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**IRAQ: THE TRANSITION FROM
A MILITARY MISSION TO
A CIVILIAN-LED EFFORT**

A REPORT
TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, January 31, 2011.

DEAR COLLEAGUES: This will be a year of unprecedented transition for the United States in Iraq as we move from a military-led mission to a civilian-led effort. The diplomatic mission that results will be of extraordinary size and complexity and it will assume security responsibilities in a still-dangerous environment. The stakes are high, not just for our civilian personnel, but for American foreign policy in the Middle East. While Iraq has made dramatic progress in recent years, the situation remains fragile and potentially reversible. The success of our diplomatic mission there will be an important factor in whether Iraq emerges from years of turmoil as a strategic partner or turns toward Iran. This report by the majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sheds new light on this important topic and offers a number of policy recommendations. The report's central message—that our government needs to make sure our objectives in Iraq are aligned with both our civilian capacities and a financial commitment to succeed—will be vital as we face a similar transition in Afghanistan in the years to come.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KERRY,
Chairman.

IRAQ: THE TRANSITION FROM A MILITARY MISSION TO A CIVILIAN-LED EFFORT

PART ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the U.S. military presence is withdrawn from Iraq, civilians, rather than soldiers, are likely to write the last chapter of the American war effort there. There is much encouraging news: There has been a remarkable transformation since sectarian war threatened state collapse in 2006 and 2007. A permanent government is finally in place. While the negotiations to form this government spanned most of 2010, the Iraqi leaders' commitment to the political process over violence has helped sustain hard fought security gains.

But these advances remain fragile, uneven, and potentially reversible. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups continue their efforts to foment violence and sectarian strife. The nine months it took to form the new government is evidence that Iraq's political processes are not yet self-sustaining. Fundamental political issues remain unresolved, from the hydrocarbon laws, to Kirkuk and other disputed internal boundaries, to the nature of Iraqi federalism. While Iraq has the potential to become a wealthy country, it faces a difficult fiscal environment until at least 2014 when increased oil production is projected to begin coming online.

The transition in the coming year from a military to a civilian mission will be critical to the United States' broader interests in the Middle East. It will test the sustainability of the progress made in recent years. It will be an indicator of United States' commitment to the bilateral partnership. And it will have a significant bearing on Iraq's place in the regional security architecture.

By December 2011, in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement, the American military is scheduled to withdraw its remaining 50,000 troops.¹ The diplomatic mission that remains will be an initiative of unprecedented size and complexity, currently projected to consist of some 17,000 individuals on 15 different sites, including 3 air hubs, 3 police training centers, 2 consulates, 2 embassy branch offices, and 5 Office of Security Cooperation sites.

But even though the new mission must attain full operational capability by October 2011 to facilitate a smooth transition, fundamental questions remain unanswered. The State Department is scheduled to assume full security responsibilities in a still dan-

¹The U.S. military effort peaked in November 2007 with some 170,000 troops. Today, there are about 50,000 troops present, in addition to 75,000 contractors, most of them third country nationals.

gerous and unpredictable environment and must strike a difficult balance between maintaining a robust presence and providing a sufficient level of security. In almost any scenario, the United States will continue to have military personnel stationed at the American embassy in a non-combat role under the Office of Security Cooperation. As in many countries around the world, these troops will be responsible for enhancing the bilateral defense relationship by facilitating security assistance. But the size, scope, and structure of this presence remain undetermined, even at this late date. Perhaps most significantly, it is unclear what kind of security relationship the incoming Iraqi Government would like with the United States.

In the wake of such uncertainties, a complicated diplomatic plan has emerged that highlights a dilemma that will likely confront the nation for as long as counterinsurgency warfare and state-building are central components of American foreign policy: How can the State Department effectively operate in difficult security environments without the support of the American military?

The U.S. Government should ensure that the scope of the mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available, including State Department capacity, the financial commitment from Congress, a degree of U.S. military support and the backing of the Iraqi Government. If these elements are not fully in place, the administration may be forced to choose between scaling back the diplomatic mission or accepting a degree of physical risk familiar to military personnel, but normally unacceptable for diplomats. Because this is a difficult and unappealing choice, this report will examine how elements of the transition can be aligned with U.S. diplomatic goals to increase the likelihood of success. Two Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members visited Iraq to examine the military-to-civilian transition in detail. These are their principle findings:

First, it is unclear whether the State Department has the capacity to maintain and protect the currently planned diplomatic presence without U.S. military support. Among the planned satellite offices are consulates in Basra and Irbil and smaller branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul. There is no doubt about these cities' strategic importance. But given the ongoing security challenges in Iraq and the immense manpower the military brings to bear, maintaining an American diplomatic presence without military support will cost hundreds of millions of dollars to set up, cost even more to operate, and have large "tooth-to-tail" ratios. The consulates will require a combined security and life support staff of roughly 1,400 to sustain about 120 functional personnel, whereas the branch offices will require more than 600 staff to support 30 functional personnel—a ratio of 20 to 1.²

If a vigorous regional presence is necessary to support Iraq's stability, a mechanism for a continued but restricted follow-on military presence should be considered to help secure American dip-

²According to State Department officials, the branch offices are projected to cost about \$350 million apiece to set up. The embassy branch office in Kirkuk is also scheduled to house an Office of Security Cooperation site which will include about 100 functional staff, as well as about 300 additional security and life support personnel.

lomats. But it is not yet clear that the Iraqi Government desires such an arrangement on terms compatible with American interests.

Second, uncertainty about the nature of the U.S. military presence in Iraq after 2012 is complicating all other aspects of transition planning. The transition's most important element also remains its biggest unknown. Although the new Iraqi Government is publicly signaling that it will not seek to renegotiate the terms of the security agreement, the door is still open for a limited follow-on U.S. military presence. Clarity is needed on what this presence will look like and how it will integrate into the larger diplomatic mission. The authors have identified three distinct possibilities for the U.S.-Iraq security relationship beyond 2011. Each involves significant tradeoffs, but only the first two may be politically palatable to the new Iraqi Government.

