[Senate Prints 112-21]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
112-21
_______________________________________________________________________
EVALUATING U.S. FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
__________
A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
First Session
June 8, 2011
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
66-591 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Why Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan Matters.................... 5
President Obama's Foreign Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan.... 6
Using Development Dollars to Support COIN........................ 8
COIN Theory and Stabilization................................ 8
Agriculture and the Challenges of Stabilization.............. 10
Consequences of Stabilization on Local Communities........... 12
The Challenges of Spending U.S. Aid Dollars...................... 13
Political Versus Development Timelines....................... 14
Limited Contractor Oversight................................. 15
On-Budget Versus Off-Budget Funding.......................... 18
Capacity Building Using Technical Advisors................... 21
Transitioning to Afghan Ownership............................ 23
Fiscal Sustainability for the Afghan Government.............. 24
Case Studies..................................................... 25
Case Study A: Success of National Programs With Local Buy-in--The
National Solidarity Program and Basic Package of Health
Services....................................................... 25
Case Study B: Issues of Sustainability--The Performance-Based
Governors Fund................................................. 28
Recommendations.................................................. 29
Annex--Academic Literature Review: Development and
Counterinsurgency.............................................. 31
Appendixes
APPENDIX I: Total U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan by Fiscal Year.. 34
APPENDIX II: USAID Funding by Province in Afghanistan, FY 2009-
2010........................................................... 35
APPENDIX III: USAID Funding by Province in Afghanistan, FY 2011.. 36
APPENDIX IV: USAID/Afghanistan: Capacity Development Programs
With GIRoA..................................................... 37
APPENDIX V: Capacity Building Programs in Afghanistan--INCLE..... 38
APPENDIX VI: Letter From Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R.
Nides to Chairman John F. Kerry on June 6, 2011................ 39
APPENDIX VII: Letter From USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah to
Chairman John F. Kerry on June 1, 2011......................... 41
(iii)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, June 8, 2011.
Dear Colleagues: This report takes a close look at how the
United States is spending civilian aid dollars in Afghanistan
to make sure we are pursuing the most effective strategy in
support of our national security objectives. We spend more on
aid to Afghanistan than any other country and the environment
in which the State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) operate is difficult and dangerous. With
the upcoming transition to an Afghan security lead in 2014 and
the increased responsibilities our civilians will absorb from
the military, we have a critical planning window right now to
make any necessary changes to support a successful transition.
This report is meant to continue a close working
relationship between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
the Obama administration on ensuring that our assistance
programs in the region meet their objectives. Given this
committee's jurisdiction to conduct oversight of the State
Department and USAID and the levels of funding in Afghanistan,
I asked the committee's majority staff to conduct a thorough
review of U.S. civilian assistance. This report is the product
of two years of staff research and travel. It is intended to
provide constructive and timely guidance for administration
officials at every level who are working to guarantee that our
taxpayer-financed aid to Afghanistan is spent in the most
effective and efficient manner possible.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
(v)
EVALUATING U.S. FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
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Executive Summary
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been at
the forefront of examining progress in Afghanistan.
This report--which is the most comprehensive
congressional investigation to date of our foreign
assistance to Afghanistan--continues that effort.
Building on 2 years of staff research and travel, the
report focuses on funding appropriated by Congress to
the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) in the Function 150
account. It does not cover U.S. military aid, such as
the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP),
which we believe deserves closer scrutiny.
The committee provided a draft of this report to the
State Department and USAID. In a response letter to
Chairman John F. Kerry on June 6, Deputy Secretary of
State Thomas R. Nides underscored the importance of
sustainability and expressed support for our
recommendation to develop a multiyear assistance
strategy. His comments are reproduced in Appendix VI.
USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah acknowledged the need to
do more to spend our aid money effectively in
Afghanistan and provided several recent examples of how
USAID is addressing the issues raised in this report.
His comments are reproduced in Appendix VII.
Today, the United States spends more on foreign aid in
Afghanistan than in any other country, including Iraq. After 10
years and roughly $18.8 billion in foreign aid, we have
achieved some real successes.\1\ There has been a sevenfold
increase in the number of children attending school and
significant improvements in health care. But we should have no
illusions. Serious challenges remain that will prevent us from
achieving our goals unless they are addressed.
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\1\ The figure of $18.8 billion refers to total Function 150
assistance to Afghanistan between FY2002-2010, which excludes total
Function 050 assistance for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF),
CERP, and counternarcotics. See Appendix I for more details.
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Foreign assistance can be a vital tool for promoting
stability in Afghanistan. Given the security challenges and
limited resources at its disposal, USAID has performed
admirably and assumed considerable risks in support of the
President's civil-military strategy for Afghanistan.\2\
However, we believe the administration can be more effective in
how it spends aid in Afghanistan. U.S. assistance should meet
three basic conditions before money is spent: our projects
should be necessary, achievable, and sustainable.
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\2\ USAID and its implementing partners have lost over 370
personnel in Afghanistan over the last 7 years. Administrator Rajiv
Shah, Ninth Annual Princeton Colloquium to address ``Rethinking U.S.
Foreign Aid and Policy,'' Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University,
April 9, 2011.
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The State Department and USAID are spending approximately
$320 million a month on foreign aid in Afghanistan.\3\ In part,
the administration has been using aid to ``win hearts and
minds.'' For instance, roughly 80 percent of USAID's resources
are being spent in Afghanistan's restive south and east. Only
20 percent is going to the rest of the country.\4\ Most of the
funds in Afghanistan's south and east are being used for short-
term stabilization programs instead of longer term development
projects, though that balance may now be changing.
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\3\ Conversations with senior Embassy Kabul officials, May 2011.
\4\ For more information, see: Response to Questions for the Record
submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John
Kerry, March 2, 2011, Nos. 21 and 22. Note that we include the
``southwest'' in our calculations for USAID resource allocations in
Afghanistan's ``south and east.'' See Appendixes II and III for funding
breakouts by province for FY 2009-2010 and FY 2011. According to
USAID's Rajiv Shah, ``roughly 65-70 percent of all our resources are
being spent in those [south, southwest, and east] areas.'' Shah's
comments are reproduced in Appendix VII.
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The evidence that stabilization programs promote stability
in Afghanistan is limited. Some research suggests the opposite,
and development best practices question the efficacy of using
aid as a stabilization tool over the long run. As discussed
below, the unintended consequences of pumping large amounts of
money into a war zone cannot be underestimated.
We must understand the impact of our assistance--positive
and negative--on the local population. For instance, we are
investing heavily in agriculture to provide alternatives to
joining the Taliban and discourage poppy cultivation. While
this may be the right approach, the strategy has raised
expectations and changed incentive structures among Afghans.
The administration is pursuing an assistance strategy based on
counterinsurgency theories that deserve careful, ongoing
scrutiny to see if they yield intended results.
Foreign aid, when misspent, can fuel corruption, distort
labor and goods markets, undermine the host government's
ability to exert control over resources, and contribute to
insecurity. According to the World Bank, an estimated 97
percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP) is
derived from spending related to the international military and
donor community presence. Afghanistan could suffer a severe
economic depression when foreign troops leave in 2014 unless
the proper planning begins now.\5\
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\5\ Dr. Ashraf Ghani, ``Preparing for Transition: A Policy Note on
Development,'' policy memo sent to Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Majority Staff, May 12, 2011.
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The administration is understandably anxious for immediate
results to demonstrate to Afghans and Americans alike that we
are making progress. However, insecurity, abject poverty, weak
indigenous capacity, and widespread corruption create
challenges for spending money. High staff turnover,\6\ pressure
from the military, imbalances between military and civilian
resources,\7\ unpredictable funding levels from Congress, and
changing political timelines have further complicated efforts.
Pressure to achieve rapid results puts our civilians under
enormous strain to spend money quickly.
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\6\ According to a former development specialist at USAID's Mission
in Kabul, the staff turnover rate in Afghanistan is more than 85
percent a year. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ``U.S. military dismayed by
delays in 3 key development projects in Afghanistan,'' Washington Post,
April 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-military-
dismayed-by-delays-in-3-key-development-projects-in-afghanistan/2011/
04/22/AFD6jq8E_story.html.
\7\ According to James Kunder, former USAID acting deputy
administrator, ``it's time to focus on the underlying reason our
fighting forces feel inadequately supported: There are a thousand
Defense Department personnel for every one USAID employee around the
world. Administrations and Congresses controlled by both parties allow
this preposterous imbalance in capability to continue. This particular
Congress has gone one better, deeply cutting USAID and State Department
funding despite warnings from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and
uniformed commanders that inadequate civilian capacity means more
American soldiers deployed and, regrettably, more dead and wounded.''
James Kunder, ``Afghan Aid Efforts are Crucial to the War Effort,''
Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, May 3, 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/afghan-aid-programs-are-crucial-to-the-
war-effort/2011/05/01/AFFhLZjF_story.html.
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We need to take a closer look at how we are spending money
in Afghanistan and the impact it is having on the Afghan state.
The U.S. Government relies heavily on contractors in
Afghanistan, but multiple reports and the recent crisis at
Kabul Bank have raised alarms about the lack of robust
oversight. Most U.S. aid bypasses the Afghan Government in
favor of international firms. This practice can weaken the
ability of the Afghan state to execute its budget, lead to
redundant and unsustainable donor projects, and fuel
corruption. The United States has committed to funding more aid
directly through the Afghan Government, but stronger measures
must first be taken to ensure greater accountability of our
funds.
The U.S. strategy is focused on building the capacity of
Afghan institutions to deliver basic services. The State
Department and USAID are currently spending approximately $1.25
billion on such efforts.\8\ But our overreliance on
international technical advisors to build Afghan capacity may
undermine these efforts. Our aid projects need to focus more on
sustainability so that Afghans can absorb our programs when
donor funds recede.
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\8\ The figure of $1.25 billion includes USAID estimated costs on
capacity-building in Afghanistan (see Appendix IV) and INL current task
order year spending on capacity-building projects in Afghanistan (see
Appendix V).
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The administration is taking welcome steps to improve
oversight. We support USAID Administrator Shah's initiatives
such as USAID Forward, which will incorporate more vigorous
measurement and accountability tools, streamline contracting
rules, and fund smaller, local agents of change. USAID has also
established the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan
initiative (A3) to ensure dollars are not being diverted from
their purpose by extortion or corruption. These and other
steps, including planned improvements to USAID's acquisition
strategy and support for third party monitoring and evaluation,
will help ensure proper use of U.S. taxpayer funds.
We believe additional action is needed and provide
recommendations throughout the report. Perhaps the single most
important step the U.S. Government can take is to work with the
Afghan Government and other donors to standardize Afghan
salaries and work within Afghan Government staffing
constraints. Donor practices of hiring Afghans at inflated
salaries have drawn otherwise qualified civil servants away
from the Afghan Government and created a culture of aid
dependency.
As we draw down our troops in Afghanistan, our civilians
will have to absorb missions currently performed by the
military. The State Department and USAID will need adequate
resources to ensure a smooth transition and avoid repeating the
mistakes we made in Iraq.\9\ Transition planning should find
the right balance between avoiding a sudden dropoff in aid,
which could trigger a major economic recession, and a long-term
phaseout from current levels of donor spending.
