address official concern over the unequal
distribution of wealth across China and its potential effects
on ``social unrest,'' Chinese media sources indicated that the
Chinese government reportedly has assembled a ``basic
framework'' for a national regulation on wages.\92\ The
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) began
formulating the regulation in 2007, and officials reportedly
started soliciting comments and suggestions for a completed
draft in early 2009.\93\ Some media reports indicated that the
regulation would be approved sometime in 2010, though one
MOHRSS official later said that was never the case.\94\ It
appears that deliberations surrounding the pending regulation
likely will continue throughout 2011.\95\
Based on media reporting, the draft contains 10 sections,
including provisions that delineate the ``parameters for
collective contracts, collective consultations, and minimum
wages.'' \96\ In addition, the draft reportedly lays out
standards to determine minimum wage level increases, and
mandates certain enterprises to ``periodically and publicly
release average wage levels, increases, and bonuses''; \97\
requires that overtime compensation, time off given on days
with extreme temperatures, as well as various kinds of state
subsidies may not be factored into the calculation of wage
levels; \98\ calls upon provinces to consider local consumer
price indexes in setting minimum wage levels; \99\ and
establishes a ``normal increase mechanism'' to ``create a
system'' of collective wage consultations and ``open a
scientifically logical space for wage increases.'' \100\
Labor experts cited in Chinese media reports also commented
that the draft lacks clarity on certain points. For example, it
reportedly does not delineate whether or not employers will be
required to answer workers' demands for collective wage
negotiations, nor does it lay out the consequences for failing
to do so.\101\ One labor expert also supported the idea to
``link wage increases to the growth of enterprises,'' which
apparently was introduced in an earlier version of the
draft.\102\
Reportedly, the draft regulation attempts to bridge the
wealth gap with additional provisions such as requiring the
disclosure to both the government and the public of plans to
adjust salary levels and benefits within what one state-run
publication called ``monopolized industries.'' \103\ These so-
called ``monopolized industries'' (longduan qiye) refer to
state-owned enterprises in industries such as electricity,
telecommunications, insurance, and finance.\104\ Another
provision reportedly also would require these enterprises to
seek approval from three different government departments
before issuing bonuses or raises.\105\ One media report
suggested that these provisions have contributed to the delay
in the regulation's approval.\106\ One academic cited in the
same report stated that the draft's proposed ``interference
with or even control of wages through administrative methods
are not compatible with the trends of market economics.'' \107\
pressure to examine wage policies
In 2011, three developments continued to exert pressure on
Chinese officials at all levels to examine their policies on
wages: Labor shortages in certain areas, growing income
inequality, and the central government's acknowledgement of the
need to rebalance China's economy. During this reporting year,
the Commission monitored reports of labor shortages surfacing
in China's manufacturing centers, particularly in the south and
coastal areas.\108\ As early as 2006, the PRC State Council
Development Research Center found that 75 percent of the 2,749
villages surveyed in China ``no longer have young laborers to
move'' outward,\109\ and other reports also suggest that more
migrant workers are opting to pursue opportunities in their
home provinces.\110\ Such developments reportedly have
contributed to the upward pressure on wage levels and, combined
with other factors, have made some factory owners consider
moving their operations further inland or to Southeast Asian
countries in order to keep production costs competitive.\111\
At the same time, it has been pointed out that ``improved
productivity can pay for more than half of these wage
increases, while the other half can be passed in the form of
higher customer prices.'' \112\ Moreover, despite moderate
increases, wages actually have fallen for 22 straight years in
proportion to China's gross domestic product.\113\
The unequal distribution of wealth received much attention
in recent years. The National People's Congress and the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference featured this issue
prominently during their March 2010 meetings.\114\ In 2011, the
Chinese media continued to report on the growing gap between
the rich and the poor.\115\ The current ``income ratio among
China's eastern, central, and western regions'' is roughly
1.52:1:0.68.\116\ Moreover, the distribution has grown more
unequal over time, with rural areas lagging far behind the
urban regions.\117\ According to a November 2010 Chinese
report, the ratio of ``urban to rural income'' was 2.9:1 in
2001, 3.22:1 in 2005, and 3.31:1 in 2008.\118\ The difference
between the top and bottom 10 percent of China's income earners
has increased from a multiple of 7.3 in 1988 to 23 in
2009.\119\
Chinese officials have appeared more willing to openly
acknowledge that a higher consumption rate within China is an
important part of the government's efforts to rebalance the
country's economic development. The PRC Outline of the 12th
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development, for
example, noted that Chinese officials ``must be soberly aware
of the fact that the problems of lack of balance, lack of
coordination, and lack of sustainability in China's development
remain prominent'' and that the imbalance in the ``investment
and consumption relationship'' poses a challenge to the
country's future growth.\120\ More pointedly, Premier Wen
Jiabao has also described China's current growth model as
``unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.''