- *Total drawdown of U.S. troops:* A full military withdrawal in 2011, except for a limited Office of Security Cooperation housed within the embassy, would confirm the United States as true to its word (an essential message to deliver throughout the region) and it would force Iraq to take full responsibility for its own affairs. However, security and political gains could be jeopardized with the full exit of American forces. In this scenario, given the prohibitive costs of security and the capacity limitations of the State Department, the United States should consider a less ambitious diplomatic presence in Iraq.
- *Expanded Office of Security Cooperation:* The United States maintains, on a temporary basis, an expanded Office of Security Cooperation that includes a limited number of non-combat military forces functioning in a reduced capacity under the State Department's purview. They provide logistical support for the Iraqi army, shore up administrative gaps within the Ministry of Defense, and provide "behind the wire" capabilities to better enable the State Department to sustain its proposed mission. Although new funding authorities would need to be negotiated between the State and Defense Departments and approved by Congress, the limited military presence would augment the State Department's ability to execute its current plan in Iraq.
- *New security agreement:* The United States negotiates a new security agreement to allow a limited and temporary U.S. troop presence to include the support described above as well as a continuing partnership with the Iraqi military to conduct select counterterrorism operations, and to sustain the nascent security cooperation between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga throughout the disputed internal boundaries. This approach should only be considered if it comes at Iraq's request within parameters consistent with American interests, which may be unlikely given the current posture of the newly formed government. It risks reinforcing the notion of the United States as an occupying power and would elicit political and popular opposition in both the United States and Iraq. In this scenario, the State Department, although still responsible for significant facets of diplomatic security, would be substantially aided by the continued but limited presence of the U.S. military.

Third, bureaucratic integration between the Departments of Defense and State remains incomplete, and the unity of effort in Baghdad has not yet been matched in Washington. Under the direction of Ambassador Jim Jeffrey and General Lloyd Austin, an effective partnership has been fostered between the embassy leadership team and the senior officers on the ground. But the supporting bureaucracy has not matched that cohesiveness. For example, according to military and civilian personnel in Iraq, it is easier to transfer critical “non-excess” equipment from the military to a third country than it is to the State Department. While the U.S. military has a pressing need for helicopters, including in Afghanistan, it is not in the taxpayers’ interest for the State Department to purchase new helicopters and ship them to Iraq if more suitable ones are already in country. There appear to be tensions within the State Department between those bureaus responsible for conducting the ambitious diplomatic strategy and those responsible for securing and supporting them. Embassy security personnel need to be empowered to face risks rationally and creatively, and protected from second-guessing from Washington that produces risk-aversion.

Fourth, a creative and sustainable funding mechanism is needed to pay for the diplomatic mission in Iraq. Congressional support has been undermined by a constrained fiscal environment and war fatigue. Yes, there are significant unanswered questions about what kind of presence the United States will have in Iraq post-2011. But regardless of whether the U.S. military withdraws as scheduled or a smaller successor force is agreed upon, the State Department will take on the bulk of responsibility for their own security. Therefore, Congress must provide the financial resources necessary to complete the diplomatic mission. Consideration should be given to a multiple-year funding authorization for Iraq programs, including operational costs (differentiated from the State Department’s broader operational budget), security assistance, and economic assistance programs. The price tag will not be cheap—perhaps \$25–30 billion over 5 years—but would constitute a small fraction of the \$750 billion the war has cost to this point.

PART TWO: CURRENT CONDITIONS IN IRAQ

The situation in Iraq is at a critical juncture. Terrorist and insurgent groups are less active but still adept; the Iraqi army continues to develop but is not yet capable of deterring regional actors; and strong ethnic tensions remain along Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries. Although a government has finally been formed, it remains to be seen how cohesive and stable it will be.

Threat assessment: Violence has been reduced by more than 90% since peaking in early 2007.³ After an upward spike in the third quarter of 2010—and notwithstanding horrific episodes such as the October 31st Al-Qaeda in Iraq attack against a Catholic church in Baghdad in which dozens of hostages were killed—the number of Iraqi civilians killed in violent attacks declined every month between the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31 and

³See Appendix III.

December.⁴ American combat fatalities are down from an average of 75 a month between 2004 and 2007 to an average of five a month in 2010. A number of insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq are still capable of violent attacks, but they are generally diminished in strength and many have begun the process of political assimilation.⁵

Despite the encouraging trend, the U.S. embassy and certain satellite sites, such as the forward operating base outside Mosul, are under daily threat from mortar and rocket fire. January 2011 was a relatively bad month, with as many as 159 Iraqis killed in a single week, but it remains to be seen whether this level of violence will be sustained. Al-Qaeda in Iraq remains the country's most dangerous terrorist organization, although the pace of its high-profile attacks has slowed considerably. Joint engagements by Iraqi and U.S. Special Operations Forces killed at least 34 of its 42 top leaders in 2010. But its remaining fighters, estimated to be 95% Iraqi, are well-trained and dedicated insurgents. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups do not currently constitute an existential threat to Iraq's political order. But continued political instability could provide them the opportunity to rejuvenate, especially in the absence of constant pressure and an integrated intelligence effort.

Iraqi security capacity: The withdrawal of the U.S. military from population centers in June 2009 left the Iraqi forces in control of all eighteen provinces. To their credit, they have withstood significant security tests, from the drawdown of over 100,000 U.S. forces to the March 2010 parliamentary elections and the ongoing government formation process that followed.

As a result of an earlier American focus on force generation, the Iraqi army has been the fastest growing professional military in the world over the past several years.⁶ More recently, efforts have shifted towards developing specialization, professionalism, and the administrative capability throughout the military and police. Despite great strides, the ability of the Iraqi forces to operate without the support of a robust U.S. presence remains unknown.

Complicating matters, Iraq's political leadership may not fully appreciate how integral U.S. military support is to buttressing the Iraqi army's basic capabilities. In large part operating behind the scenes, American troops still provide critical administrative and logistical functions, skills the Iraqi forces have yet to master.

The U.S. military has developed metrics known as "minimal essential capabilities" to measure the Iraqi security forces' foundational effectiveness at independently providing internal secu-

⁴According to the Iraqi Health, Defense and Interior Ministries, the violent death totals for the last five months are: December: 89 civilians + 62 Iraqi security forces (ISF); November: 105 civilians + 66 ISF; October: 120 civilians + 65 ISF; September: 185 civilians + 88 ISF; August: 295 civilians + 131 ISF. Source: multiple Reuters and Associated Press stories. By way of comparison, during the worst spasms of sectarian violence in late 2006 and early 2007, Iraqi civilians died at a rate of more than 100 per day.