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\9\ U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Committee Print,
Majority Staff, 112th Cong., 1st sess., ``Iraq: The Transition from a
Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort,'' January 31, 2011, http://
foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=C4ABBB7E-FFD6-4162-BB55-878EC62FE445.
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There must also be unity of effort across the U.S.
Government and international community. If we conclude that a
civilian program lacks achievable goals and needs to be scaled
back, no other actors should take over the effort. Too often,
when our civilians determine that a project is infeasible, we
simply transfer the program to other actors, such as the U.S.
military or other donors.
The theme echoed throughout this report is that our
strategies and projects should meet the conditions of being
necessary, achievable, and sustainable before funding is
allocated. The report describes how these principles have been
applied in practice through the cases of the National
Solidarity Program and Basic Package of Health Services (Case
Study A) and the ongoing effort to improve sub-national
governance through the Performance-Based Governors Fund (Case
Study B).
Finally, this report offers three overarching
recommendations for the administration to pursue a more
effective assistance strategy in Afghanistan:
(1) Consider authorizing a multiyear civilian assistance
strategy for Afghanistan. The administration and Congress
should consider working together on a multiyear authorization
that includes: (a) a clearly defined assistance strategy; (b)
the tools, instruments, and authorities required for a
successful development approach; (c) a plan as to how U.S.
funding will leverage and partner with Afghan domestic
policies, with multilateral efforts--including the World Bank,
Asian Development Bank, and Islamic Development Bank--and with
private sector financing; (d) the civilian resources needed for
a successful military draw down and transition; (e) the steps
needed to ensure accountability, oversight, and effectiveness;
and (f) metrics that measure performance and capture outcomes.
The strategy should also establish benchmarks for the Afghan
Government to fulfill its international commitments, outline
goals for improving donor coordination, and include specific
annual funding levels. This process would clarify the U.S.
assistance strategy, offer greater predictability on future
funding levels, and provide Congress with robust tools for
oversight.
(2) Reevaluate the performance of stabilization programs in
conflict zones. We must challenge the assumption that our
stabilization programs in their current form necessarily
contribute to stability. The administration should continue to
assess the impact of our stabilization programs in Afghanistan
and reallocate funds, as necessary.
(3) Focus on sustainability. We should follow a simple
rule: Donors should not implement projects if Afghans cannot
sustain them. Development in Afghanistan will only succeed if
Afghans are legitimate partners and there is a path toward
sustainability. The Afghan Government must have sufficient
technical capability and funding to cover operation and
maintenance costs after a project is completed. A
sustainability strategy would consolidate our programs,
increase on-budget aid, streamline our rules and controls, and
pursue a limited number of high-impact programs that do not
require complex procurement or infrastructure. We should also
focus on raising domestic revenue, reducing aid dependency, and
developing partnerships with the private sector to create jobs.
Success should not be measured by outputs or the amount of
money spent, but by the ability of Afghan institutions to
deliver services, the Afghan private sector to generate jobs
and grow the economy, and Afghan civil society and public
institutions to provide avenues for citizens to hold their
government accountable and participate in political and civic
life. More thought should be given to the type of projects we
fund. Our aid should be visible among Afghans, and we should
have a robust communications strategy in place so Afghans know
what U.S. civilian aid in Afghanistan is accomplishing.
Why Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan Matters
Foreign assistance is critical to advancing U.S. policy
interests overseas. When implemented effectively, it can play a
valuable role in promoting security, building governance,
fostering economic development, and supporting civil society.
Development can help consolidate military gains and support our
diplomatic efforts, which is why both President George W. Bush
and President Obama elevated development to accompany defense
and diplomacy in their respective national security strategies.
The goal of our assistance in Afghanistan is to create the
conditions for a more stable, democratic government capable of
resisting attempts by Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups from
returning and establishing safe havens from which to launch
attacks on the U.S. homeland.
The administration's fiscal year 2012 request for
Afghanistan includes roughly $3.2 billion in foreign aid.\10\
This funding level reflects the pivotal role the State
Department and USAID are expected to play to help consolidate
our military gains and ensure a successful transition. It gives
our Embassy and USAID Mission in Kabul the necessary resources
to build basic Afghan capacity.
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\10\ Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification,
Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2012, pp.
604 and 864.
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Our military leaders, including General David Petraeus,
strongly support this request.\11\ It represents a roughly 22-
percent decrease from FY 2010-enacted levels, which we believe
is a responsible reduction. The cut reflects our shared desire
to find the right-sized footprint in Afghanistan, which will
provide needed civilian resources without engaging in long-term
nation-building.
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\11\ On March 4, 2011, General Petraeus wrote to Senator Graham
about the dangers of further cuts to the State Department budget. He
stated that the proposed cuts will ``undermine our plans for a
conditions-based transition to Afghan lead and our long-term goal of a
stable and peaceful Afghanistan. During this [transition] period, [the
State Department] will shoulder important responsibilities for economic
development and national and subnational governance capacity-building,
which includes support for ministry development, rule of law, and long-
term economic development and infrastructure projects. Without a fully
resourced [State Department] role, the hard-earned progress our
troopers have made could be put at risk . . . Indeed, as we look beyond
2014, it is clear that the State Department will shoulder the lion's
share of requirements to support our enduring commitment to
Afghanistan. The funding required to build that capacity must start now
and continue for the foreseeable future.''
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We support the President's FY 2012 request and recognize
the value of foreign assistance in achieving our national
security objectives. However, we believe the administration can
be more effective in how it spends money in Afghanistan. As we
begin the transition process to Afghan-led security and as our
civilians absorb more tasks from the military, our civilian
assistance strategy must focus on what is necessary,
achievable, and sustainable. While the U.S. Government will
continue to support the government and people of Afghanistan
with foreign assistance after our troops come home, in the
words of USAID Administrator Shah, we must provide assistance
``in a way that allows our efforts to be replaced over time by
efficient local governments, thriving civil societies and
vibrant private sectors.'' \12\
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\12\ Administrator Rajiv Shah, Testimony before the Commission on
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington, DC, April 1,
2011, p. 4, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-04-
01_testimony-Shah.pdf.
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President Obama's Foreign Assistance
Strategy for Afghanistan
In March 2009, President Obama's initial interagency review
of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan found that ``a
complete overhaul of our civilian assistance strategy is
necessary,'' which would require ``a significant change in the
management, resources, and focus of our foreign assistance.''
\13\
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\13\ ``White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S.
Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,'' March 2009, pp.1-2, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-
Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
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Congress appropriated approximately $2.8 billion in FY 2009
and $4.2 billion in FY 2010 funds for Afghanistan to increase
our civilian presence in the field, build the capacity of
Afghan institutions, and support military operations.\14\
According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry,
these budget increases properly funded ``a mission that in past
years was poorly defined and underresourced.'' \15\ Former
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP)
Richard Holbrooke led an interagency effort that resulted in a
``whole-of-government'' approach.
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\14\ These figures refer to total 150 budget function assistance in
FY 2009 and FY 2010. For more information, see: Appendix I.
\15\ Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Testimony before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, December 8, 2009, p. 2, http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/December/Eikenberry%2012-08-09.pdf.
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Today, the focus of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan is to
build the capacity of Afghan institutions and promote economic
development in order to create jobs and weaken popular support
for the insurgency. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has
argued that this approach is ``far from an exercise in nation-
building'' because it aims ``to achieve realistic progress in
critical areas'' and is aligned with our security
objectives.\16\ The goal is to transition to an Afghan lead for
security responsibility by the end of 2014.
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\16\ Department of State, Office of the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, ``Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional
Stabilization Plan,'' Updated February 2010, p. 2, http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
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To accomplish this mission, the State Department and USAID
dramatically increased the number of civilians on the ground in
Afghanistan from 531 civilians in January 2009 to about 1,300
today, with approximately 920 in Kabul and 380 in the
field.\17\ The number of civilians is expected to peak at
roughly 1,450 by mid-2014, according to Embassy officials. But
overall funding levels peaked in 2010. This means that the
Embassy will have more civilians in the field with fewer
resources in 2014, just as the security transition is in full
swing.
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\17\ Department of State, Office of Inspector General, ``Report of
Inspection,'' Report Number ISP-I-10-32A, February 2010, p. 11, http://
oig.state.gov/documents/organization/138084.pdf.
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Safely maintaining civilians in Afghanistan is costly.
According to senior Embassy officials, each U.S. civilian costs
about half a million dollars. This figure covers training,
salaries, and travel expenses but excludes security costs
covered by the military, which civilians will have to absorb as
we begin drawing down troops. It also excludes the cost of
emergency protection details (EPD) that transport our civilians
in theatre. An EPD for an Ambassador in Kabul, for instance,
can cost approximately $8 million a year.\18\
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\18\ Conversation with senior Embassy Kabul officials, April 2011.
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In light of funding constraints, the State Department and
USAID may want to consider a smaller civilian footprint--a
``civilian ebb''--that gives priority to the key aspects of the
civilian mission that are necessary, achievable, and
sustainable.
President Obama's review of our assistance strategies in
the region resulted in a profound change in the coordination of
U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Traditionally, USAID leads our foreign assistance efforts with
policy guidance from the State Department. Under the
President's new strategy, SRAP housed at the State Department
in Washington, DC, is charged with overseeing all civilian
operations. The Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad have followed
suit by establishing new Assistance Coordinator positions
staffed by senior Foreign Service officers to oversee the aid.
The migration of foreign assistance responsibilities from
USAID to the State Department was intended to increase
coordination among government agencies, reduce stove-piping,
and ensure that development supports U.S. foreign policy.
This ``whole-of-government'' approach has succeeded to some
degree. For instance, Embassy Kabul's Coordinating Director for
Development and Economic Affairs (CDDEA), led by an Ambassador-
level coordinator, supervises the work of 14 sections and
agencies at the U.S. mission, including USAID, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, the Treasury attache, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Department of Transportation.
Similarly, the Embassy's Rule of Law Directorate, a civilian-
military effort led by an Ambassador-level coordinator
supported by senior military officers, coordinates and
supervises agencies working on rule of law and law enforcement
programs. These include USAID, the State Department's
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau, the
Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Marshals Service, and
the Department of Homeland Security. Both these functions have
served the U.S. Ambassador and Embassy Kabul in their efforts
to coordinate our development and assistance programs.
However, this new approach has also added multiple
Ambassador-level officials at the Embassy in addition to the
SRAP, created new layers of bureaucracy, diminished USAID's
voice at the table, and put decisionmaking on development
issues in the hands of diplomats instead of development
experts.
Using Development Dollars To Support COIN
The U.S. counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) in Afghanistan
calls on the military to secure key areas--``clear'' and
``hold,'' while USAID and its counterparts follow up with the
``build'' and ``transfer'' phases. The goal is to provide
security, strengthen local government institutions, and build
critical infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and clinics.
In theory, these steps can improve lives and weaken popular
support for the insurgency.