\121\ Although some experts have said that reforms can be done
in the short term via ``administrative fiat,'' such as
``mandatory wage hikes,'' any rebalancing efforts will be
difficult, as ``state-backed and private corporate sectors are
likely to protest reforms that threaten their margins, as will
these sectors' support bases associated with their interests,
such as the commerce ministry and the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology.'' \122\
Occupational Safety and Work Conditions
legal framework and developments
The PRC Law on Safe Production, which took effect in 2002,
delineates a set of guidelines to prevent workplace accidents
and to keep ``their occurrence at a lower level, ensuring the
safety of people's lives and property and promoting the
development of the economy.'' \123\ Specifically, the law
charges principal leading members of production and business
units to educate workers on safety issues and formulate rules
of operation; \124\ protects workers' right to have knowledge
of, speak up about, and address work safety issues; \125\ sets
forth trade unions' rights to pursue workers' complaints over
safety issues; \126\ tasks local governments at the county
level or above to inspect and handle violations and potential
dangers in a timely manner; \127\ and lays out the consequences
for non-compliance.\128\
Workers in China, however, continued to face persistent
occupational safety issues, especially those working in the
mining industry. On November 9, 2010, Zhang Mingqi, the Vice
Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, spoke to
reporters at the National Mining Industry Health and Safety
Experience Exchange Conference and stated that China had 18,128
reported cases of occupational-related illnesses in 2009, which
represented a 32 percent increase from the previous year.\129\
Of the 2009 cases, 14,495--about 80 percent--involved the lung
disease pneumoconiosis.\130\ The People's Daily has reported
that a total of 57,000 Chinese coal miners suffer from
pneumoconiosis annually, and more than 6,000 of them die from
the disease each year.\131\ Reportedly, ``pneumoconiosis is now
responsible for nearly three times as many deaths each year as
mine accidents.'' \132\
Miners are limited in their ability to promote safer
working conditions in part due to legal obstacles to
independent organizing. Collusion between mine operators and
local government officials reportedly remains widespread.\133\
Chinese authorities reportedly closed 1,600 small coal mines
with ``outdated facilities'' during the first 10 months of
2010.\134\ The State Administration of Work Safety issued a
directive in September 2010 requiring mine managers to spend
time in the shafts with workers in an effort to focus their
attention on safety issues; the directive also laid out
specific fines for managers who refused to do so.\135\ The
China Daily, however, reported that some managers skirted the
new requirements by handpicking ``people to be promoted to
`assistants to managers' and to accompany the miners'' in their
place.\136\
working conditions
Workplace abuses and poor working conditions remained a
persistent problem this reporting year. Allegations of unsafe
working environments, for example, continued to surface at
factories operated by Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned company that
manufactures electronic products. In July, a worker died after
falling from his dormitory at one of Foxconn's factory
complexes in southern China.\137\ The Commission reported last
year that more than 10 employees committed suicide in 2010,
reportedly as a result of the harsh working conditions at the
company's production plants.\138\ Workers often cited low
wages, forced overtime, military-style management, and social
isolation as some of the major problems that they face.\139\
Reports also indicated that some workers are also exposed to
chemicals known to be harmful.\140\ In May 2011, a blast at
Foxconn's factory in Chengdu city killed 3 people and injured
16 others; the families of the factory's workers complained at
the time that Foxconn management ``turned down'' their demand
for ``a list of dead and injured.'' \141\ Poor conditions and
other workplace abuses also surfaced at other factories,
including ``routine excessive overtime'' that averaged 120
hours per month, use of harmful chemicals, poor ventilation,
arbitrary calculation of wages, and mistreatment by
management.\142\ The Commission also observed one recently
published report detailing a past case involving Chinese
prisoners who, in addition to doing hard labor during the day,
were ``forced to play online games'' at night ``to build up
credits that prison guards would then trade for real money.''