⁵In addition to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, notable Sunni insurgent groups include Jaysh al-Islami, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al Naqshabandia, Hamas al-Iraq, and the Mujahidin Army. Active Shi'a groups include the Promised Day Brigade, Muqtada al-Sadr's movement, and Kata'ib Hizbollah. Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," June 2010, p 28.

⁶As of October 2010, the Iraqi security forces stood at approximately 645,000, of which 247,000 are Ministry of Defense forces and 398,000 Ministry of Interior forces.

rity and defending against external threats. Alarming deficiencies are projected beyond 2011, which will have a serious impact on the State Department's ability to provide its own force-protection:⁷

- The Ministry of Defense is deficient in its ability to maintain and support the armed forces. Although the Iraqi military has developed into a competent counterinsurgency force, the logistics, training, and maintenance requirements that contribute to its sustainment will potentially go unfulfilled without U.S. military assistance.
- The army and air force lack the full conventional ability to defend Iraq's borders against external threats. Although Iraq does not currently face a conventional threat, it cannot yet deter its neighbors from interfering in domestic politics.
- Iraq's skillful counterterrorism force is likely to become less capable because it still relies on the United States to integrate intelligence.
- The U.S. military presence is the glue that holds together nascent cooperation between the Iraqi army and Kurdish peshmerga. Without U.S. troops to resolve disputes and foster relations, the situation could deteriorate, leaving the country with two separate heavily armed security forces at odds over contentious political issues.

Arab/Kurdish security: Unresolved political tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdish regional government remain a threat to Iraq's long-term stability. In an effort to manage these tensions, the U.S. military established Combined Security Mechanisms beginning in 2009, in which Arabs, Kurds, and Americans operate checkpoints and conduct joint patrols in four provinces along the Arab-Kurd trigger line (Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala). The effort has reduced tensions and put in place lines of communication in case of a breakdown. However, it remains to be seen if this architecture can be sustained after the U.S. military withdrawal, absent progress towards resolving the underlying political disputes between Irbil and Baghdad.

The United States has also pushed for the integration of the Kurdish peshmerga into the Iraqi security forces. Prime Minister Maliki announced in April 2010 the formation of four unified peshmerga regional guard brigades which theoretically will report to Baghdad, and laid out plans to train and equip eight additional units in hopes of forming two Iraqi army divisions within Kurdish provinces.

Politics: All of Iraq's major constituencies participate, at least grudgingly, in the Iraqi political order. But fundamental questions remain about the make-up of the Iraqi state, including the nature of Iraqi federalism, the final disposition of the disputed internal boundaries, the organization of Iraq's energy sector, and the political reintegration of the Sunni Arabs. The contentious nine-month period of government formation indicates that Iraq's political processes are not yet self-sustaining.

⁷ Based on discussions in Baghdad with U.S. military and embassy officials and Iraqi military officials. See also Appendix II.

Mistrust between political factions remains high, sectarian wounds have not fully healed, and decisions to forgo violence in favor of the political process may still be reversible. The integration of the Sons of Iraq—comprised mostly of former Sunni insurgents—into the army and local governments remains uneven. Should the new government break down along sectarian lines, Sunni extremist groups may have an opening to lure back former fighters into the insurgency.

Bilateral agreements: The U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relationship is delineated in two accords that were negotiated in tandem and signed by the Bush administration in November 2008: the strategic framework agreement and the security agreement.

The strategic framework agreement is an aspirational document intended to broaden the U.S. partnership with Iraq beyond security. Although short on detail and non-binding, the agreement provides a template for normalizing the bilateral relationship in areas such as economic, cultural, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The security agreement is the legal framework that dictates the terms of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. It contains two significant milestones. First, it required U.S. combat troops to withdraw from Iraqi population centers by June 30, 2009. Second, it obligates all U.S. forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. Any changes to the agreement would require the consent of the Iraqi Government and parliamentary ratification.

On August 31, the U.S. military formally ended Operation Iraqi Freedom and began Operation New Dawn, dedicated to three distinct functions: train, equip, and advise the Iraqi military; continue counterterrorism operations; and protect U.S. diplomatic initiatives.⁸

PART THREE: AN AMBITIOUS TRANSITION

Already the largest in the world, the American diplomatic mission in Iraq will expand further as the State Department takes on full responsibility for its own security. But time for planning is short, as the new mission must attain full operational capability by October 2011.

The embassy compound will continue to be the center of American diplomatic gravity. But it will be supported by a planned 15 satellite sites across the country: three air hubs, three police training centers, two consulates, two embassy branch offices, and five Office of Security Cooperation sites. Roughly 17,000 individuals are expected to be under “chief of mission authority,” mostly third-country nationals working as life-support and security contractors. The number of American diplomats in Iraq is projected to remain at roughly 650, with an additional several hundred functional staff posted at the embassy from a variety of other government agencies, including USAID and the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture.

As of December, land use agreements had not been signed and construction had not begun at the satellite sites. The size and char-

⁸The August 31 transition is not included in the security agreement, but was outlined by President Obama in his February 27, 2009 speech on Iraq at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

acter of the Office of Security Cooperation has not been determined. The transfer from the military to the embassy of sensitive materiel has not been completed. Thousands of critical life-support and security personnel contractors need to be vetted and hired.

In an April 7, 2010 letter sent to his counterpart at the Department of Defense, Undersecretary of State for Management Patrick Kennedy highlighted the magnitude of the challenge:

Secure ground and air movements within Iraq, essential to DOS' current and proposed provincial presence, are now possible only because of U.S. military capabilities and availability of support. Without such support in the future, DOS will be forced to redirect its resources towards obtaining and supporting less-appropriate vehicles and airframes to allow the [branch offices and consulates] to function in an insecure environment. We will continue to have a critical need for logistical and life support of a magnitude and scale of complexity that is unprecedented in the history of the Department of State. [State] does not have within its Foreign Service cadre sufficient experience and expertise to perform necessary contract oversight.