This past year saw a marked shift in resources from Kabul
to the regional, provincial, and district levels in nearly all
of the 34 provinces, particularly in the south and east where
the U.S. military surge is concentrated. The shift responded to
the need for increased civil-military cooperation at the
provincial and district levels to hold territory cleared by
military operations.
Roughly 77 percent--or about $1.65 billion--of USAID's
total FY 2009-10 resources are being spent in Afghanistan's
south and east. In FY 2011, according to USAID projections,
roughly 81 percent--or about $872 million--will go to these
regions.\19\ Most of the funds in Afghanistan's south and east
are being used for short-term stabilization programs instead of
longer term development projects. Given these levels and the
trend lines indicating increased funding for the south and east
as a percentage of total FY 2011 funds, our stabilization
strategy deserves closer scrutiny.\20\
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\19\ Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011,
Nos. 21 and 22. Note that we include the ``southwest'' in our
calculations for USAID resource allocations in Afghanistan's ``south
and east.'' For more information, see: Appendixes II and III. According
to USAID's Rajiv Shah, ``roughly 65-70 percent of all our resources are
being spent in those [south, southwest, and east] areas.'' Shah's
comments are reproduced in Appendix VII.
\20\ See Appendixes II and III.
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Stabilization projects are designed to respond to urgent
humanitarian and reconstruction requirements in areas of
instability. Practitioners in the field argue that
stabilization is not development and that stabilization
projects, if pursued over an extended period, can have negative
consequences. Working closely with provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs) and district support teams (DSTs), USAID plans to
shift from stabilization to transitional development as
security improves.
This section examines the theory guiding our stabilization
efforts and our agricultural investments. It also considers the
consequences of our stabilization strategy on the local
population.
COIN THEORY AND STABILIZATION
Our stabilization strategy assumes that short-term aid
promotes stability in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and
``wins hearts and minds'' by improving security, enhancing the
legitimacy and reach of the central government, and drawing
support away from the Taliban. It presumes that the
international community and the Afghan Government have shared
objectives when it comes to promoting longer term development,
good governance, and the rule of law.\21\
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\21\ ``Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the
Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations,'' Report on Wilton
Park Conference 1022, March 2010, p. 1, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/
coin/repository/
Assesing_Effectiveness_of_Development_Aid_in_COIN_%281_Apr_10%29.pdf.
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These assumptions may not be correct. In March 2010, a
conference at Wilton Park in the United Kingdom brought
together leading experts on the role of development in
counterinsurgency. The conference report found ``a surprisingly
weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting
stabilization and security objectives'' in Afghanistan.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The key is to understand the root causes of insecurity,
which may differ in each province and district. Take the case
of the United Kingdom's stabilization program in Helmand
province between 2006 and 2008. According to a recent Tufts
University study, the stabilization model adopted by the
British during this period assumed that poverty and a limited
government presence were fueling the negative perceptions of
governmental authorities and international development
projects.\23\ Field research, however, suggests that local
residents in Helmand are more concerned about the lack of
security and poor governance.\24\ Taliban intimidation and
rampant insecurity beyond the main towns of Lashkar Gah and
Gereshk have deterred the population from cooperating with the
government. Poor governance has exacerbated these trends,
allowing the Taliban to exploit the grievances of politically
marginalized groups.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Stuart Gordon, ``Winning Hearts and Minds: Examining the
Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Helmand
Province,'' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April
2011, https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/
viewpage.action?pageId=44797077.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ Ibid., p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator Shah agrees that ``we must strive to uncover
the true drivers of instability in a region, based . . . on
local perspectives . . . What we've found is that it is
generally not the case that a lack of schools or roads drives
conflict. Often the situation is far subtler, having to do with
local power dynamics or long-held grudges.'' \26\ Our aid
strategy cannot assume that poverty or unemployment alone fuel
the insurgency. For example, according to the World Bank,
poverty rates in the insurgency-plagued Helmand and Kandahar
provinces are less than 30 percent. By contrast, in the more
peaceful central and northern provinces, poverty rates run from
between 42 and 58 percent in Bamyan and Ghor to upward of 58
percent in Balk province.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Administrator Rajiv Shah, ``Insights,'' USAID Frontlines,
December 2010/January2011, http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/
fl_jan11/FL_jan11_insights.html.
\27\ ``The World Bank in Afghanistan,'' International Development
Association Results, May 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a recent study of the drivers of political violence,
USAID found limited evidence linking poverty and low education
to support for radical groups.\28\ Development aid can have
violence-reducing effects when used to help local governments
deliver basic services, but achieving this in Afghanistan
remains challenging.\29\ Providing legitimate employment
opportunities may be part of the solution, but the literature
is inconclusive.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ``Dampening Processes of Radicalization at the Individual and
Societal Level,'' Development to Counter Insurgency, USAID Evidence
Summit, 2010, pp. 5-6.
\29\ ``Disrupting the Formation of Groups Willing to Employ Terror
and Other Political Violence to Achieve their Aims,'' Development to
Counter Insurgency, USAID Evidence Summit, 2010.
\30\ For a review of the literature on development and
counterinsurgency, see Annex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security and governance matter. Development spending can
strengthen the government and weaken insurgents in areas that
are secure and enjoy good governance. It can also have the
opposite effect when security and governance are poor or
absent. As historian Mark Moyar observes:
. . . the United States spent more than $100 million
repairing and upgrading the Kajaki hydropower plant to
provide electricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces,
but last year half of its electricity went into areas
where the insurgents control the electric grid,
enabling the Taliban to issue electric bills to
consumers and send out collection agents with medieval
instruments of torture to ensure prompt payment. The
consumers in these places use the power for the
irrigation of fields that grow poppies, which in turn
fuel the opium trade from which the Taliban derive much
of their funding.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Mark Moyar, ``Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency:
A New Guide,'' Orbis Operations, March 2011, p. 5, http://
smallwarsjournal.com/documents/development-in-afghanistan-coin-
moyar.pdf.
Aid carries risks and demands a sophisticated understanding
of the local context, patterns of insurgent recruitment, and
organizational structure of violent groups. Otherwise, our
resources can inadvertently raise local tensions, cause
infighting among local groups, and exacerbate rent-seeking
behavior among corrupt actors.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ ``Disrupting the Formation of Groups Willing to Employ Terror
and Other Political Violence to Achieve their Aims,'' Development to
Counter Insurgency, USAID Evidence Summit, pp. 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the conflicting research on the effects of aid in
promoting stability, more analysis is needed before we continue
investing a significant amount of our aid in conflict zones.
AGRICULTURE AND THE CHALLENGES OF STABILIZATION
As we continue our assistance efforts in insecure parts of
Afghanistan, we need to consider whether our aid will have a
net positive effect. This is especially true in the area of
agriculture, which forms the backbone of our strategy in the
south.
The administration's ``top reconstruction priority is
implementing a civilian-military agriculture development
strategy to restore Afghanistan's once vibrant agriculture
sector with support from USAID, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, and the Army National Guard Agri-business
Development Teams.'' \33\ Given that approximately 80 percent
of Afghans rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, the focus
is on immediate job creation, particularly in the insurgency-
plagued provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Projects include
cash-for-work programs and longer term agribusiness and
irrigation initiatives to increase linkages between farmers and
markets and enhance water management.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Department of State, Office of the Special Representative of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, ``Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional
Stabilization Strategy,'' Updated February 2010, p. 5, http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
\34\ U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee Print,
Majority Staff, 112th Cong., 1st sess., ``Avoiding Water Wars: Water
Security and Central Asia's Growing Importance for Stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan,'' February 22, 2011, http://
foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=738A9FCF-FA1B-4ECD-9814-A1F6C5BE04D2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2002, USAID has awarded about $1.4 billion for
agricultural programs. In a July 2010 report, however, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that USAID's
agricultural programs ``did not always establish or achieve
their targets for each performance indicator.'' \35\ Six of the
eight programs that the GAO assessed failed to meet their
annual targets and the three longest running programs declined
in performance from 2006 to 2008.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ United States Government Accountability Office, ``Afghanistan
Development: Enhancements to Performance Management and Evaluation
Efforts Could Improve USAID's Agricultural Programs,'' GAO-10-368, July
2010, Highlights page, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10368.pdf.
\36\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to an article in the Washington Post last spring,
USAID spent about $250 million over one year on agricultural
programs in Helmand and Kandahar alone. In the district of Nawa
in Helmand province, which has a population of about 75,000,
USAID spent an estimated $400 per person. By contrast, the
country's per capita income is about $300 a year.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ``In Afghan region, the U.S. Spreads the
Cash To Fight the Taliban,'' Washington Post, May 31, 2010, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/30/
AR2010053003722.html?nav=emailpage. Additionally, senior Embassy Kabul
officials estimate that our military and civilian aid combined
represents about four times the per capita gross domestic product.
Conversation with senior Embassy Kabul officials, May 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The primary agricultural program is the Agricultural
Vouchers for Increased Production in Afghanistan (AVIPA) Plus
project, which was designed as a $60 million national
development program and then expanded to a $360 million
stabilization program, primarily in Helmand and Kandahar, with
a significant cash-for-work component. As security improved
last summer and fall, AVIPA Plus expanded into new districts
and an additional $89 million was added to the project at the
request of the Agriculture Ministry to expand its seed/
fertilizer voucher program to 32 provinces.
According to International Relief & Development, the
implementing partner for AVIPA Plus, the project has resulted
in 780 cash-for-work projects, employing 103,000 laborers and
injecting nearly $27 million in wages into the economy--the
equivalent of creating 22,500 full-time jobs.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Elizabeth Creel, International Relief & Development, e-mail
message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, March 30,
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, NGO representatives who have worked in the area
for many years argue that such statistics conflate day laborers
with full-time employment and distort labor markets. More
importantly, these programs can generate unintended and
potentially adverse consequences. As Rajiv Chandrasekaran
reported in the Washington Post, the cash surge in Nawa
is sparking new tension and rivalries within the
community, and it is prompting concern that the nearly
free seeds and gushing canals will result in more crops
than farmers will be able to sell. It is also raising
public expectations for handouts that the Afghan
Government will not be able to sustain once U.S.
contributions ebb.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Ibid.
In 2011, USAID plans to scale back AVIPA Plus as it
implements longer term development programs under the Southern
Region Agricultural Development Program (SRADP). But linkages
between stabilization and development projects are not
seamless. In agriculture, for instance, plans to construct cold
storage facilities and build farm-to-market transportation
networks may not be completed in time to sell additional crops
and convince farmers not to return to opium farming. Moreover,
scaling back may mean that many who benefited from artificially
inflated incomes, temporary work, and subsidized seed will lose
their benefits. We should use this opportunity to measure the
real impact of our agriculture programs on security and design
future programs accordingly.