\143\
workers compensation
One major problem facing injured workers or their family
members seeking to receive timely compensation is China's
``complicated and incredibly time consuming'' work-related
injury compensation procedure.\144\ Some cases reportedly can
last for decades.\145\ It is difficult to determine the total
number of cases in part because many cases never are reported
due to the complicated nature of the compensation process.\146\
Moreover, Chinese courts and doctors do not routinely recognize
some occupational diseases. While traumatic work injuries and
deaths have been widely recognized and reported, experts on
workers compensation litigation in China report failure to
diagnose diseases like silicosis and failure to recognize that
the condition may be caused by exposure to chemicals at
work.\147\ As a result, the extent of work-related diseases
like silicosis remains difficult to measure and report on and,
therefore, in many cases goes largely unrecognized.\148\
In January 2011, the State Council's revisions to the
Regulations on Work-Related Injury Insurance (Work Injury
Regulations) became effective.\149\ The revisions made 24
changes to the old Regulations, clarifying the definitions of
what constituted ``occupational injuries''; \150\ adding law
firms and accounting firms, among others, to the list of
contributors to the occupational injury insurance fund; \151\
and stating that in applications where ``the facts are clear''
and ``rights and obligations are apparent,'' the social
insurance administrative department shall render a decision
within 15 days of accepting the applications.\152\
In addition to the aforementioned Work Injury Regulations,
the PRC Law on Social Insurance, which went into effect in July
2011, also addressed the topic of work-related injury
insurance.\153\ It clarifies that the ``employing unit,'' not
the worker, is responsible for contributing to the work-related
injury insurance fund.\154\ The law states that the
contribution rates will be determined by the ``risk level'' of
each industry, as well as the number of workplace injury cases
that occur in that industry, and leaves the task of setting the
specific rate figures to the State Council.\155\ Though the
law's language maintains that workers are entitled to receive
work-related injury insurance benefits if their injuries or
illnesses are certified as work related and that certification
of such injuries should be ``straight-forward [and]
convenient,'' it does not provide a specific time requirement
for the certification process.\156\ The law does, however,
detail the types of expenses that may be paid with money from
the insurance fund. These may include, for example, a worker's
medical treatment and rehabilitation fees as well as food and
travel allowances if the worker obtains treatment outside of
the area where the injury took place.\157\
At this point, it is not clear to what extent the revisions
to the Work Injury Regulations or the new PRC Law on Social
Insurance will streamline the complicated and time-consuming
compensation processes for injured workers. Central government
directives have, in previous years, encouraged local
governments to pressure bereaved families into signing
compensation agreements and to condition out-of-court
compensation settlements on forfeiture by bereaved families of
their rights to seek further compensation through the court
system.\158\ Moreover, there have been reports of local
officials preempting class actions by prohibiting contact among
members of bereaved families in order to forestall
coordination.\159\
Child Labor
Child labor remained a problem in China during this
reporting year.\160\ As a member of the International Labour
Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions
on the elimination of child labor.\161\ The PRC Labor Law and
related legislation prohibit the employment of minors under 16
years old.\162\ Both national and local legal provisions
prohibiting child labor stipulate fines for employing
children.\163\ Under the PRC Criminal Law, employers and
supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for
forcing children to work under conditions of extreme
danger.\164\ Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have
dulled the effects of these legal measures. The extent of child
labor in China is unclear in part because the government does
not release data on child labor despite frequent requests by