Connecting the satellite sites will be a contractor-operated air wing, operated by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.⁹ A fixed-wing component of four turboprop aircraft, which seat roughly fifty passengers, will transport officials across international borders and between Baghdad, Basrah, and Irbil. Unlike diplomats from some other nations, U.S. Government personnel are generally prohibited from arriving via commercial aircraft at Baghdad International Airport, significantly increasing transportation costs. Instead, they are flown in on military aircraft, landing within the commercial terminal's sight line. Beginning this year, they will enter the country on the embassy's air-wing.

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs plans to augment its current rotary-wing fleet of 14 UH-1N Twin Huey helicopters, with 20 Sikorsky S-61 helicopters and four more UH-1Ns, operating out of the three air hubs.¹⁰ State Department requested in writing 24 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters from the Defense Department, which are faster, carry more passengers and were already in theater. The Defense Department never formally responded. The rotary-wing fleet is theoretically capable of moving several hundred passengers a day, though this tempo may be hard to sustain in practice.

As reported by the Commission on Wartime Contracting, an independent legislative commission created by Congress, the State Department has identified fourteen military functions that will be

⁹Although both run by Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the police training program and air wing will be operationally separate. INL developed its air transportation capacity during its Latin America training and drug interdiction programs in the 1990s, and now has a worldwide fleet of about 230 fixed and rotary wing aircraft. But this will be its most complex operation.

¹⁰INL also operates a small number of MD-530 helicopters in Baghdad for surveillance and ground movement air support.

lost once the U.S. military is gone from Iraq.¹¹ The State Department is looking to reproduce limited versions of many of these functions through security contractors. But there are roles that a diplomatic mission is not capable of replacing. The U.S. military's strategic over-watch function in Iraq provides a deterrent to armed militia groups, demonstrates American resolve, and bolsters the political order.

The capacity of the diplomatic effort depends in large part on the short-term U.S. military footprint and the budget and bureaucratic support the embassy receives from Washington. The administration must be willing to make tough choices to ensure strategic goals are in line with realities on the ground and available resources.

REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

By October, the Embassy will transition from 16 provincial reconstructions teams down to four regional posts—permanent consulates in Basrah and Irbil and shorter-term embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul.

The provincial reconstruction teams have been a cost-effective enterprise, with the military providing security, logistics and transportation support. Peaking at 31 teams in 2008, the teams have interacted with provincial and sub-provincial political leaders, and been a focal point of such diplomatic initiatives as outreach to the Sons of Iraq, efforts to manage Arab-Kurdish tensions, and interactions with the Shiite religious establishment. While the State Department originally contemplated five to seven provincial sites, the rapidly rising cost estimates have reduced the number to four, leaving engagement outposts in Najaf, Ramadi, and Baquba unfilled.

In comparison to the provincial reconstruction teams, the successor sites will have reduced functional staffs, smaller operational radii, and no funding for discretionary projects. Three of the four—Basrah, Kirkuk and Mosul—will be located in dangerous locales. As the U.S. military withdraws from these locations, it will take much of its local situational awareness with it, the product of relationships cultivated over seven years.¹² Similarly, the branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul will have little capacity for sustaining

¹¹ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Report 3, July 12, 2010: "Better planning for Defense-to-State transition in Iraq needed to avoid mistakes and waste." <http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/reports>. The fourteen lost military functions are:

- Recovering killed and wounded personnel
- Recovering damaged vehicles
- Recovering downed aircraft
- Clearing travel routes
- Operations center monitoring of private security contractors
- Private security contractor inspection and accountability services
- Convoy security
- Explosive-ordnance disposal
- Counter rocket, artillery and mortar notification
- Counter-battery neutralization response
- Communications support
- Tactical-operations center dispatch of armed response teams
- Policing Baghdad's international zone
- Maintaining electronic counter-measures, threat intelligence, and technology capabilities.

¹²The observations in this section are based upon discussions with civilian and military officials in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Washington. The authors visited Kirkuk in November 2010, and visited Kirkuk and Mosul in November 2009.

the Combined Security Mechanisms, a key element of the current strategy to manage Arab-Kurdish tensions in disputed areas, which are currently supported by several thousand American troops.

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs will take over the police-training program from the U.S. military, based on a hub-and-spoke system. Approximately 190 police trainers will be based at Baghdad, Basrah and Irbil, from which they can deploy to approximately 25 field locations.¹³ Iraq now runs its own police training academies. So rather than classroom training, the program will focus on advising and mentoring the local and national police leadership, as well as supporting the Ministry of Interior and focusing on specialized disciplines such as forensics and prosecution.

While the U.S. military has begun reconfiguring existing sites as part of the military withdrawal, real estate agreements could not be formally negotiated until the new government was in place. With the consulates and branch offices becoming fully operational by October 2011, the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations has been left with precious little margin for error.

There is cause for concern that the Defense Department has not yet finalized planning on the structure of the Office of Security Cooperation and how its activities will integrate into the larger diplomatic mission, including decisions on its size, locations, lines of funding, and force protection. Current plans call for a central hub in Baghdad; four fully staffed auxiliary posts; and an undetermined number of "spokes" throughout the country. Each site will serve as a base for distinct training, maintenance, and logistical missions to improve Iraqi defense capabilities.¹⁴ More than 200 permanent military and civilian staff will be augmented by a still undetermined, but steadily increasing number of skilled contractors (currently estimated somewhere in the range of 800), supplemented by perhaps 3,000 or more life-support and security contractors. But it is unclear whether the Office will use the embassy's air wing or contract its own helicopters, which could have significant consequences for the larger diplomatic mission.

The period immediately after the military withdrawal may be especially sensitive, as extremist groups test the new defenses and attempt to demonstrate their own relevance. Current planning calls for 5,500 security contractors to be employed by the State Department in Iraq, roughly double the current number and not including the Office of Security Cooperation.¹⁵ Roughly four thousand of

¹³The Baghdad hub will hold roughly 110 trainers at Forward Operating Base Shield east of the Tigris River, near a large Iraqi Government complex which houses the Ministry of Interior and several other important government ministries. The Basrah and Irbil hubs will be contained on the same compounds that house the consulates and will be home to roughly 45 and 25 trainers, respectively.