CONSEQUENCES OF STABILIZATION ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES
U.S. stabilization projects have raised expectations and
changed incentive structures in Afghanistan, according to
development experts in the field. ``There is no question that
our foreign aid is distorting the economy,'' according to
Embassy Kabul.\40\ In some cases, we have been paying Afghans
to clean ditches and repair irrigation canals, tasks that they
have been doing for free for generations. Community leaders
have at times risked the ire of the Taliban to side with the
U.S. and Afghan Governments in supporting short-term aid
projects on the understanding that we would not abandon them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Conversation with senior Embassy officials, May 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be sure, stabilization projects may yield short-term
results, such as developing relationships with community elders
that can provide useful intelligence. But these successes do
not necessarily translate into the desired strategic outcome of
winning over the local population. Too much aid can have a
destabilizing effect on local communities that are unable to
absorb the cash surge.
Drawing on the work of economist Dr. Charles Wolf,
counterinsurgency expert Dr. David Kilcullen sees two different
trends taking place when we pour large amounts of cash into
restive areas.\41\ On the one hand, there is a ``substitution
effect,'' whereby development dollars shift popular support
away from the insurgents and toward the government. But our aid
can also have an ``income effect,'' whereby development
programs increase the resources available to villagers and lead
them to believe that they can improve their prospects of
survival by entering into negotiations with the insurgents.\42\
Many factors can influence the outcome, and we must do a better
job of understanding them when we design our aid programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Meeting with Dr. David Kilcullen, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Caerus Associates, March 21, 2011.
\42\ On the ``income'' and ``substitution'' effects of economic and
social development programs in counterinsurgency, see: Dr. Charles
Wolf, Jr., ``Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old
Realities,'' RAND Corporation, p. 7, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/papers/2005/P3132-1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Snapshots from the field suggest we may not be winning over
the local population through our current aid practices:
Despite the considerable work that has been done,
including the expansion of basic social services, major
investments in roads and other infrastructure, and a
communications revolution, negative perceptions persist
that little has been done, the wrong things have been
done, what was done is poor quality, the benefits of
aid are spreading inequitably, and that much money is
lost through corruption and waste. Research findings
suggest policymakers should be cautious in assuming
that aid projects help create positive perceptions of
the deliverers of aid, or that they can help legitimize
the government.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ ``Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the
Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations,'' Report on Wilton
Park Conference 1022, March 2010, p. 3, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/
coin/repository/
Assesing_Effectiveness_of_Development_Aid_in_COIN_%281_Apr_10%29.pdf.
New survey research in Afghanistan lends credence to these
findings. According to the International Council on Security
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and Development's May 2011 report:
The U.S. troop surge has brought unquestionable
military success, with many Afghans . . . now believing
that international and Afghan forces are winning the
fight against the Taliban. However, these military
successes have also created ``Blowback,'' which is
negatively impacting Afghan hearts and minds in the
south . . . The negative impacts of the military
operations . . . and the general backdrop of news in
the south, give the Taliban an opportunity to
``Pushback'' and gain ground by capitalizing on the
increasing resentment of the foreign presence within
the local population, which is emotionally volatile,
traumatized, isolated, and easily manipulated by
outside actors.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ ``Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local
Dynamics,'' The International Council on Security and Development, May
2011, p. 6, http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/bin-laden-local-
dynamics.pdf.
We need more analysis of the effects--positive and
negative--of our aid on the local population. We are pursuing a
strategy based on counterinsurgency theories that deserve
careful, ongoing scrutiny to see if they yield the intended
results.
The Challenges of Spending U.S. Aid Dollars
Spending aid effectively in Afghanistan is extremely
challenging, given the security climate, abject poverty, weak
indigenous capacity, widespread corruption, and poor
governance. High staff turnover,\45\ pressure from the
military, imbalances between military and civilian
resources,\46\ unpredictable funding levels from Congress, and
changing political timelines have further complicated efforts.
Pressure to achieve rapid results puts our civilians are under
enormous strain to spend money quickly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ According to a former development specialist at USAID's
Mission in Kabul, the staff turnover rate in Afghanistan is more than
85 percent a year. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ``U.S. Military Dismayed by
Delays in 3 Key Development Projects in Afghanistan,'' Washington Post,
April 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-military-
dismayed-by-delays-in-3-key-development-projects-in-afghanistan/2011/
04/22/AFD6jq8E_story.html.
\46\ According to James Kunder, former USAID acting deputy
administrator, ``it's time to focus on the underlying reason our
fighting forces feel inadequately supported: There are a thousand
Defense Department personnel for every one USAID employee around the
world. Administrations and Congresses controlled by both parties allow
this preposterous imbalance in capability to continue. This particular
Congress has gone one better, deeply cutting USAID and State Department
funding despite warnings from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and
uniformed commanders that inadequate civilian capacity means more
American soldiers deployed and, regrettably, more dead and wounded.''
James Kunder, ``Afghan Aid Efforts Are Crucial to the War Effort,''
Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, May 3, 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/afghan-aid-programs-are-crucial-to-the-
war-effort/2011/05/01/AFFhLZjF_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan is not Iraq, which had a functioning state and
robust government and civil society institutions. After the
fall of the Taliban, we were faced with the challenge of
building a democratic-style government and modern economy. The
U.S. effort began in earnest in 2009, when the administration
and Congress recognized the need for properly resourcing the
civilian effort.
Ongoing development aid will be needed for the foreseeable
future to help Afghanistan become stable. This section examines
how we can improve our assistance strategy. As discussed below,
we must overcome the challenges that have undermined our
efforts, including unrealistic timelines, lack of robust
oversight, off-budget financing, capacity-building programs
that rely heavily on technical advisors, and issues of Afghan
ownership and fiscal sustainability.
POLITICAL VERSUS DEVELOPMENT TIMELINES
Development, when done properly, takes time and results
cannot be measured immediately. In a country like Afghanistan,
development will take generations. The U.S. Government has
strived for quick results to demonstrate to Afghans and
Americans alike that we are making progress. Indeed, the
constant demand for immediate results prevented the
implementation of programs that could have met long-term goals
and would now be bearing fruit.
As recently as last summer, Embassy Kabul believed it had a
3- to 5-year window to accomplish its development goals.
However, the political tide in the United States has been
turning, with increased pressure to bring our troops home and
draw down our military and civilian budgets in Afghanistan.
Increasingly, the U.S. civilian strategy is linked to the
shorter term military strategy on the ground. Resources are
only appropriated from Congress on an annual cycle, which
complicates efforts to undertake longer term civilian
commitments.
Discussions are underway on a strategic agreement with
Afghanistan that will frame the contours of our relationship
following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. We expect there will
be a longer term commitment of U.S. civilian resources for the
people of Afghanistan. But the scope of this commitment is
still under negotiation.
Given the emphasis on annual budget cycles in Washington
and the lack of a multiyear authorization for Afghanistan that
could provide a roadmap for future funding, the administration
is again under pressure to demonstrate quick results to
Congress. Many in Congress are fixated on ``burn rates,'' or
how fast the money is spent and how much money is left in the
``pipeline.'' This results in undue emphasis at USAID and the
State Department on getting money out the door to ensure future
appropriations at significant levels. Political pressures
create perverse incentives to spend money even when the
conditions are not right.
Cutting back our foreign aid budgets is not the most
prudent solution. As we learned in Iraq, there will be
tremendous pressure on our civilians to absorb missions
currently performed by the military as our troops begin to draw
down.\47\ The State Department and USAID must have the
resources they need to ensure a smooth transition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Committee Print,
Majority Staff, 112th Cong., 1st sess., Iraq: The Transition from a
Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort, January 31, 2011, http://
foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=C4ABBB7E-FFD6-4162-BB55-878EC62FE445.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our goal should be to reduce some of the political pressure
to spend money quickly, especially when the conditions are not
right. Some ideas under discussion include a multiyear
authorization bill or creating a trust fund that could disperse
funds as needed and appropriate. We welcome further discussions
with the administration on these and other options.
LIMITED CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT
The U.S. Government relies heavily on contractors and
subcontractors in Afghanistan for aid projects. Contractors
support direct-hire personnel, implement assistance projects,
and address U.S. Government workforce shortfalls.
From FY 2007 to FY 2009, USAID obligated about $3.8 billion
to 283 contractors and other entities, including more than $2
billion (53 percent) to 214 contractors, $1.1 billion (nearly
30 percent) to 53 cooperative agreement partners, and $625
million (17 percent) for 17 grants. Two contractors--Louis
Berger International and Development Alternatives Inc.--
accounted for about $1 billion, or more than half the total of
USAID's contracts.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, pp. 4
and 21, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lores/
SIGAR4Q_2010Book.pdf. See also: Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, ``DOD, State, and USAID Obligated Over
$17.7 Billion to About 7,000 Contractors and Other Entities for
Afghanistan Reconstruction During Fiscal Years 2007-2009,'' Audit 11-4
Contract Performance and Oversight, October 27, 2010, pp. 9-17, http://
www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-11-4.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During this same time period, the State Department's Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) obligated
about $2.3 billion to four contractors, with DynCorp
International accounting for more than 80 percent of INL's
total obligations.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contractors run the gamut from companies who implement
USAID programs to individual experts who serve as technical
advisors within Afghan institutions and ministries, as Deloitte
representatives did at the Afghan Central Bank.
While there are many good reasons to use contractors in
Afghanistan, there are also reasons for concern. The case of
the Louis Berger Group Inc. (LBG) is instructive. A New Jersey-
based engineering consulting firm that accounted for over a
third of USAID's total contract obligations in Afghanistan
between FY 2007 and FY 2009, LBG recently admitted to
submitting ``false, fictitious, and fraudulent overhead rates
for indirect costs . . . [resulting] in overpayments by the
[U.S.] government in excess of $10 million'' from 1999 to
2007.\50\ Such instances of fraud undermine our reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan and highlight the need for vigorous
oversight of our war-zone contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ David Voreacos, ``Berger Group Pays $69.3 Million for Iraq
Overbilling,'' Bloomberg Businessweek, May 5, 2011, http://
www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-05/berger-group-pays-69-3-million-
for-iraq-overbilling.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the risk of contractor fraud, the use of
large numbers of contractors raises other significant
opportunities for waste and mismanagement. By contracting with
U.S. and international contractors at western prices (the
``primes''), donor funds can be lost to corruption through
multiple subcontractors over which the U.S. Government has
little to no control (the ``subs''). Projects may be built at
costs substantially less than the amount originally paid, using
substandard materials and methods. Poor security conditions and
a lack of contracting officers overseeing contactor performance
could deter site visits to confirm whether the project was
properly built, or even built at all. Afghanistan is littered
with abandoned or half-built structures.
Multiple reports have raised concerns about the lack of
robust contractor oversight. The GAO finds ``oversight
inadequate at times, thus raising questions about the agencies'
ability to ensure accountability for multibillion dollar
investments.'' \51\ The Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) warns that ``the large U.S.
investment in Afghanistan remains at significant risk of being
wasted or subject to fraud and abuse.'' \52\ The bipartisan
Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan is particularly critical of overall U.S. Government
assistance, noting that ``tens of billions of taxpayers'
dollars have failed to achieve their intended use in Iraq and
Afghanistan.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers, United States Government
Accountability Office, ``Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,''
Testimony before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, March 3, 2011, Highlights page, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11419t.pdf.
\52\ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, p.
vi, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lores/
SIGAR4Q_2010Book.pdf.