the U.S. Government, other foreign governments, and
international organizations. One recent report by a global
risks advisory firm, however, suggests that China is rated as
``amongst those with the most widespread abuses of child
workers'' and estimates that there are ``between 10 to 20
million underage workers.'' \165\
Child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors
as well as small workshops and businesses, including textile,
toy, and shoe manufacturing enterprises.\166\ Many underage
laborers reportedly are in their teens, typically ranging from
13 to 15 years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the
education system and labor shortages of adult workers.\167\ In
March 2011, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that authorities in
Longgang district, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, rescued 40
children who were found working at a factory that manufactured
electronics.\168\ The children were reportedly between the ages
of 12 and 14, holders of ``fake identity cards'' that
apparently demonstrated that they were of legal working age,
and had worked there for at least three months for about five
yuan (US$0.77) an hour.\169\ In another case reflective of the
child labor problem, Apple acknowledged in February 2011 that,
in 2010, it had discovered 91 children under 16 years old
working in 10 ``Chinese factories owned by its suppliers''; in
contrast, in 2009, the company discovered only 11 such
cases.\170\ In the case of one factory that reportedly hired 42
of the children, Apple learned that the ``vocational school
involved in hiring the underage workers had falsified student
IDs and threatened retaliation against students who revealed
their ages during [Apple's] audits.'' \171\
The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of
child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat
it,\172\ permits ``work-study'' programs and activities that in
practical terms perpetuate the practice of child labor and are
tantamount to official endorsement of it.\173\ National
provisions prohibiting child labor provide that ``education
practice labor'' and vocational skills training labor organized
by schools and other educational and vocational institutes do
not constitute use of child labor when such activities do not
adversely affect the safety and health of the students.\174\
The PRC Education Law supports schools that establish work-
study and other programs, provided that the programs do not
negatively affect normal studies.\175\ These provisions
contravene China's obligations as a Member State to ILO
conventions prohibiting child labor.\176\ In 2006, the ILO's
Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and
Recommendations ``expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of
children under 18 years performing forced labor not only in the
framework of re-educational and reformative measures, but also
in regular work programs at school.'' \177\
Criminal Justice
Introduction
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese
government's failure to uphold legal protections for criminal
suspects and defendants, promote transparency of the judicial
process, and implement legal reforms highlighted ongoing
problems within the criminal justice system. Chinese public
security officials continue to contravene international
standards by detaining, interrogating, and investigating
criminal suspects without adequate due process protections.
Closed trial proceedings and unfair trial procedures continue
to contravene Chinese and international legal protections and
demonstrate the lack of an independent judiciary.
During the year, the Chinese government signaled its
resolve to protect what it deemed to be ``social stability''
through targeted crackdowns on rights advocates and continued
reliance on an array of arbitrary and extrajudicial detention
measures. In early 2011, Chinese public security officials
implemented a harsh crackdown on government critics and rights
advocates, including lawyers, bloggers, writers, and democracy
activists. In the months that followed, Chinese authorities
employed a range of illegal and arbitrary detention measures--
including home confinement and enforced disappearances--to
``maintain stability'' and silence rights advocates.
International human rights groups have called the 2011
crackdown one of the most severe in years.
Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression of Dissent
During this past year, the Commission observed reports of
Chinese law enforcement personnel engaged in a range of abuses
targeting human rights advocates, lawyers, writers, and their
families.\1\ These abuses included harassment, assault,
detention, kidnappings, and illegal surveillance.\2\ Reported
incidents of abuse increased during periods of heightened
official sensitivity. Beginning in February 2011, public
security officials and plainclothes security personnel
detained, harassed, ``disappeared,'' and placed under illegal
surveillance prominent rights defenders. The campaign appeared
related to official concern over protests in the Middle East
and North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-called
``Jasmine'' protests within China.\3\ By April 18, the non-
governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders
reported that public security officials had criminally detained
39 rights advocates and that more than 20 individuals remained
``disappeared.'' \4\ For example, Chinese police detained
Beijing-based lawyer Tang Jitian on February 16 after he
attended a meeting to discuss the ongoing ``soft detention'' of
the self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng.\5\ Beijing
police summoned and detained human rights lawyer and university
lecturer Teng Biao on February 19 before searching his
residence and confiscating property, including two computers,
politically themed books, and documentaries.\6\ In February,
the Guardian reported that five domestic security protection
officers allegedly beat human rights lawyer Liu Shihui after he
attempted to attend a planned protest in Guangzhou city,
Guangdong province.\7\ The Commission also noted increased
police abuses against rights defenders and advocates
surrounding other politically sensitive events, such as the
Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in December 2010 and the annual
meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference in March 2011.\8\ Such
arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of
expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association
contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well
as China's Constitution and domestic laws.\9\
Pretrial Detention and Prisons: Torture and Abuse in Custody
Although the Chinese government formally outlawed torture
in 1996 with amendments to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and
the PRC Criminal Law,\10\ torture and abuse by law enforcement
officers remain widespread. In November 2008, the UN Committee
against Torture (UNCAT) stated it ``remains deeply concerned
about the continued allegations . . . of routine and widespread
use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody,
especially to extract confessions or information to be used in
criminal proceedings.'' \11\ Although China objected to the
UNCAT report's findings in its November 2009 followup report,
in October 2010, UNCAT submitted a letter to the Chinese
government requesting clarification on issues including the
legal safeguards to prevent torture, the harassment of lawyers
and rights defenders, and the lack of statistical information
related to torture.\12\
During this reporting year, the Commission observed
multiple reports in which public security officials allegedly
employed various torture measures, including beatings, electric
shock, cigarette burnings, and sleep deprivation.\13\ In
January 2011, the Guardian reported on the December 2010 death
of local police chief Xie Zhigang in Benxi city, Liaoning
province, who reportedly died from a heart attack within a day
of his detention. Xie's wife disputed the police account and
claimed Xie died as a result of torture, stating, ``There were
bruises all over [Xie's] body, and deep scars on his wrist and
ankles. Five of his ribs were broken.'' \14\ In March 2011,
human rights lawyer Zhang Kai released a video of Qian Chengyu,
a witness to the murder of village leader and petitioner Qian
Yunhui. In the February 2011 video, Qian Chengyu described how
public security officials beat him for five hours and deprived
him of sleep for thirty hours and explained that the injuries
prevented him from standing for a month.\15\
In response to a spate of high-profile suspicious deaths
and increased public scrutiny since 2009, Chinese law
enforcement agencies reportedly have ordered an overhaul of
prisons and detention centers. In 2009 and 2011, Chinese
agencies released various guidelines intended to improve
oversight responsibilities and enhance supervision of detainees
in detention centers.\16\ In early 2011, the Ministry of Public
Security reportedly delivered a draft revision of the Detention
Regulations, the first revision since the Detention Regulations
were enacted in 1990.\17\ In February 2011, Xinhua reported
that in a nationwide campaign to improve oversight of detention
centers, prosecutors found 2,207 detention center ``bullies''
and prosecuted 123 suspected crimes.\18\ In a March 2011 China
News Weekly interview, Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator-General of
the Supreme People's Procuratorate, said that abnormal deaths
in recent years had ``exposed problems in prison administration
law enforcement'' and had resulted in reportedly ``thorough''
official investigations into prisons and detention centers.\19\
Arrest and Trial Procedure Issues
access to counsel
The right to legal counsel in criminal trials is not a
guaranteed legal right for all defendants in China, even though
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and the PRC Lawyers Law
provide guidelines for legal representation in criminal
trials.\20\ Chinese law grants all criminal defendants the
right to hire an attorney, but only guarantees legal defense if
the defendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or
is blind, deaf, or mute. Although the Chinese government has
increased funding for legal assistance in recent years, most
criminal defendants approach the legal system without access to
legal assistance. [For more information on developments in
China's legal aid system, see Section III--Access to Justice.]