¹⁴As of November 2010, USF-I planned posts in Balad, Taji, Besmaya, and Umm Qasr with additional "spokes" in Tikrit, Taji, Ali Air Base, and Kirkuk. At these locations, training, maintenance, and operations will occur on equipment including F-16 Aircraft, M1A1 Tanks, T-6A Training Aircraft, UH-1H Huey Helicopters, Armored Vehicles, M113 Armored Personnel Carriers, and OH-58 Helicopters.

¹⁵Though the numbers remain in flux, current plans call for about 600 guards in Irbil, 575 in Baghdad, 335 each in Kirkuk and Mosul, and about 3,650 in Baghdad. Most of State's security contractors, both perimeter and movement, will be hired through the Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract, the successor to the current Worldwide Personal Protective Security (WPPS II) contract. However, some of the specialized security functions described in this section

these will be third-country nationals serving as static perimeter security for the various installations, a continuation of current practice at both civilian and military sites.

Despite the continuing threat of indirect fire,¹⁶ the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's ability to provide security on American compounds after 2011 is encouraging. The State Department already coordinates perimeter security and external movements through an impressive high-tech tactical operations center inside the embassy. More limited operations centers will be set up in satellite facilities located on Iraqi Government compounds or military bases, thus providing for an additional layer of local security. However, security contractors will have to take over highly specialized functions, such as explosive-ordnance disposal; counter rocket, artillery and mortar notification; and aerial surveillance, raising important questions about both the desirability and capacity of military functions in the hands of private security contractors.

The more difficult challenge will be maintaining the ability to make frequent secure ground movements. That the State Department will have considerably less firepower at its disposal "outside the wire" is obvious, but arguably desirable for a diplomatic mission. The State Department has been coordinating movements in Baghdad and other locations for some time. What the civilian mission will lose, though, is the military's over-watch capabilities. Functions like surveillance, intelligence, liaising with the Iraqi military, rapid response, and the like are less visible, but they cannot easily be replaced. The embassy's central location in the "Green Zone" provides relatively good security and easy access to key Iraqi leaders in Baghdad. But the satellite sites will only be as effective as their inhabitants' ability to get off their compounds.

The branch offices are designed to support the movements of personnel to two different local destinations simultaneously. (For the sake of comparison, the current provincial reconstruction team in Kirkuk averages three movements per day.) However, given current conditions and security standards, we believe this projection may be overly optimistic and that functional personnel will be greatly restricted in comparison with the existing construct.¹⁷

There is a built-in tension between a diplomat's desire to energetically engage local actors and the Regional Security Officers' prerogative to keep those diplomats safe.¹⁸ This is nowhere truer than in Iraq and Afghanistan, where strategically critical diplomatic objectives are paired with formidable security threats. Unlike their military counterparts, diplomats are unarmed, and every pro-

will be contracted separately. For more information, see <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rm/143420.htm>.

¹⁶ While mortar and rocket attacks against the embassy and other American facilities usually do little damage, three Triple Canopy perimeter guards were killed in July by indirect fire.

¹⁷ Two other factors could reduce the branch offices' engagement tempo. First, the U.S. military moves more personnel per movement than Diplomatic Security is able to support. Second, provincial reconstruction team Kirkuk personnel currently maintain virtual offices in the main Kirkuk Government building, allowing them to coordinate multiple meetings per movement. It is not clear that the branch offices will be able to maintain this virtual presence.

¹⁸ Regional Security Officers, special agents with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, coordinate all aspects of a diplomatic mission's security. The Embassy has used private security contractors to conduct "red zone" movements in Baghdad for some time, though it will soon lose the military's quick response capacity. Since the tragic shooting incident in Nisour Square in 2007, at least one Diplomatic Security agent now participates in every movement outside the Green Zone.

tection must be taken to ensure their safety. On the other hand, there is also a risk of compromising the mission with excessive or inflexible security requirements. The question is whether the benefits at these diplomatic missions will justify their enormous costs if the functional staff's ability to move off compound is constrained. Effective risk management and clear strategic guidance from Washington will be essential.

Recommendations

1. *The State Department should reconsider whether the embassy branch offices will have sufficient freedom of movement to justify their considerable expense.* If a vigorous regional presence is necessary to support Iraq's stability, a mechanism for a continued but restricted follow-on military presence should be considered to help secure American diplomats. But it is not yet clear that the Iraqi Government desires such an arrangement on terms compatible with American interests.
2. *The size and scope of the Office of Security Cooperation must be determined as soon as possible and integrated into the diplomatic mission.* In Afghanistan, it will be important to stand up a similar office sooner. Within the organization, the administration should develop an integrated team consisting of State, Defense, and specialized contracting personnel adept at dealing with the intricacies of U.S. security assistance. Compared to the current ad hoc arrangements in Iraq and Afghanistan, these offices will be capable of carefully assessing the needs of the host nation, aligning those desires with national interests, gauging the requirements to sustain continued support (both in terms of potential training sites and required contractors), and assessing the regional impact of arms sales.
3. *Regional security officers need to be empowered to face risks rationally and creatively.* They have an incredibly difficult balancing act to perform and must be protected from second-guessing from Washington that produces risk-aversion. While all prudent security measures should be taken, allowances need to be made for the nature of the diplomatic mission in Iraq. In the authors' experience, American diplomats in are courageous, committed and cognizant of the dangers, but often chafe at what they see as excessive security requirements. Examples of possible security measures include:
 - *Reconsider security in the Kurdish Regional Government.* Not a single American has died in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003, and until recently, American diplomats in Irbil received a higher level of movement security than in Sanaa, Yemen. Excessive security requirements in the north drain resources that could be better used elsewhere and constrain our diplomats' ability to function.
 - *Consider the use of Baghdad International Airport.* If there are systemic security gaps at the airport, the United States should forcefully engage the Iraqi Government to address these gaps. It is enormously expensive, inefficient for smaller groups and undiplomatic not to use a country's international airport.