\53\ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
``At What Risk: Correcting Overreliance on Contractors in Contingency
Operations,'' Second Interim Report to Congress, February 24, 2011, p.
7, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-
lowres.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part of the problem is a lack of qualified contracting
officers, contracting officer's representatives, and
acquisition staff. Currently, USAID has approximately 85
Foreign Service contracting officers serving worldwide with
three or more years of experience. Ten are serving in
Afghanistan and USAID plans to increase this number to 18,
which is an improvement from 2007 when there were only three
contracting officers in Afghanistan.\54\ However, this increase
will not likely be sufficient to provide adequate oversight of
contractor performance in Afghanistan. According to Maureen
Shauket, USAID's Director of the Office of Acquisition and
Assistance, in order to meet the U.S. Government's civilian
average ratio of number of dollars per contracting officer,
USAID would have to send nearly its entire overseas workforce
to work only in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Kate Beale, USAID, e-mail message to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Majority Staff, April 21, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compounding the problem is the difficulty of getting
contract staff with the right technical backgrounds to serve in
places like Afghanistan. Congress needs to create incentives
and find additional funding for USAID to build a corps of
contract officers willing to serve in war zones.
The Kabul Bank incident underscores the importance of such
a move. In 2010, massive fraud was uncovered at Kabul Bank,
including loans totaling $900 million to shareholders at the
Bank, which is nearly 5 percent of Afghanistan's current Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Fraud of this scale resulted from
failures at every level, including internal bank control; Kabul
Bank's auditors--A.F. Ferguson & Co., a Pakistani affiliate of
PricewaterhouseCoopers; Afghanistan's Central Bank; the Central
Bank's advisors, Deloitte, under a USAID contract; the
political establishment; and USAID.
At the time, USAID had only one contracting officer's
technical representative overseeing the $92 million contract
with Deloitte to provide technical assistance to the Central
Bank. An investigation undertaken by the USAID Office of
Inspector General determined that Deloitte knew or should have
known that there were serious problems at Kabul Bank and failed
to alert USAID officials in Kabul.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Tim Cox, ``Review of USAID/Afghanistan's Bank Supervision
Assistance Activities and the Kabul Bank Crisis,'' Report No. F-306-11-
003-S, USAID Office of Inspector General, March 16, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The failures do not end with Deloitte or USAID's lack of
adequate oversight. Independent of its relationship with
Deloitte, USAID should have known or suspected that there were
serious problems at Kabul Bank. Within Afghanistan, the fraud
at Kabul Bank has been described as an open secret, known and
discussed by market participants. And yet, it appears that no
one at USAID had the technical knowledge or private sector
relationships to see what many others in the sector saw.
According to a former USAID Kabul Mission Director:
Because of the ill planned downsizing of USAID's
technical staff over the past years and the difficulty
in finding senior technical Foreign Service officers to
serve in Afghanistan, the management of the Kabul Bank
Deloitte contract was relegated to a junior officer.
While he worked to the best of his ability, this
important project demanded strong technical oversight
and similar programs of this level of strategic
importance will demand senior management expertise and
a different system with USAID to ensure the
availability of senior technical staff.
In another case involving an education project for
teachers, USAID's contracting officer was unaware and did not
consent to the award of subcontracts and did not approve of
significant subcontract modifications totaling $23.4 million
out of a $94 million contract.\56\ These modifications included
changes in the duration of subcontracts and terms of
subcontractor performance, as well as significant funding
increases.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Department of State, Office of Inspector General, ``Audit of
USAID/Afghanistan's Building Education Support Systems for Teachers
Project,'' Audit Report No. 5-306-10-006-P, January 29, 2010, p. 9,
http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy10rpts/5-306-10-006-p.pdf.
\57\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to international narcotics and law enforcement
programs, INL manages approximately $927 million in contract
services in Afghanistan. Yet it has only one Contracting
Officer Representative (COR) in Washington overseeing five
Civilian Police (CivPol) Program task orders amounting to $800
million and seven In-country Contract Representatives (I-CORs)
providing on-the-ground administrative contract support.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Of the seven I-CORs, four are located in Kabul, one in Kunduz,
one in Jalalabad, and one in Kandahar. Christine Leming, Department of
State, e-mail message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority
Staff, May 3, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration is taking welcome steps to improve
oversight. We support initiatives such as USAID Forward, which
will incorporate more vigorous measurement and accountability
tools, streamline contracting rules, and fund smaller, local
agents of change.\59\ USAID has also established the
Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative (A3) to
ensure dollars are not being diverted from their purpose by
extortion or corruption. These and other steps, including
planned improvements to USAID's acquisition strategy and
support for third party monitoring and evaluation, will help
ensure proper use of U.S. taxpayer funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Administrator Rajiv Shah, Testimony before the Commission on
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington, DC, April 2,
2011, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-04-
01_testimony-Shah.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Embassy Kabul is working closely with Task Force 2010 and
Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)-Shafafiyat
(``Transparency'') to improve the quality of contractors and to
prevent contracts with Afghan contractors who are corrupt or
have ties to the insurgency. The United States is also working
with the Afghan Government to change the way security is
provided to our contractors. The military has ordered changes
in the way goods and services are procured. SIGAR and the USAID
Inspector General are investigating allegations of corruption
relating to U.S. funds and have successfully prosecuted cases
involving U.S. citizens.
More can still be done to reduce our reliance on
contractors and ensure proper oversight of prime and
subcontractors. For instance, as discussed below, more U.S.
funding could be channeled to national Afghan programs and
Afghan civil society organizations instead of large,
international contractors. The State Department and USAID
should take immediate steps to ensure sufficient staffing
levels and relevant professional expertise of contracting
officers before contracts are awarded, including steps to
recruit and train people with the proper financial oversight
backgrounds. Recommendations put forth by the bipartisan
Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan should also be implemented.\60\
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\60\ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
``At What Risk: Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency
Operations,'' Second Interim Report to Congress, February 24, 2011,
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-lowres.pdf.
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ON-BUDGET VERSUS OFF-BUDGET FUNDING
Most international donors, including the United States,
channel much of their aid ``off-budget,'' meaning it does not
go through the Afghan Government. Off-budget funding is
appealing because it provides more financial and programmatic
control to the donor, which is important in an environment
where there are significant concerns about weak government
capacity and corruption.
However, off-budget funding has significant downsides. It
can weaken the ability of the Afghan state to control
resources, which results in donor duplication, and can fuel
corruption. It has also led to the creation of thousands of
donor-driven projects without any plan for sustaining them,
including 16,000 CERP projects funded by the military at a cost
of over $2 billion.\61\ As USAID notes, there is a daily
tension between ``building capacity in the Afghan Government,
putting U.S. taxpayer money on-budget, and ensuring that urgent
[Afghan] government functions happen.'' \62\
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\61\ Josh Boak, ``U.S.-funded infrastructure deteriorates once
under Afghan Control, report says,'' Washington Post, January 4, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/03/
AR2011010302175.html?hpid=topnews.
\62\ See Appendix VII.
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Ultimately, the Afghan Government must be a genuine partner
for our assistance efforts to succeed. It cannot be held
accountable for processes over which it has little to no
control. Thus, the U.S. Government is working to meet its Kabul
Conference commitment to fund up to 50 percent of our aid ``on-
budget'' by FY 2012 from approximately 21 percent in FY 2009,
35 percent in FY 2010, and 37-45 percent in FY 2011. \63\
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\63\ Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011,
Nos. 13 and 14. According to USAID, ``we currently spend approximately
38 percent of our funds on-budget.'' For more information, see:
Appendix VII.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the London and Kabul conference communiques,
delivering aid through the Afghan Government is ``conditioned
on the Government's progress in further strengthening public
financial management systems, reducing corruption, improving
budget execution, developing a financial strategy and
Government capacity towards the goal.'' \64\
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\64\ Tim Cox, ``Review of USAID/Afghanistan's Ministerial
Assessment Process,'' Review Report No. F-306-11-001-S, November 6,
2010, p. 2, http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy11rpts/f-306-11-001-
s.pdf.
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For instance, the Afghan Government committed at the Kabul
Conference to pass an improved Audit Law as part of its effort
to improve public financial management. This is also an
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) benchmark. Yet the
U.S. Treasury Department and many at Embassy Kabul believe that
the Audit Law passed by the government is insufficient and does
not meet the Afghan obligation under the ARTF benchmark.
Failure to meet the benchmark would mean that for the first
time, a certain amount of funds--approximately $17 million--
would not be disbursed to the Afghan Government, sending a
signal that these commitments matter.\65\ However, the U.S.
Government's current position is to accept the deficient Audit
Law, despite strong internal opposition, in order to avoid a
confrontation with the Afghan Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ The ARTF is comprised of two ``windows'': 1) a recurrent
window that covers the costs of the government for operations,
maintenance, and salaries for teachers, health workers, and civilian
staff in the ministries and provinces, and 2) an investment window that
supports government capacity-building projects and technical
assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States has committed to funding more aid
directly through the Afghan Government, but stronger measures
must first be taken to ensure greater accountability of our
funds.
Most of USAID's on-budget aid--an estimated $2.08 billion--
is provided through the ARTF, a multidonor trust fund
administered by the World Bank.\66\ ARTF is a valuable
instrument through which the United States can disburse its
aid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No.
16.
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But ARTF has its own challenges. It requires some
structural changes to improve absorptive capacity and ensure
adequate field oversight. Today, World Bank supervision is
constrained by the Bank's limit of 100 personnel in-country,
who are expected to oversee 46 small programs.\67\ Donors
should push for more robust supervision from the World Bank.
Additionally, donors should consider using the ARTF for a
smaller number, i.e., 5 to 7, of big ``national programs'' like
the National Solidarity Program (NSP) to improve focus and
oversight instead of dozens of smaller programs. Finally, since
ARTF is World Bank-administered, USAID does not have authority
to audit the ARTF and its programs directly. But the United
States could argue for more rigorous application of the metrics
and benchmarks of the ARTF performance fund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Scott Guggenheim, email message to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Majority Staff, April 18, 2011.
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Aside from ARTF, the U.S. Government also delivers money
on-budget through Afghan ministries. To date, $307 million has
been transferred directly to Afghan ministries.\68\ USAID
expects to deliver at least $509.4 million through Afghan
ministries after having completed assessments to determine
which ministries can manage USAID funds. Currently, 14
ministries and agencies receive direct assistance from the
State Department and USAID.\69\
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\68\ Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No.
18.
\69\ Ministry of Finance ($30 million), Ministry of Communications
and Information Technology ($1 million), Ministry of Public Health
($236.5 million), USAID Salary Sup Special Posts ($2 million), Ministry
of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, Independent Directorate of
Local Governance ($85 million), Ministry of Finance and World Bank
($2,079.5 million), Ministry of Education ($25 million through Danish
Development Agency), Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation ($6
million), Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Ministry of Women's Affairs,
Ministry of Justice, Attorney General's Office, and Ministry of
Interior. For more information, see: Response to Questions for the
Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by
Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, Nos. 15 and 16.