This remains counter to provisions under Article 14(3)(d) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
grant the right to defend oneself in person or through legal
assistance.\21\
Chinese criminal defendants face two primary obstacles--
referred to on occasion as the ``two lows'' (liang di)--in
securing criminal defense counsel: The low rate of active
representation by lawyers in criminal cases and the low quality
of criminal defense.\22\ Most Chinese defendants confront the
criminal process without the assistance of an attorney.\23\
According to a February 2011 Beijing Review article, a
professor at China University of Political Science and Law
noted that 80 to 90 percent of criminal defendants in China are
unable to hire a lawyer.\24\ In addition, the higher proportion
of risks associated with criminal defense work--as compared
with those of civil and commercial work--continues to impact
the quality of criminal representation.\25\ In recent years,
lawyers have been illegally detained, criminally punished,
beaten, summoned, and disbarred for performing their legal
responsibilities.\26\
Chinese lawyers also remain vulnerable to prosecution under
Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law (commonly referred to as
the ``lawyer-perjury'' statute), a legal provision on evidence
fabrication that specifically targets criminal defense
attorneys.\27\ While harassment of lawyers takes many forms in
China, from prosecution for corruption to threats and physical
violence, a disproportionately high number of such cases
involve charges of evidence fabrication.\28\ Many evidence
fabrication cases are brought under Article 306, which makes it
a crime for defense attorneys or other defense agents to
``destroy or forge evidence, help any parties destroy or forge
evidence, or coerce or entice witnesses into changing their
testimony in defiance of the facts or giving false testimony.''
\29\ Because of the risks presented by Article 306, most
defense attorneys reportedly engage in passive defense: they
focus on finding flaws and weaknesses in the prosecutors'
evidence rather than actively collecting evidence or conducting
their own investigations.\30\ Chinese criminal defense lawyers
acknowledge that the threat of Article 306 of the PRC Criminal
Law--also commonly referred to as ``Big Stick 306''--gives
prosecutors ``unlimited power'' to intimidate lawyers and
derail criminal defense work.\31\
Specific cases involving Article 306 of the PRC Criminal
Law continued to be featured prominently in national Chinese
news and in ongoing debates over Article 306. In June 2011, for
instance, leading Chinese scholars and lawyers criticized the
high profile case against four criminal defense lawyers--Yang
Zaixin, Yang Zhonghan, Luo Sifang, and Liang Wucheng--in Beihai
city, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.\32\ The four criminal
defense attorneys were representing criminal suspect Pei Jinde,
accused in a murder trial, when the testimonies of three
defense witnesses challenged the prosecution's case.\33\
Authorities later detained the four attorneys on suspicion of
committing ``witness tampering'' under Article 306 and arrested
the defense witnesses, who were indicted on perjury charges. On
June 28, 2011, public security officials formally arrested
rights lawyer Yang Zaixin on suspicion of violating Article
306.\34\ The three remaining criminal defense lawyers were
reportedly released on bail pending trial on suspicion of
similar charges.\35\ In July 2011, China University of
Political Science and Law Professor Chen Guangzhong told
Oriental Outlook Magazine that the formal arrest of Yang Zaixin
was ``wrongful'' and that, based on disclosed information, the
four lawyers were fulfilling their professional
obligations.\36\ In July 2011, the Global Times, which operates
under the official People's Daily, reported that more than 30
unidentified persons attacked lawyers from Beijing municipality
and Shandong and Yunnan provinces who had travelled to Beihai
to represent lawyer Yang Zaixin.\37\ According to the Global
Times article, the assailants reportedly demanded the lawyers
not represent client Yang and that they leave immediately.\38\
Chinese legal scholars this past year continued to urge
revision of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which is reportedly
on the National People's Congress agenda, to address the
problem of Article 306 and other longstanding issues related to
criminal defense counsel. Such longstanding issues include the
commonly referred to ``three difficulties'' (san nan) of
criminal defense: Gaining access to detained clients, reviewing
the prosecutors' case files, and collecting evidence.\39\
Although authorities amended the 2008 PRC Lawyers Law to
address these issues, inconsistencies between the PRC Lawyers
Law and the 1997 PRC Criminal Procedure Law remain. In January
2011, several criminal defense lawyers, interviewed by the
Legal Weekly, expressed growing frustrations over limitations
within criminal defense work. In addition to the widely
discussed ``three difficulties,'' prominent Beijing criminal
defense lawyer Xu Lantang raised ``ten difficulties''--
including the difficulty of getting witnesses to appear in