- *Explore the feasibility of “Iraqizing” security.* Local security guards are more affordable, understand the local language and culture, and have a superior situational awareness. As Ambassador Ryan Crocker has pointed out, highly trained and vetted Lebanese guards were used during the worst years of the Lebanese civil war without a single “friendly fire” instance.
4. *A joint State and Defense Department task force should be set up to explore options for sustaining the Combined Security Mechanisms.* The Iraqi Government should be consulted on the feasibility and desirability of maintaining a smaller presence of U.S. military liaison or training teams that would not require the renegotiation of a new security agreement.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Even after the expiration of the 2008 security agreement, the United States will have military personnel stationed at the American embassy in a non-combat role, as it has in most countries in the world, as affirmed by the strategic framework agreement. But the size, scope, structure and role of this presence remain undetermined, even at this late date. Perhaps most significantly, it is unclear what kind of security relationship the incoming Iraqi Government would like with the United States. The outcome will shape the nature of the bilateral relationship, and have a profound effect on the State Department’s diplomatic posture.

Assuming no renegotiation of the security agreement, the U.S. military will transfer the vestiges of its mission to the Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq under embassy authority by October 2011. Similar offices throughout the region assist host nations with sustainment, training, acquisition, and the conduct of joint exercises, but the office in Iraq—the largest U.S.-funded organization of its kind—will face unique challenges based on the security environment.¹⁹ The Office’s responsibilities will include the provision of training and logistical support for current and future arms sale to Iraq. This is not an insignificant task given that some \$13 billion in U.S. arms sales are currently pending.

The authors suspect that many U.S. and Iraqi senior military commanders, along with some senior diplomats, would like an augmented residual U.S. military presence in Iraq after 2011 not only to bolster the Iraqi army, but also to support the Combined Security Mechanisms, protect hard fought gains in security, and provide a counter to Iran. But the new Iraqi Government has not yet signaled a public desire to renegotiate the 2008 security agreement.

And a continued military presence poses significant risks, as well: that it validates our status as occupiers in the eyes of the local population and the larger Muslim community, that it exacerbates Iraqi dependencies and thereby retards rather than accelerates Iraqi political accommodation, and that an opportunity is missed to finalize the American military exit from Iraq. It remains to be seen whether the Iraqi Government will request a continued

¹⁹ Based on discussions in Baghdad with U.S. military and embassy officials and Iraqi military officials.

U.S. military presence or how the Obama administration would respond.

Although several variations exist, the authors see three broad options for the U.S. military posture going forward. A long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq is both unsustainable and undesirable. Thus, each option is a temporary solution to help manage the evolving security situation while Iraq's political class evolves and its armed forces continue to develop. Each involves significant tradeoffs, but only the first two may be politically palatable to the new Iraqi Government.

Total drawdown of U.S. troops: In this scenario, the U.S. military departs as scheduled by the end of 2011, though presumably still leaving behind the Office of Security Cooperation described above. The United States will be viewed as upholding its end of the security agreement, delivering a critical message throughout the region: it is not in the business of occupying foreign countries.

But this option is not without significant risks. The Iraqi military will be forced to sustain itself with only limited American support. This could lead to outside political interference and a deteriorated security environment allowing Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups to reenergize and potentially destabilize Iraq, with significant negative consequences for the region. In this scenario, the diplomatic mission will not have the capacity to support the Combined Security Mechanisms set up to foster communication and coordination between the Iraqi army and Kurdish peshmerga along Iraq's disputed internal boundaries, potentially leaving two heavily armed forces at odds over unresolved politically contentious issues.

Forced to operate without the security blanket of the military, American diplomats would be exposed to additional danger without adequate protection from the host nation. Unless the Iraqi security forces can demonstrate the capability to provide a more permissive security environment, the State Department should reconsider whether it has the capacity to undertake the ambitious regional posture described in this paper.

Expanded Office of Security Cooperation: In this scenario, U.S. combat forces depart in accordance with the security agreement, but the Office of Security Cooperation would be expanded, to include additional military personnel under the ambassador's chief of mission authority. Though these personnel would serve in a strictly advisory capacity, they could continue to perform critical functions such as sustaining logistics, administrative duties, and training—roles that many in the Iraqi military and political classes seem keen for the United States to maintain. While not directly participating in force protection or combat operations, these troops could provide critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, as well as a coordination function with the Iraqi security forces, to

better enable the State Department to carry out its engagement.

This arrangement would require the consent of the Iraqi Government, though perhaps not parliamentary approval. This creates its own problems: the presence of troops, even in a limited fashion, could come to be politicized and seen as allied with ruling parties against the opposition. Such a footprint might not be capable of supporting the Combined Security Mechanisms in the north. And it would lack a quick reaction capacity or any kind of force projection except in self-defense. Though such a force would have little interaction with the Iraqi public, it might also be cited as evidence that the United States has no intention of leaving Iraq.

New security agreement: Under this scenario, the Obama administration would renegotiate, at Iraq's public request, a new security agreement to allow a continued U.S. military presence—a lean force capable of partnering in support of counterterrorism operations and maintaining the Combined Security Mechanisms in the north. This residual presence would address the projected shortfalls in the Iraqi security forces by providing sustained logistics, intelligence, and maintenance support and be positioned to help the Iraqi counterterrorism forces exert maximum pressure against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups. A larger troop presence could reinforce Iraqi border security and air sovereignty, and would probably retain a robust, if little used, rapid reaction capability.

But this scenario does not seem compatible with the public statements of the new Iraqi Government. Furthermore, the Obama administration has committed to abide by the terms of the current security agreement, negotiated by the Bush administration, and withdraw all troops by December 2011. The presence of American troops is a contentious issue in Iraqi politics. Even if the Iraqi Government signaled a desire to renegotiate the security agreement, there is likely to be significant parliamentary opposition, especially among the large Sadrist bloc. Rather than building Iraqi capacity, a continued U.S. military presence could instead foster Iraqi dependency.

If Iraq were to request a new security agreement, the United States should carefully consider the appeal, but only agree if the terms are favorable to American interests. The U.S. military presence would be purposefully limited and only present to facilitate highly selective missions.

Recommendations

1. *The administration should ensure that its resources, capacities and policy objectives are in balance.* Each of the security options described above leads to separate conclusions about how best to structure the diplomatic presence in Iraq. But there is a clear relationship between the U.S. military support in place and the capacity of the State Department, which the authors

are concerned, is not adequately incorporated into the current transition planning.