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The administration's assessment of these ministries for
specific projects has also run into challenges. As of September
2010, USAID had performed assessments of six ministries,\70\
but USAID's Inspector General found that they ``did not provide
reasonable assurance of detecting significant vulnerabilities''
that could result in the waste or misuse of U.S. Government
resources.\71\ USAID and the State Department do not follow the
same standard assessment process. SIGAR has also expressed
concern that ``the United States and other donors do not have a
process in place to assess whether Afghan institutions have the
capacity to manage and account for donor funds.'' \72\
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\70\ Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD),
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of
Education, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology,
Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Public Health. For more
information, see: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March
2, 2011, Nos. 18 and 19.
\71\ Tim Cox, ``Review of USAID/Afghanistan's Ministerial
Assessment Process,'' Review Report No. F-306-11-001-S, November 6,
2010, p. 4, http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy11rpts/f-306-11-001-
s.pdf.
\72\ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, p.
10, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lores/SIGAR4Q--
2010Book.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Embassy Kabul has taken some action to change the
assessment process of ministries to ensure proper safeguards of
U.S. funds. More must be done. The U.S. Treasury Department,
which has expertise in budgetary assessments and oversight,
could assist with assessments in conjunction with the World
Bank to ensure that our standards are harmonized with other
donors. Increasing on-budget funding should be conditioned on
the Afghan Government's success in meeting its Kabul Conference
commitments. The Afghan Government must comply with
International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements to resolve the
Kabul Bank crisis. Finally, the FY 2010 Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2010 requires the Secretary of State to
certify that progress has been made in the areas of fighting
corruption and improving governance before Economic Support
funds and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) funds can be disbursed.\73\
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\73\ U.S. Congress. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010. 111th
Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 4899, Section 1004, subsection c(1).
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Measurable progress on the part of the Afghan Government in
these areas will demonstrate that it is committed to improving
public financial management and able to protect money from
fraud and abuse. Steps must also be taken to simplify the
Afghan Government's public financial control systems, which are
too complicated and limit disbursement rates.
CAPACITY BUILDING USING TECHNICAL ADVISORS
Ultimately, success will depend on the ability of the
Afghan Government to provide basic services and security in a
transparent, accountable, and effective manner. The United
States should focus its assistance on the core state functions
that are necessary for success. Donors will not be able to keep
paying for the costs of running the Afghan Government
indefinitely.
Given this reality, the U.S. strategy is focused on
building the capacity of Afghan institutions to deliver basic
services. But our overreliance on international technical
advisors to build Afghan capacity may undermine these efforts.
According to Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan's former Finance
Minister and current Presidential advisor, in 2001 Afghanistan
had approximately 240,000 civil servants, including doctors and
teachers.\74\ The international aid effort, with its inflated
salaries, may have chipped away at this elementary form of
governmental capacity. Instead of investing in vocational and
higher education that would have given Afghans the skills to
run their country, donors hired technical advisors to do these
jobs at roughly 10 times the cost.\75\
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\74\ According to Dr. Ashraf Ghani, as reported in The Times,
``When we started in 2001 we had 240,000 civil servants willing to work
for a government salary of 25 a month. By 2004 all the
talented ones had left to become drivers for the UN, the World Bank or
charities.'' Christina Lamb, ``Afghans Plead for 25bn in
Aid as Disorder Grows,'' The Times, June 8, 2008, http://
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4087300.ece.
\75\ Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness, email
message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, April 24,
2011.
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For instance, in the last fiscal year, the Afghan Ministry
of Education's entire budget for vocational and higher
education was only $35 million.\76\ In contrast, the State
Department and USAID are currently spending approximately $1.25
billion on capacity-building efforts.\77\ A significant portion
is spent on technical advisors. The United States is currently
funding approximately 260 civilian advisors, according to
senior Embassy officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ The figure of $1.25 billion includes USAID estimated costs on
capacity building in Afghanistan (see Appendix IV) and INL current task
order year spending on capacity-building projects in Afghanistan (see
Appendix V). USAID's $1.1 billion capacity-building projects include
$219 million to assist the Civil Service Institute to build the
capacity of line ministry employees; $102 million to create effective
municipal governance; $94 million to improve teacher performance and
build capacity within the Ministry of Education; $92 million to develop
economic and regulatory policy and support the private sector; $84
million to build the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health; and $41
million to develop the institutional capacity of the National Assembly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical advisors work with an organization for a limited
time to generate institutional capacity, train Afghans to
perform effectively, and enable them to teach their own
successors. Their work can be critical in such areas as fiscal
policy and pension reform, where highly specialized technical
assistance is needed. There are a number of cases where
technical advisors have made a positive impact in Afghanistan.
But there can be substantial downsides. Technical advisors
are expensive--each one can cost between $500,000 and $1
million annually.\78\ They can be difficult to supervise, given
the shortage of qualified contracting personnel. They may fail
to report evidence of corruption or wrongdoing, believing their
allegiance is to the Afghan ministry rather than the U.S.
Government. They may do the job of Afghans themselves or impose
their own vision on the institution rather than train the
Afghan staff or advise the Afghan minister. Or they may
introduce unsustainable high-tech methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness, email
message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, April 24,
2011.
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Once they are trained, Afghans may leave their ministry to
take a job for inflated wages with international firms or
missions, resulting in brain drain from Afghan institutions.
The Afghan Government finds it nearly impossible to retain
competent workers when foreign governments, aid agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and private companies offer them
inflated salaries and benefits (``top-up salaries'')--sometimes
10 to 20 times the amount of base government salaries--to
perform jobs within Afghan Government institutions.
For instance, wage levels for Afghan Government staff such
as teachers, health workers, and administrative staff are in
the realm of $50 to $100 per month, but drivers, assistants,
and translators for aid projects are paid upward of $1,000 per
month.\79\ According to a State Department official, 40 Afghans
working in professional positions within the government
received between $3,000 and $5,000 per month in salary
supplements from the U.S. Government, although this particular
program ended in March 2011.\80\ Many of these donor-supported
positions are not even authorized in the government's staffing
charts.\81\ These practices undermine the goal of generating
long-term Afghan capacity and are unsustainable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Ibid.
\80\ Conversation with senior Embassy Kabul officials, April 2011.
\81\ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, p.
11, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lores/SIGAR4Q--
2010Book.pdf. ``Since 2002, the United States and other international
donors have paid the salaries of thousands of civilian government
employees and technical advisors to help build the capacity of the
GIRoA. Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance estimated that 17 donors were
paying more than $45 million a year in salary support for 6,600
civilian employees and advisors. This support is separate from the
money provided by the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The ARTF
pays for much of Afghanistan's regular civil service through its
contribution to Afghanistan's operating budget. Since 2002, the United
States has provided nearly $922 million to the ARTF. The United States
pledged $590 million for 2010 and has contributed $215 million of this
amount to date.'' Ibid., p. 10.
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In order for technical advisors to play a constructive
role, they must be monitored effectively. But our overreliance
on them and minimal oversight has proved costly and made it
harder for them to do their jobs. The administration should
consider other options. For example, the Scott Family Liberia
Fellows program recruits young professionals, including
qualified Liberians, to support the Government of Liberia at a
fraction of the cost.\82\ Too often, our aid programs assume
that building capacity can only be done through hiring
international experts to provide technical assistance. The
Scott Family Fellows program suggests an alternative model from
which to draw best practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ ``The Scott Family Fellows program aims to recruit young
professionals to support the Government of Liberia as it recovers from
14 years of brutal civil war. These young professionals fill a huge
capacity gap and work in Liberia as ``special assistants'' to senior
Liberian government officials, primarily Cabinet members. They
typically have a Masters degree and one or two years of relevant
experience. The program puts a special emphasis on encouraging
qualified Liberians to apply. The Fellows work long hours in a range of
activities from mundane administrative tasks to more profound policy
issues, all with the goal of helping Liberia in its urgent
reconstruction and development efforts. The Scott Family Fellows
program is funded by a generous $1,000,000 grant from the family of
Edward W. Scott, Jr. When announcing the program in February 2007,
Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said, `This is just the kind
of support we need from our friends. I am very grateful to Ed Scott and
his family for their generous support.' Since its inception, the
program has expanded to include other fellows funded by Humanity
United, the McCall MacBain Foundation, the Open Society Institute and
the Nike Foundation.'' Scott Family Liberia Fellows, Center for Global
Development, Initiatives, accessed April 19, 2011, http://
www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/--active/scottfellows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Embassy Kabul is addressing these issues. For instance, the
Embassy now meets with technical advisors twice a month to
monitor their work and ensure proper oversight. The Embassy
should also examine the efficacy of its technical advisors and
limit their use where they are not making progress.
Perhaps the most important step the U.S. Government can
take in conjunction with the Afghan Government and other donors
is to standardize Afghan salaries and work within Afghan
Government staffing constraints. This single step would have a
significant and lasting effect on improving the capacity of the
Afghan Government. Until this problem is resolved, programs
such as the Afghan Civil Service Support program, which is an
$84 million USAID program to train 4,000 civil servants in
Kabul and 12,000 more in all 34 provinces, may have limited
impact in building Afghanistan's civil service.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Embassy of the United States, Kabul, Afghanistan,
``Afghanistan Civil Service Commission and U.S. Government Sign
Memorandum of Understanding to Begin Civil Service Support Program,''
February 22, 2010, http://kabul.usembassy.gov/pre--2202.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSITIONING TO AFGHAN OWNERSHIP
Increasing and improving on-budget funding, paring back the
number of technical advisors, and standardizing salaries are
important first steps for strengthening the capacity of the
Afghan Government. But ultimately, Afghans have to be able to
absorb donor programs. The United States must focus its
assistance programs on Afghan ownership and sustainability,
especially as we prepare for the 2014 transition.
Too often, this is not the case. For example, in the past 5
years, the State Department has spent approximately $2 billion
on counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan, including $60
million since 2007 to support two counternarcotics compounds
near the Kabul airport \84\ and in Kunduz province. While it is
a U.S. objective to transfer responsibilities and ownership of
these compounds from the United States to Afghanistan, the
State Department's Inspector General found the Department still
``has not addressed how and when the Afghan Government will be
able to assume control and sustain day-to-day operations.''
\85\
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\84\ The Kabul compound is home to two specialized Afghan
counternarcotics units-the National Interdiction Unit and the
Specialized Investigative Unit-and is designed to support up to 400
Afghan counternarcotics agents to work, train, and live while on duty.
For more information, see: Department of State, Office of Inspector
General, ``Performance Evaluation of PAE Operations and Maintenance
Support for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs' Counternarcotics Compounds in Afghanistan,'' Report Number
MERO-I-11-02, February 2011, p. 7, http://oig.state.gov/documents/
organization/157927.pdf.
\85\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In other instances, we have transferred programs to Afghan
control even when the capacity does not yet exist. For example,
despite a request from Afghanistan's Ministry of Education
(MoE) for a longer extension, USAID is granting a no-cost, 3-
month extension for a successful 5-year program that expands
access to primary education classes for more than 84,000
children, over 63 percent of which are girls. The $31 million
program, called the Partnership for Advancing Community-Based
Education (PACE-A), involves four prominent international
NGOs--CARE International, Catholic Relief Services,
International Rescue Committee, and the Aga Khan Foundation--
who have experience providing education in areas not served by
the MoE.