court, the difficulty of getting a hearing for trial on appeal,
and the difficulty of participating in the death penalty review
process.\40\ According to the article, criminal defense
lawyers' primary obstacle is having innocence claims accepted
by people's courts.\41\ A January 2011 Legal Daily article said
that the challenges to successfully representing criminal
defendants have led to a decline in the rate of legal
representation of criminal defendants in China.\42\
fairness of criminal trials
Chinese lawyers and criminal defendants continue to face
numerous obstacles in ensuring the application of the right to
a fair trial. Although judicial independence is enshrined in
the 1997 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, Chinese judges regularly
receive political guidance on pending cases, including
instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the
Communist Party.\43\ Closed trials, undue political influence,
and a lack of transparency in judicial decisionmaking remain
commonplace within the justice system. For criminal suspects
that reach the trial stage, the likelihood of a guilty verdict
is great. According to 2010 official statistics from the
Supreme People's Court, the conviction rate for criminal cases
was 98.12 percent.\44\ Chinese officials routinely sentence
defendants in trials that fall far short of fair trial
standards set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.\45\
During this reporting year, the Commission has observed
several notable cases in which Chinese judicial authorities
failed to provide transparency and uphold defendants' fair
trial rights in accordance with domestic and international law.
In March 2011, for instance, the Suining Intermediate People's
Court in Sichuan province sentenced democracy advocate Liu
Xianbin, a signatory to Charter 08 (a treatise advocating
political reform and human rights), to 10 years' imprisonment
for ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \46\ Authorities
reportedly denied Liu access to a lawyer for months, which
appeared to contravene protections in the PRC Lawyers Law.\47\
[For more information about Liu Xianbin, see Section III--
Institutions of Democratic Governance.] In August 2011, the
Chaoyang District People's Court in Beijing city tried rights
advocate Wang Lihong for ``creating a disturbance'' in
connection with her role in organizing a protest outside of a
Fujian province courthouse on April 16, 2010.\48\ It was not
until March 2011, nearly 12 months after the protest, that
Chinese authorities criminally detained Wang.\49\ At Wang's own
trial in August, Wang's criminal defense lawyer, Han Yicun,
maintained that the trial was ``unfair,'' since the judge
interrupted Wang's final statement and did not permit defense
attorney Han to finish his defense statement.\50\ In addition,
the criminal defense attorneys were unable to photocopy court
documents or present arguments before the indictment.\51\ In
September, the court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison
for ``creating a disturbance.'' \52\ Additionally, in the past
year, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention released
Opinion No. 15/2011, which found that the December 2009
criminal case against prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo ``was
organized in [a] way which constitutes a breach of fairness.''
\53\
In June 2010, two regulations took effect that prohibit
convictions based on illegally obtained evidence.\54\ According
to a November 2010 Oriental Outlook Weekly article, however,
fewer than 20 percent of lawyers surveyed had used the
regulations, and many alleged that the regulations lacked
enforceability.\55\ In January 2011, a Procuratorial Daily
article addressed the reasons behind enforcement obstacles and
why the implemented guidelines lack force.\56\ The article
noted that the evidence regulations ``possess their own
inherent flaws,'' ``easily result in different
interpretations,'' and suffer from the prejudices of judicial
officials.\57\
Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders
Amid a broad crackdown against human rights advocates that
began in February 2011, authorities in Beijing municipality and
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, detained at least five
prominent human rights lawyers in late February or early March
2011, including Teng Biao, Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, and
Tang Jingling.\58\ Chinese officials detained other human
rights lawyers, such as Li Fangping and Li Xiongbing, for
briefer periods in April and May 2011.\59\ In at least some
instances, authorities required those released to sign
``letters of guarantee.'' \60\ According to one unnamed human
rights lawyer, the ``letters'' required that those released
guarantee not to commit certain acts, including criticizing the
Communist Party, participating in training by overseas
organizations, and communicating with overseas
organizations.\61\ As a result, released human rights lawyers
declined to speak to the media about their detentions.\62\
The following are examples from the past year of official
mistreatment of Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders.