2. *The administration should clarify to lawmakers in Washington what the military presence in Iraq, if any, will look like beyond 2012.*

BUDGETING AND AUTHORITIES

The total request for Congressional appropriations in Iraq in FY12, after the transition is completed, could reach \$6 billion. Of that, diplomatic operations will cost at least \$3 billion, roughly double the FY11 request and encompassing more than a quarter of the State Department's global operational budget.²⁰ This does not include other State Department programs in Iraq such as economic and security assistance, or the Office of Security Cooperation. While these are indisputably expensive programs, their cost constitute a mere fraction of what was spent on earlier military operations. And if Iraq emerges from the chaos of the last years as an important regional partner it will have been money well spent.²¹

Given this enormous cost disparity between military and diplomatic operations, it is notable that Congress cut the State Department's requests for Iraq operations twice in 2010.²² With the nation deeply involved in a second war in Afghanistan and recovering from a severe recession, Iraq receives less attention in a difficult fiscal environment. Security costs in Iraq are enormous compared to most diplomatic postings, and thus disruptive to the budgeting cycle. Nonetheless, the cuts have raised serious concerns that the current funding baselines might limit the scope of future operations. A more stable funding mechanism must be found that contains both clarity for operational planners at the State Department and mechanisms for effective Congressional oversight.

Meanwhile, the unity of mission in Baghdad does not appear to have been matched in Washington. Communication between military personnel and civilian counterparts is much better in the field than in Washington. This is hardly an unusual phenomenon, but the "stove-piping" of information and resources can have a particularly deleterious effect in such a complex operation. Within the State Department there appear to be tensions between the embassy and the Bureau of Near-East Affairs, which are looking to maintain a vigorous provincial profile, and operational bureaus

²⁰ Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides wrote in response to questions for the record from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, received November 17: *"The current average monthly obligation rate for ongoing Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP)-funded operations of the embassy and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) is approximately \$120 million per month. As the transition of DOD-supported activities to State accelerates over the coming year, average monthly obligations will grow by \$275 million, peaking at approximately \$395 million per month around the end of the third quarter before dropping to lower obligation rates by year end. This includes significant security and construction contracts related to the two Embassy Branch Offices, two consulates, and Sather Air Base-funded by the FY 2010 supplemental—to be awarded during January–March. The Department foresees total FY 2011 obligations for D&CP of nearly \$3.2 billion."*

²¹ Appropriations for the war in Iraq peaked in FY08 at \$142 billion and declined in FY10 to \$51 billion. See Appendix II.

²² The FY2010 supplemental appropriations act, passed in July 2010, included a \$540 million cut from the administration's D&CP (Diplomatic and Consular Programs account) request. FY11 appropriations have not yet been resolved with the Government operating on a continuing resolution until March 2011, but the Senate and House appropriations committee markups included cuts to administration's \$1.78 billion FY11 Iraq D&CP request, to \$1.65 billion and \$1.34 billion respectively.

such as the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and Overseas Building Operations responsible for securing them. While an element of bureaucratic tension can help refine strategic objectives, there is also a danger that differing bureaucratic prerogatives lead to muddled policy. Creative thinking is especially important to security. Because this is a transition of such extraordinary importance and complexity—and because time is so limited—the State Department must articulate sharper strategic and operational guidelines.

Furthermore, it is not clear that the State and Defense Departments have all of the legal authorities they need. For example, according to military and diplomatic personnel in Baghdad, it is easier to transfer “non-excess” military equipment in Iraq to a third country than it is to the State Department.²³ New authorities could conceivably be needed in a number of different areas: flexibility between spending accounts, operations and staffing of the Office for Security Cooperation, the definition of “chief of mission” authority, on the security standards employed, etc. Such legal questions urgently need to be resolved.

Adding to the uncertainty, Foreign Military Sales to Iraq have sharply increased in recent months. In August 2010, the U.S. military was tracking 170 Iraqi cases valued at almost \$6 billion. But by November, the number had skyrocketed to approximately 400 cases valued at nearly \$13 billion, raising serious questions about the Iraqi military’s capacity to deal with such an influx of highly technical equipment. This dramatic increase—and the accompanying contractors necessary to fulfill the orders—could result in an even larger footprint likely to overwhelm the State Department’s already lean resources. Arms sales professionals, who typically broker such deals, were not present in Iraq soon enough and political-military specialists from the State Department were insufficiently involved in the early stages of arms negotiations with Iraqis.

The startup costs associated with the Office of Security Cooperation, responsible for managing Foreign Military Sales, are typically funded by the State Department. However, in Iraq this is problematic for two reasons. First, the security environment is such that the State Department may not be able to afford the associated security costs. The Defense Department however, has less restrictive requirements—which could reduce site-protection costs by as much as \$750 million—and a larger, more flexible budget. Second, the State Department, if forced to outfit the Office of Security Cooperation to its security standards, will not achieve full operational capability by October. Due to the expanding footprint, there would be too much to do with not enough time.

Funding streams to support the Iraqi military are changing. The Iraqi army must be properly resourced and adequately equipped to deter future challenges from outside its borders. From 2005–2012 this was accomplished through the Iraq Security Forces Fund with-

²³ Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides, November 17: “*The Department of Defense (DoD) does not currently have the authority to transfer ‘non-excess’ property. Therefore, for items identified as ‘Non-excess’ the Department of State (DOS) will either have to fund those items or DoD may require exceptional, temporary authorities to transfer them to the Department of State at no cost. Giving DoD such authority would greatly facilitate such transfers.*”

in the Defense budget.²⁴ The fund has been a discretionary spending vehicle for procurement, operations, and maintenance. But in FY 2012, that funding line will be replaced with a more restrictive and traditional form of security assistance, Foreign Military Financing, granted through the Department of State's budget to finance the purchase of U.S. equipment, training, and services. The administration will likely request approximately \$1 billion annually through FY 2014 after which Iraq is forecast to be capable of financing its own military.

With the departure of combat troops, the security assistance is the principal point of leverage the United States has in promoting Kurdish integration and developing a professional generation of soldiers and police. The sale of military equipment gives us an edge in diplomacy, builds relationships, and fosters interoperability. But perhaps most importantly, it fills a void that other countries, including Iran, are more than willing to step into if left empty.