To support the sustainability of these efforts, the NGOs
work closely with the MoE to integrate classes into the formal
education system and strengthen the MoE's ability to assume
responsibility for these classes.\86\ Turning this program over
to the MoE prematurely could end access to education for many
students, particularly girls, and jeopardize the relationships
built in these communities with village mullahs that defied the
Taliban to allow their girls to attend school.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ According to one of PACE-A's implementing partners,
approximately 51 percent of the schools in the entire consortium
project have been integrated into the Ministry of Education, a process
that usually takes three years.
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FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY FOR THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
Strengthening the capacity of the Afghan Government to
undertake basic government functions is important, but it will
require fiscal sustainability to succeed. According to the
World Bank, an estimated 97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP is
derived from spending related to the international military and
donor community presence. A precipitous withdrawal of
international support, in the absence of reliable domestic
revenue and a functioning market-based economy, could trigger a
major economic recession.\87\ USAID and the State Department
recognize these challenges and their current planning is
``anticipating both the impact of the U.S. troop withdrawal on
the Afghan economy, and on U.S. civilian resources.'' \88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Dr. Ashraf Ghani, ``Preparing for Transition: A Policy Note on
Development,'' policy memo sent to Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Majority Staff, May 12, 2011.
\88\ See Appendix VII.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At present, donors are picking up most of the costs of
running the Afghan Government. Scott Guggenheim, formerly with
the World Bank, has noted that domestic revenues only cover
one-fifth of public spending and two-thirds of public spending
is off-budget, which means that donors pay for most development
services.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ The World Bank notes that domestic revenue collection in
Afghanistan reached $1.65 billion in 2010/2011, double the 2007/2008
rate as a result of significant efforts by the Ministry of Finance.
Afghanistan's core budget in this period, a combination of domestic
revenue and off-budget expenditures, was $4.6 billion. Its external
budget, comprised of donor-financed off-budget expenditures, was
reported by the Ministry of Finance to be $6 billion, though the actual
amount may be as high as $16 billion. For more information, see:
Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Achieving fiscal sustainability will require the Afghan
Government to (1) substitute donor grants for the operating and
development budget; (2) assume external budget obligations on
the operating budget; (3) pay for a share of technical
assistance for core civil service functions; (4) fund the Kabul
process; and (5) invest in operations and maintenance for
acquired assets. Transition planning should find the right
balance between avoiding a sudden dropoff in aid, which could
trigger a major economic recession, and a long-term phaseout
from current donor levels.
These are daunting tasks. Analysts estimate that it could
cost between $6 and $8 billion a year alone to sustain the
Afghan National Security Forces, depending on the final size of
the force. Without significant domestic revenue generation, the
Afghan state will not be self-sufficient for decades and
donors, particularly the United States, will have to bear the
costs. With the right planning, Afghanistan may be able to
generate substantial revenues from its sizeable mineral
deposits in the future, but we do not see any signs of near-
term revenue generation from its mineral wealth.
In the short term, it will be critical to build the private
sector and attract foreign investment. Our aid programs should
be designed with foreign capital in mind. Our capacity-building
efforts should focus on key ministries and institutions that
must work for the Afghan Government to deliver rather than an
across-the-board approach to strengthen all ministries. Instead
of creating additional off-budget assets like schools, clinics,
and roads, our attention must turn to how the Afghan Government
will sustain and staff what the donor community has already
built.
Case Studies
CASE STUDY A: SUCCESS OF NATIONAL PROGRAMS WITH LOCAL BUY-IN--THE
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM AND BASIC PACKAGE OF HEALTH SERVICES
The National Solidarity Program and Basic Package of
Health Services illustrate how national-level programs
that are on-budget and have significant Afghan buy-in
can achieve more with less. These programs exemplify
the goals of being ``necessary, achievable, and
sustainable.''
Imposing governance from the center has never been
effective in Afghanistan.\90\ According to anthropologist
Thomas Barfield:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Thomas Barfield and Neamatollah Nojumi, ``Bringing More
Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability,'' Middle
East Policy 17 (December, 2010): 40-52.
While governments in the developed world are the
unquestioned suppliers of governance to their local
communities, this has not been the case historically in
Afghanistan. Here one finds adequate local governance
in the absence of formal government institutions . . .
Successful regimes in Afghanistan have recognized this
reality by devolving considerable informal
decisionmaking power to local communities, letting them
solve their own problems so that the state does not
have to intervene. In return, local communities have
recognized the sovereignty of the Afghan national state
and have not challenged its legitimacy.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Ibid., p. 40.
As Barfield's analysis suggests, our goal should be to
strengthen local traditions of governance even as we work to
develop the central institutions of the Afghan state.
Assistance programs that are successful in Afghanistan involve
strong participation and ownership from local communities. As
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Karzai noted at the Kabul conference:
Despite some noteworthy achievements, we have learned
together that delivering our resources through hundreds
of isolated projects will not generate the desired
results, achieve public visibility, or support the
establishment of good governance. It is time to
concentrate our efforts on a limited number of national
programs and projects to transform the lives of our
people, reinforce the social compact between state and
citizens, and create mechanisms of mutual
accountability between the state and our international
partners.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Statement by President Karzai at International Kabul
Conference, July 20, 2010.
The best example of this is the National Solidarity Program
(NSP), which is the Afghan Government's principal community
development program. The United States is the largest NSP
donor, giving $528 million from June 2002 to September 2010,
including $225 million from FY 2010 funds through the ARTF.\93\
NSP promotes subnational governance by setting up community
development councils (CDCs) and training them to manage small-
scale projects funded by block grants. The program currently
reaches 23,000 villages, covering 351 of Afghanistan's 398
districts in all 34 provinces.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, ``Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program Has Reached
Thousands of Afghan Communities, but Faces Challenges that Could Limit
Outcomes,'' March 22, 2011, pp. ii and 5, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
audits/SIGARAudit-11-8.pdf.
\94\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Guggenheim, who largely designed the program,
NSP works because the government apex role is strong but
simple, execution is outsourced to the communities,
disbursements are transparent, standardized, and streamlined,
and there is strong monitoring and evaluation with expatriate
help. SIGAR's recent audit of NSP found strong community
oversight of NSP funds:
The high level of community involvement in NSP
activities--CDC elections, social audits, and community
contributions--has resulted in a degree of local
ownership of NSP-funded projects which helps safeguard
assets. Facilitating partners reported that, in some
cases, community members intervened and recovered money
when block grant funds were stolen by thieves or
embezzled by CDC members. According to one facilitating
partner, the Taliban are less likely to burn NSP
schools because communities defend them.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Ibid., p. 13.
While NSP is one of the best development programs in
Afghanistan, it too can be improved. Currently, unpredictable
donor contributions block strategic planning and communities
only receive one-time bloc grants, despite having created
significant community social infrastructure that could be used
to further ongoing governance and development programs.
Ensuring consistency in funding will be critical as NSP expands
into less permissive areas. NSP could become a key pillar of
transition because it can provide villages with a tangible
dividend from peace.
The United States could also work with the Government of
Afghanistan to improve oversight and internal controls,
strengthen reporting mechanisms on local governance, and ensure
that block grants and payments to facilitating partners are
disbursed in a timely fashion.\96\ By opening its transport
system to senior Afghan staff, the United States could
facilitate monitoring and oversight of NSP disbursements. There
are a number of national programs that were initially designed
for Afghanistan in addition to NSP that could work well with
donor support.
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\96\ Ibid., p. 13.
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Another successful model of delivering assistance in
Afghanistan is the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS).\97\
Established in 2003, BPHS provides a standardized package of
basic services, including maternal and newborn health, child
health, and public nutrition, at the four primary health care
facilities within the Afghan health system: health posts at the
community level, basic health centers, comprehensive health
centers, and district hospitals.
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\97\ According to USAID, the Ministry of Public Health was ``the
first Afghan ministry certified in 2009 to receive $239 million in
direct funding from the U.S. government to implement the BPHS in 13
provinces,'' including Badakhshan, Baghlan, Bamyan, Faryab, Ghazni,
Hirat, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Paktya, Paktika, and Takhar.
For more information, see: U.S. Agency for International Development,
``Fact Sheet: Health Service Delivery Grant - Partnership Contracts for
Health (PCH),'' July 2010.
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BPHS has proved a remarkable success, given the state of
health care 8 years ago. It has helped unify Afghanistan's
health system; improved coordination among the Afghan
Government, donors, and NGOs; and dramatically increased the
percentage of the population with access to primary health
care. National coverage rates have risen from an estimated 9
percent in 2003 to 85 percent in 2008 and under-5 mortality
rates have dropped by 26 percent since 2002.\98\ Between FY
2002 and FY 2010, the United States provided roughly $798
million in health assistance to Afghanistan.
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\98\ ``Building on Basics in Health Care,'' The World Bank, Last
updated June 2009, http://web.worldbank.org.
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With the right investments and leadership within the
Ministry of Education, the BPHS model could be extended to the
area of education. While the United States has dedicated
considerable resources to support basic and higher education,
teacher trainings, and textbooks for primary schools in
Afghanistan, international donor efforts in the education
sector are piecemeal and not coordinated for maximum
effect.\99\ According to one U.S. official:
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\99\ Between FY2002-2010, the United States spent an estimated $672
million on education assistance in Afghanistan.
The Afghan Government is constantly outraged by the
fact that they see the Germans build a school here, the
French supply schoolbooks there, and the Belgians do a
teacher meeting at a third location, which means you
have three separate projects that fail, rather than one
project that would succeed if, indeed, you knew about
them and were able to steer them to work together.
\100\
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\100\ Center for Complex Operations official, relaying comment made
by a PRT member in Afghanistan, April 2011.
CASE STUDY B: ISSUES OF SUSTAINABILITY--THE PERFORMANCE-BASED GOVERNORS
FUND
The Performance-Based Governors Fund illustrates how
the design of our aid programs impacts the outcome.
While it may be ``necessary'' in its second phase, the
program in its current design may not be ``achievable''
or ``sustainable.''
The Performance-Based Governors Fund is a program run by
the Asia Foundation that aims to empower provincial governors
by providing them with operational budgets to improve their
relationships with constituents and their overall management
capacity. Most provincial governors receive relatively few
resources from the federal government and lack capacity to
execute their modest budgets.
In the first phase, the program gave each governor $25,000
per month to spend on specified administrative expenses and a
financial advisor to help identify budget priorities, make
expenditures, and account for them. The goal was to teach
governors how to execute budgets. Funds could be used for (1)
vehicles, utilities, furniture, and equipment; (2) travel and
transportation; (3) maintenance and repair of public
facilities; (4) computer, information technology, and
communications; (5) capacity building; and (6) community
outreach.
Development experts criticized the design of the program
because it had no impact on the governor's actual performance.
Every governor, even those known to be corrupt, received the
funds.
To address these concerns, the second phase of the program
has been expanded to include incentives to improve governance.