In February 2011, security officials in
Shandong province reportedly beat self-trained legal
advocate Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing. The
reported beatings followed the couple's covert
recording of video footage in which they described the
official surveillance, intimidation, harassment, and
abuse their family has endured since Chen's release
from prison after serving his full sentence on
September 9, 2010.\63\
In April 2011, Beijing-based human rights
lawyer Jin Guanghong disappeared amid a number of
apparently politically motivated disappearances.\64\
After a Beijing psychiatric hospital reportedly
released Jin 10 days later, he was in an ``extremely
weak physical and mental state.'' \65\ Jin alleged he
was beaten and vaguely recalled receiving injections
while tied to a bed.\66\ He was unable to fully recall
the circumstances surrounding his detention.\67\ In
recent years, Jin had defended a member of the banned
Falun Gong spiritual movement in Guangzhou city,
Guangdong province, and had participated on the legal
defense team in a high-profile 2010 criminal defamation
case in Fujian province.\68\ [For more information on
conditions for Falun Gong practitioners, see Section
II--Freedom of Religion--Falun Gong.]
In April 2011, public security officials in
Beijing detained housing rights advocate and former
lawyer Ni Yulan on suspicion of ``creating a
disturbance.'' \69\ The criminal detention of Ni and
the disappearance of her husband followed months of
police harassment, which included surveillance and
disruptions in their electricity, water, and Internet
services.\70\ Ni is confined to a wheelchair reportedly
due to chronic medical conditions and alleged official
torture suffered over the past decade.\71\
In 2011, Chinese authorities have continued to pressure
human rights lawyers who take on sensitive cases by denying
annual professional license renewals during the ``annual
inspection and assessment process'' (niandu jiancha kaohe),
which justice departments throughout the country completed in
July 2011.\72\ Lawyers that participate in politically
``sensitive'' cases--including those involving workers' rights,
religious freedom, and political reform--frequently fail to
have their professional licenses renewed during the annual
assessment.\73\ As of mid-July 2011, justice departments failed
to renew the professional licenses of at least four human
rights lawyers, including Liu Xiaoyuan, Cheng Hai, Li Jinglin,
and Li Baiguang.\74\ In July 2011, a Caijing article reported
that some lawyers viewed the annual assessment system as a
``tool to suppress disobedient lawyers.'' \75\ The article
claimed that prominent rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan failed to
pass the 2011 ``annual inspection and assessment process'' as a
result of offending officials.\76\ In a subsequent posting on
his personal blog, however, Liu denied offending any
individuals prior to failing to have his professional license
renewed.\77\
The whereabouts and condition of prominent human rights
lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who angered Chinese authorities by
exposing human rights abuses and representing marginalized
citizens and religious practitioners, remain unknown. Weeks
after reportedly reappearing publicly in late March 2010, Gao
``disappeared'' again in mid-April 2010.\78\ In January 2011,
the Associated Press released information from an April 2010
interview with Gao in which he confirmed being tortured
extensively during detention.\79\ In February 2011, Freedom
Now, a U.S.-based non-governmental organization that represents
individual prisoners of conscience, publicly released a
November 2010 statement from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention in which the UN agency demanded the Chinese
government ``proceed to an immediate release of [Gao] and
provide for reparation of the harm caused as a result of his
situation.'' \80\
Arbitrary Detention
Arbitrary detention in China takes many forms and continues
to be widely used by Chinese authorities to quell local
petitioners, government critics, and rights advocates. Among
the forms of arbitrary extralegal and illegal detention are:
``enforced disappearances'';
``soft detention'' (ruanjin), a range of
extralegal controls under which individuals may be
subjected to home confinement, surveillance, restricted
movement, and limitations on contact with others;
reeducation through labor, an administrative
detention of up to four years for minor offenses;