Although there are many unknowns still associated with the transition to a diplomatic mission in Iraq, it will not serve the United States to sit back and take a "wait and see" approach to funding our efforts there. A future presence of the U.S. military, in any form, will not alleviate the responsibilities of the State Department, but will only help facilitate its effectiveness.

Recommendations

1. *Congress must provide the financial resources necessary to complete the diplomatic mission in Iraq.* To this end, senior administration officials in Washington should be more vocal on the importance of full Congressional funding for its budget requests for Iraq programs.
2. *Consideration should be given to a multiple-year funding authorization for Iraq programs, including operational costs (differentiated from the State Department's global operational budget account), security assistance, and economic assistance programs.* The State Department would have to articulate a more comprehensive three-to-five year strategy for Iraq, but would receive assurances that critical programs would not fall victim to the vagaries of the budgeting process. Congress would demonstrate its commitment to the bilateral relationship, but also be able to create benchmarks for progress and establish sunsets to ensure the transition period to normal diplomatic operations is not open-ended.
3. *State Department should appoint a senior coordinator for Iraq, housed within the Bureau of Near East Affairs, empowered to engage across bureaus.* This office would be responsible for ensuring a unity of effort within the State Department, including on difficult security matters and serve as the principle interlocutor with the Defense Department on transition issues. It will also serve as the model for transition in Afghanistan.

²⁴The administration request for FY 2011, through the defense budget, was \$2 billion dollars of which Congress is likely to appropriate closer to \$1.5 billion.

4. *If the administration needs new authorities to execute the new diplomatic mission in Iraq, these need to be urgently communicated to the appropriate Congressional committees.*
5. *Congress should approve an authority whereby the Department of Defense funds the stand-up costs of the Office of Security Cooperation inside Iraq.* This would alleviate a financial burden that the State Department would not be able to bear. Consideration should also be given to authorizing the Defense Department to subsidize security costs associated with arms sales. In the Iraqi security environment these costs are highly inflated and if incorporated could have the dual effects of pricing U.S. defense contractors out of a competitive Iraqi market and offending our Iraqi partners by calling their security measures into question.
6. *Congress should fully fund the current request for the Iraqi Security Forces Fund and future requests for Foreign Military Financing.* This will ensure future defense cooperation between the U.S. and Iraq. The “total package” approach associated with American arms sales will establish an ongoing relationship where the Iraqis will depend on specialized U.S. skills for training and maintenance. An extensive security aid package will also prohibit other regional actors from inserting their undue influence on Iraq’s fledgling democracy.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Government should ensure that the scope of the mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available, including civilian capacity, the financial commitment from Congress, a degree of U.S. military support and the backing of the Iraqi Government. If these elements are not fully in place, the administration may be forced to choose between scaling back the diplomatic mission or accepting a degree of physical risk familiar to military personnel, but normally unacceptable for diplomats.


Debate over the balance between conventional and unconventional military capacity is often heard through the halls of the Pentagon. A similar discussion must take place within the State Department regarding the role and capabilities of our diplomatic corps. Although the State Department’s budget is a fraction of the Pentagon’s, the distinctions between the diplomatic and military missions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are quickly blurring. To adapt to the counterinsurgency doctrine, U.S. troops are asked to put down their weapons and converse over cups of tea. Conversely, in Iraq the State Department is being asked to augment its traditional diplomatic functions with a forceful, though defensive, security capacity.

Reevaluating the role of diplomats is not about giving up on Iraq. Quite the opposite, it is an acknowledgment of the importance of getting the transition right. Some will argue that the war’s faulty pretext—that Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction stocks constituted “a grave and gathering danger”—justify a quick American disengagement from Iraq once our troops are withdrawn next year. While such an approach may be ideologically fulfilling, it constitutes snatching “defeat from the jaws of victory.”

For all the challenges the diplomatic mission faces, its success or failure has profound implications on the nature of the American sacrifice in Iraq. It will be an important factor in whether a more stable Iraq emerges from decades of turmoil as a strategic partner of the United States, or, instead, potentially turns towards Iran.

More than 4,400 American lives have been lost and \$750 billion spent. But no figure can encapsulate the horrific loss of life, treasure, and the associated sweat that was poured into waging war, crafting a peace, and charting the transition. Now is not the time to politically disengage. The transition must be fostered through this critical stage, for the template being created in Iraq now will serve as the model in Afghanistan in years to come.

Appendix I: Iraqi Security Forces “Minimum Essential Capabilities”



Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Ministry of Defense Required Capabilities

Priority 1:

- Conduct counter-terrorism operations
- Provide oil infrastructure security
- Provide maritime security of territorial waters
- Provide intelligence support to ground operations
- Conduct operational level command and control
- Sustain operations
- Provide air and ground tactical mobility
- Conduct basic organizing, manning, training, and equipping functions
- Provide essential services to military bases
- Provide rotary winged lift
- Provide terminal air space control

Priority 2:

- Conduct inter-ministerial security coordination
- Conduct combined arms and joint defensive operations
- Maintain control of national airspace
- Conduct air to ground attacks
- Defend Iraq's littoral waters
- Conduct advanced leader development and education
- Provide intelligence support to national policy makers
- Provide all weather day and night fixed wing air lift
- Maintain a mature training base
- Sustain forces at the national level
- Mobilize a reserve force

Ministry of Interior Required Capabilities

- Secure the population and critical infrastructure
- Conduct basic organizing, manning, training, and equipping functions
- Support and enforce the rule of law
- Provide law enforcement intelligence

Projected Gaps Dec 2011

- Logistics, maintenance and sustainment
- Cross-ministerial intelligence and information sharing
- Conventional defense capabilities of the Army
- Transition to Police Primacy (partially completed)
- Control of airspace and enforcement of air sovereignty


Appendix II: Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq

Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq, 2003–2011 (In billions of U.S. dollars by fiscal year)

Department	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total 2003– 2010	2011 Request
Defense	50	56	83	98	127	139	92	61	707	46
State (incl. USAID)	3	20	2	3	3	3	2	3	39	4
Veterans Affairs	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	5	1
Total: Iraq	53	76	86	102	131	142	96	66	751	51

Source: Congressional Research Service

**Appendix III: Security Incident Trends:
January 2004 to May 2010**



Source: Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," June 2010.