The program now has a mechanism that can increase or reduce the
monthly amount based on the governor's performance. It also
added a development component: a well-performing governor can
receive an additional $75,000 per month to spend on local
development projects determined in consultation with provincial
councils and other local groups.
Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. USAID has yet
to bring the program fully on-budget in part as a result of
concerns expressed by the Government of Afghanistan that it
lacked the capacity to implement the program effectively at the
central and provincial levels. Off-budget funding of the
program renders it susceptible to the problems noted earlier.
In addition, the Ministry of Finance has a budget execution
rate of approximately 35 percent, which means that donor funds
are replacing national government funds that are available but
not reaching the provincial level. Oversight will be difficult
since field audits are limited. USAID and its implementing
partner may not have enough supervisory personnel to ensure
that funds are properly spent and accounted for.
Absorptive capacity is another concern. In some provinces,
the governors have the capacity to allocate a $1.2 million
annual budget. However, in less-developed provinces, this
amount represents a tidal wave of funding that could hamper the
ability of local officials to spend the money wisely. Excess
funding could lead to corruption and waste. Finally, the
program is not sustainable unless concrete steps are taken to
build the capacity of the Afghan Government to execute the
program and include it within its budget. Currently, the
Independent Directorate of Local Governance does not have the
capacity to run this program.
In sum, the program in its current form may not be
achievable or sustainable. USAID should only go forward with
the program if it can eventually be put on-budget, reduce
funding in provinces where absorptive capacity is low, and
ensure sufficient oversight. As donor funding declines for this
program in outlying years, steps must be taken to replace these
funds with domestic resources. We look forward to working with
USAID as it explores options to bring the program on-budget
over the next 18 months.
Recommendations
We urge the administration to focus its assistance strategy
on what is necessary, achievable, and sustainable. Below are
the three overarching steps that would help lay the foundation
for more successful development outcomes in Afghanistan.
1) Consider authorizing a multiyear civilian assistance
strategy for Afghanistan. The administration and
Congress should consider working together on a
multiyear authorization that includes: (a) a clearly
defined assistance strategy; (b) the tools,
instruments, and authorities required for a successful
development approach; (c) a plan as to how U.S. funding
will leverage and partner with Afghan domestic
policies, with multilateral efforts--including the
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Islamic
Development Bank--and with private sector financing;
(d) the civilian resources needed for a successful
military draw down and transition; (e) the steps needed
to ensure accountability, oversight, and effectiveness;
and (f) metrics that measure performance and capture
outcomes. The strategy should also establish benchmarks
for the Afghan Government to fulfill its international
commitments, outline goals for improving donor
coordination, and include specific annual funding
levels. This process would clarify the U.S. assistance
strategy, offer greater predictability on future
funding levels, and provide Congress with robust tools
for oversight.
2) Reevaluate the performance of stabilization programs in
conflict zones. We must challenge the assumption that
our stabilization programs in their current form
necessarily contribute to stability. The administration
should continue to assess the impact of our
stabilization programs in Afghanistan and reallocate
funds, as necessary.
3) Focus on sustainability. We should follow a simple rule:
Donors should not implement projects if Afghans cannot
sustain them. Development in Afghanistan will only
succeed if Afghans are legitimate partners and there is
a path toward sustainability. The Afghan Government
must have sufficient technical capability and funding
to cover operation and maintenance costs after a
project is completed. A sustainability strategy would
consolidate our programs, increase on-budget aid,
streamline our rules and controls, and pursue a limited
number of high-impact programs that do not require
complex procurement or infrastructure. We should also
focus on raising domestic revenue, reducing aid
dependency, and developing partnerships with the
private sector to create jobs. Success should not be
measured by outputs or the amount of money spent, but
by the ability of Afghan institutions to deliver
services, the Afghan private sector to generate jobs
and grow the economy, and Afghan civil society and
public institutions to provide avenues for citizens to
hold their government accountable and participate in
political and civic life. More thought should be given
to the type of projects we fund. Our aid should be
visible among Afghans, and we should have a robust
communications strategy in place so Afghans know what
U.S. civilian aid in Afghanistan is accomplishing.
Annex--Academic Literature Review: Development and Counterinsurgency
----------
There is a bourgeoning literature on development and
counterinsurgency (COIN). Recent work on the development-COIN
nexus has modeled insurgencies as competitive governance
systems that seek to capture the support of the local
population. In a competitive governance environment, civilians
will condition their support for the government on sustainable
and transparent service provision. To that end, various
scholars have recommended building Afghan Government capacity
to provide services at the local and provincial levels through
small, community-based projects that are informed by local
needs. Development resources can be violence-reducing and
prompt defection within the insurgent's ranks,\101\ but only
under certain conditions:
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\101\ On the vulnerability of certain violence-producing groups to
government service provision, see: Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and
Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009.
Knowledge of community needs: Counterinsurgent forces
should be dispersed, less mechanized,\102\ and should
interact closely with local political leaders to gain
information about community needs. Knowledge of local
needs, as opposed to the size of one's forces, can
enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of service
provision. For instance, Berman, Shapiro, and Felter
find that small-scale reconstruction spending allocated
through CERP reduced violence in post-surge Iraq when
operational changes in U.S. strategy encouraged greater
contact and engagement with the local community.\103\
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\102\ Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, ``Rage against the
Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,''
International Organization 63 (2009): 67-106.
\103\ Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, ``Can
Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in
Iraq,'' NBER WP #14606, March 2009, Last revised: April 2011, http://
igcc.ucsd.edu/DACOR.
Small projects in secure areas: Small grants implemented
through community-based mechanisms in secure areas
stand a greater chance of success than large, big-
ticket infrastructure projects. One working study,
which uses a randomized field experiment spanning 500
villages across 10 Afghan districts, finds that NSP has
led to ``a significant improvement in villagers'
perception of their economic well-being as well as in
their attitudes toward all levels of government.''
\104\
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\104\ The authors ``find some evidence that the program [NSP]
improved perceptions of the security situation, but do not find any
effects on the actual occurrence of security incidents in and around
villages.'' Andrew Beath, Fontini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov,
``Winning Hearts and Minds?'' Evidence from a Field Experiment in
Afghanistan,'' Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Working Paper,
Last revised: April 11, 2011, http://www.nsp-ie.org/papers/hearts.pdf.
Employment and Counterinsurgency: Providing legitimate
employment opportunities may increase popular support
for the government, but only under certain conditions.
Collier and Hoeffler argue that improved economic
opportunities can increase the cost of insurgent
recruitment and diminish potential rebel supply.\105\
Berman, Callen, Felter, and Shapiro, however, find a
negative correlation between unemployment and insurgent
violence in Iraq, the Philippines, and
Afghanistan.\106\ They posit that higher unemployment
rates lower the price of obtaining information from the
population about the insurgent's whereabouts and result
from certain COIN tactics such as establishing security
checkpoints that disrupt legitimate commerce. While the
literature remains inconclusive, it suggests that we
should pay careful attention to the conditions of each
sector, resource endowments, local perceptions, and
levels of income inequality at both the national and
subnational levels when designing programs to improve
labor market opportunities for communities in conflict
areas.
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\105\ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ``Greed and Grievance in
Civil Wars.'' Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004): 563-95.
\106\ Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N.
Shapiro, ``Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines,'' Journal of Conflict
Resolution, published online March 22, 2011, http://jcr.sagepub.com/
content/early/2011/03/16/0022002710393920.full.pdf+html.
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A P P E N D I X E S
APPENDIX II: USAID Funding by Province
in Afghanistan, FY 2009-2010
Source: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John
Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 21.
APPENDIX III: USAID Funding by Province
in Afghanistan, FY 2011
Source: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John
Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 22.
APPENDIX IV: USAID/Afghanistan: Capacity Development Programs with
GIRoA
Source: Response from State Department to SFRC majority
staff, February 9, 2011.
APPENDIX V: Capacity Building Programs in
Afghanistan--INCLE
The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), through the International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, provides capacity building to
Afghanistan ministries focused on the provision of internal security,
rule of law, and enforcement of Afghanistan's illicit narcotics laws.
INL's capacity building programs in Afghanistan help build the
organizational and human capacity of Afghan Government Ministries to
effectively and independently fulfill their core functions.
INCLE funds the following capacity building programs:
Justice Sector Support Program ($64 million for current task order
year May 2010-May 2011): Launched in 2005, the Justice Sector
Support Program (JSSP) is the primary capacity building vehicle
of INL's criminal justice assistance through training,
mentoring, and technical support. JSSP supports capacity
building efforts within the following Ministries: the Ministry
of Justice (MOJ) and Attorney General's Office (AGO) and, to a
lesser degree, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Ministry of
Women's Affairs, and the Supreme Court. Through the creation of
close partnerships between JSSP advisors and Afghan Government
officials, the program's main goal is to help create
sustainable improvements in the Afghan Government's delivery of
justice to the Afghan people. In terms of nationwide reach,
JSSP is the largest justice assistance program in Afghanistan
today, with 93 Afghan legal experts, 65 American advisors, and
over 100 Afghan support staff.
Corrections System Support Program ($63 million for current task
order year May 2010-May 2011): Launched in 2006, INL's
Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) partners with the
Afghan Ministry of Justice's (MOJ) Central Prison Directorate
(CPD) to build a safe, secure, and humane prison system that
meets international standards and Afghan cultural requirements.
CSSP focuses on CPD headquarters capacity building, basic and
advanced nationwide training, infrastructure program
management, advising provincial prison leadership on secure and
humane corrections practices, and providing mentoring and
support at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center. CSSP currently
has 71 American corrections advisors and over 200 Afghan staff.
CSSP is based in Kabul and has seven regional teams located at
the RTCs in Balkh, Herat, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Bamiyan, and
Paktia and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
Kandahar.
Ministry of Counternarcotics Advisors ($800,000 for first program
year; $25 million planned): INL has provided the Ministry of
Counter Narcotics (MCN) with two advisors, an Executive Advisor
and a Capacity Building Advisor. These advisors provide advice
and support on MCN policies and programs and assess capacity
building requirements. To further advance the goal of building
MCN capacity, INL proposes a new, multi-year, $25 million
program to develop the MCN's human and bureaucratic capacity in
order to promote its independence and effectiveness. The MCN
capacity building program will provide expatriate and Afghan
advisors for the MCN's Kabul headquarters and provincial
offices as well as support for the Ministry's human resources,
information technology, commodities, logistics, and
engineering.
Ministry of Interior--Counternarcotics ($2.4 million for current
task order year): As part of its larger contract supporting
operations and facilities maintenance for the Counternarcotics
Police of Afghanistan's vetted units, which are mentored by
DEA, INL provides six additional advisors/mentors to the
National Interdiction Unit and the Sensitive Investigative
Unit. These individuals work to assist DEA in building the
capacity of the vetted units not just operationally, but also
in the areas of administration, logistics, and management.
Source: Response from State Department to SFRC majority staff,
February 9, 2011.
APPENDIX VI: Letter From Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides to
Chairman John F. Kerry on June 6, 2011
APPENDIX VII: Letter From USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah to Chairman
John F. Kerry on June 1, 2011